

## **MORAL INTEGRITY AND REPARATIONS TO AFRICA**

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## THE ARGUMENT FOR REPARATIONS

This paper presents some very preliminary thoughts on reparations due to Sub-Saharan Africa, including acknowledgment, apology, and financial compensation.<sup>2</sup> I am a political sociologist, a specialist in international human rights with a background in African studies. Focusing on the actual history of Africa, I consider the possibility of arguing a case for Western compensation for racial discrimination. I also consider the case for acknowledgment, apology and compensation drawn from the need to recognize the *moral integrity* of Africans.

Moral integrity implies Africans= moral value and competence. From the point of view of universal human rights, the moral value of each individual African is equal to the moral value of any other human being, white or nonwhite, rich or poor. Moral competence is the capacity of any C or most (allowing for various forms of disability) C human beings to distinguish right from wrong, and to make active decisions about moral issues. Acknowledgment of moral competence implies respect for the judgment of others, even when the observer disagrees with their conclusions.

Acknowledgment of the moral integrity of an individual requires acknowledgment of how that individual can be damaged or hurt by past wrongs. It also requires acknowledgment of the value to the individual of the community in which he or she lives, and how destruction of that community can also constitute an individual wrong. Acknowledgment of moral integrity, then, requires that outsiders listen carefully to insiders= accounts of the wrongs they have suffered. In the case of Africa, this requires careful attention to accounts of wrongs suffered because of the slave trade, colonialism, neo-colonialism, and various forms of Western incursion into Africa in

the present.

However, this need to respect Africans' accounts of their own histories does not require that the outsider suspend her or his own judgment. Trudy Govier argues that we do not always have to believe others' claims; rather, we can take an interest, listen respectfully, and reflectively consider claims made by other people *without believing or accepting them*.<sup>3</sup> When acknowledgment, apology or compensation are at issue, it is legitimate to apply a careful lawyer's or historian's consideration to the facts. Historical evidence for the charges of collective or individual hurts should be pursued. The outsider is not required automatically to accept narratives and claims for reparations as truths. Nor is the outsider obliged to absolve from responsibility those from within the claiming community who are responsible for wronging each other. Claims for reparations for past wrongs require sympathetic and respectful hearing, but no automatic reparatory action.

Below is my own very preliminary position on the question of reparations to sub-Saharan Africa. I have no legal training; this paper does not argue in any way a legal basis for reparation.

- 1) The factual case for global financial compensation is unprovable, based as it is on a series of counter-factual assumptions of what might have happened in Africa had there been no slavery, colonialism, or neo-colonialism.
- 2) The case for regarding the European incursion into Africa as a result primarily of racial discrimination is weak, but can be made.
- 3) Theoretically, rather than trying to calculate financial compensation from past historical relations, a better strategy would be to balance universal economic human rights with universal

obligations to fulfill these rights. Unfortunately, this is most unlikely to occur.

4) Regardless of the factual cases for compensation, acknowledgment of past suffering is a necessary step to present recognition of the moral integrity of Africans.

5) Apologies are also a necessary step to recognition of the moral integrity of Africans, and the creation of an international moral community.

6) It may be possible to establish some bases for financial compensation to Africans, to be sought from, and payable by, governments, private corporations, and some private social institutions.

7) Even if there is no other reason for acknowledgment, apology or compensation, a realist view of international relations might wish to consider them as a foundation for trust-based relations between the West and Africa in the future.

### **QUESTIONABLE HYPOTHESES ABOUT COLONIALISM AND UNDER – DEVELOPMENT**

The Declaration of the African Regional Preparatory Conference for the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, held at Durban, South Africa in September 2001, asks for historical justice.<sup>4</sup> The Declaration lays particular stress on the right to financial compensation, in Recommendation 2, which calls for an “International Compensation Scheme for victims of slave trade, as well as victims of any other transnational racist policies and acts ...@

Any attempts to calculate just compensation would encounter numerous obstacles, not least of which are incomplete knowledge and counter-factual assumptions about what might have happened@ in Africa had there been no periods of slavery, colonialism or neo-colonialism. The implied assumption is that, absent these incursions by the outside world, Africa would have@

developed in much the same way as the West has developed. This implication is manifested in many statements made by representatives of African governments at the Durban Conference. For example, Jakaya Kikwete of Tanzania said that the slave trade and colonization of Africa in the nineteenth century are responsible in a big way for the poverty, underdevelopment and marginalization that enveloped that continent ...<sup>5</sup> This assumption is heavily influenced by the development of underdevelopment school of thought, popularized in the 1960s and 70s, which attributes most African underdevelopment to its encounter with the West.<sup>6</sup>

I have contributed in my own right to this school of thought, with particular reference to Ghana.<sup>7</sup> In the 1970s I looked in my doctoral research for evidence that Ghana would have developed in its own right had it not been colonized by the British. Certainly the evidence I found showed that the indigenous Ghanaian economy was profoundly changed by colonialism. The development of Ghana was definitely in the interests of British capital, from the stress on cultivation of cocoa to the detriment of other crops to the deliberate exclusion of African businessmen from the export-import trade with London.

In conducting this research, I was assuming that without European incursion, Ghana would have developed in a capitalist direction. This, however, was a counter-factual assumption. I could not show what might have happened in Ghana without British colonialism. Perhaps had Ghana been left alone, the economic outcome might simply have been the continuation of a subsistence-level peasant society. Ghana might have been simply un-developed, rather than under-developed. Perhaps, in another scenario of non-colonial development, the central Ashanti kingdom might have conquered even more of Northern and Southern Ghana (and parts of

neighboring territories) than it had done prior to the British takeover. This might have resulted in a slave-based economy, trading items such as gold to other Africans and to Europeans in return for goods such as alcohol, tobacco and guns, but not developing in a capitalist direction.<sup>8</sup> In Ghana and in other parts of Africa, without colonialism, the result might have been agriculturally and technologically stagnant economies well into the twentieth century.

Thus, Africa might now be in a state of non-development, rather than under-development. Such non (capitalist)-development would not mean that Africa was in any way an uncivilized continent, lacking culture, sophisticated forms of governance, moral structures or laws. It would simply mean that like China until the twentieth century, it had not adopted a capitalist path to development.

A second problematic assumption about development is found in the debate between external and internal models of Western development. The development of underdevelopment school of thought assumes that the West would not have developed without simultaneously underdeveloping its colonies; the wealth it acquired externally through empire caused its own internal development. The West's wealth was facilitated by the extraction of resources from the colonies, both human labor power and mineral and agricultural products. Therefore, the West, having profited by colonialism, owes financial compensation now to its ex-colonies.

This proposition is very contentious. Other schools of thought suggest that internal changes in the West brought about capitalist growth. The evolution of internal markets, changes in land-tenure arrangements, the stratification of society into different social classes with different roles in the productive process, perhaps even the evolution of new cultural norms of savings and investment, all seem to have contributed to the development of the rich, Western European

economies. Clearly, colonialism was not enough in and of itself to create a wealthy Western economy, as the economic decline of Spain despite its substantial colonial riches indicates.<sup>9</sup>

The truth about the role of colonialism in both underdevelopment and development is probably somewhere between these two schools of thought. Therefore, one could simply dismiss these academic debates as irrelevant to the current discussion of reparations, were it not for assumptions about redistributive benefits that, it is assumed, financial compensation would create. The assumption is that since the West stole from Africa in the past, then it should return what it stole now. Once the stolen wealth is returned, it can be used to remedy Africa's present poverty. It is not African social structure, or political relations, or class exploitation, that causes its poverty: it is simply lack of a finite amount of wealth.

This is a mercantilist approach: there is a certain finite amount of wealth in the world, thus the more the West has, the less is available for others. Mercantilism assumes that once wealth is more equitably distributed, development is likely to occur in the poorer parts of the world. But in the West, development occurred as a consequence of capitalism. Capitalism is based on the presumption that increases in wealth will be generated by ever more efficient methods of production. Such increased efficiency in Africa would not necessarily be the result of monetary compensation, which could be squandered easily in temporary redistributive programs without any lasting effects on productive capacities.

These false assumptions about the relationship between colonialism and underdevelopment render any call for material redistribution problematic. Underdevelopment is not necessarily the consequence of colonialism; re-directed development is an equally likely consequence. Externally-

generated wealth -- from colonialism or from compensation -- will not necessarily result in development. Redistribution of resources does not necessarily result in improvements in productivity. The case for financial compensation is rooted in an assumption that compensation will render possible an improved African economy, but without concomitant changes in social and political relations, such an outcome will not necessarily transpire. Nor can it transpire without the entrenchment of principles of accountability and transparency in the administrative, legal and governance institutions of African nations. Wealth alone is, and always has been, insufficient for development.

## **HISTORY AS RACIAL DISCRIMINATION**

In preparatory documents for the World Conference, calls for reparation were justified on the grounds that the history of slavery and colonialism is one of racial discrimination.<sup>10</sup> The Western incursions into Africa are not best described this way.

Slavery is not necessarily a matter of racial discrimination. Slaves are taken by those who share the slaves=~~Arace@~~, as well as by those who do not. Slavery was practiced in sub-Saharan Africa prior to the incursions of the Europeans. Slaves were taken in conquest of one African society by another; disgraced individuals were also sometimes sold into slavery.<sup>11</sup> Moreover, the international slave trade was not only between Europeans and Africans, it was also between Arabs and Africans: the Arabs took about as many African slaves as were taken across the Atlantic.<sup>12</sup> Early relations between European slave-buyers and African slave-sellers were characterized by a fair degree of social equality. The trade in human beings was considered normal at the time, an era of very limited conceptions of humanity in ~~lothers@~~. Indeed, the Nigerian historian Joseph Inikori



argues that the reason Europeans first went to Africa for slaves was not because Africans were black, but because for political reasons white Europeans could no longer enslave each other.<sup>13</sup>

Thus, slavery cannot be attributed solely to prejudiced conceptions of race. Nevertheless, Europeans did harbor deeply rooted stereotypes of the *Moor*, later the *black*, as evil, uncivilized, violent and dangerous.<sup>14</sup> Such assumptions undoubtedly facilitated both the slave trade and the later colonization of Africa. It was easier than it would otherwise have been to put down African rebellions, indeed in some cases to massacre tens of thousands of Africans at a time (as in the case of the Hereros of South-West Africa), when they were considered to be a lesser species of human being, if indeed not human at all.<sup>15</sup>

The European assumption that they were actually bringing to Africa *Christianity, commerce and civilization* also made it easier to colonize Africa. Ethnocentrism is not a unique European attribute, as we know from outbreaks of racism in de-colonized countries since they received their independence.<sup>16</sup> Nevertheless, when combined with superior resources, ethnocentrism eases the process of colonization. Actions taken for pure self-interest can be justified in the name of helping the barbarians, the dehumanized Other, to become more like oneself.

The enterprise of colonialism, then, was greatly aided by racist perceptions, even if racism was not its prime cause. Neo-colonialism may not be as dependent on racism as colonialism. The term *Neo-colonialism* refers to the incursions of Western-based multinational corporations and financial institutions into Africa, along with international organizations of development management such as the World Bank. Even accepting for the sake of argument that their

intentions and effects are neo-colonial, such incursions do not need to be based on racism. The incentive to make profits knows no color; whether multinationals invest or not in Africa has to do with rational calculations of the profits to be made.

Similarly, the current stage of globalization is not necessarily based on racism. The NGO Forum at the World Conference in Durban maintained that "Globalisation is ... inherently racist."<sup>17</sup> Yet, given the willingness of international capital to move its factories around the world and to hire its employees anywhere, one could argue that global capital is the antithesis of racism. Africa suffers from a lack of such international capitalist investment. If capitalists shy away from Africa, however, it is not because Africans are black, but because as human capital they suffer from lack of education, lack of skills, and poor health (not least AIDS). One might attribute some of this poor human capital to the structural adjustment programs encouraged by international financial institutions since the 1980s, which required governments to reduce their investments in education and health.<sup>18</sup> Again, though, it is not clear that such programs were the consequence of racism, so much as the consequence of economic theories that did not take account of the human costs of economic efficiency. The ex-Soviet bloc, which is white, suffered from similar "shock treatment" approaches to its own economic inefficiencies.

The history of slavery, colonialism and neo-colonialism, therefore, cannot be attributed solely to racism. Indeed, this was acknowledged by the African Regional Preparatory Conference: "[the] slave trade, all forms of exploitation, colonialism and apartheid were essentially motivated by economic objectives and competition between colonial powers for strategic territorial gains, appropriation, control over and pillage of natural and cultural resources."<sup>19</sup> To attribute these historical processes to racism might be considered a politicized anachronism. Since international

law prohibits racial discrimination, to rewrite African history through such a lens improves the chances for legal remedy. Yet it is perhaps unwise to try to view world historical and economic relations solely through the lens of racism. Such a lens obscures the many other causes of under or non-development, especially in Africa.

### **EXCURSUS: RESPECT FOR UNIVERSAL ECONOMIC RIGHTS**

Any attempt to determine just financial compensation for the European incursion into sub-Saharan Africa would encounter irremediable obstacles, for example there is a strong argument that because incursion was not primarily motivated by racial discrimination, such compensation is not necessary. Nevertheless, the current suffering of the vast majority of Africans is so overwhelming that some effort must be made to recognize how that suffering has been caused by Africa's integration over several centuries into the world economy. One means would be to take seriously the obligation of all members of the world community to respect universal economic rights. Article 28 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that "Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized". This article implies, in turn, that everyone has an obligation to ensure that such an order exists. The international consensus on economic rights does not require "proof" of the questionable counter-factual hypotheses discussed above. Rather, it requires attention to the needs of real human beings in the present.

By international law, everyone in the world is entitled to economic rights. Whatever has

happened to an individual, a group or a nation in the past is irrelevant. The only relevance is the current need for protection of economic rights. A world economic order based on individual economic rights would require all economic actors, whether states, private corporations, other organizations or individuals, to consider the effects of their actions on everyone's economic rights.<sup>20</sup>

Economic human rights are measurable and concrete. Minimum standards can be devised for diet, shelter, and health care; whether a state or a continent can provide those minimum standards can be ascertained. Economic human rights provide a standard of accountability by all states, Western or otherwise, to those affected by their policies. Past policies of a state become irrelevant, while its present policies must be geared to the promotion of economic rights.

Yet to ensure that all people, everywhere, enjoy their economic rights now is perhaps too idealistic a project to be considered. Whatever the normative power of the principle of universal responsibility, in practice states bear enforceable responsibilities only to their own citizens. Western citizens are unlikely to give up their privileged access to economic goods to help citizens of other countries. Most Westerners, like most people elsewhere, hold to a concentric circle theory of obligation which does not require them to sacrifice their own well-being for others.<sup>21</sup>

Thus, while theoretically elegant, the principle of universal promotion of economic rights is an unrealistic tool to assist Africans in remedying the past detrimental effects of their integration into the world economy, whether caused by racism or merely by the workings of the capitalist marketplace. The claim for financial compensation for racism substitutes as a political manoeuvre to obtain from the West some of the economic resources not otherwise attainable. This claim is based on the assumption that responsibilities for historical deprivations can be accurately and

quantifiably attributed to the racist activities of external actors.<sup>22</sup> It is also based on the assumption that without such historical deprivations, Africa would be more developed (wealthy) than it is presently is.

I dispute these assumptions. Nevertheless, I believe there is a role for truth-telling and acknowledgment in the current international system. Where responsibility by the West -- or by Western actors -- for the circumstances in which Africans find themselves can be documented, there is also room for apology. Cases can also be made for certain kinds of financial compensation by carefully-delineated donors to carefully-delineated recipients, even if a blanket apology by the West to Africa is inappropriate and even if there is no possibility for payment of blanket compensation by the West to Africa.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND MORAL INTEGRITY**

There is a tendency in the Western world to attribute the dire economic straits in which Africans now find themselves to their own collective incapacities. Many Westerners believe that if Africans studied harder, worked harder, and obeyed the rules of rational economic behavior, their collective problems would be solved.<sup>23</sup>

Such comments deny the moral integrity of Africans. They imply that Africans, unlike Westerners, are incapable of recognizing the way to progress and general prosperity. They suggest that Africans are passive people, sitting under trees waiting for food to fall into their mouths. These stereotypes combine with ancient ideas that Africans are more sexually active than

Europeans, less restrained and less self-disciplined.

Racism against blacks in general, and Africans in particular, is still so strong in the Western world that some acknowledgment of the moral integrity both of individual Africans, and of Africans as a collectivity, is necessary. All peoples and all individuals are entitled to respect and a sense of dignity. This is not merely a platitude picked up from the Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is difficult for any individual to function effectively without a sense of her or his own moral worth, a sense of self-respect. This is all the more so for individuals suffering from poverty and lack of educational opportunities, without any sense that the future might bring some relief. As Didjob Divungui Di-Ndinge, Vice-President of Gabon, said at the Durban Conference, "What Africa is asking for is not compassion, pity or charity. We are asking for recognition ... of the dignity of its sons and daughters."<sup>24</sup>

White Westerners need to know, and to respect, the personal and collective stories of Africans. Only with such knowledge of personal and collective narratives can there be a real basis for collective empathy. To acknowledge the moral integrity of Africans as individuals and of Africa as a civilization requires acts by Westerners of empathic imagination, overcoming the racially inferiorizing stereotypes of their own collective history. This empathic imagination is not impossible, but it requires a constant humanizing of Africans, a constant awareness that underneath the different black skin, cultural predispositions, and ways of living there is a human soul.<sup>25</sup>

However, Westerners also possess moral integrity. They are not all racists, nor have their historical or their present relations with Africa been influenced only by racist perceptions or policies. Particularly in the post-colonial era, many Westerners involved in the social movements

for economic development, human rights, and feminism have been trying very hard to rectify the results of past racist policies, and to remedy current economic inequities. To paint all Westerners as stereotyping racists incapable of recognizing the humanity of "Others" does them a disservice and reduces the possibility of building an international moral community.

To further recognition of both Africans' and Westerners' moral integrity, some form of truth commission about European-African relations might be useful. This would not necessarily be a truth commission laying blame on individual perpetrators for discrete acts, as did the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa. It could, rather, follow the model of the 1967 International War Crimes Tribunal on US involvement in Viet Nam, seeking state responsibilities for atrocities and injustices perpetrated against citizens of other states.

Such a truth commission would acknowledge the wrongs **C** whether intentional or not, whether caused by racial discrimination or not **C** inflicted on Africa by the Western world. A truth commission would also investigate the roles that the non-Western non-African world **C** that is, the ex-Soviet Bloc, China and the Arab world -- have played in Africa. For example, the tragedies in Ethiopia in the 1970s and 1980s were caused in part by the involvement of the Soviet Union.<sup>26</sup>

Establishment of a truth commission would also require that truth be spoken about the responsibilities of Africans themselves for that continent's current dilemmas. Post-colonial African political leaders have much to answer for, from ill-conceived economic policies to intentional imprisonment and persecution of their critics to large-scale personal corruption.<sup>27</sup> To acknowledge these responsibilities of African leaders for their continent's own fate is not to put a

special onus upon them because they are black: it is merely to show that, like political leaders elsewhere, they have their share of faults. In almost all new nation-states, similar large-scale personal corruption and political repression have occurred. This unfortunate result is a function of state and institution-building, not of the peculiar characteristics of this or that racial or ethnic group.<sup>28</sup> Moreover, Africa is not a continent without an indigenous history: some, if not much of the current state of political chaos in some countries can be attributed to indigenous conflicts that must be overcome by Africans themselves.<sup>29</sup>

If the world community -- a community inhabited by Africans as well as others -- does not require that Africans take responsibility for their actions, then in a backhand way it denies them their own moral integrity. For example, despite everything that is known of the colonial history of Rwanda, as well as of the inaction of the United Nations, the United States and France during the actual genocide of 1994, the burden of guilt for the genocide surely lies most directly on the Rwandans who instigated and promoted it. Africans, like Westerners C blacks, like whites C need to accept their own duties to others. The indigenous moral systems of Africa do not permit blatant disregard of others' rights. As many African scholars have maintained, checks and balances existed on the actions of rulers.<sup>30</sup>

Sorting out Western, non-Western and non-African, and indigenous responsibilities for Africa's current state of severe economic crisis is not possible in a manner that makes quantifiable financial compensation possible. No commission could reach any more than a partial truth. Nevertheless, even such a partial truth might modify the perception that Africa's current situation is all Africans' fault, as popular racist perceptions sometimes conclude. The findings of truth commissions can constitute the bases for later history-writing and education. As South Africa's



Truth and Reconciliation Commission suggests, there is some value to a narrative upon which all sides agree. The United Nations=Draft Declaration for the Durban Conference laid particular stress on the need for education, emphasizing the importance and necessity of teaching about the truth of the ... history of colonialism.<sup>31</sup> Even if all that is accomplished by such a narrative is acknowledgment of a great historical tragedy, such acknowledgment might remove from some African shoulders the burden of belief that one is personally inferior. Truth telling, then, has a symbolic meaning. Truth commissions, history-writing, and educational curricula that sort out the responsibilities of African and outside actors will help to acknowledge the moral integrity of Africans.<sup>32</sup>

A practical aspect of truth-telling would be the establishment of a tangible collective memory, through the building of monuments decrying racism and other forms of injustice. As the Vice-Prime Minister of Luxembourg, Lydie Polfer, stated at the Durban Conference, there is a duty to remember the mechanisms which led to racism.<sup>33</sup> Ex-slave-trading and ex-colonial powers could contribute to the building of such monuments; they could help pay for the maintenance as museums of the slave forts of West Africa as museums. Such museums might also help in reconciliation by showing the responsibilities of all actors, not merely colonial powers. Museums and monuments contribute to national myths, but they can also contribute to an approximation of the truth, while neither minimizing nor exaggerating the roles of any actors.

Truth-telling, then, sorts out responsibilities. It allows for new national truths, more accurate content in education, and collective memories that show sorrow and reconciliation in

national monuments. Truth-telling might also require a symbolic apology for the wrongs inflicted on Africa by the West.

### **APOLOGY AND MORAL INTEGRITY**

Perhaps recognition of the moral integrity of Africans by Westerners is unnecessary from the African point of view. It is not clear that racist perceptions emanating from the West are influential in the formation of Africans' self-conceptions. Members of other groups that suffered discrimination, such as Jews, sometimes internalized a feeling of self-hatred and contempt, a belief that the racist oppressor's derogatory views were correct.<sup>34</sup> Early black students of race relations such as Frantz Fanon suggested there was similar self-hatred among blacks.<sup>35</sup> More reliable quantitative studies, however, have shown that African-Americans have no less self-esteem than white Americans.<sup>36</sup> Self-hatred may be even less common among black Africans, who at least live in their own communities, cities and countries, ruled by people who are phenotypically and culturally much like themselves. Nevertheless, perhaps there is still a residual fear that whites really are superior. To learn one's own history properly, and to have access to historical truths that explain the origins of one's own situation in a non-racist fashion, is to be liberated from stereotypes, whether externally imposed or internally incorporated. The African Regional Preparatory Conference called for an explicit apology by the ex-colonial powers or their successors, for the human rights violations of the slave trade and colonialism.<sup>37</sup> An apology for racism serves the function of lifting from its victims the feeling that they were personally responsible for their fate. It tells them that others were responsible for that fate, and that those others are finally willing to accept their responsibility. It restores moral equivalence between

victims and perpetrators, if not actually giving the victims a deserved moral edge. It requires the perpetrators to demonstrate the depth of their apology through a continued attitude of respect, as well as through concrete actions.

Such an apology, however, must be sincere. It must show real contrition, remorse and repentance.<sup>38</sup> The one who apologizes must acknowledge the fact of wrongdoing, accept ultimate responsibility, express sincere sorrow and regret, and promise not to repeat the offense.<sup>39</sup> The apology cannot be perfunctory, a mere statement of acknowledgment of historical or contemporary fact without any sincere regret behind it. A sincere person suffers in apologizing: he knows he has done wrong, wishes he had not, and seeks to remedy the wrong he has done as best he can. As Olusegun Obasanjo, President of Nigeria, put it at Durban, "For us in Africa, an apology is a deep feeling of remorse, expressed with the commitment that never again will such acts be practised."<sup>40</sup>

To some Africans, advocacy of apology by a white person might sound like self-indulgent white liberal guilt. By way of analogy, one wonders what is the reaction of Australian Aboriginals to whites who sign "Sorry" books to indicate their remorse for the treatment of Aboriginal people; are such signatures merely viewed as aspects of a hypocritical "politics of gesture"?<sup>41</sup> It might do the apologizer more good than the group to which the apology is directed. Apologies, however sincere, could not remedy the extreme wrongs done to Africa over the five centuries since the European slave trade and European colonialism began. As such, they might be seen by some Africans to assuage white guilt without providing a concrete remedy.

Referring to apologies offered by individuals to each other within a culture, Nicholas Tavuchis argues that a sincere apology is a potentially important cultural resource for tempering antagonisms and resolving conflicts.<sup>42</sup> Whether such a function can be performed across cultures is another matter. It is not clear that people of European background and people of African background occupy the same moral universe, in the sense of a common space where an apology in either direction can have a reconciliatory effect. Within communities, trust tends to erode when there is little homogeneity, and when there are weak or thin social networks.<sup>43</sup> One could expect even less trust where there is no community to begin with.

Govier argues that in trusting another person, we confidently expect that he or she will do what is right for us ...<sup>44</sup> Given the history of harms to Africa, perhaps an apology by Westerners would not be greeted with trust by Africans: rather, suspicion and mistrust might continue to be their attitudes. According to Coleman, trusting behavior can be defined as actions that increase one's vulnerability to another ... in ... a situation in which the loss one suffers if the other (the trustee) abuses that vulnerability is greater than the gain one receives if the other does not abuse that vulnerability.<sup>45</sup> Given the history of African vulnerability to the West, an attitude of trust in Westerners might merely be regarded as foolish by many influential Africans.

Yet it would seem that a thin, cosmopolitan world culture does now exist, in which actors are able to recognize whether others are sincere in their offer of apology. Within that world culture, a sincere apologizer might be seen for what he is, someone who honestly regrets the actions of his state, his corporation or his private institution and wishes to compensate for that action, at minimum in a moral sense. An apology is a voluntary and humane means for reconciling personal and collective differences.<sup>46</sup> Apologies can function to create a moral

community inside that cosmopolitan world culture. They might result in what the Secretary-General of the United Nations calls **A**racial reconciliation<sup>@47</sup> The distrust that seems still to characterize relations between the formerly colonized and the former colonizers **C** however politely and carefully concealed **C** might be somewhat tempered by real statements of regret for past actions. Such distrust might be more concretely tempered by actual compensatory measures, following the apology. As Roger Van Boxtel, a Dutch Minister, said at Durban, **A**We express deep remorse about enslavement and the slave trade. But an expression of remorse is not enough ... It is important to implement structural measures that benefit the descendants of former slaves and future generations.<sup>@48</sup>

## **FINANCIAL REPARATIONS**

Just as it is impossible to determine once and for all Western, non-Western, and indigenous responsibilities for Africa's current state of severe economic crisis, so it is also impossible to quantify definitively the amount of damage occasioned by the West, by other non-African actors, and by Africans themselves. The claim for financial reparations requires an unattainable knowledge of history. Nevertheless, it is possible to sort out different levels of responsibilities, by different actors. Some of these actors can be shown to bear direct responsibility for depriving Africans of their human rights, and can therefore be shown to bear a moral responsibility to compensate some Africans.

### **Who Should Pay Compensation?**

In discussing who bears the duty to compensate, one can consider a state's obligation to pay compensation to its own citizens, and that state's obligation to pay compensation to the citizens of other states with which it has had relations. One can also consider the duty of private corporations to compensate. Finally, one can consider the duty of other social institutions to compensate.

In considering states' duties to compensate for racism, one confronts the problem of intergenerational responsibility, including intergenerational responsibility for underdevelopment. World history is full of terrible stories of conquest, mass murder and genocide. Why try to compensate for that which is past? Almost everyone in the world is the descendant of some group that was conquered by some other group at some time, usually to the conquered group's detriment.

A conservative view might focus on rights to compensation of citizens or subjects of a state for acts that were illegal at the time they were committed. It would, for example, cover the Portuguese and Belgian enslavement of Africans in their own colonies, well into the twentieth century.<sup>49</sup> Such enslavement can be connected easily to racism. However, this conservative view would not accept that the colonial powers as a whole owe compensation for political conquest and the economic exploitation that was a normal consequence of such conquest.

If the legal successors of slave-buying, colonizing, or neo-colonial states are to pay compensation, they need to sort out retroactive ideas of justice and law from what were considered principles of justice and law at the time of these actual activities. They will also have to decide whether they are willing to compensate for activities not connected to racism. Neither

conquest nor racism was illegal at the time that Africa was colonized, however reprehensible they may seem in retrospect.

Aside from the obligations of states, the movement for compensation includes suggestions that private corporations should compensate individuals for wrongs committed against them. Such wrongs would presumably include human rights violations by private companies investing in Africa, such as Shell Oil in the Ogoni Region of Nigeria,<sup>50</sup> or Canada's Talisman Oil Company in Sudan.<sup>51</sup> These are cases occurring in the present, for which real evidence may be brought forward of violations of national or international law. However, they might not need, or include, any evidence of racism per se, as opposed to the ordinary operations of international capitalism.

The case for compensation for the activities of commercial firms during the period of colonialism would be more difficult to document. In Ghana, for example, the chocolate companies that still exist and that bought cocoa during the colonial period might be held accountable for monopolistic buying practices, which by undermining competition denied the cocoa-growers the fair price they asked for. Banks still in existence might be expected to compensate for the preference they gave to their European over their African customers during the colonial period, as well as for their gentlemen's agreements in restraint of competition which might have benefitted African customers.<sup>52</sup> Again, however, it would be difficult to evaluate what aspects of such exploitation were caused by or related to racism, and which were merely aspects of operation of the colonial economy. Monopolies in restraint of trade can be formed for purely commercial reasons. Bankers' preference for European over African customers was probably a consequence

of a combination of imperial interest, cultural misunderstanding, lack of collateral among Africans, and common racism.

The movement for reparations and financial compensation might look to private social as well as private economic institutions. For example, Makau Mutua has argued that the incursion of Christian missionaries into Africa violated Africans' collective right to enjoyment of their own culture<sup>53</sup>. Mutua's claim is similar to claims now made by indigenous peoples in Canada, that via forcible incarceration of Aboriginal children in boarding schools, Christian missionaries destroyed their way of life. The question of whether the churches or the government should compensate indigenous peoples for such cultural destruction is presently under consideration. Nevertheless, there is a clear case for compensation. Indigenous parents did not have any choice as to whether to send their children to Christian schools: they were obliged to do so. In these schools, the children were forbidden to speak their own languages, often separated from their own opposite-sex siblings, and kept from their parents for ten months a year by force of geographic and climatic circumstance. Very large numbers of them were also subjected to physical and sexual abuse.<sup>54</sup> In 1998, the United Church of Canada officially apologized to Canada's indigenous peoples for its participation in this coercive residential school system.<sup>55</sup>

If similar violations of rights could be documented in Africa, then it would seem similar cases for compensation could be made against Christian churches. In contrast, if conversions to Christianity by Africans were voluntary, then the case for compensation would be much weaker. One could, perhaps, argue that the only path to education in colonial Africa was through Christian mission schools: thus, conversion could be deemed a quasi-coercive activity. Here one enters the sticky grounds of what constituted a coercive undermining of one's



(retroactive) right to enjoy one's own culture, and what conversely was mere social change, engaged in voluntarily by individual Africans.

Compensation by social institutions such as Christian churches also raises the problematic point of whether religious conversion was, as such, a racist activity. Christians might argue the opposite, that it was precisely their non-racist stance that impelled them to bring their view of the Truth to Africa. Just as Islam is, or sees itself as, a non-racist religion anxious to convert everyone in the world, so is Christianity. Both religions posit universal, non-racial, Truths.

### **Who Should Receive Compensation?**

The above suggestions for who bears responsibility to compensate do not address yet another question: who should be compensated? Yet as Cunningham has argued, identification of the wronged is of particular potential significance if the matter of apology is to be linked to the matter of reparation or restitution.<sup>56</sup> In the case of the Jewish victims of the Holocaust (the prototypical bearers of rights to compensation) one rule that apparently has applied is that the living are entitled to compensation for direct wrongs, such as deprivation of property or incarceration in concentration camps. Also, the heirs of those murdered and those who survived are entitled in some instances to some compensation.

This principle of compensating the living also applies to other situations. In the discussions now occurring about the rights to compensation of African-Americans, some suggestions are for compensation for very recent wrongs, such as denial of mortgages to blacks, or denial of loans to

black farmers.<sup>57</sup> Canada has compensated both on an individual and a collective basis the living survivors of its illegal internment of persons of Japanese descent during the Second World War, three quarters of whom were Canadian born.<sup>58</sup>

It is useful to distinguish between victims abused by their own states, and victims abused by other states. For example, Canada has not compensated the refugees from Europe who were interned on its territory early in the Second World War: at the time they were interned, these individuals were not Canadian citizens but rather enemy aliens.<sup>59</sup> Surely a country's obligation to its own citizens is greater than its obligation to outsiders. If it violated laws that were extant at the time **C** either actual national laws or international laws **C** it has an obligation to its citizens or their descendants to compensate them for such violations. In the case of Africa, though, except for a few *Evolvees* and *Assimilados* in the French and Portuguese colonies, no one was a citizen of the colonizing European power. The best claim that can be made here, then, is that legal subjects of colonizing powers may be entitled to compensation for acts that were illegal at the time they were committed. The problem still arises that many of the direct victims of colonial abuses (even assuming here that these abuses were caused by racism) are now dead. The other problem that occurs in Africa is that of compensating a whole society, indeed a whole continent, even if living victims of racism, colonialism or neo-colonialism can be identified.

At this stage in my meditations on the question of reparations to Africa, I am unable to make any useful suggestions as to who should be the recipients of compensation. I accept the argument that compensation to national governments would not always be a good solution, as in some situations such compensation would result in corrupt appropriation by individuals. Nevertheless, perhaps some accommodation could be reached, as in standard debt-relief to the poorest countries. The

Draft Declaration for the Durban Conference proposed for discussion debt relief, a special development fund, and improvement of access to international markets as reparations to Avictims of slavery, the slave trade and colonialism and their descendants@<sup>60</sup> Fear of corrupt appropriation is not sufficient to negate the idea of compensation to Africa.<sup>61</sup>

### **TRUTH-TELLING AND TRUST-BASED INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

Despite all the obstacles discussed above, acknowledgment of the responsibilities of the Western powers for the current tragic situation in Africa B at least in part B may be a necessary component of trust-based relations between African and other nations in the current century. Samuel Huntington has written of the possibilities of civilizational-based international conflicts in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.<sup>62</sup> Africa is too weak an actor on the world stage to be likely to instigate such a civilizational war. Nevertheless, some Muslim Africans quickly aligned themselves with Islamist extremists after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States; thus, they are already part of the world-wide movement toward civilizational resentment of the West.<sup>63</sup> Truth-telling and acknowledgment of the responsibilities of all parties for Africa=s underdevelopment might help defuse such resentment. So also might an actual apology. As Cunningham argues, an apology can draw a line under history, allowing the relevant political actors to Amove on@<sup>64</sup> This might also establish moral equivalence between the actors. Once Westerners (and other non-Africans) view Africans as equal partners in discussions of world affairs C in a moral, not merely a political, sense C more rational decision-making might occur.

For some analysts, trust is merely an interest-based social relationship. Both sides enter into a bargain based on being able to trust each other because each knows it is in the other's interest to adhere to that bargain.<sup>65</sup> In international relations, much trust is of this interest-based type. Between the former colonized and the former colonizing world, nevertheless, interest-based trust might not be adequate, the interests of the former colonizers not being sufficiently engaged in the rehabilitation of the former colonies. There needs to be a moral dimension to trust as well. In the African case, acknowledgment of moral responsibility for slavery and underdevelopment by both sides might improve the chances of building an international moral community. In such a community, the various sides trust each other in a relationship based on solidarity, not merely on interest.

From the point of view of some embittered or angry Africans, perhaps such an international moral community is not a goal for which it is worth striving. Why, after so many centuries of slave-trading and colonial, neo-colonial and capitalist exploitation should any African feel part of a moral community that includes the West? Such an attitude is not entirely to be dismissed, however much one might rue it. In contrast, some parts of international civil society already strive to acknowledge the moral equality of Westerners and Africans; for example, the international feminist movement has made enormous strides to overcome its origins among white, Western women.

One might wish to dismiss those Africans who reject an international moral community as merely those who profit from promotion of an ideology of victimhood or a culture of complaint.<sup>66</sup> Such politics of resentment seem to permeate much of the international discussion of relations between the Rest and the West. Social movements for compensation, whether it be to African-

Americans, to Africans, or to any other group, are dismissed by some commentators as ways to perpetuate a group's underprivileged status instead of "getting on with it", availing a community of the opportunities now existing for anyone willing to work hard.<sup>67</sup> It would seem that the present cry for acknowledgment, apology and compensation is the product of a developing social movement among persons of African origin, whether in the West or in the African continent itself. Social movements do not come from nowhere: they include interpreters who name injustices and define the sought-for solutions. A cynic might reject such names of past injustices merely as moral entrepreneurs, carving places for themselves in the international community through invention of claims that did not previously exist.

A realist, however, might wish to take into account that the moral entrepreneurs of today are sometimes also present and future political leaders. If politics is an art, then in the twenty-first century it is, in part, the art of grievance. The Western world takes seriously the grievances of some people within its own boundaries seriously. It ought to take equally seriously the grievances of those outside its boundaries whom it has conquered and exploited. Global political and economic relations in the twenty-first century will be more peaceful if the idea of global justice is accepted by all actors. The historical hypotheses on which claims for reparations are based are certainly questionable: the moral weight of the claims is irrefutable.

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## NOTES

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1. This is a slightly revised and updated version of an article previously published in George Ulrich, Lone Lindholt and Louise Krabbe, eds, (title not yet decided) (Kluwer Law Publications, 2002). I am most grateful to Kluwer for permitting this re-publication. I am also most grateful to Joanna Quinn for the many conversations we have had about acknowledgment and apology over the past four years; to Anthony Lombardo for research assistance; and to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for research funds. This paper was revised after the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance took place in Durban, South Africa, September 2001, but before the Final Document from that Conference was released. I did not attend the conference.

2. In using *reparation* as the encompassing term, I am following M. Cherif Bassiouni, *The right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for victims of gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms*, United Nations, Commission on Human Rights, 56<sup>th</sup> session, E/CN.4/2000/62, 18 January 2000, 9-12.

3. T. Govier, *Trust and Testimony: Nine Arguments on Testimonial Knowledge*, *International Journal of Moral and Social Studies* 8, no. 1 (spring 1993) 31, emphasis in original.

4. *Declaration of the African Regional Preparatory Conference for the World Conference*

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*against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance,*

WCR/RCONF/DAKAR/2001/L.1 REV 3, 24 January 2001.

5. United Nations Press Release, *Acknowledgement of Past, Compensation Urged by Many Leaders in Continuing Debate at Racism Conference*, RD/D/24, 2 September 2001, 1.

6. See, for example, the influential book by the late Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (London: Bogle L'Overture Publications, 1972).

7. Rhoda Howard, *Colonialism and Underdevelopment in Ghana* (London: Croom Helm, 1978).

8. These were items in very high demand when Ghanaians started to trade with Europeans. Howard, *Colonialism and Underdevelopment in Ghana*, 80.

9. Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System II: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy, 1600-1750* (New York: Academic Press, 1980) 179-185.

10. See e.g. United Nations General Assembly, *World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance: Conference Themes, Draft Declaration*, A/CONF.189/4, 20 August 2001, Article 15; and *WCAR [World Conference against Racism] NGO Forum Declaration*, 3 September 2001, Article 63, <http://www.racism.org.za/declaration.htm>, visited 10/31/01.

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11. Victor C. Uchendu, 'Slaves and Slavery in Igboland, Nigeria', in Suzanne Miers and Igor Kopytoff, (eds.), *Slavery in Africa: Historical and Anthropological Perspectives* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1977) 124-127.
  12. Ronald Segal, *Islam's Black Slaves: The Other Diaspora* (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2001) as reviewed by Adam Hochschild, 'Human Cargo: A study of the little-known slave trade in the Islamic world', *New York Times Book Review*, March 4, 2001, 21.
  13. Joseph E. Inikori, 'The Struggle against the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade: the Role of the State' (paper presented at the conference, 'Fighting Back: African Strategies against the Slave Trade', Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J., February 16-17, 2001), 6-12.
  14. V. Y. Mudimbe, *The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy and the Order of Knowledge* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988) 44-97.
  15. Horst Drechsler 'The Herero Uprising', in Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, *The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies* (New Haven: Yale, 1990) 231-248; and Jon Bridgman and Leslie J. Worley, 'Genocide of the Hereros', in Samuel Totten, William S. Parsons and Israel W. Charny, eds., *Century of Genocide: Eyewitness Accounts and Critical Views* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1997) 3-40.
  16. A point made by Theodor Van Boven in his Background Paper on 'United Nations strategies to combat racism and racial discrimination: past experiences and present perspectives', E/CN.4/1999/WG.1/BP.7, 26 February 1999, section 3, d.



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17. WCAR NGO Forum Declaration, Article 123.
  18. Rhoda E. Howard, 'Communitarianism and Liberalism in the Debates on Human Rights in Africa', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 11, no. 1, (1992): 14.
  19. African Regional Preparatory Conference, 2001, Article 18.
  20. On the emerging movement to hold private corporations accountable for human rights, see David P. Forsythe, *Human Rights in International Relations* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 191-213.
  21. Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann, 'A Comfortable Consensus: Responsibility to Strangers' chapter 10 of *Compassionate Canadians: Citizens Discuss Human Rights*, in progress.
  22. For example, Daniel Tetteh Osabu-Kle claims that Africa is owed \$U.S.100 trillion compensation. 'The African Reparation Cry: Rationale, Estimate, Prospects, and Strategies', *Journal of Black Studies* 30, no. 3 (January 2000) 345.
  23. This is not something I can document, but it is the kind of comment often made to me in casual conversation with 'ordinary' people who are not scholars.
  24. United Nations Press Release, 'Opening Session of Conference General Debate Focuses on Addressing Legacy of Slavery, Colonialism', Plenary RD/D/19, 2<sup>nd</sup> Meeting (AM), pp.9-10.
  25. For my argument that empathy is possible across the boundaries of 'Otherness' see Rhoda

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E. Howard-Hassmann, "Identity, Empathy and International Relations", prepared for Donald Puchala and Franke Wilmer, eds. *Through the Eyes of Others: Cultural Encounters and Resistance in World Politics*, in preparation, available through McMaster University, Institute on Globalization and the Human Condition, Working Paper 00/2, April 2000, <http://www.humanities.mcmaster.ca/~global/global.htm>.

26. Harold G. Marcus, "Ethiopia: History of Ethiopia and the Horn from 1600 to the Present", in John Middleton, (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Africa South of the Sahara*, vol. 2 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1997) 71.

27. Rhoda E. Howard, *Human Rights in Commonwealth Africa* (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1986).

28. Rhoda Howard, "Evaluating Human Rights in Africa: Some Problems of Implicit Comparisons", *Human Rights Quarterly* 6, no. 2 (May 1984) 160-179.

29. Rhoda E. Howard, "Civil Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa: Internally Generated Causes", *International Journal* 51, no. 1 (winter 1995-6) 27-53.

30. Kwasi Wiredu, *Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996) 163-164.

31. United Nations General Assembly, "World Conference ... Draft Declaration", Article 114.

32. For an assessment of the various functions of truth commissions, see Martha Minow, *Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence*

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(Boston: Beacon Press, 1998) 52-90.

33. United Nations, "Acknowledgement of Past ...", 4-5.
34. Sander L. Gilman, *Jewish Self-Hatred: Anti-Semitism and the Hidden Language of the Jews* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).
35. Frantz Fanon, *Black Skins, White Masks* (New York: Grove Press, 1967).
36. Judith R. Porter and Robert E. Washington, "Black Identity and Self-Esteem: A Review of Studies of Black Self-Concept 1968-1978", in Morris Rosenberg and Howard B. Kaplan, eds., *Social Psychology of the Self-Concept* (Arlington Heights, Ill: Harlan Davidson, 1982) 224-234.
37. *African Regional Preparatory Conference*, Article 27.
38. Michelle Parlevliet, "Considering Truth: Dealing with a Legacy of Gross Human Rights Violations", *Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights* 16, no. 2 (June 1998), 172.
39. Nicholas Tavuchis, *Mea Culpa: A Sociology of Apology and Reconciliation* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991) vii.
40. United Nations Press Release, "Opening Session ...", 4.
41. Michael Cunningham, "Saying Sorry: the Politics of Apology", *The Political Quarterly* 70, no. 3 (1999) 285, 288.

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42. Tavuchis, *Mea Culpa*, vii.
43. J. David Lewis and Andrew Weigert, 'Trust as a Social Reality', *Social Forces* 63, no. 4 (June 1985) 980.
44. T. Govier, 'An Epistemology of Trust', *International Journal of Moral and Social Studies* 8, no. 2 (summer 1993) 157.
45. James S. Coleman, *Foundations of Social Theory* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 1990) 100.
46. Tavuchis, *Mea Culpa*, 5.
47. Report of the Secretary-General, 'Preparatory Process for the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance and Implementation of the Programme of Action for the Third Decade to Combat Racism', United Nations General Assembly, A/55/285, 10 August 2000, Par. 28 (a).
48. United Nations, 'Acknowledgment of Past ...', 15.
49. On Portugal, see John S. Saul, *The State and Revolution in Eastern Africa* (London: Heinemann, 1979) 28. On Belgium, see Adam Hochschild, *King Leopold's Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terrorism and Heroism in Colonial Africa* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1998).
50. Sigrun I. Skogly, 'Complexities in Human Rights Protection: Actors and Rights Involved in the Ogoni Conflict in Nigeria', *Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights* 15, no. 1 (March 1997) 47-60, and Amos Adeoye Idowu, 'Human Rights, Environmental Degradation and Oil

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Multinational Companies in Nigeria: The Ogoniland Episode@, *Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights* 17, no. 2 (June 1999)161-184.

51. John Harker, AHuman Security in Sudan: The Report of a Canadian Assessment Mission@, independent report prepared for the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ottawa, January 2000.

52. Howard, *Colonialism and Underdevelopment in Ghana*, 206-219 on cocoa, 132-140 on banks.

53. Makau Mutua, AReturning to my Roots: African Religions and the State@, in Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na`im, (ed.), *Proselytization and Communal Self-Determination in Africa* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1999) 169-90.

54. *Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Volume I: Looking Forward, Looking Back* (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1996) 365-382.

55. Douglas Todd, AUnited Church Apologizes for Abuse@, *Vancouver Sun*, October 27, 1998; and Hollie Shaw, AUnited Church Apologizes for Residential School Abuse@, *Canadian Press*, October 27, 1998.

56. Cunningham, ASaying Sorry@, 287.

57. Jack Hitt, Willie E. Gary, Alexander J. Pires, Jr., Richard F. Scruggs and Dennis C. Sweet III, AMaking the Case for Racial Reparations@, *Harpers=Magazine*, 301, no. 1806 (November 2000) 37-51.

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58. Gerald L. Gall, Mary M. Cheng and Keiko Miki, Advisory Committee to the Secretary of State (Multiculturalism) (Status of Women) on Canada's Preparations for the UN World Conference against Racism, *Redress for Past Government Wrongs* (January 2001) 2-4.
59. Eric Koch, *Deemed Suspect: A Wartime Blunder* (Toronto: Methuen, 1980).
60. United Nations ... Draft Declaration, Article 126.
61. Most of the issues I raise in this section are usefully addressed in United Nations Press Release, *Subcommission Continues Debate on Situation of Human Rights Around the World: Subcommission Experts Discuss Reparations for Slavery, Colonization*, Subcommission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 53<sup>rd</sup> Session, 1 August 2001.
62. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).
63. Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann, *Culture and the Politics of Resentment in the Era of Globalization*, prepared for a volume to be edited by George Andreopoulos and W. Ofuatye-Kodjoe, available via Institute on Globalization and the Human Condition, McMaster University, Working Paper 00/4, December 2000, <http://www.humanities.mcmaster.ca/~global/global.htm>.
64. Cunningham, *Saying Sorry*, 289.
65. This is the type of trust that James S. Coleman seems to be discussing. Coleman, *Foundations of Social Theory*, chapter 5, *Relations of Trust*.

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66. The latter term is from Robert Hughes, *Culture of Complaint: A Passionate Look into the Ailing Heart of America* (New York, Warner Books, 1993).

67. David Horowitz, *Ten Reasons Why Reparations for Blacks is a Bad Idea for Blacks - and Racist Too*, (FrontPageMagazine.com), January 3, 2001. Italics in original title.