SELF-KNOWLEDGE

AND

SELF-DECEPTION

"All my life I've been lying, even when I spoke the truth;
I never spoke for the sake of the truth, but for my own sake."

Dostoevsky, The Devils

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SCOPE AND CONTENTS:

The thesis is that there is a sense to the notion of self-knowledge which stands opposed to that of self-deception, is asymmetrical with knowledge of others, and is not endangered by the Wittgensteinian arguments for the non-cognitive thesis of avowals.

A perceptual model of self-knowledge is presented and argued against. The Wittgensteinian arguments for the non-cognitive thesis of avowals (which latter are taken to be paradigmatic expressions of self-knowledge) are presented and critically examined. A Freudian analysis of self-deception follows from which a sense of self-knowledge is derived which is shown to parallel certain features of the understanding of a work of art. This contradicts the letter, but not the spirit of the Wittgensteinian position.

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CHAPTER ONE

I(i) Although selves are persons, "self-knowledge" does not simply mean "Knowledge of a person". My knowledge of my self is self-knowledge but my knowledge of other selves is not. Getting clear about the nature of self-knowledge must, therefore, include an investigation of the ways in which it differs from knowledge of others.

There are two sorts of predicates that we may ascribe to persons called by Strawson P and M predicates ("Individuals", Chapter 3). P predicates are those we ascribe to persons but would not normally ascribe to material bodies. They include, therefore, "is smiling", "is going for a walk" as well as the psychological predicates such as "is thinking", "is in pain". M predicates are those we ascribe to persons but would also ascribe to inert material bodies; for example, "is six feet tall", "is in the kitchen". One way of expressing the idea that a person comprises both mind and body is to say that it is that entity to which both these sorts of predicates are ascribable.

The basis of the distinction between P and M predicates is an asymmetry between the self and other ascription of P predicates which does not hold in the case of M predicates. For example, I assert of myself that I am six feet tall (M predicate) on the basis of observational evidence of exactly the same kind as that

on the basis of which I assert of you that you are six feet tall. By contrast, Ido not assert of myself that I am in pain (P predicate) on the basis of observational evidence of the same kind as that on the basis of which I assert of you that you are in pain. The way in which I know I am in pain is different from the way in which I know that you are in pain. I know I am in pain because I feel it but no one else can know that I am in pain by feeling that I am , or by feeling my pain. Others can only know about my pain by observing me in pain, by observing my behaviour. I am inevitably and invariably in the best possible position to know whether I am in pain or not, since only I have direct access to my pain: another person can only surmise this fact about me (Cf PI,246)[I].

According to this account, commonly presented in discussions of this topic, the explanation of the asymmetrical character of P predicates is founded on the premise that the cognitive relation in which each person stands to his inner states is unique. It is not merely that the grounds of the ascription are different in the case of oneself and others, but that there <u>are</u> grounds in the latter case while there are none in the former. I do not have to observe anything to know that I in pain; I <u>have</u> my pain. The consequence of this for the psychological predicates (to which the subsequent discussion will be restricted) is that "first person psychological utterances in the present tense have the peculiarity that if the speaker is sincere he will tell us what his inner

states are but, by way of contrast, my sincerity won't guarantee the truth of my guess as to his inner states" (Hacker, "Insight and Illusion", p.245. Cf PI, p.224). In what follows I refer to these first person psychological utterances in the present tense by the technical term of "avowals".

The above argument brings into focus one of the most immediately striking features of avowals , namely, the fact of their apparent infallibility. Their truth is guaranteed by truthfulness. I cannot make a mistake about, for instance, my pain, about whether or not I am in pain, whereas I might easily be mistaken as to what place I'm in or what colour socks I'm wearing. I cannot sensibly be said to wonder whether or not I'm in pain . If I <u>think</u> I'm in pain then it is the case, tautologically, that I <u>am</u> in pain. Conversely, if I am not in pain , it cannot be the case that I should think that I am. The evidence of psycho-somatic pains cannot be cited as a counter example here: in these cases it is not the pain that is in doubt but the cause, for none is found.

However, the peculiarity of the example of pain, always ready to become a problem in these discussions, looms especially large here. For it is not obvious in what sense an avowal of love, for example, is infallible. It may, indeed, be held to be notoriously fallible. The impression of its fallibility, however, derives from the frequent occurrence of cases in which an individual is uncertain or confused about his feeling, cases for which there is no parallel with the example of pain. The explanation of the

possibility of uncertainty or confusion here lies with the requirement for a thought element in avowals of love which requirement is lacking in the case of avowals of pain, and this thought element is, itself, an integral feature of the feeling. A man may recognise that his state of mind is troubled, for example, but until he has identified, and consciously adopted a specific attitude towards, something in his situation which he feels both justifies and explains his state of mind, his feeling has not crystallised into a conscious feeling of love (Cf Hampshire, "Freedom of Mind", p.242-243). However, it nevertheless remains true that so long as his avowal is sincere, so long, that is, as he acknowledges his uncertainty where he feels uncertain, his avowal is infallible. If I think, carefully and sincerely, that I am in love, then it is the case that I am in love.

Wittgenstein's objections to the account presented above of the asymmetry between the self and other ascription of the psychological predicates focus on its first premise, namely, that the unique relation in which each person stands to his inner states is a cognitive one; or, in other words, that there is anything unique about the knowledge a man may have of his inner states. This assumption is the result of unthinkingly transposing the perceptual model of subject standing in observing or perceiving relation to object from the external to the internal world. "The decisive move in the conjuring trick has been made and it was the very one we thought quite innocent" (PI,308). Making this move

involves conceiving of sensations, feelings, emotions, etc., as a kind of internal objects perceived and inwardly identified by the subject - who later comes to associate names with them. It is in this way that the idea of a private language is introduced - a private language being one which not merely is not but cannot be understood by anyone other than the speaker. The difficulties with this idea are well known and I shall not rehearse them here. My concern is rather with the difficulties inherent in a perceptual model of the inner world, difficulties which arise from bringing an epistemological[2] analysis to a context which lies outside the scope of such analysis.

The origin of these difficulties lies with the fact that in so far as statements about persons can be true or false there must be criteria[3] for their truth or falsity, that is to say, there must be circumstances which give good reasons for saying that a statement about a person is true or false. Bringing an epistemological analysis to these statements gives rise to the view that it must be directly on the basis of these criteria, i.e. because we have observed that they are satisfied, that we make these statements inthe first person. And, further, it must be because we are in a position to observe that the criteria are satisfied that we are entitled to make them. Two points follow from this. First, that our inner states are conceived as a kind of "objects of acquaintance" (in the Russellian sense) which we recognise and inwardly identify. The difficulties with this conception

will be exposed in Chapter 2. Secondly,that we have some theory of the self, that is, of the meaning of the word "I". To the errors inherent in this claim I now turn.

I(ii) In order to keep the problem of a theory of the self distinct from that of the inner objects of acquaintance, it will be convenient here to consider the difficulties that arise from the attempt to give an epistemological analysis of an ordinary first person perceptual statement (rather than one ascribing a feeling) such as "I see a windmill"[4].

The truth of this statement seems to depend on only one thing, that I observe a windmill, and this seems to be all I need observe. But for me to know the truth of the statement "Bill sees a windmill" I must observe, as a minimum condition, both that there is a windmill and that Bill is in a position to observe it, i.e. that his eyes are open and directed towards the windmill. So, in this case, there are two things I must observe in order to know the truth of the statement - and then must there not also be two in the other case? The word "I" is, after all, a person referring expression. Short of adopting a brand of solipsism it seems that we must acknowledge that corresponding to any first person statement there are third person statements that are, in an important sense, equivalent to it. The statement "I am thinking", for instance, said by Bill, says the same thing, states the same fact as the statement "Bill is thinking"said about him by someone other than

Bill. Obviously, these third person statements are about persons. So first person statements are also about persons. How, then, can I assert that a contingent relation holds between two things, myself and a windmill, solely on the basis of observation of only one thing, a windmill?

The dilemma here is this: either I hold that first person perceptual statements depend on the observation of only one thing, the object of the perception, and that therefore the "I", despite its equivalence (noted above, page 6) to "you" and "he", cannot be a referring expression; or I hold that the "I" refers to a person, that firstperson perceptual statements assert that a relation holds between two things, a person and the object of the perception, but are nevertheless made on the basis of observation of only one thing, the object of the perception. This dilemma takes on an even more absurd aspect when we consider inner states such as having images, sensations and emotions. It does not seem to be enough for me to say "I see an image" that I be aware only of an image. It seems that I must be aware of something in addition to the image, something that entitles me to say, not merely that there exists an image but that I see an image.

This dilemma is reflected in two theories of the self, each favouring the opposite horn, and each attempting to explain how it is that one can know that one is aware of something. The first of these is the theory that the self is a subject or substance, the referent of the word "I". If, as seems necessary, the explanation

of how one knows that one is aware of something must be that one observes oneself (the subject of one's experience) being aware of it, then it is necessary that one identify something as oneself. Moreover, this identification must necessarily be infallible. If it were not then it would be possible for me to mistakenly identify something as myself. In other words, it would be possible for me to think I was in pain, for example, when I was not in pain but someone else was. And this is logically not possible. But if no sense is to be given to the possibility of a misidentification here, then can it be right to speak of "identification" in this context at all? Nor can this difficulty be avoided by explaining the supposition that one observes oneself by inner sense in terms of the knowledge one has of one's inner states; for it is this supposition that is supposed to explain that knowledge and it cannot, therefore, simply be equated with it. The supposition leads to the introduction of an infinite hierarchy of observers which shows it to be a superfluous hypothesis that does not explain anything.

An alternative theory of the self involves denying the existence of the subject altogether, i.e. denying that the word "I" has a referent. Prima facie, given the above analysis of first person psychological statements, this view appears paradoxical. For since the"mental objects" which first person psychological statements are supposed to be about are objects of acquaintance or perception, there must be something that perceives or is acquainted with them.

This difficulty is overcome, however, by introducing the logical construction or bundle theory of the self. According to this theory how one knows that one is aware of something is to be analysed in terms of "the relationship of sense contents to one another, and not in terms of a substantival ego and its mysterious acts" (Ayer, "Language, Truth and Logic", p. I22). So, on this theory, in order that my seeing of an image, for example, be a fact that I can know empirically about myself, my seeing of the image must be related in certain ways to certain other sense contents, and I must observe that it is so related. This appears to beg the question in assuming a substantival ego as observer but can any sense be given to the expression "relationship between sense contents" independently of my observing this relation to hold? If it is the case that I can be said to observe an image, say, and observe that it is related to certain other sense contents (which is what makes them all mine) then it ought to make sense to say that I might observe an image and observe that it does not stand in this relation to these other sense contents. But if my seeing of an image consists in the image's standing in that relation to those other sense contents, then for me to observe an image and observe that it is not so related would be for me to observe an image and observe that I do not see it - and this is,again, logically absurd.

Whatever their other merits, then, both theories fail to provide an adequate account of how it is that one can know that

one is aware of something. The objections to them are in fact exactly parallel. They may be summarised as follows. To the theory that the self is a subject or substance, the referent of the word "I", the objection is: if it makes sense to speak of identifying something as the self, then it must make sense to speak of (at least the logical possibility of) misidentifying something as the self and this is not a possibility in this context. To the theory that the word "I" has no referent and that the self is a logical construction out of the relationship of sense contents to one another, the objection is: if it makes sense to speak of observing something to have a certain property then it must make sense to speak of (at least the logical possibility of) observing something to lack that property, and this is not a possibility in this context. These objections both reflect the influence and expose the inadequacy of the use of a perceptual model in the analysis of avowals.

To conclude: an attempt was made to answer the question how it is that one can know of a certain sense content that one perceives or is acquainted with it by giving an epistemolgical analysis of the ordinary perceptual statement "Isee a windmill". The arguments that followed have shown that this approach must be fundamentally misguided. It must be so because the idea that underlies it is the idea that psychological facts about a person must be analysable into facts that are directly observable by that person himself. And this is not the case. The mistake is to think that the

question "How do you know you see a windmill?" is to be answered by supposing that, in addition to a windmill, one must be aware of something else that tells one that one sees a windmill. Normal first person observation (and sensation) statements, however, such as "I see a windmill" (and "I am in pain") are not inferred from anything and cannot be said to be made on the basis of any criteria, excepting those for the existence of the object of the perception. (Whether or not there is any object in sensation statements, i.e. statements ascribing inner states, will be discussed in the next chapter). The mistaken idea that they are derives from the mistaken use of a perceptual model in the analysis of the psychological part of these statements. Yet it would seem unquestionable that we are justified in making these statements. How are we to account for this?

CHAPTER TWO

2(i) On a perceptual model of the inner world, which gives rise to the view that our inner states are a kind of objects of acquaintance which we recognise and inwardly identify, it is not surprising that philosophers have wanted to talk of certainty with respect to a man's knowledge of his inner states. I am inevitably and invariably in the best possible position to know whether I am in pain or not, since only I have direct access to my pain, and I am therefore the final authority with regard to judgements about my pain.

However, just as talk of "identification" is only appropriate where it is also appropriate to talk of "misidentification" (page 8, above), so talk of certainty can only be appropriate where it is also appropriate to talk of less than certainty, i.e. where there is at least the possibility of doubt. A claim to certainty would be without any point where there was no condition short of certainty which the claim to certainty would be excluding. But we have already seen above (page 2) that in the case of avowals there is no possibility of doubt. It is not, however, merely a matter of contingent fact that I cannot make a mistake in identifying the contents of my inner world. Avowals of sensation are not empirically infallible in the sense that, as a matter of fact, one never makes a mistake about one's own sensations; they are necessarily infallible

in the sense that the concept of a mistake has no application to them. And this is a feature of their grammar.

To see this let us compare avowals with ordinary perceptual claims. It is clear that the statement "I see that there is a windmill on the hill" entails the statement "There is a windmill on the hill" the truth of which will be determined by reference to the criteria for something's being a windmill and being on the hill. Similarly, the statement "I am in pain" ("I am aware that I am in pain") entails the statement"There is someone in pain" the truth of which will be determined by reference to the criteria for someone's being in pain. There is an important difference between these two claims, however. For while there is a clear distinction between the fact of there being a windmill on the hill and the fact of my seeing that there is, there is no analogous distinction between the fact of my being in pain and the fact of my knowing that I am. It is not, therefore, that one's knowledge of one's inner states is infallible because one is in the best possible position to observe them. It is rather that one's knowledge is infallible because there is no distinction, no logical gap, between one's observing and one's inner state. Being in pain, observing one's pain and knowing that one is in pain come to the same thing. And that means that we can't talk informatively about "observing" here.

The lack of even a logical distinction here, which accounts for the grammatical fact of the incorrigibility of avowals,is

reflected in the corresponding lack of any distinction between the criteria for the correct use of the psychological predicates, and the criteria on the basis of which we can self-ascribe and know the statements in which we make these self-ascriptions to be true. That is if I have learned the language, that is, the meanings of the words I use, then I have all the information I could possibly have for the making of avowals. Since there is no distinction between being in pain and observing one's pain, once I have learned the meanings of the psychological predicates, there can be nothing else I have to do, in the way, for example, of inwardly observing myself, in order correctly to ascribe the psychological predicates to myself. This is the basis of the distinction between avowals and ordinary perceptual claims such as "I see a windmill" noted above. The only sense in which I could be said to be mistaken about the truth of an avowal is the sense in which I could be said to be mistaken about the meaning of the predicate employed. Criteria other than linguistic criteria cannot come in here because they would have no use. Since there is no difference between believing that one is in pain and being in pain there can be no question of explaining how it is that one believes that one is in pain only when in fact one is in pain. I do not tell from anything that I am in pain: hence there cannot be criteria which justify my self-ascriptions of pain.

My awareness of my inner states, then, cannot be explained in terms of an inward observation of some kind. An observation is

distinguished from a(mere)sensory impression by the fact that the former implies the existence of something independent of the subject of the observation while the latter does not. Avowals of sensation do not imply the existence of something independent of the subject of the avowal: in making an avowal the speaker does not mean to be saying that,apart from his mental sensory awareness there actually exists something else, the object of that awareness. There is no distinction between the grounds for the claim and the object of the claim, which is, of course, to deny that there are grounds, and this is reflected in the lack of a distinction between being in pain and knowing that one is. So avowals cannot be observational claims at all, because the essential requirement for such a claim use is lacking - namely, the existence of a ground on the basis of which the claim about something else (other than the ground itself) is made. Without the fulfilment of this requirement observational claims would be indistinguishable from mere expressions of sensation. And avowals are, precisely, expressions of sensation.

So avowals are incorrigible and ungrounded, and they are incorrigible because they are ungrounded. But they are ungrounded, not because each man occupies a special position in relation to his inner states, but because, despite the appearance of their surface grammar, they are not observational claims at all, not even a special kind of inner directed ones. In fact,of course, in being ungrounded and therefore incorrigible , avowals are often the grounds on the basis of which a claim about something else is made.

2(ii) The problem remains of what account is to be given of avowals that will expose their special character. If the sense of a sentence is given by its criteria how can it be possible that there are some sentences, i.e. avowals, which can be asserted without grounds? That avowals are incorrigible and ungrounded is a logical point not an epistemological one. The possibility of doubt with respect to them is excluded not by certainty, the certainty residing in the immediacy of experience, but by grammar. Avowals do not express observations - but then what do they do? The fact is that when I say truly that I am in pain it is my being in pain that makes what I say true. What is the relation, then, between my declaration that I am in pain and the fact that I am in pain, if the former is not the report of an observation? One possibility, already mentioned, is that my declaration is, itself, an expression of my pain. On this Wittgensteinian view, avowals are conceived as extensions of natural expressive behaviour: "Words are connected with the primitive, the natural expressions of the sensation and used in their place. Achild has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain behaviour" (PI,244). In this sense, "an avowal does not say that the world is thus and so, it is a manifestation of its being so" (Hacker, ibid, p.258). Or, in other words, an avowal is, itself, a criterion for the state avowed[I]: when asserted it is necessarily usually the case that it is true.

The advantage of taking avowals in this way is twofold.

In the first place, in assimilating them to the natural expressions of sensation some immediate sense is given to the claim, made above that they are incorrigible. I cannot be in error as to whether I am in pain; I cannot make a mistake about this anymore than I can groan by mistake. Moreover, the lack of any criterion by reference to which I know when to say "I am in pain" will cease to seem puzzling when one sees that there is noteven the possibility of raising the question how one knows when to groan, cry or hold one's injured leg. In this way the unique, logico-grammatical status of avowals is made clear.

In the second place, assimilating avowals to the natural expressions of sensation emphasises the role that these statements play in the lives of human beings. Complaining of pain, like wincing, groaning or crying, is, at least under certain conditions, a social act inviting a response in the form of such socially orientated activities as comforting, alleviating and treating. First person utterances of this kind work, at least in part, to establish a claim to be regarded as a person to whom a certain attitude and manner of behaving is appropriate. Avowals,in other words, are instances of purposeful self-expression.

However, although this view of the nature of avowals is illuminating, if the assimilation is carried too far certain difficulties are encountered. We can, for example, describe the phenomenological features of pain - that it is dull or sharp, throbbing or nagging, stinging or searing, etc. - yet it is a matter for debate whether

there is any natural expressive behaviour which these descriptions can be said to replace. Moreover, "I am not in pain " is the negation of "I am in pain" but it can hardly be regarded as a learnt substitute for a natural form of "absence-of-pain behaviour". Describing my pain as sharp or nagging, or giving an assurance that I am not in pain is normally informative rather than expressive providing important diagnostic data which is ordinarily conceived of as true or false. The weaknesses of the expressive thesis become even more evidentwhen it is extended to avowals such as: "I see a tree", "I am thinking about the non-cognitive thesis of avowals", "I remember New York", none of which can be said to replace a primitive, natural form of behaviour.

The difficulties with the expressive thesis are summed up by a remark of Norman Malcolm's to the effect that an avowal, besides being an expression of an inner state, is also a sentence in the language: "By saying the sentence one can make a statement; it has a contradictory; it is true or false; in saying it one lies or tells the truth; and so on. None of these things, exactly, can be said of crying, limping or holding one's leg. So how can there be any resemblance?" ("Knowledge of Other Minds" in the Journal of Philosophy, I958, p.978. Malcolm's emphasis).

The central point here is that the avowal "I am in pain" is a sentence the intelligible use of which depends on my understanding its meaning, that is, on my knowing how to apply the predicate on the basis of those criteria that constitute its meaning. In so far

as I know how to apply the predicate correctly, so I can apply it incorrectly, I can get it right or wrong, I can lie or tell the truth. The major difference between avowals and natural expressions of sensation, then, is that the former, besides being responses, are also descriptions which may be true or false[2].

But what sort of descriptions are they? Descriptions of my natural expressive behaviour? But I do not have to observe my behaviour (in a mirror, for instance) to tell whether I am in pain. It does not follow, however, that I describe an observation of inner sense. An avowal does not involve any inward identification of a sensation but rather the criterionless use of an expression (Cf PI, 290). "The verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it"(PI, 244). The verbal expression, or avowal, is an acquired response, a new form of behaviour. What gives it the status of a description is not the picturing relation it may (or may not) have to any inner or outer fact about a person, but its use in a particular context. Wittgenstein gives expression to this intentional, speech act conception of a description in his remarks: "What we call 'descriptions' are instruments for particular uses" (PI, 291) and "Describing my state of mind is something I do in a particular context" (PI, p. 188). Thus "I am in pain" may be a cry wrenched from me in agony (a 'natural' expression of sensation) or it may be a quite cool response to a clinical question (a description), and it is not always possible to tell which it is. But in neither case do I, as it were, "observe my soul out of the corner of my

eye" (PI, p.188). And in neither case is the expression used on the basis of (behavioural) criteria. It is its having or lacking a use, a purpose, and the nature of that purpose in a particular context that determines its status as an expression or as a description. Wittgenstein makes this point in a celebrated passage: "A cry is not a description. But there are transitions. And the words 'I am afraid' may approximate more, or less, to being a cry. They may come quite close to this and also be far removed from it" (PI, p.189).

However, avowals are not to be conceived as ordinary descriptions, whose truth or falsity is established by the criteria for a true description of a process, or other observable phenomenon. The peculiarity of avowals in this respect is brought out in an important passage in which Wittgenstein denies that the avowal "I am thinking such and such" is a description while claiming that there are criteria for its truth: "The criteria for the truth of a confession that I thought such and such are not the criteria for the true description of a process. And the importance of a true confession does not reside in its being a correct and certain report of a process. It resides rather in the special consequences that can be drawn from a confession whose truth is guaranteed by the special criteria of truthfulness" (PI, p.222. Wittgenstein's emphasis.).

So the peculiarity of avowals as descriptions derives from the fact already mentioned (page 3, above) that their truth is guaranteed by truthfulness. For since the criteria for being in a certain state comprise behaviour that is expressive of that state,

and the utterance of, for example, "I am in pain" is, itself, an expression of pain - because the truth of the utterance is guaranteed by truthfulness, my utterance of "I am in pain" is a criterion for my being in pain. In other words, the utterance of the description is necessarily good evidence for the truth of the description (which is not to say that it entails the truth of the description). My saying "I am in pain" is, therefore, a criterion for the truth of "He is in pain" said of me; it is not, of course, a criterion for the truth of "I am in pain" : "I am in pain" has no criteria (is not uttered on the basis of any criteria) (Cf Kenny, "The Verification Principle and the Private Language Argument", quoted by Hacker, ibid, p.261).

This explains the fact of the asymmetry between the self and other ascription of psychological predicates expressed in the remark: "My own relation to my words is wholly different from other people's" (PI, p.192). My utterance of "I am in pain" is a criterion for my being in pain and is therefore a criterion for your utterance of "He is in pain" (or "You are in pain") said of me. But it is not a criterion for itself. The difference here is a logical one, not an epistemological one (as though I had access to something you couldn't have access to), a matter of grammar, not a matter of circumstance.

The special logico-grammatical status of avowals, then, derives from the fact that they may be employed both to express our feelings, in being incorrigible, ungrounded statements and thus

assimilable to natural expressions of sensation, and also to state how we feel, in being descriptions having truth values. Although they cannot be wholly assimilated to a primitive, natural form of behaviour, therefore, they do have similarities, viz.: they are asserted without reference to criteria, truthfulness guarantees their truth, their assertion is a criterion for the truth of the corresponding third person sentence, and doubt is not applicable in one's own case. When I say truly that I am in pain it is my being in pain that makes what I say true, but it is not my justification or ground for saying what I say. I have no justification or ground. The predicate is criterionlessly self ascribed. But that is not to say that I use the sentence without right (Cf PI, 289). The sense of the constituent psychological predicate that is criterionlessly self ascribed is given by the criteria that justify its other ascription. In other words, the condition of my criterionlessly ascribing a psychological predicate to myself is that I should know the criteria on the basis of which to ascribe it to others (PI, 261. See also Strawson, "Individuals", Chapter 3). That is, that I should know the meaning of the predicate, the rules for its use.

This is not to give my use of the predicate a behavioural justification, however. Although psychological concepts are not logically independent of behavioural concepts neither are they reducible to them. "Pain" does not mean "groaning", even though groaning is a criterion of pain. Rather, it is part of the sense of "He is in pain" that the truth of "He groaned when he moved his leg"

is necessarily good evidence for it, i.e. a criterion for it. But I do not need to observe myself groaning to know that I'm in pain. I do not observe anything. My self ascriptions of pain do not need justification or ground. What makes them possible (without grounds) is their assimilation to the natural expression of sensation.

2(iii) So the fact that an avowal is not made on the basis of criteria or grounds does not imply that it lacks either sense or truth value (although it is peculiar in that truthfulness guarantees its truth). The consequence of the absence of grounds is the absence of the possibility of doubt, i.e. the absence of the possibility of making a mistake. It is these two, inter-related features of avowals, namely, their ungroundedness and their incorrigibility, which, on Wittgenstein's view, justify the non-cognitive thesis[3], despite the fact that they have truth values and may serve as descriptions. The thesis is clearly stated in the opening paragraphs of the argument against the possibility of a private language: "It can't be said of me at all that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean - except perhaps that I am in pain?" (PI, 246) and it is later generalised: "'I know what I want, wish, believe, feel ....' (and so on through all the psychological verbs) is either philosopher's nonsense or, at any rate, not a judgement a priori" (PI, p.221).

Wittgenstein deploys a number of arguments in defence of this intuitively unappealing claim. The basic point is made at paragraph 246: "The truth is: it makes sense to say about other

people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself". We have already seen the force of this claim above (pages I - 3). The gist of the argument is this: where the possibility of doubt does not make sense and error is inconceivable, a claim to knowledge cannot make sense either. 'I know that' is only legitimately employable where one can also say 'I believe' or 'I suspect'. One does not come to know one's inner states (by, for instance, an inward observation of some kind), one does not learn of them, one has them. Only what one comes to know can one be said to know or to be ignorant about. Only what one can find out can one know (Cf PI, p.22I and PI, 246).

What this argument amounts to is that a claim to knowledge is out of place where the possibility of going on to verify the claim is not intelligible. The "I know" in "I know I am in pain" "cannot do any of its normal jobs" (Malcolm, "The Privacy of Experience" in A. Stroll (ed.) "Epistemology", p.I48) where its normal jobs are taken to be claiming grounds, authority and priveleged position. The question "How do you know that you are in pain?" is inappropriate because I do not know this <u>any</u> how (Hacker, ibid, p.274). There are no means whereby I acquire such knowledge (although the intelligent, criterionless use of the predicate does require knowledge of the criteria which would justify its use in a third person ascription, which is what gives the predicate its sense) and hence no possibility of verifying it.

It is clear from this that a perceptual model of introspection

must be abandoned, and this we may readily accept. But what also follows from this argument is a denial of the possibility of self-knowledge. For on any reasonable interpretation of the phrase, self-knowledge is expressed through avowals,[4] and on Wittgenstein's view, as we have seen above, avowals cannot be regarded as expressions of knowledge. This is a conclusion we may be less ready to accept.

In the first place, the assertion that all knowledge claims must be grounded, as Hacker remarks (ibid, p.274) implies either an infinite regress or the possibility of giving grounds which are themselves unknowable. Neither of these alternatives seems more plausible than the assertion that some knowledge claims must be ungrounded. Hacker then produces several cogent arguments to show that "I know I am in pain", though ungrounded, cannot be nonsense.

But there is a more immediate reason why the conclusion is unappealing. Denying the possibility of self-knowledge (in a sense that is asymmetrical with knowledge of others) entails denying the possibility of self-deception. Indeed, denial of the possibility of self-deception would seem to follow from the original claim of the incorrigibility of avowals. But self-deception is an incontrovertible fact of the existence of human beings, the evidence for which is provided by the havoc it plays with their lives. Moreover, denial of the possibility of self-knowledge renders the Socratic "Know thyself" a piece of empty rhetoric (unless it is taken to be no more than an exhortation to learn the language).

Self-deception is possible and possible to overcome and,

in that event, there is a gain in self-knowledge. Wittgenstein's arguments have shown that such a gain cannot be acheived by any sort of an observation. But it is not clear that this exhausts the possibilities, that such a gain might not be acheived without observation, while yet being more than a simple increase in articulateness. What is required, therefore, is an analysis of self-deception which, in providing an account of the possibility of overcoming it, will provide an account of the possibility of acquiring self-knowledge, and thus rescue this latter notion from the cul-de-sac of the Wittgensteinian position.

CHAPTER THREE

3(i) A student of philosophy claims a deep interest in his subject. He talks a good deal, and immodestly, about his past association with it, his present projects and especially about his plans for the future. He is, however, difficult to engage in a philosophical discussion and will characteristically excuse himself with the remark that this is not "real" philosophy and consequently not worth bothering about. But he proves evasive over the question of what "real" philosophy is. He owns an extensive, carefully selected collection of books of which he is justifiably proud, but there is little evidence to show that he has read more than a handful of them. He is, moreover, not very conscientious about attendance at lectures and seminars, and is always reluctant to present papers at the latter excusing himself on the pretext of having more urgent work in hand. He does, indeed, have problems with his work, rarely completing an essay on time. He justifies his tardiness by reference to the extensive reading he likes to get done for each essay - but there is never any evidence of this in the finished article and his work is of only a mediocre standard.

I take the above to be a case of self- deception. The student appears to be trying to convince himself (and the world) that he has an academic interest in philosophy when, in fact, he has none. Such cases are not always easily identified since the

criteria for self-deception are frequently indecisive. In this case the judgement may be substantiated by reference to the family background: that the father is, for instance, a well-known academic, a domineering personality and ambitious for his son. However, in order that this case should count as one of self-deception it needs to be distinguished from simple ignorance on the one hand and simple insincerity on the other.

To count as a case of simple ignorance, we should be required to suppose that the student, through intellectual carelessness or naivety, had simply failed to notice the conflict between his professed interest in philosophy and his lack of "engagement" with it. This supposition might well be tenable in cases involving intellectually dull or emotionally distracted people, but it is not so in this case. For the student in question here does recognise that there is some conflict, but for reasons which are as yet unexplained he fails to accord it the significance which we judge it to deserve. He does not read it in the same way as we.

To count as a case of simple insincerity we should be required to suppose that the student really knew the truth of the matter but intentionally wished to deceive us. This may, indeed, always be a possibility but one that becomes increasingly remote as we observe more of his behaviour. Moreover, to support such a contention we should be required to impute some appropriate motive to him - and there is, at any rate, no obvious candidate in this case.

It is clear, however, that these proffered explanations in terms of ignorance and insincerity have some force. If our reading of the student's attitude is the correct one, then his account of it necessarily displays some kind of ignorance, albeit not simple ignorance. Moreover, in so far as he has access to all the facts that we have access to in respect of his attitude, and yet he nonetheless fails to tell us the truth about himself, he is in some sense insincere. It is,in fact, precisely the manner in which the concepts of ignorance and insincerity overlap as regards reports of inner states that gives rise to the peculiarity of self-deception. For self-deception is not simple hypocrisy, or lying, or duping; it is more genuine than these. The self-deceiver is "unable" to admit the truth even to himself and his avowals cannot, therefore, count as being truthful. Yet it also seems as though he could admit the truth if only he would: his deception is a kind of intentional ignorance, a refusal to know. Only by construing self-deception in this way can it be accommodated to the fact of the incorrigibility of avowals (their truth being guaranteed by truthfulness) presented in Chapter Two.

Herbert Fingarette, in his book "Self-deception", suggests three criteria for identifying cases of self-deception (p.53. I have here slightly modified Fingarette's suggestions). They cover, respectively, the questions of sincerity, truth and intentionality. They are as follows:

I. Sincerity : No intentional difference between the way

the individual describes his attitudes, feelings, wishes, motives, etc., to himself and the way he describes them to others.

2. Truth : The way the individual describes his attitudes, feelings, etc., to himself reflects them aptly and correctly.

3. Intentionality : The individual has not been unintentionally wrong in the way he came to describe his attitudes, feelings, etc.

Now under normal circumstances, if (I) and (3) hold then (2) will hold also. That is to say, if (I) an individual tells us about his attitudes, feelings,etc., what he tells himself, then we should be inclined to regard him as being sincere because generally (2) what he tells himself about his attitudes and feelings reflects them aptly and correctly given (3) that he does not accidentally mistake them.

But what of the case where (I) and (3) hold but (2) does not? That is, the individual tells us what he tells himself about his attitudes, etc., and does not accidentally mistake them, yet nevertheless does not describe them to himself as they are. Since (I) holds, i.e. he tells himself what he tells others, we are inclined to attribute sincerity to him. But the more we observe of him the more we come to see that something is wrong; we come to see that what he says is not unintentionally wrong but purposely wrong. This is to ascribe to him a deeper level of insincerity than that implied by the intention to deceive us (which would be shown

by a failure of (I)) and a deeper level of ignorance than that implied by unintentionally giving a mistaken description (which would be shown by a failure of (3)). But what other possibility remains?

The paradox of self-deception is illustrated by the fact that the more we concentrate on the failure of (2), i.e. the lack of truth in what the individual tells himself despite (3), i.e. that this is not the result of an unintentional mistake, the more we tend to see the individual as a deceiver, while the more we concentrate on the truth of (I) the more we tend to see him as being sincere. This is the paradox of the self-deceiver's "sincere insincerity"[I]. Its resolution lies in an identification of the deeper level of insincerity with the deeper level of ignorance to give a sense to the notion of intentional ignorance.

The connection here with Freud's work is unmistakeable. In fact, it would not be innaccurate to say that his greatest achievement was to give a systematic sense to the notion of intentional ignorance. Henri Ellenberger, speaking of the sources of Freud's thought in his "The Discovery of the Unconscious", refers to an intellectual tendency that had been salient in Europe for some centuries, which he calls the "unmasking trend" and describes as "the systematic search for deception and self-deception and the uncovering of underlying truth" (p.537). It was in order to accommodate the self-deceiver's apparent "refusal to know", the neurotic's apparent "inability to admit" the source of his symptoms, that Freud

spoke of our learning that "there is more than one kind of ignorance" (Introductory Lectures, p.322)[2], that "there are things that one would not care to admit to oneself" (The Question of Lay Analysis, Vol xx, p.188), and that "a very remarkable psychological problem begins to appear in this situation - of a thought of (one's) own being kept secret from (one's) own self" (ibid, p.188).

What Freud had in mind in making these remarks, and that in virtue of which alone they are intelligible, was his famous distinction between the conscious and the unconscious part of mental life. In its ordinary use the word "unconscious" has only a negative sense. Either it means inanimate, or comatose, or asleep, or it means, in its adverbial form, unknown or unknowingly. Freud's use of the term, however, extended its meaning beyond these. As Lionel Trilling remarked in his "Sincerity and Authenticity": "It would be an incomplete but not an inaccurate description of the theory of psychoanalysis to say that it conceives of the conscious system of the mind as a mask for the energies and intentions of the unconscious system" (p.142). And Freud writes: "In Confession the sinner tells what he knows; in analysis the neurotic has to tell more" (The Question of Lay Analysis, Vol xx, p.189). We may ask: what more does the neurotic (and the self-deceiver) have to tell?

CHAPTER FOUR

4(i) In the investigation of traumatic hysteria and obsessive actions Freud noticed that there was always something odd or unconvincing or incomplete about the reasons patients gave for their behaviour. The proffered explanations seemed always to have the character of rationalisations and could therefore be counted as paradigms of self-deception. It soon became clear that his patients' behaviour could not be explained without reference to certain ideas or thoughts of which they had no awareness. Freud's clinical work, in other words, provided him with a wealth of evidence pointing to the existence of ideas that are latent but nevertheless active.

Prima facie, this is not a tenable view. That is,saying of an individual that he has thoughts of which he is not aware appears to be self-contradictory. Freud seems to be attempting to drive a wedge precisely where it was argued in Chapters I and 2 that it was logically impossible to drive a wedge, namely, between being in a certain psychological state and being aware that one is in that state. However, the assertion that being aware that one is in a certain state is not logically independent of being in a certain state is not equivalent to the assertion that the one is identical with the other. All that Freud needs to claim is that the criteria for being in a certain state are not identical with the criteria for being aware that one is in that state, and that the former may be fulfilled

without the latter. It matters not whether this is designated a distinction between awareness and non-awareness that one is in a certain state or one between two sorts or levels of awareness that one is in a certain state. Psychoanalytic theory does not collapse if the situation it postulates is described as being that of two consciousnesses one of which is only indirectly accessible to the other, i.e. accessible only through observation of behaviour.

By "unconscious" in the Freudian sense, then, we understand a psychical process whose existence we are obliged to assume, because we have no direct[I] means of access to it, for some such reason as that we infer it from its effects. "In that case", Freud writes, "we have the same relation to it as we have to a psychical process in another person, except that it is in fact one of our own" (New Introductory Lectures, p.102). This is an important comparison to which I shall refer again.

However, inso far as the evidence for this conception was evidence for the middle phase, that is, for the existence of ideas that were both active and latent , it was evidence for a dynamic as opposed to a merely descriptive conception of the unconscious. What this means is that the difference between the conscious and the unconscious could not be accounted for merely in terms of what is known and what is unknown (or what is "felt" and what is inferred). For it was clear that some ideas that were unconscious pressed strongly towards consciousness, albeit in a distorted form. So the notion of "inadmissibility to consciousness" achieved by the mechanism of

"repression" was invoked and this in turn required the postulation of a continuing pressure keeping the rejected ideas from consciousness, viz: "resistance". The presence of a resistance was revealed by, for instance, a simple drying up of the chain of associations as they approached close to the repressed material.

Freud's view of the unconsciousness, then, was roughly this: an idea is repressed for some reason or other; it remains in the mind at once removed from consciousness and yet operative; and then in certain favoured circumstances it may reappear in consciousness. Thus: "We obtain our concept of the unconscious from the theory of repression" (The Ego and the Id, Vol xix, p.I5).

The dynamic conception of the unconscious had a further consequence, however, in that it introduced a new distinction within the concept of the unconscious itself. Clearly, not every mental content that was not conscious was subject to a repression. Those that were not conscious and not subject to a repression were referred to as being pre-conscious, i.e. accessible to consciousness through simple introspection. The unconscious is then distinguished from the pre-conscious as comprising those mental contents which cannot be brought to consciosness by simple introspection. They cannot, indeed, be brought to consciousness at all, except by means of the special psychoanalytic techniques.

The unconscious, then, is not some mysterious inner realm necessarily hidden from our gaze. There are behavioural criteria[2] for for the existence of unconscious ideas and impulses which are of

the same kind as, though not identical with, the criteria for the existence of conscious ideas and impulses. Freud's conception of the unconscious is not, therefore, susceptible to the familiar Wittgensteinian arguments against inner objects of acquaintance (or non-acquaintance) since the inner processes which it refers to all have outward criteria (Cf PI, 580). The difference between an unconscious and a conscious idea or impulse is that the former is one which an individual is unable or unwilling, or unable because unwilling, to admit to for reasons yet to be discussed. The concept of repression is invoked to explain this curious failure to admit.

The dynamic conception of the unconscious was what was most innovatory in Freud's thought. In the first place, the diversion of attention from the repressed to the repressing forces of the mind, that is from an examination of what happens in repression (the consequences of repression) to an examination of why and how (by what means) it happens, represented an important step towards understanding the paradox of the self-deceiver's, and the neurotic's, "intentional ignorance" or "refusal to know". And in the second place, the conception of the unconscious as the result of a repressing force led directly to the postulation of the ego and the id as, respectively, the agency and the object of repression. I shall briefly discuss each of these two consequences in turn taking the latter, the distinction between the ego and the id, first.

4(ii) The id is entirely unconscious. It comprises nothing but

instinctual impulses seeking discharge dominated by the pleasure principle[3]. Initially, the ego was identified with the conscious mind. Freud's later view, however, adopted for reasons that will become apparent in the discussion of repression below, was that the ego is part conscious and part unconscious. It is not, therefore, sharply differentiated from the id but merges into it[4]. In fact, the id contains not only unconscious material that is the result of repression but also that which was "innately present originally" (An Outline of Psychoanalysis, Vol xxiii, p.165). The ego is a development out of the id: that part of it which has been modified by the influence of the external world through the medium of the system pcpt-cs (perceptual conscious). It represents the external world to the id, controlling the approaches to motility of the id's instinctual impulses by replacing the pleasure principle with the reality principle. And it serves as the id's representative in the external world attempting, "by means of its muscular activity, to make the world fall in with the wishes of the id" (The Ego and the Id, Vol xix, p.56).

The ego, then, faces conflicts on two fronts[5]: with the external world in its capacity as representative of the id, and with the id in its capacity as representative of the external world. But for the ego there could be no conflict within the self, exhibited in the struggle for self-control, between the demands of the id and the demands of the external world. For the id, being entirely dominated by the pleasure principle, could only openly confront the demands of

the external world (which, when internalised, constitute the reality principle) and seek gratification of its (the id's) wishes regardless of the latter. The existence of a conflict hidden within the self requires the postulation of an additional agency in which the two principles may be opposed and their opposition resolved by arbitration. This agency is the ego and the principle governing its activity of arbitration appears to be that of self-preservation which is expressed through the ego-instincts[6] (Vol xi, p. 214; cited by Wollheim, "Freud", p.147).

What it is that the ego seeks to preserve is its integrity as mediator between the pleasure and reality principles. Freud writes: "What distinguishes the ego from the id quite especially is a tendency to synthesis in its contents, to a combination and unification in its mental processes which are totally lacking in the id " (New Introductory Lectures, p.108). And again: "(The id) is, we might say, 'all to pieces'; its different urges pursue their own purposes independently and regardless of one another" (The Question of Lay Analysis, Vol xx, p.196).

Freud refers to the ego as being"the actual seat of anxiety" (The Ego and the Id, Vol xix, p.57). It responds to a threat to its integrity in just the same way that the organism responds to realistic anxiety: by attempting to take flight. More specifically than this it is not possible to say what motivates its attempt at flight. "What it is that the ego fears from the external and from the libidinal danger cannot be specified; we know that the fear is

of being overwhelmed or annihilated, but it cannot be grasped analytically" (ibid, p.57).

The ego cannot actually escape its conflicts, however. One cannot run away from oneself. In its position as mediator between the id and the external world, its business is to reconcile the interests of the two. Where this proves to be impossible it resorts to protecting itself against disintegration by instituting a process of defence. Thus the ego is often obliged "to conceal the id's conflicts with reality, to profess with diplomatic disingenuousness to be taking notice of reality, even when the id has remained rigid and unyielding" (New Introductory Lectures, p.110). And it"only too often yields to the opportunity to become sycophantic, opportunist and lying" (The Ego and the Id, Vol xix, p.56). Self-deception, we may say, is a means of self-protection.

The conception of the ego as an integral entity employing mechanisms of defence to protect itself is the second of the two consequences, mentioned above, of Freud's introduction of the dynamic conception of the unconscious. It explains, in so far as Freud thought it possible to explain, the motive behind the conflict which gives rise to the impression that one's own self is "no longer the unity which (one) had always considered it to be, as though there were something else as well in (one) that could confront that self" (The Question of Lay Analysis, Vol xx, p.168) from which the dynamic conception of the unconscious was derived.

The first consequence of this conception of the unconscious

was the diversion of attention from the repressed to the repressing forces of the mind, i.e. to the mechanisms employed by the ego in the resolution of its conflicts. To this I now turn.

4(iii) In his early writings, Freud employed the terms "repression" and "defence" more or less inter-changeably, although the latter soon dropped out of use altogether. It was not until"Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety" (Vol xx), that the notion of defence was re-instated but this time as a general designation for all the techniques which the ego makes use of in protecting itself in conflicts which may lead to a neurosis or psychosis. Repression was then defined as a species of defence.

It is worth noting that it is not the simple conflicts between the ego and the id and between the ego and the external world that cause the neuroses and psychoses. The ego is constantly in conflict. For the most part, however, it resolves its conflicts by simple mediation, i.e. by conscious control of the impulses arising from the id or by physical activity designed to force its will on the external world. Only where its conflicts cannot be resolved in these ways does the ego resort to defence.

The manner in which the processes of defence deal with the "irresolvable" conflicts of the ego is essentially remarkably straightforward: they work by simply removing one of the protagonists to the conflict. The generic object of defence is to deny access to consciousness to any impulse, memory or perception that is liable

to disrupt the ego-synthesis. The dissension is the between two powers (usually ethical, i.e. resulting from the influence of the external (social) world, and sexual, i.e. arising from the id) one of which is conscious and the other of which is unconscious. For this reason the conflict cannot be brought to an issue, and in this way the ego is protected from the mental struggle and disruption that would ensue if it were.

The process of defence does not result in the resolution of the conflict but only in its removal from the arena of the ego's conscious activities. The inefficacy of the process is shown by the fact that it invariably gives rise to a more or less severe psychical illness. A proper resolution of the conflict can only be achieved when both powers meet on the same ground, i.e. in the conscious mind. "To make this possible is the sole task of therapy" (Introductory Lectures, p.484).

The ego's fundamental task in defence is that of denial. The result of defence may be expressed in the form of the negative judgement: "I am not aware of/that P". But there is But there is something paradoxical about this. For in denying P access to consciousness how can the ego avoid being aware of P? That would mean, absurdly, "being conscious of the drive to be repressed in order not to be conscious of it" (Sartre, "Being and Nothingness", p.52-53). The ego's defensive activity must, therefore, itself be unconscious. It cannot be dynamically unconscious, however, i.e. itself the object of defence, for the we should have to account for

this latter defensive manoeuvre, and so on. Two important conclusions follow from this. The first is that the ego cannot be identified with the conscious; and the second is that since the ego's defensive activity is itself unconscious, it cannot be possible to account for the unconscious solely in terms of defence. Freud's mature view, indeed, is that a portion of the ego operates unconsciously and that the unconscious comprises not only "that which was acquired (by repression) in the course of the ego's development (through the continual influence of the external world)" but also that which was "innately present originally" (An Outline of Psychoanalysis, Vol xxiii, p.165). The unconscious is conceived not only as a phenomenon, then, but also as a system: the system Ucs. And defence is seen as an unconscious (instinctive? See note 6) process employed by the ego as a last resort against the forces with which it has to deal.

4(iv) There is a variety of mechanisms by which the process of defence is instituted.[7] Defence against the demands of the id may be effected by repression in which the impulse is fended off through control or modification of the ideational representative. Or it may act directly on the impulse, modifying or transforming it in some way (reaction-formation, displacement, regression, sublimation). In either case this generally results in the formation of a substitutive representation which is expressed in the symptom and serves as a substitute object (idea) for the fended off impulse, but one which is very much reduced, displaced and inhibited and which is no longer

recognisable as a satisfaction. This is the genesis of neurosis.

Alternatively, in response to an intolerable frustration of the id's wishful impulses by reality, the ego may defend itself by effecting a dissociation from the external world, rejecting new perceptions (by disavowal) and divesting memories of their significance (by isolation, i.e. cutting of associative connections) creating, autocratically, a new internal (by undoing) and external (by projection) world in their place. This is the genesis of psychosis.

An important point to note is that in almost every case[8] in which a defence mechanism is employed, the patient's relation to reality is disturbed in some way. In the case of psychosis this is obvious enough. In the case of neurosis too, however, "it serves ..... as a means of withdrawing from reality and, in its severe forms, it actually signifies a flight from real life" (The Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis, Vol xix, p.183). This happens as a result of the alteration in the cathexis attaching to a part of reality, i.e. an alteration in its significance for the individual, which follows on the repression of an instinctual impulse. Moreover, the loss of reality incurred in this way "affects precisely that piece of reality as a result of whose demands the instinctual repression ensued" (ibid, p.183)[9].

All the mechanisms which the ego employs in its defence, then, have a similar objective in so far as they serve the desire for power of the id to some extent at the expense of reality. With the mechanisms involved in the genesis of neurosis there is an initial

obedience to reality (repression of the id's impulse) succeeded by a deferred attempt at flight (symptom formation to displace affect). With the mechanisms involved in the genesis of psychosis the initial flight (disavowal) is succeeded by an active phase of remodelling. "Neurosis does not disavow the reality, it only ignores it; psychosis disavows it and tries to replace it" (ibid, p.185). There is then not only a loss of reality but also a substitute for reality: in psychosis a new reality, in neurosis a symptom charged with a secret meaning of special importance.

We may notice three features of the process of defence, then. In the first place something is denied access to consciousness, i.e. there is a failure to admit something. Secondly, as a result of this, there is a loss of reality, that is , a "gap" in the explanations the patient offers of his behaviour, or something odd or unconvincing about them (and this oddity will be more pronounced in cases of neurosis than in cases of self-deception). Thirdly, to compensate for this loss, a substitutive formation is created to fill the gap where the defence took place. This is secured by the resistance that maintains the defence which gives rise to all the masks, disguises, rationalisations and superficialities that are characteristic of psychical illness as of self-deception.

How the process of defence is instituted we cannot know since it is always an unconscious, instinctive activity of the ego. We can only know that it has been instituted - by its effects, which generally[10] consist in a failure to avow the impulse, memory or perception

that is the object of defence and the development of some form of "cover-story" to conceal this failure.

4(v) What, then, does this "failure to avow" which characterises the process of defence consist in? It cannot consist merely in the inhibition of discharge of an instinctual impulse for that in itself would amount only to self-control. Moreover, whether or not the object of defence was avowed could in no way affect the achievement of such control.

Neither can it consist in a kind of simple ignorance, however. If this were all that defence resulted in then simply telling an individual what his unconscious impulses, etc., were, i.e. giving him the ideas that are the vehicles of those impulses, ought to be sufficient to dispel his ignorance, remove the defence and make what is unconscious conscious. But simply communicating an idea to an individual against which he has at one time instituted a process of defence at first makes no change in his mental condition. Freud scathingly remarks: "Such measures have as much influence on the symptoms of nervous illness as a distribution of menu cards in a time of famine has upon hunger"('Wild' Psychoanalysis, Vol xi, p.225).

Moreover, this account completely fails to make the distinction, noted above, between the unconscious and the pre-conscious by overlooking the dynamic conception of the unconscious which includes the idea of a resistance to making the unconscious conscious. The contents of the unconscious mind, on the Freudian

view, are not those of which we are merely ignorant. Equally, therefore, making the unconscious conscious is not merely a matter of coming to know something.(which is not to say that it is not partly a matter of coming to know something). Making the unconscious idea that "I still fear my father" conscious is not accomplished in simply understanding what the proposition means. It also involves understanding how it applies to oneself, one's situation and relationships, which can only be achieved through overcoming the ego's resistances and lifting the repression. But what more does this involve than making an effort of understanding?

If an idea that an individual has repressed is communicated to him Freud remarks that he does not receive it instead of his unconscious material but beside it (Introductory Lectures, p.488). It then exists on two levels (is registered in two systems) : as the conscious memory of the idea that has been communicated to him, and as the "unconscious memory of his experience as it was in its original form" (The Unconscious, Vol xiv, p. 175). Lifting of the repression occurs only when the resistances have been overcome which prevented the unconscious memory trace from being brought to consciousness and thence into connection with the conscious idea. The identity of the information given to the patient with his repressed memory is only apparent, therefore, at any rate until his resistance has been overcome. Freud writes: "To have heard something and to have experienced something are in their psychological nature two quite different things, even though the content of both is the

same" (ibid, p.176). And again:"Our knowledge about the unconscious material is not equivalent to his knowledge" (Intrductory Lectures, p.488. Cf New Introductory Lectures, p.102 quoted on page 34 above).

However, Freud later replaced this topographical view of the mind with a new hypothesis (introduced in the metapsychological paper on "The Unconscious", Vol xiv, but which received its fullest treatment in "The Ego and the Id", Vol xix). According to this hypothesis, "The difference between a conscious and an unconscious presentation is that the former comprises the presentation of a word and a thing, the latter only the presentation of a thing" (The Unconscious, Vol xiv, p.201). For a state (or "thing") to become conscious it must first become pre-conscious "through becoming connected with the word presentations corresponding to it" (The Ego and the Id, Vol xix, p.20). This is sufficient because once the links between the word and the unconscious state have been formed and the connection made, the latter will thereby have attracted to itself sufficient sensory quality to become the object of an "internal perception". The special interest of this hypothesis lies in the connection it establishes between making something unconscious conscious and giving it a verbal expression, i.e. avowing or acknowledging it. The notion of an "internal perception" is unclear, however. Freud,at any rate, does not appear to think that it is analogous to external perception, viz: "Whereas the relation of external perceptions to the ego is quite perspicuous, that of internal perceptions to the ego requires special investigation" (The Ego and

the Id, Vol xix, p.2I. I shall return to this point again.

Therapeutically, the task of making the unconscious conscious is accomplished by removing the ego's resistances and then undoing the repressions which they maintain. Although this is Freud's own account (given in the Addenda to "Inhibitions , Symptoms and Anxiety", Vol xx, p.I59) it gives the misleading impression that two tasks are involved here and not one. This cannot be the case. Resistance and repression cannot be distinct activities of the ego: the former is a necessary and not a contingent concomitant of the latter. Without it repression "would either fail in its purpose or would have to be repeated an indefinite number of times" (and this latter alternative cannot be considered as a possibility) (Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, Vol xx, p.I57). Removal of the resistance must, therefore, happen simultaneously with the lifting of the repression. This is achieved by a period of strenuous effort called "working through", the process by which a patient in analysis discovers piecemeal, over an extended period of time, the full implications of some interpretation or insight. The need for this process is to effect an alteration in the ego in order that it may overcome the power of the id's compulsion to repeat which is a consequence of "the attraction exerted by the unconscious prototype upon the repressed instinctual process" (ibid, p.I59). Since the id operates according to the pleasure principle it follows the path of least resistance in seeking gratification of its impulses. In appropriating the original unconscious representatives for its repressed instincts in this way,

the id lays down a pattern for the discharge of these instincts. It conforms to this pattern until such time as the balance of pleasure/unpleasure within it is altered. This happens when the period of "working through" with the aid of the analyst succeeds in strengthening the ego and reducing its need for self-protection by unconscious resistance. The lowering of its resistance enables it to offer the repressed contents of the id a means of conscious expression which exerts a greater attraction on them than the unconscious prototypes. In this way the id's compulsion to repeat is overcome and its pattern of discharge"undone" and simultaneously reconstructed about the new path of least resistance now provided by the newly strengthened ego. In other words, with the help of the ego, the impulses of the id find a new, more satisfactory mode of behavioural expression. One pattern of behaviour is replaced by another. The result of analysis is "something which people are inclined to accept and which makes it easier for them to go certain ways : it makes certain ways of behaving and thinking natural for them. They have given up one way of thinking and adopted another"(Wittgenstein, "Conversations on Freud", p.45). Freud's reference to the"resistance of the unconscious" (Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, Vol xx, p.160) appears to do no work that is not already done by the pleasure principle. Needless to say the account given above is at variance with Freud's own (ibid, p.157-160) but I believe it to be the more coherent for being the more economical.

What can seem peculiar in this account of what happens in

the analytic situation is the idea that the ego should co-operate in the task of reoving its resistances and undoing the repressions. It was,after all, in the interests of its own preservation that the repressions were originally instituted. They will, of course, have resulted in a loss of reality (see above) and have required the expenditure of a considerable quantity of energy which will have had more or less serious consequences for the individual. It might seem, nonetheless, that lifting of the repressions would cause the ego even greater pain and disruption. There are two factors which combat this eventuality. In the first place, it is supposed that the decisive, primal repressions "all take place in early childhood" (The Question of Lay Analysis, Vol xx, p.204), while the ego is still undeveloped and powerless[II]. "Repression proper" is the later occurrence of repression of the mental derivatives of the original repressed representative (of the instinct) or of such trains of thought as have come into associative connection with it. Now that the ego is mature and stronger it is better equipped to cope with its role as mediator between the demands of the id and the restrictions imposed by the external world. In the second place, and more importantly, the process of strengthening the ego, thereby lowering its resistances thereby lifting the repressions, is greatly aided by the phenomenon of transference.

Transference consists in the patient's old illness being transformed and newly created as an "artificial" neurotic attachment to the analyst, which may be either positive or negative. The creation

of this special relationship, the fundamental premise of which is a mutual agreement not to abuse trust, provides the patient's ego with a degree of security that it is unlikely to experience outside the analytic situation. Within the context of this new relationship the patient re-enacts all his most fundamental conflicts, all of which take on a new significance which lies in relation to the transference. The analyst, as object and centre of the neurosis, is now in an ideal position to help the patient understand and master it. For if the transference is positive, his interpretations are invested with an authority which makes them easier for the patient to accept. And since they are now directed on a situation in which the patient is immediately involved, rather than on the confused and distant events of his past, they can "intervene directly in the process of repetition converting it to one of remembrance" (Wollheim, "Freud", p.153). Instead of merely acting out unconscious impulses, therefore, the patient has the opportunity of "working through" the resistances to impulses presently felt with the help of the analyst's interpretations, rather than having to recall the resistances to impulses felt in the past. In this way the patient gradually comes to see his past and present behaviour in a new light - he comes to see and feel the rightness of the analyst's interpretations not only as they explain his present behaviour but also as he is able to provide confirming evidence for them from the newly retrieved memories of his past.

Notwithstanding the facilitating effect of these two factors

(the greater natural strength of the mature ego and the phenomenon of transference), however, lifting of the repressions is invariably and necessarily accompanied by a fierce mental struggle. "Seeing and feeling the rightness" of the analyst's interpretations, that is, coming to accept them as true, involves more than making a disinterested effort of understanding. The analyst's task is not only a pedagogic one, it is a remedial one too. And the success of analysis will depend significantly not only on the patient's intelligence but also on the strength of his desire to be cured.

4(vi) The clearest and most forcible expression of Freud's views on the difference between understanding the analyst's interpretations and "seeing and feeling the rightness"of them, is made in his succinct but very important paper on "Negation" (Vol xix, p.235-239). There he distinguishes two sorts of decisions with which the function of judgement is concerned: on the basis of the pleasure principle it affirms or denies the possession by the ego of a particular attribute - in the language of the initial pleasure-ego: "I should like to eat this" or "I should like to spit it out". And on the basis of the reality principle it affirms or denies the real existence of something of which there is a presentation - in the language of the reality-ego:"This which is in the ego as a presentation can/cannot be rediscovered in perception".

Now it is frequently the case that the ideational content of what is repressed can make its way into consciousness on condition

that it is negated, i.e. in the form of the judgement: "This which is in the ego as a presentation cannot be rediscovered in perception (is not real)". But there is also a "further, very important and somewhat strange variant of this situation" in which it is even possible to conquer the negation as well bringing about a full intellectual acceptance of the repressed, "while at the same time what is essential to the repression persists"(ibid, p.236). It is on the basis of this piece of clinical evidence that Freud distinguishes the ego's intellectual function - affirming or negating the content of thoughts - from its affective process - accepting or rejecting (expressing or repressing) a feeling, wish or attitude. And the link between the two is forged with the remark: "A negative judgement is the intellectual substitute for repression" (ibid, p.236. My emphasis.). We can draw the parallel with Wittgenstein here by adding "A positive judgement is the intellectual substitute for expression" (Cf "The verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it" (PI, 244). It is true,of course, that the verbal expression of pain is not a substitute for crying but rather a new form of expression. In so far , however, as the verbal expression is a positive judgement about, or a description of, my inner state (see above, Chapter 2) it does have the status of an intellectual substitute for expression, at least so far as is necessary for the purpose of drawing this parallel.

One consequence of this account is that it introduces an ambiguity in the term "awareness" between the application of the term to the intellectual function (involving the affirmation or

denial of the real existence of something: "This exists/does not exist") and its application to the affective process (involving the expression or repression of something: "I am/am not this"). For reason of this ambiguity, the ego's activity in repression cannot be adequately expressed in a judgement of the form "I am not aware of/ that p". For the activity of repression can no more be equated with the making of a negative judgement than a failure to avow something, even an(unconscious)refusal to avow(which is what repression consists in), can be equated with disavowal. If repression could be adequately represented by a judgement of the form "I am not aware of /that p" then a simple reversal of the negation sign would amount to a lifting of the repression, that is a full, intellectual and affective acceptance (i.e. an acknowledgement[12]) of the repressed. But we have seen above (page 53) that this is not the case.

This distinction between two sorts or levels of awareness characterising, respectively, the intellectual function and the affective process, may be seen to parallel that noted above (page 33) between the criteria for being in a certain state and the criteria for "being aware" (acknowledging, admitting) that one is in that state. The importance of this distinction resided in the fact that the former may be fulfilled while the latter are not. So we may now distinguish, corresponding to this original distinction, two stages in the lifting of a repression (in theory, if not in practice). Writing on the technique of psychoanalysis, Freud remarks: "To start with we get the patient's weakened ego to take part in the purely

intellectual work of interpretation (An Outline of Psychoanalysis, Vol xxiii, p.181) and he refers to this work as "an extending of its self-knowledge" (ibid, p.177). But he continues: "This is not, of course, the whole story, but it is a first step"(ibid, p.177). Clearly, then, Freud conceives of self-knowledge here in a restricted sense, one in which the patient's knowledge of himself is not qualitatively different from the analyst's knowledge of him and which, therefore, would not conflict with the Wittgensteinian view. Material for the work of extending the patient's self-knowledge,in this sense of the term, is gathered from the information conveyed by him to the analyst, from his free associations, from what he reveals in his transferences, from his dreams and from what he betrays by his slips or parapraxes. From this material the analyst constructs a picture of what has happened to the patient in the past, what he has repressed and what is happening in him now which provides an interpretation of his (the patient's) behaviour over and above (under and below) that which the patient himself gives to it. The patient can then confirm (or disconfirm) the accuracy of the picture (or interpretation) by his response to it - in the most simple instance, by recollecting some event corresponding to one surmised by the analyst. It is this possibility which prevents analytical interpretation from becoming an arbitrary and dogmatic procedure (See Rycroft, "A Critical Dictionary of Psychoanalysis", p.76). Once the patient has been convinced by and has accepted the analyst's interpretation , his knowledge of his repressed material is grounded

on his observation of those features of his behaviour to which the analyst has drawn his attention. This is what achieving a "full, intellectual acceptance of the repressed" consists in.

So much, however, is still only to have read the menu card, not to have had what it announces. The patient's awareness of his repressed material is so far no different from the analyst's (Cf New Introductory Lectures, p.102. Quoted on page 34 above), i.e. based on the observation of certain features of his (the patient's) behaviour. He has succeeded in overcoming the reality-ego's rejection of the repressed material expressed through the intellectual function, i.e. he has been brought to accept that"This (the repressed material) exists". But he has still to overcome the pleasure-ego's rejection of the repressed material expressed through the affective process, i.e. to come to acknowledge that "I am this (the repressed material)" or "This is mine".

What is involved in overcoming the pleasure-ego's resistances is hard to say. Freud's comment is that it "is the part of our work that requires the most time and the greatest trouble"(An Outline of Psychoanalysis, Vol xxiii, p.179). For it is "hard for the ego..... to acknowledge as belonging to itself impulses that are the complete opposite of those which it knows as its own" (Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, Vol xx, p.159). For this reason the analyst does not present his interpretation to the patient all at once as a fait accompli, which might provoke a violent outbreak of resistance, but presents it bit by bit, encouraging and soothing the ego, persuading it to

allow the repressed impulse through to consciousness via the ideational representative suggested by the analyst. Lowering of the ego's resistance results in the making of the connection between the unconscious "thing-presentation" and the conscious "word-presentation" corresponding to it, such that the patient comes to employ the analyst's account not in the interpretation of his behaviour but in the expression of his repressed impulses. The occurrence of this change is marked by a modification of the patient's behaviour which is itself indicative of his having made a full, intellectual and affective acceptance (i.e. of his having fully acknowledged) the analyst's interpretation. His "knowledge" of his repressed material is then not based on any observation but is nonetheless made manifest in the form of behavioural expression that he adopts. The difference here is paralleled by that between my awareness of the inner states of another (which requires criteria and is based on observation) and my awareness of my own inner states (which is criterionless and made manifest in the form of expression of those states) (Cf New Introductory Lectures, p.102. Quoted on page 34 above). Only when the patient's awareness of his repressed material has progressed from the stage of knowledge with observation (factual knowledge) to that of "knowledge without observation" (evidenced by the form of expression of the repressed material), only when, in other words, he is able to acknowledge his repressed impulses criterionlessly, may he be said to "see and feel the rightness" of the analyst's interpretations.

What is needed now, therefore, is an account of defence,

of its institution and removal (i.e. of what it is to make something unconscious conscious), freed of Freud's sometimes dangerously misleading physicalist imagery (which derives, in large part, from the neurological model of the mind that he constructed in "The Project for a Scientific Psychology"), and translated into the language of contemporary philosophical psychology. To this, not without trepidation, I now turn.

CHAPTER FIVE

5(i) In his writings on the technique of psychoanalysis Freud repeatedly emphasises the fact that there are two sorts of knowledge of the repressed (see, for example, New Introductory Lectures, p.102; The Unconscious, Vol xiv, p.176; An Outline of Psychoanalysis, Vol xxiii, p.178). The difference between them is analogous to that between my knowledge of others and my knowledge of myself. That is to say, one sort of knowledge is gained from observation and is therefore based on grounds, the other sort is not gained from observation and is therefore groundless. What is essential, then, to the idea of lifting a repression is the idea that the repressed impulse should come to be criterionlessly self-ascribed. In this way the asymmetry that Freud insists upon between <u>our</u> knowledge of the repressed and <u>his</u> knowledge of it can be explained.

The notion of criterionless self-ascription introduces complications, however. We have seen in Chapter 2 that the status of such ascriptions as knowledge claims is at best not clear and at worst nonsensical. For the idea that when a repression has been lifted my knowledge of the previously unconscious material is not then based on any grounds implies that there are no means whereby I acquire such knowledge, which makes the notion of the lifting of the repression paradoxical. And not only the lifting of the repression but the notion of repression itself. For how is it possible that I

can lack such knowledge? This is, of course, precisely the problem of self-deception.

What is required, therefore, is an account of how it is possible for a criterionless self-ascription to fail. We can make sense of such a possibility if we construe it not as a failure to know something but rather as a failure to acknowledge something. Acknowledging something involves showing that one is aware of it (knows it). One may, therefore, acknowledge features of other people as well as of oneself. Avowing, by contrast, is a species of acknowledgement, but one limited to features of oneself and which involves saying that one is aware of them. So I can acknowledge that I am in pain, for example, by avowing my pain, or by nodding in response to the doctor's question, or even simply by not trying to conceal it (by not suppressing my groans, grimaces, etc.). And I can acknowledge that another is in pain by showing sympathy towards him, treating and comforting him.

Acknowledging is not equivalent to knowing, then, but it is certainly not weaker. To be able to acknowledge that "I still fear my father" I must know I fear him, but not vice versa. Acknowledgement goes beyond knowledge. "Goes beyond not, so to speak, in the order of knowledge, but in its requirement that I do something or reveal something on the basis of that knowledge" (Cavell, "Knowing and Acknowledging" in "Must We Mean What We Say?", p.257). So the philosophy student of Chapter 3 may finally come to acknowledge his lack of interest in his subject by dropping his courses, selling his

books, possibly, if he has a taste for melodrama, burning his papers, and leaving university to look for a job.

On this analysis the conscious may be identified with what is acknowledged, the pre-conscious with what is acknowledgeable and the unconscious with what is unacknowledgeable. The question remains, however; what is the explanation of the fact that there are some features of myself that are unacknowledgeable by me? Given the requirement that I do or reveal something in acknowledging there seem to be two possibilities here. Either I deliberately refuse to acknowledge (i.e. conceal) these features of myself because to do so would cause me distress, or I do not acknowledge them because I am unable to recognise them for reason of their distorted form of expression. The interest and importance of the concept of acknowledgement for the concepts of repression and self-deception is precisely that it can accommodate both these possibilities.

Neurotic behaviour is that which expresses an inner state in a distorted form. One way of characterising it, therefore, is to say that it doesn't mean what it appears to express, that is, the behaviour fails to fit (is inappropriate to) the inner state of which it is actually the expression. But it cannot be right to construe this failure as the mark of a deliberate <u>conscious</u> refusal on the part of the neurotic - the result of his desire to conceal something. That would amount to straightforward deception, not self-deception (or repression). Such a claim would only be appropriate in a case where the meaning of the behaviour was transparent and

yet was not admitted. It is rather because the meaning of the behaviour is not transparent, because it is an abnormal expression of an inner state and so unrecognisable, that it is not acknowledged. Only by employing the special interpretative techniques of psychoanalysis, in fact, are we able to tell what the neurotic's behaviour "really" means.

But why does the neurotic not say what he means? This cannot be explained in terms of his ignorance of the language of (behavioural)expression; else lifting of the repression would amount to no more than coming to understand new concepts. It must be explained, therefore, in terms of his unconscious purposes - the result of an unconscious refusal to acknowledge the repressed material. Here, then, it may be seen how the concepts of a refusal to admit and an inability to recognise overlap within the concept of acknowledgement.

The neurotic's failure to acknowledge his unconscious material is a consequence of its being disguised or distorted beyond recognition by the mechanisms of defence. In being unable to recognise the disguised material he is unable to acknowledge it. But it is as a result of his (his ego's) unconscious, i.e. unacknowledgeable, refusal to acknowledge it that the mechanisms of defence were originally, automatically, instituted. Thus his refusal to acknowledge his unconscious material results in his being unable to acknowledge it since defence renders it unrecognisable. This, in turn, results in his being unable to acknowledge his refusal since to do so would be to acknowledge the unconscious material that he is now unable to

acknowledge, as a result of defence. The situation is compounded by the fact that the motive of self-protection that gave rise to the initial refusal now works against the making of the necessary effort of recognition that is required in analysis in order to lift the repression.

In the course of a successful analysis the patient comes to recognise his repressed material and thence to acknowledge it. But this cannot consist simply in his acknowledging the analyst's interpretation of his behaviour. Anyone may acknowledge that, and on the same grounds as those on which he acknowledges it, namely, on the grounds of observation of his behaviour. What he also has to, and alone can, acknowledge, is the repressed material itself, and his doing so is the criterion of his having recognised it (the real meaning of his neurotic behaviour). He acknowledges it by avowing it, or by expressing his awareness of it in some other way, or by suppressing it, but at any rate not by repressing it, i.e. giving expression to it in a disguised or distorted form. What we cannot do is acknowledge it the way he does.

Repression, then, is not to be thought of as the"forcing back" of an inner state, as it were, below the surface of the mind, as though it were entirely split off from any form of behavioural expression, but rather as the disguising of an inner state through distortion of its behavioural expression. No logical wedge can be driven between an inner state and its behavioural expression, the idea that it can derives from Freud's physicalist imagery and must

fall victim to the Wittgensteinian arguments presented in Chapter 2. No doubt this too explains Freud's hesitation over the notion of an"internal perception" of the repressed (see page 47 above).

However, in characterising neurotic behaviour as meaning something different from that which it appears to express, we are not attributing simple ignorance of the language (of behavioural expression) to the neurotic (though we may do this in certain circumstances). What prevents him expressing his inner states as they are is the distortion that his modes of expression have undergone as a result of repression which was instituted in order to avoid a conflict between his wishes and the demands of reality. To some extent this conflict must have a distorting effect even on "normal" expressive behaviour giving rise to the familiar phenomena of self-deception, which may be regarded as a mild form of neurosis[I]. Recognising such distortion must be a continuous task, therefore, evidence for the success of which will be a modification of behaviour in order that it may better, or more adequately, fulfill its expressive function. That we may express our inner states more or less adequately is what justifies our talk of knowledge here. But it is a peculiar kind of knowing. It does not result from introspection, nor is it derived from any sort of observation. In many cases it involves a kind of decision, the conscious adoption of a specific attitude towards something in one's situation which one picks out as (more adequately) justifying and explaining one's inner state. In other cases it is more a discovery than a decision, as when one is made aware

(by the suggestion of another) of a thought and its accompanying desire that had been influencing one's behaviour, which awareness brings about the crystallisation of the conscious feeling (See Hampshire, "Freedom of Mind", p.242-243. Cf page 4 above). This decision or discovery, this new way of"reading"one's inner states, is made manifest in one's expressions of them. And because the decision or discovery involved in this kind of knowledge is, itself, an integral part of the feeling or inner state, it may be said to be knowledge which is constitutive of oneself.

5(ii) How is such knowledge acquired? The mental process of decision or discovery involved in overcoming the distortion to which expressive behaviour may be subject is at all stages open to endorsement or repudiation by the individual (or patient) concerned. This process of continuous assessment I refer to as "critical determination" in order to draw the parallel here aesthetic judgement. A way of getting a clearer view of the sort of inadequacy that results from the distortion of expressive behaviour,and how it may be overcome, is to compare the process of understanding a psychoanalytic interpretation with that of understanding a work of art. In what follows I quote extensively, without further acknowledgement, from Section(iv)of Stanley Cavell's essay "Music Discomposed" (in "Must We Mean What We Say", p.189-193).

The capacity to appreciate a work of art (or a psychoanalytic interpretation) is not identical with understanding the language in

which it is composed, nor with the healthy functioning of the senses, nor with the aptness of our logical powers, for we may still not understand what is said, fail to see or hear something, miss the object's consistency, or the way one thing followed from another. What the critic (or the analyst) has to do is to get us to see or hear or realise or notice; help us to appreciate the tone; convey the current; point to a connection; show how to take the thing in. But how does he do this? And what has he done when he has succeeded, what have we (audience or patients) understood, what does our understanding consist in?

Some light may be thrown on these questions by considering one crude but nonetheless critical assertion: "You have to hear it". This is a peculiar construction - a word for the function of a sense organ is placed in the context of an imperative. One can clearly be commanded to listen for a sound, but can one sensibly be commanded to hear it? The form of the assertion implies that the achievement or result of using a sense organ has come to be thought of as the activity of that organ - as though what the aesthetic experience (as that of lifting a repression) involved was not merely a continuous effort (e.g. listening) but also a continuous achievement(e.g. hearing). And the fact is that if I don't hear it I don't know it (what it's about , what it is, what's happening, what is there). Which is to say that works of art (and psychoanalytic interpretations) are objects of the sort that can only be known (properly known) in sensing. It is not, as in the case of material objects, that I know because I see,

or that seeing is how I know (Cf Hacker: "I do not know (my inner states) any how", ibid, p.274. Quoted on page 24 above). Rather what I know is what I see. This sense is conveyed by the phrase "seeing the point" except that, in the case of works of art and psychoanalytic interpretations, its not that once their point is seen they are known; they require a continuous seeing of the point, the maintenance of a certain attitude and a certain response. Or one may say knowing here functions like an organ of sense (discriminating configurations, aspects, a way of "reading" a painting, a situation, a relationship); the exercise of a special skill. "The more one learns, so to speak, the hang of oneself, and mounts one's problems, the less one is able to say what one has learned; ..... You have reached conviction but not about a proposition; and consistency but not in a theory. You are different, what you recognise as problems are different, your world is different"(Cavell "Aesthetic Problems of Modern Philosophy" in "Must We Mean What We Say", p.85-86). Self-knowledge, we may say, is measured by the adequacy of self-expression; self-deception by its inadequacy. But there are no decisive tests of adequacy. It is something that requires critical determination.

5(iii) The fundamental tenet of psychoanalysis is that a man may not express his inner states as they are. This is not to say that they are something independent of any form of expression, and that I may, therefore, mistake them in expressing them. We have seen in

Chapter 2 that there is no room here for that sort of mistake. They may, nevertheless, be expressed more or less adequately, in a more or less distorted form, and this will be determined by reference to the individual's situation and characteristic behaviour. Given that this distortion is not the result of simple ignorance of the language , it is to be explained as arising from a conflict between the individual's wishes and the demands of reality and the need to accommodate both. This is the genesis of self-deception. If the distortion is especially severe, however, the individual "may lose possession of the region of the mind which that behaviour is expressing" (Cavell, "Knowing and Acknowledging", ibid, p.264). This is the genesis of neurosis.

Coming to understand one's neurotic behaviour, seeing what it really means, consists in acknowledging the repressed material of which it is the distorted expression. But acknowledging itself involves doing or revealing something. What coming to understand one's neurotic behaviour must finally consist in, therefore, is a modification of the mode of expression of the repressed impulse, that is, a modification that shows what it is that one understands, that shows that one has "seen the point" of one's behaviour. One's knowledge of one's inner states, that is to say one's self-knowledge, does not involve any inward observation. It consists, rather, in seeing them,and therefore oneself, in a certain way, reading them in a certain way (Cf "You have to hear it") - a way that is subject to critical determination and is made manifest in their mode of

expression. It is, then, asymmetrical with one's knowledge of the inner states of others (which cannot be manifested through their mode of expression) but not endangered by the Wittgensteinian arguments against a perceptual model of introspection. Its extent is measured in terms of the co-incidence, or lack of it, between one's inner states as they are acknowledged by one and one's inner states as they reveal themselves in one's relations with, attitudes towards and beliefs about, the world.

On this view there is no room for psychological realism: discovering the truth about oneself is identical with acquiring greater consistency in the expressions of one's inner states. But the centre of the synthesis may always be shifting, and the truth about human beings correspondingly inexhaustible.

NOTES ON THE TEXT

CHAPTER ONE

1 References to Wittgenstein's "Philosophical Investigations" in the text are preceded by the letters "PI" and cite the paragraph number for Part I, e.g. (PI,226), and the page number for Part II, e.g. (PI, p.226).

2 "Epistemological" is usually used to refer to any general theory of knowledge. It is used here, however, in a special sense to refer to the sort of investigation characteristic of empiricist theories. It is intended to contrast, in this sense, with "grammatical" which is used to refer to the conditions of making a statement in the language.

3 The criterial relation has a special logical status. It is not as strong as entailment (a criterion for P is neither a sufficient, nor a necessary and sufficient, condition for P) but neither is it as weak as inductive evidence (it is not justified by reference to established empirical correlations but rather by reference to conventions). The criterial relation is one of a priori, non-inductive or necessarily good evidence. It specifies what is necessarily usually the case for the application of a sentence or expression.

4 The argument developed in the following pages bears a considerable debt to S. Shoemaker, "Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity", Chapter 3.

CHAPTER TWO

1 For a fuller explication of this point see p.21-22 below.

2 For a battery of additional arguments to show that avowals must bear truth values see Hacker, ibid, p.266-268.

3 On at least one interpretation of this thesis. According to this interpretation the thesis is held to be compatible with the view that avowals have both sense and truth value (see Hacker, ibid,Chapter 9). Frequently, however, the

non-cognitive thesis is taken to follow from, and depend upon, the truth-valueless thesis (see, e.g. Malcolm, "Review of the Philosophical Investigations").

4 It is true, of course that we do not ordinarily think of an avowal of pain, say, as an expression of self-knowledge. A more acceptable example, in the tradition of the Socratic "Know thyself", might be knowing the reasons for one's actions. However, in so far as giving the reasons for one's actions involves reference to one's feelings, wants and beliefs whose characteristic mode of expression is in the form of an avowal, the latter may be regarded as the paradigmatic form of expression of self-knowledge.

CHAPTER THREE

I Fingarette prefers "insincere sincerity" but I think the reverse expression the more appropriate.

2 References to Freud's works inthe text are to"The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works" and cite the title of the appropriate essay, the volume number and the page number, e.g. (The Ego and the Id, Vol xix, p.56), excepting references to the "Introductory Lectures" and "New Intrductory Lectures" which are to the Pelican edition and cite the title of the book and the page number, e.g. (Introductory Lectures, p. 488).

CHAPTER FOUR

I Hypnosis cannot count as a direct means of access since a patient's responses under hypnosis can, at best, count only as grounds from which the existence of an unconscious process may be inferred. Observation of a patient's responses under hypnosis cannot count as observation of his unconscious processes in the way that observation of a person groaning and clutching his leg can count as observation of a person in pain, just because the state of hypnosis is a recognisably abnormal state.

2 The behavioural criteria I have in mind here are just those that enable us to distinguish neurotic from non-neurotic behaviour, i.e. behaviour that is unintelligible by reference to the context of conscious thoughts and processes alone. Referring to them as criteria for the

existence of unconscious ideas, however, does presuppose an initial acceptance of Freudian theory.

3 "According to Freud mental activity is governed by two principles: the pleasure principle and the reality principle, the former leading to relief of instinctual tension by hallucinatory wish-fulfilment, the latter to instinctual gratification by accommodation to the facts of, and the objects existing within, the external world. According to Freud's original formulations, the reality principle is acquired and learned during development, whereas the pleasure principle is innate and primitive." (Rycroft, "A Critical Dictionary of Psychoanalysis", p. 138).

4 Except for one portion of it from which the ego has separated itself by resistances due to repression. See "The Ego and the Id", Vol xix, for further explication of this point.

5 Actually on three fronts, the third being with the super-ego. I have not discussed this organisation because it was not directly relevant to my purposes.

6 The reference to ego-instincts is peculiar. If the ego is formed after birth how can it comprise instincts of any kind? It does not seem absolutely necessary to postulate them, however. The ego's activity of self-preservation can be accounted for in terms of its unpleasure in the face of excessive demands.

7 For a complete list see Anna Freud, "The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence", p.44.

8 In fact not in every case of repression. See "The Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis", Vol xix, p.186 bottom.

9 See, for example, the case of Frau Elizabeth von R., quoted in "The Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis", Vol xix, p.184.

10 Generally - but see the paper on "Negation", Volxix, p.235-239, discussed on pages 52-53 below.

11 The immaturity of the ego renders it powerless to cope with the demands of the id. It consequently withdraws its influence from that portion of the id leaving it to find its own mode of behavioural expression (generally

in a neurotic symptom). But since only those impulses of the id which can find expression through the ego can become conscious, the portion of the id from which the ego has withdrawn is rendered unconscious, i.e. has suffered a repression. See "The Dissection of the Psychical Personality", Lecture 3I in the "New Introductory Lectures", p.88-II2.

I2 For a fuller explication of the use of this term, see below, p.60.

CHAPTER FIVE

I It does not seem appropriate to regard self-deception as also a mild form of psychosis - involving a disavowal of reality (see Chapter 4, p.43-44) - since it does not appear that any sense can be given to a mild form of psychosis that falls short of actual psychosis, i.e. of madness.

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