Being-Towards-Death-and-Resurrection:
An Examination of Finitude and Infinitude in the Writings of Martin Heidegger and Emmanuel Falque
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By Braden Siemens, B.A.

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Title: Being-Towards-Death-and-Resurrection: An Examination of Finitude and Infinitude in Martin Heidegger and Emmanuel Falque

Author: Braden Siemens, B.A. (Canadian Mennonite University)

Supervisor: Professor P. Travis Kroeker

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Abstract

This thesis gives an account of Heidegger’s understanding of anxiety and death as it relates to the Christian theology of resurrection. It does so by investigating three primary accusations that Heidegger makes against Christianity with respect to its views on death and anxiety interpreted through a belief in an afterlife. In order to interact with Heidegger’s criticisms, Christian phenomenologist Emmanuel Falque’s work is explored for a more dialogical Heideggerian and Christian understanding of death. In doing so, this thesis picks up questions such as: can resurrection interpreted phenomenologically contribute something new to a Heideggerian view of Dasein as a Being-towards-death? as well as in what ways can Heidegger’s starting-point of finitude formulate new possibilities for interpreting Christ’s death and resurrection? Are these theological events necessary for an “authentic” understanding of death and finitude? These questions pertain to anxiety about what Heidegger calls the “to-come”, a concept mapped out in Heidegger’s own work on Christianity and then secularized in his fundamental ontology delineated in chapter one. Chapter two takes up Falque’s work on the death of Jesus and its correlations to Heideggerian views on death, while chapter three contemplates resurrection (and through this, birth) and the various modes of being that it opens up for human finitude. Chapter three concludes with a Levinasian reading of the New Testament resurrection accounts in order to consider how the Christian mode of Being-towards-resurrection can work alongside and, in a certain sense, within a Heideggerian view of human finitude as a Being-towards-death.
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Contents

Abstract

Acknowledgments

Introduction

1. Chapter 1: The Courage of Anxiety in the Face of Death
   1.1. The “How” of Religious Experience
   1.2. Time and Anxiety in the Eschatological Horizon
   1.3. Being-In-the-World and the “How” of Finitude in Being and Time
   1.4 From Parousia to Being-Towards-Death as a Phenomenon of Life
   1.5 Finitude and the Impossibility of the Infinite

2. Chapter 2: The Anxiety of Christ as a Being-Towards-Death
   2.1. Beginning With Finitude
   2.2. The Christian Flight From Death: Escaping Escapism
   2.3. Anxiety in Gethsemane: From Being-Towards-the-End to Being-Towards-Death
   2.4. The Kenotic Possibility of Life Before Death: A Critique of “Mineness”
   2.5. Suffering as Silent Flesh: A Critique of Consciousness
   2.6. Death in the Silent Flesh? A Heideggerian Response to Falque
   2.7. Conclusion

3. Chapter 3: Being-Towards-Resurrection as Otherness, Weakness, and Joy
   3.1. A Phenomenology of Birth
   3.2. Finitude as Impassable Immanence
   3.3. Passive and Active Metamorphoses
   3.4. Metamorphosis of the Self By the Other
   3.5. The World Become Other
   3.6. Weakness, Otherness, and Joy
   3.7. The Stranger and the Same: A Levinasian Excursion
   3.8. An Ontological Interpretation of Resurrection

4. Conclusion

Bibliography
Introduction

In 1927, the German philosopher Martin Heidegger wrote his major work *Being and Time*. Though the work itself deals primarily with Heidegger’s own phenomenological and ontological project, within it arise three major accusations directed against Christianity, all of which provide the impetus for this thesis. Of these accusations, the second—that for Christians death is not fully confronted but viewed instead together with the Christian view of Resurrection—acts as the hinge on which Christian Phenomenologist Emmanuel Falque builds his critical response to Heidegger. This thesis takes up both thinkers and their respective arguments about anxiety and death in order to map the ways in which Christian thinking can instruct (as well as fail to instruct) the structuring of meaning with relation to our dying and our waiting to die. As the reader will discover, no either/or boundaries are demarcated between the two philosophers, but rather this thesis attempts to enact a methodology like a pendulum swinging between Heidegger’s ontology of death and Falque’s phenomenology of resurrection, the pivot representing our human condition and our capacity for meaning-making.

Heidegger’s first accusation is that Christianity, through its presuppositional “idea of transcendence that man is something that reaches beyond itself,” no longer inquires into its own Being and has grown comfortable with quick dogmatic answers that neutralize, in their self-evidence, the issue of Dasein (Heidegger’s word for humans, literally “being-there”).¹ Said differently, for a Christian, to be a Christian precedes to be Dasein; being a Christian assumes an essence prior to existence.

Heidegger’s second accusation explains the “how” of the first: Christians neutralize their own Being, and in doing so grow comfortable, because they “already [view] death together with its Interpretation [sic] of life.” Through a dogmatic belief in the resurrection of the dead, Christians ignore their finitude by seeing death rather as a gateway to a life-after-life that surpasses death’s sting on the mortality of Dasein. Yet for Heidegger this afterworld that goes beyond finitude is inconceivable to the everyday experience of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world, that is, it requires an act of faith that contradicts lived experience. For as Stephen Mulhall puts it, Heidegger’s understanding of death is something “always left outstanding, or say incomplete.” Dasein is never a Being-towards-the-end that bears with it a resolve and completion. This, according to Heidegger, is the temptation that resurrection insists upon, that the absurdity of death is not so absurd after all, but rather a necessary passage into an eternity where all things will be resolved and reconciled. The Christian belief in the resurrection of the dead, for Heidegger, is nothing more than Dasein’s attempt to neatly tie together a life that so often is cut short of a proper meaningful ending.

As a third accusation, Heidegger suggests that Christianity posits “in-finite time out of the finite.” It is only because “primordial time is finite” that Dasein can “temporalize itself as infinite” (BT 65:379). What this means is that all Dasein exist mortally and inherit a world

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2 Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), note iv to §49:249, pg. 408. This is the translation of a note in Being and Time which Emmanuel Falque, used as Heidegger’s Christian interlocutor in this thesis, prefers at certain times to the standard Macquarrie and Robinson translation, whose rendering of this passage makes Heidegger’s criticism far less obvious. Falque uses, in instances such as this, the Stambaugh translation instead where the translation is closer to the French translation to which Falque referred. Because this wording of Heidegger’s note is the one used by Falque for his rebuttal to Heidegger, I have included it here in the Stambaugh translation which he uses. Following Falque, I will use the Macquarrie and Robinson for the *Being and Time* references below.

wherein time is experienced within the constraints of past, present, and future. It is only within this finite structuring of time, through experiencing phenomena in the world of life and death of organisms, the stasis and motion of objects, the change and consistency in nature and character, that Dasein can envision an endless sequence of moments moving forever in eternity. Heidegger argues that when eternity is posited, it is of necessity posited out of a more primary and direct encounter that Dasein has with finite time and, more than this, is an abstraction of temporality.

According to Heidegger then, Christianity misses what he calls Dasein’s fundamental ontology, that is, its primordial Being-in-the-world, because it avoids confronting anxiety about death, instead placing its hope in an escape into a life-after-life. My thesis takes up these accusations, arguing that Heidegger is correct in one sense, i.e. that Christianity has tended to settle into the complacency of what he calls the “They-self”—a mode of being which flees in the face of death and whose flight causes an inauthentic refusal to confront anxiety before death. Nevertheless, the French phenomenologist Emmanuel Falque’s work in Christian phenomenology has enacted a retrieval of Christian theology in light of Heidegger that resists Heidegger’s reductionistic accusations of Christianity. Falque’s phenomenology engages existential acts such as Christ’s anxiety in Gethsemane, his Being-towards-death, and finally explores a retrieval of Christ’s resurrection (and thereby our own) through a fully-embodied phenomenology of (re)birth. Falque clears the way, contra Heidegger, for Christianity to illuminate a mode of living-unto-death as well as a mode of being transformed not in some other world (life-after-life) but rather in a transfigured “world as Other.”

What is at stake in my thesis is not a defence of resurrection interpreted as a biological or objective life-after-life, but rather a heuristic exploration of the possible ex-

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istemential/ontological modalities that the Christian notions of death and resurrection could signify in the life of everyday finite Dasein.\textsuperscript{5} As the title of Falque’s book conveys, resurrection has far more to do with a “metamorphosis of finitude,” than with a total upheaval of it.

Heidegger’s accusations against Christianity are encompassed by his own commitment to an understanding of death that emerges in his 1927 Being and Time, a development that begins in his earlier 1921 work on Christian anxiety and eschatological time: The Phenomenology of Religious Life. Beginning in this early work on Christianity, Heidegger’s analysis of Christian phenomena reveals a portrait of religious Dasein wherein the Christian doctrine of the parousia (the coming of God/Messiah as a horizon of possibility) causes existential anxiety and thus actualizes a mode of Being-in-the-world sustained by an incessant displacement of security and complacency. The first chapter of my thesis looks at this early work of Heidegger’s, not only to interrogate the movement that takes place between it and Being and Time—in Phenomenology language of parousia is used rather than death as the ultimate conveyer of anxiety—but also to remind the reader of Heidegger’s own earlier positive contribution to Christian thinking.

The question of the first chapter concerns what happens to the phenomenology of Dasein’s temporality when death replaces parousia as the determining impetus of human anxiety and possibility. In this chapter, I map Heidegger’s methodology and outline his work as it appears in both The Phenomenology of Religious Life and Being and Time, showing how Heidegger’s language of “anxiety,” “temptation,” “the call,” temporality”—all terms that describe the religious experience of early Christianity, specifically as he sees it within the Epistles to the

\textsuperscript{5} What is meant by ontological/existential is that which has to do with the everyday Being of Dasein in the Heideggerian sense. To be ontological in the sense used here does not communicate a reality that exists scientifically or objectively nor does it constitute a nature, but rather points to a suffusion of meaning that I experience as Being-in-the-world. Being has to do with meaning, hence existence must be simultaneous to essence for Heidegger.
Thessalonians—is carried over into *Being and Time* but in a now pre-ontological modality. No longer is the language of the call or temptation used with respect to human-divine relations, but rather is now fundamental to Dasein’s experience as Being-in-the-world which is experienced prior to any conception of God or eternity. At the center of both books is the insistence that Dasein must have the courage to inhabit its own existential anxiety that society works thoroughly to distract Dasein from. But what is left in the process of the analogous paradigm shared by both the 1921 and 1927 books is the implicit realization that Dasein no longer needs the Christian experience in order to properly confront death since, as the above accusations from *Being and Time* show, Christian language does not adequately allow Dasein to confront death or anxiety at all.

For Heidegger, as Sean Ireton argues, death becomes not only the “self-realization of the individual,” but also the “determining factor of selfhood.” Death radically individualizes Dasein, a notion in Heidegger’s fundamental ontology indicative of his important distinction between metaphysics and ontology. Whereas for much of human history prior to Heidegger, death was viewed in the abstract as a metaphysical reality of the hereafter or a metaphysically ontic determination of human bios, Heidegger introduces an ontological view wherein death produces in Dasein a “fundamental way of being.” According to Ireton, Dasein has always struggled in the face of our relationship to death, and has done so in a variety of different ways through the centuries. For example, through the Middle Ages, death was “tamed’ through ritualization and human appropriation.”

\[\text{\underline{Notes}}\]


7 Ibid., 6.

8 Ibid., 10.
which were to commend the dying to a common destination into the unknown. In the late medieval era, death took on a far more individualized character, where the dying person “hoped to gain immortality on the very basis of his individuality; the soul was not only immortal, but distinctly personal.”9 This surge in individuality, passing through a romantic and Victorian literary movement as a sentimentalization of death, functioned as a pretext to the modern and contemporary understanding of death as what Ireton calls a “dirty death.” This so-called “dirty death” is where Dasein now finds itself. Ireton describes “dirty death” as “death better left concealed from others. It is in fact hidden behind the closed doors of the bedroom [fully individualized], where the public and sometimes even the closest family members are denied access. The traditional gathering place for the community to pay its final respects has thus been sealed off to all but the doctor, the new confidant in matters concerning death and dying.”10 Death is deemed culturally a “social impropriety,” as an “invisible death, hidden death, medicalized death.”11 Death, no longer “domesticated” by ritual and religion, through secularization has become “disregarded and outright denied.”12 Heidegger, writing at a time where the privatization and medicalization of death was beginning to heighten through technological advances and in the wake of WWI, has in his focus this attitude of denial concerning death. What makes Heidegger important for this thesis is that, refusing to deny death its sting, Heidegger looks straight into the vacuity of death and

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9 Ibid., 11.
10 Ibid., 13.
11 Ibid., 13.
12 Ibid., 14.
names it the “compass of our being,” insisting that “death holds the key to obtaining a complete and meaningful existence.”

Emmanuel Falque’s two works *The Guide to Gethsemane* and *The Metamorphosis of Finitude* make up the focus of chapters two and three, the first dealing with a phenomenology of death and anxiety and the second of joy and resurrection. Together these texts are probed for possible answers to the questions Heidegger raises. In the second chapter, I will analyze Falque’s *The Guide to Gethsemane*, which attempts to retrieve Jesus’ confrontation with finitude during his anticipation of death in Gethsemane and his death at Golgotha. Far from being a flight from death or an escape to a beyond, Falque interprets Jesus as resolved to make his death a mode of his life and therefore lives authentically in the Heideggerian sense. Yet Falque does not offer a mere apologetic for Christian theology. While there is no escaping the inevitability of death, Falque argues against Heidegger that death is not primarily instantiated in anxiety as an individual phenomenon, but rather expresses itself communally through living and dying for others. This Falque defines as a “kenotic possibility” of death that interprets death as a gift for others that breaks the solipsism that Falque identifies in Heidegger’s notion of the “mineness” of Dasein’s experience of Being-towards-death. Alongside this, Falque seeks to go further back than Heidegger to a more primordial anxiety of death that is silent (i.e. pre-linguistic) and therefore unconscious and primarily embodied. This is a notion Falque borrows from Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and while I am in agreement with Falque’s positive assessment of the flesh, I also defend Heidegger by demonstrating how *Being and Time* bears within it the importance of embodiment while also arguing for the necessity of consciousness/awareness in order for there to be a realiza-

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13 Ibid., 18.
tion of anxiety in Dasein. Death therefore is, as Heidegger states, primarily an anticipation felt in the mood/attunement of anxiety, but also one that can be interpreted differently from Heidegger within the Christian experience.

The third chapter addresses the first and third accusations of Heidegger, namely, the accusation that Christianity temporalizes infinity out of its own finite sense of time and that it seeks a beyond outside of itself. Emmanuel Falque’s book *The Metamorphosis of Finitude* exhibits a way of retrieving an existential understanding of resurrection while at the same time maintaining finitude as axiomatic, thereby making Heidegger’s criticism into a strength. Moving from resurrection as an ontic event to an ontological event, Falque argues that what resurrection unveils is that there are two modalities of being embodied as Dasein: the flesh and the Spirit. As for the Spirit, resurrection signifies this new modality of Being-in-the-world. Unlike the modality of the flesh, the Spirit is not solely concerned with its Being-towards-death (though it must still acknowledge and participate in a resolute anticipation of death), but also with its Being-towards-birth, that is, with the givenness of the world revealed through a phenomenology of birth; a givenness that activates possibilities of joy and lightening the load of anxiety.

An ontological investigation of resurrection concerns itself with a new mode of living in the world. In order to demonstrate the difference between the mode of the flesh and the mode of the Spirit (resurrection)—both of which are expressed in the body of Dasein—Falque compares the passivity of Christian metamorphosis to the active transformation of the Nietzschean metamorphosis. I describe Falque’s argument against Nietzsche with reference to *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* in order to further comment on the similarities and differences between the self-same will-to-power of Zarathustra and the other-centric yielding of power of the resurrected
Christ. While these differences exist, both metamorphoses are characterized by a love of the earth and the body and are filled with joy.

The third chapter also critically interprets what I call an onto-theological Trinitarianism which Falque appears to put forward as a model analogous to Dasein’s relationship with the Other, a metaphysical presupposition that seems at certain instances to contradict his insistence on finitude and phenomenology. In order to respond to Heidegger’s criticisms of theology, it is necessary to retrieve in the Christian narrative an ontological/existential meaning that does not require an onto-theological or metaphysical reality to give it substance. What we are looking for is the meaning the resurrection can convey in transforming the limits of human finitude, not a way of escaping or transgressing the natural limits of humanity. As a way of balancing Falque’s metaphysics, I introduce Emmanuel Levinas’ 1961 work *Totality and Infinity*, which, though it seeks to displace what Heidegger calls fundamental ontology, also contributes to phenomenology a discussion on ethics that is both pre-ontological and encountered within the face of the Other. In order to elucidate what a possible ontological interpretation of the resurrection might mean, I combine Levinas’ phenomenology with that of Falque’s in my own reading of the resurrection accounts described in the gospels.

Through integrating Levinas and Falque I propose three existential modalities of resurrection that can be delineated from the disciples interaction with the resurrected Christ, all of which contribute to Dasein’s Being-toward-death and in a certain sense, authenticate it: 1) the trauma of encounter with the Other; 2) the weakness and vulnerability of the flesh; 3) the joy and peace of the (re)birth in a world of difference and otherness. Through modelling of a new mode of finitude, the resurrected Christ metamorphizes the Being-in-the-world of Dasein from a mode
of solipsistic egoism of (what Levinas calls) the Same, and opens up a new manner of Being that is Other-centric and kenotic. Ultimately, what this thesis attempts to contribute toward is a step forward in Christian thinking that can fully inhabit mortality in an ontological way that actively yields to the possibilities which arrive from outside of the self, and most importantly, possibilities that are evoked not only through the anticipation of “my” own death, but the death of Christ and therefore that of the Other (who is all others).

Methodologically, this thesis assumes a provisional heuristic approach, not, on the one hand, seeking to dismiss Heidegger under the auspices of a Judaeo-Christian apologetic nor, on the other hand, to advocate for the triumph of Heideggerian fundamental ontology over later Christian phenomenology. Rather, I maintain the position throughout this thesis, alongside the thinkers that it deals with, that Dasein begins from the perspective of finitude, within a plane of immanence and Being-in-the-world. Only from that vantage point can one then determine what concepts such as death, time, or resurrection can mean for Dasein, whether in a mode of authenticity which stands temporally between the “thrownness” of origin and the indeterminacy of death (Heidegger), or in the other-centric metamorphosis of vulnerability and weakness which occurs through a phenomenology of birth and resurrection (Falque).

No synthetic reconciliation between the two thinkers is achieved, but rather a hopeful dialectic is sought in order to further the conversation surrounding finitude, death, and resurrection among Christian and non-Christian phenomenologists alike. This thesis critically contributes to an understanding of both the inadequacy and the validity of Heidegger’s critical assessment of Christian theology as that which seeks “to interpret death through the Interpretation [sic] of life.” What is to be decided upon includes 1) whether the suffering, anxiety, and death of Christ as a
Being-towards-death can speak to, open up, and move past Heidegger’s conception of death and time; 2) whether the Christian doctrine of resurrection, reframed phenomenologically via Falque (and with the aid of Levinas) as a metamorphosis of human modes of existence, successfully responds to Heidegger’s critique of infinity and resurrection in *Being and Time.*
Chapter 1: The Courage of Anxiety in the Face of Death

1.1 Introduction: The “How” of Religious Experience

In order to begin thinking about Heidegger’s fundamental ontology in Being and Time—of what is meant by Dasein’s temporally ecstatic Being-towards-death and all that such an idea might mean for enabling Dasein to deal with anxiety, a step back is necessary in order to recognize the thematic resonances with regard to terms such as “anxiety,” “the call,” “temptation,” “temporality,” “possibility,” and especially the “enactment” of the “how,” as such terms appear already planted in nascent form within Heidegger’s Phenomenology of Religious Life. Doing so will not only work as a comparison to Emmanuel Falque’s own phenomenological views of religious life later in this thesis, but also perhaps contribute to an understanding of the limitations Heidegger places on Christianity due to his selection and privileging of the Pauline Epistles over the Gospels and the repercussions this might have for any phenomenology of religious life.

Heidegger wrote The Phenomenology of Religious Life as a series of lectures on the topic of the facticity and anxiety of Christianity in the Pauline Epistles and Augustine’s Confessions. Written between 1920-1921, the lectures preceded the 1927 Being and Time by six years and

14 Throughout my thesis I have chosen to follow Heidegger in referring to human beings as Dasein (“being-there”). Heidegger attempts in Being and Time to return to the experience of a sheer “being-there” prior to any conceptual notions of human nature or any species/genus taxonomies of Being, and so simply calls humans by our initial ‘thereness’ of existence: being-there. In doing so I will also use gendered personal pronouns (he/she) in order to avoid the depersonalization that may be risked in referring to human beings as Dasein.

15 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962). From here on, references to Being and Time will be abbreviated to BT and given in the form of ‘section: page number’, where ‘page number’ refers to the widely used Macquarrie and Robinson English translation. “Ecstases” is Heidegger’s word for describing ontological time. Unlike ordinary time, which is logged by clockwork systems, ontological time is not a “pure sequence of ‘nows” (BT 65:377). Rather, what the ecstases of Dasein’s temporality signify is a “primordial ‘outside-of-itself’ in and for itself” (ibid). Dasein is a Being-in-the-world who experiences time primarily in the mode of anticipation and futurity. This is why Being-towards-death becomes the major way in which Dasein experiences itself temporally.
proves insightful in disclosing the contours of Heidegger’s early thought. For the sake of brevity, attention will be given to the second part of the first lecture, on the “Phenomenological Explication of Concrete Religious Phenomena in Connection with Letters of Paul”—more specifically, to Heidegger’s explication of the first and second letters to the Thessalonians.

Before interpreting Paul’s letter phenomenologically, Heidegger sets forth a methodology introducing his audience to philosophical concepts and context in order to establish a common starting point. Yet, paradoxically, in doing so Heidegger’s first point is to mention how philosophical concepts themselves, conditioned by history, culture, language, and context (what he calls, and what I shall call in this thesis, “facticity”) are themselves “vacillating, vague, manifold, fluctuating…it belongs to the sense of philosophical concepts themselves to remain uncertain.”

Unlike the scientific disciplines, philosophy does not have an “objectivity” in which to place or delimit it within a strict material context. Philosophy does not have determinate concepts upon which a history of thought is established in a fixed, static, and universal sense. Rather, says Heidegger, philosophy is far more akin to art or to a painting in that it causes one to “return back into factual life experience,” experience that is fundamental to every Dasein prior to any conception of a scientific method (PRL 3:7). What is this factual life experience? Heidegger answers that it is the “experiencing self and what is experienced” as that which refuses to be “torn apart” (PRL 3:7). Contrary to the many scientific disciplines, phenomenology begins with the primordial encounter with Being, that is, with Dasein’s Being-in-the-world, wherein that which is ready-to-hand (accessible to Dasein reflexively and without a sense of critical detachment) is

more immediate to lived experience than that which is present-at-hand (an envisioning actualized by dissecting and objectivization, such as, for example, when someone who breaks their glasses notices the screws holding the arms together for the very first time). Admittedly, Heidegger does not use such language until *Being and Time*, but it already appears to his earlier thinking.

What one finds in the introductory remarks of *The Phenomenology of Religious Life* is nothing less than that same pre-ontological return to a primordial experience which ruptures the subject-object relation that one finds later explicated in *Being and Time*, disclosing in Dasein its “*surrounding world*” and its “*communal world*” wherein one is a fireman, a writer, a pastor, or a retail worker who lives alongside Europeans or Canadians, or a customer who makes conversation with a local barista every morning (PRL 3:8). Everyone inhabits a world experientially before they know the world as a theory or a concept. In this sense, phenomenology begins with Dasein’s experience, what Heidegger calls the “*how*” of factual life; the “everydayness” as he will later call it in *Being and Time.*\(^{17}\) This *how* is that which precedes content but “merges into content” (PRL 3:9). It is the *how* that stands in relation to how Dasein relates to the world around it. Dasein’s *how* is a matter of *relationship*. In this relationship one finds an immediate access to phenomena (e.g. the coffee, the bedsheets, the stove) that is pre-cognizant and suffused with significance, not as an ego-subject isolated by a distance of consciousness from its objects of intentionality, but rather through an “attachment” of “worldly character” which precedes all philosophy and science (PRL 3:10; 4:11). Philosophy, writes Heidegger, has tended to ignore this world-

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\(^{17}\) “Everydayness” takes on multiple roles in *Being and Time*. At its most elementary level, it is the “basic state of Dasein” wherein existential structures are to be found (BT 5:38). Everydayness later is defined as “*Being-in-the-world which is falling and disclosed, thrown and projecting, and for which its ownmost potentiality-for-Being is an issue, both in its Being alongside the ‘world’ and in its Being-with Others*” (BT 39:225). Moreover, everydayness begins as well to take on what will below be described as the “They-self,” that is, as exhibiting an inauthentic mode of Dasein.
ly character of experience by favouring epistemology, psychology and metaphysics and in doing so, has turned its back on the most basic level of human facticity as that which is “given” and not to be merely “explained” (PRL 5:16).

Unlike the common philosophy of religion, which attempts to study the “what” of religion, such as the object of faith (God), Heidegger resists the reduction of the religious experience to such a scientific material matrix, instead allowing philosophy to determine the how of religious phenomena by asking how is religious experience enacted? How does it influence thinking? How does it effect the mode and manner of experience itself?

Before transitioning into his reading of Paul, Heidegger first takes time to clarify what it means to do a historical study and, more than this, what it means to speak at all about the phenomenon of the historical. Resisting an objectification of history that minimizes the historical to a simple chronology of time or into a schematism of eras and epochs, no such tidy organization of linear time can be found in Heidegger’s conception of history. Heidegger’s understanding of the historical is what he calls “immediate vivacity” (PRL 7:23). The historical is “a power” that “determines” and “disturbs” culture (PRL 7:23). Unlike the “historical consciousness” which permeates most thinking in the academic study of history, the phenomenon of the historical does not lead to a false security of tolerance that seeks to study history only in order to ground itself in a diversity of ideas upon which to settle so as to comprehend it. Such is a false security, always burdened by the radical inhibition of the how of the historical which is always felt underlying its own manufactured conceptualizations of history. The how of the historical is the way in which history effects and determines Dasein’s existence. According to Heidegger, this “tendency-to-secure” goes back to Plato’s own break with the historical and flight into an abstracted extra-tem-
poral realm upon whose foundation every typology and schematism concerning history is
grounded (e.g. a view of history as primarily cultural, economic, or teleological) (PRL 9:31).

Will the objectification of the historical due to the “tendency-to-secure” suffice for a phe-

nomenological reading of a historical text such as Paul? Of course the answer for Heidegger is a
resolute no. Only by breaking with a typology of the historical will we be able to revisit a text
such as Paul’s epistle to the Thessalonians on its own ground. What must be unearthed is the
phenomenon of the historical latent in the factical experience of Dasein itself, in the how of Da-
sein as expressed by Paul. Where Dasein loses its primordial experience of the historical is in
what Heidegger calls the “fall” into a “foreconception of an object” (PRL 9:35). When Dasein
presupposes an objective on which to grasp history, it in effect “falls” from its direct encounter
with the historical. What in fact is called for is a destruction of historical concepts altogether
(PRL 18:54) and a phenomenological turning to the things themselves, to a direct confrontation
with factical history in Dasein itself as it appears and, as Heidegger puts it in Being and Time,
“announces” itself to a relational meaning of the historical that is more immediate than any theo-
retical imposition of meaning (PRL 12:40) (BT 7:54, 58). Everything must be “kept open” and
“held in abeyance,” without the baggage of preconceptions, doctrinal debates, and theoretical
generalizations that muddy the primordial religious experience as well as distract from the vivac-
ity and disturbing quality that the historical has on Dasein’s Being (PRL 13:44).

1.2 Time and Anxiety in the Eschatological Horizon

Heidegger paves the path that Falque will later dare to traverse—in the assertion that
“only with phenomenological understanding, a new way of theology is opened up” (PRL 14:47).
In order to develop such a phenomenology of religion, Heidegger begins by asking about the how of the primordial and factical Christian lived experience and about the temporality that makes it phenomenally historical. The central phenomenon of Christianity, as found in Paul’s letters, is that of proclamation and the announcement of a message. Proclamation is the beginning of the how, the “enactment” of the how in Christian lived experience (PRL 20:56). What is important here is that the “phenomenological understanding [that is, the understanding of that which announces itself and appears before Dasein] is determined by the enactment of the observer” (PRL 21:57). The observer herself enacts an understanding in a lived experience which is familiar to her and only secondarily uses language as a way of explaining that experience (PRL 22:59). Proclamation is not here deemed the use of language in explicating an experience and thereby abstracting experience into a theory or doctrine. Instead, proclamation makes up the initial experience of the Christian (PRL 22:59).

Where does this enactment/proclamation begin and how does it take shape in the life of a Christian according to the letters of Paul? Heidegger looks at the earliest of Paul’s letters, the first and second letters to the Thessalonians, which, due to their immediacy to Paul’s own experience may shed light upon this enactment of lived experience. The Christians, those to whom Paul stands in relation, are those who are caught up in a particular “situation,” namely, a temporal experience of “having-been” and “having-become” (25:65). Here in the “having-become” is a linkage between Paul and those to whom he writes, a linkage of “remembering” and “knowing” which are enacted in the proclamation itself. What becomes apparent in this remembering is the evidence of a phenomenon that is “co-experienced”— a co-experiencing of an acceptance of the proclamation, one whose efficacy is actualized in the how of “the self-conduct of factical
life” (PRL 25:66). Said differently, the historical is not something which settles the Christian, but rather that which burdens her. It is no longer the Platonic “tendency-to-secure” of the extra-temporal but rather an “absolute turning-around” (μετάνοια) and “turning-toward” transformation (God/the historical) within lived experience which evokes in the Christian a mode of being that alters their possibilities in their existence. The turning-away is a turning-away from images (εἴδωλον) or “illusions” which follows from the turning-toward that which has no image, that is, that which refuses the object-historical or object-relation of a science (i.e. God). The Christian’s facticity, that which constrains and delimits Dasein’s possibilities, now takes on a new mode through the proclamation and a co-experienced “having-become.” Conversion, while creating bonds that constrain possibilities, also clears a path for new possibilities.

For Heidegger, Christianity’s phenomenological how is here temporally activated, bound up with an acceptance—even, daringly enough, a joy—in the “anguish of life” (PRL 25:66). Such joy in the midst of anguish is the natural corollary of the temporal “having-become” (in the past, though Heidegger does not call it this, once more avoiding the reduction of the historical to a familiar schema). By existing historically, the Christian enacts a mode of joy in the anguish of life, with the knowledge that turns away from mere objectification and is bound up with the conduct of factical life. Yet more importantly than this “having-become” is the expectancy of what-is-to-come, to wit, the coming of the parousia (the second-coming of Messiah). Following the acceptance of anguish in joy, the Christian experiences an “absolute distress” as a fundamental “concern” that colours the horizon of all of factical life (PRL 25:67). Such is the anxiety caused by this imminent coming of Messiah, that it “determines each moment of his [the Christian’s/ Paul’s] life. He is constantly beset by a suffering, despite his joy” (PRL 26:69). Paul’s answer to
this augmentation of anxiety by *parousia* is not a theoretical proposition, nor is it an explication of his eschatological dogma; what one sees in Paul is the enactment concerning *how* to live in actual life. There derives from the urgent horizon of the *parousia* a decisive moment wherein the Christian must choose whether or not to enter into the weakness and vulnerability of the interminability of the content (the “when”) and to a further acceptance of the anguish and anxiety of life with charity and love (PRL 26:70).

What occurs in this future projection—anticipation of *parousia*—is a refusal of scientific schemata that attempt to circumscribe time and history. There is no “when” or “what” given by Paul to the Thessalonians. Only the *how* is expressed. What in fact heightens the anxiety of the Christian in the anticipation of the future turns back on itself, ricocheting off the “coming” and the “call” of the eschaton and returning to the “having-become” and the knowledge of the joy in the original pronouncement. Eschatology thus returns to existential conversion, permeating Christian experience temporally.

This is not, however, the experience of everyday Dasein. According to Paul, the Christian is one who steps away from the “peace and security” of society, whose facticity determines for them a character of serenity and calm. Heidegger writes, “that which encounters me in my worldly comportment carries no reason for disturbance” (PRL 26:72). It is to those who are caught up in such worldliness that are “surprised” by the sudden destruction that awaits them. This is due to nothing other than a type of forgetting (juxtaposed to the Christian “remembering”) that involves a forgetting of one’s own self, “because they do not have themselves in the clarity of authentic knowledge” (PRL 26:72). Those who live in peace and security lack an original comportment which readies them not only for some apocalyptic future—as
though the point of the eschaton was the “when” of its deliverance—but rather for their own remembering of themselves through a new manner of existing temporally. Something must be transformed in the mode of their Being. Society, addicted as it is to the objectively graspable, passes by itself like an eternal somnambulant, while the Christians are called to be ever awake, compelled by the “constant insecurity” that is “characteristic for what is fundamentally significant in factical life” (PRL 26:73). What is noticeable here is the indistinguishability between the experience of the self and the experience of God; the forgetting of the self is associated with the refusal of the coming of God via the \textit{parousia}. This becomes clearer in Heidegger’s comments in his lectures on Augustine’s \textit{Confessions}. Heidegger writes, “I am not only the \textit{one from} whose place the search [for God] proceeds and who moves toward some place, or the one \textit{in} whom the search takes place; but the enactment of the search itself is something of the self” (PRL 9:141). In some sense the search for God comes out from within the search for the self. This is why, in speaking of fallenness in Augustine, Heidegger comments that those who reject the “truth” of Christian enactment are those who practice a “self-concealing” (PRL 10:148). Thus, the beginning of religious enactment must begin with the “fore-question, a questioning of oneself” (PRL 17:183). The fore-conception of objective time of security and complacency is displaced by a Christian anxiety that causes a fore-questioning of the self. The existential call from the future becomes an interrogative question of Being.

What is it for the Christian to be one who is “called” and whose calling necessitates a decision and a resolve? The call comes forth from the future possibility, from the existential horizon that is the \textit{parousia}, and which draws the Christian out from the security of worldliness. No longer does life take on the appearance of idleness and unconcern but now is fraught with care
and concern. Heidegger comments that those who find themselves in unconcern are those who inquire theoretically about the “when” of the coming, thus postponing the required action of the how (PRL 27:76). Thus Paul augments the tension of the Thessalonians, calling them from the “temptation” of the world (the “when” of content over the how of religious life). This marks the dichotomous modes of “calling” and “temptation” all of which will become important for Heidegger later in Being and Time. Temptation is that which “sets aside possibility” and “calling” is that which opens them up (PRL 13:162). In the temptation (and what is sometimes called by Heidegger a “fallenness”) those who ask the “when” question hide in the idle chatter and the inconspicuousness of the crowd, thereby removing themselves from responsibility and authenticity of being called. What occurs in the Christian who hears the call is an individuation that isolates the believer before God. As the anxiety before God increases, so too does the enlivening of a transformed way of life in the Christian.

Nothing of Heidegger’s phenomenology assumes a metaphysical or theological worldview. Alternatively, Heidegger’s project attempts to disclose the enactment of the lived experience out of which proceeds views of the world, or as he puts it, the “genesis of dogma” (PRL 29:79). The Christian does not begin with an abstraction from life or experience. As Heidegger explains, “the Christian does not step out of this world” (PRL 31:85). The content of the world remains the same, what changes is the how of our relational comportment to the world. The tentmaker remains a tentmaker even in his apostleship, but his relationship with time and his conduct in the present changes. He no longer hoards his money and no longer builds up security for himself, but gives himself wholly to the Thessalonians who receive his pronouncement.

There is no Nietzschean ressentiment here against the strong, only a “conviction” and “tendency
of life” characterized by spirit (πνεῦμα) that opens up a new manner of living historically (“having-been”) out of a present (“self-conduct”) that is motivated by anticipation of a future (parousia) (PRL 31:86; 33:88).18

1.3 Being-In-the-World and the “How” of Finitude in Being and Time

Heidegger does not abandon these terms when he writes his 1927 work Being and Time, but instead radically reframes them. As Ireton comments, Heidegger’s “early Freiburg lecture courses on Paul, Augustine, and mysticism from 1918-1921, not to mention the religious training he received during the years 1909-1911 in preparation for the priesthood, gave him a solid foundation on which to construct a philosophy oriented toward human existence and a more encompassing notion of being.”19 What one finds in Being and Time is an analysis of everyday Dasein that underlies, precedes, and simmers beneath all religious experience, including that described in The Phenomenology of Religious Life. If anything, one could say that Dasein as portrayed in The Phenomenology of Religious Life is supported by a baseline of existence that is animated by Dasein’s Being-in-the-world as described in Being and Time.20 Therefore, it is no wonder that Heidegger’s terminology in the preceding work returns in the text of his most important work. What this means for Being and Time is that parousia no longer functions as the horizon of Dasein’s authenticity and as the impetus for its anxiety. Instead, one now finds that time itself be-

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18 Heidegger uses the Greek Parousia to describe the second advent of Christ.


20 Or, depending on how one view it, Being and Time could be seen as saturated with secularized Christian theology. Ireton explains that “Being and Time is saturated with primal Christian notions such as anxiety, conscience, care, the moment, even the dualism of authenticity and inauthenticity.” Ibid.
comes “the possible horizon of being” (BT 1). Time here takes on the same futural projection as it did for Heidegger’s interpretation of the Christian *parousia*, but is now channeled through the realization of the coming of death. In addition, just like *parousia* returned the Christian back onto her “having-become,” so too does death cast Dasein back onto her own “thrownness” and factici-ty. Acceptance of one’s anxiety/anguish also makes up the decision of Dasein as she finds herself isolated by death from the “They-self” of society, a “They” which constantly tempts Dasein, distracting it from the immediacy of death’s horizon. The “call” is now that of a conscience activated by a receding future for the sake of “acting” in the present, while “fallenness” is described now as a state of inauthenticity which makes up everyday Dasein. What is sought in *Being and Time* is nothing less than a wholesale discovery of Dasein’s lived experience as Being-in-the-world, one starting from the most primordial encounters with phenomena. Dasein does not begin with a knowledge of the eternal, of a pre-existent soul, nor with any reassurance or comfort of a life-after-life. Dasein begins with its finitude as experienced in the world, wherein its mortal existence is its essence (BT 9:67).

What I argue is that the development from *The Phenomenology of Religious Life* to *Being and Time* unveils both a positive glimpse at Dasein’s Being, as something latent and only partially expressed on the surface of Christian phenomenology, as well as Christianity’s inability (according to Heidegger) to fully come face to face with death, producing thereby a heightening of anxiety that is misdirected toward a to-come of God that goes beyond primordial lived experience. This is not to say that the Christian experience does not overlap in many ways with Dasein’s fundamental ontology as depicted in *Being and Time*. Indeed, for Heidegger, the very reason why there are similarities at all between the two is because Christianity is a metaphysic that
is built atop Dasein’s basic existential structures. What *Being and Time* does in practice is to tear Christian *parousia* from its transcendence and to reinstall it as Dasein’s immanent Being-towards-death as its basic existential structure. Put another way, *Being and Time* begins from the ground up, rather than from an imminent descending of something “from above” to the ground below (as is witnessed to in both the doctrine of incarnation and in the Pauline eschatological horizon of the *parousia*). To *Being and Time* we now turn.

As in the *Phenomenology of Religious Life*, Heidegger’s phenomenology once more characterizes the *how* of philosophy, that is, the *how* of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world, as a methodological starting point (BT 7:50). Phenomena are thus, as the so-called objects of phenomenology, that which “announces itself” or “shows itself,” manifesting itself regardless of its truth or falsity, but as something “unhidden” (ἀλήθεια) and bearing within itself the simultaneous possibility of discovery and concealment (BT 7:54-57). Thus, phenomenology does not hold within itself a specific “subject matter,” but rather intends to provide the *how* of methodology. Phenomenology can then function to pass over the philosophical and theological systems that have time and again entrapped Being in their so-called “self-evidence” (including the Christian determination of Being consisting in creator/creation distinctions, *imago dei*, and the presumption of immaterial substances or souls), and make ontology once more possible through the *how* of Dasein’s direct experience of Being (BT 7:60). Motivated by the *how* of Being, one should avoid the confusion of Being with some sort of external reality, nor is the pursuit of Being a synthetic idealism of the Kantian sort. Rather, Heidegger insists that only through the phenomena

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21 ἀλήθεια here refers to Heidegger’s definition of truth as that which is “unhidden,” regardless of its truth or falsity. See footnote 22.
encountered by Dasein can anything be discovered or hidden.\textsuperscript{22} This is the phenomenology which Heidegger carries over from his teacher Edmund Husserl, a phenomenology concerned with a descriptive psychology of the things themselves as they appear to everyday Dasein. Yet unlike Husserl, Heidegger is not interested in the attainment of “absolute knowledge of essences,” but rather, as Richard Polt puts it, the attainment of “our non-theoretical openness to beings” to which “theoretical truth is secondary.”\textsuperscript{23} For Heidegger, phenomenology is not so much about the grounding of a theory of life. Because “life is more basic than theory,” phenomenology is concerned with studying “concrete existence.”\textsuperscript{24}

As is by now obvious, \textit{Being and Time} begins with the question of Being. Throughout history, according to Heidegger, Being has been interpreted through philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, and Hegel as a universal dogma that has now become (or is becoming) self-evident. For Heidegger, this certitude of Being’s self-evidence is problematic and must be queried. To do so, one must return to the ancient soil upon which the ontological categories have grown in order to grasp once more the roots of the primordial “\textit{a priori enigma}” that is itself Being (BT 1:23). Being is something to be probed, something to be sought — without an \textit{a priori} answer — from the vague idea that every Dasein has of Being, one that has been increasingly filtered as it is passed down through the history of philosophy. What Heidegger attempts is to work through the ques-
tion of Being from the starting point of Dasein’s experience of Dasein itself. As he writes: “the very asking of the question [of Being] is an entity’s mode of Being; and as such it gets its essential character from what is inquired about—namely, Being” (BT 2:27). In other words, Dasein is that which inquires about its own Being, or one for whom “Being is an issue for it” (BT 4:32). This inquiring of Dasein is what makes it distinguishable from the ontic realm and what defines it as uniquely ontological. What this means is that “Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence—in terms of possibility itself” (BT 4:33). To be ontological is to have concern with one’s existence and to care about one’s possibilities (whether chosen or inherited). Anything ontic lacks these essential existential characteristics of Dasein.

Not only does Heidegger begin from this ontological soil of Being from the vantage point of Dasein’s existence, but also from the comportment Dasein always assumes—“being in a world” (BT 4:33). Dasein is that which already finds itself in a world even before it begins to think or to cognize about substances or essences. Its essence is already experienced in its activity or existence. It is not something like a tree or a table in that it is not a “what,” but rather it is an expression of its Being (BT 9:67). Dasein is not just a property, but rather a possibility. Dasein’s natural “tendency-of-Being” comes prior to any understanding of Being, and therefore must not only be interrogated, but also unearthed through a disclosure of what tradition—func-

25 Another way of saying this is to say that Dasein is not a mere presence-at-hand. Heidegger makes a distinction between that which is “ready-to-hand” and “present-at-hand.” Heidegger writes “readiness to hand is the way in which entities as they are ‘in themselves’ are defined ontologico-categorically” (BT 15:101). For something to be ready-to-hand is to be experienced pre-reflectively and without a taking-cognizance of the thing. What is present-at-hand is built upon the ready-to-hand and only “by reason of something present-at-hand, ‘is there’ anything ready-to-hand” (BT 15:101). Knowledge of what is present-at-hand often reveals itself through an interruption or a deficiency within the ready-to-hand that stands in the way of Dasein’s concerns, such as when a tool goes missing in a shed (BT 16:103). That which is present-at-hand deprives the world “of its worldhood” by its detachment from the world, whereas the readiness-to-hand is experienced already from the vantage point of a world (BT 24:147). Yet even still, when Dasein begins to relate to objects in a present-at-hand relation, she is still acting ontologically as a Being-in-the-world, even though her possibilities are cut off existentially.
tioning as a “master” over the origin of Being and thereby cataloguing and systematizing it—has concealed through what it labels self-evident (BT 6:43). Moreover, the world of Dasein is a world most often ontologically distant from itself, even if it is ontically nearby. Like a pair of glasses which remains close to a face but goes unnoticed from day to day, so too does Dasein pass by its world without thought or reflection upon it.

Beginning with Dasein, Heidegger acknowledges certain structures that inhabit Dasein’s everyday existence. One such structure, as already mentioned, is the a priori structure of Being-in-the-world, one whose “existential meaning is care” (BT 65). As Heidegger points out, Being-In is an existential aspect of Being, one wherein there is no such thing as a “side-by-side-ness’ of an entity called ‘Dasein’ with another entity called ‘world’” (BT 12:81). Dasein thus experiences its world as encounterable through its particular “worldhood” (e.g., the world of the mailman, the farmer, or the grocer) (BT 14:93). As encounterable, Heidegger organizes encounterable Being-in-the-world into two a priori modes: authenticity and inauthenticity. Both of these modes experience “concern” as their “kind of being” (BT 12:83), namely in their experiences of “producing something, attending to something and looking after it, making use of something, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating, considering, discussing….” (BT 12:83). Care and concern make up all of these determinations and dealings within Dasein’s being, which both inauthentic and authentic Dasein experience on an everyday basis. Both modes of Dasein’s Being are caught up in a referential totality of familiarity, enironed by a matrix of inconspicuous phenomena that constitute their worldhood. Emmanuel Levinas, an early admirer and contemporary of
Heidegger, puts it thus: “to be-there is to be in the world in the sense of being alongside of things for which one must care; from this comes care.”

What separates the authentic and inauthentic modes of Dasein is their respective modes of “Being-with-others,” viz., their ways of situating themselves with regard to society. To understand this further Heidegger writes about what he calls the “They” of society which permeates everyday relations. The “They” is the context in which Dasein finds itself. Heidegger describes this “they-ness” as: “everyday possibilities of Being are for the Others to dispose of as they please.” (BT 27:164). Dasein is thus exposed to a dissolution of itself, being subsumed into the crowd of the “They.” The “They” prescribes everydayness, defining what is right or wrong while also removing the responsibility from individual Dasein to decide for themselves, providing instead an unanswerability that shrouds and obscures Dasein from its very own self. This makes it easier for the “They” to “disburden” Dasein and accommodate her. It is within the inauthentic mode of Being that Dasein lives according to the “They” and thus becomes a “They-self” (BT 27:167). Heidegger explains that in this mode one experiences a “failure to stand by one’s self” (BT 27:166).

Unlike the inauthentic mode of Being, the authentic Dasein is able to break

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26 Emmanuel Levinas, *God, Death, and Time*. trans. Bettina Bergo (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2000), 26. Levinas also adds “Care has the structure of the question how; and not that of the question what.” Ibid.

27 Included within this is the medicalization and hiddenness of death (mentioned in the introduction) that marks the modern social climate. In a footnote, Heidegger mentions Tolstoy’s *The Death of Ivan Ilyich* as an example of the “They’s” reaction to death—those characters around the dying protagonist Ivan who find death a “social inconvenience” and as “tactlessness,” all of which underlie a discomfort of inauthentic everyday Dasein when in the presence of death (BT 495, fn. xii). See Ireton, *An Ontological Study of Death*, 256.

28 Nietzsche’s Zarathustra says something similar with regard to the “They” and the need to escape from the inauthentic mode of Dasein: “where solitude ceases, there the market-place begins; and where the market-place begins, there begins the uproar of the great actors and the buzzing of the poisonous flies.” Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. trans. R. J Hollingdale (Baltimore: Penguins Books, 1961), 78.
free from the subjection to the “They” and perform a “modification” (not a detachment) from the “They” in order to regain responsibility for herself.

Both inauthentic and authentic modes of Being are constituted by a “state-of-mind,” otherwise called a “mood” or an “attunement” (BT 29:172). Moving phenomenologically to what is most primordial in Dasein, mood is that which arrives prior to cognition in Dasein’s lived experience. A state-of-mind “brings Dasein before itself,” delivering it to its “there” (BT 29:174).

What is meant by Dasein’s “There?” Heidegger explains this technical language by introducing another neologism: “thrownness” (BT 29:174). What it means to be “there” in the world is to be as it were “thrown” into a world without any self-determination or volition. One merely experiences having-been-there prior to any knowable “there.” This thrownness then characterizes both the staging of what is possible for Dasein as well as the shortening of possibilities. What moods perform in this “thrownness” is either an “evasive turning-away” from these possibilities determined by thrownness or else an acceptance of thrownness and its possibilities (BT 29:175).

Those who evade their thrownness “fall” (here Heidegger introduces the concept of “falling”) into bad moods, a sign of inauthenticity. In this sense, one’s primordial attunement to Being, through one’s disposition to one’s thrownness (and as we shall see, one’s disposition towards death), demonstrates Dasein’s openness to its world and to its own existentiality. Included within

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29 Dasein is also constituted by an “understanding” which discloses Dasein’s “potentiality-for-Being” and “what its Being is capable of” (BT 31:184). What understanding reveals to Dasein is its ability to project itself upon new possibilities that are built upon its facticity. Inauthentic understanding covers up Dasein in an “opaqueness” rooted in “egocentric self-deceptions,” that is, in a solipsism unacquainted with the world (BT 31:187), while authentic understanding brings “transparency” and sight to Dasein, allowing it to “seize” upon the “full disclosedness,” or possibilities, of its Being.

30 In division II of Being and Time, Heidegger calls this return and acceptance of thrownness “repetition.” Dasein practices repetition when it “brings itself again forth” into its ownmost potentiality-for-Being” (BT 68:388). In this way, Dasein excavates its “having-been” for the emergence of possibilities that can be “remembered” or retrieved, while also abandoning traditions that claims (through the “They”) a mastery over Dasein.
this is a type of yielding or a “disclosive submission to the world, out of which we can encounter something that matters to us” (BT 29:177; italics original).

As the aforementioned comments have already expressed, Dasein’s care-structure, that is the expressive modes of Dasein’s existentiality, is one of Being-in-the-world. Dasein can assume the two modes of authenticity and inauthenticity within which are expressed different ways of attuning oneself to one’s possibilities in the world. Often, as in the case of the mood of fear or happiness, a mood takes on an object to which it is activated (e.g., fear of the cliff, fear of the dark, happiness at the kiss or because of the promotion). Yet there is one mood in particular that Heidegger suggests is activated with an indeterminacy that holds within it no object at all. To experience this mood, “Being-in-the-world itself is that in the face of which” it arises (BT 40:232). What triggers this mood is the disclosure of the “world as world” wherein everything familiar becomes estranged and everything once at-home now becomes uncanny. This mood is anxiety. Whereas the “They” is always attempting to distract Dasein from this overwhelming shadow—tranquilizing and assuring her of her at-home-ness in the world—Dasein remains constantly pursued by anxiety in which all of the world is clouded in a most obscure darkness (BT 42:234). Anxiety “individualizes” Dasein, drawing him out from within the fallenness of the “They.” In doing so, anxiety “makes manifest to [Dasein] that authenticity and inauthenticity are possibilities of its Being” (BT 40:235). Anxiety enables Dasein to make a decision regarding how to live in the world.

Returning to ordinary and primordial experiences, Heidegger delineates, in addition to the care structure of Dasein, the temporal unity of Dasein as another existential structure, one that for Dasein is not “in time” but one wherein time is encountered as a type of determination of
meaning (BT 5:40). Similar to the Christians whose experience of parousia lodges them back into the past of their conversion, Dasein projects herself forward into a futurity that is itself a “going-ahead-of-itself” which is already a type of “historicizing,” that is, a projection into something already infused with the meaning and limitations of Dasein’s facticity (BT 5:41). As Ireton explains about Heidegger’s ontology, “Dasein is neither subject nor object, but an unbounded project.” Unlike philosophy that began with the Greeks, Heidegger refuses to think of time as an “entity,” as an eternal “Now,” or a “making-present,” in which Dasein participates (BT 7:48). For too long has time been interpreted through the lens of the present, from the standpoint of an entity (Dasein) which imposes itself upon another entity (time). Rather, time is to be understood as a horizon of being. As Heidegger puts it “Dasein is always ‘beyond itself,’” or better yet “ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-in-a-world” (BT 41:236).

1.4 From Parousia to Being-Towards-Death as a Phenomenon of Life

If Dasein’s existence is predicated upon its potentiality-for-being as Heidegger claims, then it must in its essence be “not yet something” (BT 45:276). Dasein as a whole is always less than a whole, it is always outstanding, determined by the end that is death (BT 45:277). Because the end is never actually experienced by Dasein, death remains that which is always to come. Moreover, Heidegger gives Dasein the character of a “Being towards death” (BT 45:277). Heidegger continues: “as long as Dasein is as an entity, it has never reached its ‘wholeness” (BT 46:280). There remains in Dasein always something “still to be settled” (BT 46:279).

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31 Heidegger moves into this temporal analysis of Dasein’s ontological structure within division II of Being and Time, the first division being dedicated to Dasein’s care structure and Being-in-the-World.

Since Dasein cannot have an experience of the end (for that would be to no longer be Dasein) death is made known through Dasein’s experience of “Being with Others” (BT 47:281). Through the death of family or friends death introduces itself to me, it becomes “objectively accessible” (BT 47:281). As Robert Pogue Harrison writes in The Dominion of the Dead, human finitude is “unlike other finite things in that death claims our awareness before it claims our lives.” Dasein then experiences its own awareness of death before it dies through the death of Others. The deceased take on a life of their own as they become objects of “concern in the ways of funeral rites, interment, and the cult of graves” (BT 47:282). What happens in effect through these mediums of ritual and grief is a “Being-with” that continues after death, one in terms of the dead as remaining in the “world” of the living through memory, care, and concern. The deceased thus, in their interment in the earth, point to what Harrison calls the hic Jacet (the “Here lies”) that “points to that persistent finitude that underlies the place hood of place and pervades the Da [“there”] of Dasein.” The “being-there” of Dasein is reminded also of its eventual “here lies,” of Hic Jacet, when in the presence of the corpse. Nevertheless, Heidegger insists on a separation between the dead who have lost life and those who are merely left “there-alongside” (BT 47:282). There is still an abstraction from one’s own existential understanding of death when witnessing the death of Others. The “mineness” of death has not yet been grasped. In

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33 This objectivity of death in Others prompts the present-at-hand quality of the corpse. Life is drained from the Being of the dead, and so all that remains is the cold veins, the pallid skin, and the limp flesh. What characterizes Dasein is the ability for it to be encounterable. This is lost in the presence of the dead (cf. BT 47:281).


35 I follow Heidegger in capitalizing “Other,” but for reasons more akin to Levinas whose capitalization signified an experience of the divine/infinite in the Other. See chapter 3 below.

36 Robert Pogue Harrison., 22.
In this sense death ceases to be an event (as it is in the funeral) but now must take upon itself an existential understanding (BT 47:284).

What is meant by an existential understanding of death as distinct from death understood as an event? In an existential understanding of death, death has no end, there is no totality of a life that somehow ‘wraps up’ everything. There is little resolve in an existential understanding of death. It is the interruption that shatters possibilities, lacking any knowable telos. Death thus bears a “constant lack of totality” (BT 48:286). Unlike the “not-yet” of a ripening plant, in Dasein there is no full fruition or maturity (BT 48:288). In this way Dasein is always in a state of becoming (BT 287). Already one sees in Heidegger a possible Christian sensibility, wherein the Christian is she who is already participating in the kingdom of God but not-yet perfected by it. But this is not so. Heidegger does not recognize, like the Christian, any future perfection. Death is not seen as a gateway to a new possibility, nor to a completion of one’s present life. Ending does not mean fulfilling. Heidegger confesses that “death is something that stands before us—something impending...as that possibility which is...non-relational, and which is not to be outstripped” (BT 50:294; italics original). More than this, death is the final outstripping of all possibility itself.

But to bear within ourselves an existential understanding of death, death must first and foremost become for us a “phenomenon of life” (BT 49:290). Death must be ontologically experienced in this world—or as Stephen Mulhall puts it, life must become “death’s representative”37—which excludes the possibility of asking first any question concerning an ontical other-worldly speculation” (BT 49:292). Any “metaphysic of death” which seeks to sup-

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37 Mulhall, Human Mortality, 305.
press death’s sting (by imbuing it, for example, with a negative value, calling it “evil” or by salvaging it from an original arbitrariness) can only overlap theoretically what Dasein already lives primordially and pre-reflectively (BT 49:292). To experience death as a “phenomenon of life” is to experience Being-in-the-world as already being “thrown into this possibility” of death. Heidegger quotes the medieval German writer Johannes von Tepl: “As soon as a man comes to life, he is at once old enough to die” (BT 48:289). Levinas puts it similarly: death is the \textit{a posteriori} more ancient than any \textit{a priori}.

This “thrownness into death” reveals itself to Dasein through a state-of-mind/mood which we have already discussed: anxiety (BT 50:295).

Anxiety is the existential mood which triggers the realization of one’s impending death. Whereas anxiety drew out Dasein from the “They” previously, a new layer is now added to anxiety as that which causes Dasein to contend with its own death. Heidegger explains how the “They” attempts to control the anxiety of death: “Dasein covers up its ownmost Being-towards-death, fleeing \textit{in} the face of it” (BT 50:295; italics mine). On an everyday basis of the “They” Dasein exists in a condition of ignorance towards death. In this way inauthentic and fallen Dasein attempts to flee in the face of death. The “They” in its publicness undertakes a concealment of death by calling it merely a “mishap” or by formalizing it, interpreting it as a mere event (BT 51:296). Heidegger writes, “someone or other ‘dies,’ be he neighbour or stranger. People who are no acquaintances of ours are ‘dying’ daily and hourly. ‘Death’ is encountered as a well-known event occurring within-the-world…The “They” has already stowed away an interpretation for this event….as if to say, ‘One of these days one will die too, in the end; but right now it has nothing to do with us” (BT 51:297). Thus, death appears as a non-threatening and abstracted “case”

\footnote{Levinas, \textit{God, Death, and Time}, 15.}
to everyday Dasein, tempting Dasein to abandon their anxiety by “consoling” themselves and the dying that death will be escaped somehow or other (BT 51:297). As Michael Inwood comments, “death separates, especially sharply, the sheep from the goats, the authentic from the inauthentic.”

What authentic Dasein must choose in its factical mode of Being-towards-death is to have the “courage for anxiety in the face of death” (BT 51:298). For Heidegger, courage and anxiety are not mutually exclusive. It is only those who resist the “constant tranquilization about death,” by truly allowing themselves to experience anxiety that, according to Heidegger, experience new possibilities in their life (BT 51:298). These new possibilities sparked by Being-towards-death plunge into the very core of Dasein’s Being in that Dasein begins to “anticipate” with great urgency “the possibility of the impossibility of any existence at all” (BT 53:307). Like the yielding to thrownness that authentic Dasein must undergo, so too must Dasein accept its death as something that could appear at any moment—the appearance of total disappearance. Heidegger spells out this process, “anticipation discloses to existence that its uttermost possibility lies in giving itself up, and thus it shatters all one’s tenaciousness to whatever existence one has reached” (BT 53:308, emphasis mine). In anticipation of death, one gives oneself over to it, including all of one’s possibilities, not in a suicidal frenzy of panic, but rather in a resolute decision to live in the freedom that is not decided by the prescriptive and authoritarian meaning of the “They.” The individuation following the authentic set-apartness from the “They” does not mean a total isolation and atomistic existence (as Heidegger will be accused of by many), but rather consists in an empowering of Dasein as a “Being-with” to further the “potentiality-for-Be-

ing of Others” (BT 53:309). In standing alone, Dasein can expose the illusion of the “They” to Others and thus begin to “modify” the “They” (BT 27:166).

“Being-towards-death is essentially anxiety” writes Heidegger. But it is not “cowardly fear.” Where fear grips Dasein in its power, anxiety impassions Dasein in a “freedom towards death…[and toward its] ontological possibility” (BT 53:311, bold in original text). Anxiety calls to Dasein in the “voice of conscience,” while it remains in the mode of inauthenticity, fleeing from its death (BT 54:313). The voice of conscience “discloses” an “appeal” to Dasein to make the decision of “resoluteness” (BT 54:314). It arouses Dasein from its slumber in the “They” and with the “momentum of a push,” speaks of nothing, calling Dasein to silence and reticence amongst a mob whose loud chatter distracts it from its death. It is within the “mode of keeping silent” that the call to Dasein takes hold (BT 56:318). Once more, theological interpretation (as well as psychological interpretations or any such present-at-hand imposition of meaning) must be eschewed. What matters is the lived experience of anxiety and the call of the conscience which death beckons. All that can be known is the mood of it all: that “the call comes from me and yet from beyond me and over me” (BT 57:320). Whether this call comes from God, or the results of a millennia-long evolution of mind-forming faculties that evolved through adaptation, the phenomenon itself must not be “explained away” too quickly (BT 57:320). Any such explanation, in effect, would suppress the alien nature that dominates Dasein in its thrownness. Explanation too easily consoles Dasein’s anxiety and so too closes off its ontological possibilities. All Dasein experiences directly in the call is its “uncanniness: primordial, thrown Being-in-the-world as the ‘not-at-home’— the bare ‘that-it-is’ in the ‘nothing’ of the world’” (BT 57:321). In this anxious-driven conscience, Dasein realizes its “nullity,” its congenial indebtedness to life which can nev-
er be fully purchased because of death’s indefinite arrival. This debt takes on the signification of a “responsibility” wherein Dasein—through the call of anxiety that drives Dasein towards a realization of death—comes “to owe something to Others” (BT 58:327). The silence of the call makes space for Others because it first unconceals the presence of an existential lack, a nullity made known through death but also one that death reveals in one’s thrownness. This nullity, weighing down on Dasein’s mood, must lead to freedom. As Harrison puts it, “finitude generates, rather than puts a limit on, our existential transcendence.”

How does this despair and anxiety over death, which also discloses the nullity of one’s thrownness, lead to freedom? Heidegger answers that “freedom, however, is only in the choice of one [sic] possibility—that is, in tolerating one’s not having chosen the others [that is, all other possibilities] and one’s not being able to choose them” (BT 58:331). This does not consist in an arriving at a real identity hidden beneath the veil of inauthenticity. As Stephen Mulhall describes authenticity, “authenticity is a matter not of achieving some particular state, but of acknowledging that no particular achieved state is final or exhaustive of our individuality.” Being-towards-death, calling out to Dasein through anxiety in the silent conscience that liberates Dasein from the “They,” means nothing less than ultimate freedom in an indeterminate sense. In death the structural unity of care, the Being-in-the-world modes of authenticity and inauthenticity, as characterized by relationship to the “They,” comes together with the structural unity of temporality, the “ahead-of-itself” of Dasein realizing the nullity of life through death in such a way as to be

40 Harrison, The Dominion of the Dead, 91.

41 Mulhall, Human Mortality, 309.
directed back upon itself in its thrownness (BT 59:337). Once Dasein embraces this structural unity, what occurs is far from a detachment from its world, but rather a more profound return to Being-in-the-world. Heidegger writes:

Resoluteness, as authentic Being-one’s-Self, does not detach Dasein from its world, nor does it isolate it so that it becomes a free-floating ‘I.’ And how should it, when resoluteness as authentic disclosedness, is authentically nothing else than Being-in-the-world? Resoluteness brings the Self right into its concernful Being-alongside what is ready-to-hand, and pushes it into solicitous Being with Others…resolute Dasein frees itself for its world…to let the Others who are with it ‘be’ in their ownmost potentiality-for-Being, and to co-disclose this potentiality in the solicitude which leaps forth and liberates. When Dasein is resolute, it can become ‘conscience’ for Others. Only by way of authentically Being-their-Selves in resoluteness can people authentically be with one another. (BT 60:344-345)

By having the courage to embrace the anxiety of death, one thus enters into authentic relationships with Others, freed from the “jealous stipulations and talkative fraternizing” of the “They” that no longer encompass Dasein’s existential totality with its tribalism and tendency to absorb identity into itself. Only by standing distinct can Dasein thus enter back into meaningful relationship with the “They.” This does not mean that Dasein has somehow mastered death (which Falque will later accuse Heidegger of). Heidegger insists that resolute anticipation of Being-towards-death is not a “way of escape, fabricated for the ‘overcoming’ of death,” but rather a way in which death opens up possibilities for the “dispersing [of] all fugitive Self-concealments” (BT

42 This structural unity is also characterized in such a way that “understanding [that is, potentiality-for-Being] is grounded primarily in the future” and “one’s state-of-mind temporalities itself primarily in having been” (BT 68:390). Moreover, the mood which one experiences in thrownness corresponds temporally with the understanding of possibilities one experiences in the futurity of death.
62:357). In the mood\(^{43}\) awakened by death, Dasein realizes itself and thus begins to live death as “a phenomenon of life” (BT 49:290).

1.5 Finitude and the Impossibility of the Infinite

What can be seen in this development from a phenomenology of religious life to Dasein’s fundamental ontology as portrayed in *Being and Time*? Surely there is within both a similar paradigm of existence, wherein anxiety is used to enable Dasein to have the courage to continue to exist in the face of an imminent interruption of existence (whether it be death or *parousia*).\(^{44}\) In addition, nothing is altered in the *how* of phenomenological methodology—both refuse the temptation of content and begin with the relationship to Being (although in *Being and Time* to a more original and direct relation to Being). Both Heidegger’s phenomenology of early Christianity and that of *Being and Time* characterize a movement from the “They” of everyday Dasein (which for Paul attempted to provide false peace and security) and the authentic step outside of the “They” which is temporally actualized through a futural ontology. It has become apparent how *Being and Time* takes what was already occurring in religious phenomenology—namely, anxiety as the motivation for self-conduct in the Christian world—and strips it bare of its theological attire (most prominently in the messianic *parousia*), thereby tracing the way in which a fundamental

\(^{43}\) One must remember that this existential awakening that death provokes is not a theory or a secret knowledge. Rather, it is that which everyone feels within him/her as their most fundamental emotion/state-of-mind/mood. We are all, whether hiding in a dissimulation/self-concealment or not, already anxious about death. Levinas explains that “this already is attested to by a *Stimmung* [mood]: to-be-delivered-to-death already belongs to being-in-the-world without *Dasein* having a distinct consciousness of it. This past that is already past is attested to in *anxiety.*” Levinas, *God, Death, and Time*, 47. Moreover, the mood of anxiety, once realized, discloses what was already present to Being all along. It is how we face up to this anxiety that matters for Heidegger.

\(^{44}\) Both death and *parousia* share in common an imminence and immanence. Both express a pervasive existential change while being unpredictable and indeterminable.
ontology of Dasein as a Being-towards-death can produce a channeling of anxiety vis-à-vis death that is more primordial and closer to Dasein’s Being than that of a theological attitude. This is because “care is Being-towards-death,” that is, it “reveals itself as finite” (BT 65:378). Unlike theology, that somehow deduces an “infinite time out of the finite,” the fundamental analysis of Dasein discloses that it is only because “primordial time is finite” that it can “temporalize itself as infinite” (BT 65:379). Levinas comments on Heidegger here: “there is no eternity; eternity is, like linear time, a modality of finite time; it is derived from originally time.” For Heidegger, theology imposes an infinity on the lived experience of finitude where it has no need to, and in this way compromises the primary constitution and structure of Dasein as care. By imposing infinitude Dasein cannot authentically confront the anxiety it has about death.

Is this the last word for Christianity? Is there no phenomenology of religion that can take account of death and embrace its finitude? Emmanuel Falque is one phenomenologist that calls into question Heidegger’s assessment of Christianity as an escapist flight from death. If Heidegger—

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45 In this sense the theological attitude finds itself as a sub-category of the Husserlian “natural attitude,” as that which accepts a presupposed metaphysical reality without critical reflection. Heidegger thus continues Husserl’s project in suspending (or bracketing) such biases in order to return to the “things themselves” (see Steven Delay, *Phenomenology in France: A Philosophical and Theological Introduction* (New York: Routledge Publishing, 2019), 14). Only now in Heidegger phenomenology returns to the Being of Dasein and not to transcendental consciousness (Delay, *Phenomenology of France*, 10).

46 Levinas, *God, Death, and Time*. 62. Contra Heidegger, Levinas will propose that Dasein actually bears within its constitution an “a priori hope” that is activated by a phenomenological encounter of the “beyond-measure” in the face of the Other. Ibid, 63, 65. In the face of the Other, “man is not primarily preoccupied with his being.” Ibid. 103. What we see in Levinas is a reversal of Heidegger’s priority of Being over the ethical in Dasein. Death details time for Heidegger, not the opposite. Levinas writes to the contrary that “there is an invitation [in Levinasian phenomenology] to think death on the basis of time, and no longer time on the basis of death.” Ibid, 104. Said differently, the failure we feel in the face of death—to complete our projects, plans, and to build the *eudaemonia* that all people pursue—indicates that death implies an obstacle more than anything else. Moreover “it is not my nonbeing that causes anxiety, but that of the loved one or of the other, more beloved than my being…the death of the other affects me more than my own…we encounter death in the face of the other.” Ibid, 105. Levinas surely has a strong critique of Heidegger here, and there is no room in this thesis for a full response to Levinas. Nevertheless, it should be noted that for Heidegger the death of the Other does have an immense effect on Dasein, perhaps not in an ethical mode (which may indicate an insufficiency in Heidegger’s privileging of ontology), but in an ontological way of signalling to Dasein toward the anxiety of her own immanent death, and in doing so, drawing Dasein deeper into her Being-with-Others.
ger saw in Christianity a mode of anxiety that did not properly contend with death, focusing itself instead on the incoming eschatological horizon, Falque argues against Heidegger that there is in fact a gospel account\textsuperscript{47} of Dasein facing death authentically, namely, Jesus’ own confrontation with death in the garden of Gethsemane just hours before his gruesome crucifixion by the Roman authorities. To Falque’s work the next chapter is dedicated.

\textsuperscript{47} Heidegger’s decision to return to the earliest Christian literature (the epistle to the Thessalonians) for an analysis on the Christian life may be the greatest reason for his passing over such an essential part of the Christian narrative. The crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus make up the essential crux of the lived Christian experience. Changing the textual starting point will have major repercussions for a phenomenology of religious life as will be witnessed to in the work of Falque.
2. The Anxiety of Christ as a Being-Towards-Death

2.1 Introduction: Beginning With Finitude

Though Emmanuel Falque’s work in *The Guide to Gethsemane: Anxiety, Suffering, Death* responds critically to *Being and Time*, Falque nevertheless expresses the determination to accept the full weight of Dasein’s finitude as Heidegger does. As he writes in the preface to his book, the aim of his entire life’s work is to “start off from humankind”—that is, to begin philosophically—which eventually may lead “toward God”—that is, to theology.\(^{48}\) Whether or not Falque succeeds in keeping this promise has yet to be shown, but for now it is enough to say that Falque begins on Heidegger’s terms that Dasein is a Being-towards-death that understands itself finitely. In Falque’s work *Crossing the Rubicon: The Borderlands of Philosophy and Theology*, he writes that any “confessional mode” of belief must be preceded by a “human mode.”\(^{49}\) All thinking about anything is conditioned by Dasein’s Being-in-the-world. Therefore, Falque follows what he calls a “hermeneutics of the body,” that is, that “no one believes in God if he does not first believe in the world—in fact, even in others.”\(^{50}\) Even in the case of Jesus Christ, there must be first an “accepting” of “being ‘shut in’ here, ‘dwelling,’ and taking the world under his ‘care’ even when everything will urge him to leave it” (GTG 74). Said differently, Falque asserts that

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\(^{50}\) Ibid. Italics in original.
Jesus must face up to his own finite existence as Dasein. Jesus, being human, must confront anxiety and death in order to live authentically.

There is no escaping death. It is something we all must face. Falque explains that “if we try to claim exemption [from death] we risk lying to ourselves about the burden of what is purely and simply our humanity” (GTG xvii). As Levinas points out in Time and the Other, death carries with it the “impossibility of retreat.” Falque makes this clear at the beginning of The Guide to Gethsemane: it is this “impossibility of retreat” that is embodied in the cross of Christ. Falque argues that in the ignominious and humiliating crucifixion of Jesus, “we are confronted by the insupportable (unbearable) nature of our finitude that our humanity, as such, exemplifies” (GTG xxii). As finite Dasein, we see our own destiny and fate in the exposure of Christ’s suffering flesh; Christ publicizes the inevitability of death. Death is no more the abstract “case” of the “They” in the crucifixion, but is now torn from the everyday manner of Dasein and experienced in the collapsing of the distance between the event and its ontological understanding. Unlike many Christians, who have tended to prefer the “wonder of the newly born to the conclusions of someone about to depart this life,” Falque protests that Christians must return to the most grotesque event of their religion in order to face the ineliminable eventuality of their own death (GTG xviii).

Not only does Christ’s death expose Dasein to his/her own death, it—like Heidegger’s Being and Time, but now in a new mode—makes “death a phenomenon of life” (BT 49:290). Falque writes that Christ’s death makes possible a way of “living death differently” (GTG xxv) wherein Dasein’s “animality” becomes “humanity” through “solidarity” (GTG xxvii). Contra

Heidegger, Falque argues that Christianity does not ignore the anxiety that haunts Dasein, but in fact learns how to face death and anxiety together through the model of Jesus’ own death on the cross. Unlike Heidegger’s *Phenomenology of Religious Life*, Falque does not disclose an interpretation of Christianity that in anxiety of *parousia* projects itself into a realized to-come. Rather, beginning with Gospel accounts instead of Pauline Epistles, Falque demonstrates how Jesus’ death actually performs an authentic enactment of Dasein’s anxiety when face-to-face with death. Like Heidegger, what one finds is the *how* question once more appearing in all its prominence. What concerns us in this chapter is the *how* of finitude. As Falque puts it, “we suffer from not knowing *how* to live through this finitude and thus lock ourselves into it” (GTG 23).

Moreover, when thinking about Christ’s Being-towards-death, we will put on hold any talk of a possible “metamorphosis of finitude” until the next chapter on the resurrection. After all, Dasein knows itself first in its anxiety concerning its finitude before it can know anything else. This chapter will focus instead on Falque’s alternative to Heidegger’s Pauline/eschatological phenomenology of Christian anxiety, opting instead for a phenomenological reading of Gethsemane and Golgotha that display Christ’s anxiety as a Being-towards-death. Like Heidegger, Falque still enacts a “suspension of meaning” in order to retrieve phenomenologically a new manner of living towards death (GTG 28), but what will be found in the movement from Epistle to Gospel is a vigorous riposte against Heidegger’s accusation that Christianity does not adequately confront anxiety and death.

2.2 The Christian Flight From Death: Escaping Escapism
Anxiety about death is not a Christian phenomenon, it is a human phenomenon. Moreover, using the Gospels’ description of Jesus’ final hours in the garden of Gethsemane before his brutal torture and death he endured on Golgotha cannot merely be accessible to a select religious elite. Rather, if it is to be of any wider human relevance, it must communicate in its own way the unsurpassable passage into death that everyone feels deep within them. Falque seeks to foreclose any quick comforts and consolations that Christians may find in death. For example, against both popular and much of historical Christianity, Falque insists that beginning with a “guarantee in this world that I will have an afterlife after death” means first and foremost a surpassing of “the ineradicable anxiety that exists on this side of death” (GTG 9). What may in effect occur in Christianity vis-à-vis a life-after-life is an inauthentic flight from one’s own Being-towards-death. Either, in the case of a belief in an ultimate “restitution of all things” (Origenism) which provides grace at the expense of freedom, or in the case of pietistic metaphysics where virtuous suffering is endured for an assurance in a heavenly dwelling place (Pelagianism)—in which freedom is given at the expense of grace—both result in a fleeing from one’s own finitude and death (GTG 9). Christians must no longer, in the face of Heidegger’s accusation, “view death together with its integration of life.” As Falque asserts, “the ‘ontological Interpretation [sic] of death [as is found in Heidegger] takes precedence over any ontical other-worldly speculation” (GTG 17).

52 Of course the prospect of hell may also cause anxiety for those penitents who approach death with doubt in their hearts. Yet the idea of hell can also ease the anxiety of others (through a Nietzschean resentment) who can be rest assured of a final retribution for their enemies. Either way, like the coming of the Messiah for Heidegger’s interpretation of Paul, both relate Dasein to an afterworld that distracts it from the finality of death.

53 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), note iv to §49:249, pg. 408. This is the translation of a note in Being and Time which Falque prefers to the standard Macquarrie and Robinson translation, whose rendering of this passage makes Heidegger’s criticism far less obvious. Typically, Falque favours the Macquarrie and Robinson.
Any guarantee of a life-after-life that has caused Christians to flee before death (and thus, for Heidegger, from themselves) has also been closely linked to the traditional attribution of finitude to sin. Throughout history, many Christians have associated finitude with sinfulness through a literal-historic interpretation of the fall myth in Genesis chapter three. According to this reading, Adam and Eve became finite creatures only after they had sinned against God by eating the forbidden fruit in the Garden of Eden. Falque identifies this reading of Genesis as another attempt at a flight from death. Dismissing what he sees as a problematic reading, Falque (in keeping with the majority of Christian theologians) writes “finitude is not in itself sinful” (GTG 12). Opposed to such a reading of Genesis, Falque insists that the “sinful mode of human being is thus read less in finitude itself (suffering, ageing, death) than in the refusal to accept it as such” (GTG 14). It is in succumbing to the serpent’s temptation (once more in the Heideggerian sense of temptation as a flight from finitude in the mode of inauthenticity) that Adam and Eve will become (infinite) like God, that humanity discovers its own mode of sinful Being.

On Falque’s reading, rather than a consequence of a gnostic lapse from the celestial abode of infinitude, Dasein as depicted in Genesis is rather to be understood as an “inhabiting” of finitude that makes room for possibilities and “growth” (GTG 12). To be finite is to experience potentiality and possibility. It is to become. One need only think of the caricatural parent who demands perfection from their children to realize the absurdity in expecting anything more than growth and potential in Dasein.

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54 It would be wrong to conflate sinfulness with inauthenticity. Inauthentic Dasein speaks specifically of how Dasein relates to Being, whereas sinfulness, while it may also relate to a privation of Being (as in Augustinian theology), tends to be understood by many Christians more in an ethical and moral regard.
Falque concludes his criticism of this flight from finitude stating that the God of Israel imprints Dasein with God’s own image in such a way that God consecrates Dasein’s “Being-there and the weakness of our flesh as the place of ultimate glorification” (GTG 14). Like Heidegger, Falque begins from the simple realization of Dasein’s Being-there, beginning with its factual finitude—not to be understood as emerging out of a “fall” from a purer and more primordial realm than finite lived experience. Thus, when Christ is anxious about his finitude in Gethsemane, he is not anxious because of some sinful state that he has assumed by taking on the human condition. He is simply anxious about his finitude because that is what it is to be Dasein.

2.3 Anxiety in Gethsemane: From Being-Towards-the-End to Being-Towards-Death

Like Heidegger, Falque is describing in his work a movement, not from life to death, but from death to life. In the anxiety of death, Dasein achieves a sharpened awareness of life. Falque joins Heidegger in affirming that anxiety about death is not “fear of decease” (GTG 30). There is no clear object to anxiety; anxiety being the indeterminate and ineffable not-yet of the future. As Falque notes, “the common characteristic of fear [is] an act of drawing back” (GTG 33). Fear is a psychological withdrawal from a threatening object, whereas anxiety has no such object. Before evaluating the anxiety of Christ in Gethsemane, Falque argues that first it is helpful in analyzing what anxiety is not by working through what fear is. In the garden, Jesus moves from a mood of fear and into that of anxiety as death approaches. Falque writes that “from the start of his Passion he must drink down to the lees (Mark 10:38), but before which he draws back in his agony which confirms that in the garden at the foot of the Mount of Olives he is afraid in the face of his death, at least in the way in which we all recoil from something threatening” (GTG
34). Jesus feels “alarm” at the oncoming object of fear (the end of his existence), while being abandoned by his disciples who fall asleep in the garden.

In this state of fear Dasein lives in a mode of “Being-towards-the-end” of his existence (contrasted with anxiety’s Being-towards-death). What concerns Dasein is not yet death itself as the great Nothing, but the end as an event that is painful and revolting (e.g., death from drowning, burning, or disease). The end as a determinate object of fear thus functions to spark various ways of encountering the end. Falque lists three modalities of Being-towards-the-end, all of which are insufficient to enact an authentic Being-towards-death: resignation, waiting, and heroism. Jesus will reject all three of these modalities. What one notices in the hours leading up to Christ’s death is a silence with regard to any Being-towards-the-end. Christ’s silence is one that refuses any explication of the death as an object or simple event. There is something more ontological at work in death than this. Yet Falque asserts that many interpreters of the event of Jesus’ death have filled in this silence with invented endings, all of which fall under the tripartite categorization of resignation, waiting, and heroism. Jesus himself, says Falque, resists the temptation of all three and, eventually, as will be shown below, chooses instead to take the more difficult existential road of anxiety.55

What does it mean for Dasein to enact these inauthentic modes of Being-towards-the-end? Falque describes the interpretation of this first mode, resignation, where there is “no trace of hope or joy remaining even in Jesus.” He will be imagined as the “sacrificed lamb led to the abattoir through the whim of a vengeful and angry father” (GTG 37). Jesus resigns himself to his fate in a stoic torpor and despondency. There is no meaning death provides here other than pure

55 The silence of Christ functions similarly to the silence of Heidegger’s call which rips Dasein out of an inauthentic understanding of death as an event. It silences the loud distractions of the “They.”
sublation into an arbitrary cosmic Fate. In the second mode, that of waiting for the end, Jesus is expectant and waiting for the resurrection to occur. Falque states that this imagined “certitude of the Resurrection” gives Christ a “clear consciousness of himself and of his destiny…because of his permanent participation in the beatific vision” (GTG 37). Ultimately, though, the certitude of resurrection will not only “overcome the fear of death, but at the same time suppress it” (GTG 37). If anything, the assurance of a resurrection only tries to “compensate Christ for the commonplace mode of his death” (GTG 38). The third mode of Being-towards-the-end (which attempts in vain to overcome anxiety), is the “heroic completion of his [Jesus’] life in his death” (GTG 37). What occurs in this mode is an imagined giving of meaning to one’s life through a heroic death. The death as an event in this way justifies the life.

All three of these imagined modes of Being-towards-the-end report not only on ways one might respond to fear, but also underscore the authenticity or inauthenticity of Being as proven by the quality of one’s relationship to the “They.” As Falque says, in the fear of death “the depths of Being are revealed” (GTG 39). Jesus is no exception. Drawing back from the cup of suffering, Jesus refuses to “be satisfied with, nor resign himself to, his own disappearance. But neither can he reassure himself about his Resurrection [sic] or perfect himself through heroism” (GTG 39). As a Being-towards-death, Jesus must face anxiety and anguish in the garden and thereby stand and contend before the “void that is opened up by the question of the meaning of life, once posed on the threshold of death” (GTG 39).

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56 Falque accuses this second mode of Being-towards-the-end of holding secret sympathies with the ancient gnostic sect of Docetism, wherein Jesus only “seemed” to die the death of everyone, but really denies the single factor that creates anxiety concerning human death: the unsettling meaninglessness that confronts Dasein in it. Falque quotes the theologian Karl Rahner, who states, “a genuinely human consciousness must have an unknown future” (GTG 38). Emphasis Falque’s.
In order to face this question of life’s meaning faced with one’s death, Falque once more follows Heidegger into the future. As I have shown in Chapter One, Heidegger’s phenomenology of Christianity sees in eschatology an “ecstases,” that is, a projection of Dasein into futurity that allows the future to temporalize the present. Falque comments on Heidegger’s analysis that the believer is “temporalized authentically starting off from his or her future” (GTG 41). The future characterizes the how of enactment rather than the “when” of content. Against Heidegger, Falque maintains that the rejection of Christian eschatology as an actuality that remains forever “an event that will come” cannot in fact properly dismiss Jesus’ own path through anxiety in Gethsemane (GTG 44). Because of this, Falque does not begin with Heidegger’s Pauline point of departure. Rather, he sees the how of the future in what he calls “God’s vigil” in Gethsemane. For Jesus in the garden, “the future remains in reality always already something that can at any moment orient one’s present” (GTG 42). Jesus anticipates his death, remaining in the mode of “being-awake” through the long night of anticipation.

Jesus experiences silence in Gethsemane, a silence where anxiety speaks and opens up a suspension of meaning. In the silence (think here of the silence characteristic of Heidegger’s call in the face of death) “the Nothing makes the totality of beings in some way insignificant” (GTG 45). Being-in-the-world thus receives a vertiginous groundlessness in Christ’s garden vigil. Jesus enters into an existential “solus ipse [the self alone]” where anxiety isolates him from his followers who sleep in the comfort of the “They,” unaware of the oncoming danger (GTG 46). The dis-

57 Certainly Falque disagrees with Heidegger’s denouncement of Christian eschatology as always-to-come but never actually arriving. In fact, Falque asserts that in the hope of resurrection Christ himself encounters a “manner of being in life” where “a possible future opens up to the Christian” (GTG 43). This is not a certitude of a life-after-life as has just been dismissed in the mode of Being-towards-the-end, but rather a mode of living a phenomenon of resurrection. Like Paul and the Thessalonians, Jesus enacts a “Being-always-vigilant” in Gethsemane (GTG 60). The path toward resurrection will be detailed in the following chapter.
disciples remain in a simply ontic and event-driven understanding of death, wherein it becomes a case that does not make itself realizable. It is only later when they see their master crucified that this will change for them. Jesus, on the other hand, enters into an ontological interpretation of death, plunging into the anxiety of finitude. Falque writes that “what is over (or done) in this indefatigable coming and going from the disciples to the Father is above all the entry by the Son himself into a total acceptance of the existential solus ipse of his own anxiety” (GTG 54). Falque sees a critical moment in the movement from fear to anxiety in Jesus’ dialogue with his Father. Falque explains: “from ‘if it is possible, let this cup pass me by’ (Matthew 26:39 JB), the Son moves in a metaphysical dialogue with his Father to ‘If this cup cannot pass by without my drinking it, your will be done’ (Matthew 26:42)” (GTG 48). In this movement from aversion to submission, Jesus exits the temptation of fear as resignation, certitude, and heroism, entering instead into an authentic anxiety of death.

What does it mean for Jesus to take on anxiety? How can one map out an authentic phenomenological reading of Jesus’ death within the gospel accounts? For Falque, this requires taking on an almost Levinasian phenomenology of Gethsemane. According to Levinas, the indefiniteness of death becomes apparent in the indefiniteness of the face of the Other (and the Other’s death). It is in the face of the Other and the death of the Other that I become responsible in an “Otherwise than Being” (on an ethical level), but also (and here Heidegger once more becomes primary) the death of the Other plummets me back into the “mineness” of death. Returning to Gethsemane, Falque writes that “the surrender of his [Jesus’] will to the Father opens up the kenotic (or self-emptying) route of the indefiniteness of anxiety. For him, no longer knowing what I want becomes above all like accepting the indefiniteness of what an Other wants, if not
for me, at least with me” (GTG 48). Moreover, a new unknown opens up in death, that is, the indefiniteness of the Other’s will for me in my own death, or put differently, what the Other requires of me and demands of me in my death. Unlike Levinas, Falque argues that the Other is not merely in the face, but in this circumstance, is the faceless Other found within the self. What is witnessed to in the anxiety of Christ is thus a movement from an all-powerful will to a self-emptying/yielding to a possibility given by an Other. Falque continues that this self-emptying not only involves a yielding to the Other (which in this case is the will of the Father), but also a complete losing of a foothold in Being, that is, a drinking of the cup that consists in the “receding of beings as a whole” as Heidegger put it (GTG 52). There is then a “nothing of kenosis” that renounces power and mastery over death.

2.4 The Kenotic Possibility of Life Before Death: A Critique of “Mineness”

For Heidegger, death as a “phenomenon of life” requires an appropriation of Being that stresses the “mineness” of one’s death. It is only in this ontological mineness that death is disclosed. Death is always my ultimate horizon and is not to be outstripped. Falque describes this singularization as a split from “all relations with the Other” (GTG 58). It is true indeed that “death isolates Christ from all other human beings” (GTG 63). In an ontological interpretation of death, Jesus enacts an isolation from Dasein’s Being-with-Others. But this is not the final word. As has been shown, in the gospel account, it is in the very movement from fear of Being-towards-the-end to an anxiety of the indefiniteness of Being-towards-death that an encounter with the indeterminacy of the Other is felt. Jesus encounters the Other (God the Father) in the moments before his death. Death calls him to a self-emptying possibility toward the Other. In the
moment of “ecstases,” Jesus performs “precisely a leaving of the self to go toward the Father as a modality of life envisaged within the horizon of death” (GTG 60). What this kenotic performance lays bare is a resoluteness—“I lay it [life] down of my own accord” (John 10:11)—actualized in the face of death and the decision to move through the isolation that death manifests and to divest oneself of oneself for the sake of an Other. Death still remains mine in the Heideggerian sense that it cannot be substituted by another, yet it takes on a new dimension of solidarity with Others and gift for others.

Death as it is anticipated in Gethsemane is not an appropriation of Being. Rather, it is the very opposite: it is the “disappropriation” of Being. Falque writes that “it is not appropriate that [Jesus] should, in himself, carry alone, humanly and definitely, the burden of his death in an existential and unbreakable solipsism” (GTG 69). It is the impossibility of the mastery of death that opens up and makes possible the “full recognition of the Other in him. And it is that Other in him who is alone capable of breaking the existential circle of the solitude of his own death” (GTG 71). The encounter with the Other (God, but as extended therefore also to all Others imagining that Other) in death does not necessitate another flight from death, but rather encompasses a new way into it. Falque quotes Levinas here, stating “my solitude is…not confirmed by death but broken by it…What is important about the approach of death is that at a certain

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58 Ireton notes the German root of Heidegger’s word for the appropriation of Being as eigen which he translates as implying “the notion of personal property” and “full ownership.” Ireton, An Ontological Study of Death, 253.
moment we are no longer able to be able. It is exactly thus that subject loses its very mastery as a subject.”

One loses the mastery implicit in my appropriation of Being.

For Heidegger, says Falque, the Other that breaks open such possibilities is not God, nor is it the Others we encounter as interruptions of our everyday Being-with (Levinas). “Death itself,” writes Falque, is the ultimate Other that “comes to me—alienates me and takes my identity from me” (GTG 76). For Falque, building upon Levinasian phenomenology, death is not the ultimate Other that is revealed in the death of Jesus. Rather, what is revealed is a trinitarian Other (GTG 76). Does this introduction of trinitarian theology compromise the phenomenological project and the concomitant assumption of finitude that Falque claims at the beginning of his project? It is unclear whether or not Falque will stay consistent in this promise, but for now Falque attempts an alternative (and less metaphysical understanding of trinitarian ontology),

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59 Levinas, *Time and the Other*, 74. Levinas criticizes Heidegger’s conception of the “They” as a radical minimization and reduction of Dasein’s experience of “Being-with.” Nevertheless, there is no doubt that Dasein must first come to feel itself as separate from the anonymity of society in order to reintroduce itself in a modification/retrieval of it. But, as Levinas points out, society is far more nuanced and complex than Heidegger gives space for, even going so far as to claim that “truth is bound up with the social relation.” Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 72. For example, Dasein is a Being-with-Others that consists in specific relationships such as the family-unit, the friend from school, or the football coach who fills in as father figure. Dasein experiences in its encounter with Others not only idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity, but also a surplus that is “non-synthesizable” and “indiscernible.” There is a “secrecy of subjectivity” that sociality entails. Emmanuel Levinas, *Ethics and Infinity*, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1985), 78. Levinas spends ample time in his work dedicated to the project of excavating this “infinity” and ungraspability of the Other. The Face of the Other in fact defers any appropriation of Being (which he calls the representation of the “Same”) and in doing so communicates ethics (not ontology) as the first philosophy which is otherwise than being. Ibid., 77. For Levinas, solitude and isolation are marks of Being, and moreover, it is not the goal of ethics to escape isolation, but to escape being. Ibid., 59. Moreover, unlike the call of Heidegger, that calls Dasein out of society, the call of Levinas is that which is encountered when the Face of the Other speaks. Ibid., 87. The call is in the “saying” of the inter-locution with the Other. For Falque, like Levinas, there is an “otherwise” than Being in Christianity as well (GTG 76).

60 It is unclear whether or not Heidegger would concede to this characterization of his work. After all, the terms that Falque uses against Heidegger, specifically, the so-called “mastery over death” which he accuses Heidegger of employing, never appears in *Being and Time* at all. Death is not something to be annexed through the will or through a “supreme act of consciousness” as Falque supposes (GTG 24). Rather, Heidegger makes explicit that there is no overcoming death at all. Appropriating Being as mine for Heidegger suggests a coming to terms with the inevitability of death and in so doing allowing this possibility of impossibility (death) to open the ultimate possibility of authenticity. What Heidegger seems to suggest has less to do with mastery and more to do with caring for (or what he will later call the “shepherd” of) Being.
more phenomenological, look at what the event of Jesus’ kenotic death opens up—vis-à-vis the display of trinitarian otherness—in the alterity experienced in everyday Dasein.\footnote{Of course, everyday Dasein does not in any sense engage in metaphysical dialogue with God the Father in gardens, nor does everyday Dasein experience the anguish of a tortuous death on a cross. It is sometimes difficult to follow Falque when he attempts to reconcile theological doctrine to phenomenological experience (or to apply phenomenology on theological narratives). In some ways, Falque is regurgitating Heidegger’s early phenomenology of Christianity in that, like Heidegger’s reading of Augustine, Falque’s look at trinitarian relations thins the lines between what is the alterity within God and within the self. This must be the case for any phenomenology to be intelligible. The question then is: do we need theological language to speak of everyday Dasein’s experiences?} For Falque, otherness experienced by the Son with reference to the Father is analogous to the alterity Dasein finds within herself. Quoting Augustine, Falque insists on “finding in myself the figure of a God ‘more inward than my most inward part’ (GTG 77). This, he argues, is reminiscent and along the lines of Edmund Husserl’s “intrinsically first other…the other Ego” in the Cartesian Meditations (GTG 77). Modelling this trinitarian relation onto the self, what one experiences is likewise the denial of a Being-towards-the-end of resignation, waiting/certitude, and heroism and in doing so the “defeat of the ego/self” who can no longer stand alone in the world to face his death. Like Jesus, Dasein must “not believe himself ‘alone in the world,’ or rather we might say ‘in his world’…In the solitude and ‘mineness’ of his own death, and because he is crushed and torn apart even in the flesh, what is revealed is the indwelling in him of an Other, capable of accommodating the burden of the finitude that he has put on” (GTG 79). To relinquish control over the determination of death is to move toward solidarity and otherness instead of isolation and solipsism and thus to enact a kenotic authenticity in the face of death, a specifically Christian manner of dying. Once this trinitarian opening of the self onto another occurs, no longer is death “mine” to master but a “gift” to give. We will return to this component of otherness as it pertains to resurrection in the following chapter.
Robert Pogue Harrison has worked on a similar aspect of Otherness and solidarity in his work *The Dominion of the Dead*. Whereas Heidegger sought to provide an ontology of death in *Being and Time*, Harrison seeks to provide an ontology, or rather as he puts it a “poetic philology,” “of the dead.” In the previous chapter I argue that Heidegger’s distinction between death as “event” and death as an “ontological interpretation” are equivalent to a difference between a mere “there-alongside” (the deceased) and Being-towards-death (BT 47:282). Harrison problematizes Heidegger’s formulation of Dasein’s relation to the deceased as simply a being “there-alongside” and his reduction of the corpse to a mere present-at-hand analysis. Harrison writes, “Heidegger insists that Dasein cannot relate to its own death by way of the death of others (he calls death “non-relational”), yet this is as philologically inadequate as his reduction of the corpse to a mere presence-at-hand.” Harrison continues that “the dead are our progenitors in more ways than one, for as they humanized mortality, they also mortalized humanity.” Resoluteness in death is always, when authentically activated, motivated also by a retrieval of possibilities out of my facticity, that is, out of the authority I inherit from my thrownness. In this sense to be an authentic Being-towards-death means to be individuated in an already established “culturally specific, even genealogical way.” From a cultural anthropological viewpoint, it is the dead who in a certain sense *call* the living to our conscience, who “are hounders, harassing the living with guilt, reminding them of their debts to the forefathers, calling on them to meet their

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62 Harrison, *The Dominion of the Dead*, 90. Harrison still sees himself as doing ontology as well.

63 Ibid., 93.

64 Ibid., 94.

65 Ibid., 97.
obligations.” Responsibility becomes communal and genealogical in Dasein’s relationship to the dead. Of course Harrison does not assume that authentic repetition (in the Heideggerian sense of the word as a retrieval of thrown possibilities) consists solely in a banal “mimetic repetition” of the dead’s authority, nor is it a “blind rebellion.” More importantly for the current discussion, adopting possibilities from the thrownness of Dasein’s past in her relationship to the dead—and more than this, with Dasein’s relationship bio-culturally to its shared communal world that Dasein inherits from the dead—opens up freedom to be an authentic Being-with-Others. How this pertains to Christianity rests upon the cultural-historical-religious inheritance of Christ’s death for Others that prods and probes into the Christian Dasein’s own responsibility for the death of Others. Harrison writes that “Christ’s death was handed over to others, not in the form of a corpse but, as we have seen, in the form of an opening onto the afterlife.” Afterlife here does not mean a life-after-life destination such as heaven or hell, but rather functions as a way of carrying the dead into the “afterlife” of the present. To carry Christ’s death into the “afterlife” that we live today thus in itself enacts an “opening” of our ability to give ourselves over to Others in our lives and in our deaths.

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66 Ibid., 98. Emphasis mine. For Heidegger guilt is not an ethical guilt which has to do with law or the “ought” (BT 58:328). Guilt is rather a primordial condition of Dasein that causes it to feel an “indebtedness” to existence. Guilt is the “being-the-basis of a nullity” that Dasein feels primordially; a nullity that always feels a “lack” and an unfinished-ness (BT 58:331). Unlike Harrison, guilt for Heidegger has nothing to do with “concernful Being with Others” (BT 58:328).

67 Ibid., 101.

68 Whereas Harrison does not write on an explicit Christian solidarity versus a Heideggerian solipsism, his work clarifies the perspective of what Dasein’s relationship to death, and more so to the dead (and through the dead, Dasein’s relationship to Others), can do in terms of enlivening its possibilities. Harrison’s work on the ancestral dead and cultural responsibility follow Heidegger even while criticizing him more satisfyingly than does Falque’s trinitarian phenomenology as described in this chapter.

69 Ibid., 157.
To return to Falque, a Christian manner of Being-towards-death singularizes Dasein in a silent call toward the “love for our neighbour” (GTG 80) understood as a kenotic gift. For Falque, this model is set forth through a trinitarian reading of Gethsemane as a model that manifests a human mode of kenotic authenticity. Falque explains that “the ‘Being in the world’ of the Son, solely as Son who is all-powerful in the image of his Father, actually comes to founder. From a desire of unconditional all-powerfulness, Christ passes progressively, almost pedagogically by the route of his anxiety and of his anguish, to the recognition of another power, conditional this time, to which he must necessarily submit, even according to the law of his own incarnation and simply because he shares our human finitude” (GTG 51). In Christ’s finite relationship with the trinitarian God one sees a movement from what is all-powerful to what moves through a weak anxiety in the recognition of an Other that requires submission. So too must Christian Dasein find himself in a profound experience of giving up mastery and all-powerfulness, instead submitting to the Other in the face of death. While Falque affirms the emphasis on the Other in Levinas, he also departs from Levinas in redirecting the phenomenological locus away from the face and into the body itself—the flesh and blood of Dasein. There is something yet more primordial than language or “Interpretation” in death that communicates Dasein’s anxiety, something inscribed and traced in the very enfleshment of Being.

2.5 Suffering as Silent Flesh: A Critique of Consciousness

70 Once more, Falque is unclear whether this Other is meant to be God or every other Other. The ambiguity itself may be telling in that there is perhaps no clear difference between Dasein’s experience with the one and the other.
How does anxiety express itself? For Heidegger it is a mood, attunement, a consciousness of Dasein’s Being-towards-death. To be ontological is to be primordially a Being-in-the-world circumscribed by care. It is this Being-in-the-world that anxiety confronts without at any moment leaving the world. Dasein is never a disembodied Being-in-the-world, something that Falque himself affirms when he quotes Heidegger’s remark that anxiety is “so close that it is oppressive and stifles one’s breath” (BT 40:186). Here anxiety is communicated physiologically in the stifling of the breath that “robs us of speech” (GTG 82). Notwithstanding such physiological manifestations of anxiety as expressed in *Being and Time*, Falque problematizes the notion of causation wherein a physiological effect follows a conscious awareness of anxiety which assumes that anxiety begins only after the development of language and so is not, in a sense, primordial or pre-ontological. Falque’s criticism here stems from a concern with causation. There is, argues Falque, a more primordial experience of anxiety about death that is pre-linguistic: one experienced in the silent suffering of the flesh. This is an idea Falque inherits from the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. In a helpful lecture in his book *The World of Perception*, entitled “Man Seen From the Outside,” Merleau-Ponty writes the following:

Imagine that I am in the presence of someone who, for one reason or another, is extremely annoyed with me. My interlocutor gets angry and I notice that he is expressing his anger by speaking aggressively, by gesticulating and shouting. But where is this anger? People will say that it is in the mind of my interlocutor. What this means is not entirely clear. For I could not imagine the malice and cruelty which I discern in my opponent’s looks separated from his gestures, speech and body. None of this takes place in some other-worldly realm, in some shrine located beyond the body of the angry man. It really is here, in this room and in this part of the room, that the anger breaks forth. It is in the space between him and me that it unfolds. I would accept that the sense in which the place of my opponent’s anger is on his face is not the same as that in which, in a moment, tears may come streaming from his eyes or a grimace may harden on his mouth. Yet anger inhabits him and it blossoms on the surface of his pale
or purple cheeks, his blood-shot eyes and wheezing voice . . . And if, for one moment, I step out of my own view-point as an external observer of this anger and try to remember what it is like for me when I am angry, I am forced to admit that it is no different. When I reflect on my own anger, I do not come across any element that might be separated or, so to speak, unstuck, from my own body.  

To inhabit a mind means first and foremost to experience a mood from within the body, a bodily mood. Falque writes, “the weakness of Heidegger’s analysis comes down less, as I see it, to his leaving out the body than to his inscribing it still and always in the unsurpassable horizon of being, indeed within the ordeal of its annihilation…[anxiety] always remains above all an experience in the mode of language, even if it is the negation of all speech about ‘that which is’” (GTG 82). Merleau-Ponty notes that as a child learns to express itself it does not begin with a cognitive or conscious understanding of the Other or itself as a mind, but rather “the infant learns to know mind as visible behaviour.” It is only through the medium of the body that the child experiences anger, sadness, or any other lived attunement or mood in itself or in another.

Returning to the silent pre-linguistic beginnings of anxiety within the suffering of the flesh, a phenomenological interpretation of Gethsemane and Golgotha becomes a repository of ample examples of physiological anxiety. Falque thus furthers Heidegger’s look into the lived experience of Dasein, arguing for a deepening of Dasein to the “fleshly lived experience” (GTG 82). For Falque, Gethsemane denies any attempt at a reduction of anxiety to consciousness


72 I Ibid., 86.
alone.\(^{74}\) Because the body is something “in reality I never have” and is instead “what I am,” the question then becomes not only the how of anxiety towards consciousness/the meaning of death, but the how of anxiety in the suffering of finite flesh (GTG 94). The flesh is what is the most ready-to-hand of Dasein. Jesus falls to the earth, sweating great “drops of blood” (Luke 22:44) in anguish, *weeps* in the garden, and *exhales* his final breath on the cross. On the cross Jesus is “forced also into his own suffering, exposed to the same impossibility of detaching himself from suffering…as all living things” (GTG 95). Golgotha is not only a refusal of flight in the face of death, it is a refusal of flight in the face of inevitable suffering. In this sense it is the toward-which of death that reflects the having-been of factual suffering.

Falque cites Levinas who writes: “where suffering attains its purity, where there is no longer anything between us and it, the supreme responsibility of this extreme assumption turns into supreme irresponsibility, into infancy. *Sobbing* is this, and precisely through this it announces death. To die is to return to this state of irresponsibility, to be the *infantile shaking and sobbing*” (GTG 99).\(^{75}\) What is discovered in the pre-linguistic and ineffable fleshly lived experience of Dasein is nothing less than a *thrownness* that knows death’s limit before it can describe it.\(^{76}\) As Falque writes, “the infant *[in-fans]* is in reality one who is “without speech,” who does not speak because he or she (still) does not know how to speak” (GTG 107). It is to this phenomenology of the flesh that Jesus offers, in the outstretching of his open and nailed hands, an open possibility for *touch* wherein there is found a “kiss” and “embrace” (GTG 108). Like infants who

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\(^{74}\) Falque sees himself as returning to Husserlian descriptive phenomenology, to as he says (quoting Husserl) a “beginning” in “pure—and so to speak, dumb—psychological experience…” (GTG 82).

\(^{75}\) Falque here is quoting Levinas, *Time and the Other*, 72. Emphasis is Falque’s.

\(^{76}\) Yet even this description falters, as Dasein cannot know anything before it is first described or named as such. Knowledge assumes language. This is part of thrownness.
need to be cradled in their sobbing, so too there must be a sensory response to suffering in the world. As Dasein, we lay hands on the elderly as they die, we ‘utter’ melodies together at funerals, and embrace Others in our Being-with in the face of death.

The question arises what Jesus’ own death models for us in this regard. In Gethsemane Jesus experiences no comfort physiologically speaking (and it is doubtful he experiences any psychological comfort either). There is only pain in the suffering body. If anything, on the one hand, Falque reasserts Heidegger’s insistence on Dasein as a Being-towards-death, as a finite being whose very essence (now emphasizing body) must become a question for itself. On the other hand, Heidegger’s accusation that Christianity ignores anxiety and death has surely been dismantled in the course of Falque’s phenomenology of Gethsemane and Golgotha. Jesus is thrown into the anxiety of a Being-towards-death, inhabiting the full fleshly consequences of a Being-in-the-world.

2.6 Death in the Silent Flesh? A Heideggerian Response to Falque

As part of Falque’s criticism of Heidegger, Falque accuses him of a “paradoxical angelism” which is “suffered uniquely in the interior depths of the consciousness” (GTG 82). Is this a fair accusation? If Being is to be regarded as phenomena that Dasein imbues with meaning—an embeddedness that takes place most poignantly out of the epiphany of Dasein’s Being-towards-death—then how can anxiety, as that which displaces the Being-in-the-world and radically empties the care structure of Dasein’s meaning (only to re-fill it when Dasein comes to terms with its death), be something that is pre-conscious? How can anxiety be something that is not conscious of that (knowledge-evading, to be sure) phenomenon which is the end of all consciousness?
Falque’s issue is perhaps with the reduction of Being to consciousness at the expense of enfleshment. Enfleshment must contribute as a necessary constituent of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world. There is no Dasein without hands and feet and ears. Levinas’ riposte to Heidegger’s Dasein sums up the lack of embodiment one feels in *Being and Time*: “Dasein is never hungry.”

There is no doubt that more could be said about Dasein’s enfleshment and its influence over *care* within *Being and Time*.

Yet the question that arises is whether or not there is any pre-linguistic *meaning* to death. It is difficult to think so. It is here where Falque’s reading of Heidegger falters. Contra Falque, in Dasein there is no direct encounter with any *in-fans* (without speech of infancy), there is only the anamnesis or vague recollections of a “being-there” that one can trust from the reports of video cameras, photographs, and testimonials, all of which report a having-been that is without-speech. But in this sense, the without-speech of the infant is only later realizable through the consciousness of Dasein as already having-been-in-the-world. What is problematic is not Falque’s assertion that “when words are silent, the flesh speaks” (GTG 106). The infantile sobbing of the flesh communicates primordially the thrownness of present suffering. Yet in Dasein—that is, in everyday Being-there that is conscious of its referential totality, eventually authentically awakened in the ontological interpretation of death—sobbing takes on a new understanding when it comes to something akin to a Jewish rabbi weeping over his fate in a garden. What I am arguing, in fact, is that Dasein must come to take from the meaninglessness/absurdity of death and finitude a *mean-

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ing he is conscious of. The death of Christ provides meaning\(^78\) (i.e., love for the Other, the alterity of the Other in relation to the self, solidarity instead of isolation), and so too does the Heideggerian resolve to live authentically within the new possibilities opened by death. This is something the flesh alone cannot achieve, but only respond to.

Moreover, while Heidegger does not expand on a phenomenology of the body, he does resist a separation of the mind from the body as a free-floating substance that stands apart from the world. In defence of Heidegger—responding to the “angelism” (albeit a “paradoxical” one) Falque accuses him of—I do not see such “angelism” in \textit{Being and Time}. Though Dasein is not said to go “hungry” or to exhibit corporeal appetites, Dasein is said to “hear” the call of anxiety (BT 54:314) and to “use” physically the equipment that Dasein has ready-to-hand. The ontic Things that Dasein engages on a day to day basis do not “speak”\(^79\) to Dasein outside of Dasein’s pre-reflective awareness (to be distinguished from the present-at-hand awareness) of them. Heidegger writes: “the wood is a forest of timber, the mountain a quarry of rock; the river is a water-power, the wind is wind ‘in the sails’” (BT 15:100). Without language, there is perhaps an indistinct feeling of these attributes, but there is no meaning-making.\(^80\) Dasein also uses sight to recognize (and “make conspicuous”) signs that make up its referential totality of care in the world.

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\(^78\) Not to be confused with a definition. Death is not circumscribed definitively, but rather it is in death that meaning within life is opened for Dasein.

\(^79\) Of course, this is only partially true. The fire “speaks” (so to say) to Dasein when it burns her, so too does the water when it nourishes her. Hunger is also a good example. But one cannot deduce meaning from these qualities other than in conscious engagement with the familiarity of them (e.g. ‘wine spilt on a first date,’ or the ‘half-eaten leftovers in the refrigerator’). Even in these contexts, Dasein’s physicality is imbued with meaning that requires consciousness to make possible.

\(^80\) Ludwig Wittgenstein makes a similar argument in his 1958 \textit{Philosophical Investigations} in what he called his “private language argument.” Wittgenstein argued against any notion of private meaning that separated itself from socially agreed upon conventions or what he called “forms of life.” Ludwig Wittgenstein, \textit{The Philosophical Investigations} (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953), PI, I, 23. In Heidegger, these conventions make up Dasein’s thrownness into a world of meaning that it inherits.
Dasein is hermeneutical, interpreting the use of equipment for the “toward-which” of its ends which are “for-the-sake-of-which” itself (i.e. the hammer which is “involved” in the ready-to-hand process of making something quicker for Dasein’s own interests) (BT 18:116).

More than this, Heidegger allots a portion of chapter three in Being and Time to contrast the Being-in-the-world of Dasein with the Cartesian notion (“angelism”?) of a division between the two substances of “Nature and Spirit” (BT 19:123). What is important for the present discussion is Heidegger’s criticism of Descartes’ skepticism concerning the Being of objects in the sensory realm, more specifically, Descartes’ idea that the human sensations of the “external” world are only useful for mediating external properties to the mind for internal data (BT 21:129). Heidegger describes the problem with Descartes’ epistemology thus: “What is ‘proximally’ given is this waxen Thing which is coloured, flavoured, hard, and cold in definite ways, and which gives off its own special sound when struck. But this is not of any importance ontologically, nor, in general, is anything which is given through the senses” (BT 21:129). Heidegger is here critiquing Descartes for a devaluation of the senses. Said differently, Heidegger accuses Descartes of, to use Falque’s term, “angelism” in its most purest form. What Dasein is is a Being-there with senses that can open meaning for itself in the world. Ireton points to Heidegger’s 1925 lecture course History of the Concept of Time where Heidegger “uses Descartes as a foil to overturn the metaphysical paradigm of death.” As Ireton quotes Heidegger, “Dasein’s existence is not defined by the epistemological self-certainty of the Cartesian cogito sum, but by the more ontological...

81 An interesting comment in Richard Polt’s Heidegger may be helpful here: “If our connection to other beings were cut, we would not end up inside our mind—we would end up without a mind at all. (Experiments with sensory deprivation tanks show that after a time without any sensations, people lose themselves in hallucinations and disjointed thought; their ability to be Dasein is temporarily jeopardized.) The mind is dependent on minding—caring about other beings, which show up as mattering to us.” Polt, Heidegger, 57.
awareness of moribundus sum [lit. “I am in dying”]: ‘The MORIBUNDUS first gives the SUM [sic] its sense.’ Dasein does not gather meaning primarily from thinking in the abstract removed from the body, but in the immediate ontological awareness of the death of the body. Later in Being and Time, Heidegger criticizes Kant similarly for, after moving away from reducing the “I” to a substance (which he lauds in Kant), resorting to a conceptualization of the self that is reduced to a mere “subject” (BT 64:367). Ultimately, what one finds in Being and Time is a return to the lived experience which (implicit as it may be!) includes the embodied lived experience.

2.7 Conclusion to Chapter Two

This does not mean that Falque is wrong about further pursuing the incorporation of the flesh via a phenomenology of Jesus’ death. Indeed, at Golgotha Jesus’ cry to the heavens, the blood flowing from his side, and the taste of vinegar on his lips all reveal the power of the flesh to communicate human suffering and anxiety about death. But they alone cannot provide meaning for possibilities in the face of death. Dasein’s heightened awareness of its finite existence through anxiety about death is always simultaneously a bodily expression of a mood. The how of Dasein, then, according to Falque, is found in following Christ in a resistance against a mode of Being-towards-the-end (resignation, waiting for resurrection, heroism) and in fully embracing one’s Being-towards-death in the solidarity and love of Others. Leaving no room for an escape from death in a life-after-life or through ontical other-worldly speculation, the death of Christ rather opens up a new mode of Being-with-Others in death. Out of the phenomenology of Christ’s death erupts a manner of dying (as a phenomenon of life) that instills solidarity instead.

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of solipsism, openness to the other instead of mineness. The flesh speaks out as Dasein becomes aware, through anxiety, of its death. If this is the case, and if Christianity truly does not “interpret death through an interpretation of life,” then where does resurrection belong? If there is no guarantee of a life-after-life and if Christianity must escape its popular past of escapism, what is to be done with this founding belief in the resurrection of the dead in Jesus Christ? The following chapter will be devoted to answering this question.
Chapter 3: Being-Towards-Resurrection as Otherness, Weakness, and Joy

3.1. Introduction: A Phenomenology of Birth

In the previous chapter, I have examined, primarily through a reading of Falque’s *A Guide to Gethsemane*, in what ways a Christian phenomenology of death might respond to Heidegger’s criticism that Christianity interprets “death through the Interpretation of life.” I have argued that Christianity not only does not necessarily interpret death thus, but also with reference to the death of Christ, may bear philosophical/phenomenological witness to the capacity to enter into a more enfleshed experience of anxiety with regard to death. This chapter will attempt to look at Heidegger’s second criticism, that theology deduces an “in-finite time out of the finite,” and that, in doing so, “temporalizes itself as infinite” (BT 65:379). Wrapped up in this accusation is the question concerning what resurrection might mean for any Christian phenomenology that begins, as Falque’s does, from the position of Dasein’s finite Being-in-the-world. Much of popular Christianity indeed would claim that resurrection is something extra-temporal, that is, that it exists as something transcending ordinary finite time—the dead are imagined as raised in a most literal, bodily, and objective fashion. What are we to make phenomenologically of texts such as Paul’s in 1 Corinthians where he writes “It [the body] is sown a physical body, it is raised a spiritual body” (1 Corinthians 15:44)? How are we to interpret this seemingly contradictory claim that Dasein exists as fundamentally faced with the anxiety of finitude (death) on the one hand and yet with the promise of resurrection into a “spiritual body” on the other?

Falque makes clear from the beginning that any phenomenology of resurrection must not and cannot presume to think of resurrection as “an ontic event,” but instead one must seek how it
may come to be understood as “as an ontological” event” (MF xiv). Even so, Dasein does not have direct experiences with anything resembling resurrection on an everyday basis much less is Dasein able to interrogate lived experience for a meaning concerning the modality of a spiritual or resurrected body. Surely, any (Heideggerian) phenomenology must be consistent in describing lived experience with Being. Because of this, Falque asserts that the human is never at any point a “transcendent being” (MF 6). If there is such a modality of Dasein as a “spiritual body,” it cannot be one that abandons the former body. This is the axiom I will assume with Falque. As in The Guide to Gethsemane, Falque begins once again in The Metamorphosis of Finitude from the simple starting point that Dasein is a finite Being-there. Agreeing with Heidegger that Christians should philosophically stop deriving the finite from the infinite, Falque offers a route to an ontological understanding of resurrection through an experience of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world that is open to all Dasein: birth.

Moving from the “mystery of the Passion” to the “mystery of the Nativity” will be the path Falque takes in disclosing the “mystery of Easter” (MF 4). Why birth? Like death, always throwing Dasein back to its past, so too does a Being-towards-birth send “one back to ‘another ending,’ more originary” (MF 3). In Heidegger Dasein projects itself ecstatically toward death which thus sends it ricocheting back on its factical thrownness, excavating its facticity for new possibilities. Now, Dasein will enact a Being-towards-birth in order to encounter a “new future,” one not realizable through the passage of anxiety toward death (MF 3). Birth signifies what is most “fundamental in man”; more fundamental in fact than death (MF 3). To be born is to be
‘given’ over to the world. It includes total passivity, a passivity Falque will “draw as a paradigm for the passivity of the resurrected” (MF 3). Birth returns Dasein to “what is most fundamental” in her existence. From birth Falque moves analogically toward an ontological understanding of resurrection as a metamorphosis or a “rebirth.” Metamorphosis thus draws one away from a rendering of resurrection as a literal bodily resuscitation from a grave, instead offering resurrection a mode of Being in-the-world that metamorphizes how Dasein understands not only its consciousness of Being-in-the-world but also its own embodiment in the world. Drawing on Jesus’ dialogue with Nicodemus in the gospel of John, Falque makes a distinction—one often interpreted in dualistic terms but now reframed holistically—between “what is born of the flesh is flesh” and “what is born of the Spirit is spirit” (John 3:6). Contrary to much Christian theology, Falque argues that flesh and spirit must not be “dogmatically opposed in the Greek manner” but instead should be joined to the corporal reality of Dasein as two distinct modes of Being-in-the-world. Those who live by the Spirit are those who will experience a re(birth) in the body (σῶµα); what pertains to the Spirit (πνεῦµα) coincides with an opening up of a metamorphosed manner of living and what pertains to the flesh (σάρξ) coincides with an ordinary (inauthentic) manner of living. As Falque writes, “it was appropriate for Nicodemus […] to live and to under-

83 Falque is not the first philosopher to conceptualize a phenomenology of birth. Hannah Arendt, in her work The Human Condition, writes about birth (which she refers to as “natality”) as an ontological “miracle” that provides the conditions for political action. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 178. In stark contrast to Heidegger’s mantra that “as soon as a man is born he is old enough to die,” Arendt writes “men, though they must die, are not born in order to die but in order to begin.” Ibid., 246.

84 In a footnote, Falque maintains a semantic equivalence in the word µεταµόρφωσις (µετα meaning “after” and µορφή meaning “form,” taken together as “after-form”) which can mean either a “transformation,” “metamorphosis,” or “resurrection” (MF 155). While µεταµόρφωσις appears as descriptive in Matthew and Mark (Matthew 17:2, Mark 9:2) of the transfiguration of Jesus on the mount and as the renewing of the believer in Romans and Corinthians (Romans 12:2, 2 Cor 3:18), Falque does not state why he did not choose to include also the more obvious choice of ἀνάστασις (lit. a “standing up” or “raising up”) as it appears in all of the resurrection accounts of the Gospels.
stand what was meant by being born *from below*, before grasping the meaning of being *reborn from above* (see John 3:1-13)” (MF 20). Thus the phenomenology of birth commences analogically a phenomenology of metamorphosis.

This chapter will analyze Falque’s *Metamorphosis of Finitude: An Essay on Birth and Resurrection* in order to follow this path from birth to resurrection. Moving analogically thus from a phenomenology of birth to a phenomenology (existentiality) of the resurrection, what will be kept in mind is how Falque will proceed to resurrection without compromising the answer given in response to Heidegger in the former chapter: that Christianity must first undergo anxiety as a Being-towards-death before it is able to experience resurrection. Resurrection must not be an escape from death, but rather a metamorphosis of finitude, thus transforming it in an ontological manner. As Falque writes, “far from disqualifying finitude, resurrection as *metamorphosis* thus gives meaning to it, in the operation of *transfiguration*” (MF 8). If Falque is correct, resurrection unfastens then a new *meaning* for Dasein as a Being-towards-death (and-resurrection).

3.2. Finitude as Impassable Immanence

As in *The Guide to Gethsemane*, Falque inaugurates his project by fixing the limits of Dasein. He writes, “finitude, ‘the impassable limit of our life,’ means that life is completely dominated by care, and it makes of our Being-there a simple ‘between’ caught between birth and death” (MF 13). Rather than stumbling down the temptation of “bad faith,” that is, in “lying to” oneself about the finitude that so obviously confronts Dasein, one must instead face up first to the “impassable immanence” that confronts Dasein as a “blocked horizon of my existence” (MF 14). Of course, Falque will not take this blockage as the final word on Dasein, but will guide the
reader through a transformation of finitude seen less as a delimitation and more as an opening. What will be attempted in Falque is a rejection of an interpretation of finitude that necessarily understands it as an “interminable self-reference” (14). As we shall see, Falque argues alternatively that finitude can be Other-referential (something already embryonic in the phenomenology of Gethsemane).

Falque agrees with Heidegger that the philosophical tradition has carried on a “preemptive right of the infinite over the finite” all the way from Cartesian philosophy to (for Falque) the phenomenology of Levinas (MF 16). Following the phenomenology of Heidegger means refusing to treat immanence as it so often has been treated both in philosophy and in Christian theology, that is, as a teleological horizon that functions as an intermediary to a transcendental horizon (i.e. infinitude). If the infinite takes precedence over the finite in the history of theology, phenomenology flips this, making human access to whatever meaning God might hold for Dasein the first priority. This does not mean that transcendence is omitted completely. Far from it. Dasein very often feels within her that there is “more in mankind than the pure and simple evaluation of himself by himself” (MF 18). But what it does imply is a phenomenological redefining of the concepts of immanence and transcendence themselves. Falque explains that “Immanence must be understood as ‘strictly confined within the bounds of internal experience’ (Husserl), and transcendence as an ‘openness [horizontally] of subjectivity’ and no longer as a ‘relation [vertical] of a subject to an object’ which is exterior to it (Heidegger)” (MF 18). With these terms redefined, it is clear that transcendence can no longer mean a looking outside of one’s experience for a so-called “beyond” that stands independent from the lived world. This motivates then a fur-

85 Square parentheses are Falque’s.
ther clarification of the earlier promise of maintaining finitude, that “phenomenology also needs, if it is to avoid a ‘rather suspect theological turn,’ to forbid itself any speculation on the preexistence of the Word, on the link between kenosis and incarnation, on speaking in tongues, on the hypostatic union and other questions of this kind” (MF 20). Phenomenology means starting from the flesh, from the Being-in-the-world.

This emphasis on finitude is not predicated on a slavish devotion to Heidegger’s fundamental ontology on Falque’s part. Rather, according to Falque, it is a central doctrine in Christianity that “the fleshly ordinariness of humankind” comes before any “saturation of divine revelation” (MF 21). Heidegger’s comments regarding eternity were correct in their fidelity to this insight. In modern times it is no longer intellectually possible that philosophizing about time takes its start from an outside-of-time perspective. Falque tells how “Heidegger complained ironically to an audience of theologians at Marburg (1924) about the way this had been done; and we must also start from his viewpoint today, now that all phenomenology, like all theology, works ‘from below’” (MF 22). No one knows what eternity is like, because eternity lies beyond the temporal reach of Dasein. Whatever it is to experience “horizontal transcendence” (as will be shown) cannot mean taking an a priori stance of a “vertical” eternity where knowledge of the eternal justifies knowledge of the temporal. Such a move is no longer credible philosophically and if theology seeks to respond to philosophical discourse it must be able to concede to the terms of finitude.

As the first chapter shows, Heidegger resists any reduction of temporality to a substance. For Heidegger, Dasein is not “in time” (time taken here as an entity that Being participates in) but rather time is encountered as a type of determination of meaning (BT 5:40). Dasein does not
experience itself as residing between two polarized entities that are its birth and its death, but rather Dasein is the *between* itself that creates meaning for its projects by projecting toward the future and inheriting meaning about its past through its thrownness. Thus, time in Heidegger is projected futurally toward death as a way to avoid the substantiality of an instant/moment/presence or a sequence of ‘nows’. We are not so much “*in* time as we *make* time,” as Falque puts it (MF 26). This, as I have delineated it in the first chapter, is also Heidegger’s interpretation of the temporality of the Christian experience, determined as it is by a “being on the alert” that is defined by the *parousia*. Falque explains that in Heidegger what becomes of time is an orientation “towards the future or towards death as our own second coming” (MF 28). This “second coming” of death is the “burden of time” that is driven by an unpreventable anxiety. Falque has clearly shown how the weight of this anxiety burdened Jesus in Gethsemane (chapter 2 above). Dasein’s temporality is constituted by a care structure defined by its anxiety before death.

Rather than merely passing over anxiety, Falque has demonstrated the inevitability of anxiety in Dasein’s mode of Being-towards-death (in *The Guide to Gethsemane*). Yet what is proposed in *The Metamorphosis of Finitude* is a “going through and beyond Heidegger” specifically on this point—there is *more* to Dasein than its anticipation of death, there is also its Being-towards-birth (and through this phenomenon also an opening of Being-towards-metamorphosis) (MF 36). What does this mean for anxiety and for time defined as essentially futural?

3.3. Passive and Active Metamorphoses

Dasein finds itself already-born in the world as part of its Being-there. As Jesus tells Nicodemus: “the wind blows where it chooses, and you hear the sound of it, but you do not know
where it comes from or where it goes. So it is with everyone who is born of the Spirit” (John 3:8). To be reborn is akin to being born: it “happens and is seen through its effects rather than as an actual moment of transformation. And it is there that we find the breath of the Spirit, as also the lived experience of the flesh” (MF 44). Dasein does not experience itself under a Deus ex machina transformation from the outside-in, but, like birth, metamorphosis is experienced as something that is already occurring, a mode of Being Dasein already inhabits. As in birth, this means that metamorphosis occurs in passivity.

Because of this notion of passivity in Christian metamorphosis, Falque defines the Christian metamorphosis first of all negatively over against the metamorphosis of the “Overhuman” in Friedrich Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Whereas Falque proffers a Christian metamorphosis of passivity, Zarathustra affirms one of activity and power alone. Falque quotes Nietzsche’s Zarathustra: “Far away he spat out the head of the snake—and then sprang up. No longer shepherd, no longer human—one transformed [metamorphosed], illumined, who laughed!” (MF 48). Antithetical to the so-called “passivity of the subject” in Christian resurrection—who is raised by God’s power and not one’s own—the Overhuman is raised by the will of its eternal return, by its own “reviving or recovering oneself” against the “vain temptation of immortality” (MF 48-49). As Zarathustra states, “Life itself told me this secret: ‘Behold,’ it said, ‘I am that which must overcome itself again and again.’”86 Zarathustra is the prophet who instructs his disciples to abandon morality for the sake of solitude, one wherein there can be no transformation of the self by another. “Flee” he says, “into your solitude!”87

86 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 138.

87 Ibid., 78.
Yet both the Nietzschean shepherd and Christ are metamorphosed and transformed ontologically, that is, the difference does not lie in the one being transformed and the other not, but as Falque notes, in the “actuality through which” the metamorphosis operates (MF 49). What matters is not 

that they are metamorphosed, but how they are. For Nietzsche’s shepherd, transformation is a matter of needing “to learn to stand up by yourselves or you will fall” (MF 49). Metamorphosis, for Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, is a matter of the “will to power.” Falque describes the transfiguration of the shepherd as “active and not passive…it is ‘auto-transformation,’ a victory of one’s will over death” (MF 49). In this way, Nietzsche’s shepherd falls into the heroic mode of Being-towards-the-end recited in the previous chapter in that he “raises the ego to the highest degree of its ‘all-powerfulness’ and its mastery over the self” (MF 49). Ultimately for Nietzsche, the metamorphosis of Dasein is a “resurrection of the self by the self” (MF 49).

Nietzsche, like Heidegger, accuses Christian resurrection of a “will to go on and on—in other words, of a flight from the world” (MF 49). It is the fortifying protective measure of the disciple who “built his house on the rock” (Mt 7:24) that betrays an intolerance of the sand, an “organizing a cosmos out of fear and flight from chaos” (MF 50). Whereas, for Nietzsche, the Christian falls into an escapism already present in Plato’s extra-temporality—and as Heidegger notes, finding in the extra-temporal the “tendency-to-secure” (PRL 9:31)—the Overhuman “shows both courage in his assumption of perishability and an attachment to the earth in his love of the moment as a ‘unique form of all life’” (MF 50). Zarathustra entreats his disciples saying

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88 Ibid., 138.

89 Falque’s words not Nietzsche’s.
“remain true to the earth, and do not believe those who speak to you of super terrestrial hopes!”

Nietzsche, like Heidegger, claims that Christians trick themselves when they posit an eternity separate from finitude. As Zarathustra proclaims, “it was the sick and dying who despised the body and the earth and invented the things of heaven and the redeeming drops of blood: but even these sweet and dismal poisons they took from the body and the earth.” Said differently, Christianity must necessarily posit eternity out of finitude, but this occurs because of a dissatisfaction with the earth and the body—it is an attempt “to get out of their skins.” Unlike these despisers of the body, Zarathustra offers a “joy” of a descent and a going-down into the world that “wants deep, deep, deep eternity!” Nietzsche’s metamorphosis is both joy-filled and earth-bound.

Falque notes that Nietzsche’s Zarathustra demands “courage” in assuming perishability, a notion that begins to sound a lot like Heidegger’s courage of anxiety as a Being-towards-death. The Overhuman faces his finitude and in doing so finds a “unique form of all life” (MF 50). Like Nietzsche’s Overhuman, Heidegger’s Being-towards-death is an active power to listen to the voice of the call of anxiety. Nietzsche’s treatment of corporality thus opens up two different modes of metamorphic corporality: the Christian “passive corporality” and the Nietzschean “active corporeality” (MF 50). What is at stake is not a mere “going on and on” of a life-after-life (something that would treat resurrection as event rather than ontological), but more than this a confrontation with what it means to be enfleshed in the body. As Falque boldly writes, “The es-

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90 Ibid., 42.
91 Ibid., 60.
92 Ibid., 61.
93 Ibid., 333.
cape from the tomb has for too long in Christianity been taken as the raising of a biological body...according to Nietzsche, this Christian view comes down to denying or refusing to accept the familiar law of entropy, which applies to all living things” (MF 58). The concern about resurrection then should not be distracted by the beyond of an afterlife—or as Nietzsche calls it, the preaching of the “afterworlds”94—but be brought down low to the fleshly manner of finite existence. Nietzsche reminds Christians of this crucial imperative.

Nietzsche’s polemic against Christianity provokes deeper considerations of what resurrection means for Dasein’s embodiment. If the body enters into a “glorious” state that is “raised” in “imperishability” (1 Cor 15:42), does this not negate the “fleshly body”? For Nietzsche it emphatically does. As Falque states, to become resurrected in this manner is to abandon the body for a uniform ‘body of Christ’ that absorbs all differences and actualizes an assimilation of “all active powers of corporeality into a single passive corporality” (MF 52). To be resurrected in the corporality of Christ is thus to remain in the metamorphic stage of the “kneeling camel (‘Thou shalt’), without reaching even that of a roaring lion (‘I want’) and even less that of the child who ‘says yes” (MF 53).95 To be metamorphosed by Christ is for Nietzsche to lose what it means to be human as an enfleshed, creative, and willful individual.

Against Nietzsche’s condemnation of Christian resurrection, Falque offers a more nuanced interpretation of resurrection, one taken from a quite different reading of St.Paul’s epistles. First, Falque quotes Paul saying “The body is…for the Lord, and the Lord is for the body” (1 Cor 6:13) in order to show how any openness to God in the body is also simultaneously an “openness

94 Ibid., 61.

95 On the three metamorphoses of the camel, lion, and child, see Thus Spoke Zarathustra pg. 54-55.
to the self” (MF 54). Second, Falque maintains an essential difference between the Greek “dualism of body (soma) and soul (psyche)” and the Christian distinction of the modes of Being bound up in the body (soma) as that which lives “according to the flesh (sarx) and according to the spirit (pneuma)” (MF 53). Moreover, in “distinguishing between the ‘physical body’ and ‘the spiritual body’” (1 Cor 15:44), St. Paul distinguishes…two ways of being of the body” (MF 54). Far from being an escape from the fleshly body, “glory” instead indicates a phenomenological mode of Being, one informed by the Spirit.  

What is the difference in effect between the flesh as a modality of the body and the metamorphosis of the Spirit as another modality of embodiment? Because these are ontological dispositions rather than ontic or biological alterations, it is not unfair (though Falque does not do so) to see in this Christian distinction a correlation with the ontological modes of authentic and inauthentic Dasein in Heidegger, now reframed through an especially Christian care (i.e., a specifically Christian existential mode of Being). The reason why Falque does not make this connection is unclear. For Heidegger, the fundamental ontology remains axiologically neutral (or so he claims) throughout Being and Time. Falque is here speaking in terms of its ontological modes, that is, how Dasein constitutes herself either as self-referential (sarx) or other-referential (pneuma). Perhaps the reason for this decision can be found in that Falque’s categories of sarx

96 Falque expands on the phenomenological glorification of the body, stating that “the glory of the body alone is what makes the resurrected being” (MF 60). Glorification seems to function in Falque synonymously with the somatic manner of Being according to the Spirit. One begins to sense a slippage at this point in Falque’s argument, specifically when it comes to his conflating what is “properly phenomenal” with a “metamorphosis of transfiguration (glory)” (MF 60). Falque quotes Irenaeus regarding the “light of the Father burst into the flesh of our Lord” (MF 61). What is perhaps implied here is an aesthetic “light” that signifies the mode of Being that lives in the manner of the Spirit (i.e., Other-oriented), but it becomes difficult to follow these connections as they are not properly categorized and thus appear to compromise on the promise made at the outset by Falque to proceed from the vantage point of finitude.
and *pneuma* are not described explicitly with relation to the They (here a relation to the Other for Falque), a relation that is absolutely definitely of Dasein’s care structure for Heidegger.

At its base, for Falque, living according to the flesh is a mode of turning in on the self at the expense of the Other, whereas living according to the Spirit is a manner of “turning towards others” (MF 56). Unlike Heidegger’s authentic/inauthentic distinction, the Christian ontological modes are not prompted alone by the blockage of Dasein’s finite horizon (though it does and must confront this as well), but by Jesus’ *manner of being through his body* that welcomes the flesh into an ontological metamorphosis.

Because of this openness to the Other in the manner of the Spirit, there is no “auto-resurrection” or “over-resurrection’ of the self in Christianity” (MF 57). Christianity is not heroism, just as it is not resignation or certitude of a life-after-life (see chapter 2 above). Dasein is not capable of transformation on its own, but only truly discovers itself in the alterity of an Other. Against Nietzsche, the Christian modality of the Spirit is that which is transformed in the openness to new possibilities that would otherwise be unavailable to Dasein. As Falque writes, “in demanding a raising up of the self by the self, the philosopher envisages here the modality of the ‘body’ according to Paul’s notion of the ‘flesh.’ He makes the *in-curving* of the self in its own self-overcoming (*sarx*) the site of a renunciation of any appeal to *openness* to the other (*pneuma*)—to any such appeal that might lead to escape of the self” (MF 57). To become metamorphosed then according the Spirit is to yield (in a passive way) to the call of the Other—contra Zarathustra’s constant flight back into the cave of solitude—that transforms the self, not as an escape to the self, but as will be shown below, as a realization of dependency and weakness in the self. In this way, Falque sees Nietzsche, and by extension Heidegger as well, both as “fleshy” philoso-
phers in that they both interpret solitude (for Heidegger, the “mineness” and appropriation of Being and the individuation of the self by death) as ontologically metamorphosing rather than as an Other-centric metamorphosis of the Spirit.

3.4. Metamorphosis of the Self By the Other

What does it mean for finitude to be transformed? What does it mean that “the resurrection changes everything” as Falque so ambitiously asserts (MF 63)? In order to explore this thesis, Falque turns once more to trinitarian theology. In this section I once again repeat the question whether or not theological language is necessary for the development of meaning for Dasein over against a strictly phenomenological account of everyday life. The question for Falque, in thinking phenomenologically about resurrection, is what exactly the Son—as a mortal Dasein limited by a horizon of pure immanence—“allows himself to be delivered from” in his metamorphosis (MF 64). In order to do so one must avoid the temptation of “the preemption of the infinite,” that views the finite (finitude/death) as being absorbed into the infinite (escapism/life-after-life) (MF 66). One must see in Jesus an “intra-divine event” that refuses any “deus ex machina” soteriology. Jesus’ human mortality and death themselves open up in some way also a divine affair (in the fact that it is primarily a distinctive divine mode of a human affair).97

97 Once more, Falque’s theological language becomes tricky when face to face with his phenomenological methodology. What does it mean when Falque states “The Son of Man alone, precisely because he is God, and because he is God who shares the life of human beings, cannot tolerate a distance between his humanity (finite) and divinity (infinite)” (MF 65). Does this mean that phenomenology must swallow a metaphysic that it has already refused to accept? Or is the scheme of trinitarian theology also analogous (like birth and resurrection) to a mode of being oriented toward what Falque calls the “All-Other” (which perhaps implies every Other). I follow the second interpretation of Falque, since it is closer to the maintenance of finitude. In the Son, infinity comes out of the temporal aspect of human finitude, just as Heidegger suggests.
The trinitarian dynamic of the resurrection consists in the Father’s suffering from “not dying” the death of the Son (MF 66). In this “not dying” the Father is able to experience what Falque calls an “apperceptive transposition of the other” (MF 67). This phrase, taken from Merleau-Ponty, describes how one is able to “get a sense of another organism, of what another mind-body complex feels like, through analogy with ourselves and our situation” (MF 173 footnote 16). Moreover, in a trinitarian relation analogous of a new mode of Being human (and of Being-towards-death), Jesus transfers the “mode of being (fleshly)” to the “mode of being (spiritual) of the Father” (MF 67). In this act of transference, the Father is able to truly feel in his “experience of consciousness (as spirit), what he himself has undergone in his lived experience of the flesh (as body)” (MF 67). What is being accomplished is an apperceptive transposition of the Son’s “lived fleshly experience” into the “lived experience of consciousness” of his Father (MF 67).

Does this not already imply a Hegelian dialectic of infinity that absorbs and sublates the finite into a new infinity—a theological rather than a phenomenological move? It may. What Falque is trying to achieve is an analogous experience of the finite within his use of trinitarian theology. There is what he calls a “necessary but impossible apperceptive transposition of my ‘here’ to the ‘there’ of the other [that] makes possible our joining up or pairing through a common experience” (MF 68). Being ordinarily blocked off from the Other’s perspective, what so often takes place through this transposition is an “analogical” act of consciousness wherein one “can grasp the other; that is to say, by way of an ‘as if’” (MF 68). In this framework, the Other remains totally other while remaining in a “common experience of the world” that functions as a springboard for empathy. It is this gap that the trinitarian relation of the Son and the Father, through the action of the Holy Spirit, bridges. The Father and the Son complete a full under-
standing of the one and the Other, thus breaking the phenomenological limits. At this juncture, it appears strongly that Falque has compromised on his promise to portray the infinite as a horizontal transcendence that occurs from the plane of immanence rather than a vertical transcendence that opens up to God (in the sense of an onto-theological being). The infinite is no longer, as Heidegger suggested, a temporalization of the finite. Falque asserts that “the Son possesses exceptionally, insofar as he ‘is’ God, the capacity to make the other (the Father) undergo the ordeal that he himself has undergone” (MF 69). Without working through the problems of onto-theology and the assertion of a God that is another being (which begins to sound ontic) to whom Jesus as Son can transfer a fleshly ordeal/affair, Falque moves rather into a long discussion of divine passibility and impassibility at which point one wonders where the phenomenology has gone.

The issue here is how Falque takes what is “impossible for human beings” and allows theology to break open a possibility—namely in the apperceptive transposition of the other (MF 72). One cannot feel but conflicted about the triumph of theology over phenomenology, of the metaphysical/infinite over the physical/finite. Whereas Falque spends so much time in the beginning of the book asserting the “positiveness of finitude”—while admitting that there is yet more in finitude than Heidegger and others could accept (MF 18)—there is also a leap of faith that seems necessarily to take place in Falque’s assertion that “what philosophy holds legitimately to be impossible is fulfilled in God: that is, the apperceptive transposition of me into the other” (MF 72). What occurs in God first (of course, in the fleshly incarnation of God) only secondarily
means anything for us as Dasein. On the one hand, Falque is not asking his readers to swallow an entire metaphysic of life-after-life, nor is he asking for an acquiescence to a belief in a bodily resurrection. On the other hand, Falque still maintains that this new impossible (occurring first in the “immanent Trinity” and then for “human beings” in the “economic Trinity”) transposition must be predicated upon a metaphysical trinitarian ordeal that took place on the cross and in the resurrection of Jesus Christ (MF 81). The result is to be a “transformation of the self by another than the self” (MF 75). As good as this sounds, is this really an impossibility apart from a theologically infected trinitarian phenomenology? For Falque this second step towards a metamorphosis assumes revelation, that is, it takes its departure from theology and not phenomenology. Below, I shall argue that the work of Emmanuel Levinas will help concretize phenomenologically this “transformation of the self by another” with reference to the phenomenon of the resurrected Christ as is depicted in the gospel narratives.

Falque’s trinitarian excursions in phenomenology suggest that there remains the persistence of construing the divine as something utterly bound up with the human, and that in this

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98 What Falque asserts must be a movement from time to eternity, that is, the infinite as temporalized by the finite, seems to be turned upside down in statements like “the transformation of the human becomes thinkable through the metamorphosis operated in the divine, given that the former (mankind) is taken up in the act of raising by the latter (the divine)” (MF 90). Although Dasein is passive with regard to birth and resurrection, one cannot help but notice how theology enters in from revelation and “raises up” (resurrects?) philosophy/phenomenology out of finitude, thereby dissolving philosophy into theology. These confusing remarks seem to contradict others in Falque’s works, most explicitly that in *The Metamorphosis of Finitude* such as “If the believer sticks simply to appearances as they appear (immanence), he or she will not run off, or only exceptionally, into the illusions of a discourse of the beyond—a beyond that would have to be quite artificial in that it offered no access to one’s own experience (the supposed infinite never being immediately shared out). Such a beyond would cut one off from the ordinary run of mortals…We need then...to develop the method of immanence further—that is to say, we need to push it to its limits, just as one works out a thesis in radicalizing it further” (GTG, 19, emphasis his). One may find the raising of mankind by the divine in the former quote at odds with, and perhaps breaching, the pushing to the limits of finitude (a breaking open of the limits?) mentioned in the latter quote.

99 Of course, one cannot forget that Falque is attempting the difficult task of retrieving a phenomenological experience out of Christian doctrine and narrative/mythology. If these examples were explicitly analogous to Dasein’s experience of metamorphosis by an Other this would be a less daunting task. It is in the colliding of metaphysics and phenomenological ontology that language begins to falter in Falque’s project.
there is no “break” of the “limits of man,” but rather a transformation that gives these limits themselves “another form” (MF 77). Falque asserts that resurrection, like Dasein’s being-towards-death, does not find itself “in” time but that it “makes time” (MF 78). In this sense, like Heidegger’s anxiety before death, it is the “possibility of the impossible” (the metamorphosis) that gives “rise to new possibilities” (MF 78). What this metamorphosis sparks is a “renewing of the mind” (Rom 12:2).

Resurrection viewed ontologically (and not ontically) prompts in Dasein a mode of finitude that is understood less as prison or ontic limitation and more as an opening (horizontal transcendence) towards others in the turning toward God. As has been noted, Falque recurrently states in his works that the relationship between God and creation is an analogical one. For example, the ascension of Jesus Christ emphatically does not “imply quitting corporeality” but rather opens up “another type of visibility” (MF 85). In this way, the ascension is an extension of the resurrection. This visibility consists in a new way of seeing the world instigated by incorporation into a new body (Christ’s resurrected body). Far from being a digestion of the Other into a representation of the Other into my mind (idealism), Falque argues that this new vision opened up in resurrection (the apperceptive transposition as the new impossible possibility) constitutes in the eucharistic rite an “anti-digestion” that “bursts forth” or ‘projects’ me, so that I am over there, toward what is not me—the Christ himself” (MF 86). In the central ritual of Christianity, one finds a metamorphosis of lived experience in the shift from absorption of the Other to a “bursting forth” toward the Other (who is also Christ). This new type of visibility is like that of the parable of the goats and the sheep, where Christ in his glory says to those metamorphosed in the Spirit: “just as you did it to one of the least of these you did it to me” (Matthew 25:40).
3.5. The World Become Other

If resurrection does not necessitate another world that is “beyond” this one, what does it entail? Christians have long divided up the cosmos between the heavenly and the earthly. Falque dismisses this heaven/earth division as a “Platonization” of Christianity, opting instead for the Augustinian distinction—a macrocosm of the Pauline sarx/pneuma distinction—of the two cities. Falque quotes Augustine: “two cities were created by two kinds of love: the love of self leading to contempt for God, the earthly city; the love of God leading to contempt of self, the heavenly city” (MF 95). These two cities, writes Falque, do not describe “two places or two worlds” but rather “two different and opposing ways of relating to God and to oneself. The earthly City represents the closing in on oneself and thus also to God, and the heavenly City an openness to God and thus also to oneself” (MF 95). Far from delivering Dasein from this world into another world, metamorphosis deposits Dasein into two “existentials or categories of the lived” (MF 96).

Thus the modality of Being-towards-resurrection assumes a futurity that opens up new possibilities in Dasein’s Being-in-the-world. Resurrection as ontological and not an ontic event is not something that happens at a later time after the event of Dasein’s death, but rather is “a way of being that was always already there, and that is capable of throwing light on our ‘down below” (MF 97). There is something in the ontological encounter with the narrative of resurrection that, in the enfleshed manner of living according to the Spirit, opens a “transcendence and desire for God” in a metamorphosis of “the structure of the world” (MF 97). Said differently, resurrection is that which changes Dasein’s care structure, rearranging what is prioritized (formerly the
“mineness” of death in Heidegger’s Being-towards-death) through an analogical experience oriented toward making time for the Other. What makes this mode distinctive is the possibility of assuming weakness as something positive. Falque explains that “God is body” not only for Christianity but also for paganism, Nietzsche, and Heidegger (as seen above), but what is “specific to Christianity in contrast” to these others is that “where the one praises the fleshly power of the gods […] the other recognizes the weakness of the flesh as the true site […] of the power of the Spirit” (MF 102). To participate in the existential of the world become Other, one must embrace what the metamorphosis of finitude opens up even through anxiety and Being-towards-death: a new mode of living that fully embraces in weakness Dasein’s need for what is completely Other. It is the recognition that any kind of isolation cannot on its own reconcile Dasein with the reality of its death, but that something more is required.

When speaking of resurrection as that which exacts that which is already-there, Falque does not mean to insist on an ontological “nature” of Dasein. The very naming of Dasein as Dasein indicates an aporia with regards to nature presented by existentialism. Rather than bearing a nature, Dasein is that which holds a “condition” of “liberty,” experiences itself as free to create meaning as foundational (MF 104). Resurrection, far from denying this, affirms it and furthers the existentialist mantra that “existence precedes essence.” As Falque comments, “the event of transformation does not presuppose a ‘preestablished nature,’ or one that is determined in advance—either for a return to its original state (restoration) or for the fulfillment of its personal being (accomplishment). On the contrary, it anticipates a world still to be established and configured” (MF 105). Resurrection drives Dasein ahead-of-itself ecstatically toward an unknown possibility of meaning that does not originate in the self. This idea that the world is primarily a “rela-
tion with beings” and not a “container in which we are contained” has everything to do with a resurrection that is not an event “in” in the world (ontically), but rather an ontological event that “makes worldly the world” (MF 107). The world as received by the natural attitude (which so often is heavily theological) thus dissipates and makes space (like the empty tomb) for “another sense of world” (MF 107). In this sense “world takes the place of nature” (MF 108). Such a view does not necessarily exclude theological views, but rather it clears the slate of meaning for new possible paths of Being to take shape, perhaps in this sense for a direct relation to phenomena that is religious (horizontally transcendent) and religious in the specific sense of holding certain experiences as sacred.

3.6. Weakness, Otherness, and Joy

Time cannot move from eternity into temporality, time is also that which is in our “subjective relationship to the world” (MF 112). This means that whatever metamorphosis takes place vis-à-vis Dasein’s temporality it must be one that transforms Dasein’s perspective of time. Using Augustine’s conversion experience, Falque notes that Augustine’s encounter with God in the “At once” of the present created in him the “urgency” to see God in the lived “ecstatic experience of different times (past and future) in his mode of reception, receiving the now of God (present) (MF 113-114). Rather than making the present into a substance (the Heideggerian criticism of Augustinian time), Falque interprets this experience of time as a “present (or gift) of his presence” (MF 114). The present moment thus becomes an offering of lived conscious experience of time to the Other (for Augustine this is God). Not only this, time transformed for the Christian is no longer weighed down by the “burden of the past” nor the “anxiety about the fu-
ture” (Heidegger), but rather is invited to, like Augustine, experience a “light of relief from all anxiety” (MF 113).

How does this unique temporality of resurrection differ from that of a Being-towards-death? After all, experiencing time differently does not involve an “ek-stasy” such as an escape from time into the eternal as is sometimes thought (MF 116). It is rather in the backwards turn from Being-towards-death to a Being-towards-birth that Christians experience time differently. This is, from the perspective of my thesis, the crux of Falque’s argument (against Heidegger) for Dasein’s Being-towards-resurrection, or rather, as a Being-towards-death-and-resurrection. Dasein never abandons completely its anxiety towards death, but as a holistic Being-in-the-world, neither does she forget what Falque here calls the “joy of birth.”

Falque writes that “joy” constitutes the “affective modality of the moment of transition (resurrection)” and is thus the correlate to anxiety as the affective modality—or the mood/state-of-mind—of Being-towards-death (MF 116). Said differently, joy of birth excites Dasein’s temporality toward birth according to the same care structure that anxiety excites Dasein’s temporality toward death. Rather than “consecrating anxiety as his or her most particular feeling” about the prospect of the end, Dasein is now confronted with the birth of his world as a moment of joy that “lightens” the burden of existence (MF 116). Of course, Dasein is still a Being-towards-death and in this sense the joy of birth does not eliminate the load of finitude. Yet it does transform the “way of carrying these burdens” (MF 118). Quoting Kierkegaard, Falque asserts that “He who heavily loaded, carries a light burden: he is Christian” (MF 118). Joy is thus derived in the sharing of the burden of Being with Christ (and analogously, with Others). The birth of Dasein’s world is already-given over to Dasein as a passive act to which joy is aroused. Like Niet-
M.A. Thesis—Braden Siemens
McMaster—Religious Studies

zsche, metamorphosis is fully life-affirming and non-dualist, but unlike Nietzsche, Christian
metamorphosis does not find its power in the will of the self but rather in the joy given by the
Other.

How is joy defined phenomenologically? Falque answers this negatively, by ascertaining
first what joy is not. First, joy is not “ecstasy because it doesn’t make me ‘leave’
myself” (MF 119). Rather than exiting myself, joy is encompassed by Dasein’s modality of Be-
ing-\With, that is, in its turn to the Other that is already-present in Dasein’s facticity. Second, joy
is not “beatitude,” that is, it is beatitude simply understood as a future expectation or a utopia of
eternity. Rather it is something available “today” in Dasein’s Being-towards-birth (MF 120).
Third, joy is not “happiness.” Like Heidegger’s anxiety, joy refuses objectification in that it
holds within it no object of desire. Joy is not concerned with wealth, sex, or leisure. It does not
consist in the Greek eudaemonia of philosophy. Rather it comes “by another” (MF 121). Third,
joy is not “entertainment or diversion, since it doesn’t divert me” (MF 120). There is no distrac-
tion from authenticity in joy, for, as that which, like anxiety, leads to authenticity (thus evading
the temptation of the They), it leads Dasein back to itself, but only by way of an encounter with
an Other.

Thus joy as new life/birth, that is, as a new world that opens up to Dasein the “birth of
joy” (MF 121), analogously points to a new opening of Dasein’s world toward the Other in the
weakness of the flesh like the birth of an infant. Rebirth then takes on an element of childlikeness
in the modality of the Spirit. As Falque writes, “a phenomenology of childhood, as the most dis-

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100 In the first chapter, it was noted that in The Phenomenology of Religious Life Heidegger does not ignore joy
completely. Rather than joy signifying the mood of birth as will be seen below, Christian joy for Heidegger de-
scribes an acquiescence to the anguish of life motivated by the parousia and returning to the conversion of the be-
liever (PRL, 26:70).
Distinctive part of our existence, will perhaps one day give us the keys of the *kingdom*” (MF 152).

What does not occur in birth is a replacement or substitution of anxiety for joy, but rather a transformation of it. Falque writes that “in being born, and as a philosopher, I am first of all overwhelmed by care and anxiety that floods into me…Ecclesiasticus teaches us nothing by the most crude existentialism: ‘and wish that thou hadst not been born and *curse* the day of thy nativity’ (Ecclesiasticus 23:14)” (MF 122). Rather than providing an antidote to the anxiety the philosophers put forth (including Heidegger in the “nullity” of thrownness) a phenomenology of birth is able to “take on board” anxiety in order to transform it into joy (MF 122).\(^\text{101}\)

Falque continues that “in contradiction to Martin Heidegger and the insupportable burden of time, we learn, according to the parable: ‘Do not worry about your life’” (MF 123). Falque is adamant that this does not indicate an “abdication of responsibility for one’s life” (MF 123). Rather, the how of resurrection, that is, the enactment of its accessibility to Dasein phenomenologically, is found in the “manner in which I receive it: that is to say, in the force of the Holy Spirit which allows me to live, *as joy*” (MF 124). Whereas Heidegger’s how of Christian eschatology leaves Dasein in a constant state of anxiety concerning the *parousia*, Falque offers an amendment to Heidegger wherein resurrection provides a metamorphosis of finitude wherein the mood of anxiety is balanced by the disburdening movement of joy—a joy founded upon an openness (horizontal transcendence) toward an Other characteristic of the vulnerability of the flesh in birth. Said differently, possibility in Dasein’s Being-towards-death opens itself up

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\(^\text{101}\) It is difficult at first to see how this theological language of rebirth differs pragmatically from the philosophical doctrine of “repetition” in Heidegger. Both involve a “taking on board” and a retrieval of possibilities from Dasein’s already-being-there. The difference can be found in the alterity of the source, the one arising from the self and the other from the Other.
through its metamorphosis of finitude to “passibility” as a “capacity for feeling and suffering” (MF 125).

Like birth, re(birth) can only be known in retrospect, as something already-there. Like birth, it is “something for which I cannot take responsibility” arriving as it does from something or someone Other than me (MF 130). It is something already given, in birth is revealed what Levinas calls a “primordial dispossesssion, a first donation.” Falque continues that “what is true of the mystery of rebirth from on high (resurrection) is also true for the obscurity of my birth below” (MF 130). It is difficult to explain the happening of birth from the perspective of consciousness in that it is something already inherited phenomenologically, something one “feels” rather than “knows.” In the same way, the metamorphosis of finitude is also something ontologically already given in Dasein’s finitude in the analogy of birth. What is important is the “relation to my origin” over “my origin itself” (MF 131). Like the relationship of a child to a mother, so too Dasein’s experience of re(birth) relates to the community of the church to whom it depends upon in its childlike vulnerability (MF 132). There is no “beyond” Dasein’s Being-in-the-world, but there is a “beyond” Dasein’s limitations as dictated by an “atheist humanism.” Da-sein is not closed in on itself, but rather learns to live in weakness through the model the resurrected Christ sets up.

Where do we see this existential mode of resurrection in the Gospels? We have seen so far that the metamorphosis of finitude involves joy, otherness, and weakness. Yet the disciples

102 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 173.

103 This notion is suspect in that it risks confusing Dasein’s constitution with subsequent institutions. Falque seems to imply more than an institution though, as it is Dasein’s Being-With-Others that makes up the referential context of the church.

104 This language of “atheist humanism” is borrowed by Falque from the theologian Henri De Lubac.
experienced the resurrected Christ as terrifying and were startled in thinking that he was a ghost (pneuma) (cf. Luke 24:36-37; Mark 6:49). Taken biologically or in Husserl’s ‘natural attitude,’ the resurrection accounts are nothing more than fantastic, superstitious, and magical. Taken phenomenologically though, the accounts open up new ways of Being that actualize the above qualities (i.e. joy, otherness, and weakness) of Being-towards-resurrection. In the account of the road to Emmaus (Luke 24), Jesus is encountered as the stranger on the road, “not recognized when he ought to have been recognized.” Inviting the stranger into their home to eat with them, the disciples at the breaking of bread recognize the Stranger as the metamorphosed Christ after which Christ disappears suddenly. According to Falque, in the narrative Christ is the Other that refuses to be objectivized in his “non-localization” of the body (MF 139). In such an account one finds that the “lived experience of his [Christ’s] body can help us to see, understand, taste, feel, and touch in the flesh (or lived body) of others and through the (lived) bodies of others” (MF 150).

Thus, Emmaus points to a mode of openness toward the Other that is signified in the resurrected Christ: “I see the beauty of God in my ‘brother’ (MF 150)." Phenomenologically, the disappearance of Christ before the disciples in the breaking of bread signifies the “the objectivity of the disappearance (of the body)” as the “disappearance of objectivity (of all reified bodies in the resurrection)” (MF 144). What matters is not the graspability of Christ as reduced to a material substance (e.g. ontic resurrection as event) but rather the “way or the act by which the Resurrected One offers himself to me” (MF 146).

105 Much of Falque’s discussion regarding the phenomenology of birth and resurrection takes its cue from the work of Jean-Luc Marion, Claude Romano, and Natalie Depraz. Falque writes in a footnote that the “renewing of the theological perspective of the resurrection considered through the existential of birth…would have been impossible without this new phenomenology of birth derived from Husserl’s treatment of the topic and responding to Heideggerian neglect” (MF 186, Fn. 3).
Robert Pogue Harrison comments in *The Dominion of the Dead* on the words spoken to Mary, Salome, and Mary Magdalene from the grave of Christ: “he is not here [*hic non est*]. Look, there is the place they laid him” (Mark 16:5-6). Like Falque, Harrison sees in this narrative a non-localization of the body, but more importantly of the *dead* body. Death is not the ultimate Other as in Heidegger; the *hic jacet* (“here lies”) of Christ in the tomb is not the end that creates ultimate meaning for believers. Death is rather the penultimate meaning. It is in the irreducibility of meaning to death alone, in the theological “transitivity of the *hic non est,*” where-in a heroic death or the “here” or “mineness” of the grave itself does not constitute the meaning of life but rather transcends (horizontally) in the emptiness that is full of *meaning/Being,* outwardly toward the whole world. The disappearance from the empty tomb is the “void” that “en-genders” the kerygmatic accounts of the new body that now is universal in *mode* of *Being*—that is, the metamorphosis of Christ’s community. As Harrison writes, “Wherever Christ *is,* and in whatever *mode* he exists after the Crucifixion, there is nothing left of him *here* except the sign of his elsewhereness.”

Falque continues that the phenomenon of the resurrected Christ “announces” itself just as phenomena is described in Heidegger’s *Being and Time;* Christ “showed himself” and “appears” before his disciples, but in such a way as to be considered “faceless,” that is, to be recognized in “the image of our neighbour” (MF 147). Far from some abstruse theosophy consisting in the de-

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106 Harrison, *The Dominion of the Dead,* 111.

107 Ibid., 109.
fying of the physical and fleshly limitations of the body (i.e. in the disappearance of the body, the walking through walls, the simultaneous appearances of the apparitional figure, and the ascension), the resurrection accounts point away from a “simple substantiality” of the body (MF 142). Rather, the resurrection points to a commonality over bread and wine offered by a non-recognizable Other (John 21), to a recognition of God in the wounds and weakness of the flesh (John 20:25-28). The “epiphany” and joy of the resurrection is the sacredness of “lived bodiliness” (MF 148).

3.7. The Stranger and the Same: A Levinasian Excursion

To turn to Levinas in order to expand Falque’s phenomenology may at first appear paradoxical in that whereas Falque is concerned with an ontological project, Levinas’ work seeks to critique ontology in favour of an ethical that presides it “beyond being.” Levinas of course was not a Christian but a Jew, whose phenomenological work in the 1961 *Totality and Infinity* asserted that any and all “theological concepts remain empty” outside of “ethics” and that “everything that cannot be reduced to an inter human relation represents not the superior form but the forever primitive form of religion.”108 What is found in Falque is a phenomenology that, although beginning from a plane of immanence, begins to exceed its immanence by a springboard of theology that introduces a phenomenology of trinitarian relations and a phenomenology of resurrection. While functioning analogously to a possible mode of Being in Dasein that can emerge from out of itself (in Dasein’s experience with the Other and in the already-there of its birth), Falque’s theology nevertheless does not find itself as emerging out of the phenomena encountered in Da-

sein’s everyday experience. In this way, perhaps Falque allows theology to raise up phenomenology into the service of itself. No doubt Falque carries out his axiom that “the incarnation always reveals itself from “below” in the sense that it begins with the assumption of the experience of the divine in Jesus” (MF 37). Nevertheless, within the axiom itself is the subtle prerogative for theology to allow itself the admission of onto-theology, that is, the existence of God as a being—explicitly manifest in his phenomenological analysis of Jesus’ metaphysical dialogue with the Father and the apperceptive transposition of the Other on the cross (see section 3.4 above). While many phenomenologists have found onto-theology irreconcilable with the Husserlian bracketing of the natural attitude (or epochē), Steven Delay argues that “Falque himself, no longer sees opposition to onto-theology as essential.”

This subordination of the phenomenological reduction to metaphysics and onto-theology risks compromising the ability to do phenomenology at all. Though Falque’s work succeeds in retrieving an ontological metamorphosis of finitude present in the Christian texts, Levinas’ work may be useful in preventing Falque’s work from being read onto-theologically by contributing an alternative (to Heidegger’s) analysis of Dasein’s phenomenological experience of the infinite in the Other—especially, I shall argue, insofar as it may speak dialectically to Falque’s own analysis of resurrection.

Levinas’ work *Totality and Infinity*, maintains that everyday Dasein does not need theology in order to experience the infinite. Rather, the infinite comes to Dasein in the encounter with what Levinas calls the “Face of the Other.” Unlike Heidegger’s call in *Being and Time* that


110 While Levinas himself is guilty of what is earlier described by Falque as the “preemptive right of the infinite over the finite” (MF 16), Levinas remains thoroughly a phenomenologist, seeking not to begin with theological revelation but to describe Dasein’s experience as that which experiences the Other as something beyond its own finite capacities (but from the vantage point of finitude). Though Levinas is cited sporadically in *The Guide to Gethsemane*, he is curiously absent in *The Metamorphosis of Finitude*. 
summons Dasein to itself and from itself (BT 57:320), issuing forth out of Being, the *call* for Levinas is that which issues out to Dasein from outside of herself, and “calls into question oneself” being “produced in the face of the other and under his authority.” As Delay notes, “the Heideggerian call of conscience that is said to summon us to authentic understanding originates from and within oneself. *Dasein* enters into a silent discourse with itself […] *Dasein* never answers the Levinasian call of responsibility. Always thrust back on itself, it cannot even hear the call. Absorbed in its own concern, the claim of others remains silenced.”

Contra Heidegger, Levinas purports that there is an obligation that exists outside of *my* world—one that disturbs the worldliness of Dasein and provokes a responsibility to the Other that calls past the familiarity and complacency of Dasein’s ownmost Being. The ontological is thus transcended, not by the ontical or the metaphysical, but by the embodied relations of the ethical.

Moreover, like Falque, Levinas insists that it is in the encounter with the Other that one experiences the *call*. Contra Heidegger, Levinas claims that the primary relationship to the other is not grounded on “the relationship with *being in general*, on comprehension, on ontology,” but rather that it resounds from an Other(wise than Being) that calls into question the primacy of *my* Being.

On an everyday level, Dasein dwells (“maintains itself”) in the world as “a home,” in which “everything is at my disposal, even the stars, if I but reckon them, calculate the intermediaries or the means.”

As in Falque’s Pauline manner of Being in the flesh (*sarx*), Levinas’ Da-

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111 Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 81.

112 Delay, *Phenomenology in France*, 37.


114 Ibid., 37.
sein begins in an egoistic “identification of the same in the I,” sojourning through the world while treating the Other as a mere conceptual relation that refers back ultimately to the self.\textsuperscript{115} By contrast to the “Same,” as Levinas call this egoistic Dasein, the call of ethics and responsibility—that is, the breaching of the totalization of the Other that the I always systematizes—issues forth from the Stranger and reveals an \textit{infinity} as a “way of existing of the exterior being.”\textsuperscript{116} Said differently, there is something exterior to Dasein, namely, the Other, that reveals to Dasein that which cannot be grasped, possessed, totalized, or historicized: the infinite. The infinite is the “interiority” and “secrecy” that “does not proceed from the I” and is not “an object of cognition.”\textsuperscript{117}

Yet what is infinite in the Other is primordially desirable according to Levinas. Like Falque’s phenomenology of joy that refuses an objectification, so too does Levinas’ understanding of “Desire” refuse to do so. Levinas writes that the desire of the “Infinite…arouses rather than satisfies.”\textsuperscript{118} While the Infinite arouses Desire in Dasein, it also causes a “\textit{traumatism of astonishment}.”\textsuperscript{119} Dasein’s Being is interrupted by the Face of the Other that transcends Being by the ethical, thus “uprooting” Dasein into an experience of exile from the egoistic dwelling of its world.\textsuperscript{120} This is the phenomenological encounter Levinas argues is bound up with the figure of the Other wherein one finds that “to reach the Other through the social is to reach him through

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{115} Ibid.}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., 35.}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., 58 and 62.}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{118} Ibid., 50.}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., 73. Levinas continues that “to recognize the Other is to recognize a hunger.” Ibid., 75.}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., 61.}

98
the religious.”121 Thus, like the disciples who do not recognize the divine Other in their midst, the “dimension of the divine opens forth from the human face,” and most importantly, in the face of the “Stranger,” communicated in Judaism and Christianity through the figures of the “widow” and the “orphan.”122

If one were to analyze the appearance of the resurrected Christ to his disciples with reference to Levinasian phenomenology, it becomes apparent that similar phenomena can be found in the Gospels. While initially the strange appearance of Christ astonishes the disciples and leaves them traumatized, there follows also a similar arousal of Desire in his followers (Luke 24:32), while his disappearance at once, like the Infinite in Levinas, discloses in the empty tomb the non-neutralizable, non-objectivizable, and non-thematizable. As Falque noted, “‘the objectivity of the disappearance (of the body)” reveals the “disappearance of objectivity” (MF 144).

This notion of trauma and strangeness is not absent in Heidegger. In fact, one could also speak of trauma as being similar to anxiety. Joseph P. Fell in his essay “The Familiar and the Strange” writes of anxiety in Heidegger that “anxiety is simply an experience of the failure of disclosure of beings. But just because of the lapse of projective understanding in anxiety, anxiety is able to disclose something else: ‘Nihilation…discloses these beings in their full but heretofore concealed strangeness as pure other—as opposed to nothing.’ The blanking out of everyday significance does not leave us with nothing at all; beings remain, but now as strange, stripped of their ordinary familiarity.”123 One can see such an interruption of the familiar with the strange

121 Ibid., 68.
122 Ibid., 78, 39, 77.
not only in Heidegger’s notion of death, but also in the resurrection accounts. At the end of Mark’s gospel, Mary Magdalene, Mary mother of James, and Salome encounter the empty tomb, hearing from an angel about the resurrected Jesus. The author continues, explaining that “they went out and fled from the tomb, for terror and amazement had seized them; and they said nothing to anyone, for they were afraid” (Mark 16:8). Fell notes in his essay how Heidegger describes anxiety as the “sheer that…,” and as “inherently devoid of meaning.” One cannot help but think that the initial encounter with resurrection could not mean anything less for those silently anxious disciples standing before the emptiness of their world, the empty tomb, than a “sheer that…” Fell continues to describe anxiety: “the expanse of nothingness one experiences around beings is at once the absence of given meaning and the disclosure of an opening for meaning, the place in which meaning can be projected.” Likewise, in the resurrection accounts, while the disciples experience a wordless vertigo of meaning—encountering a stranger in the place of what had previously been familiar—it is within this nothingness that a space opens for what Heidegger calls the possibility of a disclosure and an unconcealment of Being. Resurrection as phenomenal thus begins as a tearing open of everyday phenomena in which anxiety (perhaps even anxiety about death itself, but here as the encounter with the Otherness of the angels) makes room for new modes of meaning.

Perhaps the resurrection can symbolize both a Heideggerian anxiety that discloses meaning as it calls to Dasein’s conscience out of the worldless vacuity of death, and Levinasian phenomenology, wherein anxiety and trauma are produced out of the ethical call from the unfamiliar

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124 Ibid., 70. Levinas has a similar concept to the “sheer that…” in his notion of the “there is…” wherein Dasein experiences the elemental void that undergirds and haunts all labor and dwelling.

125 Ibid., 69.
and strange voice of the Other. For Levinas it is not Being that is opened up in the traumatic encounter with the Other, but rather it is the call of responsibility wherein “the face speaks.”\footnote{Ibid., 66.} It is in the encounter with the face that—like the elusive intangibility of the resurrected Christ (John 20:19, 20:26)—undoes the “form adequate to the Same,” a form whose gaze marks the contours of the Other in order to circumscribe them (cf. Falque’s “faceless Christ” MF 147).\footnote{Ibid.} Connected to this formlessness of the Face is the “nudity” of the Face. Unlike the objects of perception that Dasein sees and interprets with the light of its own intelligibility, imbuing Things with beauty or usefulness, the Face resists this reduction to cognizance by its bareness and exposure. Levinas writes that “the nakedness of the face is not what is presented to me because I disclose it, what would therefore be presented to me, to my powers, to my eyes, to my perceptions, in a light exterior to it.”\footnote{Ibid.} Thus, to use an extreme example, the face enacts a moment of hesitation on the battlefield of the egoistic I, traumatizing it by a light of its own, demanding justice rather than the violent act of pulling the trigger. Ultimately, writes Levinas, “the transcendence of the face [cf. horizontal transcendence in Falque MF 18] is at the same time its absence from this world into which it enters, the exiling of a being, his condition of being stranger, destitute, or proletarian […] is also strangeness-destitution.”\footnote{Ibid.} The destitution of the Stranger is one that demands “generosity” that counters the “enjoyment” of the ego.\footnote{Ibid.} Similar to Falque, Levinas describes a phenomenology of the face wherein weakness (here called destitution) and otherness are expressions
of the infinite.\textsuperscript{131} The destitution/weakness of Christ appears in metamorphosed form to Thomas in the stigmata of Christ’s hands (John 20:24-29), the strangeness and otherness of Christ provoke generosity and hospitality in the disciples on the road to Emmaus (Luke 24:13-33), and the experience of the infinite speaks through the Face, but now in the words of Jesus speaking “peace be with you” accompanied by the wounds of his “hands and side” (John 20:19-20). As Levinas notes regarding the Face, “the welcoming of the face is peaceable from the first, for it answers to the unquenchable Desire for Infinity.”\textsuperscript{132} The resurrected Christ traumatizes the disciples through his otherness, proclaims peace through his weakness, and instills joy through his (moving beyond Levinas) metamorphosis.

Levinas thus can be read to aid Falque in describing the phenomenological encounter with the Other that Falque recognizes in the Christian metamorphosis—an encounter with the Other that returns the Christian to an epiphany of “lived bodiliness” (MF 148). Or as Levinas puts it, “the epiphany of the face qua face opens humanity.”\textsuperscript{133} Levinas continues that “the relationship with the Other is not produced outside of the world, but puts in question the world possessed.”\textsuperscript{134} What Christian metamorphosis reveals is thus that which was already-there in birth, that which is closest to ourselves that we have forgotten by trying again and again to escape it; an escape revealed and called into question by the weakness of the Other. This already-there in birth is the fundamental experience that Dasein, though an anxiety-ridden Being-towards-death, is

\textsuperscript{131} For Levinas, joy as “love of life” and “enjoyment” is found in the I of the ego. It makes up Dasein’s primary constitution which the Other interrupts. Joy is thus not expressive of the infinite, unlike what we see in Falque. cf. Ibid., 145.

\textsuperscript{132} Ibid., 150.

\textsuperscript{133} Ibid., 213.

\textsuperscript{134} Ibid., 173.
fundamentally constituted by Others and thus is by nature ethical, an ethic unveiled in the weakness and joy of our lived experience in the world. What takes place is a real metamorphosis of Being, but one wherein Dasein goes out to the Other (loses itself) in order to find itself. In this way, the Christian metamorphosis, Jewishly understood via Levinas, might help retrieve the Heideggerian (and also Christian) saying “Become what you are” (BT 31:145).

3.8. Conclusion: An Ontological Interpretation of Resurrection

Heidegger’s accusation against theology, that it temporalizes the infinite out of time, thus becomes something Christianity has been tempted by as its strength from the beginning of its incarnational experience. The infinite is not a departure into a world beyond, but a metamorphosis of the world become Other. As Dasein, two ontological modalities appear in the encounter with the Other (as resurrected Christ): the flesh (sарx) or the Spirit (pneuma). The Other confronts us as relational Being-in-the-world, rolling away the stone that blocks Dasein’s anxious orientation toward the grave as a Being-towards-death and, in doing so, reveals the emptiness of the tomb all along, making space in the opening for another type of visibility as encountered in the Other.\textsuperscript{135} This of course does not discount the grave at all, it is still from the grave that Being (meaning) takes place into the world, but it is in the opening up the lived experience of the more in the encounter with the Resurrected One (i.e. the Other) that life takes on a new meaning. Resurrection drives Dasein ahead-of-itself ecstatically toward an unknown possibility of meaning that does not originate in the self.

\textsuperscript{135} The encounter between Mary Magdalene and the Gardener outside the open tomb, whose relationship to the earth is one of creating new possibilities of life, may be significant in this regard (cf. John 20:11-18).
Unlike Nietzsche’s Overhuman, the Christian metamorphosis not only confronts its corruptibility, but also comes face to face with its weakness and the need for Others. This is done in the backwards turn of Dasein as a Being-towards-birth. No one chooses to be born, one’s life has been handed over to it by Others. It is given. In this givenness is a joy that lightens the load of finitude, to which anxious Dasein as Being-towards-death feels weighed down. Like in birth, Dasein must realize itself once more as childlike, in all of its weakness, nudity, and vulnerability. Dasein still finds its Being in the meaning of its temporality, as Heidegger insists, but Christian metamorphosis redirects Dasein to a more holistic mode of not only Being-towards-death, but also introduces the mode of the Spirit wherein the mood of joy arises from the givenness of life.

Unlike Heidegger’s retrieval of possibilities in thrownness, the Christian metamorphosis initiated by birth discovers not only new possibilities, but also passionability, that is, in a phenomenology of birth one learns to feel deeply what is given by the Other. As we learned from Levinas, this passionability is something phenomenologically desired in Dasein’s encounter with the Face of the Other, which refuses to be conceptualized and in doing so reveals an exteriority that hides itself from the gaze of Dasein’s Sameness. This exteriority is society, and it is, contra Heidegger, in society that one experiences otherness, weakness, and joy. The Other of Christ exiles Dasein from its comfortable dwelling in the world of its Being, confronting it with an absence (the empty tomb) in order to reveal a new presence (the Resurrected One) through the world given by the Other. It is in this transforming of the limits of finitude that Dasein is able to transform from an egoistic I into the generosity held out to the Other. To repeat what is already

136 An ontological metamorphosis predicated upon this breaching of the Same can leave no room for Nietzsche’s metamorphosis wherein the self “shall return eternally to this identical and self-same life.” Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 237.
stated above: the resurrected Christ *traumatizes* the disciples through his *otherness*, proclaims *peace* through his *weakness*, and instills *joy* through his *metamorphosis*. 
Conclusion

In this conclusion I will summarize some of the dialectics explored in this thesis, beginning with the ‘how’ of the hermeneutical lens chosen by Heidegger and Falque and the way in which these lenses alter the course of their philosophical argument. Heidegger and Falque not only both begin with different starting points, but interpret their textual sources differently. How does this effect their final assertions about Dasein’s Being-in-the-world? How do the texts they utilize motivate their response to Christianity’s dealings with anxiety and death? This conclusion will pose this question while offering a rehearsal of some of the observations made throughout this thesis.

What can be gained by merely changing the textual starting point of our hermeneutics? As this thesis has attempted demonstrate, Heidegger’s interpretation of Christian anxiety (concerning parousia) in the Epistle to the Thessalonians differs maximally from Falque’s readings of the resurrection as taken from a wide variety of texts spanning from the four Gospels to the Epistle to the Corinthians. Falque effectively achieves in his work an evaluation of Heidegger’s accusations against Christianity that judges them to be uncritically reductive. The “how” of enactment in Heidegger’s view of Pauline eschatology represents an anxiety that is heightened by an on-coming parousia, yet an anxiety that never acknowledges death. On the contrary, the “how” of enactment in Falque is encapsulated in “God’s Vigil” in Gethsemane, where Jesus’ future death is “in reality always already something that can at any moment orient one’s present” (GTG 42). Contra Heidegger, Falque posits that diverging ontological and existentialist modes of Being, both as Dasein’s Being-towards-death and as the metamorphosed mode of (re)birth in the...
Spirit, can be unearthed from within the textual narratives of Christianity. Finitude is retrieved no longer as a product of sin or fallenness, but rather as a part of Dasein’s lived experience as Being-in-the-world, which is inherently meaningful.

In what way is Dasein’s lived experience of finitude meaningful from the perspective of Christianity? According to Falque, and in opposition to Heidegger’s critique of the Christian, rather than fleeing from the reality of death, Christ publicizes it, exposing it to inauthentic Dasein—not only disclosing anxiety about death, but also disclosing in resurrection the ethical call of suffering from the face of the Other. Far from withdrawing from death either in resignation, heroism, or certitude about the afterlife (the three inauthentic modes of Being-towards-the-end according to Heidegger), Jesus faces the indeterminacy, solitude, and anxiety of the not-yet of death which never finds its full ripening and resolve. In Gethsemane, Jesus is met with the silence where meaning is suspending in anxiety before death. As Heidegger insists, death is certain and not to be outstripped.

What we discover is that one is left with different ways in which death can become a phenomenon of life, depending on how one interprets (or perhaps, ignores) textual narratives. Unlike Heidegger’s understanding of “death as a phenomenon of life” which requires an appropriation of Being that accentuates its “mineness,” for Falque in the death of Christ there is revealed a view of death “as a phenomenon of life” wherein life (and death) become a gift that is given to Others and in solidarity with Others. For Heidegger death is my own and no one can take the burden from me, but for Falque death is something freely given to every Other and also revealed by every Other. This “kenotic giving” of death for Falque becomes a “disappropriation of Being” where Christ dies for his friends (cf. John 15:13) and in the midst of other victims of
Roman oppression. Like Heidegger, Christ hears the call of anxiety out of the They and into solitude, thus modifying Dasein’s Being-with-Others in a more authentic mode of Being. Whereas for Falque death is no longer the ultimate Other, but rather the trinitarian relations of Otherness and alterity, this thesis has tried to underline the ways in which the theological phenomenology promulgated by Falque can be extrapolated analogously to Dasein’s concrete worldly relations with Others. This is all the more solidified in Falque’s move beyond the mood of anxiety concerning death to an understanding of death where the body itself communicates the silent presence of anxiety—what Falque calls the “in-fans” (without speech) that primordially sobs before it speaks. In response to Falque, I have engaged his criticism of Heidegger’s “angelism” by defending the Heideggerian view that Dasein cannot experience anxiety without consciousness and without body: both are required in order to experience worldlessness and the anticipation of a Being-towards-death. Of course, embodiment is absolutely necessary for Dasein, and moreover it is necessary for any consciousness at all to be a consciousness of something, or to be intentional in the phenomenological sense of the word. Thus, both body and consciousness are required for giving meaning and mood to enfleshed lived experiences. An animal cannot meditate on the meaning of its death. This is what makes Dasein unique. Falque critiques Heidegger for falling into the trap of Cartesianism that Heidegger is trying to counter, but I argue that Falque falls short in this critique, not allowing for the nuances in Heidegger’s fundamental ontology that envision Dasein as an embodied consciousness, or rather, to put it in Heideggerian language, a Being-towards-death-in-the-world—the “in the world” suggesting embodiment and the “towards-death” suggesting Dasein’s capacity to anticipate and feel anxiety through thoughts and moods and not just through sensory pain.
Though modified, Falque explicitly identifies with Heidegger’s methodology and project. Even Heidegger’s criticism that Christianity deduces an “infinite time out of the finite” is regarded as a correct and positive, rather than negative, assessment of Christianity according to Falque. Because resurrection, understood as an existential metamorphosis of finitude rather than a biological transfiguration of species, must be interpreted as an ontological rather than ontic event, so too must it commit itself to corporality and materiality. Birth is then that life which is most originary in its givenness, that happens to Dasein as something exterior to itself, but in which Dasein can interact and create meaning for itself. Metamorphosis causes Dasein to project itself first back to its birth, as that which is given, and secondarily to that which Dasein can give itself in a (re)birth, in a new creative mode of Being-for-Others. In this way birth is, like death is for Heidegger, a phenomenon of life, that is, a way of interacting with our throwness that leads us to authenticity.

Again, Falque does not begin with anxiety about parousia in Thessalonians but rather focuses on the existential modes of being interpreted in Corinthians. Whereas for Heidegger, any phenomenology of religious life must end with anxiety about the parousia, and therefore end with an existence that never comes to term with the finality of death, Falque proposes a Christianity that not only comes to terms with death, but sees metamorphosis (resurrection) as a mode of being that motivates authenticity in the face of the Other. According to his reading of Paul’s Epistle to the Corinthians, Falque gleans two modalities of a Christian care-structure similar to Heidegger’s authentic/inauthentic distinction. Like inauthentic Dasein in Being and Time, the modality of the flesh (σάρξ) is caught up in the They, but here depicted in an inauthenticity constitutive of an egoism that is closed off to the Other, whereas the Spirit (πνεῦμα) unfastens a new
modality of openness to the Other. Contrary to this Christian metamorphosis of finitude is the 
Zarathustrian metamorphosis of Nietzsche. For Nietzsche, the metamorphosis from the slave-
morality and self-pity of the herd-like camel to the Overhuman that self-resurrects in an over-
coming of the self by the self (in the doctrine of eternal recurrence) distinguishes between an ac-
tive metamorphosis whose transformation occurs from an in-curving of the self onto itself, and a 
passive metamorphosis that is affected and transformed by Others.

What does this dialectic of birth and death enact in Dasein? How is Dasein transformed 
by Others? As my Levinasian analysis on the resurrection accounts in chapter three has attempt-
ed to show, the self is transformed through a traumatization of Otherness, a weakness and vul-
nerability of the flesh, and a metamorphosis of birth, all of which activate the mood/attunement 
of joy and peace. Contra Heidegger, Levinas purports an obligation that exists outside of my 
world—one that disturbs the worldliness of Dasein and provokes a responsibility to the Other 
that calls past the familiarity and complacency of Dasein’s ownmost Being. This, I argue, is ex-
actly what is witnessed to in the resurrection accounts of the Gospels. The nudity and indigence, 
wounds and stigmata, strangeness and unfamiliarity, peace and joy, all characterize the new 
mode of Being that resurrection signifies; a new mode of Being-in-the-world, a metamorphosis 
of Dasein’s finitude.

Yet none of this denounces Being and Time as a whole. Far from it. Heidegger’s funda-
mental ontology speaks to Christian theology, reminding it to be earth-bound, life affirming, to 
confront and not flee from its death, and that it is in itself temporally conditioned. These are 
characteristics of Falque’s phenomenology directly inherited from Heidegger. On the other hand, 
Falque balances Heidegger’s ontology of death with an ontological interpretation of birth that
reminds Dasein of the joy of life that lightens the anxious-driven load of finitude. Dasein is not just a Being-towards-death, but also a Being-towards-death-and-resurrection with multiple possibilities of existence. This is what a possible Christian existentialism may contribute to an ontology of death: a more holistic and abundant view of phenomena and attunement to Being.

Whether one needs theological language to communicate a phenomenology of birth is unlikely, yet this thesis has attempted to demonstrate how the resurrection narratives remain existentially relevant to Dasein, not only ontologically, but ethically. While Heidegger draws near to a phenomenology of birth when he communicates the freedom experienced by coming to terms with Dasein’sthrownness and the delimitation of possibilities due to the indeterminacy of death, he remains pragmatically solipsistic and atomized with regards to the “how” of enacting this metamorphosis of finitude. Like Nietzsche, Heidegger’s Dasein is what modifies the They after moving into its own individual authenticity—something Christ also experiences in Gethsemane—but the They, that is, society and Others, never modify the self, a fundamental imperative for Jewish and Christian belief, as Falque and Levinas insist. To be vulnerable and weak in the face of the Other, to allow their death (and not just mine) to call responsibility out of Dasein, and to experience joy and peace through communion with difference, this is to become fully human, to live as authentic Dasein, and to, in the words of Heidegger and ancient Christianity, “become what you are” (BT 31:145).
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