

"BOJNA ČAVOGLAVE" I "KNINDŽE KRAJIŠNICI":

THE IMPACT OF BAJA MALI KNINDZA AND THOMPSON'S MUSIC ON ETHNIC
RELATIONS DURING THE CROATIAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE FROM 1990-1995

By

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INTRODUCTION

During the 1990's in the Balkans, several different conflicts broke out following the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia under the pressure of what scholarship describes as ethnic conflicts. It is now considered that Yugoslavia's traumatic disintegration was driven culturally by ethnic conflicts, which became exacerbated by deteriorating economy in the context specifically of political transformations in the region inflicted by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Ethnic identity, defined not in racial but in religious and cultural terms, became the main ideological determinant in the engineering of the new national states that came out of the multiethnic, multicultural, and multireligious Yugoslavian behemoth. It has been 30 years already since the dissolution of Yugoslavia, but the region has not recovered from the memory of traumatic war animosity. Certainly, the reasons for this have to do with general political instability of the Balkans, being historically a peculiar crossroad between the East (the Orient) and the West (both of these terms taken here as cultural constructions, of course) and the various political choices that the newly formed national states made. Some of the former Yugoslavian republics, such as Croatia and Slovenia, joined the European Union and thus marked a clearly Western political exist from the traumas of wars and national revolutions in the Balkans. They attempted to de-balkanize, in a way. Others, like Serbia (but also Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Vojvodina) remained stuck in the perpetual longing for a lost national glory, where under the banner of the mighty nation state the Balkans re-gain their central political and cultural spot in the region, and in Europe. Serbia is not part of the European Union and, as the data shared in the MRP shows, recent polls tell us that Serbians actively do not want to be part of the European Union. To be clear: in the MRP I propose that both Croatia and Serbia, despite their very different political destinies in the post-Yugoslavian period, do share an

affinity in terms of elaborate, active, state sponsored and state-engineered ethnic nationalism. Evident in the developing of independent languages (Serbian and Croatian, which only 30 years ago were one language), state media, school systems and the transmission of history from the perspective of the enclosed ethnos in these respective languages, the nation is also maintained by massive campaigns of difference sustained by popular culture.

We might look for answers why ethnic nationalism is so central for Serbs and Croats (but also for all the nations that comprised former Yugoslavia: Slovenians, Bosnians, Kosovars, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Vojvodina's people) in unconventional places, usually relegated to the expertise of cultural anthropologists rather than political scientists. My interest is specifically in the nationalisms of Serbia and Croatia. This interest is deeply personal, as my parents fled Bosnia in the early 1990's from the onset of the Bosnian Civil War. In particular, the Western region of Bosnia where my father is from and his hometown of Kupres has a long history of ethnic conflicts between Serbs and Croats, and thus my family's long history of involvement in such conflicts makes me particularly interested in the ways nationalisms are created and perpetuated. While various culturalist, regionalist and historical explanations compete to provide the most authoritative explanation as to why the ethnic conflicts happened, popular music, and specifically its ability to encapsulate populist affect and thus act as an everyday political tool, is the intervention that my MRP would like to contribute to the explanatory collection of narratives around the origin and sustained traumatic memory of the Balkan Wars. I am specifically interested in the emerging Serbian-Croatian nationalisms mediated in the vernacular of popular (or pop folk) music in the period between 1990 – 1995, at the height of the disintegration of the Yugoslavian conglomerate. In particular, I will be examining one of these traumatic conflicts that occurred as a result of the Yugoslavian

disintegration. Taking place between 1991-1995, this is the Croatian War of Independence, known also as the *Domovski Rat*, or "Homeland War " within Croatia. The war, fought between ethnic Serbs within Croatia and ethnic Croats resulted in the deaths of over 20,000 civilians and soldiers, and the displacement of over 300,000 people from both ethnic groups.¹

Why this war in this time period? This is precisely the conflict, which made pronounced the emerging Serbian and Croatian nationalisms that seek to create very distinct ethnic ruptures and distinctions between the two ethnic groups. To the Western, non-Balkan gaze, Serbs and Croats are seemingly indistinguishable from each other: they are racially the same and speak in a shared language, which despite its legalized difference today, is still easy to understand by both groups without much effort. Serbs and Croats share similar culture, folklore, history, food traditions; they have both been part of the Ottoman Empire between 15th and 19th century and have a shared history of activism against the Ottomans in the 19th century. Between 1918 (the end of the World War I) and 1991, through much of the tumultuous twentieth century, both nations are part of the same state formation, Yugoslavia. Both nations are predominantly Christian. Yet, Croats are notably Catholic and Serbs are Orthodox Christians. In the absence of racial, linguistic, and pronounced religious difference, what sustains the ethnic differences between the two nations? What historical and ideological forces come to shape the Serbian and the Croatian ethnos? In the name of what have these bloody wars of difference been led?

The two artists whose songs I will be analyzing are Marko Petrović "Thompson" and Mirko Pajčin "Baja Mali Knizda". While, I have no illusion that these two artists will tell us the

¹ "Presidents Apologise over Croatian War," BBC News, September 10, 2003, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3095774.stm>.

whole story, I still believe that they can allow us a glimpse at the mechanics of identity construction in the Serbo-Croatian context of the 1990s. The reason for the selection of these two artists lies in their respective infamy in both Serbia and Croatia, their onset of both music production and fame during the conflict between 1991-1995, and the similar themes which are both overtly and subtly nationalistic in nature. These two artists provide an opportunity for rich analysis that facilitates an understanding of the impact that music, and pop culture icons have on the very real processes of imagining and producing nations.

Thus, this MRP will answer the following research question: **taking a look at the music made by the Serbian artist Mirko Pajčin "Baja Mali Knindza" and the Croatian artist Marko Petrović "Thompson" between 1990 and 1996, what impact does this have on ethnic relations between Serbians and Croats during the Croatian War of Independence?**

The project has by the following layout: the first section provides historical context. I offer first an explanation of both Serbia and Croatia during World War II, and Yugoslavia from 1945 to its disintegration in 1991, and then the subsequent Croatian War of Independence.

Historical context is important because it allows for clarification of the geo-political and social climate that shaped the artists whose work I analyze in the MRP. The Freudian concept of "the narcissism of small differences" is a fruitful tool for exploring how the distinct categories of the Croatian and Serbian nations came to fruition.² Freud's idea was that people often direct their strongest feelings of hostility and rivalry towards those who are most like them, rather than towards those who are significantly different.³ This concept can be applied to various aspects of human behavior, such as within families, communities, or even larger societal groups. People

² Sigmund Freud, *Group Psychology and Analysis of the Ego*, ed. James Strachey (New York: Norton, 1989).

³ John Nagle and Clancy Mary Alice C., "Conclusion: The Narcissism of Minor Differences?," essay, in *Shared Society or Benign Apartheid? Understanding Peace-Building in Divided Societies* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

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The term refers to a psychological phenomenon where people tend to emphasize and exaggerate the differences between themselves and others who are very similar to them, while downplaying the larger similarities they share.

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The "narcissism" part of the term comes from the notion that this focus on small differences can stem from individuals seeking to establish a distinct and unique identity, often to boost their own self-esteem or self-worth. Freud suggested that individuals might feel threatened by others who are very similar, as they could be seen as competition for limited resources or attention.

might pay more attention to minor distinctions in appearance, beliefs, customs, or ideologies among themselves, leading to conflicts and divisions that might seem irrational from an outsider's perspective.⁴ The "narcissism" part of the term comes from the notion that this focus on small differences can stem from individuals seeking to establish a distinct and unique identity, often to boost their own self-esteem or self-worth. Freud suggested that individuals might feel threatened by others who are very similar, as they could be seen as competition for limited resources or attention.⁵ While on the surface these two nations share similar ethnic, racial and religious composition, as well as a common historical destiny as Balkan entities, the engineering of *difference* in the process of separation of the two states from the diverse ethnic hegemon Yugoslavia, become so central to the nation-building process that it had to be articulated at all levels of institutional and popular culture: in official documents, in media and military propaganda, in the literary arts, and, as my argument suggests, in the language of popular music. In my MRP, I am particularly interested in how music sustained the discourse of "rupture" between Serbia and Croatia; how it amplified this rupture as an exaggerated and romanticized "national difference" and then normalized it for a wide section of the populations in these two newly emerging nation states through the disciplinary apparatuses of the state and the non-disciplinary affects and intimacies carried by popular culture. While the Yugoslavian umbrella capitalized on the narrative of brotherly yet distinct spaces of cultural and linguistic similarities, the newly emerging national states of Serbia and Croatia engineered these differences into reified narratives of independent (and traumatic) nationalism. Essentially, I am interested in articulating how the seemingly apolitical domain of pop folk music – somewhat naively obsessed with teary narratives of heartbreak, first loves, motherhood and fatherhood, primordial histories of folkloric

⁴ Nagle and Clancy, "Conclusion: The Narcissism of Minor Differences?."

⁵ Ibid.

heroes and heroines, and archaic villains among others, contributed to the process of nationalistic reification. This is precisely what Sigmund Freud's theory of "narcissism of minor differences" signals in terms of identity formation within the terms of belonging and difference.

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The second section of my MRP is an analysis of the media infrastructure in the early 1990's in both Serbia and Croatia. Here I look particularly at the political economy of the media in the context of nationalism. My goal is to answer the question how and why the selected artists were able to gain such popularity and be supported by the existing media infrastructures in Serbia and Croatia. In the third section I provide a brief biography of both Perković and Pajčin and then I directly analyze the lyrics of the most popular songs of these two selected artists through comparative and hermeneutic methodologies. My purpose is to single out the symbolism tied to the idea of nation building, violence and nationalist imagery within otherwise anodyne themes of the songs.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Music has and continues to hold a certain importance in the cultural sphere, and in regions such as the Balkans, holds a special space within this sphere when it comes to the intricate process of nation building, and furthermore to nationalism. As a result, there has been research published in the last three decades that examines this symbiotic relationship in both the Serbian and Croatian contexts; however, not much research has been done comparing the two simultaneously and examining their impact on ethnic relations between the two groups. My hope is that the MRP contributes to this field by beginning a new conversation about the ways in which both the Serbian and Croatian governments began this process of nationalism partly through their respective media infrastructures and more specifically, their music scenes.

As Stefano DellaVigna, Ruben Enikolopov, Vera Mironova, Maria Petrova, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya's (2014) research has shown, Croatian villages that are exposed and have access to Serbian radio stations and music, are 35 to 40% more likely to have ethnically offensive graffiti compared to Croatian villages where Serbian radio stations are not accessible.⁶ Research has found that the residents of said villages are also more likely to vote for Croatian political parties that are more nationalistic in their policies and rhetoric, nothing "our results indicate that media can have substantial cross-group effects in areas characterized by ethnic tensions with overlapping media markets and groups sharing similar languages" and that media programming plays a part in producing peaceful relations between neighbouring religious and ethnic groups.⁷ These researchers relied heavily on a qualitative method of data analysis with some quantitative data points being included in their study. As an example, they relied on street surveys in order to interview some residents of the villages that had access to Serbian radio. Additionally, the researchers used data on the availability of Serbian radio stations in Croatia using two different factors, and they collected examples of anti-Serb graffiti and election results in the examined towns and villages.

Additionally, significant attention has been paid to the ways in which Croatian nationalism uses music as a direct tool for nation building. For example, the original poem used for the Croatian national anthem has four out of 14 stanzas dealing with themes of loving one's homeland.⁸ The authors of this study note that the meaning and lyrics have been changed over time and have reflected a more nationalistic emphasis on the homeland than originally intended.

⁶ Stefano DellaVigna et al., "Cross-Border Media and Nationalism: Evidence from Serbian Radio in Croatia," *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 6, no. 3 (January 2014):125, <https://doi.org/10.1257/app.6.3.103>

⁷ DellaVigna et al., "Cross-Border Media," 130.

⁸ Christopher Kelen and Aleksandar Pavković, "Of Love and National Borders: The Croatian Anthem 'Our Beautiful Homeland,'" *Nations and Nationalism* 18, no. 2 (2012):251, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8129.2011.00529.x>

In this instance, the study uses content analysis as a methodological approach, in order to closely examine the lyrics of both the current national anthem and the original 14 stanza poem.

Catherine Baker's article on war memory and musical tradition (2009) examines the ways in which war has been enshrined and memorialized in the Croatian cultural identity through music. Baker focuses on three different periods: music made during the Croatian War of Independence, music commemorating Eastern Slavonia and Vukovar in the period between 1995-1998 and the Vinkovci rap period in the late 1990's.⁹ Baker's research offers a broad overview of several different Croatian artists and their impact on the Croatian music scene and the memorialization of war. She does content analysis and critical discourse analysis to show how this was achieved. Baker provides a historical overview of the way in which traditional Croatian songs were often sung by male singers about specific towns or regions from which they hailed; thus, an emphasis being placed on land emerges as an important trope of nation building. Baker concludes that "this style of music-making continued during the war but added contemporary wartime experiences to its depictions of place."¹⁰

Research has also been done on the role that children played in nation building through Croatian nationalistic music in the 1990's. Ivana Polić (2019) focuses on the role that children played by their appearances in public, in songs and music videos throughout the 1990's in patriotic songs. She used content analysis to examine the lyrics and music videos, as well as newspaper and television reports, and other kinds of materials where children were present.¹¹ She closely examined the "Stop the War in Croatia" campaign, which featured children's

⁹ Catherine Baker, "War Memory and Musical Tradition: Commemorating Croatia's Homeland War through Popular Music and Rap in Eastern Slavonia," *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 17, no. 1 (2009): pp. 35-45, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14782800902844677>.

¹⁰ Baker, "War and Memory," 36.

¹¹ Ivana Polić, 2019. "'Stop the War in the Name of Children': Children and Nation Building through Croatian Patriotic Music (1991-1992)." *Contemporary Southeastern Europe*, 2019, 41 <https://unipub.uni-graz.at/cse/periodical/titleinfo/4841055>.

drawings of reproduced war posters, and the role of Croatian singer Tomislav Ivčić, and his song "Stop the War in Croatia" which was written and sung in English with the goal of promoting international support to the Croatian government and forces.¹² Polić concluded that the use of children was central to Croatian nation-building on both the domestic and international stage by framing Croatia as a victim country in the conflict; primarily through the "Stop the War in Croatia" campaign.¹³

Similarly, research on Serbian nationalism and music employs discourses analysis and lyrics analysis methodologies. Robert Hudson's article "Songs of Seduction" (2003) examines Serbian nationalism and music as a long relationship, going back centuries and exploding into popularity even more during the First World War and the Balkan Wars.¹⁴ Hudson does content analysis of popular nationalist Serbian songs from history, that came to the forefront during the 1990's and in the various conflicts Serbians were involved in across the Balkans. As Hudson writes "one of the key elements in the creation of Serbian national identity and the project of a greater Serbia is the interdependent triad of pesme, crkva i narod: songs, church and people."¹⁵ Similarly to Polić's and Baker's articles, Hudson focuses on the ways in which Serbian nationalism crystalizes musically. Specifically, music channels the process of nation-building by providing a narrative and a soundscape, an arche and a telos to the emerging nation. By traveling through history, and employing a content analysis of lyrics from several popular songs sung by different artists, Hudson puts together a larger picture of Serbian nationalist music in the 1990's.

¹² Polić, "Stop the War," 43.

¹³ Ibid, 54.

¹⁴ Robert Hudson, "Songs of Seduction: Popular Music and Serbian Nationalism," *Patterns of Prejudice* 37, no. 2 (2003): <https://doi.org/10.1080/0031322032000084688>.

¹⁵ Hudson, "Songs of Seduction," 158.

However, there seems to be a gap in literature concerning the impact of traditional folk, or *narodna muzika*, artists that produced nationalist music in the 1990's during the conflict in Croatia. As noted, research has been done on the Croatian national anthem; on the commemoration of war in the Slavonia region of Croatia through popular music; on the use of nationalist music and children during the Croatian War of Independence and on the uses of turbo-folk as a means of promoting Serbian nationalism. There is a large amount of literature and research concerning Croatian nationalism and cultural identity in relation to music, but less literature focusing on Serbian nationalism and the ways in which music was used as a mobilizer for it.

There is a gap in examining the ways in which popular music produced during the war period by different ethnic groups impacted their ethnic relations specifically during the war. Comparative analytical frameworks are yet to be developed. My hope is that by comparing Baja Mali Knindza and Thompson, I will contribute a tentative approach for comparative analysis of nationalistic Balkan music in the times of war. These two artists have far-reaching cultural impacts on both Serbians (from Baja Mali Knindza) and Croatians (Thompson); with Thompson being the musical act that greeted and performed for the Croatian National Team during their welcome home celebrations following the 2018 FIFA World Cup.¹⁶

METHODOLOGIES

Capitalizing on existing research I utilize multimodal research method, employing both content analysis and discourse analysis. In terms of content analysis, I examine the music produced and made by both Baja Mali Knindza and Thompson between the period of 1990-1995.

¹⁶Anja Vladislavljevic, "Nationalist Singer Joins Croatia Players at Homecoming Party," Balkan Insight, October 12, 2018, <https://balkaninsight.com/2018/07/17/controversial-right-wing-singer-a-special-guest-of-croatian-footballers-07-17-2018/>.

My analysis is focused on 10 songs written, produced, and sung by each artist, with a special focus on the lyrical content of the songs; the songs are translated from their original language into English, followed by interpretative engagement. I would like to note here that many references and language used in the song lyrics are further clarified to provide context on their historical and cultural significance specifically in terms of their mobilization in/as nationalistic narratives.

Discourse analysis is used for the examination of the ways in which this music was disseminated into society, and the way in which it had an impact on ethnic relations between Serbians and Croats living in Croatia. Further, based on my discourse analysis findings, I draw conclusions on the ways in which the media infrastructure in both Serbia and Croatia allowed for the two artists in question to gain such popularity and fame. By examining the discursive practices, primarily the consumption of the material through the record sales and radio dissemination, I finally connect them to the social practices that become gradually normalized in the respective national(istic) public sphere of Serbia and Croatia. Specifically, I show at the end how the discourse of the nation in popular music becomes naturalized as a reified ethnic relation. Part of my argument is that the media infrastructures, in addition to song content, performance and lyrics, in both Serbia and Croatia at the time were instrumental to the process of engineering ethnic nationalism. Close attention to state-television and radio in both countries with their large-scale musical and social messaging is what interests me here. There is a documented public archive available online on the programming of state-owned media in Serbia and Croatia in the period that I look at to understand specifically the scale of state promotion of Baja Mali Knindza and Thompson. Additionally, there is well-documented research that shows that the Yugoslav music scene was transformed in the early 1990's, with state media playing a heavy hand in

actively suppressing Yugoslav rock bands (which were notably anti-war and were active in the political scene during the late 1980's and the early 1990's) while nationalist turbo-folk artists were actively supported and pushed through the state media infrastructure.

I believe that methodologies that account for the historical situatedness of music, its circulation and reception, combined with close analysis of lyrical content, allow for nuanced analysis of how music becomes a tool and a script in the project of imagining nationalism; Anderson's work provides a framework for understanding how nations are constructed, maintained, and transformed through shared narratives, cultural symbols, and social processes. The concept of "imagined communities" has become a fundamental concept in discussions about nationalism, identity, and the dynamics of modern societies.¹⁷ By looking closely at the systems and the histories that produced two of the most popular musical artists within their respective ethnic groups, I attempt to illuminate how celebrity in the period of political and ethnic instability is simultaneously a result and a habitat of hateful and nationalist music. I emphasize that the relationship between crisis and celebrity is cyclical: the artists' popularity was due to political and ethnic unrest already existing within Croatia; the cultural production of nationalism as popular music further exacerbated this issue by contributing to an already unstable climate and having a role in further ethnic tensions and divides.

WORLD WAR II: USTASE & CETNIKS

It is important to understand the historical context and events that led to the formation of Yugoslavia and its eventual violent dissolution. In order to ensure this is understood, we must go back to the years following the second iteration of Yugoslavia and the violent history of the region during World War II. I am specifically interested to underline the history of Yugoslavia

¹⁷ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Verso, 1983. Revised, 2016

after the World War II because this era holds an important cultural memory for both Serbians and Croats alike and the language, symbols, events and cultural artifacts continue to shape both national identities to this day, and notably in the early 1990's. Importantly, the experiment of Yugoslavia after the World War II is marked by the country's somewhat tensions presence within the Soviet system. While formerly communist and in the Soviet orbit in terms of economic relations and dependencies, Yugoslavia was the most "open" and "pro-Western" country in the region with less travel restrictions and open cultural influences from the capitalist West. Hence, the presence of active rock music scene in Yugoslavia in the 1990s.¹⁸

In the years leading up to the outbreak of World War II, the first iteration of Yugoslavia was created. The Kingdom of Yugoslavia, originally known as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, existed from 1918-1941 and was led by the Karadordevic dynasty, which had previously ruled the Kingdom of Serbia.¹⁹ The Kingdom of Yugoslavia was composed of Serbia, parts of modern-day Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, Vojvodina, Croatia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Macedonia. However, the unification of the southern Slavic peoples did not deter nationalism from rising in several different ethnic groups.

In the context of Croatian nationalism, perhaps the most well-known actor that would have far reaching implications in the future of the region and in the Croatian consciousness was Ante Pavelić. During his youth, Pavelić became exposed to and a follower of the Croatian nationalist ideologies of Ante Starčević and the Party of Rights and he would eventually become a party member, where he would actively campaign against the Kingdom and promote the idea of Croatian separatism and nationalism; even reaching out to Italian dictator Benito Mussolini in

¹⁸ Ljubica Spaskovska, "Stairway to Hell: The Yugoslav Rock Scene and Youth during the Crisis Decade of 1981–1991," *East Central Europe* 38, no. 2–3 (2011): 355–72, <https://doi.org/10.1163/187633011x597225>.

¹⁹ Pino Adriano and Giorgio Cingolani, *Nationalism and Terror : Ante Pavelić and Ustasha Terrorism from Fascism to the Cold War*, Budapest: Central European University Press, 2018,

1927 sharing his ideas.²⁰ Eventually, Pavelić began to organize the Ustaša organization and it was officially founded on January 7th, 1929. With the onset of WWII, Pavelić's ties to both Mussolini and Italian foreign affairs minister Galeazzo Ciano would prove to be useful in the creation of the *Nezavisna Država Hrvatska* (NDH), the Independent State of Croatia.²¹ The NDH was in essence a Nazi-Germany and Fascist Italian puppet state, with Pavelić serving as the prime minister of the newly established state, and with Italian Prince Aimone, 4th Duke of Aosta serving as the state's King.²² However, following the fall of fascism in Italy, Pavelić assumed the role as *poglavnik*, the new head of state, and replaced Prince Aimone.

The Ustaše were based on the ideological foundation of Croatian nationalism and separatism with the goal to be an independent Croatia state encompassing all the areas that have historically been home to ethnic Croats, in other terms, the formation of a Greater Croatia. As Pino Adriano and Giorgio Cingolani wrote, “ustashism was an expression of integral nationalism and demanded the country’s complete independence within its historical borders.”²³ However, their ideas of nation were inherently tied to ideas of race, “as in the cases of Nazism and late Fascism, this perspective was based on the understanding of nation in racial terms.”²⁴ Despite this, the Ustaše openly admitted in their official documents that a “pure Croatian” race did not exist, due to Croats being European peoples, formed through the contribution of several races and genetic groups within Europe.²⁵ The term “Aryan descent” was used instead. The eventual genocide that would take place against the Jewish, Romani, Serbian and communist communities began through racialized laws that sought to remove the rights of non-Croatian citizens living

²⁰ Adriano and Cingolani, *Nationalism and Terror*, 12, 37.

²¹ Ibid, 12, 37.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid, 188.

²⁴ Ibid, 189.

²⁵ Ibid, 189.

within the NDH. Following Pavelić's government taking office in April of 1941, the Ustaše quickly began to enact laws, such as forbidding the use of the Cyrillic alphabet in the country, people of "non-Aryan descent" were not allowed to be legal citizens, and religious Serbian Orthodox schools were shut down.²⁶ Both Jews and Serbs alike had to wear respective coloured armbands. The minister of education Mile Budak announced that "one-third [of the Serbian Orthodox] will be expelled, one-third killed, and one-third converted to Catholicism."²⁷

Religion became deeply intertwined with the Ustaša's policy of removing the groups that they deemed non-citizens from the NDH; the only two religions that were allowed to exist were Catholicism and Islam; with Bosnian Muslims being viewed as Islamized Croatians, but nonetheless Croatian.²⁸ While the conversion of Jews was not accepted in Nazi Germany, the conversion of Serbs to Catholicism was something that was actively supported as the only means by which Serbs would be able to redeem themselves in the eyes of the state.²⁹ As a result, the Croatian Catholic Church played an active role in the establishment and running of concentration camps all over the country, with many monasteries around the country being safe havens for Ustaša militia men.³⁰ By the late spring of 1941, the violence had taken hold and even German and Italian officials were shocked by the level of sheer violence and brutality that was being exhibited by the Ustaše onto the Serbian population:

"In Korenica, hundreds of Serbs were tortured and mutilated: nose and ears cut off, eyes pulled out, limbs broken; some were forced to hold red-hot bricks, dance barefoot on barbed

²⁶ Adriano and Cingolani, *Nationalism and Terror*, 190.

²⁷ Ibid, 190.

²⁸ Ibid, 191.

²⁹ Ibid, 192.

³⁰ Ibid, 194.

wire, wear crowns made of nails; others were tortured with needles driven under their fingernails or matches lit under their noses.”³¹

Numerous concentration camps cropped up throughout the country in 1941, perhaps the most infamous being Jasenovac. There were multiple locations of camps, such as Jastrebarsko, Gornja Rijeka, Sisak, Lepoglava, and Djakovo. However, as these camps would begin to fill, prisoners would be sent to Jasenovac and its adjacent camp Stara Gradiška, a camp specifically built for women and children. It should be noted, that while the main prisoners of the camps were Serbs, Jews and Roma, communist or opposition Croats were also held in these camps. While the exact number of victims from the concentration camp system of the NDH varies depending on who provides the numbers, it is estimated that somewhere between 300,000 and 500,000 Serbs, Jews, Romani, Croats and communists were killed between 1941 and 1945.³² The eventual collapse of fascist Italy and Nazi Germany’s defeat saw the fall of the NDH to the Yugoslavian Partizani led by Josip Broz Tito, and the scattering of high ranking Ustaša officials all over the world.

The memory of the NDH, Pavelić, the Ustaše and specifically Jasenovac hold a very particular space and moment in both the Croatian and Serbian cultural memory. For Croats, this moment in their national history continues to hold an increased cultural significance, such as through the fascist Ustaša chant *za dom spremni* meaning “for the homeland ready”. The slogan, which was used extensively during the Ustaša regime continues to hold cultural significance for some Croats, with the chant often being yelled at sporting events and concerts, such as Perković’s. While German law bans the use of Nazi symbols and slogans, Croatian legislation

³¹ Adriano and Cingolani, *Nationalism and Terror*, 194.

³² Emil Kjerte, “How Croatia’s Jasenovac Camp Turned Men into Brutal Killers,” *Balkan Insight*, April 28, 2023, <https://balkaninsight.com/2023/04/20/how-croatias-jasenovac-camp-turned-men-into-brutal-killers/>.

does not specify what is not allowed. Article 325 of the Croatian Criminal Code states that people who “call for hatred or violence to be directed against groups... because of their racial, religious, national or ethnic affiliation” can be punished with a three-year prison sentence, and “organizers of hate-mongering groups can receive up to six years in prison,” that people who “publicly approve of, deny or significantly belittle criminal acts of genocide, acts of aggression, crimes against humanity or war crimes” can also receive up to three years in prison.”³³ However, it continues to be shown that individuals who promote Ustaša memorabilia and slogans are not prosecuted, such as Perković who was found to not be violating public order by chanting *za dom spremni* at his concerts.³⁴

For Serbs, this era holds a traumatic space in the cultural memory. It has contributed to a wide-shared public sentiment among Serbs of what some call “Serbophobia”: the idea that Serbs have been persecuted throughout history and that they will continue to be persecuted.³⁵ The fight against Serbophobia is what an apologist camp of activists and revolutionaries provides as a justification for the atrocities that were perpetuated by the Serbian government and militia groups in the conflicts during the Balkan Wars, most notably the Bosnian Civil War.³⁶

Numerous songs emerged during the time of the NDH that continue to hold meaning in the Croatian cultural memory. Perković himself has performed various songs at his concerts from this era, which speak of violence against Serbs and communists and the creation and defense of the Croatian homeland. Perković has continually denied claims that he is a fascist sympathizer or a fascist himself, but has been continuously caught performing these songs, wearing Ustaša

³³ Sven Milekic, “Croatia Fascist Slogan Threatens to Topple Govt,” *Balkan Insight*, July 20, 2018, <https://balkaninsight.com/2017/08/31/croatia-fascist-slogan-threatens-to-topple-govt-08-30-2017/>.

³⁴ Anja Vladislavljjevic, “Croatian Court Rules ‘Thompson’ Song Did Not Break Law,” *Balkan Insight*, June 4, 2020, <https://balkaninsight.com/2020/06/03/croatian-court-rules-thompson-song-did-not-break-law/>.

³⁵ Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.

³⁶ Sabrina P. Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation, 1918-2005* (Washington, D.C., D.C: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006).

Commented [DM5]: Provide a reference here to Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. Full text available here: <https://www2.tf.jcu.cz/~klapetek/todorova.pdf>

Maria Todorova is not an apologist for violence. But she is a historian who explains how the cliches around one's identity contribute to justifications of violence. Balkanism for her is the Balkan version of Edward Said's orientalism.

Commented [DM6R5]: Also, provide a reference to: Ramet, S. P. (2006). "The Three Yugoslavias: State-building and Legitimation, 1918-2005." Indiana University Press, <https://books.google.ca/books?hl=en&lr=&id=FTw3lEqi2-oC&oi=fnd&pg=PR13&dq=The+Three+Yugoslavias:+State-building+and+Legitimation,+1918-2005.&ots=Foz8XNZ098&sig=jHdfqNTXXFAnVhXOMXS TbJgFP10#v=onepage&q=The%20Three%20Yugoslavias%3A%20State-building%20and%20Legitimation%2C%201918-2005.&f=false>

memorabilia and chanting *za dom spremni*. An organizer of one of Perković's concerts in New York made the distinction that while he might perform these songs they have never been officially recorded by Thompson and do not appear on his discography. While this is technically true, Perković's contribution to the promotion and continued legacy of this era in modern history should not be ignored. It is important to note that while the term *ustaša* is used by non-Croatians as a derogatory slur against nationalistic Croatians, for some it is also a term of pride that they will call themselves. Thus, the term in modern times holds two different connotations: one of shame and one of pride.

The political situation in Serbia was different from that of Croatia in the late 1930's and into the Second World War. Serbia was dealing with the Axis powers from all sides. However, a cult of personality was formed around Dragoljub "Draža" Mihailović, a Belgrade-born Colonel who spent his formative years receiving an education at military academies before joining the Royal Yugoslav Army before he broke off after refusal to surrender to German forces invading Serbia in the early months of 1941.³⁷ He, along with other troops who refused to surrender, began to organize in Ravna Gora in the spring months of 1941, organizing troops and collecting funds in order to support the illegal detachment group.³⁸ This group, the Četniks, were able to garner large support from Serbian villagers and peasants in the Ravna Gora area, but had long-term plans of securing stability in the region and leading a resistance against the occupying German, Italian and Ustaše forces in Bosnia and Serbia.³⁹ However, in order to distinguish himself from Kosta Pećanac's Chetniks which were actively collaborating with the occupying German powers, Mihailović and his followers identified themselves as the "Ravna Gora

³⁷ Matteo J Milazzo, *The Chetnik Movement and the Yugoslav Resistance*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2019, 12-13 doi:10.1353/book.68487.

³⁸ Milazzo, *The Chetnik Movement*, 14.

³⁹ Ibid, 15.

Movement" (however, it should be noted that colloquially, Mihailović's army and followers are referred to as the Četnik movement and as such, this paper will hereby refer to them as such).⁴⁰

While this was happening, Josip Broz Tito was organizing the Yugoslav Partisans, an organization of communists from all ethnic backgrounds in the Balkan region. Tito and his Partisans were quickly gaining popularity and numbers, and while Mihailović attempted to collaborate with Tito he felt as though their resistance was too aggressive too quickly. While the two had initially agreed to not attack each other, this quickly broke down over the course of the war and now the Četniks were actively attacking German, Partisan and Ustaša forces throughout the region. However, by 1942 the Partisans were more organized and growing in numbers, while the Četniks lacked the same formal organization and numbers. Fighting was now located in predominantly Bosnia, Montenegro and the NDH. Despite Mihailović's and the Četniks aversion to the Ustaše, that did not stop him from establishing a list of long-range programs for the group to focus on politically, which is as follows:

- I. The struggle for the freedom of all our people under the scepter of his Majesty King Peter II.
- II. The creation within a Greater Yugoslavia of a Greater Serbia, ethnically pure, which will include Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Syrmia, Banat, and Bai'ka.
- III. The struggle for the annexation to our state of all Slavic territories ruled by the Italians and Germans (Trieste, Gorizia, Istria, Carniola); the removal from the state territory of all minorities and a-national elements.

⁴⁰ Milazzo, *The Chetnik Movement*, 18.

- IV. The creation of a common frontier between Serbia and Slovenia and Serbia and Montenegro by removing from the Sandzak all the Muslims and from Bosnia-Herzegovina the Muslims and Croats.
- V. The punishment of all the Ustasi and those Muslims who have in these tragic days pitilessly destroyed our people.
- VI. The punishment of everyone guilty for the April catastrophe.
- VII. The colonization of those areas purged of minorities and a-national elements with Montenegrins.⁴¹

As a result, the Četniks terrorized Croatian and Muslim villages throughout Bosnia and in the Sandžak region of Southern Serbia and Northern Montenegro and continued to attempt to battle the Partisans throughout Bosnia. It is estimated that they were responsible for the deaths of 50,000-68,000 Croatsians, Muslims and Partisans by the end of the war.⁴² Eventually, the Četniks lost British support and with the Partisans controlling large areas of the region by the end of the war, their defeat was expected. While Mihailović attempted to organize a resistance in Serbia against the newly established Yugoslavian government, he and his men were attacked and Mihailović went into hiding in the Bosnian mountains for a year before his eventual capture.⁴³ In June of 1946, he went on trial and was found guilty of high treason and war crimes and was executed by firing squad in Belgrade on July 17, 1946.⁴⁴ It should come as no surprise that Mihailović's execution and trial served as a tool in which he become mythologized as an icon of Serbian cultural production and in the late 1980's under renewed ethnic tensions in Yugoslavia, the idea of the Četniks and Mihailović's legacy would prove to become useful tools in the

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⁴¹ Milazzo, *The Četnik Movement*, 92.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid, 181.

⁴⁴ Ibid, 181.

arsenal of nationalist Serbian politicians and political parties. The flag of the Četniks, a black background with white skull and crossbones as well as the šajkača, a peasant hat worn by the Četniks, have become symbols that continue to be used as indicators of one's support for this organization, and as such, Serbian nationalism. Similarly, Croats' use of memorabilia associated with the Black Legion and with Ustaša symbols are used as indicators in the same ultra nationalist sense. As I discuss later, these symbols have been used by both Perković and Pajčin, and their large fan bases.

Similarly to the term Ustaša in modern times, the term Četnik holds two different meanings depending on the party using it: for non-Serbs it is a derogatory slur to call nationalist Serbs, while some Serbs take great pride in calling themselves Četniks and in the legacy of Mihailović. It should be noted that while both the Ustaše and Četniks hold a significant moment in their respective ethnic identities as cultural moments there are some main differences between the two. While the Ustaše were the full-fledged government in the NDH during World War II and held significant political power when it came to their relationships with both Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, the Četniks were a guerilla army that attempted to gain political power during the war and had a plan for control after the war. Despite this, both groups have since been mythologized both domestically and abroad, as following the Partisans victory, many fled throughout Europe and North America to escape persecution by the new communist government.

THE YUGOSLAVIA ERA

Following the defeat of the axis powers in Europe, and the Partisan success in the Balkan region, Yugoslavia was officially liberated on May 15, 1945 and in the following months the newly established Yugoslav Army was battling against "bandits", with battles occurring between

Ustaše and Četniks against the Yugoslav Army.⁴⁵ Following elections, in which over 200,000 people who were deemed to have cooperated with the occupational forces were barred, parliament declared Yugoslavia to be a republic and banned King Peter from ever returning to the country.⁴⁶ In 1946, “the constitution of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia (FNRJ) institutionalized the system of “people’s rule” (*narodna vlast*) with hundreds of elected people’s committees in cities and rural communities.”⁴⁷ The government advocated for direct democracy in order to abolish all privileges, but most importantly, to eliminate any and all forms of national and religious hate. The newly established constitution formally recognized five equal constituent nations: Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Macedonians and Montenegrins. It was not until the early 1960’s when the constitution was amended to include Muslims as the sixth nation; what we see here is a blending of religious and ethnic identity as a distinct characteristic of the Yugoslavian state. The country was composed of six federal republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia and within Serbia, two autonomous regions existed, Vojvodina and Kosovo. There was a pivot away from the communism of the Soviet Union, and a shift towards the idea of workers’ self-management and as noted by Marie-Janine Calic “the Yugoslav project of creating a socialism in which democracy, pluralism, and the market economy were reconciled with the values of an egalitarian, autonomous society fascinated intellectuals and political activists throughout the world.”⁴⁸

Throughout the 1960’s and 1970’s, deemed the “golden years” in Yugoslavia, the country saw rapid growth and urbanization throughout all the republics. Tito’s Yugoslavia differed from

⁴⁵ Marie-Janine Calic, *History of Yugoslavia*, West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2019, 160.
muse.jhu.edu/book/72985

⁴⁶ Calic, *History of Yugoslavia*, 164.

⁴⁷ Ibid, 164.

⁴⁸ Ibid, 184.

other communist countries in the Eastern Bloc; some examples include Western media being allowed for consumption and Yugoslavs being free to work and travel abroad as they please. However, despite Tito's strong arm to thwart nationalistic threats, throughout the late 1960's and 1970's several events such as the Croatian Spring, the unrest in Kosovo and the growth of Islam and the ideas of Pan-Islamism show that there was still an undercurrent of ethnic and religious tensions in the republics and the country overall.⁴⁹ The economic crises of the early 1970's, caused by the 1973 oil crisis, meant that Yugoslavia, much like the rest of Eastern Bloc, was plunged into economic instability that worsened with the onset of decentralization to the republics. Following the aforementioned Croatian Spring, Tito became even more strongly armed in his attempts to suppress dissent within the republics; by passing restrictive media laws and strict counterrevolutionary activity laws.⁵⁰ By the middle of the 1970's approximately 4,000 political prisoners were behind bars across the country, with an increase in political intimidation and monitoring of citizens.⁵¹ The crumbling of socialist values led to a resurgence of religion amongst all of the republics and all three major religions: Islam, Catholicism and Orthodoxy; "the rediscovery of religion replaced former notions of socialization with communalization and reactivated faith as a constitutive element of identity formation. At the same time, each of the religious communities worked actively to glorify its own nation as being sacred."⁵²

Following the death of Tito in May of 1980, things began to take a turn for the worse within Yugoslavia, both culturally, politically and economically. An identity crisis had begun to take hold on the republics and as Colic writes, this identity crisis of the 1980's, where old fears and memories of World War II were brought up, were instrumentalized deliberately by politics

⁴⁹ Calic, *History of Yugoslavia*, 229, 231, 236.

⁵⁰ Ibid, 242-243.

⁵¹ Ibid, 243.

⁵² Ibid, 269

and this, along with increased pluralism, allowed for populism to spring up throughout the republics. In Serbia, Slobodan Milošević capitalized on using mass rallies to drive populism with ethnic Serbs and at the heart of the Serbian political message was Kosovo as a myth to the Serbian identity. On the other hand, Franjo Tudjman was seen as “the figurative descendent of 17th century conspirators and freedom fighters.”⁵³ The memory of the Četniks emerged once again during the 1980’s, with Colic noting an entire industry was produced around the production of magazines, CD’s, emblems and pennants associated with the movement. Popular folk music began to take hold and “the so-called “newly composed music” was a contemporary genre that became an important instrument in political communication.”⁵⁴ It adapted elements of folk music, supplemented with components of pop music and political messages.”⁵⁵ Despite this increase in ethnic nationalism, a 1985 survey found that a majority of 6,200 young adults considered themselves Yugoslav citizens first and then members of one of the constituent nations second. This number was highest amongst Muslims, Macedonians, Montenegrins and Serbs (76-80%), and less with Croats (61%) and Slovenes (49%).⁵⁶ However, compared to the 1960’s, the relations between the different nationalities had worsened and most individuals who were polled during this time attributed this rise in ethnic tensions to “nationalist propaganda, political egoism, regional disparities, and economic problems, not to religious, ethnic, and cultural differences.”⁵⁷

The true beginning of the end for Yugoslavia was March of 1989, when tensions in the southern province of Kosovo pushed the Serbian parliament to rescind the province’s autonomy.

⁵³Calic, *History of Yugoslavia*, 269..

⁵⁴ Ibid, 269.

⁵⁵ Ibid, 279.

⁵⁶ Ibid, 280.

⁵⁷ Ibid, 280.

As was noted earlier, the two provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina were given far reaching autonomy by Tito early on, but escalating tensions between ethnic Kosovar Albanians and Serbs living in the province meant that the Belgrade government felt the need to control the province as much as possible. This started a domino effect, with protests taking place in Ljubljana showing solidarity with Kosovars and then counter-protests the Slovenes in Belgrade.⁵⁸ Escalating issues between the Belgrade government of Milošević and the other republics meant that more and more citizens felt as though their relationships with the republics and others were becoming worse and worse. Across all of Yugoslavia, nationalist-based parties began to form and spread, with these parties prevailing in the April of 1990 in Slovenia and Croatia, with Tudjman's *Hrvatska demokratska zajednica* (HDZ), Croatian Democratic Union, campaigning on the right to self-determination of the Croatian people.⁵⁹

The Croatian War of Independence was fought between the HDZ and *Srpska Krajina*, Serbian Krajina, a self-proclaimed proto state within Croatia that held high populations of ethnic Serbians. The goal of Krajina was to essentially break off from Croatia in the same way that Croatia had broken off from Yugoslavia. The conflict, which lasted from 1991 until the end of 1995 saw high levels of civilian violence, as well as the large expulsion of Serbian civilians during Operation Storm in August of 1995. The first conflict that most considered the beginning of the war was an attack at the Plitvice Lakes National Park on Easter in March of 1991.⁶⁰ While tensions had been high for several weeks before this, Croatian police entered the park to expel a group of rebel Serbian forces that had occupied the area and they were subsequently ambushed,

⁵⁸ Calic, *History of Yugoslavia*, 285.

⁵⁹ Ibid, 285.

⁶⁰ Ibid, 285.

with an armed confrontation taking place.⁶¹ What ensued was an ethnic conflict that resulted in thousands of lives lost and hundreds of thousands of citizens being displaced.

It should be noted that this conflict plays an important role in both Serbian and Croatian cultural memory, and as discussed below, this has been done through music. Perković and Pajčin have both been heavily influenced by this conflict, and as such, so has their music. Through the creation, production, distribution and performance of these songs, this conflict has become central to not only the national identity of these respective countries but has become central to their cultural identity and memory.

THE RUPTURE OF YUGOSLAVIA: NATION BUILDING

Let's repeat some of the central questions that preoccupy me here. What causes ethnic conflicts of this level? How do two ethnic groups who lived in relative peace for several decades become embroiled in such a conflict? What causes two seemingly completely similar ethnic groups to participate in their own respective forms of nationalism? Many have attempted to answer these questions that continue to baffle scholars, pundits, journalists and ordinary people. My own analysis goes back to the Sigmund Freud's theory of the narcissism of minor differences.

Ethnic nationalisms had been simmering underneath the Yugoslav surface for several decades before coming to a head in the late 1980's and early 1990's. In the ideological construction of Yugoslavia, ethnic nationalism, blended with religious difference, was imagined as a type of Soviet-style, cool socialist multiculturalism, where all six nations live through their differences peacefully under the umbrella of the benevolent, softly militarized, nation state. Yet, in moments of economic fragility and political crisis (the latter notably generated by the death of Tito, the partisan socialist ideologue of Yugoslavia) ethnic and religious differences became

⁶¹ Calic, *History of Yugoslavia*, 285.

weaponized as a tool by political elites aiming to consolidate power and ensure order. As Ignatieff notes, “nationalism does not simply 'express' a pre-existent identity: it 'constitutes' one. It divides/separates/re-classifies difference.”⁶² He discusses the ways in which nationalism is a “fiction of identity”, much in the style of Benedict Anderson’s “imagined community”, as it seeks to insist on the primacy of ethnicity over the multiple over aspects of belonging and identity.⁶³ In a similar vein, Mila Dragojević's research on civilian violence during the war echoes this idea with what she calls amoral communities; that is communities in which this violence is seen as necessary and tolerated. As she writes “in communities where the ethnicization of everyday life is present, instead of perceiving each other in terms of personal traits or community roles, people consider ethnicities first, or, more specifically, political ethnicities.”⁶⁴

Freud’s theory is based on his 1919 clinical observations whereby he found that “it is precisely the minor differences in people who are otherwise alike that form the basis of feelings of strangeness and hostility between them.”⁶⁵ Ignatieff notes that in Freud’s theory, it is not the feeling of absolute separation that leads to conflict with others, but refusal to admit a moment of recognition and similarity.⁶⁶ “The differences between Serb and Croat are tiny - when seen from the outside – but from the inside they are worth dying for because someone will kill you for them,” and as such, for both parties their identity is boiled down to ethnicity; because a Serb is only a Serb to a Croat, he is only a Serb to himself.⁶⁷ As Ignatieff further argues, nationalism is a

⁶² Michael Ignatieff, “Nationalism and the Narcissism of Minor Differences,” *Queen’s Quarterly* 102, no. 1 (1995): 14.

⁶³ Ignatieff, “Nationalism,” 14.

⁶⁴ Mila Dragojević, *Amoral Communities: Collective Crimes in Time of War*, Ithaca New York, New York: Cornell University Press, 2019, 33.

⁶⁵ Ignatieff, “Nationalism,” 17.

⁶⁶ *Ibid*, 17.

⁶⁷ *Ibid*, 19.

an expression of collective narcissism in which the process of providing legitimacy for the attainment of statehood in turn glorifies collective, narcissistically self-obsessed identity.⁶⁸ Our individual identity becomes unimportant as we are submerged in the collective identity of ethnicity. For the ethnically obsessed engaging with outsiders is worthless because outsiders cannot understand the ingroup, neither can they ever be any meaningful part of it. Thus, the security and the fulfillment of statehood for the ethnicity must take precedence.

The idea of a collective threat was central to both Croatian and Serbian nation building during the rupture in the 1990's. As Dragojević notes, the discourse of threat was prevalent on both sides in the media. Respondents she interviewed who lived in predominantly ethnic Serb regions were exposed to the media discourse and rhetoric that the victory of the HDZ was a threat to ethnic Serbs in Croatia, just as Croats who received word that the nationalist party of Milošević, the *Sprska Socijalistička Stranka*, the Serbian Socialist Party, was a threat to them and Croatia. As such, "the new political regimes and the new definitions of statehood, primarily in ethnic terms, were being linked with respondents' existential concerns in their respective Yugoslav successor states."⁶⁹ Both Croats and Serbs were bombarded with fear rhetoric in the media. In Croatia, fears and threats of a "Greater Serbia" were looming from the victory of Milošević's party. In the Croatian national consciousness, the loss of the NDH during WWII and Croatia's involvement in Yugoslavia meant that the idea of a Greater Serbia threatened Croatian independence and statehood. To Serbs living within Croatia, the election of Tudjman's HDZ meant revival of old fears about the Ustaša regime and inevitable encroachment on the rights of Serbs living in Croatia. As such, history was also weaponized by both governments in an attempt to justify their respective political goals. Both Serbia and Croatia had political aspirations of

⁶⁸ Ignatieff, "Nationalism," 19.

⁶⁹ Dragojević, *Amoral Communities*, 37.

achieving states built based on ethnicity, as well as uniting the territories in which their respective ethnic groups occupied. For Serbia, this was parts of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina; for Croatia this was also Bosnia and Herzegovina. Additionally, the media infrastructure during Yugoslavia had emphasized a Yugoslav identity, meaning that both groups were seeking to define their cultural identity in new terms. As this paper further explores, the media infrastructures in both countries played a role in defining their respective cultural identities based on how they differ from the other and used music as a primary tool for spreading the state's ideals over what their new cultural identity holds.

MEDIA INFRASTRUCTURE IN YUGOSLAVIA: JUGOTON RECORDS

Popular music in the Balkan region began during the 1950's and further developed through festivals, radio programs and the recording industry. The emergence of Balkan pop culture and music was shaped both by international cultural trends, but also and essentially by the government.⁷⁰ The Yugoslav government sought to create and nurture a sense of what the Yugoslav identity was. In order to fulfill this goal, it invested heavily in education and radio ownership as there were disparities between wealthier and poorer regions of the country.⁷¹ In 1948, relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia broke down and thus the latter adopted the opposite cultural policy to the one espoused by their former ally. Unlike the USSR, Yugoslavia opened its cultural doors to the influence of Western popular music in the 1950's and by the end of the decade it utilized these influences to express the Yugoslav cultural and political identity.⁷² In the span of several decades, Yugoslavia's music scene became one of the most prominent and one of the strongest in Southeast Europe, which resulted in diverse music

⁷⁰ Dean Vuletic, "Generation Number One: Politics and Popular Music in Yugoslavia in the 1950s," *Nationalities Papers* 36, no. 5 (2008): 861 <https://doi.org/10.1080/00905990802373579>

⁷¹ Vuletic, "Generation Number One," 861.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 873.

repertoires sponsored by the state.⁷³ Pop, folk and rock music dominated the music scene; in 1983 folk music accounted for 58% of overall production shares, with pop music coming in at 29% and rock at 13%.⁷⁴

The record label Jugoton, based in Zagreb, was one of the pillars of the Yugoslav recording industry. First established in 1947, Jugoton by the 1970's had grown to become the largest record label in Eastern Europe outside of the USSR.⁷⁵ The label was created from the assets that the government had confiscated from Edison Bell Penkala and Elektroton, two companies that were active in the inter-war period in Zagreb and Ljubljana.⁷⁶ The label went through several distinct phases: the formative years of 1947-1953 were centered on classical, revolutionary and traditional folk music; the second phase from 1955-1960 was when Yugoslavia opened up to Western cultural influences and in 1956 Jugoton signed a contract with the American company RCA and following had licensing agreements with several Italian record labels.⁷⁷ The third phase beginning in 1968 saw the explosion of Jugoton and was highlighted by the release of several iconic albums, such as Bijelo Dugme's *Kad bi' bio bijelo dugme* (If I Were a White Button, 1974). Jugoton became an associate of EMI, Decca and RCA, and signed international performers such as Ray Charles, Wilson Pickett, Otis Redding, and Tom Jones.⁷⁸ The fourth phase started with the formation of the Yugoslav punk and new wave scene in 1977 and lasted until the dissolution of the country in 1991; this period was marked by high

⁷³ Danijela Beard and Ljerka Rasmussen, "Introduction" in *Made in Yugoslavia: Studies in Popular Music*, ed. Danijela Beard and Ljerka Rasmussen (Routledge: New York), 2 <https://doi-org.libaccess.lib.mcmaster.ca/10.4324/9781315452333>

⁷⁴ Beard and Rasmussen, "Introduction," 2.

⁷⁵ Branko Kostelnik, "Jugoton," in *Made in Yugoslavia: Studies in Popular Music*, ed. Danijela Beard and Ljerka Rasmussen (Routledge: New York), 75. <https://doi-org.libaccess.lib.mcmaster.ca/10.4324/9781315452333>

⁷⁶ Kostelnik, "Jugoton," 75.

⁷⁷ Ibid, 75.

⁷⁸ Ibid, 76.

commercial successes in the music industry by pop performers, such as Zdravko Čolić, groups like Magazin and Novi Fosili and singers such as Neda Ukraden.⁷⁹

The punk and new wave music scene of the late 1970's and 1980's was being nurtured around the background of the increasing ethnic tensions in the region and the increasing political instability. Jugoton was a crucial institution, along with smaller record labels and radio stations, that ushered these artists into the mainstream; bands such as Šarlo Akrobata, Idoli and Električni Orgazam, were the Belgrade-based bands that led the new era of Yugoslav music.⁸⁰ "Increased activity by a growing number of punk and new wave bands had a direct impact on Jugoton's production and artwork, which rose from only eight rock albums in 1976 to twenty-five in 1981."⁸¹ However, the eventual collapse of Jugoton Records would come in 1991 when it would become privatized and renamed Croatia Records.

As we can see, music played an integral part in the construction of the Yugoslav identity and, along with Western influence, allowed for the integration of a unique music industry unlike any other in Eastern Europe. The legacy continues in both Serbia and Croatia when it comes to the construction of national(istic) identity and the role that the media and music industry plays in this. It should come as no surprise that the governments of Tudjman and Milošević utilize similar tools in the creation of distinct Serbian and Croatian cultural identities as the ones that the Yugoslav state utilized in its golden period to promote diverse, yet shared, Yugoslav identity.

MEDIA INFRASTRUCTURES IN SERBIA AND CROATIA: POST 1990's

The Croatian Radio and Television (HRT) that emerged in the 1990's was one, that as Baker argues, built on the same logic as the state of Croatia, "extracting a Croatian unit from the

⁷⁹ Kostelnik, "Jugoton," 76.

⁸⁰ Ibid, 77.

⁸¹ Ibid, 78.

Yugoslav federal framework and investing it with statehood based on national self-determination.”⁸² The Zagreb-based studio, for example, that had been within the Yugoslav federal broadcasting network had been reworked as a national Croatian broadcaster; one that would not be transmitting to all of the former Yugoslavia.⁸³ Zala Volčič, cited in Baker, found that the national broadcaster in Slovenia, RTV Slovenija, underwent a similar transformation from a socialist institution that promoted Yugoslav values to a vehicle that was used for nationalizing public speech while holding an undercurrent that a national broadcaster solely existed to promote what the state narrative of that particular moment might be.⁸⁴ Baker believes the same could be said for the HRT. The HRT's narrative of the war followed that of what was espoused by Tudjman himself, notably that Croatia had been forced to fight for its peaceful independence against the “nationalist and expansionist Serbian aggression.”⁸⁵ While Tudjman reiterated claims of a “Greater Serbia” the HRT was close to follow with their stance on the conflict being the “binary narrative of peaceful, freedom-loving Croatia resisting the vicious, expansionist Serbs.”⁸⁶

Not only was the HRT an influencer radio and television, but they also controlled the music industry. “Early on in the war, the HRT was also the most powerful actor in the recording industry.”⁸⁷ As noted, before the war the main record label in Yugoslavia was Jugoton Records, located in Zagreb. However, even before the outbreak of war Jugoton had severe financial difficulties and following Croatia's succession, assets were seized resulting in the restructuring

⁸² Catherine Baker, *Sounds of the Borderland: Popular Music, War and Nationalism in Croatia since 1991*, Routledge, 2010, 14 <https://doi-org.libaccess.lib.mcmaster.ca/10.4324/9781315609973>

⁸³ Baker, “Sounds of the Borderland,” 14.

⁸⁴ Ibid, 14.

⁸⁵ Ibid, 15.

⁸⁶ Ibid, 15.

⁸⁷ Ibid, 16.

of Jugoton on a shareholding basis. It was then renamed Croatia Records.⁸⁸ From their rebranding, CR initially focused on patriotic compilations. However, as Baker notes, it was the HRT who directly commissioned new patriotic songs, giving existing ones airplay, organizing and funding music projects and enabling audio and video recordings.⁸⁹ In other terms, the HRT played an incredibly active and influential role in both creating and pushing nationalist music through the Croatian music industry pipeline.

With the HRT exercising control and influence over all domains of state media, and actively supporting the goals and ideals of the newly independent Croatian state, they also had to create what they deemed to be popular Croatian music. The idea that Croatia needed a popular music that reflected the state's cultural identity and excluded what they deemed as undesirable traits of "otherness" encouraged several different groups of producers to attempt to create a national style of Croatian music.⁹⁰ As Baker explains, the work that was needed to define a national identity through music was one that involved numerous claims and counter-claims, with symbols of both similarity and difference playing a role.⁹¹ Perhaps the most fundamental goal was the assumption that "a nation-state required a distinctively 'national' popular music."⁹² Along with the assumption that a national musical identity should help to emphasize the differences between the Croatian people and their neighbours; for Croats, the sense of belonging to a 'central European' cultural area was highly valued, but any similarities to the their 'Eastern neighbours' or even the idea of the East itself were seen as undermining the country's culture.⁹³ Croats and Serbs thus began to represent a cultural divide between the West – East in

⁸⁸ Baker, "Sounds of the Borderland," 16.

⁸⁹ Ibid, 16.

⁹⁰ Ibid, 55.

⁹¹ Ibid, 58.

⁹² Ibid, 58.

⁹³ Ibid, 59.

the relationship between their separate countries and their cultural identities. The tamburica was widely introduced in Croatian popular music, a folk instrument from the Slavonija region that was viewed as a symbol of Croatia's *westernness*. Beginning in the late 1980's, a resurgence of the tamburica legacy began and by the early 1990's, the HDZ and HRT were actively promoting the tamburica as a symbol of the Croatian people and culture through the explosion of tamburica-based pop music and the organization of music festivals. "The dominant tamburica narrative had two related strands: a) that tamburica expressed the folk culture of all Croats (not just from Slavonia or even Croatia); b) that folk music from Serbia/Bosnia should be excluded as an unwelcome foreign threat", and thus the tamburica was seen as a barrier against Serbian and Bosnian newly-composed folk music.⁹⁴

The exclusion of newly composed Serbian music from the airwaves and public repertoires of Croatia was a strategy espoused by HRT to minimize the impact of Serbia on the Croatian cultural identity. In late 1990, the organizers of Zagrebfest, a popular December music festival, announced that the newly-composed music of Serbia was not "in line with the positive social and cultural changes in the Republic of Croatia."⁹⁵ Additionally, there was an active campaign to ensure that songs with "ekavica" lyrics were removed from radio station programs; ekavica is the vowel variation that denotes the Serbian language, while ijekavica is used for the Croatian language.⁹⁶ Again, we see that the agenda of the state and the media infrastructure coincide in terms of ideological framing of the national identity.

Thus, what emerges is that Tudjman's HDZ utilized the HRT and the media infrastructure as a whole as a way to both achieve and perpetuate the goals of his government. We see an active

⁹⁴ Baker, "Sounds of the Borderland," 60.

⁹⁵ Ibid, 63.

⁹⁶ Ibid, 63.

distancing of Croatia from its neighbours, creating an othering actively during the tense years of ethnic conflict between Croats and Serbs; we see the active support of the production and dissemination of nationalist music and the ways in which the goal of the HDZ was to utilize the HRT in order to create a distinct Croatian cultural identity.

In Serbia, the music industry was defined by two main characteristics: the government's push towards nationalistic folk-music and the underground anti-war rebellion. As Robert Hudson shows Serbian nationalism and popular music have a long shared history that can be traced back to the Balkan wars of the early 20th century.⁹⁷ In the former, songs have been the chosen vessel to communicate this message and as he notes, "in the 1990's the stimulation of nationalism by popular and traditional Serbian songs involved a process of ethnification—a cult of the folkloric—in which popular music contributed to the estrangement, alienation and distancing of the Other."⁹⁸ As Hudson shows the main elements involved in the creation of a Serbian national identity, and the project of a Greater Serbia, are the triad of *pesme, crkva i narod*: songs, church and people.⁹⁹ The influence of folk elements from Serbian history are deeply interwoven into the musical culture. The genre that exploded in popularity in Serbia during the Milošević government is turbo-folk. As Uroš Cvorovic writes "turbo-folk rose to popularity in Serbia in the nineties, amid war, international sanctions, poverty, record inflation, systemic corruption, and organized crime."¹⁰⁰ While turbo-folk saturated all media through state television and radio, changes in laws at the time allowed for the creation of privately owned television companies, such as Pink TV, which had designated turbo-folk channels, and additionally promoted adult

⁹⁷ Hudson, "Songs of Seduction," 158.

⁹⁸ Ibid, 158.

⁹⁹ Ibid, 158.

¹⁰⁰ Uroš Cvorovic, "Remember the Nineties? Turbo-Folk as the Vanishing Mediator of Nationalism," *Cultural Politics* (Biggleswade, England) 8, no. 1 (2012): 127. <https://doi.org/10.1215/17432197-1572021>

films (pornography) and soap operas.¹⁰¹ The connection between state control over radio and television and the illegal economy, channeled through corruption, economic crisis and major political ruptures in the region, allowed for turbo-folk to flourish in Serbia and to achieve mass success.¹⁰²

However, the Serbian music scene and media infrastructure also cultivated the possibility for resistance and defiance to both conflict and nationalism. The anti-war action Rimtutituki based in Belgrade which, in the spring of 1992, held anti-war demonstrations and a concert titled *S.O.S. Mir, ili ne računajte na nas*, "SOS Peace, or Don't Count on Us."¹⁰³ The supergroup, composed of members of three of the leading new wave bands Ekatarina Velika, Električni Orgazam and Partibrejkers, had formed during the anti-mobilization movement in Belgrade and had recorded a single *Slušaj Vamo*, Listen Here, which was co-released by the PGP RTB label and Radio B92.¹⁰⁴ B92 was a rare outlet for Western and Yugoslav news during the Milošević era and had been the catalyst for many of the demonstrations that took place in Belgrade in 1990.¹⁰⁵ On April 14th, 1992, after the conflict in Bosnia had begun the supergroup held a live concert at Republic Square with some 30,000 attendees; yet despite the large crowd the event had no coverage on Belgrade TV.¹⁰⁶ Despite the fact that many of the new wave bands had openly mocked and questioned the socialist system in the 1980's, a large number had realigned themselves with the defense of Yugoslavia and openly opposed the nationalist forces in the different republics that eventually led to the disintegration of the country.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰¹ Cvor, "Remember the Nineties?" 127.

¹⁰² Ibid, 127.

¹⁰³ Beard and Rasmussen, "Introduction," 4.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, 4.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, 4.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, 4.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, 4-5.

At the same time while turbo folk was pushed by the Serbian government media, alternative forms of media emerged in the late 1980's which gave birth to a burgeoning underground music and art scene. The "Belgrade Underground" was a collective of artists who flocked towards alternative venues and cultural centers, such as Rex and B92 Radio in the 1990's.¹⁰⁸ *Šišmiš Radio* (Bat Radio) was a three-hour long FM radio program that aired on B92 every Monday after midnight and "represented one of the Belgrade Underground's signature art forms in the "occupied" city during the gloomy 1990s."¹⁰⁹ The show, hosted by Miomir Grujić Fleka, a multimedia artist and influential figure in Belgrade's counterculture scene of the 1980's and 1990's played a mix of obscure music, allowed for guest call ins and "strove to keep a sense of freedom alive amid the repression, militarism, sanctions, hyperinflation, enforced poverty, war, and isolation affecting the population of Serbia during the rule of Slobodan Milošević."¹¹⁰ The goal of the radio was to establish a "parallel fictional world" where the ordinary person is removed from the current political, social and economic context that Serbia found itself in; it was both a reaction and product of civil society in Serbia at the time.¹¹¹ As Aleksandar Bošković explains, "the "parallel world" of *Šišmiš Radio* ran counter to the mainstream that promoted ethno-religious nationalism."¹¹² While Fleka's show was concentrated to the underground counterculture scene of Belgrade, Bošković notes that nonetheless "if *Šišmiš Radio* did not "act" directly, in the sense of political action or activism, it nonetheless participated in expanding what counts as political action in a moment of state nationalist politics, thus acting in history and on history."¹¹³

¹⁰⁸ Aleksandar Boskovic, *Underground Šišmiš Radio*, The Slavic and East European Journal, 65, 248

¹⁰⁹ Boskovic, "Underground Šišmiš Radio," 248.

¹¹⁰ Ibid, 249.

¹¹¹ Ibid, 250.

¹¹² Ibid, 250.

¹¹³ Ibid, 267.

While Milošević's regime, much like Tudjman's HDZ, utilized the media infrastructure and music as a way to push the goals and ideals of the government, Serbia differs slightly from Croatia in several ways. Firstly, due to Belgrade's already established counterculture and new wave movement in the 1980's, there was room and a foundation for political dissent and action. B92, the Šišmiš underground radio and groups like Rimtutituki, allowed for at least the people of Belgrade to have an alternative voice and a cultural space that allowed for political disagreement. It can be argued that the 30,000 people who attended the Rimtutituki concert against the war in Bosnia in April of 1992 had the cultural and political sphere in order to allow for such an event to even take place. Secondly, while Croatia was focused on creating an identity that is distinct from its Eastern neighbours and accepting the idea of Europeanness, Serbia chose to do the opposite. Serbia focused on creating a national(istic) identity with distinct anti-globalisation undertones, promoting anti-European and anti-American sentiments, rooted in the consumption of goods, in the criminal underbelly of society and glorifying the kitschy "backwardness" of rural communities as its foundation.

THE ARTISTS IN QUESTION: WHO ARE THEY?

Born October 27, 1966, in the village of Čavoglave in the Šibenik-Knin county in Croatia, Marko Perković, is arguably one of the most well-known nationalist singers from Croatia. At the outbreak of the war in Croatia, Perković joined to defend his village but while visiting Split for leave in December of 1991, he would soon leave the army and launch himself into stardom.¹¹⁴ Perković, who is better known as Thompson, nicknamed that for his use of the American Thompson rifle while serving in the army distributed a demo tape around the bars of Split before making his way over to a local radio station.¹¹⁵ Edo Gracin, the musical editor for

¹¹⁴ Baker, "Sounds of the Borderland," 37.

¹¹⁵ Ibid, 37.

Radio Split, played his demo tape over the airways which included the song *Bojna Čavoglave* over Christmas of that same year.¹¹⁶ Two weeks later, the song won the Radio Split's contest for most popular patriotic song before the entire country was made aware of the song; a local television station TV Marjan filmed a video for the song that made its way over to the HTV after several months and two nation-wide popular Split newspaper, *Slobodna Dalmacija* and *Nedjeljna Dalmacija*, raised awareness of the song.¹¹⁷

Just six months after the song was first played by Radio Split, Perković was signed to Skalinada, a private record label owned by Zdenko Runjić, one of the most well-known and influential composer-managers in Croatia.¹¹⁸ In 1992, the Croatian press supported Perković and print media played a very important role in creating the aura of a star around Perković and articles about the history of his village throughout WWII and the current war that was playing out, was used to imbue his image as a defender of Croatia. In the decades that followed, Perković would continue to record music and embark on tours across Croatia, Western Europe and North America gradually cementing a place as an icon in the Croatian cultural memory. In 2018, when the Croatian National Soccer team came in second during the FIFA World Cup, the team was welcomed back in Zagreb with a parade of over 550,000 attendees; the musical guest that the government chose to welcome home the team was Perković.¹¹⁹ Thompson has become a part of mainstream Croatian culture, and as Croatian historian Ivo Goldstein wrote, those who attend his concerts do not necessarily view themselves as right-wing.¹²⁰

¹¹⁶ Baker, "Sounds of the Borderland," 37.

¹¹⁷ Ibid, 37.

¹¹⁸ Ibid, 27.

¹¹⁹ Anja Vladislavljevic, "Nationalist Singer Joins Croatia Players at Homecoming Party," Balkan Insight, October 12, 2018. <https://balkaninsight.com/2018/07/17/controversial-right-wing-singer-a-special-guest-of-croatian-footballers-07-17-2018/>.

¹²⁰ Al Jazeera, "Goldstein: Thompson Je Mainstream i to Je Strahota Hrvatske," Al Jazeera, June 30, 2020, <https://balkans.aljazeera.net/news/balkan/2018/8/4/goldstein-thompson-je-mainstream-i-je-strahota-hrvatske>.

Perković has been accused of glorifying the Ustaša regime, notably through his use of the phrase *za dom spremni*, which, as explained in the historical section, mobilizes the memory of the Ustaša during the World War II. *Bojna Cavoglave*, the unrecorded but well recognized song, begins with this phrase. YouTube recordings of Thomson's concerts show how the crowd chants the phrase at his concerts. A publication from 2003 by IndexHr alleges that Thompson performed the Ustaša song *Jasenovac i Gradiška Stara*, which recounts and promotes the massacres that took place in the concentration camps.^{121 122} Following backlash over a planned 2007 concert in New York, one of the organizers, George Corluka, wrote in a statement that "once again, we challenge all to obtain copies of his official albums, and kindly ask to refrain from viewing or listening to propagandistic montages constructed and posted on the Internet by anonymous Thompson-haters."¹²³ Perković himself has been seen wearing Ustaša patches and symbols on his clothing during his concert, such as at his concert in Knin in 2015.¹²⁴ His fans as well wear shirts referencing the Black Legion or other types of Ustaša symbols. Several of his concerts were banned across Europe due to the political nature of his lyrics and he has been called out by various Jewish organizations for being a sympathizer of fascist ideology.¹²⁵

Mirko Pajčin, known as Baja Mali Knindza, was born in the village of Gubin near Livno in Bosnia and Herzegovina on October 13, 1944.¹²⁶ From a young age, Pajčin took an interest in

Commented [DM8]: If this edit is right here, please, share in a footnote a link to a YouTube concert by Thomson where it is suspected that he's sung the Ustasa song.

¹²¹ Matija Babic, "Thompson - Domoljub Ili Fašist? Konačan Odgovor Je...", index.hr, December 28, 2003, <https://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/thompson-domoljub-ili-fasist-konacan-odgovor-je/178032.aspx>.

¹²² *Jasenovac i Gradiška Stara (Live in Osijek 2002) [HQ]*, YouTube (YouTube, 2023), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dQnYQ4bRF1A>.

¹²³ Michal Lando, "Croatian Singer's Alleged Nazi Sympathies Strike a Sour Note," The Jerusalem Post | JPost.com, October 27, 2007, <https://www.jpost.com/International/Croatian-singers-alleged-Nazi-sympathies-strike-a-sour-note>.

¹²⁴ Lando, "Croatian Singer."

¹²⁵ Al Jazeera, "Goldstein."

¹²⁶ Milica Tomic, "Ovo Je Jedina Prava Istina o Baji Malom KNINDŽI: Ostaćete Bez Teksta, Tu Je Sve Apsolutno Jasno!," espreso.co.rs, July 14, 2022, <https://www.espreso.co.rs/viralno/svastara/1091907/baja-mali-knindza-biografija>.

songwriting and singing and moved to Serbia in 1980. Unlike his counterpart Perković, Pajčin never actively served or fought during any of the wars in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990's. However, as the conflicts began to erupt in Croatia and Bosnia, Pajčin became inspired by the events transpiring around him and the stories of his grandmother of the events of World War II, urging him to write and release music with nationalist themes.¹²⁷ His first album *Ne Dam Krajine*, "Not Giving Up Krajina" was released in 1991 totaling over 25 albums over the span of his career.¹²⁸ During the conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia, Pajčin wrote, recorded and released music rapidly, with 4 albums being published in 1993 alone.¹²⁹ His first album was released by Jugodisk, a Belgrade-based record label and subsequent albums from the 1990's were released by Nina Trade, a former Serbian record label that was known for producing turbo-folk and SuperTron, a former Yugoslav and later a Serbian record label.¹³⁰ While Pajčin did not actively participate as a soldier in any of the 1990's Balkan wars, it is important to note that the area in Bosnia that he is from has a large Croatian population. Both during the World War II and the Bosnian Civil War his native place faced large amounts of fighting with pronounced ethnic tensions.

Like Perković, Pajčin has been accused of promoting and spreading Serbian nationalism and Serbian far-right views based on the lyrics of his songs. Pajčin's fans are known to attend concerts holding signs that have overt nationalistic messages. He is an active supporter of Vojislav Šešelj's Serbian Radical Party and has been banned from performing in Croatia and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹³¹ While Perković is today part of the mainstream

¹²⁷ Tomic, "Ovo Je Jedina Prava Istina."

¹²⁸ "Baja Mali Knindža," Discogs, 2023, <https://www.discogs.com/artist/723086-Baja-Mali-Knind%C5%BEa>.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Ibid.

Croatian culture, Pajčin does not hold the same space in mainstream Serbian culture. His songs are well-known, especially amongst the generation that fled the conflicts and lived through them, yet he still stands on the fringes of the Serbian cultural music sphere; part of this could be his intense privacy and lack of public presence. Yet, Pajčin's songs have taken on a life of their own, and while in June of 2023 he sold out a concert of 10,000 at Tašmajdan concert venue in Belgrade, there are other artists, such as Ceca, that hold a similar level of celebrity to Serbs in the way that Perković does for Croatians. Another distinction that lies between the two artists is Pajčin's more aggressive lyrics but more private personal life, contrasted to Perković's more subtle lyrics yet increased public persona and presence. At the aforementioned concert in June, fans were caught holding a sign that read Vukovar in Cyrillic, referencing the Croatian city that saw high levels of conflict between Serbs and Croatians, as well as high casualties. As we can see, fans of both artists actively feed into and perpetuate nationalist narratives with references to both World War II and the Croatian War of Independence.

LYRICAL ANALYSIS

Perković and Pajčin's lyrical content serve as one of the key pillars that allowed these men to both flourish in their respective media infrastructures and to continue to have successful careers, both domestically and abroad. While both men have slightly different pathways to success, there is significant overlap between the themes that are present in some of their songs that were released between 1990-1996 (please see Appendix A and B). The following section explores nationalism themes by dissecting some of the most nationalist lyrics to expose the ways in which both artists utilized broader discussions surrounding the engineering of distinct Serbian and Croatian national identities as the backdrop of their songwriting careers. The songs have been translated from their original Serbian and Croatian into English. The following themes are as follows: Krajina/Knin, religion, defense/violence.

Krajina/Knin

The region of *Srpska Krajina* within Croatia, and specifically the de facto capital of Knin, serve as both a symbolic and physical theme within both artists' songs. 6 out of the 10 Pajčin songs selected make direct reference to either Knin or Krajina and 5 of these songs have either Knin or Krajina in the title. For example, *Krajino Krvava Haljino* (Krajina's Bloody Dress) released by Pajčin in his 1994 album *Pobediće Istina* (Truth Will Win) begins with the opening line "Krajina is burning, the Serb is fighting," and continues describing the way in which no one respects Serbs and as such, they must fight for Krajina; "Krajina must win the war." In the 1991 song *Za Krst Čašni* (For the Holy Cross), Pajčin sings of the land of famed Serbian kings Miloš and Lazar, which spans from "From Grahov to Knin, from Glamoč to Gubin." To Pajčin's lyrics, reveal the land of Krajina as historically Serbian and thus the right of Serbs to defend and occupy it. We can see the political implications of Pajčin's lyrics, as Serbs in Krajina believed that the Croatian state was a threat to them after the election of Tudjman and as such, felt the need to establish a proto state within the country.

In Perković's 1995 song *Anica, Kninska Kraljica* (Anica, Queen of Knin), he sings of a fictional woman who is stuck in the city of Knin and how he must "burn the countryside to Knin" and calls upon Croats to remember King Demetrius Zvonimir of Croatia, a mythologized King from Croatian history that had died in the city of Knin, "hey Croats, let's remember Knin, Croatian King Zvonimir." Similarly, to Pajčin, Perković utilizes both references to Croatian history and the name of a Croatian king to justify that Knin is rightfully Croatian, and thus must be "saved" from the Serbians. The images of fire and burning are evoked by both artists when describing unfolding violence. Historical myths, softly mixed with palatable music and delivered in lyrical constructions of past heroism and vivid imagery of suffering, gently transform into

legitimate truths claims over the ownership of Knin and subsequently Krajina as either rightfully Croatian or rightfully Serbian. Moreover, the lyrics, in accompaniments of folklorized musical arrangements, perform publicly and quotidianly the justifications for violence and conflict. It is fascinating to note how popular music works in this case: as a soft power, which is a mundane background, almost a noise, at the state-sponsored TV or radio at one instance, and a powerful ideologeme, which gets transmitted by state sanctioned systems and lived existentially and affectively by hundreds of thousands of people at another. The almost invisible (in their banality) registers of ordinary politics of popular culture blends with the high registers of state propaganda and militaristic violence in an amalgamated potion, which is lived synchronously and diachronically all at the same time, all at once, to produce the enclosed fiction of the ethnic national identity.

Religion

Both artists heavily utilize religion and religious undertones in their music as symbols. In Pajčin's song *Ne Damo Ti Tudjmane Ni Metra* (We Are Not Giving You Tudjman Even a Metre), he sings "in the Krajina of Orthodox candles, no one will ever turn them off," signaling the ways in which no matter what the Croatian government tries to do, there will always be Serbs present in the Krajina region as they can never be pushed out. In *Stan'te Paše i Ustaše* (Stop Grazing and Stop Ustaše), Pajčin sings the lyrics "we defend Orthodoxy" when discussing the region of Krajina. As we can see, both physical place and religion are tied together for Pajčin, representing the uptake in the late 1980's of religiousness and nationalism across Yugoslavia. To Pajčin, the place of Knin is a physical manifestation of the Orthodox religion, tying in again, Serbs' inherent right to defend the land. The lyrics exceed the claim that Serbs have the right to inhabit the area; it is a defense of religion, specifically preserving the Orthodox faith in Croatia.

In that way, the lyrics become a metaphysical claim about the eternal and irreconcilable difference between the Orthodox and the Catholic faiths and by extension it signals an eternal conflict between the nations that identify through these two versions of Christianity. The memories of the NDH with the history of persecution of Serbs get evoked in the lyrics as a justification for any violence that might be unleashed in the name of protecting the Serbs' right to existence in whatever is claimed to be Croatian territory today.

Similarly, in Perković's 1991 song, *Moli Mala* (Pray Baby) he sings "God and mother Mary love us Croats, they want us in this beautiful suite to live in free Croatia." The lyrics serve as a justification that Croats are meant to live in Croatia because God has given them that land and wants them to live there. We see this relationship between God and the right to land being played out by both artists as a way to supersede simply nationalist notions; the justification is religious and comes from something much larger than mankind. In Bojna Cavoglave, he sings "God's justice will reach you [Serbs], everyone already knows that." Religion is used as a justification for violence and the defense of the homeland; because the Serbs are infringing upon the Croatian God-given right to the land of Croatia, they will be punished as a result of trying to take this land away from them. By using religion and God as justifications for violence and conflict, we witness a continuation of rhetoric that was used to justify the mass ethnic cleansing of Serbs, Jews and Roma from the lands of the NDH.

Defense

Another popular theme that is present is that of defense. In Pajčin's *Tu Se Brani Krajina* (Over There Krajina is Defending Itself), he sings "Krajina defends itself there, sad mornings dawn," and in *Krajino Krvavo Haljinu* "My land, the land of heroes, The hearth defends, the days pass." Here Pajčin tells us that the land of Krajina inherently belongs to the Serbs, and thus

they have a duty and a right to defend the land from Croatians. This theme is at play with the theme of religion, as the justification for this defense and right to land leads back to religion and historical ties. Similarly, Perković's *Bojna Čavoglave* is an entire song dedicated to the defense of his village Čavoglave against the Serbian army. As he sings "A Croat stands by a Croat, we are all brothers, you will not go to Čavoglavi while we are alive." Again, in *Moli Mala*, "We will drive them all away by force, to bring a peaceful sleep to the homeland." The similarity between the two artists' songs is noticeable once one begins to break down and dissect the lyrics, and like Pajčin's lyrics, the theme of defense for Perković is interplayed with religion and the right of the Croatian people to that land.

Violence

The final theme present is that of violence. Both men have songs that are known for their explicitly violent lyrics, that portray their own ethnic group as being both a victim and a perpetrator of violence. However, as we have seen, this violence is justified because of the presence of other themes, such as religion, defense and homeland. As Dragojević notes, when an ethnic identity becomes a political identity, violence against the opposing ethnicity is viewed as justified and a consequence of wartime conditions. Several of Pajčin's songs, such as *Ne Damo Ti Tudjmane Ni Metra*, *Čuti Čuti Ujko* (Quiet Quiet Uncle [Ustaša]), *Dodji Kući Momčilo* (Come Home Momcilo [The World War II Chetnik commander]) and *Krajino Krvavo Haljinu* make reference to violence that will be perpetuated against Croatians, the enemy. In *Čuti Čuti Ujko* he sings "Shut up, shut up, uncle, I'll kill you", with uncle being used to replace the term Ustaša and in *Ne Damo Ti Tudjmane Ni Metra* he sings "There are no Croats there anymore," referencing to areas in Croatia and Bosnia that experienced bloody war in the Serbian-Croatian war. Pajčin's upbeat turbo-folk song and catchy voice means that these lyrics do not sound as vulgar as one

would think; they flow with the melody, and he sings with a playfulness in his voice. However, the violence against Croats in his lyrics work to prove the claims of his Serbian nationalism. It is important to remember that these songs were released while the conflict in Croatia was unfolding and violence against civilians was perpetuated every day by both sides across the country.

Similarly, in his song *Bojna Čavoglave*, Perković sings “Listen, Serbian volunteers, band of Chetniks, our hand will reach you in Serbia as well”, letting those Serbs that he considers Četniks that the wrath and violence against Serbs in Croatia will be replicated and felt in Serbia as well. From here, Perković moves away from defense and towards a violence of retribution and attack. Unlike Serbs in Croatia, there are very small Croatian settlements in the northern Serbian province of Vojvodina, which are not as remotely populated by Croats as Serbian settlements in Croatia. For his alleged performance of *Jasenovac i Gradiška Stara* (Jasenovac and Gradiška Stara), which references the concentration camps during World War II under the NDZ, the lyrics go “In Čapljina, there was a slaughterhouse, many Serbs the Neretva carried. Oh, Neretva flows down the side, carries Serbs to the blue Adriatic.” Again, in *Anica, Kninska Kraljica*, Perković sings, “I will burn the countryside to Knin, I will set fire to two or three Serbian headquarters”. While Pajčin’s lyrics do not necessarily fit with his playful voice and upbeat turbo-folk music, Perković’s choice of using a heavier rock sound and having a strong voice means that his violent lyrics fit into his musical composition. Here again history is used as a mobilizing and memorializing force in the Balkan conflicts, through his performance of *Jasenovac i Gradiška Stara*. Perković’s explicit threatening lyrics and his choice to perform an Ustaša song lean in support of individual assumptions that he is a fascist sympathizer.

CONCLUSION

In the MRP I attempted to tackle the question of what type of impact did both Perković and Pajčin have on ethnic relationships between Serbs and Croats during the Croatian War of Independence. My claim is historical: it is impossible to understand the soft power of popular music without the complex historical context of the creation and the collapse of the first multi-ethnic, multi-cultural experiment state in the Balkans. Popular music, disseminated through national media but also hummed in ordinary households and/or ritualistically performed in stadiums and international arenas, is the soft and normalizing language of historically constructed differences. Since Yugoslavia itself was imagined in a particular way (the peculiarity of this process is beyond the scope of the MRP, of course) as a multicultural, multi-ethnic and multi-lingual fictional deviation from Soviet uniformity, it is only logical to see how the mechanics of national identity formation multiply and iterate with predictable permutations into the repertoires of at least six distinct nationalisms today corresponding to six sovereign territories within the space of former Yugoslavia. My MRP attempts an intervention in two articulations of nationalism, the Serbian, and the Croatian, visible in the musical repertoires of two iconic national singers. Obsessed with remembering the past, where supposedly all the distinctions between the ethnic groups of Serbs and Croats are spelled out as religious truths, the nationalistic imaginary (and the pop music discussed here is part of it no doubt) needs to justify what the Freudian category of narcissism of small differences exposes with clinical precision. The Serbian and the Croatian nations pay more attention to minor distinctions in appearance, beliefs, customs, or ideologies leading to conflicts and divisions that might seem irrational from an outsider's perspective.

From the onset of World War II and the memory of both Ustaše and Četniks, to the era of Yugoslavia, to the gradual dissolution of Yugoslavia in a number of bloody wars, to the

processes of nation building in the newly emerged independent nation states, the media infrastructures and the artists and their lyrics, we have seen that the level of celebrity reached by both Pajčin and Perković was facilitated by several factors: the media infrastructures in both Serbia and Croatia that were in place, the context of their lyrics that were nationalist in nature and the undercurrent of ethnic conflict that was already taking place outside the realm of music. The perfect storm was created that allowed these two men to achieve the level of fame that they did and become cultural icons in their respective countries. Perković and Pajčin are both products of and parts of their respective governments, useful tools that had been utilized to not only to spread nationalism and increase support for the conflicts, but they are also byproducts of state projects of national identity. While one cannot know if these two men would be able to achieve the same level of success if the conflict did not occur, it is important to note that they serve as important icons of cultural production in Serbia and Croatia respectively. Perković continues to hold a high level of celebrity and has been completely absorbed by the Croatian mainstream culture. While Pajčin has not experienced the same level of fame, his songs continue to hold an important cultural significance for Serbs; it would be difficult for one to attend a Serbian diaspora event today without his song *Pevaj Srbijo* (Sing Serbia) being played and sung by the crowd. While ethnic relations between Croatians and Serbs have improved over the past 3 decades, ethnic and religious tensions between the two groups remain unresolved. While both countries deal with historical revisionism, right-wing populism and undercurrents of nationalism, I believe that increased self-reflection and analysis of the elements of our popular culture, similar to what is offered in this MRP, can allow for us to begin the process of working through our complex histories and relationships with each other. Perhaps if we begin to break down the musical elements of nationalism, we can ensure it will not be weaponized again in the future.

Appendix A – Baja Mali Knindža

Pajčin, Mirko. "Za Krst Časni." Track 4 on *Ne Dam Krajine*. Jugodisk, 1991, Spotify.

Od Grahova pa do Knina, od Glamoča do Gubina, odjekuju pjesme stare, oj Miloše, oj Lazare	From Grahov to Knin, from Glamoč to Gubin, old songs echo, O Miloš, O Lazar
Od Kistanja do Kosova, od Srba do Očestova, od Karina pa do Prova, sve je zemlja Srbinovala, od Karina pa do Prova, sve je zemlja Dušanova	From Kistanje to Kosovo, from Serbs to Očestov, from Karin to Provo, everything is the land of Serbs, from Karin to Provo, everything is the land of Dušanov
Od Peulja do Gračaca, Crnog Luga, Kazanaca, od Plitvica do Cetine, za krst časni Srbini gine	From Peulje to Gračac, Crni Lug, Kazanac, from Plitvice to Cetina, an honorable Serb dies for the cross
Od Žegara do Drvara odjekuje pjesma stara, od Vojnića do Obrovca, sve od Gline do Benkovca	An old song echoes from Žegar to Drvar, from Vojnić to Obrovac, all the way from Glina to Benkovac

Pajčin, Mirko. "Ne Damo Ti Tudjmane Ni Metra." Track 4 on *Stan'te Paše I Ustaše*. Nina Trade, 1992, Spotify.

U Krajini pravoslavne svece Nikad niko ugasiti nece Dok je Srba i Krajine bice Jos radjaju majke Obilice Ne damo ti, Tudjmane, ni metra Otadzbine naseg kralja Petra Zelio si Petrinju i Glinu Sahovnicu da stavis u Kninu A znao si, nece biti tako Krajsnici ne daju se lako Ne damo ti, Tudjmane, ni metra Otadzbine naseg kralja Petra Setices se nekad Vukovara Grada Knina i starog Mostara Bolece te i Kupreska vrata Tamo vise i nema Hrvata	In the Krajina of Orthodox candles No one will ever turn it off While Serbs and Krajina will be Obilica's mothers are still giving birth We won't give you a single meter, Tudjman The ancestral home of our king Peter You wanted Petrinja and Glina To put a storage shed in Knin And you knew it wouldn't be like that Krajsnici are not easy to give We won't give you a single meter, Tudjman The ancestral home of our king Peter You will remember Vukovar sometime The city of Knin and old Mostar Kupreska vrata will also hurt you There are no Croats there anymore
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Pajčin, Mirko. "Knindže Krajišnici." Track 2 on *Živeće Ovaj Narod*. Nina Trade, 1993, Spotify.

<p>Ide Mile, ide Mile preko koridora I on kaze, i on kaže da se proci mora. Ide Mile, ide Mile preko koridora I on kaze, i on kaze da se proci mora. Sta se ono tamo cuje, ko to peva u ravnicu?</p> <p>To su majko hrabri borci, to su knindze krajisnici. Sta se ono tamo cuje, ko to peva u ravnicu?</p> <p>To su majko hrabri borci, to su knindze krajisnici. Ide Mile, ide Mile, krajisnike vodi, Vodi bracu, vodi bracu Srbe ka slobodi. Ide Mile, ide Mile, krajisnike vodi, Vodi bracu, vodi bracu Srbe ka slobodi. Sta se ono tamo cuje, ko to peva u ravnicu?</p> <p>To su majko hrabri borci, to su knindze krajisnici. Sta se ono tamo cuje, ko to peva u ravnicu?</p> <p>To su majko hrabri borci, to su knindze krajisnici. Ide Mile, ide Mile kroz bosanske trave, A dusmani, a dusmani beze preko Save. Ide Mile, ide Mile kroz bosanske trave, A dusmani, a dusmani beze preko Save. Sta se ono tamo cuje, ko to peva u ravnicu?</p> <p>To su majko hrabri borci, to su knindze krajisnici. Sta se ono tamo cuje, ko to peva u ravnicu?</p> <p>To su majko hrabri borci, to su knindze krajisnici.</p>	<p>Mile goes, Mile goes across the corridor And he says, and he says that the sea must pass. Mile goes, Mile goes across the corridor And he says, and he says that the sea must pass. What is that being heard over there, who is singing that in the plain?</p> <p>They are brave fighters, they are knindze krajisniki. What is that being heard over there, who is singing that in the plain?</p> <p>They are brave fighters, they are knindze krajisniki. Mile is coming, Mile is coming, leading the Krajsniks, Lead the brothers, lead the Serbian brothers to freedom. Mile is coming, Mile is coming, leading the Krajsniks, Lead the brothers, lead the Serbian brothers to freedom. What is that being heard over there, who is singing that in the plain?</p> <p>They are brave fighters, they are knindze krajisniki. What is that being heard over there, who is singing that in the plain?</p> <p>They are brave fighters, they are knindze krajisniki. Mile goes, Mile goes through the Bosnian grass, And enemies, and enemies flee across the Sava. Mile goes, Mile goes through the Bosnian grass, And enemies, and enemies flee across the Sava. What is that being heard there, who is singing that in the plain?</p> <p>They are brave fighters, they are knindze krajisniki. What is that being heard there, who is singing that in the plain?</p> <p>They are brave fighters, they are knindze krajisniki.</p>
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Pajčin, Mirko. "Stan'te Paše I Ustaše." Track 1 on *Stan'te Paše I Ustaše*. Nina Trade, 1992, Spotify.

<p>U Krajini gde sam rodio se, Sad se neke uniforme nose. Moj je narod od davno u borbi, Mojoj braci glava je u torbi.</p>	<p>In Krajina, where I was born, Now some uniforms are worn. My people have long been at war, My brothers head is in the bag.</p>
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<p>Stan'te pase i ustase, Ne dirajte to je nase. U nama je srce lavlje Mi branimo Pravoslavlje. Na Kupresu krvave su zore, Caprasnije u plamenu gore. Svakog dana padaju granate, Kako si mi moj rodjeni brate. Stan'te pase i ustase, Ne dirajte to je nase. U nama je srce lavlje Mi branimo Pravoslavlje. Od kako je Bog stvorio ljude, Uvek drugi dodju pa nam sude. Uvek neko u Srbina dira, I u Bosni nema vise mira. Stan'te pase i ustase, Ne dirajte to je nase. U nama je srce lavlje Mi branimo Pravoslavlje.</p>	<p>Stand up and get up, Don't touch it's ours. We have the heart of a lion We defend Orthodoxy. There are bloody dawns on Kupres, Caprasnier in flames up. Shells fall every day, How you are my native brother. Stand up and get up, Don't touch it's ours. We have the heart of a lion We defend Orthodoxy. Since God created humans, Others always come and judge us. Someone is always touching a Serb, And there is no more peace in Bosnia. Stand up and get up, Don't touch it's ours. We have the heart of a lion We defend Orthodoxy.</p>
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Pajčin, Mirko. "Pjeva Srpska Krajina." Track 6 on *Živeće Ovaj Narod*. Nina Trade, 1993, Spotify.

<p>Sa Dinare pesme bruje, do srpskog se mora čuje, od Svilaje do Karina, od Štikova sve do Knina</p>	<p>Songs are heard from Dinara, and can be heard as far as the Serbian sea. from Svilaja to Karin, from Štikovo all the way to Knin</p>
<p>Pjeva Srpska Krajina, a dušmani bježe, Krajišnici pjevaju kad im je najteže</p>	<p>The Serbian Krajina sings, and the enemies flee, Krajišniki sing when it's the hardest for them</p>
<p>Odjekuje pjesma stara od Petrovca i Drvara, sve se ori do Strmice i do crkve Lazarice</p>	<p>An old song echoes from Petrovac and Drvar, everything is plowed up to Strmica and to the church of Lazarica</p>
<p>Pjeva Srpska Krajina, a dušmani bježe, Krajišnici pjevaju kad im je najteže</p>	<p>The Serbian Krajina sings, and the enemies flee, Krajišniki sing when it's the hardest for them</p>
<p>S Velebita, ko nekada, Žegara i Zelengrada, zapjevali hrabri borci, Bukovčani, kršni momci</p>	<p>From Velebit, who used to be, Žegar and Zelengrad, sang the brave fighters, the people of Bukovica, the rugged boys</p>
	<p>The Serbian Krajina sings, and the enemies flee, Krajišniki sing when it's the hardest for them</p>

Pjeva Srpska Krajina, a dušmani bježe, Krajišnici pjevaju kad im je najteže	
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Pajčin, Mirko. "Dodji Kući Momčilo." Track 4 on *Živeće Ovaj Narod*. Nina Trade, 1993, Spotify.

Oj Đujiću, legendo Dinare Bole li te uspomene stare Setiš li se nekada Strmice Stare crkve, male Butižnice Dođi kući Momčilo, kad gora olista U Krajini više, Momo, nema komunista Dođi kući Momčilo, kad gora olista U Krajini više, Momo, nema komunista Kada sunce sa istoka sine Setiš li se Dinare planine Jednog malog sela pokraj Knina Gde je majka rodila Srbina Dođi kući Momčilo, kad gora olista U Krajini više, Momo, nema komunista Dođi kući Momčilo, kad gora olista U Krajini više, Momo, nema komunista Setiš li se braće Peuljana I četnika svojih Kosovljana Otišo si, davno je to bilo Pre pedeset godina Momčilo Dođi kući Momčilo, kad gora olista U Krajini više, Momo, nema komunista Dođi kući Momčilo, kad gora olista U Krajini više, Momo, nema komunista	Oj Đujić, the legend of Dinara Do old memories hurt you? Do you ever remember Strmica? Old churches, small Butižnice Come home Momcilo, when the mountain leaves There are no communists in Krajina anymore, Momo Come home Momcilo, when the mountain leaves There are no communists in Krajina anymore, Momo When the sun sets from the east Do you remember Dinara mountain? A small village near Knin Where the mother gave birth to a Serb Come home Momcilo, when the mountain leaves There are no communists in Krajina anymore, Momo Come home Momcilo, when the mountain leaves There are no communists in Krajina anymore, Momo Do you remember the Peuljan brothers? And the Chetniks of their Kosovans You left, it was a long time ago Fifty years ago, Momcilo Come home Momcilo, when the mountain leaves There are no communists in Krajina anymore, Momo Come home Momcilo, when the mountain leaves There are no communists in Krajina anymore, Momo
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Pajčin, Mirko. "Tu Se Brani Krajina." Track 8 on *Živeće Ovaj Narod*. Nina Trade, 1993, Spotify.

Tamo gde su Čaprazlije, gde je rodni kraj Gde je Samar i Dinara, tu je okršaj Gde je Samar i Dinara, tu je okršaj Tu se brani Krajina, tužna jutra sviću Tu je prva linija i u Čelebiću Tu se brani Krajina, tužna jutra sviću Tu je prva linija i u Čelebiću	Where the Čaprazlije are, where the birthplace is Where there is Samar and Dinara, there is a clash Where there is Samar and Dinara, there is a clash Krajina defends itself there, sad mornings dawn There is also the first line in Celebić Krajina defends itself there, sad mornings dawn There is also the first line in Celebić
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<p>Tamo gde su Poparići, gde je rodni kraj Kod Stojića i Lunića, tu je položaj Kod Stojića i Lunića, tu je položaj Tu se brani Krajina, tužna jutro sviću Tu je prva linija i u Čelebiću Tu se brani Krajina, tužna jutro sviću Tu je prva linija i u Čelebiću Gde su ljeske Petlovića, gde je rodni kraj Đurani i Maljkovići, tu je okršaj Đurani i Maljkovići, tu je okršaj Tu se brani Krajina, tužna jutro sviću Tu je prva linija i u Čelebiću Tu se brani Krajina, tužna jutro sviću Tu je prva linija i u Čelebiću</p>	<p>Where Poparići is, where his hometown is With Stojić and Lunić, there is a position With Stojić and Lunić, there is a position Krajina defends itself there, sad mornings dawn There is also the first line in Čelebić Krajina defends itself there, sad mornings dawn There is also the first line in Čelebić Where are the hazel trees of Petlović, where is the birthplace Đurani and Maljkovići, there is a clash Đurani and Maljkovići, there is a clash Krajina defends itself there, sad mornings dawn There is also the first line in Čelebić Krajina defends itself there, sad mornings dawn There is also the first line in Čelebić</p>
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Pajčin, Mirko. "Čuti Čuti Ujko." Track 5 on *Još Se Ništa Ne Zna*. SuperTon, 1993, Spotify.

<p>Na radio stanici čujem neki glas "Halo ujko, ovde dedo, jebo li te pas!" Čuti, čuti ujko, ubiću te ja Znaš li onu našu "Stiže vojvoda" Palim cigaretu, dok pričam za njim Opsuje mi majku, ja mu uzvratim Čuti, čuti ujko, ubiću te ja Znaš li onu našu "Stiže vojvoda" Razmišljam sam dugo kako bi ga prešao Ali nam se Mujo u vezu umešao Čuti, čuti Mujo, ubiću te ja Znaš li onu našu "Stiže vojvoda" Čuti, čuti mujo, ubiću te ja Znaš li onu našu "Ne volim te Alija"</p>	<p>I hear a voice on the radio station "Hello uncle, it's grandpa here, fuck you!" Shut up, shut up, uncle, I'll kill you Do you know our "The Duke is Coming" I light a cigarette while talking after him He curses my mother, I curse him back Shut up, shut up, uncle, I'll kill you Do you know our "The Duke is Coming" I thought for a long time how to press it But Mujo intervened in our relationship Shut up, shut up Mujo, I'll kill you Do you know our "The Duke is Coming" Shut up, shut up mujo, I'll kill you Do you know our "I don't love you Alija"</p>
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Pajčin, Mirko. "Srbi Se Nikog Ne Boje" Track 2 on *Još Se Ništa Ne Zna*. SuperTon, 1993, Spotify

<p>Od davnina to se znalo, tamo gde se ratovalo, gde je rat i Srbin tu je, suđeno mu da ratuje</p> <p>Pušku u ruke i bori se, nikom ne pokori se, izreka stara to je, Srbi se nikog ne boje</p>	<p>This has been known since ancient times, where wars were fought, where there is war, the Serb is there, he is destined to fight</p> <p>Gun in hand and fight, don't submit to anyone, it's an old saying, Serbs are not afraid of anyone</p>
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Najpre Turci pa Ugari, onda Švabe i Bugari, protiv bure i oluje, suđeno mu da ratuje	First the Turks, then the Hungarians, then the Swabians and Bulgarians, against storm and tempest, he is destined to fight
Pušku u ruke i bori se, nikom ne pokori se, izreka stara to je, Srbi se nikog ne boje	Gun in hand and fight, don't submit to anyone, it's an old saying, Serbs are not afraid of anyone
Opet Srbin svima smeta, sam je protiv celog sveta, protiv bure i oluje, suđeno mu da ratuje	Again, the Serb bothers everyone, he is alone against the whole world, against storm and tempest, he is destined to fight
Pušku u ruke i bori se, nikom ne pokori se, izreka stara to je, Srbi se nikog ne boje	Gun in hand and fight, don't submit to anyone, it's an old saying, Serbs are not afraid of anyone

Pajčin, Mirko. "Krajino Krvava Haljino." Track 5 on *Pobediće Istina*. SuperTon, 1994, Spotify.

Krajina gori, Srbin se bori Opet granate moj dragi brate Topovi ječe, rane se leče Ognjište moje svetinja to je Topovi ječe, rane se leče Ognjište moje svetinja to je Krajino, krajino, krvava haljino O mili rode evo slobode Krajino, krajino, krvava haljino O mili rode evo slobode Primirje kao, mnogo mi žao Moja diko, ne poštuje niko Danas je nedelja, biće diverzija Ne daj se Nenade da nas iznenade Danas je nedelja, biće diverzija Ne daj se Nenade da nas iznenade Krajino, krajino, krvava haljino O mili rode evo slobode Krajino, krajino, krvava haljino O mili rode evo slobode Krajina moja, zemlja heroja Ognjište brani, prolaze dani I sve do mora trese se gora Krajina rat dobiti mora I sve do mora trese se gora Krajina rat dobiti mora Krajino, krajino, krvava haljino O mili rode evo slobode	Krajina is burning, the Serb is fighting Shells again my dear brother Cannons howl, wounds heal My holy hearth it is Cannons howl, wounds heal My holy hearth it is Krajino, Krajino, bloody dress O dear stork, here is freedom Krajino, Krajino, bloody dress O dear stork, here is freedom Armistice like, I'm very sorry My big brother, no one respects me Today is Sunday, there will be a diversion Don't let Nenada surprise us Today is Sunday, there will be a diversion Don't let Nenada surprise us Krajino, Krajino, bloody dress O dear stork, here is freedom Krajino, Krajino, bloody dress O dear stork, here is freedom My land, the land of heroes The hearth defends, the days pass And the mountain is shaking all the way to the sea Krajina must win the war And the mountain is shaking all the way to the sea Krajina must win the war Krajino, Krajino, bloody dress O dear stork, here is freedom
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Krajino, krajino, krvava haljino O mili rode evo slobode	Krajino, Krajino, bloody dress O dear stork, here is freedom
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Appendix B – Thompson songs

Perković, Marko. "Bojna Čavoglave." Track 9 on *Moli Mala*. Croatia Records, 1992, Spotify.

<p>Za Dom Spremni! U Zagori na izvoru rijeke Čikole Stala braća da obrane naše domove Stala braća da obrane naše domove Stoji Hrvat do Hrvata, mi smo braća svi Nećete u Čavoglave dok smo živi mi Nećete u Čavoglave dok smo živi mi Tuče thompson, kalašnjikov a i zbrojevka Baci bombu, goni bandu preko izvora Baci bombu, goni bandu preko izvora Korak naprijed, puška gotovs i uz pjesmu svi Za Dom braćo, za slobodu borimo se mi Za Dom braćo, za slobodu borimo se mi Čujte srpski dobrovoljci, bando četnici Stići ce vas naša ruka i u Srbiji Stići ce vas naša ruka i u Srbiji Stići ce vas Božja pravda, to već svatko zna Sudit' će vam bojovnici iz Čavoglava Sudit' će vam bojovnici iz Čavoglava Slušajte sad poruku od Svetog Ilije Nećete u Čavoglave, niste ni prije Nećete u Čavoglave, niste ni prije Oj Hrvati, braćo mila iz Čavoglava Hrvatska vam zaboravit neće nikada Hrvatska vam zaboravit neće nikada Neće nikada Neće nikada Neće nikada</p>	<p>Ready for Home! In Zagora at the source of the Čikola river The brothers stopped to defend our homes The brothers stopped to defend our homes A Croat stands by a Croat, we are all brothers You will not go to Čavoglavi while we are alive You will not go to Čavoglavi while we are alive Thompson, Kalashnikov and zbrojevka are fighting Drop the bomb, chase the gang over the spring Drop the bomb, chase the gang over the spring Step forward, gun ready and everyone sings We are fighting for the Home, brothers, for freedom We are fighting for the Home, brothers, for freedom Listen, Serbian volunteers, band of Chetniks Our hand will reach you in Serbia as well Our hand will reach you in Serbia as well God's justice will reach you, everyone already knows that You will be judged by warriors from Čavoglav You will be judged by warriors from Čavoglav Listen now to the message from Saint Elijah You won't go to Čavoglavi, you haven't before You won't go to Čavoglavi, you haven't before Oh Croats, dear brothers from Čavoglav Croatia will never forget you Croatia will never forget you They will never They will never They will never.</p>
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Perković, Marko. "Anica, Kninska Kraljica." Track 7 on *Vrijeme Škorpiona*. Croatia Records, 1995, Spotify.

<p>Zbog Anice i bokala vina Zapalit ću krajinu do Knina Zbog Anice i bokala vina Zapalit ću krajinu do Knina Zapalit ću dva, tri srpska štaba Da ja nisam dolazio džaba</p>	<p>Because of Anica and the jug of wine I will burn the countryside to Knin Because of Anica and the jug of wine I will burn the countryside to Knin I will set fire to two or three Serbian headquarters</p>
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mi odani smo tebi i Bogu jer Hrvati smo jejejejeje Iz pepela slavna zemlja niće krv Hrvata k nebu sada više ulaz je tu uzda svu snagu domoljubljenjem dobismo slobodu jejejeje O Domovino mi odani smo tebi i Bogu jer Hrvati smo O Domovino mi odani smo tebi i Bogu jer Hrvati smo O Domovino mi odani smo tebi i Bogu jer Hrvati smo tebi i Bogu jer hrvati smoooo jejeje	we are loyal to you and to God because we are Croats heeee From the ashes a glorious land rises the blood of the Croats is now crying out to heaven the entrance is there with all the strength patriotism gives us freedom heeeeeee O Motherland we are loyal to you and to God because we are Croats O Motherland we are loyal to you and to God because we are Croats O Motherland we are loyal to you and to God because we are Croats to you and to God because we must wrestle jejeje
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Perković, Marko. "Moli Mala." Track 7 on *Moli Mala*. Croatia Records, 1992, Spotify.

Hrvatska nam razrusena pati nasa gruda, svi Hrvata mati domove nam gaze, ruse, pale smrt nam siju crvene granate	Croatia suffers for us in ruins our heart, mother of all Croats our homes are trampled, demolished, burned death shines red grenades on us
Uplasceno tvoje srce malo uplakano tvoje lice mlado dok ja bandi, brojim zadnje dane znam ja duso da ti molis za me	Frightened your heart a little your crying face young while I'm counting the last days I know, honey, that you are praying for me
Ref. Moli mala, moli duso za me Bog i majka vole nas Hrvate zele nas na ovom lipom svitu u slobodnoj Hrvatskoj da zivu	Ref. Pray baby, pray baby for me God and mother love us Croats they want us in this beautiful suite to live in free Croatia
Sve cemo ih silom otjerati domovini miran san donijeti	We will drive them all away by force to bring a peaceful sleep to the homeland

bjezat ce i proklinjati majku sto su dosli u nasu Hrvatsku	he will run away and curse his mother since they came to our Croatia
Ne mogu nam nista napraviti snagom cemo vjecno postojati u Hrvatskoj stvoriti slobodu cijelom nasem Hrvatskome rodu	They can't do anything to us with strength we will exist forever to create freedom in Croatia to our entire Croatian race

Perković, Marko. "Rosa." Track 13 on *Vrijeme Škorpiona*. Croatia Records, 1995, Spotify.

Zapjevale ptice u daljini Ne čuješ ih, ne čuješ ih ti A zoru smo, a zoru smo S njima čekali Zaustila zemlja tvoje ime Spavaju mi u njoj sokoli Ne zovi me, ne zovi me Ne mogu ti doći Rosa, rosa Rosa sad te pokriva Hej, rosa, rosa Rosa sad te pokriva Zašutila pjesma kao more Ostavlja me sunce, ostavlja Nema zore, nema dana Prijatelja stara Rosa, rosa Rosa sad te pokriva Hej, rosa, rosa Rosa sad te pokriva Zapjevale ptice u daljini Ne čuješ ih, ne čuješ ih ti A zoru smo, a zoru smo S njima čekali Rosa, rosa Rosa sad te pokriva Hej, rosa, rosa Rosa sad te pokriva	Birds sang in the distance You don't hear them, you don't hear them And we are at dawn, and we are at dawn We waited with them The earth is silent about your name My falcons sleep in it Don't call me, don't call me I can't come to you Dew, dew The dew covers you now Hey, dew, dew The dew covers you now The song fell silent like the sea The sun leaves me, leaves me There is no dawn, there is no day Old friend Dew, dew The dew covers you now Hey, dew, dew The dew covers you now Birds sang in the distance You don't hear them, you don't hear them And we are at dawn, and we are at dawn We waited with them Dew, dew The dew covers you now Hey, dew, dew The dew covers you now
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Perković, Marko. "Povratak Bogu." Track 11 on *Vrijeme Škorpiona*. Croatia Records, 1995, Spotify.

Kada je Bog stvorio nebo	When God created the sky
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Zemlja tada bila, bila je pusta I vidije da tako, tako nije dobro I stvori covjeka svojega oblika Eto sve sto vidis Neka bude tvoje Oprosti nam Boze Tako se ne moze Razmazit cu ljude Izmislit drogu Stvorit muzicare I rokere vrele Zaljubljene I uzbudjene zene Posjec ce se trava Svirati gitara Pravit cemo samo Velike orgije A Bogovi postat Postat ce rokvije Skrenuo je covjek Sa bozjega puta Pa on sada negdje S tranputicom luta Rastjerajmo tamu Da nam jutra svanu Rastjerajmo tamu Da nam jutra svanu Zato Boze zaboravi sve to Vrati nas na ono Ono staro mjesto U prah i pepeo pretvori Oprosti nam Boze Ipak smo mi tvoji Rastjerajmo tamu Da nam jutra svanu Rastjerajmo tamu Da nam jutra svanu	The land was then, it was desolate And he sees that so, so is not good And he created a man of his own form That's all you see Make it yours Forgive us, God It can't be done that way I will spoil people Invent drugs Create musicians And hot rockers In love And excited women The grass will be cut Play the guitar We'll just make it Big orgies And the Gods become It will become a rock The man swerved From God's way Well, he's somewhere now He wanders with a tranputi Let's dispel the darkness May our mornings dawn Let's dispel the darkness May our mornings dawn So, God, forget all that Bring us back to that That old place Turn it into dust and ashes Forgive us, God We are yours after all Let's dispel the darkness May our mornings dawn Let's dispel the darkness May our mornings dawn
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Perković, Marko. "Moj Grad." Track 3 on *Vrijeme Škorpiona*. Croatia Records, 1995, Spotify.

Živim prognaničkim, oskudnim životom ja sam težak slučaj i teško me riješiti	xI live an exiled, meager life I am a difficult case and difficult to solve
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ja živim od tuđe milosti samo pamtim i želim vratiti	I live by someone else's grace I just remember and want to return
Kažu treba biti strpljiv a ti moraš zapeti da bi bio sretan i slobodan kažem sretan i slobodan, ah	They say you have to be patient and you have to get stuck to be happy and free I say happy and free, ah
Sve je to kocka kad je u pitanju igra a ti smatraš da je to neki veliki zločin jer svatko radi ono što hoće zato nismo svi isti, a šta bi da jesmo a šta bi da jesmo	It's all a gamble when it comes to the game and you think it's some big crime because everyone does what they want that's why we're not all the same, and what if we were and what if we were
Ref. Odvedi me u moj grad gdje je trava zelena gdje su djeca sretna odvedi me u moj grad, hoću kući	Ref. Take me to my city where the grass is green where children are happy take me to my city, I want to go home
Depresivan sjedim u hotelskoj sobi i ne sjećam se zašto sam ovdje načelnik zdravstvene službe kaže opasno je disati i zato zapalio sam još jednu cigaretu i ne vidim tu nikakve opasnosti	I sit depressed in the hotel room and I don't remember why I'm here the head of the health service says it is dangerous to breathe and so I lit another cigarette and I don't see any danger there
Ma kome danas možeš vjerovati ja htjedoh biti ratnik a oni učiniše da budem patnik Bože vjeruj u mene, prebrojavam ja godine i ja ću kao i ti Gospode na križ zbog slobode, slobode	No matter who you can trust today I wanted to be a warrior and they made me suffer God, believe in me, I'm counting the years I will also go to the cross just like you, Lord for freedom, freedom

Perković, Marko. "Ljuta Trava Na Ljutu Ranu." Track 12 on *Vrijeme Škorpiona*. Croatia Records, 1995, Spotify.

Od mog srca draga i ljubavi tvoje ima jaca ljubav ljubav zemlje moje	From my heart dear and your love has a stronger love the love of my country
Sjecas li se draga	Do you remember dear?

pricale su kise za ljubav se gine zbog hrvatske dise Ref. Ljutu travu na ljutu ranu dacu draga ja i zivot za nju ljutu travu na ljutu ranu nemoj nikad zaboravit' na nju Onu istu nasu kosulju pripremi na tavan je stavi, za mene je spremi bice ona opet i sinu po mjeri kao sto je bila mom djedu i meni Ref.	the rains spoke they die for love because of the Croatian disa Ref. Hot grass on a hot wound I will give my life for her, dear hot grass on a hot wound don't ever forget about her Prepare that same shirt of ours put it in the attic, get it ready for me it will be tailored to my son again as she was to my grandfather and me Ref.
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Perković, Marko. "Lijepa Li Si." Track 3 on *Vjetar S'Dinara*. Croatia Records, 1998, Spotify.

Kad se sjetim, suza krene Zamirišu uspomene Svake stope rodnog kraja I narodnih običaja Prepoznah ljepotu tvoju Što probudi ljubav moju Kad sam s tobom srce moje Kuca jače, veliko je Oj, Zagoro, lijepa li si Slavonijo, zlatna ti si Herceg-Bosno, srce ponosno Dalmacijo, more moje Jedna duša, a nas dvoje Pozdrav Liko, Velebita diko Lijepa li si Lijepa li si Kad Neretva k moru krene Ti se tada sjeti mene Mojoj pjesmi budi tema Za sve one kojih nema Ajde, Istro i Zagorje Podignimo sve tri boje Zagrlimo se pred svima Neka vide da nas ima Oj, Zagoro, lijepa li si	When I remember, a tear starts They smell the memories Every foot of native land And folk customs I recognized your beauty What awakens my love When I'm with you my heart It knocks harder, it's big Oh, Zagoro, you're beautiful Slavonija, you are golden Herceg-Bosno, proud heart Dalmatia, my sea One soul, but two of us Greetings Liko, Velebita diko You are beautiful You are beautiful When the Neretva goes to the sea Then you remember me Be the theme of my song For all those who are not there Come on, Istria and Zagorje Let's raise all three suits Let's hug in front of everyone Let them see that we are there Oh, Zagoro, you're beautiful
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<p>Slavonijo, zlatna ti si Herceg-Bosno, srce ponosno Dalmacijo, more moje Jedna duša, a nas dvoje Pozdrav Liko, Velebita diko Oj, Zagoro, lijepa li si Slavonijo, zlatna ti si Herceg-Bosno, srce ponosno Dalmacijo, more moje Jedna duša, a nas dvoje Pozdrav Liko, Velebita diko Lijepa li si</p>	<p>Slavonija, you are golden Herceg-Bosno, proud heart Dalmatia, my sea One soul, but two of us Greetings Liko, Velebita diko Oh, Zagoro, you're beautiful Slavonija, you are golden Herceg-Bosno, proud heart Dalmatia, my sea One soul, but two of us Greetings Liko, Velebita diko You are beautiful</p>
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Perković, Marko. "Jasenovac i Gradiška Stara." Live performance in Osijek, Croatia, 2002.

Youtube. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dQnYQ4bRF1A>

<p>Jasenovac i Gradiška Stara, to je kuća Maksovih mesara. Kroz Imotski kamioni žure, voze crnce Francetića Jure. U Čapljini, klaonica bila, puno Srba Neretva nosila. Oj Neretvo teci niza stranu, nosi Srbe plavome Jadranu. 'ko je moga zamisliti lani, da će Božić slaviti partizani. Tko je reka, jeba li ga ćaća, da se Crna Legija ne vraća. Gospe sinjska ako si u stanju, uzmi Stipu, a vrati nam Franju. Oj Račane jeba ti pas mater, i onome tko je glasa za te. Sjajna zvijezdo iznad Metkovića, pozdravi nam Antu Pavelića.</p>	<p>Jasenovac and Gradiška Stara, it is the house of Maks's butchers. Trucks rush through Imotski, they drive the blacks of Jure Francetić. In Čapljina, there was a slaughterhouse, many Serbs the Neretva carried. Oh Neretvo flows down the side, carries Serbs to the blue Adriatic. who can imagine last year, that Christmas will be celebrated by the partisans. Who is the river, did he fuck him, that the Black Legion does not return. Mrs. Sinjska, if you are able, take Stipa and return Franja to us. Oh Račan, fuck your mother dog, and to the one who votes for you. A shining star above Metković, say hello to Anta Pavelić.</p>
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