

THE ETHICAL FUNCTION OF INTERTEXTUAL REFERENCES TO
DEUTERONOMY IN PROVERBS 1–9 AS A MORAL TRADITION

by

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ABSTRACT

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In this dissertation, I examine the ethical functions of Deuteronomic references in Prov 1–9 to observe how they are utilized in parental discourse to guide the youth toward moral formation. To analyze the ethical dimension of these intertexts, this study employs an interdisciplinary methodology that integrates MacIntyre’s meta-ethical framework and Culler’s Presupposition theory. The Deuteronomic language embedded in parental instructions is categorized into three thematic complexes: the *Shema* (Prov 3, 6, 7), the Way metaphor concerning “life in the land” (Prov 2:21–22), and the fear of YHWH (Prov 1:7; 2:5; 9:10). These thematic clusters are then mapped onto the meta-ethical categories of practice, narrative, and *telos* to further assess their moral implications in the discourse in Prov 1–9. With their active role in character formation, I conclude that they represent a Deuteronomic moral tradition that shapes and transforms the youth’s understanding of socio-ethical practice, narrative unity, the foundation, and purpose of life as the covenant people of God.

Dedicated to

“The love of my soul” (שֶׁאַהֲבָה נַפְשִׁי),

Youngwon

– Song of Songs 1:7 –

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CONTENTS

SUMMARY PAGE	ii
SIGNATURE PAGE	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	vi
CONTENTS	vii
LIST OF TABLES	xi
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	xii
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW	1
Introduction	1
The Book of Proverbs, Virtue Ethics, and Tradition	2
Ethical Approaches to Proverbs 1–9	6
Character Development and Virtue Ethics in Proverbs 1–9	6
Moral Philosophy and Virtue Ethics in Proverbs 1–9	12
Literary Approaches to Deuteronomistic References in Proverbs 1–9	21
Biblical Wisdom as “Foreign Body” (Fremdkörper)	23
History of Influence Between Proverbs and Deuteronomy	24
Wisdom as a Distinctive Tradition	29
Wisdom as a Scribal Mode	31
Intertextuality as an Alternative Methodology	32
Recent Studies on Deuteronomistic Links in Proverbs 1–9	34
Conclusion	39
CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY	41
Introduction	41
MacIntyre’s Meta-Ethical Framework and Proverbs 1–9	42
Moral Tradition: Founded on Practice and Narrative	44

Practice	45
Narrative History	51
The Moral Tradition in Proverbs 1–9	57
The Concept of “Tradition” in Old Testament Scholarship	57
Definition and Description of Moral Tradition	60
Language and Moral Tradition	65
Methodological Description and Procedure	68
Intertextuality as a Literary Phenomenon	69
Intertextuality of Deuteronomic Links in Proverbs 1–9	71
Jonathan Culler’s Presupposition Theory	75
Presupposed Tradition in Parental Instructions of Proverbs 1–9	81
Methodological Consideration	83
Thematic Complexes	83
The Concept of “Torah” (תורה) in Proverbs 1–9	86
Attitude of Proverbs 1–9 Toward the Torah	88
Diachrony versus Synchrony	89
Methodological Procedure	90
Structure of Dissertation	91
Conclusion	93
CHAPTER 3: THE SHEMA IN PROVERBS 3, 6, AND 7	94
Introduction	94
The Shema in Deuteronomy 6:4–9 and 11:18–23	96
General Analysis	96
Literary/Thematic Conventions of the Shema	98
The Shema in the Third Instruction (Proverbs 3:1–12)	104
“My Teaching” and “My Commands”	105
Pedagogical Emphasis	107
“Bind-Write” Pair with “On the Tablet of Your Heart”	110

The Reward of Life and Blessing	117
The Shema in the Ninth (Proverbs 6:20–35) and Tenth (Proverbs 7:1–27) Instructions	122
The Shema Elements Unique to the Ninth Instruction	124
The Shema Elements Unique to the Tenth Instruction	127
Ethical Functions of the Deuteronomic Shema for Practice in Proverbs 1–9	130
An Authoritative Voice as Standard of Excellence	131
Write on the tablet of the heart	134
Life as the Reward	139
Conclusion	143
CHAPTER 4: THE WAY METAPHOR AND “LIFE IN THE LAND”	144
Introduction	144
The “Way” Metaphor and the Conceptual World of Proverbs 1–9	146
The “Way” Metaphor in Deuteronomy	153
Geographical Pathway	154
The Metaphorical Use of the “Way(s)”	155
The Two Ways Metaphor in Post-Biblical Literature	165
The Way Metaphor in Proverbs 1–9	167
General Analysis	167
The Way Metaphor Schema in Proverbs 1–9	170
Traveller: The Son	173
The Ways #1: Individual Life	174
The Ways #2: Lifestyle Approved by the Parents	176
The Ways #3: Lifestyle Prohibited by the Parents	179
Destinations: “Life in the Land” and Death/Sheol	184
The Discursive Formation of “the Land” in Proverbs 1–9	188
Moral Implications of the Way metaphor and “the Land” Reference	191
Conclusion	197
CHAPTER 5: FEAR OF YHWH AS FOUNDATION AND TELOS	198

Introduction	198
Fear of YHWH in Deuteronomy	200
Fear of YHWH as Foundation and Telos of Moral Formation in Proverbs 1–9	208
Structural and Conceptual Importance of Fear of YHWH in Proverbs 1–9	208
Is Fear of YHWH Foundation, Telos, or Both?	211
Literary Evidence within Proverbs 1–9	216
“Fear of YHWH” as Intertextual Operator to Deuteronomy	221
Moral Implications of Fear of YHWH as Foundation and Telos	225
Fear of YHWH and the Process of Moral Formation	225
Moral Virtues and Imitatio Dei	227
Imitatio Dei	228
“Righteousness, Justice, and Equity” (Proverbs 1:3; 2:9)	230
Conclusion	232
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION	233
BIBLIOGRAPHY	243

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. A Comparison Between Deuteronomy 6:4–9 and Deuteronomy 11:13, 18–20

Table 2. A Comparison Between Deuteronomy 6:4–9 and Proverbs 3:1–12

Table 3. The Way Metaphor Schema in Deuteronomy

Table 4. A Comparison of the Way Metaphor in Deuteronomy and Proverbs 1–9

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AB	The Anchor Bible
ABRL	The Anchor Bible Reference Library
AIL	Ancient Israel and Its Literature
AOTC	The Apollos Old Testament Commentary
BE	Bloomsbury Ethics
BZAW	Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft
CB OTS	Coniectanea biblica. Old Testament series
CBET	Contributions to Biblical Exegesis and Theology
<i>CBQ</i>	<i>The Catholic Biblical Quarterly</i>
<i>CBR</i>	<i>Currents in Biblical Research</i>
<i>CRBS</i>	<i>Currents in Research: Biblical Studies</i>
ESEC	Emory Studies in Early Christianity
FAT	Forschungen zum Alten Testament
FRLANT	Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments
HCOT	Historical Commentary on the Old Testament
<i>HS</i>	<i>Hebrew Studies</i>
HSCPRT	Heythrop Studies in Contemporary Philosophy, Religion, & Theology
<i>HTS</i>	<i>Hervormde Teologiese Studies</i>
<i>HUCA</i>	<i>Hebrew Union College Annual</i>
<i>JBL</i>	<i>Journal of Biblical Literature</i>

<i>JJPk</i>	<i>A Journal of Jewish Philosophy and Kabbalah</i>
JPS	Jewish Publication Society
<i>JQR</i>	<i>The Jewish Quarterly Review</i>
<i>JNES</i>	<i>Journal of Near Eastern Studies</i>
<i>JSOT</i>	<i>Journal for the Study of the Old Testament</i>
JSOTSup	Journal for the Study of the Old Testament Supplements
JTISup	Journal of Theological Interpretation Supplements
<i>OLP</i>	<i>Orientalia Lovaniensia Periodica</i>
OTE	<i>Old Testament Essays</i>
OTL	Old Testament Library
ORA	Orientalische Religionen in der Antike
ÖBS	Österreichische biblische Studien
LCL	The Loeb Classical Library
LHBBOTS	The Library of Hebrew Bible/Old Testament Studies
<i>MT</i>	<i>Modern Theology</i>
NASB	New American Standard Bible
NCBC	New Century Bible Commentary
NICOT	New International Commentary on the Old Testament
<i>NIDOTTE</i>	<i>New International Dictionary of Old Testament Theology and Exegesis</i>
NLT	New Living Translation
NSBT	New Studies in Biblical Theology
NTSup	Novum Testamentum, Supplements

NRSV	New Revised Standard Version
<i>RB</i>	<i>Revue Biblique</i>
<i>SBJT</i>	<i>The Southern Baptist Journal of Theology</i>
SBL	Society of Biblical Literature
<i>SJOT</i>	<i>Scandinavian Journal of the Old Testament</i>
<i>SJT</i>	<i>Scottish Journal of Theology</i>
STDJ	Studies on the Texts of the Desert of Judah
<i>ThQ</i>	<i>Theologische Quartalschrift</i>
TOTC	The Tyndale Old Testament Commentaries
UT	Urban-Taschenbücher
UTPSS	University of Texas Press Slavic Series
<i>VT</i>	<i>Vetus Testamentum</i>
VTSup	Vetus Testamentum Supplements
WBC	Word Biblical Commentary
<i>WTJ</i>	<i>The Westminster Theological Journal</i>
<i>ZAW</i>	<i>Zeitschrift für die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft</i>
ZBK	Zürcher Bibelkommentare

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

In Christian faith, the importance of character formation is undeniable. As followers of Christ, Christians constantly aspire to be sanctified and disciplined through the hermeneutical cycle of *orthodoxy* (“right belief”) and *orthopraxis* (“right action”), aiming to cultivate a virtuous heart and character. However, this endeavour is challenging, especially within the context of modern society where the aftermath of the Enlightenment project has bequeathed us with the heritage of emotivism.¹ This new moral epistemology, if accepted even unconsciously, would disrupt this hermeneutical cycle that defines the Christian life.

This social narrative has had a detrimental impact on how we perceive our identity and social function, instilling the belief that we can shape ourselves in any way we desire for any purpose we deem best. The theistic moral tradition that once anchored Western society and culture in reality has been pulled out from beneath us, and its chilling effect is now most keenly felt on young minds. Instead of receiving instructions and guidance, they are presented with “free” choices. Their uninformed and uninstructed minds attempt to determine what is best for themselves, leading to a way of life that is at

¹ MacIntyre (*After Virtue*, 11–12) defines this term as “the doctrine that all evaluative judgments and more specifically all moral judgments are *nothing but* expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral or evaluative in character” (emphasis original).

best random and unpredictable but more commonly lost and destructive. For this reason I began exploring this ancient tradition of moral epistemology that emerged from the Deuteronomic Torah and had enduring ethical functions in the discipleship of the youths in Prov 1–9. My hope for this study is to learn from it how to appropriate our Bible-based Christian tradition for moral education and character formation of the next generation especially in the ecclesiastical context.

Thus, in this study, I will examine select clusters of Deuteronomic intertexts in Prov 1–9, aiming to demonstrate that they function as literary conventions within a moral tradition that guide the youths in their way of life. I will argue that these references serve ethical purposes within the text by presupposing the Deuteronomic text, image, narrative, and concept, informing the narrative and practice of the moral life of ancient Israel that create a didactic context for formation of a virtue-ethical character in the son.

The Book of Proverbs, Virtue Ethics, and Tradition

The book of Proverbs is well recognized in Old Testament (OT) scholarship for its ethical and didactic message that reflects a moral sphere of ancient Israelite society and that of the ancient Near Eastern world.¹ In particular, Prov 1–9 as a distinct literary unit serves as an introduction to the book and sets the didactic tone for the entire book by showcasing parental instructions to a son, emphasizing the importance of acquiring

¹ Brown, *Wisdom's Wonder*, 5; Estes, *Hear, My Son*; Schipper, *Hermeneutics*; Steiert, *Die Weisheit Israels*; Whybray, *The Intellectual Tradition*; Weinfeld, *Deuteronomic School*, 298–306; McKane, *Proverbs*, 1–10; Murphy, *Wisdom Literature*, 50–51; Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 45; Clifford, *Proverbs*; Stewart, *Poetic Ethics*, 35.

wisdom and fostering moral character.² A number of studies in this section of the book have assumed virtue ethics (alternatively, character ethics) as its ethical framework and have looked for various character-ethical features such as intention, emotion, character, community, virtues, and *telos*.³ Recently, Keefer has demonstrated that Proverbs as a whole mirrors a moral tradition within the OT akin to the virtue ethics expounded by Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas.⁴ His research draws attention to a facet of virtue ethics in biblical wisdom, a dimension that, in accordance with Alasdair MacIntyre, is absolutely fundamental to the ethos but has remained largely unexplored in OT ethics—the moral tradition encapsulated in Prov 1–9.

In biblical wisdom study, the term “tradition” typically refers to wisdom tradition that mainly consists of three books, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and Job in their particular socio-historical settings involving a certain social class(es) (often royal or scribal) from which this tradition arose. While OT scholars have attempted to either elucidate or disprove what this biblical wisdom is like as a literary tradition, much of their evidence has been circumstantial, indirect, or even speculative.⁵ Thus, Kynes among other scholars has argued that we should abandon the concept of wisdom tradition altogether.⁶ Dell, O’Dowd, and some others have suggested that we broaden our view on biblical wisdom to consider a *worldview* or *thought-world* of the OT that may be identifiable in

² Kim (“Proverbs 1–9,” iv) and Keefer (*Proverbs 1–9*) argue that Prov 1–9 offer a hermeneutical lens for the rest of the book.

³ Ansberry, “What Does Jerusalem Have to Do with Athens?”; Brown, *Character in Crisis*, 4–12 (cf. *Wisdom’s Wonder*, 6–15); Stewart, *Poetic Ethics*; Bland, *The Formation of Character*; Keefer, *Virtue Ethics*.

⁴ Keefer, *Virtue Ethics*.

⁵ Sneed (“The Elusive Attempt,” 62–63) argues that an attempt to delineate wisdom in the OT based on literary evidence alone may be “grasping after the wind.”

⁶ Kynes, “Wisdom Tradition.”

Proverbs through varying degrees of literary links.⁷ Yet, if we consider the significance of a moral tradition as a vehicle for such worldview, thought-world, and cultural values, the concept of tradition cannot simply be rejected and may actually further our understanding of biblical wisdom. Biblical wisdom as it stands more or less represents an ethical aspect of worldview, moral thought and epistemological tradition than a socio-cultural phenomenon or a literary tradition. What may further our understanding of it is rather the nature and function of the *moral* tradition that feeds into wisdom thoughts in Proverbs, and more broadly the OT, by a means of various literary links in the book. Thus, this study aims to take one untrodden path in biblical scholarship, that is, to examine the moral tradition that underlies various Deuteronomic intertexts found in the parental discourse of Prov 1–9.⁸

That said, within Prov 1–9, there are links to other sections of the OT, contributing to the formulation of ten parental instructions and three Wisdom speeches. The prevailing notion is that the Wisdom speeches exhibit linguistic similarities to the Prophets while parental instructions align with Deuteronomy the latter of which is the primary focus of this study. Many of the intertexts within Prov 1–9, however, are admittedly subtle in nuance and regrettably their significance has not garnered the attention it deserves. This study views these intertexts as an indication of a moral

⁷ Dell, *Proverbs*; O'Dowd, *The Wisdom of Torah*; Kartje, *Wisdom Epistemology*; Van Leeuwen, "Liminality and Worldview."

⁸ In this study, the term "Deuteronomic" refers to "Deuteronomy related" without any historical-critical assumptions. Deuteronomic intertexts will include other parts of OT related to the book of Deuteronomy. Also, the term "intertext" refers to a body of text that functions as a link to another text in its intertextual network without any diachronic relationship implied between them.

tradition in ancient Israel and seeks to engage with its contribution to the moral discourse in Prov 1–9.

I first provide a brief overview of key studies adopting ethical approaches to Prov 1–9 to demonstrate that the ongoing debate lacks the discussion on the moral tradition that is detectable in the text of Prov 1–9. Second, I survey previous research on the literary connections between Prov 1–9 and other parts of the OT. It becomes evident that the current discussion in this domain lacks methodological control when articulating these intertexts, all the while failing to consider the moral tradition and its role in the literary context. This twofold review aims to pose pertinent questions and suggest a way forward, emphasizing that this interpretive lacuna calls for an interdisciplinary approach. Such an approach should encompass both ethical and literary significances of the tradition within the Deuteronomic intertexts of Prov 1–9. Taking the perspective that these Deuteronomic intertexts signify a moral tradition, this study raises questions such as: How do these Deuteronomic intertexts embody a moral tradition? In what ways do they contribute to the moral discourse of Prov 1–9? What is the didactic goal and outcome of this moral tradition? To address these inquiries, I conclude by reviewing studies that employ virtue-ethical approaches. It is worth noting that, despite a lack of specific focus on the intertexts, let alone the Deuteronomic ones, these studies provide valuable insights into the broader context of virtue ethics in relation to Prov 1–9.

Ethical Approaches to Proverbs 1–9

There have been a plethora of OT ethical studies that endeavour to understand narrative and poetics of the OT in terms of their ethical thoughts, concepts, and images.⁹ Some of these studies have focused on the aspects of character and moral formation.¹⁰ Among these approaches, virtue ethics as a methodological framework has proven highly fruitful, especially, in elucidating the nature of Proverbs as moral literature. As highlighted by Ansberry, the resurgence of interest in Greek virtues has prompted numerous biblical scholars to adopt this ethical approach, enabling them to map out the moral landscape of the OT books.¹¹ In particular, virtue ethics has demonstrated its ability to explain the didactic goals and strategies employed in Prov 1–9. It has also shed light on how the moral discourse not only promotes moral behaviour but also fosters a certain moral disposition. This efficacy stems from the inherent nature of the virtue ethics framework, which presupposes character development towards the good as outlined by the given tradition, which is also a primary interest of Prov 1–9.¹²

Character Development and Virtue Ethics in Proverbs 1–9

Brown's works, *Character in Crisis* and its more elaborate sequel, *Wisdom's Wonder*, grapple with the ways in which the wisdom corpus—comprising Proverbs, Jobs, and

⁹ Birch, *Let Justice Roll Down*; Wright, *Old Testament Ethics*; Janzen, *Old Testament Ethics*; Brown, *Seeing the Psalms*; Dobbs-Allsopp, "Poetic Discourse"; Mills, *Biblical Morality*; Barton, *Old Testament Ethics*; Wenham, *Story as Torah; Psalms as Torah*. For a comprehensive survey of these studies, see Boda, "Poethics?"

¹⁰ Birch and Rasmussen, *Bible and Ethics*; Brown, *Character in Crisis; Wisdom's Wonder; The Ethos of the Cosmos*; Brown, ed., *Character and Scripture*; Carroll and Lapsley, eds., *Character Ethics*; Stewart, *Poetic Ethics*.

¹¹ Ansberry, "What Does Jerusalem Have to Do with Athens?" 156.

¹² Tousley and Kallenberg, "Virtue Ethics," 814.

Ecclesiastes—unfolds its rhetorical aim of character formation. His distinct focus on both literary and moral characters necessarily posits that wisdom literature is narrational in nature though poetic in its genre.¹³ Brown argues that Proverbs, in particular, encompasses a “meta-narrative” where depiction and development of literary characters rhetorically point toward a moral ideal characterized by “certain values and virtues that have a normative claim to be shared and embodied by others.”¹⁴ Brown places another emphasis on the role of the community in character formation although it is stronger in his first work compared to the second.¹⁵ Nonetheless, he insightfully asserts that the moral values advocated in the parental discourse of Prov 1–9 serve as the very foundation for “the maintenance and governance of the community.”¹⁶ However, an issue arises with his speculation about this community being post-exilic Yehud, and the community element itself is not extensively addressed but rather implied in the text of Prov 1–9.¹⁷ Instead, it is the moral tradition professed by this community that is more discernible through the Deuteronomic intertexts present in the text.¹⁸ Brown does acknowledge the importance of the traditions upheld by the community but does not

¹³ Brown, *Character in Crisis*, 18.

¹⁴ Brown, *Character in Crisis*, 7; Brown, *Wisdom's Wonder*, 15–16. Brown (*Character in Crisis*, 64–66) frames the whole book of Proverbs as a moral quest of a student, a literary character, who begins with home education from the parents (Prov 1–9) and ends his journey where he becomes an enthroned king (Prov 30).

¹⁵ In *Character in Crisis*, a community plays a key role in the process of character formation whereas in his second book much more emphasis is put on the concept of “wonder” as a primary means by which this normative character is cultivated.

¹⁶ Brown, *Character in Crisis*, 29.

¹⁷ The post-exilic dating of Prov 1–9 is unwarranted since the only historical reference in Prov 1–9 is made to Solomon. The dating is still scholarly unestablished (Waltke, *Proverbs 1–15*, 31–32). Also, in Prov 1–9, the terms related to community (קהל and עדה) are used only once in Prov 5:14 and seems significant only in providing the context of the first Wisdom Speech (Prov 1:20–21).

¹⁸ Brown, *Character in Crisis*, 14.

explicitly define or investigate the nature of this tradition and its functioning within the text.¹⁹

The major difference in Brown's second book, compared to the first, lies in his focus on the role of emotion and desire in character formation.²⁰ He defines "wonder" as an emotion evoked by God and his creation which not only instils a receptive disposition toward the Other but also awakens "the desire to inquire and understand." This emotion provides "emotional and cognitive resources, contemplation and conduct — in short, for wisdom."²¹ Wonder, as described by Brown, serves as a motivational factor in character development, cultivating affection toward its object and offering an epistemological lens perceiving the world afresh.

In Brown's description, it is abundantly clear how Wisdom speeches aim to promote this wonder through desirability of Woman as a female figure. However, this emphasis does not seem to extend to the parental discourse, and Brown hardly relates this wonder to the parents, who play a major role in shaping characters in Prov 1–9. In my judgment, parental תורה and מוסר, acting as "rhetorical links with communal Mosaic legislation, particularly in Deuteronomy" may be instrumental in understanding this wonder in the parental discourse.²² These Deuteronomic links illuminate how the fear of YHWH may serve as the source of this wonder (Prov 2:5–8; 3:19–20) as the

¹⁹ Brown (*Wisdom's Wonder*, 15) makes an interesting proposal that the parental figures embody traditional values, suggesting that literary characters in Prov 1–9 describe desired moral qualities. However, he does not further develop this proposal in his book.

²⁰ Brown, *Wisdom's Wonder*, 65–66.

²¹ Brown, *Wisdom's Wonder*, 23–24.

²² Brown, *Wisdom's Wonder*, 42.

creator and the fount of wisdom, seen through the lens of Deuteronomy, where it is a core concepts of the book.²³

This emphasis on an emotional factor in character formation is also evident in Stewart's work where she employs the term "desire" instead of "wonder."²⁴ While she, like Brown, utilizes virtue ethics, she critiques Brown's *Character in Crisis* for attributing excessive significance to the narrative concept for moral formation in Prov 1–9.²⁵ Stewart challenges the prevailing trend that character ethics necessitates a narrative foundation, asserting that despite occasional narrational elements in the form of short episodes, Proverbs lacks a "narrative structure" as claimed by Brown. Instead, she posits that Proverbs functions as "didactic poetry," with its poetic style performing a character-shaping role through four models of discipline: rebuke, motivation, desire, and imagination.²⁶ Stewart contends that these categories offer distinctive ways of linking motivation to desire, with "the promise of certain desires serving as a powerful motivational incentive for the student to follow the sanctioned path."²⁷

The key contribution Stewart makes in her work is that the poetic form, rather than narrative, of Proverbs possesses its unique way of shaping the desires of the son

²³ Brown (*Wisdom's Wonder*, 37–39) claims the fear of YHWH is an overarching virtue in Proverbs and plays a formative role in engendering wisdom. Brown also insightfully calls the fear of YHWH (Prov 1:7), which has "a distinctly pedagogical, even epistemological character," "fearful wonder."

²⁴ Another work worth mentioning here in relation to importance of emotion in character formation is *Desiring the Kingdom* by James K. A. Smith. In this book, he asserts that one's moral formation is not only contingent upon reason (Descartes) or worldview (the Reformed tradition) but also emotional affection which truly directs one's intention towards a certain *telos* through habits of the heart formed by cultural liturgies.

²⁵ Stewart, *Poetic Ethics*, 27.

²⁶ For the discussion concerning biblical studies on ethics of poetry in the OT, see Boda, "Poethics?"

²⁷ Stewart, *Poetic Ethics*, 218. In regard to desire as an integral part of the parental instruction, Fox (*Proverbs 1–9*, 348) and Yoder ("Shaping Desire," 60) also assert that emotional as well as intellectual engagement with the teaching is a key to the parental education in Prov 1–9.

and, consequently, their character.²⁸ However, she ignores the potential significance of the moral tradition that may undergird each parental instruction. She asserts, “Throughout the book, character is not linked to a larger narrative arc. It is not grounded in a larger story through which one makes sense of moral identity.”²⁹ To support this claim, she contrasts Proverbs with Deut 7, where the ethical foundation is found “in historical experience and connected to the continuity of the community in past, present, and future generations.”³⁰

Ironically, Prov 1–9 does accomplish precisely what Stewart mentions in her comment on Deut 7.³¹ The parents endeavour to impart ethical values to their son, values that have long been part of their historical community as evident in Prov 3:1–12. Furthermore, the presence of shared phrases and ideas between Proverbs and Deuteronomy, such phrases as “For the upright will live in the land” (Prov 2:21)³² and the repeated use of language such as “binding” (קשר) and “writing” (כתב) (Prov 3:3; 6:20–22; 7:3), characteristic of the *Shema* in Deut 6:4–10, prompts readers of Proverbs to establish connections between these parental instructions and Israel’s historical past.

However, Stewart is accurate in noting that there is no linear progression or narrativial framework in Prov 1–9. Nonetheless, she might not be entirely correct in asserting that the parental instruction in Prov 1–9 is not connected to any larger story. As

²⁸ Stewart, *Poetic Ethics*, 203. She writes: “Proverbs resists a strongly narrativial conception of character in which character is viewed as the outcome of a quest or the conclusion of a plot.” Boda (“Poethics?” 50–57) and Dobbs-Allsopp (“Poetic Discourse,” 597) also have observed that in the second half of the 20th century more OT scholars have steered their research towards the ethics of poetics in the OT. For the works that draw on the Hebrew poetry for ethics include but not limited to Brown, *Seeing the Psalms*; Wenham, *Psalms as Torah*. For a full list of these works, see Boda, “Poethics?”

²⁹ Stewart, *Poetic Ethics*, 207.

³⁰ Stewart, *Poetic Ethics*, 208.

³¹ Stewart, *Poetic Ethics*, 208.

³² Unless otherwise indicated, all English translations are mine in this study.

I aim to demonstrate in this study, the Deuteronomic links allow readers to metaphorically extend the parental instructions to a larger narrative told by the moral tradition in which they participate. In this regard, Stewart's analysis of Proverbs lacks a description of the moral context specific to Prov 1–9, wherein a disciplinary model could be intelligible to ancient readers and evoke a certain emotional response. For instance, she contends that the Way metaphor in Proverbs consists of characters with some narrational elements but is not expressed as such.³³ In my view, Stewart and Brown appear to incorporate only partially what MacIntyre and subsequently Hauerwas intended by “narrative,” which I plan to explain further in Chapter 2. For now, it suffices to note that there is a subtle difference between narrative as a *literary genre* and as a *cognitive concept*, and both ethicists mainly refer to the latter, although the former is analogously related to the latter in their usage of the term.

Bland also scrutinizes the book of Proverbs from the perspective of character formation, making observations on the developmental aspect of moral character as presented and promoted in clusters of sentence proverbs in Prov 10–29.³⁴ He draws comparisons between the process of character formation presented in Proverbs and a psychological model developed by secular psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg. The model defines moral development in three stages where the second stage involves social relationships and the community, encompassing communal virtues and values.³⁵ Bland argues that one of the major differences between Proverbs and this developmental model

³³ Stewart, *Poetic Ethics*, 208–9.

³⁴ Bland, *The Formation of Character*, 7.

³⁵ Kohlberg, *Essays on Moral Development*, 170. They are (1) pre-conventional stage, (2) conventional stage, and (3) post-conventional stage.

is that the former teaches “core values” that have “*passed on* specific character virtues”³⁶ through generations while the latter does not believe in core values but focuses on “the *process* of making moral decisions.”³⁷ However, when outlining Proverbs’s virtues and values, which he claims stand against the modern individualistic value-clarification, Bland does not once contextualize them within the traditions that distinguish them from the modern individualistic values.³⁸ In sum, several virtue-ethical studies on Prov 1–9 have emphasized the significance of human character, including emotion, as a vital component of ethics. While some have argued that character ethics inherently involves a narrative, others underscore the poetics of Prov 1–9. However, these studies often overlook the literary links to other parts of the OT and their potential significance within the moral context of Prov 1–9.

Moral Philosophy and Virtue Ethics in Proverbs 1–9

There have been also some studies that attempt to not only utilize moral philosophical concepts as a heuristic means but directly compare them to those in Proverbs. In this regard, Fox argues that ethics and wisdom in Proverbs assume three Socratic principles: “(1) virtue is knowledge; (2) no one does wrong willingly; and (3) all virtues are one.”³⁹ While Fox does not ignore the function of desire in ethics, he argues in Socrates’ shoes that one’s desire is perfectly paralleled with his/her rationality and that what Aristotle calls “weakness of will” only means ignorance. Prov 1–9 likewise, Fox claims, equates

³⁶ Bland, *The Formation of Character*, 37 (emphasis mine).

³⁷ Bland, *The Formation of Character*, 37.

³⁸ Bland, *The Formation of Character*, 44–64.

³⁹ Fox, “Ethics and Wisdom,” 77.

knowledge/wisdom with the moral virtue of righteousness and that all aspects of ethics in this book can be subsumed into one unified *system* of knowledge as “knowledge is a sufficient condition for virtue.”⁴⁰ However, while the intellectual factor is critical to formation of moral virtues in Prov 1–9, the rhetoric that actively portrays wisdom as an attractive female with much desirability seems to disagree with Fox’s whole-sale argument of wisdom as knowledge. Also, the fear of YHWH as the beginning of wisdom does seem to speak for one’s inner disposition toward YHWH as a precondition for wisdom.

In reaction to Fox’s article, Ansberry argues that the virtues in Proverbs are better understood in light of Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* (NE) which not only considers human intellectual faculty but also emphasizes human desire, or an inner disposition, which essentially forms one’s moral virtues and character.⁴¹ He consistently contends that Proverbs does not follow the Socratic principles but Aristotle’s human character as an important determinant of a moral virtue. If “fear of YHWH is the beginning of knowledge” (Prov 1:7), then this fear which already implies a precondition to knowledge, Ansberry argues, refers to a person’s inner disposition within the realm of human character as opposed to knowledge itself. Fox, too, admits that fear of YHWH is an attitude which does not fit the profile of Socrates’s heuristic model; however, he justifies his position by asserting that this fear is useful as “the first step to wisdom”; before acquiring knowledge and discernment, it can help a child to consider the results

⁴⁰ Fox, “Ethics and Wisdom,” 87.

⁴¹ Ansberry, “What Does Jerusalem Have to Do with Athens?”

of his actions and act wisely.⁴² Ansberry further appropriates Aristotle's NE to Proverbs that the former's emphasis on habituation and instruction are the pedagogical means that are also found in the latter. He asserts that the repetition and elaboration of sentence proverbs in Proverbs are akin to Aristotle's concept of habituation.⁴³ Both books understand the importance of instruction but also perception of it in ethical decisions which enables the practitioners to correctly apply the moral paradigm taught in the instructions (e.g., Prov 26:4–5).⁴⁴ While Ansberry does identify a few points of differences between the two works, what he silently assumes in his article without raising a question is that Proverbs is a work of virtue ethics. He cannot be blamed for this assumption as most virtue-ethical studies of Proverbs do the same.

Barton takes a reflective approach, questioning whether the ethics of the OT aligns neatly with the framework of virtue ethics. His argument suggests that the ethics of the OT cannot be confined to a modern or even Greek philosophical category. According to Barton, the OT wisdom literature “[inhabits] a *cruder* world of thought, where character is indeed all important but is seen as fixed and unchanging, almost at times as predetermined.”⁴⁵ Consequently, he posits that some parts of the OT exhibit deontological characteristics, others reflect virtue-ethics, and still, others display

⁴² Fox, “Ethics and Wisdom,” 81.

⁴³ Ansberry, “What Does Jerusalem Have to Do with Athens?” 167.

⁴⁴ In Prov 26:4–5, two contradictory proverbs are juxtaposed which calls for the practitioner's perception and appropriation of the instructions in a given situation.

⁴⁵ Barton, “Virtue,” 14. In my opinion, although character is sometimes depicted as static in certain parts of the OT, it is often presented as an expression of the ideals or vices outlined in the Torah. However, this does not seem to be the case with Prov 1–9, where the main thrust of the moral discourse is to educate and guide the character of the son.

teleological aspects.⁴⁶ The text most akin to virtue ethics, in his view, are those within the OT that adopt a narrative genre, although even this distinction is not absolute.⁴⁷

In this regard, the recent work by Keefer is a welcome addition to the study of virtue ethics in Proverbs as it attempts to establish the book as a tradition of virtue ethics as opposed to presuming and treating Proverbs as such.⁴⁸ This task is carried out by comparing Proverbs with the Aristotelian and Thomistic traditions, well-known works of virtue ethics, using four MacIntyrean meta-ethical criteria of a moral tradition, namely the cultural/intellectual contexts, authoritative texts, a set of virtues and standards, and the final good.⁴⁹ The core concept that institutes and encompasses these criteria is a “moral tradition” which he believes is “a concrete moral starting point.”⁵⁰ Thus, he brings Proverbs into a dialogue with two moral traditions by Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* (NE) and Aquinas’s *Summa Theologica* (ST).⁵¹ His claim is that both of these authoritative works share with Proverbs a similar virtue-ethical focus on intellect *and* human character (inner disposition shaped by desires) as opposed to Socrates’ sole focus on the former. These comparisons allow Keefer to determine if and how Proverbs may be established as a unique tradition of the OT in light of these two other moral traditions. In this way, his study identifies and characterizes moral virtues in Proverbs without presumptively equating them with those in NE or ST.

⁴⁶ Barton, “Virtue,” 17.

⁴⁷ Barton, “Virtue,” 19.

⁴⁸ Keefer, *Virtue Ethics*. Barton, *Ethics in Ancient Israel*.

⁴⁹ Keefer, *Virtue Ethics*, 4–5. Cf. MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 257.

⁵⁰ Keefer, *Virtue Ethics*, 38.

⁵¹ Keefer, *Virtue Ethics*, 14–41. ST includes a discourse on theological virtues that are built on the Aristotelian virtue ethics with a Christian worldview.

Like Brown and Stewart, Keefer understands the aim of Proverbs as education and acknowledges the main function of Proverbial character types which is “intended for interpreters to emulate or disparage,” however, without recourse to Brown’s meta-narrative argument or Stewart’s prototypical model.⁵² Rather, he calls for a need to look beyond “the form and function” of these moral characters to the ways in which Proverbs “*conceives of* action and emotion” in order to correctly understand what virtues these characters precisely portray.⁵³ For this purpose, Keefer employs NE and its criteria as a heuristic tool to discover points of comparison between Proverbs and NE in such prominent moral virtues as honour (shame), humility (pride), courage, work, speech, and friendship.⁵⁴

Both Proverbs and Aristotle view all actions and emotions as being issued from one’s “settled disposition” and are deemed as wise (or foolish) by the standard of a wise character that is praised and promoted in these works.⁵⁵ However, what is not immediately obvious, and even confusing, is that he claims virtues in Proverbs are about “hitting the mean” since wisdom at least in Prov 1–9 is framed in terms of two bipolar paths and one straight way against other crooked ones.⁵⁶

⁵² Keefer, *Virtue Ethics*, 45–46, 206–7. Keefer argues that the parental instructions (Prov 1–9), Agur’s speech (30:1–9), and the “excellent wife” (31:10–31) clearly show the moral vision of Proverbs as being educational (43–44).

⁵³ Keefer, *Virtue Ethics*, 47 (emphasis mine). In other words, his interest is in how the texts of Proverbs produce evaluations of action and emotion of a character.

⁵⁴ To this end, he utilizes three Aristotelian principles by which an action or an emotion may be judged as virtuous or vicious: “1) actions and emotions are praised and blamed; 2) vices err in excess or deficiency; 3) virtues hit the mean” (51). Here the concept of “the mean” is an integral part of Aristotle’s definition of virtue ethics which states, “a settled disposition of the mind determining the choice of actions and emotions, consisting essentially in the observance of the mean relative to us, this being determined by principle, that is, as the prudent man would determine it” (Aristotle, *Eth. nic.*, 2.6.15, cited in Keefer, *Virtue Ethics*, 47).

⁵⁵ Keefer, *Virtue Ethics*, 18.

⁵⁶ Keefer, *Virtue Ethics*, 20. In fact, Ansberry (“What Does Jerusalem Have to Do with Athens?” 169) argues that the concept of the means is what sets Proverbs apart from Aristotelian virtues.

Furthermore, one of the four criteria by which Keefer determines prominent moral virtues in these works is the intellectual and literary traditions.⁵⁷ While other criteria are evident in the texts, the intellectual and literary traditions can quickly pose a dilemma since one may cherry-pick certain contexts tailored to one's presupposition or subjective view.⁵⁸ Nonetheless, in his study, Keefer deems the literary and historical contexts as indispensable because it can prevent modern philosophical categories or one's subjective view from governing the interpretation process and help observe the particulars of the virtues as described in Proverbs.

In this regard, one indispensable tradition that he mentions here but fails to take into consideration is the OT tradition, especially the Deuteronomic tradition, that is unmistakably integral to the literary shape of Prov 1–9. For example, in comparing courage in Proverbs and NE, Keefer suggests that Aristotle's depiction of courage arising from political necessity of guarding the *polis* differs from that in Proverbs since the latter is grounded in "wisdom and the lord (3:21–26; 31:21, 25, 30)" and "acquires a *theological* colouring."⁵⁹ He recognizes how Proverbs theologically relates courage to fear and trust in YHWH as demonstrated in various OT passages. Yet, he does not delve into the vast theological resources of the tradition(s), especially Deuteronomy, that are not only expressed through literary links in Proverbs but may also speak volume to such

⁵⁷ Keefer, *Virtue Ethics*, 93–94. Other criteria are frequency, concentration, and location of the moral virtues in their authoritative texts.

⁵⁸ Keefer, *Virtue Ethics*, 95–96, 8–9. Therefore, he admits that considering the intellectual and historical contexts is "complicated when we realize that one of several contexts could be chosen, not least the OT and other ancient Near Eastern literature." Yet, he also asserts that without accounting for the particularity of the literary and social contexts, the OT has often fallen prey to modern philosophical categories.

⁵⁹ Keefer, *Virtue Ethics*, 125. The italic is mine.

theological interests.⁶⁰ This interpretive context may help ground, enrich and further refine the theological understanding of courage and fear in the very tradition out of which Proverbs is formed. Rather, he opts for Thomistic theological virtues as another heuristic means to interpret this theological impetus of moral concepts.

Thomas Aquinas' ST contains three theological virtues in the order of faith, hope, and charity (love) which, Keefer argues, is heuristically helpful in defining moral virtues in Prov 1–9.⁶¹ For Aquinas, faith is “an act of the intellect that assents to God’s revealed truth” and subsequently hope wills to “[trust] its object (i.e., God) to deliver the good that faith apprehends.” Lastly, charity is an emotional response of affection expressed in “a union with God who communicates his happiness to humans.”⁶² Keefer asserts that the three theological virtues are not only manifested in three different conceptions of fear of YHWH in Prov 1–3 but even appear in the order Aquinas arranges them.⁶³ Fear of YHWH in Prov 1:7, 29 and 2:5–6 is set in parallel with knowledge signalling “a distinct intellectual conception of cognitive action” which is commensurate with Aquinas’ understanding of faith.⁶⁴ Then, Prov 3:5–12, though with some elements of faith, mainly refers to Aquinas’ concept of hope as one is called to trust in God. Lastly, a human-divine relationship in Prov 3:11–12 indicates the Thomistic virtue of charity.⁶⁵ However, the claim that Thomistic virtues are sequentially arranged in Prov 1–3 may not

⁶⁰ However, to be fair, Keefer (*Virtue Ethics*, 213n22) does seem to recognize the necessity to incorporate other portions of the OT in this discussion.

⁶¹ See also Treier, *Proverbs and Ecclesiastes*; Schwab, *Toward an Interpretation*.

⁶² Keefer, *Virtue Ethics*, 160. Cf. Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, 2-2.4; 2-2.17; and 2-2.23.

⁶³ Keefer, *Virtue Ethics*, 168–76. That is, faith in Prov 1:7, 29; 2:5–6, hope in Prov 3:5–12, and then charity in 3:11–12.

⁶⁴ Keefer, *Virtue Ethics*, 169.

⁶⁵ Keefer, *Virtue Ethics*, 175.

reflect the literary arrangement of the Prov 3. Also, the theological virtues, being conceptually broad, are applicable to almost any OT passage one interprets, and thus their presence in Proverbs may be in the eyes of the beholder.

One significant point he raises about Thomistic charity in Proverbs, though, brings to light an aspect of Prov 1–9 (particularly in Prov 3:5–12) that has often eluded the attention of many ethical studies on Proverbs, namely, *imitatio Dei*. Inferring from the works by Schockenhoff and Schwab, Keefer asserts that God’s intimate communication with humans as seen in Prov 3:5–12 assumes “a participation in divine behaviour within the present, earthly context.”⁶⁶ Although the *telos* is God as the infinite good in both ST and Proverbs, Keefer argues, “the temporal, earthly goods” are prominent in Proverbs because they are a means to the ultimate end in God.⁶⁷ In this way, the earthly life becomes a means to participate in God’s divine life (*imitatio Dei*). I aim to further explore this topic along with the *telos* of parental instructions in the current study.

Through varying degrees of comparison, Keefer comes to a conclusion that “many of the moral concepts in Proverbs constitute virtues in the Aristotelian and Thomistic senses, with the book itself emerging as a moral tradition in its own right.”⁶⁸ In several instances, he notes a considerable overlap between Proverbs and biblical law, particularly in Deuteronomy. However, he does not elaborate on this point. If we

⁶⁶ Keefer, *Virtue Ethics*, 179. Schockenhoff (“Charity,” 247, cited in Keefer, *Virtue Ethics*, 178) writes, “*commutatio* means a sharing and commonality that consists in the fact that the Triune God gives everyone His own beatitude and calls people to participate in His divine life.” See also Schwab, *Toward an Interpretation*.

⁶⁷ Keefer, *Virtue Ethics*, 177.

⁶⁸ Keefer, *Virtue Ethics*, 203.

consider the sheer number of shared language between Deuteronomy and Prov 1–9, though, this connection deserves more attention than a passing remark. Keefer instead focuses on the Aristotelian virtues, vices, and their means which are directly related to character types to be emulated or disdained in the parental instructions of Prov 1–9.⁶⁹ However, what makes these virtues and instructions intelligible to the ancient audience is again the intellectual and cultural contexts framed and transmitted by the means of the moral tradition of which Proverbs is a part.⁷⁰ As Keefer himself insightfully points out, Proverbs is to be “interpreted as a tradition of virtue it is seen to contain transferable values, valuable not only for its original audiences and particular social strata but also for authors of the New Testament.”⁷¹ This study aims to scrutinize this moral tradition depicted in Prov 1–9 through its literary links to Deuteronomy and beyond. Through this examination, we seek to further substantiate the character formation promoted in this section of the book against the backdrop of social practices and communal stories within an expansive moral tradition.

⁶⁹ Keefer, *Virtue Ethics*, 206.

⁷⁰ In this regard, Keefer (*Virtue Ethics*, 213n22) states and suggests: “Proverbs, also, specifies little about the context in which this faith and love develop, mentioning no cult, no priest, no covenant family, no nation, not at least by name, and yet the centrality of one’s relationship to God for its ethical vision leaves one wondering how something so abstract would have stimulated its original audience and ought to perhaps redirect our attention to work that has probed the connections of Proverbs and other portions of the OT.”

⁷¹ Keefer, *Virtue Ethics*, 204.

Literary Approaches to Deuteronomic References in Proverbs 1–9

In OT scholarship, a wealth of literary connections between Proverbs and Deuteronomy has been considered in various ways.⁷² Initially, a major stream of these studies, especially among continental scholars, such as Delitzsch, Frankenberg and Siegfried, and Robert, had focused on discovering their “direct” relationship, assuming the Deuteronomic influence on the composition of Prov 1–9.⁷³ Since then, this school of thought has faced challenges and has diverged into different streams of research, the understanding of which will be immensely helpful for contextualizing and formulating our methodology in the next chapter.

First, the discovery of the Egyptian *Amenemope* in 1924 initiated a paradigm shift where the scholarly interest in biblical wisdom moved away from the Hebrew canon, turning to the Egyptian parallels and other ancient Near Eastern (ANE) wisdom literature to find lexical similarities with biblical wisdom.⁷⁴ Second, some OT scholars began to detect wisdom’s influence on other parts of the OT, and vice versa, by a means of form-critical features. In this regard, Weinfeld argues for influence of wisdom elements on the composition of Deuteronomy. In contrast, Fishbane finds that the opposite is true, viewing Prov 6 as an adaptation of Deut 5:6–18 and 6:4–9 by way of *tradtum-traditio*.⁷⁵ These influence studies, ranging from the influence of the Egyptian

⁷² Blenkinsopp, *Wisdom and Law*; Weeks, *Instruction and Imagery*; Brown, “The Law and the Sages”; Baumann, *Die Weisheitsgestalt*. For a comprehensive summary of biblical studies in this area, see Schipper, *Hermeneutics*, 6–14; Dell, *Proverbs*, 155–60, 167–78; Keefer, “*Weisheit* and Proverbs,” 86–94.

⁷³ Schipper, *Hermeneutics*, 6–7; Delitzsch, *The Proverbs*; Frankenberg and Siegfried, *Die Sprüche*; Robert, “les attaches littéraires bibliques.”

⁷⁴ Schipper, *Hermeneutics*, 12; Kynes, *An Obituary*, 30. Such works included Pritchard, ed., *Ancient Near Eastern Texts*; Noth and Thomas, *Wisdom in Israel*; Lambert, *Babylonian Wisdom Literature*; Gordon, *Sumerian Proverbs*; Gesse, *Lehre und Wirklichkeit*; Schmid, *Wesen und Geschichte*.

⁷⁵ Weinfeld, *Deuteronomic School*, 244–319; Fishbane, “Torah and Tradition.”

parallels to wisdom influence on Deuteronomy, and vice versa, assume a “direct” relationship between Proverbs and Deuteronomy, causing a methodological conundrum in discerning their historical relationship. Third, this confusion led Crenshaw among others to argue that biblical wisdom constitutes a part of the OT but must be treated as a separate tradition.⁷⁶ These challenges have produced some fruitful discussions for the further understanding of ancient Israelite wisdom and its social context. Fourth, Sneed challenges the notion of wisdom tradition to argue that biblical wisdom is not so much a tradition but a scribal mode.⁷⁷ Fifth, Kynes has recently attempted to resolve this conundrum concerning the relationship of biblical wisdom with the rest of the OT by re-conceptualizing wisdom literature with an intertextual methodology.⁷⁸ In a similar vein, a collected work edited by Dell and Kynes explores and applies intertextuality to the study of Proverbs.⁷⁹

Lastly, I discuss some recent scholars such as Sheppard, Schipper, and O’Dowd who attempt to deal with the Deuteronomic references in Prov 1–9, or Proverbs in general, in innovative ways without recourse to studies on wisdom influence or wisdom tradition discussion.⁸⁰ My aim here is to review these streams of research with an eye on their methodological weaknesses that prompt us to consider the concept of moral tradition that deals with the *ethical* nature and significance of these Deuteronomic links in Prov 1–9.

⁷⁶ Crenshaw, “Determining Wisdom Influence”; “Prolegomenon,” 1–35. See also Zimmerli, “The Place and Limit of the Wisdom”; Whybray, *The Intellectual Tradition*.

⁷⁷ Sneed, *The Social World*.

⁷⁸ Kynes, *An Obituary*.

⁷⁹ Dell and Kynes, *Reading Proverbs Intertextually*.

⁸⁰ Sheppard, *A Hermeneutical Construct*; Schipper, *Hermeneutics*; Kynes, *An Obituary*; O’Dowd, *The Wisdom of Torah*.

Biblical Wisdom as “Foreign Body” (*Fremdkörper*)

The discovery of the Egyptian Instruction of *Amenemope* published by Erman in 1924 and its literary correspondence with Prov 22:17—24:22 marked a new era of wisdom study in OT scholarship.⁸¹ It demonstrated Israelite wisdom’s affinity to the Egyptian wisdom as well as the wider ancient Near Eastern (ANE) wisdom. Taking a cue from this new information, Whybray claims that while Prov 1–9 employs the language of education similar to that of Deuteronomy (e.g., “teach,” “do not forget,” “attend” etc.), the similarities result from “the parallels with *Amen-em-opet* [which] are in general much closer than the biblical parallels.”⁸² Schipper summarizes this scholarly trend in this way: “Whatever resembled ancient Near Eastern texts must be foreign to the Bible.”⁸³ The following studies by Baumgartner and Fichtner continued to argue how similar biblical wisdom is to the ANE wisdom and how different it is from other biblical texts.⁸⁴ Fichtner in particular argued that the term Torah as used in biblical wisdom is entirely removed from Torah’s “nomistic” sense, forming its own meaning as “instruction.”⁸⁵ The seeming absence of *Heilsgeschichte* and revelatory contents, thus, led some earlier scholars such as Gese and Preuss to view biblical wisdom as a “foreign

⁸¹ Schipper (*Proverbs 1–15*, 1) divides history of research on Proverbs into three major periods of “the time before the discovery of ancient Near Eastern wisdom literature, the time immediately following this discovery, and the more recent period.”

⁸² Whybray, *Wisdom in Proverbs*, 37. However, Dell (*Proverbs*, 156) rightly contends that the same claim can be made about the vocabulary shared with the Egyptian instruction. In fact, Whybray (*The Composition*, 12–13n4) in his later book changed his view from the Egyptian influence on Israelite wisdom to “parallel developments . . . between Israel and an international genre of wisdom literature.”

⁸³ Schipper, *Hermeneutics*, 12.

⁸⁴ Baumgartner, *Weisheit*; Fichtner, *Die altorientalische Weisheit*. Cited in Schipper, *Proverbs 1–15*, 2.

⁸⁵ Fichtner, *Die altorientalische Weisheit*, 83.

body (*Fremdkörper*)” or “an appendix” to the Hebrew canon (Scott) with its own discrete worldview and scribal group.⁸⁶

History of Influence Between Proverbs and Deuteronomy

This trend of dissociating biblical wisdom from the OT and associating it with foreign wisdom took an interesting turn in 1960s. The scholars conversely began to find wisdom influence in every quarter of the OT via “affinities in vocabulary, subject-matter, and worldview” between wisdom literature and other parts of the OT.⁸⁷ This movement was propelled by Weinfeld’s traditio-historical work *Deuteronomy and Deuteronomistic School* in 1972. He argues that humanism, didacticism and doctrines of retribution in Deuteronomy are the literary artifacts of the scribal sages of the seventh century BCE in the Josianic period and the Deuteronomists who weaved in the wisdom content in Deuteronomy.⁸⁸ The sapiential agenda of this scribal tradition, Weinfeld claims, demonstrates wisdom influence on Deuteronomy. Weinfeld’s study reverses the previously accepted assumption that Deuteronomy influenced the composition/redaction of Proverbs, gaining traction in the works by Clifford, Perdue, and Loader among others.⁸⁹

While this new understanding of Proverbs may appear to draw it closer to the rest of the OT on the surface, that was not the case. Whybray who advocates this theory

⁸⁶ Gese, *Lehre und Wirklichkeit*, 2; Preuss, *Einführung*, 186–87; Scott, *Wisdom Literature*, 39. Cited in Kynes, *An Obituary*, 30.

⁸⁷ Kynes, *An Obituary*, 31–32. Kynes asserts that “wisdom was spreading like an infection throughout the OT.”

⁸⁸ Weinfeld, *Deuteronomistic School*, 255–57.

⁸⁹ Schipper, *Hermeneutics*, 11; Whybray, *The Intellectual Tradition*; Clifford, *Proverbs*; Perdue, *Proverbs*; Loader, *Proverbs* 1–9.

claims that Proverbs was part of the “intellectual tradition” developed independently of the rest of the OT but influenced the Hebrew canon. He further asserts that due to the distinctiveness of Proverbs its influence can be identified through the wisdom elements such as חכָּם.⁹⁰ However, as Crenshaw points out in his study, it is implausible to conclusively isolate wisdom-specific elements including its phraseology, nuance, and historical context.⁹¹ As a result, Kynes observes that OT scholars follow this trend and attempt to find wisdom influence in every quarter of OT literature, causing pan-sapientialism and eradicating all distinctive qualities of biblical wisdom.⁹²

There are also studies that assume Deuteronomistic influence on Proverbs. Dealing with the intertextual references in Prov 1–9 or the entire book, they have often attempted to show that these literary links reflect canonical traditions and the thought-world of ancient Israel of which Proverbs is a part. In this regard, Harris argues that Prov 1:8–19; 1:20–33; and 6:1–19 reutilize the language of other OT traditions, including the Joseph Narrative (Gen 37) and a portion of Jeremiah (Jer 7 and 20) as part of the Deuteronomistic tradition.⁹³ His inner-biblical interpretation attempts to find “internal markings” such as diction, phraseology, literary structure, and themes of Prov 1–9 that are in dialogue with earlier canonical texts and illuminate the traditio-historical process in which Prov 1–9 recontextualizes those traditions. Hence, Harris argues,

⁹⁰ Whybray, *The Intellectual Tradition*, 71–154. Whybray understands this intellectual tradition finds its impetus from the ANE wisdom literature, especially the Egyptian *Amenemope*.

⁹¹ Crenshaw, “Determining Wisdom Influence,” 132.

⁹² Kynes (*An Obituary*, 31, 36–37) lists the works that assume wisdom influence on the rest of the OT which include the primeval history (Gen 1–11), Exodus, Deuteronomy, the historical books as a whole, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Daniel, Amos, Jonah, and Habakkuk. See also Crenshaw “Prolegomenon,” 9–13; Whybray, *The Intellectual Tradition*, 1–2.

⁹³ Harris, *Proverbs 1–9*.

Even though Proverbs 1–9, for example, does not overtly refer to any characters in Israel’s history (save for Solomon in Prov 1:1), embedded in the various speech patterns in Proverbs 1–9 we can detect historical representations based upon other canonical traditions. A bridge is thus formed between Proverbs and Israel’s historical traditions *via* discourse.⁹⁴

It is noteworthy that certain expressions or images present in Prov 1–9 are capable of recalling other canonical traditions bridging “the distance between the reader and persons from Israel’s past” by way of contextualization.⁹⁵ In a similar vein, a primary goal of the current study is to examine the ways in which the Deuteronomic links in Prov 1–9 re-enact Israel’s past, specifically the Deuteronomic moments on the plains of Moab, into a familial setting. These intertexts thus create a dialogue between the parental instructions and Deuteronomy. My argument is that *this reutilization of other traditions is not subjective but it in itself depends on a moral tradition* that renders the national, covenantal materials into familial, ethical discourse.

However, one inherent weakness of Harris’s inner-biblical methodology emerges as it relies extensively on the chronological order of these texts for his arguments to be valid. Given that the relative datings of Proverbs in relation to other books such as Jeremiah are still debatable, this may substantially undermine his thesis.⁹⁶ This challenge becomes particularly significant when considering the central point of contention with the wisdom influence argument—whether Proverbs predates or postdates the books to which it is compared. Nevertheless, Harris’s study clearly suggests that linguistic

⁹⁴ Harris, *Proverbs 1–9*, 24.

⁹⁵ Harris, *Proverbs 1–9*, 175.

⁹⁶ Harris, *Proverbs 1–9*, 22. His methodology is similar to Fishbane’s inner-biblical exegesis except that he replaces Fishbane’s “exacting definition” of *traditio/traditum* with his more “general” concept of earlier and later traditions as a heuristic device (30–31). Nonetheless, the relative dating remains the most significant assumption of his methodology.

correspondences may account for a long line of canonical tradition with a shared lexical and thematic stock.

In a similar vein, Fishbane asserts that in the *pre-canonical* stage there were authoritative teachings, which he collectively calls Torah, that functioned as a canon for the later books of the OT.⁹⁷ This canon-conscious composition, he argues, is exemplified in the creative reformulation of the Decalogue (Deut 5:6–18; 6:4–9) in Prov 6:20–35.⁹⁸ He further asserts that the former functions as an authoritative text and signifies a hermeneutical interplay that takes place in the latter text. In other words, there exists a hermeneutical tradition, which he names “Tradition” (with the capital T), that interprets one text and communicates it to another. Fishbane summarizes the relationship between Torah and Tradition in this way: “. . . Torah will stand for teachings whose authority and formulation precede their reuse by Tradition. Indeed, it is precisely in the nexus between fixed and free formulations, authoritative and innovative texts, and durative and punctual functions that the Torah-Tradition dialectic unfolds.”⁹⁹ It is crucial to note here that the dialectic relationship does not unfold directly between the Decalogue and Prov 6:20–35 but between the Decalogue *as understood in* the Deuteronomic tradition and the text of Proverbs. In other words, the Deuteronomic tradition is a cultural and intergenerational medium through which Deuteronomy finds its way into the parental teachings in Prov 1–9.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷ Fishbane, “Torah and Tradition,” 275–76.

⁹⁸ Fishbane, “Torah and Tradition,” 284. Similarly, Maier (*Die “fremde Frau”*, 255) views Prov 6:20–35 as a midrashic interpretation of the Decalogue.

⁹⁹ Fishbane, “Torah and Tradition,” 276.

¹⁰⁰ In this regard, Schipper (*Hermeneutics*, 13) asserts that “Whichever position one follows, there is textual evidence for a connection between Proverbs and Deuteronomic/Deuteronomistic thought that must be explained: the similarity of some passages in Proverbs with the Decalogue (Deut 5), the Shema (Deut 6), and a possible connection between the instructions in Prov 1–9 and Deuteronomy.”

This dialectic nature of tradition and the Proverbs texts can also be sensed in Brown's article which examines the term, תורה, throughout Proverbs in comparison to Deuteronomy. He concludes that the usages of תורה in both Proverbs and Deuteronomy do not draw a hard line between "the familial and the prudent, on one hand, and the cultic and judicial, on the other."¹⁰¹ However, Brown rejects Clifford's assumption that Deuteronomy and Proverbs shared "a common tradition of exhortatory rhetoric among the scribes in Jerusalem."¹⁰² While he is right in that without extant evidence the existence of this tradition remains speculative, I contend that Proverbs's concern with "*preserving* and, inevitably, *transforming* Deuteronomic Torah for posterity" at least demonstrates that there was a type of ethical-thinking that attempts to pass on moral values to the posterity, guiding this reutilization process.¹⁰³ It is difficult to imagine that transforming the authoritative text, in this case Deuteronomy, in an effort to preserve its meaning for posterity would have depended on one's subjective interpretation; it was most likely guided by a tradition that represents a moral thought of ancient Israel and informs what moral values and worldview ought to be transferred into a new intellectual and socio-cultural context.

Despite considerable accomplishments of influence studies, Kynes summarizes this trend of wisdom research as follows: "The past century of Wisdom scholarship could be interpreted as a pendulum swinging between these two extremes" by which he means the two opposite views on the literary relationship between biblical wisdom and

¹⁰¹ Brown, "The Law and the Sages," 253.

¹⁰² Brown, "The Law and the Sages," 277n77. Cf. Clifford, *Proverbs*, 52.

¹⁰³ Brown, "The Law and the Sages," 278 (emphasis mine).

the rest of the OT.¹⁰⁴ Interestingly, both streams of influence study primarily rely on form-critical elements to establish the directionality of influence. The challenge lies in the fact that, for instance, an interpreter can establish wisdom influence on a non-wisdom text only by presupposing that the elements identified as wisdom elements are genuinely indicative of wisdom.¹⁰⁵ In a similar vein, Dell critiques this form-critical approach: “The Hebrew Bible does not include an appendix listing the literary forms it contains and describing their features . . . Interpreters have had to produce it based on their perceptions of the text’s literary features. However, they frequently struggle to identify the defining features of the few apparent generic labels in the text itself.”¹⁰⁶ To remedy this methodological conundrum, a few attempts to bridge Proverbs to the rest of the OT are made on a theological level, for example, by von Rad using the concept of Yahwism, Perdue using creation theology, Waltke using systematic-theological categories, and Longman using wisdom’s resonance with the covenant and the law.¹⁰⁷

Wisdom as a Distinctive Tradition

Crenshaw defines wisdom as a distinct tradition that markedly differs from other books of the OT belonging to *Heilsgeschichte*. He perceives wisdom tradition as inherently non-revelatory, presenting an alternative to Yahwism.¹⁰⁸ According to his perspective, Proverbs, Job, Qoheleth, Sirach, and Wisdom of Solomon are part of this tradition with

¹⁰⁴ Kynes, *An Obituary*, 38.

¹⁰⁵ Crenshaw (“Prolegomenon,” 5) defines this problem as “circular reasoning.”

¹⁰⁶ Dell, “Introduction,” 2.

¹⁰⁷ von Rad, *Wisdom in Israel*, 307; Waltke, *Proverbs 1–15*, 63–132; Perdue, *Wisdom and Creation*, 46–48; Longman, *The Fear of the Lord*, 163–78.

¹⁰⁸ Crenshaw, *Old Testament Wisdom*, 243–47.

their own theology, worldview, and social setting discrete from the rest of the OT.¹⁰⁹

While Crenshaw's characterization of biblical wisdom as a unique Jewish tradition guards against its identification as a "foreign body," it also leads to the isolation of the wisdom corpus from the rest of the OT. Notably, he holds a critical view of influence studies that seek to demonstrate the ways in which wisdom might have influenced other parts of the OT.¹¹⁰ Crenshaw's criticism is two-fold. First, as mentioned above, a form-critical argument inevitably falls into "circular reasoning." Second, these formal features assumed as distinctly wisdom, Crenshaw rightly critiques, in fact could be no more than "common linguistic stock" in ancient Israel.¹¹¹ In my opinion, however, the usage of even the most common language stock is not arbitrary, as it is appropriated in accordance with its literary, theological, and/or ethical context. Nevertheless, Crenshaw himself has to identify wisdom elements to demonstrate that wisdom tradition is indeed distinct from the rest of the OT. In doing so, he inadvertently encounters the same methodological challenge he highlights.

Another weakness in Crenshaw's methodology, which also holds true for other form-critical works on biblical wisdom, is his sociological assumption about a distinct sage-scribal group with a unified worldview.¹¹² In Crenshaw's ideal scenario, the literary form of biblical wisdom is intricately connected to a specific *Sitz im Leben*, and the content containing wisdom elements should align with this historical setting. Thus, he

¹⁰⁹ Crenshaw, "Prolegomenon," 5. In this article, he also includes wisdom psalms as belonging to this tradition but later rejects this claim ("Wisdom Psalms?" 15). For Crenshaw's definition of wisdom and sapiential tradition, see also *Old Testament Wisdom*, 1–16. For his understanding of the sociological context of biblical wisdom, see *Education in Ancient Israel*.

¹¹⁰ Crenshaw, "Determining Wisdom Influence"; *Old Testament Wisdom*, 33–34.

¹¹¹ Crenshaw, "Prolegomenon," 9.

¹¹² Crenshaw, *Old Testament Wisdom*, 23–34. He argues that this group of professional sages held "a different world of thought."

asserts that “[when] a marriage between form and content exists, there is Wisdom Literature. Lacking such oneness, a given text participates in biblical wisdom to a greater or lesser extent.”¹¹³ This is why he is not particularly excited about finding wisdom elements in historical narratives. In this vein, he criticizes von Rad for treating the Joseph narrative as wisdom although it has Yahwistic themes that do not align with the *Sitz im Leben* of wisdom tradition.¹¹⁴ This rigid understanding of the literary form, or genre, that one text can only have one genre has been contended.¹¹⁵ Moreover, the hypothetical nature of the historical settings tied to the literary forms lacks certainty, despite its interpretive significance, thereby compromising the validity of form-critical arguments. Therefore, Dell points out that interpretive vulnerabilities associated with literary form and historical settings have led the OT scholars to “supplement it, and potentially replace it altogether: intertextuality.”¹¹⁶ For this reason, the current study attempts to utilize intertextuality to understand the nature and function of Deuteronomic references in Prov 1–9 without recourse to wisdom tradition or wisdom influence. In this regard, some recent investigations employing innovative methodologies are worth mentioning.

Wisdom as a Scribal Mode

Sneed critiques previous works on wisdom literature that rigidly confine biblical wisdom to a strict generic category and/or the concept of tradition within its *Sitz im Leben*.¹¹⁷

¹¹³ Crenshaw, *Old Testament Wisdom*, 12.

¹¹⁴ Crenshaw, “Determining Wisdom Influence,” 135–36.

¹¹⁵ Longman, *The Fear of the Lord*, 276–82, esp. 281.

¹¹⁶ Dell, “Introduction,” 2.

¹¹⁷ Sneed, *The Social World*, 188–92.

Contra Crenshaw, he contends that a genre does not reflect (a) worldview(s) but rather constructs a literary fictive world detached from historical realities. Sneed instead introduces the term “mode” to articulate that wisdom was just one of many modes utilized in scribal practices during the post-exilic period.¹¹⁸ His scholarly contribution lies in illustrating biblical wisdom’s interconnectedness with *Heilsgeschichte*, which is often considered omitted in wisdom literature. Ironically, he establishes his own *Sitz im Leben* to define biblical wisdom as a mode, although he endeavours to do so using epigraphic and archaeological data.¹¹⁹ Sneed’s claim also faces criticism from Kynes, who argues that it leads to “pan-sapientialism.”¹²⁰

Intertextuality as an Alternative Methodology

Kynes’ book title is very revealing of his intention for the work: *An Obituary for “Wisdom Literature”*. Like Sneed, he argues that previous methodologies in attempting to define biblical wisdom with genre, tradition, and/or social context have led to either separation from the rest of the OT or pan-sapientialism.¹²¹ Thus, Kynes employs an intertextual concept of a genre where it is defined as “patterns of interactions between [texts] in a vast network,” forming “constellations” of texts within which a variety of texts network with one another.¹²² Put in this way, a genre is a fluid and multidimensional concept, and all the texts in the intertextual network could be grouped and regrouped variously, depending on the genre label.

¹¹⁸ Sneed, *The Social World*, 215.

¹¹⁹ Sneed, *The Social World*, 147–82.

¹²⁰ Kynes, *An Obituary*, 37–39.

¹²¹ Kynes, *An Obituary*, 26–42.

¹²² Kynes, *An Obituary*, 113.

For instance, he argues that “[as] a member of the Solomonic collection, Proverbs is read in a different constellation of texts than the modern Wisdom category, which inevitably affects the interpretation of all of them.”¹²³ His approach reacts to the previous wisdom studies that operated with “the notion of a single correct genre for texts.”¹²⁴ The most telling question concerning his methodology is the issue of subjectivity to which he responds: “Genre *classifications* can be wrong; genre *groupings* can only wrongly identify the textual affinity that connects a group of texts.”¹²⁵ In other words, in the absence of genre classification rules, genre grouping cannot be wrong as long as its common generic features are correctly identified in each text.

His methodology does not seem to take into account the intertextual associations that are intended or presupposed by the text. This critique may be important since not all groupings are significant or meaningful in understanding the interactions of Prov 1–9 with other texts of the OT. A subjective grouping may be justified by his intertextual construal but cannot be rendered important unless it can be signified by the texts themselves. Nonetheless, Kynes’ methodology is very helpful in conceptualizing the intertextual space in which interactions take place between Deuteronomy and Prov 1–9 without recourse to the history of influence or redaction. This concept of intertextual network will be utilized in this study to conceptualize a moral tradition where the literary links between the two books contribute to formulation of moral thoughts and imagination throughout Prov 1–9. However, delimiting this intertextual network by

¹²³ Kynes, *An Obituary*, 225.

¹²⁴ Kynes, *An Obituary*, 140.

¹²⁵ Kynes, *An Obituary*, 140.

considering the presuppositions present in the text will be crucial. Also, despite the methodological challenges associated with intertextuality, Dell and Kynes regard it as the most promising avenue for new discoveries.¹²⁶ They have compiled a volume dedicated to exploring Proverbs through an intertextual lens. In this collection, scholars from various facets of biblical wisdom studies delve into the meaningful connections between Proverbs and the broader Old Testament context, sidestepping the need for a rigid definition of wisdom.

Recent Studies on Deuteronomic Links in Proverbs 1–9

To explain the Deuteronomic links in Prov 1–9, some of the recent scholars, Sheppard, Schipper, and O’Dowd, whom I will mention in this section, use innovative concepts and ways to explain the relationship between Prov 1–9, or Proverbs in general, and Deuteronomy. These studies will forge a way for the current study to suggest that these literary connections may not demonstrate a direct relationship between Proverbs and Deuteronomy but rather a mediated relationship through a medium, or a tradition. In general terms, this medium is neither rigid and sharply contrasted with the rest of the OT (Crenshaw) nor is it exegetical in nature (Fishbane). Rather, this medium is functionally ethical and epistemological, transmitting its ethical values, virtues, and worldview through a dialectic relationship with the parental discourse in Prov 1–9. It appears in the form of literary links to Deuteronomy but its significance goes beyond linguistic similarities. That said, a primary aim of the current study is to describe these

¹²⁶ Dell and Kynes, *Reading Proverbs Intertextually*, 3.

Deuteronomic links in Prov 1–9 as expressions of a moral tradition employed by the parental instructions for character formation of the son.

With that in mind, Sheppard seeks to demonstrate wisdom as a “perspective” which was formed by a particular theological understanding of canon in the development of the OT. This perspective functioned as “a hermeneutical construct” for interpretation of the Torah narrative and prophetic traditions in Second Temple literature such as Sirach and Baruch.¹²⁷ Although Sheppard does not directly deal with the intertexts in Prov 1–9, his work is helpful for this study in at least two ways. First, he postulates that wisdom itself was not a tradition but rather a perspective of the thought-world or moral values of the OT that, having been developed in the OT, later gained traction in the post-canonical books.¹²⁸ Second, because this wisdom perspective forms “a part of the process of canonization,” it was by nature canon-conscious, thus utilizing Israel’s historical narrative and prophetic resources to formulate its own discourse wherever it is employed, which in our case would be Prov 1–9.¹²⁹ Of course, these post-canonical books do not provide direct evidence for the origin of the wisdom perspective in the OT itself. However, he showcases in the last part of his book that the traits of secondary redaction in several OT verses including Eccl 12:13–14 and Hos 14:9 give a glimpse of this hermeneutical construct that probably had initiated long before the Second Temple period.¹³⁰

¹²⁷ Sheppard, *A Hermeneutical Construct*, 13.

¹²⁸ Sheppard, *A Hermeneutical Construct*, 117. Fishbane (“Torah and Tradition,” 275) also came to the same conclusion about the continuum of the wisdom perspective between the pre-canonical and post-canonical periods although he uses the term “tradition” rather than a hermeneutic construct to describe the same phenomenon.

¹²⁹ Sheppard, *A Hermeneutical Construct*, 159.

¹³⁰ Sheppard’s view is very close to Fishbane’s in that the post-canonical Judaic documents demonstrate the ancient interpretation of the Scripture that was already in place.

O'Dowd takes an intriguing approach to establish a connection between Prov 1–9 and Deuteronomy. His work attempts to unravel the deeper structure of both pericopes by dealing with the “epistemological, ethical, and formative” dimensions of the two texts.¹³¹ O'Dowd argues that the primary epistemological link between Prov 1–9 and Deuteronomy is “the ontological realities of the created order” which becomes the basis for their shared worldview.¹³² However, while the creation order theme is certainly present in both texts, it cannot be established as significant to neither, especially Deuteronomy.¹³³ Even in Prov 1–9, while the theme of creation is employed in Prov 3:19–20 and 8:1–36, it seems difficult to justify that these two passages are dealing with the created order to produce this epistemological link with Deuteronomy. However, he raises some noteworthy points regarding the journey metaphor and bipolarity, both of which are epistemologically present and lexically expressed in both Deuteronomy and Prov 1–9.¹³⁴ Furthermore, in my opinion, he correctly argues for “an epistemological interdependence” where “Torah envisions and creates space for a hermeneutical application fulfilled by wisdom’s interpretive expertise.”¹³⁵ O'Dowd’s work is significant here because it demonstrates that beyond common language stock, there exists an intersubjective body of knowledge, epistemology, and worldview being exchanged between Deuteronomy and Prov 1–9, operating beneath the surface text. In my view, it is methodologically impractical to affirm, or negate, these connections at the

¹³¹ O'Dowd, *The Wisdom of Torah*, 9.

¹³² O'Dowd, *The Wisdom of Torah*, 163, 165.

¹³³ In an attempt to create a link between Deuteronomy and creation in Genesis, O'Dowd (*The Wisdom of Torah*, 24) emphasizes Deuteronomy “as a part of the Pentateuch.”

¹³⁴ O'Dowd, *The Wisdom of Torah*, 168–69, 171.

¹³⁵ O'Dowd, *The Wisdom of Torah*, 172.

epistemological level unless they are articulated through shared literary expressions. The literary conventions common to both may have been culturally and epistemologically conditioned to convey the thought-world of the traditions they represent.

In German scholarship, Delitzsch suggests that the “hidden roots” of Proverbs are in Deuteronomy.¹³⁶ Following his lead, Schipper has recently explicated and advanced the literary dynamics Delitzsch noted between Proverbs and Deuteronomy, and for that matter, between wisdom and law as attested in Prov 1–9.¹³⁷ He views Prov 1–9 as essentially a didactic, scribal *Hermeneutik der Tora* (“hermeneutics of the Torah”) in which different parts of the section display their own hermeneutical stances on Torah with linguistic links to Deuteronomy where the Deuteronomic Torah is reappropriated to their own contexts.¹³⁸ This claim is very similar to Sheppard’s understanding of wisdom as a hermeneutical construct. However, unlike Sheppard, he contends that Prov 1–9 does not have a direct relationship with Deuteronomy but rather through the “Deuteronomic-Deuteronomistic thinking” and its related traditions which give “a nomistic colour” to wisdom in Prov 2.¹³⁹

Schipper pays particular attention to Prov 2 as it functions as a “guide for reading” Prov 1–9 with the citations to the initial sentence of each of eight parental instructions that follow in Prov 3–7.¹⁴⁰ He views Prov 2 as “the wisdom mediation of the torah” that counterbalances between a sapientialization of torah in Prov 3 and 6, and a

¹³⁶ Delitzsch, *The Proverbs*, 1:34–35.

¹³⁷ Schipper (*Hermeneutics*, 313) claims, however, that the literary influence was not strictly one way as late additions of Deut 4:5–8 and 30:1–4 would have been influenced by Proverbs.

¹³⁸ Schipper, *Hermeneutics*, 311–12.

¹³⁹ Schipper, *Hermeneutics*, 308.

¹⁴⁰ Schipper, *Hermeneutics*, 310.

self-supporting wisdom in Prov 7.¹⁴¹ The main thrust of this work is to establish the chronology of redactions within Prov 1–9. As he explains, these two antithetical positions were redacted into Prov 1–9 first (Prov 3:1–12; 4:1–9, 10–19, 20–27; 5:1–23; 6:20–35; 7:1–27) whose view of torah is also evident in the post-exilic and Second Temple literature, followed by the addition of Prov 2. Interestingly, the discussions revolving around the redactional development of Prov 1–9 and the relationship between wisdom and Torah reach an ethical plane at one juncture in his study. He asserts that wisdom as the sapientialized Torah in Prov 3 and 6 conveys that “only YHWH renders the observance of torah possible” which is a perspective of late prophetic tradition in Jer 8:8 and 31. In Prov 2, however, a hermeneutic of torah counterbalances this by emphasizing the moral agency’s ability to obey the will of YHWH.¹⁴² His impressive study admittedly shows best how Prov 1–9 is intricately interwoven within itself and relates to other traditions in the Hebrew canon, especially the Deuteronomic-Deuteronomistic tradition. Yet, in my judgment, characterizing Prov 1–9 in terms of a competition between the perspectives of the Torah and wisdom is not entirely convincing because first this section of Proverbs seems to function as one cohesive literary unit.¹⁴³ Also, his redactional explanation relies mainly on his impression of the ways in which these chapters of Prov 1–9 discuss wisdom in relation to the presupposed Deuteronomic Torah.¹⁴⁴ Moreover, the two opposite views on a moral agent in Prov 1–9

¹⁴¹ Schipper, *Hermeneutics*, 312.

¹⁴² Schipper, *Hermeneutics*, 155, 310.

¹⁴³ Weeks, *Instruction and Imagery*, 90–94.

¹⁴⁴ Schipper (*Hermeneutics*, 249–50), for instance, argues that Prov 3 and 7 manifest two opposite views on human wisdom since in Prov 3:5 the parent forbids trust in one’s own understanding while in Prov 7:4 the son is told to adopt Wisdom as his sister. However, trust in one’s own understanding points to pride rather than human wisdom as indicated by Prov 7:4.

could be part of a pedagogic strategy to promote the Aristotelian mean between trusting and rejecting the human's ability to do the will of YHWH. In short, while Schipper's study works with hypothetical elements, it more or less does not assume a direct influence of Deuteronomy on Proverbs. Rather, it appreciates the textures of Deuteronomic references in Prov 1–9 presupposing “a complex system . . . not in the sense of direct citation” instigated by the Deuteronomic-Deuteronomistic tradition.¹⁴⁵

Conclusion

To summarize, a number of ethical studies on character ethics in Prov 1–9 have neglected the Deuteronomic links that are very much integrated into the parental discourse. These connections may allude to the fact that there may stand a moral tradition that forms the moral vision and defines socio-ethical practices within the Israelite community through history. Therefore, more discussion on this significant concept of “tradition” needs to take place. In the OT wisdom studies, due to the lack of methodological control and/or historical reference, scholarship has often focussed on second-guessing the direction and process of influence between Prov 1–9 and other OT books, especially Deuteronomy. Also, they often miss what these intertexts may signify in their literary and ethical context. Therefore, in this study, I attempt to demonstrate that the Deuteronomic intertexts found in Prov 1–9 are linguistic conventions of a moral tradition in the OT and function as intertextual operators to the narrative and practice of

¹⁴⁵ Schipper, *Hermeneutics*, 307.

the moral life of ancient Israel. This creates a didactic context for formation of a virtue-ethical character in the son.

CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY

Introduction

In Chapter 1, we examined the two broad streams of previous studies, taking literary and virtue-ethical approaches to Deuteronomic references in Prov 1–9. On the one hand, the virtue-ethical approaches often revolve around the concepts of narrative and character (moral and/or literary) as a way of articulating the virtues of the book. Some of these works also compare the virtues of Proverbs to other virtue-ethical works of the past (such as those by Aristotle, Socrates and Aquinas) to understand their similarities and differences. These approaches, however, often lack one important aspect of Prov 1–9 as virtue ethics, namely “tradition,” the concept that not only sustains moral values and perspective of a society intergenerationally but also makes a moral discourse intelligible.¹ In this regard, these studies also undermine or neglect the significant connection that may shed light on the moral tradition that Prov 1–9 shares with Deuteronomy. On the other hand, the literary studies on Prov 1–9 in relation to Deuteronomy are often divided on direction of influence and/or historical relationship between the two books while employing the same form-critical method with the inherent problem of circular reasoning. Yet, they tend to miss what the ethical implications and significance of their formal and literary links may be for the text of Prov 1–9.

¹ MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 256.

As such, to assess the moral significance of the Deuteronomic intertexts in Prov 1–9, this study employs Alasdair MacIntyre’s meta-ethical framework.¹ This is to demonstrate that the parental instructions in Prov 1–9 are grounded in the practice and narrative of a moral tradition that forms an ethical basis and context for character formation of the son. In order to account for the concept of “tradition” present in the parental discourse, we scrutinize its literary conventions shared with Deuteronomy and, if needed, other related pericopes of the OT using an intertextual approach conceptualized by Jonathan Culler’s theory of “presupposition.”² According to this theory, the Deuteronomic intertexts presuppose “an intersubjective body of knowledge,”³ a moral tradition, which has an ethical function in the parental discourse of Prov 1–9.

MacIntyre’s Meta-Ethical Framework and Proverbs 1–9

MacIntyre delineates in his book, *After Virtue*, that an ethical discourse from Homer through Thomas Aquinas necessarily revolved around a teleological view of human nature on “man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-telos” with its theistic moral

¹ MacIntyre’s virtue-ethical framework, which attempts to uncover “the lost morality of the past” (*After Virtue*, 25), is particularly appropriate for this study since the OT falls within this category of ancient virtue-ethical work that includes Aristotle, Socrates, and Homer. According to him, virtue-ethical traditions fell through the cracks of the Enlightenment movement that turned to humanism for answers concerning moral questions.

While it may seem conspicuous that Proverbs is a virtue-ethical work, no other OT ethical study except the 2021 publication by Keefer (*Virtue Ethics*) has attempted to ratify this assumption. By comparing Proverbs with two virtue-ethical works, Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* and Aquinas’ *Summa Theologica*, he tries to demonstrate that Proverbs consists of the concepts and virtues comparable to the Aristotle’s. He also argues that Aquinas’ theological virtues of faith, hope, and love have the explanatory power to further interpret the virtues of Proverbs.

² Culler, *The Pursuit*, 110–31.

³ Culler, *The Pursuit*, 112.

imperatives.⁴ All this changed in the eighteenth century when the Enlightenment Project overthrew the theistic notions of human life and its *teleology*, the latter of which is essential for a sense of unity in the moral discourse. This project caused moral philosophy to move away from virtue ethics to a kind of morality that is unable to legitimize any “ought” conclusion or draw an evaluative conclusion on what is “good” or “bad.” This implication of the paradigm shift was increasingly recognized by such moral philosophers as Hume and Kant.⁵ These Enlightenment philosophers lost touch with the moral tradition from which they drew their moral language and found the ground of their argument though still with the linguistic features of the moral tradition belonging to classical theism.⁶

Nonetheless, this line of reasoning in moral philosophy has come to dominate and define our emotivist culture where “. . . all moral judgments are *nothing* but expressions of preference.”⁷ In this regard, another paradigm shift initiated by Elizabeth Anscombe in 1958, as Athanassoulis puts it, is rightly called “a small revolution.”⁸ It began recovering virtue ethics afresh in the field where most moral philosophical views are fragmented and lack the core unity. As mentioned in the previous chapter, this shift is also felt in OT scholarship where virtue ethics is often deployed as a methodological framework for many ethical studies.⁹ In these studies, the focus of the moral inquiry has changed from “What should I *do*?” to “How should I *live*?” and “What kind of person

⁴ MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 65.

⁵ MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 54–61.

⁶ MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 60.

⁷ MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 13. The italic is the author’s.

⁸ Athanassoulis, *Virtue Ethics*, 11; Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy.”

⁹ Birch, *Let Justice Roll Down*; Brown, *Character in Crisis*; Brown, *Wisdom’s Wonder*; Carroll and Lapsley, eds., *Character Ethics*.

should I *be*?” The latter questions take better account of how complex, imprecise, varied, and diverse a human life is and how critical one’s character is in making ethical decisions. Therefore, the aim of virtue ethics is to teach its practitioners virtues that can help them find sound answers to these questions through formation of character. The issue MacIntyre raises in his book, *After Virtue*, is that depending on the tradition virtue ethics could mean anything from excellence in playing one’s social role (Homer) to a quality toward the human *telos* (Aristotle) or to utility for success (Franklin). MacIntyre thus endeavours to find “a unitary core concept of the virtues.”¹⁰ He argues that this meta-ethical conception of virtue may be found in three developmental elements from practice to narrative and then to tradition in that order.¹¹ While this order cannot be reversed, these components may all be present in a text belonging to that moral tradition.

Moral Tradition: Founded on Practice and Narrative

MacIntyre investigates these elements to show that they are sequentially developed in three stages:¹² (1) Practice: a set of ethical practices accepted and practiced by a particular community (or culture) leaves some tractions in the communal history; (2) Narrative: those in the community form their identity around this narrative which provides not only the purpose and meaning of the virtues but also the *telos* in the pursuit of a good life; (3) Tradition: the ethical practices and narrative form a line of a moral tradition with its own ethical perspective and language. This study will seek to probe

¹⁰ MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 216–17.

¹¹ MacIntyre (*After Virtue*, 218) thus notes that practice, narrative, and tradition, “each later stage presupposes the earlier, but not vice versa.”

¹² MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 186–87.

into the socio-ethical practices indicated by the Deuteronomic themes of the *Shema* (Prov 3:1–12; 6:20–35; 7:1–27), narrative of the moral tradition informed by the Way metaphor and “life in the land” (especially, Prov 2:21–22), and *telos* identified as the fear of YHWH (1:7; 2:5; 9:10). These elements appear to play roles in the text of Prov 1–9 as the didactic context for the parental instructions. Here *telos* is also an important concept as it sets the direction of ethical discourse and determines the goods/virtues of the tradition.¹³ Thus, this study attempts to investigate the moral tradition of which Prov 1–9 is part by scrutinizing its practices, narrative order and *telos* that underly the Deuteronomic intertexts in the parental discourse. The investigation of these virtue-ethical elements will also aid us in clarifying virtues that are promoted in Prov 1–9. My argument is that these intertextual links contribute to the signification process of the parental instructions by functioning as a pointer to the moral tradition and thus promoting character formation in line with that tradition.

Practice

The first element of a moral tradition is “practice” which MacIntyre defines as following:

Any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended.¹⁴

¹³ MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 184.

¹⁴ MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 187. (emphasis mine).

A “practice” first refers to a human activity which is socially established and cooperatively carried out within a community. It finds its root not only in its contemporary community but also those of past generations, all of which contribute to the formation/sustenance of a moral tradition.¹⁵ According to this definition, a ‘practice’ (e.g., chess) is not an end in itself but is always performed towards the goods internal to that form of activity set by an institution (e.g., Chess club) that is necessarily established in order to extend the ‘practice’ systematically through generations. In order to sustain the institution, it also aims to attain “goods” which are external to the practice. MacIntyre sets a clear antithesis between goods that are internal to an activity (e.g., becoming an excellent chess player) and those that are external (e.g., becoming a famous chess player), and it is only the former that is to be valued and pursued.¹⁶

One caveat is that with the ever evolving cultural context, the practice also needs to be challenged and “transmuted by the history of the activity” to correctly account for the internal goods of the tradition; otherwise, as MacIntyre points out, the interest of the institution not only corrupts the practice but also becomes fossilized within itself.¹⁷ In this regard, one requires virtues which he defines as “an acquired human quality . . . [which enables] us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods.”¹⁸ He also adds that the virtues “. . . also sustain us in the relevant kind of quest for the good by enabling us to

¹⁵ MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 190.

¹⁶ MacIntyre (*After Virtue*, 189) further deliberates these types of goods by stating that external goods are “characteristically objects of competition” whereas internal goods benefit the whole community which participates in the practice.

¹⁷ MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 190.

¹⁸ MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 191.

overcome the harms, dangers, temptations and distractions which we encounter, and which will furnish us with increasing self-knowledge and increasing knowledge of the good.”¹⁹ These human qualities ensure success of the practices in reaching the goods internal to the human activity and is formative to one’s character in a given cultural context. However, they do not naturally occur in an individual but are obtained through instruction and discipline from those who belong to the tradition, have years of experience in the practice, and know the moral standards and virtues by which a practitioner may excel in those practices.²⁰

A moral character formed and developed around such virtues leads one to be inclined to achieve the goods as delineated by the moral tradition. This moral power of human agents and the interplay between human agency and divine agency in ethics have frequently sparked controversies within Christian ethics, especially in Reformed circles.²¹ There has been more than one attempt to frame the doctrine of sanctification in terms of virtue ethics where the idea of a human character which sets “direction and orientation of [one’s] life” can be more helpful in describing the process of sanctification than moral behaviours and moral perfection.²²

In Prov 1–9, various practices and their standards of excellence are introduced in the form of parental instructions with words, phrases and literary expressions that echo the Mosaic instructions in Deuteronomy and the book in general. This is most

¹⁹ MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 219.

²⁰ MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 195. MacIntyre argues that this is “one of the tasks of parental authority to make children grow up so as to be virtuous adults.”

²¹ Wilson, “Virtue(s),” 813. There have been some efforts to resolve the tension between the Augustinian notion of original sin and the Thomistic-Aristotelian notion of human moral capacity. In the Reformed circles, the value of character ethics is often discussed. See Dykstra, *The Life of Faith*, 76; Nolan, *Reformed Virtue After Barth*, 11–36.

²² Hauerwas, *Character and the Christian Life*, 183.

conspicuous in the use of the *Shema* in Prov 3:1–12; 6:20–35; and 7:1–27. Presupposed in the literary conventions and the theme of the *Shema* are communally valued practices of obedience to the parental teaching, authoritative teaching of the moral tradition as the standard of moral excellence, and its internal goods. In the next chapter, I aim to demonstrate how the *Shema* is signified in the context of Prov 1–9 and transmuted from Deuteronomy. This is to argue that the literary conventions reminiscent of the Deuteronomic instructions of Moses belong, not to Deuteronomy directly, but to a moral tradition characterized by its Deuteronomic language which from this point on will be referred to as the “Deuteronomic Moral Tradition” (DMT).²³

Second, what then is the good internal to these parental instructions in Prov 1–9? The purposes of these instructions laid out in Prov 1:1–7 may be summarized as achievement of *wisdom* (1:2; cf. 2:10) defined by the core virtues that warrant the achievement of the good chiastically placed in the middle, namely “righteousness, justice, and integrity” (צדק ומשפט ומישרים, Prov 1:3; cf. 2:9).²⁴ Furthermore, only by achieving wisdom as the good internal to the practices (1:2; 2:2–4; 4:5–9; 8:11), can one

²³ Here “Deuteronomic” signifies the character of this tradition rather than its source or chronology. Also, the term, “tradition,” is not concerned with diachronic implications as it is often used in tradition criticism.

²⁴ Brown, *Character in Crisis*, 25. Brown views Prov 1:1–7 as a semantic chiasm as follows:

A	Comprehensive, intellectual values: 2a (חכמה ומוסר)
B	Literary expression of wisdom: 2b (אמרי בינה)
C	Instrumental virtue: 3a (מוסר השכל)
	D Moral, communal virtues: 3b (צדק ומשפט ומישרים)
C'	Instrumental virtues: 4–5 (תחבולות / לקח . . . תחבולות)
B'	Literary expressions of wisdom: 6 (משל ומליצה . . . דברי חכמים וחידתם)
A'	Comprehensive, intellectual virtues: 7 (יראת יהוה)

It is insightful that Brown views השכל as “action that ensures the successful pursuit of desired objectives and results.” Along with vv. 4–5, these instrumental virtues may also describe the instrumentality of the core moral virtues in gaining wisdom. My critique is that he views “wisdom and instruction” as intellectual values while “the fear of YHWH” is an intellectual virtue. They should be reversed as I will elaborate in Chapter 5.

then reach another kind of good or *telos*, namely “the good of a *certain kind* of life.”²⁵ In other words, there is an ultimate *telos*. We should note that MacIntyre’s addendum, “a certain kind,” in describing this *telos* is indicative of his “socially teleological account” as opposed to Aristotle’s “biologically teleological account.” What Aristotle referred to as the biological *telos* of a human being is the universal, ultimate end of human life.²⁶ However, in MacIntyre’s description, a particular *telos* pertains to a particular society defined by its long line of history and tradition which may account for rival claims and conflicts among a multiplicity of practices and their goods. Thus, by implication, no *telos* can claim to be ultimate for all human beings.²⁷ His aim here is to provide a meta-ethical framework that encompasses various traditions of virtue ethics. With the full recognition of the importance of a moral tradition as he conceptualizes it, this study also acknowledges that biblical history and tradition are part of divine revelation that has a claim on the *ultimate telos* of a human life.²⁸

²⁵ MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 221.

²⁶ MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 229.

²⁷ It is this argument on rival traditions and search for a resolution that he further explores in his sequel, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?*

²⁸ The Scripture’s claim on the ultimate *telos* is based on its recognized moral authority. Hauerwas’ (*The Community of Character*, 63) understanding of the moral authority of the Scripture is helpful here as it underlines the significance of a community and its traditions in the formulation of Scripture as the moral authority. Concerning the biblical traditions, he asserts that the moral authority resides in the traditions through which “a common goal can be pursued” which is to “[know] and [be] faithful to the truth.”

This is certainly true for the traditions of the Scripture where history (“a revealed reality”) becomes the resources for interpretations which then become inscripturated and treated as revelatory contents. The very basis for believing that the interpretations of these resources are authoritative is that God revealed himself through history and that such revelation takes place in the community of his people. Thus, there is no dichotomy but a continuum between revelation and interpretation, between the revealed reality and the revealed morality. Therefore, the moral authority that defines the ultimate *telos* is embodied in Scripture itself. While this *telos* is only implied in some places in Scripture, in some others it is very clear as we see in Prov 2:5 where it is stated as “the fear of YHWH.”

In addition, as Keefer (*Virtue Ethics*, 36–38) rightly points out, the *telos* defined in terms of polity (Aristotle), or for that matter tradition (MacIntyre) alone, greatly lacks the explanatory power to describe the metaphysical end it claims due to the absence of the divine in the argument. He thus argues that Thomas Aquinas furthers the Aristotelian account of the *telos* using the theological virtues of faith, hope and love as God’s revealed purpose for humanity.

Thus, while wisdom is the good internal to the parental instructions in Prov 1–9, this good is more broadly based on as well as aimed at the ultimate goal of human life, namely “the fear of YHWH” (Prov 1:7, 29; 2:5; 3:7; 8:13; 9:10; cf. Deut 5:29; 6:2, 24; 10:12; 13:4; 28:58). In other words, wisdom is the *telos* of the practices (1:2; 2:2–4; 4:5–9; 8:11) while the fear of YHWH is the ultimate *telos* and the foundation (will be explained in Chapter 5) of the whole tradition in the parental discourse.²⁹ And it is this *telos* that gives “the purpose and content of the virtues.”³⁰ Here McIntyre’s socially defined *telos* is still very helpful in framing the moral tradition of Prov 1–9 since his base argument is that a *telos* is not set by an individual’s choice or preference but is understood only in the context of the tradition which he scrutinizes with his meta-ethical framework. In Chapter 5, I will examine the nature of “the fear of YHWH” (יראת יהוה) as the ultimate *telos* of the DMT in which Prov 1–9 also participates. As I will explicate further in the same chapter, this fear not only functions as the *telos* but is also foundational to this moral tradition.

In this regard, the parental instructions for practice arise not merely from human rationale or experiences but are rather carefully guided by the authoritative teachings of the tradition as the “standards of excellence” which are manifested in the Deuteronomic

²⁹ MacIntyre (*After Virtue*, 221) concurs that there are two kinds of goods internal to a practice. The first one involves “the excellence of the products” that immediately results from the practice itself. The second good is “the good of a certain kind of life” which refers more broadly to the ultimate good of one’s life pertained to that practice. This second good may describe the *telos* of a human life particularly if the practice is related to a human self and more than a social role (e.g., a painter). To note, the fear of YHWH is articulated as a comprehensive intellectual (pedagogical) virtue by many scholars including Brown (*Character in Crisis*, 28) and Fox (“The Pedagogy,” 238); however, according to MacIntyre, a virtue by definition is instrumental and the fear of YHWH is not a means to an end but is rather cast as the end goal in Prov 1–9.

³⁰ MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 219.

intertexts of the parental instructions in Prov 1–9.³¹ What these intertextual links show is that due to its authoritative status, the Deuteronomic teachings would have been systematically extended down through generations, being reappropriated in given historical contexts. This is observable in the subtle, sometimes conspicuous, differences between Deuteronomy and Prov 1–9 in the use of shared linguistic expressions which will be utilized throughout this study as a point of departure in the examination of the DMT. These characteristics of practice delineated by MacIntyre afford us a vantage point from which this study will scrutinize the function of the moral tradition in Prov 1–9. For this tradition-dependent concept of *telos* to be viable in an individual, it has to embody “an overriding conception of the *telos* of a whole human life, conceived as a unity” in each society. This, he says, is informed by a narrative history.³²

Narrative History

MacIntyre argues that in order for a practice to be intelligible, there has to be a narrative history which not only makes the intention of a practice intelligible but more importantly gives a unity to the whole human life and character. He gives an example where to the question concerning a man who is digging, *What is he doing?* the answer could be *digging, gardening, taking exercise, preparing for winter or pleasing his wife*, depending on the particular narrative history of his life regarding the practice.³³ In other words, the intention of this man in this particular practice can be identified and made intelligible

³¹ MacIntyre (*After Virtue*, 221) writes, “A practice involves standards of excellence and obedience to rules as well as the achievement of goods. To enter into a practice is to accept the authority of those standards and the inadequacy of my own performance as judged by them.

³² MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 235.

³³ MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 239–40.

narratively in the stretch of his personal history. MacIntyre in this regard argues that there are largely two types of narrative that are interdependently in play: (1) the narrative of individual life with a beginning (birth), a middle (life) and an ending (death);³⁴ and (2) the narrative of the community historically extended through generations to which the individual belongs.

Concerning the narrative of individual life, MacIntyre argues that the narrative structure of human life has two essential elements of unpredictability and teleological character; how an individual life is unfolded is unpredictable and yet more or less driven toward a teleological end. This is the case with the son's life path where various moral challenges await him and yet the ultimate *telos* of "the fear of YHWH" is clearly instructed by the parent(s). Here the key question for one's narrative history, "What am I to do?" can only be answered in the context of another question, "Of what story or stories do I find myself a part?"³⁵ In other words, my moral identity is rooted in "what I inherit, a specific past that is present to some degree in [my] present." This past is conceptually available in the form of a communal history to provide "a *mode* of understanding . . . transmitted often through many generations."³⁶ Furthermore, the virtues as conceptualized in and through practices are not able to explain the *telos* for which they exist. MacIntyre thus argues that it is through a narrative "quest" for this ultimate goal that the virtues are understood and are given the purpose and content.³⁷ In

³⁴ MacIntyre (*After Virtue*, 246) states: "action itself has a basically historical character . . . because we understand our own lives in terms of the narratives that we live out that the form of narrative is appropriate for understanding the actions of others."

³⁵ MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 250.

³⁶ MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 256 (emphasis mine).

³⁷ MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 219.

Prov 1–9, a narrative history of Deuteronomy, and broadly the Pentateuch, is presupposed in the Deuteronomic intertexts the appropriation of which not only demonstrates the presence of a moral tradition but also its *storied telos* to be pursued, “the fear of YHWH” (Prov 2:5; 9:10).

It is important here to further refine what MacIntyre, and this study, will mean by the term “narrative.” Jones contends that MacIntyre’s understanding of a narrative is sevenfold and that his use of the term is inconsistent throughout *After Virtue*.³⁸ Yet, these seven definitions are, at best, misrepresentative of the MacIntyrean concept of “narrative” since they only describe different aspects of the two types of narrative just mentioned above. For MacIntyre, and subsequently Hauerwas, the term signifies *storied epistemological context* of a moral tradition where the narrative structure provides an epistemological means to construe cultural practices or make them intelligible.³⁹ MacIntyre’s understanding of narrative is well explained by Hauerwas in his book, *The Community of Character*. Hauerwas explains that a narrative in Christian virtue ethics “provides the conceptual means to suggest how the stories of Israel and Jesus are a ‘morality’ for the formation of Christian community and character.”⁴⁰ Furthermore, he argues: “the ‘normative framework within which actions and lives are to be morally assessed’ . . . is best thought of as a narrative . . . because all significant moral claims are historically derived and require narrative display.”⁴¹ In other words, a narrative is an

³⁸ Jones, “Narrative, Community, and the Moral Life,” 54–57. These seven ways, according to Jones, are: (1) as a way to explain a human action; (2) as the structure/quality of a human life; (3) as stories of a culture; (4) as the narrative of the self; (5) as the narrative of a community; (6) as the historical character of a tradition; and (7) as an epistemology of morality.

³⁹ MacIntyre, “Epistemological Crises,” 156; Hauerwas, *The Community of Character*, 94–101.

⁴⁰ Hauerwas, *The Community of Character*, 95.

⁴¹ Hauerwas, *The Community of Character*, 99.

ethical framework that helps people to assess their actions and lives morally. The narrative presupposed within the framework of Prov 1–9 (“the upright will live in the land,” Prov 2:21) is the “life in the promised land” and is further signified by the Way metaphor which is akin to their historical reality in Deuteronomy. This narrational framework is not presented as a genre but rather an epistemological context for interpreting the parental discourse. This is what MacIntyre identifies as lacking in the Kantian moral philosophy as well as that of other philosophers of the Enlightenment era: that they have attempted to divorce their moral arguments from the moral traditions with their storied contexts and attempt to simply replace them with human rationality (Kant) and emotions (Locke) which have resulted in what MacIntyre calls “emotivism.”⁴² On the contrary, the ancient ethical approaches including Proverbs do not neglect the narrative context from which their traditions were founded and formed.⁴³ Then, the Deuteronomic narrative as presupposed in Prov 1–9 is not a literary genre but a meta-narrative which provides an epistemological context for the understanding of moral virtues, obligations, and *telos* that makes the parental discourse intelligible.

However, many OT ethical studies often lack the discussion of the term “narrative” itself. Instead, they employ it to mean a literary genre, narrative history, a story centred on the development of characters, or else a mixed concept upon which their character ethics may be built. In particular, the academic trend of treating narrative

⁴² MacIntyre (*After Virtue*, 13) defines this concept as “the doctrine that all evaluative judgments and more specifically all moral judgments are *nothing* but expressions of preference.” The italic is original.

⁴³ For instance, as MacIntyre (*After Virtue*, 190) points out, “a good deal of the detail of Aristotle’s account of the virtues presupposes [the context] of the social relationships of the ancient city-state” which of course forms its own narrative history.

as a literary genre causes Stewart to criticize these studies for neglecting the *poetic* quality of the Hebrew Bible; however, the MacIntyrean concept of narrative is not antithetical to poetry.⁴⁴ What these studies pay little attention to is the moral tradition that justifies interpretation and appropriation of the narrative they observe in a given context. In short, a narrative is a conceptual element in the MacIntyrean virtue ethics, regardless of its literary form, and practices and virtues are grounded and ordered in a narrative unity of a moral tradition that forms the epistemological context in Prov 1–9.

This narrational epistemology may be expressed in various literary genres of the OT. This is noted in Gerhard von Rad's concept of "short historical creed" (*kleine geschichtliche Credo*) which expresses the redemptive history in a summary form that later grew into and lived on as creedal expressions of the literary traditions (e.g., Deut 26:5–9) throughout the OT canon.⁴⁵ Boda views these creedal statements as the narrative "rhythm" of the heartbeat of Old Testament theology and argues that "Exodus" and "Conquest" are the two "core historical actions" of YHWH which are found in all such creedal expressions.⁴⁶ He finds that there are extended expressions based on these core expressions which include "Life in the Land" (Deut 32:13–43; 1 Sam 12:9–11; Neh 9:24–30; Pss 78:56–72; 106:34–40; Jer 2:7; 32:23; Ezek 20:28–29).⁴⁷ According to

⁴⁴ Stewart, *Poetic Ethics*, 18.

⁴⁵ von Rad, *Old Testament Theology*, 121–22. von Rad deems Deut 26:5–9 as "the most important" given that it "bears all the marks of great antiquity."

⁴⁶ The texts that include this summarizing tradition are Exod 15:1–19; Deut 6:21–23; 26:5–9; 29:2–9; 32; Josh 24:2–13; Judg 2:1–3; 6:8–10; 11:16–24; 1 Sam 12:8; Pss 78; 105; 106; 135; 136; Neh 9:6–31; Jer 2:6–7; 32:17–23; Ezek 20:5–29 (Boda, *The Heartbeat*, 15–16).

⁴⁷ Boda (*The Heartbeat*, 20–22) also recognizes three more extending credal expressions, 'Ancestor' (Deut 26:5; Josh 24; 1 Sam 12; Ps 105:9–23; Neh 9:7–8), 'Wilderness' (Deut 29:5–6; 32:10–12; Pss 78:14–42; 105:39–41; 106:13–33; 136:16; Neh 9:12–21; Jer 2:6; Ezek 20:10–26), and 'Destruction and Exile' (Ps 106:41, 46; Neh 9:30, 36; Jer 32:24, 36, 37; Ezek 20:23). This idea that there are 'core' (or primary) historical actions and 'extended' (or secondary) historical actions is from von Rad, *The Hexateuch*, 13 and subsequently Noth, *Pentateuchal Traditions*, 46–62.

Wright, the theme of “life in the land” only finds partial fulfillment in Deuteronomy, generating a posture that “[the] promise lies behind and yet still ahead of the people.”⁴⁸ This particular narrative theme with this posture is thus found across the genres of the OT including poetry. Thus, as Boda observes, the narrative creed is appropriated in various contexts such as “obedience to law and covenant” and “praise and thanksgiving” forming part of Israel’s responses to divine redemption throughout the OT.⁴⁹

Behind some of the literary conventions conveying this theme appears to be a moral tradition that reappropriates them to the moral life of an individual as we see in Prov 1–9. Wright, in whose ethical paradigm the land is one of the three major elements, argues that “life in the land” signifies not only the covenant relationship with God but also “a specific moral and spiritual *lifestyle* before God.”⁵⁰ In Chapter 4, I will examine the “life in the promised land” as the epistemological narrative context of the moral discourse in Prov 1–9. In particular, the practices framed in the Way metaphor in Prov 1–9 is reminiscent of the Mosaic Torah proclaimed in the plain of Moab. This study takes a view that the language of “the life in the promised land” lives on in the Deuteronomic intertexts of Prov 1–9, offering an epistemological context for discussing the socio-ethical practices, their *telos* and virtues in the moral tradition. In summary, this moral tradition will be described in terms of practice (Chapter 3) and narrative (Chapter 4) shared primarily between Proverbs and Deuteronomy with the didactic *telos* (Chapter

⁴⁸ Wright, *Old Testament Ethics*, 78. Cf. Cline, *Theme of the Pentateuch*. Cline who made this proposal retracted from it in his later work; however, Wright argues that it captures an overall understanding of the Pentateuch. This concept of the “life in the land” is showcased in Deut 12–26 devoted to the law which is “all based on life in the land they have still to occupy” (80).

⁴⁹ Boda, *The Heartbeat*, 24. Cf. Goldingay, *Israel’s Gospel*, 36. Boda argues that Israel’s responses are however not always positive.

⁵⁰ Wright, *Old Testament Ethics*, 190.

5) of instilling the fear of YHWH (יראת יהוה) in the son's character. The question we now turn to is the definition of a moral tradition within the scope of this study and how it connects to the Deuteronomic intertexts.

The Moral Tradition in Proverbs 1–9

The Concept of “Tradition” in Old Testament Scholarship

It is first important to clarify that the term “tradition” as employed in this study does not refer to, or allude to, an oral/literary tradition as in traditio-historical criticism or inner-biblical interpretation although they inevitably share some common aspects. These methodologies can shed light on how we formulate the term. The concept of tradition has been widely accepted and used in historical-critical scholarship to “retrace this formation of the literary piece from its initial composition through its later stages of revision and to its final form in the text.”⁵¹

Thus, in tradition criticism, a tradition refers to the compositional/oral traditions that contributed to the final form of the text and that can be isolated. Although the conclusions of this approach are often highly hypothetical as there is no direct evidence of the historical processes it attempts to unravel, its description of the traditions standing behind the common language stock and concepts in the OT deserves attention.⁵² In this regard, von Rad's explanation of the formation of “the Hexateuch” in terms of *Credo* is very helpful. He states: “None of the stages in the age-long development of this work has been wholly superseded; something has been preserved of each phrase, and its

⁵¹ Knight, “Traditio-Historical Criticism,” 98.

⁵² Knight, “Traditio-Historical Criticism,” 113.

influence has persisted right down to the final form of the Hexateuch.”⁵³ For him, these “credal statements” were reinterpreted, retold, and reactualized through generations and incorporated into the final form of the Hexateuch by various biblical traditions.

In a similar vein, Martin Noth argues concerning Deuteronomistic History (DtrH) that one exilic historian, called the Deuteronomist, composed Deuteronomy through the Former Prophets by collecting and amalgamating “the stock of older traditions” and “literary complexes.”⁵⁴ He argues that by placing the Deuteronomic law at the beginning, the Deuteronomist set the tone for the rest of his composition and that this one seamless composition was only later separated into individual books. Noth also avers that the literary parallels shared among the Deuteronomistic literature not only bring a thematic unity to these books but also speak to the fact that they represent a theological view of Israel’s history.⁵⁵ To put it in another way, the recurring terms, phrases, images and themes within the Hebrew canon are intentional and purposeful representing a thought or a tradition of thoughts. This notion of tradition developed through literary complexes is also found in *A History of the Pentateuchal Tradition* by Noth where he, like von Rad, names five thematic complexes.⁵⁶ He further states: “a minimum of narrative material was included within each of the themes out of which the imposing work of the Pentateuchal narrative was created.”⁵⁷ He construes that each historical creed with its own narrative (e.g., “Life in the Land”) belongs to a tradition

⁵³ von Rad, *The Hexateuch*, 77–78.

⁵⁴ Noth, *The Deuteronomistic History*, 89.

⁵⁵ Noth (*The Deuteronomistic History*, 89, 97–98) avers that the exilic Deuteronomist designed this composition to explain the demise of the two kingdoms of ancient Israel with a negative prospect for the future of the nation as anticipated in the Deuteronomic law.

⁵⁶ These thematic complexes are: ‘Exodus,’ ‘Conquest,’ (and secondarily) ‘Ancestors,’ ‘Wilderness,’ ‘Sinai.’

⁵⁷ Noth, *Pentateuchal Traditions*, 62.

and that these traditions were combined with other separate historical creeds that “filled out” the compositional details of the Pentateuch. For von Rad and Noth, a tradition therefore contains the thematic complexes with their quintessential linguistic features that express the profession of Israel’s faith in YHWH’s historical acts for their nation.

In another vein, Weinfeld focuses on earlier traditions and their phraseology that were utilized in the composition of Deuteronomy, he argues, by the royal scribes in the seventh century BCE as an important project of the Josianic reforms.⁵⁸ He helpfully identifies various idioms and expressions that are inherently Deuteronomistic in nature.⁵⁹ Weinfeld observes that the Deuteronomistic phraseology is characteristically sapiential influenced by a wisdom tradition which later developed into biblical wisdom literature. Furthermore, the Deuteronomistic language, he argues, consisted not only of phrases and terms but also rhetorical/thematic structures which are characteristically didactic and liturgical (e.g., the *Shema*). Thus, the Deuteronomistic phraseology and rhetorical/thematic structures represent a thought tradition(s) which is identified by von Rad, Noth, and Weinfeld. These studies demonstrate that both Prov 1–9 and Deuteronomy share a common tradition that is observable in its literary expressions but certainly goes beyond the words to distinct thoughts and perspectives.

Lastly, inner-biblical interpretation/exegesis on the other hand views a tradition as a two-fold concept of *traditum*, the received text, and *traditio*, its interpretation/

⁵⁸ Weinfeld, *Deuteronomistic School*, 1, 158–71. Regarding the compositions that are characteristically deuteronomistic, he (8) argues that there were three major branches: (1) Deuteronomy, (2) Deuteronomistic History, and (3) the Jeremian prose sermons.

⁵⁹ Weinfeld (*Deuteronomistic School*, 189) also contends that the sage-scribes utilized wisdom material for this composition contrary to the traditional view that biblical wisdom was greatly influenced by Deuteronomy.

exegesis, where the innovative *traditio* of the received *traditum* explains the formation of the Hebrew Bible. As Fishbane explains, inner-biblical interpretation/exegesis does not trace back to the “original” but rather attempts to distinguish the interpretational strata and observe the ways in which the *traditio* builds on the *traditum* with its own theological viewpoint.⁶⁰ In this regard, Prov 1–9 may be replete with the literary stock that may have been formed by the historical processes and utilized in various interpretive strata. However, the tradition this study focuses on is not a literary tradition *per se* but rather a tradition of moral thoughts that retain ethical language stock and thematic frameworks shared with Deuteronomy, and more broadly, other parts of the OT.

Definition and Description of Moral Tradition

What tradition history and inner-biblical interpretation methods therefore highlight for us is that for certain idioms, expressions, images and themes to be transmitted from one generation to another, there has to be a communicative medium, a tradition, that consists of a body of knowledge and language.⁶¹ Not only that, it expresses an interpretive viewpoint and relevant thoughts, whether theological or ethical, that determine what, how, and why certain phrases or themes should be deemed significant and worthy to be passed down.⁶² It is also interesting to note that, despite the hypothetical nature of these historical-critical works, they often assume or consider the book of Deuteronomy as either the starting point or the epitome of those traditions due to the ample presence of

⁶⁰ Fishbane, *Biblical Interpretation*, 10.

⁶¹ In a similar vein, Schipper (*Hermeneutics*, 311–12) observes the ways in which Deuteronomy is utilized in Prov 1–9 and argues that the latter interacts with the Deuteronomistic-Deuteronomistic tradition.

⁶² Noth, *The Deuteronomistic History*, 89–99.

its phraseology found in other parts of the Hebrew canon. This, in my opinion, is the case for the tradition in Prov 1–9 where its language, moral values, and thoughts are shared with Deuteronomy through the literary expressions and rhetorical/thematic structures, thus forming its epistemological backdrop. It is my key argument that this epistemological medium in the parental discourse of Prov 1–9 is a *moral* tradition with its own ethical perspective, virtues, narrative, and *telos* expressed in the Deuteronomic intertexts. This moral tradition in Prov 1–9 shares a number of epistemological and linguistic elements with Deuteronomy. Our focus is not on the diachronic concerns of its sources, tradition history, or interpretive strata, but on the literary and ethical aspects of this tradition playing a didactic function within Prov 1–9. Given this description, the tradition as appropriated in this study is not a means of understanding historical development of a text but rather an important moral lens that brings an interpretive unity to the use of many phrases, concepts and themes of Deuteronomy that are shared in Prov 1–9.

In another vein, as mentioned in the first chapter of this study, there are a number of significant scholarly discussions around biblical wisdom literature concerning whether or not a wisdom tradition existed that influenced or was influenced by other Old Testament texts, and if it did, what kind of tradition it was.⁶³ Those who view *wisdom* as a tradition also attempt to identify the linguistic parameters and criteria of this tradition that can help us distinguish it in the OT texts. Also, Crenshaw assumes that the wisdom tradition with a “unified world view” characteristically lacks Yahwistic thought.⁶⁴

⁶³ Sneed, ed., *Was There a Wisdom Tradition?*

⁶⁴ Crenshaw, *Old Testament Wisdom*, 28–29.

However, as Dell clearly demonstrates in her study, the prominent use of “Yahweh” (יהוה) in Proverbs refutes this claim.⁶⁵ von Rad makes a similar claim that wisdom practiced in Israel was “a form of Yahwism” where “the responses are laid down in rules which worshippers of Yahweh, challenged by the world around them and confronted by ‘life,’ have made for themselves.”⁶⁶ Therefore, various attempts to define wisdom as a tradition have often led to more questions than answers.⁶⁷ I believe that one of the main reasons for this conundrum is that the concept of wisdom is not comprehensive enough to cover all the grounds of the tradition the biblical scholars attempt to describe with its literary particularities.⁶⁸ When we take into account the Yahwistic element of this tradition, the main concern is no longer just about how to live well (wisdom) but also how to do so given the covenant relationship with YHWH (ethics). In fact, wisdom was likely only a primary element of this tradition that can be defined by its religio-ethical character (e.g., Prov 1:3).⁶⁹

Furthermore, this moral tradition is not discoverable by literary features alone. In case of Prov 1–9, it also requires identification of ethical thoughts, concepts, and values that are expressed through the Deuteronomic phraseology. This is well demonstrated in the work of O’Dowd who acknowledges that wisdom literature is in line with the

⁶⁵ Dell, *Proverbs*, 90–124.

⁶⁶ von Rad, *Wisdom in Israel*, 307.

⁶⁷ See Crenshaw, “Determining Wisdom Influence”; Kynes, *An Obituary*, 3.

⁶⁸ Schmid, *Wesen und Geschichte*, 110–14. Schmid cogently demonstrates that wisdom thinking is fluid in that it underwent a structural development and is found in other forms of literature as it became dogmatized and democratized in the Egyptian, Mesopotamian as well as Israelite literature. In my judgment, this points us to the fact that wisdom thinking widespread in the OT does not stand on its own as a tradition and cannot be distinguished as such. See also Crenshaw, “Determining Wisdom Influence,” 133–34; cf. Kynes, *An Obituary*, 25–59.

⁶⁹ Weeks (*An Introduction*, 2–3) defines wisdom as “skill” or “know-how” which is deeply concerned with “pleasing God . . . not so much in understanding life itself as in discerning the divine will.”

Deuteronomic tradition sharing its epistemology and worldview.⁷⁰ For him, both Prov 1–9 and Deuteronomy are epistemologically based on “the ontological realities of the created order” that offer a complex form of the worldview which “[addresses] general admonitions for the conduct of the good life.”⁷¹ As important as creation and created order may be, however, they do not seem to be treated as the epistemological centre of this moral tradition in the texts of either Prov 1–9 or Deuteronomy.⁷² In Prov 1–9, the theme of creation only appears in 3:18–20 and 8:1–36. In Deuteronomy, it can only be implicitly inferred that “the laws for the land in Deuteronomy reflect God’s primordial intention for humanity (all nations) to live before him in a re-created garden.”⁷³ Yet, O’Dowd raises the importance of considering epistemology and worldview when studying the Deuteronomic intertexts in Prov 1–9. In a similar vein, Dell identifies numerous phrases and expressions that the book of Proverbs shares with Deuteronomy, Psalms, and Prophetic books to point out that the book is well integrated into the thought-world of Israelite life although she does not articulate what this broader thought-world and its traditions may involve.⁷⁴ Nonetheless, what defines the tradition in Prov 1–9 is not the literary elements of undefined wisdom alone but rather, as I will argue in this study, the moral thoughts, values, concepts, and images shared with Deuteronomy and across the Hebrew Bible.

⁷⁰ O’Dowd, *The Wisdom of Torah*, 162–74.

⁷¹ O’Dowd, *The Wisdom of Torah*, 163, 166.

⁷² I agree with Weeks (*Instruction and Imagery*, 123) that creation theology functions in Prov 1–9 as a rhetorical device to show “Wisdom’s antiquity and her close relationship with God.” See also Schwáb, *Toward an Interpretation*, 63–66. Cf. Boström, *The God of the Sages*, 83.

⁷³ O’Dowd, *The Wisdom of Torah*, 27.

⁷⁴ Dell, *Proverbs*, 186.

Therefore, what OT scholars often identify as “wisdom elements” may in reality be those of the moral tradition, a larger category, under which biblical wisdom may be subsumed. And if this tradition reflects the thought-world of the Hebrew Bible, it would not then have been formed discretely but was very much integrated and widespread throughout the Hebrew Bible and the wider culture of ancient Israel as more OT scholars are discovering.⁷⁵ In fact, the moral tradition would not have had its own label as a distinctive tradition or genre in ancient Israel. Rather, it would have represented a moral epistemology and language of that thought-world. Yet, the ongoing dialogue of the faith community regarding its communal life in the context of the covenant with YHWH and the Torah would have historically formed, challenged, defended, and passed down moral thoughts through generations that now functions as a tradition detectable in Prov 1–9. Our task in this study then is not to isolate this tradition from the rest of the thought-world. Rather, it aims to demonstrate how the Deuteronomic links, as presented within Prov 1–9, form and inform the moral discourse in Prov 1–9 by presupposing intersubjective knowledge of moral virtues, narrative, and *telos*.

In this regard, MacIntyre’s definition of moral tradition is a good starting point for this study as he argues that a tradition is “an historically extended, socially embodied *argument*, and an argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute that tradition. Within a tradition the pursuit of goods extends through generations, sometimes

⁷⁵ Sneed, “Wisdom Tradition,” 53–54. Sneed has a similar idea where wisdom is not a separate genre written by a discrete group of sages but rather a mode of literature, a higher level of abstraction, that was utilized by the same scribes responsible for other literature. However, in my opinion, biblical wisdom is better put as part of a Hebrew thought tradition that was present in all classes of ancient Israel that attempts to tackle questions concerning the good life as the people of the covenant with YHWH. This moral discourse would require much more than a *mode* of literature and a handful of scribes to form and continue through generations.

through many generations.”⁷⁶ To note, MacIntyre defines a moral tradition as an “argument” regarding which he asserts in his sequel: “. . . that there is no other way to engage in the formulation, elaboration, rational justification, and criticism of accounts of practical rationality and justice except from within some one particular tradition in conversation, cooperation, and conflict with those who inhabit the same tradition.”⁷⁷ In this way, the literary and epistemological elements are communally, intergenerationally reappropriated in Prov 1–9 to formulate, reason, and advance the ethical points of view of the DMT. In this study, I will seek to understand the ongoing dialogue between Deuteronomy and Prov 1–9 through the moral tradition which developed over time to form its own viewpoint, narrative, virtues and *telos*.⁷⁸

Language and Moral Tradition

A key feature of a moral tradition according to MacIntyre is its language which is the outworking of the dialogue around that tradition. In his book, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?*, MacIntyre offers an insight concerning moral tradition that may help us understand how the Deuteronomic intertexts in Prov 1–9 may function as such. As he insightfully comments,

. . . a language [] is used in and by a particular community living at a particular time and place with particular shared beliefs, institutions, and practices. These beliefs, institutions, and practices will be furnished expression and embodiment in a variety of *linguistic expressions and idioms*; the language will provide

⁷⁶ MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 257–58.

⁷⁷ MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* 350.

⁷⁸ While it is beyond the scope of this study, Schipper (*Hermeneutics*, 307–8) makes a tradition-historical argument that Proverbs’ interactions with the Deuteronomic-Deuteronomistic tradition and late prophetic tradition produced particular construals of wisdom and Torah in Prov 2, 3, 6, and 7.

standard uses for a necessary range of expressions and idioms, the use of which will *presuppose* commitment to those same beliefs, institutions, and practices.⁷⁹

There is a significant implication that we can draw from this statement concerning the Deuteronomic intertexts of Prov 1–9. Any given community in history carries with it a moral tradition consisting of a particular set of beliefs, institutions, and practices that present themselves in the form of linguistic expressions and idioms in its moral discourse which were not developed overnight in private intellectual circles but communally through generations. From another angle, MacIntyre argues that the Enlightenment Project failed to invent its own wheel of morality because its “moral judgments are linguistic survivals from the practices of classical theism which have lost the context provided by these practices.”⁸⁰ In other words, these linguistic expressions and idioms are rooted in a tradition (in his case, divine law), and without that tradition they do not have the anchor to ground either the meaning or the purpose of the moral discourse for which they are adopted.

In the same way, unless we discuss the Deuteronomic idioms in terms of linguistic representation of a thought tradition, our construal of Prov 1–9 will always be incomplete since they are sourced from the tradition’s moral reasoning and stand in relation to other similar expressions elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible. Thus, it is critical to recognize that the Deuteronomic links in Prov 1–9 are the literary traits of the shared tradition that embody an ethical value system of the ancient Israelite community of which both Deuteronomy and Proverbs partake.⁸¹ Furthermore, if the use of the

⁷⁹ MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* 373 (emphasis mine).

⁸⁰ MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 71.

⁸¹ Weeks, *Instruction and Imagery*, 103–4n8.

Deuteronomic intertexts as tradition also presupposes commitment to the same “beliefs, institutions, and practices,” it is not an overstatement that they may also presuppose the *Heilsgeschichte* and its related concepts such as covenant and law in Deuteronomy as well as other OT texts.⁸² This study seeks to understand the ways in which these links evoke the themes and narrative of *Heilsgeschichte* from Deuteronomy for the formulation of the moral discourse in Prov 1–9. For this reason, the MacIntyrean meta-ethical framework that examines a moral tradition in terms of practices and narrative can describe the nature and function of the Deuteronomic intertexts. A firm grasp of the moral tradition in turn will help us better contextualize the moral formation at which the parental discourse in Prov 1–9 aims.

In order to correctly assess this moral tradition, it is critically important to recognize that Prov 1–9 is not the only place in the OT that the same/similar Deuteronomic expressions and idioms are utilized. By examining other places where such linguistic outworking of the moral tradition is present, we may gain further insight into this tradition. In what ways do these Deuteronomic intertexts conceptualize the moral tradition in Prov 1–9? How can we analyze them as such especially given the fact that a moral tradition is an intangible and only conceptual entity in the text? To answer these questions, I attempt to utilize a structuralist construal of intertextuality to

⁸² Frankenberg and Siegfried, *Die Sprüche*, 6. Frankenberg and Siegfried asserts concerning Proverbs on a similar note, “Von Israels Verhältnis zu Jahwe und von Jahwe’s Stellung zu den Götzen und andren Fragen dieser Art, die bis in’s Exil und nach dem Exil offen waren, ist keine Rede: diese Verhältnisse werden gar nicht diskutiert, sie sind die *stillschweigende Voraussetzung und festliegende Basis alles Denkens und Empfindens*” (emphasis mine). Translation: “There is no mention of Israel’s relationship with Yahweh, Yahweh’s position regarding idols, and other related questions that remained open until and after the exile. These relationships are not discussed at all; they are the implicit presupposition and established foundation of all thought and sentiment.”

linguistically conceptualize the Deuteronomic intertexts of Prov 1–9 as a moral tradition for practical analysis of its meta-ethical categories of practice, narrative, and *telos*.

Methodological Description and Procedure

The Deuteronomic links in Prov 1–9 suggest that this text has an *inter*-textual relation with Deuteronomy and other OT texts with similar expressions and idioms. As mentioned in the previous chapter, biblical scholars have attempted to uncover the nature of this relation by comparing these two written texts directly or retracing the historical process by which they had become affiliated with one another. However, as Schipper correctly concludes in his tradition-historical analysis of Prov 1–9, this relation defies the concept of “one-dimensional references” and that it may be better described as “*a complex system*.”⁸³ Though Schipper’s study takes another direction with this insight, his observation here raises a significant line of thought for this study that requires further elaboration.

Fishbane similarly argues that textual references supposedly drawing from earlier sources seem in fact disconnected and that this may “rather point to a shared stream of linguistic tradition.”⁸⁴ He specifically mentions that it is the dialectic between the Torah and the Deuteronomic tradition that produced Prov 6:20–35 from Deut 6:4–9.⁸⁵ If the Deuteronomic intertexts indeed came to be incorporated into the parental instructions of Prov 1–9 through this system of interpretive thought and ethical perspective, then

⁸³ Schipper, *Hermeneutics*, 307.

⁸⁴ Fishbane, *Biblical Interpretation*, 287–88.

⁸⁵ Fishbane, “Torah and Tradition,” 283–84.

understanding this medium would greatly enhance our understanding of the text itself. This system has been formed neither overnight nor by a few scribal elites; rather, it should be perceived as a communal, intergenerational tradition representing the thought world of ancient Israel that is now present in Deuteronomy and Prov 1–9 as well as other relevant parts of the OT including Psalms and Prophets. Put in this way, direct comparisons of the texts are insufficient to understand the nature and function of the Deuteronomic intertexts in Prov 1–9. It should be accompanied by an investigation of the whole network of expressions in the tradition out of which the Deuteronomic intertexts are produced. However, Prov 1–9 at face value gives very little information about this tradition, and it even masks the Deuteronomic references of this source as its own words.⁸⁶ Our task is to find a linguistic way of describing the Deuteronomic links as representing this moral tradition that would enable us to leverage our meta-ethical analysis of Prov 1–9. For this purpose, this study employs a structuralist concept of intertextuality to linguistically conceptualize these Deuteronomy intertexts and their function as the moral tradition from which various social practices, storied context, and the *telos* of that story became the epistemological backdrop of Prov 1–9.

Intertextuality as a Literary Phenomenon

Intertextuality as a linguistic concept has been studied extensively in both realms of general literary study and biblical study. In the former, it has been construed in broadly two different ways by the structuralists and post-structuralists whose positions may be

⁸⁶ This is well exemplified in such a phrase as “my torah” (תורתִי) in Prov 3:1 and 7:2 while employing the Deuteronomic *Shema* that refers to the Mosaic Torah.

characterized by a limited, determinable sign system versus an unbounded, undeterminable text, respectively, although within each school we find varied versions. In biblical studies, the debate around intertextuality has been on more pragmatic issues: whether or not it is an appropriate methodology for interpretation of the Scriptures, and if it is, to what extent and in what ways it should be employed, especially given the dominant poststructuralist concept.⁸⁷ Regardless, one critical fact that should not be overlooked is that it is a literary phenomenon before it has ever been cast into a mold of theory.⁸⁸ Intertextuality in essence describes the phenomenon in which a text is not an independent production but presents a network of various intersecting texts and utterances the recognition of which transforms the way the text is read. As Alfaro notes, this literary phenomenon has been noted by many ancient, Middle Age, and modern thinkers alike who observe a plurality of voices in the texts.⁸⁹ Therefore, before the post-structuralists defined and developed the concept of intertextuality, the plural voices in a text had already been recognized as a literary phenomenon.

⁸⁷ Kristeva, *Desire in Language*. For the discussion around intertextuality in biblical scholarship, see Dell, "Introduction"; Meek, "Intertextuality," 283–84; Miller, "Intertextuality in Old Testament," 304; Nielsen, "Intertextuality"; Tull, "Intertextuality"; Van Wolde, "Trendy Intertextuality?"; Yoon, "The Ideological Inception."

⁸⁸ Ben-Porat ("Forms of Intertextuality," 258) maintains, "To ignore the validity of this conceptualization seems to me impossible." Here while he refers to Kristeva's conceptualization, he is also generally addressing this phenomenon as it happens in "all cultural texts, all codes, and all semiotic systems" which Kristeva only conceptualizes in her work.

⁸⁹ Alfaro ("Intertextuality," 269–70) writes that for Plato, "the 'poet' always copies an earlier act of creation, which is itself already a copy"; for Aristotle, "dramatic creation is the reduction, and hence intensification, of a mass of texts known to the poet and probably to the audience as well"; and for the Middle Age theologians, a biblical text calls for a "multi-levelled interpretation." T. S. Eliot, a modern literary critic, also notices that "the most individual parts of an author's work may be those in which his/her ancestors are more vigorously present."

Intertextuality of Deuteronomic Links in Proverbs 1–9

While Julia Kristeva first coined the term “intertextuality” and cast it as a post-structuralist concept, she did not either certainly invent the concept or own the term.⁹⁰ Rather, she creatively combined the Saussurean semiotic system and the Bakhtinian dialogism to describe this phenomenon.⁹¹ Reviewing these two preceding theories along with the critique of Kristeva’s is instructive here to better understand the intertextuality of the Deuteronomic links and construct a workable structuralist methodology that can help us examine the function of the moral tradition within Prov 1–9.

Saussure pioneered a linguistic concept that differentiates between a “signified” (concept) and a “signifier” (sound-image).⁹² A linguistic sign is arbitrary and relational in that it does not inherently possess *the* meaning but refers to *a* meaning depending on its function in relation to other signs within a sign system. From his perspective, various types of human communication do not refer to an object but rather a linguistic system (*langue*) out of which a number of significations (*parole*) can be produced.⁹³ Kristeva takes interest in the infinite possibility of the latter in her conceptualization of intertextuality while accordingly making the former a comprehensive concept that encompasses all aspects of culture as social texts.⁹⁴ Saussure has one notable emphasis in his construal of a linguistic system that was particularly relevant for Kristeva; that a

⁹⁰ Kristeva, *Desire in Language*.

⁹¹ Allen, *Intertextuality*, 11.

⁹² Saussure, *General Linguistics*, 65–67.

⁹³ Allen, *Intertextuality*, 8–10.

⁹⁴ Kristeva (*Desire in Language*, 36) famously argued that a text is not a stable and fixed point in which a signifier provides a determinable signified. Kristeva (68) infers from Bakhtin’s work (*Dialogic Imagination*) that there are three different levels of language where dialogical relationships are detected: first between *langue* and *parole*; second “within the systems either of *langue* ... or of *parole*”; and third between syntagmatic and systematic. As Allen (*Intertextuality*, 11) further explains, these dialogical interactions take place, not in a system of language, but “within specific social sites, specific social registers and specific moments of utterance and reception.”

text is *relational* in nature, that it can only be understood in relation to other texts. While the relational dimension of a text is a key to understanding the nature of the Deuteronomic intertexts in this study, it is problematic to argue that it is the *only* way to signify a text. Eco who previously turned from this understanding of a text contends that “. . . if the sign does not reveal the thing itself, the process of semiosis produces in the long run a socially shared notion of the thing that the community is engaged to take as if it were in itself true. The transcendental meaning is not at the origins of the process but must be postulated as a possible and transitory end of every process.”⁹⁵ While the transcendental meaning is absolutely necessary for faithful biblical interpretation to fulfill its very purpose, this relational construal helps us reimagine a text “not as the container of meaning but as a *space* in which a potentially vast number of relations coalesce.”⁹⁶ Thus, a text opens up a network of texts that together constitute “describable systems of codes, symbols, cultural practices, and rituals.”⁹⁷ The question is whether this space has certain limits and determinability (structuralist) or not (post-structuralist). Following the former, this study views the Deuteronomic intertexts in Prov 1–9 as representing a describable system of various expressions and idioms that belong to a moral tradition.

Another literary critic whose influence on Kristeva was greater than that of Saussure was Mikhail Bakhtin as it is apparent in her two well-known articles, “The Bounded Text” and “Word, Dialogue, Novel.”⁹⁸ If the Saussurean concept of

⁹⁵ Eco, *The Limits*, 41.

⁹⁶ Allen, *Intertextuality*, 12.

⁹⁷ Allen, *Intertextuality*, 95.

⁹⁸ Kristeva, *Desire in Language*, 36–63, 64–91.

intertextuality taught Kristeva the relational dimension of intertextuality, Bakhtin helped her understand its *dialogic* dimension where “a constant interaction between meanings, all of which have *the potential to conditioning others*.”⁹⁹ Dialogism points out that a language is not merely an abstract system but has social property which allows many past utterances (*heteroglossia*) and different “linguistic consciousnesses . . . separated in time and social space” (*hybridization*) to interact within an utterance or text.¹⁰⁰ He also argues that an utterance also shares with past utterances what can potentially condition and help signify its “worldviews, trends, viewpoints, and opinions [which] always have verbal expressions.”¹⁰¹ Thus, he concludes that “all this is others’ speech (in personal or impersonal form), and cannot but be reflected in the utterance.”¹⁰²

These dialogic concepts, *heteroglossia* and *hybridization*, can help us explain how the Deuteronomic utterances can be shared in Prov 1–9 while their ethical values are resignified, separated in time and space. For instance, in Prov 2:20 “the upright” (ישרים) are said to inhabit “the land” (ארץ); here the latter is not at all mentioned but presupposed as known in the text. If we follow this line of thought, the dialogue between the Deuteronomic narrative of, possibly, the “life in the promised land” and Prov 2:20 shares a moral viewpoint that may function within the same epistemological matrix, namely the moral tradition.

While influenced by the Saussurean semiotic system and the Bakhtinian dialogism, Julia Kristeva along with the *Tel Quel* circle of scholars attempted to

⁹⁹ Bakhtin, *Dialogic Imagination*, 426.

¹⁰⁰ Allen, *Intertextuality*, 214.

¹⁰¹ Bakhtin, *Speech Genres*.

¹⁰² Bakhtin, *Speech Genres*, 94 (emphasis mine).

deconstruct the established relations of the signifier and the signified as conceptualized by Saussure. Furthermore, she follows but also deviates from Bakhtin's theory by defining a text as "an intersection of textual surfaces rather than a point (a fixed meaning), as a dialogue among several writings: that of the writer, the addressee (or the character), and the contemporary or earlier cultural context."¹⁰³ This construal of intertextuality by Kristeva differs from Bakhtin's dialogism in three key ways that are significant for the linguistic construal of a moral tradition in this study. First, Bakhtin does not deem a dialogue in a text to be indeterminant and infinitely permutable but only plural and specific to the social contexts where the text transpires.¹⁰⁴ For Kristeva, however, a text is "a permutation of texts, an intertextuality in the space of a given text" and thus is "... always in a state of *production*, rather than being products to be quickly consumed."¹⁰⁵ Second, Bakhtin identifies a deep, unifying structure and culture-specific signification in a given text, but Kristeva is unable to do so although she helpfully describes the intertextuality of a text in terms of a space or a network where various social codes, symbols, and practices intersect.¹⁰⁶ Third, Bakhtin's dialogism focuses on the social aspect of intertextuality where the centralizing (or, "centripetal") force of

¹⁰³ Kristeva, *Desire in Language*, 65.

¹⁰⁴ Alfaro, "Intertextuality," 276.

¹⁰⁵ Kristeva, *Desire in Language*, 65; Allen, *Intertextuality*, 34–35.

¹⁰⁶ Culler (*Structuralist Poetics*, 140) correctly addresses the most serious issue with a version of intertextuality that allows all possible forms of intertextual connections and dismisses the notion of literary competence as tyrannical in this way: "... to reject the notion of misunderstanding as a legislative imposition is to leave unexplained the common experience of being shown where one went wrong, of grasping a mistake and seeing why it was a mistake . . . If the distinction between understanding and misunderstanding were irrelevant, if neither party to a discussion believed in the distinction, there would be little point to discussion and arguing about literary works and still less to writing about them."

heteroglossia presupposes an intersubjective body of meanings and values.¹⁰⁷ In contrast, Kristeva's concept randomizes intertextual connections through absorption of literary text into general "social texts."

In short, as I aim to articulate, this shared notion of meanings and values transferred through utterances of the Deuteronomic intertexts may form the epistemological context for moral education in Prov 1–9. I will attempt to demonstrate these Deuteronomic intertexts as representing the moral tradition which functions as a *langue* with a particular set of significations guided by the ways in which these intertexts are employed in Prov 1–9. Lastly, the Deuteronomic links also illuminate the worldview, moral values and standards, and the ultimate end of this tradition.

Jonathan Culler's Presupposition Theory

As a literary phenomenon present in every text, intertextuality if conceptualized well has great potential to accurately describe the Deuteronomic intertexts and facilitate our ethical analysis of their moral tradition in Prov 1–9. It also reminds us that the common literary expressions, patterns and structures do not merely reflect relations with other texts; but through a network of their related texts they also illuminate the thought-world of ancient Israel, or a thought tradition, whether it be theological, cultural, or as in our case, moral. Furthermore, these intertexts can be studied in the wider context of the

¹⁰⁷ Bakhtin (*The Dialogic Imagination*, 271–72) defines "centripetal force" as "... forces working toward concrete verbal and ideological unification and centralization, which develop in vital connection with the process of sociopolitical and cultural centralization." He articulates that there is also decentralizing (or, "centrifugal") force in social interactions that constantly "challenge fixed definitions (433).

Hebrew Bible with similar linguistic patterns and thematic complexes which may proffer a more round and clearer picture of the moral tradition.

Given the description of intertextuality above, this study finds that Culler's concept of "a discursive space" best describes the Deuteronomic links of Prov 1–9 as a moral tradition linguistically. He conceptualizes a collection of conventional expressions, which in our case are the Deuteronomic expressions in Prov 1–9, within "a discursive space of a culture" as *presupposed* in a text.¹⁰⁸ The key question here is: "what does [a text] assume [and] what must it assume to take on significance?"¹⁰⁹ In this regard, the semiotic concept of presupposition makes two assumptions: (1) appropriateness of expressions, and (2) "an intersubjective body of knowledge."¹¹⁰ The former explains that a literary convention must be used appropriately for others to recognize "what is known and what will be significant."¹¹¹ The latter is what Culler refers to as a discursive space which assumes knowledge shared between texts through the appropriate use of conventional expressions.

Culler's interest here is not the author's knowledge or intent but rather the prior texts that make the current text intelligible and significant in a given text. These prior texts presupposed in another text create "discursive space of a culture" defined by "the relationship between a text and the various languages or signifying practices of a culture

¹⁰⁸ Schnittjer (*Old Testament Use*, xxii–xxviii) divides all allusions in the OT into five levels of A, B, C, D, and F where level A parallels are likely to be intentional (including synoptic parallels) and level F parallels likely to be incidental. Culler's theory includes the whole spectrum of allusions into the discursive space as all different levels of connections provide insights into the ways in which the pre-texts are produced and read in a text.

¹⁰⁹ Culler, *The Pursuit*, 126.

¹¹⁰ Culler, *The Pursuit*, 111–12. Eco (*The Limits*, 225) terms these two assumptions as "the felicity conditions" and "the mutual knowledge of participants." If either of the two assumptions should fail in any case, a presupposition cannot be created in a text.

¹¹¹ Culler, *The Pursuit*, 111–12.

and its relation to those texts which articulate for it the possibilities of that culture.”¹¹²

Culler calls this intertextual space a “pre-text.”¹¹³ A pre-text formed by the presuppositions in the text does not require identification of any specific source, origin, or chronological order by which they are incorporated into the text.¹¹⁴ Rather, each constituent of the discursive space contributes to the linguistic codes or discursive practices that make signification of a text possible. Thus, while linguistic codes in a text are identifiable as “already read” and recall the discursive space associated with them, neither exactitude of their wording nor the sources, even if identifiable, are considered a primary concern. However, recognizing the tradition that utilizes those resources is crucial for understanding the variegated ways in which those resources are presupposed in a given text. This enhances our comprehension of the text concerning the discursive practice of the moral tradition.

That said, Culler’s main concern here is to observe how the language stock assumes the presence of a discursive space formed by the prior texts the origin/source of which may be lost but live on as linguistic codes in the given text.¹¹⁵ It is important to note here that the pre-texts are *limited* to the presuppositions created by the text and assume the existence of preceding texts. Thus, Culler’s concept of intertextuality does not defy determinacy of a text as Kristeva’s does. In other words, the object of his study is not a universe of all possible intertexts in all possible discursive networks but only

¹¹² Culler, *The Pursuit*, 114.

¹¹³ Culler, *The Pursuit*, 114.

¹¹⁴ Culler (*The Pursuit*, 118) does not impose necessity of identification of a source or origin as Harold Bloom does who necessitates identification of “a particular precursor text.” Rather, he articulates: “The study of intertextuality is thus not the investigation of sources and influences as traditionally conceived; it casts its net wider to include anonymous discursive practices, codes whose origins are lost, that make possible the signifying practices of later texts” (114).

¹¹⁵ Culler, *The Pursuit*, 130.

those intertexts that are presupposed in the text and “make possible the various effects of signification.”¹¹⁶ While the specific reference of the source might not be identified, the presuppositions produced by, for example, “a cliché, a quotation or a group of conventional associations” forms a thematic complex that transforms the way the text is read. Also, it is assumed that these literary conventions continually evolve in their signifying practices within the given tradition.¹¹⁷ Thus, Culler’s structuralist notion of intertextuality starts with a contained system of codes, symbols, and cultural practices; yet, it is also expandable through its intertextual network with other presupposed texts which can be discovered and re-signified in the given text through a critical procedure.

There are two main types of presupposition Culler mentions: (1) logical presupposition and (2) literary/rhetorical presupposition. The former is a presupposition that lacks referentiality and is treated as given, or as Barthes describes, “already read (déjà lu)” in the text.¹¹⁸ Culler refers to it as an intertextual operator “which implies a discursive context and which, by identifying an intertext, modifies the way in which the [text] must be read.”¹¹⁹ This undermined referentiality is intentionally orchestrated so that the creation and discovery of the pre-text leads to “[open] the question of the mode.”¹²⁰ A logical presupposition can help the reader identify the pre-texts and form questions around how and why the current text treats them in the way it does, often

¹¹⁶ Culler, *The Pursuit*, 114. He also writes: “The decision to presuppose undermines referentiality at this level by treating the fact in question as already given. In cases like this, logical presupposition is an *intertextual operator* which implies a discursive context and which, by identifying an intertext, modifies the way in which [a text] must be read” (124–25).

¹¹⁷ Culler, *The Pursuit*, 91. Cf. Riffaterre, *Semiotics of Poetry*, 23. Riffaterre (23) calls a “preexistent word group” a *hypogram*.

¹¹⁸ Barthes, *Image-Music-Text*, 159.

¹¹⁹ Culler, *The Pursuit*, 124–25.

¹²⁰ Culler, *The Pursuit*, 125.

functioning rhetorically to form a certain attitude toward them. This is well exemplified in the use of the term “the land” (אֶרֶץ) in Prov 2:21–22 where it appears as the reward of the righteous and the place prohibited for the wicked, however, without any other reference or explanation in its context. I will elaborate on these verses in Chapter 4, but it suffices at this point to see that this logical presupposition opens a discursive space of the tradition in which the land is linked to the promise of the land by YHWH in Deuteronomy. It is this pre-text that makes obedience to the parental instructions a desirable pursuit.

Literary/pragmatic presupposition operates on “the conventions of a genre” that express “the relations between utterance and situation of utterance.”¹²¹ Here “situation” does not refer to a historical setting but “conditions of possibility” for signification of the utterance in the text, which not only make the text intelligible to the reader but again *require* them to take “certain attitudes towards it.”¹²² He explains the conditions of possibility in terms of a speech act.¹²³ For example, *promise* as a genre of speech act relates an utterance of promise to a whole network of the conventions in that genre, creating a condition in which one understands that utterance as a promise. In a similar vein, a literary work is related to “a whole series of other works . . . not as sources but as a constituent of a genre, for example, whose conventions one attempts to infer.”¹²⁴ Thus, the conventions in a text open a discursive space that consists of a whole series of

¹²¹ Culler, *The Pursuit*, 127–28.

¹²² Culler, *The Pursuit*, 127.

¹²³ Poythress (“Canon and Speech Act,” 338) defines speech-act theory as a theory that “describes and classifies the different kinds of things that people do when they use sentences in actual speech.” For the list of the foundational works, see 337 n1.

¹²⁴ Culler, *The Pursuit*, 129.

conventions and creates interpretive expectations by “other members of a literary genre.”¹²⁵ Here Culler’s focus is on identifying the conventions and their intertextual network within the genre that “govern the production and interpretation” of literary content of a text.¹²⁶ However, his aim is to understand the function of those conventions in a given text and not to “[survey] the members of a class and inductively discovering common properties.”¹²⁷ Culler thus carefully observes “the *way* in which [a presupposition] produces a pre-text, an intertextual space whose occupants may or may not correspond to other actual texts.”¹²⁸ In other words, his theory also pays attention to the attitude or mode in which such presupposed pre-texts are treated in a text. Therefore, on one hand, the concept of presupposition helps us differentiate intertextuality from source/influence or comparative study, which many intertextual studies in biblical scholarship are accused of doing, by working with a discursive space as opposed to specific references. On the other hand, it attempts to limit Kristeva’s intertextuality and Barthes’s *Déjà Lu* by utilizing only the constituents of the discursive space that are presupposed in the text.

¹²⁵ Culler, *The Pursuit*, 128–29.

¹²⁶ Culler, *The Pursuit*, 128–29.

¹²⁷ Culler, *The Pursuit*, 130.

¹²⁸ Culler, *The Pursuit*, 130. The emphasis is mine. He opines, “To talk about similarities and differences between particular texts is a perfectly valid and interesting pursuit but it is not in itself a contribution to the study of intertextuality.” In this regard, as we will see in the following, identifying the conventions as belonging to a genre in practice requires us to deductively discover and compare other tenants of the discursive space that utilize common thematic patterns by observing their lexicogrammatical similarities.

Presupposed Tradition in Parental Instructions of Proverbs 1–9

Culler's Presupposition theory provides three key insights that enable us to explain the nature and character of the moral tradition in the parental instructions of Prov 1–9 which is shared with Deuteronomy. First, the moral tradition may be conceptualized as a discursive space consisting of literary conventions that are characteristically Deuteronomic. In other words, the literary conventions shared between Deuteronomy, Prov 1–9, and other parts of the Old Testament are not randomly employed but used with an intention of expressing the DMT with its moral values and virtues. The strength of conceptualizing the Deuteronomic intertexts in Prov 1–9 in terms of a discursive space is that an "allusion" where there is a referent text without a clear indication of linguistic import can be well articulated by the concept of discursive space.¹²⁹ There may be a set of words, phrases, images, and/or narrative present in a text containing an imprint of a constituent(s) within the moral tradition without much semantic correspondence or significance. However, what one may label as "coincidental" or "non-significant" could collectively recall the moral tradition shared among various referent texts due to their mere lexicogrammatical similarities. In particular, if there are some expressions that are only shared between Deuteronomy and Prov 1–9, it is a good indication that there was a process by which they are adopted into the moral tradition.

Second, the focus of this study is not to enumerate or compare the constituents of this intersubjective body of knowledge. In other words, our primary purpose is neither to

¹²⁹ Porter ("Further Comments," 12) defines allusion as invoking of a passage that may or may not be consciously intentional as it focuses on bringing into the picture "a person, place or literary work" as opposed to the language. As Porter ("The Use of the Old Testament," 80–88) also points out, there is a conundrum regarding the terms used to indicate different criteria of inter-textual connections.

produce an exhaustive list of shared language stock nor to compare their usages in Deuteronomy and Prov 1–9. However, to examine how these pre-texts are treated in Prov 1–9 and what attitude Prov 1–9 displays toward these literary conventions, it is crucial to comprehend the differences in their usages between Deuteronomy and Prov 1–9. Here the purpose is not to elucidate their historical relationship but to gain a deeper insight into the nature and character of the Deuteronomic presuppositions in Prov 1–9. This will not only help us identify the ways in which these expressions, images, and narrative context are presupposed as pre-texts but also in what ways they enhance the ethical reading of Prov 1–9.

Recognition of these intertexts necessarily influences the way Prov 1–9 is read. For instance, the parental torah (with a lowercase “t”) would be signified very differently if it is read in light of the Mosaic Torah (with a capital “T”) since the latter is perceived as from the divine authority.¹³⁰ It seems that the former is a Deuteronomic intertext that presupposes the latter, opening up a discursive space within which other members of the moral tradition can be further examined. In fact, I would even argue that the whole moral discourse in Prov 1–9 is born out of the dialogical relation between the Torah and the parental torah within the DMT.¹³¹

Lastly, the observation of the literary conventions in Prov 1–9 allows us to reflect on their ethical implications for socio-ethical practices, epistemological narrative, and *telos* of the DMT. Here Culler’s theory has the explanatory power to describe the

¹³⁰ Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 79. In Prov 1–9, the Hebrew term, תורה, is mainly employed to indicate the parental instructions.

¹³¹ In “Methodological Consideration” section below, I define what “Torah” (תורה) refers to in Prov 1–9.

discursive and transformative use of the Deuteronomic conventions in the parental instructions. As mentioned above, Culler asserts that presuppositions in a text are created as the text postulates “an intersubjective body of knowledge” in the given culture.¹³² What it reflects is the moral tradition that makes signification of such terms as “righteous” (צדק) and “wisdom” (חכמה) possible which would otherwise be merely abstract and unintelligible on their own.¹³³

Methodological Consideration

Thematic Complexes

In order to understand the moral tradition as found in the Deuteronomic intertexts of Prov 1–9, this study employs MacIntyre’s meta-ethical framework to categorize them into socio-ethical practices, narrative, and *telos*. Each of these meta-ethical categories framed in the ten parental instructions is probed using Culler’s conceptualization of a tradition.¹³⁴ However, in practice, discovering the pre-texts and understanding the ways in which they represent the DMT within Prov 1–9 take much more than analyzing the shared lexicogrammatical patterns. No doubt, without the literary similarities, no intertextual relationship may be discovered. However, they must be established not at a phraseological level only but also at a thematic level where a whole discourse pattern assumes the intersubjective knowledge of semantic relations with other texts and

¹³² Culler, *The Pursuit*, 114.

¹³³ Sneed, “Wisdom Tradition,” 69–70.

¹³⁴ While it is widely agreed that there are ten parental instructions in Prov 1–9, the division slightly differs from scholar to scholar. This study follows the outline of Prov 1–9 by Waltke (*Proverbs 1–15*, 10–14): Prov 1:8–19; 2:1–22; 3:1–12; 3:13–35; 4:1–9; 4:10–19; 4:20–27; 5:1–23; 6:20–35; and 7:1–27 with the preamble (1:1–7) and epilogue (9:1–18).

utterances. Culler concurs in his articulation of pragmatic presupposition that the *genre* structure of a text governs the way in which the literary conventions in a text are perceived.¹³⁵ This is especially true if our objective is to identify the tradition that only “loosely” connects the texts which have their own ways of signifying the common phrases (e.g., paraphrase and *cliché*) in their discourses while remaining within the same conceptual matrix.¹³⁶ Therefore, this study will not only investigate the Deuteronomic phrases and images in Prov 1–9 but also attempt to articulate the epistemological theme and worldview that they permeate in their usages in both Deuteronomy and Prov 1–9. Also, we keep in mind that the ways in which the Deuteronomic phraseology is used may have become diversified and transformed through generations to appropriate it to make it intelligible in its literary and socio-cultural context.¹³⁷

How do we then demonstrate their thematic connections? Lemke calls the thematic patterns, “discursive formations,” where they “combine a particular set of semantic relations among topical themes with a particular rhetorical or genre structure.”¹³⁸ In other words, one common expression cannot justify the relation; rather, it is a particular *set* of relations established at the semantic level that can trigger a discursive space which, in our case, comprises the moral tradition as presented in the Deuteronomic intertexts of Prov 1–9. For example, as will be articulated in the next

¹³⁵ Culler, *The Pursuit*, 127.

¹³⁶ As Lemke (“Intertextuality,” 89) describes, they do not “recur *Verbatim*, but they in effect paraphrase one another, being small variations within a recognizably constant pattern.”

¹³⁷ McConville, “Metaphor, Symbol and the Interpretation,” 332. From the perspective of speech-act theory, he argues that “with its recognition that similar ‘locutions’ might mean different things depending on the communicative intention of the author or speaker.” In this article, he convincingly asserts that the symbolic world(s) around the Journey metaphor created by Deuteronomy enables appropriation of its key elements which includes “land” (337).

¹³⁸ Lemke, “Intertextuality,” 89.

chapter, there is a set of literary elements in Deut 6:4–9 and 11:1, 18–20 that form the Deuteronomic *Shema* as a thematic complex which then can be identified within the discursive space of Prov 1–9. In this regard, he states: “any word can be used to realize any meaning provided *only that* a sufficient context is provided to establish its recurrent use in a discursive formation.”¹³⁹ Therefore, along with the phraseological connections, the thematic elements will be examined to ascertain the validity of the discursive space between Prov 1–9 and Deuteronomy. Furthermore, the thematic/rhetorical context itself can also produce a presupposition. For instance, in Deuteronomy Moses commands the parents to teach their children the words of the Torah and his words in Deut 6. When this command is actualized in a familial setting where parental instructions aligned with the Mosaic Torah are given to the children, they form a thematic correspondence between the two pericopes, creating a pretext of the Mosaic Torah within the parental torah. In addition, we are not interested in distinguishing the literary conventions of the moral tradition from the common language stock of the culture that is generically used in these texts (i.e., clichés). There is no “generic” language stock *per se* that does not belong to a particular linguistic system; otherwise, it would be unintelligible to the intended audience. Even if a cliché is utilized in the two texts without any seeming significance, it can certainly contribute to the production of a presupposition in combination with other significant associations (i.e., a thematic complex).

¹³⁹ Lemke, “Intertextuality,” 89–90 (emphasis mine). Culler’s presupposition theory concurs that the pre-texts are discovered through “the conventions of a genre” which provides a context in which a text is made intelligible (*The Pursuit*, 127). However, Lemke’s work further shows the way in which these conventions may be put together to produce a discursive formation which is practically helpful for this study.

The Concept of “Torah” (תורה) in Proverbs 1–9

In the parental discourse of Prov 1–9, the term “Torah” (תורה) appears a total of six times (Prov 1:8; 3:1; 4:2; 6:20, 23; 7:2), consistently referring to parental teaching. If this term presupposes a concept of Torah beyond its surface reference by a means of the DMT, it is rather necessary to clarify what this Torah refers to in Prov 1–9 and this study. The Torah (תורה) seems to have a wide semantic range in the OT from the Book of the Covenant (Exod 20:22–23:19), to Deuteronomy, to the Pentateuch, or to “the totality of the divine laws.”¹⁴⁰ Greengus argues that the totality usage of the term is “a late development in biblical history.”¹⁴¹ This is reasonable given that the content of the Torah would have undergone progressive development and expansion.¹⁴² Therefore, whether or not the Torah refers to Deuteronomy in Prov 1–9 would critically depend on when Prov 1–9 was composed with respect to Deuteronomy.

Without going into great detail about the relative dating of these books which is beyond the scope of this study, the Deuteronomic text itself describes the Torah in terms of writing of Moses or a book written by Moses in multiple passages of the book (e.g., Deut 4:44–45; 17:18–20; 27:3; 28:58–61; 29:20, 27; 30:10). Deuteronomy even describes Moses as transcribing the Torah (31:9, 24). McConville maintains that this “writtenness” makes Deuteronomy “an authoritative ‘book’ . . . standing at the

¹⁴⁰ Greengus (“The Anachronism,” 19–20) observes that the single term, תורה, pointing to the whole of the divine laws is found in Deut 1:5; 4:8, 44, 31:9, 11, 24; Josh 1:7–8; 2 Kgs 21:8.

¹⁴¹ Greengus, “The Anachronism,” 20.

¹⁴² LeFebvre (*Collections*, 261) asserts that this growth of the concept transpired during the periods of Josiah and Ezra assuming that Deuteronomy is dated to the Josianic reform and the Pentateuch to Ezra-Nehemiah. However, the dating of Deuteronomy is still a matter of contention. For the full discussion, see Block, “Recovering the Voice of Moses,” 386–90.

fountainhead of the ‘canonical’ tendency in the Old Testament.”¹⁴³ In a similar vein, Fishbane asserts that the Hebrew Bible in its pre-canonical stage is best viewed as consisting of the texts that were considered “pre-canonical ‘canonical’” or authoritative in Israelite community. And it can safely be said that one of these texts included a pre-canonical form of Deuteronomy where various expressions of Yahwism were reutilized by various traditions for the production of other texts until it reached its final form.¹⁴⁴ From a different angle, Brown’s work contends the popular notion that wisdom and law are two separate traditions and that Proverbs does not refer to the Mosaic Torah.¹⁴⁵ He argues that Proverbs does display various notions of Deuteronomic Torah which the parental instructions “echoes and extends, amplifies and supplements . . . within the household and for the sake of the community.”¹⁴⁶ From a redactional point of view, Schipper contends that Prov 1–9 manifests diverse views on the Deuteronomic Torah, particularly evident in Prov 3, 6, and 7.¹⁴⁷ This is attributed to the ascendancy of the Torah which, according to Schipper, has led to a devaluation of wisdom in favour of the Torah.¹⁴⁸ However, Schipper’s view of these chapters in Proverbs is elaborate with his assumption that there was a disunity in the reception of Deuteronomy in Prov 1–9.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴³ McConville, “Metaphor, Symbol and Interpretation,” 345. Cf. McConville and Millar, *Time and Place in Deuteronomy*.

¹⁴⁴ Fishbane, “Torah and Tradition,” 275–76. See also Fishbane, *Biblical Interpretation*, 287–88.

¹⁴⁵ Brown, “The Law and the Sages.” Some of the advocates of the popular view Brown mentions are Blenkinsopp (*Wisdom and Law*), Crenshaw (*Old Testament Wisdom*), and Clifford (*Proverbs*).

¹⁴⁶ Brown, *Wisdom’s Wonder*, 42.

¹⁴⁷ He argues that “Proverbs 3 emphasizes the boundaries of human insight, Prov 7 holds fast to the concept of a self-supporting (and personified) wisdom, and Prov 6 in contrast allows the torah to appear in the garb of wisdom” (*Hermeneutics*, 311). Proverbs 2 has a view aligned with Prov 6, “designating wisdom in the sense of a hermeneutic of torah” (312).

¹⁴⁸ Schipper, *Hermeneutics*, 243–56, especially 249–50.

¹⁴⁹ Schipper, “Wisdom Is Not Enough!,” 75–76.

As I have attempted to conceptualize above, these Deuteronomic conventions in Prov 1–9, however, are not merely a result of direct Deuteronomic influence nor do they represent conflicting traditions harbouring divergent perspectives on the Deuteronomic law.¹⁵⁰ Rather, they are a result of gradual formation of the moral tradition of which the Deuteronomic moral thoughts and phraseology became its defining characteristics. In this study, therefore, the term “the Torah” presupposed in Prov 1–9 will refer to a pre-canonical form of Deuteronomy that is mostly written and orally transmitted intergenerationally, and is in the public domain as moral authority.¹⁵¹ The way this Torah is conceptualized and presupposed in Prov 1–9 through the DMT allows it to provide resources for phraseology, images, concepts and ideas.

Attitude of Proverbs 1–9 Toward the Torah

Culler’s Presupposition theory observes attitude(s) of the current text toward the pre-texts which is an important factor in understanding the former. Some biblical scholars such as Schipper set wisdom as advocating Torah or opposing it. Some others such as Kwon aver that instructions of wisdom in Prov 1–9 differ significantly from Yahwism or the Torah so that “it is pointless to think that ‘laws’ in proverbial wisdom are conflicting against or competing with Deuteronomic laws.”¹⁵² These interpretations are based on the assumption that the perspectives of the Torah and wisdom instructions in Prov 1–9 either directly interact or have no relation at all. However, as I will demonstrate in this study,

¹⁵⁰ Brown, “The Law and the Sages,” 275.

¹⁵¹ Weeks, *Instruction and Imagery*, 126.

¹⁵² Kwon, “Instructions and Torah,” 13.

the moral tradition in Prov 1–9 not only honours and promotes, but also reappropriates and reformulates, the Torah for the familial, didactic setting of the moral discourse. This attitude can be detected via the Deuteronomic presuppositions throughout Prov 1–9, especially in setting the fear of YHWH as the foundation and goal of the parental instructions. Put in this way, what the parental torah endeavours to achieve is to enhance and motivate the son's understanding and internalization of the Torah.

Diachrony versus Synchrony

I am well aware of the tension in defining the diachronic concept of “tradition” using the synchronic concept of literary conventions.¹⁵³ Intertextuality construed by Culler overcomes this seeming contradiction by allowing us to redefine the concept of a tradition in terms of the discursive space where there are no sources or origins but only constituents presupposed by the current text that occupy the intertextual network without abandoning the concept of prior texts. In this regard, Kristeva's insight is that history and society can be rewritten by the writer to make “*linear* history [appear] as abstraction.”¹⁵⁴ Once a practice or historical narrative is encoded into a written text, it becomes part of a discursive space called “tradition” where diachrony can be abstracted into synchrony.¹⁵⁵ This allows us to examine these literary conventions synchronically in the very context of Prov 1–9 with an eye on the tradition that creates the pre-texts (intertexts) that are shared with Deuteronomy.

¹⁵³ Miller, “Intertextuality in Old Testament,” 305.

¹⁵⁴ Kristeva, *Desire in Language*, 65.

¹⁵⁵ However, this does not mean that as Kristeva construes intertextuality, the literary texts are absorbed into general textuality of culture and are no longer distinguishable from the social contexts in which they are embedded.

Methodological Procedure

That said, our first step is to identify the Deuteronomic intertexts in the ten parental instructions that function as the presuppositions representing the moral tradition. This process will involve examining various literary conventions in Prov 1–9 that are either assumed as already given in Deuteronomy (logical) or create conditions of possibility (pragmatic) for the very purpose of establishing the Deuteronomic tradition. These conventions in their literary context form particular thematic complexes that presuppose the Deuteronomic themes which are then resignified by the DMT in Prov 1–9. I will identify three thematic complexes each of which covers one of three dimensions of the DMT, namely practice, narrative, and *telos*. The three thematic complexes that will be examined in this study are: (1) Deuteronomic *Shema* (Prov 3:1–12; 6:20–35; 7:1–27), (2) the Way metaphor and the conceptual narrative of “life in the land” (especially in Prov 2:21–22), and (3) the fear of YHWH (especially in Prov 1:3 and 9:10), respectively. As mentioned above, my aim here is not to identify these corresponding themes of Deuteronomy and Prov 1–9 but rather examine the ways in which these themes are presupposed in the latter. These collections of Deuteronomic intertexts open up a discursive space where we may then reflect on the ways in which the moral tradition functions in the parental discourse to form and shape the moral character of the son.

At the end of each chapter, moral implications of the presupposed Deuteronomic intertexts in Prov 1–9 will be assessed to demonstrate ethical functions they perform in the context of each thematic complex. The MacIntyre’s meta-ethical components of

practice, narrative unity, and *telos* will be compared to the thematic complexes of the *Shema* theme in Prov 3, 6, and 7 (Chapter 3), the Way metaphor and the reference to the Land in Prov 2:21–22 (Chapter 4), and the fear of YHWH (Chapter 5), respectively, before concluding with some remarks concerning the results of this study.

Structure of Dissertation

In Chapter 3, we first look at the Deuteronomic *Shema* in Prov 1–9. Identifying the common literary elements of the *Shema* in Deut 6:4–9 and 11:1, 18–20, this study observes how three of the parental instructions in Prov 1–9 are formulated with these Deuteronomic elements. Interestingly, not only do these instructions refuse to name their sources but also use the Deuteronomic expressions as if they are the very words of the parents. The impact of these presuppositions, when recognized, goes beyond being rhetorical as the parental instructions define the core practice of internalization, set the moral standards in line with the moral authority of the Torah, and point the son to the end goal of “life” as reward.

In Chapter 4, these Deuteronomic thematic complexes are then examined in terms of a narrative order of the moral tradition as per the MacIntyrean meta-ethical framework. In this regard, I observe how the Way metaphor with its image schema creates conditions of possibility to evoke Moses’ discourse on ‘life in the land’ into the epistemological realm of the parental instructions.¹⁵⁶ This narrative context of ‘life in the

¹⁵⁶ In this regard, Culler (“Narrative Theory,” 213) writes concerning a narrative told in a lyric: “... a past incident is narrated but then pulled into the time of the lyric *now* by reflection on its significance.” The italics are mine.

land' promised by YHWH is looked forward to in Deuteronomy as their forthcoming reality whereas in Prov 1–9 it metaphorically represents the moral life Israelites are commissioned to live by the DMT. Therefore, some Deuteronomic intertexts bring to the surface of the text this Deuteronomic theme (Prov 2:21–22) while others re-enact Moses' command to teach the Torah to the children. These literary links may then activate the son's moral imagination as they plainly assume the identity of the son in connection with their forefathers listening to Moses' instruction concerning their life in the land (Prov 3:9–10) on the plain of Moab. In particular, like the Israelites in Deut 30:15–20, the son is called to choose between Wisdom and Strange Woman, between life and death that they offer, respectively.

In Chapter 5, I look at 'the fear of YHWH' (יראת יהוה, Prov 1:7, 29; 2:5; 3:7; 8:13; 9:10; cf. Deut 5:29; 6:2, 24; 10:12; 13:4; 28:58) which is the foundation and end goal of all socio-ethical practices and epistemological narrative in Prov 1–9 which is shared with the Mosaic Torah in Deuteronomy.¹⁵⁷ Thus, the practice and narrative of this moral tradition lead the son to set his eyes on the ultimate *telos*, the fear of YHWH (יראת יהוה). Simultaneously, the fear of YHWH calls for the need to embody its core virtues (Prov 1:3; 2:9; 3:3). I will suggest that the moral tradition offers the epistemological context for these core virtues without which these virtues may be vacuous and enigmatic in meaning. Through the analysis of these thematic elements of the moral tradition in Prov 1–9, I will demonstrate that the ethical function of the Deuteronomic intertexts is in

¹⁵⁷ Block (*The Triumph*, 295–302, 309) observes that fearing (ירא) YHWH is closely related to hearing (שמר) the Torah (תורה), Moses' sermons. The purpose of the Torah, which he argues is "instruction" and not "the law," is to engender allegiance and faith in YHWH which Block equates with the fear of him.

the moral formation of the son with the virtues that instill the fear of YHWH in the form of *Imitatio Dei*.

Conclusion

In this chapter, the interdisciplinary methodology of this study was introduced and elaborated. To examine three sets of thematic complexes of the Deuteronomic references in Prov 1–9, Culler’s Presupposition theory is employed to observe how they are presupposed in the current text. The MacIntyrean meta-ethical categories of practice, narrative, and *telos* will then be mapped onto the thematic clusters identified from the Deuteronomic intertexts. This methodology will hopefully enhance our understanding of the moral tradition embedded in and conveyed through the Deuteronomic references in Prov 1–9.

CHAPTER 3: THE *SHEMA* IN PROVERBS 3, 6, AND 7

Introduction

As identified in the previous chapter, a moral tradition is initially built on the socio-cultural practices that represent moral thoughts and virtues of a community that are reflected in words, phrases, images, and thematic/rhetorical structures shared amongst its member texts and utterances. As Culler's presupposition theory clarifies for us, attempting to locate and delineate the sources of and their direct interactions with a text is not only speculative but often incorrect because presuppositions created in a text are often only representations of the tradition that draws from the sources and not the sources themselves. Rather, he proposes that we instead study the ways in which these pre-texts that constitute the discursive space are produced and treated within the text under investigation. Therefore, we have proposed the Deuteronomic intertexts of Prov 1–9 as such expressions of the DMT.¹

In this chapter, we will scrutinize a thematic complex in Prov 1–9 that creates a Deuteronomic pre-text in connection to socio-ethical practice: The Deuteronomic *Shema* (Deut 6:4–9; 11:18–23) employed in Prov 3:1–12; 6:20–35; and 7:1–27. This is not merely to compare these two pericopes but to observe the ways in which the socio-

¹ Similarly, Schipper (*Hermeneutics*, 81–99) argues for the work of the Deuteronomic-Deuteronomistic tradition in Prov 3, 6, and 7 although it is a literary tradition as opposed to a moral tradition.

ethical practices in Prov 1–9 are formed by the moral tradition shared with Deuteronomy. This will require an examination of the paralleled expressions and themes which are often shared with other parts of the Hebrew Bible in order to draw full moral implications. For this first thematic/rhetorical complex, we observe various literary elements that function as intertextual operators to create presuppositions for the Deuteronomic *Shema*.¹ Then, these presuppositions created by various corresponding words and expressions are assessed collectively in terms of their implications for practice, its standards of excellence, and its outcomes. My aim is to demonstrate that along with some other passages in the OT, these two books share a moral tradition that manifests itself through their corresponding thematic/rhetorical frameworks and shared language.

Their correspondence, however, may not be immediately observable since the common terms and phrases in Prov 1–9 appear rather sporadically often in a paraphrastic fashion. This indicates that the moral language of the tradition became so embedded in the culture of writing, utterances, and didactic discourse to the point that some of them became treated almost as clichés and perhaps lost their “original” uses, sources and meanings. Therefore, it would not be surprising to see their transformative employment while remaining within the Deuteronomic moral tradition matrix that allows for an enhanced and guided reading of the parental instructions in Prov 1–9.

¹ Many scholars including Schipper (“Wisdom Is Not Enough!” 58–60), Fishbane (“Torah and Tradition,” 284), Braulik (“Das Deuteronomium, 93–94), and Maier (*Die “Fremde Frau,”* 153–58) have recognized the allusive parallels in Prov 3:1–5; 6:20–24; and 7:1–5 from Deut 6:6–8 and 11:18–21.

The *Shema* in Deuteronomy 6:4–9 and 11:18–23

General Analysis

In Deut 1–11, the rhetorical phrase “Hear, O Israel! (שְׁמַע יִשְׂרָאֵל)” featuring the imperative form of שְׁמַע (Deut 4:1; 5:1; 6:4; 9:1; and also Deut 20:3 and 27:9) serves not only as a structural marker but is commonly considered a characteristic feature of Moses’ speech in Deuteronomy.² Its purpose is to signify the beginning of Moses’ instructional discourse or call the audience’s attention to the important didactic message that ensues. In Prov 1–9, we see “Hear, my son (שְׁמַע בְּנִי),” sometimes with another variant, “O sons (בְּנִים),” in some parental instructions (Prov 1:8; 4:1, 10; 5:7; 7:24). This usage mirrors the function in Deuteronomy, serving either to mark the beginning of a discourse or refresh the son’s attention. In Prov 1:8 and 4:1, שְׁמַע בְּנִי and שְׁמַע בְּנִים respectively mark the beginning of the first and fifth parental instructions. It also appears in the middle of the discourse to channel the student’s attention to the reward of seeking wisdom (4:10) and obeying the parental command (5:7). This invocation also precedes a solemn warning about the devastating consequence of not following the parental instruction (7:24).³ However, due to the widespread usage of the term שְׁמַע in the OT, this marked phrase alone may not create a condition of possibility for the Deuteronomic moral tradition.

² This marked phrase is strategically placed in Deuteronomy, particularly in Deut 1–11. In 4:1, the objects of their attention are the “statutes” (חֻקִּים) and “judgments” (מִשְׁפָּטִים). In 5:1, the same invocation as 4:1 with the “statutes” (חֻקִּים) and “judgments” (מִשְׁפָּטִים) are used to introduce the Decalogue and its binding covenant. In 6:4, Moses proclaims the principal command to love YHWH after using this invocation. In 9:1, after the mention of stubbornness of the past and present generation in the previous chapter, the *Shema* phrase refreshes the thematic line with a call to trust in YHWH as they enter the land of his promise.

³ While other parental instructions in Prov 1–9 do not include שְׁמַע, all of them do begin with the invocation, “My son” (בְּנִי, 2:1; 3:1, 21; 5:1; 6:20; 7:1).

What further makes this discursive formation around the Deuteronomic moral tradition possible in the three parental instructions (Prov 3:1–4; 6:20–22; and 7:1–3) is the ethical prominence of the *Shema* in Deuteronomy.⁴ Externally, the *Shema* itself is an OT passage that was culturally accepted and widely known in the Second Temple Jewish tradition even to the Hasmonean era (the second century BCE). It is one of the few biblical passages found in the *Mezuzah* and *Tefillin* at Qumran and enjoyed an authoritative status equivalent to the Decalogue in the Nash Papyrus.⁵ Internally, the *Shema*, at least in part, has a structural significance within Deut 5–11 where it serves as a framing device, appearing at the beginning (Deut 6:6–9) and the end (11:18–20) of the section.⁶ According to Arnold, this phrase strategically introduces Moses’ paraenetic discourse in Deut 6–11, a section dedicated to the comprehensive exposition of the first two commandments of the Decalogue.⁷ Thus, its cultural and literary significance makes the *Shema* a likely candidate to be a thematic complex with a group of characteristic conventions represented in a thought tradition.

Boda points out that while the *Shema* in Deut 6:4–9 is deemed important in Judaism, some scholars are divided on its significance within the OT due to its infrequent appearances and the absence of its recognition in Deut 11:18 where a similar

⁴ Schipper, *Proverbs 1–15*, 37.

⁵ Overland, “Did the Sage Draw,” 425. See also Schiffman, *The Dead Sea Scrolls*, 306; Reider, *Deuteronomy*, 73; Schechter, *Aspects of Rabbinic Theology*. For further discussion on the *Shema*, see also Moberly, *Old Testament Theology*, 7–40.

⁶ While Nelson (*Deuteronomy*, 139–40) assumes that the *Shema* is “a redactional framing of the parenetic chapters,” the strategic positioning of the *Shema* seems self-explanatory, bracketing the entire Torah discourse (Deut 5–11), even without the redactional assumption. Lundbom (“The Inclusio,” 304–5) also agrees that the *Shema* forms an *inclusio* for Deut 5–11. He also views “the statutes (חֻקִּים) and the judgments (מִשְׁפָּטִים)” (5:1; 11:32) as another framing device for this section of Deuteronomy. Cf. Lundbom, *Deuteronomy*, 407–8; Moberly, *Old Testament Theology*, 7–9.

⁷ Arnold, *Deuteronomy 1–11*, 379. He also coins the possibility that juxtaposition of Deut 5:1–6:3 (the Decalogue) and Deut 6:4–9 is a redactional effort to bring the Ten Commandments and the *Shema* together where both passages begin with שְׁמַע יִשְׂרָאֵל (“Hear, O Israel”).

command is present.⁸ Thus, it seems that this phrase lacks substantial prominence within the OT, except for its notable occurrence in Prov 1–9, where it appears three times. Its significance in later didactic traditions of the Second Temple Judaism may evince that this phrase constituted a part of the moral tradition in the public sphere of ancient Israel. It likely persisted in applications for individual “home” ethics, even though it may not have been explicitly featured in the historical or national context of the OT.

Nevertheless, the didactic and familial setting of Prov 1–9 encourages the use of this ethical formula to actively engage the reader in the parental discourse. Thus, it could be argued that the scarcity of the *Shema* in the OT demonstrates that due to the subject-matter its purpose is specifically tailored to a particular type of ethical discourse, namely parental teaching in Prov 1–9. In this regard, while these three Proverbs passages do not contain the שמע בני construction, they all begin with the imperative form of the verbs semantically linked to שמע with the phrase “my son” (In Prov 3:1, “My son, do not forget . . .” [בני תורת]; in 6:20, “My son, observe . . .” [נצר בני]; in 7:1, “My son, keep . . .” [בני שמר]).

Literary/Thematic Conventions of the *Shema*

Before we probe into the thematic structure of the *Shema* found in Prov 1–9, it would be helpful to first identify literary conventions that are characteristic of this thematic complex in Deuteronomy. As mentioned, the *Shema* in Deuteronomy appears in two

⁸ Boda, *The Heartbeat*, 11n7.

strategic places, Deut 6:4–9 and 11:18–21, and has a thematic structure supported by a number of literary conventions and motifs that are found in both accounts.

v.	Deut 6:4–9	v.	Deut 11:13, 18–20
4	שמע ישראל יהוה אלהינו יהוה אחד		
	Hear, O Israel! YHWH is our God, YHWH is one		
5	ואהבת את יהוה אלהיך בכל-לבבך ובכל-נפשך ובכל-מאדך	13	והיה אמ-שמע תשמעו אל-מצותי אשר אנכי מצוה אתכם היום לאהבה את-יהוה אלהיכם ולעבדו בכל-בבכם ובכל-נפשכם
	<u>You shall love YHWH your God with all your heart, all your soul, and all your strength.</u>		It shall come about, if you listen obediently to my commandments which I am commanding you today, <u>to love YHWH your God and to serve him with all your heart and all your soul,</u>
6	והיו הדברים האלה אשר אנכי מצוה היום על-לבבך	18	ושמתם את-דברי אלה על-לבבכם ועל-נפשכם וקשרתם אתם לאות על-ידיכם והיו לטוטפת בין עיניכם
8	וקשרתם לאות על-ידיך והיו לטטפת בין עיניך		
	<u>These words, which I command you (s.) today, shall be on your heart. And you shall bind them as a sign on your hand, and they shall be as phylacteries on your forehead.</u>		<u>You (pl.) shall set these words of mine on your heart, on your soul. And you shall bind them as a sign on your hand, and they shall be as phylacteries on your forehead.</u>
7	ושננתם לבניך ודברת במ בשבתך בביתך ובלכתך ובשכבך ובקומך	19	ולמדתם אתם את-בניכם לדבר במ בשבתך בביתך ובלכתך בדרך ובשכבך ובקומך
	And you shall <u>recite (שנן) them to your sons and you shall talk of them when you sit in your house, when you walk in the way, when you lie down, and when you rise up.</u>		And you shall <u>teach (למד, piel) them to your sons talking of them when you sit in your house, when you walk in the way, when you lie down, and when you rise up.</u>
9	וכתבתם על-מזוזות ביתך ובשעריך	20	וכתבתם על-מזוזות ביתך ובשעריך
	And you shall <u>write them on the doorposts of your house and your gates</u>		And you shall <u>write them on the doorposts of your house and your gates</u>

Table 1. A Comparison Between Deut 6:4–9 and Deut 11:13, 18–20

As we see in Table 1, Deut 6:4–9 and 11:1, 18–20 are almost identical in most places (underlined), with only minor variations including the use of singular “you” in the former and plural “you” in the latter. There are four shared literary characteristics in the *Shema* here that we will also explore in the three parental instructions. They are, (1) “these words” (הדברים האלה) of Moses referring to the creed and the follow-up command, (2) the pedagogical emphasis through the expression, “on your heart” (על-לבבך), (3) the word pair of קשר and כתב (“Bind-Write”), and (4) the “Life in the land” motif as a reward of obedience (Deut 6:3 and 11:21). The references to “the land” (ארץ/אדמה) and “multiply” (רבה) are present in these two verses.⁹ Although either 6:3 or 11:21 is typically included in the *Shema* formula, they are definitely part of the thematic complex, forming its outcome/reward.

First, both of the *Shema* contain the phrase “these words” that Moses commands. In Deut 6:6, “*these words* that I commanded you” (הדברים האלה אשר אנכי מצוך) most likely refer to the previous verses (vv. 4–5) where the credal statement (“YHWH is our God, YHWH is one” [יהוה אלהינו יהוה אחד]) and the primary command (“You shall love YHWH your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your might” [ואהבת את יהוה אלהיך בכל-לבבך ובכל-נפשך ובכל-מאדך]) are stated.¹⁰ The creed and the command (“these words,” v. 6) are also noted for their didactic value as they are

⁹ Lundbom (“The Inclusio,” 306) avers that Deut 6:3 and 11:22 form an *inclusio* with the warning to “be careful (שמר)” to obey the commandments. However, the same argument could be made about the promised land as 6:3 consists of both a warning and a promise of the land.

¹⁰ Arnold, *Deuteronomy 1–11*, 394. Due to the inherent ambiguity of the pronoun, various arguments concerning its referent could be made. Arnold summarizes that it could refer to (1) “the immediately preceding words” (vv. 4–5), (2) the Ten Words (5:6–21), or (3) the entire Torah proclaimed by Moses on the plains of Moab. Christensen (*Deuteronomy 1:1—21:9*, 143) argues that it points back to Deut 1:1 where “these words” refer to the entire Torah.

followed by a command to teach them to the children (v. 7).¹¹ In the second *Shema*, these two phrases are missing in the immediate context. Yet, “these words of mine (Moses)” (דברי אלה) in Deut 11:18 may also naturally refer back to the immediately preceding address in Deut 10:12—11:17 where we find similar, if not the same, referents to both the credal statement as well as the primary command in Deut 6:4–5. The primary command in Deut 6:5 is partially present in Deut 11:1, 13 as well as in Deut 10:12.¹² Although the credal statement in Deut 6:4 is not expressively present in Deut 10:12—11:17, it may be inferred from the context (e.g., “the God of gods and the Lord of lords” in Deut 10:17; the warning of idolatry in Deut 11:16). Therefore, “these words” of the authoritative voice of Moses may point to the credal statement and also the primary command to love/obey YHWH which are a characteristic feature of the *Shema*. While the creed and primary command form the centre of what “these words” may refer to, I concur with Arnold that there seems to be “a gradual broadening of the concept in the paraenesis,” and it may denote “Deuteronomy’s authoritative teaching more generally.”¹³

¹¹ Arnold, *Deuteronomy 1–11*, 394. Also, למד used for didactic contexts of Deut 4:1 and 5:1 appears with this invocation and the lexical pair of the “statutes” (חקים) and “judgments” (משפטים). In Deut 4:1, למד (*piel*) means “to teach.” Here the statutes and judgments are connected with Moses’ didactic purpose of the book (Christensen, *Deuteronomy 1:1—21:9*, 79). In 5:1, Arnold (*Deuteronomy 1–11*, 300) argues concerning למד (*qal*, “to learn”) that it does not merely refer to knowledge accumulation but rather “the concept of having an experience that enables one to ‘become accustomed’ or ‘become familiar’ with something.”

¹² Deuteronomy 6:5 (love with all your heart, soul, and might); 10:12 (fear, walk, love, and serve with all your heart and soul); Deut 11:1 (love and keep his charge); Deut 11:3 (love and serve with all your heart and soul). Sharing such literary elements as “Love him” (ואהבה אתו), “with all your heart and with all your soul” (בכל לבב ובכל נפשך) and “YHWH your God” (יהוה אלהיך), Deut 10:12; 11:1, 13 lexically correspond with Deut 6:5. While Deut 11:1 is almost identical to Deut 6:5, it is juxtaposed with a command to obey YHWH’s charge. In 11:13, “love” and “serve” are combined. In 10:12, the concept is diversified to “love,” “fear,” “walk in his ways,” and “serve.” McKay (“Man’s Love for God,” 433) discusses the concept of love in Deuteronomy in relation to other terms as defined by the father-son relationship between YHWH and Israel.

¹³ Arnold (*Deuteronomy 1–11*, 592) argues that “these words” in Deut 11:18 might have contributed to indicating the whole discourse of Deut 10:12—11:21 “with the Decalogue (5:6–12) and the *Shema* (inclusive of 6:1–9)” in the Second Temple Judaic literature. This post-canonical tradition may allude to the significance of the referents of “these words of mine.” In addition, he avers that “these words” may also refer to Deut 6:4–5 specifically.

This nuanced conceptualization of the referent of Moses' words concerning the *Shema* can serve us as we attempt to comprehend the referent of the parental torah in the next section. Nonetheless, it is clear that however broadened they may become in Deuteronomy, Moses' words are centred on the credal statement and the primary command.

Second, the pedagogical emphasis on internalization of Moses' instruction can be noted from the expression, "on your heart" (Deut 6:6; 11:18), in relation to "these words" Moses utters. To note, Deut 11:18 also adds "on your soul" (על-נפשכם) to further signify the internalizing aspect of Moses' words. In this regard, we also witness the command to teach (למד) the children "these words" in all circumstances in Deut 6:7 and Deut 11:19. This educational directive as well as the provision of mnemonics reinforces the pedagogical importance that "these words" of Moses have for the people of YHWH in these two occurrences of the *Shema* in Deuteronomy.

Third, the word pair "Bind-Write" (קשר-כתב) is found in the *Shema* in Deut 6:8–9 and again in Deut 11:18, 20 where these terms are associated with the mnemonics of utilizing phylacteries and writing on the doorposts and gates (Deut 6:8–9; 11:18, 20). Nelson points out that the "Bind-Write" language can be understood on two levels.¹⁴ On a literal level, it is related to "cultural and religious practices" while on a metaphorical level hones in on the importance of "devout concentration on 'these words.'"¹⁵ As we will see later in this chapter, the *Shema* motif in Prov 1–9 appears in a metaphorical

¹⁴ Nelson, *Deuteronomy*, 92.

¹⁵ Nelson, *Deuteronomy*, 92; Thompson, *Deuteronomy*, 139–40; Arnold, *Deuteronomy 1–11*, 398.

sense, freely combining “on your heart” (על־לבך) with the “Bind-Write” pair to accentuate the need for internalization of the parental instructions.¹⁶

Lastly, both instances of the *Shema* are accompanied by the promise of a reward for obedience, specifically, “a prolonged life in the land” and “multiplication” (Deut 6:2–3 and 11:21). This reward is further emphasized in subsequent passages, with warnings and promises (Deut 6:10–25; 11:26–32) related to the theme of “Life in the Land” following both *Shema* passages. Implicit in these passages is a call for the addressees to make a decisive choice—to exclusively serve and worship YHWH.¹⁷ This call for decision explicitly reaches its culmination in Deut 30:15–16, where Moses presents it as a choice between “life and good” (הטוב, החיים) or “death and evil” (הרע, המות). It is crucial to note that this reward extends beyond the mere prospect of a long life or residence in the land; it pertains, more importantly, to human flourishing within the covenant of YHWH which will become clearer as we consider the land motif in the next chapter.¹⁸ With these four literary conventions/thematic features of the *Shema* identified in Deuteronomy, our next task is to probe into how these elements create thematic presuppositions for the Deuteronomic moral tradition in the third, ninth, and tenth instructions of Prov 1–9 in order to reflect on the socio-ethical practices of the Deuteronomic moral tradition.

¹⁶ In Prov 3:3, “Bind them on your neck; Write them on the tablet of your heart.” In Prov 6:21, “Bind them on your heart always.” In Prov 7:3, “Bind them on your fingers; Write them on the tablet of your heart.”

¹⁷ Craigie, *Deuteronomy*, 212.

¹⁸ Millar, *Now Choose Life*, 55–62.

The *Shema* in the Third Instruction (Proverbs 3:1–12)

Looking at these three parental instructions in Prov 3 more closely, we find a number of discursive uses of the linguistic features that create presuppositions for the *Shema*. It is discursive in a sense that the usages of the *Shema* phraseology in these passages are rather structurally sporadic and thematically divergent from Deuteronomy.¹⁹ In this section, I focus on these linguistic conventions related to the *Shema* within the third instruction. While the *Shema* is not found *verbatim* in Prov 3:1–12, it seems presupposed with the similar didactic quality that elicits the formation of the Deuteronomic moral tradition as shown in Table 2.

v.	Deut 6:4–9	v.	Prov 3:1–12
4a	שמע ישראל Hear, O Israel!	1a	בני . . . אל-תשכח My son, do not forget
5	ואהבת את יהוה . . . בכל-לבבך you shall love YHWH . . . with all your heart	5	בטח אליהוה בכל-לבך Trust YHWH with all your heart
6	והיו הדברים האלה אשר אנכי מצוך היום על-לבבך These words, which I command you today, shall be on your heart	1b	ומצותי יצר לבך My commandments, let your heart keep
8	וקשרתם לאות על ידך והיו לטטפת בין עיניך and you shall bind them as a sign on your hand and shall be as phylacteries on your forehead	3b	קשרם על-גרוותיך Bind them on your neck
9	וכתבתם על-מזוזת ביתך ובשעריך and you shall write them on the doorposts of your house and your gates	3c	כתבם על-לוח לבך Write them on the tablet of your heart

Table 2. A Comparison Between Deut 6:4–9 and Prov 3:1–12

¹⁹ Fishbane (“Torah and Tradition”) and Overland (“Did the Sage Draw”) contend that later tradents “creatively” produced the Proverbs passage by using the *Shema* in Deut 6:4–9. However, this study argues that the utilization of the *Shema* inevitably reflects the “traditional” ways in which these phrases were employed by the moral tradition for education purposes as exemplified in Prov 1–9.

“My Teaching” and “My Commands”

First, the parent captures the attention of the son by the invocation, “My son” (בני), similar to “O Israel” (ישראל) in Deut 6:4, though notably absent in Deut 11. Then, two imperatives resembling “hear” [שמע] in Deut 6:4 are: “do not forget” (אל־תשכח) and “keep” (נצל) in Prov 3:1. What the son is instructed not to forget and to keep differs from the directive in Deut 6:6. Instead of “these words which I command” (דברי אלה אשר אנכי מצוה, Deut 6:6) or “these words of mine” (דברי אלה, Deut 11:18), the instruction is to observe “my torah” (תורתי) and “my commandments” (מצותי) in Prov 3:1.²⁰ In particular, the term “command” (צוה) and “heart” (לבב) in Deut 6:6 also appear in Prov 3:1b: “. . . let your heart (לבך) keep my commandments (מצותי),”²¹ strengthening its link to the *Shema* in Deuteronomy.

מצוה and תורה form a lexical pair within Prov 1–9 that is only found in Prov 3:1, 6:20, and 7:2 at the beginning of each *Shema* passage. However, unlike “these words” in Deut 6:6 and 11:18, תורתי and מצותי here lack referentiality since they do not point to one particular, or a set of, commandment(s) or teaching(s). Given the literary context, it could refer to a series of instructions within this discourse (3:1–12) or those in Prov 1–9 in its entirety.²² Regardless, their references are assumed as already known by the

²⁰ Here I note that the term used with the small “t” refers to the parental teaching while the ones with the capital “T” refers to the authoritative teaching of Deuteronomy. It is my argument that these two broad categories of the term had a significantly overlapping aspect in reception.

²¹ In Deut 6:6, the verb צוה is used while in Prov 3:1 it is in a noun, מצוה.

²² Fox (*Proverbs 1–9*, 143) noticing the absent referent of “my commands” (מצותי) argues that it may refer to Prov 1–9 in its entirety and prove the compositional unity of this pericope. Similarly, Clifford (*Proverbs*, 243–44) denies that תורה and מצוה refer to the Mosaic Torah. However, Schipper (*Proverbs 1–15*, 126–27) contends that “my torah” (תורתי) and “my commandments” (מצותי) in Prov 3 should be understood nomistically with the Deuteronomic backdrop in contrast with Prov 4 where human wisdom is promoted. Similarly, Longman (*Proverbs*, 131) considers “the pentateuchal law” as the source of the parental commands and Torah. Brown (“The Law and the Sages,” 272) also argues that “. . . in 3:1; 6:20, 23a; 7:2 . . . The content of the parental tora scattered throughout Prov 1–9, however, does not preclude Deuteronomic teaching but evinces awareness of it.”

addressee. These are logical presuppositions that function here as an intertextual operator that opens up a discursive space of the DMT, particularly given מצות and תורה both of which have a predominant reference to the authoritative teaching in Deuteronomy and elsewhere in the OT.²³

מצות and תורה appear together only once in Deuteronomy. In Deut 30:10, return from the exile is envisioned but is conditioned upon Israel's obedience to "his commandments (מצות) and his statutes (חקים) that are written in this book of the Torah (ספר התורה)." Here מצות and חקים are combined to form תורה which seems to collectively indicate the totality of the Mosaic Torah.²⁴ Therefore, combined with the thematic construction similar to the *Shema*, the linguistic similarities, "my commands" and "my teaching," in Prov 1–9 may create a condition of possibility to recall Moses' teaching and commandments broadly assumed and pictured in "these words" in Deuteronomy within the given framework of the *Shema*.²⁵ As previously mentioned, one of what "these words" of Moses refer especially to is the primary command to love YHWH

²³ מצוה (Deut 4:2, 40; 5:10, 29, 31; 6:1, 2, 17, 25; 7:9, 11; 8:1, 2, 6, 11; 10:13; 11:1, 8, 13, 22, 27, 28; 13:4, 18; 15:5; 17:20; 19:9; 26:13, 17, 18; 27:1, 10; 28:1, 9, 13, 15, 45; 30:8, 10, 11, 16; 31:5), all referring to the divine command given through Moses. תורה (Deut 1:5; 4:8, 44; 17:11, 18, 19; 27:3, 8, 26, 58, 61; 29:21, 29; 30:10; 31:9, 11, 12, 24, 26; 32:46; 33:4; 33:10) is often modified with "this book of" (בספר) or "all the words of" (כל־דברי) portraying it as a physical text divinely authored through Moses.

In Deuteronomy, מצוה ("commandments") is paired more frequently with חקים ("statutes") and משפטים ("judgments") in Deut 5:31; 6:1; 7:11; 8:11; 11:1; 26:17; 30:16, but also alone with חקים ("statutes") in Deut 4:40; 6:17; 27:10. Greengus ("The Anachronism," 52) points out that clustering three law terms or more in semantic association has a strong tendency to indicate "the totality of the divine laws."

Newsom ("Patriarchal Wisdom," 123) similarly notes that these paired terms have a particular association with divine authority as they are associated with "transcendent power" that promises long life and peace. Brown ("The Law and the Sage," 278) investigates the extent to which the term תורה in each section of Proverbs resembles Deuteronomy and concludes that both sapiential תורה and Deuteronomic תורה "cover the familial, cultic, and civil, including jurisprudential, arenas of human intercourse." However, some scholars including Fichtner (*Die altorientalische Weisheit*, 82–83) contend that these terms should be interpreted differently than those in Deuteronomy.

²⁴ Greengus, "The Anachronism," 19.

²⁵ Schipper (*Hermeneutics*, 249) asserts that "Through this reference [to the *Shema*] torah and the commandments of the wisdom teacher or the father and mother move close to YHWH's commandments."

(Deut 6:5; 11:1, 13), which is at least partially utilized in Prov 3:5a, further signifying the command to “Trust in YHWH *with all your heart*” (בְּכָל-לֵבָב).²⁶

While it may not be the case that “my teaching” and “my commands” recall the credal statement and primary command in Deut 6:4–5 exactly, it certainly creates a discursive space for such considerations toward the *Shema* as the authoritative and ethically significant pre-text. These intertextual operators would link up with the generalized notion of “these words” of Moses in the *Shema*, possibly re-signifying what obeying the parents’ commands and teaching may imply and enriching their understanding of what the instructions in Prov 3 may mean. This may also include 3:7 where the command to “fear YHWH and turn from evil” may be undergirded by the principal command emphasizing faithful love toward YHWH.²⁷ In conclusion, given the *Shema* complex along with other Deuteronomic elements in Prov 3, “my teaching” and “my commands” may produce the discursive space for the Torah as the Deuteronomic teachings of Moses and even more broadly as the Pentateuchal narrative.²⁸

Pedagogical Emphasis

After the command to internalize “these words” in Deut 6:6 (“on your heart”), the rest of the *Shema* (Deut 6:7–9) revolves around internalization of the teaching of “these words”

²⁶ According to Overland (“Did the Sage Draw,” 429) the phrase, “all your heart” (כָּל-לֵבָב) is a rare expression in OT wisdom (and wisdom psalms) as it occurs only here and five times in Ps 119.

²⁷ Janzen (“The Most Important Word,” 281) argues that the *Shema* reflects the first part of the Decalogue especially with their lexical parallels. Presupposing the *Shema*, trusting (v. 5), fearing YHWH (v. 7) and turning from evil (v. 7) not only reverberates the principal command to love YHWH but may also, conversely, prohibit the practice of divided devotion, akin to the first commandment of the Decalogue.

²⁸ This broader discursive space may be possible due to a possible literary and conceptual unity from Genesis to Deuteronomy. See Noth, *The Deuteronomic History*, 1–110; Block, *The Triumph*, 105–25.

of Moses which command to love YHWH (v. 5). Thus, the command is to teach (שִׁנֵּן) these words to the children in all circumstances (vv. 7–9). שִׁנֵּן is variously translated in English Bibles, and it is clear that its definition goes beyond “to teach,”²⁹ referring to repeated citation for the purpose of internalization. O’Connell points out that this Hebrew term is used in conjunction with the merisms that further its significance in 6:7 (“talk about them when you sit in your house, when you walk in the way, when you lie down, and when you rise up”).³⁰ This pedagogical emphasis is made even clearer in Deut 11:19–20 since שִׁנֵּן is replaced with לָמַד (“to teach,” *piel*). This emphasis is also signified in the didactic context of Prov 1–9 where the command for the parents to teach their children in Deut 6 and 11 is materialized in the parental instructions given to the son using the *Shema* terminology. In this regard, this parent-son relationship presupposed not only in Prov 3:1–12 but throughout the discourse of Prov 1–9 is a rhetorical frame that creates a pre-text for the Deuteronomic *Shema* to promote its pedagogical significance.³¹

Overland proposes that we view Prov 3:1–12 as a sapiential interpretation of how to “love YHWH your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your might” (אהבת את יהוה אלהיך בכל-לבבך ובכל-נפשך ובכל-מאדך).³² In other words, he argues

²⁹ The different translations include: “teach diligently” (NASB, KJV), “impress on” (NIV), “recite” (NRSV), and “repeat again and again” (NLT). These different translations stem from the uncertainty concerning the root of the verb. Arnold (*Deuteronomy 1–11*, 395–96) argues that it should be taken as the verbal root “to repeat” especially in the milieu of “the ancient Near Eastern instructional method” while Lundbom (*Deuteronomy*, 313) views it as “to sharpen,” thus referring to “incise, impress.”

³⁰ O’Connell, “שִׁנֵּן,” 197–98.

³¹ Waltke (*Proverbs 1–15*, 62) argues that the reference to the mother put “the house setting for education . . . beyond reasonable doubt” although many scholars including Crenshaw (*Education in Ancient Israel*) and Whybray (*The Intellectual Tradition*) view a (scribal) school as the setting for Prov 1–9. However, Weeks (*Early Israelite Wisdom*, 156) contends that there is no compelling evidence or reason to assume that the schools ever existed.

³² Overland, “Did the Sage Draw,” 428–33.

that Prov 3:1–12 revolves around unpacking the practical significance of the primary command to love YHWH “with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your might” (Deut 6:5), a referent of “these words” of Moses in Deut 6:6. He avers that בכל־לבבך (“with all your heart”) corresponds to Prov 3:5 where the son is commanded to trust (בטח) in YHWH with all his heart. Also, he argues that בכל־נפשך (“with all your soul”) signifies one’s psychological and physical desires connoted by “wise in your eyes” (חכם בעיניך), “healing be to your body” (רפאות תהי לשרך), and “marrow to your bones” (שקוי לעצמותיך) in Prov 3:7–8. Lastly, unlike other Hebrew synonyms for “might,” this particular word מאד (“with all your might” [בכל־מאדך]) refers to material abundance which may be practiced by giving one’s wealth (Prov 3:9–10).³³

Lastly, Overland views חסד ואמת in Prov 3:3 as another covenantal expression for אהבת את יהוה (“love YHWH”). While he is correct to point out that this phrase in Prov 3:3 may mirror the command to love YHWH in Deut 6:4, this claim needs to be qualified with another credal statement in Exod 34:6 where חסד ואמת clearly signifies attributes of YHWH.³⁴ However, his interpretation is accurate in the sense that in this context, these terms do not refer to what YHWH bestows on the son but what the son is obliged to enact toward others.³⁵ As Loader argues, חסד ואמת should be considered with the ensuing clauses (i.e., “Bind them on your neck, Write them on the tablet of your heart,” v. 3b, c) and not the antecedent verses where YHWH’s gift of prolonged life is

³³ Overland, “Did the Sage Draw,” 428–32.

³⁴ Overland, “Did the Sage Draw,” 435–40.

³⁵ Fox (*Proverbs 1–9*, 144) argues that this phrase refers to “God’s kindness toward the pupil,” especially in the other use of the same phrase in Prov 20:28. Contra Fox, Waltke (*Proverbs 1–15*, 241) also contends that Fox’s interpretation necessitates a distortion of the ordinary rules of poetic composition.

promised (v. 2).³⁶ Also, due to the lack of any direct reference to Deut 6:5 or its phraseology, it may be more reasonable to assume that Prov 3:1–12 does not interpret but more broadly presupposes Moses' primary command as represented in the Deuteronomic moral tradition. Nevertheless, his claim that Prov 3:1–12 as a pedagogical program reflects the primary command in Deut 6:5 is justifiable. This construal is particularly plausible if we consider the thematic complex of the *Shema* that creates a pre-text for the reading of this parental instruction in light of Moses' command in Deut 6:5.

“Bind-Write” Pair with “On the Tablet of Your Heart”

Next, we look at the use of the *Shema* language in the third instruction that begins to betray a particular view of the moral tradition's content. This particular view represents a moral tradition shared with Deuteronomy that reinforces the pedagogical emphasis on the “heart” (לבב) with the language of the “Bind-Write” pair. In Deut 6:8–9, we observe the commands to bind (קשר) “these words” of Moses on their hand and on their foreheads and to write (כתב) them on the doorpost of their houses and on their gates. The “Bind-Write” pair describing the mnemonic devices (i.e., קשר and כתב) in Deut 6 and 11 also appears in Prov 3:1–12.³⁷ In Prov 3:3, however, they are no longer connected to mere physical aids for memorization but an irreversible inscription on the son's heart

³⁶ Loader, *Proverbs 1–9*, 149. Yet, he does not completely reject the possibility of reference to YHWH's kindness.

³⁷ In fact, Braulik (“Das Deuteronomium,” 246) points out that this pair is found only in Deut 6:8; 11:18; Prov 3:3; and 7:3. Schipper (*Hermeneutics*, 249) further argues that “Through this reference torah and the commandments of the wisdom teacher or the father and mother move close to YHWH's commandments.”

with the expression, על־לוח לבך (“on the tablet of your heart,” Prov 3:3). There are two notable variations from Deut 6:6 here.

First, the objects to be written on the heart are not indicated as parental teaching or commandments.³⁸ Rather, they are “steadfast love and faithfulness” (חסד ואמת) which are taken from another credal statement declaring YHWH’s character in Exod 34:6 (cf. Deut 7:9).³⁹ This creed that became incorporated into the common stock of the Deuteronomic moral language in the OT relates the attributes of YHWH to the heart of the son, further emphasizing the pedagogical importance of internalization and character.⁴⁰ In this regard, Waltke convincingly argues from other occurrences of the phrase in Prov 16:6 and 20:28 (cf. Prov 14:22) that חסד ואמת may represent human

³⁸ In Prov 7:3, the objects to be written on the tablet of the son’s heart are the parental words (“my words,” [אמרי]) and commands (“my commands,” [מצותי]), implying that in 3:3, חסד and אמת may be related to parental instruction.

³⁹ Boda’s (*The Heartbeat*, 38–47) observations on Exod 34:6–7 and Deut 7:9–10 are noteworthy here. In the former, חסד and אמת are part of the “ontological statement” describing YHWH’s abstract characteristics in v. 6 while his key functional character in v. 7 involves חסד demonstrated in his forgiveness and just punishment. In the latter, אמן (a form related to אמת) replaces the ontological statement, and with חסד, it forms the functional statement of his character. This may allude to the fact that חסד and אמת as God’s functional character traits are to be imitated in Prov 3:3.

Interestingly, Prov 3:3 is lexically much closer to Exod 34:6 than Deut 7:9–10. It may be due to the fact that חסד and אמת as a word pair in Exod 34:6 became part of common language stock as circumstantially evinced in other OT passages (Josh 2:14; 2 Sam 2:6; Pss 25:10; 61:7; 85:10, 15; 89:14). Nevertheless, the use of these words to describe God’s functional character in Deut 7:9–10 still showcases how these divine attributes may be employed in the contexts of Deuteronomy and Prov 1–9.

Nelson notes that Deut 5:9–10 runs parallel to 7:9–10 showing the movement from “a jealous God” (אל קנא, Deut 5:9) to “the faithful God” (האל הנאמן, Deut 7:9) and from the order of just punishment and then steadfast love in 5:9–10 to that of steadfast love and then just punishment, showing a movement toward “divine grace” (Nelson, *Deuteronomy*, 101). Cited in Boda, *The Heartbeat*, 46. Also, these different usages of חסד and אמת may suggest that while they are frequently paired, they represent two distinguished qualities and not a hendiadys (Waltke, *Proverbs 1–15*, 241).

⁴⁰ The phrase חסד ואמת in particular is frequently used in the OT alone without the rest of the credal statement to declare either the attribute of YHWH (2 Sam 2:6; 15:20; Pss 25:10; 85:10; 86:15; 89:14; Prov 14:22; 16:6) or the YHWH-like trait of human character (Josh 2:14; 2 Sam 2:6; Ps 61:7; Prov 3:3; 20:28). We also witness this phrase being used as a generic description of human action in Gen 24:49; 47:29.

virtues that “influence every choice and movement.”⁴¹ He also argues that a necklace (v. 3b) metaphorically expressing חסד and אמת is a metonymy for the parental instruction that offers protection and guidance.⁴² Thus, the pedagogy driven by the *Shema* in Prov 3 has its emphasis on internalization of the parental commands that aims at formation of virtues in the son. In a similar vein, Schipper observes that this phrase is utilized to indicate “the divine throne” in Ps 89:15 as well as royal ideology in Prov 20:28. Thus, he concludes that the phrase consists of both “religious and ethical dimensions,”⁴³ affirming that it not only describes the attributes of YHWH but also ethical qualities to be internalized by the son.

Second, in this regard, Prov 3:3 has a stronger emphasis on internalization compared to the *Shema* in Deut 6:4–9. In the Deuteronomic *Shema*, although Moses demands that his words be on their hearts, the mnemonics of writing only apply to the physical building (“the doorposts of your house” [מזוזות ביתך], and “your gates” [שעריך]) in Deut 6:9. However, in Prov 3, the message of the parental teaching and commands is to be written “on the tablet of your heart” (כתבם על־לוח לבך), adopting the *Shema* conventions and recasting them for further emphasis on internalization which

⁴¹ Waltke, *Proverbs 1–15*, 241. Fox (*Proverbs 1–9*, 144) argues that חסד and אמת do not refer to the human qualities as such qualities cannot be mandated. Rather, he views them as God’s kindness toward the son. However, in v. 3b–c, the son is commanded to bind and write these qualities *so that* he may find favour and good repute (v. 4). Therefore, it seems that while they allude to the divine qualities, they are also applied to the lifestyle of the son in this context.

⁴² Waltke, *Proverbs 1–15*, 242. In addition, McKane (*Proverbs*, 291) suggests that a necklace may signify חסד and אמת as “a means of adornment and beautification.”

⁴³ Schipper, *Hermeneutics*, 246.

contributes to defining the DMT.⁴⁴ The term “tablet” (לוח) in plural form is most frequently used in Exodus (24:12; 27:8; 31:18; 32:15; 32:19; 34:1; 34:4; 34:28; 38:7) and Deuteronomy (Deut 4:13; 5:22; 9:9, 10, 11, 15, 17; 10:1, 2, 3, 4, 5) where it unequivocally refers to the two tablets of stone with inscription of the terms of the covenant between YHWH and his people. It often appears in combination with the verb כתב and with the preposition על (i.e., כתב על-לוח, Deut 4:13; 5:22; 10:2, 4) as we find in Prov 3:3. In addition, the singular form לוח in Prov 3:3 may be understandable, if Kline is correct in arguing that as a covenant document, only one of the two stone tablets was placed in the Ark of Covenant and the other one was kept in the hand of Israel for “documentary witness (Deut 31:26).⁴⁵

Therefore, given the thematic frame of the *Shema* with its emphasis on “the heart,” the phrase על-לוח לבך in Prov 3:3 may then be considered “already read” (*déjà lu*) presupposing its common usage in Exodus and Deuteronomy as the tablets of the covenant.⁴⁶ Without any given reference, this phrase may function as an intertextual operator that brings in the discursive context of the Deuteronomic covenant. As I will elaborate further in the next chapter, this discursive formation curates a covenantal significance of internalization in connection to the theme of the “Life in the Land.”⁴⁷

⁴⁴ Most text critics assume that Prov 3:3c is a later redaction not present in the OG although this phrase is also present in 7:3b of the OG where the same *Shema* framework and terminology are used as attested in the secondary translations, Symmachus, Theodotion, Vulgate, Syriac, and Targum. Fox (*Proverbs 1–9*, 377) argues that the omission of 3:3c seems accidental as this line is “entirely germane and needed for the parallelism.” Therefore, combined with the pairing of “Bind-Write” in Deut 6:6 and 11:20, the linguistic proximity of על-לוח לבך to כתב על-לוח would bring the reader into a dialogue with the *Shema* as elicited by the DMT.

⁴⁵ Kline, *Treaty of the Great King*, 21.

⁴⁶ Barthes, *Image-Music-Text*, 159.

⁴⁷ In Deuteronomy, the theme of the ‘Life in the Land’ is closely related to the covenantal renewal as the blessings and curses in the land is conditional upon the fulfillment of Israel’s covenantal faithfulness.

Third, Kwon contends that לוח in Prov 3:3 is not related to לוח in the Deuteronomic covenant sense but rather in the new covenant sense in Jeremiah.⁴⁸ This is a reasonable assumption as Jer 17:1 is the only other place outside of Proverbs in the OT where the expression, לוח, is associated with לבב. Here Jeremiah says, “The sin of Judah is written (כתב) with an iron pen; with a diamond stylus-point it is engraved (חרש) on the tablet of their heart (על־לוח לבם) and to the horn of their altars.”⁴⁹ The metaphorical image of the tablet signifies the permanent inscription just as in Prov 3:3 although it is not חסד ואמת but rather Judah’s sin that is etched on the tablet of their heart, highlighting the indelibility of Judah’s sin.⁵⁰ As most commentators suggest, Jer 17:1 is connected to Jer 31:33 through a strong contrast within its covenantal framework.⁵¹ Whereas in the former the sin of Judah is written on the tablet of their hearts, in the latter YHWH promises to “write” (כתב) his law (תורתִי, “my law”) on their hearts (על־לבם) in the new covenant.

In this regard, Kwon asserts that “. . . the idea of writing divine law on human hearts in Prov 3:3 is much closer to the notion of the new covenant in Jer 31:33, where humans cannot help but keep the requirements of the Torah, than to that of Deut 6:6.”⁵² Furthermore, he makes two more observations: (1) Deuteronomy never relates the stone tablet with “internalized law on the human heart”; and (2) with Deuteronomy’s skepticism about “the truthfulness of the human heart.”⁵³ With these in view, he claims

⁴⁸ Kwon, “Instructions and Torah,” 11. Cf. McKane, *Proverbs*, 291–92; Weeks, *Instruction and Imagery*, 105.

⁴⁹ In Prov 1–9, the expression is used only twice, Prov 3:3 and 7:3.

⁵⁰ Thompson, *Jeremiah*, 417.

⁵¹ Craigie, *Jeremiah 1–25*, 223; Thompson, *Jeremiah*, 417; Schipper, *Hermeneutics*, 245.

⁵² Kwon, “Instructions and Torah,” 12.

⁵³ Kwon, “Instructions and Torah,” 11.

that it is very unlikely that Prov 3:3 uses לֵּוּחַ in the Deuteronomic sense to signify internalized divine law on the human heart. Kwon also assumes that the passages in Deuteronomy where there is a hopeful outlook on the teachability of the human heart (Deut 4:29; 6:5; 10:12, 16; 11:13, 18a; 26:16; 30:14) do not conform to the overall negative view of the “heart” in Deuteronomy.⁵⁴ In this way, the conceptualization of the human heart in Prov 3:3 may be divorced from that of Deuteronomy and married to the new covenant concept in Jer 33:31–34.⁵⁵

However, while Deuteronomy never uses the stone tablet in terms of internalized law, “the tablet” in Prov 3:3 may be said to derive its metaphorical significance from its Deuteronomic pre-text regardless of its usage. This is also evident in Jer 31:33 where the writing of YHWH’s Torah on human heart presupposes and contrasts the writing of the Mosaic Torah on the tablets of stone (v. 32: “not like the covenant that I made with their fathers”).⁵⁶ Also, we note that Deuteronomy is not entirely devoid of either the positive view of the human heart or the anticipation for the new covenant. For example, Moses commands his words to be in the heart of the Israelites (Deut 6:6), calls for the circumcision of the heart (Deut 10:16), and declares that God’s word is in their hearts (Deut 30:14).⁵⁷ Also, Deut 29:4; 30:6, 14 consist of the new covenant idea though the language is more subtle than Jer 31:31–34.⁵⁸ Therefore, while Kwon correctly argues

⁵⁴ Kwon, “Instructions and Torah,” 9, 11.

⁵⁵ Kwon, “Internalization,” 113. Cf. Weeks, *Instructions and Imagery*, 103–4.

⁵⁶ Thompson, *Jeremiah*, 580–81; Craigie, *Jeremiah 1–25*, 132–33.

⁵⁷ McConville (*Deuteronomy*, 43) cogently asserts that while “the question of moral capability” is sustained throughout the book, “the aim of Torah is [still] to create a righteous community.”

⁵⁸ Coxhead (“A Prophecy of the New Covenant”) and Gentry (“The Relationship of Deuteronomy,” 52) argue that Deut 30:11–14 refer to a future time. Gentry further argues that this is confirmed by the “meta-comment” in Deut 29:29 where Moses establishes a tension between “the secret things” (הַסְּתֵרִים) of God and “the revealed things” (הַנִּגְלִיּוֹת) that belong to human. Regarding Deut 29:4, Müller (“A Heart to Understand,” 218–19) asserts that it “[aims] at the hope that at some point in the future YHWH will finally overcome this deficiency and guarantee Israel’s lasting obedience to his voice.”

that לוח in Deuteronomy does reflect the Jeremian tradition in relation to the new covenant, the idea is not absent in the book.

This positive outlook on the human heart then may instigate a pedagogical drive in the DMT that reinforces the internalization command in Prov 3. Therefore, we may construe the use of “the tablet” as an innovative way of teaching the importance of internalizing the parental torah for the development of virtues (חסד and אמת) in the DMT. Furthermore, Kwon’s endeavour to distance Prov 3:3 from Deuteronomy and align it more closely with Jeremiah is questionable since Jeremiah seems to share vast language stock and traditions with Deuteronomy.⁵⁹ We may also argue that regardless of the differences between the use of “the tablet” in Jeremiah and that in Prov 3:3, the shared use may allude to a shared thought-world.

In sum, the image of “tablet” (לוח) is utilized in Prov 3:3 to emphasize the command to permanently internalize the virtues of חסד ואמת which may be understood against the backdrop of Exod 34:6–7 and Deut 7:9–10 as these shared expressions create a presupposition for the DMT. In particular, the term “tablet” whose plural form is often employed in Exodus/Deuteronomy to indicate the Torah may have been incorporated into this moral tradition to provide a covenantal perspective on the meaning of internalization in Prov 3:3.⁶⁰ And the thematic complex of the *Shema* in Prov 3:1–12 creates a condition of possibility and makes this (re-)conceptualization of significant terms possible through this moral tradition. Thus, for the implied readers familiar with

⁵⁹ Rossi, “Authority, Prestige or Subversion?” 383.

⁶⁰ Critical scholars often argue that Jeremiah or the Jeremian tradition participated in the composition of Deuteronomy in the exilic or post-exilic period. This conjecture based on literary evidence demonstrates that these books do not merely share linguistic features but also theological concepts and ideas geared by a tradition. Hyatt, “Jeremiah and Deuteronomy,” 156; Wolff, “The Kerygma,” 95–96.

this tradition, על־לוח לבך along with other *Shema* elements may be sufficient to produce a reading intended by the Deuteronomic intertexts in Prov 1–9.

The Reward of Life and Blessing

The last *Shema* element that we note here is the rewards promised for obedience to the parental instructions in Prov 3:2, 4, 6b, 8, and 10. Each of these verses corresponds to a parental command in Prov 3:1, 3, 5–6a, 7, and 9, respectively. In particular, the most prominent reward is longevity of life in v. 2 described in terms of a hendiadys of “length of days” (אֶרֶךְ יָמִים) and “years of life” (שָׁנוֹת חַיִּים). In Prov 1–9, “life” is signified as the promised reward for obedience to the parental instructions (Prov 3:2, 22; 4:4, 10, 22; 6:23; 7:2). We observe the same promise of reward for obeying Moses’ teaching in the context of the Deuteronomic *Shema* in Deut 6:2 (“... your days may be prolonged,” יִרְבוּ) and 11:21 (“... your days and the days of your sons may be multiplied,” יִמֵּיכֶם וְיָמֵי בָנֵיכֶם).⁶¹ For this reason, Schipper argues that this verse “connects to Deuteronom(ist)ic thought” and this motif of prolonged life to the legal tradition, especially given this theme in the parenetic command to honour parents in the Decalogues (Exod 20:12; Deut 5:16).⁶²

⁶¹ Markl, “This Word is Your Life,” 71.

⁶² Schipper, *Proverbs 1–15*, 127. Here “life” in the first *Shema* in Deuteronomy points to the residency and/or well-being in the land with further deliberation as to what that land signifies: “a land flowing with milk and honey” (Deut 6:3, אֶרֶץ זָבַת חֵלֶב וּדְבַשׁ). In a similar vein, in the second *Shema*, the days of one’s life are directly tied to the land: “your days and the days of your sons may be multiplied on the land (אֶדְמָה)” (Deut 11:21, here “the land” is אֶדְמָה as opposed to אֶרֶץ). Wright (“אֶרֶץ,” 1:511–17) asserts that אֶדְמָה is nuanced to indicate a cultivated, agricultural, occupied land in contrast to barren land whereas אֶרֶץ as a general term includes both nuances and more. For this reason, Fox (*Proverbs 1–9*, 123) translates this word as “earth”; however, it would be strange that such a generic sense of the term can be an impetus or a reward for ethical behaviour of a youth.

One clear difference between the *Shema* in Deut 6/11 and Prov 3:1–12 is that in the former this prolonged life assumes “the land” (Deut 6:3; 11:21a) whereas in the latter the connection is not elicited. It is worth noting though that the second instruction (Prov 2:1–22) immediately preceding Prov 3:1–12 ends with a reference to the land promised to the upright in v. 21 (“For the upright will dwell in the land and the blameless will remain in it,” כִּי־יֵשְׁרִים יִשְׁכְּנוּ אֶרֶץ וְתַמִּימִים יֹתֵרוּ). Here the theme of the land appears enigmatically without any contextual association. This context-lacking term may then function as an intertextual operator that opens up a discursive space where it connects to the Deuteronomic concept of “Life in the Land.”⁶³ In support of this claim, the conditional promise concerning “the land” in Prov 2:21 may implicitly relate to the promised rewards of prolonged life (Prov 3:2), favour and good repute (v. 4), and storehouse for produce (vv. 9–10).

Nonetheless, the concept in focus here is the theme of “Life as a Reward.” Within the thematic frame of the *Shema*, Prov 3:2 signifies “life” (חַיִּים) as the reward for obedience to the parental instructions. Proverbs 3:2, following the parent’s call to store his teaching and commands in the son’s heart, begins with “for” (כִּי) that establishes a causal relationship with v. 1. As the rewards for keeping parental torah and commandments (“they will add to you . . .” [וַיִּסְפְּךָ]), the parent promises “length of days and years of life” (אֶרֶךְ יָמִים וְשָׁנוֹת חַיִּים) and “peace” (שָׁלוֹם). In Prov 7:2, the tie between the parental commandments and life is much more direct: “Keep my commands and

⁶³ Weinfeld (*Deuteronomic School*, 307–16) correctly observes that “life” and “possession of the land” are two major “doctrines of reward” in Deuteronomy.

live” (שמר מצותי וחיה). Here again, while in the imperative verb form, “life” is offered as the reward/consequence of keeping the parental commandments.

Interestingly, Markl in his article on the theology of life in Deuteronomy argues that even in Deuteronomy the theme of “Life” is more significantly associated with the reward of obedience than with that of the “Land.”⁶⁴ He further elaborates that most expressions related to the land are also connected with the verb, “to live.”⁶⁵ While the theme of the “land” should not be undermined due to its historical and covenantal significance and functions as an epistemological context in Prov 1–9, Markl is accurate in stating that the theme of “Life” has its own significance as reward in both Deuteronomy and Prov 1–9. This focus on the theme of “Life as the Reward” is observed in what Lohfink refers to as a “parenetical scheme” where a call to obedience to the law/commandments is followed by a promise of blessing (*Segenshinweis*).⁶⁶ Markl finds this parenetical scheme in Deut 4:1; 5:33; 6:24; 8:1; 16:20; 30:6, 16, and 19 where Moses calls the Israelites to submit to the Deuteronomic law and states the reward of such obedience using a specific phrase למען תחיה (“so that you may live”).⁶⁷

In Deuteronomy, this parenetical scheme brings a tension between unconditional promise of the land and its conditionality upon obedience to Moses’ instructions. As Millar insightfully points out, this tension creates room for ethics as it is “the context of

⁶⁴ Markl, “This Word is Your Life,” 74. He also insightfully maintains: “Moses, who had brought Israel to the border of the Land . . . testifies through his own fate that the Land is not a necessary end and aim of a life that is fulfilled in the relationship with God” (92).

⁶⁵ Markl, “This Word is Your Life,” 75–76.

⁶⁶ Lohfink, *Hauptgebot*, 90–97.

⁶⁷ Markl, “This Word is Your Life,” 74–75. The Deuteronomic law here refers to various terms to indicate Moses’ written/spoken commandments such as “statutes” (חקים), “judgments” (משפטים), “commandments” (מצות), “justice” (צדק), in combination with such verbs as “to command” (צוה), “to love” (אהב), “to walk” (הלך), “to keep” (שמר).

the covenantal decision, the motivation for decision, the reward for decision.”⁶⁸ In this regard, the tension in this Deuteronomic theme of “Life” as the ultimate reward is highlighted in Deut 30:19–20, the climactic moment in Deuteronomy, where the Israelites are called to make a decision: “. . . choose life (חיים) in order that you may live (תחיה), you and your descendants, by loving YHWH your God, by obeying his voice, and by holding fast to him because this is your life (חיך), and the length (ארך) of your days, that you may live in the land . . .”⁶⁹

In Deut 30:15–18, Moses first conceptualizes the reward of obedience as “life” (החיים) and “good” (הטוב) and the consequence of disobedience as “death” (המות) and “evil” (הרע) which are then summarized into two words, “blessing” (ברכה) and “curse” (קללה), in v. 20.⁷⁰ In vv. 19–20, this ethical tension is heightened by his call to “choose life” (בחרת בחיים) followed by “so that you may live” (למען תחיה) as the reward for choosing the life of obedience. In v. 20, again, the theme of “Life” is heavily emphasized first by being equated with loving, obeying, and holding fast to YHWH (v. 20a) and then by being offered as the ultimate reward for obedience to this command (v. 20b).⁷¹ Although the concept of “life” is associated with the idea of the “land” here in v. 20, it appears to be an addendum to point this life back to their future reality. Therefore, the

⁶⁸ Millar, *Now Choose Life*, 60–62.

⁶⁹ Craigie, *Deuteronomy*, 366.

⁷⁰ While הרע is often translated as “adversity” (NRSV, JPS Tanakh, NASB) in opposition to “prosperity” (טוב) in v. 15, I concur with Christensen (*Deuteronomy 1:1—21:9*, 747) and Thompson (*Deuteronomy*, 287) that “good” and “evil” are fitting translations in this context. In vv. 15 and 19, טוב is paralleled with חיים (“life”) and ברכה (“blessing”) while רע with מות (“death”) and קללה (“curse”), implying that טוב and רע may point to something more comprehensive than material wealth and misfortune.

⁷¹ In this regard, Coetsee (“Concept of Life,” 124–25) insightfully summarizes in his analysis of Deuteronomy’s concept of “life” that for Israel the term did not merely mean physical life but quality of life marked by “prosperity, longevity and increase in the Promised Land” contingent upon their obedience to the law of YHWH.

link between “life” and “reward” is much more highlighted in this passage. Schipper helpfully observes that “life” (חיים) and “length” (ארך) paired in this culminating promise of reward in Deut 30:20 is also found in Prov 3:2.⁷²

This line of ethical thought and decision involving the concept of “life” seems to form the discursive context in Prov 3:2 and 7:2. Therefore, while there is only one count of the term, “land,” in Prov 1–9, its connection to the Way metaphor covered in the next chapter and the allusions to the significant theme of “Life as a Reward” in Prov 1–9 is sufficient to open up a discursive space of references to this Deuteronomic theme of “life,” particularly framed within the *Shema* in Prov 3 and 7. Also, we find other rewards in Prov 3:1–12 which, according to Weinfeld, are present in Deuteronomy.⁷³ These rewards may be subsumed under the reward of life in the land. For instance, the reward of “storehouse” (אסם) in Prov 3:10 is also found in Deut 28:8 as part of the covenantal blessing. If we consider this reference to economic prosperity, which is only used in these two passages in the entire OT, the intertextual connection signifying the Deuteronomic nature of the reward should be rendered more meaningful.⁷⁴ Perdue also points out the cultic activity associated with this reward in Prov 3:9 (i.e., “the first of all your produce” [מראשית כל־תבואתך]) to argue its connection to the cultic activity in Deuteronomy.⁷⁵ Other promised rewards of “favour and reputation” (v. 4), “straight path” (or “success,” v. 6b), and “healing and nourishment” (v. 8) are less conspicuous in terms of their association with the rewards in Deuteronomy. Regardless, these rewards

⁷² Schipper, *Proverbs 1–15*, 127.

⁷³ Weinfeld, *Deuteronomic School*, 310.

⁷⁴ Weinfeld, *Deuteronomic School*, 310.

⁷⁵ Perdue, *Wisdom and Cult*.

pertaining to the theme of “Life” offer a more nuanced understanding of this “life as a reward” which seems to be linked to human flourishing for the people in the covenant relationship with YHWH. These rewards are structurally associated with obedience to the parental instructions and contribute to the discursive formation of the *Shema* in Prov 3:1–12. This pattern of obedience-and-reward seems to presuppose the parenetical scheme in Deuteronomy. In short, Prov 3:1–12 with the thematic frame of the *Shema* may demonstrate the moral tradition that conceptualizes the Mosaic Torah, its pedagogical emphasis on loving YHWH, moral formation through internalization, and reward of life and blessing, recasting them in the context of the parental education in Prov 1–9.

The *Shema* in the Ninth (Proverbs 6:20–35) and Tenth (Proverbs 7:1–27)

Instructions

The thematic complex of the *Shema* can also be identified in both the ninth instruction (Prov 6:20–35) and the tenth instruction (7:1–27) although they do not seem to reflect as much pedagogical content of the *Shema* itself as we have observed in the third instruction. Rather, both passages use the *Shema* more as a rhetorical frame that creates a discursive space not only for itself but also for other Deuteronomic contents to facilitate the understanding of the parental instructions.⁷⁶ As mentioned above, Prov 3:1–12 demonstrates a particular conceptualization of the *Shema* centred on the primary

⁷⁶ Schipper (*Proverbs 1–15*, 37) argues that “The instructions in Proverbs 3; 6; and 7 are all closely connected to the pedagogical character of the book of Deuteronomy, albeit with their own particular emphasis.”

command to love YHWH (Deut 6:5) by trusting, fearing, and honouring YHWH, accepting his reproof, and imitating his virtues through internalization of parental instructions. In these juxtaposed parental instructions in Prov 6 and 7, the warnings against moral apostasy achieve the same goal. These warnings are expressed in terms of adultery and sexual temptation using the reformulated words of the Decalogue (Prov 6:24–35) and a graphical illustration (Prov 7:6–23), respectively.

Weeks criticizes the “marked tendency to read all the material about the foreign woman in the light of chapter 6,” reducing the parental warning to that of adultery.⁷⁷ He consistently asserts that the female figure antithetical to Wisdom represents the danger of seduction into apostasy, whether it be sexual or moral.⁷⁸ A similar warning of apostasy is given in terms of idolatry in Deut 11:16–17 immediately preceding the second *Shema*. Thus, just as there are warnings about idolatry in relation to the Deuteronomic *Shema*, so there are warnings about the foreign/strange woman who represents moral corruption in Prov 6 and 7. In this way, the seductive woman in Prov 6 and 7 brings the same consequence as idolatry in Deuteronomy—i.e., moral apostasy. The *Shema* elements in these two instructions may even open up a discursive space for stories of Israelite’s moral failures to facilitate the reader’s understanding of various temptations in life including, but not limited to, adultery. Furthermore, by the same

⁷⁷ Weeks, *Instruction and Imagination*, 87.

⁷⁸ Weeks, *Instruction and Imagination*, 141–43. Weeks (85) also cogently argues that the strange woman (אִשָּׁה זָרָה) in Prov 2:16 and the foreign woman (נִכְרִיָּה/זָרָה) in Prov 5:3, 20; 6:24; 7:5 are the same character and should not be identified with “a very concrete, historical situation” as Blenkinsopp (“The Social Context”) and Washington (“The Strange Woman”) do.

token, the *Shema* frame is rhetorically employed to promote Wisdom in Prov 6:22 and 7:4.⁷⁹

My intention here is to first briefly mention common *Shema* features that are present in these two parental instructions and then focus more on their particularities in each of these instructions. First, both instructions begin with the vocative, בְּנִי (“my son”), followed by the commands to uphold the parental “commands” (מִצְוֹת, Prov 6:20a; 7:1b, 2), “Torah” (תּוֹרָה, Prov 6:20b), and “words” (אִמָּר, Prov 7:1a) at the beginning of both discourses (Prov 6:20 and 7:1–2). Then, the language of “Bind-Write” is present in Prov 6:21 and 7:3 although in the former the verb “fasten” (עָנַד) which replaces “write” (כָּתַב) and “upon your heart” (עַל־לִבְךָ) is instead associated with “bind” (קָשַׁר) in comparison to Prov 3:3. In the latter, both “bind” (קָשַׁר) and “write them on the tablet of your heart” (כָּתַבְםָּ עַל־לִוּחַ לִבְךָ) are present just as we find in Prov 3:3. The adjunctive phrase associated with קָשַׁר is “on your fingers” (עַל־אֶצְבָּעֶיךָ) rather than “around your neck” (עַל־גְּרוּרֹתֶיךָ) as we see in both Prov 3:3 and 6:21. Despite the subtle differences, these literary conventions collectively create a sufficient pre-text for the Deuteronomic presuppositions.

The *Shema* Elements Unique to the Ninth Instruction

The ninth instruction has a particular feature that is not found in the other two parental instructions. Proverbs 6:22 presupposes Moses’ instruction in Deut 6:7 where he commands parents to teach their children diligently when sitting (יָשַׁב), walking (הֵלֵךְ),

⁷⁹ In this study, the personified wisdom in Prov 1–9 will be referred to as “Wisdom” with the capital “W.”

lying down (שכב), and rising up (קום). In this verse, having embodied the parental torah, the son is promised that: “when you walk about (הלך), she will lead you; when you lie down (שכב), she will watch over you; When you awake (קוץ), she will speak (שיח) to you.”⁸⁰ Framed within the thematic complex of the *Shema*, this collection of terms brings a further significance to the pedagogical emphasis of internalization in this parental instruction. Schipper argues that these verbs in 6:22 are descriptive of YHWH’s protection over his people in Deut 6:7. He thus concludes that this parental instruction applies the Deuteronomic Torah, as opposed to wisdom, to educate the youth.⁸¹ Given the similarity between Deut 6:7 and Prov 6:22, this Deuteronomic presupposition is plausible although the parent seems to promote wisdom here in the milieu of the parallel between Prov 6:20–24 and 7:1–5. As Waltke points out, the ninth and tenth instructions are connected through the same theme of an adulterous woman who is set against the personified Wisdom.⁸² Thus, it may be more accurate to view this female figure as Torah-embodied Wisdom since the subject of guiding, watching over, and counselling is in the feminine singular form. It is then this personified Wisdom who aids the son to withstand the “foreign woman” (נכריה) in 6:24.

⁸⁰ It is often debated as to what the subject of the feminine singular verb forms (“lead” [נחה], “watch over” [שמר], “talk to” [שיח]) refers. The most probable referents are the paternal command and maternal *torah* conceptualized as Wisdom since it is a feminine singular form. In this regard, Fox (*Proverbs 1–9*, 229) along with Delitzsch (*The Proverbs*, 115) and Müller (*Der Weisheit*, 123) argue that these parental principles are embodied into the concept of “wisdom” with a possible personification (“she”). Schipper (*Proverbs 1–15*, 240) on the other hand contends that wisdom itself is one step removed from “sapiential *torah*” that comprises the parental commandments and teaching and that the subject refers to this sapiential *torah* stemming from the divine law.

Also, we note that the last verb in this verse (שיח) which is comparable to the first line of Moses’ instruction in Deut 6:7 (“talk [דבר] of them when you are sitting in your house”) is much more nuanced than the latter as its meaning “[fluctuates] between the act of speaking and thinking.” In fact, the verbal form of the term is often employed in Psalms to describe the act of “mental/verbal reflection” (Diamond, “שיח,” 1231).

⁸¹ Schipper, “Wisdom Is Not Enough!” 62.

⁸² Waltke, *Proverbs 1–15*, 351–52.

Furthermore, Prov 6:23 where the parental commandment (מצוה) is described as a lamp (נר) and torah (תורה) as a light (אור) very much resembles Ps 119:105 where the word of YHWH (“your word,” דברך) is professed as a lamp for the psalmist’s feet (“my feet,” רגלי) and a light on his path (“my path,” נתיבה). While using a different term, Prov 6:23 also uses the image of a path (דרך) to describe the parental “rebukes of discipline” (תוכחות מוסר), further championing the proximity between the parental commandment in Prov 6:23 and YHWH’s word in Ps 119:105. Such literary resemblances are particularly significant as the parental torah in their discursive reference to the Deuteronomic Torah coheres with what “your word” (דברך) may refer to in Ps 119:105.⁸³ In a similar vein, deClaissé-Walford argues that Ps 119 is a wisdom psalm where we find “instruction in right living and right faith in the *tradition* of the other wisdom writings of the Old Testament—Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and Job. And in most of these psalms the path to wisdom is through adherence to the Torah, the instruction of the Lord.”⁸⁴ While the reference to God’s word in Ps 119:105 is articulated as opposed to presupposed as we see in Prov 6:2, this shared expression nonetheless supports the view that they both may be part of a moral tradition that promotes sapiential applications of the Torah.

⁸³ Reference to God’s word, specifically תורה, in Ps 119 has been construed in two different ways in OT scholarship. On one hand, Zenger (“Torafrömmigkeit”), Reynolds (*Torah*), and Finsterbusch (“Yahweh’s Torah”) have a multi-perspective understanding of the term where it does not refer to a fixed entity but is a fluid concept from the written Torah to divine revelation. On the other hand, Freedman (*The Exaltation*, 91–92) argues that תורה refers to “the sacred, authoritative, written revelation of God” or “the specific revelation of God’s will in the various instructions that the sacred text contains.” The latter view seems more feasible since the psalmist clearly has a text that he delights in meditating.

⁸⁴ deClaissé-Walford, *Introduction to the Psalms*, 25–26. There is a dispute on whether to recognize wisdom psalm as a *Gattung* due to the unclarity of what should account for wisdom elements (Crenshaw, “Wisdom Psalms?”; Kuntz, “Biblical Wisdom Psalms”). While discussing this topic is beyond the scope of this study, I maintain that there are such psalms as Pss 1; 37; 49; 78; 112; 119 where wisdom elements are undeniably ample and thus are distinguished in some ways from other psalms.

The *Shema* Elements Unique to the Tenth Instruction

In Prov 7, we also find two unique features of the *Shema*. First, this instruction begins with four references to parental instruction (vv. 1–2), instead of two as observed in Prov 3 or 6: “my words” (אמרי) and “my commandments” (מצותי) in 7:1 and “my commandments” (מצותי) and “my teaching” (תורתי) in 7:2. With the repeated terms, “to keep” (שמר) and “my commandments” (מצותי), vv. 1–2 form a parallelism where “keep my words” (v. 1a) is paralleled with “keep my commandments and live” (v. 2a) and “store my commandments within you” (v. 1b) with “my torah as the pupil of your eye” (v. 2b). Second, as substantiated above, the theme of “Life as a Reward” is a distinctive feature of the *Shema* in Prov 3 and 6 as well. Yet, the imperative form of הִיָּה is unique to the tenth instruction, reinforcing urgency and critical importance of keeping the parental torah.⁸⁵ Also, Prov 7:2a appears *verbatim* in Prov 4:4c where the parent informs the son that those are the exact words of the parent’s father, alluding to the intergenerational nature of this parental command.

This command to keep the parent’s commandments (7:2a) is followed by another command to keep the parent’s torah with an adjunctive phrase, “as the pupil of your eye” (כאִישׁוֹן עֵינֶיךָ) in 7:2b. The only other places in the entire OT where this expression is used are Deut 32:10 (“as the pupil of his eyes,” כאִישׁוֹן עֵינָיו), Ps 17:8 (“as the pupil of the [possessor’s] eyes,” כאִישׁוֹן בַּת־עֵין), and Zech 2:12[8] (“the pupil of his eye,” בבִּבְתָּ עֵינִי).⁸⁶

In all three occurrences, this metaphorical expression utilizes one of the most vulnerable

⁸⁵ Clifford (*Proverbs*, 87) insightfully points out that the imperative form of הִיָּה is used in the survival context (e.g., Gen 20:7; 42:18; Jer 27:12, 17; and Ezek 18:32).

⁸⁶ This phrase in Zech 2:12[8] has a unique form which, as Boda (*Zechariah*, 205) suggests, might have been a scribal error or have referred to a different term. Nevertheless, its conveyed sense may not deviate significantly from other instances of use.

and valuable parts of a human body to represent the high value and fragility of something that is worth guarding and protecting.⁸⁷

In a different vein, Fox articulates the pupil as the organ of sight that acts as “the physical medium of knowledge” and thus enables one to understand the parental *torah*.⁸⁸ Knohl also comments that this expression portrays a very similar sense to Ps 119:18 where the psalmist asks God to open his eyes to perceive the wonders of YHWH’s teaching.⁸⁹ Similarly to Knohl, Schipper asserts that this verse parallels Prov 6:23 where the parental *torah* is portrayed as the lamp and light that illuminates “the path of life” (דרך חיים) just as the pupil of the eye enables one to see.⁹⁰ Both interpretations agree that the metaphor involves divine illumination.

In my judgment, “the pupil of your eye” rather functions in Prov 7:2 to describe care and attention for an important and fragile object to be guarded and protected with care. In Deut 32:10 and Ps 17:8, God is the one who keeps and guards his people as the pupil of his eyes. The latter passage has another metaphorical expression paralleled with Deut 32:11 where a mother bird’s wing (כנף) further symbolizes the divine protection of his people.⁹¹ In Zech 2:12[8], a similar rendering of the same metaphor, “the pupil of his eye” (בבבת עינו), also expresses the people of YHWH as his vulnerable and precious

⁸⁷ Waltke, *Proverbs 1–15*, 368.

⁸⁸ Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 239.

⁸⁹ Knohl, “The Revealed and Hidden Torah,” 104. He also points out that this expression is found in 4Q274 where it indicates a divine revelation of the hidden meaning of the Torah given to a Qumran sect.

⁹⁰ Schipper, *Proverbs 1–15*, 261.

⁹¹ Craigie, *Deuteronomy*, 381; deClaisse-Walford, et al., *Psalms*, 187.

body part.⁹² Therefore, we can infer from these few passages where the metaphor is employed in the OT that it represents God's protection and care.

In Prov 7:2, however, it is the son, and not God himself, who is to carry out the act of guarding the parental torah with care. Then, this is extended to another metaphor in 7:3 where the parental command again calls for internalization of the parental torah: "write them on the tablet of your heart" (7:3b). Immediately following this parental command is another command to call "Wisdom" his "sister" (אחותי) and "Understanding" his "close friend" (מדע) in 7:4. Here befriending Wisdom appears to be closely related to binding/writing the parental torah in the son's heart, and the parental torah and Wisdom seem to complement one another. This relationship is more evident in 7:5 where, as Waltke points out, 7:5 forms an *inclusio* with 7:1; if the son keeps (שמר) the parent's words (אמרי) in 7:1, then wisdom keeps (שמר) him from the words (אמריה, "her words") of the strange/foreign woman in 7:5.⁹³

Hence, this *Shema* introduction to the tenth instruction involves the parental torah and wisdom alluding to the authoritative Torah on one hand, while the strange/foreign woman represents moral apostasy on the other hand. This sets the tone for the whole graphical illustration (Prov 7:6–27) where the strange woman is materialized as a seductive woman who brings a "young boy" (נער) among "the uninstructed" (פתאים) in 7:7 into death (7:23) unless he embodies the parental torah and wisdom. This illustration not only contextualizes 7:2a ("Keep my commandments and live!") but may also allow

⁹² Boda (*Zechariah*, 203) further comments that such a metaphor "reveals the deep connection between Yahweh and his people."

⁹³ Waltke, *Proverbs 1–15*, 370.

the reader to further presuppose familiar narrative from the Deuteronomic pre-text created by the *Shema* formula.

In sum, while Prov 6:20–23 and 7:1–3 share the common features of the *Shema* found in Prov 3:1–12, each of these two instructions has unique features of the *Shema* that are not shared with others. The series of movements, “walk,” “sleep,” and “awake,” in Prov 6:22 not only presupposes Deut 6:7 but also motivates the reader by simulating the result of embodying the parental torah and obtaining wisdom. In Prov 7:1–2, the four referents of parental instruction not only emphasize the need to keep it for the son’s survival but also reinforce the discursive formation of the Deuteronomic context for the understanding of the illustration in 7:6–23.

Ethical Functions of the Deuteronomic *Shema* for Practice in Proverbs 1–9

As Tremper Longman III points out, Prov 4:1–4a shows us that there is a tradition inherited from the preceding generation as a source of wisdom although its origin is not indicated in the passage. He supposes that the tradition stems from the law characterized by the Ten Commandments as well as the broader instructional literature of the ancient Near East.⁹⁴ While his comparative analysis showcases these possible connections to the law and other traditions, our inquiry has focused on what and how the Deuteronomic conventions are utilized within Prov 1–9 to demonstrate the moral tradition behind their particular usages. Having looked specifically at the thematic complex of the

⁹⁴ Longman, *The Fear of the Lord*, 112–17. Besides tradition, he also lists experience, observation, and correction of the elders as separate sources of wisdom (111–20). However, these separate categories of source could be subsumed under the tradition since its rounded moral perspective on life enables one to experience, observe, and have wisdom to correct others.

Deuteronomic *Shema* in Prov 3:1–12, 6:20–35, and 7:1–27, we are now in a position to identify three ethical elements and their implications concerning ethical practice: (1) The authoritative voice as the standard of excellence; (2) important pedagogy of internalization; (3) life as the ultimate good of practice.

An Authoritative Voice as Standard of Excellence

From our analysis, we may infer that the parental instructions prescribed in the moral tradition presuppose the Torah as its pre-text since what Moses commands is actualized by the parent's teaching "these words" of the Torah to their children.⁹⁵ The first moral implication concerning practice is that the parental teaching is not a mere collection of advices that stems from their personal experiences and observations of the world around them. Rather, they rely on an authoritative voice echoed through a moral tradition as reflected in the use of the *Shema* in Prov 3:1–12; 6:20–22; and 7:1–3. Drawing upon Deuteronomic language and thought, the parental instructions ground their authority in this moral tradition that derives and innovates its teaching material and pedagogy from Deuteronomy. Given this pre-text, "my *torah*" (תורתי) and "my commands" (מצותי) function as intertextual operators that are conducive to a dialogue with Moses' teachings and instructions in Deuteronomy.

To this point, MacIntyre observes that a moral tradition always finds its key expressions from "standard authoritative texts" where they "provide the paradigmatic

⁹⁵ Weeks (*Instruction and Imagery*, 126) understands the parental instructions in Prov 1–9 as follows: "the instruction that Proverbs 1–9 wants its readers to accept is neither enumerated nor explicitly identified because the work probably expects those readers to recognize that it is talking about the Jewish Law, the 'instruction' par excellence, which is already, after all, in the public domain."

examples used in instructing the same young as to how to extend concepts, to find new uses for established expressions.”⁹⁶ As we have seen above, the parental instructions in Prov 3, 6, and 7 use the Deuteronomic *Shema* as their authoritative text and imitate its education model to some degree. Yet, they do so in ways that extend the Deuteronomic conventions and concepts to deliver the ethical and didactic perspective of this moral tradition while using the same language to allow for a discursive formation.

In this regard, “my teaching” (תורתִי) and “my commandments” (מצותִי) in Prov 3 deserve our attention beyond what they may refer to in their immediate context (i.e., “these words I command you” [Deut 6:7]; “these words of mine” [Deut 11:19]). Given the discursive formation of the *Shema* in this passage, the parental teaching and commandments in Prov 3 presuppose Moses’ primary command to “love YHWH your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your might” (Deut 6:5). Thus, Overland in his article goes as far as to claim that Prov 3:1–12 is a midrashic reading of Moses’ primary command in Deut 6:5 to love YHWH.⁹⁷ However, the limited use of the phraseology from Deut 6:5 without any direct reference rather indicates that the Deuteronomic *Shema* is presupposed rather than interpreted. Presupposing this authoritative voice of the tradition, the parental instruction in Prov 3:1–12 formulates its instructional content in ways that are characteristically pedagogical, practical, and programmatic with a focus on the youth and uninstructed.

The ninth and tenth instructions also contain two varied versions of the *Shema* that contribute to formation of discursive presuppositions to further articulate the ethical

⁹⁶ MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?*, 382–83.

⁹⁷ Overland, “Did the Sage Draw,” 440.

view of the moral tradition. By employing the images of walking, lying down, and rising up Prov 6:22 presupposes the phraseology of Deut 6:7 but clearly for a different purpose. In Deut 6:7, these images accentuate the pedagogy of internalization whereas in Prov 6:22 their purpose is to describe the benefits of internalized wisdom: to guide (נחה), watch over (שמר), and counsel (שיח) the son. In this way, internalization is not only emphasized afresh but its benefits may attract and motivate the son to take the parental instructions to his heart. Also, while in Deut 6:7 the subject of the series of the verbs is Moses' command(s), in Prov 6:22, as I have argued above, it is best understood as Wisdom who is gained from internalized parental instructions. Thus, this wisdom is also closely related to the Deuteronomistic Torah but should not be equated with it since it is formed through the moral tradition which mediates between the Deuteronomistic Torah and the parental torah. The parental instructions and wisdom are intergenerationally shaped by the Deuteronomistic Torah as perceived through the lens of the moral epistemology and tradition of the ancient Israelite thought-world as we witness in Prov 1–9. As a result, the parental torah is able to incorporate creative elements such as the strange/foreign woman, personified Wisdom, and an illustrative story (7:6–23) to further aid the young mind in comprehending the promises and warnings of the authoritative Torah.

Likewise, using a rare expression, “as the pupil of your eye” (כאישון עיניך) in Prov 7:2, the command to keep the parental teaching may presuppose its reference to divine guidance and protection from Deut 32:10 and Ps 17:8 in the context of the *Shema* formula. In other words, while the metaphor primarily calls for the son's close

observance of the parental teaching, it may also bear the discursive context of YHWH's involvement from two other passages. This is in line with Prov 7:4–5 where divine wisdom and understanding are promised to guard (שָׁמַר) the son.

In view of the Deuteronomic presuppositions created by the *Shema*, we return to the significance of “my torah” (תּוֹרָתִי) and “my commands” (מִצְוֹתַי) in Prov 3, 6, and 7. Through the discursive formation of the Deuteronomic moral tradition, the parental instructions gain an authoritative status. Therefore, by default it becomes the “standards of excellence” in ethical practice that are, as MacIntyre defines the term, “appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity.”⁹⁸ In other words, regardless of their historical context, the parental instructions help us understand what ethical practices par excellence are found in Prov 1–9. These moral standards resonate with but do not exactly align with Deuteronomy or even Deuteronomi(st)ic theology. They are unique in a sense that they presuppose the Mosaic, nationalistic, and covenantal concepts in Deuteronomy through the *Shema* and yet recast them into ethical, pedagogical, and individual education taking place in a family setting. In the process, one highly esteemed practice is internalization of the parental torah which I discuss next.

Write on the tablet of the heart

The second moral implication of the *Shema* in Prov 3, 6, and 7 is that there is at least one ethical practice par excellence: to obey and internalize the parental torah and commandments that presuppose the DMT (Prov 3:3; 6:21–22; 7:3). Compared to the

⁹⁸ MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 218.

Deuteronomic *Shema*, the *Shema* in Prov 3:3 and 7:2 puts more emphasis on internalization of the ethical character and the parental instructions, respectively, by using the expression, “Write . . . on the tablet of your heart” (כתבם על־לוח לבך). This internalization aims ultimately at character formation of the son, which is well demonstrated in Prov 3:3. Unlike in Prov 7:2, the object to be internalized in Prov 3:3 is not the parental torah but חסד and אמת which as mentioned above refer to the “character creed” of YHWH which is to be imitated by his subjects. The question is whether this internalizing practice can be accomplished by means of the parental education or require God to write divine instructions on the tablet of the pupil’s heart as in the new covenant (Jer 31:33). This question is especially concerned with כתב לוח לבך (“write on the tablet of your heart”) that is also found in Jer 17:1, its only other use outside of Proverbs.

Both Schipper and Kwon find their answers to this question by relating Prov 3:3 and 7:2 to the concepts of the sapiential Torah and the new covenant from Jeremiah, respectively. Schipper maintains that “writing” (כתב) and “teaching” (לבד) the Torah “on the heart” (על־ללב) are “key concepts in Deuteronom(ist)ic tradition” and that this expression contributes to the conception of the parental instructions as the Deuteronomic Torah.⁹⁹ He further argues that the *Shema* in Prov 3, 6, and 7 utilizes the terminologies of this tradition but opposes its theology. Redactionally, he claims, these chapters of Proverbs progressed toward distrusting human wisdom and relying on divine wisdom for

⁹⁹ Schipper, *Proverbs 1–15*, 38; *Hermeneutics*, 249.

understanding the Deuteronomic Torah.¹⁰⁰ The point of discussion for him in this regard is whether or not humans are capable of learning and acting upon the divine will.

Schipper contends that “Trust in YHWH with all your heart” (בטח אל יהוה בכל-לִבְךָ, Prov 3:5a) and “Do not rely upon your own wisdom” (אַל-בִּינֶתֶךָ אֶל-תְּשֻׁעֶךָ, Prov 3:5b) focus on the limit of human wisdom and reliability of divine wisdom in the Deuteronomic Torah.¹⁰¹

However, I disagree that Prov 3:5 dichotomizes human and divine wisdom.¹⁰² Rather, it attempts to clarify the source of wisdom as divine (Prov 2:6) and encourage the son to acknowledge its divine nature so that his heart may be in the right place through the learning process.¹⁰³ This argument is supported by the plain command of the parent: “Write . . . on the tablet of your heart” (Prov 3:3) which assumes that internalization of the parental instruction is possible. As it seems, the Deuteronomic moral tradition in Prov 3:1–12 utilizes the *Shema* language to affirm human capacities to learn, internalize, and carry out the divine will through moral education while also acknowledging that such phenomenon can be only divinely orchestrated.¹⁰⁴ This requires

¹⁰⁰ Schipper (*Hermeneutics*, 136) articulates his point of view in this way: “In short, the limits of human perception and the disturbance of the heart result in a redefinition of wisdom. Wisdom no longer consists simply of practical knowledge gained through empirical observation but is instead made accessible through God . . . Observance of the torah increasingly becomes something that lies beyond human perception that YHWH alone must facilitate.”

¹⁰¹ Schipper, *Hermeneutics*, 246. In contrast, he argues, Prov 7 views human wisdom as having “intrinsic value as long as it is recognized as divine wisdom” (250). Schipper (*Proverbs 1–15*, 54) further conjectures that juxtaposition of these different views of the Torah is part of “educative wisdom.”

¹⁰² Schipper (*Hermeneutics*, 246) asserts: “[Prov 3:5] emphasizes the contrast between human and divine wisdom and opposes the inadequacy of human knowledge with the individual relationship with God.”

¹⁰³ Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 149; Kwon, “Instructions and Torah,” 13.

¹⁰⁴ Fox, “The Pedagogy,” 238.

wisdom, and thus, wisdom is not separate from obedience to the Torah as Schipper characterizes them.¹⁰⁵

In terms of the human heart, Kwon shares Schipper's view that writing the wise instructions on a human heart requires divine involvement. However, he opposes the idea that the referent of what is to be written on the human heart is the Deuteronomic Torah or even that Prov 3:3 and 7:2 are related to Deuteronomy. Kwon claims that the references to the "heart" in Prov 2:6, 10; 3:3; 6:21; and 7:3 resonate with the notion of the new covenant in Jer 31:33 where YHWH himself writes divine instructions on his people's hearts making internalization possible.¹⁰⁶ He contends that in Deuteronomy the human heart is viewed as untruthful and unteachable.¹⁰⁷ Furthermore, he dismisses the 'circumcision of the heart' in Deut 30:6 by relating it back to writing the *Shema* on the doorpost in Deut 6:6–9 and 11:18–21.¹⁰⁸

However, I aver that the Deuteronomic notion of human heart in Prov 1–9 is double-sided. In Deuteronomy, while the overall assessment of it is indeed negative, there are a few references to the circumcision of the heart (Deut 10:16 and 30:6) and teachability/internalization (Deut 6:6–11; 30:14) among others that have a positive outlook on the heart.¹⁰⁹ In this regard, Peter Gentry detects a similar tension between "divine sovereignty" and "human responsibility" highlighted in Deut 29:29.¹¹⁰ Here

¹⁰⁵ Schipper (*Hermeneutics*, 249–50) also views Prov 3, 6, and 7 all having different perceptions of wisdom, Torah, and their relationship due to the redactional history. He argues that Prov 6 has the concept of "torah wisdom" without wisdom elements whereas Prov 7 views all wisdom as divine wisdom with intrinsic value without the concept of Torah.

¹⁰⁶ Kwon, "Instructions and Torah," 11–12; "Internalization," 112–16.

¹⁰⁷ Kwon, "Instructions and Torah," 11–12.

¹⁰⁸ Kwon, "Internalization," 114.

¹⁰⁹ Millar, *Now Choose Life*, 179–80.

¹¹⁰ Gentry, "The Relationship of Deuteronomy," 51–52.

Moses comments that there are “the secret things” (הנסתרות) that belong to God’s sovereign work as well as “the revealed things” (הנגלות) that fall under human responsibility. He argues that the latter was given in divine instructions, the Deuteronomic Torah, but that the former was to be given through the circumcision of the heart (Deut 30:6).¹¹¹ In other words, the giving of the Torah indicates that the human heart has a divine guide to faithful obedience; however, it is also deeply flawed and requires God to write the Torah on the tablet of the human heart. Therefore, although “writing on the tablet of the heart” in Prov 3:3 is only shared with Jer 17:1 and not with Deuteronomy, this concept is not foreign to Deuteronomy (Deut 10:16; 29:3–4; 30:6).

If we can accept the idea of the DMT that comprises this Deuteronomic concept of a new covenant that is also present in Jeremiah, there is no need to view human wisdom and divine wisdom as mutually exclusive (Schipper) or cut the observable relationship between Prov 1–9 and Deuteronomy (Kwon).¹¹² As mentioned above, “tablet” (לוח) in Prov 3:3 and 7:3 may have been employed in connection with teachability of the human heart. Yet, in connection with the term’s new covenant concept (Deut 30:6, 14; Jer 17:1; and Jer 31:33), Prov 3:3 may also presuppose Moses’ emphasis on internalization that can be accomplished only by YHWH himself. In this way, both Deuteronomic notions of the human heart, signifying teachability and divine

¹¹¹ Gentry, “The Relationship of Deuteronomy,” 51–52.

¹¹² Schipper (*Hermeneutics*, 312) considers Prov 2 as a redactional layer that “counterbalances” Prov 3 and 6. He contends that Prov 2 has a positive view of human wisdom as a hermeneutic of the Torah that is sharply contrasted with Prov 3 and 6 that prioritize the Torah.

engagement, may be present in the discursive formation of לִוּחַ and constitute the Deuteronomic moral tradition.¹¹³

Life as the Reward

The third moral implication of the *Shema* in Prov 3 and 7 concerns the ultimate reward for obedience to the parental instructions: “Life” (חַיִּים). Every ethical practice has the good that is “internal to that form of activity.”¹¹⁴ MacIntyre identifies two types of the good: (1) “The excellence of the products” and (2) “the good of a certain kind of life” which I redefined in Chapter 2 in terms of the Aristotelian concept of the ultimate (“biological”) good.¹¹⁵ The former good, which is the common good of all parental instructions internal to themselves, is *internalized* wisdom. The tablet (לִוּחַ) of one’s heart where human instructions and divine engagement cross signifies this good internal to the practices commanded by the parents. All parental teaching and commands are given so that the son may internalize them and acquire wisdom. This purpose is clearly stated in the introduction to Prov 1–9 (1:2) and the “table of content” in Prov 2 (vv. 2–7).¹¹⁶

¹¹³ Boda (“Knowledge from Above”) also finds this double-sidedness of wisdom, human and divine, in the book of Proverbs from a slightly different angle. He argues that while observation, experience, and tradition are often seen as sources of wisdom as exemplified in Prov 4:3–4 and 24:30–34, the concept of divinely infused wisdom (2:5–11) must be assumed as is observable in the pouring forth of Wisdom’s spirit in 1:23.

¹¹⁴ MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 189.

¹¹⁵ MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 190.

¹¹⁶ According to Schipper’s analysis of Prov 2 (*Hermeneutics*, 310), this chapter is “a guide for reading” other parental instructions that cites “the respective first verses of other lectures” and bring them “as a unified whole.” He cogently argues that the first part of the chapter (Prov 2:1–11) deals with the wisdom concepts while the second part (2:12–22) introduces the two types of dangers marked by sinful men (vv. 12–15) and the strange woman (vv. 16–19). Ending with the antithetical fate of the sinners and the righteous (vv. 20–22), Prov 2 concisely introduces all elements that are dealt with in the rest of Prov 1–9.

What MacIntyre identifies as the second type of the good, which is the *ultimate* good of practice, is “life” in this context brought on by following the parental standards of excellence. This ultimate good is framed as reward/consequence in Prov 3:2 and 7:2 as explained above. Additionally, we consider Prov 4:4 where the same phrase as Prov 7:2 is found. Here the parent names the source from which the phrase is derived. It is his/her father who instructed him/her to internalize the parental commandments (Prov 4:4b) and followed up with the same commands as Prov 7:2: “Keep my commandments and live” (שמר מצותי וחיה, Prov 4:4c). Here the imperative form of חיה is indicated as the direct consequence of keeping the parental commands (שמר מצותי). While Prov 4:1–9 (the fifth instruction) does not contain the thematic complex of the *Shema*, it begins with שמעו בנים (“Hear, O sons”) which resembles the first phrase of the Deuteronomic *Shema*. With the command to internalize the parental commandments and live, this intergenerational tradition, explicitly emphasized as inherited from the father, appears to be more than just a family tradition; rather, it seems to be part of a wide-spread moral tradition.

This “life” as the ultimate good of practice may primarily refer to physical well-being and peace in the son’s life. However, we should not overlook the discursive context created by its Deuteronomic presuppositions of the *Shema*. From our analysis of the concept of “life” in Deuteronomy, we are reminded that “life” in Prov 1–9 may refer to human flourishing, a life well-lived, discursively reinforced as the reward that the son would gain by pursuing the parental standards of excellence. Furthermore, according to Coetsee who surveys the usages of חיה in all its varying forms in Deuteronomy, all other

uses except its generic uses as “physical life,” “life span,” or “animals,” are closely related to YHWH. It indicates “obedience to him” (4:1; 5:33; 6:24; 8:1; 16:20; 30:6, 15, 16, 19, 20), the “living” God (5:26; 32:40), his will as source of life (8:3; 32:47), or his power over life (32:39).¹¹⁷ “Life” as conceptualized in Deuteronomy also has a close connection with Israel’s covenant relationship with YHWH. Therefore, the usages of חיה and its derivative forms in the *Shema* of Prov 3 and 7 create the discursive pre-texts of the moral tradition with such a characterization of the term in Deuteronomy and relate the reward of life to YHWH’s blessings of longevity (Prov 3:2a), shalom (3:2b), economic prosperity (3:10), and protection “as the pupil of his eye” (7:2; cf. Deut 32:10). In this regard, the command to “live” in Prov 4:4 and 7:2 is an invitation to become a partaker of life as YHWH’s blessed people.

With this in mind, we now consider two other important moral implications for this ultimate good of practice that will be explored further in later chapters but are noteworthy to mention here. First, “life” in the parental discourse of Prov 1–9 is depicted as one destination in the bifurcated paths where the pupil is called to choose the right path. In this regard, the Way metaphor is employed to describe two opposite paths that lead to two opposite ends. This metaphor will be further elaborated in the next chapter. Here it is sufficient to mention that these two ways are defined by depictions of sinful men (Prov 1:8–19; 2:12–15; 4:14–19) and the strange woman (Prov 2:16–19; 5:3–6; 6:24–35; 7:6–27). Following the paths of these two dangerous characters results in removal of life (Prov 1:19), darkness (4:19), ruin (5:14), destruction (6:32), and Sheol

¹¹⁷ Coetsee, “Concept of Life,” 123.

(7:27). In contrast, the path of keeping the parental instructions (Prov 6:23, “way of life” [דרך חיים]) brings life (3:2 and 7:2) to the pupil. This conception of life as a decision through the Way metaphor create a discursive context where it recalls Moses’ invitation to choose between life and death (החיים והמות), good and evil (טוב ורע), and blessing and curse (הברכה והקללה) in Deut 30:15, 19.

Second, one reference to the “land” and multiple references to “life” in the *Shema* of Prov 3, 6, and 7 bring the latter into focus especially because the former does not have any substance in the son’s reality. However, given the Deuteronomic presuppositions as addressed in this chapter, it at least suffices to bring the son into the epistemological narrative of Deuteronomy. As the son asks the question, “What am I to do?” the parent uses the Deuteronomic conventions and thoughts as conceptualized in the moral tradition to ground the son’s identity and frame his life decisions in terms of making a decision for life as a member of the community of YHWH in the story of Deuteronomy. In other words, while the land is not explicitly utilized in the parental discourse, the thematic complex of the Way metaphor probed in the next chapter may create a storied epistemological context with the *telos* suited for “life in the land.” This narrative context upon which the Deuteronomic moral tradition is built may not only signify the parental instructions as authoritative and internalization of those instructions as divinely empowered, but also life as the sought-after reward of YHWH’s blessing.

Conclusion

In sum, first, the authoritative voice that stands behind the parental instructions is the DMT, offering the lens through which the Deuteronomic moral standards of excellence may be translated into the goods of wisdom and ethical practices. Second, while the linguistic similarities may not speak conclusively to the existence of this moral tradition, the reformulations of the Deuteronomic themes and concepts in Prov 1–9 points us to a long line of moral thoughts developed through the history of ancient Israel. This moral tradition consists of at least one essential standard of excellence: that is, obeying and internalizing the parental instructions which requires both human participation as well as divine involvement. Third, the text of Prov 1–9 presupposes this moral tradition through a well-recognized thematic complex of the *Shema* and thus opens up the discursive space for the Deuteronomic content, its concepts and ideas, to shape and mould a certain understanding of the parental instructions (e.g., the graphic illustration of seductive woman in Prov 7:6–23). This discursive formation allows for various Deuteronomic constituents of this moral tradition such as Moses' credal statement and primary command (Deut 6:4–5) and internalization of the Torah in the new covenant (Deut 30:6, 14; cf. Jer 31:33) to inform and transform the reading of the parental instructions in Prov 1–9. And they do so by presupposing the Deuteronomic themes and images.

CHAPTER 4: THE WAY METAPHOR AND “LIFE IN THE LAND”

Introduction

In this chapter, we examine the Way imagery which not only constitutes a thematic complex intertwined with various Deuteronomic conventions but also, as per Weeks’ analysis, serves as the backbone of the parental instructions, providing literary unity.¹ In Prov 1–9, the son’s moral life is depicted in terms of a way on a journey which diverges into two opposite pathways. He must choose one over the other, and figuratively speaking, walk in it. The “good” paths collectively point to obedience to the parental instructions and attention to Wisdom speeches whereas the “evil” paths find resonance with the wicked friends and the strange woman. While both pathways look equally promising since those on each pathway speak persuasively to the son, they ultimately lead him to opposite ends, either life or death.

This imagery curiously bears a striking resemblance to that in Deuteronomy where it represents YHWH’s commandments Israelites are called to obey in the promised land. This land, however, is not merely their imminent reality but also a metaphor. The parental instructions in Prov 1–9 employ the Way metaphor with numerous linguistic parallels with the Mosaic Torah including a reference to “the land”

¹ Weeks, *Instructions and Imagery*, 90. The importance of the Way metaphor in Prov 1–9 is well noted by other scholars such as Habel, “The Symbolism”; Van Leeuwen, “Liminality and Worldview”; Perdue, “Liminality”; Millar, “The Path Metaphor”; Zehnder, *Wegmetaphorik*.

(Prov 2:21–22). For this reason, they are often viewed as the “re-enactment” of the Deuteronomic teaching in a familial education setting.¹ In a moral discourse, it is not uncommon for moral choices to be structured in terms of a bipolarity of “good” and “evil.” However, the structural importance of the Way metaphor in Prov 1–9 and the mention of “the land” in Prov 2:21–22 highlight for us their *conceptual* and *epistemological* resonance with Deuteronomy. This resonance on a conceptual level, and not only on a linguistic level may demonstrate their epistemological link through the Deuteronomic moral tradition.

Therefore, in this chapter, my aim is to better understand the conceptual world of Prov 1–9 represented by the Way metaphor which also involves the Deuteronomic narrative context concerning “life in the land.” This narrative context not only provides an epistemological framework for the readers’ understanding of the socio-ethical practices but also enhances their moral imagination to become shaped by it as they learn to discern a right path given the bipolar choices (especially, Deut 30:15–19 and Prov 9:1–18). First, an examination of how the Way metaphor is employed in Deuteronomy is undertaken to facilitate an understanding of the conceptual world of Prov 1–9. Second, a brief survey of the Way metaphor used in post-canonical traditions is conducted to demonstrate its diverse applications and its integration into the thought-world of Jewish traditions. Third, an analysis is made of how the Way metaphor and its connection to the “life in the land” motif presuppose the Deuteronomic narrative context. Lastly, the moral implications of the Way metaphor are considered.

¹ O’Kelly, “Wisdom,” 103.

The “Way” Metaphor and the Conceptual World of Proverbs 1–9

A number of OT studies have identified the “Way” metaphor as a rhetorical device that not only moves the parental discourse forward but also reveals the conceptual world presupposed within Prov 1–9. Habel views this metaphor as a “root metaphor” which is “elaborated, clarified, and intensified in terms of its polar opposite” in various “satellite metaphors.”² Presuming the evolving nature of Proverbs, he asserts that the metaphors in Prov 1–9 embody three levels of perspective or worldview: empirical interpretation, Yahwistic reinterpretation, and cosmological reinterpretation. These enrich this symbol system with “contrast, colour, and depth.”³ According to Habel, these different interpretations stem from bipolarity of the “Way” metaphor as their epistemic basis. In this regard, Perdue makes some useful observations that have implications for the social function of the “Way” metaphor.⁴ He argues that Prov 1–9 characterizes a society in terms of the bipolarity between structure and anti-structure and that this characterization creates a space of liminality for the inexperienced to learn the way a society functions by transmitting social values.⁵

Van Leeuwen does not construe the “Way” metaphor as either the “root metaphors” or “nuclear expression” of Prov 1–9 but only as part of “the systematic coherence with other metaphors” characterized by the polarity of Wisdom/Folly, Good/Pseudo-Good, and Life/Death.⁶ Also, he further advances Perdue’s argument; that this coherent system of metaphors “presupposes an even deeper structure . . . the worldview,

² Habel, “The Symbolism,” 133.

³ Habel, “The Symbolism,” 157.

⁴ Perdue, “Liminality,” 115–16.

⁵ Perdue, “Liminality,” 115–16.

⁶ Van Leeuwen, “Liminality and Worldview,” 111.

model, or map of reality which is held by a culture or social group” in order to “inculcate a particular Yahwistic worldview.”⁷ According to this worldview, the boundaries and limits are set by the bipolar metaphors in Prov 1–9 and are founded on the cosmic order, alluding to the fact that their religio-moral nature takes precedence over their social nature.⁸ This then implies that boundary-keeping and apportioning of nations are considered God’s work (Deut 32:4–8). This depiction of the cosmos legitimizes his proposal that Proverbs texts concerning hereditary estate (Prov 15:25; 22:28; 23:10–11) also “presuppose the historical tradition of the giving of the land,”⁹ which, I would argue, is the moral tradition with a concept of “the promised land” in Prov 1–9 (2:21–22). Thus, for Van Leeuwen, the “Way” metaphor is part of a bipolar metaphorical system that creates “the socio-ethical order.”¹⁰ While his understanding of the metaphorical system representing a worldview is insightful, I do not concur that Wisdom’s presence in creation (8:22–31; 3:19–20) justifies the creation order as the fundamental structure of the entire pericope of Prov 1–9.¹¹

For Fox, the Way metaphor is the “ground metaphor” or “nuclear symbol” into which the parental teachings are integrated and unified.¹² He articulates that the ground metaphor is “an image that organizes other perceptions and images and conveys a way of perceiving the world.”¹³ His understanding of the Way metaphor is similar to that of

⁷ Van Leeuwen, “Liminality and Worldview,” 113–14.

⁸ Van Leeuwen, “Liminality and Worldview,” 116–17.

⁹ Van Leeuwen, “Liminality and Worldview,” 121–22.

¹⁰ Van Leeuwen, “Liminality and Worldview,” 117.

¹¹ As Weeks (*Instruction and Imagery*, 123–25) correctly articulates, the primary function of the personified Wisdom is to form “a counterpart to the foreign woman” and not to discuss the creation order. Cf. Schipper, *Proverbs 1–15*, 318.

¹² Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 128.

¹³ Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 129.

Van Leeuwen as he views it as a way of interpreting the world and life; however, he disagrees that boundaries and limits are included in the conception of the metaphor.¹⁴ Fox observes that the Way metaphor may be organized into two categories of “many paths” and “two paths” where the former describes many potential ways human life can go while the latter signifies the bipolar nature of those many paths. As will be shown in this chapter, Fox is accurate in stating that the Way metaphor schema in Prov 1–9 does not define the ways as two paths as the son’s individual life is pictured as a way which may lead to the destination of either life or death.

Job Y. Jindo attempts to further articulate “the *Weltanschauung* (‘worldview’) of ancient Israel as reflected in the use of language in biblical literature”¹⁵ by describing a covenantal notion of the land present in the conceptual world of the Old Testament. Although he does not specifically delve into the connection between the land and Prov 1–9, his application of cognitive linguistics aids in construing the cosmos (target domain) as the “divine estate” (source domain) in the Hebrew Bible.¹⁶ More specifically, the promised land (target domain) is characterized as YHWH’s estate (source domain) expressed in terms of יָרַשׁ (“to possess” [the land]) in Deut 7:1, נָחַל (“to inherit”) in Deut 19:3, and שָׁלַח (“to evict”) in Lev 18:24, betraying the metaphorical concept of THE PROMISED LAND IS YHWH’S ESTATE.¹⁷ Interestingly, he asserts that this

¹⁴ Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 129n115.

¹⁵ Jindo, “Toward a Poetics,” 222.

¹⁶ Jindo, “Toward a Poetics,” 236. He employs cognitive linguistics since it provides a way to understand “the interaction between language and human cognition” (225). As Jindo explains, a metaphorical concept in cognitive linguistics has “the conceptual domain by which we understand another domain” called a source domain, and “the conceptual domain that is understood by this source domain” called a target domain (226). It is assumed that this conceptual mapping helps us understand the cognitive structure of language users.

¹⁷ Jindo, “Toward a Poetics,” 240.

metaphorical construal is also the key to understanding the parent-child metaphor for the relationship of God and Israel; the people of Israel inherited the promised land (target domain) just as adopted heirs inherit their adoptive parent's estate (source domain). He further elaborates that the hereditary status of an adopted child in ancient Near Eastern culture was conditional upon fulfillment of obligations. Thus, he concludes that this culture of adoption family bears on the way in which YHWH may "consider, or reconsider, the legitimacy of Israel's hereditary status with respect to the Land of Promise."¹⁸ This metaphorical caricature concerning the land in the Old Testament may then form a part of the conceptual world shared between Deuteronomy and Prov 1–9.¹⁹ To clarify, this promised land, once the reality of Israel in Deuteronomy, would no longer represent the mere geographical region of Canaan. Rather, it conceptualizes a good life, or human flourishing, and grounds the identity and perception of the readers in the story of the promised land. We will return to this point as some Deuteronomic presuppositions constitute part of this conceptualization of the "Way" metaphor in Prov 1–9.

What we are beginning to comprehend, then, is that the Way metaphor is not merely a linguistic device but, as Kartje insightfully comments, "forms the structural underpinning of one's perception of the world" in Prov 1–9.²⁰ Furthermore, structuring metaphors "do not simply reflect, but actually help to shape, the manner in which the worldview is perceived by a society's inhabitants . . . [and] to define the fundamental

¹⁸ Jindo, "Toward a Poetics," 243.

¹⁹ Jindo ("Toward a Poetics," 228–29) points out that "images and expressions that seem unrelated on the textual surface level are in fact conceptually interrelated on the deeper level."

²⁰ Kartje, *Wisdom Epistemology*, 27.

values represented in the worldview.”²¹ In the case of Prov 1–9 specifically, Kartje asserts that “the good/wise choice is the one that follows a specific path and does not cross specified boundaries.”²² As I will argue, this worldview that the Way metaphor conveys in Prov 1–9 is neither abstract nor generic; rather it is connected to the metaphorical concept of the promised land as the final destination and the epistemological context of Deuteronomy, both of which are very familiar to the son. Put in this way, then, the objective of Prov 1–9 is two-fold: (1) to engage the son with this structuring metaphor that permeates the social values and worldview of the DMT for liminal learning and (2) to ground his social identity in the bigger story of which he is already part. As MacIntyre argues, those who find their place in the bigger narrative become motivated with a sense of goal and purpose for their life.²³ Therefore, Millar is only half correct that the Way metaphor is not so much “an explanation of ontology, but [] motivation and rhetoric.”²⁴ To be fair, she only deals with aphoristic proverbs containing the Way metaphor in the first sayings collections (10:1—22:16). However, to argue that the Way metaphor in Proverbs is only “a clever rhetorical strategy” vastly lacks recognition of the essential worldview of the Torah, the very element that makes the metaphor persuasive.²⁵

²¹ Kartje, *Wisdom Epistemology*, 41.

²² Kartje, *Wisdom Epistemology*, 41.

²³ MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 256.

²⁴ Millar, “The Path Metaphor,” 97, 107. Millar argues that the Way metaphor maps the source domain of the path onto the target domain of life to describe the latter in terms of the act-consequence connections where acts and consequences are bipolar in nature. While her study is concerned with the Path metaphor in Prov 10–22, it is applicable to that in Prov 1–9. Concerning the didactic power of metaphors, see Brown, “The Didactic Power.”

²⁵ Millar, “The Path Metaphor,” 98–99.

In this regard, lastly, Weeks notices the Deuteronomic qualities of the “Way” metaphor. He contends that it is neither the root metaphor (Habel) nor the ground metaphor (Fox) but a *structuring* metaphor in Prov 1–9 where it “links between the characters, the juxtaposition of their speeches, and the explicit representation in chapter 9 of an antithesis.”²⁶ Therefore, it is central to the understanding of Prov 1–9. What is immensely helpful in his argument is that, by examining the “Way” imagery in Deuteronomy, the Deuteronomic books as well as prophetic books (e.g., Deut 5:32–33; 2 Kgs 22:2; and Isa 30:21), he concludes that this metaphor is strongly associated with the Torah.²⁷ Then, assuming the parental torah’s connection to the Torah in Prov 1–9, the “Way” metaphor may not be merely the parent’s clever invention. Rather, it is drawn from the moral tradition to ground the son’s moral life on the conceptual world of the Torah, especially Deuteronomy. This may include the narrative of his forefathers of Israel who travelled perilous pathways across the wilderness to inherit the promised land from their divine parent. For this reason, Zehnder rightly claims: “Im Alten Testament wird ständig deutlich, dass die Frage nach Recht und Moral, die Frage nach der rechten Lebensführung nicht abgelöst werden kann vom historischen Weg, auf dem sich die Menschen—zumeist das Volk Israel oder seine Vorväter—befinden” (In the Old Testament, it is constantly evident that the question of justice and morality, the question of the right way of life, cannot be detached from the historical path on which the people

²⁶ Weeks, *Instruction and Imagery*, 90; Habel, “The Symbolism,” 133; Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 129. Fox’s understanding of the “Way” metaphor differs from Habel in that whereas Habel believes other metaphors in Prov 1–9 stem from this metaphor, Fox avers that it “organizes other perceptions and images and conveys a way of perceiving the world.”

²⁷ Weeks, *Instruction and Imagery*, 152.

—mostly the Israelites or their forefathers—are situated).²⁸ Once this conceptual story of the past and its worldview are ingrained in the son, it may not only aid him in finding the right path of life but even form his identity around it.²⁹ Our task then is to understand this conceptual world and narrative of Deuteronomy operating underneath the surface of Prov 1–9 text which provides the epistemological context for ethical values and worldview transmitted through the parental instructions.

The Way imagery is not particular to Deuteronomy or even the OT. As a myriad of linguists point out, LIFE IS A PATH is a conceptual metaphor that is fundamental to human cognition that helps to conceptualize and structure our understanding of life.³⁰ However, the “Way” as the source domain often represents something more than just a generic pathway in the OT, especially in Deuteronomy. And it is certainly not because “walking was the primary mode of transportation in ancient Israel.”³¹ In my view, Israel’s historical reality of journey toward the promised land would have made this metaphor very close to their experience. Notably, in Deut 8:2, Moses commands: “You shall remember all the way (כל־הדרך) which YHWH your God has led (הלך) you in the wilderness these forty years.” Here “all the way” primarily refers to the physical path on which YHWH led Israel in the wilderness, and yet, it was also on this path where they learned to keep YHWH’s commandments.³² Therefore, Arnold rightly claims about this

²⁸ Zehnder, *Wegmetaphorik*, 488.

²⁹ In this regard, Lakoff and Johnson (*Metaphor We Live By*, 214) states that “To study metaphor is to be confronted with hidden aspects of one’s own mind and one’s own culture . . . To do so is to discover that one has a worldview, that one’s imagination is constrained, and that metaphor plays an enormous role in shaping one’s everyday understanding of everyday events.”

³⁰ Lakoff, *More than Cool Reason*, 60–61; Millar, “The Path Metaphor,” 99; Basson, “The Path Image,” 19–29.

³¹ Basson, “The Path Image,” 20.

³² Also, this phrase seems to reverberate “every commandment” (כל־המצוה) in 8:1, implicitly relating the two phrases.

verse that “. . . the route through the desert that Israel has travelled . . . subtly also implies a life direction, a ‘path’ as in English, perhaps calling Israel to learn from their desert experiences those lessons needed for a proper life direction.”³³ Since the forty-year journey was centred on learning to obey YHWH’s commandments, it would have been effortless for Israel to identify the Way metaphor with obedience to the Torah and their journey in the wilderness and then to incorporate it into their vernacular. Thus, Moses’ instructions and warnings in Deuteronomy concerning their imminent life in the promised land often draw on this metaphor. And it would not be surprising that this conceptualization of moral life would be reflected in the moral tradition through various Deuteronomic expressions which we now witness in Prov 1–9. Through this metaphorical structuring of moral thoughts, the significance of the Way metaphor, and indeed of the conceptual story of the land, continues into subsequent generations although the story itself might have become no more than a fragment of their cultural memory (Prov 2:21–22).

The “Way” Metaphor in Deuteronomy

With this in mind, we first look at how the Way metaphor is employed and what ideas, images, and expressions are associated with it in Deuteronomy and other parts of the Old Testament to comprehend the schema of this metaphor. This will in turn help us better understand how this underlying imagery is presupposed within Prov 1–9 to provide an epistemological context to the parental torah. In Deuteronomy, the only Hebrew term

³³ Arnold, *Deuteronomy 1–11*, 481.

that explicitly refers to “way(s)” is דרך. This term is employed largely in two different senses: geographical and metaphorical.

Geographical Pathway

There is a cluster of the term דרך used in the first two chapters to describe mostly either the current location from which Moses addresses Israel (Deut 1:2) or pathways of their forty-year journey which he reiterates (Deut 1:19, 22, 31, 33, 40; 2:1, 8, 27; 3:1). We also observe דרך mentioned in the stipulations of the law associated with either historical events during their journey to the land of Canaan (Deut 23:4; 24:9; 25:17) or various geographical locations and pathways toward and from the land of Canaan (Deut 11:30; 14:24; 17:16; 19:3, 6). At times the term is employed in its generic sense without geographical notions (Deut 6:7; 11:19; 22:4, 6; 27:18; 28:7, 25, 68). The geographical use of דרך not only signifies the forty-year journey toward the promised land but also reflects the historical reality of ancient Israel in Deuteronomy. Furthermore, there are several places in Deuteronomy where the geographical and metaphorical senses of דרך coalesce. As mentioned above, in Deut 8:2, Israel is called to remember “all the way” (כל־הדרך) that YHWH led them which may refer to both their journey in the wilderness as well as YHWH’s commandments. This ambivalence may not be intentional, yet it reveals just how closely the “Way” metaphor could be identified with its geographical sense due to their historical context.³⁴ Similarly, דרך in Deut 17:16 and 28:68 mainly refers to the physical pathway back to Egypt which YHWH forbids, but its combination

³⁴ Robson, *The Handbook*, 261. Cf. Brown, “The Didactic Power,” 135.

with “Egypt” would also signify Israel’s disobedience, even betrayal, to YHWH’s commandment.

The Metaphorical Use of the “Way(s)”

Weeks argues that in Deuteronomy and other parts of the Old Testament, the “Way” (דרך) metaphor is often employed as an idiom that connotes “human behaviour,” “a person’s circumstances,” or “pattern of behaviour . . . [that] characterize whole groups” (e.g., 2 Kgs 22:2).³⁵ Particularly, in Deuteronomy, this metaphor distinctly conceptualizes one’s obedience to the commandments of YHWH (מצות יהוה) and moral life of Israel as a way.³⁶ Alison Gray argues that the Way imagery forms the “underlying metaphorical model” that creates metaphor clusters in Deut 4, evoking a visual image of pathway for YHWH’s commandments and contributing to the understanding of them.³⁷ Here the moral life characterized by obedience to YHWH’s commandments is the target domain while the Way imagery within its historical context is the source domain, giving the image schema of OBEDIENCE TO THE TORAH IS A WAY.³⁸

³⁵ Weeks, *Instruction and Imagery*, 150.

³⁶ Weinfeld (*Deuteronomistic School*, 333) lists “to walk in the way/ways of Yahweh” as a Deuteronomistic phrase that finds its usage in other Deuteronomistic books (Judg 2:22; 1 Kgs 2:3; 3:14; 11:33, 38).

³⁷ Gray, “Metaphor Clusters,” 35. Jeal (“Blending Rhetorical Arts,” 57–58), a New Testament scholar, rightly critiques modern interpreters for their sole focus on analysis of words and disregard for “the images evoked in the mind.”

³⁸ Seufert (“A Walk,” 151) recently has argued that the Way metaphor conceptualizes Israel’s covenant relationship with YHWH as journey not only in Deuteronomy but throughout the Deuteronomistic history (Judg 2:12; 8:27; Josh 1:7; 24:20; 23:13; 1 Kgs 2:3; 8:33; 11:33; 15:34; 22:43; 2 Kgs 17:21; 21:9). While I view obedience to the Torah as the target domain of the metaphor, it certainly assumes the covenant relationship with YHWH. Yet, the latter is not the target domain at least in Deuteronomy. For instance, in Deut 8:6 Moses commands: “You shall keep the commandments of YHWH your God, to walk in his ways and to fear him.” Here it is clear that “walking in his ways” refers to obeying his commandments in its immediate context. Nevertheless, this study astutely highlights that the path of obedience ultimately signifies Israel’s relational reality with YHWH, and this metaphorical expression had a lasting impact on the life of ancient Israel.

How then are features of the source domain mapped onto those of the target domain? Basson, Gray, and Zehnder provide similar lists of corresponding features they have identified in their investigations of the “Way” metaphor in Ps 25, Deut 4, and Old Testament ethics, respectively.³⁹ I modify and adopt their insights to further understand the Way metaphor in Deuteronomy and Prov 1–9. First, in Deuteronomy, the travellers who walk the way are Israelites. Second, there is a guide/master of the way whom they follow. Third, the way itself represents the Torah or YHWH’s commandments while walking in that path signifies a person’s ethical behaviour in obedience to YHWH’s commandments. Fourth, turning aside from the way implies that there are bifurcated crossroads in the way which call for moral choices the Israelites have to make between good and evil. The other ways include idols, spiritual apostasy, and insubordination/corruption. These paths not only stand in opposition to the way of obedience to the Torah but also present challenges and threats of destruction on the journey. Lastly, each of the bifurcated paths has its own goal and consequence. The destination of the “way” is the blessed life in the promised land whereas that of the other ways is curse, destruction/annihilation, and death.⁴⁰

Source Domain	Target Domain	Verses in Deuteronomy
Traveller	Israelites	The addressees of the Way metaphor are the Israelites throughout Deuteronomy.
Guide/Master	YHWH, other gods, false prophets and dreamers, levitical priest and judge	7:4 (YHWH); 11:28 (other gods); 13:5 (false prophets and dreamers) 17:9–13 (levitical priest and judge)

³⁹ Basson, “The Path Image,” 23–24; Zehnder, *Wegmetaphorik*, 485; Gray, “Metaphor Clusters,” 31–46.

⁴⁰ Zehnder (*Wegmetaphorik*, 500) argues that the Way metaphor in the OT has the concept of purpose which often cannot be differentiated from that of consequence.

Source Domain	Target Domain	Verses in Deuteronomy
The Way	<u>Plural</u> : The commandments of YHWH/ The Torah – “to walk in his ways” (ללכת בדרכיו) – “to walk in all his ways” (ללכת בכל־דרכיו)	8:6; 10:12; 11:22; 19:9; 26:17; 28:9.
	<u>Singular</u> : The commandments of YHWH/ The Torah (against the other way) – “all the way” YHWH commanded (כל־הדרך) – “the way which I command you” (דרך אשר אנכי מצוה) – “turn aside from the way” (סרתם מהר מן־הדרך) – “following” (אחר) YHWH	5:33; 9:12; 9:16; 11:28; 13:5; 31:29 * 30:16 is an exception.
The Other Way(s)	<u>Idols</u> – “turn your sons away” (יסיר את־בנך) – “following other gods” (לכת אחרי אלהים) – “to the right or to the left” (ימין ושמאל) – “turn from” (פנה) any of the words which I command you – “drawn away” (נדה) and worship other gods.	7:4; 9:12; 9:16; 11:28; 28:14; 30:17
	<u>Spiritual apostasy</u> – “to seduce you from the way” (להדיחך מן־הדרך)	13:5
	<u>Insubordination, corruption</u> – “turn aside from the word” (תסור מן־הדבר) – “act corruptly and turn from the way” (השחת תשחתון וסרתם מן־הדרך)	17:11–12; 31:29
Walking	Engaging in ethical behaviour	5:33; 8:6; 10:12; 11:22; 26:17; 28:9; 30:16
Following	Obedying	7:4; 11:28
Turning (to the right or to the left)	Disobedience	5:32; 7:4; 9:12; 9:16; 11:28; 17:11; 17:20 (from the commandment); 28:14 (the words I command you); 30:17; 31:29; 13:5 (seduce)
Destination	Blessing, prolonged/abundant life in the land, possession of the land	5:33; 8:6–10; 11:23, 27; 17:20; 19:9; 30:16

Source Domain	Target Domain	Verses in Deuteronomy
	Curse, destruction/annihilation, death	7:4; 9:14; 11:28; 17:12; 30:17–18

Table 3. The Way Metaphor Schema in Deuteronomy

The Way metaphor schema in Deuteronomy appears to be employed for different purposes in the singular and the plural. It is consistently used in the plural form (i.e., “ways”) in Deut 8:6; 10:12; 11:22; 19:9; 26:17; and 28:9 to refer to the commandments of YHWH (מצות יהוה) without reference to the opposite way. This metaphor in the plural may depict many ways in which YHWH’s commandments can be kept in one’s life. Another function of this metaphor in Deuteronomy is to contrast this way and its outcome with those of disobedience. Interestingly, whenever contrasted with the way of disobedience, דרך always appears in the singular form except in Deut 30:16. In the singular usage (i.e., “way”) in Deut 5:33; 9:12, 16; 11:28; 13:5; and 31:29, דרך, perhaps as a collective whole, is contrasted with the opposite way signified by the verb “to turn” (סור, i.e., “turn from the way”). Therefore, the singular “way” signifies obedience to YHWH against the other ways that diverge from the straight path. It should be noted here that the text of Deuteronomy does not explicitly name the opposite ways; it is only implied with words indicative of deviation from the way of obedience.

In the Way imagery schema, one may “walk” (הלך) on the path (5:33; 8:6; 10:12; 11:22; 26:17; 28:9; 30:16) where motion along the way signifies practicing/living out the

commandments of YHWH as one's moral norm.⁴¹ Thus, "to walk in his ways" (ללכת) (בדרכיו) is often paralleled with "to keep the commandments of YHWH" (26:17; 28:9; 30:16) or is expressed as a means of the latter (8:6; 19:9; 11:22).⁴² It should be noted that every occurrence of the plural form of דרך in Deuteronomy used in this metaphorical sense appears with the verb הלך without reference to the opposite ways. With the addition of "all" to "his ways" (כל-דרכיו) in Deut 10:12 and 11:12, this walking of the way intensifies the call for one's full commitment to YHWH.

There is a guide/master to "follow" (אחר) in this path, YHWH (7:4), but there are also other gods (11:28) and false prophets and dreamers (13:5) who sidetrack the people. Van Hecke argues that in the OT, הלך אחר ("walking after YHWH") portrays the one being followed as the guide, goal, superior, guard, protection, and forerunner, signifying the relation between humans and God as well as humans and idols.⁴³ He also points out that this particular metaphorical expression with אחר is "only used as polemic directed against the illicit walking after other gods" in the OT.⁴⁴ In this regard, another possible motion on this path is "to turn away" (סור) from the straight way prescribed by YHWH through Moses which is almost always singular and is often combined with "to the right

⁴¹ In this regard, Deut 6:7 may be noted. Here another metaphor involving the term "way" (דרך, s.) is utilized though its usage deviates from the rest. Combined with the verb שָׁנָן ("repeatedly recite"), the routine movements of "talking" (דבר), "sitting" (ישב), "walking" (הלך), "lying down" (שכב), "rising up" (קום) idiomatically underscores the importance of teaching "always and everywhere" (Nelson, *Deuteronomy*, 92; Arnold, *Deuteronomy 1–11*, 395–98). However, in Prov 6:22, this idiomatic phrase becomes signified as an expression of the Way metaphor.

⁴² It is also expressed as a means of fearing YHWH in Deut 10:12.

⁴³ Van Hecke, "Are People Walking," 44–47. Also, Gray ("Metaphor Clusters," 39) infers from Lundbom (*Deuteronomy*, 237) that "walk" (הלך) and "hold fast" (דבק) are parallel expressions of אחר with "their underlying conceptual image being one of following closely behind someone." However, she includes other gods neither as part of this image nor as the object of these verbs.

⁴⁴ Van Hecke, "Are People Walking," 71.

or the left” (ימין ושמאל) in 5:32; 7:4; 9:12,16; 11:28; 17:11; 30:17; and 31:29.⁴⁵ This veering off from the straight way signifies disobedience to the Torah and by implication creates a bipolarity between the path of obedience and that of disobedience. In 17:20 and 28:14, סור is used among other verses to directly address disobedience to YHWH’s commandment and words of Moses, respectively, without reference to דרך, demonstrating how integrated the Way metaphor is into the language concerning the Torah in Deuteronomy. Here the metaphorical “way” and the Torah are used almost synonymously. Furthermore, the people of Israel not only turn aside from YHWH’s ways voluntarily, but they may also be seduced (נדה) by a prophet (נביא) or dreamer (חלם), the false guides, away from the way YHWH commands them to walk (13:5).

In contrast, in Deut 17:8–13, the levitical priests (הכהנים הלויים) and the judge (השפט) are set as the guides instituted by YHWH for difficult legal cases, and the Israelites are not to turn aside (סור) from their “verdict in the judgments” (דבר המשפט) which carries the same weight as YHWH’s commandments (v. 12). Thus, the standards by which the decisions are made are their spoken words; פי (“mouth”) seems to be used here to signify its interpretive and verbal qualities.⁴⁶ Since their decisions are based on the Torah of YHWH, insubordination to their legal decisions is considered an offence as

⁴⁵ The exact expression, “to the right or the left,” is also used in Deut 2:27 to describe Israel’s possible usage of the passage way in the land of Sihon, king of Heshbon. Here Moses makes a plea and a promise that Israel would only use the pathway without turning to the left nor to the right. Brown (“The Didactic Power,” 135) infers from the study by Lakoff and Johnson that for any metaphor to work, it cannot be too enigmatic or too banal. The “living metaphor” is grounded on shared knowledge and experience and yet creates new references. In this way the Way metaphor builds on the historical reality through the pathways toward the promised land to portray the Torah as the way (Deuteronomy) or else individual lifestyle or good/evil in the world as ways (Prov 1–9).

⁴⁶ Nelson (*Deuteronomy*, 222) argues that “the mouth (פי) of the Torah” refers to “the priestly answer based on priestly lore or oracle” while “the judgment” (המשפט) is “the decision of a judge based on precedent or accepted legal standards.” However, McConville (*Deuteronomy*, 292) cogently contends that even if the priestly teaching and the judgments here are independent of the Torah, their authority would still rest on it.

serious as disobedience to the Torah worthy of capital punishment (v. 12).⁴⁷ The presumptuous negligence of the oral instructions instituted by YHWH metaphorically creates an alternative pathway that leads to death in reality. In a metaphorical sense, the parents as moral guides in Prov 1–9 resemble these legal officials since the parental instructions are not only presented with their interpretive and verbal qualities but negligence of their words results in destruction.

The Way metaphor schema in Deuteronomy thus necessarily includes the other way(s) that diverge(s) from the straight path, posing threats of sidetracking for those wishing to stay on course and leading them to the ways that are opposite to the straight one. Here idolatry appears in 7:4; 9:12, 16; 11:28; 28:14; and 30:17 as the prominent challenge that is consistently accompanied by “to turn aside” (סר) to characterize the other ways opposite to the straight way of YHWH. As Seufert highlights, this movement away from the way of YHWH construes “a lack of intimacy and danger to the relationship.”⁴⁸ In particular, Deut 9:12, 16 recount the golden calf incident in Exod 32 archetypically showing from Israel's own experience what these opposite ways look like and what repercussions are expected down this path—death. Three other challenges that characterize deviation from the way are spiritual apostasy (7:4; 13:5), insubordination (17:11), and corruption (31:29). Particularly relevant to the temptation in Prov 1–9 is Deut 7:4 where Moses warns the people of making a covenant or intermarrying with

⁴⁷ While Braulik (“Die Ausdrücke,” 36n115) contends that the Torah here refers to legal directives and not the Mosaic teaching, Christensen (*Deuteronomy 1:1—21:9*, 375–76) argues that the legal decisions by the Levitical priests and the judges carried the same weight as the Mosaic Torah.

⁴⁸ Seufert, “A Walk,” 165–66. He also observes that עבר (“to pass beyond”), עזב (“to abandon”), ררף (“pursue”) and נדה (“drive away”) among others also utilize the Way metaphor schema to signify the covenant relationship with YHWH, or as this study suggests, obedience to the Torah. The purpose of this study is not to be exhaustive in enumerating all instances of this metaphor. It is sufficient to see that throughout Deuteronomy, this metaphor is employed to depict life of obedience to YHWH's Torah.

foreigners as they would “turn your sons away (סור) from following (אחר) [YHWH].”

Although דרך is not directly mentioned here, again the metaphorical language סור clearly assumes the metaphorical construal of disobedience.

That said, finally, this image schema describes two opposite destinations resulting from the bifurcated pathway. The way of obedience has the final destination of blessing (30:16), prolonged/abundant life in the promised land (5:33; 8:6–10; 11:23; 17:20; 19:9; 30:16) and possession of the land (11:27) whereas the opposite way of disobedience ends in curses (11:28), destruction/annihilation (7:4; 9:14; 30:17–18), and death (17:12; 30:17–18). In particular, the promised land is described in terms of the consequence of obedience to YHWH’s commandments directly rather than metaphorically. Yet, due to the wealth of the metaphorical language (i.e., “walking,” “following,” “turning aside,” and “to the right or to the left”) surrounding obedience to the Torah, it seems likely that the promised land is also integrated into the Way image schema as presented in the moral tradition. If this is the case, then it would not be surprising that the promised land is presupposed in Prov 2:21–22 conceptualizing a destination of one’s moral life metaphorically.

This bipolar projection of the Way imagery is found in Deut 11:26–32 and 30:15–20 both of which are widely accepted as two climactic moments in the book.⁴⁹ In these passages, the emphasis is on the moral choice between two ways of living in the

⁴⁹ Concerning Deut 11:26–32, Arnold (*Deuteronomy 1–11*, 600–601) argues that these verses are “a culminating finish” that not only summarizes the homiletical exhortations of Deut 5–11 but also concretizes “many consequences of obedience or disobedience . . . into a singular reality linked with the covenant.” Lundbom (*Deuteronomy*, 410–11) notes that this climactic conclusion of Deut 5–11 with a lexical parallel between 5:1 and 11:32 is marked by the two distinct options which are fully enumerated in Chapter 28. He also observes these two ways in Deut 30:15–20, arguing for its continued life in later traditions as found in 4Q473 (824).

promised land that are available to Israel. As their physical journey ends, another journey of “life in the land” begins. In this regard, Seufert also comments concerning the Way metaphor in Deuteronomy: “the exodus journey consistently recurs in Deuteronomy and lends a level of significance to the COVENANT RELATIONSHIP AS JOURNEY construal otherwise missing in the other language.”⁵⁰ For this reason, Moses pleads with them to choose commitment to the covenant with YHWH as he lays out two opposite destinations of the covenantal blessing and cursing. Both passages are formed with a cluster of metaphorical elements belonging to the Way imagery that essentially describe the content of the covenant in terms of a bifurcated path that leads to two opposite ends. The way of obedience to YHWH’s commandments leads to “a blessing” (ברכה) in 11:26, and “life” (החיים) and “the good” (הטוב) in 30:15, but the way of disobedience ends in “a curse” (קללה) in 11:28, and “death” (המות) and “the evil” (הרע) in 30:15. Thus, in these covenant-pledging moments, the Way metaphor rhetorically structures Moses’ call to choose the way of obedience over and against the way of disobedience. Interestingly, this metaphorical image of the bifurcated ways is also mapped onto physical places in the land of Canaan (11:29), namely Mount Gerizim and Mount Ebal, where a whole list of blessings (28:1–14) and curse (28:15–68),

⁵⁰ Seufert, “A Walk,” 169.

respectively, are declared.⁵¹ This may further demonstrate the likelihood that the Way imagery in Deuteronomy includes a schematic mapping that involves the promised land. Therefore, human flourishing expressed in the term, “life” (target domain), is imagined as life in the promised land (source domain) in Prov 1–9.

In short, I argue that this metaphor with its related expressions had continued to be prominent in the DMT. The Way metaphor in Deuteronomy has its distinctive notion of the promised land which consists of both historical and metaphorical senses. In addition, as McConville points out, this notion includes actual specified land, yet land and its possession also stand for the covenant relationship between Yahweh and Israel in all its dimensions.”⁵² Thus, he concludes that the journey metaphor has “important implications for the religion and ethics advocated by the book.”⁵³ The Way metaphor in Prov 1–9 seems to be the ethical outworking of this historical narrative. Yet, we need to look “beneath the surface of the text” to understand precisely how the metaphorical concept of the promised land functions within Prov 1–9. As McConville argues, Prov 1–9 has its own “[symbol-system] within which events, discourses, and persons are found to make sense.”⁵⁴

⁵¹ There is a general consensus in OT scholarship that this bifurcation of blessing and curse in Deuteronomy is part of the covenantal form shared among a number of other ancient Near Eastern Suzerain-Vassal treaties where a vassal pledges to be loyal to the Suzerain state and obey all the terms of their treaty agreement. Kitchen and Lawrence (*Treaty, Law and Covenant*, 1:898) whose extensive study on the treaties, laws, and covenants in a number of ancient Near Eastern inscriptions conclude that the whole book of Deuteronomy structurally comprises the essential components of the ancient Near Eastern treaties as follows: (1) Title (1:1–5), (2) Historical prologue (1:6–3:29), (3) Stipulations (4–26), (4) Solemn ceremony (27), (5) Blessings (28:1–14), (6) Curses (28:15–68), (7) Recapitulation and oath (29:1–31:8), (8) Deposit and reading (31:9–13; cf. vv. 24–26), (9) Witnesses (31:14–30), (10) Song as witness (32:1–43), and (11) Colophon (32:44–47).

⁵² McConville, “Metaphor, Symbol and the Interpretation,” 337.

⁵³ McConville, “Metaphor, Symbol and the Interpretation,” 341.

⁵⁴ McConville, “Metaphor, Symbol and the Interpretation,” 342.

The Two Ways Metaphor in Post-Biblical Literature

The Way metaphor is also often employed in the post-biblical literature to describe and discern the good and the evil “ways” in life. Their use of the metaphor does not seem to stem merely from a cognitive structure of the human mind but more so from their particular relation to the Torah. In his *magnum opus*, Fishbane seeks to understand inner-biblical developments in various texts of the Hebrew Bible which he attributes to exegetical processes of various hermeneutical traditions.⁵⁵ For his analysis, he utilizes four interpretive traditions, the scribal, the legal, the aggadic, and the mantological, all of which can still be found in early post-biblical Judaism.⁵⁶ Fishbane justifies the use of post-biblical categories for the study of the Hebrew Bible texts by arguing that “the origins of the Jewish exegetical tradition are native and ancient, that they developed diversely in ancient Israel, in many centres and at many times . . .”⁵⁷ In other words, such interpretive traditions (*traditio*) were forged and shaped through the interpretive developments of the received texts (*traditum*) during the pre-canonical era. Similarly, although the post-canonical use of the Way metaphor cannot “prove” that the Way metaphor in Deuteronomy and Prov 1–9 constitutes a moral tradition in the pre-canonical period, it can certainly aid in approaching this metaphor in terms of a moral tradition and broadening our understanding of this metaphor.

The Way metaphor found in Jewish/Christian literature of Second Temple period functions as a metaphorical framework for ethical discourse. However, the metaphor is

⁵⁵ Fishbane, *Biblical Interpretation*.

⁵⁶ Fishbane, *Biblical Interpretation*, 17.

⁵⁷ Fishbane, *Biblical Interpretation*, 19.

typically called the Two Ways metaphor since it only appears in bipolarity. This imagery has often been utilized by scholars as a linchpin for investigations concerning the historical relationships among the Second Temple writings.⁵⁸ In these studies, two Christian writings, Barnabas and the Didache, are frequently mentioned. They utilize the Two Ways form to speak of good/evil and life/death (*Didache* 1–6) and with the added notions of the dualistic realms of two spirits and light/darkness clothed with an apocalyptic tone (*Barnabas* 18–21).⁵⁹ Examining this Qumran document and other similar Second Temple Jewish documents (including The Doctrina Apostolorum, the Apostolic Church Order, the Mandates of the Shepherd of Hermas, and Life of Shenuti) containing the Two Ways form, Audet and subsequently Kraft and Nickelsburg among others reached the same conclusion that *Barnabas* and the *Didache* drew the Two Ways form indirectly from the common Jewish source.⁶⁰

Baltzer identifies three common elements of the Two Ways metaphor in the Second Temple documents: (1) the dualism of the two spirits designated for the two paths, (2) divine reward and punishment, and (3) the end-time. According to Nickelsburg, this Two Ways literary form embedded in the Christian writings such as Barnabas, the Didache, and the Shepherd of Hermas displays an apocalyptic worldview expressed in the spiritual dualism and eschatology in relation to divine recompense, both of which are either absent or unclear in Deuteronomy or Prov 1–9.⁶¹ Nonetheless, this

⁵⁸ E.g., van de Sandt and Flusser, *The Didache*; and Dimant, “The Two-Ways Notion”; Nickelsburg, “The Two-Ways Tradition.”

⁵⁹ Kraft, “The ‘Two-Ways Tradition(s)’ in Retrospect,” 140–41.

⁶⁰ Audet, “Affinités littéraires”; Kraft, *Barnabas and the Didache*, 8; Nickelsburg, “The Two Ways Tradition”; cf. van de Sandt and Flusser, *The Didache*, 59–70. See also Schlecht, *Die Apostellehre*.

⁶¹ Nickelsburg, “The Two-Ways Tradition,” 103.

Two Ways metaphor is considered a “tradition” in scholarship. It is often acknowledged that this concept is related to the Deuteronomic tradition evident in Deut 30:15, and also subsequently, Jer 21:8 and Sir 15:17 where Moses, Jeremiah, and the scribe, respectively, summon the practitioner in a similar way to obey God’s commandment and live.⁶²

This bipolar depiction of this metaphor is also an element of the Way metaphor observed in Prov 1–9 although the latter lacks an eschatological aspect as seen in the post-canonical use.⁶³

Also, these Second Temple documents show that this metaphor is not an invention of a biblical writer that was later referred to by subsequent tradents. Rather, it is better seen as a stock image that constituted the ancient Israel’s bipolar characterization of life for the people of YHWH which was later transformed and adapted into moral discourses as found in the Second Temple literature as well as Prov 1–9.

The Way Metaphor in Proverbs 1–9

General Analysis

There are four Hebrew words utilized to express the Way imagery in Prov 1–9: דרך (“way,” Prov 1:15, 31 [plural]; 2:8, 12, 13, 20; 3:6, 17, 23, 31; 4:11, 14, 19, 26; 5:8, 21; 6:6, 23; 7:8, 19, 25, 27; 8:2, 13, 22, 32; 9:6, 15), נתיבה (“path,” 1:15; 3:17; 7:25; 8:2, 20),

⁶² Suggs, “The Christian Two Ways Tradition”; Nickelsburg, “The Two-Ways Tradition”; Kraft, *Barnabas and the Didache*; “The ‘Two-Ways Tradition(s)’ in Retrospect”; van de Sand and Flusser, *The Didache*, 140–90.

⁶³ Schipper (*Hermeneutics*, 308) views Prov 2 as influenced by late prophetic eschatology ending with reference to “the land.” However, as I argue below, this reference may be looking back on Israel’s journey to the promised land to reimagine the present rather than looking forward to the eschatological future for pedagogical motivation.

אֶרֶץ (“pathway,” 1:19; 2:8, 13, 15, 19, 20; 3:6; 4:14, 18; 5:6; 8:20; 9:15), מַעֲגַל (“track,” 2:9, 15, 18; 4:11, 26; 5:6, 21). Compared to the Way metaphor in Deuteronomy, there are three more terms that represent the way in the metaphor which may be translated variously as “way,” “path(way),” and “track.” While these Hebrew terms may have some subtle differences in nuance, they often appear in pairs without a particular pattern or special usage indicative of semantic significance as it is the case with the plural and singular in Deuteronomy. There are several characteristics of the Way metaphor in Prov 1–9 that are notably similar or dissimilar to Deuteronomy. First, the way hardly indicates an individual life in Deuteronomy, but in Prov 1–9 it frequently refers to one’s life path which is neither definitively good or evil but has the potential to be either of the two ways. In this regard, Weeks comments concerning the Way metaphor in Prov 1–9 that “the uneducated have to be seen as essentially random; they may be travelling the right way or the wrong way, straight or crooked, but their direction is not fixed.”⁶⁴ This is understandable if we consider the context of Prov 1–9 where the primary focus is on individual and ethical considerations, in contrast to the national and covenantal emphasis in Deuteronomy—though these aspects are not mutually exclusive.⁶⁵

Second, when the way does not signify the moral life of an individual, it usually appears in a construct chain modified by various moral qualities or certain figures characterized by them (e.g., “the paths of the righteous” [אַרְחוֹת צְדִיקִים] in Prov 2:20, and “the way of evil” [דֶּרֶךְ רָעָה] in Prov 2:12). At least on the surface, this seems different from the Way metaphor in Deuteronomy where it singularly refers to obedience to

⁶⁴ Weeks, *Instruction and Imagery*, 83.

⁶⁵ Longman, *The Fear of the Lord*, 172–74.

YHWH's commandments with the other deviated paths only implied in the text.⁶⁶ Weeks claims that in Prov 1–9 “it is hard to isolate just two paths, let alone any ‘polar contrast’ between them.”⁶⁷ He asserts that there is only one right way set by instruction and the son is to continue on that way without deviation.⁶⁸ However, this one path cannot be deemed as truly singular if, as posited by his argument, the ways are depicted as plural in Prov 1–9. It appears that he makes this argument to illustrate the similarity between the Way imagery in Prov 1–9 and that found in the broader OT context, especially the Deuteronom(ist)ic books, where the Way metaphor predominantly signifies “a single path approved by YHWH.”⁶⁹ I argue that the Way imagery in both Deuteronomy and Prov 1–9 is featured as both one exclusive way and bipolar ways with two opposite destinations. The plurality of the ways in Prov 1–9 does not negate their bifurcated nature since their modifiers can be classified as either good (instructed by the parent) or evil (prohibited by the parent). This indicates the moral duality inherent in these paths, a concept similarly implied in Deuteronomy.

Third, Zehnder rightly argues that the Way metaphor in the Old Testament is employed broadly in “history” (i.e., Deuteronomy) to represent “course/trajectory of life” (*Ergehen/Lebensweg*) and in “ethics” (i.e., Prov 1–9) to stand for “behaviour/lifestyle” (*Verhalten/Lebenswandel*).⁷⁰ The former metaphor arises from the Israelite historical narrative of “wandering existence” whereas the latter from the basic property

⁶⁶ Weeks, *Instruction and Imagery*, 152–53.

⁶⁷ Weeks, *Instruction and Imagery*, 75.

⁶⁸ Weeks, *Instruction and Imagery*, 76.

⁶⁹ Weeks, *Instruction and Imagery*, 150.

⁷⁰ Zehnder, *Wegmetaphorik*, 473.

of repeated actions/behaviours forming a lifestyle.⁷¹ Yet, the Way metaphor for ethics is not merely forged from a generic experience of life alone. These two categories cannot be systematically isolated from one another due to what he refers to as “Unschärfe” (blurriness) that epistemologically brings the experience of the external journey through the desert into the realm of the moral-religious inner life. This literary phenomenon is exemplified in Deut 8:2–6 where the way through the desert is also described in terms of a way into the hearts of the people of God. While grammatically the subject is the second person plural (“you”), a concern for individual faithfulness and spiritual maturity is clearly in view.⁷² Therefore, my argument is that the Way metaphor along with various Deuteronomic expressions creates various pre-texts for the DMT in Prov 1–9 which in turn transform how the metaphor is read in its context. From these three vantage points, we now take a closer look at the image schema of the Way metaphor in Prov 1–9 to observe how it functions in the given context.

The Way Metaphor Schema in Proverbs 1–9

Based on Zehnder’s insight, the Way metaphor schema in Prov 1–9 may be articulated as: A LIFESTYLE IS A WAY.⁷³ The term, “lifestyle,” best characterizes the metaphor, but the main concern of the parents in describing these lifestyles is to form and shape the son’s character as will be discussed in the next chapter. Also, as Weeks insightfully points out, the literary characters (e.g., the strange woman) juxtaposed to the Way

⁷¹ Zehnder, *Wegmetaphorik*, 474. For the latter, I would add that repeated actions/behaviours do not only form one’s lifestyle but also the person’s character.

⁷² McConville, *Deuteronomy*, 169; Craigie, *Deuteronomy*, 186.

⁷³ Waltke (*Proverbs 1–15*, 194) helpfully notes that the English word, “lifestyle,” does not cover one critical notion of “way” which is “the consequences of that conduct.”

metaphor serve as instructive tools for the son, and the reader, for discerning what is good from what is evil.⁷⁴

The table below shows what lexical elements are involved in the Way image schema of Prov 1–9 compared to Deuteronomy. This is to help us observe how they presuppose the Torah through the Deuteronomic expressions of the DMT. At this point, it is important to note that while each metaphorical aspect is scrutinized for its presupposition of the Torah, no one feature alone can bring the metaphor in Prov 1–9 to produce a Deuteronomic pre-text. In order for a discursive formation to take place, it will require nothing less than the whole thematic complex of the Way metaphor with its lexemes and their conceptualization. Once a schematic link is established between Deuteronomy and Prov 1–9, only then can each metaphorical feature be seen as presupposing a Deuteronomic pre-text as I hope to demonstrate below. For the purpose of this study and lack of space, I will focus on three aspects of the Way metaphor, “Traveller,” “The Ways/Other Ways,” and “Destinations.” In my view, they can help us best in understanding how the Deuteronomic Torah and the conceptual narrative concerning “life in the land” are presupposed in Prov 1–9.

Source Domain	Target Domain (Deuteronomy)	Target Domain (Prov 1–9)	Verses in Proverbs 1–9
Traveller	Israelites	the son	
Guide/Guard/Master	YHWH, other gods, false prophets and dreamers, levitical priest and judge	The parents (and their commandment and reproofs), Wisdom, the strange woman	2:7–8, 11; 3:6b; 3:17, 31; 4:11, 14; 5:8, 21; 6:6, 23; 7:25; 8:2, 20, 22, 32; 9:6, 15
Lamp/light	-	Guidance	6:23

⁷⁴ Weeks, *Instruction and Imagery*, 81.

Source Domain	Target Domain (Deuteronomy)	Target Domain (Prov 1–9)	Verses in Proverbs 1–9
The Way	-	An individual life	1:31; 3:6; 23; 4:26; 5:8, 21; 6:22; 8:2, 22; 9:15
	<p>The commandments of YHWH/ The Torah (against the other way)</p> <p>– “to walk in his ways” (ללכת בדרכיו)</p> <p>– “to walk in all his ways” (ללכת בכל־דרכיו)</p> <p>– “all the way” YHWH commanded (כל־הדרך)</p> <p>– “the way which I command you” (דרך אשר אנכי מצוה)</p> <p>– “turn aside from the way” (סרתם מהר מן־הדרך)</p> <p>– “following” (אחר) YHWH</p>	<p><u>Modifiers approved by the parent</u></p> <p>uprightness [ישר]</p> <p>integrity [תם]</p> <p>justice [משפט]</p> <p>righteousness [צדק]</p> <p>equity [מישרים]</p> <p>the righteous [צדיקים]</p> <p>good (course) [טוב]</p> <p>life [חיים]</p> <p>good men [טובים]</p> <p>pleasantness [נעם]</p> <p>peace [שלום]</p> <p>wisdom [חכמה]</p> <p>his godly ones [חסידו]</p> <p>YHWH (his) [יהוה]</p> <p>understanding [בינה]</p>	<p>2:13; 4:11</p> <p>2:7</p> <p>2:8, 9; 8:20</p> <p>2:9; 8:20</p> <p>2:9</p> <p>2:20; 4:18</p> <p>2:9</p> <p>2:19; 5:6; 6:23</p> <p>2:20;</p> <p>3:17</p> <p>3:17</p> <p>4:11; 8:32 (“my”)</p> <p>2:8</p> <p>8:22</p> <p>9:6</p>
The Other Ways	<p><u>Idols</u></p> <p>– “turn your sons away” (יסיר את־בנך)</p> <p>– “following other gods” (לכת אחרי אלהים)</p> <p>– “to the right or to the left” (ימין ושמאל)</p> <p>– “turn from” (פנה) any of the words which I command you</p> <p>– “drawn away” (נדה) and worship other gods.</p>	<p><u>Modifiers prohibited by the parent</u></p> <p>Sinners (“their”) [חטאים]</p> <p>Everyone who extort [בצע]</p> <p>evil [רע]</p> <p>the wicked [רשעים]</p> <p>the evil [רעים]</p> <p>darkness [חשך]</p> <p>crooked [עקשים]</p> <p>devious [נלוזים]</p> <p>strange woman [אשה זרה]</p> <p>a man of violence [איש חמס]</p> <p>the strange woman’s (her) house [ביתה]</p> <p>Sheol [שאול]</p>	<p>1:15</p> <p>1:19</p> <p>2:12, 8:13</p> <p>4:14</p> <p>4:14, 19</p> <p>2:13</p> <p>2:15</p> <p>2:15</p> <p>5:6, 7:25</p> <p>3:31</p> <p>7:8</p> <p>7:27</p>
	<p><u>Spiritual apostasy</u></p> <p>– “to seduce you from the way” (להדיחך מן־הדרך)</p>		
	<p><u>Insubordination, corruption</u></p> <p>– “turn aside from the word” (תסור מן־הדבר)</p> <p>– “act corruptly and turn from the way” (השחת תשחתון וסרתם מן־הדרך)</p>		
Walking/going	Engaging in ethical behaviour	Engaging in (un)ethical behaviour	1:15a; 2:13b, 20a; 3:23; 4:14; 8:20; 9:6
Keeping/guarding/	-	Continuing without wavering	1:15b; 2:8, 20b; 8:32; 9:15
Stumbling	-	Failing	3:23b

Source Domain	Target Domain (Deuteronomy)	Target Domain (Prov 1–9)	Verses in Proverbs 1–9
Following	Obedying	-	
Turning	Disobedience	Rectification/Rejection (of evil or wisdom)	1:23; 3:7; 4:5b, 15, 27; 9:4, 16; 7:25
Destination	Blessing, prolonged/ abundant life in the land, possession of the land	Life in the land, Wisdom's house	2:21–22; 3:2; 4:10; 9:1–6
	Curse, destruction/ annihilation, death	death/the dead, the house of the strange woman, Sheol	2:18; 7:8, 23, 27; 9:11, 14

Table 4: A Comparison of the Way Metaphor in Deuteronomy and Proverbs 1–9

Traveller: The Son

First, the one travelling the way is obviously the son to whom the whole parental discourse is addressed. The son is imagined in this imagery as the traveller who walks in the ways instructed by the parents. Given the familial didactic context of Prov 1–9, there is no surprise concerning the addressee being the son.⁷⁵ In fact, each parental instruction begins with this invocation just as the Deuteronomic *Shema* does with “Israel” (יִשְׂרָאֵל) in Deut 6:4. Recognition of this discursive formation with the Torah enables the reader to observe that this invocation presupposes the Israelites as those with whom the son is to identify himself. This presupposition might be reinforced by Prov 3:12 (the third instruction, 3:1–12) in which the son's relationship with YHWH is depicted in terms of the father-son metaphor.

⁷⁵ Waltke (*Proverbs 1–15*, 62) contends that this invocation should be taken at face value as opposed to the scholarly consensus that describes it as a metaphor for a teacher-pupil relationship. He argues that this presumption is based on the court setting of Egyptian wisdom and that “[the] home setting for education in ancient Israel, for both the Mosaic law (cf. Deut 6:7–9) and Solomon's proverbs, is put beyond reasonable doubt by references to the mother.”

In the OT, the only other place where YHWH is depicted in relation to a disciplining father for the love of his son is Deut 8:5 (cf. Prov 13:24). This parallel may strongly suggest that the father-son metaphor is part of the DMT which not only elucidates the son's relationship with YHWH but also aligns his identity with the Israelite travellers toward the promise of YHWH. This seems to be a result of *Unschärfe* ("blurriness") Zehnder mentions in his work. In this vein, Zehnder argues, ". . . der äussere Weg wird zum Bild für den inneren Weg, für die Führung durch JHWH und den Wandel des Volkes" (The outer path becomes an image of the inner path, depicting the guidance by YHWH and the transformation of the people).⁷⁶ Therefore, the son does not merely represent a biological son but also a "spiritual heir";⁷⁷ thus, the line between the two identities of the son is blurred by the appropriation of the father-son metaphor in this context. Furthermore, this identification with his forefathers in Deuteronomy aims to foster an ethical lifestyle in the son's life though this invocation alone does not achieve this effect.⁷⁸

The Ways #1: Individual Life

The "ways" with various modifiers in this metaphor presuppose the moral standards/norms in the Torah. At a first glance, the metaphorical "ways" in Prov 1–9 appear somewhat different from those in Deuteronomy. While in Deuteronomy it exclusively refers to the way of obedience to the Torah with the opposite ways only implied, the way

⁷⁶ Zehnder, *Wegmetaphorik*, 481.

⁷⁷ Waltke, *Proverbs 1–15*, 186.

⁷⁸ Arnold, *Deuteronomy 1–11*, 486.

in Prov 1–9 can signify: (1) an individual life which is value-neutral with a potential to be either good or evil, (2) a “good” lifestyle/moral character instructed by the parents, or (3) an “evil” lifestyle/moral character, prohibited by the parents.⁷⁹ However, except (1), which is a new category in Prov 1–9, (2) and (3) do display similarities with the Way metaphor in Deuteronomy, and the parental instructions/prohibitions align with YHWH’s commandments in the Torah.

First, when the metaphorical way refers to an individual life in Prov 1–9 (1:31; 3:6; 23; 4:26; 5:8, 21; 8:2, 22; 9:15), it assumes that the son (בן) or “the uninstructed youths” (פְּתִימִים) have freedom and responsibility to make moral judgments and decisions. There are various English translations for פְּתִימִים, ranging from the naïve to the simple-minded. However, I favour Weeks’ translation as it clarifies the nature of this literary character, who may incline towards either good or evil depending on the source of instruction received.⁸⁰ For instance, in 1:31a, Wisdom condemns the uninstructed who refuses to listen to her (vv. 24–25) saying, “Thus, they shall eat of the fruit of their *own* way (דֶּרֶכָם).”⁸¹

This act-consequence nexus (also found in 3:23) implies that the “way” representing a person’s individual life involves decision-making that may potentially lead to either moral excellence or moral decadence. In other instances of this category, the parent instructs the son to “examine” (פָּלַט, 4:26), “stay away (from the strange woman)” (רָחֵק, 5:8), find Wisdom who stands “on the way” (עַל־יֶדְרֵךְ, 8:2), and not be

⁷⁹ Fox (*Proverbs 1–9*, 129) portrays the Way metaphor in a similar way though he categorizes the ways referring to an individual life as “many paths” with a sense of different potentials.

⁸⁰ Weeks, *Instruction and Imagery*, 106.

⁸¹ The italics are mine.

deceived by the woman of folly who seduces those who originally intend to go straight in their paths (המישרים ארחותם, 9:15). In 5:21, the son is proffered the ultimate reason for choosing the right path:⁸² “For (כי) before the eyes of YHWH are the ways of a man and all his paths [YHWH] examines (פִּלֵּס).” In a similar vein, once parental wisdom is acquired and internalized, Wisdom then “guides” (נָחָה) when “walking” (הֵלֵךְ), “guards” (שָׁמַר) when “sleeping” (שָׁכַב), and “talks” (שִׁיחַ) to the son when “awaking” (קִיץ) (Prov 6:22). Here as the son’s daily routine, which involves walking, progresses, the embodied wisdom ensures that his individual life path remains on track. Given this reality concerning the individual life, the son is also instructed: “In all your ways *know*⁸³ him, and he will make your paths straight (בְּכָל־דֶּרֶכְיָךְ דַּעְהוּ וְהוּא יִישר אֲרַחְתֶּיךָ)” (3:6). In addition, there is yet another instance in 8:22 where it points to the creating work of YHWH which is unbounded by any limitation and signifying the establishment of Wisdom before the inception of this work.⁸⁴

The Ways #2: Lifestyle Approved by the Parents

Second, a “way” also stands for lifestyle and moral character expressed with modifiers in construct chain that describe the moral quality of each way. Due to the variety of modifiers, Fox contends that there exists “a plurality of ‘paths of life,’” yet they are also categorized into “the ways of the righteous” and those leading to death.⁸⁵ My argument

⁸² Waltke (*Proverbs 1–15*, 323) rightly argues, “Behind all the utilitarian arguments there is ultimately a religious reason the omniscient Lord upholds a moral order wherein sin brings its own punishment with it.”

⁸³ Delitzsch (*The Proverbs*, 81) argues that the translation of יָדַע, “acknowledge,” here does not bring out its full significance as it implies “earnest penetrating cognizance.” The italics are mine.

⁸⁴ Murphy, *Proverbs*, 52; Waltke, *Proverbs 1–15*, 404.

⁸⁵ Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 130.

is that these descriptions of the ways can be categorized into either good or bad based on parental approval or disapproval, and that the parental standard for judgment presupposes the moral norms of the Torah through its associated phraseology. As indicated in the table, the first set of modifiers associated with the Way metaphor describes the “good” way instructed by the parents. For instance, “righteousness, justice, and equity” (כל-מעגל-טוב) stand in apposition to “every good track” (צדק ומשפט ומישרים) in 2:9, depicting these moral qualities in terms of tracks on a road clearly approved by the instructing parent.⁸⁶ The scholarly consensus is that these moral qualities describe a desired human behaviour/character in the context of Prov 1–9.⁸⁷ In fact, these three moral qualities are listed as core moral virtues of the parental discourse in Prov 1:3. Receiving the parental instructions and seeking wisdom through them (2:1–4; 4:10–11) bring the son into “the paths of the righteous” (2:20; cf. 2:9 and 4:18), forging him into a man counted among the righteous.

Now, looking more closely at the concept of “righteousness” in Prov 1–9, we can witness how this moral quality, as well as other ones approved by the parent, presupposes the moral-religious norm of the Deuteronomic Torah.⁸⁸ In Deuteronomy, the concept of righteousness is closely interwoven into the fabric of the commandments of

⁸⁶ The Hebrew term, מעגל, does not merely describe a path but has an added image feature as it often refers to “cart tracks” or “wagon ruts” leaving “the trails that others are obliged to follow after it dries and hardens.” (Waltke, *Proverbs 1–15*, 227). This metaphorical image may allude to a repeated behaviour that forms into a habit or a character.

⁸⁷ Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 60; Loader, *Proverbs 1–9*, 58; Whybray, *Proverbs*, 32; Schipper, *Proverbs 1–15*, 66.

⁸⁸ While righteousness, justice, and equity do have distinguishable qualities, as Fox (*Proverbs 1–15*, 60) argues, they “convey a single concept that embraces the entire range of honest and equitable behaviour in personal and social relations” in Prov 1–9. This single concept is well encapsulated in the concept of righteousness. For further detail, see Loader, *Proverbs 1–9*, 58; Ho, *Ṣedeq and Ṣedaqah*, 140. Ho argues that צדק covers the semantic field of justice, righteousness, and blessing.

YHWH (Deut 1:16; 4:8; 6:25; 16:18–20; 24:13; 25:1, 15). Moses' rhetorical question in Deut 4:8 captures this point well: “. . . what great nation has statutes (חקים) and judgments (משפטים) as righteous (צדיקים) as this whole Torah (תורה) which I set before you today?” Here the Torah is characterized by the adjective, “righteous,” in a ritual (חקים) and legal (משפטים) sense.⁸⁹ In Deut 6:20–25, Moses simulates a parental catechistic instruction where it ends with the parent's exhortation (v. 25): “It will be righteousness (צדקה) for us if we are careful to keep all this commandment (כל־המצוה) before YHWH our God just as he commanded us.” In this verse, obedience to YHWH's commandment is considered righteousness. While the צדק-words are relatively rare in Deuteronomy, almost all occurrences are related to the Torah itself or obedience to it as these examples demonstrate.⁹⁰

It is clear that this term alone cannot show that the pathways in Prov 1–9 presuppose the Deuteronomistic Torah. Yet, terms such as “uprightness” (ישר), “justice” (משפט), “wisdom” (חכמה), “understanding” (בינה), and other modifiers of the “good” way in Prov 1–9 are also the words that are either related to the Torah in Deuteronomy or employed in other parts of the OT, especially the Psalter, to describe the Torah or its ideals.⁹¹ For instance, “justice” (משפט) appears in conjunction with the Torah in Deut 4:8; 17:11; 33:10. In Deut 4:6, keeping and observing the statutes and judgments of YHWH are referred to as “your wisdom” (חכמתכם). “Peace” (שלום) is not connected to

⁸⁹ Arnold, *Deuteronomy 1–11*, 239.

⁹⁰ There are eighteen occurrences of all cognate forms of צדק, and despite the wide semantic range of the term, they are all related to the commandments of YHWH in the Torah except three occurrences in Deut 9:4–6 and one occurrence in each of 32:4 and 33:19.

⁹¹ If we consider Torah's changing content in the pre-canonical period (LeFebvre, *Collections*, 261), what the Torah refers to in the Psalter and what it presupposes in Prov 1–9 may be very different.

the Torah in Deuteronomy; in Ps 119:165, it is designated for those who love YHWH's Torah. Similarly, in Ps 1, "the way of the righteous" (דרך צדיקים) is determined by one's "delight in the Torah" (בתורת יהוה חפץ). Another interesting parallel is found between Ps 119:105 and Prov 6:23.⁹² In the former, God's word is described as "a lamp (נר) to my feet" and "a light (אור) to my path," and in the latter, נר and אור are applied instead to "the commandment" (מצוה) and "the torah" (תורה) of the parents. This image of a lamp and a light is present only in these two passages creating a condition of possibility for the parental instructions to presuppose the Torah. It appears that the didactic thought of the DMT takes YHWH's commandments in the Torah, which are legal, national, and covenantal in nature, and describes them in terms of ethical and individual norms for the uninstructed youths using various modifiers attached to the Way metaphor. This metaphor then illustrates the nature of character formation, namely how decisions and judgments result in forming one's character, and the absolute necessity of the Torah in this process.

The Ways #3: Lifestyle Prohibited by the Parents

It goes the same for the other set of modifiers depicting the opposite way that are unequivocally antithetical to the ideals of the Torah. For instance, two paths the parent prohibits are the way of "sinners" (חטאים) in Prov 1:15 and the path of "the wicked"

⁹² Wenham (*Psalms as Torah*, 97) argues that in Psalms "'Law' or 'instruction' covers all God's revelation to Israel, whether it is found in the Pentateuch or other parts of the Bible." Yet, according to his conception of the Torah (98) in Psalms, there is no doubt that "the revelation at Sinai" and "the Mosaic sermons about the law in Deuteronomy" are part of it as exemplified by Deuteronomistic phraseology in Ps 119. In fact, I argue that this common language stock shared with Prov 6:23 may be an indication of the DMT.

(רשעים) in 4:14. In Ps 1, the person in “the way of the righteous” (דרך צדיקים) is described as the one who “does not walk in the counsel of the wicked (רשעים), nor stand in the way of sinners (חטאים), nor sit in the seat of scoffers (לצים).” These three moral characters including “scoffers” which represent the way of evil in Ps 1:1 also appear in Prov 1–9 but not in Deuteronomy.⁹³ This shows that Ps 1 and Prov 1–9 share the moral perspective that views the way of evil with certain character qualities. That said, according to Ps 1:2, the righteous person who keeps from these evil ways is first and foremost characterized by his delight in “the Torah of YHWH” (תורת יהוה). Here, the moral norm of the Torah clearly draws a line between the ways of the righteous and the wicked in Ps 1 while in Prov 1–9, תורה is not associated with YHWH but the parents (“my”). Nonetheless, the shared use of the Way metaphor in both Ps 1 and Prov 1–9, where paths are delineated by moral qualities or individuals embodying such, suggests a common moral tradition. This also reinforces the possibility that the Torah standard may be presupposed in the moral characteristics of the ways in Prov 1–9.

There are other modifiers of the ways that are prohibited by the parents. Interestingly, many of them are adjectival nouns that represent characters embodying certain moral qualities. Aside from “sinners” (1:15), “the wicked” (4:14) mentioned above, there are also “evil men” (רעים, Prov 4:14), “a man of violence” (איש חמס, Prov 3:31), and “the strange woman” (אשה זרה, Prov 5:6; 7:5, 25). This is also the case with the “good” ways: “the righteous” (צדיקים, Prov 2:20; 4:18), “good men” (טובים, Prov

⁹³ In addition, though not framed with the Way metaphor, “the scoffers” (לצים) and its cognate form לץ appear thirteen times in Prov 1:22; 3:34; 9:7; 13:1; 14:6; 15:12; 19:25; 19:29; 20:1; 21:11; 21:24; 22:10; 24:9. The only other place outside of Ps 1 and Proverbs where the word is used is Isa 29:20.

2:20), and “his godly ones” (הַסִּידִי, Prov 2:8). These characters are both literary as well as moral and are what Brown refers to as “flat characters” that “[appeal] to well-established ethical norms and expectations [and] can be an ideal model of, or foil for, normative characters.”⁹⁴ These ethical norms and expectations, I have argued, are grounded on the DMT’s understanding of the Torah, and the ultimate reason for their presentation in Prov 1–9 is to help form the son’s moral character.

In this regard, there is another metaphor schema that seems to operate with the Way metaphor schema in Prov 2 though it is also found in other places within Prov 1–9: “MORAL LIFE IS A WAR.” Lund argues that a source domain of a metaphor is often related to other source domains in this way.⁹⁵ Without going into extensive details, this War metaphor expresses these prohibited ways and characters as attackers and YHWH as “a shield (מָגֵן) to those who walk in integrity” (v. 7b), “guarding (נָצַר) the path of justice” (v. 8a), and “keeping (or protecting, שָׁמַר) the way of his godly ones.”⁹⁶ Also, the reasons for receiving the parental instructions are “to deliver” (נָצַל) the son from the man speaking perversity (v. 12) and the strange woman (v. 16). This hostility between the two groups of pathways reinforces the parent’s instructions regarding the accepted and forbidden paths.

Out of these characters, the strange woman stands out the most not only because she is consistently contrasted with personified Wisdom but also beyond Prov 4 she is the

⁹⁴ Brown, *Character in Crisis*, 16.

⁹⁵ Lund, *Way Metaphors*, 40. This relating of a source domain with other source domains is referred to as “symbolic synonyms.” Stordalen, *Echoes*, 73–74.

⁹⁶ Waltke, *Proverbs 1–15*, 226.

only character that sustains her presence to the end of Prov 9.⁹⁷ Weeks argues that this strange woman, among other evil characters symbolizing deviated paths, serves as “an archetype for the corruption of the unwary.”⁹⁸ It signifies “the biblical motif concerning the seduction of Israelites into apostasy” and “for the original readers, her name *conjures up* associations with the seduction of Jews into apostasy.”⁹⁹ In other words, it is the ingenious intention of the text to present the strange woman without definitive association with a historical situation or person so that the readers themselves can relate to this character and her ways. However, this process is not random as they would be guided by a network of Deuteronomic presuppositions already established in the text including the ones created by the strange woman herself.

In Prov 2:12–22, Schipper observes that there is one key verb, עָזַב (“to abandon”), that characterizes both “those abandoning (עָזַב, m.) the paths of uprightness” (v. 13) and the strange woman “who leaves (עָזַב, f.) the companion of her youth” (v. 17). In 2:17, “abandoning (עָזַב) the friends of her youth” (v. 17a) is paired with “forgetting (שָׁכַח) the covenant (כְּרִית) of her God” (v. 17b). He maintains that “the term is characteristically used in the context of abandonment of the law or covenant, ultimately

⁹⁷ There are several different descriptions concerning the female figure(s) in Prov 1–9 such as “strange woman” (אִשֶּׁה זָרָה, Prov 2:16; 5:3, 20; 7:5), “foreign woman” (נִכְרִיָּה, Prov 2:16; 5:20; 6:24; 7:5), “harlot” (אִשֶּׁה זֹנָה, Prov 6:26), “adulteress,” or “a man’s wife,” (אִשֶּׁת אִישׁ, Prov 6:26), and “woman of follies” (אִשֶּׁת כְּסִילוֹת, Prov 9:13).

⁹⁸ Weeks, *Instruction and Imagery*, 154.

⁹⁹ Weeks, *Instruction and Imagery*, 141. He rightly complains that scholarly focus on identifying this female figure(s) as an adulteress or a prostitute overlooks her literary function as Wisdom’s counterpart along with other “bad” characters (128–47). The studies that focus on identification of the foreign woman include Washington, “The Strange Woman”; Blenkinsopp, “The Social Context”; Tan, *The Foreign Woman*; Camp, *Wise, Strange and Holy*. Weeks (154) also points out that to identify her with a historical situation of the post-exilic intermarriage in Ezra 9–10 and Neh 10:30; 13:23–27 is to miss its poetic representation.

meaning a betrayal of YHWH himself.”¹⁰⁰ Furthermore, in Prov 7:14, this strange woman who symbolizes apostasy seduces the uninstructed into apostasy. This image of abandoning the covenant with YHWH aligns with idolatry which is presented as the opposite way of YHWH’s commandments in Deuteronomy (7:4; 9:12; 9:16; 11:28; 28:14; 30:17). Therefore, while idolatry is completely absent in Prov 1–9, its essential significance of causing apostasy is fully expressed through the “strange woman” (אִשָּׁה זָרָה) and other Torah-violating characters in Prov 1–9.¹⁰¹ The sexual appeal of the strange woman and the violence of the wicked seem best to represent religious-moral apostasy from YHWH in a familial youth education setting.

In summary, the Way metaphor in Prov 1–9 represents either an individual life with the capacity for both good and evil, or a lifestyle defined by moral qualities subject to parental approval or prohibition. We have found that the former use of the Way is linked to the act-consequence nexus, necessitating discernment and moral decision-making on the part of the son. In the latter use, the moral qualities or characters collectively testify to either the ideals of the Torah or violations thereof.

¹⁰⁰ Schipper, *Hermeneutics*, 95. Waltke (*Proverbs 1–15*, 229) also asserts that the term is employed “in the law and the prophets for Israel’s apostasy from the Lord and his covenant.”

¹⁰¹ The strange woman and her ways may presuppose idolatry in view of the Deuteronomic discursive formation in Prov 1–9. In the Pentateuch, the Hebrew term זָרָה and its cognate forms (זָרָה) is often employed to describe things that are ritually unacceptable before YHWH (Lev 10:1: “strange fire” [אִשׁ זָרָה]), those who are not priests (Num 1:51: “laymen” [לֵוִיִּם]), or people who are outsiders/foreigners/aliens (Num 18:4: “outsider” [זָרָה]) as Wenham (*Leviticus*, 154) explains. There is only one occurrence of this term alluding to “strange gods” (זָרִים) with the preposition ב in Deut 32:16 (“they made him jealous with strange gods [בְּזָרִים]”). This is the only other place where this grammatical construction appears in the entire OT besides Prov 5:20 (“Why, my son, should you be infatuated with a strange woman [בְּזָרָה]?”) despite the difference in number.

Destinations: “Life in the Land” and Death/Sheol

Every pathway leads to a destination, and the same holds for the pathways presented in Prov 1–9. As we have seen, the Way metaphor significantly structures the entire parental discourse in Prov 1–9, yet the second instruction (Prov 2) utilizes the Way language more extensively than any other ones.¹⁰² The parent ends this instruction by telling the son that the final destination is “life in the land” (v. 21). This life in the land as a destination is further extended from its spatial definition to that of time in Prov 3:2 where the son is promised a prolonged life (v. 2a) and time of peace (v. 2b). This same promise of a prolonged life is repeated in 4:10.

In all three passages, there is conditionality to the promise of life in the land. In 3:1 and 4:10, the condition is that the son does not forget (שכח), lets his heart keep (נצר), listen (שמע) and accept (לקה) the parental torah. That said, the parental torah employs the Way metaphor to guide the son along the right path, either by approving or prohibiting moral qualities or literary figures who embody them, which I argued presuppose the moral norms of the Torah. In other words, whatever life in the land represents in Prov 1–9, it entails the condition that one reaches it only by way of obeying the parental torah.¹⁰³ Wright argues that this conditionality and partial fulfillment of the promised land are sensed throughout the OT where “[the] promise lies behind and yet still ahead of the people.”¹⁰⁴ It continues to be the ultimate destination to be reached. In Prov 1–9, it

¹⁰² The Way terms are utilized 12 times out of 50 in Prov 2, accounting for nearly 25 percent of the total occurrences. The remaining instances are distributed among eight other chapters.

¹⁰³ Concerning the promised land, Martin (*Bound for the Promised Land*, 83) astutely claims that “the presence of unconditionality does not necessarily exclude conditions, for unconditionality and conditionality concurrently exist in various kinds of relationships, and particularly in sonship.”

¹⁰⁴ Wright, *Old Testament Ethics*, 78. Cf. Weinfeld, *The Promise of the Land*, 184–85. However, Loader (*Proverbs 1–9*, 135) observes that this moral pursuit is distinguished from that in Deuteronomy as it is now based on “individual merit” and “insight achieved by the individual.”

appears that the symbolic significance of the promised land serves as a Deuteronomic pre-text, while the tension inherent in “life in the land” coheres with the parental instruction.

Therefore, the parent warns the son that only the righteous (ישרים) and the blameless (תמימים) live in the land while the wicked (רשעים) and the treacherous (בוגדים) are cut off from it (Prov 2:21–22). While the destination for the wicked and the treacherous is not indicated in these verses, we find that it is “death” (מות) and “the dead” (רפאים) in 2:18. Also, in 7:27, the strange woman’s house is equated with “the way to Sheol” (דרכי שאול). Furthermore, while Prov 9 does not directly involve the Way metaphor, it presents Wisdom’s house (vv. 1–6) and the woman of folly’s house (vv. 13–18) as two opposite destinations.

These descriptions of the destinations in Prov 1–9 have some similarities and differences with Deuteronomy. The shared feature that stands out the most is the reference to the land as a promise dependent on obedience to the parental torah. In Deuteronomy, similarly, the promise of the land is consistently associated with obedience to the Mosaic Torah (e.g., Deut 4:1–2, 13–14, 40; 5:31–33; 6:1–3, 17; 8:1, 6–10; 11:8–12; 30:15–16). The promise is frequently framed in conditional statements, with the Torah serving as the metaphorical path toward that goal. In Prov 1–9, the parental torah is not portrayed as the right way itself but as the guide to the right way. Nonetheless, the language used for the promises and curses concerning the land are strikingly similar between Prov 1–9 and Deuteronomy and include: “days” (ימים),

“length/prolonged” (אָרֶךְ), “life” (חַיִּים/חַיָּה) for the promise and “death” (מוֹת) for the curse.¹⁰⁵

Now, the question at hand is to discern what these destinations represent in Prov 1–9. Are they the same as in Deuteronomy? Or, do they refer to something completely different? On one hand, Fox suggests that we refrain from looking beyond the surface of the text and avoid associating the land with either an eschatological place in the afterlife or the land of Canaan.¹⁰⁶ He asserts that the “[concern] for the Land of Israel is absent from biblical Wisdom literature, as is the belief in an afterlife.”¹⁰⁷ He thus translates אָרֶץ as “the earth” which in his opinion is more appropriate for the metaphorical geography.¹⁰⁸ In the same vein, Fox associates all of “death” (2:18a), “the dead” (2:18b; 9:18a), and “Sheol” (7:27; 9:18b) with physical death.¹⁰⁹ Schipper, on the other hand, views these terms as indicating the eschatological future. For him, the concept of “the land” along with its formulaic expressions such as “to tear away” (נָסַח) and “to cut off” (כָּרַת) in 2:22 is typical of “Deuteronom(ist)ic theology” as found in Deut 28:63.¹¹⁰ Yet, due to the late prophetic redaction, Prov 2:21–22 theologically aligns with Isa 56–66.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁵ In Prov 1–9, the promises are: “length of days (אָרֶךְ יָמִים) and years of life (שָׁנוֹת חַיִּים) . . . will add to you” (3:2) and “the years of your life (שָׁנוֹת חַיִּים) will be many (יִרְבוּ)” (4:10). In Deuteronomy, some examples of similar promises concerning the land include: “. . . that you may live long (תֵּאָרִיךְ יָמִים) on the land” (Deut 4:40), “. . . that your days may be prolonged (יֵאָרְכֶן יָמֶיךָ)” (6:2), “. . . so that you may prolong days (תֵּאָרִיכוּ יָמִים) on the land” (11:9), and “. . . that you may live and multiply (חַיִּית וּרְבִית)” (30:18). The curses in Prov 1–9 involves “death” (מוֹת), “the dead” (רַפְּאִים), and “Sheol” (שְׁאוֹל). In the climactic moment of the covenant renewal in Deut 30:15 and 19, “death” (מוֹת) is used as a covenant curse.

¹⁰⁶ Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 123.

¹⁰⁷ Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 123.

¹⁰⁸ Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 123.

¹⁰⁹ Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 122, 251.

¹¹⁰ Schipper (*Proverbs 1–15*, 105) assumes that the parental instruction in Prov 2 has “a ‘nomistic’ colouring” which alludes to the Deuteronomic law.

¹¹¹ Schipper, *Hermeneutics*, 146–52.

Also, paralleled to Prov 11:3–5 with the “day of wrath” in its formulation, Prov 2:21–22 has an eschatological overtone associated with the land.¹¹²

Loader and several others adopt a mediating position, contending that the concept of the land in Prov 1–9 differs from that in Deuteronomy and/or the “land theology” in the Deuteronom(ist)ic tradition, even though its conceptualization is not disconnected from biblical tradition.¹¹³ For them, the land is a metaphor. In this regard, McConville asserts that “‘land’ thus becomes inseparable from the Deuteronomic vision of a people keeping covenant, worshipping and enjoying blessing in the context of community, justice, peace and joy (16:13–15).”¹¹⁴ This Deuteronomic vision of human flourishing for the people of YHWH, in my opinion, essentially encapsulates the Deuteronomic presupposition in Prov 2:21–22. However, there are two caveats. First, the main concerns of this Deuteronomic vision is no longer national and covenantal but individual and ethical in Prov 1–9. Therefore, it is now obedience to the *parental* torah that promises to bring abundance and blessing in life while religious-moral apostasy brings self-destruction as pictured in 7:21–23. Second, however, I would also add that the land reference in Prov 1–9 does not exclude the concept of the covenant evident in the conditionality of the promise. To be sure, the land reference does not merely imply that “living wisely assures that one will remain on this earth rather than descending to the underworld before one’s time.”¹¹⁵ Rather, Israel’s renewed covenant relationship with YHWH and the covenant promises in Deuteronomy carry ethical implications for

¹¹² Schipper, *Hermeneutics*, 177–78.

¹¹³ Loader, *Proverbs 1–9*, 135; Murphy, *Proverbs*, 17; Waltke, *Proverbs 1–15*, 234–35; Clifford, *Proverbs*, 49.

¹¹⁴ McConville, “Metaphor, Symbol and the Interpretation,” 337.

¹¹⁵ Clifford, *Proverbs*, 49.

their individual lives, calling for their obedience to the Torah.¹¹⁶ Linking the notion of the land with moral characters, “the upright,” “the blameless,” “the wicked,” and “the treacherous,” as opposed to obedience to moral directives, demonstrates that the main focus of this Deuteronomic presupposition regarding the land is the moral life and character of the son.

The Discursive Formation of “the Land” in Proverbs 1–9

Before considering the moral implications, we consider how this reference to the land and the Way metaphor create and sustain a discursive context of “life in the land” for the further understanding of these presuppositions in Prov 1–9. As we have already observed, Prov 2:21–22 curiously does not have any immediate context to harness the referent of “the land” (ארץ) other than the fact that it is the destination for those on “the way of good men” and “the paths of the righteous” (v. 20). This is a classic example of what Culler refers to as “logical presupposition” where a word or phrase employed in the context lacks referentiality and is treated as already given.¹¹⁷ He argues that it is “an intertextual operator which implies a discursive context and which, by identifying an intertext, modifies the way in which the poem must be read.”¹¹⁸ Thus, in Prov 2, “the land” as the intertextual operator opens up a discursive context of its Deuteronomic concept.

¹¹⁶ Millar, *Now Choose Life*, 65–66.

¹¹⁷ Culler, *The Pursuit*, 124.

¹¹⁸ Culler, *The Pursuit*, 124–25.

Looking at it from the reader's perspective, this contextless reference to the land also causes what McConville calls "semantic shock" or "semantic impertinence," which refers to a metaphor's capacity to surprise the readers and offer them "new horizons of meaning" when it is "fresh" in their minds.¹¹⁹ Its appearance in Prov 2:21–22 is a semantic shock as this historical and covenantal concept enters the realm of ethics for the daily life of a youth. It gives a new spin to how the Way metaphor is understood in Prov 1–9, powerfully connecting the son's life journey not only with the moral norms of the Torah but also the Deuteronomic narrative concerning "life in the land." In this way, the son's obedience takes on a whole new meaning since it relates his life story to that of his forefathers and his social identity to the people of YHWH, offering a clear direction, purpose and meaning for his life recaptured in the concept of "fear of YHWH."

It is helpful to observe the strategic positioning of this reference to the land in Prov 2 to understand its impact on the schema of the Way metaphor in Prov 1–9. Proverbs 2 appears with a conditional frame where there are a series of "if" (אם, vv. 1–4) and "then" (אז, vv. 5–8, 9–11) with "for" (כי, v. 6 and v. 10), explaining the causal relationship between אם and אז clauses. It is followed by two purposes of wisdom (ל + infinitive, vv. 12–15, 16–19) and its ultimate consequences (כי, vv. 20–22).¹²⁰ This chapter lays out key terms, concepts, and ideas and introduces one major character, the strange woman, structuring them with the Way metaphor and summarizing how and

¹¹⁹ McConville, "Metaphor, Symbol and the Interpretation," 333. However, once it becomes a conventional expression, it no longer has the same effect.

¹²⁰ Schipper, *Hermeneutics*, 54–55. Schipper divides this parental instruction into Prov 2:1–9 and 2:10–22 the latter of which is structured around wisdom entering one's heart (vv. 10–11) followed by two infinitive phrases להצילך ("in order to save you," vv. 12, 16) indicating the function of wisdom. While I disagree with this arrangement of the chapter, he is correct in that the key to the fulfillment of the purposes is wisdom. YHWH gives wisdom and wisdom enters one's heart which deliver the son from those who speak perversity and from the strange woman.

why to receive parental instructions and seek wisdom. Thus, its significance for Prov 1–9 has been well recognized; it is considered “a table of contents” (Strack), an introduction to “the instructional program” (Meinhold), or even a reading guide for the parental discourse (Schipper).¹²¹ It is at the end of this chapter that the “life in the land” is nestled, framing the ultimate goal and consequence of following or rejecting the way of wisdom.

Another context we may have to consider, which is seldom noted in wisdom studies, is the connection between Prov 2:21–22 and 3:1–12. Due to the traditional chapter division with “My son” clearly marking each instruction, they are treated as two discrete instructions. As the most Deuteronomic instruction of the entire parental discourse, Prov 3 describes what the “life in the land” looks like for the people under the covenant with YHWH. The theme of prolonged life in Prov 3:2 is listed as a major reward of obedience to YHWH’s commandments in Deuteronomy (Deut 4:40; 6:2; 11:9; 30:18). The principle of “steadfast love and faithfulness” in Prov 3:3, which is reminiscent of the covenant with YHWH (Deut 7:9; cf. Exod 34:6), is now applied to the communal life of the son who as a result would find favour and good reputation in the sight of God as well as others (Prov 3:4). Trusting, knowing, and fearing YHWH (Prov 3:5–7) do bring physical well-being (v. 8). In v. 10, the first harvest of the produce unmistakably brings in the theme of “life in the land” with the term, “storehouse” (מִדְּבָר), which appears elsewhere in the OT only in Deut 28:8. This may be more than sufficient

¹²¹ Strack, *Die Sprüche*, 313, 315; Meinhold, *Die Sprüche*, 43; Schipper, *Hermeneutics*, 309. Schipper argues that Prov 2 contains initial verses of the nine lectures in Prov 1–9 and that it functions as a guide for reading.

to produce a Deuteronomic presupposition that extends this single reference to “the land” to have a formative impact on the reading of the subsequent instructions.

In this vein, just as YHWH is the disciplining father in Deut 8:5, so is the parent to the son in Prov 3:11–12. As mentioned above, Jindo’s insight on the metaphor schema of the promised land in the OT (THE PROMISED LAND IS YHWH’S ESTATE) is deemed very useful here.¹²² He argues that this metaphor mapping is intricately interwoven with the father-son metaphor in the OT, thus completing the picture of the adoptive son inheriting the promised land from YHWH, Israel. In this way, the conditionality of the promise in Prov 2:21–22 in combination with the father-son metaphor in 3:11–12 may help produce the Deuteronomic presupposition concerning the land reference, further strengthening the epistemological context of “life in the land.”

Moral Implications of the Way metaphor and “the Land” Reference

In this chapter, I have sought to understand the Way metaphor and “the land” reference in Prov 1–9, especially Prov 2, from the perspective of the moral tradition. Before delving into the Deuteronomic nature of the Way metaphor, it is important to acknowledge that the main concern for using the Way metaphor in Prov 1–9 is moral formation of the son. Zehnder insightfully points out that “Wie der Weg durch das wiederholte Treten der Füße entsteht, so bildet sich aus der Wiederholung gleicher Verhaltensweisen einerseits ein bestimmter Lebenswandel und andererseits ein bestimmter Lebensweg heraus” (Just as the path is formed through the repeated tread of

¹²² Jindo, “Toward a Poetics,” 239–41.

feet, so too does a specific way of life emerge from the repetition of similar behaviours, giving rise to both a distinct lifestyle and a particular life path).¹²³ Thus, this metaphor itself alludes to repeated actions/behaviours that turn into a certain lifestyle and set a particular life trajectory. In Prov 1–9, the text consistently employs this imagery juxtaposed to particular moral traits or characters with these traits to demonstrate that repeated behaviours manifesting these qualities eventually form into one’s character. However, the Way metaphor does not merely operate on the cognitive level but also on the intertextual level where it creates the Deuteronomic presuppositions that bring new colours and depths to the metaphorical landscape in Prov 1–9. This discursive context created by these two Deuteronomic elements ethically employs the Deuteronomic imagery and narrative concerning the journey toward the promised land as an epistemological context of the parental instructions. We have observed how this narrative context may aid the parental instructions to be more effective as it engenders moral imagination to rethink the son’s moral life in terms of his forefather’s historical journey toward the promised land.

According to MacIntyre’s meta-ethical framework, this narrative context is not only effective in understanding human life but also absolutely necessary. It brings a unity to personhood, making one’s socio-ethical practices intelligible and placing them in the context of a “bigger” story in which a person finds meaning, direction, *telos*, and identity.¹²⁴ Therefore, this narrative unity has two levels of conception, individual and communal. A person’s individual life manifests many actions and behaviours that cannot

¹²³ Zehnder, *Wegmetaphorik*, 474. Cf. Brown, *Seeing the Psalms*, 49–50.

¹²⁴ MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 216.

be made intelligible unless we understand the person's narrative history. In a similar vein, the person's individual narrative would lack intelligibility and a sense of continuity without the context of communal history to which the person belongs. By ignoring this narrative context, one inevitably lacks a narrative unity, making the person feel that "his or her life is meaningless."¹²⁵ Conversely, through this narrative context, people also find a sense of meaning, direction, and purpose since they realize they are "bearers of a particular social identity" belonging to a moral tradition which has its own moral limitations and particularities of the community.¹²⁶ In this regard, "the individual's search for his or her good is generally and characteristically conducted within a context defined by those traditions of which the individual's life is a part, and this is true both of those goods which are internal to practices and of the goods of a single life."¹²⁷

The son's search for his good in Prov 1–9 is guided by the parental instructions that create a Deuteronomic context where the Way metaphor teaches the moral norms of the Torah and the "life in the land" motif helps him imagine human flourishing at its best. This ethical function of narrative context then is to help the son achieve a narrative unity in his life which is essential for moral formation.¹²⁸

How then does the narrative context work with the land reference and the Way metaphor to formulate ethical teachings for the son within Prov 1–9? Just as the distinction between the journey narrative and the Way metaphor becomes "blurry"

¹²⁵ MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 217.

¹²⁶ MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 220–22.

¹²⁷ MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 222.

¹²⁸ As will be discussed in the next chapter, moral formation requires acquirement of virtues, and MacIntyre (*After Virtue*, 219) argues that the virtues are what form our moral character and sustain us in our "quest" for the good.

within Deuteronomy (Zehnder), so it does in Prov 2 where we observe blurriness occurring between the Way metaphor and the narrative context concerning the land.¹²⁹ Drawing from Lindbeck, McConville asserts that the symbolic world(s) produced by the Bible is(are) “narrationally structured,” and it is these “symbolic systems within which events, discourses and persons are found to make sense.”¹³⁰ What this may conversely mean is that “the land” as a destination of the Way metaphor in Prov 1–9 cannot be disconnected from its narrative setting which is applied to Prov 1–9 in three ways.

(1) Conditionality of Human Flourishing: In Prov 2:21–22, the land as a reward can be associated with either “dwelling” (שכן) and “remaining” (יתר) or “being cut off” (כרת) and “tearing away” (נסח). As the Deuteronomic narrative goes, Israelites flourish in the promised land only if they obey the Mosaic Torah. If they disobey, they are cut off from it. This conditional promise is understood as the covenant term in Deuteronomy.¹³¹ Proverbs 2:21–22 presupposes this narrative context for the Way metaphor given their strategic position and their metaphorical significance as the ultimate destination. Put in this way, the son can flourish in life with favour and good repute (v. 4), success (v. 6), physical well-being (v. 8), abundance (v. 10), and ultimately father-son relationship with YHWH (v. 12) only by adhering to the moral norms (or “ways”) of the Torah instructed by the parents. Thus, while the “life in the land” is understood in a metaphorical sense, it can lead the son to conceptualize his obedience to the parental torah as fulfillment of

¹²⁹ In this regard, McConville argues that “the projected worlds of the Bible have a connection with the surface narratives of texts, but are not dependent on strictly narrative types of discourse, because they have to do with the symbol-systems within which events, discourses and persons are found to make sense.”

¹³⁰ McConville, “Metaphor, Symbol and the Interpretation,” 343; Lindbeck, “Interpretation,” 33, 35.

¹³¹ Arnold, *Deuteronomy 1–11*, 69–70.

covenant obligations which in turn brings a narrative unity in his moral life and character.¹³²

(2) The Re-enactment of Moses' Torah Education: Using Lohfink's study on speech-acts, McConville argues that Moses' speeches on the covenant establish a paradigm for intergenerational education and for the teaching role to ensure the ongoing vitality of the covenant.¹³³ In a similar vein, O'Kelly correctly argues that Prov 1–9 is “a *re-enactment* of the familial educational setting and the transmission of tradition it envisions.”¹³⁴ The prologue of Proverbs then is part of the moral tradition that models Moses' Torah education and actualizes his command to teach the children the *Torah* of YHWH in a familial setting. This storied context is conducive to moral imagination that this family education is not merely moral education but a way of preserving and ensuring human flourishing for the faith community (Prov 4:3–9). It also helps the son to identify himself with the moral tradition and integrate its “ways” into the very practice of his moral life.

(3) Moral Life as Journey: If the reference to the land in Prov 2:21–22 produces a narrative context, then the Way metaphor may also presuppose Israel's journey toward the promised land, recasting the son's moral life in terms of a journey toward human flourishing. The metaphor schema, MORAL LIFE IS A WAR, suggests that there are many moral dangers and perils awaiting the son on his way toward human flourishing. Through these moral challenges which the parent warns about and even simulates for

¹³² MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 218.

¹³³ McConville, “Metaphor, Symbol and the Interpretation,” 344–45; Lohfink, “Bund,” 220–21, 238.

¹³⁴ O'Kelly, “Wisdom,” 103. The emphasis is mine.

him in Prov 7:6–23, he is to walk and discern the ways of wisdom to reach human flourishing, which is also a major shaping force of the son’s moral character. In a similar vein, MacIntyre conceptualizes the narrative unity as “a quest” arguing that “only through encountering and coping with the various particular harms, dangers, temptations and distractions which provide any quest with its episodes and incidents that the goal of the quest is finally to be understood. A quest is always an education both as to the character of that which is sought and in self-knowledge.”¹³⁵ The goal of the quest is clearly stated as “life in the land” (Prov 2:21), yet what this flourishing life exactly entails is unknown to the son beyond what is promised in the Torah (3:4, 6, 8, 10, 12). Curiously, the goal is also clearly related to “fear of YHWH” (2:5; 9:10) which we will explore further in the next chapter. Regardless, it is certain that the parent’s didactic goal is not merely to teach him how to accumulate material abundance; rather, it is to have his character formed and his identity found by guiding him through the right pathways amid all the moral challenges.

(4) Virtues as Ways: While the metaphorical ways in Prov 1–9 portray the moral norms of the Torah, within the context of Prov 1–9, most of them also represent the moral virtues which are to be embodied by the son. They are described in terms of “ways” because a virtue is “a perduring way of life that characterizes our actions and our disposition.”¹³⁶

In short, by strategically positioning “the land” and connecting it with the Way metaphor, a presupposition of the Deuteronomic narrative is produced within Prov 1–9.

¹³⁵ MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 219.

¹³⁶ Wilson, “Virtue(s),” 812.

This narrative context, ethically applied, offers a new horizon of understanding for the conditionality of the promise, the human flourishing, and the moral quest involved in the son's moral life.

Conclusion

In this chapter, the Way metaphor in Deuteronomy, post-canonical literature, and Prov 1–9 is examined to demonstrate that this particular metaphor constitutes part of the DMT that defines many ways of life in terms of the standard and norm of the Torah. Also, the Way metaphor schema consists of bipolar destinations one of which is pictured as the promised land (Prov 2:21–22). The DMT's moral vision of "life in the land" has some implications for the covenant relationship with YHWH, familial moral education and life, and character virtues to be inculcated in the son.

CHAPTER 5: FEAR OF YHWH AS FOUNDATION AND *TELOS*

Introduction

In Chapter 3, we argued that the Deuteronomic *Shema* in the parental instructions (Prov 3, 6, and 7) opens up the discursive space offering a cross-section of moral practice in the Deuteronomic moral tradition. The didactic elements of moral education demonstrably include their standards of excellence, authority, and the “heart” pedagogy with its rewards. In Chapter 4, we scrutinized the Way metaphor and the heteroglossia of “the land” hybridizing the narrative context of “The Life in the Land” into that of the parental instructions. These intertextual operators and literary conventions from Deuteronomy are historically extended to form a storied epistemological context that offers unity in familial moral education in a different time and place.

If Prov 1–9 is a cross-section of the moral tradition with the Deuteronomic *Shema* and the promised land representing ethical practice and narrative context, respectively, then the concept of the fear of YHWH signifies the foundation and *telos* of this moral tradition. In a similar vein, Moses emphasizes “to fear YHWH” not only as the foundational disposition necessary for hearing and obeying the authoritative Torah but also as their didactic goal. In Prov 1–9, the fear of YHWH refers to a foundational

disposition for wisdom and character toward which the parental wisdom directs the son.¹ I will develop this point in the course of this chapter, but for now, it suffices to state that this fear is ultimately what parental wisdom attempts to instill in the son in this first collection of Proverbs. This transcendent concept ordered the moral life of ancient Israel and was intricately interwoven into Israel's covenant relationship with YHWH.² The phrases, "the fear of YHWH" and "to fear YHWH," appear twenty times in the book of Proverbs and six times in Prov 1–9 alone, underscoring its significance as a *leitmotif* within the book.³

In this chapter, I will argue that the fear of YHWH (especially Prov 1:7; 2:5; 9:10) signifies the foundation and *telos* of the parental instructions, marking the initial and final stages of character formation envisioned in parental instructions. It will also be argued that this understanding of the fear of YHWH is derived from the Deuteronomic moral tradition. In this regard, my first focus will be on exploring the term "fear" (ירא), as it pertains to YHWH, and categorizing its different uses within Deuteronomy. Then, I will analyze the usage of the fear of YHWH in Prov 1–9 with its concept presupposing the DMT. Lastly, the fear of YHWH in Prov 1–9 is conceptualized as the first point *and* the first milestone of a developmental process for moral formation as depicted in Prov

¹ In this regard, some scholars such as Fox (*Proverbs 1–9*, 69) finds that "the fear of God is the sphere within which wisdom is possible and can be realized, the precondition for both wisdom and ethical behaviour." Yet, some others such as Weeks (*Instruction and Imagery*, 118) adamantly contends that "the fear of YHWH is something that one gains from wisdom and knowledge, not *vice versa*."

² The book of Proverbs is often assumed as distinct from the concept of *Heilsgeschichte* and covenant which are quintessential in Deuteronomy. Yet, it will become clearer later in this chapter that the Deuteronomic language stock in Prov 1–9 evinces against such a proposal. Waltke (*Proverbs 1–15*, 64–125) views Proverbs as seamlessly connected to the biblical theology of the OT. Cf. Dell, *Proverbs*, 125–54.

³ In Prov 1–9, 1:7; 1:29; 2:5; 3:7; 8:13; 9:10. In the rest of the book, 10:27; 14:2, 26, 27; 15:16, 33; 16:6; 19:23; 22:4; 23:17; 24:21; 28:14; 29:25; 31:30.

1:7, 2:5 and 9:10.⁴ As I will argue, this developmental process involves the moral virtues (Prov 1:3 and 2:9) that the parental wisdom seeks to instill in the son to effectively guide him in the direction toward a character that embodies this fear.

Fear of YHWH in Deuteronomy

In Deuteronomy, the concept of fear expressed through various words including the lexeme ירא is employed forty-four times in all of its cognate forms, and its variegated meaning ranges from terror to loyal allegiance and trust. Our aim here will not be a comprehensive study of these terms in the book but only in their relation to Prov 1–9 where it is almost exclusively devoted to YHWH as the modifier or object (i.e., “the fear of YHWH” [יראת יהוה] in 1:7; 1:29; 2:5; 8:13; 9:10, and “to fear YHWH” [ירא את־יהוה] in 3:7).⁵ For this reason, I will only probe the occurrences that are semantically related to YHWH, paying special attention to collocations of other related terms in their contexts.

Block proposes that there is a gradation of eight types of fear in Deuteronomy: terror, fright, anxiety, awe, reverence, submission, allegiance, and trust.⁶ These categories are, however, neither mutually exclusive nor distinct from one another as, for example, fear as a reverent attitude is often connected with trust in YHWH. Rather, they depict different dimensions of fear that are more emphasized than others in a given

⁴ I use the term, “milestone,” with an intention to convey a sense that the fear of YHWH representing the foundation and the end goal of character development cannot be “possessed” as material goods. Rather, it marks developmental stages of moral virtues which once acquired continue to grow into the person’s character (Prov 1:5; 9:8b–9). The fear of YHWH is the ultimate *telos* in the sense of maturing a person into, what MacIntyre (*After Virtue*, 175) refers to as, “a certain kind of life” that may be best explained by this fear. This point concerning human *telos* in relation to moral formation will be elaborated in the moral implication section.

⁵ The only exception is 3:25 where the father tells the son not to fear (ירא) sudden dread.

⁶ Block, *The Triumph*, 286.

context. Gruber simply postulates two categories of fear in the OT, fear as terror and fear as reverence.⁷ In the latter case, I will argue that fear is depicted as both a foundational disposition toward YHWH necessary for obedience and a didactic goal often associated with the verb למד.

First, in Deuteronomy, fear as an emotion is experienced in the terrifying encounter with YHWH (e.g., 5:5) and the threats of divine judgment (e.g., 13:12[11]; 17:13; 21:21). For instance, when Moses describes the fear that the Israelites experienced in the theophany at Mount Horeb, he says: “. . . you were terrified (יראתם) because of the fire and did not go up the mountain” (Deut 5:5). These occurrences of ירא describe human emotions characteristically associated with direct exposure to the divine presence or action in Deuteronomy.

Second, fear also expresses a reverent disposition toward YHWH as exemplified in Deut 6:13, 24; 8:6; 10:12, 20.⁸ In these cases, this fear is first associated with God’s benevolent acts of deliverance from the Egyptian slavery and/or generous gift of the land (Deut 6:10–12, 20–23), fatherly care for the Israelites on the way to the promised land (8:1–5), forgiveness (10:10–11), and generosity (10:18–19) that lead to the command to fear YHWH. Here the command to fear YHWH in each passage is related to God’s

⁷ Gruber (“Fear, Anxiety and Reverence,” 412) finds parallel expressions in Akkadian and Aramaic that have these two connotations. In a similar vein, Arnold (“The Love-Fear Antinomy,” 563) argues that ירא has “respectful awe or reverence, on the one hand, but also terror, on the other.” In a different vein, Eichrodt (*Theology of the OT*, 2:269) views bipolarity of fear where “anxiety” and “trust” are on each bipolar end of the spectrum while “awe” is in the centre of this religious emotion.

⁸ Arnold (“The Love-Fear Antinomy,” 565–66) insightfully points out that “there is something fundamentally similar—even identical—between the fear-response in combat and the correct posture of adoration and veneration before king and god.” Therefore, while we mention a reverent disposition, it does not preclude the affective dimension of the term which includes terror. See also Strawn, “Iconography.”

generous acts in different ways but all point to God's grace toward his chosen people (7:7; 8:17) to be the reason to be wholly committed to him.⁹

For instance, in Deut 6:10–12, while iterating the gift of land, the main concern is spiritual amnesia where they, and their children (vv. 20–23), may “forget” (שכח, v. 12) YHWH.¹⁰ Concerning Deut 6:10–12, Arnold further comments that vv. 12–13 is “a sermon expansion” of the Ten Commandments.¹¹ With the reminder of past deliverance from slavery functioning as the preface, the command to fear YHWH alludes to the first commandment to be wholly devoted to him and not to “follow” (הלך) other gods. Similarly, in the context of the catechistic lesson (6:24), the parent teaches the son that YHWH commanded them not only to perform the statutes but also to fear YHWH.¹² As Arnold comments, the fear here indicates “covenant-centred reverence so closely linked to the love of God.”¹³ In other words, Israelites are not called to perform statutes only but also to “fear” YHWH, addressing the inner faculty of the subject toward YHWH.¹⁴

This use of fear is also found in Deut 10:12–13 where Moses summarizes five “primary moral values” in the covenant piety.¹⁵ However, the grammatical construction of vv. 12–13 seems to suggest that these two verses do not merely list the moral values but also express their relationships to one another:

⁹ McConville, *Deuteronomy*, 189–90.

¹⁰ Arnold, *Deuteronomy 1–11*, 410.

¹¹ Arnold, *Deuteronomy 1–11*, 411.

¹² The ל preposition before the infinitive form of ירא seems to function as an explicative to describe the manner of an action. See Arnold and Choi, *Biblical Hebrew Syntax*, 76–77; van Merwe, *Reference Grammar*, 352.

¹³ Arnold, *Deuteronomy 1–11*, 426.

¹⁴ Block, *The Triumph*, 309.

¹⁵ Arnold, *Deuteronomy 1–11*, 558.

And now, Israel, what does YHWH your God ask (שאל) of you?
 except to fear (כי אם-ליראה) YHWH your God,
 by walking (ללכת) in all his ways¹⁶
 and to love him (ולאהבה אתו)
 and to serve (ולעבד) YHWH your God with all your heart and soul
 by keeping (לשמר) the commandments of YHWH and his statutes
 which I am commanding you today for your good.

The question asked here is an ethical one as it concerns what YHWH requires from the Israelites in their very life in the land. All five verbs here are in the infinitive form with the preposition ל; however, the conjunction ו does not precede the two infinitive phrases, “by walking” (ללכת) and “by keeping” (לשמר). This grammatical arrangement may epexegetically signify the ethical outworking (i.e., walking and keeping) of the inner dispositions expressed as fear, love, and wholehearted service.¹⁷ Furthermore, since “fear” is named before other verbs, Block suggests that “This was not only the ‘first principle of knowledge’ . . . and the ‘beginning of wisdom’ . . . it was also the first principle of covenant piety.”¹⁸ We also note here that the fear of YHWH paired with “follow” (הלך) spearheads a list of verbs in 13:5[4] where it makes the most sense to perceive it as an attitude that enables one to keep (שמר) his commandments and his voice, serve (עבד) him, and cling to him (דבק). This fear then, in combination with love and whole-hearted service, may describe a disposition or inner attitude that is foundational to external loyalty and obedience.

¹⁶ There are five infinitive phrases constructed with the preposition ל followed by verbs in infinitive construct form. Strangely, the conjunction ו is employed only in front of “to love” (אהב) and “to serve” (עבד). “To love,” structurally centred, is often interpreted as the central element in this litany (Christensen, *Deuteronomy 1:1—21:9*, 204; Craigie, *Deuteronomy*, 204). However, Robson (*A Handbook*, 318) convincingly argues that the arrangement of ו here suggests that the ones without it (i.e., “to walk” [הלך] and “to keep” [שמר]) do not function as the complement of שאל but as an adjunct that is “gerundial or explanatory,” clarifying what precedes it.

¹⁷ Robson, *A Handbook*, 317–19.

¹⁸ Block, *The Triumph*, 309.

In Deuteronomy, fear (ירא) frequently appears concurrently with “love” (אהב) as we just witnessed in 10:12–13.¹⁹ O’Kelly argues that in Deut 6, ירא and אהב are “used virtually [interchangeably]” as they appear in vv. 2, 13 and vv. 4–5, respectively, though I concur with Arnold that they are purposefully distinguished while sharing a similar semantic domain that pertains to the relationship with YHWH.²⁰ Arnold critiques the consensus within biblical scholarship that the injunction to “love” YHWH in Deuteronomy is interpreted solely in cognitive terms, focusing on covenant loyalty and obedience, while neglecting its affective dimension.²¹ He then argues that just as love has both cognitive and affective aspects, so does fear.²² In this respect, while fear is closely associated with submission to YHWH (6:1–2; 8:6; 10:12, 20; 13:5[4]), its significance is also in the affective. In Arnold’s own words, it is “the covenant-centred, value-building reverence often associated with Israel’s wisdom tradition (Prov 1:7), which yields obedience as a by-product.”²³ In a similar vein, Lapsley comments that the injunction to love YHWH is not “an irrelevant footnote to obedience to the law, but is *fundamental* to a proper relationship with God.”²⁴

¹⁹ Arnold (“The Love-Fear Antinomy,” 559, 562) observes that ירא and אהב appear fifteen times and eleven times, respectively, in Deut 5–11 alone.

²⁰ O’Kelly, “Wisdom,” 104; Arnold, “The Love-Fear Antinomy,” 567. Arnold (551) insightfully suggests that “love” and “fear” are complementary in Deuteronomy as “love” is restricted “in order to prevent an affection devoid of reverence” while “fear” is conversely “restricted to prevent a terror devoid of delight.”

²¹ Such scholars as William L. Moran and Susan Ackerman derive this conception of “love” from comparison with other ancient Near Eastern treaties that are analogous to Deuteronomy and employ the term only in a political sense without any note of emotion. In contrast, Arnold (“The Love-Fear Antinomy,” 560–61) concludes that אהב in Deuteronomy “denotes more than natural affections, but certainly not less than affection.”

²² Arnold in his article uses two categories of cognitive and affective dimensions in describing love and fear. Although he does not explicitly define these terms, the “cognitive” dimension seems to refer to cognition and behaviour while the “affective” dimension to emotion and disposition.

²³ Arnold, “The Love-Fear Antinomy,” 566–67.

²⁴ Lapsley, “Feeling Our Way,” 369 (emphasis mine).

Fear as reverence is also depicted as a learnable goal in Deut 4:10; 6:2; 14:23; 17:19; 31:12, 13. In these contexts, fear is treated as something that can and must be learned and internalized by the Israelites entering the promised land and is associated with למד (“to learn” or “to teach”) in almost all cases except in 6:2. Put in another way, the fear of YHWH is conceptualized as a primary learning goal of Mosaic instructions in Deuteronomy that is critical not only for the generation entering the land but also for all their subsequent generations. To note, it is critical not to assume here that the fear of YHWH can be acquired as a subject learned at school. Rather, in this context, to fear YHWH appears to describe a goal attainable by living mindfully and safeguarding emotions through hearing and obeying YHWH’s commandments (4:10), which is then formed into habit, lifestyle, and even moral character.²⁵ Fear with preposition ל or למען indicating the purpose is found in Deut 4:10; 6:2; 17:13, 19; and 31:12–13.²⁶

In this regard, the context of Deut 4:10 is interesting since here in Deut 4, Moses recounts the direct encounter with YHWH at Mount Horeb and uses it as “the ground of an appeal to Moab generation and all future generations.”²⁷ In Deut 4:10, the divine command is recalled: “Assemble the people to me, that I may let them hear (שמע) my words so to learn (למד) to fear (ליראה) me all the days that they live in the land.” In the given context, fear may express sheer terror of direct exposure to YHWH. Yet, McConville points out that in v. 10 Moses is newly introduced as a mediator between

²⁵ In this regard, Arnold (*Deuteronomy 1–11*, 373) comments that “the fear of God commanded in Deuteronomy is both cognitive, ensuring that one’s mind directs one’s behaviour on the correct path, and affective, safeguarding one’s emotions partly as a result of one’s cognitive commitment.”

²⁶ Arnold and Choi, *Biblical Hebrew Syntax*, 111, 115.

²⁷ McConville, *Deuteronomy*, 104.

YHWH and the people.²⁸ Here it is described as if Moses alone was standing before the presence of YHWH (“You [עמרת, s.] stood before YHWH . . . he said to me [אלי]). He argues that this sets the tone for the recollection of Mount Horeb in the rest of the chapter, and the point is clearly made in 5:23–27 where the people’s request for Moses to be the mediator is accepted. Thus, McConville concludes: “Deuteronomy emphasizes that Israel meets God primarily by means of his word, and to that end this passage will mitigate the idea of the vision of God, and highlight the role of Moses, the ‘teacher’ of the word.”²⁹ In this way, as Deuteronomy unfolds, “learning” to fear YHWH becomes increasingly associated with internalization of the Torah itself and inner disposition of commitment to YHWH.

Again in 6:2, fear with the preposition למען in v. 2 is understood as Moses’ goal for teaching (למד) God’s commandments (מצוה), statutes (חקים) and judgments (משפטים). In 17:13, Moses orders the presumptuous one who does not respect the ruling of the priest “according to the terms of the Torah” (על־פי התורה) to be put to death so that all the people may hear (שמע) and fear (ירא).” Though the object of “hear” and “fear” is not indicated, by implication it refers to the Torah as divine teaching from YHWH. In other words, the execution of justice according to divine teaching has the anticipated outcome of fear and obedience. In 17:19, the instruction is for the future king in Israel; that this Torah is read (קרא) and observed (עשה) so that he may learn to fear YHWH (למען ילמד ליראה את־יהוה). Again, the preposition למען articulates this fear as the didactic aim. In 19:20, an eye-for-an-eye approach is commanded for the violator of the ninth

²⁸ McConville, *Deuteronomy*, 105.

²⁹ McConville, *Deuteronomy*, 106.

commandment bearing false witness to the end that the rest may hear (שמע) and fear (ירא). In 31:12–13, Moses commands that the Torah be read in the assembly of Israel “so that (למען) they may hear (שמע) and so that (למען) they may learn (למד) and fear (ירא) YHWH your God” (v. 12). In v. 13, he repeats “hear” and “learn to fear” except the subject to this command are “their children.”

In these passages of Deuteronomy, the fear of YHWH does not only refer to emotions or a reverent disposition but also the didactic aim of YHWH’s instructions Moses delivered within the context of covenantal piety. We note that the concept of fear is frequently collocated with such terms as “read” (קרא), “hear” (שמע), “obey” (שמר), and “teach/learn” (למד), acting either as the attitude required for these actions or as their didactic goal which attains the internal good of these activities, a moral character aligned with such reverence toward YHWH. Block helpfully observes that Deut 17:19–20 and 31:11–13 where fear is collocated with these four verbs also relate fear to the Torah,³⁰ alluding to the importance of internalizing the Torah for acquiring this fear as part of the learning process. In particular, second, fear is either paralleled with or acts as the object of the verb למד (*qal*: to learn; *piel*: to teach) indicating that the concept of fear is a didactic aim. In Deut 6:24–25, as mentioned above, this educational goal may allude to character formation (i.e., “righteousness” as our good”). Finally, fear is also closely associated with the promise of “life in the land” as a reward (4:10; 6:3; 17:19; 31:13) and child education (4:10; 31:13) betraying its ethical, didactic dimension. This dual notion of the fear of YHWH as a foundational disposition and didactic goal in

³⁰ Block, *The Triumph*, 297.

Deuteronomy seems presupposed in the parental instructions of Prov 1–9 as the moral framework though with some of their particularities.

Fear of YHWH as Foundation and *Telos* of Moral Formation in Proverbs 1–9

Fear of YHWH is the central link between Deuteronomy and Prov 1–9 as Block rightly argues.³¹ The theological significance of the fear of YHWH in Deuteronomy is comparable to its moral emphasis in Prov 1–9 where the phrase is similarly conceptualized as both the foundational disposition required for and didactic *telos* aimed at by parental discourse. In this section, we investigate (1) the structural and conceptual integrity of the fear of YHWH within Prov 1–9; (2) ways in which the phrase is conceptualized and presupposes its Deuteronomic concept; (3) its depiction as part of moral formation; and (4) moral virtues involved in this process. We also keep a close eye on how the fear of YHWH in Prov 1–9 presupposes its Deuteronomic concept to create a discursive space for moral discourse.

Structural and Conceptual Importance of Fear of YHWH in Proverbs 1–9

Before discussing the fear of YHWH as both the foundation and *telos* of parental instructions, we first examine its structural and conceptual significance within Prov 1–9. According to Waltke, this prologue to the entire book has a clear literary structure consisting of a preamble (1:1–7) and a chiastic arrangement of the rest (1:8—9:18) where the fear of YHWH appears in structurally important places including the preamble

³¹ Block, *The Triumph*

(1:7) and the epilogue (9:10) forming an *inclusio* around the first collection.³² The phrase is also dispersed in 1:29; 2:5; 3:7; and 8:13 indicating its close integration into the rest of the literary unit. Furthermore, in a wider scope, it also makes an appearance in the second last verse (31:30) thus framing the entire book.³³

It is often thought that Proverbs has undergone several stages of literary evolution from primitive pithy sayings to advanced discourse and from secular wisdom to Yahwistic wisdom. The underlying assumption of this theory is that secular wisdom is original and Yahwistic wisdom secondary.³⁴ This redactional view often seems forced and artificial. For instance, Whybray, a strong advocate of this theory, separates the subsections of Prov 1–9 into two groups of secular and Yahwistic wisdom where the latter was redacted into the former in two stages of expansion. He argues that the first stage involved the addition of personified Wisdom and the second stage that of the concept of the fear of YHWH as an effort to bring together wisdom and Yahwism.³⁵ The hurdle to his claim is Prov 3:1–12 where the entire instruction is centred on the Yahwistic elements of trusting (v. 5), acknowledging (v. 6), fearing (v. 7), and honouring (v. 9) YHWH.³⁶ They are also intertwined with secular concerns such as successful life, physical healing, and material abundance.³⁷ McKane's assertion that the parental instruction in Prov 3:1–12 was modified unrecognizably to align with Yahwistic piety is

³² Waltke, *Proverbs 1–15*, 12. In particular, rival invitations of the father and the gang to the son (A [1:8–19]) and Wisdom's rebuke of the uninstructed (B [1:20–33]) are reverberated in Wisdom's invitation to the uninstructed (B' [8:1–36]) and rival invitations of Wisdom and the foolish woman to the naïve (A' [9:1–18]).

³³ Murphy, *Proverbs*, 255; O'Kelly, "Wisdom," 98–99; Schipper, *Proverbs 1–15*, 70.

³⁴ For further discussion, see Whybray, *Wisdom in Proverbs*, 72–104; McKane, *Proverbs*, 1–22.

³⁵ Whybray, *Wisdom in Proverbs*, 72–104.

³⁶ Whybray, *The Composition*, 59; Dell, *Proverbs*, 92.

³⁷ Weeks, *Instruction and Imagery*, 99.

unfounded and speculative.³⁸ Like Whybray, he presupposes that the Yahwistic element of both Prov 1:7 and 9:10 was not part of the original constituent of wisdom but was redacted later as per a “Yahwistic reinterpretation.”³⁹ However, this redactional construal of the fear of YHWH is possible only if we already assume that the Yahwistic element is separable from the rest.⁴⁰

In contrast, other scholars have contended that the fear of YHWH is conceptually and structurally inherent to the book and not merely a religious addendum to secular wisdom. Interestingly, von Rad, while subscribing to the evolutionary view of Israelite wisdom, still argues that conceptually “for Israel there was only a single, unified world of experience . . . Later teachers, then, are no different from the earlier ones, who already derived perceptions from experiences of Yahweh.”⁴¹ In a different vein, Dell argues that the fear of YHWH uniquely functions in the book as the “bridge between the educational and religious contexts.”⁴² For instance, the fear of YHWH is closely identified with knowledge/wisdom in 1:7; 1:29; 2:5 and 9:10 and cannot be separated from them. Particularly, in Prov 1:7, the phrase structurally frames all other wisdom-related terms in Prov 1:2–6 which may otherwise be considered “secular” without the fear of YHWH.⁴³ This secular-Yahwistic connection is reinforced via the *inclusio* between “To know [לדעת]” and “wisdom and instruction” in v. 2a and the reprise of “knowledge” (דעת) and

³⁸ McKane, *Proverbs*, 8.

³⁹ McKane, *Proverbs*, 264, 368. He also divides each sentence proverb in Prov 10–29 into three classes the last of which manifests Yahwistic piety (11–12).

⁴⁰ Weeks, *Early Israelite Wisdom*, 59.

⁴¹ von Rad, *Wisdom in Israel*, 70.

⁴² Dell, *Proverbs*, 95. Also see Murphy, *Proverbs*, 256; and Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 71.

⁴³ Brown, *Wisdom's Wonder*, 33–36. See also Bartholomew and O'Dowd, *Wisdom Literature*, 44.

“wisdom and instruction” (חכמה ומוסר) in v. 7.⁴⁴ This literary device not only marks off this section (vv. 2–7) but also uses the fear of YHWH (v. 7a) as a way of characterizing knowledge, wisdom, and even parental instructions.⁴⁵ This conceptual integration of the fear of YHWH combined with its structural significance evinces that it is “an integral part of the structure of many of the genres and of chapters [in Proverbs].”⁴⁶

Is Fear of YHWH Foundation, *Telos*, or Both?

Now then, we turn to the question of how the relationship between wisdom/knowledge and the fear of YHWH is portrayed in Prov 1–9 as it may further help us understand the ethical function of the latter within this context. There has been a “chicken and egg” controversy concerning whether the fear of YHWH as an initial disposition toward YHWH must precede the acquisition of wisdom or wisdom as a means must orient one toward the fear of YHWH. This conundrum comes mainly from some lexical ambiguities that arise from two words, ראשית (Prov 1:7) and תחלה (Prov 9:10). These terms associate the fear of YHWH with wisdom/knowledge in a similar fashion and both are typically translated as “beginning” in most English translations.

Prov 1:7 יראת יהוה ראשית דעת (The Fear of YHWH is the beginning of knowledge)

Prov 9:10 תחלת חכמה יארת יהוה (The beginning of wisdom is the fear of YHWH)

⁴⁴ Waltke, *Proverbs 1–15*, 180–81.

⁴⁵ Dell, *Proverbs*, 95; cf. Clifford, *Proverbs*, 34.

⁴⁶ Dell, *Proverbs*, 123.

Waltke suggests that ראשית could mean (1) temporally (“first thing”), (2) qualitatively (“chief thing”), and (3) philosophically (“principal thing”).⁴⁷ Fox and von Rad assert that the option quickly narrows down to (1) if we consider תחלה in 9:10 which unmistakably refers to a temporal beginning as a precondition or precedent to wisdom/knowledge.⁴⁸ Waltke and others creatively amalgamate (1) and (3), arguing that the “first thing” could also be the “principal thing”⁴⁹ just as a cornerstone is both first and foundational to an ancient structure. Thus, for them, the fear of YHWH is a prior attitude that is foundational to acquiring wisdom.⁵⁰

On the contrary, Weeks and subsequently O’Kelly argue that the fear of YHWH does not precede wisdom and knowledge but results from them. Weeks does not consider the fear of YHWH as distinct but rather as occupying the first part of the wisdom acquisition process. He rejects the assertion that ראשית and תחלה could signify the *basis* of wisdom/knowledge, as it is not employed in this manner anywhere in the OT.⁵¹ Weeks claims that תחלה (9:10) is a “beginning” in the sense of “the first point” (result) in order.⁵² The construct chain of תחלה and חכמה, Weeks claims, implies that the latter is viewed as “a continuing state or process” and the former as “the first point.”⁵³ Furthermore, he argues, it is in this same sense that ראשית is also used to indicate “first

⁴⁷ Waltke, *Proverbs 1–15*, 181.

⁴⁸ Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 67–68; von Rad, *Wisdom in Israel*, 66.

⁴⁹ Waltke, *Proverbs 1–15*, 181.

⁵⁰ Waltke, *Proverbs 1–15*, 181; Block, *The Triumph*, 305; Schipper, *Proverbs 1–15*, 71; Ansberry, “What Does Jerusalem Have to Do with Athens?” 161–62; Longman, *The Fear of the Lord*, 12–13.

⁵¹ Weeks argues that the only verse in the OT where it is even remotely similar to this use of the term ראשית is in Mic 1:13. Here Lachish might be portrayed as the “basis/beginning of sin” (ראשית חטאת) to Israel due to its idolatry. Weeks (*Instruction and Imagery*, 118) avers that even here the meaning is likely temporal and not conceptual.

⁵² Weeks, *Instruction and Imagery*, 118–19; O’Kelly, “Wisdom,” 107; Schwáb, “Fear of the Lord,” 658.

⁵³ Weeks, *Instruction and Imagery*, 118.

in a temporal sense, like the beginning of a season or the first fruit of a harvest.” In fact, this is precisely the way the term is used in Prov 3:9. Therefore, for Weeks, the fear of YHWH is the outcome of wisdom and knowledge, not vice versa.⁵⁴

He further elaborates his point by observing the ways in which the fear of YHWH is related to wisdom/knowledge in Prov 1–9. In 8:12–13, wisdom is syntagmatically parallel to the fear of YHWH and likewise identifies herself with hatred of evil. In 1:29, the fear of YHWH and knowledge are equated. In 2:5, the fear of YHWH is stated as something achieved in conjunction with the knowledge of God. Most importantly, this verse articulates that the fear of YHWH comes as a result of receiving parental instructions and seeking wisdom.⁵⁵ Proverbs 2:1–22 contains a series of protases (“if [אִם],” vv. 1, 3, 4) followed by a series of apodoses (“then [אָדָּם],” vv. 5–8, 9–11) where the first result of heeding parental instructions (v. 1), crying out for discernment (v. 3), and seeking out wisdom (v. 4) results in understanding the fear of YHWH (v. 5).

Weeks does not state what the fear of YHWH is in exact terms but nonetheless indicates that according to Prov 1–9, wisdom and knowledge are not merely a skill but a process of learning through the parental instructions the first outcome of which is the fear of YHWH. Fear of YHWH is then a certain condition or state reached by those who heed the parental instructions.⁵⁶ However, the question arises as to whether wisdom can be acquired without beginning with the fear of YHWH. Fox and von Rad compellingly

⁵⁴ Weeks, *Instruction and Imagery*, 118.

⁵⁵ Weeks, *Instruction and Imagery*, 115.

⁵⁶ Weeks, *Instruction and Imagery*, 112–13, 173.

argue that the answer is a resounding no.⁵⁷ Nonetheless, this way of portraying and associating the fear of YHWH with wisdom and knowledge can find some support from the Prov 1–9 text as he demonstrates that the fear of YHWH is the result of wisdom and knowledge, not a precondition, or an attitude required for gaining wisdom. Lastly, Weeks conjectures that this didactic notion of the phrase finds its root in the Jewish tradition founded on Deuteronomy where the fear of YHWH is likewise attained, though by learning the Torah as opposed to seeking and possessing wisdom.⁵⁸

O’Kelly further elaborates on this point concerning the fear of YHWH as being developed from its Deuteronomic notion. After making the identical claim about the two terms, תחלה and ראשית, he too concludes that they both refer to the first fruit of wisdom and knowledge in Prov 1:7 and 9:10. He then supports his claim with the concept of the fear of YHWH in Deuteronomy which, he claims, is also expressed in terms of obedience (Deut 5:29; 6:1–2; 10:12–13; 13:5[4]; 17:19; 31:12–13) which makes it achievable through “learning” (למד) YHWH’s commands in Deuteronomy (Deut 4:10; 14:23; 17:19; 31:12–13).⁵⁹ Therefore, O’Kelly views Prov 1–9 as a familial implementation of the Mosaic command to teach children in Deuteronomy and asserts that the fear of YHWH is the didactic goal of the parental instructions and wisdom in Prov 1–9.⁶⁰

I find both claims concerning the fear of YHWH as the foundation or the outcome of wisdom only partially convincing. What is missing from both arguments is a

⁵⁷ von Rad, *Wisdom in Israel*, 66–67; Fox *Proverbs 1–9*, 69.

⁵⁸ Weeks, *Instruction and Imagery*, 117.

⁵⁹ O’Kelly, “Wisdom,” 104–5.

⁶⁰ O’Kelly, “Wisdom,” 110; Cf. Block, *The Triumph*, 309–10; Schipper, “Teach Them Diligently,” 27–28.

possible consideration that perhaps the fear of YHWH is *both* the foundation *and* the desired outcome of wisdom and instruction as we have observed in Deuteronomy. In this regard, Schwáb makes an interesting suggestion that ראשית (1:7) and תחלה (9:10) may connote both the basis and outcome of wisdom.⁶¹ He rejects the reading of these terms as indicating that the fear of YHWH temporally precedes wisdom and agrees with Weeks that תחלה in 9:10 refers to the first result in order. Yet, his caveat is that we still cannot rule out its sense as *logical*—and not temporal—basis, especially for such an abstract notion as wisdom. He also points out that the fear of YHWH as the first manifestation of wisdom may as well signify the basis of wisdom. In the same vein, ראשית in 1:7 could also mean the first fruit and the basis of wisdom as its usage in Prov 4:7 seems to imply.⁶² O’Kelly criticizes this assertion that this ambivalent understanding of these two terms has no linguistic support from the OT. He also argues that the fear of YHWH never precedes wisdom logically in Prov 1–9; however, it is based on his pre-determined notion of these terms. It is also derived from his understanding of the fear of YHWH in Deuteronomy;⁶³ however, as discussed above, Deuteronomy presents the fear of YHWH as both a disposition and a didactic goal of learning.⁶⁴ Therefore, I contend that the fear of YHWH in Prov 1–9 presupposes its dual Deuteronomic notion.

My argument is similar to that of Schwáb since I view the fear of YHWH as both the foundation and didactic *telos* of wisdom; however, I do not subscribe to his ambivalent understanding of these two terms. Rather, the two terms, ראשית (1:7) and

⁶¹ Schwáb, “Fear of the Lord,” 661.

⁶² Schwáb, “Fear of the Lord,” 659.

⁶³ O’Kelly, “Wisdom,” 108.

⁶⁴ O’Kelly, “Wisdom,” 108–9.

תהלה (9:10), may have two distinct—even opposite—referents, namely the foundation and first result, respectively.⁶⁵ I support this argument using two lines of evidence: (1) a literary analysis within Prov 1–9, and (2) an intertextual reference to Deuteronomy.

Literary Evidence within Proverbs 1–9

O’Kelly contends that ראשית never refers to “principle” or “basis” in the OT, let alone Prov 1–9.⁶⁶ Yet, the other two uses of this term in Prov 1–9 (4:7 and 8:22) seem to go against his claim, implying both the “source/prerequisite” and the “beginning.” In 4:7 (“The beginning [ראשית] of wisdom: Acquire wisdom!”), it seems awkward to translate ראשית as the first fruit of wisdom since this verse in essence concerns *where* and *how* the acquisition of wisdom initiates. Therefore, it is much more intelligible to treat ראשית here as the starting point and source of wisdom.⁶⁷ This is even clearer in 8:22 where ראשית seems to imply both the first in time as well as the prerequisite of God’s work. Here Wisdom declares: “YHWH possessed me at the beginning (ראשית) of his way, before his works of old.” The term “before” (קדם) articulates which point in time ראשית refers to; it is before the point from which YHWH’s works began. In other words, YHWH possessed Wisdom temporally prior to his creating work. This context supports that Wisdom is at the beginning not merely as first in order but also as “primary and indispensable” for YHWH’s creation, and this message ripples throughout 8:22–31.⁶⁸

⁶⁵ Schwáb (“Fear of the Lord,” 654) argues that both terms may strangely refer to both prerequisite and result; even with consideration of poetic ambivalence, his construal seems to obscure the meaning of the text.

⁶⁶ O’Kelly, “Wisdom,” 107.

⁶⁷ Schwáb, “Fear of the Lord,” 659; Kidner (*Proverbs*, 64) interprets the verse as follows: “What it takes is not brains or opportunity, but decision. Do you want it? Come and get it.”

⁶⁸ Kidner, *Proverbs*, 74.

Therefore, at least in Prov 1–9, ראשית may indicate both the beginning *and* source/prerequisite of wisdom. Nonetheless, this answer is not definitive since ראשית is also employed to mean the “first fruit” of harvest (ראשית כל־תבואתך) in Prov 3:9, the sense Weeks and O’Kelly identify with תחלה referring to the first outcome of wisdom.

As far as תחלה is concerned, I suggest that Weeks’ interpretation may be generally correct. The term appears only once in the entire book of Proverbs and may communicate a different sense than ראשית in the context of Prov 1–9 though it is constructed in the same way as ראשית in relation to the fear of YHWH in Prov 1:7. As Arnold observes, out of twenty-three occurrences of תחלה in the OT, there are only a few instances (2 Kgs 17:25; Isa 1:26; Hos 1:2; Dan 8:1; 9:21, 23; Ezra 4:6; and Neh 11:17) where the term simply indicates “a former or earlier period in time” as opposed to “the first in a series of events or ideas.”⁶⁹ Thus, it is highly probable that תחלה signifies the first important milestone reached in the process of wisdom acquisition, a state of moral discernment described as the fear of YHWH.

Upon closer examination of the poetic parallelism in 1:7 and 9:10, it becomes apparent that ראשית signifies the beginning, while תחלה denotes the initial result.

Fear of YHWH (is)	יראת יהוה
the foundation of knowledge;	ראשית דעת
Wisdom and instruction	חכמה ומוסר
fools despise.	אוילים בזו
(Prov 1:7)	

⁶⁹ Arnold, “תחלה,” 4:286. The twenty-two occurrences are: Gen 13:3; 41:21; 43:18, 20; Judg 1:1; 20:18; 2 Sam 17:9; 21:9; 2 Kgs 17:25; Isa 1:26; Hos 1:2; Amos 7:1; Prov 9:10; Ruth 1:22; Eccl 10:13; Dan 8:1; 9:21, 23; Ezra 4:6; and Neh 11:17.

In this verse, the second line seems to function as a disambiguation of the first line, clarifying in what sense the fear of YHWH is the beginning of knowledge.⁷⁰ If the fear of YHWH is the starting point or prerequisite of all knowledge, then fools who neglect the fear of YHWH may hate wisdom and instruction due to the lack of the foundation.⁷¹ If we render the fear of YHWH as the first outcome of knowledge here, it does not align well with “fools” in the second line. Also, in the context of vv. 1–7 that states the purposes of the didactic discourse, the fear of YHWH may well be articulated as the initial step into the pursuit of wisdom rather than the result of it.

The first fruit of wisdom (is)	תחלת חכמה
the fear of YHWH	יראת יהוה
the knowledge of the holy one (is)	ודעת קדשים
understanding	בינה
(Prov 9:10)	

In Prov 9:10a, not only ראשית is replaced with תחלה but the word order of subject–predicate in 1:7 is also reversed to predicate–subject.⁷² In this nominal clause, the fear of YHWH is preceded by the first fruit of wisdom although the former still seems to be the subject.⁷³ However, the fronting of the predicate (“the first fruit of wisdom”) may highlight it as clarifying what the fear of YHWH is. Furthermore, “knowledge of the Holy One,” is syntagmatic to the fear of YHWH. The unusual use of “the holy one” (קדשים) in a construct relationship with “knowledge” (דעת) may point to the knowledge

⁷⁰ Berlin, *Biblical Parallelism*, 98–99.

⁷¹ Schipper, *Proverbs 1–15*, 70.

⁷² Loader, *Proverbs 1–9*, 394.

⁷³ Merwe (*Reference Grammar*, 495) argues that when there are two noun phrases in a verbless clause, “the relatively more definite phrase is regarded as the subject.” In Prov 9:10, the fear of YHWH seems more clearly defined than its predicate counterpart. However, as Merwe (509–10) suggests, the latter may have been fronted intentionally to bring it into focus.

ultimatum that is distinguished from other forms of knowledge in Prov 1–9.⁷⁴ Then, identified with the knowledge of God, the fear of YHWH seems depicted as a result of applying wisdom.⁷⁵

Another piece of evidence that תחלה in 9:10 may indicate the first result as opposed to beginning is its impressive lexical parallels with 2:5 where the fear of YHWH is clearly part of an apodotic statement (“אז”), alluding to the first harvest rather than the beginning.⁷⁶ That said, תבין (“to understand,” 2:5a) and יראת יהוה (“the fear of YHWH,” 2:5a) correspond with בינה (“understanding,” 9:10b) and יראת יהוה (“the fear of YHWH,” 9:10a). Also, דעת אלהים (“the knowledge of God,” 2:5b) is repeated in 9:10b with a slight variation: דעת קדשים (“the knowledge of the holy one,” 9:10b). As mentioned above, Meinhold names Prov 2 *Lehrprogramm* (“Curriculum”) and Schipper refers to it as a reading guide that “presupposes the other instructions.”⁷⁷ One of the ways in which Schipper argues Prov 2 functions in this way is by citing first lines of other instructions.⁷⁸ Thus, these lexical correspondences may signify the relationship between 2:5 and 9:10 and further support the claim that the latter refers to a result rather than the beginning.

Concerning תחלה, we could also consider the context of Prov 9 where we see an “uninstructed youth” (פתי, vv. 4, 16) having to decide on which of the final invitations by both Wisdom (vv. 1–6) and Folly (vv. 13–18) he or she will join. For the immature youth

⁷⁴ Waltke (*Proverbs 1–15*, 441) suggests that “the holy one” emphasizes “otherness” of this knowledge in “the sphere of his sacredness, separated from the mundane, the common, and the profane” although such a theological concept may not be directly imported into the moral language of Prov 1–9.

⁷⁵ Schipper (*Proverbs 1–15*, 332) argues that v. 10b does not advance but rather reiterates v. 10a, calling the poetic arrangement, “a synonymous declarative” (220).

⁷⁶ Concerning Prov 2:5 as an apodosis, see Schwáb, *Toward an Interpretation*, 133–34.

⁷⁷ Meinhold, *Die Sprüche*, 43; Schipper, *Hermeneutics*, 206.

⁷⁸ Schipper, *Hermeneutics*, 205–8.

taking the first step of his or her journey toward wisdom, this decision is difficult and random as both invitations sound very similar and persuasive. In contrast to the youth, between these two antithetical invitations, we also witness individuals who have matured in their journey either toward wisdom or folly (vv. 7–9). “A wise man” (חכם) and “a righteous man” (צדיק) have been formed by wisdom through parental instructions whereas “a scoffer” (לץ) and “a wicked man” (רשע) have solidified their resistant position to reproof (יבה). The most significant contrast between these two types is that the former receive instructions and reproof whereas the latter do not. Interestingly, the wise man and righteous man who initially reach a certain state of wisdom and righteousness do not stop growing; with further guidance, they grow wiser and increase in learning (v. 9).⁷⁹ This developmental concept of the fear of YHWH coheres with the idea that it is only the “first fruit” of wisdom which anticipates more harvest.

Therefore, within the text of Prov 1–9, it is legitimate to assume that the fear of YHWH both articulates the initial foundation for wisdom in 1:7 and indicates the first result of wisdom in 9:10. However, this is not to say that our analysis is conclusive because we lack direct evidence although poetic parallelism and contextual coherence do point us toward this interpretation. Nevertheless, one undeniable fact concerning the fear of YHWH is that we cannot completely rule out one interpretation in favour of the other due to how both construals of the phrases seem to be present in Prov 1–9. Contra Weeks and O’Kelly, the basic connotation of both ראשית and תחלה as indicating a beginning cannot be ignored because the fear of YHWH as an inner attitude must first enable

⁷⁹ Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 307–8.

obedience to the parental torah and indeed continue the moral life prescribed in Prov 1–9 inherently belonging to Yahwistic piety. Likewise, the fear of YHWH as the final *telos* can also be justified as it is clearly stated as the desired outcome of pursuing wisdom and receiving parental instructions in Prov 2:5.

“Fear of YHWH” as Intertextual Operator to Deuteronomy

The phrases, “the fear of YHWH” (יראת יהוה, Prov 1:7; 1:29; 2:5; 8:13; 9:10) and “to fear YHWH” (ירא את־יהוה, Prov 3:7), indicate that it is one of the central *leitmotifs* of Proverbs as it is in Deuteronomy. Thus, these phrases in Prov 1–9 may be powerful intertextual operators to Deuteronomy especially because despite their strong presence within Prov 1–9, they are not substantiated. They are assumed as “already known,” presupposing the notion(s) of the fear of YHWH within the DMT.⁸⁰ Thus, whereas the concept of the fear of YHWH may have caused the lexical conundrum in the mind of modern readers which I have iterated in this section, it most likely would have not for the intended readers of Prov 1–9 who already had a particular understanding of the phrases as construed in the DMT. Fear of YHWH which is expressed with the moral and didactic language creates a Deuteronomic presupposition in Prov 1–9 from the conventions of the didactic genre utilized in both corpora.

As an intertextual operator, the fear of YHWH opens up a discursive space where the dual Deuteronomic notion of the fear of YHWH, which I identified above, may

⁸⁰ Jindo, “The Biblical Notion,” 437.

modify the way the text surrounding it is read in Prov 1–9.⁸¹ In Deuteronomy, this fear is often juxtaposed to the terms related to the internalization of the Torah or words of YHWH through Moses: “read” (קרא), “hear” (שמע), “obey” (שמר), and “teach/learn” (למד).⁸² These activities either require this fear as a principal attitude (e.g., Deut 10:12–13; 13:5[4]) or perceive it as the didactic goal (e.g., Deut 4:10; 5:29; 6:1–3; 14:23; 17:19–20; and 31:11–13). In Prov 1–9, we observe that שמע and שמר are closely connected to the parental instructions but not directly with “fear” (יראת).⁸³ Yet, as we have seen in 1:2–7, all the expressions related to parental instructions and wisdom/knowledge in this summary of purpose are framed with the fear of YHWH.⁸⁴

This framework of the fear of YHWH in 1:7 then creates a condition of possibility for the readers to view this fear as a necessary condition for hearing, receiving, and obeying the parental torah as well as for acquiring knowledge and wisdom. Of course, we could equally articulate it as the first fruit of knowledge here, but the immediate context of the couplet with the second line concerned with fools who do not have this foundation favours the former construal. Likewise, in Prov 9:10, the fear of YHWH may be presented in either way, but as we have observed, the coupled line and the wider context of the chapter point us to the view that it describes an attained state or condition of wisdom and righteousness (9:8b–9). Also, the lexical parallels between 2:5

⁸¹ Fear as an emotion is excluded from this discussion due to its specific appropriation to the cases of theophanic experience which are absent in Prov 1–9.

⁸² As iterated above, other terms include “love” (אהב), “serve” (עבד), “walk” (הלך), and “cling to” (דבק).

⁸³ “Read” (קרא) and “teach/learn” (למד) are curiously absent in Prov 1–9; this is understandable if we consider that the Torah to be read in Deuteronomy is comparable to parental instructions in Prov 1–9 which are not written but spoken. Also, the very activities of learning and teaching Moses instructs in Deuteronomy are reenacted in Prov 1–9 making them unnecessary to be described.

⁸⁴ Waltke, *Proverbs 1–15*, 180–81.

and 9:10 implicitly support this intended sense of the fear of YHWH here as the first fruit.

In the context of “the righteous man” (צדיק, 9:9b) and “the wise man” (חכם, 9:8b, 9:9a), the fear of YHWH as the first fruit in 9:10 may signify moral maturity. This developmental aspect might not be confined to embodying such moral qualities like righteousness and wisdom; rather these individuals labeled as righteous and wise are depicted as continuously growing wiser (יחכם-עוד, 9:9a) and increasing in learning (יוסף לקח, 9:9b). As mentioned earlier, this embodied righteousness could align with the parental perspective in Deut 6:24–25, envisioning it as a character trait instilled through obedience to YHWH’s commandments and reverential fear towards him. If the Deuteronomic concept of the fear of YHWH encompasses such a notion of moral formation, especially with the frequent use of לִמַּד in relation to יִרָא, then the fear of YHWH in 9:10 may presuppose that perspective.

While the fear of YHWH opens up a discursive space of the Deuteronomic moral tradition within the context of Prov 1–9, it is the surrounding context that determines how this fear may be understood. The context of the fear of YHWH in 1:29 seems self-explanatory. Those who neglect and hate Wisdom (vv. 25, 29) are defined as the ones who “did not choose the fear of YHWH (וִירֵאת יְהוָה לֹא בָחַרוּ).”⁸⁵ The absence of this basic attitude makes wisdom acquisition impossible. Fear of YHWH in Prov 2:5a (“Then, you will understand the fear of YHWH” [אָז תֵּבִין יִרְאֵת יְהוָה]) is also quite straightforward as this clause is the first apodosis (אָז) in the series, following a series of the protasis in vv.

⁸⁵ Waltke (*Proverbs 1–15*, 210–11) argues that this verse signifies the fools’ willful rejection of the fear of YHWH as a way of life leading to the final judgment.

1–4 (אם). In other words, the conditional clauses of heeding the parental instructions and seeking wisdom as silver promise the fear of YHWH as their achievement in their apodosis. While either Deuteronomic notion of the phrase is possible, again this context of protasis-apodosis casts it as a result rather than a precondition.⁸⁶

In both Prov 3:7 and 8:13, fear is equated with hatred of evil. The contexts portray fear as the inner attitude associated with the prohibition of leaning on one's own understanding (3:5, 7a) and possessing "pride" and "arrogance" which is regarded as evil (v. 13). While this contextual-intertextual argument may not conclusively show that ראשית and תחלה refer to the beginning and the first result, respectively, at least this dual Deuteronomic notion may serve as a means of understanding the fear of YHWH as both the foundational disposition as well as the didactic goal of wisdom/knowledge acquisition in Prov 1–9.

In short, I have proposed in this section that the fear of YHWH in 1:7 marks the beginning (ראשית) while in 9:10 it refers to the first milestone (תחלה) in wisdom acquisition. Previously, both ראשית and תחלה have been construed as either the beginning or the first harvest, and lexical evidence alone cannot justify interpretation of these terms. However, my argument is that their immediate contexts and Deuteronomic presuppositions within Prov 1–9 make it more plausible that the phrase refers to both the beginning and *telos* of wisdom acquisition.

⁸⁶ Schwáb, *Toward an Interpretation*, 132–34.

Moral Implications of Fear of YHWH as Foundation and *Telos*

In Chapter 3, we discovered that in Prov 1–9, the good of socio-ethical practice (obedience) is defined as “life” (Prov 3:3; 7:2), signifying human flourishing. This concept is further elucidated and framed as the epistemological narrative of “life in the land” (2:21–22) in Chapter 4. In this chapter, the fear of YHWH is presented as the ultimate *telos* of the DMT, as presupposed in the Prov 1–9 text. Drawing from Aristotle’s insight concerning the human *telos*, MacIntyre argues that “the *telos* is not something to be achieved at some future point, but in the way our whole life is constructed.”⁸⁷ Transposing this notion into the context of Prov 1–9, true human flourishing is not a distant prospect awaiting the son in “the land”; rather, it materializes through his engagement with the parental torah and acquisition of wisdom. These endeavours contribute to his maturation into a person of character, enabling him to thrive in the kind of life designated for those in a covenant relationship with YHWH. In this regard, the fear of YHWH as the *telos* offers a frame of reference for moral formation and determines the right kind of virtues for *imitatio Dei*.

Fear of YHWH and the Process of Moral Formation

Fear of YHWH as a *leitmotif* marks the beginning and the first milestone of a process, a process in which the son’s moral character is to be formed through internalization of the parental instructions. In this regard, Prov 2:1–4, 5–8, 9–11 provide an important insight concerning this process. Schwáb identifies an intentional literary device in Prov 2:4 to

⁸⁷ MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 175.

2:5. In 2:1–4, the parent summons the son through a series of protasis to receive parental instruction and seek wisdom. However, there is a “surprising turn” in the two subsequent apodotes, where the son obtains “the fear of YHWH” (v. 5) and “righteousness, justice, and equity” (v. 9) instead of wisdom.⁸⁸ The explanation follows, clarifying that the fear of YHWH is acquired because YHWH imparts wisdom (v. 6), and righteousness, justice, and equity are received because wisdom takes root in the son’s heart (v. 10). According to Schwáb, this demonstrates that wisdom logically precedes the fear of YHWH and the three moral qualities and that Prov 2 aims to direct the reader’s attention to “God behind wisdom, justice, protection, and success.”⁸⁹

This rhetorical device also encapsulates a character development process in terms of cause-and-effect dynamics. Embracing the parental torah and actively pursuing wisdom undoubtedly fosters the son’s maturation, as the divine gift of wisdom enters his heart. This maturing process culminates in embodiment of the fear of YHWH (Prov 2:5; 9:10) and the moral qualities (2:9), which leads to continuous growth in moral character and virtues (9:8b–9). In this regard, Fox insightfully comments: “Wisdom both begins with fear of God (1:7; 9:10) and leads to it. If the child does his part—the other parties will obviously do theirs—his fear of God will move to a higher stage, as described in [Prov 2].”⁹⁰

Furthermore, I would argue that the positioning of the fear of YHWH at the outset and conclusion of the collection is deliberate, reinforcing this interpretation. Thus,

⁸⁸ Schwáb, *Toward an Interpretation*, 133.

⁸⁹ Schwáb, *Toward an Interpretation*, 138.

⁹⁰ Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 111.

the fear of YHWH describes one's initial disposition toward YHWH (1:7) that makes his/her journey of acquiring wisdom and knowledge possible. This emphasis in the preamble sets the tone for the entire parental instructions and Wisdom speeches in Prov 1–9. Also, in the “reading guide” of Prov 2, the whole process of character formation is laid out with an eye on the ultimate *telos* of obtaining the fear of YHWH (2:5) and moral virtues (2:9). As the parental discourse closes in Prov 9, the fear of YHWH, the first result of wisdom (9:10a), culminates in “the knowledge of the Holy One” (9:10b) with the wicked and the mature testifying to this process (9:7–9).⁹¹

Therefore, presupposing the Deuteronomic notion, one may have a more nuanced understanding of the fear of YHWH in Prov 1–9. And the ethical function of this phrase is not only to mark the foundational disposition and the ultimate *telos* of character formation but also to frame the whole process of character development within Prov 1–9 by which “the uninstructed” (פְּתִיִּים) grow into a “wise person” (חָכָם) and a “righteous person” (צַדִּיק) through the parental Torah guided by the DMT.

Moral Virtues and *Imitatio Dei*

If the fear of YHWH marks the beginning and the end of moral formation, we may also ask what the process between these two points would involve. This is where the parents aim to nurture wisdom in the son through various instructions to the end that he acquires a virtuous character mirroring the fear of YHWH. Practically, this end is reached by inculcating certain core virtues in the son since, according to MacIntyre, a virtue is “an

⁹¹ Fox (*Proverbs 1–9*, 112) asserts that the fear of YHWH begins as a mere “emotion or attitude” and become fused with knowledge of God which is “in essence an awareness or cognition.”

acquired human quality” absolutely needed to reach the human *telos*.⁹² Conversely, he also argues that it is the human *telos* that “determines what human qualities are virtues.”⁹³ Which virtues then serve as the guiding principles to keep the son on the straight path toward the fear of YHWH? I will posit that the virtues outlined in Prov 1:3 and 2:9 fulfill this role and are rooted in the principle of *imitatio Dei*.

Imitatio Dei

Barton argues that there are three bases of ethics in the OT one of which is the “imitation of God.”⁹⁴ He illustrates his point using Deut 10:17–19 (“For YHWH your God, he is God of gods, the Lord of lords, the great, the mighty, and the awe-inspiring God who does not show partiality nor take bribe. He does justice for the orphan and the widow, and shows his love for the aliens by giving him food and clothing. *So, love the aliens, for you were aliens in the land of Egypt*”). As Barton points out here, the Israelites are told “to take God’s character as the pattern of their character and God’s deeds as the model for theirs.”⁹⁵ While he is careful not to equate *imitatio Dei* and the OT ethics, he finds that unlike the law, the Torah (“teaching”), especially the wisdom literature, has a teleological character where the objective is not to merely obey the commandments but

⁹² MacIntyre (*After Virtue*, 222) defines a virtue as “an acquired human quality . . . [which enables] us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods.” Cf. Wilson, “Virtue(s),” 811–14.

⁹³ MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 184.

⁹⁴ Barton, “The Basis of Ethics.”

⁹⁵ Barton, “The Basis of Ethics,” 17. Cf. Wenham, “Laws and Ethical Ideals,” 89

to walk with God as exemplified by Enoch in Genesis.⁹⁶ In this regard, he explains that the most common image used for this ethical principle is a “Pathway.”⁹⁷

Recently, Keefer and Schwáb have noted this ethical principle in Prov 3:5–12 and Prov 2, respectively.⁹⁸ Drawing from Aquinas, Keefer argues that Aquinas’ theological virtues of faith, hope, and love can be identified in Prov 3:5–12. He finds faith in YHWH (v. 5), hope for straight paths (v. 6), bodily health (v. 8), and economic resources (v. 10), and charity throughout vv. 5–12 but especially in YHWH’s loving discipline (vv. 11–12).⁹⁹ Keefer argues that “God’s communication with humans” in these ways invites people “to participate in His divine life.”¹⁰⁰

Using the same heuristic lens, Schwáb finds *imitatio Dei* in Prov 2 where the concept of the fear of YHWH is closely associated with “ethical behaviour” (2:5; 2:9).¹⁰¹ He infers from Weeks that the fear of YHWH as indicating “a relationship of loyal, obedient respect” may connote the image of “servant” which is strongly present in Mal 6:13; Deut 6:13; 10:12, 20; 13:5; Josh 24:14; 1 Sam 12:14, 24; Neh 1:11; Job 1:8; 2:3; Ps 119:38. However, he admits that such an image is absent in Prov 1–9 though the character trait of “obedient listening” may allude to it.¹⁰² However, aside from employing Thomistic theological virtues or the Servant image, we may still identify this ethical basis in Prov 1–9.

⁹⁶ Barton, “The Basis of Ethics,” 19–20. This ethical basis has been actively engaged in rabbinic literature though it was popularized by Martin Buber who argued that as the image of God for us “to imitate God means to walk in his ways” (Kaplan, “Martin Buber,” 12). He further posited that we fulfill God’s will by following his “attributes” as opposed to “the commandments” (13).

⁹⁷ Barton, “The Basis of Ethics,” 20.

⁹⁸ Keefer, *Virtue Ethics*, 178–79; Schwáb, *Toward an Interpretation*, 108–159.

⁹⁹ Keefer, *Virtue Ethics*, 178.

¹⁰⁰ Keefer, *Virtue Ethics*, 178.

¹⁰¹ Schwáb, *Toward an Interpretation*, 141–42.

¹⁰² Schwáb, *Toward an Interpretation*, 142.

“Righteousness, Justice, and Equity” (Proverbs 1:3; 2:9)

First, we find such virtues listed in Prov 1:3 and 2:9. As Brown observes, “Righteousness, justice, and equity” (צדק ומשפט ומישרים, 1:3) are the core virtues of Proverbs located in the centre of the chiasmic structure of 1:2–7.¹⁰³ This same set of moral virtues appear again in Prov 2:9 (vv. 9–11) where they are paralleled with the fear of YHWH in 2:5 (vv. 5–8) via a discourse marker, “then” (אז), and the verb, “to understand” (בין). Here both the fear of YHWH and these moral virtues are signified as the outcomes of seeking wisdom. If we suppose that the fear of YHWH marks the beginning and the first harvest of moral formation, then “righteousness, justice, and equity” may refer to that first harvest of character traits that are acquired through moral formation.¹⁰⁴

These moral qualities are closely related to the Way metaphor within Prov 1–9, representing “every good track” (כל-מעגל-טוב) in 2:9. The metaphorical image of אעגל seems to portray a “wheel rut” that guides one’s wagon along the path, probably depicting the three virtues in terms of habituated practice that chisels the son’s character toward the fear of YHWH.¹⁰⁵ They are also connected to the Way metaphor in other verses (“the pathways of justice” in 2:8; “the pathway of righteousness,” “the paths of justice” in 8:20), indicating their significance as the lifestyle the parents desire to instill in the son. As mentioned in Chapter 4, these moral qualities attached to the Way

¹⁰³ Brown, *Wisdom’s Wonder*, 32.

¹⁰⁴ Waltke (*Proverbs 1–15*, 227) views these moral values in Prov 2:5 as those YHWH “commits himself to protect.”

¹⁰⁵ Schipper, *Proverbs 1–15*, 112; Waltke, *Proverbs 1–15*, 227; Lyu, *Righteousness*, 134–35. In his analysis of “righteousness” in Proverbs, Lyu concludes that “righteousness is a virtue that the readers are urged to internalize through the application of wisdom. When internalized, righteousness represents the integral character *in toto* that reveals a deep root in Yahwistic piety.”

metaphor may presuppose the moral norms of the Torah.¹⁰⁶ If the Torah is metaphorically depicted as the way in Deuteronomy, and if the Way metaphor in Proverbs 1–9 assumes this Deuteronomic imagery, can we view the ways in the latter as the pathway one journeys with YHWH, imitating His ways rather than merely adhering to prescribed commandments?

Lastly, throughout the OT, there are four verses where cognate forms of צדק (“righteousness”), משפט (“justice”), and מישרים (“equity”) appear in the same verse. They are in Deut 32:4; Ps 99:4; and Prov 1:3; 2:9.¹⁰⁷ In the first two verses, they describe the attributes of YHWH and the latter two indicate human moral virtues. In Ps 99:4, God is praised as the enthroned king who loves “justice” (משפט), establishes “equity” (מישרים), and executes “justice” (משפט) and “righteousness” (צדקה). In this Psalm, the three moral attributes of God are applied in his governance of human affairs.

In Deut 32:4, located in the beginning of “Song of Moses” (32:1–43), Moses depicts God as follows: “The Rock! His work is perfect, For all his ways are just (משפט); A God of faithfulness (אמונה) and without injustice, Righteous (צדיק) and upright (ישר) is he.” Here Knowles notes an atypical use of “the rock” (הצור) as the image of YHWH. Instead of describing divine strength and refuge, it describes his “divine righteousness, spiritual parentage and nurture, . . . religious uniqueness,”¹⁰⁸ in other words, God’s attributes in relation to humans. He insightfully points out that this metaphorical image

¹⁰⁶ While these three terms may be nuanced differently, they often appear in different combinations of pairs demonstrating their semantic proximity to one another throughout the OT (Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 60).

¹⁰⁷ While we find cognate forms of the three terms collocated in Pss 94:15 and 119:7, 137, they describe a concept (e.g., “judgment” in Ps 94:15) rather than personal traits of a person or attributes of God.

¹⁰⁸ Knowles, “The Rock,” 316.

is part of the message that “[calls] for reciprocal faithfulness on the part of the covenant people.”¹⁰⁹ While uncertainty exists as to whether these divine attributes in Deut 32:4 and Ps 99:4 are presupposed in the human character traits in Prov 1:3 and 2:9, it at least shows that the moral qualities ascribed to YHWH are mapped onto the moral life of his people in Prov 1–9, possibly calling for *imitatio Dei*.

Conclusion

Fear of YHWH employed in Prov 1–9 and Deuteronomy exhibits certain similarities, yet significant differences also exist. In Deuteronomy, it refers to terror, a reverent disposition, or a didactic goal. The first of these appears specifically in the context of direct exposure to divine presence, and its sense does not seem to carry the same weight in Prov 1–9 due to its focus on the ethical dimension of the fear of YHWH. I have argued, however, that the latter two senses are employed in Prov 1:7 and 9:10, respectively. Marking the beginning and the first milestone of a developmental process, this phrase signifies the critical importance of an inner attitude towards God for wisdom acquisition and a character formed and shaped by the moral virtues that the parents endeavour to instill in the son.

¹⁰⁹ Knowles, “The Rock,” 321.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

In this study, I have examined select clusters of Deuteronomic intertexts in Prov 1–9, aiming to demonstrate that they function as literary conventions within a moral tradition that guide the youths in their way of life. I have argued that these references serve ethical purposes within the text by presupposing the Deuteronomic moral tradition. I have found that they provide authority and a standard for socio-ethical practices, create an epistemological narrative context for moral formation, and represent the foundation and ultimate *telos* for the moral formation of virtuous character in the youths of ancient Israel.

I began this exploration in Chapter 1 where I surveyed two major approaches to Prov 1–9 within OT scholarship. I found that the studies taking ethical approaches tend to assume a virtue-ethical framework for this section of Proverbs and attempt to unravel the ways in which character is formed. It is often the case that biblical scholars associate character ethics only with historical narrative in the OT, but Stewart cogently argues for appreciation of Hebrew poetics in the ethical teaching of Proverbs. There are other studies taking an ethical approach that directly compare and contrast Prov 1–9, and Proverbs as a whole, with the moral philosophy of Aristotle, Socrates, and Aquinas which have affirmed the usefulness of the virtue-ethical framework for understanding Proverbs. However, due to their ethical focus, they often do not engage sufficiently with

the literary content including the Deuteronomic references or mention of the moral tradition although according to MacIntyre a tradition is crucial for any discussions concerning ethics. There are also literary approaches to Deuteronomic references in Prov 1–9 that have been fruitful in advancing our understanding of the text, especially in the ancient Near Eastern context and in the context of the OT. However, they have also inadvertently caused a hermeneutical conundrum in several areas. The questions concerning what biblical wisdom is and whether it influenced or was influenced by other OT literature have preoccupied the discussions, often leaving the questions about the intertextual references within Proverbs unanswered. Thankfully, some recent studies have focused on understanding the nature of the Deuteronomic references in Prov 1–9 marked by Schipper's work.

This review of previous literature then calls for an interdisciplinary methodology that may probe the functions of these Deuteronomic intertexts within Prov 1–9 using an ethical framework. Thus, in Chapter 2, I laid out my interdisciplinary methodology that involves first MacIntyre's meta-ethical framework. In order to account for the the Deuteronomic references that are characteristically innovative and presupposed within this section, I utilized a intertextuality concept of "Presupposition" by the structuralist linguist, Jonathan Culler. I conceptualized the Deuteronomic intertexts as intertextual operators and the DMT as a discursive space where the text of Prov 1–9 interacts with "the various languages or signifying practices of a culture."¹ In this way, the Deuteronomic intertexts were deemed an access point to this tradition of moral

¹ Culler, *The Pursuit*, 114.

epistemology within the ancient Israelite culture through which they are signified and understood in Prov 1–9.

For ethical analysis, MacIntyre’s meta-ethical framework was employed to analyze this moral tradition and heuristically organize the Deuteronomic references into three ethical elements that constitute a moral tradition: (1) socio-ethical practice, (2) epistemological narrative, and (3) *telos*. These MacIntyrean constituents are manifested in three thematic complexes of the *Shema* (Prov 3:1–12; 6:20–35; 7:1–27), the Way metaphor and the promised land reference (Prov 2:21–22), and fear of YHWH (1:7; 2:5; 9:10). My argument was that these Deuteronomic intertexts can advance our understanding of the function of the DMT as presupposed in the text of Prov 1–9.

The Deuteronomic thematic complex probed in Chapter 3 is the *Shema* elements that are dominant in Prov 3:1–12 and also present to a lesser degree in 6:20–35 and 7:1–27. To find the literary elements of the *Shema*, Deut 6:4–9 and 11:18–23 where the *Shema* appears in Deuteronomy are studied. Here four common elements are identified in both passages: (1) “these words” (הדברים האלה) which consistently refer to the credal statement concerning oneness of YHWH and the primary command to love him, (2) the pedagogical emphasis through the expression “on your heart” (על-לבבך), (3) the word pair of “Bind–Write” (כתב and קשר) with “on your heart” (על-לבבך), and (4) “life in the land” as a reward of obedience.

Applying these findings to Prov 3:1–12, I discovered that the lexical pair of מצות and תורה which only appear in the *Shema* instructions out of all parental instructions in Prov 1–9 vastly lacks referentiality, thus creating a condition of possibility for

presupposition of the Deuteronomic Torah. The pedagogical emphasis of internalizing the presupposed Torah has the purpose of shaping the son's character in the pattern of YHWH's חסד and אמת (Prov 3:3). The Deuteronomic character of these divine attributes are further reinforced with the expression, "on the tablet of your heart" (על-לוח לבך), which appears elsewhere in the OT only in Jer 17:1. In relation to Jer 31:31–34, this expression may demonstrate that this same moral tradition operative in Jeremiah may express a balanced view between the human responsibility of internalization and the absolute necessity of divine involvement. In this *Shema* thematic complex, the references to "a prolonged life" and "the land" inevitably create a Deuteronomic presupposition for covenant conditionality (Deut 30:15–20) to dictate the son's understanding of ethical choices. The *Shema* in Prov 6:20–35 and Prov 7:1–27 differs from that in Prov 3:1–12 since its ethical function in the former is not to contextualize its message in the whole parental instruction but rather to provide a rhetorical frame in the parental warnings against moral apostasy.

Thus, I concluded in this chapter that from the perspective of socio-ethical practice, the thematic complex of the *Shema* in Prov 3, 6, and 7 functions to create a discursive space for the DMT and its authoritative voice of the Torah to reinforce and contextualize the parental torah. One standard of moral excellence identified is to not only obey but also internalize the parental torah presupposing the Deuteronomic Torah with the caveat that this process is warranted by YHWH's sovereign involvement. "Life" which is promised as the reward signifies human flourishing for those in the covenant relationship with YHWH as conceptualized by the Deuteronomic presupposition.

In Chapter 4, the thematic complex of the Way metaphor in relation to the “land” reference was investigated. I argued that the Way metaphor is not only a structuring metaphor within Prov 1–9 but also permeates the social values and worldview of the DMT which includes the narrative context of Deuteronomy, particularly with the reference to “the land” in Prov 2:21–22. In Deuteronomy, the Way metaphor is bipolar in nature although obedience to the Torah is metaphorically cast as a way while the opposite ways are only implied in such metaphorical expressions as סור (“to turn away”), פנה (“to turn from”), and נדה (“to seduce”). Interestingly, there is a clear distinction between the plural and singular uses of the Way metaphor where the way is in the singular form only when contrasted with the opposite way. To contextualize our view of the Way metaphor, I included a brief survey of the post-canonical traditions that employ this metaphor with the distinct characteristic of clear bipolarity between two spiritual realms with an eschatological view.

Then, I compared the Way metaphor in Deuteronomy with that in Prov 1–9 to demonstrate the ways in which this metaphor presupposes the Deuteronomic Torah and its concept of the land. I discovered that there are two distinct characterizations of the “way” in this metaphor in Prov 1–9 to represent: (1) an individual life which has a potential to be either good or evil and (2) like in Deuteronomy, the “way” can signify the two opposite ways of good and evil. The first representation is inevitable given the didactic context addressing the son’s individual life. The second one is comparable to the Way metaphor schema in Deuteronomy although the ways do not signify either obedience or disobedience but two distinct lifestyles.

Both ways are juxtaposed with modifiers that clearly indicate their moral qualities. The parent's approval and prohibition of these ways determine whether they are good or evil; however, they also stand for the moral values that are clearly characteristic of the Deuteronomic Torah. Inferring from Zehnder's concept of "Unschärfe" (blurriness), I also observed that this Deuteronomic characterization of the ways blurs the line between the historical journey of Israel toward Canaan and the inward journey of the son represented in the Way metaphor. Both journeys are encountered with various moral challenges as well as the destination of the promised land (Prov 2:21–22). Then, I demonstrated Prov 2:21–22 in the context of Prov 2 and 3:1–12 to explain the discursive formation of the land in Prov 2:21–22 and its function as an epistemological context in Prov 1–9.

Concluding this chapter, I discussed how this Deuteronomic narrative as an epistemological context not only makes the parental instruction more engaging but also brings a narrative unity to the readers. This presupposed context makes their life story intelligible in the context of a bigger story where they may find meaning, direction, *telos*, and identity in life. More specifically, the metaphorical sense of "life in the land" leads the readers to conceptualize their obedience to the parental torah as fulfillment of covenant obligations, the Mosaic Torah as an educational paradigm, and moral life as a war that requires vigilance and the moral vision of character formation through acquirement of virtues.

Lastly, in Chapter 5, I scrutinized fear of YHWH as a Deuteronomic presupposition that functions as the *telos* of the DMT as presupposed within Prov 1–9.

In Deuteronomy, fear in relation to YHWH has a number of connotations attached to it which not only has the cognitive but also affective dimensions. Therefore, in one sense, it expresses one's disposition and inner attitude toward YHWH. Yet, in another sense, it is also indicated as a learnable objective often associated with למד ("to learn" or "to teach") as exemplified in Deut 17:19 and 31:11–13.

In Prov 1–9, the concept of fear of YHWH has structural and conceptual importance, strategically positioned in a preamble (1:1–7) and the epilogue (9:10) bracketing the whole section. Its paralleled significance in Deuteronomy then creates a condition of possibility for the Deuteronomic discursive formation within Prov 1–9. In Prov 2:5, it is also clearly stated as the *telos* of the parental instructions and wisdom-seeking endeavours just as it is the *telos* of the Mosaic Torah in Deuteronomy. While fear of YHWH is the *telos*, it is also posited as the "beginning" (ראשית) of knowledge (1:7). This dual notion of the concept and the ambiguity around the terms, ראשית (1:7) and תחלה (9:10), both of which are typically translated as "the beginning" in most English Bible versions, have led to various construals of fear of YHWH in the context of Prov 1–9.

The recent studies by Weeks and O'Kelly have contended that both ראשית and תחלה should be understood in the sense of the "first harvest," as they both often mean, or the reward for gaining wisdom and knowledge. Interestingly, the two scholars propose this interpretation in light of Deuteronomy. I have argued in this chapter that תחלה can be understood as Weeks and O'Kelly suggest, especially in light of the literary correspondence between Prov 2:5 and 9:10. However, I also contended that ראשית

should still be interpreted as “the beginning” due to its immediate context and its use within Prov 1–9. Furthermore, it is argued that the Deuteronomic concept of fear of YHWH also refers to a foundational disposition toward YHWH and the *telos*, a learning goal.

Therefore, I concluded that fear of YHWH in 1:7 and 9:10 represents a learning process that begins with fear of YHWH as a disposition and develops into fear of YHWH as moral character embodying wisdom. This interpretation is especially plausible if Prov 2:5, a verse paralleled to 9:10, is considered with 2:9 with which 2:5 is syntactically paralleled with the discourse marker, אז (“then”). Proverbs 2:9 lists three moral virtues (“righteousness, justice, and equity” [צדק ומשפט ומישרים]) that are already outlined in the introduction (1:3).

The moral implications of this chapter were two: (1) fear of YHWH in Prov 1–9 represents the foundation and the ultimate *telos* of character development and (2) this character formation requires at least five virtues, namely “righteousness, justice, and equity” (Prov 1:3; 2:9). This string of terms appears together once in Deut 32:4 to describe the attributes of YHWH in the song of Moses. My argument was that fear of YHWH in its relation to these character attributes is an instance in the OT ethics where the ethical principle is *imitatio Dei*. Therefore, the Deuteronomic presuppositions within Prov 1–9 contributes to the understanding of these moral and character values that may otherwise be vacuous and empty in meaning without such context. Therefore, in this study, I have shown that the Deuteronomic references within Prov 1–9 are intertextual

operators that presuppose the Deuteronomic moral tradition that provides an epistemological and ethical context for moral education of the youth.

For further study, the moral tradition as presupposed in Prov 1–9 may be traced in other parts of the OT via the Deuteronomic literary conventions to observe in what ways they are different from and related to those in Prov 1–9. A good starting point for such investigation will be Psalms where the Way metaphor with bipolarity sets the stage in Ps 1 for the rest of the collections and also continues to be present to describe the ways of righteous and wicked. It will be interesting and insightful to observe how the Deuteronomic conventions in Prov 1–9 are utilized in Psalms in relation to the Way metaphor. Also, it may be helpful to examine the ways in which the character virtues identified in Prov 1–9 are utilized to describe human virtues as opposed to divine attributes in order to provide their wholistic picture within the OT.

One last point is this. As we have observed in this study, the ethical functions of the Deuteronomic references this study has identified in Prov 1–9 are related to clear instructions with moral power and authority to direct one's life, a narrative unity that grounds one's identity and meaning in life, and the ultimate *telos* beyond oneself. They seem to be vastly missing in the Western society where we find ourselves today. This alarming situation partially relates to the absence of a moral tradition which is deeply rooted in the theistic worldview and actively rehearsed by the parent generation. We ought to pay attention to MacIntyre's warning:

Without those moral particularities to begin from there would never be anywhere to begin; but it is in moving forward from such particularity that the search for the good, for the universal, consists. Yet particularity can ever be simply left behind or obliterated. The notion of escaping from it into a realm of entirely

universal maxims which belong to man as such, whether in its eighteenth-century Kantian form or in the presentation of some modern analytical moral philosophies, is an illusion and an illusion with painful consequences.²

In the realm of child/youth education, it is imperative to acknowledge that moral particularities founded on the fear of YHWH are the foundational starting point. Without this fear, their life journey towards understanding the good is open to many moral challenges human reason alone cannot overcome. Proverbs 1–9 teaches that they need to be formed and transformed by a moral tradition founded on God’s word that informs this fear and guides them to it. This fear of YHWH is also the ultimate *telos* where true human flourishing is found. It is within this frame of mind and moral particularities of Prov 1–9, which this study has sought to comprehend, the youths in the covenant relationship with God may learn to hear and obey, fight and inherit, live and be blessed.

² MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 221.

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