LABOUR UNIONS AND THE CANADIAN POLITICAL PROCESS

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by

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SCOPE AND CONTENTS: This study examines the political activities of organised labour in Canada. It is a study in comparative politics and examines Canadian experience in relation to that of the United States and Britain.

In particular, this study examines the reasons for the C.L.C.'s support of the New Democratic Party. It considers the development of labour's political activities as represented by the labour congresses. An assessment is made of the party system, since it shapes the nature of labour's approach to politics, and shows that the actions of the C.L.C. result from the particular nature of the determinants of the Canadian system. It is suggested that the character of the Canadian party system has been especially influenced by the operation of parliamentary institutions, but may change due to the pressures of such large national interests as organised labour.

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INTRODUCTION

The nature of a party system is dependent on a variety of complex factors. Political institutions and traditions, social and economic structure, all play an important role in the shaping of a country's party politics. In Canada, the party system has been influenced by a heterogeneous geographic, economic, and social framework, bounded by British parliamentary institutions. A party system has been described as providing "a bridge to connect the groupings of society with the institutions of the State."[1] The purpose of this study is to argue that the institutions of the state have been of especial significance to the nature of party politics in Canada. This is not to say that parliamentary institutions have been the prime determinant of the party system. In themselves, parliamentary institutions have been of no greater significance than the groupings of society. The importance of such institutions lies in the manner in which they have also accentuated and reinforced the influence of the other determinants of the party system.

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[1] L. Lipson, "Party Systems in the U. K. and the Old Commonwealth: Causes, Resemblances and Variations", Political Studies, VII (1959), 12.

In particular this study is concerned with the formation of the New Democratic Party. The shared North American environment has led to many similarities between political parties in Canada and the United States. There is, however, a notable difference in that, in Canada, the major political parties have shown themselves to be less sensitive to the political aspirations of the labour unions than are their American counterparts. It is argued that this is a reflection of the influence of parliamentary institutions on the shape of the political parties. As a result of these circumstances, Canadian labour unions have followed the example of British unions and have attempted to attain political recognition of their aims through the support of a "labour" party. In order to assess the validity of such a hypothesis, this study seeks to establish that Canadian labour not only has not been able to cultivate a close relationship with a major political party, but also that the labour movement justifiably seeks that relationship. A comparison of the political activities of Canadian labour with those of the labour movements in Britain and the United States helps to place the situation in perspective.

Trade unions, through their central labour congresses, seek to influence national policies through pressures on the major political parties. The nature of these parties is therefore an important factor in determining the type of political action that is employed by the unions.

This study attempts to analyze developments in the union movement in relation to the operation of the party system and seeks to show that the direct political activities of the Canadian Labour Congress (C.L.C.) are a result of the character of the Canadian party system. In the light of American experience, it is tentatively suggested that the pressures of such a nationally organised pressure group will modify certain features of the party system.

This study has been prompted by the participation of the C.L.C. in the founding of a new political party, the New Democratic Party. The opening chapter examines the composition of that party and the nature of its programme, as they took shape at Ottawa in August, 1961. This new party seeks to challenge the two major parties. Its programme is radical, yet sufficiently moderate in tone to attempt to win support from farmers, fishermen, and small businessmen as well as organised labour. This study seeks to discover the reason for the C.L.C.'s involvement in the new party, and the basic significance of its entry into Canadian politics.

It is shown that the political activities of British and American labour have brought their labour congresses into close contact with a major political party. In Britain and the United States, organised labour is naturally involved in politics. The aims of labour are only partly achieved at the bargaining table; they are also achieved by securing

favourable legislation.[1] Although the attitude of American labour to political action has been strongly influenced by Samuel Gompers's "non-partisan" theory of "electing our friends and defeating our enemies", the A.F.L.-C.I.O. has found the Democratic Party more sympathetic to its interests and has therefore given increasing support to that party. At the beginning of this century, the British T.U.C. found itself faced by two major hostile parties and felt it necessary to support a new party in order to advance its interests. The successful growth of the Labour Party has ensured that labour's interests are effectively voiced in British politics. Thus, despite some historical differences, both the A.F.L.-C.I.O. and the T.U.C. are in varying degrees aligned with a major party. As central labour bodies, both the congresses seek to retain their own freedom of action.

In Canada, organised labour has also been inevitably involved in politics. The Canadian labour congresses, however, have not been willing or able to support a major political party. Herein lies the reason for the initial connection of the unions with the New Democratic Party. The prime movers behind the birth of the new party were the trade union organisations. The merger of the T.L.C. and the C.C.L. to form the C.L.C., in 1956, consolidated the national position of organised labour. The C.I.O. was a potentially

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[1] See:- A.F.L. Convention, Report of Proceedings (1954), p. 12.

strong economic group but it also sought political power. The founding of the New Democratic Party was a direct result of the failure of the C.L.C. to find itself able to support a major political party. This study traces the actual events which led to the unions' formal participation in the new party.

The lack of a party favourable to labour is seen as a result of the particular nature of the party system in Canada. Underhill has said that, "Of all the conceivable party systems under which free government can be carried out in a democratic community, I should say that our present Canadian system is about the worst".[1] This system, however, is a product of the Canadian social and political environment, and has developed to meet the needs of the country. James Bryce has observed that "the study of popular government in Canada derives a peculiar interest from the fact that while the economic and social conditions of the country are generally similar to those of the United States, the political institutions have been framed upon English models . . ."[2] In assessing the Canadian party system, this study examines how these influences have shaped the operation of the British and American systems. It attempts

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[1] G. V. Ferguson and F. H. Underhill, Press and Party in Canada, Issues of Freedom (rev. ed.; Toronto: Ryerson, 1955), p. 40.

[2] James Bryce, Modern Democracies, I (New York: Macmillan, 1921), p. 455.

to show that the activities of nationally organised pressure groups have been a major factor in determining the nature of party politics in the United States. These activities have counteracted the narrower demands of regional interests and have led the major parties to adopt specific "national" policies. There tends to be recognizable differences between the Democratic and Republican parties. The present alignment of American parties has enabled labour to develop a friendly relationship with the Democratic Party.

In Britain, the social and institutional framework has resulted in a party system composed of disciplined parties which present specific alternatives to the electorate. The British party system has also responded to the pressures of interest groups in the sense that labour's support of a third party led to the decline of one of the antipathetic major parties. It is noted, however, that third party movements in the United States have failed to be as successful as the British Labour Party and are relatively ineffective political instruments.

In contrast, the Canadian party system is based on compromise. The combination of a complex North American environment and a British system of government has resulted in incoherent parties which attempt to appeal to all classes, doctrines, and social persuasions. The parties meet the British parliamentary requirement of party discipline by stressing party leadership rather than party programmes.

The vagueness of the party platforms helps to unite diverse narrow regional interests in each party. It is natural that an economic pressure group, with specific national aims, should feel frustrated by political parties which operate under such circumstances. As yet there has been no Canadian equivalent to the response of the American parties to national pressure group activity. The political consequences of the social and economic environment of North America, accentuated by parliamentary institutions, remain a dominant influence in Canadian party politics.

The increasing pressures of organised labour through the C.L.C. are seen as the beginning of a pressure group influence which, in the long run, may change the nature of party politics. The formation of the New Democratic Party is not seen as a mere temporary phenomenon. A party system "is certain to be influenced by the groupings in society and is likely to reproduce their complexity or simplicity."[1] Canadian parties may be led to consider political issues from a "national" standpoint and to adopt more specific programmes. Third parties have greater opportunities for success in Canada than in the United States; but they have had little electoral success against the compromises and adjustments of the two old parties. The future of the New Democratic Party depends largely on the ability of the Liberals and Conservatives to meet the challenge of national pressure groups.

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[1] L. Lipson, op. cit., p. 23.

This study does not seek to consider the entire structure of Canadian unionism, nor all the complexities of Canadian politics. It would be a gross exaggeration to suggest that the future of Canadian politics can be summed up in a study of this nature. By limiting the terms of reference to the national aspects of labour's political activity and using a "comparative" approach, it is hoped, however, that this study will shed some new light on the political process in Canada.

I

THE FOUNDING CONVENTION OF THE NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY

In August 1961, a new national political party was launched at the largest political convention ever known in Canada. The founding of the New Democratic Party marked the fulfilment of a decision of the C.L.C. to form a new party with the assistance of the Co-operative Commonwealth federation (C.C.F.). The founders of the party sought to present it as a broadly based, democratic organisation, which was representative of labour, farmer and professional groups.[1] In order to present a challenge to the policies of the two major parties, the party programme was to be a radical one, but sufficiently moderate to win popular support.

The participation of the C.L.C. and the C.C.F. in the founding of the party led to charges that it was to be a socialist party, dominated by the trade unions. The founders, however, firmly resisted any attempt to mark it as a "workers party alone" or "a mouthpiece of the unions".[2] To prevent such an identification, the executive officers of the C.L.C. refrained from seeking office in the party as

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[1] See Chapter III, pp. 51-55.

[2] Stanley Knowles, Interview with Winnipeg Free Press, Canadian Commentator (May, 1958), p. 2.

union officials. Furthermore, although the Party acknowledged its common roots with the C.C.F., its programme and composition were to be quite different from that of the C.C.F. The delegates to the convention wished to avoid the unfavourable connotations that had grown up around that party, and, in particular, any direct identification with socialism.

An emphasis on a broadly based party was reinforced by the origins of the convention's eighteen hundred delegates. Although no major farm group had come forward to endorse the founding of the new party, some three hundred farm delegates were present. The C.C.F. was represented by seven hundred and thirty delegates. Among these C.C.F.ers were many who sought to ensure that at least the voice of the left wing socialist tradition would continue to be heard within the new party. Those interested in "social progress",[1] but outside the ranks of organised labour, the C.C.F., or farm groups, had also been invited to play a part in the formation of the party, and brought together into "New Party Clubs". They were represented by two hundred and fifty delegates. Since the sole condition of their membership was a liberal mindedness, the New Party Clubs provided a centre for a moderate "revisionist" approach.

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[1] Stanley Knowles, The New Party (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1961), p. 65.

Six hundred and fifty-eight trade union delegates were present. The Party had rejected the idea of block voting and established the "principle of one delegate, one vote".[1] The convention thus avoided accusations of union domination of the kind levelled at the British Labour Party. From a numerical point of view one could not accuse the unions of controlling the convention and the party. It might be argued that, as the unionists were a more disciplined group, the number of union delegates does not indicate their real strength. Observers of the convention, however, could find little indication of domination by a coherent union bloc. One labour reporter wrote: "Organised labour has kept to the shadows at the convention of the new party - so much so that some union members are concerned that the trade unions are in danger of eclipsing themselves as an effective force in the party they have helped to create."[2] The Party's federal executive of twenty members contains only nine trade unionists. Nevertheless, the C.L.C. had felt that, "A labour movement without a part in political matters is a labour movement evading one of its fundamental responsibilities".[3] Labour had

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[1] Study Paper on the Constitution, National Committee of the New Party (Ottawa: January, 1960), p. 11.

[2] Globe and Mail (August 3, 1961).

[3] Claude Jodoin, ibid. (August 1, 1961).

played a key role in the formation of the party. This study attempts to examine the significance of the presence of the unions at the convention.

The founding convention had three main objectives: to choose a name, a leader and a programme. The groups which combined to form the party had formed a central body known as the "National Committee for the New Party". The party leaders favoured the continued use of the name "New Party". Many delegates, however, felt that this name was not specific and too temporary. The democratic nature of the Party was also uppermost in many minds but the American connotation of the name "Democratic Party" proved an obstacle to its adoption. Finally the convention approved a combination of these two preferences, "The New Democratic Party."[1] In doing so the convention rejected the choice of the party leaders and the constitutional committee. The naming process itself had demonstrated the appropriateness of the designation "Democratic".

The composition of the delegations at the convention suggested that the party would lie to the left of the Liberal and Conservative parties. The delegates represented all shades of "left wing opinion". The New Party Clubs and the trade unions, however, were predominantly "liberal" rather than socialist. It was the moderate wing which shaped the

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[1] For a detailed account see:- Trevor Price, "Who put the 'D' in the N.D.P.", New Democrat, I, no. 2 (1961), 9.

image of the party at the founding convention.

This situation was reflected in the choice of party leader. Mr. T. C. Douglas, premier of Saskatchewan, defeated Mr. Hazen Argue, the left wing, national leader of the C.C.F., by more than a three to one majority. Mr. Douglas made it plain in his acceptance speech that his election spelt victory for the moderates. He accepted the Prime Minister's challenge to fight the next election on the issue of "free enterprise versus socialism", but was obviously shy of the term "socialism". He preferred to "put the issue in its proper terms" of "a choice between a planned economy designed to provide full employment and a higher standard of living or an unplanned economy based on the philosophy of every man for himself."[1] Mr. Douglas' socialism, bears a closer relationship to the "revisionist's" goal of welfare statism, which manages a capitalist economy, than to a dream of the socialist millenium. Mr. Douglas' views are typical of the political programme adopted by the founding convention.

The New Democratic Party attempted to draw up a political programme which would have a wide appeal to "all Canadians". The programme included such slogans as, "New Hope for the Farmer", "A Sound Fishing Industry", "A Job

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[1] Report on the Founding Convention, O.F.L.-P.A.C., Memo. Political Education, III, no. 1 (Ontario Federation of Labour P.A.C., Sept.-Oct. 1961).

for Everyone" and "Homes for our Families".[1] Each section in the programme was designed to attract widespread support. A comparison of the party programme with the C.L.C.'s "Statement of Principles", however, indicates that the New Democrats were especially sympathetic to the aims of organised labour. There is a striking measure of agreement between these two documents. Virtually every clause contained in the C.L.C.'s Statement has been incorporated into the party programme. Both the Congress and the Party seek, for example, the same national labour code, the same social security measures, an "adequate" Bill of Rights, and the abolition of the Senate. The Party, however, neglected to repeat labour's specific commitment to the nationalization of banking and credit, and the elimination of foreign competition with Canadian vessels engaged in coastal trade.[2] The New Democratic Party avoided such strong statements.

The Party's federal programme suggests that the election of New Democrats ensures that the interests of organised labour will be represented in Parliament. The discussions that took place at the convention provide a further indication as to the nature of the New Democratic Party and its position in the Canadian political spectrum. The key issues at the convention were the party's attitude to public and

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[1] New Democratic Party, Federal Program (1961).

[2] C.L.C., Statement of Principles (1956).

private enterprise, and its defence policy in relation to N.A.T.O. and nuclear weapons. In this, the debate was typical of that to be found in the British Labour Party and perhaps every Western party of the left. In addition, the peculiarly Canadian issue of federalism, in relation to the province of Quebec, took on a special significance for the delegates.

Some of the delegates from the C.C.F. brought to the convention the old traditions of that party as found in its first manifesto, drawn up at Regina in 1933. The preamble to this manifesto set out the objectives of the C.C.F.: "we aim to replace the present capitalist system, with its inherent injustice and inhumanity by a socialist order from which the domination and explcitation of one class by another will be eliminated . . ..No C.C.F. government will rest content until it has eradicated capitalism."[1] In postwar years, however, the leaders of the C.C.F. had felt embarrassed by the strong terminology of this statement. It was a handicap in seeking labour union support and electorally undesirable to retain such a dogmatic socialist outlook. Efforts were made to draw up a new statement from suggestions given by the provincial bodies of the C.C.F. Their views, however, widely diverged and the national council itself

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[1]Regina Manifesto (Regina, July 1933), in David Lewis & Frank Scott, Make This Your Canada (Toronto: Central Canada, 1943), pp. 199-207.

presented a new statement of aims at its 1956 Winnipeg convention. The fundamentalists found this new manifesto thoroughly distasteful and yearned for the "clear language and burning conviction of Regina."[1] They had no time to organise a strong opposition, however, and the new statement of aims was carried by a large majority. The C.C.F. was no longer concerned with the eradication of capitalism, but would "not rest content until every person in this land and in all other lands is able to enjoy equality and freedom, a sense of human dignity, and an opportunity to live a meaningful life as a citizen of a free and peaceful world." The substitution of this nebulous statement is an important indication of the path of moderation toward which the party was moving. While the C.C.F. reaffirmed its faith in public ownership "as the most effective means of breaking the stranglehold of private monopolies", it also recognised that, "in many fields there will be a need of private enterprise which can make a useful contribution in the development of our economy."[2]

The experience of the C.C.F. in the government of Saskatchewan had been of some influence in the party's adoption of a more moderate economic policy. As S. M. Lipset

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[1] Dorothy Steeves, The Compassionate Rebel, Ernest Winch and his Times (Vancouver: Evergreen, 1960), p. 208.

[2] Winnipeg Declaration (1956), in Canadian Labour, I, no. 6 (September, 1956), 15-16.

has observed, any social democratic movement which is faced with electoral success has a special interest in being re-elected. Re-election often involves a political platform which does not antagonise any major group in the electorate nor present a fundamental challenge to the existing social order. The C.C.F. became content to stress increased social security rather than nationalization of industry. "Increased social services are an easy solution to the dilemma of the democratic socialist in office."[1]

The C.C.F.'s embrace of a mixed economy and the moderate C.L.C. commitment to the public ownership of public utilities, produced a subdued economic policy in the New Democratic Party. The basic aim of the party was "planning" rather than "socialism". The 1960 "Study Paper on Program" suggested that the party should extend public ownership only "where necessary to economic planning or to break the power of private monopoly", and there would be "Opportunity for private business and industry to function properly and make a fair rate of return."[2] This is far to the right of the traditional socialist dogma of common ownership of the means of production, distribution, and exchange, and more akin to

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[1] S. M. Lipset, Agrarian Socialism (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1950), p. 245.

[2] Study Paper on Program, National Committee of the New Party (Ottawa: January, 1960).

the view that public ownership should be "used pragmatically".[1] The framers of the federal programme were mainly concerned that the word "socialism" should be carefully avoided. They concentrated on measures to improve labour standards, retirement plans, health plans, and housing rather than a basic transformation of the Canadian economy. The party gave priority to a policy of promised full employment, guaranteeing "jobs for all members of the labour force willing and able to work".[2] The rigidity of this statement and the proposed "Guaranteed Employment Act" are no less dogmatic than the socialist principles which the party so resolutely abandoned. As Dr. Eugene Forsey observed: it was "Unworkable except in a totalitarian economy".[3]

The debate on defence inevitably centred on the controversial issue of neutralism. The left wing of the C.C.F. stood for a quasi-neutralist defence policy of abandonment of N.A.T.O., while the C.L.C. were vigorously opposed to any such move. Claude Jodoin felt particularly strongly on this question and was instrumental in the adoption of the resultant compromise of qualified support of N.A.T.O. Jodoin held that, "We do not regard N.A.T.O. as an article of faith or a

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[1] J. C. Weldon, "Economics of Social Democracy", in M. Oliver, ed., Social Purpose for Canada (Toronto: University Press, 1961), p. 174.

[2] New Democratic Party, Federal Program (1961).

[3] Globe and Mail (August 2, 1961).

way of life, but we do believe that it is a means by which we can co-operate with those who have proven themselves to be our friends."[1] The delegates pledged a New Democratic government to "seek a reappraisal and change of N.A.T.O.'s policies and objectives", and to press for "the simultaneous disbandment of the Warsaw and N.A.T.O. pacts."[2] Furthermore, the party demanded an immediate ban on nuclear tests and the establishment of a "non-nuclear club". Once again the New Democrats had adopted a moderate approach.

Finally the debate on the issue of "Co-operative Federalism" throws an important light on the atmosphere of compromise and moderation which had been a main feature of the convention. The C.C.F. and its Quebec organisation, Parti Social Democratique, had always been regarded suspiciously by French-speaking Canadians. The C.C.F. was seen as a Western, English party with socialist principles that were akin to "centralism". The delegates from the province of Quebec decided to test the good intentions of the New Democratic Party. The draft programme of the party observed that "Canada has developed from two great languages and cultures".[3] A caucus meeting of the Quebec delegation agreed

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[1] Hamilton Spectator (August 2, 1961).

[2] New Democratic Party, op. cit., p. 27.

[3] Draft Program of the New Party, National Committee of the New Party (Ottawa: May, 1961).

to press this point as an article of faith and to move the deletion of the word "national" wherever it appeared in the party's programme and the substitution of the word "federal". They felt that "national" failed to convey the federal and bicultural nature of the country. For many delegates, acceptance of this measure seemed the key to political success in Quebec. The convention endorsed the Constitution Committee's support of the change but not without some searching criticism. Dr. Eugene Forsey wondered why he had never heard any complaints from French Canadians about Canadian National Railways. "Will we have to change the National Film Board or the National Health and Welfare Department?"[1] The Quebec delegation had their way, however, and the framers of the party programme dutifully changed their "National Health Plan" to a"Health Plan for Canada"; "National Retirement Plan" to a "Federal" one; "National Labour Standards" to "Canadian" ones. A "National Labour Code" still remained, as did the party's "National Conventions".

The whole affair at first appears a childish exercise in semantics. Even a Quebec labour convention remarked that this interpretation of confederation was "relativement nouvelle et peu courante".[2]

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[1] "Co-operative Federalism", Canadian Labour, VI, no. 9 (September, 1960), 20.

[2] Noel Perusse, directeur des relations extérieures, F.T.Q., "Le N.P.D. créera un Canada nouveau", Canadian Labour, VI, no. 9 (September, 1960), 42.

The notion of "two nations" has widespread implications for a party programme based on a planned economy. The New Democratic Party became committed to maintain provincial autonomy, particularly that of Quebec, within a structure of close federal-provincial collaboration.[1] The basic significance of this affair lies in the mood of the delegates. Their attitudes toward this issue are typical of the approach to the whole party programme. A spirit of compromise pervaded the convention. In this instance, they sought to placate the Quebec delegation in the hope that the party would thereby strengthen its appeal to the French speaking electorate.

At its founding convention, the New Democratic Party emerged as a party of the left, attempting to attract wide support from the electorate. The Party sought to avoid any specific class identification and to bridge the psychological gulf between farmer and labour. Of special significance, however, is the deep involvement of organised labour in this new party. Although the Party did not wish to be identified as a "labour party", it had been founded on the initiative of the C.L.C. This study examines the implications of such a development for the Canadian political process.

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[1] New Democratic Party, op. cit., pp. 20-22.

II

AMERICAN AND BRITISH LABOUR

TWO POLITICAL TRADITIONS

The formation of the C.L.C. in 1956 created a central labour congress embracing over seventy-five per cent of Canada's trade union membership. The C.L.C. had been created out of a merger of the Trades and Labour Congress (T.L.C.) and the Canadian Congress of Labour (C.C.L.) in order to strengthen the position of organised labour as an effective pressure group. It was natural for a new central labour organisation to look at the experience of its counterparts elsewhere in considering future policies and tactics. Canadian labour has been greatly influenced by American unionism. Indeed, the merger itself followed a similar one of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. in the United States. Furthermore, the C.L.C. now saw itself as the equivalent of such bodies as the British Trade Union Congress (T.U.C.) and sought to achieve a status in Canada similar to that enjoyed by the T.U.C. in Britain. Before considering the political position of the C.L.C. within a purely Canadian context, it is useful to review the political activities of labour bodies in the United States and Britain.

American Labour

One of the main characteristics of American labour unions has been their preoccupation with the pursuit of industrial negotiations. This so called "business unionism" draws a sharp distinction between the areas of political and economic action, and interprets the welfare of its members primarily in terms of their direct relationship with the job. Although this concern with job control has produced a large measure of success in improving general working conditions, it has led many observers to feel concern for the lack of adequate social objectives. The extension of legislation affecting collective bargaining, however, has made it inevitable for the American labour unions to enter into some form of political activity. While regarding industrial negotiations as the main means of attaining their goal of "advancing the welfare and working conditions of the great mass of those who work for wages", the unions have found themselves drawn into "the legislative halls."[1] The concentration on industrial techniques should not be allowed to obscure the fact that, in reality, American labour has always been in politics. This has been not only to gain advantage in bargaining positions with industry, but also in recognition of the limitations of collective bargaining as the sole

[1]George Meany, C.I.O. convention, Report of Proceedings (1956), p. 17-18.

instrument of policy. "Labour has long recognised that the gains which it wins through economic action can be protected, implemented, and extended only if it develops a progressive program of legislation and secures its enactment through effective participation in the political life of the nation."[1] The key to the American position is therefore one of priorities, which in turn has coloured the manner in which the unions have actually entered politics.

The basic American attitude towards labour in politics has been shaped by the traditions of the A.F.L. under Samuel Gompers. Despite resolutions calling for "most generous support to the independent political movement of the working man",[2] appearing in the early years of the labour movement, political activity was regarded as an "extravagant expenditure of strength."[3] Formulated at the beginning of this century, Gompers' theory stated that, "we will stand by our friends and administer a stinging rebuke to men or parties who are indifferent, neglectful or hostile."[4] It has left a profound mark on organised labour in the United

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[1] P. Murray, Report to C.I.O. Convention (November, 1943).

[2] A.F.L. convention, Report of proceedings (1886), p. 34.

[3] A.F.L. convention, Report of proceedings (1887), p. 29.

[4] Ibid. (1906), p. 3.

States as its guide to political activity. The labour unions would support individual candidates for public office if the voting records of those candidates showed a friendly disposition towards the aims of labour. Organised labour was unconcerned with party tickets. Yet Gompers had not always opposed political action as is clear from his statement in 1886 that the "recent political action of organised working men of the country, by which they have demonstrated they are determined to exhibit their political power", was to be "regarded with pleasure."[1] Experience showed, however, that "political movements are ephemeral. The trade union movement is not a line for today. Its continued existence is too valuable to be gambled in the political arena."[2] While the problems facing labour were seen as primarily industrial, Gompers' policy of "political voluntarism" went unchallenged and the attitude of the A.F.L. towards politics remained a negative one. Its "Bill of Labour's Grievances" was favourably received by the Democratic Party in 1908, but the A.F.L. was more concerned with concentrating its energies against the growing use of the injunction as a weapon against union activities.[3] The depression, however, stirred

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[1] P. Taft, "Labour's Changing Political Line", Journal of Political Economy, XLV (1937), 634.

[2] Samuel Gompers, "editorial", American Federationist (February, 1919), p. 150.

[3] For full discussion see:- P. Taft, op. cit.

labour into support for La Follette's Progressive Party in 1924, and Gompers endorsed several candidates for political office. The failure of the party only served to reinforce the view that, "Party politics, whether they be Democratic, Republican, Socialist, Populist, or Prohibitionist, or any other, shall have no place in the conventions of the American Federation of Labour."[1]

The passage of the Norris La Guardia Act in 1932, restricting the use of injunctions, marked the beginning of a more positive approach to political action. The labour unions now sought government assistance in organising the industrial worker. The Democrats introduced two important pieces of legislation -- The National Industrial Recovery Act and the Wagner Act. These acts strengthened the ability of the unions to bargain for "the closed shop", and set up the National Labour Relations Board to ensure "no unfair labour practices by employers". The growth of industrial unionism brought a clash of interests with the older craft unions. The unions within the Committee for Industrial Unions were expelled from the A.F.L. in 1937, and formed the Congress of Industrial Organisations (C.I.O.). The C.I.O. developed a militant political attitude and organised "Labour's Non-Partisan League". The League vigorously applied the Gompers approach while spelling out their own

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[1] A.F.L., Constitution, III, Sec. 8.

immediate objectives. The years of the Depression had produced a public opinion which was favourable towards labour, but by the 1940's this situation was rapidly changing. The use of the strike weapon to promote labour's aims antagonised public opinion and the unions were accused of sabotaging the war effort. The Smith-Connolly Act of 1942, passed despite President Roosevelt's veto, restricted the use of strike action in war-time and the use of political funds by labour unions. This act provided a further impetus to political action. A year later, a Political Action Committee was set up by the C.I.O., which endorsed Roosevelt's programme. The committee was an attempt to place on a permanent basis "a nation wide organisation to protect the rights of the working man as well as the rights of the returning soldiers, the farmers, the small business man, and the so called 'common man'."[1] A final factor in the events encouraging labour's organised entry into politics was the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. The act introduced strict regulations on the conduct of unions in order to correct abuses of the law by organised labour. Special machinery was set up to handle disputes which threatened the national economy. Union funds were not to be spent on federal elections and the closed shop was declared illegal. Unions became liable for the

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[1] P. Murray, quoted in D. J. Bradley, "Organised Labor and Politics", in L. Pope ed. Labor's Relation to Church and Community (New York: Harper, 1947), pp. 54-55.

acts of their officials and were forbidden to make use of the secondary boycott or strike in support of other unions. Union officials were required to file an affidavit declaring that they did not support violent revolution against the United States' Government. The unions naturally regarded these measures as "anti-labour". The fact that such a bill could be passed at a time when organised labour was a powerful economic pressure group, indicated the ineffectiveness of economic action unless supported by political power. Mr. Meany felt that act showed "how the gains we had achieved over the years could be taken away through punitive legislation."[1]

By 1948, both of the main labour congresses, the A.F.L. and C.I.O., had political action programmes. The C.I.O. had formed a "Political Action Committee", and the A.F.L. a "Labour League for Political Education." Greater attention was paid to political matters and union committees were formed on legislation, civil rights, housing, education, economic policy and social security. The merger of the A.F.L. and the C.I.O. in 1956 saw the formation of a Committee on Political Education (C.O.P.E.), and an increased endorsement of candidates in local and Congressional elections.[2] In 1958, 70% of the candidates endorsed by

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[1] G. Meany, "A.F.L. Convention Report, Political Education", American Federationist (January 1962), p. 4.

[2] "Endorsement from Labour", The Economist (September 22, 1956), p. 961.

C.O.P.E. were elected to Congress.[1] Kennedy himself indicated that much of his success in the 1960 Presidential Campaign was due to A.F.L.-C.I.O. support.[2]

The Gompers policy has never gone unchallenged and there has always been a number of unions within each congress declaring for independent political action. The McClellan Committee's investigations into the corrupt practices of some labour unions had, in the late 1950's, aroused public opinion in favour of increased restrictions on union activity. This feeling, combined with the efforts of those seeking restrictions on the unions' use of the boycott and picketing, resulted in the passage of the "Landrum Griffin" Labour Reform Act of 1959. The Act required unions to file reports on all financial transactions, and to hold regular elections by secret ballot. The secondary boycott provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act were reinforced and the use of picketing for the purpose of organising union locals was forbidden if an employer had already recognised another union. The Bill was bitterly opposed by unionists who held that it would have little effect on those unions involved in malpractices and would only serve to harass the activities of bona fide unions. The unions saw a "concerted and malignant conspiracy between major industrialists and reactionary

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[1] American Federationist (December 1958), p. 10.

[2] See: New York Times (December 9, 1961).

groups, in both political parties, to render the labor movement ineffective in politics and at the bargaining table."[1] The leadership of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. called for an intensification of the Gompers policy. They declared that the Congress was independent of any political party and would treat the voting record of all members of Congress and the state legislatures as "basic evidence of their convictions and attitudes . . . with the distribution and explanation of the records as a primary function of labor's political efforts."[2] Some representatives of affiliates to the Congress, however, felt that the situation called for the formation of a labour party for "all the working people of this country, an independent party of labour, for the workman, the small businessman, and the professional people."[3] No strong support emerged for such a party but it was clear that the situation called for more than a "Vote as you want but please vote"[4] attitude.

The American labour movement seeks to exert a certain amount of political power that is normally associated with a political party, without incurring the responsibilities

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[1] "Report A.F.L.-C.I.O. Convention, September, 1959", American Federationist (October, 1959), p. 10.

[2] "Report A.F.L.-C.I.O. Convention, September, 1959", op. cit., p. 10.

[3] A.F.L.-C.I.O. Convention, Report of Proceedings (1959), p. 385.

[4] G. Meany, "editorial", American Federationist (November, 1958), p. 3.

which a party must face. There has been a crystallisation of labour's aims, as is shown in Meany's "Positive Program for America", that is slowly eroding away the Gompers concept of non-partisanship. A pressure group with a clear programme, soon finds itself drawn towards a particular political party. In recent years, labour unions, with the exception of the Teamsters, Longshoremen, and Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, have consistently given their support to the Democratic Party. The bulk of the expenditures of the C.C.P.E. in 1958, went to the support of Democratic candidates. While avoiding a direct form of relationship with the party, this development is a broadening of the Gompers approach and a positive attempt to increase the political influence of labour. J. Hutchinson has observed that "it would be wrong to infer that labour either dominates or is dominated by the Democratic Party; or that the relationship is effectively exclusive, always smooth or wholly welcome on either side. But the alliance is national, enduring, and close, a major political fact . . ."[1]

Although the A.F.L.-C.I.O. has given increasing support to the Democrats, its attitudes towards political action are still fundamentally based on Gompers' "concept of the individual friend". The preoccupation of American labour

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[1] J. Hutchinson, "Labour and Politics in America", Political Quarterly, XXXIII, no. 2 (April-June, 1962), 140.

with "business unionism" and lack of a fervent political commitment is in some measure due to the nature of American society. In European countries, trade unionists are bound together in a sense of "class consciousness" which has made their labour movements militantly partisan. The European worker considers the conditions of work and professional life to be the result of collective action of a political nature since it is only by such action that he has ever effectively succeeded in bettering them. This feeling is quite alien to the North American continent where the working class view their progress as the result of individual personal effort.[1] As Mr. M. Pelling observes, social mobility is no greater in the United States than elsewhere, but the myth of the middle class society has curtailed the development of a pervading sense of "working class solidarity".[2] Mr. S. M. Lipset attributes the phenomenon of "classlessness" in the United States as due to the "relatively little difference between the standards of living in adjacent classes." He holds that "the wealthier a country, the less is status inferiority experienced as a major source of deprivation."[3] It may be

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[1] See:- M. Duverger, Political Parties, trans. B. & R. North (London: Methuen, 1954), pp. 23 & 30.

[2] H. Pelling, American Labour (Chicago: University Press, 1960), pp. 221-225.

[3] See:- S. M. Lipset, Political Man (New York: Doubleday, 1960), pp. 61-65.

argued, however, that Mr. Lipset neglects to distinguish fully between the quantitative and the qualitative aspects of class consciousness. A basic feature of the European class structure is the aristocratic tradition of social status based on birth, education, and occupation, which is not necessarily directly reflected in a standard of living, but rather in a way of living. Material success is not accorded the same measure of respect in Europe as in the United States. The attitudes of inferiority or superiority which the European tradition generates cannot be measured purely in such terms as expenditure or consumption. Whatever the contributory factors, class consciousness is noticeably absent in North America.

British Labour

The existence of a British political party, supported by the trade unions is often seen as reflecting a significantly different political tradition in Britain from that in the United States. In 1960, eighty-six trade unions were directly affiliated to the British Labour Party. The affiliation of these unions provides financial stability to the Party. In 1959-60, ninety-five percent of the donations to the Party's General Election Fund were received from trade unions.[1] In turn, the trade unions have a strong influence

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[1]Report of the Finance Department, Labour Party, Report of the 59th Annual Conference (1960), p. 49.

on the policies of the Labour Party. Over eighty per cent of the votes cast at the Party's conferences are held by the unions. Twelve of the twenty-seven members of the Party's National Executive Committee are trade union representatives. The unions have been accused of dominating party conferences but the records show that the unions have in fact never consistently voted en bloc.

Political activity by British trade unions also takes the form of direct sponsorship of individual Labour Party candidates. In the General Election of 1959, the unions sponsored 129 of the Party's 621 candidates. Of the 258 successful candidates, 93 were nominees of the trade unions.[1] The unions usually select safe "Labour seats" in which to put forward their own candidates. The individual unions regard their candidates as representative of their own special interests in the House of Commons. Within each constituency, close contact is maintained between the local Labour Party organisation and the Joint Trades and District Council. This relationship is maintained at a national level through the National Council of Labour, which is comprised of the Labour Party, the Trade Union Congress and the Co-operative Union.

Such an alliance between the trade union movement and a political party has no counterpart in the United States.

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[1] Secretarial Report, Labour Party, ibid., pp. 5-6.

Nevertheless there is an affinity between the T.U.C. and the A.F.L.-C.I.O. in their attitude towards political activity. Both British and American unions seek to improve and maintain wages, hours, and conditions of work. Political action serves to reinforce rather than replace industrial action. The provision of economic and industrial services is fundamental to both.

The early political activity of the T.U.C. and its initial reluctance to support an independent labour party shows an attitude not dissimilar from that of the American trade union movement. British union leaders were content to ask for "nothing more than a few working class members in the House of Commons, belonging to one or other of the 'respectable' parties to which they could thus obtain access for the adjustment of any matters in which their societies happened to be interested."[1] The British trade unions sought political representation within the existing major political parties. In practice, the union movement was habitually allied with the Liberal Party. The T.U.C. had entered the sphere of political activity in 1871 through the formation of a Parliamentary Committee and three years later two union supported parliamentary candidates were elected to the House of Commons. Although these M.P.s had specific commitments on

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[1] Sidney and Beatrice Webb, The History of Trade Unionism (London: Longmans, rev. ed., 1920), p. 681.

labour issues, they were members of the Liberal Party rather than "Independents". The T.U.C. was hostile to any hint of a specific labour party. The socialist Independent Labour Party (I.L.P.), led by Keir Hardie, however, regarded the labour organisations as a source of funds in its own struggle for political power and strongly advocated the formation of an independent trade union party. The issue came to a head in 1889, when a small committee was given the task of setting up an organisation "to secure a better representation of labour in the House of Commons".[1] In 1900 a Labour Representation Committee (L.R.C.) was organised. This Committee was a compromise between the socialist faction, pressing for a "United Labour Party", and those who supported the idea of an "Industrial Representation League". Some trade unionists were beginning to feel that it would be necessary to maintain a strong independent position in the legislature to support the industrial position of labour.[2] The majority, however, remained content with their position as the "tail end of the great Liberal Party"[3] and it was the socialists from the I.L.P. who provided the driving force behind the L.R.C. At the L.R.C. Conference in 1900, many protested against the

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[1] T.U.C. Conference, Report of Proceedings (1889), p. 64.

[2] See:- H. Pelling, The Origins of the Labour Party, 1880-1900 (London: Macmillan, 1954), p. 227.

[3] F. Engels, quoted in I. F. MacDonald, The State and the Trade Unions (London: Macmillan, 1960), p. 46.

use of independent political representation and asserted that there was already an effective labour group in the Commons. "They had not called themselves independents, they had not worn trilby hats, red ties, but they had done their work."[1]

The movement for the formation of a labour party grew in momentum, however, as attacks on the position of the trade unions increased. The action of the House of Lords in the Taff Vale Judgement in 1901, ruling that unions could be sued in a corporate capacity for damages, marked the turning point in regard to political action. Up to this juncture the two traditions of British and American labour had been on parallel lines. The political activity undertaken by British labour in 1902 was in fact typically American. There had been a widespread circulation of division lists on the Taff Vale Judgement vote and a canvass of all prospective candidates. The representatives of labour in Parliament were to act purely as a pressure group which could voice labour's grievances. Keir Hardie emphasised that the labour group in Parliament "must embrace a readiness to co-operate with any party which for the time being may be engaged in promoting legislation in the direct interest of labour, and be equally ready to associate themselves

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[1]John Burns, quoted in F. Bealey & H. Pelling, Labour and Politics, 1900-1906 (London: Macmillan, 1958), p. 7.

with any party in opposing measures having an opposite tendency".[1]

In the 1906 General Election twenty-nine of the Representation Committee's fifty candidates were elected and a formal party structure embodying whips was set up. The trade unions had reluctantly engaged in direct political activity. The marked success of this working class party, however, encouraged the unions to participate farther. The course of events was dictated in no small measure by the unsatisfactory relationship with the Liberal Party which many unionists in the T.U.C. would have otherwise been content to support. It was no dream of a socialist Utopia that had spurred the trade unions to participate in the formation of the Labour Party, but merely a desire to maintain positions already secured by industrial action. The Liberals may well have been able to retain union support, but as Ramsay MacDonald complained, "We didn't leave the Liberals. They kicked us out and slammed the door in our faces".[2] The growth of the Labour Party was given a further impetus by a renewed attack on trade unionism in 1909. In that year, the Osborne Judgement prohibited unions from making financial contributions to any political party or presenting their own candidates at national

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[1] F. Bealey & H. Pelling, op. cit., p. 28.

[2] Ramsay MacDonald to Herbert Samuel, August 16, 1895, quoted in H. Pelling, op. cit., p. 238.

or local elections. The Liberals hoped that this would put an end to any independent action by labour but it merely encouraged greater trade union support for the Labour Party. The further development of the party, culminating in its replacement of the Liberals as the second party, ensured the continuance of a firm relationship between the unions and the Labour Party down to the present day. The T.U.C., however, always remained politically independent. The formation of the General Council of the T.U.C. in 1921 substantially increased its political power above that exercised through the old Parliamentary Committee.

Similarity of attitudes to political action in Britain and the United States did not end with the growth of the Labour Party. Some resemblance can be seen with regard to developments in the T.U.C. The central labour congress is not directly affiliated to the Labour Party, although organically linked through its constituent bodies. Its status as an "Estate of the Realm", and the recent lack of support for the Labour Party has led to a certain amount of coolness on the part of the General Council of the T.U.C. towards the Party. The welfare of trade unionism is placed before any party allegiance. The T.U.C. places more value on its own pressure group activities than on any influence the unions might have through the Parliamentary Labour Party. With representation on sixty government advisory committees and bodies, it is consulted on every significant change in

industrial and economic policy. On the defeat of the Labour Party in 1951, the General Secretary of the T.U.C. was quick to emphasise the T.U.C.'s attitude towards the Conservatives. "It is our long standing practice to seek to work amicably with whatever government that is in power, and through consultation, jointly with ministers and with the other side of industry, to find practical solutions to social and economic problems facing the country".[1] In fact, in 1953 the Chairman of the General Council openly discussed a withdrawal by the trade unions from the Labour Party in order that "the T.U.C. would be less embarrassed in its dealings with a Tory Government".[2] Gompers would have been quite happy to sit among such men.

Despite the close relationships existing between individual trade unions and the Labour Party, there is some correspondence between the position of the T.U.C. as a central labour body and that of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. Both bodies retain a degree of freedom of action, but have found in varying degrees that their aims of full employment, higher wages, and better social conditions require more than collective bargaining and will not permit them to look upon political parties with complete non-partisanship. They cannot ignore the larger social and economic context within

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[1] Quoted in:- S. Finer, Anonymous Empire (London: Pall Mall, 1958), p. 40.

[2] Manchester Guardian (October 2, 1953).

which their actions take place. A concern for the degree of inflation, balance of payments, and the general condition of industry takes labour deeper into politics. Pressure groups "with predominant economic motives, normally . . . get a more sympathetic hearing from one party than another".[1] It is to a group's advantage to cultivate a closer relationship with the political party which is the more favourable to its aims. The A.F.L.-C.I.O. have found that "many more Democrats than Republicans qualify for C.O.P.E. support".[2] The close ties of British unionism with the Labour Party are the result of a situation where neither major party qualified for labour's support.

At the national level, the British and American labour congresses seek political recognition. This aim has brought the T.U.C. into partnership with the Labour Party and drawn the A.F.L.-C.I.O. towards the Democratic Party. In the light of this position one might expect a somewhat similar situation to exist in Canada. There would appear to be nothing inherent in the nature of trade unionism which precludes participation in the political process.

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[1] V. L. Allen, Trade Unions and the Government (Toronto: Longmans, 1960), p. 3.

[2] A.F.L.-C.I.O. Executive Council, Report (Washington: 1961), p. 260.

III

CANADIAN LABOUR AND POLITICS

Canadian labour has found itself concerned with political action from its earliest days. The first federations of Canadian labour unions attempted to influence the two major political parties through "legislative lobbying". The unions demanded legislation to improve working conditions, to increase wages, to protect themselves from adverse court decisions, and to restrict immigration, but found that the parties would not fully respond to such demands. Canadian labour therefore turned to direct political action. In 1874, Daniel O'Donoghue, vice-president of the Canadian Labour Union, was successful in the Ontario provincial elections and became the first "independent" labour member of a Canadian legislative body. The depression of the late seventies, however, undermined trade union activity and in 1879, O'Donoghue lost his seat. On the initiative of the Toronto Trades and Labour Council, in 1883, a new national labour organisation, the (Dominion) Trades and Labour Congress was established. The unions reaffirmed their belief that, "The working class of this Dominion will never be properly represented in Parliament or receive justice in the legislation of this country until

they are represented by men of their own class and opinions".[1] In 1895, the Trades and Labour Congress (T.L.C.) supported direct political action on a national basis. The president of the T.L.C. was elected to the British Columbia Legislature in 1898, and a year later the constituent bodies of the Congress voted by a forty-one to three majority in favour of an independent labour party.[2]

In its early years, the political activity of the T.L.C. was influenced by the policies of its affiliates from two rival American organisations, the A.F.L. and the Knights of Labour. The Knights of Labour were militant local "assemblies" of skilled and unskilled workers which often supported direct political action. The international unions of the A.F.L. counterbalanced the influence of the Knights. Despite the political resolutions which were passed at the annual conventions of the T.L.C., the A.F.L. affiliates were influential in preventing the Congress from fully participating in direct political action. The crusading spirit of the Knights of Labour soon waned and in 1902 the remaining assemblies were expelled from the T.L.C. During the early 1900's the Canadian unions were also influenced by the development

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[1] Quoted in, Eamon Park, "Labour's Political Diary", Canadian Labour, VI, no. 9 (September, 1961), 21.

[2] Eugene Forsey, "History of the Labour Movement in Canada", Canada Year Book, 1957-58 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1958), p. 801.

of the Labour Party in Britain. In 1900, two labour members held seats in the Canadian parliament and, in 1906, the president of the T.L.C. himself entered the House of Commons. The success of the British Labour Party in the 1906 election encouraged the T.L.C. to endorse "the idea of sending representatives of labour to Parliament and to the Local Legislatures",[1] but in the elections that followed only a handful of labour candidates entered Canadian legislatures. The old party loyalties and apathy of union members proved to be stronger than their economic "interests".

At its Ottawa convention in 1917, further pressures were placed upon the T.L.C. to engage in direct political action. The executive of the T.L.C. was instructed to assist in the formation of "an Independent Labour Party for Canada upon the same lines as the British Labour Party" and to, "set up the necessary associations for political action through trade unionists and sympathisers at a provincial level, based on the Congress's Platform of Principles".[2] This proposal was in part a product of the radical aims of Western representatives, who were growing dissatisfied with the cautious policies pursued by the leaders of the T.L.C. from "conservative" Eastern Canada. Such revolutionary movements as the International Workers of the World and the Socialist Party had

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[1] T.L.C. Convention, Report of Proceedings (1906), p.82.

[2] T.L.C. Convention, Report of Proceedings (1917), pp. 43-44.

developed a radical tradition among Western trade unionists. In 1919, further aggravated by the wartime emergency powers of the federal government, the Western delegates formed a revolutionary syndicalist body, the One Big Union (O.B.U.), in opposition to the T.L.C.[1] Soon after its formation, the O.B.U. was involved in the Winnipeg General Strike. This strike was vigorously suppressed by the federal government, who regarded it as a revolutionary uprising. As a result of the General Strike, the O.B.U. drew support from many sections of organised labour at the expense of the T.L.C. The O.B.U. was unable to consolidate its position, however, due to the considerable opposition of the T.L.C. and the federal and provincial governments. By 1923, the T.L.C. had regained its position amongst organised labour in the West.

The T.L.C. delayed action on the 1917 resolution concerning direct political action until 1921, when a conference of the representatives of the provincial organisations formed the ill-fated Canadian Labour Party. In 1919, a farmer government had been elected in Ontario and two years later the "United Farmers" formed the provincial government in Alberta. Labour had actively participated in these movements and was therefore encouraged to engage still further

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[1] See discussion in:- H. A. Logan, Trade Unions in Canada (Toronto: Macmillan, 1948), pp. 302-320.

in direct political action. The Canadian Labour Party, however, was a miserable failure. In the federal election of 1921, only two out of its thirty candidates were elected and in 1927 the party was disbanded. After this unsuccessful attempt, the T.L.C. settled into the traditional Gompers posture.[1] The core of its national political activity was formalised in an "annual pilgrimage" to Ottawa to present its legislative requests to the Federal Government. A committee of T.L.C. delegates from across Canada would formulate a number of recommendations which were presented at a meeting with the Prime Minister, the Minister of Labour, and other Cabinet Ministers.

The depression of the early 1930's again revived demands for the T.L.C. to support a new national labour party. In 1932, the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (C.C.F.) was formed from the remnants of provincial independent labour parties and western farmer's groups, under the wing of J. S. Woodsworth. The C.C.F. represented a protest against the depression policies of the two major parties, and adopted a programme of democratic socialism.[2] This new party attempted to appeal to organised labour but the only prominent labour leader at the Calgary Conference, which set up the C.C.F.,

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[1]Leslie Wismer, "The Trades and Labour Congress of Canada", Canadian Labour, I, no. 1 (April, 1956), p. 25.

[2]See chapter I, p. 15.

was A. R. Mosher, president of the nationalistic, All-Canadian Congress of Labour (A.C.C.L.). Supporters of the C.C.F. repeatedly called upon the T.L.C. to endorse the C.C.F. The T.L.C. merely re-affirmed its intention to "act as the legislative mouthpiece for organised labour in Canada independent of any political organisation".[1] Support was growing, however, for formal links between the party and labour. In 1938, District 26 of the United Mineworkers of America (Nova Scotia and New Brunswick), affiliated to the C.C.F. at the national level.[2] A number of unions from both the T.L.C. and the A.C.C.L. followed suit and affiliated on a provincial basis.

The Second World War produced further pressures in favour of direct political action. The A.F.L. and C.I.O. split in the United States was duplicated in Canada. The Canadian Congress of Labour (C.C.L.) formed in 1940, became the Canadian equivalent of the C.I.O. and at first pursued a policy of non-partisanship. The C.C.L. promised to support "those candidates who have demonstrated their friendliness to labour".[3] Organised labour sought to extend its activities under the protection of a "national labour code",

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[1] T.L.C. Convention, Report of Proceedings (1935), p. 175.

[2] Angus MacInnis, "First Union affiliation", 25th. Anniversary Souvenir (Ottawa: C.C.F., 1957), p. 29.

[3] See Debate:- C.C.L. Convention, Report of Proceedings (1941), pp. 44, 139.

such as already existed in the United States in the Wagner Act. The T.L.C. and C.C.I. were dissatisfied with the lack of trade union representation on administrative bodies and demanded explicit legislation guaranteeing collective bargaining rights of labour. The federal government had passed one Order-in-Council, P.C. 2685, which merely asserted the right of workers to organize, and even the subsequent order, P.C. 1003, which embodied many of the provisions of the Wagner Act, did not satisfy the demands of the unions. The C.C.L. increasingly supported the C.C.F. and in 1943, its leaders, "sick and tired of going cap in hand to Mackenzie King to get labour's policies adopted",[1] accepted the C.C.F. as the vehicle for the political activity of the C.C.L. The political climate appeared to be favourable to the C.C.F. since some thirty of its candidates had been elected to the Ontario legislature. The 1943 Montreal convention of the C.C.L. therefore endorsed the C.C.F. "as the political arm of labour" and advised "all affiliated and chartered unions that they affiliate to the C.C.F."[2] Pressure to support the C.C.F. was also apparent in the meetings of the T.L.C. but the influence of the A.F.L. tradition and the opposition of the communist bloc within the T.L.C. ensured that the activities of this Congress remained "independent of any

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[1] C.C.L. Convention, Report of Proceedings (1943), p. 54.

[2] Ibid., p. 54.

political organisation". The T.L.C. had set up a National Political Action Committee in 1943, but only in name. The C.C.L. continued to endorse the policies of the C.C.F. but as in the T.L.C., a communist bloc sought to break any connections with the C.C.F. This was successful in forcing the C.C.L. to place greater emphasis on its own long range programme for labour and on the work of its Political Action Committee.[1] In 1945, the C.L.C. submitted its aims to all political parties, but received support only from the C.C.F. The Congress, therefore, continued to reaffirm its endorsement of the C.C.F.

The history of the political activities of Canadian labour is a complex one. A great variety of factors have shaped the political role of the Canadian labour congresses, but by the 1950's there had emerged two distinct attitudes toward any political action. Despite pressures inside the T.L.C. to support the C.C.F., the T.L.C. followed a policy of non-partisanship and despite anti-C.C.F. pressures in the C.C.L., the C.C.L. was committed to a policy of direct political activity by member unions. There has always been one factor, however, common to all the diverse forms of labour's political activity. The recurring appearance of independent labour candidates, the formation of the C.C.F., and the continued existence of that party, indicate some

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[1] C.C.L. Convention, Report of Proceedings (1944), p. 53.

dissatisfaction with the two major parties. From the start, the Canadian labour unions recognised that they could never be entirely non-partisan and yet always felt that neither major party could be trusted to support labour's aims. Their political action was merely a protest against this situation. Even the T.L.C. might have been prepared to abandon some of its non-partisanship if it had been able to rely on a major political party to support its aims. Confronted with the generous promises made by the Liberal Party in 1945, the T.L.C. gave an indirect endorsement to that Party, stating that, "those who made these pledges must be given an opportunity to redeem them".[1] The T.L.C.'s resolve to "encourage and organise non-partisan political action and education, consistent with the principle of electing our friends, and defeating our enemies, to further the cause of labour"[2] was not entirely due to a vigorous belief in Gompers' philosophy but rather to the post war ineffectiveness of the C.C.F. as a potential vehicle for the legislative aims of that congress. A basic feature of the development of Canadian unionism has been its inability to cultivate a close relationship with one of the major political parties.

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[1] National P.A.C. Statement, Trades and Labour Congress Journal (June, 1945), p. 44.

[2] T.L.C. Convention, 1953, Labour Gazette, LIII (1953), 768.

In 1956, the T.L.C. and the C.C.L. joined forces to form the Canadian Labour Congress (C.L.C.). The delegates to the first C.L.C. convention were cautious in their approach to political action. Those delegates supporting the C.C.F. feared that any motion which endorsed the C.C.F. would either be defeated or merely passed by a narrow majority. The old leaders of the T.L.C. were firm in their opposition to any direct political action. The retiring president of the T.L.C. advised the new congress "to stay with the purpose of the trade union movement and to avoid becoming the tail to any political kite".[1] The convention was content to acknowledge that the C.C.F. had "fought consistently for labour's legislative programme, inside and outside of the Parliament of Canada and the provincial legislatures".[2] All affiliated unions were urged, "(a) to take the utmost interest in political affairs (b) to continue such forms of political action or education as they may have carried out in the past and (c) to undertake such further activities as may in the future appear appropriate for achieving the basic objectives of the Congress".[3] A Political Education Committee was also set up

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[1] P. Heuough, C.L.C. 1st convention, Report of Proceedings (1956), p. 49.

[2] "Report C.L.C. Convention Proceedings", Canadian Labour (May, 1956), p. 132.

[3] C.L.C. 1st convention, Report of Proceedings (1956), p. 49.

to give "all possible support to individual affiliates in carrying out a programme of political education and action". The local unions were thus free to continue their support of the C.C.F. and were in fact assisted in this by the Political Education Committee. The new direction in which organised labour was to move was indicated in a resolution on political education. This resolution authorised the committee and the executive to initiate discussions with farm groups, the Co-operative movement, and the C.C.F., "or other political parties pledged to support the legislative programme of the C.L.C., excluding Communist and Fascist dominated parties, to explore and develop co-ordination of action in the legislative and political field."[1] The feelings of the new congress were expressed by Eamon Park in these terms: "For too long there has been a misalignment in the political life of this country. I see a great new opportunity to strengthen those political forces that have been helping us to provide the drive for an effective people's party in Canada".[2] Other speakers urged the building of a party that would really "represent the working people", and the need for a party, "in government, committed to the political programme of this Congress."[3] The Convention established a draft legislative

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Toronto Telegram (August 25, 1956).

[3] Labour Gazette, LVI (1956), 642.

programme which the political parties were to embrace if they hoped to gain the formal endorsement of the C.L.C. Only the C.C.F. pledged to do so.

The Conservatives' overwhelming success in the 1958 General Election only served to emphasise the weakness of the political position of the C.L.C. Without an existing political fortress of its own, labour would have to build one. By 1957 the C.L.C. was already considering the example set by British unions as a solution to labour's political problems. In August 1957, Claude Jodoin suggested in the C.L.C. Executive Council that the C.L.C. should "give some thought to the position of Congress with regard to politics, and also study the relationship between the British Trades Union Congress and the British Labour Party . . .".[1] Six months later, the Executive Council decided, "that a resolution should be prepared for submission to the Convention, instructing the Executive Council to establish a consultative committee with the C.C.F., for the purpose of developing an effective political instrument patterned along the lines of the British Labour Party . . .".[2]

At the 1958 convention of the C.L.C. the delegates recognised the need for the creation of an effective political

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[1] "C.L.C. Executive Council Meetings", Canadian Labour, II, no. 9 (September, 1957), 31-32.

[2] "C.L.C. Executive Council Meetings", Canadian Labour, III, no. 4 (April, 1958), 29.

force and called for a "broadly based people's political movement, which embraces the C.C.F., the labour movement, farm organisations, professional people, and other liberally minded persons interested in basic social reform and reconstruction through our parliamentary system of government". The Executive Council was instructed to initiate discussions ". . . with the C.C.F., interested farm organisations, and other like-minded individuals and groups, to formulate a constitution and a program for such a political instrument of the Canadian people; and to report on such a plan, draft constitution and program to the next Convention of this Congress for action."[1] Eamon Park introducing the resolution stressed the "urgent need for a re-grouping and re-alignment of forces which believe in the same social objectives and social aims as we hold in this Congress".[2] Speakers acknowledged the contributions made in the past by the C.C.F., but it was necessary to increase the support for such a party. They were "showing to the people of Canada that at long last the results of the elections have finally impressed on our mind that the existing political structure is not the kind of structure to gain us the results which we demand for all our membership".[3] The C.C.F. welcomed such a re-alignment and,

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[1] C.L.C. Convention, Report of Proceedings (1958), p. 45.

[2] Ibid., p. 46.

[3] Ibid., p. 47.

at the C.C.F. National Convention in July 1958, adopted a resolution authorising its National Council and National Executive to enter into the discussions proposed by the C.L.C.[1] A C.C.F.-C.L.C. political committee was formed, later to become the National Committee for the New Party. During the following years, "New Party" conferences and seminars were held in every major centre in Canada. Suggestions for the party's draft programme and constitution were sought during these discussions.

Events in 1959 provided a further stimulus for the labour organisations to carry into effect their desire for an effective political instrument. The passage of Bill 42 in British Columbia, which forbade the use of union dues for political purposes, and the actions of Premier Smallwood against the loggers in Newfoundland, produced a deep bitterness in the ranks of labour. Furthermore, the steps taken by the C.L.C. towards a party of "their own" were themselves instrumental in producing a coolness in the attitude of the Conservative Government towards the Congress. The Government pointedly passed over recommendations from the Congress in regard to labour representation on Government bodies, particularly in rejecting Mr. Stanley Knowles' nomination to

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[1] See: S. Knowles, The New Party (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1961), Appendix B.

the Unemployment Insurance Advisory Committee.[1] The third convention of the C.L.C. in 1960 endorsed the progress made towards the formation of the new party and instructed the Executive to participate actively in the preparations for the founding convention. Delegates to the convention felt that labour was "being forced into politics to defend not only its hard won rights, but indeed its very existence".[2]

The C.L.C. believed that neither the Liberal Party nor the Conservative Party could give justice to, or protect the interests of, organised labour. The Liberals had claimed to believe in "strong trade unions, bargaining freely in the interests of their members",[3] yet it was a Liberal government in Newfoundland that had removed bargaining rights from the International Woodworkers of America. In the field of social security, the Liberal's pledge to implement comprehensive health insurance was doubted by those who remembered the same unfulfilled promise in 1919 and 1945. The Conservative government had failed to convince the C.L.C. that it would provide the legislation that labour sought. The steps taken by the Conservatives to deal with the heavy unemployment

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[1] See: "The Government Again Breaks Faith", Canadian Labour, VI, no. 10 (October, 1959), 6.

[2] C.L.C. Convention, Report of Proceedings (1960), pp. 33-36.

[3] "... Statements of Liberal Policy, 1958," National Liberal Federation, p. 20.

of 1958 were considered clumsy and halting. Labour repeatedly pressed for measures to increase effective demand as a solution to the problem and attacked the tight money policy of the government.[1] The Conservatives could not be expected to put into operation the wide degree of planning which labour regarded as necessary to ensure economic growth. The Conservative's National Productivity Council was seen merely as a potential sub-committee of the Economic Advisory Council sought by the C.L.C.[2]

The source of the funds which maintain the old parties confirmed labour's mistrust. The financial contributions from large corporations to party funds were sufficient indication of an anti-labour bias within the Conservative and Liberal parties. Such contributions are often made to both provincial and national party campaign funds in order to obtain contracts or to influence party policy. The trade unionists bitterly drew the conclusion that the parties, "sell themselves to big business for their campaign funds".[3] The C.L.C. therefore felt it necessary to assist in the inauguration of a party which was not dependent on business interests.

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[1] For example see:- "C.L.C. Programme for Full Employment", 27th February, 1958, in Canadian Labour (March 1958), 23.

[2] Roland Godin, Presidential Address, Canadian Labour, VII, no. 5 (May, 1962), 3.

[3] New Party Newsletter, VI, no. 1 (January, 1960).

As the central labour body in Canada, the C.L.C. is composed of autonomous affiliated unions. Since the constitutions of some of these unions call for the maintenance of political neutrality, the C.L.C. could not become directly affiliated to the party. The position of the C.L.C. is akin to that of the T.U.C. in relation to the British Labour Party. Mr. Claude Jodoin has emphasised that the C.L.C. is outside the New Democratic Party. "We must remain independent, free to praise when deserving of praise and free to castigate should it forget its obligations to the Canadians who elected it".[1] Furthermore, the C.L.C. has declared that it is prepared to co-operate with any government of "sound social and economic policies."[2]

The C.L.C. has found it necessary to supplement collective bargaining with political action in order to further the aims of labour. These aims not only require favourable decisions at the bargaining table but also protection through favourable legislation. The C.L.C. therefore shares with its American and British counterparts an involvement in politics. All three labour congresses seek support from a sympathetic major political party. The involvement of American Labour in politics has brought it into alignment with the Democratic Party. The dissatisfaction of the

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[1] Globe and Mail (April 25, 1960).

[2] Brief to the Federal Government (March 14, 1962).

British Labour Movement with the two parties led to its assistance in the formation and growth of a new political party. In contrast, the political activities of Canadian labour have been spasmodic. The C.L.C., however, has consolidated the economic status of labour through the merger of the two older congresses, the T.L.C. and the C.C.L., and now seeks a comparable amount of political influence. The C.L.C. has felt itself unable to support either of the two major parties and therefore seeks political influence through the formation of a new party. Nevertheless, neither the C.L.C., the A.F.L.-C.I.O. nor the T.U.C. wish to become an appendage of any political party. The idea is anathema to them. The three congresses find themselves unavoidably involved in politics, yet wish to retain complete freedom of action on their members' behalf.

The participation of the C.L.C. in the formation of a new political party is not due to any peculiar feature of trade unionism in Canada. It is merely the action of a grouping in society which feels that it has not been given sufficient political recognition by the major political parties. The aims of labour organisations centre on such issues as wages, hours, working conditions, and the provision of social welfare. Such issues cloak a more basic aim. Labour unions are fundamentally concerned with the maintenance of their own security and growth. In Britain, Canada, and the United States, unions seek to match the

economic and political power of labour with that of business interests. In a study of industrial relations, Stuart Jamieson finds that the conflict between labour and management can be attributed to an intense competition between the two for "primary influence in the councils of political parties and governments, and for public approval and prestige generally". Such concrete issues as wages and working conditions may be regarded as "weapons manipulated by each party in the bargaining process to fortify or advance its position in the struggle of power".[1] In this conflict labour and business interests solicit the support of the major political parties. The nature of the response from the parties determines the degree to which an interest group will participate in direct political activity. The formation of the New Democratic Party results from the particular nature of the Canadian party system. It is a symptom of a new influence operating among the determinants of the Canadian party system and represents a protest against the lack of response from the major political parties.

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[1]Stuart Jamieson, "Industrial Relations and Government Policy" in A. E. Kovacs, ed., Readings in Canadian Labour Economics (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1961), p. 141.

IV

PARTY POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN

S. M. Lipset has said that, "Contemporary Canadian politics should be seen as the product of a failure of British Parliamentary institutions to work in a complex American Federal Union".[1] He feels that there is an incompatibility between British institutions and an American environment. The political and social determinants of the Canadian party system are rooted in both Britain and the United States. In order to assess the significance of the formation of the New Democratic party, it is therefore important to study the operation of the American and British party systems. The type of political action pursued by a pressure group will to a large extent depend on the nature of the party system. In order to understand the position of labour in politics, one must also understand the party system.

The nature of a party system is determined by the political, economic and social structure of society. The British political and social environment is fundamentally

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[1] S. M. Lipset, "Democracy in Alberta", Canadian Forum (December, 1954), p. 196. For an earlier discussion of this point see:- J. W. Dafoe, Canada, an American Nation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1935), p. 75.

different from that of the United States. There is therefore a marked contrast between the British and American party systems. "The culture of a society" provides "the foci around which political conflict tends to crystallize".[1] The small and homogeneous nature of the British Isles has resulted in a centralised form of government and consolidated political parties. The variegated nature of American geography has produced great sectional differences, which in turn have resulted in a diverse cultural heritage. The United States is said to form a "checkerboard of vast territorial units each with its own political interest".[2] The American "model" for a party system is therefore one "in which each of the major parties was as nearly as possible a fair sample of all the important factions in the Country".[3] Each party is said to be a discordant amalgam, as flexible and as uncommitted as possible. Compromise has destroyed any hint of party dogma. The centre of gravity of the American party system is at the state level and the possibility of party discipline is considerably limited. The Southern Democrats tend to have more in common with their fellow conservatives in the Republican

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[1] S. H. Beer, "Pressure Groups and Parties in Britain", A.P.S.R., L no. 1 (1956), 1.

[2] V. O. Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (2nd ed.; New York: Crowell, 1950), p. 156.

[3] A. N. Holcombe, quoted in H. A. Bone, American Politics and the Party System (3rd. ed. Toronto: McGraw Hill, 1955), p. 619.

Party than with the Northern Democrats. In contrast, British political parties are more deeply divided on matters of principle and party doctrine. This division is due to the fact that they are fundamentally a reflection of a deeply rooted class consciousness.[1] In Britain, a democratic socialist party of the left confronts a conservative party of the right.

The differences between the American and British systems of government have further influenced the development of two contrasting party systems. The British parliamentary system of government is more conducive to the operation of a rigid party system than the American separation of power between the executive and legislature.

After a British General Election, the leader of the majority party in the House of Commons is normally called upon to become Prime Minister. The Prime Minister appoints a cabinet mainly from among members of his party in the House of Commons, the House acts in the manner of a sustaining electoral college for the Prime Minister and his cabinet. The cabinet is generally assured of majority support since if a Government party member votes against the Government, he risks its defeat, compelling the Government to resign, or dissolve Parliament. Individual members of the British House of Commons do not vote only according to their own personal views on each issue but follow the line laid down by their

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[1] S. H. Beer, op. cit., pp. 21-22.

party whips. The voting of each party member is therefore generally synonymous with that of his party. To vote against the party is to risk the safety of one's own seat at the next election. The national party organisations also exercise some control on the selection of parliamentary candidates, thereby ensuring a certain amount of conformity to party doctrines.

A British Prime Minister can normally rely on strong party support for his legislative programme. A President of the United States, however, does not enjoy such rigid party discipline. The American separation of powers between the executive and the legislature has given a powerful independent role to members of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The timing of the Presidential and Congressional elections makes it possible for the Presidency and Congress to be controlled by opposing political parties. The President could expect little cooperation in such circumstances, yet even where his own party has a large majority in Congress he still cannot rely on the party to follow his initiatives. This was perhaps most clearly demonstrated in the struggles of President Roosevelt with the Democratic Party in the late 1930's.

The American system of government does not impose any common interests on members of the legislature. A member of the Senate or the House of Representatives may oppose an important administration bill even when he is of the same

party affiliation as the President. To refuse passage to such a bill does not endanger a member's seat.

American political parties are traditionally seen as comprehensive coalitions which integrate the same heterogeneous groups. The undisciplined party is viewed as a unifying agent. "A federal union is safe so long as the parties are undogmatic and contain members with many contradictory views".[1] A strong party system composed of disciplined parties, which present clear alternatives to the electorate, is recognised as being appropriate to the British Isles but unsuited to North America.

The American party system has been presented as being the appropriate model for Canada. It is therefore important to examine the nature of American political parties in order to test the validity of such a model. If American political parties were loose uncommitted coalitions, one would expect this fact to be reflected in the voting records of the parties in Congress. One would not be able to forecast the actions of senators or representatives, purely on the basis of their party affiliation. As David Truman observes, however, in his study on the parties in Congress, "Ample evidence already exists to support the proposition that, at least in the act of voting, the party label is consistently

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[1]H. Agar, The Price of Union (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), p. 689.

the most reliable prediction of a legislator's action".[1] This is not to suggest that the Democrats and the Republicans are tightly disciplined groups. In both parties there exists a cleavage between progressives and conservatives but, in spite of such intra-party differences, the voting records show a real contrast in the political tendencies of the two parties. This is particularly apparent in the behaviour of the parties in regard to labour unions and the role of government in the economy.[2] The majority of the Democrats show themselves to be less in favour of restrictions on the activities of organised labour and more in favour of increased government expenditures, than do the Republicans. The debates that took place on the Labour Reform Act of 1959 and on appropriation bills illustrate this tendency. The Democratic Party is a party of change and liberalism, despite the qualifications one must make in taking account of the deviations of the Southern Democrats. The Republican Party is a party of conservatism. These characteristics are mainly the result of the interaction of pressure groups on the political parties; abstract principles and political ideology play a minor role in the life of the parties.

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[1] David B. Truman, The Congressional Party (New York: Wiley, 1959), pp. vi-vii.

[2] See J. R. Pole, "Forward from McCarthyism", Political Quarterly, XXXIII, no. 2 (1962), 195.

The traditional concept of the American party system states that the "major parties are primarily concerned not with framing issues or drawing distinct programs, but in trying to discover some way of bringing together into reasonably harmonious relationships, as large a proportion of the voters as possible."[1] The growth of modern interest groups, however, has modified the behaviour of the parties. The large national organisations of labour, business, and agriculture reflect the broad interests of their members. The activities of such groups tend to offset the narrow local pressures which fall upon members of Congress, and have led the parties to consider political issues in terms of their national implications. As a result of this "nationalizing influence"[2] the Democrats and Republicans have taken specific stands on national issues. This in turn has made it difficult for many interest groups to remain neutral towards political parties.[3] As one interest group aligns itself with one party, so its opponent aligns itself with the other major party. Labour unions have found the "liberal" Democratic Party more congenial than the

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[1] P. Herring, The Politics of Democracy (New York: Rinehart, 1940), p. 17.

[2] See Paul T. David, "The Changing Party Pattern", Antioch Review, XVI (1956), 333-350.

[3] Committee on Political Parties, "Towards a More Responsible Two Party System", American Political Science Review (A.P.S.R.), XLIV (1950), 19-20.

Republican Party to the interests of organised labour. Business interests have found more friends among the Republicans. Thus each group finds itself increasingly committed to a political party. "The sharpening commitment of many powerful unions to the Democratic Party has forced many powerful trade associations to adopt a posture of thinly veiled Republican partisanship."[1]

American political parties are said to make similar appeals with similar policies to similar groups. It was felt to be of great political advantage for the parties to suppress any striking emphasis on party differences. Both parties thought that they could win votes which were formerly pledged to the other and felt that the acknowledgement of a real choice might antagonise potential support. In the 1960 Presidential Campaign, Nixon vainly attempted to persuade the electorate that the Republicans and Democrats were alike in their goals, and differed only in their methods of achieving them. The validity of a broad approach to the electorate has been challenged by studies of voting behaviour. Samuel Huntington found that there was an inverse relationship between voting strength (a "quantative aspect") and the degrees of liberalism and conservatism (a "qualitative aspect"), of the two parties. Huntington

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[1]Clinton Rossiter, Parties and Politics in America (4th ed.; New York: Cornell University Press, 1961), p. 23.

attributes the success of the Democrats in 1948 to the advantage gained by "mobilising a high degree of support from a small number of interests, rather than mustering a relatively low degree of support from a large number of interests."[1] Thus it is to a party's advantage to reciprocate the support which it receives from interest groups. Conscious of the value of the support of organised labour, the Democratic Party has openly sought labour endorsement even in the conservative South,[2] while the Republicans make little effort to direct a specific appeal to the labour vote in urban areas. In many instances a political party welcomes the assistance of particular interest groups in providing posters and leaflets or automobiles to carry voters to the polls. In 1960, the Democrat's voter registration drive worked closely with C.O.P.E. and a special "Citizen's Non-Partisan Registration Committee" of the A.F.L.-C.I.O.

The interplay that has taken place between the political parties and interest groups in the United States has resulted in a party system which does not completely correspond to the traditional concept of such a system. While American parties remain loose federations of state organisations and are less cohesive and less disciplined than are

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[1] C. Huntington, "A Revised Theory of American Political Party Politics", A.P.S.R., XLIV, no. 3 (1950), 657.

[2] J. Hutchinson, "Labour and Politics in America, Political Quarterly, XXXIII, no. 2 (1962), 141.

British political parties, the demands of major interest groups have required the Democrats and Republicans to adopt comprehensive and consistent policies. There are similarities between the two parties, but the response of the parties to the "national" aims of interest groups has led to real differences.

The history of the American party system shows that the Democratic and Republicans parties have not been able to meet the demands of all sectional interests. A persistent feature of American politics has been the emergence of third parties. "Let one section begin to feel that its interests are being permanently discriminated against by both parties and the time for a plain spoken third party, organised mainly along sectional lines is ripe."[1] The third party is not so much a product of hard times, but a natural growth in the demand by sectional groupings for a share in prosperity. When the major political parties appear intransigent, a third party acts as a safety valve for the expression of discontent. Third parties have made a distinctive contribution to the American scene. They have pioneered the way for such measures as primaries for national conventions, female suffrage, direct election of Senators, abolition of slavery, postal savings banks and income tax. These

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[1] J. D. Hicks, "The Third Party Tradition in American Politics", Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XX, no. 1 (1933), 27-28.

originally appeared on the political platforms of such groups as the Populists and the Greenbackers. The third party performs the educative function of calling attention to certain problems and pointing a way to their solution where major parties at first hesitate to do so. Their role is an unrewarding one, for once they have demonstrated that votes are to be gained by adopting their demands, then one or other of the main parties absorbs them. Their function has been compared to that of the male bee. "They have fertilized another party with their ideas and then passed into oblivion".[1] Even the mere threat of the emergence of a third party may modify the political attitudes of a dominant party as was seen in the Civil Rights controversy of 1956-57.

Intense obstacles discourage the formation of a third party. A third party lacks the national standing and the financial resources of the two major parties. There are considerable legal barriers to overcome. Some states require from twenty-five to two hundred thousand signatures in support of a party before it may be placed on the ballot. Even then a third party has had its name printed on the ballot, the pattern of voting in the single member constituency naturally impedes the party's chance of success.

The ineffectiveness of a third party movement as a

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[1] J. Mallory, "The Structure of Canadian Politics", in J. G. Greenslade, ed., Canadian Politics (Mount Allison University Pubs., no. 4), p. 42.

political instrument is, in itself, sufficient reason for organised labour in the United States to shy away from such a vehicle. American labour has found itself able to work within the existing party system. The unions have been able to exert influence in both parties in their selection of candidates through the system of nomination by direct primary. Furthermore our discussion has shown that the present alignment of American parties has enabled the unions to develop a friendly relationship with the Democratic Party.

American political parties have responded to the pressures placed upon them by interest groups. The A.F.L.-C.I.O. and other national organisations of interest groups have found that at least one of the two major parties is sympathetic to their aims. A similar development did not take place in Britain. We have seen in Chapter Two that, early in this century, the two major British parties vigorously supported measures to curb the power of the trade unions. The disciplined nature of these hostile parties made it necessary for the trade unions to support a new party in order to advance labour's interest in Parliament. The subsequent growth of this party changed the composition of the old party system. The Labour party became one of the two major parties. The use of direct political action by the unions has thus obliged the party system to respond to the pressures placed upon it. In neither Britain nor the United States have the political parties been able to ignore

the claims of powerful interest groups. Such groups are themselves a reflection of their social and economic environment. The activity of interest groups has therefore tended to shape the party system.

Since trade unionism is one of the major economic interests in society, it is also politically significant. In Britain and the United States the party system has already responded to the pressures of trade unionism. In Canada, however, it has been shown that the labour unions have felt that neither of the major political parties was eligible for support. It would seem that the major parties in Canada are pervaded with a spirit which is unfavourable to the aims of the national economic grouping that is represented by the C.L.C.

V

THE CANADIAN POLITICAL SCENE

The nature of the Canadian party system has been shaped by the operation of the British form of parliamentary government in a North American social setting. The combination of these factors has resulted in a system which shares some of the characteristics of both British and American party systems. In Britain and the United States, the party system has to some extent been influenced by the pressures of large interest groups. In particular, political parties have responded to labour's claim to political recognition. Canadian labour, however, has felt it necessary to follow the action of British unionism in supporting a new political party to promote labour's interests. This political behaviour indicates that the Canadian party system has yet to acknowledge the political status of organised labour. Despite certain shared characteristics, Canadian political parties are not facsimiles of either British or American parties.

The Canadian Federal government is based on the British parliamentary model. The position of the Queen as head of state is represented in Canada by the Governor-General. The Canadian Prime Minister, together with his

cabinet is a member of, and responsible to, the lower house of the legislature, the House of Commons. In Canada, there are the same inducements to party discipline as in the British House of Commons. The premier has the power of dissolution which he may use as a threat to recalcitrant followers; if a large number of Government supporters vote against a Government resolution, they risk the fall of the Government and the loss of their own seats. Due to the special demands of the North American environment, the operation of this system of government has been modified in Canada. Unlike Britain, Canada contains many diverse and conflicting interests. The Maritimes, Ontario and Quebec, the Prairies and British Columbia form particular economic units each with its own special interests. Superimposed on these interests are the deep-seated racial and religious differences between English Protestant provinces and French Catholic Quebec.

A modification of the British system is particularly apparent in the composition of the Canadian cabinet. As in Britain, the Canadian Prime Minister generally chooses his cabinet from among government supporters in Parliament. This choice is limited by certain conventions peculiar to Canada. It is expected that each province should have at least one representative in the federal cabinet and that the racial and religious diversity of the country should also be reflected in its membership. Sectional interests

also have established claims to certain portfolios. The minister of fisheries is thus generally from the Maritimes or British Columbia, the minister of agriculture, from the Prairies. This emphasis on sectional representation ensures that cabinet discussions are greatly influenced by sectional considerations.

The organisation of the two major Canadian parties is similar to that of political parties in the United States. The parties are loose federations of local parties, with little central control on the selection of parliamentary candidates. Neither party has an adequate national organisation and any attempt to interfere with local candidates would be ineffectual without provincial backing. At election times the national party does take on some meaning as its election machine gains momentum, but afterwards, the rudimentary central office returns to a state of hibernation. As a result, the parties have been dubbed as being at the "electoral committee stage".[1]

The major party platforms are deliberately vague in order to avoid antagonising certain groups of voters. These platforms often include long lists of unrelated measures in what appears to be an attempt to attract support from every sectional interest in Canada. In federal elections, therefore,

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[1] F. C. Pilley, "Social Structure and Canadian Political Parties: The Quebec Case", Western Political Quarterly, IX (December, 1956), 907.

politicians are careful to stress items of the platform with a local appeal and draw attention away from items which may be locally unpopular.[1] Both major parties have very similar general policies, varying only in emphasis and interpretation. They are essentially pragmatic in approach and are prepared to take a firm policy only in response to a manifest need. Thus, although neither party is committed to a theory of public ownership, both the Liberals and the Conservatives have not hesitated to set up government corporations if such action appeared necessary to further the development of Canada's economic resources. Mr. St. Laurent thought that for "a political party to endure it must have principles and must be true to these principles."[2] Both major parties, however, merely claim to stand for one basic principle, "the advancement of the common rather than special interest."[3] The promised means of serving this "general interest" are as vague and meaningless as the term itself. As a substitute for clear national policies, the parties present themselves as possessing "solid administrative ability".[4]

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[1] See:- Hugh G. Thorburn, Politics in New Brunswick (Toronto: University Press, 1961), pp. 106-108.

[2] D. C. Thompson, "Liberals settle for the Middle Road", Saturday Night (February 4, 1961), p. 7.

[3] Flora McDonald, Our Conservative Party, Notes on an Address. See also:- J. W. Pickersgill, The Liberal Party (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1962), p. 32.

[4] Purpose for Canada -- The Liberal Answer (National Liberal Federation, 1962, rev. ed.).

The choice between the parties is not one of policies but administrators. The traditional American concept of political parties has thus been the prevailing influence in Canadian politics. Canadian political observers find that, "this country cannot be governed so long as it remains free and democratic, except by some kind of a party or coalition which attracts support from all the major interest groups in the country--ethnic, linguistic, geographic, and economic".[1] To be asked to attempt a synthesis on such a scale is a considerable requirement.

There is a conflict between the British parliamentary institutions which require party discipline, and the attempt of each party to represent the diversity of interests in Canada. Since opposing interests are represented in each party, indeed even in the cabinet itself, it would appear to be difficult to insist on strong party discipline in the House of Commons. This apparent conflict is solved by the adoption of vague political platforms which are successful in maintaining party loyalty. Parliamentary government places an emphasis on party unity. In Canada, this emphasis has not produced tightly organised parties with specific principles, but has served to reenforce the uncommitted nature of the major parties. Party unity is ensured by

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[1] G. W. Ferguson and J. M. Underhill, Press and Party in Canada (Rev. ed.; Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1955), p. 38.

the ambiguities of party policy.

Unlike the American Presidential form of government, the British cabinet places responsibility inalienably on the executive. A Canadian Prime Minister with an overall majority in the House of Commons is unable to plead convincingly that opposition in the legislature prevented the implementation of his election promises. The major parties are therefore further encouraged to avoid exhaustive or unconditional statements. This apprehensive approach is typified in the 1962 defence programme of the Liberal Party which falls back on such phrases as: "Decisions must be made in the light of changing circumstances as they become known . . . a new Liberal government will not hesitate to adapt its defence policy to changing conditions and more important, will not shirk the responsibility of making clear decisions on defence policy when they are required . . . will reserve the right to examine each new development in the light of its over-riding responsibility for the security of the Canadian People".[1] Even where a party platform comes close to enunciating a specific policy these types of provisos make it clear that the party leader does not regard the platform as mandatory but rather as a guide.[2]

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[1] The Liberal Programme, General Election, - 1962 (National Liberal Federation), pp. 23-25.

[2] See:- Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates (May 23, 1923), p. 3048.

The need for party unity has also resulted in an emphasis on the position of the party leader. Recent discussion of the political parties centers not so much on "Conservative" and "Liberal" but rather "Diefenbaker" and "Pearson". The Conservatives talk in terms of the "Diefenbaker Government" and "the great stamp of John Diefenbaker upon the history of the Country".[1] A Conservative M.P., in discussing John A. Macdonald, founder of the Conservative Party, illustrates this awe of leadership. "He saw that it was necessary to build a broad political party, to bring together a broad country with many diversities. This is the essence of Canadianism. But a great overall party we couldn't have in Canada without strong leadership."[2] The parties seek a leader as a central rallying point and basis of allegiance. They are content with the very minimum of specific party policy. The result is that the history of the two parties is not to be found in terms of their particular policies but in terms of their leadership. Perhaps both the main architect and arch-exponent of this Canadian approach to politics was Mackenzie King. His unctuous, flexible approach was the key to the long line of Liberal successes. It necessitated the retention of actual political

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[1] G. Hogan, "Five Years of Great Achievements", Ottawa Newsletter (Progressive Conservative Party of Canada, 1962).

[2] H. Macquarrie, "What our Party Stands for", Address to the Progressive Conservative Student Federation.

power in his own hands. His leadership was the ideal of the Canadian tradition which he himself has shaped. The party needed no national office or research organisation, since he was the party's campaign manager, strategist and policy maker. His careful manoeuvring swallowed up all potential opposition and brought one election success after another. After his election as party leader in 1919, the Liberals avoided the inconveniences of a national party convention for nearly thirty years.

The Canadian party system has little in common with the party system in Britain. The diverse sectional character of the Canadian environment has been a prevailing influence in the development of the major political parties. In the United States, the demands of such an environment have been modified by the activities of powerful interest groups. Such groups have counteracted local pressures and led the political parties to consider issues in terms of their national implications. Canadian political parties have been without such a "nationalizing influence".

In Canada, pressure groups are less cohesive than their American counterparts. Such interests as the Canadian Manufacturers Association and the Canadian Chamber of Commerce are loosely organised federations. Agricultural interest alone fails to bind together farmers from the Maritimes and those from the Prairies. There is no equivalent in Ottawa to Washington's powerful permanent lobbies. In

the main, this is due to the nature of Canadian federalism. The interpretation of the British North America Act has led to a stress on provincial power rather than on the power of the Dominion government. While the decisions of the American Supreme Court have increased federal power, the decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, as final arbiter on Canadian constitutional interpretations from 1867 to 1949, have limited the activities of the Canadian federal government.[1] There has been less centralization in Canada than in the United States; thus Canadian interest groups do not find it so necessary to maintain pressures at the federal level. In Canada, interest groups have generally continued to reflect narrow rather than broad interests. The actions of such groups have had little influence on the party system. The major parties in Canada are themselves federal unions. The diverse geographic and social composition of Canada has resulted in parties of compromise, a tendency which has been specially accentuated by the requirements of the British pattern of parliamentary government. Such a party system does not lend itself to the type of political party which would be favoured by a national economic interest. It may be argued that the formation of the New Democratic Party represents a protest of the labour movement in Canada against such a party system.

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[1] Canada, Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, Report, Vol. 1 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1940), pp. 24-59.

During the past twenty years, there has been a number of "new start parties", products of three significant movements -- the French nationalists of Quebec, the farmer-socialists in Saskatchewan and the social creditors in Alberta and British Columbia.[1] These parties, however, have been unable to challenge the position of the two major parties in federal politics. Political reformers of the left have often attacked the established party system and have prescribed a re-alignment of the major parties on a left-right basis. The C.C.F., with an elaborate collectivist programme, represented an attempt to form a left wing party which would become one of the major parties. At its most optimistic moments in the immediate post-war years, however, the C.C.F. could only hope to hold the balance of power between the two older parties. It was never able to branch out from its Western agrarian roots and really make an impression on federal politics. The Conservative and Liberal Parties appropriated many of the C.C.F.'s social welfare planks, including unemployment insurance, old age pensions, and family allowances. The C.C.F.'s lack of success placed it in the position of a "becalmed protest movement".[2] Many

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[1] H. McD. Clokie, "Political Retrospect", in J. H. Aitchison, Ed., The Political Process in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), pp. 183-89.

[2] See Leo Zakuta, "Membership in a Becalmed Protest Movement", Canadian Journal of Economic and Political Science, XXIV, no. 2 (May, 1958), 190.

reformers again see the New Democratic Party as an attempt to "create a sense of realism in Canadian Labour's political life, to create a state in which there will be a form of political life whereby there will be a left and a right viewpoint within the framework of our democratic system and to end the tweedledee and tweedledum system".[1]

The formation of the New Democratic Party also brings to the fore the position of third parties in Canada. In the United States, the emphasis on the Presidential elections, with the whole country as the electoral district, places a bias against the possibility of a third party gaining eminence. The British parliamentary system is without such an obstacle. It is possible for a party to build up local strength and secure representation in the House of Commons. Canadian third parties benefit both from the British parliamentary system and from the federal structure of the Dominion. The third party is able to build up its strength in the provinces, perhaps win provincial elections and with a certain amount of local support can hope to gain seats in the House of Commons. The fact that the Canadian federation embraces only ten provinces, rather than the fifty states of its neighbour, makes it both easier and of more value for a third party to secure a firm organisational base in one or two provinces. Mr. J. R. Mallory has observed that, "Parties which

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[1] Eaton Park, C.L.C. Convention, Report of Proceedings (Montreal, 1960), p. 35.

fail to achieve office die almost unborn: a party which achieves provincial power has achieved the conditions of success."[1] The provincial basis of the Social Credit Party in British Columbia and Alberta ensured that it did not disappear from the Canadian political scene after its federal defeat in 1958. The C.C.F. enjoyed considerable advantage from the existence of the homogeneous wheat economy of Saskatchewan in which it first established itself, just as the British Labour Party relied for its early support from closely knit mining communities. The Parliamentary system enables a third party to build up support within a number of constituencies until the number is large enough to challenge the major parties. This situation is considerably more favourable to third party movements than the American system of government, where the criterion for political success is a demonstrated potential to capture the Presidency. Furthermore, unlike an American counterpart, a Canadian third party would be able to participate in a coalition government. A sectional group wishing to form a new party in Canada faces considerably fewer constitutional obstacles to political success than do similar movements in the United States.

American pressure groups are able to exercise a direct influence on the policies of the major parties by lobbying

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[1] J. R. Mallory, Social Credit and the Federal Power in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1954), p. 167.

individual representatives and taking an active part in party primaries. In Canada there are no party primaries, and the cabinet system of government imposes a certain degree of party discipline which destroys the effectiveness of lobbying individuals. The Canadian party system restricts the manner in which a pressure group may approach the political parties in order to advance its interests. Thus any militant group, such as the C.I.C., which feels that the two major parties are unsympathetic to its aims, has often little alternative but to form a new party.

VI

CONCLUSION

This study has attempted to show that Canadian labour unions have inevitably found themselves concerned with political action. The traditional channel of action through collective bargaining is today an inadequate means of arriving at a satisfactory solution of the problems faced by labour unions. Union activities depend to a large degree on an ability to influence the major political parties at Ottawa. The Canadian unionist feels that "to the extent that labour-management relations are now a three party, rather than a two party affair, the character of the third party, namely the Government, is a matter of considerable importance to us".[1] Although such problems as medical care, housing, and general economic policy are not obviously connected with the bargaining process, they have a direct bearing on the concern of the unions for the welfare of their members. Thus the labour unions are immediately thrust into the political arena. As a large, powerful economic group within society, the unions seek to persuade one or both of the major political

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[1] D. McDonald, "The C.L.C. and the New Party", Canadian Labour, IV, no. 12 (December, 1959), 8.

parties of the reasonableness of their demands. They endeavour to find a sympathetic ear with men whom they can trust in the legislature. The nature of the parliamentary form of government gives the dominant role to a party rather than the individual elected member. The unions are therefore concerned that their aims should be reflected in the political platforms of the Canadian parties.

While Canadian, American, and British unions all share an involvement in politics, the three labour congresses differ in their relationships with the major political parties. At the beginning of this century, the T.U.C. assisted in the formation of the Labour Party, which is today one of the two major parties in Britain. British unionism therefore has a particularly close relationship with that party. The A.F.L.-C.I.C. has also established a contact with the sympathetic Democratic Party in the United States. In Canada, however, the C.L.C. has not felt itself able to cultivate a relationship with either the Liberal or Conservative Party. Although some labour unions in Canada had a weak link with the C.C.F., this party provided an extremely ineffectual vehicle for political expression. It failed to make any substantial impact on the Canadian electorate. The C.L.C. was, therefore, prompted to take the leading role in the formation of a new party. It is hoped that this party will take labour's aims and effectively gain a recognition of them in the economic and social policies of the country.

This situation reflects the structure of the Canadian party system. Despite differences in their political processes the two major parties in both Britain and the United States represent separate political attitudes, as gauged by their attitude to state intervention into economic life. In Canada, however, both parties attempt to span the political spectrum. They have no basic differences in their attitudes toward policy, except in regard to emphasis. The failure of either party to provide direct support for the aims of organised labour may be directly attributed to the social and political determinants of the party system.

There has been little pressure on the Canadian parties to adopt firm national positions on political issues. The parties attempt to represent the diverse sectional character of the country within the requirements of parliamentary institutions. In Canada, the reconciliation of the diversity of interests produced by geographic and cultural groupings is as important as the reconciliation of economic interests. Such a task does not face the British political parties which operate within a relatively homogeneous environment. Canada, however, shares the parliamentary form of government that was developed in such an environment. In order to maintain their political strength the Canadian parties not only attempt to unite the wide diversity of interests within the country but must also effectively combine them within a united party in the House of Commons. The Canadian political parties seek

to achieve an equilibrium among the heterogeneous political forces through compromise. Such compromises are frustrating to a nationally organised economic interest. The formation of the New Democratic Party may be seen as the result of such a situation.

In June 1962, the New Democratic Party faced its first General Election. A minority Conservative Government of 116 members was returned to Parliament. The number of Liberal M.P.'s was increased from 51 to 99, while the Social Credit sweep of 26 seats in Quebec gave that party a total of 30 seats. The New Democratic Party itself received over a million votes, a fifty per cent increase over the 1958 vote for the C.C.F.

The most significant feature of the election for the New Democratic Party was that all of the 19 seats gained by that party were in industrial areas. The defeat of Mr. T. C. Douglas in Regina and the rejection of the New Democratic Party in the Prairies emphasized the fact that the party's strength lay in areas different to those which had previously given support to the C.C.F. In the Prairies the Conservative Party had managed to attract the support of the farmer through crop payments and trading agreements with China. The 1962 Vancouver Convention of the C.L.C. had urged all affiliates to work for the election of New Democratic Party candidates. The Party relied heavily on such support in its gains in the industrial areas of Ontario and

in British Columbia. Six of the New Democratic M.P.'s were themselves trade unionists.

The real question that should be asked, however, is not whether the attempt to combine farmer and labour in one party has failed, nor whether a social democratic party can ever hope to gain the support of the Canadian electorate. It is rather a question of whether the economic and political pressures of trade unions have begun to exert a "nationalizing influence" in Canadian politics.

Having ensured the formation of a new party sympathetic to labour, the C.L.C. is rapidly seeking to disengage itself and to move to what might be termed the "equilibrium position" of its British and American counterparts. The C.L.C. has already withdrawn in terms of organisation, and it merely remains for the Congress to convince the older parties and the electorate of its independence of the New Democratic Party. The C.L.C. jealously defends its autonomy. Mr. Claude Jodoin made this quite clear at the founding convention of the new party when he said, "Once the New Party is formed, the Canadian Labour Congress will not interfere or try to influence the internal affairs of the New Party; just as we will most strenuously oppose any interference on the part of the New Party in our internal affairs. . . . As trade unionists we do not want to dominate, neither do we

want to be dominated."[1]

The function of North American third parties is to "bring forward new ideas and to argue them up and down the country so that the people could know them and judge them. When an idea which is thus proposed . . . makes sufficient headway, it will be adopted by one or more often by both of the major parties."[2] The founders of the New Democratic Party realised that the C.C.F. had merely performed the function of a third party in prodding the major parties. The hopes of the New Democrats lie in the belief that, "a third party can, by setting itself up with a real difference, become the second party or the first".[3] It would be presumptuous to suggest that the New Democratic Party will become a major party simply because it alone represents the aims of the trade unions. Some observers have suggested that a possible escape from the apparent impasse created by the 1962 General Election would be "a re-alignment of political forces along clearer right-left lines, with a Conservative-Social Credit alliance facing a Liberal-NDP alliance".[4] D. M. Wrong

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[1]Claude Jodoin, "The C.L.C. and Politics", Canadian Labour, VI, no. 9 (September, 1961), 6-7.

[2]H. Ager, The Price of Union (boston: Houghton, Miffin, 1950), p. 598.

[3]Stanley Knowles, "The New Political Party", Canadian Commentator, III, no. 12 (December, 1959), 4.

[4]D. Smith, "Two Views of the Election: (2) That Uncertain Feeling", Canadian Forum (July, 1962), p. 76.

already finds it possible "to discern a more pronounced Left-Right division of the national electorate than has been apparent in previous elections".[1]

To forecast a regrouping of the political forces of the left and right is to be rather premature. The concept of such a regrouping is not a new one. Attempts to introduce a left-division in Canadian politics have been "limited by what seems to be the inherent regional, racial, and constitutional rigidities of Canada".[2] Thirty years ago, Mr. Frank Underhill complained that the Canadian party system does not "provide an effective means by which economic interests other than those of organised business can exercise a reasonable influence in the determination of national policy".[3] Today, however, the Canadian trade unions are substantially stronger. On the merger of the two main labour congresses in 1956, the unions began to cast glances at the favourable political position occupied by the T.U.C. in Britain. The C.L.C.'s support of a new party is basically a protest against the predominance of the old narrow regional and ethnic interests in Canadian party politics.

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[1] D. H. Wrong, "Canadian Politics in the 60's", Political Science Quarterly, LXXVIII, no. 1 (March, 1963), 11.

[2] H. McD. Clokie, "Political Retrospect", op. cit., p. 189.

[3] F. H. Underhill, "The Party System in Canada", Presidential Address, Canadian Political Science Association (1932), p. 169.

The C.L.C. has become politically mobilised in order to attain recognition of its interests. The congress is motivated by a desire to obtain from the political parties a more receptive attitude towards the aims of labour. The C.L.C.'s participation in politics remains complementary to its bargaining activities in industry and it seeks to avoid any deep involvement in the manoeuvres of party politics. Similarly for the New Democratic Party to present itself solely as a labour party would ipso facto be condemning itself to the status of a minor party with little hope of ever winning the support of a significant section of the electorate. The connection between the C.L.C. and the New Democratic Party goes deeper than the working arrangement that exists between American labour and the Democratic Party. Both sides, however, resist any representation of their relationship as being overly close. Regardless of the future of the New Democratic Party, union support of that party will have fulfilled its purpose if it stirs the major political parties out of their antipathy towards labour. The participation of the C.L.C. in the formation of the New Democratic Party may be seen as a protest against the nature of a party system produced through the operation of parliamentary institutions in a North American environment.

A party system cannot ignore the balance of economic power in the community. As a result of the growth of labour as a national group, one may expect opposing interests to

place more emphasis on national organisation to counteract the political aims of labour. The concept of "countervailing power" applies to both economic and political systems.[1] It would appear that, in the long run, the Canadian political parties will be subjected to the "nationalizing influence" of pressure groups in the same manner as have parties in the United States. As Mr. Lipson has commented, "whenever the existing parties and electoral methods afford inadequate recognition to new interests and groups which arise within society, the latter will succeed in making their way."[2] The fate of the New Democratic Party will depend to a large extent on the response of the major parties to the growth of such powerful influences.

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[1] See:- J. K. Galbraith, American Capitalism (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1952).

[2] L. Lipson, "Party Systems in the United Kingdom and the Old Commonwealth: Causes, Resemblances and Variations", Political Studies, VII (1959), p. 23.

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