A CENTURY OF NATIVE LEADERSHIP

A CENTURY OF NATIVE LEADERSHIP: SHINGWAUKÖNSE AND HIS HEIRS

JANET ELIZABETH CHUTE

A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
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

To Laurie Connon, without whose kindness and patience this study would never have been begun, and to Fred Pine Sr., without whose interest and enthusiasm it would never have been finished.

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ABSTRACT

Two conflicting schools of thought have arisen regarding proto-Ojibwa society and leadership, as well as social-organizational changes which have taken place within Ojibwa bands during the historic era. Proponents of the first theoretical perspective hold that territorially-based clans and clan chiefs existed in the Upper Great Lakes region until social breakdown occurred as a consequence of indirect colonialism and the fur trade. A second view stresses the persistence among the Ojibwa of an ethos of egalitarianism characterized by conceptions of "power" and "control" distinct from Western notions of competitive, self-interested action. Both approaches are examined in the light of oral and historical evidence pertaining to the activities of the noted Ojibwa chief Shingwaukönse and his successors during the nineteenth century. The study concludes that Native leadership underwent substantial elaboration during the colonial period in response to external commercial, government, and missionary agencies, and yet remained sensitive to band goals and aspirations by maintaining a social environment conducive to the preservation of cherished Native values. The tradition of leadership established by Shingwaukönse survived into the twentieth century at Garden River, Ontario, since, with a fair degree of success, chiefs and band have continually sought to protect and develop potentialities inherent in traditional group prerogatives, including a specific interest in land and resources.

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PREFACE

The speeches of Shingwaukönse between 1846 and 1850 furnish some of the most explicit testimonials to the principle of Native right to be expressed in the United Canadas during the mid-nineteenth century. Shingwaukönse's ideas and actions set precedents which exerted a profound influence on the future course of Indian policy in Canada. The chief defined three major goals for Ojibwa peoples: first, to establish linkages with government agencies just beginning to exercise jurisdiction in the Upper Great Lakes area; second, to preserve an environment in which Native cultural values and organizational structures could survive; and finally, to devise new strategies conducive to the formation of band governments capable of assuming a degree of proprietorship over resources on Indian lands.

Shingwaukönse grounded his proposals on historical precedents familiar to him. Three years prior to the passing of the Royal Proclamation of 1763, which prohibited unregulated use of Indian lands west of the Alleghenies, colonial administrators had formally recognized the existence of Native territorial prerogatives in the vicinity of Sault Ste. Marie. By this time head chiefs had assumed complex roles as policy-makers and political negotiators. Many were wealthy, in terms of their potential to accumulate material assets, and during the height of conflicts between rival Western powers, gained additional prestige by acting as allies of the British Crown.

These leaders identified themselves by their <u>dodems</u>, or

designating marks. These acquired meaning in the colonial transactional forum from a syncretistic blend of European heraldic and indigenous religious symbolism. Head chiefs exercised regulatory and protective jurisdiction over lands used as hunting and fishing grounds flanking major water routes into the interior. With the growth of territorialism, fostered mainly by the availability of firearms and more efficient technology for local resource exploitation, a balance of power in the Upper Great Lakes area became mandatory. Elaboration occurred in systems of alliance and exchange, and in the religious sphere. Bands, integrated internally, as well as allied laterally over time with neighbouring groups by marriage, developed into influential political entities under the auspices of indirect colonialism and the fur trade.

When the era of intercolonial rivalries drew to a close, and conceptions of laissez faire economic liberalism bred new commercial policies, the old transactional system collapsed. The outbreak of the War of 1812, by temporarily reviving the value to the British of the Indians as military allies, merely delayed the broader trend towards the erosion of colonial institutions and their concomitant relational practices. Many western Ojibwa leaders, predicting the magnitude of threats to their independence inherent in the historical process, briefly supported a series of cult movements which encouraged violent resistance to the encroaching powers, and then sank into an attitude of passive defiance towards both British and American authority.

Shingwaukönse, by contrast, had been attentive to views on Native rights and the potential role of Indian peoples expressed by

independent traders, officials and missionaries whom he encountered on his widespread travels throughout Michigan and the Canadas. After much careful thought and preparation, and with the assistance of Allan Macdonell, a lawyer and mining explorer, the chief finally devised a plan in 1846 which he believed might grant the Ojibwa a measure of control over their future in the midst of a rapidly changing world. Yet, during negotiations in 1849, prior to the signing of the Robinson treaties which in 1850 conveyed the mineral and timber lands north of Lakes Huron and Superior to the British Crown, Alexander Vidal, a young and inexperienced Indian Commissioner, drew on vague American practices and precedents to relegate Indians to the status of mere "occupiers" of lands. Native peoples would henceforth be denied proprietary rights to resources other than fur. Vidal's position on Indian status, although legally encoded, was riddled with ambiguities. Such anomalies and contradictions became targets of attack for Ojibwa leaders, intent on breaking legal barriers by setting new precedents for Native relations to land and resources. Determined to succeed, Shingwaukönse's successors made some headway and, despite government policy, won the respect of local missionaries, merchants and government agents, several of whom actively supported Native goals.

In addressing the subject of Ojibwa leadership from the theoretical standpoint, this study employs information derived from ethnohistorical analyses of Shingwaukönse's career to assess a prevailing ethnographic contention that self-interested action came to characterize leadership among southwestern Ojibwa bands by the mid-nineteenth century. It is argued, however, that this position is appropriate mainly to western groups, defiantly resisting the encroachments of what had come to be regarded as a hostile, alien force. On the other hand, Ojibwa head chiefs

in the northeastern sector of the Upper Great Lakes region were actively seeking creative policies which might enable bands to preserve the reciprocity of interest and intention traditionally characterizing relations between leader and group. From this viewpoint, self-interested action may be seen to constitute a temporary anomaly, fostered by stressful circumstances. To support this proposition, this work examines from the historic perspective the nature of checks and balances operating at Garden River to render leadership accountable to band interests. Recent findings by Mary Black (1977a) demonstrate that Ojibwa views on power and power relationships differ substantially from modern Western conceptions of competitive self-interest. Black's conclusions provide a convenient point of departure for the following investigation of Shingwaukönse's career as leader, and of political, social and economic developments which have arisen principally as a legacy of this chief's actions and policies.

INTRODUCTION

Extensive documentation exists regarding the influence exercised for over fifty years within the Upper Great Lakes Native community by the noted Ojibwa chief Shingwaukönse (1773-1854) and subsequently by his successors, among whom were his sons Ogista (1800-1890), Buhkwujjenene (1811-1900) and George Menissino (1839-1923). While Shingwaukönse, whose name means "The Little Pine" (often shortened to "The Pine", although imbuing it with increased symbolic significance),[1] rose to prominence prior to the War of 1812, the majority of historical accounts relating to his activities date from between 1814 and 1914: the period chosen for this investigation, conducted within the context of a broader examination of Ojibwa leadership in general, of The Pine's ideas and achievements. The decades immediately following the close of the War of 1812 constitute an interesting era for the study of traditional modes of Ojibwa decision-making, since the Native peoples of the Lake Superior region, while affected by change, still lay beyond the westward thrust of agricultural settlement and industrialized resource development. Bands could maintain a degree of economic autonomy from vicissitudes experienced by the British fur trade during these years by continuing an uninterrupted seasonal round of activities involving hunting and fishing, horticulture, berry gathering and maple sugar production. After 1838, when Shingwaukönse and his followers came to reside permanently at Garden River, in what was then Upper Canada, affairs within their settlement grew increasingly marginal to the course of events which transformed

the fur trade and mission station at Sault Ste. Marie, ten kilometers westward, into an important industrial center. This semi-isolation facilitated the growth among band members of a strong sense of group identity centered about attachment to a policy devised by The Pine during the 1830's which shaped Native responses to external pressures for change by the nineteenth century.

This study endeavors to clarify how traditional concepts and values influenced decision-making by Native leaders confronted by challenges set by new and unfamiliar policies. It examines factors which demonstrate that continuity in value orientations persisted over time, while highlighting important modifications, departures from, and creative additions to the Indians' thought system, range of interests, and goals for the future. In early chapters historic evidence pertaining to Native leadership in the Upper Great Lakes area is reviewed in the light of anthropological theory concerning the flexibility of Ojibwa social organization (Rogers & Smith, 1973; Smith, 1973) and the nature of specific kin-based, social, political and economic attachments. Ways in which decision models and transactional analysis have been applied to the Subarctic Indian milieu (Feit, 1970, 1973; Morantz, 1977, 1982; Paine, 1971, 1977; Salisbury, 1976, 1979) have bearing on this discussion, yet the approach adopted focuses mainly on the relevance of two analytical viewpoints on Native interaction patterns. Both of these relate to the concept of what constitutes a "man" in terms of the moral code and value system of the Eastern Subarctic Indian. The usefulness of this theoretical orientation with regard to the Ojibwa of Lake Superior arises from the premise that important cultural commonalities exist for

Eastern Algonquian-speaking peoples as a whole (Hallowell, 1946).

The two perspectives are examined and their utility tested. The first of these, which until recently constituted the dominant view, regards the Ojibwa individual as self-centered, psychologically atomistic and concerned with the maximization of his own power and prestige in a covertly-expressed competitive behavioral milieu. The ascription of this personality orientation to the Ojibwa coincides with G. Foster's argument that there exists a concept of the "limited good" by which personal power and the material resources gained by such power are viewed as being in scarce supply (Foster, 1965).

An alternative stance has recently been developed for the Eastern Algonquian linguistic area. Instead of there being one culturally-transmitted code of interaction among individuals, relationships may exhibit a range of culturally-structured variants depending on situational context. Relations may be coercive, but this is not usual. Richard Preston (1975a, 1975c, 1979) maintains that the competitive, self-assertive individual among the Eastern Cree is best considered an anomaly. The Cree in their concept of what constitutes a "man" focus far more on the development of self-reliance and personal competence. Competence manifests itself, according to Cree standards, within the religious, social, economic and political spheres of action. Similarly Adrian Tanner (1979) argues that among the Mistassini Cree, stresses emerging in the domain of interaction and characterized by a certain degree of ambiguity and competition are reduced through adherence to structured behavioral forms and semi-ritualized action.

Mary Black (1977a) avoids any need to reconcile the seeming

incompatibility of these perspectives on the Eastern Algonquians by proposing that a concept of individual "power-control" exists among the Ojibwa which is inseparable from the notion of personal responsibility. She emphasizes that the individual is not only a power-holder but in certain instances also a provider of services, especially in the religious sphere, whose competence resides in acting properly in a moral sense towards "those he is responsible for". Black's work is of crucial importance to the theoretical and methodological orientation adopted within the context of this study, and for this reason her premises are given special consideration in this introduction.

While previous studies have focused on the response of Native leadership and group composition to the fur trade (Leacock, 1954) and to the effects of game depletion (Hickerson, 1962; Bishop, 1974), little work has been carried out on the relationship of leadership to value orientations. In contrast to earlier studies, this thesis stresses the existence of ideological and moral bases for decision-making with reference to historical events. Within this framework the applicability of the notion that the Indians held a concept of the ideal individual as self-assertive and competitive - or, conversely, personally competent - stands as a question of major significance.

Anthropological and Historical Perspectives on Leadership

Perspectives on leadership in the Eastern Subarctic vary considerably. A. G. Bailey (1937: 86) suggests that decision-making resided in the band as a whole. The rise of specialized leadership roles has been viewed as a historical phenomenon associated with the

fur trade and colonial contact (Ray, 1974:137-8; Freeman & Ray, 1978: Chapter 7; Rogers, 1965; Morantz, 1977, 1980; 1982; Preston, 1968). By contrast, Harold Hickerson (1962, 1970) and Charles Bishop (1974) regard the fur trade as a major factor in the breakdown of patrilineal, exogamous totemic clans, led by clan chiefs, among the proto-Ojibwa population of the Great Lakes.

Edward S. Rogers and James G. E. Smith (Rogers & Smith, 1973; Smith, 1973) refute Hickerson and Bishop by proposing instead that Ojibwa band structure is and always has been based on the existence of a nodal or stem kindred which derives its cohesiveness from sibling solidarity. This unit serves as a gravitational core for larger group integrations through the activation of both consanguinal and affinal kin ties. Fission occurs should scarcity of resources or internal dispute prompt such action. Given the pattern of cross-cousin marriage in an ego-based kinship universe, groups under stable conditions resolve themselves into two categories; one formed wholly of consanguines or parallel kin, and the other class composed of cross kin into which an individual may marry (Eggan, 1966:78-107). Leadership of groups larger than the nodal core may be factional since it is concerned mainly with the distribution of scarce resources or, conversely, the preservation of self-interest. Smith (1973) maintains that by the late eighteenth century Ojibwa leadership southwest of Lake Superior underwent some elaboration, with a concomitant diffusion of political power within each group.

Smith's findings on this subject provide material for a comparison with the role played by Shingwaukönse during the mid-nineteenth century among the Ojibwa of Lake Superior. Yet Smith relies heavily for his

description of leadership categories - for instance those of "war chief" and "civil chief" - on the writings of Henry R. Schoolcraft (1793-1864), head of the Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan, Indian agency from 1822 to 1841, and of William W. Warren (1825-1852), a government interpreter whose relatives on the maternal side belonged to the fur-trading Cadotte family at Lapointe, Wisconsin. Both Schoolcraft and Warren spoke a degree of Ojibwa and possessed kin relations, although not socially close ones, with Native families on the west shore of Lake Superior. Warren may have spent more time than Schoolcraft speaking directly with Ojibwa peoples, particularly Eschkebugecoshe, chief at Leech Lake, Minnesota, who provided Warren with much of his material for his work History of the Ojibway Nation, first published in 1885. Schoolcraft almost always met with the Native population in an official capacity or through intermediaries such as members of the fur-trading Johnston family of Sault Ste. Marie into which the agent married in 1823. By far the majority of meetings with Indians experienced by Warren and Schoolcraft occurred because of the two men's connections with the American Indian Department. It is not surprising, therefore, that their views on Ojibwa leadership should be colored by their own attitudes towards the aims and implementation of nineteenth-century American Indian policy.

Schoolcraft divided Native chiefs into two broad categories. The class he favored welcomed state intervention in their people's affairs and aided in maintaining peaceful relations among Indian nations on the frontier. Visionary leaders like the Shawnee Prophet, Elkswatawa, (Schoolcraft, 1857, VI: 353-55), and Black Hawk (Ibid.: 447-52) constituted the second category whom the agents like Warren (1970:323-4),

viewed as disruptive to both the sphere of government-Indian relations and the welfare of the Native peoples themselves. Other leaders Schoolcraft found more difficult to understand and so classify. These chiefs could be independent, haughty and, the agent believed, primarily self-interested. Several who seemed to demonstrate a Machiavellian flair for political diplomacy won Schoolcraft's grudging respect. Among these chiefs were Eschkebugecoshe and Shingwaukönse.

The agent realized that the Ojibwa community in the early decades of the nineteenth century, although widespread geographically, was politically cohesive. Native leaders from around Lake Superior shrewdly compared experiences regarding their treatment from the various government authorities and prepared the content of their official speeches accordingly.[2] Schoolcraft knew only too well he was seeing merely the tip of the iceberg. Beyond his office walls, Ojibwa alliances shifted according to Native aims and loyalties which he could not hope to understand. His only recourse lay in manipulating the few material and symbolic inducements - medals, flags and small sundry presents - which formed his only purchase, tenuous as it was, on the essentially independent activities of the Native peoples of the Lake Superior region.

Degree of geographical distance from the seat of government authority made little difference to the covert operations governing Native actions. On August 18, 1828, Schoolcraft recorded in his diary a mixture of dismay and yet reluctant admiration for the seemingly cavalier attitude shown by Shingwaukönse towards the intentions of the American Indian Department. At this time the chief resided not more than fifteen kilometers from the agent's office at Sault Ste. Marie:

> Visited by the Little Pine (Shingwaukonce), the leading chief on the British shore of the St. Mary's, a shrewd and politic man, who has united, at sundry periods, in himself the offices and influence of a war chief, a priest, or Jossakeed, and a civil ruler. The giving of public presents on the 5th had evidently led to his visit, although he had not pursued the policy expected of him, so far as his influence reached among the Chippewas on the American shores of the straits. He made a speech well suited to his position, and glossed off with some fine generalities, avoiding commitments on main points and making them on minor ones, concluding with a string of wampum. I smoked and shook hands with him, and accepted his tenders of friendship by repledging the pipe, but narrowed his visit to official proprieties, and refused his wampum (Ibid., p. 306).

Schoolcraft six years later came to reverse this cautious detachment and express wholehearted praise for the chief, but it was not because Shingwaukönse or his tactics had changed. Indian-White relations had deteriorated with the outbreak of the Black Hawk War and the chief emerged as a bulwark of stability in his commitment to maintaining the neutrality of the Ojibwa community. For this reason it became increasingly clear in the context of this study that nineteenth-century sources regarding leadership had to be approached with caution. Time-consuming difficulties which arose from continuously having to screen historical sources for evidence of writers' biases underscored the necessity of employing anthropological perspectives to serve as explanatory aids in the interpretation of such materials.

The Investigation of Cultural Persistence - Methodological and Theoretical Orientations

Concern was felt during the initial stages of the study that retrieval of oral data on traditional attitudes regarding leadership might constitute a problem. It was anticipated that Ojibwa elders at Garden River might be reluctant to discuss a subject which belonged more

to the past than the present, especially since community emphasis leaned towards the implementation of progressive forms of local government. These apprehensions proved groundless, however, as the ethnographer found that, in addition to modern and ongoing developments in band administration, traditional concepts of leadership are still very much in evidence and that Shingwaukönse remains a figure of considerable importance at Garden River.

Recent anthropological studies demonstrate that Cree-Ojibwa culture, although accomodating to change, retains much of its essential vitality and integrity (Black, 1977a; Feit, 1978; Preston, 1980; Rogers, 1962; Smith, 1973; Tanner, 1979). While most residents at Garden River no longer engage full time in economic pursuits as hunters, fishermen, traders, harvesters of furs and other bush resources, significant aspects of the traditional outlook persist. According to an unpublished doctoral dissertation entitled "An Ethnoscience Investigation of Ojibwa Ontology and World View" by Mary Black (1967), semantic structures presented as indicative of cognitive orientation among Ojibwa peoples in the early 1950's (Hallowell, 1960) could still be found characteristic of the Ojibwa world view over a decade later.

To gain an understanding of the hidden concepts and premises informing Ojibwa cognitive processes Black employs an ethnoscience model (Metzger and Williams, 1966; Black, 1969; 1971; 1973; 1977b) which permits both ethnographer and Native informant to enter into the process of question formulation by allowing data drawn from informant

answers to control the ongoing elicitation technique. The goal of Black's approach is to begin questioning using the ethnographer's own categories and then, by analyzing the degree of variation of responses, readjusting the original question so that it generates a higher ratio of stable answers. Black's work focuses specifically on eliciting classes and criteria feasible for an analysis of distributional meaning within a broader "domain", or segment of the Ojibwa belief system.

While greater emphasis in the present study is placed on the findings of Black's ethnoscience technique than on the methodology she employs, attention was arrested by her stress on concepts and premises as the operational components of the Ojibwa belief system. Her assertion that these could be subjected analytically to examination by the "logic of question and answer", as formulated by the philosopher R. G. Collingwood (1939), laid much of the ground for the mode of structured dialogue which ultimately developed between the ethnographer and certain bilingual elders at Garden River. During these sessions one important task of the ethnographer lay in progressively restructuring questions to align more closely with the meanings presented in the information received, and so render the adjusted questions of utility in the interpretation of events recorded in the historical sources.

The Concept of "Power-Control"

Black directs her methodology towards the testing of premises advanced a number of years earlier by A. Irving Hallowell concerning Ojibwa cognitive orientation. In an article entitled "Ojibwa Ontology, Behaviour and World View", Hallowell (1960) argued for the presence in

Ojibwa thought of a categorical domain, bema.diziw.d, "living things", within which he could define no clear natural-supernatural boundary. On the basis of her ethnoscientific investigation Black finds she is able to support Hallowell's assertions that the Ojibwa belief system tolerates considerable ambiguity regarding the taxonomic boundaries of the "persons" classes which form components of the broader domain bema.diziw.d. The Ojibwa view certain living things, human as well as non-human beings, as able to undergo metamorphosis, an attribute which temporarily enables these "persons" to be placed in categories other than that in which they usually reside (Black, 1977b). Black recorded regularities in respondents' behavior she observed during interviews when discussion focused on certain classes of "persons" such as ädiso.ka.nag, immortal beings known to possess abilities that humans often lack and whose activities are recounted in legends also designated by the term ädiso.ka.nag. Black proposes that these behavioral manifestations, usually denotative of an underlying sense of respect towards the subject, arose due to the existence of a complex system of beliefs concerning "power-control" which she views as "central and integrating" within the sphere of Ojibwa thought and action.

Like other scholars (Benedict, 1923; Landes, 1968:112), Black regards one definition of "power" to be that of a personalized possession, "gift" or "blessing" bestowed on human beings by spirit guardians. Yet "power" also stands as a "dimension along which each class in the domain of living things shows a characteristic or relative value" (Black, 1967:88). Black suggests that a distinction may be drawn between particularized power, 'gaš ki? ewiziwin, and power as a gradient, manido, by which

power-holders may be hierarchically ranked in a manner similar to that which she recorded from her study of distributional meaning. The primary criterion informing such semantic structuring, she contends, is the equation of "power" with autonomy and self-sufficiency.

So greatly valued are these two characteristics among the Ojibwa that "persons" evidencing them rank high in cultural terms. For this reason relationships between individuals tend to follow certain prescribed rules which, while allowing for the presence of particularized power in others, enable each to maximize his own sphere of autonomy in the context of the transaction. Normally the system is laden with indeterminacy; power-holders rarely publicize their capabilities. Ojibwa individuals possess a wide range of behavioral modes and devices, many of the latter which fall into the category of "protective medicine", which allow them to retain autonomy in situations where independence may be threatened. One behavioral strategy includes "deliberately refraining from forcing a definition of the situation, to underline. . . [one's] own relative powerlessness". In such instances the link between "power" and "control" becomes clear, since individuals may seek to manipulate the relation by compelling the other to take "the position of having to decide on the definition of the situation" (Black, 1977a:147).

Yet individuals reside in Ojibwa communities with acknowledged capabilities which are not so ambiguous. Among these are human persons who share attributes with spirits in that they actively use their powers to help or harm. While Black maintains that Ojibwa leaders provide exceptions to the usual powerless stance, she embeds the concept of Native leadership deeply within the operation of the power belief system itself. Each individual is expected to be self-sufficient, but those

with great powers are charged with special responsibility to use their gifts to aid others in becoming so. This sharing relationship does not always develop; gifts may be misused for selfish ends, but it is the socially-sanctioned one to which leaders must conform if they wish to maintain their status within the group:

> An Ojibwa root, debenima-, has been variously translated as 'boss', 'master', 'the one in charge', or 'the one in control'. But the favored translation of a sensitive bilingual was 'those I am responsible for'. The idea of bossing is generally rejected, as is the idea of competition, yet both must occur at times. It can be seen that the areas of social control, of leadership and political structure, of the various cooperating social units necessary to kinship organization and to subsistence activities -- all these must be balanced somehow to accord with the rules of the system about power (Ibid., p. 146).

This stress on the idea of reciprocal responsibility rather than on authoritative action parallels in many respects the "paradox" encountered by Adrian Tanner (1979: 187) respecting leadership within the Cree winter hunting group. Among the Mistassini the range of a leader's decision-making powers over allocation of material resources and land use varies as a function of the self-sufficiency and productivity not of the leader alone, but of the group as a whole. Although a leader's "gifts" remain covertly expressed except in certain ritualized settings, demonstration of their working to the benefit of the band in the economic and political, as well as religious sphere assures others of the consistency with which such powers are used to further the welfare of the group. Social cohesiveness is thus promoted.

Neither Tanner nor Black suggest whether or not such an integrating relationship might exist at higher levels of group inclusiveness than that of the basic winter hunting unit. This omission constituted a point of

departure with the present study. To acquire an understanding of leadership as it is perceived by the Ojibwa themselves comprised a major aim, and for this purpose several months were spent interviewing elders at Garden River regarding the subject. The ethnographer interspersed these fieldwork sessions with historical research in archives and libraries in Toronto, Ottawa, London and Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario, and in Detroit, Mount Pleasant, L'Anse and Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan. The work included examination of registry office, census, land survey and other government records, church documents, band files, fur trade accounts, and newspapers. Photocopies of documents were introduced into fieldwork sessions and often became focal points of discussion. This facilitated the cross-referencing of archival data with information gained from oral testimonies.

Information Gained from Fieldwork Experience

Certain elders who during early meetings had expressed reticence (Preston, 1975c) or else a polite disposition to please without committing themselves to answering questions except in an oblique manner, gradually assumed their own measure of control over the conversations. These sessions proved to be the most productive in terms of data shared. Not only did the elders relay information which they undoubtedly drew from the body of their own knowledge and experience rather than simply replying in terms of what they thought the ethnographer would like to hear, but a relationship developed which may have approached traditional norms of interaction between teacher and learner.

This proposition, that an approximation of culturally-defined instruction ensued, is based on the fact that changes in elicitation

technique arose at the instigation of the elders themselves. They subtly structured discussions in accordance with situational factors, among these the season, other people present and the nature of the question asked. Interviews developed a serious tone after nightfall, and elders affirmed that certain subjects of discussion, such as Nanabush tales, would be restricted to the winter season if it were not for the time constraints imposed by the research project. There were quiet requests for tobacco or, as one member of the Pine family explained, "When you tell stories like that, because it's like medicine, you have to drink a little bit." While a degree of semiritualization had been anticipated from elders in the context of their telling sacred legends, their extension of this behavior to stories concerning Shingwaukönse came as a surprise.

Hallowell (1960: 27) writes concerning ädiso·ka.nag:

> The significant thing about these stories is that the characters in them are regarded as living entities who have existed from time immemorial. While there is genesis through birth and temporary, or permanent form-shifting through transformation, there is no outright creation. Whether human or animal in form or name, the major characters in the myths behave like people, though many of the activities are depicted in a spatio-temporal framework of cosmic, rather than mundane dimensions. There is social interaction among them and between them and the änícinábek /Native people/.

There could be no doubt that the body of legends in which Shingwaukönse figured prominently fell into the category of ädiso·ka.nag, or gitchi.ädiso·ka.nag, "great sacred stories", as they were designated so by those telling them. References to Shingwaukönse in myths often drew responses similar to those which Hallowell and Black found associated with discussions of "other than human beings". With regard to the kinship term accorded the leader, for example, at least three of Shingwaukönse's descendants referred to him continuously as "my grandfather" - an expression

of respect - although in only one instance, that of Dan Pine Sr., was Shingwaukönse actually a grandfather according to kinship reckoning.[2]

Another factor which suggested that Shingwaukönse had passed from human status to that of spirit arose from his being considered a source of spiritual blessings and their manifestations in the form of necessary skills and material resources for the entire Native community. In a manner reminiscent of the culture hero, Nanabush, Shingwaukönse provided knowledge to cope with contingencies in ways beneficial to all anícinábek. Unlike Nanabush, however, who was credited with the invention of technology basic to aboriginal culture such as the weaving of nets by watching a spider spin a web (personal communication, Fred Pine Sr.; Blair, 1911, 1: 283-4), Shingwaukönse's genius lay in the discovery by a combination of visionary means and personal observation of mechanical principles underlying the workings of tools, weapons and other instruments associated with Western culture, historically adopted by and vitally important to the Ojibwa.

In one story the chief constructed a type of musket from a suitably-shaped piece of soft-centered wood by extracting the pith core and blocking one end of the tube. Lumps cut from exposures of lead in rocks provided ammunition, while a substance prepared from a wasp's nest, found at the intercession of Woodpecker, served as wadding. Except for the necessity to procure gunpowder, pilfered from a ship, Shingwaukönse's ingenuity according to this tale, rendered the Ojibwa as hunters independent of reliance on traders. Since self-determination constitutes a primary Ojibwa value (Rogers & Smith, 1973; Black, 1977a), Shingwaukönse's abilities as rendered in myth not only approximate a collective ideal,

but also serve as inducement for the continuation of competent behavior according to cultural standards despite major changes in the surrounding social, political and technological milieu.

On one level, Shingwaukönse acts to preserve a valued way of life by working within and gradually extending, through parallel and independent invention, the scope of Native culture until the latter can hold its own against the tide of intrusive Western knowledge and technology. This capacity may be transmitted to others in descending generations in the context of a vision experience, and several of Shingwaukönse's descendants stated that "their grandfather" had appeared to them in this manner to offer guidance. To these elders, Shingwaukönse demonstrated his status as one of the ädiso.ka.nag by encapsulating within his person a potential source of cultural knowledge.

Expansion of the range of Ojibwa technical skills represents only one dimension of Shingwaukönse's legendary character. There exists a second which is far more striking, and proved central to an understanding of certain references to the chief's activities in the historical documentation. It was first revealed in a remark made by Fred Pine Sr. that "Shingwaukönse was a leader looking for a home for his people, the Ojibwa nation". This statement arose in conjunction with a discussion of the chief's prodigious capacity for lengthy fasting, the vision sanctions he obtained thereby in order to become a djiskiu, wabano and a member of the midéwiwin, and the continuous guidance and sense of purpose he derived from "other than human persons" with which he formed close association. Through his ability for "spirit flight",[3] Shingwaukönse focused his energies on the search for this homeland where Ojibwa could live with sufficient resources for a secure economic future and apparently

a fair degree of political autonomy.

The historical data supported the story with regard to the geographical breadth of the chief's contacts. By the mid-nineteenth century plans grew apace in the Lake Superior Native community to effect a migration of two thousand Ojibwa from the region of Leech Lake, Minnesota, and unrecorded numbers, from between Lapointe and the Keweenaw Peninsula on the south shore of Lake Superior, to Garden River and vicinity.[4] It was the potential highlight of Shingwaukönse's career - one for which, both oral and written evidence suggest, he had been preparing for over twenty years. But it also contravened British Indian policy aimed at restricting movement of Indians from the United States into Canada. In 1853 the Indian Department, suddenly jolted into a realization of the Native scheme, took steps to prevent the projected removal. His long-awaited achievement thwarted, Shingwaukönse died the following year.

Shingwaukönse nevertheless never has died nor perhaps will he ever die in the minds of his descendants. As a member of the ädiso'ka.nag, he remains immortal. One indicator of his unique status at Garden River appears in attitudes uniformly held towards the chief by persons who trace their ancestry to him through their mother, affines, or adoption, all of whom when interviewed claimed that Shingwaukönse constituted a powerful and effective leader.

Shingwaukönse cannot be regarded as a political symbol forged in conflict between opposing power factions as is Victor Turner's portrayal of Our Lady of Guadalupe, who "lives in scenes of action. . ." (Turner, 1974: 153). By contrast, "other-than-human" Shingwaukönse is conspicuously absent in times of present-day factional confrontation on the reserve.

Two reasons have already been suggested for this: first, that this chief represents certain cherished Ojibwa values not open to dispute, and, second, that the Ojibwa tend to place greater emphasis on visionary experience than on symbolic manipulation as a sanction for political action within the community. A link between recitation of legends and the transference of traditional forms of power exists but the relationship was found to be both indirect and subtle.

Legends, Visionary Experience and the Transmission of Power

The relation of information concerning Shingwaukönse took place in piecemeal fashion. Often only a skeleton of a story was all that could be obtained at one session, with significant details being added at subsequent meetings. Elders always controlled the flow of information. As one man explained:

> [So and so] . . . is holding a lot of stuff back. They all do that. Of course, they'll tell a little bit now and then. I do that too, you know.

The manner in which this statement was delivered displayed no intent to manipulate data in simply a kind of meaningless game (see Appendix A). This elder later referred to such information as "seed", me.e.kun. What he actually meant by the word, however, came slowly, as each progression towards integration of reference with the broader Ojibwa belief system had to be made by the ethnographer herself, with the "instructor" acting as judge as to the appropriateness of the suggestion. Several of her attempts to explain the term "seed" were rejected outright by the elder. These focused on the concept of "seed" as a moral precept as in the Christian sense of "sowing the good seed". It was only by linking the idea of "seed" with the notion of selectively withholding information

information that the meaning intended became clearer. Final agreement lay in the word manido, "power".

The willingness to share legends, ädiso·ka.nag, established a potential climate for the transfer of manido, even though final sanction for its retention and use could come only from vision pursuit. Elders stressed that imparting stories of this nature approximated the transmission in the natural world of pollen or semen, and one man dissected a pine cone to show how seed was frequently hidden until the proper time for its release.

The thought of accepting monetary payment for the telling of ädiso·ka.nag struck persons as abhorrent. Offerings such as tobacco, liquor or clothing might be accepted, but one could not present sacred legends for sale. It would do the listener "no good" and show disrespect for the ädiso·ka.nag who are bound to the teller by a reciprocal link, akin to that of grandfather-grandchild. Money could be presented and accepted, however, if offered as a gift with no taint of commerciality or alienation.

A strict conceptional distinction thus existed between knowledge which could be bought, such as various types of protective medicine, and a gift like that of willingness to impart information which would prepare a person for the reception of manido. The former could be construed as dangerous for both buyer and seller, whereas the latter constituted a benevolent act on the part of the giver. Ädiso·ka.nag like Shingwaukönse "liked to be talked about", as long as conversations were respectful to him, and one elder, in reciting the stories, said he "felt good about telling them".

During these sessions spent talking about "seed" it became apparent that the use of the word could not be likened to a sustained metaphor, as it might in English. Instead, it defined a perspective, often emotionally as well as intellectually perceived, which shaped cognitive processes to view the world as a dynamic interplay of immortal, ever waxing and waning forces. After giving examples of how seeds would not germinate until touched by frost, Mr. Fred Pine Sr. asked how this principle might be evidenced in one's own life. Although the ethnographer suggested the vision fast, to which the elder acquiesced, "Yes, that's it," the lesson proved to be more complex. The notion of dormancy and revitalization, rather than death and rebirth, pervaded most, if not all, facets of activity in the Ojibwa world view; for example, in the demographic regulation of animal and plant populations or in medicine, where the object was to encapsulate and convey a vital principle, which cyclically experienced growth, maturity and decline.

Dan Pine Sr. remarked that not only were "non-human persons" subject to the "laws" described above, but, like man, they "craved things". They could become "hungry", puck.a.dā. If "seed" embodied the idea of the transmission of culturally-sanctioned forms of power from generation to generation, then the laying of offerings represented its sharing, laterally, to ever-present spirit beings. For, in spite of the ideal, no "person" could ever be totally autonomous. "Disturbances" could occur if a being "craved" more than the standard respect offerings, or if human beings irresponsibly failed to "feed" certain spirits. In such cases special sacrifices might have to be made to satisfy the troublemakers. Only a particularly skilled medicine man knew the rules of regulating the feeding

of especially "hungry", "greedy" or "bold" beings, who often possessed capacities to help the Indian. In such instance the phrase "to use him" was adopted, implying that the relationship involved manipulation and strategem, rather than the straightforward, reciprocal exchange of "blessing" and "offerings".

Difficulties arose in selecting English terms to describe qualities of Native leadership. Elders actively participated in seeking ways to express ideas concisely in the English language while doing as little injustice as possible to the Ojibwa concept. The extent of control which certain elders exerted over these sessions may be gained from the fact that, when confusion was seen to exist in the ethnographer's mind, they terminated the discussion abruptly with "Well, that's all for today." At the next meeting they would then introduce an English or Ojibwa term which they considered embodied the idea they had wished to convey at the preceding interview. Such aids to mutual understanding were gratefully received, as they formed semantic cores around which to build further meaning.

Four of these terms are presented in the context of this study, since they pertain to attributes considered to have been possessed by Shingwaukönse. Three of the four, "seeing", "guidance" and "regulation", relate to the use of special vision-derived powers. The fourth, "security",[5] or self-determination, is the cherished goal state to be achieved and protected on behalf of the group and may be viewed as the motivating goal underlying Native actions during the course of the events discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.

Seeing. Dan Pine Sr. explained that seeing meant viewing the world in such a way so that hidden principles, persons and relationships become apparent. To see constitutes a gift, granted by fasting. One may use these powers, but not before submitting one's preliminary observations to a man of greater knowledge, whom Dan called a "witness".

Features of this modern explanation bear resemblance to a process of obtaining and demonstrating power described by Dan's grandfather, Shingwaukönse, to the American Indian agent Henry Schoolcraft at Mackinac in 1839:

> Chingwauk began by saying that the ancient Indians made a great merit of fasting. They fasted sometimes six or seven days, till both their bodies and minds became free and light; which prepared them to dream. The object of the ancient seers, was to dream of the sun, as it was believed that such a dream would enable them to see everything on the earth. And by fasting long and thinking much on the subject, they generally succeeded. Fasts and dreams were first attempted at an early age. What a young man sees and experiences during these dreams and fasts, is adopted by him as truth, and it becomes a principle to regulate his future life. He relies for success on these revelations. If he has been much favored in his fasts, and the people believe that he has the art of looking into futurity, his path is open to the highest honors.
>
> The prophet, he continued, begins to try his power in secret, with only one assistant, whose testimony is necessary should be succeed. As he goes on, he puts down the figures of his dreams or revelations by symbols, on bark or other material, till a whole winter is sometimes passed in pursuing the subject, and he thus has record of his principal revelations. If what he predicts is verified, the assistant mentions it, and the record is then appealed to as proof of his prophetic power and skill. Time increases his fame. His ke.kee.wins, or records, are finally shown to the old people, who meet together and consult upon them, for the whole nation believe in these revelations. They, in the end, give their approval, and declare that he is gifted as a prophet -- is inspired with wisdom, and is fit to lead the opinions of the nation.
>
> Such, he concluded, was the ancient custom, and the celebrated old war-captains rose to their power in this manner (Schoolcraft, 1851, I: 114).

Seeing denoted a cumulative process involving fasting, observing, experiencing, recording and demonstrating. While the aptitude to see constituted one gift bestowed by the spirits, an individual could also acquire and develop other blessings, as long as one obtained the visionary and social sanctions for doing so. In the past, obtaining a vision conducive to one joining the midéwiwin did not preclude a person from the practice of wabeno or djiskiu. Shingwaukőnse had acted in all three capacities.

Guidance. An individual derived a sense of purpose from a spirit appearing to him in a vision or dream and telling him "what he is to to with his life". All living things had a purpose within the Ojibwa thought system, and though many were usually useful, some proved antithetical to Native well-being. For this reason it was necessary for a community to have a leader who possessed skill to predict, evaluate and devise strategies to thwart possible sources of danger. Shingwaukónse repeatedly provided the example. Not only could the chief locate an enemy at a distance and determine its strength by djiskiuwin , but he could also foretell the numbers of casualties on either side. Shingwaukönse could do this both by direct communication with his spirits and by reading guides.

Every Indian knew some "guides", such as a star person, who might also be regarded as an individual's special "chum".[6] The world was full of these guides, for direction finding, locating water, to ensure general good luck. Through his special seeing powers, however, a man like

Shingwaukönse could read a large number of these messengers easily and well.

Regulation. Since the Ojibwa perceived their world as composed of dynamic elements often vying for recognition and resources, a major purpose of the human power holder resided in establishing a correct balance among them so that the community might remain cohesive and economically and politically secure. The locus of this regulation lay in the activities of the leader vis-à-vis other human and non-human powers. Performance of rituals might regain equilibrium for a while; nevertheless disturbances on both the cosmic and local scale constituted part of the ongoing pattern of personalized causality. According to Richard Pine, for the power holder to act decisively in the face of such challenges comprised an obligation intimately associated with the possession of power.

Diverse situational crises called for varying strengths of power from a leader - since power differed mainly in intensity rather than kind - in order to reinstate balance within the causal universe. Such rectifying action enabled group members to fulfill effectively their respective purposes once again without having to resort to continuous competition.[7] Oral testimonies supported Black's assertions (Black, 1977a) that the belief system tolerated a ranked hierarchy of such power holders. Elders provided examples from the animal kingdom - for instance, between rutting caribou - to show that this system enabled competition to ensue between power holders without irreparable damage being done to the community fabric at lower levels. It was the power holder rather than the community which was most vulnerable, for knowledge and skills only

conferred leadership status so long as they engendered confidence and appeared to benefit the group. Individual and group goals were the same.

One member of the Pine family stressed the subtle bonds of belief, intention and purpose shared by his "grandfather" and those for whom he acted:

Mr. Pine: Shingwaukönse had the power to kill animals. He said, "If you don't kill them, they'll kill you."

Interviewer: What do you mean by wes.yug? /A.wase.yūg or wild animals/.

Mr. Pine: All animals. Manido...he said, "they are all valuable. Beaver, you can sell. Mukwa makes beds." Everything was put in for the Indians to use. From the spirits.
"You were put in for a purpose." That's what Shingwauk said. "If you run into any trouble, you're the cause of it. You can bring disturbance." See...he put that all in one word /in Ojibwa/. "You can make a good thing or a bad thing of yourself." He was really smart, just like a minister.
He told the others..."you be proud of the gift. Don't make fun of anything, don't waste anything. The sun will help you. It's not for sale. If you throw it away... if you do, I'll live naked."[8]

These statements reflect the same value placed on reciprocity between leader and group that Black (1977a) and Tanner (1979) observe among the Ojibwa and Cree. To determine how far such cultural concepts and premises may have served to influence Shingwaukönse's activities in the historical context comprises a primary aim of this study.

Chapters One to Three of this work provide analyses of social and cultural changes among the Ojibwa during the eighteenth century to provide background for Shingwaukönse's later activities. From

historical sources pertaining to The Pine's life, it was also found that Shingwaukönse passed through three distinct stages in his career as a head chief. Each of these phases has been dealt with respectively in this study: in Chapters Four, Five and Six. During the first stage, from 1827 to approximately 1845, the chief concentrated on appealing for government and missionary aid to found a Native settlement at Garden River. When such assistance failed to materialize, he briefly divested himself of his leadership status. During this second and interim period he may also have experienced a weakening of his exclusive attachment to Anglican doctrines. The onset of mineral exploration north of Lakes Huron and Superior, meanwhile, increased government interest in Native issues, but for far different reasons than those operating during the period of intercolonial rivalries.

Finally, in 1846, The Pine -- drawing on a syncretistic blend of Native and Christian beliefs, traditional Ojibwa prerogatives, and western legal principles to establish a direction and momentum for his plan -- fostered a Native movement to found a "homeland" for refugee bands from the south and west of Lake Superior, fleeing the consequences of American removal policy. His bid for Native control of mineral and timber resources, although peaceful and accommodationary in intent, aroused resistance from the Canadian government, which in 1849 denied Indians legal title to land other than on a mere "occupancy basis." Chapters Seven to Ten investigate the struggle of his successors to regain some measure of self-determination over affairs within their communities, in keeping with The Pine's original goals.

In the final section the further question is raised, did Shingwaukönse act according to a consistent policy as leader of the

Garden River settlement, established only two decades before his death in 1854, or were his activities situationally task based or crisis oriented? On the basis of oral and documentary evidence, this work holds that the chief did align his actions in conformity with a policy embodying deep-seated traditional values and goals for the future. In so doing he exhibited a degree of power-control which his sons, given a rapidly changing social, economic and political milieu, would have difficulty in emulating. His descendents nevertheless continued to exhibit a special sense of purpose derived from The Pine's scheme, the development of which underlay and shaped their actions and stood as a focus around which other groups rallied to share a vision for the future.

CHAPTER ONE

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN OJIBWA LEADERSHIP IN THE UPPER GREAT LAKES REGION

Shingwaukönse's Band Affiliations

In August 1822, Henry R. Schoolcraft, American Indian agent at Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan, recorded in his diary that Shingwaukönse, whom he described as a "person of some consequence among the Indians", had visited his office. In appearance and manner Shingwaukönse impressed the official favourably. According to Schoolcraft, The Pine stood five feet, ten inches in height, with a well set frame, "had a tuft of beard on his chin, wore a hat, and had some other traits in his dress and gear which smacked of civilization" (Schoolcraft, 1854, 4 : 557; 1975: 110). Presenting a "shrewd and grave countenance", Shingwaukönse broached the subject of American intentions in erecting Fort Brady so near the straits of the St. Mary's River, making Schoolcraft wonder if seeking information relative to a distribution of presents to the Indians to take place later in the season might not have constituted the purpose of the visit. Yet Schoolcraft prevented his suspicions from guiding his conduct. Shingwaukönse proved to be too influential a person, "being a meta, a wabeno, a counselor, a war chief, and an orator or speaker", to risk exposing him to any remark which might be construed as an insult by an American official. The agent instead chose to welcome his Native guest cordially, even though The Pine dwelt "for the most part, on the British side of the river".

That Shingwaukönse resided on British soil did not alter Schoolcraft's estimation of him as a potential friend of the American government. The agent realized that the boundary line placing the north shore of the St. Mary's River under a separate national jurisdiction had little meaning for the Ojibwa. What attracted Schoolcraft's attention was the nature of the leadership a person such as Shingwaukönse exercised within the local band, which ranged over a sizeable territory extending east and west on both sides of the rapids. This interest had a basis in political expediency as well as scientific curiosity. The agent had been instructed by his superiors to foster goodwill for the American government among important band leaders. From talking to fur trading families and through his observation of Indian council meetings, he understood that the principal speakers and major power-holders belonged to one large family designated by the mark, or dodem, of the Crane. In his initial years as an administrator, Schoolcraft assumed that this leadership reflected the identity and composition of the entire Sault "home band", and frequently referred to this hypothetically homogenous social and political unit as the "Crane band". Shingwaukönse, spokesman of the Sault Indians, he maintained, "traces his lineage from the old Crane band here" (Schoolcraft, 1975: 110).

The Pine's affiliation with the "old Crane band" stemmed from his mother, who belonged to the Crane group (Wilson, 1886: 51). By examining church and census records, one may gain an idea of The Pine's earlier band attachments. A census taken at Garden River in 1867 gave "British Lake Superior" as the birthplace of both Ogista (1800-1890)[1] and Buhkwujjenene (1811-1900), and recorded that a third son, Tagoosh

(c. 1790-1876) had been born at "Portage Lake, U.S." on the Keweenaw Peninsula,[2] which suggested that The Pine had lived near Hancock, Michigan, at the turn of the nineteenth century. Ambiguity surrounding the birthplaces of his eldest children implies that, as Fred Pine Sr. asserted, prior to his arrival at Sault Ste. Marie Shingwaukönse acted "a bit like a lone ranger".[3]

The Pine's closest associations prior to the War of 1812 seem to have been with the Grand Island band located near present-day Munising, Michigan.[4] This may have been the place of origin of several of his wives, of whom he had four in 1830.[5] Two of his sons-in-law, Piabetassung and Misquabenokay, also belonged to this group. Piabetassung, at Shingwaukönse's instigation, moved with his "relations" from Grand Island by way of Bay de Noc, northern Lake Michigan, to Garden River about 1832. The Pine had previously acted as a spokesman for the Grand Island head chief Shawanapenasse, or "The South Bird", who was Piabetassung's "uncle".[6] Following his association with Shawanapenasse, Shingwaukönse, after spending several years at Saginaw, Michigan, employed his oratorial skills on behalf of the Cranes who exercised political jurisdiction in a subtle but real way over the territory surrounding the rapids. Oratorical skills were thus transferable from group to group. An aspiring man might act in this capacity with several groups before heading a following in his own right.[7]

The "Crane band" to which Shingwaukönse returned by 1820 occupied a village on a hill overlooking the rapids on the American side. A strip of land, approximately sixty acres in area along the banks of the St. Mary's channel served as a site for visiting bands to erect their hemispherical huts and structures for ceremonial and trade purposes.[8]

The "Crane band" ranged in size from one hundred to three hundred individuals and was led by a head chief, or ogima, by the name of Shingabaw'osin. Each smaller extended family unit in turn recognised a head man, known as ani.ke.ogima or a "step below chief," who might temporarily act as a "spokesman" or "war chief". In these respects Ojibwa leadership at the rapids exhibited characteristics similar to other bands throughout the Upper Great Lakes region (Grant, 1960: 350; Jones, 1861: 107-8; Redsky, 1972: 40-1; Slight, 1844: 70-2; Speck, 1915: 5).

Shingwaukönse's activities suggest that it was difficult for an ambitious, middle-aged man like himself, even though possessing visionary power, membership in the medicine society known as the midéwiwin, and a notable war record to his credit, to rise in social status within what appeared to be a leadership hierarchy, solidly based, although covertly expressed, at both the Sault and Grand Island. This finding contrasts with the argument forwarded by James G.E. Smith (1974) that factional conflict characterized issues and events within band politics in the past as much as it does today. Instead, it is suggested that a recognition of graduations in power-control made factional strife over any one issue a rarity, with respect for major power-holders the rule. Disputes arose primarily regarding succession following the death of a leader, when close kin of the deceased might temporarily strive for access to the highest position in the band, although such conflicts may actually have been a phenomenon associated with the breakdown, under external pressures by the nineteenth century, of internal mechanisms governing succession.

Head chiefs acted as protectors and leading negotiators on behalf of their bands. The exigencies of such politics often demanded

radical measures. In accord with their role as protectors, these leaders often threatened supernatural retaliation if angered or insulted.[9] They were also expected to contribute to maintaining a balance of power among leading chiefs within the Upper Great Lakes region. A description of the head Crane chief at Sault Ste. Marie, Shingabaw'osin, written in 1826 by Thomas McKenney, American Superintendent of Indian Affairs, demonstrates a radical difference between Ojibway and American perspectives on Native leadership. McKenney (1972: 207) portrayed Shingabaw'osin as a dependent and ailing old man:

> Our Indians /of the Sault band/ paid us a formal visit to our tent. The old chief /Shingabaw'osin/ spoke of his age, of his apprehended blindness from cataract, and with tears, of the kindness he had experienced at the hands of the young man /possibly his son, Kebay Nodin/ -- the same who laid the fish at the Governor's feet.

It is doubtful whether McKenney would have understood the major departure from traditional Ojibwa attitudes that Shingabaw'osin had made in his speeches during treaty negotiations at Fond du Lac in August 1826. In one of his most radical statements, Shingabaw'osin acquiesced in the Americans' desire to exploit the copper resources on Ojibwa lands, in spite of vehement opposition from another chief known as The Plover, whose band's territory along the Ontonagon River lay in the midst of rich copper-bearing country just west of the base of the Keweenaw Peninsula. Like other members of his group, The Plover held that copper constituted a gift from the Great Spirit which could be proclaimed the property of no one man.[10] The Indians believed that exposures of mineral were protected by spirit guardians and that unsanctioned use by Indians as well as Whites could lead to severe reprisals by these beings.[11] Shingabaw'osin's unconditional support for American policy regarding the

SHINGABA W'OSSIN.
Image Stone.

Courtesy of the Clarke Library

alienation of copper reserves may have been interpreted by McKenney as a wise decision by an enlightened chief, but for certain leaders of the Native community like The Plover it stood as an unwarranted abrogation of authority by a single power-holder.

Occasions such as the treaty-signing at Fond du Lac in 1826 placed strains on the traditional form of leadership. Treaties on the American side of Lake Superior in the early decades of the nineteenth century often took place at locations a considerable distance from Ojibwa groups residing in the eastern sector of the Lake Superior region. Confronted by unfamiliar government policies, Native representatives had to make decisions on issues vitally affecting their bands, but in situations where traditional checks and balances on a leader's power failed to work effectively. Although Shingabaw'osin represented the entire Sault band, he travelled the long route to Fond du Lac in 1826 accompanied by only a small retinue. During the course of negotiations he may have spoken mainly for himself and a few of his close kin rather than for his group as a whole.

The consequences of this externally-imposed "distancing" of a power-holder from the band for which he was responsible posed a threat to the traditional system of leadership by 1826, but it did not destroy it. In many ways the pattern of leadership displayed by Shingwaukönse later in the century paralleled that exhibited by Shingabaw'osin a generation earlier, but with one important difference. Certain results of decisions made by Native representatives contending with policies, essentially alien to them, became standards by which later leaders could weigh the pros and cons of similar responses to such external schemes. Instead of rejecting traditional values, leaders could use this newly developed fund of knowledge to bring the consequences

of future decisions more into line with the values they wished to preserve.

The "Cranes" - Oral History

The term "Cranes" referred to a group which was as much political as it was social or genealogical in character. On occasion, the symbol of the Crane could be used to reinforce hierarchy in the power structure of the Ojibwa group. This became evident during one head chief's telling of a story, recorded by William W. Warren (1970: 87-8) during treaty negotiations at Lapointe, Wisconsin, in 1842. Keche.Besheke, or "Great Buffalo", of the Loon dodem opposed the terms of surrender, while Tugwaugaunay, an elderly Crane chief, sought a compromise with the American government. Not only did a deadlock in negotiations seem imminent, but the argument threatened to split the band into two camps. At this point Tugwaugaunay rose and described the circuit in the sky made long ago by a Crane which came to earth from heaven. This bird called with so imperative a voice that representatives from bands residing around Lake Superior became his followers. Although the bird first settled at Sault Ste. Marie, he later moved with his retinue to the vicinity of present-day Lapointe. At this new location, Tugwaugaunay continued, The Crane appointed a member of the Loon dodem to act as spokesman for the group. Since Keche.Besheke was the son of the "Loon" so chosen, Tugwaugaunay used the story to rebuke the leader for attempting to act, without proper group sanction, in a capacity above his ascribed station within the prevailing power hierarchy.[12]

The recitation of this legend, Warren claimed, healed the breach, since the story was well enough known that all assembled agreed that it

gave Tugwauguanay, a descendant of the original Crane leader, the prerogative to assume the foremost place in the band council. Yet, outside the specific context in which it was recited, this tale tells little of past events in the Upper Great Lakes Ojibwa community, which must be reconstructed from documentary sources. It indicates that the term "Crane" refers to the first of a line of influential leaders who moved from the St. Mary's straits to Wisconsin, but suggests nothing of the time period involved or possible reasons for the original gathering. As the head chiefs Shingabaw'osin and Shingwaukönse both belonged to the Crane band, an investigation of the origins of Crane power within this particular group in the nineteenth century, and its maintenance, will set the background for a diachronic model to be developed explaining the nature of Ojibwa leadership in the Upper Great Lakes area. The next two sections of this chapter examine ecological, historical and cultural factors which may have contributed to the political preeminance of the "Cranes" during the period under study.

Ecology, History and Cultural Continuity

Controversy has arisen between two schools of thought as to whether the proto-Ojibwa should be classified as an egalitarian, primarily patrilocal hunting-gathering people (Smith, 1973; Wright, 1965) or as a population whose reliance on a summer fishing focus enabled them to sustain a social organization characterised by patrilineal territorially-based clans and hereditary clan chiefs (Fitting, 1970; Hickerson, 1962; Mason, 1981: 31; McNeish, 1958). Sault Ste. Marie lies in a transitional zone between the Canadian and Carolinian biotic

provinces characterized by a variety of seasonally abundant subsistence resources. The degree to which fish predominated in the aboriginal Native diet, and the feasibility of corn horticulture in this ecotone have both been viewed as factors conducive to the growth of semi-permanent settlements. By pointing out the opportunities for peoples in Upper Michigan to supplement their horticultural returns with fish and big game, Charles Cleland (1966) has postulated that villages could have arisen in areas with a frost-free season too short for the maturation of corn. Similarily, Kenneth Dawson (1983) has viewed the Upper Great Lakes region as a cradle for "core villages" in localities where, even prior to the introduction of corn horticulture from the south, populations could seasonally exploit concentrations of wild rice or waterfowl in addition to fish. Historically, villages certainly existed by 1680, and Hickerson (1962) has argued that each one may have constituted the residence site of a patrilineal clan. Prompted by exposure to European commerce and individualistic values, a confederation of these clans, he suggested, took place in the late seventeenth-century at the Sault mission-trading center, where fish at the rapids could support the enlarged population. Sault Ste. Marie thus formed a geographic crucible for the emergence of an Ojibwa "nation", and subsequent migrations resulted in the spread of groups representative of this new national entity throughout the Lake Superior region and southwest to the headwaters of the Mississippi.[13]

It is nevertheless doubtful whether fish at the rapids could ever have supported a permanent settlement sizeable enough to give rise to an Ojibwa "nation". Great numbers of whitefish taken in the St. Mary's channel during the spring, and from late September to early November

could temporarily support large aggregations of people who visited the locale for ceremonies, trade or because they sought refuge from wars in their own country.[14] Yet water levels fluctuated from year to year, with one season bringing a good catch, the next a failure.[15] There is, moreover, a singularly consistent lack of evidence throughout the historical era which might imply either an ideological or organizational bias among the Ojibwa towards highly-structured modes of corporate behaviour. While a reduction in big game and fur bearers occurred in the Sault area as a consequence of the introduction of European hunting technology and the pressures of the fur trade, little substantiating data exists for a permanent migration of large groups out of the region wholly on account of food scarcity or the commercial exploitation of fur resources. It is anticipated instead that <u>most</u> movement took place within the Lake Superior region at the level of the <u>smallest social unit</u>, the nodal core, composed of a man, his wife or wives, and those most closely related to him by blood, marriage, or adoption. Sometime prior to 1700 the Native population inhabiting the St. Mary's straits area increased to the point that migration occurred to lands formerly occupied by Sauk peoples along the southeastern shore of Lake Michigan. Bands or band segments, engaged in repeated warfare with the Iroquois, also gradually pushed southwards from north of Lake Huron to inhabit territory earlier vacated by the Huron, scattered by the Iroquois incursions. Yet, neither of these movements seems to have been accompanied by socio-structural changes in band organization similar to those described by Hickerson (1970: 53).

Hickerson's premises have been criticized by James G. Smith

(1973), who claims that data drawn from early French sources provides little justification for the restriction of the protohistoric Ojibwa population to the limited number of named groups which resided near the mission-trading station at Sault Ste. Marie in the years surrounding 1670.[16] Smith (n.d.) has asserted, on the basis of archaeological, linguisitic and historical evidence, that prior to European contact, the Ojibwa, Ottawa and Nipissing constituted one culturally and linguistically similar population ranging geographically from the St. Lawrence lowlands, across the Upper Great Lakes area, to an undetermined boundary west of Lake Superior. With the inception of the fur trade, mobility in the Upper Great Lakes region vastly increased. In travelling from band to band, Indian individuals exercised consanguinal and affinal kin ties where they existed, or the dodemic relationship where they did not (Smith, 1974a); but no fundamental alterations occurred in bands' flexible social organization.

The documentary evidence provides several examples of such movement, and undoubtedly much more occurred than has been recorded. For instance, in 1662, according to Nicholas Perrot, two small groups from the Sault journeyed along the north shore of Lake Superior and finally joined a band at Chequamegon, Lapointe, on the southwest coast (Blair, 1911, 1: 173). Other groups made a complete circuit of the lake, a practice which grew frequent in later years. In the 1660's a combined party of Saulteur, Ottawa, Nipissing, and Amikouets from near Chequamegon moved eastward to claim a bloody victory over an Iroquois war expedition on a peninsula at the western end of the St. Mary's straits (Ibid.: 179-81), an event still related with pride by the Ojibwa to a Methodist

missionary at Garden River during the mid 1850's.[17] Other Ojibwa bands remained relatively stable geographically over time, although on occasion temporarily displaced by Iroquois incursions. In 1697, named groups, similar in description to those identified by the Jesuit Father, Claude Dablon, twenty years earlier, still inhabited Lake Superior's southern coast between Sault Ste. Marie and Chequamegon during the summer months (Margry, 1886, 6: 6). Given that a degree of fusion and fission would have occurred among bands, and the fact that some named groups may have died out completely as independent entities, band organization, as Smith stresses, apparently remained resilient during these years. There was little demographic displacement out of the broad geographic region demarcated by the Lake Superior drainage systems. Most bands retained considerable political and economic autonomy during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by exploiting a wide range of seasonally available resources within large, roughly defined ranges over which they had hunted for many generations.

At certain locations during lulls in their ongoing warfare with the Iroquois, Algonquian-speaking peoples sometimes congregated by the thousands for several months of the year. Scholars (Tanner, 1974; Smith, 1973; Waisberg, 1977) have maintained that evidences for large semi-permanent villages on Lake Nipissing, along the straits of Mackinac, at Sault Ste. Marie, Chequamegon and elsewhere near major communication routes lying north of the "corn latitudes", constituted strategically important trade and ceremonial centers. Well-established trade linkages, they point out, already existed, prior to the arrival of Europeans, between some of the populations of the boreal forest and some of the horticultural peoples further south. The onset of the fur trade at first intensified

these indigenous exchange systems (Heidenreich and Ray, 1976). French penetration of the Upper Great Lakes region resulted in the emergence of Native "service centers" to furnish corn, root crops and bark canoes to fur brigades plying the major water routes (Waisberg, 1977: 90; 162-68). Yet it is also argued that the fur trade brought about a change in the Ojibwa value system. Native leaders began to emulate European competitive behaviour, seeking to increase their prestige by centralizing and distributing wealth. Gradually this encouraged reliance on cognative descent, or a known relationship to a common ancestor traceable through affiliants as well as agnates (Keesing, 1970: 774), in order to facilitate transmission of property and status between generations.

This study, by contrast, seeks to show that Native values were not substantially altered during the French regime. Instead it holds that economic and political self-determination constituted as important a goal during the period of indirect colonialism as it does today within modern state society. Band leaders who acted as middlemen in the fur trade, for instance, employed their negotiating skills to maintain a balance of economic power between the Native peltry producers whom they represented, and the buying agencies. Since total monopoly control of fur buying rarely prevailed during the French regime, individuals assumed the middleman role with a fair degree of success (Ray and Freeman, 1978: 53-75). At the same time Native leadership underwent considerable elaboration to protect long-term group interests in the face of the intrusive European political and economic systems. On behalf of their bands, head chiefs developed a strong sense of responsibility for land and resources. They exercised jurisdiction over territories that were defined by distinctive geographic features -- rivers, lakes and hill ridges -- and all adult males were expected to participate with their leader in defending their land. One tendency within oral traditions related by elders

at Garden River was the far greater emphasis placed on a band's range being defendable than on its economic assets. All band territories had an island offshore used for burial and ceremonial occasions, usually a high bluff as a lookout station, numerous entrances into the interior for dispersal of population, and sufficient diversity of resources inland from the lakeshore to allow a group to withstand a seige of their coast.[17] Ojibwa thinking on these matters, it was found, was strategically oriented to a high degree and exhibited marked attention to geographic and topographic detail.

Within each hunting range, emphasis was on efficiency of movement, the light birchbark canoe, toboggan sled, bark wigwam and hemispherical hut being basic to this portable settlement pattern. The spring and fall fish runs were the only times of the year when, for several weeks, families congregated at the rapids. Maple sugar production occurred in April, "when the leaves got to be the size of a beaver's ears."[18] Families planted corn and, during the historic period, potatoes and other root crops in the sugar bush. Autumn once again brought the fish, after which families travelled inland to harvest crops they had planted in the spring, and to proceed to their winter hunting grounds. Each phase of this economic cycle provided a surplus to tide them over part of the next. Meat and fish could be dried or smoked, and berries, corn, and maple sugar preserved. The Ojibwa constructed light-weight bark boxes for storing and carrying such dry produce, while pits were dug for root crops.

The Indians pursued big game throughout the year. Moose and woodland caribou, both non-migratory species, were obtainable. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries caribou and moose occasionally

roamed the north shore of the straits in large numbers and were speared for their meat and hides (Henry, 1976: 210, 236-38; Blair, 1911, 1: 221). Bear could also be plentiful, as was the case during the "bear year" of 1811 (Kohl, 1956: 407). Until the 1840's, when their numbers declined from overhunting by White sportsmen as well as Indians, beaver, racoon[19] and migratory wildfowl were important food sources. Indians grew corn, but harvested it green (Kinietz, 1965: 321-2), trapped and snared rabbits and smaller fur-bearing animals, collected berries, and may have gathered some wild rice, although the latter was not an important resource in this region.[20] Virginia deer, though present on the Upper Peninsula of Michigan, were late migrants to the Canadian shore of the St. Mary's channel, having occupied a niche only recently vacated by the disappearance of caribou herds in the area, and so likely did not constitute an important prey for Ojibwa hunters north of Lakes Huron and Superior.[21]

Family groups "followed the animals."[22] Given the Indians' well-developed technology of river transportation, bands in the Sault area had access to many different locales. Should resources fail in one region, they could readily move to another, although if a district was under the jurisdiction of a head chief, permission would first have to be asked from the resident leader. During the year, family units ranged over a wide area, with the Sault Ste. Marie falls as its core. As well as at the rapids, fish could be taken near Whitefish Point, west of the American Sault, and during the winter through the ice on the numerous bays which indented the northeastern coast of the St. Mary's channel. Indian encampment sites existed at Garden River, Sugar Island, Thessalon, and St. Joseph's Island, and considerable movement,

back and forth, occurred throughout the winter and spring between the coast and the interior hunting grounds. Since lakes north of Sault Ste. Marie fed river systems which flow both southeast into Lake Huron and southwest into Lake Superior, bands whose territorial prerogatives during the historic era extended over these watersheds could exercise choice concerning in which direction they would head in travelling to the coast each spring.

Primarily due to its importance to the traders and colonial authorities, the whitefish run at the rapids left an indelible imprint on the history of Sault Ste. Marie. Detailed descriptions of this fishery date from the seventeenth century (Galinée and Casson, 1903: 74; J.R., 33: 149). The Indians employed a long-handled dip net, with mesh of basswood fibre, which could draw as many as fifteen fish at a single sweep of the net during a good run. The lower reaches of rivers, flowing from watersheds north of Lakes Huron and Superior and cascading over a fall zone lying not many kilometres back from the coast, also offered an environment for seasonal concentrations of fish. Fishing technology employed, mainly in the spring and fall, along these watercourses included lines and lures, leister spears, shallow seines and stone and brush weirs.[23]

The French, interested in founding a Native fishery to provision their military and trading posts, introduced the Indians to the use of deep water gills nets and encouraged them to bring dried and smoked fish to Michilimackinac to trade -- a pattern of exchange which, according to Bacqueville de la Potherie in 1671, superseded an all-Native trade system which had already been operating in that area (Blair, 1911, 1: 309-10). Yet the French experienced mixed success in persuading the

the Indians habitually to supply their establishments with fish, as bands proved reluctant to be drawn into any unilaterally-controlled commercial nexus which might impinge on their political autonomy. A similar situation arose when the colonial authorities encouraged greater attention to corn horticulture and sought to regularize production of bark canoes for the fur trade.[24] All in all the colonial powers promoted an increase in productivity in certain areas of the Native economy, but without effecting any radical changes in either traditional attitudes or values.

This study proposes that Native leadership in the Upper Great Lakes region underwent considerable elaboration during the French regime, resulting in greater protection for group interests in the face of an alien political and economic system. Head chiefs developed a strong sense of proprietorship over land and resources on behalf of their bands.[25] Rather than mainly providing for the transfer of goods and property, or intangibles such as leadership status and honorifics, agnatic and cognatic succession were adopted as regulatory mechanisms by which individuals could participate in the protection, right of residence and access to local resources vested in the person of the head chief. The ogima was not a centralizing and distributing agent for material wealth. His principal role was to establish and sustain political linkages with other powerful agencies, both Native and White, which would secure a stable milieu for his group. To this end, an elaborate system of ceremonial exchange developed. Influential leaders, endowed with knowledge of medicine and witchcraft, sought to establish a balance of power among bands residing in the Upper Great Lakes area while maintaining workable and generally harmonious

interaction with the French authorities.

It seems unlikely that, following the stabilization of this network of political interrelationships, which seems to a great extent to have been ideologically legitimized in the context of the medicine societies, bands led by influential chiefs would have merged into a "national confederacy". While one cannot ignore the integrating power which a specific symbol drawn from the Ojibwa cosmological system might have exercised within a Native alliance during the mid-seventeenth century (Greenberg and Morrison, 1982), historical evidence provides little substantiation for any major organizational change during the fur trade era. Had a confederacy designated as "Ojibwa" come into being around the time of the influxes eastward into territory vacated by the Huron dispersal (J.R., 38: 181), this entity must have arisen primarily in response to situational pressures. What seems most probable is that a war leader, believing himself to be the protégé of a bird guardian agency -- possibly a Crane or another spirit associated with war -- temporarily conferred his dodemic mark on allies whom he led into battle.[26]

That a bird symbol also represented one particular group at Sault Ste. Marie during the late 1680's arises in the writings of Baron de Lahonton. According to Lahonton, the "Ouchipoues, called Sauteurs, have an Eagle Sable, perching upon the top of a Rock Argent, and devouring an Owl Gules" (Thwaites, 1905, 2: 511). The French thus attributed classifying descriptions, employing Native symbolic elements in the manner of European heraldic devices, to bands. The French also found the "Crane" sign among the "Mississauga" of southeastern Ontario (N.Y. Col. Docs., 9, 1053-4). Clearly, the terms "Mississauga" and "Crane" were not synonymous.[27] The first pertained to the geographic band unit, the other denoted a form of transmissible entity which defined a sector of the larger group. Yet a

dodem could appear in French accounts as a band name whenever a prominent leader bearing a particular symbol took it upon himself to assume the identity of his entire group in negotiations with the colonial authorities. By allocating gifts and honors to individuals identified by a mark they recognized, the colonial authorities undoubtedly aided is sustaining the preeminance over time of leaders of a group characterized by a certain dodemic designation. In this way, the dodemic unit assumed prominence as a group entity, engrafted upon the Ojibwa kinship universe.

Leadership, the Dodem and the Issue of Group Inclusiveness

Emphasis has been placed on the dodemic unit as an exogamous unit (Freud, 1918: 4-14; Landes, 1937; Kinietz, 1947: 69) and as a device for laterally extending the range of kin obligations (Smith, 1974a). Little attention, however, has been paid to how the concept of dodem relates to the increasing stress, as the colonial era progressed, placed on agnatic and cognatic descent. Unlike kinship, which ascribes the generalizing term ndani.'ko.'bidjigan, or "our link", to all ancestors above the third ascending generation (Landes, 1937: 7), agnatic and cognatic descent groups include forebears extending many generations back. For instance, Tugwaugaunay, the Crane chief at Lapointe, maintained a "curious family register" engraved on a copper tablet which recorded eight generations of ancestors (Warren, 1970: 89-90). Similarly, Mongozeed, the Loon head chief at Fond du Lac, held that his line extended for ten generations, culminating in a patriarch with

the name Gijigossekot, or "The Sky Afraid of Man," who was believed to have exercised powers not only of healing, but also the raising of the body from death (Kohl, 1956: 138).

Owing to the growth of semi-autonomous political entities in the Upper Great Lakes region as a consequence of the operation of the colonial transactional milieu, Ojibwa society during the 1700's become organized according to descent principles, so that outside agencies viewed members of a named group as components of a distinct "set".[28] Behavioural conformity to an agnatically-oriented ideology, which governed the transmission of the dodem between generations, was never rigid however. A power-holder might acquire a dodem by tracing his inclusion in a group by reference to cognatic succession, and then, through vision sanction, change his dodem. The functioning of the Ojibwa power-belief system thus remained the primum mobile of social structural change in the Upper Great Lakes region during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

The dodem, as an identifying criterion transferred to a father's offspring regardless of sex, designates a group which cuts across the bifurcate collateral kinship universe in that from the standpoint of ego, mother, mother's sister, and mother's sister's children are not included in the unit. Yet, from historical and anthropological sources, as well as testimonies of elders at Garden River, it was found that the dodem exists on two levels: first and foremost, as a spirit entity located inside a person, and only secondarily, as a group identifier. While the dodemic system

conforms to the principles of opposition discussed by Claude Lévi-Strauss (1963; 1966), the dodem itself preserves an integrity of its own derived from the Ojibwa cosmological system. As Paul Radin (1914: 210) has contended, one should not view Ojibwa beliefs as "though they pertained to some vague social unit". Instead, from the Native perspective, religious knowledge, based upon the attainment and exercise of power-control, could simultaneously inform both individual and group action. For instance, the dodem, perceived at Garden River as a spirit guide located near a person's heart, not only protected the individual during his lifetime, but also led a person's soul following death to the "home" of his ancestors.[29] Engaging in activities out of keeping with the Ojibwa moral code brought shame upon the individual, inducing the dodem to depart, leaving the individual's soul unprotected and destined to wander aimlessly after death. For this reason, the concept of dodem could exercise powerful internalized sanctions over individual behaviour.

It was also stressed at Garden River that the dodemic unit or "clan" provided the medium through which important values, associated with certain adiso. ka.nag, were passed down from generation to generation. The head man of each dodemic unit spoke on his group's behalf, and while so doing often assumed the identity of the dodemic spirit. Most important, the dodem provided man with a means of sharing an animate component of the cosmological whole with others, in contradistinction to the highly particularized power and protection an individual derived from his personal guardian spirit.

Owing to the ubiquity of power in all human endeavours, a

recognized power-holder naturally had unique opportunities to exercise and balance the various linkages within his scope. Even a major leader such as Shingwaukönse however could not act without reference to the constraints within the moral system. Oral traditions at Garden River maintain that The Pine employed the mark of the Crane for his own, as did his children until during a period of personal hardship, which he perceived as being linked to his improper use of the Crane mark, he changed his dodem to that of the Plover.[30]

According to a story Buhkwujjenene, The Pine's son, told to an Anglican missionary during the 1870's (Wilson, 1886: 51) Shingwaukönse's mother Ogimaqua had been the daughter of a local chief named Shingwaukönse or Shingabaw'osin (although owing to the chronology it could not have been the same Shingabaw'osin Schoolcraft encountered in the 1820's) who, in turn, had been the son of "Tuhgwahna".[31] This last figure was probably the son of "Great Crane", who was a head chief at the time of the British Conquest, and stood as the apical ancester from which all "Cranes" at Sault Ste. Marie traced their geneðlogy. By reckoning descent through his mother and maternal grandfather, The Pine could claim membership in the Crane band, as well as rights to resources and residence at the rapids. This enabled him to employ the Crane dodem in the absence of any other mark as long as he remained of minor status within the Sault band. While reluctant to challenge the predominance of the head Crane chief prior to his removal in 1836 to the Canadian shore, his rise to leadership and assumption of territorial prerogatives brought about a major change in the nature of his relationship to other power-holders, including the Cranes at the rapids. It seemed at first that The Pine wished to enhance his status with a new and distinctive identity by changing his dodem from that of the Crane to that of the Plover. Yet it

appears that cultural sanctions prompted his act as much, or perhaps more than personal opportunism, given the special function of the dodem as the means by which an individual overtly expressed the nature of his relationship with others within the greater Native community.

After 1836 Shingwaukonse suffered the reversals of fortune which led him to seek additional spiritual guidance. The crucial years of decision for The Pine lay just prior to 1844, following which time he permanently assumed his new dodemic mark as an identifier.[32] Dan Pine Sr.'s stress on the Plover being a bird found both in Europe and in North America suggests that The Pine invoked spiritual assistance in determining the dodem of his father, who had been a European.[33] The chief's actions may have been further prompted by a concern that a marriage, contracted between one of his daughters, Ogimaqua, and John Kabaosa of the Crane dodem, would be incestuous according to the rules governing dodemic group exogamy.[34] According to Native belief, the chief could not change his dodemic identity at will, but he could, explained Fred Pine Sr., "lose" his former spirit, the Crane, and gain a second through fasting.[35] In this respect religious and structural logic combined to compel conformity to the moral code. Ultimately it was each individual's own responsibility to take heed of the dangers to one's soul which could befall even influential power-holders engaging in wrong behaviour. By thus bringing his dodemic identity into accord with the social principles governing alliance, The Pine restored his proper status not only within Ojibwa society, but also within the context of the Native belief system as well.[36] Shingwaukönse's substitution of the Plover for his former dodem hence provided a clear instance in which a leader conferred a new dodemic designation upon a group, a process which had been occurring since the



Plover dodem of Shingwaukonse, Hawk dodem of Piabetassung, and Crane dodem of Kabaosa. Witness Joseph Wilson, August 12, 1850. PAC, RG 10, vol. 184.



Dodemic marks, 1859. Buhkwujjenene retains the Crane dodem. Treaty No. 61 (B). PAC, RG 10, vol. 1841.

early eighteenth century, if not earlier.

It might be assumed from such evidence that use of the Crane dodem conformed to the same code. Transmission of this mark would subsequently have taken place through agnatic or cognatic descent, or by another culturally sanctioned alternative, although the result would have been neither a true patrilineage nor a residence unit. It is also likely that the Crane dodemic group developed into a self-perpetuating entity in response to a period of heightened French ceremonial activity in the Lake Superior region. For this reason, when one views Tugwaugaunay's legend of the Crane chief from the perspective of French imperialist designs and fort building in North America, one draws near to being able to pinpoint with fair accuracy when the migration of this particular leader from Sault Ste. Marie to Wisconsin may have occurred.

French Perceptions and Native Adaptations

Scholars have viewed Native-European relations primarily within the context of the fur trade ---a perspective often associated with the work of Harold Innis. Innis (1962) held that a monolithic, monopolistic organizational structure enabled the Hudson's Bay Company to penetrate and finally usurp the hegemony of its weaker rival, the French fur trade. Working on a broader canvas, he not only viewed the British fur trade as an important instrument in the shaping of distinctive Native-White institutions, but also as an integral factor in the establishment of the British-based commercial empire along the St. Lawrence-Great Lakes water route, ultimately significant in shaping the economic and geopolitical character of the

Canadian nation.

Innis' thinking has pervaded much of the recent work undertaken by economic geographers writing on the subject of Native-White relations in the fur trade (Ray, 1974; Freeman and Ray, 1978; Grant, 1981), with the result that little intensive research has been carried out on the French régime and its fur trade in the Lake Superior area during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Nor have studies focused on the participation of the Indians in activities involving the successor to the French fur trade, the Northwest Company.[37]

The priority accorded Innis' interpretation in Canadian historiography has been criticized by W. J. Eccles in an article entitled "A Belated Review of Harold Adams Innis, The Fur Trade in Canada" (Eccles, 1979: 419-41). Eccles questions the assumption that economic priorities dominated the course of French policy in the Upper Great Lakes area. Instead, he maintains that events during this time period might better be viewed in the light of rivalry between European imperialist powers rather than from the perspective of economic competition in the fur trade. Eccles points out that by 1690 a surplus of beaver had glutted French markets, prompting French abandonment of all but one of the western trading posts. The consequences of this decision, he holds, seriously undermined French military strength on the frontier. Trade, which had progressed uninterrupted since 1680, when Sieur de Luth effected a peace between the Ojibwa and Sioux, experienced only a temporary setback. Resumption of this commerce, Eccles (1979: 423) stresses, accompanied but did not dominate French policy.[38]

Eccles instead emphasizes that the French regarded intercourse between the Indians of the Upper Great Lakes and the English at Albany to constitute a major threat to the security of New France. French views on the matter, moreover, were reflected in the placement of French forts. In 1671 the territory west of Sault Ste. Marie had been claimed for the French Crown and a fort erected, but no sizable garrison had been posted near the St. Mary's straits, and by 1701 even Michilimackinac was abandoned in favor of Detroit. While Lake Superior Indians migrated southward to be near to Detroit, the main body of the Ojibwa population appeared undeterred by sudden switches in French political and economic policies. For example, in 1709 the Intendant of Canada, Antoine Raudot, described an assemblage at Sault Ste. Marie composed of a local band and a "number of wandering tribes" which differed little, if at all, from gatherings at the rapids referred to by French writers since 1641 (Kinietz, 1965: 373). On the basis of such data, one must again seriously question the weight one should ascribe to the idea that the Native peoples were adopting commercial values during these years and had become obsessed with the acquisition of European goods. It is much more likely that this "dependency thesis" arose primarily from a cursory reading of the correspondence of French officials, who found it good policy to keep alive a belief that Indian peoples could be manipulated through distributions of honors, goods and presents.

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Ojibwa exercised considerable autonomy in deciding with which colonial power

they would maintain trade relations. Colonial authorities usually had to compete for Native allegiance. When it appeared that French failure to maintain the fur trade and assist Indian allies militarily had encouraged Native leaders from Sault Ste. Marie "to defect" to the English, Pierre Le Sueur was sent to Chequamegon in 1692 to redirect Ojibwa loyalties back to the French Crown.[39] The French knew that, strategically, no groups were so effective in blocking English movement north from Albany as the Ojibwa, and yet rumours claimed that Ojibwa chiefs were considering entering into peaceful relations with the Mohawk, allies of the British. This disturbing news induced Count Frontenac to try to obtain a pledge of loyalty from the Chequamegon chief, Chingɡabé,[40] who accompanied Le Sueur to Montreal in 1695. Chingɡabé, for his part, was much more interested in obtaining French support in an ongoing war between his people and the Foxes (N.Y. Col. Docs. 9: 609). Frontenac rejected the chief's appeals for a French force to be sent against the Fox, and instead tried to win the Ojibwa's favour by reminding them of the obligations the Indians owed the French, arising from the benefits of French trade. Since Frontenac's words offered no hint of military aid, Chingɡabé vacillated in his professions of loyalty to the French Crown (Ibid.: 611-2).[41]

The Ojibwa thus did not bow after 1671 before the assertion of French sovereignty. Their stance, while superficially acquiescent, was distanced enough to make the colonial authorities hasten to fill any breach in mutual understanding with inducements to win Indian allegiance. During these years the traditional pattern of responsibility seems to have predominated, and leaders like Chingɡabé, even when encouraged by presents and other material benefits, refused to commit themselves

definitely until they had received sanction from their bands. Native leaders at this time were not merely brokers, but members of a cultural community which acted in accordance with a value system different from that of the European. As Chingabé had done, chiefs tested whether or not a colonial power could be considered a potential ally by requesting its authorities to aid in Native warfare. This constituted the standard mode of determining which external interest to support, which to deal with cautiously, and continued to be used as a tactic by head chiefs until the period of intercolonial rivalries drew to a close.[42] In general, strategies employed in the transactional sphere which enhanced the independent stance of the Indian, without undermining the advantages resident in the relationship, were most likely to be adopted by Ojibwa leaders.

The Upper Great Lakes "Forest Aristocracy"

By studying Native modes of address, the French, and later the British, employed terms gauged to flatter and thereby win the allegiance of these influential chiefs. Warren (1970: 131-2) himself suggests this, drawing on information he received from Michael Cadotte, a fourth-generation descendant of Kechenezuhyauh, the chief of the Cranes of Lapointe at the time of Sieur de St. Lusson's expedition to the Sault in 1671:

> /The envoy of the French king, addressing himself to the chief from La Pointe, said/: "If you are in trouble, you, the Crane, must arise in the skies and cry with your 'far sounding' voice, and I will hear you. The fire of your French father shall last forever, and warm his children." At the end of this address a gold medal shaped like a heart was placed on the breast of Ke-che-ne-zuh-yauh, and by this mark of honor he was recognized as the chief of the Lake Superior Ojibways. These words have been handed down from generation to generation, to his present descendants, and it will be readily seen by them that the French had already learned to use the figurative and forcible style of expression of the Ojibways. . .

No notion of the transfer of this European-conferred status seemed to have been present among the Ojibwa during the seventeenth century, since the medal was buried with Kechenezuhyauh on his death (Ibid.: 132 ff.). Nor is it apparent that any concept of the lineal transmission of leadership either through the male or female line existed.

According to elders at Garden River today, receptivity to power-control generally stemmed from a person's exposure and receptivity to a suitable vision experience, engendered in part by listening to ritualized recitations of legends, adiso:ka.nag.[43] This would be followed by collective recognition that an individual possessed attributes which fitted him to lead the group. At a feast, a leader might present a son or other close relative as his choice as successor, and guests invited were expected either to accept or reject the selection. In 1670, the Amikwa, or Beaver nation, held a feast to validate a new chief's succession to leadership (J.R., 55: 137-9), and in the 1830's a similar event occurred among Eschkebugecoshe's Pillagers (Schoolcraft, 1852, 2 67). Yet the youth, although approved by the group, might still have to prove his courage in a series of staged trials.[44] During the later colonial era, the chosen candidate was also often brought before the external authorities at Montreal or one of the western posts for recognition. Smith's finding that Ojibwa leadership became hereditary in the patriline (Smith, 1979) might possibly be accepted during the historic era for some Lake Huron bands, but has little bearing on practices at Garden River, except when external officials interfered in the leadership succession.

Since to the Ojibwa, political power was not separated from the idea of spiritual blessing, as in European thought, there was no need for a lengthy genealogy to support one's status. A man blessed with a vision

might boast an unending legacy of power, as his spirit helpers were immortal. An aspirant youth's claim to power resided in sharing in the vision of older and wiser mentors until the dreams of the young person corresponded in some measure to that of the elders. At the same time the youth elaborated on earlier versions of the story by drawing on symbolic representations from his own experience. The individual thus came to draw upon the "power" encapsulated in vision-legend. Yet, while Native ideology stressed that the transmission of such power was through vision alone, selective telling of specific stories between a father and his offspring tended to ensure that whatever political, as well as spiritual preeminence might belong to an elder would remain for several generations in his family (Kohl, 1956). This gave rise to the lengthy genealogies presented by chiefs like Mongozeed of Fond du Lac. Children internalized specific values, goals and codes of behaviour from listening to these legends, which aided in fostering a reciprocal relationship between teller and band and enabled a chief to exhort his listeners personally to forward and protect interests which they all shared.

Adiso.ka.nag of this nature on occasion gained a wider audience in ritual settings at summer assemblies. That such legends figured prominently in medicine ceremonies is indicated by Raudot's observations of one such ceremony at Sault Ste. Marie, in which an individual, after participating in rites which offered participants an opportunity to commune with spirits in an altered state physically resembling death, "raises himself and then sits down and tells the assembly tales and fables about the other world, which he says he has seen" (Kinietz, 1965: 374). According to Hoffman (1891) and Landes

(1968), the midéwiwin not only furnished just such a ritualized milieu for the recitation of a body of traditional legend, but also allowed for expression of personal vision experience: a state of affairs which accorded well with Raudot's protrayal of the medicine ceremony as a group forum for the attainment, development and transmission of power. The importance of maintaining channels to new sources of visionary experience was evident from modifications certain leaders deliberately made in the midéwiwin forum. Changes in ritual format undoubtedly occurred over time as a result of accretion, yet Schoolcraft (1855, 5: 426-7) stated that important structural modifications also took place through decision-making processes involving selection, rejection and creative adaptation:

> The initiative to be instructed in the medicine, cannot be taken by the candidate himself. This is the reason why all Indians are not Midai, as they wish to be. The initiative must be assumed by the parent or friends, under the influence of a dream which they have had. . . Formerly, it was sufficient that one person made a declaration of such a dream, with reference to another, to entitle the latter to be presented. There were then great abuses, and anybody became very easily a member of the Midai. This abuse has been reformed and Flatmouth /Eschkebugecoshe/ is regarded as one of those who have contributed most to this reform.

While participation in the initial degrees of the midéwiwin could occur at any age during a person's life, it appears that demonstration of power in its competitive or protecting aspects may have been more exclusively the prerogative of older individuals with established responsibilities. Younger men achieved recognition by rituals associated with affirmation of prowess in war. One practice, universal among the Indians of the Upper Great Lakes, was the act of "striking the post" in public assembly. A French account of this means of recounting war achievements, recorded among the Potawatomi near Detroit in 1718 (N.Y. Col. Docs., 9: 887) accords almost identically

with Schoolcraft's discussion, over a century later, of the same activity among the Ojibwa (Schoolcraft, 1853, 3: 64), indicating that throughout the historic period, participation in this ceremony remained an important means of gaining individual acclaim. Until a man proved himself worthy to follow the course of his vision in the "civil sphere", as a group's protector and guide, the main outlet for his ambitions was to lead a war party.

The ability of a person to demonstrate the possession of power-control in human relations, war and hunting laid the foundations for his exercise of territorial prerogatives on behalf of a band (Mason, ed. 1962: 53-5). This included the allocation of individual family hunting territories. Territorial prerogatives assumed differing forms depending on circumstances. Within the eighteenth-century Ojibwa economy, which was increasingly being drawn into the exploitation of sedentary fur-bearing animals, an individual's assumption of such a regulatory role constituted an adaptive advantage in allowing each group member a fair share of resources.

Leaders exercised their powers with assistance from a number of specialized aides. The oskabewis was a speaker and messenger whom Kohl (1956: 160-1) referred to as the person they "allow to speak for them and send on errands when they themselves are too lazy, or when they consider it beneath their dignity to go in person." Schoolcraft (1853,3: 62) and McKenney (1972: 235) mentioned the mishĭnowā as an "economical aid to the chief"

upon whom devolved responsibility for the distribution of presents and other goods. It is interesting to note that both these roles derived from those of functionaries within conjuring and medicine ceremonies (Schoolcraft, 1855, 5: 428; Hallowell, 1942: 41). The concentrating of these specialized prerogatives and roles about the person of a head chief and his close kin could make it difficult for an aspiring young leader to gain high status within the territory encompassed by the political "aegis" of the head man.

"Established" leaders resided principally in the vicinities of Sault Ste. Marie, Michilimackinac, Michipicoten, northern Green Bay, Chequamegon, Grand Portage and, just prior to the British conquest, forts extending northwest from the Lake Nipigon-Kaministiquia region intended to counter English intrusions from Hudson Bay (Kellogg, 1924 : Chapter 16). It is suggested that ambitious young men, having obtained a reputation for leadership, may have left these areas with their followers to push southwest and west of Lake Superior into territories where they would not encounter competition from "established" chiefs, and opportunities for hunting appeared promising. This westward migration of young war leaders from regions where "upward mobility" often proved a challenge may have been responsible for the predominance throughout the Lake Superior region of individuals and groups bearing the Crane mark, observed by the French.[45] Generally one of a leader's sons became head chief upon his father's death, while other siblings and close kin, should they be ambitious, had to seek alternative routes to status and prestige. William Warren (1970: 316-7) stated that Kechenzuhyauh's eldest son, Akeguiow or the "Neck of Earth", succeeded his father in rank, but that Shadawish, a younger son, became the "first

pioneer towards the headwaters of the Wisconsin River." The rise of young men as warriors, brigade leaders and spokesmen on behalf of bands brought them to the attention of the French. Had the French early on favoured a specific family designated by the Crane mark, then young members of this family, wherever they dwelt in the Upper Great Lakes region, might well have anticipated similar recognition from the colonial authorities.

In summary, the presence of a ranked leadership hierarchy within Ojibwa society emerged as a function of French colonial policy by the eighteenth century. New situations demanded new competencies. High ranking leaders attained negotiating skills which enabled their bands to maintain linkages with the French authorities which not only promised protection from enemies, and thus stability in trade relations, but also permitted their bands' retention of a high degree of political and economic autonomy.

Leaders famed for their courage in war and medicine powers arose in the vicinity of French military and trading establishments (Burpee, 1927: 383-4). Usually their leadership prerogatives lay unchallenged until their death. From the European perspective, the fact that these men also assumed the role of vital links between their bands and the colonial authorities, which resulted in their groups receiving special benefits and trading privileges, makes their presence, and the often large number of their followers, particularly a historical phenomenon. Yet, it is doubtful if the Native peoples viewed the attainment of these advantages as the consequence of a chief's interaction with colonial authority. A leader might consider himself to have been approached by the authorities because he had power-control, the same

power which delivered his enemies to him in war, and enabled him to contact the spirit agencies of the animals which gave their lives to him in the hunt. While the nature of the relationship varied in each case, the idea of benefits accruing because of the possession of power remained a constant.

Young aspiring leaders chose to press westward into lands historically occupied by the Menomini, Sauks, Fox and Sioux. As time progressed, groups, of anywhere from twenty to two hundred warriors, led bv these men carved out niches for themselves along the upper reaches of water courses flowing into western Lake Superior and the headwaters of the Mississippi. In their westward expansion, in wars against hostile nations, they were aided and abetted by traders who, owing to exigencies of trade, had come to oppose colonial policy (Winchell, 1911: 532).

Transactions between Indian and French colonial officials in the early eighteenth century tended to accommodate perspectives from both cultures without doing injury to either. They created a forum for the exercise and elaboration of traditional Native notions of power-control, while simultaneously the French injected what we regard today as "feudal" concepts into French-Indian relations. Head men of groups such as the "Cranes" were viewed as leading a retinue of "henchmen" who espoused the same political and military virtues as the French nobility. Not only were appropriate clothing, weaponry and medals distributed to these chiefs, but in the face of possible war with England, preparations were also made for their installment as commissioned officers. In 1708, Sieur de la Mothe proposed that at least two Indian companies be formed at Detroit "which would be placed on the same footing as those of the French, and have them commanded by the most popular Indians among their tribes; to

make a separate corps out of them. . ." (N.Y. Col. Docs., 9: 812).

Gradually, the idea took shape in Indian-French councils that such chiefs represented a kind of "forest aristocracy", viewed as being retainers not only of the French governor, Onontio, at Quebec, but also of the King of France. Yet it was not the chiefs, but rather French voyageur and Métis persons descended from these leaders and their close kin, who kept the tradition alive the longest. According to J.G. Kohl (1956: 297), writing in the 1850's:

> . . . Canadian half-breeds often swagger with two genealogies -- a European commencing with a "lieutenant du roi," and an Indian, from some celebrated chief. I met one half-breed, a man tolerably well off, who had engraved both his French coat of arms and Indian totem (an otter) on his seal-ring.

One Métis individual, likely a member of the Cadotte family, proclaimed that the "Crane" defined a group, with representatives scattered as far north as James Bay and possessing a genealogy back to The Flood (Ibid.: 149), and yet such genealogically-oriented perceptions reflected European attitudes, not Indian.

The Ojibwa, by contrast, focused on the individual exercising and sustaining power on behalf of the group. Relationships among power-holders could be competitive, although Ojibwa culture provided forums in which power could be displayed, weighed within the greater hierarchical system, and a balance of power maintained. Relations between a leader and his group were ideally reciprocal, with both seeking to uphold mutual values and interests. According to this model, leaders conformed to traditional modes of attaining widespread renown within the Upper Great Lakes Native community, particularly for their feats in war, and by participation in highly structured medicine rituals during summer

assemblies. Because Ojibwa culture emphasized an open-ended receptivity to new ideas, their leadership proved versatile, drawing as it did on a broad pool of talents. Native leaders primarily sought to sustain a transactional milieu in which they could interact with external powers, colonial authorities, and later, state officials, as representatives of self-determining groups.

The Continuation of the Dodemic System Under the British Colonial Regime

The continued political preeminance of the "Cranes" following the demise of the French regime testified to the resilience of the dodemic system in the face of indirect colonial rule (Colson, 1967). Over time the "seat" of Crane "power" tended to migrate in keeping with geographic shifts in colonial military and trade centers in the Upper Great Lakes. The "Cranes" ceased to be prominent for five decades at Sault Ste. Marie, from 1710 to 1760, however, since during this time the rapids lay on the periphery of the colonial military and trade presence. Not until 1750 did the French, in order to counter English trade competition, establish a seigniory at the Sault (WHC, 18: 98-104), and the only grantee who ever took any interest in developing the site resided in France following the close of the Seven Years War. The outcome of the battle on the Plains of Abraham resulted in a "decapitation" of French society's hierarchical structure in the western district, and left behind a resident trader and Métis population whose interests, even prior to the end of the war, were becoming aligned more closely to those of the Indians than of the Governor in Quebec (Harrington, 1979; Peterson, 1977). Yet the feudal elements which had become fused with the Native concept of leadership remained, and continued to characterize relationships between

the Indian chiefs and the succeeding colonial power.

In 1764, with little modification, the British took over the earlier French system pertaining to the Native peoples. The re-garrisoning and revival of trade at the fortress at Mackinac provided new diplomatic and commercial opportunities for Ojibwa leaders in the eastern sector of Lake Superior. Genealogies for the "Cranes" at Sault Ste. Marie point to only one ancestral figure, Ketche.okejeed.ebun, or "The Great Crane". Given the date of the Great Crane's death -- approximately 1770 as suggested by the following affidavit, dated 1837 -- this particular Crane leader must have risen to prominence during the last years of the French colonial era:

> I the undersigned do solemnly swear that. . . to the best of my knowledge, Ke-che-O-ka-ne-jeed was a chief for the Chippewa Nation of this place, and /I/ was told from my youth, and until I was of age of about fifteen that he was the head Chief of this place, and believe he got his Chiefhood, from the French. I likewise, knew his son who succeeded him in his title, whose name was Ka-qua-taw-cum O-scum, and I knew the people of this place respected him, as their head Chief. After his death, his son O-shaw-wa-na succeeded him, as head chief -- whom I knew well and respected him as such. After his death his son, the present chief -- Ke-wen-zee Shaw-we-naw -- the great, great-grand son of the first mentioned chief /sic, actually only four generations in depth/ was the rightful Chief and succeeded his Father and is now our head Chief -- and looked to as such by our people of this place.
>
> My present age according to the best of my belief is about eighty-two -- not being certain -- I was baptized as a Christian and my name, given, was Mary --
>
> Mary O-bo-shaw-baw-no-qua[46]

Mary Oboshawbawnoqua's testimony conformed to a statement made by Schoolcraft (1975: 570) regarding the "Cranes", although the agent resorted to a system of patrilineal reckoning and primogeniture to determine leadership succession.

> Gitcheojeedebun /Great Crane/, had four sons, namely, Maidosagee Bwoinais, Nawgichigomee and Kezhawokumijishkum. Maidosagee,

> being the eldest, had nine sons, called Shingabowossin, Sizzah, Kaugayosh, Nattaowa, Ussaba /or Sassaba/, Wabidjejauk, Muckadaywuckwut /Muckodayoquot/, Wabidjejaukons, and Odjeeg. On the principles of Indian descent, these were all Cranes of the proper mark, but the chieftainship would descend in the line of the eldest son's children. 47

From the evidence drawn from such historic sources one cannot state, other than by reference to the Crane migration legend delivered by Tugwaugaunay at Lapointe, that the Sault Ste. Marie "Cranes" and those of Wisconsin were genealogically related. By 1782, the year of Tugwaugaunay's birth (Warren, 1970: 87-90), however, the practice of extending kin obligations, including proscription of marriage, laterally among others bearing the same dodem (Smith, 1974a) would have led "Cranes" to regard one another as related even though no blood connection could be traced.

Continuity in Commerce Following the British Conquest

British colonial policy fostered a degree of political stability within the Upper Great Lakes region. Certain chiefs came to be as well known to the British agents as they had been to former French officials. Like their French predecessors, the British also recognized a distinction between the lake Indians and "interior bands", which lacked the ceremonial elaboration and dodemic organization of the coastal groups.

Both French and English explorers referred to peoples who resided north of Michipicoten as O-pimittish Ininiwac /sic, No.peming-inini-wug/, or the gens de terres (N.Y. Col. Docs., 9: 1053-4), whose language Alexander Henry the Elder (Henry, 1976: 214) described as a "mixture of those of its neighbours, the Chipeways, and Christinaux".

The Cranes



Descendants of Keche.Ojeed.ebun or the "Great Crane". Tuhgwahna, Shingwaukönse's great-grandfather, was probably a son or a brother of Great Crane. Shingabaw'osin's son, Kebay Nodin, became head chief of a band residing most of the time near the mouth of the Tahquamenon River, west of the American Sault. Nebenagoching was a British appointee at Sault Ste. Marie, although Kaygayosh, before his death in 1836, remained more influential among the Native community at the rapids. John Kabaosa and Waubmama joined Shingwaukönse's band. Kezhawokumijishkum, a head chief at Drummond Island in the late eighteenth century, had numerous sons. Francis Oshawano became head chief at the American Sault around 1836. Oshawano married an Ermatinger woman, and the pair's son, Edward Shawan, became a chief on Sugar Island.

*The suffix .ebun denotes that the person referred to is deceased. It is also evidently a term of respect.

These inlanders ranged over the rocky Shield lands north of Lake Superior and were ancestral to groups known today as the "northern Ojibwa" (Bishop, 1974; Dunning, 1959; Rogers, 1962, 1980). While interior bands came to the rapids to fish, they were considered by the Sault peoples as being different from the lake populations in dialect, in minor cultural aspects, and in the role their leaders played, as trading captains, in the fur trade. Head men among the coastal bands were involved as middlemen and brigade leaders, but rarely for as long a period of their lives or in as strictly an economic capacity as the inland "captains" who came with their retinues to ply the river routes between Lake Superior and Hudson Bay well into the late eighteenth century.[48]

Henry (1976: 238) found that the collapse of the French imperial design in North America had temporarily halted commerce, but had not seriously harmed the underlying mercantile organization of the Montreal traders. Entering into league with Jean Baptiste Cadotte, a tenant at the French seigniory at the rapids in 1760, Henry based his own fur trade ventures on French-Indian contacts already in existence, employing experienced voyageur personnel. Henry's interest in mining copper at Michipicoten and in the Ontonagon River region also drew on French precedents. Problems in obtaining sufficient manpower, provisions and equipment, and the difficulties of transporting ore to London markets, however, dogged Henry's mining ventures from the outset and, in 1773, the mines were abandoned.

Over seventy years would pass before a revival of mining on the north shore of Lake Superior would lead to another brief union of

interests among miners, traders, French, and Indians. This would focus on copper deposits on lands Shingwaukönse considered to lie under his protective jurisdiction. Ojibwa, French, and Métis, drawn mainly from the environs of Sault Ste. Marie, but also including a former trading captain, L'Illinois, of Fort William, and Totomenai from Michipicoten, would unite to compel entrepreneurial parties to respect Native prerogatives. Allan Macdonell, a miner whose commercial interests had ideological roots deep in the history of the Northwest trade, would act as a catalyst in this dynamic. Yet Macdonell's activities remained primarily a background to the main events, which had their origin in Native opposition to American policies of land use and resource development. Crane Ojibwa leaders from the Lake Superior region joined together in resisting these external encroachments in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. When this movement failed, many of these men, such as Ahmous, great-grandson of Shadawish (Warren, 1970: 318), would come to support The Pine's plan to develop an "Ojibwa homeland" near Sault Ste. Marie.

CHAPTER TWO

THE VOICE FROM THE CENTER

The Cranes and the Western Confederacy

Throughout the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the British encountered major problems in establishing control, to the degree they wished to exercise, over the Native population of the Upper Great Lakes region. Officials feared that, should a combined French and Spanish force proceed up the Mississippi, the French traders and Métis might turn against Britain, taking the Indians with them.[1] It was generally assumed that Ojibwa loyalty could not be taken for granted. Whenever British colonial policy on issues of potentially vital concern to the authorities -- but of relatively little importance to the Indians -- contravened a band's views, head chiefs made it clear that they would rather hunt and construct canoes for the fur trade, or fight the Sioux, than meet with the British and abide by British directives.[2]

When it became evident that the entire Native population could not readily be won over to British policy, the colonial authorities concentrated instead on securing the allegiance of certain influential head chiefs. Leaders such as the Great Crane and Ketche.Naigow received special attention on their visits to Mackinac in return for their assuring the post commander that they would maintain political stability among the western bands.[4] With lessening British-American rivalry just prior to the turn of the nineteenth century, the strategic importance to Britain of these Ojibwa diplomats and negotiators declined. During

this period of temporarily diminished hostility head chiefs redirected their energies into supporting a growing Native resistance movement in the Ohio Valley, which by 1807 developed into the "Shawnee Uprising".

The Ohio Valley marked the eastern boundary of Indian territory. Yet, even prior to the American Revolution, White settlement had pressed westward across the river into the Ohio Valley in defiance of the Royal Proclamation of 1763, which prohibited the unregulated alienation of Indian land. It was probable that the Ojibwa at Sault Ste. Marie and Mackinac were aware that a contravention of policy had been taking place. During the 1760's, British authorities at Mackinac had initially respected the existence of aboriginal right. In 1760 Robert Rogers, Commander at Mackinac,[5] recognized this principle in his land transactions with the Great Crane, and Alexander Henry the Elder had followed suit.[6] John Askin, who during the mid to late eighteenth century maintained a sizeable trading establishment near L'Arbre Croche, Michigan,[7] also actively asserted that Indian sovereignty over the soil and its resources remained absolute until ceded by treaty.[8] Since both Rogers and Askin undoubtedly held councils with the Indians on the subject, the Ojibwa likely anticipated that British law would not condone transgressions of Indian rights such as were occurring in the Ohio Valley. The Shawnee, meanwhile, began militantly asserting their sovereignty over their lands by conducting sporadic attacks on outlying White settlements. The Ojibwa do not seem to have been deeply involved in these initial confrontations. In order to determine the degree of Ojibwa participation in the "Shawnee War", which had by this time been waged in guerrilla fashion for over five years, the British in 1779 called Maidosagee to Detroit for questioning. On being asked where he

Carver (1974)

Detail of Jonathan Carver's Map of 1767, Showing Distribution of Tribal Territories, as well as John Askin's Farm

and his people stood on the issue, the Crane head chief declared that the Ojibwa preferred friendship with the British to independent Native action and would await instructions before taking up arms.[9]

British and Ojibwa interests tended to complement one another during the 1780's and early 1790's, since British policy supported the recognition of the Ohio River as the boundary between United States and Indian territory. Partly in view of the advantages to trade, but mainly in response to threats of French and Spanish incursions from the south,[10] Governor Simcoe of Upper Canada argued that Britain should attempt to maintain an Indian buffer zone in the Ohio region (Wise, 1953: 36-44). Simcoe received backing for his plan from the Mohawk chief, Joseph Brant, who attempted to convince the Ojibwa, Ottawa, Shawnee and Miamis to resist further land sales in the western district (Johnson, 1964: xxxvi-xxxviii). In association with several officials of the British Indian Department, Brant forged the Ojibwa, Wyandot, Deleware, Shawnees, Miamis, Mingoes, Potawatomis, Mississauga, and Munseys into a loose military confederation, with each member "nation" taking a particular identifying symbol. The Ojibwa bore the mark of the Crane.[11]

This confederacy did not last. General Anthony Wayne's victory over the Shawnees and their allies at Fallen Timbers in 1794, and the signing of the Treaty of Greenville the following year by which the Indians surrendered most of their lands in Ohio, diminished the appeal for the Ojibwa of Brant and his league. There was a growing distrust of the British who, in spite of promises, had failed to come to the aid of the western nations. Under the terms of the Jay Treaty of 1784 the British relinquished occupation of the oldest forts

Done in General Council at the Fort of the Miamis Rapids the 13th day of August 1793

Nations	Marks
Wyandots	Bear
Seven Nations of Canada	Turtle
Delawares	Turtle
Shawanoes	Wolf
Miamis	Turtle
Ottawas	Sturgeon
Chippawas	Crane
Senecas of the Glaize	Turtle
Potowatomies	Black-fish
Connoys	Turkey
Munsays	Turkey
Nanticokes	Turtle
Mohikens	Turkey
Mohawagas	Eagle
Creeks	Bear
Cherokees	Elk

Sent with Strings of Blacks and White Wampum.

A true Copy
Signed A McKee D.A.G.I.A.

Secy's Indn. Genl.
Office Montreal
a True Copy
Joseph Chew
D. A. G. I. A.

P.A.C., RG 10, vol. 8

To the Commissioners of the United States

Brothers — The Deputies we sent to you did not fully explain our meaning; we have therefore sent others, to meet you once more, that you may fully understand the great question we have to ask you, and to which we expect an explicit answer in writing.

Brothers — You are sent here by the United States in order to make peace with us the Confederate Indians.

Brothers — You know very well that the boundary-line which was run between the White People and us at the Treaty of Fort Stanwix was the River Ohio.

Brothers — If you seriously design to make a lasting and a firm Peace you will immediately remove all your People from this side of that River.

Brothers — We therefore ask you: Are you fully authorized by the United States to continue and firmly fix on the Ohio River as the Boundary line between your People and ours?

Done in General Council at the foot of the Miamis Rapids 27 July 1793

On behalf of ourselves and the whole Confederacy and agreed to in a full Council.

Nations	Marks
Wyandots	Bear
Delawares	Turtle
Shawanese	Snake
Miamies	Turtle
Mingoes	Snipe
Poutawatamies	Black Bird
Ottawas	Turgeon
Connoys	Turkey
Chippewas	Eagle
Munsees	Turkey

A true copy.
(signed) Alexr. Aitken A.D.C.A.

Indian Affairs (RG 10, Vol. 8, pp. R12-R11)

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in the Northwest, making it clear to the Native people that Britain's western hegemony had radically declined. The Ojibwa were particularly affected since their population now fell under two separate jurisdictions. After 1794 they were increasingly drawn into the militant activities of more southerly nations, for without the support of British power, unification might mean strength as American settlement pressed further northwest.

The Shawnee Uprising

In 1808 a full-fledged Native resistance movement sprang into life, its momentum fed by the Shawnee Prophet's dualistic ideology, which portrayed Whites as evil serpents to be forced back into the sea. Many Ojibwa, among them the Lapointe and Leech Lake head chiefs (Warren, 1970: 324), submerged their personal skills in war and negotiation into this collective effort, although their support for resistance waned when Ojibwa warriors fell ill while residing with the Prophet in Ohio during the winter of 1808-9 (Edmunds, 1983: 76). It has been argued that dependence on the fur trade militated against the Ojibwa's support of the Shawnee uprising (Danziger, 1978). Yet it might also be contended that leaders like Maidosagee understood how to exploit the strategic assets of their geographic position between rival powers, and when conditions suggested negotiation and compromise rather than resistance, abandoned the Prophet and his western allies.

After 1808 the Ojibwa at Sault Ste. Marie once again supported Brant, who upheld the British government's original scheme of preventing American expansion west of the Ohio River. This sudden reversal in Native policy has been echoed in oral traditions which have carried down

to the present day at Garden River. "Ojibwa was once too powerful," Fred Pine Sr. explained. "He tried to kill the Snake. But that was wrong because old Snake had young ones coming along."[12] By 1800 the British and American powers were far too entrenched in the west to be driven back by Native strength.

The legend entitled "The Red Head" recorded by George Johnston, son of the trader, John Johnston, may also refer to this cooling of Ojibwa interest in the ideology of the Shawnee Prophet.[13] This story relates how two brothers, pursued by their mother in the form of a "rolling head", became protégés of bird spirits (Schoolcraft, 1848: 113; 1975: 669). One of the brothers, whose guardian was Oshuggay,[14] quarrelled with his sibling, who was under the protective aegis of Crane, and migrated south where he became known as "Shawnee".

Given the fact that the Shawnee and Ojibwa cannot be regarded as closely related culturally or linguistically, although both are Algonquian-speaking, it may be assumed that the fraternal relationship, referred to in the story, entailed the extension of the term "brother" to non-kin, and refers to the initial sharing of a common ideological outlook between the two peoples. That a penchant to follow different "spirits" eventually led each party to pursue a separate course likely reflects an event which occurred within the Upper Great Lakes Native community during the years just prior to the outbreak of the War of 1812. That the tale was not particularly old at the time it was recorded is also suggested by the fact that, in its most elaborated form, it tends to resolve conflicting dualities arising from the Shawnee Prophet's ideology. For example, one version concludes with the appearance of a white-robed man descending from the sky and emphasizing to the Crane's

protégé the value of the midéwiwin, which had been denounced by the Prophet for its use of "impure, evil medicines" (Warren, 1970: 322). Blame for the disruptions confronting the Indians instead came to be placed on the wabano, viewed as a "degraded" form of the midéwiwin (Schoolcraft, 1848:114-5).[15] No clash therefore occurred in the wake of the Shawnee uprising between the traditional Ojibwa thought system and the strongly anti-structural leanings of the prophet's teachings. By reference to this legend, Ojibwa leaders could find ideological justification for returning to their status as negotiators for their bands at a time when heightened tensions between Britain and the United States compelled the British colonial authorities to focus once again on courting Indian allies.[16]

Native-Trader Relations in the Lake Superior District, 1794-1812

Between 1794 and 1798 the Sault Ste. Marie Ojibwa launched a series of attacks against traders in the St. Mary's Straits area. These sporadic incursions, apparently based on a shrewd Native appraisal of the strategic importance of the Sault to trade in general, forced the French and Métis traders, formerly often at variance with colonial policies, to turn to the British authorities for protection. In 1796, Thomas Duggan, storekeeper at Mackinac, informed his superiors of the traders' predicament:

> The 7th of November Mr. La Framboise arrived from Sault St. Mary with an account of Manitoosaukee /Maidosagee/ and his band who reside in the vicinity of the place, threatening to cut off all the Traders there particularly the English, a few Blows were given on both sides and the day after this affair happened all the Indians went off, since when nothing remarkable respecting the Indians came to my ears. 17

These incidents fostered concern that Native hostility might turn against Whites in general. For this reason, the position of Tanner, an American captive of the Ottawa, became precarious after his adoptive Indian father Tawgaweninne, became seriously injured in a fight:

> When I saw this, I became alarmed for my own safety, and, I knew Me.to.saw.gea, an Ojibway chief, was then on the island, with a party going against the whites; and, as I had understood they had sought opportunity to kill me, I thought my situation unsafe (James, ed., 1956: 20).

On the other hand, not all traders were similarily threatened. In 1794, two years prior to La Framboise's encounter with Maidosagee in the St. Mary's straits, the Ojibwa granted one hundred and ninety-two acres of land "forever" to Jean Baptiste Nolin for "four kegs of nine gallons each of Rum and sixteen pound weight of tobacco."[19] The date and nature of this transaction is interesting, since the property had previously been purchased by Nolin from another trader, Jean Baptiste Barthe.[20] Nolin's need to obtain a deed from the Indians -- possibly the first made since the land transactions authorized by Rogers in the 1760's -- appears to have originated in the Ojibwa's heightened determination to exercise a degree of control over the disposition of lands at Sault Ste. Marie.[21] By intimidating threats and hostile acts, the Ojibwa compelled the resident commercial population to recognize the existence of aboriginal right. Confronted on both sides of the border by encroaching state powers, which by 1794 seemed increasingly likely to sacrifice Native interests to their own nation-building goals, the Native people struck back by demanding that their special prerogatives be respected.[22]

This unrest most certainly stemmed in part from the northward spread of ideas originating with Brant and the "western confederacy",

since in 1798 the Northwest Company contended that it would be difficult to obtain a land surrender at the rapids "without the interference of Brant."[23] Bitterness over the failure of the confederacy to prevent alienation of territory west of the Ohio, news of the Americans' intention to garrison Mackinac, as well as Britain's apparent lack of concern for Native interests, engendered additional Indian resentment. One thing is certain, however. Trade rivalries exerted little influence over Native activities at the Sault during these years.[24] The Indians were concerned with inducing all Whites, British or American, to recognize their territorial rights. After both British colonial authorities and trading interests became increasingly disposed to respect Native prerogatives, attacks on traders ceased. The willingness shown by Maidosagee's band in 1798 to cede St. Joseph's Island to the British government for a garrison post, and land on the north shore of the St. Mary's straits to the Northwest Company [25] demonstrated that grounds for accommodation had been reached. Relations between the Ojibwa and the British grew more amiable. John Johnston, who entered the Lake Superior trade in 1791 and eventually settled at Sault Ste. Marie, even came to know Maidosagee well enough to entertain the chief, prior to 1810, as a frequent house guest.[26]

When, in 1797, hostilities with the United States once again seemed imminent, British colonial authorities proved far more concerned about Britain's ability to retain the Indians as allies should war occur than they were about the security of the western trade. For instance, informed of a conflict in 1798 between the Ojibwa and Menominee, Colonel Guy Johnson, the Superintendent of Indian Affairs, replied that it was a "private quarrel" which would merely "lessen trade



Dodemic marks. Treaty No. 11, signed St. Joseph's Island, 30 June, 1798. PAC, RG 10, vol. 1841.

and won't harm us."[27] Annoyed by the government's disregard for their interests, traders demanded that the British intervene to halt the incessant warfare between the Ojibwa and neighbouring peoples. Yet the British continued to do as little as possible to alienate the western bands.[28] Following the collapse of the Shawnee uprising, many Ojibwa bands joined the British in a common endeavour to hold American expansionism at bay. Even when the outbreak of hostilities in the spring of 1812 severed supply lines -- restricting British distributions of gifts, honors and provisions to the Indians on the frontier -- the warlike spirit of Tecumseh and his allies remained strong. These warriors, one Indian superintendent informed General Brock, "have been constantly employed in making bows and arrows, not having any ammunition."[29] The Indians' diligence in defending their own interests continued even after the war, when Britain abandoned its Native allies in order to help establish conditions for a lasting peace with the United States.

Britain's first step after the signing of the Treaty of Ghent was to move the western post from St. Joseph's Island to Drummond Island. The station at St. Joseph's had been partly a concession to Indian demands. While difficult to defend from attack by water, it had proven to be easily accessible to the Lake Superior bands, and lay near important fisheries. By 1815, however, Native interests had been relegated to a low priority, with William McGillivray of the Northwest Company the only voice calling for other than purely strategic factors to be recognized in the choice of the location for the garrison.[30] While the fluctuating sense of responsibility towards the Indians exhibited by the British colonial government contrasts sharply with Washington's

economically-based Indian policy, implemented after 1800, it also shows that Ojibwa had far greater challenges to meet after the end of the War of 1812 than those arising solely from the expediencies of trade.

It is perhaps a legacy of nineteenth-century United States Indian policy -- which regarded trade as a means by which Ojibwa political, as well as economic loyalties might be manipulated -- that bands have been characterized as dependent on western goods to the point of having their national allegiances shaped by commercial determinants (Danziger, 1978: 53-67; Johnson, 1971; Prucha, 1962: 66-101). While Washington after 1814 certainly promoted this view,[31] it appears from the historical record that bands actually acted far more from their own interests than in relation to external commercial policies. Schoolcraft's recognition of this fact after his first-hand encounter with head chiefs on the western frontier led him to fear that rapid American expansion westward might foster a general Indian revolt of even larger proportions than the Shawnee uprising.[32]

Schoolcraft's father-in-law, John Johnston, by contrast, saw the possibility for discord between the Ojibwa and Whites in the Lake Superior district arising not from White settlement, since most of the area remained wilderness, but from an increasing lack of respect shown by petty traders for Ojibwa leaders and their followers. There had always been such elements present, but by the 1790's their numbers had grown, as the sons of older traders, and newcomers from the east, vied with one another for furs. To Johnston, most trade relationships lacked even the vestiges of civility. Incidents such as the following were common:

> My good neighbour/s/. . . walked into the water and hauled the canoe to shore and without ceremony possessed themselves of eight or ten beavers the old man /Mamongazida/ had killed. They kept him and his two wives, and a Mrs. Sayers, one of

> his daughters. . . in a constant state of intoxication for some days, at the end of which they turned them out of doors, telling them they must provide for themselves as they would feed them no longer. 33

The United States government responded by establishing a system of bonding and licensing traders, situated at trading houses, and imposing duties on goods imported across the international border. Yet, prior to Schoolcraft's appointment in 1822, these regulations had remained poorly enforced in the Lake Superior region (Johnson, 1971). By 1820 it had become difficult for Ojibwa leaders to maintain stable relationships with external political authorities which would ensure a degree of continued self-determination for their bands. The relatively lenient sanctions on commerce present under the Trade and Intercourse Acts of 1796, 1799 and 1802 (Prucha, 1962: 50) gave way to new measures, which were gauged to restrict group movements to specific geographical areas and which interfered directly in bands' internal regulatory mechanisms.[34] The progression towards reduction in the latitudes within which a chief could exercise his traditional range of powers was nevertheless a gradual one, and in hindsight, looking back at events between the years 1790 and 1820, one might say that traditional modes of leadership adapted remarkably well, given the accumulating hardships.

Schoolcraft's Perceptions of Native Leadership

The views of Henry Rowe Schoolcraft regarding Native leadership differed substantially from those expressed by his father-in-law, John Johnston. Johnston saw callousness and jealousies generated among competing merchants, and the self-interested manipulations of government agents, as primary culprits whenever chiefs found difficulties in establishing long-term relations with government officials or trading

agencies. Schoolcraft, by contrast, viewed band leaders as inherently unstable in both thought and action, owing to their traditional beliefs.

Although Schoolcraft's language could be forceful and, especially in his earlier writings, provocatively lyrical, his works continuously returned to the same themes with little additional analysis or variation. Indeed, if one compares the views expressed in his Algic Researches (Schoolcraft, 1839) -- the volume of Indian myth from which Longfellow later drew his ideas for the poem "Hiawatha" -- with his contributions to his History, Condition and Prospects of the Indian Tribes of the United States (Schoolcraft, 1851-7), one finds that his attitudes towards Ojibwa leadership grew increasingly dogmatic with time. To Schoolcraft, traditional culture constrained Native thought to an emotional perception of the world, "feeling almost everything, hoping almost nothing" (Schoolcraft, 1854, 4: 639). Reasoning could occur, but related solely to "topics which are familiar to the hunter state" (Ibid., 3: 57). In the late nineteenth-century evolutionary school of thought to which Schoolcraft, like his acquaintance Lewis Henry Morgan later adhered, the "hunter state" allegedly constituted the lowest stage of human cultural and intellectual development.

When not confined to the exercise of simple technical skills, Native reasoning, he claimed, faltered through a servile dependence on a multitude of localized spirit powers which engendered a system of belief antagonistic to insightful thought. The mediators in this scheme were the "medas, priests, jossakeeds, seers, sorcerers, or jugglers" whom he denounced as "mere demonic agents of Satan, that revel in the doctrine of polytheism, introduce confusion in the Indian mind, between the boundaries of the good and evil power, and keep it on the torture, by

setting one class of the spirit-gods at war with the other" (Ibid., 4: 637). Schoolcraft recognized that linkages existed between the Ojibwa system of waxing and waning spirit power and cyclical seasonal changes in the natural world (Ibid., 1853, 3: 492), but he made the world of physical appearance primary and the Ojibwa power belief system secondary and dependent on the latter -- a reversal of actual Native concepts. When Schoolcraft did deal directly with the notion of power in Ojibwa thinking he borrowed his explanatory concepts from Zoroastrianism. From this viewpoint he argued that Ojibwa cosmology lacked a clear perspective on dualities, and so inhibited the development of stable, abstract thought.[35]

In his assessments of Ojibwa leadership, Schoolcraft demonstrated firm adherence to his era's belief in individual as well as collective progress, to be attained through the recognition and refinement of a "manly independent spirit." Such an ideology -- stressing aggressive, tough-minded, decisive action, but also systematic reflection -- permeated the agent's biographical descriptions of Native head men and constituted the standard by which such men were judged. While Schoolcraft provided valuable ethnographic information on the Native mode of territorial allotment in the vicinity of Chequamegon in 1791 -- the year in which Johnston first encountered Waubojeeg[36] -- the following portrayal of this leader's role in the functioning of this system reflects a predominately moral rather than analytical appraisal:

> The hunting grounds of the chief. . . extended along the southern shores of Lake Superior from the Montreal River, to the inlet of the Misacoda, or Burntwood River of Fond du Lac. If he ascended the one, he usually made the wide circuit indicated, and came out at the other. . . In this ample area, the La Pointe, or Chagoimegon Indians hunted. It is a rule of the chase, that each hunter has a portion of the country assigned to him, on which he

> alone may hunt; and there are conventional laws which decide all questions of right and priority in stalking and killing game. In these questions, the chief exercises a proper authority, and it is thus in the power of one of these forest governors and magistrates, where they happen to be men of sound sense, judgement and manly independence, to make themselves felt and known, and to become true benefactors to their tribes. (Schoolcraft, 1848: 142)

Schoolcraft's emphasis on a chief's ability to exercise "a proper authority" over band affairs indicates that the agent failed to grasp the degree of flexibility and responsiveness to internal and external conditions with which leadership actually functioned among the Ojibwa. To him, Native leadership activities were usually situationally based, reflecting no policy, foresight, decisiveness -- even hope, for the Indian "always anticipated harm, never good" (Schoolcraft, 1853, 3: 58). Owing to his ideological beliefs, he came to view most Native leaders as mere instruments of public opinion whose powers resided solely in popular acclamation, gained primarily through the demonstration of a relentless thirst for war and bloodshed (Schoolcraft, 1851, 1: 194; 1855, 5:187).[37]

Schoolcraft had not levied such harsh judgments on the ability of Native thinkers to frame policy and act decisively during the early stages of his career as an Indian agent. In 1832 he had accorded Eschkebugecoshe, the Pillager head chief, with an aptitude for "practical reflection" (Mason, ed., 1958: 52). Yet, not surprisingly, for a leader to be a "reasonable" man in Schoolcraft's estimation a chief had to be willing to to conform to American policies. The agent's favourable impression of Eshkebugecoshe derived from a belief that the leader had readily accepted United States jurisdiction over his band. The head chief had declared his friendship for the American government during an encounter

with Lieutenant Zebulon Pike in 1806, and again in 1820 at a meeting with General Lewis Cass and his survey team, of which Schoolcraft had been a member (Mason, ed., 1958: 52; Schoolcraft, 1973: 154-5; Schoolcraft, 1851, 1: 142). Gradually, however, the agent changed his opinion, especially as the western chiefs -- regardless of what their speeches said -- demonstrated no inclination to confine their loyalties to the United States.

At the close of the War of 1812 Cass had recommended that the Americans, similar to the British, distribute presents annually to the Indians (Unger, 1967: 61-2), but Washington had already decided to opt for a system of economic controls, to be implemented through a trading house system. These were intended to counter what was felt to be the prime threat: the activities of British commerce. In 1816, Congress, concerned about the influence of British trade on Indian political loyalities, and prompted by the wishes of the powerful American Fur Company monopoly, effected radical changes in the Lake Superior trade. Ensuing legislation banned the British commerce from American soil, and provided for the wholesale government control and re-organization of the trade, henceforth to operate only at fixed posts within defined geographic districts (Johnson, 1971: 110-61; Schoolcraft, 1851, 1: 141). It soon became evident to Schoolcraft, however, that Washington's policy failed to discourage Native attachment to Britain, since visits to the post on Drummond Island continued (Schoolcraft, 1975: 297-99).

Schoolcraft shrewdly surmised that the main cause of the Ojibwa's defiance in the face of American policy originated not from British sources, although he believed that British influence remained a problem, but from a political stand taken by the Native people themselves against

the implementation of radical social, economic and religious changes in their way of life. Instead of responding positively to the United States' attempts to check their wars, the western Ojibwa, if anything, intensified their warfare with the Sioux and upbraided bands residing in the western sector of Lake Superior for their lack of courage in not adopting a similar course.[38] Owing to his fears that a gathering of discontented and war-prone Indian nations might result in an uprising against the United States, Schoolcraft oppposed Washington's plan to transport the Ojibwa to lands west of the Mississippi, even though he felt that segregation of Indians and White settlers constituted a pressing need.[39] Yet the agent could offer no solutions for the problems he raised, except for the American government to secure as much land as possible from the Indians and guard against unruly aggregations of bands forming on the frontier.

Schoolcraft's perspectives on Ojibwa leadership cannot be considered apart from his ideology in general. The agent remained convinced that Native head men fell into two categories: those who exhibited the capacity to exert authority and those who lacked it. Those who failed to meet Schoolcraft's standards of leadership suffered the agent's direct intervention in their affairs. Schoolcraft never considered whether or not Indian leadership might constitute a self-sufficient system in its own right, apart from externalities like war, trade and colonial military policies. This weakness caused him to be inconsistent in his relations with head chiefs. While at times he contended that Ojibwa society had acquired its lineal and "aristocratic" characteristics during the colonial period, and that the <u>dodem</u>, as a group identifier, was probably a recent adaptation, he still found it

good policy to designate Shingabaw'osin as a "king", with the "Crane totem standing as the distinguishing mark of the reigning clan" (Schoolcraft, 1857, 6: 339-400). The agent held that through rewarding or punishing a head chief, depending on the nature of his acts, the government might eventually come to exercise control over band behaviour in general. By publicly shaming Shingabaw'osin for intemperance, for example, Schoolcraft anticipated a reform of Indian drinking habits. "If the king of the Chippewas could be so treated, it was naturally inferred that the subject might meet with harsher usage," he argued (Ibid.).

Warren (1970: 135) considered relations between leaders and their bands to be breaking down by the mid-nineteenth century owing to an absence of discrimination on the part of Indian agents like Schoolcraft, who often accorded honors to individuals lacking high status within their bands. Schoolcraft, on the other hand, saw the introduction of the value of "abstract self-interest" as the only means by which the Ojibwa could exercise resolve independent of what he believed to be obstructing band jealousies, forever maintaining individual band members at the lowest common denominator of intellectual, social, economic and political development. He doubted, however, whether Native leaders could ever wield the degree of authority requisite to impose "enlightened" policies on their followers (Schoolcraft, 1857, 5: 187).[40]

A Model to be Tested

In making these diverse claims, Schoolcraft and Warren were both looking wholly at the leaders themselves rather than the values and goals such chiefs may have been trying to preserve in the face of change. According to Smith, decision-making among the Ojibwa has not altered

substantially since the nineteenth century, but has always been grounded in "an implicit belief in consensual democracy and a corollary ethos of egalitarianism." Smith's use of Foster's concept of the "limited good" to explain modern-day leadership behaviour on reserves nevertheless seems to have discouraged Smith from raising the question of whether or not leaders, given access to more diverse resources, might not work harmoniously together to develop these resources at their command to their group's advantage. Yet, should a primary aim of a traditional leader be to evaluate the worth of available group resources and to establish permanent linkages with government and other agencies, capable of assisting his band in securing a sustained yield from these assets, the result would be a process which could never occur in a vacuum, divorced from external sources of information. More than likely, it would instead tend to elevate to a high priority the acquisition of knowledge and skills capable of forwarding band goals. Conversely, a leader who focused solely on attaining short-term returns might be exposed to allegations that his actions were motivated more by personal gain than group interests, and he might eventually be rejected as a liabilty by his band.

This approach views the maintenance of "sufficient good", rather than constant adaptation to "limited good", as the goal state to be achieved by band leaders within the developing nation state.[41] The kind of pervasive factionalism which Smith (1979) describes could be said to characterize instances in which unifying policies have not been developed, or have proven to be difficult to realize owing to external factors. Far more noticeable is the fact that personal achievement had always constituted the main gauge of leadership potential among the Ojibwa.

Emphasis on genealogy, and especially agnatic and cognatic descent, which had arisen during the French and British colonial eras (Mason, ed., 1962: 134; Schoolcraft, 1975: 570; Kohl, 1956: 138), had already begun to fade by the mid-nineteenth century. At the same time, an increased emphasis on individual achievement, as a criterion in the selection of band leaders, ensured that a pool of potential candidates, with diverse skills, would always be available to fill any breach, should prevailing leadership fail to attain band objectives.[42] At Garden River on occasion, several head men in succession held the office of chief within a short time span. These situations arose not as a consequence of factionalism, but because external pressures demanded that a diverse range of energies and talents be directed towards securing a particular goal desired by the band.

The model to be tested in subsequent chapters will follow from the premise that many influential Ojibwa power-holders accepted Shingwaukönse's leadership since, during a stressful era for the Native peoples, The Pine sought to establish a milieu in which their values and goals could survive into the future. Shingwaukönse presented an alternative to the responses to change exhibited by the late 1820's by western Ojibwa leaders, many of whom had adopted an attitude of passive defiance to external authority. Schoolcraft held that intensification of warfare with the Sioux and rejection of government-sponsored religious, economic, and educational facilities by several of these chiefs, arose as a bid to maintain, by a collective force of will, a way of life which was becoming untenable. This defiant demonstration of autonomy permeated band relationships with traders and missionaries, and led to a re-emphasis on traditional beliefs and practices following the

decline of a series of revivalistic cult movements which had arisen in the early nineteenth century.[43]

Schoolcraft, like many of his contemporaries (Unger, 1967: 70), nevertheless erred in viewing this as a permanent state, rather than a temporary phenomenon. Basically reactionary, the stance of the western bands militated against the maintenance of permanent linkages with external agencies, as well as other Native groups, and hence traditional leadership appeared to be on the decline. Yet, once conditions proved amenable to a reestablishment of ties, as they did in the eastern sector of the Lake Superior region by the mid 1840's, Ojibwa leadership reasserted itself. Shingwaukönse and his band not only sought information and skills from both British and American sources, but also constantly modified their sphere of transactions so that the cultural and technological modifications introduced would not clash with the integrity of their traditionally-based strategems, values and beliefs. This ensured, among other things, the retention of checks and balances, arising from the Ojibwa's ability to continue exercising a cultural code, gauged to keep group resources uniformly accessible to all band members.

Shingwaukönse resided periodically on the British side of the St. Mary's straits in the years following 1820, but he did not become a head chief or exercise territorial prerogatives in this area until after 1827. The following chapter provides a biographical account of his life prior to his rise to full leadership status. Sketchy though it may be, due to lack of available sources, it embraces more than half his lifespan, for in 1827 Shingwaukönse was fifty-four years old. He would not reach the peak of his career as a negotiator and power-holder until he was well over seventy.

CHAPTER THREE

THE PINE -- MAN AND LEGEND

Oral Traditions Regarding Shingwaukönse's Ancestry and Role as a Native Leader

Shingwaukönse, although of Métis ancestry, was from a cultural background that was clearly Ojibwa. Even though his close ally, Nebenagoching, a Crane chief at Sault Ste. Marie, was apparently fluent in both the French and English languages, The Pine could speak neither French nor English.[1] More is known about The Pine's mother than his father. When the White consort of Shingwaukönse's mother, Ogimaqua, settled at Detroit, she separated from her lover and married a man of the Grand Island band. Vagueness surrounding the identity of The Pine's natural father has given rise to considerable speculation. According to one legend, recounted by Dan Pine, Sr., The Pine had a claim to the nobility of Europe, for he was the son of Napoleon Bonaparte:

> He /Shingwaukönse/ came on a ship across the Atlantic. Why did he come? See. . . that's part of the mystery. When his father Bonaparte found he was gone he was broken hearted. He /Bonaparte/ came over on a ship and landed somewhere on the coast. When he found his son he was glad. He tried to get him to go back, but Shingwauk wanted to stay. 2

Another story, recorded at Garden River during the late 1850's by J.G. Kohl (1956: 374-7) described Shingwaukönse as the son of a British officer -- who presented the young boy with an opportunity to become a "White", which The Pine declined.[3] Both Kohl's account and the legend, passed down from generation to generation within The Pine's family make

one identical point, that Shingwaukönse's Indian identity was the product of choice. That he had once had the opportunity to be raised as a "White" remained a secondary consideration, and only served to heighten the importance of The Pine's decision to remain an Ojibwa.

According to present-day traditions, The Pine set out at an early age to learn as much as he could about his people's beliefs and their bearing on power relationships in the Upper Great Lakes area. According to Fred Pine Sr., Shingwaukönse spent much of his youth fasting, often leaving to go to a solitary place by himself for several days.[4] Dan Pine related that his father, John Askin, had told him that Shingwaukönse fasted nine times, for ten days at a time, prior to marriage. Traditionally, Ojibwa men tended to marry in their late twenties, after they had secured a sense of purpose from their dreams. Shingwaukönse was said to have been twenty-nine when he completed this series of ordeals. Dan Pine also explained that Shingwaukönse's loyalties to Ojibwa culture emerged from his visions, never from merely political motives or self-interest.[5] Kohl (Ibid.: 375-6) provided a description of one of Shingwaukönse's youthful visions, based on oral testimonies from Garden River:

> /The boy/ lay, half-naked and sleepless, trembling with cold and hunger, on his hard bed. He whimpered for a long time, but at length fell into a state of half dreaming and half waking. Then he fancied that a gentle voice said, "Thou, poor Shinquakongse, thou are wretched; come to me!" He looked around him but he could see nothing. But he perceived a path hovering in the air, which gleamed in the darkness, and which, commencing at his bed, ran upwards through the doorway of his cabin. He comprehended that it was a way on which he must walk. He went upon it, and kept on rising higher and higher into heaven. There he found a house, from which a man came out to meet him, wrapped from head to foot in white garments, like a priest. "I called thee, O Shinquakongse, to me, to show thee something glorious. Look thither, towards the rising sun." When he looked, Shinquakongse perceived the entire field full of tents and groups, among them being the great tents of the

> kings and chiefs, and a multitude of braves, warriors, and leaders, sitting together at the war-council. His eyes were, as it were, blinded by the dazzling brilliancy, and he felt a longing to be among them. "See, Shinquakongse," the white-robed man proceeded, "I give thee this picture, thou art still young, and thou are at the same time poor, wretched, and persecuted. But hereafter thou wilt be as grand as those thou seest there in the field, and will become, thyself, a mighty hero. I will always think of thee, if thoudoest the same by me, and give thee this symbol in remembrance of this moment.
>
> With these words he handed little Shinquakongse a gay fluttering pennant, and with this in hand, he again descended his hovering path. The path, too, was decorated on either side with fluttering pennants, through which he marched in triumph. The flags in the glistening path extended down to his hut, and the last of them stood by his bed. When the rough winter's wind again blew right coldly through the hut, he started and woke up, and lo! all had suddenly disappeared.
>
> But the glorious reminiscence remained to /sic/ him, and the lad firmly believed from that moment that he would once become a great chieftain of his people. And the dream was really fulfilled. He became the greatest "general" of his race, and was known and celebrated everywhere among the Ojibbeways on the entire lake of Mitchigaming (Michigan Lake) and Kitchi-Gami.
>
> After that dream he also changed his name of Shinguacongse which. . . had the very trivial meaning of "The Little Pine." He called himself from that time forth Sagadjive-Osse,[6] which means almost identically "When the sun rises." "It was amusing," my narrator added, "how highly he adored the sun from that time forth; and when he dreamed of it, he ever saw it before him, like a person walking before him and conversing.

This story contains many of the symbolic elements which infused relations between Indians and the colonial authorities by the late eighteenth century, together with a stress on height and luminosity which is intrinsically Ojibwa.[7] Elders at Garden River volunteered information regarding Shingwaukönse's relationship with the Sun. It became evident during these discussions that a spirit's physical appearance, because it was regarded as so mutable, constituted only a minor facet of the identity of the guardian being, Waube.che.chaug, the "White Soul", or as one elder stated with considerable reverence, "the

Courtesy of Bishophurst
Sault Ste. Marie

Shingwaukönse

Photograph courtesy of the Shingwauk Project

Nebenagoching, Shingwaukönse and Ogista



Courtesy Department of Ethnology,
Royal Ontario Museum

Shingwaukönse's tomahawk pipe and ball-headed club

Great White Stirring Soul."[8] It was also maintained that The Pine, whose power was considered to have increased as he grew older,[9] could at times assume the character of Waube.che.chaug:

> The priest said to him, "Do you believe in the soul?" And Shingwaukonse said, "I must believe, I am the soul." 10

It would not have been a major step for Shingwaukönse, following his conversion to Anglicanism, to endow his essentially traditional vision of the Sun with traits of the Christian God. Schoolcraft, recalling The Pine's statements to him about the Sun, wrote, "The sun is depicted, in several places, to represent the Great Spirit" (Mason, ed., 1962: 86). According to elders at Garden River, the luminiscent spirit gave power to see deeply into things and embodied a source of spiritual renewal in personalized form, with which one could communicate as one would with a friend. Kohl's use of the word "longing" to describe the impetus which drove The Pine to make his vision an actuality is probably not accidental. Residing in the Great Soul's "blessing" lay an embryonic purpose which the chief sought to develop into its holistic form and, in so doing, his own competencies and sense of self-worth. Owing to these correspondences between oral testimony and Kohl's description of Shingwaukönse's vision experience, it is suggested that the German scientist presented a reasonably accurate rendition of what he had been told concerning The Pine's concept of the permanent source of his "power" as a leader.

Historical Documentation Relating to Shingwaukönse's Parentage

Little additional oral data could be secured regarding Shingwaukönse's parental background. From documentary sources it was found that John Askin, an influential trader and commissary officer

stationed at Mackinac from 1764 to 1780, fitted well with Kohl's description of The Pine's father as a Scotsman associated with the British military, since Askin moved to Detroit at the turn of the nineteenth century. Interesting, but far from conclusive evidence may also be found in the journal of Charles Gaultier, storekeeper at Mackinac. During February 1791 Gaultier distributed provisions both to "Chinwak, Chief Saulteaur," and "La Vieille Askin, pauvre infirme."[11] It is a possibility that this "Vieille Askin", residing in the neighbourhood of Sault Ste. Marie may have been one of Askin's Indian consorts, as well as Shingwaukönse's mother.[12] Yet an equally strong, or perhaps even stronger argument may be made for an alternative paternity.

On March 19, 1778, Jean Baptiste Barthe, a trader at Sault Ste. Marie, noted in his account book, "Donnez a La Mere de l'enfant de Lavoine /sic/."[13] The phrase "de l'enfant de Lavoine" suggests that Barthe had been providing supplies for the Indian mother of a child named "Lavoine". It also infers that not only was the youth called "Lavoine", but that he was also the son of a man bearing the name "Lavoine".[14] This is significant for two reasons. First, Shingwaukönse and his son, Tegoosh, both on occasion adopted "Lavoine" as a synonymous name (Mason, ed., 1958: 149; Schoolcraft, 1973: 80; Neill, 1970: 463).[15] Second, it implies that the trader exhibited a special paternalistic concern for the Métis child, which leads the present investigator to believe that The Pine may well have been the son of Lavoine Barthe, a trader at Sault Ste. Marie and Mackinac.

In 1778 Jean Baptiste Barthe employed an individual by the name of Lavoine Barthe at an annual wage of 1000 livres.[16] Although the precise relationship remains uncertain, it is possible that Lavoine was Jean

Baptiste's brother,[17] which would also make him brother-in-law to John Askin Sr., who married Jean Baptiste's sister. John Askin Sr.'s marriage to Archange Barthe cemented the close social, political and business relationship which had developed between the Askin and Barthe families after the Seven Year's War. Both families were militaristic in attitude, oriented commercially towards Montreal, and loyal to Britain. It would have been natural, given the willingness to aid one another displayed by members of these families, that both Jean Baptiste Barthe and John Askin Sr. should have felt a degree of concern for the welfare of a "country-born" son, one of their close kin.

A third and more remote possibility was that Shingwaukönse was the son of Jean Baptiste Chevalier and his wife, Francis Alavoine, "Lavoine" or "Manon". Some support for this contention comes from Dan Pine Sr.'s memory of Shingwaukönse being descended from a "chevalier".[18] Fred Pine Sr.'s assertions that The Pine's father was called "Lavoine Pat", however, makes Lavoine Barthe the more likely paternal candidate, since the name "Barthe" would be rendered "Pat" or "Bart" in the Ojibwa dialect, which lacks the phoneme ϴ or "th". Shingwaukönse was also known to have affixed the name "Augustin Bart" to a treaty made between the Sault Ste. Marie "home band" and the American government in 1820 (Schoolcraft, 1973: 6). In this instance "Bart" could mean "Barthe", but it could just as easily reflect a desire on The Pine's part to associate his name with the British aristocracy by employing the titular designation for "Baronet". Yet the weight of evidence suggests that Shingwaukönse may well have been related to both the Barthes and Askins of Detroit.

Shingwaukönse and the War of 1812

If John Askin Jr.[20] knew of any genealogical relationship between Shingwaukönse and his own family he never acknowledged it publicly, although he regarded The Pine as an influential Ojibwa war leader. Each spring, Lake Superior chiefs sent messengers with wampum to bands residing on Lakes Huron and Michigan calling for assistance in their conflicts with the Sioux. In response, parties of men joined contingents of warriors as they passed the different Native villages en route west.[21] In May 1810, John Askin Jr. wrote William Claus, Deputy Superintendent of Indian Affairs, that Shingwaukönse was among those soliciting assistance for a foray into Sioux country.[22]

Lacking close kin connections with members of the "forest aristocracy", Shingwaukönse was forced to attain the rank of leader through his own achievements. In this process, by 1800, it had become requisite that a man secure recognition from the British authorities to complement his rising status within the Native community. In this, Shingwaukönse was fortunate, since John Askin Jr. readily accepted him as a figure of note. The Pine also evidently admired Askin in turn, and it may be that the war chief knew of, and shared, Askin's viewpoint on Native rights to territory west of the Ohio.[23] Mutual respect and possibly more personal ties between the Native leader and the Askin family strengthened The Pine's resolve to join the British cause should war erupt between Britain and the United States. Richard Pine Sr. and Fred Pine Sr. both argued that The Pine received a number of medals and other honorifics at St. Joseph's Island prior to 1812 to distribute to Native leaders throughout the Great Lakes region in order to encourage loyalty to the Crown.[24]

According to Fred Pine Sr., Shingwaukönse shared the views

of Brant and Tecumseh that the British would assist the Indians in preventing the spread of American settlement and resource exploitation west of the Ohio River.[25] This accorded with a tradition recorded by Dr. Oronhyatekha, a Mohawk leader, at Garden River about 1910 which stated that the Ojibwa held a council at Mackinac Island in 1809 to decide whether to join the British or the Americans in the event of war. The gathering found itself divided in its allegiances, and a wampum belt was made to commemorate this split. Shingwaukönse became the belt's recognized keeper, and it remained in his family until acquired by Dr. Oronhyatekha (Cumberland, n.d.: 26).

Shingwaukönse would nevertheless only have stood as primus inter pares at Mackinac, since the influential "Cranes" Waubejejauk, Sassaba, Muckadayoquot and Shingabaw'osin also decided to fight for the British. Soon after the declaration of war in June 1812, Shingwaukönse joined approximately two hundred and thirty other Ojibwa and Ottawa warriors under the command of John Askin Jr. in a decisive attack on the Americans at Mackinac.[26] Following the surrender of the American garrison to the British, Askin directed the Indians to Amhertsburg to join General Isaac Brock in the siege of Detroit in August.[27]

General Brock saw clearly the value of the Indians to the British cause. In recognition of this fact he promised that "no effort of mine shall be wanting to keep them attached to our cause -- if the condition of this people could be considered in any future negotiation for peace it would attach them to us for ever."[28] Shingwaukönse may or may not have been present at the abortive attempt to capture Fort Miami in September, at which the Saginaw and Mackinac Indians deserted due to the indecisiveness of the British regarding the feasibility of the attack.[29] Yet, most

certainly, he was with Brock at Queenston Heights in October. According to his own account:

> /In/ the summer /of 1812/ I was on my lands in the centre of Lake Superior, now the Long Knives' land, whence I was called to the Great Fall with my men, there I fought and there much of Ojibway blood was shed, some of my young men lay on the ground and some reddened the soil with their blood. Yes it was red with Indian blood. All the summer I was on this war party with my young men and it was only when the winter snow whitened the ground that I returned to my place. They are still with me, three of my people, now old men who were with me there at the Great Fall. Three different days I led the attack on the Long Knives, and much Long Knife blood was shed on these occasions, for I conquered on the two first occasions and on the third was not worsened by the Nahtahwas /Americans/ who were opposed to us though I suffered much and was myself wounded yet I beat them back. We rushed too far in pursuit and many perished -- only two of us returned alive. This my Father is the account of my conduct when I helped you when you fought for your territory. All the Indians of different tribes helped you and we helped you, we who are called Indians, to retain possession of your lands, therefore you retained it Father. 30

The following summer Shingwaukönse and other Ojibwa from Grand Island and settlements flanking the St. Mary's Channel fought in engagements around Lake Erie.[31] John Askin Jr. retained control over the dispatching of Indian warriors to assist in these various campaigns (Wood, 1920: 452-3). Acting under orders from Askin, Shingwaukönse may well have participated in the taking of Fort McKay, near Prairie du Chien, in July 1814 and in the Battle of Lundy's Lane later the same summer. Schoolcraft (1973: 79) maintained that The Pine himself "conducted the last war party from the village in 1814." It may have been due to the close attachment Shingwaukönse felt for the Askin family that he persevered in fighting with such fervor until the end of the war, particularly after the deaths of Brock and Tecumseh. Over thirty years later Shingwaukönse would refer to his association with John Askin Jr. as the source from which he first

derived official sanction to exercise territorial prerogatives on the north shore of the St. Mary's straits:

> When the war was over the /British/ chiefs spoke to me through my friend the late Mr. Askin and said, thank you Shinguaconce, many thanks to you, you will never be badly off, even your children will be looked after by the English. You have lost your land in the bargain, made between us and the whites. Choose for yourself land in the neighbourhood of the Sault on the British side. Have nothing to do with the Long Knives, you will soon find that you will be visited by good days which will not end as long as the world exists. 32

It appears that after the war Shingwaukönse tended to gauge his movements relative to those of his "friend" Askin, who in 1816 was posted to Amhertsburg. The "Shingwalk" and "Shingwalk jun" whose names appear on an American treaty concluded at Saginaw on September 24, 1819 (Washington, 1837: 276-7) probably refer to The Pine and his son Ogista. Shingwaukönse's presence at these negotiations would not have been particularly remarkable. Indians from the Sault Ste. Marie area regularly travelled back and forth to the Saginaw region,[33] and the Saginaw head chief, on the other hand, maintained territorial rights to lands in the vicinity of the straits of Mackinac over which his band hunted during the winter.[34] The Pine only sojourned at Saginaw for four years. When in January 1820 Askin suddenly died (Quaife, ed., 1928: 69ff)[35] it appears that Shingwaukönse no longer had reason to reside in Lower Michigan and by July of the same year he was at the St. Mary's rapids.[36]

The British resumed distributing presents to the Upper Great Lakes bands in 1816, in response to Washington's garrisoning of Mackinac and American plans to built a second fort at Sault Ste. Marie. At the same time, the colonial authorities placed far more weight on ensuring amicable neutrality among the western bands than on encouraging

active demonstrations of loyalty. Following the signing of the Treaty of Ghent, the British took care not to press issues which might prove offensive to the United States. Brock's recommendation made at the war's height that Indian interests should be considered in any forthcoming peace agreement was no longer considered advisable. As Lieutenant Colonel Robert McDouall, Commander at Drummond Island, commented, peace favoured expediency and discretion:

> Through me, the Western Indians were taught to cherish brighter hopes, to look forward to happier days -- to repose with confidence in the sacred pledge of British honors -- to anticipate the time when they would be restored to the abodes of their ancestors! How have such prospects been realized? -- they are abandoned at their utmost need, and /are/ about to be immolated on the altar of American vengance. Can I be otherwise -- as the author of these gay delusive hopes -- than the object of their bitterest reproaches or can their hapless fate fail to touch me nearly and awaken every sentiment of pity and compassion? Nevertheless in this emergency, I have, with the utmost cautious circumspection, abstained from any act which might give just cause of offense to the American government. 37

Chiefs who had distinguished themselves in battle may even have been deliberately passed over during the distribution of special honors after 1816. In 1819 the British Indian Department vested the eight-year-old son, Nebenagoching, of the Crane chief Waubejechauk with the head chieftainship at the rapids. Oral traditions at Garden River where Nebenagoching resided for most of his later life, claim that the British appointment arose from a need to reconcile conflicting claims to the honor by rival head men.[38] Within the broader historical context, however, one may also argue that British policy following the war favoured selection of a "symbolic figurehead" who would ensure diffuse attachment to the Crown rather than **overt** loyalty.



Courtesy of the Department of Ethnology
Royal Ontario Museum

Waubejechauk's Vest



McGill. In N. Jaye Fredrickston, The Covenant Chain. Ottawa: National Museum of Man, 1981.

Waubejechauk's Medal

American Versus "Crane" Sovereignty at Sault Ste. Marie: An Analysis of an Episode in the American Drama of "How the West Was Won"

British fears of Indian aggression against the United States were not without foundation, for during 1815 and 1816 the Ojibwa population at the Sault adopted a cohesive stance against the imposition of American sovereignty over their lands at the rapids. This Native enmity acquired form and focus under the direction of a Crane sub-chief by the name of Sassaba. The actual degree of Sassaba's participation in two brief attacks on American military expeditions in the St. Mary's Channel area is unknown, although Schoolcraft viewed this war leader as the principal perpetrator (Schoolcraft, 1975: 632). On both occasions, Indian hostility curtailed efforts by American military personnel to penetrate the Lake Superior region by way of the straits.[39]

The third and final demonstration of Ojibwa animosity towards the American exercise of authority over their territory occurred on July 16, 1820, during negotiations between the "Crane band" and the United States concerning a surrender of acreage for the military post of Fort Brady. No annuities were offered, since the American government maintained that it already possessed title to the land under the terms of the French seignorial grant made in 1750 and the Treaty of Greenville of 1795. These were questionable arguments, especially since Washington in later years disallowed land claims submitted by heirs of the early French estate (Bald, 1937; Bayliss & Bayliss, 1955: 42-4). Yet these events cannot be divorced from their historic context. The securing of a site at the rapids was an issue of grave national significance to the Americans. For negotiations to have failed would have been publicly construed as demonstration of the inability of the United States to withstand the permeation of British influence along the international border.

Success, on the other hand, would constitute a moral as well as territorial victory for an emerging international power, and sides were drawn even before the contest began.

Not surprisingly, therefore, contemporary American accounts of the event pitted rationally-planned American expansionism against an "archaic" fur trade and Britain's encouragement of Indian atrocities in defence of the Northwest commerce -- a view in vogue in the United States since the American Revolution (Wise, 1970: 187). The signing of the treaty of 1820, it was proclaimed, would herald a new age of settlement and resource development (WHC, 8: 181-2). Dualities allegedly present in the event were heightened by contrasting what was seen as Cass' straightforward and decisive conduct with a background of disorderly, but numerically and strategically superior Native strength. It was stressed that Cass' expedition "consisted of /only/ eleven soldiers, twelve Canadian voyageurs, nine friendly Indians, a suite of eight, and a small escort. . . of twenty-nine soldiers" (WHC, 5: 412). George Johnston, who portrayed himself as a leading actor in this "drama", contended further that the resident Native population had been swelled by the presence of visiting bands and could easily have raised a formidable force:

> The Indian village /was/ situated on an elevated bank, and at this season of the year was well populated by the Indians who had arrived from the different regions of the country from their winter hunting excursions; . . . and this annual assemblage of Indians were now encamped on either side of the river, dotting the shores with their wigwams, the probable assemblage of Indians at this this time could not have been less than fifteen hundred men capable of bearing arms (MPC, 12: 609).

In actuality, the odds against the American party were much less. Schoolcraft (1973: 76-7) restricted the number of Indians likely to become involved, should trouble occur, to "forty or fifty lodges,

or two hundred Chippewas, fifty or sixty of whom were warriors," whereas the Americans had thirty-four manned muskets "in addition to which, each of the savans, or Governor's mess, were armed with a short rifle." Fifteen or twenty houses, standing "in the midst of picketed lots," belonged to Métis families, who would remain neutral.

Accounts of what happened at the treaty negotiations on July 15 and 16 differ in details, but with regard to the general order of events, they display much similarity. The Indians had initially welcomed General Cass' military and scientific expedition. Schoolcraft (1973: 76), a member of Cass' retinue, noted: "Long before reaching the place, a large throng of Indians had collected on the beach, who as we put in towards the shore, fired a salute, and stood ready to greet us with their customary bosho." It was only when the government interpreter was directed in council by General Cass to remind the Indians "that their ancestors had formerly conceded the occupancy of the place to the French, to whose national rights and prerogatives the Americans had succeeded. . ." that the Native audience registered alarm. Schoolcraft (Ibid.: 79) divided the Indian response into two camps, the "moderates" and the "hostiles". Other accounts ignored this distinction, preferring instead to portray the event as a dynamic drama from which only villains and heroes could emerge.

Sassaba became the leading villain in the scenario. On hearing the interpreters' words, Sassaba refused to smoke the tobacco proffered by the Americans and tried to persuade others of the band to follow his lead. According to Schoolcraft (Ibid.: 79), the "tall, martial

looking man, of the reigning chiefs of the Crane Totem. . . stuck his war lance furiously in the ground before him" and began haranguing the assembly. The malcontent then "wheeled around. . . and walked off towards the /Ojibwa/ village and hoisted the British colors. . . while the chiefs and all were amazed at Sessaba's course..." (MPC, 18: 609-10).[40]

General Cass emerged as the hero of this event. Unarmed, and accompanied solely by his interpreter, the general went to the Indian encampment, hauled down the British flag and declared to the Indians that "as sure as the sun that was then rising would set, so sure would there be an American garrison sent to that place, whether they renewed the grant or not" (Schoolcraft, 1973: 79-80). Cass declared that two flags could not fly over the same territory, and thus stood his ground as the intrepid defender of American sovereignty. In response, Mrs. Johnston, Waubojeeg's daughter, her husband being absent in Europe, instructed her son George to call the chiefs together and "with authority commanded the assembled chiefs to be quick, and suppress the follies of Sessaba, the chief" (MPC, 12: 605-8).[41]

Replying to Mrs. Johnston's appeal, the band selected Shingwaukönse -- perhaps because he was an outsider, divorced from the social and emotional bonds of close kin ties and obligations to the "Crane" group -- to lead a delegation to prevent Sassaba from inflicting injury on the American camp. George Johnston acted as the sole chronicler of this secondary confrontation, in which The Pine persuaded Sassaba to lay down his arms:

> /The group met/ Sessaba, who, having divested himself of his regimentals. . . /emerged/ painted and in war accoutrements,

> leading a party of warriors, prepared and determined for a desparate encounter with Gen. Cass. Shingwaukonse, on meeting Sessaba, and addressing the party with him, said to them: "My friends and relatives, I am authorized by our chiefs and elders to stop your proceedings." Sessaba, instantly replying said to Shingwaukonse, "You was /sic/ a war leader when my brother fell in battle; he was killed by the Americans, and how dare you come to put a stop to my proceedings?" and raising his war-club, struck at Shingwaukonse and grazed his left shoulder and Shingwaukonse, undismayed, still kept up his oration and with his eloquence and the power vested in him by the chiefs, he prevailed on the party to return quietly to their respective lodges, then situated at the head of the portage and along the shore of the falls (MPC, 18: 611).

The treaty was signed soon afterwards in George Johnston's office. Under its terms, the Native leaders surrendered an area sixteen miles square, and received confirmation of perpetual rights to fish at the rapids. Shingabaw'osin had his name placed first on the document, Shingwaukönse waited until all the others had made their mark, before requesting his name be affixed as "Augustin Bart". Sassaba refused to sign.

The attitudes adopted by the Indians during these proceedings has never been thoroughly examined. Most accounts assume that the Native population was simply acting in conformity with "insidious counsels" given by British authorities and traders upon whose presents and goods they had become dependent (WHC, 8: 181; Unger, 1967: 100). This view depicts the Indians merely as extensions of British and military commercial policy along the northern frontier. Yet Schoolcraft's distinction between "moderates" and "hostiles" at the negotiations suggests that there were different degrees of animosity expressed towards the American presence, of which Sassaba's violent disapproval constituted the extreme. The most interesting interplay was that between Shingwaukönse and Sassaba, since both men were war leaders and both had

been attached to the British. Although one historical account cited the fact that Sassaba had lost his brother, Waubejejauk, in the War of 1812 as the primary explanation for his deep resentment of the Americans (WHC, 5: 411), other brothers of the deceased had been present at the negotiations and had not acted similarily. For this reason it seems that a more plausible clue to Sassaba's behaviour might be found in his age and status relative to his brothers. The war leader was portrayed as young, perhaps not much older than thirty (Ibid.), and would not have reached an age when he would be respected for possessing the experience and power-control to deal competently with issues effecting the welfare of the entire band. By contrast, Shingwaukönse, even though he had a disposition to side with the "hostiles" (Schoolcraft, 1973: 77), was expected to subordinate personal self-interest to band considerations in accord with the status he had attained.

Shingwaukönse, moreover, was not, as was Sassaba, a leading member of the "ruling Crane family." If a rank order existed within this group, then Sassaba might have been trying to enhance his relative status by gauging it against an external measure -- that of the degree to which he could aspire to the likeness, as he perceived it, of a British military commander. That Sassaba persisted in conforming to this mould, even when other Indians recognized its inappropriateness in their transactions with the Americans is supported by Schoolcraft's description of Sassaba's dress and behaviour at a council held at the American Indian agency in 1822:

> As the throng of both resident and foreign bands approached, headed by their chiefs, they were seated in the square. It

> was noticed that the chiefs were generally tall and striking-looking persons, of dignified manners and well and even richly dressed. One of the chiefs of the home band, called Sassaba, who was generally known by the sobriquet of the Count, appeared in a scarlet uniform, with epaulets and a sword. The other chiefs observed their native costume, which is, with this tribe, a toga of blue broad-cloth, folded and held by one hand on the breast, over a lightly-figured calico shirt, red cloth leggings, and beaded moccasins, a belt or baldric about the waist, sustaining a knife-sheath and pouch, and a frontlet of skin or something of the sort, around the forehead, environed generally with eagles' feathers (Schoolcraft, 1975: 96).

After Sassaba's denunciations of the Americans won no response from his band, he became an outsider. The former war leader adopted a culturally-structured mode of behaviour by which he could retain possession of power, but of a kind recognized by the Ojibwa as unpredictable and potentially dangerous.[42] His adopted status as a "British officer" rejected by the group, Sassaba began to clothe himself with little else than a wolf skin, with the tail of the animal trailing behind him. Those who were not immediate kin removed themselves from his presence as his behaviour grew increasingly antisocial. He drank heavily, and just over a month following the collective denial of his former identity, he drowned in the rapids when his canoe overturned (Ibid.).

Two anthropological interpretations have been presented to account for incidences of such behaviour among the Ojibwa. Applied to this case, the first would view the fate of the central figure, Sassaba, as arising from a form of "witch hunt" in which he played the victim (Marano, 1982: 185-97); the second would argue that Sassaba, alone, was responsible for the consequences of his rash and precipitate action (Landes 1938a). These interpretations were discussed with Richard Pine Sr. and Fred Pine Sr., at Garden River, who both concluded that Sassaba's fate had been

the result of his "unbalanced use" of power. Richard Pine Sr., when told of the incident, denied Marano's explanation, arguing instead that Sassaba's behaviour showed all the signs of an individual who was intent on increasing his power.[43] The fact that Sassaba had placed himself in a vulnerable position while intoxicated meant he was trying to appeal to the spirits of the rapids. It was noted by the two Ojibwa elders that Sassaba had been overtly favouring the British over the American government without first consulting the wishes of his group.[44] This behaviour -- unleaderlike, according to Ojibwa standards -- designated him as "unpredictable" as far as group perceptions of his "power" were concerned (Brown, 1982).

Marano's interpretation of a certain type of group behaviour might have helped in explaining events surrounding Sassaba's activities had the "Cranes" in 1820 perceived the young chief's actions as entirely uncontrollable and potentially injurious to their welfare. The fact is that the Sault band so successfully exercised its decision-making powers to effect a compromise between the contending parties that no group compunction to seek Sassaba's destruction ever arose. Shingabaw'osin and his sub-chiefs made it clear to all concerned that their band would no longer resist the American presence at the rapids. That Shingwaukönse, moreover, had been able to thwart Sassaba's conspiracy against Cass' party had lasting consequences for his career. From 1820 onward The Pine could assert that, with the backing of his group, he had been instrumental in offsetting a potentially volatile situation on the western frontier: a fact that would carry considerable weight with Schoolcraft for years to come (Schoolcraft, 1975: 248).

Schoolcraft (Ibid.: 97) began his career at Sault Ste. Marie as

an Indian agent with the view that the outcome of Cass's expedition to the rapids in 1820 had led to a permanent and stable accommodation between the Ojibwa and the American government. The agent also initially hoped that his investigations might bring much to light concerning the Indians' beliefs, and set out to cultivate a "good understanding with this powerful and hitherto hostile tribe." Although the agent found the Indians generally reluctant to discuss such matters with him, he was able "by suitable attention and presents" (Schoolcraft, 1848: 299) to persuade Shingwaukönse to teach him two sets of songs -- with their corresponding mnemonic devices cut in wood tablets -- relating to the midéwiwin and the wabano (Schoolcraft, 1851, 1: 361-81).[45]

Shingwaukönse, even though Schoolcraft treated him with respect, still remained par inter pares among his own people. In 1822 he did not yet have his own following separate from that of the "home band". Almost nothing is recorded of Shingwaukönse's activities in the historical documents from 1822 to 1827, although oral traditions at Garden River indicate that the chief travelled extensively during these years. That Shingwaukönse acted as a middleman in the fur trade, either for the Johnston family or another establishment[46], would do much to explain the fact that he had contacts ranging as far west as Red River by 1827.

The Pine Emerges as a Major Power-Holder

While The Pine, in conformity with the "policy" adopted by the Sault Ste. Marie band after 1820, did not openly express his attachment to the British government, it is nevertheless evident that he was still very much engaged in strengthening alignments with representatives of the British Crown. Schoolcraft (1975: 298) attributed the rise in

anti-American feeling at Lapointe after 1826 to the agitations of an Indian by the name of Mezai, or "The Catfish", whose activities the agent felt could be traced to the influence of British traders at Sault Ste. Marie and Drummond Island. Yet George Johnston, sub-agent at Lapointe between 1826 and 1829, saw Shingwaukönse and another chief by the name of Kawgodaheway -- likely a close relative of Peter Marksman, who became a Methodist missionary in the Lake Superior region during the 1830's[47] -- as the principal impetus behind the contest. In May 1827 Johnston notified Schoolcraft of the following information he had received from Tugwaugaunay:

> Kaw go dah e way and Shing wah konce. . . told Missi if you do not listen and come to your English father. . . he is determined to fire four shots, and there will not be left, one single man, woman or child living on the south shore of Lake Superior and throughout the interior country, within the limits of the United States, the power of his shots will be great inasmuch that he will not leave a tree standing. 48

Johnston's words imply that Shingwaukönse may have been involved in a minor stress-induced revitalization cult. The affair had undoubtedly been prompted by Britain's decision to vacate Drummond Island, resulting in a sudden geographical shift in a major power center in the Upper Great Lakes. That <u>political</u> rather than <u>economic</u> factors underlay the disturbances is indicated by the fact that Kawgodaheway, Shingwaukönse and Mezai[49] were political spokesmen, respectively, for the head chiefs at Mackinac, Sault Ste. Marie and Lapointe (Mezai being Besheke's brother[50]). Once these three principal power-holders had readjusted their alignments to compensate for the radical political change, tensions subsided. Following Britain's establishment of a new center for distributing Indian presents at Penetanguishene, The Pine set out to make amends with the American agent. The complex fabric of Native

political interactions on the frontier would thus be imbued with a more balanced, holistic character, wedged as the system was between two state powers. In this, The Pine was almost immediately successful. By 1828 the chief's relationship with Schoolcraft was such that the Native leader could anticipate as warm a reception from the American official at Sault Ste. Marie as he could expect from the British at Penetanguishene.

In delivering a speech to Schoolcraft in the fall of 1826, The Pine formally "recapitulated his good offices and exertions towards the Americans" by stressing that "a plot had. . . been formed to cut off the Gov.'s party, and that he and Mr. G. Johnston had been instrumental in thwarting the design." (Schoolcraft, 1975: 248-9) Shingwaukönse then expressed the hope that the Ojibwa might continue to enjoy the protection of the American government. Thus The Pine demonstrated that he had made a firm choice to remain in the Sault area, a stance to which he held firm even in the face of British pressure for his band's removal to Penetanguishene after 1827. As later events proved, however, Shingwaukönse's statement to Schoolcraft, contrary to the agent's assumptions, did not necessarily reflect an allegiance to American sovereignty. It constituted mainly a personal demand for aid and protection for his band.

Shingwaukönse's bid for protection suggests that the chief could no longer be considered a "lone ranger" merely acting as orator to the different bands as the occasion arose, but had become a leader in his own right, exhibiting responsibility for his followers. He demonstrated his power-control in forming advantageous linkages, but without surrendering a high degree of political or economic autonomy. It was a position he strove to maintain, regardless of changing political and economic conditions, for the next twenty-five years.

CHAPTER FOUR

FOR THE KING AND THE KING'S CHURCH

The Ojibwa Peace Advocate

While George Johnston's pronouncements in 1827 regarding Shingwaukönse had represented the chief as hostile to American Indian policy, these assertions lost credence for lack of further evidence. The Pine's subsequent activities brought him into increasing favour with Schoolcraft. The Indians' seeming vacillation regarding their national loyalties also attracted sufficient attention at Penetanguishene to warrant Superintendent Anderson sending Shingwaukönse a wampum belt upbraiding him and his followers for having "two hearts" and encouraging them to reaffirm their ties to the Crown.[1] During a council held on St. Joseph's Island in 1829, The Pine admitted that he had formerly believed that the British, in choosing to close their western post in response to American demands, had abandoned his people, but added that if the British proved faithful to their Native allies and continued to supply presents, he and his band would consider moving permanently to the Canadian shore.[2] At this time the government also promised to build houses for The Pine's band in the vicinity of the rapids.[3]

The Pine may well have used strong words against the United States in response to speeches delivered by authorities such as Thomas G. Anderson at annual distributions of presents, or when faced with the anti-American sentiments expressed by independent British traders. The commercial

ventures of men such as Charles Oakes Ermatinger at the Sault depended on keeping the Indians loyal to the Crown in order to draw the western fur trade north of the border. Schoolcraft (1975: 251) observed the influence that Ermatinger's invectives could have on Native individuals. Bisconaosh, he stated,"has been taken advantage of by Mr. E., a trader on the opposite shore who told him the Americans would cause him to be whipped, with other idle stuff of that sort, if he came over". For this reason Bisconaosh had been hesitant to approach the American agent, or even reside on the American side, although "he was anxious to return to the seat of his forefathers."

The social sphere was charged with ambiguities. The divisive bellicose rhetoric which so often characterized formal speech-making and commercial transactions usually failed to permeate everyday relations among residents of both Saults. While their political and economic affiliations differed, Schoolcraft and Ermatinger exchanged visits, with the agent more than once a guest in the trader's home, well-known for its generous hospitality and lively, convivial atmosphere (Capp, 1904: 152). On the other hand, Shingwaukönse could declare that if an Indian child were to break a mere pane of glass on the American side, he would be "flogged for it".[4] Yet, until his death, the Native leader remained on cordial terms with Schoolcraft. Within this social milieu it remains unlikely -- despite rumours in 1827 -- that The Pine would have attempted to foster Native cohesion through advocating Ojibwa opposition to the United States.

When Shingwaukönse refused in the spring of 1832 to encourage his band to participate in the Black Hawk War, Schoolcraft began

to place confidence in the chief as an advocate of peace. All former suspicions of The Pine seem to have been forgotten. Since Schoolcraft knew that his informant's stance carried considerable weight among the Lake Superior bands, this disclosure eased the agent's anxieties regarding the disposition of the Indians west of the Sault to join in hostilities (Mason, ed., 1958: 147-9). The Winnebago "uprising" of 1827 over the American usurpation of Native lead mines in southern Wisconsin had involved the Sioux, the Ojibwa's enemies (Zanger, 1980: 64-7), and had not threatened a widespread outbreak of violence. But in 1832 the situation looked more serious. The Pine, the agent realized, had once supported Tecumseh's stand against the alienation of Indian land west of the Ohio. Given Shingwaukönse's hesitancy to espouse war, it appeared that the western confederacy had finally succumbed to internal political rifts, with the Ojibwa both in Canada and the United States generally reluctant to take up arms.

In September 1833, Shingwaukönse explained to Francis Audrain, the sub-agent at Sault Ste. Marie following Schoolcraft's removal to the agency at Mackinac, how critical the Ojibwa's decision whether or not to fight had been to subsequent Potawatomi activities. The Pine stated that "his son" Shawanapenasse, head chief of the Grand Island band, kept him abreast of events occurring in the Bay de Noc region of Upper Michigan. While the chief referred to Shawanapenasse as his "son", this terminology likely denoted neither close consanguinity nor even a major differentiation in ages between the two men.[5] Shingwaukönse considered those for whom he bore a special responsibility as his "sons" and "daughters", especially when referring

to Ojibwa leaders whose interests he had promised to represent to government authorities at the Sault:

> He [Shingwaukönse] said that wampum was sent from Penetanguishene in the spring of 1832 by some person in his name to the Potawatomi, he disclaimed having any knowledge of it, and said it was unauthorized by him, that he was much surprised this last spring when his son Oshawwunnebenace visited him at Nibish [sic, Nebish] rapids [in the vicinity of the Sault] to find he had in his possession the wampum which I now hand you, purporting to be a reply to the one above mentioned, that this was the first intimation he had of the wampum being sent to them in his name from Penetanguishene, he said he would like to find out who sent it, he thought it was some of the Ottawa and requested Mr. Johnston to try to find out at Mackinac who had used his name.
>
> The purport of the message he received was that the Potawatomi were dissatisfied, that they had drawn their war clubs from behind their backs and now held them in their hands ready to strike at any time, that they had one year to listen and observe the movements of their brothers the Chippewas.
>
> He said that two years ago he visited his son at Bay de Nock [sic] and mentioned to the Indians there his intention of remaining quiet and adopting the religion of the white man.
>
> He said he had always listened to his Father Mr. Schoolcraft's counsels and would do so still and would remain quiet.
>
> He said that the wampum, pipe and war hatchet that /were/ given to him in the spring of 1832 was intended by the Sauks to be an invitation to go to war against the Americans, that it was sent through a Potawatomi living near Chicago who had altered the words of the speech and informed him it was to go against the Sioux.[6]

Following the spring of 1832 Schoolcraft became increasingly familiar with several members of the chief's family, especially Buhkwujjenene, whom he invited to join him on a journey to the sources of the Mississippi River. The agent's aims in conducting the expedition, in addition to ascertaining the degree of support for the Black Hawk War among the western bands, included geographical and mineralogical exploration and the vaccination of the Indians against smallpox. Buhkwujjenene left in June 1832, in company with Schoolcraft, Dr. Douglas Houghton acting as surgeon and naturalist, George Johnston as interpreter, Lieutenant James Allen

of the United States Fifth Infantry as head of a ten-man military escort, and about twenty engagés. Buhkwujjenene may not have travelled with the others beyond Lapointe, for Boutwell noted in his journal for June 21st (Mason, ed., 1958: 315) that "Poquochenini remains with Mr. Hall, who is alone, Mr. W[arren] being on his journey to Mackinac". Buhkwujjenene's association with the Reverend William Boutwell, sent by the American Mission Board to the Indians at Leech Lake, and the Reverend Sherman Hall, an Episcopal missionary stationed at Lapointe since 1831, suggests that The Pine's son, a youth of about twenty years at the time, became fairly well acquainted with the teachings of Christianity before he returned from his travels in August. His growing knowledge of this subject, however, probably paralleled rather than fostered his father's interest in the Christian faith, since by the summer of 1832, Shingwaukönse had already begun his own investigations into the nature of the Christian god.

By his own admission, Shingwaukönse gained his first insights into Christianity through the exertions of the Roman Catholic Church.[7] Contact could have occurred between 1815 and 1827 when priests from Quebec sporadically held summer services at Drummond Island while en route to and from their main mission field at Red River (Nute, 1942). Since the question of The Pine's conversion seemed an intriguing one, several interview sessions with elders were spent in learning what might have led The Pine to seek an understanding of Christianity. The following section draws on the explanations provided in response to this line of questioning.

The Preservation of Potentiality in the Ojibwa Universe

Traditional Ojibwa belief required a leader to form an

intimate, long-term relationship with spirit persons to whom he appealed for material help, as well as for a workable balance to be maintained among powers in the Ojibwa universe. The preservation of this state was viewed as requisite for man's security and survival. Invocations to these beings included the plea that the reciprocity implicit in the relationship might never fail (Richard Pine Sr. and Fred Pine Sr., personal communication).

"Blessings" of white technology and skills would similarly issue from assuming respectful behaviour towards the white man's god. The problem would be to choose the religious affiliation and mode of conduct which would best establish this relationship. For this reason The Pine evidenced a willingness to listen to the often conflicting religious arguments offered by missionaries of the several denominations which he encountered in the years following 1828. By subtle forms of questioning he rapidly distinguished main ideological differences among them. Discussions between Shingwaukönse and representatives of the Methodist, Anglican, Baptist, and Roman Catholic religions have been preserved, and offer valuable insights into the attitude which the Native leader held toward these denominations as potential sources of blessings. Although The Pine evinced religious "exclusiveness" between 1833 and 1838 by favouring the Church of England over others, he did not remain strictly wedded to this behaviour once it failed to bring expected reciprocal results. In later years, Shingwaukönse remarked that his initial problem in trying to learn about Christianity stemmed not from lack of available sources of instruction, but from the danger of confusion bred through encountering such a variety of religious views and opinions.[8]

The Pine evidently retained a sense of balance and perspective

within this sea of ideological diversity by retaining much of his faith in his traditional beliefs, while gradually adding to the range of his religious knowledge by adoptions from Christianity. This constituted a syncretistic process, involving little polarization of meaning in symbolic terms. The locus of this integration lay with the individual, although such was the nature of Shingwaukönse's influence within his band that elements of his modified belief system have become a cultural legacy, to be spoken of by his descendants. Otherwise, Native thought and its expression remained little changed in structure and content. The traditional world view continued to inform most activities. The Pine apparently continued participating in the midéwiwin, wabano and conjuring ceremonies. The Pine also retained his religious paraphernalia. According to Ogista (Kohl, 1956: 384), "his father destroyed all his papers and birch-barks, and painted dreams, dances, and songs, shortly before his death."

Elders argued that Shingwaukönse accorded high priority to the need for maintaining balance in the affairs of men, although such matters remained subordinate to relationships maintained with the spiritual realm, the source of all power. The Whites were there to stay. Aggression no longer posed a viable alternative for Native peoples residing in the Upper Great Lakes region, and The Pine counselled others to preserve peace. At the same time, he aimed to have his territorial rights as a Native leader recognized by the British and Americans: not only for the sake of his own band but also on behalf of Ojibwa who wished to escape the pressures of white settlement and resource exploitation south of Lake Superior. This extension of a refuge was not necessarily an appeal for the permanent settlement of all who might respond to his call, but an offer which would hold until a measure of stability

returned to the sphere of Indian-White relations. For an enlarged population to reside even temporarily on these lands would require instruction in the white man's skills. Since, in keeping with the Native perspective, such blessings would come only after a period of adequate preparation, one had to choose a course of action commensurate with the nature of the gift desired. In consequence, Shingwaukönse set out to learn as much as he could regarding the White man's god.

Opportunities, But With a Price

Opportunities for religious instruction and training in practical skills arose in conjunction with a government-sponsored program for Native agricultural settlements on a plan devised by the Methodists. British Indian policy had been undergoing revision for over a decade. In 1828, Major General H.C. Darling, soon to assume the office of Chief Superintendent of Indian Affairs, submitted a number of proposals to the Colonial Secretary, Sir George Murray. These would form the basis for a new perspective on the administration of the Native population in the two Canadas, in keeping with the dominant philosophy of the era, philanthropic liberalism. This ideology engendered humanitarian and evangelical missionary movements which perceived political, social and moral reform as the leading causes to be upheld in the colonies, as well as in Britain. Darling's proposals developed into policy measures under the direction of Sir James Kempt, Administrator of Lower Canada, and Sir John Colborne, Lieutenant Governor of Upper Canada. The idea was to concentrate Indians in villages with only enough land to encourage the cultivation of family farms,

and to assist in the development of these communities by providing tools and training in agriculture and animal husbandry.[9] Education and religious instruction, suggested Colborne, might be supported by a fund financed by the sale or lease of Indian lands. The "civilization scheme" was expected to attain two important goals: it would render the Indian population self-sufficient, and make the system, once in place, economical for the government. The Indian Department's transfer in 1830 from military to civil control brought its budget under the annual scrutiny of the Imperial Parliament, which ensured emphasis on retrenchment during the experimental phases of the policy's implementation (Surtees, 1969).

One of the first actions of the British government under the new policy was to collect three groups of southeastern Ojibwa, as well as a band from Drummond Island, into two settlements at Coldwater and the Narrows just north of Lake Simcoe, and to furnish them with agents, missionaries, teachers, farmers, blacksmiths and mechanics. Although the Sault Ste. Marie Indians were invited to join, they refused to leave the St. Mary's straits area. Their reason for declining seems to have arisen from their wish to distance themselves from centers of British and American control, which, although dispensing benefits, also threatened to interfere directly in band affairs. By remaining at the Sault, Shingwaukönse and his band could enjoy advantages, such as the services of a blacksmith, extended by the American government, while preserving the autonomy necessary for observing and weighing the outcomes of following either British or United States policy. The Pine's band was well aware of its strategic position vis-à-vis

the British and American Indian agencies on the northwestern frontier in the early decades of the nineteenth century. And the group was careful to preserve a range of options.

To attain Western technical knowledge remained a foremost aim, since such could be adapted to expand the range of economic possibilities open to Native people. But the process would be gradual, not imposed. Shingwaukönse concentrated on adding to traditional skills, rather than replacing major aspects of a valued way of life. The Pine focused on further developing a technical and social organizational base already in existence. Migration to Penetanguishene and an exclusive reliance on farming, on the other hand, would mean relinquishing a large body of proven traditional practices relating to a familiar geographic environment.

In the early 1830's Shingwaukönse was progressing towards attaining three primary goals for his people. The first two were economic: obtaining external aid for developing the range of Native technical skills, and devising new ways of protecting his people's resource base. The third, and perhaps most important task, involved the establishment of new linkages with what he perceived to be both the spiritual and political sources of the White man's strength. This would ensure long-term continuance of much needed "blessings". The Pine and his band therefore set out to develop an approach which, they anticipated, might rapidly secure their goals. If missionary endeavours at the rapids tended in following years to be strongly influenced by Native interests, it was because Shingwaukönse and

his people were acting according to a certain strategy to attain their desires in which the resident missionary, even prior to his arrival, had already been cast in an integral role.

The Influence of Protestant Missions on Leadership at the Rapids after 1826

The Pine had little reason to leave the rapids area to seek religious instruction, since missionaries could be contacted close at hand. While the Church of England did not send a denominational representative to the Canadian side until 1830, American Episcopal missionaries had been sporadic visitors to the area since the 1820's. The Society of Jesus resumed active work after 1834, and in 1846 the Roman Catholic mission at the American Sault became a Jesuit charge under the Revered Jean Baptiste Menet, S.J. (Rezek, 1906, 2: 45). Father Frederick Baraga, after his labors at L'Anse and prior to his consecration as bishop in 1853, erected a church on Sugar Island where he held services for approximately three years (Verwyst, 1900; Lambert, 1967). The Native population on the Canadian shore, residing between Thessalon and Batchewana Bay, meanwhile drew the attention of itinerant laborers belonging to both of these religious persuasions.

After 1826, the American Sault became the focus for missionary exertions. A fund, reserved under the terms of the Fond du Lac treaty of 1826, provided for the erection and maintenance of Indian mission schools in the rapids vicinity and at Mackinac. The Baptists, under the Reverend Abel Bingham, established the first of these institutions to the rear of Fort Brady in 1828.

Three years later, Methodists entered the field, petitioning Schoolcraft's agency for a grant of land and funds to begin their own school on Sugar Island.

This venture, part of a larger scheme developed by the exhorter John Sunday, to induce Ojibwa from Grape Island, Bay of Quinte, to form an agricultural settlement on Sugar Island, attracted considerable notice at the rapids. In September 1831, several head men signed a document surrendering a tract of land on Sugar Island, extending along the shore "from a point opposite Garden River", three miles in length by one mile deep.[10] Although The Pine was not party to this treaty, Shingwaukönse was known to the Methodists. George Copway (1850: 197), who who was at the Sault in 1831, described him as a "chief of much celebrity -- noted for his bravery, activity, and perseverance. . . His general appearance is highly commanding."

According to another Methodist adherent, David Sawyer (Van Dusen, 1974: 28), the Sugar Island settlement floundered owing to opposition from "pagans and Roman Catholics", with cholera forcing the mission congregation to disperse by the spring of 1832. It had also been too far removed from the rapids fishery.[11] Yet these setbacks failed to discourage Methodist mission activity at the Sault. In June 1833, the Sault band substituted land at Little Rapids, approximately three kilometres below Fort Brady and closer to the main fishing grounds, for their former grant to John Sunday on Sugar Island. Reactivated, Methodist work spread rapidly along the south shore of Lake Superior. John Sunday and the Reverend John Clarke began a mission on Keweenaw Bay in 1832, which developed into the Native community of Pequaming near L'Anse, Michigan.[12]

Methodist missionaries often found "established" head chiefs reluctant to embrace the newly-introduced beliefs. Leaders preferred to retain their traditional regulatory powers over their groups' social, economic and political activities, rather than surrender these to outside agencies. That a desire to "improve" or "to elevate" could translate itself into actual control on the part of Christian missionaries could be perceived by some chiefs as a very real threat to their leadership powers (Grant, 1983: 280ff.). By contrast, bands whose political and economic autonomy had been severely undermined by the decline of the fur trade and White usurpation of their lands saw in adherence to the missions hope for the alleviation of their difficulties.

Many of the most notable Methodist preachers of Ojibwa extraction laboring in the Upper Great Lakes region during the 1830's -- Peter Jones, John Sunday, George Copway, and Peter Marksman — gained widespread attention by promoting the idea of Native "homelands", set apart from the pressures of frontier society, where Indians could seek spiritual solace, Christian fellowship, and material assistance in the development of their communities.[13] This vision of refuge areas, promoted and protected by Christian missionary endeavours, greatly influenced The Pine's own scheme for a settlement northeast of the rapids.

Seeking the Great Spirit of Peace

Following the distribution of presents at Penetanguishene in 1832, The Pine continued his search for knowledge by attending a Methodist council at the Narrows, near Lake Simcoe. He evidently had been invited by John Sunday and represented one

of six "pagan" chiefs from localities "scattered abroad between that place [The Narrows] and the Rocky Mountains. . ." (Elliot, 1837: 157). No White men attended, although according to Charles Elliot, a Wesleyan Methodist visiting from England -- who received the account indirectly from Peter Jacobs, an Ojibwa missionary -- Shingwaukönse's appeal for instruction in Christianity and the benefits of civilization stemmed from a wish to espouse peace. The Pine's speech, in which the chief told of his failing faith in "traditional" spiritual agencies, and his desire to learn of Christianity,[14] was one of the highlights of the occasion:

> I . . . began to think, "What shall I do without a God? I remembered John Sunday speaking about a great God; and I thought that I would come to this country, to see who knew about John Sunday's God. I have heard of many stars shining over my head" (meaning the different denominations of Christians). "I wish very much that some of you would give me information which is the true star. Just before I left home, I received a string of black and white wampum, and a tomahawk, the blade of which was painted red. When I considered that although my arms were very long, and my body very large,[15] should I enter into this war, I should be the means of spilling much blood, I determined to decline it, and therefore made this answer: -- 'I am now unable to render you any assistance in this warfare, having just commenced to seek after a Great Spirit (Keche Munnetoo), and feeling very poor in my heart'" (Ibid., 157-8).

In reply, the Christian chiefs acknowledged that many material as well as spiritual benefits ensued from adopting Methodism. Joseph Sawyer stated that could The Pine "visit our village at the Credit River. . . /he/ would see a great many good houses, a chapel, a school house, a work shop, a saw mill, and many other improvements" (Ibid., 159). Shingwaukönse thus came to form an opinion of what sort of material advantages one might expect from adhering to Christianity. But he also had a deep faith in the ability of Christianity to help the Ojibwa

gain a secure place within the changing society of the Upper Great Lakes region. To this end he proved willing between 1832 and 1838 to forward letters and wampum belts, carrying promises of peace and brotherhood, from the Lake Simcoe Methodist head chief, Mesquahkeence, or "Yellowhead", to the leaders Quezezhanshish and Nezhepenasse[16] on the Keewenaw Peninsula, with whom The Pine maintained regular communication (Slight, 1844: 78-83).

Little intensive study has been made of the manner in which specific Native leaders expressed their receptivity to Christian instruction and its concomitant rewards. It has generally been supposed that missionaries themselves provided the initiative for change, with the Indians either accepting or rejecting the teaching set before them. Missionaries have been viewed as major catalytic agents in easing the transition of Indian society from its traditional state of relative political and economic autonomy, to a new phase of dependence on government policy (Graham, 1973: 91). They have also been regarded as heady idealists, determined to establish a form of "heaven on earth" among the benighted heathen -- a role which did not make them sympathetic to government interference in affairs pertaining to their special missionary preserves (Usher, 1974). The role of the missionary has been seen as an extensive one (Graham, 1975: 5), "which contains many differing roles in itself... -- particular facets being defined by the context or situation in which the role is played..." The principal limitations on the scope of missionary endeavours, it has been argued, stemmed from government interference, particularly with respect to competition from government agents for power and prestige. At the Sault, however, the missionary would be met with plans already set forth

by the Native community, independent of his own goals. Native expectations would cast him in a role he had far from anticipated.

Choosing a Denomination

Shingwaukönse remained aloof from all Christian denominations throughout 1832. He instead engaged in numerous private conversations with missionaries, trying to find one man on whom he could rely to help achieve his goals. In December, for instance, The Pine informed the Baptist, Bingham, not only of his intention of becoming Christian, but also of his encouraging Indians living far to the west to come to the Sault and embrace the White man's religion. Bingham, who concentrated almost entirely on eliciting signs of "grace" as a prelude to personal salvation, was taken aback. Faced with such a grand scheme, forwarded by an individual he knew to be a medicine man, he treated the suggestions lightly:

> In a conference I had with him/Shingwaukönse/ about a year ago, in which I compared the two religions /Christianity and the midéwiwin/, he acknowledged that the meta religion looked like the religion of the Devil. Today he acknowledges his belief in the truth of the Xtian religion and expresses his desire that all the Inds. should embrace it. He says he has the past summer taken it upon him to visit several distant clans of Inds. in the Chippewa country to recommend to them unitedly to embrace the Christian religion, yet he acknowledges his neglect of the concerns of his own soul, and pleads his misfortune which has disabled him from meeting the demands of his Trader. 17

Bingham's response was to direct The Pine to meditate on the condition of his soul and to refrain from drinking. The Pine's desultory reply to the last admonition particularly concerned the missionary. "He acknowledges the advice was good," Bingham reflected, "but whether he will adopt it is another question."[18]

The Reverend Abel Bingham

Courtesy Clarke Library

Shingwaukönse, it was to prove, had little patience with emotional evangelism. About a month later, two of the chief's sons-in-law -- one the son of Nawgichigomee and the other, Magissanequa -- arrived at the Baptist mission with their wives, and Bingham organized a conference. All had been members of the Baptist congregation. The Pine's daughters stated that they had been "backsliders" and one of them admitted she had twice joined in the midéwiwin. As he had with their father, Bingham spared no pains in pointing out the evils of following the traditional religion. Not surprisingly, both became very frightened, especially as they had recently experienced a death in the family.[19]

Two days afterwards, Bingham and his interpreter, John Tanner,[20] went to visit Shingwaukönse and other members of the Garden River band to arrange a similar testimony meeting. This time The Pine controlled the conversation, directing it away from the missionary's penchant for expounding on individual "failings". The chief impressed on the missionary the seriousness of the situation among the western Indians, and their need for a peaceful reconciliation with the Whites. "Was informed by him that most of the Ojibwa country was about upon the point of rising against the Americans," Bingham recorded. "If one man was foolish enough to strike, the whole would follow."[21] Shingwaukönse's answer to the crisis involved settling the western Indians on the British side and instructing them in the Gospel.[22] Yet it was quite obvious that The Pine could expect little help from the Baptist missionary in developing his own plan. Bingham evinced little or no interest. Assistance would have to come from elsewhere.

The King's Church at the Canadian Rapids

The British Sault presented a virgin field as far as the Anglican Church was concerned, untrammeled by interference from government agencies and rival denominations other than those on the American side.[23] Interest shown in such ventures by Lieutenant Governor Sir John Colborne, and James Stewart, Bishop of Quebec, led to the founding of the Society for Converting and Civilizing the Indians of Upper Canada at York on October 30, 1830, with the Bishop as president and Colborne as patron. The Society described its purpose in grand terms by associating the success of Britain's imperial designs with the special religious trust committed to the care of her established church:

> The sacred use to which Great Britain, at this day, puts the enlargement of her empire in remote parts, is to impart to them the religious faith to which she owes her superiority: -- and it is before her influence, thus exercised, more than any other nation, that superstition and ignorance are fast disappearing from the globe (Waddilove, 1839: 24).

Financial backing for the endeavour failed to keep pace with these grand expectations. Owing to the Society's insufficient funds, it would only be with the promised aid of the Indian Department that the Society could consider making plans for the development of a model agricultural community at the Sault.

During the summer of 1830 the Reverend George Archbold the Lake Huron district to examine possible sites for an Indian mission. Archbold recommended several locations, and in the fall of 1830 James D. Cameron, son of the Hudson's Bay Company factor by the same name, set out with a schoolteacher[24] to begin his labours at LaCloche and Sault Ste. Marie. The reception he received from the Indians at the first place differed radically from the response he encountered at the second. On

October 14, the factor, John McBean, at LaCloche noted in his post journal:

> Frisee had an interview with Mr. Cameron, told him they did not expect him this year and advised him to go back. To this Mr. Cameron replied that he had not come to comply with the whims of Indians, and consequently was determined not to return, but to pass the winter here.[25]

Despite his zealousness, Cameron failed to win any adherents at LaCloche during his first stay. On June 4, 1831 McBean reported that Cameron, after "passing the winter here /at Lacloche/ with the hope of converting the Indians to Christianity, leaves them in the state he found them".[26]

Cameron's experiences with The Pine's band, by contrast, led him to entertain grand hopes for the Sault (Waddilove, 1839: 27). In January 1832, he placed the number of converts at fifty-two souls (Ibid., 28) and the attendance of children at the school between eighteen and twenty. The interest taken in learning the ten commandments, which he had translated into the Ojibwa language, was very encouraging, and prayer meetings, he reported, "are generally numerously and punctually attended." Little else is known of Cameron's fledgling Anglican mission. In the spring of 1831 the Society removed him from his position, since he had joined the Reverend Abel Bingham and become an itinerant Baptist preacher. In 1835 he married Shingabaw'osin's daughter and resided with her in the locality of the Tahquamenon River, west of the American Sault. Yet he did not immediately break his ties with Shingwaukönse's people, for after 1832 he acted as interpreter for his successor at the Anglican mission, William McMurray.[27]

McMurray, who arrived on the north shore in the fall of 1832, found the same degree of responsiveness among Shingwaukönse's band as had Cameron. The idea of establishing settlement elsewhere, such as at

LaCloche, was abandoned and all energies were focused on the development of the Sault Ste. Marie mission. McMurray embarked on his labours with little knowledge of the Indian people, and even less of the locality to which he had been appointed by Lieutenant Governor Colborne (Scadding and Hodgins, 1890: 41-2). He carried with him an introductory address from the Society for Converting and Civilizing the Indians which, in a paternalistic tone, stated, "If you listen to the teacher. . . and hear all that he will tell you out of the Great Spirit's book. . . the Great Spirit will forgive your former bad deeds, and will make you his Friends." [28]

Shingwaukönse completely ignored the tone of the address and demanded to know if the missionary had been sent by the Lieutenant Governor. McMurray handed him his credentials, with the seal of the Province attached, "and after comparing this with the medal which had been given him for his services to the King, the Chief was satisfied that he was duly accredited" (MacLean, 1973: 51). In a set speech, The Pine then demanded to know why the houses had not been built according to promise:

> We have heard for the last four years that houses were to be built for us, but we do not even see them begun; but we have ears to hear with, and hearts to understand. If we should see the buildings up, it would satisfy us, together with our young men, and then we would attend to the pursuits of agriculture settle upon our lands. [29]

The houses would be tokens of the government's desire to help the Indians develop their economic base; they would not be ends in themselves. The Anglicans, Shingwaukönse asserted, should be made aware of the nature of the grave relationship they were about to assume, for the lands were poor. Without long-term aid, even if "we were to settle upon them and endeavour

to follow the pursuits of agriculture, they would not yield a sufficiency to support us". The Pine implied preference for the hunting way of life, but game had grown scarce (Waddilove, 1839: 103).

Shingwaukönse admonished the missionary not to blame or belittle the Indians because they sometimes drank

> I suppose our Father thinks we are like children; always sitting and warming ourselves at the fire, and also thinks we are such, as regards rum; but it is not so with us, for during the winter we live upon meat and fish, and any other game we may chance to get in the woods: but when we see the white people in the spring, they offer us a glass and we take it.[30]

Finally, the Native leader concluded with the charge that the missionary should care for several widows who could no longer help themselves, and that the Indians would prefer to have the distribution of their presents take place at Sault Ste. Marie rather than at Penetanguishene.

Shingwaukönse's speech evidenced power-control by merging the power-of-the-powerless approach, with regard to declining traditional subsistence resources, with a strategy gauged to warn the missionary not to take the chief's words and actions lightly, especially with regard to the attack on the White stereotype of the "drunken savage". In this manner the chief forced the new missionary ultimately to define the situation, but using terms outlined by Shingwaukönse himself. The Pine continued, on behalf of his band, to wield the same degree of control over McMurray's endeavours for the next six years. But it would not be all one way. The Indians would also be willing to accede to many changes which, their chief persuaded them, would be for their eventual good.

Reciprocity and Compromise - A Two-sided Venture

The range of meanings brought to a transaction by each party taking

part in it need not necessarily be congruent in order for a relationship to function well (Salisbury, 1976). Neither is the expressed intention of the most dynamic party always the one which most influences the eventual nature and outcome of the transaction. The relationship which gradually came to be established between McMurray and Shingwaukönse evolved out of a series of minor compromises and adjustments made on both sides. When it was finally terminated in 1838, it left precedents which served to shape the expectations of Indians regarding the role of future Anglican missionaries. McMurray, on a salary of only £120 per annum (Waddilove, 1839: 86), lacked the means to effect any radical changes in the Indians' way of life. Instead, his primary goal was to spread the gospel and induce behaviour from his flock commensurate with that of a Christian congregation. He wished to wean the Indians away from drinking and towards raising enough agricultural produce to make them self-sufficient. He did not expect great advances in the way of schooling during these early years, and made no secret of the fact that he thought the need for and benefits of education to be highly overrated among missionaries generally.[31] Primary attention, he argued, should be given to helping the parents of the children assume settled habits, and then better attendance at a school would in all probability follow.

In this respect, McMurray differed greatly from the low church evangelicals who would succeed him. Prior to his appointment to the Sault, he had been enrolled as a divinity student in a school run at York by the high churchman, Archdeacon John Strachan, and had served as catechist at St. James Church, York, of which Strachan was rector. McMurray did not

view himself as God's special appointee to radically reform and enlighten the Indians. If anything, his religious credentials were rather humble. He did not receive his deacon's orders until August 1833. Before this time he could preach, but not conduct full-scale services. As a deacon, he was not permitted to administer the Eucharist -- the prerogative of a priest (MacLean, 1973: 52). His main authority resided in a special commission bestowed on him by the Lieutenant Governor, which enabled him to swear in the Hudson's Bay factors, William Nourse, Angus Bethune and John Swanston, as the first magistrates on the north shore of the straits, and vested him with the responsibilities of an Indian agent. Young, inexperienced, and occupying the lower echelons of the Established Church, McMurray adapted to the Sault milieu more rapidly than it responded, in turn, to his teachings. During the first winter the missionary resided at the Hudson's Bay establishment and at the Johnston home. He won a ready acceptance into the Johnston family, who -- familiar with Shingwaukönse's reputation as a medicine man and leader -- doubtless enabled McMurray to form a far more intimate and favourable impression of the chief than he would otherwise have gained on his own. In the fall of 1833 he cemented his relationship with the Johnstons by marrying Charlotte Johnston, or Ogenebugoquay -- "The Woman of the Wild Rose." By this time McMurray had ceased to live up to his name, Nazhekawahwahsung -- "The Lone Lightning" -- bestowed on him by The Pine's band. Charlotte, who had formerly aided Bingham in his work, now joined Cameron in acting as an interpreter at the Anglican mission.[32]

Soliciting McMurray's Aid in Defending Band Resources

Shingwaukönse immediately endeavoured to gain McMurray's assistance in protecting the "home band's" prerogatives to land and resources on both sides of the St. Mary's River. The American Fur Company's entry into commercial fishing in 1832 provided employment for the resident Métis (Nute, 1926), but for The Pine, who had the interests of a group as well as individuals at heart, the need for a degree of economic independence from major monopolistic enterprises remained paramount. The American Fur Company's endeavours to secure exclusive privileges to several fishery locations on northern Lake Michigan led to confrontations with Native users of these grounds. By June, 1833, The Pine was representing Ojibwa leaders in a similar dispute with the American government regarding usurpation by non-Natives of the rapids fishery secured by treaty in 1820.[33] The Anglican missionary agreed to help when Shingwaukönse informed him that the Indians might have to quit the south shore of the rapids altogether, since the American government proved unwilling to interfere.[34]

The Pine approached the subject of resource use from the Ojibwa standpoint: individual initiative had to be reconciled with a moral premise that one should not harm the chances of another within one's group to make a living. Basically protectionist in his outlook, Shingwaukönse extended Ojibwa regulatory powers to new commercial resources such as timber, now becoming important to

the Ojibwa economy. Fishing and logging would provide monetary revenue for the band under a primarily Native-controlled extractive system.[35] The Pine mustered a local "lobby", including a local medical doctor and a merchant, as well as the Anglican missionary, in support of his plan. Should the group fail to receive a sympathetic response from Francis Audrain, then the band would move to the Canadian side. When approached, the sub-agent was completely taken aback by the definiteness of The Pine's stance, and suggested to Schoolcraft that it might be McMurray's doing:

> Shingwauk & Kawguash /sic, Kaygayosh/ with about twenty-five or thirty followers, principally of the Home band visited the office, accompanied by the Revd. McMurray, Dr. Hoyt and Levake -- The visit was an unexpected one to me. Kawguash and Shingwauk made speeches, the tenor of which were complaints against the white people for building Houses and fishing on the reservation above the garrison, & destroying their timber on Sugar Island -- The foregoing appeared to me as a mere pretext for their visit -- & to my astonishment they concluded by saying, that the Indians were all going to the Canada side to encamp. . . I told them I thought if they went over & made a permanent abode on the Canada shore that you would shut the door of this office. Several of them said they would not go over, & I believe few if any will cross.
>
> It appears that Mr. McMurray had been counselling with them, on the Point and elsewhere on our side, on this subject of removal for some time past, & is using very active means to get them to remove to Canada. John Johnston informed me this morning that Mr. McMurray says he has a right so to do so. . . Mr. McMurray I think very impudently threatened to burn Shingwauk's American flag. 36

The timing of events suggests that the primary impetus behind this migration to the Canadian side arose from The Pine and his band, not the missionary. Shingwaukönse had been encouraging Indians to settle at Garden River and on Sugar Island for years prior to McMurray's arrival at the Sault. In addition to securing protection for the timber and fishery, the chief also directed the missionary to

ensure that, in terms of government assistance and protection, the Indians of Sault Ste. Marie would be placed "upon the same footing as those of the River Credit."[37] There was no doubt that by 1832 the chief had an array of tasks ready and waiting for McMurray to perform.

The chief had been priming Native leaders throughout the Upper Great Lakes area for years to expect a missionary-sponsored community on the north shore of the St. Mary's channel, and now he proclaimed that the time had arrived. In consequence, McMurray received numerous applications from head chiefs, residing between L'Anse and Fond du Lac, who wanted to join the mission community. Keche.Besheke, "Great Buffalo", or "Waishkey",[38] leader of the Loon family at Lapointe, personally visited the missionary in March. "Waishkey," McMurray informed his brother-in-law, George Johnston, "seemed to be desirous of settling on our side, provided he had a house to settle in."[39]

Shingwaukönse considered that, at last, his powers were equal to the task of revitalizing the Native community. He had expended a small fortune in skins in attaining his knowledge of "power-control" from medicine men, willing to impart their knowledge at a high price, and evidently felt confident that his power alignments would work.[40] Yet throughout the summer of 1833 the chief still refused to commit himself to one particular Christian denomination, although he stated that his band regarded McMurray as their main Christian guide. This may have stemmed from Shingwaukönse's close attachment to Kaygayosh, the third eldest son of Maidosagee,[41] who had assumed the head chieftainship of the Crane band following Shingabaw'osin's death in December 1828.

A well-known medicine man, Kaygayosh had been The Pine's mentor in the midéwiwin (Kohl, 1956: 380-2), and doubtless remained a confidant in other matters as well. Kaygayosh, meanwhile, viewed his own political power as issuing from his prominent position within the "Crane" family, rather than from any attachment to a mission establishment.[42]

Shingwaukönse and His Nodal Core Group Accept the Anglican Faith

While he continued to work with traditional leaders like Kaygayosh with regard to the protection of band resources, Shingwaukönse finally saw his way clear to requesting baptism from McMurray following the missionary's expedition to the Eastern Townships during the late summer of 1833 to receive Deacon's orders.[43] Buhkwujjenene had fallen ill of a hemorrhage from the nose, and during a prayer session held by McMurray for the youth's recovery, the father suddenly "threw down his pipe, arose and proclaimed: "Why should not I also offer up a prayer to the Great Spirit on behalf of my son?"[44] When Buhkwujjenene recovered soon afterward, it reinforced The Pine's confidence that he was following the correct course. On October 6 The Pine requested baptism for himself. He assumed the appearance of monogamy in November by marrying his youngest wife, Ogahbageyhequa, by Anglican ceremony, although at least two of his former wives remained with the band after this date. Buhkwujjenene, Ogista and his wife Pewaundahgahsenequa, Kabaosa and his wife, Ogimaqua, and Megissanequa and his wife Owiaquahgeyhequa formed the initial converts.[45]

In March 1834 McMurray baptised Mezai, who had come from Lapointe to join the settlement, Mezai's brother Ahnahgeah, and Mezai's wife. A week later, a woman by the name of Ojanganuse, either one of The Pine's



SHINGWAUK AND WIFE.

From Frost (1904)

daughters or one of his former wives, and a youth of fifteen, who was likely her son, named Apequash, accepted baptism. James Robertson known as Odahbit, the sole survivor of the tragedy which had claimed Sassaba's life over a decade before (Schoolcraft, 1975: 119), was also among the converts. Robertson had been interpreter at the Hudson's Bay Company post at Michipicoten, but had resigned his position on being employed as a catechist by McMurray at the Sault.

By June, Piabetassung and his wife Obahbahmejewenoqua were among the converted, along with Omenahkumigoqua or "Susan Askin", who, being fifty-five years of age, may have been Shingwaukönse's sister. Another participant, Isabella Sayers, of sixty-five years of age, had been the "country wife" of John Sayers, the fur trader, and afterwards probably a consort of The Pine.[46] Piabetassung's entire family took the surname "Askin", likely at the head chief's insistence.[47] Shingwaukönse himself assumed the English name "William McMurray", but rarely used it except in correspondence with McMurray himself. Ogista became "Thomas McMurray" and Buhkwujjenene, "Henry McMurray". Nahwahquashkum, Shingwaukönse's eldest son, finally baptized in June in spite of opposition from his in-laws, accepted the name, "George McMurray".[48]

The missionary kept his promise regarding arranging an interview for Shingwaukönse with the Lieutenant Governor. During the winter of 1833 he accompanied the chief, two of The Pine sons, and two of The Pine's sons-in-law to York.[49] At Shingwaukönse's express request, Colborne granted The Pine authority to protect timber and fisheries which the chief

considered to be under his jurisdiction. Houses would also be built in accordance with earlier government promises. In one report to the Society, McMurray claimed that "His Excellency gave a gracious reception and ultimately answered by ordering one hundred and fifty pounds to be appropriated for the foundation of a village, which will be commenced in the ensuing spring."[50]

With the expectation that a farming community would be established, the years 1833 and 1834 proved to be rewarding ones for McMurray. At the same time, the missionary was pleased, even astonished, at the eagerness of his Indian congregation to come hear his services, and adopt Western standards of behaviour. According to his accounts, the Ojibwa dressed neatly, in a "tasteful" blend of Native and European clothing, attended worship regularly, were orderly in conduct, and polite and helpful in disposition.[51] During the winter, families travelled from their hunting grounds, not more than twenty kilometres distant in most instances, to hear McMurray preach, and deposit their children at the mission school, opened in November 1833.[52] The numbers escalated week by week.

> On the 14th November, sixteen days after his arrival, Mr. McMurray. . . preached to an assembly of <u>thirty</u> persons, chiefly Indians. On the 25th, a considerable increase was visible in the attendance; and on Sunday, 10th January, <u>fifty</u> persons assembled for divine worship. . . on the next Sabbath, <u>eighty</u> persons united in the service of the church. 53

Many had completely abandoned drinking. The chief, on being approached by whiskey sellers, was quoted as replying, "When I wanted it, you would not give it to me. Now I do not want it, you try to force it upon me. Drink it yourselves!" (Maclean, 1973: 51). Such statements, quoted



CHURCH AT SAULT STE. MARIE.

From Beaven (1896: 128)

over and over in missionary reports, created a lasting, but erroneous impression of The Pine as having remained a teetotaller for the rest of his life (Armstrong, 1892: 164).

While McMurray was diligent in according credit for such changes to the intervention of God and the Church, he at times had to admit he felt carried along by a momentum he did not fully understand. The Pine and his sons expected the clergyman to expand the scope of his missionary endeavours along Lake Superior's northern coast, long before McMurray was ready to take such a step. As early as December 1833, Ogista stated that he and a companion intended to travel to Michipicoten and the Pic on their own to preach the Gospel, and asked the missionary to furnish them with supplies. McMurray hesitated -- the Society disapproved of persons not properly qualified acting on behalf of the Church -- but, still, when Ogista repeated the offer, the deacon thought he could justify the undertaking:

> As I considered the objections of the Committee [regarding unauthorized preaching] to apply only to the permanent engagement of such services, I acquiesced in their proposal, and furnished them with provisions to and from Michipicoten, at the expense of 6 dollars. I trust the sanction of the Committee will not be witheld /with regard/ to this step, which I considered it my duty to take.[54]

The missionary expressed delight that "all things worked together for good" when the chief factor at Michipicoten, George Keith, who provided transportation for Ogista's party free of charge,[55] spoke highly of McMurray's work as evidenced "per Augustus [Ogista] and his companions."

> I am really amazed at the knowledge they have acquired of Christianity. They have behaved in every respect with the greatest propriety, and I am persuaded the seeds they have sown will bring forth fruit to repentance and reformation.[56]

By this time McMurray felt that no dynamic other than the Divine will, could be operating to sponsor such willing attention to the Gospel on the part of Native peoples in the Upper Great Lakes area. Invitations issued from chiefs at Michipicoten and the Pic for missionaries to reside permanently with their bands. In the spring of 1834 Ojibwa from west of Lake Superior began congregating far in advance of the time they usually assembled at the Sault en route to the distribution of presents. "The number of Indians . . . during the summer has been very unusual, chiefly from the head waters of Lake Superior, Leech and Sandy Lakes," the missionary noted.[57] All seemed to want to learn as much about the goals of the mission as possible. McMurray's labours increased dramatically because of these incomers. In order to cope with the multitude of interested persons, McMurray increased "his services on Sunday to three, and the weekly services to two: the numbers usually attending them varied from 150 to 200 persons, all Indians."[58] And still the crowds continued to grow:

> Many more are thinking seriously and incline to follow the example of their brethern, all of whom remain steadfast in the Faith, in no instance, whatever, reverting to their former practices. They hold religious meetings among themselves, on such days as they do not attend to me. As might be expected from the nature of our holy religion, the new convert soon becomes warmly interested for his benighted brethern; and his anxiety on this account will be no matter of surprise to those whose birth and education have been Christian.[59]

By the fall of 1834 McMurray had assisted the chief in two important ways. First, he enabled The Pine and his group to vest their plans for a Native "homeland" with special appeal. Second, the missionary had enhanced the chief's territorial prerogatives by enabling them to be given special status by Colborne's commission of 1833. McMurray may

have appreciated Shingwaukönse's determination to protect resources on behalf of the Sault Band, since the chief also forbade work on Sundays, in keeping with his newly-acquired Christian beliefs. According to the Hudson's Bay Company journal for September 30, 1834, The Pine publicly notified the Métis of this new regulation:

> The Indian Chief /Shingwaukönse/ held a Council with the Canadian & halfbreed inhabitants to put a stop to the cutting of wood on the British side for sale to the Americans, and to prevent anyone from scooping at the rapids on the Sabbath day. 60

The Hudsons' Bay Company raised no objections either, since the chief, by demanding that his permission be obtained before any commercial outfit could set seines along the coast between Thessalon and Batchewana Bay, helped reduce competition. George Johnston, who in 1834 entered the Mackinac fish trade with Ogista as his assistant, secured The Pine's sanction to establish an outpost at Batchewana Bay. While another merchant, by the name of Chapman, respected Shingwaukönse's prerogatives as well, others did not and were penalized. In the fall of 1834, Samuel Ashman, son-in-law of the Sandy Lake head chief Katawebedai, not only established a commercial fishery at Goulais Bay, but also sent William Cameron, James D. Cameron Jr.'s relative, to compete with the Hudson's Bay Company for the Indians' spring hunt. According to William Nourse, the Hudson's Bay factor at Sault Ste. Marie, Ashman evaded customs but not The Pine's scrutiny:

> During the winter a party of Americans have been carrying on an extensive traffic with smuggled property at Goulais Bay. The Indian Chief /Shingwaukönse/ under an authority from the Lieutenant Governor, gave them warning to quit the 6th January, but they paid no attention to it. I apprised Captain /James/ Anderson, the Collector of Customs /at Michipicoten/. The abuse had become too great -- I therefore procured an authority to act. 61

In response, Nourse in March 1835 arranged to put a stop to the illegal venture:

> /We were met by Mr. Laronde, the Hudson's Bay Company agent/ at the place where the smugglers were encamped and there made the seizure -- distributing the Fish, etc. to the Indians to whom they of right belonged. . . & destroying the remainder. 62

The Pine, with the assistance of the local magistracy, continued to oppose commercial interests operating without his permission on the northern side of the "home band's" traditional hunting and fishing range. The missionary's cherished goal, by contrast, was the establishment of a model farming community. Two years before, owing to scarcity of funds, it had seemed like an impossible dream. The Hudson's Bay Company had even ridiculed the idea. To Sir George Simpson, embarking on such a project would prove to be a fruitless proposition unless at least £300 could be procured -- which the Company's governor felt to be an unlikely prospect (Waddilove, 1839: 86). Yet by the spring of 1833 everything had changed. Colborne promised funds to build twenty Indian houses and provide a farming instructor, schoolteacher and a carpenter. Shingwaukönse's band seemed enthusiastic, to the degree that McMurray felt the Ojibwa shared his hopes for the future. His goal now seemingly within range, the missionary wrote the Society concerning his charge:

> For myself I felt lastingly attached to them and have reason to believe that the attachment is reciprocal. Our prospects brighten daily, and justify my belief, that with the continuance of the Divine blessing, the success of the mission is now placed beyond all doubt. 63

Foxes in the Vineyard - Power Struggles at the Rapids

McMurray had fulfilled the Indians' desires by acting as a channel


Point Mamainse
Batchewana Bay
Goulais Bay
Goulais River
Tahquamenon River
Naomikong Pt.
Sault Ste. Marie
Garden River
Echo Lake
Church's Landing
Sugar Is.
Bay Mills
Sault Ste. Marie
Thessalon River
Bruce Mines
Thessalon
St. Joseph's Is.
North Channel
Drummond Is.
Cockburn Is.
Mackinac Is.

Map 1


Lake of the Woods
Fort William
Michipicoten
Lapointe
Portage Lake
L'Anse
Ontonagon River
Garden River
Little Current
Wikwemikong
Manitowaning
Bay de Noc
Saginaw Bay
Detroit

Map 2

for requests and grievances to the Lieutenant Governor. This intermediary role had not been an onerous burden and there is reason to believe that the missionary enjoyed the unrivalled status it conferred upon him in the eyes of his Native congregation. When Thomas G. Anderson suggested that he let his "temporal duties" as an Indian agent fall to his catechist and interpreter, James Robertson, McMurray rejected the idea.[64] The missionary also hedged when the Society suggested that Robertson run the school. The Indians, he contended, would never listen to a schoolmaster who was "an Indian like themselves".[65] The missionary saw no future in altering his role as the sole dispenser of government benefits and relief. To permit Robertson a degree of authority would undermine the one-to-one understanding he felt existed between Shingwaukönse and himself. He and The Pine were the head people responsible for the success of the mission; all others of the congregation would be the mere recipients of the fruits of their labour.

As long as The Pine and the missionary shared understandings about the projected settlement, McMurray held, everything went smoothly. Yet it was Shingwaukönse, acting in consort with Kaygayosh, the Crane head chief, and not McMurray who wielded the greatest influence within the "home band". Under the leadership of The Pine and Kaygayosh, the rapids community remained cohesive. Since the Anglican mission in the long run came to prove to be more a divisive than a unifying influence, The Pine eventually had to overrule the missionary and direct the course of the settlement single-handedly towards new goals.

Seeds of contention within the community burgeoned into life in the spring of 1835, beginning with a clash between McMurray and The Pine

over the location of the mission establishment. Shingwaukönse and his band wanted to plant their gardens at Ketegaun Sebee, or Garden River. With the sanction of Kaygayosh at the rapids, and Keokonse the Thessalon head chief, The Pine had arisen as leader of one of the most prominent Ojibwa villages along the north shore of the St. Mary's straits.

The east bank of the Garden River had been seasonally occupied by Indians since the eighteenth century as a "supply station" for fur brigades passing up the north channel en route to Lake Superior (Frost, 1904: 59-60; James, 1830: xxx; Kelton, 1888: 25). Its geographic proximity to the British post on St. Joseph's Island, readily accessible from the eastern extremity of Sugar Island, enhanced its position during the years immediately prior to the War of 1812 (see Map 1). Following the relocation of the British station, and the termination of the east-west brigades following the merger in 1821 of the Northwest and Hudson's Bay Companies, the locus of trade activity shifted to Sugar Island. A number of merchants resided on the island, foremost among in the 1830's being Michael G. Payment and Malcolm McKerchie,[66] who maintained market connections in Michigan, Ohio and Upper Canada. These men traded with the local Ojibwa population for fish, preserves, timber, handcrafts, vegetables, firewood for steamer fuel, and possibly copper ore as well.

Shingwaukönse, as head chiefs before him had done, intended to protect and regulate resources on Indian land by maintaining control over access to interior water routes.[67] Garden River was the focal base for The Pine's operations since it was strategically placed relative to a broad inland water transportation

system connecting every sector of the band's hunting and fishing range that The Pine considered to be under his charge -- from west of Thessalon to Batchewana Bay.[68]

Regardless of The Pine's repeated appeals, McMurray rejected proposals that the mission settlement be established at the mouth of the Garden River, near the trading establishments on Sugar Island.[69] In the spring of 1834 the missionary had been able to rent the stone mansion, and estate grounds at Sault Ste. Marie, belonging to Charles Oakes Ermatinger. This arrangement not only provided the missionary's family with comfortable lodgings, but also offered an expanse of cleared, surveyed land for farming purposes. Four acres of the Ermatinger property bordered on the St. Mary's River, while the remainder, comprising thirty acres, extended to the crest of a hill behind. Fields were already enclosed by fences; sufficient hardwood for construction and firewood for fuel could be secured north of the property; and McMurray contended that the Indians could raise hay, potatoes and other vegetables on the slope behind the mansion.[70]

Indian Superintendent Thomas G. Anderson arrived at the Sault in June in company with the Reverend Adam Elliot, former Anglican missionary to the Home District. Anderson and Elliot had been interviewing band leaders north of Lake Huron to determine the feasibility of establishing a government-funded Anglican mission establishment at Manitowaning on Manitoulin Island. As an extension of Anderson's duties, Lieutenant Governor Colborne had requested the agent to look into affairs between McMurray and the Indians, since news had reached Colborne that the

mission's proximity to approximately forty Roman Catholic French and Métis families had become a contentious issue. Colborne proposed that the rapids area be reserved exclusively for the Anglican Church and that the French and Métis be removed from Sault Ste. Marie.[71]

Shingwaukönse arranged a viewing of the Garden River area on July 2nd, and attempted to persuade Anderson to agree to the site.[72] In this the chief was unsuccessful. The Superintendent considered the soil to be "pure sand" and supported McMurray's preference for Sault Ste. Marie.[73] While concerned about the nearness of the mission to Fort Brady on the opposite shore, Anderson felt that economy justified the renting of the Ermatinger estate. The "state of the funds and the very low price for which Mr. Ermatinger's property is offered" overruled Ojibwa opposition as well.[74] Government and missionary priorities prevailed regardless of Shingwaukönse's scheme. Anderson simply expected the Native population to comply obediently with his decision. The Indians were dismayed by this state of affairs. Years later they would recount to Anderson's son, Gustavus:

> When the first Blackcoat (Mr. McMurray) came here, he found us encamped at the Sault, and asked us where we proposed settling. We told him that as our fields were at Garden River, and our fathers before us planted their potatoes there, we hoped, if a mission was to be established, that our Father in Toronto (Sir John Colborne) would allow us to have it where the land was good.
>
> In about two years after this, our Blackcoat said that he had received a letter from our Father, who said that he thought the Sault the best place for a mission. Accordingly a commencement was made by building the church [actually the schoolhouse]. We did not like this, but we said our Father at Toronto knows what will be for us his children's good; let us then obey him and willingly agree to settle where the church is.[75]

Besides choosing a site, Anderson's responsibilities included settling the dispute between McMurray and the Métis. McMurray had complained to

Colborne that most of the Métis engaged in smuggling, and in response, Colborne instructed the Indian Department to investigate. This task eventually fell to the Hudson's Bay Company. Bethune, the chief factor at Michipicoten argued, in his company's interest, that the "grog shops" of the free traders constituted a nuisance to the peace and order of the community.[76] Nourse, factor at the Sault, also supported Colborne's proposal that the Métis be removed. He had long opposed the Company's employment of this "class", and forwarded a plan which, he maintained, would improve financial prospects:

> . . . we are under a state of thraldom as things are now; /the factor complained/ the Freemen here knowing we cannot do without them are often very saucy, to keep them in humour credits are often given to them -- and money often lost: were we able to do without them no such risks would be incurred, and some saving might be effected. 77

Nourse's solution to the labor problem was simple: dispense with the "habitants" and employ Indians on a wage system. Ojibwa, the factor argued, could be readily hired and as easily dismissed, having traditional hunting occupations to which they could readily return. Those who had already been employed proved reliable workers. Men like Buhkwujjenene and Mezai knew the routes well, and so could act as mail carriers and canoemen.[78] The mission's goals thus offered the Hudson's Bay Company a unique opportunity for finding moral justifications for opposing its main source of competition. Whether or not the Métis actually posed a threat to the public peace, however, was another question.

Confronted by the combined forces of government, the Established Church and commercial monopoly, the Roman Catholic Indians and Métis, not surprisingly, felt both threatened and angered, and accused The Pine

and his band of siding with an agent of discord. Although Anderson depicted the affair as a contest between "Indians" and "Half Breeds", the primary cause of the unrest stemmed from McMurray's assumption of control over resources and land in the interests of the Anglican Church. The Pine had tried to allay the growth of divisiveness by proposing to have the mission based at Garden River and so allow the Métis and Indians under Nebenagoching, who depended principally on the rapids fishery, to reside in the vicinity of the rapids unmolested from external interference. In response, the population at the Sault respected the territorial prerogatives vested in The Pine. There is no evidence that, prior to Anderson's arrival, bad feeling existed towards the chief. Until 1835 the community had remained socially cohesive, in spite of outside intervention, gauged to drive a wedge between Roman Catholics and Protestants. For instance, in a petition to Colborne, numerous signees, among them "Pierre L'avoine. . . Chief's son" (Tegoosh) and "Joseph Ne.pa.nin.toting" (Nebenagoching), argued that they had been prohibited by McMurray from cutting wood to construct a Roman Catholic chapel even though they had "previously obtained the consent of the principal chief, for so doing".[79]

With Anderson's and Elliot's appearance, the situation radically changed. Anderson made no secret of the fact that Protestants would be favoured over Roman Catholics, and that "Indians" would be recognized, while "Métis" were to be ignored. The 216 "Protestants" received presents at the Sault mission, while the remainder were forced to travel to Penetanguishene. The same policy pertained to the distribution of agricultural assistance and relief.[80] Anderson also stressed that the only valid channel to the Indian Department

henceforth lay through the Anglican missionary.[81] It may have made good financial sense to streamline expenditures and administration by centralizing power in the hands of the missionary at the rapids, but it split the band "owning" the land, and by late June The Pine's followers found themselves embroiled in a series of local disputes, which apparently included the use of witchcraft.[82]

Anderson's desire to integrate all controlling agencies on the frontier also led to his manipulating prevailing power alignments within the "home band" to suit government interests. On the grounds that the Roman Catholic Crane chief had participated in smuggling operations, the agent exercised the considerable powers conferred upon him by the Indian Department (Smith, 1975: 6-13) by divesting Nebenagoching of the chieftainship he had held by British consent since 1819.[83] In Nebenagoching's stead, Anderson announced, "Shing-gua-conce. . . /would be/ Grand Chief and all the tribes coming to this place must be obedient to him."[84]

Shingwaukönse was not long in making use of his favoured position. He presented Anderson with a map of the coast from Thessalon to Goulais Bay, with his "jurisdiction" clearly marked. When pressed, Anderson promised to uphold the territorial prerogatives of this "Protestant" leader."[85] By obtaining the superintendent's agreement to recognize Native territorial rights, The Pine had thrown into question the nature of the mission's land tenure at the rapids. McMurray paid a fixed annual rent to Ermatinger who, since no formal surrender of the property to the Crown had ever been made, was just as much a "squatter" as the French and Métis. Anderson also failed in his endeavours

to persuade the French and Métis to move to St. Joseph's Island. The French had requested upwards of £1800 for their strip lots fronting on the channel, a sum which dealt a severe set-back to Anderson's plans and, ultimately, left the settlement at the rapids unaltered.[86]

Influence of Indian Department Policy on Alliances among Head Chiefs

Between 1832 and 1835 McMurray had won the approbation and respect of his Native congregation. Yet there is little doubt that this state of affairs derived not so much from forceful, authoritative directives on the part of the missionary as from the willingness of the Indians to enter into a kind of relationship structured as much, or more, by Native expectations as by doctrinaire Christian beliefs. It was a reciprocal relationship which worked. Anderson's determination to control the frontier bands through a programme of systematic settlement, nevertheless tended to undermine the status of the missionary, who became little more than a puppet of the Indian Department. Without notifying McMurray, Anderson placed James Robertson in charge of certain administrative responsibilities and dismissed James D. Cameron Jr. as interpreter. The superintendent felt it his duty to impress on the Indians the idea that government priorities overruled those of the missionary, and that both official and mission goals were opposed to those of free trade.

Indian policy had become, first and foremost, a tool of international diplomacy. Well aware of American fears concerning the influence British independent traders might exert over the Indian population of the northwestern frontier, Anderson had been instructing the western bands for over a decade to leave their often lucrative

commercial pursuits and settle permanently near the British military posts.[87] The idea of encouraging missions to run farming communities emerged as an afterthought -- engendered by Methodist endeavours at New Credit -- and was promoted because it promised to be the most inexpensive way of dealing with Britain's former Native allies.

What this policy failed to consider, however, was that broad lateral political networks already existed among head chiefs. When exacerbated by the Indian Department's policy of favouring members of the Established Church over adherents of other denominations, rivalries between Native leaders eroded old power structures, while alliances, partly based on religious commonality, bred new political alignments. This process had divided the three principal head chiefs at Coldwater and led to the dispersal of the settlement's inhabitants.[88] Government attempts to exercise control over the movement of peoples by encouraging attachment to government goals had bred results diametrically opposite to official expectations.

In order to protect the integrity of their leadership, head chiefs began to strengthen their lateral ties, seeking to entrench their groups more securely both within the Upper Great Lakes Native community, as well as in the eyes of the British government. Jean Baptiste Assiginack an Ottawa chief from L'Arbre Croche, Michigan, who frequently acted as agent to the western bands on behalf of the Indian Department, saw his valued status falling into jeopardy due to his preference for Roman Catholicism. To counter this possibility, Assiginack built up a strong power base at Pentanguishene, including within his retinue the prominent Ojibwa chief, John Aisance, whom he persuaded to convert from Methodism to Roman Catholicism (Leighton, 1983: 9), and Jean Baptiste Tagwaninini,

an Ojibwa originally from Saginaw, Michigan, who had temporarily joined Aisance's band, but later moved to Wikwemikong on Manitoulin Island.[89] The fourth member of this group, John MacFarlane, also known as "John Bell", was a Métis from Nipigon whose father had ensured that he had received enough education to be able to read and write English, and speak French. This background led Bell to become an interpreter both for Anderson and the trader Andrew Mitchell at Penetanguishene.[90]

It did not take Anderson long to discover that Assiginack, Aisance, Tagwaninini and Bell had been in frequent contact with the Roman Catholics at the Sault who opposed the Anglican mission.[91] The superintendent's elevation of Shingwaukönse to the status of head chief and his demotion of Nebenagoching had partly been a ploy to break up this seemingly religious-based alliance. Both Anderson and Elliot, meanwhile, proclaimed Shingwaukönse to be a "model Anglican convert," while attempting to sever the chief's allegiances to the broader Upper Great Lakes Native community by encouraging his dependency on government patronage. In this last aim, they were totally unsuccessful. Shingwaukönse had sought government favor in the first place on behalf of his Ojibwa and Ottawa allies, and his own followers. For the chief to have renounced his alliances would have deprived his actions with respect to the government authorities of their essential meaning.

An Appeal For New Allies

The Ojibwa had been distrustful of American policy ever since 1833, when Washington refused to protect their fishery locations. Successive events increased their concern. Blacksmith services to Indians at the Mackinac agency

were suddenly withdrawn in 1834.[92] The following year the American garrison disregarded the existence of a Native burial ground, reserved under the terms of the 1820 treaty, in adding an extension to Fort Brady (Armstrong, 1892: 165). In answer to these grievances, Shingwaukönse offered a simple solution: move to the Canadian side. Regardless of Anderson's and McMurray's choice of the Ermatinger estate as the main mission site, The Pine continued to exercise authority over the much wider territory extending from east of Garden River to Batchewana Bay.

The Pine still retained associations with the "Cranes" through his relationship with Kaygayosh, and encouraged the elder Crane leader to become a "British chief." Shingwaukönse had already publicly stated his own stand on the matter of national loyalties. During negotiations at Mackinac, in March 1836, concerning a major land cession in northern Michigan, he had declared his independence from the American government. The decisive tone of his speech, regardless of its content, had won Schoolcraft's admiration. "Attention was perfectly arrested by the force, comprehensiveness and striking oratorical turns" of the speech, the agent noted approvingly (Schoolcraft, 1851, 1: 112).

Owing to his privileged position with regard to the British government, Shingwaukönse could afford to exercise autonomy apart from the "old Crane band." Kaygayosh, his loyalties in 1836 divided between his responsibilities to his group and his dislike of American Indian policy, faced a far more difficult decision. Schoolcraft had selected Native delegates whom he knew to be amenable to the government's terms, to proceed to Washington to take part in preliminary negotiations regarding the forthcoming treaty. Those whom the agent felt leaned towards

the British interest, he did not inform of the affair until the delegates had already departed. Schoolcraft justified his deliberate exclusion of the Crane head chief from the proceedings on the grounds that the views of dissenting leaders should automatically be overruled in the interest of the state. For Kaygayosh, however, striving to retain his band's unity, things appeared in a different light. Why, for instance, Kaygayosh complained, should Waubojeeg, who was Schoolcraft's uncle by marriage and a head of the Caribou dodem from Lapointe, be made "at his own will. . . the representative of the ancient red men whose totem is the lofty Crane?" (Schoolcraft, 1975: 524).

Although Schoolcraft eventually permitted Kaygayosh to participate as a "first-class" chief in the treaty, this was more a concession to Kaygayosh personally, than a recognition that the "Crane band" still existed as a functioning political entity. Not long after, Kaygayosh, and his younger brother Muckedayoquot or "Black Cloud", and Muckedayoquot's two sons, John Kabaosa and Waubmama, joined Shingwaukönse's group on the Canadian side.[93] Nebenagoching, who had remained firm in his attachment to the British interest in spite of Anderson's attempts to demote him, also continued to act as a prominent Crane chief.

Head men from Mackinac and St. Ignace entered into alliances with The Pine as well, although still retaining their names on the American band lists in order to share in annuity payments. To these leaders, linkages with The Pine constituted a form of insurance, as they would permit their bands to move to the Canadian shore should the United States government seek to compel the Indians to leave Michigan. The occasion of the 1837 annuity distribution had already brought an unwelcome surprise. The treaty of March

Kaygayosh

Catlin (1973)

1836 had been modified by Washington, without the Ojibwa's knowledge prior to its ratification in May. The original agreement had maintained that removal would only take place when "the said Indians desire it."[94] As ammended, the treaty now restricted Indian occupancy at the rapids to only "five years. . . and no longer" and made "lands southwest of the Missouri" -- outside the Ojibwa's familiar mixed-woodland habitat -- the place of destination.[95] With the likelihood of removal in the near future, Shingwaukönse's plan for the establishment of a "homeland" refuge for bands throughout the Lake Superior district rapidly gained widespread appeal.

At the same time The Pine had to protect his own power base at Garden River. Anderson's recognition of Shingwaukönse's territorial prerogatives north of the St. Mary's channel had been a minor victory for the chief, but the fact still remained that the Superintendent had been contemplating drawing all bands along the north shore of Lake Huron to Manitowaning on Manitoulin Island. The Pine strongly disapproved of the idea. The Roman Catholic settlement at Wikwemikong, composed of Ottawa migrants from L'Arbre Croche, had become a new focus of operations for Assiginack, Tagwaninini and Bell, and Shingwaukönse felt no inclination to confront his rivals.

The faction led by Assiginack had been developing a political ideology which would enable its formerly disparate elements to feel comfortable working together in unison. Historical precedents were sought to validate the political unification of the Ojibwa, Ottawa and Potawatomi within the Lake Huron district. The

answer lay in the Ottawa tradition of the Three Fires. The Ottawa leader Sagimah, it was maintained, had during the mid-seventeenth century, led the Ottawa, Ojibwa and Potawatomi to victory against the Iroquois. The legend "worked" because the Saginaw Ojibwa and Ottawa could identify with it. Yet the legend meant far less to the Lake Superior Ojibwa, not all of whom had participated in this drive against the Iroquois, or whose ancestors had returned to their traditional lands in the Upper Great Lakes region and felt no need to justify their rights to territory by tales of conquest.[96]

Subsequent events sharpened rivalries between the Sault Ste. Marie and Manitoulin factions. In the fall of 1835 Sir Francis Bond Head had succeeded Sir John Colborne as Lieutenant Governor. After a tour of Indian missions in Upper Canada, Bond Head declared the idea of establishing yet another government-supported settlement a costly and probably fruitless endeavour, and suggested removing as many bands as possible to Manitoulin Island to obtain more land for settlement. In order to further his removal plan, in 1836 the Lieutenant Governor secured a surrender of Manitoulin Island from the resident Indians. The Ottawa at Wikwemikong felt their preeminence on the island to be unquestioned at this point, and Father Proulx, the priest at Wikwemikong, even went so far as to ask Anderson on behalf of the Roman Catholic mission for permission to occupy the houses and outbuildings which had been erected the preceding year at Manitowaning in readiness for the projected Anglican mission settlement.[97]

While the Ottawa on Manitoulin Island may have had reason to be pleased, Protestant Upper Canada was horrified. The British organization, the Aborigines Protection Society, founded in 1836, retaliated

with the statement, quoted repeatedly in the Protestant press, that the Canadian government had exchanged three million acres of good farmland for 23,000 barren, rocky islands.[98] Although Bond Head's project assumed priority throughout 1837, Shingwaukönse continued to press for assistance for his people near Sault Ste. Marie. His attempts to secure support from head chiefs residing on Lake Huron drew comment from Elliot in 1837, who viewed Shingwaukönse as valiantly upholding the banner of Anglicanism in the north, regardless of reversals in government policy:

> Chinguacounse assembled his brother chiefs of the Chippewa nation who are not Christians, but have often assured me that they would become members of the Church, and when he reminded them of their promises, they each made speeches in turn and renewed their assurances that they would adopt the Established religion. 99

There could be no doubt by this time, however, that McMurray's "presumption" of control over unceded property at Sault Ste. Marie had long been overruled by Shingwaukönse's strong assertion of his own proprietory right to the land. Over the next several years the strategy by which The Pine hoped to retain his control over territory which he, according to Ojibwa customary practice, considered to be under his management and protection, would lie in pressing the government for the construction of the houses promised by Colborne. These houses soon became political counters in a heated "power game" between The Pine's band and the government, since the building of the houses would constitute firm recognition of a strong Ojibwa presence at the rapids. But should Shingwaukönse fail, the threat existed that the band might cease to survive as an autonomous political entity, and so lose its capacity to regulate its social and economic future.

Given the direction of Bond Head's Indian policy, the Anglican missionary could no longer fulfil the expections of The Pine's band, and in 1837 he resigned. McMurray cited the government's failure to honor its promises to the Indians as the reason behind his decision:

> This reflected sorely upon me as their missionary. I made the promises to the Indians on the strength of those made to them by Sir John Colborne; but as they were not carried out by his successor my position was seriously altered, for the Indians began to think that I had no authority for making the promises referred to, thus casting doubt upon my veracity.
>
> This induced me to resign my mission, not because I did not love the work. . . 100

The precedent set by the reciprocal relationship existing between the missionary and the Ojibwa informed the positive attitude the band expressed towards those who would succeed McMurray in the Anglican mission field at the Sault. McMurray's labours, while they had produced no long-lasting material changes within the Native community, had been invaluable to The Pine in securing direct lines of communication both to the Crown's representatives and to heads of the Established Church. These linkages raised Shingwaukönse materially in the sight of of the Indian Department, and at the distribution of presents in 1838 the chief was formally recognized as spokesman for the western bands. Shingwaukönse quickly turned his new status into a public platform for discussing his own views on the responsibility of the Crown to the western bands -- ideas at variance with the prevailing attitude of assembled officials and clergy, who supported revival of the fledgling Anglican mission on Manitoulin Island. While retaining connections with the government and the Anglican Church, The Pine also set out to harness other dynamic agencies, legal and commercial, which might assist his people in achieving their goals.

On becoming head chief, Shingwaukönse exercised control over his group's membership and the use of resources within the scope of his territorial "jurisdiction". He also maintained the choice of whether or not to speak or act, when invited to do so, on behalf of other leaders and their bands. In 1837, however, he was approached to represent a new group, the Métis at Sault Ste. Marie. To this Shingwaukönse agreed, not only because many Métis had become bona fide members of his band through intermarriage, but also because the chief had come to recognize the value of the Métis to his future plans for the Native community at the rapids.

CHAPTER FIVE

YEARS OF TESTING AND TRIAL

By 1837 Shingwaukönse secured backing for his plans from the Métis, largely because the Métis found it mandatory to have an "Indian" speak for them since, as a group, they lacked political recognition from the British government.[1] At the same time, The Pine appreciated the experience and skills that could be contributed by the Métis towards the realization of his scheme for the Native community, as the Sault Ste. Marie area promised to yield valuable resources, particularly timber, which the Métis knew how to market to advantage. Shingwaukönse initially experienced success in bringing Indians and Métis at the rapids together in pursuit of common interests, especially since indigenous aims differed from mainstream society's views of the "role" Native peoples should occupy on the frontier. Because the Ottawa contingent on Manitoulin Island, however, was developing a community of its own which would rival that at Garden River in the government's estimation, The Pine soon encountered formidable problems.[2]

Effects of the Decline of the Fur Trade on the Upper Great Lakes Community

During the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the independent traders and Native bands remained separate but complementary halves of a broader, integrated Upper Great Lakes community founded

on the fur trade. Descendants of traders could become "Indians" over time, although personnel of the trading interests associated with the British military establishment at Mackinac, and later at St. Joseph's Island, Drummond Island and Penetanguishene, were less prone to becoming assimilated into Native society than those whose activities were further removed from the regulatory protection and control of the colonial authorities. Large trade monopolies did not make an appearance in this region until after 1780, so that traditions emerging from the sphere of political interaction between Indians and colonial officials during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries came to be sufficiently well-established that they continued to inform trade transactions into the nineteenth century.

By 1800, the independent traders and the Ojibwa were linked together by marriage alliance, shared cultural understandings and use of a common tongue -- Ojibwa being the language of trade. Heads of many leading trading establishments married Indian women, and certain of their daughters reversed the direction of marriage exchange by marrying into Native society.[3] Later arrivals to the trade intermarried with earlier families. Xavier Biron married Angelique Cadotte from Lapointe; his son, Alexis, married Mezai's daughter.[4] Jean Baptiste Perrault wed a Native woman, and their daughter became wife of Waubechacheke, a chief of the Crane <u>dodem</u> at the Sault, and the father of Nebenagoching.[5] These marriages instigated the growth of reciprocal, obligational bonds between the independent trading interests and leading chiefs. The Lake Superior region thus became a map of reticulate ties between independent traders and head chiefs superimposed upon a longer-standing alliance

system established among the Native leaders themselves.

The greatest setback to the independent trade at Sault Ste. Marie occurred following the close of the War of 1812. The American Congress, concerned about the influence of British fur commerce on Indian political loyalties, and prompted by the wishes of the powerful American Fur Company monopoly, effected radical changes in the Lake Superior trade. Legislation after 1816 banned the British fur trade from American soil, and provided for government control and re-organization of fur commerce, henceforth to operate only at fixed posts within defined geographic districts (Johnson, 1971: 101-6; Schoolcraft, 1851, 1: 141). With these constraints placed upon the British commerce, the complementary characteristics of the eighteenth-century trading milieu lessened. At first, prominent Sault traders like Xavier Biron, his son Francis, and Augustan Nolin thought they could escape the severity of the economic penalties inflicted on them by American policy. Together they persuaded Ojibwa from Fond du Lac to exploit beaver grounds on the north shore of Lake Superior. In July 1818, the Hudson's Bay factor at Michipicoten, Andrew Stewart, warned his superiors that Francis Biron and Ojibwa trappers from west of Lake Superior intended to establish trapping territories and oppose his men at Capenacagamie. The idea of Ojibwa coming from Fond du Lac failed to surprise the factor. Indians, ever since the Hudson's Bay Company had established its post on the coast in 1797, had arrived at Michipicoten from as far north as Henley House, associated with Fort Albany, although the Hudson's Bay Company tried to induce bands to attach themselves to only one post over time. The incoming trappers presented special problems in 1818, however, since they would "winter" nearby and work

for a rival interest.[6]

Stewart, faced with this threat, hit on a shrewd plan well in keeping with Company goals. The Hudson's Bay Company focused attention on preventing Northwesters or free traders from the Upper Great Lakes region from reaching the valuable interior fur country (Galbraith, 1957), which rapidly led to an over-exploitation of fur-bearing animals, by rival interests, in the coastal area. Knowing this, Stewart decided to invite the independent traders to join forces with the Hudson's Bay Company, and so provide stiff competition for the Northwest Company at Matawagamie, forty-four miles inland from Michipicoten. Biron and Nolan thought the plan a good one. Following the signing of an agreement on August 22, the parties set off together to oppose the Northwest Company, having mutually agreed to uphold a share system with a division of furs to take place in the spring.[7]

In this manner the impact of economic hardship on the independent trade was delayed for a time. Trade unrest west of Lake Superior during these years led to a concentration of population from Red River at Sault Ste. Marie. The French and Métis sought assistance from the Bishop of Quebec in order to foster an institutional base for their growing, but disorganized and economically-faltering community. Priests from Quebec set out to establish a social system based on the St. Lawrence model, to extend from Sault Ste. Marie westward to the Red River (Nute, 1942). In the turmoil of inter-company fur trade rivalries, this vision faded in spite of repeated appeals from the frontier. By the late 1820's the Sault population had to be content with their settlement being a satellite of Roman Catholic missionary endeavours

supplied from the American side, rather than being a core for religious, cultural and economic expansion, as they had originally hoped.

United States officials, meanwhile, kept an increasingly watchful eye on British activities regarding the western Indians. Military and government agents knew of the wide geographic spread of interlinking relationships between traders and chiefs, and feared the influence that British commercial interests could exert within the scope of these alliances. The British agent Thomas G. Anderson of Drummond Island sought to quiet American fears by stressing the need for bands to desist from the fur trade and adopt sedentary farming activities.[8] Indian compliance to Anderson's suggestion only worsened the economic difficulties of the independent trader and Métis population. With the unification of the Northwest Company and Hudson's Bay Company in 1821, and the signing in 1833 of an agreement between the British and American trading monopolies aimed at squeezing out independent enterprise, the need no longer existed for major fur companies to form short-term alliances with older trading establishments to procure competitive advantages. The 1821 merger resulted in dismissal of many former company employees and placed a ceiling on opportunities for those not directly associated with the company bourgeois.[9]

In contrast to the fur trade milieu, Native society continued to exhibit organizational stability. The core of Shingwaukönse's band was composed of his sons, his daughters, and their husbands, Kabaosa, Megissanequa, Misquabnokay, Piabetassung, and Shebakezik.[10] This central core continued to act as a unit vis-a-vis neighbouring groups by maintaining alliances with the Abatossaway family on Manitoulin Island, the Gegwetosse family on Sugar Island and the Missegan family at L'Anse,

Diagram A

Shingwaukönse's Sons and Sons-in-law



* George was also known as Nahwahquashkum

** Menissino was also known as George Shingwauk



Diagram B



After 1830 Boissoneau men gained entrance into the Garden River and Batchewana bands by marrying Biron women. The arrow ⟵ indicates that individuals joined the Garden River band. An arrow facing the reverse direction ⟶ indicates that persons became members of the Batchewana band.



Diagram C

The above diagram is a vastly simplified representation of the pattern of intermarriages among four families in the Lake Huron region. While cross-cousin marriage in the first descending generation has been prohibited, owing to Christian influence, cousin marriage still occurs in the second descending generation. This marriage pattern enables bands to retain close ties with each other and facilitates mobility within the marriage universe.

Diagram D



Intermarriages among the L'Anse, Sugar Island and Garden River bands.

Fred Pine Sr. and his cousins, Eva Kabaosa (above) and Irene Boissoneau (below). Eva's and Fred's mothers were sisters. Irene's father, Fred Abatossaway, was Fred's maternal uncle. See Diagram C

Michigan (Diagram C). Marriages also occurred between The Pine's band and that of Nebenagoching, the son of Waubechechake, whose family resided in cabins scattered along the north shore of the St. Mary's River.

Since those vested by the Canadian government with aboriginal status proved the only ones to be granted a degree of legal justification for their continued existence as kin-based groups, descendants of traders and voyageurs who wished to exercise ties with the Native community eventually chose to become included in the bands. For instance, due to Nebenagoching's kin connections with the Perraults through his mother, the Perrault family joined the Batchewana band. Dyadic linkages between siblings, where one of the pair was already married to a member of the nodal core unit (Helm, 1965), were most frequently exercised to gain entry as long as the head chief and sub chiefs proved willing. Some of these chain-like connections could be intricate. Xavier Biron's wife's sister, a daughter of Michael Cadotte at Lapointe, married Francis LaRose, whose brother, Charles LaRose, later wed Ogista's daughter. This link to the central core enabled Xavier's two sons, Francis and Charles Biron, to enter the Garden River band.[11] The marriage of Native women to a neighbouring group facilitated the joining of newcomers, as was the case with the Biron family and the Boissoneaus from Red River (Diagram B). Métis incomers who acquired band status formed a sedentary periphery around the nodal core, and in time came to share equal privileges with other group members. At this time they dropped their former individualized form of property holding and accommodated to a flexible band organization.

Head chiefs maintaining territorial prerogatives and having large followings of sons and Indian and Métis sons-in-law to

hunt and trap on their lands exercised far more independence in their business transactions in the region north of Lake Huron and in the vicinity of Sault Ste. Marie, than further west where monopoly control dominated after 1821. During the 1820's and early 1830's the Hudson's Bay Company at the Sault and LaCloche found that advantages lay in currying the favour of these ambitious Native entrepreneurs. Borrowing a tactic from its rivals, the Company came to rely to a significant extent on experienced Native middlemen who knew the nature of the trade within their own territories well enough to exert a regulating influence over an otherwise highly competitive milieu. Although one such chief, The Frisée of French River, obtained goods from Andrew Mitchell at Drummond Island, and later from Penetanguishene, the Native entrepreneur refused to let the interests of his major supplier limit the scope of his trading activities. In February 1828 the LaCloche factor recorded:

> Peter McFarlane and Jas. Johnstone did not go to the Serpent's as they discovered traces of people having passed in the direction towards the Frisée's lands & therefore followed, & overtook two men belonging to Mitchell /at Drummond Is./ and accompanied them to the Frisée's. The Frisée & his band has [sic] the Furs intended for each party laid aside. What was for us was the best share of the two. . . .[12]

Leaders benefited from the presence of marked competition among trading outfits. They could and did, often arrogantly, demand high quality goods, expect blacksmithing services and receive luxury items as presents on their visits to the posts. They anticipated the extension of provisions to themselves and their bands when food became scarce.[13] A fair degree of economic autonomy could be manifested by shrewd Native middlemen who usually controlled the distribution of furs to the buying agencies.

Head chiefs often worked in close association with buyers who were close relatives. For a decade following 1816, Charles Oakes Ermatinger, for instance, relied on his father-in-law, Katawabedai, to skirt the American prohibitions on British citizens trading south of the border (Schoolcraft, 1975: 305). It also became commonplace for leaders from Sandy Lake, Leech Lake and Lapointe to bring furs to trade at Sault Ste. Marie en route to the annual distribution of British presents.[14] In response to rising custom duties on goods imported into the United States, however, Ermatinger stopped this trade in 1828 and retired to Montreal. For a decade after 1828 Hudson's Bay Company factors Angus Bethune and Angus McBean endeavoured to revive the commercial linkages Ermatinger had formerly maintained with the Fond du Lac Indians. As encouragement, the factor McBean at LaCloche welcomed landings of brigades, headed by Shingwaukönse, Nebenagoching and Mezai, travelling from western Lake Superior on their way to Penetanguishene.

The experiment, nevertheless, proved unsuccessful at Sault Ste. Marie owing to increasing competition from merchants on the other side of the river, and scores of petty traders from Drummond Island and Penetanguishene. In 1831, the volume of furs traded proved to be so small that Sir George Simpson told Angus Bethune that he considered:

> /the/ Establishment at the Sault /to be/ merely a Provision Depot for the Southern Department and passing Brigades. . . /and could/ not see there /was/ any opening there for Trade with natives or whites. 15

Increasing External Intervention in the Fur Trade

Pressures of competition had brought about a decline in all kinds of fur bearing animals: Indians continued to make adaptations to the changing situation. "Several families along the Lake, and

especially in the interior have their lands parcelled out" and were "extremely careful of nursing their beaver", wrote the factor at LaCloche in 1843. Poachers dared not to venture "but at the risk of their lives."[16] The trend was towards a systematic utilization of sedentary fur resources such as beaver, with a periodic abandonment of this mode of economic livelihood when overhunting, high water, or prevalence of human or animal disease demanded it. The Indian Department and the Hudson's Bay Company responded to this scarcity of beaver in 1831, and again in the 1840's by establishing quotas and temporary prohibitions on the taking of the animal.[17] Far more interested in preserving good relations with the United States than in aiding the fur trade, the government urged bands to move to agricultural settlements near Coldwater. For interior bands, one recourse in the face of such pressure involved shifting their hunting and trapping onto grounds further inland, by following river routes well known since the eighteenth century.[18]

Lake bands, by contrast, found themselves in a difficult predicament. To these Indians the interior posed as a frightening place inhabited by alien peoples reputed to be cannibals.[19] At the same time their leaders associated government schemes advocating the adoption of Christianity and "civilization" with the sacrifice of a familiar and -- although difficult with the decline in animals -- still viable way of life. To these head chiefs, the greatest threat came from the abandonment of the trade by both companies and independent buyers. Although the beaver population recovered somewhat when numbers of competitors withdrew from the field after 1830, it again declined during the 1840's, compelling the Hudson's Bay Company to concentrate on alternative ventures, among them

commercial fishing and copper mining. After 1840 the Great Lakes fur trade was pursued with diminishing ardour. Demonstrations of hospitality which had formerly characterized Native-trader transactions ceased, a fact resented by the Métis and Indians. Years later, in 1849, The Pine would debate the Hudson's Bay Company's right to territory at the rapids. According to tradition, he would argue, company occupation of this land remained contingent upon the trading establishment providing a feast the Native peoples each spring.[20] Such statements underline the depth of concern experienced by the Native peoples for the passing of a way of life in which they felt they had played an important role.

Change of trade policy also engendered a different attitude on the part of Hudson's Bay factors towards the Native peoples. James D. Cameron, McBean's successor at LaCloche, placed production before long-term stable returns, and expected the Indians to devote all their time and energies to trapping. By 1843 he chafed against the conservationary measures introduced by his superiors to preserve the beaver population. To support his contentions he characterized the entire Native population as being by nature gauged to kill any fur bearers that crossed their path, regardless of the Company's sanctions. As long as one beaver could be procured, the hunt would continue, he asserted.[21]

It is perhaps paradoxical that Cameron's strongest opponent for this line of thinking was his own Métis son and namesake, James D. Cameron Jr., educated to be an Anglican missionary. James Jr. returned to the Lake Huron region during the final stages of the fur trade's decline. Since he was a missionary, his father expected him to represent the vanguard of historic forces of change which would civilize and settle the Upper Great Lakes country. When the son became a Baptist and joined an Ojibwa band

through marriage to Shingabaw'osin's daughter, the factor was disappointed and angered. Although the young Cameron experienced a temporary return to paternal favor when, following his first wife's death, he courted the daughter of Thomas McMurray, an employee of the Hudson's Bay Company, the son finally chose to return to his former band by marrying Shingabaw'osin's granddaughter and his former wife's parallel niece. This decision prompted his father to renounce him publicly as his son.[22]

For men like James D. Cameron Jr., the very "civilization" they had been expected to foster at the Sault came to grant them little place or status, because they were Métis. The years approximately 1840 to 1860 came to be characterized by the rise and decline of a view of the Upper Great Lakes social order which drew a strict dichotomy between "Whites" and "Natives", and then drained the latter category of positive substance and potential. Cameron, regarded as a "Native" by this society, challenged this perspective to the degree that when The Pine appealed to government and missionary societies for protection and assistance, it was the Baptist missionary who stood at the forefront of those who offered to speak on behalf of the Ojibwa in any ensuing negotiations.[24] Educated Métis like James D. Cameron Jr. became important aides to Shingwaukönse and his successors since they understood enough of both White and Native cultures to introduce western concepts to their bands in terms the Ojibwa could understand. Since Cameron evidenced greater attachment to the Native peoples than mainstream society, he tended to be trusted by the Indians at the rapids, and eventually his descendants became assimilated into Ojibwa society.[25]

Changes in the Economy Following the Decline of the Fur Trade

Since the traditional subsistence economy was well adapted to draw on the strengths as well as cope with the vicissitudes of the local environment, most of its characteristics persisted into the nineteenth century. The major change appeared when a pressing need arose for head chiefs to prevent resources under their territorial jurisdiction from being usurped by American business interests. The reduction in numbers of fur bearing animals led to a greater emphasis than before on the Mackinac fish trade to finance the purchase of provisions and goods. Native "owners" of fisheries soon came to compete with White commercial fishermen, who after 1830 claimed the same areas.

Following American expansion westward into Illinois, fish prices soared to five dollars a barrel as demand from White settlers grew. Fur companies moved into this new area of commerce, driving Native persons not attached to their organizations from the fishing grounds. Since Indians could be violently assaulted on their locations near Manitoulin Island, Cockburn Island, and Thessalon, the issue became politically volatile by 1849, when Native peoples sent delegations to the seats of the Canadian and American government to obtain the exclusive use of their traditional sites. Both the Canadian Civil Secretary and Washington refused to protect Native fishing rights, since to devise laws contradictory to the prevailing policy of laissez-faire would be likely to sponsor a public outcry against what might be conceived as a revival of aristocratic privilege.[26] Native leaders nevertheless continued their campaign, since the sale of fish provided trappers with the funds to secure their winter staples of salt pork, flour, cornmeal,

tobacco and tea.

Trapping continued from fall until spring, as long as furs could be obtained and commanded a good price. Animals hunted included beaver (although after 1840 their numbers declined drastically), mink, marten, fisher, muskrat, and especially foxes, which brought the highest return. Trappers employed a number of dead-fall, spring mechanism and baiting techniques which remained unchanged by French and British contact. Steel traps, gill nets, guns and ammunition, could be obtained by trade. Hunting took place with muskets and, later, rifles, although older ways persisted. The Anglican missionary, Frederick Frost, noted that certain elderly individuals as late as 1900 eschewed the "new" hunting technology and preferred the bow and arrow to all other means.[27]

Heads of "nodal core" groups "owned" individual hunting territories. Bush camps were established near a water body where trout could be taken in nets. Men travelled the trails in search of beaver and large game, while women snared rabbits, trapped, hunted and fished near the camp. Large game was distributed within the hunting group, although individuals usually retained the proceeds of their own fur catches. While sons shared in the territorial prerogatives of their fathers, affinal and friendship ties could also be activated to gain admission to family hunting grounds, provided the "owner's" decision met with the sanction of the band as a whole. In these instances a share of the furs taken by a hunter would be offered in payment to the owner of the hunting limits in return for the latter's willingness to "lend" his territory.

Following the return from the interior, each family group planted corn, pumpkin, squash, and root vegetables in proximity to their maple sugaring operations. The uncertain character of this pursuit and absence

of fertilization militated against large, strongly nucleated village settlements in the rapids area, even at the height of the fur trade. Horticulture along the St. Mary's channel remained a risky venture due to the frequent wetness of the climate during the harvest season produced by the cold waters of Lake Superior meeting the warmer Lake Huron body. Residents sold their surpluses of potatoes and other vegetables to merchants on Sugar Island and St. Joseph's Island. It was not until the mid 1830's, however, that agriculture came to be practised under the supervision of missionaries intent on establishing a new social order on the frontier. The Indians acquired horses and cattle from traders and raised oats as fodder for these animals as early as 1830, if not earlier. A declining local economy following the signing of the Robinson treaties made it difficult for the Ojibwa to keep animals and, in consequence, many continued to rely on food derived from hunting and trapping. Farming at Garden River depended on the Ojibwa being able to engage in logging and mining to acquire funds to purchase seed, animals and farming equipment.

Boat building, guiding, mining exploration and lumbering became important occupations by the late 1840's. A continuity may thus be traced with the fur trade in the Native people's continued participation in activities associated with large-scale resource exploitation. Not surprisingly the Ojibwa in 1846 considered their occupations as contributory to the growth of the national economy, and initially proved optimistic when confronted with the knowledge that new resource industries would supplant the failing fur trade. Their knowledge of the locations of ore deposits, familiarity with the topography of the land and river routes, and particularly, their willingness to share their expertise made the Ojibwa

an integral part of the history of early resource development north of Lakes Huron and Superior.

From 1840 to 1846 Canadian policy directly countered Ojibwa and Métis plans for the establishment of "homelands", as places of refuge on the frontier for self-determining bands. It would only be after 1846, when timber would be sought by a new class of Canadian entrepreneurs, that The Pine's appeals for protection and aid would finally be heard by the Governor General. Until that time, official attitudes focused far more on ways of diplomatically quelling American fears concerning the Ojibwa presence than in responding to Native desires and grievances.

The Pine as Spokesman for the Western Bands

There appeared to be an especially pressing need in 1837 for the Canadian government to draw Ojibwa away from the American frontier. George Johnson warned that the Indians, angered by the State of Michigan's intention to construct a canal through their fishery preserve, and influenced by anti-American sentiment voiced during the Rebellions in the Canadas, might attack Fort Brady. Although relations between the commander of the fort and the "home band" at Sault Ste. Marie grew more cordial after the military stepped in to prevent the canal project from being undertaken, American concern over the possibility of further instances of Native unrest lingered on for years. Washington considered immediately moving the Ojibwa to lands along the Missouri River.

Removal constituted only one of a number of challenging issues facing the Native peoples on the American side. Scarcity of game and a financial depression in the United States, lasting from 1837 to 1844,

dampened prospects in the fur and fish trade and made the thought of joining government-sponsored settlements tempting. Yet, to be compelled to take up residence west of the mixed woodland zone, in country which had no sugar maples or other resources considered requisite for the Ojibway way of life was less inviting. "The Sault chiefs," wrote James Ord, sub-agent at the Sault, to Schoolcraft's brother James, "are not adverse to going to land between Lake Superior and the Mississippi, but are not aware of any obligation to go west of the Mississippi River."[28]

The Pine, aware of the spirit of mounting tension south of the border, used his influence and relatively undiminished political autonomy as a "British chief," to alert Schoolcraft to the extent of Native opposition to American Indian policy. During the distribution of presents on Manitoulin Island in 1837, Shingwaukönse encountered a Potawatomi chief who informed him that "the southern Indians had passed a large wampum belt. . . and that fourteen different tribes, to the west and north, had acknowledged and received it, binding themselves to support one another."[29] In response, Schoolcraft suggested to C.A. Harris, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, that a small military force, or at least a special agent, might be placed on Drummond Island to prevent the northwestern Indians from visiting Manitoulin Island in the future.[30]

Shingwaukönse, knowing of Schoolcraft's intention to stem Native movement eastward, devised a strategy of his own to thwart the American government's plans to control the movements of the western Ojibwa. In a speech delivered to the Indian Department at the distribution of presents in 1837, The Pine denounced Bond Head's removal policy and proposed instead that the western bands stay stationary, although remaining independent allies of Britain. The annual gift giving, The Pine

continued, should be transferred to St. Joseph's Island, since it would be convenient for the Sault Ste. Marie Ojibwa and accessible to visiting bands from Lake Superior. "Many of your children live at a great distance from this Island," the chief proclaimed, "and there is a high hill /the American agency/ between which prevents their seeing the fire which burns or the flag which floats from the staff erected at this place." "But," he continued, "I can see all the Indians belonging to our tribe. I can see as far as the Red River, or even to this place."[31] By these words Shingwaukönse not only offered the British government an option for retaining the loyalties of bands from as far west as the Upper Mississippi, but also set himself up as the main spokesman for the Lake Superior Ojibwa "nation": a political entity forged from Native alliances existing since the 1760's, if not earlier.

Ottawa emigrants to Manitoulin Island rejected Shingwaukönse's proposals, however. Although the Ojibwa head chief declared that he spoke on behalf of the Ottawa, Potawatomi, and Ojibwa "nations", two influential Ottawa chiefs, Mocomonish and Ottanwish, branded The Pine's words as presumptuous (Jameson, 1838: 285). "The chiefs who live at the Bay to the west[32] have not before heard that your red brethern desire the flag to be removed from this place to St. Joseph's," Ottanwish charged.[33] Nor was the government sympathetic to his appeal. Indian Affairs favoured the Ottawa, who were oriented towards a sedentary village life based on corn horticulture and fishing, over Ojibwa hunters and traders. When the time came to bestow a flag on an Indian band, the honour fell to the Ottawa residing at Wikwemikong (Ibid.: 286). The Pine, and the western Ojibwa for whom he had spoken, were regarded as unwelcome "aliens" by the Wikwemikong Ottawa.[34] Anna Jameson, an observer at the ceremonies, stated

that the Red River bands in particular, aroused much "wonder and curiosity" among the Ottawa contingent, and on inquiring as to their identity, were "told they were cannibals. . . the title being. . . quite gratuitous and merely expressive of the disgust they excited." (Ibid.: 275)

The Pine found himself out-manouvered in 1837 by the state of affairs engendered by Bond Head's policy. Shingwaukönse's first suggestion, that a British fort be established on St. Joseph's Island was rejected out-of-hand, mainly for practical reasons. The original military and trade establishment had been a concession to Britain's Indian allies prior to the War of 1812, but in 1837 the government evinced little interest in the site, since it lacked a good harbour, as well as lime and stone for construction purposes, and would be hard to defend from attack by water.[35] Second, The Pine's pleas for government assistance went directly counter to Bond Head's stress on fiscal economy. Anna Jameson, who sympathized with the Lieutenant Governor's viewpoint, regarded Shingwaukönse's proposals as indicative of an outmoded reliance on the beneficence of British colonialism. On reflecting on an address which she had read, directed by the chief to Bond Head in January 1837, pertaining to the failure of the government to provide houses at the Sault, Jameson concluded that the chief lacked both foresight and cultural flexibility. "The Indians have no comprehension of a change of governors being a change of principles," she observed. In an era of self-help and emerging responsible government in the Canadas, it seemed only proper that the Indians should construct the houses themselves. Yet, she maintained, owing to their cultural "backwardness", such work was "absolutely inimical to their habits." "It requires," she claimed, "more strength than the women possess; and for the men to fell wood and

carry logs /was/ an unheard of degradation" (Ibid.: 236). Jameson failed to consider that there might also be a dimension to Shingwaukönse's stance vis-a-vis the government which, in intangible terms, counted for far more to the head chief's band than the construction of a number of wooden structures.

It upset Shingwaukönse that Bond Head had not bothered to visit the Anglican Ojibwa settlement at the rapids during a recent tour the Lieutenant Governor had made of Indian missions in the province (Ibid.: 237-8). Bond Head's interest extended only as far as the Native people on Manitoulin Island. Even after 1837 Sault Ste. Marie was to fall into what one historian has termed the "undistributed middle" -- too far south to be under the jurisdiction of the Hudson's Bay Company charter, too far west to be of concern to Upper Canadian legislators (Arthur, 1973). For many years the Native community at the rapids would remain principally an out-station of the government-sponsored mission establishment at Manitowaning on Manitoulin Island.

Washington registered even less concern for Indian interests than its apathetic northern neighbor. Discovery of untapped mineral wealth and virgin pine southwest of Lake Superior gave rise to public pressure for further land surrenders. Disagreements, arising among head chiefs surrounding the signing of a treaty in July 1837 between the United States and the western bands at St. Peter's on the St. Croix River, Minnesota, left the Upper Great Lakes peoples deeply divided: a state of affairs which, to Washington, militated against the likelihood of Indian uprisings along the frontier. Since, in 1837 Canada had stated that, once the British Parliament withdrew its annual grant for Indian presents, all further expenditures of this nature on the western bands would cease, Washington

cancelled plans to build a post on Drummond Island. American annuity payments, meanwhile, were timed to conflict with the British distributions.

The Pine, regardless of these developments, continued determined to establish a refuge area for Ojibwa from the United States. It would not be merely houses or presents which would constitute the main issues at stake. Cloth, blankets, needles, combs, awls, kettles, guns, ammunition, and other practical articles received at Manitoulin Island remained welcome items, especially as monopoly prices at American trading posts had risen steeply by 1838 for all categories of goods. Yet, most important would be the establishment of a secure, long-term relationship with a government power which would aid the Indian in gaining and developing a viable place in what had suddenly become a very threatening world.

A Model Chief

At the distribution of presents the following year, in August 1838, The Pine subordinated his grievances concerning what he felt was Canada's failure to honor its promises regarding building the houses, and concentrated instead on praising the religion of his "Great Father, the Red Coat."[36] His words were timely. The opposition of Britain's protestant missionary societies to Bond Head's scheme had led to a return to the former "civilization program" initiated by Sir John Colborne.[37] Shingwaukönse shrewdly strengthened his political position by stating that his decision to embrace Christianity derived from advice offered him by Colborne six years earlier. The chief declared that he had remained faithful to the trust Colborne vested in him; he prayed regularly and had not taken alcohol in six years. His lodge

had become a center for Anglican prayer meetings.[38] To officials who wished to commence an Anglican mission establishment at Manitowaning, The Pine appeared as a model Indian: a status formally bestowed on the chief at a special ceremony held on Sunday, August 12.[39]

The Canadian Indian Department, by favoring The Pine in this manner, could not fail to annoy the Roman Catholics and Methodists present at the occasion. One Methodist minister, James Evans, proved particularly perturbed since Shingwaukönse had only recently approached him to request that a Methodist missionary be sent to the Sault. There had even been discussion of establishing a Methodist schoolhouse and an agricultural and fishing community at Batchewana Bay.[40] On August 7, Evans recorded in his diary that the Methodist contingent had been willing to "proceed no further than the Sault until this chief decided on a matter which must govern our future movements."[41] In spite of their generous overtures, however, the Methodists came off second best. Once The Pine learned that it had been arranged for an Anglican missionary to proceed to the Sault that fall, he declined the Methodists' offer, although Evans noted that, should the arrangement with the Anglican church "fall through," the chief promised to rescind his former position and "consider us as his nearest relations."[42] Given these terms, it is hardly surprising that Evans should consider Shingwaukönse to be susceptible to government pandering.[43]

Even though Evans might consider Shingwaukönse "much abused and deceived by false promises" of "the church", there is little doubt that the chief's strategy for choosing Anglicanism over other denominations was as much political as it was religious. Rather than acting passively in consort with government schemes, The Pine decided to

test the political capacities of his new, government-bestowed status. To Shingwaukönse, the time seemed auspicious to press for an extension of presents to the Red River Ojibwa and the Métis whom he wished to have participate in his Native community.[44] The unique climate engendered by the outbreak of the 1837 Rebellions had caused the Upper Canadian authorities to retract their statements, made the previous year, regarding the immediate termination of Indian presents. In the spring of 1838, Thomas G. Anderson had arranged for Assiginack carry a wampum parole as far west as the headwaters of the Mississippi, inviting bands to aid the British cause and partake of the Queen's bounty. Knowing Anderson to be still actively recruiting Native support as late as August, Shingwaukönse requested that Métis be treated similarily to the Ojibwa, since both peoples had demonstrated their loyalty to the British Crown during the War of 1812. "I went last year to the Head Waters of Lake Superior to a friend (a half-breed, like myself), to inform him how good our Great Father was," the chief continued, assuming a radically different "identity" from the one with which the Indian Department had so recently vested him. A road must be made to Red River, The Pine proclaimed before an audience of over three thousand, so that "poor people who drip in rabbit skins may come. . . and partake of these presents."[45]

It must have been an awkward moment for Anderson, who had been freely extending invitations all spring to the western Native leaders to support the British cause. The superintendent at first hedged when confronted by Shingwaukönse's speech, but, warning The Pine that he should not be overly optimistic regarding the probable response, finally promised to relate its contents to the Lieutenant Governor. Receiving

no reply whatsoever, the chief repeated his desires at Manitowaning the following summer, with several significant additions. The Ojibwa needed a blacksmith, he declared, while he himself required "money to be able pay someone to protect the timber of his lands."[46]

Shingwaukönse had by this time put his plan to develop a logging industry at Sault Ste. Marie into action. His first step was to secure government support in purchasing the necessary equipment. Bond Head's successor, Sir George Arthur, appeared amenable to the idea of an Indian agricultural settlement at the rapids and, in response to The Pine's repeated petitionings, promised to assist the Ojibwa in building houses by supplying "axes and other tools."[47] The chief's next goal was to secure use of the sawmill on the Ermatinger estate, which had stood vacant since McMurray's departure from the mission. In the spring of 1840 Shingwaukönse discussed the subject with Thomas G. Anderson, who was now Indian Superintendent at Manitowaning. The agent informed his superiors that The Pine's scheme was becoming increasingly complex:

> On the 7th inst. Shin-gwa-konce from St. Mary's came down. . . /to Manitowaning/ with a part of his tribe to enquire whether the halfbreeds would be clothed as mentioned last year, but I could not enlighten his understanding on the subject. He at the same time requested me to say to you, he was going to work at present and wished to get a yoke of oxen to draw logs and a carpenter & blacksmith and to have the wind mill repaired! 48

The Pine explained to Anderson that the Sault would become the residence of a thoroughly loyal, hard-working Native community espousing the ideals of self-sufficiency not only stressed by the Indian Department, but also upheld by the Ojibwa value system. Indians and Metis would help one another, both groups working to preserve the spirit of reciprocity which traditionally characterized relations

betweeen an Ojibwa leader and his people. After 1838 The Pine no longer urged his followers to act in accordance with external behavioural guidelines, either of missionary or government origin.[49] From now on his activities would conform more closely to the value orientations of his group, since a large, unified community at the rapids would mean political strength. While Shingwaukönse remained loyal to the Church of England, he also understood that the concept of the Christian God could not be encapsulated within the confines of one denominational creed. At the same time, he expected the missionary of Britain's Established Church to act as an intermediary between the Ojibwa and the state authorities. Since the chief viewed himself as equal in rank to the Anglican missionary, he considered a transaction between himself and the priest to be as binding as a formal agreement between two Native power-holders. For this reason, failure in the future to uphold promises made to the Ojibwa would be regarded by the chief and his band, not as the consequence of mere policy change, but as a serious breach of trust.

The Pine's Resistance to the Manitowaning Settlement

The Pine was careful not to sanction official plans to induce bands to settle on Manitoulin Island, but instead requested that an Anglican missionary be sent to Sault Ste. Marie to take McMurray's place.[50] Although the chief continued to press for "advantages of civilization" to be extended to the Native people, he disapproved of the government's scheme, resurrected in 1838, of isolating Indians from the kind of commercial influences which had formerly characterized the fur trade.

Anderson, by contrast, viewed the isolationist policy as potentially effective both in drawing bands away from the international

Chippawas	Lake Huron	Drummond Island	–	–	–	1	10	16	3	0	4	4	7	2	47
do	Michigan	Bay de Knot	1	1	0	1	21	30	5	8	15	6	5	17	110
Ottawas	do	Wai-gui-tuc-ka-se	1	2	0	1	122	139	33	34	34	15	5	35	446
Chippawas	Huron	Sault St. Marys	–	1	–	–	18	26	5	0	4	4	2	3	68
do	Michigan	Grand Traverse	–	–	–	–	15	13	2	4	4	4	4	4	50
do	do	Point St. Ignace	–	–	–	1	8	16	2	2	3	1	4	1	38
Menominies	do	Green Bay	–	–	–	–	11	10	2	0	4	3	1	3	34
Chippawas	Huron	Sault St. Marys	–	–	–	1	14	15	4	9	0	0	5	7	55
		American Territory	2	4	0	5	219	295	61	57	63	37	33	77	848
		Total receiving Presents	15	10	10	22	711	786	159	212	196	113	120	243	2597

Coldwater 20th August 1838.

T. B. Anderson
S. I. A.

Indian Visitors from the Upper Great Lakes region at Manitowaning, 1838
P.A.C., RG 10, vol. 124

border and protecting Indians from unsavory White frontier influences. The scheme would also provide education, social, agricultural and mechanical skills to facilitate Native assimilation into mainstream society.[51] The agent sought to lessen the Ojibwa's resistance to the plan by assuring Shingwaukönse and other leaders that their territorial prerogatives over lands on the north shores of Lakes Huron and Superior would be protected by the Crown should they move to Manitoulin.[52] Yet the retention by the State of all decision-making powers relative to the assimilation process made it possible for government administrators to turn a deaf ear to the head chiefs' views on removal. For Anderson, trying to align the reality of Native demands with the State's stereotype of the politically impotent "Indian" involved a delicate juggling act. It usually proved much simpler to ignore the purport of The Pine's statements whenever they appeared inconsistent with government policy.[53]

Anderson further overlooked the fact that rivalries between head chiefs could space bands over the landscape in a manner which failed to conform to official plans governing the laying out of missionary settlements. At first, the agent had sought to lessen religious rivalries by according a specific geographic locale on Manitoulin Island to each denomination.[54] Yet, Assiginack, Anderson's Roman Catholic interpreter, owing to his official status, resided at Manitowaning, where his house rapidly became the center of a Roman Catholic following within the Church of England settlement.[55] Anderson had to admit that Assiginack's activities often contradicted government expectations, and during the winter of 1838 even found himself engaged in a minor power struggle with the interpreter:

> Assiginack is a clever man and designing enough to obtain, indirectly, influence sufficient to make himself appear the author of the Indians willingness to fight the Queen's enemies & and thus draw them from the Department and accomplish the object he would have in view, the destruction of the Establishment. 56

Yet Assiginack's influence with the Wikwemikong Indians made him indispensable to the government (Leighton, 1983: 9-10). Shingwaukönse, on the other hand, commanded no such confidence within the Indian Department. Regardless of his attachment to the Established Church, The Pine mainly provided a figurehead which could be singled out to appease the demand of the mission societies for proof that a combined Church-State mission Establishment could work. By remaining at the Sault, however, the chief would not be brought into direct competition with Assiginack and Wikwemikong leaders, and so he could preserve his power base intact. In 1839 his most difficult task was to keep the western Ojibwa chiefs residing south of the international border loyal to his vision of a perpetual, reciprocal relationship with the Crown. In 1838, with the first distribution of annuities under the terms of the American treaty signed on the St. Croix, not one western band travelled to Manitowaning for the distribution of presents. In response, The Pine sent a communication to Lapointe upbraiding Keche.Besheke for surrendering his political autonomy for a pittance in money and goods. Keche.Besheke proved apologetic, and promised to ask Eschkebugecoshe, among others, to come down with him to Manitowaning the following summer.[57] The Pine thus remained the central figure promoting annual visitations by the western Ojibwa to Manitoulin Island. At the same time, the chief concentrated on furthering his own policy for Sault Ste. Marie and environs. Should bands from west of Lake Superior wish to join his settlement he would endeavour to have everything in readiness to receive them.

One Remove from the Missionary

The Reverend Frederic Augustus O'Meara arrived at the Sault in

the fall of 1838,[58] and took up residence on the Ermatinger estate. Unlike McMurray before him, O'Meara espoused low church views. He came to the north with a feeling of deep personal responsibility, as an ambassador of Christ, to spread the Gospel as effectively as possible over a wide geographical area. The thought of souls lost to the influence of Christ depressed him, yet he proved unwilling to administer the redemptive sacrament of baptism before he felt participants were adequately prepared for the rite. The Roman Catholics and especially the Methodists, he held, were far too lenient in bestowing the privilege. O'Meara was quickly bound up in the task of saving souls, to the exclusion of the temporal concerns raised by the Indians. He deeply resented the intrusion of matters beyond the ken of his pastoral duties, and quickly impressed this fact on the minds of his Native congregation.

During his first winter, O'Meara found the Indians encouragingly responsive to his preaching. Although he was aided by George Johnston, who acted as interpreter, James Robertson, a catechist, and an assistant by the same of Sanson, the minister preferred thinking of himself as a lone and independent servant of Christ. These same attitudes made him possessive of his flock, and he upbraided any other pastor, regardless of denomination, who ventured to exercise interest in those he felt to be under his express care. Not surprisingly, this led him into disputes with the Roman Catholics, Methodists and Baptists. Yet, owing to his intense allegiance to duty, he was willing to undergo hardships to reach Indians at Goulais Bay several times during the first winter. On being met by a group of Indians from Batchewana Bay who had been baptized by McMurray, O'Meara decided to include occasional visits to this band.[59] The long arduous journeys did not blunt the zeal that underlay

his independent cast of mind. By June 1839, the missionary also decided to dispense with his interpreter, and prepared to communicate directly with his Indian congregation by requesting Shingwaukönse to teach him the Ojibwa language.

During one of these teaching sessions The Pine showed O'Meara letters from Keche.Besheke and several other head chiefs. Shingwaukönse had cast O'Meara in the role he had formerly ascribed to McMurray -- that of an intermediary between the band and the British authorities. The missionary had no idea of the identity of the Lake Superior and interior chiefs who sent these communications to The Pine or of the purport of the wampum messages. Yet he missed no opportunity of impressing on the chief the importance of using his influence -- which, the minister proclaimed to Bishop Strachan, "appears to be considerable" -- to keep the Indians attentive to religion.[61] The Pine gave the priest two large wampum belts "sent him by chiefs in the interior to be delivered to the Chief Superintendent of Indian Affairs. . ." O'Meara was also expected to convey messages to the government "formed of pieces of eagles' claws strung on deer skin or silk ribbon which are according to their arrangement. . . made to speak the mind of the person sending them."[62]

Shingwaukönse wanted to establish his settlement at Garden River rather than at the rapids, and in late May 1839 persuaded O'Meara and the Reverend Crosbie Brough, who had come on a visit from Manitowaning, to view the lands and soil at the location east of Sault Ste. Marie. Although neither O'Meara nor Brough regarded finances as the salient factor in their decision to refuse the Indians' proposition, as Anderson had done previously, they considered Garden

River to be unsuitable. It was necessary, both argued, for the Indian to have "some point of concentration where they will constantly remain during certain seasons of the year" and the rapids fishery seemed to provide the most stable mode of procuring subsistence other than agriculture. Regardless of the Indians' views, the missionaries' perspective had the backing of the government, which in two reports, maintained that the Sault Indians devoted their time almost exclusively to fishing, while hunting served only as a secondary occupation. The thought of a government-directed change from a fishing economy to a mainly agricultural one seemed a less formidable challenge to the policy-makers than did promotion of agriculture among a primarily hunting people. The first merely required the modification of an already largely sedentary subsistence pattern.

If The Pine was temporarily disappointed in his plans to move the mission to Garden River, he still had other responsibilities to attend to. He was determined to have thewestern head chiefs ready to express an active allegiance to the British Crown. By late May a large assembly had collected at the Sault. O'Meara, surprised by the great numbers of interior Ojibwa insisting on being baptized, frequently found it necessary to review the grounds on which he reserved baptism for what he termed "proven candidates." In early June the crowd at the rapids had been augmented by "some other strange Indians from the north shore of Lake Superior."[64] The Leech Lake Indians arrived soon afterward, and all stated their readiness to accept an Anglican missionary. Even though the Episcopal missionary, the Reverend Boutwell, decided to terminate his mission

to the Leech Lake band in 1838 owing to the defiant attitude of Eschebugecoshe's band towards Christianity, O'Meara naïvely regarded these same Indians as "interesting sons of the forest" who had not yet heard the word of the Gospel.[65]

O'Meara at first saw the requests for baptism as the seeking of the "natural man" for God's Truth. To support this view, he argued that The Pine had even prepared questions, to which the priest had responded before a large attentive audience:

> In the course of my visiting among the Lodges today I met a good many Indians in the chief's wigwam when some questions that the old man put to me led me to explain the second Commandment pointing out the gross impropriety of which Roman Catholics have been guilty of leaving out of their catechisms /a/ portion of God's word and I also took occasion in the hearing of those who were by and who I was anxious should derive some benefit to enlarge on other truths of Christianity to which all listened with apparent interest. 66

It soon became evident that O'Meara was not the man to aid in promoting a Native settlement based either on agriculture or commercial fishing. He lacked both an aptitude and interest in such goals. His main concern remained with "souls", their preparation for the next world, and the dangers inflicted on them by heathenism and "erroneous doctrines" held by rival denominations. Though his religious colleagues praised him for zealousness, they also recognized a rash and precipitate side to his character (Millman, 1983: 654). This aspect of his nature must also have struck Shingwaukönse, whose technique in "testing" people lay in subjecting them to careful questioning for long periods of time (Capp, 1904: 175), at least until he could assess their fundamental personality traits.

For his part, O'Meara considered The Pine more dignified and reasoned in his judgment than the rest of his band. "Reason" constituted a trait the missionary valued highly, since he felt it was only through the rational faculty that man could gain insight into Christian truth. At the same time he continued to hold a romantic view of Indians as nature's "children" which blinded him to the problems which they faced in trying to adapt successfully to changes around them. O'Meara undoubtedly felt personal pride in being associated with an influential British chief. In August he wrote with admiration of the arrival of the Sault Indians at Manitowaning in "a fleet of about seventy canoes, which as they sailed before a strong wind with the chief at their head in a large batteau with two British flags displayed, had a very pretty appearance."[67]

The Indians' willingness to listen to O'Meara's teachings lasted a year, and then ended. This development was not cast in terms of personal rejection of the missionary, but involved a gradual withdrawal fostered by a sequence of events, which included the refusal of the government, once again, to fulfil its promises regarding the construction of houses. O'Meara's attitude did not improve matters. The Pine made his wishes explicit concerning the houses, and in reply the priest agreed to take a pipe to the Lieutenant Governor as a remembrance of the trust established between the band and the Queen's representative six years before.[68] Yet, once in Toronto, O'Meara made no effort to promote the settlement The Pine desired. In his own account of his meeting with the Lieutenant Governor in the fall of 1839 O'Meara stated:

> During the ensuing week I had several interviews with his Excellency the Lieutenant Governor on the subject of the Indians and the surest mode of advancing their best interests. It is pleasing to see how deep an interest he takes in

> everything that concerns them and instead of falling into the same error that many have done supposing that their civilization must precede their conversion, His Excellency is of opinion that the only way of civilizing them is to endeavour to have that change effected in their hearts and motives which will be sure completely to soften down their savage manners and habits. . . 69

O'Meara described the results of these sessions to the Indians soon after his arrival back at the Sault. Although disappointed, they continued to attend religious meetings, and on New Year's obeyed the missionary's directives not to join with the Métis population in the usual drinking spree.[70] The Pine nevertheless found himself in an increasingly difficult position because of the way O'Meara responded to the illness of his eldest son, Nahwahqwashcum. According to O'Meara, Nahwahqwashcum had suffered an internal injury while lifting a heavy object at Mackinac Island during the summer. The Pine, suspecting witchcraft to be the cause, asked the missionary to try to reconcile Nahwahqwashcum's wife and in-laws to Christianity, since he evidently suspected that they were the perpetrators of the problem. O'Meara's account of his response to The Pine's appeal evidenced a dogmatic and unsympathetic attitude, prompted not only by emotional evangelicalism, but also by strict adherence to the tenets of prevailing government policy:

> The chief applied to me to interfere in the matter, and to speak to his daughter-in-law on the sinfulness of her conduct in neglecting the vow of love in sickness and in health that she had made to her husband when they were united after the form of our Church ...Having had information from more than one individual that the old man himself had on one occasion been betrayed into the sin of drunkeness, I took this opportunity to speak to him on the awful consequences of...falling into his old practices and warning him of the certain destruction from the presence of the Lord that awaits on drunkards. 71

The missionary felt Nahwahqwashcum's ailment to be of a minor character, and he railed against the use of Native medicines to effect

a cure.[72] In December 1839, The Pine's son rapidly declined in health, and on March 12 proved too delirious to listen to the missionary. O'Meara became angry that the Indians had not sent for him before the man had lost his reason, since it was then too late to establish the state of the dying man's soul. "Seeing that it would be useless to remain," O'Meara wrote to J.J. Grasett, Secretary of the Society for Converting and Civilizing the Indians, ". . . I took my leave to return home the same evening, leaving directions that should his reason return they would immediately send for me."[73]

O'Meara's attitudes differed so radically from the traditional shaman healer that his refusal even to try to counter the source of the malady must have seemed to the Indians like an amazing admission of weakness. Certainly his aid in such instances was never called for again. From then on, O'Meara found a change in the attitudes of the Native population as a whole, from Garden River to Batchewana Bay. News travelled fast. Where he had before found welcoming anticipation at his arrival, he more often than not had to pry the Indians out of their lodges. Reflecting on one cool reception he received at Goulais Bay, he confessed that, when the "message is received with . . . apathy. . . This breaks the spirit and saddens the heart of the ambassador of Christ. . ."[74] Faced with circumstances with which he had no previous experience, O'Meara reacted in strong terms. Had he sought the assistance of others familiar with the Indian cultural milieu, for instance, George Johnston or Mrs. McMurray, both of whom had proved of inestimable help to the Reverend McMurray, the gap might have been breached. But he did not. The Indians had not assumed an overtly hostile stance, but one simply of lack of interest.

O'Meara's pride prevented admission of failure, and he cast about for a reason which would clear him of any imputations that he had not retained command of his Native congregation at Sault Ste. Marie. He found it in the context of Nawhwahqwashcum's funeral. During the preparations for the burial, O'Meara grew angry when asked to contribute food or money on behalf of the church and the government to the traditional funeral feast. It was a minor request, but when considered from the standpoint of the vast gap in understanding developing between the missionary and the Indians, that it became transformed in O'Meara's mind into a reflection of what he saw as flaws in the Ojibwa character is not surprising. The Native population was by nature worldly-minded, he maintained, concerned only with eliciting material benefits. Shingwaukönse and his band viewed missionaries simply as a source of government advantages and for this reason only, they assumed the name and conduct of Christians.[75]

The Pine grew increasingly reluctant to respond to O'Meara's requests, and found his band less and less willing to heed the missionary's instructions. For instance, when O'Meara demanded that Shingwaukönse use "his authority" to persuade the Indians to make their children attend school regularly, the latter dissimulated with a non-committal reply. O'Meara could be unreasonable as well as callous, as Shingwaukönse had discovered the previous fall when, in response to a near failure of the rapids fishery, the Indians had stayed out long hours on the water trying to take whatever fish they could catch before leaving for their hunting grounds. As they had fished all Saturday night, many grew tired during the Sabbath service. O'Meara showed no mercy. "I told them thro' their Chief that they were not only to

abstain from work on the Sabbath itself," he informed the Upper Canada Clergy Society, "but also from such extra labour on the Saturday night as would render them incapable of putting the day to the purpose for which it was intended. . ."[76] Shingwaukönse was not only placed in a difficult position in having to convey the unpopular missionary's decisions, but, owing to his return to drinking heavily, also fell prey to the missionary's invectives. Gradually, O'Meara's warnings concerning the destruction of the soul through drink came to have little meaning to the chief. In September 1840, while O'Meara was representing these dangers to Ogista, the priest discovered that The Pine and several others had also been involved in a drinking spree on the American side.[77] These incidents grew so frequent during the New Year celebrations that on January 2, 1841, the chief had to be carried to a hut, lent by O'Meara to the Indians.[78]

In addition to the lack of fish, the winter of 1839 had been exceedingly harsh.[79] Residing at the Sault had not promoted farming or the storing of vegetables. Conditions for hunting had also been poor. To avoid such hardship in the future, Shingwaukönse and his band held a council in the spring and stated to O'Meara that they could no longer remain at Sault Ste. Marie.[80] The Pine's earlier plans to begin a logging industry with the help of the Métis had fallen through. O'Meara's antagonism towards Métis and Roman Catholics had destroyed the co-operation existing between the mission Indians and Métis, so essential to the scheme. In the spring of 1840 Anderson had refused to consider any of The Pine's proposals seriously and pressured for the Indian's removal to Manitoulin, citing an alleged poor climate and soil for agriculture as suitable reasons.[81]

The missionary, in a complete reversal of his former views on the importance of the rapids fishery in determining band location, declared to Strachan that the Native population had found it necessary to revert to their traditional mode of procuring subsistence, and had left the rapids area:

> The reason of this change in the place of encampment during the summer seems to be that in former years they looked forward to having houses built for them by Government at the Sault, but now having waited so long in vain they have ceased to expect them, and therefore each family continues /to encamp/ in the summer in or about their sugar bush which is usually contiguous to the spot on which they make their gardens, near which it is much more convenient for them to remain than at the Sault, and thus they are likely in future to be as much scattered in summer as they are in winter, and indeed more so, as the necessity of fishing makes them collect more in one place during the winter, but in summer wherever each family chooses to pitch their tent they can generally obtain subsistence. . . 82

The missionary grew despondent over the Indians' abandonment of his mission. The band would become extinct, for without missionary guidance, O'Meara declared, a "propensity for intoxicating drink" would undoubtedly destroy the current generation of Indians "both in soul and body."[83] The only hope for preserving a remnant, he argued, lay in insulating a number of children from all contact with their parents. To this end O'Meara initiated an experiment by keeping six children under instruction at the mission house during the winter of 1841. On March 9, 1841, however, Mezai had removed most of the children because, O'Meara stated, "their poor foolish parents, believing some most ridiculous stories invented by the malice of the Canadians here, sent for them. . ."[84] All the interest O'Meara had previously demonstrated in following the Indians on their seasonal round of activities departed; he devoted his time instead to Ojibwa translations of the Collects, Epistles and Gospels with the aid of an

Indian interpreter from the Credit mission.[85] No visiting Indians came to the mission in the summer of 1840, and O'Meara no longer felt pleasure in travelling long distances. By late 1840 he was now in accord with the Indian Department's plan for removing the Indians to Manitowaning. Souls must be saved, but such could be done better in milieu in which the Indians were more under the control of the missionary.

The Pine Seeks Semi-Seclusion

The missionary's presence had not in any way lessened the band's political autonomy. By scattering their lodges, they avoided his scrutiny over their affairs, and often it seemed that their propensity to be away, or intoxicated, coincided rather well with the times O'Meara was known to be bringing news from Anderson which needed an immediate reply. The government plan to form a settlement on Manitoulin Island, by contrast, posed a considerable threat. During February and March of 1841 Anderson and The Pine engaged in an exchange of views regarding the band's removal. The superintendent pressed vigorously for residence at the Establishment. Shingwaukönse, for his part, informed both Anderson and the Governor General that he refused to "sit like a gull" on the barren rocky terrain near Manitowaning when he could raise adequate agricultural produce at Garden River. What kind of markets, The Pine asked, existed on the island? Most important, if he left, what would happen to his lands at the Sault?[86] Anderson responded by declaring all the arguments to be out of line with government policy. For the Indians to be away from the influence of the Métis traders and the "whiskey traffic" would save their souls from

destruction, stated the superintendent, taking a moralistic stance. "Now would it not be better to die like a gull, and your soul to go to heaven," the agent inquired, "than to die like a king and your soul be cast into hell?"[87]

Because The Pine regarded Manitoulin Island as unfit for agriculture, the superintendent responded by claiming that "/single/. . . families have raised more produce than you say all your tribe have raised."[88] Regarding markets, Anderson lacked a specific reply, since the mission project concentrated on the insulation and regulation of Indian labor, not on the creation of commercial enterprises. Trade could be carried out at LaCloche or Penetanguishene, he responded, although it would be better for the Native people to engage in wage labor than in trading activities. Reflecting on ways of controlling Indian labor, Anderson argued that the system of taking credit kept the Indians "weighed down" so that they could not call the products of their labour their own.[89]

While Anderson answered The Pine's questions regarding Native prerogatives over land at the Sault in an elliptical manner, his words seemingly indicated that the chief's prerogatives had been fully recqgnized by the government:

> As regards your Lands: suppose you were on your bed of sickness, you could not take these lands with you -- your Heirs would inherit them; and so on, until your tribe sold them. By coming here, you only leave them, as it were, for a time; you used to leave them when you went to hunt for skins. You leave them now for better motives -- to seek a better inheritance; you neither give nor sell them, they remain yours until you die; no-one has a right to deprive you of them; therefore you need not be uneasy on that head. 90

Anderson's statements regarding markets emphasized the view that

Indian peoples lacked political strength, by adding economic vulnerability to the list of their weaknesses. Yet the prevelance of the liquor traffic arose as a factor of trade competition, not Indian incompetence in negotiating. No attempt, however, was made to separate the two (Bleasdale, 1964: 154-5). Shingwaukönse knew that there would be little scope for independent enterprise at Manitowaning. At Sault Ste. Marie, by contrast, he could negotiate for favourable terms for the sale of his band's products among a number of competing merchants. Shingwaukönse's critique of the system of isolating Indians from commercial intercourse with Whites would be one of the first, and most cogent stands to be made against the government establishment at Manitowaning by either Indian or White in the early 1840's. Many years later this viewpoint would constitute accepted policy.[91] But in 1840 and 1841 Shingwaukönse and his band had to confront the threat to their political and economic autonomy by relying on their own resources and initiative.

The Pine gained time through vacillation. He rejected the idea of removal in November 1840,[92] agreed tentatively to it in January the next year, and finally conceded that he would go on May 13, 1841. On June 12 O'Meara held a service at Garden River for the largest congregation he had met with in months, since many Indians had assembled to bid farewell to their chief. On May 15, Shingwaukönse and John Bell, who acted as the chief's interpreter, left for Manitowaning.[93]

The Garden River band continued its activities, undeterred by

by The Pine's absence. Ogista was now in charge, with his brother-in-law, Piabetassung, as a minor chief in his own right on Sugar Island. The Baptist missionary, Abel Bingham, found the band, composed of the head men Ogista, Kabaosa, Megissanequa, Wabanosa, Shebakezick, and their families, as well as Buhkwujjenene -- who was still unmarried -- camped at Garden River.[94] This group informed Bingham that they had previously joined the Anglican church at the "urging of their chief," but had grown disillusioned, and "wandered from their Christian profession."[95] One surprising entry in Bingham's journal, for November 14, 1841, tells of a meeting the missionary held with The Pine and his wife, during the very period when O'Meara and the Indian Department assumed The Pine to be residing on Manitoulin Island.[96] The chief had briefly slipped away to visit his band during the season when most of the Manitoulin Island residents were at their fishing grounds, and his absence would not be noticed by either O'Meara or Anderson.[97] The fall also constituted the time when bands traditionally met near the rapids fishery to conduct ceremonies and exchange information. Shingwaukönse, while he had evidently transferred the weight of responsibility for his own band's affairs to his son Ogista, refused to isolate himself from the large general councils which would have been held at the Sault during this season. Information gained by the chief at this time regarding events in the Upper Great Lakes region, he would later employ as the subject of reflection over the winter months ahead.

The Agreement to Remove -- Bluff, Sincere Consideration, or Blind Concurrence?

Shingwaukönse left his band in the spring of 1841 and resided separately from it, except for short return visits, until the following spring. In so doing, the chief relinquished all traces of his former high status. His immediate family, other than John Bell who had become his son-in-law, failed to join him. The strain of Anderson's repeated probings into the nature of Ojibwa land tenure at the Sault was beginning to tell on the old chief. The Pine passed a winter punctuated by confusion and emotional fatigue, and occasionally sought release in bouts of drunkeness. Finally, in June 1841, Shingwaukönse explained to O'Meara that he had arrived at a determination to depart, for as things were he could no longer cope. His condition would merely worsen should he remain, "so he must go immediately even should no one wish to follow him."[98]

The missionary believed that Shingwaukönse, feeling remorse over his drinking, desired to seek an asylum away from the temptations of the whiskey traders. O'Meara further assumed that The Pine had been abandoned by his band because of certain failings the chief had exhibited as a leader.[99] Yet, given the boisterous farewell the departing chief received at Garden River, it appears that any contentions which may have arisen between Shingwaukönse and his followers during the winter were well on their way to being healed by the spring. One thing, moreover, was certain. By temporarily divesting himself of leadership status, The Pine avoided embarrassments inherent in the roles of "model convert" and "government intermediary" expected of him by the Indian superintendent and the Anglican missionary. This would free him from earlier pressures and allow him to weigh available options. At the same time the chief emphasized his political and economic powerlessness to the government by relying on the Indian department for his subsistence and

accommodation.[100] It seems that Shingwaukönse, with the full comprehension and compliance of his band, assumed a liminal role as a prelude to his demonstration of a more focused course of action relative to the affairs of those on whose behalf he exercised his leadership.

In line with a three-stage processual sequence outlined by Arnold Van Gennep (1909) in his seminal discussion of rites of passage, Shingwaukönse's stance during the fall and winter of 1841-2 exhibited none of of the traits of his past or future state. Nor did it hint, in the initial stages, of the result of the transition which would emerge by the following spring. Unlike the formal ritual context, in which the range of outcomes of the liminal state are strongly structured by traditional expectations, the cultural milieu in which Shingwaukönse acted derived its formal aspects from interrelations among dynamic personalized cosmological concepts which introduced a considerable degree of indeterminacy into the process. It might be assumed that limitations imposed by external agencies on the chef's conduct would have inhibited his engaging in activities in keeping with an internally-consistent thought system. Yet it is also contended that, because the Ojibwa power belief system advocated ritualized "powerlessness" as an important avenue to spiritual "blessings", a behaviour pattern stressing indeterminacy would automatically protect the chief from government and missionary manipulation, since it defied any strong exercise of individual initiative during the liminal state.

For The Pine to have reached a decision to leave Garden River during the spring season, viewed by the Ojibwa as conducive to the renewal of spiritual as well as natural powers, suggests that the departure, in itself, may have been viewed collectively as an act of semi-ritual importance. The chief's absence from his band, furthermore, would be felt in more ways than

one. Perhaps most significantly, he had persuaded John Bell, the resident trader and outfitter for the Indians' winter hunts, to accompany him to Manitoulin. But Shingwaukönse evidently harbored no intention of either economically or politically coercing his followers to move to Manitowaning. That he eshewed any intermediary role is obvious from the fact that several members of the Garden River band individually approached Anderson regarding their need for houses, rather than calling on the chief to speak for them.[101] Meanwhile having Bell, who spoke English, French and the Native tongue, nearby as an interpreter undoubtedly proved an invaluable assistance to The Pine in searching for information relating to government goals in the Upper Great Lakes area. Shingwaukönse's influence over Bell in 1841 must have been considerable, since Bell renounced Roman Catholicism and joined the Ojibwa leader in professing Anglicanism.[102]

Anderson's tendency to view the chief's willingness to reside at Manitowaning as a sign of future success for government policy served to heighten the ambiguity of The Pine's role. The mere fact that Shingwaukönse had agreed to come to Manitoulin Island was hailed by the superintendent as a victory for the cause of the Anglican mission.[103] On receiving news from O'Meara of the chief's decision to leave Garden River, Anderson wrote to Jarvis: "And now, that an opportunity offers itself to prove that the experiment of trying to civilize the Indians is not in vain I trust the object may be carried to its full accomplishment."[104] So certain was the superintendent that The Pine would persuade his band to resettle that he immediately ordered twenty-five houses to be built. By September, Anderson had raised this number to forty houses.[105]

Anderson had recognized Shingwaukönse's territorial prerogatives to

the Sault area merely as a preliminary to a major land surrender which the agent expected to follow as a matter of course after the settlement of The Pine's band on Manitowaning Island. Seen from this perspective, The Pine's liminal state also doubled as a clever defensive strategy. Shingwaukönse's arrival on the island with a meagre retinue created major problems for the superintendent's long-range plans. When Anderson attempted to secure The Pine's agreement to the land surrender at the Sault, the chief stated that he was powerless to act independently of his band. By this reply, Shingwaukönse protected Métis as well as Ojibwa territorial claims, as the agent evidently intended to force the Métis to vacate their holdings by ceding the land out from under them. But when The Pine instead demanded compensation in rent or specie for any land ceded, including "at least one half of the money" for the sale of the Ermatinger property should it occur,[106] Anderson found himself in a difficult position. The agent could not compel a surrender from a chief who refused to act as a representative for his people. Since The Pine had rendered himself almost totally invulnerable to pressure, he could bargain freely, without fear of consequences. He ceased using the houses, which the government had promised to build at the Sault, as counters in an elaborate power game. During the winter he would simply collect information. In this way he would acquire the rudiments for new and possibly more workable strategies to employ on behalf of his people.

But strategies were not enough. There would have to be a revision of goals. The Pine had spent a decade trying to secure government assistance for his Native settlement, but so far, his attempts had failed. He also knew that the Indians living on the south shore of

Lake Superior would be approached by the American government to cede their land during the summer of 1842. To Keche.Besheke, among others, he formerly had denounced the idea of relinquishing land to the Americans, since loss of autonomy usually followed. Yet the question remained: did Indians on the British side have firm alternatives as compared to those residing in the United States? Did they necessarily have to sell the totality of their lands at once, or might they keep control over the timing or else the extent of land to be ceded? What choices did they have?

These must have been frustrating subjects for Shingwaukönse, lacking an understanding of cultural variables implicit in the white man's view, but he clearly felt that his responsibilities required him to make the effort. In early June, when both O'Meara and Father J.B. Proulx, the Roman Catholic missionary from Wikwemikong, happened to visit his house[107], The Pine began his usual questioning, proceeding from Native premises. A single theme permeated his inquiries, as all pertained to the sphere of intergroup relations. What, from the white man's standpoint, he asked, was the cause of war? Was man "related to all animal and immaterial things and also to the Heavenly Bodies?" Finally, which would be better: presents, or money given in payment for one's lands?[108] Neither O'Meara's nor Proulx's responses proved very enlightening, other than to show the chief the degree to which interdenominational rivalries promoted hostility. Proulx's attempts to answer the first question by reference to Joan of Arc and certain French and continental conflicts only irritated the volatile British patriot, O'Meara. O'Meara passed over The Pine's second enquiry with a few perfunctory remarks, although Proulx

seemed to be willing at least to give the question a degree of consideration. In answering The Pine's questions regarding land cessions, however, the two missionaries expressed diametrically opposed points of view. O'Meara favoured land surrender and removal to the Establishment, while Proulx remained decidedly hostile to this option, encouraging the chief to protest the termination of presents.[109]

After some consideration, Proulx admitted that he failed to understand why the Ojibwa would even wish to come to the Establishment. This touched off a rejoinder from Shingwaukönse, who apparently could not resist poking fun at discrepancies between what he viewed as White-sponsored agricultural utopias and the harsh realities of life in the north:

> Mr. P. said, You old man, what are /sic/ you come for? I have always heard your lands were very good. Yes, said the Pine, everything grows well on them. Wheat grows as high as a man. Mr. O'Meara said I never saw it. How could you, you came so seldom the Pine said. I never wanted for anything at the Sault, plenty of food last winter. We killed 20 Rein deer -- but here not one. 110

Shingwaukönse found it difficult to sustain his sense of humour, however, when the discussion turned to the Canadian government's policy of discontinuing presents to Indians living in the United States. The Pine introduced the topic himself in response to what he evidently felt was the parochial tendency of the "Blackcoats" to focus on affairs relating solely to Manitoulin Island. The chief's concerns, by contrast, embraced the whole of the Lake Superior region, and lands far to the west. Not surprisingly, he cast his description of the territory in Ojibwa terms, with the lake of the Ojibwas, Lake Superior, constituting the geographic center of the "Great Island" of North America. He told the missionaries of his struggles to understand how, when all living things possessed some degree of power, the entire "island" of North

America now fell under just two powers. Where were the other forces which might have counterbalanced these two powers, and so prevented the growth of their precocious arrogance in dividing, to their own advantage, his people's lands? Why had the many religious denominations not interfered? After all, "Me me-nik ke-puk-ka-e-ne-nim /how many preaching men are there/?" he asked.[111] And were these Blackcoats truly concerned about the fate of his people in this increasingly "dualistic" universe in which Indians seemed to have no place?

> You are two Black Coats, now I want to know if our Saviour marked in the Bible, that the whites would journey towards the setting sun until they found a large Island in which there were many Indians living in a rich country -- that they should rob the natives of their animals, furs and land, after which the English and Americans should draw a line, from one to the other end of the Island and each take his share and do what he pleases with the Natives, I ask if that's written in the Bible? 112

A fourth party to the discussion, Mr. Wilson (likely George Wilson, newly-appointed Collector of Customs at Sault Ste. Marie) interjected regarding the position of the American Indians, "/It's/ their own fault, why don't they come here?" Annoyed by the remark, The Pine retorted, "How is it their fault/? T/hey remain there to receive payments for their lands."[113] To Shingwaukönse, the Whites had shown a distinct lack of concern for group territorial prerogatives. As a Native leader, The Pine knew he could encourage bands to migrate to Canada, but could not force them to do so.

According to oral traditions at Garden River, the problem lay at a deeper level. From the standpoint of a shamanic perception of the universe, Shingwaukönse viewed the "disruptions" among his people to be cosmological, not merely geopolitical in scope. It would require a brave man to confront the hidden powers which threatened to displace,

even annihilate the Ojibwa. But, as one legend maintained, "He could not turn back. He had a purpose, a gift. 'And then what kind of man would I be?' he said. 'You cannot leave the path. . . You wouldn't be remembered.'"[114]

Shingwaukönse meanwhile kept his "allies" abreast of his findings during the winter of 1841-42. While he maintained a low profile at the Establishment, he was doubtless active in sending and receiving messages through the wide Native communication networks. It would probably not be precipitate to see his encouragements as instrumental in bringing an "unusual number of Indians from the Upper Lakes" to the Sault in July, from whence they proceeded to Manitowaning to join an even larger assemblage of about six thousand for the distribution of presents.[115]

The response from the western bands heralded the chief's reintegration into Native society. The Pine re-emerged fully into the mainstream of his group's activities in late July -- his period of semi-ritual separation ended. The Pine had dwelt for a year in the "wilderness" of strange ideologies and ideas, and now he returned to his familiar rivers, lakes and woods, with their inhabitants, human, animal and spiritual. The Garden River band by late July had decided not to settle at the Manitowaning Establishment. On August 15, Shingwaukönse apprised O'Meara of this decision, to which the missionary could only react with chagrin that the chief and his followers had once again slipped from his control.[116]

The band's decision coincided with the chief's own departure for Garden River, which suggests that a reciprocal relationship between leader and group had reasserted itself. Members' earlier tentative expressions of acquiescence to removal may well have arisen from these individuals'

fears that, should The Pine fail to devise a strong course of action by the spring of 1842, residence at the Establishment might constitute the securest recourse in the midst of rapid change, for the government at least would supply basic necessities. In this respect, the band's vacillations regarding removal could not be regarded as either blind concurrence or mere bluff. The burden of responsibility for the group's reply to the government lay on the shoulders of The Pine. After giving the subject much consideration, he had decided at last that he might be able to succeed in his original objective of establishing a strong, self-determining Native community centered at Garden River. There would thus be no land surrender. He would retain his power base intact. The territory, instead, would be logged, farmed and fished by the Native population. The commercial milieu, moreover, had improved by 1843: return to better economic times in the United States encouraged a rise in fish prices, followed in turn by a resurgence of commercial fishing at the rapids and elsewhere along the coast. After the demise of the American Fur Company in 1842 (Nute, 1926), competition strengthened, but there was also a choice of buyers. Philetus Swift Church, a merchant on Sugar Island, also began hiring band members to cut wood for sale as fuel to passing steamers during the winter of 1845.[117]

The rising power of the two developing nation states, which threatened the economic and political autonomy of the western bands, would have to confront an indigenous movement at the Sault, led by The Pine. But Shingwaukönse and his allies, Indian and Métis, would not negotiate with these expanding state entities without special external assistance. The chief intended to ask head representatives of as many Christian denominations as he could contact to assist him.

Calling on the Churches for Aid

Shingwaukönse immediately began his search for representatives of Christian denominations who might be sympathetic to his plans. On August 3, 1842, he approached the Anglican Bishop, Strachan, and his companion, Lord Morpeth, who had attended the distribution of presents, to send an Anglican missionary to Garden River. The Pine's appeal impressed Strachan, who argued that there had been "a good deal of art and management in his arrangement & mode of introducing it."[118] In reply, the Bishop promised to visit Garden River during the summer, although he confided to the Chief Justice, Sir John Beverley Robinson, that he basically disapproved of The Pine's suggestion since The Pine's band "were too few & will be much better /off at Manitowning/."[119] Viewing the site did not change Strachan's opinion.[120]

Shingwaukönse next approached Michael Power, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Toronto. Power responded sympathetically to The Pine's appeal to send a clergyman, but would make no firm commitments. Whenever Baptist and Methodist missionaries ventured to Garden River, their assistance was also requested. The Baptists' expectations regarding Christian duty proved rather too stringent for The Pine's liking, however. When Bingham stressed the need for temperance, the chief proclaimed that "Ogista was now. . . their chief & he wished him to lead & them to follow him in the path of sobriety."[121]

Shingwaukönse's skepticism regarding emotional evangelicalism may also have arisen in the context of an "experiment" he conducted to test the validity of Millerite beliefs, described by an itinerant Baptist preacher. William Miller was one of a number of leading American millenarians who proclaimed that the Biblical prophecy of Revelation

would be fulfilled in the United States during the mid-nineteenth century (Thomas, 1967). The Baptist encountered by Shingwaukönse had set the Day of Reckoning at April 30, 1842. By keeping note of the date and carefully watching for telling signs in the sky, The Pine eventually concluded that the prophecy was a hoax.[122] The Pine thus indicated by the spring of 1842 that he could not be easily swayed either by religious fanaticism or political polemics. Different manifestations of Christian belief had evidently come to exhibit different degrees of "power", according to Shingwaukönse's own cultural gradient for assessing such matters. Denominations which sought through emotional appeals to make a man into an idealized creature, unreconciled to the cares and obligations of day-to-day existence, ranked low. According to Bingham, The Pine had little interest in conforming to specific church creeds. "By the remarks made by the old chief who spake for the whole of them," he concluded, "I think they have not much notion of listening very attentively to our instructions any farther than suits their own conscience."[123] It would be Ogista's task to maintain relations with the more emotionally inclined of the denominations, while his father would concentrate on strengthening linkages with the Established Church. But no potential source of aid would be overlooked.

A Second Appeal to the Anglican Church

Since the Anglican missionary provided The Pine with his most direct link to the Queen's representatives, the chief prevailed on O'Meara in August 1842 to draft a petition to the Governor General requesting that the land belonging to the Ermatinger estate revert

to the Indians. Receiving no response, the chief held an interview with the Governor General in 1843. When still no assistance was forthcoming, The Pine set out in the spring of 1844 to ask the resident missionary to forward a message to McMurray, whom he knew O'Meara would be seeing in the near future. Three times already The Pine had attempted to contact McMurray, who had become Rector of St. James Church in Dundas, near Hamilton, but McMurray had apparently not received the letters or not replied. This time the chief sent a particularly eloquent plea to the rector as a "brother" and "friend" to use his influence to have a minister reside permanently at Garden River. "My brother William," Shingwaukonse appealed, "I call on you for the goodness and love of God, I call on your brother Minister who is listening to me, that you both help with me /sic/, that we may again have a Minister. . . you will be strong, you that are Ministers, and with all your might help with me."[124] The Pine assured McMurray that interest in Christianity was on the rise in his band. Members held religious meetings, conducted by Ogista, Bukhwujjenene and Piabetassung, twice weekly.[125]

Oral traditions at Garden River indicate that the years 1844 to 1846 spanned a particularly hard period for The Pine. He had not yet entered into the final phase of his career in which he would risk damaging his linkages with government and church to secure his goals. At the same time, he suffered major disappointments and illness. In his letter to McMurray he reported that Megissanequa had recently died.[126] During the summer of 1845 he had also cut his foot with an axe, the effects of which, "for some time threatened to prove fatal" (O'Meara, 1846: 37). Worse still, the chief failed to secure the help of the Anglican church.

The appeal to McMurray had initially aroused the interest of the Reverend James Beaven, a high churchman and personal friend of the rector, who even considered raising funds in England for the revival of the Sault mission. Beaven set out in August 1845 for the Sault with the purpose of determining first-hand the viability of the mission project. On his arrival at the rapids, Beaven found about forty houses occupied by French and Métis, but no Indians.[127] The minister characterized the Indian community at Garden River he had come so far to see as consisting of "six or eight Indian huts and a log house or two under construction for the chief." At this sight, his enthusiasm waned markedly (Beaven, 1896: 124). Beaven's views on The Pine's band stemmed solely from personal observation, since he had been unable to obtain the service of either the Johnston family or a knowledgeable employee of the Hudson's Bay Company to act as interpreter in communicating with the Indians. While acknowledging the strategic importance of the Sault in attracting Native peoples from around Lake Superior, the minister felt that, for missionary work to flourish, it would be necessary to spend considerable sums to establish a large agricultural and industrial school in the region. In 1845, the smallness of the bands, their scattered distribution along the coast, and the existence of equally valid appeals for monetary aid from groups residing nearer to the seat of the Episcopal See in Toronto argued against such expenditures.

The Pine's responsibilities to his Native allies had meanwhile increased. Many prominent Ojibwa leaders in the United States in 1845, on being pressured by the American government to cede their territory, opted for annuities without a struggle -- not out of self-interest, but because there no longer seemed to be any alternatives.

Following the Lapointe treaties of 1842 and 1845, serious political rifts divided bands as faction heads considered migration to Canada in accordance with Shingwaukönse's plan, as a way of securing a better future for their families than remaining crowded onto American reserve lands. Indians who had been forceful in opposing the surrenders at Lapointe, moreover, found themselves not only hounded by American authorities, but also by members of their own bands.[128] Internal band strife led to the spalling off of small family groups, which joined together in making a representation to the Crown through the Collector of Customs at the Canadian Sault in June 1845. "I have to inform you," wrote George Wilson to Thomas G. Anderson, "that two Chippeway Indian chiefs, Muckedaypenasse and Neokema, from La Point, Lake Superior, have called upon me requesting me to inform them whether the Government would permit them to come and make their home in Canada."[129] A number of closely-related families, including altogether five hundred individuals, had asked Muckedaypenasse to make the appeal on their behalf. It would be the first step toward the migration which Shingwaukönse had been anticipating for many years.

The Unretreating Frontier

Shingwaukönse by 1846 had made a firm commitment to remain on his lands and regulate their economic potential. The merchant, Church, had already suggested a way of enhancing the local economy: selling wood to passing steamers. He hoped that -- given the protection of this industry by the Crown and the linkages he had carefully fostered with religious organizations -- his plans for a settlement would bear fruit within a year.

Then, in the spring of 1846, Shingwaukönse's scheme suffered a setback. Joseph Wilson, son of George Wilson, who had recently been appointed Crown Lands agent, suddenly confiscated wood cut by the Indians on Squirrel Island, not far from the main Ojibwa village. To Wilson, Church and the Ojibwa had disregarded the international tariff on timber and taken the resource without a license. Writing to the Commissioner of Crown Lands, the agent described Church as "an American adventurer that has enriched himself by defrauding /the government of/ revenue on both sides of the Frontier."[130] Church nevertheless had local connections, and on March 18 the agent was arrested in the American Sault and sent to jail. To the Sault community, divorced from strong metropolitan controls, Wilson constituted a meddlesome nuisance, and when the agent refused to sign a document granting permission for the continuation of timber cutting, he remained confined for two days.[131]

Shingwaukönse next sent a petition to George Ironsides, Anderson's successor as Indian Superintendent at Manitowaning, setting forth the chief's own position on the matter. He explained that his territorial prerogatives had been recognized by Colborne in 1833 and that his band derived much needed revenue from the timber on the lands. "/When/ Mr. Wilson sells our wood & acts with us as he does, I feel as if he entered into my house and took without my leave what he might find therein," The Pine asserted.[132]

Shingwaukönse anticipated recognition of the reciprocal relationship existing between the Ojibwa and the Crown previously dictated by feudal custom.[133] For this reason, Shingwaukönse swore to uphold the promises made by his people in the past to defend their Sovereign in return for protection on their lands:

> Tell him my people are ready, if necessary to go to war -- that we are all ready to fight for our Great Mother and that he must not think we are not true to him. . . it is only because we are poor, naked & shivering that we complain. 134

Shingwaukönse concluded his appeal by begging for "pity", a traditional way of approaching a protector (Landes, 1968: 20). Unfortunately for the chief, the times were against such an appeal. On October 10, 1845, the Legislative Assembly, with the approval of the Governor General and Executive Council, had passed legislation extending the jurisdiction of the united provinces of Canada East and Canada West over the lands at the Sault. The sympathies of the naval commander, Lieutenant Harper, who had been dispatched by the Crown Lands Department to report on land tenure at the rapids, lay with the Métis population. Harper's decision to recognize an individualized system of land tenure as already existing at the rapids negated all prior claims of the Indians based on aboriginal right.

> /N/ot one individual on the British side (with the exception of the Hudson's Bay Company) own one foot of soil or land -- their Houses are built and their little gardens planted under the fear that they may be ordered off at any moment and lose all -- no title deed can be got as the Indians here claim the land . . . 135

Harper suggested that the Métis lacked incentive to farm intensively because of the precariousness of their land tenure. He contended that the Métis constituted a loyal population and recommended that their lots be surveyed and title extended to each resident.[136] The Pine's territorial prerogatives were threatened as never before. An ideological clash had arisen on the western frontier between the fading political forms associated with feudalism and indirect colonialism, and a rising new philosophy, "Little Englandism", which espoused colonial self-rule.

The Imperial government had been gradually relinquishing its burden of expenditures for Indian presents and missionary settlements. From now on, emphasis would be placed on retrenchment. While new policy measures, devised from the findings of a major investigation into Indian Affairs begun in 1842 under the auspices of the Governor General, Sir Charles Bagot, still retained Indians as charges of the Crown rather than of the Province (Leslie, 1982), a major problem remained in frontier areas where Indians had not yet ceded lands, and so did not live on reserves. Revenue for the promotion of Indian "civilization" would, in the future, derive in great part from the sale or lease of surrendered territories. This placed Shingwaukönse and his band in a classic double bind, for, in their appeals to the government for assistance in protecting and developing their territory in its unsurrendered state, they were undercutting principles on which the whole system operated. Most likely it was their determined stance to retain their land base intact which, regardless of his official stance six years before, prompted Anderson in 1846 to to undermine any legal grounds on which the Ojibwa might obtain recognition by the Crown for rights to resources and territory. Owing to Anderson's position on the matter of aboriginal rights,[136] on May 11, 1846, Ironsides received a letter from the Civil Secretary's office, instructing him to inform Shingwaukönse that "the lands on which he resides and the timber are claimed by the Province."[137] The chief, furthermore, could expect no assistance, the communication continued, "unless he and his band will remove to Manitoulin Island, where they might enjoy the same advantages that others who already reside there have so much profited by."[138]

With this opposition, Shingwaukönse's relations with the

government moved into a new phase. He had proven determined and shrewd in the defence of his goals for a Native settlement, but always with a marked respect for the Crown and its representatives. From 1846 onward he would add outright confrontation to his strategies for maintaining the integrity of his original policy. On the morning of April 27, 1846, Alexander Vidal, a provincial land surveyor working in the vicinity of the Sault, found himself faced by a small delegation of Indians headed by Shingwaukönse and Nebenagoching. The chiefs expressed "indignation" at the surveyor's presence on lands they claimed as their own. Vidal, concerned by the determined manner in which they defended their claims, promised not to proceed with the survey until he had contacted his superiors at the Crown Lands office. In response, the Land Commissioner, D.B. Papineau, instructed Vidal to ignore the Indians' complaints, assuring the surveyor that he could proceed safely since "should /the bands/ offer any kind of resistance. . . we will of course suppress the same at once."

In 1846 the ideological sides had been drawn. The Indians would defend their rights to land, in opposition to a policy which, ironically, had been proclaimed to aid in protecting the rights of aboriginal peoples.[139] The Pine would act far differently from the government's stereotyped image of the politically defenceless Indian. By drawing allies from many sides, The Pine attracted the notice of the press, and within three years the Native claim had escalated into an international issue.[140] Aspects of this contest have stubbornly defied easy historical analysis. Historians dealing with the subject have come to different conclusions regarding the nature of forces behind events (Leighton, 1982; Knight, 1982; Owram, 1980: 39-40). All have agreed, however, that the

contest arose as frontier resistance to metropolitan control. And, yet, it constituted a form of protest which evidenced none of the flamboyant, tumultuous characteristics of cult-induced movements, such as the Shawnee uprising of 1808 or the Northwest Rebellion of 1885. All in all, it presented a principled show of opposition, basically moderate and non-violent (Leighton, 1982). This study argues that the tendency of factors motivating this Native movement to elude simple historical analyses arises from the fact that they, as often as not, have drawn upon and complemented, rather than challenged, mid-nineteenth century Western aspirations and goals.

CHAPTER SIX

PURSUING THE GREAT SPIRIT'S POWER

Revitalizing a Failing World System

Regardless of their formerly unified pursuit of a peaceful land of refuge inspired by Methodist teachings in the 1830's (Slight, 1844: 75-83), Native leaders gradually accepted the fact that their earlier vision of "God's kingdom on earth" would never materialize as long as Indians lacked rights to land or resources. After 1846 Shingwaukönse no longer conveyed messages of hope for a mission-sponsored, or even exclusively Christian Native "homeland" to bands west of Sault Ste. Marie. The threat of removal among the southwestern Ojibwa was too pressing to put faith in plans for the distant future. The situation demanded immediate help.

The Pine realized that direct confrontation with encroaching powers, which refused to grant his people a place in the new order, was useless. Resistance would have to be of an ideological nature, capable of directing future political and economic action. While historians have realized that The Pine could be a clever political negotiator (Leighton, 1982; Hall, 1984), Shingwaukönse's role as a co-ordinator of incipient dynamisms on the frontier has not been adequately acknowledged. Indians had their own solutions and found means of expressing them in ideological forms. As the political and economic foundations of British colonialism crumbled away, the Methodist mission movement had provided a brief reprieve for Native hopes. By the mid 1840's, however, Ojibwa plans began to assume

a far more distinctly Native character.

Shingwaukönse the Prophet

For several years after 1840 The Pine had withdrawn from intensive contact with the colonial authorities. Then, in 1846, he re-emerged at the head of a movement espousing a syncretistic blend of Native and Christian belief, more traditionally Ojibwa than western in orientation, which the chief believed might be employed to secure a "homeland" in the vicinity of Sault Ste. Marie after all. At this time, according to Fred and Richard Pine Sr., Shingwaukönse called upon Thunder for assistance. "Blessed" with a vision from this source, The Pine appealed for aid to other Native leaders and Métis who shared his religious outlook. Those, like his son Ogista, who chose to adhere to Methodism, which disparaged attachment to the Native religious system, rejected the chief's call. Older leaders, like Keokonse and Nowquagabo, who still believed in the traditional conceptual framework, responded.

The Pine set out to restore and invigorate existing Native beliefs. Viewed from the traditional religious standpoint, the cosmological system needed bolstering, since many formerly responsible spirit guardians had vacated their "posts", and so allowed alien forces to disturb the world balance (see Appendix C). Working within this thought system, Shingwaukönse began mustering his "power" to stop the erosion of the broader whole. As a prophet capable of discerning relationships among dynamic agencies, The Pine, elders at Garden River maintained, use his diagnostic skills in attempts to alleviate the cosmological "disruption" he saw arising from rapid political and economic

change. In this role he assumed responsibility for reviving the waning cosmological system, and so granting his people a future share in the benefits of a "restored" world. For this reason his focus would be on group rights and responsibilities rather than on material factors. The resource base would constitute merely the "raw ground" from which an enterprising leader might extract future benefits for his people through development and judicious regulation of latent potentialities.[1]

In devising a plan of action Shingwaukönse also drew upon Christian teachings which emphasized the integrity of peoples and nations who loved God.[2] Fundamentally peaceful in intent, his appeal to the Canadian government called for laws to be passed that would protect Indian territorial prerogatives and establish permanent linkages between Native groups and the developing nation state. His faith in the efficacy of Christianity led the leader to regard missionaries as potential friends, and he was not disappointed in this respect. James D. Cameron, the Baptist preacher, willingly responded to the chief's requests for aid in communicating Native demands and grievances to government agencies and religious organizations.

Shingwaukönse and the Mining Interests

Shingwaukönse also regarded two mining explorers as allies, both of whom promised to support Native aims in return for the chief's assistance in prospecting ventures. Evidently, memories of the workable relationship which had existed in the mid 1700's between the Native peoples and the independent trading establishments aroused Shingwaukönse's hope that something similar might develop between the Ojibwa and the mining companies during the nineteenth century. Continuities with the

past certainly existed. The two explorers, Allan Macdonell and John William Keating, spoke the Ojibwa language fluently and were familiar with Native beliefs and customs. Allan Macdonell's father, Alexander Macdonell of Collachie (1762-1842), had been Assistant Secretary in the Indian Affairs Department between 1816 and 1822. Alexander Macdonell's uncle, John Macdonell, furthermore, had acted as John Askin's forwarding agent at Mackinac before joining the Northwest Company. Allan Macdonell, who was a lawyer as well as an entrepreneur, was also known to the Roman Catholic Métis, since Bishop Alexander Macdonell had been related to him.[3] Keating had seen active service in the War of 1812 and, until the mid 1840's, had been Indian agent at Amherstburg.[4] Macdonell and Keating both responded to The Pine's appeals for help, since under the chief's direction the Garden River, Sault Ste. Marie, Michipicoten and Fort William bands agreed to guide the prospectors to copper, iron, silver and gold exposures on their lands. In return, Macdonell and Keating pledged to see that the Indians' claims to proprietorship over the mineral deposits would be recognized in law and that a system of leases and royalties would be implemented to ensure the Native peoples a share in potential mining returns. The Ojibwa predicted that their future would be enhanced by a system of special protections, new entrepreneurial contacts, and improved linkages to government.

Shingwaukönse informed his western Ojibwa allies that times were auspicious for their migration to the new "homeland" in the Sault Ste. Marie area. He stressed that mining, lumbering, trapping and fishing promised to afford a sufficient economic base for an incoming population of at least two thousand individuals from Michigan west to the Red River District. At the same time, Macdonell, Keating and the

merchant, Church, agreed to help with the establishment of sawmills, mining operations and markets for agricultural produce. Native leaders from Red River, Rainy Lake and Lake of the Woods proved impatient by the spring of 1846 for the Canadian government to grant leave for their move to the projected Indian Settlement.

The miners' dependence on their Native guides, meanwhile, made it difficult for them to do otherwise than to recognize prior Native rights to mineral resources. In response to a request from Shingwaukönse, Keating in June 1846 drafted a petition to J.M. Higginson, the Civil Secretary, to be directed to the Governor General. To avoid taking sides, Keating explained in an accompanying letter that his own actions stemmed from personal necessity rather than advocacy of Shingwaukönse's views. "As I depend much upon them for assistance in exploring," he stressed, "I could not refuse to give them my aid in addressing His Excellency."[5] Shingwaukönse, for his part, admitted that he "had no certain knowledge" regarding the authority which had sanctioned the miners' activities north of Lakes Huron and Superior and requested the Governor General, Lord Metcalfe, to meet with him in Montreal so that they could discuss arrangements relating to proprietorship, royalties and dues. "I want always to live and plant at Garden River," The Pine concluded, and so expect "a share of what is found on my lands."[6]

The idea that Native willingness to assist in mining explorations might grant Indians a secure and valued place in Canadian society also influenced bands east of Sault Ste. Marie. In September 1846 a number of Indians from the vicinity of Manitowaning, Manitoulin Island, approached Indian Superintendent Ironsides with specimens of copper. The agent, in turn, informed his superiors that the petitioners desired all future

operations on Indian territory to be subject to government regulation:

> The Indians have a very high idea of the value of these things, and have requested me to beg of His Excellency that any mines which may be discovered shall not be subject to the enterprise of private individuals, but that the matter be taken into the hands of the Government and that they, the Indians, may receive whaever portion His Excellency may be pleased to ward to them. 7

As long as mining prospects appeared encouraging, the Indians could rely on Ironsides and Keating to convey their wishes to the Province's authorities. Keating in particular was generally trusted because of his connections to the Native community through his Ojibwa wife from Walpole Island and owing to his past associations with government and the military.[8] His activities, however, were soon to prove that such confidence was mostly unwarranted. Reorganization of the Indian Affairs Department in 1845 had cast Keating adrift. Dismissal from his post at Amherstburg in the name of government retrenchment had led him first into the Indian trade and, finally, into prospecting. As time progressed, he became increasingly undependable as an ally to the Native people in a competitive world where, to Keating, the ends increasingly came to justify the means.[9]

Once having secured Native aid in his mining explorations, Keating joined the politician and entrepreneur, Arthur Rankin, as well as James Cutherbertson and Robert Stuart Woods, in forming the Huron and Sault Ste. Marie Mining Company, which sank a shaft at Bruce Mines in 1846.[10] Rankin, in turn, with Allan Macdonell and others set about organizing the Quebec and Lake Superior Mining Association, which began operations at Mica Bay on the northeastern coast of Lake Superior.[11] Yet, after financial difficulties dimmed their initial optimism, Keating and Rankin suddenly severed ties with both the Ojibwa and Macdonell --

who continued to respect his promises to the Indians. By 1849 Keating had gone so far as to publicly renounce all obligation on his or his associates' part to recognize Native rights to minerals or timber. Owing to the costs of exploration, he argued, it was impossible to regard the Indians as other than an available source of labor.

Finally compelled to restrict the scope of their enterprise, Keating, Rankin, Cuthbertson and Woods sold their workings at Bruce Mines, along with a Mica Bay location, to the Montreal Mining Company.[12] The trustees of this second organization -- among them Sir George Simpson, the Honorable Peter Moffatt, the Honorable Peter McGill, and William Collis Meredith -- represented some of the most prominent financiers and political figures of the day. Since their company's promotional campaign depended to a great extent on parading the virtues of advanced technology in meeting the challenges which had defeated Alexander Henry's mining operations at Point aux Pins during the eighteenth century,[13] they could not be expected to take kindly to a dynamic on the frontier which threatened to assume the character of a bid for recognition of aboriginal rights, reminiscent of arguments forwarded prior to 1821 by supporters of the Northwest Company. They felt the old political and economic order should be left to die to make way for the new. It was thought best to ignore the Native claims issue, hoping it would disappear.

Yet Indian pressure continued. Under the influence of the mining companies, the Indian Affairs Department finally ordered Ironsides in June 1847 to instruct Shingwaukönse and his people to move to Manitoulin Island, as the Governor General disapproved of the Indians remaining near the Sault. The chief was further directed not to come to Montreal

"as all communications can be made in writing. . ."[14] Undaunted, Shingwaukönse, Nebenagoching, Nowquagabo, Kabaosa, Keokonse, Piabetassung, Megissanequa, Ogista and Buhkwujjenene sought out O'Meara and requested that he prepare a petition declaring their commitment to remain at Garden River. The Great Spirit had given them the land and no temporal government could deprive them of that which God himself had granted:

> Already has the white man licked clean up from our lands the whole means of our subsistence, and now they commence to make us worse off. They take everything away from us, Father. Now my Father, you are too high to help those people who take from us, you who sit on high place at Montreal are he who helps those who are wronged, as those who have lately come to work as wishing to wrong us. I call God to witness in the beginning and do so now again and say that it was false that the land is not ours, it is ours. 15

This letter received no reply. By November the Executive Council had authorized the sale of approximately thirty large mining locations along the north shore of Lakes Huron and Superior in keeping with the terms of an order-in-council passed earlier in May.[16] Each location had to conform in size to 6,400 acres to accord with a government standard set to discourage speculation and prevent minor entrepreneurial interests from competing with the Montreal-controlled mining companies. Applicants had to pay £150 down and were given two years to submit the balance at a rate of 40 shillings an acre, after which time the sites would be forfeited to the Crown.

Four locations fulfilling this description, lying side by side had been staked and surveyed in the vicinity of Garden River. The westernmost boundary of the series ran due north from a point west of Partridge Point on Little Lake George. Each of the surveyed areas approximated the shape of a rectangle, two miles wide along the St. Mary's

channel in front, and extending back five miles due north. The interior boundary, common to all, paralleled roughly the sinousities of the coastline. Rankin and Cutherbertson held the major interest in the two western locations, applied for under the names of F.C. Clark and John F. Elliot. Further to the east, the Benjamin H. Lemoine and John Simpson locations fell under the control of the Garden River Mining Company, with George Desbarats, the Queen's Printer, as agent. A fifth location, registered in the name of John Wilson, lay north of Echo Bay.

The Lemoine location took in the whole area of the Native village and extended a good way up the Garden River. Since the chief had never negotiated in any way with Desbarats or any member of his company, The Pine took offense, and early in May 1847, Desbarats reported that his exploring party had been driven off by the Indians. The agent also noted that no form of land surrender had been conducted with the Native population. Any delay in so doing, he continued, would "increase the cupidity of the interests and with it, also the difficulty of compromise."[17] Desbarats knew that any eruption of violence would place the mining companies in an ambivalent legal position should direct collisions occur. Prompt government action, Desbarats argued, was necessary to rectify the situation, especially since Captain William Ermatinger, a lawyer and son of Charles Oakes Ermatinger and Charlotte Katawebedai, intended to uphold the concept of aboriginal right in order to lay claim to his father's estate at Sault Ste. Marie.[18]

In yet another petition drafted by O'Meara and dated July 5,



Lemoine and Simpson Locations

P.A.C., RG 10, vol. 205

1847, Shingwaukönse, with Nebenagoching, Piabetassung and Kabaosa as witnesses, stated that he had fought in the War of 1812, had been wounded, and so considered himself a deserving ally of the British. Shingwaukönse repeated his claim that John Askin Jr. had recognized his people's right to locate themselves at Garden River, although Shingwaukönse had originally migrated from the United States. He had granted his band the choice whether or not to treat with the United States. In reply, they had refused to relinquish their sovereignty over the soil on the Canadian side by accepting American money, although they had been taunted for it by American officials. He also repudiated the charges that his people had driven away explorers by force. According to The Pine, he and his principal men had "waited upon the leader of it /Desbarat's party/ in his tent and requested that he would desist as this was their land. . ."[19] The chief emphasized that he would continue to protect his territory against trespass even though Ironsides had written to him stating that "it was the wish of the government that these persons should occupy our land."[20]

Again, no reply followed. In August Shingwaukönse complained to Ironsides that the government's delay had placed him in an embarrassing position, as the other leaders whom he represented "were daily calling on him for information."[21] The Pine also laid a grievance before Samuel Peters Jarvis, the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs. All Native applications for redress, directed to the local magistrate, William Nourse of the Hudson's Bay Company, against the illegal removal of timber and mineral from Indian land, the chief explained, had been futile -- even though the Ojibwa had on occasion

experienced ill usage from the trespassers. Jarvis, in response, communicated Shingwaukönse's complaint to the Reverend William McMurray and appealed to the clergyman to look into the case. Soon afterwards The Pine himself left for Toronto, where he spoke with McMurray and the Reverend James Beaven, to whom he presented an ornate pipe as proof of the sincerity of his desire for another Anglican missionary to be sent to Garden River.[22]

Noting that no cession of Native title to lands along the north shores of Lakes Huron and Superior had ever occurred, the Committee of the Executive Council argued that the Ojibwa applicants were merely immigrants, who had no claim as "Aboriginal Inhabitants of the Country." They should be compelled, the Committee recommended, to move to "some other place sufficiently distant to render it probable that they might not again be called upon to give place either to Agriculturalists or Miners."[23] A final decision on the matter was suspended, however, pending a report from the Commissionery of Crown Lands.

D.B. Papineau, the Crown Lands Commissioner, did not submit his report until November. In the interim, the Native community at the Sault directed another petition to Indian Affairs. This time the Ojibwa took another tack. Although, they argued, their summer villages had been on the south shore of Lake Superior, they still held claim to the territory extending north to the height of land lying between the Upper Great Lakes and Hudson's Bay "from time immemorial," since this region had always been used by them for hunting. They were now willing to surrender the whole area, while





Niagara Historical Society

Pipe which Shingwaukönse presented to
the Reverend James Beaven in 1847

reserving to themselves certain specified tracts of land.[24]

Papineau could not easily ignore the claim. The Crown Lands Commissioner nevertheless felt he could repudiate it, and supported his decidely negative views on the issue by reference to conveniently available ethnographic opinion. In 1846 the Provincial Geologist, William Logan, and a Deputy Surveyor, John W. McNaughtan, had been dispatched to conduct mineralogical investigations along the north shore of Lake Superior. On his return, McNaughtan declared that the Indian population from Sault Ste. Marie west to the Fort William district numbered between six and seven thousand and seemed to be increasing. Their ancestral origins, he contended, lay along the banks of the Mississippi River, from which they had been "expelled by tbe Sioux" and forced to occupy lands on the southwestern shores of Lake Superior, by ascending the Chippewa River in Minnesota. They later emigrated to Green Bay, Wisconsin, where "they remained some time under the French Dominion." During this period they came to Michilimackinac to trade and settled on the south shore of Lake Superior from whence "they came to the North Shore as they state."[25]

Regarding the original occupants of the north shores of Lakes Huron and Superior, McNaughtan asserted that their origins were of the "Algonkin Nation" of which but a remnant remained at Lake of Two Mountains. Large numbers of these "Algonkin" had settled on the Ottawa River where they "were totally destroyed by the Iroquois a few years before the arrival of the French at Montreal." The remainder were held to have been attacked by smallpox "to such an extent they ceased to exist as a Nation." Armed with such evidence,

Papineau boldly dispensed with the claims issue by stating that future dealings with mere remnants of Nations should involve the extension "upon the faith of the British government" of a small cash annuity to promote "civilization".[26]

On both sides of the international border neglect of Native claims aroused Indian bitterness against government authority. This state of affairs prompted James D. Cameron Jr. to address a letter to the Crown Lands Department in which he offered to act as an intermediary between the Province of Canada and the Ojibwa to quell potential unrest.[27] Owing, in 1848, to the survey of a ship canal through the American rapids, the head chief Oshwano led a delegation to Washington to have Native title to land and the local fishery recognized under the treaties of 1820 and 1836.[28] On the Canadian side, Keokonse and Nowquagabo in December of the same year persuaded Alexander Murray, a government geologist, to relay a message to the government that they wished to retain six miles along the north shore of Lake Huron, on either side the Thessalon River, for their own use, and to have their fishing grounds in front of the tract protected.[29]

The atmosphere of heightened tension and potential discord lasted only a few months. Elections in the Canadas during the spring of 1848 ushered in a solidly-based Reform government, holding a large majority in the assembly. Demonstrating a more positive attitude towards settling the matter than his predecessor, the newly-appointed Crown Lands Commissioner, John H. Price, reviewed Papineau's earlier report, maintaining that in the spirit of fairness, the Indians' grievances should at least be investigated. Vidal had informed

the Crown Lands Department in February that the Lemoine location included the entire Garden River settlement. Since Garden River constituted the only sizeable village between Sault Ste. Marie and Manitowaning, Price asserted, "the justice or at least expediency of dispossessing /the band/ is well deserving of consideration before the land is given to others." The Indians had exercised choice in fighting with the British in the War of 1812, Price stated, and British officers at Mackinac had apparently guaranteed The Pine territory on the British side. He also noted that the Six Nations had been granted land under similar terms. It therefore seemed proper to suspend the location assigned to B.H. Lemoine until a well-informed decision could be reached.[30]

Tired of waiting for a reply to his earlier appeals, Shingwaukönse, with a chosen delegation of his band, and Louis Cadotte as interpreter, journeyed to Montreal in the spring of 1848 to hold an audience with Metcalfe's successor as Governor General, Lord Elgin. About the same time O'Meara began publicly contravening McNaughtan's assessment, presenting an almost exactly opposite picture of the state of the Ojibwa peoples of Lake Superior. To the Anglican missionary, the bands were poverty-striken, ridden with disease, drastically declining in numbers and faced with the threat of extinction.[31] While O'Meara's stance was gauged to sponsor greater exertion in aid of the Native peoples within the Anglican Church, it was also evidently born of the fear that, should the bands present too strong a challenge to provincial policies, the position of the Native peoples might become grave indeed. Far better that they be presented as objects of

Courtesy Clarke Library



COURTESY ROYAL ONTARIO MUSEUM, TORONTO

The Distribution of Presents, 1848

Harper, ed. (1971)

pity.

The interview in Montreal must have exhibited an incongruous side, especially with O'Meara's pleading for recognition of the Ojibwa's inability to defend themselves. Shingwaukönse, by contrast, directed a barrage of complaints against the mining companies for trespassing on his territory. The miners, The Pine emphasized, set fires which had burned for miles, driving away game. Blasting of the rock likewise made hunting almost impossible. At the same time, agents of the mining companies prevented the Indians from cutting timber and firewood on locations, even though conditions of sale had not been fulfilled.[32] To ascertain the validity of these complaints, Elgin sent Thomas G. Anderson, then visiting Superintendent of Indian Affairs residing in Cobourg, to investigate the matter.

Anderson arrived at the Sault in early August, following the distribution of presents at Manitowaning. Bishop Strachan, McMurray, O'Meara and a number of other Anglican delegates also attended, anxious to protect what they viewed as an important mission preserve. On addressing the Indians in Council on Friday, August 18th, Anderson could not have failed to be aware that before him sat the chief who had continuously opposed his scheme for a missionary establishment on Manitoulin Island. In the years following the close of the War of 1812 Anderson had represented a new order which demanded that the Indians beat spears into plowshares at a safe distance from the international boundary. Yet the Native peoples had not participated in his vision of the wilderness developing into a pastoral paradise of hardy independent farmers, and Anderson's views had become redundant. It had become clear

that the mixing of national diplomacy with the affairs of Christianity had deluded no one, especially not the Ojibwa. The English missionaries, moreover, had indicated by their presence at the Sault that they preferred the Indians to be Christianized and civilized on lands chosen by the Native people themselves.

Local entrepreneurial interests were also represented at the assembly. Joseph Wilson, Collector of Customs and Lands Agent, supported the rights of the miners. Allan Macdonell, "a licence holder in the Quebec Mining Company," attended, as did George Johnston from the American Sault. According to Anderson's account, these individuals participated mainly as spectators; Shingwaukönse and the Superintendent dominated the discussions.

Anderson directed The Pine to explain in what manner miners destroyed hunting territories and occupied their village. The chief responded by merely repeating what he had earlier relayed to the Governor General in Montreal. Yet, when the Superintendent challenged the chief to state "by what authority" he claimed the lands, Shingwaukönse was visibly taken aback. The British had always negotiated treaties with the Indians, he maintained. No such cession had taken place on the Canadian side of the rapids.[33]

The following day, Anderson held a similar discussion with a visiting chief and ally of The Pine, Peau de Chat from Fort William. Peau de Chat succinctly presented his band's view regarding the Ojibwa claim. All men, the chief stated, once spoke the same language and so understood each other. Since that era, "a change has taken place, and we speak different languages." In time, fur and goods took the place of words between groups, but no land had ever been surrendered.

During the late war, he continued, the Ojibwa fought for the British. Shingwaukönse had been wounded and "in much misery." The loyalist Indians now wished to settle and form villages, but the fur companies and the miners made it difficult because both expected the Ojibwa to act at variance with what the Indians believed was now in their own best interests. Most important, Peau de Chat stressed, not only the soil, but also the minerals on Indian land should be surrendered for "good pay". The Indians would then be free to develop their own territories in their own way:

> The white man, the miner and trader could do what he liked with the land, and so could the Indian on that part which we would like to reserve, when we give our land up, we will reserve a piece for ourselves and we, with our families will live happily on it, we will do what we please with it.

The chief concluded that he wanted a fair evaluation of his land's worth, an offer to be made by the government for his mining locations, and arrears payments for the loss of minerals. Like Shingwaukönse, Peau de Chat spoke as the representative of an independent people, willing to bargain but not to submit to external pressures:

> Tell the Governor at Montreal to send a letter and let us know what he will do, and what our land is worth, in the meantime I will converse with my tribe on the subject, when I am going to sell my land, I will speak again and settle matters. A great deal of our mineral has been taken away, I must have something for it. I reflect upon it, as well as upon that which still remains. 34

Anderson's report written on August 26 at Sault Ste. Marie proclaimed that "there does not appear a doubt but that the present race are the proprietors of the vast mineral beds and unceded forests, from Grande Bateure /sic., Grand Batture/ near Missisangeeny River on Lake Huron, to the Boundary Line at Pigeon River on Lake Superior, throughout

which region numerous locations have been granted." No power by right of conquest or sale had ever deprived them of their proprietorship. Not having any personal interest in mining, Anderson was also disposed to be generous where Shingwaukönse's band was concerned, and recommended the cancellation of all four locations at Garden River. The Superintendent also indicated that he had been advised to make these statements by "Gentlemen of the Quebec Mining Company" who corroborated The Pine's statements regarding the injuries to the Native peoples occasioned by the blasting and burning of the bush. Among these would have been Allan Macdonell. Anderson concluded his views on the claims issue by maintaining that while the Indians were "incapable of opposing the forced occupation," there could be little doubt that they would "give serious annoyance" until their rights were extinguished. Overall, the agent felt that the care and explicitness with which the chiefs had prepared and expressed their desires and grievances deserved serious consideration. Once the Indians stipulated which tracts they wished to reserve, all territory north of Lakes Huron and Superior should be surrendered, "following the height of land to the Honbl. Hudson's Bay Company Boundary line north of Lakes Huron until it strikes the Frontier line between Lac Le /sic., La/ Pluie and the mouth of the Pigeon River."[35]

Anderson in 1848 expressed a cautious optimism because the Indians seemed to be using their own initiative to make something, after all, of the government's earlier drive to encourage settlement. For this reason he placed special emphasis on the fact that the Garden River population, numbering about one hundred individuals, had forty acres planted with potatoes, corn and other crops and "fifteen houses built

by themselves."[36] Should lands be secured on which the Native peoples had already begun improvements, then the frontier wilderness might indeed "blossom" under a new system of promoting geographically-dispersed villages. The Oregon dispute had been settled; the international boundary now ran clear to the Pacific. No longer was it mandatory for Indian policy to be devised with an eye to the possibly adverse reactions of Canada's powerful southern neighbour. Anderson's perspective also departed from his earlier reliance on missionary assistance in the promotion of "civilization", which to him meant agricultural pursuits. Shingwaukönse and Peau de Chat indicated that the Native people were willing, if given suitable conditions, to undertake much of this task on their own. In this spirit Anderson instructed his son, Gustavus, who had been appointed Anglican missionary at Garden River, not to become dismayed should his efforts not meet with immediate success. The disposition of the Ojibwa was towards independence of spirit and action. Patient channeling in a "proper direction", however, might bring permanent beneficial results.[37]

Anderson's continued stress on relegating a predominately autonomous people to a narrow economic niche was a fatal flaw in his scheme. Neither Shingwaukönse nor Peau de Chat had narrowed their demands to emphasize simply promotion of farming. Agriculture constituted only one facet of a number of demands regarding their economic base. Indian arguments focused on the preservation of Native rights, among them the freedom to develop, under the protection of the Crown, a way of life which the Ojibwa believed was naturally adapted to both their present and historical environment.

In less than a month Anderson received a double shock. Soon

after leaving the Sault, he wrote his son at Garden River that he had not yet heard from Montreal regarding when treaty negotiations might commence. In reply Gustavus stated that Shingwaukönse had become impatient and had engaged a lawyer, who had warned the mining companies against cutting any more timber on the band property.[38] The American press, moreover, had acquired a transcript from Louis Cadotte of Shingwaukönse's speech, presented on August 18. This account differed substantially in content and emphasis from Anderson's own rendition of The Pine's delivery. While this disclosure challenged the validity of his earlier report, what particularly piqued the agent was the defiant tone of the speech set out in the American press. Rather than acting in docile conformity with the Superintendent's wishes, the Ojibwa demanded implementation of a system granting them the right to compensation for all injuries to a resource base which they unquestionably saw as being under their own proprietorship and protection:

> The Great Spirit, we think, placed these rich mines on our lands, for the benefit of his red children, so that their rising generation might get support from them when the animals of the woods should have grown too scarce for our subsistence. We will carry out, therefore, the good object of our Father, the Great Spirit. We will sell you lands, if you will give us what is right and at the same time, we want pay for every pound of mineral that has been taken off our lands, as well as for that which may hereafter be carried away. 39

The stress on the Great Spirit as the primum mobile behind the Native claim struck Anderson as almost heretical, considering his own firm belief in mid-Victorian concepts of how the social order should be structured and operate. Raymond Firth (1973: 404), in his discussion of the substance behind symbolic forms, argues that "God. . . can be regarded in many ways, from a very real Supreme Being and controller of

the Universe to an imaginative human construct of ideal values." In Anderson's view, God as a ruling power could not be invoked in a manner which seemed to have, as a primary goal, material gain without such intermediary conditions as enterprise, risk and toil. According to the superintendent, the Ojibwa had adopted a pragmatic, and thus wholly untenable attitude towards the Deity. For Anderson, the question was not one of rights, aboriginal or otherwise, but of right or wrong. As his concept of moral right was derived from a hierarchical view of the social order, the Indians' demand that the government should be strictly accountable for all minerals taken from Indian land exemplified to him a moral flaw in reasoning, at variance with the social, political and economic status of the Native people, as he saw it.

Gustavus, meanwhile, found he could wield little influence within the Garden River community. For one thing, the missionary lacked skills in farming, and the Indians expected him to do all his own chopping of wood, cooking and other maintenance work.[40] His lack of competence in even such simple matters had quickly become apparent to the band.[41] The Anglican mission had originally been planned for Sault Ste. Marie, but The Pine had made it clear in his welcoming speech to Gustavus that his band had no intention of moving back to the rapids, and expected the missionary to reside with them at Garden River.[42] Although the missionary stated to his superiors that he felt it his duty to remain at the Native settlement, the Ojibwa having built him a house,[43] the priest still spent much of his time at Sault Ste. Marie, living with Joseph Wilson or at the Hudson's Bay Company post.[44] It was mainly Gustavus' inability, as a single man, to maintain himself adequately while attending to his religious duties, that compelled him to leave Garden River for

long periods during the winter months.

For the residents of the Ojibwa community, life was charged with a sense of expectation regarding the impending treaty. There were several major celebrations, among these, weddings for Piabetassung's daughter and Tegoosh's daughter on Sugar Island, a house-raising for which "all turned out to cut logs"[45] and festivities for a week following the New Year, during which time Ogista made his appearances around the village "in grand style".[46] To curb what he viewed as the excesses and exuberances of Native activities at Garden River, Gustavus could be stern, threaten to leave, and seek to impose his own sense of order on the dynamic milieu, but to no avail.[47] Against the background of often boisterous social events appeared a steady stream of visitors: traders, miners, visiting chiefs and their bands, Paul Kane the artist, missionaries from many denominations, and men from Bruce Mines, including William B. Robinson, the mine manager.[48] Shingwaukönse dominated every affair: on one occasion holding a council with the Batchewana people concerning outsiders' rights to produce maple sugar on Garden River territory, and on another, with certain Métis wishing to reside at Garden River in the event of a treaty being signed. The Métis appeal was granted, for in his diary, on January 23, 1849, the missionary noted, "Chief Shingwaukönse gave them leave to settle here."[50]

Gustavus Anderson's diary leaves no doubt of the extensive powers The Pine exercised regarding access to territory and resources at Garden River. But, while the priest was often present at councils and expressed sympathy for the Native land claim, he was not made party to the primary scheme taking shape under The Pine's direction. Gustavus learned indirectly what was happening from Macdonell, whom the

missionary believed took "a real interest in /Ojibwa/ affairs."[51] In June 1849 Macdonell assisted in drafting a deed conveying two hundred acres, granted on the west side of the Garden River by The Pine the previous January, to the Anglican mission.[52] By this time, Gustavus felt himself dependent upon, and even an appendage of The Pine's own plans for the Garden River community.

Allan Macdonell's much closer relationship to the Ojibwa and the Métis, by contrast, may have been modelled on the kind of responsibility that his relative, Bishop Alexander Macdonell, had exhibited, while still a priest in Scotland, when the Highland clearances forced Macdonell clansmen to seek employment in the Glasgow factories.[53] The future Bishop had not only seen to his peoples' economic welfare, but had also fashioned the clan into a noted regimental organization under its chief, before finally accompanying the group to North America (Rea, 1974: 5-10). Allan Macdonell may have viewed the Ojibwa band as similar to his own Glengarry community, for kin ties, both consanguineous and affinal, still wielded strong influence on Glengarry politics during the 1840's (Ibid.: 32). Possibly a desire to emulate his worthy relative accounted for Macdonell's loyalty to The Pine's group, whom he designated as "his people".[54] Even his own economic ventures seemed temporarily to have taken a secondary place to his conviction that he had a duty to "his band" to fulfill, in return for the trust they had vested in him.[55]

When still no sign of treaty negotiations had appeared on the horizon by May 1849, The Pine, along with Nebenagoching, Ogista, Kabaosa and several others, prepared once again to set out for Montreal. There can be no doubt that tempers were running high in the Upper Great Lakes Native community at the seeming betrayal of promises made by

Anderson the previous autumn. The arrival at Michipicoten of leaders and bands from western Lake Superior threatening to stop mining operations alarmed employees of the Quebec and Lake Superior Mining Association.[56] Chief Factor MacTavish at Sault Ste. Marie nevertheless tried to appear unperturbed. "/Of/ course it is only threats," he assured Sir George Simpson, "as they are not in a position to take the high hand."[57] By this time, Allan Macdonell, at Shingwaukönse's invitation, had accompanied the Garden River delegation to Montreal.

In Montreal, the Ojibwa and Macdonell together explored effective ways of presenting the Native claim to the Governor General. The speech finally delivered by The Pine before Lord Elgin began with the declaration:

> Why ask by what right we claim these lands? These lands where our fathers and their fathers' fathers lie buried, you must know it as every Red Skin does know it, that long before your White Children crossed the waters of the rising sun to visit us, the Great Spirit, the Red Man's God, had formed this land and placed us here, giving it to his Red Children as their inheritance. 58

Undoubtedly owing to Macdonell's influence, The Pine's address at times approached the stance adopted by the Northwest Company in its contest with Lord Selkirk at Red River three decades earlier. "/One/ might /appeal/ to their aboriginal rights," one supporter of the Northwest Company had proclaimed in 1816; "/for/ the law of nature gave to these Native the right to defend their persons and territory against lawless aggression."[59] Yet Shingwaukönse espoused violence only as a last resort. Even the most cowardly of animals, "though they feel destruction sure, will turn upon the hunter," he warned.[60] The chief's delivery did not threaten Native defiance, for it had not been born out of the matrix of colonial or commercial rivalry. It instead

embodied an appeal directed not only to the Governor General, but also to the Canadian public at large, to assist the Indians in gaining what had already been ordained by the Great Spirit:

> The Great Spirit in his beneficence, forseeing that this time would arrive when the subsistence which the forests and lakes afforded would fail, placed these mines in our lands, so that the coming generations of His Red Children might find thereby the means of subsistence. Assist us, then, to reap that benefit intended for us. . . Enable us to do this, and our hearts will be great within, for we will feel that we are again a nation. 61

On July 7, 1849, The Pine's speech appeared in the Montreal Gazette, and received sympathetic attention in other newspapers. Such news alarmed the Montreal-based mining interests, who feared that a treaty recognizing Nature demands might endanger their title to locations on Lakes Huron and Superior.[62] While The Pine learned of this "row at Montreal" from Gustavus Anderson in the spring, the chief remained ignorant of the fact that his primary adversary lay close at hand and was a man he trusted, John William Keating. concerned over his mine holdings, Keating lashed out in the press at The Pine, branding the Native leader a mere rabble-rouser. Shingwaukönse, Keating proclaimed in a letter to the Chatham Chronicle, "is a half-breed from the extremity of Lake Superior, shrewd and intelligent, and who has worked himself up to a prominent place, by means of the traders and missionaries, and what is vulgarly called the 'gift of the gab.'" To divide The Pine in the public eye from those the chief represented, Keating asserted that only Nebenagoching, Keokonse and Nowquagabo had any just claim to land at the Canadian Sault.[63]

Most Ojibwa bands, Keating continued, had fallen under the control of the Hudson's Bay Company, whose policy was "to keep them as much as possible in the interior." On the other hand, bands along

out en route to Sault Ste. Marie.[67]

Time dragged on. By August 10 a large assemblage of Indians had gathered at Michipicoten.[68] Fears spread when news that cholera had broken out within the Sault community, and only two of the Lake Superior families dared venture past the rapids to attend the distribution of presents at Manitowaning.[68] By the second week of September there were still no signs that a treaty would be made. Tempers began rising, and rumours spread that powder and ammunition were disappearing from mining company stores at Echo Bay.[70]

Captain Anderson arrived at Manitowaning on September 13th to present Shingwaukönse and Tagwaninini with medals for their services during the War of 1812,[71] but admitted he lacked authority to open negotiations. The leading government commissioner, Alexander Vidal, was already at Sault Ste. Marie by this time. Since September 6th, Vidal had been conducting investigations on his own regarding the claims. A man only thirty years of age, Vidal knew little of Native culture and the values of the people with whom he would conduct business during the following days. A talented mathematician and a surveyor, he possessed a flair for legal affairs, and spent three days transcribing information from books and documents pertaining to United States Indian policy.[72] Vidal also recorded ethnological data -- acquired from George Johnston, who had been recommended to him as an informant -- regarding leadership among the Indians. According to Johnston, transmission of leadership operated in keeping with principles of "hereditary right", only if selection of the successor was "acquiesced in by all others." The democratic principle also governed group responses to matters which dealt with broad political issues, affecting the entire Ojibway community of the

the coast, he asserted, lived wholly on fish, so that mines would be of no use to them. It was far better that these people farm and fish and exchange their produce with the mining towns. This would benefit them far more, Keating held, than "the empty honour of barren possessions."[64] It was evident that any competing interest, White or Native, which threatened the hegemony of the Montreal mining interests would face strong opposition. Representatives of this clique in the Sault vicinity, and a number of others, Keating among them, who -- being minor transient concerns -- chose to seek protection for their interests under the umbrella of this near monopoly, proved the greatest check to the realization of The Pine's goals.

Not all officials or company servants in the Sault area, however, shared this perspective. Chief Factor William MacTavish viewed Sir George Simpson's mining speculations with a detached eye.[65] His letters also made it clear that the Hudson's Bay Company had not half the influence over the Indians in 1849 that Simpson would have liked it to have had.[66] Because of his independent-mindedness, and the fact that he regarded the Native population in the Sault vicinity as a vital semi-autonomous community, MacTavish's correspondence presents valuable insights into events following The Pine's return to Garden River in July.

Preliminary Negotiations

Macdonell remained in Montreal with Lord Elgin after Shingwaukönse left for the Sault. When the Governor General informed the lawyer that commissioners prepared to hold treaty negotiations would be present at the rapids within a month, Macdonell told the Pine and the chief notified his Native allies. Forty canoes from west of Lake Superior set

Upper Great Lakes. Lesser war leaders on Lakes Huron and Superior were bound to follow an influential head chief's summons to war, although the latter generally abided by expressions of opinion given at a "smoking council." A "sense of tribe" found expression at these councils, and decisions were almost always unanimous.[73]

This presented a real problem for Vidal, since it was evident from speaking to Johnston that fairly strong and internally coherent political entities existed in the Upper Great Lakes region. For Vidal, the problem lay in discovering the political system's vulnerable points. On page eight of his private notebook, Vidal touched on what he thought might be one such weakness:

> In the /American/ treaty negotiations for the surrender of the territory south west of Lake Superior the principal chief (the Buffalo I think). . . at first refused to sign, not regarding the conditions as sufficiently favourable, and it was not till many of the younger and inferior chiefs had attached their names or totems that he would yield -- but he did so at last.

To underline the point, the commissioner jotted in the margin, "principal chief can be coerced by inferiors."[74] Vidal had found his weapon.

Vidal had not been sent to the Sault to negotiate with the Indians. Since June the Tories had been taunting the Reform government for its inaction on the claims issue. Rumours that a heated exchange had taken place between Ogista and the Governor General in Montreal had only provided additional political ammunition. Ogista apparently had demanded that Elgin state the exact amount the government had already received for mining locations in the unceded district, to which the Governor General had replied that he had no certain knowledge but thought that no money had yet been collected. Knowing differently, Ogista had directed a torrent of verbal abuse at Lord Elgin, which

required, as one newspaper put it, "the ready tact of the Interpreter to explain in /sic/. . . more courteous language."[75] As a consequence, the Tories assailed the Reformers for keeping the Crown's representative ignorant of occurrences in the province, thus placing the Reform party's reputation on the line.

By the time Anderson arrived at the rapids, Vidal had already devised a policy which the surveyor felt operated according to well-defined legal principles, and would prove easy to administer in practice. From extracts from reports which he selected from the Journals of the House of Assembly, and what at the time were ambiguous American legal precedents, Vidal concluded that Indians could in no wise hold title to territory or resources. No Native leader, he argued in substantiation of his case, had ever exercised authority to transmit land to a sovereign Western power. "I perceive one view of the original title of the various Indian tribes to have been taken and one principle acted upon in all cases," he continued, "the /treaty/ transaction was not considered as a purchase or surrender of territory but as a purchase of the right of hunting in and occupation /of territory/."[76] Productive mineral workings at Bruce Mines, Mica Bay and Princess Bay, near Fort William, furthermore, had escalated the worth of the mining locations so that any dispute with the Indians regarding actual land values would proveembarrassing to the government. For this reason Vidal also sought to prevent Ojibwa participation in any decisions concerning the amount of compensation the Indians might receive for their "right of occupancy."

Vidal's task in this second regard proved a difficult one, since the Indians were well aware of the value of their land. What was more, Shingwaukönse defiantly regarded the claims issue as a testing ground for

the validity of aboriginal right.[77] With Macdonell's assistance, The Pine had invoked principles of natural law in defining the right of small nations to be recognized as possessing special status, which could only be modified or eliminated through negotiation or conquest. On these grounds, Native leaders were seeking to establish a modus vivendi, by which bands might abide by their own system of resource management. According to the Native value system, once a head chief became an "owner" of territory on behalf of a group, he was within his rights to demand return for any loss incurred by removal of resources from his lands. In requesting government assistance in setting royalty standards should mineral discoveries on Indian territories prove worth mining, the Ojibwa hoped to establish a long-term source of capital. Head chiefs also looked forward expectantly to having Indian Affairs aid them in surveying the boundaries of the tracts on which their traditional prerogatives would continue to operate.

The Pine and Nebanagoching meanwhile agreed to lease a mining location to Macdonell and his successors for nine hundred and ninety-nine years, with a royalty of two percent accruing to the Indians. The site, north of Sault Ste. Marie, was one which Macdonell himself had originally explored and surveyed in 1845. The agreement contained one condition: if the mine were not worked within five years following the issue of the lease the location would be forfeited to the band.[78] Since Vidal's operational premises undermined the Indians' ability to sanction leases or to receive royalties, the commissioner believed that the government need not consider this particular proposition seriously. Since his plan of action had been drawn up prior to his meeting with the Indians, future councils were mere formality. Regardless of the

Indians' wishes, they would receive a perpetual annuity, capitalized from a fund controlled by the Executive Council, a system which could be easily dispensed with should need arise.[79] The scheme granted the Ojibwa little decision-making power and no rights to major merchantable resources. To Vidal, to be an "Indian" and to be the recipient of a share in the compensation fund were, for administrative purposes, functionally synonymous, and not surprisingly, once the system became implemented, the terms "Indian" and "annuitant" often appeared interchangeably in government reports.[80]

The only task thus left for Vidal and Anderson following the distribution of presents was to determine what amount of compensation might be needed to settle the claim. For this purpose the commissioners, along with a Mr. Sommerville from the Illustrated London News and nine men from Garden River, travelled by steamer to Fort William and then toured east along the coast by canoe, visiting Indian villages en route.[81] Father Frémiot, S.J. of the Fort William Roman Catholic mission supported Peau de Chat's bid for a return on minerals removed from his band's land. Both commissioners in reply severely reprimanded the priest for interfering in affairs which, they held, did not concern him.[82]

In council on September 25, Anderson directed his attention towards L'Illinois, an elderly head man. In his younger years L'Illinois had been appointed a trading captain by the Hudson's Bay Company and still annually received a regimental uniform, which earned him the name Miskouakkonaye, or "Red Coat". For the meeting, L'Illinois wore his full regalia, presented the commissioners with a pipe to smoke, and commenced ceremonies with a lengthy speech in which, Frémiot commented sourly to his superiors, "he traced his origins back to the flood, I

believe, or perhaps earlier."[84] Meanwhile, Vidal, seeing Peau de Chat as his primary opponent, set out to block the leader at every turn. Both commissioners described the younger chief as shrewd, intelligent and self-interested. "I think selfishness is the mainspring of his efforts to bring all the Indians to one place, as he would then exercise authority over a large number," Vidal asserted.[85] Yet, in his replies to questions addressed to him at the meeting, Peau de Chat revealed that he spoke not for himself but for the interests of his group. According to Frémiot, it was evident that attainment of government recognition for the Ojibwa's territorial prerogatives constituted Peau de Chat's primary concern. As his band resided on territory that straddled the international border, the chief wished to know if the commissioners approved of his group receiving compensation from both the United States and the Province of Canada:

> "Would it be a crime for the Americans to give me money? Would it be a crime for the English to pay me?" /questioned the chief/.
> "Of course not" /replied the commissioners/; "it is our duty to pay you. Your question is trifling."
> "But" /stated Peau de Chat/ "is it not my land that is in question in this deal?" [86]

The Native leader thus gradually came to realize that neither land nor resources constituted the main point at issue.

The commissioners failed to meet any Indians on their voyage from Fort William to Sault Ste. Marie. This they attributed to the lateness of the season and the fact that bands had left for their hunting groups,[87] although it later became evident that the Indians had deliberately avoided meeting the government party.[88] With the assistance of Hudson's Bay Company servants at the Pic and the Sault, and from what information Anderson could extract from Peter Bell, one of the crew members, Vidal and Anderson drafted a map of what they considered to approximate the territories claimed by the bands. While the



Anderson and Vidal, Map, 1849

AO, Irving Papers



Crown Land Department
Surveyors Office West
Montreal August 1849

DEPARTMENT OF INDIAN AFFAIRS
TOPOGRAPHICAL BRANCH
TRACED
29-7-95
OTTAWA, CANADA.

commissioners had some idea of the geographical features marking band boundaries along the lakeshore, they had little idea of the size of the tracts or the direction in which they extended into the interior.[89] In the majority of cases, they simply projected the lateral boundaries of the frontage claimed by each band, northward to intercept a line delineating the southern boundary of the land included under the Hudson's Bay Company charter. On the basis of this understanding, the officials expected the head chiefs merely to ask for a lump sum, as compensation for Native "occupancy rights".

Those Native leaders who anticipated that the government would make the first offer were dismayed. They were being asked to define a situation in terms unfamiliar to them and for which they were not prepared. Peau de Chat demanded thirty dollars annually per head in perpetuity, Shingwaukönse, ten dollars per head, while other bands requested even more. Vidal interpreted these responses not as the show of defiance they may actually have been, but as the results of "counsels of designing whites." This provided the commissioner with an excuse to present Native leaders as ignorant and incompetent, and so underline a need to impose the "ultimatum of the government" upon the bands north of Lakes Huron and Superior.[90]

Owing to the rigidity of the commissioner's position during negotiations, councils held with the Pine and his people at the Hudson's Company fort at the Sault proved short and stormy. Even McTavish grew concerned, since Vidal's opposition to the Indians having rights to land militated as much against the Indian grant of 1798 and the Hudson's Bay Company as against Macdonell and his leases.[91] To make matters worse for the factor, Macdonell refused to press the issue,

asserting that his concern for the economic future of the Ojibwa motivated his petition for the mining locations more than self-interest. "McD. /Macdonell/ himself," wrote MacTavish to Simpson, "distinctly says that if the Indians can obtain better terms from others, he will have great pleasure in giving them /the claims/ up, so stands the matter at present."[92]

When, on October 15, Vidal trenchantly demanded that Shingwaukönse place an evaluation on his band's "occupancy rights", The Pine abruptly terminated the discussion by that stating that the terms were unfamiliar to him. Before answering, he first had to consult with his people. At this point Superintendent Anderson adjourned the meeting until the following day. When the council again assembled, Shingwaukönse immediately raised the subject of the Hudson's Bay Company's and Macdonell's claims. In response, Vidal declared that the government owned the land and that all tracts allotted by the Indians were "of no value to their holders."[93] At this, Macdonell arose and challenged the government to defend its position in the courts. He knew Indians could not be considered "minors in law" and he had "good legal advice on the subject." The Indians' right to the soil would be vindicated; he would personally see to it.[94] Shingwaukönse, on being asked whether he joined with Macdonell in espousing this position, replied "Hear him for us; -- you do not understand what we say, you understand one another; we will not make replies -- talk to Mcdonell /sic/."[95] When the Commissioners continued to ignore the lawyer, Shingwaukönse charged that the government would cast the Indians aside if they disregarded Macdonell, for the latter acted as the spokesman for Native views, not his own. The Pine then turned to Macdonell and said, "Come, my friend,

get up and speak."[96]

Vidal would still have nothing to do with the lawyer. The meeting was not a court of law. There was no judge present. Vidal's denial of aboriginal right and The Pine's support of the opposite position only made a clash of perspectives inevitable. The prospect of being engaged in an argument in which the Ojibwa might be shown to have grounds for a legal case was not inviting. Rising, Vidal departed, leaving Anderson to listen to Macdonell's final speech and then close the council.[97]

The Mica Bay Affair

The commissioners continued to malign Macdonell following this episode. In a letter to his father, dated October 17, 1849, Vidal maintained that through the lawyer's auspices, opposition to the government "had been. . . made to extend far and wide."[98] Fearing a confrontation and assured of the rightness of his own position, Vidal set out to destroy what he felt was an insidious secret compact existing among the head chiefs. His strategy concentrated on isolating Shingwaukönse from his allies by negotiating separately with each leader in turn. Advocacy of The Pine's policy, Vidal warned, could jeopardize all Indian opportunities to reach an agreement with the government. Either bands complied with the government's wishes or they would be cast into a state of political limbo without even monetary recompense for their loss of territory. On October 23 the commissioner informed his family that his plan of divide and conquer had worked and described an example of his technique in action:

> As soon as McD. had learnt at our council that in the event Shingquakonse /sic/ (the Sault Ste. Marie chief) proving /sic/

> refractory that we would treat independently with the others who had delegated their authority to him, messages were dispatched up and down to encourage them to remain firm in their adherence to Shinquakonse, and having some doubt about Ke-wa-konse, a special boat was sent to bring him up to Garden River on some excuse, that when we reached his place we might not find him. . . /On/ arrival /we/ found he was in Shinquakonse's in close council. . . we sent for him, explained fully the old man's position and succeeded in breaking up the council. . . so our cunning opponent outwitted himself nicely and afforded us an opportunity of explaining in /the/ presence of Shinquakonse and his subs, and talking at them with great effect, a much better thing than simply seeing Kewakonse /sic/ alone at his camp, and to crown it all we took him back to his wigwam the next day in our canoe. 99

From ensuing events it seems evident that neither The Pine nor Macdonell would have allowed any breach to widen between opposing sides broad enough to foment frontier unrest. There would be no "social drama", to use Victor Turner's terminology (Turner, 1974). This may have been more The Pine's than Macdonell's doing. Shingwaukönse had steadfastly pursued a course of reconciling his people's needs for the future with opportunities potentially available within the broader power structure. The situation in the fall of 1849 would be no different.

MacTavish at the Hudson's Bay Company fort verified Vidal's observation that The Pine sent messengers to bands on Lake Huron to "prevent the Commissioners seeing them."[100] Yet it does not seem that the factor bothered to inform Vidal and Anderson of rumours, circulating within the Sault Ste. Marie community since May, that the operations of the Quebec and Lake Superior Mining Association at Mica Bay would be taken over. In a rather jaunty vein, MacTavish on November 11, 1849 wrote to a friend that a party composed of Indians, Metis, Allan Macdonell, Macdonell's brother Angus, who was also a lawyer, and Wharton Metcalfe from Montreal, had started out for Mica

Bay. MacTavish knew that Macdonell had disagreed with a decision, made by the mining company's directorate in 1848, gauged to turn mining on Lakes Huron and Superior into a speculative enterprise, rather than a long-term venture promoting social as well as economic development. Macdonell had taken to expressing his views on this subject publicly around Sault Ste. Marie so that MacTavish not illogically assumed that the expedition constituted a demonstration of protest against company policies. The news did not even particularly surprise him. "It is said here Mr. Bonner expected this visitation all fall," the factor wrote, "/and until/ the day before, people thought they intended going to Michipicoten Island. . ."[101]

MacTavish expected no violence. Instead, he seemed almost to be enjoying the excitement caused by the affair, since his prevailing state of being "bone idle", as he called it, usually made him spend most of his time hoping for a transfer to York Factory.[102] On November 12, the factor informed Sir George Simpson that fifteen American Indians had joined the expedition. MacTavish's ability to keep account of the composition and movements of the group indicated that little effort had been made to conceal the undertaking. On the evening of November 13, moreover, Joseph Wilson arrived at the mine manager's office at Mica Bay with a deposition, given to him by William Cameron, warning of the impending takeover and requesting that measures be taken to receive the Native party.[103]

John Bonner, the mine manager, took no defensive measures, although Wilson stressed that the expedition was already at Goulais Bay. At four the next morning, Bonner, aroused by a loud knocking, opened his door to be faced by The Pine, Nebenagoching, the two Macdonells,


Pte. aux Mines
Quebec and Lake Superior Mining Association
Mica Bay
Quebec and Lake Superior Mine Association
Montreal Mining Company
Manainse
Batchewana Reserve (ceded 1859)
ceded area
Rankin location
Garden River Reserve
Sault Ste. Marie
Sugar Island (U.S.A.)

Wharton Metcalfe and "30 Indians and half breeds. . . in their war dresses, each armed with a gun, and some with bowie knives."[104] At dawn Bonner gave orders to evacuate the mine, and on November 16 one hundred and sixty men, women and children were brought to the Sault by schooner. Bonner explained for the benefit of Company shareholders that he could not expose the mine workers and their families to possible danger -- hence his decision to vacate the place.[105]

Bonner continued that the Indians had been cajoled into taking part in the Mica Bay expedition by the Macdonells. "/The/ friendly language and amiable demeanour of the Indians towards us," Bonner stated, "were such as to induce us to consider the intimations of their English allies as mere idle threats, arising from a. . . desire of private gain, and not the redress of Indian wrongs." The mine manager argued that Allan Macdonell desired to use his position as intermediary with the Indians to secure leases which would only be profitable to himself.[106]

To encourage the Indians to accede to his plan, Macdonell plied them with whiskey, the mine manager declared. To support this assertion, Bonner maintained that on Mamainse Island, not far from the mine, he had found "part of a barrel of whiskey, a loaded musket, and some clothing. . . left after their carouse preparatory to the attack." Although no violence had been committed, he stressed that the party had been heavily armed. They had even removed a small cannon, belonging to the Hudson's Bay Company, from in front of Joseph Wilson's house. If violence had not been anticpated, Bonner asked, why were the Native participants supplied with muskets, knives and ammunition?[107]

O'Meara shared Bonner's belief that Macdonell was the leading

figure behind the mine takeover. Soon after the incident, the missionary inteviewed Ojibwa fishing near Thessalon, one of whom, a daughter of the chief, would only say that "the elder McDonell had taken. . . /Shingwaukönse/ with him." The priest, perhaps to shield the Anglican Ojibwa congregation from blame in government eyes, emphasized that no Indians from Garden River had taken part in the expedition, except The Pine and an "old heathen Indian named Nahwahquakahbo."[108] Neither O'Meara nor Gustavus Anderson knew prior to the actual event, that plans to take over the mine had even been contemplated.[109] The suddenness of the affair persuaded O'Meara that subversive interests had been at work within the Indian population. A group of Montreal merchants had published an "Annexation Manifesto" in the Montreal Gazette on October 22, 1849, calling for the union of the Province of Canada with the United States. Annexation, the declaration had argued, would bring about a return to favorable market conditions formerly secured by Imperial preference. O'Meara, although without proof, felt that the Mica Bay incident and the annexation issue might be related.

On November 12, 1849, the priest wrote the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs outlining his suspicions regarding Macdonell and the annexation movement. This prompted Lord Elgin to conduct a brief investigation into the substance of the allegations. In December, the Governor General reported to Earl Grey, the Colonial Secretary, that a Métis missionary on the "United States side" had received "communications from persons in Canada who were desirous to render the American Indians on. . . /the/ frontier troublesome in connexion with the annexation movement."[110] Whether or not an attempt to gain Indian support for the Montreal-based cause referred to by Elgin

actually occurred, however, such undoubtedly had little to do with the Mica Bay affair. While several of Macdonell's family had been associated with the Northwest fur trade, the lawyer denounced the shift in emphasis towards monopoly control exhibited after 1846 by Montreal commercial interests operating north of Lakes Huron and Superior. By 1849, Macdonell had aligned his sympathies with the rising Toronto business community, competitor to the annexationist Montreal merchants. Elgin even suspected that Bonner's reluctance to repulse the aggressors in November might have sprung from the mine manager's intention to use the incident to collect substantial damages from the Province.[111]

In response to a warning from Anderson that if the government did not act quickly, the Indians would think Macdonell had "overawed the government," Elgin dispatched a detachment of the Rifle Brigade, under the command of Captain Ashley Cooper, to repossess the Mica Bay mine. At the same time, Joseph Wilson, George Ironsides and William MacTavish were appointed special constables.[112] Ironsides, accompanied by the Ojibwa head chief Mishiquongai,[113] and Wilson also joined the troops, but owing to inclement weather, the entire party had to admit the futility of ever reaching the mines before spring.[114] The Pine, Macdonell and their allies remained in possession of the mines throughout the winter. On orders from Sir George Simpson, the "Rifles" quartered at the Hudson's Bay Company's buildings, much to MacTavish's distaste, and an uneventful winter season closed in at Sault Ste. Marie.

By contrast to the quiet state of affairs at the Sault, comment in the metrcpolitan press regarding the Mica Bay incident had grown lively. In November The Patriot, a Toronto paper, took an almost macabre pleasure in reporting, albeit erroneously, that owing to government

mismanagement of the claims issue, Indians had attacked miners on Lake Superior, "killing 150 persons and taking 80 persons into the interior."[115] Bonner, stung by allegations that he had vacated the mine solely in order to be able to claim compensation, wrote an article in The Pilot in which he attacked Macdonell for leading the mine takeover.[116] In response, The Montreal Gazette protrayed Macdonell as no less than a champion of Native rights, while placing the blame for events at the mine on Lord Elgin, who was charged with "duplicity" against the Indians.[117] Meanwhile, throughout November, Allan Macdonell expressed a reluctance to declare his stand publicly on the issue until a trial date could be set, when "in the witness box the truth /would/ be elicited."[118]

Yet by mid December Macdonell could no longer remain silent in the face of Bonner's accusations. Bonner had not only charged that Macdonell had threatened to raise "two thousand Indians"[119] to subdue the mining interests by violence, but also that The Pine had himself admitted to being so drunk prior to joining the expedition in November that he had to be "wheeled over the portage" at Sault Ste. Marie in a cart and shipped to the mine "in a state of insensibility."[120] Macdonell replied in The Patriot that it had been Shingwaukönse, and not he, who had declared that there "would be 1500 or perhaps 2000 in the spring, determined to maintain their rights." As to the charges that he harboured violent intentions against the mining company, the lawyer reminded his adversary that in the spring he had still been in Montreal with The Pine when Peau de Chat, rather than himself, warned Bonner that the miners must cease operations until a settlement could be made with the government.[121] Responding to Bonner's accusations that the lawyer sought only his own interests, Macdonell maintained that he

had acted, and continued to act, solely as Shingwaukönse's agent. Recalling a conversation between himself and Bonner on the morning after the takeover, Macdonell stated that he had tried to prevent the mine workers from having to vacate the site by attempting to gain a lease from the Indians on behalf of the company:

> I said a lease might be taken from the Chiefs, thereby acknowledging the Indian right. I told /Bonner/, however, that I could promise nothing until I saw the Chiefs. I went over to them and made the proposal. They authorized me to agree to anything which would not be a means of depriving them of the position they then held. 122

Finally, Macdonell branded all allegations that he had given The Pine whiskey, in order to compel the chief to comply to the expedition, as spurious:

> I will defy any one throughout the whole extent of the country, to fix upon me the crime of making an Indian drunk. I was in the boat that carried Shingwakonce /sic/ and the other Chiefs, and there was not a drop of spiritous liquor of any kind in it. Upon the following day we did fall in with a boat in which there was liquor, and I induced one of the Chiefs to order it to be thrown away, which was instantly done. 123

On December 3, Bonner declared publicly before George Ironsides that the Mica Bay operations had been "violently dispossed" -- a statement to which Allan Macdonell objected, since the mine manager had not been an eyewitness to the event.[124] The following day, Allan and Angus Macdonell, Shingwaukönse, Nebenagoching, Nowquagabo, Pierre and Eustace Lesage, and Charles Boyer voluntarily surrendered themselves to the justices of the peace at Sault Ste. Marie. Refused bail, the small group of "miscreants" left almost immediately by steamer for Penetanguishene, and from there for Toronto. In Toronto they underwent about an hour's questioning, were committed to gaol for a few days,

and finally were released by the Chief Justice, Sir John Beverley Robinson, a relative through marriage to Macdonell.[125] Robinson held that the party had been arrested illegally.[126]

The government had not been interested in the petty squabbles which had erupted in the press between Allan Macdonell and Bonner during the early winter. The arrival of the Native party in the metropolis, however, had caused considerable excitement, and the fact that Shingwaukönse had fought in the War of 1812 as a British ally and was now on trial by the Canadian government circulated in American as well as Canadian newspapers.[127] When suddenly, in January 1850, the issue shifted over to considerations of the validity of aboriginal right, the government began seriously to search for an approach which would settle the claims question for once and for all.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE STRUGGLE FOR ABORIGINAL RIGHTS

The Aboriginal Rights Debate

In an editorial in January 1850 The Globe commented on the Ojibwa demands. Indian claims, The Globe declared, were an obstruction to national development. The earth might "be the Lord's and the fulness thereof," but the rewards should fall to those with the enterprise to exploit the resources:

> The principle of depriving the Indians of lands which they could not use, in order that white men should teach them to bring forth the fruits, God has provided for the sustenance of man, may be an unjust one; but like many unjust principles, it has been ratified and sanctioned by time and common practice. It is now too late to discover and blame it. 1

According to The Globe, the Ojibwa were unenterprising wanderers entrenched in a narrow economic niche with no claims whatsoever to proprietorship over land, minerals, timber, or fisheries. The most vocal advocates of Native claims at Sault Ste. Marie were the Métis, who might be given land grants by way of charity, but that was all the recognition the newspaper felt the issue warranted. Indian wigwams, The Globe maintained, "were now to be seen on the Michipicoten River, now beyond Fort William, and often in the prairies of the west, or in the forests of the north. It seems difficult to reconcile oneself to the idea of a nomad race like this, raising serious claims to the exclusive possession of a vast tract of country. . ."[2] To uphold this

contention, The Globe in another article printed extracts from D.B. Papineau's report of November 4, 1847.[3]

The Globe had raised the question of aboriginal rights to the status of a public debate, and Macdonell proved quick to take up the challenge. Employing his own views on the Ojibwa position -- drawn from Native oral testimony, Schoolcraft's writings, and descriptions of the treaties Britain had made with the Ojibwa from 1790 to 1836 -- the lawyer set out to debate The Globe's position in a series of articles in the Toronto Patriot. The Ojibwa, he began, held that they had come from Wabenong, land of the east, and belonged to a people called the Algonquin, a "generic term for the primitive stock of tribes in the north."[4] The Ojibwa were the most powerful and extensive nation which had emerged from this primary matrix; they called themselves Odjibwag, "which appears to denote a peculiarity in the voice or utterance." The Ojibwa had constituted a form of political entity in the past and had fought together as such Macdonell claimed, citing an abbreviated rendition of a legend which is still in circulation among elders today at Garden River:[5]

> . . . 12 nations from the South and from the West combined to drive out the Chippewa, twice they attacked and twice they were defeated by the Chippewas.

Macdonell emphasized that the Ojibwa boasted that they had never been a conquered nation and that Papineau's report stemmed wholly from political expediency. From what source Papineau acquired the idea that the Ojibwa came from the Mississippi "would be a curiosity to ascertain," the lawyer contended.[6] The head chiefs at Sault Ste. Marie had maintained territorial prerogatives over tracts in the vicinity of the rapids for centuries. Keokonse, over a hundred years old in 1850, had been present

as a child at the taking of Michilimackinac in 1763 and remembered the Ojibwa's transactions with the French. In no wise were the Ojibwa a "small and contemptible set of refugees," but owners "since time immemorial" of land to which "no other party can show the shadow of title or claim."[7]

On December 23 in a letter to Robert Bruce, Macdonell described his role with regard to the Indians in patron-client terms, yet implicit in his statements lay indications of a reciprocal relationship of a different order than that which usually obtained between a lawyer and those whom he represented:

> I have lived among the Indians some little time and am received among them as one of their own people. The chiefs of the different bands upon the Lake have reposed a trust and confidence in me which I deem worthy of attention. 8

With an intensity of purpose, evidently imbued with a dynamism derived from Shingwaukönse's shamanic vision, Macdonell set out to formulate a case for aboriginal right, which he anticipated testing in the courts late in the spring of 1850.

By this time it was apparent that Vidal's divide-and-conquer technique had failed. The three "American" Ojibwa (one of whom was the head chief Oshawano), five "American" Metis, twelve "Canadian" Ojibwa, thirteen "Canadian" Métis and one French Canadian whom MacTavish recorded as accompanying the Macdonells and Metcalfe to Mica Bay[9] gradually came to be seen as the vanguard of a broadly-based Native protest movement. Ironsides had previously argued that even though "measures had been taken to incite the wild Indians of the Head of Lake Superior" to join the Mica Bay expedition, the unrest was but a temporary phenomenon and would soon abate.[10] Three months later MacTavish apprised

Sir George Simpson of "talk of 2000 Indians coming down in the spring from up the country, some of them from Saskatchewan." The chief factor felt that the whole situation had grown incongruous. Probably "they will also have an auxiliary corps of Esquimaux," he remarked wryly.[11]

Throughout the fall and winter of 1849 the magistracy at Sault Ste. Marie contended that Macdonell had been manipulating matters to suit his own advantage, even to the point of persuading The Pine and his party to walk "300 miles in snowshoes. . . /while/ smelling damages. . ."[12] By March, however, matters seemed less certain. "I should say he was a little cracked," Captain Ashley Cooper of the Second Rifle Brigade wrote to his superiors in explanation of the lawyer's behaviour. According to Cooper, Macdonell intended going back to Mica Bay with "his chiefs."[13] Meanwhile Bonner, angered by the Chief Justice's refusal to admit his charges of conspiracy and armed insurrection, applied to the captain for guns and ten thousand rounds of ammunition in order to gain back the mine by force.[14]

On March 14, Macdonell informed Superintendent Bruce that under 2 Vict. Cap. 15, passed in October 1838 for the protection of Indian lands, the Crown must appoint a commissioner to preserve the territory in the vicinity of the Sault from trespass. He had been authorized to convey this message by The Pine and several other Native leaders[15] who, he said, "should they acquiesce in /Bonner's repossession of the mines/. . . would be virtually acknowledging that they had not the right to the lands. . ." Dispossession of the Quebec and Lake Superior Mining Company's operation, he continued, had occurred in response to Vidal's denial of the principle of aboriginal right. The Ojibwa had no desire to stop the course of legitimate enterprise in the Upper Great Lakes

region. An offer to lease the mine to the company for a token fee until a settlement had been effected with the government had been rejected by Bonner. Once the existence of aboriginal rights was recognized, Macdonell stressed, the company would be "enabled to proceed with their works at once."[16]

While MacTavish and Cooper might scoff at Macdonell's effusive idealism, the lawyer remained steadfast in his promise to assist the Ojibwa until negotiations had begun. William B. Robinson, who had been appointed in January to negotiate with the Indians,[17] wrote Macdonell on May 9 "warning him of the trouble he w^{d} bring on himself" if he persisted in upholding the validity of the Ojibwa takeover of the Mica Bay mine.[18] Robinson, who spent twelve days in the Sault during May, was brother of the Chief Justice John Beverley Robinson, hence another of Macdonell's in-laws, and a clever political appointment on the part of the Reform ministry. He had been a familiar figure to the Garden River Ojibwa in his role as manager at Bruce Mines, and it had been through Robinson's auspices that Shingwaukönse had been able to submit a petition to the Executive Council for travelling expenses during the previous winter.[19] As a Tory, Robinson would shield the government from the brunt of attacks should negotiations fail, and his relationship with Macdonell helped prevent any unbreachable schism from developing between the treaty-making party and the defenders of the "aboriginal rights stronghold" at Mica Bay.

The sides nevertheless remained drawn. On May 31, Macdonell informed the Indian Department that The Pine had no intention of backing down on the claims issue, regardless of Robinson's cautioning. Should Bonner succeed in fortifying mining locations north of the Sault in defiance of Shingwaukönse's wishes, it would jeopardize the good will

towards the government which Robinson's overtures had recently reestablished.[20] Frederick O'Meara, a figure frequenting Garden River at this time, grew concerned that the government would fail to impress on the Indians' minds the "enormity" of what he thought were traitorous aims on the part of those who had taken over the mine. On ill-founded suspicions, the missionary warned the Ojibwa at Garden River and Thessalon that unless they took care, they would be implicated in the guilt of "unquiet men. . . attempting to revolutionize the Province." The Pine, he maintained, had been "duped" by traitors to the Queen, and his followers would be well advised to have nothing to do with their chief as long as he continued to have dealings with the two Macdonells.[21]

The Ojibwa along the north shore of Lake Huron responded to O'Meara's meddling by sending Waubesemie, who resided at Manitowaning, to Ironsides with a memorial from three prominent head chiefs, Mishiquongai, Shawanoseway and Ainenonduck, requesting that O'Meara be removed from the district.[22] Although these men held O'Meara to be arrogant, disrespectful of their authority as leaders, and guilty of several minor offenses, including the theft of bricks from Ironsides' property at the Manitoulin Island Establishment, there could be little doubt that O'Meara's position on the claims issue constituted the main reason for the grievance.[23] Although O'Meara attempted to procure a statement from The Pine negating these allegations,[24] Wilson transmitted a request to the Indian Department in August from Shingwaukönse, Piabetassung and Kabaosa demanding that the priest be prevented from attending treaty negotiations.[25]

To offset fears implanted by O'Meara and to gain an ally who would uphold his contentions of loyalty to the Crown regardless of his having

engaged Macdonell's assistance, The Pine appealed to the Reverend McMurray to be present at the treaty negotiations.[26] On the whole, however, the Ojibwa chiefs were not overly concerned about aspersions which might be cast on their allegiance to Queen and Country. While Shingwaukönse set about mustering supporters, old Keokonse[27] meanwhile complained to Ironsides about trespassers on his lands at Thessalon and expected the Indian Department to sanction and protect a lease of an island he and "his immediate successors" had transacted with Alex Cameron, a local trader.[28] Each leader seemed to expect that their territorial prerogatives would soon be recognized by the government.

The Robinson Treaties of 1850

Following the distribution of presents in late August, William B. Robinson arrived at Sault Ste. Marie to implement the policy laid out in its essentials by Vidal the previous fall. His instructions almost exclusively concerned compensation money. In April the Committee of the Executive Council had granted £5,000 for an immediate cash payment and determined that a perpetual annuity would be drawn from annual interest on a capital fund of £25,000.[29] Robinson had also been told to secure the cession of as much land north of Lakes Huron and Superior as possible, especially the territory around Mica Bay and Michipicoten "where the Quebec Mining Company have commenced operations."[30]

Since May, Robinson had been continuing Vidal's scheme of isolating The Pine from his allies. In this he found a firm supporter in Sir George Simpson, who willingly acquiesced in furthering the government's "business with the Indians."[31] It was good economic policy for the Governor of the Hudson's Bay Company to reduce the number of free traders in the Upper

Great Lakes area, and in 1850 no one epitomized this threat to his organization's monopoly status more than Macdonell. Company agents needed little urging to spread rumours among bands at Nipigon, Michipicoten and Fort William that to support The Pine and Macdonell constituted no less than a rejection of the authority of the Crown.[32]

Shingwaukönse's and Keokonse's bands remained unaffected by this affair since they were not particularly dependent on the Hudson's Bay Company trade, but for more westerly groups who by 1840 lacked other trade options, the consequence could be severe. It was therefore not surprising that, caught between the pressure exerted by the Hudson's Bay Company on the one hand and his commitment to the alliance with The Pine on the other, Peau de Chat grew listless and finally ill at the Sault. When Lord Elgin, who had arrived to give the proceedings added dignity and publicly authorize Robinson to act as an agent of the Queen, visited Peau de Chat's lodge on August 31, the Native leader immediately "expressed his disappointment of proceedings with Mica Bay /sic/. . . and professed much respect and attachment to Queen and her representatives." Head chief Totomenai also stated that ". . . he would not consent to give Michipicoten to the Whites who asked for it, but would cede it to the Queen." According to oral tradition, The Pine exhorted the Ojibwa to protect their prerogatives, warning, "We must act. They are weak now. They will be more powerful soon."[34] But to leaders faced with a monopoly situation "they" had grown too powerful already.

The question of previous land grants made by the Sault Ste. Marie band to the French and British since 1750 proved to be a delicate one. In 1850 a Mr. Barhams of Port Hope, Ontario, submitted a claim to land at the rapids, which he contended had been granted by the Great Crane to

Sault Ste. Marie, November, 1847.

GOVERNOR,

About the inquiries done by order of your Excellency to find out the genuine families of the Indian tribe, Chippewas: We the undersigned testify that the first Indian Chief of that tribe has been Kichiokamichide, so acknowledged by the Indian families, confirmed and dignified by the French deputies first, and by those of England afterwards; this we hold from our fathers and others, first traders on Lake Superior shores: such for instance as J. B. Cadotte, J. B. Lachausse, J. B. Nolin, &c. Concerning a written testimony, we can inform his Excellency that Mr. Mare Barhams, of Port Hope, C. W., has the names of the Indian Chiefs in a bill of donation, about a tract of land, to Major Rogers, a little after the surrender of Quebec to the British, where the said Kichiokamichide is quoted to be the first Chief of the Chippewa tribe. + O shaw wâ now

This is now to inform your Excelleney that Kasakqodangue Chief is the living son of Auchaswanon, who was son of Kakaidapatoiwikamikichikangue, and this off Kichiokanichide, and consequently entitled by his family more than any body else of the Chippewa tribe to hold the first rank among the Indian Chiefs in the treaty which your Excellency is to negotiate with them next Spring, about the lands extending along the left shore of Lake Superior.

Of your Excellency, we are the most respectful and obedient servants,

L. NOLIN.

L. GORNEAU.

+ Kaw saw quaw dung

Affidavit from Alexander Vidal's Memorandum Book. Vidal Papers, Regional Collections, University of Western Ontario, London.

Alexander Henry the Elder.[35] The Pine also wanted the government to recognize his allocations of land along the Garden River to Tegoosh, and to the Anglican and Roman Catholic Churches. Similar to Vidal in 1849, Robinson chose to ignore both the Barhams and The Pine's petitions. In consequence, the mission and Tegoosh claims, in particular, remained controversial issues for years.

The commissioner, meanwhile, rejected Native demands for assistance in Indian mining and logging enterprises. When Shingwaukönse threatened to go to England to complain to the Queen concerning the government's reluctance even to consider his proposals, Robinson retorted that the chief and his people "could take such a step if they pleased". In his report to Bruce, the official suggested that, to quiet the chief, the government should build Shingwaukönse a house. After that, he asserted, nothing more would be heard of the London expedition.[36]

Robinson felt he had left the Ojibwa few grounds for complaint. In his speeches and in the treaty he drafted, he stated that the Indians would be able to continue hunting and fishing on ceded lands not yet sold or leased by the Crown. He also outlined potential benefits the Ojibwa might experience in having growing mining towns nearby, since such centres would afford markets for whatever surplus produce the Native people might wish to sell. Finally, the commissioner, in conformity with a suggestion made earlier by Vidal, included a provision in the treaty which would secure the Indians an annuity of £1, or more, per capita, should revenue from the ceded district enable the government, without loss, to increase the payments. Robinson undoubtedly inserted

this "escalation clause" expressly for The Pine's benefit.[37]

Robinson then used his control over distribution of treaty payments to drive a final wedge between Shingwaukönse and the other Native leaders present at the ceremonies. When The Pine disagreed with the manner in which the negotiations had been conducted, Robinson replied that the majority of the chiefs concurred with the government's terms and that those who signed the agreement would receive money. Those who did not could expect nothing. Otherwise, the commissioner evidenced little interest in the composition of the annuity lists, even though his two interpreters, George Johnston and J. William Keating, placed the American head chief Oshawano, or "Cassaquadung", and numerous Métis individuals under their Indian names, on the band rolls.[38]

Robinson then, on the basis of geographic criteria alone, arbitrarily divided the bands of Lake Superior from those of Lake Huron, and drafted a final treaty, which was signed on September 7th, 1850, by the chiefs and headmen residing on Lake Superior. Reluctantly, and only after presenting a petition requesting that certain Métis either be granted land or secured in their present holdings at the Sault, Shingwaukönse placed his mark on a second treaty document, duplicating almost exactly the terms of the first, on September 9th. Thirty-seven chiefs and headman signed after him.[39]

A Brief Reprieve

During the course of treaty negotiations Shingwaukönse repeatedly impressed on Robinson that, as the Canadian government refused to hear the Native side on the claims issue, the chief intended travelling to England to present the Indians' case to the Crown. At the time the commissioner

regarded The Pine's declarations as empty "threats", employed to win political leverage.[40] Robinson's all too evident scepticism at his words nevertheless failed to weaken The Pine's resolve to meet with Queen Victoria. In November 1850, Ironsides reported to Bruce that not only was the chief still thinking of going to England, but according to Shingwaukönse's "confidential interpreter", who kept the superintendent abreast of news at the Sault, the Garden River band had collected £200 for the trip. Waubesemie from Manitowaning would journey as Shingwaukönse's companion.[41]

Unforeseen legal events intervened to cause the trip's postponement. By April of 1851 the Attorney General Robert Baldwin, overturned the Chief Justice's decision on the Mica Bay issue, and Shingwaukönse had to appear for the spring assizes in Toronto, only to have the case bound over a second time.[42] George Johnston, who was collecting data for Schoolcraft's voluminous ethnographic and statistical work on the Indians of the United States, also engaged the chief's time.[43] The Pine and Nebenagoching also made several trips to Manitoulin Island to solicit Ironside's help in purchasing equipment for the development of the agricultural, fishing and logging industries at the Sault. Shingwaukönse requisitioned thousands of boards and nails, a team of oxen, two horses, a plough, saws of various sizes, a number of padlocks, as well as "irons" for a sawmill.[44] Nebenagoching, on behalf of his band, which in 1850 had reserved Whitefish Island at the Canadian rapids as a fishing station, ordered a hundred pounds of net thread to advance the Native commercial fishery.[45] Economic prospects for both bands began to brighten.

Gradually, the Garden River people came to shed their sense of disappointment over the setbacks to The Pine's scheme. This rise in morale was hastened by interest shown by the Methodists in the welfare of the community. In the spring of 1851, the Reverend George McDougall, a young and energetic man, had arrived at the Native village, to be greeted by a formal address from Ogista. Ogista outlined some of the plans the Ojibwa already had been contemplating for their own economic improvement. Potatoes, oats, turnips, carrots all grew fairly well on the reserve, Ogista explained, and concluded by an appeal to the missionary to aid the band in making agriculture at Garden River into a profitable enterprise.[46]

The band would not be disappointed. Under Methodist direction the Ojibwa built forty new houses. Agriculture progressed, regardless of sandy soil and climatic conditions that were prone to dry springs and summers, followed by wet harvest seasons which promoted rot. By 1852 a chapel, school and small agricultural training institution had been established. The missionary procured seed and supplies from the merchant, Church, on Sugar Island, who was also of the Methodist faith. While there were still major difficulties to be overcome in providing relief for needy families during the early spring, by April 1853 McDougall could write that "in a few years they will be happy people, enjoying the Blessings of this life and salvation."[47]

The Methodist presence also brought with it a source of release for the pent-up pressures and disappointments of the preceding years. The camp meetings provided the Ojibwa with a forum in which a powerful, but benign cosmological Being could be publicly called upon for aid. It was not a major step for Ogista, well versed in invoking the manido.sug

of his traditional religion, to turn his oratorical powers to pleading for God's grace.[48] A large, handsome man, Ogista possessed a deep, rich voice and a commanding, yet lyrical oratorical style which quickly gained the admiration of the Methodist clergy. One listener noted that even his "gestures were graceful and appropriate. . . exactly suited to the character of the expression."[49]

The coming of the Methodists to Garden River afforded Ogista an opportunity to redeem himself in the eyes of his family and his community. He had been severely chastized, almost ostracized for rash, precipitate words against his father, whom in 1849 he publicly denounced before Anderson and Vidal for being disloyal to the Crown.[50] He had tried to raise himself in others' estimations by bold actions and words, and by ingratiating himself with local government officials.[51] Ogista had wanted to test his own talents for leadership, to steal prestige away from his dominant father. Probably while intoxicated, Ogista had even physically attacked the elderly chief. Jealousy of Buhkwujjenene for his close attachment to Shingwaukönse and the Anglican Church[52] aroused the splenetic in Ogista's temperament. Yet with the Methodist presence, this behaviour subsided. Ogista discovered a new sense of purpose in encouraging the pursuit of agriculture and the construction of cabins.

For two years agriculture advanced steadily in response to an economic upturn induced by a brief logging boom. In the spring of 1853 Church secured a contract to supply lumber for the construction of the American ship canal at the American rapids. This had resulted in 1500 cords of wood being cut and hauled by the Methodists alone.[53] As a result, community morale rose. Use of "firewater", McDougall noted, vanished.[54] Yet such prosperity was to prove shortlived.

New government policies pertaining to the disposal of timber and minerals on the Garden River reserve militated against the existence of a well-organized, industrious community. While the Methodist movement emphasized the promotion of farming, its goals in this direction remained shackled by prevailing environmental conditions. Agriculture could only be one of a series of endeavours pursued within the seasonal cycle. McDougall soon recognized this fact and strongly supported logging. Yet it would not be long before Ojibwa loggers would become the target of extraordinarily harsh treatment from mining interests, and it appeared the Methodists would do little to resist these attacks.

Competition from the Mining Companies

The Robinson treaties stipulated that wherever the government, prior to 1850, had bargained to sell locations on unceded land, such sales might be completed following fulfillment of all conditions by the purchasers of the sites. In August 1852, George Desbarats, the agent responsible for the Lemoine and Simpson locations, pressed the government to compel the Ojibwa to "give up their land quietly" and abide by the treaty.[55] Such appeals became imbued with urgency following the passing on March 23, 1853, of an order-in-council stipulating that, after May 1, all overdue payments would be called within six months. Should the sales not be redeemed, the locations would revert to the Province.[56] William H. Palmer, Rankin's agent, thus goaded into exercising proprietorship over the Elliot and Clark claims, wrote the Indian Department that he had no interest in voluntarily supporting Church or the canal project. He would take a lawyer's advice on the subject of

the timber.[57]

Indian Affairs at first tried to effect a compromise between the mining companies and the Native people. When Desbarats offered payment for the Lemoine and Simpson locations, the Department suggested that as the mineral outcroppings lay north of the Ojibwa settlement, the locations might be resurveyed to accommodate the village in front. Garden River, it was argued, had long been the residence of "an influential band of Indians" and their removal might be "productive of very serious consequences and discontent among them".[58] Desbarats, however, refused to agree to the suggestion.

The Robinson treaties had deprived the Native peoples of clear title to both land and resources. The Reverend William McMurray recognized this flaw immediately,[59] argued that chiefs should be restored a measure of their former authority, while rights to reserve territory should be vested in the band.[60] Native leaders likewise anticipated that they could suffer from lack of rights, and the government's gradual withdrawal of presents aggravated their concern. When in 1852, the presents given to the bands approximated only three-quarters of the previous years' requisition, the three most prominent speakers, Shingwaukönse of the Ojibwa, Mocomanish of the Ottawa, and Wawcousai of the Potawatomi, expressed fears that once distributions had ceased altogether, they would no longer be recognized as acting on behalf of distinct peoples. The Pine directed his speech to Keating, who was present on the occasion, requesting that the following words be conveyed to the Governor General:

> We salute you. We beg of you to believe what we say for though we cannot put down our thoughts on paper as you, our wampams [sic, wampums] and the records of our old men are all as undying as your writings and they do not deceive.[61]

Appeals to the Governor General were in vain.[62] Elgin in November 1850 had informed his relative, Lord Grey, in the Colonial Office that, as the House of Commons refused to consider proposals for the continuation of the presents, Canada "must make the best of it."[63] This meant devising a rationale to justify diminution and final cessation of the distributions. This could be founded primarily on the expense of the presents, but the Canadian government also observed that the act of giving them indicated that the recipients deserved special recognition as members of groups. The practice, it was reported, tended "to uphold the cherished belief of independence as a separate People and is consequently inimical to the habits and mode of life of ordinary subjects."[64] In response, Bruce directed Ironsides to impress upon The Pine and the other chiefs the uselessness of any further petitions of this nature.[65]

The Superintendent General also severely reprimanded Macdonell for attempting to represent the Indians, since, Bruce emphasized, all communications had to pass through Indian Affairs officials as long as the Ojibwa continued "to participate in the Queen's Royal Bounty."[66] To this, Macdonell retorted that Lord Elgin had been willing to listen to his appeals on the Indians' behalf in 1849. Furthermore, no laws, the lawyer argued, prevented Native leaders from seeking legal assistance. Should a contrary principle be assumed, he continued, "you virtually deny the Indian redress of every grievance and would compel him to submit to every wrong which the neglect or ignorance of the Indian Department might subject him."[67] Extension of presents to Indians arose from the desire of colonial governments to ensure peaceful trade with the indigenous peoples and to reward services in time of war, and, Macdonell

asserted, should in no way exclude the Ojibway from exercising basic rights.

In addition to threatening the injury to Native rights and prerogatives described by Macdonell, the collapse of the transactional system, by which bands were given presents in return for their political and economic loyalty to British colonial institutions, deprived the Ojibwa of a dependable source of provisions and goods which in the past had helped carry them over hard times. Due to the growing scarcity of game and fur bearers north of Lakes Huron and Superior, termination of the distributions struck the Indians, and particularly the interior bands, at a time when the Native peoples desparately needed such assistance. In April 1851 Ironsides noted great numbers of inland Indians coming to the coast for the first time. Those who, although weakened by hunger, made it to Manitowaning received rations, but the agent feared that due to lack of game many had perished en route.[68] At the same time, the Hudson's Bay Company counteracted this coastward movement by attempting to prevent bands from meeting other traders. The major inducement used to encourage bands to remain stationary was liquor. Wemyss Simpson, a cousin of Sir George Simpson posted at Lacloche after 1852, unabashedly declared he also wanted to keep the Indians out of the clutches of the missionaries, since the priests would inform on him for selling whiskey to the Native people. Officially, the Hudson's Bay Company prohibited sale of spirits, but at the post under young Simpson's charge any pretension to upholding this law was sheer hypocrisy.[69] Ironside too, upheld the double standard which severely punished White and Native free traders for selling liquor but turned a blind eye to the Company's infractions. In 1852 Wemyss Simpson became

Ironsides' son-in-law, and this pair, as well as Joseph Wilson, J.W. Keating and Keating's associates, Arthur Rankin, James Cuthbertson and Arthur Maitland, formed a powerful clique hostile to all organizations, particularly missions and Native bands, who challenged their economic and political hegemony along the north shore of Lakes Huron and Superior. This group sought to force the coastal Indians into a state of economic dependence as wage laborers upon both the Hudson's Bay Company and the mining enterprises.

O'Meara recognized that the changing economic conditions instigated by the Province at the insistence of the Hudson's Bay Company and the mining companies posed a real threat to the Native community. In July 1851, encouraged by signs that the Indians would not submit to the collusion of interests so antithetical to the economic endeavours, the missionary, at The Pine's request, witnessed the signing of a contract concerning the cutting and sale of pine timber, between Philetus Church and the Garden River Band. The Indians agreed to keep Church's establishment "supplied with logs for sawing" for ten years, while the merchant would pay £25 annually to The Pine for the privilege of having the timber protected from exploitation by other commercial agencies. The Ojibwa would be paid for logs they wished to sell and Church promised to saw a certain quota of the timber hauled to his mill into boards for the band's use, free of charge.[70]

O'Meara felt the transaction to be a good one and recommended that Church receive government sanction to buy timber from the band and arrange for the payment of timber dues to the Indian Department. Ironside, on the other hand, immediately refused to condone any American maintaining close economic ties with British Indians and argued that he failed to see why O'Meara would agree to such an arrangement. In

response, Shingwaukönse turned to Allan Macdonell to assist his band in erecting a sawmill with the irons they had recently purchased from their annuity. Yet it was obvious that the nationality of the buyer was not fundamentally the point at issue, for although Macdonell wrote to the Indian Department several times for permission to begin the mill, his letters received no reply.[72]

The government still had to deflect public interest away from the aboriginal rights question raised in the press. For this reason no action was taken immediately -- either with regard to grievances of the mining companies or Church's and Macdonell's petitions. In the interim, Shingwaukönse and eleven others of his band were brought to Toronto in May for eleven days, taken on tours of the Niagara region, housed and fed in a comfortable hotel and then asked to apologize for their participation in the dispossession of the Quebec and Lake Superior Mining Company.[73] Whether the required statement was obtained by coercion or not remains a moot point. Nevertheless, The Pine and his party received an official pardon, signed by the Attorney General, Robert Baldwin, stating that the Queen's forgiveness had saved the Ojibwa from being "indicted by the Mining Companies or their agents."[74] Press releases stressed the kindly manner in which the Ojibwa delegation had been treated in the metropolis and apparently had the anticipated effect of quelling public curiosity regarding the aboriginal rights issue.[75]

Manipulation of Reserve Boundaries

In late September 1850, Keating began devising ways in which he might ingratiate himself with the influential Tory, Arthur Rankin, and others in the mining field by using his knowledge of the Native language

and affairs to further the miners' prospects of acquiring title to their locations. While he failed to secure the position of protector of Indian lands,[76] he was successful in early 1852 in persuading the Crown Lands Commissioner to employ him to work with the government surveyor, John Stoughton Dennis, in laying out reserve boundaries.[77] According to an order-in-council passed in June 1852, his role entailed acting as an "assistant" in an undefined capacity, but Keating wished to assume a measure of personal control over the positioning of survey lines. To advertise his potential worth to the government as well as to forward his own goals, he promised that whenever disputes arose between the government agents and the Indians, he would contact the head chiefs and cause them to point out the boundaries of their reserves. In July he acquired the permission he coveted. Keating now wielded considerable power. Sir George Simpson's promise to assist the surveying party imbued Keating's position with added authority.[78] In August the former mining explorer set out with Dennis to impose his own form of order on the frontier.

For the Hudson's Bay Company, and Rankin and his associates, to maintain monopoly conditions meant opposing Macdonell, who continued his explorations around the Sault Ste. Marie district with Native assistance.[79] To prevent Macdonell from becoming a serious competitor, Rankin and his party wanted uncontested access to two mineral locations, the first embracing the Clark location at Garden River, and the second lying just east of the Quebec and Lake Superior mining operations at Mica Bay. Rankin looked to Keating to do as much as possible towards freeing these two areas from Native control.

Keating's solution proved clever and deceitful. On August 6, he and Dennis decided they would begin by surveying The Pine's tract and then work east along the coast of Georgian Bay, marking off reserves as they went.[80] Six days later Keating held a council with the chief and principal men at Garden River during which a dispute arose concerning the proposed survey. In accord with his intentions that control should fall to himself should dissension occur, Keating acted on his own interpretation of the manner in which the boundaries should be laid out. This had little in common with the limits set out in the treaty. Under Keating's direction Dennis ran the western boundary to Partridge Point, but at an angle S. 11° 30' W. for 245 chains, instead of due north. This contradicted the treaty, which described the reserve as extending from Partridge Point to Masquenonge Bay, inland ten miles, throughout the whole distance. . . and also /including/ Squirrel Island."[81]

In order to expand the size of the tract eastward to comply with another of his contentions, that the reserve approximated 130,000 acres in area, Keating had the eastern boundary run to Masquenonge Bay at an angle N. 44° 30' E. for 1000 chains before it continued due north another 960 chains to a maple boundary. From this point the border extended west 1260.5 chains until it intersected a line, projected north from the western side of the Simpson location. It ran down this boundary 387 chains due south until it met and continued along the line running to Partridge Point. His manipulations freed almost all of the original Clark location, except for a small triangle of land in the southeast corner, from the burden of Native proprietorship.[82]

Defiance, Self-Interest and Decision-Making - Native Responses to United States Indian Policy

Ojibwa residing south of the American border in 1852 had lived an unsettled existence for almost half a century.[83] Bands who signed treaties with the United States government in 1837, 1842 and 1847 had no guarantee that they would be allowed to remain on their traditional territories. Even prior to the War of 1812, rivalries among the Hudson's Bay Company, the Northwest Company and American fur interests had created a sometimes violent dynamic which hampered attempts by western Native leaders to develop linkages which would ensure long-term maintenance of band autonomy. Often faced with the decision of whether or not to participate in conflicts, which seemed to serve neither their own nor their bands' interests, many chiefs had opted for neutrality. This stance had influenced their activities during the War of 1812. Keeshkemun of Lac du Flambeau (Warren, 1970: 373-4), Eschekebugecoshe and Weeshcoob of Leech Lake (Ibid.: 363), and Katawabedai of Sandy Lake (Schoolcraft, 1975: 295) had avoided engaging in the hostilities even when pressed to do so by the British authorities.

Defiant demonstrations of group autonomy also permeated bands' relationships with missionaries. Renewed emphasis on the conservative medéwiwin religion evidently arose as a reaction to the widespread cult movements which flourished at the turn of the nineteenth century. This probably accounted for the cool response of the Leech Lake Pillagers to the teachings of the Reverend William Boutwell, the Episcopalian missionary who had been sent to labour among the Pillagers between 1833 and 1837 (Mason, ed., 1858: Appendix E; Schoolcraft, 1855: 188; Hickerson, 1970).

Native trade relations, moreover, were also affected. Schoolcraft (1975: 293) detected a similar defiance in Eschkebugecoshe's reply to attempts by the United States government to render bands sedentary through the implementation of its new fur trade policy:

> Speaking of the authority exercised over their country for the purpose of trade, he said: "The Americans are not our masters; the country is ours." He wished that traders should be allowed to visit them who would sell their goods cheaper, and said that more than one trader at each trading post was desired by him and his people.

Such pronouncements reflected the views of many head chiefs residing west of Lake Superior, towards the headwaters of the Mississippi. Yet, by 1850 deep political rifts had developed among the southwestern bands. The self-interest of one or two Native leaders contributed to this state of affairs, although irresponsible behaviour on the part of at least one government official had also been a contributing factor. According to Lynman Warren, a trader at Lapointe, the Indian agent at St. Peter's had involved Hole-in-the-Day, a Pillager, in a series of petty intrigues in order to secure Native compliance to a land surrender in 1837. Hole-in-the-Day had come down twenty days before the negotiations had even begun and, according to Warren, had "in fact, made the treaty" (Schoolcraft, 1975: 611).

Hole-in-the-Day may have chosen to exploit opportunities for personal aggrandizement when the occasion arose. Yet, even so, a strong desire for personal advantage at the expense of others still remained unusual among Native leaders. The adage that the sins of the father may be visited on the son tended particularly to operate in the case of the family of Hole-in-the-Day, for his son similarly constituted an

anomaly among Ojibwa power-holders by manipulating the course of treaty negotiations in his own favour. Following the son's sponsorship of an abortive revolt against the American government because he had grown offended at a minor aspect of trade policy, he demanded, and received, the lion's share of annuity payments at a treaty made in 1867. James G. Smith (1973), who has investigated the history of Hole-in-the-Day the Younger, concludes that the "self-aggrandizement, arrogance, and lack of consideration for the welfare of his band that characterized his career are remembered and partially account for the contemporary suspicion of the elected leaders /at White Earth, Minnesota/."

While this Pillager chief's actions constituted far more the exception than the rule, the careers of the two men nevertheless indicate the kind of problems self-interested leaders could inflict on the Native community. The activities of both had detrimental repercussions throughout the Upper Great Lakes region for many years. Tensions within and among bands, lingering in the wake of the elder Hole-in-the-Day's irresponsible politics in 1837, created an emotional climate wherein any chief could readily be suspected of seeking private advantage at his group's cost. Even Eschkebugecoshe temporarily fell victim to this kind of scrutiny of his affairs for, according to Schoolcraft (1885, 5: 187), "through the importunity of the sub-agent, who gave /the Pillager head chief/. . . a flag and medal. . . /at a treaty of peace with the Sioux, the leader/ was obliged to flee his country for his life, and remain away nearly two years".

Yet such incidents did not discourage chiefs and their bands from seeking remedies to the problems confronting the Ojibwa. In the late 1840's several western leaders formed a delegation to Washington asking for a retrocession of a section of territory they had formerly ceded under the Lapointe treaty of 1842. While Schoolcraft (1851, 1: 414-6) dismissed the party merely as an affair organized by an "adventurer" to exhibit Indians publicly in the metropolis for private gain, at least one of the Ojibwa delegates, Kenisteno, would soon join the ranks of Ojibwa seeking to join The Pine's settlement near Sault Ste. Marie.[85]

Most bands faced the threat that their members might, at any time "fission" apart and scatter, owing to the escalation of internal disputes concerning whether or not the Ojibwa should conform to the will of state authority or rise en masse to oppose it. In these tumultuous times, men such as Eschkebugecoshe and Kenisteno saw in Shingwaukönse's vision of a "homeland" on the Canadian side hope that a refuge might exist away from the cutting edge of resource exploration and exploitation. And there was the chance, too, that new sources of political strength might issue peacefully out of the pursuit of new, long-term goals.

The Pine, meanwhile, needed a dependable person he could trust to act as an intermediary between the Ojibwa and the Indian Affairs Department. Owing to his belief that Keating would act on the Indians' behalf, Shingwaukönse revealed the plans circulating between himself and western Ojibwa leaders to the agent.[86]

In 1852, Keating reported to Indian Affairs that a wampum belt had been sent to The Pine by the western chiefs and that an exodus of Ojibwa from lands across the American border could be expected in the near future.[86] At the distribution of presents the same year Ironsides received "a petition from Muckedaypenasse, writing on behalf of Eschkebugecoshe of Leech Lake, Iabanse or "Little Buck" of Rice Lake, Kenisteno or "The Cree" of Trout Lake, Okandikan or "The Net Buoy" of Ontonogan, Ahmous or "The Little Bee" of Lac du Flambeau, Shaganashense or "The Little Englishman" of Grand Portage, and ten other prominent leaders.[87] Ogista, who had acted as Shingwaukönse's mishinawa in the matter, made arrangements to begin the migration onto the Sault lands as soon as the Governor General granted his permission.

Knowledge that Macdonell's earlier statements regarding the projected migration of many bands to the north shores of Lakes Superior and Huron had not been wild fancy, set government officials temporarily aback. It was stressed that any movement tending towards a concentration of the Native population on the western frontier had to be stopped at once. On August 27, 1852, Bruce instructed Ironsides to inform Shingwaukönse and Nebenagoching that the Governor General disapproved of their scheme. He closed his communication with the admonition that the chiefs "will not fail to perceive in this proposition a strong proof of the advantages they enjoy from being under the protection of the British Crown.[88] To the head chiefs, this answer, with its non sequitur and dubious extension of benevolence, deprived them of one of their foremost leadership prerogatives: the right to provide a refuge for their allies in their time of need.

Ask ke po ge gosk
Mack i ga bow
Wai in ge gum
Mi ge ge
Ke no shause
O sha wuk Ko ki shik
Ya bause
Ki chi be me se
Me so po do
A mose
Ke nis te neau
Waub un i mi ki
Nan ge be
Ma ta go mi
O kan de kan
Muk ud day bin ace
Ma shin a way
Shag ga ya saence
Ke besh Kunk

Seed Lake
Gulf of the Lake
Red Lake
Ke ge ba go shish
Lake Courteville
Puck wai a wan
Wol a wain
Puck wai a wan
Chippewa River
Lake du Flambeau
Trout Lake
Turtle Portage
Lac Chetec

Antonogan
Bad River

Rain" River
Pond du Lac

Muk ne ge ke gwa de

On behalf of the above chiefs I have inquired of the Half Breeds of Manitou & Garden River Sagi if they would be willing to allow the American Indians to come up and settle on these lands they are willing with your consent to allow them. We now ask your leave

Muk ke ne ge zance

Agishtak say He will say your alone when you and the Governor had given your consent
You are two ovo of our People ale to gather

P.A.C., RG 10, vol. 198, vol. 198, pt.1: 1162

From the government's standpoint, evidence that a strong Native alliance still existed within the Upper Great Lakes area meant that far more stringent policy measures would be needed. Memory or mention of the general appeals extended by the Indian Department during the 1820's and 1830's for bands on the American side to remove to Manitoulin Island became expunged from the record in 1852 by a new ideological perspective: that the island had always been reserved exclusively for Indians from the north shore of Lake Huron.[89] This may have been untrue historically, but political expediency and needs for frontier security nevertheless fostered its promulgation.

The next summer Keating set out with Dennis' successor, James W. Bridgland, to survey the Batchewana reserve on Lake Superior. Owing to the value of the northern sector of this tract for mineral purposes he was not inclined to be generous in estimating its area. The treaty, he claimed, granted Nebenagoching "more /territory/ than the chief could ever had a claim to."[90] As usual Keating remained on the outlook for simmering contentions among bands, or else he took a part in personally instigating disputes, which could be exacerbated to his own advantage.

He did not have to wait long. The arbitrary political division Robinson had established among bands in the northeastern sector of Lake Superior for the purpose of splitting up The Pine's alliance had developed into a fount of contention for Keating to exploit, in part by attempting to accord privileges to certain Lake Superior chiefs he earlier relied upon for mineral exploring. In 1853 he recommended that Totomenai, for instance, be allowed to lease mineral locations on the Michipicoten reserve in a manner similar to the system which operated in Cornwall, "where the Lord of the Manor always retains the Royalty, tho'

his returns vary with the profit of the mine."[91] The Batchewana and Goulais Bay Native communities, moreover, had petitioned Indian Affairs to be permitted to receive their annuities at Sault Ste. Marie, since, they argued, to travel to the rapids meant a shorter journey for them than to journey to Michipicoten to be paid by the Hudson's Bay Company.[92] These groups may also have desired to be independent of the Company's monopoly control. Yet, when the government in May 1852, without consulting the Native peoples, placed both the Batchewana and Goulais Bay bands under the authority of Nebenagoching, all three Native parties resented the decision, since each considered themselves to be politically autonomous from the others.[93] When Keating came among them in 1853, he argued that tensions arising from this source had engendered conflicts over group territorial boundaries. A wooden standard bearing the dodem of the Crane, which had been erected to mark the southern limit of the Batchewana reserve tract had been torn down by "Bears", who resented the "Crane's" jurisdiction over them.[94] This constituted another instance of a "dispute" which permitted Keating to assume the control he desired.

Keating maintained that it would be best merely to mark the areal extent of the Batchewana reserve by monuments, and thus leave the position of the survey lines on the ground ambiguous.[95] He cited the expense and difficulty of transporting equipment over rocky terrain as reasons for this decision. The Indians would not care, he claimed, for they were only hunters and fishermen. In his field reports he stressed the importance of the fisheries and argued that if they could be secured for the Native people, the land could be taken from the Ojibwa without difficulty.[96]

This time Keating judged the area of the reserve to be 184 square miles. To enclose a space sufficient to embrace this extent of territory, he had Bridgland run a line from Wanakekenging, or Pancake Bay, N. 85° E. for eleven miles. A second and parallel boundary considerably south of the first, extended from a point a short distance above Gros Cap for ten miles east into the interior. According to a map submitted to the Crown Lands Department in 1853, the eastern boundary, running north-south, intersected the two latter lines perpendicularly.[97] The purpose behind so marking the tract's boundaries was clearly to secure access to mineral beds lying east of Mica Bay. By running the northern boundary just south of the iron and copper outcroppings, rather than "ten miles throughout the whole," which would have included these sites, Keating's mining associates could begin their staking of locations at once.

Silencing Macdonell on the Issue of Aboriginal Rights

Keating feared strenuous opposition from only one source -- Allan Macdonell. Macdonell's continued petitioning early in 1853 for permission to aid the Indians in erecting a sawmill demonstrated that he still considered himself an ally and representative of the Garden River band.[98] Keating knew he could count on local support to assist him in severing Macdonell's relations with the Ojibwa. In May 1853, Ironside had written to Bruce that the Ojibwa expected the lawyer to arrive at the Sault within a month. This "frequent tampering with the Indians by unauthorized persons," the agent emphasized, "tends more than anything else to do away with that influence over them which it is necessary should be possessed by all those who have the care of them

and their well-being at heart."[99] The Indian agent also complained that O'Meara and his Anglican catechist, Buhkwujjenene, had emerged as leading instigators of Native discontent concerning the terms of the treaty. Effectively countering the missionary, however, would prove more difficult than silencing Macdonell.[100] It would be by indirectly threatening the lawyer that the government would finally procure a halt to The Pine's plans for the immediate alteration of the Robinson treaties.

Throughout the spring of 1853 Shingwaukönse had been preparing for his journey to England. Although, in March, Wilson had proclaimed the chief to be afflicted with gangrene in the back and "not expected to live,"[101] the old warrior had sufficently roused himself to set off towards Toronto in early June. He had been advanced £70 by Church to supplement the £200 or more the Garden River Ojibwa had raised themselves for the expedition. The Pine had also made arrangements with Native leaders in communities along the north shore of Lake Huron to contribute further sums as the delegation progressed eastward. Shingwaukönse had been sanctioned by his people to apprise Macdonell of their plans regarding the treaty and to request legal advice before proceeding on to the Atlantic Coast. Yet in this last attempt to gain recognition for his vision, the chief was only to face bitter shock and disappointment.

The cause of this sudden reversal in The Pine's activities lay in a bill introduced into the Legislative Assembly by the Attorney General, Robert Baldwin, regarding the administration of justice in the unorganized parts of Upper Canada. George Brown of The Globe had sent Allan Macdonell a copy of the bill in April. "It appears to me that it would have been . . . appropriately entitled an Act to procure the conviction of Allan

Macdonell," its recipient responded gravely to Brown.[102] Clause Nine warned that "any person inciting Indians or half-breeds frequenting or residing in such tracts of country. . . to the disturbance of the public peace. . . shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof shall be sentenced for not more than five years nor less than two years in the Provincial Penitentiary. . ."[103] This, for the lawyer, was bad enough, but given his idealism and deep concern for the Native peoples, other sections disturbed him as greatly. He held Clause Ten to be particularly offensive as it maintained that a sheriff or magistrate had the power to choose jurors without reference to the mode of selection prescribed by the Upper Canada Jurors Act.[104] But most of all, the bill discriminated heavily against anyone associated with the campaign for Native rights, who might henceforth be severely penalized. Macdonell was taken aback, since he had hoped for the extension of a legal system which would enhance the rights of the Native community. Many Métis, including the "Birons, La Fonds, La Batt, Le Blanc, Fontaine, Jolinaux & &. . ." had been educated in Montreal or elsewhere and among them, he charged "may be found men superior to Mr. Atty. Genl. in education as well as intellect."[105]

In April 1853 Macdonell could still afford to condemn the bill as a "high handed act" of tyranny. Only after it had passed into law on June 14, 1853 as An Act to Make Better Provision for the Administration of Justice in the Unorganized Tracts of Country in Upper Canada (16 Vict. Cap. 176)[106] did the lawyer come fully to realize that, while the Ojibwa had received a pardon, he had not, and that in consequence he might be tried within the Provisional District of Algoma under the terms of the new act. This meant that, for his security, he would have

to adopt a radically different relationship to The Pine than he had formerly assumed. In a letter date June 15 -- the day after the act became law -- Macdonell informed Bruce that during a visit he had received from Shingwaukönse and three other Ojibwa at his Toronto residence, he had branded the chief's plans to continue to England as "madness and folly." Macdonell feared the consequences of even the slightest concurrence with The Pine's scheme. "How the project originated with them I know not," he cautiously proceeded, "nor have I enquired of them, nor would I have volunteered to advise them at all did I not feel convinced that the advice which I have tendered them will not be at variance with your views of the matter..." In this tortuous manner Macdonell sought to extricate himself from an awkward position. His letter exhibited neither the pithy turns of phrase nor the clarity of argument of his earlier communications to the Indian Department. Given their situation, he concluded ponderously, the Native people had better commit themselves exclusively to farming.[107]

A Legacy of Indeterminacy

Following this disappointing encounter with their former ally, Shingwaukönse and his party returned to Garden River. Their despondency may have been alleviated in part by the excitement and religious fervour of a Methodist camp meeting held in August on Waubashine Island, lying southeast of their village.[108] George McDougall 's report of the occasion hinted at none of the bitterness which must have dogged the delegation on their return from Toronto. The missionary lauded the drawing power of the Methodist gospel, which had rallied over forty Native converts from Saugeen under the missionary, Conrad Van Dusen, sixteen batteaux from the Mahyahmakong

(Pequaming) mission, at L'Anse, associated with Peter Marksman, and several families from west of the Keewenaw Peninsula.[109] Amidst what he viewed as sublime natural surroundings, McDougall confidently asserted that Methodist preachers like Peter Jones expunged all traces of evil "superstition" to reveal everywhere the miraculous workings of the hand of God.[110] To McDougall, Garden River in 1853 evidenced a capacity for "piety, frugality and industry" which surpassed all other Methodist Indian missions within Canada.[111]

Yet, while such emotional religious appeals might temporarily assuage difficulties by raising the spirit of hope, material progress without legal rights or protection proved a superficial boon. During 1853 the Native community experienced a series of traumatic trials in short succession which militated against further economic development. Every major resource field was affected. Shingwaukönse complained that due to pressures from commercial fishing organizations, his people had been "obliged to change their encampment in consequence of threats /which/. . . prevented /them/ from making their usual fishing which is their chief dependence for the winter."[112] Even though both Wilson and Keating advocated government reservation of traditional Native fishing grounds as compensation for depriving the Ojibwa of almost all other important sources of income, nothing was ever done concerning these recommendations.

At the same time, local mining companies continued to petition the Crown Lands Department to prohibit Indians from cutting timber on the mineral locations, which at Garden River spanned the entire waterfront.[113] The only secure claim the Ojibwa had to their land base

lay in a letter written in 1850 to Superintendent Bruce by William B. Robinson pledging "on the part of the government, that the Simpson and Lemoine locations would not be sold."[114] Due to the close associations between McDougall and Church, the miners accused the Methodist Indians of taking logs; Native members of this denomination came to be punished harshly over the next four years for what their missionary had formerly viewed as "industry". William Palmer demanded that the government make "an example" of their leaders.[115]

The Garden River chief, in response, desired to be informed of the exact nature and standing of the privileges exercised by the various mining companies.[116] The Pine also felt that Cuthbertson, Maitland and Rankin had been selling pine off the reserve at inadequate prices.[117] While in October Shingwaukönse had been informed that not one of the agencies claiming locations had paid £1130, or the amount still owing on each allotment of 6400 acres, this was no indication that the pressure to acquire title to the locations would abate. Keating's intervention in the survey had seen to that. Through his auspices the Clark location had been freed from Native proprietorship. Now that Rankin and his associates had a strong bid to a claim at Garden River, they were not likely to tolerate any campaigns for Native rights.

At this time Shingwaukönse relapsed into the final stage of his illness and through the auspices of Wilson, was placed under medical supervision.[118] Even so, there was no indication that even in these last months before his death he ceased to take an intense interest in having some measure of his vision realized. Among his eldest sons, Ogista adhered to Methodism, Buhkwujjenene to Anglicanism, and Tegoosh to the Roman Catholic faith, yet this diversity of religious allegiances

within his own family seemed to make little difference to The Pine. What concerned him most related to the nature and extent of linkages his band, once he was gone, would be able to retain with agencies and institutions external to Ojibwa society. In this vein, he dictated a form of a "will" to James Chance, who had learned the Ojibwa language from O'Meara, in which he requested that Chance ensure that the Anglican church uphold Buhkwujjenene in the status of a chief.[119] He then distributed his medals to Ogista and Buhkwujjenene, thus denoting that he wished them to carry on his work. The terms of the Robinson treaties had imbued Shingwaukönse with a restlessness. He had sought to do everything he could to restore to the Ojibwa people some measure of their independence within the nation state. When he died, he transmitted this intensity of purpose to his sons.

Chance, on assuming charge in 1853 of the Anglican mission left vacant since Gustavus Anderson's departure from Garden River in October 1849,[120] immediately set out to establish Buhkwujjenene as head chief. This he believed to be in compliance with The Pine's last wishes. Since it also conformed with his own and O'Meara's inclinations, he broached the subject at once to Ironside government officials attending The Pine's funeral, even as Shingwaukönse's body was being laid in its traditional wooden enclosure on the west bank of the Garden River, a long black pennant suspended from a pole nearby, symbolizing the death of a head chief.[121] Remembering the trouble they had previously experienced with O'Meara and his dogged determination to support Buhkwujjenene's desire to go to England with The Pine, Ironsides and Wilson resented Chance's interference in the matter. They had already chosen Ogista as their candidate for The

Pine's successor. When Chance pressed the point, Wilson snapped at him, heedless of the solemnity of the occasion, that "I'll be d____d if it shall be so."[122] On December 10, 1855, Ironsides recommended to Elgin's successor, Viscount Bury, that Ogista be recognized as head man of the Garden River band in accord with "the well understood custom" that the eldest son succeeded the father.[123] The Department replied that Chance had already informed them differently,[124] and there the matter stood. The local government agents and the Anglican missionaries each regarded a different man as head chief. Owing to this quandary, the Indian Department decided not to interfere at once, but to await the logic of events.

CHAPTER EIGHT

TESTING THE UNTRIED METAL - OGISTA'S RISE TO LEADERSHIP

A Master Strategist

Unlike his father, Ogista could not demonstrate his appropriateness for leadership in the traditional manner either by referring to his past war exploits, or through the sanction of a council of elders. Oral traditions at Garden River hold that Ogista initially not only lacked experience, but also failed to attain the vision necessary to assume the heavy burden laid on him by his father. He needed "power", yet when he fasted as a youth he had grown ill, so instead he attempted to gain respect by bravado rather than by true courage.[1] He could become confused, and his indecisiveness could affect the whole group. On the positive side, he maintained his father's contacts with leaders of the western bands and, through the Methodist movement, notable Native individuals at Saugeen, Rama, and L'Anse in Michigan.

Ogista focused on bringing western education within the reach of the Ojibwa people to strengthen and enhance the Native cultural milieu, but not to supersede Native values. Methodist missionaries thought they detected acquiescence to their assimilationist schemes in his requests for educational assistance.[2] For this reason the Methodists proved surprised when the chief dropped his adherence to their organization in 1857 in favour of other religious denominations which he felt could provide aid more in keeping with his own goals and expectations.[3] While his

sudden changes in stance on such matters could give rise to contentions within the Garden River community, the band recognized that the chief's strengths outweighed his failings. If he proved weak as a policy-maker, he shone as a strategist. He could deflect attacks against his group's prerogatives by first agreeing to the petitions of the encroaching interests and, then, when the time to him seemed appropriate, swing on his complaisant adversaries and request certain demands, on behalf of his band, in return for his conditional concurrence. He won his greatest successes in the local negotiating forum for, while his appeals usually drew admiration from Indian agents and missionaries alike for their charismatic force, it would not be until well after Confederation that the substance and not merely the style of his speeches would gain the ear of the upper echelons of government bureaucracy.

Confronting Monopoly Strength

Ogista's bellicose, ill-timed actions in 1854, by contrast, were not long in attracting considerable attention. Shingwaukönse's death had left a vacuum in the network of power alignments among Native leaders within the Upper Great Lakes region. To gain widespread recognition as The Pine's successor and so fill the breach, Ogista, along with Nebenagoching, led an expedition in the fall of 1854 against the Quebec and Lake Superior Mining Company's operations on Michipicoten Island.[4] During this affair, concealed Native marksmen fired several shots past working miners. In response, Joseph Wilson notified his superiors that measures might have to be adopted in order to repress what the Crown Lands Agent had come to view as a discontented and potentially volatile Native population.[5] When his appeal failed to receive an immediate reply, the agent and magistrate turned to the Hudson's Bay Company in 1855 for help in enforcing law and order on the

frontier.

While Ogista's and Nebenagoching's expedition of 1854 may have shown the Native community that Shingwaukönse's son could pursue as strong a course of action on the matter of mineral locations as could his father, the lightning attack on the Michipicoten mine could not have been undertaken at a worse time from the standpoint of Native interests. Wilson used the incident as justification for establishing a police force at Sault Ste. Marie for the purpose of arresting "rowdies", and persons who contravened government resource policies. Meanwhile the Hudson's Bay factor at LaCloche, Wemyss Simpson, saw the episode as an excuse to solicit government backing for his scheme of thwarting free trade by compelling Native economic dependency on his company, and thus promoting a situation similar to the one which already existed among bands west of Sault Ste. Marie.

Sir George Simpson planned to relocate the LaCloche post to Little Current on Manitoulin Island, since the LaCloche station stood on a mine site he was interested in developing. Simpson realized that should his organization be able to secure government permission to reside on unceded Indian territory at Little Current, it had a good chance of assuming control over the sale of fuel and supplies to steamers plying the waters along the northern coast of Lake Huron. When informed of the attack on the Michipicoten mine by Wilson at the Sault, Sir George Simpson directed a petition to the Executive Council in which he warned of impending disorder among the Indian bands of the Upper Great Lakes.[6] Should the Hudson's Bay Company be allowed to hire Native labor at Little Current, and so set a precedent for the kind of relationship which might be established between the company and Indians elsewhere along the coast, he argued, peace

would be ensured. Although Simpson must have been aware that economic dependency had not characterized the Lake Huron trade during the early decades of the nineteenth century, he still made a point of stressing that outbreaks of "violence" had never occurred when his company "used to have exclusive control".[7]

Wilson, Wemyss Simpson, and the latter's father-in-law, George Ironsides, upheld Governor Simpson's decision to move the trading post from LaCloche to Little Current.[8] The only dissenting voice came from the Reverend O'Meara, who in 1854 had encouraged George Abatossaway, an educated Ottawa from Mackinac Island, to move with his band of approximately one hundred individuals to Little Current, open a store and participate in the steamer trade. Abatossaway, who had been considering joining The Pine's group at Garden River, decided instead to follow the missionary's advice, and within a few years developed a prosperous business.[9] By 1856, both the Superintendent of Indian Affairs, L. Oliphant, and Froome Talford, a commissioner involved in a special investigation into Native concerns in the Province during 1855, recommended that government protection should be extended to Abatossaway's enterprise.[10] Yet the government's position had changed radically following Simpson's petition to the Executive Council and, in consequence, O'Meara, knowing that Simpson promoted the image of his organization as a peace-keeper mainly as a ploy to destroy competition, feared for the economic future of the Little Current band.

A new wave of resource exploration after 1856 triggered competition between the local land agent and the missionaries for control of the Garden River Reserve. To avoid being manipulated by either side, Ogista often counterbalanced the most aggressive external party by temporarily

allying with its rival. Ogista's continuous defense of his band's prerogatives preserved a milieu in which other members of his group, especially his brother Buhkwujjenene, could devise creative resource policies. At the same time the group could exercise sanctions against their leader whenever he disregarded the interests of his people. A head man suspected of complying too readily to the wishes of one external agency or another, might be compelled to declare his position openly at a public council.[11] Due to their ability to ensure a reciprocity of interest between leadership and group, bands in the Sault Ste. Marie area were able to withstand forces aimed at undermining their decision-making powers, and so ultimately ending their existence as political entities.

Challenges facing these groups rapidly intensified. Following the appointment of Robert Pennefather to the position of Superintendent of Indian Affairs in 1856, the Indian Department fell increasingly under the influence of the Hudson's Bay Company and the mining interests. When Wilson again petitioned for troops to aid in the suppression of crime in the Algoma District, the Executive Council immediately dispatched a sergeant and six men of the Pensioner Corps to act as special constables under the magistrate's direction.[12] Meanwhile, in support of Simpson's policies, Ironsides at Manitowaning even purposely delayed annuity payments on the grounds that lack of money over the winter would keep the Native people from purchasing goods from free traders.[13] The government justified its policy of depriving the band at Little Current of its main source of livlihood by arguing that, as all Indians on unceded territory had a "joint interest in the soil," no one

group could appropriate profits from communally-owned lands and resources for their own exclusive benefit.[14] The Hudson's Bay Company came under no such liability, however, and by an order-in-council passed in October 1856, the Executive Council granted Sir George Simpson permission to proceed with his new trading establishment.[15] Simpson and his allies also argued that, as whole bands had disappeared into the interior and never returned to the coast, monies reserved for them by the Hudson's Bay Company out of their annuities had been accumulating. To keep money circulating in districts controlled by the company's monopoly, it was maintained that this surplus capital should "be considered forfeited" and distributed among individuals most nearly related to the persons who were reported missing.[16] The principle that all Native individuals held a joint interest in annuity monies, as well as in land and resources, militated against groups making major expenditures on tools or other equipment.

To make matters worse for the development of Native enterprise, Pennefather sent a circular to all Native communities in May 1856 stating that should any individual be a party to an "irregular or private bargain" to sell land, timber or other major merchantable resource, he would forfeit his annuity.[17] This new stipulation weakened the Indians' defense against external encroachment on their land and resources. In response, mining companies, believing the Ojibwa to be rendered economically impotent by the new policy, redoubled their efforts to secure the mineral locations. According to the Methodist missionary at Garden River, the government's stance had dealt the band a harsh blow morally and psychologically. Industry, George McDougall noted in 1857, had ceased entirely due "to the unsettled state of the Indians' minds relative to their lands".[18] Prices of staples such as pork and flour

had scared because of the mining boom and even the mission faced financial difficulties.[19] McDougall admitted that in the midst of such distressing circumstances, his incentives to labor stemmed almost entirely from reminiscence, rather than from hope for the future. "The past," he wrote nostalgically, ". . were /sic/ seasons of pleasing remembrance."[20]

Pressure for the Surrender of the Reserves

Rankin's agent, Palmer, recommended the abolition of the reserve system. Such land, he asserted in 1853, constituted hindrances to progress and the public good.[21] Because of Canada's willingness to withhold large tracts on the Indians' behalf from enterprising entrepreneurs, the United States had drawn ahead in the race for resource development. On the Batchewana tract lay valuable fisheries, iron, gold, and copper outcroppings, and "not less than one million acres of the finest arable land."[22] Palmer impressed upon Froome Talford the belief that Canada's destiny lay in "throwing open the portals . . . to the energies of our conquering race". According to Palmer, the best resource areas in the country lay near Sault Ste. Marie. As for the Indians, he stated, they sit around in a "state of starvation . . . too lazy to set their nets . . . /or/ to plant a few potatoes on shore. In fact they are but the feeble remnant of a wretched mongrel brood that in a few years will be extinct."[23]

The Ojibwa could expect little government protection from the consequences of resource policies implemented on their reserves by the Crown Lands Department, of which Indian Affairs was to constitute a sub-division after 1860. Wilson, in his combined roles as Crown Lands agent, Collector of Customs, magistrate and a protector of Indian lands, wielded immense power, with few checks or balances, over resources on reserves.

On behalf of Palmer, Maitland, and Cuthbertson, Wilson informed the Indian Department that Allan Macdonell still conducted explorations in a manner detrimental to the smooth operation of the reserve system, gauged to isolate the Indians from the course of national development.[24] The magistrate had been unable to pry any information from Nebenagoching concerning Macdonell's activities, but he had convinced Mishkeash, sub-chief at Goulais Bay, to talk. From this source he had learned that Macdonell had entered into an agreement with Nebenagoching regarding several mining locations, a contract, Wilson informed the government, he intended to discourage.[25] Wilson induced Mishkeash to observe and report on Macdonell's movements and transactions by promising to establish a commercial fishery at Goulais Bay. In September 1857, the agent had written Indian Affairs for permission to lease a portion of the Batchewana reserve for a fishery station,[26] but when his request was refused, he allowed a small group of American entrepreneurs to carry on operations illegally anyway, in order to retain Mishkeash as an informant.[27]

Wilson outdid even Keating in his penchant to grant or withhold privileges for the purpose of forwarding his own goals. To procure Nebenagoching's demotion from leadership, the agent sent Indian Affairs a petition from the Goulais Bay band containing complaints against their head chief.[28] The foremost of these grievances concerned the payment of annuity monies by Nebenagoching to Indians who had accepted treaty money and other assistance from the United States. When Nebenagoching learned that Pennefather had been enquiring into his handling of band finances, the head chief in April submitted a testimony accounting for all the monies under his charge,[29] which cleared the leader of the accusations made against him.[30]

While Wilson claimed to be committed to the preservation of peace and order, his activities engendered the very opposite. Strains and stresses produced by Wilson's favouring of Mishkeash over Nebenagoching[31] and his promotion of the illegal fishery at Goulais Bay against the wishes of the majority of the Batchewana band, led to an outbreak of violence. At a festivity held near the Goulais River by the owners of the illicit enterprise, taunts came to be directed at Apequash, Mishkeash's brother, evidently for pandering to Wilson's wishes. Enraged, Apequash stabbed a knife into the chest of his accuser. This incident frightened Wilson, who feared an investigation should the injured man die.[32] Since two of the men involved in the illegal fishery were doctors, and the knife had glanced off a rib, the man's life was saved. With the danger past, Wilson arrogantly reported to an acquaintance, J. Hargrave, that "/a half-breed/ . . . put a knife into the black skin of another of his race . . . and I put a few stitches in the same hole."[33]

Macdonell encouraged the Native community to prepare and sign a petition demanding that the magistrate be removed from office.[34] Intending once again to clear himself, Wilson became increasingly draconian in his dealings with those he designated as "blacks", seeking at the same time to cause Macdonell to be stigmatized similarily to others of the "black category" by maligning the lawyer "for wanting to join the country and become a true half-breed."[35] Wilson knew that timing in effecting the surrender of the reserves would prove all important if the mining interests he supported were to acquire locations in addition to those secured through Keating's auspices, in the face of competition from Macdonell and Nebenagoching. In order to prevent further difficulties, Wilson set out to silence Nebenagoching by threatening the head chief with penitentiary should he reveal anything of the agent's affairs to other government officials.[36]

Goaded by the mining interests, the Canadian government pressed for the surrender of the entire Batchewana and Garden River reserves. When approached by Commissioners Talford and Worthington on the subject, Nebenagoching at first agreed to the cession, provided that the Batchewana Bay and Goulais Bay people could retain reserves near their traditional fisheries. Indian Affairs refused the suggestion: the tract promised to be far too valuable for the purposes of lumbering and mining. Keating, appointed commissioner in charge of obtaining the surrenders, imposed his own conditions, as usual, on the negotiating forum. Should the Batchewana or Goulais bands refuse to cede their lands, he maintained, they would simply be left out of the compensation payment of £300 offered for the Batchewana tract.[37]

Mishkeash at this point found an unexpected ally in the Baptist missionary, James D. Cameron Jr. A man given to vehement outbursts of opinion, Cameron roundly denounced Keating's handling of the whole affair to Pennefather, and stressed that the Native community no longer trusted the commissioner. The agent had proven beyond a doubt that he would go to any length to aid his mining associates. During negotiations held in September 1857, Cameron continued, Keating had concluded a council by shouting at Mishkeash that he cared little whether the Goulais Bay group signed the treaty or not, and branded the band "as fools without prefixes."[38]

Given the power of the mining lobby, there was no way in which the politically-unrepresented Ojibwa could hope to retain their reserves in their entirety. In order to placate the dissident bands at Goulais and Batchewana Bays, Keating, Wilson and Simpson decided to grant these peoples the option to reserve a sum from their compensation payment to purchase eighty acres of land per family. The Batchewana tract would

thus be freed from Native control and the Ojibwa compelled, at their own expense, to incorporate into the Western system of landholding.[39]

By this time Mishkeash realized that he had few alternatives and agreed to abide by these terms since even Cameron seemed satisfied with the compromise.[40] Wilson had proven to be a false friend to the Goulais Bay chief concerning the fishery, since it became apparent that once the miners staked their claims, the Batchewana reserve would be ceded from under both the American entrepreneurs and their Native associates. Due to the illicit nature of their fishery operations, neither party would be able to seek legal redress.

There were still two matters which hindered the miners from securing their claims. First, Nebenagoching avoided having anything to do with Keating by stressing that he and his people would negotiate only with the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs -- "a childish whim perhaps suggested to them," Keating reported to Pennefather.[41] Second, while Ogista had agreed to allow each family belonging to Nebenagoching's band to settle on forty acres at Garden River, he made it clear that the balance of the reserve lying beyond the allotments to be surveyed must not be taken from the Indians. The government disagreed. As a compromise, Keating suggested that only the sector of the Garden River Reserve north and east of Echo Lake and the Echo River, embracing the Wilson location, among other mine sites, should be surrendered.[42] This could be effected most rapidly, he proposed, by rewarding group compliance with the government's terms by allowing the Indians permits to cut timber on their reserve should they concur, but by witholding such "privileges" should the band refuse to surrender.[43]

Wilson had already demonstrated he could be swift and determined

Babitahsung the Chief of the band Indians of Bay de Nocq,
Lake Michigan

Babitahsung
Madash
Wabinasey
Keche Sagaigun
Keche Binesey
Ojauwashtahmeer
Pepekaiseant
Keche dadac
Sakatoue
Maishawbenaikay
Chingwaniquet
Kahawisens
Te Gaske
Kakigabie
Wabikakake
Basswaginoonse
Andeg Weyanse
John Nanagoose
Da doat
Nebahnakay
Kakimah
Badwawegunse
Pakichewawisey
Mr ~~Wighkinnakay~~ ~~deceased~~
Edward Niganwanakay ~~deceased~~

I certify that the above names of Indians belong to the Chief Babitahsung Bay de Nocq Lake Michigan

Dr. W. Johnston
Supt. N.W. Ind. Dept.

Sault Ste Marie
January 20th
1858.

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in punishing offenders who cut timber on mineral locations on the reserves. When, in February 1857, Charles Biron was caught by the magistrate and his military pensioners removing "six long pine planks" from the Elliot site,[44] Wilson held Biron up as an example of how "half-breeds" who had "been permitted to receive Indian presents, partake of annuity and reside on the reserve" desecrated valuable resources.[45] His allegation that most offenders were Métis rested on highly dubious premises, but since he had previously levied such harsh penalties on the less adversarial, and hence more vulnerable, Methodist Ojibwa for the same reasons, and so compelled their emigration to Sugar Island, Saugeen and L'Anse,[46] far fewer "Indian" families resided at Garden River than in former years.

Ironsides and Wilson worked together to force further Indian removals. Pennefather had requested that lists be compiled of individuals whose attachments to bands passed through their mother's line, a formidable task since so many of the younger generation had exercised matrilateral ties in becoming members.[47] Ironsides knew that the Superintendent General sought to reduce the size of bands on the frontier, rather than establish hard and fast principles regulating band membership, so the official decided instead to split the Garden River band into two factions based on occupational, rather than genealogical criteria. Family heads received an ultimatum: either they remained in Canada and did not cut timber, or else they removed to the United States and relinquished all attachment to the reserve and the Canadian government.[48]

It was a hard choice for those confronted with the decision. Incentives to move to the United States had briefly existed when rumours spread that Native peoples might be given the vote in the 1856 Michigan elections.[49] Prior to the election day, American citizenship and the vote

had come to be viewed as a panacea for all the trials the Native peoples had recently experienced -- a hope which died when Indians were debarred from exercising the franchise. Following their disappointment in 1856, some Ojibwa hoped to hasten the extension of the vote by volunteering to fight in the Civil War.[50] Although Ojibwa did volunteer, even this dream faded. Taking advantage of politically-unrepresented Native land holders, the arrogantly corrupt Indian agent at the American Sault, A. Fitch, distributed Ojibwa allotments to his political cronies for patronage purposes, while barring avenues by which the Native peoples could sue for redress.[51] In the midst of this turmoil, for bands to reside near Church's establishment on Sugar Island or to seek attachment to one of the larger mission settlements in the Upper Great Lakes area offered a degree of security against speculators, dishonest officials and the threats of the mining companies.

McDougall, well aware of the burden of discrimination and political oppression cast on his Native congregation because of the Ojibwa's willingness to uphold the ideals of industry his denomination had so strongly promoted, protested feebly, but felt he could do little in the long run when faced by the powerful clique headed by Wilson, and in 1857 left Garden River. The Indians could gain no protection from his successors: Thomas Hurlburt, David Sawyer and Allan Salt.[52] The Methodist mission limped on with a rapidly declining population until it closed in 1866.[53]

Meanwhile, Biron's arrest precipitated a major clash between Ogista and the Crown Lands agent. During this confrontation, Ogista, possibly due to the political lethargy of the Methodist movement at Garden River and grieved by the death of a son sent home from Alnwick

School with tuberculosis,[54] swung against Methodism and its assimilationist attitudes. After 1857 he struck out without the assistance of missionary backing against what he saw as an assault on his people's rights and territorial prerogatives.

When Keating approached the chief in the fall of 1857 regarding licenses to cut timber, to be granted in exchange for the Garden River tract, Ogista shouted at him, "No white man shall plant his foot on our Reserve and carry on any work there."[55] Wilson endeavoured to crush this resistance by preventing the Indians from removing any timber whatsoever, and by early spring the next year the leader seemed to have "broken". The band could not hold out, with the high prices of food, and many families were actually experiencing starvation.[56] On February 2, Wilson forwarded a petition, dated January 26, 1858, in which Ogista and Buhkwujjenene agreed to uphold an official prohibition against any Native person taking timber who was in any way associated with Church's enterprise. Yet, regardless of prevailing hardship, Ogista insisted on one condition being fulfilled by the government. Only after his band had received the money owing from the sale of the mining locations would the head chief concur in the surrender of land or resources.[57]

The petition raised a storm of controversy in May between the Crown Lands Department and Indian Affairs. L.S. Sicotte, the Commissioner of Crown Lands, claimed that the "spirit of the /Robinson/ Treaty gave government complete control over conditions" under which the locations were to be sold. Any Native intervention in the process, Sicotte argued, could only be deemed detrimental to the national good.[58] Yet William Spragge, Deputy Superintendent of Indian Affairs, contended that the locations had already been forfeited and that the initial deposit of

£150 should be paid to the Ojibwa.[59] To Sicotte, Spragge's suggestion constituted political heresy. Most of the deposit money, he argued, had been spent on surveying the reserves while, due to their "violence" against miners on Lake Superior, the Indians had destroyed all claim to the remainder. "Mercy might seem meet" with regard to the government's extension of the deadline for the final payments on the locations, he concluded, for it was important to the public interest "not to abandon the reserves to the Indians, but rather to obtain all their property."[60]

Pennefather healed the breach between Sicotte and Spragge by reminding both contenders that to ensure rapid progress towards surrender "it would not be advisable to hamper any negotiations . . . with sub-conditions as the recognition of these /Indian/ mining claims."[61] As an added incentive to compel Native compliance, the Superintendent General directed Ironsides to inform the Ojibwa that the government would no longer fund any medical, school or contingency expenses out of annuities. The sale of their land would be used to form a fund to provide for such expenditures.[62]

Richard Carney - Unwitting and Unwilling Champion of Aboriginal Rights

Keating's and Wilson's shrewd plans for the eventual abolition of both the Garden River and Batchewana reserves collapsed due to the unforeseen intervention of a third party, the merchant and magistrate Richard Carney. Carney in 1856 had arrived at Sault Ste. Marie from Owen Sound and had been appointed, like Wilson and Simpson, a protector of Indian lands. A well-meaning but hardly bold or creative thinker, Carney viewed the extinguishment of the reserve system as a giant leap forward for "civilization" in Algoma. To Carney, order on the frontier would accompany the surveying of farm lots for the promotion of

settlement and the enforcement of regulations for cutting timber. On September 3, 1858, he set out for Garden River with orders from the Indian Affairs Department to organize a mode of collecting dues on timber cut on the reserve. His report of a council held with Ogista and Buhkwujjenene indicated that he had never before encountered Ojibwa with such a sophisticated grasp of policy-making and a determination to forward their own goals for their community's future.[63]

Ogista demanded to see Carney's credentials, which the magistrate presented, and then with Allan Salt acting as interpreter, recounted the difficulties his band had experienced in having their rights to land and resources recognized. The Native leader began by showing the magistrate the letter Sir George Arthur had sent to his father in 1839 promising to provide farming assistance. Such aid, Ogista continued, had never come, even though The Pine agreed to become Christian. The chief made it clear his peoples' advocacy of organized Christianity relied to a great extent on their economic as well as spiritual morale. Prior to 1853 they had at least hope for a better future, but since the prohibition on cutting wood, the very survival of the settlement lay in jeopardy:

> /When/ the Constable seized Logs and Boards . . . we gave up working, and we were at a loss what to do to sustain life, so in consequence of this many . . . went away, going to different parts, so the Govt. breaks up our settlement and we are still in the same way, the Indians are scattered, those that went away have not come back. There are Three Churches here and are nearly empty. 64

Buhkwujjenene, the next speaker, asserted that according to the Robinson treaties the distribution of annuities should occur at a place and time convenient to all concerned, yet Ironsides charged the band for transporting the money to the Sault. Payments were always late.

Why, Bukhwujjenene wished to know, when the journey to Toronto took only two days, the Indians' "money winters just half way . . ?"[65] He further recounted that under the new system of distributing annuities on a per capita basis, each person received less than one dollar, while the system itself prevented the band from acquiring a surplus for development. To enable his group to monitor their own expenditures, Buhkwujjenene wanted the government to furnish annual accounts to the band and establish a date when the Ojibwa could expect their annuities each year.

Resuming the role of spokesman, Ogista declared that the Ojibwa regarded their surrender of rights over territory and resources in 1850 to have in no way detracted from prerogatives they continued to exercise pertaining to their reserves:

> I know the boundary lines of my Reserve, and within them is my Land, the reason I reserved this was that I might have the benefit of it, it is my property, it was not given to the Govt. . . . /From the/ Land that was surrendered beyond the Reserves I have never taken anything nor do I know that my Boys have taken anything off it. 66

The head chief stated he had been collecting information regarding several mineral locations on the Garden River reserve which had been in the process of being sold to Montreal companies for over a decade. While six hundred dollars had been paid on each site, none of the interested parties had so far completed the conditions of sale. Ogista thus deemed the locations forfeited, and demanded the "principal and interest" to be paid immediately to his band. The leader also explained that his father had ordered saw mill irons, costing $136, out of the annuity, but due to government intervention the band had not been able to begin its own logging industry. He desired Indian Affairs to exchange

the irons for a yoke of oxen, and finally concluded by asking Carney if there were any possibility of a merchant settling at Garden River and opposing Church.[67]

Carney replied that such was unlikely since Church was too well established, and maintained instead that regulations should allow the band to continue trading with the Sugar Island merchant. Naïvely, the official believed that the main problem in selling wood to Church lay with the absence of a clear policy for levying dues on timber taken from reserves. He also sympathized with Ogista's view regarding the mining locations. It was "preposterous", Carney wrote Pennyfather, to expect any businessman to sell valuable property when they had been told that all the proceeds had already been expended in surveying the locations. The money should be paid to the band.[68]

Carney also tried to be a peacemaker between factions of the original Garden River band, torn apart by divisive external policies, although at times he felt almost overwhelmed by the complexity of problems he faced in assuming this role. Tensions arising from Ironsides' exclusion of Ojibwa families who traded with Church, or who had accepted money or land from the American government, sparked antagonisms which led to witchcraft scares.[69] The magistrate soon learned that the American head chiefs, Oshwano and Kebaynodin, had been trying to exclude Piabetassung and his band from sharing in whatever monetary compensation might be paid by Washington for the surrender of the American reserve at the rapids.[70] Not accepted by leaders and their allies on either side of the international border, Piabetassung asked the magistrate to assist him in retaining his status as a "British" chief, although living on Sugar Island.[71] Since to assist

Piabetassung would contravene government policy, there was little Carney could do. Indian Affairs had allowed Ironsides to use his own discretion in striking names off the annuity lists,[72] and in so doing, the Indian Superintendent had tried to gauge the temper of the Garden River and Thessalon Indians towards Piabetassung and his band, whose interests lay closely aligned with Church's trading establishment. Ogista's growing determination to sever all economic ties with Church in favor of forming alternative trade relationships on the Canadian side militated against reconciliation between the two sectors of The Pine's formerly unified band. Intermarriage and business transactions between the two groups continued, but politically each band would henceforth remain autonomous.[73]

Carney had better success in instigating a system at Garden River of evaluating "property" improvements made by Ojibwa individuals who had decided, under the pressure of Ironsides' ultimatums, to move to Sugar Island. Buhkwujjenene had asked the magistrate to protect a number of houses from being dismantled or otherwise severely injured by those evacuating them, since their former inhabitants had made the choice to leave of their own free will. Their occupants, Buhkwujjenene explained to the magistrate, had shared in prerogatives associated with membership in The Pine's band but, by their departure, had demonstrated loss of confidence in band policy and so forfeited "all the rights" to band-controlled resources, both natural and man-made.[74]

This bothered Carney, who felt that Buhkwujjenene's stance lacked fairness. To encourage what he termed a "better spirit", as well as prevent material losses to certain individuals, he reminded Buhkwujjenene that those who had left the band had also increased each

remaining member's share of the annuity, so that those moving into the houses should be willing to pay for improvements. Buhkwujjenene hesitated in replying, since he suspected any externally-imposed scheme, especially those involving alterations in annuity payments, which threatened to undermine the regulatory authority of his band's leadership which he saw as being in control of the disposition of the houses. After consultation with others, however, he finally agreed to Carney's suggestion, provided that the head chief and his principal men were notified whenever such a transaction took place. In this manner, the band's leadership acquired a new charge over its regulatory powers.[75]

As a result, try as he might during 1858 to advance the cause of Ojibwa assimilation into mainstream society, Carney nevertheless found himself called upon by unforeseen historical events to strengthen and develop local band government. His support of Ogista's claim to the mineral locations unwittingly led him to uphold the principle of aboriginal right, which immediately aroused the ire of Wilson and his clique. When Wilson contemptuously treated Carney's good-natured overtures of assistance to the bands as unwarranted interference in matters which should not concern him, Carney at first took the insult personally, rather than as a reflection of Wilson's stress on the utility of according Indians low status, especially as far as rights over merchantable resources were concerned. To signify that his intentions were honorable, and that he had no interest in becoming entangled in what he viewed as the operation of petty power politics, Carney requested Indian Affairs to send a black pennant to Garden River in his name to be suspended over The Pine's grave to replace

one that had blown away.[76] Yet, under the force of Wilson's continued assaults on his activities, Carney's support for Ogista grew brittle and by June 1859, the agent had radically changed his perspective regarding the head chief and his band. These Indians, he contended constituted nothing less than "sharp cunning traders" whom he felt "romantics" had let off too lightly by exempting them from punishment, especially for defaulting on payments to merchants. For an "untutored" savage," he continued, "it might do," but property or possessions belonging to Garden River offenders should be confiscated or else "two thirds of the population /~~will be~~/ arrested in their place."[77] For government to impose a land allotment system on the reserve, he continued, would grant creditors a lien on Native offenders and so whip order into what the magistrate had come to regard as the chaotic state of Ojibwa society.

Carney's portrayal of Indian bands as irresponsible, easily manipulated bodies of potential disruption on the frontier derived exclusively from his fears of what Wilson might be able to do to his career should the Crown Lands Agent chose to malign his new rival in manner similar to the treatment Wilson regularly accorded Macdonell. As early as January 1859 Wilson made it clear that Carney had seriously erred in raising the issue of aboriginal right and probably had opposed government policy in more ways than one. In consequence, Carney's actions lost the integrity, direction and force with which his initial sympathies had formerly endowed him. To raise himself in the estimation of the Indian Department he even resorted to offering Ogista a salary solely to compel the chief to surrender the reserve in the spring. To justify providing Ogista with this stipend,

Carney quoted the leader as saying "the Queen of England and the President of the United States have salaries and why should he not?" If the head chief wished to be paid for doing "the Tribe's business in his own way," Carney suggested to Pennyfather, "why not pay him for doing it in the manner the government desired?"[78] Ogista, however, refused to be bought and terminated all further intercourse with Carney, citing the excuse that a "che.amung /che.ogima, or great chief/ was coming," with whom the band intended exclusively to conduct business.[79]

Regardless of Carney's sudden change in attitude towards the Ojibwa in the late fall of 1858, his actions and communications as motivated by his initial sympathies benefitted all the bands, including those of Nebenagoching and Mishkeash, regardless of the magistrate's reluctance to become further involved in band affairs. Carney's detailed description of Buhkwujjenene's grievances concerning annuity payments caused Ironsides to be reprimanded in January 1859 for withholding annuities.[80] Nebenagoching had his authority restored after levying charges, with Carney's assistance, against the operators of the illegal fishery. Just before the time appointed for the trial, Carney tried to prevent the case being heard due to hostility he anticipated it would arouse in Wilson and his clique. Nebenagoching nevertheless remained adamant, so to protect himself should Wilson misrepresent him to his superiors, Carney sent a detailed rendition of the trial proceedings to the Indian Department.

Carney could not bring himself to accuse Wilson directly, and instead transferred the blame for instigating the fishery from Wilson to Mishkeash. Mishkeash, he claimed, "blackmailed" the illict company's agent, S.N. Beach, who, because of his anomalous

position in the eyes of the law could not defend himself and so suffered heavy losses. As a result, Mishkeash and his group had grown prosperous, whereas before they "had been anything but."[81] Beach, Carney argued, had meanwhile been so imbued with romantic notions of the "noble savage" that he readily fell prey to Native chicanery. As a result, the magistrate recorded that he would levy only a token punishment on the illegal enterprise, especially since the defendant, Beach, "pleaded he could bring such exculpatory evidence before the Department which he hoped would lead His Excellency, the Govr. Genl. to remit the Fines wholly or in part."[82] This would be as close as Carney would venture to come to pointing an accusing finger at Wilson.

Throughout the hearing, it had been Carney, not Beach nor the Ojibwa, who faced the hardest trial. Feeling unable to impose sentence on the partywhom he felt was most responsible for the offense, Carney chose leniency towards both Beach and himself as the safest course under the extenuating circumstances. By contrast, Mishkeash faced a less severe judgment from his own people, and it is suggested that Carney, by his detailed description of the Ojibwa "proceedings" and their outcome, sought, vicariously, to atone in some measure for what he undoubtedly realized was his use of Mishkeash as a scapegoat to conceal his own inadequacies in dispensing justice according to standards he longed to uphold, but felt pressured to lay aside in this particular case.

Immediately following the hearing, the head chiefs summoned Mishkeash before the entire Native community and Buhkwujjenene admonished him for participating in the illicit fishery. Buhkwujjenene stressed that all the Indians knew that during the trial Mishkeash had been uttering falsehoods and that, in so doing, the sub-chief had shamed his listeners as well as himself. On hearing these words, Carney

concluded, Mishkeash broke down and "cried bitterly."[83]

In providing an opportunity for Nebenagoching to exercise his authority, as well as Mishkeash to admit his wrong, the trial served a cathartic purpose and so helped to reintegrate the Native community. During the treaty negotiations which followed in its wake, each Ojibwa leader could focus strictly on securing specific advantages for the groups they regarded as being under their express protection. Mishkeash, on resuming his status as an influential head chief, arranged to purchase eighty acres at the upset price on behalf of each family at Goulais Bay.[84] Ogista agreed to act as Totomenai's spokesman concerning the Michipicoten band's need for suitable land to plant vegetables.[85] At the request of the Batchewana, Garden River and Thessalon peoples, Nebenagoching elicited a promise from William Gibbard, the Provincial Fisheries Inspector, to secure the Ojibwa exclusive use of the fishery just east of Point Thessalon, in addition to their fishery station on Whitefish Island at the rapids.[86] Head chiefs anticipated revenues to accrue to their groups from leases and sales, particularly of mining locations, on the ceded portions of the reserves. An expansive optimism prevailed which engendered a willingness among Native leaders to share their present and anticipated resources. When Ironsides promised to prevent the balance of unceded reserve territory from being taken from the Indians once the surveys were made, Ogista and Buhkwujjenene on June 14, 1859, agreed to the Indian Superintendent's suggestion that they offer families from Goulais Bay and Thessalon, interested in settling at Garden River, "an equal share of land to what we have and promise to consider you in all respects as members of our Band."[87]

Growth of a Resistance Movement

During treaty negotiations in the spring of 1859, head chiefs tried to stave off the likelihood of future clashes between their bands and officials of the Crown Lands Department by appealing for government protection over many facets of their developing economy. It was to no avail. The issue of Native proprietorship over land and resources, which Pennefather had suspended for expediency's sake during the treaty proceedings, flared into life again following the surrenders. Under the cessions known as the "Pennefather Treaties", conducted on June 9, 1859 with the Garden River and Batchewana bands, and two days later, on June 11, with the Thessalon band, the entire Batchewana tract, except for Whitefish Island, as well as over half the original area of the Garden River and Thessalon reserves, passed from Native to Crown control.[88] The agreements, as ratified, neither defined nor entrenched the rights extended to incomers to Garden River by the Garden River chiefs, an omission noted by Carney only four days after the invitation had been made.[89] They further failed to ensure that each family would receive lands. The only surveys of allotments on reserves during the nineteenth century would take place in 1866, when the government laid out "Shinguicouse Township" in response to pressure from lumbering interests who wished to secure land for a sawmill at the mouth of the Garden River, and in 1870, when the 80 acre lots at Garden River and Batchewana were finally surveyed.[90]

Not one of the promises, made by officials to encourage the Indians to agree to the surrenders, was ever honored. Gibbard immediately swept aside the verbal agreement he had transacted with Nebenagoching regarding the Thessalon fishery with a nonchalance that amazed even Ironsides, and leased the location to an American party.[91]

By this time, the Hudson's Bay Company store at Little Current, allegedly established "to give stimulus to the industry of the Indians of that neighbourhood," had driven Abatossaway out of business and then sold out to yet another external business interest.[92] Disoriented by these events, Abatossaway turned to the government for assistance and protection, but instead came to be pressured to act as an informer against other Native leaders who resisted the destruction of their people's economic livelihoods in the same manner as the band at Little Current had lost their own. At the same time, Pennefather pointedly reminded Ironsides that should chiefs, through use of such channels, be "found guilty of any transaction for the sale of timber," they must be removed from office.[93]

While the Pennefather Treaties attempted to inaugurate a system of individualized land holding on reserves, the problems inherent in such an option, given the prevailing social attitudes towards Indians, soon became more apparent to Ogista than its advantages. The leader, chosen as a delegate to meet the Prince of Wales at Sarnia in September 1860, attended a meeting of the Grand Council -- a forum for discussion and debate developed among southeastern Ontario Ojibwa mainly under Methodist missionary auspices -- while waiting for the Prince's arrival. Discussion centered on the grievances of David Sawyer and Catherine Sutton, both of whom had purchased land holdings at Owen Sound but had been unable to retain them due to prohibitions levied by the Indian Department against persons of Indian status holding property in fee simple. While Ogista at the time refrained from offering an opinion on the case,[94] the character of the complaint

could hardly have failed to register with the head chief, particularly as he knew Sawyer personally through the latter's association with the Methodist mission at Garden River.

News of such incidents bred fear and bitterness among Indians living along the north shore of Lake Huron. Gradually, the Canadian Upper Great Lakes Native community began to resolve itself into two ideological factions: the first, willing to accede to government direction in local band affairs, the second denouncing all compromise and threatening violence should resource laws be enacted on territory already subject to the exercise of traditional prerogatives. Resistance to the government centered at Wikwemikong, Manitoulin Island. As early as February 28, 1859, Samuel Kichikemeg, a leading Wikwemikong chief, informed John Aisance, son of the Roman Catholic head chief of the same name who died in 1847, of his reluctance to contribute to the Grand Council to be held that year at Rama, and implied that the Council reflected government more than Native attitudes and opinions.[95] Jesuit Fathers Choné and Kohler at Wikwemikong tried to keep the surge of discontent within the bounds of a single political issue, such as Native control over fishing locations.[96] The Muskoka bands wavered in their allegiance, and then joined the Rama camp, mainly on the instigation of Rama's head chief, William Yellowhead.[97] The final split into sides came when the government announced its intention in 1860 to secure the surrender of Manitoulin Island. In response, the Wikwemikong contingent assumed a "garrison mentality", imbued resistance with a moral rightness, and expelled those, Native or White, who dared contradict the validity of their cause.[98] At a meeting held at Mechkewanong, Manitoulin Island, in 1861, those dedicated to obstructing the government's settlement and resource policies swore to "eat out of one

dish" and never cede the island.[99]

As in 1846, the government ignored the substance of Native grievances in preparing the Canadian frontier for further resource development. The Province's desire to eliminate impediments to the smooth implementation of its resource policies sanctioned depriving the indigenous peoples of all claim to political, economic or cultural distinctiveness. When Richard Carney and his son John were appointed early in 1861 to gather data for a census, they were instructed to focus almost entirely on each band's degree of advancement towards "civilization". Western moral and organization principles dominated the mode in which questioning was to proceed by raising such issues as the number of "retainers under each chief" or the ratio of "illegitimate" to "legitimate" children within each band.[100]

Sensitive to infringements on their integrity as independent groups, the Indians refused to meet with officials, or else sought to confuse the ennumerators by providing false information. Ironsides reported to Richard Carney in May that from Spanish River, on the north shore of Lake Huron, west to Sault Ste. Marie, the Ojibwa and Ottawa proved so incensed by the nature of the data required by the census-takers that almost no hope existed of completing the forms.[101] John Carney admitted that the sheets he had filled out for the Garden River, Batchewana and Goulais Bay bands exhibited many inaccuracies and omissions due to deliberate misleadings on the part of the Ojibwa interviewed.[102]

At this time more than one half of the population of Sault Ste. Marie was of Native extraction. During his ennumerating activities John Carney registered 475 out of a total of 850 individuals residing between Garden River and Goulais Bay as Indian.[103] While to

Richard Carney and his son, no distinction existed between Métis and Indians, official opinions nevertheless differed on this point. John Prince, appointed judge of the Algoma District in 1858, held, for instance, that Native families at the rapids fell into two categories, based on his own predominately late eighteenth-century view of the social order. While the judge tended to perceive "Indians" as belonging to the domain of the "wild" and "untutored", he considered the term "half-breed" to designate only undisciplined, unstable social elements which, he contended, constituted a "pest to the whole country."[104] From his diaries, it is evident that Prince's categorial assessments were based primarily on residence and settlement patterns. Métis owned strip farms at the rapids, while "Indians" lived in nucleated villages, such as existed at Garden River. To Prince, for a Métis to join the Garden River settlement made him an "Indian", and as land prices at the rapids were likely to rise due to the approach of the settlement frontier, the more Métis who could be convinced to become "Indian", the more control men like Prince and Wilson could exercise over territory for the purpose of land speculations.

Pennefather's policies of 1857 and 1858 had resulted in the exclusion of 133 individuals from the Garden River annuity list by 1860.[105] Under Prince's countenancing of the use of social, legal and economic incentives to compel Métis to sell their holdings cheaply at the Sault and move to Garden River, band membership rose. By October 1862 the judge noted approvingly that "a good many . . . half-breeds . . . had annuity paid to them by Capt. Ironsides."[106]

Métis who moved to Garden River and swelled the community's ranks proved sympathetic to the spirit of resistance promoted by the

Roman Catholic Ottawa at Wikwemikong, and official fears escalated as more became known of the ubiquitous nature of the Native movement. Carney reported that almost all the residents at Garden River had grown distrustful of the local magistracy. Nebenagoching had instructed his band to cease all agricultural work in protest against Gibbard's stance on the fishery and he and Ogista had contacted the Governor General on the subject. Rumours spread, meanwhile, of a growing militant disposition among the bands. It was known that Canadian Ojibwa had been encouraged to join the rebels in the Civil War, while circulars directed to Hudson's Bay Company posts on Lakes Huron and Superior warned that guns and ammunition had allegedly been sent to arm the Sioux uprising in Minnesota.[107]

In accord with instructions from his Department, Ironsides drew up lists of Manitoulin Island Indians who opposed the government.[108] Surrender of the western sector of Manitoulin Island on October 6, 1862, mainly by chiefs whose territorial prerogatives extended over tracts on the neighbouring mainland, but who had resided much of the time after 1836 at Manitowaning or associated outlying settlements, strengthened the Wikwemikong Indian's resolve not to cede the territory about their settlement. Abatossaway warned that, at a council held at Wikwemikong the previous spring, the majority present had agreed "to prevent any surveyors coming to the Island." Should the men commence surveying, their work would be obstructed. Since any opposition to this act would result in the death not only of the surveying party, but also of chiefs who agreed to the 1862 treaty, Abatossaway appealed for protection from the Indian Department lest he or his band suffer injury.[109]

Wilson advocated that troops be stationed at Sault Ste. Marie to subdue the growing unrest.[110] The Provincial Fisheries Inspector also supported the use of force, and on July 23, 1863, Gibbard and a party of six constables armed with revolvers, briefly confronted an angry crowd at Wikwemikong, although no one was injured in the fray.[111] To Prince, on the other hand, strict enforcement of provincial resource regulations meant establishment of "correct" order inextricably linked with his particular sense of duty to the Crown, and by 1864 the judge had developed a plan of inducing the Ojibwa to cede their timber. Having discovered the legal loophole in the Pennefather Treaty first noted by Richard Carney in 1859, the judge used it as a wedge to divide the Native community at Garden River by restricting Nebenagoching and his band geographically to an enclave west of the original settlement and prohibiting their access to timber as a merchantable commodity:

> I am of the opinion /Prince informed Wilson/ that the Batchewana Bay and Goulais Bay Indians are entitled to a grant by way of occupation only of 40 acres of the Garden River reserve, but that they have no right to cut timber for sale thereon or to controul /sic, control/ or interfere with the chiefs of the Garden River band in any way . . . 112

Prince thus abruptly dispensed with the promise of equal rights extended by Ogista and Bukwujjenene to Nebenagoching's people only five years before. His action met no resistance, since the only man, George Ironsides, who might have stayed his course had died in 1863. The judge's unilateral decision on this matter was to remain the most serious encroachment on the head chief's right to regulate his group's membership to occur prior to Confederation.

Wilson also considered splitting the Garden River community

into privileged and non-privileged factions to secure a timber surrender, although he felt the division should be instigated to fall along religious lines rather than between bands. In a letter dated January 20, 1864, to Charles Dupont, Ironsides' successor at the Manitowaning Indian Agency, Wilson claimed that, to his "surprise", he found that Nebenagoching and his people were Roman Catholic, whereas Ogista's band was primarily Protestant.[113] Wilson's idea was to grant only Protestants timber licenses. "You and I must work together," he prompted Dupont.[114]

Even when confronted on all sides by such obviously disruptive tactics and refused assistance from Prince in preventing miners from selling timber from the unceded Elliot location,[115] Ogista still regarded the Crown as essentially a benign, protective power which could be called upon whenever his people were in distress. Spragge's response to his grievances gave the head chief little reason to question this view, since the band's long-standing debate with the Garden River Mining Company over the Lemoine and Simpson locations came to be amicably settled, due to the Deputy Superintendent's timely intervention in the affair.[116] From the remoteness of his Montreal office, Spragge had little idea of the exact nature of the problem on the frontier, but he favoured concentration and segregation of Native peoples away from the main thrust of resource development. Following a review of the miners' case by the Executive Council, George Desbarats, on behalf of the Garden River Mining Company, agreed to relinquish his claims provided the province returned his initial deposit on the sites, a proposal the government accepted.[117] Spragge considered that an important intermediary step towards theintegration of bands into the capitalist economy would be to allow the Indians to cut and sell

"firewood of ordinary descriptions" until their forests could be ceded to timber companies.[118] The Deputy Superintendent expected the Ojibwa to respond positively to his suggestions, since dues collected on the wood might contribute to a capital fund, from which interest could be drawn and paid to them annually. Such a scheme governed cutting operations at Caughnawaga, Spragge asserted, and might serve as model for a similar system at Garden River. Finally, he recommended that Ogista receive a team of oxen, and seed, to stimulate the chief's acquiescence to his plan.[119]

Support for the Band from Missionaries and Merchants

In obedience to Spragge's instructions, Wilson drew up a schedule of dues for the band to pay on "ship's knees" (used in wooden ship construction), shingle timber and cordwood for the American market. Meanwhile, Ogista, with Dupont's assistance, persuaded a Canadian, John Davidson, to open a store and build a wharf near the mouth of the Garden River.[120] Another trader by the name of John Cousins was allowed to operate a similar store and wharf nearby.[121] The Reverend Edward Sollows, Methodist clergyman at Bruce Mines, felt that a major step had been taken. The differences between the Indians and the government had been "amicably settled", he noted in June 1863. Stores had been built and full employment given to the Indians at last.[122]

Likely because he favored Spragge's system for allowing Indians to cut and sell their own timber on their reserves, Ogista baulked at Wilson's attempts to effect a timber cession, and instead instructed every head of family in his band to mark out allotments to cut timber on the Elliot location. Like the Wikwemikong contingent, his group would

stand together in defiance against offensive resource policies.[123] What was more, both the Roman Catholic and Anglican missionaries supported the Ojibwa position. This made Wilson more determined then ever to sow seeds of dissension between the two denominations. "I am certain that the Priests are at the bottom of all, they feel themselves outflanked by me as to the ownership of the Reserve," he informed Dupont in February 1864.[124]

According to Ogista, the Indians' reason for rejecting the government demands arose from their belief that the bands alone should control resources on reserves.[125] Annoyed at this intelligence, Wilson seized all the logs the Garden River community had cut during the spring.[126] Although he had intended making the confiscation while the head chief was away on a two-week caribou hunting expedition, Church, sympathetic to Ogista's position, prevailed upon the leader to stay and challenge Wilson's right to take the wood.[127]

Under Prince's influence, Wilson switched from seizing logs to apprehending Native offenders. The judge stressed that Indians could be compelled to serve as jurors, be forced to observe the game laws of which he was the author, and be indicted and fined for failing to observe provincial timber regulations.[128] "There are dangerous times looming in the distance for us who live here among the Indians and half-breeds," Prince cautioned. In March 1864, when Sollows claimed that members of the Garden River band threatened to "shoot any government officer who goes down on the reserve and interferes with them,"[129] Dupont, aware of Prince's feelings on the matter, reacted in fear. Should the magistrates meet with resistance, he argued, they "might made an example of some prominent one /leader/ amongst them and arrest and punish him, for

inciting them to disloyalty and resistance of the laws."[130]

Macdonell may have escaped penalization under Baldwin's act, passed in 1853 to deter the rise of Native unrest, but residents of Garden River would not. During the summer of 1864 Charles Biron, an educated member of Ogista's band, was apprehended for resisting the resource laws and sent to penetentiary in Penetanguishene. When the band sought assistance from Indian Affairs for Biron's defense, they were told that the law absolved the government from all responsibility in the case. According to Spragge, the matter was not one in which the Department was "officially called upon to interfere."[131]

Although Wilson, Dupont and Prince employed all the legal weaponry at their disposal, they could only diffuse the intensity of the Native resistance movement; they could not eradicate it completely. Sporadic outbursts of violence continued until as late as 1875.[132] The magistrates found themselves quixotically arrayed against a shifting, indistinct "foe" since the question at stake centered not on resources <u>per se</u>, but on Indians' status, as groups, within the future of the Canadian nation. The clashes over fishing rights, timber cutting and the survey constituted but symptoms of a greater and deeper problem which would exist as long as the groups existed. In an address to a council at Wikwemikong in 1864, one head chief poignantly described the fears which motivated his opposition to the government:

> The Whites when they come will do labour and make money. . . and to you, my friends, will be given all the lowest, meanest work to do as servants, such as carrying water, cutting wood, cleaning stables. . . 133

The Indians contended that their commitment to retaining a degree of control over land and resources derived from the responsibility they felt for their rising generation. Leaders like Abatossaway, who

favoured accommodation, stated that his band also wished to be respected as a group, determine its future, and lose little of what it presently held. With respect to their political activities during the mid-1860's, bands differed only as to means, not as regards to their ultimate goals. It was mainly in this mutual reaffirmation of commitment to the survival of cherished values that sustained resistance to the government began to fade. A lessening of discontent at Sault Ste. Marie also ensued following the removal from office of the notorious United States Indian agent, A. Fitch. The Honorable D.C. Leach, his successor, recommended the immediate granting of patents to check the worst abuses of Fitch's former allotment system.[134]

At this point two events intervened which temporarily suspended magisterial opposition to Native "offenders" of the resource laws. During the summer of 1864 the forests along the north shore of Lake Huron had burst into conflagrations which burned millions of acres of timber (Lambert and Pross, 1967: 205). Smallpox struck in the wake of this initial catastrophe and the officials had to turn their attention wholly to implementing quarantine laws and provisioning the afflicted.[135] During this break in the ongoing struggle over conflicting notions of resource proprietorship, provincial land surveyor George B. Kirkpatrick laboured over a fire-scarred landscape adjusting the boundaries of the Garden River reserve.[136]

According to the Pennefather Treaty, the western border began at Partridge Point as stated in the Robinson Huron Treaty. Halfway along its original length, however, it would intersect with a new northern boundary line, which would extend due east to a specified maple boundary, and then proceed southeast to Onigaming, or "The Portage"



MNR Survey Records
1864



Subdivision of Garden River, 1864. This survey only influenced the location of a company mill. None of the houses drawn on the map conform to the placement of boundaries. MNR, Survey Records, 1864.



Position of the Clark Location
MNR Survey Records, 1866



Tracing showing the Western Boundary of the Garden River Ind. Reserve, compiled from a Tracing and correspondence on File 9266 and from Plan of the Reserve -

J-B. Feby. 1889-

J. B.

To accompany Memo. to D.M.

P.A.C., RG 10, vol. 2048, file 9266

on the west shore of Echo Lake. It was not long before William Shebakezick, Kirkpatrick's guide, reported to Ogista and Buhkwujjenene that the survey failed to conform to Ojibwa expections. Not only was the western boundary run at an angle rather than due north, but the northern boundary also failed to strike Onigaming, as Shebakezick endeavoured to point out to Kirkpatrick. It instead fell half a mile south of the portage.[137]

Anomalies in the Garden River survey aroused Nebenagoching's suspicions regarding the boundaries of the Batchewana tract, which were also rerun in 1864. On December 31, 1864, Wilson, at Nebenagoching's request, informed Spragge that the Ojibwa expected the eastern boundary to extend inland ten miles from the coast. Just north of the surveyed boundary several mineral locations had recently been staked by Maitland and other mining entrepreneurs by the names of Begley, Mansfield, Duffield and Bethune.[138] Nebenagoching claimed that these sites lay on the reserve; to gain revenue from these land sales constituted the main reason he had agreed to the tract's cession.

Nebenagoching, Wilson admitted to Spragge, "is quite correct,"[139] Wilson had been present at the Pennefather treaty negotiations and distinctly heard Keating tell the Native assembly that the Batchewana reserve included the mineral outcroppings in question. "Better give the Indians a few miles than be accused by them of this. . . and be attacked in the press for a breach of faith," the magistrate cautioned.[140] The magistrate obviously disliked being directly confronted by the chiefs on this issue, for he knew as well as Keating the reasons why the surveys deviated from the descriptions of the tracts originally presented to the Indians in 1850.

In the spring of 1865 Wilson again endeavoured to instigate a



Goulais Bay Reserve
MNR Survey REcords

timber cession at Garden River, this time armed with a slightly different strategy. Father Auguste Kŏhler, S.J., had taken umbrage at Biron's arrest. The Indians, the priest asserted, had maintained their own code for organizing their economic pursuits "since time immemorial", which the priests understood and respected. Quarrels on such matters should be settled in a "fatherly way" outside the courts.[141]

Wilson and Dupont realized they might be bested in an argument with the Jesuits and in consequence the political position of Nebenagoching's people immediately grew stronger. These two officials, although both Protestant, could direct attacks against members of any denomination, and after 1865 simply changed the target of their invective from the Roman Catholic mission to the Anglican.

Strange "Bedfellows"

Wilson soon found the chink in the armour of the Anglican missionary opposition to his schemes that he was looking for. Chance had aspirations of "regaining" Garden River from the Roman Catholics and Methodists solely for the purposes of a Church of England mission. The bellicose low churchman, truly O'Meara's protégé, had begun to criticize the Roman Catholics from the pulpit in a manner which annoyed even the religiously lethargic Prince.[142] The clergyman also centered out Wilson's recognition of Ogista as head chief as a hindrance to the progress of his vision for the future of the community. By siding with Ogista as well as the Jesuits, Wilson felt he could place Chance on the defensive and so force Chance's compliance to the implementation of government resource policies.

Chance considered Ogista to be overly proud, unstable, easily

manipulated, given to drinking, and entertainments, dancing and ceremonies unseemly for an Anglican.[143] No friend of Wilson or Dupont, the missionary maintained that the Native leader lowered himself by simply associating with these officials. Since Ogista had received oxen and seed through Wilson's auspices, Chance decided to eradicate the possibility of such assistance being used as inducements, to promote conformity to the magistrate's demands, by deposing Ogista and establishing Buhkwujjenene as head chief in his place.

Wilson countered Chance by supporting Ogista. Meanwhile the magistrate directed missionary attention, in general, away from the resource issue and the problem with reserve boundaries by highlighting ambiguities in both missions' rights to occupy land on the reserve. Wilson's first move in this ploy was to gain Ogista as an ally against Chance. This hardly proved difficult, given the Anglican missionary's intentions to deprive the chief of his status. In June Chance complained to Spragge of Ogista bringing whiskey onto the reserve and promoting a drunken spree in which several people were injured.[144] Spragge told Dupont of Chance's comments on the affair, Dupont informed Wilson, and Wilson passed the news along to Ogista.[145] Wilson thus felt he could count on Ogista's support during the next stage of his plan.

During the summer, while Chance and Buhkwujjenene were attending an Anglican Synod in the southern part of the Province, Wilson contended that the Church of England grounds obstructed a public road and had Ogista and Father Baxter, S.J., knock the Anglican mission fences down.[146] Tegoosh and the Jesuits suggested a compromise which would allow for a road to run between the Anglican and Jesuit missions which involved moving the fences and a barn several metres. In November Dupont wrote

Spragge that the matter had been settled.[147]

Wilson knew his opponent too well to claim defeat. On discovering that the Jesuits had been permitted to enclose a portion of the point lying below their main premises, Chance decided not to let the matter drop, at which time Father Baxter, encouraged by Wilson, indicted the Anglican missionary at the spring assizes, for trespass. Wilson refused to give evidence and Ogista, although he admitted he was uncertain as to the facts, stated that a road might have existed twenty years ago. Since neither the Roman Catholic nor Anglican missions held title to land, other than the deeds drawn up by Shingwaukönse in 1848 and subsequently invalidated by Vidal, the result was a trial based on interpretations of the The Pine's original wishes and the location of the chief's grave relative to the alleged road, which seemed to run directly over the burial plot.[148]

It was not until July 1866 that Chance finally figured out that the rationale behind knocking down the fences stemmed not from interdenominational rivalry but from the government's desire to gain control of the reserve and its resources. In directing a claim to the Indian Department for damages incurred during the indictment proceedings, Chance blamed the government officials wholly for the incident. "If Mr. Wilson and the chief had not acted as they did," he argued, "the Jesuits would never have ventured to proceed against our church mission."[149]

Buhkwujjenene Intervenes on Behalf of Direct Democracy

Chance pressed for Buhkwujjenene's installation as head chief not only because of the special charge the missionary felt Shingwaukönse had laid on him, but also because he liked and approved of Buhkwujjenene

personally. Buhkwujjenene and his wife assisted Chance in innumerable ways when the clergyman first arrived at Garden River, even to the point of relinquishing their own dwelling to secure the missionary's comfort. Dignified and congenial, Buhkwujjenene exhibited many gracious mannerisms, such as bowing deeply from the waist when taking leave of a person, combined with a shrewd, almost meticulous mind for business affairs which Chance admired but could not easily emulate.[150] For these reasons Chance became increasingly emotionally involved in securing Buhkwujjenene for the head of his projected mission settlement.

In response to Chance's and Buhkwujjenene's appeals the proceding year, the Anglican Church Mission Society sent a delegation to Garden River in August 1866 to determine the feasibility of attaining fee simple title to a site for an industrial school.[151] Native complaints concerning the survey also prompted Alexander Campbell, the Commissioner of Crown Lands and Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, to visit the community about the same time. Campbell had no interest in maintaining reserves and felt they should be surrendered as soon as was practically possible. Nebenagoching's trenchant arguments for having the Batchewana tract resurveyed, however, temporarily disarmed him. To win time, Campbell replied that he would respond at a later date through Chance and Kohler.[152]

During the interim Campbell decided to forgo further discussion with the chiefs by considering both the Batchewana survey, and the failure of monies from mining sales to be placed in Batchewana band coffers, as a fait accompli. According to Keating's report of 1853, Campbell informed the missionaries that the Batchewana tract enclosed 184 square miles. This areal designation had acquired authoritative recognition

by order-in-council on July 18, 1854.[153] Technical difficulties and the expense of surveying over rocky terrain had precluded the interior boundary from following the sinousities of the coast. Then, with blunt frankness, probably because he knew Kohler and Chance would not be easily deceived as to the conflict of interests which engendered the dispute, Campbell concluded:

> The sales /of mining locations/ have been made, and it is now impossible to make any changes even if the Treaty have the interpretation which the Indian Sare /sic, Sayer or Nebenagoching/ contends for. 154

Campbell's communications only succeeded in strengthening mission opposition to the government's unilateral policies. Fathers Kohler and Baxter sought to obtain title to territory on behalf of the Goulais Bay and Batchewana bands. Since the government refrained from surveying these reserves until 1870, the Roman Catholic missionaries provided invaluable assistance in defending the Indian's land base against encroaching mining and timber interests.[155] Chance, on the other hand, aided Buhkwujjenene in raising specific grievances with Campbell concerning annuity payments and resource management at Garden River. Under the Robinson Treaties, Buhkwujjenene held, each band yearly expected to receive a lump sum for improvements as well as for distribution to individuals. He requested information regarding land sales and the timber licensing system.

Campbell replied in October 1866 that, in 1850, the population involved in the Robinson treaties had numbered 1422,[156] but according to the 1865 census, it had risen to 2285. This increase in annuitants had reduced payments to less than one dollar per person. While the Superintendent General failed to address Buhkwujjenene's query regarding

group versus individual payments, he admonished the Garden River band for drawing, through Spragge's auspices, one hundred dollars for oxen and seed which, he declared, had injured all the other annuitants sharing in the £600 allocated by treaty.

As for the interest accrued from land sales, Campbell continued, only one township, McDonald, had been laid out in the vicinity of the Sault. The amount received by the Indian Department by 1866 had been but $572.88 -- too minimal a sum to draw any interest worth considering. Campbell also argued that Spragge had misled the Ojibwa into believing that arrangements for cutting timber similar to those prevailing at Caughnawaga could be attained for Garden River. Wood on the Caughnawaga reserve had been cut and sold under provisions of a special order-in-council. No such permission could be secured for land lying north of Lake Huron.[157]

Through Buhkwujjenene's influence, Chance came to favour the promotion of lumbering over agriculture. It was unrealistic, given the climate and lack of assistance, the missionary maintained, to expect all the Ojibwa to become farmers. To deny them access to other resources on the reserve remained "cruel and unjust."[158] Chance rarely minced words even when writing to Campbell. The Governor General, he stressed, "might as well sign their death warrant at once, or issue an order-in-council to drive the Indians off the reserve, as to persist in prohibiting them from cutting wood."[159]

Chance initially demanded that the chiefs in council exercise complete managerial control over the dispersal of timber at Garden River.[160] When Campbell rejected this suggestion, the clergyman altered his position to allow Indian Affairs to govern the allocation of timber licenses.[161] The priest felt that his success as an intermediary between the Ojibwa

and the government would aid the cause of his mission, and he so endeavoured to gain Ojibwa compliance to government terms regarding licensing. This was a vain hope. Ogista refused to listen to Chance's or anyone else's views on timber management and in the fall left for the United States until May of 1867. During Ogista's absence, Chance compiled a list of grievances against the leader, including among them Ogista's "wandering" propensities, then submitted them to Campbell, and requested that an enquiry be made into Ogista's fitness for leadership.[162]

In late May Spragge instructed Dupont to investigate Ogista's activities. Dupont arrived at Garden River on a Friday without prior warning and remained until noon the next day to hear complaints regarding the leader. Receiving none, he returned to Manitowaning. News of what had taken place enraged Chance since he had not been notified of the agent's presence, and considered Dupont to be a mere instrument of Wilson. The whole affair, he maintained, had been a farce.[163]

Buhkwujjenene soon found that Chance's ardent support of his policies could at times prove to be more of a liability than an asset. In June 1867 he and his brother Ogista had engaged in a private disagreement concerning whether or not more land should be ceded from their reserve. Buhkwujjenene had opposed the government's issuing of a patent to Rankin for the Clark location on April 1, 1865, whereas Ogista argued that the sale would increase band revenue. Buhkwujjenene feared that such unconditional sales might lead to an undermining of band government and the Ojibwa's commitment to direct democracy.[164] Chance, while not particularly wishing to challenge traditional band leadership, nevertheless, through the incautious pursuit of his own mission's goals, so severely threatened the local band system that Buhkwujjenene found

himself compelled to side with his brother against the missionary in spite of Chance's strong support of the resource policies which he favoured.

The first phases of these developments were promoted by Rankin's overtures to Ogista and John Bell Jr., regarding purchase of the Elliot location.[165] While Ogista wavered whether or not he would agree to the mine sale, John Wigwas /John Megissanequa/, Joseph Tegoosh and several others, members of both the Roman Catholic and Anglican congregations, agreed to surrender three chains of land on either side of Peltier Creek, lying west of the Garden River, to the Roman Catholic mission as a location for a grist mill.[166] Ogista himself had been pressing for a grist mill since 1864, but Chance refused to believe that the head chief's involvement in the negotiations had not been instigated by the Jesuits. "I. . . protest against any surrender of land Augista /sic, Ogista/ to Mr. Rankin or Priest Kohler as illegal," Chance proclaimed to Campbell. The Jesuit mill could not possibly assist the entire community but would, he held, only foster factional dispute.[167] Chance put a complete stop to the erection of the mill in this manner. Though a cession of the mill site occurred on July 9, 1867, no mill was ever built.

The missionary's next move was to try to prevent the band from associating with Wilson and his clique. Chance declared to Campbell that Wilson's and Keating's nefarious activities would force him to use all his influence in opposing the Conservative candidate for Algoma, Wemyss Simpson, another of Wilson's cronies, in the upcoming election.[168] By September 1867 the missionary smugly reported that although Keating and his son-in-law[169] had pitched their tent near Ogista's wigwam, their attempts to win Native electoral support for Simpson would fail, since "Carney had decided not to rescue Indian votes. . ."[170] Due to Chance's

and Carney's opposition to Simpson, the Ojibwa may well have lost the franchise they might otherwise have exercised in Canada's first federal election.

It was not long before Chance demanded that the inquiry into Ogista's leadership be resumed. To negate Ironside's statement of 1855 that, as an eldest son, Ogista should succeed his father, the priest obtained statements from McMurray, O'Meara and Thomas G. Anderson regarding the absence of patrilineality and primogeniture among the Ojibwa. McMurray substantiated Chance's statements that the head chief governed the transmission of the office himself,[171] O'Meara considered patrilineality to be "engrafted" on the Ojibwa system, while Anderson claimed he had frequently in the past been called upon by a band to recognize a younger son or "a nephew" as a head chief's successor.[172]

Confronted by this additional data, Spragge instructed Dupont to return to Garden River and collect oral testimonies which might justify government implementation of an electoral system.[173] Chance recoiled at this, since Spragge had disregarded his allegations regarding Buhkwujjenene's greater integrity when compared to the moral character of his brother Ogista. Recognizing the shift in premise, the missionary hastened to point out that he had never authorized an inquiry into the "validity of chieftainship" but only into the moral foundations on which it should be based.[174]

Dupont recorded comments verbatim from the Ojibwa and sent them to Spragge.[175] From a cursory reading of Dupont's submissions, the Deputy Superintendent found that not one negative statement had been uttered against Ogista. Even Buhkwujjenene had maintained that he was satisfied with his brother as chief. Several band members stated that they could not

understand why Chance complained about Ogista drinking when Buhkwujjenene himself took liquor occasionally and at times had been intoxicated.[176] According to one affidavit by Thomas Simpson, a mining acquaintance of Wilson's, Buhkwujjenene had been given ten dollars by Dupont. Spragge felt this could imply a susceptibility on Buhkwujjenene's part for government "gifts" of the same nature Chance had accused Ogista of receiving. Or, conversely, it might reflect on the investigating team, for it was very possible, the Deputy Superintendent maintained, that Dupont was "paying him /Buhkwujjenene/ to shut his mouth."[177]

Neither Chance nor Spragge were prepared to draw any final conclusions from such unsatisfactory evidence. Chance temporarily had to lay aside his pursuit of Ogista's deposition, however, as Buhkwujjenene claimed the priest's time in examining new resource regulations. The Secretary of State, Hector Langevin, had proposed to Wilson that Indians pay full dues on all timber cut, but that license and ground rent might be purchased at half the price charged white persons "to encourage industry."[178] Ogista refused even to consider the terms. Buhkwujjenene, at the same time, explained to Chance that the dues proved too oppressive for small family operations working in the bush. Wilson, Buhkwujjenene held, had been selling land on the ceded part of the reserve for four years at twenty cents an acre. How could the Ojibwa hope to compete with settlers who could cut and sell timber from their own lands without the burden of dues or rent?[179]

Chance informed the government that the prices of provisions had escalated, whereas the Indians under the Robinson-Huron Treaty had the lowest annuities for Native peoples anywhere in Canada.[180] The strictness of the terms forced families from Garden River to seek employment in the

United States.[181] Finally, on June 8, 1868, the missionary forwarded a petition to Langevin from Buhkwujjenene, Waubamama and Bell to regard Ogista's resistance merely as a temporary protest against overly harsh measures, and prayed that the offending regulations be relaxed.[182]

Wilson and Dupont stressed that local band government on the reserve was growing stronger. The government's answer was to strike intractable individuals off the annuity lists or to arrest them. "Indians who /since 1850/ came from the American side of the line must be required to leave the Reserve," Langevin directed.[183] Due to the "anomalous state of things occasioned by many new names," Wilson was instructed to draw up lists for both Ogista's and Nebenagoching's bands and then delete those who could be placed in the category, "intruder".[184] Wilson, evidently confused as to what criterion he should adopt in striking persons off the rolls, argued that certain Métis should be allowed to remain on the lists since "they have enough Indian blood to constitute them as Indians."[185] So ambiguous thus proved the premises on which exclusion from the group could be allowed to proceed, the affair became one governed mainly by Wilson's personal whim.

The missionaries proved the greatest check on the officials' activities in this matter. When three Native persons were arrested in November under the laws forbidding the inciting of Indian unrest and sent to penitentiary, Chance could barely believe the severity of the terms. Should Wilson or Dupont ever again dare to levy such oppressive measures on men's abilities to earn an honest livelihood, the priest raged, he would "appeal to the Christian public."[186]

The course of intensive resource development on reserves continued. Under the provisions of the General Mining Act, 32 Vict., cap. 34, of

1869, a miner for one dollar per acre could gain full sub-surface rights and reap potential profits without imposition of royalties, taxes or duties (Nelles, 1974: 23). Large lumbering companies were ready and waiting to harvest the rich pine from the Garden River and Batchewana lands. It was thus essential for the Crown Lands Department that the exact state of leadership at Garden River be determined and any potential weaknesses exploited to gain further surrenders. It was an unfavourable time for the band to have Chance raise the issue of leadership once again, and yet he did.

In August 1869, William Plummer, a Sault Ste. Marie merchant as well as special commissioner for the Department of Indian Affairs, arrived at Garden River on Chance's and Spragge's instructions to investigate the leadership issue. Plummer invited the chiefs, head men and the missionaries to a council and explained that grave charges had been brought against Ogista. Not one Indian spoke.[187]

Finally, Ogista himself rose and demanded to learn the name of his accuser. Waubama, eldest son of the Crane, Muckedayoquot, also denounced the secrecy with which threats had been made against the chief. The individuals should identify themselves. Yet it was Buhkwujjenene who dealt the harshest blow against Chance's arguments for Ogista's deposition. The band sought peace on the issue of leadership, Buhkwujjenene maintained, for his father had ordained it. No one person could proclaim the meaning of the old chief's will with regard to leadership succession within the band. He and his brother both enjoyed prerogatives bestowed by their father and exercised with the sanction of their people: "My father Shingwauk gave Augustin /Ogista/ that medal he wears and

desired I also should be a chief like him and enjoy all the benefits attaching to a chieftainship. . . in witness of which he gave this paper /the will or testament of 1854/." He concluded by acting as his brother's advocate before the assembly. The charges submitted against Ogista, he declared, were false. With these words Buhkwujjenene ended, for once and for all, external attacks on Ogista's leadership.[188]

Resilience, Change and New Challenges

Native resistance to the unilateral implementation of resource regulations on reserve lands had acquired a new sophistication which promised to foster development of organizational structures able both to protect and create policies worthy of serious government consideration. Ogista had shown courage in his stand against the imposed measures, although from the government standpoint the immediate consequence appeared to be merely a deadlock between Wilson and an intractable Native leader. A second, dynamic impulse favouring negotiation and compromise meanwhile arose beneath this protective panoply. Both the Anglican and Roman Catholic missionaries willingly lent their support to this new surge of political enthusiasm, which arising out of band consensus, adopted the petition as its instrument.

Tested by the confrontation with Chance, Ogista emerged more influential than ever before. He had received the sanction of head men according to traditional custom. Through him, the band leadership system had weathered both an assault from hostile political interests and the chastisements of a narrow Victorian moral code. On apprehending the futility of driving any wedge into community leadership following this powerful exhibition of the strength of reciprocal ties existing between

the chief and his band, both government and missionaries ended attacks on Ogista.

Following this event Plummer showed a willingness to negotiate with this strong political entity. The arrests and seizing of wood which had continued as late as May 1869, ceased. Ogista and his band agreed to cede Squirrel Island to Duncan G. MacDonald for $272.00,[189] and to surrender the timber on the surrendered part of the reserve to George Danson, but only under certain conditions.[190] Both entrepreneurial parties agreed to follow the letter of the agreement exactly, which stipulated that should a sawmill not be built by MacDonald on Squirrel Island, the land must be returned to the band, and that Danson must hire and train Native labour. Since he failed to fulfil his contract, Danson's license was soon revoked.[191]

Ogista took a personal lead in promoting several projects on the reserve. After one last dispute between Chance and Baxter over land boundaries, during which Ogista and Tegoosh intervened to delineate the limits they believed their father had ascribed to each mission, Chance left to assume a new ministerial position at Niagara-on-the-Lake. This upset Ogista, since he had been hoping for the establishment of the industrial school which Chance, Buhkwujjenene and the Church Missionary Society had been considering in 1866. In 1869 Ogista believed he had been blessed by a vision similar to that his father had experienced and wanted to communicate his desire directly to the upper echelons of the Anglican hierarchy. This opportunity arose in 1870 when the Reverend E. F. Wilson, pastor at Sarnia, stopped at Garden River briefly en route from visiting Red River along with Colonel G. Wolseley's

expedition. Without telling either minister of his intentions, Ogista embarked on the steamer bearing Wilson homeward and finally prevailed on Wilson to aid him in publicly expressing his views to Canadian metropolitan society.

Ogista's adventures in Southern Ontario drew press attention and Wilson had Ogista's narrative of his own experiences published in a pamphlet entitled Little Pine's Journal.[192] The Ontario public, however, proved reluctant to encourage new missionary undertakings for the Native peoples following the Red River uprising. James Beaven, William B. Robinson and Frederick O'Meara lent verbal support, but to collect sufficient funds to build a school Wilson considered a trip to England mandatory. When Ogista cited his old age as a reason for declining, Wilson persuaded Buhkwujjenene to accompany him.

Wilson had his own ideas on the rationale behind Ogista's wish to have an industrial school built at Garden River. To Wilson, Ogista represented in his demeanour and oratorial powers the epitome of the Noble Savage: the "raw metal" which would be forged into the Christian Man by Wilson's efforts. Ogista, the missionary considered, had been summoned by the Divine Will to approach the Anglican Church for assistance; Wilson felt chosen to act as a catalyst in the "elevation" of this Ojibwa leader and his people.

On assuming charge of the Garden River mission, Wilson formally recognized Ogista as head chief, and encouraged the leader to gain a surrender of land for an industrial school.[193] The band granted approximately eighty acres to the Anglican Church in May 1871, and a smaller allotment to the Roman Catholic mission. Ogista wanted to gain access to Western education for his band, but even as early as 1874 it

seemed that Wilson and the chief had begun to experience a parting of ways regarding their respective visions for the future of the Ojibwa. The head chief repeatedly expressed fears regarding the demise of the Ojibwa as a distinct people, and depicted his concern symbolically with reference to the image of the setting sun. Yet his statement failed to move Wilson, who worked towards the assimilation of the Native people into the trades and rural working class.

On December 3, 1873, Ogista reported to Indian Affairs that the band had recognized him as head chief by universal acclamation, and he requested a salary. Almost as a footnote, he added that the industrial school, completed in the early fall of 1873, had burned down. According to the leader, the cause had been arson, the "work of some bad people".[196] Wilson arranged for another residential school to be built at Sault Ste. Marie and, in 1874, invited the Earl of Dufferin to lay the cornerstone. Even though the head chief refused to countenance the missionary's assimilationist schemes by this time, Wilson nevertheless continued to uphold the leader as the instigator of his industrial school system at Sault Ste. Marie.

Ogista continued to search for avenues in which the Native peoples could express a measure of self-determination within the nation state. Wilson, by contrast, seeing the Native community only as a limiting milieu, sought to establish a highly regimented learning environment "purged" of "uncivilized" cultural elements. Between these two perspectives lay a great gulf filled with contradiction and misunderstanding.

Chief Buhkwujjene at Mitcham.

Wilson (1886)

CHAPTER NINE

CHALLENGING THE SYSTEM FROM WITHIN

Economic development constituted a primary objective at Garden River, yet the manner in which the band proceeded towards this goal differed radically from the assimilation program set out by Parliament following Confederation. A reorganized Indian Affairs Department under the management of the Secretary of State until 1873, and after that date under the Minister of the Interior,[1] stressed the implementation on reserves of a system of individual property holding which would eventually release government from involvement in the economic affairs of the Native people. The Indians were determined to resist this external policy in order to keep their group identity, although as long as restrictive laws pertaining to their use of minerals and timber on their reserves persisted, they were prevented from employing revenue from these resources to assist in establishing a group-controlled economic base.

Testing for Native Proprietorship of Minerals: 1873-1875

Regardless of the prohibitions on Indians mining and selling mineral, many band members had considerable experience as mining explorers. Members of Nebenagoching's kin group and the Jones, Nolin and Bell families were eagerly sought after by mining company agents, among them Judge John Prince.[2] Other family heads maintained territories in the bush containing mineral deposits and engaged in black market transactions. Ogista "owned" a tract, bearing iron exposures, two kilometres back from

the coast, between the Garden and Echo Rivers, but resented the illegality forced upon him in the sale of the mineral. Like his father, he believed the reserve and its resources belonged to the Ojibwa by right.

Possibly on the advice of Simon J. Dawson, a politician well known to the Garden River people and, in 1873, a special Indian Affairs commissioner,[3] Ogista decided to try to establish a precedent which would allow bands rights to minerals. The time seemed auspicious for such a move. Not only were the principal band members at Garden River willing to let their chief test the system by bringing his own holdings on the market, but Native leaders westward to Lake of the Woods had begun to reaffirm a commitment to the idea of Native control over mineral resources. This stance gained a spokesman in Mawedopenais at the Northwest Angle treaty negotiations in September during which Native proprietorship of mineral resources arose as a major issue.[4]

As long as Ogista and his band retained control over the negotiating forum in their dealings with miners, precedents regarding ownership of minerals seemed to be within reach. Yet when one particularly influential American mining entrepreneur, James Wilkinson, began to stake far more territory than the band originally intended to alienate, the Indians lacked means of curtailing his activities and could expect no government protection. Ottawa's reaction to the Ojibwa's predicament was to try to exploit the weakness of the band's position to gain a surrender of the entire reserve.

This affair began in the fall of 1873, after Ogista permitted Wilkinson to conduct several days' explorations on the reserve.[5] Soon

afterward John Askin also brought iron holdings onto the market, but offered them to Philetus Swift Church rather than to Wilkinson.[6] When the band limited the area available for mining purposes to four hundred acres, Church abided by the conditions,[7] but Wilkinson refused to restrict his survey and staked three large locations, one of which enclosed two smaller sites claimed by Church.[8]

Ottawa initially tried to resolve the conflict between the two mining interests by determining which party first offered payment to Ogista for his explorer's right.[9] Wilkinson maintained that he had been the first, upbraided Church and Church's agent, Tegoosh, for interfering with regard to the iron, and promised to pay Ogista handsomely should the chief support his side in the dispute. Yet neither the chief nor his band would play favourites.[10]

When it became evident that the leader was not interested in money but in trying to force a decision on the issue of Native proprietorship over mineral resources, the head chief's evidence became "too contradictory to be admissible."[11] Church's case suffered since the merchant had respected band decisions, and even considered leasing the locations for five years with the privilege of renewing the transaction from time to time -- an option suggested bv Ogista that exhibited parallels to the conditions granted Macdonell in 1849.[12] Wilkinson, by contrast, emphasized that he had paid Ogista solely "to make him interested in obtaining a surrender to the Crown."[13] It had been a self-interested gesture; no legal principles nor precedents had been involved.

When Ottawa suddenly asked for the surrender of the whole reserve,[14] the head chief terminated all further negotiations. Shielded by this decisive action on the part of their leader, the band, led by

Ogista's son Jarvis, petitioned the Minister of the Interior stating that they had decided to sell 1200 acres of mineral land -- enough for both contenders -- but no more, provided that government recognized Ogista's explorer's rights.[15]

In October, Church's son Philetus Munsen Church, Wilkinson, Ogista, Jarvis, and William Driver, Ogista's son-in-law and interpreter, met in Ottawa with the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs. The government would agree to only one course. Indian Affairs would reserve the right to dispose of the locations "to whomsoever it would be most advantageous and proper to sell,"[16] and in November the band acquiesced in an unconditional cession of 1200 acres.[17] Ogista's testing of the system had resulted merely in an unsatisfactory compromise. The band had not been able to retain control over the manner in which the land would be alienated, the size of the locations, or the decision as to whom they would be allocated. No new ground had been broken.

Native Resistance to Missionary-Controlled Farming Communities

The band could expect little assistance in their quest for economic and political self-determination from missionaries who upheld the government's assimilation program. In 1874 both the Anglican and Methodist denominations briefly reconsidered the idea of establishing isolated model farming communities. Their efforts, however, were defeated by Ojibwa disinterest, scarcity of funds and the fact that the Hudson's Bay Company encouraged bands north of Sault Ste. Marie to stay in the interior.[18]

Ogista's attitude demonstrated how far Native support for missionary-

governed settlements had declined since the 1850's. During 1874, in the hope of reviving a farming-mission community at Garden River, the Methodists laid claim to the buildings they had vacated eight years earlier. The result was a two-year dispute with George Menissino, whose family resided in the mission house, and Ogista, who demanded the Methodists pay for improvements made by his brother. This confrontation marked the end of the Methodist presence at Garden River. Although the mission continued to claim the land surrounding an old graveyard, the mission house reverted to the band, and one of Buhkwujjenene's daughters, her husband, Peter Greensky, and their children occupied the premises.[19]

Economic and Political Pressures, 1875-1877

In 1875 no work existed on the reserve and times were harsh. The mining locations ceded in 1874 provided neither employment nor a market for Native produce. Instead of building on Squirrel Island, Duncan G. Macdonald, in association with Messrs. McRae, Craig and Company, erected a sawmill on seven acres, surrendered by the band in 1872, lying on the east side of the mouth of the Garden River and used the island offshore to graze horses.[20] This mill operated for only three years before it went into receivership.[21]

Until the Conservative government implemented its famous "national policy" of economic tariffs in 1878 offering protection from American competition, lumbering entered a slump which forced many sawmills along the north shores of Lakes Huron and Superior to close down. As a result, young men were compelled to migrate to mills in Michigan, Wisconsin and Minnesota. Since by law a band member remaining more than five years in the United States could be struck off the annuity lists,

seasonal migration became a necessity.[22] Marriages took place with women from communities lying south or west of Lake Superior and kinship ties were carefully maintained year after year. Eventually, whole families travelled by schooner from settlement to settlement around Lake Michigan and Lake Superior. Oral traditions imply that the spring exodus grew to be a social as well as an economic event, as stops at various communities en route to the mills presented opportunities to establish new contacts and revitalize the old.[23]

For those who remained at Garden River, the absence of wage labour continued until 1879 when Duncan G. MacDonald assigned the sawmill and its associated timber limit north of the reserve to John Spry, an American lumberman with a milling establishment on Neebish Island in the St. Mary's Channel.[24] Hardship also resulted from an order-in-council in 1875 which prohibited fishing in October, the month when the community depended on the sale of catches for their winter pork and flour supply.[25]

During these years the Ojibwa interspersed their appeals regarding lack of employment and the new fishing regulations with complaints concerning meagre annuities. The Garden River Indians joined other bands on Lake Superior in sending a petition through Simon Dawson to Indian Affairs asking that their annuities be raised to four dollars per capita according to the escalation clause in the Robinson Treaties.[26] Dawson expressed contempt for the law which denied the Native people revenue from resources upon their reserves. Native title was not one of mere occupancy or courtesy, he stormed, "but of right - conferred by the Imperial Government - long before Ontario had any existence".[27]

To add insult to injury, band funds were successfully appropriated

by a shrewd politician for his own purposes. E.B. Borron, former mine manager at Bruce Mines and in 1874 M.P. for Algoma, argued that should the Indians' petition be granted, band income from the sale of ceded lands might be used for the construction of a road from Sault Ste. Marie to Batchewana Bay. The estimated cost of this road was $45,960.[28] Arguing that the road would benefit the Indians because it would open more land for colonization and sale, Borron persuaded the Executive Council to pass an order directing that half the burden of the road's cost fall on the Batchewana Band's capital fund.[29]

By 1875, government fishing regulations, low annuities, and Borron's capture of band funds constituted only three of a growing number of irritants confronting Native leaders. Head chiefs repeatedly asserted that, in practice, the spirit of the Robinson and Pennefather treaties had been disregarded. Boundary descriptions had not been respected; provincial laws impinged on the bands' internal affairs. Although Ogista was well aware of Rankin's manipulation of the reserve's western boundary, he was also incensed by inaccuracies in the 1864 survey of the northern boundary. The imposition of external regulations concerning band membership fired additional discontent. Acting in accord with the terms of the Indian Act of 1869, William Van Abbott, appointed Indian Lands agent at Sault Ste. Marie in 1872, removed names of women from annuity lists who had married non-band members. In response, Ogista, Nebenagoching and Buhkwujjenene immediately asked Van Abbott to write Ottawa asking that the women be allowed to be "reclaimed" by the band and that Vict. 31, cap. 12 "be repealed."[30]

Indians also received four dollars per capita annuity for the first time in 1875. This, however, did not solve difficulties arising from their lack of control over capital funds. To rectify this problem,

several Lake Superior bands petitioned Governor General Lord Dufferin for arrears owing to them under the 1850 treaties. Access to lump sum payments, their document stressed, was needed to permit the purchase of agricultural implements.[31]

Borron supported the Indians in this new campaign, since promises of arrears payments could act as inducements to encourage further land cessions, especially at a time of economic hardship when younger Indians no longer knew how to trap or hunt. Ottawa, on receiving Borron's communication, instructed Van Abbott to initiate attempts to gain a surrender of the reserve. Although the agent agreed that arrears might smooth the pathway to surrender, he did not share Borron's anticipation that economic difficulties would hasten band compliance. Achieving this goal, he cautioned, might still prove to be "a work of time."[32]

Rather than supporting the Garden River band in the face of its political and economic difficulties, E.F. Wilson proved unsympathetic. Not only did the Anglican missionary vest no confidence in Ogista's plans for his community, but he also backed increased government intervention in every facet of reserve life. If the Ojibwa would not see for themselves what was good for them, he declared, "they should be made to do so."[33] Wilson wholeheartedly advocated schemes to force children away from their families, place them in boarding schools, and indoctrinate them in such a way that they would never again desire to return to their former way of life. He was more concerned about the receptivity of mainstream society to these newly "civilized" and "Christianized" entrants than about the havoc wreaked on Native families by his unthinking paternalism. A "kindly" feeling existed towards Native children in Canada, he argued. It was only Indians' "undisciplined behaviour" which prevented them from

"intermixing with the white people."[34]

Missionary and government attitudes worsened harsh conditions brought about by the winter of 1877. Fish catches failed in the autumn and merchants would extend no advances for provisions without government guarantees.[35] Even so, Ottawa rejected the Ojibwa's appeal for advances on their spring annuities.[36] Extreme distress was only narrowly averted by employment offered by the Victoria Mining Company, which operated silver workings in Duncan Township north of the Garden River reserve. In the spring of 1877 the band had granted the company a sixty-six foot strip across the reserve.[37] Although the mine apparently paid no money for the land, the company hired Native labour throughout the fall and early winter to construct a road along the ceded allowance.[38]

Government's emphasis on eradicating special Indian status and dispensing with the reserve system only made Ogista more determined to resist growing threats to the survival of his father's plan for the future.[39] Ottawa commissioned a "check survey" on mineral locations on ceded territory at Garden River preparatory to an intensive promotion of land sales both north and west of the reserve boundaries established in 1864. The idea was to induce the Indians to accept forty acres per family and surrender the balance of their land. In response to these instructions, Van Abbott called a meeting at Garden River in June 1878. Ogista adamantly opposed the agent's propositions:

> I thank the Government for asking the surrender of my my reserve while I am living. It will never come out of my heart to surrender. The Reserve was from Partridge Point to Echo Lake. This is what my father reserved. I hope while I live my Band will never consent. 40

To Inherit the Kingdom

Ogista held that eventual action with regard to the problems confronting his band could devolve only from a focus on things religious. To the Ojibwa, human aid alone could not solve difficulties of such magnitude. Improved conditions would only arise from re-establishing positive linkages with powerful spiritual agencies, as well as from the development of strategies to further specific political ends. By the spring of 1878 a spirit of revitalization had begun to affect members of both the Roman Catholic and Anglican denominations with an intensity that astonished even the crusty evangelical Wilson, and caused him to question the validity of his own assimilationist views.

In a letter to his father written in February 1878, Wilson maintained that unprompted by any act on his part, Garden River had experienced a spiritual awakening.[41] He proposed further that the settlement might stand as a center of evangelical rebirth; money must be raised to forward the mission and build a new church. To Wilson, the power of the Divine Spirit had finally appeared to infuse events about him, after years in which the priest admitted he had experienced disillusionment and doubt. At last, he concluded, he heard the voice of God speaking, with the whole Native community as His instrument.[42]

The symbolic power with which the Indians vested the Biblical use of the term "nation" at a prayer meeting at Ogista's house on February 5, particularly struck the missionary. Wilson had chosen his text from Matthew, Chapter 25:

> And before him shall be gathered all nations: and he shall separate them one from another. . . Then shall the King say unto them on his right hand, Come ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world. 43



Courtesy AO

Métis Fishermen

The central theme of the role of the nations before the throne of Grace profoundly affected the old chief who, "though very hoarse with a bad cold, knelt upon his bed and made a most touching prayer":

> O God, we have heard wonderful news to-night. . . We thank thee God for this wonderful news. . . and yet how little do we prepare for these great events. . . On which side of the great King will we Garden Rivers be? . . . God grant that we may be prepared. 44

Ogista immediately began planning a course of action based on The Pine's original vision, but with significant additions. The Ojibwa would continue to test and press the system to yield up precedents for the existence of aboriginal right, yet interspersed with this intensive political activity would be a gentler appeal to government and the missions, often employing the "power of the powerless" stance. Emphasis on spiritual revitalization and harmony of intent encouraged Ogista to bring Ottawa officials and many band representatives together in one large gathering to forward what he hoped might be mutual aims. To this end the Garden River head chief invited Native leaders from Fort William, Manitoulin, Saugeen, Nipissing, Magnetawan, Mississauga, and Parry Island to meet at Garden River on July 1.[45] He also requested Ottawa to send a delegation and monies, to be drawn on the band's capital fund, to finance the meeting.

Van Abbott attended the last session of the council on July 7 and found sixty-seven representatives assembled there from different bands who stated they were there without money or provisions.[46] Since no governmnet authorities other than Van Abbott had arrived, the assembly decided to send a delegation to Ottawa in the fall. Ogista and Buhkwujjenene were appointed from Garden River, Nebenagoching would represent the Batchewana band, Bwanakeyosh and Peter Keokonse, Keokonse's son, would attend on

behalf of the Thessalon people. A son of the deceased Megis from Parry Island, a son of the deceased Tagwaninini from Wikwemikong, a notable Manitoulin head chief, William Kenoshameg, and from Muskoka, David Aisance -- all important leaders in the Great Lakes Native community -- planned to join Ogista on his journey to the capital.[47]

When Ogista informed Van Abbott of his intentions, the agent replied that the band would receive no money for travelling expenses, nor would they be welcome at Ottawa.[48] The head chief paid no attention. The delegates, anticipating such opposition, had arranged for the journey to be funded through the auspices of the Grand Council, the forerunner of the Union of Ontario Indians, whose secretary, Moses Madwayosh, had the money ready and waiting at Collingwood. Following the delegation's departure in late September, Van Abbott informed the Minister of the Interior that the Indians were carrying a wampum belt which, they hoped, would move the government to recognize them as a loyal and independent people under the Crown.[49]

The belt, six feet long and six inches wide, depicted twenty-four Indians holding a rope attached to a boat. This wampum, Van Abbott continued, had been given to the Ojibwa in 1764. Enclosed with the agent's letter was a message from the Garden River band stating that the Indians, in alliance with the British, had "bled from head to foot" for their country. In fighting with the British forces during the War of 1812 they had honored a promise they had made to the British authorities that they would fight at the King's command. For this assistance the Indians had received presents which they appreciated "as much as the white does his money and land."[50]

The government impressed on Van Abbott the idea that, under

no circumstances, should the delegation be allowed to proceed to Ottawa. There was no need, it was argued, since Indians in any case had no right to make such demands. The Ojibwa described the wampum belt as "a treaty", the Superintendent General of Indians Affairs, David Laird, noted contemptuously in a letter to the Indian Lands agent; all colonial officials, who had ever encouraged Native faith in messages represented by symbols worked in shell, lacked authority "to make such promises." The Minister also branded the bands as presumptuous for requesting a "written agreement. . . assuring them that they are entitled to /their/ Reserves," and for official guarantees that no further surveys would be conducted without Native consent. Laird concluded by asserting that he alone had the power to subdivide reserves whenever it might be "necessary" or "in the interest of a band."[51]

Undeterred by Van Abbott's warnings that they would not be received at Ottawa, the Native delegates requested and attained an audience in the fall with the Governor General, Lord Lorne. Lorne received his Native guests graciously and promised to visit several of their communities, including Garden River, on a forthcoming expedition he was planning to Red River. While in Ottawa the Indians stressed their hostility to the allotment system intended for their reserves, but owing to Lorne's sympathetic manner, decided not to voyage to England to present their grievances in person to the Queen -- a course they had been considering. Lorne's statements had shown that the Indians' special relationship to the Crown still obtained. The Governor General's promise to meet with the band leaders in the near future, furthermore, provided exactly the excuse Ogista needed to prevent the surrender of the Garden River reserve. And it came none too soon.

Arthur Rankin had been called upon by John A. Macdonald, Minister of the Interior and Superintendent General of Indian Affairs in the new Conservative government, formed in the autumn of 1878, to raise once again the matter of ceding the reserve.[52]

Ogista maintained that no surrender would take place unless Lorne himself were willing to open negotiations. This outflanked Rankin, who meanwhile tried unsuccessfully to purchase the Elliot location as well as four hundred additional acres for a marble mine, located due north of the mouth of the Garden River. By refusing to deal with any individual except Lorne, the Ojibwa stripped Rankin of government sanction for what were essentially self-interested schemes. Ogista then opposed Rankin's right to a small triangle of land, of 345 acres, whose "hypoteneuse" followed the reserve's western boundary where it crossed the Clark location, with a tenacity which startled Ottawa.[53]

The second meeting with the Governor General took place on July 31, 1881 amidst considerable ceremony. Head men bearing long staves formed a double column flanking the path from a central dias to the wharf where Lorne's vessel had docked. Tall, portly and dressed in traditional attire,[54] Ogista came forward to greet the Governor General. With the aid of an interpreter, the chief repeated the Indians' grievances regarding loss of hunting and fishing rights, incorrect reserve boundaries, as well as their desires for payment of treaty arrears, and concluded by handing Lorne a petition.[55] Although the band was afterwards branded in the Canadian press as "chronic grumblers", Dawson, now a M.P. for Algoma, refused to accept this judgment. Under similar circumstances, he wrote to John A. Macdonald, "Whites would grumble in a far more audible manner."[56]

Lord Lorne's Visit

Photograph courtesy P.A.C.

WELCOME
LORNE



Petition

81,897

[illegible] view of the letter which the chief received from Your Excellency's secretary over a year ago, in which a promise was made to the Indians that our [illegible] interview should be granted with Your Excellency, on Your first visit among them. — We would humbly beg Your Excellency for that privilege now.

I. The Robinson treaty has been fulfilled, and up to this time only a small portion of our Land has been sold to Government still holding a large portion of territory.

We gave up our land into the Queen's hand to be sold in W. B. Robinson treaty. but there are on it bad bargaments due us! Are we to loose all this?

Again another thing is, — that some money which should have been given us by Your servants has been kept back, and which we would like much to have as we have

Again there is our fish rights, which Your servants have leased, and we have received no benefit therefrom.

II. Again, — there is our game which is being destroyed by the White men, and on which our living greatly depends.

Again, — We are much troubled by the White men wanting to get into our reserve, and the present boundries are not in their right places. It is in Your Excellency's power to remedy the loss which the Indians suffer, and we beg therefore to lay before Your humble hearts, as we feel that now we have lost too much.

We humbly the undersign Chiefs & principle men do humbly beg

Chief Augusta Shingwauk
Nabanaing-jing

P.A.C., RG 10, vol. 2091, file 15,434

Petition to Lord Lorne

Commitment to Independent Action Within the Great Lakes Native Community

Irregularities and legal anomalies, intended to deprive the Ojibwa of foundations for the defense of their land, became targets for Native attack. When, in May 1882, Nebenagoching demanded another survey of the northern boundary of the Batchewana reserve, Ottawa's examination of the documents pertaining to this issue revealed a confusing array of areal designations ascribed to territory ceded in 1859.[57] Apparently in response to Joseph Wilson's private suggestions after 1860, Keating's estimation of 184 square miles had been increased to 300 square miles by order-in-council on July 22, 1859. In 1866 Alexander Campbell gave yet another figure, of 250 square miles.[58]

Nebenagoching railed at the fact that none of these areal estimations compelled an adjustment of the northern boundary to include the mining locations sold on the Batchewana tract between 1859 and 1880. Owing to Keating's shrewd manipulation of the survey, Ottawa could ignore the issue of whether or not minerals fell under Native proprietorship. The government characterized the supposed amount of territory ceded by the Batchewana people as "liberal".[59] Nebenagoching nevertheless felt betrayed and made no secret of his attitudes on the issue.

Both the Batchewana and Garden River bands combined in opposition to Rankin's takeover of Partridge Point, which fell within the triangle of land fought for by Ogista between 1877 and 1880. In April 1883 two families, the Cadottes and the Perraults, the first belonging to the Garden River band and the second to the Batchewana band, were served with writs of eviction from farms which they had occupied for over twenty years. Ogista and Nebenagoching appealed to the Indian Department to intervene. In

response, Ottawa began an examination of documents pertaining to the sale of the Clark location and decided that the boundaries of the mining location and reserve were too ambiguous to permit a government stand on the case. The complainants, Ottawa maintained, nevertheless had recourse to the courts.[60] This boundary dispute led Ogista, John Ogista, Buhkwujjenene, Nebenagoching, Nebenagoching's son Edward, the two brothers Mishkeash and Gagiosh, and Waubmama to attend the Grand Council held in 1884 at Cape Croker. They expected to find a sympathetic audience, yet, when they discovered that at Ottawa's instigation the Council would devote its time exclusively to discussing the Indian Acts -- especially amendments relating to enfranchisement -- Ogista grew contemptuous of the gathering.

After listening to one scheme for subdividing reserves and for subjecting Native landowners to a property tax, Ogista proclaimed that he "blamed the Indians of the East and South who were well educated, for having these laws passed."[61] When, later, the subject of exclusion from band rolls of Indians who accepted enfranchisement and women who married non-band members arose, Ogista felt that he might arouse productive controversy by revealing the limitations on Native choice produced by these basically "either-or" situations. "Let /the women and the enfranchised/ go," he demanded. "I will give them nothing."[62] The fact that Native leaders could relinquish responsibility for those they protected appeared to Ogista not only to be negligence, but also weakness.

Instead of voting on the issues, the northern delegates voiced opposition to the character of the meeting and prepared to leave. The eight were angered by criticisms by southeastern leaders that northern bands were backward, wishing to reject the virtues of education and the

franchise, and preferred living "in the woods or wilderness."[63] It was only through the intervention of Chief Solomon James of Parry Island that this breach was healed. James chastized the Council for trying to impose inflexible ideological and moral strictures on all bands in the province.

Ogista responded by expressing his gratitude. "I decided to come to the Council and make my parting friendly," the leader began, "but I find you have retained my presence among you and I thank you all."[64] Ogista limited the rest of his speech to two points. First, he, as head chief, intended to retain control of his band's membership and, second, mining interests had not only broken their promises to his people but had also manipulated reserve boundaries. He concluded by requesting that his message be conveyed to the Department of Indian Affairs at once.[65]

Band Responses to Divisive External Pressures

The band was now experiencing formidable difficulties in maintaining channels of communication to Ottawa. Van Abbott endeavoured diligently to promote Indian Affairs policies after he learned in 1884 that the Superintendent General of the Indian Department had been considering replacing him with a younger man for the purpose of promoting farming among the Indians.[66] Knowing full well that the Native communities rejected government land allotment systems, Van Abbott sought to convey the impression of total compliance to Ottawa's agricultural schemes by preventing Ojibwa grievances from reaching the Indian Department. This he did by levying such severe punishments on certain educated and influential band members for even minor infractions of the Indian Acts -- especially those clauses pertaining to membership qualifications and

transmission of property -- that he silenced complaints at the source. Oral traditions stress that Waubmama[67] was one of these victims, and examination of the documentary evidence substantiates Ojibwa statements. Van Abbott understood enough of the Ojibwa authority structure to know that by suppressing the activities of an influential family head, in this case the leading member of the Crane dodem at Garden River, one could intimidate heads of other dodemic groups without giving rise to any noticeable infringements on the band's traditional leadership system.

Van Abbott's manipulations failed in their intent to break the band down into factions, since the groups immediately sought recourse to measures to prevent such an outcome. The Ojibwa knew they needed a new organizational vehicle for the development and promotion of their ideas and policies, yet they had no desire to deprive their band in any way of the structural continuity and tradition of protective service residing in the person of their head chief. On April 17, 1885, the band therefore petitioned the Indian Department to permit the election of several sub-chiefs, with the position of head chief to remain subject to traditional modes of transmission.[68] This suggestion for granting the group increased responsibility over its internal affairs nevertheless floundered owing to Ottawa's imposition of an either-or framework on band decision-making. No legal provision could be cited, the government insisted, to allow an individual such as Ogista "to retain his powers as chief in the event of the Band adopting systematic election in the appointment of chiefs."[69] The band's interest in strengthening their local government by reconciling the old and the new thus had to be temporarily set aside, and attention directed towards yet another external challenge.

A Time for Sacrifice -- Ogista's Last Years

Both the Garden River and Batchewana bands resented their lack of control over the government's use of their capital funds, and decided to counter the threat to their economic future as a group by adopting a policy of passive resistance. The drain on the Batchewana revenues for road construction had grown so intense that by 1886 Ottawa's decision to expend $400 annually for a school teacher's salary terminated interest payments to the band altogether.[70] It was little wonder that both bands fought against Indian Affairs' unilateral allocation of additional monies from their funds to promote White colonization. According to Ottawa, Native peoples could directly participate in voting money only for the purposes of education, medical expenses, and roads.[71] Ogista, in order to discourage persons in his band from breaking with his group's policy of unified resistance to the government's control of Indian revenue, blocked attempts by the agent to grant funds from the band's revenue, even for individual needs. Although the chief tried to aid in extreme cases, it still remained that sick, elderly, or destitute persons who lacked assistance from close kin or friends could suffer as long as this government-band deadlock continued in force.[72] At the same time, Native leaders fully supported government's drive to encourage settlement, provided that public works did not drain their group's coffers, since sale of ceded reserve lands would result in an increase in Ojibwa capital funds. In 1885 The Algoma Pioneer could confidently proclaim, "Come to Algoma. No Indian Troubles Here."[73] The bands as a whole meanwhile experienced hardship for the sake of gaining future rights to share in the potential benefits of Ottawa's policies. This form of "sacrifice" at Garden River only ended, its goal

Ogista by E.F. Wilson

Courtesy of Bishophurst,
Sault Ste. Marie

unattained, when the period of intense settlement drew to a close.

Ogista unstintingly devoted the final three years of his life to delaying the activities of encroaching interests until Jarvis Ogista, his son, and Buhkwujjenene could investigate each situation as it arose and seek to preserve band interests from injury.[74] When the Canadian Pacific Railway surveyed an allowance for a spur line leading to Sault Ste. Marie which cut through the community's best agricultural land, Buhkwujjenene contacted Indian Affairs asking that the line be moved north half a mile to avoid several farms.[75] When requested by Ottawa to make inquiries, Van Abbott held that the complaint had been "grossly exaggerated" and, in consequence, families affected by the railway's construction received minimal compensation for damages.[76] The lack of consideration for Ojibwa views regarding the affair fostered tensions which pervaded all future relations between the band and the CPR.

Within a year of this survey the band reported that the railway had been removing gravel from four pits. Two of these pits were located near Waubashine Island, the third bordered the Root River, and the fourth and largest lay near the Garden River. Ogista set out determinedly to vindicate Native rights in the face of this new aggressor. The band, meanwhile, collected information, charged the CPR 25¢ for each truckload already removed from the four sites, and levied a royalty of three percent on all future gravel sales.[77]

To give his band's demands bite, Ogista maintained that the CPR had acted illegally in coming onto the reserve without notifying his people, and that no surrender for the railway allowance would take place without payment first being made for the gravel.[78] Seriously ill and forced to attend meetings on a bed, the head chief declared that although

he had personally been forbidden by Van Abbott from communicating with Ottawa on the subject, he expected that his people would never cease pressing for official recognition of their rights in this matter after he was gone.[79]

Ogista's Influence on Wilson

Ogista died on December 23, 1890, and almost immediately land for the railway allowance, a station, and all four gravel pits were expropriated under the terms of the Railway Act.[80] Never once during his final years had the head chief failed to defend the prerogatives vested in him by his father, consistently upholding the notion that there must either be consent or conquest before any relinquishment of Native right might be regarded to have occurred on unceded territory. Within Sault Ste. Marie society, however, Ogista would not be particularly remembered for his efforts to secure a measure of Native self-determination.

So entrenched in Anglican circles at Sault Ste. Marie was a notion that Ogista represented an "elevated Indian" who had been redeemed from heathenism through Christianity, that a debate arose over a statement allegedly spoken by the chief on his deathbed.[81] When, on January 31, 1891, the Sault Express quoted the leader as saying he would reappear "as a sturgeon in a `small lake at the back of the houses," the Reverend James Irvine, resident missionary at Garden River, charged that Ogista could never have uttered such words. To Irvine, any transitional stages which intervened between the man's rise from the "savage" to the "saved" admitted no continuation of traditional beliefs in the chief's Christianized state, even though the newspaper's editor contended that data for the article had been drawn from a "reliable" source and "had been corroborated."[82]



Covered Graves at Garden River Anglican Cemetery
Note Gothic-style Wood Carving

Ogista's Tombstone

Roman Catholic Cemetery at Garden River

Irvine's attitudes undoubtedly prevented him from understanding Native goals and aspirations. Wilson, however, was beginning to show less myopia on this subject than his Anglican colleague. During the late 1880's in his Algoma Missionary News and Shingwauk Journal, Wilson had highlighted instances of Native conformity to English cultural traditions. Descriptions of Yuletide feasts at Garden River stressed the importance of "roast beef, plum pudding, tarts, preserves and jellies" to the occasion.[82] The Journal depicted "cottages" surrounded by gardens, fences and "flowering shrubs."[83] Although one article might claim that "not much difference /existed/ between houses of these Indians and those of our British working class,[84] by 1890 Wilson eventually had to admit that such resemblances remained principally superficial.

The missionary could not avoid knowing that he was dealing with a culture very different from his own. Whole villages, including persons whom he had considered converted Christians, could suddenly vacate a region because "a number had died."[85] Wilson also found that Indians often refused to work for him without pay and, at times, openly questioned the integrity of the missionary's intentions:

> There is something about the Indian character which makes them exceedingly difficult to work with, /Wilson asserted/. _He won't believe you are acting for his good /and/ not your own profit. 86

To Wilson, even the catechist Buhkwujjenene exhibited these particular failings. During their travels together in England, the missionary reminisced, "it was hard to convince our swarthy companion that the money was going to be applied to the purpose for which it was given. . . /Buhkwujjenene/ seemed to think at least a portion should find its way into his pocket for his personal use."[87]

Ever since Wilson's experience at Ogista's house in 1878, the clergyman had been passing through a transitional point in his career. Succeeding events further increased his sense of being in limbo. Ottawa ceased promoting industrial schools, since it held that the graduates of these institutions competed for employment with White tradesmen and immigrant labour.[88] The diminishing interest in his educational projects shown by Indian Affairs and, in even greater measure, by the Indians themselves, many of whom withdrew their children from his industrial institutions, induced Wilson to revise many of his former ideas and seek new solutions. By 1890 he had even begun to favour a measure of Native self-determination.[89]

Over a decade before, Wilson and Ogista both had interpreted the concept of "kingdom" to be a state inherited by nations faithful to the Divine Will, but their cultural backgrounds led them to view the mode of achieving this goal in radically different ways. Yet one thing was certain. Wilson had been far more changed by his labours among the Native peoples that Ogista had been influenced by his contact with late nineteenth-century British social doctrines.

In his later years Wilson reconstructed a new vision of the future of Native society from his experiences in the mission field.[90] By contrast, Ogista chose temporarily to relinquish linkages with external agencies which provided material advantages, but were nevertheless charged with threats to the political, social and economic development of his people. Hardship might result over the short-term, but the Ojibwa hoped that in the end the rewards would be more than adequate compensation for the difficulties experienced.

Borron Employs the Shingwaukönse Legend to Enhance His Own Definition of Indian Status

The issue of providing for payments according to the "escalation clause" in the Robinson treaties -- an issue which harked back to a time when the old Province of Canada could, without serious loss, sustain a yearly outlay of four dollars per capita -- became a bone of contention between Ottawa and Ontario. Ontario, in control of revenue from Crown lands, and hence faced with the likelihood of having to capitalize a fund to satisfy the Native claim, wished to keep expenditures as low as possible.[91] For this reason the Province sent E.B. Borron to Garden River to collect data which might justify slashing the size of the annuity lists.

Borron's approach to his task entailed establishing grounds for the existence in 1850 of a "charter group". From this basis, he argued, it would be possible to determine, by a system of patrilineal reckoning, who were and who were not qualified annuitants.[92] There would be no consideration of the historical factors which led to drastic reductions in group membership after 1858 or social pressures which compelled Métis to fill the dwindling ranks.

In four reports written between December 1891 and October 1894 Borron submitted what he held to be a trenchant case for halving the number of annuitants. Evidence to substantiate his views was derived from two sources: first, from oral testimonies gathered by John Driver, brother of Ogista's son-in-law William, and second, from a report written by William B. Robinson in which the commissioner set out his rationale for including the escalation clause in the treaties.[93] Conditions for data collecting were not ideal. Driver encountered difficulties in eliciting information, since both Buhkwujjenene and Nebenagoching proved

reluctant to speak with him, probably due as much to Borron's appropriation of band funds in 1864 as for the subject at hand.[94] As a result, only skeletal evidence could be obtained regarding the nature of relations between Shingwaukönse's band and the Métis.

On the basis of this data, Borron asserted that The Pine in 1849 had acted as the catalyst in a process by which "half-breeds" became endowed with Indian status. By promising Indian presents and land to Métis who assisted him in dispossessing the Quebec and Lake Superior Mining Association, The Pine, Borron suggested, epitomized the impracticality of a charismatic leader who cared little for the escalating costs incurred by the Province in consequence of so many contending for Indian status. Yet Borron's assumptions were wrong. No one event such as the Mica Bay takeover ever precipitated a large-scale entrance of Métis into bands. Individuals who participated in the expedition to the mine had been drawn from several bands, as well as from the Métis community at the rapids, but the system of recruitment adopted by The Pine in the fall of 1849 had in no way changed the traditional mode of determining permanent group membership. The exercise of dyadic kin attachments to Shingwaukönse's nodal core group still constituted the most frequent manner in which individuals joined the Garden River band after 1849.[95] The Pine might grant permission for non-band members to reside on his territory, but this did not necessarily give them the right to share in band prerogatives.

Borron also claimed that William B. Robinson endorsed the inclusion on annuity rolls of certain Métis families for political reasons. It would have been expedient in 1850, the politican argued, to placate Métis such as the Birons who seemed

to wield considerable influence within the Ojibwa population. Yet Borron either did not realize, or simply ignored, the fact that Buhkwujjenene's sister-in-law was married to a member of the Biron family.[96]

To emphasize the fact that Indians should not be allowed to have control over the membership of their own bands, Borron drew a contrast between Métis, whom he argued had been incorporated by 1850 into the capitalist commercial system, since, he maintained, they always trapped, fished or made maple sugar for sale, and "Indians", whose social organization he felt derived solely from their individualistic system of hunting territories.[97] Yet his statements concerning the deterministic influence exercised by one particular mode of land tenure on social composition applied far better to interior groups, grown dependent on the Hudson's Bay Company, than to the more economically-autonomous coastal bands. Borron refused to admit the possibility that leaders like Shingwaukönse could exercise prerogatives over land and resources on behalf of their bands, simply because to have done so would have undermined his principal contention that all Native groups in question lacked internal mechanisms capable of regulating their membership.

A Crisis in Leadership, 1891-1897

On his deathbed Ogista requested Van Abbott to recognize his son, probably Jarvis Ogista, as head chief. In reply, the agent maintained that such a decision would have to rest with the band alone and, upon the chief's death in 1891, imposed an electoral system on the Native community.[98] While the elected leadership which resulted, composed of a head chief, Buhkwujjenene, and four councillors, provided representation commensurate with the demographic strength of the band -- at this time

I, John Driver - employed as Interpreter by Mr. Borrow - interviewed - at his Mr. Borrow's request Joshua Biron of the Town of Sault Ste Marie and obtained the following information from him in reference to the Robinson Treaties

I was present - said Biron - when the treaties were made in the Year 1850 - by the Hon. W. B. Robinson - with the Chiefs and principal Men of the Indians and heard all that was said.

Several Years before the Robinson Treaty was made - Chief Shinguacouse of the Garden River Band called a Council - and the Half-breeds of Sault Ste Marie were invited to attend - so we all went. The Chief told us, that if we would join his Band and be his men or soldiers - that he (the Chief) would work for us and that we would get the presents that his band was then getting. That some day he might sell his land - and that if so - his claim should be our claim - and that we half-breeds would have a right to a share of what he, the Chief, might get for it.

That only four of us agreed to join his Band - Myself (Joshua Biron), my brother Alexis Biron, John Bell and Lawson Cadotte. All the other Half-breeds said, that they were already Indians enough, without binding themselves to be under an Indian Chief - And they all left the Council-Room.

Asked if either he or his brother Alexis - got any of the Presents that were given to the Indians at Manitowaning? Joshua Biron - replied - No - we never went for them - but I think that Lawson Cadotte and John Bell went - but I do not know whether they got anything - or not.

Source: AO, Irving Papers

numbering 437[99] -- the system was structured so as to render the new body little more than a sounding board for Ottawa's instructions to Van Abbott. School attendance, roads, and community health were the band's only responsibilities. It had control over neither reserve resources nor regulation of its membership.

Buhkwujjenene had no intention of allowing these constraints to hinder his effectiveness as head chief. In July 1891 he petitioned for two of his sons-in-law and Tegoosh's wife and children to be placed on the annuity list.[100] Ottawa refused his request, just at the time when Borron's investigations were breeding fears that others might similarily be denied such rights. The consequences proved dramatic. Borron's stress on the ambiguous nature of "Indian status" at Garden River granted Van Abbott leeway to manipulate band membership to his own advantage. In consequence, bitter inter-family disputes arose which, as the decline in the powers of the chief and council became increasingly apparent, prompted Native attacks on the externally-decreed system, as well as on the local agent who imposed it.

By 1896 at least three Ojibwa families had hired lawyers and attempted to secure title to their land holdings at Garden River on the basis of long-term membership.[101] Other instances of strife, one involving a son-in-law of Buhkwujjenene, gave rise to witchcraft attacks on Native persons who seemed to support Ottawa's policy of forcing individuals to leave the reserve.[102] Yet in every case the cause underlying these disruptive symptoms remained the same. Leadership had been deprived of its power to protect, initiate policies, and regulate activities on behalf of band interests. Buhkwujjenene declared that owing to the prevailing lack of respect for "the authority of the

Courtesy of Bishophurst

Buhkwujjenene by E. F. Wilson

ancient chiefs," too many people acted in a self-interest manner, "like whites."[103]

Subsequent events eventually militated against the breakdown of the band system into a chaos of adversarial cliques. The first and probably most influential of these factors arose during a legal dispute, in the course of which the Native plaintiff, Joseph Tegoosh, recalled precedents Shingwaukönse had established in 1848 and 1849 to govern land holding at Garden River. When, in the fall of 1891, Van Abbott permitted Joseph Nowquagezick, who had moved to Garden River as a child from Manitoulin Island and been raised by the Anglican missionaries, to build on a lot claimed by the Tegoosh family, Joseph Tegoosh produced the land deed dictated by The Pine, his grandfather, in December 1848.[104] It was obvious from this document that Shingwaukönse had granted land lying east of the Garden River to his son Tegoosh with no shadow of a doubt that he possessed full authority to do so according to the traditions of his people. "Nongom nimina ondjiiw ogimawiian," Shingwaukönse had stated: "I now give /the land/ to him in my quality as chief."[105]

As this case proceeded towards a settlement in which the Tegoosh family agreed to relinquish nine acres to Nowquagezick, Ottawa grew increasingly reluctant to interfere in the affair. It had been revealed that two Christian missions had acquired title to lands at Garden River on the grounds that their allotments had been reserved to them by The Pine years before. The issue of how much weight should be granted to the territorial prerogatives exercised by Shingwaukönse prior to 1850 threatened to resurrect the whole question of aboriginal rights with a vengeance. Van Abbott, too, apparently decided it to be an opportune time, given the desire of Native individuals to test the validity of such



Photograph courtesy of the Shingwauk Project

Oil painting of Buhkwujjenene by J.W. Forster
Canadiana Collection of the
Royal Ontario Museum

precedents in the courts, to refrain from his former practice of manipulating band lists and withdrawing residency rights.

By late 1896 the agent also knew that he faced strong but covert opposition from both the Garden River and Batchewana bands which threatened to jeopardize his career. At times, as during the Tegoosh case, enmities arose in the form of public indignation at the the agent's contravention of long-standing and customary practices. On other occasions it could assume a far more subtle character.

In November, Ottawa received a petition, signed by Nebenagoching, demanding Van Abbott's removal from office (although when later questioned, the chief denied knowledge of the complaint). The agent had been seen publicly intoxicated, the document submitted, had charged fees and withheld annuities for services which were his duty to perform, and had proven too free in striking names off the band lists.[106] In response, and unbeknown to the local agent, Ottawa instructed A. Dingman -- Inspector of Indian Reserves and then involved in the Tegoosh case -- to conduct an investigation into Van Abbott's activities.[107] Dingman found the agent to be suffering from overwork, illness, poor pay, and fears of inadequacy in filling his assigned role.[108] When Indian Affairs and the two bands concurred in permitting Van Abbott to remain at his post until eligible for full pension,[109] the agent stopped his former oppressive practices, began to rely substantially on an educated Native constabulary for maintaining order on reserves,[110] and commenced acting as an impartial intermediary in disputes between the band and Ottawa over timber.

Van Abbott's change in behaviour alleviated much of the atmosphere of fear and concern at Garden River. Ottawa's rejection of Borron's recommendations, considered too severely radical, removed a second

source of contention. Commissioner A. Macrae, who visited Garden River in August 1897, instead suggested that while certain individuals might be vested with "non-transferable status" -- in that their children might not be considered Indians -- government should not significantly alter the band lists as they stood.[111] In this more congenial atmosphere leadership returned wholeheartedly to pressing for a measure of managerial control over reserve resources.

The band wished to increase opportunities for small-scale family logging operations and advocated a resurvey of the northern boundary to include 12,616 acres, known as the "Indian Strip", covered by the Spry timber lease.[112] Following a bombardment of petitions, and finally a trip by a Native delegation to Ottawa in July 1895, Indian Affairs agreed to move the east-west boundary northward, provided that the band granted $350 for the purpose from their capital funds of $47,068.[113] Buhkwujjenenene and his councillors readily agreed.

When it became apparent in October 1896, however, that a far larger sum would be requested by Ottawa for subdividing the township of Duncan, north of the reserve, Buhkwujjenene vetoed the earlier transaction and demanded that the reserve's western boundary first be run north from Partridge Point before any further negotiations regarding the northern line took place.[114] By this act the chief demonstrated to his band that its leadership could still respond to challenges and place matters in abeyance until a consensus could be reached. On February 9, 1897 Buhkwujjenene and twelve others walked out of a council meeting, with the result that thirty-four of the forty-seven voting band members originally present assented to a survey, which cost the band $3,787.[115] In this manner, leadership deferred to the wishes of the group, which

viewed the return of the "Indian Strip" as a potential source of future revenue, but avoided bowing directly to Ottawa's terms, which upheld the continuation of the Spry lease until the company cleared the land of its timber.[116]

Disappointed to have Ottawa refuse what they viewed as a valid bid for an improved economic future for their community, the Ojibwa nevertheless had little choice but to continue the struggle in other ways to develop their local economy. When the sawmill at the mouth of the Garden River burned in 1891, it became necessary for the band to make arrangements with local lumbering firms to secure employment during the fall and winter months,[117] despite the law against Indians conducting businessson their own. While Ottawa initially manifested reluctance to treat these Native transactions with much seriousness, in the end Ojibwa persistence triumphed.

Trials and Tribulations of the Timber Trade

Logging provided a valued source of income for several reasons. It allowed for an adjustment in the fall and winter phase of the Ojibwa's traditional seasonal cycle of activities which was in keeping with their need to involve themselves to a degree in mainstream commercial society without radically altering either the composition of the kin-based winter hunting group, or undermining the utility of the system of family hunting and trapping territories. The establishment of timber quotas, gauged to avoid the necessity of intensive exploitative techniques and production deadlines, permitted male work groups to intersperse logging with other bush employments: caribou and moose hunting, trapping, fishing, maple sugar gathering, mineral exploration, and guiding.[118]

Provisioning camps for the winter remained a major difficulty, since provincial fishing laws prohibited taking fish in the autumn when fish were most abundant, and merchants were often reluctant to extend credit. The once bountiful Whitefish Island fishery also had grown less productive owing to steamers dumping wastes near the rapids and polluting the water.[119] Finally, in 1898, the island was expropriated under the terms of the Railway Act, although certain residents were permitted to retain property holdings until 1905.[120] The decline of this fishery brought new challenges, since it threatened to set band members increasingly at the mercy of the local merchants in the spring and fall. Not surprisingly, a search for alternatives to the sale of fish as a means of supplying their winter bush camps ranked high among Ojibwa priorities by the 1890's.

Government attitudes towards Native logging operations did not help matters. Ottawa regarded the ability to take timber off the reserve as a prerogative to be extended parsimoniously and only to bands in straitened economic circumstances. When Buhkwujjenene directed Van Abbott in the fall of 1891 to inform Ottawa of the band's desire to cut two thousand cords of spruce,[121] Ottawa reacted by requesting a report stating "whether /the/ Indians absolutely /were/ in need of such a privilege."[122]

This state of affairs persisted for over five years. When crop failure compelled Buhkwujjenene in October 1896 to petition Prime Minister Laurier for a general cutting license, it was anticipated that sympathy for the band's plight as winter approached would move government to act quickly in alleviating economic distress.[123] In readiness, family groups moved to their logging territories, set up wigwams and shanties, and

cut haulage ways.[124]

This time Ottawa curtailed logging operations for an entire winter. The resulting lack of funds so crippled farming activities the subsequent spring that the Ojibwa were forced to apply for goverment assistance to tide them over to the following year. Hayter Reed, Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, on having the Ojibwa's method of parcelling out reserve land described to him by a timber buyer, developed objections to the family territorial system. He felt that this mode of organization failed to clear the land properly for division into farms. By allowing the Ojibwa to cut "promiscuously", he argued, "only the best and most acessible /timber/ would be taken," disputes would arise, and "the risk of fire /would be/ increased."[125] To curtail production until the Indians demonstrated a greater readiness to assume agricultural pursuits, the Superintendent General stipulated that, while timber had to be block cut, not more than 500,000 board feet of pine might be removed by the Indians during the winter.[126] Gradual modification of the terrain would thus finally force the Ojibwa to adopt the farming economy the government had been trying unsuccessfully to impose on them for over half a century.

The agent in November received a map of the reserve graphed out in allotments, each two miles square. No work, Reed ordered, might be undertaken until the agent had marked out the reserve according to plan (with blazing on trees) and ascribed a berth, to be block cut, to each work group.[121] In reply, Van Abbott, who by 1896 had come to question the feasibility of Ottawa's Indian policy, argued that the arrangement suited neither the buyer nor the Indians. The original contract with H.P. Fremlin, the timber merchant, had called for one million board feet of

pine. Moreover, "500,000 board feet would go a very short way among the 70 or more Indians who may require work."[128]

Familiar with the topography of the reserve, the band stressed that their own system of land allocations suited the rugged character of the countryside. Much of the timber lay scattered in valleys, a factor that militated against block cutting. As for Ottawa's emphasis on conservation, the Ojibwa replied that bush fires annually destroyed far more timber than they could take out. They appealed for permission to begin work at once, with no changes in their mode of operations, since most families had already erected bush camps, and groups lacking horses or oxen would have no means of transporting logs once ice choked the rivers.[129]

Their arguments were to no avail. Indian Affairs rejected the contract with Fremlin because it was an agreement the band had made itself. Ottawa then negotiated a new contract, but by this time it was too late for work to begin. By February the Ojibwa were so deeply in debt to merchants for provisions that they could not afford seed for spring planting. Jarvis Ogista, Buhkwujjenene's spokesman, appealed to Indian Affairs for help, stating that a "sentiment of humanity," if nothing else, should impel Ottawa to draw monies from the Garden River capital fund for seed potatoes.[130]

By depriving the Ojibwa of earnings from logging, the government had eradicated the band's insurance against hardships occasioned by crop failure. Yet Ottawa refused Jarvis' request, referring to the same policy which had driven Abatossaway out of business in 1859. "The Department does not agree that the whole band should pay for seed requested by few," its reply stated.[131]

When, at Jarvis' prompting, Father G. Artus, S.J., and Van Abbott voiced strong support for the grants,[132] Ottawa reluctantly agreed to forward $325 to be repaid with an interest rate of six percent per annum.[133] By May, however, neither money nor seed had arrived, and it was too late to plant potatoes. Not surprisingly, tempers at Garden River ran high. "I wish to tell you," Jarvis informed Reed, "that. . . if next winter our people is /sic/ starving as they have been the last one we will hold the Department of Indian Affairs responsible."[134]

When matters did not improve the following winter, Jarvis, who had been elected chief in 1897, attempted to have Father Artus appointed as advisor to the band. To this, Ottawa immediately objected, on the grounds that such a course might foster interdenominational rivalries. Faced with few alternatives, the Ojibwa finally set out on their own to rectify government misconceptions concerning their group's economic competencies, with the result that significant changes appeared in Ottawa's policy. Handicaps formerly imposed on their enterprises came to be temporarily allayed.

The band's first move in this direction occurred during the winter of 1901-1902, after one timber company refused to grant advances for provisions unless the local agent officially guaranteed that the Indians would cut 30,000 cedar and tamarack ties. Since William Nichols, Van Abbott's successor,[135] had less experience in conducting such transactions than his predecessor or the Ojibwa themselves, he not only agreed to sanction the work but also permitted the band to negotiate its own contract with the company. The Ojibwa resolved to cut the ties eight feet long, six inches in thickness, and sell their finished product at twenty-one cents per tie, minus dues. Delivery would take placed along the St. Mary's

River, the Echo River and the Canadian Pacific rail line. In 1901 both the company and Indian Affairs seemed satisfied with the arrangement.[136] When the following January, however, the company suddenly refused to pay for any ties under six and one-half inches in thickness, and stipulated that the rail line would constitute the only acceptable delivery point, the band's new chief, Charles Cadotte, accused the firm of breaking the contract. What was more, the government had doubled the dues on each tie -- four cents instead of the two cents charged Whites -- and Cadotte demanded to know the reason why.[137]

In response, Ottawa argued that the company required ties of over six inches in thickness to prevent the Indians from inadvertantly cutting them under six inches at the narrow end.[138] Other arguments were equally petty. It was suggested that, while the contract may have allowed ties to be delivered to the banks of the Echo River, in the final analysis "the tenderer had the option of choosing the locality," not the band.[139] With regard to the charging of double dues, Indian Affairs reiterated the position that the timber belonged to all members of the band, "men, women and children in equal shares." The government justified the increased dues, theoretically destined for the band's capital fund, by arguing that workers should "not be allowed to appropriate the full value of the timber for their own use and benefit, and thus deprive the non-workers of their share of interest therein."[140] Given Borron's sweeping appropriation of Indian funds in 1874, this must have seemed like the last straw. Yet, instead of reacting with anger, the band displayed a calm, business-like demeanour.

The usual diameter of cedar and tamarack tress at Garden River, Cadotte explained, enabled a man to make only two ties of six-and-one-half

inches thickness from a single log, whereas from the same log one could obtain three ties six inches thick. The chief particularly resented having women, children, and the elderly used as an excuse to deprive Native leadership of decision-making powers over proceeds from reserve lands. Yet the chief's response was measured. Band members "not taking ties were employed in other lucrative manner," he asserted, "and. . . the whole band really reaped the benefit of the work on the ties."[141] Double dues were therefore unnecessary. There was no open condemnation of Ottawa, only a straightforward account of why, from the band's perspective, the government policy was seen to conserve neither revenue nor resources.[142]

The band also gained an ally in its Indian agent, William L. Nichols. New to the situation, Nichols was shocked by the cycle of seasonal hardship imposed upon the Ojibwa. Conservation of resource revenue counted for far more to Ottawa than community welfare, he noted. To alleviate distress, he began drawing on his "own means" to assist Native families who, as a consequence, were soon "doing better than they /had/ done before under similar circumstances."[143] The band's patience and Nichols' confidence were rewarded. The company expressed satisfaction with the 30,000 ties delivered to the CPR and stated that it hoped to enter into future contracts with the band.[144] The Ojibwa had proven that they could manage their own business affairs in a way that the government found difficult to criticize. As a result, Ottawa relaxed its policies regarding dues and quotas.

Soon afterward, the band negotiated a lucrative contract with another company, Burton Brothers of Barrie, which gained Ottawa's approval for its policies for handling supplies, haulage teams, timber scaling, and any disputes which might arise.[145] In a more generous vein than his predecessor Reed, Frank Pedley, the new Superintendent General of Indian

Affairs, gave Nichols leave to issue timber permits to Indians "for such quantities as each applicant could be reasonably expected to produce."[146] Not only had the band preserved its organizational and territorial systems, but it had also promoted development of a more sympathetic attitude on the part of government to Native interests.

Building on Established Foundations

By the turn of the century, a more congenial economic and political milieu, as well as a heightened public interest in things Native, provided Ojibwa individuals with novel opportunities to draw on their stores of traditional lore. About 1900, George Kabaosa, a great grandson of The Pine, assisted L.O. Lawrence, an immigration officer at Sault Ste. Marie, in incorporating themes from Henry Wadsworth Longfellow's epic poem "Hiawatha" into a play in the Ojibwa language.[147] First performed by an all-Indian cast in a natural setting at Kensington Point, east of Garden River, in 1900, the play attracted considerable local acclaim. So impressed was Longfellow's granddaughter, who attended the first production, that she donated a stained glass window to St. John's Church, built on the Anglican mission land in 1882, as a memorial to Buhkwujjenene, who died in 1900.[148] Yet, like Longfellow's poem itself, the works of L.O. Lawrence and others such as Governor Charles Osborne of Michigan[149] and the Michigan author, Sara Stafford,[150] endowed their subjects with a romanticism which reflected more the vanished past than the potentialities of the Native present.[151]

Blindness to the course of actual historical events did little to bring public perceptions of Ojibwa capabilities into alignment with the band's rapidly developing political and economic competencies. A



Courtesy AO

St. John's Anglican Church



Courtesy AO

The Longfellow Window



Courtesy AO

Hiawatha Play, 1904

new intensity of purpose revealed itself in the wording of petitions presented to Ottawa in the decades immediately following 1900. The lyrical oratory came to be punctuated by terminology of a new genre as young Ojibwa spokesmen sought new words in the dominant English language that could be used to defend traditional prerogatives. One such communication, for instance, designated the Garden River reserve as a "primogenitive habatation /sic, primogenial habitation/" on which Indians hence should be granted "full rights" to resources, especially timber.[152]

New pressures demanded that grievances be conveyed with succinctness and force. In 1906 the Algoma Advisory Union, a precursor of the Sault Ste. Marie Chamber of Commerce, complained that as the Garden River population had failed to clear large farms, even though forests on all sides of their reserve were being levelled by timber companies, Ottawa should expropriate the reserve, as others had recommended many times before. The Union, composed of several prominent Sault Ste. Marie residents, petitioned Prime Minister Laurier to terminate the reserve system so that the municipality might extend eastward beyond Partridge Point.[153]

Owing to the sustained opposition of William Nichols and the Band Council, who sent a delegation composed of Chief George Menissino, John Askin, Alex Wabonosa, and W.J. Pine to Ottawa in November 1906, the Union had to be content by 1910 with an order-in-council allowing construction of a trunk road across the reserve, but no additional surrender of territory.[154] After four lengthy years of negotiations, the Ojibwa obtained a ruling exempting them from having to contribute labour or funds, either for construction or maintenance, to the enterprise. The band also secured acceptance of the condition that,

should the road cease to be used for public conveyance, the land allowance would revert to the band.[155] The encroachments of modern capitalist society would come only so far, and then no further.

CHAPTER TEN

PRESERVING A DISTINCTIVE NATIVE COMMUNITY

Developments in the Sphere of Men's Activities

Traditional organization, skills and values continued to inform the band's ongoing struggle to defend and develop the economic potential inherent in their reserve's diversified resource base.[1] The winter kin-based hunting, trapping and logging group had weathered pressures to reshape the community's logging force almost exclusively into all-male, company-controlled work teams. Each fall, once the chief and council concluded their negotiations with timber merchants concerning provisions, quotas, prices and locations for delivery, family groups set out to their bush camps. It was a way of life which had persisted since the 1850's, and would continue to be followed at Garden River into the first decades of the twentieth century.

Logging operations were presided over by the father, who directed the labor of sons and sons-in-law. Alternatively, a man might remain in the settlement during the winter and send only his sons, along with a sledge, equipment, and, if he owned one, his team of horses or oxen -- a mark of family independence and pride. Most men looked forward to the day when at last they might purchase their own teams, and this cultural emphasis on each male head securing means to operate his own independent family business has been carried over into the mechanized twentieth century in the ownership of heavy equipment, trucks, and even small bulldozers.[2] A third option, generally adopted by younger, unmarried men, was to seek employment off the reserve from jobbers or in company-owned logging camps.[3]

The opening of roads, haulage routes, and skidways facilitated the use of teams, sleighs and carts for transportation in the bush, rather than the toboggans, sleds and dog teams formerly employed. Following maple sugaring in the early spring, men prepared and planted their fields using the same teams that had hauled logs during the winter. Traditional religious attitudes towards seasonal transitions and their characteristic economic activities persisted in spite of technological changes. For instance, males with recognized spiritual powers conducted spring rituals, made offerings and supplications to the invigorated spiritual agencies of the universe, and burned tobacco in the fields.[4]

Throughout the summer many men sought wage employment. Others who owned boats and nets engaged in the commercial fishery. Still others, apprenticed by their French or Métis fathers, or taught at an industrial school, practiced a trade such as boatbuilding, carpentry, shoemaking, harness-making, or blacksmithing.

Summer was also the time for mining. Since an act, passed in 1888, stated that no royalties would accrue to the band's credit from mining on reserves, the bands possessed little initiative to sell or lease mineral lands. Instead, members of the Sayers, Jones, Nolin, Bell and Pine families employed practical skills they had acquired as mineral explorers in the working of small family-owned iron, copper, and silver ore operations on the ceded townships of Laird and Duncan or on the Batchewana tract.[5] Sales of ore became a welcome source of extra capital. Marble quarrying also provided cash supplements. Mines came to be "circulated" over time within kin groups. A man might reassign his location to his brother or to his son, and his son transfer the mine to his brother-in-law, and so on.[6]

During the fall, men who had been working elsewhere returned to the reserve for the harvest, and haying on the marshes along the Root River and at Echo Bay. Autumn was the maturation period in the seasonal cycle and received ceremonial recognition as such. For the community's medical practioners, suitable plants were ready for gathering in the fields, forests and water. For families who remained in the settlement during the winter, firewood had to be chopped and stacked. As not all groups who left for the bush participated in logging, men who pursued alternatives such as hunting and trapping inland, collected bark, and with the assistance of their wives, constructed canoes.

During conversations with elders at Garden River today, it became evident that the Ojibwa cognitive system endowed new activities with meaning transferred from valued traditional occupations. For example, "lowering pointers" at high water season down the White, Puckasaw, Montreal, and Mississauga Rivers not only demanded skills similar to those required in the rapids fishery but also a fortitude derived from protective spirit agencies. The "river" constituted an evocative symbol of one's life and to reach one's destination along the course meant heeding spiritual as well as material guides. Successful performance reflected on a man's identity and well-being since such competence arose from an inner spiritual balance between acquired technical knowledge, economic necessity, and a person's own specific rationale for engaging in the task.[7]

Women's Activities

Women, when not caring for livestock or elderly kin and children of school age -- thus precluding their leaving the settlement in winter --

joined their husbands in the bush.[8] At the camps they fished, trapped, prepared hides and skins, assisted in the construction of shelters, made and repaired garments, gathered firewood, cooked and minded children who had accompanied them. They and their husbands engaged in maple sugaring in April, and during the summer months tended the maturing crops.[9]

With the assistance of male members of the family, women procured needed raw materials and made garments, footwear, baskets, and handcrafts for family use or sale. Women and girls picked berries and dried them in the sun. Because men were often employed in wage labour away from the community, women formed the core of the family group during the summer months, the reverse of the winter pattern. In the autumn, female family members dried and smoked fish and prepared the harvests of field and garden for winter consumption.

While women tended to be more conservative than men, the division of labour by gender was not rigid. Men and women could perform many of the occupations traditionally associated with the other sex. This was less often a matter of choice than necessity, owing to the often prelonged separation of men from their families. Assumption of predominately male roles by women was also evident in the political and religious spheres. The female family head could -- especially if she possessed recognized medicine powers, or if the family lacked a senior male member owing to absence, sickness or death -- assume the status of a speaker or group leader.

Occupational Interdependence Throughout the Seasonal Cycle

Adrian Tanner (1979: 6-13, 62-72) has observed that unwillingness on the part of trade monopolies in the north to equip and provision trappers

has in recent years forced the Mistassini Cree to rely on government subsidies to maintain their winter fur production. This furnishes a later example in time of the process of increasing economic dependence on monopolies and government that, by 1850, was appearing west of Sault Ste. Marie. By contrast, the Garden River Ojibwa refused to accept Vidal's dismissal of Shingwaukönse's claims to prerogatives over merchantable resources, in addition to furs, as valid, even though after 1850 Vidal's views came to determine the Canadian legal system's definition of Indian tenure both to land and resources. The band was able to protect and develop a diversified local economy characterized by a number of seasonally appropriate actvities, none of which dominated the annual cycle. The vitality of the Garden River peoples' economic system was crucial to their political autonomy, since the degree to which Native proprietorship over valuable resources was recognized by both government and company interests tended to determine the scope of band leadership's decision-making powers.

Availability of wage labour, close proximity to many sources of purchaseable goods, and the ready convertibility of local resources -- fish, fur, sugar, wild meat, agricultural produce, timber, and minerals -- into saleable items made activities at Garden River less vulnerable seasonally to minor climatic fluctuations than was the case among fur-producing interior bands. By 1900 each phase of the annual cycle at Garden River was characterized by an occupation capable of providing monetary returns, from which a portion was necessarily reserved and reinvested in the next endeavour. Fishing in the fall purchased provisions for winter logging which, by spring, in turn produced funds for seed.

Band leaders attempted to promote summer employment opportunities on the reserve to provide funds to supplement cash returns from market gardening, one of the most risky ventures within the cycle. Crop failure was not uncommon and insurance unknown. Other activities could usually tide the band over bad harvest seasons, but should crops fail and then Ottawa impose policies which curtailed production in another segment of the annual economic round (such as logging or fishing), the ensuing hardships could be severe.

Little Systems and Broad Minds

Ojibwa leadership at Garden River maintained its strength of purpose, since it, historically, had been so intimately involved in battling the forces of change which brought the restrictive legislation to bear on Native goals. The subject could arouse considerable emotion in elders who personally participated in the struggle:

> What is his right? It /the law/ can be wrong even if it wears a crown of gold. And what is gold if it means that? He's stepping over God. 10

There was reason for hope in 1900. Nichols, the government agent, refused to slot Indians into an economic niche like many of his predecessors. Owing to his relatively unconstricted outlook, he came to respect the competencies inherent in the community and sought to encourage them. Two of his successors, Thomas G. Wigg and Murdock MacLellan, followed his lead. All three officials, after 1910, upheld a claim made by the Garden River band to gravel along the Garden River, lying north of the Canadian Pacific Railway's ballast pit. Construction of the trunk road raised the demand for gravel and hence its price. The Garden River deposits constituted some of the finest grade stone readily accessible within Algoma.[11]



Note

Railway Co's Property, shown edged green
Encroachments of Ballast Pit on Indian Reserve shown edged red
Property to be acquired in Indian Reserve for Ballast Pit shown edged yellow

Area of Encroachment { (2) 1.00 Acres / (3) 5.13 / 6.13

Area of Property to be acquired (including encroachment (3)) 323 Acres

Right of Way Department
Last Entered Registry Office
Planned April 3rd 1913

C. P. R.

LAKE SUPERIOR DIV. DISTRICT No. 1

GARDEN ALGOMA SUBDIV.

Plan showing portion excavated outside of Boundaries of the Ballast Pit on the Garden Indian Reserve

Scale 1:2000ft.

Resident Engineers Office
Sudbury May 1911

Note

Portions excavated outside C.P.R. Co's Boundaries shown edged in red

Bears of Cross Sections is N.W. Corner of Pit and Northerly Boundary Line of Property used as Base Line

The surveys for this plan were made under my direction and personal supervision and I hereby certify as to the unprejudiced character and to the accuracy of the same

(Signed) H.T. Reid
President Engineer Corps Ry
Sudbury, Ontario

Th. Cox Nov 3.13.

P.A.C., RG 10, vol. 2067

At first the incident seemed minor, at least superficially, to both the local agents and Ottawa. It concerned the removal of stone from the reserve for commercial purposes without band permission. As the issue gained momentum, however, it grew apparent that more was at stake than merely a Native bid for a potentially lucrative, short-term source of income. Principles would be raised which had been, and would continued to be, of enduring significance to the Ojibwa.

The Gravel Pit Dispute

George Kabaosa had complained to Indian Affairs as early as 1897 that the Canadian Pacific Railway had been removing gravel from band property and selling it to local buyers. By the spring of 1911 so much crushed stone had been shipped from a site, 32.3 acres in area lying north of the Garden River pit, that Charles Cadotte, the elected chief, demanded that an official measurement be made of the amount removed.[12] Under Cadotte's leadership the band hired a team of lawyers, Messrs. Goodman and Galbraith; conducted a careful inquiry into prevailing gravel prices; secured an affidavit from a local company to support their contentions; and charged the CPR $25,513, or eight cents per cubic yard for 318,924 cubic yards of stone taken by trespass.[13]

The CPR, which had built a spur line into the ballast pit, declared the price "excessive" and refused to pay.[14] In response, Ottawa dispatched J.G. Ramsden, Inspector of Indian Reserves, to Garden River to inquire into the difficulty. After consulting with the Ojibwa leaders and the two local Indian agents, MacLellan and Wigg, who both termed the band's demands "fair and just,"[15] Ramsden devised an alternative scheme which would prevent alienation of either land or resources, and transform the gravel

Courtesy AO

George Kabaosa and Family
Sugar Island



George Kabaosa

Photograph courtesy AO

into an ongoing source of revenue for the Garden River community. The price to be charged for the gravel would be reduced drastically from eight cents to two cents per cubic yard, while the railway would be required to pay a fixed sum of $150 per acre for "injury" to reserve property, and a royalty of $1.50 per carload on all gravel shipped from the area in the future.[16]

The band agreed with Ramsden's suggestions. These terms embodied the strongest precedent that had yet been raised for the legitimization of Indian control over a resource within reserve boundaries. The Ojibwa, confidently assuming that negotiations would focus exclusively on the issue of trespass, requested Indian Affairs to submit the case for arbitration by federal, provincial, CPR, and band representatives.[17] In January 1913, John Askin asked for a copy of the Arbitration Agreement to study prior to the band's appointment of a negotiator, although there seemed little doubt that J.G. Ramsden would be the Indians' choice. Not only would a forum arise for the testing of the existence of principles basic to aboriginal prerogative, but the CPR -- one of the most powerful agents of national unification -- would be taking its place alongside Canada and Ontario on the stand. If the Ojibwa secured their claim, the event would not fail to have a widespread impact on Indian policy in Canada.

Sudden realization of the momentous consequences to Indian status should the Ojibwa claim be admitted shook both Ottawa and the CPR from their former lethargy. In 1913 Indian Affairs appointed A.D. McNabb, a far less flexible man than either MacLellan or Wigg, to the position of local agent. McNabb branded the leading Ojibwa spokesmen as "agitators", Nichols and his two predecessors, Wigg and MacLellan, as interfering nuisances, and refused to consider the Native claim seriously.[18] The agent's

authoritarian attitudes stemmed from Ottawa's desire to curb the surge towards self-determination inherent in the band's continuous struggle to rectify ambiguities in reserve boundaries and gain a measure of control over local resources. So close came the Ojibwa to breaking the barriers of the restrictive legal system pertaining to Indian status that it apparently instigated a reactionary response from Ottawa in defense of the status quo.

What the Indians viewed as a dispute concerning control over resources, Ottawa regarded solely as a question of whether or not more reserve land should be alienated. Ramsden had presented a number of reasons why Ottawa should preserve the land base on behalf of the band, but the issue of actual proprietorship had not been debated. And Indian Affairs and the CPR ensured that the opportunity would not arise.

The fact that the band had been conducting independent business transactions with another firm, the Superior Dock and Dredge Company, came to be turned against their case. The Ojibwa had agreed to sell a sixty acre quarry to the local gravel company in the hopes of securing a long-term employer of Native labour. Sensing a commercial rival, the CPR pressured Ottawa to sidestep Ramsden's position regarding royalties. This Ottawa did by relegating the band to the status of mere "occupiers" rather than proprietors of land or resources. Ottawa then dispensed with the charge of trespass, the CPR expropriated the 32.3 acres, and the board of arbitrators -- which did not include J.G. Ramsden -- became responsible only for determining the land's value. The payment the Ojibwa had received for their sale of the quarry to the Superior Dock and Dredge served as a model, and in the end the band received only $5,282 for the land and gravel, minus $1,293 for legal costs.[19]

The Wild Man's Stone

Knowledge that the basis of negotiations with the CPR had been altered without their consent fired the band's opposition to the cession of the Buhkwujjenenewabick, a traprock bluff lying north of Squirrel Island. Two rival gravel companies sought to possess the hill as a site for a quarry and, as in the past, Ottawa reserved all rights over the disposition of the territory once it was surrendered. The Ojibwa retaliated by stating that cessions they had previously made, while supposedly for their "benefit", had turned out to be sacrifices for which they received little or no return. Even the stone quarry ceded to the Superior Dock and Dredge Company had failed to provide employment the Ojibwa complained, since the firm had been driven out of business by competition with the CPR pits.[20] Band leaders informed W.R. White, head of the team sent to survey the face of the Buhkwujjenenewabick, of their annoyance at losing Squirrel Island, the Clark location, the gravel pits, and especially Partridge Point, which had been subdivided by 1902 for settlement.[21] They demanded that at least one of their grievances be met. White reported to Ottawa that the Ojibwa refused to sanction any further sales until the western boundary of their reserve was run due north from Partridge Point in accord with the Robinson Huron Treaty.[22]

It was only when the gravel companies themselves began offering incentives to encourage the band to agree to the cession that Ottawa's resistance began to wane. Guarantees were extended that employment, including insurance benefits, would become available on the reserve. The Indians were also informed that not only would boundaries set down by the chief and council be respected, but also that should the site cease to be used for quarrying, it would revert to the band. Eventually

The Buhkwujjenenewabick



Band Office


TOWNSHIP
DUNCAN
INDIAN STRIP
MARBLE QUARRY
WILKINSON LOCATIONS
C.P.R. BALLAST PIT
LITTLE
LAKE GEORGE
BUHKWUJJENENEWABICK
ST MARY'S
RIVER
SQUIRREL
ISLANDS
CAMELSHILL
LITTLE ST JOSEPH ISLAND
ECHO BAY
ECHO RIVER
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MEHOE
PLAN OF THE INDIAN RESERVE
AT
GARDEN RIVER
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

Adapted from Surveys of Garden River made in 1916 and 1921. Ontario: MNR Survey Records.



Courtesy of Mr. George Richardson

Hollister Jewell & Co., Garden River, Ont.
Manufacturers of Lumber, Lath & Shingles, and
Dealers in General Merchandise.
Script

the terms grew sufficiently advantageous that to refuse them would entail rejecting an important opportunity for local development and, finally, the Garden River Ojibwa agreed to surrender.[23]

Norman Jones, who worked at the quarry during its operation, claimed that, according to oral traditions, all parties who trespassed beyond the geographic limits set forth in the 1914 agreement would have incurred punishment from the Buhkwujjenene.sug who "owned" the Buhkwujjenenewabick, the "Wild Men's Iron".[24] Shot with "seed" or "cork" by the Wild Men, a person who ignored the boundaries laid out by the contract's terms, would become "crazy".[25] This propensity of the Ojibwa to translate geographic landscape into symbolic space endowed events at the quarry with heightened significance. Even though negotiations had concerned the cession of nothing more glamorous than gravel, the consequences of the agreement would be recited in legend generation after generation. Similarly to the Mica Bay mine takeover at Point Mamainse in 1849, events surrounding the Buhkwujjenenewabick in 1914 were endowed with a mythical appeal, serving as symbolic precedents for future action.

Curbing the Dynamism -- The Influence of New Economic Policies on Band Development

The conditions the Garden River band was able to impose on the sale of crushed stone from the Buhkwujjenenewabick drew the group as close as it had ever come to being able to exercise full proprietorship over a resource, other than fur. It would be the last such accomplishment for many years. After 1913, A.D. McNabb deliberately refused to record any of the speeches made in council, pertaining to the issue of resource control on the reserve, in the band minutes.[26] He also constantly maligned Ojibwa leaders, among

them, George Kabaosa.[27] By refusing to recognize either Native suggestions or grievances, and imposing a rigid agricultural policy on the developing community, the agent temporarily checked the momentum towards self-determination. As a result, the Garden River community came to suffer from factional strife, similar to that experienced in 1857 and 1896.

McNabb encouraged agriculture with an avidity which amounted almost to zeal. Ottawa promoted farming on reserves as an adjunct to a campaign for a "New Ontario" of the north, and in keeping with the emphasis on social and economic reform in general which characterized Canadian politics at the close of the First World War. The band gained some advantages from new arrangements for loans, financed out of band funds at an annual interest rate of six percent,[28] for purchasing seeds, draft horses, and farming equipment, and from a series of drives by local merchants, the Union Agricultural Society and other organizations to promote increased agricultural production.[29] Yet major difficulties also arose from government's concentration on a single economic activity.

Some Ojibwa families could not meet payments for horses, oxen and other purchases, especially as crop failure remained a frequent problem, regardless of McNabb's sanguine expectations. No farming insurance existed, and when band members fell deeply into debt Ottawa could threaten to take "drastic measures" to collect on loans.[30] In this campaign, optimistic rhetoric far outdistanced practicality. Niggardly financing, often poor equipment, and pressure for intensive cultivation of crops such as strawberries[31] unsuited to either the climate or the soil, continually hampered the scheme. A survey of allotments at Garden River made by Lang and Ross, P.L.S., showed that by 1916 family heads held from six to fifteen acres, rarely more: the same ratio of land to

single family groups as had existed at the time of the 1861 census.[32]

In activities other than agriculture, McNabb regarded Indians as "gleaners", harvesting what was left after the departure of the large resource industries. In 1913, when the American firm which held exclusive rights to timber on the ceded Batchewana tract ceased all cutting operations, owing to a law stipulating that all wood pulp be manufactured in Canada, McNabb suggested that Ottawa terminate the company's timber license and allow the band what meagre returns remained on what he saw as cut-over country.[33] He opposed Kabaosa's campaign for Ojibwa management of timber resources on reserves, however, and turned a deaf ear to Native demands for the cancellation of the Spry lease on the Indian Strip.[34] Regardless of sustained pressures from the Garden River band for control over this territory, formally recognized by Ottawa as part of the unceded reserve in 1895, the Indian Strip did not revert to the Indians until 1932.[35]

Ottawa's support for a single occupation -- farming -- rather than the local economic system as a whole, with its seasonally integrated and interrelated activities, led to a myopic perception of what was happening "on the ground". Even McNabb had little grasp of the situation, a circumstance which, in his accounts of how the Native economy functioned over time, gave rise to glaring contradictions and inconsistencies. For instance, in 1913 he described the Goulais Bay band as eking out a "very precarious living" from fishing, whereas three years later he proclaimed the same group to be "expert fishermen" who derived a "good living" from their occupation.[36] McNabb also argued that, due to "excellent" soil conditions, agriculture flourished at Garden River, whereas an American Indian agent visiting the community during the same period

wrote that no farming existed "outside of small gardens, /as/ nearly all the able bodied Indians /were/ working at fairly good wages at river driving or loading timber on vessels."[37]

This policy bias towards land base, and away from principles of group resource management, proved extremely injurious to the harmonious interrelationship formerly existing between the Batchewana and Garden River bands. McNabb, in seeking to control the reserve environment by promoting farming, interacted exclusively with the Garden River Band Council, and so deprived the Batchewana leaders of a forum to voice ideas and grievances. This threatened to force Batchewana band members into a caste-like situation offensive to the Ojibwa, who valued free and direct democratic expression within the group. McNabb also revived Joseph Wilson's policy of fostering internal dissension by depriving one band of rights while extending privileges to the other. The Batchewana Council, at first, wholeheartedly supported the Garden River people's drive to rectify inaccuracies in reserve boundaries, and backed George Kabaosa's campaign to gain group access to timber on the Indian Strip. During the First World War, members of both bands emphasized their desire to acquire full citizenship rights, and enrolled in the services to this purpose: a situation exhibiting parallels to events during the American Civil War, over a half-century before. Both groups shared in the pursuit of human freedoms which they knew had been denied them or, as in the case of the franchise, withdrawn.[38]

When George Kabaosa was forced to step down as elected chief shortly after he had won his office in March 1916, owing to Ottawa's refusal "to approve any of the leadership candidates," relations between the two bands dramatically worsened. This

onset of externally-enforced conditions of "limited good" led to extreme hardship for all reserve residents, especially those whose names failed to appear on the Garden River annuity list. Documentary evidence suggests that niggling sanctions imposed on Batchewana band members by the agent -- and Garden River members acting under McNabb's direction -- extended even to the use of firewood,[40] and resulted in the immediate growth of factionalism. Oral traditions support this contention, and refer to this period as the time of the "clean up" or "purge".[41]

Since a tendency towards exclusiveness on the part of one segment of society contravened fundamental Ojibwa values, the situation prompted a search for ways out of the dilemma. Neither band would submit to the government policies which bred the conflicts. When worsening tensions between the two groups led to disputes over who in 1850 had been the principal head chief at Sault Ste. Marie, Shingwaukönse or Nebenagoching, the Batchewana band decided to leave Garden River and purchase a sector of the original Clark location which was now on the market.[42] That a basic unity still existed between the seceding band and its former host group nevertheless remained apparent in the willingness of both band councils to permit individual families to exercise a high degree of choice in deciding to which group they would eventually offer their allegiance. Former members of the Batchewana band joined the Garden River band, and vice versa.

Mechanisms for Maintaining Positive Political Interrelationships with Government and Industry

The Garden River band responded to the inflexibility of government policy after 1913 by dividing its leadership potential in such a way that one sector was responsible for upholding positive linkages with the government,

and the other was expected to press, as far as could reasonably be expected, for changes in keeping with Native values and goals. On the surface, it appeared that two factions had arisen. In practice, however, the arrangement allowed for a degree of political activity without the danger of alienating McNabb or Ottawa. The responsibility for maintaining good relations with the government usually fell to an elderly and respected individual who had already earned a reputation in the council forum and who chose to relinquish the more active role to younger men. This practice aided in maintaining a structural continuity in the tradition of "civil chieftainship" exhibited by Ojibwa leadership prior to 1850.

John Askin assumed this role about 1913 and held it until his death in 1919. A dignified orator, respectful to government policies without being subservient, Askin maintained a stance that furnished a core of stability and continuity within a repressive milieu. In 1912 McNabb had distrusted Askin, since he had seen the seventy-six-year-old sub-chief as the "ruling spirit" behind the band's opposition to the CPR during the gravel dispute.[44] In 1915 the agent regarded Askin as an ally within the band and expressed gratitude for the "able assistance he /Askin/ has always rendered the agent since taking office."[45]

In his speeches as a counsellor and spokesman, Askin found it necessary to turn against his past as a lumberman in urging the Ojibwa to farm exclusively. In March 1916, for instance, McNabb recorded that Askin had denounced lumbering as an occupation to the point of accusing J.L. Kennedy, a local timber buyer, of "raking off the farmers."[46] Yet this seemingly strong ideological commitment to agriculture by an individual who, because of his retirement from heavy labour, could afford

George Menissino and John Askin, Foreground
Shingwauk School, Sault Ste. Marie

Courtesy Garden River Band Office

John Askin

to adopt a stance at variance with the complexities of the situation, proved to be necessary to the band's interests. Had Askin not taken the position he did, Garden River might well have lost 4,000 acres of prime agricultural property west of the Echo River to a government-run prison farm, on the grounds that the Indians lacked the initiative to work the land.[47]

While the chief and council at Garden River remained firm in their determination to forward valued goals, band leadership by 1913 found it difficult to express its full potential. So much energy had to be diverted towards protecting whatever gains had been made between 1906 and 1912 that speakers like Askin spent much of their time simply defending the status quo. This state of affairs stemmed largely from the continued ideological positioning of "Indians" in a category counter to the stream of national development and the "public good". From this source sprang anomalies and contradictions pertaining to Native title to land and resources, and especially the relegation of bands to the position of "occupants" rather than proprietors of reserves.

Simon J. Dawson, as well as legal experts involved in investigating Native claims disputes, found that the province's contravention of hunting and fishing rights, extended to Indians under the Robinson treaties actually brought the powers of the Crown to extend such prerogatives into question.[48] The constitutional significance of such findings discouraged their full exploration until developing philosophies of thought could foster more complex legal structures designed to shield the Crown's delegated rights. Because the Robinson agreements provided the model for later treaties made between Native peoples and the Crown, and as such, had a major bearing on Canada's relationship with its Native people.

Indian groups continuously tested the capacity of these agreements to uphold aboriginal rights. The history of the Garden River community is a long story of attempts to break legal barriers, set up after 1849, by creating new precedents. Ogista's sale of the Wilkinson location and the gravel pit dispute of 1914 were both directed towards this end. Although they failed in their primary goal, they led to minor triumphs in the negotiating forum so that conditions inserted in agreements with outside agencies came increasingly nearer to recognizing Native proprietorship over land and resources on reserves, regardless of prevailing law.

The denial of rights to bands traditionally exercising territorial prerogatives and possessing a form of government based on direct participatory democracy, with a system of leadership held responsible to the group through a system of responsive reciprocal ties, has led to severe problems for the Garden River community throughout the years. Special difficulties have arisen due to actions of shrewd men who, acting in an official capacity in the 1850's and pretending to be Shingwaukönse's friends, worked for their own economic advancement, manipulating reserve boundaries on the assumption that the eventual collapse of the band's organization and the destruction of its territorial base would serve to conceal their handiwork. In the name of retrenchment and band control, moreover, Ottawa made group membership dependent on receipt of annuities, rather than vice versa, as had formerly been the case. This threatened to end the Garden River community as a vital, developing entity by breaking it down into warring factions, clamouring for money and other material benefits to compensate for a lack of rights. When it was found that dissension could not halt the momentum towards

self-determination, the government adopted harsher measures. In 1916 officialdom reacted by depriving Garden River of its leadership altogether until a suitable degree of compliance to external expectations could be restored.

On the positive side, by 1916 the Ojibwa had demonstrated that in the face of formidable odds they could still maintain a milieu conducive to the development of their culture in all its social, economic and political manifestations. Restrictive policies could be gradually changed, and the consequences of ignorance and dishonesty rectified through the combined efforts of Native leaders and sympathetic government, legal, commercial and religious agencies. Most important, band leaders have retained The Pine's faith that indigenous peoples might function as semi-autonomous, self-determining groups within the Canadian nation.

CONCLUSION

The Unifying Vision

Between 1827 and 1853 an alliance arose among Native leaders from north of Lake Huron and around Lake Superior west to the Red River and the headwaters of the Mississippi. Its objective focused on ways in which bands could seek reconciliation with, and participation in the course of the emerging Canadian state. This policy, according to legend, originated with a "gift" bestowed on Shingwaukönse in a dream which granted him the insight to see rifts in intention and understanding which divided political agencies, both Native and White, as well as the promise of a power to assist in healing them.

The reputations of power-holders such as Shingwaukönse lay mainly with the accuracy of their skill in discerning causes of disruption within the universe and their ability to devise courses of action to deal with these disturbances. In practising divination a leader had first to secure a vision granting the requisite "blessing" from spirit agencies, and then obtain the sanction of his group to employ his special "gift". To maintain reciprocal relationships with the spirits over time constituted a flow of power in the vertical dimension, but equally important was the "balancing" of this dynamism within the horizontal plane, the sphere of social and political interaction.[1] This momentum, often regulated through ritual, came under the aegis of superior human power-holders whose main task lay not in setting their strength against other powers in a continuous competitive struggle, but in maintaining a workable balance at all levels of the cosmological system. Human power-holders had therefore to be

wary of signs of change and adjust their own position and strategies accordingly.

Since the Ojibwa believed that sufficient "good" entailed the presence of sufficient "power", lack of good meant some agency was temporarily obstructing the source. Once the flow of power stopped, then resource avenues also ceased.[2] On the other hand, proper alignment with the power source ensured that necessities required by a band would continue to be supplied. In 1846 The Pine considered spiritual agencies to have responded to his pleas, and felt optimistic that in the midst of seeming want there would be hope for his people's future.

The failure of the Shawnee uprising had demonstrated the futility of trying to resist White encroachment onto Indian territory and, in response, Shingwaukönse devised a policy of reserving certain lands and resources exclusively for the benefit of the Indians. He emphasized his past loyalty to Britain and argued that his followers, like other loyalist groups, deserved to occupy their territory unmolested. Recognizing limitation as symptomatic rather than causal, the chief set out to encourage the government to assist him in founding an Ojibwa settlement, similar to Methodist farming communities in southeastern Ontario, but which would exercise managerial jurisdiction over local lumber and mining operations, as well as promote farming. To aid in securing his goal The Pine surrounded himself in 1848 with Native allies, interpreters, Métis and French traders and, in the case of Allan Macdonell, a lawyer and entrepreneur. Head chiefs from other bands acted in a similar manner by claiming timber and minerals on behalf of their own groups.

Fearful of large concentrations of Native people on the

western frontier, both Canada and the United States ignored The Pine's appeals. Shingwaukönse's plans regarding lumbering and mining on lands over which he exercised regulatory control met with the rebuttal that the Ojibwa lacked sound organizing principles. To allow Indians to exploit timber or mineral on their reserves, it was maintained, would lead to chaos and wastage of the resource. Policy-makers refused to accord bands the potential for responsible action, a radical reversal of the stance the British authorities had taken towards the Ojibwa, as military allies, during the period of intercolonial rivalries only a generation earlier.

Although government opposed his scheme, so confident was the chief in the rightness of his vision that he invited Ojibwa from around Lake Superior, as well as the French and Métis at the Sault, to join with him and Allan Macdonell in dispossessing mining operations at Mica Bay, north of Sault Ste. Marie. This act launched the subject of aboriginal rights into the public forum and the years 1850 to 1852 came to be characterized by a lively press debate concerning Native relationships with the land and its resources. This controversy came abruptly to a close following the passing of a bill in June 1853, introduced by the Attorney General, Robert Baldwin, which threatened harsh legal sanctions on any person or group, viewed as an instigator of Indian discontent within the Algoma district.

This new law curtailed overt developments in Ojibwa leadership and policies which had been progressing during the preceding two hundred years, and much of the momentum for change came to be forced "underground" to enliven councils held within and among bands. Dynamic leadership, often shielded from external view, slowly continued

to strengthen and engender new organizational forms, as chiefs retained, elaborated and defended their prerogatives in the face of formidable difficulties. Had Ojibwa leadership not demonstrated cautious candor, as well as flexibility and innovativeness after 1850, it would never have survived until the present day with any semblance of its original integrity.

Traditional Ojibwa Leadership: Its Prerogatives and Responsibilities

Chapter One of this study traced relationships between the dodem as a component of the Native cosmological system, and the presence within the Ojibwa bands of social entities, referred to as dodemic groups and defined by agnatic, or less frequently, by cognatic descent principles, which have a bearing on the nature of leadership, its prerogatives, responsibilities and transmission over time. While it was suggested that the Ojibwa belief system may well always have allowed for transfer between generations of specific traditions and symbolic forms, able to be used as group identifiers, new incentives for social elaboration arose during the seventeenth century. It was also maintained that any stress on unilineal descent principles or primogeniture derived primarily from organizational concepts introduced by the French and British and engrafted on the Native system. During the colonial period Indian leaders assumed the status of a "forest aristocracy" in their relationship with external authorities, who presented them with medals and other accoutrements denoting rank. With the close of the colonial era, however, these ceremonial exchanges ceased. This led to re-emphasis on persisting leadership principles which upheld, as a norm, reciprocity of interest between a head man and his group, and encouraged

a leader to protect his people even when to do so involved personal risk.

The scope of political and economic prerogatives exercised by an Ojibwa chief on behalf of his group went far beyond the range of responsibilities demonstrated by the leader of a winter hunting group. While in some ways the former seemed to be an elaborated version of the latter, esepecially with regard to regulation of access to local resources, the role of the head chief proved less concerned with economic activities per se than with band membership and the preservation of a milieu conducive to harmonious interaction among several extended family groups. The Ojibwa ogima acted as a co-ordinator, in addition to his responsibilities as a policy-maker and diplomat. Although many anthropologists regard this role as a solely historical phenomenon, investigators' views vary on this point according to the weight each scholar attributes to the modifying influence exerted on proto-Ojibwa organization by European contact, and the degree to which the Upper Great Lakes environment, prior to 1760, is envisioned as harsh or, conversely, diversified and capable of sustaining an "original affluent society" (Service, 1971: 72-8; Smith, 1974, II: 54). The nature of leadership among proto-Ojibwa peoples has thus been the subject of a controversy whose course, due to lack of early historical data strongly supporting either one side or the other, has been more determined by theoretical perspective than by empirical appraisal of historical fact. That environmental vicissitudes promoted organizational flexibility among the proto-Ojibwa is generally accepted, although historical factors have made the Ojibwa record far more complex.

One ethnological trend has been to view band leadership among Algonquian-speaking groups as emerging from a primitive organizational form

stressing personal individualism. John M. Cooper (1939) regarded the hunting territory system recorded for the Montagnais (Speck, 1915a) as diagnostic of an individualistic tendency among all Northeastern Algonquian-speaking peoples which, he claimed, had existed since "time immemorial". The political economy of the family hunting group, Cooper claimed, went so far as to approximate the status of a "minute state", while the jural authority exercised by chiefs, where such leaders existed at all, remained restricted to adjustment of boundaries and intervention in disputes. Cooper suggested that the importance of the "band" versus the family group arose in the forum of government-Indian relations. Following this development, he argued, "the family would not be so nearly identical with the 'state'", leadership would come to wield a wider and more pervasive influence, and changes would take place in land tenure, so that "the line between band sovereignty and ownership in severalty would be more distinctly and sharply drawn" (Cooper, 1939: 90).

Focus on the "band" returned following Julian Steward's assertion that this group may have constituted the original political and economic unit among Algonquian-speaking peoples after all, and that emphasis upon the family and individualized territorial system stemmed from fur trade relations (Steward, 1936: 331-50). Diamond Jenness (1932: 124-5) had also been exploring this line of argument and further studies tended to uphold this premise in the historical context (Leacock, 1954; Rogers, 1963). Scholars recognized a major difference between the form of individualized land tenure exhibited by Native societies principally exploiting beaver for trade, and the wider-ranging hunting exploits of peoples who pursued migratory big game such as barren ground caribou

(Speck and Eiseley, 1939). Eleanor Leacock (1954) and, later, Robert Murphy and Julian Steward (1956) by drawing a distinction between use value and exchange value, posited that securing animals for their pelts fostered an irreversible dependency on trade goods, resulting in the predominance of individualism in both the economic and social spheres of interaction.

Edward S. Rogers nevertheless cautioned that one should not place too much reliance on ecological and trade factors in determining the nature of historic organizational forms. Among the Ojibwa he found that human population level could fall considerably below the carrying capacity of the resource base (Rogers, 1969c). This led him to suggest that rarely-examined cultural variables, such as the predominance of witchcraft, operated to space groups relative to one another over the landscape. Yet other scholars (Hickerson, 1962, 1967; Dunning, 1967; Bishop, 1974), argued that capitalist mercantilism could still explain such phenomena. Dispersion of peoples northward from the Upper Great Lakes area due to the influence of the fur trade, they maintained, led to a breakdown of formerly territorially-based clans, but allowed for the retention of certain associated structural forms: for instance, the existence, in attenuated form, of an ancient system of clan chiefs and clan tenure.

Within the last two decades, however, there has been a shift in emphasis back to the idea that individual initiative within the family group may always have constituted an important impetus behind social dynamics among northern Algonquian-speakers. Richard Preston (1968), in maintaining that Cree transfer traditional economic, political and religious skills between generations most readily within the small social unit, also noted that certain individuals had expanded the range of their economic and political

competencies outward to meet the complexities of acting within the framework of the nation. Similarly, Adrian Tanner (1979) challenged Leacock's unilineal model for the "inevitability" of economic dependency in the Eastern Subarctic by arguing that, seasonally, subsistence activities still predominated over production for exchange among the Mistassini Cree. Capitalism, Tanner claimed, has modified Cree cognitive structure and social organization to a far lesser extent than had earlier been anticipated. More recently, Harvey Feit (1982) has employed qualitative and quantitative data to develop a model for assessing the viability of hunting societies in the Canadian north. Feit's work not only demonstrates that hunting constitutes a feasible economic occupation, but also suggests ways in which Native leaders might interact with government and other external agencies in revitalizing, developing, and protecting the hunting sector of Canada's boreal forest economy.

Other scholars, by focusing almost exclusively on the flexibility of Ojibwa social organization in response to external contingencies and vicissitudes, have tended to see Native leadership, not as an instigating force, but as a dependent variable within a constantly adapting social system. Following the tenets of conflict theory (Bailey, 1969), James G. Smith (1974) posited that principles of opposition guided behaviour over scarce resources and that in the ensuing strife individuals arose who assumed the rank of leaders. To Smith, leadership remained diffuse in its powers throughout the historic era, since structural elaboration of the authority hierarchy existing within the hunting group failed to resolve tensions arising from demonstrations of personal initiative within the band milieu. Smith's preference for the term "nodal core" in describing the central social, economic and political unit around which consanguines and affines may coalesce, mainly in response to external stimuli, inferred that social organization conformed to economic base, demographic ratio remained congruent with availibility of resources,

and leadership depended on the acquisition and distribution of scarce material assets with an eye to building a strong political following in relation to the opposition. Such a system, predicated on the notion of "limited good", maintained the egalitatian character of bands by keeping everyone at the same level of economic and political advancement.

While Smith's analysis may highlight problems existing among Ojibwa under the reserve system (Tanner, ed., 1983), his approach fails to consider the influence of intercolonial rivalry on leadership during the French regime (Eccles, 1979) and British colonial era. Head chiefs gained widespread prominence by being regarded by the competing colonial powers as courtable military allies. As such men frequently acted as brigade leaders in the fur trade, they had access to material goods which rapidly became a form of currency exchanged among influential power holders to facilitate the maintenance of a balance of pwer within the Upper Great Lakes Native community.

During periods of heightened intercolonial tension, head chiefs of strategically-placed western bands would even occasionally arise as mediators between European contestants. At the same time political strategies devised by these men to preserve their groups' autonomy during negotiations with external authorities carried over and informed the manner in which chiefs regulated the trade milieu in their bands' favor. Ojibwa leaders controlled access to the entrances of major inland waterways, and hence resources along such routes. Colonial authorities borrowed heavily from eighteenth-century Western concepts of status and tenure in defining and recognizing the nature of these prerogatives, vested in head chiefs, and communicated these to the Indians as well (Kohl, 1956: 378-9). After 1760 John Askin Sr., a sympathetic friend to the Ojibwa and Ottawa, sought to have these rights recognized in British and American law, a goal also pursued by his son, John

Askin Jr., and later, by Allan Macdonell. All three men came to be attacked for their stance on this issue by a new regime of British officialdom which rose to power at the close of the War of 1812.[3] Following the end of the period of intercolonial rivalry most Indian agents had little respect for indigenous leadership prerogatives and, by the 1840's, government policy had gone so far as to claim that such rights had never existed.

Shingwaukönse assumed prominence at a time when the old order in the Upper Great Lakes Native community was passing away. His activities demonstrated that certain head chiefs, exposed to new ideas, could overcome constraints which might have tended to keep Ojibwa leadership poorly equipped to instigate social change. It is also evident that The Pine gained a cohesive following for his plans: otherwise his policies would not have become firmly entrenched in oral traditions passed down from generation to generation at Garden River. Other power-holders proved receptive to his ideas, since he acted in accord with traditional values which all understood and wished to preserve.

That Shingwaukönse's policies, particularly those regarding land and resource management on reserves, continued to influence Ojibwa leadership after his death, is in part owing to the nineteenth-century political climate in Canada. Influenced by an American precedent set in 1857 when United States officials allocated farm acreages in the vicinity of Sault Ste. Marie to Ojibwa individuals and families, Canadian authorities attempted to subdivide Indian

lands north of Lake Huron the following year. Further inducements for Native peoples to abandon their reserves included promises of the extension of the franchise and other citizen rights to those who agreed to support a system of individualized land tenure. Yet Canada, which only gradually emerged from its colonial status, nevertheless failed to exhibit the degree of centralized decision-making relative to Indian land affairs that Washington displayed, for instance by the late 1880's in unilaterally subdividing Indian reserves under the terms of the Dawes General Allotment Act. The historical interrelationship between American and Canadian Indian policy cannot be considered one of simple parallel development. When pressured by mining and logging companies to dispense with the reserve system, Canadian officials responded with far more expediency and compromise than their American counterparts. Regardless of the political strength of groups contending against Ojibwa interests, opportunities still usually remained for a measure of Native initiative and creative policy-making in the negotiating sphere.

That the Ojibwa social order did not suffer organizational breakdown in response to the radical changes taking place around it in the late nineteenth century testifies to its internal resilience. While this may be partly explainable by reference to its flexibility (Smith, 1974), cultural factors were undoubtedly also involved. Mary Black (1977a) presented a perspective on Ojibwa intergroup relationships which both complemented and modified Smith's earlier stance on Ojibwa social dynamics by replacing the predominately Western notion of competitive self-interested action, employed by Smith, for a variant form of conduct more in line with Ojibwa values and beliefs. Black discovered

that the Ojibwa place a high value on personal qualities conducive to the formation of relationships characterized, not by competition, but by respect on one side and responsibility on the other. Although Black discerned a hierarchy existing among power-holders, she also found the system to be charged with ambiguity, metamorphosis, and the waxing and waning of power in response to external contingencies. Drawing on Black's argument that "power" may be viewed as an ability to retain a measure of control over circumstances, often on behalf of others as well as oneself, it is suggested that Ojibwa culture provided considerable incentive for individuals to attempt to preserve an environment congenial to group interests. This had been The Pine's aim, and success in securing this desired state in some degree remained an important gauge at Garden River by which the group judged a man's competence as a leader.

Leadership Capable of Meeting Challenges

Predominantly historical in approach, this study holds that the Ojibwa system of thought and values provides an important interpretative key to the activities engaged in by Shingwaukönse and his successors. Throughout the period under examination cultural imperatives, which accorded high status to individuals and groups capable of maintaining independence and control in the face of difficulties, compelled ambitious men to devise creative policies, in spite of the often formidable nature of the problems confronting them. At the same time, the actions of these leaders may be found to closely conform to the tenets of their culture's power-belief system.

Shingwaukönse, for instance, appealed to colonial authorities, state officials and several religious denominations for assistance in

forwarding his settlement scheme, and yet the chief would accept aid only if it was presented in such a manner that it fulfilled Indian expectations. Missionary and government policies which threatened to force the Ojibwa into a social, economic or political niche incompatible with the Indians' own cultural goals were to be resisted. In the early 1840's The Pine found it necessary to distance himself from the very agencies he had previously been courting. When his strategies brought results out of line with his band's interests, it was incumbent on the chief to form new alignments more congenial to group desires.

During this period of semi-isolation, The Pine meditated on ways in which he might promote peaceful accommodation between Whites and Indians so that bands might continue to retain their integrity as groups. In 1846 he emerged so confident in the attainment of such a goal that he challenged the Province's right to implement a monolithic development policy -- regulating mining and lumbering in the Lake Huron and Lake Superior regions -- which lacked any provisions for the recognition of aboriginal claims. By taking over a mine on the northeastern coast of Lake Superior in the fall of 1849, Shingwaukönse and his allies caused the government to reverse its former position and implement a system of reserves north of Lakes Huron and Superior in 1850. In his actions in regard to the mine, the chief had been able to draw upon a widely-recognized body of Native legend and belief regarding the existence of powerful protecting spirits in the mine's vicinity in order to give the Native resistance movement special symbolic appeal. At the same time he and his allies could count on the support of Allan Macdonell, a former shareholder in the dispossessed mining company who had come to oppose the growth of monopoly control over the course of resource

development on the western frontier to the extent that he was willing to defend aboriginal rights even when the unpopularity of his stance threatened to jeopardize his own career. Macdonell's presence as a mediator well known to government, miners and Indians militated against violence being committed by either side during the fall and winter of 1849-50, when the mine remained under Native control.

Regardless of The Pine's determination to protect his people's rights, the Native people gained no recognition for their traditional prerogatives in 1850 other than the admission, stated in the Robinson treaties, that Indians might retain hunting and fishing rights on ceded lands not yet sold or leased by the government.[4] The government negotiator, William B. Robinson, had shrewdly weighed prevailing metropolitan stereotypes of the "Indian" with an eye to their utility in rallying public support for the Robinson treaties, since the character of this concession was well in line with the image of the Upper Great Lakes Indians as solely hunters and gatherers, even as late as 1850. The fact that many had been participating as independent entrepreneurs in the fur trade, commercial fishing, lumbering and mining -- often in ways invaluable to the early course of "mainstream" resource development -- was ignored. The explanation lies in the nature of the interest groups dominating Canadian politics after 1850. Large-scale mining held the greatest measure of political power among the resource industries north of Lakes Huron and Superior (Nelles, 1974), and prominent political figures and business magnates such as Sir George Simpson and Arthur Rankin who owned shares in mineral locations were not about to allow Indian "presumptions" to hinder their enterprise.

These monopolistic concerns combined with local government agents

to deprive the Indians of their few remaining rights. Shingwaukönse must have come to realize the enormity of this threat to local band government, shortly before his death in 1854, when his decision to lay his band's grievances before the Crown in England came to be vehemently opposed by the Indian Department, which he had formerly believed would protect Native interests. Between 1854 and 1857 the government, in the name of efficient resource management and social control, destroyed the viable community economies which The Pine and George Abatossaway had been fostering at Garden River and Little Current. There was little band chiefs could do, however, for the penalties which were imposed under an act, passed in the legislature in June 1853, made it a courageous matter for sympathetic missionaries and entrepreneurs to defend the Indians' enterprise against the centralized policy.

From 1857 to 1865 Native animosity against the political impotence imposed on band leaders engendered a resistance movement centered at Wikwemikong, which threatened violence against all others, Native or White, who dared question the moral veracity of its strategies. Yet, like The Pine in earlier years, this interest group preferred peaceful measures and appealed to the Sovereign to restore to bands a degree of their former decision-making powers regarding their people and lands.

Yet there was no breaking through the dominant ideology, which gradually came to permeate all legal definitions and interpretations regarding the relationship of Native peoples to the land and its resources. Mere hunters, fishermen and gatherers, it was maintained, could never broach complex schemes, and in a band state lacked even the ideological essentials for true conceptions of liberty. Bands soon found they paid a high price

for being "Indians" within the mainstream legal system, as their traditional economies floundered following the legal circumscription of band-regulated hunting and fishing. Missionary journals tell a sad tale of starvation, sickness and removals during these years. Meanwhile, policy-makers until 1865 held that Indians had no clear rights to marketable resources other than fur, and that under the reserve system, title to land constituted a mere "courtesy" extended by the Crown.[5] Such ambiguous, contradictory and basically denigrating perceptions of the Native economy and system of land tenure persisted in spite of denunciations against this line of thinking after 1873 by Simon J. Dawson, M.P. for Algoma.[6]

Head chiefs and their bands fought to preserve the operation of the traditional management system, which ensured that all heads of family groups within the band had access to available resources, while continuously seeking to expand the range of resources open to exploitation by Indians. It was an uphill battle. In 1873 Ogista and several head chiefs from Lake Superior considered the time auspicious to press for a degree of local band control over mineral locations, but were unsuccessful in their attempt. By this time Ogista and Buhkwujjenene had grown amenable to the government's right to collect timber duties from band members engaged in lumbering, although both men had no illusions that what government agents called "conservation" referred principally to this conservation of revenues and had little to do with the preservation of a long-term yield. When the dues came to be oppressive, many family heads who "owned" territories containing timber and minerals simply sold the resources on the black market. Government policy thus fostered a degree of illegality, with band members,

local merchants and even missionaries aiding in the deception.

Whether engaged in legal or illicit lumbering, however, the Ojibwa early on adopted the "family territory system" to regulate their operations on the reserve, and the local Indian Lands agent was usually too occupied with other matters to attempt to interfere in Native bush activities. The Ojibwa mode of production occasionally gained admiration from local entrepreneurs, although such approval, when broadly publicized, carried with it liabilities for the system. For instance, when one timber merchant in 1896 informed Ottawa that the Indians maintained their own method of parcelling out areas for cutting timber which not only conformed well to the topography of the land but also incorporated a share system regulated by the chief and principal men, he unwittingly became an informer. Instead of receiving gratitude for appraisal of conditions as they were, both entrepreneur and local agent received a reprimand for their leniency and disregard of policy, with instructions to implement a grid system of timber berths at once, regardless of the wishes of the Indians. This threat was only averted when the band, through its chief and council explained that good reasons existed for retaining such incongruency between levels of resource management. Assured that the Native system could be rational and effective and that it did not conflict with neighbouring large-scale company operations, Ottawa permitted to band to exercise a greater degree of autonomy, not only in mode of resource exploitation, but also in transactions with buyers, than Indians had previously been accorded by law.

During roughly the same period, local agents also began permitting Indian individuals to hold mining locations on ceded lands.[7] While this constituted a departure from Shingwaukönse's original plan

by which timber and minerals would be group-controlled resources, supplying revenue for the whole band, the private operations provided locatees with cash supplements which could be used to purchase supplies for winter trapping or logging, or materials to fashion agricultural implements. By the 1890's the local band economy had come to be characterized by a series of seasonally appropriate activities, in which a portion of the surplus returns from one employment was necessarily re-invested in preparations for the next. Mining, like temporary wage labour, offered a source of funds to meet unexpected contingencies which might arise during the annual round, without placing a strain on limited band capital.

At no time during the period under study did the Garden River band ever conform to the model of Ojibwa society which depicts passive, albeit flexible responses to external pressures as the primary characteristic of group action. The prerogatives over land and resources exercised by this group stemmed not from protective legislation designed to confirm such rights, but from a hard-fought struggle engaged in by the Native people themselves. In 1857, 1877, 1884 and 1905, powerful external interests pressured the government to dispense with the reserve system in the vicinity of Sault Ste. Marie. Through forcing Ottawa to recognize their band's commitment to preserving the special relationship to land and resources it had always upheld, the Garden River leaders after 1859 were able to retain their land base almost intact. At the same time, the Ojibwa, with the co-operation of local government officials, merchants and company agents, maintained much of the non-capitalistic character of their system of production.

For such reasons the land base may not be viewed as the

determining factor in preserving the integrity of the group over time.[8] Such persistence stemmed directly from the character of the relationship between the band and its leadership, sustained over time by recourse to customary modes of publicly exposing the intentions and goals of leaders so that leadership could be made continuously responsible to those on whose behalf it acted. The strength of this core relationship enabled the group as a whole to develop organizational forms capable of upholding, elaborating and defending prerogatives over land and resources in a manner conducive to the perpetuation of "sufficient good" for all concerned, regardless of the fact that such rights have never been encoded in Canadian law. During the course of research on this study, it became evident that groups are greatly defined by their history and what they do with their legacy of values, organizational traits and symbols inherited from the past. Cultural precedents, although adaptable to many new social contexts, still must have a receptive climate in which to take root and develop new organizational forms.

Traditional and Modern Manifestations of Leadership

While the relationship between power-holder and group has persisted at Garden River, the weight of decision-making has tended to shift back and forth from leader to band, depending on external circumstances. This study suggests that prior to 1850, when the reserve system was first established north of Lakes Huron and Superior, the group composed of Shingwaukönse's followers had little sustained instigating or directive powers other than those residing in the heads of the component hunting groups whose authority was mainly restricted to the sphere of winter hunting activities. Constant vigilance in the interests of the group's defense was mainly the responsibility of

the most prominent power-holder, whose family unit formed a "nodal core" to which other family groups attached themselves through their exercise of agnatic, affinal or cognatic kin ties. The Pine's band, through consensus, could impose checks and balances on their chief's prerogatives and options, but Shingwaukönse remained the primary actor, especially in the sphere of external affairs.

The chief, in consultation with his principal men, also retained the right of admitting new individuals to the reciprocal relationship he upheld with his group. The "band" thus could not properly be considered a residence unit, since its existence depended far more on the nature of the linkages actively maintained between leader and follower than on location. An individual might "belong" to a band and yet not reside with the group for long periods of time.[9] At any one time, moreover, group size might expand or contract, depending on the degree of competency exhibited by its leader in sustaining a political, economic and social milieu conducive to the perpetuation of valued group interests and activities. Under stable conditions, a hierarchy composed of sub-chiefs, recognizing the presence of a head chief, remained in high profile. Well into the late nineteenth century the Garden River "band" could still be described as a body of individuals which came under the political aegis of a prominent leader. In short, Shingwaukönse and his band were inseparable: he had brought the group into existence and sought to sustain it. After his death, this group became vastly reduced in size as family groups spalled off and joined other bands, mainly in response to divisive government policies.

A major change in the government's concept of "band" organization, as pertaining solely to the region north of Lakes Superior and Huron,

occurred in 1874 when, following urgent petitioning by the Indians of the Robinson treaty area, distribution of annuities ceased to be based on the sharing of a fixed lump sum among all recipients. The adoption of the four-dollar annuity per capita raised questions concerning rights to these monies, which ultimately led to the encoding of the principle of partus sequiter patrem -- in the interests of government economy -- for the first time, in the Indian Act of 1876. It was this "limited good" offered by Ottawa, more than other one factor, which created a legally defined "band" at Garden River, as contrasted with the more flexible "band" following of the traditional leaders. Locally, however, the traditional "band" persisted and became the decision-making band unit . Although this entity was often mistakenly viewed by Indian Department officials as synonymous with the legally-defined "band", because petitions from this source failed to distinguish "status" from "non-status" individuals, the latter band unit remained separate from its static twin in much the same way as the living organism exists apart from its shell.[10]

Tensions, arising at Garden River from time to time due to lack of congruency between individual and group interests as the band expanded in size, gradually came to be resolved through increasingly stronger determination on the part of leadership to attain control of sufficient resources for the good of the whole. At this time the "band" emerged as a political entity functioning in its own right, with the petition serving as its major tool. Together, traditional power-holders, elected leaders and the "band" sought to ensure that resources exploited by outside agencies furnished capital returns to the group in terms of royalties, interest, dues or employment opportunities. In this way no

sources of revenue on the reserve would be totally alienated, and in several agreements with resource companies the Ojibwa insisted upon the condition that, once external utilization of quarries or timber berths terminated and revenues ceased to flow into group coffers, the land involved would revert to the band.

The system for electing a chief and council implemented by Ottawa in 1891 in response to band petitions proved better suited than traditional leadership to cope with increasingly complex issues pertaining to the allocation and protection of reserve land and resources, since it ensured that leadership could be drawn from a broad pool of diverse talents and skills. At the same time the band developed a systematic framework of action within which precedents could be set and improved upon, through discussion and debate, when similar issues repeatedly arose. This process of bureaucratization in response to surrounding social, economic and political change, while certainly not unique among the Ojibwa (McKay, 1978), began to evolve independently of direct external pressures as early as 1885 at Garden River, due to the band's determination to forward its goals in a manner which would draw recognition and respect from mainstream society, while ensuring the band a measure of political autonomy.

The Divided Mantle

Even with these organizational changes, the traditional value system, founded on the idea of upholding reciprocal respect relations with responsible power-holders both seen and unseen, still informed Ojibwa thinking to a significant degree. Its persistence militated against the notion of individual and intergroup competition and provided focus for both individual and group initiative. This assertion

questions the notion that Indian peoples who leave the strictly hunting and trapping way of life also tend to lose the integrity of their beliefs (Tanner, 1983: 31). It instead supports a stance which regards Indian thought systems as capable of fostering creative premises which could ultimately be of considerable informative value to mainstream society. While this perspective approaches recent symbolist viewpoints concerning the generative potentialities of belief systems (Sahlins, 1976; Wagner, 1975), it also stresses the need for historical investigation of how such thought systems actually affect group behaviour over time. Only then may anthropologists and historians come to appreciate the creative potential of specific world views.

The Native belief system constitutes a level of reality which, according to elders at Garden River, is not open to negotiation since it holds the key to Ojibwa distinctiveness. One's personal competence arises from one's ability to transcend boundaries of limitation for those for whom one is responsible. It is far from a factionalized universe. Older individuals at Garden River voiced concern that the modern emphasis on group boundary maintenance might detract from the concept of "power" as primarily a creative principle within living things and so militate against their culture's stress on the need for individualized expressions of respect towards sources of such power. Yet, while holding that definite assertions might rend the veil of ambiguity which always protects the system from encapsulation, and hence subjection to notions of "limited good", one elder still ventured to express confidence and pride in the resilience of his value system, comparing it to a tree which throughout many seasons has been able to retain its core of vitality:

> When I was last down at the graveyard they say those old pines there, they get weak /blasted?/ at the center. But just the other day they cut one down and you know, it was solid, solid right through.

In conclusion, it is suggested that the maintenance of a milieu congenial to the survival of cultural values important to the Ojibwa at Garden River remains a persistent theme throughout the period from 1814 to 1914. The transactional responses necessary to maintain such a climate changed, yet basic values did not. Decline of the fur trade and the advent of mining and timbering heralded an extensive elaboration of ideological concepts, but no radical departures in fundamental cultural premises. Since so many aspects of the traditional religious world view continued to inform Native responses to external political, economic and religious agencies, ädiso.ka.nag concerning Shingwaukönse remained powerful cultural transmitting mediums for the aims which this Ojibwa leader upheld during his lifetime. Shingwaukönse the Man has more recently become replaced by Shingwaukönse the Prophet, whose vision of the future is anticipated in its actualized form, generation by generation.[11] For this reason, perhaps more than any other, his descendants are expected to maintain the tradition and generally do, even though they may be removed from direct participation in the bureaucratized political arena. In this common endeavour to maintain and develop a group milieu, founded on values the chief upheld, the mantle of leadership, divided between "individualistic" and "group" manifestations, becomes one again, to engender the same confidence and hope for the future which Shingwaukönse himself placed in his people and culture.

ENDNOTES

Endnotes, Introduction

[1] Oral traditions at Garden River maintain that Shingwaukōnse preferred to be called "Shingwauk" or "The Pine" once he became a well-known Native leader. Without the diminutive suffix meaning "little", the name implied that the chief had reached the summit of his powers. It also bore a substantially different relation, than that implied by the name "Little Pine", to the power of the Sun Being, by which the Sun and the person bearing the name came to be symbolically vested with an intimate relationship. "Shingwauk" meant the sun remained overhead, as at noonday, while the individual stood beneath, like a full-grown pine tree, drawing upon the Sun's influence.

The Pine had several names during his lifetime. One of these was Bouanik, or Flint, and another, The Dreamer. The chief used a third name, Semosance, or "Little Weasel" when he lived in Wisconsin. When Shingwaukōnse felt that his thoughts and activities were in accord with the cosmological system he became "The Pine" -- a holder of a name with symbolic associations with the huge white pine tree which is considered to pierce the upper levels of the sky. "The One Who Rises Over the Hill", Sa.ujeu.a.say, however, was The Pine's most powerful name, since it encapsulated the idea of emanations direct from the Sun Spirit, new-born and strong. The chief also had a French name, Augustin Lavoine.

[2] During the early decades of the nineteenth century Schoolcraft noted that the Ojibwa had become very shrewd in their appraisals of American and British Indian policy. For instance, according to the agent:

> Annamikens [a sub-chief of Eschkebugecoshe's band] made a speech, in which he expressed himself very favorably of our government, and said he should carry back a good report of his reception. He contrasted some things very adroitly with the practices he had observed at Red River, Fort William, and Drummond's Island. Deeming it proper to secure the influence of a person who stands well with the Indians on that remote frontier, I presented him with a medal of the second class. [Schoolcraft, 1975: 303-04]

Annimikens was of Métis extraction (Schoolcraft, 1975: 297).

[3] Elders concentrated wholly on the purpose of these flights. One description of "spirit flight", however, is presented by Marilyn E. Johnson (Paper, 1980: 195):

> [Flights serve] ...to inspect the physical and emotional well-being of friends, relatives, and other individuals under one's care. A shaman can be a spiritual guardian for people he has met or people he has never physically met but who are of specific interest to him...

[4] "Reports that certain American Indians from near the Red River and the South shore of Lake Superior wish to seek an asylum under the Standard of the Red Coat. Encloses a list of Chiefs with the Places of Residence". 7 August, 1852. P.A.C. (Henceforth "RG 10"). RG 10, vol. 198 pt. 1.

[5] These terms were suggested and explained by Dan Pine Sr., Dick Pine Sr., and Fred Pine Sr.

[6] Fred Pine Sr. specifically mentioned the Star Being, Moosa, or "Walker", whose responsibility as a power-holder was to encourage growth in areas of the country where vegetative life has been decimated by fire, over-exploitation or disease.

[7] Harvey Feit (1978: 287) found the same belief among the Waswanipi Cree of northern Quebec that a demonstrated ability to achieve culturally-valued goals stemmed from a correct alignment of thought and action relative to the complexity of the causal universe:

> "Power" [wrote Feit] is mainly actualized in human life in the intimate linking of human thought and action to the course of the real world produced by the causal action of all 'living beings'. All 'living beings' actualize their understandings in action and sometimes successfully integrate their thoughts and action with those of others in [such a] way that each participates in the "power" of making the world. "Power" does not control things and make them happen; "power" is a relationship between 'living beings' such that thought and action are one and so that something happens whereby potentiality becomes actuality.

One responsibility of the head chief was to determine the attitudes of his band with regard to a specific event,and then express these views publicly in a manner which would satisfy all concerned. This particular role was also often delegated to a functionary called a kekedowenine. The kekedowenine pleaded on behalf of the integrity of relationships existing either within the band or between groups. Interview with Richard Pine Sr., 10 November, 1982. The Anglican missionary Frederick Frost (1904: 143), who had observed the kekedowenine speaking at Garden River as well as at other Indian communities, stated:

> [whenever murder was committed] ... there was a great deliberation between the friends of the murdered man and the friends of the murderer. The criminal is brought up before them. He has a "kekedowenine" (an advocate) and so have the others. The advocate stands up and talks. It would not be well to kill the wrongdoer; this would not bring back the dead, it would only increase the number of the dead. How grand is forgiveness and mercy.

The Kekedownenine also acted as an advocate whenever disputes arose between band members. Buhkwujjenene most frequently assumed this role when his brother, Ogista, was head chief of the Garden River band. In 1859 Buhkwujjenene effectively settled a conflict between the head chief of the Batchewana band and the sub chief at Goulais Bay. He also successfully acted as an advocate for Ogista during a government investigation, held between 1867 and 1869, into Ogista's fitness for leadership. (See Chapter Eight of this study.)

[8] This elder presented the sentences first in Ojibwa and then translated them into English. "Mukwa" is the Ojibwa word for "bear".

Endnotes, Chapter One

[1] Ogista (1800-1890), Buhkwujjenene (1811-1906) and Peter Tegoosh (c.1796-1876) may have been born near L'Anse, Michigan, although this is not certain. Such information could not be obtained for Thomas Shingwauk (1796-1883), who lived at L'Anse, and Nahwahquashkum (1799-1840). No relevant data could be found for The Pine's daughters Owiaquahgeynegoqua (1805- ?), Ogimaqua (1813- ?), Marie (1816 - ?) and Waintegoochequai. Annie (1816-1887) was raised at Michipicoten. Another son, Jean Baptiste Bukwujjenene, apparently resided most of his life in the vicinity of Fort William and Isle Royale, operating as an independent trader.

The Pine's youngest children, John Askin, or "Erskine", (1836-1919), George Menissino (1838-1923) and Louis (1839-1899) were born at Sault Ste. Marie, probably to the chief's youngest wife, Ogahbageyhequa, whom The Pine married by Anglican ceremony on November 1, 1833.

Genealogical data was taken from the records of St. John's Anglican Church, Garden River, the Roman Catholic Church Register of Assinins (formerly L'Anse) Indian Catholic Mission, Methodist Church records at L'Anse and the Pine Family Bible, kept by John Askin's wife, Cecilia Shawan, and now in the possession of a daughter of Dan Pine Sr. Relevant information was also derived from "Report of Baptisms, Marriages and Burials at Sault Ste. Marie, 6th October 1833 - 15th March, 1835." Fifth Annual Report of the Society for Converting and Civilizing the Indians of Upper Canada, for the year ending October, 1835.

[2] RG 10, vol. 617: 30-35.

Portage Lake forms part of a water route which cuts across the Keewenaw Peninsula. Hancock and Houghton are both situated near this lake.

[3] Interview with Fred Pine Sr., 17 November, 1983.

Nebenagoching's Obituary. "A Noted Indian Chief: Historical and Biographical Sketch of His Remarkable Career." Sault Star, 10 June, 1899. The Grand Island band was once a noted political entity within the Upper Great Lakes region, but by the turn of the nineteenth century its former prominence had waned. Schoolcraft (1975: 102) wrote of this group in 1822:

[4]

> The Indian band occupying it was formerly numerous. There are many stories still current of their former prowess and traits of hospitality and generosity, and of the skill of their old seers, and divining-men, i.e. Jossakeeds. Its present Indian population is reduced to forty-six souls, of whom ten are men, nine are married, one of whom has two wives, and there are two widows.
>
> Of this band the Star family, so called, have long possessed the chieftainship, and are remarkable on several accounts. There

are eleven children of them now living, five of whom are males... Sabboo is the principal man. The South Bird, his elder, and the ruling chief, has removed to Bay de Nocquet [sic. Bay de Noc].

5 Little is known of Shingwaukõnse's wives, other than that The Pine married a pair of sisters by Native custom, by each of whom he had a son. RG 10, vol. 2631, file 128, 145, part O. Tegoosh's mother and Buhkwujjenene's mother, who were these sisters, may have been French Canadian Métis. Another wife may have come from Saugeen or Cape Croker. Although the chief assumed the appearance of monogamy after his conversion to Anglicanism, his former wives continued to reside with his band.

6 "Letter to Richard Carney from Garden River chief inquiring as to his right as a chief, dated October 12, 1858." A.O. MU 275. Harry D. Blanchard Collection, M. Section Papers, 1766-1932. Shawanapenasse participated in the treaty by which the Ojibwa surrendered St. Joseph's Island to the British in 1798. The treaty shows the Thunderbird dodem opposite Shawanapenasse's name. Oral traditions at Garden River maintain that Piabetassung was of the Hawk dodem.

7 One such man was Mongozeed, the "Loon's Foot", son of Katawabedai, head chief at Sandy Lake, Minnesota. When his brother assumed headship of the Sandy Lake band, Mongozeed moved to Fond do Lac, where he became speaker, and finally head chief, of the Fond du Lac group (Schoolcraft, 1975: 298).

8 The "home band" were called Bo.wating.inini.wug, or "men of the place of the shallow rushing water." Local ceremonial structures included the residences of the head chiefs. Centrally placed within the Ojibwa encampment, the head chief's lodge, from forty to sixty feet in length, displayed symbolic figures arranged so as to represent aspects of the Ojibwa cosmological universe in microcosm. While no historical accounts provide good accounts of the appearance of the residences of the Sault chiefs, detailed nineteenth-century descriptions exist of the lodges of Waubojeeg (Warren, 1970: 253-54) and Mozojeed of Wisconsin. Schoolcraft (1975: 379) wrote that representations of spirits at the four corners of the world were carved on the corner posts of Mozojeed's residence and that human figures, holding hands, were painted on the walls. A bird figure suspended on a pole stood as a "witness" overlooking the councils held within the lodge.

9 It was stated by descendants of Nebenegoching, whose father Waubechechake, or "White Crane", had been Shingabaw'osin's brother, that Nebenegoching as a young child had been frightened even to pass near the "old man's [his uncle's] house". The name Shingabaw'osin refers to a process of seeing through a stone to the spirit within or associated with the stone. The name may also be applied to the stone itself, usually weathered into a peculiar shape by forces of natural erosion (Schoolcraft, 1848: 292).

Another indication of the respect that Shingabaw'osin holds among the Garden River population is that very few older residents will mention this head chief's name.

10 Ratified Treaty No. 145. Documents relating to the Negotiation of the Treaty of August 5, 1826 with the Chippewa Indians. N.A. RG 75, T 494, Reel 10.

11 An Ojibwa, Wabish-ke-penasse, who in 1820 guided Governor Cass's party to the location of the famous copper rock of the banks of the Ontonagon River not only suffered banishment from the Ontonagon band for so doing, but also believed that his personal spirit guardian had deserted him (Schoolcraft, 1975: 110-11).

12 In this legend the Loon answered the Crane's cry, and so became the band's spokesman. As was customary in such stories, dodemic designations for individuals rather than names were used. Schoolcraft (1848: 192-95) recorded that the rise to prominence of the Loon dodem at Lapointe occurred about 1780 when Andaigweos, or "Crow's Meat", of the Loon mark, migrated from Sault Ste. Marie to Lapointe. Like many Ojibwa men, Andaigweos spent his younger years hunting and trading on the upper reaches of the Mississippi River, where he protected Jean Baptiste Nolin from attack at a time when Native hostility towards traders had grown pervasive. Intermarriage with the Crane family at Lapointe enabled Andaigweos to remain at Lapointe, where both his prowess as a spokesman and the favour bestowed upon him by the traders and British colonial authorities aided his rise to the status of a sub-chief. By 1842 Andaigweos' grandson, Ketche-Besheke, had also assumed a prominent place in the councils of the Lapointe band.

13 This interpretation of Native history in the Upper Great Lakes region relies to a great extent on the ethnohistorian limiting the number of groups to be examined to those found by early French missionaries residing in the St. Mary's Straits area. Father Dablon (J.R., 54: 131-33) in 1670 not only identified the resident band at the rapids by their geographical designation, Pahouitingwach Irini [sic. Bo-wating-inini], but also recorded a number of other named groups which Hickerson considered to have permanently joined the "confederacy". According to Dablon, four nations resided in the immediate environs of the Sault: the Saulteurs, Noquet, Outchingbous and Marameg, each of whom had a hunting range within the eastern sector of the Lake Superior district. Three other nations: the Amicoures, the Mississague and the Achiligouiane, hunted farther east, north of Lake Huron. Finally, there were eight other nations, two of which had "no fixed abode", although they returned to the rapids each year to fish, and six nations which only visited the Sault sporadically when "driven out of their country by famine". The latter were interior Indians or "gens de terre" or what are today known as Cree and northern Ojibwa. While the size of these named groups remains controversial, Smith (1974: 11-34) maintained that most did not exceed a population of two hundred and fifty individuals,

and many were likely smaller.

[14] The Potawatomi in 1641 had taken refuge at Sault Ste Marie from wars in their own country (J.R., 23: 223-25).

[15] Alexander Henry the Elder (1976: 206) recorded an absence of whitefish at the rapids in the fall of 1762. The Hudson's Bay Company records of the autumn of 1827 also indicated a sharp decrease in the catches of all kinds of fish in the Lake Huron district due to the height of the water. According to the factor at the LaCloche post this occurrence "was entirely giving [sic: owing] to the height of the water and the high winds we had in the Fall.... The fish procured is generally trout and whitefish which are caught with nets, lines and spears and salted for winter stock." Hudson's Bay Company Archives, Winnipeg. Microfilm copies at P.A.C. (Henceforth MG 20). MG 20, Reports on Districts, LaCloche post. B/109/a/1/1827-28. A similar decline in catches occurred in 1834. MG 20, Sault Ste. Marie post, Correspondence Book. Chief Factor Bethune to Mr. McCay, 10 February, 1834. B/194/b/7/1834.

[16] Summer fishing activities remained little changed in the Lake Superior region between 1640 and 1670 (J.R., 23:223-5; J.R., 50: 267-9). Father Claude Allouez, laboring at the mission of Saint Esprit, established during the 1660s at Chequamegon, described a pattern of lake fishing among Indian nations, some of which groups were quite probably culturally and linguistically similar to those at Sault Ste. Marie, but which visited the rapids only rarely:

> This Lake is, furthermore, the resort of twelve or fifteen distinct nations... coming some from the North, others from the south and still others from the West. They all betake themselves either to the best parts of the shore for fishing, or to the Islands, which are scattered in great numbers all over the Lake. (J.R., 50: 269).

It does appear that these western bands migrated east, towards the Sault, after 1670. For instance, Pierre Boucher (Neill, 1970: 403) and Pierre Esprit Radisson (Saull, 1943) indicated that bands at Keweenaw were familiar with copper extraction. They also held beliefs regarding this metal which leads one to suggest that these people were ancestral to the residents of the Ontonagon River region who proved so opposed in 1826 to the expropriation of these copper exposures by the United States Government. It is further noted that the Atchaterakangouen, described by French missionaries in 1672 as a group residing northwest of the Jesuit mission of St. Francis at Green Bay, Michigan, might be considered a candidate for the "Cranes" which later emerged along the Lake Superior coast between Sault Ste. Marie and Lapointe. According to Father Allouez (J.R., 58: 41):

> Deeper in the woods toward the west, is the Mission of St.

> Marc to the Outagami [Fox], where are the Ouagoussak, Makoua, Makoucoué, Mikissioua.... Still farther to the westward, in the woods, are the Atchaterakangouen, the Machkoutenek, Marameg, Kikaboua and Kitchigamick.

This suggestion, however, remains tentative and is not aided by the writer's suspicion that several groups bearing the same name may have existed simultaneously which may or may not originally have derived from a parent unit.

17 P.A.C. MG 29/D 53. Diary of the Reverend Allan Salt.

18 William Cullen Bryant (1846) provided a detailed account of horticultural practices among the Ojibwa he encountered as he journeyed along the north channel of the St. Mary's river. Bryant noted that potatoes could be left in the ground during the winter and harvested the following spring. Interview with Fred Pine Sr., 10 June 1983.

19 Raccoon have not been given much attention as a food resource, but according to Fred Pine, it could be an important one. Alexander Henry frequently mentioned the hunting of raccoon for both meat and skins (Henry, 1976: 131-2; 135).

20 In 1822 Schoolcraft (1975: 115) wrote, concerning wild rice in the vicinity of the Sault, "I this day dispatched my interpreter... to the northern straits to gather some of it [wild rice] for seed; the result was successful."

21 According to elders at Garden River, moose were hunted in October north of the reserve and on the flats near the conjunction of the Goulais and Root River systems, northwest of Sault Ste. Marie. Deer (sp. Odocoilus virginianus) and caribou (sp. Rangifer tarandus) ranges being incompatible (Peterson, 1966), the presence of caribou on the north shore of the St. Mary's straits until the turn of the twentieth contury likely kept the number of deer to a minimum. With the disappearance of caribou from this area, moose and deer populations have been increasing. One deer herd presently ranging within the Sault Ste. Marie district is thought to be a recent migrant from the United States (Dupont, 1982: 1). The fact that caribou are presently not found near the rapids may have caused James G. Smith (n.d.: II-23) to suggest that this may always have been the case. Yet caribou population ranges have changed radically in recent years. Caribou once was regarded as the most highly prized meat for ceremonial occasions, according to oral traditions at Garden River. Until 1900 caribou hunting was regularly pursued for several weeks each winter by residents of the community.

22 Interview with Dan Pine Sr., 15 September, 1982.

23 Father Hennepin in 1669 noted the high degree of skill required

to pursue the rapids fishery (IHC., 1903: 52), and fishing techniques changed very little over the next two hundred years. Since the fish congregated near the bottom of the course of rapids, canoes lined up near the head of the falls and took turns fishing on the downstream run (Johnston, 1960: 147). The use of shallow seines has been reported by archaeologists (Cleland, 1983; Conway, 1980). Oral tradition also indicates the use of such nets. One legend maintains that Nanabush learned the art of making these nets from Spider. A large sturgeon weir spanned the Garden River during the 1840s. Such weirs were maintained over many years. "The Journal of Lieutenant James Allan, Expedition of 1832" (Mason, ed., 1958: 181) describes a fish weir on the Ontonagon River, Wisconsin, "in the same place that [Alexander] Henry found it."

24 This should not be taken to indicate that colonial policy and trade policy were always congruent. During the late eighteenth century traders deliberately encouraged the Mackinac Indians to build canoes at exactly the same time the colonial authorities wished the head chief, Keche-Naigow, and his band to meet in council. Captain Lamothe to Indian Department, 12 June, 1793. RG 10, vol. 8: 8384-87.

25 That a Native leader could regulate outsiders' access to water routes and resources on his band's territory is clearly evident from seventeenth-century documents of Le Borgne on Allumette Island in the Ottawa River (Sagard, 1865 : 88; 250-2), Alexander Henry's experiences at Rainy Lake (Henry, 1976: 242) and the responses of the Sault Ste. Marie band to the United States military presence at the rapids in 1816 (Chapter Three of this study). This study does not attempt to determine whether or not such prerogatives were exercised by leaders prior to contact with Europeans, even though one scholar (Hunt, 1940: 11-22) has maintained that the fur trade, if it did not instigate, most certainly intensified territorialism among bands. On the other hand, trade routes are known to have considerable antiquity in the Upper Great Lakes region, especially with regard to the widespread distribution of copper items made from metal from Native mines on Lake Superior (Kellogg, 1925: Chapter 16).

26 During interviews conducted by the Ontario government with Native residents of the Muskoka region in 1911 during the land claims case which finally terminated in the Williams Treaty of 1923, mention was frequently made of a leader, bearing a bird dodem, who led warriors from east of Sault Ste. Marie against the Iroquois about 1652. See, for instance, Statement of Sam Snake, Rama band, 1911. RG 10, vol. 2331, file 67, 071-4A. A version of the same legend appears in Chief Paudash's account recorded in 1905 (Ont. Hist. Soc. Papers and Records, 1905, 6: 7-11). Paudash stated that the story had been handed down from his great grandfather, Ogemapenasse, who died about 1770. This story was well known among the southeastern Ojibwa. George Copway (1847: 55-9) of the Crane dodem also argued that his forebears came from the Mississauga River area, east of Sault Ste. Marie.

[27] It was not until 1736 that many bands recorded by the French for the Upper Great Lakes area were actually found by the explorer Chauvignerie to be composite, containing two or more dodemic groups. While the Mississauga, of which thirty warriors resided on the north shore of Lake Huron at this time, and twenty on Manitoulin Island, bore only the mark of the "Crane", the Saulteur exhibited both the device of "the Crane and the Cat Fish". A different group inhabited the region around Michipicoten. These were the Papinakois, who bore the symbol of the "Hare". The Papinakois, in contrast to other nations, were considered Gens de Terre, or Algonquian-speaking people of the interior rather than of the lakeshore, and gravitated back and forth between the upper St. Lawrence Valley and the north shore of Lake Superior. Crossing Lake Superior to L'Anse, Chauvignerie discovered forty Saulteur, or Ojibwa, bearing the device of the "Crane and Stag". No mark was recorded for the one hundred and fifty warriors at Chequamegon. Finally, a group known as the Ouacé [sic, Awausé] with the device of the Catfish resided at Gamanettigoya, near present-day Grand Portage, Minnesota (N.Y. Col. Docs., 9: 1053-54). The French were mainly interested in identifying and determining the military might of the respective bands.

[28] James G. Smith (1974) suggests that the clan organization of peoples such as the Potawatomi and Dakota, who, during the early historic period were more horticulturally-oriented than the Ojibwa (Callendar, 1961), may have influenced the composition of the Ojibwa band during the French colonial period.

[29] According to Ojibwa elders at Garden River, as on earth, so in the afterlife, man falls under the protectorship of guardian spirits. Ancestral spirits may appear in the semblance of luminescent beings like stars, although they may assume other forms as well.

[30] It is interesting to note that Henry L. Morgan in Ancient Society (Morgan, 1877: 166) referred to chu.e.skwé.ske.wa as "snipe", from which source F. W. Hodge (1910) must have derived the idea that chueskweskewa designated the "snipe gens". At Garden River the word for "snipe" is muhno.menekáshe, whereas chueskweskewa is the word for "plover". Paul Pine, Ogista's son, who resided at Marquette, Michigan, acted as Morgan's guide in the scientist's researches into beaver habits (and probably in mining exploring as well) and may have given Morgan information regarding the chueskweskewa dodem.

[31] The man "Tughwahna" referred to by Buhkwujjenene may have been a brother of Maidosagee, the head chief at Sault Ste. Marie during the late eighteenth century and father of the Shingabaw'osin encountered by Schoolcraft. A man by the name of "Tugauhanas" acted as Maidosagee's spokesman at Detroit in 1779. Papers relating to the Western Indians and Indian Affairs at Detroit, 6 June, 1779. RG 10, vol. 16: 113, Reel c-1224. Likely it was the same person whose name, rendered "Tacoaoanais", appears on a land surrender made by the Ojibwa to the Northwest Company in 1798. Surrender of land at Sault Ste. Marie to the Northwest Company, 10 August, 1798. A.O., MS 75, Russell Papers,

Reel 5.

[32] Shingwaukonse to the Reverend William McMurray, 13 May, 1844. A.O. MG. 35, Strachan Papers. This is the first recorded instance of The Pine employing The Plover dodem.

[33] Interview with Dan Pine Sr., 15 September, 1982.

[34] This marriage had been solemnized by Anglican ceremony on 7 November, 1833. "Report of Baptisms, Marriages and Burials at Sault Ste. Marie, 6th October 1833 - 15th March, 1835", Fifth Annual Report of the Society for Converting and Civilizing the Indians of Upper Canada, for the year ending October, 1835.

[35] Interview with Fred Pine Sr., 17 June, 1983.

[36] Disposition of sons and daughters constituted a paternal prerogative, especially when the father was a well-known and respected power-holder within the Native community. For this reason daughters were esteemed by their fathers (McDonnell, 1960: 278). The Pine was angered by Buhkwujjenene's determination to marry Margaret Cadotte, which contravened the chief's own power of decision-making in this respect (Frost, 1904: 87).

[37] A recent two-volume work entitled La Compagnie du Nord-Ouest by Robert Rumilly (1980) provides little information on Indian-trader relations.

[38] According to Eccles (1979: 423) geopolitics figured far more than trade during the French regime of the late seventeenth century:

> The accession of William of Orange to the English throne in 1689 and of Louis XIV's grandson to that of Spain in 1700 brought about a marked shift in the European balance of power and a prompt renewal of Anglo-French hostilities. From this point on, the fur trade was mainly an economic weapon in Anglo-French imperial rivalry. What was now of primary importance to France was not the trade in fur per se but the military alliances it made possible with the Indian nations who were a far more important factor in this European power struggle than has yet been recognized. It was they, not the French or the English, who were sovereign in the west, despite the grandiose claims made by the rival powers.... The French position was that given their grossly inferior numbers, they had at all costs, to keep the Indians from contact with the English. This meant they had to supply the Indians with European goods they could no longer do without. Were the French not to supply them they would, of necessity, go over to the English. With the renewal of Anglo-French hostilities in 1702 the fur trade posts became a chain of garrisoned military

forts where furs had to be traded, at a loss if necessary, to retain the Indians in the French alliance and bar any attempted expansion of the English colonies west of the Alleghenies.

[39] The Saulteur chief, Thioratarions, and Ononsiaka from Lake of Two Mountains, had taken a peace belt to the Iroquois in accord with the preachings of a Huron known as "The Baron", who stressed the fulfilment of a vision-derived sanction for peace among Indian nations (N.Y. Col. Doc. 9: 607).

[40] The symbol $_8$ was used by the Canadiens to signify a sound in the Algonquian tongue not found in the French (Eccles, 1969: 78).

[41] Frontenac attempted to dissuade Ching$_8$abé from warring with the Foxes by reminding the chief of the assets of remaining loyal to French policy. In the following speech the French governor made it clear that Indian military might was crucial to the French colonial cause:

> Chi[n]ga$_8$be, my son. I am very glad to have learned by the thanks you present me for having given you some Frenchmen to reside in your nation, that you are sensible of the advantages you derive from the articles they convey you; and to behold your family now clothed like my other children, instead of wearing bearskins as you formerly were in the habit of doing. If you wish me to continue sending you the same aid, and to increase it still more hereafter, you must resolve to listen attentively to my voice; to obey the orders that will be given to you in my name by Le Sueur, whom I again send to command at Chagouamigon, and to think only of making war on the Iroquois, who is your mortal enemy as well as the deadly foe of all Upper Nations, and who has become mine, because I have taken your part and prevented him oppressing you.
>
> Embarrass not yourself, then, with new quarrels, nor meddle with those the Sioux have with the Foxes, Maskoutens and others except for the purpose of allaying their resentments. (N.Y. Col. Docs., 9: 612)

To this Chinga$_8$bé answered:

> Father: It is not the same with us as with you. When you command all the French obey and go to war. But I shall not be heeded and obeyed by my nation in like manner. Therefore I cannot answer except for myself and those immediately allied or related to me. Nevertheless I shall communicate your pleasure to all the Sauteur. (N.Y. Col. Docs, 9:612)

The French had reason to be worried. Fifty years later, in 1742, the Ojibwa, angered by French reluctance to condone their wars with the Foxes and doubtful of French strength, engaged in a series of attacks on

French commerce, killing a number of traders on Lake Huron near LaCloche (WHC, 17: 425-6). Brigades of Ojibwa canoes then plied south to the British post at Oswego and in 1747, north to Fort Albany on Hudson Bay (N.Y. Col. Docs. 10: 137-45).

[42] The same independence of spirit towards traders could be demonstrated by leaders as late as 1822. "With my traders," declared Katawabedai, head chief at Sandy lake, to the British at Drummond Island, "I discourse without reserve. Anything I ask them for -- rum or otherwise -- they grant my requests -- with you it is a different case. I fear to displease you." Speech of Katawabetai at Drummond Island, 9 June, 1822. T.G. Anderson Papers, 1814-1822. A.O. MS 23, Reel 1.

[43] Elders of the Pine family placed no special emphasis on the Plover dodem in discussions concerning adiso.ka.nag about Shingwaukōnse. The spirit holding this position was represented by the Sun, to which Shingwaukōnse came increasingly to associate himself as he grew older. Dick Pine regarded himself as an "inheritor" of this relationship through a series of visionary experiences focusing on the Sun, but which originated with his "grandfather" three generations previously. Interview with Richard Pine, 13 June 1983.

War stories were often passed down from generation to generation. Buhkwujjenene remembered a specific war song his father had sung on return from battle. Buhkwujjenene also informed the missionary Frederick Frost (1904: 84) that Shingwauk used to address his people with forcible earnestness. The Pine had been able to hold his audience spellbound as he recounted with vigor "the glorious deeds of war with the Yankees and their Indian allies."

[44] The Reverend Allan Salt recounted how a man would have to undergo tests to prove his courage. In one instance an individual was required to brave the spirits of the dead in order to secure a capture of tokens signifying his fitness for leadership. P.A.C. MG 29/D 53. Diary of the Reverend Allan Salt. Copies of Salt's diaries also are housed at the United Church Archives, Victoria University, Toronto. In 1832 Schoolcraft learned that Eschkebugecoshe, also known as "Flatmouth", had presented his son, not yet old enough to have validated a claim to the status of chief through personal achievement, to the assembly "as a future candidate for their chief." (Schoolcraft, 1852, 2: 67). No reference to patrilineal descent was made by the agent in this passage. In 1836, however, Schoolcraft attempted to gain a high degree of control over the local Sault bands by personally appointing Kebay Nodin, Shingabaw'onsin's son, to the head chieftainship. On Shingabaw'osin's death in 1828 the leadership had passed to hs brother, Kaygayosh. When Kaygayosh died in 1836, Schoolcraft felt it mandatory to appoint Kebay Nodin, since Kaygayosh's successors were "British". At the same time, Schoolcraft (1975: 570-71) split the "home band" into three geographic divisions. The first lay about Miscotosaugeen, or Hay Lake, nine miles below the rapids. The second embraced the sixty acres reserved for the band at the falls, and the third was on the Tahquamenon

River, the site of Shingabaw'osin's former lodge.

[45] It is possible that the "Cranes" on Lake Superior did originate in a single location. If Kechenezuhyuah rose to prominence at Sault Ste. Marie around 1670-80, then his descendants might well have spread out in two directions, east and west. This was true of Maidosagee's sons, according to Schoolcraft (Mason, ed., 1962: 30):

> With shrewdness enough to manage the concerns of the band, he [Maidosagee] was a voluptuary. He married four wives, three of whom were sisters, by whom he collectively had twenty children. Each of the male children, in time deemed himself, a legitimate ruling chief, and thus attached to himself some followers. The harmony of the band was thus impaired & in a measure destroyed, and the ancient village weakened, by migrations to new regions and its once heavy population scattered along the waters of the basin of Lake Superior & the river St. Mary.

This paragraph appears in Schoolcraft's early writings, when the agent still considered territorial prerogative determinative of group size and strength of leadership, rather than the reverse, which is probably nearer the fact of the matter.

[46] Testimony of Mary Oboshawbawnoqua. Major W.V. Cobbs to C.A. Harris, Com. OIA. Washington. March, 1837. Wash N.A. M 234-422/422. Copy of document housed in the Archives of St. Peter's Cathedral, Marquette, Michigan. This statement was given to support a claim to the head chieftainship of the "home band" made in 1836 by Francis Oshawano, or Cassaquadung (Gaw.zaw.que.dung. Catlin, 1973, 2: 162), descendant of the Great Crane who had been born on Drummond Island. Schoolcraft overruled Oshawano's claim and appealed instead to a system of patrilineal reckoning, involving primogeniture, which he maintained to be correct according to "the principles of Indian descent" (Schoolcraft, 1975: 570).

[47] "Nattaowa" or "Nataway", the "Good Voice" was actually a son-in-law of Maidosagee. He was supposedly of Iroquois descent (Catlin, 1973, 2: 106-07).

[48] The division between interior Indians and lake Indians is still regarded by the Garden River Ojibwa as existing today, particularly linguistically with regard to slight differences in inflection. Since their hunting grounds lay inland, near to watersheds of rivers running both north and south, the gens de terres were particularly courted by both British and French traders (Eccles, 1979; Morantz, 1977, 1982).

Endnotes, Chapter Two

[1] The memory of the shrewdness and skill of the western Indians in forest warfare was still fresh in British memories, since General Braddock's crushing defeat at the hands of a combined French and Indian force had occurred only five years before, in 1755 (Peckham, 1970: 141-7)

[2] When the British were seeking grounds for capitulation with the Americans in 1793, the British at Mackinac found it extremely difficult to call the Indians to council at Detroit. RG 10, vol. 8: 8384-7, Reel C-10, 999.

[3] Ketche.Naigow was also known as the "Grand Sable" or "Great Sand Dune".

[4] Round Island near Mackinac, Grand Island and Saginaw Bay were three important strongholds of Ojibwa and Ottawa power. There is little doubt that simmering rivalries existed among the head chiefs from such areas, as is implied by a legend entitled "The Charmed Arrow", which Schoolcraft collected near Grand Island (Williams, ed., 1956). In this story, a well-known historic personage, Sagima of the Ottawa, is engaged in shamanic combat with the leader of the Grand Island Ojibwa. Regardless of such defiant declarations of superiority by one Algonquian-speaking people to the seeming detriment of another, the Ojibwa and Ottawa claimed to be bound, along with the Potawatomi, "to support each other in war and in peace." "Report to the Secretary of War of the U.S. on Indian Affairs, comprising a narrative of a tour...in the summer of 1820" (Morse, 1822: 141). It is evident from this report that if the British had trouble in communicating with the western bands, the Americans faced a far more difficult task, and had to rely extensively on Métis traders to gain any information at all (Ibid.: 141 ff.).

[5] There were dangers for officials who sympathized too closely with the French and Native population. Robert Rogers was court-martialled for what were believed to be his sympathies for the French and Spanish and his disregard of British colonial policy.

[6] Rogers also instructed the explorer Jonathan Carver (1974) to respect aboriginal right. Schoolcraft in May, 1859 received notice of a deed dated 1 May, 1767, drawn up by Carver, in which Chiefs Hawnopawjatin of the Turtle dodem and Otohtongombiskeau of the Snake dodem granted the explorer land along the Falls of St. Anthony. The tract was vast, requiring five days travel to span it. The deed had remained in the Plantation office in Whitehall, London, England. Regarding the Carver deed, 2 May, 1859, Washington, Schoolcraft Papers, Reel 15. In his diary Schoolcraft (1975: 560) mentions a deed from the Great Crane to Major Robert Rogers. The agent chose to ignore the document, since it was dated prior to the proclamation of George III

interdicting grants. An affidavit regarding Alexander Henry's grant is to be found in Alexander Vidal's private memorandum book. Memorandum of Indian Mission. Vidal Papers, CA90N VID 33. Regional Collections, University of Western Ontario, London.

[7] The location of Askin's trading establishment may be seen on the map of Carver's travels in 1766 and 1767 (Carver, 1974: Frontispiece).

[8] John Askin Sr. held this position on aboriginal rights until the 1790s. When his son, John Askin Jr., was requested by several prominent Ojibwa leaders to speak on behalf of Indian interests at the Greenville Treaty negotiations in 1795, Askin Sr. had this advice for his son:

> ... use your utmost influence... to Endeavour that the first article of the Treaty between [the Indians]... and the Americans should be that they are sole Masters of their lands, to dispose of them as they think fit without any restraint whatsoever... [in order that the lands may] be a future source of wealth for these poor people and their offspring. (Quaife, ed., 1928, 1: 550).

[9] Papers relating to the Western Indians and Indian Affairs at Detroit, 6 June, 1779. RG 10, vol. 16: 113, Reel C-1224.

[10] There is still a memory at Garden River of a time when a power, lying "south", might have proceeded up the Mississippi River and countered the British influence in the Upper Great Lakes region. Certain families, such as the Surettes, claim ancestry from French peoples belonging to this southern "power". Interview notes, 16 May, 1983.

[11] A.M. McKee, Deputy Minister of Indian Affairs, to the Commissioner of the United States. RG 10, vol. 8: 8525; 8542. Reel C-10, 999.

A modern political organization, the Anishinabek, maintains that the confederacy dates back to the meeting between the Native peoples and Sir William Johnson at Niagara in 1764. This is an important event for Indian political organizations in Ontario.

[12] Informal conversation with Fred Pine Sr., 9 May, 1984.

[13] Elders at Garden River may still tell stories incorporating parts of this original legend. The importance of events, which occurred at the turn of the eighteenth century, dominates oral traditions even today. As Fred Pine Sr. maintained, it was a time when "the White man was going to drive the Indians off the face of the earth. There were disturbances everywhere. The Indians had to push back and back." Field notes, 2 August, 1983. In this context the term "Shawnee" defined groups which had fallen under the influence of certain spirits which caused them to become disruptive elements. Many bands were viewed

either as having succumbed to the pursuit of fruitless violence or, in areas where settlement had long been under way, as conceding too much of their independence to the Whites. Both, according to this elder, had become "unbalanced" and were collectively designated "Shawnee".

By contrast, at the turn of the nineteenth century Chief Paudash, a Crane chief at Rice Lake, Ontario, presented a different image of "The Shawnee". At a time when interest in Tecumseh and the War of 1812 ran high in local Ontario historical circles, Paudash readily asserted that certain Ojibwa were "Shawnee". He stressed further that his own ancestors had been "Shawnee" who had dwelt in "peace and power" in the Ohio Valley until, owing to internal strife, his people moved to Sault Ste. Marie, and from there to Rice Lake (Ont. Hist. Soc. Papers and Records, 1905: 7-8). This role of the Ojibwa in the "conquest" of Southern Ontario has more recently been examined in an article by P.S. Schmalz (Schmalz, 1984: 316-52). The concept of self-contained power, implicit in the absence of any suggestion that external factors, other than malevolent spirit agencies might have caused internal disunity, is common to both adiso.ka.nag. The key symbol, the "Shawnee" or "The South Man", since it is endowed with diametrically opposite meaning in the two different contexts, suggests that the important message refers not to origins or entities per se, but to the sphere of external relations at the time the story was devised.

Within the colonial or state milieu one primary function of the head chief was to develop an image commensurate with the policy and goals his followers wished to pursue, with a good eye to the political strength and biases of his White external audience. Anthony Paredes (1980: 406-7) has recently used the term "ideological" to define what he sees as a conscious political symbolization of Ojibwa identity in the modern North American scene, whereas he tends to place what he calls "tribal symbols directly derived from the traditional past" in a different and non-political category. This perspective, it is argued in the present study, tends to ascribe an unwarranted non-creative stasis to the Ojibwa past. Conversely, it is suggested that manipulation of symbolic substance for political ends has always occurred among the Ojibwa, with the head chief often expected to communicate, in frequently impressive oratorical style, what is held by his people to be conducive to the preservation and elaboration of their culturally-valued goals.

[14] Schoolcraft (1975: 295) maintains that "Oshuggay" is the Ojibwa term for "osprey". The Ojibwa at Garden River, however, argued that "Shuggay" was the word for a young crane. The bird guardians would therefore be an old and a young crane. It denotes "pelican" in some dialects.

[15] Chusco, an Ottawa shaman, suggested that the wabano was introduced by a "Potawatomi, who was sick and lunatic a month [and]... pretended that he had ascended into heaven" (Schoolcraft, 1848: 211).

[16] Native religious beliefs ensured that the Ojibwa would ritualistically align band purposes with the ongoing activities of the personalized universe. From this standpoint, the hostile stance towards white settlers engendered by the prophet's teachings constituted a temporary aberrant state in a spiritual universe ideally governed by principles of harmony and fertility. Fred Pine Sr. explained how both individuals and groups could actively participate, following a period of disruption, in restoring the cosmological ideal:

Elder: There is something I wish to tell you about. I dreamed about it last night.
Shingwauk got everyone together. It was at blueberry picking. Near the Shelldrake [River, Michigan].
He said Heaven never stands still. It rotates. We are all going there. We will all be the same in Heaven. There will be no strangers.

Then he told them all. "It's there if you look for it. The harder we'll work the better we'll be." They asked the Holy Spirit what they'd do.

Interviewer: What do you mean, "Heaven rotates"?

Elder: It turns round... all the souls up there. You're bound to meet somebody up there you know if you look.

Interviewer: What sort of work were they going to do?

Elder: Oh... first they'd have a ceremony. Like they'd eat the earth. I did that. When the Indians came back from World War One they all got down and ate earth. The Whites thought we were crazy. But that's what you do. You are thankful. Me.quetch wen.dum. I am glad for my mother-earth. Ska.beyung de.ake.ming. We came back for what we started.

Interviewer: So the earth is a provider?

Elder: Have you noticed that the Indian word for foot is the same [has the same meaning?] as the word for heart? The Indian used to take his shoes off and walk in his bare feet. He's fertilizing mother earth. That's an old, old story.

The earth has got everything. See? It's all there if you look for it. You've got to know how. Shingwauk knew how.

Interview with Fred Pine Sr., 4 February, 1984.

[17] P.A.C. MG 19, vol. 7: 128. Reel C-1479.

[18] Ibid.: 208.

[19] "Articles of agreement between Jean Baptiste Nolan and Quesgoitacameguiscame, sic Tamesa Mestosaguis and Bouniche." 15 September, 1794. Detroit. Detroit Public Library, Burton Historical Collection. J.B. Nolin Papers. Nolin was later an agent for the Northwest Company at Sault Ste. Marie.

[20] Rep. no. 42. 20th Congress, House of Representatives. Land Cessions in Michigan. Committee on Public Lands, Jan. 2, 1828: 452. Barthe had resided on the property at Sault Ste. Marie for at least two decades prior to the sale, which occurred in 1788.

[21] Further support for this contention may be found in an affidavit submitted by Michael Cadotte, a descendant of Alexander Henry's trading partner, concerning an Indian attrack made on the estate of John Sayers. Sayers may not have obtained the sanction of the band for his occupation of land at Sault Ste. Marie:

> [In] 1797,... while Mr. Sayre was in the Indian country, the Indians destroyed his buildings on said lot, so that, on Mr. Sayre's return, it was of so little value, or the expense of repairing it would be so great, he engaged in the service of the Northwest Company, and went to Montreal to reside. (Ibid.: 462)

[22] Whether or not the Indians discriminated between traders of purely European and those of Métis origins is not clear, but it is assumed that permanent occupation of land would have been the deciding factor, regardless of ancestry.

[23] Regarding communication through the falls of St. Mary's, Quebec, 8 November, 1798. RG 10, vol. 1. Most of Brant's communications to bands in the Upper Great Lakes area came in the form of letters to Sally Aince at Mackinac and Detroit. Sally Aince to "Brother" Brant, 26 January, 1795. RG 10, vol. 9: 8830, Reel 10, 999.

[24] While competition between the Hudson's Bay Company and the Northwest Company west of Lake Superior drew Indian leaders and their bands into violent confrontations during the early nineteenth century, there is little evidence that a parallel situation existed at the Sault. Leaders with close associations to the Sault independent traders generally remained aloof from such forays. For instance, Katawabedai, father-in-law of the independent trader, Charles Oakes Ermatinger, remained neutral in the conflict of 1816 which resulted in the murder of Governor Semple of Red River by Maji Gabowi of Eschkebugecoshe's band of Pillagers. (Mason, ed., 1958: 66): Katawabedai to the Superintendent of Indian Affairs, Drummond Island, 16 July, 1816. RG 10, vol. 32: 19143-6.

More sporadic instances of trader-Indian strife, recorded by

Schoolcraft (Mason, ed., 1958: 23, 55, 147) and Warren (1970: 325) question assumptions that trade relationships stood uppermost in the minds of the Native population. Jean B. Perrault in 1785 (Schoolcraft, 1853, 3: 353-69) and Francois Malhiot (WHC, 19: 163-233) in his journal for 1804-5, also presented numerous instances of Ojibwa arrogance towards traders with whom they maintained no kin-based or other personally important relations.

[25] A cession of land was also made by the Fort William band to the Northwest Company in 1798. All these land transactions seem to have been motivated by Indian sensitivity to any transgression to their aboriginal rights. Report of Commissioners A. Vidal and T.G. Anderson on Visit to the Indians on the North Shore of Lakes Huron and Superior for the purpose of investigating their claims to territory bordering on those Lakes, Appendix E. RG 10, vol. 20. Typescript copy in Ontario Archives. Three bands were involved in the surrender of St. Joseph's Island. Captain G. Lamothe to Superintendent of Indian Affairs, n.d. P.A.C., Claus Papers, MG 19-F1, vol. 7: 262-3, Reel C-1479.

[26] According to Schoolcraft (Mason, ed., 1962: 109) Maidosagee "was a frequent guest, prior to 1810" of the Johnston family and "was happy to while away many of his winter's evenings in return for the ready hospitality which was sure to await him at the home of the Indian's friend."

[27] Extract of a letter from Col. Johnson, St. Joseph's Island, 30 September, 1798. RG 10, vol. 1: 248.

[28] British policy encouraged the use of presents and other "endeavours to promote His Majesty's enterest in General, by keeping up friendly intercourse and communication between all the Indian Nations, assuring them of the King's Paternal care and regard as long as they continue to merit them, by acting as good and obedient children ought to." Instructions for the Good Government of the Indian Department, 1800. RG 10, vol. 789: 6759.

[29] Matthew Elliot to General Isaac Brock, Amherstburg, 16 June, 1812. P.A.C. RG 8 (henceforth RG 8), c-676: 144-6.

[30] RG 8, C-95: 229-30.

[31] The American Commander at Mackinac, William Henry Puthuff, held that the western Indians would have to be weaned away from their allegiances to the British by presents, since no one Native leader could be relied upon to obey American directives over the long term. Puthuff to the Secretary of War, 29 November, 1816. Records of the Michigan Superintendency of Indian Affairs, N.A., RG 75, vol. 1: 350-5, Roll 2.

[32] Schoolcraft knew that Eshkebugecoshe of Leech Lake and Keche.Besheke of Lapointe had been among the prophet's followers and

that both chiefs by 1812 had returned to the traditional Ojibwa religion (Schoolcraft, 1855, v: 189; Warren, 1970: 324). The Shawano cult, like others before and after it (Tanner, 1975: 188-9), stressed advocacy of anti-structural forms of thought, ideologically represented as communitas (Turner, 1974: 231-70), but in reality denoting a stress-induced system of opposition forged against the encroachment of American settlers on Indian land (Goltz, 1973; Edmunds, 1983). There was little to gain from such resistance in the long run since these movements estranged influential chiefs who had gained additional status in their negotiations with colonial or state authority. One vision-inspired leader, Mikenak, who in 1746 raised an Ojibwa-Ottawa contingent in the Michilimackinac area to fight against the French, was avenged for his activities by Pontiac (Schoolcraft, 1852, 2: 271). Schoolcraft expressed his fears concerning a possible uprising in 1836 in Letter to the President, 10 February, 1836. Washington. Schoolcraft Papers, Reel 5.

[33] Washington. Schoolcraft Papers. Journal of John Johnston, 19 June, 1828. Reel 4. By contrast to the petty traders, Johnston maintained respectful relations with Mamongazida of the Loon dodem at Lapointe and his son Waubojeeg. Waubojeeg held a notable reputation as a warrior, since he had led a war-party of about two hundred men, drawn from around Lake Superior, in a decisive victory against the Fox and Sauks at the falls of the St. Croix River, Minnesota, in the mid-1760s. After waiting a year at Waubojeeg's request, Johnston married Oshawuscodawaqua, Waubojeeg's daughter, in 1793. By this time, Johnston knew that Mamongazida had been recognized as a head chief by both the French and British, and had been present with the British forces at the fall of Niagara. In 1765 this chief visited Sir William Johnson to request that prohibitions placed on the Lake Superior trade in 1760 be lifted (Schoolcraft, 1855, 5: 525). During the French period, Mamongazida may also have headed "a rude confederation of local bands" (Mason, ed., 1958: 11; Schoolcraft, 1855, 5: 147). Johnston, who remained a British patriot all his life, treated the old chief with deference, since Mamongazida possessed a belt and silver gorget which had been presented to him by William Johnson. Mamongazida's father, Ketche.Nokay, had emigrated to Wisconsin from Grand Portage during the French regime (Warren, 1970: 52, 242, 266).

The "Mrs. Sayers" mentioned in the quotation may refer to Isabella Sayers, who was baptized at Garden River by William McMurray in March, 1833. Isabella Sayers, or Obemahabnoqua, was the mother of John and Henry Sayers, traders in the Lakes Huron and Superior region who were given land on Sugar Island in 1826 under the terms of the Fond du Lac Treaty, as well as Guillaume Sayer, whose arrest in 1849 fostered an uprising among the Métis of the Red River country (WHC, 19: 174 ff).

The Indian leaders resented the treatment they received at the hands of the traders. In spite of the ready availability of trade goods in 1832, Eschkebugecoshe complained heartily to Schoolcraft about the lack of "formality" exhibited by American traders and the high prices of goods (Mason, ed., 1958: 55).

[34] Head chiefs on the United States side could no longer regulate who could and who could not hunt on their lands. When Tugwaugaunay wanted George Johnston, appointed sub-agent at Lapointe in 1827, to prevent Métis who were not associated with his band by kinship or ties of friendship from using resources on his territory, the chief found that the government chose, categorically, to prohibit all Métis from hunting, and not merely those persons whom Tugwaugaunay regarded as poachers. George Johnston to Schoolcraft, 6 January, 1828. George Johnston Papers, Bayliss Library, Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan. Johnston, when operating as a trader in 1826, felt that certain bands despised him because of his close associations with Schoolcraft and the Sault Ste. Marie agency. "All the Indians of the old Desert at the Head Waters of the Ouisconsain River say that I am the cause of their being persecuted by government," Johnston informed Schoolcraft on 16 March, 1826, "and that I came to this place not for the purpose of trade but to watch their conduct, and that I was so appointed by Government...." Ibid., Book 1. The big game and fur bearing animals in these areas, between 1797 and 1827, had declined considerably owing to trade competition.

[35] "These two principles," Schoolcraft asserted,"... are found to be so attentuated and infinitely diffused, and in this diffusion they have become so materialized and localized, and so prone to manifest themselves in the shape of created matter, animate, and inanimate, that every class of creation, and every species of every class is seized upon by their forest worshippers, as an imaginary god." (Schoolcraft, 1851, 1: 413).

[36] Bands allocating individualized hunting territories were recorded in the late seventeenth century. According to Baron de Lahontan, the Ojibwa at Sault Ste. Marie "would choose rather to die from hunger than to straggle out of the Bounds allotted them, or to steal the Beasts that are taken in their neighbours' Trap." (Thwaites, ed., 1905, 2: 482).

[37] "Their government has been deemed a paradox," he declared, "at the same time exercising, and too feeble to exercise power. But it is not more paradoxical than all patriarchal governments, which have their tie in filial affection, and owe their weakness to versatility of opinion. War and other public calamities bring them together, while prosperity drives them apart. They rally on public danger, with wonderful facility, and they disperse with equal quickness. All their efforts are of the partizan, popular kind. And if these do not succeed they are dispirited. There is nothing in their institutions and resources suited for long continued, steady exertion." (Mason, ed., 1958: 94). "Where mere opinion was law," Schoolcraft continued, "and power constituted right, every man was a judge, an advocate, an executioner. The law of retaliation was in full force. The strong and brave have indicated their own rights. The weak were trampled on. Independence formed the beau ideal of life, but they lost it by its

diffusion. To avoid political subjugation, they suffered anarchy, and mistook license for liberty. No class body or order, would give up a portion to secure the rest." Manuscript. Washington, Schoolcraft Papers. Subject File. Reel 48.

[38] These taunts had some effect on the eastern Lake Superior bands, for McKenney (1972: 189) maintained that in 1820 thirteen Ojibwa youths left Grand Island on a disastrous expedition, in which all but one were slain, in order to "wash away with their blood, the imputation of cowardice, that had been cast upon their band by others of their tribe, living higher up the lake, and nearer the seat of the war."

[39] Letter to the President. Feb. 10, 1836. Washington. Schoolcraft Papers, Reel 5. Schoolcraft posited that the Ojibwa people as a whole would succumb to some, at the time, vaguely-defined "laws" of cultural or natural selection and eventually become extinct. The agent was certain this process was already operating in the eastern sector of the Upper Great Lakes region. He stressed that the population in this area had drastically declined. While on a trip along the American shore of the St. Mary's straits in 1838 to assess the nature of Indian land, the agent counted only 569 individuals, although he found 1459 acres of old fields and 3163 acres of abandoned village sites (Schoolcraft, 1975: 602).

"We should not deceive ourselves as to the native Indian opinions of themselves and of the European race," the agent cautioned. "They have with intuitive correctness, conceived the idea that two states of society so antagonistical as the hunter and the civilized state could not long exist prosperously in juxtaposition." (Schoolcraft, 1855, 5: 151)

[40] By 1850 Schoolcraft was claiming that the Indians had no place in civilized society, since they lacked the intellectual, moral, genetic -- Schoolcraft was a firm believer in the inferiority of what he termed the "oriental mind" -- and political capacity for real freedom. He had even extended this sombre perspective to western bands, beyond the immediate range of settlement and resource development, who were still enjoying a sufficiency of game for their population of over one thousand souls. These groups, he claimed, would be forced further west as resources were depleted (Schoolcraft, 1855, 5: 187-8).

[41] Schoolcraft's interest in collecting legends and generally favorable attitude towards the Ojibwa he met between the years 1822 and 1828 likely derived from his close association with John Johnston. Schoolcraft's perceptions gradually changed after Johnston's death in 1828. The agent's later views on band organization and leadership differ radically from seventeenth-century French perceptions on these subjects (Blair, 1911, 2: 136):

> The harmony which subsists among the savages is in truth displayed not only by their words, but in their actual

> conduct. The chiefs who are most influential and well-to-do are on an equal footing with the poorest, and even with the boys, with whom they converse as they do with persons of discretion. They warmly support and [even] take in hand the cause of one another among friends; and when there are any disputes they proceed therein with great moderation. They expose themselves as little as possible to personal encounters and disputes together; and if there is any person who deserves a reprimand, this is given to him with great mildness. The old men treat the young men as sons, and these call the old men their "fathers".

[42] While factionalism at Garden River tended to follow kinship alignments, the right to assume leadership almost always derived from personal competence rather than kinship factors alone. Three of Shingwaukōnse's sons became head chiefs following his death, with these sons competing for the office with each other, as well as with their more distant kin.

[43] This no doubt accounted for the lack of headway made by the Episcopal priest, the Reverend William Boutwell, in introducing Christianity among the Leech Lake Pillagers in the early 1830's (Mason, ed., 1958: Appendix E; Schoolcraft, 1855, 5: 188; Hickerson, 1970: 57-9). Schoolcraft (1975: 293) in 1828 reported a similar defiance in Eschkebugecoshe's responses to the agent's efforts to impose American trade policies on the Leech Lake people.

Endnotes, Chapter Three

[1] In 1897 the Indian Lands agent at Sault Ste. Marie referred to a conversation he had with Nebenagoching in the French language. RG 10, vol. 1954, file 4472: 482895. Nebenagoching's mother, born a Perrault, may have remarried a Sayer after the death of her first husband, Waubechachake, who had been a brother of Shingabaw'osin. Both Buhkwujjenene and Tegoosh spoke a degree of French and, owing to the teaching of missionaries, could read written Ojibwa (Wilson, 1886: 246).

[2] Interview with Dan Pine Sr., 13 June, 1983. Dan Pine held that this was an old tradition in his family. Prince Napoleon, cousin of Napoleon III, visited Sault Ste. Marie in 1861 (Ferri, 1973: 199-201). At this time the Métis were "isolated among and scorned by the Anglo-Saxon population." The prince's aide-de-camp regarded the Indians, on the other hand, as a people whose "silence conceals a certain contempt for the onlookers and a real pride."

[3] According to Kohl (1956: 377) Shingwaukönse once met his father in Detroit:

> [His mother] ... took him once to the town of Detroit, where his real father, the English officer, was stationed. The latter gazed with pleasure on his grown-up "savage" son. He felt proud of him, "et il voulait le mettre blanc" (and he wished to educate and establish him as a white man), as his father was brought up. He proposed to him to enter the English service, and become an officer. "Mais Shinguakongse ne voulait pas se faire mettre blanc." He had a settled desire to remain with his mother and his Indian relatives.

Kohl also maintains that the father "from that time kept an eye upon them, and often sent them up messages to Lake Superior."

[4] Interview with Fred Pine Sr., 10 June, 1983.

[5] Interview with Dan Pine Sr., 13 June 1983. A ten-day session is an extraordinarily long time for a fast.

[6] Fred Pine Sr. maintained that ujew, or the Ojibwa term for "hill", formed the root of this word. In this respect, the name means "He [the Sun] is rising over the hill." The Sun could "see" all things on earth, and exercised a powerful regulatory control within the Ojibwa cosmos.

[7] It is interesting to note that "the Vision of Ogauns", recorded by Diamond Jenness (1935: 55-9) at Parry Sound contains much that is reminiscent of The Pine's vision and would have dated from about the same period. In these visions, a spirit being does not simply appear and converse with the supplicant, but a journey must be made to and from

a realm populated with spirits. Tanner (1979) noted that the Cree also place emphasis on the need to mediate symbolic space. Cree peoples bridge the gap between the human plane and the world of the controlling spirits though ritual means before setting out to hunt the animal or object desired. Among the Cree, however, such relationships apparently tend to be temporary and situationally restricted, dependent on the ritual skill of the mediator, and either economically-based or protective. Conversely, among the Ojibwa linkages with spirits established at the time of the vision quest remain binding throughout an individual's life and, if auspicious, confer on the recipient a lasting sense of purpose.

[8] Interview with George Agawa and Fred Pine Sr., 12 August, 1983; interview with Fred Pine Sr., 10 June 1984.

[9] Ruth Landes (1968) also noted this trait. The Minnesota shaman, Hole-in-the-Day, stated that he could not only converse with Thunderbird, but believed he would be reincarnated as this spirit following his death.

[10] Interview with Fred Pine Sr., 10 June, 1984.

[11] Journal Cenus par Charles Gaultier, 1791. RG 10, vol. 26: 14987.

[12] During his years at l'Arbre Croche and Mackinac, Askin Sr. had three children, John Jr., Madelaine and Catherine, by an Indian woman prior to his marriage in 1772 to Marie Archange Barthe of Detroit. The collections of Askin Papers in the Burton Historical Collection, Detroit Public Library, the Ontario Archives in Toronto, and the Public Archives of Canada in Ottawa (MG 19-A3) make no mention of Shingwaukõnse. Few records, however, of Askin's early career survive (Quaife, ed., 1928, 1: 16).

[13] J.B. Barthe Papers. Account Book. Detroit, Burton Historical Collection, Detroit Public Library.

[14] This contention is further supported by a statement, following a list of provisions, in Barthe's account book for 3 February, 1778, which reads, "Donnez a La Feme du Sauvage qui a éttè a nee La Voine à Mackinac [sic]." Shingwaukõnse would thus have been born at Mackinac, as Dan Pine Sr. claims. Interview with Dan Pine Sr., 13 June, 1983.

[15] The name "Lavoine" was employed by Tegoosh on a petition to the Lieutenant-Governor. To His Excellency Sir John Colborne, K.B., 1835, Bishop Macdonnell's Papers. A C 2402. Toronto, Archives of the Catholic Archdiocese of Toronto.

[16] J.B. Barthe Papers, Barthe ms. ledger, Detroit, Burton Historical Collection, Detroit Public Library. In 1778 Lavoine Barthe

moved west, possibly to settle in the vicinity of the Wisconsin portage (Quaife, ed., 1928: 143 ff.). A man by the name of "Laurent Barthe" was a pioneer in this area, and "Laurent" may be a derivation from "Lavoine". Louis Barthe, the only other member of the Barthe family who would approach the description, acted as an interpreter to the Winnebago in the late 1820s, but later returned to Detroit. Mention of "Laurent" Barthe is found in "Pierre Grignon's Recollections" (WHC, 3: 288-9). That the Askin and Barthe families could have assisted in the upbringing of one of their members' "country-born" sons is evident from the fact that John Askin Sr. largely raised John Askin Jr.'s son, Jean Baptiste, whose mother had been an Indian woman (Quaife, ed., 1928: 69 ff.).

[17] Milo Quaife, editor and publisher of many of the Askin Papers housed in the Burton Historical Collection, Detroit, admits his own uncertainty on this point (Quaife, ed., 1928: 34 ff.). See also Denisson Genealogical Collection. Burton Historical Collection, Detroit Public Library.

[18] Interview with Dan Pine Sr., 13 June, 1983. The name "Alavoine" or "Lavoine" was present in both the Chevalier and Barthe families. This was owing to two sisters, daughters of Charles Alavoine, a captain of the militia at Monteal, in the early eighteenth century (Quaife, ed., 1928, 1: 34 ff.), being willing to join their husbands in the Upper Country after 1720. The first sister, Margaret Charlotte Alavoine, in 1721 married Theophile Barthe, Jean Baptiste Barthe's grandfather. The second sister, Frances, married Jean Baptiste Chevalier of Mackinac. Certain sons of this second union retained the name "Lavoine" as a surname, rather than "Chevalier", as did "Charles Lavoine", born on 10 October, 1827 (WHC, 19: 3). The Chevalier family was connected with the Northwest trade, and maintained commercial as well as family connections with the Barthes and Askins of Detroit.

[19] Interview with Fred Pine Sr., 10 June, 1984.

[20] John Askin, Jr., born about 1762, was the eldest of John Askin Sr.'s three children by an Indian woman, Manette. Educated in Montreal, John Jr. entered the fur trade for several years, and in 1801, through his father's influence, was appointed storekeeper at the British post on St. Joseph's Island. John Askin Sr. to Isaac Todd, 31 December, 1801, PAC, Askin Papers, MG 19 A3, vol. 1: 209. John Jr. was appointed to the post at Amherstburg in 1816.

[21] Such war parties set out each summer from the Mackinac straits area. In 1801, for instance, Thomas Duggan wrote his superiors that two Ottawa canoes had passed St. Joseph's Island en route to Sault Ste. Marie where they would be joined by twelve Ojibwa warriors in their campaign against the Sioux. Thomas Duggan to P. Selby, June, 1801, PAC, Claus Papers, MG 19-F1, vol. 8: 149.

[22] In May, 1810, John Askin Jr. informed Claus:

> Songaypeuw, Shingwaukonce, Sawgatahgami & Seyketow, Chippewa Chiefs of Lake Superior, sent four strings of white wampum to the Chiefs of this vicinity, and invited them and their Young men to join them in going next moon to strike against the Nawdaweysies, however the Chiefs have sent back the wampum and say they will not accept the invitation.

John Askin to William Claus, 8 May, 1810. RG 10, vol. 27: 16, 0, 79. Reel C-11,007. John Askin Jr. wielded considerable influence among the Indians who regularly visited St. Joseph's Island, a fact which occasionally aroused jealousies among Askin's superiors and peers. RG 10, vol. 488: 2892-3; 29010-11.

[23] John Askin Sr. supported the idea of Indians retaining aboriginal rights on lands which they had not yet ceded to the state (Quaife, ed., 1928, 1: 550).

[24] Interview with Fred Pine Sr., 12 July, 1982; Interview with Richard Pine Sr., 13 June, 1982.

[25] Interview with Fred Pine Sr., 12 July, 1982.

[26] John Askin to William Claus, 18 July, 1812. PAC, RG 8, C-676: 201. Accompanying the Ojibwa and Ottawa were 200 Canadians under the direction of Charles Langlade Jr., Austin Nolin and Michael Cadotte Jr. Lieutenant Robert Dixon arrived from Green Bay with over one hundred Sioux, Menominee and Winnebago warriors. Altogether, this would have made 580 volunteers. (Wood, ed., 1920: 436-7)

[27] Askin maintained that approximately seven hundred Indians left for Detroit in August, 1812 (Wood, ed., 1920: 436-7). Shingwaukönse received a medal for his participation in the Detroit campaign. List of receivers of medals for engagement at Detroit, Chateauguay and Chrysler's Farm, 30 November, 1848. RG 10, vol. 264.

[28] General Isaac Brock to Lord Liverpool, 29 August, 1812 (Wood, ed., 1920: 506-8).

[29] A.C. Muir to General Proctor, 30 September, 1812. P.A.C. RG 8, C-671: 106-7.

[30] Petition of William Shinguaconce et al., 20 August, 1846. RG 10, vol. 416.

[31] In one of these engagements the Crane head man, Waubejejauk, lost his life (Schoolcraft, 1973: 79; 1975: 632). Schoolcraft states that Waubejejauk fell at the Battle of the Thames. See also The Sault Star, 28 December, 1957.

[32] Petition of William Shinguaconce et al., 20 August, 1846. RG 10, vol. 416: 5942.

[33] Interview with Mark Pine and Eina Pine, 15 September, 1982. Fred Pine Sr. also recalled stories told to him as a boy by his adoptive mother, Buhkwujjenene's daughter, that Shingwaukōnse spent several years after the war in Lower Michigan recruiting persons to form a band. Interview with Fred Pine Sr., 10 June, 1983. Another reason for The Pine's presence at Saginaw during the treaty talks of 1819 may have been to compare the American with the British manner of negotiating with the Indians.

[34] For this reason the British negotiated in 1815 with the Saginaw head chief, Nebauquam, when they wished to acquire Drummond's Island as a site for a military post. This occasion commenced "with a grand fete to all the Indians of the neighbourhood, next a present to propitiate the Great Spirit of the Lake and induce him to favor the transaction", and finally the guarantee of a fixed amount of presents to be given annually to the grantor and his family. Colonel Robert McDouall regarding Captain Payne's survey of Drummond Island, October, 1815. P.A.C. RG 8, C-258: 399.

[35] The death of Askin may have dealt The Pine a severe blow. An indication of the chief's desire to perpetuate Askin's identity may be gathered from his vesting his first son to be born after the official's death with the name "John Askin" or "John Erskine".

[36] Shingwaukōnse was present at this time to meet an American party sent by Washington to effect a land surrender at the rapids (Schoolcraft, 1973: 76).

[37] Colonel Robert McDouall regarding Captain Payne's survey of Drummond Island, October, 1815. P.A.C. RG 8, C-258: 399. McDouall had formally thanked the western Indians for their assistance in the war on the King's Birthday, June 5, 1814, but in the intervening year, 1815, between the abandonment of Mackinac and the establishment of the garrison on Drummond's Island, the British tended to ignore the Indians of the Upper Great Lakes by focusing on Amherstburg as the center for the distribution of presents and honors. Speech delivered by Lt. Colonel McDouall to Chiefs and Warriors at Michilimackinac, June 5, 1814. P.A.C. RG 8, C-257: 272.

[38] A document preserved in the Sayers family reads:

> In consequence of Wa-ba-che-chake, a Chippewa of the Sault St. Mary's having been killed in a battle during the late war with the Americans at Fort George, his title and marks of distinction thereby falling to his son, Ne-ban-a-bay, a boy of eight years of age, we the subscribers do hereby with the

advice and consent of his tribe here assembled invest the said Ne-ban-a-aw-bay with the title and marks of distinction belonging to his late father.

Drummond Island, the 29th day of June, 1819.

Joe Maremette
Major Commanding
W. McKay
Supt. Indian Affairs, D.J.

There are numerous documents, mainly newspaper clippings and letters, in the archival repository at the Band Office at Garden River on this subject. The most complete source is a newspaper article entitled "Ex-Chief Recalls Indians' Tribulations." Sault Star, 28 December, 1957.

[39] The first of these encounters occurred in June, 1815, while the John Johnston family were entertaining an American commander, General Brown, and his train of officers in their own home. During the course of these civilities, a French trader arived and warned that the Indians in secret council had determined to massacre the American party in their camp during the night. Armed guard was posted and the threat never materialized, although the incident discouraged the General's party from proceeding farther up the straits into Lake Superior in keeping with their original plans. The American military also became the focus of a second attack in July, 1816, when General McComb and his suite, accompanied by the Johnston family, travelled by canoe to Point aux Pins, near Gros Cap, to have a picnic on the beach. Not long after the general's party had ventured ashore, McComb narrowly escaped serious injury when a musket aimed at him by an Indian, who may have been Sassaba, failed to fire (Schoolcraft, 1975: 632). Once again Indian hostility curtailed efforts by American military persons to penetrate the Lake Superior region by way of the straits. Both of these incidents are related by George Johnston in his "Reminiscences." (MPC, 12: 605-8) Copies of the original document are housed in the Bayliss Library, Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan. That the American military was the target, rather than Whites in general, is evident from the correspondence of Hudson's Bay Company servants. Parties of sportsmen were frequent visitors to the fishing grounds during these years. John Silveright, factor at Sault Ste. Marie, noted in 1821 that both Major Winnett from Drummond's Island and the Earl of Dalhousie passed through the St. Mary's straits without incident on a trout fishing excursion to Gros Cap north of Sault Ste. Marie. John Silveright to James Hargrave, 3 September, 1821. PAC, MG 19-A21, Hargrave Collection, vol. 1, series 1: 3.

[40] Another account also centered on Sassaba as a disruptive individual who, "with the devil in his ugly face", kicked over the pile of tobacco and rushed out "with his train of chieftains." (WHC, 5: 411). By contrast, George Johnston presented a different view of Sassaba's status within the band. According to Johnston, the "young

chief" remained outside the circle of head men until he suddenly came forward to prevent one of the older chiefs smoking the tobacco (MPC, 18: 611).

[41] General Cass came to share the hero's laurel with Oshawuscodawaqua. For instance, the expedition's secretary, J.D. Doty, wrote in his diary:

> Mrs. Johnston's influence, and the courage that never knew fear on the part of our chief, have saved probably hundreds of lives, and given us peaceable entrance to a country whose territory skirts an inland sea, co-extensive with the Baltic, and which must ere long be added by cession to the millions and millions of acres already composing Uncle Sam's farm. (WHC, 5: 413)

[42] Richard Pine Sr. argued that the fact that Sassaba put himself in the position where he could be drowned meant he was actually trying to appeal to the spirits by going down the rapids. Traditionally, parents would even send young children on rafts over the rapids to increase the child's power. This line of argument continued to be held even when the ethnographer persisted that Schoolcraft considered the drowning to be wholly accidental.

[43] Fieldnotes, 13 August, 1982.

[44] Wolves are not quite witches according to the elders interviewed, although Fred Pine Sr. admitted that Sassaba was probably becoming "Windago" or "unbalanced." Interview with Fred Pine Sr., 12 June, 1985. A Windago is a person possessed by a destructive spirit which upsets that individual's equilibrium vis a vis the world around him. The term may also refer to the spirit itself. A powerful medicine man, however, may "use" a Windago for his own purposes. The subject was discussed with several elders. From these conversations, as well as from historical sources, it was found that, at Garden River, degrees of outsiderhood existed, some more socially tolerable than others (Kohl, 1956: 357-65).

[45] Schoolcraft kept detailed notes concerning his "initiation" into the midéwiwin. When first approached for information concerning the medicine society, The Pine proved reluctant to impart any knowledge. When the agent expressed interest in joining the midéwiwin, however, the chief agreed to holding a ceremony in the agent's office in January, 1827. Although several members of the midéwiwin society were present The Pine acted as head functionary. After sealing off the office from external influences by drawing the blinds and locking the door, The Pine began singing phrases represented by figures carved into wooden "song boards", designed as mnemonic aids. The chief also performed what the agent considered to be "transformations of legerdemain." (Mason, ed., 1962: 36-7)

[46] Fred Pine Sr. and Dan Pine Sr. maintained that The Pine traded west of Lake Superior before the War of 1812, and after 1820 with the Hudson's Bay company. Between 1800 and 1812 The Pine plied the river route between Fort William and Lake of the Woods and more rarely journeyed to Rainy Lake, which constituted the outfitting station for the Athabaskan brigades (Gates, 1965: 191). On occasion he travelled as far north as the Saskatchewan River. He was also held to have spent several years trading into Fort Albany and was once supposed to have pressed as far north as Fort Churchill. The central idea expressed by elders focused on Shingwaukönse's determination to familiarize himself as much as possible with the world around him. This appears to be an important value in Ojibwa society. Most elders living at Garden River today have also travelled widely. It is not unusual to find men and women in their 70s or 80s who have lived at Moosonee, Fort Albany, Fort Frances or interior Wisconsin.

Following the decline of the fur trade The Pine migrated east from the headwaters of the upper Mississippi River, bringing with him refugees from the Sioux wars in the west (Kohl, 1956: 315-6). Not all those who became members of his band were necessarily Ojibwa. Fred Pine Sr. argued that not only membership, but in some instances the very quality of humanity came to be extended to those The Pine encountered along the Mississippi:

> They met them on a big sandbar. They were kind of greenish. Scaly-like. Strange looking guys. He said, maybe we ought to kill them. After all, we don't really know what they are like. Maybe we can't trust them.
>
> So they built a big fire. And performed a miracle. They drummed. They said, maybe they are O.K. So they let them have some of their women. And you know, they weren't all that bad looking after all. They became people, just like us.
>
> (Interview with Fred Pine Sr., 10 February, 1983.)

[47] Kahgodaheway, or "Gah-go-dah-ah-quah," is one of Peter Marksman's synomymous names. Marksman, born in 1816 of an Ojibwa father and a Métis mother, was from Fond du Lac. Initiated into the midéwiwin at an early age, Marksman later went to Ebenezer College in Jacksonville, Illinois, and became a Methodist Episcopal preacher at Pequaming, L'Anse, Michigan (Pitezal, 1901: 1-16).

[48] G. Johnston to H.R. Schoolcraft. 15 May, 1827. N.A., RG 75. Records of the Michigan Superintendency 1814-51, vol. 2, FM-2(1), Roll 67: 105-6.

[49] Mezai was a resident of Garden River by 1835. Ketche.Besheke considered joining the settlement in the 1830s, but by 1850 decided against the move (see Chapter Five of this study).

50. Thomas G. Anderson Papers. A.O., MS 23, Reel 1. June 9, 1822.

Endnotes, Chapter Four

[1] The subject of Two Wampum Paroles sent to the Western Tribes from the Chief, John Aisence of Penetanguishene, by Mr. Anderson of the Indian Department. To the Chippewas of Sault Ste. Marie and Lake Superior. Report on the Affairs of the Indians in Canada. Journals of the Legislative Assembly. 1847. App. T.

[2] Minutes of Speeches made by the Different Tribes of Indians in reply to Lieutenant-Colonel Mackay's of the 11th of July, 1829. Journals of the Legislative Assembly. 1847. App. T.

[3] The Pine in 1833 argued that the British Government had promised houses. "The Speech of a principal Chief of the Ojibway or Chippewa Nation, named Chinguacose, in their behalf, on hearing the address read from the Society for Converting and Civilizing the Indians, established at Toronto." (Waddilove, 1839: 103-4)

[4] Minutes of Speeches made ... the 11th of July, 1829. Journals of the Legislative Assembly. 1847 App. T.

[5] Benjamin Slight (1844: 82 ff.), a Methodist missionary, wrote, "The Indians consider it rude to call a man by his proper name in common discourse. They always give him the quality he has with respect to the speaker, but when there is between them no relation or affinity, they use the term of brother or uncle, nephew or cousin, according to each other's age, or the feeling they possess towards the person they address." For instance, Shingwaukōnse referred to Head Chief Yellowhead of Rama as "Brother" and "Netahwis Mesquah-keence". Ken-ah-nis-shung-wok-koonse to Mesquah.keense. (Ibid.)

[6] Francis Audrain to Schoolcraft, 25 September, 1833. N.A. RG 75, MI, F.M-2, Roll 71. Shawanapenasse was likely related to The Pine through the marriage of The Pine's mother to a member of the Grand Island band. Shawanabenasse, also referred to as "Oshawwunnebenace", remained chief of the Bay de Noc band until his death in 1836 (Schoolcraft, 1975: 560). His band participated in treaty negotiations in 1836 distinct from the Grand Island band. The Pine's view that the Potawatomi would wait one year before making any moves rested on valid premises, since 1833 brought major land cessions near Chicago and the first of a number of Potawatomi migrations into Upper Canada (Clifton, 1975: 30). It is possible that Shingwaukōnse's unsympathetic attitude towards the warlike aspirations of this group may have discouraged Potawatomi from pressing north as far as the Sault. By 1837 the head chief of the Bay de Noc band was Adowawaego (Schoolcraft, 1975: 560).

[7] Testimony of John Bell. Thomas G. Anderson Papers, S29. Baldwin Room, Toronto Metropolitan Library.

[8] The Pine made frequent references to the confusing array of religious opinions and creeds which confronted him during these years. See, for example, Elliot (1837: 157-8).

[9] Sir Thomas Kempt to Sir John Colborne, 18 February, 1829. RG 10, vol. 5.

[10] Request that the President Sanction a Grant of Land to Grape Island Indians, From the Resident Chiefs at Sault Ste. Marie, 20 September, 1831. Washington, Schoolcraft Papers, Reel 5.

[11] Extract of Letter of Francis Audrain, 22 June, 1833, N.A., RG 75, MI, Roll 71: 84.

[12] The present writer is indebted to the Reverend John Henry, pastor of the Methodist church at Zeba, near L'Anse, and to Isidore Missigan, Zeba, for their assistance in investigating the history of the Pequaming Methodist Mission. The history of the Zeba Mission is presented in History of the Zeba Indian Mission, United Methodist Church. Ahmeek, Michigan: Copper Island Graphics (1982).

[13] George Copway supported this concept well into the late 1840s (Copway, 1850: 274).

[14] Shingwaukōnse maintained that he had forsaken his traditional religious practices. "I ... gathered them [the manido.sug] up for the last time, and I said Kewabenenim, I throw you away," the chief declared (Elliot, 1837: 157). At this occasion, according to Elliot:

> [Shingwaukōnse] held in his hand a string of white wampum ... which colour signified his present object, viz., searching after a clean white heart. He enquired first of the Christian chiefs, "Are you truly more happy now in your hearts than when you had our father's religion? If you are so, I wish you to tell me."

[15] It was explained to Elliot (1837: 159) that "having long arms denotes the possession of a large country. A large body signifies that he has many people in his tribe." (Ibid.: 159)

[16] Nezhepenasse and Quewezhanshish became and remained Methodist (Ibid.: 418). For more information on Nezhepenasse, or "The Single Bird", son of Gitchee Iaubance of L'Anse, see Mason, ed. (1962: 135). One wampum sent by Yellowhead consisted of seven strings of white shell, one of coloured beads, with nearly two yards of red ribbon and two pieces of tobacco. The white beads proclaimed peace on earth and goodwill to men by the blood of the cross (Slight, 1844: 175).

[17] 17 December, 1832. Journal Two, Bingham Papers. Clarke Historical Library, University of Central Michigan, Mount Pleasant.

[18] Ibid.

[19] 22 January, 1833. Ibid.

[20] Bingham employed John Tanner, the Saginaw captive, as an interpreter during the early 1830's. After 1840 Bingham's interpreter was Louis Cadotte.

[21] 24 January, 1833. Journal 2, Bingham Papers. Clarke Historical Library, University of Central Michigan, Mount Pleasant.

[22] Ibid.

[23] The area had been represented as a suitable site for Anglican endeavors even prior to the War of 1812. Correspondence Regarding the Application of Mr. John Johnston in 1810 for a Missionary to be sent to Sault Ste. Marie. Jacob Mountain, Bishop of Quebec to Charles Manners, Archibishop of Canterbury, 11 November, 1810. Toronto. Toronto Metropolitan Library, Scadding Collection.

[24] Cameron describes the schoolteacher as his "cousin". This may have been William Cameron, who later became a trader at Sault Ste. Marie (Waddilove, 1839: 27).

[25] LaCloche Post Journals. MG 20. B/109/a/3/1829-30.

[26] MG 20. B/109/a/5/1831-32.

[27] Cameron accepted baptism from Bingham's hands on May 2, 1832. Journal 2, 1832. Bingham Papers, Clarke Library, Central Michigan University, Mount Pleasant. For notice of his removal from the Anglican mission, see Second Annual Report of the Society for Converting and Civilizing the Indians &c, 1832. (henceforth referred to as The Society).

[28] Second Annual Report of The Society, Appendix.

[29] MacLean (1973: 51).

[30] Waddilove (1839: 104).

[31] In his report for 1833 McMurray complained that his constant attention to "the business of the school interferes with more important duties" (Waddilove, 1839: 98).

[32] McMurray to George Johnston, 7 May, 1833. George Johnston Papers. Burton Historical Collection. Detroit, Detroit Public Library. McMurray's marriage made him brother-in-law both to George Johnston and Henry Rowe Schoolcraft. McMurray always felt closeness to the Johnstons, as well as Strachan and Colborne.

[33] Elbert Herring to Schoolcraft, 20 June, 1833. N.A. RG 75, Ml, Roll 71: 68; George Johnston to Schoolcraft, 20 June, 1833. N.A. RG 75, MI. Roll 71:60.

[34] Francis Audrain to Schoolcraft, 13 June, 1833. N.A. RG 75, MI, Roll 71:48.

[35] Shingwaukonse to George Ironsides, 20 February, 1846. RG 10, vol. 157: 904057. Reel C-11,495.

[36] Francis Audrain to Schoolcraft, 13 June, 1833. N.A. RG 75, MI, Roll 71:48.

[37] Third Annual Report of The Society, York, 1833.

[38] "Waishkey means "New Born", or "Of the New Earth." He is not to be confused with Waubojeeg's son, who had the same name.

[39] McMurray to George Johnston, 7 May, 1833. George Johnston Papers. Burton Historical Collection, Detroit, Detroit Public Library.

[40] J. G. Kohl (1956: 382) presented a detailed description of a session between The Pine and Kaygayosh in which medicine matters were being discussed. Kohl derived his information concerning this discussion between the two medicine men from a Métis, possibly George Johnston. According to Kohl, the session was held in a lodge, especially constructed for the occasion, somewhat removed from the Ojibwa village. Kohl also stated that The Pine, in learning about medicine, had expended "at least forty packets of beaver skins.... Each packet at that time contained "one hundred pounds of beaver skins", and beaver was worth "eight to ten dollars a pound. Forty packs hence represented a minimum value of thirty thousand dollars...."

[41] Schoolcraft (1975: 570) gives the relative age of Maidosagee's sons, from eldest to youngest.

[42] Kaygayosh did not accept Anglican baptism until he was on his deathbed in 1836 (Schoolcraft, 1975: 549). Kaygayosh still viewed his own political power as issuing from his position within the Crane family, rather than from attachment to the mission station.

[43] "The Venerable Archdeacon McMurray". Algoma Missionary News, January, 1892.

[44] Ibid. Years later Buhkwujjenene stated, regarding his own conversion:

> I thought of the great Spirit, of His love and goodness, and joy filled my soul. I knelt under a bush and prayed. I looked toward the west; the sun was setting in glory and splendor, and the glow and glory was a pledge of God's favor. It was like the glory that filled my soul. (Frost, 1904: 86)

[45] Journal of the Missionary to the Sault Ste. Mary, ended July 22, 1835. In Fifth Annual Report of The Society, 1835.

[46] Ibid.

[47] "John Askin", Shingwaukõnse's own son who was given this name, was not born until 1836. The Pine first bestowed his favored name on Piabetassung's family.

[48] See Chapter 5 of this study regarding Nahwahquashkum and the hostility of his in-laws.

[49] Third Annual Report of The Society, York, 1833.

[50] Ibid.

[51] Ibid.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Report presented to the Society at its meeting at Upper Canada College, Toronto, December 27, 1834. The Fourth Annual Report of The Society ... for the year ending October, 1834.

[55] William Nourse to Bethune, 29 July, 1835. Correspondence Book, Sault Ste. Marie. Hudson's Bay Company Archives, Winnipeg. Microfilm copies at P.A.C. (Henceforth MG 20). MG. 20. B/194/b/10/1835-6.

[56] Fourth Annual Report of the Society, York, 1834.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Ibid.

[60] 30 September, 1834. Post Journal, Sault Ste. Marie. MG. 20. B/194/a/8/1834-5.

[61] William Nourse to Angus Bethune, 12 April, 1836. Correspondence Book, Sault Ste. Marie. MG 20. B/194/b/10/1835-1836, 2 November, 1834. Post Journal, Sault Ste. Marie. MG 20. B/194/a/8/1834-1835; William

Nourse to Louis Denis Laronde, 2 December, 1834. Correspondence Book, Sault Ste. Marie. MG 20. B/194/b/9/1834-5.

[62] 9 March, 1835. Post Journal, Sault Ste. Marie. MG 20. B/194/a/8/1834-1835.

[63] Fourth Annual Report of the Society, 1834.

[64] Thomas G. Anderson to Captain G. Phillpots, 18 July, 1835. A.O., MG 35, Strachan Papers. Fourth Annual Report of the Society, York, 1834.

[65] Fourth Annual Report of the Society, York, 1834.

[66] Michael Payment came to Sugar Island in 1834. Malcolm McKerchie became a trader on Sugar Island after he left the employ of the Hudson's Bay Company. In 1845 Philetus Swift Church built a store, two docks, a sawmill, a shipyard and a drydock at Church's Point on the eastern end of the island, facing Garden River (Bayliss and Bayliss, 1955: 164-5). Five settlements emerged on Sugar Island near these merchants' establishments. These were Payment, Wilwalk, Baie de Wasi, Brasser and Homestead. Other traders in this area included members of the Sayer, Corbiere, Lecoy, Mastaux, Amiot and McFarlane families. Most were of Métis extraction. Church in particular often seasonally employed Native women to pick berries for him during the summer. Journal of F.L. Osler, August, 1868. A.O. Mss. Osler Papers, 11-1-c. MU 2298. These merchant organizations were severely injured by the re-routing of shipping traffic along the Hay Lake passage on the American side of the strait by the late nineteenth century. One by one they closed down operations and by 1900, very few were left.

[67] Canoes which ascended the Garden River to Ranger Lake could travel west through Laughing Lake and Morrison Lake, reaching the Goulais River and they could proceed downstream to Goulais Bay. A westward extension of this chain of lakes and rivers included a route from the Goulais River through Point Lake, Haines Lake and Gavor Lake to the southward-flowing Chippewa and Batchawana river systems. These rivers dropped steeply to the coast and their waters were often turbulent. Interview with Fred Pine Sr., 10 June, 1983.

[68] Alexander Murray to Indian Affairs Department. RG 10, vol. 168: 97700. The Pine at times spoke for chiefs residing as far west as the Puckasaw River, which was the dividing line between the territorial jurisdiction exercised by the coastal bands under Shingwaukōnse's headship and the lands under the protection of the Lake Nipigon head chief, Mishimukwa.

[69] Fourth Annual Report of the Society, York, 1834.

[70] Ibid.

[71] Anderson attempted to carry out Colborne's proposals by removing the Métis en masse to St. Joseph's Island. His own rationale for doing this rested on three premises: first, the Métis were distrusted by the United States Government for their alleged anti-American influence among the Indians; second, the agent considered them indigent and unprogressive in their farming practices; and, finally, he felt they constituted a bad example to the mission Indians because of their smuggling ventures.

Although a number of these Métis "squatters" had previously obtained authority from commanding officers at Drummond Island to occupy land along the river shore, the agent ignored these claims since no survey of lots had been made. Once the Métis had been forced to vacate the water's edge, Anderson promised the Ojibwa that the government would commence to build twenty Indian huts.

About thirty Métis houses lay along the north shore of the rapids. Two diametrically opposite views of the Métis existed at this time. The first romantically portrayed the Métis as self-sufficient hunters, trappers, fishermen and cultivators, so attuned to seasonal cycles and the natural way of things that their small farms became known in their own mixed dialect of French and Ojibwa as "deserts -- the French Canadians, accusing themselves, as it were, of being desolators of nature ..." (Kohl, 1956: 304). This symbolic perspective was used by E.B. Borren during the late nineteenth century to deprive The Pine's band of rights (see Chapter Nine of this study). The converse view, which fired the American Government's and the Hudson's Bay Company's concern, presented the Métis as militarily and commercially aggressive. Nothing would suit young Métis men better, argued John Bigsby of the 1823 American Boundary Commission, than to embark on a war venture "at the head of their Indian friends, to kill and be killed at ten shillings a day" (Bigsby, 1850: 130). By 1835, moreover, these men had reason to be aggressive. Their economic position was not enviable. They had been pressured out of their trading operations by the monopolistic fur trade enterprises. Most felt that their skills in carpentry, boatbuilding, voyaging and guiding deserved greater rewards than the sporadic employment offered by the Hudson's Bay Company. The United States' policy against British fur traders operating on the American side precluded trading pursuits. The most accessible commercial prospect lay in smuggling goods and liquor across the border, a hazardous task, especially as McMurray zealously reported offenders by 1835.

After 1836 there were several Métis resistance movements, which included the Sayers uprising at Red River in 1849 and the Native takeover of a mining company north of Sault Ste. Marie the same year. There were also angry demonstrations towards the Hudson's Bay Company, although these incidents lie outside the scope of this study. These shows of unrest involved corporate ideals which gained force among the buffalo-hunting Métis of Red River (Pannekoek, 1970: 72-90). See also October, 1835. MG 20. B/194/e/8/1835; Petition of the inhabitants and natives of the settlement situated on the Red River, in the Assiniboine country, British North America. Ordered by the Legislative Assembly to

be Printed, 22nd May, 1857. PAC., Macdonell Papers. MG 24, I 8. vol. 40.

[72] Elliot wrote in his journal for this date:

> [we] left Sault Ste. Marie, and Mr. Robertson, Chinguacounse, and other Indians, accompanied us to the Garden River, which has been represented [by them] to be a preferable site for the Mission. (Waddilove, 1839: 87)

[73] Anderson's Journal, 1835. Typescript: 7. Anderson Papers. S29. Baldwin Room, Toronto Metropolital Library.

[74] Thomas G. Anderson to Captain G. Phillpots, 18 July, 1835. A.O. MG 35. Strachan Papers.

[75] Extract from the Reverend G.A. Anderson's Report of the Sault Ste. Marie and Garden River Mission, January, 1849. Typescript. The Reverend Canon Colloton Papers. Anglican Heritage Collection, Bishophurst, Sault Ste. Marie.

[76] Even though the Sault and its environs fell outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Hudson's Bay Company's original charter, during the 1830s the tradition that a chief factor should uphold precepts of religion, order and morality lingered on in areas south of the Height of Land between Hudson's Bay and the watersheds of river running south into the Upper Great Lakes (Peake, 1972: 72-93; Rich, 1957: 38-48).

[77] Report on the District of Sault Ste. Marie. MG 20. B/194/e/8/1835.

[78] Nourse to Mr. Louis Denis Laronde, 2 December, 1834. Correspondence Books, Sault Ste. Marie. MG 20. B/194/b/9/1834-1835.

[79] To His Excellency, Sir John Colborne K. B. Lieutenant Governor of the Province of Upper Canada, 1835. AC 2402, Bishop McDonnell Papers, Toronto, Catholic Archdiocesan Archives. The Métis petitioned the Roman Catholic Bishop, Alexander Macdonell, for a priest to reside permanently on the Canadian side and attend to their community's interests. Petition to the Right Reverend Alexander McDonald, Roman Catholic Bishop of Upper Canada, 14 September, 1834. AC 2401. Bishop McDonnell Papers. Toronto, Catholic Archdiocesan Archives.

[80] Anderson's Journal, 1835. Typscript. Anderson Papers, S29. Baldwin Room, Toronto Metropolitan Library.

[81] Thomas G. Anderson to Captain G. Phillpots, 18 July, 1835. A.O. MG 35, Strachan Papers.

[82] It is likely that the "Cranes" were under witchcraft attack at this time. Anderson noted in his journal on June 30, 1835, that the Indians "promised to bury the dead bird as will appear in document No 2." Anderson's Journal, 1835. Anderson Papers, S29. Baldwin Room, Toronto Metropolitan Library.

[83] Mention of the document granting Nebenagoching the head chieftainship is made in a communication from Richard Carney to Robert Pennefather, 16 October, 1858. RG 10. vol. 245, pt.2: 145638-41.

[84] Thomas G. Anderson to Captain Phillpots, 18 July, 1835. A.O., MG 35. Strachan Papers.

[85] Ibid.

[86] Ibid. When the Métis declared that they wished monetary compensation for their waterfront lots, Anderson made vague threats of government retribution for such "insolence." "I told them the Govt. would not purchase from them," the agent stressed, "[and] that they had now refused our offer of land at St. Joseph's which they might otherwise regret."

[87] Anderson instructed the Indians to farm and no longer conduct war against the United States or among themselves. Indian Council, 14 July, 1822. A.O. Captain T.G. Anderson Papers, 1814-1922, Ms 23, Reel 1.

[88] John Bell to Bishop Macdonell, 8 April, 1834. AC-16. Bishop McDonnell Papers, Toronto, Catholic Archdiocesan Archives. Bell stated that the Indians had "all left Coldwater for the forest, because the missionary told them that they must return to the religion of their 'Great Father' at York or lose all gifts from the Government."

[89] George Ironsides to Indian Department, 25 March, 1850. RG 10. vol. 612: 745-7; Ironsides to George Vardon, RG 10, vol. 621: 872. Also RG 10, vol. 130: 73348-50.

[90] The agent continued to rely on John Bell as an interpreter after Anderson was appointed Indian Superintendent at Manitowaning in 1838. George Ironsides became agent at Manitowaning in 1845.

[91] Thomas G. Anderson to Captain G. Phillpots, 18 July, 1835. A.O., MG 35, Strachan Papers.

[92] Petition of chiefs to Andrew Jackson, enclosing speeches of chiefs of Mackinac and L'Arbre Croche, 15 October, 1834. N.A. RG 75, MI, Roll 69: 51-2; 73-7.

[93] Anderson engaged Waubmama as a middleman canoesman in 1849. Diary of Thomas G. Anderson, Visiting Superintendent of Indian Affairs

at Cobourg, 5 September, 1849. A.O., MU 838. Mis MSS, transcript copy, p.24.

[94] Articles of a treaty, 1836 (7 Stat. 491. Kappler 1904-1911, 2: 450). Lewis Cass to Henry R. Schoolcraft, 14 March, 1836. N.A. RG 75, M1, Roll 72: 462-5.

[95] James Ord to James L. Schoolcraft, 5 June, 1838. N.A. RG 75, M234, Roll 415: 619.

[96] The Council of Three Fires has been discussed in several studies (Burpee, 1926: 73; Jenness, 1967: 277; White, 1913: 390-90). George Copway stresses the predominance of the Ojibwa in the wars against the Iroquois (Copway, 1851: 33-4; Schmaltz, 1984: 336-7).

[97] Thomas G. Anderson to Indian Affairs, 10 May, 1839. RG 10, vol. 124: 69878.

[98] William H. Higgins, Secretary to the Aborigines' Protection Society, and Augustus D'Este and Samuel Blackburn, on behalf of the Committee. Enclosed with a letter to Sir George Arthur, K.C.B., from Lord Glenelg, 22 August, 1838, British North American Provinces: 101.

[99] Elliot to Bishop Strachan, 12 October, 1837. A.O., MG 35, Strachan Papers.

[100] Seventh Annual Report of the Society, 1839. See also "Historical Sketches: Archdeacon McMurray", The Canadian Church Magazine, January, 1890; Algoma Missionary News, January, 1892.

Endnotes, Chapter Five

[1] On the American side of the St. Mary's straits, Métis often arose as intermediaries in negotiations with the government (Clifton, 1975). Canadian officials, however, refused to recognize the Métis as a class, and Métis thus had to become "Indian" in order to participate in the struggle for Native rights.

[2] Ottawa leaders who joined The Pine's campaign for Native rights included Abotossaway, Oshuzasubedeness, Maggrah and Shebakezick. Shebakezick had been a brigade leader, directing canoes between Red River and the Mackinac region. Descendants of this man now live on the Whitefish Reserve as well as at Garden River. Cecelia Shawan's mother, Elizabeth Michaud, a Métis from Penetanguishene, had been the wife of Shebakezick's son, William Shebakezick, but later married Oshawano's son, Edward. She is Dan Pine's grandmother on his maternal side.

[3] Michael Cadotte married the daughter of the head Crane chief of Lapointe. Jean Baptiste Nolin apparently maintained such an alliance with Andaigweos, head chief of the Loon dodem, who was father of Besheke and probably Mezai. Besheke in July, 1821, referred to Mezai as his "Brother". Council at Drummond Island, 12 July, 1821. A.O. Captain T.G. Anderson Papers, 1814-1822. Ms 23, Reel 1.

[4] Church Registers, The Immaculate Heart of Mary, Garden River.

[5] Oral traditions at Garden River maintain that Nebenagoching's mother was a Perrault. See Harrington (1979).

[6] 8 November, 1797. Post Journals, Michipicoten. MG 20. B/12a/a/1/1797; 17 August, 1818. Post Journals, MG 20. B/129/a/9/1818-19.

[7] 22 August, 1818. Post Journals, Michipicoten. MG 20. B/129/a/9/1818-19.

[8] Indian Council, 14 July, 1822. A.O. Captain T.G. Anderson Papers, 1814-1822, Ms 23, Reel 1. Commander Puthuff at Mackinac in 1816 had warned the United States War Department regarding the need to win over influential "civil chiefs", who exerted a measure of control over their subordinates, the war leaders. Puthuff's distinction between "civil chiefs" and "war chiefs" in his allocation of gifts and honors set a precedent for United states policy and came to be unquestioningly accepted by Schoolcraft after 1820. William Henry Puthuff to War Department, 29 November, 1816. N.A., FM2, vol. 1, Roll 1: 350-55.

After the close of the War of 1812, the Ojibwa in Michigan tried to retain a measure of their economic and political autonomy. In 1815, Misquuckey (Yellowhead), of the caribou dodem, Aisance of the Otter dodem, and Kenaybecoinini of the Catfish dodem united in an attempt to enter into a pact with the British colonial authorities regarding their hunting territories in southern Ontario. In 1817 the size of this

alliance increased with the inclusion of the "Pike Tribe". Adherents to this alliance declared their intention to secure "right of beaver hunting and hunting generally throughout their land." This movement suffered by the British endeavor to move Native peoples away from the American border after 1827 and settle them at Penetanguishene. 17 November, 1815. The chiefs of the Chippeway Nations, lease of 250,000 acres of land for a year. RG 10, vol. 34: 18670; 7 June, 1817. Petition of the Reindeer, Otter, Catfish and Pike Tribes. RG 10, vol. 34: 19886.

[9] Such discrimination gave rise to ephemeral wildcat schemes, such as James Dickson's plan in 1836 to establish a Native state in present day Texas (Arthur, 1970: 151-62). Dickson's goal was to be achieved, by force if necessary, by Dickson's "army" of Métis volunteers, recruited from communities between Montreal and Red River. Factor John McBean's son from LaCloche became one of the leading organizers in this ill-fated expedition.

[10] Ogista's daughter Charlotte married a member of the LaRose family. No documentary evidence that Shebakezick was The Pine's son-in-law could be found, although oral testimonies argued that he had married one of Shingwaukönse's daughters.

[11] Church records of St. John's Anglican Church, Garden River; Church records of the Immaculate Heart of St. Mary, Garden River. Francis and Charles Biron, who assumed much of their father's status within the Sault community by the late nineteenth century became prominent members of the Garden River band, while Alexis, their brother, also a well-known figure at the rapids, joined Nebenegoching's group. Both before and after their entry into the bands, many French and Métis individuals retained a degree of social prominence at Sault Ste. Marie, by contrast to the poor image of the Métis presented by men like Thomas G. Anderson. Until his death in 1860 Xavier Biron remained a respected member of the Sault communty. John Silveright of the Hudson's Bay company noted in 1823 that the independent trader continued to drive an elegant carriole even though "his means of supporting rank are diminishing." By 1835 Biron supplemented his income from the commercial fishery by running a ferry service across the St. Mary's Channel. It was a major remove from the lucrative enterprise he had carried on at Fond du Lac, yet his social reputation persisted. Judge John Prince, who in the late 1860s entertained aspirations of establishing himself as a member of a local gentry, lauded Biron for remaining a gentleman in spite of sickness and financial difficulties. Silveright to James Hargrave, 10 May, 1823. PAC. Hargrave Collection, MG 19-A21, series 1, vol. 1: 7-8; A.O. 3 January, 1862, and 12-13 March, 1862; Prince Diaries.

[12] 25 February, 1828. LaCloche Post Journals. MG 20. B/109/a/1/1827-1828.

[13] Ibid.

[14] In 1827, John McBean stated that Indians from Fond du Lac brought 300 rats (muskrats), 9 raccoons, 4 bears and an otter, but refused to trade at the HBC post. They went instead to the Ermatinger establishment. LaCloche Post Journals. MG 20. B/109/a/1/1827.

[15] Sir George Simpson to Bethune, 5 January, 1831. Correspondence Book, Sault Ste. Marie. MG 20. B/194/a/6/1831. Indians north of the Sault by 1834 had been reduced to relying on rabbits and fish for food. According to chief Factor George Keith at Michipicoten:

> Black + Brown bears, lynx, fisher, martin, mink, cross, red + silver foxes, beaver + otter, Wolves and Wolverines are almost exterminated, as are the moose and red Deer. There exist a few thinly scattered Rein Deer within range of most of the Posts, and in approaching Sault Ste. Mary's a few fallow deer survive.

Michipicoton. Reports on Districts. MG. 20. B/129/e/1833-4.

[16] J.D. Cameron to James Hargrave, 5 May, 1834. PAC. MG 19-A21, Hargrave Correspondence, Reel 76: 1655-56.

[17] John McBean to Sir George Simpson, 5 May, 1831. MG 20. LaCloche Post Journals. B/109/a/4/1930-31. J.D. Cameron to James Hargrave, 5 May, 1843. PAC, MG 19-A21, Reel 76: 1655-56.

[18] Unlike the case in the Lake Huron district, it was difficult at Michipicoten to determine the range of the Indians' hunting grounds. MG 20. Report on the District of Michipicoten. B/129/e/9/1833-34. Reports filtered down from points further north of the depredations of a group known as the "Crane" Indians. Bethune to Keith, 3 July, 1830. MG 20. B/194/a/5/1829-30.

[19] 7 September, 1829, John McBean reported the spread of alarm among the Indians at the post because of an alleged sighting of cannibals from the interior. On 10 September, 1829, the "'Grand Medicine' [was] held, as a means to find out the causes of their fear," he wrote. LaCloche Post Journals. MG 20. B/109/a/3/1829-30.

[20] William MacTavish to Sir George Simpson, 17 October, 1849. MG. 20. B/194/b/15/1849-50. The visitations of the head chiefs at the fur post had usually been occasions of note. For instance, one by one these brigades had passed LaCloche in 1831 en route for Penetanguishene. Mezai came on July 8, Nebenegoching on July 10, and finally Shingwaukõnse on July 30. MG. 20. LaCloche Post Journals. B/109/1/5/1831-2.

[21] J.D. Cameron Sr. to James Hargrave, 16 April, 1842. PAC, MG. 19-A21. Hargrave Correspondence: 2881.

[22] John Ballenden to James Hargrave, 26 April, 1842. PAC, MG 19-A21. Hargrave correspondence: 2327.

[23] This major change in the social order and social perceptions occurred throughout the Upper Great Lakes region.

[24] J.D. Cameron to the Honourable James H. Price, Commissioner of Crown Lands, 1847. Copy in the Indian File, Bruce Mines Museum.

[25] Descendants of both J.D. Cameron Jr. and William Cameron reside at Bay Mills and Au Train, Michigan.

[26] George Vardon to J. M. Higginson, 16 April, 1848. RG 10, vol. 612: 215. According to the diary of the Anglican missionary Gustavus Anderson, who resided at Garden river from the fall of 1848 to the spring of 1849, fishing constituted an important commercial enterprise. Almost all residents of the community owned a batteau and used gill nets to take catches near Thessalon. With their earnings they purchased pork, flour, lard, cornmeal, tea and tobacco. The rapids fishery occurred during the spring and from late September to early November. By the 1840s, however, competition from American speculators had made it a hazardous pursuit since, in brief frays which arose on the fishing grounds, Native fishermen could be abused and injured. Gustavus noted in 1848 that whitefish sold for five dollars a barrel. It was a major event in the annual economic cycle for men to trade their fish at Mackinac, after which they would celebrate for a week. The diary of the Reverend Gustavus Anderson, August 26, 1848, to May 23, 1849. Thomas G. Anderson Papers, S29, Folder B. Baldwin Room, Toronto Metropolitan Library.

[27] As late as 1900 the missionary Frost (1904) noted many instances of men and women favoring traditional materials and techniques over more modern, but often costly, functional equivalents.

[28] James Ord to James R. Schoolcraft, 5 June, 1838. N.A. RG 75, M234, Roll 415: 619. George Johnston wrote that while on a trading expedition to St. Joseph's Island he was informed "that secret smoking councils had been and were held among Indians on the North Shore of Lake Huron" for the purpose of attacking Fort Brady. In response Major Cobbs of Fort Brady placed the post on the alert. George Johnston, spring 1838. George Johnston Papers. Bayliss Library, Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan.

[29] Schoolcraft to C.A. Harris, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, War Department, 29 August, 1837, enclosing Extract of a Letter dated Sault Ste. Marie, August 20, 1837. N.A. RG 75, Records of the Michigan Superintendency, Letters sent... July 18, 1836 - June 26, 1839: 300.

[30] Ibid.

[31] First Speech of Chinquakous -- Young Pine. James Givins Papers. Baldwin Room, Toronto Metropolitan Library.

[32] Ottanwish was referring to Wikwemikong, Manitoulin Island. Most of the Ottawa at Wikwemikong had migrated from L'Arbre Croche, Michigan. The Speech of Ottanwish after hearing the address of Chinquakous. James Givins Papers. Baldwin Room, Toronto Metropolitan Library.

[33] Ibid.

[34] These would have been the Leech Lake Indians observed by O'Meara at Sault Ste. Marie the following summer. O'Meara to the Reverend H.J. Grasett, 5 June, 1839. A.O. MG. 35, Strachan Papers.

[35] In his most recent work on the War of 1812, George F.G. Stanley referred to the St. Joseph Island post as a "miserable station" (Stanley, 1983: 8).

[36] The Reply of Ching-qua-konse, A Chippewa Chief. James Givens Papers. Baldwin Room, Toronto Metropolitan Library.

[37] Bond-Head in 1836 had obtained land surrenders from the Hurons along the Detroit River and the Saugeen Indians of the Bruce Peninsula, as well as the cession of Manitoulin island.

[38] Upper Canada Clergy Society, Second Annual Report, 1838: 22 ff.

[39] James Evans' Diary, 11 July - 17 November, 1838. E.J. Pratt Library, Victoria College, Toronto.

[40] James Evans to Joseph Stinson, 4 August, 1838. (Landon, 1932: 52-3). A Methodist missionary was sent soon afterwards to Fort William.

[41] James Evans' Diary, 11 July - 17 November, 1838: 68. E.J. Pratt Library, Victoria College, Toronto.

[42] Evans to Stinson, 20 August, 1838 (Landon, 1932: 57).

[43] Evans' Diary: 72-4. According to Evans:

> [One part] especially of the speech [of the Indian Department officials] was very objectionable -- that of pointing out Shingwaukonse the chief at the Sault, as the most respectable + the neatest + best provided with his family of any of the Indians on the Island. I have no doubt but the intention was good viz. to shew the pagans the benefits of Christianity but

> many of the Indians both Catholic and Methodist could not but feel themselves much injured by such a personal particularization ... it is difficult to determine why this body of Indians was selected from the three thousand on the island and this chief only allowed to speak in council save that they are the only members of the Church of England who were present in the vast assembly.

[44] Evans' Diary: 107; Second Speech of Chinquakons. James Givins Papers. Baldwin Room, Toronto Metropolitan Library.

[45] Anderson to S.P. Jarvis, 1 March, 1838. RG 10, vol. 124: 69819-20.

[46] Second Speech of Chinquakons and Reply. James Givins Papers. Baldwin Room, Toronto Metropolitan Library. It was an awkward moment, since the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, just prior to The Pine's address, had delivered a speech which praised the Indians for their unfailing loyalty. Speech of Samuel Peters Jarvis, Chief Superintendent of Indian Affairs, to the Indian Chiefs assembled in Council at Manitowaning, the 12th of August, 1838. RG 10, vol. 69: 9; Anderson to Jarvis, 23 May, 1840. RG 10, vol. 124: 69712.

[47] Extract from a letter from Sir George Arthur, Lieut. Governor, to Chief Shinquackouce, dated Govt. House, York, 19 Sept. 1839. P.A.C., RG 1, E5, ECO file 1157, vol. 8, 1848. The subject of the kind of skills the Métis could contribute to The Pine's settlement was discussed with several elders. Among those most helpful with regard to this topic were Joe Boissoneau Sr. and John Biron. Interview with Joe Boissoneau Sr., 13 August, 1982; Interview with John Biron, 12 August, 1982.

[48] Anderson to Jarvis, 23 May, 1840. RG 10, vol. 124: 69712-3.

[49] The Pine's decision to ask the British Government to extend presents to the Métis also logically complemented Anderson's belief that Métis on the western frontier not in receipt of the Queen's bounty might prove disloyal. Anderson to Jarvis, 17 December, 1838. RG 10, vol. 124: 69676-79.

[50] This stance of The Pine's did not discourage the Methodists from holding religious meetings at Sault Ste. Marie. In November, 1838, Evans visited Shingwaukōnse's band and baptized one of the chief's grandsons. Evans Diary: 46. Toronto, E.J. Pratt Library, Victoria College.

[51] The assimilationist stance gained ideological reinforcement after 1840 following the development of a political philosophy by Herman Merivale at the University of Oxford. This philosophy would direct British Colonial Office policy for the next two decades. Merivale, who became Permanent Undersecretary of State for the Colonial Office in

1848, claimed that of four options: extermination, slavery, insulation and amalgamation, open to colonial legislators with regard to aboriginal peoples within the British empire, the surge of public support for humanitarian reform had ruled out the first two alternatives (McNab, 1978). Merivale also argued that isolation could lead to an alienation of Native peoples from their lands and, ultimately, to dependence on government.

[52] Report on the Affairs of the Indians in Canada. Journals of Legislative Assembly of Canada, 1847. App. T., App. 94.

[53] Allowing the Native people to continue unrestricted commercial intercourse with Whites and among themselves was seen as contravening yet another political philosophy, that of the eighteenth-century Swiss philosopher, Emerich de Vattel. Vattel predicted that in contentious circumstances "natural law" would predominate over artificial legislation. He stressed the political powerlessness of unsettled aboriginal or "erratic" nations, who would be driven to extinction unless they could be assimilated into the "superior" economic and political system of western Europe and the Americas. Vattel's perspective provided justification for obtaining the surrender of the Indians' hunting grounds by demarcating a sharp contrast between the intellectual, moral, economic and political capacities of hunting populations, and that of agricultural peoples. Since unsettled groups were politically weak, they could not be expected to be able to protect their rights against superior nations wishing to occupy the vast tracts required to procure their subsistence. On these grounds the Indian Department proclaimed that metropolitan regulation of the "natural" process could only be assured if the power both to direct assimilation and obtain land surrenders remain vested in the Crown, rather than in the provinces. While basically humanitarian, the government's new policy orientation relegated the Indian to the level of a non-rational being, for, according to Vattel's premises, aboriginal peoples lacked the ability to formulate consistent policy. The retention by the state of all decision-making relative to the assimilation process made it possible for government administrators to turn a deaf ear to The Pine's suggestions. Report on Affairs of the Indians in Canada. Journals of Legislative Assembly of Canada. 1844-45. App. EEE; Report on the Affairs of the Indians in Canada, Journals of Legislative Assembly of Canada. 1847. App. T., App. 94;

[54] Anderson to the Rev'd M. Proulx at Wikwemikong, 10 May, 1839. RG 10, vol. 124: 69878.

[55] Crosbie Brough to Archdeacon Strachan, 20 December, 1838 (Lewis, 1956: 66-7); Anderson to Jarvis, 8 June, 1842. RG 10, vol. 124: 69773-5.

[56] Anderson to Jarvis, 24 December, 1838. RG 10, vol. 124: 69698.

[57] Keche.Besheke, also known as Keche.Waishkey, wrote Shingwaukōnse:

> My Dear Friend Shingwauk
> I received your letter that you forwarded to me by Cap^{n} Wood. I am very satisfied to hear that your family is well as also yourself. My Dear Chief I remember well what I told you last summer. I have always the same mind I don't alter it. I love too much my mouth and my heart. My pipe I sent you shall remember you of my faithfulness. I also tell you my Dear Chief that nobody can + will be the master of me. I am my own Master. They tell me that our agent when he arrives to this place will intreat me to go to Prairie du Chien this summer. But I tell you that I will certainly not go but I intend to go down this summer to see our English friends for the last time as they will give us presents this summer only and then no more. I intend to go down to Mahnitowahno in the month of June next. I like more to go down to see the Red Coat than to receive here a little money. So I will go down. As the heart of my forefathers has been so is mine. Never believe My Dear Chief that any body is master of me and the Americans never shall be. The half-breeds that came to La Pointe last summer know all our chiefs, and almost all our Indians tormented me last summer -- even our Traders spoke ill of me. I can tell you for my person that I will certainly go. I think altho' that the chief Ashkebuggecooshe and his young men will arrive this spring and go down with me. I hear this chief and his young men are very poor this winter that they are almost freezing to death so I think he will go down to see our English friends for the last time. The chiefs from the interior asked me to wait for them that they would go along with me. I told them that I will start from here early in June, if they arrive in due season we will go down in company. Perhaps also Aiahbens will go down, he said so. For me I go down to keep my word. I honor my own word very much and always wish to keep it. If I live I will see you next summer. My Dear Chief Shingwauk, we are poor. I do not know what we shall eat during the journey but still I will go. I wish you good health my Dear Friend and good health to all your family and our friends
>
> Your Friend
>
> Kache Whashke

The Reverend F.A. O'Meara to Bishop Strachan, 31 October, 1839. A.O. MG. 35, Strachan Papers. Besheke, the grandson of Andaigweos, whose father apparently married one of Waubojeeg's daughters, accepted Christianity only shortly before his death (WHC, 3: 365-9). He would have been approximately the same age as Shingwaukōnse. Anna Jameson, deriving her information from George Johnston and Schoolcraft, wrote concerning Besheke:

> [At Lapointe] ... was the grand national council fire, (the extinction of which foretold, if it did not occasion, some dread national calamity,) and the residence of the presiding chief. The Indians know neither sovereignty nor nobility, but when one family has produced several distinguished war-chiefs, the dignity becomes by courtesy or custom hereditary; and from whatever reason, the family of Wayish,ki or the Mudgi.kiwis, exercised, even from a remote period, a sort of influence over the rest of the tribe. One traveller says that the present descendents of these chiefs evince such a pride of ancestry as could only be looked for in feudal or despotic monarchies. The present representative, Piz.hi.kee (the Buffalo,) ... still resides at La Pointe. When presented with a silver medal of authority by the American government, he said haughtily, "What need of this? it is known to all whence I am descended!" (Jameson, 1838: 202-3)

Although 110 Ojibwa came in 1838 from Bay de Noc, 47 from Drummond Island, 123 from the American Sault, 50 from Grand Traverse, 38 from Point St. Ignace and 34 from Green Bay, none came from Lapointe or the Upper Mississipppi. The distribution of American annuities conflicted with the British present giving in 1838. "Return of Indians who received Presents at Manatowauning in August 1838". RG 10, vol. 124: 69777.

[58] O'Meara had been present at the distribution of presents at Manitowaning in August, 1838.

[59] O'Meara to the Reverend H.J. Grasett, 5 June, 1839. A.O. MG. 35, Strachan Papers.

[60] Ibid.

[61] O'Meara to Bishop Strachan, 30 October, 1839. A.O. MG. 35, Strachan Papers.

[62] Ibid.

[63] Ibid. According to an 1838 government report, the Ottawas of Manitoulin Island numbered 268 souls, the Ojibwa of Sault Ste. Marie and St. Joseph's Island, 189 souls. RG 10, vol. 124: 69836. Fish was regarded as the main food for all these bands. RG 10, vol. 124: 69845.

[64] O'Meara to Grasett, 5 June, 1839. A.O. MG. 35, Strachan Papers.

[65] O'Meara to Strachan, 3 October, 1839. A.O. MG. 35, Strachan Papers.

[66] Ibid.

[67] Ibid.

[68] Ibid.

[69] Report of F.A. O'Meara covering period June - September, 1839. 3 October, 1839. A.O. MG. 35, Strachan Papers.

[70] O'Meara to Strachan, enclosing copy of Report sent May 4th, 1840, to the Secretary of the Upper Canada Clergy Society. A.O. MG. 35, Strachan Papers.

[71] Ibid.

[72] Ibid.

[73] Ibid.

[74] O'Meara to Grasett, 17 March, 1840. A.O. MG. 35, Strachan Papers.

[75] Ibid.

[76] Report of the Rev. F.A. O'Meara, Sault Ste. Marie, to the Upper Canada Clergy Society, dated 4th May, 1840, sent to the Bishop of Toronto, 7th Oct., 1849. A.O. MG. 35, Strachan Papers.

[77] Ibid.

[78] O'Meara to Strachan, 20 October, 1841. A.O. MG. 35, Strachan Papers.

[79] MG. 20. B/129/e/1833-34.

[80] O'Meara to Strachan, 19 January, 1841. A.O. MG. 35, Strachan Papers.

[81] Anderson to Jarvis, 23 May, 1840. RG 10, vol. 124: 69712.

[82] O'Meara to Strachan, 19 January, 1841. A.O. MG. 35, Strachan Papers.

[83] Ibid.

[84] There had been a serious bout of influenza at the mission house in January, 1841. O'Meara to Strachan, 20 October, 1841. A.O. MG. 35, Strachan Papers.

[85] Francis Wilson, or Francis Wilson Jones, also known as Wahbahnoosay, arrived in early December in the employ of the Society for

Converting and Civilizing the Indians. O'Meara to Grasett, 8 January, 1840; F. Wilson Jones to Grasett, November 11, 1840. A.O. MG. 35, Strachan Papers.

[86] Report on the Affairs of the Indians in Canada, Journal of the Legislative Assembly of Canada, 1847. App. T. Copy of a letter sent by Thomas G. Anderson, Esquire, Superintendent of Indian Affairs, to Shinquakonce. App. No. 94.

[87] Ibid.

[88] Ibid.

[89] Anderson felt this problem was counterbalanced by the fact that Indians could "bring their own private property duty free" across the national border under the Jay Treaty of 1794. Indians could "take their Fish, sugar etc. either to Penetanguishene, Owen's sound, Goderich, Port Sarnia, Detroit, and Michilimackinac to Barter for Young Cattle or such other articles as their produce will procure for them," he claimed. Anderson to J.M. Higginson, Civil Secretary, 16 July, 1845. RG 10: 86990-3. For this reason Anderson rejected a proposal to consider entering goods for the Indians duty free at Manitowaning, which, he argued, would only promote the liquor traffic.

[90] Journal of the Legislative Assembly of Canada, 1847. App. T., App. No. 94.

[91] Journal of the Assembly, 1858, App. 21, No. 25. "Answers to queries put by the commissioners for Indian Affairs to the Reverend Mr. F.A. O'Meara." In a strange reversal of fate, O'Meara, after suffering a serious personal attack in 1850 by three Ojibwa chiefs acting in consort with The Pine, came to be one of the main supporters of The Pine's policies.

[92] O'Meara to Strachan, 19 January, 1840. A.O. MG. 35, Strachan Papers.

[93] Ibid.

[94] One tradition at Garden River states that The Pine, accompanied by a "Crane" and a "Sturgeon", explored the north shore of the St. Mary's River for five years. The "Crane" would be either Kabaosa or Muckedayoquot. Megissanequa was a member of the Sturgeon dodemic group. Interview with Fred Pine Sr., 10 June, 1983. Megissanequa was probably originally from Mackinac. Recognized as a chief in 1836 by the American government, he seems to have settled permanently at Garden River by 1840. In 1828 he received a medal of the "first class" from H.R. Schoolcraft for saving the life of Mr. Agnew, Inspector of Customs at St. Mary's, whose dog train had fallen through the ice (Schoolcraft, 1975: 291). A descendant of Megissanequa, Ernest Jones, recounted that

his great-grandfather moved to the Canadian side because of untoward advances made by the tropps at Fort Brady towards the women of Megissanequa's family. Interview with Ernest Jones, 26 November, 1982. Piabetassung had become a chief on Sugar Island in 1843.

[95] Bingham Journal, 14 November, 1841. Bingham Papers. Clarke Library, Central Michigan University, Mount Pleasant.

[96] Ibid. See also RG 10, vol 145: 83747; RG 10, vol. 145: 83751.

[97] O'Meara maintained that all the Indians had returned to Manitowaning from their fishing grounds by early November, so The Pine could not have been missed at the Establishment. O'Meara to Strachan, 6 January, 1842. A.O. MG. 35, Strachan Papers.

[98] O'Meara to Strachan, 20 October, 1841. A.O. MG. 35, Strachan Papers.

[99] Report on the Manitowaning and Sault mission by the Rev. O'Meara. RG 10, vol. 145: 83747-50.

[100] Anderson to Jarvis, 9 March, 1841. RG 10, vol. 124: 69723-4.

[101] O'Meara to Strachan, 6 January, 1842. A.O. MG. 35, Strachan Papers.

[102] Ibid.

[103] Anderson to Jarvis, 9 March, 1841. RG 10, vol. 124: 69722-4.

[104] Ibid.

[105] Anderson to Jarvis, September 1841. RG 10, vol. 124: 69733-4.

[106] A claim for the Ermatinger estate had been submitted to the government by the Ermatinger family on 11 August, 1843. RG 10, vol. 124: 69765-6; Anderson to James Fraser, 2 January, 1842. Fraser was acting as agent for Charles O. Ermatinger's son William. RG 10, vol. 124: 69765-7. In response, Shingwaukōnse prevailed on O'Meara to draft a petition to the Governor General requesting that land belonging to the Ermatinger estate revert to the Indians. The Pine led the list of signatories, but of the remaining chiefs who signed the document only two, Mishkeash and Nowquagabo, hailed from the Canadian side. The others, among them Kebaynodin, Saboo, Ogemapenasse and Ahbetahkezick, who had been associated with Shingabaw'osin's band. The Pine had called on one bastion of what Schoolcraft had termed the "old home band" to help in preserving Native territorial prerogatives. To the Governor in Chief of Upper Canada [sic, Canada West]. RG 10, vol. 120:4809. With

the assistance of Joseph Wilson, newly appointed Crown Lands Agent and Collector of Customs, The Pine sent a second petition in October (Capp, 1904: 175-6).

[107] Statement of John Bell. Thomas G. Anderson Papers, S29. Baldwin Room, Toronto Metropolitan Library.

[108] Ibid.

[109] Ibid.

[110] Ibid.

[111] Ibid.

[112] Ibid.

[113] Ibid.

[114] Interview with Fred Pine Sr., 5 January, 1984.

[115] James Ord to Robert Stuart, 1 September, 1842. N.A., RG 75. M 234, Roll 771: 15.

[116] Report of Rev. Frederick A. O'Meara, 17 October, 1842. A.O. MG. 35, Strachan Papers.

[117] Bingham Journal, 24 January, 1846. Bingham Papers. Box A. Clarke Library, Central Michigan University, Mount Pleasant.

[118] Strachan to his wife, Ann Strachan, 10 August, 1842. A.O. MG. 35, Strachan Papers.

[119] Strachan to John Beverley Robinson, 11 August, 1842. A.O. MG. 35, Strachan Papers.

[120] Strachan to his wife, Ann Strachan, 17 August, 1842. A.O. MG. 35, Strachan Papers.

[121] Bingham Journal, 27 November, 1842. Bingham Papers, Clarke Historical Library, Central Michigan University, Mount Pleasant.

[122] According to O'Meara's account of The Pine's story:

> [The preacher] ... went so far in his intercourse with the Indians as to tell them that there was no use in their making sugar or hunting, as the end of all things was at hand and would surely come on a day which he named. Old Shingwackonse's manner of treating this fanatical teaching was somewhat characteristic. Relating the matter to me he said,

> "When the old man (the Baptist preacher) told me all this I thought over in my mind what I had heard of God's Word, and remembered that I had been told by my own minister that no man knoweth of that time, but I determined to keep count of the days. So I put a notch on my pipestem every morning, proceeding with my sugar making and hunting as usual, knowing that even should the old man's word turn out to be true there was no harm in my doing so; and when the day appointed was approaching my son and I went into the woods on a hunting excursion. At last my pipestem told me that the day was come. I therefore said to my son, Let us not do anything o-day but watch what takes place. So we watched all day but saw nothing but very fine weather, and again at night no change came. Having watched the starry heavens from under my blanket I fell asleep at last and did not wake until next morning, when we went on our way, exclaiming that the old man had told us lies.

Report of the Rev. F.A. O'Meara, 19 December, 1843. A.O. MG. 35, Strachan Papers. Soon after his meeting with the Baptist preacher, Shingwaukönse set off with a retinue in a "large canoe, well manned" to Kingston to visit the Governor General. They proceeded, following the Trent Canal route, to Kingston and then travelled down the St. Lawrence. On their return trip they conveyed O'Meara, who had been visiting his wife, who had just had a baby at Orillia, back to Manitowaning. Report of the Rev. F.A. O'Meara, 19 December, 1843. A.O. MG. 35, Strachan Papers.

[123] Bingham Journal, March 6, 1843. Bingham Papers. Clarke Historical Library, Central Michigan University, Mount Pleasant.

[124] Shingwaukönse to William McMurray, 13 May, 1844. A.O. Strachan Papers.

[125] Oral traditions at Garden River maintain that The Pine made political enemies at this time. Certain Native leaders disapproved of the strong stand the chief adopted concerning the need for linkage to the British Crown. They disliked his promotion of an Indian refuge-settlement on the Canadian side, and especially his opposition to bands accepting annuities in lieu of retaining their rights to land. One of the most serious attacks was launched by a group of medicine men near a lake "back of Baraga, Michigan." These men intended to capture The Pine's soul and so kill their adversary. According to this story, told to Fred Pine Sr. by Zeben [Elizabeth] Wabanosa, Buhkwujjenene's daughter, one djiskiu arranged for a shaking lodge to be constructed. Shingwaukönse nevertheless proved too powerful and outwitted those who plotted against his life:

> The head medicine man made it so that there was a tripod in the tent holding a bucket, secured by big pins. You've got to come, the man [conjuror] said. I'm not going, Shingwauk says.

> You've got to come. Don't press me, Shingwauk says. Let's make him. So, they went into the shack [shaking tent]. There it was shaking. Then nothing. They listened. They lifted it up and there was a hole in his back the size of a bucket. Shingwauk had gone right through him.

Interview with Fred Pine Sr., 2 August, 1982.

[126] Shingwaukonse to McMurray, 13 May 1844. A.O. MG. 35, Strachan Papers.

[127] Most of the men were probably on Sugar Island, cutting wood for Church's establishment.

[128] Ever since 1826 discovery of minerals and rich pine reserves on the southern coasts of Lake Superior led to public pressure on Washington for further land surrenders.

[129] George Wilson to Thomas G. Anderson, 24 June, 1845. RG 10, vol. 150: 87003-4. Anderson replied, "I do not think those chiefs, or any other Indians who continued to reside within the American lines after the 1st of August 1843 have the most distant chance of receiving Presents in future from the British government." Thomas G. Anderson to George Wilson, 1 August, 1845. RG 10, vol. 150: 87005-6.

[130] Joseph Wilson to D.B. Papineau, Commissioner of Crown Lands, 21 June, 1846. RG 10, vol. 159: 91444-6. RG 10, vol. 159: 91442-3.

[131] Joseph Wilson eventually received a formal letter of apology from Washington (Capp, 1904: 180-1). The timber had been cut on the Canadian side, on Jones Island, also known as Squirrel Island. A.O. Minutes of the Executive council, 20 May, 1846. Executive Council Records, Canada State Book E: 424.

[132] Shingwaukonse to George Ironsides, 20 February, 1846. RG 10, vol. 157: 40407.

[133] Ibid. British chiefs stated their allegiance to the Crown before requesting favors, in accord with a system of etiquette which had been functioning in the Upper Great Lakes area for over two hundred years.

[134] Ibid. Shingwaukōnse accused Wilson of taking what rightfully belonged to the Ojibwa:

> Colborne gave me charge of all the Lands between Batchewana Bay and Tessalon [sic, Thessalon]. Father, our country is poor, very poor, and the little provision we got from the Americans for allowing them to cut timber was very useful to me and my people. When we had plenty of food I did not allow

> them to cut timber. After I refused permission, and when I did give them leave, I pointed out the place where they should cut it. When their vessel was laid upon our side, they had then only one, they paid me twenty-five dollars every winter for leave to cut fire wood and for protection -- Father since Mr. Wilson came here all this is changed. They have now five vessels laid upon the British side and my leave was not asked. They have cut firewood and I and my Indians have not been paid for it. The best timber on the British side has all disappeared since last spring. The Americans have got it, but the poor Indians have nothing, they see their land estranged and dare not complain. Mr. Wilson has done all this. Father, will this continue? ... Tell my great father that our Land when the timber is destroyed is of no value, as it is either rock or sand, and only in a few places can we make gardens.-- Tell him that when Mr. Wilson sells our wood, + acts with us as he does, I feel as if he entered into my house and took without my leave what he might find therein. Tell my great Father that I hope he will assist me in old age.

[135] Extract of a Report from Lieut. Harper, R.N., Commanding H.M.S. Experiment, dated Penetangishene, 1st Sept. 1845. RG 10, vol. 151: 87759-60. Although the land proved better on the Canadian side than south of the St. Mary's straits, Harper suggested that the Métis lacked incentive to farm intensively because of their precarious land tenure. He believed the Métis constituted a loyal population and recommended that their lots be surveyed and the titles extended to them. As for the Indians:

> On a statement of T.G. Anderson Esquire, dated Indian Office, Toronto, September 25th, 1845 ... it appears that none of the Indians in that quarter can be regarded as descendents of the Original Tribe who inhabited the Country in question and do not possess authority to cede their title to the Crown.

Copy of a Report of a Committee of the Executive Council, dated 10 October, 1845. RG 10, vol. 151: 87762-3.

[136] Ibid.

[137] J.M. Higginson to George Ironsides, 11 May, 1846. RG 10, vol. 612: 100-01.

[138] Alexander Vidal to D.B. Papineau, 27 April, 1846. Letters received, General Land Commissioner. A.O. RG 1, series A-1-6: 21675. MS 563, Reel 22; Reply to communication of Alexander Vidal. A.O. RG 1, series A-1-6: 21678.

[139] The government's policy was set out in Report on the Affairs of the Indians in Canada. Journals of the Legislative Assembly of Canada,

1844-45. App. EEE.

[140] The issue attracted the attention of the British press. When public interest in The Pine and his campaign was at its height, The London Illustrated News for August 25, 1849, printed the following as part of a front page article:

> In cases of absolute inferiority of structural development among the tribes we conquer, and where amalgamation of races is not expedient, or possible if it were, all that the best and wisest of men can do, is to see that the inevitable disappearance of the weaker race is left to time and nature to effect.... But, in the case of the aborigines of America, and other regions where the natural man existed in his noblest type, a more exalted duty ought to have been performed. Here, there was no mental inferiority or physical incompatibility. Man for man, the accident of education excepted, they were our equals....

Endnotes, Chapter Six

[1] Shingwaukōnse's scheme concerned Native proprietorship over timber, mineral deposits and local fisheries. This constituted a radical departure from the perspective of most Native leaders, who maintained their secrecy in response to White inquiries regarding the location of mineral outcroppings. It is not known whether the Indian peoples willingly showed the first French explorers the position of Native copper mines on Lakes Huron and Superior. The French, from Champlain onward, certainly noted that the Ojibwa had methods of extracting and forming ceremonial and trade items from malleable metals, particularly copper. Father Claude Dablon in 1669 (J.R., 54: 153-9) and, in 1709, Governor Raudot (Kinietz, 1940: 371-2) found that the Indians of the Sault Ste. Marie area emphasized the association of copper and mining with dangerous protective spirits, among them the giant water lynx, Mishibesheu. Even as late as 1929 one Native individual from the Thunder Bay district, Lake Superior, stated that his grandfather told him of the "gathering on the Canadian shore, and of the ceremonies, the dance and the appeal to the Spirits, that were deemed necessary before the trip [to Isle Royale in western Lake Superior] could be made" (Fox, 1929: 317-8).

According to the elders at Garden River, copper and iron exercise a "balancing" power within the universe and, to sustain the cosmological scheme, are frequently buried if not in regular use. To handle metallic minerals disrespectfully courted supernatural retaliation from the spirits who "owned" the deposits. Or, else, wrong behavior might compel these beings to leave their "posts" causing vacuums, and hence disruptions, in the cosmic system. Banishment of White Bird from his band in 1820 for showing Cass's expedition the way to the copper rock near Ontonogan River, Wisconsin, indicated the kind of response a band member might receive from his people for irresponsibly exposing the foundations of the cosmological order to outsiders ignorant of the delicate structure of balanced power relations in the universe (Schoolcraft, 1975: 296).

[2] One legend at Garden River holds that Shingwaukōnse was "blessed" by the Thunderers with supernatural powers which the chief could employ in time of war.

An individual, like Shingwaukōnse, who was considered to have received such gifts in a dream, was called Ogechedah, the "new" or "preparing" man. The spirit of the warrior is termed Mudjekewis, "elder brother". Menissino, or "man of the island", is a warrior whose abilities in battle approach the powers of the Thunderers. For a tale regarding the origins of "warriorism", see "A Legend of Indian Belief", Algoma Missionary News and Shingwauk Journal, vol. 5, no. 4, April 1, 1882: 213.

[3] John Macdonell was engaged as an agent to John Askin in June, 1778, and later went into the service of the Northwest company (Quaife, ed., 1928, 1: 92 ff.; WHC, 19: 230).

[4] J. William Keating's career as an Indian agent is discussed in James Douglas Leighton, The Development of Federal Indian Policy in Canada, 1840-1890, unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Western Ontario, 1975.

[5] Keating to J.M. Higginson, Civil Secretary, 10 June, 1846. Regarding Petition No. 156. RG 10, vol. 159. Keating had to gain permission from the Ojibwa to enter on a band's territory before he and his associates could begin mining the ore. Since head chiefs protected their territories, the only way to ensure a cordial reception on a group's lands was to enter into negotiations with the leader for the purpose, at least nominally, of effecting an arrangement beneficial to both parties. In return for the chief's permission to explore, Keating, according to Native custom, offered a share of the potential takings of the projected mining operations.

Indian participation in mineral explorations during 1845 and 1846 had, according to one Hudson's Bay Company factor, made the bands reluctant to hunt. Ballenden to Hargrave, 11 January, 1846. PAC, Hargrave Correspondence, MG 19, A21, Reel 76: 3562.

[6] Petition of Chief Chingwauk, June 10, 1846. (Petition No. 156). RG 10, vol. 612. This document, written by Keating and sent to Ironsides through the auspices of the Hudson's Bay Company, provides a census of The Pine's band. In 1846 the band contained 33 men, 31 women, 38 boys and 24 girls. Total number of group members stood at 126.

[7] Ironsides to George Vardon, Deputy Superintendent of Indian affairs. RG 10, vol. 160, pt. 2: 92149-51.

[8] Keating was with the Michigan Volunteer artillery at Prairie du Chien when the call came to evacuate this area in 1814. Thomas G. Anderson was also present at this event. RG 10, vol. 158: 335. Journal of the Proceedings in Fort McKay from the departure of Lt. Col. McKay for Michilimackinac, August 10 - November 28, 1814. Thomas G. Anderson Papers, S29. Baldwin Room, Metropolitan Toronto Library.

[9] Keating, while Indian agent at Amherstburg, was appointed a protector of Indian Lands in 1839. RG 10, vol. 612: 6.

[10] The directors of the Huron and Sault Ste. Marie Mining company were Arthur Rankin, James Cuthbertson, Robert Stuart Woods and J.W. Keating (Knight, 1982).

[11] Articles of Association of the Quebec and Lake Superior Mining Association, 20th October, 1846. Quebec: J.C. Fisher.

[12] One of the locations owned by the Montreal Mining company, and a location belonging to the Quebec and Lake Superior Mining Association, lie side by side at Point Mamainse, Mica Bay, to the north of Sault Ste.

Marie.

[13] Report of the Trustees of the Montreal Mining Company to the Shareholders at the Adjourned General Meeting of the 30th November, 1846: 1-5. Montreal: Canada Gazette Office. Baldwin Room, Metropolitan Toronto Library. Messrs. Ballenden and Livingston of the Hudson's Bay Company at Sault Ste. Marie became agents of the Montreal Mining Company.

[14] Vardon to Ironsides, 29 June, 1846. RG 10, vol. 612.

[15] Petition of William Shinguaconce, Henry Shinguaconce, Thomas Shinguaconce, Joseph Nabenagoshing, Nahwaquagaboo, Francis Kewahcunce, Charles Pahyahbetahsung, John Kabaoosa, James Ahbetahkezhik and George Mahgahsahsuhqua. RG 10, vol. 416: 5942.

[16] A copy of the order in council passed May 20, 1846, was sent to Joseph Wilson. RG 10, vol. 159: 91442-3.

[17] George Desbarats to Major Campbell, 10 May, 1847; Copy of a Report of a Committee of the Honorable the Executive Council dated the 2nd November, 1846, approved by His Excellency the Governor General in Council the same day. RG 10. Copies, Indian File. Bruce Mines Museum.

[18] William Ermatinger, Attorney for Charlotte Kattawbide. Regarding claim for land at Sault Ste. Marie, 7 May, 1847. RG 10, vol. 163: 94932.

[19] Petition of William McMurray Chinguakose, Joseph Nabenagojing, Charles Pahyabetahsung and John Kabaoose, 5 July, 1847. RG 10, vol. 123: 6190-8.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ironsides to Major A. Campbell, Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, 25 August, 1847. RG 10, vol. 166: 96644-6.

[22] Extract of a letter from Col. S.P. Jarvis to the Rev. Wm. McMurray dated Manitoulin Island, 3rd Aug., 1847. In Appendix to Minute of a Council Held by T.G. Anderson, V.S.I.A. at Sault Ste. Marie on Friday the 18th day of Aug., 1847-8. PAC, RG 1, ES, ECO file 1157, vol. 8.

[23] RG 10, vol. 123: 6191.

[24] Ironsides to Indian Affairs, 25 August, 1847. RG 10, vol. 166: 96644-6. Another petition sent by the Ojibwas inhabiting the north shores of Lakes Huron and Superior was reported on for the information of the Governor General in Council on 5 November, 1847. Copy of a Report of the Commissioner of Crown Lands Relative to Indian Settlements at Garden River, Lake Huron, etc. signed J.H. Price, Crown Lands Department, Montreal, 26 April, 1848. Copy. Indian file, Bruce Mines Museum.

[25] Report of the Honorable Commissioner of Crown Lands regarding claims of certain Indians to territory on the shores of Lakes Huron and Superior, and embracing the subject of a letter by George Desbarats Esq., dated 10th May, 1847, claiming protection against the Indians for persons engaged in mining operations. 4 November, 1847. RG 10, vol. 163.

[26] Ibid.

[27] J.D. Cameron to the Honorable James H. Price, Commissioner of Crown Lands, 1847. Copy. Indian File, Bruce Mines Museum.

[28] Cameron to the Governor General, 25 March, 1850. RG 10, vol. 612: 790-1. Ogista visited Washington, along with the American head chiefs, in connection with the fisheries issue. The Diary of the Reverend Gustavus Anderson, August 26, 1848, to May 23, 1849. Thomas G. Anderson Papers, S29. Folder B. Baldwin Room, Metropolitan Toronto Public Library.

[29] Alexander Murray, Provincial Geologist, regarding native claim at Thessalon. RG 10, vol. 168: 97700.

[30] Copy of a Report of the Commissioner of Crown Lands... 26 April, 1848. Copy. Indian File, Bruce Mines Museum.

[31] Louis Cadotte was Shingwaukōnse's interpreter on this occasion. RG 10, vol. 612: 338. For O'Meara's views, see O'Meara (1846; 1848).

[32] T.G. Anderson to Major Campbell, 9 October, 1849. RG 10, vol. 173: 100434.

[33] Minutes of a Council Held by T.G.Anderson, V.S.I.A. at Sault Ste. Marie on Friday the 18th day of August, 1848. PAC. RG 1 , E5, ECO file 1157, vol. 8.

[34] Council of August 19, 1848. PAC. RG 1, E5, ECO file 1157, vol. 8. Between 1814 and 1845, the head chief at Fort William had been L'Espaniole, or "The Spaniard". Peau de Chat was The Spaniard's successor. A.O. T.G. Anderson Papers. Council, 15 July, 1821. MG 23,

Reel 1; Simpson (1847: 34-35).

[35] T.G. Anderson to the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, 26 August, 1848. PAC. RG 1, E5, ECO file 1157, vol. 8.

[36] Ibid. During the Oregon dispute, Ironsides had tendered suggestions to the government regarding the role the Indians could play in any upcoming hostilities with the United States. Ironsides to Indian Affairs, 16 March, 1846. RG 10, vol. 612: 36. By this time he was a "voice crying in the wilderness".

[37] T.G. Anderson to Gustavus on becoming a minister of the Church of England, 24 July, 1848. Thomas G. Anderson Papers, S29. Folder D. Baldwin Room, Metropolitan Toronto Library.

[38] T.G. Anderson to Major Campbell, 9 October, 1849. RG 10, vol. 173: 100434-6.

[39] Ibid.

[40] The diary of the Reverend Gustavus Anderson, 4 September, 1848. Thomas G. Anderson Papers, S29. Baldwin Room, Metropolitan Toronto Library.

[41] Ibid., 18 October, 1848. During October The Pine requested Gustavus Anderson and George Johnston to write letters to several government officials, among them Governor Cass of Michigan. Most of these would have concerned Native claims to local fisheries.

[42] Extract from the Reverend G.A. Anderson's Report of the Sault Ste. Marie and Garden River Mission, January, 1849. Typescript. The Reverend Canon Colloton Papers. Anglican Heritage Collection. Bishophurst. Sault Ste. Marie.

[43] Ibid.

[44] William MacTavish to George Simpson, 20 September, 1849. Sault Ste. Marie post. Correspondence Books. MG 20. B/194/b/15/1849-50.

[45] The Diary of the Reverend Gustavus Anderson, August 26, 1848, to May 23, 1849. Thomas G. Anderson Papers, S29. Folder B. Baldwin Room, Metropolitan Toronto Library. Piabetassung was not altogether happy about his daughter's wedding, according to Gustavus' account of 15 December, 1848. The house-raising took place on 29 December the same year.

[46] Ibid., January 26, 1849.

[47] Ibid., February 2, 1849.

[48] Ibid., October 20, 1848.

[49] Ibid., 29 December, 1848, and 2 March, 1849.

[50] Ibid., 23 January, 1849.

[51] Ibid., 22 September, 1848.

[52] Report to Bishop of Toronto from Gustavus Anderson, 3 January, 1849. Thomas G. Anderson Papers, S29, Folder D: 114. Baldwin Room, Metropolitan Toronto Library. Gustavus reported to Bishop Strachan that nearly all the Garden River populace had "relaxed into heathenism".

[53] Indenture Contract of a gift of land from Indians to Rev. G. Anderson. 2 p. Signed Shingwakonce, Nebenagoching, Piabedausunk, Kabaose, Augustin, John Bell, Ogimabenaishe, Paquetchene and Mizaketosh, principal chiefs. Thomas G. Anderson Papers, S29. Folder C, No. 49. Baldwin Room, Metropolitan Toronto Library. Years later, Gustavus wrote of this event:

> I asked [the chief] to set apart for the mission a certain parcel for that purpose upon the Reserve. He consulted some of his people and walked over the place I had selected and said 'I will give this place for a church and if you will make a writing I will sign it.' I then consulted with Allan McDonell who drew up the Document which was signed at my house at Garden River in the presence of a number of Chiefs and others who had assembled in Council.... Messrs Wilson, McDonell and [J.D.] Cameron came down from the Sault together & Nebenagoching came with them. As he was an acknowledged chief of the Ojibways he was asked by Shingwaukounce to sign the document. All the signatures of the Indians were in McDonell's handwriting -- they making their totems.

Testimonies. 1870 Inquiry. Statement of Gustavus Anderson. Garden River Band Records, 36-2-2; RG 10, vol. 7566. Shingwaukõnse was always required to present any request pertaining to either the sale or lease of land to the band in council.

[54] MacTavish to A. Campbell, 3 July, 1849. Sault Ste. Marie post. Correspondence Book. MG 20. B/194/b/15/1849-50.

[55] Alexander Macdonell Estate Papers. Biographical Information. A.O. MU 1778. Allan Macdonell's relationship to the Roman Catholic Bishop, Alexander Macdonell, is also discussed in Rea (1974: 30-32). Like most families closely politically and socially associated with the Tory Compact, the Macdonells intermarried within a fairly small group, occasionally marrying second or third cousins.

[56] For a fuller discussion of this subject, see Arthur (1973: x1).

[57] Captain Ashley Cooper to War Department, 6 March, 1850. PAC. RG 10, C-1029; Macdonell to Bruce, 23 December, 1849. RG 10, vol. 179: 103886.

[58] Montreal Gazette, 7 July, 1849.

[59] "The Communications of Mercator upon the contest between the Earl of Selkirk and the Hudson's Bay Company, on one side, and the North West Company, on the other." Reprinted from the Montreal Herald. Montreal: W. Grey, 1917: 55-6.

[60] Montreal Gazette, 7 July, 1849. A great many of Shingwaukönse's turns of phrase have obviously been tailored, undoubtedly by Macdonell, to make them more palatable to the public taste. Some phrases are identical to those allegedly spoken by other Native leaders during approximately the same period. See, for instance, speeches quoted in Slight (1844). It is also possible that Native spokesmen employed a widespread, well-established repertoire of phrases in order to convey certain ideas.

[61] Ibid. The Pine and Nebenagoching posed for watercolor sketches to be made of them while in Montreal by the artist Cornelius Krieghoff. Portrait of The Little Pine and The Eclipse [Nebenagoching]. (Harper, 1979). The chiefs also attracted the attention of the poet Charles Sangster who, in his "Lament of Shingwaukonse", portrayed the Native leader as longing for a land of freedom for his people on the western frontier, but who must eventually flee westward beyond the pressures of White civilization (Monkman, 1981: 79).

[62] Macdonell discusses his part in the expedition to Montreal to visit Lord Elgin in The Patriot, 19 December, 1849.

[63] The Diary of the Reverend Gustavus Anderson, May 9, 1849. Thomas G. Anderson Papers, S29. Baldwin Room, Metropolitan Toronto Library: "The Indians on Lake Huron and Superior. To the Editor of the Chatham Chronicle", August 15, 1849. Wawanosh Family Correspondence, Box 4382, No. 6. Regional Collections, University of Western Ontario, London.

[64] Ibid.

[65] William MacTavish to Dougald MacTavish, 18 October, 1848. A.O. MU 1391. Letter Book. W. MacTavish, 17 October, 1848 25 May, 1849.

[66] William MacTavish to James Hargrave, 30 January, 1849. PAC. Hargrave Correspondence. MG 19 (A21), Reel 76: 4005; MacTavish to James Hargrave, November, 1848. A.O. MU 1391. Letter Book.

[67] The Patriot, 19 December, 1849.

[68] MacTavish to George Simpson, 10 August, 1849. Sault Ste. Marie post. Correspondence Book. MG 20. B/194/b/15/184950.

[69] Ironsides to Major Campbell, 17 September, 1849. RG 10, vol. 612: 358.

[70] J.A. Williams of the Steamer "Gore" to Robert Baldwin, 15 November, 1849. RG 10, vol. 612: 401.

[71] Diary of Thomas Gummersall Anderson, a visiting Supt. of Indian Affairs at this time, 1849, at Cobourg. Sept. 5th, 1849. A.O. MU 838, 1-A-1. Typescript copy: 5. For a list of the chiefs and warriors awarded medals for their assistance in the War of 1812, see RG 10, vol. 264.

[72] A Journal of Proceedings on my mission to the Indians -- Lake Superior and Huron, 1849, by Alexander Vidal. Transcribed by George Smith with historical notes by M. Elizabeth Arthur. Brights' Cove, 1974. A.O. Pamphlet No. 78. Vidal's ability to decide the terms upon which all future negotiations with the Indians would take place underlines the importance of the role he played in the commissioners' 1849 expedition. As had happened in the years following the close of the War of 1812, a new order was wrenching power from the old. T.G. Anderson, who in 1814 had represented a member of the officialdom who had aided the political decline of men such as John Askin Jr., now had the tables turned on himself and he resented it deeply. Even MacTavish could not fail to see the secondary position in which Anderson, in his seventies, had been placed relative to Vidal, only in his thirties, during the negotiations of 1849. MacTavish to Simpson, 20 September, 1849. Sault Ste. Marie post. Correspondence Book. MG 20. B/194/b/15/1849-50; Extract from T.G. Anderson's Diary, last page. A.O. MU 838, 1-A-1.

[73] Alexander Vidal Papers. Memorandum of Indian Mission, 1849.

[74] Ibid.

[75] The Patriot, 8 December, 1849.

[76] Alexander Vidal Papers. Memorandum of Indian Mission, 1849.

[77] Statement of John Bell. Thomas G. Anderson Papers. S29. Baldwin Room, Metropolitan Toronto Library.

[78] Report of Commissioners A. Vidal and Thomas G. Anderson on a visit to Indians on North Shore Lake Huron & Superior for purpose of investigating their claims to territory bordering on these Lakes. Appendix. Extracts from the Notes Taken at the Conference with the Indians at the Sault Ste. Marie -- October 15th and 16th, 1849. A.O.

Aemelius Irving Papers, MU 1464. 26/31/04.

[79] Memorandum of Indian Mission. Vidal Papers. CA 9ON. VID 33. Regional Collections, University of Western Ontario.

[80] J.A. Macrae to Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, 18 February, 1899. Memorandum, 1 June 1899. RG 10, vol. 2832, file 170, 073-1.

[81] A Journal ... by Alexander Vidal. A.O. Pamphlet, No. 78: 1.

[82] Diary of Thomas G. Anderson ... 1849. A.O. MU 838, 1-A-1.

[83] Father Frémiot's Report to his Superior in New York, Archives de la Société de Jésus du Canada Français. Lettres des nouvelles missions du Canada, vol. 1: 446-58. In Arthur (1973: 13-16).

[84] Ibid.

[85] Memorandum of Indian Mission.... Vidal Papers. CA 9ON. VID 33. Regional Collection, Unversity of Western Ontario; A Journal... by Alexander Vidal. A.O. Pamphlet, No. 78: 4. These same sentiments were echoed in the commissioners' report. Report of Commissioners A. Vidal and T.G. Anderson on a visit to Indians on North Shores of Lakes Huron & Superior. A.O. Irving Papers. MU 1464. 26/31/04.

[86] Chief Peau de Chat's Report on His Interrogation by Visiting Indian Agent. Archives de la Société de Jésus du Canada Français, A-16-1. In Arthur (1973: 17).

[87] Vidal to his father, Richard Emeric Vidal, 17 October, 1849. Vidal Papers, CA 9ON VID 333 TSL 22 OE, Misc. Regional Collections, Unversity of Western Ontario.

[88] Report of Commissioners A. Vidal and T.G. Anderson. A.O. Irving Papers. MU 1464. 26/31/04.

[89] Native engagés on the expedition around Lake Superior included Peter Bell, son of John Bell from Nipigon, Mezai's son Francis, Waubmama -- the son of Macadayoquot -- and Waisangais, Piabetassung's son. Peter Bell depicted the Nipigon Indians to Anderson as troublesome, given to inter-family feuds and murder. Partly, Bell's attitudes would have arisen because the Nipigon Indians were "inlanders" and not involved in the alliance between The Pine and the Fort William coastal chiefs. In 1849 The Pine was speaking for bands residing as far west as the Puckasaw River, the eastern boundary for the Nipigon band territory. MacTavish to Simpson, 17 October, 1849. Sault Ste. Marie post. Correspondence Books, MG 20, B/194/b/15/1849-50; Diary of Thomas Gummersall Anderson, a visiting Supt. of Indian Affairs at this time, 1849, at Cobourg. A.O. MU 838, 1-A-1. Typescript copy: 19.

[90] Report of Commissioners A. Vidal and T.G. Anderson: 7. A.O. Irving Papers, MU 1464, 26/31/04.

[91] Treaty with Northwest company, Metosaki et al, 10 August, 1798, Sault Ste. Marie. A.O. Russell Papers, MS 75, Reel 5; Extracts from the Notes Taken at the Conference with the Indians at the Sault Ste. Marie -- October 15th and 16th, 1849. Report of Commissioners A. Vidal & T.G. Anderson. A.O. MU 1464, 26/31/04; MacTavish to Simpson, 17 October, 1849. Sault Ste. Marie post. Correspondence Book. MG 20. B/194/b/15/1849-50.

[92] MacTavish to Simpson, 17 October, 1849. MG 20. B/194/b/15/1849-50. This letter provides a detailed account of the council held on the 15 October at Sault Ste. Marie.

[93] Extract from Note Taken at the Conference with the Indians at the Sault Ste. Marie -- October 15th & 16th, 1849. Report of commissioners A. Vidal & T.G. Anderson. A.O. Irving Papers. MU 1464, 26/31/04.

[94] Ibid.

[95] Ibid.

[96] Ibid.

[97] Ibid.

[98] Vidal to his father, Richard Emeric Vidal, 17 October, 1849. Vidal Papers, CA 90N, VID 333 TSL 22 OE, Misc. Regional Collections, University of Western Ontario.

[99] Vidal to his wife, Catherine, and his children, 23 October, 1849. Vidal Papers. CA 90N VID 333 TSL 22 OE. Regional Collections, Unversity of Western Ontario. William MacTavish knew about the alliance between the Michipicoten Indians and the Sault Ste. Marie band since early November, 1849. MacTavish to Simpson, 6 November, 1849. Sault Ste. Marie post. Correspondence Book. MG 20. B/194/b/15/1849-50.

[100] MacTavish to Simpson, 17 October, 1849. Sault Ste. Marie post. Correspondence Book. MG 20. B/194/b/15/1849-50.

[101] MacTavish to A.H. Campbell, 11 November, 1849. Sault Ste. Marie post. Correspondence Book. MG 20. B/194/b/15/1849-50. Since their organization lacked sufficient proceeds to work all their holdings, the directors of the Quebec and Lake Superior Mining Association had been considering putting up their locations on Michipicoten Island for sale by auction. Quebec and Lake Superior Mining association Report, 10th July, 1848: 4. Baldwin Room.

Metropolitan Toronto Library.

[102] MacTavish to James Hargrave, November, 1848. A.O. MU 1391. Letter Book, W. MacTavish, 17th October - 25 May, 1849.

[103] MacTavish to George Simpson, 12 November, 1849. Sault Ste. Marie post. Correspondence Book. MG 20. B/194/b/15/1849-50. William Cameron was the Métis who delivered the deposition to Wilson. Customs House Records, Sault Ste. Marie. The present writer is indebted to Paul Williams for this reference.

MacTavish's view that Macdonell was sincerely concerned about the economic future of the Indians is in stark contrast with Vidal's attitude towards Macdonell. Macdonell, Vidal held, is a "crafty man", pretending to be the Indians' friend, "but in reality their worst enemy". Vidal to his father, Richard Emeric Vidal, 17 October, 1849. Vidal Papers. CA 9ON VID 333 TSL 22 OE, Misc. Regional Collections, University of Western Ontario.

[104] The Patriot, 19 December, 1849.

[105] Ibid.

[106] British Colonist, 8 February, 1850. Bonner placed the blame for the attack squarely on Macdonell. There is little doubt, however, that Shingwaukōnse had been using his oratory skills and experience as a war chief to muster recruits for the Mica Bay expedition. In 1893, Joshua Biron stated:

> Several years before the Robinson Treaty was made -- chief Shinguaconce of the Garden River Band called a Council -- and the Half-breeds of Sault Ste. Marie were invited to attend -- so we all went. The Chief told us, that if we would join his Band and be his men or soldiers -- that he (the Chief) would work for us, and that we would get the presents that his band was then getting. That some day he might sell his land -- and that if so -- his claim should be our claim -- and that we half-breeds would have a right to a share of what he, the Chief, might get for it.
>
> That, only four of us, agreed to join his Band -- Myself (Joshua Biron), my brother Alexis Biron, John Bell and Louison Cadotte. All the other Half-breeds said that they were already Indians enough without binding themselves to be under an Indian chief: And they all left the council-room.

Statement of Joshua Biron of Sault Ste. Marie, a Half-breed included in, or at all events paid with the Garden River Band of Indians from the year 1850 to the present time 1893. Made to John Driver and sworn to him. Testimonies included with letter from John Driver to E.B. Borron, 5 June, 1893. A.O. Irving Papers. MU 1465, 27/32/10.

Shingwaukōnse's and Biron's use of the term "soldiers" to describe

the relationship of recruits to their chief may reflect the fact that both individuals had spent time, prior to 1812, among the buffalo-hunting peoples of the Red River district, and so adopted the terminology of the highly corporate buffalo hunt (Morton, 1857: 78-9). Yet the fact that only those Métis closely related to The Pine's nodal core group joined the band shows that purely Ojibwa social organizational principles were operating. The Birons and Cadottes could both activate linkages to Buhkwujjenene through Buhkwujjenene's wife, Margaret Cadotte, as well as to Nebenagoching's band through Alexis Biron's marriage to Mezai's daughter. Records of the Immaculate Heart of Mary, Garden River. John Bell apparently had married one of Shingwaukōnse's daughters, named Mary. All those who joined the band were well-known traders in the Upper Great Lakes area.

[107] British Colonist, 8 February, 1850.

[108] O'Meara to Major Campbell, 12 November, 1849. RG 10, vol. 612: 393-7.

[109] Gustavus Anderson left Garden River soon after the Mica Bay mine takeover and did not return to the Anglican mission. His father recorded that by the fall of 1849 the events of the summer had left the young Gustavus suffering from "nervous palpitations of the heart." Diary of Thomas G. Anderson, 1849: 38. A.O. MU 838, 1-A-1.

[110] Elgin to Lord Grey, Colonial Office Secretary, 24 December, 1849 (Private); Elgin to Grey, 21 November, 1849 (Private); Elgin to Grey, 11 October 1850. C.O. 42 (Doughty, 1937,2: 563-4; 724; 748-9).

[111] Elgin to Grey, 24 December, 1850 (Private). (Doughty, 1937, 2: 563-4). The Quebec and Lake Superior Mining Association's request for a loan of £12,500 indemnity for damages was considered, and rejected, by the Committee of the Executive Council on May 31, 1850. A.O. MS9. Reel 19. Executive Council Records, Canada State Book K. Lord Elgin by this time was convinced that the Ojibwa had been influenced to take over the mine by "unprincipled white men". Elgin to Grey, 1849. (Doughty, 1937, 2. Appendix XVII: 1485).

[112] T.G. Anderson to Robert Baldwin, 16 November, 1849. RG 10, vol. 612: 402-3; E. Meredith to Ironsides, 20 November, 1849. RG 10, vol. 612: 404-6; Committee of the Executive council, 19 November, 1849. A.O. MS9. Reel 19. Canada, Executive Council Records, Canada State Book J: 491-3.

Captain William Ermatinger was appointed to interpret at meetings with the Indians at Sault Ste. Marie, and directed to travel with the Rifles. A.O. MS9. Reel 19. Canada, Executive Council Records, Canada State Book J: 502. William Ermatinger and his maternal uncle, Mongozeed of Fond du Lac, had also been present at the councils in October, 1849, at which time he had been trying to gain title to the Ermatinger estate at the rapids. MacTavish to Simpson, 14 September, 1849. Sault Ste.

Marie post. Correspondence Book. MG 20. B/194/b/15/1849-50. See also: Report of a Committee of the Executive Council, 7 July, 1852. The previous November the Committee had also noted that Charles Oakes Ermatinger was present at the Sault. A.O. MS9. Reel 20. Canada, Executive Council Records, Canada State Book M: 308. Expenses incurred by the government's responses to the Mica Bay incident were charged against the proceeds from the sale of the mining locations.

[113] Mishiquongai, head chief of the Beaver dodem, held territorial prerogatives over the French River area. When, in 1837, he moved to the Anglican mission Establishment at Manitowaning, he retained these prerogatives. With regard to Mishiquongai accompanying Ironsides, see Ironsides to Bruce, 27 May, 1850. RG 10, vol. 612: 771-2.

[114] A. Cooper to Ironsides, 15 December, 1849. RG 10, vol. 612: 427.

[115] The Patriot, 21 November, 1849. There was a certain smugness in Tory circles on learning of the Reform government's acute embarrassment concerning the consequences of the claims affair. On the other hand, The Patriot, a Tory newspaper, admitted that the rumour concerning "killings and abductions" near Sault Ste. Marie were probably "greatly exaggerated". The article of 21 November was followed by a far more balanced reporting of events by the same newspaper two weeks later. The Patriot, 8 December, 1849.

[116] The Pilot, 1 December, 1849.

[117] Montreal Gazette, 23 November, 1849. This newspaper viewed Macdonell as an upholder of Native rights in the face of a presumptuous and uncaring government authority:

> Mr. Vidal in a most flurried and nervous manner interrupted Mr. Macdonell, saying that if he persisted, the council should be broken up and that there should be no treaty; to which Mr. Macdonell replied, "I will maintain the position in which these people have placed me. It would be base and dishonorable in me to desert it now and as their agent I tell you, then be the Council dissolved, but let there be no Treaty, but upon you head rest the blame."

The Commissioners, for their part, saw Macdonell as a bellicose trouble-maker:

> The Council being formally closed, Mr. Vidal left the room, Captain Anderson remaining as a spectator. Mr. McDonell continued to address the Indians in a most inflammatory style.

Extracts from the Notes Taken at the Conference with the Indians at the Sault Ste. Marie -- October 15th & 16th, 1849: 4. Report of

Commissioners A. Vidal and T.G. Anderson. A.O. Irving Papers. MU 1464, 26/31/04.

[118] Macdonell's reply to an article by Bonner, in The Pilot, 11 December, 1849, may be found in The Patriot, 19 December, 1849.

[119] Montreal Gazette, 23 November, 1849.

[120] "To the Editor of the Patriot". The Patriot, 19 December, 1849. See Bonner's reply to this article in "Letter From Mr. Bonner, Superintendent to the Board of Directors of the Quebec Mining Company", British Colonist, 8 February, 1850.

[121] The Patriot, 19 December, 1849.

[122] Ibid.

[123] Ibid.

[124] Statement of John Bonner before George Ironsides, 3 December, 1849. RG 10, vol. 612: 420-21. Macdonell to the Civil Secretary, 23 December, 1849. RG 10, vol. 179: 103884; George Ironsides to Indian Affairs, 3 December, 1849. RG 10, vol. 612.

[125] Alexander Macdonell Estate Papers, Biographical Information. A.O. MU 1778; PAC. Macdonell of Collochie Papers, MG 24 I 8. Finding Aid 99, Biographical Notes. For Macdonell's later career as a transcontinental railway promoter and leading member of the Canadian Expansionist movement, see Swainson (1982: 553-5).

[126] Macdonell to Bruce, 21 December, 1849. RG 10, vol. 179: 109890. On 14 January, 1850, Angus Macdonell served a summons on George Ironsides and Archibald Cameron, manager of the Montreal Mining company at Bruce Mines, for illegal arrests of The Pine and his party. Macdonell File. Baldwin Room, Metropolitan Toronto Library.

[127] Detroit Free Press, 22 December, 1849. This article stated that Shingwaukōnse had been present at the Battle of Queenston Heights and had been awarded medals for bravery for his participation in the War of 1812.

Endnotes, Chapter Seven

[1] The Globe, 5 January, 1850.

[2] Ibid.

[3] The most comprehensive survey of the debate between the Tory and Reform press on the aboriginal rights question is found in The Patriot, 29 December, 1849.

[4] The Patriot, 29 December, 1849.

[5] Interview with Fred Pine Sr., 20 June, 1984.

[6] The Patriot, 29 December, 1849. It was Shingwaukõnse's band to which surveyor John McNaughtan's informants referred. The great mobility within the Upper Lakes region made any assertion that groups moved east to west or vice versa redundant by 1780. Many constantly moved back and forth. Only established chiefs remained fairly sedentary.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Macdonell to Bruce, 23 December, 1849. RG 10, vol. 179: 103884. Reel 11,507; Macdonell to Bruce, 23 May, 1850. RG 10, vol. 182: 105850-55. Macdonnel argued that he acted on behalf of Shingwaukõnse, Nebenagoching, Piabetasssung, Puckeswance and Peau de Chat.

[9] MacTavish to A.H. Campbell, 16 November, 1849. Sault Ste. Marie post. Correspondence Book. MG 20. B/194/b/15/1849-50. Other reports directed to the government concerning the Mica Bay affair include J.A. Williams, of the Steamer "Gore", to Robert Baldwin, 15 November, 1849. RG 10, vol. 612: 401; O'Meara to A. Campbell, 12 November, 1849. RG 10, vol. 612: 383-87; Charles Thompson to Robert Baldwin, 14 November, 1849. RG 10, vol. 612: 398-400; T.G. Anderson to Robert Baldwin, 15 November, 1849. RG 10, vol. 612: 401.

[10] Charles Thompson to Robert Baldwin, 14 November, 1849. RG 10, vol. 612: 399; Ironsides to Bruce, 10 January, 1850. RG 10, vol. 180: 404272-74.

[11] MacTavish to Simpson, 14 February, 1850. Sault Ste. Marie post. Correspondence Books. MG 20. B/194/b/15/1849-50.

[12] Statement of the Defendants in Process. A.H. Campbell of the Montreal Mining company, 27 June, 1850. RG 10, vol. 612: 846-50.

[13] A. Cooper to the War Department, 6 March, 1850. PAC. RG 8, C-1029: 4.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Bonner was annoyed that his original charge of "violent dispossession" of the mine was changed to "riot and forcible entry". A.O. MS9, Reel 19. Canada, Executive Council Records, State Book L: 490; Macdonell to Bruce, 21 March, 1849. RG 10, vol. 179: 109890; Macdonell to Bruce, 14 March, 1850. RG 10, vol. 181: 105297.

[16] Macdonell to Bruce, 14 March, 1850. RG 10, vol. 181: 105297; RG 10, vol. 612: 730-32.

[17] Executive Council Minutes. A.O. MS9, Reel 19. Canada, Executive Council Records, Canada State Book K: 300-01.

[18] Diary of W.B. Robinson on a visit to the Indians to make a treaty, 9 May, 1850. A.O. J.B. Robinson Papers, MU 5906.

[19] Committee of the Executive Council, with reference, presented to the Honorable Col. Bruce from the Hon. W.B. Robinson, 11 January, 1850. A.O. MS9, Reel 19. Canada Executive Council Records, Canada State Book J: 590-91.

[20] Macdonell to Bruce, 31 May, 1850. RG 10, vol. 183, pt. 1: 105905-6. Bruce's reply, 12 June, 1850. RG 10, vol. 183, pt. 1: 105957-59.

[21] O'Meara to Campbell, 12 November, 1849. RG 10, vol. 612: 392-97.

[22] Petition of Mishiquongai, Shawanoseway and Ainenonduck, 9 March, 1850. RG 10, vol. 572; Indian Affairs to Ironsides, 18 October, 1850. RG 10, vol. 612: 612-13. Mishiquongai was of the Beaver dodem, Shawanoseway -- a medicine man (Harper, ed., 1971: 54-55) -- was of the Pike dodem, and Ainenonduck was likely of the Beaver dodem. Waubesemie belonged to the dodemic group designated by the Bear's Tail. The petition was submitted to George Ironsides by Waubesemie on 22 May, 1850.

[23] Ironsides to Bruce, 24 September, 1850. RG 10, vol. 572; RG 10, vol. 612: 495-97.

[24] O'Meara travelled to Sault Ste. Marie and Garden River in July and secured an affidavit from The Pine and Kabaosa that the Garden River Indians approved of his activities as a missionary.

[25] Document 493. RG 10, vol. 612: 91; Wilson to Ironsides with enclosed petition from Chief Shingwokonse, Chief Pahyahbetahsoong and Chief Kabaoosa, Recorder Pahquahchenene, 29 July, 1850. RG 10, vol. 183, pt. 2: 106370; RG 10, vol. 184: 106928. Ogista at this time was angry that O'Meara had accused his daughter, Joustine, of immorality.

In response, Ogista and Louis Cadotte drew up a memorial to Indian Affairs gauged to clear Joustine's reputation. RG 10, vol. 612: 487.

[26] The Pine promised to have McMurray's son, Ian William, or Iehbaishdish, recognized as an Indian on the band lists. McMurray also claimed Indian status through his wife being a descendant of Waubojeeg. McMurray to Indian Affairs, 24 September, 1850. RG 10, vol. 183, pt. 2: 106609-11; Ironsides to Bruce, 4 November, 1850. RG 10, vol. 184, No. 4681. Reel 11,510. For W.B. Robinson's reply: RG 10, vol. 183, pt. 2: 106616.

McMurray, who remained a firm friend of the Indians until his death, made his last journey to Garden River in 1891. E.F. Wilson, the Anglican missionary who recorded the event, stated that McMurray and Buhkwujjenene, on first meeting each other after many years, clasped hands for a full minute, each man's eyes "being full of tears". The Canadian Indian, September, 1891: 343-8.

[27] Lewis Henry Morgan (1868) spent considerable time with both the Garden River and Thessalon bands, owing to Schoolcraft's assistance in directing Morgan's research. According to Morgan, Keokonse stated that his sister's son would assume leadership on his death, which led Morgan to speculate whether or not the Ojibwa might be matrilineal. He was incorrect, however. Keokonse of the Crane dodem was succeeded by an individual of the fish dodem, but the chief had probably made the appointment within his circle of close kin with little reference to any principle of lineality.

Keokonse's territorial jurisdiction overlapped with those of the Drummond Island head chiefs. It was likely The Pine had to ask permission from Keokonse to exercise territorial prerogatives on the north shore of the rapids after 1836. By 1849, however, Anderson and Vidal had noted that tensions had arisen between the Garden River band and the Thessalon people, which had manifested itself as a territorial dispute over a tract of land extending north from Pumpkin Point. Report of Commissioners A. Vidal and T.G. Anderson. A.O. Irving Papers. MU 1464. 26/31/04.

[28] Ironsides to Bruce, 5 February, 1850. RG 10, vol. 612: 713-14; Bruce to Ironsides, 23 February, 1850. RG 10, vol. 612: 715; 789; 790-91.

[29] Report of the Committee of the Executive Council, 16 April, 1850. A.O. MS9, Reel 19. Canada, Executive Council Records, Canada State Book K: 180-82.

[30] The Committee of the Executive Council, while rejecting the request of the Quebec and Lake Superior Mining Association for a loan of £12,500, nevertheless intended securing the mining company's title to its locations as rapidly as possible. A.O. MS9. Canada Executive Council Records, State Book K: 33-4; 300-01.

[31] Diary of W.B. Robinson, 13 May, 1850. A.O. J.B. Robinson Papers, MU 5906.

[32] Ibid., 27 August to 5 September, 1850.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Interview with Fred Pine Sr., June 10, 1983.

[35] Alexander Vidal to the Honorable Commissioner of Crown Lands, 11 December, 1849. RG 10, vol. 123: 6617-20.

[36] In 1953 Canon F.W. Colloton copied the following from the original statement, in the possession of Chief William Erskine Pine, which had been translated from the Ojibwa language:

> This is what you are doing today. February 12th [probably 1852]. Two acres west, goes from east, then north and south four acres long, east and west, two acres, north and south four acres.
>
> This is how much is given from our Chief to be used for a church, a Catholic Church. This be there forever... as long as there is water in the lake.
>
> This is to hear the words of our Master. This is what our Chief gives.

Reverend Canon Colloton Papers. Anglican Heritage Collection, Bishophurst, Sault Ste. Marie. Shingwaukõnse may not have immediately concurred to Tegoosh's request for land for the Roman Catholic mission, but after repeated appeals from his son, he did so. According to Buhkwujjenene, after Father Kõhler had approached The Pine on the subject, the chief had replied, "I am getting tired and said I told my son Tagooshe to follow my religion but he does not want to do so. Now I shall give my land for the sake of my son." Testimony of Buhkwujjenene. Inquiry regarding mission property at Garden River, 1870. RG 10, vol. 7566; Garden River Band Council Records, 367-2-2; Knight (1984: chapter Two). At present, the Anglican Church holds approximately 60 acres on the reserve, the Roman Catholic Church about 15 acres. The United Church presumably also claims the land on which the original Methodist mission stood. Toronto. Ministry of Natural Resources, Survey Records. Survey by W.R. White, July 18, 1921. No. 14. K6-19.

[37] Robinson simply followed Vidal's lead in drafting the treaties. Little that was new had arisen from the negotiations of 1850. In the fall of 1849 Vidal had first suggested that treaty compensation should be limited to "a fixed amount not to be exceeded, but open to diminution if the band decreased". Memorandum of Indian Mission. Vidal Papers.

CA 9ON VID 33. Regional Collections, Unversity of Western Ontario. By 5 December, 1849, Vidal realized that the intractable Shingwaukōnse would have to receive at least one special concession to encourage his people to agree to the surrender on Vidal's terms. A provision, argued Vidal, "might be made, if necessary, for an increase of payment upon the further discovery and development of new sources of wealth". Report of Commissioners A. Vidal & T.G. Anderson: 10. A.O. Irving Papers, MU 1464, 26/31/04.

[38] Honorable Wm.B. Robinson. Vouchers for payments made in respect to negotiating Indian Treaties, 1850. A.O. Irving Papers. MU 1465, 26/31/3. See also: Copies of accounts of payments to Indians under Robinson Treaties, 1850-1892. A.O. Irving Papers. MU 1465, 27/3/5. Information for these lists was gathered by Keating and George Johnston, both of whom acted as Robinson's interpreters and assistants. RG 1, A-1-1. Crown Lands Papers, Surveyor Letters Received, vol. 66: 233. "Chief Casaquatung", or "Cassaquadung" on the vouchers refers to Oshawano, the American head chief. Abel Bingham referred to this individual by both names in his journals. See also: Bruce to Ironsides, 24 January, 1854. RG 10, vol. 613: 817. Oshawano is buried in the Roman Catholic graveyard at Garden River. His brother Joseph was head chief among the Drummond Island Ojibwa. For a year by year census of the Indians at Garden River, see Appendix B.

[39] The Robinson treaties were presented for approval to the Governor General in Council on 29 November, 1850. A.O. MS9, Reel 19. Canada Executive Council Records, State Book K. It was held that should bands "at any time desire to dispose of any mineral" they could do so with the assistance of the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs. Ibid.: 609.

The Executive Council were also confronted with two Métis petitions in 1850. The first stated that Joseph Nebenagoching, Shingwaukōnse, Kabaosa and Piabedassung desired Charles Oakes Ermatinger and each of his children to be given either a portion of land or a mineral location for their assistance during the treaty negotiations. To His Excellency the Earl of Elgin and Kincardine, Governor General of British North America, from Joseph Nebenagoching et al., 10 September, 1850. A.O. Upper Canada Land Petitions, "E", Bundle 6, 1847-1852. According to Robinson this document, signed by the chiefs in the presence of Allan Macdonell, was placed in the Commissioner's hands by Nebenagoching. A.O. C-1892. RG 1, L3, vol. 182-B.

Two other petitions were also submitted to Robinson to give to the Governor General. The first, drawn up by Charles Oakes Ermatinger and Francis Biron, asked that title to land holdings already occupied by fifty-five French and Métis individuals be granted by the Crown. The second petition requested that one hundred acres of land be granted to certain Métis persons. This document was signed by Charles Cadotte, from Red River, and thirty-four others. A.O. Upper Canada Land Petitions, "E", Bundle 6, 1847-1852; RG 1, L3, vol. 182-B. A schedule of the inhabitants of the Sault Ste. Marie village and the acreages of

their individual land holdings is included with these petitions. The Métis held strip farms 1.5 to 3 acres in extent along the waterfront. These allotments also extended 10 to 50 acres back from the shore of the St. Mary's Channel.

[40] Robinson to Bruce, 27 December, 1850. RG 10, vol. 612: 673-75.

[41] Ironsides to Bruce, 20 November, 1850. RG 10, vol. 572; RG 10, vol. 612: 659-61; Ironsides to Indian Affairs, 8 June, 1853. RG 10, vol. 572; Bruce to Ironsides, 6 January, 1851. RG 10, vol. 613. The Indians had raised the £200, by subscription, by their own efforts. Ironsides, however, was determined to sow seeds of dissension between the Garden River band and the Indians on the north shore of Lake Huron. He stressed that the Lake Huron group would likely not take part in funding The Pine's expedition to England.

[42] Macdonell to George Brown, 30 April, 1853. A.O. MS 91, pkg. 11, George Brown Papers, Correspondence; Bruce to Ironsides, 1 April, 1851. RG 10, vol. 613: 272, Reel 13386.

[43] George Ironsides to Schoolcraft, 25 July, 1851, and 17 September, 1851; Schoolcraft to George Johnston, 24 May, 1851, and 6 November, 1851. George Johnston Papers, Bayliss Library, Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan. George Johnston to Schoolcraft, 23 August, 1851, and 6 February, 1852. Washington, Schoolcraft Papers, Reel 9.

[44] Abstract of Requisitions from the Indians, 1851. RG 10, vol. 613: 372, Reel C-13, 3 & 6; Ironsides to Indian Department, 4 November, 1850. RG 10, vol. 184: 197278; Ironsides to Bruce, 28 September, 1850. RG 10, vol. 205; and Ironsides to Bruce, 16 January, 1851. RG 10, vol. 613: 1.

[45] Requisitions of Chief Nebenagoching. RG 10, vol. 205: 121654; RG 10, vol. 613: 193. Travel expenses for chiefs could also be deducted from band annuities. Thomas Hamilton to Ironsides, 26 March, 1852. RG 10, vol. 613: 523-24.

[46] Speech of Ojestah [Ogista]. 27th Annual Report of the Missionary Society of the Wesleyan Methodist Church, June 1851 - June 1852. United Church Archives, Emmanuel College, Toronto; The Christian Guardian, 6 October, 1852: 206. The Methodists considered surveying the reserve into farm plots.

[47] McDougall to Ironsides, 28 January, 1853. RG 10, vol. 614: 634; The Methodist Society in 1853 numbered about fifty people. The Indians had gathered building materials to construct a chapel. The Christian Guardian, 27 April, 1853: 114; The Christian Guardian, 28 December, 1853; 28th Annual Report of the Missionary Society of the Wesleyan Methodist Church, June 1852 - June 1853.

[48] Speeches by Ogista are recorded in Pitezal (1862: 356-8). McDougall wrote enthusiatically about the prosperity of the mission in The Christian Guardian, 20 September, 1854: 196.

[49] The Christian Guardian, 18 October, 1854: 7.

[50] Extract from Memoranda Made at the Indian Village, Garden River, on the Second Day after the Conference at Sault Ste. Marie. Report of Commissioners A. Vidal and T.G. Anderson, Appendix C: 2. A.O. Irving Papers. MU 1464, 26/31/04.

[51] Wilson to Ironsides, 9 November, 1850. RG 10, vol. 612: 656-57.

[52] Oral traditions at Garden River assert that Ogista and Buhkwujjenene could have frequent disputes during the 1850s, but that the two brothers worked together more closely as the years went by. Documentary evidence bears this out. James Chance to William Spragge, 3 September, 1867. RG 10, vol. 616: 420-22.

[53] After 1853 interdenominational strife arose with the coming of the Roman Catholics and the return of the Anglicans. 29th Annual Report of the Missionary Society, June 1853 - June 1854. By 1854, over $2000 had accrued to the band members from the sale of timber.

[54] Ibid.

[55] George Desbarats regarding Lemoine location, August, 1852. RG 10, vol. 206: 121809-13.

[56] Public Notice. Mining Locations. Crown Lands Department, Quebec, 24 March, 1853. RG 10, vol. 613: 829-35; Balances Due Indian Department, 10 November, 1853. RG 10, vol. 613: 834-35; Regarding Wilson location, Echo Lake, 1853. RG 10, vol. 206: 121805.

[57] Palmer complained that the Ojibwa were "working havoc among the Pines and that Shingwaukōnse encouraged the activity. Palmer to Cuthbertson, 23 August, 1853. RG 10, vol. 323: 216499; Palmer to Indian Department, 9 August, 1853. RG 10, vol. 205: 121525-26; Palmer to Indian Department, 1 October, 1853. RG 10, vol. 323: 216502-5. Wood sold for three dollars a cord in 1853, which was a good price.

[58] RG 10, vol. 205: 1212890; RG 10, vol. 206: 721809-14.

[59] McMurray to H.R. Schoolcraft, 12 November, 1851. Washington. Schoolcraft Papers, Reel 9.

[60] Dr. Reverend McMurray, Appendix No. 8. Letter to His Excellency, 22 August, 1855. Report of the Special Commissioners to investigate Indian Affairs in Canada, Sessional Papers, Province of Canada, 1858, Appendix 21.

[61] Speech of Chingwaukonse. RG 10, vol. 198, pt. 1:116,406-7.

[62] Assiginack to Indian Affairs regarding Wampum. 21 October, 1851. RG 10, vol. 613: 440-42. In 1855 the present would be limited to a blanket which, it was held, was probably "the only article of any real use to an Indian". Napier to Bruce, 25 October, 1853. RG 10, vol. 206: 721870. Bruce to Ironsides, 10 May, 1854. RG 10, vol. 612.

[63] Elgin to Grey, 1 November, 1850 (Doughty, ed., 1937, 2: 725).

[64] Reflections on the Indian Situation in Upper Canada: 2-3. 45 Handwritten Pages. A.O. Irving Papers. MU 1464, 26/30/14.

[65] Napier to Bruce, 25 October, 1853 (Private). RG 10, vol. 206: 721870-71.

[66] Bruce to Macdonell, 9 April, 1850. RG 10, vol. 612.

[67] Macdonell to Bruce, 23 May, 1850. RG 10, vol. 182: 105850-55; Bruce to Macdonell, 21 December, 1849. RG 10, vol. 179: 109890.

[68] Ironsides to Bruce, 5 April, 1851. RG 10, vol. 613: 278-80. See also: RG 10, vol. 613: 216-17, 288-89, 291, 572-73. In March, 1851, Ironsides wrote that many Indians had been excluded from participating in the treaty negotiations in the fall of 1850. He argued that omission of some of their names from the band lists may have been intentional on the part of the chiefs of the mainland, particularly with regard to Ojibwa who moved to Manitoulin Island, leaving their band territories on the north shore of Lake Huron. Ironsides to Indian Affairs, 13 March, 1851. RG 10, vol. 188, Reel C-11,512: 199548. Chiefs Aibainse, Aisance and Toolose of eastern Georgian Bay and the Muskoka region claimed that they have originally been Potagunessing Indians, exercising territorial prerogatives over Drummond Island and the neighbouring mainland coast, about Spanish River. They were angered at having to settle at Coldwater during the 1830s, and so losing a claim to land and status under the Robinson treaty. Ironsides to Indian Affairs, 3 July, 1851. RG 10, vol. 189: 110499. This division between peoples along the north and eastern shores of Lake Huron was to manifest itself even more distinctly in the late 1850s (See Chapter Eight of this study).

More and more Ojibwa and Ottawa families were applying to come to Canada from the United States. among these were Pawpomekezick and his band from western Lake Superior, who wished to settle at Keche.nai.oshing [Big Point] on Lake Huron. Ironsides to Indian Affairs, 20 March, 1851. RG 10, vol. 613: 294. Indian peoples who arrived from the interior at Manitowaning were often sick and malnourished.

[69] Wemyss Simpson to James Hargrave, 25 October, 1851. PAC. Hargrave Correspondence. MG 19, A21, Reel C-75: 4847; Wilson regarding

prohibitions on the whiskey trade, 17 April, 1852. RG 10, vol. 197: 115205.

[70] Agreement between Shinguacouse and his Band and P.S. Church, 1 July, 1851. RG 10, vol. 191: 11383-84.

[71] Ironsides to Bruce, 4 September, 1851. RG 10, vol. 191: 111376; RG 10, vol. 613: 394-95; Bruce to Church, 3 October, 1851. RG 10, vol. 191: 111380; Church to Bruce, 29 September, 1851. RG 10, vol. 191: 11376; Bruce to Church, 30 July, 1851. RG 10, vol. 191: 111387.

[72] Bruce to Ironsides, 30 July, 1851. RG 10, vol. 191: 111387-88; Macdonell to Bruce, 16 August, 1851. RG 10, vol. 202: 119543.

[73] RG 10, vol. 186, pt. 2: 108771-73. The party went to Toronto by way of Buffalo, and while in Toronto stayed in The Brothers Hotel. RG 10, vol. 188: 109891.

[74] Attorney General of Canada West Recommends that Indians ... be pardoned, 22 May, 1851. RG 10, vol. 188: 109891; RG 10, vol. 613: 253-54.

[75] Macdonell regarding the manipulation of public sympathies by this course of action. Macdonell to George Brown, 30 April, 1853. A.O. MS 91. George Brown Papers. Correspondence.

[76] Just prior to the signing of the Robinson Huron Treaty, Keating sold his timber interests, which he had held on the north shore of Lake Huron by a contract with Chief Big Gun (probably The Frisée), to a Mr. Davies, who attempted to secure title to these timber operations, located on Reserve No. 3. Keating regarding application of Mr. Davies, 2 August, 1850. RG 10, vol. 183, pt. 2: 106360. Keating then applied for the position of protector of Indian Lands on Lakes Huron and Superior with magisterial powers. Keating had a keen sense of the contradiction which had arisen between the role of the Province of Canada as a promoter of logging and mineral development, on the one hand, and the Province as a protector of Indian lands on the other. Keating had been involved by this time as an intermediary in several "deals" between chiefs and entrepreneurs anxious to log or mine on reserve territory. William Bartlett, Indian agent at Amherstburg, for instance, was likely involved with Keating in several of his speculations on the Batchewana reserve tract. Keating to Indian Affairs, 26 September, 1850. RG 10, vol. 184, No. 4620, Reel C-11510; Regarding Mr. Bartlett's application for purchase of land at Batchewana Bay, 16 September, 1859. RG 10, vol. 614: 67.

[77] Keating to Bruce, 19 February, 1852. RG 10, vol. 194: 113704; RG 10, vol. 194: 113708. Commissioner of Crown Lands, John Rolf, appoints Keating to accompany Dennis in conformity with an order in council passed on 14 June, 1851. RG 10, vol. 195: 11404.

[78] Keating's Report. August, 1852. RG 10, vol. 198, pt. 1: 116270- 3. Dennis requests that Keating accompany him on the survey. RG 10, vol. 198, pt. 1: 116275-78.

[79] Wilson to Indian Affairs, 18 July, 1856. RG 10, vol. 226: 134878.

[80] Keating to Bruce, 6 August, 1852. RG 10, vol. 198, pt. 1: 116270-72; Fieldnotes. Survey of Garden River. Wednesday, 4 August, 1852. John Stoughton Dennis. Crown Lands Records. Copy in Garden River Band office, No. 36-18.

[81] RG 10, vol. 2211, file 42451. Dennis wrote concerning Keating's and his encounter with the Garden River leaders:

> Mr. Keating and self had Council with chief and his sons after which went up to Partridge Point and located South West angle of Reserve ... which [we] have resolved to lay out as follows [sic], and although objected to in this shape at first by chiefs, was approved by them.

Fieldnotes of survey of Garden River Reserve, Thursday, 12 August, 1852.

[82] Ottawa. Ministry of Natural Resources, Survey Records. Map #14 K19. #2484. J.S. Dennis, 14 May, 1853.

[83] Ever since 1837 the American Ojibwa had been unsettled regarding their lands. Besides problems arising from the meagre monetary compensation offered under the 1837 surrender, there was evidence that the Indians party to the transaction failed to grasp that they were actually ceding land. Many believed the treaty referred only to pine and minerals (Armstrong, 1892: 10-11).

[84] Ironsides to Indian Affairs, 7 August, 1852. RG 10, vol. 573, Reel 13,373. Ironsides had been given the petition, from "Mocataibeness" [Muckedaybenasse] or "Blackbird", of "the vicinity of Red River", to allow the western bands to settle at Garden River and on the Batchewana tract. About two thousand Ojibwa planned on immigrating to Canada. Captain Ironsides Reports that Certain American Indians from near the Red River and the south shore of Lake Superior wish to seek asylum under the Standard of the Red Coat, 7 August, 1852. RG 10, vol. 198, pt. 1: 116,288-89.

[85] Report, 1853. William Keating and J.W. Bridgland. Keating in this report discusses the state of the year-round gill net fisheries on Lake Superior and offers suggestions for their development. RG 10, vol. 207: 122406-25. (See also ff.85 of this chapter.)

[86] Keating to Bruce, 6 August, 1852. RG 10, vol. 198, pt. 1: 116270-72.

[87] Captain Ironsides Reports that Certain American Indians ... wish to seek an asylum under the Standard of the Red Coat, 7 August, 1852. RG 10, vol. 198, pt. 1: 116288-89.

[88] Ibid.: 116288

[89] Bruce to Ironsides, 3 June, 1850. RG 10, vol. 612: 834.

[90] Keating informed Bruce on 22 October, 1853, that Peau de Chat and his band intended offering an asylum to the Rainy Lake and several American bands, as had The Pine and Nebenagoching at the rapids in 1852. RG 10, vol. 205: 121916. At this time L'Illinois publicly renounced all relations he may have had in the past with Shingwaukōnse.

[91] Report, 1853. RG 10, vol. 207: 122406-25. Keating's decision not to run boundaries led in the future to confusion on the subject of the areal extent of reserves. S. Bray to the Deputy Minister of Indian Affairs, 1 June, 1896. RG 10, vol. 2846, file 174,445.

[92] Ironsides to Bruce, 18 May, 1852. RG 10, vol. 196: 115151-53.

[93] Ibid.

[94] Report, 1853. RG 10, vol. 207: 122406-25.

[95] Ibid. See also Ottawa: Ministry of Natural Resources, Survey Records, vol. 19: 104-07.

[96] Ibid.

[97] Map. Batcheewaunaung Reserve. James W. Bridgland, May, 1854. Ottawa. Ministry of Natural Resources, Survey Records. K2-34. The notation "184 square miles" is marked on this map.

[98] Macdonell to Bruce, 14 April, 1853. RG 10, vol. 202: 119540; RG 10, vol. 614: 720.

[99] Ironsides to Bruce, 23 May, 1853. R.G. 10, vol. 202: 120102.

[100] O'Meara had been accepted by The Pine once again, following the missionary's attempts to aid economic development on the Garden River reserve.

[101] Wilson to Ironsides, 21 March, 1853. RG 10, vol. 201, pt. 2: 119396-97.

[102] Macdonell to George Brown, 30 April, 1853. A.O. MS 91, pkg. 11. George Brown Papers. Correspondence.

[103] Ibid.

[104] Ibid.

[105] Ibid.

[106] Vict. 16. Cap. 176. Province of Canada Statutes, 1853: 720-24. A.O. B91, Reel 6.

[107] Macdonell to Bruce, 15 June, 1853. RG 10, vol. 203: 120308-11.

[108] The Christian Guardian, 7 September, 1853: 6-7. This article also mentions the Buhkwujjenenesug. George McDougall noted that the Indians believed in the existence of small, man-like spirits who were said to inhabit the bluff north of Waubashine Island.

[109] Ibid.

[110] Ibid.

[111] The Christian Guardian, 20 September, 1854: 196.

[112] Wilson to Indian Affairs, 21 July, 1853. RG 10, vol. 614: 647-48. Shingwaukōnse at the time demanded a map of his reserve and a title deed signed by the Governor General.

[113] RG 10, vol. 205: 121290.

[114] Robinson to Bruce, 24 September, 1850 (Morris, 1891: 19).

[115] Ironsides to Bruce, 27 September, 1853, and Palmer to Ironside, 10 September, 1853. RG 10, vol. 205: 121521.

[116] W.H. Palmer regarding the Root River [Elliot] location, 24 August, 1853. RG 10, vol. 205: 121525.

[117] Ironsides to Bruce, 10 September, 1853. RG 10, vol 205: 121521. The Pine also asked for government aid in regulating his own people's sale of the timber. Meanwhile Bell ignored Palmer's threats to bring legal action against the band. RG 10, vol. 323: 216502. Reel C-9578.

[118] Dr. John Newton, surgeon at Mica Bay, attended The Pine. RG 10, vol. 201 pt. 2: 119397; RG 10, vol. 614: 698.

[119] James Chance to William Spragge, 6 July, 1867. RG 10, vol 333: 533-35; Chance to Spragge, 31 July, 1867. RG 10, vol. 333: 525-27.

[120] There had been no resident Anglican missionary at Garden River since Gustavus Anderson's hurried departure in the fall of 1849. While Father Kōhler, S.J., ran a mission on Sugar Island, the Methodists in 1851, at Garden River, had found a nearly vacant field for their missionary endeavours.

[121] Shingwaukōnse's grave was located on the west bank of the Garden River (Kohl, 1956: 373). The grave site has since been destroyed by water erosion.

[122] Chance to Spragge, 17 June, 1867. RG 10, vol. 616: 409.

[123] Ironsides to Viscount Bury, 10 December, 1855. RG 10, vol. 222: 131771-72; RG 10, vol. 208: 122909.

[124] S.Y. Chesley to Ironsides, 30 January, 1856. RG 10, vol. 614: 62. Chesley, evidently not able to read Ironsides' handwriting in a former communication from the Manitowaning agent, refers to The Pine as "Kigwakonce".

Endnotes, Chapter Eight

[1] Interviews with Dan Pine Sr. and Fred Pine Sr., 1983 and 1984.

[2] Paul Pine, Ogista'a son, attended schools at Sault Ste. Marie and L'Anse, Michigan. References to Paul Pine may be found in the Bingham Papers housed in the Clarke Library, Central Michigan Unversity, and in the Zeba mission records, L'Anse. Paul, who acted as a guide for Lewis Henry Morgan (1868), was fairly well educated.

Both Ogista and Ogista's elder brother Thomas resided much of their time at L'Anse, as did their children. Visiting back and forth between the two Native communities was frequent for members of the Kabaosa, Pine, Missegan, Thompson and Wabanosa families. George Pine, great grandson of Shingwaukonse, became well known as a timber cruiser on the Michigan side. Records of the Zeba M.E. Mission society in the possession of the Reverend John Henry, L'Anse; Status Animarum Missionis Sanctissimi Nominis Jesus, Assinins; RG 10, vol. 615: 561; Land Records and Vital Statistics, L'Anse; Baraga County Records, Houghton; Guide to the Baptismal Records of LaPointe and L'Anse (Copied by Father Bertrand Kotnick from the State Archives of Wisconsin) -- Copy in the Archives of St. Peter's Cathedral, Marquette. Fred Pine Sr. and the present writer visited distant "Pine" relatives at L'Anse during the fall of 1983.

It is not known whether "Joseph Shingwauk", who joined Francis Petosky in 1844 in running away from Upper Canada College, was Ogista's son or Ogista's brother. RG 10, vol. 144: 82804-05. Francis Petosky was the son of Ignatius Petosky, after whom Petosky, Michigan, is named. Chief Ignatius may have been the son of a French or Scottish trader and an Indian woman, although this interpretation is open to dispute. Petosky File, Little Traverse Regional Historical Society Inc.; Petosky (1929: 442-48).

[3] Ogista had close contact with both the Anglican and the Roman Catholic missionaries, particularly during the Wikwemikong "resistance" of 1863-1867.

[4] This attack may have been prompted by Indian anger over the government's seeming betrayal of the promise, made in 1850 by W.B. Robinson, that the Ojibwa would retain the Simpson and Lemoine locations as part of their reserve. Ironsides to Bruce, 30 March, 1854. RG 10, vol. 209: 123747-48. The Lake Superior Journal of 4 November, 1854, called for "prompt and stringent measures" to protect the mines. Lake Superior Journal, Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan, 4 November, 1854: 2; (Chaput, 1969: 221).

[5] Lake Superior Journal, 4 November, 1854: 2.

[6] Simpson reported that Nipigon Indians had stolen goods from St. Ignace Island along the northern shore of Lake Superior. RG 10, vol. 240: 143016.

[7] Simpson, 28 July, 1856. RG 10, vol. 227: 134976-78. Simpson stressed that the free traders, not the Indians or Métis per se, were agents of disorder on the western frontier.

[8] Ironsides became Wemyss Simpson's father-in-law in 1853. Ontario Parliamentary Companion. Montreal, 1869: 141. The matter of the HBC post at Little Current was first raised in 1856. RG 10, vol. 614: 227.

[9] L. Oliphant, Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, to Ironsides, 20 November, 1854. RG 10, vol. 574.

[10] Transmitting opinion of Commissioners Talford and Worthington regarding Abatossaway's enterprise at Little Current, 19 January, 1858. RG 10, vol. 613: 227; RG 10, vol. 613: 822-24. Oliphant attempted to make the system of leasing timber berths on Indian reserves both remunerative and fair to the bands involved, as well as to the timber companies. Under pressure from influential entrepreneurs who had become interested in exploiting the timber resources at Thessalon and Garden River, terms of agreements were changed under Oliphant's successor, R. Pennefather, to favor the companies. The Roman Catholic priests at Wikwemikong and the Anglican missionaries at Garden River strongly contested the right of the government to hinder the growth of Native entrepreneurial enterprise. James Chance to Indian Affairs, 18 July, 1859. RG 10, vol. 614: 330.

[11] Richard Carney to Indian Affairs, 25 March, 1859. RG 10, vol. 248: 147691-98.

[12] Executive Council Minutes, 28 June, 1856. A.O. MS9. Canada. Executive Council Records, Canada State Book Q: 350. In 1856 Joseph Wilson arrested three "halfbreeds" whom he considered unruly and sent them north, as deserters, with the Hudson's Bay Company. Wilson's actions on this matter were severely criticized the The Globe, 17 and 18 July, 1856.

[13] Ironsides to Pennefather, 24 July, 1856. RG 10, vol. 226: 134663. Reel C-11538.

[14] Pennefather to Ironsides, 14 December, 1859. RG 10, vol. 614: 358. According to Pennefather, the "... wood they cut does not belong to them alone, but to all the Indians living on the island, and that it is no more than right, but that some part of the money paid for this wood should go to help the poorest -- and that part too, is to be spent in making it easier for the steamboat to get the wood." This argument, militating against all forms of individualistic enterprise on the reserves other than hunting and trapping, remained in force as grounds for policy well into the twentieth century.

[15] Regarding a communication from Sir George Simpson dated 23 August, 1856. A.O. MS9. Reel 22. Canada Executive Council Records, Canada State Book R: 557-58.

[16] H. Labouchere to Governor General Sir Edmund Head, 20 February 1856, quoted in R.J. Pennefather, Memorandum, 7 April 1858. PAC. Colonial Office Records. CO 42, vol. 613. Labouchere opposed isolationist policy, which stressed the implementation of tutelage conditions prior to the Indians' assimilation into white society. To save the government money, he argued, Indians should be encouraged to work for the Hudson's Bay Company or to take positions as wage laborers.

[17] Regarding Circular of 26 May, 1856. Pennefather to Ironsides, 15 July, 1856. RG 10, vol. 614: 16.

[18] 32nd Annual Report of the Missionary Society of the Wesleyan Methodist Church, June 1856 - June 1857; RG 10, vol. 2040, file 8949.

[19] The Christian Guardian, 5 August, 1857: 4.

[20] Ibid.

[21] [Copy of a letter of William H. Palmer to Froome Talford, 2 February, 1857. RG 10. Copy in Garden River Band Office records.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Macdonell petitions Viscount Bury regarding mineral deposits on the Garden River and Batchewana reserves, 7 June, 1855. RG 10, vol. 217, pt. 2: 128994.

[25] Mishkeash and Apequash figured prominently in the records of the Hudson's Bay Company, as both were prominent brigade leaders and guides. They joined Sir John Richardson's expedition when Richardson's company passed through Sault Ste. Marie (Richardson, 1854: 52-53). MacTavish to Simpson regarding Admiralty expedition, February, 1849. A.O. MU 1391. Letter Book. W. MacTavish, 17 October, 1848 - 25 May, 1849.
Joseph Wilson reported on Macdonell's activities north of Sault Ste. Marie in July. Wilson to Indian Department, 15 July, 1856. RG 10, vol. 226: 134878. The number of Indians at the rapids at this time, he added, was 157.

[26] Wilson to Indian Department, 12 September, 1857. RG 10, vol. 256: 140312.

[27] Carney to Indian Affairs, 25 March, 1859. RG 10, vol. 248: 147690-99.

[28] An insight into Wilson's personality may be gained from MacTavish's statement that "Wilson is fierce in his loves." MacTavish to John Ballenden, 19 January, 1849. A.O. MU 1391. See also, Wilson to Ironsides, 30 January, 1857. RG 10, vol. 241: 14290; Ironsides to Bruce, 27 April, 1858. RG 10, vol. 241: 143281; Wilson to Indian Affairs, 27 July, 1858. RG 10, vol. 235: 139547-53; Ironsides to Pennefather, 30 January, 1857. RG 10, vol. 614: 181: RG 10, vol. 614: 160.

[29] Nebenagoching responded to the fact that Métis families had been excluded from the annuity lists in 1857 by arranging for a collection to be made among his band's members and for the proceeds to be distributed to the Métis residing with his group. Ironsides to Bruce, 27 March, 1858. RG 10, vol. 241: 143286.

[30] Ironsides felt that Nebenagoching might be willing to surrender the Batchewana reserve. RG 10, vol. 241: 143295-97. At this time Wilson and Ironsides were competing against one another for the coveted position of a commissioner at the treaty negotiations they knew would soon commence. RG 10, vol. 242: 14599; RG 10, vol. 242: 144039; RG 10, vol. 245, pt. 2: 145637-41.

[31] Wilson favored Mishkeash, while Ironsides favored Nebenagoching. Both chief and sub-chief were thus caught up in the rivalry between Wilson and Ironsides during 1857 and 1858. The role of commissioner, however, fell to Keating.

[32] Carney to Pennefather, 6 September, 1858. RG 10, vol. 249: 148472-82.

[33] Wilson to James Hargrave, 9 December, 1856. PAC. MG 19. A21. Hargrave Correspondence. Reel C-77: 6097.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Wilson to Hargrave, 11 May, 1856. PAC. MG 19. A21. Hargrave Correspondence. Reel C-77: 6030-31. Macdonell had been trained as a surveyor prior to his law education. In 1856 Warren Metcalfe, Macdonell's friend who had been apprehended for his part in the Mica Bay mine takeover, left for England.

[36] Carney to Pennefather, 25 March, 1859. RG 10, vol. 248: 147695; Carney to Pennefather, 16 October, 1858. RG 10, vol. 245, pt. 2:145638-41. Nebenagoching traced his descent back to Maidosagee, by means of the document issued to him in 1819, in order to support his claim to the head chieftainship.

[37] Keating to Pennefather, 21 July, 1857. RG 10, vol. 235: 139547-50.

[38] Cameron to Pennefather, 21 July, 1857. RG 10, vol. 235: 139547-50.

[39] RG 10, vol. 247: 147044.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Keating to Pennefather, 8 July, 1857. RG 10, vol. 235: 139458-61.

[42] Descriptions, from Vidal's notes, concerning the survey of locations at Garden River. RG 10, vol. 2445, file 93,317.

[43] Keating to Indian Affairs, 1857. RG 10, vol. 235: 139650-51, Reel C-11542.

[44] Wilson to Pennefather, 9 February, 1857. RG 10, vol. 235: 139452-54.

[45] Ibid.

[46] One individual who emigrated from Garden River to the Sarnia district was Anemahbenowee, father of David Nahmabin of Sarnia. "A Study of the Family Connections to the Chippewa Families who moved to the Sarnia Indian Reserve from the areas they formerly inhabited previous to the time of the signing of the Amherstburg Treaty of 1822." Indian Families. CA 90 NPLA 280 - 73S72 OE(U-65) Vf. 280. Regional Collections, University of Western Ontario. Discussion of this emigration may be found in 40th Annual Report of the Missionary Society of the Wesleyan Methodist Church, June 1964 - June 1865.

[47] Pennefather to Wilson, 14 July, 1857. RG 10, vol. 235. Reel 11,542. Indian Affairs was concerned about the increase in the Native population. August 13, 1855. RG 10, vol. 613. Reel C-13387.

[48] Ironsides to Pennefather, 17 February, 1859. RG 10, vol. 247, pt. 3: 147452. As soon as a band's population reached approximately 150, the government would make a determined effort to split the group. Policy did not allow large concentrations of Native peoples along the international border (Frost, 1904: 293).

[49] George Johnston to George W. Manypenny, 3 October, 1856. N.A. RG 75, M234. Roll 405: 0269.

[50] This affair prompted an investigation by Washington. Thomas C. Slaughter to W. Dole, 27 October, 1861. N.A. RG 75, M234, Roll 406: 1056-57. The issue of extending the vote to Indians had been discussed in 1853, with the American government reaching the conclusion that a man could not both exercise the franchise and be a member of a tribe (i.e. receive annuities from the government). Daniel Blish to the Honorable

R.M. Clelland, 12 May, 1853. N.A. RG 75. M234. Roll 404:0006.

[51] William Johnston to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 8 January, 1860. N.A. RG 75. M234, Roll 406: 0773. Regarding Oshawana's complaint to Henry C. Gilbert, 31 December, 1855. N.A. RG 75. M234, Roll 405: 0082. Fitch took office in July 1857.

[52] Hurlburt was at Garden River during 1857 and 1858, Salt during 1859, while Sawyer acted as an interpreter to the mission at different times. William Harkimer resided at Garden River in 1860. Hurlburt felt that the government should abolish the operation of traditional leadership and impose an elective system on bands. He argued, however, that Indians were intellectually inferior to whites, a racist attitude which began to pervade the Methodist movement at Garden River by 1858, as Methodism became less sect-like and more institutionalized. Hurlburt to Indian Affairs, 22 December, 1857. RG 10, vol. 239, pt. 1: 191860.

[53] From 1860 to 1866 Garden River lay under the charge of the Reverend Edward Sollows and the Reverend Samuel Downs of Bruce Mines. It was supplied with a missionary from 1871 to 1880, but apparently no attempt was made to send a missionary to reside at the community after 1873.

[54] The Christian Guardian, 4 November, 1857: 55-56.

[55] Keating to Indian Affairs, 1857. RG 10, vol. 235: 139650-53. Reel C-11542.

[56] One area on which this paper does not particularly focus, but which was all too evident from conversations with elders as well as from missionary reports, was the extraordinary numbers who died on the reserve from malnutrition and disease induced by the poverty in which the Ojibwa were placed during these years. In 1855, for instance, the Methodists admitted that over sixty-nine individuals had died since their arrival at Garden River only three years before. 32nd Annual Report of the Wesleyan Methodist Church, June 1856 - June 1857. As years passed, the Methodist clergy, in their reports, became increasingly obsessed by the severity of conditions at Garden River, which they felt they could do little to rectify -- a radical departure from the message of hope that their movement had brought to the bands twenty years previously. Epidemics of smallpox, consumption, and influenza left neither Indians nor missionary families untouched, for the Anglican missionary, Frederick Frost, lost several children from sickness. To survive, elders argued, families sought to have as many children as possible. Conversation with Fred Pine Sr. and Richard Pine Sr. It was not unusual for a couple to have ten children and for only one or two to live to adulthood. Fred and Richard Pine, for instance, lost both their parents, Jacobdome Pine and Mariah Abotossaway, from tuberculosis before either person interviewed had reached the age of five. Fred's twin brother starved as a baby; another brother died in a

drowning accident. Conditions markedly improved, however, between 1904 and 1913, when the band could assume a greater degree of control over affairs on their reserves than had formerly been the case, but deteriorated again after this date for at least two decades.

[57] Petition dated 26 January, 1856. RG 10, vol. 239, pt. 2: 142584-86; RG 10, vol. 239, pt. 2: 14, 2581-82.

[58] L.N. Sicotte to Pennefather, 16 February, 1858. RG 10, vol. 239, pt. 2: 142549-52.

[59] RG 10, vol. 239, pt. 2: 142560-64.

[60] Sicotte to Pennefather, 16 February, 1858. RG 10, vol. 239, pt. 2: 142549-52.

[61] R.T. Pennefather, 3 March, 1858. RG 10, vol. 239, pt. 2:142565-70.

[62] Pennefather to Ironsides, 4 June, 1858. RG 10, vol. 614: 246.

[63] Carney's appointment to position of a Protector of Indian Lands occurred in 1856. RG 10, vol. 223: 132530 A-B.

[64] Carney to Pennefather, 6 September, 1858. RG 10, vol. 249: 148472-82.

[65] Ibid.

[66] Ibid.

[67] Ibid.

[68] Ibid.

[69] Information and complaint of Edward Pawyawbedeussung [son of Charles Piabetassung] of Garden River vs Kechenebaunewbeu of Thessalon. A.O. Harry D. Blanchard Collection. M Section Papers, 1766 - 1932. MU 275. Kechenebaunewbeu was a conjuror.

[70] Shawano, Wabojick and Kabanodin, 2 October, 1858. N.A. RG75. M 234, Roll 406:0249-50.

[71] Letter to Richard Carney from Garden River chief inquiring as to his right as chief. Dated October 12, 1858. A.O. Blanchard collection. MU 275.

[72] This letter, from S.Y. Chesley to Ironsides, dated September 1858, is discussed in Ironsides to Pennefather, 17 February, 1859. RG 10, vol. 247, pt. 2: 11872.

[73] Tegoosh lent the Garden River band money from time to time. In October 1858, for instance, he received thirty dollars from the band in repayment for a loan he had given. Affidavit, 2 October, 1858. RG 10, vol. 613: 266.

Pennefather was determined to reduce the number of annuitants, and requested Ironsides to draw up lists of Métis, illegitimate children, and non-members residing on reserves and to furnish percentages of the number in each category relative to the band as a whole. RG 10, vol. 614: 443. It would be these categories which would either be struck off the lists or forced to leave the reserve. Ironsides mainly excluded those who cut timber. RG 10, vol. 247, pt. 2: 11872. Reel C-12,640; RG 10, vol. 613: 1038-39.

[74] The Ojibwa make a firm distinction between the categories "natural" and "man-made". Things regarded as "man-made" are distinguished by the suffix kan (Fred Pine Sr., personal communication).

[75] Carney regarding vacant houses at Garden River. RG 10. Reel C-12,641: 149,346.

[76] Carney to Pennefather, 3 September, 1858 (Private). RG 10, vol. 247, pt. 2: 14704.

[77] Carney to Pennefather, 12 June, 1859, regarding subdivision of reserves. RG 10, vol. 249: 148490-94; RG 10, vol. 249: 148485-86. Carney was strict in enforcing Lord's Day regulations on the Indians. Indians were not permitted to hunt, fish, or make maple sugar on Sunday. A statement of Carney's prohibitions on sugar production on Sundays may be found in the Blanchard Collection, A.O. MU 275. No other sector of the Sault Ste. Marie population seems to have come under these sanctions.

[78] Carney to Pennefather, 28 May, 1859. RG 10, vol. 247, pt. 2: 147043-46.

[79] Ibid.; Carney to Pennefather, 25 April, 1859. RG 10, vol. 248: 147739-41. Nebenagoching expected to be able to purchase a lot of 80 acres at the upset price.

[80] S.Y. Chesley to Ironsides, 10 January, 1859. RG 10, vol. 614: 187-88. Money would no longer be given in "bulk to the chiefs", but the agent would henceforth be responsible for taking individual receipts from each band member.

[81] Carney to Indian Affairs, 25 March, 1859. RG 10, vol. 248: 147690-99.

[82] Ibid.

[83] Ibid.

[84] Misheash and Apequash had help from Father Kõhler, S.J., who from 1860 to 1870 worked diligently trying to secure these lands for the Goulais and Batchewana Bay peoples.

Confusion was already arising over the extent of the Batchewana Indian tract by this time. In 1853, Keating and Bridgland had stated the size of the reserve to be 184 square miles. Keating in 1857, however, argued that, of the Batchewana reserve, 300 square miles was "fit for agricultural purposes". RG 10, vol. 235: 139650. The final extent of the reserve decided upon arose from political expediency. Only agricultural land (i.e. land not suitable for mining locations, since most of this land was really swamp and scrub) would be considered reserve -- all mineral lands, which were most valuable, would fall outside the boundary.

[85] Ironsides reports that chief Totomenai's band desires to exchange the reserve at Gros Cap for land either at Ahgaiwong [Agawa] or at Batchewana Island, 24 August, 1859. RG 10, vol. 242: 143599. Reel C-12,637. The Gros Cap reserve had mineral locations on it.

[86] 24 August, 1859, No. 12206. RG 10, Reel C-12,642. No. 12206.

[87] Thomas Augustin, Hd. Chief; Henry Paquetchenene, Chief, 14 June, 1859. RG 10, vol. 573.

[88] Copy of a Committee of the Honorable the Executive Council, dated 18 July, 1859, approved by His Excellency, the Governor General in Council on the 22nd of the same month. RG 10, vol. 236: 148843; A.O. RG1, A-1-7. Box 8, 1859. See also, Morris (1891, 1: 228-31).

[89] Carney to Indian Affairs, 12 June, 1859. RG 10, vol. 249: 148490. Reel C 12,641.

[90] Plan of Shinguicouse [township], Garden River. Wilson and McGee, P.L.S. December, 1866. Toronto: Ontario, Crown Lands, map division.

[91] Gibbard leased the fishing location to an American. RG 10, vol. 614: 332. Pennefather's reply to Ironsides' letter, 1 September, 1859. RG 10, vol. 614: 339.

[92] For an encapsulated presentation of these events, see James Barry (1978: 74-75).

[93] Pennefather to Ironsides, 15 July, 1856. RG 10, vol. 614: 16.

[94] Memorandum of the proceeding of an Indian Council held at Sarnia on the 12th September 1860. RG 10, vol. 256: 153974-80; RG 10, vol. 614: 407-09. "No business will be transacted nor must any remarks be made upon the policy of the Government towards them" the circular cautioned. The problems encountered by David Sawyer and Catherine Sutton are discussed by Van Dusen (1974: Chapters 14 and 24).

[95] Kichikemeg to members of Grand Council, Rama reserve, 28 February, 1859. RG 10, vol. 613. The Wikemikong members ceased contributing funds to Grand Council coffers between 1859 and roughly 1865.

[96] The Wikewemikong resistance movement was entirely Native sponsored, with the priests trying to channel the momentum into forms of peaceful protest rather than outbreaks of violence. With Ironsides' death in 1863 and the appointment of his haughty successor Charles Dupont, the Indians' anger escalated. Dupont had little interest in protecting Indian lands in the face of settlement and resource development, and so the contradiction inherent in the role of the Province as protector of Indian interests and promoter of western-style economic development ceased to exist. The Indians were forced to restore a balanced tension within the Province's role by their own efforts. Many contemporary accounts of this resistance exist. Among these are Van Dusen's account (1974: Chapter 28), and articles in The Globe for 30 July 1863, and the Canadian Illustrated News for 8 August 1863. See also, Leighton (1977) and the J. Paquin MS., Regis College, Toronto. Official correspondence regarding the Manitoulin Island treaty may be found in Canada, Sessional Papers (No. 63), A 1863.

Owing to the pressures on government exerted by men such as E.B. Borron, in 1860 several provisions of the law which had formerly granted chiefs a degree of proprietorship over land and resources on their reserves were repealed, and the conditions regulating resource exploitation on Crown Lands were extended to apply to timber and minerals on reserves. This triggered fears at Garden River as Wilson and Ironsides began to ignore Indian wishes in implementing the new policy. RG 10, vol. 254: 151940; Borron to Indian Affairs, 16 August, 1856. RG 10, vol. 614: 64. Joseph Wilson was appointed Crown Lands agent on 13 April, 1863. RG 10, vol. 302: 202378.

[97] When a debate arose concerning the most suitable successor to Chief Megis at Parry Island, Yellowhead of Rama upheld James Pagahmegabow, of the Caribou dodem against Ahwahquagezick of the Birch Bark dodem. There was also factionalism along religious lines, as Yellowhead and Pagahmegabow were both Methodist, while their rivals were mainly Roman Catholic. RG 10, vol. 613: 1038-39; RG 10, vol. 614: 419; ibid., 423.

[98] The expulsion of the Chief Tehkumma and others at this time led to families later being left off the status Indian rolls. J. Paquin, S.J., to A.N. McNeill, 26 November, 1896. RG 10, vol. 2832: 170,073-1.

[99] RG 10, vol. 615: 348-50.

[100] Instructions regarding census taking. RG 10, vol. 615: 15-18.

[101] By this time the band began collectively to refuse to expose any of their indigenous beliefs and practices to "outsiders", particularly government authorities. George Johnston wrote that he hoped that popular acceptance of Schoolcraft's ethnological writings might encourage the Ojibwa to revive once again their "hidden and cherished institutions". But as the years progressed Johnston, plagued by his own problems as a person of Métis descent, became increasingly doubtful that such would occur during the nineteenth century. George Johnston to Schoolcraft, 23 August, 1851. Washington. Schoolcraft Papers. Reel 9.

[102] John Carney's comments on the Agruicultural Census Sheets clearly indicate this. A.O. Census, 1861. Ennumeration District No. One from Westerly limit of Rankin's Mining Location in possession of Wellington Mining Co. of Lake Huron to Indian Mission, Batchewana Bay, Lake Superior, District of Algoma. Ironsides reported the same problem. RG 10, vol. 254: 153183. Reel 12,644.

[103] The population of Enumeration District No 1 numbered 898. The number 475 for the Indian residents does not include the Batchewana Bay community, or else the Native proportion of the population for District No. 1 would be considerably higher than one-half the total people recorded.

[104] 15 November, 1862. A.O. John Prince Diary.

[105] The number 113 has been calculated from a census of Garden River Indians for the years from 1850 to 1880 in the Aemelius Irving Collection. A.O. MU 1464, 26/31/03 and 04.

[106] 21 October, 1862. A.O. John Prince Diary.

[107] Carney to Pennefather, 23 May, 1860. RG 10, vol. 254: 152474-77; George Copway, formerly a Native Methodist missionary, was soliciting volunteers to join in the American Civil War. RG 10, vol. 615: 336-38; Circulars were sent cautioning local government agents that arms may have been sent to the Sioux. February, 1863. RG 10, vol. 302: 202351.

[108] RG 10, vol. 615: 136.

[109] Abotossaway. Statement made before David Layton at Manitowaning, 26 February, 1862. RG 10, vol. 615: 137. Notices in Ojibwa were circulated from Wikwemikong among the Indians on Manitoulin Island to have Abotossaway removed from the island, since the chief was an informer. RG 10, vol. 615: 477.

[110] Wilson to Dupont, 12 February, 1864. RG 10, vol. 615: 389-92.

[111] D. Blain, the lawyer responsible for the Indians' defense, argued that the government had infringed upon Native rights:

> The whole question is one of title. Is the fishery the property of the Indians or not? If of the Indians, they have only done that which the law will warrant every man in doing in protecting his property against intruders. If the property in the fisheries be ceded to the government, the Indians are not aware of the fact they say. I took this ground before the magistrates [Wilson, Ironsides, Layton, Carney, and Judge Prince]. But they were of the opinion that the production of the license granted by Mr. Proulx raised a presumption that the Crown was entitled to the property ... in the absence of ... proof to the contrary....

The Canadian Illustrated News, vol. 2, no. 13, 8 August, 1863: 151.

[112] Prince to Wilson, 22 December, 1863. RG 10, vol. 615: 321-22. Prince and Wilson were appointed to conduct sales of Indian land and collect dues and fines on timber cut on reserves. RG 10, vol. 302: 202380; Prince to Dupont, 10 December, 1863. RG 10, vol. 284: 191328. The Indians, stressed Prince, lacked anything resembling fee simple to their lands.

[113] Wilson to Dupont, 20 January, 1864. RG 10, vol. 615: 621-23; Wilson to Spragge, 26 December, 1863. RG 10, vol. 615: 316-18; Wilson to Spragge, 29 March, 1864. RG 10, vol. 302: 202600-02.

[114] Wilson to Dupont, 20 January, 1864. RG 10, vol. 615: 621-23.

[115] RG 10, vol. 283: 191328. Judge Prince's view regarding the locations may be gained from his diaries. A.O. 31 July, 1861; 1 October, 1861. A.O. Prince's Diaries.

[116] B.H. Lemoine and George Desbarats had been very reluctant to part with their two locations, but under Spragge's encouragement they did so, especially as Robinson had stipulated in 1850 that the two mining sites should revert to the reserve. RG 10, vol. 230: 136899.

[117] Upper Canada Land Petitions, "G" Bundle 9, 1858-1864. A.O. RG 1, L3, vol. 220(a): 16; RG 10, vol. 323: 216486-87.

[118] Spragge to Wilson, 8 September, 1863. RG 10, No. 124 vol. 302: 202598-99.

[119] Spragge to Dupont, 31 March, 1864. RG 10, vol. 615: 414-15; Spragge to Dupont, 22 April, 1864. RG 10, vol. 615: 429-32; Spragge to Dupont, 28 May, 1864. RG 10, vol. 615: 449-51.

[120] RG 10, vol. 284: 191419-20. Spragge held that trade with Church should be permitted. RG 10, vol. 615: 367-68, 399-40.

[121] Spragge to Dupont, 7 May, 1864. RG 10, vol. 615: 445-47. Chance considered Cousins' behaviour towards Indian women improper and stated Cousins also sold spirits to the Ojibwa. RG 10, vol. 324: 218397.

[122] 39th Annual Report of the Missionary Society of Wesleyan Methodist Church, June 1863 - June 1864.

[123] Ogista asks Prince for information. RG 10, vol. 284: 191329; Ogista defies Prince and Wilson. Dupont to Spragge, 15 March, 1864. RG 10, vol. 284: 191376.

[124] Wilson to Dupont, 12 February, 1864. RG 10, vol. 615: 389-92; Spragge to Dupont, 26 April, 1864. RG 10, vol. 615: 434-35. The Wikwemikong contingent, led by Mocomanish and Tagwaninini, in June of 1866 demanded Dupont's removal from office. Ottawa Island Band of Wikwemikong to Indian Department, 18 June, 1866. RG 10, vol. 333: 101-05.

[125] Dupont to Wilson, 1 March, 1864. RG 10, vol. 284: 191363.

[126] Church to Dupont, 7 March, 1864. RG 10, vol. 615: 408.

[127] Ibid.

[128] Prince to Dupont, 6 January, 1864. RG 10, vol. 615: 371-72. "My opinion," stated Prince, "[is] that the Indians at Garden River are merely occupants without payment of rent":

> When Canada was conquered by General Wolfe 104 years ago, on the Plains of Abraham, near Quebec, England obtained the absolute possession of the whole country and she allowed certain Indian Tribes to occupy lands as hunting lands, but never gave them the fee simple of these lands.
>
> I am of the opinion that the Indians have no right whatsoever to sell, or to cut for sale the timber from off these lands, called reserves.... If they were permitted to sell all the timber thencefrom, and to denude the lands of it, what would the land be worth? Why, little or nothing, comparatively speaking.

Memorandum, 10 December, 1863. RG 10, vol. 284: 191328.

Prince encouraged Dupont to dissuade Indians from hunting, which he believed to be the right only of "gentry" like himself. This was a radical reversal of the earlier stance against the implementation of game laws in the United Canadas expressed by newspapers such as the

Montreal Gazette. Prince to Dupont, 12 March, 1864. RG 10, vol. 284: 191412-15. Montreal Gazette, 11 December, 1848.

[129] Dupont to Spragge, 15 March, 1864. RG 10, vol. 284: 191376; Dupont to Indian Affairs, 10 December, 1863. RG 10, vol. 284: 191363. Dupont suggested that Charles Biron be arrested and sent to the penitentiary at Penetanguishene. Dupont to Spragge, 15 March, 1864. RG 10, vol. 284: 191376. The agent also felt the Roman Catholic priests should be penalized, since he accused them of promoting the unrest. Dupont to Spragge, 21 November, 1864. RG 10, vol. 284: 191581-90. When Indian leaders began to assert that Dupont and the Crown had no control over them, the Indian superintendent panicked:

> In Quebec [they] said they owed no allegiance to the British Govt. and said that this land intervening to the Pacific is not British territory and that the Indians are not subjects but allies of their Majesty. Backed by a number of American Indians who with their forefathers fought vs. Her Majesty -- proclaiming themselves aliens -- [they] indirectly [? word indistinct] murdered Mr. Gibbard....

Dupont to Spragge, 21 November, 1864. RG 10, vol. 284: 191581. Whether or not an Indian "murdered" Gibbard, whose body in 1863 was found floating in the waters off Manitoulin Island, was never determined. The agent made no secret of his suspicions, however. Dupont even hesitated to distribute relief, sent by Indian Affairs, to the bands after the fires and smallpox epidemic of 1864, arguing instead that Native peoples should earn their provisions by wage labor. Ibid. Spragge intervened to compel the agent to assist the Indians.

[130] Dupont to Indian Affairs, 10 December, 1863. RG 10, vol. 284: 191363.

[131] Spragge to Dupont, 26 April, 1864. RG 10, vol. 615: 434.

[132] "The Collingwood Outrage". The Globe, 28 October, 1875. Interband conflicts apparently could arise but authorities were always misled as to the cause. RG 10, vol. 619: 52, 788-89; Sault Express, 6 October, 1896.

[133] To Our Brother Chiefs, 1864. RG 10, vol. 615: 348.

[134] Leach to W. Dole, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 12 January, 1864. N.A. RG 75. M234. Roll 407: 0408-32. Abottosaway, meanwhile, had not reached the end of his difficulties. A complaint levied against the chief for engaging in a "drunken spree" led the government to compel the band to leave Little Current. John Burkett to Dupont, 1 December, 1864. RG 10, vol. 615: 568; RG 10, vol. 615: 1005. Spragge informed Abotossaway that he and his band should move to Sucker Creek on Manitoulin Island. Spragge to Obetossoway, 8 September, 1865. RG 10,

vol. 615: 959-62. The band did so in 1866. Return of Indians. RG 10, vol. 616: 267-68. Complaint of Sarah Abotossaway. RG 10, vol. 619: 45556.

One event which raised the Métis and Indians in the estimation of John Prince was the ready willingness of the Native population to respond to the judge's call to arms in 1866, when rumors spread of Fenian plans to raid Sault Ste. Marie from a base near Marquette, Michigan. A.O. 27 August, 1866. Prince Diary.

[135] Spragge to Wilson, 22 December, 1864. RG 10, vol. 615: 578-80, 581-82.

[136] Instructions to Kirkpatrick, 2 July, 1864. Kirkpatrick earlier reported that the Indians wished the boundaries to conform to the terms of the treaties of 1850 and 1859. Kirkpatrick to Indian Affairs, 12 June, 1864. RG 10, vol. 302: 202646; Fieldnotes, 1864. Book 823. Part 1. G.B. Kirkpatrick. Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources.

[137] Lawrence Vankoughnet to G.B. Kirkpatrick, 27 April, 1893. RG 10, Garden River Band office file, 40-3; Band Council Meeting, 10 February, 1897. RG 10, vol. 2878, file 177,991-1, part O. Reel C-11296.

[138] Interview with Nebenagoching. Wilson to Indian Affairs, 13 December, 1864. RG 10, vol. 302: 202804-09; Wilson to Spragge, 14 January, 1865. RG 10, vol. 302: 202841-44.

[139] Wilson to Spragge. Confidential. 1 January, 1865. RG 10, vol. 302: 202809-12; Wilson to Spragge, 15 March, 1865. RG 10, vol. 302: 202922-24.

[140] RG 10, vol. 302: 202809-12.

[141] Auguste Kõler, S.J., to Dupont, 4 October, 1864. RG 10, vol. 284: D42. Reel C-12,664.

[142] 20 March, 1865. A.O. Prince Diary.

[143] Chance to Campbell, 10 March, 1866. RG 10, vol. 324: 216822.

[144] This was a second offense. The first occurred in February. Ibid.; Chance to Pennefather, 28 February, 1865. RG 10, vol. 282. Reel C-12,663.

[145] Spragge to Dupont, 28 June, 1865. RG 10, vol. 615: 875-76; Dupont to Spragge regarding Ogista, 2 May, 1865. RG 10, vol. 331: D3. Reel C-9581.

[146] Chance to Campbell, 10 March, 1866. RG 10, vol. 324: 216822.

[147] Dupont to Spragge, 3 November, 1865. RG 10, vol. 331, D 79. Reel C-9582. Dupont failed to solve the difficulty at this time, but by the end of the month he felt it was well on its way to being settled. Spragge to Dupont, 23 November, 1865. RG 10, vol. 615: 1026.

[148] Chance to Dupont, 15 August, 1865. RG 10, vol. 615: 931; Chance to Campbell, 10 March, 1866. RG 10, vol. 324: 216822; RG 10, vol. 324: 216828; Chance to Campbell, 10 March, 1866. RG 10, vol. 616: 44-46.

[149] Chance to Campbell, 28 July, 1866. RG 10, vol. 324: 216811; Chance to Indian Department, 15 August, 1865. RG 10, vol. 324: 216816; RG 10, vol. 323: 216466.

[150] Algoma Missionary News and Shingwauk Journal (1880-1890); Frost (1904). Mrs. Chance also describes this chief in In Memoriam, Reminiscences of Our Work Among the Indians (n.d.: 10-16).

[151] Spragge to Dupont, 9 August, 1866. RG 10, vol. 616: 134-37. At the same time, Indians would receive their annuities at Garden River rather than at Sault Ste. Marie. Spragge to Dupont, 24 September, 1866. RG 10, vol. 616: 191-92.

[152] Campbell to Kohler, 11 October, 1866. RG 10, vol. 340: 378-81.

[153] Ibid.

[154] Ibid.

[155] In 1848 Cuthbertson had paid Bell for labor Bell performed on buildings on the Elliot location, and for protecting the site from trespass. Bell had no intention after 1850, however, of opposing the band and refused to prevent the cutting of wood. RG 10, vol. 323: 216486-93.

[156] RG 10, vol. 326: 218443-44; RG 10, vol. 340: 578-81.

[157] Memo on the subject of Alex. Campbell's letters of 27 August and 4 September, 1866. RG 10, vol. 340: 565-67.

[159] Ibid.

[160] Chance to Campbell, 26 October, 1866. RG 10, vol. 324: 216807. Reel C-9578.

[161] Chance to Spragge, 21 May, 1867. RG 10, vol. 616: 400-01.

[162] Chance to Campbell, 28 November, 1866. RG 10, vol. 324: 216938-40.

[163] Chance to Spragge, 17 June, 1867. RG 10, vol. 333: 537-40; Spragge to Dupont, 29 May, 1867. RG 10, vol. 333: 545-46; Dupont to Spragge, 10 August, 1867. RG 10, vol. 333: 521-23.

[164] Ogista in 1864 had asked for an advance on the band annuity to construct a sawmill. Petition, 12 March, 1864. RG 10, vol. 284: 191382.

[165] Chance to Spragge, 17 June, 1867. RG 10, vol. 333: 541-44. Bell had entered into a contract with Rankin regarding a house on Bell's Point in 1871. RG 10, vol. 2048, file 9266. Chance complained about the disappearance of a yoke of oxen which apparently had been sent by the Indian Department in 1867. Langevin to Plummer, 24 June, 1869. RG 10, vol. 617. Reel C-13389.

[166] Treaties No. 110 and 111, July 7 and 9, 1867.

[167] Chance to Spragge, 17 June, 1867. RG 10, vol. 333: 541-44.

[168] Chance to Spragge, 3 September, 1867. RG 10, vol. 616: 420-22.

[168] Allan Macdonell returned to the political scene at Sault Ste. Marie and ran unsuccessfully in the 1869 election. Ontario Parliamentary Companion. Montreal, 1869: 141.

[169] Chance to Spragge, 3 September, 1867. RG 10, vol. 616: 420-22.

[170] RG 10, vol. 333: 510-13; RG 10, vol. 616: 420-22.

[171] Statement of William McMurray, 31 August, 1867; Statement of T.G. Anderson, 17 August, 1867; Statement of F.A. O'Meara, 10 August, 1867. RG 10, vol. 333: 430-31, 514-15, 517-19.

[172] Ibid.

[173] Spragge to Dupont, 16 August, 1867. RG 10, vol. 616: 518-19.

[174] Chance to Spragge, 28 September, 1867. RG 10, vol. 333: 498-501.

[175] RG 10, vol. 333: 478-84.

[176] Dupont to Spragge, 8 September, 1867. RG 10, vol. 616: 423-24.

[177] Spragge's comments on the rival claims of Ogista and Buhkwujjenene. RG 10, vol. 333: 472-73.

[178] Langevin to Wilson, 13 december, 1867. RG 10, vol. 326: 218440-41.

[179] Extract of Chance's letter of February, 1867. RG 10, vol. 341: 327-30, 332-33; Chance to Langevin, 24 November, 1868. RG 10, vol. 327: 218,694-96.

[180] The price of Indian land was not to exceed 20¢ cash per acre in order to promote rapid settlement of the Algoma District. RG 10, vol. 302: 202380.

[181] RG 10, vol. 327: 218,694-96.

[182] Indian petition, 8 June, 1868. RG 10, vol. 326: 218,434-38.

[183] List of Indians and Halfbreeds residing on Garden River Reserve who may be regarded as Intruders. RG 10, vol. 617: 106; Heads of families, Nebenagoching's band. RG 10, vol. 617: 105. Wilson complained about the Indians selling timber to Church. RG 10, vol. 303: 3202. Reel C-12,675.

[184] RG 10, vol. 303: 3202.

[185] The Indian Act of 1869 sought to exclude those of "less than three fourths Indian blood from the privilege of the Indian community." RG 10, vol. 1942, file 4103.

[186] Chance to Spragge, 17 June, 1867. RG 10, vol. 333: 537-40; Chance to Langevin, 24 November, 1868. RG 10, vol. 327: 218694-96. Reel C-9579. Conditions were shocking, Chance related, with starvation not infrequent.

[187] Regarding rival claims to leadership, 3 August, 1869. RG 10, vol. 333: 473.

[188] Statement of Augustin [Ogista]. Ibid.: 482-83; Statement of Wahbemaimai. Ibid.: 479; Statement of Pahkutchenenene. Ibid.: 481. Taken from testimonies recorded by Dupont in 1867. In November, 1869, William Plummer was instructed to arrange for an electoral system to be implemented in conformity with the terms of the 1869 Indian Act. The Garden River band's support for Ogista evidently made such an election unnecessary at this time. Langevin to Plummer, 5 November, 1869. RG 10, vol. 617. Reel C-13389.

[189] Conditions with regard to the surrender of Squirrel Island. RG 10, vol. 2048, file 9321. This island of 126 acres ceded by the band in 1872 was sold in 1888 to Duncan Gillis McDonald and eventually subdivided into lots.

[190] Joseph Howe to Plummer, 20 January, 1873. RG 10, vol. 619: 9. Plummer remained Visiting Agent until June, 1873, when J.C. Phipps was appointed to fill the post at the Manitowaning agency. RG 10, vol. 619: 139; RG 10, vol. 619: 166-68.

[191] RG 10, vol. 619: 9.

[192] Little Pine's Journal. The Appeal of a Christian Chippeway Chief on Behalf of his People. Toronto: 1872.

[193] RG 10, vol. 1915, file 2697, part 0. Reel C-1110.

[194] The grants were confirmed by the Privy Council on 16 June, 1871. RG 10, vol. 7566.

[195] Both Ogista and Buhkwujjenene referred to the image of the setting sun in representing their view that Christianity would then rise like a "new day".

[196] RG 10, vol. 1915, file 2697, part 0, Reel C-11110.

Endnotes, Chapter Nine

[1] Administrative Outline. The Historical Development of the Indian Act. Treaties and Historical Research Centre, P.R.E. Group. Indian and Northern Affairs, August, 1978: vii.

[2] By 1896 this competence in mining affairs demonstrated by band members came to be resented by competitive White mining explorers. RG 10, vol. 2846, file 174,471. In 1896, the Roman Catholic missionaries took the side of the Indians involved in one such contest. Legal disputes over the positioning of surveyed locations were a common occurrence. In 1872 and 1873, for instance, George Austin and R.W. Scott, Commissioner of Crown Lands, opposed one another over the survey of a mine site. RG 10, vol. 1903, file 2188. Surveys of timber berths were subject to greater government regulation than were mining locations (Nellis, 1974).

[3] Simon J. Dawson (1820-1902) became an M.P.P. for Algoma in the Ontario legislature and a federal M.P. in 1878. According to oral testimonies at Garden River, he seemed to have been a man remembered with particular affection by the Indian community.

[4] Consec. Nos. 131 and 1 2, Treaty No. 3 between Her Majesty the Queen and the Saulteaux Tribe of the Ojibbeway Indians at the Northwest Angle of the Lake of the Woods with Adhesions, October 3, 1873. RG 10, vol. 1846.

[5] Affidavit, 11 January, 1875. RG 10, vol. 1938, file 3776; RG 10, vol. 1937, file 3773, Reel C-11115. This iron deposit had been known by the band for a long time. In 1823 trader John Johnston had informed Major Joseph Delafield of the United States Boundary commission of its location "nine miles up the Garden River" (McElroy and Riggs, eds., 1943: 371).

[6] Affidavit, John Shingwok (John Askin), November, 1874. RG 10, vol. 1937, file 3773, Reel C-11115.

[7] Church to Indian affairs, 25 November, 1875; Van Abbott to Indian Affairs, 13 August, 1874. RG 10, vol. 1937, file 3773.

[8] Statements of John Traynor, P.L.S.; Van Abbott to Indian Affairs, 26 September, 1874. RG 10, vol. 1940, file 3940.

[9] Affidavits of Philetus Church, James Wilkinson and William Fingland regarding payments to Ogista. RG 10, vol. 1937, file 3773.

[10] Synopsis of case. RG 10, vol. 1937, file 3773.

[11] Regarding the conflicting claims; William Fingland to the Minister of the Interior, 27 September, 1874. RG 10, vol. 1938, file 3776.

[12] Conditions of lease to Church, 13 August, 1874. RG 10, vol. 1937, file 3773.

[13] Affidavit, William Fingland, 20 April, 1875. RG 10, vol. 1937, file 3773.

[14] E.B. Borron was a prime impetus behind the surrender of the reserve at this time. This caused Ogista, Buhkwujjenene, Waubmama and nine others to refuse to vote even on the surrender of the mining locations. Van Abbott to the Minister of the Interior, 19 October, 1874. Buhkwujjenene acted as an effective check on his brother's actions by personally writing Ottawa and demanding that Indian Affairs transact business with the entire band rather than solely the head chief. Buhkwujjenene to the Superintendent of Indian affairs, 26 October, 1874. RG 10, vol. 1938, file 3776.

[15] Petition of Band to the Honorable Minister of the Interior, 17 October, 1874. RG 10, vol. 1938, file 3776.

[16] RG 10, vol. 1938, file 3776; RG 10, vol. 1944, file 4236, part O, Reel 11117. Mineral lands were sold for one dollar, fifty cents cash per acre.

[17] Treaty No. 140 for Mining Locations 21H - 26H was signed by the band on 25 November, 1874. It was officially registered in February 1875. To the Honorable Secretary of State, 16 February, 1875. RG 10, vol. 1944, file 4236, part O, Reel C-11117. All of these mining locations have subsequently become forfeited to Ontario under The Provisional Land Tax Act of 1924 (Emerson, 1979: 11); Correspondence on Wilkinson location and its ownership by University of Michigan. RG 10, vol. 1909, file 2372, part O, Reel C-11109.

[18] E.F. Wilson to Clifford Sifton, 14 July, 1874. RG 10, vol. 1936, file 3673, Reel C-11115. Wilson wanted the Anglican mission to be partly funded from Batchewana Band capital. At this time sixty-seven individuals resided at Batchewana Bay. The Hudson's Bay Company encouraged bands in this area to spend as little time on the coast as possible. 52nd Annual Report of the Missionary Society of the Wesleyan Methodist Church, June 1875 to June 1876. In 1877 the Methodists claimed that bands were compelled to leave for their hunting grounds in early August, after which time individual families saw little of each other until late spring. Their condition was described as "pitiable" by the missionaries, who argued that in years past the Indians had remained at the coast during the spring and summer. Company policy, however, had changed and, after the furs were traded, families were sent directly back to the hunting grounds which made it almost impossible for the

missionaries to follow them. 54th Annual Report of the Missionary Society of the Wesleyan Methodist Church, June 1877 to June 1878.

[19] The Methodist missionary, E.S. Curry, granted James Chance the power to allow George Menissino to occupy the house. RG 10, vol. 619: 131; Spragge to Phipps, 12 July, 1873. RG 10, vol. 619: 199; E. Wood to J.C. Aikins, 24 June, 1873. RG 10, vol. 619: 201-3; E.S. Curry to J.C. Aikins, 2 January, 1873. RG 10, vol. 619: 127-9. Peter Greensky was likely related to the Greensky family of L'Anse, Michigan.

[20] File regarding sale of Squirrel Island, and the building of a sawmill owned by Messrs. Craig and Company, 1872-1879. RG 10, vol. 2048, file 9321. Squirrel Island was conditionally surrendered by the band on 27 June, 1871. The purchaser was required to construct a "really good" operating sawmill prior to the issue of a patent for the island. See also "Research Report on Squirrel Island Indian Land Claim and Garden River Reserve #14" (Robinson, 1980).

[21] Ibid. The sale of the seven acres occurred on 17 April, 1872. Surrender No. 165 (Morris, 1891, 2:63-5).

[22] James Chance's correspondence to Indian Affairs provides information regarding these seasonal migrations, since the missionary held annuity monies for members of his congregation until their return to the reserve. John Whalen, or Katawkequonabee, working at Bruce Mines in 1863, for example, asked for his family's annuities to be sent to Chance. RG 10, vol. 615: 434-5. Whalen, who married a daughter of American head chief Oshawano, attempted to purchase land along the coast in Laird township which constituted the traditional fishing grounds of Oshawano's band. Whalen died before this transaction took place. RG 10, vol. 1990, file 6612, part O, Reel C-11129.

[23] Interviews with Ernest Jones, Richard Pine Sr. and Fred Pine Sr., 1982 - 1983.

[24] RG 10, vol. 2048, file 9321.

[25] Documents regarding fishing regulations adopted 3 April, 1875; Council held at the English School House, 5 August, 1875. RG 10, vol. 1967, file 5184.

[26] Simon J. Dawson to The Secretary of H.E. the Governor General, 7 April, 1873; Petition. To His Excellency Right Honorable Earl Dufferin, K.C.B. Governor General of Canada in Council. A.O. Irving Papers. MU 1465, 27/31/1(1).

[27] Simon J. Dawson to Colonel C. Stuart, 7 October, 1881. A.O. Irving Papers, MU 1465, 27/31/1(1). Simon J. Dawson was a member of the lumbering family of Dawsons from the Ottawa Valley. Simon Dawson's family had intermarried with Macdonells even prior to each family's

emigration to Canada from Scotland (Simon J. Dawson's mother, for instance, was Anne Macdonell). It is thus not surprising for members of these two closely inter-related families, such as Simon J. Dawson and Allan Macdonell to share views and interests in common. A.O. Dawson Family Papers, MU 828. Crown lands Office. William Dawson, Simon's brother had even been dismissed from a post as a surveyor for what he felt were fostered by factional politics between his family and the Crown Lands Commissioner, Papineau. A.O. Dawson Family Papers, MU 828.

[28] E.B. Borron to the Honorable D. Laird, 9 April, 1875. RG 10, vol. 1958, file 4683, part 0; RG 10, vol. 1978, file 5978, part 0, Reel C-11126. An Order in Council of 12 February, 1878 authorized the expenditure of one thousand dollars annually. An equal amount was to be provided yearly by the Ontario government.

[29] Ibid. Funds derived from sales, leases and royalties on ceded Batchewana and Garden River lands were placed in a capital fund, from which interest was drawn semi-annually and paid to the Indians. Because sales of mineral locations and mineral royalties, prior to 1888, contributed considerably to the band capital fund, it was not surprising that Garden River and Batchewana Indian leaders directed much of their attention to the subject of minerals on reserves. The bands, however, had almost no say over the disposal of the invested principal fund, and in the case of the Batchewana band, in particular, sizable government expenditures for roads, other public works, land management in general and schools rapidly depleted capital funds.

A detailed government report on mineral resources on Indian lands may be found in A.O. Irving Papers. MU 1479, 41/40/11-13. According to this report:

> ... all moneys received from the said land thereof, shall, after deducting the usual proportion of expenses of management, be placed at interest [and] ... be paid to the Indians....

[30] Councils held at the English School House, 5 August and 7 August, 1875. RG 10, vol. 1967, file 5184. The Indian Act of 1869 excluded Indians who resided continuously outside Canada for five years or longer, or who had received half-breed lands or script (Treaties and Historical Research Centre, Research Branch, 1978: 54).

[31] To His Excellency the Right Honorable Earl Dufferin, K.C.B. Governor General of Canada in Council. A.O. Irving Papers. MU 1465, 17/31/1(1). Copy of a Report of a Committee of the Honorable the Privy Council, 9 July, 1873, A.O. RG 24, series 2, Howland Papers, No. 368.

[32] Van Abbott to the Minister of the Interior, 25 May, 1878. RG 10, vol. 2028, file 8922, part 0, Reel C-11138. Since 1857 Canada's Indian policy had been to force Indians off reserves. Until 1878, however, the choice of whether or not to abandon the reserve system was left up to the Indians themselves. Even after this date Canada never adopted the strict measures implemented by the United States to acquire Indian lands which unilaterally subdivided reserves and allotted family farms.

[33] Wilson to Indian Affairs, 31 July, 1877; Wilson to Indian Affairs, 10 September, 1877. RG 10, vol. 2023, file 8598, part O. Reel C-11137.

[34] RG 10, vol. 2040, file 8949.

[35] E.B. Borron to the Honorable D. Mills, 23 November, 1877. A.O. Irving Papers. MU 1465, 27/31/1(1).

[36] Van Abbott to the Minister of the Interior, 21 November, 1876. RG 10, vol. 2000, file 7332. Plummer to Indian Affairs, 21 October, 1877. RG 10, vol. 2028, file 8924. Petition, Ogista's band. RG 10, vol. 2028, file 8924.

[37] Surrender No. 166, 15 November, 1877. The author is indebted to Mr. George Richardson, Toronto, for his kindness in supplying a typescript copy of the surrender from his own records.

[38] RG 10, vol. 2001, file 7392, Reel 11132.

[39] Van Abbott to the Honorable Minister of the Interior, 25 May, 1878. RG 10, vol. 2028, file 8922, part O, Reel C-11138.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Edward F. Wilson to his father, 5 February, 1878. Letterbooks of E. Wilson, Anglican Heritage Room, Bishophurst, Sault Ste. Marie.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Augustine Chingwauk, Chief of the Ojibway, to the Honorable Member of the Dominion, 17 June, 1879; Van Abbott to the Honorable Minister of the Interior, 21 June, 1879. RG 10, vol. 2090, file 14,067; Reply from the Indian Department, 10 July, 1879. RG 10, vol. 2092, file 15,434.

[46] Van Abbott to Indian Affairs, 22 July, 1879. RG 10, vol. 2092, file 15,434.

[47] Garden River General Council 7 July, 1879. RG 10, vol. 2092, file 15,434; 31,337; RG 10, vol. 2092, file 15,434: 15,811. Garden River Delegates, 5 July, 1879. RG 10, vol. 2092, file 15,434: 15,811.

[48] Van Abbott to the Minister of the Interior, 22 July, 1879. RG 10, vol. 2092, file 15,434: 09529-30.

[49] The band had requested assistance from their capital fund to cover travelling costs in September, 1879, but had received none. Petition of 29 September, 1879. Funds were finally secured with the help of the Grand Council. Moses Madwayosh to Vankoughnet, 9 October, 1978. RG 10, vol. 2092, file 15,434.

[50] Memorial to His Excellency Lord Lorne. RG 10, vol. 2092, file 15,434: 15,811-2.

[51] Minister of the Interior to Van Abbott, 29 September, 1879. RG 10, vol. 2092, file 15,434.

[52] Van Abbott to John A. Macdonald, 15 June, 1880. RG 10, vol. 2092, file 15,009; Van Abbott to the Minister of the Interior, 3 October, 1879. RG 10, vol. 2092, file 15,434.

[53] Ogista's grievances regarding the Clark location and the western boundary resulted in Ottawa's examination of the available documentation, but little was done. RG 10, vol. 2211, file 42,451; Aubrey White to Vankoughnet, 7 February, 1889. RG 10, vol. 2445, file 93,317. After reviewing Vidal's survey of the mineral locations made in 1848, White concluded "Mr. Dennis in running the West Boundary of the Reserve coincided with the projected East boundary of the Clark location except where he deviated from the North and South line to strike Partridge Point." The 345 acres in question was considered part of the reserve in the 1870s. The matter was slated to have gone to a board of arbitrators, but seemed to have "died" en route owing to problems in making claims against the Old Province of Canada, for the period prior to 1867. Rankin argued that he had paid for, and thus owned, the 345 acres, as part of the larger location. Rankin to the Honorable Thomas White, 9 February, 1888. RG 10, vol. 2048, file 9266. Rankin had received a patent for the Clark site in 1865, although the actual boundaries of the location remained ambiguous. S. Bray to Department of Indian Affairs, February 1889.

Joseph Cozens, Provincial Land surveyor, declared that the debates of 1875-1877 had been "settled in Rankin's favour." Copy of Report of Committee of the Honorable the Privy Council, 3 January, 1889. RG 10, vol. 2067, file 10,307, pt. 1, Reel 11149. By contrast, Messrs. Reed and Reed argued in 1897 that the triangle of 345 acres had never been surrendered. Messrs. Reed and Reed, 1 March, 1897. RG 10, vol. 2048, file 9266.

[54] The Globe, 3 August, 1881; The Graphic, London, England, 1881: 261. PAC, MG27(1B4), Lord Lorne Papers. Ogista wore a scarlet beaded vest, black beaded leggings and a skunkskin headdress with eagle feathers.

[55] Petition, 1881. RG 10, vol. 2092, file 15,434: 31,337. The petition was in both English and Ojibwa language.

[56] Simon J. Dawson to Colonel C. Stuart, 7 October, 1881. A.O. Irving Papers. MU 1465, 27/31/1(1).

[57] George F. Austin, acting on behalf of the chiefs and warriors of the Goulais Bay and Batchewana Bands of Indians, 31 May, 1882. RG 10, vol. 2185, file 37,479, part O, Reel C-11176.

[58] Edward Langevin regarding Austin's correspondence, 31 July, 1882. RG 10, vol. 2185, file 37,479, part O, Reel C-11176.

[59] Ibid.

[60] Van Abbott to the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, 2 April, 1883, and reply. RG 10, vol. 2211, file 42,451.

[61] 8th Grand Council, Cape Croker Reserve, 10 to 15 September, 1884: 5. Minutes, Discussion of the Indian Advancement Act. RG 10, vol. 2351, file 70,622. The Grand-Council discussion sessions centered around the subject of the Indian Advancement Act of 1884 which provided for annual elections of councillors, regular council meetings, collection of taxes, enforcement of by-laws, possession of land by location ticket and annual property assessment (Treaties and Research Centre, Research Branch, 1978: 85-86). Had it been implemented, the Advancement Act would have radically undermined Ogista's powers as a head chief at a time when the local system of band government would have been ill-equipped to cope with external interests, seeking to control reserve lands and resources.

[62] Ibid. : 22.

[63] Ibid. : 5.

[64] Ibid. : 18-19.

[65] Ibid. : 19.

[66] Extract of Meeting of the Treasury Board held on the 26 June, 1886. RG 10, vol. 1954, file 4472. Municipal powers pressured government to put another man in the office of Indian Lands agent.

[67] Van Abbott continually maligned Waubmama and interfered with Waubmama's ability to rent a house, exercise trusteeship over a grandson, and communicate his grievances to Ottawa. The grandson, a son of his daughter Mary Jane by her husband Charles Abatossaway, had been presented to Waubmama to raise as his own son. RG 10, vol. 1982, file 6230; RG 10, vol. 2191, file 38,593. Waubmama, as was customary in the 1880s, had his son-in-law residing with him at Garden River; by 1900 he often lived with his daughter at Sucker Creek, Manitoulin Island, until because of approaching blindness he felt a need to appeal for government relief. Jacob Thompson to Indian Affairs, 10 October, 1903; J. Bird

Holland to Mr. Macrae, 18 January, 1910. RG 10, vol. 3078, file 264,750. Waubmama was a son of Macadayoquot, a Crane chief, and grandson of Maidosagee. A.O. Census, Algoma District, 1881.

[68] Van Abbott to Indian Affairs, 17 April, 1885. RG 10, vol. 2296, file 59,090, part O, Reel C-11197.

[69] Reply to Van Abbott's letter of 17th Inst., 30 April, 1885. RG 10, vol. 2296, file 59,090, part O.

[70] Nebenagoching to Simon J. Dawson, 21 December, 1886. RG 10, vol. 2354, file 71,687, part O, Reel C-12782. See also RG 10, vol. 2297, file 59,197.

[71] Regarding powers of chief and council. Van Abbott to Indian Affairs, 30 January, 1891. With a population of 437, the band was permitted "two head chiefs and four second chiefs." The band chose to have only one chief and four councillors. RG 10, vol. 2296, file 59,090, part O.

[72] Ogista offered personally to pay relief from his own annuity payments to assist "old blind ... Shebakezick," but would allow no money to be taken from band funds for the purpose. Van Abbott to Indian Affairs regarding Council Meeting, 8 April, 1890. RG 10, vol. 2067, file 10,307, pt. I.

[73] Algoma Pioneer and District General Advertiser, 12 January, 1881.

[74] This division between the protective aspect and dynamic political agencies within the band continued to exist from this time onward.

[75] Buhkwujjenene to Van Abbott, 1887; Van Abbott to Indian Affairs, 26 August, 1887. RG 10, vol. 2067, file 10,307, pt. I.

[76] Van Abbott to Indian Affairs, 3 September, 1887; Van Abbott to Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, 19 September, 1887. RG 10, vol. 2067, file 10,307, pt. I.

[77] Messrs. Scott and Scott, Barristers, to L. Vankoughnet, 23 February, 1890. RG 10, vol. 2067, file 10,307, pt. I.

[78] Van Abbott to Indian Affairs, 6 March, 1890. RG 10, vol. 2067, file 10,307, pt. I.

[79] In February, Ogista appointed Buhkwujjenene to look after the business of the band. Van Abbott to Indian Affairs, 8 February, 1890; Speech of Chief Augustin, 8 April, 1890. RG 10, vol. 2067, file 10,307, pt. I. Ogista had been in contact with the Honorable Edward Blake,

Leader of the Opposition, regarding the matter of the gravel pits. Buhkwujjenene had already been responsible for several years for sending petitions to Ottawa on behalf of the band. See, for example, Buhkwujjenene to Sir John A. Macdonald, 20 February, 1882, regarding arrears under the terms of the Robinson Treaties. A.O. Irving Papers, MU 1465, 27/32/

[80] Description of gravel pit sites and other areas expropriated under the Railway Act of 1879. RG 10, vol. 2067, file 10,307, pt. I. The four pits were surveyed in January of 1889.

[81] Sault Express, 31 January, 1891. E.F. Wilson saw Ogista's death as another page in the saga of the disappearing Indian. Ogista, he maintained, stood as "a true ideal of a race of people who are rapidly receding from the stage of Canadian life; upward of six feet tall, splendid physique, noble bearing and commanding presence ... these together made up the features of a countenance that was formed to attract. His ... forensic eloquence often moved his white brothers to admiration of the wonderful natural gifts of the forest-born chieftain." The Canadian Indian, no. 1, vol. 1; October, 1890: 153.

[82] Sault Express, 31 January, 1891.

[83] "To Editor, Garden River, January 9, 1882", Algoma Missionary News and Shingwauk Journal, vol. v, no. 3, 1 March, 1883.

[84] Algoma Missionary News, vol. vi, no. 10, 1 October, 1883: 55-8.

[85] "Letter to the Editor". Algoma Missionary News and Shingwauk Journal, vol. v, no. 12, 16 December 1893: 86.

[86] "Shall We Keep On?" Algoma Missionary News and Shingwauk Journal, vol. vi, no. 10, 1 October , 1883.

[87] Ibid.

[88] Clifford Sifton, the Minister of the Interior, had viewed monies spent on Indian schools and the maintenance of the reserve system as a waste of federal funds (Hall, 1981, 2: 270-1).

[89] David Nock (1973; 1976; 1982b) traces this development in Wilson. Nock argues that Wilson, because of his upper-class English background, was able to act to a degree independently of the Native Church policy of Henry Venn and his evangelical colleagues. After studying events in Red River and personally visiting Cherokee settlements in Oklahoma, Nock contends, Wilson came to see the value of encouraging self-government among the Native peoples.

[90] E.F. Wilson in 1887 was gathering information on Indians as far west as the Mackenzie River district. His main focus of attention by

this time was no longer on the Indians residing near Sault Ste. Marie. RG 10, vol. 2375, file 75,898, part O, Reel C-11210.

[91] In August 1973 Spragge argued that owing to the "fluctuating population of these Indians, the computation [of annuitants] should be based upon their numbers at the time of making the Treaties in 1850, namely Lake Superior Indians, 1240, Lake Huron Indians, 1422." Spragge, Indian office, 9 August, 1873. A.O. RG 24, series 2, Howland Papers, No. 368; A.O. Irving Papers, 1465, 27/31/1(1). Spragge's statement made no allowances for Ironsides' policies of compelling Métis migration onto reserves during the late 1850s.

Buhkwujjenene was one of the main Native leaders pressing Ottawa for arrears payments under the Robinson treaties. Buhkwujjenene to Sir John Macdonald, 20 February, 1882. A.O. Irving Papers, MU 1465, 27/31/1(1).

[92] Borron, who had been mine manager at Bruce Mines before entering Algoma politics, wished to bring the Indians about Temagami under government control, since the Temagami Ojibwa had taken no part in the Robinson Treaties (Zaslow, 1974; Hodgins, 1979). While Speck (1915) noted that several Temagami families had migrated northward from Sault Ste. Marie sometime prior to 1850, when hundreds of Ojibwa individuals from western Lake Superior were passing through the Sault looking for refuge on Canadian soil, there was probably a resident band at Temagami when the new arrivals appeared. Many families had also been pulled northward from the coast under the policy of the Hudson's Bay Company, especially after 1841.

There can be little doubt that The Pine's policy had been an exclusive one. Oral testimonies at Garden River, as well as documentary evidence, strongly suggest that Shingwaukōnse was not in any way allied in 1850 with head chiefs <u>east of Thessalon and Mississaga</u>. When asked at this time whether Yellowhead of Rama had any claims on lands west of Moose Deer Point, Shingwaukōnse denied the validity of Yellowhead's assertions (Morris, 1891, 1: 20). In March 1851 Ironsides had maintained that, in 1850, the names of the interior Indians had never been mentioned, this "being quite intentional on the part of the chiefs of the main land." Ironsides to Indian Department, 13 March, 1851. RG 10, vol. 188: 199548, Reel C-11512. Yet, oddly, Lawrence Vankoughnet in 1884 contended that Ironsides actually wrote, "the omission to include their names was unintentional on the part of the mainland chiefs." Vankoughnet to J.M. Courtney, 17 September, 1884. <u>Ontario Sessional Papers</u>, 1885, No. 45: 25. The present writer, recognizing the penchant of the head chiefs to be extremely exclusive in their views of who might and who might not join their alliances -- for instance, the term "chosen" or "picked" men is always used in oral testimonies -- has little doubt that Shingwaukōnse did indeed <u>deliberately</u> exclude the interior Indians. Ogista in 1858 demonstrated the same attitude towards former members of the band who took money from the United States government.

In 1849 The Pine allied with head chiefs from Fort William, Michipicoten, Thessalon and Mississauga. The groups for which Shingwaukõnse exercised special prerogatives lay between Thessalon and the Puckasaw River. The chief refused to act on behalf of bands which did not subscribe to his leadership. Shingwaukõnse's main political connections lay to the westward. It was his son, Ogista, who strengthened Garden River's ties with the Lake Huron and Sarnia bands. Interviews with Dan Pine Sr. and Fred Pine Sr., 1982, 1983 and 1984.

Borron considered Shingwaukõnse to have indiscriminately acted on behalf of all Indian and Métis peoples north of Lakes Huron and Superior in negotiations with the government, a very incorrect assumption. Given the constant mobility among bands residing between the Height of Land and the lakeshore, it was doubtful that interior bands existed of which the mainland chiefs would not have, at least, been aware in 1850. Borron was able to do much towards rectifying the consequences of the exclusive stance taken by The Pine and his allies by 1850. Likely discrimination against the interior and other neighboring groups arose as a response to The Pine's failure to attain his primary aim -- control over fisheries, mines and timber on reserves. Annuity money would go farther if shared by fewer claimants.

Richard Pine Sr. stressed that discriminatory attitudes towards the interior Indians were reversed after 1850, and that the Garden River band became committed to assisting northern Native groups to gain their rights. Interview with Richard Pine, 15 November, 1982.

[93] John Driver to E.B. Borron, 5 June, 1893. A.O. Irving Papers, MU 1465, 27/32/10; W.B. Robinson to Col. Bruce, 24 September, 1850 (Morris, 1891, 1: 17-21). E.B. Borron, Report on the Robinson Treaties and claims of the Indians Under the Same (1891); Robinson Treaty Annuities, Revision of the Pay Lists for 1890-91, by Mr. Borron; Report by E.B. Borron relative to Annuities Payable to Indians in terms of the Robinson Treaties, 31st December, 1892; Supplementary Report by E.B. Borron On the Right of Half Breeds to participate in the benefits of the Robinson Treaties, 27th October, 1894. A.O. Irving Papers, MU 1465 27/32/09.

[94] John Driver interviewed Buhkwujjenene, Nebenagoching, Black Potatoe of Sucker Creek (Àbatossaway's band), and Peter Ahbahjigance -- a son-in-law of Chief Gagoish of Whitefish Island who, in turn, was a brother of Mishkeash and Apequash. Likely the name "Gagaiosh" is synonymous with "Kaygayosh", and implies that a relation existed between the Crane chief, Kaygayosh, who died in 1836, and the chief residing at the rapids in 1893. Frank Daigle was another son-in-law of Gagaiosh and, like certain members of the Biron family interviewed by Driver, was a well-known figure in Sault Ste Marie society. Driver himself joined the Garden River band by exercising ties through his brother William, who was Ogista's son-in-law.

According to Driver, neither Buhkwujjenene not Nebenagoching were disposed to be informative in response to Borron's survey.

[95] Borron (1892: 40-1) also contended against the right of any chief to adopt members into his band. This affected all Native adoption cases in Canada.

[96] Ibid. :7-8. Buhkwujjenene married a Cadotte.

[97] Borron, Supplementary Report (1894: 7-8). "Real" Indians, Borron argued, "depended for obtaining such of the products of more civilized races and countries -- as had ... [to them] become almost indispensable." Borron's statement pertained only to bands which had become dependent on the Hudson's Bay Company, and did not in any way describe the Garden River Ojibwa whom he had interviewed. He instead placed the Garden River Indians in the "semi-civilized" category. A.O. Irving Papers. MU 1465, 27/32/09.

[98] Van Abbott to Indian Affairs, 9 January, 1891. Included with Notice of death of A. Shingwauk. RG 10, vol. 2552, file 112,279.

[99] Ibid.

[100] Petition, 3 July, 1891. RG 10, vol. 2580, file 117,364, part O.

[101] RG 10, vol. 2631, file 128,145; RG 10, file 116,383; RG 10, vol. 2637, file 129,029, part O; RG 10, vol. 2665, file 133,343.

[102] Peter Tegoosh to Phipps, 6 October, 1890. RG 10, vol. 2544, file 111,470; Band Council petition, 25 June, 1891. RG 10, vol. 2580, file 117,364; Van Abbott to Deputy Superintendent of Indian Affairs, 4 June, 1896. RG 10, vol. 2544, file 111,470. This man, a son-in-law of Buhkwujjenene, and not the same Tegoosh who was The Pine's son, had resided at Garden River for 18 years. Ottawa required Peter Tegoosh to trace his genealogical connections through his father's line, which Tegoosh could not do. He instead resorted to the traditional mode of reckoning his band attachments by reference to his connection to a head chief. When Buhkwujjenene could not compell Ottawa to accept Tegoosh as a member of the Garden River band, Tegoosh procured affidavits from the head chiefs at Cockburn Island and Sheshegwaning, Manitoulin Island, that he had been born and raised at Sheshegwaning. Buhkwujjenene to John A. Macdonald, 31 July, 1882. RG 10, vol. 2192, file 38,590, part O, Reel C-11177; Tegoosh to Phipps, 6 October, 1890.

[103] Council Meeting and Election, 28 August, 1897. Recorded in French by Father G. Artus. Priest's diary, Records of the Immaculate Heart of Mary, Garden River.

[104] Vankoughnet to the Honorable P. Daly, Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, 16 January, 1893. RG 10, vol. 2631, file 128,145.

[105] Document, Exhibit "A", dated 8 December, 1848. RG 10, vol. 2631, file 128,145.

[106] Petition signed by Nebenagoching, 7 November, 1896. RG 10, vol. 1954, file 4472.

[107] To His Excellency the Governor General in Council, 27 May, 1896. Van Abbott to the Indian Affairs, 4 February, 1897. RG 10, vol. 1954, file 4472.

[108] Correspondence of Tegoosh claim, RG 10, vol. 2631, file 128,145, part O, Reel C-11253; A. Dingman, Report, 1 November, 1892. RG 10, vol. 2649, file 131,221.

[109] Ibid.; RG 10, vol. 1954, file 4472; RG 10, vol. 2832, file 170,073-1.

[110] In 1900 Jacob Wagimah and William J. Pine were constables. RG 10, vol. 2662, file 133,095-2, part O, Reel C-12789R.

[111] RG 10, vol. 2940, file 197,341; RG 10, vol. 2945, file 198,776.

[112] Correspondence regarding boundary dispute and subdivision of the reserve, 1896-1921. RG 10, vol. 2878, file 177,991-1, part O, Reel C-11281. Includes list of lands sold on Garden River Reserve.

[113] Memorandums for the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, 17 October, 1896, and 1 March, 1897. RG 10, vol. 2878, file 117,991-1. Revenue accruing to the band under the 1859 Pennefather Treaties came to be placed in an "Indian Land Management fund" -- apparently a borrowing or unilateral extension of the system already established in other parts of the Province by 1846. Monies from this fund were used for purposes of colonization officials' salaries, as well as for the maintenance of the reserve system. No indications that the fund would be employed in this manner were given in the Pennefather Treaties. Memorandum to the Honorable the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, 25 February, 1892. RG 10, vol. 2498, file 102,986-1.

[114] Council of 8 February, 1897. RG 10, vol. 2878, file 177,991-1, part O.

[115] Cost of a survey. RG 10, vol. 2878, file 177,991-1, part O.

[116] Frank Pedley to chiefs, 20 December, 1907. RG 10, vol. 2878, file 177,991-1, part O.

[117] Van Abbott to Indian Affairs, 19 October, 1891; Reply, 24 October, 1891. RG 10, vol. 2572, file 116,426, part O, Reel C-11241.

[118] The Anglican missionary Frederick Frost (1904) gave detailed accounts of Indian life in the logging camp. For men to take a couple of weeks to engage in caribou hunting was a common occurrence.

[119] Steamers dumped ashes from their boilers into the channel. Pollution of this nature does not seem to have been a problem two decades earlier (Disturnell, 1872: 12).

[120] Correspondence regarding the cession of Whitefish Island. RG 10, vol. 2824, file 168,291-1, Reel C-11283. The rapids fishery continued well into the 1900s before it went into its final decline, although lumber drives could choke St. Mary's channel with logs. Minutes of the Garden River Council Meeting, 1 September, 1905. RG 10, vol. 1733.

Whitefish Island contained an Indian burying ground. Nevertheless, in March 1899 four railways, the Algoma Central Railway, the Pacific and Atlantic Railroad Company, the Hudson's Bay and Western Railway, and the Ontario and Lake Superior Railroad, became involved in proceedings which led to the expropriation of the island under the Railway Act. Gagaoish's band were relocated in 1905 to Gros Cap, fifteen miles northwest of Sault Ste. Marie, where Apequash had previously purchased land.

[121] Van Abbott to L. Vankoughnet, 19 and 10 October, 1891. RG 10, vol. 2572, file 116,426. The cost of this message, sent by telegraph, was charged to the chief, Buhkwujjenene. Van Abbott, as an Indian Lands agent, felt no obligation to become directly involved in Indian matters.

[122] Vankoughnet to Van Abbott, 4 October, 1891. RG 10, vol. 2572, file 116,426.

[123] Chief and Councillors to Wilfred Laurier, 20 October, 1896. RG 10, vol. 2572, file 116,426, part O, Reel C-11241.

[124] Ibid.

[125] Hayter Reed to Van Abbott, 21 November, 1896. RG 10, vol. 2572, file 116,426.

[126] Ibid.

[127] Reed to Van Abbott, 2 December, 1896; Van Abbot to Reed, 23 November, 1896. RG 10, vol. 2572, file 116,426.

[128] Van Abbott to Vankoughnet, 23 November, 1896. RG 10, vol. 2572, file 116,426.

[129] Petition of Band, 25 November, 1896. RG 10, vol. 2572, file 116,426.

[130] Jarvis to Indian Affairs, 10 May, 1897. RG 10, vol. 2572, file 116,426. Jarvis indicated that goods from merchants were "exceedingly dear."

[131] Acting Secretary of Indian Affairs, 30 April, 1897, to Gervais [sic] Pine. RG 10, vol. 2903, file 185,154.

[132] Father Artus on behalf of Jarvis, 1897. RG 10, vol. 2903, file 185,154.

[133] Van Abbott to Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, 12 May, 1897. RG 10, vol. 2903, file 185,154.

[134] Jarvis to Indian Affairs, 10 May, 1897. Buhkwujjenene, meanwhile, petitioned Ottawa for assistance so that the band could procure horses and oxen. Buhkwujjenene to the Superintendent of Indian Affairs, 25 February, 1897. RG 10, vol. 2903, file 185,154.

[135] William L. Nichols became Acting Indian Lands agent at Sault Ste. Marie in 1901 and Indian Agent in 1904. RG 10, vol. 1954, file 4472. Merchants refused to supply provisions to Indians without a government guarantee. Van Abbott to Indian Affairs, 3 December, 1900. RG 10, vol. 2572, file 116,426.

[136] Band Council resolution, 2 December, 1901. The Timber Inspector, George L. Chitty, had earlier stated that the ties could be "delivered on the banks of any stream which can be driven." Chitty to Indian affairs, 26 November, 1901. RG 10, vol. 2572, file 116,426. Each head of family at Garden River designated on a common list the number of ties his group could make in a season. Vessels loaded many of these ties directly from wharves near the mouth of the Garden River.

[137] Band Council Resolution, 25 January, 1902. RG 10, vol. 2572, file 116,426.

[138] J.D. McLean to Nichols, 28 January, 1902. RG 10, vol. 2572, file 116,426.

[139] Ibid.

[140] J.D. McLean to Nichols, 28 January, 1902. RG 10, vol. 2572, file 116,426.

[141] Band Council Minutes, 8 February, 1902. RG 10, vol. 2572, file 116,426.

[142] Ibid.

[143] Nichols to Indian Affairs, 4 February, 1902, RG 10, vol. 2572, file 116,426.

[144] Contract with Harris Tie and Timber Company, 13 January, 1902. RG 10, vol. 2572, file 116,426.

[145] Chief George [Menissino] Shingwauk and sub chiefs. Regarding Contracts with Burton Brothers. Agreements 17 September, 1901, and 14 September, 1902, George Chitty to J.D. McLean, n.d.; Contract of the 5th October, 1903; Frank Pedley to George Shingwauk, 19 September, 1902. RG 10, vol. 2572, file 116,426.

[146] Pedley to Nichols, 14 October 1903. RG 10, vol. 2572, file 116,426.

[147] L.O. Lawrence was a colonization officer for the CPR (Monkman, 1981: 127). The Hiawatha Play was later taken on tour to many of the large centers in Ontario and Michigan. In 1905, under the auspices of F.W. Burton and "Mr. Gordon, a musical director of the Hiawatha Company," the players travelled to England and the European continent. Stranded in London, England, for lack of funds, the small group appealed to Ottawa for assistance to return home. Ottawa, even as late as 1905, responded angrily at the thought of Indians being absent from their reserves. To this Nichols replied, "As to leaving the reserve, they frequently have to do so for a great part of the year to obtain a living and I do not believe that their [exposures with] ... the outside world will be any more detrimental to them than they do [sic, would be] with the outside element nearer home." Nichols to Indian Affairs, 23 August, 1905. RG 10, vol. 3092, file 285,050. Rights to the Hiawatha play were transferred to the Grand Rapids and Indiana Railway which staged productions at Round Lake, near Petosky, Michigan (Lockwood, 1912). George Kabaosa continued to maintain relations with playwrights, scholars and other visitors to Garden River. In November 1937 a photograph of him taken in 1923 appeared in an issue of the National Geographic Magazine (Stirling, 1937: 549). More recently it has appeared on the cover of Alvin Josephy's The Indian Heritage of America (Josephy, 1968).

[148] For a discussion of Buhkwujjenene's interest in the Anglican Church, see Frost (1904: 93).

[149] Osborne knew both George Shingwauk and Charles Andrews, and from his Indian contacts had collected a number of stories and incidents concerning Garden River and its vicinity (Osborne and Osborne, 1942). Informal conversation with Charles Andrews and Father Joseph Lawless, S.J., on Sugar Island, September 1984.

[150] Sara Stafford presented a number of legends which she learned from Buhkwujjenene regarding contests between men and spirit guardians of the copper and silver deposits near Fort William (Stafford, 1903: 1-20).

[151] The epic poem, Hiawatha, by Longfellow has little to do with the substanc of Native culture, as it was composed in keeping with the nationalistic tenor of nineteenth-century western thought. This Schoolcraft himself recognized in 1855, although he tended to denigrate the substance of the legends by this time. "To the Editors of the National Intelligencer," 7 September, 1855. Washington. Schoolcraft Papers, Reel 14. "Longfellow," Schoolcraft argued, "... left out of sight as much as possible the strife between antagonistic spirits or demons ... a repulsive trait which serves in the original as a kind of poetic machinery for the Indian sage."

Nanabush tales, in particular, seem to have changed very little from Schoolcraft's time. Antagonistic forces are present, but attention remains fixed on the decisions made by the culture hero, on Nanabush's own supernatural powers and his human failings. The consequence of Nanabush's acts are told humorously, so that Nanabush the trickster becomes not a subject for emulation so much as a power-holder who teaches by his deeds.

[152] Petition of chiefs and sub-chiefs, 27 November, 1907. RG 10, vol. 2878, file 177,991-1, part O, C-11291.

[153] James W. Curran to Sir Wilfred Laurier, 26 October, 1907. RG 10, vol. 2578, file 177,991-1, part O.

[154] J.D. McLean to P. Rowland, 23 June, 1910. RG 10, vol. 2578, file 177,991-1, part O.

[155] Regardless of these conditions, a dispute arose concerning whether or not the band would contribute to rebuilding a bridge which washed out on the reserve in 1910. The Province argued that the band should be charged at least half the cost of renewing the structure, since the bridge lay on the line of an older road running between Bruce Mines and Sault Ste. Marie. Ottawa opposed the Province's claim, since the allowance for the older road, known as the Great North Road, had never been surrendered. Reports and correspondence pertaining to construction of a highway, 1907-1914. RG 10, vol. 2579, file 177,991-2, part O, Reel C-11291. In 1907 the Garden River band capital fund stood at $94,375.

Endnotes, Chapter Ten

[1] In 1905 William L. Nichols wrote concerning the resource wealth of this area: "The said Agency is one of the largest and most important in the Dominion. The revenue collected ... [is] from $10,000 to $15,000 yearly." RG 10, vol. 1954, file 4472.

[2] Heavy equipment such as ploughs and harvesters were owned in common by the band. Today school buses, snowploughs and police cars fall into this category. Several family heads may also pool their proceeds to buy a bulldozer or other sizable piece of heavy equipment.

[3] George Kabaosa sent his sons to erect a camp. Kabaosa to Indian Affairs, RG 10, vol. 2463, file 95, 808-7, pt. 2.

[4] During the spring sahsahguhwejegawin, or spring feast of thanksgiving and sacrifice, offerings were either suspended from a pole or elevated on a platform. A small animal, such as a dog, might be sacrificed (Flannery, 1940: 25; O'Meara, 1846: 14). Burning tobacco in the fields invoked the spirit forces to provide a good harvest. It was practiced widely well into the twentieth century and, less so, until the present day. The present investigator is indebted to members of the Pine family for their informative discussions concerning the symbolic relationship of the Sun and the "made tree", natig.kan, used in the spring thanksgiving ceremony.

Very little has been recorded concerning other traditions associated with horticultural pursuits, which were traditionally the preserve of women. There is the implicit assumption in Ojibwa legends that certain kinds of "power" may be conveyed through the feet to the soil. This may be a fructifying influence, or else it may be a power antithetical to various forms of life. Schoolcraft (1855, 5: 70) mentions the practice of a naked menstruating woman encircling the cornfield at night in order to prevent pests and blight from attacking the crop.

[5] Individuals held mines even prior to 1888. See Edward Sayers' application for a mine, 28 November 1876. RG 10, vol. 2000, file 7320. The new responsibilities connected with the sale and reassignment of mining locations did not please Van Abbott, who felt that his duties were already too onerous for one man. RG 10, vol. 2847, file 179,899. Under the General Mining Regulations, October, 1887, a royalty of four per cent on the sales of the products of all mines was to be placed in trust for the Indians interested in the land patented. Mining Regulations to Govern the Disposal of Mineral Lands Other Than Coal Lands, established under the 41st section of Chapter 43, Revised Statutes of Canada, sections 81 and 82. RG 10, vol. 2389, file 79,921. After 1888 this four per cent royalty no longer accrued to the band.

[6] Numerous reassignments of locations occurred after 1888. RG 10,

vol. 2000, file 8669. These involved members of the Sayers, Jourdain, Nolin, Nootsai, Jones and Robinson families. William Erskine (Askin) Pine, John Askin and George Shingwauk (Menissino) held mining locations in Duncan Township by 1901. RG 10, vol. 2892, file 181,609 - 127, 128, 129, part O, Reel C-11293.

[7] Interview with George Agawa and Fred Pine, 12 August, 1983.

[8] Interview with Bertha Sayers, 20 November, 1982; Interview with Fred Pine Sr., 20 June, 1984.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Interview with Fred Pine Sr., 20 June, 1984.

[11] This gravel was allegedly the best grade of stone available between Sault Ste. Marie and Sudbury, and was used for building the Soo and Sudbury Trunk Road. M. MacLennan to J.D. Maclean, 25 March, 1912. RG 10, vol. 2068, file 10,307, pt. 2.

[12] George Kabaosa to the Superintendent General, 11 April, 1897; Band Council Resolutions, 15 April 1911 and August 21 1911; Thomas G. Wigg to the Superintendent of Indian Affairs, 21 August, 1911. RG 10, vol. 2068, file 10,307, pt. 2.

[13] A.M. Goodman and D. Galbraith to J.D. MacLean, 11 December, 1911; J.D. MacLean to E.W. Beatty, General Solicitor of the C.P.R., 20 January 1912. Affidavit citing gravel prices from Stone Lumber Company, St. Joseph's Island, 14 September, 1911. George Kabaosa to the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, 15 November, 1911. RG 10, vol. 2068, file 10,307, pt. 2.

[14] Vice President CPR to J.D. Ramsden, February, 1912. RG 10, vol. 2068, file 10,307, pt. 2.

[15] J.D. MacLean to E.W. Beatty, 21 September, 1911. RG 10, vol. 2068, file 10,307, pt. 2.

[16] J.G. Ramsden to J.D. Maclean, 26 December, 1911. RG 10, vol. 2068, file 10,307, pt. 2.

[17] J.D. McLean to A.D. McNabb, 29 January, 1913. RG 10 vol. 2068, file 10,307, pt. 2. Reel 11149.

[18] McNabb to McLean, 8 October, 1913. RG 10, vol. 2068, file 10,307, pt. 2.

[19] The land was expropriated under section 199 of The Railway Act of 1879. The award, from which there was no appeal, arose from the arbitrators' decision to place a value of $100 per acre on 27 acres and

$400 on 5 acres. This news shook the Band, who thought that the matter of trespass "would be dealt with exclusively." Moses McFadden to Indian Affairs, 1 October, 1913. RG 10, vol. 2068, file 10,307, pt. 2.

The Indian Affairs Department, the Garden River Band, the CPR and the Province of Ontario were each represented on the arbitration board. While not a leading participant in this affair, Ontario was necessarily present since by the decision arising in 1889 from the case officially known as "The St. Catherines Milling and Lumber Company vs The Queen", the Province held proprietary interest in land and resources even on unsurrendered Indian territory (Schull, 1976: 103-11); PAC, Indian Lands Papers. RG 1, A-1-7, vols. 7 and 8. Ottawa, on the other hand, was expected to act as the vindicator of Indian rights, which it failed to do on this occasion -- an omission which rendered the concept of Native "right" highly ambiguous in the eyes of the law.

Ramsden, who had been chosen as arbitrator for the band by an unanimous standing vote in the Band Council, was ignored in Ottawa during the final selection proceedings.

[20] RG 10, vol. 3169, file 405,123, part O, Reel C-11333. A complaint against this company to fulfil its terms of agreement was raised by Alex Wabanosa. A.O. Sault Indian Agency Records, Department of Indian Affairs, MS 216. The band were also annoyed since a 66 foot land allowance around Echo Bay for landing purposes had been overlooked in future land sales. The last of these allowances, on the Hartman Mining Location, was eliminated in 1936. RG 10, vol. 2208, file 42,033.

[21] By March 1914, the Garden River bands were also well aware of the great amount of unsold or forfeited land existing on both the Garden River and Batchewana tracts. For lists of these lands, see RG 10, vol. 2434, file 89,600, pt. 16. There were attempts after 1914 to sell these lands at public auction.

[22] White to Indian Affairs, RG 10, vol. 3053, file 243,190; Meeting held in Council Hall, 28 February, 1914. A.O. Sault Ste. Marie Agency Records, Department of Indian Affairs, MS 216 (4).

[23] The band by 1924, under the leadership of William Erskine Pine, were sophisticated negotiators and resource managers. A.O. Sault Ste. Marie Agency Records, Department of Indian Affairs. MS 216 (8). The issue of the traprock quarry continued for years. The most strenuous debates took place in the Band Council Meetings between June and November 1918, with George Kabaossa and Alex Wabanosa as the principal speakers. By 1928 such facilities as electric lighting on the reserve were supposedly to be guaranteed by a company interested in quarrying the stone. "Garden River Trap Rock Deposit to be Operated -- $1,000,000 Plant Assured." Sault Star, 23 November, 1928.

[24] Interview with Norman Jones, 22 September, 1982.

[25] Ibid.

[26] A.D. McNabb ignored speeches which contravened the policy he was expected to promote. On 9 December 1913, for instance, he wrote, "All our time was taken up with speeches that amounted to nothing by the usual Orators all about surrenders etc." A.O. Sault Indian Agency Records, MS 216 (4). When faced with the complaint that Partridge Point had been alienated without a surrender taking place, McNabb retorted on 12 June, 1916 that the matter had already been settled "once and for all." A.O. Sault Ste. Marie Indian Agency Records. MS 216 (5). Partridge Point was subdivided into allotments by 1902. Plans of Water Lots in front of the Township of Rankin adjoining the town of Sault Ste. Marie. Signed Joseph Cozens, P.L.S., 29 November, 1902. Map 34329/02. Toronto: Ontario ministry of Natural Resources.

[27] Undeterred by government's opposition to his protests, George Kabaosa continued to press for the return of the Indian Strip to Band control. Kabaosa's struggle on this issue was taken up by chief Amable Boissoneau in the 1930s. RG 10, vol. 2463, file 95,805-7, pt. 2.

[28] Van Abbott to Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, 12 May, 1897. RG 10, vol. 2903, file 185,154. Financing for heavy horses to draw ploughs and timber was arranged on 3 December, 1915.

The years immediately following the onset of the First World War were ones of extreme hardship for the band. The decline of the Canadian economy, injured by a loss of export markets, particularly affected market gardeners and employees in local veneer mills. Vegetable gardens on the reserve were reduced in size and often became weed-infested as families sought alternative livelihoods, including a greater emphasis than previously on hunting, fishing and snaring rabbits for subsistence. By 1916, however, the economic prospect at Garden River had improved owing to the shift in the Canadian economy towards specialized war demands. Report of A.D. McNabb, Indian Agent for the Ojjibewas of Lake Superior, Eastern Division, Ontario. Canada, Sessional Papers, Dept. of Indian Affairs, No. 27, 7 George V, A, 1917.

[29] One such event occurred on 22 November, 1918. Sault Indian Agency Records, Department of Indian Affairs. MS 216 (6). Speakers included Mr. Abrahams, Mr. Fuller from Shingwauk School and Mr. A.E. Eddy.

[30] 25 February, 1918. A.O. Sault Ste. Marie Agency Records. MS 216 (6).

[31] 3 May, 1917. A.O. Sault Ste. Marie Agency Records. MS 216 (6).

[32] Plan of Sub-division of Garden River, 1916. Plan 1590. Copy in Garden River Band Office. The movements of property lines on the Garden River reserve may be easily traced, since elders remember the positioning of allotments and their respective "owners" back to 1880. Today individuals "own" lots on which they may not reside.

There has been a gravitation away from the waterfront to residence along the highway. Originally, the village lay on the east side of the Garden River, with the missionary establishment and graveyards situated on the west bank. Point St. Charles, further west, could flood on occasion prior to the regulation of the water level in the St. Mary's Channel by the lock system.

In 1850 the only other major landmark besides the Garden River Indian village was John Bell's trading establishment at Bell's Point, west of Point St. Charles. After 1858 farms belonging principally to members of the Batchewana Band lay along the coast of French Bay, between Partridge Point and Point St. Charles. Members of the Pine family have seasonally resided near Echo River and Echo Bay since the 1840s, if not earlier. A list of families living along the Echo River is provided for the year 1914 in RG 10, vol. 3175, file 437,632.

[33] A.D. McNabb to Indian Affairs, 18 December, 1913. RG 10, vol. 2366, file 73,850, pt. 2 (Red Series).

[34] RG 10, vol. 2463, file 95, 808-7, pt. 2.

[35] Ibid.; RG 10, vol. 2366, file 73850, pt. 2.

[36] A.D. McNabb to Indian Affairs, 18 December, 1913. RG 10, vol. 2367, file 73,850-2; Report on Garden River and Batchewana Bands, Letterbook 6: 59. A.O. Sault Indian Agency Records, MS 216 (6).

[37] Frederick W. Abbott, an American who visited Garden River in 1914, found that "nearly all these Indians have tuberculosis and do not present a hopeful appearance, though they all live in fairly good houses." At this time the chief drew an annual salary of $100 from band funds.

The Indian agent earned $1,200 a year and had an assistant. Abbott estimated that about $500 a year accrued to the band from licenses on timber sold (Abbott, 1914-15: 78).

[38] Certain band members, after 1858, were able to regain the franchise by purchasing property holdings in Sault Ste. Marie, as was evident from the 1880 voters list for Sault Ste. Marie. Persons of Indian status who resided wholly on reserves, however, were not entitled to vote. In March, 1879, Simon J. Dawson, M.P. for Algoma, argued in the House of Commons that the Indian Act's enfranchisement provisions, which made exercise of the vote contingent on conformity to an individualized system of land tenure, did not apply in Ontario. He then made a motion that all Indians enfranchised since 1869 should be returned to their bands, although it is not known whether the motion was carried. (Treaties and Historical Research Centre, Research Branch, 1978: 75); Canada. House of Commons Debates, 1 Sess. 4 Parl., 1879, vol. 1: 844-45. Enfranchisement of Indians. Motion for Return, 31 March, 1879.

[39] This election took place on 4 March, 1916. A.O. Sault Indian Agency Records. MS 216 (5).

[40] 20 December, 1916. A.O. Sault Indian Agency Records. MS 216 (5).

[41] The term "clean up" was frequently used by elders in discussions regarding the lack of control the Band had over group membership. External officials would "clean up" the reserve and in so doing "hurt everybody". Fieldnotes, August 10, 1982.

[42] "Batchewana and Garden River Indians Differ on Who was Last High Chief", Sault Star, 23 November, 1939.

[43] Interview with Abe Lesage, 10 August, 1982; Interview with Bertha Sayers, 20 November, 1982.

[44] A.D. McNabb to J.D. Maclean, 17 December, 1912. RG 10, vol. 2068, file 10,307, pt. 2.

[45] 4 March, 1916. A.O. Sault Indian Agency Records. MS 216 (5).

[46] 25 March, 1916. A.O. Sault Indian Agency Records. MS 216 (5). Garden River throughout these years sent delegations to annual Grand Council meetings.

[47] RG 10, vol. 3175, file 437,632. On June 8, 1915, the Garden River Band awarded John Askin a monthly stipend of five dollars for as long as he lived for "services he has given the Band for a great number of years." A.O. Sault Indian Agency Records. MS 216 (5).

[48] Re Proposed Stated Case Test of the Validity of the Robinson Treaties, 18 December, 1916. RG 10, vol. 2406, file 84,041, pt. 2.

Endnotes, Conclusion

[1] For an outline of the Ojibwa cosmological scheme as described by elders at Garden River see Appendix C.

[2] One elder, on being asked whether the Ojibwa ever considered themselves self-sufficient, chose to illustrate his reply by presenting a case where a rival power had severed the link with the source of supply:

> Indians were never self-sufficient.... And years ago they killed one another.... I'm sorry to say this but my dad's uncle ... and my dad, they got mad at one another. We pretty near starved.... He couldn't catch anything. Fished out in the lake with line. Nothing. With traps, nothing. Try to catch rabbit ... nothing. Nothing.

Fieldnotes, 12 August, 1983.

[3] Two major changes in official Indian policy north of the Upper Great Lakes which occurred during the period covered by this study took place in 1820 and 1849.

[4] To Alexander Vidal, this provision would have constituted more a privilege than a right. It was also so interpreted by W.B. Robinson in 1850.

[5] Simon J. Dawson to Colonel C. Stuart, 7 October, 1881. A.O. Irving Papers. MU 1465, 27/31/1(1).

[6] Ibid.

[7] RG 10, vol. 2000, file 8669.

[8] It was far more due to the independent action of Native leaders who risked their own energies, time and money in encouraging external government, missionary, commercial and legal agencies to support their goals. Often the persistence and courage shown by these leaders won the admiration and respect of local officials and clergy, personally involved with the chiefs. Yet, as important as such external support would prove to be, since it had cumulative influence over the long term, during the late nineteenth century it alone was not powerful enough to make policy more responsive to Indian needs and aspirations.

[9] RG 10, vol. 2544, file 111,470.

[10] Occasionally individuals who included their names or marks on petitions to the government were residents, but not "status" Indians, at Garden River.

[11] This is Shingwaukönse's reputation among modern-day Ojibwa cultural and political organizations. For example see From the Anishinabek (The Ojibway, Ottawa, Potowatomi and Algonquin Nations) To The Parliament of the Dominion of Canada, Ontario Indian, December, 1982: 25; Sallot, Lynne and Tom Peltier, Bearwalk, Markham, Ontario: Paperjacks Ltd., 1978: 182-84, 197, 200, 211. First published by the Musson Book Company in 1977.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A
CULTURAL PERSISTENCE IN THE SPHERE OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS

During initial stages of fieldwork certain persons interviewed expressed reticence and, seemingly, suspicion towards the investigator and her work. While reticence has been considered characteristic of Ojibwa and Cree personality structure (Friedl, 1956; Hallowell, 1946; Preston, 1975c), the writer adopted a wait-and-see attitude before drawing any conclusions. Part of the answer regarding this reticence was forwarded voluntarily by Dan Pine Sr. during a conversation over other matters. According to Mr. Pine, the affection one individual may hold for another, or for a group, makes the relation between a person and the subject of one's affection vulnerable to interference from undesired external influences. Ties of special significance to the individual are aften kept secret from outsiders, or else so great a field of ambiguity is maintained about the relation that the true nature of the tie becomes unfathomable to those not party to it.

To the Ojibwa, relationships are not static but are subject to evolution and change. Circumstances strongly affect relations. On her travels around Lakes Huron, Michigan and Superior, the writer had opportunities for observing meetings between elders of different bands. In the traditional forum the aim of each elder is often to determine the degree of "power-control" of the other, while at the same time "weighing his own" and deciding how best to apply it in the ongoing context.

These meetings frequently take place in partial isolation from younger family members, as sanctions prohibit those "lacking sufficient power" from interfering in the transaction. It was evident that much information exchanged is of the non-verbal type. Careful hand and eye movements, and a generally poised and dignified demeanour characterize such exchanges.

During negotiations with outside agencies in the past, the Garden River leadership on occasion exhibited a marked reticence in the face of external policies and proposals which posed a threat to local band interests. Fred Pine Sr., explained that such oblique responses constituted the Ojibwa's main way, in the absence of firm legal protections, of preserving what they most value. "Ants," he stated, "run carrying their eggs from one hole to another when danger comes. That's like us. We go back and forth so you never see what or where it is." What surprised the interviewer was the degree to which the Ojibwa have objectivized this trait in themselves. It has become a cultural strategy handed down from generation to generation, standardized to the extent that leaders, in particular, may be judged for their "competence" in demonstrating such behaviour in their transactions with outsiders.

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*Discussion with Dan Pine Sr., and Alan Knight during a drive after a service at St. John's Anglican Church, Garden River, in June 1983; interview with Fred Pine Sr., 10 June 1983.

Between 1846 and 1850 band numbers at Garden River fluctuated between one hundred and fifty and three hundred individuals. After 1850 band size could suddenly be reduced, owing to the implementation of government policies compelling emigration of families from the community.

Garden River Indians

Year	Numbers entitled to receive Annuity under R.T. of 1850	Numbers actually paid	Amount	Rate	Information derived from
1850	266		1672		
1					
2					
3					No pay lists
4					
5					
6	344	344	379 84	1 10 2/3	
7	344	344	365 50	1 06 1/4	
8	230	230	375 67	1 64	
9	268	268	301 50	1 12 1/2	
1860	211	211	237 90 1/4	1 12 3/4	
1	246	246	295 81 1/2	1 20 1/4	
2	258	258	291 54	1 13	
3	258	258	291 54	1 13	
4	257	257	290 21	1 13	From Books of Superintendent at Manitowaning
5	276	276	309 79	1 13	
6	280	280	316 40	1 13	
7	292	292	292 00	1 00	
8	313	313	306 74	98	
9	287	287	287 .	1 00	
1870	270	270	291 62	1 08	
1	275	275	288 75	1 05	
2	313.	313	313	1 00	
3	318	318	330 72	1 04	
4	331	331	304 56	92	
5	329	329	312 55	95	
2nd April 5	328	309	942 45	3 05	
6	342	314	1256 .	4 .	
7	349	318	1272 .	4 .	
8	358	327	1308 .	4 .	From Agent Van Abbott at Sault St. Marie
9	373	342	1368 .	4 .	
1880	385	361	1444 .	4 .	
1	391	367	1468 .	4 .	
2	400	376	1504 .	4 .	
3	397	373	1492 .	4 .	

Batchewana Bay
Nubenaigowching and Band

Year	Numbers entitled to receive Annuity under Robinson Treaty of 1850	Numbers actually paid	Amount	Rate per cap	Information derived from
1850	188	88	176 .	2 00	
1					
2					
3					No pay lists
4					
5					
6	181	181	99 86	1 02½	
7	181	181	92 31	1 00¼	
8	211	211	347 75	1 74	
9	173	173	194 62½	1 12½	
1860	182	182	205 212	1 12¾	
	188	188	226 07	1 20¼	
2	223	223	251 77	1 13	From Supt. Phipps at Manitowaning
3	223	223	251 99	1 13	
4	234	234	230 58	1 07	
5	243	243	275 54	1 13	
6	242	242	271 14	1 12	
7	241	241	241 00	1 00	
8	237	237	232 26	98	
9	239	239	239	1 00	
1870	242	242	261 42	1 08	
1	242	242	234 10	1 05	
2	220	220	220 .	1 00	
3	236	236	245 44	1 04	
4	316	316	293 41	92	
5	310	310	294 50	95	
5	310	287	881 25	3 05	
6	331	310	1240 .	4 .	
7	328	284	1216 .	4 .	From Agent Jas Abbott at Sault St. Marie
8	327	303	1212 .	4 .	
9	331	307	1228 .	4 .	
1880	331	307	1228 .	4 .	
1	326	305	1220 .	4 .	
2	342	331	1284 .	4 .	
3	345	324	1296 .	4 .	

Source: AO, Irving Papers

Sessional Papers 1851 appendix (ii)

Voucher No. 2.

For Shingaconse's Band and Self. — We, the undersigned acknowledge to have received from the Honorable William B. Robinson, the sums set opposite our respective names.

Names.	Men	Women	Children	Total	Amount
Shingaconse, for special purposes for the Band generally. see Note	- -	- -	- -	- -	$ 350
Chinquaconse, ($4 each). --	1	2	6	9	36
Kaloosa	1	3	4	8	32
Piabetasung	5	1		6	24
Augustin	2	3	3	8	32.
Paquatchenini	1	1	4	6	24
Wabanosa	3	2		5	20
Chinquanoquet		2		2	8
Tegooshe	2	2	6	10	40
Akebakeshick	2	1	1	4	16
Kitchepenasse	1	5	1	7	28
Maisquanbinoka	1	2	1	4	16
Idoissa	1	1		2	8
Patowaash	1	3		4	16
Wabakakick	1	1		2	8
Kiketawag	2			2	8
Segaquon	1	1		2	8
Pamassung	1	1	2	4	16
L. Corbine	1	1	1	3	12
Anewaba	1	1		2	8
Nawandego	1	3	1	5	20
Pepekewesais	1	1	2	4	16
Kagegabe	2	3		5	20
Alexis Cadotte	2	4	2	8	32
Joshua Biron	1	1	3	5	20
Carried up and forward.					818

AO, Irving Papers

Vouchers No 2 - Continued

Names.	Men.	Women	Children	Total	Amount.
Brought Forward.					818
Joseph Biron	2	2	5	9	36
Aquasa (by Paquochenini)	3	4	3.	10	40
Wakigaboequa (by do.)	2	2	3	7	28
Jonssaint	1	1	3	5	20
Naoquagaboa, Chief of Paquakong and Band.					30
Chippewa's Widow at $5 each	1	3		4	20
Aminiawaishcung	1		2	3	15
Naoquagaboa (for others)				2	10
Petowanoquetoqua.	1	1		2	8
Wassanga	3	1	3	7	28
Shawenegonabe	1	1		2	8
Wabenama		2		2	8
Ondaquiaso	1	1		2	8
John Bell	2	3	5	10	40
Charles Cadotte	1	2	3	6	24
Maabenasse	1	1		2	8
Oshawoskoqua	1	1		2	8
Muttash	1	3	1	5	20
Nanabosho.	1	1	3	5	20
Sagalo	1	1		2	8
Nebinagishickoqua		4		4	16
Matawaash	1	1	3	5	20
Louis Cadotte.	3	2	3	8	32.
Mishquagenos	1	1		2	8
Chinquock	2	1		3	12
Saquitchewassa	1	1		2	8
Apitakesuck				3	12
Carried Forward.					1313.

Voucher No. 2. concluded.

Names	Men	Women	Children	Total	Amount
Brought Forward.					$ 1313
Ogema.	1	1		2	8
Oshawesequagena.	1			1	4
Kitchedainda	1	1	1	3	12
Animikipenasse	1	1		2	8
Charles Cadotte	1	1	1	3	12.
Charles Biron	1	2.		3	12.
Alexis Biron	1	2	3	6	24
Peter Bell (by John Bell)	1	1	1	3	12.
Susan (by do.)		1		1	4
Shingwacouse, paid Steamer Gore.					208
Ocunwindego. at $5 ea (by wife)	3.	3.		6	30
Naogeshick	1	2.		3.	15
Sagieg.ouse.	1	1		2	10
Total.	.		.	.	$ 1672.
					£ 418

Witness to Payments.
Geo. Johnston, Interpreter
J. W. Keating

Garden River, Sept 11th 1850.

W. B. Robinson

Note. — $200 to pay demands on the Band.
100 to pay an American Indian Chief
for money borrowed by the Band.
50. to pay their Interpreter.
$ 350.

Census for 1865 of the Indians of Garden River

Names of heads of families	Religion	Tribe	Adults Male	Adults Female	Youths 14 to 21 Male	Youths 14 to 21 Female	Children under 14 Male	Children under 14 Female	Total	Increase since last Census by Births	Increase since last Census by Immigration	Decrease since last Census by Deaths	Decrease since last Census by Emigration	Remarks
Agista	Pro	Ojbt	1	3	2	-	1	1	8	2				
Aquetchemone	"	"	2	3		2		4	11					—
Chemahgwai	"	"	1	2	1	1	2		7				1	
Chetahkezhick	"	"	1	1	1				3					
Commoning	"	"	1	1			3	3	8					
Mamkapeeke Squaw		"	1	1					2				1	
John Bell		"	1	1	1				3					
Charles Cadotte	R.C.		2	2		1			5					
Debaun Squaw	"	"		2					2					
Wm Cheeyhan	R.C.		2		1	4		3	10	1	1			
Mary Ann Cobe	"		1	1	1			3	6					
Thomas Ke-ezhickezhick	Pro		1	1	1		2		5					
Eliza Ann Ke-ezhickezhick Squaw	"			2					2					
Louis Shingwauk	"		1	1		1		1	4					
Michelle Cadotte	R.C.		1	1			3	2	7					
Catherine	Pro		1	1					2					
Wm Sr. Sayer	C. of E.		1	1			4	1	7					
Nazemmeme (the Bussman)	"			1		1	3	2	7					
Wm Jackson Burn	"		1	4		2	2	1	10		1			
Wm Jr. Burn	"		1	2		1			4					
Wm Charles Burn	"		1	1			3	2	7					
Michelle Abiquets	"		1	1		2	6	1	11					
Kezhickenogquai	"		1	1				1	3					
Louis Cadotte	"		1	2			1		4					
Nabbenemone	Pro		1	2					3					
William Shetahkezhick	"		1	1			1	1	4					
Schguteh Nawaidac	"		2						2					
John Agista	"		1	1			3	2	7					



			29	40	8	15	38	29	159				
													122

APPENDIX C

OJIBWA COSMOLOGY, ITS INFLUENCE ON SPATIAL CONCEPTS AND GROUP INTERRELATIONSHIPS

The Ojibwa belief system gained dynamism from integrations and tensions perceived as operating along and between vertical and horizontal dimensions of a complex cosmic scheme. Each culture carrier shared a concept of this interplay of cosmological forces to some degree. Presided over by a benign but distant High God, this universe was populated by numerous spirit actors, often anthropomorphic or animal-like in appearance, which could appear to human beings in dreams.

New manifestations of these spiritual agencies could arise, strong, from the east and pass, like the Sun on its course through the sky, towards the west. A second axis, known as the "Everlasting Road" ran from south to north, with its northern extremity presided over by the Star Being, the Great Bear.

Native cosmographers recognized four primary directions, each with a major spirit inhabitant and a number of intermediary positions between these cardinal points. A series of levels ascended vertically from a base, lying below the earth's surface, each bearing spirit populations so numerous that they were described as living "in cities". The system also evidenced a thermodynamic aspect. Substances of lower levels were "cool", whereas those of upper regions were "warm". Yet, owing to power-holders' capacities for metamorphosis, and the ambiguities of Ojibwa thought in general regarding the world of appearances, this sequence could easily be inverted. Bird spirits enjoyed special

privileges in their facility to enter the realm of Heaven, ōgweō-giswon literally, the "hole in the sky". They were usually debarred, however, from the milieu of the water spirits, who had "holes" to their special habitations in the centre of certain lakes or bays. Mishi.beshu, a water being with a snake-like characteristic and the face and forebody of a lynx, could survive on land, as could Gĕná.beck, the Water Snake. Lizard, Ogé.kuh.dăung.wā, and Turtle, Squă-dis, would travel towards water, and thus were viewed as directional aids. Snapping Turtle, Mĕk.kenuk, could travel everywhere and acted as petitioner to other spirits when need arose. To the Ojibwa, the ability to penetrate barriers or travel long distances safely were all part of power, manido.

APPENDIX D

Fred Pine gave the following account of hunting in the early twentieth century:

Fred Pine, Sr.: We used to go up the [Garden] river as far as the [first] rapids, then the men and boys used to get out and push the canoe up the rapids. We carried lots of dried fish. We spent the fall fishing for that. That's what we lived on. Our lands were the farthest up of all. . . around Garden Lake. There was one big camp. The women and kids used to stay there. The men would travel around the trails. They used to be away two or three days or more. They had all their cooking gear in little lean-tos along the trail. They'd spend the night. . . .

The men would hunt beaver. . . some fisher. The women took mink. Small furs. They skinned 'em. Each kept their own.

We weren't far apart, you know. Just five or six miles away there would be another gang. You weren't all that lonely. . . . We had dog sleds. The old men always carried parts of snowshoe frames in case they [the frames] broke. They used to go to Mississauga along the trail to get pork, flour, meal. We stayed up there until the spring.

We all came down at Christmas to trade, and again in the spring. The men used to go back after to bring the canoes and traps down.

Interviewer: Did you go back to the same place year after year?

Fred Pine, Sr.: Not always. Usually. You followed the animals. You left some equipment there. Cooking gear.

Interviewer: What about people from Sugar Island and other bands? Where did they hunt?

Fred Pine, Sr.: Well, they would come to the chief and say, 'Let me have an area. . . maybe only one lake. We're not many, we don't need that much.' And he'd give it to them.

Interviewer: Was there that much free territory?

Fred Pine, Sr.: Oh, yes. There were lots of lakes back there. The people from Mississauga, they hunted up behind, up the Benadong. They had all that area, that was their territory.

Interviewer: It was the band chief, then, who said if one could hunt?

Fred Pine, Sr.: Yeah.

Interviewer: How did you know when you came to the edge of a territory?

Fred Pine, Sr. You knew. There were marks, broken branches. You didn't go over.*

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*Interview with Fred Pine, Sr., 10 June, 1983.

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ABBREVIATIONS

IHC	Illinois Historical Collections
JR	Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents
MH	Michigan History
MPC	Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections
MHC	Minnesota Historical Society Collections
WHC	Wisconsin Historical Society Collections

Government Documents and Publications

Canada

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