

THE MEANING OF INTUITION
IN CONTEMPORARY
PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

A THESIS

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CHAPTER I

AN OUTLINE OF THE FOUR POSITIONS

The religious believer will often state that he knows intuitively that God exists. His claims are frequently supported, though in a much more sophisticated way, by a considerable number of philosophers and theologians, who maintain that the intellect knows intuitively the existence of God. Such thinkers as Augustine, Bonaventure, and Pascal are among those who champion such an approach. In opposition to them, there are thinkers who maintain that the existence of God is established to the satisfaction of the intellect by argument and inferential demonstrations. Thinkers such as Aristotle, Aquinas, and Suarez are among the prominent ones in this latter category. Throughout the history of Western philosophy these two approaches to God have gained favour or disapproval, and frequently the success of the one has led to the depreciation of the other.

Today the intuitive approach is gaining popularity in the theologico-philosophical circles of England and Continental Europe. It is not the purpose of this thesis to suggest detailed reasons for this, although I believe that the philosophies of Edmund Husserl and Henri Bergson have been partly responsible. Another reason might possibly be the deadlock between the supporters of the traditional proofs for the existence of God and the contemporary followers of Hume and Kant. Each side vehemently continues to refute the other so that the spectator is becoming rapidly confused and perhaps bored with the whole debate.

The source of the deadlock appears to be different epistemologies, and it seems that the issue will be finally resolved when the epistemological differences are settled. The intuitive approach is regarded perhaps as the breaking of fresh ground on a sterile battlefield.

In this thesis we shall confine ourselves to an examination of the intuitive approach of Jacques Maritain, E. L. Mascall, Illyd Trethowan, and John Baillie. The choice of these thinkers is not arbitrary, for the four of them cover a considerable scope of religious traditions. Maritain and Trethowan are Roman Catholics, Mascall is an Anglican, and Baillie a Presbyterian. There is also a further advantage in this selection, for two of the major Western theological positions are represented, the Thomistic and Augustinian traditions. The intuitive approach has been very much associated with the Augustinian tradition but has received little mention in Thomism. It is interesting to see the Thomists go beyond the immediate confines of Aquinas, and it is a tribute to the flexibility of Thomism that they are willing to do so. This justifies Langmead Casserley's remark that the Augustinian philosophy is perhaps the perennial philosophy of Western Europe.¹

In this thesis a close examination will be made to determine what the word 'intuition' means in the writings of Jacques Maritain, E. L. Mascall, Illyd Trethowan, and John Baillie. The word 'intuition' is an extremely ambiguous term, and on the popular level can mean anything

¹L. Casserley, quoted in I. Trethowan, The Basis of Belief (New York 1961), p. 72.

from mental telepathy to aesthetic inspiration. An attempt will be made to pin down the four writers to a definition of intuition to avoid the confusion that will otherwise arise. The role of conceptualization will also be considered in the various intuitions of God. We shall attempt an evaluation of the intuitions of God to assess their merits as approaches to God. Lastly common features will be indicated in an attempt to pin down fundamental religious ideas shared by all four writers. The search for fundamental agreement between philosophers is often more fruitful than the uncovering of differences.

In this chapter we shall briefly outline the basic position of the four writers. We shall begin with certain fundamental Thomistic notions that will form the basis for the intuitions of God in Maritain and Mascal. For the Thomist being is the formal object of the intellect, since the intellect is "cut out to conquer being".² That which is first attained by the intellect is being as enveloped or embodied and diversified in some particular. The first object of the intellect is not a particular as such nor being as such, but rather it is the particular object and being in general. Being is the first object grasped by the intellect but it is attained in sensible things by dianoetic intellection. The intellect first knows being clothed in some particular. Although the intellect encounters particular objects, the particular does not immediately yield up its specific nature, but rather is first known as a being. Furthermore, we also know being as essentially diverse, since we know

²J. Maritain, The Range of Reason (New York 1952) p.9.

it as embodied in different subjects. Being seems to be differentiated from within.³

The intellect is immediately able to know being, and because of this immediacy the Thomists say that we have an intuition of being. "There is therefore an intellectual perception of being, which, being involved in every act of our intelligence in fact rules all our thought from the very beginning."⁴ The first intuition of the intellect is that of being, but this intellectual intuition requires the instrumentality of the senses. The intellect cannot intuit without the material given to it by the senses. It cannot enjoy an immediate intuition that is completely independent of the senses, for this can be enjoyed only by angelic intellectual intuition.

The intellect on the common sense level, on which this intuition of being occurs, does not function without a concept. Since being is the first object to be intuited by the intellect, it is not surprising to find that being is the first concept to be formed and that all other concepts are variants of this one. We gain a concept of being corresponding to this intuition of being, although the concept apparently never attains the richness of the intuition. "The term, being, is the correct term to express it, though obviously we cannot display by this

³If the intellect comes to know being before it gains any other concepts, how does it know being as diversified? To know it as diversified is to see it embodied in different particulars, and presumably, if we are able to recognize different particulars, then we probably already have concepts of those different particulars. Therefore it would seem that concepts precede our knowledge of being as diversified.

⁴J. Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge (New York 1938) , p. 210.

poor word nor for that matter by the most skilful devices of language all of the wealth contained in the intuition."⁵ The concept of being can grasp only imperfectly the fullness of the intuition of being. Yet although being becomes a concept just as tree becomes a concept, the former concept differs considerably from the latter and from all other concepts. The concept of being is essentially analogous, for it is realized in diverse ways according to the nature of the object. Being differs from universals not only in that it has a greater amplitude but chiefly in that it is not one and the same in the different subjects and in the mind which abstracts the notion of being from these different subjects. The concept of being is implicitly multiple, since men and trees are different in their very being. Everything which divides these beings from one another is the same being which we find in each of them, and yet it is varied. Being is not a univocal concept, which applies to a number of particulars and thereby establishes a community of essence among them. Being is, however, not an equivocal concept, since there is likeness of meaning in saying that a man is and a tree is. The concept of being is therefore analogous. It is essential to realize the analogical nature of being. If this is overlooked, Maritain fears that philosophy will end up with a pure pluralism like that of Descartes or a monism like that of Hegel. In actual fact being is superuniversal, transindividual, transspecific, transgeneric, transcategorical "as if in opening a blade of grass one started a bird greater than the world".⁶

⁵J. Maritain, *A Preface to Metaphysics* (New York 1962), p. 51.

⁶J. Maritain, *The Degrees of Knowledge*, p. 212.

The concept of being is not necessarily a verbal formulation or even a concept explicitly thought. Some languages for example lack a word 'being'. The Thomists assert, however, that the idea of being is nevertheless implicitly present in all minds. Frederick Copleston states that consciousness "pre-supposes a pre-reflective awareness of existing in encompassing Being".⁷ From the very beginning of our experience "man finds himself 'there' within the area of Being".⁸ There is an idea of Being in our minds at the earliest stirring of the intellect. Copleston draws, however, a distinction between 'seeing' and 'noticing'. We may, for example, see a snake and only later realize that it was an adder. We say therefore that we saw a snake but did not notice that it was an adder. Similarly, we 'see' being, but only the metaphysician 'notices' it. "To notice or advert to this fact (the intuition of being) is not to see things which other people do not see; it is to advert to or notice what many people rarely advert to explicitly".⁹ Copleston maintains that we all implicitly have the idea of being, but that we have not explicitly realized it. A child may not explicitly have an idea of being, but the idea of being is implicit in the ideas which he does form. Presumably the idea of being is so fundamental to our intellect that it seems strange or almost artificial to talk about our forming such an idea. Presumably the Thomists would say that we live and move within being and

⁷F. Copleston, Contemporary Philosophy (Westminster 1963), p. 74.

⁸Ibid., p. 74.

⁹Ibid., p. 65.

that it is difficult for us to examine the notion.

When the concept of being arises, the concept of existence also arises. It is in and with the concept of being that the concept of existence is conceived. At the same time that the intellect forms the concept of being, it says in a judgment that this being exists. Both are necessary; to say "this being exists" we must have the idea of being; to have the idea of being the act of existing must be affirmed by the judgment. At this first awakening of thought each is dependent upon the other. After this, the intellect then grasps the act of existing affirmed in the first judgment of existence and makes it an object of thought through a concept. Existence is thus made object through the objectifying of what is really a trans-objective act and that refers to trans-subjective subjects that carry out this act of existing. The concept of existence cannot be separated from the concept of being. Yet although we can conceptualize the intuition of being, it must be remembered that being and existence are not simply essences or objects. We use these concepts but do so to know a reality which is not an essence but is the very act of existing. All sciences except metaphysics use concepts to reach essences, but through the concepts of being and existence we know a reality that is not an essence but is existence itself.

The intuition of being and conceptualization of that intuition take place, as we have indicated, on the level of common sense or pre-philosophic plane. The intuition of God occurs on this same level and is linked with the intuition of being. It appears that, as soon as we have the intuition of being, we also have an intuition of God. The

latter seems to follow upon the former. "In perceiving Being Reason knows God -- the self-subsisting Act of being in an enigmatic but inescapable manner."¹⁰ As soon as the intellect begins to stir it enjoys an intuition of God according to "the natural or, so to speak, instinctive manner proper to the first apperceptions of the intellect prior to every philosophical or scientifically rationalized elaboration".¹¹ The Thomists have indicated that our intuition of being includes the notion that being is diverse and analogical. It is this idea that is the key to the intuition to God, for, once this is granted, there is room for the notion that being "bears within itself the sign that beings of another order than the sensible are thinkable and possible".¹² The intuition of God justifies this latter sign and shows the intellect that beings of another order are more than merely thinkable and possible. "Human reason's approach to God in its primordial vitality is -- intuitive-like or irresistibly vitalized by and maintained in the intellectual flash of the intuition of existence."¹³ Maritain maintains that "the knowledge of God before being developed into logical and perfectly conceptualized demonstrations, is first and foremost the natural fruit of the intuition of existence".¹⁴ If the intuition of God is a further development of

¹⁰Maritain, The Range of Reason, p. 67.

¹¹Maritain, Approaches to God (New York 1962) p. 18.

¹²Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, p. 214.

¹³Maritain, The Range of Reason, p. 90.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 90.

the intuition of being, hinging on the analogical nature of being, it follows that the intellect enjoys an intuition of God early in its career and, like the intuition of being, it is always implicit in the mind. Like the intuition of being it can become covered up and not be explicitly present in the mind. We all have implicitly an idea of God which must be recognized and made explicit. Copleston's "Seeing and Noticing" distinction will also apply to the intuition of God. It should also be mentioned that the Thomists consider this a natural knowledge of God, since it belongs to the rational order rather than to the supernatural order of faith.

The contents of this intuition of God in the writings of Jacques Maritain must now be spelled out in some detail. Maritain states that the intuition of God contains three steps. The first step is that I am intuitively aware of the existence of an object such as a tree or a mountain, which I realize exists in its own way completely independent of me. At the same time I am struck by the "solidity and inexorability of existence".¹⁵ The second step is that we are intuitively aware of our own existence. At the same time we feel frail and threatened before the independent existence of others and are aware of the "death and nothingness to which my existence is liable".¹⁶ The third step is that I intuitively realize that this "solid and inexorable existence" and my own existence filled with "death and nothingness" imply "some absolute, irrefragable existence, completely free from nothingness and death".¹⁷

¹⁵Maritain, Approaches to God, p. 19.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 19.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 19.

These then are the three leaps of the intellect which occur within "the same unique intuition".¹⁸

The second stage of this pre-philosophic approach to God is called by Maritain a "prompt spontaneous reasoning as natural as this intuition".¹⁹ By 'reasoning' Maritain does not mean that this stage is on the same level as scientific or philosophic reasoning, for this approach including this reasoning stage is still within the framework that Maritain labels pre-philosophic. Maritain says that the reasoning in this second stage is "a reasoning without words, which cannot be expressed in articulate fashion without sacrificing its vital concentration and the rapidity with which it takes place".²⁰ Although this second stage is described as a reasoning without words, it seems legitimate to regard it as conceptual. In the first place we have seen how the intuition of being is immediately conceptualized. Since the intuition of God is a development of this presumably it too becomes conceptualized. Secondly, this stage is a reasoning stage, and, although Maritain allows for non-conceptual experiences, there is little reason to regard reasoning, however primitive, as proceeding without concepts. Thirdly Maritain states that metaphysics proceeds by concepts, and, since the pre-philosophic stage is regarded as being virtually metaphysical it presumably is also conceptual. In describing this reasoning as reasoning without words it is probable that Maritain is saying that it cannot be explicitly

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 19.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 20

²⁰ Ibid., p. 20

stated in verbal form. Such an attempt to clarify it vocally would impair the rapidity and energy by which this reasoning proceeds.

This second stage is analogous to the first, since it also has three steps which follow to some extent the same sequence as the first. We first realize that we are subject to death and that we are Being-with-nothingness. We secondly realize that we are dependent upon the totality of nature of which we are a part and that this also is Being-with-nothingness. Thirdly we reason that this universal whole of Being-with-nothingness implies Being-without-nothingness. The conclusion of both stages is the same; there is an "absolute existence" or "Being-without-nothingness" upon which we and the world are dependent.

Thus the internal dynamics of the intuition of existence, or of the intelligible value of Being, causes me to see that absolute existence or Being-without-nothingness transcends the totality of nature. And there I am, confronted with the existence of God.²¹

The relationship between the intuitive or first stage and the reasoning process or second stage must be examined in greater detail. It is unlikely that the one can exist without the other. Maritain says that the second stage "immediately springs forth as the necessary fruit of such a primordial apperception" and is "enforced by and under its light".²² Indeed, the second stage is "more or less involved" in the first stage. The second stage accompanies and elaborates upon the immediate non-conceptual intuition through its conceptualization and primitive reasoning. To talk of a non-conceptual intuition may at first seem

²¹Ibid., p. 20. For purposes of the thesis, we must accept his use of the word 'cause'.

²²Ibid., p. 20.

Bergsonian, but this is to overestimate the role played by intuition. It is misleading to think of intuition leaping ahead and followed by a conceptualising process which loses the vividness of the intuition, as the philosophy of Bergson would suggest.²³ It is more likely that the two are indissolubly linked together. It appears that the "flash of intuition" gives shape and orientation to the conceptual stage. Yet the flash of intuition is clarified and explicated by the second stage. In the intuitive stage, for example, we are uncertain about the form of Being-without-nothingness. We are uncertain whether it is immanent in the objects of our experience or whether it is separate from them. In the second stage Being-without-nothingness is seen as transcendent and self-subsistent. We realize that "there is another 'hole' -- a separate One -- another Being, transcendent and self-sufficient and unknown in itself and activating all beings, which is Being-without-nothingness, that is, self-subsisting Being, Being existing through itself".²⁴ The second stage has not given us fresh information, but rather has clarified and explicated what which was confused in the first stage. Without this second stage the actual intuition would be vague and perhaps untrustworthy. It is uncertain whether it would deserve the name knowledge. Both intuition and conceptualization seem to be needed. The two stages interlock, and yet there is a vital tension between them,

²³ Maritain does suggest, however, that to some extent this is the case as we noted earlier. To this extent he does seem Bergsonian.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 20.

both of which render adequate this "primordial way of approach".

The intuition of this absolute existence is according to Maritain an intuition of God's existence. This intuition is direct, since the intellect confronts the object without passing through successive steps, as it must do in inference. Yet it is mediate, rather than immediate, since we do not intuit God's existence as it is in itself, but rather are intuitively aware of God's existence through our awareness of Being-with-nothingness. Thus our intuition of God's existence is direct and mediate, arrived at through the intuition of being. It should also be noted that Maritain places emphasis upon the existence of nature rather than upon the intuition of our own existence. This is in keeping with the Thomistic notion that we are led to God by our observations of the external world.

We must now turn to a consideration of E. L. Mascall. Mascall's starting point is identical with that of Maritain, the intuition of being. Like Maritain, Mascall also realizes that being, as we find it exemplified in different objects, is subject to "nothingness and death" and is therefore finite. Mascall calls us to recognize that finite beings are finite, that is, that there is nothing in the essence of a finite being which necessitates its existence. The recognition of finite being is the key to the intuition of God's existence or apprehension, as Mascall prefers to call it.

What is necessary, in short, if we are to pass from a belief in the existence of a finite being to a belief in the existence of God is not so much that we should thoroughly instruct ourselves in the laws and procedures of formal logic as that we should thoroughly acquaint ourselves with finite beings, and learn to know them as they really are.²⁵

²⁵E. L. Mascall, He Who Is (London, 1943), p. 73.

Mascall tells us that our apprehension of God is gained "by an intimate metaphysical grasp of what contingency, as our experience reveals it to us, really is".²⁶ Contingency by its very nature declares that it is dependent upon something which is not contingent. Within Mascall's Thomism the object of our apprehension is not God as He is in Himself, but "God is manifested in His created activity in finite being; more accurately, the object is finite being as manifesting God in His creative act".²⁷ Our apprehension is the apprehension of the cosmological relation.

What can thus be apprehended, it is alleged, is neither the creature-without-God nor God-without-the-creature, but the creature-deriving-being-from-God and God-as-the-creative-ground-of-the-creature: God-and-the-creature-in-the-cosmological-relation.²⁸

Mascall says, therefore, that we have an apprehension of God, or a intuition as he prefers to say, that is direct and mediate, for we apprehend God in and through finite creatures. God is intuited, therefore, as the result of a "metaphysical grasp", which is a seeing of the cosmological relation between God and His creatures gained by the intuition of finite being.

The intuition of God within the thought of Maritain and Mascall stems from an awareness of being. As we have seen, this approach is centered upon the existence of the world, an approach which justifies our considering Thomism as a metaphysic of nature. The approach to God

²⁶E. L. Mascall, Existence and Analogy, (London 1949) p. 67.

²⁷Ibid., p. 69.

²⁸E. L. Mascall, Words and Images, (London 1957), p. 85.

through the existence of the world is one strand, but within European thought there is another, the approach to God through the self.

This insistence that Christian theism is primarily a matter of self-consciousness, rather than a metaphysic of nature, is one of the two ways of understanding and expressing Christian philosophy which runs side by side, and in strong contrast with one another, throughout the later history of Christian thought.²⁹

This "matter of self-consciousness" introduces the Augustinian tradition, which is a major current in European thought and has influenced in various ways such thinkers as Anselm, Newman, and others. It is embedded within the Thomistic tradition, although it has been overlaid by other elements. Maritain's and MacCall's intuitive approach is perhaps a tapping of the latent Augustinian notions. This approach is centered upon the notion of contuitio, which is the notion that we contemplate God through His action upon the soul.

Both the Thomistic and Augustinian traditions stress the creative activity of God, the one upon the world, the other upon the soul. In both cases we know God not as He is in Himself but through His creative activity. For this reason the intuition of God within the Augustinian camp will also be direct but mediate. Both traditions are centered upon the dependency of that which is created, but Augustine stresses the way of the inner man. The soul of man bears the imprint of the Creator, and it is through contemplation of His effects upon us that we apprehend Him. Dr. Langmead Casserley states that "the essence of Augustinian theism is that immediate self-consciousness is not a self-consciousness of the self-alone . . . It carries within it an immediate apprehension of the Creator".³⁰ Iltyd Trethowan states that "the detection itself, occurs,

²⁹L. Casserley quoted in I. Trethowan, The Basis of Belief, p. 72.

³⁰L. Casserley, Ibid., p. 71.

fundamentally, in the inner life" and "the source of our metaphysical discoveries seems to be the self".³¹ Like the Thomists the Augustinians also make the distinction between 'seeing' and 'noticing'. The evidence of God's existence is there, but we must know how to look. We must realize that we have already looked and seen, but have not realized what we were doing. It is essential for us to recognize explicitly things that we have tended to take for granted.

The particular strand within the Augustinian approach that shall be dealt with here is the self with its convictions of values, and Eiltyd Trothowan will first be dealt with. The self, Trothowan states, frequently encounters judgments of values, which elicit from us certain responses. It is important to understand that, while this approach is that of the "inner man", this is not to say that values are subjective. This would make Augustine an existentialist. Trothowan's point is that the self in its conscious activities and in its contemplation of experience recognizes values, which draw from us a sense of obligation. In spite of our own wishes values make a claim upon us and oblige us to do such and such a course of action. It is true that obligation is frequently explained away by psychologists and psychoanalysts, but, even after their interpretations have been digested, we cannot avoid the encounter with value situations and the corresponding claims that they make upon us. Once we encounter values, we are placed "on a slippery slope that ends in religion".³² The self and its conviction of values are the basis for

³¹Ibid., p. 103.

³²Ibid., p. 98.

Trethowan's intuition of God.

Trethowan uses the example of the obligation to find the truth. Why do we strive to learn the truth and feel obliged to stand by it? Is it simply because of the fact that the knowledge of truth is useful? This is doubtless part of the story, but it is more likely that we feel that the truth must be found regardless of the uses it is put to. Is there not something of the sacred about facts to the scientist? Does not the academic wince when a fellow academic has deliberately suppressed or distorted facts simply to make his conclusion more acceptable?

That needs to be made explicit. The question which is now being asked comes to this: doesn't it matter that you should know the truth about the business in hand, the formula for human happiness or whatever else it may be? Hasn't it an importance because it is the truth? Isn't there a demand for truth in the human mind? Isn't there a duty to know the truth or at least avoid self-deception? And still it may be said that we just happen to be made like that, that it has no far-reaching implications. Yet it is surely at this point that the positivist position should seem most obviously untenable. Once the question of truth is seriously entertained, it is hard to see how it can be honestly dismissed, although its implications may at first be quite obscure.³³

Upon examination truth seems to be something which stands over against us and which compels us to seek it out. It becomes our duty to do justice to the demands which truth makes upon us.

Trethowan states that to know the truth does not mean to discover the "dominant decision" about it nor is truth the agreement between the judgment and the object itself. Knowing the truth means, Trethowan argues, that we discover things as they really are. The point is that things are what they are whether we know them or not, and to discover the truth about them is to discover them.³⁴ "To say that something is

³³Ibid., p. 100.

³⁴This bears a close resemblance to Martin Heidegger's doctrine of truth.

true is to say not only that we discover it but that it is."³⁵ But why has truth this value and why do we feel a duty towards it? We realize that certain values make a claim upon us, but upon examination there seems to be no justification for these claims; values seem simply "things". We admit that they are values but are unable to comprehend how they receive their value. The question of the source of values now becomes important, and the obvious step, so Trethowan thinks, is to look "behind" them for some justification. We begin to realize that values are derived values, and the value that they have is not their own. The most satisfying step seems to be that values by themselves are not valuable, for they do not exist by themselves. They are, so to speak, anchored in something whose value is self-sufficient, and this is God. Values owe what they are to God and are "reflections" of God. It is important to be careful here. Trethowan is not denying value to, for example, the search for truth, but is raising the question as to why such a phenomenon is valuable. The search for truth as a value seems unable to account for its value. We therefore begin to think that it derives its value from something else. Therefore, we can see that the recognition of the effects of values upon us is at the same time an apprehension of God in whom value ultimately inheres.

So what we are doing here is to illustrate the apprehension of God by some attempt to describe its effects. If the effects are recognized, it may be allowed that they are effects of this apprehension... What we seem to have been saying is that it is really God whom we value when we seem to be valuing his creatures. It is because they are "reflections" of God that they have value.³⁶

³⁵Ibid., p. 108.

³⁶Ibid., p. 102.

This relationship between effects and Creator must be spelled out with caution. It is not simply that we see through these effects to God or see Him acting in them. The creatures have value in themselves just as God does, but have it in a "limited, fragmented form". The creatures point to an "absolute simplicity and absolute richness" in which values are "unlimited and are identified, fused with one another".³⁷ The creatures have an element of incompleteness about them and point to that which is the very bedrock of all value and is complete and full.

The objects of experience are now recognized as having value of themselves, and these values, if steadily inspected, prove to be values which are enmeshed in other values - - and we are back again in Athens, listening to the prophetess from Mantinea, to the first Itinerarium mentis ad Deum in our Western records.³⁸

This is Trethowan's approach to God. God is intuited as the source of value through recognition of particular values which point to Him. To find God in this way is not to discover a new approach to God. Trethowan insists that this approach simply makes explicit what we have implicitly thought. We have always acknowledged certain values and presumably always knew that they pointed to something beyond them. We have always implicitly acknowledged God through recognizing His effects, and Trethowan regards it as his task to clarify this implicit awareness. For this reason he regards his approach not as a demonstration that we have knowledge of God but rather as a monstration. Such monstrations are not arguments designed to posit God as the result of inference, but rather

³⁷ Ibid., p. 102.

³⁸ M. Pontifex, I. Trethowan, The Meaning of Existence (London 1953), p. 176.

are designed to evoke in our minds an apprehension of God. The demonstration is designed to make "the light break through", "the spark jump", or "the penny drop". Demonstrations are designed to show that we in our world are dependent, dependent upon a source which is absolute. "What is left to us but to pass beyond them, to say that to 'exist' means 'to be a creature'?"³⁹

Another writer who emphasises the intuition of God through values is John Baillie. Baillie dissociates himself from inferential proofs for the existence of God and states that "He is not an inference but a Presence".⁴⁰ Baillie states that we enjoy an intuition of God that is mediated through various aspects of our experience.

Yet, though we are more directly and intimately confronted with the presence of God than with any other presence, it does not follow that He is ever present to us apart from all other presences. And, in fact, it is the witness of experience that only 'in, with, and under' other presences is the divine presence ever vouchsafed to us.⁴¹

Baillie maintains that an intuition of God is given in conjunction with the presence of our fellows and the corporeal world. We shall omit the latter, since it does not concern us here. By the presence of our fellows Baillie means a situation in which we recognise the claims others make upon us, for "the knowledge of God is withheld from those who keep themselves aloof from the service of their fellows".⁴² It seems that the

³⁹I. Trenchard, The Basis of Belief, p. 109.

⁴⁰J. Baillie, Our Knowledge of God (New York 1939), p. 126.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 173.

⁴²Ibid., p. 179.

intuition of God is given when we recognize that we have a sense of duty towards others and realize that we have certain obligations to them.

Baillie indicates a predilection towards an ethical approach. He shows a preference for Kant, who, so he thinks, was attempting to reach God through the awareness of duty. Baillie claims "to see in Kant's philosophy a most valuable recovery of the fundamental truth that Absolute Reality instead of being reached speculatively by means of deduction from the data of sense, is revealed to us directly in the form of Absolute Obligation".⁴³ It is in the awareness of our duty that we intuit God. This should not be surprising for Baillie maintains that our life is continually invaded by God, for "there is no son of man who has never been confronted at all by the challenge of the divine".⁴⁴ It is in this very invasion of our lives by God that our sense of duty arises. Baillie maintains that we should not divorce the law from Him who gives the law, for Baillie argues that "the Source of the obligation is Himself directly revealed to us and that it is in this vision of His glory and His holiness that our sense of obligation is born".⁴⁵

In recognizing this intuition of God we recognize that our world is a dependent one.

We have said enough to make it plain that the spiritual life of man is, in every part and mode of it, a derived and dependent life . . . Even the most elementary and familiar of our spiritual experiences

⁴³Ibid., p. 161.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 8

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 162

are robbed of their true meaning if they be regarded otherwise than as part of the soul's dealings with One who all our lives through is seeking us out in love.⁴⁶

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 258

CHAPTER II

THE THOMISTIC APPROACH OF MARITAIN AND MASCALL

In this chapter we shall analyze what Mascall and Maritain mean when they speak of the intuition of God and how satisfactory their intuition of God is from the philosophic standpoint and for the religious believer. Yet before we can proceed, we must note two important philosophical principles for subsequent discussion rests upon them. The case for the Thomists' intuition of being and of God depends on the truth of certain philosophical claims. The first claim is that the intellect can intuit. Maritain claims that such a premise is denied by modern philosophers such as Kant, who says that the senses alone are intuitive and that the intellect simply unifies and synthesizes.¹ An intellectual intuition is ruled out from the start by Kant. Maritain on the other hand makes the claim that "I have understood that the intellect sees".² The second claim is that, while the senses are directed towards sensible objects in particular, the intellect as such is directed towards being. The Thomists think that the intellect must start with sense experience but can proceed beyond the senses to discover that which the senses cannot discover. Modern epistemology has followed to a large extent the epistemology of Locke and assumes that the intellect works exclusively

¹I do not think that Maritain is being completely fair to Kant.

²J. Maritain, The Range of Reason, p. 9.

with various patches of colour, sounds, odours, and so forth. It assumes that the intellect does not have its own proper objects, but must confine itself to the material gained by the penetration of the senses. An aeroplane, for example, is perceived as a grey blotch, a white trail, and a loud noise, and from these different impressions we derive the notion of an aeroplane. In other words the only object of which we have direct knowledge is the particular sensum. Thomistic epistemology stresses, however, that the sense object is not the objectum quod but the objectum quo through which the intellect abstracts the intelligible trans-sensible being. The intellect uses the sense object as the objectum quo, through which it is able to pass to apprehend the objectum quod. The sensible particular is not the terminus of perception, the objectum quod, but the objectum quo through which the intellect can grasp in a direct though mediate activity the intelligible extramental reality, which is the real thing. Mascall states that "the human mind, by its very constitution, is capable of penetrating beneath the phenomenal surface of finite beings and of grasping them, however imperfectly and partially, in their ontological nature".³

It is not the purpose of this thesis to argue for or against these Thomistic premises, since the present paper must restrict its scope. It is sufficient for our purposes at present simply to note these assumptions and to indicate that they are important foundations for the intuition of God. Justification of these assumptions would basically involve examining the soundness of modern philosophy versus ancient and medieval

³E. L. Mascall, He Who Is, p. 83.

philosophy and claiming the superiority of the latter two. The quarrel between the ancients and the moderns cannot be solved at this point.

We shall now examine in detail what Maritain means when he speaks of an intuition of God. As we have seen in the previous chapter, being is the first "object" of the intellect. The intellect grasps being from the material presented to it by the senses, for the senses themselves do not grasp being. It is justifiable, therefore, to regard the intellect's intuition of being as an intellectual perception. Maritain's use of intuition suggests that we can pattern intuition on the model of sense perception. The analogy with sense perception seems basically sound. An object presented to the senses is perceived directly and immediately. Similarly being as an object for the intellect is perceived directly and immediately.⁴ Being is not grasped by inference or deduction but is immediately "seen" by the intellect, which, as Maritain has stated, is cut out to conquer being. Maritain says that

we are confronted here with a genuine intuition, a perception direct and immediate . . . It is a very simple sight, superior to any discursive reasoning or demonstration because it is the source of demonstration. It is a sight whose content and implications no words of human speech can exhaust or adequately express and in which in a moment of decisive emotion, as it were, of spiritual conflagration, the soul is in contact, a living, penetrating, and illuminating contact, with a reality which it touches and which it takes hold of.⁵

As we have seen, Maritain criticises modern philosophy, for it has forgotten that the intellect "sees". It has forgotten that "there are in things objects or centers of visibility, which our senses do not reach

⁴Yet we must remember that the instrumentality of the senses is required.

⁵J. Maritain, A Preface to Metaphysics (New York 1962), p. 51.

but which our intellect does reach."⁶ The intuition of being is but one of the many intuitions that the intellect enjoys. The intellect also sees primary principles such as the principles of identity, non-contradiction, causality and sees the intelligible forms within sense particulars. Being is one object among many, although it is by far the most important, for all other intellectual perceptions depend upon it.

Another point of similarity between intellectual and sense perception is that an element of passivity is involved in both cases. The senses must be passive in order to receive impressions. The intellect must also be passive, since within Thomistic philosophy in the act of knowing, the intellect receives the specifications of the other and becomes immaterially the other.⁷ Both senses and intellect must submit themselves to the object.

Analogy, of course, presupposes not only similarity, but also difference. While the directness and immediacy with which the intellect grasps being justifies comparison with perception, there are points of difference. The most obvious point of difference between the intellect and senses is that the intellect requires the instrumentality of the senses to enable it to intuit. Within the Thomistic philosophy, the intellect cannot function without the mat-

⁶J. Maritain, The Range of Reason (New York 1952) p.9

⁷This is a distinct contrast with Kant.

erial presented to it by the senses. The senses, on the other hand, do not require the instrumentality of another faculty. The intellect, however, cannot enjoy an immediate intuition that is completely independent of the senses. Such a privilege is enjoyed only by angelic intellectual intuition. The analogy between angelic intellectual intuition and sense perception is, therefore, stronger than the analogy between human intellectual intuition and sense perception. Because it requires the instrumentality of the senses, the human intellect must abstract from the material given by the senses in order to see its objects.

Another point of difference is that, while the intellect is partly passive, it is also active. The intellect must receive from the object so that it can be specified by it, and to this extent the intellect is passive. Yet the intellect is active, since it causes itself to be the object. To know is to become immaterially the other, and the vitality for this process comes from the intellect itself. The intellect possesses the activity to cause its own immaterial identification with the object. Knowing is therefore passive inasmuch as the specification is received from the object, but active inasmuch as the vitality for this identification stems from the intellect itself.

So far we have drawn an analogy between intellectual and sense perception. It must be stressed that Maritain's intuition is strictly intellectual, which separates it from intuitions in other philosophies. Maritain's intuition seems

at first like Bergson's, since the description of intuition as a "living, penetrating, and illumination contact" strikes a Bergsonian note, but Maritain stresses the intellectual bent of his intuition. Bergsonian intuition is not strictly an intellectual discipline, but is some species of empathy. Maritain's intuition is conceptualized, while Bergsonian intuition proceeds without concepts for Bergson regarded conceptualization as impairing the directness by which we penetrate to the experience of duration.⁸ Nor is Maritain's intuition of being the object of empirical intuition or concrete encounter, as it is in various systems of existentialism, which tend to make it of the same nature as psychological or moral experience. Being is in these systems grasped by a kind of affective connaturality. Such philosophies forget the intelligible nature of the intuition of being. They forget that the intellect attains reality within itself and intuits being through abstraction in an idea or concept.

It is therefore an idealist prejudice which prevents these philosophies from making a frank and deliberate use of the eidetic intuition. They fail to see that they do employ it all the same but on its lowest level and mingled with sensible and emotional factors, the level, namely, of psychological experience or experiences even more enveloped by the capacity of the senses.

Hence, although the various forms of experience of which I have spoken may serve as paths to the metaphysical perception of

⁸ Though, as we have seen, Maritain is indebted to Bergson.

being, they cannot of themselves constitute it. This perception, this intuition is of supremely eidetic order, is purely intelligible, not empirical.⁹

Thus far we have clarified what Maritain means by the word 'intuition'. It is apparent that intuition as a form of intellectual perception is the correct interpretation. The previous chapter indicated that the intuition of God was connected with that of being. Maritain has stated that this intuition of God takes place in "one unique flash of intuition", even though it contains three steps. The fact that this intuition of God contains three steps seems at first puzzling and seems to make the intuition more inferential than intuitive. It can be argued that Maritain is stating these three leaps in their logically proper order for purposes of clarification, although in actual fact, they all occur simultaneously. On the other hand, Maritain seems to indicate that, although these steps are part of one intuition, there is nevertheless a temporal succession and that the intellect actually moves from one step to the other. He states that "the intellect moves first to actual existence as asserting itself independently of me; and then from this sheer objective existence to my own threatened existence; and finally from my own threatened existence spoiled with nothingness to absolute existence."¹⁰ Phrases like 'moves first' and 'then from...to' are the keys and seem to indicate

⁹J. Maritain, A Preface to Metaphysics (New York 1962) p. 64

¹⁰J. Maritain, Approaches to God (New York 1962) p. 19

an actual temporal succession. It must be repeated that this is not a slow deliberative process, but has rather an element of immediateness and quickness about it. It can be objected that, if there is a movement of the intellect through several steps, then strictly speaking we cannot say that we have one intuition but rather several. This objection might be valid, if each of the steps were explicitly deliberative, but, as Maritain has repeated, there is a rapidity and suddenness in this primordial approach. The speed by which the intellect moves in making these steps and the manner in which the three steps are closely integrated with one another seem at present to justify our calling it one flash of intuition. Whether it can finally be considered this remains to be seen, but this point shall be further considered in later pages.

The existence of God is arrived at in the third step of this intuition, and this intuition of God is considered to be direct though mediate. What must now be examined is whether we actually intuit God's existence through finite things or infer it from the contents of our experience. Upon close examination it seems that this third step is in fact inferred from the other two steps. It appears that we do not enjoy an intuition of the existence of God in and through finite being but rather we appear to infer God's existence from our awareness of finite being. Such an interpretation is suggested by the following passage,

And third, in the same flash of intuition, which is but my becoming aware of the intelligible value of being, I realize that the solid and inexorable existence perceived in anything whatsoever implies...some absolute, irrefragable existence, completely free from nothingness and death.¹¹

The second stage, the reasoning which follows upon the intuition and elaborates upon it, also indicates that God's existence is arrived at through inference. Maritain states that "I see that Being-with-nothingness, as my own being is, implies, in order to be, Being-without-nothingness."¹² In another discussion, Maritain writes that "from this it finally follows that since this universal whole does not exist by virtue of itself, it must be that Being-without-nothingness exists apart from it."¹³ It, therefore, seems to be the case that God's existence is reached on the basis of inference from the previous two steps. Out of our observations of finite being we infer the existence of infinite Being or God.

We are now in a position to clarify fully the relationship between the intuition of being and the intuition of God and what exactly is meant by the word 'intuition' in the latter case. From the foregoing evidence, it appears that the existence of God is inferred from the intuition of being. Once we have gained the intuition of being, the in-

¹¹ Ibid., p.19

¹² J. Maritain, The Range of Reason (New York 1962) p.80, my italics

¹³ J. Maritain, Approaches to God (New York 1962) p.19. The phrase "must be" suggests an inferential process.

intellect immediately infers the existence of God on the basis of the finitude of being and by the use of the analogical nature of being. The existence of God is inferred to account for the existence of finite creatures, which are unable to account for their own existence. We are here using the word 'inference' to describe a process involving successive steps until a conclusion is reached, although I realize that there can be immediate inferences. The existence of God seems to be reached in this manner by Maritain. The notion of God's existence is the conclusion of an argument rather than an "object" of intellectual perception. God does not appear to be an object confronting the intellect, but is the conclusion of an argument. Certainly the argument could claim that there is such an object or external reality as God, but He is not an object for the intellect in the manner suggested by the model of intellectual perception. God is posited as the creator of finite being. This inferential step seems to follow inevitably with considerable vigour. Maritain suggests that the intellect seems almost forced to make this inference, once it has been granted the intuition of being. Maritain says that "the knowledge of God....is first and foremost a fruit of the intuition of existence, and forces itself upon our mind in the imperative of virtue of this intuition."¹⁴ Such statements give us some indication of the necessity under which this inference is made. The intuition of God has turned

¹⁴J. Maritain, The Range of Reason (New York 1962) p.90, my italics.

out to be a very rapid inference of God's existence. Having set up the model of intuition as intellectual perception, Maritain does not use this model when he comes to the intuition of God and has, in fact, used inference.

If God's existence is in fact inferred, then is Maritain justified in speaking of an intuition of God? We have seen that he has said that the existence of God is posited within one flash of intuition and we have also seen that intellectual intuition can be considered an intellectual perception. Evidence has indicated, however, that the existence of God is inferred from the existence of the creatures. If God's existence is the result of inference, then we cannot say that the intellect perceives the existence of God. If God's existence is inferred, then we must reinterpret Maritain's one unique intuition. What seems to be the case is that in this unique flash of intuition that Maritain talks of, we quickly infer God's existence on the basis of our intuition of being. This element of quickness is important. As Maritain says, the inference is not slow or ponderous, but is done with speed and rapidity. Nevertheless, it still remains an inference and cannot be regarded as an intuition. With this in mind we must re-examine whether the unique flash of intuition with its three steps can validly be considered intuition. The first two steps qualify, since the intellect contemplates as its object being abstracted from particulars, and the quickness with which the mind jumps from one step to the

other justifies, as was stated earlier, our considering them as both within the bonds of one intuition. The third step is, as we have seen, an inference of Absolute Being. Therefore, we must break up the one unique flash of intuition with its three steps into an intuition with two steps followed immediately by an inference.

We must be careful in distinguishing the different meanings of the word 'intuition'. We have defined intuition within the Thomistic framework as intellectual perception with an object directly and immediately before it.¹⁵ Intuition is commonly used, however, to indicate an intellectual process which is carried out extremely rapidly. We say, for example, that we know intuitively that our friend John will marry Sue. What seems to be involved here is that a chain of reasoning involving the habits and tastes of John and Sue pass rapidly through our minds and the answer that John and Sue will marry is quickly arrived at. In this example, the word 'intuition' is used to mean a very rapid inferential process.¹⁶ In mathematics, to take another example, we say that we intuitively know that the answer to the problem is that x is 9. What seems to be the case is that we have done similar problems on previous occasions and that the steps of the inference pass rapidly through our

¹⁵ Though the instrumentality of the senses may be required.

¹⁶ This would appear to be what Descartes means by the word 'intuition'.

mind. This first meaning must be distinguished from the second meaning of intuition, which is the meaning used by Maritain and indicates an intellectual perception after the fashion of the analogy sketched earlier. We have seen that Maritain does not say that we have an intuition of God in the second sense of the term. Maritain could, however, say that we have an intuition of God in the first sense, since this inferential process of God's existence moves extremely rapidly. When Maritain talks of our knowing God's existence within one flash of intuition, it is possible that he is sliding over into the first meaning of the word and is thinking that, since God's existence is inferred very quickly, we can say that we intuit God's existence. At any rate we may conclude that Maritain does not intuit but rapidly infers God's existence. The word 'intuition' as used by Maritain in speaking of an intuition of God is being used in the sense of a very rapid inferential process.

We noted in a previous discussion of the relation between concepts and intuition that conceptualization and the bare intuition are closely woven together so that in actual practice they cannot be actually separated, although for purposes of explication, a distinction can be made. The inference of God's existence, therefore, is reached on a conceptual level. Indeed, it is difficult to understand how inference can be carried out without concepts. God is, therefore, conceived as existing, and Maritain's approach can be regarded as essential as opposed to existential. It

seems, in fact, that what this primordial approach really is is a kind of primitive cosmological argument. We reason that the world is unable to account for its own existence, and we infer the existence of God to account for it. This primordial approach is the germ of the cosmological argument to God's existence. If this is the basic nature of the inference, then Maritain must attempt to meet the objections to this argument and particularly those of the Kantian system. The basic problem is that the inference of God's existence must move from the essential to the existential order.¹⁷ It can be charged that the idea of God's existence has been shown to be thinkable and possible, but has been established only on the conceptual level. How can we guarantee that the inference of the existence of God is based on existential reality? Can we guarantee God's existence on the existential level?

Immanuel Kant, for example, claims that, while the cosmological proof begins with the experience of contingency, to establish the existence of God, it slides across to the ontological argument and assumes that God's existence follows from a concept of God. Reason takes leave of experience altogether and from concepts only establishes which among all possible things contains in itself the requisite conditions of absolute necessity. This requisite is found

¹⁷That is, from the concept of God to the recognition that there is a real being corresponding to this concept.

in the concept of the ens realissimum only, and reason thereby concludes that this is the necessary Being.

The whole conclusive strength of the so-called cosmological proofs rests therefore in reality on the ontological proof from mere concepts, while the appeal to experience is quite superfluous, and, though it may lead us on the concept of absolute necessity, it can not demonstrate it with any necessary object.¹⁸

Kant's point is that, while experience may suggest the concept of a necessary Being, experience itself cannot demonstrate whether there is such a reality that answers to the concept. Hence the cosmological argument cannot establish that there is a Necessary Being, although it can establish the concept of a Necessary Being. It can further be argued by Kant that "the concept of a Supreme Being is, in many respects, a very useful idea."¹⁹ Kant argues within the first critique that the concept of God is a concept of reason which serves the purpose of unifying and completing our knowledge. The concept of God is, so to speak, a subjective law of economy, which serves the useful purpose of unification, but does not give us the right to assume an objective validity of such a concept and "to run riot in the transcendent." In the case of the cosmological argument, it could be argued that the notion of a self-sufficient being is a useful concept arising from our observation that

¹⁸ T.M. Greene (ed.), Kant Selections (New York 1957) p.254

¹⁹ Ibid., p.251

all things within our experience are not self-sufficient. The notion of a self-sufficient Being thus gives us the intellectual satisfaction of unity and completeness to what would otherwise have seemed incomplete.

In the previous chapter the position of E. L. Mascall was outlined briefly, and, since we have encountered difficulties in Maritain's position, it seems appropriate to turn to Mascall to see if he can avoid some of Maritain's difficulties. We must first discuss at greater length what Mascall means by apprehending God "in and through finite creatures". The first possible interpretation of what this means is the interpretation given to Maritain, that of a rapid inference. It could be argued that our intuition of being discloses to us that being, as we encounter it, is finite. It is incomplete in itself and unable to account for its own existence. Therefore, we infer the existence of Infinite Being, which we call God. Mascall, at several points, gives evidence for such an interpretation. He quotes, for example, with approval Dom Pontifex's statement that the direct object of our experience is "effect-implying-cause". How else can we go from the existence of finite creatures to that of God but by inference or by apprehending God as He is in Himself? Thomistic thought has maintained that this latter apprehension is man's highest end and is reserved for the next life. Since the latter has been ruled out, for it implies that in earthly life we are not confronted with the vision of God as He is in Himself, we are

therefore left with inference. The existence of God must, therefore, be inferred on the basis of our awareness of finite being.

This interpretation does not, however, do justice to the notion of contuition, which Mascall has emphasized. The key is Mascall's statement that, "the object of his (ontologist's) apprehension is not God in His naked reality but God is manifested in His creative activity in finite being; more accurately, the object is finite being as manifesting God in His creative act."²⁰ A more adequate interpretation, therefore, of what is meant by apprehending God "in and through finite creatures" is to say that we apprehend God by seeing finite being as essentially dependent. Earlier it was shown how the intuition of being is an intellectual perception. At the same time as we "see" being, Mascall would assert that we "see" it as dependent and inasmuch as we "see" finite beings as dependent, we realize that they "declare their immediate dependence upon a being that is absolutely and infinitely perfect."²¹ We "see" God, so to speak, as existing "behind" dependent being. The seeing of dependency makes us intuitively aware of that which is not dependent. Maritain insists that this step is not inferential, for he says that "the existence of being in

which essence and existence are really distinct does not logically imply the existence of a being in which essence and existence are really identical."²² It must be stressed that we do not see this "beyond" as it is in itself for our perception of it is mediated by that which is dependent. We see God by and through our seeing of the dependency of finite being. Finite being manifests the radical dependency of itself upon God and we should note that the word 'manifests' means 'showing' rather than 'inferring'. Because of our intuition of dependent being, we gain an intuition of God that is mediate and direct.

The very seeing of dependency entails that we see at the same time something "beyond." Perhaps a rough analogy will help to clarify this point. It is as if Mascall is calling us to see that finite being has the important property *q*, *q* being the property of dependency. We know that *q* by its very nature cannot exist without the property *u*, which is the sustaining activity of a self-sufficient God. We do not actually see property *u* in itself, but immediately upon seeing *q*, we realize that there must also be property *u*, since *q* cannot exist without *u*. The jump from *q* to *u* is not inferred, but in seeing *q*, we can say that we also see *u*, the perception of the latter being mediated by the former.

²²Ibid, p.78

The problem which we are really encountering in explaining how we see God through seeing finite being is that the analogy of perception is being seriously strained. To speak of seeing God mediately strains the analogy with sense perception, which we drew earlier. Do we ever say that we perceive something mediately in sense perception? The notion of sense perception involves the idea of seeing something directly and immediately. It might make sense to speak of intellectually seeing something mediately, but this is difficult to do within the analogy of sense perception. If we do not see anything directly and immediately, it can be doubted whether we see it at all. Seeing mediately seems to imply that on the basis of seeing, we infer something beyond that which we see. For example, on looking at the front wall of a house, we could say that we mediately see the back wall, but we are in reality inferring that the house has a back wall on the basis of our seeing the front wall. Is not the key notion of perception the idea that the object is direct and immediate? How do we see anything that is direct and mediate?

Yet the answer to this objection has already been given. In saying that we perceive God mediately and directly, Mascall means that we perceive the quality of dependency in finite being. In perceiving finite being as dependent, we are at the same time perceiving it as sustained by God's activity, since this is what dependency involves. This answer can soften the criticism, which claims that we were

straining the analogy of intellectual perception in speaking of God as being perceived mediately and directly. What is actually the case is that we perceive the dependency of finite being immediately and directly. In saying that we perceive God mediately and directly, what we are really doing is perceiving the quality of dependency immediately and directly, and, as we have seen, dependency by its very nature testifies to that which is independent. It is this factor which can come to the rescue of the analogy. In actual fact, we perceive the dependency of finite being immediately and directly, and in so doing, we are justified in claiming that we see God mediately and directly.

The unity of this process must be stressed. As we have said, the seeing of the dependency of the contingent order is also a seeing of a self-sufficient Source. The two are necessary and blend together. We would not see the world as dependent, if we did not see that there was a self-sufficient Source. Similarly, we would not intuit God, if we did not see the dependency of the contingent order. The intuition of the two orders is essentially one intuition, the seeing of the one clarifying and contrasting with the other. We must repeat Mascall's claim that what we intuit is neither the creature-without-God nor God-without-the-creature, but the creature-deriving-being-from-God and God-as-the-creative-ground-of-the-creature: God-and-the-creature-

in-the-cosmological-relation. It is not the case that we intuit the world as dependent and then intuit God, for we would not recognize the world as dependent, if we did not have some awareness of God. On the other hand, we do not enjoy some mystical vision of God and on the basis of this, recognize the world as dependent. It must be remembered that the two elements are combined into one intuition. There is a vital tension between the two elements, but it is this tension that makes the intuition.

It can be objected that this intuition is attempting to combine too much and that this "vital tension" must ultimately break down into two distinct intuitions. It might actually be the case that this intuition of the cosmological relation is actually an inference of the existence of God made on the basis of our observations that the world is contingent. This would make Mascall's position like that of Maritain's. On the other hand, Mascall's intuition might be a quasi-mystical apprehension of God or a revelation, which makes us view the world as dependent. Either one of these alternatives might be the experience which Mascall claims as his intuition. In defence of Mascall, however, it must be admitted that Mascall seems aware of these other alternatives and stresses that his cosmological intuition does not fall into the categories mentioned above. He repudiates the view that he is using inference and denies that this intuition is a supernatural form of grace or illumination. The reply is, of course, that in spite of

his denials, his cosmological intuition still falls into one of two categories. In the last analysis the case must rest with the testimony of experience. Mascall claims that this intuition is within the scope of experience of us all. If the reader has had such an intuition and agrees that Mascall is correct in his description, then Mascall has been vindicated. Since Mascall claims that his case is founded upon experience, it must be tested on that basis. Mascall claims that if we really recognize contingent being as contingent, we will see it as dependent and will also see God mediately. Contingency and finitude mean dependency, and we shall see the characteristic of dependency "by an intimate metaphysical grasp of what contingency, as our experience reveals it to us, really is."²³ Mascall believes in

the inherent power of the human mind to penetrate into the heart of beings and obtain a true, even though a limited grasp of their ontological status, and the consequent possibility of an immediate recognition that that status demands as its ground the existence of that infinite Being whom, as the Angelic Doctor tells us, all men are agreed in calling God.²⁴

Mascall's intuition of God hinges, therefore, upon the seeing of finite being as dependent, for on the basis of this we see God, the independent Being, mediately through

²³ E.L.Mascall, Existence and Analogy (London 1949) p.67

²⁴ E.L.Mascall, He Who Is (London 1943) p.92

dependent being. Mascall's case finally rests upon the conviction that such an intuition is within our experience.

It is time that we attempted to answer the criticism that was raised against Maritain, which is that the existence of God is posited only on the conceptual or essential level, and is not guaranteed on the existential level. We must inquire if Mascall can overcome this charge. Do we simply conceptualize God into existence? Mascall insists on the existential anchorage of our intuition of God, and this may be of assistance to us in defending both Maritain and Mascall. Mascall is much more definite than Maritain on the fact of God's actual existence. He states that the apprehension of God's existence is not contained in a concept, but rather is affirmed in a judgment. We do not conceive God's existence but rather affirm his mode of existence. We do, of course, use concepts to make our affirmation, for otherwise we would not know what it was we were affirming and our judgment would be meaningless. In the concepts by which we refer to God, we do not, however, form a concept of God himself, for this would be to define him and would lead us into ontologism.²⁵ Mascall insists that what he is doing is affirming God's mode of existence using the concepts of finite being. The intuition of God

²⁵By ontologism we mean the notion that the unassisted human intellect in its earthly existence beholds the essence of God.

is an intuition that affirms God's existence rather than conceives it. By placing a great emphasis upon judgment, Mascall considers himself an existentialist²⁶. He would, therefore, claim that the intuition of God is safely planted on the existential level.

We have not started with a clear and distinct idea of God or with a concept of his essence and then proceeded to discover something that corresponds to this idea or this concept. We have, on the contrary, started from the existence of finite being and found it declaring by its very finitude the existence of a being of which we can form no clear and distinct idea and of whose essence we can form no concept.²⁷

This claim must be examined in greater detail.

If we affirm God's existence through concepts whether

²⁶This term has been used to a considerable degree thus far, and a definition is in order. Mascall derives his 'existentialism' from Aquinas, who, so Mascall claims, places stress upon the notion of existence. Aquinas recognized the primacy of existence rather than the Platonic attempt to cast all existence into essences. Aquinas moved from the Platonic notion of 'to be is to be something' to the notion of 'to be that which it is'. The essence of something is the manner in which it exists. Aquinas' starting point is the one, the actual concrete existent. Essence arises from the existential act and does not precede it. Mascall, claiming the support of Aquinas, says that we must start with existential acts, each of which because of its determinate character gives rise to a particular essence. Essence is the mode of existence.

²⁷E. L. Mascall, Existence and Analogy (London 1949) p.88

finite or not, then it appears that concepts come before judgment and we are still open to the charge that we have extended concepts beyond the realm of reality and might be affirming an object which has been merely conceived. If, however, Mascall still insists that affirmation comes before conceptualization, then we are again faced with the problem of how one can affirm without concepts. It seems difficult to know how we can affirm without concepts, however vague they might be, as indeed concepts must be that apply to God. On the other hand, it can be argued that we can affirm that something is without knowing what it is. We see, for example, an object in the dark. We know that it exists, but we are unable to describe it by concepts. What Mascall seems to be saying is that we make a first affirmation that God exists. We then use finite concepts and make a second affirmation that these concepts apply to God. But again it seems that Mascall has problems. How does Mascall know that it is God's existence that he is affirming in the original affirmation? In the example of the object in the dark, we affirm only that 'something' exists. Mascall, so it seems, wants to say that in the original affirmation we are affirming more than the existence of 'something'. He wants to make this 'something' God. But how can he do this without admitting that this 'something' can be conceptually described, and, therefore, admitting that concepts come first. In the final analysis, Mascall's existentialism, it seems to me, gets out of hand in his

attempt to establish God's existence on the existential plane. In spite of Mascall's statements, it is difficult to see how he can avoid some of the same criticisms that have been levelled against Maritain. There is still the danger that God's existence has been established only in a concept and that there may not be an object answering to the concept.²⁸

Both Mascall and Maritain want to maintain that the intuition of God, whether it be inferred or "perceived", is rooted in the existential realm. As we have seen, Thomism maintains that our minds can reach reality and probe its ontological depths. Concepts, they maintain, are derived from the insight of the intellect and are patterned after reality. Indeed, as we have already indicated, the concept is the means through which we grasp reality. Concepts which are products of the categories of the understanding are unknown in Thomistic philosophy, for the intellect is not locked within itself but penetrates through to the existential realm. Intuition and concepts are

²⁸I realize that I have probably been unfair to Mascall. This whole question is one that has given me considerable difficulty. Perhaps some of the difficulty springs from the fact that Mascall's statements on the subject are too brief for proper understanding. Mascall derives this notion from the fifth edition of Etienne Gilson's Le Thomisme. A clearer understanding of this issue would no doubt be gained by a study of the relevant texts in Gilson's book.

derived from the intellect's ability to perceive reality as it really is. Maritain has stressed that, when we have gained the intuition of being, we are driven by necessity to infer God's existence. Existential conditions force the intellect into inferring the existence of God. Therefore, Maritain would maintain that the existence of God is not simply a play on concepts but is rooted in "the way things are." The existential realm testifies to the existence of God.

Thus the internal dynamism of the intuition of existence, or of the intelligible value of being, causes me to see that absolute existence or being-without-nothingness transcends the totality of nature. And there I am, confronted with the existence of God.²⁹

The key words here are the phrases "causes me to see" and "confronts." The inference of God's existence is necessitated by existential conditions so that Maritain is "confronted" with God's existence. While God's existence is conceptually inferred, such concepts are faithfully patterned after existential conditions. Both Mascall and Maritain insist that their philosophical pronouncements mirror reality and that an intuition of God's existence is not some kind of linguistic trick but an existential reality. Both have confidence in the intellect's ability to understand the nature of the universe. In this way, they would attempt to overcome the charge that they are dependent upon the ontological argument and to avoid Kant's criticisms.

Mascall concludes that

the outcome has been the affirmation of the existence of a God who is self-existent and therefore does not exist just in order that the world may be rational. We have in fact arrived at the God of whom the Old Testament speaks. Quoad nos et in ordine cognoscendi, God appears primarily as the world's creator, but, in the very process by which we come to recognize Him, He is manifested as existing quoad seipsam et in ordine essendi in His own right and not for our convenience.³⁰

In the last analysis, the Thomists are confident that the intellect can know reality and that its concepts arise from an adequate understanding of reality. The concept 'God' arises in the intellect, because reality indicates that there is such a being. In the final analysis, the dispute hinges on the ancient and medieval belief that metaphysics is possible. Much of modern philosophy is skeptical about the possibility of metaphysics and, therefore, is inclined to deny the harmony between the concepts of the intellect and reality itself.

Mascall and Maritain have shown how the intuition of being leads to the existence of a Necessary Being whom they call God. Maritain regards this "primordial way of approach" as being "human reason's eternal way of approaching God."³¹ What we must now question is whether this equation of Necessary Being with God is entirely justified. Maritain

p.89

³⁰ E.L.Mascall, Existence and Analogy (London 1949)

³¹ J.Maritain, Approaches to God (New York 1962) p.20

and Mascall are rather ambiguous on this point, and we must explore their several statements on the matter and evaluate them.

At several points Maritain indicates that his primordial way of approach is sufficient to confront us with God. He states that "the knowledge of God, before being developed into logical and perfectly conceptualized demonstrations, is first and foremost a natural fruit of the intuition of existence."³² Mascall also strengthens this position by his continual emphasis that finite beings manifest the creative activity of God. He writes that "in the last resort St. Thomas has only one datum for an argument for the existence of God, namely, the existence of beings whose existence is not necessitated by their essence; that is, beings in which essence and existence are really distinct."³³ It appears that the intuition of a Necessary Being is at the same time an intuition of God.

The equating of Necessary Being with God is certainly justified in ordine essendi. Within a fully developed metaphysics such as that of Aquinas, God is most certainly Being-without-nothingness, who creates and sustains finite beings. Yet the traditional meaning of the word "God" means more than simply an ontological prin-

³²J. Maritain, The Range of Reason (New York 1952)p.90

³³E.L. Mascall, Existence and Analogy (London 1949) p.78

ciple. The word "God" is more apt to convey notions of goodness, justice, awe, and a host of other attributes which inspire in man the attitude of reverence and devotion. Rudolph Otto has discussed at considerable length "the idea of the holy" and has shown how the term "God" suggests the numinous, and notions of value. The believer is more inclined to regard the experiencing of these qualities as a more adequate intuition of God than the awareness of Necessary Being. There are several criticisms that can be raised against the Thomists. In the first place, Inscall and Maritain suggest that in ordine cognoscendi God is first known as Necessary Being. The intuition of being, "reason's eternal approach to God" seems to be regarded as the most fundamental approach to God. Such an approach seems strange to the believer, who, it seems likely, first knows God as the God of goodness, and other such qualities, many of which Otto has pinpointed. In the second place, it is debatable whether the intuition of Being-without-nothingness is adequate as an intuition of God. The believer would wish to maintain that by the word "God" much more is meant than Being-without-nothingness. It may be quite legitimate to speak of an intuition of Being-without-nothingness, but it is straining religious sensitivities to establish this as an adequate "approach to God." The notion of God as Necessary Being is one strand of traditional ideas about God, but nevertheless it is only one strand and is secondary to an intuition of God as the object of reverence. Man has

fundamentally regarded God as holy and only secondarily as Necessary Being. Mascall and Maritain have either made being and the numinous identical or have omitted the latter. In either case an important part of what is meant by 'God' has not been dealt with adequately; Being-without-nothingness gives us no "idea of the holy."

Finally it would seem that the approach to God through an awareness of being is made less plausible by existentialism. The philosophy of Martin Heidegger is an attempt to call man back to Being and to let Being present itself to him. Heidegger has pursued Being all his life and yet has never experienced God. The existential encounter with Being by Heidegger and Sartre has never been an encounter with God. It can certainly be argued that the search for Being is in reality a search for God and that Heidegger has not clearly seen this. The criticism remains, however, that Necessary Being is only one strand of what is meant by 'God', and in itself is not sufficient to establish an adequate intuition of God. The contemplation of the finite objects of nature through the awareness of being is not sufficient to be considered an adequate intuition of God.

It must be mentioned that the force of these criticisms appear to have been felt by the Thomist, Frederick Copleston. Copleston says that we enjoy an intuition of being which give us "the pre-reflective awareness of things as standing in relation to an obscure Ground of existence"³⁴

³⁴Frederick Copleston, Contemporary Philosophy (Westminster 1963) p.74

and "the marginal awareness of an undescribed background or ground of finite existence."³⁵ Yet Copleston hesitates to call this intuition of a ground of existence God. As a Thomist he admits that on the ontological level they are identical, but within this "marginal awareness" he does not wish to identify the ground of finite existence with God. Copleston regards the intuition of finitude as yielding the awareness that finite beings are dependent upon that which is not dependent. This he thinks is the basic content of the intuition, and attempts to explicate this awareness of dependence gives rise to various metaphysical systems, which interpret this awareness in different ways. To regard the ground of existence as God in the Christian sense is simply one interpretation, which albeit legitimate, cannot be justified by the intuition itself.

I do not want to argue here in favour of any particular philosophy or type of philosophy; but I do suggest that the question of the ultimate ground of empirical existence would never be raised were there not a primary implicit awareness of existing against a background of Being...A pre-reflective awareness of dependence or of what used to be called "contingency" is not the same thing as a direct awareness of God. If it were, there could hardly be those disputes between rival metaphysical systems of different types, to which we are accustomed in the history of philosophy.³⁶

The conclusion to be drawn from this is not that God is not Necessary Being, but rather that to go from the in-

³⁵H.D.Lewis (ed.), Contemporary British Philosophy (London 1956) p.137

³⁶F.Copleston, Contemporary Philosophy (Westminster 1963) p.75

tuition of Necessary Being to the intuition of God is too simplified a notion and does not do full justice to what the believer normally thinks an intuition of God involves. We must, therefore, criticise Mascall and Maritain if they intend to leap from one to the other, and evidence indicates that they do so.

As we have seen, what is needed to make Being-without-nothingness a more adequate intuition of God is some notion of value. For the most part Mascall's and Maritain's discussion of being has been divorced from any consideration of value. Yet there are suggestions within Mascall and Maritain that being as such is valuable. Both Mascall and Maritain maintain that the intuition of being is the driving force behind the famous five ways of Aquinas and contains the germ of the five full developed proofs. Maritain writes,

It appears, therefore, that the philosophical proofs of the existence of God, let us say the five ways of St. Thomas Aquinas, are a development and an unfolding of this natural knowledge, raised to the level of scientific discussion and scientific certitude. And they normally presuppose this natural knowledge, not with regard to the logical structure of the demonstration, but with regard to the existential conditions of the thinking subject.³⁷

Mascall regards the five ways as drawing attention to five outstanding features of finite being, all of which can be reduced to one fundamental characterization, the inability of finite being to account for its own existence. The

³⁷ J. Maritain, Approaches to God (New York 1962) p.23

five ways are five ways of explicating the dependence of finite being upon God.

The different arguments are not obtained by syllogizing five different kinds of acts of inspection of finite beings; they are all obtained from one kind of act, and indeed can all be obtained from one single act. If we see any finite being as it really is--one point of moss or the smallest ant, to use Maritain's illustration--we shall see that God is implicated in it as First Mover, First Efficient Cause, and all the rest.³⁸

If the intuition of the cosmological relation is considered to be the root of five ways, it is obvious that being must convey some notions of value if it is to be the source of the fourth and fifth way, which deal with the value of the creation. Mascall and Maritain unfortunately have only scattered references to the value of being, and, as we have seen, they seem concerned only with that aspect of the intuition of being that can be developed into the first three ways. If they had given more attention to the relation between being and value, then the intuition of the Necessary Being would yield a more adequate intuition of God, since it would see God as the creator of value. If greater emphasis can be placed on showing how the fourth and fifth ways develop from the basic intuition, the criticisms against equating the intuition of God with the intuition of Necessary Being can be overcome, for God would then be a God of value and not simply a bare Being-without-nothingness. Thomism

³⁸E.L.Mascall, He Who Is (London 1943) p.78

contains within itself the cure of the malady in the fourth and fifth ways, but Mascall and Maritain have not sufficiently developed it. Beyond mentioning that the fourth and fifth ways can be derived from the intuition of being, they say little. Maritain talks at one point of the "intelligible value of being"³⁹ and Mascall says that "the fact that beings exist with limited perfection declares their immediate dependence upon a being that is absolutely and infinitely perfect"⁴⁰ but such references are few and scattered. God as the God of value, the fundamental way in which He is regarded by the believer, is passed over.

It should be noted in passing that Maritain does talk about a rediscovery of Love. He claims that the rediscovery of existence is not only a rediscovery of God but also a rediscovery of Love. The intuition of being apparently carries along with it the intuition of my own Self in the form of an intuition of Subjectivity as Subjectivity. This Subjectivity is not an object of thought, but rather is "the very well spring of thought - a deep, unknown, and living centre which superabounds in love, attaining through love its suprememlevel of existence, existence as giving itself."⁴¹ In this "abyss of Subjectivity" we discover what Maritain calls the generosity of existence. Subjectivity,

³⁹J.Maritain, Approaches to God (New York 1962) p.20

⁴⁰E.L.Mascall, Existence and Analogy (London 1949)
p.77

⁴¹J.Maritain, The Range of Reason (New York)1962)p.90

which is a dynamic and living centre, not only receives but gives. It receives through the intellect by means of knowledge; it gives through the will by means of love. This giving of love is, Maritain thinks, the supreme revelation of existence for the Self.

Thus it is that when a man has been really awakened to the sense of Being or Existence, and grasps intuitively the obscure, living depths of the Self and Subjectivity, he experiences, by virtue of the inner dynamism of this intuition, that love is not a passing pleasure or a more or less intense emotion, but the root tendency and very meaning of his being alive. He becomes both an 'ontological and erotic' man; he is man anew.⁴²

Therefore, Maritain says that through our primordial intellectual grasping of existence, we know that God is the self-subsisting Being. Through an intuition accompanying this, we also know God as "absolute ontological generosity, the self-subsisting Love; and that such transcendent Love inherently causes, permeates, and activates every creature, which in answer loves God more than itself."⁴³ Thus the intuition of Being is coupled with an intuition of Love. While the recognition of this intuition of Love might be an attempt to make God the source of value, it nevertheless is not entirely satisfactory. In the first place, while the intuition of love apparently accompanies the intuition of being, it nevertheless remains a separate intuition. To give full justice to the notion of God as the source of value, Maritain should attempt to incorporate

p.90 ⁴²J.Maritain, The Range of Reason (New Yor: 1962)

⁴³Ibid. n.90

the intuition of love within the intuition of being so that the intuition of Being-without-nothingness is at the same time an intuition of a Being-who-is-Love. Since the two are separated, the fundamental criticism still remains. In the second place, this talk of an intuition of Love stemming from subjectivity has the serious disadvantage of being, at least to me, extremely obscure. I cannot really understand what he is saying, and I suspect that it is not entirely my own fault.

Within the Thomistic framework there is actually considerable material for Mascall and Maritain to draw upon in discussing the relation between being and value, for Aquinas has discussed the matter at considerable length. Aquinas says that goodness and being are really the same so that in ordine essendi a consideration of being involves a consideration of value. Aquinas states that each being has a good, and is in its own manner perfect.

I answer that every being, as being, is good. For all being, as being, has actuality and is in some way perfect, since every act is some sort of perfection, and perfection implies desirability and goodness, as is clear from what has been said. Hence, it follows that every being as such is good.⁴⁴

According to Aquinas each entity has its own perfection and goodness as an end to be achieved. Aquinas also identifies beauty with being and goodness. It should be pointed out that by 'good' Aquinas here means a kind of 'ontological goodness', which is not the same thing as moral goodness,

⁴⁴Introduction to St. Thomas Aquinas, (ed. A.C. Pegis) (New York 1948) p.38

but nevertheless it is clear that the scale of being is at the same time a scale of value. God is the supreme end and object of value, and all things desire Him. God as Necessary Being is therefore a God of value, a notion which does justice to the reverence and worship of God by the believer. If this notion of value is incorporated within the intuition of being, then Maritain and Mascall will have greater justification in moving from the intuition of being to the intuition of God.

Yet there remains one important obstacle to be overcome before this can be done. The Thomists must establish the objective status of values; they must convince us that values are embedded within being and are not the products of human choice. Modern philosophy whether it be philosophical analysis or existentialism has established the fact-value distinction and has said that values are created by man. The world as such, being as such, has no value in itself; it has only those values which we choose to give it. 'X is good' really means 'I like x' or 'I commend x to you'. Once the existence of God is established satisfactorily, then the fact-value distinction becomes easier to tackle. Once we are convinced that theism is true, then it is not likely that we will regard the Creation, which reflects its Creator, as being without value and think that the creatures themselves create their own values. The Thomists, however, cannot assume the existence of God at this point, for this is the very issue under discussion. At this point we must

move from values to God and not vice versa. The Thomist cannot use God's existence to establish the objectivity of values. He must, therefore, establish the objectivity of values and show that being is valuable, before he can posit the intuition of God as the source of value. Such a task is important not only for the Thomist but for any theist.

In this chapter, we have examined what Mascall and Maritain mean when they speak of an intuition of God. Maritain's intuition of God is basically inferential by nature; Mascall's intuition of God patterns itself after the model of perception. In both cases, the intuition is an exclusively intellectual operation. Some of the difficulties that arise out of their meaning of intuition have been indicated. We then examined the contents of the intuition of God that both Thomists give us and assessed its value from a religious perspective. In both cases, the intuition was found to be rather meagre because of the lack of consideration of values. It was suggested that the fault was not that of Thomism as such, but was due to Maritain's and Mascall's treatment. Attempts to rectify their oversights within a Thomistic framework can be carried out. Both Mascall and Maritain have been attempting to point out by their intuition of being the dependency of the temporal order upon God, and this appears to be the key notion. In our next chapter we shall examine in detail another approach to the notion of dependency and one which we hope will remedy some of the defects in Mascall's and Maritain's position.

CHAPTER III

THE AUGUSTINIAN APPROACH OF TRETHOWAN AND BAILLIE

In the previous chapter, we saw the attempt by Maritain and Mascall to establish an intuition of God on the basis of the intuition of being. Dissatisfaction was expressed with this viewpoint, because the intuition of God granted by this approach seemed inadequate from a religious standpoint. Some attempt was made by the Thomists to incorporate considerations of value into the intuition, but no attempt was made to establish the objectivity of values, which was indicated as a necessary starting-point. Some evidence must be given that values are embedded within the world and are not the result of human projection, as much of modern philosophy maintains. The Augustinian approach, as represented by Trethowan and Baillie establishes its intuition of God on the awareness of value and thereby attempts to give a more adequate notion of what is generally meant by the term 'God'. Trethowan and Baillie also appear aware of criticisms of the objective status of values and attempt to show how values are embedded within the very world itself.

Trethowan maintains that a wide range of values, whether they be ethical or aesthetic, can lead us to an

intuition of God, but concentrates his attention upon ethical values. Trethowan makes the case for the objectivity of values by analyzing carefully what is involved in the matter of obligation. In the last analysis he does not resort to argument to make his case, but maintains that his case rests upon an analysis of our actual experience. In the last analysis he would claim that his case has empirical grounding and that positions which depart from this are not being faithful to our actual experience. The crux of obligation is that 'we are called upon to do something, that we are not morally free.'¹ When a particular value makes a claim upon us, we feel that this value, so to speak, stands over against us and compels us into a course of action, even though our immediate desire is to carry out some other course of action. Let us repeat, for example, the value of the search for truth. Certainly it may be said that it is useful and expedient for us to know the truth, but Trethowan insists that this is not the whole story. Is there not, for example, in the case of the scientist something of the sacred about facts? In spite of our wishes, it matters that we know the truth.

To recognize that something is true is not merely to decide that you can rely on your information, that you can make something work. It is to find something from which there is no legitimate escape; we may succeed in putting it out of our minds, if we happen to dislike it, but we can hardly fail to be aware, at the same time in our

¹Trethowan, The Basis of Belief (New York 1961) p.96

lives at least, that in such a case we are doing a sort of violence to ourselves ... Truth, the rock bottom which we can touch if we try, is something over against all of us.²

In the final analysis, Trethowan concludes, we value the truth, not because of personal desires or motives, but because it makes a demand upon us to which we feel obligated to respond. The search for truth seems to be intrinsically valuable and we are called upon to recognize this and carry out its claims. "Value is always an encounter with what does not spring from ourselves, it cannot be entirely our own work, it is always in some sense a gift."³ The crux of the matter is that Trethowan does not think that man is morally free, as, for example, Sartre would maintain and that man's freedom precedes value standards. We are not free to project our freedom in whatever mode of Being-in-the-world that we wish. Trethowan maintains that values stand in judgment over our freedom and oblige us to act in accordance with their dictates. Such a position, Trethowan maintains, is founded upon an analysis of the obligation which we experience in encountering a value standard. His case rests upon the belief that, if we are honest with ourselves, we will admit that values stand over us and are, therefore, objective.

²Ibid., p.101

³M. Pontifex-I. Trethowan, The Meaning of Existence (London 1951) p.158

Baillie makes basically the same case. Baillie has considerable admiration for Kantian moral philosophy, as the first chapter indicated. Kant, so Baillie thinks, has stressed that we reach God not in the realm of sense but in the realm of moral claims made upon us. Yet Kant has maintained that the moral law is dictated to us by our own moral conscience and is a self-imposed law. One of Kant's great tasks was the divorce of ethical theory from theology. Kant, therefore, denies that ethical values are imposed upon us from 'outside' and are, therefore, not objective in the sense that we have been speaking of.⁴ Baillie maintains, however, that a "moral consciousness" is a glib abstraction which "has the appearance of a process that goes on entirely within ourselves rather than a converse that takes place between ourselves and Another."⁵ To maintain, as Kant did, that ethical demands are self-imposed is to divorce them from their roots in that which is Other.

⁴We must be careful here. The Kantian ethical position is not objective in the sense that it is imposed from outside, for it is a law of our own reason. On the other hand, this does not mean that it is individualistic and arbitrary, for it binds the individual to a universal form of conduct. The individual is nevertheless under an imperative, even though it is of his own making. In this thesis the word 'objective' means that which has its basis outside of the ego.

⁵J. Baillie, Our Knowledge of God (New York 1959) p. 160

The reduction of the spiritual life of mankind to mere respectful acceptance of a formula was, in fact, the last absurdity of the eighteenth century. It is no mere formula with which the sons of men have ever found themselves faced as they approached life's most solemn issues, but a Reality of an altogether more intimate and personal kind.⁶

Baillie's basic contention is that in ethical demands we are confronted with One who makes demands upon us, which we "with the bottom of our hearts" recognize as God.

Baillie quotes with approval the words of William Temple that "no law, apart from a Lawgiver, is a proper object of reverence."⁷ Furthermore, Baillie claims that we have always known that we cannot evade the challenge of God without a sense of wrongdoing or guilt.

No other challenge that has ever reached us has been so insistent or so imperious. You and I have often tried to evade it; we have done many things in its despite; sometimes, when its demands were most inconvenient, we have tried to pretend that it had no right to be there at all. But in the bottom of our hearts we have never been able to doubt its right.⁸

The demands of the moral life stand over us, and we implicitly know that to deny them is to betray our own proper good and the Sovereign Love which offers them. By analysis of what he thinks actually confronts us in moral demands, Baillie indicates the falsehood of positions that claim that moral values are subjective projections. As was the case with

⁶ Ibid, p.158

⁷ Ibid, p.158

⁸ Ibid, p.156

Trethowan, the key to Baillie's case is the awareness that moral demands confront us and impose limitations upon our freedom. The demands of the moral life come from 'outside' ourselves and we submit to them in the realization that it is our chief end to do so.

Both Trethowan and Baillie make their claim for the objectivity of moral values by claiming to have analyzed carefully the actual content of moral demands. They claim that actual examination of such experiences leads us to posit the objectivity of moral demands. Their case stands if our own honest analysis of moral demands agrees with theirs and falls if it does not. Yet it is apparent that there are differences between Trethowan and Baillie on some details of this content. Baillie differs from Trethowan since he claims that in moral demands we are confronted with the Lawgiver who is God, and that the moral demands must be seen as a relationship between ourselves and Another. Baillie fundamentally is saying that moral demands are at the same time a divine challenge and that we know them as such. His case for the objectivity of moral standards rests basically on this encounter with Another. Trethowan would agree that ultimately moral demands are a divine challenge, but hesitates to say that God is known as immediately as He is known by Baillie. When reading Baillie, we have the feeling that he is reading too much of his own position into our experience of moral obligation. In Trethowan, the process

is more gradual. We can feel the full claim that values make upon us but not immediately intuit God. Such an awareness must be evoked, whereas Baillie rules out such an intermediary step. It seems to me that Trethowan has the better case. There are many individuals who would basically admit the objectivity of values and yet who are not aware of the divine challenge. Baillie rules this out of court, a step which not only isolates himself from the experience of many but seems to show a lack of charity to the honest testimony of many. Trethowan, on the other hand, is prepared to accept the position of such individuals and proceeds to evoke from it the intuition of God.

Preference must, therefore, be given to Trethowan's position, which is a more accurate analysis of what people encounter in moral demands. If we accept Trethowan's analysis and agree that he has made a case for the objectivity of values, we are still, of course, uncertain about the nature of this objectivity. Does this objectivity have its basis in society through a social contract, or does it even transcend the projection of society itself? Trethowan does not explicitly deny this latter position, but it seems clear from his analysis that there is no adequate reason why society should posit the search for truth as a value. He has indicated that there is no real motive for the individual to establish its status as a value, and his reasons can presumably be transferred to society as such. Society also

stands under value standards and has felt the obligation to adapt itself to them. The social contract as an explanation is inadequate.

So far we have seen that the intuition of God is linked with the awareness of moral value. Some attempt must now be made to analyze what Trethowan and Baillie mean by the word 'intuition', when they speak of an intuition of God. As we saw in our analysis of the Thomists, the word has different meanings, and we must now see how Trethowan and Baillie are using the word. Trethowan says that

the evidence of God's existence is there to be looked for, but it is not easy to teach people how to look. And one reason for this is that, in all probability, they have already looked and seen without realizing what it was they were doing. We must also face the possibility that they have looked and seen and then deliberately looked away.⁹

It is significant that Trethowan speaks here of the importance of looking. Some caution must, of course, be exercised, because the word 'look' is frequently used with no special epistemological significance attached to it. Yet Trethowan elsewhere uses similar expressions which convey the notion of looking. Trethowan speaks of the intuition of God as being an awareness which "shows"¹⁰ our world as dependent, and this requires a "looking beyond"¹¹ the immediate objects

p.96 9I. Trethowan, The Basis of Belief (New York 1961)

10Ibid, p.108

11Ibid, p.109

of our experience. Such expressions accumulate so that we are left with the impression that such words are not used carelessly but deliberately. Evidence indicates that Trethowan appears to be using the word 'intuition' in the sense that Mascall has wanted to use it, in the sense of an intellectual perception. We do not need arguments but monstrations. The intellect is not required to infer but to see. For further elucidation on the nature of monstration Trethowan quotes E. I. Jatin, who writes that "we cannot argue from finite to Infinite, unless we really see that things are finite--and that means seeing them as dependent on the Infinite."¹² Monstration is "for want of a better name, a dialectic of suggestion, an encouragement to take another look at the world, and see."¹³

The notion of intuition as intellectual perception was discussed in the previous chapter, and Mascall was presented as favouring this approach. In the previous chapter the analogy was drawn between sense perception and intellectual perception, and similarities and differences were stated. In Mascall we noted that God's existence while directly intuited was nevertheless mediated through finite things. The same applies to Trethowan, for in Trethowan's thought the existence of God is seen along with that of the creatures and is mediated through the latter. Trethowan's intuition of God, like Mascall's is a contuition of God,

¹² Ibid., p.81

¹³ Ibid., p.81

for God is seen through dependent values. Much the same treatment can be given to Trethowan's position as was given to Mascall's. Like Mascall, Trethowan calls us to recognize the element of dependency, in this case, the dependency of value. This seeing of dependency is at the same time a seeing that there is a self-sufficient Source. This "seeing" of their dependency is at the same time a "seeing" of that which they are dependent on, though this latter is "beyond" the dependent values and is seen through them. Trethowan says that the intuition "shows us ourselves and the world in which we live as dependent, and a closer attention to it reveals in time that what we are aware of is in fact the active presence of the Infinite."¹⁴ Trethowan is calling upon us to examine our experience of value and in so doing we shall "reflectively discriminate the two disparate elements, finite and infinite, which are already present in this experience."¹⁵ These statements of Trethowan's remind us of Mascall's position, which is similar in many ways. Mascall was calling upon us to analyze our intuition and to recognize the elements of dependency and self-sufficiency. This should not be interpreted as stating that we intuit God directly and immediately but rather that God is seen as the Creator sustaining and working in the created order. We do not infer God's existence from the dependent order but rather see Him through the latter. Intuition is intellectual per-

¹⁴Ibid., p.108

¹⁵Ibid., p.115

ception, not inference.

In speaking of intellectual perception, we have been using the model of sense perception. This analogy has been justified because both processes have an element of directness about them and are not inferential involving successive steps. The analogy is also strengthened by the fact that both the senses and the intellect are open to reality and receive data about reality. Both are original and immediate recipients of data. On the other hand, Trethowan seems aware of the difference in saying that we perceive God and that we perceive a tree. To avoid the misinterpretation that God is seen immediately and directly as the tree is, he dissociates himself from the term intuition and prefers the term apprehension. Apprehension, he argues, conveys the element of directness but need not be an immediate vision. This term apprehension does justice to the fact that "there is a character of directness about our knowledge of God, despite the fact that it is not an immediate vision--it is an obscure, though genuine, apprehension."¹⁶ It would appear that Trethowan has some doubts about using the model of sense perception, since he does not want to use the word 'intuition'. Nevertheless the model of sense perception is useful and clarifies though we must recognize fundamental differences between sense perception

¹⁶Ibid, p.67

and intellectual perception and in saying that we perceive a tree and in saying that we perceive God.

Trethowan has said that the step to God upon Whom all things are dependent is in the last analysis seen to be so.

Nothing will come of nothing, indeed, but this must be seen. And I found myself realizing that I had not myself become a theist as the result of any strictly logical process. When I said to myself, 'There must be a cause, a universal cause' I was simply registering the fact that my 'notion' had turned into a conviction. I had simply seen that there is a universal cause; I had apprehended it in its operations.¹⁷

Trethowan's method is that of analyzing our experience of finite existence, and claiming that, if we do so we will see its relationship to the infinite.

To say that we discover God's existence in an 'apprehension' of God and to say that we do so by an analysis of our experience is not to make two different claims. It is all one claim.¹⁸

We are called upon by Trethowan to reflect upon our experience of values and to see the dependency of values upon God. We will gain the intuition of God, if we use the method of reflection. Trethowan states that "when I say that 'being' or 'existence' involves a reference to God, I mean that it proves to do so when we have brought our minds to bear upon it, to use Mascal's language again, in 'recollection'."¹⁹ Trethowan appeals to Gabriel Marcel and his phenomenological

¹⁷ Ibid., p.129

¹⁸ Ibid., p.115

¹⁹ Ibid., p.115

method as his authority. Trethowan's intellectual perception appears fundamentally to be intellectual perception as it is envisaged in the field of phenomenology.

This enables us to clarify what Trethowan has meant when he talks of knowing God implicitly and explicitly. Our experience implicitly testifies to God, but we have not yet brought our minds to bear upon it. When we do so, when we reflect upon our experience, our experience explicitly yields the intuition of God which was contained within it. The intellect must turn inward to analyze our experience until the intuition of God is seen.

The detection itself occurs, fundamentally, in the inner life. Even if our bent is to look outwards to the general scene, to the human situation viewed abstractly, we must bring with us (although we may hardly be aware of it) some hint of the essential clue. Knowledge of the self and knowledge of the world are interdependent. But the source of our metaphysical discoveries seems to be the self.²⁰

We have stated that Trethowan appears to look to Marcel for his model of recollection. Marcel states that fundamentally reflection is nothing more than attention to a certain experience or course of experiences. This is the predominant theme of phenomenology, which purports not to use inference or deduction but simply to examine closely what is actually given to us in experience. "To the things themselves" is the rallying cry of Husserl. If we examine and reflect upon

²⁰Ibid, p.103

a particular experience, its meaning or essence will disclose itself to us in intuition. The phenomenologist does not have to resort to other methods, but prefers to scrutinize the particular experience which we have brought under the glance of the Ego.

According to Marcel, reflection is carried out because something important to us is at stake. "The act of reflection is linked, as bone is linked with bone in the human body, to living personal experience and it is important to understand the nature of this link."²¹ It is important to realize that "reflection is still part of life, that it is one of the ways in which life manifests itself, or more profoundly, that it is in a sense one of life's ways of rising from one level to another."²² Reflection is rooted in our lives and should not be regarded as something cold and alien.

On the other hand, the more we grasp the notion of experience in its proper complexity, in its active and I would daresay in its dialectical aspects, the better we shall understand how experience cannot fail to transform itself into reflection, and we shall even have the right to say that the more richly it is experienced, the more, also, it is reflection.²³

It is difficult to state exactly what Trethowan conceives the procedure of his reflection to be. He states

²¹G. Marcel, The Mystery of Being Volume 1 (Chicago 1960) p.97

²²Ibid. p.101

²³Ibid. p.102

that "analysis here means the process by which we reflectively discriminate the two disparate elements, finite and infinite, which are already present in this experience."²⁴ A possible interpretation is that, when we reflect upon a given value, we carry out a phenomenological analysis to enable us to intuit the pure nature of the value. Trethowan indicates that some phenomenological analysis is necessary, for he states that, when confronted with a value, for example, the search for truth, we discard such notions as determining its value by appeal to consequences or social motives.

Why, let us ask again, should we desire the truth? What value can there be in finding things out if they seem not to serve any practical purpose? Why not spend all the time in day-dreaming, if you enjoy it and have the opportunity? Perhaps because people would make fun of you. But doesn't the question of self-respect arise? And what is there about ourselves which we should respect?...Why, then, should it seem so important that men should see things as they are?²⁵

It is clear from the above passage that in his analysis of value Trethowan is performing phenomenological reductions and is discarding possible explanations of the source of value. This process continues until he is left with the "contingency" of the value, that is, with seemingly no source of value. Then "the light breaks", "the pennydrops" and Trethowan intuits God as the source of value. In this

²⁴I. Trethowan, The Basis of Belief (New York 1961) p.115

²⁵Ibid, p.101

way we see the finite dependent upon the infinite and have done justice to Trethowan's claim that "we reflectively discriminate the two disparate elements, finite and infinite." Through phenomenological analysis God has been intuited as the source of value.

Unfortunately this latter interpretation makes little use of the phenomenological method of Marcel, to whom Trethowan has frequently appealed. Another variation of Trethowan's method is possible, which attempts to pattern itself after Marcel. Marcel's phenomenological method consists of two levels of reflection, primary and secondary reflection. Primary reflection dissolves the unity of experience, for it establishes a break in its continuity; secondary reflection is recuperative and restores that unity. Let us accept the premise that Trethowan is modelling his notion of recollection on Marcel's model and see how it might work. On the first level of reflection we encounter a break in the unity of our experience, for we wonder why values are valuable. They seem to be contingent, that is, they are unable to account for their value as value. We then proceed through secondary reflection to re-establish this unity. Presumably the reductions outlined above enter at this stage in the attempt to reaffirm the unity of our experience. Finally we intuit God as the source of value upon whom finite values are dependent. The unity of our value experiences has been re-established by the intuition

of God. The two elements, finite and infinite, have been intuited, and the essential unity between the two orders has been established. Trethowan's remark that we "dis-criminate the two disparate elements, finite and infinite" should not be taken to indicate a split in our experience, for the intuition has established a harmonious relationship between the two. This is a possible interpretation that can be given to Trethowan's analysis. When we consider the reliance that Trethowan places upon Marcel, it is more likely that this second interpretation is the correct description of Trethowan's recollection. In either case, we have established that the word 'intuition' as used by Trethowan appears to be the meaning given to it in phenomenological circles, all of which draw their inspiration from Husserl.

Trethowan's case rests, therefore, on phenomenological analysis, and he apparently thinks that, if one uses his procedure, he will intuit God. His case rests with Marcel's contention that "nothing is more necessary than that one should reflect."²⁶ The intuition of God arises from analysis of our experience. Trethowan would claim, therefore, that in a broader sense of the term he is an empiricist.

An analysis of what Baillie means by 'intuition' must now be made. Baillie rules out inference from the

²⁶ G. Marcel, The Mystery of Being Vol. 1 (Chicago 1960) p.47

start so that the charge of rapid inference can be dismissed. Our knowledge of God, Baillie submits, is basically founded on the experience of His presence. Baillie criticises those philosophers who give too great a role to inference and severely limit what he calls perceptive or intuitive reason. Baillie thinks that these two terms can be legitimately used and interchanged with one another. His reason for this is that intuition and perception were two Latin words used to translate the Greek word aisthesia, which could be called ratio perceptiva or ratio intuitiva. Baillie, unlike Trethowan, likes the model of intellectual perception. Such a model stresses the non-inferential aspect of this kind of cognition. It also emphasizes that the mind is in touch with reality just as sense perception is. The intuitive ability of the intellect is an original source of data just as the senses are. Baillie dissociates himself from the meaning of intuition in the sense that we speak of intuiting the truth of a proposition or mathematical solution. This latter meaning is to remain exclusively within the realm of concepts. By calling intuition intellectual perception, Baillie means that we are in touch with existential reality in a direct manner. The intellect confronts in some manner an object. Intuition is the realm of immediate knowledge, that is, it is knowledge not mediated by inference. This immediate knowledge is not simply the bare reception of data, for Baillie claims that it is the product of intelligence. Experience is cognitive and not simply the

reception of data or emotion.

We must realize that Baillie's case is resting on two foundations. In the first place, he is broadening the scope of our experience to include data over and above that given by the sense. The relationship between such experience and the experience gained by the senses proper is that the former presupposes for their possibility the experience gained by the senses. The senses are apparently necessary starting points to open up the other "senses".

My contention will indeed be that we have even what can properly be called sense experience of other things than these. The human spirit, I shall say, develops certain subtler senses or sensitivities which go beyond the bodily senses.²⁷

He indicates that they require the bodily senses to set them in operation but that

they carry us far beyond such experience, making us sensitive to aspects of reality of which these taken by themselves, could not conceivably inform us. They enable us to perceive something not otherwise perceptible; to perceive it, I say, and not merely to conceive it as a concept to which we are led by argument.²⁸

Baillie deliberately makes an analogy with the bodily senses and these other "senses" to establish the idea that we perceive things not perceptible by the bodily senses. We should not fear that Baillie is creating strange and fantastic new senses, for he insists that fundamentally

²⁷J. Baillie, The Sense of the Presence of God (London 1962) p.52

²⁸Ibid., p.53

experience is a unified whole. "The world we know is known by us as one world."²⁹ Experience is basically a whole, and it is mis-leading to divide it up into watertight faculties or senses.

The knowledge of God is also an intuitive knowledge gained by the intellect's perceptive ability. Therefore, we can say that our knowledge is immediate, since it is not gained by inference. On the other hand, Baillie has been careful to maintain that an intuition of God is mediate, since it is mediated through the intuition of duty. We do not actually see God, as He is in Himself.

A speculative knowledge of God as He is in His naked majesty would not and could not save, but would rather terrify and destroy. A saving knowledge, a knowledge that meets our situation as regards conscience and justification and reconciliation, must be a veiled knowledge.³⁰

It is more accurate to say as Baillie himself admits, that the intuition of God is a mediated immediacy. The intuition of God is mediated through our duty, for we see God through it. Hence Baillie's mediated immediacy appears to be a contuition.

So far we have seen that Baillie's intuition of God is an intellectual perception, but further consideration must now be given to such a view in light of what we have said about Trethowan's views on recollection. Baillie divides mental activities into two divisions, immediate knowledge and reflection. We have already outlined Baillie's

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Ibid, p.51

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J. Baillie, Our Knowledge of God (New York 1959)p.191

notions of immediate knowledge, and so further elucidation is not necessary at this point. Reflection or, as Baillie calls it, thought is the "secondary activity of the mind in which it bends back upon its own primary operations."³¹ So far Baillie appears to be following Trethowan, but this is as far as the similarity goes. Baillie identifies reflection with inference and makes no provision for reflective processes such as those described by Marcel. The purpose of reflection or inference is "to bring to the light of full consciousness the real nature and interior grounds of such knowledge as we already have, and thus to add further knowledge to it."³² In Trethowan such a process makes explicit the real nature of our experience and yields us the intuition of God. But in Baillie, this process is not patterned after phenomenological analysis, but is inferential in nature. Furthermore, this inferential process is "a very arduous one and can never achieve complete success."³³ The process of reflection can deal with immediate knowledge only in a rather clumsy fashion and lacks the clarity and certitude that intuition possessed.

Starting from such knowledge as is thus already in our possession, we proceed to draw inferences from it, but the inferred knowledge cannot have the same quality of certitude; and the more elaborate the chain

³¹ J. Baillie, The Sense of the Presence of God (London 1962) p.51

³² Ibid., p.60

³³ Ibid., p.60

of inferences required to reach it, the less assurance we have in respect of it. There may always be an error in our logic, a neglected alternative perhaps, and the further our speculation goes, the greater is the possibility of such error. All in all, therefore, the seat of human wisdom will always remain with our intuited rather than with our inferred knowledge of our human situation.³⁴

Baillie thus indicates that inference is clearly an inferior form of intellectual activity. Knowledge and certitude reside basically in the intuitive powers of the mind, which Baillie maintains are in direct contact with reality.

Baillie's intuition is clearly not phenomenological in nature but refers to what he thinks is the basic activity of the mind, a direct and immediate contact of the intellect with the world that surrounds it. Our knowledge of God is located on this level. Any process of reflection will confuse and distort this primary grasp of reality and lead us into error. Baillie's intuition is basically the immediate awareness by the mind that it is constantly confronted by the presence of God.

This statement by Baillie, that the intellect is confronted by God, should be examined in more detail, and in doing so we shall discover an important difference between the Thomistic approach and those who consider themselves to be Augustinians in some sense, as do Baillie and Trethowan. Maritain has stated that his intuition of God belongs to the realm of natural knowledge, as opposed to the realm of

³⁴J. Baillie, The Sense of the Presence of God (London 1962) p.61

supernatural illumination or faith. Trethowan and Baillie do not accept this rigid distinction and do not classify their intuitive approach as a "natural" knowledge. Baillie begins his book, Our Knowledge of God, by stating that "the great fact for which all religion stands is the confrontation of the human soul with the transcendent holiness of God."³⁵ The chief term of importance appears to be the word 'confrontation', and Baillie goes on to say that "not one of us has been left alone by God" and that "there is no son of man who has never been confronted at all by the challenge of the divine."³⁶ Baillie's point is that God has revealed Himself to all men and that knowledge of God is imparted by God Himself. Baillie denies that there is a "natural" knowledge of God apart from revelation and is dissatisfied with the traditional distinction between nature and revelation.

Prior to the nineteenth century there was no distinction that seemed simpler or more clear-cut than this one, and any child could have told you what it meant. He would have explained to you that at creation God had endowed man with the power of reason, and that by the 'unaided' exercise of this reason man had been able to find out some things about God; but that, at a later time, God had added to the knowledge thus at man's disposal by communicating certain further information which he could not possibly have found out for himself. Just as there

³⁵J. Baillie, Our Knowledge of God (New York 1959)

³⁶Ibid., p.3

are two ways of becoming possessed of the answer to a mathematical problem - by working out the problem for oneself and by being told the answer by somebody else; so it seemed to almost everybody for almost a thousand years that there were two quite distinct avenues to the knowledge of God.³⁷

This traditional clear-cut distinction is a misleading one, and Baillie proposes to incorporate both within a broader notion of revelation. The "natural approach", instead of being regarded as distinct from revelation, is to be regarded as a more general kind of revelation.

Our conclusion must therefore be that such moral and spiritual knowledge as may in any one period of human history seem to have become an inherent part of human nature, and so to be an 'unaided' natural knowledge, is actually the blessed fruit of God's personal or historical dealings with man's soul; and so in the last resort also a revealed knowledge."³⁸

Baillie has, therefore, denied a sharp natural-revelation cleavage and prefers to speak of a general revelation in which God confronts all men with His challenge. It can be argued in passing that this approach expresses to a high degree the notion of God as sustaining the temporal order. The "natural knowledge" approach, Baillie suggests, seems to mean that God, the Creator and Sustainer, stands aside from the knowing and thinking of His creatures. By revelation Baillie does not mean the dictation of writings

³⁷ Ibid, p.35

³⁸ Ibid, p.42

or the communication of information, but by revelation he means personal communication, "the self-disclosure of a Personality."³⁹ Revelation is "the continual invasion of our life by His holy Presence."⁴⁰ The intuitive ability of the intellect receives this continual revelation of God to it. The intellect appears to receive intuitively a revelation of God, and for this reason, Baillie's approach cannot be categorized as "natural", as the Thomists classify their intuition.

Trethowan has said that he is an Augustinian, and presumably he too will repudiate the intuition of God as being a strictly natural approach, and the notion that God stands aside, so to speak, from the activity of the intellect. The discussion of knowledge and illumination in the thought of Augustine is an extremely difficult topic and one which goes beyond my own knowledge and the scope of this paper. Any discussion of this point must inevitably be extremely limited and inadequate. Augustine himself cannot be pinned down to any rigid distinction between a natural state of man and man in the state of grace. He himself regarded such a distinction as somewhat artificial and arbitrary. The sustaining activity of God is omnipresent, and we cannot consider man in isolation from God's activity, as the

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p.37

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p.174

Thomistic distinction between natural and supernatural conditions of man seems to imply. Within the thought of Augustine, there is special consideration given to the belief that God 'illuminates' the soul, and it appears that the intuition discussed by Baillie and Trethowan is to some extent an illumination. In making the intuition of God it would appear that the intellect is being aided and acted upon by God. Trethowan states that "the fact seems to be that the presence of God works upon our minds at so early a stage."⁴¹ He also writes that the human intellect in "its drive towards God cannot be set in motion by an innate instinct but only by God's action upon it, and this action must arouse it precisely as an intellect."⁴² Trethowan indicates in several passages that the intuition of God is reached by God's action upon the intellect. God apparently works within the intellect, and the intuition of God is reached through His activity.

Perhaps more light on this matter can be reached by a consideration of the views of Augustine himself. Augustine maintains that the understanding needs the light of God. God is, so to speak, the sun of the soul. "The soul is the eye; God is the light."⁴³ Augustine's theory

⁴¹I. Trethowan, The Basis of Belief (New York 1962) p.113

⁴²Ibid., p.132

⁴³E. Portalis, A Guide to the Thought of St. Augustine (London, 1960) p.110

of illumination maintains that the intellect cannot gain intellectual truth of that which is eternal without the influence of God upon it. He maintains that God imprints upon the intellect a representation of those eternal truths contained in His mind. The intellect contemplates eternal truths and values with the aid of the activity of God just as the eye sees objects with the aid of the sun. The intellect is, therefore, aided by divine illumination, for God is the light by which eternal truths are known.⁴⁴

It would appear that we know eternal truths only through God, who impresses them upon us. When we examine these truths and values more closely, we will see that they are embedded in God and will recognize that it is He who impresses them upon us and who, therefore, can be seen through them as their Source. The intellect apprehends God in

⁴⁴I realize that this topic is a controversial and difficult one and would have avoided it if possible, but its inclusion seemed necessary. This interpretation of Augustine's illumination is but one of several. One interpretation associated, for example, with William of Auvergne is that the activity of God in the intellect is almost a separate intellect. Another interpretation associated, for example, with Malebranche is that the intellect sees eternal truths directly in God. This, of course, is a form of ontologism. Copleston thinks that by illumination Augustine means that God works upon the intellect guaranteeing the truth of certain propositions. God does not imprint truths upon the intellect but rather gives certitude to the intellect and assures the intellect that the truths at which it has arrived (through abstraction, Copleston suggests) are eternally true and are grounded in the very nature of God. God in this interpretation is the guarantee of certainty. These three interpretations are three possible ones, but it is more likely that the one stated in the main text of the thesis is the correct one.

values it encounters and recognizes God as their Source. God is their Source, not only in that they are ultimately "anchored" in God but also in that He is the source of their presence in the intellect.

The intuition of God for Trethowan is an intellectual perception after the manner described earlier, but seems to be a perception illuminated by God. As Augustine has said, the soul is the eye, but it requires God as the sun to enable it to see. Because of this viewpoint both Trethowan and Baillie have separated themselves from Mascall and Maritain. Undoubtedly, there are further differences between Trethowan and Baillie, for it is unlikely that Baillie's general revelation is the same as Trethowan's illumination. Trethowan, for example, quotes with approval Baillie's intuitive approach to God, but dissociates himself from Baillie's notion of a "direct personal encounter with Him in the Person of our Lord Jesus Christ."⁴⁵ Trethowan indicates that his intuition is "an awareness of him which is no more than an awareness of the transcendent Infinite and a summons to a fuller supernatural knowledge, the knowledge of faith."⁴⁶ Yet both Trethowan and Baillie differ from the Thomists in that the latter claim that their approach is a natural one, whereas the former have located their in-

⁴⁵Trethowan's discussion of Baillie is to be found in The Basis of Belief p.68-71

⁴⁶Ibid., p.69

tuition on the fringe of a supernatural approach. The intuition of God for them calls for a recognition of the activity of God upon the soul, for He is known through His effects upon us. Father De Lubac writes that "God reveals himself to man by imprinting his image upon him. That divine operation constitutes the very centre of man."^{47 48}

We must now attempt to examine more closely the actual contents of the intuitions of God given by Trethowan and Baillie. Trethowan's intuition shall be analysed first of all. We have seen that the intuition of God is gained, when we see that values without God seem to be groundless or "contingent". Before we examine the actual contents of Trethowan's intuition, we must first analyse this somewhat puzzling notion. Trethowan has said that values seem "contingent", since a particular value seems unable to account for its value. He has ruled out appeal to consequences and has, therefore, concluded that the quest for a source of

⁴⁷ Ibid., p.91

⁴⁸ As we have seen, Trethowan's intuition is illuminated by God. There is also a passage in Marcel which indicates that the phenomenological analysis might be guided by God's activity in the intellect. Marcel writes that "this process of reflective self-clarification cannot be pushed to the last extreme; it may be, as we shall see, that reflection, interrogating itself about its own essential nature, will be led to acknowledge that it inevitably bases itself on something that is not itself, something from which it has to draw its strength." (G. Marcel, The Mystery of Being, p.47)

values has become urgent. Trethowan appears to be raising the same question about values as the Thomists asked about finite being. Maritain and Mascall ask why there is something rather than nothing; Trethowan asks why a value is valuable.

Why should something at least seem to have value for their own sakes? They make a claim upon us, but, when we look into it, there seems at first to be no justification for their claims; they are just things. We are forced behind them to account for their value. Taken by themselves, they are not valuable, yet value is present to them.⁴⁹

Trethowan's basic contention is that values we encounter are contingent and lack self-sufficiency. This contingency of values points to that which is the self-sufficient source of value, and this is God.

The absoluteness of moral obligation, as I see it, is so far from being self-explanatory that if it were not made intelligible by being found in a metaphysical - and in fact a theistic - context, I should be greatly tempted to hand it over to the anthropologists and the psychologists. For if there is not an answer to the question 'why ought I to do anything?' (when 'ought' is taken in the absolute sense), if 'ought' is regarded as an ultimate datum, it is not unnatural to suspect that it is the result of conditioning processes, historical accidents which are matters not for philosophical discussion but for scientific investigation.⁵⁰

The immediate objection to such a claim is the charge that to maintain that a value is unable to account for its value is to deny that it is a value. To establish God as a source of value and as the explanation for their

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p.101

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p.117-8

value further robs their status as values. Trethowan himself realizes that such an objection can be made, but maintains that his position "is paradoxical, but it makes sense."⁵¹ A good method by which to defend Trethowan's claim is to compare him with the Thomists. The Thomist does not deny that finite existence exists, but he questions why it exists and claims that finite existence is not explainable in terms of itself. Trethowan is asking the same question, for he does not deny that values are valuable, but wonders why they are valuable and claims that they are not explainable in terms of themselves. Why must the search for truth be valuable? The Kantian would leave it at this level and claim that it is valuable on the basis of the Categorical Imperative. Trethowan would reply, and quite rightly it seems to me, that such a solution shows the incompleteness and unsatisfactory nature of Kantian ethics.⁵² The Categorical Imperative as a final source of explanation is surely unsatisfactory and leaves any moral value ultimately groundless. To maintain piously that the self-sufficiency of a value can be found in itself is also denied by Trethowan.

...it is the fact that many modern philosophers have been content with the view that 'ought' is both absolute and in itself an absolute datum. One explanation is that the Christian moral outlook is still tenaciously held by many who have abandoned Christian doctrine. They perceive a value in a certain code of

⁵¹ Ibid., p.102

⁵² In many ways it has developed that Kant is one of the greatest opponents of this approach.

conduct which they are determined, most properly, to defend. This is not to suggest that there have not been moralists in other ages who have been professed agnostics. But the 'post Christian' is in a peculiar position. He is convinced that the Christian system of thought must be abandoned; he is inoculated against the profession of theism in a special way - and he also suspects perhaps that this system of values is doomed to disappear, although he may not see that this is a natural consequence of the abandonment of theism.⁵³

Trethowan maintains that to hold, for example, that the killing of Jews is wrong as a value and to cut it from its theistic bed as contemporary philosophy has done is to leave it hanging in mid-air.

This issue is an important issue not only for ethical philosophy but for human civilization. What is being discussed here is the adequacy of foundations for ethical systems, and Trethowan claims that the only adequate basis for ethics is to ground them in God. This does not mean that he is defending an ethic based on divine command, which would say that 'x is good' exclusively means 'that which is commanded by God'. Trethowan recognizes that 'good' has value in itself, but claims that this value is contingent, that is, that there is no reason why it should be a value. I have suggested that the Thomists provide a model for this viewpoint. Just as we ask why the world has existence, so we ask why a value has the value it does. There is an

⁵³Ibid., p.118

element of contingency in both cases. Trethowan claims that we must look for a Source of ethical principles and that God is the most adequate explanation. To vindicate Trethowan's claim, it would be necessary to show the superiority of basing ethics upon God rather than upon other ultimates like utilitarianism or self-realization. If we do not seek for a source, then we leave values in mid-air, so to speak, and Trethowan thinks that this will endanger their status as values. Unfortunately, this is a deep and difficult topic and one which cannot be dealt with here. In passing, it can be said, however, that the history of ethical philosophy justifies to some extent Trethowan's fear. Since God has been rejected as the Source of value, we have seen the steady disappearance of the objective status of values until values are regarded as subjective projections. Even the existentialist, Jean-Paul Sartre, admits that ethics without God poses a problem.

The existentialist, on the contrary, finds it extremely embarrassing that God does not exist, for there disappears with Him all possibility of finding values in an intelligible heaven. There can no longer be any good a priori, since there is no infinite and perfect consciousness to think it. It is nowhere written that "the good" exists, that any one must be honest or must not lie, since we are now upon the plane where there are only men. Dostoevsky once wrote 'If God did not exist, everything would be permitted'; and that for the existentialist is the starting point. Everything is indeed permitted, if God does not exist, and man is in consequence forlorn, for he cannot find anything upon either within or outside himself...Nor, on the

other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimize our behaviour. Thus we have neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse.⁵⁴

It is, of course, assumed that to base ethics upon subjective projection is inadequate. Bertrand Russell, for example, in 1954 finds himself reluctant to accept the subjectivity of ethical judgments.

If I say that oysters are good, and you say that they are nasty, we both understand that we are merely expressing our personal tastes, and that there is nothing to argue about. But when Nazis say that it is good to torture Jews, and we say that it is bad, we do not feel as if we were merely expressing a difference of taste; we are even willing to fight and die for our opinion, which we should not do to enforce our views about oysters. Whatever arguments may be advanced to show that the two cases are analogous, most people will remain convinced that there is a difference somewhere, though it may be difficult to say exactly what it is.⁵⁵

Russell dislikes admitting that ethics are a matter of subjective taste, but the basis for maintaining their objectivity is only "feeling though not decisive" and a "difference somewhere, though it may be difficult to say exactly what it is."⁵⁶ Such a position as the latter is vague, to say the least, and seems to run the danger of complete collapse. Indeed, much of modern ethical phil-

⁵⁴W. Kaufman (ed), Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre (Cleveland 1956) p.294

⁵⁵Bertrand Russell quoted in J. Baillie, The Sense of the Presence of God (London 1962) p.79

⁵⁶Ibid, p.79

osophy has witnessed its collapse and the relegation of values to subjective choice. 'X is good' means no more than 'I like x'.

The point is that modern ethical philosophy shows that Trethowan's question is a legitimate one. To maintain the objectivity of values and to divorce them from a source of value has led to the collapse of the former. It would appear that there is a certain contingency about values and that it is necessary to have some source of values, a source which is self-sufficient, and upon which particular values are dependent. Values, so to speak, are "anchored to" or "embedded" in God. Values are dependent upon God, just as finite existence is dependent upon God. This is, as Trethowan says, a paradoxical and rather difficult notion but one which seems justified. I have suggested that the Thomistic search for a Necessary Being is a good model and can provide some clarification. It seems appropriate to end this discussion with a passage already quoted earlier but relevant here.

What we seem to have been saying is that it is really God whom we value when we seem to be valuing his creatures. It is because they are 'reflections' of God that they have value. But this does not mean merely that we see through them to him or find him acting in them. It means also that his creatures, although always deriving from him, brought into being by him, are not without an intelligible relation to him.⁵⁷

On the basis of the "contingency" of values, we

⁵⁷I. Trethowan, The Basis of Belief (New York 1962)
p.102

intuit God as their Source. God is not only the source of value but is also Himself the supreme value. In being the ground of all value God is Himself valuable. We can ascribe to Him attributes of goodness, wisdom, and so forth, which we find in the finite realm. God is seen as the sustainer of all that is valuable in creation, for the intuition "shows ourselves and the world in which we live as dependent"⁵⁸ and causes us to realize that "what is left to us but...to say that 'to exist' means 'to be a creature'".⁵⁹ Trethowan's intuition of God blends more easily with traditional religious beliefs, for, since God is the supreme value, He is an object of reverence and worship. We criticised Maritain and Mascall, because their intuition of God lacked reference to value. Trethowan has remedied this situation by establishing his intuition on the basis of the awareness of value rather than the awareness of being. The former appears to be the more adequate approach and blends itself more readily with religious attitudes. Trethowan's intuition of God is more appealing to the religious believer than is the intuition of God given by the two Thomists. Indeed, the word 'God' seems an appropriate term to use to refer to the Source of value, whereas the term did not seem entirely satisfactory when it was used by the Thomists to refer to Being-without-nothingness.

58 Ibid., p.108

59 Ibid., p.109

Trethowan warns us that

throughout it is a single experience to which we are pointing, an experience which reflects its object in that it is at the same time rich and simple. The object is unlike any other object, so that it can be misleading to call it an object, and the experience is unlike any other experience, so that it can be misleading to call it an experience.⁶⁰

Yet in spite of his warnings that this intuition of God is unique, for purposes of clarification some model must be sought. An attempt shall be made to compare the intuition of God to the awareness of Duty. We must remember that this is nevertheless only an analogy and that there will be considerable difference.

In moral situation x we are strolling beside the banks of a river and see a child struggling in deep water and obviously on the verge of drowning. We immediately jump in and save him. On being questioned afterwards about why we saved him, we reply that we saw that it was our duty to do so. This is our model situation, which we shall compare with the intuition of God which we encounter in value x, which is, we shall say, the search for truth.⁶¹

In both cases, situation x and value x, the first observation is that there is a 'depth' beyond the mere immediate observables. In both cases, there is 'something more' than what is at first seen. An opponent will challenge

⁶⁰ Ibid., 107

⁶¹ In establishing this model, we must acknowledge the influence of I. T. Ramsey.

this. Both cases, he will maintain, are complete in themselves. Value x is complete in itself; we do not have to resort to anything 'more'. Value x is not dependent on anything else; it is valuable in itself without our having to resort to anything 'beyond'. The same can be said for situation x. The situation can be perfectly explained by enumeration of spatio-temporal details. There is a child struggling in the water, a man walking on the bank, the man sees the child and jumps in. More detail, of course, can be given; the muscles of the man contract, his glands are stimulated, but the whole situation can be encompassed within a spatio-temporal description. We immediately deny this and claim that the situation contained more than what is at first seen and described. We claim that there is something more, something which is beyond the spatio-temporal observables. Situation x had 'depth', for it was a moral challenge. We claim that we saw this as an instance of my Duty, which challenged us and which broke in upon us as something going beyond empirical circumstances. Situation x has to be seen in light of something more, that is, in light of my Duty. Both challenge and response transcend the empirical situation through which they were expressed. Situation x was not complete in itself; it must be understood in light of something more, my Duty. The same is the case with value x, the search for truth. We claim that, though x is valuable, this is not the whole situation. There is something more; there is an additional depth to the search for truth. We see

something more, and this is that it is seen as a reflection of God. Such an observation carries us, of course, beyond the immediate framework. We must maintain, therefore, that value x contains also a depth beyond itself. In both cases there is a greater depth than at first appears. The man in situation x sees more than a child in the river and in value x , we see more than simply value x .

Another point which clarifies the intuition of God in terms of the model is that we claim to "see" our Duty. With reference to the drowning child we say that we "saw" that we should save him. Inference was not involved in the process. We did not say to ourselves a) this child is drowning b) this child is valuable because c) all children are valuable and d) children are worth saving when drowning. Although morality is frequently seen in this light as Kantian ethics seem to suggest, in actual practice it is more likely that we "see" our Duty. Common language witnesses to this, for we say "I see that I should do this" and "I saw my duty and did it". Likewise we claim that God's existence is primarily "seen". It should furthermore be noted that we see our Duty in and through the particular situation. In situation x we see our duty, and we see duty only in the particular situation. We are not constantly in a state of being dutiful; we do not constantly entertain in our minds the sense of duty. Duty is elicited and triggered off only by the particular situation. It is situation x which triggers off the awareness of duty, just as value x

triggers off the awareness of God. The intuition of God is, as we have seen, given through the particular value.

When asked why we saved the child, we reply that our Duty prompted us to do so. To explain situation x we must appeal to Duty. We must look beyond situation x to Duty as our reason for saving the child. The ultimate explanation for situation x is found in Duty, for we cannot account for our action in situation x solely in terms of situation x. Situation x is rooted in Duty, which is the final source of appeal. Duty is the ultimate explanation, and specific situations are explainable in terms of it. Similarly Trethowan has said that a value is unable to account for itself and must be anchored in something ultimate, which he maintains is God. We must look beyond value x to account fully for its value, and we must appeal to the existence of God. The question of 'why' must be traced beyond value x and situation x, for it is only the ultimates, in this case God and Duty, that can answer the question 'why'. Situation x and value x are inexplicable in themselves, and are explainable only in terms of something beyond them. Situation x and value x both depend on the ultimates of Duty and God.

This, then, is the model by which it is hoped that the intuition of God is clarified. There are certain similarities between the two situations so that the analogy can justifiably be made. There are, of course, obvious points of difference. The main difference is that in the intuition

of God, we claim that God is an existential reality, that is, that He is in some sense an object, a being. While it cannot be denied that there is "something" called Duty, it is not regarded as being a Being. Whatever ontological status we give to Duty, it clearly does not have the same ontological status as the "living God". We should also correct what might have been a misleading notion. We are not to regard the intuition of Duty and that of God as two separate things, as the model suggests. Baillie and Trethowan would actually maintain that an intuition of Duty contains within it an intuition of God; the two cannot be divorced from one another. It was for the purposes of the model that the two were separated. In actual fact, so these two intuitionists, would maintain, it is misleading to posit an intuition of an abstract thing called Duty; moral obligation actually leads us to God.

It is hoped that this model provides some clarification of Trethowan's intellectual perception. It will still no doubt be claimed that this whole notion of intellectual perception is somewhat vague. Interestingly enough, there are elements within the Platonic-Augustinian tradition which might give greater clarity to the notion of intellectual perception, but which we nevertheless must exclude. If Trethowan were Plato, it would be possible to clarify intellectual perception in terms of the notion of recollection. In using the word, 'intuition' we could say that what was actually meant was that we were recalling something. This

Platonic notion of recollection has often been modified and has led to the notion of innate ideas. In this latter interpretation, when we speak of intuiting something, what we mean is that we are uncovering an idea that was innate within the intellect. Finally, the notion of illumination could be modified into a doctrine of revelation. In this case in speaking of intuiting God we mean that God has revealed Himself to us. These interpretations are possible ways of spelling out in greater detail what Trethowan means, but unfortunately all three must be rejected. There is no evidence at any point to indicate that Trethowan is relying on any of these interpretations. Indeed none of them seems entirely appropriate. The notions of recollection and innate ideas fail to do justice to the fact that intellectual perception claims to be perceiving an "object" outside the mind, in this case, God. These two doctrines do not adequately emphasize the important feature that the intellect is intuiting a reality outside of the intellect. The notion of revelation as an interpretation is unsatisfactory, for Trethowan considers his intellectual perception to be within the scope of philosophy, while a position based on revelation is generally considered to be beyond the realm of philosophy.

Mention was made of Ramsey, when the model was being discussed, and it is Ramsey who can supply us with some elucidation on the matter of intellectual perception. In the last analysis there appears to be a great similarity between Trethowan and Ramsey on this topic, and the comparison en-

ables us to interpret Trothowan with greater clarity. What Trothowan is saying is that in examining a value he sees something 'more'. This experience takes on a new depth, which we had not seen before. Indeed Ramsey says that "such a discernment lies at the basis of religion" and that "without such 'depth'; without this which is 'unseen'; no religion will be possible."⁶² Ramsey says that a religious situation begins with particular situations that can be described in spatio-temporal details. Then "the penny drops", "the ice breaks" and a religious situation has been evoked, because the situation is seen in a new light. The situation is seen in a new depth or in another dimension, which cannot be reduced to spatio-temporal observables, as the previous description was. We have not discovered simply more facts, but rather the situation is now seen in a new depth.

Ramsey uses the example of the formation of a friendship with the person whom we frequently meet during the day's work.

We may previously have known all kinds of facts about him. We have had a very great deal of what Russell would have called 'knowledge by description'. We may first have known him as the man in the bowler hat who came to sit next to us in the train. He then appears opposite us at lunch, and we begin to see him regularly. We now know him as the man who invariably orders 'Double Diamond'; the man who does the Times crossword in fifteen minutes; and as the weeks pass we come to know him as the man who has a wife and three children; too much herbaceous border to weed in the evenings, too few vegetables left after the frost, too little money left at the end of the month. But one day he says, offering his hand: 'Look here - I'm

⁶²T. Ramsey, Religious Language (London 1957) p.15

Nigel Short.⁶³ At that moment there is a 'disclosure', an individual becomes a 'person', the ice does not continue to melt, it breaks. We have not discovered just one more fact to be added to those we have been collecting day by day. There has now been some significant 'encounter', which is not just a moving of palm on palm, no mere correlation of mouth noises, not just heads nodding in some kind of mutual harmony.

Ramsey is saying that we have not simply learned one more fact about this man. The situation has taken on a new depth, for he is now seen not as the person who sits across from us but as a companion. We now look at him in a new dimension. There is now 'more' to this situation than there previously was, for it has assumed a depth that it lacked before.

Furthermore, Ramsey claims that this new depth cannot be reduced to psychological data. These experiences are psychological since they are within the realm of experience, but this does not mean that they can be reduced to such experiences.

Let us emphasize, without any possibility of misunderstanding, that all these situations, when they occur, have an objective reference and are, as all situations, subject-object in structure. When situations 'come alive', or the 'ice breaks', there is objective 'depth' in these situations along with and alongside any subjective changes.⁶⁴

Here it seems that Ramsey is attempting to clarify an important feature of intellectual perception, which Trethowan,

⁶³Ibid., p.26

⁶⁴Ibid., p.28

Mascoll, and Baillie have also been attempting to point out, that the intellect is confronted with an objective reality. Intellectual perception must be explained in terms of subject and object, perceiver and perceived. Thus I suggest that Trethowan's intuition can be clarified by examination of I. T. Ramsey, who seems to be describing in perhaps simpler terms the same experience.

We must now examine in detail the contents of Baillie's intuition of God. For Baillie it is not the case that we intuit a Source of Obligation, which we realize is God. What actually occurs is that God reveals Himself to us, and from this revelation of God, our sense of obligation is born. God is revealed, and from this vision we derive obligation. "It is His perfection that rebukes us; it is His love that constrains us."⁶⁵ The intuition of God through duty is a revelation of a living Person and "what we call the moral law is but an abstraction which our limited and limiting minds make from the concreteness of the living Glory that is revealed."⁶⁶ For Baillie, the revelation is, as he has stated, the self-disclosing of a Personality, and from our confrontation with this holy Personality all values and obligations are derived. The notion of obligation cannot be detached from Him who lays the obligation upon us, for "this final demand that is made upon our wills is directly apprehended by us as a claim made upon us by a holy and personal

⁶⁵ J. Baillie, Our Knowledge of God (New York 1959)
p.162

⁶⁶ Ibid, p.162

Being to whom we give the name of God."⁶⁷ Baillie maintains that the notion of obligation as grounded in the revelation of Personality is justified since "morality is essentially a function of personality, we can feel no moral obligation to an Absolute who is not apprehended by us as a personal being."⁶⁸

Since God is revealed as Personality, Baillie is dissatisfied with the theological approaches that seek to make God an object. Baillie quotes with approval Kierkegaard's remark that God is infinite subjectivity and Bonman's remark that the assumption that experience is all of the subject-object category has played havoc with much of European philosophy. Knowledge of God is knowledge of a Subject, a Thou, another Knower by whom we are known and who meets us as Another. God confronts us not as an object but as another Subject; He is the other who is most near.

He confronts us not as an It nor as an inference from all possible Its, but, from the very beginning, as a Thou. He is not something we find ourselves speaking about, but Some One we find ourselves speaking to. He confronts us in such a way that we know we must not speak about Him in the third person, but can only speak to Him in the second person.⁶⁹

Baillie quotes with approval Buber's remark that God is the eternal Thou by whom we are constantly addressed. Because of this experience of God as Subject, our thinking about God

⁶⁷ Ibid., p.244

⁶⁸ M. Buber quoted in J. Baillie, Our Knowledge of God (New York 1959) p.244

⁶⁹ Ibid., p.220

should be existential, that is God must be thought of in the second person. Because God must be frequently treated as object for purposes of thought and discourse, theology must become dialectical, that is, theological statements must oscillate in two opposite directions so that each statement about God is supplemented and balanced by a second one. Only in this manner can we speak meaningfully of our confrontation by "the absolute and omnipresent Other in which all others have their ground."⁷⁰

For Baillie the question of the contingency of values does not really arise, since fundamentally he maintains that we are aware of values in our confrontation with God. It is the latter which comes first, for value and obligation are derived from that confrontation situation. Baillie would deny that we can make the separation in knowing values and knowing God. Such a position as Baillie's has its difficulties. Trethowan would agree that in the order of being, value and God are one, but it can be questioned whether in the order of knowing, we know God and values together. Trethowan's case seems more in keeping with normal experience, for there are many quite sincere persons who recognize the claims of values without intuiting God as a Personality or a Thou. No doubt such an intuition can be triggered; Trethowan's case rests on the conviction that it

⁷⁰Ibid., p.228

can. But to maintain this intuition of God as Personality and from whom our experience of value arises seems going beyond the realm of ordinary experience. It is debatable whether most people enjoy Baillie's intuition. Furthermore, if we do intuit God in a close connection with value, as Baillie maintains, many would take issue with Baillie's notion of God as Personality.

A more serious problem arises, however, from Baillie's contentions. At times Baillie suggests that we intuit God through the awareness of our duty. "We reach the Unconditional only in an unconditional imperative that reaches us."⁷¹ This would make the intuition of God direct and mediate. At other points, however, Baillie suggests that duty springs from our awareness of the personality of God and that all values come from this confrontation. This would appear to make our intuition of God direct and immediate, since the intuition of God is not mediated by values but rather values come from that confrontation. Baillie has stated that "the Source of the obligation is Himself directly revealed to us."⁷² Baillie at other points states his dislike of inferential arguments for God's existence because "nearer things are presupposed by which the knowledge of him is mediated."⁷³ Baillie maintains that God is present to us 'in, with, and under' other experiences, but, since obligation springs from

⁷¹ Ibid., p.157

⁷² Ibid., p.162

⁷³ Ibid., p.177

the awareness, we must first be confronted with God. It is difficult to see how Baillie can avoid the charge that God is intuited immediately and directly.

Baillie claims that the intuition of God is mediated through my encounter with others. He writes that

the knowledge of God is withdrawn from those who keep themselves aloof from the service of their fellows. It means that 'He that loveth not knoweth not God' whereas 'if we love one another, God dwelleth in us.' And this is indeed a blessed provision by which God makes my knowledge of Himself pass through my brother's need. ⁷⁴

Baillie further holds that in the awareness of my brother's need, I intuit God and that, therefore, the intuition of God is mediate. Baillie again states that "reality does not lie merely in the existence of my neighbour as an object among other objects in the world, but in the right he embodies as over against my own otherwise unlimited desires."⁷⁵ Baillie is basically saying that God is intuited when we recognize that we have obligations towards our neighbours and that the intuition of God is mediated through this awareness of obligation. But has he not claimed obligation arises from an encounter with God? We never experience obligation apart from the encounter with God. Therefore, to realize that we have obligations towards our neighbours indicates that we have already intuited God. The

⁷⁴Ibid, p.179

⁷⁵J. Baillie, The Sense of the Presence of God (London 1962) p.36

intuition of God does not appear to be mediated through awareness of obligation to our neighbours but must precede the latter. Baillie would, of course, maintain that the two awarenesses go together so that the intuition of God is mediated 'by, with and under' the intuition of obligation to our neighbour. Yet we can doubt if this delicate balance is adequate, and it appears to have tilted in one direction, towards the direct and immediate intuition of God which must precede, if we are to have any sense of obligation. We must, therefore, question Baillie's mediated immediacy and conclude that he has in reality placed himself in the camp of mysticism. There is no objection to this latter state, which is a blessed one for those capable of enjoying it. The problem is that Baillie must recognize that this is where he has placed himself. In the last analysis, Baillie seems to come down to the position of religious experience. His meaning of intuition must be seen within the context of religious experience in which God reveals himself to the human soul. If Baillie's position is within this sphere, then it is beyond the proper field of philosophy.

Having examined the nature of the intuitions of God according to Baillie and Trethowan, we must now examine the role of conceptualization in these intuitions. As we have seen from the study of Baillie, the intuition of God is quite rich in content. Baillie states that this intuition of God tells us what God is like. Baillie denies the claim

of Thomists that our knowledge of God is based on inference from earthly attributes and proceeds by analogy to God. Baillie claims that in the revelation of God, we discover predicates which we then apply to earthly creatures. In describing the attributes of God, it has commonly been assumed that there is a comparison between God and the creatures based upon the attributes of the creatures. Baillie states that the comparison frequently moves, however, from God to man using attributes of God. The very notion of personality is an example. The word 'personality' was first used as a theological term with reference to the Trinity, and only later was it used in psychology with human reference.

To say that we directly know certain attributes of God without the mediation of inference and analogy may seem startling at first, but Baillie maintains that such a notion is justified. He insists that the Thomist must ultimately make such a concession, if the doctrine of analogy is to make sense. The Thomist says, for example, that we gain the notion of a Perfect Being through comparison of less perfect beings with more perfect ones, but Baillie questions how we can make such a comparison without already apprehending a standard of perfection, by which we grade the less and the more perfect. Baillie says that from our confrontation with God, we discover the ideal moral conceptions such as goodness and also such conceptions as infinity, eternity, omniscience, and omnipotence. These we do not find from the creation but rather "we and all creation stand

condemned by being brought into the light of them."⁷⁶

It must be then that we have some direct knowledge of Another who is Uncreated and in whom these qualities inhere. Such are known, not *aposteriori*, but *a priori*, which is to say, being interpreted, that they are first seen not on earth but in heaven. They are the names of the attributes which we find in God.⁷⁷

Baillie maintains that there are attributes of God which we directly ascribe to Him through being confronted with Him, and these divine attributes are compared with earthly attributes. "What is false is the assumption that the comparison moves from man to God instead of from God to man."⁷⁸ Such a view, he maintains, is bound to end in anthropomorphism. Baillie draws in the opinions of others to support his case. He quotes Norman Kemp Smith, who writes,

In respect of each and all of the ontological attributes the Divine is not known through analogy with the self, or with any other creaturely mode of existence. These divine attributes presuppose God's existence, and save in this reference even their bare possibility cannot be established. If without any antecedent or independent apprehension of the Divine, we have to start from the creaturely, as exhibited in Nature and in man, and by way of inference and of analogy - on the pattern of what is found in the creaturely - through enlargement or other processes of ideal completion, to construct for ourselves concepts of the Divine, then the sceptics have been in the right; the attempt is an impossible one, condemned to failure

p.251 ⁷⁶ J.Baillie, Our Knowledge of God (New York 1959)

⁷⁷ Ibid, p.252

⁷⁸ Ibid, p.254

from the start. We cannot reach the Divine merely by way of inference, not even if the inference be analogical in character. By no idealization of the creaturely can we transcend the creaturely. 79

Yet we must exercise caution at this point.

Baillie says that our knowledge of God is not direct and immediate, but rather this knowledge of God's attributes is given 'in, with, and under' the attributes of man.

God's attributes are given in conjunction with the corresponding attributes of man, the two being compared and contrasted with one another. In this way, our knowledge of God is direct but mediate. When Baillie says that we see God's attributes in and with those of His creatures, it seems apparent that what Baillie wants is a intuition, for like Mascall we see God-with-the-creatures. Baillie says that we see, for example, the goodness of God along with the goodness of man, and the latter is seen as judged by the former. The result is, concludes Baillie, that "the spiritual life of man is, in every part and mode of it, a derived and dependent life." 80 Man sees himself as a "being whose centre lies not in himself but in God." 81

Yet, as we have seen, the intuition of God that Baillie describes appears to be direct or immediate in spite of some of his statements to the contrary. To maintain that God's attributes are given in conjunction with corres-

79 Ibid., p.252

80 Ibid., p.258

81 Ibid., p.258

ponding attributes of man's, is too perilous a position.

If Baillie wants to hold that our concepts of God are derived from our confrontation with God, then it would appear that he has slipped over into the mystical camp. If the attributes ascribed to man are judged by those of God, as Baillie suggests, then it appears that our concepts of God's attributes come first.

Baillie has said that out of our intuition of God, we discover such conceptions as goodness, infinity, and so forth. In the intuition of God, we derive certain concepts of God's nature, and often earthly concepts are derived from these concepts gained from the intuition of God. The intuition of God actually gives us certain concepts of God, which are not simply abstractions from earthly conditions. This is a startling claim and one which must be examined in more detail to check its soundness. It would appear that our intuition of God is conceptual, or at least that we can make some attempt to conceptualize the intuition. Furthermore, these concepts are derived from the intuition itself and are not concepts derived from earthly conditions and stretched to express the intuition of God. Baillie insists that the comparison moves from God to man and indicates that our concepts such as omniscience and goodness are derived from the intuition of God. Such a notion we must question. If our concepts move from God to man, why is it that such concepts as omniscience and omnipotence have prefixes attached to them, which indicates that they are earthly concepts qual-

ified by means of the prefixes to express knowledge of God. By saying that God is omniscient, we are saying that he is all-knowing. But in saying that he is all-knowing, we are using the concept 'knowing' and are attaching the prefix 'all' to indicate that we are predicating 'knowing' to a being who possesses knowing to the highest degree. The prefix in a concept ascribed to God indicates that the concept is rooted in earthly conditions and is being stretched by means of the prefix so that it can suitably be predicated of God. The prefix indicates that the concepts ascribed to God are derivations of empirical concepts. If our concepts were truly to move from God to man, then earthly concepts would have the prefixes attached to them to indicate that they were derived from the concepts ascribed to God. We would say, for example, that God is knowing and that man is less-knowing. It would appear that concepts actually move from man to God.⁸²

Furthermore, Baillie's notion that our concepts move from God to man presents great difficulties for the doctrine of analogy. Although he repudiates the doctrine of analogy, Baillie is himself committed to analogy, unless he wishes to maintain that in saying 'God is good' and 'man is good', we are using the word 'good' univocally. Presumably Baillie, like many an orthodox theist, would not want to do

⁸² We are assuming that the order of concepts is also the order of verbalization.

this. If we accept that 'good' is being used analogically, according to Baillie we predicate 'good' as we see it in God to 'good' as we see it in man. The comparison is as follows:

<u>godness</u>	: :	<u>goodness</u>
essence of God		essence of man

whereas the traditional notion of analogy was as follows:

<u>goodness</u>	: :	<u>goodness</u>
essence of man		essence of God

In both cases the left side is the basis of the analogy, and on its basis we move to the right side. The problem with the traditional doctrine of analogy is that we do not know the essence of God, although we at least are able to know the basis of the analogy, which nevertheless may be of some help in aiding us to understand the right side. In Baillie's analogy, however, we cannot say that we really know the left side of the analogy, so that it becomes difficult to move to the right side. The only way out for Baillie would be if he admitted that we knew the essence of God. Since we have seen that to some extent Baillie is a mystic, the problem is alleviated, but nevertheless few mystics would claim that they know the essence of God, and certainly Baillie would be most reluctant to do so. Since we do not know the essence of God, it is difficult for us to maintain that the concepts move from God to man.

Furthermore, if certain concepts are derived primarily from God and Baillie indicates that concepts like

goodness are "first seen not on earth but in heaven"⁸³, then are we to understand that a child first learns the concept 'good' from seeing it in God? Such a notion seems rather extravagant. Looking back upon our experience, we surely learned the word 'good' first from earthly examples and then saw that it could be applied to God. We then realized that God was supremely good and was the source of all goodness, but nevertheless the concept 'good' as applied to God was learned from our earthly experience.

Nevertheless Baillie's point against Thomistic analogy can be appreciated. Baillie maintains that if we do not have any previous apprehension of God and if we must start with the creature and reach God by idealizing the creature, then we cannot reach God. Such a notion may be quite correct, and Baillie seems to have the upper hand on the Thomists at this point. Yet it appears that conceptually we must move from man to God. This, however, need not lead us into anthropomorphism, as Baillie fears it does. The strict Thomist does have difficulty in establishing a scale of perfection and in knowing the suitability of concepts ascribed to God. But is it necessary to set up Baillie and the strict Thomist as the only two alternatives? Another interpretation on relationship of concepts and the intuition of God can be found in Trethowan, and to his approach on

⁸³ Ibid, p.252

this topic we must now turn.

Trethowan says in reference to Anselm that "the idea of God is not an idea at all, in St. Thomas's conceptual sense, but a vivid apprehension."⁸⁴ Beyond statements like this, it is difficult to find explicit statements by Trethowan on the subject. We must remember, however, that Trethowan is an Augustinian and that much of Augustine's philosophy is rooted in the thought of Plato. When we combine this fact with quotations like the above, it becomes possible to set up a possible interpretation of Trethowan's thoughts on the topic of the intuition of God and conceptualization. We shall attempt to interpret Trethowan's thoughts on the subject by presenting a Platonic interpretation of the matter.

Plato states in his Seventh Letter that the highest knowledge "cannot be put into words like other studies."⁸⁵ It is probable that Platonic intuition, after which Trethowan's intuition is most likely patterned, goes beyond the limits of conceptual thinking. When we intuit God as the source of values, the intellect has presumably fathomed beyond conceptual knowledge, for we cannot see God as He is in Himself and lack the adequate concepts by which to express the intuition of Him. In this intuition the intellect has broken through finite concepts to gain an intuition of God,

⁸⁴D.M. Pontifex-I. Trethowan, The Meaning of Existence (London 1953) p.168

⁸⁵P. Friedlander, Plato, an Introduction (New York 1964) p.20

the Source of those values which we conceptualize. Yet Plato's intuition is not anti-conceptual, as Bergson's intuition appears to be. In order to preserve the contents of that intuitive 'breakthrough' and in order to communicate, the intellect obviously requires concepts. The intuition must be "anchored" by concepts and "captured" in conceptual language. The intellect, for example, is confronted with the value of goodness in situation x, and suddenly intuits God as the source of earthly goodness. This intuition is triggered by the concept 'good' as it is applicable to situation x, and the intellect will presumably preserve the intuition by saying that God is also good and is, in fact, the source of good. The intuition is, therefore, anchored by the concept 'good', and we will say that God is intuited as also being good, although we will probably attempt a qualification also in conceptual terms by saying that God is 'extremely good' or 'good to the highest degree'. By such means as these, our intuition is conceptually preserved for purposes of clarification, preservation, and communication. Yet the intuition of God fathoms much further than the concepts indicate. Although situation x is 'good' and God is 'good', and although both situations are spanned by the one concept, the intellect realizes the disparity between situation x and God and the weakness of applying the concept 'good', as it is used in situation x to a description of God. It would appear that the intellect penetrates much further,

and this penetration is the point of orientation for all conceptualizing and is the point from which all concepts emanate. The original intuition can never be completely embedded in conceptual language and remains outside as the ultimate criterion by which the conceptual structure is judged and often revised. For this reason, Plato was never satisfied with mere communication of concepts to convey his innermost thought, but preferred to preach, tell stories, create myths so that "the spark will jump" and the intellect will see that to which all concepts were pointing.

Such a position as the above is probably that of Trethowan's. The intuition of God itself, while it can never be completely conceptualized, is embodied in finite concepts. Yet behind the finite concepts is that part of the intuition which is beyond all expression and conceptualizing and which is the driving force behind conceptualizing and the judge of all concepts. Finite concepts are used as models to express the intuition and are frequently modified by other finite concepts to clarify and communicate the intuition. The work of I. T. Ramsey comes immediately to mind as an attempt to express intuitions of God through finite models. The word 'wise', for example, is a conceptual model, and the concept 'all' is added as a qualifier. Through this conceptual model the intuition of God as a God of wisdom is embodied, and yet obviously such a model is attempting to point beyond itself. The conceptual model is not the final say on the matter; it attempts

to "make the penny drop" and give us the intuition of God to which it is pointing. Ramsey says that "our hope is that at some point or other the ice will break, the light dawn, and a characteristically theological situation will be evoked."⁸⁶ Hence it appears that concepts must always be the servants of the intuition, which in turn requires the service of concepts. Concepts and intuition must remain in delicate balance with the intuition guiding the concepts and the concepts preserving and clarifying the intuition. Thus it seems that our concepts must move from man to God, but this need not land us in anthropomorphism, as Baillie fears, for we must realize the inadequacy of finite concepts and their basic servitude to the intuition of God granted to us. Thus, strictly speaking, we can have knowledge of God through the intuition of God, which can guide us through the perilous straits of anthropomorphism. Unlike Baillie, however, we must recognize our great dependency upon finite concepts.

In this topic of the role of our concepts in the intuition of God, Baillie's position as compared with Trethowan's appears too facile. We can appreciate what Baillie was arguing against; we can sympathize with his fears about anthropomorphism and with his distrust of exclusive reliance on inferential proofs. It seems fair to conclude, however, that in his reaction against one pos-

⁸⁶ I.T. Ramsey, Religious Language (London 1957) p.66

ition, he has swung too far in the opposite direction and has laid himself open to some serious charges. The immediate objection that one has to Baillie's position is that it is too simplified an account. In the first place, we can question whether the intuitive ability of the intellect possesses the great scope of certain and immediate knowledge that Baillie ascribes to it. Baillie's epistemology simply seems too simplified an account. Furthermore, his disparagement of the mind's reflective ability comes dangerously close to anti-intellectualism. Baillie appears almost Bergsonian in his great confidence about the mind's immediate grasp of reality and his disparagement of inference and recollection. In repudiating the latter, he has cut himself off from the valuable features of phenomenological research. Baillie's epistemological approach to the nature of our knowledge of God is too facile a solution to be of lasting benefit.

In the second place it can be charged that Baillie is expecting too much of us. There seems no choice but to conclude that Baillie's approach is within the camp of mysticism. It was previously indicated that there is no objection to this position, which is a blessing to those capable of such experiences, but it can be questioned whether all of us are inclined in a mystical direction. It might be a danger to mysticism to expect all of us to be oriented in this direction. Again it can be maintained that to call everyone to a mystical encounter is too simplified a

solution.⁸⁷ Finally, to maintain that everyone 'in the bottom of his heart' is a theist sounds too glib a notion. It may be the case that the non-theist has confused or not noticed his knowledge of God, as Trethowan maintains, but Baillie at times gives the impression that if the atheist does not believe, then it is his own fault. Baillie writes that "it is, indeed, our common sin and shame that we do our best to ignore God's gracious approach, shutting ourselves up within our human finitude."⁸⁸ To maintain this seems at times to show a considerable lack of charity to the honest testimony of the non-believer. Baillie is too quick in concluding that his own experiences are those of the human race. Baillie does not seem to take the non-believer's case seriously, and this is a poor starting point for any piece of academic work. For these reasons, one must ultimately conclude that Trethowan has the better position.

We shall close this chapter by considering the 'existential' nature of Baillie's and Trethowan's position. Baillie's intuition is, as we have seen a "general revelation" a confrontation by God with man. According to Baillie, man is actually confronted with the divine. It can be charged

⁸⁷On the other hand, it could be maintained that such a solution is an extremely difficult one. To call everyone to a mystical encounter is perhaps a very difficult solution, if we assume that not everyone is capable of such a calling.

⁸⁸J. Baillie, Our Knowledge of God (New York 1959)

that to posit God as a source of value is only a linguistic achievement whereby 'God' becomes a kind of key word in ethical statements and that it has not been established that God actually exists. Baillie's answer to this has already been given. God is not arrived at simply as a linguistic device, for Baillie says that in intuition we directly encounter some aspect of reality. Intellectual perception implies that there is an object which we perceive. We are actually confronted by God and his challenge is felt by all. God's presence is an existential fact and one which, so Baillie maintains, unless we are honest with ourselves, we cannot deny.

Trethowan also maintains that he is crossing the gap between idea and reality. As a phenomenologist, Trethowan can claim that consciousness is always consciousness of something. Phenomenology does not claim that consciousness is simply bodily states becoming objects for themselves, as Spinoza seemed to maintain. We cannot regard all experience as the subjective experience of our own states. Consciousness is consciousness of something other than itself. "It belongs as a general feature to the essence of every actual cogito to be a consciousness of something."⁸⁹ Unfortunately, this does not solve the problem, for, while consciousness is always consciousness of something, Husserl

⁸⁹ E. Husserl, Ideas (New York 1962) p.108

does not discuss the matter of existence so that 'something' has no ontological status. Trethowan, however, attempts to grapple with the question of the existence of the object of our intuition. Trethowan suggests that Anselm would have avoided illogicality, if he had said that the only possible explanation of our idea of God is that there must be a reality capable of causing such an idea. It is the very operation of God upon us that gives rise to the idea of God. We are called upon to recognize the operation of God upon the self.⁹⁰

For him (Anselm) the idea of God is not an idea at all, in St. Thomas' conceptual sense, but a vivid apprehension. Indeed, perhaps the most pertinent criticism of Anselm is that he erred fundamentally in trying to express in the uncongenial form of a dialectical demonstration a profound inward experience.⁹¹

It can be immediately objected that God is simply an idea of the intellect which may not be a reality. The idea of God could be an abstraction from earthly predicates, which are then intensified to a high degree. Trethowan's point is, however, that the notion of God could not be gained simply by abstraction. We ultimately have such an idea, because there is a God, who impresses an apprehension of His existence upon us. In the final analysis, Trethowan

⁹⁰This idea no doubt is derived from the notion of illumination discussed earlier.

⁹¹M. Pontifex-I. Trethowan, The Meaning of Existence (London 1953) p.168

rests his case upon such a conviction. Although he has departed significantly from this tradition, Descartes states this conviction that the idea of God in our minds is not achieved by abstraction, but rather the very idea of God testifies to His existence.

Hence there remains only the idea of God, concerning which we must consider whether it is something which cannot have proceeded from me myself. By the name God I understand a substance that is infinite (eternal, immutable) independent, all-knowing, all powerful, and by which I myself and everything else, of anything else does exist, have been created. Now all those characteristics are such that the more diligently I attend to them, the less do they appear capable of proceeding from me alone; hence from what has already been said, we must conclude that God necessarily exists.⁹²

The crux of the contention appears to be that the human intellect is not capable of inventing the idea of God by generating it from the finite. The idea of God must ultimately arise out of our experience of such a Being.

In this chapter, we have discussed the intuition of God through the awareness of value. Its advantage over the Thomistic position has been noted, and it has been mentioned that the approach of Baillie and Trethowan can roughly be defined as Augustinian. Of the two writers, a preference was shown for the approach of Trethowan and reasons for this preference were given. There remains now the task of drawing concluding observations from these two chapters and attempting to gain some broader perspective of this whole approach.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this chapter we must make some concluding remarks about the two approaches that we have been examining. The basic factor which both approaches have in common is the notion of contingency and dependency. The world reveals itself to us as a contingent order. The objects of nature and our own selves are unable to account for their own existence. Values which we encounter are unable to explain why they are valuable. Taken in themselves all things in our world are incomplete. Because this realm is contingent and incomplete, we also see it as a dependent order. It is seen as dependent on that which is self-sufficient and complete.

It is this second step, the observation that the world is dependent, which is the fundamental one, and one which will be denied by many. Because our world is contingent, is there any justification for concluding that it is dependent on something which is not contingent? Why must we assume that there is something "behind" the world which sustains it? Perhaps we must conclude that the world simply is contingent and should be accepted as such. Perhaps there is no reason why the world should exist, and we should not

seek for one beyond the assumption that existence as we know it is a cosmic accident. Perhaps we must accept the world's contingency as final and thus accept the basic absurdity of existence. Trethowan is perhaps right when he sets up as the alternative to his intuition of the self-sufficient background of existence the absurd.

The alternative is to conclude that there is no purpose in human life and in the world around us, to call our experience absurd. Everything then is absurd, and it is the great merit of Jean Paul Sartre to have made this so clear for us.¹

It is true that we may not like this alternative, but simply because we dislike the absurd, we have no right to reject its truth.

Having heard from existentialism as an alternative to assuming that the world is dependent, we should also listen to the criticism from the circles of philosophical analysis. It can be claimed that the search for some metaphysical "completeness" that arising from our observations that the world is contingent is simply a queer kind of question that cannot be answered. To posit God as an explanation for the world's contingency is simply to be misled by a strange question that cannot be answered in any intelligent fashion. In the famous debate between A. J. Ayer and F. C. Copleston, Copleston proposes as a meaningful question the question of why there is something rather than nothing. Copleston seeks

for some explanation of the world's existence, Ayer's objection is that not only is such an explanation self-contradictory, but also the question itself is meaningless. Copleston's question is a "why" question, and all "why" questions demand "how" answers in the form of a description. If Copleston's question cannot be answered by a description, and Copleston indicates that he is demanding more than a description, then he is entertaining a contradictory notion.

The contradiction is, I think, that if you accept my interpretation of why 'why' questions are, then asking a 'why' question is always asking for a more general description and asking for the 'why' of that is asking for a more general 'why' question still. And then you say, "give me an answer to a 'why' which doesn't take the form of a description" - and that's a contradiction. It's like saying, "Give me a description more general than any description, which itself is not a description," and clearly nobody can do that.²

In addition to not being satisfied with a descriptive answer, the kind of answer Copleston is expecting is an explanation of all events. He has generalized the "why" question to cover all possible events. Ayer thinks that any explanation to such a question is a faulty one. Any explanation, if it is to be an explanation, must be compatible with one course of events and incompatible with other events. If the events are different, then the explanations will be

² G. MacGregor, - J. W. Robb, Readings in Religious Philosophy (Boston 1962) p.332

are necessary and certain and yet which apply to contingent things. Simply because the reality to which the proposition applies is contingent, the proposition itself need not be contingent, and simply because the proposition is necessary and certain, it need not be a tautology. Copleston uses as an example the law of contradiction. Here we have a proposition that is certain and necessary and yet it applies to contingent beings within our experience. Copleston claims that Ayer is restricting the criterion of meaningfulness to those questions that can be answered by the methods of empirical science, while Copleston claims that he is asking a question that is on a different level.

Whether such a question can be answered or not is obviously another matter, but if I ask whether anything lies behind phenomena, whether anything is responsible for the series, finite or infinite, of phenomena, the answer - supposing that there is an answer - must, in my opinion, refer to the reality lying beyond or behind phenomena - but, in any case, to ask why any finite phenomena exist, why there is "something" rather than "nothing", is to ask a different sort of question from the question why water tends to flow downhill rather than uphill.⁵

Copleston maintains that such metaphysical questions as why there is "something" is not meaningless, but can legitimately be asked without the charge that we are playing with words. The basic contention between Ayer and Copleston is that Ayer wishes to confine the criterion of meaningful-

⁵Ibid., p.332

ness to the sphere of the methods of empirical science.

The validity of Copleston's question really depends upon showing that the criterion of meaningfulness is broader in scope than Ayer allows it to be. Copleston criticizes Ayer's position as follows:

In short, I consider that logical positivism, apart from its theory of analytic propositions, really embodies the notion of 19th century positivism; that the terms "rational" and "scientific" have the same extension. This notion certainly corresponds to a popularly held prejudice, but I don't see any adequate reason for accepting it. I still find it difficult to understand the status of the principle of verification.⁶

Ultimately the dispute between Copleston and Ayer over the limits of meaningfulness are based on the dispute between classical and modern Humean philosophy. As we saw in the beginning of chapter two, classical philosophy, whose basic tenets are held by the four writers here considered, thought that the intellect could penetrate beyond the limits set down for it by Hume or Kant. Ayer's criticisms are based on an acceptance of Hume, while Copleston's claim for the meaningfulness of metaphysical questions is based upon a denial of Hume. We cannot at this point resolve the controversy beyond stating Copleston's immediate arguments for the meaningfulness of the metaphysical question. If we accept that the criterion of meaningfulness goes beyond the verification principle, and Copleston maintains that we implicitly think that it does, then to ask for a Source of

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Ibid., p.355

the world's existence is a legitimate question.

I've contended that a metaphysical idea has meaning if some experience is relevant to the formation of that idea, and that a rational metaphysic is possible if there are - as I still think there are - principles which can express an intellectual apprehension and a nature of being. I think that one can have an intellectual experience - or intuition if you like - of being. A metaphysical proposition is testable by rational discussion, but not by purely empirical means. When you say that metaphysical propositions are meaningless because they are unverifiable in your sense, I don't really think that this amounts to more than saying that metaphysics are not the same thing as empirical science.⁷

Copleston submits that Ayer is presupposing that all reality is given in sense experience and that there is not such a thing as metaphysical reality. This must be a presupposition, and, if it is not completely arbitrary, then it is based on philosophical principles which go beyond and which cannot be demonstrated by the verification principle. In the last analysis, Copleston maintains that Ayer is implicitly thinking that the criterion of meaningfulness goes beyond the methods of empirical science. Ayer himself is thereby dabbling in metaphysical principles, and once the gates have been opened to this degree, then we can at least admit the possibility that Copleston's search for a Source of existence is a meaningful one and might indeed have the answer which Copleston thinks that it has.

⁷Ibid., p.355

Let us accept, therefore, that the jump from the observation of the world's contingency to the answer that it is dependent upon God is in principle meaningful. We must, therefore, return to the problem of whether such a move is the correct one. In Maritain's case, such a move appears to be inferred; in the case of the other three such a step is "seen". As Trethowan has already said, "nothing will come of nothing, indeed, but this must be seen." The factor of dependency appears to be "seen" by the intellect. We are called to examine our own experience and to see what is actually given, and the writers here considered regard their case as resting on experience. Trethowan dubs the intuition of God as a "metaphysical experience" available for everyone, though it exists in an unrecognized form. The term 'experience' immediately arouses distrust and a suspicion that such experiences are beyond the realm of philosophic speculation. "Metaphysical experience" is furthermore regarded as belonging to the subjective realm and is associated primarily with feelings. In the writers here considered, however, this metaphysical experience is intellectual and depends upon the intuitive ability of the intellect though feelings and emotions are linked with it. To talk of a feeling of a sense of obligation is to include some element of emotion and feeling. In reply to the charge that such experiences are subjective, Trethowan and the others insist that this experience is available to all. It

is not one person's subjective experience, but is implicit in the experience of all intellects.

Inasmuch as all four writers call us to analyze our experience, this approach can, therefore, be considered empirical. I personally think that one of the reasons for the appeal to intuition in the contemporary philosophical-theological circles is the desire to ground a position in experience. Obviously the word 'experience' is being used in a much wider sense than it is commonly used by modern philosophers like Hume. As we have seen in Ramsey, there is 'something more' than spatio-temporal observables, but this 'more' is not to be considered as a transcending of experience, but rather is an attempt to broaden its scope. By claiming to be empirical, the writers selected here are firstly claiming that the intuition of God begins with spatio-temporal observables; for example, the existence of an object of nature. This is what I. T. Ramsey calls 'empirical anchorage'. Secondly, out of the observation of these spatio-temporal details, we gain the intuition of God. This second step transcends spatio-temporal details, but is also experienced rather than inferred and is considered to be within the realm of experience. The intuition of God appears to be located "more deeply" within our experience. It is not among the immediate and obvious aspects of our experience, but is considered to be present on a deeper level. Copleston, for example, calls himself an empiricist.

But then I don't claim that metaphysical

propositions are not in some way founded upon experience. In a certain sense I should call myself an empiricist, but I think that your empiricism is too narrow. 8

To label this approach as empirical means broadening what contemporary philosophy means by experience. Baillie makes his case as follows,

Nearly all contemporary philosophers profess to be empiricists, and to be an empiricist is to believe that all our veridical knowledge derives from sense experience and can be checked by reference to it. But the empiria or experience many of them have in mind is an experience of the corporeal world as revealed to us by our bodily senses, and these assume that this is the only experience, and consequently the only knowledge, we possess of trans-subjective reality, whether it be Umwelt or Mitwelt...It is an assumption that we must strenuously oppose. Our lives would be poor and savourless if we had no awareness, in which we could repose the least degree of trust, of anything in reality save what we can see and hear and touch and taste and smell. My contention will indeed be that we have even what can properly be called sense experience of other things than these. The human spirit, I shall say, develops certain subtler senses of sensitivities which go beyond the bodily senses. 9

A willingness to hold a broader view of experience has always been a characteristic of phenomenology, which regards limitation of experience to human impressions and Russell's atomic facts as arbitrary. Phenomenology has, as we have seen, influenced Trethowan and undoubtedly has affected the Thomists. While few phenomenologists would be willing to stake their reputations on Baillie's somewhat poetic claim, they nevertheless would feel some sympathy

⁸ Ibid., p.354

⁹ J. Baillie, The Sense of the Presence of God (London 1962) p. 52

with him in his opposition to the Humean tradition. Undoubtedly phenomenology and its acceptance of a broader scope of experience has been partly responsible for the claims of the intuitionists that their case is based on experience. Husserl claims that the adoption of Hume's position is not a return to what is immediately given to us, but is itself a standpoint. Husserl claims that,

we start out from that which antedates all standpoints: from the totality of the intuitively self-given which is prior to any theorizing reflection, from all that one can immediately see and lay hold of, provided one does not allow oneself to be blinded by prejudices, and so led to ignore whole classes of genuine data. If by 'Positivism' we are to mean the absolute unbiased grounding of all science on what is 'positive' i. e. on what can be primordially apprehended, then it is we who are the genuine positivists. In fact, we permit no authority to deprive us of the right of recognizing all kinds of intuition as equally valuable sources for the justification of knowledge, not even that of 'modern natural science'.¹⁰

This does not mean that we are returning to some kind of bizarre cult, but rather that any kind of experience that claims to be given immediately is admitted provided that it yield itself to close scrutiny. It is presumably in this latter process that we determine what is genuine and what is prejudice.

The question of verification of this intuition of God must be considered. If we are to treat this intuitive approach in an empirical manner, then we must ask how this

intuition can be denied or confirmed. In order to verify whether or not we actually had an intuition of God, we must return to the region of experience out of which it arose and allow it to be critically judged again and again. The case stands or falls by constant examination. If we are asked how our faith in God that arises from this intuition can be falsified, the answer would be found in an analysis of the fundamental intuition. It is possible that a closer scrutiny can show that we were mistaken and saw something which was not there. It is also possible that examination can show that we were correct. Verification is ultimately carried out, not by analysis of other realms of experience, but by a return to the experience itself. If we claim that a piece of art is beautiful or that litmus paper turns red in acid, these claims are verified by returning to the art gallery where the picture is and to the laboratory where the litmus and acid are. The experiences are verified by returning to them again. So it is with the intuition of God. The intuition of God is not, so to speak, a thunderbolt from on high that comes arbitrarily and unexpectedly, but is always implicit in our experience. It is open to analysis at any time. It is always there for us to affirm or deny its claim to be an intuition of God. The presence of the religious community is also an additional aid to verification. It is not one individual but a number who testify that there is such intuition. The religious community is a guarantee that this is not the imaginings of one individual who imposes his views upon the rest.

Finally the intuition of God is verified by what I. T. Ramsey calls its empirical fit. Unlike the scientific hypothesis, an intuition of God is not judged for its truth by the possibility of deducing consequences from it. It is verified and justified by its ability to cover and incorporate wide ranges of experience and phenomena. We gain an intuition of God not only by analyzing value *x* but value *y* as well. In situation *z*, which, we shall say, is the reflection upon the existence of an object of nature, we also gain an intuition of God. Furthermore, we find that the intuition gained in these diverse experiences is also helpful in clarifying other diverse situations, which until then appeared somewhat puzzling and enigmatic. This intuition, born in a moment of insight, is now found to be suitable in accounting for other diverse experiences. Our intuition of God is, therefore, verified by its empirical fit.

It is rather judged by its stability over the widest possible range of phenomena, by its ability to incorporate the most diverse phenomena not inconsistently. There are in theology, as opposed to science, no deductive derivations, emerging one by one, to confirm or falsify the theory which is on our lips. The theological model works more like the fitting of a boot or a shoe than like the 'yes' or 'no' of a roll call.¹¹

What must be decided is whether or not the intuition of God is actually contained within the awareness of being and of values or whether it is what Husserl would call a prejudice. Is the awareness of God a feature added

¹¹I. T. Ramsey, Models and Mystery (London 1964) p.16

by theologians and believers in God and not actually contained within the experience itself? This is obviously the decision of importance. The theist can only say that, if you look at your experience of being and of value as it really is, you will intuit God. He can only say as Augustine did, "look within". If a person maintains that he has had no such experience, presumably the theist can go no further and must resort to other methods. This is in keeping with the rules of the empirical game. If the person cannot see the desired object, then further advances cannot be made. Furthermore, if only a few claim to "see" what the theist does, then we can begin to question the accuracy of the theist's sight. In the last analysis, this approach must stand or fall by this.

Yet this much should be said in defence of the theist. The experience here referred to has been claimed by many, and to deny this without consideration is to run the danger of complete scepticism. The writers here considered claim to have seen the element of dependency in existence and the dependency of finite existence upon God. Their claims, though they may be false, must, at least, be taken seriously. We have already had occasion to rebuke Baillie for refusing to take the atheist's case seriously. It should be pointed out that the number who claim to have intuited God in some manner similar to the ones here described is considerable. A large number in the ancient societies, for example, keenly felt the contingency of ex-

istence and considered the realm of "becoming" to be dependent upon a realm of "being". Mircea Eliade has observed the strong tendency of archaic man to refuse to accept the temporal realm and history as absolute and final and to look to an eternal and divine realm.¹² Plato can be regarded as the philosopher par excellence of this ancient ontology. This, however, should not be taken as conclusive proof for the correctness of "seeing" the feature of dependency, for this reduces the search for truth to a survey of what is predominately held to be true. In the final analysis, numbers do not decide truth. In matters of truth it is possible for one person to be right and the entire human race to be wrong. Ultimately one must decide whether it was the modern or ancient man who had a better metaphysical grasp of the universe. If we side with the ancients, and it seems to me that the theist must, some attempt must be made to explain in some way the shortsightedness of modern man, for it cannot be denied that not too many today "see" the element of dependency in existence. I suggest that modern philosophy and science have very much confined the vision of modern man to the earth and have made him regard the world as a "complete" order. The teleological view of nature held by ancient and

¹² See M. Eliade, Cosmos and History (New York 1959)
Myths, Dreams and Mysteries (London 1960)
The Sacred and the Profane (New York 1961)

medieval philosophy helped to make man regard the world as dependent. Modern science and philosophy have, of course, abandoned such a viewpoint. The sense of Being in the Thomistic sense has not been a major characteristic of modern thought. Hume writes that,

The idea of existence, then, is the very same with the idea of what we conceive to be existent. To reflect on any thing simply, and to reflect on it as existent, are nothing different from each other. That idea, when conjoin'd with the idea of any object, makes no addition to it. Whatever we conceive, we conceive to be existent. Any idea we please to form is the idea of a being; and the idea of a being is any idea we please to form... 13

As long as the world is regarded as a chain of sense perceptions then the "mystery of being" is bound to perish. Values are also regarded by modern philosophy as either the result of the convention of society as in Hobbes or as projections of my own Being-in-the-world. If these necessary bridges to the intuition of God are removed, that is, the awareness of being and the awareness of value, then it is not surprising that modern man does not see the world as dependent upon God. Nevertheless these reasons should not be taken as a refutation of the modern claim that the world is not dependent. The modern may be correct in not seeing any element of dependency in existence, although I am personally inclined to accept the testimony of the ancients. It might also be pointed out that certain schools of existentialism sense the incompleteness of the world order by their de-

piction of an atheistic world as absurd. The world, taken by itself, does not seem to be rational and ordered. Such thoughts can be taken as evidence that modern man somehow senses that earthly existence requires some justification beyond itself.

Within this study we have analyzed the intuition of God through two basic approaches, the awareness of being and the awareness of value. It has already been indicated that the intuition of God through value provides us with a more adequate notion of God. In Trethowan and Baillie, God is intuited as the Source of value, and such a notion does justice to the traditional religious notion that God is a God of goodness, love, etc. The Thomistic approach of Mascall and Maritain, which intuits God as the source of Being, establishes God as the Necessary Being, which albeit important is nevertheless secondary to the notion of God as the God ^f of value.¹⁴ God as Necessary Being is a notion that would be accepted quite readily by the deist and as well by the theist. It is the intuition of value in God that separates those who worship from those who are content simply to accept His existence. The Augustinian approach of Trethowan and Baillie has, therefore, the deeper religious insight and is a more adequate approach to God.

Another advantage that the two Augustinian writers have over the two Thomists is that their approach is simpler.

Although, as we have seen, Aquinas himself gave considerable attention to considerations of value.

As the second chapter showed, in order to intuit God as Necessary Being, it appears that we must accept an impressive array of Thomistic metaphysics. Such a route to the intuition of God might easily bewilder the reader, who might understandably be reluctant to accept a quite complicated metaphysic before he is granted the intuition for which he is searching. It appears that the intuition of God within the Thomistic framework is deeply embedded within a metaphysical structure that might easily intimidate the less professional or those who disagree with Thomistic metaphysics. It is, of course, impossible not to embed the intuition of God within a philosophical framework; it is difficult to have an intuition divorced from any kind of philosophical assumptions. Certainly Trothowan and Baillie set their intuition within a wider philosophical context, but at the same time, their intuition of God is simpler and more direct. In the first place, to begin with value considerations is to have a simpler starting point. I. T. Ramsey, for example, who attempts to evoke intuitions of God in the simplest, most direct manner possible in order to establish contact with those who have little sympathy for metaphysics, prefers 'disclosure situations' arising out of value considerations to those that are in some sense derived from the awareness of being. I do not mean to suggest that the intuition of being is a faulty approach, but I do suggest that the value approach has the virtue of being more readily understand-

able and less wedded to a particular metaphysical structure. What can roughly be described as the Augustinian-Platonic tradition as a general rule has always tended to be more flexible and not bound rigidly by any one interpretation. Finally I suggest that the approach to God through values establishes contact with man's tendency to strive for and defend certain values. In our own age we have seen men struggling to assert and defend certain values like justice, respect for persons, and so forth. The value approach seeks to show that these cherished values are not simply the result of human convention that can be changed arbitrarily, but are embedded within the eternal nature of God.

Nevertheless, in the last analysis we must recognize that both approaches are needed. By 'God' the Christian theist means a God who is the Creator and Sustainer of temporal existence and who is the Source of value. To give us the most satisfactory account of God, both the normative and ontological approaches must blend. In this thesis we have perhaps unduly created a dichotomy between the Thomistic and Augustinian approaches and have too rigidly categorized Thomism as the approach through being and the Augustinian tradition as the approach through value. As the second chapter indicated, Aquinas discusses the scale of perfection and of value and incorporates it into his ontology. Trethowan also recognizes considerations of ontology by his statement, "'to exist' means 'to be a creature'". All four writers appear to recognize the importance of both normative

and ontological considerations, and, although they may confine their attention to one field, they seem to be aware of the other.

In these remaining few paragraphs we shall attempt some concluding remarks on the value of intuition. We have seen that the intuitive approach can be traced back to the Augustinian tradition, which is rooted in the philosophy of Plato. Plato thought that the most important truths ultimately were intuited and not inferred. In the Republic and in the Symposium, for example, the highest truths were "seen" to be so. Intuition for Plato was not contrary to intellectual procedures, but was in the last analysis its perfection. Philosophical writers who emphasize the role and importance of intuition, far from opening up the floodgates of anti-intellectualism and rampant subjectivity, may in fact be returning us to an important feature of human thought.

It is difficult to state at this point how much confidence the theologian can place in intuition. Trethowan obviously thinks that it is of very great importance, and starts from the premise that the existence of God cannot be proved by logical deduction. The attempt to make God's existence the conclusion of a self-evident syllogism simply cannot be done. This does not mean for one moment that he is underestimating the importance of argument, but he maintains that in the last analysis we are dependent upon the intuition of the contingency of the world order and its dependence upon the eternal God, for our conversion and belief

as theists. Whatever the role of argument beyond this point, this important intuition is the necessary foundation. Without this intuitive perception on our part, all further discussion is in vain, and Trethowan regards as one of the tasks of rational argument the evoking of this fundamental intuition. All discussion must radiate from this intuition, as do spokes from a wheel. Certainly the theist can never afford to do away with the traditional inferential procedures, as Baillie seems inclined to do. Nevertheless Trethowan seems to have hit a vital nerve of the theistic framework. It is probably true that ultimately the believer has "seen" that God exists and that the world order is a dependent one. The most important truths of human existence seem to have been born by intuition, whether they be aesthetic, scientific or philosophical insights. It is likely that the faith of the theist ultimately arose from intuition and to a large extent arose through some of the approaches outlined here. This seems in keeping with Plato's remark made in the above paragraph. It must also be recognized that no believer can enjoy a kind of "bare" intuition of God, for whatever he intuits will have been shaped by the religious community in which he lives. H. D. Lewis, who emphasizes the intuitive approach, recognizes the importance of the religious community to a greater degree than the four writers here selected have done. The role of the community must be recognized in discussing the content of the intuition

of God, since man is by nature a political animal and lives within a social context.

In the last analysis, it seems true to say that however important the intuitive approach will become in theological circles and however important inference is recognized as being, the intuition of the dependency of the finite order upon the eternal God will remain, as Trethowan has observed, the basis of belief.

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