

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

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THE PROBLEM OF EVIL.

Brief Outline,

Chapter I.

Introduction.

- I An age-long question
- II Obstacle to systems of thought
- III Seemingly inscluble. Is it?
- IV Its importance for practical virtues.

Chapter II

Nature of Evil. What

- I Physical, (a) In Nature
(b) In Humanity
- II Moral, (a) Relative
(b) Negative
(c) Illusive
(d) Positive (1) Partial
(2) Necessary
(3) Awful
(4) Wilful

Chapter III

Place of Evil. Where.

- I Extra-Terrestrial. ~~X~~emonology not proven.
- II Terrestrial (a) Nature
(b) Man (1) Body
(2) Mind
(c) God

Chapter IV

Origin of Evil. Whence

- I Dualism. (a) Fate
(b) Satan
(c) Matter
- II Deity. Defect in His
(a) Thinking - Unconscious
(b) Character
- III Man (a) Heredity (1) Original Sin
(2) A necessity
(3) Fall story
(b) Development, Psychological Genesis,
Physical growth.
(c) Free-will, "Dread gift."

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THE PROBLEM OF EVIL.

Chapter I.

Introduction.

Among all the great problems concerning human life and destiny that have engaged the eager attention of the mind of man none have been more fascinating in their interest, or baffling in their nature, than the ancient, but perennially modern problem of evil. Its subdued and sombre lights have ever exerted a profound and mysterious influence upon man in his more serious and meditative moments. The common man has recognized, sometimes with a dull despair, sometimes with a fiery resentment, the persistent oppression of evil in his life. The great thinker has striven to comprehend its meaning, and to pierce the veil that screens from mortal eyes its mighty mysteries. Both alike have recognized its pervasive and oppressive presence. It seems indeed that man is born to trouble as the sparks fly upward.

Every consistent system of thought that has sought to explain the world as it is, has found in the problem of evil either a serious stumbling block or an insuperable obstacle. When once the question is raised to which Augustine sought anxiously the answer, "Whence was evil?" (1) then difficulties at once arise. If the world is a unit, and in the light of modern thought and achievement we must affirm it ~~so~~, then how the discord of evil first arose, or, as Lodge puts it, how the grit got into the cosmic organism is indeed a hard question. (2)

To the earlier Hebrew sages the origin of evil was no problem since all evil, as well as all good, was ascribed directly to Jehovah, both materially evil and pernicious acts. But as the standard of morality was raised Jewish thought found itself face to face with the dilemma against which the human intellect vainly beats its wings, like a bird against the bars of its cage. (3) In the great drama of Job the writer sets forth the problem with all its bitter sting. "In the fell clutch of circumstance" a noble soul seeks vainly a solution to his suffering. He repudiates the old solution that the good never suffer. Yet he does not draw the conclusion that God is lacking either in justice or in power, and he is therefore driven to an agnostic position. He does not know the reason for his suffering. It is a mystery that he cannot solve. (4)

The Greek thinkers were also sorely perplexed by the presence of evil in the world. Even Plato, perhaps the most spiritual of them all, had admit inconsistently a secondary principle into the universe. This made his world a virtual dualism, and marred the splendid idealistic structure he had raised.

And no less is it a hard problem for the modern philosopher or theologian. One may hold with Hoffding, that the essence of existence is that through all changes no value is ever lost. "But in order to completely verify and establish the axiom of the conservation of value it would be necessary to shew that nothing in the course of the world is merely a mean~~z~~ or a possibility, still less a mere hindrance, but that on the contrary, that which possesses mediate worth has always immediate value also, and that all hindrances are also means." (5) To us at present, with our limited outlook and finite expression such a demonstration is of course impossible.

(1) Augustine Confessions, Page 123.

(2) Lodge, Man and the Universe, Page 123.

(3) W. H. Bennett, Expositors Bible-Chron. I & II Pages 288-289

(4) Pratt, Psychology of Religious Belief, Pages 133-134

(5) Hoffding, Philosophy of Religion, Page 223.

A strictly monistic or dualistic system is hard to maintain in the face of evil, and rarely indeed has either been held with complete consistency. The monist loses all distinction between right and wrong, good and evil, in his absolute. The dualist has evil, or evil beings, existing eternally with God. From both positions the average thoughtful man recoils. He refuses to accept either an annulling of morality, or two eternal principles, Good and Evil, existing side by side. Either of these solutions seem to him equally unthinkable.

And yet even a modified monism finds a difficulty with evil, especially if it holds with Fraser, that Omnipotent Goodness is at the core of the universe. Such a view has still to face, with Browning, the hypothesis that universal love is incompatible with any kind of evil, whether natural or moral. (6) As the Pluralist says, Philosophical Theism tends towards Pantheism, and then it has difficulty with evil. Like everything else it (evil) must have its foundation in God, and this is hard to see if God is absolutely good. (7) This is indeed the supreme difficulty which theistic faith and hope encounter in a universe, which at least on this planet, presents a strange mixture of what is bad with what is good. (8) But every man who would frame a satisfactory Theodicy, and "Justify the ways of God to men" must at least attempt to surmount this ancient obstacle. He cannot blink the fact that pain seems distributed capriciously: that ignorance and error are more common than intellectual insight: and that there are wicked human acts which contradict the ethical ideal, and are therefore absolutely evil. He must face the question how the Universal Power can be all good if that Power is revealed in a world which contains such evil. (9)

To many the shadows that gather around the problem seem to render it incapable of solution by human minds. Lotze says concerning it that we know that evil has taken hold upon us, and that sin runs through the whole race. But it is a problem at which we unsuccessfully labor. Our finite wisdom is the end of our tether when we decide concerning the power or wisdom of God. The light of Goodness and the shadow of Evil are both alike unintelligible. (10) Such a summary dismissal of the problem is not satisfactory. True it may be indeed that our wisdom is finite, but who shall set the limits even for that finiteness? We must ever be employing its powers and enlarging its sphere, even in the face of difficulties. Although the argument for the wisdom of the Creator, drawn from the evidence of design in the world, may not be helped by certain classes of phenomena, such as the suffering of animals and the innocent, and the almost insurmountable evil influences that have surrounded most of the race, (11) not lightly can we lay aside the evidences of wisdom that are patent to our intelligence. Nor can we refuse to consider their weighty suggestiveness as to the ultimate rationality of the universe. And if it is rational at heart then the problem of evil cannot be finally and absolutely a problem insoluble.

It is to the glory of man that he can make a problem of evil. No question becomes a problem until the light of reason is brought to play upon it. To lightly accept a thing in its entirety affords no problem, but it does become one when the ground has to be contested for step by step. And only by such struggles can the free spirit of man rise to higher levels. Already from the strivings of the past some light is being shed on the gloomy problem of evil. The absolute relation of evil to the divine sovereignty is one of the problems of the ultimate nature of God and man. (12) And we have come to know that God and man are closely akin. God is the absolute principle of the world, and our life is a reproduction and a realization of the self of the Great Spirit. (13) As our spirits develop and rise toward fulness of life and being we understand and appreciate this the more. We know God, His life is our life, and we are

- (6) Henry Jones, Browning as a Philosophical and Religious Teacher - Pg 230
- (7) Jones, Varieties of Religious Experience - Page 131
- (8) Fraser, Philosophy of Theism - Page 247
- (9) Fraser, Philosophy of Theism - Page 253
- (10) Lotze, Microcosmus - Page 433
- (11) Pratt, Psychology of Religious Belief - Pages 188-189
- (12) W.H. Bennett, Expositors Bible - Chro. I & II Page 282
- (13) Blewett, Christian View of the World - Page 257

essential factors in His own self-conscious existence, without which the very life of God would be incomplete. (14)

It is indeed true that in certain stages of Christian experience the dualism it contains seems hopeless and irreconcilable. Men are involved in sin by the very process by which they become men, but reconciliation glimmers in the doctrine of Incarnation and Redemption. (15) Christianity proclaims that salvation is possible to all through Christian love and faith. In those elements the spirit of man holds implicitly a solution. Soteriology implies a solution to the Problem of Evil. (16) Perhaps a satisfactory Theodicy is possible only to the Christian viewpoint, although a complete Theodicy is impossible on earth. (17)

Although it may be impossible to solve completely, once and for all, the problem of evil, and although in dealing with it the religious consciousness has always to contend with the difficulty why the means to the development and preservation of the valuable should be necessary, and why the valuable should not exist immediately, (18) yet the mind of man can never rest content with shelving it. Although he were doomed to endless circular reasoning concerning the moral perfection of God in relation to evil (19) he would continually be striving to enlarge the circle. If it should be true that no religious reconciliation with absolute totality of things is ~~the~~ possible, because while some evils are ministerial to higher forms of good others may be so extreme as to be incapable of entering any good system whatsoever (20) even then man must face the problem and attempt the reconciliation. And he must reach some conclusions concerning it, although they be not final. The great fact of evil enters into daily life. As we think towards it so will our actions be. And if for no other reason it would demand careful consideration and deep pondering, because of its meaning and bearing on the great virtues of courage, endurance, resignation, and hope. (21)

Chapter II.

THE NATURE OF EVIL.

THE WHAT.

As we turn our attention to the nature of evil we become conscious that all evils are not of the same kind. Neither are they of equal importance for a proper view of life. The field is seen to divide into two distinct and separate divisions. These divisions have been regarded by some as almost mutually exclusive, sin being held to be a problem in humanity, and evil a problem in divinity. (22) But they are so closely related and so intertwined that it seems not merely needless, but well-nigh impossible, to separate them. The ills of fortune and moral ills are not to be sundered. Moral ill often becomes a source of ill fortune, physical evil is frequently ~~conclusive~~ ^{conclusive} to moral evil. They are inseparably linked aspects of the temporal order. (23) For purposes of examination however, it will be convenient for us to look at each class by itself.

There is first the great class of physical, or perhaps better, non-moral evils. The cosmic process produces effects that we are apt to regard as evil. Storm and tempest, fire and flood, the fiery outburst of volcano,

- (14) Tom Broeke, Construction Basis for Theology - Page 209
- (15) Blewett, Christian View of the World - Page 20-37
- (16) Blewett, Christian View of the World - Page 257
- (17) Van Oosterzee, Christian Dogmatics I - Page 346
- (18) Hoffding, The Philosophy of Religion - Page 226
- (19) Ladd, Knowledge, Life and Reality - Page 483-484
- (20) James, Varieties of Religious Experiences - Page 164
- (21) Royce, The World and the Individual II - Page 280
- (22) Lodge, Reason and Belief - Page 102
- (23) Royce, The World and the Individual II -Page 387-389

and the ravening maw of tremulous earthquake, are all looked on with dreadful that yet are harmful. But there are evils less powerful than these, evil being that which destroys and corrupts. Iron is consumed by rust; wheat is made useless by smut; animal bodies are attacked by disease germs. (24) Throughout the realm of Nature we see life maintaining itself by death, and strength preying on weakness. Nature is "Red in tooth and claw with ravine," and has been since the prehistoric days of the "Dragons of the primeval world is limited by their constitution; that provision may be made for easing their pain, (as the hypnotism of the snake for its victim) and that they do not suffer so much as we suppose. (25) And yet there is withal much pain and suffering in the brute creation.

And how wide-spread is the reign of pain and suffering among men! The hapless poverty of the lowest classes; the dumb, helpless suffering of little children; the apathetic misery of women in sweat-shops; the pain-wracked lives of bed-ridden invalids, all these appeal for relief from the dolorous, fateful wheel of existence to which they are bound. Such pain may be an evoker, or even correlate, of pity and sympathy, it may even be a natural and divinely appointed means for the education of the spiritual life; (26) but to the hapless sufferer, often innocent and unrelieved, such consolation and comfort would be cold and barren indeed.

The field of non-moral evils presents us with harsh and bitter problems but the bitterness is increased when we enter the sphere of moral evil. And this is after all the great problem. Physical ills are but secondary and minor compared to the moral ills of life.

Is moral evil merely a relative thing? It has been said that good and evil are relative ideas. The former is identical with the agreeable, the latter with the disagreeable. Absolute good, absolute evil are so many chimeras of the theological mind and metaphysics. (27) It is undoubtedly true that natural evils are largely relative. Dirt is matter misplaced. A weed to the botanist is not the pest that it is to the farmer. (28) Pain is a salutary danger signal. And in the realm of ethics the standards of morality have not been static or invariable. They have varied in different climes and ages, and yet we must hold that essentially they were invariable. The essence of good is to satisfy demands. That is good therefore which will satisfy most demands at once. (29) The moral good is that which satisfies the desires of a moral agent, or that in which a moral agent can find the satisfaction of himself which he necessarily seeks. (30) And fundamental to all life and conduct is the relation of the moral agent to the world of his fellows, and to the Absolute Spirit in whom the universe of finite spirits live, and move, and have their being. No man therefore, liveth unto himself alone. Jacobi therefore we cannot follow when, in reply to Fichte, he refuses all measures of right and wrong, except the determinations of the private spirit. (31) Neither can we agree with Hobbes that evil is merely relative. In fact we must reject all views of life and conduct based on a materialistic position. As Fraser has clearly shewn, the consistent materialist loses all distinctions of right and wrong, good and evil, in a wild eternal whirl of cosmic atoms. (32)

Evil has been held by some thinkers to be a mere negation. Scotus Erigena declares that since there is no real being outside of God, Evil has no substantial existence. It is the absence of good, life, and being. (33)

- (24) Plato, Republic - Page 354
- (25) Ladd, Knowledge, Life and Reality - Page 484
- (26) Fraser, Philosophy of Theism - Page 258
- (27) Hobbes, in Weber. History of Philosophy - Page 304
- (28) Lodge, The Substance of Faith - Page 46
- (29) James, The Will to Believe - Page 201
- (30) Green, Prolegomena to Ethics - Page 195
- (31) Emerson, Representative Men - Page 347
- (32) Fraser, Philosophy of Theism - Page 59
- (33) Weber, History of Philosophy - Page 208

God is the essence of all things and persons in which they must at last eternally and unconsciously repose. (34) But all these speculations, bold and daring though they be, are a mere philosophic dream offered without proof and indifferent to the demands of human experience. (35) Before Frigena, Plotinus, in talking over the old idea of matter being evil, had said that matter may be regarded as evil in the sense of absolute lack or want of the good, from which it follows that all that really is is good. Souls are evil only if they give themselves over to matter, that is, affirm the utter absence of good. But such a material sub-stratum as the source of evil is only a creature of logical abstraction. (36) It does not suffice to answer the imperative needs of daily life. Evil must always be more than a negation. A cruel purpose exists as a positive fact in the mental experience of the one cherishing it. (37)

We may be led to ask whether, while being not a mere negation but a real experience, evil may be an illusory experience, having the shadow and semblance of reality, but not its substance. The mystic so views it, with the result that he is led either to a glaring self-contradiction, or else to an Antinonian view of life that permits of any conduct whatsoever. (38) To the Christian Scientist evil is simply a lie, although in so calling it he is guilty of a bad speculative omission. (39) The Pantheistic views of Spinoza lead also to the idea that evil is illusory. Evil and good both vanish when seen "sub species aeternitatis." But logical pantheism is inconsistent with human ideals of moral goodness, and with real evil. God must be perfect; therefore whoever and whatever exists must likewise be perfect, since all is in God, Nero and Jesus are equally divine. But remorse witnesses to the existence of facts of which the Universal Power cannot be the origin, unless that Power be evil, which Spinoza would not admit. Our moral experience disrupts pantheistic unity and necessity. (40) The human conscience is a bulwark for theistic faith, as opposed to pantheism.

A somewhat similar fate meets Browning's pantheistic optimism. He holds that moral evil is somehow a form of the good, since all things are good. Evil is only illusory, and yet it is a necessary means to the good by inciting to action. (41) At the same time we don't know positively that evils are evil, neither do we need to know. In fact it is better for us to be thus in ignorance, because if we had clear knowledge that evil was only illusory, it would paralyze all moral effort. (42) But this view is also wrecked in running athwart the hard, cold, and bitter facts of human knowledge, life, and reality. The empirical test shatters it.

With slightly different turns and emphases other thinkers have expressed somewhat similar views. Thus John Caird says, "The position of the man who has entered on the religious life is that evil, error, imperfection, do not really belong to him; they are excrescences which have no relation to his true nature; they are already virtually, as they will be actually, suppressed and annulled, and in the very process of being annulled, they become the means of spiritual progress." (43) The Transcendentalism of Emerson is expressed in similar phrasing, "The theological problems of original sin, the origin of evil, predestination, and the like are the souls of mumps and measles, and whooping-coughs." (44) It is the chief characteristic of those whom James designates as "the healthy-minded," to be unable to feel the reality of evil. Systematic healthy-mindedness, conceiving good as the essential and universal aspect of being, deliberately excludes evil from its field of vision. (45) For such an exclusion there is a psycholog-

(34) Fraser, Philosophy of Theism - Page 84

(35) Fraser, Philosophy of Theism - Page 84

(36) Ten Broeke, A Constructive Basis for Theology - Page 45

(37) Fraser, Philosophy of Theism - Page 260

(38) Royce, World and Individual II Page 395-398

(39) James, Varieties of Religious Experience - Page 101-102

(40) James, Varieties of Religious Experience - Page 101

(41) Fraser, Philosophy of Theism - Page 434

(42) Strong, Great Poets and their Theology - Page 434

(43) H. Jones, Browning as a Philosophical and Religious Teacher

(44) H. Jones, Browning as a Philosophical and Religious Teacher

(45) H. Jones, Browning as a Philosophical and Religious Teacher

(46) H. Jones, Browning as a Philosophical and Religious Teacher

(47) H. Jones, Browning as a Philosophical and Religious Teacher

(48) H. Jones, Browning as a Philosophical and Religious Teacher

(49) H. Jones, Browning as a Philosophical and Religious Teacher

(50) H. Jones, Browning as a Philosophical and Religious Teacher

(51) H. Jones, Browning as a Philosophical and Religious Teacher

ical reason. The mind can hold but one dominant thought at once, and so when happiness is actually in possession the thought of evil can no more acquire the feeling of reality than the thought of good can gain reality when melancholy rules. (46) However healthy-mindedness is undoubtedly inadequate as a philosophical doctrine, because the evil facts for which it refuses to account are a genuine portion of reality. (47) Even although a scholar like Harnack believes that the thought of Jesus concerning evil and disease was much in line with that of the healthy-minded, (48) yet we must hold that the universe is not entirely reasonable. There is evil in the world, let pantheists and others say what they will. (49)

Evil is a positive fact in human life. Is it then a complete or only a partial fact? Royce holds that it is the latter. According to him an evil is, in general, a fact that sends us to some other for its own justification, and for the satisfaction of our will, and this applies without exception to every finite fact, as finite. Any temporal fact is essentially more or less dissatisfying and so evil. (50) All finite facts are evil in so far as when, taken in themselves, they have no complete meaning, and leave us in disquietude searching still for the Other, i.e. for true Being in its wholeness. No finite fact is a total evil, since it forms with other finite facts the total life in which the Absolute is fulfilled. (51) Such is Royce's view of evil based on his idealistic system, that can find no rest or satisfaction in time, because it must embrace a completed universe in its totality. It seems indeed that the finite spirit is robbed of true individuality and freedom. (52) And is it true that every evil act is dissatisfying and incomplete? Was the wounding of the traveller to Jericho not a completed act? and were not the thieves satisfied with their booty, supposing they got any? Furthermore if every finite act is evil was the relief of the good Samaritan no better than the attack of the robbers? It seems impossible to maintain that every finite act is bad, or the cup of cold water could not receive commendation. Neither does it seem altogether true to life to explain our fragmentary experiences, sorrows, hopes, and fears, as being simply factors in the All-inclusive Self. We must, to a large extent, sympathize with the Pragmatist in his attack on the Idealist for gliding over the problem of sin and evil. (53) The facts relating to Knowledge, Life and Reality, as both James and Ladd insist, can never safely be divorced from the empirical test.

Is evil a necessary fact in human life? Hegel says that it is. It is a stage in the development of the individual that must be passed through if there is to be advance from innocence to virtue. It begins with the consciousness of right and wrong, and is therefore the fruit of reflection. In fact, because of this, ~~evil~~ is itself evil. Evil is thus a profound and radical fact in the development of the free spirit. The divine Spirit comes to consciousness of itself only in man, and in order to do so must pass through the stages of finitude before the finite is annulled in the Infinite. (54) It is not easy to see how to successfully evade the force of Hegel's contention that evil is thus necessary. We know indeed that the story of the Fall is a picture of each individual life. The road from innocence to virtue seems to be well-nigh impossible to imagine without evil. In any case even if we cannot say absolutely that evil must be actual, it is at least certain that it must be possible. The development of moral personality is not possible without the ability to exercise choice for good or ill.

Hegel does bring out also what after all is the core and essence of moral evil, viz. that it is essentially selfishness. The man who enforces

- (46) James, Varieties of Religious Experience, Page 88
- (47) James, Varieties of Religious Experience, Page 163
- (48) James, Varieties of Religious Experience, Page 100
- (49) A.J. Jones, Rudolf Eucken, Page 20
- (50) Royce, World and Individual II, Page 380-381
- (51) Royce, World and Individual II, Page 363
- (52) Ten Broeke, Constructive Basis for Theology, Page 337
- (53) Ten Broeke, Constructive Basis for Theology, Page 297
- (54) Hegel, Philosophy of Religion III, Page 547

he claims of his particularity, his selfishness, or selfness, is evil, he declares. (55) Again, he says, the infinite, which exalts itself to the infinite without renouncing its own individuality is mere abstract identity, inherently evil, the supreme form of untruth, falsehood, and evil. (56) In other words that man is evil who refuses to renounce his own natural impulses desires, and will, and identify himself with the life of God. (57)

We must hold then that moral evil is a positive fact in life, and that its essence is selfishness. Moral evil is not an abstraction. It is actually found in the lives of human persons who occupy this planet. (58) Indeed to many it is not a mere fact, but a fact of awful reality. To "the morbid-minded" evil is no mere relation of the subject to particular outer things, but something more radical and general; a wrongness or vice in his essential nature which no alteration of the environment, or any superficial rearrangement of the inner life can cure, and which needs a supernatural remedy. (59) In its extreme form it is not the conception or intellectual perception of evil, but the grisly, blood-freezing, heart-palsying sensation of it close upon one, and no other conception or sensation is able to live for a moment in its presence. (60)

And essentially it is selfishness. Sin is a deliberate and wilful act of a free agent, who sees the better but chooses the worse, and therefore acts injuriously both for himself and others. Selfishness is the tap root. (61) It is true that conditions are sometimes much against making a good choice, and yet it is also true that circumstances out of which a good man will make stepping stones to heaven, a bad man will turn into a pathway to hell. The responsibility for this however, rests not with God, but with men. (62) The rupture in the moral universe has come through the misuse of what Dante called "the dread gift of free-will." It is the resistance of the particular will to the Absolute will. The wrong lies not in seeking satisfaction, but seeking it outside of and against the whole, instead of in and with the whole. It seeks to make itself the whole, instead of subordinating itself to the whole as a ministrant member. (63) And so moral evil in its selfishness is anti-social. Not merely is the well-being of the agent involved, but of society too. It militates against true selfhood by inducing in the agent and in others conditions which prevent the normal life, (64) As such it is not only self-perversion of the will, it is also essentially vile and contemptible. (65)

Chapter III

THE PLACE OF EVIL.

THE WHERE.

Where is Evil to be found? Are we to suppose that it is to be found only on our earth, or is it a fact so profound and radical not likely to be found throughout the far-flung universe? We can say that it is not necessarily confined to this planet, that is like a grain of sand compared with the myriad worlds around it. We cannot know that the possession of moral agents is a peculiarity of this planet alone in the stellar universe.

A belief in the existence of an evil spiritual hierarchy under a powerful leader has been very generally accepted in all ages. It has entered into the master-pieces of the world's literature, as in Dante and Paradise

- (55) Hegel, Philosophy of Religion - I- Page 133
- (56) Hegel, Philosophy of Religion - I- Page 193
- (57) Ten Broeke, A Constructive Basis for Theology- Page 197
- (58) Fraser, Philosophy of Theism - Page 262
- (59) James, Varieties of Religious Experience - Page 134
- (60) James, Varieties of Religious Experience - Page 162
- (61) Lodge, The Substance of Faith - Page 52
- (62) A.W. Momerie, The Origin of Evil - Page 52
- (63) Pflügerer, Philosophy of Religion-Vol. II Page 25-26
- (64) Ten Broeke, Constructive Basis for Theology- Page 345
- (65) Strong, Great Poets and their Theology - Page 132

lost. Persian dualism is based on it. Christianity accepted it. "We wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against the spiritual hosts of wickedness in the heavenlies." (66) It has been a popular tenet of belief down through the ages.

Doubtless it took its rise in the primitive philosophy of animism that ascribed all phenomena to personal agents, good or bad. Later the ideas were hypostatized and given individual embodiment as in Ahriman and Ormuzd of Parseeism.

We cannot deny the possibility of the existence of such beings as Satan. Daub in his Judas Iscariot argued that a finite evil presupposes an absolute evil, and the absolute evil, as real, must be in a person. Ruskin says, "I leave you to call this deceiving spirit what you like, or to theorize about it as you like. All that I desire you to recognize is the fact of its being here, and the need of its being fought the deadly reality of the thing is with us and warring against us." (67)

But on the other hand we cannot affirm the necessity for such a belief. The evidence needful to establish it is, and must likely always remain, totally insufficient. Hegel shews that the Romans in their religious beliefs did not get to "The abstraction called the devil, abstract evil and wickedness in an absolutely definite form." (68) Kant regarded the devil as a personification of the radical evil in man. Schloiermacher held that the problem remained to seek evil rather in self than in Satan. Hoffding declares the idea of devil to be a symbol which is employed under the influence of experiences where that which is of value to man is assailed. (69) If such a community of spirits exist, then Evil will undoubtedly be found among them. Their existence is however, not proven. And such a belief is not required by the Practical Reason as a postulate needful to explain the world, as are the postulates of Immortality, Freedom, and God.

Evil is at least found on this planet. Does it extend to both animate and inanimate nature? The old view that made matter the source of evil had to affirm that it did. The modern view, that makes of the universe a universe, affirms the same truth, with reservations, though for vastly different reasons. All nature shares in the suffering of men. "The world itself is the great Flagellant which ceases not to scourge its bleeding limbs as a punishment for its sins, Most truly where-ever the stars shine does a universal sorrow pervade all the vixens of nature." (70) *mine*

Parseeism also affirmed that the struggle between good and evil pervades all nature as well as human life. (71) Paul declared too, that the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together. (72) Moral evil is not to be ascribed to the whole of creation on the earth, but of animate nature at least, it may be said that it shares in the world-wide heritage of evil. Bird and beast we know suffer, and who shall deny a sensitive shrinking to the soul of a flower!

In the realm of humanity we reach the great home of evil. Man's body, linked with the rest of creation, bears the marks of it. Partly as the result of individual action, evil reigns in the bodies of men. But moral evil can be found only in the human mind. Good and Evil are impossible in a non-sentient world. Moral law or moral relations can exist only in a mind that feels them. (73) In a world without conscious beings there is no sin. (74) Says Buchner in Man ~~and~~ the Past, the Present, and the Future, "It is only in man that the world becomes conscious to such a degree that it rises out

(66) Paul, Epistle to Ephesians - 6-12

(67) Ruskin, Time and Tide- Works XVII Page 365

(68) Hegel, Philosophy of Religion II Page 307

(69) Hoffding, Philosophy of Religion - Page 207

(70) Van Oosterzee, Christian Dogmatics II - Page 436

(71) Hoffding, Philosophy of Religion - Page 234

(72) Paul, Romans - 8-22

(73) James, The Will to Believe - Page 189-190

(74) Lodge, The Substance of Faith - Page 49

of its previous dream like natural existence. Struggle therefore, rages on the domain of morals as violently as it formerly did on the physical field." The mere animal is incapable of moral good or evil. Man is capable of both. Reason and will are used in the pursuit of each. (75) Hegel also points out that in the Jewish religion the finite spirit is the place where the contest between good and evil goes on, and is fought out. (76) In Spinozism too, the distinction between good and evil undoubtedly makes its appearance with reference to God and man ... it is for man that this distinction exists. (77) Good and good things cannot exist independent, of a mind that feels, wills, and knows. (78)

The human mind is the stage on which is slowly unrolled the tragic drama of moral evil. Adolescence seems to be the time when the struggle is most acute. The consciousness of right and wrong, good and evil, is being brought forth and developed. It is clearly the time above all others when new forces are beginning to act, new powers to function, ...! A ferment of feeling, distress, despondency, and anxiety are so common a feature of these years that early adolescence has been designated as the storm and stress period. (79) The physical changes in the growing youth are usually accompanied by psychic disorder and discord. There is as Hall says, a sense of wrong within. (80) It seems as if the individual is recapitulating the history of the race, as Hegel suggests in his comment on the story of the Fall. (81) Mankind must have gradually risen to the knowledge of right and wrong. The older forms of faith were not familiar with any very sharply drawn distinction between good and evil. Oldenberg remarks on this point concerning the Indians, "The religious documents of old India reveal how an embodiment of the distinction between good and evil ... is alien to the oldest forms of belief, and must be alien to them, although in the course of a slow development it becomes more and more accentuated." (82)

Whether the recapitulation theory be true or not it is at least certain that the struggle with evil in each life is largely psychological. With some the conflict is exceedingly acute. There are discordant natures who are natural dualists. The life of feeling and will is spurred on by a continual feeling of inner resistance which causes a discord in the mind and urges to a restless striving after harmony and unity. (83) The psychological basis of such "twice born" characters seems to be a certain discordancy or heterogeneity in the native temperament of the subject, an incompletely unified moral and intellectual constitution. (84) All may not pass through such keen experiences, but all experience the inner conflict, to some extent. The only objects of a Practical Reason, says Kant, are Good and Evil. The one is a necessary object of desire, the other of aversion. (85) And the conflict between the two gives rise to the sense of sin. In the consciousness of sin man feels the misfit between the ideal of the will which his estimation of value has led him to form, and the reality of his own will. This inner psychological drama is recognized in the highest popular religions - in Buddhism and Christianity - to be the real world drama, and to the development of this within the soul of man the great cosmical processes are, in the long run, subservient. (86)

One further question must be raised. Is evil to be found in God? Is the Absolute also the home of wrong and evil? With our view of moral evil we cannot for a moment hold such a position. We have found it to reside in the finite spirit of man. And yet in the more general sense is not evil in the Absolute, if only in the form of suffering, or other kindred results of the Absolute, if only in the form of suffering, or other kindred results of moral evil, though caused by others? If being, as Schopenhauer says, is synonymous with suffering (87) must not the Infinite infinitely suffer? Hegel shews that the significance of the Syrian religion, the religion of pain, is that it is the Deity who suffers, and that this is a divine process

- (75) Green, Prolegomena to Ethics - Page 199-200
- (76) Hegel, Philosophy of Religion II - Page 199
- (77) Hegel, Philosophy of Religion I - Page 99
- (78) Lotze, Microcosmos I - 5
- (79) Starbuck, Psychology of Religion - Page 213
- (80) Hall, Adolescence II Chap. 14
- (81) Hegel, Philosophy of Religion -I Page 276, II Page 200, III Page 53
- (82) Hoffding, Philosophy of Religion - Page 327
- (83) Hoffding, Philosophy of Religion - Page 284
- (84) James, Varieties of Religious Experience - Page 157
- (85) Kant, Watson's Selections - Page 280
- (86) Hoffding, Philosophy of Religion - Page 115-116
- (87) Weber, History of Philosophy - Page 553

which pertains to the nature of God himself. (88) Ladd declares that religion believes in a suffering God. (89) We must believe that God suffers. If the ills of his creatures are events external to the life of their Creator, then the Creator has fashioned suffering in which he himself has no share and of which he is independent. In that case the ancient dilemma as to the limitation of his power on the one hand, or his benevolence on the other, retains all its hopelessness of meaning. The ways of God cannot thus be justified. (90) With our modern views of the close kinship between God and his children we accept the teaching of Jesus that suffering is not to be regarded as a human attribute only. (91) We believe it is also to be found in the heart of the All-Father.

Chapter IV

THE ORIGIN OF EVIL.

THE WHENCE.

Whence did evil come? What is the mysterious secret of its origin? By what strange chance did it come to be - if chance it was? Today we know that physical and moral evil are intertwined. Each may be the cause of the other. Physical evil, as pain, often comes as a result of moral evil. On the other hand physical evil, by weakening the powers of resistance, often predisposes to moral evil. But whence did either or both first begin?

Among the Greeks, Plato as far as may be gathered from his last work, saw in the assumption of an evil principle, existing side by side with the good, the only possible way of maintaining the goodness of the deity in the face of the experience of the discords of this world. (92) This second principle has sometimes been held to be an impersonal being, a sort of Fate, or else a personal spiritual being, or beings, or else an unspiritual substance, viz. matter. (93)

Fate, or Necessity, governing the lives and actions of both men and gods, was a common belief in ancient days. It has not been entirely unknown in modern times. But its importance in the history of thought has not been very great. An impersonal power, whether good or ill, even "A power that makes for righteousness" could never appeal with much strength to the minds of most men.

The idea of a personal spiritual power however, as we have already seen has held potent sway over the minds of millions. In the Persian religion Ahriman is the hostile power who continually opposes Ormuzd the Good. Taken over into Jewish, and later into Christian thought, he becomes the Adversary, the opposer of God and man. The thought of two rival eternal powers is unthinkable because it gives us at least two gods, which means that we have no God at all. Furthermore it implies the supervision of the primary ethical postulate - that Omnipotent Goodness is at the core of the universe - without which no experience is trustworthy. (94) Satan then cannot be eternal, and if he is finite we still have to ask how did evil enter into him, i.e. whence did it originate?

An ancient and persistent view has held that in matter is to be found the source of evil. Plato had to admit the refractory nature of the "hyle" with which God had to struggle. Aristotle saw its rising rebellion in the planets. The planets are immortal and uncreated beings. Their movements oppose the divine and perfect movements of the *πρωτος οὐρανός*, the first heaven, and thereby declare their independence of the Deity, and their host-

(88) Hegel, Philosophy of Religion II - Page 86

(89) Ladd, Knowledge, Life and Reality - Page 70

(90) Royce, World and Individual II Page 405

(91) Lodge, Man and the Universe - Page 35

(92) Höffding, Philosophy of Religion - Page 327

(93) Pflüderer, Philosophy of Religion IV -Page 1

(94) Fraser, Philosophy of Theism - Page 259

ility toward the universal order. (95) Later the Gnostics also viewed matter as the source of all evil, a belief that found a firm footing in the Christian Church. From this arose the macerations and rigorous asceticisms of early and mediaeval Christianity.

Few, or none accept this view today. If evil is inherent in matter then evil is not what ought not to be. (96) Furthermore, our conception of matter is becoming more refined. Science, by critical analysis, has shewn its close kinship with force. Evil would then indeed be linked most vitally with the central Force of the universe. At present we can at least say that matter is a system of sense symbols by which God speaks to us. It is the valued servant and symbol of spirit in constant correlation with living mind. (97) Not there can we look for an explanation of the origin of evil. In fact no eternal Dualism can give us the origin. It merely accepts the fact of evil's existence.

Is the origin of evil to be looked for in the Deity, either in a defect of his thinking as in the irrational blind will of the Unconscious in modern Pessimism, or from a defect in his character as seen in the Greek conception of the Deity's envy at man's attempts to rise? (98) Or as Fraser puts it, either a power of mixed good and evil, or blindly indifferent to both. (99) If God is the source of all, then is he not as Augustine asks, also the source of evil? (100) This is indeed a difficult question. One world, says Ladd, cannot be the product of two independent and eternally existent principles. Neither can the genesis and reality of moral evil be accounted for in such a way as to satisfy the demands of rational thought, by positing an eternal principle of evil on an equality with, and over against, a good God, or by denying in any way the constant dependence of all finite personality upon the life of God. And so the most difficult and serious work any monistic system has to achieve lies on ethical grounds. (101) It is true indeed that the individual is partly responsible for his sin, and that society must also share in the blame for allowing defective social conditions to prevail, but is not God also partly responsible since he created the individual and, to a degree, is immanent in him?(102)

To the speculative minds of India Metaphysics was of more importance than Ethics. There was a lack of interest in the moral question. And hence came their conception of an absolutely monistic God who should include within himself the evil as well as the good. (103) Evils found their necessary basis in the being of the world. The Hebrew who held that sin sprang from human freedom (104) could never accept such a God. The righteousness of Jehovah perverted the Monotheism of Judaism from developing into Monism. The God who could not behold evil could never develop into an Absolute who should merge good and evil in himself. (105) The Absolute Power must remain perfect in holiness and goodness.

But is the Absolute all-powerful? The Stoics held to a necessity of Nature which gave rise to evils. Good and Evil are interwoven. Virtue needs evil. (106) Leibnitz also held that if there were a clash between the claims of God's power or his goodness, we must hold fast to his goodness. For him the source of evil was found in the limits imposed on the free creative activity of God by primeval necessity of eternal truths. (107) But, as Lotze shews, these eternal truths have no significance apart from God. Law is but his accustomed mode of working.

God is also limited, in Hegel's thought, at certain moments or stages. Passing up through successive and continuous stages he is at last found in a rationally articulated Universal Consciousness, shared unconsciously by things and consciously by persons. (108) Evil manifests itself necessarily

- (95) Weber, History of Philosophy - Page 123
- (96) Fraser, Philosophy of theism - Page 260
- (97) Fraser, Philosophy of Theism - Page 260
- (98) Pfleiderer, Philosophy of Religion IV - Page 1
- (99) Fraser, Philosophy of Theism - Page 259
- (100) Weber, History of Philosophy - Page 197
- (101) Ladd, Knowledge, Life and Reality - Page 52
- (102) Ten Broeke, Constructive Basis for Theology - Page 348
- (103) Pratt, Psychology of Religious Belief - Page 90-91
- (104) Lotze, Microcosmus - Page 467
- (105) Pratt, Psychology of Religious Belief - Page 135
- (106) Pfleiderer, Philosophy of Religion - IV - Page 6

Evil must arise first in the mind before being transmuted into word or deed, and so it has a psychological genesis. The tendency to the satisfaction of the natural impulses is as necessary to man as to other beings. This tendency, which is the essence of the will, is not in itself evil. But the law comes in to restrict, and the desire not being done away with, develops self-will. Only through the developing moral consciousness does the mind come to see that the prohibition is right. (131) The ability therefore to recognize the difference between good and evil is a result of growth. And modern thought is coming to recognize that each individual must of necessity pass through these stages. The ancient doctrine of the Fall is giving place to its modern equivalent of a better understanding of the physiological and psychical nature of the developing individual. The so-called "vitiosity of nature" is only the psychic fact that in the first stages of development the sensuous, impulsive, instinctive life dominates, and many do not pass beyond this level. In the slow development from the sensuous to full self-conscious personality men do both what does, and what does not, accord with their true being. (132)

Moral evil then rises with the growth of the developing personality. It comes to fruition in the exercise of the will. The rise of evil is contingent on the universe being a universe that includes persons, and not things only. A world of finite persons must be capable of being made bad by the persons of whom it consists. (133) There must be power of origination and individual persons are the only originating powers in existence known to man, over and above the universal power. (134) As Lotze puts it, free beings bring in new beginnings of action. But this does not condition God. Omniscience can foresee a free action as real, which, as a temporal phenomenon, has its place in the future. (135)

Thinkers of many shades of opinion unite in tracing the origin of evil to that possibility of a wrong choice which is necessarily involved in the creation of a finite personality endowed with freedom of will. And man has such freedom. The moral power of making a responsible choice between good and evil in action is emphatically that in which man is free, either to erect himself above the temptations of sense, or to let his proper personality be merged in physical nature. (136) Man's conscience with its remorse attendant on wrongdoing convicts the wrong-doer of his wrong. (137) And man's moral faculty cannot be, as the scientist says, from matter or evolution. It is part of man's outfit. It is the transcript of an eternal and divine law. The inward voice is one from out the unseen, announcing to the soul that a kinship exists between it and God. (138) And the conscience is violated by the agent's own will. Sin, says Abelard, lies in the will which intends it, whether the act is carried out or not. (139) Descartes says error arises from not restraining the will, so that it chooses the false instead of the true, and evil instead of the good. (140) Shakespeare taught that sin begins in the abuse of the free will, although it may become a fixed state, as with Iago. (141) With the sage of Konigsberg too, the source of evil lies in the free adoption of a bad instead of a good principle of action. The only sense in which evil is innate is the capacity to choose freely a good or evil rule of conduct. (142) It is with free-will, declares Hegel, that guilt takes its rise, and free-will is first found in reflection. (143) From a very different standpoint the pessimism of Schopenhauer teaches also that the will is the origin of evil, since it is the endless source of all life. (144)

A modified Monism will hold therefore to the belief that evil in its beginnings must be sought in the activity of the finite will. Just how the many finite individuals with their close and vital linkage to the Absolute are so constituted that they are able to assert themselves rebelliously is a dark mystery. And yet we must assert not only the interdependence of the

- (131) Fleiderer, Philosophy of Religion - Page 34
- (132) Ten Broeke, Constructive Basis for Theology - Page 346
- (133) Fraser, Philosophy of Theism - Page 278
- (134) Fraser, Philosophy of Theism - Page 279
- (135) Lotze, Microcosmus IX 5
- (136) Fraser, Philosophy of Theism - Page 144
- (137) Fraser, Philosophy of Theism - Page 145
- (138) Halfyard, The Spiritual Basis of Man and Nature - Page 147
- (139) Weber, History of Philosophy - Page 226
- (140) Descartes, A Discourse on Method - Page 116
- (141) Strong, Great Poets and Their Theology - Page 199
- (142) Ten Broeke, Constructive Basis for Theology - Page 179
- (143) Hegel, Philosophy of Religion I - Page 271-272
- (144) Weber, History of Philosophy - Page 552

finite many, but also their collective dependence upon the Infinite. And this gives to the problem of evil its universal tinge. The fact of sin, e.g. is personal and yet is not merely individualistic. Our sin had its root in the sin of the world, and yet in our sin the sin of the world is perpetuated. (145) Sin does not come only through wrong decisions of the adult will. It has the character of a universal. (146) And here again we return to its relationship to the Absolute. Jacob Böhme found the origin of evil to consist in the fact that the one will in order to become manifest, sensitive, and operative, must carry itself into a number of different centra, the self willing of which gives rise to strife, clash of wills, and anxiety. (147) Somewhat similarly Royce says that since the whole temporal order is the expression of will, all ill-fortune results from the defects of some finite will. (148) He allows moral freedom to the extent that one can hold by attention, or forget by inattention, an Ought already present to one's consciousness. (149) To sin is consciously to choose to forget, through a narrowing of the field of Attention, an Ought that one already recognizes. All sin is sin against the light by a free choice to be inattentive to the light already seen. (150) We feel that Royce does not go far enough in this, and that he minimizes too much the great fact in daily life of moral evil in all its massive horror. Since his Absolute is all-inclusive he consistently draws the conclusion that nothing absolutely evil exists. (151) But such a serene and sunny optimism seems smitten by the dark and tragic chapters in our human story.

Human sin and ignorance are not entirely irreconcilable with the existence of a good and perfect author of the world. It would be a contradiction to affirm free persons, and yet deny to them the possibility of choosing the wrong, in order to save the divine perfection. But the evil so done would not properly be because of divine permission, but would be the inevitable contingency involved in the ideal of moral personalities who are to work out in themselves the moral ideal. (152)

We conclude therefore that while the social conditions that environ the individual may be so far from helpful that their pressure actually predisposes to evil, and that while the natural inheritance, both in physical tendencies and mental traits may exert a silent but potent influence, that nevertheless we must look for the ultimate cause of evil, both moral, and physical too, so far as that is bound up with the moral, in the exercise and abuse of the power of free-will held by the responsible, though finite, individual.

(145) Blewett, The Christian View of the World - Page 9-10

(146) Blewett, Christian View of the World - Page 203

(147) Fleiderer, Philosophy of Religion IV -Page 22

(148) Royce, The World and the Individual II -Page 390

(149) Royce, The World and the Individual II-Page 360

(150) Royce, The World and the Individual II -Page 359

(151) Royce, The World and the Individual II-Page 358

(152) Ten Broeke- Constructive Basis for Theology - Page 339

Chapter V.

THE REASON FOR EVIL.

THE WHY.

Why does evil haunt our human experience, or, even more searching, why should it? Why should its darksome shadows be flung across our path? This is indeed the crucial question for any theodicy. Perhaps to our finite minds a complete answer will never be possible. And yet even as we face bravely the question some gleams of light break forth to reward our endeavors

Is evil such that God could not prevent its entrance into the universe? We have already rejected such a view if there is implied the Manichean dualism. We cannot allow two eternally existing principles as an explanation of the origin of all things in a universe.

There does seem to be more truth in the view that evil was a necessity for the law of contrast, by which things are made known to us. Light must strike upon something dark in order that its manifestation may be real. (153) Sickness without health is meaningless. Goodness has no meaning if badness is impossible or non-existent. Every rise involves the possibility of a fall. (154) We cannot allow however, ^{absolute principle of the Absolute} that this principle of the Absolute, or else the eternal Good must have been opposed by eternal Evil. But for our finite existence it seems to have a certain, if not an absolute, validity. We have already noticed in this connection Hegel's view that virtue is only to be gained through the struggle with evil. If we accept that view, then we must hold that, in some sense, evil is a necessity.

Are we to believe that God permitted evil? Leibnitz held that we must. It is permitted as a feature of the best world, and as a means to the attainment of greater goods. It is one of those discords which, introduced at the right place, make the harmony more impressive. (155) Such is his view as set forth in his famous Theodicy. Francis Howard Williams has expressed a similar thought,-

"I questioned, why is evil on the earth?
A sage for answer struck a chord, and lo!
I found the harmony of little worth
To teach my soul the truth it longed to know.
He struck again, a saddened music, rife
With wisdom, in my ear an answer poured,
Sin is the jarring semi-tone of life,
The needed minor in a perfect chord."

To which sentiment Lotze would reply that there is no consolation if there is harmony in the whole, while discord, or evil, remains in the particular. (156) Not easily, if at all, can we find the reason for God's permission of evil. Since man was made free sin was possible to him. God must have permitted it, it seems, for the sake of the good that could not be attained without it. If so evil was allowed, not as a thing which ought to be, but as a thing that could not be. (157) However to permit finite creatures to

(153) Hegel, Philosophy of Religion II - Page 76

(154) Lodge, The Substance of Faith - Page 46

(155) Fleiderer, Philosophy of Religion IV - Page 21

(156) Lotze, Microcosmos - Page 716

(157) Fleiderer, Philosophy of Religion Vol. IV - Page 39

sin is God's ineffable act of self-limitation, that has cost God more than it has cost man. (158)

Evil has undoubtedly an educative aspect. It is true, as Lotze says, that this is not so in regard to animals, nor yet in the case of all human beings. (159) And yet the fact remains that a large educative function is served by evil, although this may be due rather to the nature of the man that is able to surmount and conquer obstacles and difficulties, than to the nature of evil in itself. It is better to have in existence on educational trial morally responsible persons than to have a wholly non-moral, or physically necessitated universe. (160) Such a view also relieves the problem of evil when the history of human progress is interpreted as a divinely conducted education of all who will permit themselves to be so educated. (161) John Stuart Mill argues in his Posthumous Essays that this world would be a better world if the whole human race were already in possession of everything which it seems desirable it should have. But surely it is infinitely better for races to struggle up to material prosperity and spiritual perfection than to have been created incapable of progress. In the latter case they might have been comfortable and satisfied, but their comfort and satisfaction would have been no higher than a brute's. (162) And their religious life would have been on the same plane. Religion grows by conquest of the ills of life. In fact for religious faith evil is not wholly evil, since religion itself is born in the effort to escape from evil. (163) It is better to let mankind "Move upward working out the beast" than to have had a creation perfect mechanically. But if humanity were to thus become "perfect through suffering", would it not have been better if God had not created at all? We cannot so affirm it. No father would choose extinction for his children in preference to life. Neither would a sentient being wish to cease to be. Life with all its ills would be chosen in preference to non-existence. (164)

"To be no more; sad cure; for who would lose,
Though full of pain, this intellectual being?"

By Milton
These words ascribed to Belial express the natural abhorrence of the human mind at the mere thought of cessation of being. Rather life with all its *evil* need of ill than no life at all.

And so evil contributes toward the development and the exhibition of man's true greatness, not through intrinsic merit of its own, but by being overcome. Man attains to moral manhood through temptation conquered. The very fact that man can feel the discords of life is at once a proof that existence contains value, and a sign of his own nobility. (166) It is through the endurance and the conquest over its own internal ills that the spirit wins its best conscious fulfillment. (167) The attainment of a goal means a struggle, and if there were no longing in time there would be no peace in eternity. (168) So also James, in commenting on the picture of St. Michael with his foot on the dragon's neck, to be seen in the Louvre, says that the world is all the richer for having a devil in it, so long as we keep our foot on his neck. (169) Man is the better for the ills of life, since we have the ills, after conquering them. And so in dealing with the ascetic spirit which recognizes the wrongness of life and seeks to overcome

- (158) Strong, Christ in Creation & Ethical Monism - Page 34
- (159) Lotze, Microcosmus, Page 717
- (160) Fraser, Philosophy of Theism - Page 329
- (161) Fraser, Philosophy of Theism - Page 330
- (162) A.M. Momerie, The Origin of Evil - Page 22
- (163) Ladd, Knowledge, Life and Reality - Page 493
- (164) Blewett, Christian View of the World - Page 293
- (165) Milton, Paradise Lost Book II - Lines 146-147
- (166) Hoffding, Philosophy of Religion - Page 272
- (167) Royce, World and the Individual I - Page 381
- (168) Royce, World and the Individual II Page 385
- (169) James, Varieties of Religious Experiences - Page 50

it by an appeal to the soul's heroic resources, and the cleansing power of suffering. James claims that such is the profounder way of handling the gift of existence, as compared with those who minimize the wrong and do not recognize it. Evil remains evil but is forced to contribute towards man's welfare as he combats and masters it. He pays the price, perhaps even a Gethsemane, but reaps the fruits of victory. The Hill of Victory is reached by the Via Dolorosa.

From this standpoint a meaning may be seen for the ^{also} psychological ills and ferment of the storm and stress period of Adolescence. When we grasp the full significance of adolescence, says Starbuck, we shall see that all the instability and anxiety, and uncertainty, and even the extreme pain, is one of Nature's ways of producing a full-fledged self-poised human being with a high degree of self-reliance and spiritual insight. Many who have become the leading exponents of religious truth have undergone great spiritual conflicts in youth, (170)

Man must pay the price of progress in every sphere of life and activity. And nowhere is it so clear as in the moral realm that the desired end cannot be realized, or even approached, except by paying the cost in immense suffering all along the way. Courage, temperance, constancy, wisdom, justice, fidelity, and kindness are virtues quite inconceivable in a world free from temptation, suffering, and loss. Indeed such is the essential nature of the moral self that it cannot come into being at all except by way of a process which is one long-continued, painful struggle. (171) And so we must not assume that the divinely necessitated absence of evil would be alone good, Such a universe would give us only a universe of things and not persons, And we would not lop off even the ills of life if by so doing we sheared away also the glory of a developing humanity.

But there may be a deeper reason yet than the development of the individual to explain the presence of evil. Perhaps too, that reason may put us nearer to the divine centre. Is it possible that the universe, in its inner essence, is in constitution and purpose redemptive? Such a view is at least, not impossible. If it should be true, then we might find the key to much, if not all, of the problem of evil, in the principle, so morally magnificent and so divinely illustrated, of vicarious suffering. To ancient Israel belongs largely the credit for this truly noble conception. Shadowed forth as a possible solution to the problem confronting the writer of Job, it is set forth with noon-tide clearness and splendour in the Servant Songs of Dentero-Isaiah. Buddha, about the same time had sought and found a solution in the renunciation of life to save self in Nirvana, But with far deeper and diviner insight the Prophet of the Exile had seen a truer and more God-like solution in the giving up of life for others in Vicarious Suffering. Job had but a glimmering of such a solution. The Preacher in Ecclesiastes had despaired of finding one at all. But this prophet sees an ethical and teleological purpose pervading life. The value of suffering lies in the salutary moral influence it exerts both on the suffered and society about him. It is possessed of a healing power for the moral life and also for the history of the whole community. And in Christianity the same teleological view is prevalent. (172) The folly of the Cross, so inexplicable by the intellect has yet its indestructible vital meaning. (173)

This view of the redemptive use of evil corresponds with our knowledge of the social structure of the world, and especially the realm of human life. All human life is social. Moral agents are relatively free, but not absolute.

(170) Starbuck, Psychology of Religion - Page 263

(171) Ladd, Knowledge, Life and Reality - Page 352

(172) Afliederer, Philosophy of Religion IV - Page 14

(173) James, Varieties of Religious Experience - Page 364

ly independent of each other. And so vicarious suffering is common through all the temporal order; and this gives to the moral life its positive significance. (174) Schopenhauer sees that deliverance from the universe of evil is to be won by man. Man by morality is to be the redeemer of the world. Von Hartmann assigns a similar task to man, in which he is to be the fellow worker of the Absolute. It is by him that God works out the redemption of himself and of the universe. In the close of the Phenomenology of the Moral Consciousness he declares that "Real existence is the incarnation of the Godhead; the world process is the story of the Passion of the God who has become flesh, and at the same time the way to the redemption of Him who is crucified in the flesh: but morality is the cooperation towards shortening this way of suffering and redemption." While we cannot accept the pessimistic view of the universal prevalence of evil, we must acknowledge with gratitude the splendid thought that man has not to struggle alone against the evil of life. The children of men, as the three Hebrew children, do not endure the furnace alone. They have as a sustaining companion One who, in a deeper sense than Nebuchadrezzar imagined, is "Like a son of the Gods."

And so we arrive at the thought that human life is social because the life of God pervades it. God and man are therefore co-workers in the redemptive task of life. To each human individual it is allowed, and needful, to "fill up that which is lacking of the afflictions" of God. The divine has borne suffering for the sake and help of humanity, and the evils of life seem to have been essential ingredients of life from the dawn of mankind. (175) Perhaps their mission has been to develop this divinely altruistic spirit of self-sacrifice. As James says, the universe could not be finished without us and our struggles to realize our ideals. The valuable in life is not diminished by it, but rather enhanced and increased. Not even suffering and death can militate against it, for it is precisely by suffering in the service of the highest, with the eye fixed upon it, that we can witness to its power. (176) As we rise to the thought and spirit of the Highest we shall become increasingly willing to assume a redemptive mission. When we suffer ill fortune due to external natural agencies we shall realize we are enduring a part of the world's burden due to its struggle with sin and its consequences. We shall undertake to atone for the ill an unknown agent has done. We shall rejoice when we know the agent, that opportunity is afforded of joining in the common task of atoning for the sin. (177) In suffering thus we link ourselves to the Highest, for religion, says Ladd, has a suffering God. A perfect Personality must be more keenly sensitive to suffering than an imperfect personality such as Lotze says we are. Who then can measure the sufferings of the Infinite? "Behold and see if there be any sorrow like unto His sorrow!" If as Vinet suggests in one of his letters, to suffer is nothing else than to live deeply, and sorrow and love are the conditions of a profound life, then the most divine human life is that which has the greatest capacity for both. But love and sorrow are both evoked by the evil of the world. The mystery of iniquity may never be fully revealed, but we do know that sin, pain, sorrow, and suffering are linked in "a vast, fundamental, ontological embrace." If the universe is not tending towards one great distant goal in God then "darkness covers the earth and gross darkness the people," and the dark pall of evil remains unlifted. If however, the central principle in the universe, tending towards the overcoming of evil, is redemptive, then, indeed we begin to see "the day break, and the shadows flee away." The plaintive appeal of the DeProfundis shall surely be swallowed up in the soaring strains of the Te Deum.

(174) Royce, World and Individual II - Page 174

(175) Lodge, Reason and Belief - Page 44

(176) Hoffding, Philosophy of Religion - Page 227

(177) Royce, World and Individual - Vol. II - Page 390

Chapter VI

THE OUTCOME OF EVIL.

THE WHITHER.

What is to be the final outcome of the evil found on this planet? Is the mixture of Evil with Good in the universe endless or transitory? Are pain, error and vice to disappear by perfectly realized goodness in all persons and in all worlds? Are all certain at last to become what they ought to be? These are indeed questions that seem incapable of settlement. (178)

Is evil in its nature eternal? We have seen that actual evil is not eternal since it arose through the abuse by the finite spirit of "the dread gift of freewill". Concerning possible evil we cannot speak so certainly, since we are faced with the question Hoffding raises as to how discord could spring from perfect harmony. But even if we could say with certainty that possible evil was not eternal in its origin, we could not then say it would not be everlasting. Finite beings we hold to have an origin, but not an extinction. And it is in such that evil has its common abode.

Plato held that evils are imperishable, for there must ever be something that strives to thwart the good. (179) He teaches also that while most persons may be purified by varying periods of suffering, yet for some enormous criminals, though few, there is reserved eternal punishment. They are hurled into Tartarus, never to come out. (180) A somewhat similar view has been prevalent in Christian thought. Some men will never cease to sin. This will entail eternal misery. And this misery will vindicate God's holy law. There may however be only a few eternally lost, for hell is pictured in Revelation, not as an ocean, but only as a lake. (181) The very dualism between the blessed and the damned has been used, as Hoffding points out, to uphold the belief that value can never perish. Augustine defends eternal punishment as both ethically and aesthetically necessary. All that harmony demands is that everything should be in its right place. And the very contrast between the blessed and the damned may serve to increase the beauty of the whole. As Hoffding well remarks, in such a case neither God nor the blessed would be blessed. (182) Among modern thinkers Schopenhauer held that evil was eternal. It necessarily and infinitely exceeds the good, and is irreparable. The world, and therefore the pains, are eternal. Only the individuals that die are relatively redeemed. (183)

The great difficulty into which the view of the eternal continuance of evil leads, to give a somewhat different turn to one of Fraser's arguments, is that it runs into a possible moral chaos. (184) If evil agents are continually getting worse, and yet, as persons, have power of continuous origination, it is conceivable that they might finally corrupt all persons. put a universe of devils would hardly square with man's faith that the Power Supreme in the universe is moral. Even a partial universe of devils would seriously clash with the thought of the supreme Power as Omnipotent Goodness. Such a conclusion a modified Monism must reject, unless supported by much stronger evidence than is now available. If evil is eternal it must be so in a changed and transformed mode of being.

If evil is not in its nature finally eternal how is it at last to be overcome? Does it of itself tend to degeneracy, and, dwindling away, finally die out? We cannot so affirm it. Hall indeed does think that it tends to

(178) Fraser, Philosophy of Theism - Page 320

(179) Plato, Theaetetus - Page 176

(180) Plato, Republic - 615

(180) Plato, Phaedo - 113

(181) Strong, Christ in Creation and Ethical Monism -Page 422-434

(182) Hoffding, Philosophy of Religion - Page 257

(183) Weber, History of Philosophy - Page 558

(184) Fraser, Philosophy of Theism - Page 179-180

to annihilation, while goodness tends to survival. (185) Similarly it has been said that since evil tends to retard development, but the universe is nevertheless developing, that thus evil contains a suicidal element, and tends to die out. (186) Such a view however, especially with regard to moral evil, hardly corresponds with the empirical test that both James and Ladd recommend to be applied to theoretic constructions. We know that evil usually tends to develop and thrive. It grows by what it feeds on. And certainly whatever its attitude, the mind of man does not ~~wax~~ ^{wax}. Whether given to the careful cultivation of the good, or to the assiduous pursuit of evil, it waxes stronger and stronger. We cannot hope to see the problem of evil solved by watching the whole plant, root and branch, wither and die.

May we look forward to seeing it finally destroyed? Will the sword of the Lord cut it down? Some have held that all evil shall be annihilated, and all evil persons shall be destroyed. Only the morally progressive shall retain conscious, personal life. But it seems altogether too fanciful to discriminate thus between the existence of individuals whose only difference is one of moral quality. If one finite person cannot be lost from the Absolute, how can another cease to be? And is a child of the All-Father less a child if he has erred and sinned? Conditional Immortality is a theological hobby-horse that we cannot undertake to ride.

Evil, we may confidently hope, is to be at last overcome. That hope has been crystallized, as Hegel has so comprehensively shewn, in most of the religions of mankind. At some point in their development there is a moment, or stage, where evil is at last conquered. In the religion of Egypt, e.g. Good has the power to assert itself and to annihilate the non-existent, the evil. And so at last pain and evil, and even death itself, are overcome, and Typhon, the evil principle, is judged and condemned by Osiris, the good. (187) Even in the radical dualism of the Persians we find the idea expressed, although it is thought of as a future event, that Ahriman is at last overcome, and Ormuzd alone reigns. (188) We see finally this principle exemplified supremely in Christianity. The abstract depth of the opposition has demanded an infinite suffering and consequently a reconciliation which will be correspondingly complete. (189) But Christ has taken our finite nature in order to slay it by his death. This death is thus at once finitude in its most extreme form, and at the same time the abolition and absorption of natural finitude. (190) The death of the natural gets in this way a universal signification. The finite, evil, is in fact destroyed. The world is thus reconciled, and through this death the world is implicitly freed from evil. (191) Each individual is to realize that the sense of separation and estrangement between the Divine and the human, which is the evil element, has been annulled. The realization of this comes in the act of worship. (192) For Hegel evil is a stage of finiteness that must be necessarily passed through in the gradual unfolding of the Universal Consciousness. We may not follow him in all his logical intellectualism, but we must note with admiration the skill with which he marshals and uses his examples to prove his point that evil is finally overcome. Nor can we deny the cogency and force of his appeal. In some form we must hold to the same view that evil will be overcome. Reason may not logically conduct us to such a position, but faith inevitably leads us there. We may well hold that the attainment of the true self, through personal thought and will, are ^{of} so much importance in the economy of God's universe that evils

(185) Hall, Adolescence II - Chap. 14

(186) Lodge, Man and the Universe - Page 86

(187) Hegel, Philosophy of Religion II - Page 102-103

(188) Hegel, Philosophy of Religion II - Page 87

(189) Hegel, Philosophy of Religion III - Page 65

(190) Hegel, Philosophy of Religion III - Page 93

(191) Hegel, Philosophy of Religion III - Page 96

(192) Hegel, Philosophy of Religion Vol. I - Page 239-244

~~(193) Fox-Brooks, Constructive Basis for Theology - Page 347~~

~~(194) Fraser, Philosophy of Theism - Page 350~~

done along the way are secondary and no essential part of the end, and in their very nature are to be overcome. (193) It may even be, as Fraser suggests, that to this same end God may use miracles at sundry times, to reinforce the progressive movement, to vivify and enlighten the dormant faith and hope of bad persons to their moral recovery. (194) However that may be, it is true that history gives grounds for believing in a gradual evolution towards an ideal; and that while we are now engaged in a struggle with evil, that we are nevertheless on the way to infinite good and righteous issues. We may without undue presumption believe that

"All is well, though faith and form
Be sundered in the night of fear."

But it is not even necessary to remain in "the night of fear." To the religious man, says James, fear is not merely held in abeyance, it is positively expunged and washed away. And so happiness comes in to take its place. And this form of happiness is no mere feeling of escape from evil. It cares no longer to escape. It consents to the evil outwardly as a form of sacrifice-inwardly it knows it to be permanently overcome. (195) If we hold that the universe is constitutionally redemptive, and also that the aberration of the finite individuals cannot sunder them completely from the Absolute, then we must believe that somehow evil is to be finally overcome.

Evil is to be overcome, but not by self extermination, nor yet by destruction from without. Then it seems as if it must be by absorption into the good. It would be undue presumption to assume that this necessarily must be so. How all moral perversion, with its attendant suffering can finally disappear; and how morally bad persons can be made good consistently with the retention of moral freedom, may be a big mystery. And yet an ethical trust in a Moral Power as Absolute, seems to require a universe morally perfect at last. (196) Great leaders in theological thought as widely separate as Origen and Hans Deÿck have held that all souls will finally return to God. Royce, from his idealistic standpoint, solves the problem by boldly asserting that the souls never did fall away from God. From their own point of view they seemed to have done so, but from the viewpoint of the Absolute they never fell away. (197)

Many of the Hindu thinkers found a solution for the ills of life in absorption into Brahma. (198) But not so easily can we dispose of our difficulties. Sin is a deep and real evil and must be atoned for. We must hold, with Royce, that every evil deed in the temporal order must be atoned for, if not by the agent himself, then by some other; and that only through this atonement can the perfection of the whole ever be manifested. (199) And thus we return to the thought of redemptive design in the universe. But this requires at least a relative Monism. And so, as R. Fleiderer says, while evil could not exist as evil unless the individual beings were real, independent, separate wills, different from the One will, yet evil could not be a moment finally overcome in the harmony of the whole, unless all the separate wills were embraced by the unity of the whole life of God, as subordinate moments of it. (200) Boehme also saw strife and evil emerge from the self-willing of the finite wills in which the one will was manifest; but only to the end that in the overcoming and flooding it in the eternal will from which it sprang, the life of goodness and love should become manifest. (201) A recent writer has put the position concisely. Our lives are part of the process by which the Absolute Spirit realizes himself in the lesser spirits. . . These lesser spirits must be free. In such freedom sin is possible. Sin in life has become actual. But sin cannot be the last word since it must be overcome. Hence the need in the universe for

- (193) ~~Page 21 (Thesis)~~ *in Locke, page 347,*
 (194) ~~Page 21~~ *Fraser.* " 330
 (195) James, Varieties of Religious Experience - Page 47-49
 (196) Fraser, Philosophy of Theism - Page 321
 (197) Royce, World and the Individual - Page 302-303
 (198) Hoffding, Philosophy of Religion - Page 152
 (199) Royce, World and the Individual II - Page 368
 (200) R. Fleiderer, Philosophy of Religion IV - Page 39-40
 (201) R. Fleiderer, Philosophy of Religion IV - Page 22

redemption. (202) The moral dualism of the world constitutes the need for salvation. But salvation is made possible because of the profounder Monism in the supremacy and love of God, (203) The Cross of Christ assures men of such a reconciliation as being possible, Jesus seeks to win men to the Spiritual Community he has established. Sin led to sacrifice, but the world is richer with sin and sacrifice than it would have been had sacrifice been lacking. (204) And so in the love of the All-Father and his redeeming pity we find the ultimate ground for believing that the good shall at last swallow up the evil, and the prodigal sons be restored to the Father's home. This belief must ever be a matter for individual faith, since it cannot be scientifically demonstrated. But the man who has embraced this faith finds it offers the only satisfactory, if incomplete, solution for the evil of life. Such a faith however is confident that the dark shadows of our contradictions and our weaknesses have a final meaning. It believes they are incidentals, however painful, along the way of spiritual development, but that they are utterly overcome in the higher enjoyment of the soul that has attained unto the life that is eternal in God. (205)

(202) Flewett, Christian View of the World - Page 72-73

(203) Flewett, Christian View of the World -Page 35

(204) Royce, Problem of Christianity

(205) Ten Broeke, Constructive Basis for Theology - Page 263

Chapter VII.

CONCLUSION.

And now we have well-nigh completed our task. At the best it must have been, from its very nature imperfect. Often it is impossible to give for the faith one may hold, a logical reason such as the scientist or the mathematician may demand. When facing one of the dark mysteries of our human experience it is not possible that "The spirit of mortal be proud." The very best Theodicy sees limits imposed that it is neither possible, nor perhaps desirable, to pass. To a spirit humbled by the awful vastness of the great gulf into which he has sought to peer, dogmatism is impossible. To a fellow spirit who may differ from his own views he must allow liberty of thought and opinion. Personal faith has to be after all the last court of appeal. As Hume says in closing his essay on The Natural History of Religion, the contradictions of life, if not understood, must be accepted. Lotze also frankly says we don't understand the solution that yet we believe in.

In the foregoing we have endeavored to set forth our belief, as well as possible. We noted that natural and moral evil, though different, were yet almost inextricably intertwined, and yet that moral evil, a positive entity, was the more bitter problem of the two. In trying to locate evil we could not say whether it might be in beings of an extra-terrestrial sort or not, but we did find it in the animate world that we know, even in the Deity. The seat of moral evil we found to be in the finite spirit. On raising the question as to whence it came, we found that while God as Creator and Sustainer, and also the environing society, were involved, yet the root of moral evil lay in the abuse of "The dread gift of freewill" by the finite spirit. Why such an abuse should be necessary or possible we tried to answer by the thought that for moral personality the possibility at least, must exist; and, perhaps as a corollary to that, since the possible has become actual, that the universe is teleologically redemptive. Both of these thoughts however, lead straight to the heart of the inscrutable mystery as to the ultimate nature of the Infinite and finite spirits, and their relationship. To this crux of the whole problem no final, satisfactory answer can be given. Personal faith must ever be the sole illuminant here. Because of personal faith we believe that evil shall not be eternal, but that it shall be at last overcome and absorbed into the good. As opposed to Schopenhauer we believe with Von Hartmann that evil is not irreparable, and that redemption is universal. (206) Thus far at least we can agree with him.

A modified Monism has seemed the most reasonable view to take. We must believe in the vital and intimate union of the finite spirits and the Absolute. And yet we cannot accept the rigid monistic view that would rob the finite spirits of responsibility and true individuality. That necessitates, as Strong says, that Monism must leave God transcendent, although not in the sense of outsidership but in inexhaustibility of resource. (207) The Absolute, while embracing the totality of his creatures, must yet be above and beyond them. Furthermore if the universe is to be accepted as trustworthy then the Absolute must be Moral Goodness.

In the light of this belief we can rest the dark problem of evil. Perhaps the unfolding of future ages will make plainer some things that are now obscure. As Fraser says, Ladd also agreeing, the present tragedy of sin and suffering on this planet is not extended enough in time and space to explain its final meaning and universal issues. If the universe is morally trustworthy it seems to imply that for its explanation a longer and a larger life than this earth affords will be experienced. (208) It has taken myriads of ages for the development of life to its present stage. It might be that evil and suffering are only the beginning of another and a higher state of being to be realized countless ages hence. In comparison with the vast whole of existence our experience is strictly limited. Hence, as Hoffding points out, with enlarged vision might come a changed outlook. (209)

(206) Weber, History of Philosophy - Page 558

(207) Strong, Christ in Creation and Ethical Monism - Page 24

(208) Fraser, Philosophy of Theism - Page 330f

(209) Hoffding, Philosophy of Religion - Page 270-271

And ~~we~~ we must believe that such an enlarged vision will yet be ours. A larger and a longer life than this is indeed demanded. All the great religions offer compensations for the ills of life, but none excel Christianity. She offers salvation from sin both in this, and in a future, life. And she sets forth also the splendid ideal of the Spiritual Community, or the Kingdom of God, a kingdom progressive and finally triumphant, (210) a kingdom of "Brotherly sons of God." And so we are comforted in our present trials and struggles. Our comfort lies in knowing that in all this ~~life~~ life ideals are being sought and meanings temporarily expressed with incompleteness at every instant, with the sorrow of finitude in every movement of the natural world, but with the assurance of the divine triumph in eternity lighting up the whole. (211)

With a faith such as this to sustain us we may well face the hard and rough places in life with cheerful courage. And it is right that we should do so. Even for the man who cannot cherish this faith, a brave and radiant outlook is of supreme importance as a sustaining and driving force in life. Stuart Mill, quoted by Hoffding, asserts that imagination has its rights no less than critical reflection, and that the former is within these rights when it dwells by preference on cheerful possibilities, not only because these afford us immediate satisfaction, but also because they encourage us in our striving. To dwell without necessity on the ills of life is a useless expenditure of nervous power. (212) Kant also recognized the value of the same principle and however much he is inclined in his ethics to lay formal stress on the contrasts, discords, and catastrophes within existence, yet his last look at it is hopeful. (213) So too, Spinoza saw that a man attained the highest perfection not by attending to feelings of fear, weakness, or limitation, but by fixing his eye on the valuable and the good, and striving to reach it. This is the policy of sound wisdom and good judgment. We cannot avoid or ignore the evil of life, but we do not need to dwell on, much less brood over, it. The mystery of evil should not detain us in a mazy labyrinth of doubt and speculation that checks our onward march in life and paralyzes progress. We may not be able to solve the riddles of existence, but that is no reason why we should not lead a great and beautiful life. (214)

Such however can best be done by a personal trust in the Supreme Power. And the history of the race gives reasonable warrant for such a trust. Unless the historic evolution of the human race as a part of the World-All may be believed to be directed toward, and to be secure in, the final triumph of that all-inclusive Good, which all the other great religions dimly foreshadow, and Christianity denominates "Eternal Life in the Kingdom of God", there is no solution possible for this dark problem of evil. But religion holds out the hope of an ideal good. The faith in the securing of this good as the fixed purpose of God through a process of development, is religion's solution of the problem of evil. (215) In its lowest form religion is frankly dualistic regarding the evils of human life, but in its highest form it finds relief and strength through trust in a good God. (216) Ay, as it grows and develops, and recognizes the necessary discipline of pain for life it learns to

"Welcome each rebuff,
That turns earth's smoothness rough,
Each sting that bids nor sit nor stand but go."

And so we find our solution only by individual faith in a good God. It is not easy to reconcile all moral attributes in a finite person. Much

- (210) Ladd, Knowledge, Life and Reality - Page 492
- (211) Royce, World and the Individual II @ Page 411
- (212) Hoffding, Philosophy of Religion - Page 342
- (213) Hoffding, Philosophy of Religion - Page 342
- (214) Hoffding, Philosophy of Religion - Page 270
- (215) Ladd, Knowledge, Life and Reality - Page 493-494
- (216) Ladd, Knowledge, Life and Reality - Page 359

harder is it then in the case of the Infinite and Absolute. And when the finite spirit must attempt this it faces an impossible task. Yet for faith in a moral and trustworthy universe it must be attempted. We require a steadfast and omnipotent Good Will, guided by omniscience and free from the limitations of space and time. But still the finite cannot grasp the Infinite, and hence faith must come in to fill the gap. With that faith must be also a voluntary, ethical, and spiritual union with the object of that faith, and a filial attitude toward Him. The good then enjoyed in communion with the Divine is found to outweigh all the ills of life, while the life of the pious man is felt to be under the loving care of a heavenly Father, (217) and so for him all things work together for good.

Evil then finds its great opponent and conqueror in the redeeming love of God, that must reign till it "Hath put all enemies under His feet." Evil must be conquered and then transmuted that "God may be all in all." In the fine words of the great Dutch poet Da Costa

"At the confines of the ages, sees my eye the spirit of evil
Vanquished and disarmed, for rebellion no more able.
When the Lord God in all things, and in all, is all,
Will it light be, ever light be, light of light and darkness born."

We are eternally at home in God. (218) "That God which ever lives and loves," And so even amid the evils of life we may await, with a serene, unshaken faith, the final confirmation of that faith in the radiant unfolding and consummation of

"One God, one law, one element,
And one far-off divine event,
To which the whole creation moves."

- (217) Ladd, Knowledge, Life and Reality - Page 489-490
(218) Royce, World and the individual I - Page 427

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