ADOLF HITLER:

THE ROLE OF THE LEADER

IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM

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SCOPE AND CONTENT: An analysis of the part played by Hitler in German history to illustrate the important role personality can play in determining political events. Particular attention is paid to the reasons for the downfall of the Weimar Republic to see what role, if any, they played in shaping Hitler's career; to a delineation of the kind of person who was attracted to Hitler's banner; to Hitler's ability to develop the N.S.D.A.P. and lead it to power; to Hitler's position in the formation of the Third Reich and his supremacy within that regime; and to the ideology that dominated his personality.

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INTRODUCTION

The study of totalitarianism today revolves most frequently around the social conditions preceding and during the regimes of Stalin, Hitler and Mussolini. For example, political scientists have found it very significant that there existed in the U.S.S.R., Germany and Italy such common factors as an emergence from the First World War with a tarnished military reputation; economic disorganization; an inability of parliamentary institutions to face the crises that befell these three countries, with a consequent demoralization of the liberal parties and a rapid expansion of extremist organizations; and a general air of unrest and desire for change which pervaded all ranks of society. Happy to find such comparable experiences in all three pre-totalitarian regimes, many political scientists have hastened to the conclusion that these are conditions precedent to the establishment of a totalitarian government.

In doing this, the factor of the personalities of Stalin, Hitler and Mussolini upon events has been all but forgotten.[1] The reasons why political scientists have turned to the study of social conditions are not hard to find.[2] Unemployment, income, social status and the like are capable of being tabulated. Personality on the other hand is a much more intangible matter, which is almost impossible to subject to "scientific" study. In the first place the personality student is faced with the inability of obtaining a full documentation on his subject, as government documents are either not available or only partially so.

He must base much of his work on biographies, which, the authors being but human, are necessarily tendentious to a greater or lesser degree, and, further, he cannot in the nature of things interview his subject. In the second place, his only means in many cases of evaluating the effectiveness of the leadership is guesswork, since the relationship between cause and effect may now be hopelessly obscured. Finally, it is difficult, if not impossible, to discover what caused people to follow a leader or what were the leader's motives in advocating one course of action over another. In short, the material is such that it just cannot be run through a computer and this, in itself, in the prevailing search for a "scientific" basis to political studies, may well be enough to prejudice many political scientists against undertaking an analysis of the role of personality in politics.

But there has resulted a serious imbalance in the field of totalitarian studies through this very neglect of the personality factor, with an over-emphasis in one part striving to replace a paucity of material in another. The study of social conditions is important, but it does not answer all our questions. For instance, the idea that various social and political factors are conditions precedent to the establishment of a totalitarian regime is incomplete to say the least. Admittedly there is a correlation between the extent of social disintegration in the old regime and the amount of innovation undertaken by the new. However, we question the assumption that social disorganization leads to any specific type of government, or, more particularly, that extreme disorganization necessarily brings about an extreme form of government such as totalitarianism. On the contrary, we argue that the

nature of the new regime is determined by the personal characteristics and ideologies of the man or men who make use of and exacerbate the prevailing social conditions in order to seize power in the resulting chaos. We hope to amplify and confirm this point in an analysis of Hitler and his effect on Germany.

The relationship between the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich is dealt with in the first part of this thesis. The factors that led to the downfall of parliamentary institutions in Germany between 1918 and 1933 are examined. An account of the rise of the NSDAP is also given. Finally, we hope to show why Nazi totalitarianism was so little influenced by the Weimar Republic.

The second part of this thesis deals with the relationship between Hitler and the totalitarian society that was set up in Germany. It is argued that the reason why Germany became a totalitarian country was that Hitler wanted it to be so. A few aspects of society under National Socialism will be examined to illustrate this point. An attempt will then be made to determine why Hitler felt the need to "co-ordinate"[3] his country. By way of a conclusion, the three questions of Hitler's insanity, uniqueness and effect on the world will be investigated.

CHAPTER ONE

THE MISFORTUNES OF THE REPUBLIC

On March 21, 1918, the German Army launched its powerful offensive on the Western front. Although in some measure successful, it had to be called off before its objective, Amiens, had been taken. Thereafter the initiative passed gradually into the hands of the Allies, with the result that by August 8 the German front had been broken. By September 28, General Ludendorff insisted upon an armistice "at once", and four days later Field-Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, in reiterating the High Command's demand for an immediate truce, stated that "the Army cannot wait forty-eight hours."[1]

Under pressure from the Army, Prince Max of Baden agreed to assume the Chancellorship for the purpose of seeking an armistice.[2] On October 3 he entered into correspondence with President Wilson, and a series of notes passed between the two men, the most important of which was the President's note of October 23. In it Wilson announced that "if it [the Government of the United States] must deal with the military masters and monarchical autocrats of Germany, it must demand, not peace negotiations, but surrender."[3] Espying a chance of obtaining some measure of leniency from the Allies, Germany did not hesitate to sacrifice the Kaiser, for Wilhelm II had lost the faith of his subjects. In him they saw the man who had led them into the war, and now that defeat was in the offing, they did not feel ready to shelter him from the consequences of it.[4]

At the front, as news of the intended armistice became known, the soldiers grew slow to risk their lives over a stretch of land from which in all probability they would soon be required to withdraw.[5] When the Admirals decided to steam out and engage the English fleet, thus meeting the "death with honour" required by their naval code, the sailors declined to accompany them. So effectively did the stokers come out on strike that, by November 4, a red flag flew from every ship. The success of the sailors' mutiny fanned the sparks into flames and revolution swiftly spread through Germany. The troops were in no mood to fight for their Emperor.[6] Faced with a mutiny, General Gröner took it upon himself to inform Wilhelm that "der Fahnenheid ist jetzt nur eine Idee." The oath of loyalty to the Kaiser no longer carried any meaning to the troops.[7] Confronted with the stark reality conveyed by these words, the Kaiser had no other choice but to abdicate. "Neither hand grenades, nor machine guns destroyed Imperial Germany, but rather a lack of faith in its right to exist."[8]

On November 8, the German delegation entered into negotiations with Marshal Foch at Compiègne for the conclusion of an armistice. When asked his opinion of the proposed terms, Hindenburg recommended that the delegation seek amelioration on some of the points, "but if these efforts fail, we shall have to accept it anyway."[9] The Armistice Commission included no representative of the High Command. This was technically due to Wilson's demand in his note of November 5, that only properly accredited representatives of the German Government be sent, but the main reason was the Army's desire to avoid the onus of responsibility for accepting the armistice conditions in all their severity. Personally appealed to

by Hindenburg, Mathias Erzberger had consented to head the Commission.[10] Thus, when the armistice was formally concluded on the morning of November 11, the document bore the signature of a civilian.

The Social Democrats had taken over the Government on November 9. Although the leaders of the party had hoped to establish a Constitutional Monarchy after the British pattern, the rank and file refused to countenance this.[11] Meanwhile, the Spartacists, led by Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, were preparing to announce a soviet regime. When news of this reached the Social Democrats panic stirred one of the leaders, Philipp Scheidemann, to act on an impulse. Seeking to forestall the Spartacists he went to a window in the Reichstag building and, without consulting his colleagues, proceeded to proclaim the Republic to a great throng of Socialists, who had gathered below in the Königsplatz.[12]

Thus was born the first Republic of Germany. It did not represent the fruition of a long-established movement towards it, but rather it was the result of two influences from outside Germany: namely, the threat of a Bolshevik Revolution inspired by the Soviet Union, and, secondly, the chance offered by the Allies of a more lenient peace through the rejection of the Kaiser. On its day of birth, Germany was faced with the collapse of the civil and military organs of authority. The infant Republic would have a severe test of its strength in its immediate task of restoring order into what had become something approaching chaos. The new citizens of the Republic experienced no great change of heart at its coming. Indeed the sympathies of its very progenitors were not undivided, for the leaders of the Social Democrats had sought to preserve the monarchy.

Up to this point the history of this party had been one of continuous opposition to the established government. Those called upon to administer the Republic were therefore unprepared for the task, and, in some cases, unfit for it. "There might be something of exhaltation in waking up famous like Byron," Theodor Wolff wrote to Ebert, "but it was less pleasant to find oneself in the morning the Supreme Commander of the Revolution after going to bed as a member of the respectable middle class."[13]

Polling for the National Assembly took place on January 19, 1919. The Socialists failed to gain a majority, obtaining 185 seats out of 421. The next two largest parties were the Centre Party and the German Democratic Party, which won 88 and 75 seats respectively. The only party which gave unambiguous support for the restoration of the monarchy was the German National Party, which received 42 seats. The Assembly met at Weimar on February 6 for the primary task of drawing up a constitution for the new regime. This was completed by August 11.[14]

The Constitution provided for a popularly elected President. It was his task to select a Chancellor who enjoyed the confidence of the Reichstag, the lower house of the bicameral legislature, which was elected by proportional representation. The upper chamber, the Reichsrat, represented the Länder. At the time the Constitution was hailed as the most democratic in the world, but, with the wisdom of hindsight, criticisms of it have been developed to help explain the collapse of the Weimar Republic. However, it is questionable whether these criticisms are valid. The fall of the Republic was due to the unscrupulousness of a minority which used its institutions for its own purposes. No matter what form

the Constitution had taken, this minority would still have squeezed the maximum possible amount of political profit from it.

Erich Eyck has severely criticized the use of proportional representation made by the Republic.[15] If the framers of the Constitution had expected the Reichstag to provide the country with a Government, they should not have expected it at the same time to be an accurate mirror of public opinion. The parliamentary system of government and proportional representation are, in his opinion, mutually exclusive. As it turned out, the Reichstag only fulfilled the latter role of acting as a reflection of public opinion by giving seats to numerous political parties. This multiplication of parties meant that every Weimar Government was a coalition of three or more parties. At the fall of a Government, usually caused by the withdrawal of one of the coalition parties from the Cabinet, there would follow an undignified shuffling of parties to secure a new coalition, supported by a majority of the Reichstag.

Eyck further argues that since the electorate was expected to choose between lists of candidates drawn up at party headquarters, the party leaders were given a disproportionate measure of power.[16] The electoral districts were far too large to allow any group feeling among the voters or between them and their representatives.[17] Thus the bond between the representative and the people was broken, which served only to lessen the voters' sense of responsibility for the calibre of the man they sent to the Reichstag. Moreover, the large size of the electoral districts meant that only those with the wealth of the party treasuries behind them could effectively campaign in them.[18]

Proportional representation cannot be blamed for the number of political parties in Weimar Germany. The number of parties that assembled at Weimar in 1919, that is before the Weimar Constitution was promulgated, was at least nine.[19] Traditionally Germany had a multi-party system. A single-ballot, single-member constituency system might have reduced the number of parties, but this was precluded by the wish of the framers of the Constitution to achieve a more subtle representation of public opinion.[20] These men were also influenced by a desire to prevent a recurrence of the situation that existed before 1918, when some urban areas were markedly underrepresented. Further, there is nothing inherently noxious in proportional representation itself that can permit a connection being drawn between it and fascism. Other European countries had this electoral system during the inter-war period, but only Germany and Italy produced fascist governments. The worst that can be said of it is that it exacerbated an already unstable situation.

Criticism has also been raised over Article forty-eight of the Constitution, which gave the President broad dictatorial powers in emergencies.[21] It has been pointed out that parliamentary democracy collapsed in Germany in 1932 when Chancellor Brüning used Presidential decrees in preference to Reichstag laws.[22] The fact remains, however, that at certain times of national distress parliamentary institutions are not suitable to deal with the crisis. Provisions must be made in constitutions for emergencies. Without these powers, it is quite possible that the Weimar Republic would have collapsed as early as 1923. For it was perfectly clear by that time that the Reichstag could provide

no suitable answer to the problems of inflation. By using these powers responsibly, Stresemann saved the Republic from an early death.

The framers of the Constitution are also blamed for failing to centralize the Reich fully[23]; for over-centralizing it[24]; for detracting from the legislature's powers by inserting provisions for popular initiatives and referenda[25]; for giving the legislature a preponderant place for which it was historically unprepared[26]; and for giving the President too much power.[27] Such critics blame the structure of the house for its inhabitants. It is pointless to argue whether institutions are democratic or not, for fundamentally it is the attitude of those who operate them that determines their character.

There is no factual basis for the legend that the German Army would have been victorious but for the treachery of the civilian authorities. As has been noted above, the German High Command had first demanded an armistice and had agreed, although unwillingly, to its terms. It is ironic that Ebert, a Social Democrat, the first President of the Republic and one of its mainstays until his death in 1925, should lay the foundation stone of the "stab-in-the-back" myth. As the first of the troops retreating under the conditions of the armistice reached the gates of Berlin, they were met there by Ebert, who welcomed them with this amazing assertion: "As you return unconquered from the field of battle, I salute you."[28]

Hindenburg testified to the truth of the legend. Before a Committee of Enquiry he read a prepared statement which blamed the civilian government for the Army's defeat.[29] By giving his support to it, he con-

firmed the "stab-in-the-back" myth for the German people. For he occupied a peculiar position in their hearts. During the early days of the First World War it soon became clear that the Kaiser was unable to fulfill his allotted role of national hero.[30] With the campaign in the West not going according to plan, the German High Command was quick to divert public attention to the Eastern front where in August and September 1914 Hindenburg's subordinates gained impressive victories over the invading Russian forces. Hindenburg suddenly found himself a national hero. A battleship was named after him. Parks, squares and cafés took his name. Huge wooden statues of him were erected and became something in the nature of fetishes to the German people, who would pay for the honour of driving iron nails into them.[31] Thus arose the Hindenburg cult. As a result of it, his statement was widely accepted as the true explanation of Germany's collapse in 1918.[32]

Although many did speak up against the "stab-in-the-back" myth, their protestations carried little weight. The fact that there was no truth behind it did not affect the strength with which it was held by the German people. According to Eyck, the cause of the legend was basically psychological and lay in the utter disappointment of the people's hopes. Many Germans had subscribed to democracy and a Republic in the belief that this would secure for them the mildest possible treatment by the men of Versailles. When this expectation was not fulfilled, they sought comfort in the illusion that the German Army had not been defeated. No one was prepared to accept the responsibility for Germany's predicament but "blamed instead 'the others', particularly those responsible for the November Revolution. And people found it all too easy to group with those

responsible for the Revolution, those men who, accepting responsibilities in that dark hour, had set to work at the hard and thankless task of reconstruction."[33]

The Republic thus became inextricably associated with the defeat of Germany in 1918. The "November criminals" gave Hitler and other extreme nationalists a target against which they continued to hammer throughout the life of the Weimar Republic. To a large section of the population they succeeded in conveying the idea that the sense of shame and national humiliation at defeat would not disappear so long as the Republic was allowed to exist. The Republic was never able to remove this stigma, which prevented many people from giving the regime their full support.

The German people were totally unprepared for the severity of the Versailles Treaty.[34] Having deluded themselves into expecting a peace based on Wilson's Fourteen Points, the actual terms came to them as a staggering blow. Mass meetings, organized up and down the country, angrily demanded that Germany refuse to sign the peace. At first the National Assembly fell in with this mood, urging with near unanimity the Government not to sign.[35] However, more sober second thoughts of a continued blockade and an allied invasion made them reconsider. Speaking for the Army, Hindenburg left the Government in no doubts as to its inability to defend Germany's western frontier.[36] And so, with noother real alternative, the Government gave its reluctant consent. The war was officially brought to a close on June 28, 1919, in the Hall of Mirrors at the Palace of Versailles.

Despite the Government's attitude to the Treaty, certain sections of the population held the democratic regime responsible for it.[37] Their indignation was particularly directed at five sections of the Treaty. In the first case, Germany's ability to arm was drastically curtailed.[38] The Army was restricted to 100,000 men, enlisted for a twelve year period. The General Staff was dissolved and banned. Germany was not allowed any military aeroplanes, tanks, submarines or weapons of offence. The occupied Rhineland and a strip fifty kilometers east of it were demilitarized. It may be cogently argued that an Army of this limited number was insufficient in view of the unsettled conditions in Germany and the menacing attitude of Poland.

Germany did lose a large amount of territory in Europe -- thirteen per cent of the pre-War Reich -- and also all her colonies.[39] In Europe a corridor was cut between East and West Prussia to give Poland access to the sea; Danzig and Memel were made free cities; North Schleswig was returned to Denmark and Alsace-Lorraine to France; the Saar was temporarily internationalized; and part of Silesia went to Poland. The Allies' one-sided moral indignation, directed at the allegedly incompetent German colonial rule, was bound to create an impression of hypocrisy. Although of small economic importance, the "theft of the colonies" generated much popular indignation.[40]

Probably the most explosive issue was that of Germany's culpability for starting the War. Article 231 demanded the acceptance by Germany of the responsibility "for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been sub-

jected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her Allies."[41] There was little point in telling the Germans that they were guilty if they did not feel guilty. As a result of systematic propaganda throughout the war, the majority of Germans thought that the war had been forced upon them by the policies of France and Russia. They might have accepted peace terms on the axiom that the loser pays for the war. However, they thought that their national honour had been insulted when they were required to agree that the blame for any hardships they might suffer could morally be laid at their own door.[42] It was probably this clause more than any other that made many Germans sympathize with extremist demands for the abrogation of the Versailler Diktat.

Under articles 227-230 the Kaiser and other German war leaders were to be surrendered to the Allies for trial on charges of violation of the laws of war.[43] Wilhelm II was safely in Holland, from where it was generally realized that the Dutch Government would refuse to extradite him. However, in the list of those wanted by the Allies was nearly every leading figure in German public life during the war: the Crown Prince; the war-time Chancellors; Field-Marshals von Hindenburg and Mackensen, Generals Ludendorff and von Falkenhayn; the Admirals of the fleet; and many others. Also included in the list were persons of less exhalted rank, such as the U-boat commanders, doctors accused of neglecting wounded prisoners and engineers responsible for the destruction of industrial plants in France. Such was the rage with which the German people saw their leaders branded as criminals, that the Government would certainly have found it impossible to arrest these men without provoking

a civil war.[44] These clauses, however, were never destined to be put into effect, as a German counter-proposal to try the listed persons in Germany was accepted.[45] Only a few lesser individuals were ever brought to trial.

The question of reparations was invariably a delicate one. From the start it was realized that Germany was completely incapable of paying for the total cost of the war.[46] Thus the central problem was always a determination of how much she could contribute. As this figure would have to take into account Germany's potential economic status, widely varying estimates were made. The men of Versailles set up an Allied Reparations Commission, which presented Germany in April 1921 with a bill for 132 billion marks.[47] The German economy, which was already beginning its collapse, was unable to bear this burden. However, according to German figures, the country had paid 51.7 billion gold marks by the end of August 1924. The Allies reckoned the total paid in this period at eight billions.[48] Under the Dawes Plan of August 31, 1924, Germany was to pay 2.5 billion gold marks per annum.[49] This she fulfilled by means of accepting numerous foreign loans, which in the seven years following the Dawes Plan totalled 10.821 billion marks.[50] The Young Plan of August 31, 1929, again reduced the amount of German reparations.[51] They were finally suspended under the Hoover Moratorium of July 1929.[52] According to the Reparations Commission's estimate, the total amount paid by Germany between 1918 and 1931 was 10.711 billion gold marks.[53]

The reparations question was always an unsettling one for the Republic. The payments were bitterly unpopular and no aspiring politician dared imply that Germany was legally obligated to pay for the damage she had caused by attacking her neighbours. The economic troubles and the consequent misery that afflicted the country were all blamed on the reparations. Despite Stresemann's successful efforts in reducing their burden, little credit for this was given to the democratic regime. As the Republican Government had accepted the Versailles Treaty and the reparations, all discontent generated by the hardships caused by them was turned, not against those who had started the First World War, but against the Weimar Republic.[54]

The First World War was an exceedingly expensive affair for all participants. It had cost Germany 165 billion marks and all her foreign investments.[55] At the end of the war she was faced with machinery worn out or in disrepair, a working population weakened by blockade and famine, a decrease in the yield of cultivable land and a badly disorganized communications system.[56] Under the Versailles Treaty Germany lost 14.6% of her cultivable land, 75% of her iron ore deposits, 68% of her zinc deposits and 26% of her output of coal.[57] On top of all this she was faced with the task of paying reparations.

By 1923 the German currency had collapsed. R. D'O Butler talks of "values gone crazy with noughts."[58] This inflation was partly the result of the backwash of the war. Instead of reducing spending power by cutting down incomes or increasing taxation, the Imperial Government had resorted to printing money to finance the war.[59] During the

period 1914-1918 the circulation of notes had increased sixfold and the amount of cash deposits fivefold.[60] These sums were absorbed by war loans as can be seen by a comparison of the 1913 and 1920 National Debt. Whereas in 1913 the Reich's debts amounted to 5.4 billion marks, in 1920 the total stood at 200 billion marks.[61] At the end of the war the exchange value of the mark was half that of 1914.[62]

Until the spring of 1922 the exchange rate was still viable: 290 marks to the dollar.[63] However, the increasingly menacing attitude of France, culminating in the occupation of the Ruhr in January 1923, undermined international confidence in the mark. An extra burden was thrown on the Reich Government as the passive resistance taken up against the French meant that it was forced to feed the millions of civil servants and workers in the Ruhr.[64] It could only do this by printing more money as taxation provided insufficient amounts.[65] The rate of exchange spiralled. By November one dollar was worth a hundred and thirty thousand million paper marks.[66] On November 20 it would have taken 2.3 trillion paper marks to buy one gold mark.[67]

An economic catastrophe s u c h a s inflation affects every level of society in a way no political event can. It put an end to trade, rendered businesses bankrupt, caused food shortages in the big cities and increased unemployment. The savings of the middle class were wiped out. Its full significance is noted by Bullock:

> The result of the inflation was to undermine the foundations of German society in a way that neither war, nor the revolution of November 1918, nor the Treaty of Versailles had done. The real revolution in Germany was the inflation, for it destroyed not only property and money, but faith in property and the meaning of money.[68]

It is easy to record the facts and figures of the situation, but the feelings of the people are harder to comprehend. When one expects to be able to buy a house with so many marks, but two weeks later one is unable to buy a brick with them; when those receiving wages used to proceed as fast as they humanly could to the nearest grocery store after they were paid, lest their money be rendered valueless before they reached it, then the world has lost its sanity. It was as if a lunatic had been let loose in the mint and no one could turn his idiot mind from its obsession of producing more and yet more paper money. The Germans never fully forgave the world for letting this happen to them; never again would they fully trust the Government which for one long year had made a mockery of their lives.

With the help of large foreign loans the years from 1924 to 1930 were ones of resurgence for the German economy. Just before the New York Stock Exchange collapsed in October 1929 the financial situation seemed very good indeed.[69] But as the Americans withdrew their foreign investments the crisis spread throughout the world. In Germany the depression began as a banking problem.[70] When, first the Darmstädte und National Bank was forced to suspend payments on July 31, 1931, and then other banks followed it, the Government was compelled to intervene. One of its emergency measures forced the banks to cut down and withdraw credit.[71] This led to a general economic crisis. With the withdrawal of loans, industry soon found itself in difficulties. Following the inevitable cutdowns in production, workers were dismissed or put on part-time work. The result was acute unemployment.[72] Of the total labour force in Germany,

14.2% were out of work, as compared with 12.5% in the U.S.A. or 12.8% in the United Kingdom.[73]

The effects of the depression were not limited to the working-class. The middle class, especially its lower section -- the clerks, shopkeepers, small businessmen, the less successful lawyers and doctors and retired people living on their savings -- was threatened not only with a loss of income, but also, as a consequence of this, with a loss of respectability.[74] Farmers were also hard hit, being caught between falling prices on the one hand and pressure from the banks for repayment of loans on the other.

Hamstrung by party differences, the Reichstag failed to meet the challenge of these two economic crises. Instead government by Presidential decree under Article forty-eight was resorted to. Seeing the failure of the Reichstag, the German people were yet again led to doubt the viability of parliamentary institutions. Further, extremist groups were able to channel the discontent generated amongst the unemployed against the Weimar Republic.[75]

One of the greatest disappointments for the creators of the Weimar Constitution was the failure of the German political parties to play the part expected of them. They had hoped to see the Cabinet giving the political leadership, while being checked and balanced by the President and the Reichstag. To have done this, the Cabinet would have had to exert a much greater influence over the Reichstag than it did. In practice, the irresponsibilities of some parties and the vagaries of others meant that the Government was never a stable coalition, but merely a tem-

porary alliance of differing interests, which might command a majority in the Reichstag when it was formed, but which soon disintegrated in the face of controversial issues.

The Social Democratic Party was in a difficult position. For many years the largest group in the Reichstag, it lay itself open to criticism by not giving more support to the bourgeois parties. If indeed it had done this a stable coalition could have been formed, but the party was wary of doing so, fearing to lose the support of the workers to the Communists.[76] By withdrawing their support the Social Democrats brought down the Wirth, Stresemann and Müller Cabinets. In 1923 Ebert had warned his colleagues: "Your reason for unseating the Chancellor will be forgotten in six weeks. But you will be suffering from the consequences of your stupidity after ten years have passed."[77]

The party found it impossible to adjust from being the party of constant opposition under the Imperial regime, when it had fought hard for the interests of the working class, but never had to bear the responsibilities of government. In the Republic, the Socialists could not forget their class consciousness long enough to work with other interested parties so as to provide a stable Government for the country. Their political shortsightedness is illustrated by one of their spokesmen who steadfastly refused to put "some imaginary national interest before the proletariat's class interest."[78]

The Social Democrats were not the only ones who sinned in this respect. Stresemann took his party -- the Volkspartei -- to task for a similar reason. First, he criticized the excessive power of party dele-

gations, which could bring down a Government by instructing its ministers to withdraw from it. This meant that ministers could have no political wills of their own, but were forced to serve the party organization. This, he considered, was an attitude "fatal to liberal democracy". He went on to warn his colleagues of the consequences of their irresponsibility. "Confronted by these displays of partisanship, many of our citizens are lapsing into a kind of passive resignation which is the worst thing that can befall a democratic state. . . . Party squabbling over the distribution of power creates in the people an attitude of indifference - if not disgust."[79]

The Centre Party represented Roman Catholic interests and so, unlike the liberal parties, did not lose votes in the face of the growing extremism in Germany. It was represented in all the Weimar Cabinets until von Papen came to power. However, A.J.P. Taylor bitterly criticized it because it was "ready to work with any system that would protect Roman Catholic interests; and in the last days of the Republic it stretched out its hand to the forces of destruction, just as in the last days of the Empire, it had turned to the Republicans." Although every party contributed to the fall of the Republic, none did so "with greater cynicism than the Centre - indifferent to the Republic, or even Germany, so long as Roman Catholic schools enjoyed their favourable position."[80]

The German National People's Party had started out its life supporting the restoration of the monarchy. This tenet was allowed to fade into the background in favour of extreme nationalist views, especially after Alfred Hugenberg became chairman of the parliamentary party in 1925.[81] The controller of large cinema, advertising and news agencies,

Hugenberg devoted all his money and organizing talents to the downfall of the Republic. He kept up a steady cry against Stresemann and his policy of Erfüllung: the fulfillment of the Versailles Treaty obligations, with a concurrent stand for their alleviation through normal diplomatic channels. Although he alienated many of the most influential leaders of the party and although, after 1930, the party's vote was halved by the National Socialists, Hugenberg was undaunted. He maintained his policy of embarrassing the Government whenever possible, until the Nationalists joined the Hitler Cabinet in January 1933. Five months later he was forced to resign.

The Communists were blinded by their determinist view of history.[82] Convinced that the Weimar Republic was the forerunner of fascism, and that the Communist revolution would come with the overthrow of fascism, they worked to weaken republican institutions and parties, so that they might speed up the pre-determined course of history. Completely failing to realize the threat of National Socialism, they ostentatiously disassociated themselves from the Social Democrats in 1928 in order to cooperate with the NSDAP in bringing about the downfall of the Republic.[83] They set themselves the task of destroying the German people's faith in democratic institutions. "The KPD shared with the extreme Right the responsibility of debasing the currency of politics to the point where party intolerance, the defamation of political opponents, violence, gangsterism, even murder, became an accepted part of German political life."[84] And so, with their eyes open, the Communists did all they could to facilitate Hitler's coming to power. Shortly after this purpose was fulfilled, the KPD was rooted out of the Third Reich.

As the Reichstag weakened the Cabinet, the President's position was inevitably strengthened. For, if the Cabinet was unable to command a majority in the Reichstag, it was forced to fall back on Presidential emergency decrees in order to pass essential measures. By merely refusing to sign these decrees the President was able to force whatever changes he wished in the Cabinet. Both Müller and Brüning were compelled to resign for this reason. Under Brüning the government of the country was carried on only by means of these decrees, for, when forming the Cabinet, Hindenburg had stipulated that ministers "be identified with no party coalition."[85] In other words, the Cabinet was solely responsible to the President and the Reichstag no longer exercised any effective political power. Parliamentary government in Germany was dead.

The years of the Weimar Republic were violent ones for Germany. Anarchy was never entirely wiped out: at times it threatened to engulf the regime. The general respect for law and order that is the basis of the democracies of the Western world seemed sickly and fragile in the Republic, in comparison with the strident illegalities from both left and right wing extremists. The Government's attempts to control the situation, often based upon the theory that the violent will only be curbed by violence, served only to weaken further the standards of constitutional government and legality.[86] However, when the Government sought to bring order to the country through the medium of the law courts, it failed to do so on account of the partiality of many members of the judiciary, which prevented them from seeing right wing extremists as the criminals they indubitably were.[87]

There were three reasons for this prevalence of violence. In the first place, as S.M. Lipset has pointed out, "acceptance of the norms of democracy requires a high level of sophistication and ego security. The less sophisticated and stable an individual, the more likely he is . . . to fail to understand the rationale underlying tolerance of those with whom he disagrees."[88] Before 1918 Germany had been a hierarchical society generally and within that society there had existed a number of rigid hierarchies, of which the Civil Service and the Army were the most noteworthy examples.[89] The basic characteristic of a hierarchy is that members of one either give orders to their inferiors or receive orders themselves. This means that within them it would be almost impossible to develop any political sophistication, that is the ability to reach a mutually approved solution to a problem by means of compromise. Threats to the stability of the individual were numerous during the years 1918-1933, and included the sense of national humiliation at defeat, the loss of savings during the inflation of 1923, and the threat of unemployment during the depression. Thus many of the citizens of the Weimar Republic were unable to meet Lipset's prerequisites for a stable democracy --"a high level of sophistication and ego security."

At the end of every war, the men who actually fought it, who have been conditioned to give and accept violence as their daily duty, find it difficult to readjust to the civilian routine. To many Germans the end of the First World War meant returning to stuffy offices and dull lives, and to people who during the four years of absence had become strangers. It meant the breaking up of the spirit of camaraderie and the close friend-

ships forged at the front, as the soldiers scattered to their home towns. Confronted with the sight of the profiteers and the slackers, of what was thought to be a feeble government of pacifists which had betrayed the Army, it is no wonder that many of the frontline soldiers felt completely out of touch with the bourgeois civilian existence that awaited them. They were the men, according to Waite, "who could never demobilize psychologically."[90]

The third reason for the prevalence of violence in the Weimar Republic lay in the collapse of the bourgeoisie in the inflation and the depression. For with them collapsed the bourgeois Christian morality with its virtues of respect, pity and gentleness. The consequences of this moral disintegration have been tabulated by Scheele:

> The amorphous mass of the nation abandoned itself to alternate fits of violence and enervation. Prof. Henri Lichtenberger noted the disappearance of that respect for authority, that administrative probity and strict discipline which had been the pride of Imperial Germany. Law no longer enjoyed respect, crime flaunted itself with impudent cynicism.[91]

In the political sphere this tendency to violence manifested itself in many different ways. The most spectacular of these was the Putsch. There were no less than seven unsuccessful coups d'état in the five years following the end of the war. The Communists made four bids for power: in November 1918; in January 1919; in March 1921; and in October 1923.[92] The right wing extremists were responsible for the Kapp-Lüttwitz Putsch of March 1920; the Küstrin Putsch of September 1923; and of course the Beer Hall Putsch in November of the same year.[93]

Political murder associations sprang up afterthe war. At their hands both Mathias Erzberger and Walther Rathenau fell. A conservative estimate of 354 political assasinations during the period from 1919 to the death of Rathenau in June 1922 was made by the National Minister of Justice.[94] Modelled on the medieval Fehmgerichte, the murderers, in the name of "folkish justice", would mete out death penalties to "traitors", into which category fell leading members of the Government, persons who disclosed illegal arms' caches to the authorities, and also former comrades with whom they had quarrelled.[95]

Many of those "who could never demobilize psychologically" joined the Freikorps, finding therein comradeship, understanding, economic security and a continuation of the military life they had come to revere. The Government used these Freikorps to restore order in Berlin in March 1919, when the Communists called a general strike. Armed with permission to shoot on sight anyone found in possession of weapons, they went on the rampage. Between 1,200 and 1,500 citizens lost their lives.[96] On April 30, 1919, the Freikorps were sent into Munich to crush the Communist regime that had been set up there. The Times correspondent reported that "all suspects of extreme views are shot without trial. Numerous notables disappear without trace. The press is completely muzzled . . . ."[97] Completely innocent people were murdered without compunction. For example, a group of Catholic workers of the St. Joseph Society, meeting to discuss educational and cultural matters, were interrupted by the Freikorps. Then, twenty-one of the workers, selected at random, were shot on the spot as

"Communist terrorists".[98] A conservative estimate placed the number killed in Munich at between 1,000 and 1,200.[99]

The NSDAP never hesitated to use illegal means to gain its ends. An example of Nazi hooliganism occurred in early December 1930, when the film All Quiet on the Western Front was shown. This film ill-accorded with the glorified National Socialist conception of war and also put the lie to the "stab-in-the-back" legend. Therefore, Goebbels organized his henchmen to threaten those who wished to see the film and to drive out those who did enter the theatre with stink bombs. The police were unable to do anything about it, while the civil authorities were sufficiently cowed to have the Chief Board of Film Review reverse its previous decision and ban the film on the grounds that "it would tend to endanger German national prestige."[100]

The NSDAP and the KPD shared the honours for political rowdiness. When the ban on the SA was lifted in mid-June 1932, street clashes between it and the Communist Red Front became all too common. The Police President of Berlin reported that in Prussia alone between June 1 and July 20 there had been 461 political riots, in which eighty-two were killed and four hundred seriously wounded.[101] In one particularly violent clash at Altona in 'Red' Hamburg on July 17, nineteen were reported killed and 285 wounded.[102]

The fantastic political situation at that time is illustrated by the events of July 25, 1932, in the Prussian Landtag. The KPD introduced a motion of no confidence in the Prussian Government, in which it also voiced its disapproval of the National Socialists by calling them a band

of murderers. Aroused by this unparliamentary language, the NSDAP deputies set upon the Communists, doing considerable damage to people and property alike. However, when order was restored and the vote taken, the National Socialists proceeded to vote with the Communists, thus insuring that the vote of no confidence was passed.[103] Goebbels noted in his diary: "In three minutes we were the masters of the hall. . . . One group sang the Horst Wessel Song. Eight badly wounded from amongst various political parties. . . . The assembly hall was one great shambles. We stood as victors in the ruins."[104] Both parties were deliberately set on cultivating a lack of respect for parliamentary institutions. As they steadily increased the number of their supporters, so, too, with equal steadiness did the chances of a democratic survival decline in Germany.

The founders of the Republic have often been criticized for their failure to weed out ruthlessly those persons in their employ who refused to give their allegiance to the Weimar regime.[105] These people were to be found in the military, the judiciary, the Civil Service and the teaching profession. Yet it would have been quite impossible at any time to have dismissed all of them <u>en masse</u>, or even large sections of them, before 1924. As the Republic had no trained men to replace those brought up to loyalty to the Kaiser, it had to make do with the tools at hand. However, after 1923 when stability was restored, the failure of the Government to root out the persons responsible for flagrantly treasonable utterances and acts within these professions is, to say the least, puzzling. Freedom of speech is not usually taken to include the freedom to incite treason.

The Army played a vital role in the Republic. Unlike other countries, Germany had never established the superiority of the civil authorities over the military.[106] It was generally recognized that the Republic depended on the goodwill of the Army for its existence. Having assumed this responsibility, the High Command was able to exert undue influence on the Government by simply declaring that it could not feel itself responsible for maintaining law and order if a proposed appointment or policy was carried out. By using this threat, the Reichswehr was always able to get its own way. The generals used this power discreetly, ostensibly maintaining their declared position of being above party politics.

The attitude of the Reichswehr towards the National Socialists was ambivalent. In the early days of the Republic the High Command was reluctant to offend Hitler, as it envisaged the incorporation of the SA into the Army should Poland declare war on Germany.[107] This consideration, however, did not prevent General von Seeckt, Chief of the General Staff, or General Gröner, Minister of Defence, from handing down strong directives in 1923 and 1930 respectively against aiding National Socialists, as they believed that should Hitler acquire power the country would be plunged into civil war.[108] No National Socialists were to be accepted into the Army or even employed as workers in arsenals and supply establishments. On the other hand, some of the more junior officers, bored by peace and the slow promotion in the small Army, were attracted by Hitler's promise to overturn the Versailles Treaty. Nazi propaganda began to spread through the lower ranks.[109]

General von Schleicher, "with a passion amounting almost to an obsession for intrigue and a marked preference for the devious and the disingenuous",[110] had no scruples against plotting with Röhm behind the back of his superior, Gröner. As a result of his machinations and Hitler's much vaunted adherence to the paths of legality, the Army and the NSDAP drew nearer to each other. Gröner was elbowed out of office in May 1932, while three weeks later Schleicher saw that the ban on the SA was lifted.[111] Schleicher evidently saw himself as using Hitler for the furtherance of his own influence. However, in the ex-corporal he had more than met his match. Hitler accepted these benefits but stood aside as Schleicher fell from power, ready to take his place. By giving battle in the political arena, the Army was defeated and its position of independence lost for ever.

The most flagrant examples of disloyalty to the Republic came from the courts. The judges had little love for democratic government, not even feeling that their oath of office bound them to the republican state.[112] At the death of Ebert, the Journal of German Magistrates devoted five lines to his memory.[113] The same publication, however, said of von der Pfordten, Judge Appeal of the Supreme Court of Bavaria, who was killed during the Beer Hall Putsch: "He is entitled to say of himself: Patriae in serviendo consumor."[114]

The courts seemed to consider a defendant's loyalty to the Republic as aggravating the crime. Thus, for example, when the pacifist author, Carl von Ossietzki, published an article exposing the clandestine arrangements that had been made to augment the Army in contravention of the Versailles Treaty, he was found guilty of "literary treason".[115]

Avowed nationalists, on the other hand, could expect the most lenient treatment possible. One of the murderers of Rathenau was reprieved and an accomplice acquitted.[116] Slanders against democratic politicians were barely punishable.[117] Anti-semitism was also apparent in the courts' decisions.[118] It is a trifle melodramatic to say that "the funeral dirge of the German Republic was a rustling of legal documents and writs",[119] but at least this statement conveys the truth that German democracy received no help from the judiciary.

Like the judiciary, the teaching profession felt few ties to the Weimar Republic.[120] The teachers had been brought up under the old order and maintained their loyalty to it rather than to the existing regime. The Republic failed to build up their material security and social eminence. This did not necessarily make them National Socialists -- although a fair number of the party fanatics came from their ranks -- but rather reactionaries. The children under their influence were taught that the present Germany was as nothing compared with the glories of the past. As a result German youth had no respect for democracy and fell easy prey to Hitler's stirring appeals.

The civil servants stood in much the same position as the teachers, although they had an extra grievance in that their salaries were raised and them promptly slashed with the onset of the depression.[121] Here again, the NSDAP infiltrated the service, although this was the exception rather than the rule. However, whatever the personal sympathies of the civil servant, the tradition of impartial service and the fulfilment of orders to the best of one's ability held firm. It should not be for-

gotten that at the time of the Kapp-Lüttwitz Putsch in 1920 the civil servants came out on strike along with the workers, thus helping to crush the rebellion.[122]

Under Ebert the Republic had prospered: under Hindenburg it died. Hindenburg can in no sense of the word be called a democrat. His own personal preference was for a restoration of the monarchy.[123] Yet for the first few years of his Presidency he undoubtedly did his best to fulfil his oath of office, but the strain of it soon proved too much for his advanced age. Easily moved, he inclined to agree with whomever he had spoken to last. Moreover, those who were momentarily in his favour could more or less bend the old gentleman to their will. Gröner, von Papen and von Scleicher all owed their political downfall to the fact that they had lost Hindenburg's approval.[124] With the additional responsibility of government by Presidential decree falling upon him, he showed himself to be more and more incapable.[125]

In 1932 Hindenburg was persuaded against his own wishes to stand for re-election by the parties which were in support of the regime. Unable to agree on another candidate, who could have been more active and more able in his defense of the Republic, they decided to back Hindenburg.[126] For Germany, such unwillingness to subordinate immediate party interests before long-term ones was a tragedy.

The majority of the German people stood apart from the Republic. It was not that they actually opposed it, although a minority bitterly hated the regime, but rather that they felt no attachment to it. The French Foreign Minister in 1925, Aristide Briand, spoke of this to Stresemann at Locarno. There were a large number of Germans, according to the

Frenchman, who refused to commit themselves to the present because they hoped for some miracle in the future. "If you ask them just what this miracle is going to be, they are unable to say. But the fond hope that a miracle could happen keeps them peering into the misty future - even building their homes there - and, at the same time, keeps them from casting their bright eyes upon the present."[127] To them the Weimar Republic was a period of transition, a temporary expedient towards some brighter future. For a regime to survive the trials that afflicted Germany between 1918 and 1933, it would need the full-hearted support of its citizens. The Republic never did attract this support, except perhaps during the months of the French occupation of the Ruhr. This being so, democracy in Germany lacked those extra reinforcements which might have shored up the structure against the storms.

CHAPTER TWO

THE NATIONAL SOCIALISTS

Having examined the disasters that befell the Republic, we must next turn our attention to the rise of National Socialism. As no political movement can exist without partisans, it is important to ascertain the type of German who was attracted to Hitler's banner. In considering the adherents of National Socialism, the distinction must first be made between the fanatical party members and those who merely gave the Party their electoral support. We argue that the former comprised a maladjusted minority and represented the extreme forms of the authoritarian personality. These misfits would have existed even if Hitler had never been heard of: he merely turned them into his most devoted followers by providing them with congenial outlets for their energies. On the other hand, the electoral supporters, without whose votes Hitler could never have entered power along the constitutional path he had set himself, had to be carefully cultivated. It was by no means pre-ordained that they should support the NSDAP, as both the KPD and the Nationalists offered alternative channels for their discontent. It was Hitler's genius as a party politician that ensured that they cast their votes for the National Socialists. In Mein Kampf, he explains the difference between these two categories:

> Every movement will first have to sift the human material it wins into two large groups: supporters and members. . . . A supporter of the movement is one who declares himself to be in agreement with its aims, a member is one who fights for them. The supporter is made amenable to the movement by propaganda.[1]

An examination of the authoritarian personality reveals the attraction of the NSDAP.[2] The basic motivating factor of persons displaying this trait seems to be that they are unsure of themselves and are, consequently, afraid to stand on their own. They lack a sense of conscience, either having had their moral values destroyed by some external calamity or never having had a chance to develop the faculty of seeing right from wrong. As a result of this, these people identify themselves with an in-group and accept uncritically every pronouncement that is handed down by the leaders of the group, thus substituting an external moral force for an internal one. They are unable to feel any resentment towards in-group members and thus any such feelings are channelled onto members of out-groups, especially if such persons dare to criticize the in-group and thereby endanger the authoritarians' sense of security. Any mental effort of introspection is shunned. They tend to think in terms of categories and also in terms of absolutes. The individual as individual loses his importance. He is to be judged according to whatever group he is placed in by the authoritarians and that group will be considered either good or bad, with no intermediate shadings, according to its relation with the in-group. As the feeling of the individual's importance is lost, respect for human life declines. There is a preoccupation with the leader-follower relationship, the authoritarians often inflating the leader's importance and then iden-

tifying themselves with him in order to overcome their own feelings of ineffectiveness. Finally, the authoritarians manifest a spirit of general aggressiveness towards the world, partly because their frustrations need to find expression outside the in-group, partly as a result of their contempt for human life, and partly because their sense of insecurity needs to be stilled by displays of violence and toughness.

The National Socialists provided the authoritarians with an in-group, with a leader who shared and understood their feelings, with a channel for their aggressiveness and with a cause to which to dedicate themselves. For the first time in their lives they had a sense of belonging. The NSDAP provided a haven for "the generation of the uprooted and the disinherited",[3] in which they could slough off their unwanted and ineffectual selves and satisfy their "craving for the dissolution of cursed individuality".[4] This is the reason why Hitler urged the SA to fuse its will with his.[5] The faith which the authoritarians had lost in themselves, they now placed in their holy cause. Seeking to merge themselves completely with the group, they had a passion for unity; seeking to renunciate the self, they had a passion for sacrifice. From such men as these arose the party fanatics, who years later at Nuremburg were unable to feel that they had sinned. They had simply followed their leader's orders, which for them had become the sole criterion of right and wrong.

People with authoritarian personalities can be found in every country. Their numbers in Germany during the Weimar Republic were, however, unnaturally high for two reasons. In the first place, a

person's moral values can be destroyed or seriously weakened when calamities of one sort or another threaten his hitherto secure life. In this respect the inflation of 1923 hit the bourgeoisie hard, as many of its members had come to link moral goodness with material success. When money lost all meaning, so too did their moral values.[6] Again, party membership in the NSDAP jumped during the depression years.[7] Indeed, at the height of the unemployment, for every unemployed worker the KPD won over, the National Socialists gained two.[8] Nor is it without significance that the small, independent businessmen were more highly represented in the NSDAP than other sections of the middle class. For, unlike the cartels, they were unable to maintain their prices, and unlike the working class, they had no form of unemployment insurance to fall back on.[9] To find themselves, formerly highly-respected members of the community, faced with bankruptcy, and hence, to their minds, disgrace, completely broke their confidence in themselves and in the way of life they had hitherto accepted. After 1928, the middle-class parties in the Reichstag disintegrated: by the 1933 election they maintained only twenty-one per cent of their 1928 total vote.[10]

The second reason for the higher than average number of authoritarians in Weimar Germany lies in Germany's social development, which tended to discourage signs of individuality. Under the Kaiser, Germany had been very much an authoritarian system and a reflection of Prussian militarism. This atmosphere pervaded not only the schools, but also the family. Here the father was the undisputed centre of authority, the mother's role being reduced to the level of Kinder, Kirche und Küche. The emphasis throughout childhood was always on fitting in with the greater framework and

being an unprotesting cog in the system, with a consequent denigration of all signs of individuality. Talcott Parsons has pointed out that the Germans valued their neighbours much more on their formal status in the social system and less on their individual characteristics. In support of this he remarks on the extensive and rigid use of titles in German society: very few people were just plain Herr Braun or Herr Schmidt.[11] The effect on the German people of the hierarchical society has been noted above.[12] The result of all this was to inculcate a tendency in the people not to rely on their own judgement, but to accept what their superiors told them. Hence, when Germany became a democracy, many of its citizens found themselves ill-equipped to deal with the decisions they were called upon to make. In the light of these considerations, it is easy to understand the attraction of Hitler's Führerprinzip, under which responsibility for such decisions would be lifted from their shoulders.

Although the party fanatics may have been ready at hand, Hitler had to attract the party supporters by his own wits. A political party with a revolutionary programme such as the NSDAP seeks to attract the votes of the malcontents who desire a change of regime. Despite the common assumption that most supporters of National Socialism were of middle class origin,[13] Hitler always sought to attract votes from all classes of society. He saw the NSDAP as the party above classes and indeed it was the first German party, apart from the Roman Catholic Centre Party, substantially to breach class lines. "A new nation", Hitler declared, "must arise from this work [of the National Socialists] which overcomes even the worst evils of the present, the cleavage between the classes for which the bourgeoisie and Marxism are equally guilty."[14] "We must on principle

free ourselves from any class standpoint."[15] The racial core of the nation "is not the product of any single stratum of society and certainly not to be identified with any such stratum."[16] "But with us in Germany, where everyone who is a German at all has the same blood, has the same eyes and speaks the same language, here there can be no class, there can only be a single people and beyond that nothing else."[17] "All classes must be welded together into a single German nation."[18]

Indeed, it seems almost as if Hitler despised the bourgeoisie. One reason for this may have been his failure to win acceptance in that class in his early days in Vienna.[19] Again the bourgeoisie represented to him the worst evils of Weimar democracy. The bürgerlich political parties, busily furthering their own selfish interests, never escaped his scorn. His dislike of the class is apparent in Mein Kampf: "Our present day bourgeoisie has become worthless for every exalted task of mankind, simply because it is without quality and no good."[20] His Secret Book, written after he had come in closer contact with national politics, is unremittingly abusive of the bourgeoisie. Hitler calls the class "incompetent, lacking any genius or ability to improvise." He accuses it of never having "possessed an idea of its own, but indeed a measureless conceit and money", capable of thinking only in "economical-political terms", of being "frivolous", "unvölkisch", on the side of Polish nationalism, "arm-chair politicians", "manic protesters", "corrupt", "hypocritical", and always "willing to deceive themselves over the real situation". It is anti-military unless the Army be a "burglar-protection agency of international-pacifistic stock-exchange interests". Its foreign policy is "most stupid", "senseless and indeed catastrophic". He talks of

the "theatric babblers of putrid bourgeois elements", of the "yelping of cowardly bourgeois curs", which is "unspeakably contemptible", and of "bourgeois stupidity and dishonest lack of principle, avarice and cowardice".[21]

Whatever Hitler's personal sentiments were in regard to the middle class, he was not one to turn up his nose at the possibility of attracting its votes. He was perfectly willing to make any promises that would bring it to his side. This fact only demonstrates that Hitler's attention to any particular interest group was strictly practical. His declared aim was to create a party outside the class framework, to do which he was prepared to woo each and every stratum of society. Thus he told the capitalists that they had "worked their way to the top through their capacity, and on the basis of this selection, which again only proved their higher race, they had a right to lead."[22] The peasants, on the other hand, were given to understand that they were the back-bone of the nation. In Mein Kampf Hitler wrote that the preservation of "a healthy peasant class cannot be valued highly enough."[23] For the workers there was yet a third message: "The German workman is surpassed by none."[24] The very name of National Socialist German Workers' Party was designed to attract converts from all sections of the population. Thus, as Konrad Heiden puts it:

> He did not hammer the same simple statement into the minds of millions; on the contrary, he played with the masses and titillated them with the most contradictory assertions. It is the art of contradiction which makes him the greatest and most successful propagandist of his time. He does not dominate the minds of millions, his mind belongs to them. Like a piece of wood floating on the waves, he follows the shifting currents of public opinion. This is his true strength.[25]

Neither the propaganda nor the practice of National Socialism could be termed wholly middle-class. Rather they were both eclectic, with Hitler ready to accept ideas from any section of the political spectrum.[26] The reason why Nazism is regarded as an expression of middle-class extremism is that itreceived a large measure of its support from the bourgeoisie. Hans Gerth has pointed out that in 1933 fifty-eight per cent of the Party could be called middle-class.[27] As for voting support, the collapse of the Weimar liberal parties with the concomitant rise of the NSDAP tells its own story.[28] There is, however, no reason to regard National Socialism purely as an expression of middle-class extremism. According to Gerth, nearly one-third of the Party in 1933 was composed of manual workers.[29]

The NSDAP had to compete with the KPD in seeking both party members and voting support. For they were both looking for the same kind of person -- the malcontent -- as is shown by the frequent interchange of members between them. Indeed, the number of ex-Communists in the NSDAP was sufficiently large for them to acquire a special name -- the "Beefsteak Nazis": brown on the outside, red on the inside.[30] Hitler often expressed admiration for Communist spirit and tactics, saying once "I have always . . . given orders that former Communists are to be admitted to the Party at once. The petit-bourgeois Social-Democrat and the trade-union boss will never be National Socialist, but the Communist always will."[31] Support for the proposition that the Nazis and the Communists were both cultivating those discontented with their lot also comes from the fact that Hitler had least success in the larger cities.[32] Where there

were large working-class populations, the Communist organizations were well established and the Nazis, consequently, found that their potential supporters had already been appropriated by the KPD.

Although the middle class might be in a majority in both the party ranks and the party's supporters in the electorate, this did not make the Third Reich into a bourgeois paradise. Once he was in power Hitler paid scant attention to the wishes of the middle class.[33] The importance of the party members and supporters is lost unless they are thought of as respectively those with authoritarian personalities and those with a grudge against the world. It was the personalities of such men and not their social origins that gave the Third Reich its character of violence and incoherence.[34] As Hitler himself said, "in the ranks of us National Socialists the disinherited of Right and Left must come together."[35] In the next chapter we shall see how Hitler used this human material to build up his Party and how he then led it to victory.

CHAPTER THREE

THE RISE OF THE NSDAP

On September 15, 1919, the Reichswehr sent Hitler to a meeting of Anton Drexler's German Workers' Party, in order to ascertain whether that movement could be of any use to the Army.[1] Thus began the association between the man and the Party, which, not so many years later, was to dislodge the Reichswehr from its proud position of dominance over German affairs.

Hitler did not take the movement seriously at first, hesitating to accept a position as the seventh member of the party's committee. At that time he had no intention of joining a ready-made party, wanting instead to found one of his own in which he could be certain to play the leading part. However, on the grounds that "this absurd little organization seemed to [him] to possess the one advantage that it had not frozen into an 'organization', but left the individual an opportunity for real personal activity",[2] he decided to join the Party. The years up to 1923 were spent in ensuring his personal dominance over it and in seeing to its growth.

By July 1921, the last challenge to Hitler's leadership had collapsed. Previously his high-handed methods of dealing with his fellow committee members had produced growing resentment. Consequently, when Hitler left for Berlin early in the summer of 1921, the rest of the committee promptly proposed that the party merge itself with other small

groups, in the hope that this would fetter Hitler's freedom of action. Hurrying back to Munich, Hitler embarrassed them by offering them his own resignation. This, they realized, was completely out of the question, as without Hitler the party would decline to the amateur organization it had been before he had arrived. By demanding dictatorial powers, Hitler provoked them into publishing a defence of themselves, in which they charged him with "furthering the interests of the Jews and their friends." Hitler thereupon sued them for libel. At this the opposition collapsed. Hitler was given virtually unlimited powers, while Drexler was kicked upstairs as Honorary President.[3] An examination of this incident would have taught the world not to underestimate Hitler's capacity to fight his way out of a tight corner.

At the beginning of 1920, Hitler was put in charge of the Party's propaganda.[4] More imaginative methods of recruitment were used, as Hitler set himself the task of bringing the Party's name to the attention of the public. Gradually attendance figures at party meetings were pushed up, until, on February 24, 1920, some two thousand people filled the Festsaal of the Hofbräuhaus.[5] Here the Party's new name was announced -- the National Socialist German Workers' Party -- along with the twenty-five point programme. Unlike Mussolini, who refused to be tempted into setting out explicit aims, the programme was a fairly comprehensive platform of social and political reform. Although Hitler always declared that the programme was unalterable, some parts of it, especially those concerned with big business, later caused him some embarrassment.[6] It would, however, be a mistake to write down these points as mere propaganda.

Many of them express some of Hitler's most fundamental ideas, to implement which he expended considerable effort in the twelve years following 1933.

In December 1920 the Party had acquired a weekly newspaper -- the Völkischer Beobachter. The money for this came partly out of secret Army funds and partly from Dietrich Eckart, an early member of the German Workers' Party.[7] Two years later the newspaper became a daily, the money for this being provided by individuals whom Hitler had attracted to the party doctrine, most notably Putzi Hanfstängl.[8]

The precursors of the SA were the "strong-arm" squads, which were first formed in the summer of 1920.[9] A year later they were organized into the "Gymnastic and Sports Division" of the Party. On October 5, 1921, they became known as the Sturmabteilung or SA.[10] Composed chiefly of ex-Freikorps men, their main task was to prevent the breaking up of Hitler's meetings by his political opponents and to break up in turn the meetings of these opponents.[11] A month after the SA acquired its new name, the Saalschlacht of party legend occurred, in which they expelled a band of Communist rowdies from a Nazi meeting at the Hofbräuhaus. In October 1922, they fought a pitched battle with left-wing forces in the streets of Coburg. To have been present at Coburg Day later became a mark of distinction within the Party.[12]

As insecurity and disorder increased with the coming of the inflation, Hitler stepped up his activities. The number of meetings and demonstrations increased and his attacks on the "November criminals" became even more vitriolic. Unlike other German nationalists, who rallied behind the Berlin Government at the time of the French occupation of the

Ruhr, Hitler demanded the removal of the Government of the "November traitors" as a prerequisite to taking action against the French.[13] The real enemy, he argued, lay in Berlin. This did not stop him from charging Stresemann with giving into the French when an end was made to passive resistance.[14]

Relations with the Berlin and Bavarian Governments became more and more strained as the Bavarians refused to take action against Hitler's scurrilous attacks against the Reich Government. By splitting the two Governments, Hitler hoped to be able to persuade the Bavarians to support a proposed March on Berlin, in emulation of Mussolini's March on Rome.[15] This, however, von Kahr, State Commissioner of Bavaria, refused to do. Realizing that he would get no help from Kahr and that, under Stresemann, social conditions were improving, Hitler felt that the chance of taking action was slipping away. Earlier in the year, an attempt to break up a meeting of the Socialists and Communists had turned into a fiasco when the authorities had refused to support the National Socialists.[16] Hitler felt that he must move now or never and this time he must not fail, thus risking the faith of his followers for good.

Such was the background to the Beer Hall Putsch of November 8 - 9, 1923. It is remarkable how near Hitler came to succeeding through sheer bluff. In fact, had von Kahr, Seisser and von Lossow not been allowed to slip away from the Bürgerbräukeller and so deny their previous consent to join Hitler's National Government, it is conceivable that Hitler might at least have gained control of Bavaria. From the moment he boldly entered the hall and informed those present that the Bavarian and Reich Governments had been removed to the last desperate march on the

War Ministry the next morning, Hitler had tried to give an impression of strength, for which there was little material support.[17]

The fact that he, who had started from nothing less than four years ago, had persuaded Kahr to shake hands with him before the cheering crowd at the Bürgerbräukeller and Generals Ludendorff and Lossow to agree to serve under him, was, as Bullock puts it, "evidence of political talent of an unusual kind."[18] However, acting on the spur of the moment as he did, the Putsch was badly organized in that Hitler had not thought out any plans, but was improvising as he went along.[19] Also, the forces that he had at his disposal were not given the chance to concentrate before the night of November 8 and so could not take over any of the key-points of the city.[20]

The reason for this lack of organization lay in Hitler's belief that, once given the opportunity, the civil and military authorities would follow his lead. "We never thought to carry through a revolt against the Army: it was with it that we thought that we should succeed."[21] This belief was shattered noisily, and bloodily on the morning of November 9, when a police contingent fired down the narrow Residenzstrasse, up which between two and three thousand men were marching with Hitler and Ludendorff at their head.[22]

The most remarkable fact of the ill-starred Putsch was a further demonstration of Hitler's ability to come up fighting after what seemed the final blow to his hopes as a political leader. His chance came in his trial for treason which began on February 26, 1924. It lasted twenty-four days and in the witness stand Hitler found a platform from which he could, for the first time, make his voice heard throughout Germany.

The judges were exceedingly lenient towards his outbursts, only mildly rebuking him for his interruptions.[23] He proceeded to calumniate the Weimar Republic -- "What are our forms of Government today but organs for executing the will of foreign tyrants?"[24] -- and to utter threats against it. His line of defence was that, since the founders of the present regime in Germany were traitors to the German people, he himself was not a traitor but, on the contrary, a true German patriot. "There is no such thing as high treason against the traitors of 1918."[25] Openly admitting his own part in the Putsch, he reproached Kahr, Seisser and Lossow for ruining the chance they had of helping Germany. His closing speech ended: "You [the Court] may declare us guilty a thousand times, but the Goddess, who presides over the Eternal Court of History, will with a smile tear in pieces the charge of the Public Prosecutor and the judgement of the Court: for she declares us guiltless."[26]

Evidently determined not to anger the Goddess unduly, the judges acquitted Ludendorff. Hitler was given the minimum sentence of five years imprisonment and was not deported as required by law.[27] Had he in fact served his whole sentence, he would not have been released until 1929, when, without having been able to rebuild the party organization, it is possible that he would have been unable to reap the benefits that the depression showered upon him. In fact he only served about nine months, during which time he lived in considerable comfort in the fortress at Landsberg. The time was spent in receiving visitors and in dictating Mein Kampf.

During his months of imprisonment, the NSDAP disintegrated.[28] The Party was proscribed and the Völkischer Beobachter suppressed. Most of its leaders were under arrest. Rosenberg, a man unable to make up his mind or assert his authority, was left in charge. Without Hitler's dominating influence the Party began to fight within itself. This Hitler did nothing to discourage, preferring rather to see the Party collapse than let a possible rival entrench himself at its head. On December 20, Hitler was released and set about to re-build the Party almost from scratch.

He had outlined his new policy of legality to Kurt Ludecke while in Landsberg.

> When I resume active work it will be necessary to pursue a new policy. Instead of working to achieve an armed coup, we shall have to hold our noses and enter the Reichstag against the Catholic and Marxist deputies. If out-voting them takes longer than outshooting them, at least the results will be guaranteed by their own Constitution! Any lawful process is slow. . . . Sooner or later, we shall have a majority -- and after that, Germany. I am convinced that this is our best line of action, now that conditions in the country have changed so radically.[29]

The conditions to which Hitler refers were those which were bringing about the gradual stabilization of the country. With increasing prosperity, the revolutionary situation of 1923 was fading. A further cause of his legality campaign was the realization that without the Army behind him, he would never gain control of Germany. The Party had to become respectable.

The years 1924 - 1928 were spent strengthening the organization of the Party. At the end of 1928, Hitler was still a small-time politi-

cian, little known outside the South. Even in Bavaria he was regarded as part of the political lunatic-fringe.[30] Throughout these years Germany refused to take him seriously; his antics aroused, if not indifference, then feelings of contempt or amusement.[31] The striking quality of his leadership in this period was "the fact that he never let go, never lost faith in himself and was able to communicate this, to keep the faith of others alive, in the belief that some time a crack would come and the tide at last begin to flow in his favour."[32]

Hitler's first move was to make his peace with the Bavarian Government, with the result that the ban on the NSDAP was lifted and the Völkischer Beobachter reappeared on February 26, 1925.[33] However, he soon overstepped the mark. The alarmed authorities in many of the Länder prohibited him from speaking in public.[34] Hitler turned his attention to party organization. He divided Germany into thirty-four Gaue, which roughly equalled the Reichstag electoral districts. Each Gau was subdivided down to the lowest unit, the cell, which corresponded to a SA squad. At the head of each Gau was a Gauleiter, personally appointed by Hitler. Several subsidiary party organizations were created: the Hitler Youth, the Nazi Schoolchildren's League, the Students' League, the Order of German Women, a Nazi Teachers' Organization and unions of Nazi Lawyers and Nazi Physicians.[35]

"In the world of normalcy, a Nothing, in chaos, a Titan."[36] This is Konrad Heiden's judgement of Hitler. Although we argue that Hitler was a danger and a lurking menace whatever the social conditions -- witness the careful organization of the Party, his ability to hold it loyal to him during the uneventful years of 1925 - 1928, and the further fact

that during this period party membership jumped from 27,000 to 108,000[37]-- it is undoubtedly true that he thrived in times of social distress. The discontent generated by the worsening economic conditions after 1928 gave him the voting fodder he so urgently needed to carry through his plans of legality.

He first made his weight felt in German national politics in the agitation over the Young Plan. Hugenberg placed his chain of newspapers at his disposal, by means of which he made himself a familiar figure throughout Germany.[38] From October 1929 onwards the National Socialists started to make impressive gains in the provincial elections and in the Reichstag election of the following year, the NSDAP made a spectacular leap. From the 1928 election, when theypolled less than a million votes and were allotted twelve seats in the Reichstag, the number of votes jumped to 6,409,600 and the number of seats to 107, making them second only in size to the Social Democrats.[39]

The Party was now over its most difficult period. Hitler was no longer regarded as a crank. All Germany sat up and started taking notice. This included the big industrialists who, with their highly developed sense of self-preservation, were in the habit of buying the sympathies of those political parties which looked as if they might one day form a Government.[40] As a result of this, the financial worries of the NSDAP were removed. To persuade the industrialists to loosen their purse-strings, Hitler played down the left-wing of his Party. Otto Strasser was driven out when he refused to change his radical attitude. In a speech to the Industry Club at Düsseldorf in January 1932, Hitler spoke for two and a half hours and managed to convert a hostile audience

into an enthusiastic one.[41] But if the men of business thought that they had bought Hitler, they were later to be sadly disillusioned when they realized that instead of giving orders to him, they, along with the rest of Germany, were to be reduced to doing what they were told without argument. "They were to discover . . . that, contrary to popular belief, bankers and business men are too innocent for politics when the game is played by a man like Hitler."[42]

Hitler set himself the task of bringing the Army into sympathy with the National Socialist movement. In a speech of March 1929, he urged the Reichswehr to stop considering itself above politics. It must come down fairly and squarely on the side of the National Socialists or else it would find itself under the orders of the Bolsheviks.[43] This appeal and the promise to expand the Army found an echo with the younger officers. Although soldiers were expressly forbidden to belong to the NSDAP, some infiltration took place. Three lieutenants were charged in February 1930 with spreading Nazi propaganda in the Army.[44]

When their case came before the Supreme Court at Leipzig, Hitler was called as a witness for the defence. He used the opportunity to allay the High Command's doubts as to his constitutionalism and also as to the role of the SA. "The basic principle is", he declared, "that if a party regulation conflicts with the law it is not to be carried out. Many party members have been expelled [for contravening this principle], among them Otto Strasser, who toyed with the idea of revolution."[45] As for the SA, their sole object was, according to Hitler, the protection of National Socialist propaganda. In 1925 he had given orders that the SA should carry no weapons and that it should in no way have a military

character. After the war, General Jodl admitted at Nuremburg that he had been fully reassured by Hitler's testimony.[46]

As the Party grew bigger, Hitler's authority as sole arbiter of the party line was challenged, notably by Gregor Strasser. Strasser had been placed in charge of the Party in Northern Germany, where he had built up a very efficient organization, which was more loyal to him and his left-wing views than to Hitler.[47] As the clashes of opinion between Munich and Berlin became more frequent, the Party seemed destined to split. At one stage, Strasser's protégé, Goebbels, demanded that "the petit-bourgeois Adolf Hitler be expelled from the National Socialist Party."[48] Hitler handled the challenge to his power skillfully. He called a meeting in South Germany on a day whennorthern Gauleiters would have difficulty in attending. With the majority of party officials present behind him, he completely outmanoeuvered Strasser. Having beaten him on all counts, he then won Strasser around by adopting a conciliatory attitude. Thus the split was papered over. Hitler scored a further victory in winning Goebbels over to his camp.[49]

To control party bickering and challenges to his authority, Hitler set up a party court -- the Uschla -- in 1926.[50] Breaches of the criminal law were not its concern. Its main task was to maintain party discipline. Hitler ensured that the officials of the court were loyal to him, and so turned it into an effective instrument for strengthening his hold over the Party.

Until 1934 Hitler never really solved the problems posed by the SA, which under Röhm had become a highly efficient fighting force.[51] After Gregor Strasser had been brought to heel, the SA became the repository of left-wing views within the Party.[52] It also demanded that in the National Socialist state, it be treated on an equal footing with the Army.[53] Hitler was faced with the delicate question of how to check this independent attitude without at the same time damaging its revolutionary fervour. The situation grew increasingly out of control as SA brawling became more violent with the onset of the depression. Plans were found in 1932 showing that preparations had been made by the SA to carry out a coup d'état and as a result the SA was banned for a period.[54] Röhm hesitated to obey this ban, thinking of resisting it with violence, until Hitler ordered him sharply to comply with it.[55] After January 1933 the SA became insistent in its demand for a radical Second Revolution.[56] Hitler finally settled the matter by violence on the night of June 30, 1934. About eighty men lost their lives, including Röhm, Gregor Strasser and Schleicher.[57]

The twenty-nine months following the September 1930 Reichstag elections were ones of intrigue and violence. Hitler was constantly manoeuvering to improve his position and the picture was certainly made no clearer by the backstage manipulations of Schleicher. President Hindenburg was now completely incapable of following what was going on, making use of his emergency powers in accordance with the instructions of his current favourites.[58] The large National Socialist bloc in the Reichstag prevented any attempt by that body to exercise effective control over the Government.[59]

Hitler's political genius at this time was clearly shown in his ability to hold out against tempting offers to bring the NSDAP into a coalition government[60], and in his ability to prevent the disintegration of his Party. Hitler was determined to be in a position in which he could either criticize the Government ruthlessly or actually control the Government himself. Especially after the November 1932 election, in which the NSDAP lost some two million votes, Schleicher's offer must have been tempting.[61] But Hitler was adamant: he himself must have the Chancellorship.

The strain on the Party throughout 1932 was enormous. Two Presidential and two Reichstag elections more than exhausted the party treasury. By January 1933 party debts were variously estimated at between twelve and twenty million marks.[62] A sense of defeatism and demoralization set in. It was even apparent in Goebbels' diary. "Scarcity of money has become chronic", he wrote, while on the eve of the November election he commented: "Last attack. Desperate drive of the Party against defeat."[63] He closed the diary for the year 1932 in a mood of pessimism. "This year has brought us eternal ill-luck. . . . The past was sad and the future looks dark and gloomy; all chances and hopes have quite disappeared."[64]

The Party was put under additional strain, when Schleicher, having failed to induce Hitler to join him, decided to break him by splitting the Party. Schleicher selected Gregor Strasser for this purpose, offering him the Vice-Chancellorship and the task of dealing with unemployment.[65] Strasser was willing to come in, but when Hitler accused him of disloyalty, he resigned from the NSDAP and left Berlin. His disappearance gave Hitler time to crush the incipient revolt in the Party.

He successfully appealed to the Gauleiters and Deputies to stay loyal to him and then made tours of the country, speaking as often as three times a day. By means of such efforts he kept the Party intact, although it was going through its worst period since 1930 -- on December 3, the Thuringian elections showed a forty per cent drop of the Nazi vote since July.[66]

Suddenly Hitler's luck changed. Papen met Hitler secretly on January 4, 1933, when they agreed to Schleicher's overthrow.[67] He was to be replaced by a Nationalist and National Socialist coalition. It was also arranged that the NSDAP's debts be paid off. Papen then set to work to bring down Schleicher. Using his influence with Hindenburg, he persuaded the President to turn down Schleicher's request to govern by emergency decrees. When Schleicher appealed to the political parties in the hope of gaining a Reichstag majority, he was rebuffed. Driven to request the dissolution of the Reichstag on January 28 he was denied this by the President. In this situation he had no other alternative but to resign. On January 30, 1933, Hindenburg appointed Hitler Chancellor of Germany.

What, then, was the relationship between the social conditions of the Weimar Republic, Hitler and the advent of the Third Reich? The connection between Hitler and the downfall of the Republic is not without importance. He led a cleverly organized campaign against democracy in Germany. His political ability cannot be doubted. Starting from nothing, it took him but fourteen years to reach the top. During these years he suffered reverses that would have ruined the political career of a less able man. Yet, undaunted, he somehow managed to keep his head and his cunning. A brilliant propagandist and an able strategist, he

held the NSDAP together under his sole leadership during all the years of hardship. His very existence must be seen as one of the contributing factors to the fall of the Weimar Republic.

The relationship between the Weimar Republic and the Nazi state is less easily determined. Ernst Fraenkel, in his book The Dual State,[68] put forward a theory that, to a large extent, the nature of the Third Reich should be understood, not as a reflection of Hitler's character, but as a continuation of the Weimar Republic. He pointed out a curious dichotomy in the National Socialist dictatorship. The terror and capriciousness of government in the Third Reich exemplified one side of National Socialism. This area of irrationality Fraenkel called the Prerogative State. However, Hitler could hardly have pursued his military aims amidst complete disorganization. Thus there was the other side of Nazism, the Normative State, which represented a certain minimum level of efficiency, with which National Socialist arbitrariness did not interfere. The Normative State, most readily apparent in the capitalist ordering of the economy, was formed by the continuation into the Third Reich of various rational elements that were part of the Imperial regime and the Weimar Republic.

To Fraenkel, then, the Third Reich was the Weimar Republic, the Normative State, with a layer of Nazi anarchy imposed upon it. Although the Prerogative State was always potentially superior and was ever seeking to extend itself into new fields, the effect of the Weimar Republic remained. Even though the principle nulla poena sine lege might fall by the way-wide, as in the Lex van der Lubbe;[69] though the Rule of Law with its insistence that the ruler be bound by his own laws and the

traditional legal desire for objectivity might collapse as the judiciary sought to fall in with the Nazi spirit, the legal system as a whole did not dissolve into an unprincipled morass. When the political considerations of the Prerogative State did not intervene, burglars still met their deserts and contractual questions were settled by the old law. Similarly in the industrial sphere, even though the Prerogative State had taken hold in the labour field, the capitalists, Fraenkel argued, were still assured of sufficient Weimar stability to enable them to carry out their operations with confidence. Other parts of the Third Reich presented the same dual pattern.

Fraenkel's theory is important in that it stresses the high degree of functional efficiency in the Third Reich, a fact which other scholars have often ignored in their desire to present a sharper picture of Nazi totalitarianism.[70] However, the argument of The Dual State cannot be accepted without serious reservations. It is doubtful whether Fraenkel's division of Nazi Germany into a Prerogative and a Normative State is valid. The question arises as to the dividing line between the two categories. Admittedly a hazy dividing line does not invalidate categorization, but in Fraenkel's theory the very existence of a dividing line, hazy or otherwise, is in doubt. As he is forced to admit with his phrase "the potential superiority of political considerations",[71] the Prerogative State could and did thrust its attentions, either permanently or intermittently, upon any of the areas included under the Normative State. These areas of rationality existed on sufferance: their continued survival was nowhere assured. Because no one knew where arbitrary inter-

ference might strike on the morrow, it would have been better to have considered Nazi Germany as being simply a Prerogative State. Looking back, parts of society may have escaped such interference during certain times, but to affirm the existence of a Normative State during the life of Hitler (The Dual State was published in 1941) is to envisage areas of society inviolate to Nazi capriciousness where none existed.

Even if Fraenkel's theory is discarded as an over-statement, the problem of whether the Weimar Republic influenced the Third Reich to some lesser degree cannot be ignored. The first question to be asked is this: in what way can an old regime influence a new one? The degree of such influence naturally depends upon the degree of social and political disintegration experienced by the former regime. Thus, at one end of the scale, we have changes of government within the constitutional framework, on which occasion the new regime is virtually the same as the old. The United States under Eisenhower or Kennedy or Johnson is recognizably the same place. Here the political and social structure is so firmly established that there is no question of it changing to any great extent from one administration to the next.

There is the intermediate case where the political structure collapses, but the social structure, although perhaps modified, is still basically the same. De Gaulle's France is perhaps the best example of this. The political structure of the Fourth Republic was found to be incapable of meeting such crises as the Algerian situation. Although the governmental set-up collapsed and De Gaulle was able to draw up a new constitution, French society continued to be much the same as it had been. Into this category we can also place the newly independent nations who,

even though they have set up their own forms of government, have nevertheless inherited the same social problems as faced the colonial administrators.

Social structures are based on sets of norms which define the accepted political and social behaviour. Consequently, the continuance of the structure necessarily implies the continuance of these norms. When this is the case the new governors will find themselves restricted by the old attitudes and values. These norms also determine the degree of political sophistication enjoyed by the subjects. If the complex balance of "parochial", "subject" and "participant" values, that Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba found to be necessary before a democracy of the Anglo-Saxon variety could be established,[72] has not been developed, then the new governors cannot safely hand over to their subjects such political powers as are enjoyed by the Americans or the British. To put it briefly, the continued existence of the social structure acts as a limit both on how much and also on how little power the new governors may take upon themselves.

On the other hand, when the norms underlying the social structure have been enfeebled, the new rulers find themselves with a virtual carte blanche. Twice this century Germany has been faced with such a situation: in 1945, when two such differing regimes as the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic were created from a common base; and also in 1933.[73] In Chapter One we have depicted the gradual disintegration of the Weimar Republic. Economic disaster corroded away the rigid social structure and devaluated the very norms of social and political behaviour. As Walter Laqueur puts it, "in the last analysis, the

main source of the evil [National Socialism] was moral relativism and indifference: the plain fact that too many people in Germany were unable or unwilling to differentiate between right and wrong."[74] This being so, we can say that in his task of shaping the Third Reich Hitler needed to pay little attention to the conventions of the preceding regime.

It is true that the Weimar Republic can be said to have influenced the Third Reich in a limited and special sense. Certain customs the people of Germany, including Hitler, had been brought up to accept. Hitler had no desire to change these as they were part of his mental make-up and they automatically formed part of his conception of the Third Reich. But the important point is that their existence was assured only because he approved of them. There can be no doubt that if Hitler disagreed with something, its chances of survival were slim. Thus we can say that if parts of former German regimes survived into the Third Reich, this was not due to any inherent reason that they should do so, but rather because the Führer allowed them to remain either because he failed to find any superior substitutes for them or because he desired their continuance.

In this respect it is interesting to compare the efforts made by the democratic and totalitarian regimes to break with their predecessors. Back in 1918, when democracy made its apologetic entry into German society, no effort in fact was made to effect a decisive break with the old ways. Public officials were allowed to flout the Republic openly and to praise the former regime with impunity. No attempt was made to win the armed forces to democracy. That the Government failed to attract the support

of the German people as a whole can be seen by an examination of the Reichstag election returns, which show a fairly steady increase in the combined anti-democratic vote.[75] Anti-republicanism was never equated with being anti-German. Hitler had realized the mistakes of the Weimar Republic and had learnt from them. He strove to insure that non-loyalty to himself or his regime appear as treachery to Germany. The Civil Service, the teaching profession, the judiciary and the armed forces all received special attention to make certain their adherence to the Nazi cause. Hitler's most trustworthy and able lieutenant, Goebbels, was assigned the task of securing the German people's acquiescence towards National Socialism, if not their enthusiasm. Compared with the Weimar Republic, the Third Reich made a much more determined effort to break the links, such as they were, connecting it with the former regime.

Thus we have seen how the conventions of pre-1933 Germany had been so undermined that Hitler had no need to respect them when he set out to build his new society. That it was his aim to construct a wholly new social structure and that in fact he did not heed the previous norms of social and political behaviour, but rather his personal vision, will be demonstrated in the following chapters.

CHAPTER FOUR

HITLER'S REICH

No other regime has provided the political scientist with a wealth of material comparable to that given by the Third Reich. After the war, vast quantities of official documents fell into Allied hands and the surviving Nazi leaders gave at Nuremburg their personal accounts of what happened. And yet, despite this, the question of Hitler's importance to the regime has never been conclusively answered. H.R. Trevor-Roper argues along these lines:

> When asked not what he did but how he did it, or rather how he was able to do it, historians evade the question, sliding away behind unplausible answers. To the Marxists - most old-fashioned of all - he was simply a pawn, the creature of a dying capitalism in its last stages. Others have seen him as a charlatan profiting by a series of accidents, a consummate actor and hypocrite, a sly, cheating peasant, or a hypnotist who seduced the wits of men by a sorcerer's charms. Even Sir Lewis Namier endorses the account of him given by a disgusted German official as a mere illiterate, illogical, unsystematic bluffer and smatterer. Even Mr. Bullock seems content to regard him as a diabolical adventurer animated solely by an unlimited lust for personal power. And yet, we may object, could a mere adventurer, a shifty, scatter-brained charlatan, have done what Hitler did, who, starting from nothing, a solitary plebeian in a great cosmopolitan city, survived and commanded all the dark forces he had mobilized and, by commanding them, nearly conquer the whole world?[1]

Trevor-Roper answers his own question with an emphatic negative:

> I wish to maintain - contrary, as it appears to all accepted opinion - that Hitler had a mind. It seems to me that whereas a mere visionary might, in 1920, have dreamed of such a revolution, and whereas a mere adventurer

> might, in the 1930s, have exploited such a revolution, any man who both envisaged and himself created both a revolution as a means to empire and an empire after revolution, and who, in failure and imprisonment, published in advance a complete blueprint of his intended achievement, in no significant point different from its ultimate actual form, simply cannot be regarded as a mere visionary or a mere adventurer. He was a systematic thinker and his mind is, to the historian, as important a problem as the mind of Bismarck or Lenin.[2]

This latter quotation from a most eminent authority mirrors the argument of this thesis. The fact that the Third Reich was Hitler's brainchild can be illustrated in several ways, the best of which is probably a comparison of Hitler's proposals in Mein Kampf with the regime he set up ten years after he had written the book. An examination of it reveals a fairly full account of what the author intended to do and how he proposed to carry out these aims.

"The state is a means to an end", Hitler wrote. "Its end lies in the preservation and advancement of a community of physically and psychically homogenous creatures."[3] Thus the German state must be made to serve the interests of the German people which, to Hitler's way of thinking, meant that "the German Reich as a state must embrace all Germans",[4] including those who, for one reason or another, found themselves in non-German territory -- those in Austria, in the Saar, in Memelland, in Danzig and the Polish Corridor, in Silesia and in Sudetenland. Hitler's foreign policy up to 1939 was governed by this aim. The Saar was returned after a plebiscite in 1935. In 1938 Hitler badgered his native Austria into submission and in the fall of that year carried off his biggest diplomatic coup -- the acquisition of Sudetenland with its 2,800,000 Germans from Czechoslovakia. Lithuania surrendered

Memelland the following year. By this time, with the exception of Alsace-Lorraine, German borders were extended far past their 1914 position. Hitler's own particular brand of diplomacy, however, failed him when he turned his attention to Poland. Despite his hope that England would back down at the announcement of the Pact between himself and Stalin, Europe was plunged into a full-scale war.[5]

Perhaps by this time England and France had come to realize that German territorial expansion would not end with the inclusion of all German-speaking people within the Reich borders. Although this formed a preliminary aim for Hitler, his most important external ambition was of far greater scope. In 1923, the Führer, imprisoned and with his party in ruins, had written:

> We [National Socialists] take up where we broke off six hundred years ago. We stop the endless movement to the south and west, and turn our gaze towards the land in the east. . . . If we speak of soil in Europe today, we can primarily have in mind only Russia and her vassal border states.[6]

In these lines we find the very kernel of Nazi foreign policy (see next chapter).

Numerous details concerning the internal organization of the Third Reich can be found in Mein Kampf. The federal structure of the Weimar Republic had to go.[7] In February and March 1933, to implement this, Hitler appointed Reich Governors to each State. These were empowered to abolish the State Governments and Diets, to make laws and appoint State officials. They were responsible solely to Hitler.[8]

All Germany was to be organized along one principle. "The principle which made the Prussian Army in its time into the most wonder-

ful instrument of the German people must some day, in a transferred sense, become the principle of construction of the whole state conception: authority of every leader downward and responsibility upward."[9] In other words Germany was to become a series of hierarchies modelled on the military pattern. Representative bodies might be useful and perhaps even necessary in certain circumstances, although they were never to be used as decision makers.[10]

No better illustration of this principle at work in the Third Reich can be found than in the cultural field.[11] In this instance, the Chamber of Culture, under the presidency of Goebbels, was divided into seven sub-chambers, one each for literature, the press, broadcasting, theatre, music, art and films. By decree, "whomsoever takes part in the creation, reproduction, spiritual or technical manufacture, distribution, preservation, sales, or in the propagation of sales, of cultural goods, must be a member of the appropriate sub-chamber."[12] Before a membership card was granted, which alone would enable the musician to play, this musician had to prove his "reliability", that is that he was wholly submissive to the regime, could prove himself of Aryan descent back to 1800 and that before 1933 he had not had any connection with left-wing parties.[13]

The NSDAP in particular was to be organized according to this principle "so that one day it may not only show the state these same guiding principles, but can also place the completed body of its own state at its disposal."[14] Hitler was fully aware of the danger of weakening the party's militancy if membership was not restricted after he came to power. Then, he realized, there would be a flood of applications

by the many who sought to further their own interests by jumping on the band-wagon. In Mein Kampf he proposed that enrollments be allowed "only with extreme caution and after the most thorough scrutiny."[15] This was put into effect by banning entry except to those who came up through the ranks of the Party's youth organizations.

If the end of the state was to be the "preservation and advancement" of the community, then it followed that the state had to look to the people's well-being. To Hitler, this meant that the German people must be carefully supervised and bred to achieve an ever purer distillation of the Aryan type. The state "must set race in the centre of all life. It must take care to keep it pure."[16] All racially unsound elements were to be sterilized or exterminated. Besides those of Jewish extraction, this included all those suffering from a physical defect, from any form of mental illness, or from any hereditary disease.[17] The first of the eugenic laws following these lines was published six months after the Nazis had entered power.[18] On the other hand, all those who were considered racially fit were to be encouraged to produce as many children as possible.[19] Thus, after 1933, the Nazis made strenuous efforts to remove the stigma of illegitimacy and special bonuses were made available to mothers of large families.[20]

Hitler's anti-semitism was without doubt a deep-seated prejudice, hating, as he did, the Jewish people with a venom that has rarely been paralleled. All that was wrong with the world was of Jewish origin. In the end the thought association of Jew with evil became so overpowering in his mind, that all who stood in his way he automatically

considered as Jews. Both Roosevelt and Churchill were so categorized. With his mind so warped by this prejudice, it followed to Hitler that the Jewish people must be extirpated from German society root and branch. Just as we shun and cast out filth and evil, so too were the Jews to be treated. So long as one drop of Jewish blood remained in Germany, the National Socialists would not have finished their historic task. Although never defined, the shadow of Auschwitz hangs over Mein Kampf.

In Part Two, chapter nine, Hitler makes his proposals concerning the working class and the trade-union movement. Nothing, he said, was to be done about the question until the NSDAP was in power and could summon up the resources of the state to its aid. It would be a mistake to try and infiltrate the Marxist unions. Instead, the National Socialists should set up one of their own, which, not being based along class lines, would bear no resemblance to former trade-unions. As the National Socialist state would not recognize the existence of classes, the union would be an organization of both capital and labour, with the task of representing various occupational pursuits. Because the aim of all Germans, worker and employer alike, should be to serve the interests of the whole community and not just their own, the right to strike was to be abolished. Wage scales and conditions of work would be settled, not by haggling, as before, but according to whether the welfare of Germany would be bettered or not. Lastly, the National Socialist state would assume the legal care and protection of all.

The organization which took the place of the trade-unions -- the German Labour Front -- was set up in May 1933.[21] Membership, in fact if not in theory, was compulsory for both employers and employees. Its

tasks included the enforcement of protective labour laws, such as they were, and the supervision of working conditions. Associated with it was the Kraft durch Freude organization, which provided the German workers with cheap vacations and supervised leisure-time activities. A law of January 1934 formalized the relationship between the worker and his employer, the latter becoming the leader and the former his followers, who in true National Socialist tradition had no right to intrude with requests and recommendations.[22] Questions of wages and hours were settled by a government-appointed Trustee of Labour, whose task it was "to secure the maintenance of industrial peace."[23] In practice this system meant that the working man was defenceless against the detailed supervision of his life by the state. At first sight this would seem hard to fit in with the pattern set in Mein Kampf. But just as Auschwitz was implicit in Hitler's anti-semitism, so this complete subordination of the German working population was the logical result of the demand that the state and the community as a whole must always be the first consideration.

Another field where National Socialist policy is only comprehensible through a study of Hitler's writings is the history of the Churches in the Third Reich. At first sight, war to the death between Christianity and National Socialism would seem to be inevitable. Not only were the Christian virtues of humility and peace scorned by the Nazis, but that basic Nazi belief in the superiority of the Aryan race went against the Christian idea of the equality of all men. Moreover, as they were both seeking a total hold over the minds of the German people, there could be no compromise between them.

It is true that Hitler, with all the powers of the state behind him, constantly attacked the Churches. The Christian press was proscribed[24]; the religious youth organizations were banned[25]; the passing of collection plates was forbidden[26]; and great numbers of the clergy were murdered or imprisoned.[27] Although in the face of this attack it might seem to be the patent duty of every Christian to take up arms against the Third Reich, two obstacles stood in the way of this opposition. The Protestants were hindered by their heritage of Lutheranism, which emphasized that tyrannical government was merely an emanation of this sinful world and was to be borne without complaint as a divine punishment.[28] "If you are oppressed wrongly, accept it; it is the essence of the worldly regime."[29] Secondly, there was the question, especially pressing for the Roman Catholics, as to whether their allegiance to God or Rome did not make them traitors to Germany.[30] For example, if a German Christian gave shelter to a Jewish family, he might be doing his duty as a Christian, but, according to Hitler, he would at the same time be weakening the German race. Faced with this torturing decision between God and Germany, between the hard way and the easy way, between the distantly intangible and immediate considerations, it is not all that surprising that so many chose the latter of these.

Yet the fact remains that the churches stayed open and there were always clergy ready to attack the regime from the pulpit.[31] As institutions officially discouraged but not banned, German citizens were given the opportunity to show their distrust of the regime by attending church, the only means of group opposition open to them.[32] No

evidence has been found to show that there was a conscious Nazi policy to use the Churches as a kind of safety-valve through which the pent-up feelings of the population could be released. On the contrary, the existence of a secret decree of Bormann's to the Gauleiters concerning the Churches came to light at the Nuremburg Trials, in which they were given the order that "all influence which might impair or damage the leadership of the people exercised by the Führer with the help of the NSDAP must be eliminated. . . ."[33] This would seem to suggest that the survival of the Churches was not due to any opportunity they might afford the people of expressing their opposition to the regime.

There is no need to construct hypothetical answers to the problem of the Churches' survival of the Third Reich. The reason why Hitler restrained some of his more rabid followers and did not tear down the churches can be found in his Table Talk:

> The main thing is to be clever in this matter and not look for a struggle where it can be avoided. Being weighed down by a superstitious past, men are afraid of things that can't, or can't yet, be explained - that is to say of the unknown. If anyone has needs of a metaphysical nature, I can't satisfy them with the Party's programme. . . . So it's not opportune to hurl ourselves now into a struggle with the Churches. The best thing is to let Christianity die a natural death. . . . The dogma of Christianity gets worn away before the advances of science. Religion will have to make more and more concessions. Gradually the myths crumble. . . . When understanding of the universe has become widespread, . . . then the Christian doctrine will be convicted of absurdity.[34]

To Hitler there was no point in allowing the Christians to make martyrs of themselves. National Socialists had no need to waste time and effort devising a "final solution" for the Churches. The inevitable death of Christianity was hastened with every step forward taken by science. It

is, then, to Hitler's words that one must turn if Nazi policy and practice in religious matters is to be understood.

"The decisions will be made by one man."[35] As far as Hitler was concerned, this meant that he alone intended to have the final say on the shaping of the Third Reich. The crux of this thesis revolves around the question of whether he lived up to this dictum. This, it seems, can be answered affirmatively. Other sections of Mein Kampf he did not forget, and it seems unlikely that he should neglect his very basic principle of government: the Führerprinzip. The only organization capable of putting up a sustained opposition to this principle was the Army. With its tradition of staying above politics, though this had been sadly weakened before 1933, and acting as the power behind the throne, it is hard to see how and why it ever let itself be dictated to. Yet, even in strictly military matters, Hitler came to impose his will over it. An examination of the part played by the Army in the Third Reich will reveal how Hitler came to dominate it, his strongest potential opponent.

No kindred feelings ever eased Hitler's association with his generals, coming as they did from worlds that were poles apart. Always lurking in the background of Hitler's dealings with the aristocratic Officer Corps was a feeling of inferiority on his part. He was but a petit-bourgeois upstart, an ex-corporal at that, while they came from land-holding and titled families. Consequently, when he came to power, he treated them with a mixture of deferential respect and swaggering contempt, speaking scathingly of the 'gentlemen' who wrote 'von' before their names.[36]

His relationship with the High Command was further marred by the fact that it formed part of Hitler's category of experts, which he never ceased to castigate.[37] Undoubtedly, one of Hitler's greatest talents was his ability to get down to the roots of a complex problem and, by ignoring any complicating factors, to come up with a solution. It was this capacity which earned him the title of "the terrible simplifier".[38] Naturally intolerant of criticism, he was infuriated by the professional military men who could see only difficulties and who questioned the power of his 'intuition'.

The attitude of the Army was one of condescension. The plan was to keep the whip-hand over Hitler, but at the same time to accept any benefits he was prepared to offer them. They were kept happy by such measures as those of March 16, 1935, in which conscription was reintroduced, the Army enlarged to thirty-five divisions and the rate of re-armament speeded up.[39] As Hitler had promised, the Versailles Treaty was nullified and Germany withdrew from the League of Nations. The Army's compliance was also secured by the fact that, while he lived, Hindenburg ordered it to co-operate with Hitler.[40] Also some saw in Nazism a chance of German salvation; others a chance of preferment.[41]

After Hindenburg's death, Hitler assumed the offices of both President and Chancellor. In the former capacity, as Supreme Commander, he insisted that the armed forces take the following oath:

> I swear before God to give my unconditional obedience to Adolf Hitler, Führer of the German people, Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, and I pledge my word as a brave soldier to observe this oath always, even at peril of my life.[42]

In the tradition of Prussian militarism an oath of allegiance was a sacred thing indeed. Some offiers, using it as an excuse not to examine their own consciences, refused to take action against Hitler while he was still alive: the failure of the July 20, 1944, Putsch was due in some part to the refusal of the generals to take control of the country until they had definite proof of Hitler's death.[43] Besides this, by taking the oath, the Army was giving an implied acceptance of the regime's legality.

Hitler's second method of binding the Army to his Government was to involve it in the internal politics of the country. These tactics were illustrated by the role of the Army in the Röhm purge. On April 12, 1934, Field Marshal von Blomberg, Minister of War, signed a pact with Hitler on board the pocket-battleship Deutschland to the effect that the Reichswehr wouldsupport Hitler's candidacy for the Presidency, if Hitler would discipline the SA.[44] The Army must have known that this disciplining would involve wide-spread and violent measures, since the generals ordered a state of alert all over the country on June 25, as a precaution against the SA starting a civil war.[45] Once the blood had started to flow the Army did nothing to stop the gangster methods employed, but instead praised the Führer for his "soldierly decision and exemplary courage".[46] The High Command was now bound by blood to Hitler.

The Army's self-confidence was seriously undermined by Hitler's successes in the military sphere. Hitherto, when military questions had arisen, their judgement had never been doubted. Thus, when Hitler announced his decision to re-militarize the Rhineland, despite the protests and the counter-measures that were laid before him, the General

Staff was thrown into confusion and panic.[47] However, this action resulted in the first of the Blumenkorsos -- bloodless victories. The German people were jubilant and the Reichswehr dumbfounded. The occupation of Austria and the invasions of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Scandinavia, Holland, Belgium and France were all ordered by Hitler over the protests of the General Staff. All were German successes. The Wehrmacht grew unsure of itself. Perhaps, they reasoned, there was some truth in the claim that Hitler was the greatest military genius of all time, and, if so, it was only right that his decisions should be accepted unhesitatingly.[48]

In 1938 Hitler went over to the attack in his dealings with the Army. Early that year the von Blomberg and the von Fritsch scandals broke. These gentlemen were respectively the Minister of War and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. The former was discovered to have married a prostitute and the latter was faced with a charge, trumped up by the SS, of being a homosexual.[49] Hitler took the opportunity of dismissing both from office. He himself took over the Ministry of War, while General von Brauchitsch, who was too over-awed by Hitler ever to be persuaded to take action against him, was placed in charge of the Army. At the same time the Army was subordinated to a new unified command of the armed forces -- the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), which was set up with another yes-man at its head, Field-Marshal Keitel.[50] The opportunity was taken to discharge a number of refractory generals, most of whom bore old Prussian names.[51]

The process of ensuring that the top-men were either Nazi supporters or so spineless that they could be browbeaten into submission was carried one stage further in the drastic purge of military personnel that took place between December 1941 and April 1942.[52] Hitler himself took over as Commander in Chief of the Army, which position entailed his personal supervision of campaigns.[53] This re-shuffle was so far-reaching that only one of seventeen Field-Marshals and three of thirty-six Colonel-Generals managed to get through the war and keep their positions.[54] This, of course, meant chances of rapid promotion for ambitious officers. Nor was the fact lost on others that Hitler was free with money, lands and honours to those who enjoyed his favour. Thus, between the threat of dismissal and the promise of advancement, Hitler had the Army well under control.

The final humiliation of the Army followed the July 20, 1944, attempt on Hitler's life. The Waffen-SS achieved a parity with the Army. Himmler was made Commander-in-Chief of the Home Army. The Nazi salute for the first time became mandatory "as a sign of the Army's unshakeable allegiance to the Führer. . . ." All General Staff officers were to take part in the indoctrination of the Army with National Socialist propaganda. Finally, Nazi Political Officers were, in imitation of the Soviet practice, attached to all military headquarters.[55] From this time on the Army completely lost its self-respect, while Hitler's attitude to the Officer Corps was governed by "invincible suspicion and vindictive spite."[56]

The cause of Hitler's military downfall lay in his very domination of the Army. His early military successes had been largely due to his unorthodox methods and his peculiar talent for weighing up his opponents' weak points.[57] By 1941, he had come to believe in his own military genius, thinking that his orders were bound to result in victories. Any reverses were due either to the treachery or to the lack of will-power in the Officer Corps when they failed to carry out his commands. He lost his earlier flexibility and once having stayed the Russian counter-attack in the winter of 1941 by orders to stand firm, he thought that defeat under any circumstances could be averted if retreat was forbidden.[58] As a consequence German fighting forces were more than decimated. With the silencing of criticism from the High Command, he gradually proceeded to lose touch with reality. Impossible orders were handed down to his officers and when these men failed him, it was their cowardice and not his withdrawal from the practical world that was to blame. The sight of him during the last months, in the great bunker in the Chancery grounds, manoeuvering imaginary armies, which were to rescue him from the encircling Russians, can only be described as pathetic.

The relationship between Hitler and his lieutenants shows clearly that Hitler's pre-eminence was uncontested even by those closest to the throne. Neither singly nor as a group could the Nazi élite ever feel that Hitler was bound to take its advice or that its influence on the Third Reich was at any time not subject to his final arbitration. His description of the role of lieutenants in Mein Kampf matched the practice of the Third Reich.

> There must be no majority decision, but only responsible persons, and the word 'council' must be restored to its original meaning. Surely every man will have advisors by his side, but the decisions will be made by one man.[59]

In the early days of the Third Reich, Hermann Goering was undoubtedly only one step behind Hitler on the power ladder. Placed in charge of the Four Year Plan Office, he exercised his authority over German industry.[60] The Gleichschaltung of the economy, however, followed fairly closely the plan set out in Mein Kampf. Whether this was so because Goering had received broad instructions from the Führer on this matter or that he was merely effecting what he had read in the book, is not known. Whichever view is correct, Goering certainly followed his superior's pointers on the subject. As the German economy prospered honours were heaped upon Goering. He was given the leadership of the Luftwaffe.[61] In 1939, Hitler announced that he would stand first in the line of succession[62] and, in 1940, he was made a Reichsmarshal.[63] Despite his vaulted position, Goering did not hesitate to tell Sir Neville Chamberlain that "when a decision has to be taken, none of us count more than the stones on which we are standing. It is the Führer alone who decides."[64] Goering's power began to decline after 1940, when his Luftwaffe failed to force England into submission. His was not told of the plans to invade the Soviet Union until November 1940, six months after their inception.[65] Retiring into a life of luxury and comparative ease, he still remained one of Hitler's closest friends. It was not until seven days before Hitler's death, when Goering sought to negotiate with the Allies, that this last link was broken. Hitler expelled him from the Party.[66]

Heinrich Himmler was reluctantly appointed to head the Gestapo by Goering in 1934.[67] During the next ten years he extended his power until he gained control over the Third Reich's police state. He controlled not only the secret police, the SS, the Waffen-SS, the concentration camps, the re-settlement of conquered territories, but also, after 1944, he was entrusted with military counter-intelligence, the prisoner of war camps and even the command of a front-line army group.[68] Here was a concentration of power that might easily have toppled Hitler. In fact Himmler was approached by the anti-Nazi conspirators.[69] Yet such was the nature of the man, too dull-witted to strike out on original lines and too trusting in Hitler's genius ever to gainsay him[70], that right up to the end Hitler thought of him, with reason, as der treue Heinrich. Himmler was the perfect lieutenant for Hitler: a capable administrator, who realized that without the Führer he was nothing. Nevertheless, like Goering, he sought to bring the war to a close on his own initiative and was similarly expelled from the Party.[71]

As Minister for Propaganda and President of the Chamber of Culture, Goebbels played an important role in the internal affairs of the Third Reich. A more colourful man than Himmler, he was also far more intelligent. A protégé of the Strassers, he was won over to Hitler in 1926, when the latter used all the charm at his command to do so.[72] Apparently Goebbels never forgot this experience, for, although Hitler never considered his propaganda minister a potential leader of the Nazi movement, and although he was out of the Führer's favour for most of the war, Goebbels must be considered Hitler's most devoted lieutenant.[73]

He was content to follow Hitler's commands, even though he had sufficient intelligence to strike out on his own. His fields were ones in which the Führer considered himself a past-master and on which he was always ready to give advice. Perhaps Hitler, distrusting this clever man, sought to confine his energies to fields over which he was capable of exercising control. Content in this role, Goebbels spent his time trying to out-Herod Herod and in maintaining his personal admiration for the Führer.[74] At Hitler's death, Goebbels also committed suicide having made up his mind "to end a life which will have no further value to me if I cannot spend it in the service of the Führer."[75]

Martin Bormann, unpopular even with his party colleagues who regarded him as an upstart, shot up to power after 1941, when he replaced Hess after the latter's flight to Scotland. As head of the Party Chancery he controlled the job distribution in the NSDAP and as Hitler's private secretary he came to decide whom and what Hitler should see.[76] He found favour in the Führer's eyes because, like Hess, he was only too willing to relieve him of tedious but important paper-work and because he became adept at screening his superior from unpleasant information.[77] Named Party Minister in Hitler's will, he nevertheless had no influence on the shaping of the Third Reich, partly because of his late rise to prominence and partly because, like all Hitler's lieutenants, with the exception of Goering and possibly Goebbels, he was by nature an accomplished administrator, but not a policy maker.

At various times Gregor Strasser, Ernst Röhm and Albert Speer wielded great power in the Nazi Party or in Germany, but they did not hold their positions for long. After 1933, minor luminaries of the Nazi old-guard, such as Frick, Ley, Ribbentrop and Rosenberg, tended either to take to drink or to find themselves with high-sounding titles, which carried little accompanying power.

There was never any doubt in the Third Reich where the final authority lay. The fates of Strasser and Röhm, who had dared to question the Führer, were always present in the minds of his lieutenants. However, he seldom interfered with the internal workings of his ministries, being content just to give out general policy lines. The routine of government bored Hitler.[78] A minister, therefore, was able to carve out an empire for himself, but even this, on account of the resultant rivalries, only served to increase Hitler's own power as the supreme arbiter. Because of his unchallenged supremacy, it was generally realized that those closest to him would augment their own power position. Consequently he was courted assiduously. Yet it would be a mistake to write off all their words of praise and respect as mere sycophancy, for Hitler had the gift of attracting men and holding them by the sheer force of his personality.[79] The intrigues that filled Germany in the latter part of the war were not aimed at replacing the Führer, but rather at becoming his accredited successor.[80] No better testimony of the hold Hitler had over his lieutenants is to be found than in their statements at the Nuremburg Trial. For instance, Ribbentrop told the prison psychiatrist, G.M. Gilbert, that:

> the Führer had a terrifically magnetic personality. You can't understand it unless you have experienced it. - Do you know, six months after his death, I can't completely shake off his influence?[81]

On the stand Goering testified that whether Hitler was guilty of mass murder or not, he maintained his loyalty to him in difficult times as well as good.[82] To conclude, then, we can say with Bullock "that Hitler bore the final responsibility for whatever was done by the regime."[83] As his loyal retainers, these men made it their task to put into effect the Führer's desires. While Hitler was indispensable to the Third Reich, they were not.

Nothing, perhaps, shows more clearly Hitler's pre-eminence in the Third Reich than his pose as a messiah and the widespread German acceptance of this role.[84] Back in 1923 Hitler described the rare occurrence of a man who was both a practical politician and a philosopher. "Such a man does not labour to satisfy the demands that are obvious to every philistine; he reaches out towards ends that are comprehensible only to a few."[85] This was how Hitler saw himself. He was the man with a mission -- the improvement, physical, moral and material, of the German race -- the full mysteries of which he alone could fathom. Thus, in typical fashion, he told an audience: "I go with the assurance of a sleepwalker on the way Providence dictates."[86] As an oracle he expected and received obedience to his pronouncements. In the 1936 edition of the Organisationsbuch der NSDAP, the first of the pledges of the Party member is given as: "The Führer is always right."[87] For Hitler his will took on a mystic quality: "my will cannot be broken."[88] By an exertion of will on his part, he thought he could succeed where other

men had failed. Similarly he regarded his powers of intuition as being beyond the reach of ordinary men. Time and again he delayed taking action until this "inner voice" had spoken to him.[89] Once his mind was made up, however, there was no shaking him from the position he had taken.

How much of this messianic attitude was sincerely felt and how much of it was a mere pose is a difficult question to answer, for Goebbels fell to work with a will on the task of presenting the Führer as a God-given leader to the German people. This he did consistently, often using religious language to make his point.[90] Undoubtedly this unceasing eulogy went to Hitler's head, causing him to lose touch with his one-time firm grasp of reality. But, as Trevor-Roper says, "his own firm belief in his messianic mission was perhaps the most important element in the extraordinary power of his personality, which lasted long after the external reasons for its survival had disappeared; and the acceptance of the myth even by the intelligent Speer is the best evidence of its power."[91] The very fact of its acceptance shows that Hitler was not simply a primus inter pares, but that he stood in a separate category above the reach of everyone else.

The very idea of Hitler allowing himself to be influenced over the shaping of the Third Reich is rendered highly improbable by a brief examination of the man's character. As Bullock says: "Hitler lacked any ability for co-operation and compromise. The only relationship he understood was that of domination."[92] Chapter Eight of the second part of Mein Kampf is significantly entitled "The Strong Man Is Mightiest Alone." The history of the NSDAP up to 1933 is marked by Hitler's care to remove

possible rivals to his supreme authority. After he came to power he maintained this policy, the Röhm purge being a vicious example of it. In November 1933 Hitler told a French correspondent: "Je décide seul de la politique de l'Allemagne."[93] By this time those non-Nazi members of the Cabinet, who were supposed to act as a check upon him, had been pushed aside.[94] To deny Hitler's pre-eminence in the Third Reich is to deny his known personality.

As final evidence that Hitler was not only supreme but was also held in considerable respect, there is the history of the last few weeks of the war. Even then, Trevor-Roper points out, "when all powers to compel or reward, all machinery to enforce his decisions, all hopes of success or relief, all glory of achievement had departed, that demonic character by mere force of personality and perhaps the habit of control, reigned undisputed over his followers."[95] The German people fought for Hitler to the end, at a time when not only the SS but Himmler himself were out in the front lines. There were no mutinies or hunger-riots such as characterized the end of the First World War.

It is hoped that this chapter has provided acceptable answers to two questions. Firstly, was the main influence shaping the Third Reich Adolf Hitler? We have shown that the Third Reich corresponded closely to the form of government presented by Hitler in his Mein Kampf and his Speeches. The second question is whether, once the Third Reich was established, Hitler was in a supreme position or whether he was under the influence of others. To answer this question we have noted how he subordinated the Army, how he always maintained control over his lieu-

tenants, how his messianic claims were accepted, how it was out of character for him to accept being dictated to by others and how his position was never questioned to the very end. We conclude, therefore, that Hitler reigned supreme in the regime of his own making.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE MIND OF ADOLF HITLER

If the proposition that Nazi Germany was the product of Hitler's decisions is accepted, the difficult question arises as to what was behind the Führer's actions. Any number of explanations of the motivating factor behind Hitler have been volunteered. His first moves to suppress the political parties and the trade unions were plainly designed to root out any immediate challenge to his power. But once his position was secured, the reason why he proceeded to "co-ordinate" German society between 1933 and 1938 is harder to understand.

One group, represented by Rauschning, Borkenau, S. Neumann and Bullock, purports to find the answer in a basic nihilism which, they say, pervaded the NSDAP.[1] They argue that it was no ideology that moved Hitler and his Party, but cold, unrelenting hatred against the world at large, which rejected them early for one reason or another. Within Germany, this hatred was turned most frequently against the Jews, although the Nazis sought also to destroy the liberal bourgeois order.[2] When Hitler turned his thoughts to foreign policy, he couldonly think in terms of war, and they quote in support of this Hitler's admission of February 1942 that "since I've been in power, I've had only a single idea: to rearm."[3] To them, the Gleichschaltung of German society should simply be seen as the necessary preparation for unleashing hitherto unequalled

forces of destruction against the world. Rauschning describes Hitler as glorying because "even if we could not conquer, then we should drag half the war into destruction with us."[4] A further support for this argument might be found in the end of the Third Reich. Refusing to compromise and seek terms with his enemies, Hitler insisted on fighting to the end, which came only when he destroyed himself.

There are, however, several difficulties in the way of this theory, which make it appear as a gross simplification. All these authors, apart from Bullock, published their conclusions before the end of the war and, like most early books on National Socialism, suffer both from the desire to make out a strong anti-Nazi case -- a desire which especially afflicted expatriate Germans writing on Hitler -- and also from the lack of material which came to light after the war. They were not to know of Hitler's many references to what he intended to do "after the war", which are found in his Table Talk.[5] The existence of post-war plans stultifies the argument that Hitler, in his love of death and destruction, longed for war pure and simple. Further evidence against this theory can be found in Hitler's agitated efforts to prevent a general declaration of war against Germany, when he realized that his invasion of Poland would not follow the pattern set in Austria and Czechoslovakia.[6] Nor must it be forgotten, that despite Hitler's assertion to the contrary, re-armament in Germany was not stepped up to a war-footing until March 16, 1935, and that Hitler's final Götterdämmerung need not be interpreted as the act of a man who wanted to pull the whole world down with him, but rather as a result of the obstinacy of a man who had come to believe in

his own omniscience and inability to give a wrong command. This latter view is supported by the fact that Hitler refused to admit to himself that the war was irrevocably lost right up to the last few days.[7]

Another problem that arises from the nihilist theory, which believes that the sole purpose of the Gleichschaltung was the preparation for war, is whether Germany would be de-totalitarianized after a successful conclusion of hostilities. The answer to this must in the nature of things be tentative, but there are a few pointers. Firstly, we have Hitler's assurance that he intended to deal with the Churches after the war "as the last great problem".[8] In other words, society was going to be one degree more, not less, organized. Secondly, there is the argument that totalitarian terror increases as opposition to the regime, against which it is nominally directed, is wiped out. Arendt points out that "terror increased both in Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany in inverse ratio to the existence of internal political opposition."[9] With the withdrawal of external opposition, there would be no checks left on the government's actions. Finally, if comparisons with the Soviet Union can offer any guidance, the controls in that country were definitely not slackened, rather they were tightened, as Stalin insisted that his country strive harder than ever to catch up and surpass the West. For these reasons, it is doubtful whether the Gleichschaltung can be attributed to Nazi nihilism.

Apart from the nihilist theory, two other explanations of Hitler's motives have been put forward. Some have argued that Hitler's life was dominated by a lust for personal power, while others have urged that he was sincerely striving to implement his ideology. The difference between

these two views boils down to the relationship between power and ideology in totalitarian regimes. Supporters of the former view argue that Hitler used his ideology merely as a means to further his own power, while those upholding the latter see Hitler's acquisition of power as a necessary prerequisite to putting his ideology into effect. The confusion surrounding this topic is apparent even in Miss Arendt's The Origins of Totalitarianism, in which no less than three mutually exclusive explanations are given. We are told that in order to establish terror, which is an essential part of totalitarian government, an ideology is needed to retain the support of the masses.[10] This position of ideology as a means to power is reversed when we are informed that, although the totalitarian's "ultimate goal" is world conquest, this "ultimate goal" is really only a means to an end, "since only in a world completely under his control could the totalitarian ruler possibly realize all his lies and make true all his philosophies", that is his ideology.[11] Finally, Miss Arendt seems to compromise between these two positions. "It is in the nature of ideological politics . . .", she says, "that the real content of the ideology . . . is divorced by the logic with which the 'idea' is carried out."[12] In other words, the means -- p o w e r -- gradually becomes transformed into an end in itself.

Bullock supports the view that ideology played only a subordinate part in Hitler's career. "His twelve years' dictatorship was barren of all ideas save one - the further extension of his own power and that of the nation with which he had identified himself."[13] This certainly seems to be a true summation of Mussolini's life. In his article in the Enciclopedia Italiana, "The Doctrine of Fascism", Mussolini writes that

"the Fascist State is a will to power and to government",[14] and that "Fascism was not given out to the wet nurse of a doctrine elaborated around a Table."[15] In the case of Hitler, however, the answer is not so clear cut. What with the Twenty-Five Point Programme and Mein Kampf, Hitler provided a super-abundance of information about what he intended to do after he was in power. Admittedly, he never felt himself bound by what he wrote, but at least this is evidence that he, unlike Mussolini, had thought out plans of what he might do after he had assumed the leadership of Germany.

The whole problem is complicated by the necessity of drawing a line, if possible, between what Hitler said and wrote for propaganda purposes, and what he really believed in. In Mein Kampf he writes that "the lack of a great, creative, renewing idea means at all times a limitation of fighting force. Firm belief in the right to apply even the most brutal weapons is always bound up with the existence of a fanatical faith. . ."[16] In this passage he seems to be referring to ideology as a means to attaining totalitarianism. If this is the case, then we are bound to conclude that Hitler wanted power for its own sake.

But, again, there are difficulties in the way of accepting the power theory in all its simplicity. For one thing, this theory necessarily implies that Hitler's mind was unbalanced, for there is something more than a little insane in the idea of a man attempting to exterminate a whole race and plunging all the world into war, for no reason at all except to revel in the knowledge that he could do these things. Yet it seems highly improbable that an unstable man could pull himself up by the boot-straps to take the leadership of Germany, that he should for twelve

years make his country feared by the rest of the world, and that for four of these years he should stand up to the combined might of the Commonwealth, the U.S.A., and the U.S.S.R. Nor is there anything erratic about the way German society was "co-ordinated". The whole operation had an air of cool purposefulness about it. There can also be no question of Hitler's seeking of power for its personal trappings -- wealth, status, ceremony, etc. He always lived modestly, which was in striking contrast to some of his lieutenants, notably Goering.

How can the persecution of the Jews be understood in power terms, when it forced many of Germany's leading citizens into exile? Every explanation but the obvious has been given. The persecution, it has been said, was necessary to maintain the dynamism of German society, or it was a propaganda device to retain the support of the masses, or it gave an opportunity for the German people to direct their discontent at some object other than the regime.[17] The power theory demands that anti-semitism be seen as an arcanum dominationis.

There is no reason, however, why anti-semitism in the Third Reich should not be treated as an end in itself. The power theorists treat all Hitler's words as being so much white-wash, designed to aid him in his search for power. But, as was shown in the preceding chapter, Hitler put into practice many of the plans he had formulated in Mein Kampf. Undoubtedly a certain amount of what he said was pure propaganda, but if everything is written off in this fashion, much of what happened in Nazi Germany becomes inexplicable. In Mein Kampf Hitler states that during his Vienna days, that is, long before he had any need for propa-

ganda, "a view of life and a definite outlook on the world took shape in my mind. These became the granite basis of my conduct. Since then I have extended that foundation very little, I have changed nothing in it."[18] It is argued that the whole of Hitler's career was based on these tenets, the chief of which were anti-semitism and the doctrine of Lebensraum.

Although he later exploited his anti-semitism for propaganda purposes, there is no evidence at all that this belief was anything but a sincere and deeply held one. Throughout his writings, speeches and talks, including his political testament, he unceasingly inveighed against the Jews as the major cause of all that was wrong with the world. It was, therefore, the mission of the superior race, the Aryans, to exterminate this pestilence. There seems to be no doubt that as far as anti-semitism or belief in racial values went, only Himmler came near to rivalling his superior's fanaticism. The terror that was unleashed against the Jews throughout Europe should be understood as the direct consequence of this fanaticism.

If Hitler was seeking power, why did he make such a fool of himself over the Soviet Union? The order not to retreat or give way under any circumstances was disastrous for German hopes.[19] His previous military strategy had been blessed by his flexibility and his willingness to try something new. Now, suddenly, his attitude hardened into rigidity. Why did he turn a blind eye to the Russian winter, which he knew had humbled Napoleon before him? Why did he, the master propagandist, make no attempt to win over the Russian population? An individual obsessed by the thought of personal power would surely have been more shrewd. But the Soviet Union, with its vast empty spaces, was Hitler's blind-spot. His

thinking on the subject was dominated, not by a lust for power, but always by a belief in Germany's need for Lebensraum. His last recorded written words were: "The aim must still be to win territory in the East for the German people."[20] In contrast with the emotionalism of his anti-semitism, he had reasoned out this doctrine. The problem was the over-population of Germany. The possible solutions were a policy to restrict the population's growth; a search for colonies outside Europe; or an expansion eastwards. Having excluded the first two alternatives for practical reasons, it seemed to Hitler that the only means of saving Germany was to march towards the rising sun, settling German colonies in the conquered territories and relegating the native inhabitants to serfdom.[21]

If this argument along with anti-semitism are accepted, as being basic to Hitler's thoughts, a number of matters fall logically into place. It explains his statement, quoted above, that his single idea since he had been in power was to re-arm. Obviously his policy would involve war and he intended the German Army to be fully equipped when the time came. German society was also to be completely prepared for the impending hostilities. It was to be so organized as to be able to give its utmost to the effort, and also there was to be no opportunity for internal dissension, such as, Hitler believed, had brought about Germany's downfall in the last war. Hence the Gleichschaltung in all its aspects. The path ahead for Germany would be hard, the National Socialists reasoned, and it was not going to be through weakness that the country failed in its historic mission.

It explains also why, in his political testament, although Hitler expressed regrets at making war with England and the U.S.A., no mention of the Soviet Union was made.[22] Indeed, the whole pattern of Hitler's war can be understood only if the Soviet Union is accepted as the main target. First, the countries through which the German armies would have to march were brought under Nazi control; second, the western frontier was secured, and, although the U.K. survived the initial attack, Hitler refused to get himself involved in a costly invasion of the country. Instead, assembling in the East all possible divisions, he turned to the third phase: the invasion of the Soviet Union.

It was in the firm belief that he was saving Germany from downfall and indeed the whole of European civilization from the Bolshevik hordes and the wiles of the "grand Jewish conspiracy" that Hitler saw himself in the role of the messiah. "One thing is certain", he said, "that without me the decisions to which today we owe our existence would not have been taken."[23] Hitler was never modest about his capabilities. He regarded himself as unique and told the world so. For example, in August 1939, he informed his military commanders:

> There will probably never be a man with such authority or who has the confidence of the whole German people as I have. My existence is therefore a factor of great value. But I can be eliminated at any moment by a criminal or a lunatic. There is no time to lose. War must come in my lifetime.[24]

Herein lay the seeds of his downfall. Right up to 1941, he continually found his intuition superior to the experts' rationalism. He became no longer content with his role of the man with the historical mission, but began to assume other messianic traits, notably the belief

in his own infallibility. In this, perhaps, he himself fell a victim to Goebbels' propaganda machine.[25] Once he started to consider that success must inevitably attend him in the fulfilment of his mission, the turning point had been reached. Putting aside his earlier political agility, which had brought him so much success, his management of the Russian campaign was, in comparison, heavy-handed.[26] For him, German victory in the east was assured by history, whose chosen servant he was. If his orders were obeyed, they must inevitably be crowned with success. Any disturbing news which did not fit into this pattern was simply ignored, as Hitler retired more and more into a world of fantasy.[27] In this fashion the doctrine of Lebensraum so came to dominate Hitler's life, that by blunting his political genius it left this most extraordinary man weaponless and at the mercy of his enemies. We conclude, then, that to call the man a nihilist or a power-seeker is to underestimate him. The reason for the Third Reich's existence lies in Hitler's desire to see his ideas fulfilled.

CONCLUSION

Having examined the relationship of Hitler to the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich, we conclude with an attempt to determine the main reason for Hitler's downfall, and an evaluation of Hitler and his effect on the world. The seeds of Hitler's collapse can be found in the portrait of the young Hitler given by A. Kubizek.[1] The picture emerges of a rigidly self-controlled youth, who set himself a vast programme of studies and who was likely to conceive grandiose projects, such as writing an opera even though he had no knowledge of musical composition, without any doubts as to his ability to carry it through. His ideas were already formed and thus he merely sought in his omnivorous reading a confirmation of these principles. Awkward in the company of strangers, he turned to his friend as a sounding-board for his thoughts. Kubizek, aware that Hitler did not want to enter into a debate, contented himself with the role of passive listener, excusing his companion's brusqueness and moodiness "because these unpleasant sides of his character were over-shadowed by the pure fire of an exalted soul."[2] Perhaps the most revealing sentence in the whole book is this: "He simply could not bear taking orders from other people, for he received enough orders from himself."[3]

Further, on his study habits in Vienna, Kubizek has this to say. "I do not remember Adolf ever having tried to apply in practice what he

had learnt."[4] He was wholly self-sufficient in his ideas and never tried to test them in conversation with other people who shared his professional interests. Being completely withdrawn into himself, Hitler tended to live in a dream world of his own, far from the practical world. Indeed visionary and consequently sometimes unrealistic thinking seemed to be the natural bent of his mind. To hold him in the present he had to have close and continuous contact with other people. He only learned to do this when he delved into politics at the end of the war. This contact was closest not when he was dealing with individuals, but rather with a mass. For he had the ability to discern the mood of the crowd before him and to give voice to all its thoughts and passions. According to Konrad Heiden, "the true aim of political propaganda is not to influence but to study the masses. . . . Rather than a means of directing the mass mind, propaganda is a technique of riding with the masses. It is not a machine to make wind, but a sail to catch wind."[5] It was by opening his mind to the thoughts of the people that Hitler became "a master of mass emotion".[6]

However, if Hitler could open his mind, so too could he close it. This, in effect, is what happened when he ceased to take any great interest in German national politics around about 1937 and turned his attention to the international sphere.[7] This time was also a turning point for the nature of the Government in the Third Reich. Up till then, Germany was ruled by what was basically a charismatic leadership. According to Max Weber, charisma is:

> a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary man and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities. These are . . . not accessible to the ordinary person, but are regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them the individual concerned is treated as a leader.[8]

When Hitler came to power in 1933, he came as the prophet who was going to lead Germany out of the wilderness, as the messiah who had discerned the path of history and as the inspired one who, by purging Germany of its corruption, would bring glory to the country. Moreover he was accepted in this role, not only by his fanatical lieutenants, but also by large numbers of Germans who saw the lifting of the depression and the new respect accorded by foreign leaders to Germany as signs that Hitler had "at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities."

Charismatic leadership in its "pure" form is essentially a transient and volatile thing. As the specific crisis which engendered it passes, routinization and stabilization set in. "It is the fate of charisma . . . to give way to powers of tradition and rational socialization."[9] In considering the evolution of the Government in the Third Reich, the distinction must be applied between charismatic leadership and authority, as defined by Robert Bierstadt. He says:

> Leadership depends upon the personal qualities of the leader in the situation in which he leads. In the case of authority, however, the relationship ceases to be personal and, if the legitimacy of the authority is recognized, the subordinate of the authority must obey the command even when he is unacquainted with the power who issues it. In a leadership relation, the person is basic; in an authority relation the person is merely a symbol.[10]

By 1937 Germany was firmly bound to Hitler's will. Personal appearances and exhortations were no longer needed, although it is noteworthy that when the structure of the Third Reich threatened to collapse, that is, after the July 20, 1944, attempt on Hitler's life, the Führer thought it necessary to come before the microphone himself in order to reassure the German people. But, emergencies apart, it is true to say that the longer Hitler stayed in power, the greater was the distance that he put between himself and the German people.

Once the war had started, Hitler was cut off from all his former associates and interests, closing himself in at his headquarters with his military advisers. Goebbels, having to do his task without the aid of Hitler's presence, noted that "the Führer practically lives in a concentration camp."[11] Hitler himself was irked by the closed sort of life he led. "Here in the Wolfschanze, I feel like a prisoner in these dugouts, and my spirit can't escape."[12] The people with whom Hitler did come in contact were sycophants, who, like Kubizek, learnt to adopt the role of passive listeners in the Führer's presence. Thus Hitler lost his chance to draw support from the ideas of others. His mode of thinking consequently reverted to its natural channel; Hitler once more began to live in his dream world. Handicapped by this, the Führer, like those who suddenly lose their sight, could thereafter only grope his way towards his goal. Without the opportunity of a guiding arm, he inevitably blundered off the path and by so doing destroyed himself and his high hopes.

Whether or not this "blindness" was a form of insanity is hard to say and not only on account of the difficulty of defining insanity. All reports confirm that by the end of the war Hitler was a physical wreck, and this fact undoubtedly affected his mental state to some degree. The man was exhausted and only managed to keep going by means of artificial stimulants.[13] To Speer, he seemed senile.[14] The uncontrollable shaking of the left side of his body has been diagnosed variously as Parkinson's disease, or of an hysterical origin or as stemming from the tertiary stages of syphilis.[15] On the information available at present all this must be guess-work and, as such, does not give much help in determining Hitler's mental condition. A more important consideration is the generally acknowledged fact that the margin between genius and insanity is small. Although some would question Hitler's brilliance, despite the affirmation of it by such authorities as Trevor-Roper and Bullock,[16] a brief examination of Hitler's career should swiftly allay any such doubts. The unending and steadily increasing strain of the war years probably first pushed Hitler across the margin of insanity. These bouts of utter unreality at first assailed him infrequently, but during the last months they took a firmer hold upon him. The weeks preceding his decision to commit suicide were characterized by a rampant emotionalism, wild accusations and incomprehensible ramblings on Hitler's part.[17] But once this decision was finally made, that is, when he forced himself to face reality, he grew more calm. Shortly before the end, Speer was impressed by Hitler's serenity.[18] Thus it appears that Hitler went to his death in the full possession of his faculties, showing by his suicide

that he was fully aware of the utterly hopeless situation into which he had led Germany.

Bullock ends his study of Hitler with the words "si monumentum requiris, circumspice";[19] and indeed the world of pre-1933 seems very remote from that of today. When time has sorted out the trivial from the significant, it may well be that historians will see the Hitler years as the end of the era which originated at the time of the French Revolution. For it is in these years that three major sociological trends first began to make a substantive mark upon the world and its ways. Firstly, Hitler brought to fulfilment the idea first introduced during the First World War: that of the total involvement of the state in society. All the countries that entered the fight against him were forced to follow his example, so that nowadays the idea of state interference is no longer the anathema it was formerly. Secondly, Hitler also had the effect of weakening the class structure,[20] not only because he himself abominated its workings, but because in total war success depends upon the efforts of every citizen. Thus the lot of the working man in the U.K. was greatly improved during the war, as his unstinted labour was essential to its conduct. Finally, the research establishments which flourished during the war and the industrial boom occasioned by the demands of a world in arms have not been allowed to decline, with the result that today we are benefitting from a scientific and technological revolution which has provided us with everything from sputniks to the "instant" range of foods. It is too much to say that Hitler was the instigator of these trends, for each neither began nor ended during the years 1933 - 1945. They are historical developments, taking years to shape themselves and run

their full course. But we can say that Hitler and the war he caused accelerated the technological revolution to its flat-out tempo and far-reaching scope that characterizes it today. We can also say that even though the doctrine of laissez-faire and the rigid class structure of society were already crumbling in the inter-war period, they were given a fresh and decisive impetus by Hitler and his war.

The country most affected by Hitler is naturally Germany itself. The Gleichschaltung abruptly cut short the gradual historical development of the country, with the result that Germany was faced with a virtual tabula rasa in 1946. Political institutions, such as political parties and trade unions, had to be started again from scratch. National Socialism had the effect of displacing Prussia from its preponderant role in German politics. The Army was brought under the jurisdiction of the civil authorities, thus losing its long-held position of lofty independence. The Prussian Junkers forfeited their privileged place in German society.[21] Also many of the political ideas which have tarnished German thought since the Reformation,[22] by reason of their having played an integral part in the Nazi ideology, seem to be compromised past recall. Nationalism, militarism, anti-semitism and the Pan-Germanic idea appear at the moment to have left German politics for good.

If the Third Reich has had some salutary affects on Germany, it goes without saying that it also resulted in much harm. The systematic poisoning of the people's minds with the more distasteful tenets of National Socialism will be neither easily nor swiftly remedied. Deutsch and Breitling estimated that in the mid-fifties about one in twenty of the German people were still hard-core Nazis, while one in eight ex-

pressed implicit sympathies.[23] Also, as an aftermath of the intense political involvement of the Hitler years, many Germans have concluded that politics is a dangerous game, best left to professionals.[24] Their interest has consequently reverted from public affairs to private ones. Even today they tend to be reluctant to commit themselves in public on any particular issue, contenting themselves instead with such passive forms of political activity as reading the newspapers, rather than forming political groups or taking part in political discussion.[25] There is little sympathy for the idea of trying to influence the government except by voting because the development of the norms of active political participation has been stunted by the fear of involvement.[26] Almond and Verba have found that although they are happy with the government in a pragmatic sense, they do not give it their emotional support.[27] In short, they stand aloof from the democratic regime, fearing lest they get their fingers burnt a second time. These two factors -- the dogged support of the former regime by a determined minority and the emotional detachment from the existing system -- recall forcibly the predicament of the Weimar Republic. It is to be hoped that the Bonn Republic will not meet with the same economic calamities which befell its predecessor.

It is an exceptional man who leaves his mark on the world to the extent that Hitler did. He was, as Albert Speer puts it, "one of those inexplicable historical phenomena which emerge at rare intervals among mankind."[28] It was the possession of a virtually unique characteristic that made him so extraordinary. Other leaders might have in common with him his oratorical skill, but Hitler was more than a mere demagogue. They

might share his political genius, but Hitler was more than an outstandingly capable political tactician. They might also share Hitler's belief in his historical role given him by destiny, but Hitler was more than a messiah. They too might display his less pleasant characteristics -- his disrespect for human life and his Machiavellian cynicism -- but Hitler was more than this. Not just the sum of these parts, he was above all marked by a certain quality which sets him off from other aspirants to his position. The key to this seems to lie in the inhuman and absolute way the man pursued his aims. It was not simply that he discarded conventional morality, but that he lost his humanity in the process. Von Schirach said of him: "Before 1934 he was menschlich; from 1934 to 1938 he was Übermenschlich; from 1938 on he was unmenschlich. . . ."[29] Other dictators have displayed all the normal human weaknesses, ranging from greed to leachery. But Hitler is set apart from them precisely because it became impossible to recognize him as one of us. In this, we can thankfully say, he is virtually unique.

N O T E S

Introduction

(1) In fact, apart from two notable exceptions -- A. Bullock and H. Trevor-Roper -- the relationship between Hitler and the advent of National Socialism has been all but ignored. F. Neumann, for instance, sees the Third Reich as the creation of the German industrialists. H. Arendt and W. Kornhauser see it in terms of the "mass society". R. D'O Butler sees National Socialism as the logical outcome of German society and ideology. S. Lipset sees it as an expression of middle-class extremism, and K. Heiden as an expression of a social revolution that was sweeping the world.

(2) See L. Edinger, "Political Science and Political Biography: Reflections on the Study of Leadership", Journal of Politics, vol. 26, May 1964, pp. 423 ff, at p. 430.

(3) "Co-ordinate" is used as a translation of the German word Gleichschalten. In practice it meant the bringing of all the various sections of German society into a position to which the state could conveniently hand down its commands.

Chapter One. The Misfortunes of the Republic

(1) Quoted in W. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (New York, 1960), p. 31.

(2) E. Eyck, The Weimar Republic (Cambridge, 1962), I, 34.

(3) Quoted in E. Eyck, op. cit., I, 37.

(4) E. Eyck, op. cit., I, 38.

(5) J. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power (London, 1954), p. 17.

(6) General Gröner gives an illustration of the situation. "A division which had been considered particularly reliable had been selected to cover the rear of General Head Quarters against rebels marching from Cologne and Aachen; the troops refused to obey their officers and, in spite of orders to the contrary, set off to march homeward." Quoted in E. Eyck, op. cit., I, 44.

(7) Quoted in J. Wheeler-Bennett, op. cit., p. 3.

(8) E. Eyck, op. cit., I, 45.

(9) Quoted ibid., I, 46.

(10) J. Wheeler-Bennett, op. cit., p. 23 fn.

(11) W. Shirer, op. cit., p. 52.

(12) W. Shirer, Midcentury Journey (New York, 1961), pp. 127-128.

(13) Quoted in J. Wheeler-Bennett, op. cit., p. 18.

(14) E. Eyck, op. cit., I, 61. But see also W. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, op. cit., pp. 55-56, and G. Scheele, The Weimar Republic (London, 1946), p. 149.

(15) Op. cit., I, 69-71.

(16) Op. cit., I, 70.

(17) E. Eyck, op. cit., I, 71.

(18) Ibid.

(19) G. Scheele, op. cit., p. 149.

(20) E. Eyck, op. cit., I, 69.

(21) W. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, op. cit., p. 56 fn.

(22) E.A. Mowrer, Germany Puts the Clock Back (New York, 1933), p.188.

(23) R. Butler, The Roots of National Socialism (London, 1941), p.218.

(24) G. Scheele, op. cit., p. 47.

(25) Ibid., p. 48.

(26) G. Ritter, "The Historical Foundations of the Rise of National Socialism", in The Third Reich, M. Baumont, J. Fried & M. Vermeil, ed.s, (London, 1955), p. 389.

(27) E. Eyck, op. cit., I, 72.

(28) Quoted in R. Waite, The Vanguard of Nazism (Cambridge, 1952), p.7.

(29) Hindenburg's statement, probably prepared by an extreme nationalist called Helfferich, is a good example of the Army's capacity for self-delusion. The following is part of it. "In spite of the superiority of the enemy in men and material, we could have brought the struggle to a favourable issue if determined and unanimous co-operation had existed between the army and those at home. But whereas the enemy showed an ever greater will to victory, divergent party interests began to manifest themselves with us. . . . Owing to this our will to victory was undermined. I looked for energy and co-operation, but found pusillanimity and weakness. . . . Our operations in consequence failed, as they were bound to, and the collapse became inevitable; the revolution was merely the last straw. As an English General has very truly said, 'The German Army was stabbed in the back.' It is plain enough upon whom the blame lies. If any further proof were necessary, it is to be found in the utter amazement of our enemies at their victory." Quoted in J. Wheeler-Bennett, Wooden Titan New York, 1936), pp. 235-237.

(30) J. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power, op. cit., p. 12.

(31) J. Wheeler-Bennett, Wooden Titan, op. cit., p. 77.

(32) The Committee of Enquiry had been set up by the Government in order to reveal to the German people the Army's part in the acceptance of the armistice and peace terms. However, public reaction against the Government following Hindenburg's statement was such that, when the question arose as to whether or not a guard of honor should be provided at his departure from Berlin, the answer came back: "Certainly give him a guard of honor. Give him two if necessary, but for God's sake get him out of Berlin." Quoted in J. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power, op. cit., p. 68.

(33) E. Eyck, op. cit., I, 72.

(34) J. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power, op. cit., p. 45.

(35) W. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, op. cit., p. 57.

(36) J. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power, op. cit., p. 52.

(37) A. Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (London, 1962), p. 58.

(38) J. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power, op. cit., p. 46.

(39) W. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, op. cit., p. 58.

(40) E. Eyck, op. cit., I, 113-114.

(41) E. Eyck, op. cit., I, 95.

(42) E. Eyck, op. cit., I, 95-97.

(43) J. Wheeler-Bennett, Wooden Titan, op. cit., pp. 228-229.

(44) Ibid., pp. 229-230;

(45) Ibid., pp. 230-231.

(46) E. Eyck, op. cit., I, 115.

(47) A. Bullock, op. cit., p. 85.

(48) F. Lütge, "An Explanation of the Economic Conditions which Contributed to the Victory of National Socialism", in The Third Reich, op. cit., p. 419.

(49) Ibid., p. 420.

(50) Ibid., p. 421.

(51) Ibid., p. 427.

(52) W. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, op. cit., p. 136.

(53) F. Lütge, op. cit., p. 436.

(54) A. Bullock, op. cit., pp. 52, 53.

(55) F. Lütge, op. cit., pp. 418, 419-420.

(56) Ibid., p. 418.

(57) Ibid., p. 419.

(58) Op. cit., p. 227.

(59) F. Lütge, op. cit., p. 422.

(60) Ibid.

(61) Ibid., p. 423.

(62) Ibid.

(63) Ibid.

(64) W. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, op. cit., p. 61.

(65) Ibid., p. 62.

(66) A. Bullock, op. cit., p. 90.

(67) F. Lütge, op. cit., p. 423.

(68) Op. cit., p. 91.

(69) E. Eyck, op. cit., I, 75. F. Lütge, op. cit., pp. 425-426.

(70) F. Lütge, op. cit., p. 431.

(71) Ibid., p. 432.

(72) The figures for registered unemployed are as follows:

	January	December
1929	1,260,044	2,850,849
1930	2,640,681	4,383,843
1931	3,953,946	5,615,187
1932	5,475,778	5,772,984

During certain months of 1932 and 1933, over six millions were out of work. These figures are taken from A. Bullock, "The German Communists and the Rise of Hitler", in The Third Reich, op. cit., p. 511.

(73) F. Lütge, op. cit., p. 434.

(74) A. Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, op. cit., p. 152.

(75) Ibid., p. 153.

(76) E. Eyck, op. cit., II, 52.

(77) Quoted ibid., I, 282.

(78) Quoted ibid., II, 250.

(79) Quoted ibid., II, 196-197.

(80) "The Seizure of Power", in The Third Reich, op. cit., p. 524.

(81) For a summary of Hugenberg's role in the Weimar Republic, see J. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power, op. cit., p. 208 fn.

(82) A. Bullock, "The German Communists and the Rise of Hitler", op. cit., p. 509.

(83) Ibid., p. 511.

(84) Ibid., p. 519.

(85) Quoted in E. Eyck, op. cit., II, 258.

(86) A case in point is the Government's use of the Freikorps to restore order in Berlin and Munich. See below.

(87) In this respect, it is interesting to compare the sentences handed down by the Courts on the participants in the right-wing Kapp-Lüttwitz Putsch with those received by the adherents of the Bavarian Soviet Government. In the former case, the sum total of years sentenced was five; in the latter, six hundred and fifteen. R. Waite, op. cit., p. 162.

(88) Political Man (New York, 1963), p. 108.

(89) See Talcott Parsons, "Democracy and Social Structure in Pre-Nazi Germany", Essays in Sociological Theory (Glencoe, 1954), p. 104.

(90) Op. cit., p. 42. Some idea of the mentality of these men can be gained from the quotations Waite gives on p. 26 from books by two of them.

(91) Op. cit., p. 27.

(92) A. Bullock, "The German Communists and the Rise of Hitler", op. cit., p. 504.

(93) For accounts of the Kapp-Lüttwitz Putsch and the Küstrin Putsch, see J. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power, op. cit., pp. 71-82, and pp. 111-112 respectively. For the Beer Hall Putsch, see A. Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, op. cit., pp. 106-113.

(94) R. Waite, op. cit., p. 216.

(95) For an account of the murder associations, see ibid., pp. 212-227.

(96) Ibid., p. 76.

(97) Quoted ibid., p. 89.

(98) Ibid., p. 90.

(99) Ibid.

(100) E. Eyck, op. cit., II, 295-6.

(101) A. Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, op. cit., p. 213.

(102) Ibid., p. 214.

(103) A. Bullock, "The German Communists and the Rise of Hitler", op. cit., p. 513.

(104) Quoted in E. Eyck, op. cit., II, 408.

(105) E.A. Mowrer, op. cit., p. 15.

(106) J. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power, op. cit, pp. 3-4.

(107) Ibid., p. 228.

(108) For von Seeckt's and Gröner's Orders of the Day, see ibid., p. 19 and p. 213 respectively.

(109) W. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, op. cit., p. 139.

(110) J. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power, op. cit., p. 182.

(111) For a more detailed account, see G. Craig, "The Reichswehr and National Socialism: The Policy of Wilhelm Gröner", Political Science Quarterly, vol. 63, 1948, pp. 194 ff.

(112) G. Kramer, "The Influence of National Socialism on the Courts of Justice and the Police", in The Third Reich, op. cit., p. 602.

(113) Ibid.

(114) Quoted ibid., p. 603 fn.

(115) Ibid, p. 608.

(116) Ibid.

(117) Ibid., pp. 608-609.

(118) Ibid., pp. 609-611

(119) Ibid., p. 616.

(120) E. Eyck, op. cit., II, 281.

(121) Ibid., II, 139.

(122) Ibid., I, 151.

(123) In his political testament Hindenburg called for a restoration of the monarchy. J. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power, op. cit., p. 314.

(124) Ibid., p. 232.

(125) E. Eyck, op. cit., II, 351.

(126) Quoted ibid., II, 32.

Chapter Two. The National Socialists

(1) A. Hitler, Mein Kampf (Boston, 1962), p. 581.

(2) This description of the authoritarian personality is taken from T.W. Adorno et al., The Authoritarian Personality (New York, 1950).

(3) The phrase is Konrad Heiden's.

(4) E. Hoffer, The True Believer (New York, 1958), p. 131.

(5) A. Hitler, Speeches (London, 1942), p. 263.

(6) G. Scheele, The Weimar Republic (London, 1946), pp. 24-26.

(7) See M. Duverger, Political Parties (London, 1959), p. 84, where, by means of a graph, he compares the concomitant rise of party membership, voting support and the percentage of unemployed.

(8) A. Bullock, "The German Communists and the Rise of Hitler", in The Third Reich, M. Baumont, J. Fried & M. Vermeil, ed.s, (London, 1955), p. 517.

(9) A. Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (London, 1962), p. 152.

(10) G. Scheele, op. cit., p. 149.

(11) "Democracy and Social Structure in Pre-Nazi Germany", in Essays in Sociological Theory (Illinois, 1954), pp. 111-112.

(12) See Chapter One for a description of German hierarchical society.

(13) See, for example, S.M. Lipset, Political Man (New York, 1963), p. 131, where he claims that "fascism is basically a middle class movement . . ."

(14) A. Hitler, Speeches, op. cit., p. 79.

(15) Ibid., p. 13.

(16) Ibid., p. 144.

(17) Ibid., p. 16.

(18) Ibid., p. 263.

(19) A. Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, op. cit., p. 808.

(20) Op. cit., p. 407.

(21) A. Hitler, Secret Book (New York, 1961), passim.

(22) A. Hitler, Speeches, op. cit., p. 111.

(23) Op. cit., p. 138.

(24) A. Hitler, Speeches, op. cit., p. 884.

(25) K. Heiden, Der Führer (New York, 1944), p. 139.

(26) A study of the NSDAP's earliest statement of principle -- the Twenty-five Point Programme -- shows clearly the wide appeal of the party. For the traditional, right-wing forces in Germany were the promises of the abrogation of the Treaties of Versailles and St. Germain, and the blatant anti-semitism of the platform. For the middle class came the promise of action against the trusts and large department stores. For the farmers there was a proposal of drastic, agrarian reform. For the workers was the undertaking to abolish unearned income and to share out the profits of the large industries. For the full text of the Programme, see Speeches, op. cit., I, 103-107.

(27) "The Nazi Party: Its Leadership and Composition", American Journal of Sociology, vol. XLV, January 1940, pp. 517 ff, at p. 525.

(28) See S. Lipset, op. cit., pp. 138-146.

(29) Op. cit., p. 525.

(30) R. Waite, Vanguard of Nazism (Cambridge, 1952), p. 274.

(31) Quoted ibid., p. 237.

(32) See S. Lipset, op. cit., p. 144.

(33) See Chapter Five, note two, for an elaboration of this point.

(34) In his book, The Nazi Elite (Stanford, 1951), Daniel Lerner develops the concept which he terms "marginality". By this he means the alienation of an individual from his political and social context. A person is considered marginal if there is evidence of a factor such as inability to find employment in his life-history. Thus a fanatical party member (the authoritarian) and a party supporter (the malcontent) are likely to be considered as marginals. In dealing with the Nazi elite, Lerner divides the party members into three categories: the propagandists, the administrators and the police sections. Most of the propagandists came from the upper-ranks of society, whereas the administrators came from the lower-middle and working classes (p. 34). Lerner shows the importance of the marginal men (that is, the authoritarians and the malcontents) in the upper ranks of the Nazi Party in the following figures (p. 84).

Class	Prop.	Admin.	Police
Marginal	77.4%	82.1%	77.1%
Non-Marginal	22.6%	17.9%	22.9%

The marginal men obviously played an important part in the Third Reich. Lerner's figures are based on the Party Führerlexikon, published annually up to 1939.

(35) Quoted in K. Heiden, op. cit., p. 146.

Chapter Three The Rise of the NSDAP

(1) A. Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (London, 1962), p. 64.

(2) A. Hitler, Mein Kampf (Boston, 1962), p. 223.

(3) A. Bullock, op. cit., pp. 73-74.

(4) Ibid., p. 65.

(5) Ibid., p. 66.

(6) Ibid., p. 75.

(7) Ibid., p. 67.

(8) W. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (New York, 1960), p.46.

(9) A. Bullock, op. cit., p. 67.

(10) Ibid., p. 73.

(11) W. Shirer, op. cit., pp. 42-43.

(12) A. Bullock, op. cit., p. 73.

(13) J. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power (London, 1954), p. 164.

(14) A. Bullock, op. cit., p. 100.

(15) Ibid., p. 103.

(16) Ibid., pp. 96-97.

(17) E. Eyck, The Weimar Republic (Cambridge, 1962) I, 273.

(18) Op. cit., p. 113.

(19) A. Bullock, op. cit., p. 114.

(20) T. Jarman, The Rise and Fall of Nazi Germany (New York, 1956), p. 199.

(21) A. Bullock, op. cit., p. 113.

(22) A. Hitler, Speeches (London, 1942) I, 133.

(23) Much comment has been made over Hitler's so-called cowardice in escaping from the scene as swiftly as possible. However, in a situation in which his superior numbers could not be brought to bear, to continue advancing would only be suicidal and to run for cover would be to follow the dictates of common sense. It is generally accepted that Ludendorff put Hitler to shame by standing cool and imperturbable in the crisis. Yet a reliable eye witness, the American consul in Munich at that time, maintains that "both Ludendorff and Hitler behaved in an identical manner, like the battle-hardened soldiers they were. Both fell flat to escape the hail of bullets." Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (New York, 1964), p. 24.

(24) A. Bullock, op. cit., p. 115.

(25) A. Hitler, Speeches, op. cit., I, 83.

(26) Quoted in A. Bullock, op. cit., p. 115.

(27) A. Hitler, Speeches, op. cit., I, 87.

(28) A. Bullock, op. cit., p. 120.

(29) For an account of the Party's collapse during Hitler's term of imprisonment, see A. Bullock, op. cit., pp. 122-127.

(30) A. Hitler, Speeches, op. cit., I, 168.

(31) A. Bullock, op. cit., p. 144.

(32) Ibid.

(33) Ibid., p. 145.

(34) Ibid., p. 129.

(35) Ibid., p. 131.

(36) Ibid., p. 141.

(37) K. Heiden, Der Führer (New York, 1944), p. 179.

(38) A. Bullock, op. cit., p. 141.

(39) Ibid., p. 147.

(40) Ibid., p. 161.

(41) W. Shirer, op. cit., p. 142.

(42) The full text of Hitler's speech can be found in Speeches, op. cit., I, 777-829.

(43) A. Bullock, op. cit., p. 175.

(44) Ibid., pp. 163-164.

(45) Ibid., p. 165.

(46) Ibid., p. 166.

(47) Ibid.

(48) Ibid., pp. 135-136.

(49) Quoted ibid., p. 137.

(50) Ibid., p. 138.

(51) Ibid., pp. 138-139.

(52) Ibid., p. 169.

(53) J. Wheeler-Bennett, op. cit., pp. 305-306.

(54) Ibid., p. 308.

(55) A. Bullock, op. cit., pp. 202-203.

(56) Ibid., p. 204.

(57) Hitler, in his desire to attract persons of every political stamp to his banner, had on occasions agreed to incorporate left-wing proposals into the party programme. For example, the early Twenty-Five Points came out strongly against big business. In 1933, after the first flush of victory had died down, the left-wing Nazis began to agitate for the implementation of the various social reforms. In their phraseology, the Second Revolution would be concerned with the reorganization of German society according to their ideals.

(58) For an account of 'The Night of the Long Knives', see J. Wheeler-Bennett, op. cit., pp. 322-324.

(59) Ibid., p. 232.

(60) W. Shirer, Op. cit., p. 171.

(61) Ibid., p. 167.

(62) Ibid., p. 176.

(63) A. Bullock, op. cit., p. 242.

(64) Quoted ibid., p. 145.

(65) Ibid., p. 238.

(66) W. Shirer, op. cit., p. 176.

(67) A. Bullock, op. cit., pp. 243-245.

(68) (New York, 1941).

(69) Marius van der Lubbe, who was found guilty of setting fire to the Reichstag buildings on the night of February 27, 1933, was executed under this law which retroactively provided the death penalty for this offence.

(70) See, for example, F. Neumann's "Note on the Name Behemoth", which prefaces his book Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism (London, 1942) in which he claims that National Socialism was "a non-state, a chaos, a rule of lawlessness and anarchy." See also H. Arendt, who states that "both Hitler and Stalin held out promises of stability in order to hide their intention of creating a state of permanent instability." Origins of Totalitarianism (London, 1962), p. 391.

(71) Op. cit., p. 119.

(72) The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton, 1963).

(73) The situation in 1918, it must be noted, did not represent a social collapse as well as a political one. The Weimar Republic was marked by the inability or the unwillingness of many of its citizens to admit the passing of the Kaiser's authoritarian regime and to orient themselves to democracy.

(74) "Nazism and the Nazis", Encounter, vol. XXII, April 1964, pp. 39 ff, at p. 46.

(75) The anti-democratic parties were the Communists, the National Socialists and Hugenberg's Nationalists. These three parties received the following percentages of Reichstag seats:

January 1919	5.5%
June 1920	14.5%
May 1924	42.4%
December 1924	33.4%
May 1928	30.9%
September 1930	39.5%
July 1932	59.0%
November 1932	59.5%

These percentages were based on the figures given by G. Scheele, The Weimar Republic (London, 1946), p. 149.

Chapter Four Hitler's Reich

(1) H. Trevor-Roper, "The Mind of Adolf Hitler". Introductory essay to Hitler's Table Talk, 1914-1944 (London, 1953), p. vii.

(2) Ibid., pp. viii-ix.

(3) A. Hitler, Mein Kampf (Boston, 1962), p. 393.

(4) Ibid., p. 398.

(5) See Chapter Five, note six.

(6) A. Hitler, Mein Kampf, op. cit., p. 654 (The italics are Hitler's).

(7) Ibid., p. 575.

(8) A. Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (London, 1962), p. 271.

(9) A. Hitler, Mein Kampf, op. cit., pp. 449-450.

(10) Ibid., p. 449.

(11) For a full discussion of the fate of the arts in the Third Reich, see F. Pick, The Art of Dr. Goebbels (London, 1942).

(12) Quoted in F. Pick, op. cit., p. 40.

(13) Ibid., p. 41.

(14) A. Hitler, Mein Kampf, op. cit., p. 451.

(15) Ibid., p. 585.

(16) Ibid., p. 403.

(17) According to Hitler, "those who are physically or mentally unhealthy and unworthy must not perpetuate their suffering in the body of their children." Mein Kampf, op. cit., p. 404.

(18) R. D'Harcourt, "National Socialism and the Catholic Church in Germany", in The Third Reich, M. Baumont, J. Fried & M. Vermeil, ed.s, (London, 1955), p. 808.

(19) Mein Kampf, op. cit., pp. 403-404.

(20) For a description of the German Labour Front, see T. Cole, "The Evolution of the German Labour Front", Political Science Quarterly, vol. 52, 1937, pp. 532 ff.

(21) W. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (New York, 1960), p. 263.

(22) Quoted in O. Nathan, The Nazi Economic System (Durham, 1944), p.179.

(23) R. D'Harcourt, op. cit., p. 807.

(24) Ibid., p. 809.

(25) B. Forrell, "National Socialism and the Protestant Churches in Germany", in The Third Reich, op. cit., p. 823.

(26) Upwards of eight hundred Roman Catholic and three to four hundred Evangelical clergy died in Dachau alone. H. Rothfels, The German Opposition to Hitler (London, 1961), p. 40.

(27) B. Fornell, op. cit., pp. 821-822.

(28) Luther. Quoted in E. Fraenkel, The Dual State (New York, 1941), p. 118.

(29) R. D'Harcourt, op. cit., p. 810.

(30) A. Bullock, op. cit., p. 734.

(31) H. Rothfels, op. cit., p. 43.

(32) G. Gilbert, Nuremburg Diary (New York, 1947), p. 81.

(33) A. Hitler, Table Talk, op. cit., p. 59.

(34) A. Hitler, Mein Kampf, op. cit., p. 449.

(35) A. Bullock, op. cit., p. 666.

(36) According to Hitler, "even the Generals are sterile. They are imprisoned in the toils of their technical knowledge. The creative genius stands always outside the circle of the experts". H. Rauschning, Hitler Speaks (London, 1939), p. 16.

(37) F. Gilbert, Hitler Directs His War (New York, 1950), p. xxvii.

(38) J. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power (London, 1954), p. 344.

(39) Ibid., p. 292.

(40) Ibid., pp. 292-294.

(41) Ibid., p. 339.

(42) Ibid., pp. 393-395.

(43) Ibid., p. 312.

(44) Ibid., p. 321.

(45) Quoted ibid., p. 325.

(46) Ibid., pp. 350-352.

(47) Ibid., p. 353.

(48) Ibid., pp. 364-372.

(49) Ibid., p. 372.

(50) Ibid., p. 373.

(51) Ibid., pp. 525-526.

(52) Ibid., p. 525.

(53) Ibid., p. 526 fn.

(54) A. Bullock, op. cit., p. 752.

(55) Ibid.

(56) Ibid., p. 665.

(57) Ibid., p. 664.

(58) A. Hitler, Mein Kampf, op. cit., p. 449. (The italics are Hitler's).

(59) T. Jarman, The Rise and Fall of Nazi Germany (New York, 1956), p.195.

(60) J. Wheeler-Bennett, op. cit., p. 340 fn.

(61) A. Bullock, op. cit., p. 547.

(62) Ibid., p. 592.

(63) Quoted ibid., p. 391.

(64) Ibid., p. 598.

(65) Ibid., pp. 787-788.

(66) Ibid., p. 290.

(67) Ibid., p. 728.

(68) J. Wheeler-Bennett, op. cit., pp. 577-578.

(69) A. Bullock, op. cit., p. 729.

(70) Ibid., p. 795.

(71) Ibid., p. 138.

(72) Ibid., p. 795.

(73) Ibid., pp. 727-728.

(74) Quoted ibid., p. 797.

(75) Ibid., p. 730.

(76) Ibid.

(77) Ibid., p. 676.

(78) Ibid., p. 776.

(79) Ibid., p. 777.

(80) G. Gilbert, op. cit., p. 62.

(81) Ibid., p. 207.

(82) A. Bullock, op. cit., p. 312.

(83) H. Trevor-Roper, The Last Days of Hitler (New York, 1962), p.293.

(84) A. Hitler, Mein Kampf, op. cit., p. 212.

(85) A. Hitler, Speeches (London, 1942), II, 1307.

(86) Quoted in H. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (London, 1962), p. 349 fn. In his book, Germany Reborn, Goering writes: "Everyone who knows the close inner bond between Hitler and his men will understand that for us followers it is axiomatic that the Leader must possess any quality which is attributed to him in its highest perfection. Just as the Roman Catholic considers the Pope infallible in all matters concerning religion and morals, so do we believe with the same inner conviction that for us the Leader is, in all political and other matters concerning the national and social interests of the people, simply infallible." Quoted in D. Spearman, Modern Dictatorship (London, 1939), p. 84.

(87) A. Hitler, Speeches, op. cit., I, 243.

(88) Hitler's own explanation of this process is given by H. Rauschning, op. cit., p. 181. "No matter what you attempt, if an idea is not yet mature, you will not be able to realize it. I know that as an artist, and I know it as a statesman. Then there is only one thing to do: have patience, wait, try again, wait again. In the subconscious the work goes on. It matures, sometimes it dies. Unless I have the inner incorruptible conviction: this is the solution, I do nothing. I will not act; I will wait, no matter what happens. But if the voice speaks, then I know the time has come to act."

(89) Examples of this are quoted by D. Spearman, op. cit., p. 85. Thus Karl Rauch writes in Die literarische Welt that "the War produced apart from all its horrors, the epochal source of new life. All the healing power that sprang from it has been condensed in the person of Lance-Corporal Adolf Hitler, the light of whose ideas was for weeks dimmed by gas, . . . in order that, although outwardly blind, he might see the inner light of the German transformation." A further example is given by Gottfried Benn in his Der Neue Staat und die Intellectum. "The Leader is the creative force; in his history are united the irrational elements of the will of history, first made visible by him. . . . He appoints himself, although one may also say that he is appointed; it is the voice from the burning bush and he follows it; thither he must go and see the great face. In our case the mass followed, and surrendered itself to the Leader."

(90) H. Trevor-Roper, op. cit., p. 104. The significance of the words "even the intelligent Speer" is that this man, alone of Hitler's court, preserved his powers of conscience and independent discrimination. An extraordinarily gifted administrator, as is shown by his ability to keep the German war economy together, despite bomb damage and shortages of raw materials and labour, Speer was the only man ever to contradict one of Hitler's orders, in this case, the order to lay waste to Germany, confess this to Hitler, and live to tell the tale.

(91) A. Bullock, op. cit., p. 124.

(92) A. Hitler, Speeches, op. cit., II, 1148.

(93) A. Bullock, op. cit., p. 256.

(94) H. Trevor-Roper, op. cit., p. 74.

Chapter Five The Mind of Adolf Hitler

(1) F. Borkenau, for example, writes that National Socialism was nothing but "a hysterical outburst of destruction". The Totalitarian Enemy (London, 1939), p. 143.

(2) Cf. A. Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (London, 1962), p. 808. F. Borkenau, op. cit., p. 26, argues that "the process of destroying the middle classes is constantly gathering momentum." According to H. Rauschning, it is not any doctrinaire commitment that drives National Socialism into rationally incomprehensible action, but its irrational character, which continually prompts it to any possible revolutionary destruction of existing institutions. The Revolution of Nihilism (New York, 1939), p. 22.

(3) A. Hitler, Table Talk (London, 1953), p. 328.

(4) H. Rauschning, Hitler Speaks (London, 1939), p. 123.

(5) See, for example, the references in A. Hitler, op. cit., pp. 73, 340, 347, 411.

(6) A. Bullock, op. cit. See Chapter Nine: "Hitler's War, 1939". See also, D. Thompson, Listen Hans (Boston, 1942), pp. 141-142, where she quotes Hitler as saying: "No, my friend, the British won't fight, and everything will turn out beautifully."

(7) For the effect of Roosevelt's death on Hitler, see A. Bullock, op. cit., pp. 780-781.

(8) Quoted in C. Friedrich and Z. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (Cambridge, 1956), p. 251.

(9) H. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (London, 1962), p. 393.

(10) Ibid., p. 6.

(11) Ibid., p. 350.

(12) Ibid., p. 472.

(13) A. Bullock, op. cit., p. 806.

(14) B. Mussolini. Quoted in M. Oakeshott, The Social and Political Doctrines of Contemporary Europe (New York, 1942), p. 178.

(15) Ibid., p. 169.

(16) A. Hitler, Mein Kampf (Boston, 1962), p. 533.

(17) The various explanations of anti-semitism are examined by H. Arendt, op. cit., pp. 3-10.

(18) A. Hitler, Mein Kampf, op. cit., p. 22.

(19) A. Bullock, op. cit., pp. 688-690.

(20) Quoted in W. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (New York, 1960), p. 1131.

(21) Mein Kampf, op. cit., pp. 640-655.

(22) A. Bullock, op. cit., p. 794.

(23) A. Hitler, Table Talk, op. cit., p.58.

(24) Quoted in J. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power (London, 1954), p. 446.

(25) H. Trevor-Roper, The Last Days of Hitler (New York, 1962), p. 294.

(26) A. Bullock, op. cit., p. 669.

(27) A. Bullock, op. cit., pp. 721-722.

Conclusion

(1) The Young Hitler (London, 1954).

(2) Ibid., p. 134.

(3) Ibid., p. 132.

(4) Ibid., p. 133.

(5) Der Führer (New York, 1944), p. 139.

(6) A. Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (London, 1962), p. 379.

(7) Ibid., pp. 721-722.

(8) Quoted in R. Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (New York, 1962), p. 88 fn.

(9) M. Weber, quoted ibid., p. 236.

(10) Quoted ibid., p. 298.

(11) Quoted by G. Allen in his introduction to Hitler Directs His War (New York, 1950), p. xiii.

(12) Table Talk (London, 1953), p. 340.

(13) A. Bullock, op. cit., pp. 717-718.

(14) Quoted in H. Trevor-Roper, The Last Days of Hitler (New York, 1962), p. 125.

(15) H. Trevor-Roper, op. cit., p. 126. A. Bullock, op. cit., p. 392.

(16) H. Trevor-Roper, op. cit., pp. 293-294.

(17) A. Bullock, op. cit., p. 806.

(18) Ibid., p. 788.

(19) Quoted ibid., p. 786.

(20) Op. cit., p. 808.

(21) This was particularly true in Germany. According to R. Dahrendorf, "the most obvious evidence of the revolutionary impact of the Nazi regime is the near total destruction of the old Prusso-German upper class through the rise of a party elite of new men; through the disappearance of Prussia as a political and administrative entity; through the death of almost an entire generation of young officers from the aristocratic families in the campaigns of the first years of the war; through the systematic liquidation of the old German upper class after the revolt of July 20th, 1944; and finally through the destruction of the economic basis of the old elite as a result of the division of Germany." "The New Germanies: Restoration, Revolution, Reconstruction", Encounter, vol. XXII, April 1964, pp. 50 ff, at p. 51.

(22) R. Dahrendorf, op. cit., p. 51.

(23) A. Bullock, op. cit., p. 807.

(24) K. Deutsch and R. Breitling. "The German Federal Republic", in Modern Political Systems: Europe, R. Macridis & R. Webb, ed.s, (New Jersey, 1963), p. 315.

(25) G. Almond & S. Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton, 1963), p. 429.

(26) Ibid., pp. 116-117; 314-315; 429.

(27) An example of this attitude can be found in one of the interviews G. Almond & S. Verba undertook for their study. A German citizen explained his detachment from contemporary politics on the grounds that he had already seen "too many wrong decisions being made". Op. cit., p. 430.

(28) Ibid., pp. 102; 250-251; 429. It is realized that the trend in Germany is distinctly away from latent Nazi support. This can be seen in the figures given by the German Gallup Institute. Germans were asked "if today - as in 1933 - you were faced with the choice of voting for or against a man like Hitler, how would you decide?" In 1963, 77% would not vote for "a man like Hitler", 5% would vote for him, and 18% made no clear decision. Even though the figure of those who would vote for another Hitler has declined from 15% in 1954, with the inclusion of the undecided there still remains nearly a quarter of the population who are not committed to the Bonn Republic. (It is interesting to note that the Institute could not establish any connection between the attitude "for/against" and age, youth, class or any of the other usual social categories. See Chapter Two.) Figures are quoted in Encounter, op. cit., p. 53. A poll conducted by the Institut für Demoskopie posed the question: "When in this century do you feel things went well for Germany?" At the end of 1963 a third of the German people were still not com-

mitted to the existing regime, although the trend is patently for more and more Germans to accept democracy. The detailed result of the Institut's question is as follows:

	Oct. 1951	June 1959	End of 1963
In the present, today	2	42	62
World War II	-	-	1
1933-1939	42	18	10
1920-1932	7	4	5
Before 1914	45	28	16
Don't Know	4	8	6

Figures are quoted in Encounter, op. cit., p. 45.

(29) Quoted in H. Trevor-Roper, op. cit., p. 103.

(30) Quoted in G. Gilbert, Nuremburg Diary (New York, 1947), p. 23.

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