

EXAMINING OTHER DIPLOMACIES OF SRI LANKAN MIGRANT WORKERS

EXAMINING OTHER DIPLOMACIES OF SRI LANKAN MIGRANT WORKERS IN
SOUTH KOREA: A HUMAN-CENTRIC APPROACH TO DIPLOMATIC STUDIES

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LAY ABSTRACT

The academic study of diplomacy has focused on states and their accredited agents. This has resulted in scholarly work that mostly limits itself to issues, interests, and solutions relevant to states and their leaders. While these concerns are important and relevant, the scholarship has neglected to take the concerns of ordinary people and communities into account. The implications of this have been the exclusion of issues related to race, class, and gender, among other distinctions from the scholarship. This dissertation argues that scholars studying diplomacy should also place humans at the centre of concern, rather than only states. It does so by examining how Sri Lankan migrant workers in South Korea engage in diplomacy through the functions of representation, communication, and negotiation. Therefore, the dissertation contributes by centring ordinary people and communities in the study of diplomacy and international relations and showing how they matter.

ABSTRACT

The academic field of Diplomatic Studies has long been insulated from critical interventions in the broader discipline of International Relations. While critical discussions surrounding gender, race, and class have been in ascendance in International Relations, Diplomatic Studies has managed to police its traditional disciplinary boundaries by centring scholarship around states and their accredited agents. The state-centric focus of the field has resulted in scholarship privileging the interests of states, which are abstract entities, over those of actual living communities; therefore, engage with issues primarily important to masculine, Eurocentric, and elite actors.

This dissertation intervenes in the academic field of Diplomatic Studies to decentre the state and reorient the field's focus towards human-centric issues. It argues that societal non-state actors engage in Other Diplomacies as they interact with each other across boundaries of perceived differences. Thereby the dissertation contributes to the literature on Other Diplomacies by showing how Sri Lankan migrant workers engage in Other Diplomacies as they interact with their interlocutors in South Korea. It shows how Sri Lankan migrant workers utilise diplomatic skills to understand and navigate their gendered, racialised, and classist identities. This dissertation also contributes to the literature on consular affairs by arguing that it constitutes a part of Diplomatic Studies rather than a separate field of study. I sustain the human-centric focus of Other Diplomacies and shows that societal non-state actors provide and receive consular assistance from each other due to inadequate levels of assistance from their state. I propose that Other Diplomacies scholarship sustain a human-centric focus to uncover the gendered, racialised, and classist power hierarchies that societal actors must negotiate across as they interact with other actors, both state and non-state. Thereby this dissertation contributes to the critically inclined scholarship of Diplomatic Studies in particular and International Relations in general.

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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Dissertation

diplomacy, n....

1. The management of international relations by negotiation; the method by which these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys; the business or art of the diplomatist; skill or address in the conduct of international intercourse and negotiations....
2. Skill or address in the management of relations of any kind; artful management in dealing with others. (“Diplomacy, n.” 2020)

- *Quoted from the Oxford English Dictionary Online (September 2020)*

This quote provides a good starting point for the dissertation because it reminds us how fluid the term diplomacy can be. Despite the seemingly vast difference between the two meanings, they both refer to a common function: managing relations with others. At the heart of the difference between the two meanings lies the question of who engages in the management of relations. The first meaning restricts it to a function that only states, and their accredited representatives can engage. As this chapter will show, the academic field of Diplomatic Studies, which engages in the study of diplomacy within the broader discipline of International Relations, shares this state-centric view of diplomacy. In contrast, the second non-restrictive interpretation of diplomacy has largely been excluded from Diplomatic Studies (Cornago 2013), except for recent interventions in the margins of the field (Beier 2016; Young and Henders 2012), which have shown that non-state actors can also engage in diplomacy. Overall, this dissertation lends itself to these marginal interventions with the objective of shifting the academic field of Diplomatic Studies from an exclusively state-centric one, to recognising that people, as individuals and groups, can also engage in diplomacy. This matters because it enables issues concerning gender, race, and class to receive serious attention in the study of diplomacy rather than exclusively focusing on problems that concern the international society of states. The discursive power that Diplomatic Studies wields within and outside academia makes it crucial

that the field opens up to discussions around human-centric interests and problems rather than state-centric ones exclusively. To be clear, this dissertation does not ignore states or the impact they have on diplomacy but takes issue with the fact that the academic field has exclusively focused on state-centric issues, reducing societal non-state actors to the status of objects.

This dissertation uses the concept of Other Diplomacies (Beier and Wylie 2010b; Young and Henders 2012; Henders and Young 2016) to build a human-centric approach to Diplomatic Studies. Other Diplomacies has been broadly defined as “a range of things that non-state actors do as they interact with each other, including across political, legal and normative borders and differences of culture, language and other identities” (Young and Henders 2012, 378). This study focuses on how Sri Lankan migrant labourers engage in Other Diplomacies with their South Korean interlocutors. Chapter five shows that some Sri Lankan migrant labourers in South Korea intentionally strategise their interactions with employers to promote a positive identity of Sri Lankan migrant labourers. Despite their identity being framed in statist terms, the Sri Lankan migrant labourers’ objective is not to promote a positive identity of the Sri Lankan state but to promote employment opportunities for fellow Sri Lankan labourers in South Korea. The Sri Lankan migrant labourers’ allegiance is to actual fellow Sri Lankans seeking to escape their marginalised circumstances by migrating to South Korea rather than to the abstract concept of the Sri Lankan state. The sixth chapter examines how other societal non-state actors provide consular assistance to the Sri Lankan migrant workers in South Korea, mainly owing to the inadequate services provided by the Sri Lankan state. Therefore, as Young and Henders (2012) argue, an Other Diplomacies approach succeeds in unsettling the state-centric narrative of diplomatic relations through its societal non-statist approach, which in this case shows the bilateral relationship between Sri Lanka and South Korea to be multi-layered and fluid. What

follows in the rest of this chapter is the first step in building a foundation to examine the Other Diplomacies of Sri Lankan migrant labourers in South Korea. It will open with a detailed overview of the dissertation.

1.1: Overview

The two meanings of diplomacy that appear in the Oxford English Dictionary Online, quoted at the start of this chapter, are analogous to the two understandings of diplomacy that this dissertation project negotiates. On the one hand, diplomacy, defined as the management, through communication and negotiation, of inter-state relations, is the dominant understanding of diplomacy within the discipline of International Relations (Constantinou and Sharp 2016; Cornago 2013). On the other hand, the second meaning of diplomacy has, if not in substance but spirit, an affiliation to the concept of Other Diplomacies, which studies interactions between societal non-state actors. However, the concept of Other Diplomacies is more complicated than the study of interactions between individuals or groups, a topic that I will touch upon briefly later in this chapter and more extensively in the next chapter. The two meanings quoted above exemplify how differently the term diplomacy can be used in the English language and shows its subjective nature and reliance on context to define its meaning.

Similar to how the word diplomacy relies on context to make its meaning clear, placing a dissertation in its proper context is essential to complete its meaning. A dissertation, like theory, is always for someone and some purpose (Cox 1981); it is written from a specific position in academia and has a specific objective relevant to its disciplinary home. While this dissertation is written within the broad discipline of International Relations, its disciplinary home is located within the narrower field of Diplomatic Studies, and its intended audience and significant contributions are to that field.

The field of Diplomatic Studies has been constructed through the time and effort of scholars working purposefully to frame a sub-discipline within International Relations. Diplomatic historians and theorists contributed to this by building unified themes around how diplomacy has been understood in scholarly literature. Diplomatic historians traced modern diplomacy's origins to the Italian city-states while referencing Ancient Greece as a site where diplomacies occurred (Berridge 2010; Berridge, Keens-Soper, and Otte 2001). Diplomatic theorists have largely converged within the English School of International Relations (Constantinou and Sharp 2016; Neumann 2012a; 2003), where their version of international society has provided a unifying perspective from which to study diplomacy. An exception may be the sub-field of Public Diplomacy, which owes greater allegiance to the concept of soft power (Nye 2008). However, soft power and Public Diplomacy are both state-centric concepts and have not challenged the English School's idea of diplomacy as a component of International Society. Additionally, the International Studies Association has a growing membership in its Diplomatic Studies Section, which has brought together scholars in the field since 1997 (Holmes 2019; Murray et al. 2011). Finally, specialist peer reviewed academic journals like the *Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, scholarly book series such as *Studies in Diplomacy and International Relations* by Palgrave Macmillan, and publications such as *The SAGE Handbook of Diplomacy* (Constantinou, Kerr, and Sharp 2016) have helped cement the study of diplomacy as a separate field within International Relations.

While personal interest played a significant role in my decision to focus on diplomacy, several other factors also make it important. The first reason has to do with unsettling an academic sub-field that has insulated itself from interventions around race, class and gender that have permeated the rest of International Relations. By effectively policing the field's boundaries,

mainstream scholars have managed to carve out a niche within International Relations where state-centric perspectives have remained undisturbed. This chapter's literature review section will provide further insights into how Diplomatic Studies has privileged state-centrism, marginalising race, class, and gender issues. The expectation is not that this dissertation will fundamentally alter the field of Diplomatic Studies, but that by contributing to the societal non-state actor-centric concept of Other Diplomacies, it will in some small measure play a role in decentring the state and unsettling the comfortable hold that state-centrism has over it. This will allow serious discussions around race, class, and gender.

Initiating and sustaining discussions around race, class, and gender is important because most scholars in the Diplomatic Studies field have ignored them. The current state of the field of Diplomatic Studies is somewhat reminiscent of the broader discipline of International Relations before the intervention of critical scholarship. Mainstream International Relations scholarship used to and still focuses on the interests and problems of states, which obscure the workings of race, class, and gender-based power relations that underpin global hierarchies (Chowdhry and Nair 2002). Among the contributing factors that obscure the role of race are the ways in which the discipline has been written to normalise Western-led and state-based international relations while erasing the role of European colonialism (Persaud and Sajed 2018; Vucetic and Persaud 2018; Anievas, Manchanda, and Shilliam 2015), capitalism (Anievas 2010), and patriarchy (Peterson 1992). The following paragraphs will show how the current state of Diplomatic Studies is similar to mainstream International Relations, and therefore requires critical interventions that will reveal, unsettle, and ultimately challenge its Eurocentric, elitist, and patriarchal ontologies.

Realist oriented state-centrism has, for the most part, prevented any serious discussion taking place on the role of gender in diplomacy. For example, it is only recently that a collective of few

scholars such as Karin Aggestam, Ann Towns, Katarzyna Jezierska, Anne-Kathrin Kreft, and Birgitta Niklasson have begun to scratch at the surface and ask how we may understand gender beyond focusing on the role of women in diplomacy (Aggestam and Towns 2019; Towns et al. 2020; Niklasson 2020). They have begun to ask questions and suggest research agendas centring around the role of gender in negotiations and institutions, where institutions are understood as both organisations and “less formalised but yet persistent sets of relationships, practices or behavioural patterns” (Aggestam and Towns 2019, 20). Most work on gender in diplomacy has been limited to discussions around women’s underrepresentation in foreign ministries (Cassidy 2017; Neumann 2012a), where Cassidy (2017) has even suggested the possibility of a ‘non-gendered diplomacy’ as more women join the ranks of foreign ministries (Standfield 2019). While discussions surrounding increasing the number of women in diplomatic positions are valuable and contribute to making women and their issues visible, they do not challenge diplomacy’s masculinised ontologies. Instead, the discussion is limited to how women could just as well or better represent their state or international organisation in diplomatic roles. However, as Aggestam (2016) points out, women play a significant role outside the state system in mediating conflicts, though their diplomacies cannot be accounted for in the singular, state-centric, and Realist version of mainstream diplomacy. Therefore, decentring the state in Diplomatic Studies will create room for more nuanced understandings of gender.

While serious gender-based interventions are starting to appear in disciplinary forums, discussions around class are non-existent within Diplomatic Studies. Searches for labour, Marxist, or other class-based discussions in Diplomatic Studies have proved to be futile. For example, Sandra Whitworth’s (1994) discussion of how the International Labour Organisation ‘others’ female labour engages with gender and labour but does not examine it from a

diplomacies framing that considers factors such as representation, communication, and negotiation. Academic writing that uses terms such as labour diplomacy (Hyman 2005) have also occurred outside the recognised field of Diplomatic Studies, usually in the academic field of Labour Studies, where the term diplomacy is used as a synonym for relations. The term communism appears in several titles related to diplomacy but is often used to describe a state's regime type, such as communist China (Hong and Xiaozheng 2002; Ratliff 1969) or communist Romania (Stanciu 2013). The writings do not have any engagement with power relations between classes or class-based issues. The absence of class issues from Diplomatic Studies is not unusual given the state-centric nature of the subject. The transnationalism of class struggle would have undermined the understanding of states as sovereign entities, something that would not have squared with the way modern diplomacy is understood (Armstrong 1999).

Diplomatic Studies' response to discussions around race and coloniality revealed how it is policing its state-centric boundaries. A few important interventions by Zondi (2016) and Opondo (2018; 2016; 2010) have directly addressed problems of Eurocentrism and colonialism in Diplomatic Studies. However, their work has not been cited or engaged with by other scholars in the field. Instead, prominent and influential scholars in Diplomatic Studies, most notably Iver B. Neumann (2010; 2012b; 2019), have chosen to acknowledge the field's Eurocentrism and resolve it in two ways. The first approach has been to suggest that Eurocentric diplomatic practices have been proven to be flexible and adaptable to the rest of the world, and therefore, there is no problem as such to overcome (Neumann 2010; 2012b). The second and more recent approach has been to suggest that Eurocentrism is a problem, but it can be combatted by engaging in the study of more non-western agents (Neumann 2019). This approach would resolve the problem through a census-based diversification of the field, but it falls back into re-

affirming Eurocentrism through the same epistemologies and ontologies. A closer reading of his engagement with Eurocentrism reveals that Neumann considers Eurocentrism inevitable because of the unique traits Europeans possessed, such as being “quicker than others to grasp the power/knowledge nexus” and were historically more “interested in producing systematic knowledge about the rest of the world than have other civilisations” (211). Thus, the literature that claims to combat Eurocentrism within the field has actually helped advance Eurocentric exceptionalism.

The Eurocentrism of scholars within the field has contributed to minimising or erasing the role colonial violence played in the spread of modern diplomacies around the world. Diplomatic Studies scholars, except for Opondo (2010), do not often explicitly discuss the details of colonialism’s role in the spread of European diplomacy. In the rare occasions that they do, honest admission is limited to a few sentences (Sharp 2009; Neumann 2019). However, the rest of their texts are often dedicated to sugar-coating the stark facts. A good example is how Paul Sharp (2009) tries to use neutral sounding terms such as ‘agreed’ when discussing European colonialism:

The expansion of the European society of states was a remarkable achievement. In a process lasting less than 500 years, the various international societies which had developed through thousands of years of human existence encountered one another, discovered what they held in common and what they did not, and on the basis of this their members apparently agreed to the establishment of a single international society based on the achievements of one of their number in this regard (160).

The language’s neutrality provides a cover to explain away the dominance of the European version of diplomacy behind the façade that all colonial subjects agreed to and voluntarily accepted it. Consider the manner of Paul Sharp’s writing presented above. According to Sharp, therefore, the outcome of a single international society based on European practices came about

voluntarily when Europeans and non-Europeans ‘discovered’ each other. His narrative goes on to say that after considering each other’s similarities and differences, they all agreed to an international society based on European practices. In another example, Sharp (2009) agrees that the Indigenous diplomacies practised by nations in pre-colonial North America disappeared after “their members *joined* the international society of states” (161) [my italics]. The decimation of Indigenous nations, peoples and their lifeways through colonial violence is erased through Sharp’s use of language. Meanwhile, scholars writing on Indigenous diplomacies such as Beier (2009a; 2010; 2016), de Costa (2009) and King (2018; 2017) have been greeted with very little engagement by popular scholars in the field; similar to the silences that greeted Opondo and Zondi’s critique of Eurocentrism.

The discussion so far has established that Diplomatic Studies is an academic field that has managed to exclude many serious critical discussions around race, class, and gender. Leaving out the role women play in mediating conflicts (Aggestam 2016), the role of transnational labour struggles (Armstrong 1999), and the role of colonialism in establishing current Eurocentric diplomatic practices (Opondo 2018; 2016) has been an outcome of the state-centric focus of the field. A primary reason for the absence of serious discussions around race, class, and gender has been the dominance of structural approaches such as the English School in International Relations and their understanding of the world as an international society of states. Additionally, the study of diplomacy has been dominated by the concept of soft power (Nye 2008) that provided a foundation for Public Diplomacy, which essentially retains the state-centric view of traditional diplomacy but brings in non-state actors as presenting challenges and opportunities to state identity and policy objectives (Huijgh 2016). Therefore, the basis on which the roles of non-state actors are considered is limited to how far they impact states. The dominance of the

English School and soft power approaches has meant that only states and the relationships between them have mattered for Diplomatic Studies scholars. The literature review and theoretical overview sections of this chapter will clarify the state-centric framing of the field. As mentioned earlier, the primary reason to intervene in Diplomatic Studies was to contribute to unsettling its state-centric insularity and invite greater engagement with issues of race, class, and gender.

Unsettling the state-centric framings of Diplomatic Studies becomes even more important when considering the field's discursive power. Similar to the point made by Marshall Beier (2009b) concerning the discipline of International Relations, the field of Diplomatic Studies also holds discursive power over “students, policymakers, and occasionally an attentive public” (16) given the field's position as a site of knowing and authority. The expert status awarded to scholars in the field allows them to define the issues, interests, and possible solutions concerning diplomacy. Diplomatic Studies is tied to the practice of state-based diplomacy where theory becomes practice (Murray et al. 2011; Neumann 2012a) and “prescription becomes description” (Neumann 2012a, 1). As I have shown in the preceding paragraphs, Diplomatic Studies scholars have chosen to focus on state-based interests and pursue state-centric interests. Thereby, like in much of mainstream International Relations, the study of diplomacy has privileged the abstract concept of the state over actual living communities (de Costa 2009). Given the field's discursive power, issues related to race, class, and gender receive little or no attention while Realist framings of diplomacy “largely serves a capitalist, white and patriarchal international system” (Standfield 2019, 154), which get amplified among the wider audience who take Diplomatic Studies scholarship seriously.

This section has outlined that Diplomatic Studies has remained well within state-centric foundations despite critical interventions that interrogate issues related to race, class, and gender in International Relations. This chapter's literature review section will dive deeper into this aspect by setting out the field's state-centrism in greater detail. Unsettling the state-centric framework of Diplomatic Studies becomes important because of the wide discursive power the field holds within academia and outside of it. The next section of this chapter will discuss how this dissertation aims to unsettle the state-centric framing of Diplomatic Studies.

1.2: Contribution

In broad terms, given the field's state-centric focus, this dissertation aims to contribute towards a human-centric reorientation in Diplomatic Studies. A human-centric focus refers to placing people, their interests, and concerns, at the centre of analysis, instead of states. This involves considering societal non-state actors¹ as agential actors in their own right, whose interests, problems and possible solutions must be taken seriously and understood as central to the field. However, it is necessary to point out that adopting a human-centric approach is not equivalent to claiming that states do not matter. States matter very much to diplomacy and societal non-state actors and cannot be ignored. To be sure, states and the system of states play a significant role in determining the identities, movements, and material circumstances of societal non-state actors. Instead, this dissertation aims to remove states to the background and make room to recognise how people also engage in diplomacies as they interact with each other across

¹ The use of the term 'societal non-state actors' when referring to people is in itself indicative of the state-centrism of the field. I am aware of the politics underlying the use of the term societal non-state actors in this dissertation. However, I will retain use of the term because it has been used in the existing literature on Other Diplomacies, and because I want to position this dissertation within rather than outside the field of Diplomatic Studies.

boundaries of perceived differences. A human-centric approach, therefore, foregrounds individuals and groups and considers them to be diplomatic actors.

In more specific terms, this dissertation contributes by building on the concept of Other Diplomacies to reorient the field towards a human-centric approach. At a foundational level, Other Diplomacies can be understood as a concept that captures interactions between societal non-state actors as they mediate across boundaries of perceived differences (Young and Henders 2012). While this definition provides a starting point to this dissertation, the next chapter will discuss what Other Diplomacies mean and how I conceptualise it in greater detail. The relative novelty of the concept means that its definition has not yet hardened, though its general contours are apparent from its definition. However, I modify the definition by Young and Henders to refer to interactions between societal non-state actors where at least one of them is conscious of representing a set of broader identities or perceives the other as representing a range of identities. The actors involved need to be aware of either projecting a form of identity or receptive of the other as representing some form of identity. The identities in question are fluid, multi-layered and cannot be divorced from the social context within which they occur. Thereby a single individual may represent different identities as they move from one social context to another. This idea will be unpacked and clearer in the next chapter. Therefore, this dissertation develops and further clarifies the concept by adding to the literature on Other Diplomacies.

The dissertation project makes its specific conceptual and empirical contributions by examining how Sri Lankan migrant labourers in South Korea engage in Other Diplomacies. In doing so, it supports the initial arguments made by Young and Henders in their 2012 article regarding unsettling statist identities. It is necessary to mention that framing of societal non-state actor identities in statist terms reflects the fact that states cannot be ignored, nor does this

dissertation attempt to ignore them. The migrant labourers who were interviewed readily identified themselves as Sri Lankan, though not in terms of representing the Sri Lankan state. In another respect, the migrant labourers' perceptions of Sri Lankan identity reflect its fluid and contested nature as opposed to the unitary and static nature of statist identities that normally pervades much of the Diplomatic Studies literature (Young and Henders 2012).

The investigations into the interactions between Sri Lankan migrant labourers and their South Korean interlocutors also revealed how Other Diplomacies could contribute to developing the study of Consular Affairs. While some aspects of consular work, such as issuing government documents and permissions, are the sole preserve of the state, societal non-state actors sometimes play significant roles that mimic those providing special consular assistance. I also use this opportunity to examine how state-based consular work can be studied within the context of Diplomatic Studies. Consular Affairs have been left out of Diplomatic Studies literature owing to its mundane nature and because it does not engage in inter-state relations. I dispute this position in my intervention to argue that consular work should be included in the study of diplomacy. Therefore, in addition to the contributions made to the study of Other Diplomacies, this dissertation also makes a few suggestions regarding approaches that could be used to study state-based consular work.

1.3: Literature Review – An Overview of Diplomatic Studies

This literature review intends to provide an overview of the Diplomatic Studies field. Theoretical and conceptual engagements with Diplomatic Studies will be reviewed in the next section. The literature review will show how despite the expansion in substantive material, the field has mostly remained state-centric in its focus.

The diplomatic historians provide a good starting point for the literature review because they have been very influential in framing the study of diplomacy. One reason for their importance is that diplomatic historians comprised the bulk of academic writing specifically about the study of diplomacy until the mid-1990s (Murray et al. 2011). Their work linked together diplomatic history, practice and theory by interpreting the writings of select practitioners as diplomatic theory (Murray et al. 2011; Watson 1984). *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger*, co-authored by Geoffrey Berridge, Maurice Keens-Sopper, and Otte (2001), provides an example of how diplomatic historians attempted to define the field. The book traces the history of modern diplomacy through the writings of individuals such as Nicolo Machiavelli, Cardinal Richelieu, Francois de Callieres, Ernest Satow, Harold Nicolson, and Henry Kissinger. It is impossible to miss the Eurocentrism of this evolutionary story of diplomacy, which starts with a European and ends with a European migrant in the United States of America (Zondi 2016). The result was that the historians interpreted European inter-state relations as the study of diplomacy.

The diplomatic historians strengthened the view of diplomacy as a European institution by tracing its origins to the Renaissance. According to them, modern diplomacy originated in the city-states of Italy during the European Renaissance and then developed mainly in France and Britain after the Peace of Westphalia (Berridge 2010; Berridge, Keens-Soper, and Otte 2001; Hamilton and Langhorne 2011). The Italian city-states of Renaissance Europe are portrayed as a microcosm of today's world with a shared language and religion, which, combined with their geographic proximity to each other, created suitable conditions for the evolution of diplomacy (Berridge 2010). Hamilton and Langhorne (2011), delving deeper into the topic, argue that the anarchic environment created by the equal power balance between the city-states resulted in conditions that favoured settling disputes through peaceful negotiations rather than war, thereby

favouring the development of diplomacy. The Diplomatic Historians also point to the start of the resident ambassador as a crucial factor for the evolution of modern diplomatic practices during this period (Berridge 2010; Hamilton and Langhorne 2011). Therefore, according to Diplomatic Historians, modern diplomacy is understood to have originated with the innovative diplomatic practices of the European Renaissance.

However, more recent scholarship in diplomatic studies has acknowledged the many contributions made outside of the European Renaissance. Some diplomatic historians have noted the role of interactions between European political entities and the Byzantium and Ottoman empires in developing diplomatic practices (Cohen 2018; Cohen and Westbrook 2000). Other scholars have shown how modern diplomatic practices have their origins in medieval Christian practices rather than being inventions of the European Enlightenment (Neumann 2010; 2012b). Postcolonial scholars have pointed to how colonial violence played a central role in eradicating other forms of diplomatic interactions that existed before European colonisation (Zondi 2016; Opondo 2016; 2018; 2010). While these interventions have proved valuable in problematising the early diplomatic historians' definition of diplomacy as a European state-centric practice, the field has remained firmly wedded to its state-centric foundations.

While the study of diplomacy has expanded to cover many substantive areas, they have largely remained state-centric. As mentioned earlier, Diplomatic Studies has expanded from limiting itself to the interactions between states and their representatives to include non-state actors. Within this expansion, the study of Public Diplomacy forms a significant sub-field. Just as the study of diplomacy worked to build its field, Public Diplomacy scholars are working to make their mark in International Relations. Relying heavily upon Joseph Nye's concept of soft power (Nye 2008), studies on Public Diplomacy have dealt with how states can use non-state

actors to further their foreign policy objectives. Today the field counts specialist book series, the *Palgrave Macmillan Series in Global Public Diplomacy*; specialist handbooks, *The Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, now in its second edition; and dedicated academic journals, such as the *Journal of Public Diplomacy*; showing all the markers of a distinct field of study. The field has its origins in United States foreign policy and saw exponential growth after the September 11th attacks (Snow 2020; Huijgh 2016; Melissen 2005). Today, substantive studies of public diplomacy cover many countries and continents. Examples are the publications on Canadian (Cull 2021; Potter 2008), Brazilian (Mariutti and Tench 2016; Pestana 2020), Russian (Yablokov 2015; Becker 2020), Chinese (Zhao 2016; d’Hooghe 2014; Wang 2011; Rawnsley 2020; Hartig 2015), South Korean (Park 2020; Cho 2012; Ayhan 2020), and Indian (Suri 2011; 2011; Thussu 2020) public diplomacy, to name a few. As such, some of the contributions to Public Diplomacy are a direct attempt at analysing how states have either engaged in public diplomacy or how they can better engage in the practice.

The literature on Public Diplomacy, in keeping with the state-centric focus of the field, classifies the initial stages of the practice as ‘Traditional Public Diplomacy’, which involved state efforts to influence foreign publics (Huijgh 2016; Snow 2020). This type of public diplomacy was seen as an extension of inter-state diplomacy and involved practices such as international radio broadcasts during the Cold War and student and cultural exchange programs run by government agencies (Huijgh 2016). Traditional public diplomacy and studies related to them are still relevant despite the declining power of international radio broadcasts. Rather than relying on shortwave transmissions, radio and television broadcasts are carried through internet-based media such as the Voice of America, China Global Television Network (Arceneaux and Powers 2020), China’s CCTV, and Russia’s RT (Rawnsley 2020). Government sponsored

cultural exchanges through agencies positioned globally, such as the American Centre (Bellamy and Weinberg 2008; Bhandari and Belyavina 2011; Mueller 2020; Cull 2008), British Council (Leonard, Small, and Rose 2005; Pamment 2017; Fisher 2020), and Confucius Institute (Rawnsley 2020; Hartig 2015; Liu 2019; Lo and Pan 2016) continue to operate and command the attention of academic inquiry.

However, scholars soon started looking beyond the traditional public diplomacy practices of governments and proposed an examination of ‘new public diplomacy’ that reflected a total war approach to understanding public diplomacy practices. As Ellen Huijgh (2016) describes it, new public diplomacy “needs to – or should – encompass at least two features: first, a multi-actor approach, with many actors above and below the level of national government and different types of non-governmental actors at home and abroad; and second, the formation of relations between them through dialogue and networking activities” (442). I described this approach to public diplomacy as a total war approach because it strives to encompass all levels of actors, situated within and outside the state’s borders, as public diplomacy practitioners and targets. However, this total war approach to new public diplomacy was not what was conceived when it was first articulated in an edited volume by Jan Melissen (2005). The idea of new public diplomacy involved taking state and non-state actors seriously in world politics (Melissen 2005; Hocking 2005). Both Hocking and Melissen argued for a broader research agenda among scholars that framed their understanding of public diplomacy as encompassing ‘world politics’ instead of the inter-state politics that traditional public diplomacy focused on. Hocking (2005) very clearly argued that the ‘public’ must be understood as agenda setters rather than mere tools of statist foreign policies. This argument required scholars to view state and non-state actors in a ‘networking’ environment as opposed to a hierarchical one with states at the top. However, the

authors' vision for a new public diplomacy that is holistic has remained “more rhetoric than reality” (Huijgh 2016, 445). In 2020, the study of Public Diplomacy continued to be framed in statist and propagandist terms with trending new concepts such as nation-branding.

Most scholars continue to pursue the study of Public Diplomacy in its traditional state-centric framework. Even seemingly innovative themes such as digital public diplomacy, celebrity diplomacy, and gastro-diplomacy have been framed in statist terms when discussed within the Public Diplomacy framework. For instance, discussions around digital public diplomacy centre around how ministries of foreign affairs can formulate digital public diplomacy goals, what strategies can be used to achieve those goals, and how to measure their successes and failures (Bjola, Cassidy, and Manor 2020). Even in the instances where digital diplomacy is referred to, without the ‘public’, it relates to information communication technology as tools of states or international organisations (Gilboa 2016; Kampf, Manor, and Segev 2015; Bjola and Zaiotti 2020). Similarly, the public diplomacy literature on celebrity diplomacy has primarily focused on the use of celebrities as United Nations goodwill ambassadors (Alleyne 2005; Cooper 2020; Wheeler 2011). Nonetheless, many of the issues and controversies surrounding the role of celebrity diplomats at the United Nations have been analysed in the context of their impact on member states (Cooper 2020). Gastro-diplomacy has been restrictively defined as strategic state-sponsored events promoting the ‘national brand’ (Rockower 2020). As such, the realm of public diplomacy has remained focused on increasing the soft power of the states concerned.

While the category of Public Diplomacy envelops many substantive areas of diplomacy, there are several other sub-categories of diplomacy that shape the field. One such area that has seen a growth in interest is science diplomacy. A broad description of science diplomacy reveals three overlapping categories of study: state-led efforts at facilitating international scientific

cooperation, using science to inform foreign policy decisions, and inter-state relations as being driven by international scientific cooperation (Davis 2014). An important point about science diplomacy is that it is framed positively, as an approach that brings in much needed clarity and problem solving capability to diplomacy and global politics, in effect depoliticising problems. Some of its most ardent promoters see it as a silver bullet, the application of which would resolve environmental, social, and political issues that plague the earth (Copeland 2016). However, recent, more careful analyses of the issues at stake have resulted in warnings being issued of the dangers of the sensationalist claims and the promise of depoliticised solutions to the world's problems made by science diplomacy (Flink 2020). Absent the sensational claims, the 'science' in science diplomacy remains an adjective that describes a particular form of state-centric diplomacy.

The literature on Diplomatic Studies includes a few that differentiate and categorise themselves not on thematic or substantive elements but according to the actors involved. One such category gaining traction is the study of City Diplomacy. Cities, a category that could be thought of as substate actors, can be considered diplomatic actors. It is not difficult to trace a history of diplomatic interactions between cities within a Diplomatic Studies concept, especially since the origins of modern diplomacy are considered to have originated in the city-states of Italy (Berridge 2010; Nicolson 1964; Hamilton and Langhorne 2011). However, city diplomacy is frequently studied in the context of international relationships, where cities are considered to engage in diplomacy only when they interact in relationships with cities located outside the borders of their state (Leffel 2018; Acuto 2016; Amiri and Sevin 2020). On account of the implications that the Trump Administration and Brexit have had on migration, the literature on city diplomacy has recently begun to study how some cities are subverting national level policies

by positioning themselves as sanctuary cities (Grandi 2020; Leffel and Acuto 2017). This is a welcome approach to the study of city diplomacies since it examines how cities represent themselves internationally and nationally, resulting in the genuine acceptance of new diplomatic actors.

Sustaining the focus on diplomatic actors, Diplomatic Studies has recognised the diplomatic roles celebrities play in world politics. As mentioned previously, the role of celebrity diplomats is clear as public diplomacy practitioners for international organisations and states. Audrey Hepburn, Richard Gere, and Angelina Jolie are examples of a few well-known names to serve as United Nations goodwill ambassadors (Wheeler 2011; Cooper 2020; Alleyne 2005). Additionally, scholars have pointed out how some celebrities such as Geldoff, Bono, and Bill Gates have taken up causes of their own (Cooper 2016; Wheeler 2016), but what is unconvincing is whether they are engaging in diplomacy. The work of celebrities involving aid to Africa, lessening third-world debt and combatting AIDS in Africa appear more suited to being categorised as celebrity activism than diplomacy. One problem has been that some scholars have not made sufficient effort to convince the reader that celebrities are engaging in diplomacy when they promote various causes. For example, Andrew Cooper (2016) simply asks readers to take a postmodern leap of faith and accept celebrities engaging in diplomacy without much further elaboration. Cooper then spends significant effort to show how celebrities have access to world leaders and can capture the public's attention and thereby impact world politics as a justification to consider them diplomats. However, the literature does not clarify what diplomatic functions the celebrities are engaging in or whom they are representing and to whom representations are being made. Some of the more recent critically inclined scholarships has pointed out that what celebrity diplomacy ends up representing are the narratives of a victimised, infantilised, and

perpetually underdeveloped other who needs to be rescued by the United States led Global North (Kogen 2015). While some scholars continue to make a case for celebrity diplomacy, it is important to constantly recognise how it is racialising the ‘other’.

An overlapping category to celebrity diplomacy is sports diplomacy, which can be easily identified with traditional public diplomacy, where states use sporting personalities and events to promote their soft power (Murray 2016). According to this conventional view, states that host international sporting events accrue a measure of soft power, and states can use international sporting events to send political messages (Murray 2016). As such, scholarly literature that examines how sports contribute to the soft power of states is the most prominent within Diplomatic Studies (Hong and Xiaozheng 2002; Abdi et al. 2018; Keech 2001; Murray 2017; Qingmin 2013). Moving beyond this traditional approach Murray (2018) has introduced several new categories that take both a non-hierarchical approach to international sport cooperation and takes the politics of sporting personalities seriously. The first of these categories is ‘new’ sports diplomacy which recognises the ‘networking’ nature of amateur sports and the partnership role of state and non-state actors in international sports. This stands in contrast to the hierarchical ordering of traditional sports diplomacy that privileged the state. The second category examines non-state sporting actors within the context of an international society of sport by combining their celebrity status, as celebrity diplomats (Cooper 2016) with their supposed function to minimise friction (Bull 2002), resulting in the development of international society, as understood by the English School of International Relations (Bull 2002). The third and final category identifies a sports anti-diplomacy that is described as the immoral, unethical, and violent behaviours in sports, which need to be avoided if sports diplomacy is to be a ‘resource for hope’ (Murray 2018). The author points out how non-state sports actors sometimes engage in

diplomacy by acting as representatives of a wider identity. Examples cited by the author (Murray 2018) include the Black Power Salute by Tommie Smith and John Carlos at the 1968 Olympics, Colin Kaepernick's refusal to stand for the United States national anthem in 2016, and a host of other representative acts by other athletes to highlight racial injustice. These are but a few examples of how sports personalities can act as diplomats, representing identities and issues that matter for a range of marginalised people.

The study of diplomacy has gone further to suggest that regular everyday people engage in diplomacy. Citizen diplomacy has been a term that has been used in the field of Diplomatic studies to refer to either citizen-led diplomacy or state-led citizen diplomacy (Tyler and Beyerinck 2016). State-led citizen diplomacy is where citizens are used as public diplomacy tools (Tyler and Beyerinck 2016; Mueller 2020). This state-centric form of diplomacy involves sending and receiving cultural and educational exchanges, where the intention is that private citizen interactions will create positive images of the country concerned among foreign citizens (Bhandari and Belyavina 2011; Bellamy and Weinberg 2008; Bu 1999). This has been the intent of traditional public diplomacy, as discussed previously. However, the more contentious version of citizen diplomacy refers to the citizen-led diplomacy efforts. State-based official diplomats and some Diplomatic Studies scholars have been reluctant to recognise private citizens as diplomats (Tyler and Beyerinck 2016; Sharp 2001). A frequently referenced historical event is the successful attempt by United States citizen George Logan in 1798 to repair relations between the United States and France; despite his success, the United States passed the Logan Act prohibiting private citizens from engaging in diplomatic negotiations (Tyler and Beyerinck 2016; Jones 2015). Despite the hostility of practitioners and scholars, it has become difficult to dismiss the impact citizen-led diplomacy can have on world politics. One of the most prominent

examples of impactful citizen-led diplomacy was the campaign to ban landmines (Williams and Goose 2008; Williams, Goose, and Wareham 2008). In line with this example, it is also possible to argue that celebrity diplomacy actors and non-state sports actors also fall under this category since they are private citizens. When considering the literature on peace movements in general (Patterson 2007; Hucker 2015; Shemesh 2012; Williams, Goose, and Wareham 2008; Williams and Goose 2008), another factor that needs to be taken into account is whether they deal with diplomacy or societal activism. I am not suggesting that diplomacy and societal activism are mutually exclusive, but the scholarly literature that focuses on citizen activism does not necessarily frame their analysis in terms of diplomatic functions such as communication, negotiation, and representation. Additionally, a survey of Diplomatic Studies reveals that there are far fewer contributions regarding societal non-state actors, including celebrities, non-state sports actors and citizens acting as diplomats, than there are of state-centric diplomacy.

Therefore, while there are diverse ways in which diplomacy is envisioned, a large proportion of Diplomatic Studies privileges the state and the system of states. This dissertation does not take issue with the state-centric focus of Diplomatic Studies per se, but with the field's tendency to monopolise and privilege states, the system of states, and their interests.

An approach to diplomacy that has disturbed and at times stood in opposition to the dominant understanding of diplomacy as a solely inter-state affair is the literature on Indigenous Diplomacies. Indigenous Diplomacies are positioned to reveal colonial practices and some of the diplomacies and lifeways that they erased. Scholars working in Indigenous Diplomacies have spent considerable energies on ground clearing exercises, explaining why Indigenous Diplomacies are relevant and important to International Relations (Beier 2009a). Working and engaging with Indigenous Diplomacies must be done with great care because it is easy to slip

into reinforcing the structures and ontologies of state-centric colonial categories such as the Westphalian notion of sovereignty (Franke 2009). In an examination of the pre-colonial history between the Yolngu people of Northern Australia and the Macassan people of Sulawesi, de Costa (2009) argues that they relied on the notion of Indigenous transnationalism, which was based on both formal diplomatic practices and embedded practices in the very way that the social orders were constructed and understood by the communities. De Costa points out that rather than emphasising separateness, as does the dominant interpretations of state-centric diplomacy, Indigenous Diplomacies are based on a shared and inclusive cosmology. Hayden King (2018) emphasises the inclusivity and fluidity of Anishinaabe conceptualisations of territorial sovereignty. He also points to the fundamentally different cosmology that Anishinaabe diplomacy is embedded in by pointing out that it takes the sovereignty of the land and non-human creatures seriously. Therefore, Indigenous diplomacies fundamentally challenge the rigid Westphalian sovereignty of Diplomatic Studies and the wider field of International Relations and provide a welcome break from Westphalian state-centric diplomacy. It is not a category that can be subsumed under Diplomatic Studies, nor do the scholars working on Indigenous Diplomacies desire such an affiliation. Therefore, Indigenous Diplomacies provide an example of how the hegemonic ontology of a singular (Eurocentric) diplomacy can be challenged. I engage with the concept of Indigenous Diplomacies in more detail as in how it relates to Other Diplomacies in the next chapter (section 2.2).

I have provided a brief overview of the scholarship on diplomacy to show how much it is state-centric. Except for Indigenous diplomacies, a few works in postcolonial diplomacy, and gender in diplomacy, much of the Diplomatic Studies literature has avoided discussing gender,

race, and class issues. Other Diplomacies, which I will discuss extensively in the next chapter, provides the field with an opportunity to engage with these issues.

1.4: Theoretical and Conceptual Overview of Diplomatic Studies

This section will provide an overview of the theoretical and conceptual landscape of Diplomatic Studies. The next chapter discusses how the concept of Other Diplomacies relates to and positions itself within these diplomatic theories. I am presenting this section as an extension of the literature review to provide greater context for the rest of the dissertation.

The role of theory has been somewhat contested in Diplomatic Studies. While some scholars claim that there is a dearth of theory in Diplomatic Studies (Murray et al. 2011; Holmes 2018), other scholars take the view that there is widespread theorising of diplomatic thought, only that it is not explicitly identified as such (Constantinou and Sharp 2016). Examining the claim put forward by Sharp and Constantinou (2016), it follows that the term ‘diplomatic theory’ is synonymously used with terms such as ‘diplomatic thought’ and ‘diplomatic concepts’. As they explain, their broad view of what constitutes diplomatic theory is “grounded in the key conceptual explorations, epistemological exchanges, and normative and critical propositions concerning different aspects of diplomatic practice” (Constantinou and Sharp 2016, 13). From this foundation, they classify diplomatic theories in several ways; the first being as ‘early diplomatic thought’, which examines theory from what can be described as the pre-statist era. Second, as diplomatic theories of statist practices, which relate to the discipline of International Relations in its predominantly Realist form. Thirdly, as a part of Critical International Relations theories, such as poststructuralist, postcolonial, and practice theories. Fourthly, the scholars acknowledge contributions being made by scholarship outside International Relations, such as

from anthropology, sociology, psychology, and theology (ibid). Therefore, theories of diplomacy can be understood as an area enriched by many different approaches.

However, a different approach is taken by Stuart Murray (2008), who argues that the expanding scope of studies in diplomacy must be ‘classified and consolidated’ to be analytically useful. Murray proposes a taxonomy that classifies diplomatic theories and concepts into the three popular mainstream International Relations traditions: Realism, Idealism and Constructivism. The three International Relations traditions are presented respectively as the traditional, nascent, and innovative schools of diplomacy. While the author spends much time defining each school’s characteristics, he provides little information on the scholarly works that fall within those categories. The proposed three schools in diplomacy are defined as ideal types, where traditionalists focus exclusively on inter-state diplomacy, the nascent school focuses exclusively on non-state actors, and the innovative school, as the name suggests, focuses on privileging both state and non-state actors (Murray 2008). Despite the seeming inclusivity of different actors, the proposed taxonomy excludes critically inclined scholarship on diplomacy that does not fall within the mainstream understanding of Realist-Idealist-Constructivist International Relations.

This section is not interested in developing a taxonomy of diplomatic theory but intends to signpost several important theories, concepts and approaches that frame the study of diplomacy. Though my understanding of diplomatic theory draws from the broader and inclusive interpretation taken by Sharp and Constantinou (2016), it is also influenced by Murray’s (2008) stricter disciplinary definitions. This dissertation aims to broaden the study of diplomacy by considering societal non-state actors seriously, but what is not so explicit is that it is a project that also aims to build the field of Diplomatic Studies. As such, the theoretical and conceptual

framing of the field will show how Other Diplomacies are different from the existing literature and how it relates to the field. Therefore, the theoretical overview will start by showing how the English School of International Relations' concept of International Society has provided an important foundation for theorising diplomacy. The English School has had a significant impact on the study of diplomacy with scholars such as Hedley Bull [1977] (2002), Adam Watson (1984), James Der Derian (1987), Christer Jonsson (2005), Martin Hall (2005), and Paul Sharp (2009) being prominently identified with this theoretical stream. Secondly, the concept of soft power (Nye 2008) has proved to be foundational in the sub-field of Public Diplomacy, which is rapidly developing into a field of its own, if it has not already. While much of the Diplomatic Studies field has relied on the two concepts of International Society and soft power, works that rely on poststructuralism (Constantinou 1996), feminism (Aggestam and Towns 2019) and the practice turn (Pouliot and Cornut 2015) in Diplomatic Studies are gaining greater traction. This section will expand on the mentioned categories to illuminate the theoretical framework of Diplomatic Studies.

The English School of International Relations has played a crucial role in the development of Diplomatic Studies. Diplomatic Studies scholars identify Martin Wight (1966), Herbert Butterfield (1966), Adam Watson (1982), and Hedley Bull (2002) as responsible for shaping the theoretical and conceptual contours of Diplomatic Studies today (Neumann 2003; Dunne 1998). Iver Neumann (2003) has written a detailed discussion of the influence that the English School had on the study of diplomacy, which I will draw on, but I will avoid repeating. Instead, I focus on the English School's three significant contributions to this dissertation and show how they have changed across time and between scholars. First is the English School's

concept of an international society, secondly their state-centric definition of diplomacy and third their identification of the functions of diplomacy.

The concept of an international society is crucial because it contextualises the world view within which diplomacy exists for the English School. This concept has been a key ‘invention’ of the English School since it defined its identity by differentiating it from the Hobbesian worldview held by Realists and the Kantian worldview of the Idealists (Dunne 1998). For the English School, an international society was thought to exist, “when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions” (Bull 2002, 13). They contrasted their idea of an international society (sometimes called a society of states) with that of a system of states which entailed the existence of at least two states that were aware of each other and therefore acted “-at least in some measure- as parts of a whole” (Bull 2002, 9). The difference between the two systems is that an international society was predicated on a set of shared interests, values, and rules absent in a system of states. It is this that enables the ‘working of common institutions’ between states, including diplomacy.

Understanding international society as being constituted by a group of states has meant that diplomacy was also conceived in statist terms. Drawing on the writings of two British diplomats, Harold Nicolson (1964) and Ernest Satow (1917), Hedley Bull (2002) defines diplomacy as the conduct of peaceful relations between states and “other entities with standing in international politics” (156), by ‘professional diplomatists’, using tact and subtlety. Using the example of Bertrand Russell writing to Kennedy and Khrushchev during the Cuban missile crisis as an instance where a non-state actor may have impacted international politics, Bull insists, quite

arbitrarily, without any explanation, that it should not be understood as diplomacy. Despite this strict construction of diplomacy as the exclusive preserve of state actors, he soon chips away at it to include “other political entities with standing in world politics” (157), by which he mainly has in mind international organisations and ‘groups dedicated to national liberation’. To justify the exception, Bull cites Ernest Satow’s (1917) recognition that diplomacy may be conducted with vassal states, the fact that in the past European states have engaged in diplomacy with entities other than states, and Ragnar Numelin’s (1950) accounts of early forms of diplomacy between ‘primitive tribes’. Therefore, even though Bull insists on diplomacy being understood as a purely inter-state affair, it is apparent that he could not sustain the strict definition.

The inclusion of state and non-state actors continues in his description of the functions of diplomacy. As I will show later, Bull’s work to outline the functions of diplomacy has had some bearing on the study of the subject, mainly by providing a basis for later scholars to draw on and interpret non-statist forms of diplomacy. Accordingly, the functions of diplomacy are defined as communication between states and ‘other entities in world politics’, the negotiation of agreements, the gathering of intelligence on foreign countries, reducing friction in international relations, and symbolising the existence of an international society (Bull 2002). Except for the function of gathering intelligence, all of these functions would be familiar to Diplomatic Studies scholars today. While communication and negotiation are known by the same terms, reducing friction and symbolising international society’s existence needs some explanation. What Bull (2002) means by reducing friction is the expectation that diplomacy involves tact and subtlety and appropriate mannerism. The function of diplomacy to symbolise international society is one that is related to a diplomatic culture, which to Bull is an important element of an international society that is no longer held together “by a common aristocratic culture, ... ties of blood and

marriage” (176) as was the case in ‘old’ European diplomacy. However, to Bull (2002), diplomacy is a secondary concern regarding the representation of inter-state relations because, according to him, the presence of diplomats in one another’s states presuppose the existence of mutual recognition of states their rights and privileges (Neumann 2003; Jonsson and Hall 2005). In other words, diplomacy is not a requisite for the functioning of international society.

I chose to highlight Hedley Bulls’ writings on diplomacy for a variety of reasons. His chapter about Diplomacy in *The Anarchical Society* (Bull [1977] 2002) is the earliest coherently articulated work on diplomacy within the early stages of the English School. While Martin Wight and Herbert Butterfield’s (1966) edited volume *Diplomatic Investigations* was the first work to identify itself as of the English School, it contained only one chapter on diplomacy by Butterfield (1966). The chapter itself did not clarify or analyse diplomacy but was an essay lamenting the end of diplomacy conducted by elites away from the public view (Neumann 2003). Therefore, in chronological terms, Bull’s 1977 edition of *The Anarchical Society* was the school’s first attempt to clarify and set out how it interpreted diplomacy. Additionally, it is clear that Martin Wight and Hedley Bull were the intellectual heavyweights in the formative years of the English School (Dunne 1998), making his writings an authoritative representation of it. However, to clarify, while the English School has been important to Diplomatic Studies, the study of diplomacy was only one among many other concerns of the English School and was by no means crucial for its development; in fact, scholars working within the English School have largely ignored the study of diplomacy (Dunne 1998; Neumann 2003). Therefore, Bull’s chapter on diplomacy in *The Anarchical Society* remains an appropriate starting point to trace the influence of the English School on Diplomatic Studies.

International society has been one of the most durable ideas that Diplomatic Studies has borrowed from the English School. While the concept has remained static, its relationship to other elements of international politics and diplomacy has undergone some revisions. Adam Watson (1982), Jan Melissen (1999), David Armstrong (1999), Christer Jonsson and Martin Hall (2005), and Paul Sharp (2009) have used the concept of an International Society in much the same way that Hedley Bull conceptualised it in 1977. However, while not changing the meaning of International Society, Paul Sharp (2009) argues that distinctions between international systems (system of states) and International Society are irrelevant. Instead, he argues that international relations can be understood as being composed of a plurality of international societies that are constantly in flux through processes of integration-disintegration, expansion-contraction, and concentration-diffusion.² While not disputing the existence of an international society of states, Stuart Murray (2018) puts forward the innovative concept of an ‘international society of sports’. He argues that an international society of sports, constituted by non-state sporting actors, “form a system, in the sense that the behaviour of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others’ and have ‘established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognise their common interest in maintaining these arrangements’” (143) exists. What is particularly innovative about the international society of sports is that it combines the concepts of ‘International Society (Bull 2002; Watson 1992), ‘scapes’ (Appadurai 1996), and ‘sportscape’ (Manzenreiter 2008) to create the ‘international society of sports’ which comprises of “individuals, clubs, NGOs, businesses and [sporting]

² Paul Sharp (2009), drawing upon Adam Watson’s (1992) later work on international society, argues that international society should be understood, not as a rigid structure but one that fluctuates across three dimensions. International society can be mapped on the continuums of integration-disintegration, expansion-contraction, and concentration-diffusion. However, while this is an important intervention with regard to the idea of an international society, it is not very relevant to this dissertation.

regimes” (Murray 2018, 142). Therefore, while drawing on the ideas of the early members of the English School of International Relations, recent scholarship has innovated them to include non-state actors as subjects of international relations.

This innovative trend continues with the use of the term diplomacy. As mentioned earlier, for Bull (2002), diplomacy was restricted to state actors and was understood as merely reflective of international society (Neumann 2003; Jonsson and Hall 2005). Adam Watson (1982) shares this view though he formally defines diplomacy as “negotiation between political entities which acknowledge each other’s independence” (21). His major work on diplomacy, titled *Diplomacy: the dialogue between states*, focuses on analysing inter-state relations. However, unlike previous English School scholars, he does not sub-ordinate diplomacy to international society. Instead, he argues that international society is established by “diplomatic negotiation between the member states, and are continuously amended by the same means to meet the pressures of change” (206). Thereby, diplomacy is understood to be constitutive of international society rather than merely reflective of it, a view consistently upheld by subsequent scholarships (Melissen 1999; Jonsson and Hall 2005; Murray 2018). Paul Sharp’s (2009) diplomatic theory of international relations is an exception because it understands diplomacy as mediating the spaces between separatenesses. This supports the traditional English School’s structural worldview rather than the performative view of diplomacy taken by the latest generation of English School scholars such as Melissen (1999), Jonsson and Hall (2005), and Murray (2018).

Der Derian’s (1987) notable contribution, *on Diplomacy: A Geneology of Western Estrangement*, occupies a special place in diplomatic studies. It is a work that has foundations within the English School literature on Diplomatic Studies but is rarely, if at all, drawn upon by the school itself (Neumann 2003). Perhaps Der Derian’s most important contribution to the field

is his definition of diplomacy as “a mediation between estranged individuals, groups or entities” (Der Derian 1987, 6) that provided future non-statist diplomatic scholarship with a valuable point of reference. In other words, it initiated a post-structural engagement in the study of diplomacy and opened up the possibility of moving beyond the statist-bound framing of the field. It is equally important not to over-emphasise Der Derian’s contribution to non-statist understandings of diplomacy since, for analytical purposes, he restricts diplomacy to mean “the mediation of estranged peoples organised in states which interact in a system” (Der Derian 1987, 42). However, Der Derian’s initial definition of diplomacy coupled with his investigation into the social aspects of diplomatic culture and their everydayness; his assertion that “the most trivial matters have been crucial – and neglected – factors in the formation of diplomatic practices” (Der Derian 1987, 114; Neumann 2003) have opened new possibilities for the study of diplomacy.

A critical theoretical work on diplomacy that developed upon Der Derian’s (1987) post-structural opening in the study of diplomacy was Constan Constantinou’s (1996) *On the way to diplomacy*. A part of the book successfully argues that diplomacy is performed into being by practitioners and scholars. It does so not with the intent of destroying diplomacy but to examine how it has come into being and what its effects are. Some of the key points in the book *On the way to diplomacy* are unsettling the state-centrism of diplomacy, showing how the definition of diplomacy cannot be foreclosed and examining how theory is implicated in diplomatic practice. In the book’s final pages, Constantinou argues that critical theories and approaches to diplomacy should not be overlooked merely because they do not address the questions and concerns related to prominent worldly issues. Constantinou’s (1996) intervention in Diplomatic Studies created the space necessary to explore diplomacy beyond its popularly understood framings.

Several critical works of scholarship followed *On the way to diplomacy* (Constantinou 1996). Though not necessarily a poststructural one, the edited volume *Sustainable Diplomacies* (Constantinou and Der Derian 2010b) made several critical contributions to how diplomacy was conceptualised outside traditional state-centric framings. The editors point out that using the term ‘sustainable’ in the book’s title was not intended to be an attractive catchword for what is now a popular topic but reflects their view of what diplomacy should be in the twenty-first century. Sustainable diplomacies reflect the idea that diplomacy should mediate differences while being sensitive to the self and other, which accords priority to constant reflection as to the means, ends and context of that mediation (Constantinou and Der Derian 2010a). The edited volume starts with a chapter on sustainable diplomacy that argues for an Ecological Realism, which centres on protecting the ecosystem and mediating inter-communal relations rather than that of states, utilising both state and non-state actors and conventional and unconventional ideas (Wellman 2010). Another chapter examines how modes of encountering otherness in Africa were erased through European colonisation, and an ‘indigenous otherness’ was created to deal with the colonised more easily (Opondo 2010). In his chapter, Roland Bleiker (2010) points out the limitations of state-based diplomacy and argues for the transformational potential of everyday diplomatic activities between North and South Korea as a new way to study the issue. These are just a few examples of how diplomacy can be conceptualised when not privileging a state-centric approach.

Scholars engaged in Diplomatic Studies have appeared reluctant to embrace the call to broaden the actors, ideas and contexts within which diplomacy is framed. There has been little to no literature built upon the concept of sustainable diplomacies, except perhaps *Other Diplomacies*, which will be discussed in the next chapter. However, the field of Diplomatic

Studies has seen a renewed interest in practice theory (Pouliot and Cornut 2015). Iver Neumann was the first to draw attention to the use of practice theory for Diplomatic Studies (Neumann 2002), which he followed by suggesting that it might revive the English School's interest in diplomacy (Neumann 2003). He was particularly interested in using the idea of 'habitus' built on the writings of Marcel Mauss, Norbert Elias and Pierre Bourdieu because it analyses the world of diplomats as distinct from that of non-diplomats (ibid). This approach bears a close resemblance to Paul Sharp's (2009) diplomatic theory, though no explicit connection is made, where he understands diplomacy (and diplomats) as inhabiting a space between separateness and mediating relations of separateness. Scholars using practice theory to illuminate diplomatic practices have primarily focused on cosmopolitan sites such as the European Union, the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the World Trade Organisation, and the World Bank (Pouliot and Cornut 2015). While the geographic location of the scholars themselves may partially explain this selection bias, it also may point to the difficulty in generalising diplomacy and diplomatic practice as a 'habitus' outside of highly institutionalised international organisations. Catriona Standfield (2020), a scholar focusing on gender in Diplomatic Studies, encourages some self-reflexiveness in using practice theory by critiquing how it has ignored Bourdieu's theory of patriarchy when applying the approach to the study of diplomacy. Reminiscent of Vradi's (2008) critique of International Relations' uncritical use of ethnography, Standfield (2020) calls on Diplomatic Studies scholars to exercise caution and reflexivity when importing concepts from other disciplines because we may be perpetuating existing ontologies in the guise of offering new insights.

Overall, the field of Diplomatic Studies is a varied theoretical and conceptual field. While the English School played a prominent part in the study of diplomacy and continues to influence

the field to this day, many other theories and perspectives have provided valuable insight into the study of diplomacy. As discussed, the English School has had a long history of influence over the theoretical and conceptual approaches to the study of diplomacy. Its mainstay has proven to be the idea of an International Society, between Realists' chaotic anarchy and the humanism of Idealists. The practice theorists have invited the field to new discussions around theory and methods of study. However, the poststructural interventions have been ground-breaking and made it possible to re-imagine diplomacy outside of dominant understandings of sovereignty, but their contributions have been marginalised with the rise of Public Diplomacy.

Public Diplomacy has been underpinned by a single concept: Joseph Nye's (2008) soft power. The concept has been foundational in the study of Public Diplomacy (Snow 2020). Though a few scholars such as Jan Melissen (2005) and Brian Hocking (2005) preferred a more nuanced approach to the study of public diplomacy, their call has not been taken up by the rest of the sub-field. I will again touch upon soft power and Public Diplomacy in the next chapter as I discuss the concept of Other Diplomacies in detail.

1.5: Chapter Outline

The second chapter builds upon the first to define how Other Diplomacies is framed in this dissertation. Given that Other Diplomacies is a relatively new concept, its definition has not yet crystallised, allowing some room for it to be sculpted by each author. This chapter represents my attempt to engage with the concept and outline an operational and normative definition (by which I mean the spirit in which we should engage in Other Diplomacies scholarship). In doing so, I engage with three different types of literature: academic articles that explicitly engaged with the concept, academic articles and book chapters that have been categorised as literature in Other Diplomacies though their authors do not explicitly engage with the concept, and a few academic

articles published by anthropologists that examine what they refer to as everyday diplomacies. Drawing on the three sets of academic literature, I argue that while Other Diplomacies can be operationalised through the study of societal non-state actors as they interact across boundaries of difference, it is also imperative that we remain cognizant of the normative aspects of the concept as one that centres on societal non-state actors. Thereby, Other Diplomacies provides a framework from which non-traditional sites of diplomacies can be interrogated to reveal how power hierarchies related to race, class, and gender, among other distinctions, operate and contextualise relations between societal non-state actors.

Having clarified how the concept of Other Diplomacies is framed, the third chapter investigates how the concept can be researched. This chapter builds on the previous two and makes connections with the following three chapters by discussing how I conducted ethnographic work into the Other Diplomacies of Sri Lankan migrant workers in South Korea. The chapter starts by showing that while historical approaches were used by the literature that explicitly engaged with Other Diplomacies, the rest of the articles and book chapters that share a normative approach similar to this dissertation used ethnographic methods. I then show how an uncritical approach to using ethnography can strengthen the researcher's authority rather than amplify the participants' voice. Consequently, I do not claim that I am presenting the 'authentic' voice of my participants in this dissertation, and neither is it possible to do so within an academic text. Nonetheless, in keeping with this chapter's objective, I discuss how the case was selected and the participants recruited for this project. Additionally, I discuss my positionality in relation to the participants so that the power relationships between us become apparent. This sets the background to chapters five and six, where I examine how the participants engage in Other Diplomacies. The final section of this chapter outlines my fieldwork and describes a few of its

challenges. The discussions in this chapter, therefore, help provide context to the methods of research.

Taking note of the micro-level focus of the dissertation, the fourth chapter intervenes to provide a macro-level contextualisation for the presence of Sri Lankan migrant workers in South Korea. The presence of migrant workers from a poorer country working in a wealthier country may appear natural from a global economic perspective. However, I trouble this ‘natural’ position to show that the migrant workers are marginalised on classist, racist and sometimes gendered bases to sustain the privileges of statist and elitist groups in Sri Lanka and South Korea. I start from a somewhat unorthodox position of examining the history of inward labour migration to Sri Lanka from South India during British colonial times. However, I explain that I do so because today, the descendants of the migrant labourers from South India face racial and classist discrimination that makes them the other in their own country. The chapter then provides a history of the outward labour migration from Sri Lanka, including the labourers presently in South Korea.

The section on South Korea starts by briefly contextualising the history of Korean labour before examining the role of racism and xenophobia that framed the conversation and laws around inward labour migration to South Korea. South Korea itself has a history of labour migration but is directionally inverse to that of Sri Lanka. South Korean labourers travelled to the Middle East and Europe in the mid-twentieth century, which was later replaced by inward labour flows. However, the South Korean Government presents a progressive view of its migrant labour visa regime, promoting it as a fair and transparent system that respects the human rights of foreign workers. The final section of this chapter troubles this convenient image by telling a story of one Sri Lankan migrant worker. While the South Korean visa regime for migrant

workers is not dysfunctional, it does not centre around the interests of the migrant workers. Therefore, this chapter begins with macro-level analysis but returns to the micro-level focus to show how policies and processes that appear to work on paper do not always translate effortlessly to practice.

The fifth chapter explores how Sri Lankan migrant labourers in South Korea engage in Other Diplomacies. This chapter shows how Sri Lankan migrant workers consciously strategise when interacting with their South Korean employers over matters of employment to mitigate any negative perceptions of the broader Sri Lankan migrant worker community in South Korea. They recognise the wider implications their actions have for the Sri Lankan community of migrant workers in South Korea. A point that needs emphasis here is that the labourers did not assume to represent the sovereign state of Sri Lanka, but they were conscious of being representative of ‘Sri Lankan migrant labourers’. The ‘Sri Lankan-ness’ that the migrant labourers identified with was not its statist identity but one bounded by race and class: ‘Sri Lankan’ actually meaning Sinhala, often Buddhist and less affluent individuals. This results in the creation of fragmented, context based, and fluid ‘Sri Lankan’ identities, which unsettle the essentialised unitary identity of Sri Lanka that the state tries to project.

The framework of chapter six shows how Other Diplomacies should move beyond the operational definition that Young and Henders (2012) provided. It argues that societal non-state actors provide consular assistance to Sri Lankan migrant workers because the state has neglected its obligations towards them. This chapter contributes to the Diplomatic Studies field by extending the literature on consular affairs and Other Diplomacies. Consular affairs have not attracted much attention in work on Other Diplomacies, nor has it in the field of Diplomatic Studies. Other Diplomacies has not engaged with consular affairs because of a narrow

interpretation of consular work as functions such as passport and visa issuances that are monopolised by the state. On the other hand, the wider field of Diplomatic Studies has considered consular functions separate from diplomatic functions, mainly because it deals with societal non-state actors in everyday settings instead of high-level inter-state relations. Using the case of Sri Lankan migrant workers in South Korea, this chapter argues that societal non-state actors engage in providing special consular assistance. Therefore, this chapter first discusses the reasons for the relative neglect of consular affairs in Diplomatic Studies literature. Secondly, it engages in a discussion of how the Sri Lankan state neglects its migrant worker population. Using the points established in the first two sections, the third uses an Other Diplomacies framework, centring on the interactions between societal non-state actors to show how they provide consular assistance to each other. The final section examines some practical examples of consular assistance provided by societal non-state actors to Sri Lankan migrant workers in South Korea.

The concluding chapter summarises the dissertation, connects Other Diplomacies and this dissertation to International Relations, and introduces a few further research questions generated during the dissertation process. It proposes that the future of Other Diplomacies lies in sustaining its human-centric focus while expanding its operational definition to include interactions between societal actors and non-societal actors such as states, corporates and non-governmental organisations. This dissertation generated several interesting possibilities for further research that was outside the scope of this project. One such possibility lies in a discussion about the Eurocentrism of Diplomatic Studies. The discussion that I envision is not an argument about how the field can move beyond Eurocentrism or how it can be combatted, but rather to examine how discussions within the field can be infused with a genuine recognition of the violent role

colonialism played in universalising European diplomatic practices and norms. *Diplomatic History and the historical approach to Other Diplomacies* encouraged by Young and Henders (2016) may contribute to a project of this nature. Secondly, as chapter six touched upon, consular affairs is an area of study that could enrich Diplomatic Studies. Though dismissed by powerful gatekeepers such as Hedley Bull (2002) and Iver Neumann (2018) as lying outside the strict dimensions of inter-state relations, consular work involves deploying diplomatic skills in settings far more chaotic than the carefully regulated sites of inter-state diplomacy. The smooth functioning of state-based consular work involves establishing and maintaining friendly relations with foreign state and non-state actors who are not necessarily under compulsion to reciprocate. Such questions lay outside the scope of this dissertation but have the potential for interesting future research projects.

Chapter 2: Other Diplomacies

2.1: Introduction

This chapter aims to define and clarify how the concept of Other Diplomacies is framed in this dissertation. The previous chapter outlined important theoretical positions in Diplomatic Studies and reviewed the prominent trends within the field. As noted, a feature of the Diplomatic Studies field has been the continuation of its state-centrism despite a broadening range of theoretical and conceptual approaches taken by scholars. I do not present Other Diplomacies as a concept that completely resolves the shortcomings identified in Diplomatic Studies. Instead, Other Diplomacies provides an opening from which to explore new sites of diplomacy that were traditionally excluded. As will be evident, much of this depends on how we choose to operationalize the concept. This chapter proposes that as we interrogate everyday interactions between societal non-state actors using Other Diplomacies, we must remain cognizant of how power hierarchies related to race, class and gender, among other distinctions, operate (Young and Henders 2012). In other words, scholarship engaging with Other Diplomacies must consider both the operational definition and normative framing of the concept.

Failing to consider the normative framings of the concept carries the risk of being enveloped as a category within Public Diplomacy, a field that has recently seen exponential growth. Public Diplomacy has already, at least partially, subsumed categories such as citizen diplomacy (Mueller 2020), celebrity diplomacy (Cooper 2020), and diaspora diplomacy (Kennedy 2020). The fact that Public Diplomacy engages societal non-state actors and themes that are sometimes identical to what Other Diplomacies engage with increases this risk, the consequences of which would be that Other Diplomacies becomes a category of scholarship that examines how societal non-state actor interactions impact states. As I show in the third section of

this chapter by comparing the work of Tiessen (2010) and Dubinsky (2018), if not for the different normative framings, there would be little difference between Public and Other Diplomacies. Therefore, as a novel concept, if Other Diplomacies is to make a significant contribution to Diplomatic Studies, we need to distinguish it from the already existing categories in the study of diplomacy.

It is not possible to compartmentalize the operational and normative definitions of Other Diplomacies. Therefore, there are overlaps in the discussions surrounding the two. The chapter is organized around three categories of literature. The first includes the literature that explicitly discusses Other Diplomacies. This section examines the definition of Other Diplomacies offered by Young and Henders (2012) and examines how it has been operationalised. The second section examines literature that has already been categorized as Other Diplomacies, though their authors do not explicitly engage with the concept. The purpose of this section is to set out a normative framing of Other Diplomacies. Both these sections discuss the overlaps and how distinctions can be made between Other Diplomacies and existing concepts in Diplomatic Studies, including Public Diplomacy and Paradiplomacy. It is impossible to ignore how both sections involve literature linked to Canadian international relations.

The first detailed definition and discussion of Other Diplomacies as an analytical concept appeared in an article by Mary Young and Susan Henders (2012) in a special issue of the *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* exploring how Canada may respond to the ‘rise of Asia’.³ In their article, the authors note that Other Diplomacies first appeared as a term used to identify the fourth section of an edited volume by Marshall Beier and Lana Wylie (2010a), *Canadian*

³ *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* (2012), volume 18 issue 3

Foreign Policy in Critical Perspective. Later, Henders and Young (2016) continued developing the concept by organising a special issue of *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* that explored the Other Diplomacies in Canada-Asia relations.⁴ In the introduction to *Other Diplomacies, Other Ties: Cuba and Canada in the Shadow of the US*, the editors Luis Rene Fernandez Tabio, Cynthia Wright, and Lana Wylie (2018b) point out how some chapters in the volume are indicative of Other Diplomacies, though the chapter authors do not explicitly engage with the concept. Finally, the most recent reference to Other Diplomacies examines how ‘Hong Kong-resident Canadian nationals’ represented Canadianness during the 2014 Occupy Central and Umbrella Movement (Henders 2020). While six articles engage with the concept of Other Diplomacies explicitly, many other scholarly works engage within the operative and normative definitions of Other Diplomacies without expressly making the connection. I include both sets of literature in this chapter to develop a normative position for Other Diplomacies. As evident, the concept of Other Diplomacies is a relatively new one and has been discussed in relation to Canadian international relations. Therefore, while using the scholarship referenced above to define and discuss Other Diplomacies, this chapter shows how the concept can be applied outside Canadian-centred settings.

The third section introduces the work of anthropologists in the study of diplomacy and strengthens the operational and normative definitions set out in the previous two sections. This dissertation itself engages Other Diplomacies outside the Canadian international relations settings. While I examine the Other Diplomacies of Sri Lankan migrant labourers in South Korea in chapters five and six, in this chapter, I introduce a few contributions from anthropology that

⁴ The Hague Journal of Diplomacy (2016), volume 11, issue 4

examine how societal non-state actors engage in everyday diplomacies (Marsden, Ibanez-Tirado, and Henig 2016). This section also provides insights into how Other Diplomacies can benefit from drawing on literature outside the disciplinary boundaries of International Relations. The concluding section summarises the chapter and opens links to the fifth and sixth chapters of the dissertation.

2.2: Other Diplomacies- Defining and Distinguishing the Concept

Other Diplomacies was first defined and discussed as a concept that could be used to understand the nature and implications of Asia-Canada societal relations (Young and Henders 2012). To this end, the authors positioned the concept of other diplomacies as a response to the call for critical scholarship in the field of Canadian foreign policy analysis made by Sjolander, Stienstra, and Smith (2003) in their edited volume *Feminist Perspectives on Canadian Foreign Policy*. Sjolander, Stienstra, and Smith ask critical questions as to “who speaks for Canada?” (6) and “what is foreign?” (6) in foreign policy with regard to Canada. They point out how the answers to these questions, often taken as a given, are, in fact, constructs and that problematising them through feminist scholarship allows for an “emancipatory political project” (7). The ultimate objective is to make visible the voices of people who go unheard in foreign policy analysis today and to open up a wider range of solutions to policy issues: solutions that are currently not thought of due to the rigid focus on state based traditional definitions of Canadian foreign policy.

Other Diplomacies have been successful at introducing a critical examination to Canadian foreign policy with its functional approach. Its critical approach to foreign policy aims to “capture analytically the everyday activities of societal non-state actors that have a diplomatic character” (Young and Henders 2012, 375). Therefore, Other Diplomacies are about framing

certain activities undertaken by people who are not traditionally understood to be diplomats or state officials. Despite this unorthodox interpretation of diplomacy, the concept remains successfully anchored to the field of Diplomatic Studies because it interprets diplomacy in terms of the functions it fulfils. For Young and Henders (2012), the central focus of Other Diplomacies is negotiation and communication and as such define it as “a range of things that non-state actors do as they interact with each other, including across political, legal and normative borders and differences of culture, language and other identities” (378). Therefore, Other Diplomacies is defined by what diplomats do rather than who they are (ibid). This functional approach to diplomacy that they describe is not unfamiliar to the field.

The orthodox view of diplomacy has always been that it fulfils certain functions in international relations. As outlined in the previous chapter, going back as far as 1977, Hedley Bull (2002) devoted significant portions of his chapter on diplomacy to outline its functions and relevance to international society. While Hedley Bull includes intelligence gathering, minimising friction, and symbolising international society's existence as functions of diplomacy, the first two functions he prioritises are communication and negotiation. Diplomatic Studies scholars working in the English School tradition have continued to consider communication, negotiations and representation essential functions of diplomacy (Jonsson and Hall 2005; Murray 2016). Diplomatic historians suggest that before the term was popularised by Edmund Burke in Britain, diplomacy was known as negotiations and included functions such as communication and intelligence gathering (Berridge 2010). Therefore, Other Diplomacies' focus on the functions of diplomacy should not be controversial to the rest of the academic field.

Decentring the state in Diplomatic Studies is what makes Other Diplomacies contentious for the field. In the previous chapter, I already showed that Diplomatic Studies remained a state-

centred field despite the proliferation of diplomatic actors. However, Other Diplomacies is distinguished by its centring of interactions *between* societal non-state actors (Young and Henders 2012; 2016; Henders and Young 2016; Henders 2020) which pushes states and their interests to the periphery. This dissertation project did not encompass diplomacies or interactions that may occur between non-state and state actors, making it one of the features that distinguish the concept from Public Diplomacy. For example, Young and Henders (2012) describe Filipino domestic workers in Canada as engaging in Other Diplomacies as they negotiate and mediate across cultural and language differences in bringing up Canadian children. Relying on the work of historians, Young and Henders (2016) provide further examples by arguing that interactions between societal non-state actors “helped to build and maintain the European imperial world order, but also sometimes transformed that order” (380) in the late eighteenth to early twentieth centuries. They point to possible interactions that would have occurred in the context of Canadian missionary schools in Japan, Canadian oil workers in British and Dutch colonial territories in Asia, and Asian middlemen working as recruiters and supervisors of Chinese labourers in Canadian railroad construction (ibid). The clear focus on the role of societal non-state actors in constructing and challenging world orders does not sit comfortably with the dominant understanding of diplomacy as a state-centric practice.

Though state actors have been excluded from the definition of Other Diplomacies, their influence has not. Henders and Young (2012) acknowledge that non-state actors are often framed in statist terms, but they explain that this contradiction serves to unsettle the essentialist nature of state identities. Unsettling singular and essentialised state identities to show them to be “fluid, internally and externally contested, multi-layered and unbounded” (378) is an important and unique contribution that Other Diplomacies can make to Diplomatic Studies. A powerful

example of this is provided in Montsion's (2016) article on the Indigenous Diplomacies of British Columbia's First Nations. Montsion examines British Columbia's First Nations' efforts to negotiate with China about investing in the natural resource sector. The article shows that the Indigenous Diplomacies of the First Nations unsettle Canada's territorial sovereignty claims and reveals it as a state engaged in ongoing colonisation. This article troubles the identity of the Canadian state as a unified and singular political entity that has sovereign authority over its territory and subjects. It also troubles the Canadian state's image as a global champion of human rights (Beier 2010; 2009a). Therefore, it is clear that adopting an Other Diplomacies approach has unsettled the unified character of the Canadian state and, in this case, also the global image that it perpetuates.

However, Montsion's (2016) article does not solely deal with non-state actors; it actually examines the interaction between British Columbia's First Nations, the Canadian and Chinese states. Therefore, it does not lie within the definition of Other Diplomacies but has a marginal overlap with the concept in terms of challenging statist approaches to the study of diplomacy. As Montsion (2016) further points out, Indigenous Diplomacies cannot be subsumed within the category of Other Diplomacies because "the legal standing and histories of Indigenous peoples in Canada grant them a distinct position, and their efforts at self-representation therefore have an incomparable status, from both statist and Indigenous points of view" (407). Additionally, Indigenous Diplomacies is a field defined by ongoing colonisation and political activism by Indigenous nations. Therefore, Indigenous Diplomacies must be engaged with care, and in their own terms, because as Franke (2009) made clear, it is all too easy to subsume it within the ontologies of Eurocentric academia. As the marginal overlap with Indigenous Diplomacies

indicates, defining and positioning Other Diplomacies can be challenging given the proliferation of different types of diplomacies and diplomatic actors.

Out of the many types of diplomacy, Public Diplomacy has been one of the fastest growing and prominent subfields that overlap with Other Diplomacies. The overlap occurs mainly because both concepts take non-state actors into consideration. The fluidity of Public Diplomacy has meant that the concept has broadened to include state-led public activity and people to people activity (Snow 2020). The term ‘new’ Public Diplomacy has come to signify a more diverse approach to Public Diplomacy. Accordingly, this new version of Public Diplomacy emphasises the role of multiple actors, including those beneath and above the state level, in developing relationships through dialogue (Huijgh 2016). The idea being enunciated today in Public Diplomacy is that it must incorporate a wider variety of non-state actors into its field of study to understand better how they may be manipulated in the states’ interests (Marsden, Ibanez-Tirado, and Henig 2016). This is how cultural and educational exchange programmes have now fallen within the framework of the Diplomatic Studies field. The people to people exchanges that emerge from the U.S. Fulbright scholarships (Bellamy and Weinberg 2008; Bhandari and Belyavina 2011), the English language, examination and library services of the British Council (Leonard, Small, and Rose 2005; Pamment 2017) and the Chinese language programs of the Confucius Institutes (Hartig 2015; Wang 2010) are some examples of the new Public Diplomacy. Despite this diversity, Public Diplomacy, whichever version we are speaking of, new or traditional, is founded upon the idea that non-state actors are better positioned and are more convincing actors on the global stage than governments in spreading their message (Hocking 2005). All of these examples still fall within the category of state sponsored activities,

and it is very clear that the publics of foreign countries are reduced to being objects that can be influenced and changed to serve the interests of state actors.

Rather than side-step the issue of overlap with Public Diplomacy actors, Young and Henders (2012) clearly explain that Other Diplomacies centres on the ‘everyday practices’ of societal non-state actors with a diplomatic character, irrespective of whether those practices are motivated by or related to states. Though both concepts may examine interactions between societal non-state actors, their normative focus is different, as Young and Henders (2012) explain:

The key question is not whether non-state activities involve state support for strategic purposes or whether they are influenced by state decisions.... Rather, the other diplomatic framework permits an analytical focus on how certain everyday non-state practices can overlap with, blur and sometimes disrupt official diplomatic action in ways that fundamentally challenge statist approaches (379).

As Young and Henders have made clear, Other Diplomacies takes a decentred view of the state and prioritises non-statist approaches to the study of diplomacy that *challenge* statist approaches.

An example from the Other Diplomacies literature is helpful at this point to further examine what the implications of challenging statist approaches may entail. Serge Granger’s (2016) article on the role of Quebec cinema in influencing international relations reveals the implications of decentring the state. The article swaps the state-centrism usually associated with Public Diplomacy for the sub-state-centrism of Paradiplomacy. While Granger’s (2016) article is wide ranging, the underlying central argument is that Quebec cinema, as an ‘other diplomatic’ actor, influenced international relations. The article explores how Quebec cinema represented China to Quebec cinema-goers and thereby helped change their perceptions about China and Chinese immigrants, and how the cinema lobby influenced the framing of the UNESCO convention. The first few sections of the article examined cinema as a propaganda or public

diplomacy tool that generated significant aid donations for Catholic missionary work in China during the early twentieth century and contributed to “the eventual end of discrimination towards Chinese immigrants in Canada” (394). The next section briefly discusses state-led efforts to use cinema in order to portray China in a favourable light as an ally during the Second World War, which is once again reflective of a public diplomacy function. Finally, the discussions on how Quebec cinema played a role in international relations through the International Federation of Coalitions for Cultural Diversity to help formulate the UNESCO convention reflects very closely to the concept of Track-II or Citizen Diplomacy. Therefore, Granger’s article, while being framed as one that involves Other Diplomacies owing to its analysis of non-state actors in the representation of identities and their role in international relations, also has multiple overlaps with Public Diplomacy, Citizen Diplomacy, Track-II Diplomacy and Paradiplomacy.

While the overlaps themselves are problematic, the impact it has on the politics of framing Other Diplomacies is more significant. In distinguishing Other Diplomacies, Young and Henders (2012) pointed out its approach as one that was committed to discussing the centrality of power in terms of race, gender and class, among other distinctions, to everyday interactions between societal non-state actors. However, Granger’s (2016) centring of Quebec paradiplomacy foreclosed any possibility of such engagement. Paradiplomacy involves the international relations of non-central governments (Cornago 1999), and they reproduce much of the same normative aspects of state diplomacy, except that they do so in the form of sub-state actors. Of particular note was Granger’s (2016) suggestion that discrimination against Chinese migrants had ended in Canada and that Quebec cinema contributed to the cause through movies such as the 1944 *Invitation a Souper*, which portrayed the generosity of French Canadians towards a Chinese child despite the prevailing war privations. These examples highlighted how non-state

actors (Quebec cinema, in this case) worked in state-led public diplomacy efforts. The absence of serious discussions around race, class and gender comes into relief when comparing this article with Young and Henders (2016) discussions of how societal non-state actors contributed to creating and sometimes challenging the European imperial order. In their article, Young and Henders (2016) discussed the class and racialised positions occupied by the societal non-state actors under discussion. Contrary to this approach, Granger foreclosed discussions around race by treating it as a topic that was settled favourably in the mid-twentieth century with the assistance of Quebec cinema. Therefore, rather than using the Other Diplomacies framework to uncover ‘power hierarchies’ related to race, class and gender (Young and Henders 2012), Granger (2016) glorifies the role of Quebec cinema as a non-state actor that contributes to the Paradiplomacy of Quebec.

Granger’s (2016) article on the Paradiplomacy of Quebec’s cinema would fall under the strict definition of Other Diplomacies if understood solely based on its definition as the everyday interactions between non-state actors with a diplomatic character. However, if a broader understanding of Other Diplomacies is considered, including its normative spirit, of which one was to capture power hierarchies related to race, class, and gender in societal non-state actor interactions, Granger’s article falls outside its boundaries. This chapter's next section contributes to setting out a normative agenda for framing Other Diplomacies.

2.3: Other Diplomacies - Framing a Normative Agenda

Discussions surrounding the normative framing of Other Diplomacies must take place as the concept develops and its definition begins to be less dexterous. Not doing so risks the concept being interpreted as one that just adds another new category of diplomatic actors into the state-centric field of Diplomatic Studies. As demonstrated in the discussions surrounding

Granger's (2016) article in the previous section, it is possible to position Other Diplomacies as either another form of statist diplomacy or one that assists in performing traditional diplomacy. I recognise that Other Diplomacies can have multiple definitions, including different normative framings; therefore, what I attempt in this section is to clarify what the term means to this dissertation and thereby not foreclose the discussion of how Other Diplomacies should be defined. It is not an attempt at drawing definitive borders with an inside and outside but an exercise in clarifying the position of this dissertation. I will sketch the normative boundaries of how Other Diplomacies is understood in this section. To achieve this, I will draw on existing literature associated with the concept though their authors do not explicitly reference Other Diplomacies.

One feature that distinguishes Other Diplomacies is its ability to capture diplomacies that traditional definitions disallow. Beier and Wylie (2010a) devised the term Other Diplomacies to describe the last section of their edited volume, *Canadian Foreign Policy in Critical Perspective*. For them, Other Diplomacies captured “issues and topics traditionally excluded from discussions of Canadian foreign policy” (Beier and Wylie 2010b, xviii). Within this section of the volume were included chapters discussing work-abroad programs where Canadian youth engaged with foreign communities (Tiessen 2010), the linguistic division between French and English language scholarship on Canadian foreign policy (Roussel 2010), the diplomacies of Indigenous nations (Beier 2010), and a discussion that invited a reflexive examination of critical Canadian foreign policy (Wylie 2010). The fact that these chapters represent an ‘Other’ in critical Canadian foreign policy becomes evident when they are contrasted with the other sections of the volume: “Doing Canadian Foreign Policy”, “Fighting the Global War on Terror”, and “Security and Self after 9/11” (Beier and Wylie 2010b). Even though all the chapters in these sections took

critical approaches to examine Canadian foreign policy, the topics they discussed were readily identifiable as relevant to Canadian foreign policy and were relatable to the state. However, the scholars working in the section on Other Diplomacies had to make an extra effort to show that they were engaging in the study of Canadian foreign policy. For example, Tiessen (2010) had to first set the groundwork by “broadening our understanding of public diplomacy in the context of Canadian foreign policy” (141) before arguing that Canadian youth working abroad contributed to constituting Canadian identity. Therefore, the usage of the term Other Diplomacies originally intended to capture non-state actors and themes that were relevant to Canadian foreign policy but fell outside its traditional definitions.

However, the significance of Other Diplomacies goes beyond just capturing actors, issues, and topics traditionally excluded from Diplomatic Studies. It fundamentally disrupts the monopoly states and state interests hold over the study of diplomacy. This aspect of Other Diplomacies intersects with the ontologies of Indigenous Diplomacies that recognises states, but only as a part of a broader set of actors. While Indigenous Diplomacies recognises states as actors in international politics, the assertion is that states are not the only actors (Beier and Wylie 2010b). Indigenous Diplomacies provides a crucial intervention for Other Diplomacies and the wider discipline of International Relations by challenging the principle of state sovereignty as the basis on which all politics rest. I stress the word challenge because, as Franke (2009) points out concerning Indigenous Diplomacies, recognising non-state actors as engaging in diplomacies is often difficult and tends to fall into the categories of pre-political, sub-political, or anti-political, ultimately situating ‘Otherness’ in relation to the state. While this dissertation certainly does not escape statism, it understands Other Diplomacies as a concept that allows societal non-state

actors to be centred and their issues and concerns to be taken seriously, not by showing how it matters to states, but by showing how they matter to the actors themselves.

Therefore, Other Diplomacies do not merely capture the interactions of societal non-state actors but centre them as actors in their own right. The centring of societal non-state actors clearly and unambiguously differentiates Other Diplomacies from the rest of Diplomatic Studies. One example of centring societal non-state actors comes from a chapter by Karen Dubinsky (2018), 'Taking Generation NGO to Cuba: Reflections of a Teacher', in the edited volume, *Other Diplomacies, Other Ties: Cuba and Canada in the Shadow of the US* (Tabio, Wright, and Wylie 2018b). Dubinsky's chapter is also an example of scholarship that does not explicitly identify with Other Diplomacies but can be categorised as one that falls within its framework (Tabio, Wright, and Wylie 2018a). Dubinsky's chapter revolves around the exchange program Queen's University has with the University of Havana, Cuba. Thereby the chapter revolves around the interactions between societal non-state actors, focusing mainly on the interactions between Canadian students and their Cuban interlocutors.

Dubinsky (2018) does not position the exchange program in terms of what it means to the Canadian state but focuses on the participants and what it means for them. She takes the time to provide some context into the background of the Canadian students who travel on the exchange programme to Cuba. While they are undergraduates from various arts stream programs, they are likely to have travelled either to Cuba or other third-world destinations, including in work-abroad programs or as volunteers. Therefore, some students can have preconceived perceptions of Cuba as a destination that needs rescuing or saving. Some preconceived notions of Cuba get unsettled during the exchange program, such as when Canadian students are surprised by what Cubans have achieved despite their poverty and seeming helplessness. Dubinsky (2018) does not paint a

one-sided picture of her students' experiences either. She discusses how the students noted the poverty and racism in Cuba but appeared to be oblivious to their existence in Canada (Dubinsky 2018). Nowhere in the chapter does the author argue that the Canadian students represent the Canadian state, nor do they attempt to convince the Canadian state that it is beneficial to focus more on such student exchanges.

The stark difference of shifting from state-centric to societal non-state-centric scholarship becomes even more apparent when two works that use each approach are compared. Rebecca Tiessen (2010) framed her chapter on youth abroad programs using a Public Diplomacy approach, whereas Dubinsky's (2018) approach to a similar topic, youth exchange programs, adopted an Other Diplomacies framing. Tiessen's (2010) chapter argues that the Canadian government should pay serious attention to youth abroad programmes because they are de facto Canadian ambassadors. Tiessen (2010) reasons that her thesis is important to promoting Canada's image abroad, one that has been negatively impacted by cuts in development aid and its involvement in wars abroad. In contrast to being part of an occupying military force, Canadian youth volunteering abroad would "generally promote a positive image of Canada as a caring and giving nation" (153). This was not a critique of Tiessen's work, which she identifies as one in Public Diplomacy, but the intent is to highlight how Public Diplomacy approaches frame societal non-state actors as tools or objects to be used to enhance the state's image abroad. Therefore, the comparison is directed at highlighting how the two approaches overlap but, crucially, how they diverge from one another.

Dubinsky's (2018) chapter discusses a similar subject to what Tiessen (2010) did, but with an entirely different focus. Both authors focus on Canadian youth working abroad, sometimes even asserting the same points. For example, Tiessen (2010) quotes a surprised youth

saying that they “did not expect so many Peruvians to possess such a wealth of knowledge and skills” (149) regarding Peruvians developing software throughout the Amazon. Dubinsky (2018) highlights how her students echoed the same sentiment when quoting an exchange student who had hoped to “teach literacy, to people in other countries, but in Cuba, they did it themselves” (308). In both examples, it is clear that the participants had positioned themselves as being able to help the less developed because they possessed the knowledge and capacity that the third-world others did not. The scholars present more similar discussions, including how sometimes encounters in the ‘developing world’ lead to the reinforcement of stereotypes.

However, despite sharing the same category of participants and despite making similar observations, Tiessen (2010) and Dubinsky (2018) have diverging objectives. In the conclusion of their chapters, Dubinsky and Tiessen do not pass up the opportunity to address the Canadian state. While Tiessen makes a case for building Canada’s image abroad, Dubinsky asks for reciprocity from the Canadian state to bring Cuban students to Canadian universities on exchange programs. Dubinsky’s argument to bring in Cuban students is not premised on promoting Canada’s image. Instead, it is based upon the fact that the benefits of the current exchange program flow only one way, towards enriching Canadian students with little contribution to Cuban academia. She mentions how the Canadian contribution is mostly limited to the material, like supplying the toner for the photocopier in Havana’s Philosophy Department. On the other hand, Tiessen’s central argument is that the Canadian state should channel more resources and energy into developing youth abroad programs because they will help enhance Canada’s soft power. Recalling that theory is always for someone, and some purpose (Cox 1981), Dubinsky’s (2018) and Tiessen’s (2010) chapters provide a good representation of how

Other Diplomacies and Public Diplomacy draw different conclusions from very similar research contexts.

The discussion around youth abroad programs and student exchanges necessitate a diversion into a brief discussion of Citizen Diplomacy. It is a concept that closely relates to Public Diplomacy and Other Diplomacies owing to its study of societal non-state actors. The literature review in the previous chapter outlined a few scholarly works under the category of Citizen Diplomacy, which is further divided into state-led and citizen-led diplomacy (Tyler and Beyerinck 2016). Most of the literature focuses on state-led citizen diplomacy, which often refers to various exchange programs designed explicitly by states to enhance their soft power. The literature in this sub-category clearly overlaps with Public Diplomacy; the chapter by Tiessen (2010) that we just examined being an excellent example. The literature in the second sub-category is paltry and usually references efforts by non-state actors to influence international relations, such as the civil society-led efforts to ban land mines (Tyler and Beyerinck 2016; Williams and Goose 2008; Williams, Goose, and Wareham 2008). Therefore, while Citizen Diplomacy examines the agency of non-state actors, they do so with a view of them as sub-political actors (Franke 2009). However, as highlighted in the comparison between Dubinsky's (2018) and Tiessen's (2010) chapters, Other Diplomacies differ from both of the Citizen Diplomacy sub-categories because it centres societal non-state actors in their own right, rather than showing how they are relevant to state actors.

One more aspect of Other Diplomacies that needs to be outlined is that it provides a framework from which it is possible to examine the workings of power as it is linked to class, gender, race and other distinctions that contextualise and govern the interactions between societal non-state actors (Young and Henders 2012; Henders and Young 2016; Young and

Henders 2016). For example, Young and Henders (2012;2016) have made connections to issues of class, gender and race in their analysis of Canadian Other Diplomacies through secondary sources.

The contribution by Catherine Krull and Jean Stubbs (2018) to the edited volume, *Other Diplomacies, Other Ties Cuba and Canada in the Shadow of the US* (Tabio, Wright, and Wylie 2018b) provides a good example of how primary sources, in the form of interviews, can uncover issues of class, gender and race among other distinctions within the framework of Other Diplomacies. Additionally, the chapter points to how societal non-state actors intentionally strategize and mediate across identities in their interactions with the other; and how such mediation is evidenced in their interviews. Their chapter itself is a part of a much larger project examining Cuban diasporas (Krull and Stubbs 2018) and explores “why Cubans have chosen to migrate to Canada, their experiences and perceptions once there, and how they relate to Canada and their country of birth” (267). The chapter is based on first-hand interviews conducted with Cuban immigrants living in both Toronto and Montreal, which have enabled Krull and Stubbs to present a complex picture of the Cuban diaspora and avoid presenting a singular narrative.

They uncover how race and class differences influence the decisions of Cuban migrants and how they mediate identities. Krull and Stubbs (2018) show that Cuban migrants cannot be thought of as a homogenous group because they are often differentiated in terms of wealth. The decision about where to live is often determined mainly by differences in wealth and class. The wealthier Cubans can afford to live in Toronto’s exclusive neighbourhoods and Gatineau, while many of the other less well-off live in less affluent parts of Toronto. Perceptions of race and skin tones also impact how different Cubans experience Canada. Many Cubans had chosen Canada over Florida because they perceived Canada as a friendlier developed country than the United

States. However, several participants Krull and Stubbs' (2018) interviewed revealed that they discovered subtle forms of racism in Canada; as one participant told them: "...[Canadians] do not discriminate openly but when you start interacting with them you realise that people here are quite racist and discriminate against you (Thirty-one-year-old male)" (278). Another participant spoke of the different perceptions of identities that he had to mediate across in Canada because he was perceived variously as 'Afro-Cuban', 'black', or 'mulatto', whereas in Cuba, he was just Cuban. Adding another layer of complexity to racialised experiences of Cubans in Canada was the solidarity that they felt with some sections of Quebecers. The feelings of solidarity resulted from both communities identifying as being minorities in Canada. As a twenty-six-year-old male participant said in reference to Quebecers: "They are like Cuba ... A small population trying to fight a large enemy ... an enemy who wants to take away their identity, their culture" (288). While Krull and Stubbs (2018) point out the impact of class and race in their interviewees' lives, they do not advance a singular argument about the Cuban diaspora in Canada. Instead, the reader is presented with the multi-layered identities and contexts that Cuban migrants must navigate across as they live in Toronto and Montreal. It is essential to keep in mind that Krull and Stubbs did not explicitly engage with Other Diplomacies as they wrote the chapter, but the subject of their inquiry, interactions between the Cuban diaspora and Canadians, is relevant to the concept. The chapter, however, is crucial because it points to how centring societal non-state actors can uncover rich detail of how relations between Cubans and Canadians are constituted.

This section intended to provide a normative agenda that frames Other Diplomacies as a concept that centres societal non-state actors and engages them in a manner that allows us to uncover the relationships of racialised, classist and gendered power that they mediate across in their everyday interactions with otherness.

2.4: Other Diplomacies- Beyond Canada and Diplomatic Studies

As already pointed out earlier, the literature that explicitly acknowledges Other Diplomacies has been associated with Canada. Henders and Young (2016) go so far as to encourage further research, “especially from the perspectives of non-Euro-American peoples and polities” (350) in their introductory article for the *Hague Journal of Diplomacy’s* special issue. This dissertation can be partially seen to be answering that call by examining Other Diplomacies between Sri Lankan migrant labourers and their South Korean interlocutors. However, some scholarly work already exists that can be categorised as engaging with Other Diplomacies, though their authors do not explicitly make the connection and are not International Relations scholars. *The Cambridge Journal of Anthropology* published a special issue in September 2016 (Volume 34; issue 2) under the title, ‘Everyday Diplomacy: Insights from Ethnography’. As the editorial clarifies, the special issue’s objective is to show how non-statist forms of diplomacy occur in everyday settings, using ethnography as an analytical tool (McDonald 2016). This chapter aims to strengthen the definition and normative framings of Other Diplomacies outlined in the previous sections. The fact that the scholarship I reference in this section comes from outside the context of the first-world provides a helpful link to the fifth and sixth chapters of this dissertation, where I examine the Other Diplomacies of Sri Lankan migrant workers in South Korea.

The anthropologists do not stake their claim to be studying diplomacy based upon the statist interpretations within the field of Diplomatic Studies. Instead, they approach the subject as an intervention in an interdisciplinary exercise involving ethnography and diplomacy (Marsden, Ibanez-Tirado, and Henig 2016). Working under the theme of ‘everyday diplomacy’, the anthropologists note Iver Neumann’s (2012a; 2013) and Merge Kuus’ (2013) ethnographic work

in analysing inter-state diplomacy but also note Constan Constantino's (2015), Noe Cornago's (2013), and Dittmer and McConnell's (2016) arguments for moving beyond statist framings for the study of diplomacy. Rather than offer constrictive boundaries within which to work, the authors in the special issue have been licensed to interpret 'everyday diplomacy' in light of the empirical cases they were examining (Marsden, Ibanez-Tirado, and Henig 2016). My reference to these articles as non-Canadian and non-Diplomatic Studies examples of Other Diplomacies, in a way, risks appropriating that literature into something that it is not. Therefore, rather than understanding these articles as examples of Other Diplomacies, it is appropriate to present them as examples of an interdisciplinary wealth of resources that Other Diplomacies can draw upon as it grows and shapes its disciplinary framings.

A good starting point to discussing the connections between Other Diplomacies and the everyday diplomacies that the anthropologists have investigated is to examine how the societal non-state actors are diplomatised. The special issue contains articles that examine various ways in which societal non-state actors engage in diplomacies. The common thread that runs through the articles written by the anthropologists recognises that the societal non-state actors under review utilised diplomatic skills in everyday interactions with others to achieve their goals. In their article, Diana Ibanez-Tirado (2016) introduces embodied diplomacy as a way to discuss how ordinary Tajiks engage their diplomatic skills to negotiate between official dress codes, personal preferences and foreign fashion trends in everyday settings. David Henig (2016) argues that the *sofra*, a dining etiquette deployed by a Muslim Dervish brotherhood in Bosnia Herzegovina, is a "mode of being diplomatic and a site of everyday diplomacy" (76). For Hennig, dining etiquette serves as a site that makes it possible to establish and mediate relationships with the other. Madeleine Reeves (2016) explores how brokers in the market for

rental accommodations of Kyrgyz migrant labourers in Moscow employ diplomatic skills to bring landlords and tenants together and resolve disputes that arise intermittently. It sheds light not only on the diplomatic skills of brokers who have to negotiate “notions of trust, profit, morality, honour, and risk” (96) but also on how migrant labourers strategize their interactions with their interlocutors in precarious economic and legal settings. These and other articles in the special issue contain valuable insights into how societal non-state actors use diplomatic skills in their everyday interactions with others and, therefore, can be considered diplomatic actors despite their non-statist nature.

Though the anthropologists have not relied on statist interpretations to diplomatise the societal non-state actors, many continue to refer to them in statist framings. For example, though concerned with interactions and diplomatic skills, the actors are still referred to as Afghans (Marsden 2016), Tajiks (Ibañez-Tirado 2016), or Kyrgyz (Reeves 2016). Young and Henders (2012) pointed to this as a source of tension in *Other Diplomacies* because it framed non-state actors in ‘state-bound identities’. Furthermore, the Afghan traders in Ukraine and other former Soviet bloc countries appeared to intentionally mimic the comportment of statist diplomats through dress and by adorning their trading offices with the symbols associated with Afghan embassies (Marsden 2016). Such offices sometimes included waiting rooms adorned with maps of Afghanistan and traditional paintings, while the office itself would contain the flags of Afghanistan and the host country. However, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the tension created by the state-bound identities of societal non-state actors strengthens the concept of *Other Diplomacies* because it unsettles the state's unified and essentialised identity.

The state-bound identities of the societal non-state actors become unsettled following a closer inspection. For example, the Afghan trader-diplomats’ efforts to mimic the statist symbols

of Afghan embassies face disruptions owing to practical considerations in the Russian Federation, such as when they are inclined to include a photograph of President Putin in their offices (Marsden 2016). Marsden (2016) records another instance that unsettles the statist identity of the Afghan trader-diplomats in an incident where the Ukrainian government requested a wealthy and influential Afghan trader in Odesa to secure the release of a Ukrainian pilot after the Taliban captured him following a plane crash. It is clear that Ukraine did not identify the trader-diplomat as a representative of the Kabul government but as representing an ‘Afghan’ identity distinct from that of the state. It becomes clear that though societal non-state actors are framed through state-bound identities, they are not necessarily considered representatives of that state, and this disrupts the understanding of the state as sovereign. Therefore, as Young and Henders (2012) argued, the examination of social relations framed in terms of statist identities leads to the unsettling of statist identities themselves.

Other Diplomacies has swapped the traditional definition of state-based diplomacy to rely on one that focuses on defining it through a functional approach (Young and Henders 2012). As I argued earlier in the chapter, the intentional strategizing of interactions between societal non-state actors are imperative to operationalising Other Diplomacies. While Young and Henders (2012) framed Other Diplomacies to include practices that were both consciously and unconsciously carried out in interactions between societal non-state actors, this dissertation captures interactions where the actors were conscious of some aspect of their own identity being relevant to shaping how they interacted with the other. Therefore, the societal non-state actors would need to be aware of their identity, either in statist or non-statist forms, and have some form of desired outcome from the interaction. Two examples from Reeves’ (2016) account of Kyrgyz migrant workers in Moscow will help demonstrate this point. Sanjar is a Kyrgyz migrant

worker in Moscow who rents an apartment from a Russian surgeon. In turn, he and his wife live in one room of the apartment, and they sublet mattress space for at least another twenty Kyrgyz migrant workers who occupy the other two rooms. In order to secure a rented apartment in Moscow's racist and xenophobic real-estate market, Sanjar had to pass himself off as a native Russian with an urban habitus to the prospective landlady. He engaged in this performance intentionally (mis)representing his identity to achieve his objective. Reeves (2016) also points out that Sanjar engages in diplomacy by the "strategic mediation of otherness" (Constantinou and Der Derian 2010a, 10) as he 'balances' relations with the Russian landlord, and between his tenants and their neighbours, and also keeps the local area policeman on good terms, so he does not initiate a raid on his overcrowded apartment. In other words, Sanjar has to intentionally manage a complex web of relations that require him to mediate across language, culture and other differences. The fact that the participant recognises their use of diplomatic skills in strategically mediating identities or maintaining peaceful relations between parties with competing interests enables researchers to capture and show how societal non-state actors engage in Other Diplomacies.

The participants' awareness that they are mediating differences to achieve some objective allows researchers to reflect upon the impact of class, race and gender on those interactions. As already mentioned, showing the power circulations based upon class, race, gender, and other distinctions forms a part of the normative agenda for Other Diplomacies. In the previous paragraph, I mentioned Reeves' (2016) account of how Sanjar acquired his rented apartment from a Russian surgeon by representing himself as a native Russian. Sanjar, aware that as a foreigner, he would not be able to rent an apartment in Moscow's xenophobic real-estate market, strategized consciously to mis-represent his identity. Sanjar mentions to Reeves (2016) that his

previous employment at a university in Kyrgyzstan, fluency in the language due to his Russian-medium schooling, and his light skin colour helped him represent himself convincingly as a native Russian rather than a foreigner during his interactions with the Russian landlady. It shows that he was aware of the classist and racist context within which he had to operate and therefore consciously negotiated the interactions with his potential landlady, co-opting her classist and racist biases to achieve his objective successfully.

Like the Kyrgyz real-estate brokers in Moscow, the Afghan traders that Marsden (2016) investigated also consciously engaged in strategic interactions to achieve their objectives. According to Marsden (2016), the traders claimed that entering into romantic relationships with women in the host country facilitated their learning of local languages and culture, thereby enhancing their diplomatic skills. Marrying women in host countries also afforded the traders safe locations to stay at and a network of in-laws and cousins they could draw upon for various trading requirements. Strikingly, there is no mention of the Afghan traders marrying out of romantic interest; instead, it is presented as a practical step to enhance their trading activities through sustained local connections (Marsden 2016). The Afghan traders offer a view of gendered interactions where romantic relationships with women are strategically used to developing diplomatic competencies and securing their family networks to promote trade.

However, strategizing interactions with the other comes with consequences to oneself and the broader community understood to share one's identity. The anthropological intervention in diplomacy signals how one societal non-state actor's actions can impact the broader community who are perceived to share their identity. This is relevant to Other Diplomacies because it shows how an individual who, without necessarily claiming to represent a wider group, can represent such identities. For example, Marsden (2016) points out how the divorce between an Afghan

trader and the daughter of an Uzbek president led to the Uzbek government making it very difficult for all Afghan traders to carry on doing business in the country. A separate group of Afghan traders who live in Ukraine are fearful of the possible consequences that may arise after the son of an Afghan trader entered Ukrainian politics. The Afghan traders in Ukraine fear that it may focus attention on their community, bringing their trading activities under unwelcome scrutiny (Marsden 2016). This indicates that a single individual's actions can impact a wider community seen as sharing the same identity. While the examples cited above assign statist identities to societal non-state actors, there are situations where it is possible to see how such an impact may extend to other categories, such as foreigners in general.

The perception of sharing an identity can also influence how societal non-state actors provide consular assistance to each other in the absence of state services. While some states work to strengthen the link between their citizens abroad through their embassies and consulates, not every state shares the same commitment to consular work (Marsden 2016). While the intervention in consular affairs requires moving beyond Other Diplomacies, it focuses on societal non-state actors, a topic I discuss in the sixth chapter regarding Sri Lankan migrant labourers in South Korea. Marsden (2016) discusses how Afghan societal non-state actors in Moscow provide consular assistance to each other. The 'Homeland Trading Centre', an extensive shopping and hotel complex, has become a de-facto Afghan consulate where Afghan traders and labourers feel protected in the xenophobic and racist Moscow environment. A large number of Afghan traders, which Marsden (2016) estimates to be four thousand, ensure security and employment for each other and the Afghan labourers they employ. The trading centre at one point even provided office space for the official Afghan commercial attaché to work out of when the Afghan Ambassador to Moscow refused to recognise his appointment, owing to differences

arising from domestic Afghan politics. Therefore, Marsden's (2016) work contributes to Other Diplomacies and the literature on consular affairs.

This section discussed how Other Diplomacies could be conceptualised outside the Canadian context. It demonstrated that the field of anthropology has the potential to inform the study of Other Diplomacies, especially regarding how to operationalise the concept.

2.5: Other Diplomacies- Conclusion

This chapter drew on examples from International Relations and Anthropology to define the operational and normative definitions of Other Diplomacies. This section will summarize the main points I wish to make in this chapter.

Young and Henders (2012) correctly recognize that Other Diplomacies includes interactions that societal non-state actors engage in, irrespective of whether they do so consciously or unconsciously. An excellent example of this approach being applied was Dubinsky's (2018) reflections on Canadian exchange students in Cuba. While the author successfully shows how the experience re-affirmed stereotypes in some students while unsettling them in others, the chapter did not delve into how the students mediated across differences or represented their identities. However, in terms of methods, the chapter was written as an auto-ethnography, where the author was able to draw on her considerable proximity and familiarity with the student exchange program to provide valuable insights from an Other Diplomacies perspective. While this method can be effective, as in Dubinsky's (2018) chapter, this method's requirements limit research possibilities to only what the individual researcher is deeply familiar with.

Therefore, while *Other Diplomacies* aims to capture the everyday interactions between societal non-state actors as they mediate across boundaries of difference, I focus on the interactions where participants are aware of intentionally mediating identities as they interact with the other. The Cuban migrants in Canada that Krull and Stubbs (2018) wrote about, the Afghan traders that Marsden (2016) wrote about, and the Kyrgyz migrant workers in Moscow that Reeves (2016) discussed provide three examples where the participants were conscious of the identities that they mediated. Their participants were conscious of the racialised and classist hierarchies of power they had to negotiate and mediate across. Therefore, when examining the *Other Diplomacies* of Sri Lankan migrant workers in South Korea, I have only considered those interactions where the participants were consciously mediating differences to achieve some objective; by objective, I do not only refer to the achievement of an end goal, as in a definitive target. Instead, the objective could also be the maintenance of friendly relations between the participant and their interlocutor. Therefore, my operational definition of *Other Diplomacies* slightly modifies the definition outlined by Young and Henders (2012) to exclude mediations that societal non-state actors have engaged in unconsciously.

This chapter proposed a normative agenda within which *Other Diplomacies* should be framed. Drawing from the initial introduction of the term, I argued that *Other Diplomacies* should capture those topics and issues that are excluded from traditional discussions around diplomacy (Beier and Wylie 2010b). One significant factor that results from this approach is the decentring of the state. It reorients *Other Diplomacies* away from traditional Diplomatic Studies literature that centre on states towards one that centres societal non-state actors and their interests and concerns. I compared Tiessen's (2010) work on Public Diplomacy and Dubinsky's (2018) chapter on *Other Diplomacies* to show how similar research subjects and similar findings could

lead to two vastly different conclusions, depending on whether the focus was state-centric or societal non-state actor centric. The fifth and sixth chapters of this dissertation follow this normative framing by centring the Sri Lankan migrant workers in South Korea and their interests and concerns. While those two chapters do not ignore the impact of the Sri Lankan and Korean states on migrant workers, the states' interests or concerns are not discussed.

As Young and Henders (2012) argued in their initial article on Other Diplomacies, the concept also centres the power hierarchies relating to race, class, and gender, among other distinctions, when examining the interaction between societal non-state actors. Examples of how Other Diplomacies can reveal such power hierarchies include discussions surrounding Cuban migrants' experience of racism and classism in Toronto and Montreal (Krull and Stubbs 2018), Kyrgyz migrants' experiences of the xenophobic Moscow real-estate market (Reeves 2016), and the Afghan traders gender-based strategizing in the former Soviet Union countries (Marsden 2016). A state-centric focus does not prioritize such a normative approach since its overwhelming concern is with the power hierarchies faced by states. I draw attention to the racialized and gendered experiences of Sri Lankan migrant workers in South Korea in my fifth chapter, while the sixth chapter uncovers how classist assumptions are at least partially responsible for the lack of effective consular assistance. The ability of Other Diplomacies to uncover issues of race, class, and gender in societal non-state actor interactions allows for deeper and wider discussions in the field of Diplomatic Studies.

The societal non-state actor centredness of Other Diplomacies, coupled with its normative framing of unsettling statist narratives, provide an opening to discuss how societal non-state actors engage in providing consular assistance to each other. As Marsden (2016) pointed out how the Afghan traders engaged the premises of the 'Homeland Trading Centre' in

Moscow as a de-facto Afghan consulate, the sixth chapter of this dissertation examines how Sri Lankan migrant workers receive consular assistance from others. Both cases show how the abandonment by the state of its obligations shifts the burden of consular assistance upon non-state actors. The discussion of consular assistance by societal non-state actors takes us beyond the concept of Other Diplomacies because such assistance is often predicated upon a shared common identity rather than difference.

This chapter clarifies how Other Diplomacies is defined in this dissertation. As such, it is one suggestion on how to frame and develop the novel concept. However, this chapter also shows what is at stake in sustaining a critically oriented framework for Other Diplomacies. Sustaining the critically oriented directions set out for it in the early years of its development (Beier and Wylie 2010b; Young and Henders 2012) is imperative to maintaining its distinction from statist diplomacy and, therefore, promoting its unique contribution to the field of Diplomatic Studies.

Chapter 3: Researching Other Diplomacies

3.1: Introduction

The previous two chapters set out the framing of the field of Diplomatic Studies and how this dissertation interpreted Other Diplomacies. I showed that the field of Diplomatic Studies is overwhelmingly centred around state-centric literature that obscures how actual living communities engage in relations across boundaries of differences. Chapter two defined Other Diplomacies as the interactions between societal non-state actors that occurred as they consciously mediated across boundaries of difference. Crucially, the chapter positioned Other Diplomacies as a concept that centres societal non-state actors and their interests. Thereby, the previous two chapters laid the foundations for the rest of the dissertation.

This chapter builds on the previous two and connects them to the fifth and sixth empirical chapters of the dissertation. Therefore, this chapter aims to discuss how the research was conducted into the Other Diplomacies of Sri Lankan migrant workers in South Korea. The methods that were used in this dissertation can be broadly described as ethnographic. Where ethnography is understood as the written account of fieldwork (Jenkins 1994; Vvasti 2008) that encompasses “establishing rapport, selecting informants, transcribing texts, taking genealogies, mapping fields, keeping a diary, and so on” (Geertz 1973, 6). However, more importantly, it is also an effort to provide a ‘thick description’ (ibid). Therefore, connected to ethnography is the implied association that the researcher is an expert concerning the lives of their participants. The proximity coupled with the length of time a researcher spends among the participants, studying their ways is supposed to allow them to provide a thick description, one that can distinguish between a twitch, wink, and a parody of a wink (ibid). Despite spending only three weeks’ doing’ fieldwork in South Korea, I too stake my claim to authority on the proximity I share with

almost all participants on the markers of race, language, culture, and gender. However, as I caution in the third section of this chapter, anthropology's critical turn has unsettled the researcher's position as an expert of their participants' lives. Therefore, while the purpose of this chapter is to connect the first two theoretically inclined chapters to the final two empirically inclined chapters, it does so by showing how the empirical case was explicitly selected and designed to serve the theoretical framings of the dissertation.

Engaging in an explicit discussion around how the research was framed and investigated makes it possible to see how power circulated between the academic field, researcher, and the participants. The fact that the research question was framed to address a deficit in the Diplomatic Studies literature sets the foundation for reshaping the participants' voices to be in sync with this project's requirements. The dissertation highlights the concerns of the participants and their interests in so far as it can be captured within the framework of Other Diplomacies. Despite deriving no direct benefit from the dissertation project, the participants consented to and assisted me in completing the fieldwork. Another way to present this chapter is as one that critically examines how the research was conducted into Other Diplomacies and what the political framings of it are; what does ethnography, as a research method, entail? How did power hierarchies operate in interactions between the researcher and the participants? How may have the power hierarchies and relationships impacted the ethnography? These are some of the questions that this chapter aims to answer.

To do so, the first section of this chapter examines what methods have been used in the existing Other Diplomacies literature, which was identified in the previous chapter. I show that many of the scholarly works that fall within the same normative framing of this dissertation utilise ethnographic methods. In the next section, I start by examining Iver Neumann's (2012a)

ethnographic work in Diplomatic Studies as an example of how researchers claim authority over their participants' voices, implying that they are the expert authority on the subject. Next, I caution against the uncritical use of ethnography. Instead, advocating for explicit self-reflexiveness and humility on the part of the author. In light of this, the fourth and fifth sections of this chapter set out how the case selection was made, how participants were recruited, my positionality in relation to them, and some issues and limitations I faced in fieldwork. I also include a discussion about my participants' backgrounds to provide the reader with context regarding where they are coming from, their politics, and social context. The sixth part provides a brief outline of my fieldwork in South Korea. Thereby, this chapter links the first two chapters of the dissertation to the final two through a discussion on methods.

3.2: Methods in Other Diplomacies

This section is intended to show that, given the operational and normative definitions of Other Diplomacies I set out in the previous chapter, ethnographic approaches are best positioned to studying the concept. The fact that only six academic articles engage explicitly with the concept of Other Diplomacies makes evaluating research methods challenging. However, on the other hand, it also makes it easier to use different methods since no tradition exists, against which justifications must be made when using non-traditional methods. Therefore, while I take the six articles into account, I also draw on other academic work, identified in the previous chapter, that do not explicitly reference Other Diplomacies but can be understood as falling within the analytical category.

The first article by Young and Henders (2012) did not discuss in detail the methods that may be appropriate in the study of Other Diplomacies except to “urge a historical approach to diplomacy” (385) in the study of Asian-Canadian Other Diplomacies. Their follow up article in

the *Hague Journal of Diplomacy* continued to build on the historical approach by drawing on the work of historians to examine sites of Other Diplomacies in the late nineteenth to early twentieth centuries. Serge Granger's (2016) article in the same issue examined the historical role of cinema in Quebec's paradiplomacy. Similarly, Montsion (2016) takes a historical approach to study the interactions between First Nations, China and Canada. Anthropologists working on everyday diplomacies have also pointed out that trans-imperial and translocal trading and religious networks have been considered sites of non-statist diplomatic practices across time and space (Marsden, Ibañez-Tirado, and Henig 2016). Therefore, examining the history and excavating past interactions may be one way of researching the Other Diplomacies of societal non-state actors.

However, much other academic work that falls within the operational and normative definition that I set out for Other Diplomacies use some form of ethnography for research. These include interviews, informal conversations, naturalistic observations and sometimes personal reflections. The chapter by Karen Dubinsky (2018) involved a personal reflection of her experiences as a university professor accompanying Canadian students on exchange trips to Cuba. The author's reflections tell the reader that the Canadian students' interactions and experiences in Cuba sometimes help unsettle the singular narratives of the third-world that dominate the first-world perception of it. However, Dubinsky's (2018) valuable personal reflections come from ten years of experience and familiarity with the exchange program, a period during which she saw many students and undoubtedly developed an intrinsic familiarity with the exchange program. While personal reflections provide insightful detail into societal non-state actor interactions, not all researchers have the opportunity to draw on such personal experiences sustained over long periods.

Instead, scholars must use ethnography to develop insights into the often private sphere where everyday interactions between societal non-state actors occur. An example of this is the chapter by Krull and Stubbs (2018) that examines Cuban migrants in Toronto and Montreal. The authors appear to rely on interviews to examine their Other Diplomacies, though they do not explicitly discuss their methods, except in an endnote. The authors used direct quotes to substantiate their points about how the participants mediated everyday interactions grounded in classist and racist contexts. In the notes, Krull and Stubbs (2018) point out that the chapter was part of a larger project that examined how gender, class, and race, among other distinctions, impacted the experiences and perceptions of migrants. They also point to using a broader set of methods, including “site visits, participant observation, and in-depth interviews” (295) that enabled them to uncover the issues that impacted the migrant communities. This indicates that ethnographic methods of inquiry are well positioned to uncover relations of power linked to race, class and gender, among other distinctions.

The appropriateness of ethnography to uncover race, class, and gender in power relations was further evidenced in the anthropologists’ work examined in the previous chapter. Fieldwork and the associated ethnographies played an essential part in their analysis of interactions. The observations made regarding the diplomatic mimicry of Afghan traders, by dress and office furnishings (Marsden 2016), the rapport and trust involved in revealing how one engaged in illegally subletting space in Moscow apartments (Reeves 2016), and the possibilities that opened up due to chance encounters (Cheuk 2016) would not have been possible without engaging in fieldwork. While we are familiar with the Afghan traders and Kyrgyz migrant workers in Moscow from the last chapter, the Indian traders in the Chinese fabric market were not discussed. Briefly, the point I wish to make about how fieldwork enables valuable chance

encounters is provided by Cheuk's (2016) account of how he met an Indian trader while returning from a scheduled interview. This encounter led him to witness a vibrant dispute between the Indian trader and his Chinese supplier that he would otherwise not have. Observations from this interaction provided much needed insight into why Chinese manufacturers continued to trade with Indians who had acquired an 'evil Indian' image. Therefore, given the understanding of Other Diplomacies set out in this dissertation, ethnography provided the most appropriate research methods. Additionally, a discussion on ethnography is imperative, given its use in this dissertation.

3.3: Problematizing Ethnography

Ethnography is no stranger to the discipline of International Relations. It has been used frequently within the critically inclined sections of the discipline, at times as a method to capture an 'authentic' reality, a form of writing that allows critical engagement, or as a new theoretical turn that captures the everyday (Vrasti 2008). One of the problems of this emancipatory framing of ethnography in International Relations is that it ignores the cautions of critical anthropology scholars who pointed out that ethnography's claim to represent reality was, in fact, a "skilful narrative device meant to keep the narrative authority of ethnographers intact" (295). This section discusses some of the problems with ethnography briefly and argues that self-reflexivity and humility on the researcher's part can help mitigate a few of the more apparent injustices committed by the author in writing up the conversations and observations of the participants. However, while making these commitments, it is imperative to acknowledge the power that the reader holds in interpreting the text. The reader must also commit to being cognizant of the commitments made by the author when reading and interpreting the dissertation in order to hear better the participating subject's voice. The problems identified in the section cannot be

remedied completely but only mitigated to a certain degree by holding in tension the conscious framing-up of the participants that take place in the last two chapters.

Iver B. Neumann's (2012a) ethnographic work, *At Home with the Diplomats: Inside a European Foreign Ministry*, provides us with an example of how a researcher can subtly claim an authoritative voice over that of their participants. His ethnographic inquiry into the working of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is considered a significant contribution to the Diplomatic Studies literature for various reasons. However, Neumann (2012a) does not really engage in any self-reflexiveness with regard to his position at the Norwegian Foreign Ministry. In the preface, the reader is told that he trained as an anthropologist with the understanding that he would work and write about the Foreign Ministry (ibid). The reader is not told what the explicit and implicit requirements of this relationship were. It is entirely left to the reader to critically question the implications arising from Neuman's (2012a) exercise in ethnography. State-based diplomacy is difficult to study owing to its secretive nature and the fact that a researcher would be 'studying up' (Wiseman 2015; Kuus 2013; Nair 2021). Surely, Neuman being granted access would have come with conditions; it is difficult to imagine otherwise. A point to note is that his book is not critical of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry in any serious way. He concludes that the Ministry is moulded on very masculine lines but that with the inclusion of more women and minorities of ethnically non-Norwegian origin, the Ministry is becoming a more diverse place (Neumann 2012a)⁵.

⁵ Neumann makes this point in chapter five of the book, which is written based on archival research, and not based on ethnography. This carries significance because Neumann's points about diplomacy being a gendered profession is frequently cited as the significant contribution of this book (see Standfield 2020).

Additionally, Iver B. Neuman has had an ongoing working relationship with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He mentions that he was invited to co-author a history of the Ministry for its centenary in 2005 with fellow Norwegian scholar Halvard Leira (2005) [see also: (Neumann and Leira 2007)]. It is doubtful that the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, a bureaucracy intent on consistent messaging, a conclusion Neumann (2012a) himself comes to, would invite a scholar who is deemed critical of their work to write a piece for its centenary celebrations. A critical reading of the book brings up these questions that Neumann does not touch upon, despite a section in the book's conclusion titled self-reflection (Neumann 2012a, 182–89).

A second issue that deserves mention is how Neumann (2012a) sets himself up to be familiar with the workings of the foreign ministry but does not engage with differences between himself and the participants, other than a brief mention of how diplomats are concerned with outcomes while he is concerned with conceptual questions and ontology (ibid, 182). For example, while he mentions at one point “...how, in the crunch, diplomats would brush off my input by activating a discursive resource: “you academics” concentrate in the conceptual, whereas “we diplomats” concentrate on the operative” (184), he does not engage in discussing how it may be symptomatic of other differences between him and the participants. It is interesting that right after mentioning this, he moves to re-affirm the affiliation between academics and diplomats by referencing how both Chatham House and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs were formed with the idea of connecting the two groups. Neumann then asserts his authority by pointing out that he worked for ten years at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs before being approached by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs because he “worked in what the MFA considered the corner of academic life closest to them” (184). So,

Neumann's section on self-reflexiveness actually attempts to justify why he has an authoritative voice over the Norwegian diplomats he is writing about.

While writing up the lives, experiences, and expressed thoughts of the participants reduces them to a framing constructed by the author, engaging with how the project was framed can help unsettle the author's claim to authority by showing that they too are a participant in the fieldwork - a participant with their own objectives and motivations, just like those they are studying and writing about. A researcher possessing humility regarding their work can give the research subject greater visibility. When researchers acknowledge and accept their fallibility, they lose some of the authority and power they would otherwise be imbued with. This erosion of authority puts the researcher and their participant on a more level field since the researcher is explicitly acknowledging that their research may have shortcomings. Expressed differently, explicitly stating the shortcomings of ethnographic research causes the relationship between the subject and the researcher to be altered in the eyes of the reader, from one that is similar to the proverbial child/parent relationship to one that is closer to that between peers. It diminishes the researcher's overpowering visibility and places him on a more equal footing with his subject. However, it does not resolve the issue of researchers' subverting the participants' voices completely. Instead, it encourages the reader to question the author's assumptions and authoritative claims instead of taking them for granted.

A book chapter by Renato Rosaldo (1986) that analyses, *Montaillou*, a work by Le Roy Ladurie, provides a convenient example of how researchers frame themselves as experts over the participants' lives. *Montaillou* (Ladurie 1978)⁶ presents an ethnographic study of fourteenth-

⁶ Citation references an English translation by Barbara Bray.

century village life in France, which Ladurie constructs using the inquisition register. Rosaldo (1986) questions how ‘authentic’ a picture the inquisition register makes because the participants' responses are undoubtedly shaped by the context they are recorded in, and there is no way to verify the accuracy of what the inquisitors themselves transcribed. Despite these very obvious shortcomings, Le Roy Ladurie treats the peasant confessionals as unproblematic testimonials that can paint a picture of French village life in the fourteenth century. Ladurie, when he does question the reliability of the testimony as an accurate description of life in that period, only does so fleetingly and is dismissive of the doubts he raises (ibid). Rosaldo points to how, in order to strengthen his own authority on the subject, Ladurie claims the inquisitor to be an objective investigator. To achieve this, Ladurie goes so far as to attribute the inquisitor with a scholarly detachment from the villager and presents him as someone intent on getting at the objective truth. However, Rosaldo points out that the peasant accounts used by Ladurie were obtained as confessions in a setting where the inquisitor dominated over the peasant giving testimony. Rosaldo (1986) thereby problematises and takes down much of Ladurie’s claim to authority. A substantial part of Ladurie’s claim to an authoritative voice over the peasant life of fourteenth-century France relied on reading the inquisition register as a collection of objective truths. Similarly, it is essential to examine the power relationship between the ethnographers and their participants to uncover how it may have impacted the ethnographic account.

Rosaldo (1986) discusses another strategy used by Ladurie to strengthen his claim to writing an objective reality. Ladurie subverts history to the present by telling his twentieth-century French readers to imagine that they share similarities with the fourteenth-century peasant. He engages his contemporary readers by telling them that the fourteenth-century peasants would have wept, expressed happiness, and gestured similarly to the way they do. This

attempt at making the unfamiliar familiar leads to eroding the original subject's identity; it makes the fourteenth-century peasant into someone the reader imbues, not with the properties of the other but with the sameness of the familiar and thus diminishes any sense of difference.

Contemporary ethnographic accounts also carry the same risks of obliterating otherness by failing to sustain the accounts of the other as different from one's own experiences, no matter how similar they may appear to be.

The academic position of its holder often enhances if not assures the authority of the ethnographer. Meanwhile, the participants themselves are denied the same authority to speak for themselves. Beier (2005) points to a similar situation in his discussion on how oral traditions are devalued in academic settings except when spoken from the lectern by credentialed professors. This results in Indigenous voices, carried down through oral traditions, being delegitimised while the foreign ethnographer is legitimated when they transcribe the same oral tradition. This speaks to a deeper point about power in the social sciences. Those occupying positions imbued with power and privilege, such as in academia, have the power to exclude certain types of knowledge that they deem inadequate.

Related to the discussion on power and privilege in academia is its gendered nature. Abu-Lughod (1990) discusses this problem through feminist ethnography and how it is othered in terms of the hyper-professionalism seen in the field. She explains: "This is a hierarchy in which the first term is associated with a valued masculinity and the second a devalued femininity: professional/unprofessional, objective/subjective, abstract/concrete, theoretical/descriptive, citational or related to the literature/based on personal observation" (Abu-Lughod 1990, 19). Citing examples of non-academic voices being discounted, she points to 'untrained' writers such as Margery Wolf (1960), Marjorie Shostack (2000) and Elizabeth Fernea (1969), who have

written ethnographies that have not been recognised as such. Furthermore, the female authors use of different conventions and styles, their focus on everyday matters, and an absence of professional style set them apart from the ‘hyper-professional field of ethnographers (Abu-Lughod 1990). Therefore, Abu-Lughod advocates for an unsettling of the boundaries as a way to move forward in feminist ethnography. She is pointing to the fact that disciplinary boundaries have been guarded at the expense of new knowledge. However, an unsettling of the boundaries will mean that the credentialed academic will lose their privileged position as the authoritative voice that speaks. If this can be achieved, it would allow the research subjects to be heard much louder over the voice of the credentialed academic.

However, being heard louder does not equate to controlling the narrative that the researcher sets out. As mentioned before, how the participant is heard and what topics or issues are discussed would have often been determined or at least broadly framed during the project's research design phase. This is inherently true of all research projects, where projects impact ethnographic fieldwork by shaping the interactions between participant and researcher. The subject's voice is compromised at the very outset when the research question itself is formulated. The research question is formulated according to the researcher's requirement and the discipline within which they work. As Abu-Lughod (1990) pointed out, anthropology is a professional field that engenders particular ways of doing research, even if they are critically oriented. The subject does not have a say in framing the academic discipline, its peculiar research methods or the research question itself. In fact, in an overwhelming number of cases, the participants are not consulted at the stage when research projects formulate their central research questions and research proposals. Therefore, the foundations for the power dynamic between researcher and participant are set long before formal contacts are made between the two groups.

The only possibility of unsettling the relationship of power between the researcher and the participant is to discuss explicitly how the research question was formulated, the motivations behind it, and any other considerations. Hugh Gusterson (1998) provides an example of what such engagement looks like. Gusterson (1998) engages in an ethnographic study of nuclear scientists working at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in San Francisco. According to him, personal considerations motivated the framing of his central research question (Gusterson 1998). Gusterson can pinpoint a public debate between him, as an anti-nuclear activist, and a nuclear scientist from the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, as the point when he became curious as to how a fellow human being could believe that developing weapons of mass destruction was justified and even noble. Gusterson starts his fieldwork three years later, and it is the curiosity that germinated during the debate that drove his research agenda. Gusterson's honesty is to be appreciated because it helps the reader understand his position and politics regarding nuclear scientists who are his participants. This revelation is important to the reader because it gives away Gusterson (1998) as an interested and partial researcher rather than an impartial and objective one. Gusterson has abdicated some of the power that the discipline of anthropology automatically confers among its researchers, thereby simultaneously forcing the reader to take the perspectives of the participants seriously.

The researcher should not leave it to their careful readers to raise questions regarding the voice of the participants, but it must be explicitly brought to the attention of the reader. Marshall Beier's (2005) ethnographic work on Indigenous people is an excellent example of this approach. Before delving into the details of his research, he outlines the problems associated with maintaining the subject's visibility and very humbly admits that he himself is likely to inflict violence upon the spirit of the commitments that he made. By taking down his own authority,

which was conferred to him by academia, he provides an avenue for the reader to consider his Indigenous participants as the ones with an authoritative voice.

Therefore, each researcher is *responsible* for being explicit about the shortcomings of their research, and it is equally important that they explain the motivations that lie behind their choice of particular research questions. The purpose of this exercise in explicitness is to allow the reader to make their own critical judgements about the degrees of legitimacy and authority that the researcher deserves to be imbued with and attribute authority to the participants. This process troubles the researcher's unquestioned authority and raises the profile or visibility of the research subject. The author of the text is indeed influential and should be conscious of it and use every tool available to them to highlight weaknesses in the research project and provide an avenue for the visibility of the subject.

As mentioned earlier, the reader also has an important role to play in this process. The reader must take serious note of the author's commitment to unsettling their academic authority in order to allow some degree of visibility for the participants' voices. However, it is important to be cognisant of the fact that despite the best efforts of the author and perhaps even with an equally committed reader, the research project remains one designed by the author and read by the reader for their own objectives. Therefore, despite every sincere effort made by the author and the reader, the best that can be hoped for is to unsettle the academic authority of the written text but not to resolve the problem of overwriting the voice of the participant.

3.4: Fieldwork: clarifying case selection

As the previous section set out, the uncritical use of ethnography can result in the researcher positioning themselves as an expert authority over the lives that their participants live. This section aims to explain how the dissertation's research agenda was developed, the case

selected, and the researcher's positionality to the participants. It will also outline a few of my concerns surrounding the fieldwork experience. A discussion of these topics does not result in the participants' voices being heard over mine, but it helps frame me as another participant. Nonetheless, I consider this an opportunity through which the researcher, my motivations, and interests can be uncovered and placed before the reader, just as the participants will be in the following three chapters. Thereby, following Beier (2005) and Gusterson (1998), I aim to unsettle my authority as an expert researcher by discussing my motivations and politics so that I may be understood as a participant myself.

The realisation that mainstream International Relations sometimes fails to capture certain aspects of what it claims to study provided the basis for this dissertation's research agenda. I was socialised into the discipline of International Relations through its Realist foundations, and it was not until my first year of doctoral studies that I was exposed to feminist, post-structural, and post-colonial theories. It is only after being introduced to these critical International Relations theories that I came to recognise individuals, groups, and communities not only as legitimate actors in international relations but as ones that mattered. Thus, what started as a mainstream Sri Lankan foreign policy analysis project grounded in social constructivist theories soon morphed into an interest in how actual Sri Lankans engaged in international relations. When I discussed this change in interests with my supervisor, she crucially introduced me to Young and Henders' (2012) work on *Other Diplomacies*. *Other Diplomacies* focus on societal non-state actors as legitimate subjects of international relations in their own right positioned it as a concept that could investigate aspects of international relations that were not captured by traditional approaches.

One of the significant challenges working on Other Diplomacies was the absence of established studies that involved the concept. However, this also proved to be an opportunity because it accords one with the freedom to shape the concept and operationalise it. Since I have already dealt with the conceptual issues in the previous chapter, the current discussion will focus on the challenges and opportunities related to the empirical investigations. The fact that I am from Sri Lanka meant that developing a case study related to Sri Lankans was the most prudent way to investigate Other Diplomacies. I would be able to make contacts more quickly and engage with them more effectively because I speak one of the languages and am familiar with social norms regulating interactions. Therefore, the next challenge involved selecting a suitable population of Sri Lankans abroad who could participate in the research project.

An examination of Sri Lankan migrant populations around the world uncovered two exciting possibilities. The first consisted of the substantial Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora in the Greater Toronto Area. This community had started to grow since the 1980s when many Sri Lankan Tamils fled their homes as refugees from the war (Amarasingam 2015). In terms of logistics, this case study would have been an ideal one to pursue. However, my position as a Sinhalese from Sri Lanka foreclosed any possibility of engaging with the Tamil population. The second option consisted of the substantial Sri Lankan migrant worker populations in the Middle East. This population did not consist of one particular racial group, so there was a good chance of finding individuals who spoke Sinhala or English within this community. Because Sri Lankan migrant workers had been travelling to the Middle East since the late 1970s (I discuss this in greater detail in the next chapter), there was an exciting possibility that they had established some form of rules or norms through ongoing interactions with the local populations. This prospect was particularly interesting because it would allow me to explore not only the

representational aspect of Other Diplomacies but also their rule-making functions (Young and Henders 2012).

Delving deeper into the character of the Sri Lankan migrant worker population in the Middle East uncovered exciting possibilities. An important signal of the overall migrant labour character was that statistics showed women to constitute a majority of departures; between the years 1996 and 2012, on average, 105,000 women departed Sri Lanka each year to work as domestics in Middle-Eastern households (Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment 2017, 6). Though the number of women departing to work abroad has steadily decreased in both absolute and proportional terms since 2012 (ibid), the impact of interactions between Sri Lankan domestic workers and their employers continues to be felt. Many domestic workers have been at the receiving end of violent abuse from their employers, which have permanently impacted them psychologically and physically (Mourkarbel 2009). On the other hand, though rare, there have been a few media reports which tell heart-warming stories of how some former domestic workers are visited by the children they used to take care of in the Middle-Eastern households where they worked. The long history of Sri Lankan domestic workers in the Middle East, coupled with the fact that they operated in the private and intimate environment of a household, makes their case a very promising one to examine Other Diplomacies.

Despite the relevance of the case, which is reminiscent of the Filipino Au Pair example cited by Young and Henders (2012), Sri Lankan domestic workers in the Middle East proved too challenging upon closer inspection to pursue. While my positionality on race, which would have been an issue pursuing the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora in Toronto, was not a significant worry in the case of domestic workers, positionality regarding gender and class were significant barriers. Preliminary investigations into the domestic workers in the Middle East revealed two points

related to gender, which should have been apparent from the start: The first was that all Sri Lankan domestic workers were women except for those hired as drivers; and secondly, the opportunities for meetings with female domestic workers were limited. Many domestic workers have few opportunities to leave the household. Arranging meetings within the households where they worked would have also presented insurmountable challenges. As Mourkarbel (2009), a migration studies scholar who worked with Sri Lankan domestic workers in Lebanon, pointed out, this space is also gendered. It is controlled by the wife or madam of the household, making access for a male researcher an additional hurdle to cross. Furthermore, Mourkarbel (2009) showed that employers often have racist attitudes towards their domestic employees, which would mean another barrier to overcome.

The challenges discussed so far are those in addition to the gender and class barriers between me and Sri Lankan domestic workers in the Middle East. The gender barrier itself proves to be a significant one because of the gender-based violence that some domestic workers face within and outside their workspaces (Gamburd 2000; Mourkarbel 2009). Additionally, they are often from impoverished households in Sri Lanka, making it difficult for me as a male from a middle-class background to convince them to share and trust me with their intimate stories. Considering the many logistical and ethical barriers I would have to overcome, and given the limited time and financial resources available to me, this promising case study could not be pursued. Nonetheless, with the appropriate resources and ethical considerations, the interactions between Sri Lankan migrant workers and their interlocutors in the Middle East hold the promise of providing an excellent case study that examines both the representative and rule-making functions of Other Diplomacies.

3.5: Fieldwork in South Korea: context and positionality

After concluding that it was not feasible to study the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora in Toronto or the Sri Lankan migrant workers in the Middle East, South Korea drew my attention. I was aware of the increasing popularity of South Korea as a destination for migrant labourers. While countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates remain a popular destination for Sri Lankan labourers, outside of the Middle East, South Korea has become the country that draws the largest number of unskilled labourers (Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment 2017, 16). Almost all Sri Lankan workers in South Korea are male, with females constituting only about 0.1% of total departures to South Korea (ibid). This demographic meant that unlike the domestic workers in the Middle East, there was no gendered barrier to studying Sri Lankan migrant workers in South Korea.

Additionally, it became clear that most migrant workers in South Korea would be Sinhalese since more than 98% of them came from districts where Tamils and Muslims constitute a minority population (Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment 2016, 44). Sadly, this statistic on race is an important one in examining Sri Lanka. While Sinhala racism is nothing new in Sri Lanka (Wilson 1999; Vittachi 1958), racist attention has shifted from only focusing on the Tamil minority to include the Muslim minority. After the military defeat of the Tamil armed struggle for independence in 2009, Sinhala racists found that the spectre of the ‘Tamil terrorist’ had lost its potency to stoke the general public’s imagination, not to mention the regional and global human rights outcry it has the potential to cause. Instead, the combination of the ‘global war on terror’, the global image of ‘Islamic terrorism’, and the ‘Hindutva’ sweeping India, the regional superpower, make Muslims a convenient target in Sri Lanka. Unfortunately, the racialised context of social relations in Sri Lanka makes the researcher’s race a factor that

must be taken into account when conducting fieldwork that requires access to and the trust of the participants. Given the demographic of the Sri Lankan migrant worker in South Korea, my Sinhala middle-class male credentials placed me in an excellent position to undertake fieldwork among them.

While religion sometimes became a relevant distinction in interactions with the participants, it was not a factor that participants inquired about. The instance when religious distinction became important was during the time I attended a Sunday church service conducted by Participant#11, a Sri Lankan pastor. The Pastor's congregation was entirely made up of Buddhists with the exception of one Christian. As I recount in greater detail in chapter six, the fact that I shared the religious identity of the Buddhist congregation may have made it easier for some of them to speak to me. The evidence I have to this effect is that several congregation members took the trouble to go out of their way to point out that I should not consider them as having 'sold out' to the Christian faith despite their attendance at the Sunday service. Other than making the assumption that I shared their Buddhist faith in this instance, I was never asked about my religion. Therefore, while it appeared that the participants assumed that I shared their religious identity, it was rarely, if ever, brought up in conversations.

However, despite sharing racial, language and other cultural signifiers with the participants, it is vital to note the many differences between us. The reader would not be wrong to assume that I have an advantage in understanding this particular study group rather than one where I have no connections. For example, it would have been financially and logistically far more feasible to have recruited migrant workers in Ontario for this case study. Despite my justification on the proximity I share with them, I must point out some ways in which I, too, am a foreigner to the world of the Sri Lankan labourer in South Korea.

Most of the differences that marked me out as a foreigner in the worlds of the participants were how I enjoyed a greater level of privilege in relation to them. One of the key differences between the participants and me was that of social position. While I never occupied an elite social position in Sri Lanka, I held a privileged position relative to many of the participants. It is tempting to describe this difference as one created between the urban-rural divide, though other factors, including income and wealth, impact it. I am not suggesting that there is a compartmentalised difference between the urban and the rural, but I allude here to the general perception in Sri Lanka to the often made social distinction between those that grew up in the city versus those who grew up in the village. The distance between the city and the rural may not be physically great in Sri Lanka, but it can be vast in terms of access to resources.

The lack of access to academic resources in rural locations is one possible cause of this perceived divide. However, it is also one that has material consequences. The lack of access to academic resources because they are either unavailable or, when available unaffordable, leads to some students leaving school after completing only eleven or fewer years of education, rather than the whole thirteen years. Students then take up low paying agricultural or manufacturing jobs while a few work in family-run businesses. The income from such jobs or self-employment is generally sufficient only to fulfil the basic everyday necessities required by a family. However, such income is insufficient to spend on private education opportunities or capital expenditures. Indeed, many Sri Lankan migrant workers travel abroad to save up sufficiently to construct their own house and ensure they can afford private higher education opportunities for their children (Gamburd 2000).

Therefore, not only social position but economic security also marks the difference between the participants and me. My parents were professionals, which meant that they would be

virtually guaranteed an income every month, even if it were not significant. This economic security meant that the spectre of hunger or any other grave depravity never hung over our family. The same cannot be said of many of the participants. Most of them, especially those from very remote areas, came from households that relied on agriculture for their livelihood. A few of them were subsistence farmers, meaning they had very little income. A few participants had lost their father when they were children, thus driving them into poverty. The gendered nature of labour ensured that when their mothers did find employment, it was for a low wage. While these circumstances are tragic, they were not exhaustive reasons for poverty. Many other participants spoke of a difficult childhood simply because their parents were engaged in low-paying or precarious employment. Therefore, the differences between the participants and me were often enhanced by economic circumstances.

The difference in economics ensured differences in the levels of mobility between the participants and me. I was a Sri Lankan graduate student in Canada who travelled to South Korea to conduct fieldwork for my dissertation. My ability to secure a visit visa, travel to South Korea, remain there for three weeks and then return to Canada, irrespective of what I had accomplished there, was in itself a sign of relative privilege. Contrastingly, many participants were labourers in South Korea who were there to make a living for themselves and their families back in Sri Lanka. Some of them had mortgaged properties to raise money for the cost of the trip. They were legally free to leave South Korea at any time they wished to, but their economic conditions made it impossible to do so before collecting substantial savings.

The shared identities assisted me in recruiting and securing participants for my fieldwork. A few conversations with friends and acquaintances in Sri Lanka led me to several introductions to Sri Lankan migrant workers in South Korea. The participants who were thus

initially recruited helped recruit further participants, and thus the number of participants snowballed. My fieldwork would not have been possible without each of them willing to sacrifice their time and energy without receiving any form of reciprocity from me.

3.6: Fieldwork: An outline

This section provides an overview of my fieldwork. As mentioned, though the fieldwork itself took place during three weeks in South Korea, I conducted preliminary interviews and had informal conversations via Skype starting in March of 2019. I have continued to stay in touch with a few of the participants after departing South Korea and have had follow-up interviews with several of them to clarify specific issues.

I spent three weeks in South Korea in June of 2019. My first week was spent in and around Seoul, the capital of South Korea. I was fortunate, on many levels, to have been invited to stay on the premises of a Christian church that hosted Sri Lankan migrant workers living in that area. I was provided accommodation and food by the Sri Lankan pastor, who helped me recruit several new participants and other invaluable contacts. The pastor was also instrumental in teaching me to navigate the bus and subway routes in and around Seoul. One of the fundamental issues I faced getting around for fieldwork was that I did not know Korean. The buses and bus stops in Seoul displayed all their information in Korean, which made it hard to get around without a translator. Google maps, which I rely on to get around in Toronto and Hamilton, was not available in South Korea. Instead, I had to rely on some helpful tips from the pastor and a few Korean apps.

The church premises were on the second floor of a three-storey building that had several other offices. The church itself consisted of a congregation hall, kitchen, shower room and two bedrooms. I was given the privilege of occupying one whole bedroom, while at one point during

that week, the next room was shared by three people, and a fourth slept on a couch in the congregation room. Though I made several attempts to offer to share my room or sleep in the congregation hall, they were firmly rebuked by the four labourers. They pointed out that I was a guest, and while they were used to sharing accommodation among themselves, I should not put myself through any trouble. I suspect that this attitude had partly to do with the recognition that I was indeed a guest, but it also signalled that I was not one of them.

During this week, I met a small group of Sri Lankan graduate students. They were introduced to me through a contact at the Sri Lankan Embassy in Seoul. The meeting took place in the residence hall for international graduate students at one of the three most prestigious Korean universities.⁷ One of the students invited me to join them for dinner on a Sunday evening, an event that they had already planned to get to know another Sri Lankan who had been resident in South Korea for over twenty years. They were hoping to get his advice on living in Seoul. One of the students had been in South Korea for more than two years but was relatively new to Seoul, and another student was anticipating the arrival of their family and needed to find suitable accommodation for them. In contrast to the workers, this group found it perfectly natural for me to help with the cooking and cleaning up. They also addressed me by my first name, as I did them. Instead, the workers never did this; instead, they addressed me as *Aiya*, a Sinhalese word literally meaning elder brother. This term is not often used outside of family members in Colombo, but it is considered a convenient and proper way to address those more senior than you in the rest of the country. When it is used thus, it carries with it a respectful connotation. The

⁷ In Korea, the top three universities are known by a collective acronym, SKY: Seoul National University, Korea University and Yonsei University.

term *Aiya* is not usually used to address males who are considered to occupy a lower social standing, even if they are older than oneself.

Additionally, this group, in contrast to the migrant workers, constituted three women. While two students were in Korea of their own accord, the other two were recipients of Korean Government scholarships and held mid-level public sector jobs in Sri Lanka.⁸ Overall, the students came from a much more privileged social and economic positions than the labourers. They were older, already had postgraduate level university degrees, and came from more socially and economically privileged backgrounds than the labourers. While they were brought up in various geographical locations of the country, they had all moved to a major city or suburb at some point in their lives. Interviews and hanging out with this group provided a quite different perspective to that of the labourers.

The female graduate students I met proved critical to the fieldwork. Though I do not examine how they engaged in Other Diplomacies, their familiarity with and interactions with Sri Lankan migrant workers in Seoul provided me with answers to some questions. Two graduate students, in particular, were cognizant of their gendered and racialised identities. I will be using some of their insights when discussing the Other Diplomacies of migrant workers in the fifth chapter.

I spent my second week in a rural village near the Southern city of Jinju. Here I stayed on the premises of an industrial scale laundromat staffed almost entirely by foreign workers. A majority of the laundromat workers were Sri Lankans but included a few Thai, Vietnamese and

⁸ The Korean Government scholarships are a part of a public diplomacy program that mimics the International Visitor Leadership Program operated by the United States Department of State.

Filipino workers. My host, who was from Sri Lanka, lived in an airconditioned container that was located on the same premises as the laundromat, which he shared with his Thai girlfriend. The container was separated into two sections: a bedroom and another living area with a few chairs, tables, and a refrigerator. While all three of us used the living area of the container, I was told to sleep in their bedroom while they slept in another room within the building that housed the laundromat. I was told that there was no room for negotiation on the matter when I raised objections to them having to shift their sleeping spot. Once again, similar to my experience in Seoul, my hosts provided food, accommodation and ensured that I was never in want. During this week, I met many workers, including some from Thailand and the Philippines, and travelled to several factories with a worker who was engaged in the part-time business of distributing Sri Lankan grocery items. The time I spent in this smaller village setting provided for several in-depth conversations with the participants.

I spent my final week back in Seoul, but this time arranged for my own accommodation in a hostel situated in the heart of downtown Seoul. My previous host at the church insisted that I return to the church where I could stay free of charge, but I was eager to make new acquaintances outside of those I associated with at the church. I selected the downtown location near a central subway station, which made getting around in the city easier. The Seoul subway's English announcements, coupled with a beginner's familiarity with a few key intersections, helped me navigate the city for the rest of my interviews, meetings and socialisations. During the final few days, I met a few new Sri Lankans who had been residents in South Korea for a long time, and these meetings immensely helped clarify many issues I had. These interactions included those with religious workers in the Seoul area and provided insightful context regarding the racialised identities they had to mediate across.

During my time in South Korea, I spoke to a few South Koreans. Other than one conversation, all other conversations with South Koreans were through either a Sri Lankan translator or carried out with the help of Google Translator. Unfortunately, this meant that I was not able to have in-depth conversations, and I also did not have sufficient time to build up a rapport with my South Korean participants. This contributed to making much of my interactions with South Koreans superficial. Many of them made several similar points, such as that they treated all foreigners equally and identified the increasing disparities in wealth as the most pressing problem in South Korea. Unfortunately, my language handicap and the limited time I had prevented me from delving deeper into these matters.

The fieldwork constituted an essential part in understanding how Other Diplomacies can be operationalised. The following three chapters bear direct content from fieldwork interactions.

3.7: Conclusion

This chapter discussed how I investigated Other Diplomacies of Sri Lankan migrant labourers in South Korea. It started with an overview of the Other Diplomacies literature that showed the use of both historical approaches and ethnographic approaches. However, it is vital to understand that employing ethnography as a method does not ensure that emancipatory ideals are achieved. Instead, its uncritical use risks writing the author's voice as the authentic voice of the participant. While recognising that a perfectly ethical version of writing is not possible, the researcher's authority can be unsettled by revealing the politics of the research project. Thereby enhancing, though far from ensuring, the possibility that the voices of the participants are heard.

This dissertation project started as an attempt at critically engaging with foreign policy analysis. However, the concept of Other Diplomacies provided a welcome approach to study diplomacy from a societal non-state actor centred perspective, radically reorienting traditional

Diplomacy Studies. After considering two other possible case studies, I chose to study the interactions between Sri Lankan migrant workers and their South Korean interlocutors.

However, while we share signifiers of race, gender and language, which make communication easier when conducting fieldwork, differences in social and economic circumstances separate us.

It is critical to recognise and bear these differences in mind when reading chapters five and six.

Chapter 4: Sri Lankan Labourers in South Korea – Historical and Political Context

4.1: Introduction

“The people of this country [Sri Lanka] used to refer to their shanty-towns as Korea, and I told them [an audience of Sri Lankan migrant workers in South Korea], you all are here now looking for jobs in the country that was considered equivalent to the level of a slum.”

Galkande Dhammananda Thero
Chair of the Department of History, University of Kelaniya, Sri Lanka⁹

This quote, problematic in itself, indicates a history and politics behind the presence of Sri Lankan migrant workers in South Korea. Though not as popular today, about twenty years ago, ‘Korea’ was one of the popular terms used to describe shanty-towns in Colombo. While I have not been able to find any published sources that investigate how the term came to be used, the elitism and racism inherent in it are not easy to miss. This quote is interesting to this dissertation because it disturbs any normalcy that may be associated with the presence of Sri Lankan migrant workers in South Korea. From a structural perspective, there may be nothing to interrogate about workers from a more impoverished country seeking employment in a wealthier one. However, the quote unsettles this normalcy and invites us, with its own problematic elitist and racist referencing, to treat the presence of Sri Lankan migrant labourers in South Korea as a problem rather than a solution.

This chapter takes a moment to briefly account for the larger circumstances that have resulted in the presence of Sri Lankan migrant workers in South Korea. Much of this dissertation

⁹ Translated from Sinhala by the author. Social media source: SLVLOG. “‘හික්ෂුවත් නුවාල සහිතයි’ මාධ්‍ය ඉල්ලන්නෙම ලේ!! ගල්කන්දේ ධම්මානන්ද ස්වාමීන් වහන්සේ (Exclusive).” YouTube, June 12, 2019. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IVr17VcWQFk>. 4:23-4:32

takes a micro-level perspective by centring on the lives, identities, and positions of societal non-state actors. The first two chapters worked together to construct a theoretical framing for the dissertation that was critical of statist approaches taken in the study of international relations and laid out a non-statist approach that could illuminate the micro-level workings of international relations. The third chapter engaged with the implications of how the micro-level may be researched and provided some understanding of the personal considerations that result in Sri Lankan migrant workers taking up work in South Korea. The following two chapters engage with Sri Lankan migrant worker identities and interactions in South Korea. Therefore, this chapter intervenes in order to provide a larger historical and political context to the dissertation.

Taking the broader circumstances of migrant workers into consideration allows us to understand better the structural conditions that determine their lives. To do so, this chapter examines several different macro-level topics and ends with a return to centring the societal non-state actor. The first section centres around Sri Lanka, while the following two sections focus on South Korea. The final section returns the chapter to the micro-level analysis by telling a migrant worker's experience in South Korea.

A discussion of labour migration in Sri Lanka cannot ignore the inward labour migration from South India during the colonial period. Relevant for the purpose of this chapter and dissertation are the racialised, class-based discrimination faced by the descendants of that population. While the descendants of South Indian migrants cannot be classified as migrant labourers in any way, the racialised discrimination they face in their own country effectively positions them as the other, placing them in a similar category to that of the Sri Lankan migrant worker abroad. The only difference being the latter cross sovereign territorial boundaries while the former is othered in their own country. However, in many ways, as outlined in the first

section, the descendants of South Indian migrants to Sri Lanka face much graver issues than the migrant workers abroad. For instance, unlike the migrant workers in the Middle East or South Korea, the descendants of South Indian plantation workers do not have the option of returning ‘home’, even in destitute circumstances. Racism has overpowered the class-based discrimination that should have connected the descendants of the South Indian labourers to the majority Sinhala labourers. I also discuss how the Sri Lankan state and elite classes rely on migrant workers to sustain their privileged positions.

The third section outlines a history of labour migration in South Korea. While South Korea was also a labour sending country in the middle of the twentieth century, it has transitioned into a labour receiving country by the end of the last century. I trace this history and the recent changes to the process of hiring foreign workers. I then outline in the fourth section how the current migrant worker hiring process works in principle. This section also offers a glimpse into how the practical implementation of the process is not as smooth as it is on paper. Before concluding, the final section offers the story of one Sri Lankan migrant worker in South Korea whose experience of the official migrant worker process was starkly different from what is outlined by the South Korean Government.

4.2: Sri Lanka and Labour Migration

Sri Lanka has a complex history of labour migration that begins with inward flows during the colonial era. The territory identified presently as Sri Lanka has a long history of migration from various parts of continental South Asia and includes labour migration that dates back to about 500 BC (De Silva 2008). However, I choose to start contextualising labour migration from the period of British colonisation because the Sri Lankan state as we know it today did not exist as a centralised political entity in precolonial history (De Silva 2008). The British Empire created

the present-day territorial borders of Sri Lanka during the early 19th century to make it easier to administer (De Silva 2008; Wickramasinghe 2014). While the Portuguese and Dutch, who colonised much of the coastal areas of Sri Lanka in the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries, benefitted from exploiting existing economic structures in the island, the British, who colonised the island in its entirety in 1805, made significant changes to the structure of the economy (Wickramasinghe 2014). One of the fundamental changes was introducing a plantation economy that started with coffee in 1833 (Bandarage 1982). These plantations required large amounts of labour during picking season, for which labourers were annually brought in from South India; this began the process of inward labour flows during colonial times (Wickramasinghe 2014; De Silva 2008; Bandarage 1982; Kanapathipillai 2009). The coffee plantations were soon replaced by tea, and the plantation economy endured, resulting in the permanent settlement of South Indian labourers that went on to make up approximately 500,000 or 12% of the island's total population by 1911 (Wickramasinghe 2014; Shastri 1999). The migrant labourers, their families and their descendants live in small community houses, referred to as coolie-line houses located within the plantations to ensure maximum efficiency (Wijetunga and Sung 2015). These houses belong to the plantations; workers and their families can live in them as long as they worked on the plantations. As a result of the housing rules, most labourers and their descendants were forced to continue working on the same plantation with little chance of escaping servitude since they did not possess the financial means to purchase property or sustain themselves outside the plantation economy. Therefore, the marginalisation of labourers from South India was structurally tied to the plantation economy.

Formal independence from British colonial rule did not bring about any changes to the lives of the plantation workers and their descendants in Sri Lanka. The British had enacted a

series of constitutional reforms in Sri Lanka that included the granting of universal franchise in 1931 to elect members of a consultative council, which later transferred to the universal franchise to elect members of parliament in 1948 (De Silva 2008). Sri Lanka's new rulers, all of whom belonged to the English speaking local elites, worked quickly to disenfranchise the plantation labourers and their descendants by making them stateless through some of the first acts of parliament passed in post-independent Sri Lanka (Wickramasinghe 2014; Shastri 1999). The Sri Lankan Government engaged in negotiations with India to 'repatriate' plantation workers and their descendants. After an extended period of negotiations, more than 374,000 plantation workers were 'repatriated' to India in 1971 (Vijayapalan 2014). The plantation workers who remained were not recognised as Sri Lankan citizens and remained stateless until as late as 1988. They did not have full access to public services before 1988 on account of being stateless, and even afterwards, their rights and benefits of citizenship have largely remained nominal (Kanapathipillai 2009; Vijayapalan 2014; Ramasamy 2018). Therefore, both the British Empire and the post-independent Sri Lankan state, and by extension, a majority of its citizens, played a role in marginalising and denying fundamental rights to the plantation workers from South India and their descendants.

However, as Wickramasinghe (2014) and Shastri (1999) point out, the plantation workers marginalisation was not just based on race but included classist elements. The citizenship acts passed by Sri Lanka's post-independent parliament placed the onus of establishing citizenship on the applicants, requiring them to submit various documents. Many of the plantation workers were illiterate and had never applied for birth certificates. However, wealthy merchants and white-collar estate workers who also had arrived from South India themselves were able to comply with the citizenship laws because they either had the required documentation or were

able to acquire them. Many poor and illiterate plantation workers did not understand the complex documentation requirements to apply for citizenship. Wickramasinghe (2014) mentions that in a few cases where attempts were made to apply for proper documentation, they were scuttled by an elaborate web of fear and mistrust created with the involvement of postal workers. Therefore, in addition to racial discrimination, the plantation workers had to deal with classist barriers.

The plantation workers were not the only group to be marginalised based on class. Many other groups, including Sinhala youth from rural areas, found it difficult to find employment and decent wages in an economy that continued to prioritise plantation-based exports. Post-independent Sri Lanka continued to rely on plantation crops such as tea, rubber and coconut as the top earners of foreign exchange and its benefits accrued to the owners of estates, their distributors and retailers. The plantation economy that the British introduced had destroyed much of the subsistence agricultural economy, and there was virtually no manufacturing or service industry that could generate employment or social mobility for many economically and socially marginalised groups. Therefore, the opening up of migrant labour opportunities in the Middle East provided a much-needed income source for those that did not own capital resources (De Silva 2008).

Outward labour migration from Sri Lanka started in 1976 and continued to increase until it became a major source of income for Sri Lankan workers and their families, a fact that was welcome by governments in Colombo because it provided a valuable source of foreign exchange income (Gamburd 2009). Migrant labour demographics were dominated by male workers during the first few years but were soon replaced by females heading to work as domestics in Middle Eastern households (Gamburd 2005; 2009; Ramanayake and Wijetunga 2018). The remittances generated by their labour steadily increased until they became the largest foreign exchange

income source for Sri Lanka (Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz 2007). Inward remittances, mainly from migrant workers, increased from about US\$ 13 million or 0.3% of Gross Domestic Product in 1976 to about US\$ 291 million or 5% of Gross Domestic Product in 1985 (The World Bank 2020b; 2020a). Foreign exchange income from migrant labourers has continued to constitute between 8% to 9% of the Gross Domestic Product in Sri Lanka since 2010 (ibid). Sri Lankan governments continue to pursue a policy of encouraging labour migration by explicitly promoting foreign employment and by failing to develop viable domestic alternatives for potential migrant labourers.

The growth in foreign exchange income reflected the success of deliberate government policies that sought to encourage foreign employment as both a solution to domestic unemployment and finance its economic liberalisation drive (Samarasinghe 1998). Recognising the potential of migrant labourers to become a source of foreign exchange income, the Sri Lankan government, in 1985, set up the Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment to regulate migrant labour flows. According to the parliamentary act it was set up under, the Bureau's main objectives are to promote foreign employment, regulate the recruitment of migrant labour, and provide welfare assistance to migrant workers (Parliament of Sri Lanka 1985). As a result, the Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment started to play a critical role in implementing government policies related to migrant labour, and its role will be discussed further in chapters five and six.

While exporting labour became ever more lucrative, governments had to contend with the growing perception that the absence of mothers who departed to work as domestics in the Middle East had adverse impacts on their children, and by extension, on the whole of society (Shaw 2010). Despite evidence of a complex relationship between migrant mothers and their children's

wellbeing, in 2013, the government enacted policies to ban mothers with children younger than five years from migrating as labourers. The government increased its focus on promoting employment abroad to young men instead of women (Shaw 2010). Thus, the opening up of the labour market in Korea came at an opportune moment for governments that wished to maintain foreign exchange inflows while appearing to combat the perceived ill effects of mothers migrating to work as domestics.

A point that lies outside the scope of this dissertation but deserves mention is how Sri Lanka's foreign exchange earnings have relied on women's labour. From British colonial times to the early 1990s, Sri Lanka's foreign exchange earnings came from the export of tea and rubber, both plantation sector industries that relied exclusively on women's labour for harvesting and processing (Samarasinghe 1998). Then, starting in the early 1990s, Sri Lankan governments promoted the setting up of garment factories that would produce clothing for export. The selling point to foreign and local investors was the availability of relatively educated but cheap and docile labour in the form of young women (Shaw 2007). 'The feminisation of Sri Lanka's foreign exchange earnings' (Samarasinghe 1998) is seldom taken seriously or discussed as contributing to its economic development. However, working women from poor and marginalised backgrounds are often discussed as either victims or sources of social problems, rarely are they credited for being the backbone of the economy.

This section's objective was to provide an overview of the history and significance of migrant labourers to the Sri Lankan state. While it appears that the labour inflows and outflows are two separate categories, they both serve to benefit the Sri Lankan state and the elite groups. Their marginal status helps ensure a supply of cheap labour for wealthier classes either in the form of plantation, factory or domestic workers. While the Sri Lankan migrant workers who

travel abroad do not work directly for Sri Lankan entities, their remittances have propped a social, economic and political structure that continues to rely on the poorest and most marginalised for its survival.

4.3: South Korea and Labour Migration

The history of Korean labour is a long one and needs to be discussed to provide some contextualisation for labour migration in South Korea. Labour struggles in Korea date back to the late Nineteenth century and the Japanese imperial period from 1910 to the Second World War (Minns 2001). The impending war largely drove the Japanese Empire's drive to industrialise Korea, which saw its industrial labour force grow from about 400,000 in the mid-1930s to more than 1.3 million by 1943. While the largest employers in Korea were Japanese corporations, they paid their Korean employees just one-third of what was paid to Japanese migrant labourers, igniting labour disputes and activism at the intersections of class and nationalist struggles (ibid).

After gaining formal independence from Japanese rule, labour unions faced repression until the early 1990s. Though their power increased soon after formal independence from the Japanese Empire, it was quickly decimated by United States military repression, the Korean war, and subsequently through the repression of South Korean authoritarian regimes. After the Japanese left, labour unions took over many factories and contracted out their managerial positions, starting a radical economic experiment. Labour unions grew substantially and formed into a National Council of Labour Unions with a membership of half a million by late 1945. However, repressions by the United States military starting around 1946 put an end to the power of organised labour. During this period, landowners and businesspeople formed the conservative Korea Democratic Party headed by Syngman Rhee, who would later become President of South Korea with the backing of the United States. The 1961 South Korean military coup and the

subsequent militarisation of industry coupled with the setting up of a federation of trade unions that was subservient to the military regime ensured that labour unions were not able to organise effectively. However, the authoritarian methods of repression had only served to drive labour organising underground. When South Korea started to relax its stranglehold on opposition activities in the 1980s, labour union action such as strikes increased to unprecedented levels. Despite the loosening of political restrictions, there were at least 1,400 political prisoners, of which half were labour activists in 1990 (Minns 2001).

It is within this context that we should examine South Korea's complex history regarding migrant labour. Starting in the early 1960s until about the late 1980s, South Korea sent migrant workers to Europe and the Middle East. However, South Korea became a receiving country for migrant labourers around 1987 due to economic and social changes that were taking place. On the economic front, a boom in the construction industry began drawing workers away from other sectors of the economy, especially from the small and medium scale industrial sector. On the social front, South Korean youth were spending more time in school, were overall wealthier than the generation before, and became more conscious of status. This left many positions in the 3-D job category unfilled. The 3-D category refers to jobs that are difficult, dirty, and dangerous. It is this labour gap that incoming migrant labourers, including those from Sri Lanka, are filling (Kim 2009; Kong, Yoon, and Yu 2010).

Initially, the South Korean government and the general public were opposed to inward migrant labour flows despite labour shortages. The South Korean opposition to migrant labour derives from general xenophobia and racism within South Korean society. Many in South Korea perceive their country as ethnically homogenous and therefore fear that an influx of foreigners would also introduce many social issues (Kim and Koo 2016). Therefore, when the government

eventually responded to increased pressure from small and medium scale business owners for foreign labourers, it did so with the express intent of privileging the perceived security of South Korean society over economic interests (Kim and Koo 2016; Kim 2009). Centring Korean ethnicity, the government initiated an Industrial Training Program in late 1991 that brought unskilled migrant labourers to work in South Korea (Kim and Koo 2016; Kong, Yoon, and Yu 2010). This program privileged the hiring of foreigners of ethnic Korean descent, mainly from China, Russia and Vietnam, though it did not entirely exclude the hiring of workers from other countries. There is a substantial Korean population in the neighbouring countries comprised of those who fled during the Japanese imperial period to escape famine and political prosecution, and in Vietnam, there are those who had been fathered by Korean soldiers fighting in the Vietnam War. With hereditary bloodlines to Korea, these foreign nationals were perceived as less of a risk to hire than ‘complete foreigners’ to fill labour shortages (ibid).

Despite this filial affiliation between the migrant labourers and the South Korean population, the ‘training’ program’s clear intent was to utilise cheap labour to benefit the small and medium scale industry. This program, emulating a migrant labour program that was in operation in Japan since 1982, brought in workers under the guise of ‘trainees’ to ensure that they had no recourse to labour rights (Kim and Koo 2016). Many migrant workers faced unfair and abusive practices at the hands of their South Korean employers but could do nothing more than leave (Kim and Koo 2016; Kim 2009; Lim 1999). Since the ‘trainees’ visa status was tied to a single employer, leaving that employer also meant that they would lose their legal status in South Korea. Poverty and helplessness would force such workers to seek employment with another South Korean employer, who would be happy to take on a foreigner with no legal status since they could be further exploited for even lower pay than they received (Kim 2009; Lim

1999). This makes it clear that while there were undoubtedly racialised preferences in hiring, class-based differences played a more dominant role, resulting in an exploitative and abusive relationship between the Koreans and the foreigners of Korean origin.

The racialised and abusive system of exploiting migrant labour did not register in the South Korean consciousness, despite human rights and civil society activism, until a group of foreign workers protested. In January of 1995, thirteen Nepalese workers engaged in a peaceful protest in front of a prominent Catholic Cathedral, a sanctuary site for anti-government protests in South Korea. The Nepalese workers held up placards that carried messages such as, “I lost three fingers on my right hand working in a factory. What will I do for the future?”, “Please don’t beat me” and “we are not slaves” (Lim 1999, 346; Kim and Koo 2016, 626). This peaceful protest did not set off a chain reaction that led to better working conditions for migrant labourers, but according to Timothy Lim (1999), what it did achieve was to humanise the migrant worker as someone who was abused and helpless, rather than being perceived as a threat to Korean society. Crucially, it showed the government that migrant workers had the collective power, should they wish to use it, to significantly disrupt the day-to-day economic life of South Korea, internationalise their problems and bring disrepute to the country as a whole (ibid).

South Korea’s government was further pressured into taking the problems of migrant workers seriously due to several other domestic and international factors. First, after the Nepali workers’ protest, it became easier for local activists to harness the help and alliance of transnational labour advocacy groups. Secondly, international human rights organisations such as Amnesty International and other groups, including Christian organisations, issued statements critical of South Korea’s treatment of its migrant workers. Thirdly, the South Korean judiciary had begun to consistently uphold the rights of migrant workers, including those considered

illegal, in cases related to employment disputes. It is clear from this evidence that the South Korean Government took action to protect migrant workers because they were concerned about the damage to the country's image as a modern leader among the community of states, rather than any genuine concern for the welfare of migrant workers (Lim 1999; Kim and Koo 2016).

The process of formulating a new program for migrant worker inflows to South Korea resulted in the enactment of the Employment Permit System in 2003 by Korea's National Assembly (Park and Kim 2016). As noted previously, the central focus in developing this new program came out of the need to reform South Korea's deteriorating image rather than genuine concern for the welfare of migrant labourers. Sookyung Kim and Jeong-Woo Koo (2016) pointed out how vital legislation, drafted and presented to the Korean Parliament by a committee of migrant advocacy groups, was systematically watered down before it was passed as an act. Initially, the bill to enact the new Employment Permit System included mention of protecting the human rights of foreign workers. However, after considerable and almost universal condemnation in the Korean National Assembly, it was amended to remove all mention of human rights and presented as a bill that simply dealt with 'manpower management' (629).

The bill's final version also reflected the Korean National Assembly's xenophobic fears that migrant workers may stay on and become citizens of South Korea. Therefore, the parliament was careful to make revisions that limited the period of time workers could remain continuously in South Korea to less than five years. A five year residence period within the country is one of the requirements to naturalize as a South Korean citizen. The bill also included two articles that appeared to promote the principle of equality but were practically intended to privilege workers of Korean descent and discriminate against foreign workers in general. One of the articles allowed foreigners of Korean origin to work, even if they were not in the country on work visas,

a privilege not extended to foreigners of non-Korean origin. Another article that appeared to prevent employers from discriminating against workers based on nationality was designed to be practically unenforceable. The minister presenting the bill assured the South Korean National Assembly members that though the law was written a particular way, the enforcement orders that define how the law would be operationalised would, in fact, enable discriminatory practices. Therefore, there must be no doubt that the Korean Government's true intentions in implementing these changes were to ensure the continued supply of labour to Korean businesses while ensuring that the law did not allow migrant labourers to organise themselves in collective action. Therefore, despite the welcome changes in South Korean migrant labour laws, it continues to dehumanise migrant labourers and reduces them to a factor of production organised under capitalist and racist principles (Kim and Koo 2016).

However, this is not to say that migrant labourers have not benefitted from some limited protections accorded through the Employment Permit System. One of the major improvements implemented through the Employment Permit System, starting in 2004, was defining work hours, overtime, and holidays (Cho et al. 2018). Another advantage to migrant workers is the reduced cost of pre-departure preparation due to the transparency of the process and the fact that it is handled between government agencies of both countries (Cho et al. 2018; Park and Kim 2016; Kim 2015). The fact that migrant labourers fall under some regulations and insurance schemes that govern domestic workers provides a safety net that was not available under the previous migrant labour programs (ibid).

This section showed South Korea's inverse transformation to Sri Lanka, that is, from a labour sending state to a labour receiving state. Like Sri Lanka, South Korea has continued to marginalise migrant workers while utilising them for the benefit of capital owning classes.

However, South Korea is concerned about its image on the world stage and has promoted itself as a progressive state that treats its migrant workers well, though it is not necessarily concerned with their wellbeing. The next section will first trace the process of hiring migrant workers in South Korea in principle and then offer some insights from the experiences of fieldwork participants.

4.4: Systematising Inward Labour Migration - The Employment Permit System

After the passage of the relevant act, the Employment Permit System came into operation in 2004. One of its advantages is that there is just one process that prospective migrant labourers from each of the sixteen sending countries follow in order to get to South Korea (Human Resources Development Service of Korea n.d.; Park and Kim 2016). The process for the prospective migrant labourers can be set out sequentially.

In principle, it is a straightforward one for both the prospective employer and migrant worker. On the migrant workers' side, it starts with the enrolment for a Korean language test, TOPIK, which prospective migrants have to pass together with a medical test before they are placed in a labour pool. Additionally, prospective migrant labourers can take a skills test that involves performing tasks using tools and machinery, a one-minute interview, and a physical test. On the other side, Korean employers must also qualify to hire foreign workers by showing that they are unable to hire Korean nationals for the jobs being advertised and fulfil several other requirements set out by the government. Qualified Korean employers then approach Job Centres, which are run by an agency under the Ministry of Employment and Labour, that are located across the country and provide details of their workforce requirements and the preferred nationality of workers they wish to hire. The Job Centre then matches the employers' requirements to the workers in the labour pool and provides the employer with a list of three

candidates for each job vacancy, along with some of their details and the video of the skills test, so that the employer can assess the workers' competency, demeanour and Korean language ability. The employer is required to provide a detailed contract which is sent through the Job Centre to the Government agency in the sending country that coordinates the Employment Permit System. This concludes the first part of the selection process, where the prospective migrant worker is offered a detailed contract of employment which they can choose to sign or refuse (Cho et al. 2018).

The second part of the recruitment process starts once a prospective worker signs a contract. Migrant workers who sign a contract are required to purchase an airline ticket, apply for their visas, purchase repatriation cost insurance, and sign up for health and industrial accident insurance. While the migrant workers have to complete, sign and submit the required paperwork, the process of submitting visa applications to the Korean Embassy, purchasing airline tickets and insurance are completed by the coordinating government agency in the sending country. In the case of Sri Lanka, this is performed by the Sri Lanka Foreign Employment Bureau. The government agency in the sending country also conducts another training program that covers Korean culture, language, workplace safety and other relevant details. Once the migrant workers actually arrive in Korea, they are required to report immediately for a three-day orientation program conducted by Human Resource Development Services, an agency of the Korean Government. Finally, the Korean employers arrive on the third day to take charge of their new migrant labourers from the Human Resource Development Agency. This ends the initial government controlled process of recruitment and training for migrant workers, though subsequent checks are supposed to be carried out by government agencies to monitor the status of workers who enter the country (Cho et al. 2018).

While this process involves several transparent steps that are seemingly set up with the intention of protecting the workers and their interests, the reality for the workers can be different. The first step itself, learning Korean, can be a substantial challenge and expense for some prospective workers. This is especially so because there is no guarantee that their ‘investment’ will be rewarded with employment in Korea. For example, a comprehensive report by the World Bank states that in 2015, 60,000 individuals sat the Korean language test, but only about 3,000 found jobs in Korea (Cho et al. 2018, 41). For successful candidates, the time, money and energy required to complete the other requirements such as the medical and skills test can be considerable. For example, during one interview, participant #22, who lives approximately 100 kilometres away from Sri Lanka’s capital, Colombo, a four to five-hour one-way journey by bus, described how he had to make multiple trips to Colombo on consecutive days. Sometimes, bus journeys in Sri Lanka may involve standing all the way in crowded busses with little or no elbow room. Therefore, the participant’s experience should be understood within that context and not that of inter-city travel in Ontario, which in relative terms is luxurious. He specifically mentioned how one day, he left home at 3 am to go to Colombo for his police clearance certificate, stood in line to complete all the paperwork related to it and then returned home at 9 pm. During that day, he ate very little in Colombo since he was concerned about how the food may impact his medical exam scheduled for the next day. He was concerned that the oily food sold in most small tea shops and restaurants that he found affordable may negatively impact his medical test ratings. As a result, he consumed porridge as soon as he got home after applying for his police clearance and remained fasting until the medical exam the next day. He left again early the next morning at 3 am for Colombo to complete his medical test. This information was derived from participant #22’s answer to a follow-up question I asked, “Right, so when you hand over your passport to

the [Sri Lanka Foreign Employment] Bureau, the Bureau takes care of the visa and everything else?”. His immediate response was, “no, no, it is not as if they just do it for us. We have to suffer a great deal”. The basic idea that he wanted me to understand was that while this was a well laid out process on paper, there were many problems and hardships that had to be negotiated during this process. Participant #22’s opinion was that the Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment could have been more thoughtful in organising the application process for prospective workers since they know that many travel far distances to reach Colombo.

All the Sri Lankan migrant workers who participated in this project went to South Korea under the Employment Permit System. The next section offers the story of one such participant, who faced a very different reality to the one set out in principle.

4.5: A Migrant Worker’s Employment Permit System Story

The Employment Permit System is commended by international organisations such as the International Labour Organisation for its transparency over labour contracts (Kim 2015). While this may be true for some workers, the experiences of other workers show that this may be a more self-congratulatory illusion that officials blind themselves to. All labour contracts have to be presented by the prospective employer to the Job Centres and should include information regarding working hours with daily start and end times, working conditions, the provision or non-provision of meals and accommodation, holidays, overtime and anything else that is covered by Korean labour laws (Cho et al. 2018; Kim 2015). The contract offered is examined by both the Korean Government agency and an agency of the labour sending country’s government to ensure compliance with the law. The coordinating government agency in the sending country is then required to explain the terms of the contract to the prospective migrant worker before they

sign. However, this process does not always ensure that the workers will actually be working under the conditions stipulated in the agreement.

One of the participants, #23, showed me a contract written in Korean with English language translations that stipulated his workday in the coastal fishing industry would be from 7 am to 4 pm with a 60-minute break for meals. Participant #23, who did masonry work with his father in their village, located about 6-7 hours away from the capital Colombo, described the reality he faced after his employer took charge of him from the Human Resource Development office. I do not intend to present participant #23's account as representing all Sri Lankan migrant labourers' experience in South Korea. However, his story provides a window into the human experience and emotions that migrant labourers face when the reality they encounter differs from what is set out by the Employment Permit System process.

Participant #23 invited me to listen to his story and ask questions on his weekly day off from work, and while he spoke, he took the trouble to cook for me what is popularly considered a welcoming and auspicious breakfast in Sri Lanka. I have chosen to present a part of his narrative in what may seem to be an exceptionally long direct quote. However, I chose to present it thus, in order to allow his voice to be read as far as possible, mainly because he was eager that I hear it and tell it. His narration was not an answer to a question I put forward but something he wanted to share. It is not my intention to claim, in any way, that I am presenting his 'authentic' voice since it has been coloured by the framing of this chapter, the larger dissertation project and my English translation of his Sinhala. To ensure a smoother read, I have edited out several intermittent interjections I made to acknowledge my shock and interest as he narrated his story. I have also included brief explanations within square brackets to provide context and clarity for some of the pronouns he uses. I offer some comments at the end of participant #23's narration.

His story starts when his employer, a South Korean fisherman who owns a fishing trawler, picks him up after completing the mandatory three-day training at a Human Resource Development Service centre:

I came directly into fisheries, but it was impossible to work there. He [employer] came and dropped me [to my living quarters]. The next day, early morning, I was wearing this exact same sarong [pointing to the long cloth garment he was wearing around his waist], he came and called me. The contract said that I was to work from 8 am to 5 pm [sic], but he called me at about 3:30 in the morning. I got up and went. He told me to put on a shirt and trousers and come with him, so I did. Then he got into a truck, and I followed, he drove straight to a pier, and we got on to a fishing boat. It was raining heavily, and there was a thunderstorm that morning. I had just arrived there. I was really angry, but there was nothing I could do. I came here because I had no money. I decided to go ahead and see what would happen. We spent four days out at sea. I spent all *four* days out at sea in the same clothes and underwear I had on. I could not shower or brush my teeth. I had everything, the toothpaste and toothbrushes, but I had not taken them with me to the boat since I had no idea that I would be going out to sea that day. There was another guy from another country on the boat, and he had everything he needed in a little satchel. I did not take anything because I was not told anything. It was my first day there.

So afterwards, they started to train me. I could not understand anything that was being said. I have never done a fishing job in my life. I had never been on a boat before, and this was a big boat. I did not eat for three days because I did not want to take a shit. You have to take a shit directly into the ocean through an opening in the boat. So, I never took a shit during the sea voyage, and I somehow held it in. I was also extremely shy since I was new. Now, of course, I do not care at all; I am game for anything. Anyway, in the evenings, all the boats dock on an island in the middle of the sea, so did we. Then they ate, I did not; I always gave one excuse after another not to eat. They kept inviting me to eat and drink liquor. They [employer and Koreans in general] were very good. However, when working, they shout and curse at you, but they are very good after finishing work. They put a cigarette in my mouth, lighted it for me, gave me a beer, really nice.

On the final day, he [employer] was saying something, and I did not understand. Due to my fault, several fishing nets got torn that day. You see, we must unroll the nets in a systematic manner as we sail. You have to do it really fast because the boat is moving. Somehow a net got tangled because I was too slow and clumsy, and it started to tear. The fellow [employer] came towards me like a devil; it is fair that he got angry because it is a loss for him, and he kicked me. He shouted, saying that I was told how to do the job, and he held his head in his hands....

Now, when we roll up the net, sometimes there are giant crabs caught in it, and we have to remove them. So, to remove them from the net, you have to hold them in a particular way and snap off their limbs and then throw them back to the sea. I just could not bring myself to do it; I really could not. How can you break an animal's limbs and throw them back to the sea? I said I could not do it and just sat down. I also felt scared

that he might just throw me out to sea, so then I said, ok, I will do it. However, I did not do it with much enthusiasm. You see, you have to do it really fast. How can you break limbs off animals? You tell me. They also have to live, right? He [employer] taught me [how to break off the claws], and I did it without much enthusiasm. Not because I could not work, but because I just could not bring myself to do that job. Then he came near me, and you know there are those hammers with rubber heads; he hit me on the head with one of those. Yes, he hit me on the head; I am telling you the truth, ok? Right at that moment, I remembered Sri Lanka; I thought to myself, what have I gotten myself into? At that time, I had borrowed 300,000 Rupees in Sri Lanka to buy this and that for my journey. I decided there and then that this would be the only trip I go on with him [employer], no matter whether I get caught or not [to law enforcement]. Then I just sat down and cried. Even though we cry, their [Korean employers] hearts do not soften.

If it were to go to sea in the morning and come back in the evening, as some fishing boats do, then there is no problem. [Then] we can speak with our family. All this was just as I came, no? The people at home were worried. I mean, I had not gotten a phone during the first few days. If there was a week or two, then I could have bought a SIM and arranged the living quarters a bit. I mean, once we begin to detest something, it becomes something that we can't stand.

This account of how a newly arrived migrant labourer navigated their first few days of work and engagement with Koreans outside of the carefully laid out government plans offered an insight into their emotions and lived experiences. Their feelings of alienation, anxiety, fear and desperation are captured at various points in Participant #23's narration. Participant #23 had just left behind his wife, who was pregnant with their first child, his parents, and other family members in a remote Sri Lankan village. As he explained in a later conversation, poverty and the threat of going back in a worse off financial situation played a significant role in motivating his continued stay in Korea and his submissiveness, though short-lived, to abuse by his first employer. The Korean Government's presentation of the Employment Permit System as a neat linear process that takes workers through a transparent and safe process does not capture in any essence the many challenges that migrant labourers face on the ground in their new location.

The Employment Permit System can sometimes hold a migrant labourer hostage to his employer. According to the law, workers need to obtain a 'release letter' from their employer if

they wish to leave their employment and remain legal within South Korea's visa regime. A worker who chooses to abandon his workplace automatically becomes classified as *pulgup*, a term that, in effect, means illegal foreigner in South Korea. When participant #23 ran away from his employer on the night they reached shore, his legal status in South Korea became one of an illegal foreign worker or *pulgup*. After running away, participant #23 managed to secure a SIM card and get in contact with a few other Sri Lankans who guided him to their location in the interior of the country. Because participant #23 left without obtaining a release letter from his employer, he is at risk of being deported if discovered by South Korean authorities and has no access to free health care, something that he was initially insured for. He has continued to work as a *pulgup*, carefully avoiding any entanglement with authorities. His wages, holidays and other rights are negotiated between him and his new employers, with no protection from the law.

However, participant #23 by no means can be reduced to a victim of the system; neither is he an example of someone who successfully resisted and overcame the systemic disadvantages against migrant labourers. Participant #23 provides an example of how migrant labourers face and engage with the daily challenges of working in South Korea. He has successfully coordinated the setting up of a small-scale manufacturing and distribution business in Sri Lanka during this time. His wife and father-in-law run the business that now employs more than ten workers, and they own at least two small transport trucks for distributing their manufactured produce. This is a significant achievement for someone who had to borrow money to pay for the process to come to South Korea. Participant #23, however, still works as a *pulgup* in South Korea, having moved to a different employer recently than where I met him. He now works as a machine operator in a small junkyard, hesitant to go back to Sri Lanka because of the economic uncertainty of the post-COVID world. He can still make much more money in South Korea than

if he were to go back to Sri Lanka. Therefore, he remains in South Korea, conscious of the risks and challenges of remaining or leaving.

4.6: Conclusion

While there were several various topics covered in this chapter, it intended to provide an overview of the broader structural conditions that result in Sri Lankan migrant workers travelling to South Korea. It also examined the recruitment process for foreign workers in South Korea and contrasted it with the actual experiences of a few participants.

While colonialism had a significant impact in shaping the economic and social structure of Sri Lanka, formal independence did not bring about meaningful changes to those in marginalised groups. For the plantation workers who descended from South India, formal independence brought with it even greater marginalisation when they were made stateless. This community continues to be marginalised and othered in Sri Lanka, making them in some ways similar to the Sri Lankan migrant workers abroad.

Women have constituted a significant proportion of the migrant worker population, and their economic contributions encouraged the Sri Lankan state to promote foreign employment actively. Despite their economic contribution, female migrant workers are often criminalised for leaving behind their children and accused of increasing social costs. While women still travel abroad as migrant workers, increasing state and public attention has focused on the young men who travel to South Korea. This has served to divert attention away from the perceived negative impacts of foreign employment.

Despite the economic need for foreign labourers, South Korea resisted opening their borders to foreign workers on racist and xenophobic grounds. However, they first opened the

labour market for foreigners of Korean origin and later expanded it to cover several other nationalities. To this day, South Korea carefully controls the admission of foreign workers based on nationality, limiting them to citizens of countries with whom they enter into bilateral labour agreements.

The bilateral labour agreements are signed in order to govern each step of the hiring process. The Employment Permit System, as it is known, has been projected as a transparent process that has the benefit of the worker at heart. However, while there are certain benefits from the program, its practical application does not reflect the same level of perfection publicised by the South Korean Government. The story of the Sri Lankan migrant worker who arrived in South Korea expecting to work well defined hours in an inland fishery, only to find that he was on board a multi-day fishing trawler in high seas, provides an example of how the system differs in principle and its practical application.

Though beyond this dissertation's scope, this chapter also indicates that the descendants of South Indian plantation workers, female migrant domestic workers in the Middle East and the predominantly Sinhala male migrant workers in South Korea share class-based solidarity in their marginalised positions. However, their solidarity is made impossible by perceived differences in race and gender.

Chapter 5: Other Diplomacies of Sri Lankan Workers in South Korea

5.1: Introduction

The previous chapters of this dissertation have laid the foundations for this chapter and the following one. They did so by establishing the theoretical framework for Other Diplomacies in the first two chapters. After which, the third chapter discussed how research into the Other Diplomacies of Sri Lankan workers in South Korea was carried out. Finally, the previous chapter provided a wider historical and political context for the migrant workers' presence in South Korea. These foundations provide the theoretical, historical and political basis for this chapter to examine how Sri Lankan migrant workers in South Korea engage in Other Diplomacies.

I follow the operational and normative definitions of Other Diplomacies set out in the second chapter when answering this question. This chapter examines the interactions between Sri Lankan migrant workers and their South Korean interlocutors to argue that the former engages in Other Diplomacies. While Young and Henders (2012) identify two aspects of Other Diplomacies, namely, its representative and rule-making aspect, I focus on the representative aspect in this dissertation. When doing so, as mentioned in the second chapter, I limit my examination of Other Diplomacies to those practices where the participants are conscious of their own identities or the identities of others. Not only do the Sri Lankan migrant workers consciously represent themselves to South Koreans, but they also consciously interpret representations of South Korea. Thus, identities are mutually constructed through one's own representations and by interpreting the representations of others (Young and Henders 2012).

As mentioned in the second chapter, Other Diplomacies refers to the everyday interactions between societal non-state actors as they mediate consciously across boundaries of difference. I engaged in in-depth conversations with Sri Lankan migrant workers, graduate

students, community leaders, and a few South Korean nationals in capturing the Other Diplomacies of the migrant workers. While I extensively discussed my relationship with Sri Lankan migrant workers in the third chapter, I did not outline my interactions with South Korean participants. As mentioned in the third chapter, the language barrier was difficult to overcome. Except for one interview, all interviews and discussions with South Koreans happened in the presence of Sri Lankan migrant workers. I often relied on the migrant workers to translate for me or used Google Translate. Therefore, I was not able to establish with South Koreans a level of rapport close to what I had with the Sri Lankan participants. Therefore, I have used my conversations with South Korean nationals sparingly and, in the few instances that I do use them, have done so careful not to extrapolate and interpret their meanings too far. I have, however, made use of a few conversations I had with community leaders and Sri Lankan graduate students to contextualise and help make sense of certain puzzles. While conversations with other groups helped illuminate several aspects of the Other Diplomacies of migrant workers, the chapter's central focus remains the experience and interactions of Sri Lankan migrant workers in South Korea.

In addition to the operational definition, this chapter must be framed within the normative definitions of Other Diplomacies that I set out in the second chapter. Firstly, given that one of the vital aspects of Other Diplomacies is centring societal non-state actors (Young and Henders 2012; Henders and Young 2016), I focus on Sri Lankan migrant workers in South Korea. The concerns of states are not taken into account, decentring them to the background. Secondly, through its societal non-state-centric focus, the chapter captures the use of diplomatic skills in mediating relations between people (Marsden, Ibañez-Tirado, and Henig 2016) that are traditionally excluded from consideration in mainstream studies of diplomacy (Beier and Wylie

2010b). Thirdly, I highlight the power hierarchies linked to race, class, and gender (Young and Henders 2012) when examining the Other Diplomacies of the Sri Lankan workers in South Korea. This aligns the current chapter with the operational and normative definitions set out in the second one.

I begin this chapter with a brief outline of the inter-state bilateral relationship between Sri Lanka and South Korea. The focus of the section is to show how migrant workers are marginalised in the framing of the bilateral relationship though they form a significant part of it. The second section shows how Sri Lankan migrant workers first consciously encounter South Korea. This section shows that many of them identified South Korea as a wealthy country, in line with the statist identifications framed around international economics outlined in chapter four. However, it also points to how the increasing popularity of South Korean film and television series also provided ways through which prospective Sri Lankan migrant workers formed perceptions of South Korean identity. The next section deals with how the singular narrative of a simple identity gets unsettled after the workers arrive in South Korea. Their actual everyday experiences disturb the singular identity of the country, revealing the more complex hierarchical relationships that have to be navigated. The fourth section shows how the Sri Lankan migrant workers consciously strategise to mediate their identities to achieve various objectives. The final two sections contextualise explicitly the power hierarchies linked to class, race and gender that the migrants navigate. Though the class, race and gendered aspects cannot be neatly separated, I have separated them to engage with them more clearly.

5.2: Sri Lanka – South Korea Bilateral Relations: Marginalising Sri Lankan Migrant Workers

The Sri Lanka-South Korea bilateral relationship was nothing much to speak of before the two countries signed the bilateral labour agreement. Official bilateral diplomatic relations

between the two states started in November 1977 (Embassy of Sri Lanka 2016a), forty-four years ago, but contained little substance. During the first twenty-five years of the official relationship, there were only ten high-level meetings between government representatives of both countries (Embassy of Sri Lanka 2016b). However, during the next twenty years, the start of which coincides with the signing of the bilateral agreement on labour in 2004, there have been over one hundred official diplomatic meetings between the governments of the two countries (Embassy of Sri Lanka 2016b). While there may be several reasons for the increased intensity of state-level bilateral relations, it is impossible to ignore the role of the approximately 30,000 Sri Lankan migrant workers in South Korea (Embassy of Sri Lanka 2016a).

Despite the significant role the migrant labourers play in the economies of both countries, they have received relatively little attention within the framing of the inter-state relationship. The previous chapter already discussed the importance of migrant labourers in terms of being a source of foreign exchange income for Sri Lanka and a production factor that keeps small and medium scale industries in South Korea economically viable. However, in the public sphere, the two countries do not pay much attention to migrant workers. For example, a statement by the Sri Lankan Embassy in Seoul on the relationship between the two countries devotes only one sentence to migrant labourers, which is placed towards the end of the text, coming after discussions on high-level political visits, trade, foreign direct investment, tourism, and development aid (Embassy of Sri Lanka 2016a). Despite the prominence given to economic relations through the official government statement, an examination of South Korean – Sri Lankan trade, tourism, and investment statistics do not show such ties to be significant. Central Bank of Sri Lanka annual reports (2005; 2009; 2013; 2017; 2021) clearly show that trade with South Korea constituted less than 2%, Foreign Direct Investment inflows and stocks were well

behind even countries like Canada, Malaysia, and Italy, not to mention those of the largest source countries, China and India. Tourist arrivals from South Korea do not even make it into the statistical records where the major source destinations are India and China (ibid). The statement also frames the Sri Lanka – South Korea relationship as a historical one based on their shared regional (Asian) and religious (Buddhist) ties (Embassy of Sri Lanka 2016a), though Sri Lanka's Buddhist history has been traced within the South and Southeast Asian region (Keyes 2016) and never with East Asia. The only part of the government statement that can be recognised as being somewhat accurate is to be found in its closing sentences that mention close cooperation in the areas of academia, science and technology, defence, and cultural relations (Embassy of Sri Lanka 2016a) since the South Korean Government appears to be funding scholarships for Sri Lankan graduate students. While the Sri Lankan Government seems keen to point out the higher-order ties to South Korea, the one-sentence mention of migrant labour appears to almost be an embarrassment in the diplomatic relationship. In a similar vein to its Sri Lankan counterpart, the South Korean Government focuses on traditional topics such as politics, trade, development assistance, education, and culture in their section on bilateral relations (Embassy of the Republic of Korea 2020), paying the minimum possible attention to migrant workers.

A traditional Diplomatic Studies approach to the bilateral relationship would require us to take a state-centric approach. As shown in the first chapter, Diplomatic Studies has remained focused on states and their accredited agents, focusing on their interests and problems. Such a state-centric approach would focus on the material benefits and costs of the bilateral relationship that accrue to the states, which, for Sri Lanka, means a steady inflow into its foreign currency reserves. On the other hand, for South Korea, it contributes to filling their gap in the supply of labour for dirty, difficult and dangerous jobs in the small and medium scale industries. Another

way to study the bilateral relationship would be to take a Public Diplomacy approach to inter-state relations, which would involve examining how the migrant labourers can be exploited as tools to increase the soft power of both states. Such an approach would, at the very least, argue that representative practices of migrant labourers must be taken into account because they impact the identity of the state; said differently, the migrant labour matters only for what they mean to the state. Both these traditional approaches essentially reduce migrant labourers to objects or tools within the bilateral relationship rather than taking them seriously and as a central concern of the literature, even though they are constitutive of the official relationship.

The following sections leave behind this statist approach and adopt an Other Diplomacies approach that centres on the Sri Lankan migrant labourers as they represent themselves and simultaneously interpret and make sense of the South Koreans' conscious and unconscious representations.

5.3: Imagining South Korea

Sri Lankan migrant workers arrive in South Korea with some perception of South Korean identity. It was clear from conversations with participants that many of them had developed perceptions about South Korean identity well before they arrived in the country. Many of them said that they began to consciously think of South Korea and form perceptions about it after hearing accounts from family and friends who worked there or knew someone who worked there. In addition to this, a few participants had encountered and formed perceptions based on South Korean television series that ran on local channels. Many migrant workers developed initial perceptions of South Korea as a wealthy, peaceful, and modern country from these sources.

The most frequent and impactful perceptions of South Korean identity appeared to be formed through the accounts of returning migrant workers. Participant #4's story is instructive of this situation. Participant #4, a twenty-two-year-old from a coastal village in East Sri Lanka, explained how the economic success of a fellow villager who returned from South Korea provided a basis for his first perceptions of the country and motivated him to come and work there. According to Participant #4, the fellow villager who worked in South Korea had been poor and with little economic prospects for the future, very much like himself. However, after returning from South Korea, the villager had sufficient savings to start a fuel supply business for boats that docked in a nearby harbour. Perseverance and the right contacts had allowed the villager to expand his fuel supply business so that he was now one of the richest men in not just the village but the whole district. For participant #41, himself a twenty-two-year-old boy from a low-income family, observing first-hand how a fellow villager's economic circumstances were transformed completely from 'rags to riches' not only motivated him to migrate to South Korea for work but also defined what South Korea was perceived to be. Participant #41 was concerned about South Korea only so far as it was a destination for acquiring wealth; this translated into the uncomplicated and straightforward perception of South Korean identity as a wealthy country. Many other migrant workers I spoke to shared participant #41's experience of encountering South Korea through first-hand and third-hand accounts before they started the migration process. The only difference was that instead of hearing and seeing first-hand how returning migrants could transform their circumstances, some of them had heard third-hand accounts of the transformative potential that a labour stint in South Korea held. Said differently, South Korea was identified as a destination that could transform their material wealth and social standing.

Additionally, South Korea was perceived as also a civilised and modern society. While stories from returning migrants also helped form such perceptions, some participants pointed out that they had first encountered South Korea through social media and television. For instance, participant #22 said he had developed an interest in South Korea because of a particular television serial on a local channel. According to him, the television series helped create an impression that South Korea was also a land of feminine women, honourable men, and stunning scenery. Participant #11, the Christian pastor, and participant #28, a migrant worker, shared similar sentiments when I asked them what motivated Sri Lankan migrant workers to work in South Korea. They said that while economic reasons are paramount, some migrant workers wanted to have the experience of travelling to South Korea. The pastor, providing a further explanation, said that they had met several migrant workers who had arrived in South Korea because of perceptions formed through social media posts and television series. Social media posts of cherry blossoms in spring, picturesque snowfalls, and bright city lights coupled with the romanticised depictions of South Korean life in television series formed perceptions of the country that many prospective migrant workers found attractive.

However, none of the participants suggested that they were solely motivated to work in South Korea for the novel experience. The romanticised perception of South Korea was synchronous with and served to strengthen the perception of South Korea as a wealthy country.

South Korea's identity as a destination of wealth capable of fundamentally transforming one's economic condition is often reinforced by those wishing to exploit it for profit. As mentioned in the fourth chapter, there are private individuals and organisations, all across the sixteen sending countries, which offer Korean language tuition classes for those taking the compulsory language test (Cho et al. 2018). Korean language training schools in Sri Lanka

advertise their expertise in training students for the test and promote South Korea as a destination that pays high salaries to migrant workers to attract as many students as possible. One of the participant's, #28, elaborated on the issue better than many others. He pointed out that many Sri Lankan migrant workers who recently arrived in South Korea had extremely high expectations of making large sums of money, a perception that was created by the Korean language tuition industry. According to him, some advertisements he had seen claimed that migrant labourers could earn 400,000 Rupees a month, which is the equivalent of approximately 3,000 Canadian Dollars. To provide some context to these numbers, the mean per capita income per month in Sri Lanka is less than 20,000 Rupees or under 150 Canadian Dollars (Department of Census and Statistics 2018). However, participant #28, who was working in South Korea along with his wife for more than three years, argued that it was impossible to earn 400,000 Rupees for every month worked in South Korea. Monthly salaries often range between 250,000 to 300,000 Rupees for most migrant labourers. Those working in extremely busy factories may be able to earn more during peak seasons due to the availability of a lot of overtime work, which are usually limited to a couple of months each year. The gist of what participant #28 said was that the perception of South Korea as a destination for enrichment was somewhat misleading. He explained that though migrant workers are able to earn significant levels of income, much more than they would if they remained in Sri Lanka, their expectation of earning levels was not realistic. Therefore, the initial perception of South Korea as a wealthy country that promised to change one's own circumstances became unsettled soon after arriving.

5.4: Unsettling South Korea

The unsettling of the South Korean identity has severe and immediate perceptual and material consequences for both Sri Lankan migrant labourers and their South Korean employers.

While our focus in this chapter is on Sri Lankan migrant labourers, their South Korean employers also have a significant role to play since each other's identities are mutually constituted (Young and Henders 2012). Speaking with two Sri Lankan community leaders, participants #11 and #12, it became clear that they were concerned by how identities were mutually constituted through interactions and representative practices. They were concerned with how the migrant workers behaviour had the potential to impact the wider community that fell under the category of Sri Lankan migrant workers.

Participant #12 passionately spoke about the problems associated with representational practices that reflected on the whole community identified as Sri Lankan migrant workers. According to him, when some workers realised that they could not earn and save as much money as they anticipated, they begin to look for new jobs with better pay or get demotivated and work as little as possible. Participant #12 is a long term Sri Lankan resident of South Korea who had been there since the mid-1980s. He too, first arrived as a migrant worker but was now officially working as a translator for the South Korean Government in labour matters. He has built his image as a community leader among the Sri Lankan migrant labourers in the Seoul region. He was quite passionate when he offered the following account of how Sri Lankan migrant labourers react to the unsettling of their perceptions of South Korea:

These fellows [Sri Lankan migrant workers] come here expecting the moon and the stars [high earnings], and when they realise that they cannot achieve it, they leave their workplace looking for better pay. So, imagine the situation of the employer, he has spent his money and energy to bring down a worker from Sri Lanka, and that fellow leaves after getting his first month's salary. Will he [South Korean employer] ever hire another Sri Lankan? Then there are some fellows [Sri Lankan migrant labourers] who, if their shift starts at 8, get up at 7:55. The fellow then brushes his teeth, washes his face, eats and goes to the toilet on company time!

As participant #12 pointed out, this practice becomes problematic because it represents Sri Lankan migrant labourers as unreliable.

Participant#11, a Sri Lankan pastor who worked with Sri Lankan migrant labourers, shared these very same sentiments. Both these participants, who dealt with the problems of Sri Lankan migrant labourers daily, were concerned about the spread of negative perceptions of Sri Lankan migrant workers because they feared it would mean South Korean employers are less likely to request Sri Lankan labourers under the Employment Permit System. As mentioned in chapter four, South Korean employers must define the nationality of the workers they wish to hire when applying for foreign workers through the employment offices. Thus, individual perceptions and representative practices of societal non-state actors matter for the broader category. An important point about Participant #12's concern was that the image of Sri Lankan migrant workers was inextricably linked to how they were perceived by the other, in this case, their South Korean employers. Therefore, the perceptions of South Korean employers were what mattered to participant #12, resulting in his critique of migrant labourer behaviour.

Further exploration into this question revealed at least three broad categories of responses. The three different responses show how different societal non-state actors choose to approach it. The first category of response takes an approach that is very similar to a citizen-diplomacy approach in its treatment of migrant labourers as impacting the state. For example, participant #12 responded to the problem by lobbying the Sri Lankan state to educate prospective migrant labourers about their representative role and its consequences. During his more than 30 years of social work in South Korea, Participant #12 had established himself as a community leader and thereby made connections with the Sri Lankan Embassy in Seoul, officials of the Sri Lanka Foreign Employment Bureau, and a few prominent leftist members of Sri Lanka's parliament. He claimed that negative perceptions of Sri Lankan migrant labourers had directly contributed to less than 500 new hires in 2018, while that year's approved quota for Sri Lankan

labourers was 3,600. Participant #12's argument was that the Sri Lankan Government should be concerned about the reducing demand for Sri Lankan migrant labourers because it meant fewer opportunities for new prospective migrant workers, lower foreign exchange income for the country, and an overall rise in unemployment. He strongly felt that the Sri Lankan Government should be proactively 'educating' the workers about their potential role as representatives of the country before they depart for South Korea. Though the representative practices involved occurred in the private sphere, participant#12 made the case that it mattered to the state.

This approach does not necessarily argue that the state should intervene in order to defend or promote its soft power objectives, as would be the case for a Public Diplomacy intervention. However, participant #12's approach relegates the migrant workers to a sub-political level (Franke 2009), assigning a student-teacher or adult-child relationship between the Sri Lankan state and Sri Lankan migrant workers. However, as far as this dissertation is concerned, participant #12's concerns crucially point to how South Korean employers' perceptions of individual Sri Lankan workers matter to the wider category.

5.5: Other Diplomacies in Action

The second approach we are about to examine takes a different view from the first by focusing more closely on each individual case. Here we describe how participant #11, a Christian pastor from Sri Lanka, deals with the problem of convincing a South Korean employer to issue a 'release letter' for a migrant worker who has already abandoned work. Foreign workers have to obtain letters of release from their employer before leaving their current employer under the Employment Permit System. Failure to obtain a release letter means that the migrant workers automatically lose their legal status to remain and work in South Korea. Therefore, obtaining a release letter for migrant workers who already abandoned their work becomes a process that

must be skillfully negotiated with the employer. The following discussions will show that participant #11 herself engages in Other Diplomacies as she mediates across identities when negotiating with South Korean employers. Additionally, unlike participant #12, who sees the problem as one that can be resolved through state intervention, for participant #11, it is a problem that must be seen in a broader social context but negotiated at a personal level.

Participant #11, the Christian pastor, employs diplomatic skills similar to those of the Afghan traders (Marsden 2016) and Kyrgyz migrant workers (Reeves 2016) referenced in chapter two in negotiating the issue of a release letter. The use of tact and the ability to co-opt identities are central to participant #11's theatrical performance in dealing with *sajanims* (business owners). Participant #11 would swap her street clothes for the formal religious attire of a Christian nun before visiting the *sajanim* with the Sri Lankan migrant worker who had left work. According to her and several other participants, Christian religious workers occupy a respected position in South Korean society. Additionally, as two experienced migrant workers, participants #24 and #28, explained, *sajanims* are not fully aware of the legal framework within which they hire and retain migrant workers. However, the Christian pastors and religious workers take the trouble to be informed about labour regulations and therefore have the upper hand in defining the terms in which the negotiation between themselves and the *sajanims* occur. The result being that participant #11's Christian nun's costume confers not only authority and respect in the eyes of the *sajanim* but also a sense of fear.

Participant #11 described her strategy in dealing with employers as a theatrical performance. The first part of participant #11's theatrical performance involves praising the *sajanim* for the gracious deed of hiring a poor Sri Lankan and berating the Sri Lankan migrant worker for having abandoned his work post. Act two involves pointing out to the *sajanim* the

dangers of keeping on an unhappy employee. Participant #11 said she stresses how it risks lowering productivity levels, and secondly, the possibility that continuing to retain an unhappy worker could also be detrimental to the workflow of the rest of his employees. She then alludes to the more dangerous legal implications if the worker's absence comes to the notice of South Korean immigration authorities. Here she is referring to the fact *sajanims* risk being blacklisted and their permission to hire foreign workers rescinded if it is found that there is a pattern of foreign workers abandoning his company. Participant #11 admitted that cases of blacklisted employers are rare but that it is a negotiating tactic she uses to get the upper hand. *Sajanims* in the small and medium scale industries are often reliant on foreign workers to fill their vacancies for dirty, difficult, and dangerous jobs and do not want to be blacklisted, according to her. By the end of act two, Participant #11 claims that she can generally secure the *sajanims* consent for a release letter. However, before departing, participant #11 berates the Sri Lankan worker once again in front of the *sajanim* and tries to convince him not to generalise this unpleasant experience as representative of all Sri Lankan migrant workers. She then tells the *sajanim* it is the hot-headedness of youth that is to blame for this experience and that an older and more mature Sri Lankan would have provided a very different experience. Participant #11 said she performs the final act as an attempt to salvage the image of Sri Lankan migrant workers so that the *sajanim* will not be averse to hiring Sri Lankans in the future. Participant #11, though not a migrant worker herself, but a foreign religious worker, consciously strategised and mediated across identities to negotiate with a South Korean employer, thereby engaging in Other Diplomacies.

Participant #11 showed that she was well aware of the wider context within which Sri Lankan migrant workers operated. She explained her thoughts on the matter; Sri Lankan workers

were “lazy, selfish, and vain to the point of not wanting to bow their heads to anyone and were ready to leave at the slightest hardship or insult”. However, according to her, they now had to compete in the migrant labour market with those from an expanding list of countries such as Myanmar, Thailand, and Bangladesh. The workers from Myanmar and Bangladesh had a reputation for being hard workers and were not averse to ‘bowing their heads’ and taking verbal abuse from their South Korean bosses. Neither were they selective about employment rights and personal comforts, as Sri Lankans were. She also pointed out that the workers from Thailand were usually trained in welding or some other skill that made them more valuable for South Korean employers, a fact that was echoed by several other participants (#21, #22, #24, #28). Therefore, participant #11 said she considered this context when she was negotiating with the *sajanim*s. According to her, there is an appropriate manner in which labour disputes should be resolved so that the employer feels that they have not had to compromise too much and crucially that she does not leave the *sajanim*s with an unfavourable perception of Sri Lankan workers.

Discussions with some migrant workers themselves revealed similar concerns and an awareness of the need to be tactful when dealing with their employers. Most migrant workers readily accepted that leaving or being less productive at work was unfair to the *sajanim*. However, they also noted that they had to look after their interests too. Migrant workers had made significant financial commitments to follow the Employment Permit System so that they could return home with substantial savings. Given this situation, some migrant workers claimed to be in a tighter spot than the community leaders. As participants #22 and #42 told me, “It is true that Sri Lankan boys get a bad name when people change jobs, but we have to look after ourselves too, no?”

When inquiring further into the circumstances of his departure, participant #22 said that he had negotiated his departure from the last employer with great care. According to him, his employer had been kind to him, and he had no particular issues except that the work was strenuous and the pay was not as much as he had hoped. When the company had a high volume of customer orders, there would be much work, overtime and an equal amount of pressure. However, it was not so all year round; sometimes, several months would go by where there was little work, which meant no overtime and hence less pay. Overall, participant #22 did not think that it was worth his time to continue work in the company when there were severe seasonal fluctuations. However, participant #22 pointed out that there was an ‘art of quitting’ since he needed to leave with a letter of release from his employer and wanted to make sure that he does not jeopardise the chances for another Sri Lankan to work at the company. This was a particularly sensitive negotiation because he wanted to secure a job for another Sri Lankan friend at the same company. This meant that he needed to negotiate an exit from the company without alienating the *sajanim*.

According to participant #22, he had planned his departure from his last employer well in advance of its execution. He said that he had first started by discussing pay issues with the *sajanim* and that they had tried to resolve the issue genuinely. Despite these attempts, participant #22 acknowledged that given the number of orders, it would be unrealistic to expect higher pay levels: “I do not think he [employer] was being unreasonable, I think he really tried to increase my salary, but he had too little business”. After some time, a few more foreign workers from other countries had left the company, and participant #22 had to undertake more tasks that made work more difficult for him because he had to shift large pieces of metal from one place to another, but it did not result in any significant overtime because there was little work. Next,

participant #22 said that he started making calculated changes in his work behaviour to show that he was under pressure: “I started to make little little mistakes, worked more slowly, things like that”. Finally, one day he dropped some equipment and just sat down and stopped working, claiming that he was just too tired and could not handle the pressure. He then spoke to the employer and requested that he issue him a release letter to look for work elsewhere. According to participant #22, the excellent rapport that he maintained with the employer contributed to the successful resolution of the situation. Further, as evidence of his skilful negotiation, he pointed out that his Sri Lankan friend had obtained employment with the same company and worked there now. Therefore, participant #22 had resigned when he wanted to, with a letter of release from his employer, and managed to secure a job for his Sri Lankan friend though he was departing the company. This shows how he utilised diplomatic skills in negotiating the resignation process and remained aware of the implications of the detrimental repercussions his actions may have on those who shared his Sri Lankan identity. Thus, it demonstrates how participant #22 engaged in Other Diplomacies.

The two examples from this section clearly show that individual Sri Lankan migrant workers in South Korea are aware of representing a wider Sri Lankan identity. However, I never got the sense that they were concerned about representing the state; instead, they understood their identity to be related to other Sri Lankan migrant workers in South Korea or those hoping to come over. Given that Sri Lankan migrant workers are aware of representing a wider identity and their utilising diplomatic skills to mediate across identities and negotiate with South Koreans is evidence of how they engage in Other Diplomacies. A factor that was not discussed so far but is evident in these interactions is that there is a clear hierarchy in the relationship between South Koreans and Sri Lankan migrant workers. The interactions documented above operate within the

context of these power hierarchies related to class, race and gender. The next section will begin to explore how these hierarchies operate.

5.6: Other Diplomacies – Uncovering Hierarchical Relations of Power Linked to Class and Race

An Other Diplomacies approach allows us to see the classist, racialised, and gendered contexts and relationships Sri Lankan migrant workers navigate. However, I will show in this section that while Sri Lankan workers had to navigate hierarchical relationships, they too engaged in imposing their own racialised and gendered biases.

The class-based context within which the Sri Lankan migrant workers operate has been extensively discussed in chapters three and four: starting with their often marginalised and impoverished circumstances in Sri Lanka to the class-based power relationship they have with the company owner in South Korea. However, despite working in South Korea at the pleasure of the government and their employers, the latent power of migrant workers, as a whole, did not go altogether unnoticed. Two Koreans I spoke to, participants #61 and #63, considered migrant workers an essential part of their company. While participant #61 was the *sajanim* or owner of a company, he employed his nephew, participant #63, to work in the company. I spoke to them separately, but they both observed that they would not be able to find the labourers to do the work in their factory if not for foreign workers. They accepted that there was a perception among some South Koreans that allowing migrant workers into the country was problematic but believed that such people did not have to face the problems they did when it came to hiring labourers. Therefore, the migrant workers, as a collective, play a very significant role in the economy of small and medium scale South Korean manufacturers.

Migrant workers are, however, a racialised group and have assigned hierarchies amongst them. The workers from countries with darker skin tones are not able to access some of the jobs

that go to their lighter-skinned fellow workers. Jobs in the service sector, including hotels and restaurants, did not hire darker-skinned migrant workers. Participants #23 and #24 pointed this out at a restaurant as we were having dinner. Participant #24 spoke to one of the waiting staff and confirmed that they were Vietnamese, as were all of the wait staff in that restaurant.

Participant #24 pointed out that the service sector jobs were challenging but not as difficult as the more physically demanding factory jobs. The participants pointed out that people from countries such as Vietnam, Thailand, and the Philippines get hired into these jobs because they look more similar to South Koreans; most times, it is difficult to distinguish between them until the accents of the migrant workers give them away. According to participant #23, South Koreans felt more comfortable being served upon by lighter-skinned people because there is a perception that the darker-skinned workers are not as clean. The result of this hierarchy among migrant workers, based on skin tones, was not limited to excluding some from the service industry.

The hierarchical racialisation of migrant workers according to their skin colour extended to factory workers as well. Participant #28, who had worked in South Korea for several years with his wife, said that he had experienced discrimination from South Korean employers because of his skin colour and appearance. According to him, South Koreans considered beards and body hair to be signs of unhygienic practices. Participant #28 explained:

we [Sri Lankan workers] shower and wash every day after work; otherwise, we cannot sleep, whereas those from Myanmar just rub themselves down with a wet towel. However, the Koreans assume us to be the unclean ones. One day they [South Koreans] asked me – why are you all so unclean? – so after that, I now take care to carefully shave every day. Can you see? [pointing to his face] I have no stubble at all. That is how it is. What to do?

Though not expressed in these exact terms, participants #21, #25, #42, and #11, the Christian pastor, echoed similar sentiments and accounts. Participants #23, #24, and #25 noted that during certain points, South Koreans working in their factory would show them pictures of traffic lights,

electric kettles, and vegetables such as pumpkins and ask whether they had ever seen them before coming to South Korea. The participants pointed out that they had not asked similar questions of the Thai nationals working with them. As participant #24 put it, “Can you see what these Koreans take us to be?”. All these participants noted that most Sri Lankan migrant workers who hoped to have longer term prospects with their employer tended to respond to the racialised cues from their South Korean employers and dress, shave and maintain hair-styles in accordance with what is understood to project them in a more favourable light to their employers.

While many participants understood that they were discriminated against based on racial factors, there were instances where the Sri Lankan workers themselves engaged in using race to discriminate against other migrants. All the participants who said they were racially discriminated against because of their darker skin also said that such treatment was justified. According to some participants, the country belonged to the South Koreans, and they were acting according to their cultural norms; therefore, racism was reasonable. Some participants justified the racism they encountered by saying that if there were foreign workers in Sri Lanka, they too would be treated the same way. One participant, #21, took this one step further by lobbying his employer not to hire Muslim migrant workers. According to participant #21, he had a good relationship with his employer and used it as a privilege to influence future hires, steering his employer towards hiring from non-Muslim countries. However, many Sri Lankan migrant workers did not have the privilege of such a close relationship with their employers, and those that did usually focused on encouraging their employers to hire more Sri Lankans. As Sri Lankan migrant workers engaged in Other Diplomacies, they did so from a racialised and, therefore, subordinate position to South Koreans and other lighter-skinned migrant workers. Sri Lankan

migrant workers, therefore, operated at the intersections of class and race when they engaged in Other Diplomacies with their South Korean interlocutors.

5.7: Other Diplomacies: The Role of Gender

The role gender plays in the Other Diplomacies of Sri Lankan migrant workers have been a somewhat difficult issue to write about. While the hierarchical relationships based on class and race were more evident and observable in my fieldwork, the role of gender was not readily observable in the relations between Sri Lankans and South Koreans. First, I did not observe many interactions between South Korean women and the Sri Lankan migrant workers. Despite this fact, most male workers were never hesitant to tell me about their relationships with South Korean women. I use some such conversations to highlight several points in this section. Secondly, reflecting the overall demographic of the Sri Lankan migrant workers in South Korea, I met only a few Sri Lankan female workers during my fieldwork; and all of them were in South Korea with their husbands or boyfriends. This meant that the few conversations I was able to have with them were overshadowed by the husband or boyfriend's presence. Therefore, it was difficult to probe in-depth what their thoughts as women migrant workers were. I had to contend with the outcome that they mostly echoed the sentiments of their male partners. However, the role gender plays in the lives of migrant workers becomes more apparent once we begin to cast a wider net by focusing less on the operational aspects of Other Diplomacies but focusing on its normative framings.

As mentioned, it was not possible to observe or record interactions between Sri Lankan migrant workers and South Korean women, and neither was it possible to discuss how Sri Lankan women perceived their interactions with South Koreans. Therefore, I will base this section on my conversations with male Sri Lankan workers and two female graduate student

participants. While the female graduate students could not tell me much about the experiences of female workers, one of them, participant #34, had been in South Korea for more than five years and the other participant, #33, for two years. During their time in South Korea, they have had interactions with Sri Lankan male workers and were aware of some of their prejudices. The female graduate students' contribution was invaluable in shedding light on many of my questions about gender.

The fact that men constitute an overwhelming number of migrant workers in South Korea establishes them as a masculine group. Their masculinity was noted by different actors, including the Sri Lankan Embassy, which emailed me the following reply to my question on how they perceive Sri Lankan migrant workers in South Korea, “most of them are young and energetic, Sri Lankan workers especially male workers have a very good recognition in the companies where they work”.¹⁰ The Christian pastor, participant #11, who worked with migrant labourers, noted their masculinity as sometimes serving to divert them to wasteful practices, and all of the male migrant workers I spoke to did not pass on an opportunity to describe their thoughts on South Korean women.

Many of the comments Sri Lankan migrant workers made regarding women in South Korea displayed a failure to examine the world outside their own masculinised understanding. One of the most striking memories I have of my fieldwork is that, without exception, every Sri Lankan migrant worker claimed that South Korean laws and law enforcement favour women. When I asked why they thought so, different participants provided different answers; participant #28 said that South Korean women controlled the family finances and gave their husbands

¹⁰ Emailed reply from the Sri Lankan Embassy in Seoul, received on 13 June 2019.

pocket money, participants #21, #24, #27, #28, #47, and #42 said that if women made a complaint against a man to the police, the man would be promptly arrested. While it was clear that the migrant workers were convinced that women were favoured in South Korea's legal system, they could not say why this was so. I could not solve the puzzle of why the migrant workers thought so until I spoke to participant #34, a female graduate student. After laughing at the assertion made by the Sri Lankan men, she said that in South Korea, there was some degree of parity between the sexes in Korean society. She claimed that, despite the migrant workers' claims, South Korea remained a patriarchal society, but there exists a greater degree of parity between the sexes in South Korea than in Sri Lanka. According to her, the migrant workers incorrectly considered women's subordinate position in Sri Lanka as parity between the sexes. Therefore, participant #34 theorised that the migrant workers interpreted this greater degree of parity as evidence that South Korean laws and law enforcement favoured women. This example demonstrated how Sri Lankan migrant workers relied on gendered stereotypes to interpret their environment.

The extent of this problematic stereotypical understanding was amplified because almost every migrant worker claimed that South Korean women secretly desired them. The consensus among Sri Lankan migrant workers was that racial and classist barriers prevented South Korean women from expressing their desire openly. When I probed the basis of such an assumption, I was told that I should be able to understand it. Even the Christian pastor herself claimed that South Korean women were attracted to the Sri Lankan migrant workers. When I asked her why, the answer was, "don't you know? Our boys are well built, and I cannot spell it out for you, but you can understand, no?" While saying all this, the participant also raised her eyebrows and clenched her fist; I assumed to symbolise the masculinity of the boys, leaving me with the

understanding that she was making the case that the migrant workers were sexually more attractive to the South Korean women.

However, once again, no one could actually point to any evidence to show that Korean women were attracted to Sri Lankan men. If anything, the only thing they could concretely point to was the fact that South Korean women paid scant heed to Sri Lankan men. Participant #24, when I probed the question in-depth, admitted that South Korean women were not infatuated with Sri Lankan men. According to him, in the rare instances where South Korean women entered into relationships with Sri Lankan men, they were those who had little hope of establishing a relationship with a South Korean man. Participant #24 concluded by saying, “If you are talking about older women, yes, then we have some say. It is easy to tackle them. There are some who have done it, but not the younger ones. If they are older and divorced, then it is much easier”. Nonetheless, this myth sustains itself on a masculine framing of the Sri Lankan workers’ identity.

Another way to examine the gendered dimensions of the Other Diplomacies of Sri Lankan migrant workers in South Korea is to understand their feminised identities. Though the migrant workers see themselves as masculine, their racist and classist subjugation by South Korean employers, discussed previously, can feminise migrant worker identities while representing the South Korean employers as masculine identities. Of course, the participants did not see themselves as feminine, nor did they ever frame their interactions with South Koreans in explicitly gendered terms. However, the gendered nature of the relationship became visible when it was unsettled by an incident that occurred after I left. During a night out among a group of Sri Lankan migrant workers, at some point, they decided to confront another group of Sri Lankan migrant workers over an old but unresolved argument. The violent confrontation between the

two groups led to several workers being seriously injured and one fatality. As a participant explained the situation over a telephone call, he had not expected the incident to make the local news and therefore thought it best to avoid letting their employers know. The participant did not want his employer to know because he feared that they might identify Sri Lankan migrant workers as a ‘murderous bunch’ and too dangerous to trust, thus alluding to their masculinity. Unfortunately for the participant, the incident made the local news and even managed to create a stir among the local community due to the seemingly savage nature of the attack. According to the participant who called me, after the incident became known, the South Koreans appeared distant and reserved for a couple of weeks. The participant assessed that the South Koreans had suddenly become aware that they were capable of violence. This unsettling of Sri Lankan workers’ identities from their feminised position to one where their masculinity was on display troubled the gendered power hierarchies for a few short weeks.

As I mentioned at the start of this section, the gendered aspect of the power hierarchies that operate between Sri Lankan migrant workers and South Koreans is evident but not readily visible, especially given the lack of opportunity to talk to women. Nonetheless, I have discussed some aspects of the gendered context within which migrant workers operate and engage with South Koreans.

Before moving to the concluding section of this chapter, it is important to recognise the complex positionalities that South Korean women occupy in society. While some authors argue that Korean women have shifted from being perceived as sexual objects to sexual subjects (Choi 2014; Shin 2009), others have argued that women’s sexual subjectivity ranges between “Korea’s Confucian cultural heritage and Western views of sexual pleasure and desire” (Lee 2001, 160). Scholars such as Cho Haejoang (2001) present this complexity as conflicting subjectivities

between the roles of mother, motherly-wife, and sexy woman. The gist of which bears out the fact that women, their roles in South Korean society and gender are ‘under construction’; or in other words, they are constantly being made and re-made (Kendall 2001).

I presented a very short overview of women and gender in South Korea in the previous paragraph to provide a hint of the complex academic discussions around the topic that are ongoing. However, the scope of the dissertation and this chapter’s focus on Sri Lankan migrant workers do not provide adequate space for a thoughtful discussion around the subject. While there is considerable research surrounding the migration of foreign brides to South Korea (Kim 2009; Kim 2012; Kim 2014), there is also a growing literature on migrant workers and gender in South Korea (Lee 2003; Chung 2020; Tsujimoto 2014), which fall within the academic fields of citizenship and migration studies. Therefore, further research into the relations between Sri Lankan migrant workers and South Korean women, whether from within an Other Diplomacies approach or outside of it, should detail the wider literature on gender, women, and migration.

5.8: Conclusion

I focused on my fieldwork in South Korea to show how Sri Lankan migrant workers engage in Other Diplomacies. Its societal non-state actor focus provided a framework to examine non-traditional sites of diplomacy. A traditional focus on diplomacy would have resulted in a state-centric analysis of the bilateral relationship that marginalises the role of migrant workers. The Sri Lankan and South Korean states frame their bilateral relationship in trade, investment, and cultural ties with minimal references to the migrant workers. However, this chapter centred on the migrant workers and their experiences and interaction in South Korea to argue that they engage in Other Diplomacies and show how they mediate across power hierarchies of class, race and gender. The intent has not been to valorise the migrant workers as resisters challenging the

classist, racist or gendered relations but to show how they operate within these relationships of power.

Sri Lankan migrant workers strategically mediated across identities as they interacted with their South Korean employers to achieve their objectives. Migrant workers were primarily concerned with increasing their incomes but realised that they needed to manage their exits from the employers for two reasons. The first is that they required a release letter from their current employer to remain legal in South Korea. Secondly, they were aware that negative perceptions of Sri Lankan workers among employers would reduce the chances of future Sri Lankan hires. Their concern, though, was not with representing the Sri Lankan state but with representing Sri Lankan migrant workers as a collective group. Thus, their individual actions had wider repercussions for those that were identified as belonging to the same category. Therefore, the migrant workers and those who represented them used various diplomatic skills to negotiate with their employers.

The strategising and use of diplomatic skills did not occur in a vacuum but within relations of power. These relations of power can be contextualised within classist, racist and masculine framings. Many workers were aware of the classist and racist framings of their interactions with South Koreans but remained blind to their gendered nature.

Chapter 6: Other Diplomacies and Consular Assistance: The case of Sri Lankan migrant workers in South Korea

6.1: Introduction

This chapter developed out of two shortcomings. The first, from a disciplinary perspective, is the fact that there is a dearth of literature on consular affairs within the field of Diplomatic Studies (Melissen 2011). The second stems from my time in fieldwork, where it became evident that the issues and problems migrant workers faced in South Korea were a central concern to them. It is impossible to ignore that problems and issues constitute a central aspect of their lives, especially given the claim that this dissertation makes to centre living communities while decentring the abstract concept of the state. At the same time, I want to stress that this chapter does not in any way do justice in terms of highlighting the issues that Sri Lankan migrant workers face in South Korea, nor does it adequately analyse the lack of state-provided consular services. An engagement with that topic requires a separate project in itself. Instead, I hope to initiate a discussion on the lack of consular assistance to Sri Lankan migrant workers from within a Diplomatic Studies framework. The objectives for engaging in such a discussion are similar to why I framed this project as one in Diplomatic Studies; to unsettle a discursively powerful state-centric field by showing how societal non-state actors engage in diplomatic functions. This chapter uses the concepts of consular affairs and Other Diplomacies to illuminate the interests, issues and possible solutions that Sri Lankan migrant workers in South Korea encounter.

This chapter argues that societal non-state actors engage in providing consular assistance to Sri Lankan migrant workers in South Korea because the Sri Lankan state has neglected its obligations to citizens abroad. I will outline my argument by first discussing the reasons for the

relative neglect of consular affairs in the Diplomatic Studies literature. This section will show how the state-centrism of the field lies at the centre of consular affairs' exclusion in Diplomatic Studies. It also discusses some issues and possibilities related to researching state-based consular assistance. Second, the chapter points out how the Sri Lankan state has maintained a lacklustre attitude to consular assistance to its citizens, especially its migrant worker population. In this section, I show that perceptions of the social status of migrant workers contribute to the relative apathy of the Sri Lankan state to their issues. As a result, Sri Lankan migrant labourers have resorted to relying on societal non-state actors for assistance (Gamburd 2005). The third section engages with how the concept of Other Diplomacies makes visible the consular assistance that societal non-state actors provide and receive from each other. Before concluding, the fourth section provides a few examples of how societal non-state actors provide consular assistance to Sri Lankan migrant labourers in South Korea.

Similar to mainstream Diplomatic Studies literature, Other Diplomacies has also not engaged with consular affairs. While the relatively recent entry of Other Diplomacies into the field of Diplomatic Studies has been one reason for this, another possible one may be the fact that a significant part of state-based consular affairs has to do with activities monopolised by the state, such as issuing passports, determining citizenship and issuing visas (Young and Henders 2012). This framing of consular affairs leaves no room for societal non-state actors because they are functions that only states have the authority to conduct. However, the focus on actions that are monopolised by states neglects special consular services associated with the protection of citizens abroad.

Special consular services refer to the broad range of functions that meet the obligations states have to protect their citizens abroad. Under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations

(VCCR), states, through their consular affairs divisions, are granted legal authority to protect and look after the welfare of their citizens abroad (Okano-Heijmans 2011). This internationally accepted convention places an obligation on each state to afford consular assistance, within legal bounds, to its citizens abroad who may be in distress (ibid). The subject of consular affairs is a comprehensive one and encompasses “documentary services, individual assistance to citizens in distress and assistance in times of crises” to be provided by the sending state to its citizens abroad (Okano-Heijmans 2011, 22). Each of these three categories consists of many different actions and are by no means mutually exclusive. However, this chapter will exclude documentary services from its discussion because it refers to functions such as issuing passports, visas and providing notarial services, which only states are authorised to conduct. The chapter will also exclude assistance in times of crisis since they generally refer to human-made or natural disasters, which Sri Lankan migrant labourers in South Korea have not experienced, with the exception of the recent Coronavirus pandemic. This chapter will focus on the provision of individual assistance, which includes a wide array of functions such as assistance during hospitalisations, incarcerations, looking for persons reported as missing and assisting in the disposition of remains.

When examining these issues, it became clear that there were many research gaps. Some of these research gaps resulted from how the field of Diplomatic Studies chose to define itself as a state-centric one. Another reason for research gaps to exist may be the relative difficulty in gaining access to privileged diplomatic sites. Archival research and interviews are difficult to gain access to, but observing or participating in interactions involving officials from a different country is equally difficult to overcome due to potential political and ethical fallout. Therefore, focusing on societal non-state actors reduces some of these concerns. I have mentioned several

possible areas for future research, which I will elaborate on in more detail in the concluding chapter.

6.2: Consular Affairs and Diplomatic Studies

This section of the chapter will discuss the literature on consular affairs in the field of Diplomatic Studies, specifically, the lack of it. As a field that examines the practice of state-based diplomacy, Diplomatic Studies has very little to say about its consular aspect (Melissen 2011; Leira and Neumann 2011; Aggestam 2016, 2020; Melissen 2020). The little mention that consular affairs has received in the literature primarily focuses on descriptive accounts of how consular affairs evolved in different countries (Berridge 2010; Zonova 2011; Liping 2011; Leira and Neumann 2011; Hernandez 2011; Kersten and Van Der Zwan 2011; Ulbert 2011). The rest of the literature examines how consular services have changed in response to more assertive public expectations in the Global North and advances in communication technology (Hamilton 2011; Heijmans and Melissen 2007; Melissen 2020). Within the field, there is little else in terms of consular affairs.

One reason that consular affairs is neglected in Diplomatic Studies is because of the view that its historical development was distinctly different from that of state-based diplomacy (Aggestam 2016). Scholars have often argued that the role of the consul originated with merchant seafarers, thus tracing their origins to well before the practice of resident ambassadors in Fifteenth-century Italian city-states (Berridge 2010; Leira and Neumann 2008). Depending on which country or region they are studying, authors trace modern consular functions to different points. Several examples bear out this point: Leira and Neumann (2008) trace the origins of the Norwegian consular service to the Hanseatic League's growth, pointing out that even English kings in the early fourteenth century had allowed disputes between merchants to be settled under

the laws of merchants. The Russian account of consular history places its origins during the time of Tsar Peter the Great (Zonova 2011), while the Dutch point to their representatives designated as ‘consuls’ to the Ottoman Empire in 1607 (Kersten and Van Der Zwan 2011), and the Spanish make links to the laws governing foreigners in the Visigoth Kingdom as far back as around the year 600 AD (Hernandez 2011). These varied lineages tell a different story to that of diplomacy, whose origins, as mentioned in the first chapter, are neatly traced to the Italian city-states of Renaissance Europe.

The separation of the consular and diplomatic has historical and more contemporary foundations. Among them, one such factor linked to historical reasons is the differing social standings of those appointed as ‘consuls’ and ‘diplomats’. Within the European context of state-based diplomacy, sovereigns tended to appoint social elites to diplomatic positions while consuls came from socially lower ranks (Berridge 2010). Even if appointed by the same sovereign, the different social positions held by diplomats and consuls meant that their social circles did not overlap (ibid). More importantly, it meant that diplomats had the predisposition to look down on their poorer consuls. The fact that it involves engaging with ordinary fellow citizens lends itself to a particularly “coalface quality that sets consular work aside from much of diplomacy” (Melissen 2011, 4). Secondly, the two Vienna conventions contributed to codifying the separateness of the functions, powers and responsibilities of the two services. While the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations governs all consular work and officials, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations governs the rest of the diplomatic service (Berridge 2010; Okano-Heijmans 2011). Therefore, both historical and contemporary factors point to consular affairs being distinctly different from diplomacy.

Despite the genuine differences between consular and diplomatic work, the fact remains that consular affairs are firmly a part of the modern state-based diplomatic machinery. A check of the official websites of foreign ministries shows that almost all countries run their consular services as a part of each country's ministry of foreign affairs. Some consular affairs divisions, such as the United States consular service, which functioned separately, was combined with its diplomatic corps in 1924 to form a single United States Foreign Service (Hamilton 2011). While some countries such as France still maintain a distinction between its diplomatic and consular corps by not bringing its consuls under the strict authority of its ambassadors, its consular officers still fall under the overall authority of the foreign ministry (Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs 2020). Even when Hedley Bull in 1977 argued that the diplomatic and consular branches should be treated as separate, he admitted that it is difficult to compartmentalise the two because “the present tendency is for diplomatic and consular services to be merged” (Bull 2002, 160). Given that consular work constitutes a part of modern diplomacy, its relative neglect in the Diplomatic Studies literature offers a curious puzzle.

A more in-depth examination of the reasons outlined in the three preceding paragraphs points to state-centrism as a foundation for the lack of interest in consular affairs in the Diplomatic Studies literature. Leira and Neumann (2011) explicitly admit this when they make a case for the separation of the two services by asserting that states and a system of states are not prerequisites for the existence of consuls, “but simply the existence of economic activities that involve members of more than one group or polity” (Leira and Neumann 2011, 229–30). The two authors continue to unconvincingly argue that state-based diplomatic work constitutes a separate culture or institution marked out by its permanency, whereas consular work is immediate, transitory and does not create a ‘consular culture’ (ibid). They draw on the work of

economic historians to make this argument by claiming that consular work is ad hoc and aimed at resolving situational issues that do not generate a distinct ‘tradition’ or ‘culture’ as diplomatic work does. Leira and Neumann (2011) are unconvincing for two reasons. The first is that their claims related to consular work are not based on current consular activities but focus on a historical approach. As I pointed out in the previous paragraph, it is very difficult to compartmentalise the foreign service of states into distinct diplomatic and consular affairs branches in the present day, which is what Leira and Neumann (2011) do in their chapter on consular affairs. Secondly, their reasoning is based on the arbitrary premise that diplomacy requires sovereign approval and a system of states, while consular work does not. However, consular work today is an obligation of sovereign states. It is operationalised out of their diplomatic missions, relying on the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations for a legal basis, as I have already discussed previously in this chapter. However, the ethos of the claims made by Leira and Neumann (2011) appears to drive towards the distinction made by Hedley Bull (2002) that diplomatic relations were confined to relations between sovereigns, whereas consular relations involved interactions with both private citizens and representatives of sovereigns and therefore should be the basis of a distinction between the two. The popular narrative of consular work bears this out, where consular functions are primarily understood to involve issuing passports, visas and looking into the welfare and protection of their citizens abroad, all of which fall under the categories that encompass the mundane and everyday. Therefore, the state-centrism of Diplomatic Studies literature has ensured the marginalisation of consular affairs due to its focus on the everyday activities of societal non-state actors.

However, consular functions, similar to diplomatic functions, involve communication and negotiation with host country officials and non-state actors. In their day-to-day work, consular

officials are required to communicate and negotiate with host country officials in immigration, prison, medical, police, and sometimes military systems, to name a few. Maintaining a healthy rapport with host-country government officials helps ensure that consular officers are informed and can gain access to their citizens when they are arrested, injured or are victims of crime. Additionally, they may have to maintain relationships with non-state actors such as charities, hostels, and funeral houses to assist their citizens experiencing various forms of distress. In the process of maintaining and nurturing these relationships, consular officials establish rules and norms and identify shared goals with both state and non-state actors, all of which are core functions of diplomacy (Young and Henders 2012).

The difference between the relationships that consular officers and diplomatic officers have with host country actors is the level and purpose of those contacts. Generally, diplomatic officers regularly meet with ministers, heads of departments or other significant actors, both state and non-state, who are recognised as politically significant, but consular officers regular contacts are low to mid-level officers of the state or those that are seen to be politically insignificant non-state actors. While consular officers are concerned with the wellbeing of their citizens and the integrity of their visa system, diplomatic officers are concerned with furthering the political and economic objectives of the sending state. Therefore, the beneficiaries of diplomatic relations tend to be state actors, whereas the beneficiaries of consular relations are private citizens. Despite these differences, from a functional perspective, both diplomatic and consular officers engage in communication and negotiations.

Problems associated with researching the communicative and negotiative functions of consular work make it even more difficult to convince an already sceptical Diplomatic Studies audience that consular work involves diplomatic functions. The ‘diplomacies’ of consular work

are most likely to occur in relation to situations that involve distressed citizens of the sending state. As I mentioned previously, a distressed citizen in the consular context refers to someone who is facing an injury, arrest or are a victim of crime outside their home country. As such, any fieldwork would involve observing communications and negotiations that concern the private and intimate details of private citizens, even if the private citizen themselves were not being observed. This raises questions of the ethics around obtaining voluntary consent from a private citizen in distress, not to mention whether it is even feasible to obtain voluntary consent within the context of consular interventions. While this highlights the important questions of ethics, there are organisational barriers to overcome before focusing on serious ethical considerations.

Scholars have found that gaining access to state-based diplomatic sites are extremely difficult and requires perseverance and the backing of significant financial resources (Wiseman 2015; Kuus 2013; Nair 2021). A clarification is required by what I mean here before proceeding. While diplomatic officers, especially principal officers and public diplomacy officers, can be receptive towards interview requests, it is not unlikely that they will tow the official line during these interviews. Therefore, it is unlikely that such interviews will reveal how representations and negotiations actually occur between diplomats. Naturalistic observations of diplomatic encounters are important because researchers can have informal conversations and observe the manner in which participants actually engage in representation, negotiation and communication. Many of the authors who have gained such access to observe and participate in informal conversations with diplomats have done so in multilateral settings such as the United Nations (Wiseman 2015), the European Union Commission (Kuus 2013), and at the Association of South-East Asian Nations (Nair 2021). Their work does not focus on the workings of one particular state, but the bureaucracy of multilateral organisations and generally do not deal with

issues considered politically sensitive. The few instances where scholars have gained access to state-based diplomatic sites have resulted in a study of the bureaucracy of respective foreign ministries (Neumann 2012a; Datta-Ray 2016). The ethnographic fieldwork has not involved actual observations of ‘inter-state’ diplomatic negotiations but observations of the Norwegian (Neumann 2012a) and Indian foreign ministry (Datta-Ray 2016) bureaucratic workings. As I mentioned before, consular assistance requires officials to interact and maintain relations between mid and low-level host government officials and with non-state actors such as workers in healthcare, charities, and funeral homes, to name a few. Hence, the interactions that would establish consular assistance as a site of diplomacy would require us to observe not just the officials of the sending state but those of the receiving state and some of its non-state actors as well. While I pointed out how difficult it has been for scholars to gain access to diplomats of a state or multilateral organization, the possibility of gaining fieldwork access that involves two states and possibly also non-state actors appear extremely difficult.

A possibility that works around organizational barriers to fieldwork is to consider making contacts with participants in settings outside their workspaces. Hugh Gusterson’s (1998) ethnography of nuclear scientists, mentioned in the third chapter, began by making contact with them in private everyday settings such as clubs and churches. A recent article by Deepak Nair (2021) discusses how he ‘hung-out’ while ‘studying-up’ when researching the Association of South-East Asian Nations. Nair (2021) argues that hanging out with diplomats outside their usual habitus provides greater insight into the organisation’s working rather than observing them within the workplace. This strategy may help examine relations between consular officers and their host-government and non-state interlocutors because they are likely to meet and sustain relationships outside official settings. Building a mutual understanding and a level of trust

between the two groups is essential to carrying out their duties and obligations. For example, the simple act of arranging to visit an incarcerated citizen can either become a bureaucratic nightmare requiring advanced preparations that involve official communications with the host country foreign ministry or can be arranged in relatively much less time through a personal telephone call to the prison superintendent or commissioner. Most consular operatives would prefer to use the second option because it involves efficient use of their resources and ensures timely access to their incarcerated citizens. However, for such un-official arrangements to work, it requires consular officials and host country prison officials to have developed a mutual understanding and trust. Developing such trust levels requires both parties to often communicate and negotiate arrangements in private settings and informally agree to a standard operating procedure that both parties recognize as beneficial. Sustaining these relationships could often require dining and wining outside official business hours and locations. While gaining access to these research sites is difficult, it presents fewer barriers than accessing formal sites for informal conversations and naturalistic observations.

I recognize that interviews are likely to be the most convenient research method to explore the diplomacies involved in consular assistance. Interviews with serving and retired officials and non-state actors involved in dispensing consular assistance would prove to be logistically more convenient and easier to access than fieldwork observations. However, two significant shortcomings that are difficult to overcome make formal interviews an unattractive method. Firstly, formal interviews often can result in the respondent providing the officially acceptable version approved by senior officials in the organization (Wiseman 2015; Nair 2021). Therefore, interviews are likely to reveal that consular officers perform their jobs according to the letter and spirit of the regulations governing their official actions. Additionally, formal

interviews are likely to be treated as public diplomacy opportunities by diplomats and consular officers, thereby revealing a propagandising narrative rather than what actually happens in consular work. There is the possibility that interviewees may not discuss the informal arrangements they have with their counterparts, given that it could disturb the official narrative of how things should be done in a statist bureaucracy. The second shortcoming arises from respondents taking the opposite approach. That is providing answers that exaggerate the power and influence they hold (Nair 2021). Therefore, though not resolving completely the issues noted, observations and informal conversations during fieldwork can provide the researcher with valuable insight into the interactions between actors that formal interviews cannot.

While substantial barriers exist, research into the diplomacies of state-based consular officials is an interesting future research topic partly because the study of consular affairs has been relatively neglected in Diplomatic Studies up to now. The first barrier is making a conceptual argument to a sceptical field that consular work involves diplomacy. Secondly, there has to be a serious discussion of research methods. Issues concerning the privacy of individual citizens and the sensitive nature of inter-state relations make it difficult to access consular workspaces for fieldwork. However, the increasing attention on micro-level international relations and intellectually honest discussions about the use of ethnographic methods to study diplomacy (Kuus 2013; Nair 2021) are encouraging signs that the diplomatic interactions involved in consular work can be researched. As I mentioned, an extensive discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this dissertation, a matter I, therefore, discuss as a possible future research agenda in the concluding chapter.

While it is challenging, Diplomatic Studies must be open to engaging with consular work as constituting a part of state-based diplomacy. Consular work involves establishing and

maintaining useful and productive relationships with a wide range of state and non-state contacts. Moreover, these relationships are often not maintained based on norms such as international law, but as ongoing reciprocal relations based on mutual understanding and trust, relying on its performers to be diplomatically skilful.

6.3: State-based consular assistance and Sri Lankan migrant workers

There are at least three good reasons why the Sri Lankan state should prioritise consular assistance to its migrant worker population. First, the Sri Lankan state, as a fundamental obligation, has a responsibility to its citizens abroad under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Okano-Heijmans 2011). Secondly, migrant worker remittances are the largest foreign exchange income source and constitute a substantial portion of the Gross National Product (The World Bank 2020b; 2020a). I will not delve into the significance of migrant labourers to Sri Lanka's economy since chapter four adequately covers the details. Thirdly, before they leave Sri Lanka, migrant workers are required by law to register and pay fees to cover the potential use of consular assistance (Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment n.d.). The fees also contribute towards paying for officers of the Bureau to be stationed at Sri Lankan diplomatic missions in order to assist migrant workers and look into their welfare. In principle, the Sri Lankan state has an obligation, motivation, and the government structure in place to provide adequate consular assistance to its migrant worker population.

However, the Sri Lankan state has consistently failed to provide adequate levels of consular assistance that migrant workers in distress demand. Sri Lankan migrant workers, especially women who work as domestics in the Middle East, complain that Sri Lankan embassy officials are unhelpful in situations where their assistance is required (Gamburd 2005; 2009). Consular and Bureau of Foreign Employment officials are often accused of showing a lack of

interest in assisting migrant workers facing abusive situations (Human Rights Watch 2007). For example, while many Sri Lankan female migrant workers shy away from reporting sexual abuse for fear of stigmatisation, the few who do wish to report abuse and take action find that they get little support from the Embassy and are not told about the various options or resources available to them (Gamburd 2005; Human Rights Watch 2007). Despite being at the end of severe criticism, the Sri Lankan state's attitude towards providing consular assistance has not significantly changed.

The continued apathy and neglect towards the issues and problems of migrant workers were starkly evident with the onset of the Coronavirus pandemic. While the Sri Lankan government prioritised the repatriation of Sri Lankan students abroad, migrant workers were asked to remain abroad. The repatriation of students started as early as February 1, 2020, when the government owned airline, under express instructions from the country's president, sent a charter flight to China to bring back thirty-three students (Srinivasan 2020; Foreign Ministry Sri Lanka 2020a). Afterwards, special flights continued to repatriate Sri Lankan students from around the world (Foreign Ministry Sri Lanka 2020c; 2020b). In contrast, the Sri Lankan government officially discouraged migrant workers from returning and placed them last in the order of precedence for repatriations (Government of Sri Lanka 2020). The President's advisor on foreign relations at that time, recently appointed as the secretary to the Foreign Ministry, was quoted on the webpage of a leading Sri Lankan newspaper laying out the state's repatriation policy, "Currently, we give priority to students. Then, we will take action to bring back those who have gone abroad on temporary visas. We have got many reports of such cases. Once it is done, we will bring back the migrant workers on a priority basis, which means pregnant women and those who have lost jobs will be given priority" (Fonseka 2020). The pandemic helped reveal

how the Sri Lankan Government's failure to provide consular assistance to migrant workers is based on discriminatory practices rather than a lack of capability and resources.

The fact that Sri Lanka's migrant population is mainly composed of labourers supports the theory that the lack of consular assistance is, at least partly, due to the recipients' low social status. While there are no statistics for outbound tourists from Sri Lanka, it would not be farfetched to assume that a majority of Sri Lankans overseas are either students or migrant workers. As mentioned in chapter five, the mean per capita income for households per month in Sri Lanka is about 150 Canadian Dollars (Department of Census and Statistics 2018), hardly sufficient to make for a large outbound tourist population nor a large student population capable of paying international student fees. While according to UNESCO statistics, there are about 25,000 Sri Lankans studying abroad (UNESCO 2020), the number of migrant workers eclipses this number with even conservative estimates amounting to about two million (Withers 2019). The latest statistics from the Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment claim that 88% of all Sri Lankans leaving the country are migrant workers (Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment 2019). The large numbers of Sri Lankan migrant workers and their vulnerability make them the most likely to seek consular assistance from Sri Lankan embassies. While it is beyond the scope of this chapter and dissertation to argue that low social status and class factors are to blame for the lack of consular assistance to Sri Lankans abroad, I wish to explore this relationship in future research.

This section focused on the lack of consular assistance provided to Sri Lankan migrant workers around the world. The situation is true of the migrant labourers in South Korea too, as will be discussed in the fourth section of this chapter.

6.4: Other Diplomacies and Consular Assistance

The preceding two sections established two points. The first is that from a disciplinary framing, the field of Diplomatic Studies considers consular work to be distinct from state-based diplomacy and hence not worthy of attention. Following on from this point, I pointed out some difficulties in studying the diplomatic interactions that constitute the diplomacies aspect of consular work. The second point, a substantive one, established that the Sri Lankan state fails to provide adequate consular services, especially to its migrant labour population. As a result of the apathy shown by the Sri Lankan embassies during their moments of distress, migrant workers have relied on each other and host country non-state actors for assistance (Gamburd 2009). Therefore, this section explores the possibility of using an Other Diplomacies approach to examine the consular assistance provided and received by societal non-state actors.

However, taking an Other Diplomacies perspective on consular assistance is not without its issues; therefore, it requires some discussion. While the concept of Other Diplomacies is well framed to take into consideration the interactions between individuals or groups who perceive themselves to be different, it is not framed in a way that recognises interactions between and within groups who identify as being similar. Indeed, even when understood as the mediation of estrangement between individuals or groups (Der Derian 1987), the concept of diplomacy assumes the existence of differences. It is impossible to mediate estrangement when there is none. Though the concept of Other Diplomacies broadens the framing of what constitutes diplomacy, it requires a firm perception of difference. The provision of consular assistance, on the other hand, is predicated on perceptions of sameness. State-based consular assistance requires that the recipient be a citizen of the sending state, a requirement that is also shared by most non-state providers of assistance to their citizens abroad. Most non-state actors extend support and

assistance to each other based on a perception that they share the same identity. This identity may not necessarily be citizenship but may be some other shared perception such as race, ethnicity, language, religion, or culture. An example of this was outlined in the second chapter by referencing how Afghan traders in Moscow had established themselves in a consular role, providing safety and security for fellow Afghans (Marsden 2016). Therefore, while societal non-state actors may provide consular-like assistance to each other, such interactions fall outside the framework of both state-based diplomacy and Other Diplomacies. Therefore, this chapter will only focus on the consular assistance provided to Sri Lankan migrant labourers by societal non-state actors in South Korea who are perceived as different.

Consular assistance provided by societal non-state actors from within the same community would make a fruitful future research topic but is beyond the framework of this project. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the consular assistance provided by Sri Lankan migrant labourers to each other constitute an essential part of how they live their lives while abroad. Studies by Gamburd (2009) of Sri Lankan migrant workers in the Middle East revealed that in the absence of adequate consular assistance from embassies, the migrant workers relied on each other for support and assistance. Conversations with migrant workers in South Korea revealed a similar situation. The work that many migrant labourers do in South Korea is dangerous, making them extremely vulnerable to injury and sometimes death (Fonseka 2019). Most migrant workers I encountered during fieldwork were well aware of these risks and responded to them by creating and maintaining a network of fellow acquaintances from Sri Lanka who could help in the event of distress. Participant #24 went so far as to say that Sri Lankan migrant workers who did not maintain a network of fellow country acquaintances “had no existence”, which he explained meant that they had very little chance of surviving an accident

or some other form of distress. Participant #25, who was also present at that meeting, elaborated on #24's comment:

There are those [Sri Lankan migrant workers in South Korea] who do not drink, do not go to clubs, they do not go out, on holidays they stay in their rooms and call home. Those guys are the ones who play an excellent game in Korea and send money home, but on the day that disaster strikes, they will not have anybody. Hands get caught in machinery, or you can die; if the company owner does not send your body to Sri Lanka, nobody is there to do that. No boys [to do that]. That is how it works.

The perception of having to rely on one another during times of distress was a strong motivator for establishing and maintaining relationships among the Sri Lankan migrant labourers in South Korea. However, these interactions are outside the framework of Other Diplomacies because they do not cross boundaries of perceived differences but are based on a shared identity. Nonetheless, they constitute important diplomatic functions such as identifying shared goals, which in this case is assisting oneself and fellow migrant workers in distress, maintaining relationships to that end, and establishing norms and rules for providing and receiving assistance (Young and Henders 2012). These interactions, which are internal to the group, nonetheless have an impact on how they perceive themselves and their identity. While it is beyond the scope of this dissertation, it will be interesting to examine how the internal dynamics of a perceived group helps constitute their identity and thereby contribute to how they mediate interactions with others.

The concepts of Other Diplomacies and consular assistance frame the parameters of this chapter. This framing excludes the assistance that migrant workers from the same country provide to each other. It is important to note this exclusion because, from the perspectives of the migrant workers, their interactions with those that share their identity goes a long way in determining how they live their lives as migrants. However, despite moving beyond the

operational aspects of Other Diplomacies, this chapter remains well within the normative focus of Other Diplomacies by centring on societal non-state actors, their interests, issues and possible solutions.

6.5: Other Diplomatic consular assistance to Sri Lankan migrant labourers in South Korea

This section of the chapter will explore the Other Diplomacies of Sri Lankan workers as they mediate across religious identities and access consular assistance in South Korea. South Korean societal non-state actors, especially Christian pastors, have been assisting distressed, predominantly Sinhala-Buddhist, Sri Lankan migrant workers, a fact that has not gone unnoticed by the Sri Lankan state. The following account of how an instance of ‘elephant diplomacy’ happened between the states of Sri Lanka and South Korea is an example of this. Kim Hae-sung is a Christian pastor and the president of a non-governmental organisation that helps migrant workers in South Korea (Tae-hoon 2010). In the early 2000s, Pastor Kim helped two destitute Sri Lankan migrant workers by providing them food and shelter, one of whom happened to be related to a future president of Sri Lanka (Se-jeong 2010). In 2010, the then President of Sri Lanka gifted two elephant cubs to Pastor Kim as a mark of gratitude for the assistance he provided to Sri Lankan migrant workers in South Korea (Se-jeong 2010; Min-ho 2018). This gift is significant not only for its physical size and oddity but because it symbolises the importance that the gift-giver attaches to the recipient’s act of kindness. Other instances of elephant gift-giving have been to commemorate milestones in state-based diplomatic relations, such as sixty years of Japan-Sri Lanka relations (DailyFT 2013) and seventy years of China-Sri Lanka relations (ChinaDaily 2007).

There are several issues I wish to highlight from this example. First is the issue that the state neglects the welfare of migrant workers. As I have outlined in this chapter, little attention is

paid to consular assistance by the Sri Lankan state, especially for migrant workers in South Korea and the Middle East. Therefore, the jumbo-sized gift can be seen to represent the failure of the Sri Lankan state to look after its migrant workers in distress since it was an expression of gratitude for an act that the Sri Lankan state omitted to perform; that of providing effective consular assistance. Secondly, it points to the role that connections to powerful elites have in directing state resources. I discussed how the migrant workers social class was a contributing factor to the lack of consular services, a fact that the recent Coronavirus pandemic highlighted. Similarly, this example indicates the power that kinship to elite actors have in moving the resources of the state to gift an elephant to a private non-state actor abroad, however, with no changes being made to increase consular assistance levels. Finally, the example also draws our attention to the role of Korean non-state actors who assist Sri Lankan migrant workers in distress, especially Christian pastors and their organisations.

Christian pastors, known as *moksanim* in South Korea, are held in high esteem by the Sri Lankan migrant labour population for the capacity and willingness they show to effectively assist those in distress. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Sri Lankan migrant workers have extremely high regard for Christian pastors who are seen as being very influential in South Korean society. Not only do the *Moksanim* effectively resolve employment disputes, but they do so without charging a fee or placing any other demands on the recipient. Participant #24, who had been in South Korea for about ten years, had the following to say, “as soon as a *moksanim* intervenes in a labour dispute, the employer surrenders... Sometimes the *moksanim* or the centres they run bring in food and various other things for us, and the only thing they ask for in return is to have a photo taken with us”. *Moksanim* or Christian pastors and their ‘centres’ have been of central importance to Sri Lankan migrant workers in distress.

One issue that Sri Lankan migrant labourers face in South Korea is that of employers who do not stick to the conditions of the labour contract. I already highlighted this issue in chapter four through the experience of Participant #23 in the fishing industry. That incident was not an isolated one. Participant #28, two months after arriving in South Korea, discovered that his employer was not correctly calculating his pay. When confronted, his employer refused to make the necessary changes. By that time, participant #28 had developed contacts with a *moksanim* in the area and sought his help. The *moksanim* provided him with the necessary guidance on where to complain about the issue and offered to help as he fought for his rightful pay and arrears. Participant #28 successfully resolved the pay issue. After that, the employer retaliated through different means but was not able to subjugate participant #28 in the ways they wanted. According to participant #28, he was able to maintain a semblance of dignity and continued to work in the same company because the *moksanim*'s constant presence worked to counterbalance his employer's attempts at retaliation.

The assistance that *moksanim*s and their organisations provide can be wide ranging, going beyond the immediate necessities of assisting in labour disputes. During my first week in Seoul, the church where I lodged was one such organisation operated by a *moksanim*. The *moksanim* of that church, though a pastor, made his living by running a coffee grinding and distribution business located near the church premises. The unique feature of this church is that the *moksanim* left the day-to-day operations and problem solving to the Sri Lankan pastor, participant #11, who worked there. The *moksanim* would be present in church only for most Sunday services and to resolve any particularly difficult labour problems. Each Sunday, before the service, participant #11's Korean husband would drive their van to designated spots in two or three nearby towns with a high concentration of Sri Lankan workers. Workers who wished to

attend the Sunday service and needed transport would make use of this service. The service itself would include a Sinhala sermon presented by participant #11, followed by a brief speech by the *moksanim*. Afterwards, a few Christian songs would be sung before a few talented and eager members of the congregation began singing Sinhala pop songs. At this time, lunch would be served. Later in the evening, the migrant workers would get dropped back to the same location. Therefore, while this church was ‘owned’ and operated by a Korean non-state actor, the main interlocutor shared a common identity with the migrant workers they helped.

Despite the shared identity in terms of country of origin and language, a critical difference between the provider and the recipients of assistance was religion. Religion provided a difference that had to be mediated across. Participant #11, the Sri Lankan pastor, said that out of her whole ‘congregation’, only one of them was Christian; all others were Buddhists. She pointed out that neither the *moksanim* nor she assisted migrant workers based on religion. There was no requirement for migrant workers to attend her Sunday service in return for assistance. So, the entire relationship between the *moksanim*, Sri Lankan pastor and the migrant workers were voluntary. Though the pastor offered this neutral version of the relationship, while observing the Sunday service, it became apparent that the religious difference between the church and the migrant workers was a significant aspect of the difference that the migrant workers had to mediate.

The Sri Lankan migrant workers chose to mediate the religious difference using a myriad of strategies. Several migrant workers who spoke to me were keen to point out that though they had good relationships with the church and *moksanim*s, they were wary of proselytising. Participant #28, who, as I explained earlier, had relied on a *moksanim* to rectify pay issues and remain in the job, was careful to point out to me that he identified himself as a Buddhist. Another

Participant, #21, a regular at the Sri Lankan pastor's church, made it very clear that he identified as a Buddhist though he had a very close and trusting relationship with Participant #11. Both participants volunteered this information without any form of questioning by me in order to firmly establish their identity as Buddhists. I observed acts of open defiance during the Christian Sunday service. During the sermon, the pastor would intermittently say 'Amen', expecting the congregation to respond. However, the congregation collectively made it clear that they were reluctant participants by not returning the 'Amens'. In turn, the pastor responded by continuously repeating the word 'Amen' until she got at least a mumbled response. Finally, when the sermon ended, there was a relieved sigh from the back rows, loud enough to be heard at the front, and someone said, "thank goodness it is over". During lunchtime, the pastor talked individually to members of the congregation, asking about their welfare, families and employment issues. She also was successful in introducing and linking different migrant labourers together who may be able to help and look out for each other in terms of getting better jobs. However, whenever she brought up God or encouraged those present to tell their friends and bring them along for sermons, the enthusiasm of the migrant workers would wane, and some of them would even avoid making eye contact with her. What became clear in observing these interactions was that though they were stripped of differences such as nationality, language and race, religion constituted a difference to mediate across.

What became clear from observing these interactions is that mediating across differences occur at multiple levels. While the most apparent levels to navigate across in Diplomatic Studies are the national or state level differences, other significant aspects of difference such as religion do exist between societal non-state actors. Identifying such distinctions of difference helps further unsettle the unitary and essentialized character of statist identity.

6.6: Consular affairs beyond the operational definition of Other Diplomacies

An aspect of consular assistance that this chapter did not delve into was the consular assistance provided and received by societal non-state actors perceived to be similar. This omission was made in view of the conceptual boundaries of Other Diplomacies. However, this aspect of consular assistance is widespread and contributes to how societal non-state actors choose to interact and project their identities to the other. In the case of Sri Lankan migrant workers in South Korea, such assistance has proved crucial in cases of hospitalisation, incarceration and even messaging about potential threats to safety and security. As participant #21 said, when his hand got caught to an industrial rolling pin, he relied on Participant #11 to keep his family in Sri Lanka informed of his surgery and post-surgery recovery.

Another example that highlights this aspect occurred after I departed from South Korea. As mentioned in the previous chapter, a fight had broken out among a group of Sri Lankan migrant workers, which resulted in one fatality and several seriously injured requiring hospitalisation. One of those injured was participant #25, who was arrested, hospitalised and later deported to Sri Lanka. During his incarceration and hospitalisation, it had been other Sri Lankan migrant workers who had ensured that he was in contact with his family and took charge of his personal belongings, a function typical of state-based consular services.

Once the police became aware that many of the migrant workers involved in the fight were deemed irregular by the South Korean immigration authority, search operations commenced looking for more irregular migrants. In response, the Sri Lankan migrant worker community in that region set up a messaging system that kept each other informed of immigration raids and roadblocks in the area. State-based consular services provide similar assistance by looking into their citizens' welfare, especially when hospitalised or incarcerated,

and issuing travel advisories or warnings of potential threats to their safety and security. While it is unlikely that any state-based consular service provides roadblock and immigration raid information to their citizens, from the perspective of migrant workers without valid visas, this service was crucial to their wellbeing. This highlights how the normative approach of Other Diplomacies that allows us to centre the issues, interests and possible solutions of societal non-state actors provide new insights that matter to them.

6.7: Conclusion

Given that I have written this dissertation with the intent to address shortcomings in the field of Diplomatic Studies, there are two important contributions that this chapter makes. The first contribution is to highlight the relevance of consular affairs to the field. As mentioned, the state-centric focus of Diplomatic Studies has resulted in consular affairs remaining understudied because it engages with societal non-state actors. However, I argued in this chapter that consular assistance requires the deployment of diplomatic skills in communicating and negotiating with host-country state and non-state actors. Researching consular interactions is challenging because, in addition to the difficulty of gaining access to diplomatic circles, fieldwork will have to navigate privacy issues related to individual citizens. Therefore, ethical and logistical concerns make it difficult, yet not impossible, to observe or record actual interactions between state-based officials of two countries on matters concerning their citizens.

The second contribution to the Diplomatic Studies literature comes from furthering the research on Other Diplomacies. Some societal non-state actors in the host country engage in assisting migrants in ways that mimic the consular assistance provided by state-based diplomats. While the literature on Other Diplomacies has focused on the interactions between societal non-state actors engaging in representative practices, it has not explicitly focused on special consular

assistance. This chapter is, therefore, a starting point to explore this understudied area of global politics. Focusing on issues faced by migrants, especially those in vulnerable positions such as foreign workers, would help highlight their concerns and show how little states are doing to assist them, despite an obligation to do so under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. This approach commits to the normative framing of Other Diplomacies that I set out in chapter two by centring societal non-state actors and decentering the state.

However, this chapter also has several implications that go beyond Other Diplomacies. It highlights the need to revise the 1967 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations to reflect the changing nature of citizens requiring assistance abroad. Relying on the Vienna Convention to define the responsibilities and rights of states to their citizens abroad is inadequate in light of the issues and problems faced by the migrant labourers, as highlighted in this dissertation. It is doubtful, though, that states themselves will take the initiative to revise their scope of responsibility towards their citizens abroad, given that states like Sri Lanka appear not to be interested in adequately meeting their current international consular obligations. Therefore, this may indicate an area in which citizen activism and advocacy is required to prod governments to revise the existing Vienna Convention or come up with new bilateral and multilateral agreements to better assist their citizens abroad in distress.

The Sri Lankan migrant labourers around the world continue to rely on non-state actors, including societal non-state actors, for assistance during distress. These networks, consisting of non-state actors providing consular assistance, can offer interesting empirical evidence to investigate how norms and rule-making functions develop in non-state settings. While it may be outside the operational definition of Other Diplomacies, such research would retain the concept's

wider normative framing by centring societal non-state actors and contribute to new research on rule-making practices.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

The dissertation was not written to resolve problems in Diplomatic Studies completely but to unsettle its state-centrism. Diplomatic Studies has remained resistant to changes taking place around it. This dissertation proposes that Diplomatic Studies scholars take societal non-state actors seriously as engaging in diplomacies across boundaries of difference. Not only does a societal non-state actor-centeredness unsettle the monopoly of states as the only actors capable of engaging in diplomacy, but the approach makes it possible to uncover power hierarchies related to race, class, gender, and other distinctions that societal non-state actors have to mediate across as they engage in diplomacies. The dissertation empirically focused on Sri Lankan migrant workers in South Korea to show how Other Diplomacies can make a critically oriented contribution to Diplomatic Studies scholarship.

I will retrace the dissertation's discussions in the next section to show how they contributed to unsettling state-centrism and uncovering the racialised, classist and gendered relations of diplomacies. While this dissertation was written within the operational and normative definitions of Other Diplomacies, I propose that the future of Other Diplomacies lies in a firm commitment to its normative framings but should move beyond examining only interactions between societal non-state actors to include both state and non-state actors. The next section makes explicit that Other Diplomacies and this dissertation constitute a part of International Relations. The final section of this chapter will present a few of the future research possibilities that arose out of the research process but were outside the current dissertation's scope.

7.1: Dissertation Summary

The first chapter was crucial to establishing the problem that the dissertation dealt with. The introduction identified this dissertation as engaging with the field of Diplomatic Studies, a branch of the wider discipline of International Relations. Therefore, a foundational part of the dissertation was to establish the state of the field of Diplomatic Studies. The chapter argued that Diplomatic Studies was a state-centric field, the implications of which was a foreclosing of the ability to discuss issues related to race, class, and gender in diplomacy. Given the field's discursive power over policymakers, academics, and at times the general public, it is important to unsettle its state-centric focus that detracts from the concerns of actual living communities. The literature review showed that the Diplomatic Studies centring on statist actors made it possible only to discuss the interests of states, which are abstract entities. While some scholarship in the field, such as those within the sub-field of Public Diplomacy, includes the study of non-state actors, they remain centred around state interests. Said differently, non-state actors were considered relevant to the study of diplomacy only so far as they impacted states and their interests. The concerns and interests of non-state actors were rarely taken seriously in the study of diplomacy. The non-state actors were seen as potential contributors to or detractors to state-based diplomacy.

A theoretical overview of the field also helped establish this point by revealing that two traditions of thought dominated Diplomatic Studies. The first was the English School of International Relations, while the second was the concept of soft power. Most academic work within the field that explicitly engaged with theoretical concepts made connections to the English School (Neumann 2003), while the nascent sub-field of Public Diplomacy based its foundations on the concept of soft power (Snow 2020). Both these traditions privileged statist accounts of

international relations and diplomacy. However, these traditional accounts have been disrupted through post-structural interventions (Constantinou 1996), literature on Indigenous Diplomacies (Beier 2009a; Franke 2009), and recent questions from feminist perspectives on diplomacy (Aggestam and Towns 2019; Standfield 2020). Though still occupying marginal spaces in the academic field, these critically oriented interventions provide some hope that there is space for questions relevant to societal non-state actors within Diplomatic Studies.

Chapter two contributes to unsettling the state-centrism in Diplomatic Studies by outlining an operational and normative framework for the concept of Other Diplomacies. While the operational definition of Other Diplomacies relies on a functional approach to diplomacy, its normative framing centres on societal non-state actors. Its functional approach to diplomacy prioritises what state-based diplomats do rather than who they are (Young and Henders 2012). Therefore, the functions of communication and negotiations form the basis of its operational definition as a concept that examines the interactions between societal non-state actors as they mediate across perceived boundaries of differences. While their definition opens up the possibility to consider a broad range of interactions between societal non-state actors, including those in which they are not necessarily aware of engaging in mediating across different identities, this dissertation acknowledges Other Diplomacies only when societal non-state actors are conscious of mediating their identities or consciously reading the identities of others. I narrowed Young and Henders' (2012) definition to prevent scholars from interpreting the interactions between societal non-state actors in ways that they themselves do not. The operational focus on interactions between societal non-state actors provides a fundamental shift away from the state-centred definitions of diplomacy in traditional accounts of the field.

While the operational definition of Other Diplomacies provides a non-traditional approach in the field, its normative framings must also be considered if the state-centrism in Diplomatic Studies is to be unsettled. Normative framings are crucial to Other Diplomacies because interactions between societal non-state actors can be subsumed within a state-centric focus. For example, research into the experiences of societal non-state actors in study abroad programs showed that both analyses reveal similar findings but came to a different conclusion regarding the role of the state. The Public Diplomacy approach argued that the state, Canada, in this case, pays more attention to study abroad programs because they have great potential to positively enhance Canada's image abroad (Tiessen 2010). On the other hand, the Other Diplomacies approach argued that the Canadian state had an obligation to reciprocate by assisting more Cuban students in visiting Canada on exchange programs (Dubinsky 2018). While the former was concerned with promoting Canada's soft power, the latter focused on its reciprocal obligations that would benefit students from another state. Therefore, this example demonstrates the need to ground Other Diplomacies in its normative framing because its distinction relies not only on researching societal non-state actors but also on centring them and their interests, issues and possible solutions.

I relied on three categories of academic literature in framing operational and normative definitions for Other Diplomacies. The first category included literature that explicitly engaged with the concept; the second included literature identified as Other Diplomacies work though their authors did not explicitly engage with the concept; the third category consisted of literature from the discipline of Anthropology engaged with non-state diplomatic actors. While the first category, particularly the work of Mary Young and Susan Henders, provided a basis for Other Diplomacies, literature from the other two categories provided much of the basis for the

normative framework. The most crucial aspect of the normative framework was sustaining a centred focus on societal non-state actors rather than states. Engaging with all three categories of literature, especially the second and third, provided insight into how this dissertation could research Other Diplomacies.

The third chapter transitioned the dissertation to a discussion surrounding research methods. I showed that most of the Other Diplomacies literature, identified in the second chapter, relied on ethnographic methods to investigate. Additionally, ethnography is well-positioned as a research method to investigate interactions between societal non-state actors. While ethnography has the aesthetics of an emancipatory research method, an uncritical approach can often strengthen the researcher's position as an authoritative voice over their participants' lives. While it is possible to minimise the problematic aspects of ethnographic work, they cannot be eliminated. Therefore, I outline the case selection, my positionality in relation to the participants, and an overview of my fieldwork in this chapter. Researching the Other Diplomacies of Sri Lankan migrant workers in South Korea was the most convenient choice, given that I shared several distinctions of nationality, language, race, and gender with most of them. However, the participants and I differed in terms of social class, a crucial difference that placed me in a privileged position. Many of the participants came from rural areas of Sri Lanka, but almost all of them were financially and socially disadvantaged. Most of my time in South Korea was spent hanging out with migrant workers, three Sri Lankan community leaders, and a few Sri Lankan graduate students. While the community leaders were long term residents and had close dealings with the migrant workers, the graduate students were among the few female participants in my fieldwork. The female graduate students were able to provide

crucial insights into the gendered nature of migrant worker identities. This chapter, therefore, engaged with methods, fieldwork, and a micro-level description of the participants.

The fourth chapter's objective was to provide a macro-level overview of the history and politics of Sri Lankan migrant workers in South Korea. British colonialism played a transformative role in Sri Lanka's economic, political and social structures. The economic structure was fundamentally transformed from a predominantly subsistence agricultural base to one that relied on exports of plantation crops such as coffee, tea, and later rubber (De Silva 2008; Wickramasinghe 2014). South Indian labourers were brought in to work in the plantations because there was a shortage of labour in Sri Lanka. This community was systemically marginalised and faced racial and class-based discrimination even after formal independence from the British Empire. Their descendants are effectively othered in Sri Lankan society and constitute a migrant worker community within the territory of their own country. While not racially discriminated against, many poor Sinhala youths faced classist discrimination when finding social and economic mobility. The migrant work opportunities that came up in the Middle East and later in South Korea provide youths marginalised on class-based grounds the possibility of social and economic mobility. These migrant workers now form a vital source of foreign exchange income for Sri Lanka, bringing in more income from their remittances than any other source.

South Korea also has a history, and therefore politics of labour migration. It started allowing foreign workers in the mid-1980s after their small and medium scale industries could not fill vacancies for jobs classified as dirty, difficult, and dangerous. South Korea brought new laws in 2004 that gave migrant workers rights similar to domestic workers following fears that ongoing accusations of migrant worker abuse may damage its international image. Currently,

migrant workers from sixteen countries, including Sri Lanka, work in South Korea under their Employment Permit System. The system has been lauded for its transparency and protection of migrant worker rights. However, when refocusing away from the macro-level back to the micro-level, the Employment Permit System does not appear to be as perfect as claimed by the South Korean Government. The account of a Sri Lankan migrant worker who expected to work an inland fishing job but found himself on a multi-day fishing trawler out at sea provides us with an example of what these macro-level conditions mean for actual migrant workers.

The fifth chapter begins to engage with the fieldwork and shows how Sri Lankan migrant workers in South Korea engage in Other Diplomacies. Though Sri Lankan migrant workers constitute a significant part of the state-based bilateral relationship between Sri Lanka and South Korea, they are hardly mentioned in the official communications of both governments. Sri Lankan migrant workers often imagine South Korea as a wealthy and modern first-world country. However, their perceptions get unsettled after realising that the work is much harder, living conditions are poorer, and the income is not as high as they thought it would be. Therefore, most migrant workers do not stay with the same employer for long, but because the visa regime requires migrant workers to obtain a ‘release letter’ from their employers, leaving a job requires diplomatic skill and the mediation of identities. A community leader who sometimes intervenes in labour disputes described how she uses a well thought out and elaborate theatrical performance to secure ‘release letters’ when the migrant worker themselves fail to do so. Her performance took into account racial, national, and religious identities. Similarly, a few migrant workers were also conscious of their nationality and strategised their exits from employment so that their employer would not be averse to hiring Sri Lankans in the future.

Additionally, the migrant workers showed an awareness of the racialised context they were operating under. There is a racial hierarchy based on skin tones and appearance that is applied among migrant workers. Vietnamese and Philipino workers were able to access better paying and more comfortable service sector jobs that were closed off to the darker-skinned Sri Lankans. Some Sri Lankans took careful steps to conform to South Korean standards of hygiene since they were aware that South Koreans considered them unclean due to their facial and body hair. Despite an awareness of the class and race-based discrimination they faced, migrant workers were not cognisant of their masculine-based perceptions of Korea. Discussions with female graduate students were vital in uncovering the gendered perceptions and identities of Sri Lankan migrant workers. This chapter, therefore, showed how Sri Lankan migrant workers engaged in Other Diplomacies within hierarchical relations of power linked to class, race, and gender.

The final chapter examined how societal non-state actors engaged in providing consular assistance. This chapter was concerned with two objectives; the first was to show that state-based consular assistance involved diplomacy, and the second was to take into account the problems and issues that were central to the experience of Sri Lankan migrant workers in South Korea and around the world. Consular affairs have been marginalised in Diplomatic Studies primarily because it deals with societal non-state actors rather than state actors. However, I argue that the provision of state-based consular assistance requires creating and maintaining relations with state and non-state actors using diplomatic skills. One of the problems associated with the study of state-based consular assistance are challenges stemming from gaining access to diplomatic spaces and concerns around the privacy rights of individual citizens who are receiving consular

assistance. Despite these challenges, the study of consular assistance as diplomacies would provide valuable insight into new sites of diplomacy.

A diplomacy-based study of consular assistance reveals that the Sri Lankan state has consistently provided inadequate consular services to its migrant worker populations. As a result, Sri Lankan migrant workers relied on each other and host-country non-state actors for consular assistance. The societal non-state actor centric approach of Other Diplomacies positions it well to study non-state consular assistance. The strict adherence to the definition of Other Diplomacies only partially reveals how societal non-state actors assist each other. Much of the consular assistance is dispensed and received among actors that share a common identity. Therefore, there is no mediation of identities that take place in many instances of consular assistance. However, within this dissertation's framework, I showed how Sri Lankan migrant workers had to mediate across national and sometimes religious identities when receiving consular assistance. Loosening the framings of Other Diplomacies while keeping a central focus on societal non-state actors can provide new and valuable insights for Diplomatic Studies that may positively impact actual living communities.

As mentioned at the start of this concluding chapter, this dissertation has taken an initial venture into engaging Other Diplomacies explicitly in fieldwork. The following section will examine possible future research avenues that arise from this dissertation.

7.2: The Future of Other Diplomacies

There are two important points I would like to highlight under this section. The first point is that Other Diplomacies should sustain its normative focus on human-centrism, something I already made clear in the second chapter. Losing sight of the human-centric approach that places

human interests, issues, and possible solutions at the heart of Other Diplomacies scholarship would risk relegating it to just one more category of the many existing hyphenated diplomacies in the field. It also means that Other Diplomacies literature will have to constantly justify its existence in relation to other more well-established categories such as citizen diplomacy and public diplomacy that privilege the state. Therefore, at a foundational level, Other Diplomacies should sustain its human-centric normative focus.

Secondly, the future of Other Diplomacies lies in expanding its operational definition to take into account the interactions between societal non-state actors and state actors. The sixth chapter provided an inkling of the limitations of restricting the Other Diplomacies' gaze to interactions between societal non-state actors who see each other as different. It meant that I investigated only the societal non-state actor interactions, thus leaving out how migrant workers employed their diplomatic skills during interactions with official diplomats. An investigation into how migrant workers deployed their diplomatic skills in navigating the power hierarchies between them and consular officers could have provided new insight into consular diplomacies, focusing on the interests of the societal non-state actors. The result would reveal how states, through their consular and diplomatic missions abroad, impact the lives of their citizens in distress. Examining the interactions between Sri Lankan migrant workers and consular officers would have uncovered how the former use their diplomatic skills to navigate race, class, and gender-based power hierarchies. Thus, it provides an avenue to critique the state's approach to meeting its obligations to protect its citizens abroad and highlight human-centric issues.

Additionally, broadening the operational definition of other Diplomacies to include state actors can be extended to include various other actors such as corporates, international organisations, and even non-governmental organisations. All these different types of actors

would, however, not be the centre of concern. Instead, the centre of scholarship would remain on the societal non-state actors who interact across different identities to represent, communicate and negotiate their interests to these other actors.

7.3: Other Diplomacies and International Relations

This section of the dissertation has two objectives. The first is to address the critique that the dissertation may lie outside the academic discipline of International Relations, and the second is to show how it makes contributions towards the wider discipline. These two objectives are related and ultimately seek to make the case that Other Diplomacies and this dissertation are relevant to the discipline of International Relations, beyond the field of Diplomatic Studies.

First, however, it is important to remind ourselves that academic disciplines and their sub-fields such as International Relations and Diplomatic Studies were constructed centring states to privilege particular ontologies. As already discussed in the first chapter (sections 1.4), traditional Diplomatic Studies literature arbitrarily defined diplomacy to the realm of state-based actors, though it was clear that non-state actors also engaged in diplomacy. For example, though Hedley Bull [1977](2002) started by defining diplomacy as a function limited to state actors, he soon expanded it to include international organisations and even “political groups which are not widely recognised as states...” (157). To a critical reader, Bull’s (2002, 156-160) discussions around diplomacy make it clear that restricting its definition to state-actors resulted from a necessity to provide a concrete and parsimonious definition that would fit into the English School’s concept of an International Society rather than from a desire to reflect the multiple actors and situations in which it actually operates. The same is true of International Relations, which has been framed quite arbitrarily around state sovereignty (Walker 1992), utilising fictitious narratives to normalise its Eurocentric, capitalist, and masculine ontologies that obscure

the workings of racialised, classist and gendered power hierarchies (Chowdhry and Nair 2002). Therefore, when discussing the relevance of Other Diplomacies or this dissertation to International Relations, it is important to bear in mind the arbitrariness with which the academic discipline itself has been framed and the power relations that it privileges.

Whether Other Diplomacies, and this dissertation, can be considered as International Relations arises because it decentres the state, and therefore the argument follows, also the ‘International’. However, while Other Diplomacies decentres the state, the concept does not claim the state or the international to be irrelevant to societal non-state actors. Instead, as this dissertation clarifies, the Other Diplomacies of Sri Lankan migrant workers and their South Korean interlocutors occur within the context of the bilateral labour agreement between the two states. Migrant workers have to mediate across identities utilising diplomatic skills because their immediate circumstances result from the terms and conditions of the bilateral labour agreement. For example, chapters four and five showed how the work visa regime required migrant workers to obtain approval from their employers to resign. Failure to do so automatically criminalises them, causing them to lose their visa status and with it the right to regulated pay rates, not to mention the possibility of deportation. It is within these same international circumstances that migrant workers feel that they had to project a feminized identity (section 5.7) so that their South Korean employers would see them as docile and compliant workers, rather than masculine and assertive ‘trouble makers’. Further, the fourth chapter showed how the migrant workers’ circumstances were the outcome of much longer and wider histories that included European, and to a certain extent Japanese, colonialism and the effects of a capitalist global economy that drives labour migration from impoverished locations to relatively wealthy ones. Therefore, this dissertation shows how inter-personal and inter-societal interactions between Sri Lankan migrant

workers and their South Korean interlocutors are governed by ‘International’ hierarchical power relations based on colonialism, capitalism, and gender (Enloe 2004; Young and Henders 2012; Chowdhry and Nair 2002).

Additionally, the fourth, fifth and sixth chapters, when read together, show how states rely on inter-personal and inter-societal relations to sustain their international hegemonic status. This dissertation shows how the International, in the form of states and corporate actors, rely on the marginalised personal circumstances of the migrant workers to sustain their hegemonic status (Enloe 2004). Chapter four laid out how essential migrant labourers are to sustaining the Sri Lankan economy through their foreign exchange remittances; similarly, the chapter explained how South Korea’s small and medium scale industries rely on migrant labourers to fill vacancies in the dirty, difficult and dangerous jobs category. The inter-personal and societal relations between migrant workers and other non-state actors who provide consular assistance (chapter 6) not only help sustain the migrant workers but also unwittingly help sustain the hegemonic actors, including states and owners of capital who are responsible for creating the vulnerable conditions under which the migrant workers operate. The consular assistance provided by non-state actors helps migrant workers become resilient when faced with challenges or distress, ensuring minimum disruption to production processes. This shows that the International creates the conditions under which inter-personal and inter-societal relations operate and relies on those personal relations to sustain their hegemonic status (ibid). Therefore, though this dissertation centres around inter-personal and inter-societal relations, it does so from an International Relations framework that examines power hierarchies based on race, class, and gender.

This dissertation contributes to the wider discipline of International Relations in two ways. The first is that it contributes to unsettling the statist ontologies of International Relations.

While much work has been done to challenge the Realist-oriented mainstream of International Relations, its hegemonic ontologies remain powerful. Given that Diplomatic Studies has carved out its niche within the broader discipline of International Relations, this dissertation's intervention in the field also impacts the wider discipline. Therefore, when the hegemonic ontologies of Diplomatic Studies are unsettled, the impact extends to International Relations. Secondly, the dissertation's contributions to interventions in the area of Consular Affairs add to Diplomatic Studies and the scholarship on International Relations. As I pointed out in the sixth chapter, running a Consular Affairs operation involves initiating and maintaining extensive engagements with state and non-state actors in the host country. These are crucial links essential to assisting citizens abroad who are in distress which are often ignored owing to being perceived as 'low' politics. However, as pointed out in chapter six, they do constitute international relations. Therefore, this dissertation is relevant to and contributes to the broader field of International Relations.

7.4: Future Research Agenda

Focusing on Other Diplomacies by centring societal non-state actors provides several new opportunities for research. One of the most significant issues that can be discussed from this perspective is the issue of consular assistance. As I mentioned in chapter six, evidence points to the substantial consular assistance provided by societal non-state actors. Marsden's (2016) study of Afghan traders and my own study of migrant Sri Lankan workers in South Korea revealed that societal non-state actors sharing the same national and racial identities extended and received assistance during times of distress. It also works to create a community and shape that community's identity, as I observed from the participants. The significance of such research

would be to show how states are failing in one of their primary diplomatic roles, that of protecting their citizens abroad.

Secondly, I have already extensively discussed the case that consular work must be seen as diplomacy. Its diplomatic character can be excavated through the relations that consular officers have to maintain with state and non-state actors to assist their citizens abroad effectively. These relations occur in non-traditional locations of diplomacy that generally have no predefined norms of behaviour and require consular officials to deploy diplomatic skills in order to build and sustain them. While this does not directly contribute to the concept of Other Diplomacies, it makes a case for uncovering new and non-traditional sites of diplomacy.

Though not directly related to Other Diplomacies, a major problem that arose when surveying the state of the field was the Eurocentrism in Diplomatic Studies. As I mentioned in the first chapter, scholars such as Opondo (2018; 2016; 2010) have already engaged with this issue. However, other scholars within the Diplomatic Studies field have not engaged with his writings. Instead, prominent scholars in the field, such as Neumann (2019), have described Eurocentrism as a problem that can be ‘combated’ by increasing non-western scholarship. However, this is unlikely to resolve the issue since the very practice of statist diplomacy, based on which the field operates, is Eurocentric in character.

Taking serious note of Opondo’s (2010) lead, future research must engage with how diplomacy played a role in colonial encounters. To be clear, this would not be an attempt to overcome Eurocentrism in the field but to lay bare its existence that so often is hidden under cover of state-centrism. For example, Opondo (2010) discusses how Christian missionaries, societal non-state actors themselves, and European colonial officers worked to erase non-Christian and non-state modes of diplomacies that existed in pre-colonial Africa. Similar

investigations into other parts of the world can reveal how western diplomatic practices were normalised through colonialism. Additionally, during formal decolonisation periods, newly independent countries had to rely on their colonial masters to establish and maintain state-based diplomatic relations. For example, Sri Lanka's early diplomats were trained by the United Kingdom, and some diplomatic missions were run out of British embassies and consulates (Mendis 1983). This ensured the adaptation of not only European diplomatic practices but specifically those of the western block. Thus, it would explicitly reveal how Eurocentrism operated rather than offering the sanitised version of the English School, which claims that the rest of the world adopted European diplomatic practices because they were convinced of its superiority (Sharp 2009).

However, as it stands now, the field of Diplomatic Studies remains one that is masculine, state-centric, and Eurocentric. Much work remains to be done to unsettle and uncover these framings. This dissertation was a first step in such an approach. There are encouraging signs in the form of Indigenous Diplomacies and feminist interventions that contribute to this project. Therefore, Other Diplomacies should sustain their societal non-state centric framings to support and contribute to the unsettling of state-centrism of Diplomatic Studies.

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