

BRASIDAS AND DERKYLIDAS

BRASIDAS AND DERKYLIDAS:
THE IMPACT OF CHARACTER AND COMMAND ON SPARTA IN THE
PELOPONNESIAN WAR

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[Abstract]

In 5th century BCE Sparta, due to corruption within the dyarchy, the ephorate siphoned away the kings' military powers and distributed them amongst a new class of commissioned generals. The narrative of two generals, Brasidas and Derkylidas, help to reconstruct Spartan command doctrine and ethos, and serve as exemplars against which two positive and four negative examples are compared. Significant features of their personalities and operational function are analyzed to determine what qualities assist in achieving success. Manuals from the Canadian Armed Forces provide perspective, insight, and supplemental information concerning military doctrine/ethos, ideal command characteristics, tactical acumen, and operational frameworks.

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Introduction: Sparta and Hellas

Classical Sparta is an obstinate beast, purposefully resistant to any external attempts to understand or appreciate her. She kept her habits and secrets closely guarded, projecting a carefully curated air of obedience, cohesion and military supremacy. She had little interest in leaving behind a tangible record for us to investigate, archaeological or literary. Her only interests were pragmatic – retention of control over her territory, conformity in her citizenry, and loyalty amongst her allies. That leaves modern scholarship indebted to the fragments of information passed down through the work of outsiders, which is necessarily incomplete and insufficient to create more than a vague impression of their society. As Paul Rahe notes,

*"In effect, scholars find themselves in the position of children eager to reconstruct a vast jigsaw puzzle – who are aware that the great majority of the pieces are missing and that many of those which have survived are broken, and who then discover, to their great dismay, that their situation is complicated by yet another, perhaps even graver deficiency: for they have not the vaguest notion what the puzzle would look like if they actually managed to piece it together."*¹

Even within this fractured image, there stands out to me a phenomenon in her progress through the 5th Century BCE. As Sparta navigated the perils of the Greco-Persian War, increasing hostility with Athens, and at last the eruption of the Peloponnesian War, she made a quiet but drastic change – generalship² (and, relevant later, admiralship) was discretely slipped out of the hands of her kings and granted to a developing class of commanders. Amongst this rising class, two such generals stand out: Thucydides' Brasidas and Xenophon's Derkylidas from the *Hellenika*. Not only are they dominant characters in

¹ Rahe 2016, 64

² *Generalship* will be used for the duration of this paper as a cover-all term, including both polemarch and navarch postings, unless otherwise specified.

their respective narratives, but they are two of the best-described Spartan characters period. Upon closer examination of them, another striking pattern appears amongst the less well-illuminated Spartiate commanders – broadly, those who shared core personality traits with Brasidas and Derkylidas seemed to be more successful both at home and abroad, while those who did not, were not.

I do not believe this pattern is coincidental or a product of authorial intervention. I believe that these traits represent the result of a Spartan practise for which no direct evidence survives. To my mind, the consistent appearance of certain traits in powerful and successful commanders surely reflects the process of selection at Sparta in granting the commissioning of a generalship to an individual commander. I also suggest that the establishment of such a rubric (official or otherwise) is correlated directly to the dissemination of command formerly concentrated within the kingships.

I will illustrate here an adaptation of the Spartan state, brought on by a growing mistrust of the centralization of military powers within the dyarchy and resulting in the development of curated individuals achieving commission as generals. I further intend to establish that the two most successful generals of their times – Brasidas and Derkylidas – can act as a metric by which all other, less explicit Spartan commanders can be compared.

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As a *polis*, Sparta was organized around militarized life, partly from necessity and partly from choice. Unlike her first rival Argos and her later rival Athens, Sparta could not

claim autochthony³. The Spartans were believed to be the descendants of 'the Dorian Invasion' into the Peloponnese where they settled in Lakedaimon and conquered Lakonia in the seventh and sixth centuries. These Dorians claimed ownership over the land due to their dyarchy's direct descent from Herakles. Continuous claim over the lands and the subjugated people, therefore, relied on the continued preservation and maintenance of the dyarchy.

In the latter half of the eighth century, the Spartans committed to a twenty-year long campaign to conquer Messenia. The struggle cemented the dyarchy as warlord-kings, granted the utmost authority over the army and decisions while at war. Once Messenia was won, it became clear that Spartan forces would be unable to undertake any more expansion. Had they taken the risk, it would have stretched their forces too thin and left openings for the old helots in Lakonia and the new helots in Messenia to revolt, as they did in the next century, prompting the Second Messenian War⁴. Even Lakonian *perioikoi* were only as loyal as it was beneficial to be⁵. It is somewhere here, within the seventh century, that Lykurgos ostensibly implemented his reforms and laws, settling Sparta into her archaic and classical form. Lykurgos' new domestic doctrine would make Sparta into a cautious homebody, more

³ Rahe 2016, 42

⁴ Rahe 2015, 5 | "The helots who tilled the soil were both a precondition for the Spartan way of life and a permanent threat to the city survival. The 'old helots', descended from the ancient Achaean stock ascendant in the Mycenaean age, resided near their masters within Lakonia in the southeastern Peloponnese and gave every appearance of being docile. In time of need, some from among them were even freed and recruited as heavy infantryman into the army of Lakedaimon. To outsiders, they sometimes seemed broken in spirit. But – when the opportunity presented itself – many of these Lakonian helots proved to be fully capable of rebellion. Aristotle rightly speaks of them as a hostile force 'continuously lying in wait for misfortune' to strike. ... [In Messenia], where the Spartans themselves were few, the helots were numerous, conscious of their identity as a separate people, bitterly hostile to their masters, and prone to revolt."

⁵ Rahe 2015, 6 | "[...] and in emergency, the Spartans could never be fully confident that their allies within Lakonia and Messenia would rally to their cause. If the 'dwellers-about (*perioikoi*)' – the class of non-Spartiate Lakedaimonians who resided in the subject villages of these two provinces and retained in privilege a measure of local autonomy – were generally loyal, it was chiefly out of fear."

interested in maintaining her own affairs and committing as few resources abroad as was possible⁶. She would instead rely on diplomacy and a semi-steady latticework of alliances to keep the Peloponnese reasonably stable.

Like many other cities of her time, Sparta liked to profess that she maintained an unwavering faithfulness to the laws of Lykurgos and had preserved them in their original and intended form. However, by the end of the fifth century, it would be obvious even to pro-Spartan observers such as Xenophon that she had undergone significant social shifts, even if the letter of the law remained largely unchanged:

"Should anyone ask me whether I think that the laws of Lykurgos still remain unchanged at this day, I certainly could not say that with any confidence whatsoever. For I know that formerly the Lakedaimonians preferred to live together at home with moderate fortunes rather than expose themselves to the corrupting influence of flattery as governors of dependent states. And I know too that in former days they were afraid to be found in possession of gold; whereas nowadays there are some who even boast of their possessions. These were alien acts in former days, and to live abroad was illegal; and I have no doubt that the purpose of these regulations was to keep the citizens from being demoralized by contact with foreigners; and now I have no doubt that the fixed ambition of those who were thought to be among them is to live to their dying day as governors in a foreign land. There was a time when they would fain be worthy of leadership; but now they strive far more earnestly to exercise rule than to be worthy of it. Therefore in times past the Greeks would come to Lakedaimon and begged her to lead them against reputed wrongdoers; but now many are calling on one another to prevent the revival of Lakedaimonian supremacy. Yet we need not wonder if these reproaches are levelled at them, since it is manifest that they obey neither their god nor the laws of Lycurgus.

"I wish also to give an account of the compact made by Lykurgos between King and state. For this is the only government that continues

⁶ Rahe 2016, 12

*exactly as was originally established, whereas other constitutions will be found to have undergone and still be undergoing modifications."*⁷

The tenuous balance Sparta had to maintain between her military obligations and the sociopolitical considerations of her domestic situation would lead her to a precipice she could not sufficiently backpedal from.

The Ionian Revolts and the subsequent Persian response would upset Sparta's balance once more. Drawn into conflict by the oncoming Persian threat, Sparta would be pulled further abroad than she had ever intended to be, which put newly settled doctrine under strain. Her ability to adapt would dictate her fate over the coming century.

⁷ Xenophon *Constitution of the Lakedaimonians*, 14.1-15.1, transl. G. W. Bowersock (1968)

Chapter 1: Kings and Commanders

At the opening of the fifth century, Sparta began a gradual but continuous metamorphosis that left her fundamentally altered. Conflict with Persia would reveal a troubling deficit within Sparta's balance of powers: the dyarchy.

As mentioned in the introduction, Sparta could not simply do away with her kings in the manner that Athens and other *poleis* did. Sparta's claim to the land upon which she was founded rested entirely on the legitimacy of the dyarchy, making it an indispensable part of the government. Furthermore, the kingships could take credit for leading the Spartiates to relative wealth and privilege due to their successful campaigns of subjugation in Lakonia and Messenia. The kings were far from vestigial figureheads maintained for legitimacy's sake; they possessed a very active role in the governance of their *polis*.

[Dyarchy]

The dyarchy was a dual kingship made up of the senior Agiad line and the junior Eurypontid line. Both were ostensibly descendants of Herakles, and the seniority of the lines did not necessarily reflect which king had more influence during his reign than the other. Unlike every other male Spartan citizen (including their own younger brothers and extended family), direct heirs to the dyarchy did not participate in the *agoge* education system and were educated privately⁸. Some kings did pass through the *agoge* as non-linear successors to heirless kings, though this was less common. Similarly to any aspect of Sparta, the totality of the dyarchy or an individual king's powers are challenging to establish. As Rahe points out, kings were the through-line of the Spartan state, generally outliving the members of the

⁸ Rahe 2016, 41

Gerousia and passing through dozens of boards of ephors during their tenure⁹. Even if they were limited by the Gerousia or the current ephorate, they had the option of waiting out the obstructing parties and moving forward with their plans once more malleable members were selected. It is likely that kings exercised a considerable amount of interpersonal sway – honours, favours and friendships granted by the kings no doubt had significant impact on one's standing and reputation within Sparta, and in turn being a gracious king could lead to swift advancement of the king's own agenda¹⁰.

Much of the kings' soft social power would have originated in their official powers. Kings had the ability to appoint *proxenoi* and the four *pythioi*, overseeing adoption, and marrying off heiresses¹¹. The kings' access to these unwed heiresses was of particular significance. Despite trade and dowries officially being banned, Spartan women were capable of inheriting the property of deceased male relatives, therefore potentially adding significant wealth to the estate of whomever would become their husbands. Beyond even that, the kings were independently the most wealthy citizens in Sparta, with access to gold, silver, looted valuables, and land amongst the *perioikoi*¹². A friendship with the king not only

⁹ Rahe 2016, 52

¹⁰ Andrewes 2002, 58-60 | Andrewes makes the argument that kings with powerful personalities like Kleomenes would have been able to influence the election of ephors to ensure cooperative boards. I agree with him – it seems not only possible but plausible that the favour of the dominant king would sway the voting patterns and likely even the candidates. This is the explanation he provides for why ephors are only mentioned at the beginning and the end of Kleomenes' reign – social control was already slipping from his grasp close to his death, so naturally the ephorate would follow.

¹¹ Rahe 2016, 44-45

¹² Rahe 2016, 47

opened doors during one's military career, but was likely to assist in boosting one's wealth as well¹³.

The main strength of the dyarchy, however, was their inherited and perpetual generalship. From the sixth century, the kings were expected to jointly lead any army sent out of Sparta, though this would change as the fifth century progressed¹⁴. On campaign, a king was accompanied by two ephors to act as advisors¹⁵, but he could only be held to account for any misconduct once returned to Sparta. Otherwise, his decision-making was unilateral: he could conduct sacrifices, "appoint his own officers, to issue orders to all and sundry, to send troops wherever he wished, to raise fresh forces, to execute cowards, and even to levy money."¹⁶ In this capacity, too, a king was expected to maintain the system of roads that connected the Peloponnese¹⁷.

While delegation of generalship wasn't unheard of at this point, the encroachment of Persia and the alliance with the other Greeks necessitated more consistent commissioning of non-royal generals. The kings had a more-or-less direct hand in choosing the sortie of officers they took with them on campaign¹⁸. Herodotos confirms for us that the kings had the capacity – at the very least for small expeditionary campaigns – to hand-select the individuals who would make up his complement, as does Leonidas in preparation for

¹³ Rahe 2016, 43, 46-47

¹⁴ Rahe 2016, 42

¹⁵ Xenophon *Constitution of the Lakedaimonians*, 13.5

¹⁶ Rahe 2016, 43

¹⁷ Rahe 2016, 44-45

¹⁸ Xenophon *Constitution of the Lakedaimonians*, 13.7, transl. G. W. Bowersock (1968) | "The [king's] staff consists of all peers who are members of the royal mess, seers, doctors, fluteplayers, commanding officers and any volunteers who happen to be present."

Thermopylae¹⁹. It is less clear whether the dyarchy – either at home or on campaign – had the capacity to appoint a commander in a theatre in which they were not themselves involved. For example, it is unclear who assigned Eurybiadas to lead Sparta's navy at Artemisium and Salamis;

τὸν δὲ στρατηγὸν τὸν τὸ μέγιστον κράτος ἔχοντα παρείχοντο
Σπαρτιῆται Εὐρυβιάδην Εὐρυκλείδew ... ναύαρχος μὲν νυν ἐπὴν ὡυτὸς
ὃς περ ἐπ' Ἀρτεμισίῳ, Εὐρυβιάδης ὁ Εὐρυκλείδew ἀνὴρ Σπαρτιήτης, οὐ
μέντοι γένεος τοῦ βασιλείου ἔων.

*"The fleet's supreme commander was provided by the Spartiates:
Eurybiadas, the son of Eurycleidas ... The man in command of the fleet
was the same Spartiate – Eurybiadas, the son of Eurycleidas – who had
led*

*it at Artemisium, despite his not being a royal blood."*²⁰

Herodotos does make a point of calling out Eurybiadas' lack of connection to the royal family, which could imply that prior to the Greco-Persian war, commissioned generalships would have been expected to go to a royal family member. It is unlikely that Herodotos would make this notation in error, particularly since Eurybiadas is the only Spartan general mentioned in his narrative outside of the supervision of a king (or regent)²¹.

Herodotos relates that the establishment of the dyarchy at Sparta was the result of happenstance²². Aristodemos, the king who led the Dorians into the Peloponnese to establish Sparta, had by his wife Argeia twin sons, named Eurysthenes and Prokles.

¹⁹ Herodotos *Histories*, 7.205, transl. T. Holland (2013) | "So it was Leonidas who came to Thermopylae – escorted, as was the custom, by three hundred handpicked men, all of whom already had sons."

²⁰ Herodotos *Histories*, 8.2, 8.42; transl. T. Holland (2013)

²¹ It is also entirely possible that the last time – prior to the Persian invasion – a general had been commissioned had been before the institution of the laws of Lycurgus, and thus predating the more meritocratic advancement of non-royal commanders that would appear later. However, such conjecture must remain speculative, as Herodotos' narrative does not include information which would prove or disprove such analysis.

²² Herodotos *Histories*, 6.51-53

Aristodemos, who was already mortally ill, lived long enough to see his children born but not long enough to definitively mark one or the other as his successor.

*"The Lakedaimonians of the time then consulted together, and decreed that the eldest, as was traditional, should be installed as king – but because the twins were identical in every way, they had no idea which one to choose. When they found themselves stuck for an answer (and perhaps even at an earlier stage), they tried to solve the puzzle by turning to the woman who had given birth to the twins; but she too declared that she found it quite impossible to tell them apart. (In fact, despite this assurance, she knew full well which one was which – but it was her ambition that they should both of them, by some means, end up on the throne.)"*²³

Eurysthenes was determined to be the elder son by the monitoring of Argeia's treatment of the boys. He was the progenitor of the Agiad line, while his brother Prokles was the progenitor of the Eurypontid line.

Regardless of whether Herodotos relates actual fact or merely legend, the installation of two kings institutionalized rivalry. This constitutional competition between the two kings worked very much in the favour of the health of the *polis* at large, as it allowed for other facets of the Spartan governmental structure to act as a check on the dyarchy as a whole. If the two kings acted in concert – as we will see shortly – it was very possible for them to exercise outsized influence and override other bodies within the state²⁴. As Rahe aptly notes, "The most dangerous element within the Spartan regime was the kingship."²⁵ At the beginning of the fifth century, the Spartans would experience this first-hand. A series of corrupt kings (and a regent) would very comprehensively demonstrate the capricious nature

²³ Herodotos *Histories*, 6.52

²⁴ Rahe 2015, 23

²⁵ Rahe 2015, 17

of the dyarchy. The dubious honour of being the initial king to kickstart concerns over the dominion of the dyarchy goes to Kleomenes I, the son of Anaxandridas.

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Anaxandridas had a peculiar issue in relation to his succession: he had four sons by two wives²⁶. His initial wife at first appeared to be infertile but he held significant affection for her and refused to divorce her. Pressured by other members of the Spartan state, he agreed to a compromise and took a second wife. This second wife became the mother of Kleomenes, his firstborn. However, shortly after, his first wife gave birth to his second son, Dorieus. She would go on to bear him two more children, Leonidas and Kleombrotos. When it came time to succeed Anaxandridas, there was disagreement over whether birth order or marriage order should take precedence. Ultimately, the Spartans adhered to birth order, installing Kleomenes on the throne. As a consequence of this, Dorieus would leave Sparta in a rage, taking colonists with him to Sicily, where they would all subsequently die.

Kleomenes possessed a somewhat ugly character and reputation, so it is perhaps not particularly surprising that his younger Eurypontid colleague, Demaratos, was not very fond of him. Herodotos describes him in largely unflattering terms: "[his inheritance of the throne] owed nothing to Kleomenes' personal qualities [οὐ κατ' ἀνδραγαθίην σχῶν], and everything to his primogeniture"; "Kleomenes, it is said, was not quite right in the head [οὐ φρενήρης], to the extent that he was almost a lunatic [ἄκρομανής] ..."; "Such then, is the

²⁶Herodotos *Histories*, 5.39-48 | These passages recount Anaxandridas' succession issues, Kleomenes' ascension, and the death of Dorieus.

explanation given in Argos for the insanity [φασὶ μανέντα] and wretched death of Kleomenes, but the Spartiates themselves deny that the gods had anything to do with his madness [μανήναι²⁷]."²⁸ Indeed, the only time that Herodotos relates a positive interaction involving Kleomenes is during his meeting with Aristagoras of Miletus, when his daughter Gorgo intervenes to chide him and "Kleomenes ... was much tickled [ἡσθεῖς] by this exhortation of his daughter"²⁹ as he appears to have had a soft spot for her.

The real trouble began in 506³⁰, when Kleomenes, as a favour to the Athenian Isagoras and to avenge himself on the Athenians for insulting him the last time he attacked them³¹, geared up a second offensive. This time, his younger colleague Demaratos joined him on campaign. Just prior to the confrontation, the Corinthians quit the field, inspiring second thoughts in Demaratos, which seemed to have caused the campaign overall to collapse³². The fallout from the dissolution of this campaign would mark the first amendment to the military powers allocated to the kings:

*"It was a consequence of this dissension the law was laid down in Sparta forbidding both kings to take the field together, as they had been doing up to that point. What is more, the fact that one of the kings had been stood down meant that one of the two sons of Tyndareus, both of whom had previously always gone on campaign at the request of the army itself, could likewise be left behind."*³³

²⁷ Liddel & Scott, 1078, μαινόμεαι | Curiously, this word's meanings are all applicable to Kleomenes' characterization – *to rage/be furious*; (subst.) *the madman*; *to be mad with wine*; *to be driven mad (by the gods)*.

²⁸ Herodotos *Histories*, 5.39, 5.42, 6.84, transl. T. Holland (2013)

²⁹ Herodotos *Histories*, 5.51, transl. T. Holland (2013)

³⁰ *The Landmark Herodotos: The Histories*, 399 | They supplied the date in the side notes.

³¹ Herodotos *Histories*, 5.74

³² Herodotos *Histories*, 5.75, 5.77 | "The inglorious implosion of the army left the Athenians eager for revenge."

³³ Herodotos *Histories*, 5.75, transl. T. Holland (2013)

Kleomenes' relationship with Demaratos would never recover from this ostensible betrayal, and only served to gift Kleomenes with another target. During his first invasion in 510, Kleomenes had found and kept the falsified oracles commissioned by the Alkmeonids in 511³⁴. He would attempt to use these oracles to gin up support for another invasion of Attika in 504, to no avail³⁵.

In 494³⁶, Kleomenes would make the first of his two most troubling decisions. After ostensibly receiving an oracle predicting his capture of Argos, he wasted no time attempting to bring the prophecy to fruition. Once the Argives discovered the Spartans were marching against them, they hurried to confront them. While they were camped opposite each other, Kleomenes tricked the Argives into keeping their guard down and attacked them while they were eating breakfast. The Argives scrambled to the cover of a nearby grove, which happened to be sacred to Apollo. When the bulk of the Argive army refused to leave the grove, he ordered wood be piled around the grove's outer edge and set alight, burning both the grove and its sheltering suppliants. Afterwards, he sacrificed at a temple of Hera, despite the objections of the presiding priest. He turned back to Sparta, then, and,

“On his return home, his enemies hauled him before the ephors, claiming that he had accepted a bribe to spare Argos capture, even though it had been his to take. ... his response was to insist that by capturing the shrine of Argos he had, in his own opinion, fulfilled the oracle given by the god. That being so, he had regarded any attempt to capture the city as most inappropriate, until he had first discovered, by offering up sacrifices, whether the god would make him a gift of the city or would stand in his way. As he visited the sanctuary of Hera in the hope of receiving a favourable omen, a spurt of fire had blazed out from the breasts of her statue, thereby revealing to him the

³⁴ *The Landmark Herodotos: The Histories*, 393; Herodotos Histories, 5.63

³⁵ *The Landmark Herodotos: The Histories*, 406; Herodotos Histories, 5.90-94

³⁶ *The Landmark Herodotos: The Histories*, 456-459; Herodotos Histories, 6.76-82

certain truth: that he would not take Argos. ... This was his explanation, a defence that seemed to the Spartiates so plausible and reasonable that the prosecution never had any prospect of dragging their quarry down.”³⁷

This blasphemous behaviour, however, would be recontextualized by his gruesome death – not only by the rest of the Greeks, but by the Spartans as well.

Kleomenes would come into contention once again with Demaratos in 491, when Kleomenes was on campaign in an attempt to thwart the medizing of Aegina. The Aeginetans had medized quietly, but the Athenians – who had been recently in conflict with Aegina – saw this as a covert ploy to use the Persians’ wealth against Athens. The Athenians rushed to Sparta with the news, using it as a pretext to get Sparta to launch an offensive on their behalf. Regardless of the alternate motive, Kleomenes did not hesitate to impose himself on Aegina. Demaratos, however, held more reservations. One of the leading Aeginetans, Krios, confronted Kleomenes as follows;

“Your course of action is clearly provoked by Athenian bribes rather than reflecting the official policy of the Spartiates as a whole. Otherwise you would have come to make your arrests accompanied by the other king.’ (This speech had been prompted by a letter from Demaratos.) [...] Meanwhile, back in Sparta, all sorts of muck about Kleomenes was being raked by Demaratos, the son of Ariston, himself a king of the Spartiates, albeit from the junior house.”³⁸

This was a slight that Kleomenes would not forgive.

Similarly to Kleomenes' own father Anaxandridas, Demaratos' father Ariston had some fertility issues, which Kleomenes was able to exploit. As with his colleague, Ariston's first wife bore him no children. He was equally unlucky with his second wife. While his third wife

³⁷ Herodotos *Histories*, 6.80-81, transl. T. Holland (2013)

³⁸ Herodotos *Histories*, 3.50-51, transl. T. Holland (2013)

would deliver him an heir, she came with a different complication: she had formerly been the wife of one of his friends, Agetos, making the timeframe of Demaratos' conception ambiguous³⁹. Despite his initial misgivings, Ariston did accept Demaratos as his legitimate son and no further issue was made of it until now.

Upon his return from Aegina, Kleomenes "duly turned to pondering how Demaratos might be removed from the throne – and sure enough, by fixing on [the conception timeline], he found a promising line of attack."⁴⁰ He found as an ally to his scheme one Leotychidas son of Menares, himself a Eurypontid, with a feverish resentment towards Demaratos over Demaratos taking as wife a woman Leotychidas had wanted for himself⁴¹. As promised, Leotychidas dredged up Ariston's skeptical outburst concerning Demaratos' siring and the testimony of the ephors who happened to be present when he said it, then swore that Demaratos was not Ariston's legitimate son⁴². Kleomenes took a page from the Alkmeonid playbook for himself – suggesting that the Spartans consult the oracle from Delphi to settle the issue, which he duly bribed⁴³. The Pythia's ruling in Kleomenes' favour sealed Demaratos' fate, being deposed and replaced by Leotychidas. Demaratos initially remained in Sparta, but after a short period of time, he fled. The Spartans nearly managed to catch him in Zakynthos, but the people there refused to hand him over, and he would go on to become a permanent guest in the Persian court. Ultimately, Demaratos would wind up

³⁹ Herodotos *Histories*, 6.62-64

⁴⁰ Herodotos *Histories*, 6.61

⁴¹ Herodotos *Histories*, 6.65

⁴² Herodotos *Histories*, 6.65

⁴³ Herodotos *Histories*, 6.66

with the last laugh, outliving both his former colleague and his usurper while their lives and reigns ended in disgrace⁴⁴.

Kleomenes had accomplished his second great crime with the deposition of Demaratos. Now joined by his co-conspirator – the second corrupt king to feature in this chapter – Leotychidas, he turned his attention back to Aegina. With the weight of both kings bearing down on them, the Aeginetans surrendered to the Spartans without resistance. Ten of the highest value Aeginetans were selected by the kings and sent to Athens as hostages⁴⁵.

They would not have long to bask in their success. Later that same year, Kleomenes' machinations would come to light. He initially fled to Thessaly, then to Arcadia, where he tried to stir the people there into a revolt against Sparta. To prevent further conflict, Sparta recalled Kleomenes on good terms and reinstated him without prejudice. Kleomenes himself would not make it to the end of the year, overcome by some form of madness that resulted in him taking his own life⁴⁶. Leotychidas would not fare much better. He, like the man he deposed, would wind up in exile. But first, his involvement with Aegina would also come back to haunt him⁴⁷.

In the year following Kleomenes' death, the Aeginetans lodged a complaint against Leotychidas for the seizure of their citizens. In response, the Spartans swiftly organized a

⁴⁴ Herodotos' opinion on Kleomenes and Demaratos seems split. In 6.61, he states, "So while Kleomenes was away in Aegina working for the common good of Greece, there was Demaratos busy stabbing him in the back – not out of any great concern for the Aeginetans, however, but because he was consumed by envy and malice." However, he does not mention why Demaratos felt this way, nor is this consistent with his portrayal of Demaratos in Book 7. Holland also observes this in his 2013 translation (Book 6, footnote 53).

⁴⁵ Herodotos *Histories*, 6.73

⁴⁶ Herodotos *Histories*, 6.74-75

⁴⁷ Herodotos *Histories*, 6.85-86

trial and found him guilty, sentencing him to be surrendered to Aegina. One particularly astute Spartan pointed out, however, that holding the king hostage would eventually compel the Spartans to attack Aegina again to reclaim him. Seeing the wisdom in this, they opted instead to have Leotychidas call upon Athens to release the hostages entrusted to them. This they would refuse to do, still aggrieved by the Aeginetans, on the grounds that both kings had entrusted the hostages to them and therefore both would be required to release them. Unable to accomplish his goal, he returned home.

Kleomenes' death would not just have impacts on Leotychidas. As his younger half-brother Leonidas was taking the throne, the Greco-Persian War was getting underway. Leonidas' budding reign would famously be cut short at Thermopylae. Kleombrotos would succeed his brother but would not last long in office either. Upon Kleombrotos' death, the throne reverted to Leonidas' son, Pleistarchus. But since he was far too young to actually take up kingly duties, Kleombrotos' son and Pleistarchus' cousin, Pausanias, was appointed regent. Pausanias would represent the Agiad throne for the rest of the Greco-Persian War.

Since his trial in relation to the Aeginetan hostages, Leotychidas had kept his head down and would continue to do so right up until his banishment. His new young colleague would not be so discerning. Pausanias will be the third example that solidifies the pattern marking the dyarchy as untrustworthy in command. Initially, Pausanias proved himself to be an insightful and competent commander. His skills both as a tactician and a ground-level commander would see not only the battles of Byzantium and Plataea won, but the famous

Persian general Mardonius slain⁴⁸. He would also demonstrate his capacity for sympathy when a woman who escaped Mardonius' camp came to him seeking shelter and aid in returning home. He not only heard her out but managed to actually get her home⁴⁹. Unfortunately for Pausanias, his victory would grant him access to the thing that would begin his downfall: Mardonius' camp and all the spoils contained within.

“Pausanias issued a proclamation forbidding anyone to lay a finger on the booty [τῆς ληΐης] and ordered the helots to gather up everything of value [τὰ χρήματα]. They duly dispersed throughout the camp and came across pavilions adorned with gold and silver [κατεσκευασμένας χρυσῶ καὶ ἀργύρῳ], gilded couches and others that were overlaid with silver [ἐπιχρυσούς καὶ ἐπαργύρους], and mixing bowls, shallow bowls and other kinds of drinking-vessels, all made of gold [χρυσέους]. The helots also found carts loaded with sacks, which turned out to contain gold and silver cauldrons [λέβητες ... χρύσειοί τε καὶ ἀργύρεοι]. From the corpses that lay around they stripped armlets and torques [ψέλια τε καὶ στρεπτοὺς], and short swords made of gold [τοὺς ἀκινάκας ἐόντας χρυσέους] of the kind that the Persians call akinakes; but of the brightly patterned items of clothing no account was made. ... The Greeks portioned [the spoils] out among themselves, with each contingent receiving its just return. Although it is not recorded what portion of the spoils might have been given to the individuals who would most covered themselves with glory at Plataea, I am sure that they must have been awarded something. Certainly, ten of all the various things of value [δὲ πάντα δέκα ... ὥς δὲ αὐτῶς καὶ τὰλλα χρήματα] were set aside and given to Pausanias: women, horses, talents, camels, everything.”⁵⁰

In Mardonius' tent, Pausanias fell in love with Persian wealth. Herodotos reports, with no small hint of irony, that Pausanias called his fellow generals into Mardonius' tent to highlight the difference in luxury between the Greeks and the Persians even in their food, saying: “Here is what their leader enjoyed every day – and yet, for all that, he has come to rob us of

⁴⁸ Herodotos *Histories*, 9.53-57

⁴⁹ Herodotos *Histories*, 9.76

⁵⁰ Herodotos *Histories*, 9.80-81, transl. T. Holland (2013)

the miserable portions [δίαιταν ... ἡμέας ... οἰζυρὴν] you see here!”⁵¹ Even if this anecdote proved to be true, neither it nor his success in battle appear to have done him any favours in winning over the affections of the other Greeks or in allaying any suspicions in Sparta. While Herodotos’ narrative of Pausanias carries on no further after Plataea (barring a single sentence of foreshadowing back in 8.3), Thucydides’ account supplies the consequences for us:

“But because of his violence the Hellenes already disliked [ἤχθοντο] him, especially the Ionians and those recently freed from the king. They went to the Athenians and asked them to become their leaders in view of their kinship and to not allow Pausanias to commit any acts of violence. ... Meanwhile, the Lacedaemonians recalled Pausanias for an inquiry [Παυσανίαν ἀνακρινοῦντες] about what they had been hearing; extensive misconduct charged [ἀδικία πολλή κατηγορεῖτο] against him by the Hellenes when they visited gave more the impression of an imitation of tyranny than a generalship [τυραννίδος μᾶλλον ἐφαίνετο μίμησις ἢ στρατηγία]. It happened that he was summoned just at the time when the allies, except for the troops from the Peloponnesos, had changed their allegiance over to the Athenians out of hatred [ἔχθει] for him. On coming to Lacedaemon, he was rebuked for injustices [ἀδικημάτων] committed against some individuals on a private basis but acquitted of the most serious charges of misconduct; medism was the most important accusation against him and appeared to be the least in doubt [κατηγορεῖτο δὲ αὐτοῦ οὐχ ἥκιστα μηδισμός καὶ ἐδόκει σαφέστατον εἶναι]. They did not send him out again as leader [ἄρχοντα] and instead sent Dorkis and a few others with a small force; but the allies would no longer accept them in command.”⁵²

Pausanias would never receive command again⁵³. Pausanias’ disbarment from the conflict would not hinder his lust for power and wealth, however.

⁵¹ Herodotos *Histories*, 9.82, transl. T. Holland (2013)

⁵² Thucydides *History*, 1.95, transl. S. Lattimore (1998)

⁵³ Thucydides *Histories*, 1.128 | “When Pausanias the Lacedaemonian was acquitted of wrongdoing after the first time the Spartiates recalled him, from his command in the Hellespont, and put him on trial, he was no longer sent out on public business ...”

Without permission from Sparta and under the guise of conducting business related to the war, Pausanias made his way from Hermione to Kolonai in the Troad. There he intended to fulfill the plans he had arranged with the Great King when he had captured Byzantium. According to Thucydides, Pausanias had sent back some of the King's relatives when he took the city, one of which was carrying an offer of marriage to Xerxes' daughter. The King responded enthusiastically, sending Artabazos to convey his positive reply and offer his resources. Thucydides states that it is on account of this exchange that Pausanias grew overbearing, violent and visibly Medized⁵⁴. Despite their previous acquittal, the Spartans could tolerate Pausanias' belligerent behaviour no longer.

"... the ephors sent a herald and a skytale ordering him not to let the herald leave without him; otherwise, he would be declared an enemy of the Spartiates. Pausanias, wishing to avoid suspicion as much as possible and confident of overthrowing the accusation by means of money, returned to Sparta a second time. And at first he was thrown into prison by the ephors (it is in their power to do this to the king); then he subsequently contrived his release and presented himself for judgement by anyone who wanted to examine him.

"The Spartiates had no clear evidence, neither his enemies nor the entire state, on which they could sufficiently rely in punishing a man who was both of the royal family and in high rank at the time (for he was regent, as a cousin, for Pleistarchos son of Leonidas who was king and still underage), yet by his flouting of convention and his imitation of the barbarians he had furnished many reasons to suspect that he did not want to be limited to his existing circumstances. ... They were also informed that he was intriguing with the helots, and this was the case; for he promised them freedom and citizenship if they joined his uprising and supported his future plans. But not even then, not even trusting some informers among the helots, where they prepared to take extraordinary action against him, observing the practice so

⁵⁴ Thucydides *History*, 1.128-131 transl. S. Lattimore (1998) | In 1.95, Thucydides mentioned that the Medizing aspect of the charge was the least in doubt. Here in 1.130, he expands on why that was: "... but he would go forth from Byzantium wearing Median garb, Medes and Egyptians formed a bodyguard for him as he proceeded through Thrace, he had a Persian table set for himself, and he was able to contain his pretensions but gave away by minor actions that he was resolved to do so in the future on a grander scale."

*customary among them, slowness in planning anything irrevocable against a Spartan citizen without indisputable proof ...”*⁵⁵

Despite all of these substantial claims against him, Pausanias would wind up sold out by a close confidant and personal messenger from Argilos⁵⁶. The man, suspicious that none of the runners before him ever seemed to return, covertly read the letter that he'd been intended to carry to Artabazos. At the bottom of the letter, he found a postscript that confirmed his fears – Pausanias had instructed he be put to death upon delivery. Having been betrayed by an alleged friend, he delivered the letter instead to the ephors. Though convinced of his guilt, they sought to hear an admission out of Pausanias' own mouth. The informant then set up a trap for his erstwhile patron at a sanctuary in Tainaron, where he hid the ephors behind a false wall so they could hear his confrontation with Pausanias in person. He professed to having read the letter, then derided Pausanias for the treatment he had been set to receive. He asked Pausanias' forgiveness for the trespass and Pausanias admitted that the letter and instructions had indeed been his. Feeling guilty, Pausanias apologized himself and promised that the man would not be harmed on the condition that he not interfere with Pausanias' ongoing plans. It would be too late, however, for his machinations to progress any further. The ephors had heard all they needed. Upon his return to Sparta, Pausanias was confronted by the ephors. Sensing their intentions, he fled into a sanctuary called the Bronze House, where he hid himself in a small room with only one door. The ephors were not to be dissuaded – they posted themselves at his door and starved him

⁵⁵ Thucydides *History*, 1.131-132, transl. S. Lattimore (1998)

⁵⁶ Thucydides *History*, 1.133

out. When he was next to dead, they opened the door and dragged him from the sanctuary. He died just past the threshold of the Bronze House, where he would eventually be buried⁵⁷.

In the meantime, Leotychidas had been sent to Aegina, acting predominantly as admiral for the fleet docked there⁵⁸. He had moved the fleet to Delos, where they had remained idle, until an ambassador from Samos appeared. Leotychidas granted their request for aid and immediately set out. Upon arriving at Samos, however, they were disappointed to discover that the Persians had abandoned the island in an attempt to preserve their fleet and instead retreated to Mycale, on the mainland, to rely on their landed troops. Leotychidas and the Greek troops pursued them there, disembarking and drawing up battle lines. Ultimately the Greeks would win the battle of Mycale, but opinion was split over how to progress next. Leotychidas would lead his contingent home while the other Greeks, led by the Athenians, would progress onto Sestos and further into Ionia.

Leotychidas' end would be an undignified one. Thucydides only mentions Leotychidas once, during Mycale, and seems to have no opinion on the man either way. However, Herodotos tells us early on that Leotychidas, like his last colleague Pausanias, would be brought down by greed.

“Not that Leotychidas was to grow old in Sparta. Rather, he would suffer retribution for what he had done to Demaratus. When he led the Lacedaemonians on campaign in Thessaly, he could easily have brought the

⁵⁷ Thucydides *History*, 1.134

⁵⁸ Herodotos *Histories*, 8.131, transl. T. Holland (2013) | “In fact, the coming of spring and the presence of Mardonius in Thessaly did stir the Greeks to action. Although there was still no mustering of the land-forces, the fleet – one hundred and ten ships in all – docked in Aegina. The supreme commander, by land as well as by sea, was Leotychidas the son of Menares [στρατηγὸς δὲ καὶ ναύαρχος ἦν Λευτυχίδης ὁ Μενάρεος] ...” The Greek is less definite than the translation. Leotychidas may not have been the supreme commander of the fleet (which, last Herodotos mentioned, was Eurybiadas), but the topmost general at Aegina.

*entire country to heel, had he not accepted as a bribe vast amounts of silver. Caught red-handed, right in the camp, sitting on a glove full of silver, he was put on trial and went into exile, and had his house torn down. He took refuge in Tegea, which is where he died.”*⁵⁹

He would be succeeded by his grandson, Archidamos.

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Thucydides says, after the Greeks’ rejection of Dorkis as a replacement commander for Pausanias,

*“... they left and the Lacedaemonians sent no others subsequently, fearing that they will be corrupted away from home, just as they had observed in Pausanias, also wanting to be rid of the war against the Medes and considering the Athenians capable of leading it and close friends for the time.”*⁶⁰

Indeed, this seemed to be a phenomenon that Sparta worried about the most in sending her men abroad,

*“... [they] prided themselves on possessing a moderation that they, in fact, lacked. When under the gaze of their fellow Spartans, these men could be relied on to conduct themselves with courage and self-restraint in admirable fashion. But, when alone or abroad, they frequently succumbed to temptation – and the disgraceful desires that were by and large contained, if not entirely suppressed, when their hegemony was confined within the Peloponnesus were later unleashed and proved fatal to their enterprise ...”*⁶¹

The corruption of an outside influence could be swift and come with devastating consequences. In the few years preceding, during and after the Greco-Persian War, Sparta saw three members of the dyarchy – two kings and a regent – succumb to the temptations of power and money despite possessing the most of both within their city. All three would also

⁵⁹ Herodotos Histories, 9.90-92, 9.98-99; Thucydides *History*, 1.89

⁶⁰ Thucydides *History*, 1.95

⁶¹ Rahe 2016, 30

die ignominiously and in disgrace. While the Spartan kings were not the only men within Sparta who could be lured in by illicit wealth, they were surely the most dangerous ones to have succumb. The dyarchy had proven in the last three tumultuous decades that they could not be trusted to constrain themselves. A new leash would be necessary.

If the biggest defect in the structure of the dyarchy was their susceptibility to greed initiated by their exposure to the outside world, then the kings would be kept close to home. If the impetus for leaving the bounds of Lakonia was war, then the military supremacy of the kings would be scaled back. Fortunately, precedents had already been set which would allow Sparta to curtail her kings' power. Kleomenes and Demaratos' disagreement over the expedition against Athens had already inspired the state to overwrite the law requiring both kings to campaign together. Pausanias had had his command revoked from him and been replaced by Dorkis, a man otherwise completely unattested to and not mentioned to have royal ties. The solution would be the appointment of generals – men of Spartan grit and cunning, given military dispensation of like authority to the dyarchy with none of the drawbacks. Generals, unlike the kings, could be recalled and punished without suffering drastic consequences at home or abroad. Domestic political jockeying like that of Kleomenes, Demaratos and Leotychidas would not impact campaigns. Detrimental greed and bribery could be dealt with swiftly and severely, unlike the slow course taken with Pausanias. It would be the perfect workaround, a way to subdue the dyarchy without disrespecting or undermining its authority.

If a scheme like this had been proposed to the kings, it is doubtful that it would have been approved. It is more probable that the scheme was undertaken by some other aspect of the government. But which one?

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Sparta's domestic political makeup is difficult to discern and the allocation of powers is hard to delineate. Her constitution, such as it was, seems to have largely been informal and elastic – intentionally so, so as to maintain flexibility and resilience. As Rahe spends an entire chapter pointing out⁶², Sparta's government incorporated elements of monarchy, oligarchy, democracy and autocracy in such a way as to make describing it in definite terms nearly meaningless. Broadly, she had four elements that made up her governing bodies – the dyarchy (which we have already discussed), the assembly, the Gerousia, and the ephorate.

[Assembly]

The Spartan assembly appears to have operated in a similar manner to those of other *poleis* like Athens, working as an administrative and/or legislative body that would debate on and pass policy. The exact bounds of the assembly's role and power are unclear. Policy proposals seem to have originated largely within the Gerousia but were occasionally presented by the dyarchy or ephorate. While Aristotle is of the opinion that the assembly is little more than a rubber-stamp body⁶³, Thucydides and Xenophon instead refer to the

⁶² Rahe 2016, 39-41

⁶³ Andrewes 2002, 51| Andrewes points to the word *sunepipsephisai* (*Politics*, 1272a, 11), “join in assenting”, and draws the conclusion that this very specific definition precludes an option to object to a proposal. However, on pg. 55, Andrewes points out that Aristotle's version of Sparta in the *Politics* may have been written about prior to his study of the Great Rhetra, which is evident in his *Constitution of the Lakedaimonians* (and Plutarch, who subsequently used his notes).

assembly as the primary body to handle deliberation and vote on policy⁶⁴. Naturally, often who or what made a policy decision in Sparta goes unnamed, usually credited simply to ‘the Spartans’. However, when there is explicit confirmation, it appears that the assembly – and not the Gerousia – is the primary body⁶⁵. Among their powers, at least, were the ability to negotiate/ratify treaties, hear ambassadors, and vote on whether or not to go to war⁶⁶.

[Gerosia]

The Gerousia was an assembly of twenty-eight elder Spartiates, with two seats reserved for the two kings, to make a total council of thirty⁶⁷. The most concretely known requirement for membership was to be a Spartan *homoios*, aged sixty or older.

*“Drawn exclusively from the priestly caste that seems to have constituted the city’s ancient aristocracy, directly elected by popular acclamation, and guaranteed the office for life, the gerontes performed three functions: the first, probouleutic; the second, judicial; and the third, sacerdotal. With the ephors presiding, the ‘old men’ met to set the agenda for the assembly, and thereafter they could annul any action on its part that exceeded the authority which they thereby conferred.”*⁶⁸

They could also take up a semi-judicial role when invited to by the ephorate, acting as a jury in the case of particularly important/public crimes or the judgment of kings. Neither I nor Rahe doubt they had a lot of unofficial influence and were likely involved a lot behind the

⁶⁴ Andrewes 2002, 52-53 | Thucydides never mentions the Gerousia explicitly. While Andrewes does not make this point, it may be that Thucydides conflates the assembly and Gerousia, as if they were two halves of the same administrative process. Xenophon *does* call out the Gerousia specifically during the Kinadon Conspiracy, but they otherwise do not feature in his narrative. Andrewes points out that the *gerontes* were likely gathered because the ephors were unsure of who was involved but still wanted the weight of another body’s authority to back up their decisions.

⁶⁵ Andrewes 2002, 54-56 | Thucydides mentions the assembly four times and Xenophon eight times, while the Gerousia is never mentioned doing anything comparable. However, with the generalized nature of the term, I would not find it surprising if the Gerousia was a sub-section of the larger assembly and, like with Kinadon, could be called upon when a rapid decision needed to be made.

⁶⁶ Andrewes 2002, 54-55

⁶⁷ Andrewes 2002, 50

⁶⁸ Rahe 2016, 54

scenes, but their up-front political power seems limited. Indeed, Andrewes is of the opinion that they had little to no formal power⁶⁹.

[Ephorate]

The ephorate was an annually elected board of five men allowed to serve only one term in their lifetime⁷⁰. In order to acquire the position, one had to be a Spartiate over the age of forty-five⁷¹. The ephors fulfilled a broad range of positions within Sparta, including oversight of the ten-day inspection of the *neoi* and the appointment of the *hippeis*⁷². They worked in conjunction with the assembly and the Gerousia, “empowered to convene [the] city’s assembly, set its agenda, and preside over it.”⁷³ Indeed, there seems to be little the ephorate didn’t do – treasury management, tax collection, calendar calculations, army makeup and assemblage, policing, civil dispute resolution, criminal investigations and serving as jurymen for capital cases alongside the Gerousia⁷⁴. Even in foreign affairs, they had duties – deciding on which foreigners could enter and for how long, granting or refusing permission for a Spartan to go abroad, receiving embassies, conducting negotiations and putting policy or treaties before the assembly for a vote⁷⁵.

Perhaps most importantly, the ephorate had the ability to hold the king accountable, charging and punishing the kings for crimes. As Rahe points out:

“... [the ephors] were to exercise this prerogative time and time again: Cleomenes and his colleague Leotychidas, Pausanias the regent and his

⁶⁹ Andrewes 2002, 56

⁷⁰ Rahe 2016, 48

⁷¹ Rahe 2016, 51

⁷² Rahe 2016, 49

⁷³ Rahe 2016, 49

⁷⁴ Rahe 2016, 49-50

⁷⁵ Rahe 2016, 49

royal son Pleistoanax, Agis and his younger contemporary Pausanias the king – all of these were brought to trial (some repeatedly) and all but Agis were eventually convicted and banished or immured and starved to death. Of all the fifth-century kings, only three – Leonidas, his son Pleistarchus and Archidamus – are not known ever to have been tried for a capital crime, and even this statistic may be misleading. Leonidas and Pleistarchus bore the full weight of royal responsibility for periods so brief that their escape could not be deemed significant. And neither of their reigns nor that of Archidamus is sufficiently well attested ... There is no evidence that the Spartans distinguished between the judicial and the political functions of their magistrates, and the removal of a king was a matter of enormous political significance.”⁷⁶

This broad range of powers would naturally put them in opposition to the dyarchy and afforded them the opportunity to curtail the kings when they so desired. Perhaps one of the only things they could not do was act as a commander in the field⁷⁷.

[Polemarchy]

For all the detail listed here of the powers available to each arm of the Spartan government, one detail remains frustratingly out of reach: who appointed the commanders? Ancient sources are vague at best and most modern scholarship has little conjecture on offer.

“In the vast majority of cases Xenophon merely tells us that the Spartans sent out an army under the command of a king, or still more vaguely that the king led an army out, without saying how one king rather than the other was appointed to the command in question. Once or twice, after his phrase about the ephors calling up the army, he goes on with words which, taken literally, would mean that they also decided who was to lead it; that, in Xenophon, could be strictly true, or could be mere carelessness of expression.”⁷⁸

⁷⁶ Rahe 2016. 50-51

⁷⁷ Rahe 2016, 49

⁷⁸ Andrewes 2002, 62(-63) | He goes on to state, following this quote, “But three or four times he uses a fuller formula, saying that the ephors called the army up and ‘the city’ appointed its commander; ‘city’ as opposed to ephors must mean some wider body, presumably the full assembly. In common with most historians, I take it that the fuller description is the more correct, and that this procedure by which the assembly determined which king was to command can be traced back to 510, when Herodotos (V, 61, 1) tells us that the Spartans decided to send a larger expedition against Athens and appointed Kleomenes to lead it.” I disagree with Andrewes on this

As we've already discussed, it is particularly unlikely that the dyarchy would agree to the narrowing of their military powers, even out of the bitterest spite. In the unlikely event that they had have agreed, it seems doubtful that – as Andrewes observed above – the sources (and Xenophon in particular) would have used a generalization like 'the Spartans' instead of more directly referring to the king in question.

The assembly and the Gerousia do not seem equipped for this task either. Unlike Athens – which elected its ten generals annually and granted them leeway to make wartime decisions from there – Sparta does not appear to have standing generalships, instead commissioning their generals based on present need⁷⁹. Sparta conducted her operations by theatre, deploying commanders to locations that she had obligations or interests in. Thucydides illustrates this difference inadvertently when describing the outcome of the conflict over Amphipolis⁸⁰. When Kleon dies and the Athenian offensive is lost, Athens abandons the theatre immediately and entirely. In contrast, Klearidas – Brasidas' lieutenant and the Spartiate who takes over after his death – remains on site until Sparta's treaty with Athens comes into effect⁸¹. The Spartan assembly and/or the Gerousia convening every time

point. As I mentioned above, Herodotos states that the kings only stopped jointly commanding in 506, meaning that Kleomenes was not so much appointed to lead as acknowledged as the more senior commander to Demaratos. Andrewes' conclusion also does not account for the appointment of non-royal generalships. Unlike Athens, Spartan generals seem to be assigned to a specific campaign or theatre, not just given a role and granted license from there. Also unlike Athens, which voted in their generals at set intervals, Spartan generals are appointed and recalled at various times throughout the year, making it unlikely that the assembly or even the Gerousia is convened every time a generalship is granted, rescinded, or expired.

⁷⁹ The corrupting influence of foreign peoples and cultures were a primary concern for those in power in Sparta, so limiting generals to one theatre and/or task may have been a method to limit external exposure. The capacity to self-direct while in the field – as Brasidas and Derkylidas exhibit most obviously – may have been an understood necessity of command or a grace granted to proven commanders.

⁸⁰ Thucydides *Histories*, 5.10-13

⁸¹ Thucydides *Histories*, 5.21 | Indeed, Klearidas only leaves Amphipolis to defend his refusal to comply with the treaty's obligations in person.

a new theatre opened or a general needed to be selected or recalled is, on its face, quite unlikely. Spartan wartime decision-making was required to be responsive, definitive and rapid in order to respond to shifting priorities and Athenian movement, to the extent that authority over recall and strategy were delegated⁸².

The domestic logistics alone make the proposition implausible: would generals be elected or appointed? How would candidates be decided in either scenario? How much information about a given theatre could be reasonably supplied so the assembly could make an informed decision? Would the Gerousia know potential candidates well enough to make their decision? Could a commander's friends keep him from being recalled even at the expense of the state? How could the imprecise vote-by-shouting practise of the assembly be reasonably applied to commissions? Who would be the arbiter of what information was important enough to give to the assembly and Gerousia? Even should there be some resolution to these most immediate issues, no source even *hints* at their right to do so. The assembly is said to have the right to vote on whether or not to go to war, and the Gerousia can present proposals and nullify resolutions of the assembly, but neither body is alluded to

⁸² Thucydides *Histories*, 8.39, transl. S. Lattimore | "The Lacedaemonians also sent eleven Spartiates along as advisors to Astyochos, one of whom was Lichas son of Arkesilas. And their instructions were, when they arrived at Miletos, to join Astyochos in attending to matters in general in the way that would be best, to send out either these same ships or a greater or smaller number to Pharnabazos in the Hellespont, if that seemed best, assigning as commander Klearchos son of Rhamphias, who was sailing with them, and to dismiss Astyochos from his position of admiral, if that seemed best, and appoint Antisthenes; for in view of the letter from Pedaritos they were suspicious of him." For such a broad range of power to be granted to an advisory delegation – essentially to replace the entire leadership of the theatre at Miletos – Sparta must have required incredibly swift action from her military coordinators. As the ephorate controlled the wrangling of armies and permission to leave or enter Sparta, it seems logical that military strategy and logistics would fold into their existing responsibilities. Neither the Gerousia nor the assembly are described intervening in generalships unless criminal charges were involved (as is seen with the trial of Sphodrias in *Hellenika* 5.4).

having any wartime power, explicit or otherwise or indeed managing foreign policy more generally.

I suggest, instead, that the ephorate was responsible for the appointment of generals. A council of five would be a sufficiently small number to keep apprised of the rapid pace of wartime developments, strategy and deployments. They were already the body responsible for peace negotiations and discussions with allies, and more generally managing Sparta's foreign affairs. Their basic duties had them oversee the *agoge* and the *neoi*, as well as assembling the *hippeis* and any deploying army groups. Being Spartiates themselves, they would know who in their generation was fit for what task. They had explicit judicial powers, making them suitable for the recall and prosecution of misbehaving commanders. Ephors at the end of their terms were already required to offer an account of their actions and choices to the incoming board, so there is no reason to preclude the possibility that new magistrates would be briefed on military matters as well. Perhaps most importantly, ephors were expressly prohibited from military command during their tenure, conceivably making them the only five men in Sparta not eligible for commission⁸³. The ephorate was also the only branch with the authority to curtail the dyarchy's military power. While in office, the kings were supposed to be deferential to them, and they had the ability to bring kings to trial

⁸³ What age groups would be eligible for or restricted from commission is lost to us. Among the few names of Spartan generals that we do have, their age (or information which could relay clues about their age) is rarely divulged. To my knowledge, no explicit age is ever given for a general, only the occasional mention of whether or not they are a Spartiate or if they were an ephor appears in the record. However, that does not discount the possibility (however remote) that a *neos* or a *geron* could receive a commission too. I find it most likely that commissions were granted primarily to *homoioi* or senior *neoi*, however.

whenever they pleased. For their own actions, the departing ephors were answerable only to the board replacing them.

Already the heart of the government and the arbiters of domestic conduct and foreign affairs, the ephorate exercised control or influence over every aspect of Spartan life in some capacity. They were in an optimal position to oversee the progress of the war and adjust strategy according to any results from diplomacy. With direct access to the children in the *agoge* and charged with the supervision of the *neoi*, they could monitor the development of individual temperaments, filtering for and cultivating the desirable in the upcoming generations. Furthermore, serving ephors would have had access to dozens of former magistrates who could offer advice or be deputized to ensure the ephorate's will was being upheld⁸⁴.



The Greco-Persian War – and particularly the actions of Kleomenes, Leotychidas and the regent Pausanias – had taught Sparta that her dyarchy could not be trusted abroad. As the only people with the capacity to course-correct, the ephorate discretely constrained the dyarchy's military powers. The ephorate then disseminated these powers amongst a

⁸⁴ Thucydides *Histories*, 8.39, transl. S. Lattimore (1998) | “The Lacedaemonians also sent eleven Spartiates along as advisors to Astyochos, one of whom was Lichas son of Arkesilas. And their instructions were, when they arrived in Miletos, to join Astyochos in attending to matters in general in the way that would be best, to send out either these same ships or a greater or smaller number to Pharnabazos in the Hellespont, if that seemed best, assigning Klearchos son of Rhamphias, who was sailing with them, and to dismiss Astyochos from his position as admiral, if that seemed best, and appoint Antisthenes; for in view of the letter from Pedaritos they were suspicious of him.” The powers granted to the advisors here mirror those of the ephorate quite closely. It is reasonable to assume that Lichas, being the only named advisor, had been an ephor at some prior point. He appears to have been a well-known and spry older man, as Xenophon describes him in *Hellenika* 3.2.21 as a *geron* who competed in a chariot race c. 402, a decade after his assignment to Astyochos.

fledgling class of commanders. These commanders, serving at the behest and under the direction of the ephorate, would be assigned their station as required or by theatre. As the ephorate expanded on this strategy, time and experience would teach them which qualities in a prospective general to search for and which to avoid. As the fifth century progressed into the Peloponnesian War and beyond, a pattern would emerge in the depiction of Spartan generals – a pattern of personality traits that suggest an unofficial rubric that structured the ephorate's appointments, reflected most prominently in two men: Brasidas and Derkylidas.

Chapter 2: Brasidas and Derkylidas

Our sources for the Peloponnesian War are limited. For Sparta, this is even more the case. If any works were written in Sparta during this period, they are entirely lost to us. Indeed, Athens did not fare much better. Much of her output, too, has been lost or has only been preserved in Roman-era works⁸⁵. However, two sources that were directly contemporaneous with the war survive almost entirely intact and neatly slot together to create a thorough narrative of the second half of the 5th century. These are the works of the Athenians Thucydides and Xenophon. Both of these men served Athens, though on opposite ends of the war's timeline, and Xenophon's *Hellenika* is explicitly a continuation of Thucydides' unfinished *History*. Being as contemporary and complete⁸⁶ as they are, they remain our best and most comprehensive sources not only for Athens, but for Sparta as well.

Some scholars⁸⁷ would argue that the depictions of characters in these works serves the ends of the overarching premises woven into the narratives – specifically Thucydides' overt political thesis and Xenophon's known Socratic influence – and so cannot be taken to be historically reliable. I would suggest, however, that it is not so much the case that the depiction of prominent characters was moulded to substantiate the author's opinion as that the characters are prominently featured because they exemplified the authors' view. Furthermore, the premises and perspectives Thucydides and Xenophon bring to their respective works are compatible, but not the same. As such, the consistency between the

⁸⁵ Most relevantly, Plutarch and Diodorus Siculus (channelling Ephorus of Cyme).

⁸⁶ Thucydides' *History* appears to have been incomplete at the time of his death, but subsequently originally published in that state since Xenophon's *Hellenika* picks up where Thucydides' narrative tapers off. Hence, Thucydides' work is as 'complete' now as it was upon initial publication.

⁸⁷ See Luginbill 1999, *Thucydides on War and National Character*; Strauss 1973, *Xenophon's Socrates*.

representation of characters who appear in both authors' works suggest that they are, in fact, reporting their traits accurately⁸⁸.

One further objection is, with Xenophon's *Hellenika* explicitly being a continuation of the *History*, that parallels between characters may be due to Xenophon imitating Thucydides⁸⁹. I find this both unfair and uncharitable. Xenophon has a reputation amongst scholarship as being an imitator of Plato and Thucydides, and inferior to both. While his thinking was certainly impacted by Socrates and his *Hellenika* was inspired by Thucydides' unfinished work, he does not compromise his own writing style and preferences to more closely resemble his predecessors.

Thus, this chapter will proceed under the reasonable assumption that while character traits may have been emphasized or framed in a certain light to communicate a view or interpretation, the representations of the characters themselves are trustworthy.

[Strategos]

The most difficult and frustrating aspect of Spartan military history and historiography is the lack of clear doctrine that might be extracted and analyzed. In my first chapter, I discussed how corruption from being abroad was a primary concern for the Spartan government at home, and how often being beyond the bounds of Peloponnesian soil saw Spartan leaders act out. Xenophon blames extended contact with external luxury, degrading

⁸⁸ Derkylidas, specifically, appears in both the *History* and the *Hellenika* and his characterization remains consistent across both works. It could be argued that Derkylidas remains consistent due to Xenophon imitating Thucydides, but if that's the case, then he cannot be governed by his Socratic thinking. If Xenophon is governed by his Socratic thinking, then he cannot be imitating Thucydides. This also discounts the consistency of the characterizations of Klearchos in the *History* and the *Anabasis*.

⁸⁹ See Soulis 1972, *Xenophon and Thucydides: A study on the historical method of Xenophon in the Hellenika with a special reference to the influence of Thucydides*.

their Spartan moral fibre as they left the rigid bubble of discipline and peer-enforcement present at home⁹⁰. This was not something Spartan leadership was unaware of, either⁹¹. Sparta's system was consistently fighting against the contradictions she herself created. The tension caused by these contradictions, however, did in part keep her held together. Older generations who had experienced the Greco-Persian War had an eye now for a corrupt and overweening commander, and as they cycled through the ephorate, they were afforded the opportunity to sort the wheat from the chaff as successive generations rose through the *agoge*. Those with the appropriate skills, mannerisms and connections would be elevated, offered the chance of commission as a general, while others would be relegated to less prestigious positions more suited to their temperament. The decisions concerning appointments and commissions would have to be made carefully and cautiously. A baseline rubric for command would have had to be established.

Any Spartan literature on the subject that may have existed is lost. Xenophon's *Constitution of the Spartans* is the most detailed account we have of the Spartan mindset, but it, too, says nothing about a rubric for command. Instead, the image of Sparta's ideal *strategos* must be extracted and reconstructed from the material our Athenian sources provide us. Yet that, too, leaves significant informational gaps. The full-time military professionalization of the Spartans separates them from Athens or Thebes, but neither was Sparta sufficiently large or cohesive enough to allow comparison to states with broader power

⁹⁰ Xenophon *Constitution of the Lakedaimonians*, 14.2-7

⁹¹ Rahe 2020, 7 | "Moreover, the Spartans had good reason to suspect that the vaunted discipline of their compatriots was a hothouse flower not apt to survive the temptations on offer in the outside world."

like Egypt, Rome, or Persia. She remains an anomalous society. Since no reasonable comparison exists in the ancient world, I have instead turned to modern military practice as a means of finding suitable doctrine which aligns with the evidence of Spartan command behaviour in the source material.

The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) may seem an odd comparison to the Spartans. However, in broad scope, they share many of the same concerns, stresses, and highlight many of the same underlying principles. As with Sparta, the CAF:

- has citizen-based forces which are significantly smaller than those of her peers;
- resides on a land mass beyond her ability to defend on multiple fronts;
 - bordered on both sides by water, but with a weak navy compensated for by an ally
 - contends with multiple types of terrain within her own borders (particularly the mountain range that bisects her and prairie/plains)
- relies heavily on alliances for defense;
- has primary training objectives targeted towards defense;
 - training for foreign objectives is secondary to training for domestic operations
- is drawn into war mostly at the behest of her allies;
 - e.g., Canada joining the USA on campaign in Afghanistan; Sparta joining Corinth's efforts at Corcyra
- relies heavily on the ability of her troops to be interoperable with allied forces;
 - including movement and logistics coordination, attack strategy, force deployment, training allied troops, tension de-escalation/negotiation, cooperation with local populaces, and taking command of allied troops
- trains all troops *two up*⁹²;
- prioritizes individual troop thought, awareness, and action in training;
- emphasizes caution and inventive strategy in engagement;
- keeps all forces informed of strategy and objectives;
- and encourages battlefield initiative and resourcefulness.

⁹² This is CAF slang. It refers to how the CAF trains soldiers to be able to fulfil the roles of ranks “two up” from them. For example, a corporal should be able to fill the role of a sergeant should the situation call for it. While not explicitly referred to by this slang term, the principle can be found in *Command* (1996), pg 20: “The Canadian Army command philosophy [...] requires an understanding of operations two levels of command up. [...] In addition, a dedicated component of all leadership training should prepare individuals to assume command one level higher.” Note that *Command* (1996) is no longer current, but the term remains active.

Most importantly, these shared concerns impact the developmental ethos and doctrine which inform how troops and commanding officers interact, are trained, and are expected to behave. Naturally, Sparta's methods in practice were much harsher than those the CAF utilizes presently, but the prevailing considerations are analogous.

While it would be unwise to claim that any modern military can be mapped onto an ancient one, the CAF's publications can grant insight into the development and exercise of a Spartan doctrine that is evidently at play in the sources, but lost to us now. Instead of attempting to fit Sparta into the CAF's framework, I will be using the CAF to provide terminology, tactical/strategic models, and doctrinal acumen that can be seen to bear on what we read in the sources but has not been considered in wider scholarly discussion. The CAF will serve here as a supplement to, not a replacement of, recorded Spartan command practices.

[The CAF] ⁹³

In 1973, the Canadian Chief of the Defense Staff, General Jacques A. Dextraze, wrote a paper on the art of leadership for the CAF. In it, he detailed his thoughts on what constitutes leadership, how leadership is effectively facilitated, and the qualities that successful leadership requires. He considered his advice to be useful at any level, from lowly master corporals to general officers. While directed towards the CAF and other peer militaries, the simple and straightforward truths of his advice remain useful in any military context –

⁹³ A special thank you is owed here to Cheyenne Blackmore, my sister and a Canadian Armed Forces infanteer, who helped me find and make use of military resources and terminology. Her knowledge and assistance was invaluable in facilitating the articulation of my thoughts. Furthermore, her insights into Canadian military operation, doctrine, and ethos – alongside her perspective as a currently serving soldier – have been illuminating.

certainly in the study of modern military leadership, but also that of ancient command. His relevant opinions, as they pertain to our discussion here and in the subsequent third chapter, are as follows:

“The point that I want to make is that the basic principles of leadership and man management are both timeless and universal. [...] Leadership, then, is an art, rather than a science. [...] Unlike computers, [human] performance is influenced for better or worse by a wide range of human emotions that reflect, in large measure, the quality of leadership that is being exercised. Because a leader is working with that infinitely complex entity called a human being, he must be an artist, not a mechanic. As in all art forms, simplicity is to be preferred to complexity. You will see that the leadership principles I discuss below are very simple, reflecting as they do some basic characteristics of human nature. [...] Big words don’t impress me, and they won’t likely impress your subordinates. [...] I believe that there are four qualities that are essential ingredients of successful leadership. These are: loyalty, knowledge, integrity, courage.

Loyalty. *To be a great leader, you must display two forms of loyalty. You must first of all be loyal in an upward direction, to your superiors and through them to your government and country. At the same time, however, you must be loyal to your subordinates. It is not always easy to reconcile these two forms of loyalty. You sometimes have great difficulty in keeping a proper balance between the two in the face of conflicting demands. [...] Where loyalty to superiors and subordinates cannot both be simultaneously satisfied, then loyalty upward must prevail, because in the final analysis it is loyalty to our country that really counts. One more word regarding loyalty. Loyalty demands that you forsake personal pleasures if they conflict in any way with the performance of your duties. You have no right to take time off for amusement tonight if you should use this time to prepare for tomorrow’s task.*

Knowledge. *You must possess knowledge if you are to be efficient. If you have knowledge you will command respect not only from your subordinates, but from your superiors as well. You must never stop learning and you must never pretend to anyone that you know something when in fact you do not. On the contrary, it is best to admit your ignorance of a certain point under discussion and encourage whoever is speaking to you to clarify the particular subject further. In so doing you will be learning something new, while at the same time revealing that you are honest. In the long run, there is no substitute for knowledge. As you progress in rank, there will be a tendency to neglect your own self-education. This tendency will come naturally, since*

with higher rank you will have more privileges and more assistants to do things for you. [...] Instead, remember that to lead you must know what you are talking about, and to gain the necessary knowledge you must study a given problem with every means at hand. Too many people believe that it is old-fashioned to set aside time to study like a student at school. This is wrong, because military leadership without knowledge never has been and never will be truly successful. History is full of examples of how battles and wars can be lost through lack of knowledge. Look how often large, well-equipped armies have been trashed by smaller forces. [...]

Integrity. *Integrity means the refusal to deceive others in any way, no matter what the circumstances⁹⁴. As a leader, you must take decisions and accept their results. You are the one responsible for the success or failure of your actions. You must admit your mistakes at least to yourself, and profit from them. You must not try to bluff your way through or shake your responsibility off onto others. One sure way to undermine your effectiveness as a leader is to play games with people. Take it from me, it doesn't work. It may give you some advantage in the short term, but it is bound to hurt you in the long run.*

Courage. *I would define true courage as the desire, or at least the willingness, to face danger in the knowledge that it exists. I have heard people refer to a courageous man without fear. This, to me, is a contradiction. I believe, rather, that courage is a quality of the mind which makes one refuse to be swayed from his aim by danger or difficulty. To me it is a quality that enables a man to marshal all his abilities to overcome the hardships standing in his path. I am positive that perseverance is the heart of courage. To sum up what I have said, I believe that the courageous man is one who has succeeded in mastering his emotions and weaknesses. [...] It is my belief that indecision in the face of a difficult problem reflects a lack of courage. It is the easy way out, but is usually wrong.*

I could mention many other qualities that are essential to good leadership, but in my opinion those I have discussed above are the vital ones. All of the other useful qualities, I think, can be distilled down to these four. If you are loyal and knowledgeable, and have integrity and courage you have what it takes to be a good leader in the Canadian Forces at any rank level.”⁹⁵

⁹⁴ As a point of clarification, I believe he is referring to being candid with one's own troops and superiors, not enemy forces.

⁹⁵ Gn. Dextraze 1973 | Significant sections of the quotation are omitted for the sake of brevity, and some formatting of the original text has been altered for more fluid readability.

As General Dextraze put it himself, “*plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose* – the more things change, the more they stay the same.”⁹⁶ The qualities required of individuals for effective leadership have not changed much, if at all, even if deployment of those qualities varies across time, space, and situation. As he said, command operates at a human level, not a mechanical one: while the tools for war have changed significantly, the people both issuing orders and receiving them have not. The qualities that General Dextraze outlined here – along with the CAF’s additional expectations of *leadership, vision and intellect, judgement and decisiveness, and willpower*⁹⁷ – will serve as a reasonable stand-in for the baseline qualities the ephorate looked for in their commanders.

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*“Military command encompasses the art of leading, decision-making, motivating and directing all ranks into action to accomplish assigned missions. It requires a vision of the desired end state, an understanding of military science (doctrine), military art (the profession of arms), concepts, missions, priorities and the allocation of resources. It requires an ability to assess people and risks and involves continually re-evaluating the situation.”*⁹⁸

Due to the sparing manpower available, the CAF places significant emphasis on the quality of troops’ training, education, and ingenuity. Indeed, more emphasis is placed on *leadership* than *command* throughout all levels of the CAF’s hierarchy. This capstone doctrine – prioritizing *leadership* over *command* or *control*⁹⁹ – directly informs the

⁹⁶ Gn. Dextraze 1973 | As this version of the paper is a reprint of the original (and, as far as I can tell, the only publicly available version) but is only in website form, I will omit a page number and instead include [this embedded link](#) back to the CAF site. This link will also be included in the bibliography and the entirety of his letter as it appears on the CAF site will be included in *Appendix II: The Art of Leadership*.

⁹⁷ *Command* (1996), 11 | *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Doctrine* (2005), 19.

⁹⁸ *Command: The Operational Function* (2018), 9, 4

⁹⁹ see *Appendix I: Definitions and Abbreviations*

command doctrine, and the expectations placed upon commanders. For the CAF, command is the most pivotal aspect of operational success. Since they are empowered with significant latitude to act in accordance with the situation, the mission's success can live or die on the ability of the assigned commander.

“Commanders are empowered with command authority. However, they must also possess the intellectual ability to decide on a course of action and the interpersonal skills to inspire subordinates within the command to carry out the action. Legally, morally and practically, the authority for command is vested in a single individual, rather than a team (although many aspects of command are collaborative). Likewise, responsibility for the effective exercise of command, and the achievement of assigned objectives, rests with the same individual. Commanders rely on the professional expertise of their advisors and subordinate commanders.”¹⁰⁰

Sparta would find herself agreeing. When she opted to appoint generals instead of exclusively tasking out¹⁰¹ her kings, she still left them with many of the same powers as the latter, though with more recourse with which to curtail overreaching individuals. Her generals would have their theatre and objective outlined for them by the ephors, perhaps given a pre-assembled force and/or established allies with which to cooperate, then were largely left to achieve their mission at their discretion. Particularly given how distant some theatres were and the difficulties this would cause in communication concerning wider theatre operations, choosing an appropriate man for the job was paramount.

What we do have concerning Spartan training accords with this. While at surface level it appears that the *agoge* served purely as a tool of indoctrination (which it was), details

¹⁰⁰ *Command: The Operational Function* (2018), 9, 6

¹⁰¹ *Command* (1996), 32 | “**Task.** A task is an activity which contributes to the achievement of a mission.” A ‘task’ or ‘tasking’ may be routine as weapon maintenance or as important as being assigned control of a battle group. As a verb, ‘tasking’ or ‘tasking out’ refers simultaneously to the assignment of and carrying out of a given endeavour.

about the process point toward a kind of peer-powered sifting that separated out potential commanders from likely subordinates. For example, Xenophon mentions that the youngest age bracket amongst the *agoge* were kept low on food so as to force them to steal¹⁰². Any punishment they would face would not be for having stolen, but for being caught doing so. He states that this teaches and reinforces stealth and cunning, both of which were highly prized skills. The image such a description may conjure is of a lone child, or perhaps one with a couple friends, sneaking into storerooms under cover of night. However, it is worth bearing in mind that Spartan food was rationed; even with low population numbers, a hundred or more children attempting to steal food consistently and simultaneously would be impossible to hide from roving *homoioi*. A much more plausible, albeit quite speculative, scenario would be one of peer groups self-sorting into pseudo-hierarchies: a ‘commander’ (or a small group of decision-makers) who makes the raid plans, ‘recce’¹⁰³ who scope out the prospective route and report back, ‘sentries’ who watch the route and help carry off the stolen goods, and ‘specialists’ who break into the stores and smuggle out the goods. Good leadership would emerge naturally from these groups without intervention from the *paidonomos*¹⁰⁴, as poor leadership would result in hunger, anger and personnel reallocation. Furthermore, these budding leaders were given a controlled environment in which to practise these new skills, as well as having the consequences of failure made readily apparent. It can be reasonably suggested that as ‘leader’ children progress through the system, they continue to build and exercise their competency and likewise attract the

¹⁰² Xenophon *Constitution of the Spartans*, 2.4

¹⁰³ “Recce” (pronounced *REK-kee*) is short for *reconnaissance*; see *Appendix I*

¹⁰⁴ Xenophon *Constitution of the Lakedaimonians*, 2.2: παιδονόμος

attention of an *erastes* experienced in command. That connection would likely result in more command-oriented mentoring and, eventually, commission.

While the CAF has a more concretely defined rank structure, networking and reputation have as much to do with promotion as they did in Sparta. A *grey-man*¹⁰⁵ – a soldier who blends homogenously with other soldiers, thus becoming ‘greyed-out’ – will see little to no promotion even if they are overall pleasant, well-liked and otherwise adequate. Those who exhibit leadership and assume responsibility consistently and successfully, even if they do so without ambition to rank-climb (sometimes especially so), will find themselves routinely put up for elevation and commendation by their direct superiors. For the Spartans, those who would have *grey-manned* did so within the *agoge*, and may never have sought or been considered worthy of any kind of command element. Those with potential would have been groomed for and elevated to positions of higher authority early on.

The characteristics which Sparta prized are not as straightforwardly laid out as those of the CAF but appear to be in alignment. Qualities that the ephors were screening for are most likely to show up in generals whose records are marked by consistent accomplishment. It is here, then, that we return to the ancient sources, to examine the means and manner by which Spartan generals were judged successful. As Rahe notes concerning the close reading of Thucydides:

“In trying to make sense of what happened in and after the late 430s, our task must then be, in part, to do for ourselves what Thucydides leaves it for us to do – which is, to elucidate what he left unsaid. To this end, we must pull

¹⁰⁵ This is CAF slang. There are two more variants of this term. To *grey-man* is to be in the process of or have become a *grey-man*. *Grey-manning* is behaving and performing in such a way as to become a *grey-man*. To *grey-man* can be unintentional, but *grey-manning* is purposeful.

together the fragments of information that Thucydides provides us, we must add to that information from the other surviving sources; and we must ‘draw out lessons’ for ourselves and ‘trace the drifts and counsels of the actors to the seats.’ Most, if not all, of the time we will find ourselves discovering what he had recognized at the outset.”¹⁰⁶

I intend to do just that. As such, the best place to start is with Thucydides’ own favourite Spartiate general – Brasidas.

[Brasidas]

“Brasidas caught a mouse among some figs and, when he got bitten, let it go. Then, turning to those who were present, he said, ‘There is nothing so small that it does not save its life if it has the courage to defend itself against those who would lay hand on it.’”¹⁰⁷

Thucydides reports on the conflict between Epidamnus and Corcyra in Book 2 simultaneously as a prelude to and a microcosm of the Peloponnesian War. He lays out the details of the conflict, then reflects on how the overarching themes, motives, and explanations echo across the subsequent war. It is little surprise, then, that the Spartan general he is most fascinated by makes his debut appearance here. Brasidas, of his own volition, intervened to defend the town of Methone in Messenia.

“It happened that Brasidas, son of Tellis, a Spartiate [Βρασίδας ὁ Τέλλιδος ἀνὴρ Σπαρτιάτης], was in these parts with an expeditionary force, and when he heard he came with a hundred hoplites to support the locals [ἐβοήθει τοῖς ἐν τῷ χωρίῳ]. Passing through the Athenian forces [διαδραμὼν δὲ τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατόπεδον], which were spread out over the area and had their attention directed toward the walls, he forced his way into Methone [ἐσπίπτει ἐς τὴν Μεθώνην], and although he lost a few of his men in the onslaught, he not only secured the city, but, a result of this act of daring, was the first in this war to be commended [ἐπηνέσθη] at Sparta.”¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁶ Rahe 2020, 54

¹⁰⁷ Plutarch *Moralia* Vol. III, 122-124, transl. F. C. Babbitt (1931)

¹⁰⁸ Thucydides *History*, 2.25, transl. S. Lattimore (1998)

This is the sum total of what Thucydides has to say about Brasidas and his intervention at Methone. Its very inclusion is itself somewhat strange, as it seems to have little-to-no impact on the wider theatre. Yet, it serves as a conspicuous introduction to a character who dominates the narrative of Books 4 and 5. Indeed, several notable characteristics of Brasidas are evident even in such a short passage. Brasidas was not ordered to intervene nor was it his intended mission – Thucydides explicitly relays that he did so to protect the local people. He also demonstrates his ‘smash-and-grab’ approach to battle, which was both proactive and stealthy. His ability to take initiative successfully and make efficient use of his resources in service of Sparta’s broader interests sees him well rewarded, despite the deviation from his intended (but undisclosed) original mission. If this pattern of behaviour had been adverse to Sparta’s domestic stability – despite it furthering their interests abroad – it is unlikely Spartan officials would have lauded Brasidas publicly enough for Thucydides to have found out about it after the fact.

CAF doctrine relays a series of conventions called the *Ten Principles of War*¹⁰⁹, which are operational guidelines designed to apply to any campaign type. Brasidas fulfilled nearly all of them at Methone.

- Selection and Maintenance of the Aim
 - “Activities at the lower tactical levels must be planned and conducted in harmony with the intent and operational objectives identified at the higher echelons of command.”
- Offensive Action
 - “Commanders adopt the defensive only as a temporary expedient and must seek every opportunity to seize and maintain the initiative through offensive action. ... To achieve this, commanders must be prepared to act independently

¹⁰⁹ For a comprehensive breakdown of all ten principles, see *Appendix III: The Ten Principles of War*.

within the framework of the higher commander's intent. Seizing the initiative, therefore, requires audacity, and almost inevitably, the need to take risks."

- Surprise
 - "Surprise makes a major contribution to the breaking of the adversary's cohesion, and hence, defeat. ... The effects of surprise are enhanced through the use of speed, secrecy and deception, though ultimately it may rest on the adversary's susceptibility, expectations and preparedness. The adversary need not be taken completely by surprise, but only become aware too late to react effectively."
- Security
 - "Security protects cohesion and assures freedom of action. It results from measures taken by a commander to protect friendly forces while taking necessary, calculated risks to defeat the adversary."
- Concentration of Force
 - "It is essential to concentrate overwhelming force at a decisive place and time. It does not necessarily imply a massing of forces, but rather the massing of effects. This allows a numerically inferior force to achieve decisive results."
- Flexibility
 - "Commanders must exercise judgement and be prepared to alter plans to take advantage of opportunities as they present themselves on the battlefield."
- Cooperation
 - "It is only through effective cooperation that the components of a force can develop the full measure of their strength. It entails a common aim ... and the coordination of all operational functions to achieve maximum synergy. ... This principle of cooperation must be practised within the JIMP framework and as a principle to the comprehensive approach of multiple agencies working in the pursuit of a common end state."
- Administration
 - "Successful administration is the ability to make the best and most timely use of resources. ... Situational awareness, foresight and anticipation are hallmarks of sound administration."

He operated within the joint, inter-agency, multi-national and public (JIMP) framework explicitly, not only supporting the broader goals of the theatre but aiding the civilian populace of Methone via liberation. Furthermore, his operation displayed elements of intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) and the decision-action cycle, also known as the OODA (observe-orient-decide-act) loop¹¹⁰.

¹¹⁰ see *Appendix V: Application of Fighting Power*

In kind with the expectations of CAF commanders, Brasidas kept the wider goals of Sparta in mind and altered his operations in such a way as to further them. He won Methone's affection by breaking the Athenian siege and assisting their people before continuing with his given assignment. This awareness of Sparta's larger political and regional aims, the capability of his own forces, and the landscape (both politically and geographically) of the region he was operating in is a hallmark of his command. It is no surprise that Sparta would wish to celebrate such successful initiative, nor that he found himself given advisory roles in subsequent campaigns. It will be a recurring feature of his characterization.



The next time we meet Brasidas, he was sent out in the company of two other Spartans to advise an admiral by the name of Knemos, who had just suffered severe defeat at the hands of the Athenian navy and had retreated to the port of Kyllene at Elis.

“The Lakedaimonians also sent Timokrates, Brasidas and Lykophron to Knemos as advisors for the fleet, ordering them to prepare better for another sea battle and not be barred from the sea by a few ships. For especially since it was their first attempt at sea battle, they found it baffling to their expectations and did not believe that their own fleet was so greatly deficient, but that some kind of cowardice had occurred, not taking into consideration the long experience of the Athenians compared to their own brief training. So they sent out the advisors angrily.”¹¹¹

“πέμπουσι δὲ καὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τῷ Κνήμῳ ξυμβούλους ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς Τιμοκράτη καὶ Βρασίδαν καὶ Λυκόφρονα, κελεύοντες ἄλλην ναυμαχίαν βελτίῳ παρασκευάζεσθαι καὶ μὴ ὑπ’ ὀλίγων νεῶν εἶργεσθαι τῆς θαλάσσης. ἐδόκει γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἄλλως τε καὶ πρῶτον ναυμαχίας πειρασάμενοις πολὺς ὁ παράλογος εἶναι, καὶ οὐ τοσούτῳ ὥντο σφῶν τὸ ναυτικὸν λείπεσθαι, γεγενῆσθαι δέ τινα

¹¹¹ Thucydides *History*, 2.85, transl. S. Lattimore (1998)

μαλακίαν, οὐκ ἀντιτιθέντες τὴν Ἀθηναίων ἐκ πολλοῦ ἐμπειρίαν τῆς σφετέρως
δι' ὀλίγου μελέτης. ὀργῇ οὖν ἀπέστελλον.”

After a brief hiatus to regroup and repair their ships, Brasidas again demonstrated his strategic opportunism.

“Then Knemos, Brasidas and the other Peloponnesian generals, wanting to bring about the sea battle quickly before any reinforcements came from Athens [βουλόμενοι ἐν τάχει τὴν ναυμαχίαν ποιῆσαι πρὶν τι καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπιβοηθῆσαι], first called the troops together and, seeing most of them afraid because of the previous defeat and without eagerness, encouraged them.”¹¹²

After a surprise victory in their second round against Phormio and the Athenians, Brasidas once again moved to push their advantage while they still had it, further displaying his initiative and flexibility (recall Principle 3: *Offensive Action*):

“Before disbanding the fleet, which had withdrawn to Corinth and the Gulf of Krisa, Knemos, Brasidas and the other Peloponnesian commanders, at the beginning of winter [ἀρχομένου τοῦ χειμῶνος], wanted to make an attempt on the Peiraeus, the harbour of the Athenians at the suggestion of the Megarians; it was not guarded or closed, as was natural on account of their great superiority through their fleet. ...

“The Peloponnesians made this decision and proceeded immediately. Arriving by night [ἀφικόμενοι νυκτὸς] and launching the ships they sailed, no longer against the Peiraeus as had been intended, since they feared the danger [καταδείσαντες τὸν κίνδυνον] (and it is also said that there was a wind preventing them) but to the tip of Salamis facing Megara ...”¹¹³

The surprise attack threw the Athenians into a panic – Athens thought Peiraeus was captured while Peiraeus was sure the Spartans were coming for them next. However, Brasidas’ opportunism was well balanced against his very Spartan prudence¹¹⁴.

¹¹² Thucydides *History*, 2.86, transl. S. Lattimore (1998)

¹¹³ Thucydides *History*, 2.93, transl. S. Lattimore (1998)

¹¹⁴ I ascribe the Spartans’ strategy here to Brasidas since of the other advisors sent out to Knemos, Timokrates killed himself before the second battle with Phormio was even over (2.92 | “Timokrates the Lakedaimonian, on board the Leukadian ship sunk near the merchant vessel, killed himself when the ship was lost, and he was washed ashore in the harbour of Naupaktos.”) and Lykophron makes no further appearance. Westlake 1968

“... this is just what might easily have happened, if they had been willing to keep their nerve [εἰ ἐβουλήθησαν μὴ κατοκνήσαι], and a wind would not have prevented them. ... After the Peloponnesians had overrun most of Salamis and captured men and booty and the three ships from Boudaron, the fort, they sailed back to Nisaia as quickly as possible when they found out about the Athenian measures for defense. Their ships were another factor to worry them, since they had been launched after a long time and were not at all watertight [ἔστι γὰρ ὅτι καὶ αἱ νῆες αὐτοῦς διὰ χρόνου καθελκυσθεῖσαι καὶ οὐδὲν στέγουσαι ἐφόβουν].”¹¹⁵

Brasidas was not reckless with his audacity¹¹⁶. Once more stepping beyond the bounds of his assigned task, his own aim in pressing the Athenians was to secure as much of value as possible without significant risk to his own fleet. The capture and looting of Salamis after an unlikely victory was the safest option to maximize glory without chancing an Athenian counter-attack.

Thucydides’ and Rahe’s opinion of the decision to limit the raid to Salamis is uncharitable when considered through the lens of full-spectrum operations (FSO)¹¹⁷. Knemos’ initial fire¹¹⁸ with Phormio and the Athenian navy was part of a major combat operation, whereas the raid on Salamis was a limited intervention assault. This shift down in scale, both at the campaign theme¹¹⁹ level and the intended area of operation (AO), was a

(*Individuals in Thucydides*) suggests that Thucydides has drawn attention to Brasidas here and in Methone in order to build up to Brasidas’ Thracian exploits. While this is likely narratively true, I don’t doubt that Brasidas’ accomplishments were legitimate. Furthermore, the approach taken for the Salamis raid is much more characteristic of Brasidas than Knemos.

¹¹⁵ Thucydides *History*, 2.94, transl. S. Lattimore (1998)


¹¹⁶ Rahe 2020, 117 | Rahe and I disagree on the interpretation of Spartan action. Rahe suggests that “had they possessed the audacity of Phormio” they could have deeply wounded the Athenians, perhaps to the point of unsettling their growing empire. I maintain that the Spartan decision was the wiser of the two, factoring in weather, opportunity, and the state of their own vessels.

¹¹⁷ For more comprehensive breakdowns of the subsequent ideas presented here, see *Appendix IV: Continuum of Operations*.

¹¹⁸ “Fire” is a term used for any and all combat encounters.

¹¹⁹ More comprehensive excerpts concerning “campaign themes” are supplied in *Appendix IV: Continuum of Operations*. In particular, see Figure 3-4 for a comparison between campaign themes.

mindful application of Principles 1 (Selection and Maintenance of the Aim), 4 (Surprise), 6 (Concentration of Force), 7 (Economy of Effort), and 10 (Administration). In particular, although Thucydides regards this as a missed opportunity, it appears the Effect Sought¹²⁰ in attacking Salamis was not to extend the raid onto Athens or even Peiraieus, but instead to rattle Athenian confidence and cohesion, which was achieved. Brasidas and Knemos would have known their ships would not actually be capable of achieving anything decisive, instead swapping to an operation that would inflict fear and panic. This attack was never intended to be a *main effort* fire. The fact this operation was the last any navy could carry out due to the approaching winter meant Athens would have to wait months to find out for sure if their harbour was actually safe from Spartan assault – in effect, Salamis not only saved face for Knemos, but served doubly as a psychological operation (PSYOP) against Athens and her navy. For Brasidas, at that time, the raid on Salamis had achieved the desired effect¹²¹.



Brasidas appears again in book 3, though only briefly. He was once again sent as an advisor¹²² to the Spartan responding to the civil war raging in Corcyra, Alkidas. Unlike Knemos, however, Alkidas was not so receptive to Brasidas' advice:

¹²⁰ *Land Operations* (2008), 3.12 | The "Effect Sought" includes not only the resolution desired at the end of a campaign, but also the manner in which that end-state is to be achieved.

¹²¹ *Land Operations* (2008), 4.9 | "A military force will project its fighting power throughout its AO and has potential to do the same throughout its area of influence. It may do so on both the physical and psychological planes. In doing so, however, it may create desired and /or undesired effects in the larger area of interest. ... Thus, activities and their effects are not limited to the physical dimensions of the geographical area of influence. Activities that occur within an AO can have effects far removed from the geographical AO or area of influence. Tactical incidents may even have wide-ranging operational and strategic effects."

¹²² Notably, Brasidas is sent alone to Alkidas. I believe this is further proof of him being the architect behind Knemos' successful Salamis raid – even if Thucydides doesn't expressly acknowledge it, it appears implied that his effort was recognized (if not explicitly rewarded as at Methone) by Sparta.

“The next day [Alkidas and the Peloponnesians] were no more willing to sail against [Corcyra], even when its people were in complete disorder and panic and although Brasidas is said to have advised this to Alkidas, but without having an equal voice, and instead they disembarked at the promontory of Leukimne and plundered the countryside.”¹²³

“τῇ δ’ ὕστεραίᾳ ἐπὶ μὲν τὴν πόλιν οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἐπέπλεον, καίπερ ἐν πολλῇ ταραχῇ καὶ φόβῳ ὄντας καὶ Βρασίδου παραινούντος, ὥς λέγεται, Ἀλκίδα, ἰσοψήφου δὲ οὐκ ὄντος · ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν Λευκίμμην τὸ ἀκρωτήριον ἀποβάντες ἐπόρθουν τοὺς ἀγρούς.”

This passage once again hinges on Brasidas’ commitment to what is formulated by the CAF as the JIMP framework and awareness of PMESII (political, military, economic, social (including cultural and religious), infrastructure and information constructs). Brasidas’ diligence in seeing through Sparta’s commitments and wider political objectives conflicted with Alkidas’ hesitance. Indeed, Thucydides illustrates that Corcyra’s demise was cannibalistic and harsh. As internal hostilities continued to compound, the opportunity that Brasidas had pushed for to successfully intervene was lost.

With Knemos, Brasidas had pulled back from major combat in favour of limited intervention to great success. With Alkidas, he urged escalation from limited intervention into major combat. Whether changing theme to major combat would have proven successful is unknowable, but the failure of Alkidas’ campaign proves he was correct to assert that limited intervention was not conducive to the campaign’s, Corcyra’s, or Sparta’s interests.

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While most of his admirable traits are foreshadowed in books 2 and 3, Brasidas becomes a leading figure throughout the narratives of books 4 and 5. Brasidas reappears to

¹²³ Thucydides *History*, 3.79, transl. S. Lattimore (1998)

us early on during the conflict at Sphacteria, wherein he was the only commander to attempt an amphibious landing to retake the shore¹²⁴. Unlike his other successes that we have thus far seen (and will come to see), Brasidas was lacking most of the elements he best operated within – secrecy, negotiation, darkness, poor weather, and surprise. The only one of his preferred elements at play was difficult terrain, but he was the party on the offensive, which made it a disadvantage. Thucydides does not sugarcoat that he failed in his attempt to retake Pylos and nearly died for his trouble. However, he emphasizes that Brasidas was the only commander courageous enough to even try, and makes time to mention that Brasidas' lost shield was a symbol the Athenians found worthy of adding to their trophy¹²⁵. Brasidas' reputation spoke for him, and he cut an imposing figure as an adversary.

We catch up with him again at 4.70, as he gathered his army in advance of his march into Thrace. He took time from his task here to once again assist locals in trouble. In this case, his forces were responsible for fending off Boiotians ganging up on Nisaia and successfully intimidating the Athenians out of an attack on Megara¹²⁶. Once that was dealt with, Brasidas returned to gathering his forces and moved off towards Thrace.

Brasidas' rhetorical ability is showcased for the first time as he's passing through Thessaly. His procession was stopped by Athenian-friendly Thessalians in spite of his Thessalian escort.

“Brasidas himself stated that he came as a friend to Thessaly, themselves included, and was in arms against the Athenians, who were at war with him, and not against them; although he knew of no hostility between

¹²⁴ Thucydides *History*, 4.11-12

¹²⁵ Thucydides *History*, 4.12

¹²⁶ Thucydides *History*, 4.70-73

Thessaly and the Lakedaimonians to prevent access to each others' land, he would not now proceed against their wishes [ὥστε τῇ ἀλλήλων γῇ μὴ χρῆσθαι], since this was impossible [νῦν τε ἀκόντων ἐκείνων οὐκ ἂν προελθεῖν], but nevertheless requested them not to stop him [οὐ μέντοι ἀξιοῦν γε εἶργεσθαι]. They listened and went away [καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀκούσαντες ταῦτα ἀπῆλθον]; on the advice of his escorts, he moved on rapidly without a halt before a larger group could gather to block him.”¹²⁷

Thucydides describes the Thessalian group simply as οἱ Θεσσαλοὶ ... ἄλλοι ... τὰναντία τούτοις, “other Thessalians opposite to them”, implying that this was less an organized political collective than it was a disaffected assortment of citizens. Regardless, Brasidas treats them with grace and understanding. Not only was appealing to and aiding other *poleis*' citizens a penchant of his, it was a strategically valuable skill for a general. As Wheatland points out,

“... measuredness is a diplomatic virtue. It allows for greater flexibility in foreign relations by attracting potential enemies and making them open to persuasion. Measuredness is therefore not an end in itself. For it to be useful, it must not preclude deception, cunning, and other unseemly intellectual capacities when dealing with foreign powers. As a general acting with sole authority far away from his city, Brasidas must balance the tools of diplomacy in a prudent manner. ... The lives of his men and interest of his city must take precedence ...”¹²⁸

The social capacities of “leadership, interpersonal skills such as communication, persuasion, and conflict management are critical to working with others.”¹²⁹ As Sparta's own defense strategy relied heavily on her alliances, it stands to reason that any of her leading men would be required to have such skills well in hand. Awareness of Thessaly's PMESII conditions, to put it in terms of the CAF, speak to Brasidas' high-level knowledge of the political geography he was walking into as he progressed further north.

¹²⁷ Thucydides *History*, 4.78, trans. S. Lattimore (1998)

¹²⁸ Wheatland 2020, 120

¹²⁹ *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Doctrine* (2005), 19

Once through Thessaly and into Chalkidike, Brasidas was confronted with the tensions between Perdikkas and Arrhabaios. Despite Perdikkas having been his benefactor, upon arrival he opted to attempt to mediate the situation. His efforts were thwarted by Perdikkas' own unwillingness to participate. Brasidas suffered a reduction in the monetary support he received from Perdikkas and the Macedonian king's displeasure, but he had successfully preserved his forces by averting a conflict he otherwise would have been drawn into¹³⁰. Brasidas' exercise of Principle 7 (Economy of Effort) had not merely maintained the strength of his army by evading involvement but had kept a grasp on his most crucial resource: time¹³¹.

A core tenet of Brasidas' strategy had always been speed – but speed required effective timing, and effective timing required risk. Generals before and after him would suffer for fumbling their initiative; being too hesitant to seize an opportunity or too overzealous in chasing it would both lead to failure and disgrace. As we have already seen, however, opportunism was a talent of his, and he was particularly good at thinking on his feet. Brasidas likely knew that getting involved (with either Perdikkas or Arrhabaios) might mire him in lengthy conflict, one he was not likely to benefit from no matter who the victor turned out to be. With the Athenians' attention turned elsewhere for the moment, his window to establish a Spartan foothold would only grow smaller the longer he took. He didn't waste the moment: he turned his forces onto Akanthos at the end of summer, the start of their wine-

¹³⁰ Thucydides *History*, 4.83 | This skillful weaving between Perdikkas and Arrhabaios serves as a good illustration of Wheatland's point about the quality of Brasidas' measuredness.

¹³¹ *Command in Land Operations* (2007), 1.5-6 | "In combat operations, the ability of the enemy to react effectively to friendly actions is the primary time factor to consider."

making season, when he presented the greatest threat to their crops¹³². He didn't even have to take up arms against the *polis*:

“Brasidas said this much; and the Akanthians, voting by ballot, after a great deal was said on both sides, decided by a majority to revolt from Athens, partly because of what was appealing in Brasidas' speech, partly out of fear for their fruit, and after they had bound him to the oaths sworn by the Lakedaimonian officials when they sent him out, that the allies he brought over would be truly independent, they then admitted the army. And not much later, Stagiros, a colony of Andros, joined the revolt.”¹³³

This is our first glimpse of Brasidas' ability to break adversary cohesion, an extremely important factor in the disrupting and unravelling of an adversarial force¹³⁴, which he accomplished through a skillful combination of charisma and threat of violence\.. The quiet capitulation of Stagiros shortly after Akanthos appears to have been only the beginning.

While Thucydides details the Athenians failing to take Boiotia, Brasidas moved deeper into Thrace from Chalkidike. His chosen target was Amphipolis, since it possessed resources the Athenians relied on such as gold and timber. It would also cut Athens off from her allies up the Strymon should he be able to use Amphipolis as a jump-off point to take Eion and its bridge¹³⁵. He stopped at Aulon and Bormiskos, where he fed and watered his troops. With Argilian traitors in Amphipolis won over by Perdikkas and Chalkidian allies now waiting for him to arrive, he hastened to Amphipolis under cover of night and through stormy snowfall¹³⁶.

¹³² Thucydides *History*, 4.84

¹³³ Thucydides *History*, 4.88, transl. S. Lattimore (1998)

¹³⁴ *Command* (1996), 8 | “Cohesion is the glue that solidifies individual and group will under the command of leaders. ... The CAF's approach to operations seeks to defeat the enemy by shattering his moral and physical cohesion, his ability to fight as an effective coordinated whole, rather than by destroying him physically through incremental attrition.”

¹³⁵ Thucydides *History*, 4.105, 4.108

¹³⁶ Thucydides *History*, 4.103

“... and now, since the opportunity had appeared and Brasidas had arrived, they let him into their city and revolted from Athens, and during that night [ἐκείνῃ τῇ νυκτὶ] they brought the army before dawn to the bridge across the river. The town is some distance from the crossing, and the walls did not go down to it as they do now, and only a minimal guard was stationed. Easily overpowering them, attack unexpected [ἀπροσδοκήτοις προσπεσών], Brasidas crossed the bridge and immediately held what the Amphipolitans living over the whole area owned outside the walls. Since his crossing caught people in the city unawares [ἄφνω], and some of those outside were captured, while others fled inside the walls, the Amphipolitans were thrown into complete confusion [τεῖχος], especially because they were suspicious of one another.”¹³⁷

Inside Amphipolis, Athenian loyalists mobilized fast enough to bar the gates to Brasidas, reaching out to the Athenian general Eukles to arrange the *polis*’ defense. Thucydides, Eukles’ attending admiral, posted at Thasos, immediately began gathering his fleet together to come to Amphipolis’ defense. However, Brasidas won the citizens of Amphipolis over despite Eukles’ presence and Thucydides’ pending aid.

“When the majority heard this [offer from Brasidas], there was a shift in their thinking, especially since the citizens included few Athenians and were mainly a mixture, and a large number of those within were related to those captured outside. They found the proclamation a fair one compared with what they feared – the Athenians because they were glad that they might leave, since they hardly saw their peril as only the general one and besides did not expect help soon, and the rest of the masses because they were not losing equal rights of citizenship and were being unexpectedly freed from danger. ... the surrender was effected and they admitted Brasidas on the terms he had proclaimed.”¹³⁸

Once more, Brasidas’ judicious application, in the terms of the CAF, of PMESII and the JIMP framework resulted in the successful achievement of his main objective. While Thucydides never reports what intelligence Brasidas may have had – other than reporting on the existence of “partisans of Brasidas” – his ability to cater in negotiation to the local populace

¹³⁷ Thucydides *History*, 4.103-104, transl. S. Lattimore (1998)

¹³⁸ Thucydides *History*, 4.106, transl. S. Lattimore (1998)

speaks to a thorough, if not complete, understanding of the region. Furthermore, Brasidas' 'mercy' not only to Amphipolis as a whole but to the resident Athenians as well reinforced Sparta's reputation as a liberator rather than a conqueror, establishing civil-military cooperation (CIMIC)¹³⁹. Indeed, Thucydides confirms that not only did Brasidas deploy a PYSOP following the surrender, but that it was successful: "[The Athenians] were also afraid that the allies would revolt. For Brasidas not only behaved moderately in general but was spreading word everywhere that he was sent out in order to liberate Hellas."¹⁴⁰ As we will see, this operation was decidedly effective and significantly expanded Brasidas' area of influence (A of I).

Once Brasidas had established a base of operations in Amphipolis, he could begin working on establishing his commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs) and ISTAR. Thucydides, quite reasonably, does not report on what recce he tasked out or what behind-the-scenes politicking he was up to. However, it is reasonable to assume (based on the knowledge he would later display) that he would have immediately set to establishing, at minimum, a detailed understanding of the geography of his area of operation (AO) during the lull before the Athenians mustered reinforcements. Brasidas' Economy of Effort, adept political evasion, and capitalization on his advantage in time and space had left Athens on her back foot. Aware that he was without a maritime force of any kind, he managed to exploit

¹³⁹ For the sake of this argument, it does not actually matter if this reputation is true, because Brasidas is appealing not to doctrine, but ethos. It serves both Brasidas' and Sparta's interests if his political task is to reinforce an existing standing rather than trying to overcome a negative opinion.

¹⁴⁰ Thucydides *History*, 4.108, transl. S. Lattimore (1998)

geography, surprise, and the closing in of winter to undermine Athens' navy, effectively forcing them into a scrambled defensive posture.

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Brasidas' AO following the capture of Amphipolis appears to have been non-contiguous and non-linear¹⁴¹. His objective was not uncontested control of the AO but to broaden and secure the AO through CIMIC with allied *poleis* while focusing his attention on subjugating uncooperative cities. He moved north up the Strymon river and along the Akte peninsula, likely to simultaneously impede Athens from accessing Thrace's resources and to poach her allies. With his promises proven true by the treatment of Amphipolis under his control and his effective PSYOP, many of the surrounding *poleis* opted for capitulation:

*"[The Akte peninsula] contains Sane, a colony of Andros right by the canal, facing the sea toward Euboea, and in addition Thyssos, Kleone, Akrothoi, Olophyxos, and Dion, which are inhabited by a mixture of bilingual barbarian people. There is also a Chalkidian element, but small, and the majority are Pelasgian, part of the Tyrrhenians who also once occupied Lemnos and Athens, in addition to Bisaltians, Krestonians, and Edonians; they are distributed among very small cities. Most of these came over to Brasidas, but Sane and Dion resisted, and he stayed in their territory with his army and plundered it. When they did not yield, he immediately campaigned against Torone in Chalkidike, which was occupied by the Athenians; a few men ready to betray the city had called him in. Arriving while it was still night just before dawn [ἀφικόμενος νυκτὸς ἔτι καὶ περὶ ὄρθρον], he and his army took up a position near the sanctuary of the Dioskouroi, which is about three stades from the city."*¹⁴²

Brasidas took Torone with the help of Lysistratos from Olynthos, having scaled a sentry post and invaded the city from there. The assault took Torone by such surprise that they met very

¹⁴¹ *Land Operations* (2008), 4.14

¹⁴² Thucydides *History*, 4.109-110, transl. S. Lattimore (1998)

limited resistance by either the Toronians or the posted Athenians. The assault had begun after dark and, by dawn, Brasidas had control of the city.

“Once it was day, and the city was securely in his possession, Brasidas proclaimed to the Toronians who had taken refuge with the Athenians that any who wished could come back out to their own property and claim their rights with safety, and he sent a herald to the Athenians asking them to leave Lekythos under truce, keeping their possessions, since it was Chalkidian territory. They refused to leave but asked for a day of truce to take up their dead; he gave them two. During this time, he bolstered the strength of the nearby buildings [ἐν ταύταις δὲ αὐτός τε τὰς ἐγγύς οἰκίας ἐκρατύνατο], and the Athenians strengthened their own position.”¹⁴³

Thucydides’ report of the Torone operation, again, falls well within the PMESII framework – specifically the awareness of the ethnicities Brasidas would be encountering and the mention of infrastructure maintenance. Indeed, this approach to dealing with adversaries who can be made to undergo disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) is, as we learn from the CAF *Land Operations* manual, significantly more effective than destruction:

“... consequently long-term success will require the support of that local populace, it is essential that commanders at all levels, but specifically at the tactical level that will have daily contact with the local community, consider the effects that operations will have on civilians and their infrastructure. A solid knowledge and understanding of local culture and customs, mitigation of danger to the population and civilian infrastructure, and the planning of information operations in relation to the population should be applied to achieve the desired effects and avoid undesired effects.”¹⁴⁴

¹⁴³ Thucydides *History* 4.114, transl. S. Lattimore (1998)

¹⁴⁴ *Land Operations* (2008), 2.2

Indeed, Brasidas extended very generous mercy to Torone under the condition that the *polis* become a stalwart ally for Sparta¹⁴⁵. Naturally, the *polis* agreed and his attention was turned to Lekythos instead.

Lekythos did not follow in Torone's footsteps. Following the end of the body retrieval truce, Brasidas wasted no time in moving on the nearby *polis*. Lekythos itself was a poor place to attempt a defensive posture, consisting of inadequate walls and a significant amount of wood. Luckily for Brasidas, the Athenians cracked their own cohesion: the collapsing of a house they were attempting to man spooked the remaining forces, who assumed they had been routed and promptly fled.

*“When Brasidas realized that they were leaving the battlements and saw what was happening, he charged with the army and took the fort immediately, killing all he caught inside. And the Athenians, evacuating the place in this way, travelled to Pallene in boats and the ships ... and clearing Lekythos by removing all buildings, [Brasidas] dedicated the whole place to [Athena] as sacred ground. During the rest of the winter, he organized the places he occupied and made plans against the rest [καὶ ὁ μὲν τὸ λοιπὸν τοῦ χειμῶνος ὃ τε εἶχε τῶν χωρίων καθίστατο καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπεβούλευεν].”*¹⁴⁶

A skillful combination of charisma and opportunism saw Torone and Lekythos fall under Brasidas' control within days of each other. To stationed Athenians and Athenian allies, the breakneck expansion of Brasidas' A of I must have appeared like a tidal wave set to overwhelm them. The success of his close operations on the Akte peninsula would have established a stable AO so the rear operations could take place over the winter, enabling the success that Brasidas would soon find against the coming Athenian reinforcements.

¹⁴⁵ Thucydides *History*, 4.114

¹⁴⁶ Thucydides *History*, 4.116, transl. S. Lattimore (1998)



Brasidas' initial salvo in Thrace scared Athens enough to press for an armistice with Sparta¹⁴⁷. However, the damage was already done. Despite the armistice, Skione took advantage of the downtime and revolted from Athens, seeking Brasidas' protection and support¹⁴⁸. A neighbouring *polis*, Mende, followed a few days later, once he followed through on the promises he made to Skione¹⁴⁹. In order to protect both defecting cities from Athenian retaliation, he sent their women and children to Olynthos in Chalkidike. Once he had established thorough influence over his AO, and had the CIMIC of the local *poleis*, he was sufficiently settled in Thrace to now acquiesce to Perdikkas' desire to campaign against Arrhabaios¹⁵⁰. Unfortunately, this campaign did not go well for either party. Brasidas' worry over Mende's situation and betrayal by Perdikkas' erstwhile Illyrian allies undercut their efforts and further frayed their strained relationship.

Upon realizing that the Illyrians were not coming and the Macedonians were fleeing without informing him, Brasidas began to hastily pull his own troops out¹⁵¹. His battle group (BG) held firm under the harangues from Arrhabaios' troops in a steady withdrawal, managing to also prevent themselves from getting boxed in at a pass. In retribution for being abandoned by the Macedonians, Brasidas' troops took out their frustration on Macedonian territory. This would be met with Perdikkas' quiet disdain and his resolve to withdraw his

¹⁴⁷ Thucydides *History*, 4.117-119

¹⁴⁸ Thucydides *History*, 4.120-122

¹⁴⁹ Thucydides *History*, 4.123

¹⁵⁰ Thucydides *History*, 4.124-125


¹⁵¹ Thucydides *History*, 4.127-128

support from the Spartans entirely (though without committing to the Athenians either). Ultimately, Perdikkas' unwillingness to have Spartan forces within his lands led to him preventing Spartan infantry reinforcements even from arriving through Thessaly¹⁵². However, some of the higher-level Spartans did manage to make it to Brasidas, including the young man who would eventually take up his position, Klearidas.

Brasidas closed out the winter and year by attacking Poteidaia in much the same fashion as he had Torone, though with less success.

“At the end of this winter, Brasidas, when it was almost spring, made an attempt on Poteidaia. He arrived at night [προσελθὼν γὰρ νυκτὸς] and set up ladders, getting that far without detection [ἔλαθεν] (for when the alarm bell was being passed along, he acted in the interval before the man who handed it over came back), yet right after discovery, before anyone climbed up, he quickly led his army away and did not wait for day. And the winter ended, also the ninth year of this war, which Thucydides recorded.”¹⁵³

His inability to capture the city seemed to have little effect on his goals or morale and was swiftly shaken off.



Book 5 sees the end of Brasidas and the culmination of his campaign efforts in Thrace. It exemplifies the CAF concepts of Find, Fix, Strike (which are major elements of Command, Sense, Act, Shield, Sustain (CSASS)), ISTAR and the OODA loop¹⁵⁴. In the summer that followed Brasidas' string of winter successes, Kleon landed at Skione and overran both the city and Torone while he was away.

¹⁵² Thucydides *History*, 4.132

¹⁵³ Thucydides *History*, 4.135, transl. S. Lattimore (1998)

¹⁵⁴ While I will demonstrate these concepts in the following sections, more comprehensive information will be available in *Appendix V: Application of Fighting Power*.

“When Brasidas learned about this, he took up his own position at Kerdyllion; this is a place on high ground across the river not far from Amphipolis, belonging to the Argilians, and it gave him a full view [κατεφαίνετο πάντα αὐτόθεν] so that Kleon and his army could not proceed without being seen; he had every expectation [προσεδέχετο] that Kleon, contemptuous of the enemy numbers, would do so, advancing on Amphipolis with the army on hand. At the same time, he had his preparations ... Brasidas took up his position at Kerdyllion with fifteen hundred of these, while the rest were stationed in Amphipolis with Klearidas. Kleon stayed inactive for a while and then was forced to act exactly as Brasidas expected [ὁ δὲ Κλέων τέως μὲν ἡσύχαζεν, ἔπειτα ἠναγκάσθη ποιῆσαι ὅπερ ὁ Βρασίδης προσεδέχετο].”¹⁵⁵

In CSASS, *Sense* incorporates all elements of preparation, including recce, CCIRs, ISTAR operations, intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB), and battleplan formation. *Sense* also incorporates the sub-framework elements of *Find* and *Fix*. *Find*, as is implied, is concerned with pinpointing enemy locations, learning BG numbers and composition, and understanding the terrain – predominantly CCIR activities. *Fix* entails corralling an adversary into actions and/or locations that are beneficial to your forces and detrimental to their own, with ISTAR being an essential tool in maximizing and synchronizing¹⁵⁶ the desired effects (Principle 6: Concentration of Force). All of these factors make up the *observe-orient* elements of the OODA loop. Brasidas adeptly deployed all of these concepts in a textbook manner, expertly angling the Athenian forces into a snare that Kleon was completely unaware lay before him.

“As soon as Brasidas saw the Athenians stirring, he came down from Kerdyllion and entered Amphipolis. He did not consider marching out in regular formation [ἐπέξοδον μὲν καὶ ἀντίταξιν οὐκ ἐποιήσατο], doubtful about his forces and considering them over-matched, not in numbers (these were about equal) but in quality (for the whole Athenian contingent in the expedition was first-class, along with the best of the Lemnians and Imbrians), but prepared to attack with guile [τέχνη δὲ παρεσκευάζετο

¹⁵⁵ Thucydides *History*, 5.6-7, transl. S. Lattimore (1998)

¹⁵⁶ “Synchronization” has a specific meaning in military contexts. See *Appendix I: Definitions and Abbreviations*.

ἐπιθησόμενος]. If he were to reveal his numbers to the enemy and also the barely adequate way his men were armed, he doubted that he would be more successful than by giving the other side no prior opportunity to see them and not using their contempt for his actual situation. He accordingly selected one hundred and fifty hoplites for himself and assigned the rest to Klearidas, wanting to make a sudden attack [ἐπιχειρεῖν αἰφνιδίως] before the Athenians moved away, since he thought he would not catch them by themselves again if they ever got reinforcements. After summoning all his forces with the intention of encouraging them and also telling them his plans [τὴν ἐπίνοιαν φράσαι], he spoke ...”¹⁵⁷

The *Command* element of CSASS is on display here. *Command* is largely self-evident, referring to making sure the assigned commander is capable of handling both the planning phase and issuing orders/delegations. Brasidas’ commands are met with immediate obedience and his plan was supported by both his junior officer (Klearidas) and the BG itself. Brasidas, too, was evidently personally involved here in ISTAR activities, having surveyed the adversary personally. This is also the clearest look we get into the *decision* aspect of the OODA loop, wherein he is both forming and disseminating his plans in real time to his troops. It is notable that Thucydides specifically mentions that he summoned *all* his forces to the meeting, implying that he followed a doctrine similar to the CAF of making sure all soldiers are aware of the broader battleplan, not simply of their own role within it.

The fire itself plays out exactly as Brasidas expected it to. The Athenians, having not had the chance to conduct ISTAR and CCIR operations of their own, had no true grasp of the size and composition of Brasidas’ forces, nor what the Spartiate intended to do next. Perhaps Kleon was overconfident after having taken Torone and assumed he could employ

¹⁵⁷ Thucydides *History*, 5.8, transl. S. Lattimore (1998)

similar brute force to find success at Amphipolis. Whatever he had been thinking (or not thinking), Brasidas was about to punish him for his cocky inaction.

“Coming out of the gates of the stockade and the first one in the long wall that existed at the time, he advanced at a fast run where the road goes straight ... and he struck at the middle of the Athenian army, where there was panic caused by disorder as well as astonishment at his daring [τὴν τόλμαν αὐτοῦ], and routed it, and at the same time Klearidas, following his orders to come through the Thracian gates with his forces, was attacking. The overall result was that the Athenians, taken by surprise [τε τῷ ἁδοκῆτῳ καὶ ἑξαπίνης], were thrown into sudden confusion on both sides. Their left wing, which was toward Eion and had already moved ahead, was cut off immediately and fled [εὐθὺς ἀπορραγὲν ἔφευγεν]. And Brasidas, moving along to the right wing as soon as the left was in retreat, was wounded; and the Athenians did not notice that he had fallen, but those at his side lifted him up and carried him away. The Athenian right wing was more resistant, and while Kleon, since he had not intended to stand his ground in the first place, immediately fled and was run down and killed by a Myrkinian peltast, the hoplites with him drew their ranks close together and fought off the attacks of Klearidas two or three times and only gave way when the Myrkinian and Chalkidian cavalry and peltasts surrounded them, throwing javelins, and then they were routed. So the whole Athenian army was in disastrous flight [οὕτω δὴ τὸ στράτευμα πᾶν ἤδη τῶν Ἀθηναίων φυγὸν χαλεπῶς], and the remnant, after the others were killed either in the fighting or by the Chalkidian cavalry and peltasts, took different routes through the hills and got away to Eion. Those who had borne Brasidas from the fighting and rescued him brought him into the city while he was still alive; he heard that his men were the winners and died not long afterward. The rest of the army, returning from the pursuit with Klearidas, stripped the dead and set up a trophy.”¹⁵⁸

The Act in CSASS and the OODA loop encompasses everything from the moment a fire is committed to until the moment it is over, expanded on further by *Strike*. *Strike* seeks to exploit a *Fixed* adversary in order to result in a decisive outcome, usually in a *main effort* fire. Indeed, the result of the CSASS framework could not have asked for a better example of successful deployment than Brasidas’ demonstration here. He further demonstrated several

¹⁵⁸ Thucydides *History*, 5.10

Principles of War, including 1 (Selection and Maintenance of the Aim), 3 (Offensive Action), 4 (Surprise), 6 (Concentration of Force), 8 (Flexibility), 9 (Cooperation) and 10 (Administration).

Brasidas' Thracian campaign was marked by near-constant success, from expanding Sparta's political reach and alliances to disrupting Athenian hegemony in a region she once thought secure. Through the course of the campaign, he demonstrated effective use of the Ten Principles of War, CSASS, JIMP, CIMIC, ISTAR, PMESII, and the OODA loop. His awareness of the people he would be working with, the environment he would be working within, and the higher-order objectives of the campaign resulted in a commander who was able to successfully wrangle a well-held region away from a peer adversary despite poorer quality equipment and inconsistent support (Perdikkas). His ingenuity and charisma worked in his favour, facilitating fewer battles fought more briefly – a goal in every Spartan engagement.

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Brasidas rightly deserves the fame bestowed upon him. He was an incredibly talented commander, and one I am not surprised Thucydides was so fascinated by. Despite his insistence that Brasidas was an aberration within Spartan command hierarchies, I fully agree with Sears¹⁵⁹, however, that Brasidas was far from an un-Spartan Spartan. How could he be, when two decades later, another Spartiate just like him appears in the record?

¹⁵⁹ Sears, M. A. 2020. "Brasidas and the Un-Spartan Spartan," *Classical Journal* 116.2, 173-198

[Derkyllidas]

*“Derkyllidas, when Pyrrhos had his army near Sparta, was sent to him as ambassador; and when Pyrrhos stated that they must receive their king Kleonymos, or they would find out that they were no braver than any of the rest, Derkyllidas interrupted to say, ‘If this man is a god, we do not fear him, for we are guilty of no wrong – but if he is a man, he is surely not superior to us.’”*¹⁶⁰

Brasidas is arguably the most well-described non-royal Spartan in the surviving sources. Our second example, Derkyllidas, may not be the next best recorded, but he follows very closely in Brasidas’ mould. Not quite as outspoken or outwardly charismatic as his predecessor, Derkyllidas demonstrated a comparable gravitas and success rate, making him an excellent second subject to analyze.

Derkyllidas’ first appearance is in Thucydides, at the tail end of the work. It is a brief appearance, but it marks the beginning of a pattern for his operations – perhaps most significantly, his affinity for operating in the Near East.

“In the following summer, as soon as spring began, Derkyllidas, a Spartiate, was sent by land with no small army along the coast to the Hellespont to cause the revolt of Abydos (the people are colonists of Miletos), and the Chians, during the time Astyochos was still at Rhodes ...

*Immediately after this, when Derkyllidas had completed his march from Miletos, Abydos on the Hellespont revolted and went over to Derkyllidas and Pharnabazos, as did Lampsakos two days later.”*¹⁶¹

Hearing of the defection, an Athenian general rushed to attempt to take the *poleis* back over. Derkyllidas’ hold was very strong, however, and neither city submitted. This will not be the last we hear of Derkyllidas’ relationship with Abydos, specifically.

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¹⁶⁰ Plutarch *Moralia: Apophthegmata Laconia*, “Derkyllidas”, transl. F. C. Babbitt (1931)

¹⁶¹ Thucydides *History*, 8.61-62, transl. S. Lattimore (1998)

The bulk of Derkylidas' appearance features in Books 3 and 4 of Xenophon's *Hellenika*. He appears first within the *Hellenika* as a replacement for Thibron, a general who was performing exceptionally poorly. As soon as we have been introduced to him, his operational cunning and strategic aim at breaking adversary cohesion are made apparent.

“While Thibron was in Ephesus planning his march into Caria, the man who was to succeed him as commander, Derkylidas, arrived; Derkylidas had such a reputation for shrewdness that his nickname was ‘Sisyphus’ [ἀνὴρ δοκῶν εἶναι μάλα μηχανητικός · καὶ ἐπεκαλεῖτο δὲ Σίσυφος]. ... As for Derkylidas, when he took over the army, he realized that Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos viewed each other with suspicion, so after conferring with Tissaphernes, he led his army into the territory of Pharnabazos, choosing to fight one rather than both of them at the same time. Now even before this, Derkylidas was hostile to Pharnabazos and punished by being made to stand holding his shield, which is considered a grave dishonour by Spartans of quality, since it is normally inflicted on those who fail to maintain formation. This former insult made Derkylidas all the happier to invade the territory of Pharnabazos. And even at the very outset he differed greatly in his command from Thibron in that he did not allow his army to harm his allies as it marched through friendly territory up to Aeolis, an area controlled by Pharnabazos [καὶ εὐθὺς μὲν τοσούτῳ διέφερεν εἰς τὸ ἄρχειν τοῦ Θίβρωνος ὥστε παρήγαγε τὸ στράτευμα διὰ τῆς φιλίας χώρας μέχρι τῆς Φαρναβάζου Αἰολίδος οὐδὲν βλάψας τοὺς συμμάχους].”¹⁶²

In this, Derkylidas was displaying his use of what the CAF would recognize as the Principles of War, in this case Selection and Maintenance of Aim, Security, Economy of Effort, Flexibility, and Cooperation. As we know from his brief appearance in Thucydides, Derkylidas clearly had some pre-established networks in the Near East and used them to effect a smooth transition into power and ease the establishment of his own AO. Of interest here is the way Xenophon draws explicit attention to Derkylidas' attention to JIMP, PMESII and CIMIC concerns – particularly the desire not to make his army a burden on his allies.

¹⁶² Xenophon *Hellenika*, 3.1.8-10, transl. J. Marincola (2009)

Where Thibron had puttered around at his leisure, Derkylidas wasted no time in consolidating a secure AO and A of I, possibly utilizing his existing networks and reputation to avoid having to coerce or assault prospective allies, opting instead for DDR.

“It was at this moment that Derkylidas arrived, and immediately, in just one day [ἐν μιᾷ ἡμέρᾳ], the coastal cities of Larisa, Hamaxitos, and Kolonai all came over to him of their own accord [τὰς ἐπιθαλαππίους πόλεις ἐκούσας παρέλαβε]. He also sent word to the cities of Aeolis and asked them to free themselves and to receive him within their walls, becoming allies of the Spartans. The citizens of Neandria, Ilion, and Kokylion obeyed him, since the Greek garrisons in these towns had been treated very badly after the death of Mania.”¹⁶³

The commander in control of the city of Kebren, seeking reward for his loyalty to Pharnabazos, initially refused Derkylidas. Once the sacrifices were favourable, Derkylidas mounted an assault on the city but was let in without a fight by the citizens. Once he had taken Kebren, he moved on to Skepsis and Gergis¹⁶⁴. It should be noted that this is a very pure example of CIMIC – the citizenry of this *polis*, independent of the desires of their acting government, cooperated with Derkylidas of their own volition.

Like the people of Kebren, the citizens of Skepsis and Gergis were keen to accept Derkylidas’ influence against the will of their leading men. His similarity in situation and temperament to Brasidas emerges prominently in his discussion with Meidias.

“In conversation with Derkylidas, [Meidias] asked him on what conditions he might become an ally, and Derkylidas said on the condition that he allow the citizens under his control to be free and autonomous. ... Meidias, knowing that he could not now rely upon his citizens to help him prevent Derkylidas’ advance [ὅτι οὐκ ἂν δύναίτο κωλύειν βίᾳ τῶν πολιτῶν], allowed him to enter [Skepsis]. ... [Derkylidas] handed over the city to the citizens, and he exhorted them to conduct its affairs in a manner consistent with being Greeks and free men. He then departed and led his army toward Gergis

¹⁶³ Xenophon *Hellenika*, 3.1.16, transl. J. Marincola (2009)

¹⁶⁴ Xenophon *Hellenika*, 3.1.19

as many of the people of Skepsis accompanied him along the way, honouring him and expressing their delight at what he had done [συμπρούπεμπον δὲ πολλοὶ αὐτὸν καὶ τῶν Σκηψίων, τιμῶντές τε καὶ ἡδόμενοι τοῖς πεπραγμένοις].

...

And as [Derkylidas] said this he was moving toward the gates of Gergis with Meidias in tow, and the army followed peacefully, with the men walking two by two [καὶ τὸ στράτευμα ἡκολούθει αὐτῷ εἰρηνικῶς εἰς δύο]. Those who were on the lookout from the towers (which were quite high) hurled no missiles when they saw that Meidias was with Derkylidas. ... Meidias hesitated to have the gates opened, fearing that he would be immediately taken prisoner, but he nevertheless gave the order to open them. When Derkylidas entered, he went straight to the acropolis, keeping Meidias in tow. He ordered the rest of his soldiers to take positions around the walls, and he himself with the men around him sacrificed to Athena. When that was done, he ordered the bodyguards of Meidias to ground their arms in front of his own army because, he said, they would now be his mercenaries and Meidias did not need to be afraid any longer.”¹⁶⁵

As with Brasidas' mercy to Torone despite their initial obstinacy, Derkylidas was kind and generous to Meidias despite his alliance with Pharnabazos. In Derkylidas' custody, Meidias was ultimately sent back to return to his family estate in Skepsis without penalty or harm. It is clear, though not explicit, that Derkylidas was familiar with the PMESII conditions of the region and very interested in taking advantage of CIMIC to capitalize on Security, Economy of Effort, and Cooperation.

Along with his CIMIC and PMESII concerns, he also evidently worked within something akin to the JIMP framework as well. His primary concern, once he had an established an A of I in Ionia, was to cement Principle 5 (Security).

“After Derkylidas had made these arrangements and had captured nine cities in eight days, he considered how he could pass the winter in friendly territory without his army becoming a burden to his allies (as the troops under

¹⁶⁵ Xenophon *Hellenika*, 3.1.20-23, transl. J. Maricola (2009)

Thibron had been), and also how he might keep Pharnabazos from feeling superior enough to harm the Greek cities with his cavalry. So he sent a message to Pharnabazos and asked him whether he wanted peace or war. Pharnabazos was worried that the fortification of Aeolis was done to attack his own homeland, Phrygia, and so he chose to make a truce. After this, Derkylidas went to Bithynian Thrace, where he wintered and this choice of location did not at all displease Pharnabazos, since the Bithynians had often gone to war against him.”¹⁶⁶

Security, as a Principle, is largely about maintaining autonomy and movement as opposed to establishing defenses or entrenching oneself at a given location. In fact, defensive posture is intended to be a last resort, with entrenchment or sieging being undesirable strategies. Freedom to move and respond is paramount to synchronization, which results in effective operations. As Kleon demonstrated at Amphipolis, being forced to *react* as opposed to *act* is a massive tactical and operational detriment. Despite being the defending party, Brasidas retained the initiative and utilized it to devastating effect. Like Brasidas’ opportunism, Derkylidas’ ability to seemingly always take up the initiative is a hallmark of his strategy.

Wintering in Bithynian Thrace was a successful endeavour for both Derkylidas and his forces. Derkylidas’ quiet competency paid off handsomely for him via extended commission.

“When spring came, Derkylidas marched from Bithynian Thrace to Lampsacus. While he was there, the Spartan government sent three commissioners from home, Arakos, Naubates and Antisthenes, whose orders were to examine the situation in Asia in general, and specifically to tell Derkylidas to remain in office and retain his command for the coming year [καὶ Δερκυλίδᾳ ἐροῦντες μένοντι ἄρχειν καὶ τὸν ἐπιόντα ἐνιαυτόν]. They had also been ordered by the ephors to address the soldiers and tell them that the ephors condemned their previous conduct but praised their recent behaviour, since they no longer acted unjustly. If, then, in the future the soldiers acted unjustly, the ephors would not tolerate it, but if they behaved with justice toward their allies, they would commend them. Yet when the commissioners said these things to the soldiers in assembly, the leader of the men who had

¹⁶⁶ Xenophon *Hellenika*, 3.2.1-2

*fought under Cyrus said, ‘See here, Spartans, we are the same men now as we were last year. But there is a different commander now from the one we had before. You yourselves, therefore, can figure out quite easily why we do not now act unjustly, whereas back then we did [ἀλλ’, ὦ ἄνδρες Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἡμεῖς μὲν ἔσμεν οἱ αὐτοὶ νῦν τε καὶ πέρυσιν · ἄρχων δὲ ἄλλος μὲν νῦν, ἄλλος δὲ τὸ παρελθόν. τὸ οὖν αἴτιον τοῦ νῦν μὲν μὴ ἐξαμαρτάνειν, τότε δέ, αὐτοὶ ἤδη ἱκανοὶ ἔστε γινώσκειν].’*¹⁶⁷

In CAF doctrine, the failure of a unit is a failure of its command. The BG that had been stationed under Thibron was not an ineffective force unto itself. Instead, its capability had been handicapped by a poor commander without the will or respect necessary to make good use of them. This is succinctly demonstrated by how impressive they proved to be under Derkylidas’ authority.

While the commissioners remained in camp with him, Arakos mentioned that the Chersonese was being raided by Thracians and that the Spartan government was considering building fortifications along the isthmus to defend their allies there. Derkylidas’ initial motivation for pre-emptively undertaking this task was likely selfish in nature, attempting to win recognition by taking the lead on a major infrastructure project. However, that personal consideration is not mutually exclusive of supporting Sparta’s wider aims and providing relief to Spartan allies.

“Derkylidas listened to them but did not reveal his own idea. Instead, he sent the commissioners off to Ephesus via the Greek cities, delighted that they were going to see the cities in a state of peace and prosperity. So they set out, and Derkylidas, knowing now that he would remain in command, again sent to Pharnabazos and asked him whether he wanted war or truce, such as had been in force during the winter. Pharnabazos again chose a truce, and so Derkylidas left Pharnabazos’ cities in peace and crossed over the Hellespont with his army into Europe. He travelled through that part of Thrace with which he had established friendly relations [καὶ διὰ φιλίας τῆς Θράκης πορευθεὶς], was hosted by Seuthes, and finally reached the Chersonese. He

¹⁶⁷ Xenophon *Hellenika*, 3.2.6-7, transl. J. Marincola (2009)

learned that there were eleven or twelve cities there, and that the land was excellent and extremely fertile, but that it had been laid waste by the Thracians, just as he had been told. When he found that the isthmus was only thirty-seven stades wide, he did not delay but sacrificed and immediately began to build the wall [οὐκ ἐμέλλησεν, ἀλλὰ θυσάμενος ἐτείχιζε] ...

Having built this wall, Derkylidas crossed back again to Asia. Reviewing the state of the cities there, he found that all were doing well [ἐπισκοπῶν δὲ τὰς πόλεις ἑώρα τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καλῶς ἐχούσας] but that there were exiles from Chois who had seized Atarneus, a fortified city. ... Learning that there was a great deal of grain within Atarneum Derkylidas made camp there and began to lay siege to the city. He brought it to terms in eight months [καὶ ἐν ὀκτῶ μηνὶ παραστησάμενος αὐτούς] and set Drakon of Pellene in charge of affairs there.”¹⁶⁸

Once again, he was applying multiple Principles at once, the predominant ones here being Selection and Maintenance of the Aim, Security, Flexibility, Cooperation, and Administration. It is also likely that such PMESII work fostered local CIMIC and deepened political and intelligence relationships, furthering his ability to *Shield* and *Sustain* (CSASS).

Throughout all of this time, Derkylidas and Tissaphernes had maintained an easy and amicable relationship. That alliance, however, had been predicated on Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos being hostile to each other. While Pharnabazos’ jealousy had not abated, they began the process of discussing and resolving their issues. Once Derkylidas learned of this meeting, however, his early worries about having to take on both men’s armies returned and he crossed back over the Maeander to defend his primary AO. He was correct to worry. Once they made it into Ionia, they nearly ran headlong into encamped Persian forces. While most of his army prepared themselves for battle, troops from Priene, Achilleion, the islands, and the Ionian cities abandoned the BG. However, this did not dissuade Derkylidas. ISTAR

¹⁶⁸ Xenophon *Hellenika*, 3.2.9-11, transl. J. Marincola (2009)

intelligence had reported that the two Persian leaders were still at odds. He pounced, exploiting their incomplete cohesion.

“It was reported [ἐξηγγέλλετο] to Derkylidas that counsel among the Persians was divided, Pharnabazos wishing to attack but Tissaphernes refusing to give the order, for he remembered how the Greek army of Cyrus’ supporters had fought with and defeated the Persians, and he believed that all Greek forces were similar to those. Instead, he sent a message to Derkylidas that he wished to have a conference with him. Derkylidas, taking the best-looking infantry and cavalry he had, went forward toward the messengers and said to them, ‘Well, now, as you can see, I was planning to fight, but since Tissaphernes wishes to confer, I will not oppose him in this. If we parley, however, we must exchange pledges and hostages.’ ...

On the next day, they met at an agreed-upon place, and they decided to learn from each other what each side might accept as terms for peace. Derkylidas demanded that the King allow the Greek cities to be autonomous, and Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos said they could accept this if the Greek army were to leave their territory and the Spartan harmosts were removed from the cities. After this discussion they made a truce with each other until the proposals could be reported back to Sparta by Derkylidas and to the King by Tissaphernes.”¹⁶⁹

Derkylidas thus managed to successfully dodge open conflict and open negotiation, driving a wedge further between the two Persian satraps. Once again, Derkylidas’ initiative and cunning allowed him to slip out of combat he otherwise likely would have lost and preserve his forces.

It would take nearly a year, but the truce would come to be. Indeed, Derkylidas was present as a commissioner when King Agesilaos agreed to the armistice presented by Tissaphernes on behalf of the Persian King¹⁷⁰. For Derkylidas, this was proof that his efforts

¹⁶⁹ Xenophon *Hellenika*, 3.2.18-20, transl. J. Marincola (2009)

¹⁷⁰ Xenophon *Hellenika*, 3.4.6

had borne fruit and underlined his ability as a worthy commander and an effective diplomat. Tissaphernes' immediate betrayal of the truce would result in his eventual execution.

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After the failed truce with Tissaphernes, Derkylidas disappears from the narrative until Book 4. His appearances within this book are significantly more brief but still illustrate his capability as a commander and political agent. Ironically, he surfaces in the narrative at Amphipolis, having just overseen a successful battle.

“When [Agesilaos] had reached Amphipolis, however, Derkylidas met him there and reported that the Spartans had gained a victory, and that while only eight of the Spartans had died, the enemy had lost a very great number. He also revealed that losses among the Spartan allies had been substantial. Agesilaos asked Derkylidas, ‘Would this be the right time for those cities that have contributed soldiers to our campaign to lean as quickly as possible of our victory?’

Derkylidas replied, ‘Yes, for when they hear of this, it is likely that they will be even more enthusiastic.’

‘Wouldn’t you be the best person to announce this to them, since you yourself were present at the battle?’

To which Derkylidas, who was delighted to hear this, since he was always fond of travel, replied, ‘I would, if you order me to do so.’

‘Well, then, I give the order, and I command this besides: that you announce to them that if our Spartan affairs come out favourably, we shall be together again, just as we said.’

*So Derkylidas set out for the Hellespont.”*¹⁷¹

Unlike Brasidas, we have not seen Derkylidas lose any battle he’s been present for. He was as successful in Brasidas’ domain as he had been further East. It is unclear what relationship Derkylidas had with the Near East that might explain how he found continuous victory

¹⁷¹ Xenophon *Hellenika*, 4.3.1-3, transl. J. Marincola (2009)

there. However, I find his presence at Agesilaos' side concerning matters in the Near East (the above quotation and dealing with Tissaphernes) to be conspicuous.

While Xenophon never specifically tells us what happened to Derkylidas in the interim from his departure at Amphipolis to his reappearance here at Abydos, he seems to have been appointed harmost of the *polis* and built up a significant amount of CIMIC and personal goodwill within the local population. For all that Derkylidas and Pharnabazos had managed to deal with their animosity in a professional manner in years prior, Pharnabazos opted to let the grudge rule him while he was riding the high of a naval victory. Once again, Derkylidas managed to thwart him.

*"[Pharnabazos went back to his own lands] because Derkylidas, who from long ago had been his enemy, happened to be in Abydos when the naval battle was fought, but unlike the other harmosts, Derkylidas did not withdraw from his city and instead kept control of Abydos and preserved it as an ally of the Spartans."*¹⁷²

Derkylidas delivered an empowering speech, exciting the local populace to its own defense.

*"When they heard this, the people of Abydos obeyed him, not grudgingly but enthusiastically [προθύμως ἐπέισθησαν]. They received in a friendly manner the harmosts who had come to Abydos and sent for those who were not there. When many experienced men were gathered together in the city, Derkylidas crossed over into Sestos (which is opposite Abydos and not more than eight stades distant) and brought together all those who held land in the Chersonese through the agency of the Spartans, and he also received all the harmosts of the European cities who had fled in exile. He told these men that they should not lose heart, knowing that even in Asia, which from the small city of Temnos and other places where they could live and not be subject to the King. ... By talking to them in this and similar ways, he prevented them from being overly frightened."*¹⁷³

¹⁷² Xenophon *Hellenika*, 4.8.3, transl. J. Marincola (2009)

¹⁷³ Xenophon *Hellenika*, 4.8.5, transl. J. Marincola (2009)

Derkylidas is only a harmost here, and there is no mention of a posted garrison for him to call upon in the event of an attack. None of the other harmosts stood their ground, instead retreating to his city for protection. It speaks to the depth of his CIMIC connections that he could rally the *polis* to its own defense under such duress and draw the other harmosts into fighting with him. He may not have been as bombastic a character as Brasidas, but he was no less persuasive, amiable, or committed to his cause.

The last time we see Derkylidas is in a brief mention during another Spartiate's power-jockeying. With Sparta's new alliance with Pharnabazos and Athens stirring up trouble around the Aegean, Derkylidas slips as inconspicuously from Xenophon's narrative as he entered that of Thucydides.

*"Although they did not find fault at all with Derkylidas [τῷ μὲν οὖν Δερκυλίδᾳ οὐδὲν ἐμέμφοντο], they sent out Anaxibios – who was friends with the ephors and who had arranged that just this thing should happen – to serve as governor at Abydos."*¹⁷⁴

Of particular note here is the fact that Derkylidas' replacement had nothing to do with him or his performance. Indeed, Derkylidas was perfectly satisfactory and competent in his role. It is unclear why Anaxibios felt the need to unseat Derkylidas specifically and not any number of the other harmosts posted nearby. Abydos does not seem to have been of any exceptional strategic value, nor grand in any real capacity (unlike the posting of Byzantium, for instance). It may be the case that Derkylidas' CIMIC networks and success record were exactly why he needed to be removed for Anaxibios to flourish – he was a well-established and well-loved general who had rightly earned the favour he was shown. His last brush with

¹⁷⁴ Xenophon *Hellenika*, 4.8.32, transl. J. Marincola (2009)

Pharnabazos proved that he was someone others deferred to, even in his unofficial capacity, and he had the will and presence to solidify morale and ensure cohesion. Anaxibios may have felt Derkylidas' influence would have stifled him and prevented him from making his own name.

|||·|||

Xenophon, who had known him personally, does not tell us what ultimately happened to Derkylidas. Should something scandalous have occurred in later life, Xenophon likely would have reported it. He was not one to pull punches in his history simply because someone was his friend (in the *Hellenika* and *Anabasis*, at least). It is possible that Derkylidas' death occurred after the publication of the *Hellenika*. Regardless, he left behind a remarkable legacy of understated success.

[*Kaloi Kagathoi*]

Much about Derkylidas echoes Brasidas, but in a quieter, tamer fashion. His ambition was not as evident as Brasidas' had been, veiled by duty and his mild temperament. He also seems more calculating than Brasidas, playing the satraps off each other and refusing to be goaded into conflict with Pharnabazos despite their animosity. He was manipulative where Brasidas was conciliatory but both were excellent diplomats. His decisions and actions were, like Brasidas', executed in service to Sparta's broader goals, but he worked more to secure rather than establish Sparta's foothold in Ionia. He was careful to be gracious to new allies and accommodating to existing ones, making manageable promises and keeping them.

Where Brasidas' speech was bombastic and charismatic, Derkylidas was shrewd and resolute.

Yet, despite these marked differences in the way they presented themselves, they both exhibit the same qualities that make a man a leader. They were both reasonable, proficient and judicious men capable of exercising firm but fair control over themselves, their troops, and their allies. They were cooperative, astute, modest, respectful, attentive, proactive, thoughtful and deliberate. For all their differences, their attitude toward command appears fundamentally similar. The existence of this similarity – coupled with matching fruitful careers – suggests these attributes had a significant impact on their ability to be successful. However, once may be chance and twice only coincidence. In the following chapter, I will provide examples three and four to prove my pattern. Then, we shall turn our gaze to another four to see what becomes of generals who fail to attain or retain such crucial qualities.


Chapter 3: Success and Failure

In an annotation within his translation of Thucydides' *History*, Lattimore states, "[Brasidas] succeeds by what Thucydides stresses are un-Spartan qualities: initiative, boldness, personal charm and speaking ability."¹⁷⁵ Yet, if one were to look through the literary record, one would find that Brasidas is not the first Spartiate to possess such qualities¹⁷⁶. As we explored in the last chapter, the career of Derkylidas displays considerable parallels to Brasidas' – parallels too significant to be mere coincidence. The likeness of the central characteristics of their personalities and the core tenets of their leadership styles is incredibly close. Even the trajectories of their careers have a resemblance to each other. Indeed, neither man is said to have been reprimanded or punished for their choices and both are explicitly reported to have been praised for their actions. They are not recorded to have ever been charged, fined, imprisoned, exiled, or removed from command as punishment at any point. Considering that Brasidas and Derkylidas' careers are nearly two decades apart, it is reasonable to suggest that their common attributes and attitudes were desired and selected for.

In the following chapter, I will demonstrate how those who adhered to the example set by Brasidas and Derkylidas flourished, while those who did not were penalized for their failure.

¹⁷⁵ Thucydides *History*, ed. and transl. S. Lattimore (1998), pg. 187-188 | This excerpt was taken from Lattimore's prelude to book 4.

¹⁷⁶ Herodotos *Histories*, 8.59-64 | The very first non-royal Spartan within the literary record – Eurybiadas, the admiral in charge at the battles of Artemisium and Salamis in Herodotos' *Histories* – is notably a calm presence and a commanding speaker. At Salamis, he went against the suggestion of his countrymen and Sparta's closest ally (the Corinthian admiral Adeimantos) to side with the riskier plan of Themistocles. It was not Themistocles that convinced the Greek Alliance to fight at Salamis – it was Eurybiadas.



The predominant factors that appear most often to yield success are leadership, charisma, amicability, opportunism, cunning, stealth, resourcefulness, thoughtfulness, cooperation, confidence, and discretion. It was necessary that these traits be checked by obeisance to the state, humility, accountability, prudence, pragmatism, finesse, and tact. They can be seen to have operated under frameworks recognizable to the CAF as the Ten Principles of War, the OODA loop, and CSASS, with CIMIC, JIMP, ISTAR and PMESII concerns top of mind. Choosing strategies and tactics that seek not only to accomplish the given task, but also incorporate the advancement of the broader goals of the state (even at the risk of one's personal recognition), is vital.

Brasidas and Derkylidas had already demonstrated that the exercise of these characteristics and judicious applications of these frameworks not only prevented defeat, but built trust and confidence, strengthened alliances, and – most importantly – yielded victory.

[Klearidas]

“Leadership is self-perpetuating – at least, it should be. This means that you, as a leader, have a solemn responsibility to develop leadership ability in your subordinates. Remember that all of them sooner or later will have to lead others. The best way for you to teach them, of course, is by example, hopefully a good example.”¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁷ Gn. Dextraze 1973

Klearidas is best known for being Brasidas' successor after he perished at Amphipolis. Often, any examination that touches on him does so only in relation to Brasidas, relegating him to his predecessor's shadow. Even Thucydides' own narrative treats him as such, turning nearly all attention away from the ongoing fight for Thrace once Brasidas is dead. Klearidas does not feature much within the text, but despite the brevity, his appearance is notable.

Klearidas first appears at the tail end of Book 4, where he is arriving as part of a supporting complement sent from Sparta following Perdikkas' estrangement from Brasidas.

“Just then, as it happened, the Lakedaimonian Ischagoras was about to lead an army to Brasidas on foot, and Perdikkas [...] blocked the army at the preparation stage, so that there was not even an approach to the Thessalians. Ischagoras himself, however, along with Ameinias and Aristeus reached Brasidas since the Lakedaimonians had sent him to inspect the situation, and in violation of all agreements they brought him some of the young men from Sparta to appoint as governors in the cities instead of leaving this to those on hand. And [Brasidas] appointed Klearidas son of Kleonymos at Amphipolis and Pasitelidas son of Hegesandros at Torone.”¹⁷⁸

Klearidas, despite being one of the junior men in attendance, is the most important character amongst those who arrived here. Ischagoras, Ameinias and Aristeus do not feature in the subsequent fires and Pasitelidas was unable to keep his AO secure. Pasitelidas attempted to resist Kleon's landing forces but failed to repel the invasion and, thinking that retreating to the city would preserve himself and his forces, abandoned his post. Ultimately, his cowardice resulted in his capture and subsequent disappearance from the narrative¹⁷⁹. While Klearidas certainly benefitted from not being in command of Kleon's initial landing site or the target of the opening fire, Pasitelidas stands as an immediate negative comparison.

¹⁷⁸ Thucydides *History*, 4.132, transl. S. Lattimore (1998)

¹⁷⁹ Thucydides *History*, 5.3

Again, of all the other Spartans who had come to reinforce Brasidas, Klearidas is the one he trusts to help him pull off his plan to drive off the Athenians.

*“Brasidas took up his position at Kerdyllion with fifteen hundred of [two thousand soldiers], while the rest were stationed in Amphipolis with Klearidas. ... [Returning from Kerdyllion, Brasidas] accordingly selected one hundred and fifty hoplites for himself and assigned the rest to Klearidas, wanting to make a sudden attack before the Athenians moved away, since he thought he would not catch them by themselves again if they ever got reinforcements.”*¹⁸⁰

Klearidas also features in Brasidas’ speech prior to their assault on Kleon’s forces.

*“... and then you, Klearidas, after you see me pressing them hard and in all probability causing a panic, take your own men, open the gates all of a sudden, run out, hurry to engage them as quickly as possible. This is our best hope of causing them to panic, for a contingent attacking later is more terrifying to the enemy than the one in action on the field. And show your own courage, as you should, being a Spartiate, and you allies follow him bravely too ...”*¹⁸¹

Klearidas followed Brasidas’ orders in spite of significant enemy pushback. The plan was a success, and in the aftermath he setup a trophy¹⁸².

Following Brasidas’ burial, Klearidas took over the campaign in Thrace and continued to operate it in much the same manner as Brasidas had conducted it.

*“After they received their dead, [the Athenians] sailed home, and those with Klearidas organized matters around Amphipolis [οἱ δὲ μετὰ τοῦ Κλεαρίδου τὰ περὶ τὴν Ἀμφίπολιν καθίσταντο].”*¹⁸³

As part of his efforts to *Shield and Sustain* (CSASS) the newly liberated region, he rewarded the CIMIC of the people of Amphipolis with economic and infrastructure reinforcement and recovery (PMESII). Even though these efforts would ultimately be undermined by Sparta’s

¹⁸⁰ Thucydides *History*, 5.6-8, transl. S. Lattimore (1998)

¹⁸¹ Thucydides *History*, 5.9, transl. S. Lattimore (1998)

¹⁸² Thucydides *History*, 5.10

¹⁸³ Thucydides *History*, 5.11, transl. S. Lattimore (1998)

pursuit of armistice, Klearidas' commitment to the people who had aided Spartan forces was emphatic.

“[In order to comply with the treaty, the Lakedaimonians] ordered Klearidas to hand over Amphipolis to the Athenians and the others to observe the treaty as it applied to each of them. They were unwilling, since they did not think the terms were to their advantage; and Klearidas, showing favour to the Chalkidians, did not hand over the city but said that he had no power to hand it over against the will of the Amphipolitians [οὐδὲ ὁ Κλεαρίδας παρέδωκε τὴν πόλιν, χαριζόμενος τοῖς Χαλκιδεῦσι, λέγων ὡς οὐ δυνατὸς εἶη βίᾳ ἐκείνων παραδιδόναι]. With envoys from the region, he hurried to Lakedaimon to defend himself if Ischagoras and his associates blamed him for not complying, also because he wanted to know whether the agreement was still flexible, and when he learned that they were committed he hurried on his way back, since the Lakedaimonians sent him with instructions to hand over the place if at all possible, but otherwise to bring out any Peloponnesians who were there.”¹⁸⁴

Ultimately loyal to his state, Klearidas still did his best to adhere to the alliance groundwork that Brasidas had built and tried to fulfil the promises made to Amphipolis.

Klearidas upon his arrival, it is pointed out, was still quite young [τῶν ἡβώντων αὐτῶν]¹⁸⁵, which makes his resistance even more noteworthy. Ischagoras was the senior-most commander in Thrace once Brasidas was dead, but it was Klearidas who took up Brasidas' role instead. Klearidas' skill as a commander is demonstrated not only in successfully carrying out Brasidas' orders during the fire, but when he took pains to defend and cement the results of the campaign. It is unclear if Klearidas had a successful career prior to Thrace and what came of him afterwards, since he disappears entirely from the

¹⁸⁴ Thucydides *History*, 5. 21, transl. S. Lattimore (1998)

¹⁸⁵ Thucydides *History*, 4.132.3

record. What is clear, however, is that he had the makings of a great commander, very much in line with his predecessor.

[Cheirisophos]

“The guiding principle for commanders is that accomplishment of the mission is paramount over all other considerations. After this comes the reputation and benefit of the regiment or service, and then the benefit of the subordinates. But in certain extreme operational situations, it will become obvious to the commander that in no way is the mission achievable. In these situations, the commander has a difficult choice to make. Preservation of the force, while still doing what can be done for the mission, becomes the key consideration. If faced with an honourable enemy, surrender is possible. In other cases, some form of withdrawal or holding until relieved may be the best course of action, all the while looking to sustain or create conditions to allow another force to assume the mission.”¹⁸⁶

Excluding Agesilaos, Cheirisophos is arguably the best described Spartan within Xenophon’s corpus. Over the months they led the Ten Thousand, the two became close. Cheirisophos was Xenophon’s co-commander, companion, and friend through most of the events of the *Anabasis*. As such, intimate moments of stress, nerves, courage, and fidelity are recorded for him in a manner that they typically are not. On Xenophon’s part, it may have meant even more to have captured them on paper since the two men would separate and tragically never get the chance to reunite.

He may, like Klearidas, seem like a strange choice to round out this list of positive examples. He was, after all, not the original Spartan commander of the Ten Thousand. Similarly to Klearidas, he was not commissioned but inherited the role from his dead superior. Unlike in the case of Klearidas, this expedition was panhellenic, mercenary, and

¹⁸⁶ C:TOF 29, 37, footnote 22

not one undertaken in service to Sparta. However, his command still demonstrates the positive attributes and successful strategies, tactics, and methodologies exhibited in the prior examples.



Cheirisophos is present throughout Books 1¹⁸⁷ through 6 but only takes up a dominant role in the narrative after the death of Klearchos. We first hear directly from him in Book 3, when the remaining Greek captains are assembled and discussing what they should do following Tissaphernes' betrayal. At this point in the narrative, it was now January of 400 and the Ten Thousand were roughly fifty kilometres north-east of the Tigris, following the Zapatas River to a fording where they would cross and head west-south-west toward Larisa/Nimrud¹⁸⁸. They were in Media, deep within Persian territory, and perhaps a hundred and fifty kilometres west of the Zagros Mountains. It was here, in the wake of the execution of nearly all their senior command staff, that the Greek captains held their council. In response to Xenophon's speech about the necessity of choosing replacement leadership quickly, Cheirisophos spoke up in agreement, all but ordering the captains to return to their troops and appoint a commander from within their ranks.

*“No sooner had [Cheirisophos] said this than he stood up, so that there should be no delay and they would carry out what was necessary.”*¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁷ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 1.4.3, 2.1.5, 2.5.37 | His only mention in Book 1 is his arrival (though Xenophon does not say if his arrival signalled Sparta's support of Cyrus), and in Book 2 he is only mentioned off-handedly. It is clear early on, however, that he was hands-on and extremely lucky, since in 2.5.37, he was out foraging with some of his troops when Klearchos was gathering captains to unknowingly accompany him to their deaths.

¹⁸⁸ *The Landmark Xenophon's Anabasis*, 68 | The route of the Ten Thousand up to this point is taken from Map 2.4.27, supplied by the editorial team.

¹⁸⁹ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 3.1.47, transl. D. Thomas (2021) | Gr: καὶ ἅμα ταῦτ' εἰπὼν ἀνέστη, ὥς μὴ μέλλοιτο ἀλλὰ περαίνετο τὰ δέοντα.

Cheirisophos evidently already wielded a significant amount of authority and respect¹⁹⁰.

Once they reconvened, it was Cheirisophos who spoke first, delivering a short, candid, yet poignant speech to rally the men.

*“Brave soldiers, the current situation is difficult, now that we have been deprived of such men as generals and captains and soldiers; and in addition to that, Ariaaios’ people, who were previously allies, have now betrayed us. All the same, it’s necessary to prove ourselves good men in the present circumstances: not to give way, but instead to try and save ourselves by a noble victory if we can; and if we cannot, at least to die nobly, never letting ourselves fall alive into the hands of the enemy [ὁμῶς δὲ δεῖ ἐκ τῶν παρόντων ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς τελέθειν καὶ μὴ ὑφίεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πειρᾶσθαι ὅπως, ἣν μὲν δυνώμεθα, καλῶς νικῶντες σωζώμεθα · εἰ δὲ μή, ἀλλὰ καλῶς γε ἀποθνήσκωμεν, ὑποχείριοι δὲ μηδέποτε γενώμεθα ζῶντες τοῖς πολεμίοις]. For I think that we would then suffer what I pray that the gods may inflict on those we hate.”*¹⁹¹

Following after him, Xenophon details a strategy to return to Greece without attempting any further negotiation with the Persians. Cheirisophos, who seems to have had *de facto* authority to preside over their discussions, put Xenophon’s proposal up for a vote. Once they voted in favour of the plan, Xenophon further proposed Cheirisophos act as their leading commander, guiding from the front while Xenophon took over the rearguard¹⁹². This, too, was voted in. Shortly after, one of Cyrus’ other Persian friends, Mithridates, appeared and attempted to join forces.

“The generals discussed this and decided to give this answer, which was delivered by Cheirisophos: ‘What we think right, if a certain person allows us

¹⁹⁰ *Command* (1996), 13: “Subordinates will not have confidence in a commander unless he is a master of his profession. [...] In addition to formal education and training, a commander’s knowledge is determined by experience and by personal study of his profession.”

¹⁹¹ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 3.2.1-3, transl. D. Thomas (2021)/transl. W. Ambler (2008). This speech in particular echoes the sentiments and considerations detailed in the introductory quote. Indeed, as *Command* (1996), 18 notes: “A commander inspires his subordinates through the combination of clarity of thought, articulate speech and comprehension of the situation.”

¹⁹² Xenophon *Anabasis*, 3.2.37, transl. D. Thomas (2021): “... ‘Now if anyone sees any better plan, let’s do it differently; but if not, Cheirisophos could take the lead, especially since he’s Lakedaimonian’ ...”

*to go home, is to make our way through the country doing the least damage possible [ἡμῖν δοκεῖ, εἰ μὲν τις ἐᾷ ἡμᾶς ἀπιέναι οἴκαδε, διαπορεύεσθαι τὴν χώραν ὥς ἂν δυνώμεθα ἀσινέστατα]; but if anyone should block us from our route, we will fight it out with that person, using the utmost strength we can.”*¹⁹³

Mithridates attempted to persuade them to treat with the King again, but recce reported a kinsman of Tissaphernes amongst his entourage and he was refused further communication.

The following morning, the Ten Thousand crossed the Zapatas River with their baggage train and light troops enclosed within their ranks for protection. Mithridates approached once more, feigning friendship, then attacked the rearguard. Xenophon made the decision to give chase, but the Persian troops were lightly armoured and equipped with ranged weapons, reinforced by cavalry, and thus the Greek pursuit accomplished nothing. Cheirisophos confronted Xenophon on his call¹⁹⁴, since it had left the rear open to attack or harrying by the Persian cavalry. Xenophon admitted to this, but offered up his justification and a solution to their cavalry deficiency. It seems that Cheirisophos took this well, and his solution was adopted¹⁹⁵. Some four days later, they once again met the Tigris at the abandoned city of Larisa. For roughly the next week and a half, they were harried by Persian missiles and cavalry. One evening, they managed to pull up camp overnight and get far enough away for some breathing room¹⁹⁶.

¹⁹³ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 3.3.3, transl. D. Thomas (2021); Gr: βουλευομένοις τοῖς στρατηγοῖς ἔδοξεν ἀποκρίνασθαι τάδε · καὶ ἔλεγε Χειρίσοφος · ἡμῖν δοκεῖ, εἰ μὲν τις ἐᾷ ἡμᾶς ἀπιέναι οἴκαδε, διαπορεύεσθαι τὴν χώραν ὥς ἂν δυνώμεθα ἀσινέστατα · ἦν δέ τις ἡμᾶς τῆς ὁδοῦ ἀποκωλύη, διαπολεμεῖν τούτῳ ὥς ἂν δυνώμεθα κράτιστα.

¹⁹⁴ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 3.3.11

¹⁹⁵ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 3.4.1; *Command* (1996), 24. “[Subordinates] must also know that their superiors have sufficient confidence in them to permit honest mistakes.”

¹⁹⁶ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 3.4.36-37

The following day, Cheirisophos called Xenophon forward and they discussed the task of taking a ridge ahead of them, held by the Persians. Cheirisophos took Xenophon's opinion seriously and allowed the younger man to take some of the vanguard and assault the ridge¹⁹⁷. The operation was successful, and Cheirisophos led the army down to the plain where there were villages with bountiful supplies. Cheirisophos, as at Cunaxa, had proactively begun rustling the abundant cattle with some of his men¹⁹⁸. While they were scavenging, the Persians caught up with them and began torching the villages, burning the ungathered supplies within them. Cheirisophos ordered the men to burn the remainder of the villages, astutely recognizing that the Persians would need to retreat to meet their own supply lines¹⁹⁹. It bought them some respite as they debated what to do next. With the help of local captives, they ultimately settled on passing over the mountains to the north²⁰⁰.

That night, under cover of darkness to escape the eyes of Persian scouts, the Ten Thousand pulled up camp and made their way north, reaching the foothills of the mountains at daybreak. Much like Brasidas at Kerdyllion, Cheirisophos undertook *recce* himself and scaled the hill without being noticed, then led his contingent down into some valley villages, which the locals – called the Kardouchoi – fled from. The Greeks were ordered to take nothing but supplies nor to touch the people in the hopes that they would be allowed to pass through unharmed, since both parties were hostile to the King²⁰¹: in CAF terms, he

¹⁹⁷ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 3.4.36-43

¹⁹⁸ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 3.5.2-4, 2.5.37

¹⁹⁹ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 3.5.6, 3.5.13

²⁰⁰ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 3.5.17

²⁰¹ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 4.1.7-9. Though Xenophon does not say who issued it, it would make sense for the order to have come from Cheirisophos. As Derkyllidas showed, Spartans were usually very alliance-positive and went to extra effort to not disturb friendly territory or harm its inhabitants.

attempted to limit obstacles that may prevent CIMIC and JIMP by keeping PMESII concerns in mind.

While they only suffered minor attacks overnight, once they were in the narrow mountain passes the following days, they suffered continuous assault from both the locals and the weather. It is a credit to the communication and management skills of Xenophon and Cheirisophos that only once was the army not in synchronized movement. There was an instance where Cheirisophos pushed forward quickly when Xenophon had asked him to stop, forcing the rearguard to retreat too quickly to hold formation²⁰². Once they were stopped for the day, Xenophon angrily confronted Cheirisophos.

“When they reached the end of the day’s march, Xenophon, just as he was, went straight up to Cheirisophos and began to blame him [εὐθύς ὥσπερ εἶχεν ὁ Ξενοφῶν ἐλθὼν πρὸς τὸν Χειρίσοφον ἡτιᾶτο] because he had not waited and they had been forced to fight while fleeing. ‘And now,’ he said, ‘two good and honourable men are dead, and we were unable either to recover their bodies or to bury them. In reply, Cheirisophos said [ἀποκρίνεται], ‘Look at the mountains and see how elsewhere they are altogether impassable; the only route is this one you see going straight up, and you can see on it the great crowd of people who have occupied it and stand guard over the road out. That is why I was pressing on and why I didn’t wait for you, so that I could get there first before the pass was occupied against us – the guides we have say there is no other road [ταῦτ’ ἐγὼ ἔσπευδον καὶ διὰ τοῦτό σε οὐχ ὑπέμενον, εἴ πως δυναίμην φθάσαι πρὶν κατελῆφθαι τὴν ὑπερβολήν · οἱ δ’ ἡγεμόνες οὐκ ἔχομεν οὐ φασιν εἶναι ἄλλην ὁδόν.]”²⁰³

Instead of returning the outburst with violence (as their former lead commander Klearchos might have done) or overruling him, Cheirisophos took Xenophon’s criticism calmly and explained himself. With the help of a captive who, unknown to Cheirisophos, happened to

²⁰² Xenophon *Anabasis*, 4.1.15-18

²⁰³ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 4.1.19-21, transl. D. Thomas (2021)

be in Xenophon's possession, they settled on another route, sending ahead a small party to seize a high point before it could be held against them²⁰⁴. As they continued to push through the mountain passes, they were steadily hassled from above.

"So whenever they blocked the vanguard, Xenophon, in the rear, would leave the track for the higher ground and dislodge what was obstructing the vanguard's onward route by trying to get above the force blocking them; while whenever they attacked the rearguard, Cheirisophos would leave the track and try to get higher than the blocking force, in turn dislodging what was obstructing the rearguard's forward progress. Thus they constantly came to each other's assistance and put a lot of effort into supporting each other [καὶ ἀεὶ οὕτως ἐβοήθουν ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἰσχυρῶς ἀλλήλων ἐπεμέλοντο]."

²⁰⁵

For all of the difficulty they encountered from the populace, terrain, and weather, the two men managed to maintain their cohesion, synchronization, communication, and unit management. Indeed, the flexibility they demonstrate in command is extraordinary²⁰⁶.

It had taken them a full week to make their way through the mountains and they were relieved to find villages with the resources they needed on the other side. The next day, when they looked out over the Armenian Plain, they saw Persian cavalry forces gathered on the opposite side of the Kentrites River. The Persians waited for them there in an attempt to stop the Greeks from breaking out into Armenia. When they attempted to cross the river regardless, the Ten Thousand discovered that it was too deep and slippery to cross. Retreating to the villages in the foothills, the Greeks found themselves boxed in between the

²⁰⁴ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 4.1.22-28

²⁰⁵ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 4.2.25-26, transl. D. Thomas (2021)

²⁰⁶ *Command* (1996), 16: "A subordinate should report to his superior, and to other interested parties, such as flanking formations, any significant changes to the original plan. This promotes unity of effort and balances the requirement for local initiative with the need to keep others informed, so they can make necessary adjustments to their own plans."

river and the Kardouchoi in the mountains²⁰⁷. Overnight, Xenophon had a dream which he shared with Cheirisophos. When they sacrificed, the omens were favourable. Not long after, some young troops reported to Xenophon that there was an area up the river that was shallow enough to ford by foot and which the Persians weren't patrolling. Xenophon immediately reported this to Cheirisophos, and they poured libations out, believing it to be the resolution of the dream and sacrificial omens²⁰⁸. They gathered the generals and decided that Cheirisophos would take half the army over the fording site and secure the opposite shore so Xenophon, in control of the back half of the army and the baggage train, could then cross in safety. They quickly moved to the ford, favourably sacrificed again, and began to cross. Xenophon noticed the Persian cavalry approaching to intercept, but were not yet in range for their bowmen, so made the split-second decision to frighten them to surprising success²⁰⁹.

*“Lykios, in charge of the cavalry, and Aischines, in charge of the unit of peltasts with Cheirisophos, seeing [the Persians] in full flight, went in pursuit, while the mass of the soldiers shouted out not to be left behind but to break out with their comrades toward the highlands. Cheirisophos, however, once he had crossed the river, did not pursue the horsemen. Instead, from a standing start where the banks came down to the river, he immediately broke out toward the enemy infantry posted directly above them. They, seeing their own horsemen in flight and hoplites advancing on them, abandoned the heights above the river.”*²¹⁰

Cheirisophos and Lykios gained control of the opposite bank and highlands very quickly.

Once the Greek baggage train moved over the ford, the Kardouchoi realized the rearguard

²⁰⁷ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 4.2.28-4.3.8

²⁰⁸ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 4.3.8-15. | Xenophon reports having prophetic-esque dreams multiple times throughout the *Anabasis*. I am not certain how devout Xenophon himself was, but Cheirisophos' belief in his dream and the omens certainly corresponds with how pious Spartans tended to be.

²⁰⁹ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 4.3.16-21

²¹⁰ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 4.3.22-23

was only a small force and attacked. Noticing this, Cheirisophos promptly sent his light troops to reinforce Xenophon. Xenophon, spotting the troops' approach, ordered them to maintain the bank to cover the rearguard's retreat²¹¹. Once they were reformed on the other side of the river – now no longer hampered by the Kardouchoi or the Persians – they began the march across the Armenian Plains.

Now late February, they progressed through Western Armenia easily until they reached the Teleboas River, where they encountered the lieutenant governor and friend of the King, Tiribazos. Tiribazos proposed a truce, wherein the Greeks would be given supplies in exchange for leaving the land unharmed. The generals agreed to this and continued until they found a bountiful village, shadowed by Tiribazos' forces. However, they found themselves contending with a heavy snowfall so deep the draft animals couldn't move. An expert scout, Demokrates, was sent to recon the area and returned with a Persian soldier who informed them of Tiribazos' plan to wait until they were bottlenecked within a nearby mountain pass to ambush them²¹². Using their captive, they surprised Tiribazos' forces and scattered his camp. Nervous to waste the good fortune, they retreated and made haste through the pass before Tiribazos' forces could reform. They completely lost their adversary and forded the Euphrates, but the continuing snowfall and cold worked against them²¹³.

Come March, severe exposure, poor clothing, and limited rations had seen a significant portion of the army fall seriously ill or die, despite Xenophon's best efforts to preserve

²¹¹ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 4.3.27-34

²¹² Xenophon *Anabasis*, 4.4.15-18

²¹³ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 4.5.1-6

them²¹⁴. Those in the vanguard, including Cheirisophos, had found a village they could rest in, but most of the army hadn't been so fortunate.

*“Meanwhile Cheirisophos sent some troops from the village to find out how things were with the troops at the rear [ἐν δὲ τούτῳ Χειρίσοφος πέμπει τῶν ἐκ τῆς κώμης σκεψομένων πῶς ἔχουσιν οἱ τελευταῖοι]. The latter were pleased to see them and handed over the invalids to them to take to the main camp while they made their own way there; and before they had traveled two and a half miles, they were in the village where Cheirisophos was bivouacking.”*²¹⁵

With the remaining units having been assigned other nearby villages to rest in, the army was treated graciously by the locals and took the time to recover. Xenophon befriended the headman of his assigned village, promising no harm would come to him.

“On the following day, Xenophon took the headman and set out on his way to Cheirisophos. [...]

*When they came to Cheirisophos, Xenophon found him with his troops in their quarters, all crowned with garlands of hay and with teenage Armenian boys serving them ... After Cheirisophos and Xenophon had greeted each other effusively [ἐπεὶ δ' ἀλλήλους ἐφιλοφρονήσαντο Χειρίσοφος καὶ Ξενοφῶν], they jointly interrogated the village headman through their Persian-speaking interpreter as to what country they were in. He replied, ‘Armenia.’ [... And he explained where the road went.”*²¹⁶

They remained in the villages for another week before moving out.

Xenophon sent his headman to Cheirisophos to act as a guide, and the man brought his adolescent son.

“The headman, who was left unbound, led them through the snow, and they were on their third day's march when Cheirisophos got angry [ἐχαλεπάνθη] with him because he was not taking them to villages; but he said that there weren't any in this region. Cheirisophos hit him, but he still did not tie him up [ὁ δὲ Χειρίσοφος αὐτὸν ἔπαισεν, ἔδησε δ' οὐ]. After this, the headman ran off in the night, leaving his son behind. This incident – the combination of mistreating the guide and then being careless about him – was the only thing

²¹⁴ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 4.5.12-21

²¹⁵ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 4.5.22, transl. D. Thomas (2021)

²¹⁶ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 4.5.30, 4.5.33-34, transl. D. Thomas (2021)

about which Cheirisophos and Xenophon has a serious disagreement during the whole journey [τοῦτό γε δὴ Χειρισόφῳ καὶ Ξενοφῶντι μόνον διάφορον ἐν τῇ πορείᾳ ἐγένετο, ἢ τοῦ ἡγεμόνος κάκῳσις καὶ ἀμέλεια. Πλεισθένης δὲ ἡράσθη τοῦ παιδὸς καὶ οἴκαδε κομίσας πιστοτάτῳ ἐχρήτο.].”²¹⁷

Bearing in mind the amount of pressure Cheirisophos and Xenophon specifically were under, it speaks to the quality of their character and their general penchant for patience and resolution that this incident was not only the first and last disagreement they had, but the only outburst of temper and violence we see from Cheirisophos at all.

Even now bereft of a guide, the Ten Thousand continued onwards for another week following the Phasis River. As they approached, Cheirisophos noticed hostile forces occupying a pass they needed to travel through. He halted the army and called all the generals together to plan²¹⁸. Xenophon suggested that they take a stealthy route behind the enemy and take them by surprise in order not to endanger themselves more than necessary, adding:

“But why am I the one putting forward ideas about stealing? What I at any rate hear, Cheirisophos, is that you Lakedaimonians – you at least who are numbered among the homoioi – practise stealing from your earliest boyhood, and that to steal things other than those that custom forbids is not disgraceful to you, but something noble. And so that you may steal as effectively as possible and make efforts to avoid detection, it is customary, I gather, for you to be whipped if you are caught stealing. So now has come the time for you to show off your education, and really take care that we are not caught as we steal part of the mountain, so that we shall not get a beating.’

‘But on the contrary,’ said Cheirisophos, ‘what I hear is that you Athenians are terribly clever at stealing public money, even though it’s an especially terrible danger that the thief is running – and indeed I hear that this is especially true of the best among you, assuming that with you it is the best

²¹⁷ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 4.6.2-3, transl. D. Thomas (2021)

²¹⁸ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 4.6.7, transl. D. Thomas (2021). Of particular interest to me in this section is how Cheirisophos frames engaging in combat: *“It’s time to consider together how to carry on the contest as honourably as possible. / ὥρα δὲ βουλευέσθαι ὅπως ὡς κάλλιστα ἀγωνιούμεθα.”*

*who are thought fit to rule. So it's time for you too to show off your education.”*²¹⁹

While this exchange is clearly one of banter between good friends, the fact that neither character rebuffs the stereotyping implies that it is understood (on some level) to be true. Cheirisophos certainly proves as much. Throughout the campaign, Cheirisophos has consistently been first into the fray – whether that be to gather supplies, conduct reconnaissance operations, or lead a charge. No doubt, had he not been the primary operations coordinator, Cheirisophos would have been more than capable of leading the assault. However, when Xenophon offered to lead the party up the mountain, Cheirisophos instead opened up an opportunity for another eager volunteer to prove his courage and leadership²²⁰. The flanking was successful, and the forces holding the pass fled without much of a fight.

As March bled over into April, they progressed through the land of Taochoi, but supplies were scarce. Eventually they came across a stronghold but had difficulty breaching its defenses.

“When Xenophon came up with the rearguard, both peltasts and hoplites, Cheirisophos said to him then and there, ‘You have come at just the right time. The place has to be taken – there are no food supplies for the army unless we capture it.’ They began to plan the operation together on the spot, and when Xenophon asked what the obstacle was to getting inside, Cheirisophos replied, ‘There is just the one route up to it that you see, and when anyone attempts to advance along it, they roll rocks over the edge of that overhanging cliff there. And whoever gets caught by a rock ends up like

²¹⁹ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 4.6.14-16, transl. D. Thomas (2021)

²²⁰ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 4.6.19, transl. D. Thomas (2021) | “Cheirisophos replied, ‘Why is it necessary for you to go and abandon your post in the rearguard? Send others instead – unless perhaps there are some volunteers?’” *Command* (1996), 24, notes that good commanders will give subordinates a chance to demonstrate their quality: “They must be challenged to provide some indication of their potential to perform at the next rank level.” Cheirisophos seems aware that such an opportunity is only made possible if the commander allows it.

*this – ‘And with that, he pointed out people whose legs and ribs had been crushed.’*²²¹

Xenophon suggested that they continue to bait the inhabitants so their supply of rocks would empty, to which Cheirisophos agreed. They took the fort and acquired its supplies²²². They then followed the Harpasos River into the land of the Skythenoi until they came upon the city of Gymnias. With the help of Gymnias’ ruler, in May, they made it to the Black Sea²²³.

The sea brought with it more conflict, however, and they were forced to contend with the Kolchoi. Xenophon was quick to come up with a plan to deal with the steep battleground, which was approved by the other generals.

*“Both Cheirisophos [on the right wing] and Xenophon [on the left] and the peltasts with each of them made their way forward in positions that outflanked the enemy line, and when the enemy saw them, they ran right and left to meet them and thus broke up their formation, creating a big gap in the middle of their own line [οἱ δὲ πολέμοι ὡς εἶδον αὐτούς, ἀντιπαραθέοντες οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ δεξιὸν οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ εὐώνυμον διεσπάσθησαν, καὶ πολὺ τῆς αὐτῶν φάλαγγος ἐν τῷ μέσῳ κενὸν ἐποίησαν]. On seeing the enemy divided in two the peltasts [...] thought they were in flight and began to run, cheering as they did so. [...] As for the enemy, once the peltasts had begun to run, they didn’t make a stand anywhere but turned in flight, each in a different direction [οἱ δὲ πολέμοι, ὡς ἤρξαντο θεῖν, οὐκέτι ἔστησαν, ἀλλὰ φυγῇ ἄλλος ἄλλῃ ἐτράπετο].”*²²⁴

Cheirisophos and Xenophon consistently demonstrate synergy in tactics and operation, working harmoniously as a command team and reaching their targets in the battlespace. As

²²¹ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 4.7.3-4, transl. D. Thomas (2021)

²²² Xenophon *Anabasis*, 4.7.13-14, transl. D. Thomas (2021) | “Here, as a result, there was a terrible spectacle. The women threw their children off the edge and flung themselves down after, and the men did likewise. [...] From this place only very few people were captured ...”

²²³ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 4.7.24. The Greek, just because it’s fun: καὶ τάχα δὴ ἀκούουσι βοώντων τῶν στρατιωτῶν θάλαττα! θάλαττα! καὶ παρεγγυώντων.

²²⁴ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 4.8.16-19, transl. D. Thomas (2021)

May passed into June, they found their way to Trapezus and stayed in the surrounding Kolchian villages²²⁵.

The men became restless as June rolled on, sick of travelling and eager to be out of Asia Minor. They gathered together and discussed their options.

*“Next Cheirisophos stood up and said ‘Men, I have a friend called Anaxibios who happens to be the current nauarchos, so if you send me to him, I think I would come back both with triremes and with merchant ships to ferry us. If you do indeed want to go by sea, wait until I come back. I will be quick.’ When they heard this, the soldiers were pleased and voted for him to set sail as soon as possible.”*²²⁶

With that, Cheirisophos departed, leaving Neon the Asinean to command his troops in the interim. Xenophon now appeared to *de facto* take up Cheirisophos’ position as lead general.

June turned to July, then to August, and finally September before Cheirisophos reunited with the Ten Thousand at Sinope’s port-city, Harmene.

*“At this point Cheirisophos came with a single trireme. The soldiers were full of expectations that he had come with something for them. But he had brought nothing, though he reported that both Anaxibios, the nauarchos, and the others had praised them, and that Anaxibios had promised that if they turned up outside the Black Sea, there would be pay for them [ὁ δ’ ἦγε μὲν οὐδέν, ἀπήγγελλε δὲ ὅτι ἐπαινοίη αὐτοὺς καὶ Ἀναξίβιος ὁ ναύαρχος καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, καὶ ὅτι ὑπισχνεῖτο Ἀναξίβιος, εἰ ἀφίκοιντο ἔξω τοῦ Πόντου, μισθοφορὰν αὐτοῖς ἔσεσθαι].”*²²⁷

With Cheirisophos now returned, the subject of leadership was brought up. The men considered that one overarching command, as opposed to the joint one Cheirisophos and

²²⁵ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 4.8.22-24

²²⁶ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 5.1.3-4, transl. D. Thomas (2021). Cheirisophos’ speech in Gr: ‘φίλος μοί ἐστιν, ὦ ἄνδρες, Ἀναξίβιος, ναυαρχῶν δὲ καὶ τυγχάνει. ἦν οὖν πέμψητέ με, οἶμαι ἂν ἐλθεῖν καὶ τριήρεις ἔχων καὶ πλοῖα τὰ ἡμᾶς ἄξοντα · ὑμεῖς δὲ εἴπερ πλεῖν βούλεσθε, περιμένετε ἔστ’ ἂν ἐγὼ ἔλθω · ἤξω δὲ ταχέως.’

²²⁷ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 6.1.15-16, transl. D. Thomas (2021)

Xenophon had formerly shared, would be more efficient. Xenophon himself, however, ultimately refused the post.

*“So as a result, they chose Cheirisophos. After he had been chosen, Cheirisophos came forward and said ‘In fact, men, I assure you that I would not have stirred up dissension if you had chosen someone else [ἀλλ’, ὦ ἄνδρες, τοῦτο μὲν ἴστε, ὅτι οὐδ’ ἂν ἔγωγε ἐστασίαζον, εἰ ἄλλον εἴλεσθε]. But on the other hand, you have done Xenophon a service,’ he said, ‘by not choosing him, since Dexippos has already for some time been maligning him to Anaxibios as much as he can, even though I strenuously tried to silence him. [...] But since you have chosen me,’ he said, ‘I too will try to do you what good I can [ἐπεὶ μέντοι ἐμὲ εἴλεσθε, ἔφη, καὶ ἐγὼ πειράσομαι ὅ τι ἂν δύνωμαι ὑμᾶς ἀγαθὸν ποιεῖν]. So get yourselves ready to put to sea tomorrow, provided there is a fair wind. Our voyage will be to Heraklea, so everyone without exception should try to land there; and once we have arrived there, we will discuss further plans.”*²²⁸

Once they had made the trip over to Heraklea, the men turned their restless energy back on their commanders. Gathered together, they complained about the lack of pay and proposed an ambassador be selected to bully Heraklea into providing the funds they required.

*“At that they proceeded to put forward different people as ambassadors, in first place Cheirisophos, because he had been chosen as commander; and some put forward Xenophon. But both of them strongly resisted, for they were of the same opinion that they should not compel a friendly Greek city to give what they did not wish to give.”*²²⁹

When the threats of the ambassadors failed and Heraklea closed itself fully to them, they turned on their leadership. They blamed Cheirisophos and Xenophon, then formed a splinter group consisting of Arcadians and Achaeans²³⁰.

“So Cheirisophos’ overall command was dissolved then and there on the sixth or seventh day from when he was elected.

Xenophon, however, wanted to make the journey in the company with Cheirisophos [Ξενοφῶν μέντοι ἐβούλετο κοινῇ τμετ’ αὐτῶν τὴν πορείαν

²²⁸ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 6.1.32–33, transl. D. Thomas (2021)

²²⁹ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 6.2.6

²³⁰ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 6.2.9

ποιεῖσθαι], thinking that this would be safer than for each to set out on his own. But Neon was arguing the case for making their way in separate contingents. He had heard from Cheirisophos that Kleandros, the harmost of Byzantium, was saying that he would come to Kalpe Harbour with triremes. So this was the reason for his advice, in order that only he and Cheirisophos and their soldiers should sail away on the triremes and so no one else should participate. Cheirisophos, partly through depression at what had happened and partly because of his consequent hatred for the army, allowed Neon to do whatever he wanted [καὶ Χειρίσοφος, ἅμα μὲν ἀθυμῶν τοῖς γεγενημένοις, ἅμα δὲ μισῶν ἐκ τούτου τὸ στράτευμα, ἐπιτρέπει αὐτῷ ποιεῖν ὃ τι βούλεται].”²³¹

Against his own desires, Xenophon followed a sacrificial omen and chose to stay with the army. Cheirisophos did not wait on any other contingent, but left Heraklea toward Thrace. Xenophon is not clear on when precisely Cheirisophos got sick, but he made it as far as Kalpe Harbour²³². Xenophon would manage to reunite the two halves of the army there, but by the time he arrived, Cheirisophos had died²³³.

|||

In their brief biography of him supplied in the appendices, the editors of *The Landmark Xenophon’s Anabasis* have this to say about Cheirisophos:

“But the general impression that Xenophon gives us, whether fairly or not, is that Cheirisophos, though not actually incompetent and certainly not deficient in personal bravery, lacked tactical imagination and skill in managing men. On reaching Trapezus, Cheirisophos planned to arrange sea transport back to Greece, and sailed away to Byzantium to obtain help in so doing from the nauarchos Anaxibios, who he claimed was an old friend of his, but he brought only one trireme with him when he finally rejoined the Greeks at Sinope. [...] According to Xenophon, Cheirisophos’ death was due to the effects of a medicine he took for a fever, but his general failure with both the Spartan authorities and the army may have been a factor too. Strikingly, Xenophon does not give him an obituary, as he has earlier done

²³¹ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 6.2.12-14, transl. D. Thomas (2021)

²³² Xenophon *Anabasis*, 6.2..18, 6.3.10

²³³ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 6.4.11

*for senior leaders. This may be a sign that Xenophon thought him insignificant or unworthy; but note that the recipients of obituaries in Anabasis all died as the result of enemy action of one kind or another, and it was the Spartan custom that only those who die in battle are entitled to be named on the inscriptions to commemorate them.”*²³⁴

I find this characterization of Cheirisophos to be both misguided and uncharitable. The effective teamwork and command synergy the narrative demonstrates hardly bespeaks a lack of tactical imagination. Likewise, Cheirisophos' uninterrupted and uncontentious five month long command is quite incompatible with the claim that he lacked skill in managing men. As far as Cheirisophos' dealings with Anaxibios, any reader who completed the *Anabasis* and Book 4 of the *Hellenika* will recall how temperamental and difficult the navarch was. It is little wonder, then, that Cheirisophos didn't manage to get Anaxibios' help, even as his friend. Cheirisophos also hadn't lied: Dexippos succeeded in making Anaxibios excessively hostile to Xenophon. Indeed, once Kleandros was removed from his posting at Byzantium, there would not be another amicable Spartan in the region until Derkylidas replaced Thibron. Furthermore, I cannot begin to guess what "his general failure with the Spartan authorities and the army" might mean – particularly since he had gotten Kleandros' assistance (provided they make it to Byzantium) and the Ten Thousand hadn't managed to acquire any ships of their own in the meantime. I do find it plausible that Cheirisophos doesn't receive an obituary because he did not die in battle, and that seems to me more likely than Xenophon showing any disrespect. Nor is the sentiment attributed to Xenophon plausible in light of his narrative: Xenophon refused command out of deference to


²³⁴ *The Landmark Xenophon's Anabasis* (2021), 458-459, §7.2

Cheirisophos, appealed to and followed his judgment, and backed up his tactical decisions without fail.

As the CAF model helps us appreciate, Cheirisophos was an excellent commander. From the beginning of Book 3, Cheirisophos proved to be the calm, authoritative, and even-keeled presence the Ten Thousand desperately needed. He made judgment calls when the men were hesitant, held himself and others accountable for poor decision-making, and his firm but approachable authority held the army together without infighting from the Tigris to the Black Sea. He was unquestionably their leader, but he was not arrogant as Klearchos had been, presuming he alone knew the correct course of action. He consulted with his command team consistently, kept communication with his senior staff and troops clear and direct, and routinely worked alongside his lower ranks. He joined in on recce and CCIR/IPB/ISTAR activities, planned and executed relatively complex manoeuvres in sync with his subordinates, and maintained enough battlespace awareness to promptly and prudently redeploy his troops to support other commanders. Despite the massive stressors of constant danger, ever-dwindling food, and little-to-no material comforts, he kept the army more or less healthy, mobile, and operable without resorting to abusiveness or harsh punishment – even in the face of severe and foreign weather. Unlike most commanders, he was deep inside enemy territory in control of a small, mobile AO, consistently fending off adversarial and unfamiliar forces – yet he still managed to follow the Ten Principles of War, employ the CSASS and OODA loop models to great success in fires, and use the JIMP framework to keep his panhellenic force unified. Under his command, his forces were on the offensive more than the defensive, did not let their cohesion fracture under the weight of

disheartening news, and never had their freedom of action taken from them. He even repeatedly demonstrated CIMIC and PMESII concerns for the locals that they, by necessity, had to raid even when it didn't work out in his favour. It was not the week after his return in September that fractured the Ten Thousand, but the three months it spent directionless and static without him.

Cheirisophos may not be as accomplished a figure as Brasidas or Derkylidas, but such generals do not succeed without subordinate commanders like him ensuring their objectives are achieved. Cheirisophos' only goal once he inherited Klearchos' mess was to get the Ten Thousand out of Persia alive, which he accomplished. He cannot be blamed for the disagreeable stinginess of Anaxibios, the inherent aggression of the Ten Thousand's soldiers, or being given less than a week to put them back to rights. As Xenophon would have the misfortune of experiencing, once Cheirisophos was gone, the cohesion of the Ten Thousand unravelled inexorably. Clearly, no one else in the Ten Thousand had the gravitas or command necessary to hold them together in his absence. Cheirisophos was an excellent commander given a deeply unenviable task that he managed to not only accomplish, but accomplish *well*.



As in criticism, in analysis it helps to have positive examples balanced against negative ones. So far, we have seen how Klearidas and Cheirisophos measure up to Brasidas and Derkylidas and exemplify the traits and skills required of a Spartan for success. Now, we will

turn our attention to those who, while they may possess some or all of the traits and skills listed above, fell short in their exercise or in their combination. In the examples following, we will examine where these men fell short, even when there appears to be no reason they should not have succeeded.

[Lysander]

*“One sure way to undermine your effectiveness as a leader is to play games with people. Take it from me, it doesn’t work. It may give you some advantage in the short term, but it is bound to hurt you in the long run.”*²³⁵

Lysander is one of the most famous—or perhaps infamous—Spartan generals, following after Brasidas. Most would not expect him to be listed amongst those who ‘failed’ as generals. Unlike the examples to follow, Lysander’s failure was not one of quality as a soldier or capability as a general, but of modesty as a Spartiate.

As a commander in the field, Lysander fits nicely between our exemplars. Like Brasidas, he was bold and inventive in his strategy, adept at thinking on his feet and engaging in fires on his own terms. Yet, similar to Derkylidas, he was also skilled at forward thinking in his battle planning and CIMC-style networking in his theatres. He was not as magnetic and clever as Brasidas, but neither as shrewd and remote as Derkylidas. As Sears notes:

*“Though Thucydides lived to see the end of the Peloponnesian War and Lysander’s role in engineering Athens’ defeat and surrender, the historian died before completing his work, which breaks off abruptly in the account of the year 411. Lysander certainly would have been a dominant character in the remainder of Thucydides’ work, and as Hunter Rawlings has persuasively argued, Thucydides would likely have paralleled Brasidas’ activities in Books 4 and 5 with Lysander’s in the hypothetical Books 9 and 10.”*²³⁶

²³⁵ Gn. Dextraze 1973

²³⁶ Sears 2020, 184 | Sears’ reference: Rawlings 1981, 234-43

While Lysander's strategic and tactical ability are not in question, he, at the end of the 5th century, fell into the same trap of conceit that Kleomenes, Leotychidas and Pausanias the Regent had at its beginning.

“Pausanias [the Regent] and Lysander lived long enough to let their arrogance become too much for their fellow Spartans, the former being starved to death while a suppliant in a temple, the latter being set up by a rival²³⁷ to die ignominiously in battle.

[...]

Lysander behaved as an absolute ruler and was honoured with a cult and other lavish rewards far beyond what Greeks should have deemed appropriate for a mortal.”²³⁸

Lysander had earned the right to be proud – even prideful – but his ambition was out of line. As General Dextraze plainly states, “... loyalty upward must prevail, because in the final analysis, it is loyalty to our country that really counts.” In the latter half of his career, Lysander's loyalty strayed from Sparta and coalesced around himself. It is that ruinous error that will be explored.

|||

As has been mentioned, Thucydides' narrative cuts off before Lysander can make his appearance. He appears to us instead in Xenophon's work, specifically as a recurring character in *Hellenika* Books 1, 2, and 3. We pick up the narrative early in Book 2, not long after he oversaw the fall of Athens and the installation of the Thirty Tyrants. The Thirty, already dissolving into paranoia and violence, were having issues suppressing dissent in

²³⁷ It is unclear what Sears means here by “set up by a rival”. So far as Dr. Corner and I can find, the passages Sears is referring to may be Pausanias (Hell. 3.5.25) and Plutarch (Lys. 30). However, neither source is explicit about a rival or a plot to have Lysander killed off.

²³⁸ Sears 2020, 174, 182

Peiraieus. Both the Thirty and those in Peiraieus sought aid from Sparta to resolve the mounting tension, both claiming the other was revolting from the newly established Spartan Alliance. Lysander responded in favour of the Thirty, directing his brother to blockade Peiraieus while he sieged it by land²³⁹. King Pausanias, however, suspected ulterior motives.

“When the things were progressing in this way, the Spartan king Pausanias grew suspicious that if Lysander should accomplish his goal, he would not only win great repute but would also gain complete control over Athens.

οὕτω δὲ προχωρούντων Παισανίας ὁ βασιλεὺς φθονήσας Λυσάνδρῳ, εἰ κατειργασμένος ταῦτα ἅμα μὲν εὐδοκιμήσοι, ἅμα δὲ ἰδίᾳ ποιήσοιτο τὰς Ἀθήνας, πείσας τῶν ἐφόρων τρεῖς ἐξάγει φρουράν.”²⁴⁰

If Lysander had wanted to reaffirm and secure his control over Athens via the Thirty, then his scheme was thwarted by Pausanias’ interference. Not only did the fires they engaged in go poorly, but the ephors were more inclined towards Pausanias’ solution for peace than Lysander’s plans²⁴¹. The Thirty and Peiraieus would come to terms via treaty without Lysander’s involvement.

Pausanias’ worry might have been justified. If Lysander’s attempt at meddling abroad had failed, his attempt at home would not. When he died, the aged King Agis left behind no clear successor. A man named Leotychidas claimed he was Agis’ son [υἱὸς φάσκων²⁴² Ἄγιδος εἶναι] and therefore had the right to the throne, but Agesilaos – Agis’ younger brother –

²³⁹ Xenophon *Hellenika*, 2.4.23-29

²⁴⁰ Xenophon *Hellenika*, 2.4.29, transl. J. Marincola (2009)

²⁴¹ Xenophon *Hellenika*, 2.4.36

²⁴² φάσκω is an unusually ambiguous choice of word for Xenophon to use here. Liddell and Scott’s first definition is *say, affirm, assert* “often with the notion of alleging or pretending”, with further definitions being *think, deem, expect* and *promise*. It may be purposeful evasion on Xenophon’s part, so he doesn’t have to give an opinion on whether Leotychidas was telling the truth.

contested that Agis had disavowed him²⁴³. When a respected interpreter of oracles offered his opinion in a manner that would have favoured Leotychidas' bid, Lysander saw his moment and inserted himself into the discussion.

“Lysander, however, spoke on behalf of Agesilaos and said that he did not think that the god was saying that the ‘lame kingship’ referred to someone who stumbled and limped but, rather, that they should ensure that no one was king who was not genuinely born of the Herakleidai [ὥς οὐκ οἴοιτο τὸν θεὸν τοῦτο κελεύειν φυλάξασθαι, μὴ προσπταίσας τις χωλεύσαι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον μὴ οὐκ ὦν τοῦ γένους βασιλεύσειε]. For indeed the kingship would be lame unless those from the stock of Herakles led the city.”²⁴⁴

Xenophon drawing attention to Lysander's interjection is unlikely to be accidental. While it would not be unreasonable for a man of significant influence like Lysander to weigh in on such a debate, he had a personal stake in the outcome as well. Lysander had been a lover of Agesilaos' and the two remained close. If Lysander were able to sway opinion enough to get Agesilaos on the throne, he would have a powerful ally and be further elevated within the social circles of the dyarchy. Should Agesilaos become a king, Lysander's reach would only continue to grow. If he was careful, Lysander's agenda could become Agesilaos' agenda and through him, Spartan policy. Whatever his motives may have been, Lysander's efforts paid off and his hopes were realized – Agesilaos would take the throne and Lysander would hold a court of his own alongside him.

Despite now holding most of the Greek world under the auspices of the Spartan Alliance, the dyarchy and ephors had proven to be largely uninterested in regime change. Particularly after the disastrous results of installing the Thirty Tyrants in Athens, many of

²⁴³ Xenophon *Hellenika*, 3.3.1-3

²⁴⁴ Xenophon *Hellenika*, 3.3.3., transl. J. Marincola (2009)

the dekarchies that Lysander had installed around the Aegean had been dismantled or dismissed. Looking to regain his former network of influence, Lysander used a warning about the building up of a Phoenician fleet to convince Agesilaos to go to war.

“Lysander believed the Greek fleet to be far superior; recalling that the Greek army that had marched up-country had managed to return home safely, he persuaded [πείθει] Agesilaos to promise to lead a campaign against Asia, if the authorities would place thirty Spartiates, about two thousand newly freed helots, and a force of about six thousand of the allies under his command. For among his objectives in doing this, Lysander hoped to accompany Agesilaos in the campaign so that he could, with Agesilaos’ help, re-establish the dekarchies that he himself had set up earlier in the cities [πρὸς δὲ τούτῳ τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ αὐτὸς συνεξελθεῖν αὐτῷ ἐβούλετο, ὅπως τὰς δεκαρχίας τὰς κατασταθείσας ὑπ’ ἐκείνου ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν] but that the ephors had eliminated when they decreed that the cities should be governed instead by their own ancestral law.”²⁴⁵

Lysander got the army and campaign he requested. At Agesilaos’ side, he sailed to Asia Minor. As Agesilaos (and Derkylidas) attempted to formulate an agreeable truce with Tissaphernes and the Persian King, Lysander set to work rebuilding his networks and establishing himself as the primary source of access to Agesilaos.

Unfortunately for him, this pre-eminence would be brief. Lysander may have helped to put Agesilaos in power, but that did not mean Agesilaos would allow himself to become Lysander’s puppet.

“But since everyone knew Lysander, they would all apply through him to obtain their requests from Agesilaos. The result was that a huge mob was always paying court to Lysander and following him around, so much so that it seemed as if Agesilaos was but a private citizen and Lysander the king [καὶ διὰ ταῦτα αἰεὶ παμπλήθης ὄχλος θεραπεύων αὐτὸν ἠκολούθει, ὥστε ὁ μὲν Ἀγησίλαος ιδιώτης ἐφαίνετο, ὁ δὲ Λύσανδρος βασιλεύς]. Agesilaos later made it very clear that he, too, was unhappy with this state of affairs, but at this

²⁴⁵ Xenophon *Hellenika*, 3.4.2, transl. J. Marincola (2009)

time, it was the other members of the thirty²⁴⁶ who, motivated by envy, were not silent. Indeed, they said it to Agesilaos that Lysander was behaving contrary to the law, conducting himself more regally than even a king was entitled to do [ὡς παράνομα ποιοίη Λύσανδρος τῆς βασιλείας ὀγκηρότερον διάγων]. After this, when Lysander brought people to the king, Agesilaos would always send them away without giving them what he knew they wanted. And when Lysander perceived that every time his wishes were made known, Agesilaos decided just the opposite, he understood what was happening. So he ceased to allow a crowd to follow him around, and he said openly to those who wished to obtain some favour from the king that they would actually achieve less if he himself were a party to the request.

Lysander was distressed by this dishonour [βαρέως δὲ φέρων τῇ ἀτιμίᾳ], and so he went to the king and said, ‘Now I see, Agesilaos, that you know very well how to diminish your friends [μειοῦν μὲν ἄρα σύγε τοὺς φίλους ἡπίστω].’

‘Yes, by Zeus,’ Agesilaos replied, ‘at least those who wish to appear greater than me [τούς γε βουλομένους ἐμοῦ μείζους φαίνεσθαι]. As for those who increase my honour, well, I would be ashamed of myself if I did not know how to honour them in return.’

‘Well,’ said Lysander, ‘perhaps you are behaving now more sensibly than I did in the past. Do me one favour at the very least – send me away from here so that I might not be ashamed by being here and having no influence with you, and also so that I might not be in your way. Wherever I go, I shall attempt to always conduct myself so as to be of some advantage to you. [τάδε οὖν μοι ἐκ τοῦ λοιποῦ χάρισαι, ὅπως ἂν μήτ’ αἰσχύνωμαι ἀδυνατῶν παρὰ σοὶ μήτ’ ἐμποδῶν σοὶ ὦ, ἀπόπεμψόν ποί με.]’

Agesilaos agreed with what Lysander had said, and so he sent him off to the Hellespont.”²⁴⁷

Lysander would regain some of his former favour by persuading a Persian named Spithridates to leave Pharnabazos’ service and join Agesilaos²⁴⁸. Even so, the relationship between the two men remained compromised and would never get the chance to be recovered. By the end of the next year, Lysander would be dead.

²⁴⁶ *The Landmark Xenophon’s Hellenika* (2009), 102; footnote 3.4.8a: The ‘thirty’ in this instance were the group of thirty Spartiate officers who were sent out with Lysander to accompany King Agesilaos on this campaign.

²⁴⁷ Xenophon *Hellenika*, 3.4.7-10, transl. J. Marincola (2009)

²⁴⁸ Xenophon *Hellenika*, 3.4.10

Lysander had left with Agesilaos in 396 to Asia, then was sent away to the Hellespont after their falling out. By 395, he appears to have made his way back to Sparta and was officially reassigned to Phocis. This time, the legwork would not be done for him – Lysander was tasked to assemble his own army out of allies in the region and meet King Pausanias at Haliartos. He was quick to see the task completed and, in addition, also convinced the Orchomenians to revolt from Thebes²⁴⁹. Thebes was not pleased with this development and sent ambassadors to Athens in search of support, which they received²⁵⁰. However, Lysander would reach his AO in Phocis before the promised Athenian aid could arrive. Despite this advantage, his attempt on the *polis* would not go well.

“Lysander, who was leading the contingents from Phocis, Orchomenos, and the territories in that area, arrived at Haliartos ahead of Pausanias [ἔφθη τὸν Παισανίαν ἐν τῷ Ἀλιάρτῳ γενόμενος]. Once there, he neither remained inactive nor awaited the army from Sparta [ἡκων δὲ οὐκέτι ἡσυχίαν ἔχων ἀνέμενε τὸ ἀπὸ Λακεδαιμόνος στρατεύμα], but with just the men he had, he went up to the wall of the Haliartans. At first he was making headway into persuading them to revolt from Thebes [καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἔπειθεν αὐτοὺς ἀφίστασθαι] and be autonomous. But when some of the Thebans who were stationed on the wall prevented the Haliartans from defecting, Lysander began to attack the wall. The Thebans, upon learning of his arrival and assault, marched on the double to Haliartos from their territory with both their infantry and their cavalry. It is unclear whether Lysander failed to notice them as they approached and attacked him, or whether he did see them coming but held his ground in the belief that he would be able to defeat them [ὁπότερα μὲν οὖν, εἴτε λαθόντες τὸν Λύσανδρον ἐπέπεσον αὐτῷ εἴτε καὶ αἰσθόμενος προσιόντας ὡς κρατήσων ὑπέμενεν, ἄδηλον: τοῦτο δ’ οὖν σαφές]. But it is clear that a battle took place at the wall [ὅτι παρὰ τὸ τεῖχος ἡ μάχη ἐγένετο]; a trophy now stands witness to it at the gates of Haliartos.

²⁴⁹ Xenophon *Hellenika*, 3.5.6

²⁵⁰ Xenophon *Hellenika*, 3.4.13, transl. J. Marincola (2009). The Theban ambassadors’ speech specifically calls Lysander out by name: “Instead of the freedom they had promised, the Spartans imposed a twofold slavery on [former Athenian allies]: for they are being tyrannized both by the harmosts and the boards of ten that Lysander set up in each city.” Marincola notes that Xenophon had an anti-Theban bias, but the arguments he supplies for their speech likely has some real and known basis. The resentment of Lysander’s policy must have been reasonably widespread.

*Lysander was killed, and the rest of his men fled to the mountains, with the Thebans in hot pursuit.”*²⁵¹

The campaign would ultimately come to nothing and the fallout would result in the deaths of both Lysander and Pausanias²⁵². In the wake of his death on the battlefield, Lysander's army broke and fled. Most were subsequently run down and killed by the Thebans. Pausanias arrived the next day, just in time for the promised Athenian contingent to appear. Upon learning of the obliteration of Lysander's army, Pausanias realized that he did not have the numbers necessary to attempt another assault on Theban territory and instead negotiated the return of the bodies. The Thebans granted the request on the condition that the Spartan army depart immediately afterwards, which they agreed to and complied with²⁵³.

Xenophon calls attention to the fact that Lysander's decisions at Haliartos were strange. While he had been known to take risks in similar fashion to Brasidas and Derkylidas, he had never been reckless about them before. Xenophon speculates that he may have chosen to fight under the assumption that he could defeat the Theban forces. It would have been out of character for Lysander not to have undertaken sufficient CCIR, IPB, and ISTAR preparations and thus been unaware of his adversary's numbers and composition. As shown in the quote above, Xenophon does not say that Pausanias was late to the rendezvous, only that Lysander was there first²⁵⁴, nor does he suggest that Lysander had any reason to believe that Pausanias was not going to arrive in time. Lysander approached Haliartos well aware

²⁵¹ Xenophon *Hellenika*, 3.5.17-19, transl. J. Marincola (2009)

²⁵² Xenophon *Hellenika*, 3.5.25. Pausanias was accused of arriving late on purpose and leaving Lysander to die. Instead of facing the charges, he fled to Tegea and died shortly thereafter from illness.

²⁵³ Xenophon *Hellenika*, 3.5.22-24

²⁵⁴ ἔφθη from φθάνω has the specific definitions of *come/do first/beforehand*, with the supplemental definitions *arrive first, overtake, outstrip, and anticipate*.

that Pausanias was on his way and when his attempts at persuasion failed, he opted to attack the city rather than retreat and await reinforcement.

Lysander was an excellent strategist and coordinator, so it is highly unlikely that his failure here was due to a lack of, or oversight in, technical skill. In CAF terms, during prior engagements, he had operated under the guidelines of full-spectrum operations (FSO) and the continuum of operations to great success²⁵⁵. He had never otherwise failed to employ that the CAF would recognize as ISTAR, JIMP, CSASS or the Ten Principles of War to his advantage. Furthermore, Xenophon does not report that Lysander made any attempt to contact or locate Pausanias for coordination. The CAF notes that failure to establish synchronization between BGs is significantly detrimental to a campaign's success probability.

*“Acting flexibly, based on an assessment of a changed or unexpected situation, should be expected and encouraged in training, even if it means varying from original orders. The important proviso is that any action should still fall within the general thrust and spirit of the superior’s intentions. A subordinate should report to his superior, and to other interested parties, such as flanking formations, any significant changes to the original plan. This promotes unity of effort and balances the requirement for local initiative with the need to keep others informed, so they can make any necessary adjustments to their own plans. Once the right conditions have been established, commanders should be capable of acting purposefully, within their delegated freedom of action, in the absence of further orders.”*²⁵⁶

²⁵⁵ For more information, see *Appendix IV: Continuum of Operations*.

²⁵⁶ *Command* (1996), 16

It is unclear at what point in the OODA loop Lysander decided he possessed the *combat arms*, *combat power*, and *fighting power* to engage Haliartos in a *main effort* fire²⁵⁷. What is clear, as Xenophon points out, is that his calculations were wrong.

In light of these considerations, I offer some speculation of my own. Instead, I suggest that his estrangement from Agesilaos had additional consequences on Lysander as an individual, not just as a commander, which impacted his decision-making in the field. He had gone to Asia with the intention of re-establishing himself as a power broker in the region, but Agesilaos' irritation cost him further respect and influence. Arriving as the king's most trusted advisor, he left Ionia publicly diminished and disgraced. His time at the Hellespont appears to have done nothing to abate the humiliation for him. Already distrusted by Pausanias and now shunned by Agesilaos, Lysander may have considered the campaign in Phocis to be a way to restore his reputation. Perhaps unwilling to work under Pausanias again²⁵⁸, he may have chanced Haliartos in a gambit to prove that he could accomplish his goals by himself. If he had undertaken ISTAR, he might also have known about the approaching Athenian forces and felt further pressure to capture the city without risking the wait for reinforcement. Whatever the proximate cause was, I believe his poor decisions at Haliartos can be (at least in part) attributed to his desire to restore the tatters of his reputation.

²⁵⁷ For more comprehensive definitions, see *Appendix I: Definitions and Abbreviations*. In brief, this means the equipment, manpower, and ability to conduct a decisive operation against Haliartos.

²⁵⁸ Recall Xenophon *Hellenika*, 2.4.29-35. Pausanias deliberately undercut Lysander's command and goals at Peiraeus as to limit his growing influence. He was successful both in stymying Lysander's plans, but also in cutting Lysander out of the conflict's resolution.



Having now seen the trajectory of Lysander's life and career, it is worthwhile to address a question that Sears poses:

*“[W]ould Brasidas have behaved any differently than Lysander had he lived longer and achieved total victory over the Athenians and thus imperial responsibilities?”*²⁵⁹

Bluntly put, the answer is unknowable. Brasidas' life ended early, before rivals or his own arrogance might undermine him. Based on Brasidas' record, it's difficult to even guess whether he would have followed a similar path to characters like Lysander. However, we can definitively contrast Lysander's career to Derkylidas'. Like Lysander, Derkylidas operated primarily in Ionia, Bithynian Thrace, and the Aegean. Similarly, he saw extended commission as a general working in these regions and established extensive personal connections and networks that facilitated, as we might say, CIMIC, ISTAR, and JIMP-esque operations. Derkylidas, too, was responsible for high-stakes negotiations with foreign powers and worked directly with King Agesilaos in the Near East. Derkylidas' record proves that Lysander could have had a successful and lengthy career without overstepping the boundaries of his position or alienating his fellow *homoioi*. Indeed, the length of Derkylidas' known career significantly supersedes that of Lysander. Derkylidas' trackable dates range from summer 411 to 389 – a span of twenty-two years. In contrast, Lysander's recorded range is from 407 to 395 – a span of twelve years²⁶⁰. Not only does Derkylidas outlive Lysander, he

²⁵⁹ Sears 2020, 182

²⁶⁰ *The Landmark Thucydides* (1996), 517; *The Landmark Xenophon's Hellenika* 2009, 171 (Derkylidas) : *The Landmark Xenophon's Hellenika* 2009, 28, 116 (Lysander). These dates are taken from the annotations provided on the respective pages.

had at least ten extra years during which time he could have made errors or enemies that may have resulted in death or exile. Yet, Derkylidas is not recorded to have faced punishment of any kind. Where Lysander's story ends with his death, Derkylidas' does not, so it is also possible that Derkylidas' career continued on after what is recorded.

The events in Asia Minor took a toll on Lysander – both privately and publicly. When viewing the aberrant nature of his campaign operations in Phocis through the lens of a man trying to revive his flagging reputation, the oddity of his choices become a little more logical. Lysander had every reason to be motivated to redeem himself in the eyes of his peers, and it is possible that he attempted to use the Phocis campaign to accomplish that. If he did, that impetus led him to take a risky gamble that did not pay off – a gamble that was, at its core, selfish. We know from Derkylidas that a commander whose decisions were not compromised by concern for personal advancement consistently produced favourable results. Bearing all of this in mind, I believe it is reasonable to assert that it was Lysander's inability to maintain the prioritization of the state over his own goals, coupled with his lack of modesty and humility, that ultimately resulted in his downfall.

[Sphodrias]

*“As a leader, you must take decisions and accept their results. You are the one responsible for the success or failure of your actions. You must admit your mistakes at least to yourself, and profit from them.”*²⁶¹

Sphodrias appears only in Book 5 of Xenophon's *Hellenika*. Unlike other generals we have looked at thus far, it will not take significant examination and analysis to understand the makeup of Sphodrias' character. Sphodrias appears in the narrative during King

²⁶¹ Gn. Dextraze 1973

Kleombrotos' campaign in Boiotia in 378. Kleombrotos had taken over following his father, Pausanias, fleeing Sparta²⁶². Kleombrotos' intention had been to retake Thebes, but the campaign swiftly failed. During the retreat, Kleombrotos left Sphodrias as governor of Thespiiai²⁶³. Xenophon does not supply or speculate on Kleombrotos' reasoning for this choice, nor does he give any details about Sphodrias' prior record which might justify being appointed to such a position. Sphodrias' subsequent behaviour must leave us puzzled by the decision.

Before the close of the year, Sphodrias had proved to be both corrupt and ineffective.

*“[The Thebans, in an attempt to avert war with Sparta] persuaded [πείθουσι] Sphodrias, the Spartan governor at Thespiiai (by giving him money, it was suspected [χρήματα δόντες, ὥς ὑπωπτεύετο]), to invade Attika, so that he might induce the Athenians to go to war against the Spartans. Sphodrias was persuaded [πειθόμενος], and he claimed that he would capture the Peiraieus, since it was still without gates [...] saying that he would arrive at the Peiraieus before daybreak. The new day, however, found Sphodrias and his army only as far along as Thria²⁶⁴. There he made no attempt to evade detection [καὶ οὐδὲν ἐντεῦθεν ἐποίησεν ὥστε λαθεῖν] but simply turned about and began to seize cattle and plunder houses.”*²⁶⁵

Sphodrias' control over his unit was loose. The irregulars²⁶⁶ which had joined his unit throughout his march abandoned him once they got near Athens and warned the *polis* of the coming attack. Unknown to Sphodrias – due in no small part to the unsanctioned nature of his actions – three Spartan ambassadors were present in the city at the time of his assault.

²⁶² Xenophon *Hellenika*, 3.5.25. Following the disaster of the Boiotian campaign, Pausanias was put on trial for failing to appear at Haliartos on time and indirectly leading to Lysander's death. Instead of attempting to defend himself at trial, Pausanias fled to Tegea and died shortly thereafter.

²⁶³ Xenophon *Hellenika*, 5.4.15

²⁶⁴ For reference, Thria is not far from Eleusis.

²⁶⁵ Xenophon *Hellenika*, 5.4.20-21, transl. J. Marincola (2009)

²⁶⁶ *Irregulars* or an *irregular* is the term for a soldier who joins a unit of a non-professional army. These soldiers are often *ad hoc* additions to a unit and mercenary.

*“There happened to be in Athens three Spartan ambassadors, Etymokles, Aristolochos, and Okyllos, staying at the home of Kallias, the man who looked after Spartan interests at Athens. When the news about Sphodrias was announced to the Athenians, they immediately seized these men and kept them under guard, believing they were involved with the plot. The ambassadors, however, were completely baffled by what had happened [οἱ δὲ ἐκπεπληγμένοι τε ἦσαν τῷ πράγματι] and defended themselves saying that they would never be such fools as to put themselves into the hands of the Athenians if they had known that there was a plot against the Peiraieus. Moreover, they would not have been at the house of the Athenian who looked after Spartan affairs, a place where they would most quickly be found. They also said that it would soon be quite clear to the Athenians that the city of Sparta knew nothing of Sphodrias’ actions, and they were confident that the Athenians would learn that Sphodrias had been put to death by the Spartans. So the Athenians released these men, judging them to have no knowledge of the plot.”*²⁶⁷

The ambassadors were lucky that the attack was so transparently ill-considered and sloppily executed. Once they learned of what happened, Spartan officials were incensed and immediately recalled him to be put on trial.

*“Back at Sparta, the ephors recalled Sphodrias and indicted him on a capital charge [ὑπὲρ θανάτου]. He, however, was afraid and did not obey the summons. Yet even though he disobeyed the summons and was not present at his trial, he was acquitted: to many this seemed to be the most unjust verdict ever rendered at Sparta [καὶ πολλοῖς ἔδοξεν αὕτη δὴ ἀδικώτατα ἐν Λακεδαίμονι ἢ δίκη κριθῆναι]. The reason for his acquittal was as follows.”*²⁶⁸

Sphodrias only escaped execution by a chance connection. His son, Kleonymos, happened to be the lover of King Agesilaos’ son Archidamos. Sphodrias begged Kleonymos to utilize that connection to get Agesilaos to pardon him, which Kleonymos did. It took some time for Archidamos to muster up the courage, but he eventually did confront Agesilaos and ask this favour on behalf of his lover. Twice he questioned Agesilaos about what he would do, but

²⁶⁷ Xenophon *Hellenika*, 5.4.22-23, transl. J. Marincola (2009)

²⁶⁸ Xenophon *Hellenika*, 5.4.24, transl. J. Marincola (2009)

only received ambiguous answers²⁶⁹. Despite this, Agesilaos must have been moved by his son's affection for Kleonymos.

*“After this, one of the friends of Sphodrias, while conversing with Etymokles, said, ‘I think that all of you who are friends of Agesilaos are going to vote to put Sphodrias to death.’ To this, Etymokles replied, ‘By Zeus, if we do, we will not then be doing the same as Agesilaos, since he is repeating to everyone he talks to with that although it is impossible to maintain that Sphodrias did not do wrong [μὴ ἀδικεῖν μὲν Σφοδρίαν ἀδύνατον εἶναι], nevertheless, as boy, youth, and adult, he had continually performed every service to Sparta, and thus it would be difficult to put such a man to death: for Sparta needs such soldiers.’ [...] This, then, is how Sphodrias was acquitted. Back in Athens, the Athenians who favoured the Boiotian cause pointed out to the people that the Spartans had not only failed to punish Sphodrias but had actually praised him for attacking Athens. So the Athenians began to construct gates at the Peiraieus and set about building ships and assisting the Boiotians with great enthusiasm.”*²⁷⁰

Agesilaos' decision to oblige Archidamos was not without significant consequence. For Archidamos, Kleonymos would become a loyal, lifelong partner²⁷¹. For Sparta, however, Sphodrias' acquittal brought about a renewal of hostilities with Athens, a strengthening of Theban influence, and a fracture within Sparta's wider authority.

Sphodrias was not responsible for, or even a significant factor in, the decline of Spartan hegemony that occurred over the course of the 370s, but his acquittal was further fuel for the malcontent simmering underneath the constraints of the alliance. Sphodrias' behaviour was, as Agesilaos himself admitted, egregious. Two of his most significant deficits were in willpower (coupled with intellect) and integrity. As the CAF explains:

²⁶⁹ Xenophon *Hellenika*, 5.4.28-31

²⁷⁰ Xenophon *Hellenika*, 5.4.32-34, transl. J. Marincola (2009)

²⁷¹ Xenophon *Hellenika*, 5.4.33, transl. J. Marincola (2009). Upon learning of Agesilaos' favour, Kleonymos vowed to remain loyal to Archidamos, a promise he would keep until he died. Kleonymos would ultimately sacrifice his life to protect Archidamos at Leuktra in 371. “His death, it is true, brought extreme grief to Archidamos, but Kleonymos, just as he had promised, brought no shame to Archidamos, but rather, honour.”

*“The essential thing is action. Action has three stages: the decision born of thought, the order or preparation for execution, and the execution itself. All three stages are governed by the will. The will is rooted in character, and for the man of action character is of more critical importance than intellect. Intellect without will is worthless, will without intellect is dangerous.”*²⁷²

“The setting of high standards of conduct, based on professional ethics and personal moral principles, is required of all commanders. Values such as moral courage, honesty, and loyalty are indispensable in any organization, but especially the military. [...] Observance of such values, based on self-discipline and professional integrity, and adherence to both military and civilian law, plays a crucial role in the maintenance of military discipline and morale. Commanders have a critical role in setting and maintaining the ethical climate of their commands, a climate that must be robust enough to withstand the pressures of both peacetime and operational soldiering. It is the responsibility and duty of all commanders to sustain institutional values in their commands.

Integrity of character is crucial for effective leadership. A commander cannot maintain the confidence of his troops – nor senior levels the confidence of the government [...] – unless he possesses the highest degree of moral credibility. [...]

*Self-control is an important component of setting the example. It not only adds dignity to command but will aid its preservation.”*²⁷³

Accepting Thebes' proposal in the first place was damning – if he knew nothing else, Sphodrias should have known Thebes and Sparta were adversaries and that Athens and Sparta were allied. He himself had been present for King Kleomenes' campaign and was placed in Thespiiai specifically as an impediment to Thebes' expanding influence in Boiotia. Attacking an ally at the behest of an adversary makes little sense, especially if suspicion was unfounded and he was not bribed. Furthermore, leaving his area of responsibility (AOR) in Thespiiai was imprudent and insubordinate. He had been given the commission and

²⁷² Gn. von Seeckt 1930, *Thoughts of a Soldier* (London: E. Benn LTD), 123. Re-quoted from *Command* (1996), 16-17.

²⁷³ *Command* (1996), 19

discretion necessary to defend his assigned *polis* and perhaps the immediate A of I surrounding it. He was not given leave to work with Thebes or to depart his AOR, nor could he reasonably expect to receive it if requested. Acting so far outside the bounds of his delegated freedom of action without consulting Sparta devalued any integrity he may have once had, and his army reflected his unscrupulous and self-serving character.

If leaving Thespias was bad, the march to Peiraeus was worse. Sphodrias' army was an *ad hoc* collection of volunteers and locals. Xenophon reports to us that Sphodrias allowed them to behave erratically and plunder unassociated and non-target areas. In addition to this was the influx of irregulars who joined at random. As the CAF explains, the combination of a *laissez-faire* command with an improvisational contingent is a volatile one:

*"[A] highly cohesive unit is characterized by subordinates who perfectly understand their commander's intent. [...] The commander of an ad hoc unit must expend much more effort ensuring that his subordinates fully understand his intentions and direction, and to feel reassured that the task will be completed properly. Ad hoc units, therefore, cause a significant escalation of risk that must be appreciated by higher commanders."*²⁷⁴

Sphodrias considered none of this. As one might expect, his movements were reported to Athens by defecting members of his own unit, which effectively dissolved the campaign before it could reach its objective. It must have been clear to those defecting members that Sphodrias was not a commander overburdened with integrity – it would not have taken long for rumour to disseminate that he had been bribed, or for knowledge to spread that he was a *harmost*, not a *strategos*, and had no legitimate business in Peiraeus. On top of this, he clearly undertook no CCIR, IPB, or ISTAR preparations once he got near Athens and allowed

²⁷⁴ *Command* (1996), 21

his army to maul territory belonging to Spartan allies. His ignorance – by chance or by choice – of Sparta's JIMP goals had collateral impacts on Sparta's reputation, her ability to project power and moral authority, and, through that, her capability to establish or reinforce CIMIC and ISTAR relationships.

Sphodrias' flaws were many, varied, and conspicuous. Self-important, oblivious, foolish, vainglorious, capricious, and morally frail, he bungled every facet of his authority promptly and irreparably. His failure as a harmost and a commander was consummate and complete.

[Thibron]

*"Loyalty demands that you forsake personal pleasures if they conflict in any way with the performance of your duties. You have no right to take time off for amusement tonight if you should use this time to prepare for tomorrow's task."*²⁷⁵

Where Sphodrias seemed to go out of his way to present his flaws the moment he was given command, Thibron seemed unable to keep them from surfacing. Where Sphodrias' errors were unmistakable, Thibron's are more subtle. However, both men failed in like fashion: neither was capable of keeping control of their BGs, nor could they achieve their objectives. Thibron would not face the threat of execution like Sphodrias, but he would find himself ignominiously demoted, fined, and exiled. When given a second chance to prove himself, he would pay for his inadequacy with his life.

²⁷⁵ Gn. Dextraze 1973

After Cyrus' failed coup, Artaxerxes gifted Tissaphernes Cyrus' former territory. Tissaphernes demanded acknowledgement from the Greek cities in Ionia, but they refused him. Seeking to remain autonomous, many of these cities called on Sparta for assistance.

“So the Spartans sent Thibron to [Ionia] as harmost, giving him about a thousand of the freed helots as soldiers and about four thousand of the rest of the Peloponnesians. Thibron also demanded three hundred cavalry from the Athenians, promising that he himself would provide for their upkeep. [...] When they arrived in Asia, Thibron gathered additional soldiers from the Greek cities on the mainland, since at that time all the Greeks of Asia obeyed any order that a Spartan might give them. Thibron at this time did not bring his cavalry down into the plain but kept a close watch on the enemy and did not try to keep their forces from ravaging the land near whatever position he happened to be holding [καὶ σὺν μὲν ταύτῃ τῇ στρατιᾷ ὁρῶν Θίβρων τὸ ἵππικὸν εἰς τὸ πεδίον οὐ κατέβαινεν, ἡγάπα δὲ εἰ ὅπου τυγχάνοι ὦν, δύναίτο ταύτην τὴν χώραν ἀδῆωτον διαφυλάττειν].”²⁷⁶

Thibron's dismissal of CIMIC, JIMP and PMESII-type concerns is a consistent theme throughout his tenure as commander in Asia Minor. This disinterest impacted his ability to make use of ISTAR and thus disallowed sufficient IPB.

“There were in addition some weak cities that Thibron took by force. Thibron also besieged Larisa (the one called Egyptian Larisa), encircling it with an army after his attempts at persuasion failed [ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἐπείθετο]. When he could not take it by any other means, he attempted to cut a shaft and dig a conduit that would cut off the city's water supply. The Larisaans, however, would run out from the wall and throw wood and stones into the shaft. When Thibron, in response, made a wooden covering over it, the Larisaans countered by attacking at night and setting the cover on fire. Since it seemed that he was having no success [δοκοῦντος δ' αὐτοῦ οὐδὲν ποιεῖν], the ephors ordered him to leave Larisa and campaign instead against Caria.

While Thibron was in Ephesus planning his march to Caria, the man who was to succeed him as commander, Derkylidas, arrived. [...] So Thibron departed for home, where he was fined and sent into exile, because the Spartan allies had brought a charge against him that he allowed his army to plunder the friends of the Spartans [ὁ μὲν οὖν Θίβρων ἀπῆλθεν οἴκαδε καὶ

²⁷⁶ Xenophon *Hellenika*, 3.1.4-5, transl. J. Marincola (2009)

ζημιωθεὶς ἔφυγε · κατηγοροῦν γὰρ αὐτοῦ οἱ σύμμαχοι ὡς ἐφείη ἀρπάζειν τῷ στρατεύματι τοὺς φίλους].”²⁷⁷

It is unclear whether the ephors redirected Thibron to Caria legitimately or if it was a ruse to get him out of Ionia. Derkylidas faced no such issues when he returned to Asia Minor. Indeed, Derkylidas did not have to take up arms against most of the cities he encountered, nor was he reduced to contrived schemes in an attempt to induce his adversary's surrender. Under Derkylidas' command, the same men even received commendation²⁷⁸.

Xenophon makes no mention of what happened to Thibron between his exile in 399 and his return, or why he was recalled. It is also unknown why he was considered for the commission in the first place, but in 391 he was sent back to Ionia. His performance there, however, did not indicate that he took his second chance any more seriously than his first.

“When the Spartans saw that Strouthas was hostile to them and friendly toward the Athenians, they sent Thibron to wage war against him. Thibron crossed over into Asia, and using Ephesus along with Priene, Leukophrys, and Achilleion (these cities in the plain of the Maeander) as his base, he raided and plundered the territory of the King.

As time went by, however, Strouthas came to realize that every time Thibron made his expeditions, he failed to maintain proper formation [ἐκάστοτε ἀτάκτως καὶ καταφρονητικῶς] but instead proceeded as if contemptuous of the Persians. As so Strouthas sent horsemen into the plain and ordered them to charge and encircle Thibron's forces and carry off whatever they could. It so happened that after breakfast Thibron and Thersander the flute player were spending time in the tent together. Thersander was not only a fine flute player, but he also claimed to be very strong, since he was a great imitator of Spartan ways²⁷⁹. Strouthas, seeing that the enemy was bringing assistance without order and that the men in front were few [ἰδὼν ἀτάκτως τε βοηθοῦντας καὶ ὀλίγους τοὺς πρώτους], suddenly appeared at the head of

²⁷⁷ Xenophon *Hellenika*, 3.1.7-8, transl. J. Marincola (2009)

²⁷⁸ Xenophon *Hellenika*, 3.1.8-10

²⁷⁹ *The Landmark Xenophon's Hellenika*, 166. Footnote 4.8.18b: “In Xenophon's time, the statement that Thersander was a great admirer of Spartan ways is a double entendre, referring to homosexual practises. The description of Thersander as ‘very strong’ would imply that he was thought to be the active partner and, therefore, Thibron the passive one.”

many cavalry drawn up in proper battle formation. They first killed Thibron and Thersander; once these fell, the rest of the Spartans took flight, and the Persian cavalry pursued them and struck down many of them. Some escaped safely to friendly cities, while more had in fact been left behind in camp, since they found out too late that a raiding party had gone out. For as so often was the case, Thibron made his sorties without even announcing them [πολλάκις γάρ, καὶ τότε, οὐδὲ παραγγείλας τὴν βοήθειαν ἐποιήσατο]. That was how this campaign ended.”²⁸⁰

From Rhodes, a Spartiate named Diphridas was sent to take over Thibron’s command and ensure that the allied cities under his jurisdiction remained under Spartan control.

“Diphridas was no less gracious than Thibron, but in his capacity as general he was more resolute and more enterprising, since pleasures of the body did not master him, and he always accomplished whatever task he set himself.”²⁸¹

Diphridas, like Derkylidas before him, had cleaned up the mess Thibron had made of the campaign. This time, Thibron’s lacklustre control over his forces and sloppy delegation cost him his life instead of his job.

Xenophon’s account does not attempt to hide his contempt for Thibron²⁸². However he may have emphasized Thibron’s failings, they were there to be emphasized, and his poor performance twice had to be salvaged by two different generals nearly ten years apart²⁸³. Thibron’s most explicit weakness was control, both over himself and his troops. Since “it is the commander who conceived of the plan and provides the drive, motivation and energy to

²⁸⁰ Xenophon *Hellenika*, 4.8.17-19, transl. J. Marincola (2009)

²⁸¹ Xenophon *Hellenika*, 4.8.22, transl. J. Marincola (2009); Gr: ἦν δ’ οὗτος ἀνὴρ εὐχαρὶς τε οὐχ ἥττον τοῦ Θίβρωνος, μᾶλλον τε συντεταγμένος καὶ ἐγχειρητικώτερος στρατηγός. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκράτουν αὐτοῦ αἱ τοῦ σώματος ἡδοναί, ἀλλ’ αἰεὶ πρὸς ᾧ εἶη ἔργῳ, τοῦτο ἔπραττεν.

²⁸² Xenophon *Anabasis*, 7.6.43. Xenophon heard from Thibron’s representative, Polynikos, alongside “some others” that Thibron intended to execute him if he ever came under the custody of the Spartans. The origin of Thibron’s animosity toward Xenophon is unclear.

²⁸³ In a hilarious run of irony, Derkylidas – who had taken over his command back in 399 – was still operating in Asia Minor in 391.

attain the objective”²⁸⁴, as the CAF manual explains, it is no surprise that Thibron’s preoccupation with his flute-player and inattention to things such as the timing of taskings resulted poor performance. As the CAF points out,

*“When officers fail to set a higher set of standards in dress, deportment and professional and personal conduct, there is an implied permission to all those around them, in particular subordinates, to drop the standards expected of them. They feel free to adopt lower standards in all facets of military life than those that should be expected. Discipline fails and professional rot occurs. This ‘implied permission’ quickly begins to affect other facets of responsibility.”*²⁸⁵

Through the lens of the CAF, it is also clear that he utterly failed to undertake necessary ISTAR and CSASS operations in order to secure his own camp and his broader AO. Camp sentries or recce posted in the area should have alerted Thibron to Strouthas’ approach. Had Thibron taken time to establish CIMIC relationships with the cities he was surrounded by, he may also have received warning from them, but we know from his 399 campaign that he didn’t make such efforts. Furthermore, he failed to incorporate the Ten Principles of War, most egregiously 1 (Selection and Maintenance of the Aim), 2 (Maintenance of Morale), 3 (Offensive Action) and 10 (Administration). He allowed himself to be put on the back foot by disrespecting and underestimating his adversary, forcing him to react instead of act.

Thibron’s lack of attention toward and apparent indifference to his own command condemned both his campaigns and his career to failure. He treated it dismissively and focused instead on his own appetites. His self-centred lack of focus had a detrimental effect on the discipline and cohesion of his men, while his poor management had left the unit open

²⁸⁴ *Command* (1996), 12

²⁸⁵ *Command: The Operational Function* (2018), 35, section 48

to a surprise attack. The absence of care, creativity, and initiative in his command stymied him at Larisa as much as it did on the Maeander.

[Klearchos]

*“The job of leading demands that you acknowledge good work and be critical of bad work on the part of your subordinates. How you do this can have an important bearing on your effectiveness as a leader. The key here is moderation. Excessive praise and excessive rebuke are each detrimental in their own way. I am not saying that rewards or punishments are to be avoided: I simply mean that they must be metered out fairly and intelligently.”*²⁸⁶

Like Derkylidas, Klearchos is a Spartan general who features in both Thucydides and Xenophon’s *Hellenika*. However, unlike Derkylidas, his brief appearances there are testimony to his insignificance. In Thucydides, he appears twice as nothing more than a sidenote²⁸⁷, and his final mention features him running errands²⁸⁸. Despite being notable enough to be mentioned by name, he accomplishes nothing and contributes nothing to the narrative or the war effort. The task he was given was completed by someone else and he fails to merit any further acknowledgement.

He is barely more relevant in the *Hellenika*. His only appearances are brief and uninspiring, near the beginning of Book 1. He is first mentioned being sent to the Hellespont

²⁸⁶ Gn. Dextraze 1973

²⁸⁷ Thucydides *History*, 8.8, 8.39, 8.80. In 8.8, it is remarked that he was appointed proxenos to Byzantium and in 8.39, his name appears as an option to replace Astyochos, which does not happen. Neither his role as proxenos nor optioning him as a replacement general bear any weight within the narrative. Again, this stands in contrast to Derkylidas, whose position as proxenos and replacement general are deeply relevant to his role in the work (and in Spartan victory in the Near East, more precisely).

²⁸⁸ Thucydides *History*, 8.80, transl. S. Lattimore (1998): “... since Tissaphernes was a poor supplier, and dispatched Klearchos son of Rhamphias to Pharnabazos, in accordance with his original orders on leaving the Peloponnesos, with forty ships. ... So these forty ships set out on the open sea to keep the Athenians from knowing about their voyage, and after they were caught in a storm most, with Klearchos, found shelter at Delos and subsequently returned to Miletos (but Klearchos then travelled to the Hellespont and took command) while ten with the general Helixos of Megara got through to the Hellespont and brought about the revolt of Byzantium.”

a second time by King Agis to cut off Athenian grain imports²⁸⁹. In the interim, he became the *harmost* at Byzantium, where he got sieged by Athenian forces. While the Athenian forces could not break the city, neither could Klearchos repel them. Instead, he left the city in an attempt to gain aid from Pharnabazos, who was in the area with his own army. Xenophon details his failure for us in two succinct paragraphs.

“Klearchos, the garrison commander, thinking that no one would [betray the city], had arranged everything as best he could and, entrusting the matters in the city to Coiratadas and Helixus, crossed over the strait to Pharnabazos to get pay for the soldiers from him. He also wished to gather together the ships that were in the Hellespont, some of which had been sent as guards by Pasippidas, others in Antandros, and others that Agesandridas (who was Mindaros’ junior officer) commanded in Thrace. Moreover, Klearchos wanted to build additional ships so that, with an expanded fleet, he might attack the allies of Athens and thus compel the Athenians to withdraw their forces, and so lift the siege on Byzantium.

But when Klearchos sailed out, those Byzantines who would betray the city – Cydon, Ariston, Anaxikrates, Lykurgos and Anaxilaos – set to work. Anaxilaos was later charged at Sparta because of his betrayal but escaped the penalty of death: he defended himself by saying that he was a Byzantine, not a Spartan, and that he did not betray the city but, rather, saved it, for he saw the women and children perishing by famine, since Klearchos gave all the food to the Spartan soldiers; and so it was for this, not for gain or from hatred of the Spartans, that he had let the enemy into the city.” ²⁹⁰

Let us explore every manner in which Klearchos’ plan was, charitably put, irresponsible. To begin, there is no reason that Klearchos should have left his battlespace. The errands he set for himself could have been handled by trusted subordinates while he maintained his AO and AOR. Particularly considering how many objectives he had hoped to achieve, sending multiple representatives at once would have been both more reasonable and more

²⁸⁹ Xenophon *Hellenika*, 1.1.36

²⁹⁰ Xenophon *Hellenika*, 1.3.17-19, transl. J. Marincola (2009)

expedient. Second, building and maintaining cohesion between both the army and the populace should have been a priority, especially in a siege situation.

*“Cohesion is the glue that solidifies individual and group will under the command of leaders. Common intent based upon mutual understanding, trust, and doctrine is crucial. Cohesion allows military forces to endure hardship while retaining the physical and moral strength to continue fighting to accomplish their mission.”*²⁹¹

Derkyllidas proved at Abydos that the *polis*’ faith and trust in the commander’s decisions, even during a siege with poor odds, can be a make-or-break factor in victory – the CAF explicitly states, “... unit cohesion and a strong sense of ‘family’ [are] the keys to tactical success.”²⁹² Derkyllidas won because Abydos believed he would take care of them; Klearchos lost because they knew he wasn’t concerned for them. Thirdly, he failed to take into account any of the underlying factors illustrated by the CAF’s Ten Principles of War, which massively undercut his strategy, but especially 3 (Offensive Action): “Only through offensive action can a military force assure the defeat of an adversary. Commanders adopt the defensive only as a temporary expedient and must seek every opportunity to seize and maintain the initiative through offensive action.”²⁹³

In its *Land Operations* manual, the CAF identifies six determinants for a unit’s success when operating in a joint campaign. Consideration and achievement of these constituent elements help ensure decisive and long-standing results from any operation. They read as follows²⁹⁴:

²⁹¹ *Command* (1996), 8. For a more complete and comprehensive breakdown of the term and the CAF’s understanding of cohesion’s value, see *Appendix I: Definitions and Abbreviations*.

²⁹² *Command* (1996), 8

²⁹³ *Land Operations* (2008), 3-5

²⁹⁴ *Land Operations* (2008), 3-5

- **Defeat or Deter Land-based Adversaries.** Land forces have the ability to coerce, persuade and dissuade or comprehensively defeat any adversary. Air and maritime forces may do great damage, particularly to massed forces, but an adaptive adversary will find ways to survive their attacks and avoid defeat. To achieve success, land forces must be used to physically close with the adversary.
- **Seize Terrain Objectives.** Land forces can effectively seize physical objectives. Fires are rarely capable of ejecting a determined adversary from the terrain they occupy. Even if mass fires might be ultimately effective, the resulting collateral damage may be unacceptable in terms of campaign and strategic objectives.
- **Secure Terrain Objectives.** Physical occupation by ground forces is the only certain means of achieving lasting security of an area. This applies to security against conventional manoeuvre forces, and against unconventional adversaries. To effectively combat and counter an insurgency, it is vital for forces to be placed on the ground being contested and to live and work amongst the population. Against an unconventional adversary, land forces as small as a platoon may effectively secure a piece of terrain.
- **Positive Influence on Populations.** Influence, through daily human interaction, pervasive security and confidence building activities, is key to long-term stability. Well-trained and disciplined soldiers, deployed amongst a population, can have a major impact and influence on a population and garner their support for the campaign.
- **Enable Other Agencies to Operate.** Land forces provide the framework of security and support that will allow other agencies, particularly civilian and unarmed, to undertake their responsibilities. In any region, long-term stability and prosperity will depend upon other governmental and non-governmental agencies dealing with a wide variety of civil, political and social issues. These agencies can only work in an environment in which land forces have achieved a significant measure of security.
- **Serve as a Symbol for Political Commitment.** The commitment of a nation's land forces may be costly in both resources and lives. It represents considerable political commitment and acceptance of risk on behalf of a government and a domestic populace.

Using Derkylidas at Abydos once more as a counter-example, we can conclusively see how negligence towards these factors, as the CAF has outlined them, leads to campaign failure.

- **Defeat or Deter Land-based Adversaries.** Xenophon neglects to tell us how Derkylidas drove off Pharnabazos' forces but explicitly tells us that he did manage to do so. While he did leave his immediate AO, he *did not* leave his AOR. Derkylidas could have easily been recalled to Abydos from Sestos²⁹⁵.

²⁹⁵ Xenophon *Hellenika*, 4.8.5, transl.. J. Marincola (2009): "When many experienced men were gathered in [Abydos], Derkylidas crossed over into Sestos (which is opposite Abydos and not more than eight stades distant) ..." Footnote 4.8.5b notes, "Eight Attic stades of 583 feet would convert to about 0.9 miles [1.45

- In contrast, Klearchos crossed over the Bosphorus Strait from Thrace into Bithynia in Asia Minor by ship. He could not be easily recalled or contacted in the event of emergency or betrayal (such as what occurred). His intended reliance on maritime power also would not have broken the ground siege of Byzantium.
- **Seize Terrain Objectives.** Derkylidas was always careful to keep fires as brief and infrequent as possible to ensure the preservation of his manpower and materiel²⁹⁶. He was aware that attacking from within Abydos was only a reasonable option under certain conditions. Klearidas' assault from within Amphipolis following Brasidas' initial ambush is a good example of such conditions.
 - Klearchos' subordinates seem to have been aware of the worsening conditions within the walls of Byzantium, which is why they attempted the attack. However, attacking without the initiative is notably disadvantageous²⁹⁷. Klearchos' absence combined with his negligence left his subordinates with few and unfavourable options.
- **Secure Terrain Objectives.** Derkylidas was the *proxenos* to Abydos, thus it was his duty to ensure the *polis*' defense. His established relationships and reputation in the area provided a pre-existing backbone of local and regional support which was strong enough to weather Pharnabazos' fires. The AO was secure *before* Pharnabazos arrived.
 - We have seen that Klearchos had been in the area before, sent by King Agis. His inability to secure the region prior to engagement is likely related to his nominal local support. His inability to acquire CIMIC coupled with his inability to defeat/deter the Athenians resulted in his failure to secure the AO.
- **Positive Influence on Populations.** As I mentioned, Derkylidas was very established and well-liked at Abydos. He had garnered the trust of the local populace and they were willing to follow him even against a larger, better supplied force. Furthermore, Xenophon draws attention to how Derkylidas took the opinions/needs of Sparta's allies into consideration throughout the entirety of his tenure as general.
 - Klearchos had no such advantage. Byzantium clearly supported Sparta, but the Byzantines did not support Klearchos. By the time Athens began the siege, it was too late to build and/or reinforce CIMIC relationships, address PMESII concerns or work on ISTAR networks.
- **Enable Other Agencies to Operate.** The other *harmostai* and *proxenoi* that had been forced to retreat from their *poleis* by Pharnabazos came to Derkylidas.

kilometers].” Considering that, on average, a human being can see up to three miles/five kilometers into the distance, Derkylidas likely could physically see Abydos from Sestos.

²⁹⁶ *Materiel* is not a misspelling, but a term used by the CAF and many other professional militaries to refer to non-personnel military assets. This includes weapons/weapons systems, vehicles, and even buildings/defensive architecture.

²⁹⁷ This is a prime example of how Klearchos failed Principle 3 (Offensive Action): “Initiative means setting or changing the terms of battle through offensive action. ... To seize and then retain the initiative requires constant effort to force the adversary to conform to our operational purpose and tempo while retaining our freedom of action.”

Derkylidas made space for them and their forces within Abydos and Sestos despite the limited room and resources. He was also able to convince the people of Abydos to take up arms. His management and oversight of this cooperation led to victory.

- Klearchos, as far as Xenophon reports, did not attempt to make use of the Byzantines for defensive or offensive action. While he did seek outside aid, he chose to do so in an inefficient and protracted manner. In the interim, he lost of the support of the Byzantines and thus the siege.
- **Serve as a Symbol for Political Commitment.** Derkylidas always prioritized reassuring Spartan allies and promoting Sparta's higher-order objectives. In Abydos, taking in displaced Spartan allies and successfully protecting his own *polis* reinforced Sparta's commitment to protecting their allies in Asia Minor.
- Prior to the siege, Byzantium had been a staunch Spartan ally for many years. Anaxilaos specifically says that he doesn't hate Sparta. Klearchos' behaviour and poor command forced Byzantium to surrender to save herself.

Klearchos may not have been directly in charge during Byzantium's fall, but he remains responsible for the failure of the *polis*' defense nonetheless. Klearchos allowed Byzantium to be sieged, starved its residents to feed his own men, then abandoned his AOR. By the time his subordinates had been given authority and attempted to recover the situation, Klearchos had already left it untenable and unsalvageable. As the CAF frames it, "Authority gives the commander the right to make decisions, transmit his intentions to his subordinate commanders, and impose his will on subordinates. Together with his authority, commanders accept the additional burden of accountability to their superiors for the actions of their subordinates. This accountability is the complement of authority, and can never be delegated."²⁹⁸ Indeed, Helixus and Coiratadas wound up prisoners of the Athenians while Klearchos returned to Sparta freely²⁹⁹. Klearchos' presence in the *Hellenika* ends here, and when we reunite with him in the *Anabasis*, he is an exile³⁰⁰.

²⁹⁸ *Command* (1996), 5

²⁹⁹ Xenophon *Hellenika*, 1.3.21-22. When he was disembarked at Peiraieus, Coiratadas actually managed to escape to Dekeleia. No more about these two men is mentioned in Xenophon's narrative.

³⁰⁰ *The Landmark Xenophon's Anabasis* (2021), 468. According to *Appendix W* §20.2, Diodorus Siculus (14.12.2-7) and another author named Polyaeus (uncited) detail the events that result in Klearchos' exile,



Klearchos features quite extensively in Books 1 and 2 of the *Anabasis*, due in no small part to his command position within the Ten Thousand and his collusion with Cyrus. His spectre lingers over the entirety of the *Anabasis*, as Xenophon (and likely the rest of the Ten Thousand) continually lays blame for their troubles at his feet. His presence here, however, is most notable not due to its length, but to the inclusion of an obituary. For the only time we'll see within these examples, a character's demeanour, mannerisms, and personality traits are explicitly detailed without having to be interpreted through his actions. Of the eulogies featured at the end of Book 2, Klearchos' is also by far the longest. Due to the length of the obituary which will be included in full below, I will mostly summarize his tenure as commander of the Ten Thousand.

Sometime in the interim between the *Hellenika* and the *Anabasis*, Klearchos was exiled from Sparta and found his way into the friendly company of Cyrus³⁰¹. In the wake of King Darius' death and the accession of his eldest son Artaxerxes, Tissaphernes convinced Artaxerxes that Cyrus was plotting a coup. Cyrus, who had not, was only saved by the intervention of their mother, Parysatis. However, the fear and humiliation caused by the accusation lingered, and Cyrus – now afraid of his brother's power over him – began quietly amassing troops. For this purpose, he turned to Klearchos in 403-2 and gave him a sum of

including disobeying direct orders from the ephors and having to be forcibly dislodged from Byzantium and nearby Selymbria by Spartan forces. It is after these events that Klearchos befriends Cyrus.

³⁰¹ According to the *Landmark* editions of each work, the fall of Byzantium occurred in 408 and the Persian succession crisis happened in 405-4. Xenophon does not mention when Klearchos came into Cyrus' company.

gold to maintain mercenaries for him in Thessaly. In spring of 401, he called upon Klearchos to bring all of his mercenaries and meet him in Sardis³⁰². From there, they travelled through Phrygia, Lycaonia, and Cilicia gathering support. At Tarsus in Cilicia, sometime in August/September of 401, the Ten Thousand became suspicious that they were being lead against the King. Klearchos initially ignored their concerns and attempted to force them onward. It went poorly.

*“[The soldiers] already suspected that they were being led against the King, and they said they had not been hired for that. Klearchos was the first to try to force his own soldiers to go on [στρατιώτας ἐβιάζετο ἰέναι], but they started to throw things at him and at the draft animals carrying his baggage whenever they began to move forward. On this occasion, Klearchos only just escaped from being stoned to death [Κλέαρχος δὲ τότε μὲν μικρὸν ἐξέφυγε μὴ καταπετρωθῆναι], but later on, when he realized that he was not going to be able to succeed by force, he called together an assembly of his soldiers. To begin with, he stood there in tears for a long time.”*³⁰³

In his following speech, he professed his affection for his soldiers and promised that in spite of how well Cyrus had treated him and how Cyrus had paid their wages in the past, he would side with them. His impassioned monologue conveniently failed to address whether they were headed to fight the King, but he allowed the soldiers to believe he was refusing to do so. He arranged more theatrics with Cyrus, addressed the men again, and (after some negotiation with Cyrus) convinced the Ten Thousand to continue³⁰⁴.

From there, Cyrus’ army moved into Syria, then southeast along the Euphrates towards Babylon. When stopped at Thapsakos, Cyrus finally revealed that they were, indeed, marching against the King. The Ten Thousand were not impressed with this revelation,

³⁰² Xenophon *Anabasis*, 1.1.9-1.2.1

³⁰³ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 1.3.1-2, transl. D. Thomas (2021)

³⁰⁴ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 1.3.9-20

accusing the generals of having known well in advance and lying to them. Only through the promise of more money did they remain³⁰⁵. In November 401, at Charmande, Klearchos' temper once more got the best of him and, once again, he nearly got killed in his own camp.

*“[A] dispute of some sort arose between one of Menon’s troops and a soldier from Klearchos’ contingent, and Klearchos, judging that Menon’s soldier was in the wrong, struck him several times [πληγὰς ἐνέβαλεν]. That man then went to his own army and spoke about it, and when they heard his tale, the soldiers became angry and worked themselves up into a rage with Klearchos [οἱ στρατιῶται ἐχαλέπαινον καὶ ὠργίζοντο ἰσχυρῶς τῷ Κλεάρχῳ]. [...] One of Menon’s soldiers, who was chopping wood, saw Klearchos as he rode through, and let fly at him with his axe [ἤησι τῇ ἀξίνῃ]. This soldier missed him, but first one and then another started to throw stones [ἄλλος δὲ λίθῳ καὶ ἄλλος]; a clamour arose, and then many more threw stones at him [εἶτα πολλοί, κραυγῆς γενομένης]. Klearchos made his escape [καταφεύγει] to his own army and immediately called them to arms.”*³⁰⁶

The contingents of Menon and Klearchos would have come to blows if not for the timely intervention of Proxenos and Cyrus. Later on in the month, Cyrus called Klearchos³⁰⁷ and the other commanders in to help him decide what to do with Orontas, a Persian who had attempted to expose Cyrus’ plans to the King. Cyrus asked Klearchos first what to do, and he suggested execution³⁰⁸. Orontas was put to death and the army moved on into Babylonia, where they met the King’s army at Cunaxa.

The battle went well for the Greeks, but not Cyrus or the rest of his army. Klearchos was instructed to take up position on the right flank. Seeing that the King’s line outstretched his own, Cyrus ordered Klearchos to push toward the centre-left, but Klearchos believed if

³⁰⁵ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 1.4.11-13

³⁰⁶ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 1.5.11-13, transl. D. Thomas (2021)

³⁰⁷ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 1.6.5, transl. D. Thomas (2021): “Cyrus called Klearchos inside the tent to take part in his council, since he seemed, both to Cyrus and to the others, to be by far the foremost in prestige among the Greeks.”

³⁰⁸ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 1.6.9, transl. D. Thomas (2021)

his flank wasn't protected by the river, that he could be encircled. Employing double-speak much the same way he had to his troops, Klearchos said that "he would take care that things went well [ὅτι αὐτῷ μέλει ὅπως καλῶς ἔχῃ]."³⁰⁹ Once the battle commenced, the Greek forces pushed straight instead of left as instructed, but broke the line commanded by Tissaphernes. In the meantime, the forces surrounding Cyrus made a push for the King's position, but none made it that far. Unknown to the Greeks, who had run down the retreating Persian forces, they had left a wide gap in Cyrus' line. The remainder of Cyrus' army broke under the onslaught and the Persians routed them back to the camps, which they plundered³¹⁰. By the end of the day, the Greek forces were so distant that they could not see, even from atop a hill, that their patron was dead and his army had lost³¹¹. When they returned to their baggage train and camp, they found it looted and went without food.

It was late the next morning when messengers from Tissaphernes and the King arrived. They ordered them, since Cyrus was dead and overall they had won the day, to lay down their weapons and entreat the King for mercy. "Klearchos still maintained the line that it was not for the victors to hand over their weapons."³¹² When the other generals could not come to

³⁰⁹ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 1.8.13, transl. D. Thomas (2021)

³¹⁰ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 1.10.4-6

³¹¹ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 1.10.13-17: "The Greeks halted there, grounded their arms, and rested for a time. While they did this, they marvelled that Cyrus was not to be seen anywhere and that nobody came from him. They did not realize that he was dead but imagined that he had done in pursuit or had ridden on ahead to seize some position."

³¹² Xenophon *Anabasis*, 2.1.9, transl. D. Thomas (2021); Gr: ὅμως δὲ Κλέαρχος τοσοῦτον εἶπεν, ὅτι οὐ τῶν νικῶντων εἴη τὰ ὄπλα παραδιδόναι

consensus on a course of action, the Persian embassy pressed him for a decision³¹³. What he offered instead was a vague reply, attempting to buy time for them to think of a way to escape.

“To this, Klearchos said, ‘Well, that’s what you say. What you are to report back from us is that we think that, should it be necessary to be friends with the King, we would be more valuable friends if we had out weapons than if we had surrendered them to someone else; and we think that, should it be necessary to fight a war, we would likewise fight better if we had out weapons than if we had surrendered them to someone else.’

[Phalinos repeatedly presses Klearchos for clarification on the decision.]

*[Phalinos] again asked, ‘Am I to report back truce or open war?’ and Klearchos again answered the same: ‘Staying put – truce; retreat or advance – open war.’ But he gave no clear clue as to what he would do.”*³¹⁴

Indeed, when he received word that Ariaaios, one of Cyrus’ Persian supporters, was leaving in the morning and would let the Greeks depart with him, Klearchos once again gave an empty answer³¹⁵. However, Klearchos ordered the generals to move overnight to Ariaaios’ camp, which solidified his position as primary commander³¹⁶. They searched nearby towns but found the King had already ransacked them. The following morning, the King offered a

³¹³ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 2.1.15-20. When asked for his own opinion, Klearchos attempted to shift the responsibility to Phalinos, who also dodged answering. I believe that, as at Byzantium, Klearchos was attempting to weasel out of responsibility now that the command has turned disastrous. As he had done in addressing the mutinous troops, Klearchos slyly slid out from under the responsibility to make a consequential decision (or own up to the truth) and made it a collective issue, despite the choices leading up to it not being collective.

³¹⁴ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 2.1.20-23, transl. D. Thomas (2021).

³¹⁵ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 2.2.1-2

³¹⁶ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 2.2.5, transl. D. Thomas (2021): “When they heard this, the generals and captains went away and did as instructed. And from then on Klearchos acted as the commander and they obeyed, not because they had elected him their commander but because they saw that he alone understood what the commander must understand, while the others did not have enough experience.” I think Xenophon is being generous here. Klearchos had worked himself into a position of authority amongst the Greeks (no less for his command than his violence), and I doubt anyone else was eager to volunteer to take responsibility for their mess.

truce. He refused to agree unless the King directed him to supplies for his army, which the King acquiesced to³¹⁷.

Three days later, Tissaphernes approached them and asked after why they had campaigned against the King. The response the generals settled on applied to everyone but Klearchos, who was tasked with delivering it. They denied knowing they were to be deployed against the King and had only continued to serve Cyrus because he faced poor odds and had been a patron of theirs prior. They stated that they did not deny Artaxerxes his rule and now only wished to return home³¹⁸. Tissaphernes returned three days later to relay the King had granted them pardon on the condition they depart and not ravage the land as they left. They agreed and swore under oath to oblige the requests.

Since Tissaphernes' territory included parts of Ionia and Hellespontine Phrygia, he was meant to act as their guide and benefactor on their return trip. However, they waited on him into December with no word. The delay made the Greeks anxious and impatient, a distrust that did not ease even once they departed³¹⁹. Tensions only escalated as the Greeks sequestered themselves away from the main camp, individual soldiers came into conflict, and continuous warnings about secret attacks kept arriving³²⁰. These warnings amounted to nothing, and even several days of uneventful marching calmed no one. In an attempt to

³¹⁷ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 2.3.4-9

³¹⁸ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 2.3.21-23

³¹⁹ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 2.4.1-11

³²⁰ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 2.4.10-24

abate the tension, Klearchos met with Tissaphernes³²¹. After a rather candid conversation, the two men agreed to be on more friendly terms. Klearchos, perhaps seeing this as a chance to solidify his control³²², overrode any concerns and convinced five generals, twenty captains, and roughly two hundred troops to come with him to meet with Tissaphernes³²³. Klearchos and the five generals were arrested while the rest of the complement were murdered. Ariaaios relayed that Klearchos had been found guilty of oath-breaking, perjury, and conspiracy and had thus been executed³²⁴. That is how Klearchos died.

Had Klearchos been a more clear-eyed and disciplined man, he might have more closely considered that he was in the middle of enemy territory, unable to speak the language of the locals, bereft of food, without a guide, devoid of reinforcement, and now bereaved of a benefactor. He was in no reasonable position to test the patience of the King at Cunaxa, but he had done so. While his distrust of Artaxerxes and protectiveness of his troops is understandable, he let pride guide his initial interactions with the King. Arguably, creating the pretense that the Ten Thousand were a conceivable threat to the King in order to protect them had only backfired. Instead of making the Greeks just intimidating enough to dissuade the Persians from threatening with them, the Persians took the display seriously. Though conceived with good intentions, Klearchos' plan inadvertently stranded the Ten Thousand.

³²¹ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 2.5.2. Klearchos' speech in their dialogue (2.5.3-26) is uncharacteristically straightforward and reasonable. While he was blunt, he managed to be diplomatic, sincere, and (strangest of all) honest.

³²² Xenophon *Anabasis*, 2.5.29, transl. D. Thomas (2021). Klearchos had a rivalry with Menon and felt his control was threatened by him: "Klearchos too wanted the entire army to look just to himself and to be rid of the troublemakers."

³²³ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 2.5.30

³²⁴ Xenophon *Anabasis*, 2.5.38-40

From a CAF perspective, Klearchos' command of the Ten Thousand was an immediate disaster. As Brasidas demonstrated back in Chapter 2, keeping one's BG informed and aware was a fundamental element of his success. The unit's understanding of their commander's intent down to ground level was essential not only for tactical manoeuvre, but also for cohesion. Klearchos, contrarily, demonstrated an aversion to reasonable and direct communication, keeping even his own captains unaware of his intent until they were right upon the King. As the CAF explains:

"The ability to communicate effectively is critical. However brilliant a commander's powers of analysis and decision-making, they are of no use if he cannot express his intentions clearly ... [...] On operations, a commander must be able to think on his feet, without prepared scripts or notes, and be competent enough to brief well and give succinct orders to his subordinates through the combination of clarity of thought, articulate speech, and comprehension of the situation."³²⁵

*"This climate of command should encourage subordinate commanders at all levels to think independently and to take initiative. Subordinates will expect to know the 'reason why'. A wise commander will explain his intentions to his subordinates and so foster a common understanding, a sense of involvement in decision-making, and a shared commitment."*³²⁶

Once they were at Cunaxa, it only became worse. In line with Principles 1, 6 and 7, had Klearchos followed Cyrus' directive and concentrated his force on breaking the King's 'centre of gravity'³²⁷, they may have been able to break the King's line regardless of the King's numerical advantage. Furthermore, refusing Cyrus also cost the army synchronization:

"The synchronization of manoeuvre, firepower, (fires) and influence is at the heart of manoeuvre warfare and allows the decisive concentration of effects against adversaries, other targets, and centres of gravity. Fracturing these

³²⁵ *Command* (1996), 18 | The bolding is from the manual, not my own insertion.

³²⁶ *Command* (1996), 19

³²⁷ *Command* (1996), 28 | "The focus is the enemy's Centre of Gravity, the source of his freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight, and how best to attack, neutralize or destroy it."

*centres of gravity will dislocate the adversary, breaking cohesion and the will to resist.”*³²⁸

*“In short, the tactical commander’s focus must lie on the skillful defeat of the enemy by timely decision-making, superior use of arms, and competence in synchronizing combat power on the battlefield.”*³²⁹

This deliberate de-synchronization allowed Klearchos’ forces to break so far through Tissaphernes’ ranks that they cut themselves off and left a gaping wound in Cyrus’ right wing. Since the King’s line was significantly longer than that of Cyrus, he could afford to lose his left wing and still have sufficient combat/fighting power and freedom of action to flank and enclose Cyrus’ army. Furthermore, a proficient commander would have used the shattering of Tissaphernes’ line as an opportunity to flank the King’s centre-left and crack the centre of gravity. Had his strategy even vaguely followed the methodology of CSASS (and within that, the tactics of *Find, Fix, Strike*) or even evidenced basic cooperation, many of these simple but costly mistakes would have been avoided. However, tactical control over himself and his troops remained lacking.

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Klearchos’ obituary, alongside those of Proxenos, Menos, Agias, and Sokrates, closes out the narrative of Book 2. The longest of them all, it is remarkably direct and explicit, detailing the uglier parts of his personality and reflecting on how he was perceived by those around him.

“One of the generals, Klearchos, seemed by common consent among all who knew him personally to be a man, who was both a warlike person and a lover of war to an extreme extent [καὶ πολεμικὸς καὶ φιλοπόλεμος ἐσχάτως]. This is clear from the fact that, while he remained with the Lakedaimonians as long

³²⁸ *Land Operations* (2008), 4-19

³²⁹ *Command* (1996), 23

as they were at war with the Athenians, when peace came he persuaded his city that the Thracians were wronging the Greeks; and, having arranged the matter with the ephors as best he could, he set out on a voyage with a view to making war on the Thracians in defense of the Chersonese and Perinthos. But for some reason the ephors changed their minds after he had already left and tried to make him turn back from the Isthmus, and therefore he no longer obeyed them but continued his voyage to the Hellespont. As a result, the Spartan government went so far as to condemn him to death for disobeying orders. Now an exile, he went to Cyrus. What words he used to persuade Cyrus have been recounted elsewhere, the outcome being that Cyrus gave him then thousand darics. He took the darics, but he did not use them to live at his ease; on the contrary, with this money he collected an army and set about waging war against the Thracians [ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν χρημάτων συλλέξας στράτευμα ἐπολέμει τοῖς Θραξί]. He defeated them in battle, and afterward he carried on harrying and pillaging them [ἀπὸ τούτου δὴ ἔφερε καὶ ἦγε τούτους], continuing the war against them until Cyrus had need of his army. Then he left Thrace in order to wage war once more, this time alongside Cyrus. So these seem to me to be the actions of a man who is a lover of war [ταῦτα οὖν φιλοπολέμου μοι δοκεῖ ἀνδρὸς ἔργα εἶναι]. When it is possible to live in peace without suffering shame or damage, nevertheless such a man chooses to be at war [αἰρεῖται πολεμεῖν]. When it is possible to retain his money without danger, he chooses to diminish his wealth by going to war [αἰρεῖται πολεμῶν μείονα ταῦτα ποιεῖν]. Other people want to spend their money on boys or some other kind of pleasure. Klearchos wanted to spend his money on war [ἤθελε δαπανᾶν εἰς πόλεμον].

Thus he was a lover of war, but he also seemed to be someone who was warlike, in that he loved danger [οὕτω μὲν φιλοπόλεμος ἦν · πολεμικὸς δὲ αὖ ταύτῃ ἐδόκει εἶναι ὅτι φιλοκίνδυνός], he led his troops against the enemy both by day and by night, and he kept his wits about him in the worst of circumstances, as all those whoever in his company on any of his campaigns used to agree. He was also said to be suited to command, as far as anyone with the harsh temperament he had could be [δυνατὸν ἐκ τοῦ τοιοῦτου τρόπου οἶον κάκεινος εἶχεν]. On one hand, he was as capable as anyone else of thinking through how the army could obtain its food supplies and of actually procuring them; on the other hand, he was also capable of impressing on those around him the lesson that Klearchos must be obeyed. He achieved this by being harsh, for he was gloomy in appearance and rough in his speech, and he always used to punish troops severely and sometimes in anger, which on occasion even he regretted [τοῦτο δ' ἐποίει ἐκ τοῦ χαλεπὸς εἶναι · καὶ γὰρ ὁρᾶν στυγνὸς ἦν καὶ τῇ φωνῇ τραχύς, ἐκόλαζε τε ἰσχυρῶς, καὶ ὀργῇ ἐνίοτε, ὥς καὶ αὐτῷ μεταμέλειν ἔσθ' ὅτε]. But he also punished on principle, for he thought that there was nothing to be gained from an

undisciplined army; on the contrary, the story was that he even said that if a soldier was going to be on sentry duty, or avoid squabbles with his mates, or advance unhesitatingly against the enemy, it was necessary for him to fear his commander more than he feared his enemy [δέοι τὸν στρατιώτην φοβεῖσθαι μᾶλλον τὸν ἄρχοντα ἢ τοὺς πολεμίους]. So when things got really tough, the soldiers very much wanted to hear from him, and they would not accept anyone else. They said that his habitual gloom appeared at such times cheerfulness itself amid the expressions of the others, and his harshness seemed to be a strength when directed at the enemy, so that it appeared no longer harsh but a source of salvation. But whenever they were out of the worst danger and it was possible to turn to others for leadership, many would desert him, for he had no charm but was always harsh and savage [ὅτε δ' ἔξω τοῦ δεινοῦ γένοιτο καὶ ἐξεῖη πρὸς ἄλλον ἀρξομένους ἀπιέναι, πολλοὶ αὐτὸν ἀπέλειπον · τὸ γὰρ ἐπίχαρι οὐκ εἶχεν, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ χαλεπὸς ἦν καὶ ὠμός], so that the soldiers' attitude toward him was like that of boys toward their teacher. And as a matter of fact, he never held his followers by friendship or goodwill [καὶ γὰρ οὖν φιλία μὲν καὶ εὐνοία ἐπομένους οὐδέποτε εἶχεν]. Those who associated with him did so because they had been put under his command by a city or out of poverty, or because they were constrained by some other necessity, and in his hands they were extremely obedient. By the time they began to win victories over the enemy under his leadership, his presence had already had powerful effects in turning the soldiers he led into useful troops, for they had confidence in the face of the enemy, and their fear of punishment from him kept them in good order. That, then was the sort of commander he was, but they said that he did not at all like it when others gave him commands [ἄρχεσθαι δὲ ὑπὸ ἄλλων οὐ μάλα ἐθέλειν ἐλέγετο]. He was around fifty years old when he met his end.”³³⁰

No doubt Xenophon's own opinions of Klearchos tint the obituary, and Xenophon himself doesn't claim that his representation is impartial. Though he attempts to balance Klearchos' malignant qualities against his diligent and focused aspects (almost always in respect to command³³¹), he does not shy away from the overall malevolence innate to Klearchos' character. Klearchos' affection for war, violence, and danger are repeated and emphasized, along with the ugly harshness that dominated his personality. The image of Klearchos

³³⁰ Xenophon *Hellenika*, 2.6.1-15, transl. D. Thomas (2021)

³³¹ Xenophon seems to have a kind of sympathy for Klearchos' command style, perhaps retrospectively influenced by how difficult commanding the Ten Thousand proved to be without Cheirisophos' assistance.

rendered through the obituary (and his entire presence in the *Hellenika* and *Anabasis*) is one of a brutal, domineering, and disagreeable man, barely tempered enough by his Spartan training to make him tolerable. His appetite for combat fed his arrogance and often allowed bloodlust and ambition to overrule good sense. In the aftermath of poor decisions or being confronted as to falsehoods, he excelled at shirking responsibility and redirecting blame. He was duplicitous with his own troops and allies, evasive and cagey about answering direct questions, and controlling but uncooperative in the battlespace. His character deficits impacted the errors he made in his strategy, tactics, and operation, resulting in single-minded, desynchronized, and inferior deployment.

Conclusion: Shield and Spear

There is a maxim in the CAF which every soldier groans to hear: *The ground will dictate*. It implies that no situation, regardless of how good intelligence and reconnaissance are, will ever be understood well enough not to require in-the-moment judgement and plan re-evaluation. Neither maps nor description can ever truly prepare you for the situation you will face once your boots hit the dirt. Everything is up in the air until you can see it with your own eyes, and all operational planning is aspirational at best – *the ground will dictate*.

In a world such as this, Sparta likely felt more out of her depth than most. For a *polis* that commanded the kind of respect and exercised such hegemony as she did, she was critically undermanned. Her home territory was hostile to her control, and any slip in the mirage she carefully maintained was liable to undermine the careful balance of her system. Any significant loss in manpower or morale could have had disastrous consequences. She was held together by tension, and should one of her cables have snapped, she would have unravelled with it.

The 5th century would prove to be a test for the strength of those cables. The Greco-Persian War revealed a rot within the dyarchy – Sparta's kings proved to be just as susceptible to greed and corruption abroad as normal men, and the ephorate had only barely managed to cauterize the wound in time. The dyarchy's military control needed to be curtailed, but such a birthright could not simply be taken away. Furthermore, the scale of the war had proven that Sparta might need to cover more than two theatres at once, and her kings would not be sufficient. To combat both issues at once, the ephorate, over the successive decades, siphoned away the totality of the kings' command and dispersed it amongst a rising class of

generals. These generals would be easier to commission, replace, and punish, re-stabilizing Sparta's domestic politics. Should kings need to be sent out, they would largely remain on the Greek mainland, well within range of recall. However, this pivot to commissioned generalship meant alternative criteria to birthright would need to be established. If these men were to be given a commission, they would need to prove worthy beforehand. An assessment of their character and skills was required in order to select the most worthy and appropriate candidate.

For Sparta, having commanders who could operate successfully under any conditions was essential. Arguably, no two commanders better demonstrate this than Brasidas and Derkylidas. This was not an accident: the means and manner by which they accomplished their tasks are remarkably similar for a reason. They embody the archetype Sparta desired of all her generals – a harmony of traits and tactics in operation which would see them to victory. Klearidas and Cheirisophos follow in the mould set by their predecessors, subscribing to their philosophies and acting in accordance with the Spartan ethos. Though neither could claim to be as remarkable or consequential as Brasidas and Derkylidas, nevertheless both Klearidas and Cheirisophos reflected their predecessors' character traits, attitudes, and skills.

In contrast, Lysander, Sphodrias, Thibron, and Klearchos demonstrate the consequences of failing to live up to their example. Each man was brought low by some manner of arrogance, greed, selfishness, and conceit accompanied by poor tactical decisions. They prioritized themselves over their allies and their *polis*, always to the detriment of the

operation. Egregious errors caused by pride, laxity, negligence, or complacency resulted in catastrophic defeat each time. Whatever traits and skills they may have shared with Brasidas and Derkylidas were overridden by failings in self-control, discretion, and prudence.

It is a testament to the effectiveness of Brasidas and Derkylidas that over two thousand years later, their tactics, strategy, and command philosophy can be recognized in those of a modern military such as the CAF. Just as with Sparta, many of the qualities that Canada searches for in its commanders are not derived from an individual's soldiering skill, but from their character and personal conviction. Both states understand that tactical acumen can be trained and improved, but without a sufficiently loyal will, it amounts to nothing. Similarly, both states trust their commanders to act as necessary within the purview of their discretion. Creativity, efficiency, cunning, diplomacy, cooperation, and prudence during operations are desired, encouraged, and rewarded. The success of a campaign can live or die on the efficacy of the commander's leadership, coupled with his strategic capability. More often than not, operational objectives are not achieved with force but through guile and relationship building. It is to the commander, after all, that the ground will dictate its terms, and he must be prepared hold his unit steady as they meet its challenge.

A Spartan general was called upon to serve as both shield and spear for Sparta. He was responsible for protecting and nurturing her connections, just as he was obliged to go to war for her. He had to be as capable a soldier as he was a diplomat, and able to be either as necessary at any time. He should be even-tempered, reasonable, shrewd, sincere, proactive, attentive, daring, ambitious, thoughtful, synergistic, inventive, reactive, dutiful, disciplined,

inspiring, firm, and fair. He was one of the *homoioi* – above everything else including himself, he represented Sparta and her will. Should a prospective general meet these expectations, so too would he meet with success. Should he fail to meet her standards, it was likely to cost him his commission, citizenship, or life.

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All information detailed within the *Appendices* is taken verbatim from CAF manuals, which are fully and properly cited in the bibliography. For the sake of brevity, the manuals and associated citations used here are as follows:

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 - [LO [page number], [section number]]
- B-GL-300-003/FP-000, *Command in Land Operations*
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- B-GL-310-000/FP-001, *Command: The Operational Function*
 - [C:TOF [page number], [section number]]
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³³² Admittedly, I am not really sure how to cite the manuals. They have no available author and the copyright is credited to the Ministry of National Defense, the Queen, or both. Most also do not list a publication house. I’ve chosen instead to organize them by their serial numbers, which are the most consistent method of sorting them. In citation, I will refer to them by their title and year for ease of understanding (since some of the numbers are very similar).

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Appendices

Appendix I: Abbreviations and Definitions

[Definitions]

ACT – is the operational function that integrates manoeuvre (integral fire and movement), fire support and influence activities to achieve an advantage over an adversary or other targets in order to affect their behaviour. [A:TOF 10, 7]

– is the ensemble of physical activities – termed “*fires*” – and influence activities, coordinated and harmonized through a manoeuvrist approach and battlespace management. *ACT* capabilities engage a wide variety of targets in a complementary fashion on the physical and psychological planes. [A:TOF 10, 8]

Fires – fire support and manoeuvre [A:TOF 10, 8]

Area of Intelligence Responsibility (AIR) – is an area allocated to a commander, in which he is responsible for the provision of intelligence, within the means at his disposal. [LO 4.12]

Area of Interest (A of I) – is the area of concern to a commander relative to the objectives of current or planned operations, including his areas of influence, operations, and/or responsibility, and areas adjacent thereto. [LO 4.10-11]

- **Tactical.** At the tactical level, the area of interest includes JIMP activities both within and adjacent to the AO.
- **Operational.** At the operational level, the area of interest includes JIMP activities within and adjacent to either the joint operations area.
- **Strategic.** At the strategic level, the area of interest includes global JIMP activities. [External factors] can have near immediate influence upon operations.

Area of Operation (AO) – is an operational area defined by a joint commander for land or maritime forces to conduct military activities. [LO 4.11-12]

- conduct of operations
- coordination of fires
- control of movement
- development and maintenance of installations
- terrain management, to include installations
- force protection security
- maintenance of the common operating procedure (COP)
- area of intelligence responsibility (AIR)

Area of Responsibility (AOR) – is the geographical area of ground, sea or air under the command of a commander who has the necessary authority and power to exercise it. This responsibility is normally extended to intelligence collection, conduct of operation, control of movements and possible the maintenance and protection of facilities, but it can also be limited to a specific domain. [LO 4.11]

Battlespace – The environment, factors and conditions that must be understood to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the mission. This includes air, land, sea, space environments, the enemy and friendly forces, facilities, weather, terrain, the electromagnetic spectrum and the information environment within the operational areas and areas of interest. [LO 4.8, footnote 45]

Battlespace Framework – is the tool used to facilitate decentralization of execution by identifying subordinate commanders and their AOs, and establishing command relationships for each phase of a campaign or operation. It is the arrangement of troops, resources and command and control in the environment. [LO 4.9]

Cohesion – This training, ruthless application of standards and insistence on skilled and principled leaders lead directly to unit cohesion and a strong sense of ‘family’ – the keys to tactical success. Cohesion is the glue that solidifies individual and group will under the command of leaders. Common intent based upon mutual understanding, trust, and doctrine is crucial. Cohesion allows military forces to endure hardship while retaining the physical and moral strength to continue fighting to accomplish their mission. Cohesion is equally important for the enemy. The CAF’s approach to operations seeks to defeat the enemy by shattering his moral and physical cohesion, his ability to fight as an effective, coordinated whole, rather than by destroying him physically through incremental attrition. This is defined as *Manoeuvre Warfare*, an approach that emphasizes that our aim is to destroy our opponent’s will to fight. [CILO, 8]

Combat Arms – is a colloquial term that refers to a slightly wider description of ‘combat elements’. It includes armour, infantry, field engineers, and artillery.

Combat Power – the total means of destructive and/or disruptive force which a military unit/formation can apply against the opponent at a given time. It is measured in physical terms and stems from the physical component of fighting power [LO 4.1]

Command – is defined as “the authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination and control of military forces.” Command is exercised through the creative expression of the human will necessary to accomplish a mission through the exercise of the authority vested by the national government and the chain of command for the direction, coordination and control of military forces. Exercising that authority and responsibility is an interpersonal endeavour that is highly reliant upon the relationship between a commander and subordinates. [C:TOF 9, 5]

Complex Environment – A battlespace with a mix of geographical, environmental and human factors that collectively and significantly complicate the conduct of operations.

Control – reduces uncertainty, mitigates risk and increases agility by imposing relative order through the establishment of structures and processes to enable command and manage risk. *Control* must be achieved in a manner that provides commanders with relevant feedback to inform decisions while also allowing them to focus their efforts on broader issues and future operations. Commanders who can operate in a chaotic

and uncertain environment without becoming frustrated by attempting to over-control the situation will be more dynamic in making decisions. Therefore, commanders must carefully consider when to impose control measures to support the decision-making process as well as when and what authority should be delegated in the execution of operations, and to whom that authority should be delegated. [C:TOF 10, 8]

Doctrine – is the fundamental principles and practices by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. The role of doctrine is to impart knowledge and provide authoritative guidance for the organization of armed forces and the conduct of operations as part of the military act. It acts as a guide for action rather than as a set of fixed rules: it is authoritative but requires judgment in application. [C:TOF 7, 1]

– is also a statement of how the Army intends to fight. In this sense, doctrine often describes an idealized situation and then contrasts the ideal with the reality that Army leaders can expect. *Doctrine* provides a means of conceptualizing campaigns and operations as well as a detailed understanding of conditions, frictions and uncertainties that make achieving the ideal difficult. *Doctrine* also helps potential partners understand how the Canadian Army will operate. It establishes a common frame of reference and a common cultural perspective to solving military problems, including useful intellectual tools. [C:TOF 7, 2]

Capstone doctrine – establishes the Army's view of the nature of operations, the fundamentals by which land forces conduct operations, and the methods by which commanders exercise command. It also serves as the basis for decisions about organization, training, leader development, materiel, soldiers, and facilities. [C:TOF 7, 1]

Effects-based approach - The *effects-based approach* to operations is one in which the desired end state is carefully considered prior to undertaking tactical actions, to ensure that military forces only conduct tactical actions that will likely lead to that desired end state eventually. It is little more than a natural planning process that ensures tactics ultimately support the strategic aim. That is, that is the application of the operational art. It is formally defined as:

The way of thinking and specific processes, integrated in both the physical and psychological planes that focus on desired outcomes (effects) rather than activities to enable both the integration and effectiveness of the military contribution within a comprehensive approach and the realization of operational strategic outcomes. Note: The specific processes involve the organization of activities to achieve planned, desired and measurable effects that will realize objectives and ultimately meet the mission end state. [C:TOF 17, 22]

End-State – Military conditions established by the operational commander that must be attained to support strategic goals.

Ethos – is the uniting spirit that embraces and reflects the imperatives, values and beliefs of army professionalism, the requirements of operations and national values and beliefs. [CILO G-1]

Fighting Power – is defined as the ability to fight, consisting of three essential, inter-related components: a *physical*, *moral* and *intellectual* component. It is measured by assessment of operational capability. The application of these capabilities is not limited to fighting, but includes the completion of all activities required for operational success. [LO 4.1]

Main Effort – is defined as: “a concentration of forces or means, in a particular area and time, where a commander seeks to bring about a decision.”

OODA loop – is a command and control process that an individual actively applies in order to act on a set of circumstances. Commanders first observe and learn about their own forces’ status and situation, the environment, and the enemy. Then, they orient themselves by achieving situational awareness in order to develop a battlefield visualization. After conducting planning, they decide what to do and how to do it. Commanders act upon that decision by directing the execution of the action. Theat returns them to the observation stage where, having acted, they observe the enemy reaction and their own forces’ actions, continuing the decision-action cycle. [C:TOF 10, 9]

Operational functions – are a means of envisioning and building military capabilities rather than a series of boxes into which every military capability must fit. According to its battlefield role, every military capability, from the individual soldier upwards, is a tailored balance of all the operational functions. *Operational functions* may be used as a means of visualizing, planning and executing operations. Every operation is planned and conducted through a consideration of the five operational functions†, taking into account the operational environment at hand, the objective to be achieved and any imposed limitations. [C:TOF 13, 15]

† see *Appendix V: Application of Fighting Power*

Orders Group – a general term referring to a typical unit.

Power – below terms are often interchangeably used; however this illustrates the differences and interrelationship between these distinct terms. [C:TOF 13, 14]

Combat power – The total means of destructive and/or disruptive force that a military unit or formation can apply against an opponent at a given time.

Fighting power – The ability to fight, consisting of three essential, inter-related components: a physical component, a moral component and an intellectual component. *Fighting power* is measured by assessment of operational capability.

Physical – consisting of quantifiable elements such as organizations, equipment, systems and training, which are conceived, designed and built to ultimately accomplish tasks. [C:TOF 12, 12]

Moral – consisting of largely intangible psychological, ethical and cultural factors from which we derive morale, cohesion, *spirit de corps* and fighting spirit at all organizational levels. [C:TOF 12, 12]

Intellectual – consisting of foundational education, doctrinal knowledge and awareness of the operational environment. [C:TOF 12, 12]

Firepower – The amount of *fire* which may be delivered by a position, unit or weapon system.

Synchronization – is defined as: “the arrangement of military actions in time, space and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time.”

Systems – refers to the PMESII constructs and characteristics within an environment.

[Abbreviations]

AI	– area of interest
AIR	– area of intelligence responsibility
AO	– area of operation
A of I	– area of influence
AOR	– area of responsibility
BGs	– battle groups
C2S	– command and control system
CAF/CF	– Canadian Armed Forces/Canadian Forces
cbt	– combat
cbt sp	– combat support
CCIR	– commander’s critical information requirements
CIMIC	– civil-military cooperation (can include reconstruction)
CJTF	– combined joint task force
COIN	– counter-insurgency

comd sp	– command support
CONPLAN	– contingency plan
CS	– close support
CSASS	– Command, Sense, Act, Shield, Sustain † see <i>Appendix V: Application of Fighting Power</i>
CSS	– Combat Service Support
DDR	– disarmament, demobilization, reintegration
EBA	– effects-based approach
FHTs	– field human intelligence teams
FLG	– forward logistics group
FSO/FSS	– full-spectrum operations
HUMINT	– human intelligence
IPB	– intelligence preparation of the battlespace
ISTAR	– intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and recon
JIMP	– Joint, Inter-agency, Multinational and Public framework
LF	– Land Forces
OODA loop	– Observe-Orient-Decide-Act cycle (also referred to as the <i>decision-action cycle</i>)
OPCOM	– Operational Command
OPCON	– Operational Control
OPLANs	– operation plans
OPP	– operational planning process
OPSEC	– Operational Security
ORBAT	– order of battle
PA	– public affairs
PIRs	– priority intelligence requirements
PME	– peacetime military engagement
PMESII	– political, military, economic, social (including cultural and religious), infrastructure and information constructs

PSO	– peace support operations
PSYOPS	– psychological operations
recce	– reconnaissance
SA	– situational awareness
SOF	– Special Operations Forces
SOP	– span of command
TACOM	– Tactical Command
TACON	– Tactical Control
TF	– task force
TTP	– tactics, techniques and procedures

Appendix II: *The Art of Leadership* by Gn. J. A. Dextraze (1973)

Uploaded to the CAF's website Line Of Sight on November 29, 2021 and accessed May 12, 2025. Reprinted here for posterity and citation. The text of the page reads as follows:

The following article is reprinted from a paper written by General Jacques Dextraze in 1973 during the second year of his tenure as Chief of the Defense Staff. Considered by many as the ultimate paper on the art of leadership, it is reproduced here in its entirety. A brief biography of General Dextraze can be found at the end of the article.

I am addressing this, my second personal message to the Canadian Forces, specifically to those of you who are faced with the great challenge of leadership, namely the group from master corporals to general officers, inclusive.

I have not chosen the subject lightly. To me, leadership is the key to success in military operations, in peace and in war, as it has always been through the centuries. Yet it is a subject that doesn't get the attention it deserves today. My purpose with this letter is to stimulate some thoughts, and to put leadership in the forefront of your minds, where it belongs. I want you to read carefully and seriously what I have to say.

Back in 1959, when I was a colonel and the Commandant of the Royal Canadian School of Infantry at Camp Borden, I talked to a graduating class of young officer cadets on "Leadership and Man Management".

I find it interesting, some fourteen years later, to look back over the words that I presented to those budding young leaders that day. What strikes me most, upon reading my text, is how little my ideas about leadership have changed over the years. I myself have certainly changed in the interim – in rank, in outlook, even in my basic approach to military life. Likewise, the world around me has changed dramatically in those fourteen years: 1959, after all, was before Vietnam, the hippies, colour TV, the permissive society, widespread drug abuse, "wars of liberation", man in space, unification, and all those things and events that have characterized the recent era as the period of "future shock".³³⁴ And yet, when it comes to basic principles of leadership, which I talked about in 1959, it is remarkably clear to me that, "plus ça change, plus c'est la meme chose" – "the more things change, the more they stay the same".

Another thing that surprises me in retrospect is the fact that my remarks on leadership, which were directed to a group of brand-new infantry officers and which were very much in the context of the imminent employment of these officers as platoon commanders, are pretty well appropriate in a much wider sense. For example, an air element master corporal who is

³³⁴ Editor's Note: Dextraze was referring to the book *Future Shock* published in 1970 by futurist Alvin Toffler.

responsible for the repair of an aircraft could very well apply the principles evoked on that occasion, as could, say an admiral in command of a flotilla of our ships.

The point that I want to make is that the basic principles of leadership and man management are both timeless and universal.

What I would like to do, then, is to talk about a few very straightforward rules that have helped me immensely during my career and which I commend to you in the hope that they will, at the very least, stimulate some thoughts in your minds about such matters.

In doing so I don't lay claim to their originality because that, after all, would be a contradiction of the point I just made about their timelessness. These basic rules have been around since man first learned that working together was the key to success in battle and in his more peaceful pursuits. My only presumption is that my personal experience, covering as it does a lengthy span of years and the whole spectrum of military ranks, in conditions of war and peace, has given me a rare opportunity to see for myself how true these basic principles of leadership are, and how helpful they can be in solving the difficult problems that face all who must lead other men.

Before getting down to specific principles, I would like to dwell for a moment on leadership in general.

First of all, let me give you my definition of leadership. There are as many definitions as there are writers on the subject, but I have always favoured one that seems to capture the essence of it in very simple terms:

“LEADERSHIP is the art of influencing others to do willingly what is required in order to achieve an aim or goal.”

Leadership, then, is an art, rather than a science. I am convinced, however, that many of the problems faced by managers today, at all levels, stem from the fact that the art of leadership seems to be dying, and it is being replaced by mechanical processes of control that seem to make little distinction between the men and the machines that make up the system. Modern managerial techniques, introduced in the name of efficiency and economy, often tend to dehumanize the organization and its individuals. Because machines obey instructions consistently and without complaint, modern managers are inclined to assume that people should respond in the same way. They don't, of course. They have capacities, strengths and breaking points that vary from individual to individual and from situation to situation. Unlike machines, many people work best under stress. Unlike computers, their performance is influenced for better or worse by a wide range of human emotions that reflect, in large measure, the quality of leadership that is being exercised. Because a leader is working with that infinitely complex entity called a human being, he must be an artist, not a mechanic.

As in all art forms, simplicity is to be preferred to complexity. You will see that the leadership principles I discuss below are very simple, reflecting as they do some basic characteristics of human nature. It is not surprising to me that one of the symptoms of the process that degrades leadership from an art to a mechanical process is the increasing use of complicated

language, with a lot of technical terms whose purpose often seems to be to impress rather than to describe. We talk of “rationale” rather than “reason”, “utilize” rather than “use”, “personnel inventory” rather than “people”, the list is endless. The language for a good leader is simple and direct, leaving little room for error. Big words don’t impress me, and they won’t likely impress your subordinates.

So much for the introductory remarks. What I want to do now is discuss briefly the various qualities and principles that bring about good leadership in a military person.

I believe that there are four qualities that are essential ingredients of successful leadership. These are:

- LOYALTY
- KNOWLEDGE
- INTEGRITY
- COURAGE

LOYALTY

To be a great leader, you must display two forms of loyalty. You must first of all be loyal in an upward direction, to your superiors and through them to your government and country. At the same time, however, you must be loyal to your subordinates. It is not always easy to reconcile these two forms of loyalty. You sometimes have great difficulty in keeping a proper balance between the two in the face of conflicting demands. This seems especially true today, in this era of changing moral standards when, for example, some individuals feel compelled to steal and publish classified documents in the name of loyalty. But it isn’t a new problem. Any commander who has ever ordered troops into battle must certainly have paused to reflect, or should have, on the need to risk lives for a higher cause. And which of you, at some time or another, hasn’t yielded to temptation to commiserate with your subordinates over those “clots from Headquarters”?

I can offer you one fundamental rule to guide in this dilemma of conflicting loyalties.

Where loyalty to superiors and subordinates cannot both be simultaneously satisfied, then loyalty upward must prevail, because in the final analysis it is loyalty to our country that really counts.

One more word regarding loyalty. Loyalty demands that you forsake personal pleasures if they conflict in any way with the performance of your duties. You have no right to take time off for amusement tonight if you should use this time to prepare for tomorrow’s task.

KNOWLEDGE

You must possess knowledge if you are to be efficient. If you have knowledge you will command respect not only from your subordinates but from your superiors as well. You must never stop learning and you must never pretend to anyone that you know something when in fact you do not. On the contrary, it is best to admit your ignorance of a certain point under discussion and encourage whoever is speaking to you to clarify the particular subject further.

In so doing you will be learning something new, while at the same time revealing that you are honest. In the long run, there is no substitute for knowledge.

As you progress in rank, there will be a tendency to neglect your own self-education. This tendency will come naturally, since with higher rank you will have more privileges and more assistants to do things for you. Do not let these circumstances lull you into a state of laziness that is characterized by such attitudes as: “I am far too busy to deal with these details”, or “Why should I bark when I have dogs that can bark for me”, or “I cannot let myself get emotionally involved in this matter”, and so on. Instead, remember that to lead you must know what you are talking about, and to gain the necessary knowledge you must study a given problem with every means at hand.

Too many people believe that it is old-fashioned to set aside time to study like a student at school. This is wrong, because military leadership without knowledge never has been and never will be truly successful. History is full of examples of how battles and wars can be lost through lack of knowledge. Look how often large, well-equipped armies have been trashed by smaller forces. Sound, knowledgeable leadership makes the difference, and the necessary knowledge can only come through hard work. Do not be under the impression that, as your career progresses, the piece of grey matter in your head will grow in size proportionate to the loftiness of your rank. This just doesn't happen. You may be given more authority by promotion, but you are not by the same act given additional knowledge or ability. These you must acquire yourself through study, application and experience.

You should also be acutely aware of the rapid pace at which man's total fund of knowledge is increasing these days. This is just as true of military art as it is of the sciences in general. Things are happening so fast on the military scene in the nineteen-seventies that no one who claims to be a leader can sit back and hope to operate effectively with what is probably obsolescent knowledge. Formal education alone is not good enough. Self-education is the answer.

INTEGRITY

Integrity means the refusal to deceive others in any way, no matter what the circumstances. As a leader, you must take decisions and accept their results. You are the one responsible for the success or failure of your actions. You must admit your mistakes at least to yourself, and profit from them. You must not try to bluff your way through or shake your responsibility off onto others. One sure way to undermine your effectiveness as a leader is to play games with people. Take it from me, it doesn't work. It may give you some advantage in the short term, but it is bound to hurt you in the long run.

COURAGE

I would define true courage in battle as the desire, or at least the willingness, to face danger in the knowledge that it exists. I have heard people refer to a courageous man without fear. This, to me, is a contradiction. I believe, rather, that courage is a quality of the mind which makes one refuse to be swayed from his aim by danger or difficulty. To me it is a quality that enables a man to marshal all his abilities and powers to overcome the hardships standing in

his path. I am positive that perseverance is the heart of courage. To sum up what I have said, I believe that the courageous man is one who has succeeded in mastering his emotions and weaknesses.

We are more conscious of courage in wartime than in peacetime, because in war there are naturally more opportunities to display courage, and because bravery in action is often spectacular. It is sometimes forgotten, however, that courage of a different sort may be called for in peacetime, and that this “quiet” courage is no less important than the battlefield kind. We have not been actively engaged in combat now for a long time, yet all of us in positions of responsibility are faced with making decisions that may call for a large measure of moral courage. Too often in peacetime it takes courage to “rock the boat,” and I must admit that our peacetime system sometimes seems to have a built-in bias against those who have the courage to speak out against what they honestly believe to be wrong. Perhaps this is the root cause of a malaise that is common today throughout our society, but whose impact we feel especially keenly in the armed forces. I am talking about indecision. It is my belief that indecision in the face of a difficult problem reflects a lack of courage. It is the easy way out, but is usually wrong.

I could mention many other qualities that are essential to good leadership, but in my opinion those I have discussed above are the vital ones. All of the other useful qualities, I think, can be distilled down to these four. If you are loyal and knowledgeable, and have integrity and courage you have what it takes to be a good leader in the Canadian Forces at any rank level.

And now some general remarks on my philosophy of leadership.

The job of leading demands that you acknowledge good work and be critical of bad work on the part of your subordinates. How you do this can have an important bearing on your effectiveness as a leader. The key here is moderation. Excessive praise and excessive rebuke are each detrimental in their own way. I am not saying that rewards or punishment are to be avoided: I simply mean that they must be metered out fairly and intelligently. One thing that annoys me particularly is the current trend in the Forces to heap praise upon people who are simply doing the good job that is expected of them. The danger is obvious (as it is in the opposite case of over punishment). It’s like fighting a battle, if you commit all your resources to a routine action there’s nothing left for the unforeseen. You must keep something in reserve, and this is no less true when it comes to awarding praise or punishment.

Leadership is self-perpetuating – at least it should be. This means that you, as a leader, have a solemn responsibility to develop leadership ability in your subordinates. Remember that all of them sooner or later will have to lead others. The best way for you to teach them, of course, is by example, hopefully good example.

In the Canadian Forces today there are two areas of weakness in respect to leadership development, namely in the junior non-commissioned ranks and in the junior officer ranks. One of my goals as CDS is to correct this situation through formal leadership training and professional education programs, but these alone will not be enough. There must also be

“on-the-job” leadership training and this is the responsibility of individual supervisors, especially at the sergeant and major levels. These people must do all they can to pass on their expertise to aspiring subordinates, through delegation of authority, personal counselling, etc. The future excellence of our Service, after all, depends very much on the leadership potential of today’s corporals and captains.

I have listed below some of the basic rules of leadership that I have found useful in my career, and which I commend to you. The list is not all-inclusive, and it is random, but when considered together with the four principles mentioned earlier it summarizes my approach to good leadership.

Finally, I want to make one thing clear. Although I have pointed out a number of qualities and rules that are, as I said earlier, timeless and universal, I don’t want to imply that there is a single stereotype for the Perfect Leader, or that there is only one approach to leadership. If this were so, life would be pretty unbearable. (Imagine, for example an armed force made up of 83,000 JADDEX’S!)

On the contrary, within the bounds imposed by the few general rules I have touched on, there is an infinite range of possible personalities that are compatible with good leadership, varying from hard-nosed sons-of-guns to soft spoke methodical persons who exude quiet confidence. It is no contradiction that generals like Patton and Bradley, Guderian and Rommel, or Montgomery and Alexander, work well together. In fact it may be true that differing leadership styles are complementary, and therefore equally essential within a military organization.

The important thing is that you adopt a leadership style that matches your own innate personality. Don’t become artificial in an attempt to copy a style that doesn’t suit you. Be yourself, and conduct yourself according to the guidelines given here, and you will find that leadership comes naturally. But you must work at it.

GOOD LUCK

J.A. Dextraze

General

Chief of Defence Staff

RULES OF LEADERSHIP

- Don’t coax your subordinates into obeying your orders. On the other hand, do not club them into it.
- Don’t flatter your subordinates. It is unnecessary and tends to degrade you in their eyes.
- Don’t be sarcastic toward subordinates.

- Display confidence and pride in those under your command.
- Always support your superiors, and make it clear to your subordinates that you do.
- Accept full responsibility in the eyes of your superiors for the mistakes and failures of your subordinates. If they fail, it is your fault, and your job to make whatever corrections are necessary. Don't try and shift the blame downward.
- Never end an order with a threat. Your rank carries with it all power, explicit or implicit, that you need.
- If a reprimand becomes necessary, administer it privately unless there is some compelling reason to do it publicly.
- Always be concerned for the well-being of your subordinates, and let them know that you are.
- Never take things for granted. Check and double-check.
- Don't abuse the privileges of your rank. Be austere in granting and accepting privileges.
- Work hard and don't waste time.
- Be meticulous and correct about conduct, bearing, dress and personal relationships.
- Recognize that leadership and popularity are not synonymous.

Biography of General J. A. Dextraze

General Jacques Alfred Dextraze was born on 15 August 1919 in Montreal. He enrolled as a soldier in Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal in 1939 and enlisted in the Canadian Active Service Force in 1940. He was commissioned in 1942 prior to going overseas. By 1944, he was a company commander, and led his company in Normandy where he won the Distinguished Service Order (DSO). In December 1944, General Dextraze was appointed Commanding Officer of Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal, a position he held until 1945. He received a bar to the DSO for his services as commanding officer. He then volunteered for the Canadian Army Pacific Force, slated for the invasion of Japan, and was appointed the Commanding Officer of The Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment. Following demobilization, General Dextraze returned to civilian life until 1950, when he was asked by the Minister of National Defence to take command of the Second Battalion Royal 22e Régiment for service in Korea. General Dextraze decided to remain in the army following the Korean Conflict. From 1957-1960, he was Commandant of the Royal Canadian School of Infantry and then became commander of Camp Valcartier. Promoted to brigadier in 1962, he was appointed Commander Eastern Quebec Area (one of two areas in Quebec Command) and in 1963 became the Chief of Staff of the United Nations headquarters in the Congo (the mission was called Opération des Nations Unies au Congo – ONUC). During this mission, General Dextraze demonstrated great bravery during an operation that successfully rescued a number of missionaries, teachers and students from rebel forces. For these actions, General Dextraze became the only Canadian to receive the Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire (Military Division) with oak leaves for gallantry. From 1964 to 1966 he was the Commander 2 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group, followed by two tours at FMC Headquarters first as Chief of Staff Operations and then as Deputy Commander. From 1970 to 1972, he was Chief of Personnel at national Defence

Headquarters. In 1972 he was promoted to general and appointed Chief of the Defence Staff until 1977, when he retired from the Canadian Forces. General Dextraze remained active in civilian life and was Chairman of the Canadian National Railway from 1977-1982 and was involved in several military, sport and other organizations. He died on 9 May 1993 and is buried at the Notre-Dame-des-Neiges Cemetery in Montréal.

Appendix III: The Ten Principles of War ³³⁵

The ten principles are applicable throughout the spectrum of conflict, regardless of the campaign theme. Commanders at all levels, guided by the desired objectives, must consider each principle and strike a balance between the competing demands of the various principles. The ten principles of war are:

- I. **Selection and Maintenance of the Aim.** Every operation must have a single, attainable and clearly defined aim that remains the focus of the operation and towards which all efforts are directed. The linkage between the levels of war is crucial for each battle; engagements or operations must be planned and executed to accomplish the military objectives established by the commander. Activities at the lower tactical levels must be planned and conducted in harmony with the intent and operational objectives identified at the higher echelons of command. The aim of any force, therefore, is always determined with a view to furthering the aim of the higher commander. It is thus vital that commanders clearly express their intent in a concise and clear manner.
- II. **Maintenance of Morale.** After leadership, morale is the most important element on the moral plane of conflict. It is essential to ensuring cohesion and the will to win. Morale is nurtured through discipline, self-respect, and confidence of the soldier in his commanders and his equipment, and a sense of purpose.
- III. **Offensive Action.** Only through offensive action can a military force assure the defeat of the adversary. Commanders adopt the defensive only as a temporary expedient and must seek every opportunity to seize and maintain the initiative through offensive action. Initiative means setting or changing the terms of battle by action. It implies an offensive spirit in the conduct of all operations. To seize and then retain the initiative requires a constant effort to force the adversary to conform to our operational purpose and tempo while retaining our freedom of action. To achieve this, commanders must be prepared to act independently within the framework of the higher commander's intent. Seizing the initiative, therefore, requires audacity, and almost inevitably, the need to take risks. This applies to both the physical and cognitive planes. In the case of the latter, information operations must be conducted in an offensive manner in order to influence target audiences and affect their behaviour in a desired manner.
- IV. **Surprise.** Surprise makes a major contribution to the breaking of the adversary's cohesion, and hence, defeat. Against a conventional adversary, modern sensors may limit the chances and overall effects of surprise. However, surprise may well serve to degrade an enemy's ability to react. In facing an unconventional adversary, the use of sympathizers and agents within local populations will provide adversary forces with early warning. Doing the unexpected and thereby creating and exploiting opportunities will achieve surprise. The effects of surprise are enhanced through the use of speed, secrecy and deception, though ultimately it may rest on the adversary's susceptibility, expectations and preparedness. The adversary need not be taken

³³⁵ *Land Operations* (2008), 3.6-8

completely by surprise, but only become aware too late to react effectively. Surprise can be gained through changes in tempo, tactics and methods of operation, force composition, direction or location of the main effort, timing and deception. Deception consists of those measures designed to mislead the adversary by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to influence or induce him to perceive the situation in a manner prejudicial to his interests. It is a vital part of tactical operations serving to mask the real objectives, and in particular, the main effort.

- V. **Security.** Security protects cohesion and assures freedom of action. It results from measures taken by a commander to protect friendly forces while taking necessary, calculated risks to defeat the adversary. In operations at the tactical level, we must not associate security with timidity. Regardless of the operations of war and the campaign theme undertaken, commanders must ensure active security through reconnaissance, counter-reconnaissance, patrolling and movement. It must be kept in mind that an over-emphasis on security, in particular force protection, at the cost of undertaking offensive actions against the adversary, will render the force ineffective and ultimately lead to defeat.
- VI. **Concentration of Force.** It is essential to concentrate overwhelming force at a decisive place and time. It does not necessarily imply a massing of forces, but rather the massing of effects. This allows a numerically inferior force to achieve decisive results. The principle of minimum forces required should be followed, whereby the application of force must be as precise as possible in order to ensure that the engagement will result in the desired primary and subsequent effects and avoid collateral damage.
- VII. **Economy of Effort.** Economy of effort implies a balanced employment of forces and a judicious expenditure of resources. Commanders must take risks in some areas in order to achieve success in their main effort.
- VIII. **Flexibility.** Commanders must exercise judgement and be prepared to alter plans to take advantage of opportunities as they present themselves on the battlefield. Flexibility requires a common battlefield vision by all commanders and a clear understanding of the superior commanders' intent. Essential to flexibility are effective information gathering and dissemination, rapid decision-making, and an agile force that can shift its focus quickly. Forces must also be held in reserve to deal with the unexpected and to maintain the momentum of a tactical operation by exploiting success when there is an opportunity. Commanders at all levels must be prepared to shift rapidly between types of tactical operations from across the spectrum of conflict.
- IX. **Cooperation.** It is only through effective cooperation that the components of a force can develop the full measure of their strength. It entails a common aim, team spirit, interoperability, division of responsibility, and the coordination of all the operational functions to achieve maximum synergy. Combat service support integration is a manifestation of cooperation. This cooperation may be pushed to the lowest tactical levels, particularly in a dispersed operating environment. This principle of

cooperation must be practised within the JIMP framework and as a principle to the comprehensive approach of multiple agencies working in the pursuit of a common end state. When working with non-military agencies, commanders may take an informal lead in implementing this spirit of cooperation.

- X. **Administration.** Successful administration is the ability to make the best and most timely use of resources. Administration is the indispensable servant of operations and is often the deciding factor in assessing the feasibility of an operation or the practicality of an aim. A commander requires a clear understanding of the administrative factors that may affect friendly activities. Commanders must have a degree of control over the administrative plan corresponding to the degree of operational responsibility. Situational awareness, foresight and anticipation are hallmarks of sound administration.

Appendix IV: Continuum of Operations ³³⁶

The *raison d'être* of the land forces is the application of combat power. This ability to fight also creates organizations capable of performing a wide variety of other activities. Throughout history, land forces have been required to operate effectively across the spectrum of conflict that is, to undertake tasks ranging from building civil infrastructure through policing conflict to major conflict. They must be able to conduct this variety of activities simultaneously and sequentially, and transition quickly from one type of activity to another during rapidly evolving conflicts. Commanders must not focus on a single activity or sequential progression. Rather, they must be able to effectively visualize how a campaign or operation will evolve over time, in the light of changing circumstances throughout their AO, and how the balance across different types of activities will or should shift. Campaign success is likely to depend upon understanding such simultaneity, how it evolves throughout the campaign, and how it affects the planning and execution of operations. This concept is relevant to all levels of command and is referred to as **full-spectrum operations (FSO)**.

The **continuum of operations** is a conceptual framework used to explain the relationship between campaigns and the various types of tactical activities that constitute their conduct. It allows for the visualization at the tactical level of military input into campaign lines of operation in which the land forces have a lead or a *supporting* role. Commanders must maintain a long-range vision of where a campaign is going and consider the long-term effects of current operations. This framework should help commanders think beyond the specifically assigned mission to what may come next.

The continuum of operations places a specific mission into a wider context that includes four major concepts:

- I. **Spectrum of Conflict.** The spectrum of conflict spans from high intensity combat (great deal of violence) at one end to relative peace (a minimum of violence) at the other end, and it provides the overall environment for the continuum and campaigns. It reflects the intensity and level of violence expected and found in a campaign, and success is reflected in a move to the lower levels of violence on the spectrum. In short, the spectrum of conflict provides an environment in which predominant campaign themes change over time, indicating priorities allocated to multiple types of operations that may be conducted simultaneously.
- II. **Predominant Campaign Themes.** Predominant campaign themes reflect and describe the general nature of a campaign and will change over time.
- III. **Types of Operations.** Campaign plans are realized at the tactical level through three types of tactical operations: **offensive**; **defensive**; and **stability** (tactical) operations, in addition to **enabling** operations. Note that these operations are classifications of tactical activities, such as attack, and the activities are normally realized through a series of tactical tasks. Priorities and resources ebb and flow between these tactical operations as required by the situation and campaign theme,

³³⁶ *Land Operations* (2008), 3.8-14, 3.18-20

particularly as the campaign theme changes over time. The balance between the types of operations will reflect the type of campaign and the principles by which it should be conducted.

- IV. **Simultaneity.** Tactical operations and their constituent activities and tasks will be conducted simultaneously. For example, one tactical unit or subunit may be conducting an attack, while another is defending a vital point and a third may be assisting with reconstruction or the delivery of humanitarian aid, all within the same AO at the same time.

The spectrum of conflict reflects the environment in which operations occur. The principles discriminator is the prevalence, scale and intensity of violence. These vary between absolute peace and absolute war. Land forces operate throughout this spectrum. No conflict will exist at just one point on the spectrum of conflict. Its intensity will vary in time and place. It is important to recognize that a campaign will consist of simultaneous and sequential activities from various locations on the spectrum of conflict.

PREDOMINANT CAMPAIGN THEMES

States of peace, tension and conflict and combat may be local or widespread, and transient or prolonged. The character of any particular campaign may be difficult to define precisely and is likely to change over time. It will probably consist of a wide and changing variety of activities across the spectrum of conflict. It is nevertheless possible to describe several predominant campaign themes within the continuum of operations. They demand different approaches, are guided by specific principles and require different force packages.

Campaign themes within the continuum of operations can be broadly divided into the following categories:

- I. **Major Combat.** Major combat campaign is the most demanding of military campaigns and operations. It is characterized by combat that is frequent, widespread and intense. It will be conducted against other formal, conventional military forces.
- II. **Counter-Insurgency (COIN).** COIN is defined as: *those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken to defeat insurgency.* A COIN campaign is characterized by an insurgent based adversary, the political nature of the crisis, a need to address multiple facets of the environment and root causes of the crisis through a comprehensive approach with the military in the overall supporting role, and a degree of combat that is less than the experienced in a major combat campaign.
- III. **Peace Support.** A peace support campaign impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and military means, normally in pursuit of UN Charter purposes and principles, to restore or maintain peace. Such operations may include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and peace building.
- IV. **Peacetime Military Engagement.** Peacetime military engagement (PME) is defined as: “military activities in peacetime that involves cooperation with other nations or agencies, primarily intended to shape the security environment.” It includes initiatives to improve mutual understanding and interoperability. Such

operations may include aspects of security sector reform (SSR), in which indigenous security forces are restructured and trained, and other security apparatus and institutions are reformed or developed. It may include programmes and exercise with other nations designed to improve mutual understanding with other countries, improve interoperability, and improve the standards and capabilities of other nations. Military involvement may be complemented by activities conducted by other agencies seeking to improve other aspects of the host nation government and society.

- V. **Limited Intervention.** Limited intervention consists of those operations that have limited objectives and scope, such as the rescue of hostages, security and/or evacuation of non-combatants, re-establishing of law and order, or providing disaster relief. They are usually conducted with a specific, limited aim and for a short duration, often a number of days. Due to their limited scope, they are not true military campaigns. They may occur at point along the spectrum of conflict and may occur while other operations are occurring in the same area. Most domestic operations are classified as limited intervention.

Predominant Campaign Themes




Figure 3-3: Predominant Campaign Themes along the Spectrum of Conflict

Comparative Aspects of the Campaign Theme. Descriptions of the campaign themes are broad and tend to overlap, therefore, there will be common elements among them. The campaigns will change over time for various reasons, such as : deliberate, pre-planned phases (such as a shift from peace support to major combat); changes in the environment brought about by adversary activity, neutral activity and changed political guidance; or, unexpected opportunities or demands that arise during the campaign. As depicted in Figure 3.4, it is possible to discriminate between campaigns by characterizing and comparing various aspects:

- I. **Political Risk.** The level of risk acceptable to the Government, including the risk of casualties, is a measure of the political importance of the campaign. It is proportionate to the threat to the nation or national interests. It is influenced by the public appetite to continue the operation, given the public's perception of the threat, the level of risk, the inherent moral value and the elements or extend of national interest.
- II. **Effect Sought.** The strategic effect (result) sought will often determine the character of a campaign. For example, the defeat of a hostile state will demand a different approach from the separation of warring factions.
- III. **Character of Combat.** Combat can be characterized by its prevalence, scale and intensity:
 - a. **Prevalence.** Prevalence is a measure of its frequency.
 - b. **Scale.** Scale describes the level of combat, which can be measured by the level at which forces integrate their activities in combat. For example, in major combat, battles are often fought at formation level; however, in COIN, they will be more usual at section, platoon, or company level.
 - c. **Intensity.** Intensity describes the degree of concentration of combat, measurable by the rate of consumption of logistics and casualties.
- IV. **Types of Adversaries.** The nature and number of adversaries will have a major influence on the character of a campaign and conflict. They may range from sophisticated conventional forces to primitive tribesman. It is important to appreciate that adversaries are adaptive. For example, once a regular army has been defeated, it may mutate into an irregular force with different aims, and thus change the character of the conflict. Thus, the campaign theme will also alter.

Campaign themes should not be confused with tactical operations, tasks or activities. Campaigns and their operational objectives are realized through tactical operations, activities and tasks. These involve the specific application of doctrine to solve specific tactical problems and are often used to assign missions to subordinates. Campaign themes, as a rule, are too general to use in assigning missions. Rather, they describe the broad general conditions that exist in an AO and provide principles to guide planning and action as a campaign progresses.

Spectrum of Conflict Criteria		Peacetime Military Engagement	Peace Support	Counter-insurgency	Major Combat	Limited Intervention
Political Risk ¹		Low	Med/Low	Victim: High Allies: Med	High	Less than risk of inaction
Effect Sought ²		Shape security environment	Uphold international peace and security	Defeat insurgents Break external links	Defeat hostile state Recover territory Change adversary's behaviour	Varied, to include evacuations, strikes, etc.
Character of Combat	Prevalence	No combat foreseen	Localized, infrequent, discrete incidents	Localized, intermittent	Widespread, continuous	Plan may involve or avoid combat
	Scale ³	Self defence	Section and platoon	Section, platoon and company	Battalion and higher echelons	Depends on plan
	Intensity	No combat foreseen	Low; occasionally high	Med/low, long duration; occasionally high	High	Potentially high; short duration
Type of Threats ⁴		None	Formed units and/or irregulars	Irregulars	Formed units	Formed units and/or irregulars

Note: All characterizations are generalizations. Exceptions may exist.

¹ The level of acceptable risk, including risk of casualties, is a measure of the political importance of the campaign, proportional to level of threat to the nation or national interests.

² The strategic effect sought often determines the character of a campaign: removal of a hostile regime demands a different approach than separation of warring factions.

³ This is the predominant level routinely engaged in combat. Levels may escalate occasionally.

⁴ Adversaries are adaptive and may move from one type of strategy or tactic, or even organization, to another as conditions improve or deteriorate for them, and as their opponents adapt to their tactics. In addition, the arrival of new types of forces (e.g., the Chinese in Korea or foreign Mujahadeen in Afghanistan against the Soviets) can change the character of the campaign.

Figure 3-4: Predominant Campaign Themes by Selected Criteria

FULL-SPECTRUM OPERATIONS: LAND TACTICAL OPERATIONS OF OFFENSIVE, DEFENSIVE, STABILITY, AND ENABLING

Campaigns and operations are prosecuted through the conduct of tactical operations³³⁷ and activities. Land forces will undertake a wide range of tactical level activities in the prosecution of an assigned operation and the overarching campaign. They may be simultaneous or sequential depending upon the level of command. Tactical activities are divided into **offensive**, **defensive**, **stability**³³⁸ and **enabling operations** (see Figure 3.5). Together, they describe all tactical military activities conducted within a campaign³³⁹.

- I. **Offensive Operations:** are tactical activities in which forces see out the enemy in order to attack him.
- II. **Defensive Operations:** are tactical activities that resist enemy offensive activities.
- III. **Stability Operations:** are tactical activities³⁴⁰ and are defined as: “a tactical activity conducted by military and security forces, often in conjunction with other agencies, to maintain, restore or establish a climate of order.”³⁴¹ They allow for responsible government to function, development to occur and progress to be achieved.
- IV. **Enabling Operations:** are tactical activities that link, support or create the conditions for offensive, defensive and stability operations.

Campaigns and operational plans are realized at the tactical level through the simultaneous and sequential conduct of these tactical operations and their constituent activities and tasks. Priorities and resources ebb and flow between these tactical operations as required by the situation and campaign theme, particularly as the campaign theme changes over time. This simultaneous conduct of enabling, offensive, defensive and stability activities is termed **full-spectrum operations (FSO)**. Full-spectrum operations are defined as : “the simultaneous conduct of operations by a force across the spectrum of conflict.”

Generally, all types of tactical operations and activities may be conducted **simultaneously**, regardless of the campaign theme. The balance between types of activities gives a campaign its predominant character. Major combat may consist primarily of offensive and defensive

³³⁷ In order to avoid confusion over the term “operations”, NATO refers to tactical level operations as “activities” only and does not use the overarching title of operations for each of the three tactical level sets of activities. See AJP 3.2 *Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operation* and ATP 3.2.1 *Allied Land Tactics*.

³³⁸ “Stability operation” is defined as “a tactical activity conducted by military and security forces, often in conjunction with other agencies, to maintain, restore or establish a climate of order. (Approved by Army Terminology Panel, May 2007).

³³⁹ These are tactical level activities, assigned to and conducted by tactical level units and subunits. Thus, to state that a campaign will be a “stability operation” is a misnomer. The campaign will likely be peace support or COIN, but many of the tactical level activities undertaken in support of the campaign will be stability and defensive operations.

³⁴⁰ In the past the term “stability operations” have been used to describe operational level campaigns. This has been a misnomer. In its proper sense, stability operations refer to tactical level activities and tasks.

³⁴¹ Army Terminology Panel approved May 2007. Stability activities are defined in NATO as: tactical activities that seek to stabilize the situation and reduce the level of violence. They impose security and control over an area while employing military capabilities to restore services and support civilian agencies. (NATO AJP 3.2)

activities, while COIN may have a complex mix of all three types. Enabling operations are never conducted in isolation for their purpose is to enable other operations.

Even when activities are sequential, it is important to plan them simultaneously as linkages between the different operations are important. If not coordinated, early actions may compromise subsequent operations. This combination of simultaneous offensive, defensive and stability activities that reflects a campaign's predominant theme at any one time and place can be illustrated by the continuum of operations model. his model also demonstrates how this combination will change over time (see Figure 3.5). The **balance** between the three types of operations will be dictated by the type of campaign, the principles by which the campaign is conducted, the situation at hand and the commander's intuition in terms of how to best support the operational objectives. As a campaign moves to the lower end of the spectrum of conflict, more effort and resources will be dedicated to stability operations, and less to offensive and defensive operations.




Figure 3-5: Tactical Operations on the Continuum of Operations

Appendix V: Application of Fighting Power

OPERATIONS IN SPACE AND TIME³⁴²

Deep Operations. Deep operations are: “operations conducted against forces or resources not engaged in close operations. They expand the battle area in time and space, help to shape the close battle, make it difficult for the enemy to concentrate fighting power without loss, and diminish the coherence and tempo of his operations.” Deep operations are those operations conducted at long range and over a protracted time scale against adversary forces or resources not currently engaged in close operations. They may be decisive operations, but in general they will be shaping. For example, a deep target engagement may reduce the combat effectiveness of the adversary’s reserve force prior to a main attack. At each level of command, the extent of the deep operations and related area is dependent upon the commander’s means of acquiring information and engaging targets. Deep operations include three principle activities: information operations; surveillance and target acquisition; and interdiction. They may be conducted on the physical and psychological planes, the latter seeking to create long term influences in a target audience. This may include, for example, delivering PSYOPS leaflets to conscripts in enemy reserve units, or building civil infrastructure so that subsequent generations of a region are better educated and more stable.

Close Operations. Close operations are: “operations conducted at short range, in close contact and in the immediate timescale.” Close operations are those that involve friendly forces in direct contact with the adversary or operations in which commanders anticipate direct contact taking place. The means used in close combat could range from physical destruction with lethal weapons, to arrest of detainees. They may be shaping, decisive, and even sustaining operations of forces in contact. Combined arms coordination is the hallmark of close operations. Close operations will normally occur on the physical plane, although there may be instances when they will occur on the psychological plane, independently or in addition to the physical plane. For example, a firepower demonstration may convince a belligerent commander not to manoeuvre his forces from a cantonment site, and a medical clinic for the local populace will immediately engender good will and local support.

Rear Operations. Rear operations are defined as: “operations which establish and maintain one’s own forces in order to generate the freedom of action to allow for the conduct of close and deep operations.” Rear operations are the largely administrative and logistic activities that occur out of contact with adversary forces, that is, behind the area in which close operations are occurring. Rear operations require security, particularly in campaigns involving an asymmetric, non-conventional adversary. In non-contiguous and/or nonlinear battlespaces (that is, in areas with no identifiable rear area), there is a need to secure the lines of communications and critical centres. Rear area operations including the security and force protection aspect are normally sustaining operations (in terms of the effects framework).

³⁴² LO 4.16-17

CSASS³⁴³

Fighting power is applied through functional capabilities and activities. The operational functions are: **Command, Sense, Act, Shield, and Sustain**. In organizing and applying fighting power through the operational functions, forces conduct activities known as core functions. Core functions are: **find, fix, and strike**, with **exploit** an implied function. Together, these two functional groupings comprise the functional framework. The functional framework is effectively the plan for an operation. It is a framework for manoeuvre of both physical activities (fires) and influence activities.

The operational functions describe the functional capabilities of a military force, regardless of the type of unit or formal operational role. They apply to all levels of warfare, the tactical, operational, and strategic. Fighting power is applied through the organization and application of the operational functions. The relative balance given to each function will dictate the nature of the effects created. The operational functions operate on both the physical and psychological plans. **The operational functions are listed as: Command, Sense, Act, Shield, and Sustain.**

COMMAND. Command is the operational function that integrates all the operational functions into a single comprehensive strategic, operational or tactical level concept. It provides vertical and horizontal integration through the planning, direction, coordination and control of military forces and other elements as allocated. It provides the means to unify and integrate the activities of the other functions in the finding, fixing and striking⁶² of adversaries or other targets. The central component of the Command function is a philosophy emphasizing the importance of formulating and communicating the commander's intent. A thorough understanding of the intent guides decision-making at all levels, and encourages both initiative and speed of action. It provides for a unity of purpose and effort on the vertical and horizontal planes and even between the military and other elements of the JIMP framework. Command support processes are reliant upon robust communications, good intelligence, and an effective battle procedure process. Commanders will need the skills to operate in a fastpaced and highly technical environment while still ensuring personal dominance of the operations and decision-making process.

SENSE. Sense is the operational function that provides the commander with knowledge. This function integrates those assets that collect information and then provide the analysis to produce information and knowledge, which is then disseminated. By design, it leverages all sources of information. Sensor management and fusion must be centralized to gain full advantage of disparate systems found in the modern battlespace. This operational function is inherently modular, capable of integrating additional systems and capabilities at every level: tactical, operational or strategic. The scope of the Sense function must be broad in order to firstly provide the commander with a broad and deep knowledge base of the operational environment, and secondly,

³⁴³ LO 4.1820

to assess the effects of activities across all elements within the environment. This view of the environment must not only include the physical characteristics of weather and terrain, but also the broad range of other systems, entities and power structures that exist and operate in the environment. The interrelated elements and systems of an environment that must be assessed in the broad knowledge base are the political, military, economic, social (including aspects of culture and religion), infrastructure, and information. These elements must not only be assessed by the Sense capabilities, but the effects of our activities upon them must be predicted to the greatest accuracy possible and then analyzed to ensure that the desired effects and objectives are being achieved.




Figure 4-2: The Generation and Application of Fighting power and Its Effects

ACT. Act is the operational function that integrates manoeuvre, firepower, and information operations (influence activities) to achieve the desired effects. It integrates fires and influence activities. The synchronization of manoeuvre, firepower, (fires) and influence is at the heart of manoeuvre warfare and allows the decisive concentration of effects against adversaries, other targets, and centres of gravity. Fracturing these

centres of gravity will dislocate the adversary, breaking cohesion and the will to resist. Act functions engage a wide variety of targets in addition to an adversary. Information operations (that is, influence activities) such as civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) reconstruction or PSYOPS may be used to influence target audiences to support a campaign or to convince elements of an adversary to surrender. Thus, the functions inherent in Act are conducted on the physical and psychological planes in order to achieve desired effects. It is the complete combination of fires and influence activities synchronized and harmonized through manoeuvre and battlespace management.

SHIELD. Shield is the operational function that provides for the protection of a force's survivability and freedom of action. Shield facilitates the friendly forces' freedom of action. Shielding, at the strategic level, particularly in terms of the asymmetric threat to domestic populations, is a joint function that stretches from the theatre of operations to the domestic population. At the tactical level, Shield includes protective measures through air defence, countermobility and survivability, such as the construction of defensives and the hardening of structures. Shielding will become increasingly difficult as forces operate dynamically and are dispersed over an extended area in the face of an increased adversary ability to see and strike, or against a threat that utilizes asymmetric tactics and takes refuge amongst civilian populations. The function of Shield also includes force protection measures, which is the responsibility of all forces and their commanders.

SUSTAIN. Sustain is the operational function that integrates strategic, operational and tactical levels of support to generate and maintain force capability. Sustain ideally takes an anticipatory approach that enables support services to be provided commensurate with an increased tempo in manoeuvre operations. Thus, it will move towards an intelligence push system based upon situational awareness and asset visibility. The supply-based support system, centred on stockpiling within echelons, may evolve in certain campaigns to a distribution-based system where supplies are held within a "pipeline" and delivered on as required basis. The utility and effectiveness of an echelon system will remain extant. Sustain function also incorporates health care and welfare systems and procedures.

FIND, FIX, STRIKE (EXPLOIT)³⁴⁴

Certain military arms and services are more inclined by the nature of their inherent capabilities to operate predominately within a single operational function. However, most arms and services will operate across a number of operational functions. Activities that seek to attack an adversary's cohesion, or to affect the will of the adversary and other targets, are executed through three core dynamic functions. These are: **find**, **fix**, and **strike**. The need to be prepared to **exploit** is implicit. Finding and fixing the adversary or any other target will contribute to *shaping*. Striking and exploiting have the potential to be *decisive*. The function of fixing should not be limited to the tactical task "fix," or confined to defensive

³⁴⁴ LO 4.21-25

operations to protect the force. Defensive or offensive operations designed to fix the target may set the conditions for offensive action to strike him. Likewise, the ability of an adversary to conduct information operations and influence elements of a population may be “fixed” through aggressive PSYOPS and public affairs (PA) activities. These core functions are normally carried out through the Sense and Act operational functions and their inherent capabilities. Where circumstances permit, operations designed primarily to find, fix, or strike the adversary should be exploited. Operational experience indicates that finding, fixing, striking and exploiting should be conducted concurrently, or at least through seamless transition achieved from one to another.

FIND. Finding the adversary or a potential target is a basic function that endures throughout an operation and is continually applied and assessed. It includes locating, identifying, tracking, and assessing the target, be it an adversary or otherwise. Forces may be directed specifically to fight for information, particularly in the opening stages of an operation. This will normally be a sound investment when the situation is confused and seemingly chaotic. Whatever its source, information is never wholly reliable. It should be verified or corroborated with other sources. A commander cannot know everything. Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and recce (ISTAR) systems can produce so much information that they could overload a commander or analyst who tries to assimilate its vast amount, and it becomes a point of friction. These problems can be overcome by setting clear and succinct priorities for intelligence gathering, and directing ISTAR elements accordingly. This will be key in the “direction” step of the intelligence cycle. Finding demands far more physical and intellectual effort than simply locating the adversary. A commander is far more likely to succeed if he knows the organization, location, and strength of an adversary force, its intentions, how it fights, and how it may react to friendly action. It is equally important to establish where the threat is not located, and to determine what he is unlikely to do within a given time, as this may provide opportunities for surprise and exploitation. Receiving information from a wide variety of sources contributes to the quality of the intelligence picture that helps a commander formulate his plan. Within the battlespace and environment, the finding function includes identifying and analyzing those elements, other than an adversary, that affect a situation and may play a role in realizing the successful conclusion to a campaign. These include key players and elements in the environment, such as cultural influences, social ties, and religious and political leaders and clan groups, that may have to be engaged in pursuit of enduring campaign objectives and end states. The “find” analysis should indicate the role these environmental characteristics, individuals and groups play in the environment, their aims, and the ways in which they may be influenced to support the campaign. In short, a holistic approach must be taken to the “find” function so that all key elements within the environment are found and analyzed for their role in achieving campaign success. Although technological means will prove helpful in locating and assessing an adversary or other target, human analysis and experience is still required to assess likely intentions. It must be remembered that soldiers and others in contact with the adversary and local populace are sources of information, and often very accurate

sources of information. Thus, key intelligence needs should be widely disseminated throughout the force, down to the lowest levels as appropriate, as standing priority information requirements.

FIX. To fix an adversary or another target is to deprive it freedom of action. This can be done by denying the adversary or target his goals, distracting the adversary from his goals, or by denying him information needed to obtain his goals. This may be done on the either the physical or psychological plane, or on both. Fixing in physical terms involves the use of combat forces to hold ground against an adversary's attack, to hold or fix an adversary in one location by firepower and/or manoeuvre, or to hold vital points by protecting against adversary intervention. Its object is to restrict an adversary's freedom of movement and increase our own ability to manoeuvre. The fixing of manoeuvre forces may be done through a combination of shaping attacks, blocking positions Deception and surprise is key to fixing adversary manoeuvre forces. Denying the adversary the opportunity to achieve his goals and putting him in a reactive frame of mind enhances our freedom of action. Resulting in distraction, this is done by deceiving, luring and surprising the adversary. When an adversary is deceived, he is certain how to react, but his decision is wrong. When he is lured, he is invited to take a course of action that will make him vulnerable. When he is surprised, he becomes uncertain how to react to ambiguous information until it is too late. Given such uncertainty, the adversary can be forced to cover all options, thereby dissipating his force and being distracted from his purpose. He is thus fixed. Fixing on the psychological plane involves disrupting and preventing the adversary's ability to influence the understanding and will of other elements in an environment, namely elements in a population and their leaders. The object is to restrict his manoeuvre on the psychological plane, that is, in shaping the perceptions, will, and behaviour of others. This is mainly done through information operations and may include, for example, the issue of timely media statements explaining the actual facts of an engagement before the adversary can issue propaganda seeking to undermine friendly force legitimacy. Physical activities may have secondary effects to fix a target on the psychological plane. The fixing of an adversary force will often be planned as a **shaping** effect in support of a simultaneous or subsequent **decisive** action. Fixing an adversary with manoeuvre operations can quickly consume one's own fighting power. Thus, a balance must be struck to ensure that the resources allocated to fixing do not unnecessarily reduce those required for striking. Likewise, on the psychological plane, the use of friendly PSYOPS and PA messages to fix those activities of the adversary must not reduce significantly the ability to produce one's own messages and the means to influence target audiences.

STRIKE. Striking the adversary is achieved by attack and other offensive activities on the physical or psychological planes, or ideally, a combination of both. Striking activities may be decisive or shaping. Striking in physical terms involves the attack on adversary forces to: seize or capture ground; destroy equipment, vital points, and installations; kill adversary personnel; or, gain a position of advantage. The objective is to manoeuvre

forces or concentrate and deliver firepower to gain leverage over an adversary. Success, particularly in critical capabilities or areas, will lead to secondary psychological effects on the adversary, such as a decrease in morale and cohesion. Thus, striking activities should be aimed at the adversary's weak points in order to gain positions of advantage and undermine his morale and confidence. To strike and create first order effects on the psychological plane is to attack or engage a target's understanding, perception, and will. Much of this striking, be it against an adversary or some other target group, will be done through information operations, that is, influence activities. Striking an adversary on the psychological plane through influence activities requires good intelligence, sound analysis, specialist advice, and thorough coordination. Ideally, activities strike the adversary simultaneously on the physical and psychological planes in a complementary fashion. It will involve selective attack upon his key capabilities, his understanding, and his morale and legitimacy within the environment. This would be a synchronized combination of fires and influence activities. Thus, striking will combine manoeuvre forces, special forces, with PSYOPS, PA, CIMIC and other influence activities to create complementary effects in pursuit of the objective. The adversary should see his key capabilities destroyed, his position out-maneuvred and untenable, his ability to command, control and sustain reduced, and his ability to influence other elements of the environment including leaders and populations neutralized. The combination of physical and psychological effects in striking the adversary must be complementary. If not carefully considered in **comprehensive planning and targetting**, the effects of physical activities may undermine those of influence activities generated through information operations. For example, if PSYOPS is used to convince conscripts or others to surrender, but manoeuvre forces close too quickly, which does not set the conditions to allow mass surrender or creates too much collateral damage, the effectiveness of the plan will be undermined and the legitimacy of the campaign and its forces will be reduced.

EXPLOITATION. Exploitation is the seizure of an opportunity to achieve a higher commander's objective, or to fulfil part of his intent, directly. Opportunistic exploitation requires action beyond the given mission. To achieve the overall intent, therefore, it may be necessary to supplant the task stated in orders. For example, a commander ordered to neutralize an adversary covering the approaches to his commander's objective may find an approach that is not covered and simply move directly to the objective. Opportunities can occur at any time while finding, fixing, or striking. Striking the adversary is intended to achieve the purpose of the mission. To turn success into a greater achievement, one needs the audacity and determination to seize fleeting opportunities. Exploitation relies upon offensive action, surprise and flexibility, along with a commander's initiative and understanding of his superior's intent. It should be supported by the concept and philosophy of mission command. Recce is a key enabler for exploitation. Recce should be extensive, expansive, and continuous in order to find the opportunities for exploitation. Where recce forces are not strong enough to strike, they fix the threat, limiting his freedom of manoeuvre and permitting him to be struck by other elements. Recce forces should be prepared to lead

any exploitation. In seeking to tactically exploit a situation, commanders must keep in mind that tactical exploitation may have to be delayed or even sacrificed in order to support the overall operational objective. For example, forces may have to permit a fleeing adversary to escape in order to secure an area or a populace affected by the recent engagement, thus supporting the operational objective of safeguarding the populace, preventing lawlessness, or securing vital sites. Exploitation may occur on the psychological plane through influence activities of information operations. A successful attack against an adversary's position may be exploited through PSYOPS and PA messages that undermine the public image and capability and legitimacy of the adversary and his supporters. Any such information operations messages must be carefully crafted so that they do not appear to be gloating or exaggerated.

DECISIVE, SHAPING, AND SUSTAINING OPERATIONS

The effects framework is used to describe and link tactical operations through the commander's scheme of manoeuvre. The framework refers to the conduct of operations and their related results, and may be used at all levels of command to conceive the conduct of operations. It is the tool by which a commander may synchronize the activities of his forces, in the AO, *by purpose over time and space*. Hence, it is the **arrangement of effects in the battlespace**. The effects framework provides a means of conceiving and articulating activities by purpose. The activities may be described in terms of purpose as: **shaping**, **decisive**, or **sustaining**. Concepts of the effects framework, like those of the battlespace framework, should be described in relation to decisive points and lines of operation. It must be remembered that the concept of shaping, decisive, and sustaining applies to both the physical plane and psychological plane.

Every tactical operation has one of three purposes: decisive, shaping, or sustaining. The commander will define and express his intent⁶⁴ and his scheme of manoeuvre in terms of decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations. This framework allows formations and units to understand the relationship of their missions and tasks to those of other formations and units through the synchronization of all operations contributing to the higher mission. Decisive, shaping, and sustaining are defined as:

Decisive Operations. Decisive operations are those activities that will directly achieve the commander's intent. Decisive operations conclusively determine the outcome of operations or battles. There is only one decisive activity for any operation or battle. During phased operations, the main effort can change phase by phase, but there remains only one decisive operation. When the decisive operation is launched it should become the main effort.

Shaping Operations. Shaping operations are those activities that favourably shape the adversary and battlespace for the decisive operation. They make an adversary or other target vulnerable to attack or another decisive action, and help dictate the time and place for decisive actions. Shaping operations can be phased to occur prior to, or simultaneous with, the decisive operation. Success of shaping operations is measured by the creation of specific desired effects that set the conditions for the decisive

operation. Shaping operations can take time to have an effect, particularly if they are conducted as activities and effects on the psychological plane.

Sustaining Operations. Sustaining operations are those operations that ensure that the force has adequate resources to project fighting power throughout and beyond the accomplishment of the decisive operation and any following exploitation. They include combat service support (CSS), force protection, establishment and protection of operating bases, and support for and protection of civilians and civilian establishments. They must be focussed to support the commander's intent and follow his main effort. Unity of command is essential to coordinate the many functions of sustaining operations. The concept of sustaining operations may be extended to include the sustainment of support and legitimacy of a campaign from the local populace.

Appendix VI: Command, Authority, Management, and Leadership ³⁴⁵

The inter-relationships and interconnected of command, management, and leadership functions often make it difficult to disentangle the command, management and leadership effects achieved by individuals in positions of authority.

- a. COMMAND is the purposeful exercise of legitimate authority over structures, resources, people and activities. Command is bounded by the lawful authority delegated to a commander and may only be exercised down the chain of command.
- b. AUTHORITY is always derived from a higher or superior entity and encompasses both a legal and constitutional component that gives the commander the right to make decisions, transmit their intentions to subordinates, and impose their will on others.
- c. MANAGEMENT involves responsibilities for a broad range of function including planning, problem-solving and decision-making, organizing, informing, directing, developing, coordinating, monitoring, controlling, allocating and managing resources. *Management* is empowered by the authority delegated to a manager and may only be exercised down the managerial chain.
- d. LEADERSHIP may be exercised by anyone, regardless of organizational position, to purposefully influence up, down and across the chain of command to achieve an objective. Leader influence works in concert with the formal authorities of command and management but also operates independently of such formal authority. Command provides the structures and leadership provides the motivations, which together shape operational effectiveness.

Leadership is not constrained by the limits of formal authority and is an essential trait for both commanders and managers. Individuals anywhere in the chain of command may, given the ability and motivation, influence peers and even superiors. Military command is distinguished from management by the unique authorities of military commanders to resort to large-scale lethal force, to compel subordinates to go into harm's way and to dispense a distinct military justice with substantial powers of punishment.

³⁴⁵ C:TOF 31-34, 43-44

Appendix VII: Manoeuvrist Approach | Manoeuvrist Warfare

The central component of the Command function is a philosophy – mission command – emphasizing the importance of formulating and communicating the commander's intent and allowing subordinates the authority and initiative to fulfil it. A thorough understanding of the intent guides decision-making and enables this mission command philosophy at all levels. It encourages initiative and speed of action, and provides for a unity of purpose nested within each level of command. [C:TOF 14, 17]

[Principles of the *Manoeuvrist Approach*]³⁴⁶

The *manoeuvrist approach* is a philosophical approach to operations that seeks to defeat adversaries by shattering their moral and physical cohesion – their ability to fight as an effective, coordinated whole – rather than by destroying them physically through incremental attrition. It uses all capabilities – fire, manoeuvre and influence activities – to achieve a psychological advantage over the enemy. The *manoeuvrist approach* is equally applicable to all types of campaigns from peace support through major combat.

In formulating plans, a commander should strive to implement the manoeuvrist approach in order to gain a physical and psychological advantage in relation to the enemy and their objectives. The *manoeuvrist approach* is realized through the following principles:

- a. CONCENTRATION ON THE ADVERSARY'S VULNERABILITIES to attack the adversary's weaknesses on both the psychological and physical planes to degrade their will to fight and disrupt their force cohesion. Activities and their effects should be focused on exploiting vulnerabilities while avoiding strengths.
- b. MISSION TYPE ORDERS focus on the effects to be achieved. *Mission-type orders* direct forces through the commander's clearly articulated intent, tasks and desired effects, rather than by detailed supervision and the imposition of control measures or restrictions. Mission orders enable decentralized decision-making and empower commanders at all levels to react to situations and to capitalize on opportunities as they arise, while being guided by the intent of commanders one and two echelons above.
- c. AGILITY through rapid decision-making and intellectual acuity enables a commander to seize and retain the initiative and dictate the course of operations by *acting quicker than the adversaries can react* on both the physical and psychological planes. Once overcome by events, the adversary loses cohesion and unity of action, and the ability to influence the operating environment. *Agility* is required at all levels of command and in all situations.
- d. FOCUS ON MAIN EFFORT generally expressed in terms of a particularly friendly unit, activity or effect. The main effort focuses combat power and resources on the vital element of the plan and allows subordinates to make decisions that will support the commander's intent without constantly seeking advice. While each unity is

³⁴⁶ C:TOF 17-18, 22-23

granted the freedom to operate independently, all forces are unified in their desired end state.

- e. EXPLOIT TACTICAL OPPORTUNITIES. Commanders are able to react to changes quicker than the adversary by maintaining situational awareness and exercising freedom of action. Reserves are formed to exploit opportunities created by the active shaping of the operating environment. Commanders must build and practise (through training) a culture among subordinates that uses mission command and encourages initiative.
- f. ACT BOLDLY AND DECISIVELY. Commanders at all levels must deal with uncertainty and take decisive action to seize fleeting opportunities in support of the higher commander's intent. They accept confusion and disorder, and generate it for the adversary. Risk is calculated, understood, mitigated and accepted.
- g. COMMAND FROM A POSITION TO INFLUENCE THE MAIN EFFORT. Commanders place themselves where they can influence the main effort and ensure that the desired effects are created to realize the desired objectives. If the main effort of a campaign rests with influence activities that seek to engender security and support from a populace, then commanders must position themselves to influence the unity of effort between all the available elements of power and within the local populace. To retain the ability to influence operations, a commander must not permanently allocate all resources to subordinate units or formations.

[Application of the *Manoeuvrist Approach*]³⁴⁷

The *manoeuvrist approach* to operations seeks to attach the adversary's will to fight, and thus undermine and even shatter their cohesion by avoiding trials of strength and targeting the adversary's vulnerabilities or weakness. Attacking the adversary's cohesion is done both physically and psychologically through fire and influence activities.

Three approaches to attacking will and cohesion are:

- a. PRE-EMPTION to seize a fleeting opportunity to deny the adversary an advantageous course of action. *Pre-emption* relies upon surprise, and requires sound intelligence to understand and anticipate an adversary's actions which can be swiftly exploited. The purpose of pre-emptive action is to prevent an adversary from gaining an objective or establishing influence. Effective *pre-emption* denies initiative to an adversary, causes confusion and doubt, destroys confidence, and undermines plans. *Pre-emption* is often achieved by allowing subordinates at all levels the initiative, consistent with the commander's intent, to seize opportunities as they arise on both the physical and psychological planes.
- b. DISLOCATION of an adversary is to deny them the ability to bring their strength to bear. It seeks to avoid fighting the adversary on their terms by avoiding and neutralizing their strengths so they cannot be used effectively. Envelopment or deep penetrations into the operational depth of an adversary, by small military forces, may cause dislocation by attacking reserves, lines of communications, and C2 networks.

³⁴⁷ C:TOF 20-22, 24-29

Deception can be used to lure the adversary into making incorrect tactical decisions and dislocating their forces. Influence activities, such as psychological operations and local public affairs, can dislocate the messages of enemy propaganda.

- c. DISRUPTION selectively attacks the adversary to break apart critical assets and degrade coherence of their fighting power. Disruption ruptures the integrity of the adversary's fighting power and reduces it to less than the total of its constituent parts. It often shapes the operational environment for more decisive action. Disruptive actions include getting into an adversary's lines of communication, seizing or neutralizing what is important to them, surprising and deceiving them, presenting them with unexpected situations, using psychological operations (PSYOPS) to disrupt propaganda and undermine their forces, and attaching their plans and preparations. In many campaign themes, such as a counter-insurgency (COIN), the establishment of credible coalition forces and superior governance models can disrupt the influence and intimidation that the adversaries have over a populace.

The *manoeuvrist approach* is not only applied through physical activities (*fires*) that affect enemy will and cohesion as second-order effects, it is also applied through influence activities that directly attack enemy will and cohesion. The *manoeuvrist approach* is conducted simultaneously on the physical and psychological planes in a complementary fashion. Just as a commander may wish to reach a piece of vital ground in order to make the enemy's defence untenable, and thus undermine the enemy's will and cohesion, the same commander may wish to issue highly effective PSYOPS messages to undermine enemy forces, provide emergency aid to locals suffering occupation, and issue accurate and timely public affairs (PA) statements, to out-manoeuvre the enemy in time, space and influence.

Activities are planned and conducted with a common objective in mind, so that activities seeking to shatter the will and cohesion of an adversary do not negatively affect the will and cohesion of those groups that support the campaign. When an adversary is attacked, the legitimacy of the campaign must be maintained in the eyes of its supporters and potential supporters.

Depending upon the campaign theme, it may be possible to influence the adversaries and opponents to become supports of the campaign. This requires activities that address the root causes of the crisis and conflict itself, the application of activities on the psychological plane, and the considered and judicious use of physical violence.

A successful *manoeuvrist approach* requires a style and philosophy of command that fosters de-centralized decision-making, the use of initiative at all levels, the ability to react to the unexpected and the ability to take advantage of opportunity. It requires a sound understanding of the enemy and their relationship with the local populace.

