GHANA, WORLD, AND FUTURE: TRANSLOCALITY AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FOR PAN-AFRICANISM, 1957-1968
GHANA, WORLD, AND FUTURE: TRANSLOCALITY AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FOR PAN-AFRICANISM, 1957-1968

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A Thesis Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy

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LAY ABSTRACT

I argue that Ghana’s national development from 1957 to 1968 was conceived of, practiced, and situated within, transnational and international connections that can be best understood through the concept of translocality. Translocality refers to the entanglement of different localities and communities, and in this context, how the idea and practice of development cannot be separated from these relational connections. The research supporting this concept contributes to understanding African postcolonial national development in tension and co-constituted with non-national dynamics. As an idea and policy mandate dictated by Kwame Nkrumah, national development was defined as a resource in the struggle for Pan-Africanism but also entangled with the politics of Pan-Africanism, the Cold War and international creditors. These translocal connections are explored through the activisms and commentaries of women Pan-Africanists, activists, and political moderates travelling to Ghana as well as the formal Pan-African diplomacies in pursuit of the economic unification of Africa. Ghana’s development future was also subject to the interdepartmental politics of international creditors and an emerging liberal economic consensus. This study is necessary because it changes our understanding of how the politics of postcolonial development is understood, as co-constituted with non-national political, economic and social dynamics.
ABSTRACT

As former colonies and newly independent states of the ‘Third World’ organized internationally around anticolonialism in the 1950s and 1960s, Ghana became a key site in debates over development at the height of the Cold War. Contributing to the new economic and political history of postcolonial Ghana, this study examines the national development visions and international political-economic connections of the Nkrumaist state 1957-66 and the first year under the post-coup National Liberation Council through the lens of translocality. Translocality refers to the entanglement of different localities and communities, and in this context, how the idea and practice of national development is co-constituted with these connections. Kwame Nkrumah situated national development as a resource in uniting the African continent against foreign political and economic influence. The Nkrumaist state played a leading role in the formation of the Organization of African Unity, non-alignment, nuclear non-proliferation, and attempts at harmonizing national development continentally. The movements of individuals to Ghana seeking participation within the Nkrumaist project were also racialized and gendered. Women Pan-Africanist activists organized conferences and made internationalist commentaries, making claims for inclusive economic development and participation. Furthermore, Ghanaian national development, dependent on mixed-planning foreign capital, markets, and technologies to finance projects, became increasingly subject to non-national departmental debates and an emerging liberal disciplinary politics through 1962-1966. The International Monetary Fund, Britain and the United States came to a consensus regarding a balance of payments and foreign reserve crisis in Ghana. After a military coup d'état in 1966, the NLC introduced an
IMF reform package and embarked on a program of unmaking Nkrumaism. This study contributes to understanding the translocal dynamics of postcolonial development and development discourses.
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CONTENTS

LAY ABSTRACT..............................................................................................................III

ABSTRACT......................................................................................................................IV

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...............................................................................................VI

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS..............................................................................................X

LIST OF TABLES...........................................................................................................XI

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.............................................................................................XII

INTRODUCTION:
Translocality and the Politics of Writing 1960s Ghana......................................................1

CHAPTER ONE:
Making Nkrumaism: From Theory to Practice and Nation to World, 1957-1968..............43

CHAPTER TWO:
Gender and Translocality: Pan-Africanist Women and Nkrumah’s Expats, 1957-1965....106

CHAPTER THREE:

CHAPTER FOUR:
The Translocality of Development Finance: Britain, the International Monetary Fund and an Emergent Consensus, 1962-1968.................................................................222

CONCLUSION:

BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................................................302
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Illustration 1: Seven Year Development Plan 1963/64-1969/70..........................103

Illustration 1: Felix Severin Kangni, CPP feature Poster 1963 Accra Ghana.............104

Illustration 2: United States of Africa, Concept Poster by Felix Severin Kangni........105
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: International Monetary Fund Report 1969………………………………………………..278
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADB       African Development Bank
AU        African Union
CPP       Convention Peoples Party
CRO       Commonwealth Relations Office
CWAAD     Conference of Women of Africa and of African Descent
EEC       European Economic Community
ECGD      Export Credit Guarantee Department
FYP       Five Year Development Plan
FO        Foreign Office
IBRD      International Bank of Reconstruction and Development
IAEA      International Atomic Energy Agency
IMF       International Monetary Fund
NLC       National Liberation Council
OAU       Organization of African Unity
ODD       Overseas Development Department
PP        Progress Party
PRAAD     Public Records and Archives Administration Department
SYDP      Seven Year Development Plan
UK        United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
US        United States of America
USSR      Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VRA       Volta River Authority
WB        World Bank
STATEMENT OF ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT

Paul Emiljanowicz is the sole author of this dissertation.
Introduction – Translocality and the Politics of Writing 1960s Ghana

There should be dreams before returns, as before goings, before everything. That is only just. But these have been woven of such heavy earth that they will load his spirit down and after they touched him it will never fly again.¹

At midnight on March 6, 1957, standing shoulder to shoulder, people gathered the grounds of the Accra Polo House to hear their new leader Kwame Nkrumah and the Convention Peoples Party (CPP) announce the birth of an independent nation state separate from Britain – Ghana. This landmark moment was the result of years of anticolonial organizing, protests and bureaucratic legal maneuvering by nationalist Gold Coast lawyers, students and youth, community groups, unemployed school leavers, women and labour. It was a realization of the appropriately titled “Motion of Destiny” which passed before the House of Commons on July 10, 1953, granting the right of transition toward self-rule for the Gold Coast. There was little opposition among the political parties for independence – the Northern Peoples Party, Muslim Association Party, or the Asante National Liberation Movement. Only a year earlier these parties were involved in contentious party politics causing the colonial administration to fear the outbreak of civil war in what had once been described as the Empires model colony. Nkrumah and the CPP promised transformative diversified industrial development and an expansive socialist welfare state with public services and industries, all intended to usher Ghana into the modern world and achieve a degree of fairness. Ghana was also set to serve as the vanguard of Pan-Africanism, nuclear non-proliferation, non-alignment and economic diplomacy to free and unite the continent,

¹ Ayi Kwei Armah, The Beautiful Ones Are Not Yet Born (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1968), 3. This text is often quoted by Ghanaian historians and Africanists as an example of Afro-Pessimism.
at the height of the Cold War. In less than a decade however, the promises of Nkrumah’s national development imaginary went unrealized and was replaced through a military coup in 1966 by the National Liberation Council (NLC) which disavowed the aliberal socialist direction the country was headed.\(^2\)

The history of Nkrumah’s Ghana became a signifier for the failure of state-directed economic development espoused by economists and historians of West-Africa, marking the beginning of structural adjustment policies directed by Bretton Wood’s international financial institutions the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) branch of what became the World Bank (WB). Afro-pessimism emerged as a description for the emotional and political response to the disappointing failures of postcolonial governments which had enthusiastically adopted state interventionist policies and national liberation models.\(^3\) This movement from hopeful optimism to Afro-Pessimism in the late 1960s, was recounted in Ghanaian author Kwesi Ayi Armah’s first novel *The Beautyful Ones Are Not Yet Born* (1968). Through an unnamed railway freight clerk protagonist, Armah describes a dystopian experience living under Nkrumah marked by economic insecurity, food shortages, rising prices, and increasing authoritarianism centred on the personality cult of the leader and the corrupt party. Throughout the novel, the protagonist struggles with adapting to his corrupt surroundings and embracing materialism-nationalism at the cost of his traditional ethical

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\(^2\) See Conclusion for a description of the NLC’s self-described ‘house cleaning’, providing detailed assessments of each economic and public sector, criticizing Nkrumah’s development policies, ideology, education, financial irresponsibility, ‘political naivety’, and for being more concerned about international rather than national politics.

\(^3\) Jon Soske, “The Dissimulation of Race: "Afro-Pessimism" and the Problem of Development,” *Qui Parle* 14(2) (2004), 15. The emotional response, from hope to disappointment, is important to Afro-Pessimism.
values. Remarking in conversation that those who don’t participate in the transformation are labelled as “… chichidodos … whose entrails are not hard enough for the national game.” You were either an adherent to the vision and values of the nation, or someone to be deprived and socially alienated. Such emotion provoking narratives have contributed to a polarized debate and competing representations of the economic performance and political legacy of the Nkrumah years in Ghana.

From the vantage point of Afro-Pessimism and historical hindsight, a mainstream common sense consensus emerged that describes Nkrumaist Ghana as a narrow nationalist project whose goals of Pan-Africanism, nationalism, and foreign Marxist-Leninist socialism led to economic crisis and political authoritarianism between 1957-1966. It also became a case study used to justify foreign directed structural adjustment programs to reign in Nkrumah’s, and others, underfinanced socialist policies by international monetary institutions and Western governments. The era of decolonization provoked fundamental economic questions into the nature of pre-colonial, colonial, and postcolonial social-economic development in Africa. Development served as the most pressing problem for new states and was an interpretive lens to determine the level of a society’s progress resulting in policy prescriptions. Despite the contestation over how to become developed, there is surprisingly little definitional disagreement over the term within the field of African

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4 Armah, The Beautiful Ones Are Not Yet Born, 55.
5 Ibid., 16.
6 James Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: Development, Depoliticization and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho (University of Minnesota Press, 1994), xiii. Ferguson makes a similar claim, calling development a “central value” and “interpretive grid”.
economic and political history. The usefulness of development as an analytical category and central value is presupposed in the literature. Development is both a quantitative-qualitative description of historical phenomenon and processes, and also a normative goal to aspire towards, respective to particular development ideologies. There was however profound disagreement over which systems and theories would produce the correct development path, whether the policy-path would be interventionist and socialist, free market, or an indigenous African alternative. These disagreements have played out in the historiography, provoking the question, how might we move beyond polarization? One possible method advanced in this dissertation is translocality, the non-national entanglements and connectivities which defined the idea, operationalization, and networks associated with, Ghanaian national development.

**Not Just another Term: Translocality and African Postcolonial Development**

The theory of translocality is not homogenous and does not derive from a single text or author. It is the collection of insights ranging from quantum mechanics and critical theory in the social sciences and humanities. At the core of translocality is a deconstruction of the performative relationship between discourse and the world, which challenges deeply held tenants of individual agency, separateness, subjectivity, and futurity. The discursive is not

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7 For a genealogy of the modern term development from the 16th century French Simonian thought to the mid-20th century consult M.P Cowen and Robert Shenton, *Doctrines of Development* (New York: Routledge, 1996). The authors define the modern concept of development as planned interventions in the present to create a desired future, deriving from French Simonian thought that determined land, labor, and capital was best guided by expert Bankers in the interests of the majority.

8 There are variations of socialist and free market development, these are the generalized terms.

the end-result of “human-based activities” but material “(re)configurings of the world through which local determinations of boundaries, properties, and meanings” are intra-actively enacted and reproduced.\textsuperscript{10} The notion of translocality presumes that localities, which are the geographical, social, political, cultural, ideational and economic communities, are hierarchical. They also do not exist as separate and detached, but derive from and are continually a part of, an ongoing enactment of differentiating relations. Within this account, agency is not held in the traditional sense nor is it a property of persons or things, but an enactment, a “matter of possibilities for reconfiguring entanglements.”\textsuperscript{11} This understanding challenges the idea of independent human agents freely acting on the world detached from the dynamic ongoing flow of agency. This approach further allows for the recognition of material-discursive “apparatuses of production, including boundary articulations and exclusions.”\textsuperscript{12} The enactments of boundaries, sovereignties, and borders inherently entail exclusions between individuals, regions, and nations. Nevertheless the choices researchers make in affording agency to a particular subject/object also produces inherent narrative silences and exclusions, reducing entanglement within phenomenon privileging a hierarchy of particular elements. The world exists within complex networks of phenomenon that emerge through entanglements and relationalities. Translocality is therefore a way of attempting to engage with the messiness – tensions, contradictions, paradoxes – of unfolding entangled historical processes.

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{11} Karan Barad, \textit{Matter and Meaning}, 30-42, 710.
Translocality is different from transnationalism or internationalist approaches for two reasons, ontological and empirical. Ontologically, transnational and internationalist approaches presuppose the world as a place of separate individuals with full agential capacity interacting and inter-relating within material, biological and social constraints. Historical processes are then broken down by the mutual interactions of fundamentally separate component-parts. While this sometimes varies in the emphasis on the inter-determinacy of these relationships, the scholarship almost unquestionably assumes and grounds transnational or internationalist historical interventions in this ontological superiority of the individual. In contrast, translocality is grounded in the idea of co-constitution, entanglement, and intra-action. The universe is intimately entangled, and co-constituted at the level of individuals, matter, ideas, and the non-human. Everything is part of a wider context which through processes of entanglement, exist and become transformed. Researchers have long been making agential cuts, assigning agency to particular individuals or categories – whether gender, race, or class – albeit increasingly intersectionally, but in doing so agency is dis-assigned elsewhere. A translocal perspective, therefore, attempts to make sense of the co-constitution and entanglement of the local or national, with non-local and non-national dynamics.

Secondly, in the case study presented here, postcolonial Ghana’s national development was conceived of by Nkrumah as a resource in the Pan-African struggle within the context of neocolonialism, neoclassical economics, and the global Cold War. It was entangled with diaspora and North American and European expats, who for different reasons, were driven to contribute and participate in Ghana’s development. It was also tied
to liberal neoclassical interventionism and the politics of financing the state through borrowing. While translocality expands the scope of analysis to potentially every individual within or connected to Ghana, pragmatically this case study makes agential cuts but recognizes the opportunity for further research into the translocal dynamics of national development.

National development in Nkrumaist Ghana was global in scope, reflective of the currents of Third World solidarity and non-alignment politics in the 1950s and 1960s. Transnational movements such as Negritude, Pan-Africanism, or Pan-Arabism of the 1930s-1970s developed historically alongside emerging nationalisms. There was a mutual compatibility between anticolonial politics and imagining larger cultural or political communities. Or, as Alina Sajed and Timothy Seidel make clear using Frantz Fanon, that the “uniqueness of anticolonial nationalism is its inextricable connection and connectivity to other colonized spaces and other anticolonial struggles”. As will be shown, much of the historiography has cast postcolonial projects as failures, or as alternatives to the nation state. The notion of connectivity used as a lens to move beyond polarization and interpret

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16 David Scott, *Conscripts of Modernity. The Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment* (Durham: Duke University, 2004); See also Frederick Cooper, “Possibility and constraint: African independence in historical perspective”
the international political and economic history of postcolonial Ghana, builds on the broad literature on colonial and postcolonial translocality.\textsuperscript{17} The functioning of colonialism and building of anticolonial movements was translocal, involving multiple local sites and relational exchanges within and beyond the colony or state.\textsuperscript{18} Extending from translocality, postcolonial connectivity is used to show how transnational expressions of development set the conditions for processes which produce close interrelations between different places, people, ideas, and policies. Transnationalism has a broad usage in the literature, as either a social morphology, a type of consciousness, a cultural form, or as a descriptor for the movement of capital and political solidarity.\textsuperscript{19} Connectivity in this sense is not a way to move beyond the nation state as a unit of analysis, or to transcend the problem of the nation or development by offering a non-Western alternative. The paradox of postcolonial nationalism, at least in the context of postcolonial Ghana, is that its expressions of translocality were mediated through the nation. The nation, with its translocal core, was both the strategy to decolonize and unite against (neo)colonialism, but in itself reflects a wider tension between local and global visions of the postcolonial future and attempts to link the nation to larger communities.

\textsuperscript{17} Ulrike Freitag and Achim Von Oppen, \textit{Translocality: The Study of Globalising Processes from a Southern Perspective} (Brill, 2009).
Therefore, we need to think of the postcolonial nation state and development processes as opening spaces for wider networks of exchange, contact, influence, and politics. These spaces, while seemingly different if considering for example the activisms of Pan-Africanist women in Ghana or the liberal interventions of foreign creditors, they are nonetheless both a part of the co-constitution of a particular phenomenon, in this case of national development. It is out of this translocality that tensions, contradictions, and contestations emergen in the idea, practice, and politics of national development. I use postcolonial connectivity as a lens into identifying the translocal – sometimes competing, complimentary, and tensional – conceptions and practice of national development. To clarify, development in postcolonial Ghana is both political and economic. Nkrumah thought of national development as a resource in the Pan-African revolution and non-alignment during the Cold War, not something reduced to economic calculations or territorial sovereignty. The Pan-Africanist women’s movement and experience of white European expats both drew on discourses of Nkrumaism and race within transnational networks to make claims. Economic diplomacy was also central to Nkrumah’s development vision, attempting to achieve non-aligned economic independence through continental coordination and economic harmonization. This development vision was dependent on foreign investment and aid to fund projects, which contributed to a foreign credit deficit and balance of payments difficulties from 1962 to 1965-66. An international consensus emerged among the IMF, Britain, IBRD (World Bank) and the US about the Ghana economic and political crisis which effected loan extensions and procurement. This dissertation charts these connections against the backdrop of Nkrumaism entangled within the global political economy.
Translocality is not to be confused with internationalism or constructive internationalism which is rooted in liberal international relations theory. Internationalism tends to presuppose an inclusivity and common goals among states who are then able to cooperate effectively and create multi-lateral institutions.20 However, this problematically blurs the underlying power-relations and inequalities in world systems and between states, as well as the legacies of dependency and colonialism in the present that impact postcolonial governments and economies. In fact, some scholars have challenged the limitations of liberal internationalism, its Western biases and hierarchies of gender and race in global politics.21 One might be tempted to talk about a postcolonial internationalism, but this too presupposes an agential separability and that power asymmetries in the global political economy have been addressed, including the reorganization of multi-lateral institutions. While aspects of Nkrumaism can fall under the category of internationalism, particularly in the activists of women. Generally speaking, Nkrumaist development sought to combat the structures of the global political-economy, advancing the interests of the Pan-African revolutionary struggle against (neo)colonialism and non-alignment during Cold War. Therefore, internationalism as used in this project, refers to particular characteristics of the overall entangled translocality of postcolonial Ghana.

Therefore this study contributes to rethinking postcolonial development as translocal. In Ghana, national development functioned as an intervention in the present to create a desired future premised on the principles of Nkrumah’s theory of philosophical

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consciencism, Pan-Africanism, non-alignment and the selective use of economic doctrines that were deemed reflective of African tradition. The politics of Ghana’s future was also entangled within networks of financial technocrats and the Cold War. Nkrumah thought of the one-party socialist state and development as the framework for decolonization and the realization of Pan-Africanism, challenging Westphalian notions of homogeneity and territorial belonging. But in doing so, his project privileged economic rights over social-political protections and struggled to balance advocating for both unity and national sovereignty. It was also contradictory in that to fund national development Nkrumah relied on international finance which made outcomes dependent on interdepartmental debates, review processes and bias. These historiographical and theoretical insights help contextualize present invocations of Nkrumaism by activists, as well as provide generalizable framework for the study of how transnational political and economic contexts – Pan-Africanism, the Cold War, Bretton Woods – are entangled with postcolonial development plans for the future. I am not suggesting standardization from one national context to the next, but a rethink of the foundations by which scholars and policy practitioners delineate the national from the international, and vis-à-vis. Developmentalist visions on the continent abound during this period. Julius Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda, for example, each implemented their own developmentalist visions reconciled with traditional values, Cold War, and Pan-African contexts.

Navigating a Contested Historiography

In what has become an authoritative text on economic development in Ghana, Tony Killick uses Nkrumah’s Ghana as a test case to affirm the negative economic performance of state-
directed socialist policies. According to Killick, at independence, Nkrumah “started with advantages…a rich accumulation of economic assets,” a supply of diversified mineral wealth, with strong capital stock, high savings and investment rates, and a developed import capacity. Nkrumah, however, turned this economy into one of economic crisis and mismanagement. His ‘bad ideas’ of nationalism, socialism, and Marxism reflected the ‘big push’ state interventionist policies advocated by post-WW2 development economists. He summarizes;

The mutual reinforcement of economics, socialism and nationalism gave this set of ideas an intense attraction to statesmen such as Nkrumah… the prescriptions of the literature coincided in most essentials with the natural predilections of a leader of Nkrumah’s background and persuasions.

Killick is not wrong in identifying that the main tenants of Nkrumah’s economic theory reflect, to some extent, socialist economists and the Austrian school’s Paul Rosenstein-Rodan’s model of structural change. While his earlier work was theoretical and related to the study of time, Rosenstein-Rodan is most known for his Big Push Theory of economic development published in 1943 as a method for underdeveloped countries to achieve

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23 Ibid., 73.
24 Ibid., 74-75.
industrialization. Rosentstein-Rodan believed that market economies were imperfect and could not provide price mechanisms to make a competitive economy conducive to industrialization. A market economy presupposes that prices would transmit information reliably allowing firms or individuals to respond and coordinate investment prioritizing planning and capital return. However, private firms prioritize short term planning, not long term growth. Private or state firms acting on their own to industrialize would struggle to make profit because of the relatively small-domestic market, imperfect communication to coordinate industrialization, and because the capital needed exceeds individual firms. The type of development newly industrializing states needed was also diversified and included social investments which had public rather than private benefit.

To remedy this, Rosentstein-Rodan argued that the state must act as the coordinator of economic activity among state and private owned firms in a “planned industrialization comprising simultaneous planning of several complementary industries.” Only state governments could guarantee the movements of capital internationally, soliciting investment and loans to finance development projects. What Rosentstein-Rodan presupposed is that there is a limited absorptive capacity of the world market and

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29 Ibid., 58.
30 Ibid., 58-59.
developing economies to manage debt levels leading to an inability to repay creditors, known as a balance of payments problem.\textsuperscript{32} When there is not a capacity to pay and the relative absorptive capacity is low, he argues, grants and international investments had to be used by governments and financial institutions.\textsuperscript{33} While Rosenstein-Rodan’s theory, mediated through economists such as Arthur Lewis and Jan Drewnowski, was drawn upon in Nkrumah’s thought, it does not provide the full scope of his entangled political and economic system. Nor does it explain how consensus about crisis emerges among creditor institutions and states within the context of the translocality of Ghana’s national development.

As a result of Nkrumah’s ideas, however, Killick argues that the state functioned as an inefficient agent of modernisation, with poor economic decision that made it unable to improve overall performance.\textsuperscript{34} Importantly, Killick associates being a nationalist with the state, describing Nkrumah as a state centrist with a particular vision of the nation-state as coordinator of Ghanaian economic and political activity.\textsuperscript{35} Furthermore, Killick does not accept that ‘neocolonialism’ or foreign investment interests – that is to say structural or external constraints – played a role in Ghana’s development. Instead, for Killick, it came down to policy choice, asserting that “Ghanaians are not helpless victims of global forces

\textsuperscript{33} Paul Rosentstein-Rodan had later spent time at the World Bank in the late 1960s and 1970s working toward diversified investment, addressing agricultural change and unemployment as part of the African division.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., 350.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., 1-2.
beyond their influence; their economic prospects rest on the decisions they and their leaders take about how domestic institutions should be developed.”36

This reading of Nkrumah’s economic thought is decontextualized from the politics of international finance, development aid and Pan-Africanism. Nkrumaism is reduced to a blend of nationalism, socialism, and Marxism whose applied ideas in Ghana reflected the economic naiveties of post-World War II development economics concerning the role of the state. By beginning with a reading of Nkrumah as a test case for policy implementation, Killick ignores the evolving aspects of Nkrumah’s ideas that were part of a wider system of thought in which state-directed national development is an element of a continental strategy to achieve economic independence. For example, Nkrumah considered the state as only one stage of the liberation struggle and not the end goal.37 Killick further avoids any critical discussion of the Africentric core of Nkrumah’s thought and its relation to his selective appropriation of economic doctrines. There is no mention of conscientism, nor explanation for how Nkrumah justified the utilization of private investment and firms, for example, in controlled coordination with the state to garner foreign investment, technology, and expertise to assist with development. This provided firms preferential contracts and subsidized costs, creating an environment for corruption that contributed to negative development outcomes as was the case of the Tema Dry Dock scheme and the Parkinson Howard shipping firm as discussed in Chapter 4.38

36 Ibid., 483.
38 The case of the Tema Dry Dock and the Apollo Report of 1966-1967 will be discussed in Chapter 4.
Continuing this narrative, economic historian and UN consultant George Ayittey, claims that Nkrumah’s ideas are not uniquely African and that he was among the first generation of postcolonial leaders responsible for the importation of Marxism to the continent as the model of political and economic governance;

…the fundamental mistake of the African nationalist leaders [Nkrumah included] was that they spurned their own indigenous African heritage… Most of the models and systems they introduced or imposed on Africa were alien. In particular, the one-party state system and socialism as an economic ideology can never be justified on the basis of African tradition.39

For Ayittey, Marxism and socialism are alien ideologies that do not reflect indigenous traditions. Nkrumah’s decision to implement secular elected councils to oversee chieftaincy and the abolishment of the House of Chiefs, is cited as an example of the suppression of African tradition in pursuit of foreign ideas.40 Nkrumah, however, recognized that the chiefs had played a role in colonial governance while also deriving from a pre-colonial African heritage. His ideas about chieftaincy adapted to local contexts – from ‘smashing’ the chiefs to a critical acceptance – ultimately recognizing them as an element of African consciencism.41 Nkrumah also partly justified the selective use of socialism for its potential to nurture and reflect traditional African values of communalism. Oddly, Ayittey fails to engage with Nkrumah’s Africentric ontology of consciencism. Instead, the case of

40 Ibid., 495.
Nkrumah is used as an example for the failure of ‘alien’ Marxist ideas which were seen as responsible for life “after independence [being] a starvation diet and a gun to the head.”

A few scholars have proposed that Nkrumah had a “narrow” national, rather than transnational, vision that utilized the discourse of Pan-Africanism as part of creating and advancing a “symbolic nationalism” and “civil religious performance.” Pan-Africanism here is reduced to a coercive discourse that functioned as a counter hegemonic tool to colonialism in an effort to engineer national solidarity and unity among the population. It was a strategy to maintain governance while pushing an ambitious political and economic project. Harcourt Fuller, writing in reaction to what he identifies as an imbalance in the scholarship where too often Nkrumah was characterized as a Pan-Africanist and not a nationalist, offers a precise summary:

My position is that, while Nkrumah is the Pre-eminent Pan-Africanist, he was first and foremost a nationalist. His primary agenda was to build Ghana as a model nation-state upon which a United States of Africa would be modelled.

Contrary to Fuller’s assertion, Nkrumah can be seen not as a nationalist first and Pan-Africanist second, but rather as both simultaneously. His system of thought entangled Ghanaian political and economic independence within the wider African revolution against neocolonialism. The building of national consciousness was only the first stage: “The

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42 Ibid., 487.
43 Harcourt Fuller, Building a Nation: Symbolic Nationalism during the Kwame Nkrumah era in the Gold Coast/Ghana, PhD Dissertation (Department of International History, London School of Economics, August 2010).
45 Ibid., 54.
nationalist phase is a necessary step in the liberation struggle, but must never be regarded as the final solution.”47 Nkrumah’s nationalism was embedded within a translocal politics and struggle for unity; it was not the ultimate horizon of his thought.

Echoing these trends, Gerardo Serra describes Nkrumaism as “based on the combination of elements of nationalism and Pan-Africanism with echoes of Marxist-Leninism” that centred on the personality cult of Nkrumah and was reproduced through “religious…mythical iconography” and institutional, educational, and economic arenas of contestation.48 Ghana in the 1960s is characterized as an increasingly authoritarian one-party state, the Convention Peoples Party (CPP), which underwent broader structural and institutional transformations to enact the political-social hegemony of Nkrumaism.49 The problem is not Serra’s reading of economic doctrines or governmental and institutional structures. Rather it obscures, the fluidity and tensions of Nkrumah’s uses of the one-party socialist state to combat neocolonialism within a particular historical moment.

Perhaps just as adamant as the mainstream,50 are attempts to romantically imbue the Nkrumaist years as an alternative to Western capitalism, vaguely defined, that transcends the nation state. Within the emergent field of postcolonial and decolonial studies, there is a tendency to under-historicize the tensions of postcolonial national projects which leads to ahistorical evaluations of their political and economic performance. In these works,

49 Ibid., 668.
50 See also Roberts Bates, When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late-Century Africa (Cambridge University Press, 2008).
Nkrumah and other nationalist leaders, are presented as bastions of anti-colonial and anti-capitalist revolution. Nkrumah in particular is noted famously by Basil Davidson as the ‘Black Star guiding the liberation struggle’. In Davidson’s account, the contradictions of Nkrumah’s Pan-African diplomacy are ignored, as he is presented and forgiven as a man of ideas. What is problematic here is the ways in which Nkrumah embraced features of market capitalism, foreign aid, and also acted against the creation of an East African Federation and intervention in Togolese politics. Davidson himself had spent considerable time advocating for Third World Solidarity and Pan-Africanism, visiting Nkrumah’s Ghana and writing positive editorials. He is also responsible for producing an 8-part documentary series on Africa for Western audiences.

In contrast, a recent turn in the scholarship on decolonization and postcolonial political history has provoked a renewed interdisciplinary consideration into the 1960-70s African anti-colonial archive. The reasons for the increased output have been political. African anticolonial thought and experience is defined as that which “can be read as diagnos[ing] the logic of colonialism and does so for the political purpose of fighting colonial rule within a particular historical juncture.” Anticolonialism as a body of ideas, peoples, and events, becomes an archive of knowledge to Western politics, economics, and culture, as well as a means of highlighting the importance of engaging with this historical moment. Such an archive, the authors argue, “must be located (to the degree it has a

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52 Ibid.
location) within the political fights against colonial rule, during and after, the period of decolonization.” 55 Postcolonial leaders are being more systematically explored as a result, as well as what Robbie Shilliam calls alternative “forms of spatiality that cannot be contained within a strictly colonial modern frame.” 56 These non-Eurocentric connections and possibilities within the anticolonial archive, “speak not only of the contradictory effects and manifestations of [Western] modernity, but also illustrate the way through which the colonized cultivated knowledge sideways.” 57 According to this perspective, these episodes reveal both the agency of those under colonial conditions as well as decolonial alternative forms of knowledge, being, and belonging. Such moments have also been described as “counterplot[s] to modernity,” where sources of identity, belonging, and politics come to challenge the colonial by creating spaces for translocal relationalities outside of the colonial gaze. 58

I am appreciative of the concern for calling attention to anticolonial movements and what they reveal about the functioning of global politics, economics, decolonization and transnationalism. Yet, there is a thin line between romanticizing these moments as emancipatory, or as containing open possibilities for alternative futures. 59 What if such material and ideational postcolonial connectivities and alternatives were equally tied –

55 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
59 Frederick Cooper, Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945-1960 (Princeton University Press, 2014). Cooper describes how during French decolonization there were other possibilities to decolonization open, such as a greater French Union, which he treats as being more progressive than the narrowness of national postcolonial visions that were to come.
indeed, co-constitutive – to Western and Eastern Europe? Does not the idea of an anti-colonial archive presuppose single archival sites or limit the field of inquiry to continental and/or anticolonial sites? And how might focusing on translocality contribute to the post-development literature which is presented as a corrective to debates about agency/structure and positionality, challenging the concept of development itself, a response to the “significant failures of development to live up to the promise of its theory” and to create new “ways of thinking beyond development”? Nkrumah’s vision and those alternatives among Pan-African female activists, European expats, the IMF and development departments in Britain and the United States, did not abandon discourses of development. Instead they reframed development to make specific claims on the political-economic direction of the country.

The engagement with archives searching for prescriptive liberal policy paths or alternative imaginaries, reflect what David Scott identifies as the way in which the contemporary “problem-space inhabits the writer and subject” – the “discursive context…of argument and intervention.” In this case, postcolonial Ghana and the problem of national development under Nkrumah, provides answers to sets of problems related to the ‘proper’ development path for postcolonial states and theories about non-Western alternative imaginaries within the anti-colonial archive. One must exhibit caution, even though this new temporally and geographically elastic ‘archive’ has received considerable

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attention in academic conferences and publications. It presupposes a series of fundamental claims based on, what I denote through the Ghanaian case study, an incomplete reading of anticolonial thought and the nature of the postcolonial state, conceptually and in-practice. The case of Nkrumaist Ghana does not fit the framework. The period of decolonization remains loosely defined, as well as discussion of ‘decolonization’ itself. Is anticolonialism equivalent to decolonialization? Is what makes the two distinct just a matter of language, and what is at stake for how the history of the Nkrumaist period is being told? Further, how can we confront the poor political and economic performance of the state without falling into Afro-Pessimism? In a similar way, this new archive risks privileging particular narratives of anticolonialism and ignoring the tensions, ambiguities, and contradictions of anticolonial figures and state projects in relation to capitalism and the West.

Pan-Africanist scholars outside of North-America and Europe have also continued to call attention to the possibilities of the Nkrumaist years. Biannual international Kwame Nkrumah conferences organized by African scholars, while marginalized, nevertheless produce insightful content. The Nkrumah biographer Zizwe Poe characterizes Nkrumah’s

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63 There is a consensus in the field of critical international relations that the nation state, derived from the Treaty of Westphalia 1648, is a violent instrument in hegemony whose violence was reproduced in postcolonial state projects. Most notable in Anthony Giddons, *The nation-state and violence*. Vol. 2 (University of California Press, 1985); See also Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in *Bringing the State Back In* edited by Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) for a famous description of the state as an organized racket.
project as one of “Pan-African nationalism.”\textsuperscript{64} The aims of unifying and developing a
nation are co-constituted; the nation is a resource in the struggle against neocolonialism and
towards the unification of Africa.\textsuperscript{65} The concept of creating a Pan-African political
economy advanced by Ama Biney which functions as “an alternative, indeed an antidote, to
neoliberalism” further helps to situate Nkrumah’s vision within a continental and global
struggle against neoliberalism.\textsuperscript{66} Biney assesses the negative effects of neoliberal
disciplinary economics since the 1970s characterized by reduced public expenditures,
increased foreign reliance, and lack of development.\textsuperscript{67} He argues that Nkrumah’s
conception of Pan-African unity provides a policy model alternative. By combining the
resource wealth and economic coordination of African states, a strong continental union
would be able to renegotiate financial relationships and develop public service
infrastructure while nurturing internal markets and regulating trade/investment to develop
on their own terms.\textsuperscript{68}

\textsuperscript{64} Zizwe Poe, “Reflecting on Pan-African Liberated Zones: Designing a Dynamic Nkrumahist Evaluation,” in
\textit{Re-Engaging the African Diasporas: Pan-Africanism in the Age of Globalization}, edited by Charles Quist-
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{66} Ama Biney, \textit{Political and Social Thought of Kwame Nkrumah} (United States: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011);
Ama Biney, “The Neoliberal Agenda versus the Pan-Africanist Agenda: Towards the Way Forward,” in \textit{Re-
Engaging the African Diasporas: Pan-Africanism in the Age of Globalization}, edited by Charles Quist-Adade
\textsuperscript{67} The tension between Nkrumah’s ambitious developmental paradigm and the realities of the state dealing
with negative foreign credit supply, inability to pay foreign creditors, while trying to solicit investment/aid,
remains underexplored in these perspectives. What’s missing is a discussion about the specific policies and
implementations. However, what these perspectives reveal appropriately is an unwillingness of the IMF and
creditor nations to adopt policies – such as obligated grants based on GDP % - to alleviate interest and move
developing countries away from long-term dependency.
\textsuperscript{68} Ibid., 143.
In many ways, the debates about the external constraints of national capital markets and foreign economic influence reflects earlier agency/structure debates. As a Pan-Africanist Marxist historian, Walter Rodney famously introduced both the concepts of underdevelopment and dependency to the field. He defines the notion of underdevelopment as an economic tool to compare levels of development between uneven human groups’ vis-à-vis quantitative models of population, gross domestic product, education, and service access. Accordingly, the exploitation of Africa by Europe – the stagnation of markets, slavery, and colonialism – buttressed industrial development in the metropolis while depriving the colonies. These experiences of power and Africa’s continual exportation of resource-labour surplus, made it dependent on Europe. The resulting systematic drain of African wealth made it impossible to develop and allocate resources indigenously, without subservience to those who have the power to “manipulate the system.” In line with Marxist state formation, Rodney claims that postcolonial states, especially those with ties to Britain such as Nkrumaist Ghana, were organized around the developmental constraints of outwardly directed exploitation economies with no “historic break.” As an activist, his political objectives become most evident when he romanticizes that such a radical ‘break’ from the “principle agency” of international capitalism which has been the cause of “underdevelopment…over the last five centuries,” is necessary for


70 Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Howard University Press, 1972), 5.

71 Ibid., 13.

72 Ibid., 74, 147-150.

73 Ibid., 210-211.

74 Ibid., 27.

75 Ibid., 80-84.
developmental justice. Although it did not include explicit analysis of race or gender, the text provoked a series of publications by critical economic historians and policy analysts.

The terms resource trap and unequal development have also been used in debates about external constraints and a monolithic unidirectional engagement between postcolonial states and Europe. Samir Amin famously coined unequal development through case studies on the groundnut economy in Senegal and the plantation cocoa economies in Ghana and the Ivory Coast, 1880-1970. Unequal development, closely related to underdevelopment, is the consequences of power asymmetries of comparative advantages within national-international market economies. An outward directed colonial development path where growth is determined by gross domestic product creates structural external constraints that nurture dependency and inequality. This is described as a trap for colonies that prevented development and economic independence from Europe. The entrenched capitalist classes and elites are described as gaining a persistent power over the market forming tributary allegiances, and collaborations, which causes a lack of public finance. These historical realities have evolved to neo-colonial rule since decolonization.

Neo-colonialism – a term coined by Nkrumah – refers to the structures of post-independent

76 Ibid., 261.
77 Timothy Shaw, “The Evolution of Inequalities: East African Economic History,” Africa Today (1977). Roger Southall, “Polarisation and Dependence in the Gold Coast Cocoa Trade 1890-1938,” Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana 16 (1975); Southall’s assessment is one of the most notable as it applies Rodney’s dependency trap to micro-cast study. There has also been repudiation of this perspective by intuitionalist economics, best encapsulated in Gareth Austins, Land, Labour and Capital in Ghana (James Currey, 2001).
78 Samir Amin, Neo-Colonialism in West Africa (Harmondsworth, 1973), 3-6.
79 Ibid., 14, 76-79.
80 Ibid., 268.
81 Ibid., xxi.
82 Ibid., Amin’s ‘economic section’ can be summarized as the identification of this ‘trap’, its evolution and effects.
83 Ibid., 117-130.
states which are intimately integrated into metropolitan-colonial trade, investment, and knowledge networks.84 This means that the sovereign policy capacities of postcolonial states to implement equal redistributive national development paths (socialism) and macroeconomic management, was limited.85 Like Rodney, Amin contends that the economic development of West Africa “constitutes an irresistible [contemporary] pressure for the maintenance of colonial development...domination and underdevelopment.”86 There can be no future of economic planning, he argues, within outward directed economies integrated with Europe.

In conjunction with the disagreements between continental and Western narratives of Nkrumaist Ghana, the theory of the developmental state has emerged to interpret the trajectories of South Asian and African experiences in the mid-late twentieth century.87 There are, however, competing definitions of the developmental state on offer. The term was first used by Chalmers Johnson in 1982 to describe the successful long-term economic development of state intervention policies in Japan.88 In contrast, for Thandika Mkandawire the defining feature is ideological, when the core of the state’s mandate is to harmonize available resources for economic development.89 What these early definitions missed is that

84 It should be noted that the inverse of this dependency school of thought is the extensive scholarship on state managed economies that are characterized as corrupt, nepotistic, and capture rents to support an elite class. For a summary of this argument see Christopher Clapham, *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival* (Cambridge University Press, 1996).
85 Ibid., 250, 252.
86 Ibid., 274.
87 Other concepts exist such as post-neoliberalism, neo-structuralism/neo-developmentalism, developmental patrimonialism, and neo-extractivism, but these conceptually can be categorized as operating within GS and DS.
the state, as Peter Evans contends, has an embedded autonomy within market forces and existing institutional constraints that the state needs to navigate successfully to achieve development outcomes. More recently, Jewellord Nem Singh and Jesse Ovadia emphasize that its core concern is multi-coordinated state intervention and developmental outcomes that lead to structural transformation.91 There has also been an emphasis on the legitimacy of a developmental government, that it has the “authoritatively, credibly, legitimately, and in a binding manner”92 to implement development policies. Economic development is not a goal but a means,93 and the policy paths taken are contingent on the interaction between local and international stakeholders.94 The means of achieving national development in Ghana were diverse, but the state remained the central instrument in coordinating and legitimizing Nkrumah’s developmental paradigm.

Historians of Post-war British foreign policy and the politics of Western engagement with Africa during the Cold War and to Ghana in particular, have drawn attention to a shifting development policies responding to nationalist movements, and the loss/transition of former colonial possessions.95 Development aid and investment are

95 See the works of Joseph Hodge, Triumph of the Expert: Agrarian Doctrines of Development and the Legacies of British Colonialism (Ohio University Press, 2007); David Sunderland, Managing British Colonial
presented as part of a wider strategy of continuity in attempting to maintain advantages in trade, contracts, and market access during transition. These strategies are often presented as a combination of Cold War politics with the practicalities of Ghana being tied to foreign reserves and the regulations by the West African Central Bank (WACB) and the Crown Agents. These works that center on Britain engage primarily in single-archival sites within the wider context of Britain’s decline globally and reconstitution of relations due to decolonization. However, there has been a lack of research on the transnational inter-departmental debates of the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO), Exporter Credit Guarantee Organization (EXCGO), International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), pertaining to the politics and economic performance of Nkrumah. More interrogation of the interdepartmental and department-to-department correspondences in relation to financing Ghanaian development and Nkrumah’s political-economic policies is needed.

**New Economic and Political History of Ghana**

Providing a reading of the Nkrumaist years that strikes a middle ground, Vannessa van den Boogaard acknowledges the tensions within Nkrumah’s conception and practice of citizenship and Pan-Africanism. Based on his Pan-African commitments and the indigenous Akan principle of belonging, which is rooted in the notion of inclusive community belonging, Nkrumah believed in a non-territorial citizenship existing outside of

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national borders and open to all Africans: “Africa is one people, one country, one nation.”\textsuperscript{96} Nkrumah’s practice of citizenship was formed on the basis of the “African personality” – bonds of blood and kinship – and the struggle for political subjectivity.\textsuperscript{97} Nkrumah defined this African personality as the “identification with African historical past and struggle of African people in the African Revolution to liberate and unify the continent and to build a just society.”\textsuperscript{98} He struggled to negotiate the practicalities of advocating for a non-territorial citizenship versus national liberation against colonialism. National liberation tied individuals to a particular territory while Pan-Africanism was premised on non-national continental/diasporic bonds of belonging.\textsuperscript{99} Boogaard also confronts Nkrumah’s selective use of the tools of modernity, such as the printing press and newspapers, in pursuit of anticolonialism. As Boogaard contends “modernity involves various elements…that drivers of divergent social imaginaries can utilize in ways that define certain practices of their own distinct societies and modernities.”\textsuperscript{100} These problems of cultivating Pan-Africanism while creating conditions for national sovereignty and the selective use of modernity, provide a point of departure into not only the tensions of Nkrumah’s vision. It also provides insights into how the creation of larger imagined cultural, political, and economic postcolonial communities come to be conceived of and operationalized through the nation state.


\textsuperscript{97} Boogaard, “Nkrumah’s Political Thought,” 7-8.


\textsuperscript{99} Boogaard, “Nkrumah’s Political Thought,” 16.

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid.
To be sure, discussion of tensions as an epistemological prescriptive to generalized binaries and encounters between local and global contexts is not new.\textsuperscript{101} The influential collection by Frederick Cooper and Ann Stoler is widely attributed to introducing the notion of tension to transnational African and imperial history against trends in subaltern studies that assume parochial isolation of countries and regions from global processes.\textsuperscript{102} For these authors, there is a tension in the relationships between the development of hierarchies based on difference, with the extension of universalizing principles expressed in the domains of culture, society, economics, politics, and knowledge.\textsuperscript{103} Rather than focus on the colonial and metropolitan relationship however, I explore the translocality of postcolonial Ghanaian development. Nkrumaism was a universalizing development paradigm that had to navigate in practice national, continental, diasporic, and global Cold War contexts. This relationship and usage, when viewed through the lens of postcolonial connectivity, provides an entry into the contradictory potentials and limitations of the postcolonial Nkrumaist state.

Relevant to unpacking the economic doctrines of Nkrumaism, Gerardo Serra draws attention to the political performance and political instrumentalization of statistics by the Nkrumaist state and those economists working within it.\textsuperscript{104} Writing as part of the new

\textsuperscript{101} Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler (eds), \textit{Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeoisie World} (University of California Press, 1997), 4-5.

\textsuperscript{102} This text provoked a response by scholars such as Dipesh Chakrabarty who characterizes it within a tradition of imperial studies of colonized spaces were ‘everything’ becomes variations of a master narrative that could be called “the history of Europe” in Dipesh Chakrabarty, “Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History: Who Speaks for ‘Indian’ Pasts?” \textit{Representations} 37 (1992), 1.

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., 37.

economic history of Africa promoted by economic historians such as Gareth Austin and Morten Jervan\(^{105}\) as well as increased concern over the ambiguous role of experts,\(^{106}\) Serra contends that the statistics and numbers were at the heart of the Nkrumah regime.\(^{107}\) Sites of tension over numbers existed within the state, such as in the teaching and practice of economics within the Nkrumah Ideological Institute department of Politics and Economics from 1962 to 1966.\(^{108}\) This also follows Sally Merry’s formulation that the “production and usage” of economic indicators effect the discursive representation of the state and the politics of governance and development.\(^{109}\) Serra shows how this played out within the state between economists working at the University of Ghana such as Jan Drewnowski who did not always reproduce Nkrumahism, instead teaching a unique brand of Polish socialism.\(^{110}\) Less attention however has been paid to the translocal production and usage of numbers in consensus building and economic performance review processes that were equally, I argue, central to the Nkrumahist state. The national and international production

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\(^{107}\) Serra’s argument in particular reflect the colonial historiography about how data collection – census, geographic surveys – were tools for governance and management. Robert Home, See Of Planting and Planning: The making of British colonial cities (Routledge, 2013); Bernard Cohn, Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India (Princeton University Press, 1996).

\(^{108}\) Ibid.

\(^{109}\) Sally Engel Marry, The Seductions of Quantification (University of Chicago Press, 2011).

and use of economic performance missions and reviews by the IMF in Ghana for example, were directly tied to advancing liberal policy reforms.

Reflecting on this absence in the historiography, Matteo Grilli urges historians to consider the importance of this archive. Grilli correctly observes that this collection provides an underexplored look into the domestic and foreign policies of African nationalism at a continental level. This corresponds with recent work on the internationalism of Ghana’s foreign policy engagement with South African Apartheid, debates about the Algerian War for Independence and violence, as well as the Rhodesia crisis. Recent studies have also begun to unpack the relationship between Ghana and Eastern Europe, or the “black east.” Some scholars have argued that the relationship between Ghana and Eastern European states such as Hungary reveal that despite the “...structural setting of hierarchical world-systemic positions, the dynamic circulation of experts and ideas developed into postcolonial interconnectivity.” These works provide openings for studies into Ghana’s economic diplomacy and developmental coordination, both continentally and within the context of Cold War non-alignment. In this context, I

111 Particularly the Bureau of African Affairs Archive collection in PRAAD Accra, Ghana.
115 Marcia Schenck, “Constructing and Deconstructing ‘The Black East’ – a helpful research agenda?,” Stichproben Weiner Zeitschrift fur kritische Afrikastudien 34(18) (2018), 135-152. A research framework that seeks to locate the role Africans played in Eastern Europe and vis-versa to highlight the importance of Africans in Cold War history.
evoke postcolonial connectivity to refer to these translocal entanglement, looking not just at formal Pan-African diplomacy or the global political economy of national development, but also the movement of activists and building of internationalism by non-state actors.

In complementing the works of Serra and Grilli, Jeffrey Ahlman explores Nkrumaism through the regional archives of the CPP. Ahlman’s dissertation research uncovers the national social history of how civil society responded to the hegemony of Nkrumaism during a tightening of the political sphere.117 This involves an original exploration of the youth arm of the CPP created by Nkrumah. Programs such as the Builders Brigade and Young Pioneers were organized in an effort to promote a socialist citizenship and reflect the values of Nkrumaism among the younger population.118 This was in line with institutional education initiatives such as the creation of the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute in Winneba. These useful studies of the national context of Nkrumaism engenders investigation into the continental and global interconnections of Nkrumaism with the world. Contributing to Serra, Grilli, and Ahlman119 – who will be brought into conversation at multiple points throughout this study – this study examines the translocal connections of Nkrumaist Ghana’s national development for Pan-Africanism.

Source Materials and Methodology

118 Ahlman, 2017, See Chapter 3 for a full description of the history of the Builders Brigade and Young Pioneers.
119 The works of Jeffrey Grischow are also influential in the new economic and political history of Ghana but they will be discussed in Chapter 1 and Chapter 3.
In line with Grilli and Ahlman’s call for transnational archival engagement, this study draws on multi-sited archival research in Ghana, the United Kingdom and United States, as well as source materials from Poland, West Germany, Hungary, and South Africa. In Ghana, the primary archival sites used are the African Bureau and RG collections in Public Record and Administration Archives Department (PRAAD) and collections at University of Ghana. I scoped the collections and records pertaining to the Nkrumaist years, focusing on development policy, economic performance indicators, financial institution records, economic diplomacy and Pan-Africanism. They also include details of hitherto unexplored transnational projects, such as the All African Trade Union (AATU), nuclear non-proliferation, and the Continental Social Credit and Welfare Scheme. I also analyzed more personal letters, correspondences, minutes, and reports, including unexplored scandals, debates and controversies, which help illustrate the tensions and translocal core of the Nkrumaist state. They further provide insights into the continental and international connections of national development vis-à-vis Pan-African politics, international finance and technical exchanges within the context of the global Cold War.

The UK and US archival sites gave me a unique perspective into the ways in which Ghanaian debt, inter-departmental politics of development finance procurement and the ‘pragmatic’ strategies used to push Ghana to liberalize import regulation and trade, were entangled. The Kew archive houses important documents of the Foreign Office (FO) relating to Ghana’s development, scandals with private contractors, and correspondences, reports, and collaborations between the FO and the International Monetary Federation (IMF), Washington (US) and the World Bank (WB). In the US, I consulted the IMF
archives online and in Washington, specifically looking at economic performance reports and correspondences concerning loans and debt-repayment. The central focus is on the perceived performance of the Ghanaian state, including contestations over statistical indicators and numbers. I also consulted the Nkrumah collections at the New York Public Library. These archives, in conjunction with those in Ghana and in the UK, provided resources into the economic mission and review process at the IMF, the building of consensus, as well as the first year of the NLC and unmaking of Nkrumaism. While these records have been cast aside by recent historians, I uncover a hidden arena of contestation and transnational entanglement. I was able to access various digital sources from Hungary and Poland to supplement some of the archival sources regarding expats working close to Nkrumah as well as technical/financial assistance in development projects. Lastly, I consulted national and global newspaper and economic sources. While I use a transnational framework, my approach centres on the political and economic developmental visions of postcolonial Ghana and the Nkrumaist state.

The archival methodology used for this study is framed by Frederick Cooper’s call to re-think African history within a transnational framework that accounts for the interaction and tensions between international/colonial processes and specific localized contexts. According to Cooper, the experience of Empire, and imperial governance, well into decolonization, prompted a series of alternative possibilities and transnational imperial political relations that reject notions of a “single postcolonial configuration.” The

political possibilities 1950-1990s have, at various moments, been open, constrictive, and radical, filled with unrealized possibilities for political-imperial community other than the state. This requires an engagement with transnational archival sites. Furthermore, Andrew Zimmerman, trained as a German historian of overseas expansion turned Africanist,\textsuperscript{121} departs from the early imperial rethinking project by interpreting the colonized and colonial processes as “coeval subjects of history and objects of analysis” that historians of Africa and the diaspora have ignored by situating ‘Africans’ within European narratives.\textsuperscript{122} Here, he promotes the adaptation of Sebastian Conrad’s concept of multi-sited historiography which developed from anthropologist George Marcus’s notion of a multi-sited ethnography.\textsuperscript{123} In the context of Ghana, multi-sited archival research and interdisciplinarity helps to better situate national concerns – such as development – within wider transnational and global contexts.

These approaches toward de-localization have a difficult task of demonstrating the relation between multiple local-national trajectories within the global political economy. Such a research praxis invariably requires trans-disciplinary collaborations between sub-historical disciplines – such as Europeanist, Americanist and Africanists – and allows for the application of new theoretical tools in sociology, anthropology, cultural studies, to historical methodology.\textsuperscript{124} While this study heeds the call for transnational archival research and critical engagement with interdisciplinarity, it explores the postcolonial

\textsuperscript{121} Andrew Zimmerman, “Africa in Imperial and Transnational History: Multi-Sited Historiography and the Necessity of Theory,” \textit{The Journal of African History} 54 (2013), 331.
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid., 338-339.
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid., 338.
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid., 338 and 340.
connectivities and development imaginaries of Nkrumaist Ghana through the lens of translocality to disrupt prevailing orthodoxies within a polarized historiographical landscape. In addition to archival sources, I conducted semi-structured open ended interviews during field research in the Accra and Tema regions of Ghana. These interviews offered a point of entry into the complex legacy and living memory of those living in 1960s Accra-Tema regions. While these interviews are not at the core of this study, they supplement the multi-sited archival research and provide supporting intimacies concerning women activists, economic development and the enduring post-coup legacy of Nkrumaism and connectivity in Ghana.

**Outline and Conclusion**

My central argument is that postcolonial Ghanaian national development was translocal, as it was conceptualized and contested as a resource in the struggle for Pan-Africanism in the Cold War and was entangled with continental and diasporic activisms and liberal interventionary politics. It shows how nationalism and development within this particular theatre 1957-1968, should be conceptualized through postcolonial connectivity and competing developmental visions of the future. This is important for political and conceptual reasons. Firstly, a translocal approach situates the successes and failures of national development within wider non-national contexts which have a significant effect on development outcomes and the types of policies national governments can pursue. Furthermore, by understanding postcolonial development through translocality, researchers in Ghana and elsewhere can use the framework to make sense of non-national entanglements and tensions within and outside of nation state boundaries. This would
enable new lines of inquiry into the co-constitution of postcolonial development, thereby
provoking new investigations into the politics, economics, and outcomes of how
development was conceptualized and practiced in postcolonial contexts.

In sustaining this argument, Chapter 1 challenges the polarized historiography of
Kwame Nkrumah’s social-political and economic thought during and after his Presidency.
Revisiting published and unpublished primary sources, I argue that Nkrumah’s thought was
an evolving system of ideas within historical context. Rather than casting him as an
authoritarian importer of Marxist-Leninist ideas or as a non-Western alternative, I read
Nkrumah’s thought through his ambiguities, contradictions, and the problems he
confronted. Nkrumah himself was grappling with his ideas, attempting to reconcile the
selective appropriation of Marxist-Leninism and national development by creating an
Africentric non-Atheistic materialism, rooted in Akan cosmology and quantum physics,
from which to ground his national imaginary for Ghana. Accordingly, national
development for Nkrumah – in thought and practice – was interwoven within translocal
politics of Pan-Africanism and economic development for independence in the African
revolution while being entangled with complementary and competing visions.

Chapter 2 examines the gendered dimensions of translocality in Nkrumaist Ghana
through the Pan-African women’s movement contributions to development and their
ambiguous relationship with the state. I centre on the archival records of Ghanaian Pan-
African activists, female CPP members and propagandists, the Women’s Organization, and
Afro-American moderates and radicals, as well as white-British, Eastern European and
American women working close to Nkrumah. The importance here is to reflect on the
transnational networks of women self-assertion, internationalism, and claim making within the politics of Ghanaian national development and Pan-Africanism. As well as the hierarchical racial and gendered terrain in which limited, and sometimes empowered, women differently within the Nkrumaist state related to race and geographic background. It further draws attention to the 1960 Conference of African Women and Women of African Descent and the pairing of nuclear non-proliferation to development as forums for the greater inclusion of women in Pan-Africanism and development. The CPP had opened up spaces for women in the party, yet the transnational activisms of these women have seldom been mentioned in reference to the Nkrumaist Pan-African state. By exploring the entanglement of women around the world, centred on Ghana development, I reveal their importance in creating and shaping translocality.

Responding to the call for engagement with Ghana’s foreign policy in the 1960s, Chapter 3 examines the Pan-African postcolonial connectivities and non-aligned internationalism of the Nkrumaist state to 1966. The focus is on how the state put into practice the ideology and developmental paradigm of Nkrumahism continentally and in relation to the Cold War. It explores political and economic diplomacy, including the African Unity and ‘World without the Bomb’ Conferences, and Ghana’s role in advocating for the formation of the Organization of African Unity, the All-African Trade Union and the ‘free trade zone in Africa’. Such economic diplomacy tied national development to the continental restructuring of an imbalance of power in international trade, the creation of a free trade area in Africa, a joint external tariff and creation of a fund to stabilize prices of primary products. Through this engagement, Nkrumah had to navigate Cold War tensions
to try to create a unified anti-racist, anti-nuclear, and economically independent Africa, in which Ghanaian national development served as a resource. Accra became a centre – one of many – for holding Pan-African conferences, meetings of heads of states, and for the economic and political training of revolutionaries. However, tensions arose in advocating for mixed-market economic harmonization among member states within a United States of Africa that had to balance individual sovereignties, national politics, and pre-existing disputes. Nkrumah’s prevention of the East African Federation, intervention in Togoland in 1963 and insistence on the repatriation of political refugees also reveal the contradictions of his Pan-Africanism in practice. Despite these tensions, the Nkrumahist state sought the harmonization of national development schemes in order to promote Pan-Africanism as a non-aligned independent force in the world for nuclear non-proliferation, continental sovereignty, and development.

Chapter 4 explores the translocal politics of development finance procurement and controversy over the economic policies and performance of Ghana from 1960 to 1968. I draw attention to what I term the liberal-disciplinary consensus that emerged which used neoclassical economics to characterize Ghana as undergoing a balance of payments crisis that required a suspension of new loans and extensions to pressure transition into liberalization directed by the IMF and IBRD. This crisis was interpreted as the result of the economically irrational state-directed and overspending policies of Nkrumah, who was unwilling to submit to so-called liberal disciplines. However, the economic performance of the state was contested by the Bank of Ghana and the Ghana government, whose reports from 1963-65 show economic expansion and identify the causes of balance of payments
deficit in long-term reliance on non-preferential foreign lending. Despite this, the Nkrumah government had just published the Seven Year Development Plan (SYDP) in 1963 and needed investment to remedy a depleted foreign currency reserve to be able to fund the development projects and continue to push for the Pan-African revolution. However, interdepartmental debates in Britain, correspondence with the U.S and the release of IMF and IBRD mission economic reports over the course of three years, Britain and the U.S began, in principle, to recognize the legitimacy of Nkrumah’s requests but in practice actively delayed and denied extending or offering new loans. This even took the form of lobbying Western-Eastern European governments against entering into discussions with Ghana. Within these debates, by narrowing on the Volta Loan Extension, I identify how Ghanaian national development was situated within the translocal politics of liberal-disciplinary consensus building in the Cold War that advocated for Nkrumah to adopt disciplines directed by the IMF and World Bank.

The conclusion explores the unmaking of Nkrumaism in Ghana by the National Liberation Council, particularly the educational, economic, and political policies passed in 1966-1967 that saw a reversal of the SYDP and non-alignment toward liberal reform. In the end, the Nkrumaist vision, wrought with ambiguities and contradictions in practice, was an attempt to articulate a vision of national development premised on Pan-Africanism, non-aligned open-transnational cooperation and participation in the revolution against colonialism. Accordingly, only by achieving unity and economic independence from foreign control could a standard of living and decolonial freedom be achieved – at least in theory. The conclusion addresses the historiographical and theoretical implications for
understanding postcolonial nationalism and development within this particular theatre between 1957-1968, not through the lens of narrow nationalism, non-Western alternatives or internal tensions confined territorially-culturally, but through translocality – the postcolonial connectivities and competing developmental visions of the future. It further reflects on the translocal legacy of Nkrumaist Ghana and the post-Nkrumah period of successive military regimes using data from Pan-Africanist Today annual meetings in Winneba and Accra. Nkrumah and his vision, just like in the 1960s, permeates the consciousness of Ghanaians and continental-diasporic Pan-African activists. The question of Ghana’s future and place within the global political economy, still remains entangled with all those government planners, foreign experts, and international creditors with their own ideas about Ghana’s development.
Chapter 1 – Making Nkrumaism: From Theory to Practice, From Nation to World, 1957-1968

This Chapter provides an intellectual history of Nkrumaism as the translocal development ideology for the postcolonial state from 1957 to 1966. As discussed, the mainstream scholarship on Kwame Nkrumah continues to over-emphasize his narrow nationalism, adherence to imported ideas, and the failures of his state interventionist project in Ghana. In contrast, the critical non-Western literature emphasizes the postcolonial possibilities of his thought as a potential transcendent alternative to neoliberalism. As a point of departure, I argue for an alternative reading of Nkrumah within a translocal context that centres on the tensions, ambiguities, and connectivities of his thought and action as a system. To accomplish this, the first section explores Nkrumah’s shifting fiscal policies at independence and the core state development policies during his leadership. This includes the 2nd Five Year Plan (1958-1963) and the Seven-Year Plan for National Development and Reconstruction (1963/64-1969/70). I then examine Nkrumah’s theory of consciencism, showing how this theory – created to legitimize policy in Africentric terms and address critics – provides a rationality for the state’s political-economic transnational policies. In doing so, I answer the core questions; how did Nkrumah reconcile his positionality and the selective appropriation of Marxism/socialism with his Africentric philosophical consciencism? How does his Africentric theory ground Nkrumaism and differ from Marxism, socialist big push economics, and other African leaders of the post-World War II period such as Julius Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda? Further, how did Nkrumah confront the economic realities of postcolonial development, the Cold War and why did he rely on foreign investment and debt to combat neocolonialism? In conjunction with these
questions, I explore Nkrumah’s promotion and reconciliation of African nationalism with Pan-African Unity in his theoretical work and development policies.

Nkrumah’s navigation of these tensions of translocality were dynamic, and at times self-reflexive, although in practice often remained unresolved. His published works solicited mixed praise among African state leaders, becoming official revolutionary doctrine in Ben Bella’s Algeria in 1961 and official diplomatic condemnation and threat of sanctions from the United States in 1965. There was a notable radicalization of his ideas after the 1966 military coup d’état, although they were no longer the official ideology of the state. Nkrumah became more centred on revolutionary-guerrilla action to confront (neo)colonialism rather than economic development. Nkrumah’s philosophical conscientism, Pan-African nationalism and selective appropriation of development, the state, and economic doctrine provides evidence of postcolonial nationalism that is grounded in a transnational struggle for Unity and decolonization. The purpose of this chapter is not only to provide a translocal reading of Nkrumah’s political and economic thought, but also to show how Nkrumah’s idea of Ghana’s national development was translocal in scope which allowed for multiple contexts to become entangled and co-constitutive with development.

By exploring Nkrumah’s thought and action, culminating in his operationalization of Ghana’s national development as a resource for the Pan-African revolution in the neocolonial global Cold War, this Chapter sets the translocal context in which the dissertation is organized. All the other activists, contexts and connectivities that follow are situated within, the result of, entangled with, or are inspired by this translocality at the core.
of Nkrumah’s vision of the future for postcolonial Ghana and Africa in the world. Further, Nkrumah himself developed his ideas within a milieu or international exchanges and networks, appropriating and deploying ideas mediated through his unique experiences.

Economic Planning for Economic Independence and Unity, 1957-1964

The advice you have given me, sound though it may be, is essentially from the economic point of view, and I have told you, on many occasions, that I cannot always follow this advice as I am a politician and must gamble on the future.\(^1\)

In October 1957 Caribbean economist William Arthur Lewis, who had been present at the independence celebration a year prior, returned to Ghana to take up the position of chief economic advisor to Kwame Nkrumah. Lewis was one of many professionals from the diaspora who took up posts in Ghana and also had experience in colonial administrations.

Born in St. Lucia to a middle class family of Anglican school teachers, Lewis became a quintessential figure of professionals from the British West Indies, struggling to understand the connections between wealth/power and poverty/powerlessness in (post)colonial development.\(^2\) He played a role in Caribbean nationalist movements and the Moyne Commission in 1938 which was a colonial inquiry into labour unrest in the British Caribbean.\(^3\) He received his PhD from the London School of Economics in 1940.\(^4\) Central to Lewis’s thought was the idea that developed countries advanced by capitalist sectors appropriating the resource-labour of non-capitalist subsistence sectors, providing the basis

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\(^1\) Letter from Kwame Nkrumah to Arthur Lewis (August 1, 1958), Copied from Keenleyside File, Lewis Papers, Box. Enclosed in RG 17/1/183 (PRAAD Accra, Ghana).
\(^3\) Ibid., 33.
\(^4\) As a trained development economist Lewis would publish his seminal works in 1956-57 and received a Nobel Prize in 1979, coining the ‘Lewis Model’.
for industrialization.\textsuperscript{5} Lewis was not a Marxist but did have socialist leanings, and read Paul Rosentstein-Rodan believing that the state, operating in complementarity with the interests of labour, could function as an effective mechanism for coordinating development. He was a ‘centrist’ voice of caution and proponent of export led mixed-market labour intensive industrialization.\textsuperscript{6} However, 15 months after taking up the position alongside Nkrumah, Lewis left Ghana because of an irreconcilable dispute with the direction of the Second Five Year Plan (2\textsuperscript{nd} FYP) announced in 1958.

Contextually, the post-Korean war commodity boom in the early 1950s meant that the late colonial government had benefited from high prices of staple commodities such as cocoa and gold.\textsuperscript{7} There was approximately $100 million in funds available to subsidize industrial development policies which both Lewis and Nkrumah agreed had to be based in export-led growth and a shift toward manufacturing. Lewis had previously produced a Report on Industrialisation in the Gold Coast\textsuperscript{8} published in 1953 offering an analysis of agriculture and the colonial economy, making policy recommendations on industrialization. He argued that “priority public expenditures” had to be made before industrialization, and to provide strong trade protections for vital-struggling industries in

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{6} Arthur Lewis (1960), Lewis argues for two policy paths developing states should take, depending on the existing manufacturing potential and agricultural sector.
  \item \textsuperscript{7} Marian Radetzki, “The Anatomy of Three Commodity Booms,” Resources Policy 31 (2006), 58. Ultimately this was a ‘transient phenomenon’ and despite Killick’s (2015) claim, did not produce sustained long term price advantage surplus.
  \item \textsuperscript{8} Arthur Lewis, Report on Industrialisation in the Gold Coast (1953). This report contains Lewis’s recommendations for industrial and labor policy describing “industrialisation [in Ghana circa 1953] is a substitute for unemployment, and is necessarily one of the two major objectives of economic policy, the other objective being to maximise the output of agriculture.” (Paragraph, 222).
\end{itemize}
support of mixed-planning investment and coordinated projects. During consultation and
drafting of the 2nd FYP, Lewis began to confront Nkrumah on the constant revisions
towards implementing what he termed white elephant or prestige projects – those that have
a high cost with low-value return. Lewis believed that Nkrumah was too political, letting
his political passions persuade economic reasoning. Even on cocoa, where Lewis
supported use of central resources to address a range of issues such as insecticide spraying
and the introduction of selective technologies, Lewis and Nkrumah disagreed on which
department would be responsible. Lewis favored the Ministry of Agriculture while
Nkrumah wanted it to be done by the Cocoa Marketing Board, because as Lewis
contended, it would allow preferential subcontracting and potential bribes that the CPP
could engage in. Most contentiously, they clashed on Nkrumah’s diversion of finances for
‘pet projects’ and the scaling back of social services, health, and education related schemes
for those Nkrumah gave priority to in the name of industrialization and Pan-Africanism.

In a letter to Nkrumah written on August 1, 1958, after a series of attempts by
Lewis to intervene in the drafting on the 2nd FYP, he describes the plan as making:

…inadequate provision for some essential services while according the
highest priority to a number of second importance….Alas, the main reason
for this lack of balance is that the plan contains too many schemes on
which the Prime Minister is insisting for “political reasons.”

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9 Ibid., 234 and 235.
10 Ibid.
11 Arthur Lewis, Autobiographical Note.
13 Letter from Lewis to Nkrumah (August 1, 1958), enclose in Keenleyside File, Lewis Papers, Box.
It was not just the political instrumentalization of the plan which garnered Lewis’s criticism, nor the de-prioritization of essential services, but it was the diversion of funds for projects that had been agreed upon that was most upsetting. Nkrumah’s priorities included diverting nearly 20% of the FYP budget for nonessential items such as yachts for VIPs, international conference centre, and a floating dock.\textsuperscript{14} In the same letter, Lewis describes these items as being “pet schemes of a sort which neither develop the country nor increase the comfort of the people” and instead result in a “…cut down severely on water supplies, health centers, technical schools, roads.”\textsuperscript{15} Lewis concluded, urging Nkrumah as a “fellow socialist” to limit his spending while the majority of Ghanaians suffer from a lack of access to services and live in poverty.\textsuperscript{16} In other words, Lewis’s model of essential services and supportive industrialization prioritized what he saw as the needs of the people.\textsuperscript{17}

In response to these criticisms, Nkrumah refused the advice of Lewis and in his defence, makes a clear distinction about the political nature of national development and to think beyond the economic point of view. He rebukes that “The advice you have given me, sound though it may be, is essentially from the economic point of view… I am a politician and must gamble on the future.”\textsuperscript{18} The £18 million in what Lewis denounced as pet projects were defended by Nkrumah as being essential for diplomacy and hosting African leaders.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{14} 2\textsuperscript{nd} Five Year Development Plan, Development Committee, Government of Ghana RG/1/12 (PRAAD Accra, Ghana).
\textsuperscript{15} Lewis, \textit{Report on Industrialisation in the Gold Coast} (1953), Paragraph, 240.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{18} Kwame Nkrumah to William Arthur Lewis (August 1, 1958).
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid; See also Kwame Nkrumah, \textit{Dark Days in Ghana} (Panaf Books Ltd., 1968). Written in 1968 Conakry, Guinea while in exile, Nkrumah reflects on what had been achieved economically and defends his development planning.
Nkrumah had a vision of the future in which the economic development path of the state was a means to achieve political independence against neocolonialism and to support transnational liberation movements and Pan-African unity. His ideas were also changing, adapting to shifts in the price of commodities and internationalist tensions relating to anticolonial liberation on the continent, Pan-Africanism, the Cold War and developmental aid procurement. This episode with Lewis however reveals not only the impact of the transnational migration of experts to Ghana’s postcolonial development project, but also provides an entry into exploring the ideas and practice of Nkrumaism. National economic development was a political project of imagining a future, not just for Ghana but for the world. This meant that development economics had to be rationalized through Nkrumah’s internationalist Pan-African word view.

Indeed, Nkrumah’s development vision for Ghana was centred – reflected in the 2nd FYP – on developing for the future, establishing a shift toward industrialization with supporting public services to create a modern economy independent from the pressures of outside forces and in service of the African revolution. Yet, the FYP published into policy in 1959 after its presentation to the Assembly by Nkrumah on March 1959 has been interpreted as a compromise by Nkrumah and the ‘conservatives’ within Ghana, those who had worked with British colonial officials.20 The plan’s financing was to come overwhelmingly from public funds; £50 million from the government of Ghana’s reserve and another £50 million from the reserves of the Cocoa Marketing Board. The central

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20 Tignor, *Development Economics* (2006); This interpretation does not account for Nkrumah’s willingness to adopt export-led industrialization buttressed by social services, it was not so much a compromise as an eagerness by Nkrumah to enact a welfare state.
government, as seen through the Development Committee, were to finance 80% of phase 1. The plan had privileged economic rather than social programs, despite allotting 61% to infrastructure, health, housing, education, and public services, while 19% for central government, 12% for manufacturing and 8% for agriculture. Nkrumah claimed in a National Assembly debate on March 4, 1959 that the plan would “give us a solid foundation to build the welfare state... to give us a standard of living which will abolish disease, poverty, and illiteracy, give our people ample food, and good housing, and let us advance as a nation.” However, the original deficit forecast skyrocketed to ₤343 million due to the inclusion of projects, because of Nkrumah’s insistence that they would promote industrialization and diversification of new industries, the core aims of the plan. While the initial publication of the 2nd FYP provoked praise by some commentators, the new numbers for phase 2 prompted the Bank of England and the Economist to express fears that Ghana would exhaust foreign reserves and securities to follow, what J.M Loyes called “a pipe dream.”

Despite the mounting criticisms of development, Nkrumah’s previous position as Economic Secretary in the British colonial government of the Gold Coast, had an early record of what can be described as fiscal conservatism in his contribution to the 1st FYD in 1950-1955. In the 1953-54 fiscal year, 10% of the gross national product was saved. Thus

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21 2nd Five Year Development Plan, Development Committee, Government of Ghana RG/1/12 (PRAAD Accra, Ghana).
25 No. 18, J. Loynes to A.W Snelling, April 3, 1959, PRO DO 35/9303 (The National Archives Kew, UK).
“the Government put aside for public development £1 out of every £10 worth of wealth produced.”26 During the same period, “the corresponding figure for public saving in the United Kingdom was just over 3% of the gross national product,” while that of “the United States was just under 2%.”27 Through careful economic planning for independence and through monetary instruments between 1951 and 1955, Nkrumah raised the national income from £20 million to £65 million per annum, while expenditure rose from £14 million to £52 million.28 The country was further able to pay external debts while developing a reserve of foreign assets and currency.29 Nkrumah had left £500 million of reserves, accumulated during the colonial period (from 1951 to 1956), in “long-term low interest British securities” which were not allowed to be accessed by the British.30 From these investments and savings which included a yearly surplus from government investment into the mining industry 1952-1955, Nkrumah’s internal self-government designed the 1st Five Year Development Plan (1st FYP) and embarked on developmental projects without outside loans. These projects targeted social and public supports, ranging from the creation of a compulsory elementary school education, technical institutes and secondary schools such as Kumase College and the University of Ghana campus. It further included the construction of secondary schools, hospitals and healthcare training programs for nursing, midwifery, public as well as supporting major roads and railway infrastructures.

26 Kwame Botwe-Asamoah, (2012),
27 Kwame Nkrumah Announcement of the Five Year Development Plan (1954).
29 Nkrumah; Statistics Bank of Ghana, 73, RG/17/2/183 (PRAAD Accra, Ghana).
When contrasting Nkrumah’s experience during the 1st FYP, the first two years of implementation of the 2nd FYP saw changes to commodity prices and increased political tensions which drained foreign reserves and made it difficult for the government to fund phase 1 without taking on debt.\textsuperscript{31} The price of agricultural commodities, in which the economy was centred around, began to lose the relative price advantage that it had enjoyed in 1952-1957 due to less demand.\textsuperscript{32} Nkrumah believed a possible solution rested in creating a central Ghanaian banking system separate from the monetary disciplines arranged by the British West African Currency Board (WACB).\textsuperscript{33} These were according to the CPP line, “colonial international economic arrangements.”\textsuperscript{34} The WACB was created to supply foreign currency, fixing the West African Pound to sterling and determining the exchange rate value and inflation rates.\textsuperscript{35} This prevented the government from printing currency without securing it with foreign reserves, but kept inflation at 1\% in 1957 and 0\% in 1958 because of the stability against pound-sterling depreciation.\textsuperscript{36} An independent system would provide greater autonomy for development from the perspective of Nkrumah. As a result, the CPP went into talks with the WACB to put forward the Bank of Ghana Ordinance which was passed by the British Parliament in 1957. This Ordinance emphasized the need to assert monetary discipline and prevent political interference.

\textsuperscript{31} Report on the FYP.
\textsuperscript{33} Kwame Nkrumah, Nkrumah’s Notes on the WACB.
\textsuperscript{34} “CPP calls for a central bank,” \textit{Ghana News}. RG/17/2/183 (PRAAD Accra, Ghana).
\textsuperscript{35} The WACB Bank, (The National Archives Kew, UK).
\textsuperscript{36} Bank of Ghana, RG/17/2/183 (PRAAD Accra, Ghana).
By 1960, Ghana’s foreign reserves were nearly exhausted and the government began to borrow from the Bank to ease the deficit and continue to fund the FYP. The tension between Nkrumah and the Bank became increasingly evident as the government began to issue short-term non-interest treasure bills and enacted the Exchange Control Act of 1961 to slow the pace of foreign reserve depletion. There was also a shift in the price per ton of cocoa on the world market, which began to impact the drain of foreign reserves and forecasted wealth generated by the agricultural sector to be used for development. In 1957-1960 the price was more than $1,000 per ton, but fell yearly by nearly 20% to $210 per ton in 1965. Some commentators of the period claim that "within a few days after Nkrumah’s fall, cocoa for delivery in March-May 1966 was quoted on the London exchange at $499.66 a ton.” This has less to do with conspiracy, and more with the easing of import regulations and the Cocoa Marketing Board which long served as the ‘middle man’ between firms and producers. Regardless, price fluctuations of cocoa on the world market had significant impact on the capacity of the state to generate and maintain surplus for development planning.

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In October of 1961 Nkrumah created the Planning Commission, a re-organizing of the Development Committee, to draft the Seven Year Development Plan (SYDP).\(^{41}\) The Bank of Ghana Act of 1963 was passed to allow the government to print money, while in theory, maintaining the stability of the credit. The drafting of the SYDP took nearly 3 years, and was contentious. As Gerardo Serra notes, there were debates between indigenous and foreign economists, key and important revisions made by Polish economist Jan Drewnowski.\(^{42}\) The SYDP was posed to remedy the foreign reserves deficit by soliciting controlled foreign investment in the co-operative industrial sector, with a focus on electrical generating and industry-support services such as roads. The economic goals of the SYDP were to promote maximum cooperation between the state and co-operative productive sectors in a mixed planning economy, to regulate state investment, to “determine and direct” terms of foreign investment. More generally, repeated throughout the document, are the “four cardinal principles… the welfare of her [Ghana] people, the building of a socialist society, the independence and Unity of Africa and the preservation of world peace.”\(^{43}\) Indeed, as Nkrumah remarked, it was the most extensive and expensive development plan in the history of West-Africa, a move that would surely “turn Ghana into the sort of country we envisage.”\(^{44}\)

\(^{44}\) Kwame Nkrumah, Address to the National Assembly, March 11, 1961. (PRAAD Accra, Ghana).
As Jeffrey Grischow and Holger Weiss accurately argue, within the new political and economic historiography, the SYDP itself should be read not just as an economic document, but as a moral document which provides a picture of the future. The document provides multiple references to “the future progress and development of Ghana” and promotion of African Unity. Re-reviewing this document, specifically the section titled “African Unity and Ghana’s Economic Development Policy” as a moral document, highlights the transnational ambition of the SYDP [Illustration 1]. The section describes the considerations made in national development to benefit and promote Unity, such as producing in demand products for neighbors to influence trade. For Ghana, this meant a transition from primary commodity exports such as cocoa, timber and minerals to “medium and heavy manufacturing industry based on modern technology.” The SYDP would create “extremely favorable conditions” for foreign investment and the “scale of projected development will make it necessary for Government to borrow on a fairly extensive scale.” The completion of the Volta Project, expected in 1966, would make Ghana one of the only developing countries with “a sizeable surplus of electrical energy” powering the SYDP avoiding the “bottleneck” faced by poor countries. The balance of payments, which would become a key point in the discursive formation of a narrative about economic

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47 Ibid., 16.
48 Ibid., 16-17.
49 Ibid., 28.
crisis, is interpreted as a result of being traditionally dependent on cocoa. With a diversified trade, favorable foreign investment conditions and inter-continental trade, with energy surplus, Ghana will be able to pay for its goods, services, and loans.  

In order to address the depletion of the foreign reserves and currency inflations, foreign investment, regulated by the state for the interest of Ghanaians, still had to be utilized to fund development to achieve Nkrumah’s SYDP. Critics denounced the plan as overly ambitious. Addressing this point to the national assembly on March 11 1964, Nkrumah confidently announced that;

We welcome foreign investors in a spirit of partnership. They can earn their profits here, provided they leave us an agreed portion for promoting the welfare and happiness of our people as a whole as against the greedy ambitions of the few. From what we get out of this partnership, we hope to be able to expand the health services of our people, to feed and house them well, to give them more and better educational institutions and to see to it that they have a rising standard of living. This in a nutshell is what we expect from our socialist objectives… At the same time, we expect them to reinvest share of their profits in the further progress, both of Ghana and of themselves.  

Nkrumah was well aware of the predatory nature of international lending, the debt trap as he referred to it at a PM address for the Commonwealth.

Despite the importance of socialism to Nkrumah’s thought, he was not dogmatic in its doctrines. Instead, as will be shown, he combined foreign investment, aid, and private enterprise within a mixed-planning state directed economy. Neglected in Killick’s characterization was the fact that at independence the Ghanaian economy was dependent on

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51 Ibid., 29, 30-35.
53 Kwame Nkrumah Speech at the Annual Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference.
cocoa exports, lacked developed public services, and had an outward directed economy favoring British firms and regulatory institutions. To remedy this, immediate industrialization, public services, and networks needed to be built to reconstruct the economy and re-orient its position within the global political economy. However, given the lack of available finance, Nkrumah needed to generate and attract donor capital to fund development projects such as the Akosombo Dam and Tema Harbor. In a sessional address to the Ghanaian national assembly, Nkrumah noted:

> We welcome foreign investment provided that there are no strings attached to it, and also provided that it fits in with our plans for national development and our socialist policy. And we insist that foreign investment should not interfere or meddle with the political life of our country.

Furthermore, his government did not nationalize key sectors of the economy or appropriate companies *en masse*. Nkrumah’s mixed capitalist-socialist economy may seem like a contradiction, but when viewed within the context of his system, it provided a method to achieve economic independence to combat neocolonialism. Nkrumah assumed that a strong state with a populist political party dedicated to the revolution would be able to control these components of neocolonialism. Despite the ‘common sense’ characterization of Nkrumah, he grounded his thought in Africentric non-atheistic materialism and

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57 There is debate over whether to use Afrocentrism or Africentrism. I have chosen to use Africentrism, as Kwasi Boadi (2000) argues, the term evokes historical connections to cosmologies and cultures that reorients knowledge production away from European origins to the anteriority of ‘Africa’. This concern also reflects earlier debates in the 1960s and 1970s on African Socialism. Nkrumah himself claimed that “the term African socialism is meaningless and irrelevant,” despite being used by “European commentators,” as it fetishizes traditional communal society, ignoring its pre-colonial power relations See Kwame Nkrumah, *Dark Days in Ghana*. (Hasrek Ghana Ltd, 1968).
selectively appropriated both socialism and capitalism in the pursuit of economic independence towards non-coloniality.

I propose then to read Nkrumaism as a developing system of thought that informs political-economic action, self-reflexive and full of tensions, ambiguities, and connectivities. There are two multilayered tensions explored historically. Rather than adhere to doctrinaire socialism, Nkrumah adapted to context. He utilized a mixed-planning economy that incorporated Western investment and aid – components of neocolonialism – coordinated by the state to fund development projects. Lastly, while Nkrumah articulated a post-Westphalian project centred on the co-constitution of African nationalism with Pan-Africanism in service of the African revolution, his vision nonetheless entailed antagonisms between the duel promotion of national and continental consciousness and coordinated economic activity while simultaneously re-affirming and denying national territory as a basis for belonging. Nkrumah’s navigation of these tensions reveals his thought as a dynamic self-reflexive decolonial praxis, adapting to global-national political-economic contexts by appropriating party politics, the state, and economic development doctrines. Contrary to the dominant narrative, Nkrumah should not be thought of as a narrow nationalist or decolonial liberator. Instead, Nkrumah thought of nationalism and development in co-constitution with Pan-Africanism and connected to the world.

Tensions and Connectivity: Ontology for Economic Development and Unity, 1960-1964
Within a year of independence, Nkrumah issued special stamps to commemorate independence and his economic-political vision for the country. The Commonwealth Relations Office in London criticized the expenditures on changing the stamp. Nkrumah wrote in reply that “My Cabinet have decided, with my agreement, to put my head on the coinage, because many of my people cannot read or write. They’ve got to be shown that they are now really independent.” To be sure, these expenditures also came under criticism within Ghana, as a waste of resources. After 1964, the Nkrumah government once again re-inscribed the stamps and changed the national currency, greater reflecting imagery of Nkrumah and his political ideology of socialist development and uplift for Pan-Africanism. As Nkrumah began to move toward consolidation of one-party rule there were increased expenditures to promote symbolic nationalism and the criminalization of dissidents. The idea of a modern African, properly educated in Nkrumaism, self-sacrificing for the nation in pursuit of continental Unity against neocolonialism, was reflected in the artworks by Felix Severin Kawgami distributed by the CPP, which emphasized collective labour, modernization, and nationalism. These acts of symbolic nationalism became synonymous with criticisms of Nkrumah that he was self-grandiose and detached from the needs of Ghanaians. However, he saw the situation differently.

59 Kwame Nkrumah, “Why the Queen’s Head is Coming Off Our Coins.” Daily Graphic (June 21, 1957), 12.
60 Ghana Newspaper Editorial
61 Fuller, “Father of the Nation,” (2015), 45.
Nkrumah, in a private letter to June Milne in early 1960, expresses his discomfort with this assessment and need to begin to reflect and address his critics by justifying political-economic development vision through African terms. Nkrumah recognized the tension inherent in appropriating education and alien political-economic concepts for the anticolonial struggle, he provides an important meditation on the colonial student at the beginning of Consciencism (1964). He argued that the colonial student is an outsider to Europe who “does not by origin belong to the intellectual history” in which the university is founded. That origin is his existence as a colonial subject, dehumanized by colonial knowledge production that delegitimizes non-Western experience and knowledge. Accordingly, it is when the colonial student loses sight of this fact and becomes “so seduced by these attempts to give a philosophical account of the universe, that he surrenders his whole personality to them.” The African personality, Nkrumah argues, is replaced with an internalized European narrative of the universe. This process is often slow, starting at a young age through European education prompting a drifting away from traditional ways of life and knowing – “from their roots.” The colonial student subsequently “loses sight of the fundamental social fact that he is a colonial subject.” Thus, Nkrumah warns, that such a being becomes complacent against confronting colonial

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63 Mrs June Milne, (1962), RG/17/1/262 (PRAAD Accra, Ghana).
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid., 4.
67 Ibid.
domination which “conditions the immediate life of every colonized African” and instead acting in the colonial administration as enlightened servants.68

In contrast to such a particular colonial student, Nkrumah states unequivocally that he is among those Africans whom “sought knowledge as an instrument of national emancipation and integrity,” a tool to aid in the liberation struggle.69 Once colonialism had been defeated, education could then be used for cultural and social benefits enjoyed by “free men” and reflective of their unique African experience.70 In many ways, Nkrumah’s intellectual upbringing had reflected his early education in the Roman Catholic missions and the Prince of Wales' College at Achimota in 1930. They were first shaped by his Akan heritage and earlier education in Ghana by West-African nationalists Nnamdi Azikiwe and Dr. Kwagyir Aggrey, who had introduced him to W.E.B DuBois and Marcus Garvey. He also attended secondary school in the United Kingdom and the United States in 1935. The international dimensions of his politics developed within a milieu of organizing conferences for the West African Students Union, spending summers with Harlem Activists while attending Pennsylvania University and debating the works of Marcus Garvey, George Padmore, Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin and W.E.B. DuBois. Nkrumah played a key organization role alongside Padmore in the Fifth Pan-African Congress of 1945 in Manchester. This Congress was the first to demand an end to colonialism and racism, as well as the establishment of a United States of Africa. Rather than advocate for

68 Ibid., 5.
69 Ibid., 4.
70 Ibid.
constitutional reforms, participants, including Nkrumah, argued for complete independence and Unity.

As Boogaard contends, given the range of Western and non-Western influences, in addition to his own recognition of the risks associated with education, Nkrumah occupied the position of “multiple modernities”; he was able to appropriate and apply tools learned in the metropole for anticolonial pursuits.71 He was among a class of Africans educated in Western institutions and situated within transnational activist networks whom took up positions within nationalist politics. These individuals were refashioning Pan-African discourses from the Americas concerned with Christian civilization, colonization schemes, and racial politics into an anti-colonial politics.72 The explicit goal of forming an independent nation state working towards Pan-Africanism became the overarching goal of Nkrumah from 1945-56. Many of these individuals who inspired Nkrumah, such as W.E.B Dubois, would take up positions in the government. Dubois, serving as Advisor to the President, was provided large residence in the Cantonments district of Accra. He was responsible for not only consulting with Nkrumah on matters related to Pan-African promotion, he was commissioned to create an African history archive, a multi-volume study on continental precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial history spanning the continent.73 This massive undertaken was never completed before his death in 1963, but the relationship and impact Dubois had on Nkrumah was longstanding. Dubois’s wife, Shirley

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Dubois, who will be discussed in Chapter 2, remained in Ghana. The work and legacy of the Dubois are often cited at Pan-African conferences, and the residence was later turned into the W.E.B. Du Bois Centre for Pan-Africanism, a site of learning and memorialization. If Nkrumah indeed utilized his colonial education without losing sight of his unique African personality in the pursuit of anticolonial liberation and Pan-Africanism, how then can we think through his adoption of scientific socialism and the one-party state as the singular strategy for decolonization? Are these ideas not alien as Ayittey contends? Are they economically naïve and/or reflective of a non-Western alternative? How should the historian approach this problem within the context of a polarized historiography that has tended to neglect the intellectual history of Nkrumah’s engagement with these questions. One must look at how Nkrumah navigated this tension, as well as the historical development of his political-economic ideology in reference to Marxism and liberal/neo-liberal economics. I do this by engaging with the context and writings of Nkrumah as an archive from which to explore his political-economic thought. I will now shift focus to Nkrumah’s ontology – founding presuppositions – in his theory which are the basis of his political and economic policies of national mixed-planning socialist development for Pan-Africanism.

**Philosophical Consciencism and the Development of Africa**

Nkrumah’s thought and selective epistemological appropriation of socialism was justified through the creation of what he termed philosophical consciencism, which provides an
Africentric ontology of non-atheistic materialism. Although a non-atheistic materialism had been expressed in works such as Leibenz’s materialism, consciencism was formulated by Nkrumah with the explicit goal to “disinherit colonialism” and provide the basis for an “ideology whose aim shall be to contain the African experience of Islamic and Euro-Christian presence as well as the experience of the traditional African society, and, by gestation, employ them for the harmonious growth and development of that society.” It was the foundation of the Nkrumaist ideology, which became required reading for the CPP study group which organized students to discuss specific readings. According to some historians, the text is indicative of Nkrumah’s belief that he embodied a Platonic philosopher king, acting on the belief that his philosophy would enable a decolonial future. Nkrumah, however, took issue with the great men theory of history, asserting in his private notes:

Fundamentally, I do not believe in the great men theory of history, but I do think that so-called great men of history merely personify the synthesis of the tangled web of the material and historical forces at play.

The controversial tightening of power by the CPP, punishment of dissidents, and utilization of education to teach the values of Nkrumaism, would be seen to challenge his contention.

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75 Nkrumah, *Consciencism* (1970), 70.
76 C.P.P. Study Group, 1960-1964, RG 17/1/441 (PRAAD Accra, Ghana).
77 Gerardo Serra; Tony Killick.
78 Kwame Nkrumah, “Gold Coast Notebook Nkrumah’s Private Notes Containing Notes, Statements and Other Analytic Comments on Important Issues,” SC21/10/1A (PRAAD Accra, Ghana).
Nkrumah also would play on religious imagery in speeches and in popularized songs about Osagyefo, the redeemer, often sung before community meetings or during public events.\(^{79}\)

Even in Biney’s work, consciencism is presented as a “synthesizing ideology” for “competing class interests” in the various elements of the Ghana Young Pioneers, Ghana Trade Union Congress, the National Cooperative Council, the National Council and the United Farmers Council.\(^{80}\) It was a way to capture the needs of political groups while appealing to a wider majority under a distilled ideological framework – Nkrumaism. This narrative provides policy rationale behind expenditures into currency iconography, education reform, and promotions of Nkrumaism that were thread through internationalist rhetoric.\(^{81}\) Biney even speculates in a short paragraph that because the first edition of Consciencism referenced Nkrumah’s dedication to the encouragement and assistance received from “my Philosophy Club,” she posits that it is “plausible that other individuals wrote the book.”\(^{82}\) Biney does hedge this claim by including the testimony of Basner, who is reported to have engaged in discussion about the texts contents before publication.\(^{83}\) However, Nkrumah was a member of political philosophy reading clubs in London and Harlem in the 1930s and 1940s and also begins the 1\(^{st}\) edition talking about his educational upbringing as an answer to critics.\(^{84}\) Regardless, this text requires a closer look to show its

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\(^{80}\) Ama Biney, Political and Social Thought of Kwame Nkrumah (United States: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 127.

\(^{81}\) This argument is also reflected in Harcourt Fuller, “Father of the Nation: Ghanaian Nationalism, Internationalism and the Political Iconography of Kwame Nkrumah, 1957 – 2010” African Studies Quarterly 16(1) (2015).

\(^{82}\) Ibid., 125.

\(^{83}\) Ibid; See also Basner.

\(^{84}\) Nkrumah Autobiography.
contribution to the intellectual history of Nkrumaism and its translocal core. The first draft was published in 1964, with a few additional amendments made in 1970, although the contents were written by Nkrumah during 1960-1964. The amendments were made during a “phase of armed struggle,” after Nkrumah had been removed from power and exiled in 1966. What is important in Biney, however, is the observation of the ‘Authors Note’ in the 2nd edition, and that the text merges theory and reality, provoking political action and recognizing Ghana as part of “global humanity.”

It is also important to understand this text and theory because of its transnational role in debates about African Unity. While the Western European and North American press outlets demonized Nkrumah’s theories, African governments found much in them to agree with. Other postcolonial governments, or those involved in building African national movements, were searching from authentically African discourses to draw from to justify policies. Texts like Nkrumah’s offered a universal framework, flexible and general enough to be applied in other one party state contexts. In fact, consciencism became part of the curriculum at the University of Algiers with the first lecture delivered by Ben Bella in 1963. Although the Algerian War of independence had just ended, at times producing heated discussions within Ghana about the use of violence, Bella was faced with counter-revolutionaries and counter plots. Within this political instability, the Algerian government

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85 Ama Biney, 133. It is important to note that the content of the text that I engage with here were part of the original publication, not the amendment.
86 For example, there is evidence that Julius Nyerere in Tanzania used Ujamaa to coercively displace and reorganize villages in the name of development aligned with traditional values, see Bonny Ibhawoh and J.I Dibua, “Deconstructing Ujamaa: The Legacy of Julius Nyerere in the Quest for Social and Economic Development in Africa,” African Journal of Political Science 8(1) (2003). Also worth consulting is the rich literature on African tradition, which need not be referenced here.
formally informed Ghana that President Bella “accepts the theories of conscientism, and firmly supports the idea of a continental government.” A unique version of the theory was even being conceptualized for application in the unique context of the Algerian Maghreb, its connections to the Middle East and Islamic migratory routes. While African states such as Nigeria, United Arab Republic, and those under colonial rule, were critical of Nkrumatism, they nonetheless to varying degrees saw the importance of African Unity and cooperative economic development.

As a theory, conscientism – like historical materialism – contends that matter is primary in the universe and capable of self-motion and change. Although primary, matter is not the single reality or separate from spirit (consciousness/ideas), space, or geography. Therefore there is a deeply entangled and co-constituted relationship between matter with other forms in the universe. Nkrumah draws on both quantum physics and traditional Akan cosmology, reflective of his desire to formulate an Africentric ontology to ground African politics and economics in the present. He claims that space, time, energy and mass are interlinked is reflective of a “principle of Einstein’s, like philosophical conscientism, rejects the independent existence of space.” Nkrumah further draws on religion and African tradition to affirm the non-Cartesian entangled primary existence of matter. He does not reject spiritual existence but rather asserts that matter is primary and ideas/spirit “a

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88 Ibid., Point 2.
89 This will be discussed in Chapter 3.
90 Ibid., 92.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid., 58.
93 Ibid., 88.
derivative category… in order for propositions about spirit to make sense, there must be matter.”[94] Traditional Akan cosmology, with lineage to ancient Egypt, also assigns primacy to matter that is simultaneously entwined with spirit in a tensional relation.[95] As Nkrumah illustrates:

The traditional African standpoint, of course, accepts the absolute and independent idea of matter. If one takes the philosophy of the African, one finds that…matter is not just dead weight but alive with forces in tension…everything that exists, exists as a complex of forces in tension.[96]

Matter as such, is an entangled “plenum of forces in tension” with the incipient ability for dialectical change in properties and qualities: “By a dialectical change, I mean the emergence of a third factor of a higher logical type from the tensions between two factors or two sets of factors of a lower logical type.”[97] This change, which is not linear and continuous, Nkrumah argued, can be spontaneous or result from “categorical conversion”:

The conversion is produced by a dialectical process, and if it is from a lower logical type to a higher logical type, it involves loss of mass. Here again, that loss of mass actually takes place is deducible from Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity. It follows from this theory that every chemical change from simpler substances to more complex substances in so far as it entails the emergence of new properties, represents a loss of mass. Indeed, it represents a conversion of part of the mass of matter. In Einstein’s Theory, the loss is calculable according to the general formula $e = mc^2$ where $e$ represents ergs of energy, $m$ mass, and $c$ the velocity of light… It follows from this that in philosophical conscientism, matter is capable of dialectic change, for if natural properties are nothing but surrogates of quantitative dispositions of matter, then since natural properties change, matter must change in quantitative disposition.[98]

[94] Ibid., 22.
[95] Boadi (2002), 477; 484.
[96] Ibid., 97.
[97] Ibid., 90.
[98] Ibid., 89.
As an expression of positive forces against negative forces in a tensional dialectical relationship – with the potential to produce change – Nkrumah connects this materialism to society. He explains;

It is out of tension that being is born. Becoming is a tension, and being is the child of that tension of opposed forces and tendencies. Just as in the physical universe, the moving object is always impressed upon by external forces, any motion is in fact a resultant, so in society every development, every progressive motion, is a resultant of unharmonious forces, a resultant, a triumph of positive action over negative action.99

This ontology of matter, entangled and tensional, then becomes the Africentric basis for the ethical and political emancipation and unification of Africa.100 This is the grounding philosophy of Nkrumaism, guiding and justifying a particular type of political and social orientation. Emphasizing this point, Nkrumah states that: “Philosophical consciencism consequently adumbrates a political theory and a social-political practice which together seek to ensure that the cardinal principles of ethics [egalitarianism] are effective.”101 The principle of egalitarianism exists in tension with negative forces. Nkrumah connects this reality of matter to subjugated peoples seeking to change their relational status to dominating forces:

But just as a quality can be changed by quantitative (measurable) changes of a critical nature in matter, so this acquiescent impression can be obliterated by a change in the relation of the social forces… Positive action will represent the sum of those forces seeking social justice in terms of the destruction of oligarchic exploitation and oppression. Negative action will correspondingly represent the sum of those forces tending to prolong colonial subjugation and exploitation.102

99 Ibid., 103.
100 Ibid., 99.
101 Ibid., 98.
102 Ibid., 99.
It is within this context that Nkrumah conceptualizes African society as grounded from struggle and actively combating forms of negation. He views colonialism, neocolonialism, and its domestic postcolonial counterpart capitalism at home as negative forces negating positive African movement – “opposing and denying it” through direct political-social subjugation and through more “subtle coercion” after independence. Through a process of becoming conscious (categorical conversion) to this external pressure and positive forces unified, those under colonial conditions can change their properties towards egalitarianism. Thus, while there exist tensions within Nkrumah’s positionality trained at European institutions and selective appropriation of Marxism/socialism, Nkrumah sought to reconcile this by ontologically grounding his thought and politics in Africentric non-atheistic materialism.

In doing so however another tension emerges in Nkrumah’s contention that philosophical consciencism “cannot issue a closed set of ethical rules, a set of rules which apply in any society at any time.” In contrast to this statement, he oft proclaims that to fulfill “the aspirations of Africans… [it] requires the total liberation and unification of Africa under Scientific Socialism,” suggesting a set of political-economic rules for all of Africa. One might be tempted here to read Nkrumah as falling for a seductive alien universalism. To confront this ambiguity, Nkrumah maintains that prior to colonialism, Africa contained forms of egalitarian communalism and values – not a classless idyllic

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103 Ibid., 56; 104.
104 Ibid., 57; 70.
105 Ibid., 93.
society – which cooperatively structured relations, resources and labour. This egalitarian basis of communalism was not only destroyed by slavery and colonialism, but is irreconcilable with capitalism: “The evil of capitalism consists in its alienation of the fruit of labour from those who… produce this fruit. This aspect of capitalism makes it irreconcilable with those basic principles which animate the traditional African society.”

Thus, while capitalism is irreconcilable with tradition, Marxism and socialism are the “restatements in contemporary idiom of the principles underlying communalism.”

Socialism, by reorienting the relationship between labour and capital, provides the conditions for the nurturing of decolonization in knowledge, history, and economics.

According to Nkrumah;

When socialism is true to its purpose, it seeks a connection with the egalitarian and humanist past of the people before their social evolution was ravaged by colonialism; it seeks from the results of colonialism those elements (like new methods of industrial production and economic organization) which can be adapted to serve the interest of the people; it seeks to contain and prevent the spread of those anomalies and domineering interests created by the capitalist habit of colonialism; it reclaims the psychology of the people, erasing the 'colonial mentality' from it; and it resolutely defends the independence and security of the people. In short, socialism recognizes dialectic, the possibility of creation from forces which are opposed to one another; it recognizes the creativity of struggle, and, indeed, the necessity of the operation of forces to any change. It also embraces materialism and translates this into social terms of equality.

For Nkrumah, socialism provides a framework to nurture indigenous knowledge, equality, and decolonization – reflective of traditional values of communal egalitarianism – which

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107 Nkrumah, Consciencism (1964;1970)., 75.  
108 Ibid., 76.  
109 Ibid., 74.  
110 Ibid., 106.
would enable a creative transformation of life. However, the experiences of pre-colonial
West-Africa – particularly among the Ga, Akan, and Gonja – calls into question Nkrumah’s
presupposition. Disputes and contestations in governance, tribal warfare, market relations,
migrations and discrimination show a complexity of experience that cannot be adequately
captured by the term pre-colonial African communalism.\(^{111}\)

In contrast to Nkrumah’s view of socialism which emphasized decolonization and
the importance of indigenous knowledge as the objective basis for socialism, Karl Marx
interpreted Africa and the Orient as despotic and uncivilized while attributing positive
revolutionary qualities to colonialism.\(^{112}\) This is an important distinction to make for my
argument, as Nkrumah was aware of the claims that he was a Marxist doctrinaire, an
importer of alien ideas, circulating among the national and international press.\(^{113}\) In an
exposition on colonial political economy in India published in US press, Marx contends
that the English “dissolved these [inhabitants of ‘India’] small semi-barbarian, semi-
civilized communities, by blowing up their economical basis, and thus produced the
greatest, and to speak the truth, the only social revolution ever heard of in Asia.”\(^{114}\) He
continues;

Now, sickening as it must be to human feeling to witness those myriads of
industrious patriarchal and inoffensive social organizations disorganized
and dissolved into their units…losing at the same time their ancient form of
civilization… we must not forget that these idyllic village communities,
inoffensive though they may appear, had always been the solid foundation

\(^{111}\) For a discussion on the limits of African communalism see Olufemi Taiwo, “Against African
Communalism,” *Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy - Revue de la philosophie française et de


\(^{113}\) Nkrumah on Criticism; Paper in Ghana; British Report.

of Oriental despotism, that they restrained the human mind within the smallest possible compass, making it the unresisting tool of superstition, enslaving it beneath traditional rules... [An] undignified, stagnant, and vegetative life.”

Marx viewed precolonial societies through the gaze of despotism, whose non-European traditions – or precolonial pasts – have no value and are “undignified, stagnant, and vegetative.” The links between colonialism and imperialism for Marx were murky as colonialism was often given positive revolutionary qualities. For Nkrumah, not only did the African past have value, but it grounded his politics and the reasons for his appropriation of socialism and promotion of Pan-Africanism to combat (neo)-colonialism and nurture African values.

Accordingly, the one-party socialist state was interpreted as the only available organizational tool for combating neocolonialism and moving towards decoloniality in line with Nkrumaism. Nkrumah launched the CPP on June 12, 1949 in Accra to an audience of about sixty people, with demand for “Self-government Now.” The CPP combined the radical elements arguing for positive action and nationalism from the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) and would become the official expression of Nkrumaism. As noted, the first years of independence involved the CPP developing its political apparatus into regional politics, and administering service delivery and patronage. The CPP membership became the only acceptable platform to participate in national government; it represented Ghana and the values of Nkrumaism, non-members were viewed with suspicion. The Preventive Detention Act of 1958 had been introduced as a tool to detain without trial for a

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115 Ibid.
116 Ibid.
maximum of 5 years, which was extended to 10 in 1960. A new constitution was adopted on July 1, 1960 which changed Ghana from a parliamentary system with a prime minister to a republican form of government headed by a powerful president. The changes were pushed forward by the CPP but were met with impassioned criticisms from individuals such as J.B Danquah. In August 1960, Nkrumah was given authority to scrutinize newspapers and other publications before publication. This political evolution continued into early 1964, when a constitutional referendum changed the country to a one-party state. In a high profile case, on January 8, 1964, the Chief Security Officer ordered the arrest and detention of J. B. Danquah under the PDA, who later died in prison on February 4, 1965.

There is debate about political repression during the Nkrumist years. The case of Danquah was the most high profile incident of Nkrumah’s use of the Preventative Detention Act (PDA) receiving considerable condemnation in the media. The National Liberation Council (NLC) published a 1966 report on the treatment of political prisoners (totalling over 800) by Nkrumah, describing non-judiciary executions in the Common Cells prisons at Nsawam Prison. Combined with the public experience of Danquah, survivor testimonies, Nkrumah’s discourses about political enemies of the state and the NLC report, some historians have cast the PDA as a common place tool of political repression. Indeed, even moving transnationally, Nkrumah actively lobbied within the OAU to

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120 NLC Preventative Detention Report, (PRAAD Accra, Ghana).
121 Richard Pikney, Democracy and Dictatorship in Ghana and Tanzania (Springer, 1997), See Chapter 3 and 4.

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coordinate the repatriation and punishment of political refugees, presenting those who challenge the official Party line as security threats and saboteurs.\footnote{Kwame Nkrumah, Address on Political Refugees to the OAU Accra, (PRAAD Accra, Ghana).} There is conflicting evidence which presents a more subtle picture of high profile selective use of the PDA to control national politics. According to the National Reconciliation Report 2001-2003 which was responsible for documenting human rights abuses and testimonies since independence 1957, only two references are made to the Nkrumah period and only general claims are made about the liberal use of the PDA.\footnote{National Reconciliation Report, Volume 3 Security Services. (The University of Ghana Archive, Ghana).} It is clear that state violence was used to repress those deemed security threats, but how often and to what extent remains open to debate.

In what would become known as the Kulunguga Incident, on August 14, 1962 during a trip to the Upper Volta region a bomb assassination attempt was made on Nkrumah. This was an important turning point in Nkrumah’s domestic political policy, deeply influencing his rationality behind the use of state violence. While Nkrumah escaped unharmed, 3 individuals died, including a schoolboy, with a total of 77 persons injured.\footnote{Kulungugu Incident 1962, RG 17/2/18 (PRAAD Accra, Ghana).} In a radio broadcast following the incident, Nkrumah stated “it is certain that our enemy, having failed in this attempt, will return with redoubled effort.”\footnote{Kwame Nkrumah, Office of the President, National Radio Broadcast (August 14, 1962).} In a national broadcast on September 22 1962, taking a somber tone, Nkrumah lamented on the events at Kulunguga, reassuring his followers and the victims that the incident will be a “source of great pride for them in future to point to the scars on their bodies as the blows which they received in the great struggle against imperialism and internal reactionaries to make Ghana

\footnote{Kwame Nkrumah, Address on Political Refugees to the OAU Accra, (PRAAD Accra, Ghana).}
\footnote{National Reconciliation Report, Volume 3 Security Services. (The University of Ghana Archive, Ghana).}
\footnote{Kulungugu Incident 1962, RG 17/2/18 (PRAAD Accra, Ghana).}
\footnote{Kwame Nkrumah, Office of the President, National Radio Broadcast (August 14, 1962).}
More importantly, Nkrumah announced that he would be placing the Accra city and Tema townships under an official state of emergency through the executive Emergency Powers Act of 1961. The broadcast ended by calling citizens from all walks of life to cleanse Ghana “of such acts of terrorism and savagery once and for all.”

Justifying and explaining the need for a one-party system in a speech made to the National Assembly sessional address on February 1, 1966, Nkrumah remarked that;

A one-party system of government is an effective and safe instrument only when it operates in a socialist society. In other words, it must be a political expression of the will of the masses working for the ultimate good and welfare of the people as a whole. On the other hand, a one-party system of government in a neo-colonialist client state, subject to external pressures and control, can quickly develop into the most dangerous form of tyranny, despotism, and oppression … In other words, the basis of government is the will of the people.

Accordingly, the leading party, dedicated to socialism and representative of the ‘will of the people’, provides a framework for achieving economic independence and combating external neocolonial pressures. The party was also responsible for nurturing national consciousness and promoting the ‘new man’ who embraces scientific socialism, values of self-sacrifice for the nation, the ideology of philosophical conscientism and the representative leader. Therefore, there is a contradiction between presupposing that the

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126 Kulungugu Incident 1962, RG 17/2/1818 (PRAAD Accra, Ghana).
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid.
129 Kwarase Nkrumah, Dark Days in Ghana (Hasrek Ghana Ltd, 1968), 74.
130 Kwarase Nkrumah, Public Address, New Year’s Eve 1959; See also, Convention Peoples Party Study Group, Summary, RG/17/1/219 PRAAD Accra Ghana.
Party represents the ‘will of the people’ or captures ‘positive action’, but that the ‘people’ themselves have to be educated.

Once the right ideology, Africentric ontology, and a strong central party had been developed, education of the right materials became central to Nkrumah’s vision. In 1961 the Central Committee of the CPP increased the resources for the Council of Higher Education and finalized the creation of the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute of Economics and Political Science in Winneba. Construction began on February 18 1961, Nkrumah laying the first stone proclaimed that the men and women that pass through the Institute will be armed with analytical knowledge to “wage the battle” for African Socialism and the motherland.131 In line with the official CPP party mandate, the goals of the Institute were overtly political – to transfer the values of Nkumaism to the emergent educated youth. The Institute’s official motto, reflecting Nkrumah’s teachings, “seek ye first the political Kingdom.” There were ‘two arms’ of the institute, the Ideological Training Centre and the Positive Action Training Centre. More formally, as indicated in the Institutes mandate from 1962-66, they sought to provide forums for nationalists, activists, and revolutionaries to learn and debate technical, political, and ideological knowledge about the African struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism toward Unity.132 The syllabus reflected these goals.133 In order to facilitate enrollment, tuition was

132 Ibid., 5.
133 See “Syllabus,” RG/17/2/884, (1962), 8-19, for the complete contents and topics of each course being taught.
free – even for ‘international’ student activists/nationalists from other territories – despite limited enrollment during its existence from 1962 to 1965.\textsuperscript{134}

Education was therefore central to the development of socialism and transfer of CPP values, reflected even in the SYDP. As Nkrumah describes:

Our youth from the primary schools, through the secondary schools to the universities and higher institutions of learning, should and must be taught and trained in the socialist philosophy. They must be taught to know the working of neocolonialism and trained to recognise it wherever it may rear its head.\textsuperscript{135}

Nkrumah envisioned a national education, reflective of CPP values, that was also internationalized as his education had been. He saw great value in learning from international institutions and bringing that technical, administrative, and political-economic knowledge to be used in the service of Ghana.\textsuperscript{136} In part to accomplish this, Nkrumah set up the Council for Higher Education, and provided considerable funding for Ghanaian youth who would apply to study as international students in technical, political, and economic fields.\textsuperscript{137} Part of the funding came from the host governments, those involved were Yugoslavia, Italy, East and West Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Poland, Russia, Brazil, India, Egypt, US, and Canada.\textsuperscript{138} Maintenance allowances were also granted to students abroad in London, Paris, Oxford & Cambridge, and outside London.\textsuperscript{139} Details

\textsuperscript{134} The total enrollment between 1962-1965 was 1335 students, this number can be broken down yearly: 1962 – 100; 1963 – 210; 1964 – 475; 1965 – 550. Enrollment Numbers, National Liberation Council Education Review 1966. PRAAD Accra Ghana.

\textsuperscript{135} Kwame Nkrumah Speech at the Opening of the Ideological Institute in Winneba.

\textsuperscript{136} National Council on Higher Education, Personal, RG 17/2/182, NO. 370. PRAAD Accra Ghana.

\textsuperscript{137} Ghana Students Abroad, RG 17/2/189 PRAAD Accra Ghana.

\textsuperscript{138} Maintenance Allowances Payable to Ghanaian Students on Foreign Government Awards, a. RG/17/2/189 PRAAD Accra Ghana.

\textsuperscript{139} Maintenance Allowances Payable to Ghanaian Students Overseas, 3. RG/17/2/189 PRAAD Accra Ghana.
were kept about the progress of the students, with assessments regarding ability and prospects of completing the degree.\textsuperscript{140} As a result of a protest involving Ghanaian students over the murder of an African in Moscow in 1964, there was an ‘exodus’ of students requesting to leave the Soviet Union for other countries.\textsuperscript{141} Such incidents had to be carefully mediated as not to disturb non-aligned status and get funding repealed from host countries.

Education, stamps, and posters were central components of the diffusion of Nkrumaism. They provided an arena to transfer political-economic ideology, albeit contested, through the creation of the Nkrumah Ideological Institute and supporting international students in technical studies, to then be applied for the benefit of the nation. Such social policies were also reflective of Nkrumah’s own educational upbringing, internationalist experience in North American and European university environments and the belief, within the lineage of Garvey and Dubois, that education holds the potential for racial uplift and to better inform specific political struggles in Africa.\textsuperscript{142}


It would be the pairing of national development and Pan-Africanism in Nkrumah’s praxis that remained a central unresolved ambiguity, a constant balancing act between national and diplomatic politics. When Nkrumah returned to the Gold Coast in 1947 it was, as he

\textsuperscript{140} Ghana Students Abroad, RG 17/2/189 PRAAD Accra Ghana.
\textsuperscript{141} “Exodus of African Students from the Soviet Union,” Embassy of the Republic of Ghana, Moscow USSR, Dispatch No. 2/64 (January 24 1964), RG 17/2/189 PRAAD Accra, Ghana.
\textsuperscript{142} Kevin Gaines, Uplifting Race: Black Leadership, Politics, and Culture in the Twentieth Century (The University of North Carolina Press, 1996).
stated, with the intention of using the Gold Coast as a starting off point for African independence and unity.\(^{143}\) Nkrumah envisioned the Ghanaian liberation struggle as part of a continental struggle against colonialism. Reflecting on this aim after his exile, Nkrumah remarked that his government was pledged to the “twin task of achieving economic independence for Ghana, and of participating in the wider African revolution.” \(^{144}\) To achieve this aim, he claimed, the state had to adopt socialist policies and actively support liberation and Pan-African unity movements on the continent.\(^{145}\) Nkrumah claimed that the one-party African socialist experiment in Ghana “was essentially one of developing the country in co-operation with the world as a whole.”\(^{146}\) For him, the designation of national acts as a prerequisite for the achievement of continental-diasporic independence and unity. The very notion of the ‘national’ is embedded within an international politics, of both solidarity and struggle for unity against neocolonialism. Nkrumah incorporated important activists and continental-diaspora intellectuals. George Padmore, the Trinidadian activist who inspired Nkrumah, worked as Ghana’s minister of African affairs while W.E.B. Du Bois was titled as the official adviser to the president. From April 15 to 22, 1958, the first – but not the last – Conference of Independent African States took place in Accra. Stating the significance of this conference, Nkrumah proclaimed that “at last Pan-Africanism had moved to the African continent where it really belonged.”\(^{147}\)

\(^{144}\) Kwame Nkrumah, *Dark Days in Ghana* (Hasrek Ghana Ltd., 1968), 68.
\(^{145}\) Ibid.
\(^{146}\) Ibid., 78-79.
\(^{147}\) Nkrumah (1963), 136.
Building non-alignment and Afro-Asia solidarity became a third option in the global political economy of the Cold War against joining either the socialist or capitalist bloc countries in the 1950s and 1960s. Nkrumah believed that the Cold War was a product of imperialist and neocolonial rivalries, indicative of competition and financial expansion at the highest stage of imperialism.\footnote{Nkrumah’s title is a play from Vladimir Lenin’s, \textit{Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism} (1917) in which Lenin argues that imperial finance, debt, and capital transfers are central and compatible with imperialism – imperialism is an outlet of the last stage of capitalism.} He saw his task on the world stage as promoting peace, and strategic non-alignment in pursuit of development financing and agreements that benefit Ghana and African Unity. Nkrumah had advocated for non-alignment and peace, especially for developing nations. He delivered a speech at the United Nations in 1960, and participated at the Belgrade Non-Aligned Conference in 1961, and also toured China, the U.S.S.R. and Western and Eastern Europe. In practice, this meant strategically using agreements between the East and West against each other, which will be shown in Chapter 3, to gain better terms. Ghana under Nkrumah had significant trading and finance relationship with the United States, Britain, West-Germany, as well as communist states such as Russia, China and Poland. This included the Soviet-Ghana agreements on technical and economic cooperation August 4, 1960 and November 4, 1961.\footnote{Protocol to the Soviet-Ghana Agreements on Technical and Economic Cooperation, August 4 1960 RG 17/2/30 Miscellaneous PRAAD Accra, Ghana.} He also maintained membership in the British Commonwealth and was a regular participant of the annual Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference. He was even awarded the national order of Poland in Warsaw 1962. The non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was also put onto the agenda of African states through the Accra Assembly “World without a Bomb Conference”
June 21 to 28, 1962 by Nkrumah. The prospect of a global nuclear war not only had the potential to perturb development for Ghana and African Unity, but it threatened humanity.150

The evidence of Ghana’s Pan-African and non-alignment policy suggests that the development paradigm of Nkrumaism prioritized technical and economic relationships which benefitted the nation, Unity, and peace. Peace here is generally defined by Nkrumah as the absence of armed-nuclear conflict and external exploitation on independent nations. In a revealing address in the Ghanaian Parliament on October 15, 1963, Nkrumah responded to rumors of a partial nuclear testing agreement between the US and USSR. He commented that Ghana’s stance to such a thawing would always be “uninhibited satisfaction”;

Diversity in unity! If only we would realise that all men, whatever their special characteristic belong to one large human family, and act accordingly… without any attempt at pressing everybody into a Procrustean bed of conformity to the habits and modes of any particular race, and still less to the idea of a master race born to lord over all others.151

Nkrumah consistently engaged in the politics of non-alignment, building relationships and agreements which he felt would benefit Ghana and promote African Unity. As will be shown, this is consistent with his theory of consciencism which provides a policy rationale for decolonization, development, Ghanaian foreign policy and economic diplomacy in the Cold War.

150 The Accra Assembly: The World Without the Bomb, DOC/AA/1. PRAAD Accra, Ghana.
Nkrumah played an important role in the formation of the OAU which came into effect on May 25, 1963, with a founding members of 21 states. This is regarded as extensions of the consensus for Unity reached at multiple meetings of African heads of states and the 1961 Casablanca economic summit. Referred to as the Casablanca Group, organized by Nkrumah, Gamal Nasser of Egypt, and Sékou Touré of Guinea, they called for economic policy harmonization for mutual development and unity. In many ways the OAU was a compromise for the goals of the Casablanca Group and Nkrumaism, but he saw it as an important step towards a federation of harmonized independent states [Illustration 3]. While Nkrumah’s attempts to promote initiatives within the OAU, among journalists, artists, and trade unions, will be explored in Chapter 3, it is important to note that the OAU and conferences of the heads of African, Asia and Latin-American leaders were key theatres where Nkrumaism became internationalized in pursuit of nuclear non-proliferation, political and economic harmonization. Confronted with criticisms about the obstacles for achieving cooperation at the level advocated for by Nkrumah, in an address to the OAU on May 24, 1963 he restated his belief that uniting Africa was both an opportunity and historic duty. As will be explored in Chapter 3, Pan-African economic diplomacy and the promotion of non-aligned development, were essential components to the politics and practice of Ghanaian national development.

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152 As will be discussed in Chapter 3, the Casablanca group disagreed significantly with the Monrovia group who met earlier in 1961. The core tension was between whether immediate harmonization of development policy and economics was necessary (Casablanca) or if gradual co-ordination and multilateralism was the more appropriate policy path (Monrovia)

153 Kwame Nkrumah Speech May 24, 1963. “I have often been accused of pursuing a 'policy of the impossible'. But I cannot believe in the impossibility of achieving African union . . . Africa must unite. We have before us not only an opportunity but an historic duty".
Ghana became a centre for Pan-African organizing and enthusiasm, a base from which to coordinate development for the African Revolution. According to Nkrumah;

Ghana was a haven to which the oppressed from all parts of Africa could come to carry on their struggle. Freedom fighters and political refugees… It was a centre where they could meet to discuss common problems, and where they could organise and train.154

South African anti-apartheid activists travelled to Accra or Winneba to receive education and organizational training, as well as given platforms for public events. These functioned to help build solidarity. Martin Luther King and other civil rights activists from the United States also travelled to Ghana, inspired by Nkrumah’s vision for the country and the future. King was present at the independence ceremony in 1957, a trip coordinated by civil rights figures Bill Sutherland and Bayard Rustin who had connections with Nkrumah’s finance minister at the time, K.A. Gbedemah. In an interview with Etta Barnett, King – who despite being physically ill during the entire trip – described the event as provoking an emotional response and new hope for the struggles for freedom as a new African nation came to replace the old colonial order.155 Upon returning to Montgomery Alabama in a sermon to his Dexter Avenue Baptist Church congregation, which was audio recorded, King announces that “Ghana has something to say to us.” He continues;

… the oppressor never voluntarily gives freedom to the oppressed. You have to work for it… Freedom is never given to anybody. Privileged classes never give up their privileges without strong resistance… Freedom only comes through persistent revolt, through persistent agitation, through persistently rising up against the system of evil.156

154 Nkrumah (1968), 155-156.
156 Martin Luther King Sermon to Dexter Avenue Baptist Church April 7 1957; See also an audio of the sermon published publicly https://vimeo.com/24453571
Nkrumaist Ghana was the embodiment of racialized struggles for justice, of black self-assertion that offered support and solidarity for diasporic civil rights and continental activists.

Yet the realities of (neo)colonialism meant that the continent was, according to Nkrumah, in a “present state of disunity…divided into economically unviable States which bear no possibility of real development.” Through the creation of a community of economic life which unites separated peoples continentally, development could be reoriented, and neocolonialism defeated. The benefits that would result from Nkrumah’s Pan-African economic community were most evident in the text *Africa Must Unite* (1963). Pan-Africanism under a socialist economic system was a practical strategy directed at heads of African states to convince them of the practicalities of political and economic unity, of conceiving of their own independent states as resources in the struggle against neocolonialism. Unity would achieve “economic viability, first of all… so that our vast resources and capacity for development will bring prosperity for us and additional benefits for the rest of the world.” In contrast to the Westphalian notion of homogeneity within the state, Nkrumah contends that African unity is heterogeneous, without a common language, territory, or culture. The Westphalian state system is premised on territorially exclusive, sovereign nation-states with centralized decision making legitimacy and monopoly over the legitimate use of violence. While Nkrumah leaves open the question

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159 Nkrumah, Consciencism (1964), 87.
of violence after coloniality, the movement toward a non-state future with reconfigured Pan-African geographies moves beyond the Westphalian model as national territory is not the arbiter of belonging.

An important tension loomed however given Nkrumah’s inability to address territorial, economic, and political disputes within the AU. For him, this reflected the legacy of colonial bordering practices on the continent which served European political-economic interests.\textsuperscript{161} This meant a scaling back of the potential trade agreements and linkages between African states. Other than allotting a percentage of future GDP growth for potential agreements to be negotiated with other African countries, Nkrumah was frustrated that the plan took a narrow approach when Ghana continually advocates for unity.\textsuperscript{162} He continued to advocate for closer union of Africa, times emphasizing the need for a continental union Government for Africa as the only solution to Africa’s political, social, and economic problems. While he envisaged setting up of a Union Government for Africa, he argued the need to harmonize plans for Africa’s total development.\textsuperscript{163} He then reminisces on potential proposals for unity, explored in Chapter 3, which fell under hostility in the OAU which is worth quoting as it demonstrates the tensions of Nkrumah’s politics that he was grappling with in the SYDP. Accordingly, he saw the survival and mutual prosperity of independent African states dependent on joining in an economic and political union, a joint development plan that would eliminate competition and ease frontier

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161 Kwame Nkrumah Speech to the OAU (1964).
162 Kwame Nkrumah Presentation of the Seven Year Development Plan to the National Assembly (March 11, 1964). PRAAD Accra, Ghana.
163 Ibid.
\end{flushleft}
tensions. “We in Ghana are determined to make our wholehearted contribution towards this objective” Nkrumah continued, and “…are prepared to make whatever further provisions may be required to enable us to play our part in the achievement and consolidation of African Unity.” Reflecting on colonial violence in the Mau rebellion in Kenya, intensifying tensions in Rhodesia and across the continent, Nkrumah emphasized the need for the establishment of a central machinery for dealing with the serious political and economic questions confronting the continent.

Nkrumah’s *Neocolonialism and the Global Political Economy*

Despite the aforementioned tensions, Nkrumahism as a system of thought, ontologically grounded in Africentric non-atheistic materialism, and utilizing the one-party mixed-planning state to collectively struggle against postcolonial domination, was entangled with the global political economy (GPE) of Western financial and political interests. In *Neocolonialism*, Nkrumah (1965) documents the role of Europe, international financial institutions and industrial consortia in constraining postcolonial African development to secure economic and political advantage. The publication of this text caused the United States to threaten the withdrawal of over 30 million in aid-funds and rejection of a request for $129 million in surplus food transfers. In a telegram sent to the Ghanaian Ministry of Foreign Affairs from Washington the text is described as;

…an unprecedented attack by the head of a friendly state against the United States…The book appears to have been designed for the specific purpose of creating in the minds of the readers suspicion and distrust over the motives, intentions, and actions of the United States… The government of the

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164 Ibid., 3.
165 Ibid., 3.
166 Ibid.
United States actually therefore holds the government of Ghana fully responsible for whatever consequences the book’s publication may have.\(^\text{168}\)

It was also condemned by newspaper and media outlets whom chastised Nkrumah for “biting the hand that feeds him,”\(^\text{169}\) describing the text as “anti-American”\(^\text{170}\) and an “offensive...vitriolic attack” without merit made against the CIA and United States government.\(^\text{171}\) As popularly believed, any economic or political consequences resulting from the backlash of the text was simply “Nkrumah get[ing] what he asks for.”\(^\text{172}\) It is this text, in part, which commentators suggest made Nkrumah a “target of imperialism,” an increasing security concern for the United States and Britain.\(^\text{173}\)

Despite the content of the text, Nkrumah was actively attempting to mediate tensions with President Johnson, successor to President Kennedy who Nkrumah felt understood Ghana’s position of mixed-planning socialist development and non-alignment. In a series of correspondences, Nkrumah sounded the alarm about the CIA’s subversive activities in the country and the increasing friction between the two countries. He describes the CIA as nurturing “ill-will, misunderstanding and even clandestine and subversive activities.”\(^\text{174}\) Yet, recognizing the continued need for foreign investment, he emphasizes

\(^{168}\) Telegram from United States of America to Ghana Foreign Office Flagstaff House, Accra (1965) RG 17/1/366. PRAAD Accra Ghana.
\(^{171}\) “Ghana Denied $100, 000, 000 in Aid after Anti-U.S Blast,” The Sun (Tuesday November 23, 1965).
\(^{174}\) Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Ghana—Presidential Correspondence. No classification marking. Ghana’s Ambassador Miguel Augustus Ribeiro delivered the letter to Johnson on March 11; see Document 245. In a March 7 memorandum, Harriman
that the socialist Pan-African state can create an investment market to ensure mutual
benefit. Nkrumah describes the relationship between foreign investors and the Pan-African
state as one of partnership. Investors can earn profit on the condition that Ghana receives an
equitable percentage that could be used by the state for social-economic investment.175

A narrative of economic mismanagement – or as I describe in Chapter 4, a liberal
disciplinary consensus – subsequently was used to delegitimize Nkrumaism and justify
support for his overthrow and the subsequent liberalization of the economy. The
negotiations between Ghana, the IMF and World Bank between 1965 and 1966 show that
Nkrumah was unwilling to meet the adjustment requirements of the lending institutions. On
March 11, 1965, William P. Mahoney, the U.S. ambassador to Ghana, talking with CIA
Director John A. McCone and the deputy chief of the CIA's Africa division, remarked that
“… popular opinion was running strongly against Nkrumah… the economy in a precarious
state… one way or another Nkrumah would be out within a year.”176 On February 24, 1966,
a group of army officers – Colonel E.K. Kotoka, Major A.A. Afrifa, Lt. General (retired)
J.A. Ankra, and Police Inspector General J.W.K. Hartley – launched a military coup when
Nkrumah was out of the country advocating for Pan-Africanism. In a national address, a
leader of the officers Lt. General J.A. Ankrah, rejected the ‘radicalism’ of Nkrumah and the

175 Ibid. Nkrumah states that: “Ghana welcomes foreign investors in a spirit of partnership; they can earn
their profits here, provided they leave us an agreed portion for promoting the welfare and happiness of the
majority of our people…”

176 Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, DCI Memo for the Record, 01 Mar.–28
Apr. 65. Secret. Drafted on March 12 by [text not declassified] Deputy Chief of the Africa Division in
the CIA Directorate of Plans. Filed with a covering memorandum from Africa Division Chief [text not
declassified] to McCone. The time is taken from a CIA transcript of the conversation. (Ibid.) The meeting took
place in McCone’s office., Page 443.
impracticalities of his national development and non-alignment policy. The new Bank of Ghana governor Albert Adomakoh subsequently sent a request to the IMF to take up negotiations with the National Liberation Council immediately. 177 Correspondences between the NLC shortly after the coup reveal that United States could not formally “come outfront with support” although Ankra promised “never to go east.”178

This repudiation of Nkrumah development direction created the conditions for the IMF and the World Bank to supply lines of standby credit.179 In his published memoir, John Stockwell, a CIA officer working in Africa with links to the Ghana office, elaborates on the U.S involvement in the military coup explaining that “the CIA station chief in Accra engineered the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah… Howard Bane got a double promotion, and was awarded the Intelligence Star for the overthrow of Kwame.”180 President Johnson in a letter sent to General Ankrah after the coup notes:

Your vigorous and effective efforts to revive the Ghanaian economy are most impressive… My experts share your confidence that the program of economic reforms you are now working out with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund will provide a solid basis for a sound combination of stability and growth. I want you to know that we support you in these efforts.181

The official rationale given for supporting the military coup was conveyed in paternalistic language. Ghana was an overspending economy that needed structural reform

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177 Albert Adomakoh Telegram to the International Monetary Fund, (February 28 1966). PRAAD Accra, Ghana.
178 Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 GHANA. Confidential.
179 Williams 2016, 62.
181 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Ghana, 3/24/66–10/6/66. No classification marking.
to avoid falling further victim to internal political antagonisms, and the Soviet sphere of influence. This carries some truth; State-owned enterprises, despite the goal of cooperation with the private sector, were operating at a loss, straining balance of payments on the loans from the Bank and leading to a negative balance in foreign reserves. In line with Rosenstein-Rodan’s theory of the big push, the state could not absorb the debt through returns on development projects.\textsuperscript{182} Government spending in relation to total GDP increased from 9.5\% in 1957 to 25.8\% in 1965, moving from a budget surplus of 14.5\% in 1954 to a 6.4\% deficit in 1965.\textsuperscript{183} The external reserves, which were $269 million in 1957, Nkrumah had desperately tried to manage the depletion of foreign reserves through a central banking system, which stood at $269 million in 1957, were in the negative over $39 million in 1965.\textsuperscript{184} Nkrumah’s thinking about the role of the central bank had shifted; so too did the fiscal conservatism exercised by Nkrumah in the early 1950s. Yet, when contextualizing Nkrumah’s national development imaginary for Ghana within wider colonial legacies, it is clear that his vision of Africentric economic development and united Africans disturbed Western bloc interests within the context of the Cold War. Particularly disturbing was the idea of a national development which was Afri-centered and directed at serving African interests cooperatively with a non-aligned outlook rather than existing as a repository for land, labour, capital, and resources. Confirming this point in an assessment of the coup sent to President Johnson on March 12, 1966, Robert Komer, the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, commented that “Nkrumah was doing more to undermine our


\textsuperscript{183} Bank of Ghana, RG 17/2/183, PRAAD Accra Ghana.

\textsuperscript{184} Ibid.
interests than any other black African…In reaction to his strongly pro-Communist leanings, the new military regime is almost pathetically pro-Western.”

Thinking through the military coup as “acts of neocolonialism” in Ghana, Nkrumah wrote a revolutionary guide while exiled in Conakry Guinea, further articulating a strategy to achieve unified Pan-African development. While this text did not have a bearing on the policy of the state in the same way that Consciencism did, it represents an important radicalization of Nkrumaism in praxis through a “zonal analysis,” an attempt to standardize revolutionary strategy relative to generalized zone characteristics. In a liberated zone where “independence was secured…under the leadership of an anti-imperialist and well-organized mass party,” the nation had a duty to promote economic development and freedom from foreign economic dependence. Liberated zones have three important duties. The first is to “support actively the detachments of revolutionary liberation movements in the contested zones of Africa,” the second is to “contribute to the organisation and revolutionary practice of the people's forces” in neo-colonialist states. Thirdly, liberated zones have a duty to;

…effect an organic liaison of its political and economic life with the other liberated zones of the African nation. This implies a system of mutual servicing and aid between the various detachments of the liberation movements and the liberated zones.

185 Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Robert W. Komor, Vol. 21, 3/3/66–3/20/66. Confidential. A handwritten “L” on the source text indicates that the memorandum was seen by the President.
187 Ibid., 44.
188 Ibid., 45-46.
According to Nkrumah, this zonal analysis between enemy-held zones, liberated, and contested zones, is an important criterion guiding transnational revolutionary action. Yet Nkrumah’s promotion of Pan-Africanism and internationalism, as discussed in Chapter 3, had a mixed record and while he believed national and continental interests would align, in practice they often conflicted.

Nkrumah’s conception of nationalism as co-constituted with Pan-Africanism poses significant contradictions, similar to that of a Party in terms of representing a singular popular will in a heterogeneous social context. Namely, how to maintain difference and diversity while unifying under a common political-economic union. The diversity of ethnic, linguistic, transnational and historical experience is hard to capture in particular national settings let alone continentally. Further, Nkrumah was an important advocate for the United Nations recognition of the right to self-determination, which equates national self-determination to a designated territory protected with sovereignty. This is a tension that remains unresolved by Nkrumah, though he recognized the tensions of unity among positive forces in resistance to negative forces. Within the language of consciencism, he hypothesized that unifying forces will still have seams – differences and tensions within unity – which risk creating schisms. Thus Pan-Africanists must “anticipate this seminal disintegration and discover a way of containing the future schismatic tendencies.” The pre-existing cleavages and economic disputes among African states often were intensified by nationalism making it difficult to form consensus during the Casablanca economic

\[189\] Nkrumah, Consciencism (1964; 1970), 104.
Though Nkrumah continued to advocate for continental unity and economic integration, he simultaneously advocated for national sovereignty and the building of nationalist movements.

When contextualizing Nkrumah’s national imaginary for Ghana within his system of thought, Nkrumaism posed a direct challenge to a liberal world order against the interests of the West. It also offered a spark of concrete hope and decolonial imagination for alternative forms of postcolonial political community. Rebuking the “big lie” of economic mismanagement, Nkrumah notes;

An examination of our development plans and of their implementation reveals the truth—that it was their success and not their failure which spurred our enemies into action. Ghana, on the threshold of economic independence, and in the vanguard of the African revolutionary struggle to achieve continental liberation and unity, was too dangerous an example… Ours was a system they could neither penetrate nor manipulate.  

Nkrumah’s Pan-African nationalism, in all its tensions and ambiguities offered an Africentric framework for challenging the colonial territorialisation of Africa and functioned as a transnational non-aligned development paradigm for Unity against (neo)colonialism within a Cold War context. Nkrumah’s conception of national development is African centred, conceiving of the one-party socialist state as a strategy to combat neocolonialism in the pursuit of decoloniality. It envisioned a reconfigured relationship among postcolonial African states on African terms, while not disengaging from the global community. Attempting to operationalize a framework of harmonized non-

\[191\] Nkrumah, Dark Days in Ghana, (1968), 84; 100.
aligned Pan-African development, Nkrumah’s ideas embodied the tensions of the transnational connectivities on which his ideas were founded.

**Nkrumah as Decolonial Theorist?**

While Nkrumah never described himself as a decolonial thinker, given the popularity of the term among scholars, it is important to assess the merits of the theory against the historical experience. The decolonial turn was born out of struggles against racialized categories of difference and its dehumanizing social, political, cultural, and economic manifestations in colonialism, imperialism, and postcolonialism.\(^{192}\) The term has since been built upon by Aníbal Quijano and Walter Mignolo. Decoloniality is grounded in action-thought geared toward the “political and epistemological liberation of (ex)-colonized peoples from global coloniality.”\(^{193}\) An important characteristic of decolonial projects is that they are “something constantly in motion” moving toward a decolonial future.\(^{194}\) Decoloniality is further premised on pluriversality, a recognition of different knowledges and cosmologies.\(^{195}\) It is then premised on the rejection of Eurocentrism for an engagement with knowledge, language, and ways of being not recognized under colonial conditions.\(^{196}\) Such decolonial approaches function as an “antidote to problems with Western conceptions…the decolonial turn highlights the epistemic relevance of the enslaved and

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In the context of development, a decolonial approach must “scrutinize power and resist dominant development paradigms” allowing “Africa to rethink and re-engage development” on its own terms. Combating the international expansion of liberal institutions and new forms of colonial disciplining after independence, decoloniality offers opportunities to theorize praxis for struggles in the present while working toward envisioning-realizing an alternative future of non-coloniality.

However, the end point of Nkrumah’s thought is open; once neocolonialism is defeated, liberation gained within a one-party socialist state, and unity achieved – in theory – there would be no need for individual nation states. According to Nkrumah:

The nationalist phase is a necessary step in the liberation struggle, but must never be regarded as the final solution to the problem raised by the political and economic exploitation of our peoples. For nationalism is narrow in its application. It works within the geopolitical framework produced by colonial powers.

It is here where connecting this vision with that of his contemporary, Frantz Fanon’s notion of national consciousness provides context. Fanon attributes the first stage of decolonization with that of the nation, thought of as a generative term that embodies ‘historical movement’ and articulation of violence against colonialism, largely drawn from the ‘peasantry’. Fanon inverts the Manichean dichotomy of colonizer/colonized, conceiving of national consciousness as the “inverted” unity that acts against the “totalizing” violence
of colonial imposed dichotomies. Fanon contends that the continual struggle of “decolonization unifies this world by a radical decision to remove its heterogeneity by unifying it on the grounds of nation and sometimes race.” Like Nkrumah, Fanon asserts the transnational dimensions of the decolonial state as a “dynamic decolonial nation… [that] could only be global.” This struggle to attain a global decolonial future is also a universal one: “if we want humanity to take one step forward, if we want to take it to another level…then we must innovate… for humanity.” As a decolonial theorists, both Nkrumah and Fanon were intimately entangled in pursuing strategies to achieve liberation and combat neocolonialism while conceptualizing movement toward a decolonial future.

However, Fanon himself was deeply critical of Nkrumah and national projects more generally which did not achieve social, economic, and politic reform. He saw Ghana as indicative of the state being taken over by what he termed the “national bourgeoisie” whom sought to replace the colonizers in state positions for nepotism and material enrichments. This elite also engaged with Britain and other colonial powers, nationalizing sectors such as agriculture without modernizing production or subsidizing labour. Legitimacy for these elites, according to Fanon, derived from articulating visions which reflected the hopes of

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201 Fantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, Translated by Constance Ferrington (New York: Grove Press, 2004), 10.
203 Fantz Fanon, (2004), 239.
204 See Chapter 4 “The Pitfalls of National Consciousness” in Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (Macgibbon and Kee, 1965), for a discussion of the national bourgeoisie and the reconstitution of political and economic power in a new elite class.
205 Ibid.
the population. National development, in this context, falls into “neo-colonialist lines”

where

The national economy, formerly protected, is today literally controlled. The budget is balanced through loans and gifts, while every three or four months the chief ministers themselves or else their governmental delegations come to the erstwhile mother countries or elsewhere, fishing for capital.206

Considering its inherent tensions, does Nkrumah’s practice of development as a resource for Pan-African Unity denote a decolonial alternative? The answer is complex. On the one hand Nkrumah did articulate Africentric elements of an alternative world view and ideology, in theory, from which to ground political and economic action. His system of thought functioned as an ideological platform from which other elements of society could make claims. However, its practical expressions in policy and diplomacy were contradictory, ambiguous, and at times led to compromises. There was attempt to situate national development of Ghana as a resource in the Pan-African revolution – economic coordination and harmonization for non-aligned independence – caught within networks of financial institutions and Cold War context. Nkrumaism also structured the international connectivities and politics of those who challenged the official party line. Nkrumaism provided a formal political space in which to carve out radical internationalist claims linking their struggles with national development and Pan-Africanism. They also contribute to transnational linkages of female activists in Africa, the Caribbean, and the United States,
what became known as the global women’s movement of the 1960s, which will be discussed in the proceeding Chapter.207

In connecting traditional African values to national development, connecting Ghana with the wider Pan-African revolution, Nkrumaism reflected wider historical trends. The imagining of transnational cultural and political communities from which to create and sustain nationalism were founding features of discourses of racial uplift, Negritude, and Pan-Arabism.208 It also became central to decolonization and postcolonial governments in Africa such as Julius Nyerere in Tanzania and Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia who both drew on conceptions of traditional African values to justify specific development policies. In 1967 Nyerere issued the Arusha Declaration, outlining a vision for socialist development based on the principles of Ujamaa – collectivization – a self-described form of African socialism.209 In practice the development schemes involved coercive resettlement practices and were widely criticized. In contrast, while Kaunda was tightening political power in the 1970s, he developed an official ideology of Zambian Humanism which contended that traditional values of mutual aid, community, and trust in leadership justified one-party rule and central-state development planning.210 Like Nkrumah, both Nyerere and Kaunda were attempting to reconcile particular development and political policies through their conception of traditional African community.

208 This is not to mention the contemporary iterations of supranational governance organizations such as the European Union or the African Union.
The radicalization of Nkrumah after the coup also reflects a wider change in Africa’s role in the Third World Project, a willingness among Amilcar Cabral and others, to coordinate military resistance against (neo)colonialism on the continent.\textsuperscript{211} National development for Nkrumah functioned as both a means of asserting African independence in the global political economy and of navigating translocality, while also being inherently translocal. International connectivities were implicit in Nkrumah’s thinking regarding the politics and economics of Ghana’s place in the world. In the context of his non-atheistic materialism and the possibilities of change in relation to tension, the postcolonial Ghanaian nation – a positive force – was confronted with negative forces. Up against pressures of foreign interference, corruption, predatory lending, all while being subject to pressures from the Socialist and Capitalist bloc countries of the Cold War. Through coordinated national development and unity, Nkrumah believed that African states could confront and defeat external negating forces, thereby allowing the transnational development policy path of the postcolonial state to freely realize visions of Nkrumaism.

Nkrumah’s articulation of philosophical conscientism, Pan-African nationalism and selective appropriation of development, the state, and economic doctrine provides evidence of an important self-reflexivity and theory-practice developing in historical context. It further testifies to the tensions of translocality, the forming political communities and economic coordination’s beyond territorial-sovereignty, and the assertion of collective African sovereignty and claims within the GPE. To be sure, there were significant advancements made under Nkrumah in social services, electricity distribution, and

\textsuperscript{211} Viijay Prashad, \textit{The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World} (The New Press, 2008).
supporting infrastructures for manufacturing and to facilitate import/export (docks, roadways, and airport). The attempts made to circumvent the WACB, and address market shifts and depletion of foreign reserves while taking on significant debt, had an impact on the political centralization. The translocal vision Nkrumah articulated and the lasting economic impacts continues to animate activists and the Pan-Africanist movement in Ghana and Africa more generally. The Pan-African Today conference proceedings involving over 400 continental-diasporic union leaders, activists, professionals, youth and intellectuals, held their 3rd annual meeting in Winneba in 2018. Also, in popular memory Nkrumah is viewed favorably. Many of the development projects conducted by the 2nd FYP and the SYDP, such as the Volta Dam and Tema Highway, are still relied upon with little extension or up-keep. In interviews with Ghanaians there is a consensus that the vision and scope of leaders since the 1960s is described as less visionary, global, and ambitious.

Following this argument, Chapter 2 introduces a gender analysis to Nkrumaism and the translocality of Ghana’s national development for Pan-Africanism in the world. It will show that while Nkrumaism functioned as the foreground for Ghanaian women activism and administrative roles close, their experiences as organizers, propaganda secretariats, officials and activists were not hegemonic. In many cases, pan-Africanist women were able to utilize discourses of race and gender within Pan-Africanism and development to create transnational activist networks and make specific claims about greater inclusion of women

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213 Interviews and popular memory (Pan-African Today) as discussed in the Conclusion of this dissertation.
in postcolonial politics. The experience and role of professional European expat women close to Nkrumah will also be explored to further identify some of the complex roles and experiences of race and gender in postcolonial Ghana. As will be shown, it is not enough to deploy singular categories of either gender, race, or translocality, but necessary to use them intersectionally to capture historical nuance, co-constitution, and entanglement.
Chapter 2 – Gender and Translocality: Pan-Africanist Women and Nkrumah’s Expats, 1957-1965

This Chapter places the experiences of women – elite urban educated and market Africans, Afro-Americans, and white American and European expatriates – their labor and strategies of political engagement and maneuvering as a constitutive part of Nkrumaism and the translocality of Ghana’s Pan-Africanist project. It moves beyond the literature about the origins or development of an African feminism\(^1\) and responds to an increased concern regarding the role of women in national liberation movements and in the global Cold War among Africanists and international relations scholars.\(^2\) Within historical and continental context, influential women were moulded by the access to foreign education in places like

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London or Freetown, travelled within the diaspora, and had employment opportunities, which were sometimes contradictory. In their roles as propaganda secretariats, editors, and orators they advocated for Pan-Africanism and socialist development while putting women’s issues on the agenda despite resistance by male counterparts. Their writings were explicitly internationalist and they often spoke about events in other African countries, criticized foreign governments, and linked local struggles to the continent and global Cold War politics. This is evident in Mabel Ellen Dove’s internationalist writings and her efforts to prevent French atomic bomb testing in the Sahara which raised the issue formally among African heads of state. Dove’s writings were essential public political interventions that helped promote an internationalist vision of national liberation and Pan-Africanism. I explore the Pan-African Women’s Conference of 1960, organized by the Women’s League, hosted in Accra and its relationship to Nkrumatism as well as global civil rights movement. The conference was portrayed by United States and British intelligence and moderate Afro-American participants as a potential site of communist infiltration and anti-American sentiment. Despite this, the conference was internationalist and brought women’s issues to the forefront of Pan-Africanism and Cold War politics connected to racial equality, thus representing an important component of the translocality of Ghana’s postcolonial connectivities.

Having established public reputations from their involvement in anticolonial politics, educated Ghanaian women occupied official roles as elected officials and government administrators and organizers. It is not enough, however, to focus exclusively on experiences that confirm the thesis that the CPP supported the expansion of women
participation in national-international politics. This Chapter also draws attention to the contradictions of Nkrumaism and the gendered politics of the party line. The labor of women was valued and, at times, simultaneously feared. Men in the CPP sought to control the role of women in government while ensuring their own positions were not threatened. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 1, Nkrumah privileged expert knowledge and foreign education credentials. His government hired American and European expatriate women to administrative and government positions. Women such as American economist Ann Seidman and German Nazi pilot Hanna Reitsch held prestigious educational positions and were promoted by Nkrumah as symbols of Pan-African economics and flight training. Furthermore, Erica Powell, the personal secretary of Nkrumah – or whom she referred consistently to as “my beloved” – provides opportunity to explore the intimacies of translocality through her closeness and devotion to Nkrumah and Ghana. In 1965 Ghanaian intelligence accused Powell of being a foreign spy for the British Secret Service. In her public and private defence, Powell took advantage of her foreignness, whiteness, and intimacy to Nkrumah to escape punishment and maintain housing and retirement benefits. This example highlights the contradictions of Nkrumaism and the gendered-racial politics of Ghana’s postcolonial connectivities.³ It also reveals the experience of a white British woman in Nkrumaism and how Powell was able to navigate the formal charge of

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³ By highlighting this point I am making a similar observation that Jean Marie Allman, “Phantoms of the Archive: Kwame Nkrumah, a Nazi Pilot Named Hanna, and the Contingencies of Postcolonial History-Writing,” The American Historical Review 118(1) (2013): 104-129. Allman shows how the image of a German, prior Nazi, female war pilot was celebrated and used in Nkrumah’s promotion of aerospace technologies and the training of Ghanaian pilots. Allman also exposes the limits of the postcolonial archive in dealing with nationalist revisions to source materials.
conspiracy during a period when Nkrumah was taking a more aggressive line against women and men deemed as counter revolutionary.

The nature of women’s translocal space – their movement, experiences, and activisms beyond nation state borders – was not only racialized and politicized at the level of global Cold War politics and Pan-Africanism, but also at the level of national and local politics. Women had to gain a public or political reputation to contribute in government, party politics, but even relatively inexperienced younger women were involved in protests, oration, and various organizing roles that contribute to postcolonial politics. It is a space comprised of multiple spaces which are hierarchical depending on factors such as ability to read, urban or rural, in which women creatively appropriated platforms, whether print culture or conference forums, to forge connections and make claims for greater empowerment of women in national development and Pan-Africanism. They also used these platforms to critique foreign governments and global neocolonial and Cold War politics. There activisms and critiques had an emphasis on partnership networks of solidarity, decentring and diffusing power between participants and foreign governments. These women, mostly urban and educated, worked both outside of and within the constraints of party politics, while expanding the nature of development and politics in postcolonial Ghana. They further contributed to expanding Pan-African politics and notions of development to include nuclear non-proliferation and greater inclusion of women. As explored later, the case of European expat women in Ghana further complicate and reveal how race and gender are central to these translocal spaces, revealing how certain women are privileged and marginalized. Thus, the translocal spaces of women’s participation
contribute new questions to their co-constitutive role in broadening the scope of Pan-African development and into postcolonial translocality as an arena of contestation, solidarity, and claim-making.

**Pan-African Feminism, Global Dynamics, and the Contradictions of Experience in Ghana**

Amy Jacques-Garvey (1897-1969), a Pan-African intellectual, organizer and the second wife of Marcus Garvey, in a posthumous article posed the question: “What is the creative purpose of women? Immediately ones answer is --- to bear children.”4 In answering herself, Jacques-Garvey argues that until the beginning of the 20th century, women in Africa and Asia were subjugated by men and their non-reproductive abilities were undervalued.5 She continues arguing that despite these gendered misconceptions, women were deeply involved in freedom struggles, offering unconditional help, labor, and creativity in “…every field of endeavor to free their respective countries from the domination of rapacious exploiters.”6 Jacques-Garvey goes on to describe the characteristics of the role and importance of women in society through what she terms “women power”:

Woman's abilities are not limited because she is a female. On the contrary she is more versatile than man; she has more staying power in poverty and adversity than the he-male. She has charm, wit, intuition, humor and ingenuity; she can balance a home budget on a few dollars, and make the food "stretch" to feed her hungry household. She is noted for paying attention to details, and this skill enables her to contribute greatly to big projects in the community, state and nation.7

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5 Ibid.
6 Ibid., 109.
7 Ibid., 110.
There was no such bigger project than decolonization and according to Jacques-Garvey, women power is essential to its success or failure. Further drawing attention to the translocality of patriarchy, she argues that slavery, the holocaust, the Cold War, and the jailing of Black Panther activist Angela Davis, are all symptoms of a male dominated politics of greed and hate, of which it is up to women to actively try to change.\(^8\) She concludes that: “Women do not want to jostle men for jobs. They want what they merit and to which they can contribute their God-given qualities in trying to liberate this civilization from greed and hate.”\(^9\)

Jacques-Garvey was writing as a woman, Pan-Africanist, anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist. She was frustrated over the undervaluing of women and drew attention to the hypocrisy of narratives that ignored the contributions of women to national liberation struggles globally. Jacques-Garvey was also an internationalist who travelled widely across the continent, including Ghana, and the African-Caribbean diaspora, often referring to these places as part of a broader “Pan-African family.”\(^10\) She was part of what Ula Taylor denotes as an intellectual-African feminist who made significant contributions to the corpus of black radical activism and thought.\(^11\) Taylor takes the complex experiences of Ashwood-Garvey and Marcus Garvey’s second wife Amy Jacques-Garvey, to remedy the absence of

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\(^8\) Ibid., 111.
\(^9\) Ibid., 112.
\(^11\) Ibid.
female voices in narratives of black radical thought and anticolonialism. While women had diverse political opinions, those that contributed to Pan-Africanist and anticolonial discourse were able to introduce feminist concerns to black radical thought. The experiences and labor of women are therefore a constitutive part of national liberation. I argue that women’s internationalism was crucial to the expression of postcolonial connectivities in Ghana, while also dependent on them. Women creatively operated in and contributed to the translocality of Nkrumaisn in there activisms and roles in development politics as organizers and public Pan-African intellectuals, between the nation, continent, and world. This is significant as it re-centres woman’s co-constitutive role in postcolonial development and in diasporic, continental, and global politics, fields in which the experiences of women have traditionally been marginalized.

Like Jacques-Garvey, Ashwood-Garvey – the first wife of Marcus Garvey – was born in Jamaica and experienced British Rule and nationalist movements. She was born into a wealthy professional family which allowed her to receive an education in Britain. While a Pan-Africanist, Ashwood-Garvey situated her politics on the emancipation of women, describing in 1941 that “There must be a revolution among women. They must realise their importance in the post-war world … Women of the world must unite.” In 1945, along with George Padmore, T.T. Makkonen, Kwame Nkrumah and Peter Abrahams, Ashwood-Garvey was involved in organizing the historic Fifth Pan-African Congress in

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12 Taylor contends that Paul Gilroy’s *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* (1993) focuses primarily on elite African men and silencing the role of women in the history and development of black radical thought.


Manchester from October 13 to 21 at the University of Manchester in England. At the conference, which many future leaders of independent Africa attended, there were only two women presenters and organizers – Ashwood-Garvey and Alma La Badie. Badie was also Jamaican, and the both of them chaired the opening sessions on freedom and decolonization from British rule. It wasn’t until October 19, six days into the conference, that the issues related to women were brought up.16 Addressing the gendered imbalance of the conference, Ashwood-Garvey scolded participants:

Very much has been written and spoken on the Negro, but for some reason very little has been said about the black woman. She has been shunted to the background to be a child-bearer. This has principally been her lot. ...

Garvey offered a critique of racism, arguing that decolonization required addressing race as well as gender.18 She also called out women in the civil service who were unwilling to participate in liberation movements, advocating for greater participation among the professional educated class.19 Garvey would visit Ghana between 1958 to 1960. Her views and activism were not unique, but reflect wider trends of women participation and internationalism in anticolonial movements and as Taylor identifies, black radical thought.

18 Ibid.
19 Makalani, Amy Ashwood Garvey, 79-80.
While Taylor’s argument is convincing, in the case of postcolonial Ghana, it is also appropriate to explore the movements of women, their ideas and activism, within Nkrumaism and Pan-African development. I want to first situate the experiences of women in postcolonial Ghana within two important contexts. The first is the history of women’s political participation in the precolonial and colonial contexts. How does the political and transnational experiences of women during the Nkrumaist period – Ghanaians, diasporic, and white American and European expats – reflect wider trends of social and political-economic changes across time within the geographic space that is the Gold Coast? The second context is of the anticolonial movements and transnationalism of independent African governments more generally. Were the experiences of women in Ghana similar to those in other postcolonial African contexts and in what ways have transnational connections shaped the content and form of their political engagement? I am using the term women as a generative broad term, but as will be shown, there are no hegemonic experiences. By establishing these contexts, the Ghanaian example becomes significant as it contributes to broader narratives of change and political engagement by women as well as expands accepted narratives about the contradictions of women experiences made possible by the connectivities of Nkrumaism. The translocal politics of the state provided opportunities for women to articulate their concerns within the language of Pan-Africanism and development, tying women issues to anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism in the context of the Cold War.
Historically, women play a central role in the political and economic landscapes of the communities that make up Southern, Central, and Northern Ghana. Beyond tropes about social reproduction, they have long been involved in daily market trading, managing household finances, taking leading roles in cultural ceremonies and known as potent forces in the social and political institutions at the regional level. In some contexts, women were marginalized and have had to deal with formal patriarchy and gendered discrimination.

There is an established narrative from the historiography of the political history of women in precolonial to colonial Ghana. After the establishment of the centralized Akan in 1701, with the formalization of the roles of chieftaincy and kingship, political power became interchangeable with men. The official title of Queen Mother, in which royal women held power and were rulers over centralizing geography and resources, was replaced with the new Akan system. In the literature about matrilineal Akan chiefdoms in Ghana, a distinction is made between chiefs or kings and Queen Mothers which denotes a separate gender identity and the gendered delegation of responsibilities. Traditionally, the Queen

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20 Andrea Cornwall (ed), Readings in Gender in Africa (Boydell and Brewer, 2005).
23 Ibid.
Mothers were involved in selecting candidates for royal ascent to a vacant stool, and were an authority on kinship matters and in social-cultural ceremonies.26

Combined with the changes to local political-economic structures brought about by the trans-Atlantic slave trade and increased European intervention, the traditional roles of women in Akan society, broadly, changed. This was not without adaptation, as women creatively innovated strategies to exert their interests and participate in political, cultural, social, and economic spheres of society.27 The Krobo Queen Mothers in Southern Ghana, for example, adapted to the new patrilineage system, the slave trade, colonialism, and missionary activity, to exercise and reaffirm their political power.28 Despite this, however, regional and then national houses of chiefs systematically rejected Queen Mothers as being uncustomary, not reflective of tradition nor the guidelines set out under the colonial Native Jurisdiction Ordinance of 1883 and amended in 1910.29 Accusations of witchcraft was also used to punish and discipline women.30 During the colonial period, the labor of women in the household was deemed important, as was teaching European ideals about

26 Ibid.
28 Marijke Steegstra, “Krobo Queen Mothers: Gender, Power, and Contemporary Female Traditional Authority in Ghana,” Africa Today 55(3) (2009): 105-123.
29 A further change in the 1935 Ashanti Ordinance and the 1944 Gold Coast Colony Ordinance granted the colonial state to withdraw recognition of traditional authority. For a discussion on how women navigated and used the indirect rule British justice system see Roger Gocking, “British Justice and the Native Tribunals of the Southern Gold Coast Colony,” The Journal of African History 34(1) (1993): 108-110.
domestication.\(^{31}\) The colonial government implemented policies which extended legal protections to women in the Gold Coast.\(^{32}\) Women were able to navigate the colonial system in a variety of ways reflective of their positionality – urban or rural, wealthy or poor, educated or non-educated – which came to define the broad contours of their role in colonial and later postcolonial society.

Despite this, women who had family working in the colonial administration or who were born into middle-upper class wealth, were able to enlist in educational training in places like Sierra Leone or Britain.\(^{33}\) This phenomenon constitutes an emergent class of formally educated women in the 20\(^{th}\) century, who came back to the Gold Coast and took positions as secretaries in banks, publication houses, and in the political and financial sectors. The fields of science, technology and engineering – among formal political roles – were still seen as domains of men. It was not until the CPP introduced the Women’s League which formally allowed women to become judges and professional roles within political parties and government. What is important is that there has been continuity in the

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\(^{33}\) This is based on my observations of influential women in living/working in Ghana in the mid-twentieth century but similar observations are made in Russel Rickford, *We Are An African People: Independent Education, Black Power, and the Radical Imagination* (Oxford University Press, 2016) and Daniel Patrick Jr., *The Athens of West Africa: A History of International Education at Fourah Bay College, Freetown, Sierra Leone* (New York & London: Routledge, 2003).
experiences of women under the CPP and Nkrumah. Women as a political force in public life and the strategies of participation were tied to trends in education and professionalization. Many of the key figures examined in this Chapter, such as Mabel Dove, took up editorial and propaganda posts working within Nkrumaism, as an ideology and government, while advocating for a particular brand of Pan-African internationalism which introduced women’s issues to the forefront. Others, including Hannah Cudjoe, did not receive a formal transnational education but were transnational Pan-Africanists and speech-crafters, whose words and organizational ability inspired or provoked.

The political and working experiences of these elite educated African women during the period of Nkrumah also reflect wider trends of women’s participation in Pan-African and national liberation struggles on the continent in the early-mid twentieth century. In Southwestern Nigeria the Aba Women’s Riots of 1929, organized by rural women from Owerri and Calabar, challenged British taxation and the colonial customary courts leading to important reforms. The Igbo women organized against British colonial policy and for grievances held since the creation of Nigeria in 1914. Women also played a central role in decolonization and armed struggle in Algeria 1954-1961, Sudan 1956, Egypt, and in South Africa. The federation of South African Women were at the forefront

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of the anti-apartheid movement and contributed to the founding of the African National Congress. African liberation movements also expressed concern for women’s emancipation, although in some cases this existed only in discourse and not official policy. This meant that women were deeply involved in formal and informal roles in anticolonialism. Ghana, in this regard, was no exception. Women acted as freedom fighters, in administrative-organizational positions, as orators in protests, and took up government positions. The participation and support of women was also essential to the success of national movements and newly independent governments. Nkrumah in particular, relied on the support of not just elite organizers and propagandists but also market women who provided food and other material and labor at CPP rallies. This was also seen in Guinea through the Rassemblement Democratique Africain and women leadership of Hadja Mafory Bangoura. Other women such as labor activist Mary Muthoni Nyanjiru in Kenya or Funmilayo Ransome-Kuti in Nigeria were also important political figures in shaping anticolonial and postcolonial nationalist movements.

Women and CPP Nationalism

In Ghana, women played an essential role in the promotion of CPP nationalism, internationalism and pioneered tying women’s issues to decolonization and Pan-

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Africanism. A large number of educated women attended and were members of the UGCC and later the CPP. Beyond membership, they were also widely known as skillful organizers and orators who were able to rally crowds. Women also took the initiative in starting chants and singing to rally crowds behind a message, as well as operate water stations for participants at demonstrations. One such orator, now infamous, was Ama Nkrumah, a member of the CPP who adopted Nkrumah’s name. At a CPP rally she cut her face with a razor blade and rubbed the blood over herself after delivering a speech at a rally to emphasize the need for sacrifice in the struggle for freedom and to provoke men into action. The CPP benefited from the support of educated urban oriented women more than the UGCC. In his autobiography, Nkrumah describes the efforts of these countless Ghanaian women as being vital to the success of the CPP, specifically in “bringing about the solidarity and cohesion of the party.” He describes that “From the very beginning, women have been the chief field organizers. They have travelled through innumerable towns and villages in the role of propaganda secretaries.” They also travelled throughout the diaspora, were trained in foreign countries, and situated their struggles in Ghana within Pan-Africanist and internationalist contexts. Furthermore, because of the translocality of the Nkrumaist project, there were also European expatriate women working in government positions. By contrasting and exploring these diverse experiences within the context of

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39 For details about the roles of these women at rallies in the 1950s these dissertations are useful: Theresa Laney, Women In Ghanaian Politics (1951-1990), (Department of History, University of Ghana, 1991) and Nelson Leslie, The Role of Women in Post-Independent Ghana: Steps Towards Equality, (Department of History, University of Ghana, 1996).
43 Ibid.
Nkrumaisn and global politics, a greater emphasis is placed on the conflicting roles of elite educated Ghanaian, Afro-American and European women in postcolonial politics.

In 1951 after Nkrumah’s release from prison, the CPP held local elections that saw the appointment of Hannah Cudjoe, Letitia Quaye, Sophia Doku, and Ama Nkrumah to positions involving organizing, propaganda and journalism. One of the first formal political organizations for women, not just in Ghana but in colonial Africa, was The National Federation of Gold Coast Women which was established in 1953 with the aim of promoting women. They focused primarily on issues including gaining recognition for customary marriages from the colonial government and gender equality in both employment and inheritance practices.44 The federation published a journal, *The Federation*, beginning in 1957. The Women’s League was organized by the CPP propaganda secretary Hannah Cudjoe, who had worked for Nkrumah in the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) since the late 1940s. In tandem with these organizations, the market women in Accra also played recruitment roles for the CPP. Ardua Ankrah of Korie Wokon was a successful recruiter. Nkrumah had public lunches organized in honor of the Ghana Market Women Traders Association and women section of the CPP, securing the support of 50,000 market women.45

This was the scope of political participation which elite educated women operated in until 1960 when their role in Nkrumaisn was streamlined by the government and

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45 Peter Plange, 6.
legislature with an official quota system and organizational merger. The Ghana Women’s League and the National Federation of Gold Coast Women, was renamed the Ghana Federation of Women, and then formed together under the National Council of Ghana Women in 1960. These organizations were run by elite educated women but attracted membership from urban and rural communities. Nkrumah and other members in the CPP believed that by organizing women into a national organization they would be a more potent political force that would act in tandem with the CPP. On June 26, 1960 the parliament passed the Representation of the People (Women Members) Act, first introduced in 1959, which required the nomination and election of at least ten women as members of parliament in the National Assembly. The Act explicitly mentions the importance of the inclusion of women, describing their participation as essential. It also led to ten women being elected unopposed as MPs. This included Ayanori Bukari, Susana Al-Hassan, and Victoria Nyarko representing Northern Regions, Sophia Doku and Mary Koranteng in the Eastern Region, Regina Asamany in the Volta Region, Grace Atensu and Christiana Wilmot Western region, Comfort Asamoah from Ashanti region and Lucy Anim representing Brong Ahafo. This quota system was an acknowledgement of the important role that women played in the CPP and the struggle for independence. It also favored

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51 In 1965 Susan Al-Hassan was appointed Minister of Social Welfare and Community Development.
literate educated and urban experienced women who had built a public reputation. These women were not monolithic and had a diversity of viewpoints. This initiative was tied to Nkrumah and it was withdrawn under the subsequent military and populist governments.

The promotion of Pan-Africanism by Nkrumah also meant the movement of intellectuals and activists from the diaspora to Ghana. One such figure is Shirley DuBois (often overshadowed by the accomplishments of her husband) who was a political activist, writer and supporter of national independence movements, Nkrumah, and Pan-Africanism. Both W.E.B Dubois and his second wife Shirley DuBois were granted Ghanaian citizenship in October 1961 and were highly regarded by Nkrumah. Shirley travelled significantly through the USSR and the People’s Republic of China. Along with her husband she was also a member of the US Communist Party. It is reported that they were under investigation by US intelligence under suspicion that they were spying for socialist government and had their passports seized from 1950 to 1958.53 In 1958 they travelled to Ghana where Shirley delivered a speech to the All-African Peoples Conference in December in the absence of her husband. She raised questions about the future direction of African unity and socialism:

Which way shall Africa go? First, I would emphasize the fact that today Africa has no choice between private Capitalism and Socialism. The whole world, including Capitalist countries, is moving towards Socialism, inevitably, inexorably.54

Dubois thought of socialism as a disciplined economy and political organization where the duty of the citizen is to serve the state and sacrifice to achieve the “collective destiny” of Pan-African unity and emancipation.55

Dubois was also a powerful orator who often delivered key notes and was renowned for promoting CPP policies and agendas. Addressing the Women’s Association of the Socialist Students Organizations in Ghana about the significance of the Bill of 1960, she remarked: “…now with ten women Parliamentarians in Republican Ghana, this country has achieved what took Europe centuries to accomplish.”56 Shirley was also a socialist, who had travelled to the People’s Republic of China, remarking in the same address about her travels she states that “The women of Socialist China were advanced in all spheres of useful activity and enjoyed equal rights with men.”57 In recognition of the important role they played in the country, the former residence of the Dubois has been transformed into a museum, learning centre and part monument – a site dedicated to their lives and contributions. Dubois was also assigned by Nkrumah the task of establishing a national television network based in Ghana.

While the CPP expanded and provided greater support for women participation in formal politics, it was not without limits. These women were such potent political forces that there were fears within the Party that men would become marginalized in governance. Tawia Adamafio, former Vice-Chair of the CPP, who was later accused by Nkrumah in August 1962 for participating in his attempted assassination at Kulungu, recounted in his

55 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
political autobiography that Nkrumah sought radical gender equality in labour output.58

Adamafio mocked the introduction of the quota system, noting that Nkrumah ambitiously wanted:

Our women must take over completely as private secretaries, stenographers and copy typists. They should branch into engineering services, pharmacy, bus and taxi driving, law and medicine and all the other fields. They should go shoulder to shoulder without men.59

Leading up to the Conference of the Women of Africa and African Descent, Adamafio contended that “The Party women could not be bullied into submission by any party leader including Nkrumah himself on any matter… If necessary the women did not hesitate to boo me or any other leader for that matter.”60 However, gendered stereotypes of women persisted in Adamafio’s characterization of CPP women as being difficult to organize, he stated “…if you can imagine their gossip, bitter quarrels and bickering and the acrimony of the lashing tongues…”61 He even reminisced on the threat the National Council of Ghana Women had in terms of gaining autonomy outside of the CPP, warning that:

…it could break off in rebellion, form a party by itself and sweep everything before it at the polls. The ratio of women voters to men then was about three or more to one and the position could well arise, where Ghana would be ruled by a women President… I could see men being ridden like horses.62

58 Tawia Adamafio, By Nkrumah’s Side: The Labour and the Wounds (London: Westcoast & Collings, 1982).
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid., 63.
61 Ibid.
The view that women were a powerful political force was so prevalent that by 1962 there were great fears of a women’s revolution which would overthrow Party men and marginalize them in formal politics.

While these views were commonly expressed by officials, they were not held by Nkrumah. Instead, Nkrumah actively advocated for gender inclusion within Pan-African development but within the framework of the Nkrumaist vision of national development. In other words, women activisms and organizations in theory had to work with the state and reflect the official party line. In practice however, women activists and organizers had to work within Nkrumaism and find creative ways to bring women’s issues to the forefront. They further drew connections from Ghana to translocal women struggles on the continent and in the world while engaging in the politics of Cold War nuclear non-proliferation. These experiences of women – mostly educated, literate, urban oriented women – speaks to the individuals’ location within the connectivities of Ghana. Yet, as will be shown, these boundaries were constantly being negotiated. Rather than having to ‘toe a line’ to their unquestioned personal allegiance and obedience to Nkrumah, some of these women were able to table important women issues to Pan-Africanism and wrote extensively on internationalist issues. I will now explore the popular writings and internationalism of the propaganda secretariats and public intellectual Mabel Ellen Dove.

**Writing Internationalism: Print Culture and the Party Propaganda Secretariats**
The official propaganda outlets and party press publication provided “unconditional political and ideological support” to the national liberation movement.63 While there was

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debate on the relationship between the media and Nkrumah conducted in the Ghana Press Club (a cosmopolitan association that valued the free pursuit of truth), the *Ghanaian Times*, *Evening News*, and the *Spark* were closely tied to the CPP. In this respect, Nkrumah recognized that women played a vital role in print culture by promoting anticolonialism and nationalism which contributed to political mobilization around the CPP. In 1951 Nkrumah supported creating a women’s column in the *Evening News* by female editor Akua Sabea, to provide an official platform for women. The column allowed for a diverse range of opinions relating to women’s issues but was not overtly critical of the CPP, it was in effect a state sanctioned paper. Biney describes this as one of many initiatives and policies which sought to “elevate the status of women in the country.” Other initiatives included establishing an educational fund for women and expanding the number of female judges and government officials. The women, particularly Sabea and Mabel Ellen Dove, worked with Nkrumah, printing critiques of the colonial government and calling for independence in the *Evening News*. Sabea further took part in the CPP’s positive action campaign in 1954-55 and alongside others such as Leticia Quaye and Arduah Ankrah, were

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65 Biney, *Nkrumah’s Social-Political Thought*,
66 Hasty, *Press and Political Culture*, 33. The first women propaganda secretariats in 1951 were Leticia Quaye, Hanna Cudjoe, Ama Nkrumah, and Sophia Doku. They travelled throughout the country and enrolled men and women into the CPP, sponsored rallies, and collected contributions for the policies. They were primarily responsible for speaking about the CPP platform.
68 Biney, *Nkrumah’s Social and Political Thought*,
69 Ibid. Nkrumah reflects on these measures as significant advances in women’s liberation and their inclusion in the Pan-African revolution, see Kwame Nkrumah, *Dark Days in Ghana* (Panaf Press, 1968), 17-18.
70 Abayomi Azikiwe, 25-30.
detained in prison for their involvement.71 Even in prison it was reported that women such as Ankrah actively kept up the enthusiasm of the detainees.72 Once independence had been gained, one of the strategies of engagement with politics for educated or elite women to express their Pan-Africanist and internationalist views, reflective of the translocality of Nkrumaism, was through press publishing.

Mabel Ellen Dove was the most renowned public Pan-Africanist intellectual, committed internationalist and advocate for women’s rights. Dove was the first African woman on the continent to be elected to a parliamentary position in 1954. The Young Women’s Christians Association was established in 1952 and the Women’s Market Association was established in 1956. Before working for the *Evening News* as part of Nkrumah’s efforts to expand women’s participation in print culture, Dove published extensively under the pseudonyms Marjorie Mensah, Ebun Alkaija and Dama Dumas. Female journalists writing political commentaries had to publish under pseudonyms because of the threat of persecution form the colonial government. It was only when Dove became married to lawyer and politician J.B Danquah, was she able to publish under her own name as a female.73 She joined the CPP in 1950 and began writing for the party. In line with Nkrumaism, Dove viewed the one-party state and socialist development in pursuit of national liberation as the foreground for Pan-African unity. She was also an internationalist who critiqued foreign governments and saw Cold War as an extension of colonialism. In 1954 Dove, supported by Nkrumah, was the only female representative on

71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
the ballot for the CPP, becoming the first elected female representative, winning the rural region of Ga. However, her election was fiercely opposed, and Dove was not re-elected after her four year term in 1956, she was replaced by a male colleague. Upon independence, Dove had a significant role in the organizational politics of Pan-Africanism for the CPP and in writing political pieces which reflected the party line while creating increased awareness of women’s issues. Women activists became integrated within the National Council of Ghana Women in 1960. Although Dove was not one of the new government electives from the introduction of the quota system in 1959-60, she utilized the increased inclusivity of women and shifting norms advocated by Nkrumah as a platform to advance women’s rights and advocate for Pan-Africanism within the context of the postcolonial Cold War.

While much of the writing on Dove has been confined to literary analysis, she was widely known in Ghana as a Pan-Africanist. Africanist and theorist Carole Davis is the first to argue that Dove should also be “studied separately as a Pan-African feminist and located within the frameworks of transnational black feminist practice.” Davis contends that the intellectual archive of Dove demonstrates that she was internationally concerned with women’s issues and was concerned with politics in North America, Asia, and Europe. What I offer to this discussion about Dove, is consideration of her experiences in Ghana as she reflected and contributed to the translocality of Nkrumaism. I do this by focusing on her activisms and internationalist writings as they are related not just to Pan-Africanism, but the Cold War. I agree that the evidence suggests that Dove was a Pan-African feminist,

75 Ibid.
especially when placed in a diasporic context as Davis has done. She was also an essential component of legitimizing and promoting Nkrumaism, revealing the nuance, complexity, and translocality of her experiences.

Dove was born in Accra to a prominent Osu-based Ga market women Eva Buckman and her father was a Gold Coast based lawyer from Sierra Leon. Dove was sent to Sierra Leone Freetown to pursue primary and secondary education at the Annie Walsh Memorial School (founded in 1849) in Freetown Sierra Leone which was as run by her paternal aunt Lydia Dove. After graduation she attended Bury St. Edmunds and St. Michael’s College in England. Dove also attended a semester long secretariat program at Gregg commercial College, much to the dismay of her father who after finding out sent her back to Freetown. Before returning to the Gold Coast in 1926 at the age of 21, Dove helped organize a girls’ cricket club at Annie Walsh and was involved in an arts-drama group. Dove worked as a shorthand-typist for Elder Dempster Lines and then as a manager at a fabrics and goods department store. During this period, West-African newspapers began to devote columns to explore issues in relation to women to attract the readership of the emerging professional class of women. Dove began to freelance within the context of print culture expansion and rising nationalist sentiments for independence.76

Dove wrote for the *African Morning Post* from 1935-1940 under the pseudonym Dama Dumas, from 1936-1937 for the *Nigerian Daily Times* under Ebun Alakija and from 1950-1960 for the Accra Evening News under Aksoua Dazatsui. In these writings, Dove pushed the limits of public criticism, garnering attention from local elites, the colonial

76 Ibid.
government and expat community. Danquah, then acting as the founding editor for the daily *West African Times* employed Dove as a writer in 1931 until 1935. She then worked with Nkrumah for the *Evening News* while continuing to write for the *Daily Graphic*. Dove is regarded as the first woman in West Africa to be employed as an editor of a newspaper. Kwame Botwe-Asamoah reflects on Dove’s position as both a supporter of Nkrumah and wife to Danquah who was his most outspoken critic. What this reveals is that Dove was persistent and uncompromising in her politics. What were Dove’s politics? Her writings concerned issues relating to women and independence more broadly, often tackling women’s rights, anti-exploitation, anti-colonialism, and anti-imperialism. She also advocated for the education of women in the sciences and for greater formal representation of women in government. Dove also published a series of short stories. The theme of internationalism and the activisms of the CPP in global context are an important element of Doves collective writings which speaks to the transnationalism of Nkrumaism.

Dove’s writing was internationalist, she often commented on international affairs and issues effecting other African countries while linking seemingly disconnected struggles and issues within Africa and beyond. In these writings she also conceptualized the struggle for freedom through the lens of Pan-Africanism, where local conflicts are linked to transnational and global contexts. The official propaganda outlets and party press – the evening news and CPP publications – provided “unconditional political and ideological

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77 Kwame Botwe-Asamoah, 101-102.
support” to national liberation movements on the continent. 79 Like Nkrumaism, writers such as Dove or DuBois never offered a sustained critique of the one-party state and socialist development in pursuit of national liberation as the foreground for Pan-African unity.

Dove did not just engage with overt forms of colonial and postcolonial racism in global politics, but extended this critique to the practice of apartheid in South Africa and Kenya. She openly criticized the imprisonment of Jomo Kenyatta and black leaders as an extension of settler politics to sustain “white domination in black Africa.” 80 Particularly, she did not shy away from writing about what she saw as white oppression caused by Afrikanners. She was also outspoken in her assessment of the illegitimacy of their claim to be African. White settlement in South Africa dates to the 17th century Dutch East India Company, which established a provision placement in Table Bay. Over the ensuing century and a half, the Boers (Dutch for farmers) or Afrikaners ad they would become known – developed a distinct identity, language and culture. The frontier Boers in particular were tough, independent-minded and Calvinist. They came to regard the area around Cape Town, later Cape Colony, as theirs by right, claims underpinned by a racial-religious ideology of white superiority. 81 Dove was aware of the tensions and threat white settlement posed to the struggle for freedom and Pan-African unity on the continent. Dove correctly

79 Azikiwe, Pan-Africanism, 17.
makes the connection between race and settler-colonialism arguing that the claim to Africaness by white settlers in South Africa was “the real propaganda…The white in any part of Africa is not an African and he can never be an African by any stretch of the imagination…”82 She viewed this as both a cultural and political struggle over the definition over who is an African. Dove associated these claims as the antithesis of Pan-Africanism, a strategy of imperialism that sought to negate African identity, and the political power that emanated from it, to create a white dominion in Africa.83

Not only did Dove report on the Pan-African conferences, or write columns about issues in other African countries, she also interviewed foreign delegates and at times framed her reporting of these engagements as critiques of their governments and practices in Cold War global politics. In 1960 there was a controversy surrounding the French government testing atomic bombs in colonial Algeria (Sahara). Nkrumah was not engaged in diplomatic efforts to prevent Charles De Gaulle from testing atomic weapons in Algerian territory, as Ghana-Algerian diplomacy centred on debates about violence and trying to mediate confrontation between the French government and the Algerian National Liberation Movement.84 These tests, and the activism of Dove and the Women’s Federation however prompted the formation of the “World Without a Bomb” conference in Ghana a year later and promoted the linking of nuclear imperialism to Pan-Africanism. Dove was one of the first and most outspoken critiques of nuclear imperialism – the proliferation of

83 Ibid.
nuclear weapons, their use and testing by global powers – and non-proliferation in West-Africa. Dove saw atomic testing in the Sahara as an extension of the legacy of colonialism and a disregard for African sovereignty and wellbeing.

In January 1960, Dove reached out to interview the prominent French pacifist Pierre Martin who had gained popularity after travelling to Ghana to stage a hunger strike protest against nuclear testing and colonialism at the French Embassy located in Ghana House Accra. Martin’s efforts were reported in major newspapers in Europe and North America, but Dove was the first to be granted an interview and the Evening News was the first to break the story. In conversation with Martin, Dove called the findings of the United States Atomic Energy Commission to highlight the consequences of nuclear testing:

In the hands of Pierre Martin was a pamphlet. I (Dove) glanced through it and I will give you the details of the findings of a group of scientists in the Atomic Energy Commission of the United States of America. ‘As surely as a bomb is exploded thousands of persons will fall sick and will die in some part of the world. Carbon 14, the most menacing of radioactive substances, is a menace because it lives so long, 8,000 years. Up to the moment biological peril to man of Carbon 14 has been responsible for ‘100,000 major defectives, physical as well as psychological; 380,000 stillborn children and of infant mortality and 900,000 cases of embryonic and neonatal deaths. And yet despite all these horrors, France proposed to test in the middle of the African continent, an absolute bomb of no scientific value because according to Christian France, the most powerful countries are those who have these diabolical weapons and France believes that by endangering the lives of 200 million Africans she will become a powerful nation.”

In this rebuke, Dove called attention to the disregard of the health of African bodies and associated the atomic testing with the military development of France. Dove expressed the solidarity of the Nkrumah government with Martin’s hunger strike against the use and testing of nuclear weapons in the Sub-Saharan. In conversation with Dove, Martin makes clear that he is representing the people of France and that the French government and embassy represents elitist interests.87 Dove asked Martin whether he thought his fast could stop the test. Martin responded saying “If General de Gaulle so desires, the atom test in the Sahara could be stopped.”88

Following the publication of this interview, the Ghana Federation of Women organized a protest on January 15 1960.89 While the protest called attention to the issue within the context of the official state position against France and nuclear non-proliferation, it was an important symbolic event. The protest ended with the presentation of a cheque by the Federation, for an undisclosed amount, to E.C Quaye, the Chairman of the Ghana Council for Nuclear Disarmament.90 It symbolized the unity and service of women for Ghana, and a pledge that they would lend their efforts to the work done by the Council. It was a positive event for Nkrumah as it demonstrated the willingness of the new Federation to work under national organizational framework, in support of the CPP. As Dove remarked on this protest, it was the duty of women to involve themselves in national service to fight the real harm of international politics and policies on African bodies.

87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
The *Evening News* was the first to report on the mobilization of the Ghana women’s movement in opposition to the French atomic test. An article on the front page titled “*Women Federation Presents G21 Cheque,*” revealed that Mr. E.C. Quaye, Chairman of the Ghana Council for Nuclear Disarmament, received the gift from a three-member delegation of the Ghana Federation of Women. 91 These women were Mrs. A.M. Akiwumi, the National President, Dr. Evelyn Armateifio, the General Secretary, and Mrs. Elsie Ofuatey Cudjoe, an executive member of the Women’s Federation. This presentation of funds was held at the Accra Municipal Council and Dr. Armateifio noted in an interview with the *Evening News* that it was “…unanimously decided to make financial contributions to help the Sahara Protest Team. To this end the conference resolved to organize rallies to launch an appeal for funds. Yesterday’s contribution was proceeds from rallies held at Peki and Half Asini.”92 As a result of these public criticisms and efforts, the Second All-African People’s Conference, which convened in Tunisia ten days later, went on record condemning the proposed nuclear test by the French government.

The efforts of Dove’s participation in the national conversation of nuclear weapons, her internationalist critique of nuclear testing and the public enthusiasms generated by the Federations protest, had direct transnational impacts. Nuclear non-proliferation and testing became one of the key topics discussed at the 2nd All-African People’s Conference held in Tunisia between January 19 to 22 1960.93 On the first day of the gathering there was a rally held in opposition to the French test which was sponsored by the ruling Neo-Destour party.

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The *Evening News* of January 25, 1960 describes that: “The underlying theme of the conference is ‘Freedom and Unity’ and how to complete Africa’s independence and weld it into one unit grouping all 230 million Africans. Delegates from more than 30 nations are taking part in the conference.”94 Despite this widespread sentiment in Africa against the French test in the Sahara, it was carried out on February 13, 1960. This was its first atomic bomb, known as Blue Jerboa. In 2014, declassified documents indicated that radiation emanating from the operation in the Algerian desert extended much further than what was stated at the time. The criticisms of France and nuclear weapons testing in the Sahara, emanated from the activisms and organization of women to generate public enthusiasm and pressure official representatives to table the issue and tie it with Pan-Africanism. The conference proceedings draw a direct reference to “African women” and noted that there were diverse efforts on the continent for participants to take some form of political action.95

While the nuclear policies of members were consistent in their own nuclear development policies, some suggested that Africans should engage in nuclear development for their own ends. Despite these disagreements, on January 20, it was proposed that there be a formal condemnation by participants of France’s plans and of nuclear proliferation.96 The conference participants issued formal condemnation of the upcoming nuclear test.97 Despite these efforts, the French carried out the atomic testing on February 13 1960.98

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96 Ibid., 7-8.
97 Ibid.
In response to the subsequent condemnation of the testing and growing consensus on the role Ghana, women, and African states should take, Nkrumah organized the Accra Assembly: The World without the Bomb conference which took place June 21 to 28, 1962. Nkrumah first expressed interest in the Assembly in 1961 to Quaye, feeling the need for Asia, Africa, and Latin America to contribute to work being done by the European Federation Against Nuclear Armaments and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. The conference, which will be explored in the proceeding Chapter, had the objective of examining in “…detail and suggest solutions for those international problems which make the nuclear destruction of humanity more than a mere possibility.” Thus, Dove and the Federation played instrumental roles in advocating for greater attention to be paid to nuclear imperialism within the context of Pan-Africanism and the Cold War.

In addition to Dove’s internationalist concerns, she was a promoter and advocate of socialist development and its application to Africa. Much like Nkrumah, Dove believed that socialism provided an economic model that would restore dignity and empower Africans to collectively take control of their economic potential. Dove termed this as the “New Africanism.” Recalling the enthusiasm of independence and the importance of ‘big push’ socialist development on the tenth anniversary of the CPP’s Positive Action campaign in 1960, she stated:

The Leader is calling on them once more to rededicate themselves to the economic and social reconstruction of Ghana and the coming together of the nations of Africa – Africanism the new ideology. Other peoples and

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100 Tentative Program of the Accra Assembly, DOC/AA/1/10 (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana).
races of the past had to creep, walk and run but as the Leader said for us ‘The Time is Short’. The African has to run and leap to move with extended hand towards his brother… dedicated to the service of his country and his continent, Mother Africa.\textsuperscript{101}

Africanism, as Dove defines it, is this “…new religion to be practiced and propagated by the patriots of the new and emerging nations of Africa.”\textsuperscript{102}

Dove was also a prolific fiction writer whose work, according to Helen Yitah, challenged colonial and racial legacies while questioning male value systems that denied female subjectivity, and envisioned a “new woman” who could challenge them.\textsuperscript{103} Her largely unpublished collection of short stories, “Sketches of Life,” recently uncovered by Yitah, brings out Doves contribution to gender identity in Ghanaian literature\textsuperscript{104} Race was intersected with gender, both at the level of discourses and role of women in politics, but also in their thoughts about Pan-Africanism and socialist development. Such a unique female identity, according to Dove, is valuable to the nation state and advancing party politics as; “Women have ways of finding out things that men cannot do, and, it will be profitable to the country if they use this ability. Women have got ability that is especially unique in them and no man can trespass on this ground.”\textsuperscript{105} Thus, while Dove was influential in promoting Nkrumaiism and engaging in internationalist politics, she fundamentally worked within the context of emergent nationalism, Pan-Africanism and Cold War politics. Within these constraints, she carved out spaces of political participation

\textsuperscript{102} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{103} Helen Yitah, “Hard-Headed and Masculine-Hearted Women”: Female Subjectivity in Mabel Dove-Danquah’s Fiction,” \textit{Meridians: Feminism, Race, Transnationalism} 17(1) (2018), 134.
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., 135.
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid.
and conceived of a “new women” – similar to Nkrumah’s conception of the African personality and “new man” as explored in Chapter 1 – to fulfil their duty to the national and the continent.

While Dove was one of the pioneers of print culture activism in the colonial and postcolonial context, she was certainly not exceptional. Hannah Cudjoe built off of the space created by Dove and others to become one of the leading propaganda secretariats for the CPP, employed shortly after the first successful general election won by the CPP in 1951.106 Cudjoe was the leading women nationalist figure in Ghana.107 She was also an organizer of the national protest movements throughout February 1948 for the release of UGCC leaders from political imprisonment by the colonial government.108 Cudjoe would become directly involved producing propaganda content, developing slogans, popularising phrases, names, and songs. She saw this as an additional responsibility since it called for the organization of women into the CPP's Women Section and the men into the Youth League. She spoke at the inauguration of numerous branches of the CPP's Women's Section.109 What the example of Dove and Cudjoe illustrates however is the influence her brand of internationalism had legitimizing Nkrumaism and putting the issues of women and nuclear non-proliferation on the agenda at the Pan-African conference in Tunisia. Dove specifically saw the ‘new Africanism’ as a redemptive movement for dignity and dedication.

107 Ibid.
108 Ibid., 28-29.
to achieve Pan-Africanism, socialist development, and nuclear proliferation while promoting a recognition of the importance of women in national-international politics.

**Afro-American Connectivities in the Cold War: The Conference of the Women of Africa and of African Descent, 1960**

While the experiences and internationalism of women in print culture and as propaganda secretariats under Nkrumah had significant impacts on promoting women’s issues and nuclear non-proliferation with Pan-Africanism in the context of the Cold War, the preeminent internationalist event organized by and for women was the Conference of Women of Africa and of African Descent (CWAAD). The CWAAD convened in Accra from July 18 to 21 1960 during a year in which saw Nkrumah’s government promote inclusion and gender quotas for women in politics.¹¹⁰ I argue that this conference is a site of postcolonial connectivity by focusing on the content of the conference and the way it was politicized by Afro-American radicals and moderates, Nkrumah and the CPP, as well as by the US and British intelligence services. While the CWAAD’s impact was the formation of the All-African Women’s Conference (AAWC) in the late 1960s and 1970s, there was not a second CWAAD conference under Nkrumah.¹¹¹ The CWAAD was organized by the women’s branch of the CPP. Shirley Dubois was a key organizer, and it was organized in the structure of delegations and voted representatives to a steering

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¹¹¹ As will be discussed, women were increasingly scrutinized and as the political space in Ghana shrunk under the growing authoritarianism of Nkrumah, such conferences – I think – were no longer in the interest of Nkrumah and the CPP – they were sights of subversion.
committee. It was deliberative, meant to promote dialogue and debate among women on topics such as civil rights, Pan-Africanism, and economic development.

On the opening day of the conference on July 18, Nkrumah took to the podium at Baden Memorial Hall to sanction the event and highlight its significance for the Pan-Africanist struggle. He described the conference as “…an achievement which constitutes another landmark of progress in Africa’s irresistible march to emancipation and victory.”

An achievement that he attributed to his own government being on the front lines of the struggle. He continued:

The new African has arrived on the scene. Colonialism and imperialism are on the run, fleeing from the blows of African irredentism. What is women’s part in the great struggle for African liberation? You have to provide an answer to that question… The women of Ghana have played a most glorious part in our struggle for independence. They were solidly behind the Ghana revolution. Guided by the CPP, thousands of women flocked to the nationalist banners and, side by side with the men, fought heroically until freedom was achieved for Ghana.

The speech connected women to the national liberation struggle and situated the conference to Nkrumah’s view of Pan-African emancipation. He saw the conference as an opportunity to engage with questions of South African pass system and apartheid, French and British colonialism, and the United Nations legitimacy in Africa. Within these contexts of existing imperialism and Cold War tensions he posed the question: “What part can the women of African descent anywhere in the world play in the struggle for African emancipation?”

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113 Ibid.
From the very beginning then, the conference was promoted by Nkrumah and the CPP in relation to the Pan-African revolutionary struggle and Nkrumism.

The women organizers and participants espoused the need for socialism and the one-party state within the image of Nkrumah, but importantly rather than just simply regurgitating CPP talking points, they connected issues of gender inequality and discrimination to Pan-African revolution and wanted to create new ties between black women. The main themes of the conference were to “(a) to promote leadership and citizenship amongst women of Africa and African descent; (b) to give the…opportunity to discuss their common problems and how best these could be solved; (c) to promote friendship amongst women of Africa and African descent.”\textsuperscript{115} However, there were stark disagreements in the conference between what has been described as the radicals and moderates.\textsuperscript{116} Shirley Dubois was elected as chairman for the Americans, appointed by radicals such as Vicki Garvin, Hazel Grey, and Geraldine Lightfoot. Howard University director of medical service Dorothy Ferebee and New York University professor Jeanne Noble, who were part of the American delegation, reported that this was a strategic move by the radicals to “…wrest from the opposition the evident plan to condemn and vilify the United States.”\textsuperscript{117} They further described that the American participants were “plagued from the outset by a political struggle,” in which they had to connect civil rights struggles


\textsuperscript{117} Ibid.
to African liberation.\footnote{Dorothy Ferebee and Jeanne Noble, “Report on the Conference of Women of Africa and African Descent: Accra, Ghana, July 14-21, 1960,” 3-5, 7, Series III, Box 27, Folder “62A,” Bond Papers.} They condemned the radicals as not engaging enough with African woman and instead hyper-focused on critiquing racial oppression in the US. This is an important point as it shows the complexity and diversity of women’s political positions and experiences.

Some commentators have suggested that their report on the conference proceedings was at the request of the American intelligence services for information related to what they saw as a meeting of Communist sympathizers and potential Communist penetration.\footnote{Grimm, 176.} Secretary of State Christian Herter told the American embassy in Accra in advance of the conference that a number of “American citizens of strong leftist tendencies” would attend the meeting.\footnote{Telegram, Christian Herter to Wilson Flake, July 14, 1960, RG 84, GCGR, 1956-1958, Box 3, Folder “Conferences – Misc Africa 1960,” NACP.} John Meagher at the Accra embassy replied with a supporting worry that “…this conference may well set the pace for future efforts at Communist penetration of ‘non-governmental’ meetings in Africa… It will be necessary to be well represented numerically as well as substantively at such meetings.”\footnote{Telegram, John Meagher to Christian Herter, “Conference of Women of Africa and African Descent Held in Accra,” July 27, 1960, p. 1, 6, RG 84, GCGR, 1956-1958, Box 3, Folder “Conferences, Misc Africa 1960,” NACP.} There were official fears borne out by these communications and the reporting by the American moderates Ferebee and Nobel, which made it important to enlist African American women participation in the conference to help limit criticism of the US and the spread of Communism. The report also demonstrates that the experience of moderate Americans at the conference was one of concern for the increasing anti-American sentiments of Nkrumah, African conference
organizers, and the radicals. The conference also received the attention of the British foreign office, which had similar fears about the conference being a meeting of radical communists. The conference was a translocal sight of Cold War politics in which moderates were critical of anti-Americanism and socialism, seeking to connect their struggles with African women to achieve the goal of racial justice.

In addition to the conference, party women were also involved in recruiting transnational African-American Pan-African activists and writers from the United States who provided support to Nkrumaist Ghana and Pan-Africanism. Maya Angelou moved to Ghana in 1961 after living in Egypt and had expressed support for Nkrumah as many Afro-Americans were doing in the 1960s. Angelou lived in Accra until she spent time with Malcom X during his trip to the country in 1964. During this period she worked as an assistant administrator for the School of Music and Drama at the University of Ghana. She then took up the position as a feature editor for *The African Review* and wrote for *The Ghanaian Times*. Maya joined a delegation to the US embassy in Ghana that condemned the US response to the civil rights movement and tried to gain support for support to apply the UN genocide convention to the US. The delegation sought to show support for the August 27, 1963 March on Washington, led by Martin Luther King, Jr., by leading a demonstration in Accra. There were other such demonstrations all over the world, in Paris,
Oslo, Munich, Tel Aviv, and elsewhere. But the one that garnered the most scrutiny by U.S. officials was the demonstration by the expatriates in Ghana. The march did not have the impact its participants hoped it would have because the demonstrators, including Angelou, were detached from the actual struggles on the ground in the United States.126 Angelou recalls participating in meaningful conversations about politics in her home, and challenging “ignorant men,” such as Sheikhalı.127 However, shortly before she returned to the United States to head up an office of the Organization of Afro American Unity for Malcolm X, she travelled to Keta in Western Ghana where she recalls feeling like she had come home when villagers mistook her for a relative.128

In Accra, Angelou was at the center of Afro-American expatriates, intellectuals, and activists.129 Afro-American expatriates, civil rights activists and intellectuals were travelling to Africa, particularly Ghana, to build activist connections and advance the struggle for civil rights in the United States.130 The CPP was welcoming and Ghana was a model of an independent state that would help internationalize civil rights. Afro-American civil and labor activists Vicki Garvin and Alice Windom had also travelled to Ghana in the early 1960s. In addition to these women, the actor, novelist, activist and occasional speech

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126 Maya Angelou, All God’s Children Need Traveling Shoes (New York: Random House, 1986); Mary Jane Lupton, Maya Angelou: A Critical Companion (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1998), 33. As Lupton argues, the text by Angelou is a reflection on her coming to terms with multiple identities while living as an African American in Ghana.
127 There is a second hand account in Tavis Smiley, My Journey with Maya (Little Brown and Company, 2015), 60-64. Smiley was a close friend and colleague of Angelou, they travelled extensively together.
128 Ibid.
129 Ibid., 65.
130 Kevin Gaines, American Africans in Ghana: Black Expatriates and the Civil Rights Era (University of North Carolina Press, 2006).
writer for Nkrumah, Julian Mayfield also went to Accra. Mayfield became the publicity secretary for the Parliament and editor of *African Review*.

One of the most significant contributions these Afro-American expat women made was organizing Malcom X’s trip to Ghana in 1964. Malcom X was a civil rights leader and radical activist who critiqued American imperialism and argued that emancipation and unity required direct Black action. His presence in Ghana garnered criticisms and fears that Nkrumah would look anti-white and alienate those in the Commonwealth. Angelou reported in an interview that it was her encounter with Malcom X in Ghana that encouraged her to return to the United States and re-dedicate herself to civil rights. Importantly, Ghanaians also travelled to the US. One such visitor, Badu Kofi the sports editor of *The Ghanaian Times*, reported experiencing racism, which some viewed as embarrassing to the US.

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131 Erik S. McDuffie and Komozi Woodard, """"If you’re in a country that’s progressive, the women is progressive": Black Women Radicals and the Making of the Politics and Legacy of Malcom X," *Biography* 36, no. 3 (2013): 507-39.

132 William Sales Jr., “From Civil Rights to Black Liberation: Malcom X and the Organization of Afro-American Unity (Boston: South End Press, 1994). The Organization of Afro-American Unity (OAAU) was founded by Malcolm X, John Henrik Clarke, and other Black Nationalist leaders on June 24, 1964 in Harlem, New York. Formed shortly after his break with the Nation of Islam, the OAAU was a secular institution that sought to unify 22 million non-Muslim African Americans with the people of the African Continent. The OAAU was modeled after the Organization of African Unity (OAU), a coalition of 53 African nations working to provide a unified political voice for the continent. The OAAU is beyond the scope of this project as it was centred on unique events in the US, but Ghana played a significant role in Malcom X’s thinking and organizational activism.


134 Connie Martinson interview with Maya Angelou - All God’s Children Need Traveling Shoes - Part 2 (University of California Television, May 2, 2007), 12 minute mark approximately. This is also repeated in Smiley’s recollection of Angelou’s trip based on discussions from their time spent together.
The conference of 1960 and the wider diasporic Afro-American movements of civil rights activists and women are a constitutive part of Nkrumah’s project and the content of Ghana’s postcolonial connectivities. While there were tensions between radical and moderate participants and despite the conference being subject to surveillance by United States and British intelligence, the framework and scope of the conference further legitimized Nkrumah. The conference also contributed to the discourses of Pan-Africanism, highlighting the importance of women participation, and the building of solidarity between the experiences of women in America and in Africa. Despite this, the participants, particularly the American delegation, had diverse aims. The politics of the Cold War also played out in the surveillance and reporting of the conference to the CIA in the United States and the Foreign Office in Britain. The internal tensions within the conference and the overall contribution to Pan-Africanism, reveal the ways in which the postcolonial connectivities of Afro-American and Pan-Africanist women in Ghana were politicized by all engaged. It also reveals how this translocality – the non-national movements, exchanges, and activism of women from within and outside of Ghana – was contingent on the connections and the support of Nkrumah’s government. Thus, the experiences of woman are co-constituted and entangled with continental, diasporic, and global politics as well as other experts, economists, and foreign governments who also had their own ideas about what Ghana’s development would look like. I will now turn to an example which further complicates these connectivities by showing the ways in which a European expatriate was able to navigate formal accusations of spying through her intimacy with Nkrumah and strategic appeals to whiteness and loyalty.
European Expats and the Erica Powell Conspiracy of 1965

In addition to the opportunities for political participation afforded to elite-educated and market African women, and to those Afro-American women from the diaspora, Nkrumaism also attracted American and European expat women. Nkrumah valued foreign technical and administrative expertise. In December 1962 American economist Ann Seidman and her husband took up lecturing positions at the University of Ghana in the Department of Politics and Economics. Seidman’s work centred on teaching socialist economics and the economics of Pan-Africanism. She also served as his economic advisor for the first Pan-Africanist Conference in Addis Ababa in 1963. As a leading dependency theorist, she authored, co-authored and edited numerous books and articles on African political economy.

Furthermore, a female Nazi war pilot Hanna Reitsch, took up a position pioneering flight training in Ghana. As Allman documents, Reitsch became a central propaganda figure for the CPP. She was promoted as a female technical expert and pilot, who would help lead in the modernization and training of pilots in Ghana. Even though she had a lot of public exposure it was never mentioned by the government or popular press that she was a former member of the Nazi party. In the national archives in Ghana there is no explicit mention that Reitsch was a Nazi party member, but in the German archives it is known. Nkrumah also had a close working relationships with his publisher in the United States,
June Milne. European women were also employed in the private sector. These examples not only reveal the ways the translocality of Nkrumatism involved European expat women, but also the ways in which the expertise of these women were privileged in Nkrumaist Ghana.

Contributing to these examples, is the interesting case of Nkrumah’s personal secretary, Erica Powell, who was employed in Ghana from 1952 to 1965. In 1965 there were intelligence accusations that she was conducting communications with a known British spy and that she was a spy. This hitherto unexplored example reveals the role of a European women working with the state, Powell’s close personal relationship with Nkrumah, and the ways in which she was able to defend herself publicly and privately from the accusations. This resulted in the termination of her employment but she still received financial compensations from public funds. It reveals a seemingly contradictory moment whereby because of the privileging of foreign experts and connectivities of the state, as well as the intimacies with Nkrumah, a white British women was able to defend herself during a period that saw increased political arrests within Ghana, including women. Any account of the role of women and their scope of agency must come to terms with the opportunities and experiences of European expat women working within the country. Such experiences reflect the transnational and internationalist context of the Nkrumaist state. What the Powell controversy particularly reveals is an unacknowledged racialization of these women’s networks. During increased political repression and punishment in 1965, Powell was able to escape the formal charge of conspiracy and retain retirement benefits.
Powell was a white British expat who received her training in London and was an official member of the British Board of Secretaries. It has been rumored that Nkrumah preferred to have foreign staffers work in supportive administration roles due to the perceived prestige garnered from international education. While unsubstantiated in the source material, it has been suggested that Nkrumah hired Powell on recommendation and as he described later in his autobiography, “trusted her completely.”\textsuperscript{138} In communications between Powell and Nkrumah, it is clear that they had a professional and affectionate relationship, which could be seen as indirect evidence of a secret love affair. Archival records show the ways in which Powell used affectionate language of personal devotion to Nkrumah and drew on her position as a white American expat in official correspondences with Nkrumah, to secure her position in the administration. However, in 1965 a formal report was submitted by Ghanaian intelligence services to Nkrumah accusing Powell of being an active spy for the CIA and the British.\textsuperscript{139} In this context, Powell once again drew on her whiteness, foreignness, and close relationship to Nkrumah to rebuke the security report. Powell did not receive any sympathy from the women’s organizations. The only reference I could find was news editorials in the \textit{Evening News} in which the findings of the security report were mentioned, followed by a general call to “…carry out the investigation.”\textsuperscript{140}

The conspiracy surrounding Powell’s involvement with those connected to the British secret service and potentially the CIA, provides an example of the experience of

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\textsuperscript{138} Nkrumah, \textit{Autobiography}, 211. \\
\textsuperscript{140} Women’s League Comments on Powell, \textit{Evening News} (Accra: Ghana, February 1965).
\end{flushleft}
expat women working within the Nkrumah government. The controversy surrounding Powell, arising from concerns about her close position to Nkrumah, reveals both the limits of expat women role within Nkrumaism, and the exceptionality of Powell’s experience as both inside the formal government but marginalized by those critical of Nkrumah. The original hiring of Powell was out of the desire for transnationally trained experts in the postcolonial government and the inclusivity promoted by Nkrumah and the CPP. Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s there were active attempts to infiltrate and gather information for foreign governments. Given the relationship with the US and international financial institutions, this inclusivity had its limits. Growing global Cold War tensions concerning the development direction of Ghana played out in this controversy, as security officials such as E.K Otto expressed concern about having expats working in government because of the sensitive information. The response to the conspiracy by Powell also uncovers discourses of loyal devotion for Ghana and an intimacy with Nkrumah. Powell rebuked the charges formally by commenting on the Security Report and informally in a private letter to Nkrumah. It is important to draw distinction between both refutations, Powell was able to navigate the conspiracy. Nkrumah fired Powell because of political pressures within the CPP but because of her ability to draw on their close friendship and loyalty to Ghana, Nkrumah awarded Powell financial compensation in the form of a guaranteed pension and housing in London.

As personal secretary for Nkrumah, Powell handled regional and international meetings, accompanied Nkrumah on trips throughout the country, and was privy to intimate details regarding government operations, finances, and policies. She was never formally accused of spying, although there were concerns about her status as a British subject. After the assassination attempt of Nkrumah and rising international tensions, Powell was accused in a classified Security Report submitted January 28, 1965 of colluding with Mr. F.H.J Wileman of the British Board of Secretaries and of having potential connection to the CIA. Wileman is described in the report as a “British-Jew” carrying the designation of Secretary of the Corporation of Secretaries in London.” Wileman arrived in Accra Sunday January 24, 1965 and was “placed immediately” on surveillance “in order to discover what his real mission in Ghana was.”

According to Wileman, he was on business to advocate for expat hiring in administrative positions and for consultations. However, the report speculates that Wileman was in Ghana to meet with Powell and to possibly meet with Nkrumah. Powell is accused of having a longstanding relationship with Wileman. The report stated that in 1961 Powell had a series of secret meetings with Wileman at the London Airport during a layover from Powell’s trip to Moscow, during which Powell and Wileman were seen conducting meetings with their backs facing each other in the terminal lobby.

There are no details of the witnesses or evidence of surveillance on Powell provided to substantiate the accusations. The second incident cited concerned Powell’s correspondences with Wileman, which were attached to the report, to organize a future meeting with Nkrumah.

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143 Ibid.
As a result of intelligence gathered from the surveillance of Wileman on January 24, it was concluded in the security report that Wileman made contact with the British secret services and was a potential spy.\textsuperscript{144} On January 28 1965 the Ghanaian Security Forces deported Wileman shortly after his arrival to Accra.\textsuperscript{145} Upon conducting a search of his belongings, a letter from Ms. Powell was discovered.\textsuperscript{146} This letter, filed in the report to establish their relationship, was an indication of intent to meet with Nkrumah on behalf of Wileman and Powell’s formal reply that she would consult with Nkrumah.\textsuperscript{147} The report issued twelve allegations directed at Powell and forwarded them directly to Nkrumah’s office for review. The report concluded that there was no direct evidence that Powell knew of Wileman’s connections to the British Secret Service, however, the “relationship between Ms. Powell and Mr. Wileman is more than that of mere acquaintance.”\textsuperscript{148} The report further alleged that Powell’s position as “private secretary to the President of Ghana makes her an extremely important source for the British Intelligence Organisations.”\textsuperscript{149} While there was no direct evidence of a conspiracy these indirect connections were sufficient to make the accusation because of the tensions Nkrumah had with international financiers such as Britain and growing distrust within the CPP for European expats.

Shortly after receiving news of these accusations, Powell issued formal comments on the report that were circulated to security and government officials. In this formal

\textsuperscript{145} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid. Letters between F.H.J Wileman and Erica Powell, 6.
\textsuperscript{148} Ibid.
defence addressing the accusations, Powell maintained her innocence by denying that
Wileman tried to solicit her participation in gathering information for the British secret
service, she stated:

Why has Mr. Wileman waited 13 years before contacting me? Why didn’t
he contact me during more hectic and crucial times in Ghana’s history
when spies from all over the world were trying to ‘get in’ on what was
happening here… At no time has an approach been made to me by Mr.
Wileman or any other person who is not well known to me. ¹⁵⁰

Powell was correct. She had been working with Nkrumah since the summer of 1952 and
there were active threats of spy infiltration during the Africanization process which saw the
CPP replace the colonial administration completely by 1956. In Powell’s words, “why
now”?¹⁵¹ Powell further made an appeal to her being a British subject as a way to
delegitimize the allegations and frame them within a narrative of discrimination and
distrust against her by her political enemies. She framed this by referencing her extreme
loyalty to Nkrumah and Ghana, carefully balancing between criticism and self-defence. She
stated that:

As a British subject working in such close proximity to the President of
Ghana, I know that I must expect to be viewed with great caution and
suspicion… I wish to take this opportunity to record here and now that as
long as I have worked for the Osagyefo the President, I have been loyal,
almost at times to the point of fanaticism, both to the president personally
and to Ghana.¹⁵²

¹⁵¹ Ibid.
¹⁵² Ibid.
In this defence, Powell addresses Nkrumah as Osagyefo and refers to him in formal language, highlighting her loyalty to the leader and Ghana.

   In a more informal personal letter to Nkrumah, Powell passionately offered an intimate defence of the accusations made in the Security Report, framed within the language of personal devotion and loyalty. She began by expressing a deep concern and devotion to Nkrumah’s well-being, referencing their longstanding relationship and the threats their enemies posed. She stated:

   When the scares have healed and the bruises no longer ache, I shall only remember the happy day when you were a P.M and I was your devoted follower…Alas, you have enemies and I have enemies. I can leave, which is all my enemies ask of me. You, poor P.M, have no such simple solution because you are the king-pin, the very hub around which everything in Africa revolves.  

Powell refers to Nkrumah as the vanguard at the centre of postcolonial African politics, and illustrates that with her absence Nkrumah would be vulnerable to conspiracy. As noted previously, this discourse of personal devotion to Nkrumah was part of the personality cult and is indicative of Nkrumah’s relationship with both expat and Ghanaian women, as well as the broader public. More importantly, it provides insights into the intimacies of translocality, how Powell – a white educated European expat – had a profound emotional attachment to Nkrumah and Ghana.

   The letter continues with Powell referencing her phenotype and willingness to sacrifice herself for Nkrumah. This paragraph is worth quoting at length as it emphasizes

153 Letter written by Erica Powell to the P.M. 3 Short Road Accra, February 24, 1965. RG 17/1/339, PRAAD Accra Ghana.
Powell’s strategy of engagement with Nkrumah framed within the language of personal devotion:

But I feel I shall have failed in my duty to you if I do not speak my mind. For a long time I have asked myself: ‘Why are some people so anxious to get rid of me?’ Up till now I have always reasoned that it must be because I am white and British… This report is aimed at destroying in your eye… my loyalty to you and Ghana. I know that my loyalty to you is beyond question… I have the loyalty and devotion of a Spaniel and the instinct… I tear, with the uncontrolled yapping of an untrained mongrel bitch… I would have without hesitation destroyed myself for you. 154

This is the language of both performed personal devotion and professionalism in which Powell is engaging with Nkrumah strategically to avoid punishment. She is evidently scared for the outcome of the Security Report and is also disturbed by the accusations given her level of affection for Nkrumah and loyalty to Ghana. Powell concludes by emphatically stating to Nkrumah that “you will always remain my P.M and I hope you will remember that I shall always be there if and when you need me. With love, loyalty and devotion.” 155 It is important here to compare the formal and informal defence that Powell makes. There is a difference in audience, language and scope. The audience for the former is broad while the latter was just Nkrumah. The language used is reflective of this difference. In the informal letter, Powell is able to speak intimately and directly, refers to Nkrumah in a personal way as ‘you’, while in the formal defence she refers to him as Osagyefo. She is even confident enough in their relationship to reference her whiteness and critiques the motives of those submitting the report, characterizing them as enemies. Despite these differences, both

154 Ibid.
155 Ibid.
defences reveal that Powell had an emotional attachment to Nkrumah and Ghana, imagining him as the vanguard of Africa.

Despite Powell’s defence and her professed loyalty, Nkrumah decided to end the employment of Powell as his private secretary based on the Security Report and pressure within the CPP. However, she was not fired with grievance and Nkrumah made every effort to make sure she was informally compensated using public funds. In a correspondence with Powell dated April 5, 1965, Nkrumah informed Ms. Powell that “under the terms of your contract with the Ghana government you are not entitled to a pension.” To show appreciation for “loyalty” Nkrumah offered to buy her a house in England as well as give her an informal pension of $1200 yearly. In other words, Powell’s employment ended for political reasons but because of Nkrumah’s close working relationship with her, Powell received financial compensation. Importantly, Nkrumah was actively arresting those trying to subvert his government’s aims and thus these offers to assist Powell seem exceptional. Perhaps also the way Powell framed her informal defence within the language of personal devotion and intimacy to Nkrumah also impacted his decision to grant her an informal pension and buy her a house.

These European expat experiences provide insights into the translocality of Nkrumainism. Their experiences of immigration to Ghana to take up central positions and how they were viewed by Nkrumah in his effort to promote the aims of his government, reveal the extent to which non-African women were also entangled and were highly

157 Ibid.
Politicized. It also reveals the implicit hierarchy of woman within Nkrumah’s Ghana and there role in the implementation and operation of Nkrumaism. European educated expats were working in educational and administrative positions in Ghana. The case of Powell contributes to further complicating generalized conceptions of women’s translocality and role in postcolonial Ghana. Like Powell, Seidman and Reitche also had close contact with Nkrumah and held prestigious positions. The archival record shows that more than just instances of exceptionality, these instances reveal another important characteristic of the translocality of Nkrumaism. Furthermore, the case of Powell contributes unique insights into how exceptional European expats close to Nkrumah, such as Powell, developed strong emotional attachments for Nkrumah and Ghana. The strategy of showing devotion and loyalty to Nkrumah was also seen in other organizations and events that Ghanaian women organizers and politicians held, as mentioned previously in section 1 of this Chapter.158

Translocality and Women in Ghana

This Chapter offered a translocal account of women’s experiences in postcolonial Ghana, focusing on their roles in national liberation, Pan-Africanism and government as well as their global visions in relation to Nkrumaism and the world. What made these experiences uniquely translocal was there entanglement and co-constitution with the scope and practice of postcolonial development. Women actively forged connections with other women continentally and in the diaspora, understood Ghana’s position in global politics, and made

158 Application for an advance to purchase a motor vehicle otherwise than from a recognised firm in Ghana (G.O. 589). Applicant: Effua Atta Annan May 1964. RG 17/1/153 PRAAD Accra, Ghana. Women within the state were also able to freely appeal to the National Treasury for expenditure requests, which were often successful. The Principal Secretary of the department of African Affairs, Ms. Efua Atta Annan was granted GB500 to be paid within 36 months, which is significant given her yearly salary of GB475, to buy a new Volkswagen.
critiques and claim-making for expanding how Pan-Africanism and development was to be understood. It also revised the accepted thesis that under Nkrumaism, women’s participation in politics and work was encouraged by the CPP. While women took up positions as propagandists, editors/writers, orators, activists and in government, they were constrained by national and global Cold War politics. Women such as Dove or Dubois utilized their foreign education and print culture experience, to become formidable organizers and participants in the promotion of Nkrumaism and Pan-Africanism. These educated urban women had a distinct translocal vision which sought to work within Nkrumaism to bring women’s issues to the forefront of Pan-African and global politics. They organized conferences and events, offered criticisms and condemnations of Cold War events such as against French nuclear testing in the Sahara. The sharp public criticisms of Dove and organized protest by the Women’s Federation had the effect of putting nuclear non-proliferation and atomic testing on the agenda at the Pan-African summit in Tunisia and in the subsequent Accra conference.

The Conference of Women of Africa and of African Descent was another important event representative of Afro-American connections and the efforts of women to organize outside of the nation state. Participants were not homogenous and had different goals and ideas about whether to condemn United States imperialism, government responses to the civil rights movement, and/or the realization of Pan-Africanism. It operated within the context of Nkrumah’s official sanctioning, but nonetheless forged important connections between Afro-American women and expanded the vision and links of Nkrumaism. It was also a site of Cold War surveillance by the CIA and FO, who feared that the image of the
US would be tarnished and that the conference would be a meeting of radicals which communists could infiltrate.

African women were also met with barriers to their participation by those in the CPP that feared their assertiveness. In addition, I have drawn attention to the varying experiences of women in relation to the government. There was a range of women experiences in relation to the particular connections in which they are apart. The experiences of Angelou and Powell reveals the variety of translocal connections, the former was an American civil rights activist and educator while the latter was part of a group of white European expat women working in administrative and government positions. Both can be considered translocal and not international or transnational as they were entangled with the scope and operation of development, although at different levels. The environment created by Nkrumah’s policies created a space for the operations of the Women’s League to network with continental and diaspora activists, political leaders. It also created the conditions in which allowed for the movements of white European expat women to work in administrative and financial sectors. The participations of women were expressed in explicitly internationalist terms, an important feature of translocality in that by doing so they became entangled in the global politics of development, although often within the constraints of Nkrumaimism and foreign government surveillance. By situating the variety of experiences of women in Ghana, this Chapter has shown their role in the networks and explicit politics of internationalism, Pan-Africanism and socialist development. In contrast, Chapter 3 will examine Pan-African diplomacy at the level of Nkrumah and multilateralism to answer the following questions; how did Nkrumah and the CPP forge Pan-African
relationships in pursuit of development? What were the tensions in pursuing Nkrumaism beyond the borders of Ghana and how did these diplomatic relationships shape Ghana’s engagement with global Cold War politics?

Kwame Nkrumah had a translocal vision of national development for Pan-African unification and sovereignty for Africa in the context of the Cold War that saw Ghana as the vanguard. This Chapter explores this translocality through Ghana’s formal economic and political diplomacies within Africa and the non-Aligned world in pursuit of Pan-Africanism. In attempting to implement Pan-African development, tensions arose in disputes over a radical vision along Nkrumaist lines and between moderates. Even in contexts of regional federations and experiments in ministry, military, or development coordination, tensions arose at the level of planning, implementation and funding. These problems reveal the complex layers of harmonization between different political economies of interests, distinct socio-cultural and historical contexts, and pre-existing conflicts, which would become entangled through Pan-African development.

In 1960 Ghana joined other African states to sign on to the Casablanca Charter, outlining a vision of Pan-Africanism abiding to the principles of Bandung, respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and co-existence.¹ It created a joint economic committee and created ambitious proposals towards economic unification through the creation of an African Payment Union (APU), African Development Bank (ADB), and a common market.

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and policy toward international trade roughly modeled after the European Economic
Community (EEC). This would reorganize market relations between African states,
redrafting trade treaties, and creating a comprehensive common policy for engagement with
non-African states and the international financial institutions. It further involved defense
coordination and commitment to nuclear non-proliferation. Committed to Pan-African
development, Ghana pursued a strategy of joint consultation and the building of solidarities
to support economic coordination to advance unification. The Casablanca Charter
conflicted with those states that signed on to the Monrovia Charter, which was a less
ambitious plan of unification which Nkrumah criticized as moderate. This provided a
policy coherence for Ghana until 1963 with the establishment of the Organization of
African Unity (OAU). Ghana compromised its radical position among the Casablanca
group, but amplified commitment to the ideas of economic coordination and an African
common market were central to Ghana’s efforts in Casablanca and after 1963.

In conjunction with the Casablanca and post-1963 OAU Charter, Ghanaian officials
utilized organized state visits as important sites where Nkrumah could promote pan-
Africanism and the achievements of his government. They involved touring representatives
to specific industrial and market sites, avoiding areas and border zones where there was
political confrontation and territorial disputes. However, these were also costly and largely
symbolic. Ghana further used diplomatic missions to promote multilateral agreements,
broker trade and address conflicts. Among African heads of state Nkrumah was seen as a
middle-man between Britain and China, as well as a broker that helped intervene to resolve
political crisis on the continent. For the US and Britain, his socialist leaning development
policies were interpreted as opening the door to communism, disrupting economic interests in the region, and creating the conditions for economic crisis. The tensions of Nkrumaism manifested in Ghana’s relations with countries such as Nigeria and Togo, and Nkrumah’s contradictory positions relating to African political refugees and those who were reluctant to subscribe to Nkrumah’s model of socialist development, continental unification and non-Alignment. There were also problems with the application of economic coordination, specifically in terms of the practicality of the measures of creating a common market and common development policy. Further, when it came to the coordination of Ministries and experts among member states, there were financial and administrative disagreements and in the case of exchanges between Ghana and Guinea, resulted in Ghana incurring extra costs without being reimbursed.

**Making Pan-Africanism a Reality: From Disagreement to Compromise**

In 1968 Reginald Green and Ann Seidman, American dependency theorists who had worked at the University of Ghana until 1966 and accompanied Nkrumah to the founding conference of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Addis Ababa in 1963, released a co-authored text on the economics of Pan-Africanism.² Disillusioned by a “Balkanized Africa” with no bargaining power, unable to negotiate favorable international trade and coordinate with each other to achieve development and protect political and economic interests, they argued – like Nkrumah’s call to unite or perish – that Pan-African economic unification was the answer.³ The colonial legacy created a dependency where Africa is an

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³ Ibid.
indefinite producer of raw materials for manufacturing in Europe and subject to price cartels, market manipulations, and political interventions to achieve economic ends.⁴ Newly independent African states were also comparably small to foreign firms and “dependent in large measure because they are economically small.”⁵ Further, because of Africa’s integration into the global economy and dependency on foreign markets, finance, and technologies, industrialized economies could freely take advantage of developing economies in Africa. Green and Seidman argued that to address these structural problems, Pan-African unification modeled after the ECC, would make Africa better able to defend against foreign firm and government intervention and to escape the trap of dependency. The authors were expressing the core tenet of Nkrumah’s vision of economic unification and that of the Casablanca Charter. They also believed in pairing of national liberation and development with Pan-African Unity through “sound economics.”⁶ After the overthrow of Nkrumah in 1966, Seidman taught at the University of Tanzania and Green took up a post in the Tanzanian government.

The key premise of their text, both the economic diagnosis and policy remedy, comes from their experiences and frustrations of planning and teaching Pan-African economic policy in Ghana. Rather than make normative evaluations about the success of these policies, I am interested in how the attempt to realize Nkrumah’s translocal vision of Ghana’s economic coordination for Pan-Africanism within the Casablanca Group and the

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⁴ Ibid., 42.
⁵ Ibid., 92.
OAU functioned in practice. What are the tensions of pairing national development to continental and global contexts? In exile, Nkrumah attributed the failure of the effectiveness of the OAU as being a compromise where his radical vision of unification became fractured by national rivalries, different ideas about what would constitute an African common market, coordination responsibilities, and issues of territorial sovereignty in transnational development projects. But how did this idea of economic unification come to exist in the first place and what were its expressions in the context of the Cold War and Ghana’s foreign policy? Further, how did Nkrumah navigate this vision with the realities of the OAU after 1963?

Narratives abound as to why Nkrumah’s Pan-African diplomacies failed to achieve the aims of economic coordination for development as practiced by the CPP. It is important to assess these approaches to highlight the unique analysis that I offer which shifts the focus to the political and financial tensions of translocality. The failures of Pan-Africanism have been interpreted as a problem of conflicts of identity within the OAU or from a political-economy approach. The first approach centres on the unique personalities of African leaders and the particular nationalisms and social, political, economic contexts which made establishing a radical vision of Pan-Africanism impossible. In some cases, African states had long histories of conflict over resources, borders, and complex histories

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8 These range from novels, journalistic and scholarly critiques to popular culture and formal politics.
of migration – as is the case of the failures of the Ghana-Nigeria union in the 1960s. This led to the emergence of different conceptions of what Pan-Africanism meant, creating conflicts when it came to implementation.¹⁰

The second approach emphasizes the Cold War and colonial legacy, the ways in which capitalist and/or socialist expansion and engagement with Africa did not implement a new rules based system to strengthen bargaining power.¹¹ Such a system needed to give African states more power in the global political economy through the creation of monetary and political institutions and by regulating foreign firms/capital and lending in development. This suggests that Pan-Africanism was not radical or effective enough in operationalization. This also has merit based on the archival record. The Pan-African Congress established in 1959 was divided in the 1960s between the Casablanca Group, who supported Nkrumah’s concept of a “United States of Africa,” and the Monrovia Group, who favoured an integrationist approach to unity. The latter group succeeded in their argument for the maintenance of sovereignty, within the institutional structure of the OAU; in a newly postcolonial context that was wary of centralised governance on a large scale this was not surprising.¹² The debate between the Casablanca and Monrovia groups earlier


discussed was centred on the sovereignty of individual states within a supranational organization, with an alternative conception to the Westphalian model championed by Kwame Nkrumah as a new set of principles for African heads of state to follow.\footnote{Leila Farmer, “Sovereignty and the African Union” Journal of Pan African Studies 5(10) (2012), 93.}

However, the triumph of Julius Nyerere and the Monrovia group saw sovereignty imparted as a “ready-made” principle, a newly acquired combination of commitment and instruction rules that constrained outside forces and enabled those within accepted borders the right to self-determination.\footnote{Martin Welz, Integrating Africa: Decolonization’s legacies, sovereignty and the African Union (Abingdon: Routledge 2013).} In this way, the principles of sovereignty became cornerstone rules of the first intergovernmental manifestations of Pan-Africanism, an assertion of the new rules “aimed at colonial powers” in the OAU Charter. There was a disparity between the granting of sovereign agency and the ability to exercise it, with the demands of working towards Pan-African unity and the harmonization of political-economic policies.\footnote{Ibid., 3.}

In contrast, by focusing on unification policies and the effects of applying Nkrumaist Pan-Africanism, including the administrative, financial and practical applications of efforts towards economic coordination and the building of multilateral/continental relationships, the tensions of translocal development become apparent. The year of 1963 is a defining moment in this narrative which marks an amplification of Nkrumah’s efforts for Pan-Africanism until 1966 but also the amalgamation of the Casablanca and Monrovia Groups in the OAU. Therefore, the first section examines 1958 to 1963 and the second 1963 to 1966. In addition, I show how
Ghana’s efforts in promoting and performing Pan-African economic coordination were unsustainable, financially costly, and resource intensive and often resulted in disputes related to finances. There were also growing border conflicts with Togo and a growing concern for political refugees. Without the support of other countries Ghana became increasingly isolated in international politics and the radical vision of Pan-Africanism lacked majority support among OAU members. The content and tensions of Ghana’s foreign policy reflect the translocality of its position within Africa and the global political economy. Despite shifting contexts and disputes, Nkrumah kept up the image of Ghana as the vanguard for a radical translocal vision of economic unification for Pan-Africanism.

Since Ghana’s national development was positioned as a resource in the pursuit of Pan-Africanism, the objective of its continental and international diplomacy was to promote a global image of active unity building. Active in that Ghana had to be creating new multilateral agreements and regional organizations to test Pan-Africanism in practice, as well as use diplomatic missions, state visits, and continental-international conferences to put forward concrete policy proposals. In the realm of development, Nkrumah used the state to advocate for economic unification and the harmonization of development planning and aid through the creation of an African development bank. There were also attempts to reach beyond the continent and the bipolarity of the cold War to engage with newly independent Caribbean countries and nationalist movements in the service of promoting the model of Pan-Africanism. Because of this translocality – the co-constitutions of Ghana and Pan-Africanism – significant political, financial, and coordinating tensions arose which could not be overcome, leading to disputes and compromise. Rather than economic
unification and harmonization, cooperation became the new mandate and Nkrumah was faced with increasing pressures from international monetary institutions and moderate African governments.

Ghana did not participate in the 1955 Afro-Asian Conference of non-aligned states in Bandung Indonesia. It was not until independence when Nkrumah and the CPP began to promote Ghana’s liberation to continental unification and non-alignment in international politics. The Bank of Ghana issued a memorandum in 1961 assessing the foreign policy of Ghana and its central role in organizing multilateral agreements and conferences:

The April 1959 Conference of Independent African States, the formation of the Ghana-Guinea Union in November 1958, the All African Peoples’ Conference of December 1956, the July 1959 meeting in Sanniquelle, the establishment of the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union in December 1960, the organisation of the Casablanca Charter States in January 1961 are surely the symbols and evidence of a great political awakening in Africa.16 From 1958 to 1960 Ghana pursued a policy of what Matteo Grilli terms prudent self-interest.17 Nkrumah’s political capital was increased by his participation in the All African Peoples Conference and agreements with Guinea and Mali to reduce tariffs, commit to common defence and increase export-imports with promises of further economic coordination in development.18 There was also an effort to create an All African Trade Union Federation after the Pan-African Trade Union Conference of all African trade unions took place in Accra on November 9 1959. The headquarters of the committee was fixed in

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16 Notes on Ghana’s Africa Policy, 1. RG 17/2/183 (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana).
18 Ibid.
Accra, composed of 19 members and its main goal was to organize the workers of Africa for Pan-Africanism.

Ghana’s foreign policy and Nkrumah’s Pan-Africanism underwent a radicalization from 1960 to 1963 empowered by membership in the Casablanca group and because of unfolding crises in Congo and Rhodesia. Nkrumah was viewed as a continental leader and middle-man between African governments and Europe, and was often requested to advocate or mediate issues on behalf of another African governments. With the imprisonment of Jomo Kenyatta in 1961, the Kenyan African National Union sent a cable and follow up letter on March 15 to Nkrumah requesting that he “plead our case with the British Government” to release Kenyatta. As Matteo Grilli notes, by supporting opposition movements, Nkrumah could influence national politics towards socialist and Pan-Africanist leanings. Nkrumah described Ghana’s stance as absolute commitment to the people of the Congo:

I am therefore happy to assure you that, with this understanding, the Government and people of Ghana shall stand firstly behind the Congo… in the interests of the safety and security of Africa as a whole.

Nkrumah’s first response was to study and discuss organizing a military brigade among African states. He also had to balance Pan-Africanism and membership in the Commonwealth, most evident in his criticisms of British policy vetoing UN resolution on the legitimacy of Southern Rhodesia, calling it a racialist usurpation of power threatening

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20 Kwame Nkrumah letter to Cyrille Adoula, Prime Minister Republic of the Congo, Leopoldville, sent October 23, 1963. RG 17/2/142 (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana), 38/64.
21 Southern Rhodesia, Osagyefo Response to Ian Smith Plot, RG 17/2/385 (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana).
Africans and asking the British to take a clear policy position on what they intend to do. Nkrumah made it clear that Ghana would “oppose those who expect to assume independence unilaterally.” Nkrumah was upset with the British entertaining accepting the settler state of South Rhodesia to the Prime Minister Commonwealth Conference. Nkrumah, who regularly attended these meetings, made note that Northern Rhodesia in contrast had universal franchise, did not practice racial discrimination and “will shortly become independent and there are precedents, as in the case of Uganda.” In Southern Rhodesia, the plot by Ian Smith to declare independence in October 1964 with the assistance of Portugal, created a racialized settler state which closed the Benguela railway disconnecting Northern Rhodesia. The publication of the plot in the London Daily Mail and the Economist was frantically circulated at the Ghana embassy in London. Kwesi Armah, who was the head ambassador for Ghana at the London embassy, began to lobby for Britain, explaining how Smith was betting on reluctance for Britain to intervene militarily and the immediate isolation Northern Rhodesia would face. Armah feared that popular opinion in Britain supported Smith’s move because of Anglo-Saxon connections to the settlers in comparison to any sentiments for African nationalism.

In 1961, the Ghanaian President decided to respond to the failures of the previous year with a more radical Pan-African policy. Considering the strength of its enemies,

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22 Kwame Nkrumah to British Prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas Home, April 24, 1964. RG 17/2/142 (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana), 48/64.
23 Ibid., 2.
26 Ibid., 3.
Ghana had to invest much more resources in the struggles for African liberation and unity. A new radical “Ministry of foreign affairs” was established to deal specifically with the African continent: the African Affairs Secretariat (AAS). A series of political crisis in the Congo and Southern Rhodesia were amplifying the need for a coordinated response among African states. The Congo Crisis had changed significantly the political situation in Africa, leading to a break between two fronts of African states, one of “radicals” (Casablanca Group) and one of “moderates” (Brazzaville Group later merged into the Monrovia Group). The distance between the two was mainly based on their opposite vision on the recognition of the new government in Congo and on the autonomy of Katanga. “Brazzaville” and “Monrovia” sponsored Mobutu, Kasavubu and Tshombe, while Casablanca opposed them.27 There were also disagreements over the economics of the union. The Monrovia group members were not receptive to socialist economics and ideas about establishing a common market. They saw such measures as infringing on national sovereignty and the right for states to engage in multilateral or international trade in their own interest.28 In contrast, the Casablanca group sought to establish a more radical vision of unification tied to development, empowerment in global politics, a common policy and coming up with concrete plans to achieve it.

At the Casablanca conference, participants established the Casablanca Group and Charter to work towards implemented Pan-African unification. As Nkrumah commented on the opening day, the groups function is to “to promote the freedom, unity, and well-being

27 Grilli, 416.
28 Ibid.
of all the peoples of Africa without distinction of racial origin, respecting the religious, social and cultural heritage and aspirations of each of them.”29 He proposed that, with the approval of prospective participation nations, the Group work towards the establishment of a “Union of African States” under a republican constitution within a federal framework and unified economy.30 The union government would be responsible for foreign affairs, defence, the issue of a common reserve currency and common bank, economic planning and development.31 The Casablanca Charter would become, in theory, the platform for a common foreign policy – non-alignment in the interest of Africa – and common defence, the maintenance of common currency and the coordination and assistance of economic development.32 Membership was guaranteed to any state or territory within Africa. Originally, Nkrumah had envisioned that such a union would replace other economic and political relationships with non-African states, proposing that all other non-African unions be terminated. The Group, led by Nkrumah, was focused on pursuing decolonization and an anticolonial international solidarity.33 This union would aid decolonization efforts by targeting assistance and helping states become independent. It was decided that the structure would consist of a union council of states, equal representation between member states, and a secretary-general of the union.34 The council of states would elect a President of the union who would preside at all meetings of the council of states forthcoming the

29 RG/17/1/228 (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana).
30 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid., 4.
appointment. There would be no formal citizenship or customs barrier between any parts of the union.

The Union was to rule based on majority vote by the members in the Council. The Council had the authority to delegate responsibilities for sub-agencies, it was the “primary governing and lawmaking body of the Union.” Implicit in the purpose and prospective governance of the union of African states was the idea that political independence and unity would allow for economic coordination and development. It was a strategy to decolonize and pursue economic independence, and to navigate Cold War international politics through inter-continental diplomacy. This diplomacy, from the beginning, was conceived of in economic terms, as both the means to create the conditions for development, as well as the political discourse that framed development-related goals. There would also be a Union Court of Justice and a Customs Union, which would have the powers necessary “for the protection and advancement of underdeveloped areas.” The Court would also function as a dispute mechanism, to mediate conflicts between member states and the union. The Union had no executive binding power, except in the exercise of a power assigned to the union collectively. Any acts which impose on the sovereignty of states, required the consent of the state. While states would remain entirely autonomous in the decision making of their country, they could assign duties to the Union, transferring responsibility for any function. In terms of an operation budget and recurrent revenue, the union would depend on member state contributions, this contribution will be relative to the taxable capacity and

35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
finances of member states. The yearly budget of the Union will be submitted to the
governments of each member state and then collectively consulted upon in the Council.\textsuperscript{38}

Unification and governance structure of the Casablanca group was conceived in line with
Nkrumaism.

The aim of the Casablanca Charter was to achieve Pan-African unification by
uniting economically, harmonizing development plans and coordinating resources. Doing
so would propel Africa to the international stage to lead the struggle for nuclear
disarmament, peace, and mutual non-aligned development as a solution to the Cold War:

\ldots to assign again to Africa its place of destination in the vanguard of the
march of mankind at the head of peace loving nations standing for man’s
rights, contributing to the prosperity of humanity.\textsuperscript{39}

Its members would create proposals that would achieve economic unification. In the first
resolution the Charter states that the “political solidarity of our countries must be affirmed
in the economic field… to be free from all forms of economic domination and
dependence.”\textsuperscript{40} It describes the Casablanca group’s efforts to put in order the “disrupted
economy of the African countries to promote a common planning policy.”\textsuperscript{41} This was to be
done not just in the field of economics, but also in coordinating central continental
communications and defence initiatives. It was agreed that it would be necessary to have
communication systems to connect member countries, as well as setting up an African
Postal Union to create a “single postal territory for the reciprocal exchange of articles of

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., 4, (17), Sub-section: “Finances of the Union” (1960).
\textsuperscript{39} Secretariat Form, GP/A1337/4/61-62 , RG 17/2/205 (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana).
\textsuperscript{40} African Economic Committee of the Casablanca Charter, Resolution No 1. RG 17/2/142 (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana).
\textsuperscript{41} Recommendation No., 1, Second Sub-Committee Commission, 1. RG 17/2/142 (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana).
correspondence and postal services.”

Members of the Casablanca Charter were required to attend all international conferences and hold preparatory meetings of delegates “to coordinate their action constantly during the course of the conference.” They discussed issues of maritime and air transport, costs and institutions, fair price mechanisms for services. English, Arabic and French languages were proposed to be the official language of the group with the recommendation of immediate proficiency training. These issues were to be coordinated by a permanent Bureau, liaison which was to provide information for members and the creation of sub-committees.

When focusing on the economic sub-committee and Ghana’s plans to put into practice economic coordination, institutions, and policies to realize the vision of the Casablanca Charter and Nkrumaism, the underlying translocality becomes clear. The mandate of economic unification and harmonization points to how Ghana and other African states were thinking beyond nation state borders and regarded their countries as intimately entangled with each other. It is important to analyze the committee’s proposals as they reflect the politics of Pan-Africanism and the Cold War, but also reveal underlying tensions in pursuing coordination and balancing sovereignty. Nkrumah would also pursue these economic proposals, as a mandate and as policy, until 1966. The economic committee agenda in the meeting in Conakry July 15, 1961, concerned with policy coordination, harmonization of the exploitation of natural resources, financial relations with monetary

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43 General Recommendations of the African Economic Committee, Appendix B. RG 17/2/142 (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana).
zones and international economic organizations.\footnote{Agenda for the Economic Committee of Casablanca Powers in Conakry July 15, 1961. RG 17/2/142 (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana).} Trade exchanges on a mutual basis, equal, a common international policy concerning development finance and trade.\footnote{The First Session of the Committee of African States of the Casablanca Charter, Held at Conakry from 17\textsuperscript{th} to 21\textsuperscript{st} July 1961, "On Trade Relations." RG 17/2/142 (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana).} The second meeting was held in Cairo January 5, 1962. The record of these meetings and the common economic policy and institution proposals were also translated into French and Arabic. Participants proposed to create, in the future, a permanent Council of African Economic Unity (CAEU) to assess common problems, challenges, and to create unique planning methods for African countries.\footnote{Ibid., "On Economic Development." Also responsible for the signing of an Economic and Technical Convention between member states of the Casablanca Charter.} The CAEU would be composed of two representatives from permanent members, a rotating Chairman on a two-year basis with a two-third majority vote principle for deliberations.\footnote{Agreement for the Establishment of a Permanent Body by the Member States of the Casablanca Charter to Accelerate African Economic Unity, Article 1-4. RG 17/2/142 (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana).} As the result of the assessments, the CAEU would then propose practical policy measures to reach a common planning policy to promote co-operative development and to “avoid competition which might be harmful to their proper interests, for realising African Unity.”\footnote{Ibid., 2.} It would function as a mechanism to ensure the implementation of Pan-African development that could, in theory, navigate the complex layers of interests and visions.

The least ambitious proposal, although essential to supporting economic coordination, emanating from these meetings was the creation of an African Payments
Union (APU) for multilateral cleaning, consolidation, and to facilitate trade.\textsuperscript{51} By setting up the APU, member states would have to settle all outstanding accounts between each other, and to facilitate payments and trade relationship between member states.\textsuperscript{52} There was no effort within the committee to address how states that lacked capital would be able to settle accounts. It was assumed that states would be able to pay back their loans. The interest from loans from members would be re-directed as recurring revenue for the African Payments Union headquarters and administrative operations which would be based at an undecided location.\textsuperscript{53} If it had come into effect, all existing bi-lateral trade agreements would be effectively terminated.\textsuperscript{54} The Monrovia group members saw this as disruptive and chaotic, but the committee determined that to achieve economic unification all trading relationships had to be reconfigured and inter-continental exchange nurtured.\textsuperscript{55} This involved abolishing a quota system for trade within five years and the gradual reduction of custom tariffs on all products among member states by 25\% within the first year and the remaining by 1966. Members in the APU would be granted favored nation status to promote equal trade and mutual development. Furthermore, the importation of products would be calculated by the committee according to supply and demand, and all members needed to facilitate passage through all territories. The proposal for the creation of an APU

\textsuperscript{51} The First Session of the Committee of African States of the Casablanca Charter, Held at Conakry from 17\textsuperscript{th} to 21\textsuperscript{st} July 1961, “On Financial and Monetary Relations.” RG 17/2/142 (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana).
\textsuperscript{52} Recommendations on African Payment Union, Economic Development Bank, and Monetary Zone: African Payment Union, 1. RG 17/2/142 (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana).
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., “Provisional Agreements”.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 2.
was an important pillar for the realization of Pan-Africanism in the Casablanca group but was a facilitating institution.

In partnership with the operations of the APU, the economic committee proposed the creation of an African Development Bank (ADB) as the central monetary institution to finance development. No longer, the committee argued, would member states have to deal with the conditionalities of the IBRD and IMF. The ABD would leverage African capital to impact price on commodities, address dependency to non-African countries, and provide the finance for large scale development projects approved by the committee and the ADB. It would also fund project important for longer term social development projects with low direct returns on investment. Like the APU, the funds for the ADB would be generated through member state contributions. The funds from the ADB were to be used to “subsidise member states or to grant low interest rates to be determined by member states” or to fund private ventures as recommended by member states.\(^{56}\) There is no discussion in any of the proposals for the ADB about how existing foreign reserves would be calculated or if the ADB would centralize access to foreign currency by leveraging with international financial institutions. By the time of the proposals, the head of the ABD would be the board of directors, composed by technical experts with “moral character.” The status of the ADB was set to be determined in a meeting scheduled for 1964 but it was never put into practice by the Casablanca group. Nkrumah would not advocate for an equivalent ADB until 1965 within the OAU alongside President Muhammar Ghadaffi in Egypt.

\(^{56}\) Creation of an African Development Bank, 1. RG 17/2/142 (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana).
The final proposal was the creation of an African common market regulated by African technocrats or individuals of high moral character. Once an APU and ADB was established, the union would have the institutions necessary to regulate a common market. The core idea of the market was to have a common economic policy regarding inter-continental and international trade. Member states would be able to engage with international states as long as it does not compromise territorial integrity for member states or as a whole.57 Trade agreements had to be subject to a review process by technical experts in the APU and ABD. Members would have to commit to consultations when evaluating potential agreements or policy, and to coordinate responses and approaches to global market changes and political events.58 Loans for development projects would be considered with experts. These efforts would improve the conditions of commercial and trade exchange of African countries and industrialized countries “especially aiming at establishing better proportion between the prices of primary and manufactured goods.”59

The Committee, in defending their proposals, concluded by recommending that it was “convinced that the path followed by member states is the surest to liberate our economies from external pressures and to consolidate our political independence.”60 This idea became central to the lobbying efforts of Ghana after the formation of the OAU in 1963 as it was a persisting idea of the Casablanca states and their attempts to implement Pan-African economic unification pursuant to the ideals of equal development expressed in the Charter.

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57 African Economic Committee of the Casablanca Charter, Resolution No 2. RG 17/2/142 (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana).
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid., 2.
The creation of an African common market in response to the European Economic Community, included the reciprocal treatment and progressive elimination of customs duties and quantitative restriction up to 1966 among members, except where tariffs are maintained for “revenue and protective purposes.” This broad exception had the potential to create conflict, if some African states had preferential access to markets within the EEC because of Article 7 which obliged them to grant the same tariff removals. It was feared that this could create the conditions adverse to the development of a balanced economy within the framework of an African common market. Ghana therefore took the position of rejecting association status among non-European members in the EEC. Summarizing this position Nkrumah stated that “the association status runs counter to African aspirations for an African Common Market and political unity.” He added that Ghana was interested in “a purely African Organisation developed on the basis of [an] African Continental Union.”

Nkrumah consistently advocated for the creation of an African common policy as conceptualized by the economic committee of the Casablanca Charter. He denounced those African states who were independently engaging with European manufactures and for market access, reducing tariffs with selective states in Europe, as not being Pan-Africanist. In a report on the Common Market which was sent to African and Caribbean governments, states unequivocally that; “The fundamental point is that Ghana is opposed to the activities

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61 “Common Market” 37/111 ST/VIS [State Visits], RG 17/2/224 (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana).
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid., 37/111.
64 Ibid.
of the European Common Market in Africa. The African states must aim at establishing an African Common Market as a basis for negotiating on an equal footing with the European Common Market.”

Nkrumah also tried to establish diplomatic relations with the Afro-Caribbean diaspora, Trinidad and Jamaica, to influence Caribbean and Latin-American states within the United Nations to support proposals and ideas that are “important to Africa” – the creation of a common market and anti-imperialist policies. Both countries were seen as having a historical connection to Africa, were seen as anti-imperialist and worked well with African delegates. There were plans for Nkrumah to visit Trinidad and the capitals of other Caribbean countries as part of a diplomatic tour to strengthen this relationship but it never materialized. Despite this, Caribbean outreach remained important and even when faced with economic deficits nearing 1966, Nkrumah considered “the possibility of opening a Mission in either Jamaica or Trinidad with parallel accreditation to other Caribbean countries.” Despite this, Nkrumah’s attempted engagement was also an effort to advance Nkrumaism and his standing within the UN by gaining the support of Caribbean members. It was even suggested that doing so would persuade Caribbean states to adopt a similar outlook and strategy of Caribbean Unity to protect their interests in the context of American and European market domination.

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67 Ibid., page 4.
68 Ibid., Point 6: “The Caribbean states, as their economic power develops, may have to consider promotion of a Caribbean outlook to their trading with the rest of the world. Only in this way can they be protected from competition among themselves and from the exploitation of superior economic interests”.
Putting into practice the Casablanca values and attempting to navigate the threat of nuclear war, was an important feature of Nkrumaism. Nuclear imperialism and non-proliferation was connected to ideas of national development and colonialism emanating from important activists like Mabel Ellen Dove. Within this context Ghana would host the preeminent nuclear non-proliferation forum for African countries. The “Accra Assembly: The World without the Bomb” took place between June 21 to 28, 1962. Nkrumah first expressed interest in the Assembly in 1961 to Mr. E.C. Quaye, where in conversation he described the need for Asia, Africa, and Latin America to contribute to work being done by the European Federation Against Nuclear Armaments and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. Nkrumah invited Rev. Canon L. John Collins of St. Paul Cathedral, London and Chairman of Christian Action, to nominate the Prepatory Committee who would undertake the technical work of convening the international meeting. The Prepatory Committee published an official statement on October 25, 1961 outlining the task of the forthcoming Accra Assembly; participants must be non-aligned and from the Third World. A pre-assembly meeting in Zagreb February 28, 1962, set of documents would be circulated in advance based on reports of experts divided into 6 committees. After this meeting the UN released a unanimous report to study the economic and social consequences of disarmament, reflecting many of the points of the Committee and need for the “utilisation of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.” A Secretariat was then established in Accra, comprising F.E Boaten, T.A Osei, Z Cervenka, James Moxon, and

70 For a summary of these meetings consult AA1/2 and AA1/10 RG 17 (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana).
E.L. Bartels, and they were responsible for implementing the decisions of the Preparatory Committee and making arrangements for the assembly. Nkrumah allotted G50,000 to the Committee and Secretariat to be used at their “unfettered disposal” for participant travel costs to Accra with the hope that other government would also contribute. The event was promoted within the Casablanca group but Nkrumah took a leading role.

The meeting and topics of concern raised are important to consider when exploring the connectivities of Ghana because of the ways in which Nkrumah connected nuclear disarmament to economic problems of development and disempowerment in the world system. Its scope was the “examination of the fundamental problems of hunger, disease, ignorance, and servitude and concrete suggestions as to their solutions… The assembly, however, is not intended as a mere protest meeting against atomic warfare. Its object was to examine in detail and suggest solutions for those international problems which make the nuclear destruction of humanity more than a mere possibility.” It was also the hope of participants that by bringing together non-aligned individuals “new lines of thinking may emerge” to limit nuclear weapon proliferation. The report of the first committee, comprised of independent scientists from the continent and Europe, Dr. Tabib (Chairman), Blair Fraser, Dr. Elich Kuby, Jose Smole, and Tadeusz Stralkowshi, held three full-day discussions. The committee concluded by offering six main points for the Assembly. Their most significant concern revolved around the “balance of power” and the promotion

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72 Ibid., 4.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid., 2-3.
75 Ibid.
of “non-aligned countries as a possible and positive alternative to the policy of total division” in international politics.\textsuperscript{77} Thus, they were trying to navigate the tensions of reconciling territorial sovereignty and collective efforts to re-balance the bipolarity of the Cold War through the organizational and diplomatic efforts of non-aligned countries with Africa at the forefront.\textsuperscript{78} Across all 6 committees, there was considerable coalition around the issue of the re-distribution of power, cooperation, non-alignment and disengagement in the pursuit of peace and equal development.

There were approximately a hundred attendees at the Assembly, many of whom were those “chosen solely on the basis of individual merit” without allegiance to a power bloc and techno-experts from Africa, Asian and South America.\textsuperscript{79} The Assembly took the structure of the Casablanca format in which an opening speech was made by Nkrumah followed by plenary sessions and the circulation of reports by sub-committees and experts. These sessions involved discussions of findings and recommendations by experts relating to the economic, political, and humanitarian threat of nuclear weapons and strategies for disarmament and the redirection of military finance to development.\textsuperscript{80} There was also time allotted to take the attendees sightseeing in the greater Accra and Tema areas to showcase the successes of Nkrumah’s government and to further promote himself as a Pan-African and global leader worth modeling. The tours included the construction sites of Tema Harbour and the Akosombo Dam on Sunday June 24.\textsuperscript{81} Similar to the state visits,

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{80} Program of the Accra Assembly: The World Without a Bomb, Doc/AA/1/10 (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana).
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid, 3.
conference participants were shown industrial areas to bolster a mediated image of the successes of Nkrumaism in Ghana. The program, including the tours, was defended by the Accra organizers as a “attempt to fire the imagination of the peoples of the world with the possibilities for development which exist once universal disarmament can be achieved.”

The primary topics discussed at the conference were the reduction of international arms race, the need for methods of effective inspections, controlled disarmament, and the transformation of existing nuclear technology to peaceful uses. A consideration of the economic problems arising from disarmament, and an examination of the “fundamental problems of hunger, disease, ignorance, and servitude and concrete suggests as to their solutions… by liberating these resources misused by the armament race.” The conference delegates agreed that international disputes should be solved peacefully and that there should be a complete secession of nuclear tests. These tests were framed as nuclear imperialism, in which the few countries that possessed nuclear weapons undermined the principles of self-determination and territorial integrity among some newly independent states. To address this, an Accra Plan of disengagement was proposed that would require non-nuclear powers to commit to maintaining a nuclear free zone including all of Africa, Asia and Latin America. The conference also proposed the creation of a Control Committee among nuclear and non-nuclear powers, to conduct independent inspections with its own international staff over the territories of signed states.

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82 3/26.
83 Ibid., 3.
86 Ibid., 6-7.
There was consensus that Africa would be declared as a nuclear free zone and that they had to work toward finding agreements for multilateral negotiations with the US and USSR to address the issues raised by the Assembly.\textsuperscript{87} It was agreed that these discussions and any agreed upon resolutions should be conducted through the UN and be inclusive of non-aligned states. Conference participations also put forward demands including that nuclear reactors for making Uranium-235 in Japan, West-Germany, India, Sweden and Israel had to comply with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to regulate stockpiles of nuclear fuel, check systems, and to report on weaponization. This meant strengthening the inspection powers of the IAEA, contingent on resolution between US and USSR.\textsuperscript{88} They further proposed a rethinking of national defence toward better understanding the sources of war: “A rational concept of defence in the nuclear age must include the attack upon the sources of war itself, upon international distrust and upon poverty and want.”\textsuperscript{89} Within the principles of Nkrumah’s Pan-Africanism, sovereignty had to be respected while confronting nuclear imperialism. This was the preeminent meeting in which Africa was brought into conversation with global nuclear politics.

The discussions also reflected Mabel Dove’s concern expressed a year earlier regarding nuclear imperialism and the ongoing legacy of colonialism. The proliferation of nuclear weapons were seen as an extension of unequal rule in which newly independent states could not participate and were potentially most effected by in terms of the threat of

\textsuperscript{87} Declaration of Africa as a Nuclear-Free Zone: Osagyefo’s LRS to IND. African States (YES or NO), September 16, 1963. RG 17/2/205 (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana).
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{89} “Peace-making Machinery and National Defence,” 5 DOC AA 1/6 15/26 (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana).
political coercion and testing. They even proposed an economic strategy of reconversion in capitalist or socialist countries to achieve disarmament without economic disruption as there were over $100 billion spent on arms that were increasing inequalities because of disparities nuclear weapons technologies. Thus the Assembly sought to promote democratic action and public debate to counter the vested interests of military professionals, national interests and power blocs. It was also a translocal vision entangled and co-constituted with the rest of Africa, in which resources could be redirected and used productively in agriculture, education, eradication of diseases, communication, and housing in Africa.

In addition to the Accra Assembly, Nkrumah also supported the efforts of civil society organizations that had explicit Pan-African and internationalist aims. In addition to the conference of African Women and Women of African Descent explored in Chapter 2, the Second Conference of Pan-African journalists was held in Accra from November 4-8 1963, the first was held in Bamako, Mali in May 1961. Nkrumah welcomed conferences such as these as they promoted, directly or indirectly, values of Nkrumaism and Pan-Africanism. The African Press played a role in the realization of Unity, but like the OAU and Ghana’s support for civic initiatives, journalists in Accra identified problems in politics, finance, and structure which went unaddressed. Participant countries and

90 DOC AA 1/7, 3. (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana).
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid., 2 and 3.
95 Ibid.
organizations were drawn from membership, and those who expressed interest in Pan-Africanism. While Nkrumah’s hosting and supporting conferences to promote Pan-Africanism on the world stage would persist after 1963, they became less civil society inclusive and more concerned with official state leaders.

**From Unification to Unity: Ghana and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), 1963-1966**

In 1963 Africa states were divided into the Casablanca, Monrovia, and Brazzaville groups because of important disagreements. The first was the refusal of the UN policy in the Congo by the Casablanca group despite the other two groups agreeing. The second was the formal recognition of the Algerian provisional government and support for the national liberation front, the Casablanca group gave them full membership as they did to Morocco. States in the Brazzaville and Monrovia groups had close links to France and Mauritania was part of the Monrovia group. However, the most significant issue that separated the Casablanca group from the others was their promotion of Pan-Africanism as directly related to the unification of African economies and world peace. Despite these differences, they had similar aims in anticolonialism, an end to racial discrimination, political and economic cooperation between African states. Because of this common goal for greater unity, groups met through heads of states conferences and gatherings.

There are important similarities and differences of the visions of Pan-Africanism and economic unification between the more radical Casablanca group – which reflected the prescriptions of Nkrumaism – and the compromised settlement of the OAU. The OAU was

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96 Appendix 11: List of Countries, 5. RG 17/2/151 (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana).
established on May 26, 1963 when the heads of 30 independent African states signed the Charter of Addis Ababa, composed of 23 articles. Under article 11, the OAU describes its purpose as supporting the unity of African states, increased cooperation, to defend mutual sovereignty and territories, to eradicate all forms of colonialism, and to promote international cooperation through the UN. Members then established five specialized committees to coordinate and carry out programmes within specific fields the policies and mandate of the OAU. These were the; Economic and Social Commission; Educational and Cultural Commission; Health, Sanitation and Nutrition Commission; Defence Commission; and the Scientific, Technical, and Research Commission. The organization framework of the OAU was a similar deliberative process of dissemination of reports, evaluation, discussion, and then drafting resolutions and policies. Also like the Casablanca Charter, the OAU Charter expressed the importance for economic unity by creating joint-infrastructure projects to facilitate transportation and trade, economic coordination, commercial relations, and customs procedures among member states. It stated clearly that this involved: “To harmonize development plans; to elaborate common projects in the field of science, culture, and public health; to encourage free movement of people and goods among member countries”.

The Charter affirmed the sovereignty of colonial borders, deciding that if they were to be adjusted based on precolonial ethnicity it would invite conflict and instability.

Despite criticisms of colonial legacy members in the OAU could not risk conflict. Accordingly then, the OAU presented itself as being pragmatic: “Out of realism and necessity we [the OAU] have to be selective in developing programmes and projects, selective both as to the timing of their initiation and as to the nature of the projects themselves.”\textsuperscript{101} In the field of development, the OAU believed that since there were significant difficulties in determining where capital needed to flow for planning and the lack of technical knowledge and/or reliable statistics, economic cooperation for ‘big projects’ were seen as being risky capital ventures.\textsuperscript{102} The economic commissions mandate, guiding the activities of OAU economic coordination, was to determine possibilities of creating a free trade area in Africa [or as Nkrumah would later term, a common African market], establishing a joint external tariff to protect infant industries and a stabilization fund for primary products, to organize the harmonization of natural development schemes, new transport-transit facilities to nurture trade within Africa, an African Payments and Clearing Union.\textsuperscript{103} It also contained more euphemistic policies such as the restructuring of international trade, the gradual liberation of national currencies from external dependence through an all-African monetary area.\textsuperscript{104} The seminal journal the \textit{OAU Review} in May 1964, published to mark the one year anniversary of the founding of the OAU, provides insights into the justifications, values, and tensions of African unity. Its self-described

\textsuperscript{101} Ati Jufke Widajo, Officer-in-Charge of the Organisation of African Unity, First Session of the Economic and Social Commission held in Niamey, Niger (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana).
\textsuperscript{102} First Session of the Economic and Social Commission held in Niamey, Niger (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana), 10.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., 11.
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid.
purpose was to “become a worthy voice of the hopes, the aspirations and the efforts of the peoples of Africa.”  

In economic terms, the OAU described its efforts as the organizational body to address economic cooperation and the imbalance of power, to promote the importance of trade. The primary aims were economic cooperation, not economic unification or harmonization, and to address the imbalance of power in international trade through pragmatic means. Rather than create a common market and policy for international trade as suggested by Nkrumah and implemented in the Casablanca Charter, the OAU planned to create regulations that would not abolish existing trade agreements, or put financial burden on states to settle accounts or to lose sovereignty over fiscal and trade policy. The OAU planned to implement a free trade area in Africa, a “restructuralization of international trade,” the creations of a “joint external tariff” as well as a fund for the “stabilization of prices of primary products.” They were more reactive measures to market forces and did not address issues of dependency or creating a central monetary institution in Africa. OAU members believed this allowed for inter-African trade, the “gradual liberation of national currencies from any external dependence” and to “study the ways towards the harmonization of natural development schemes in the present and in the future.” The discourse of economic unity in the OAU had similarities with the Casablanca Charter, but development planning was less ambitious – emphasizing cooperation over unification or

106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
harmonization – then what Nkrumah had envisioned, which ultimately would lead to disputes.

The economic Committee of the OAU came up with a 9 point programme of which it emphasized the following five points:

1. “Harmonization and coordination of national development plans starting with the scientific study of the means required for this purpose.
2. Setting up of a Free Trade Area through investigation of appropriate measures to achieve standardization and harmonization of customs techniques and procedures.
3. Study the problem of payment agreements amongst African countries until the setting up of an African Payments and Clearing Union.
4. Effective cooperation in the field of transport by land, sea and air…
5. Setting-up of an African Telecommunications Union for All African countries.”

The report goes on to discuss issues how a regulated economy would allow for investment in supporting educational initiatives and science. The OAU’s short term plan for 1961-1966 was to increase total school enrollment from 11 to 15 million, increase in average output of teachers by 45,000, and long term plan of educational investment expenditure increased from $584 million in 1961 to 1, 154.4 million in 1956-57. Science and technology is described in the report as a means to harnessing the creative capacity of Africans and the continents natural resources in the pursuit of development. There was a consensus for promoting investment in the training of scientists and technological professionals at African universities. The report further addressed issues of health and nutrition by promoting the expansion of health care services, delivery, and infrastructures. While there was an importance placed on technocratic experts in technology and development, like

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108 Ibid., 12.
110 Ibid., “Natural Resources,” 32.
Nkrumaimism, education and the need to invest in educational infrastructure to produce African experts and to develop science was considered an important feature of the OAU’s mandate.

By the time of publication of the report, the OAU had emerged as a central figure in the concrete manifestation of Pan-Africanism but its expressed aims were less radical than Nkrumah’s vision reflective of the Casablanca proposals in economic coordination. While the committee proposed the setting up of a free trade zone, it was premised on a liberal market without committing to reorganizing payments, agreements, creating a common policy and differed from the Casablanca common market. At the Accra conference of 1965, which Nkrumah was adamant be held by Ghana, he used the platform to criticize the plans toward economic unity discussed by the Committee and challenged member states to think differently. In the first session of the Accra conference, Nkrumah stated that member Committees responsible for drafting plans were being too preoccupied with money and balancing payments, arguing that they should be submitting organizational plans and not worrying about finance.\textsuperscript{111} Nkrumah further professed that:

\begin{quote}
Those in Africa who fear the fusion of divisions and the annihilation of separatism are clearly the agents of foreign interests seeking to humiliate and degrade our great Continent of Africa… those who fight against the desires and aspirations of the masses in Africa will fail.\textsuperscript{112}
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[\textsuperscript{111}] African Affairs Minutes from the Conference of Heads of State and Government, Accra, September 1965, 1. RG 17/2/470 (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana).
\item[\textsuperscript{112}] Ibid., 5.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Despite these criticisms, Nkrumah stressed the need to realize decolonization through Pan-African Unity. The conference also involved a guided tour of the Akosombo Dam and Tema to once again showcase Nkrumah’s successes.\footnote{Ibid., “Conference Programme”.
\footnote{Lists of Supporters, RG 17/1/476 (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana). These states included: Angola, Basutoland, Bechuanaland, French Somaliland, Gambia, Mozambique, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Portuguese Guinea, Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and Swaziland. Supporters of these struggles were Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Somalia, Malawi, Brazzaville, Dahomey, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Burundi, Cameroon. Doubtful supporters; U.A.R, Maurentania, Sudan, Ethiopia, Central African Republic, Togo. The list of ‘difficult cases’ in support; Liberia, Nigeria, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Senegal, Madagascar, Chad, Gabon, Congo (Leopoldville), Niger, Upper Volta, and Rwanda.}
\footnote{Harcourt Fuller, Building the Ghanaian State: Kwame Nkrumah’s Symbolic Nationalism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
\footnote{Notes of the First Meeting of the Food and Currency Committee – September 1965. RG 17/2/385 (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana). The meeting was held at the Ministry of Finance on August 20, 1964.}}

Nkrumah wanted the OAU to openly support territories struggling for independence.\footnote{Ibid., “Conference Programme”.
\footnote{Lists of Supporters, RG 17/1/476 (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana). These states included: Angola, Basutoland, Bechuanaland, French Somaliland, Gambia, Mozambique, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Portuguese Guinea, Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and Swaziland. Supporters of these struggles were Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Somalia, Malawi, Brazzaville, Dahomey, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Burundi, Cameroon. Doubtful supporters; U.A.R, Maurentania, Sudan, Ethiopia, Central African Republic, Togo. The list of ‘difficult cases’ in support; Liberia, Nigeria, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Senegal, Madagascar, Chad, Gabon, Congo (Leopoldville), Niger, Upper Volta, and Rwanda.}
\footnote{Harcourt Fuller, Building the Ghanaian State: Kwame Nkrumah’s Symbolic Nationalism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).}
\footnote{Notes of the First Meeting of the Food and Currency Committee – September 1965. RG 17/2/385 (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana). The meeting was held at the Ministry of Finance on August 20, 1964.}}

Advertisements of the conference were distributed before and during the conference within Ghana organized through the CPP propaganda secretariats. The common theme of these varied posters is that Nkrumah, as the Father of African Unity, was actively building the structure to implement unity. Further, there was a call to workers and students to commit themselves to the development of the nation and sacrifice themselves. This was part of a broader strategy of symbolic nationalism in which Nkrumah was engaged.\footnote{Ibid., “Conference Programme”.
\footnote{Lists of Supporters, RG 17/1/476 (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana). These states included: Angola, Basutoland, Bechuanaland, French Somaliland, Gambia, Mozambique, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Portuguese Guinea, Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and Swaziland. Supporters of these struggles were Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Somalia, Malawi, Brazzaville, Dahomey, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Burundi, Cameroon. Doubtful supporters; U.A.R, Maurentania, Sudan, Ethiopia, Central African Republic, Togo. The list of ‘difficult cases’ in support; Liberia, Nigeria, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Senegal, Madagascar, Chad, Gabon, Congo (Leopoldville), Niger, Upper Volta, and Rwanda.}
\footnote{Harcourt Fuller, Building the Ghanaian State: Kwame Nkrumah’s Symbolic Nationalism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).}
\footnote{Notes of the First Meeting of the Food and Currency Committee – September 1965. RG 17/2/385 (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana). The meeting was held at the Ministry of Finance on August 20, 1964.}}

The first meeting of the Food and Currency Committee appointed in conjunction with the conference of African heads of state in Accra September 1965, sought to create a procedure for currency exchanges with a 24-hour service, the acceptance of traveller’s cheques as well as to expedite customs processes and import licensing.\footnote{Ibid., “Conference Programme”.
\footnote{Lists of Supporters, RG 17/1/476 (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana). These states included: Angola, Basutoland, Bechuanaland, French Somaliland, Gambia, Mozambique, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Portuguese Guinea, Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and Swaziland. Supporters of these struggles were Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Somalia, Malawi, Brazzaville, Dahomey, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Burundi, Cameroon. Doubtful supporters; U.A.R, Maurentania, Sudan, Ethiopia, Central African Republic, Togo. The list of ‘difficult cases’ in support; Liberia, Nigeria, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Senegal, Madagascar, Chad, Gabon, Congo (Leopoldville), Niger, Upper Volta, and Rwanda.}
\footnote{Harcourt Fuller, Building the Ghanaian State: Kwame Nkrumah’s Symbolic Nationalism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).}
\footnote{Notes of the First Meeting of the Food and Currency Committee – September 1965. RG 17/2/385 (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana). The meeting was held at the Ministry of Finance on August 20, 1964.}}

By 1965 the OAU was seen within Ghana, and by progressives elsewhere, as an extension of the politics and practice of Ghana centred on Nkrumah. At the opening of the
Summit Conference of the OAU in Accra on October 21, 1965 Nkrumah set the tone of the meeting stating: “We are glad to recall today memories of our struggle for independence; our prophetic imaginings of a new Africa emancipated from colonial chains, standing united and ready to play its historic role in world affairs.” Nkrumah recognized that peace could not be achieved in Africa with so much poverty, war, and disease in the world. He made reference to the struggles in Vietnam, Pakistan, and Palestine including how the “situation in Rhodesia poses a grave threat to Africa. The racialist minority which has been allowed to assume power…to make a unilateral declaration of independence” to implement an apartheid state. Nkrumah continued:

We in Africa cannot remain indifferent to the fate of four million Africans in that territory… We call on the British government to do its duty and to fulfill its obligations to all its citizens in its colony of Southern Rhodesia… In the event of the United Kingdom failing in its duty, I am sure that member states of the O.A.U. will take up arms in support of the four million Africans who form the majority in Southern Rhodesia.

Another major concern tabled by Nkrumah, was the practicalities and politics of criminalizing and granting asylum to political refugees, especially those deemed as subversive counter-revolutionaries to the African Pan-Africanist revolution.

While Nkrumah was hosting and advocating for Pan-Africanism, he was engaged in military and territorial disputes. During the 1965 OAU conference in Accra there were border clashes in the Upper Volta region. The Ghanaian security services considered these as acts of sabotage to disrupt the conference, and intensified border defence and naval

118 Ibid, 7.
119 Ibid., 8.
patrols. Further, during the conference the Ghana military was conducting a secret mission to Kulungu where there had been a previous assassination attempt on Nkrumah. The dispute regarded the moving of sign points from 40 to 600 metres away from a newly built border barracks. The military threatened to use force if the Ghanaian border guards re-adjusted the postings. The guards were given an ultimatum to move back or be shot, to which Nkrumah responded by sending 200 soldiers to the posting to “meet force with force if need be.” This was an established internationally recognized border. In addition to border disputes, Nkrumah’s government was also trying to address a crisis of legitimacy in late 1965, in which political rivals and dissidents were being jailed and silenced in Ghana. This is an important point because the tensions of translocality meant that Nkrumah was hyper-focused on continental and international concerns while ignoring the demands of interests groups at home.

In communication between Nkrumah and US officials on development aid and Ghana’s promotion of Pan-Africanism, Nkrumah stated clearly that:

…the first stage of decolonization is coming to an end. The demand for political unity, for the liberation of the rest of the continent, and for economic independence is becoming general, insistent and coniferous. It was an open question however, whether this next stage will be violent, anarchic or peaceful and constructive, depending on how “Western industrialized nations respond.”

122 Ibid., 4.
124 Ibid.
The Ghana foreign office believed that Europe, generally, was recognizing that undisturbed markets and peace depend on unified African states developing strong agriculture and industry, with West-Germany increasing investment. Although Britain still supported settlers in South Africa and the US was considered an open question. The founding of the US was anticolonial revolt and there was a similar desire for Africa to achieve unity but because of anti-communist US foreign policies, there was reluctance in supporting African unity. Importantly, Ghana was not part of the Communist bloc. In discussion with US officials Nkrumah defended this position noting that:

…to take our people into the Communist bloc is to limit our commerce and cultural contacts with the West, yet we are extending out commerce with, and encouraging investments from the West… We only impose conditions that these must not menace our political stability, limit our independence or inhibit our socialist economy. We have socialism and anti-imperialism in common with the Communists, which makes us travel with them on many paths which you will not tread.

Because of Ghana’s development circumstances, it required the pooling of resources and socialist management to increase productive output and target development. In line with Nkrumaism, the Foreign Office took the position that socialist policies are a means to an end. As such, Nkrumah stayed consistent in challenging the US to accept the conditions of Pan-African unity, socialist development, and of non-interference, for peaceful co-existence.

**State Visits, Committee Coordination and Diplomatic Missions, 1960-1966**

125 Ibid., 2-3.
In addition to conferences and proposing strategies of unification, state visits and diplomatic missions were important to Nkrumah’s public imagine and promotion of Pan-African development. State leaders and representatives from communist and capitalist bloc countries, and the non-aligned world travelled to Ghana during Nkrumah’s tenure. In the immediate postcolonial era when governmental policies in Africa were largely determined by personalities, compromised agreements could be reached through direct talks between government officials during their mutual diplomatic visits, which, since 1962, have been mainly preoccupied with African unity. These diplomacies also draw attention to the networks and links Nkrumah actively forged and how these connectivities made possible the legitimization of Nkrumaism. They further reveal the translocality of the project within Africa and the world. These visits and missions are translocal because they are symbolic and performative expressions of Pan-Africanism or a solidarity in Ghana’s pursuit of development that reflect the entanglement of postcolonial development within global politics. These relationships involving localities across the world were not only central to Nkrumah’s vision but they played a constitutive role in the tensions and successes of Nkrumaism.

State visits and diplomatic missions provided opportunity for Nkrumah to promote policies and discourses of unification. These visits typically involved a reception committee to meet and attend to visitors, official meetings with ministers, visiting sites and state
dinners in Accra. Upon arriving at the Accra International Airport, state visitors would be greeted with an “arrival ceremony” involving traditional cultural presentation (drumming/clothing), ushers, and an official workers and police brigade lining the route from the airport to the state house. Then they would get picked up by an official envoy and driven through Accra to either the Castle or the Polo Ground to have a “courtesy call” with Nkrumah. If other high ranking African state officials were passing through Accra to another country, arrangements are made with the Foreign Office to have a Minister, Deputy Minister, and chief Protocol Officer to accompany the individual.

The most frequently attended sites were the Pressm Ghana Distillaries, Nsawam Canneries in Accra, the Tema Harbour via Achimota Road and the industrial centres in Tema and Akosombo. By arranging visits to these sites, Nkrumah could mediate what parts of Ghana were being seen and show off those industrial centres and development projects which would impress the state visitor. This gave credence to Nkrumah’s ideas and proposals for Pan-African unity and development in the world. The programmes of each visit were submitted and approved by Nkrumah, and often he would make revisions and

127 ST/VIS [State Visits], RG 17/2/224 (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana). After reviewing the itineraries of African leader state visits to Ghana they are all conducted in the same format: formal reception at the airport, official guided tours of industrial sites followed by meetings and communication with Nkrumah by phone or in person.
128 The airport was renamed the Kotoka International Airport in 1969 by the NLC to honour Lieutenant General Emmanuel Kwasi Kotoka who died in a coup attempt against Nkrumah. 
129 Arrival Ceremony Accra International Airport, 106. ST/VIS [State Visits], RG 17/2/224 (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana). Contains a rich description and the materials needed for a standard state visit arrival ceremony, costs are not included.
130 Ibid., “State Visit Programme”.
131 In the case of President Nicolas Grunitzk, he was only spending 30 minutes at the Accra International Airport on route to Abidjan, and three officials were sent to meet and accompany Grunitsky during his short stay. M.F Deing, Osagyefo the President, File No., February 24, 1964. ST/VIS [State Visits], RG 17/2/224 (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana).
132 “Industrial Centres to be Visited,” 30. ST/VIS [State Visits], RG 17/2/224 (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana).
offer to meet and/or entertain the visitor. The state visits were conducted using similar itineraries. This can be seen when looking at the format of visits by Haile Selassie I of Ethiopia in 1963, Prime Minister of Nyasland August 24, 1963, Prime Minister of Uganda August 23, 1963, and Prime Minister of Gambia David Jawara May 20-24, 1964. Despite this standardization, they were different relative to the specific political circumstances. In the case of President Apity of Dahomey, Nkrumah wanted to impress upon him Ghana’s successes as a way to use Apity’s influence among French speaking African countries to promote a continental Union Government. He did this by pairing the state visit with an announcement for the promise of increasing bilateral ties between Ghana and Dahomey through technical cooperation in development.

Political leaders from the African diaspora were also invited to Ghana. President Eric Williams of Trinidad, who was also a historian of capitalism and a communist, made a visit to Ghana from February 26 to March 1, 1964. As per the standard format, Williams was treated to a tour of industrial sites and had discussions with Nkrumah. These talks related to the promotion of diplomatic relations and the “other problems which imperialism had bequeathed to Africa and the Caribbean area and the need… to construct a sound economy as a foundation for their political independence.”

133 Ibid., 8. In the case of Dr. Banda’s visit to Ghana in 1963, Nkrumah revised the submitted itinerary so that he could “entertain Dr. Banda to dinner at the castle…but that particular item is not to be included in the programme at the request of Osagyefo”. It can be assumed that official records of state visits do not fully capture the events.
134 Programme: Visit of Mr. David Jawara Prime Minister of Gambia, 2. ST/VIS [State Visits], RG 17/2/224 (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana).
135 Notes for Talks by Osagyefo with President Apity of Dahomey, 1 and 2. ST/VIS [State Visits], RG 17/2/224 (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana).
136 Ghana-Trinidad and Tobago Communiqué, Accra, March 1, 1964. ST/VIS [State Visits], RG 17/2/224 (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana).
communiqué, Nkrumah and Williams jointly established that “The material conditions of both peoples [Ghanaians and Trinidadians] were similar as both had suffered the ravages of imperialism and colonialism and were now struggling for their rightful place in the comity of nations.”

Thus, political unity in Africa and economic coordination were presented as a model for Afro-Caribbean countries. Williams told Nkrumah that he deeply admired efforts made to create political unity at the recent OAU meeting in Lagos, and that the Caribbean commonwealth countries were making similar efforts. In this respect, Ghana’s critique of selective association in the EEC via a common market was also a promotion of the organizational value of Pan-Africanism for advancing economic interests of multiple states against imperialism and neocolonialism.

Both agreed that frequent exchanges of ideas and experiences were “…in the interest of both countries and of African/Caribbean solidarity and of world peace.”

In addition to these diplomatic missions, Ghana invited envoys from neighboring and socialist countries to discuss “economic links.” This included a large delegation from the Peoples Republic of China led by Premier Chou En-Lai, to Accra on January 13, 1964, in which Nkrumah gave a welcoming speech. In this speech, Nkrumah described

137 Ibid., 3.
138 Ibid., 3-4.
139 Ibid., 4.
140 Notes for Osagyefo the President: Ninth Meeting of the African Affairs Committee at Flagstaff House on Thursday August 27 1964 at 10am: Item 3 – Economic Links with Ghana’s Neighbors. RG 17/2/385 (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana).
how the Peoples Republic project of uniting a population of 350 million is similar to Africa’s. He noted that:

A united Africa will be a strong link in the chain of Afro-Asian anti-imperialist solidarity. We shall speak with one voice and fight together to make the world safe for mankind… If only imperialists and neo-colonialists would accept and abide by these principles, I am sure that world peace would be established and preserved for all time.\(^{142}\)

En-Lai was shown the Tema Harbor and other industrial centres, conversations with Nkrumah.\(^{143}\) En-Lai, according to the communique report from En-Lai’s trip, indicated that the Peoples Republic would be committed to supporting the aspirations of continental unity and of independent African governments in pursuing peace, neutrality and development.\(^{144}\) This was also part of Cold War grand strategy in which the Peoples Republic and the USSR were actively supporting liberation movements and spreading influence to counter British and US dominance.

Diplomatic missions were therefore seen as crucial for advancing Nkrumaism and building solidarity between Ghana and the World. Ghana conducted special diplomatic missions to Kenya, Somalia, Uganda and Nyasland; Mali, Upper-Volta, and Niger; Northern Rhodesia, Burundi and Ruandi; Togo and Dahomey; Congo (Brazzaville); Algeria. If a country was in the process of adopting socialist policies or expressing interest in Pan-African, efforts were made to send a diplomatic mission to “explain the progress that Ghana has made.”\(^{145}\) These missions also served as a means of promoting Nkrumaism

\(^{142}\) Ibid., 2.
\(^{143}\) Joint Ghana-China Communique, 1. ST/VIS [State Visits], RG 17/2/224 (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana).
\(^{144}\) Ibid., 8.
\(^{145}\) “Socialism in Africa,” Diplomatic Missions in Africa. ST/VIS [State Visits], RG 17/2/224 (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana).
and Pan-Africanism. Ghana’s diplomatic efforts, according to Algeria’s Ben Bella, often
were not appreciated by other African countries. Bella describes that: “Although Ghana has
spent millions of pounds sterling in the struggle to liberate colonial territories, other
African states do not appear to have sufficient appreciation of this contribution.”

In discussion with the prominent Indian diplomat Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit during her visit to
Ghana, Nkrumah describes the necessity of establishing a continental government for
Africa without delay despite it being “not clear whether many of the other African countries
have as much interest as Ghana in this respect.”

When trying to implement the coordination of national ministries and experts
between African countries, Ghana was confronted with financial and administrative
difficulties. This was seen in the relationship between Ghana and Guinea in which a dispute
arose over rents and policing costs for the minister exchange program. Guinea expected
Ghana to pay the full costs while Ghanaian officials believed that “Ghana is providing
for Guinea more than what she receives in return” and would be reimbursed. Ghana also
requested to the Guinea Resident Minister to advise his Government on reciprocating this

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146 Outline of Point to be raised by Osagyefo the President during Discussions with Premier Ben Bella, 12.
ST/VIS [State Visits], RG 17/2/ (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana).
147 Osagyefo’s Meeting with Mrs. Pandit – September 6, 1963, 11. ST/VIS [State Visits], RG 17/2/ (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana). This visit centred on Ghana trying to persuade India to support a resolution at the 18th session of the United Nations General Assembly. Ghana was critical of India’s foreign policy and military agreements with the US, such as accepting military supplies and establishing an Anglo-American squadron, calling it an abandonment of non-alignment, a policy in which “...India never really believed in non-alignment”. Ibid, “The State of Indian Non-Allignment,” 2, Nkrumah was also critical of how the Indian government was handling Kashmir.
148 Notes from Osagyefo’s Meeting with Mrs. Pandit, ST/VIS [State Visits], RG 17/2/ (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana), 17.
149 RG 17/1/261 (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana).
150 EPK Seddoh, PS, October 1962. RG 17/1/261 (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana).
facility in respect of an office in our Mission here in Conakry. These disagreements lasted until November, when Guinea requests proof of rent payments, to which Ghana replied showing 70,000 paid until January 1963.

In response to the complaint, the Guinea government suggested that the accommodations were inadequate. Before payment, Guinea suggested that the minister accommodations in Ghana be amended to include renovation of the residence and acquisition of new furniture. Guinean officials described that “the mission’s residency is in a very bad state. In the first place it needs whitewashing and repainting.” The official further described Nkrumah’s welcome as “cold, a bit warm on the second occasion” and also complained about receiving a quarterly remittance in Guinea’s currency, not the cedi.” A year later there was another dispute regarding missing receipts. The problem of who would fund the minister exchange program could not be solved and was moved to the African Affairs Committee who decided in Ghana’s favor and requested Guinea to provide financial reimbursement.

The disagreements over reciprocal rent payments and accommodations with ally and OAU member Guinea is an important example of the practical problems that arose in Nkrumah’s attempts to implement ministry coordination. There was an unwritten

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151 Privileges on Reciprocal Basis, September 26 1962. RG 17/1/261 (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana).
153 K Budu-Acquah, Resident Minister to The Principle Secretary, December 7, 1962. RG 17/1/261 (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana).
154 Ibid., 2.
expectation that Ghana would pay, similar to defensive and trading coordination, because Nkrumah had reinforced the continental image of an economically successful leader and vanguard of the Pan-Africanist movement. In reality, this put a significant burden on Ghana’s finances which led to a lack of funds for military expenditures, diplomatic missions, infrastructure investments, and as will be shown in the proceeding Chapter, development projects such as his heralded Akosombo Dam.

**A test case for Pan-African Unity: The Ghana-Nigeria Union and Common Defence**

Outside of the translocal networks built by Nkrumah and Ghana’s participation in the implementation of economic unification, political disputes arose when implementing regional unification. This can be seen in how the relationship between Ghana and Nigeria had to navigate tensions between national and local interests with transnational migration and Pan-African commitments. Both countries have a long history of colonial and precolonial territorial migrations. Ghana accepted a large number of migrant workers in the 1950s. By 1960 one in eight adults were from another African country, and 22% of the adult population in Accra were designated as aliens.156 Most West-African migrants travelled to Ghana primarily, but also the Ivory Coast, Gambia, Sierra Leone or Liberia.157 In 1960, 11% of people living in Ghana were foreign born and that number increased in 1963 to 29%.158 There were 200,000 Nigerians living in Ghana in 1960.159 The census was taken in March, with a recorded total of 827,000 aliens in Ghana during 1960, the great

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157 Ibid.

158 Ibid., 7.

majority being employed adults with only 11% unemployed.\textsuperscript{160} Over 6000 Ibos fled to Ghana to escape civil war in Nigeria. The largest numbers of migrants coming to Ghana were the Togolese, Voltaics, and Nigerians, while Ghanaians also comprised majority of skilled labor in Liberia.\textsuperscript{161} Legislation adapted to these migrations with the passage of the Aliens Act of 1963 (amended in 1965) which required non-status migrants to get an official residents permit.

Given the cross migration of Ghanaians and Nigerians, Nkrumah suggested that the creation of a Nigeria-Ghana Union as the “nucleus of a Union of African States can be established on the framework of an understanding between Nigeria and Ghana.”\textsuperscript{162} This issue would become a testing ground for the ideas of Pan-Africanism, mimicking the framework proposed by Nkrumah. A Union Parliament, composed of both Nigerian and Ghana representatives, would have equal power in coordinating resources toward coordinated economic development, defence, foreign policy, and customs.\textsuperscript{163} A President and Prime Minister were to be appointed. Nkrumah declared in a speech at the Positive Action conference held in Accra 1960 that he would concede to a Nigerian candidate, to “surrender leadership if this is considered necessary for the achievement of common objectives.”\textsuperscript{164} By 1963 the prospects of unity between Nigeria and Ghana, as envisioned in

\textsuperscript{160} The total percentage of migrants per labor field: 25% of the tailors, 46% of the male millers, bakers, and brewmasters, 32% of the longshoremen, 59% of the butchers, 39% of the labourers, and 42% of the service workers (including army and police) see 1960 \textit{Population Census of Ghana} (Accra 1964) (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana).


\textsuperscript{162} Proposed Ghana-Nigeria Union, 1 (1960), RG/17/1/228 1960 PRAAD, Accra Ghana.

\textsuperscript{163} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{164} Ibid., Positive Action Summary Speech 1960.
1960, were becoming harder to realize. Nigeria saw the main issue with the preservation of the rule of law and democratic norms, which were being threatened by Nkrumah’s passing of the Act and move towards restrictive one-party rule.

It was a common assessment to view Ghana as being more economically efficient compared to Nigeria, because of the disparity of supporting infrastructure and the increased level of corruption in Nigeria.\(^{165}\) It also was tied to the political differences in governance, or as Ghanaian research bureau official in foreign affairs M.F Dei-Anang stated: “What is going on in Nigeria provides indeed, an almost classic illustration of just how much harder it is to get results in a democracy.”\(^{166}\) The economic successes of Nkrumah and failures of Nigeria were seen as fundamentally to be the result of difference political structures and the assumption that Nkrumah was a man who “could get things done.”\(^{167}\) Ghana was efficient, successful in rousing support for African Unity and for developing public infrastructures that could be relied upon for private investment firms.

On November 25, 1960, the Embassy of Ghana in Belgrade Yugoslavia sent a confidential telegram to Flagstaff House. Despite recent tensions at the Ghana embassy in Leopoldville, the telegram describes a meeting held by the Ambassadors of Belgium, Britain, France, Italy, and the United States. The meeting concerned the “political scene in Africa” and assessments of countries in relation to where they stood in the relation to

\(^{166}\) Ibid.
\(^{167}\) Ibid., 2.
Soviet or Capitalist bloc countries, and remarked on the idea of African unity.168 While these opinions “were discussed over afternoon tea and could be taken as idle talk” they also “portray the personal attitude of these envoys… their governments as well” towards African unity.169 The telegram notes that:

At this particular meeting Ghana, the U.A.R., Mali, Guinea and Morocco were described as countries pursuing dangerous policies backed by the Soviet bloc and Yugoslavia. To them Kenya, Algeria, Nyasaland and both Rhodesias might be following the footsteps of these five… Ethiopia, Tunisia, Libya and Liberia were said to be classified at the meeting as countries without any ‘real policies’ to worry about.170

In the recounting of the meeting, African unity was characterized as a dream that was unfeasible given geographic distance between supporters, a change in leadership within Nigeria from Nnamdi Azikiwe to Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. At the Lagos conference with Nigeria, the discussions on how to deal with political refugees were combative and there were even threats of a boycott led by Nigeria in the OAU against Ghana. This resulted in official condemnation for political assassinations of leaders and subversive activities. However, it did not lead to any concrete resolutions, as Matteo Grilli argues, but did highlight the feelings of less radical African states towards Ghana under Nkrumah.171 It also set the issue of political refugees in Ghana on future conference agendas.172 Nkrumah made a commitment to relocate Sanwi refugees, King Amon Ndouffou III included, to

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169 Ibid., 4.
170 Ibid.
172 Ibid., 198.
Algeria. Grilli describes this move as a sign of goodwill to ease tensions with Ivory Coast President Félix Houphouët-Boigny – who was influential among the less radical OAU members – and to mediate criticisms that Nkrumah was actively undermining national governments by supporting and training political refugees in Ghana.\(^{173}\)

What these examples reveal is that Pan-Africanism had its limits when dealing with political refugees and balancing national politics, security concerns, and Pan-Africanism. In practice then, the translocality of Nkrumaism put Ghana in a position of costly expenditures in relation to other African countries. Ghana’s successful development was co-constituted with economic unification and political unity as a bulwarks against neocolonialism in the global political-economy. In the case of Ghana-Nigeria, growing tensions emanating from migrant populations and disagreements over the correct development path and political refugees, led to a scaling back of the aims of the 1960 union by 1965. The tensions over the practical and political costs of implementing forms of unification contributed to disunity.

The translocality of Ghanaian foreign policy can also be seen in defence planning. When it came to implementing a common defence strategy, Nkrumah – in his role as the supreme commander of the Ghanaian military – sent support ships and military supplies to other African countries. The Ghana navy was the most developed of the independent countries in West-Africa, despite having only 70 officers (78 under training in the UK in 1965).\(^{174}\) The Navy was responsible for sea training, fishery protection, anti-smuggling

\(^{173}\) Ibid., 198.

patrols, search and rescue operations, supply drops and goodwill visits to other countries.\textsuperscript{175} Nkrumah envisioned an expansive role for the Navy in West-Africa, linking it to part of the OAU’s mandate for collective defence.\textsuperscript{176} A plan was proposed in 1963, shortly after the creation of the OAU, to expand the Navy and operations in West-Africa through the creation of new trained officers, a new naval base, and berthing stations at the Tema port.\textsuperscript{177} The Navy suffered from technical and financial difficulties. Long range communication was unreliable and a lack of military berths meant the Navy had to use commercial ports which were in heavy demand.\textsuperscript{178} There was only 1 naval barrack which was overcrowded and lacked resources for training and housing more officers.\textsuperscript{179} Despite Nkrumah’s ambitions, the investment needed to complete the 1963 plan was never granted to the Navy by the Nkrumah government.\textsuperscript{180}

By 1965 the construction of the base at Tema had stalled, there were administrative delays in creating new berths, and attracting new trained officers because of the lack of resources.\textsuperscript{181} The Navy had sent yearly briefings to Nkrumah requesting funds, at minimum to maintain yearly expenditures, but they were not granted. This is another important contradiction in Nkrumaism; that the realities of the financial costs were ignored while rhetorically the Navy was promoted as an example of collective defense and assistance

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{176} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{178} Ibid., 2.
\textsuperscript{179} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{180} Multiple appeals for funds by the Ghana Navy to Nkrumah’s office, they stop in 1965 with no evidence of making the 1963 targets. Ibid., 2-3.
\textsuperscript{181} Brief for the Supreme Commander, Major Problems Affecting the Army, 8-9. RG 17/2/154 (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana).
\end{flushleft}
within the OAU. Nkrumah did not live up to these investment promises, yet his government continued to demand they expend resources in the name of Pan-Africanism. The total defence expenditures for 1965 and 1966 were scarcely more than they had been in 1960. The army suffered from underinvestment and resources, despite Nkrumah issues a plan for expansion and constantly offering the use of the military in interventions. 182 Army headquarters were responsible for all routine tasks and administration and they only consisted of 6 officers. These problems in the chain of command were compounded by a lack of basic supplies for infantry and a lack of logistical materials and experts. There was a need to update army training but the requests from officers requesting authority and funding to expand training services were never granted by Nkrumah’s government. 183 Despite committing to joint defence missions and Pan-African defence systems, the national army lacked sufficient resources. This is an important characteristic of the translocality of Ghana’s foreign policy as it reveals a tension between balancing defence planning and spending between national and continental operations.

Not only was there coordination in terms of military defence systems and resources, but also police coordination to stop opposition movements. The official King of the Ivory Coast Sanwi liberation movement (SLM), S.M Amon Ndouffou III, in April 1965 sent a telegram to Nkrumah asking for help to arrest individuals organizing his destoolment. 184 Ndouffou and the Sanwi of the Ivory Coast had been exiled temporarily to Aiyinasi, Ghana

183 Brief for the Supreme Commander, Major Problems Affecting the Army, 8-9. RG 17/2/154 (PRAAD: Accra, Ghana).
184 Cabinet Royal, Roi du Sanwi, S.M Amon Ndouffou III to Osagyefo (April 20 1965), African Affairs RG 17/2/163 HDS/1, PRAAD Accra, Ghana.
and was seeking assistance from the Ghanaian police services to arrest and detain a number of what he called “bad Sanwi refugees acting subversively to demolish his SLM [Sanwi Liberation Movement].” These refugees were deemed ‘bad’ by Aiyinasi because of political disputes, they were accused of lobbying the SLM against Ndouffou to the Ivory government and appointed Agnalamon as the new King. This was reported by one of Ndouffou’s “good refugees” in Kutuah on March 10th 1965. Agnalamon had also been in contact with the Kuaku Kwadjo Haccandy in the Ivory Coast government, pledging to submit authority and give up the main tenants of the SLM.

After the coup in 1966, Ghana effectively abandoned its commitments to Nkromah’s vision of economic coordination for Pan-Africanism within the OAU, although it remained a member. The scope of state visits among non-aligned and communist countries ceased from 1966 to 1968, instead only Western aligned representatives from international financial institutions were actively invited to access and discuss economic issues. It also marked the ending of any resurgence of the Casablanca Charter among OAU member states. The National Liberation Council described the policies of an African common market and coordination of Ministries as costly and indicative of an inefficient corrupt state. They also condemned investing in an ADB as it would contribute to rising

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185 Ibid., 1.
186 Ibid., 2.
187 Ibid.
188 There are no ST/RG files at PRAAD in Accra related to state visits or diplomatic missions under the National Liberation Council, instead there are only economic missions by international financial institutions and Western aligned states.
debt, foreign reserve depletion, and a balance of payments crisis.\footnote{Ibid.} June Milne, the literary executive of Nkrumah’s writings and publisher of London Panaf-Books, described his decision to go to Guinea following the military coup that ousted him from office as the final act of his Pan-Africanism;

The fact that Nkrumah chose to go to Guinea to live after the coup was in itself a Pan-African act… When Nkrumah arrived in Conakry on that historic day, March 2 1966, Touré, in an unprecedented expression of Pan-Africanism, proclaimed Nkrumah president of Guinea and was ready to step down. Nkrumah was deeply moved, but only agreed to become co-president. I can think of no historical parallel to either Touré’s proposal or to the role Nkrumah subsequently fulfilled in Conakry as co-president of Guinea.\footnote{June Milne, “Kwame Nkrumah: Life After the Coup and the Conakry Period,” \textit{New Directions} 14(4) (1987), 39.}

Nkrumah’s Ghana was at the forefront of implementing a translocal vision of Pan-Africanism, the beginnings of a united Africa, but this was Nkrumah’s final moment on the continental stage. While Milne is correct, by re-directing focus to the administrative, financial and political challenges of pursuing economic coordination for Pan-Africanism, another narrative arch emerges. The ambitious translocality of national development which caused tensions between politics and economics, national/local and continental/international contexts, lacked consensus and the resources in Ghana necessary to succeed.

\textbf{The Translocality of Pan-African Diplomacy}

This Chapter explored the complexities and tensions of translocality at the level of Pan-African diplomacy and the attempt to implement different visions of Pan-Africanist
development. The disagreements regarding the extent to which states would relinquish some sovereignty to adopt political unification and economic harmonization on a continental scale, meant that no singular vision of unity in development was adopted. Despite the compromised settlements and Nkrumah’s persistence in trying to plan and put into action his ideas of what Pan-African development means, these initiatives were meant to create new connectivities and reposition Ghana and Africa within the global political economy.

The translocality of Ghana’s development is seen in the relational layers of complex relationalities, power hierarchies, individual and government interests within Africa, the diaspora and the world. Beyond transnationalism or internationalism, translocality involves the connections of disparate political, economic, and social groups centred on Ghana’s Pan-African development. The tensions of this translocality in coordinating Pan-Africanism came to define the outcomes of Ghana’s diplomatic efforts in the final years before the military coup. These interactions were translocal in the sense that the problems and disagreements with implementation, not just in grand planning but also in ministry exchange programs or the question of financing, were amplified in the context of regional and state-to-state relationships. The distinct local and national power hierarchies and political-economies, meant that coordinating Pan-Africanism would be complex. The translocality of development conceptualized and advocated for by Nkrumah on the continental and world stage meant that implementation involved navigating layers of entangled contexts, often leading to conflicting visions and disputes. Nevertheless, Pan-African development aspired to achieve a new empowered continental union to combat
neocolonialism in the global Cold War, while being limited and shaped by all those who were apart of these complimentary and sometimes competing, development plans. Despite tension and contradiction in implementation, it was a project of remaking translocal connections to empower Ghana and Africa in a global hierarchical system of neocolonialism and inequality.

From independence, Ghana made agreements with neighboring states and hosted conferences to build political and economic foundations for unification that reflected the translocal scope of national development as a political and internationalist project. In line with Nkrumaism, from 1960 to 1963 Ghana committed its foreign policy to the Casablanca Charter and promoted a public image as the vanguard for Pan-Africanism. This had the effect of legitimizing Nkrumah’s policies domestically and to the world, while also responding to a series of political crisis on the continents ranging from white settler separatism in Rhodesia and the jailing of anticolonial leaders. The policy of pursuing economic coordination and a common development policy was planned to politically strengthen African states allowing for change in the international system towards non-exploitative economic relations and peace. It was conceptualized as an alternative non-alignment agenda amongst African states to reposition in the Cold War global economy. African crisis and underdevelopment would be better managed by a strong continental union. This even involved the planned redistribution of resources used in nuclear weapons technologies to coordinate ministries and create a common development policy. Ghana hosted the preeminent nuclear non-proliferation conference and Nkrumah saw the economic potential for reutilizing weapons investments for economic development and
harmonization. The issues of pre-existing disputes, territorial sovereignty, and complex local political-economies was balanced with a process of mutual consultation, technical research, and a voting system. Given the short span of the Casablanca Charter, many of the proposals of the economic committee were never fully implemented among members and the radical proposals were compromised with the formation of the OAU which adopted a less ambitious agenda. Unification became replaced with ideas about independent African states with multilateral connections engaging in a global open market.

The ideas of Nkrumah and the Casablanca Charter, specifically ideas about economic coordination and socialist development, were deemed too radical by moderate African countries. This meant that putting into practice economic unification required the practical navigation of different conceptions, responsibilities and resources concerning what unity would look like. Confronted with these shifting policy contexts, the African Secretariat and Nkrumah were consistent from 1963 to 1966 in advocating for the creation of an African central bank, a common market and international trade policy to coordinate development. Through organizing conferences for the OAU, or supporting civil society conferences, Nkrumah tried to maintain the public image of radical Pan-Africanism and Ghana’s role. This even involved committing resources to promote joint defence operations and economic cooperation of ministries. Ghana continued to conduct state visits and diplomatic missions to strengthen multilateralism and to promote a mediated image of Nkrumah’s successes and the potentials for economic coordination.

At the level of foreign policy and coordination these postcolonial connectivities were fragile, unequal, and had to be constantly reinforced through diplomatic missions,
state visits, conferences, and public propaganda. Ghana had to balance loyalties in the
commonwealth, but maintained a general policy of non-alignment, despite the increasing
tensions this had with the US and Britain. Despite this, there were administrative and
financial limitations to this coordination. In the case of the ministry exchange program, it
was limited by disputes over mutual financing of residents and accommodations. This often
resulted in Ghana incurring extra financial costs. Ghana also expended resources in joint-
defence and diplomatic operations which created inefficiencies which were not met with
adequate investment to expand or conduct operations. There were also problems stemming
from local political economies and territorial disputes related to borders as well as to the
problem of political refugees. Nkrumah’s efforts to uphold the principles of the Casablanca
Charter after 1963 were flexible as he simultaneously advocated that states needed to
uphold borders to prevent political refugees. As with other member states, prudent self-
interest and the maintenance of national unity or territorial sovereignty were prioritized.
When Pan-Africanism was not convenient or overly costly, disputes arose over the
responsibilities and policies. In addition, Ghana’s status in the commonwealth and as non-
aligned, meant a careful balancing of interests and strategic partnerships that were
calculated to benefit Nkrumah’s political capital and Ghana.

The next Chapter will explore the international politics of development finance
procurement for the prized project of Nkrumah’s development plans for Ghana and Africa,
the Akosombo Dam. The financing of this project became subject to Cold War politics and
liberal financial disciplining away from socialism. There emerged a discourse of economic
crisis and Britain did not meet its financial obligations pursuant to a contract. The IMF and
Britain corresponded to create a common policy towards development finance for Ghana and began to conceptualize Ghana as in a balance of payments and foreign reserves crisis. This crisis was portrayed as originating from the failures of Nkrumah and his development plans for Ghana. How was development finance tied to IMF/WB discourses of structural adjustment? How was Nkrumaism perceived in relation to crisis and ‘rational’ economic policies? In answering these questions, it furthers the central thesis and extends connectivities to development finance procurement, which was central to the realization of Nkrumaism, and its embeddedness within the international political economy.
Chapter 4 – The Translocality of Development Finance: Britain, the International Monetary Fund and an Emergent Consensus, 1962-1968

This Chapter explores translocality through the ways in which the Nkrumaist development direction for Ghana – mixed planning, non-alignment for Pan-Africanism – was entangled within the Bretton Wood’s financial vision for a liberal non-state interventionist Ghana. This is done by examining Ghana’s development finance procurement, the emergence of a liberal disciplinary consensus in response to economic crisis from 1962-1965, and the payment rescheduling of these loans in 1966-1968. The politics of procuring funds for development and of loan repayment is translocal because of the entanglement of creditors, experts, economists, and foreign government officials, with the implementation and operation of national development projects. The successes of implementing core projects identified by Nkrumah was dependent on the interests, politics, and inter-departmental discussions of lenders. The practice of lending also became a tool for lenders to pressure Nkrumah to adopt liberal economic reforms and scale back development planning. Therefore, the seemingly disconnected and minutia of debates and policy consensus building by creditors, actually becomes highlighted as co-constituted to the implementation and struggle over the development direction of Ghana.

The historiography on foreign directed structural adjustment in Ghana overemphasizes the 1966 overthrow of Nkrumah, highlighting the budgetary and reform discussions between the National Liberation Council (NLC) and subsequent Progress Party (PP) with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and member countries.¹ They also begin

in the 1970s or 1980s, emphasizing the Economic Recovery Program sponsored by the World Bank in 1983 which transformed the Ghanaian economy, liberalizing trade and creating an attractive environment for increased foreign investment in the extractive resource sector. This approach ignores the translocality of Ghana’s development and the emergence of a liberal disciplinary consensus concerning economic crisis and debt procurement, which had an impact on financing the Seven Year Development Plan (SYDP) and in Ghana’s planning for the future. While awaiting official IMF mission reports in 1964, it became increasingly clear to the Foreign Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Foreign Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) in the early 1960s that Nkrumah was overspending or mismanaging funds on projects that offered little return. This led to an effort to delay response to Nkrumah’s request for the Volta loan extension and new terms for expansions. After the reports were released and consultation with the IMF, the FCO and CRO engaged in inter-departmental debates regarding the nature of the Ghanaian economic crisis, Britain’s role, private firm corruption, and the need for Ghana to submit to extern review process. Fearing pushing Nkrumah to the Soviets, they reached the determination that the FCO would accept, in principle, Ghana’s right to request funding for legitimate

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development projects reviewed by stakeholders but, in practice, actively denied and
delayed entering into contract to let the economic crisis play out.

It was believed that the crisis could produce political changes in Ghana and force
Nkrumah to submit to IMF reform packages. The FCO and Washington were correct in
their assessment. Nkrumah was removed from office in a military coup d'état by the NLC.
The interim government accepted the standby credit offer with a set of conditionalities
meant to discipline the economy and address foreign reserve deficit, balance of payments,
inefficient-corrupt administration, and over spending. Once accepted, development finance
payments on loans to IMF member countries were rescheduled in two agreements in 1966
and 1968. The standby credit and the rescheduling were reported as successes by an IMF
review in 1969. They are described as having reoriented the economic direction of the
country away from Nkrumaism, paying down loans, reducing regulations, and foreign
capital exchange. However, there were continued fears of mismanagement in import
licensing, slowed growth, and stressed the need for continued disciplined procurement of
development loans and review by the IMF. What this narrative shows is that the finances
behind Ghana’s development, premised on non-aligned loan procurement and Pan-
Africanism, were an important feature of translocality. Ghana’s development was entangled
in international debates about the economic performance and mismanagement of the
country, as well as concerns about shifting to Soviet influence, leading to a liberal
consensus about foreign loans and the continued funding of Nkrumaist development
dependent on the interdepartmental discussions between and within foreign institutions as
well as the process of review.
The international politics of development finance is a co-constitutive part of the translocality at the heart of Ghana’s postcolonial national development. Just like Pan-Africanist women, activists or heads of state involved in promoting particular ideas about Ghana’s development, international governments and creditors had their own view on what Ghana’s development future would look like. The discussions surrounding the Volta Loan contract and the consensus regarding economic crisis and prescriptive reforms, reveal another terrain in which competing visions of Ghana’s development were contested and entangled. The successes and failures of Nkrumaist development cannot be decontextualized from the translocal politics of development finance. The liberal disciplinary politics and the impacts it had for Nkrumah’s ability to secure funding, renegotiate loans or address foreign firm corruption, had a significant impact on development outcomes. These interdepartmental debates and the politics of development finance more broadly, highlight another set of co-constitutive connections within the relationalities between different groups entangled in Ghana’s development. Nkrumah was dependent on securing funds to carry out development plans while also being subject to the politics and visions of liberal governments and international creditors. These tensions demonstrate, once again, how translocal entanglements impact the way development is conceived of, and by whom, as well as the implementation and success of planning.

The Volta Dam Project and International Development Finance, 1961-1964

The 1960s was a politicized and internationalized period for the procurement of development finance for newly independent nations such as Ghana. The USSR, US, and UK used development aid and partnerships as part of foreign policy strategies to exert their
influence globally and in Sub Saharan Africa particularly.³ By ensuring that newly
independent economies in the Third World were open to Western influence, not only would
communism be perturbed but it would benefit interests of private firms and financial
regulatory multilateralism.⁴ Although there is new research on British and French policy of
development aid, this lacks discussions on development finance procurement and how a
consensus regarding crisis led to policy change.⁵ The use of development finance
relationships therefore reflects trends in international relations and involve a combination
of political and economic factors which determine size, composition, and location of
development foreign policy.⁶ As discussed in Chapter 1, Nkrumah believed that as long as
loan contracts could be negotiated on agreeable terms, debt taken on for development
spending would be justified if the revenue generated from the projects would be profitable.
This was also in-line with the views of development economists such as Paul Rosenstein-
Rodan and Jan Drewnowski. Ghana was theoretically supposed to be able to pay foreign
and domestic lenders, while increasing the rate of spending called for by the SYDP.
Nkrumah’s development plans required electrical energy output and an eventual national
grid, none as important as the Akosombo Dam project. When it came time to ask to use the
unspent portion of the original loan to extend the project, Ghana was subject to

³ For a discussion of the role of development foreign policy in the Cold War consult, James Meernik, Eric L.
Krueger, and Steven C. Poe, "Testing Models of U.S. Foreign Policy: Foreign Aid during and after the Cold
War," The Journal of Politics 60(1), (Feb., 1998): 63-85; Thad Dunning, “Conditioning the Effects of Aid: Cold
23; Michael E. Latham, The Right Kind of Revolution: Modernization, Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy
from the Cold War to the Present (Cornell University Press, 2010).
⁴ Ibid.
⁵ Gordon Cumming, Aid to Africa French and British Policies from the Cold War to the New Millennium
international politics and interdepartmental discussions regarding economic performance and the need for reform.

The Akosombo Dam (henceforth referred to as the Volta Dam) is often perceived as a prestige project of Nkrumah’s, but it was actually efficient both in terms of planning costs and projected overall expected electrical outputs that would be profitable. It was also part of a power generating project for aluminum smelting and distribution, whose successful operation was central to Nkrumah’s development vision for the country. However, the prospects for its development was first conceived by the engineers Sir William Halcrow and Partners in 1949 under the colonial Gold Coast Government. They were tasked with assessing the feasibility of constructing a dam to generate power along the Volta River Basin. Their report was published in 1951, estimating £230 million for the construction of a hydroelectric dam. Due to the costs involved, project financing was put on hold until Nkrumah, in discussion with President Eisenhower during a visit to Washington in July 1958, asked to have an engineering firm reassess the benefits and costs of the project. Kaiser Engineers and Constructors Inc., undertook the study and released their report in March 1959 would become the general outline for the construction of the dam and it supplied the figures used for procuring loans from the US and UK. The cost of the Volta

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Dam, including the generating station was reduced by more than 40% in the new proposal, from £230 million to £130.7 million. While the costs were also reduced, the power generated was projected to be higher from 564 MW to 768 MW, or about 22 times the 1959 power generating capacity of the country.\(^\text{11}\) The report also recommended the creation of an aluminum smelter plant at Tema, to correspond with the Tema Harbor project, a change from the planned location at Kpong. This smelter would process imported aluminum until profits allowed for the mining of local bauxite for refinement.\(^\text{12}\) A suggested 500 mile network of transmission lines was also planned to be installed to harness and distribute power from the Volta Dam.

In order to fund the Volta Dam and meet the demands of Nkrumaism, foreign loans and investment needed to be preferentially secured. American and British companies were offered favorable electricity costs, providing incentive for investment in the aluminum smelter plant, something originally included in the 1951 report.\(^\text{13}\) The funding effort was to be a public-private partnership, involving loans, private firms, regional actors and the Ghana government. Consultations lasted 18 months, with the World Bank issuing a second favorable viability report, providing a final legitimacy for investor trust in the Volta Dam. This enabled confidence in the UK and US to issue a loan of £35 million, with side letter options, while Ghana was to provide the remaining funding.\(^\text{14}\) Ghana was the primary funder for the Dam project. The cost of the aluminum smelter, an essential component to

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the project, still required funding. To address this, Nkrumah had to create favorable regulatory conditions to entice a foreign private firm to operate the smelter.\(^{15}\) The Volta Aluminum Company (Valco) was created with investment from American shareholders at an estimated cost of £54 million.\(^{16}\) Importantly, Valco was granted an exemption from duties on aluminum imports and from the threat of state expropriation, which was a reason British firms were hesitant to invest in the smelter.\(^{17}\) Valco was a privately owned company that was given preferential treatment by the government. The Valco shareholders supplied £11.4 million while the Export-Import Bank of the United States granted Valco a loan of £32.1 million to fund the first phase of the smelter project. The second phase involved investment of £10.5 million. On January 22, 1962, the Ghana parliament approved the Master Agreement between Ghana and Valco, and it was signed shortly afterwards by Nkrumah and Edgar Kaiser of Kaiser Industries on behalf of Valco.\(^{18}\)

The Ghana parliament passed the Volta Development Act in 1961, establishing the Volta River Authority (VRA) which was operated by 6 board members with Nkrumah as acting chairman. The VRA was tasked with overseeing the dam, the power station, transmission network, and development projects related to the Volta region. The VRA was also responsible for environmental conservation, regulating the reservoir impounded by the

\(^{15}\) David Hart, "Volta River Project: A case study in politics and technology," (University of Edinburgh, 1977).
\(^{16}\) Ronald Graham, *The aluminium industry and the Third World: Multinational corporations and underdevelopment*, (Zed Books, 1982). Importantly Graham argues that Ghana’s incorporation into aluminum smelting coincides with a post-WW2 growth of monopolies in aluminum markets. Within the language of Marxist dependency theory, these aluminum oligarchies concentrated in ‘advanced capitalist states’ are not attempting to control the resources of developing states, such as Ghana, leading to external constraints and dependency.

\(^{17}\) Ibid.

\(^{18}\) Ibid; See also David Hart, "Volta River Project: A case study in politics and technology," (University of Edinburgh, 1977).
dam, the fishing within the lake, lake transportation and communication, and wildlife.\textsuperscript{19}

Because of the expansive roles, the VRA was in direct communications with local community leaders, party, and labour groups, sometimes leading to contestations over who controls the water.\textsuperscript{20} Construction of the Volta Dam and aluminum smelter began in 1961 and was completed in 1965.

I argue that this was a translocal process involving technologies, firms, and experts from the US and UK. It was a translocal rather than international process because not only was it central to Nkrumah’s development plans but it was to be modeled in other African countries. The role of corporations in persuading governments to sign on to contracts with high construction and operating costs in exchange for stock shares or preferential treatments is also not unique to Africa. Similar processes can be observed in Latin America, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. In the case of Ghana, the Kaiser Engineers and Constructors Inc., was contracted to design and supervise the construction of the dam and smelter on behalf of the VRA. Since the VRA had been established before construction, infrastructures such as housing, roads, and communications had been set up to support contractors.\textsuperscript{21} In the agreement, 20\% of the electrical output generated would be allotted to Ghana while the remaining was granted to Valco as part of the initial investment.

\textsuperscript{19} Kirsty Wissing, “Assistance and Resistance of (Hydro-)Power: Contested Relationships of Control over the Volta River, Ghana.” Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space 37(7) (November 2018). This is an important article as Wissing identifies contestations between the VRA, Nkrumah, and local Akwamu peoples – one group of many effected by resettlement and dam construction – over “about who can control water, how water can (or sometimes cannot) be controlled, and how deities are the most authoritative actors in any human engagements with water and its flow”.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{21} David Hart, "Volta River Project: A case study in politics and technology," (University of Edinburgh, 1977).
Commentators were critical of Nkrumah’s willingness to grant preferential treatment to Valco and the potential long term consequences of transferring a significant share of the power generated by the project for a developing Ghanaian population.23

The economic performance of Ghana during this period led the Bank of Ghana to suggest reducing development expenditure – such as the Volta Dam – to implement reforms. The Bank held a similar position with that of the IMF in 1960, cautioning Nkrumah for taking on more domestic debt than revenue generated for development projects. The average annual rate of growth for the national economy from 1959 to 1960 had been 7%, with the pace slowing to 6% in 1961. Gross national product against market prices had increased from 6% to 49 million.24 Prices rose by 8%, but there was no increase in gross national income. There was also a reduction of stocks marked by a relatively high rate of consumption expenditure with a shift from government to private consumer expenditure. Government expenditure slowed from 22% in 1960 to 16% in 1961. There was significant concern in the rate of capital formation increase, with a reduced rate to 8% from 28% the previous year.25 This contributed to the general trend of deteriorating foreign holdings, balance of payments deficit, and a failure of exports to increase alongside the

25 Ibid., 2.
increase of imports.\textsuperscript{26} Emphasizing this risk to the economic development of the country, the Bank highlighted:

The point cannot be overstressed that future economic growth and stability and high level of employment all depend upon present rates of capital formation. Therefore every effort should be made in succeeding years, to maintain a higher and more steady level of gross domestic fixed capital formation.\textsuperscript{27}

In the minutes of a board meeting held in August 1962, the Bank came to consensus regarding the “…spectacular increase in Treasury Bills issued during the year under review…” and the “need for orderly spending by the Public Sector.”\textsuperscript{28} Chairman H. Kessels drew attention to the increase in Ghana’s sterling treasury bills as of June 30 1962. However, the yield on these bills was steadily declining at a rate of 3.75\% annually.\textsuperscript{29}

Sterling backed securities were used, granted out to institutions and companies to prevent inflation. However, the University of Ghana had an outstanding balance of 800,000, barely being able to pay annual interest of 7\%. This led the Bank to take over sterling securities of University of Ghana. There was also concern that the financing the Bank conducted in the cocoa sector still had an outstanding balance of 5 million. This prompted the Bank to take over securities of the Ghana Agricultural Produce Marketing Board, the Government of Ghana, and other public corporations, granting credits up to the amount of the securities.\textsuperscript{30}

The Bank was also suffering from bilateral payment account difficulties, despite multiple

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 2-3.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{28} Bank of Ghana, Minutes of Meeting of the Board held on Thursday 30th August, 1962 at 3pm, 3. Public Records and Administration Archive. RG 17/2/183 (PRAAD Accra, Ghana).
\textsuperscript{29} Manager, Issue Department Report for August, 1962. Public Records and Administration Archive. RG 17/2/183 (PRAAD Accra, Ghana).
\textsuperscript{30} Memorandum for the Board, Cocoa Finance, 19/100, Public Records and Administration Archive. RG 17/2/184 (PRAAD Accra, Ghana).
cable and written requests for account balance confirmation, the Bank had difficulty in corresponding with foreign Banks, specifically in Eastern Europe soviet bloc countries.

As a result of these concerns, there were disagreements between Chairman Kessels and the Government Ministry of Finance. Kessels was upset that without the Banks prior consultation the Ministry implemented a new currency system which adopted a “unit equivalent to 8/4d for the new system instead of the 10/- recommended by the [Bank of Ghana] Committee.”31 The Ministry of Finance had also completed arrangements for the printing of the new currency notes, inscribed with symbolic representations of Nkrumaism, “without first asking for competitive quotations.”32 As far as Kessels was concerned, the government was not willing to consult with the Bank regarding fiscal policy or development spending in good faith. Despite this, the Bank was doing everything it could to remedy the domestic interest rates and repayment terms to free up capital for foreign capital payments and to ease inflationary pressures. In fact, in accordance to Section 8 of the Bank of Ghana Ordinance of 1957, Kessels tried to ease the government’s financial difficulty by authorizing “on his own responsibility, payment of the Government’s portion of the profits of the Bank for that year [1962].”33 This practice began in 1962 and recurred in 1963, 1964, and 1965. This is important because it indicates a growing disagreement between the Bank of Ghana and Nkrumah’s government which is part of the reason the

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32 Ibid.
33 Ibid., 2.
Bank was so willing to work with the post-coup military government to implement economic reforms.

The construction of the dam involved flooding a section of the Volta River to create Lake Volta, forming between 1962 and 1966.34 This had significant social-political and environmental ramifications for the Volta basin region. The new lake was planned for areas with longstanding communities. While the reports of 1959 indicated resettlement as a legal matter and promoted a principle of self-help, in 1961 a new policy was introduced that would use the labor of those being resettled in the construction of housing.35 The size of the population needing resettlement was also larger than originally planned, resulting in the shift in resettlement discourse from ‘town’ to ‘sites’.36 In 1964 the VRA oversaw the construction of 52 resettlement villages and began the coordinated relocation diverse populations of Akwamu, Ewe, Gonja, Krachi, Krobo, and Kwahu, over 80,000 peoples and 740 villages, the largest being the town of Kete Krachi.37 Environmentally, later studies have revealed that the dam changed the ecosystem of the Volta River and basin area.38 Small farmers and fisherman had to change their means of livelihoods, adapt to the new settlements and develop new strategies of market engagement.39 The new Volta lake had a

35 Robert Chambers (edited), The Volta Resettlement Experience (Volta River Authority: University of Science and Technology Kumasi, 1970), 26.
36 Ibid., 29.
boundary of 2,000 miles, nearly 15,000 buildings referenced, a comprehensive social
survey of some 80,000 people executed, over 14,000 acres of land cleared, over 500 miles
of laterite road constructed or improved, 52 settlement sites negotiated and planned, over
11,000 core houses built, and over 10,000 families out of an estimated 15,000 safely
evacuated.\footnotemark[40]

The compensation and resettlement strategy of the government, once plans for the
dam were finalized in 1961, posed significant difficulties. These problems are best
summarized in the studies and papers collected from the Volta Resettlement Symposium
that was held at the University of Science and Technology in Kumasi on March 21 to 27,
1965. The symposium consisted of the presentation and discussion of 13 papers related to
the Volta resettlement experience, leading to the publication of a report sponsored by the
World Bank. The reports aim was to learn from the Volta project. The original Volta
Development Act of 1961 legally mandated that compensation could be paid in monetary
and non-monetary means and that “No person shall be entitled to dispute the compensation
offered to him.”\footnotemark[41] This appealed to those advocating for more social welfare support and
government responsibility while also maintaining a position of self-help among those being
re-settled. By 1964, settlement expenditure totaled £7.7 million, £6 million of which was
spent for the clearing of forests and construction costs for housing materials, the remaining
1.7 million was left for compensation.\footnotemark[42]

\footnotemark[40]{Chambers, (1970), 30-31.}
\footnotemark[41]{Volta River Development Act, 1961, section 28(b), Public Records and Administration Archive. RG /2/160
(PRAAD Accra, Ghana).}
\footnotemark[42]{Rowena M. Lawson, "An Interim Economic Appraisal of the Volta Resettlement Scheme," The Nigerian
Journal of Economic and Social Studies (1) (March 1968).}
This was part of the tensions of applied Nkrumatism as the project was perceived by Nkrumah and the CPP as necessary for economic development to modernize Ghana. It would, in theory, provide the foundation for a national energy grid, allowing domestic and foreign firms to contribute to the process of industrialization while diversifying from a dependence on cocoa exports and global commodity prices. It would be the first energy project of such scope in postcolonial Africa that Nkrumah proclaimed more than once “would lead Africa towards Unity and economic independence.” But it was also a project involving coercive population resettlement, cultural contestations, and dependent on foreign investment, technology, and construction-engineering firms. Despite the criticisms of opposition members, it became clear as the Dam and smelter neared completion that an extension of the Volta project was needed to create a national energy grid connecting industries and railway facilitation for Valco operations.

Yet, the economic context had changed as Ghana’s foreign reserves were depleted and they began defaulting on loans. Since Ghana’s development was translocal in the entanglement of international finance and firms in central development projects, it was subject to the disciplinary politics of an emerging liberal consensus. The translocality of Ghana’s entanglement with liberal interventionism can be seen in the discussions concerning the Volta loan extension, the emergence of a liberal disciplinary consensus regarding Ghana’s economic performance and the Western position regarding new loans.

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This moment provoked debates regarding Britain and foreign lenders’ role in Ghana’s debt crisis and their lobbying of governments such as West Germany to deter new development loan agreements. It also provides insights into the translocal policy debates which framed national policies towards extending or entering into new loans with Ghana. The Volta development project – the dam, smelter, and supporting infrastructures – required foreign investment, firms, and construction expertise, in a relationship with the regional VRA.

**The Volta Loan Extension**

During the annual Commonwealth Prime Ministers meeting in 1964, Nkrumah presented the British Prime Minister, Herald Wilson, with an aid-memorandum asking that the unspent portion of the Volta loan be used for electricity distribution through the construction of a nation-wide security grid that would expand the energy conducted by the Volta Dam. The 1962 Volta loan agreement contained an important Side Letter which allowed for Ghana to use the remaining available loan balance after dam construction for other development projects contingent on consultation with the Export Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD) and Volta River Authority (VRA). The terms of the Side Letter to the Volta contract, as agreed upon in 1962 read that;

> If in spite of every effort it is then established that the whole of the loan could not be used for such (Volta) payments, the balance of the loan would be made available to finance such other contracts as may be agreed by the E.C.G.D., following consultation with the government of Ghana and the Volta River Authority, and that the precise arrangement which would be

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necessary in order to implement this undertaking would be for determination in the course of this consultation.47

This dispersal of funds within the loan agreement meant that Ghana had to garner the soft approval of multiple stakeholders and was thereby subject to inter-departmental scrutiny, politics, and oversight within Britain. There was also the wider bi-polar Cold War global political economy which was inextricably linked to anticolonial and postcolonial governments, meaning that “if one’s enemies were supported by one superpower, there was also the chance of getting aid from the other.”48 As previously noted, Nkrumah solicited mixed foreign investment from the USSR and the United States.49 This would become especially important as the assessment of the status of the dispersions to Ghana was to be purposely ‘held-up’. Yet as Nkrumah made clear in his request and reference to the 1962 contract, Ghana had a right to use the funds for legitimate development projects.

The request was made for two inter-related reasons, economic and political. The drafting and preparation of the Seven Year Development Plan (SYDP) required liquid capital to finance construction, materials, and expert costs. Public coffers and annual GDP was being used for loan payments and existing projects, requiring Nkrumah to secure foreign funding and investment. The SYDP was central to the continuation of Nkrumaism in Ghana and foreign funds and firms were required. The legitimacy of the Nkrumah

48 Global political economy is referring to the division of international politics between Western and Soviet/Eastern bloc countries enumerated in Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of our Times (Cambridge University Press, 2005); 77, 89.
49 For a discussion of United States investment and development assistance to Ghana was part of Cold War politics, to curb Soviet influence in West-Africa see Nicholas Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics The United States and the Balance of Power (New York: Routledge, 2007); Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge University Press, 2005).
government, especially after the movement toward one party rule, was thought to derive
from whether the SYDP would be effectively implemented and achieve its aims. The state
also lacked efficient taxation methods, opting instead for levying duties on exports and
imports, drawing from the central bank and foreign lenders.\textsuperscript{50} The extension of the Volta
electricity scheme, had also been reviewed by Kaiser’s engineers and considered as a
“favorite idea for several years. It was originally proposed by Mr. Dobson of the Volta
River Authority.”\textsuperscript{51} Furthermore, the Board of Trade also preferred that the loan would be
spent on electricity distribution rather than on “some other schemes that have from time to
time been mentioned.”\textsuperscript{52} It was generally thought even among the FCO that “…if the
money can be released there will be a general welcome to it being used in the way the
President and the Ghana Government have now advocated.”\textsuperscript{53} Nkrumah would not intend,
however, that the request would be subject to debates over indebtedness, crisis, and
Britain’s role, that questioned whether the remaining balance should be released.

Further, the political context in Britain also seemingly presented advantages for the
Ghanaian government, and Nkrumah specifically, informing the timing of the loan
dispersal request. The Labour party in Britain had just won a contentious general election in
October 1964 against the reigning conservatives, forming the new government of Herald

\textsuperscript{50} Morten Jervan and Deborah Johnson, “Statistical Tragedy in Africa? Evaluating the Data Base for African

\textsuperscript{51} John Hennings, Minutes (1964). FCO 35/51 (The National Archives Kew, UK).

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., 2.
Wilson with a slender majority of 4 Labour members in cabinet. In an internal report that outlined the shifting political composition of the British cabinet, High Commissioner for Ghana in London Kwesi Armah advised Nkrumah that after the October election “the attitude of the new Government… raises for us the hope of obtaining greater cooperation and assistance in the implementation of our 7-year-development plan.” Armah further reminded Nkrumah that Wilson himself was a self-proclaimed socialist whom “understood you and your views.” He was also seen as favouring African Unity and empathized with Ghana’s unique circumstances and struggles. Despite this being Ghana’s “finest hour… that we should exploit,” Armah issued a caution. Wilson had inherited an “economic mess based from borrowings from the World Bank” leading to volatile currency fluctuations and political panic among the British population. However, while the pound was not “in danger of [immediate] inflation” Armah predicted that because of these economic pressures the new government might have a “tendency to stimulate planning and balance the economy.” Armah ended the report by suggesting restraint in asking for any immediate new loans until the “turmoil has settled” but that the prospects for British investment in Ghana were overall positive.

Although the prospects for financial assistance seemed positive, Nkrumah’s request to Wilson was met with intense inter-departmental debate and scrutiny between the

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55 Ibid.
56 Ibid., 8.
57 Ibid., 4 and 7.
58 Ibid., 7.
59 Ibid., 8.
Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO), Overseas Department for Development (ODD), Board of Trade (BOT) and ECGD. Between July and December 1964 a consensus emerged – the self-described ‘Western Position’ – that sought to delay giving an answer to Nkrumah, while recognizing ‘in principle’ Ghana’s right to request disbursement and have development finance proposals reviewed by the ECGD and the newly created ODD. Initially, there was some hesitation about how to release the first portion of the loan, while the BOT expressed need for the “rehabilitation of the Accra and Kumasi distribution systems.”

However, there was concern that the upcoming release of Nkrumah’s SYDP would create new white elephant projects that required financing. This potential “change of mind” and expansion meant that officially, the Board had to “await a move from the Ghanaian authorities [for] the new development plan” and advice from Smedley. Smedley had requested a year prior, according to minutes on October 28, 1963, that he needed to be consulted before ideas “crystalized in London and instructions went out to the High Commission.”

This reflected early consensus in the CRO that the Ghana loan situation required careful considerations before “giving money to a country that is behaving so badly so far as we are concerned.”

This reveals a disciplinary attachment to loan disbursement that had already been contracted with the Nkrumah government. The Board, CRO, and High Commission viewed the future actions of Nkrumah as violating British interests and potentially disrupting

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60 V.E. Davies, Correspondence to J.B. Hennings (July 1964). DO221/49 2-WAE 60/10/1 (The National Archives Kew, UK).
61 Ibid., 2.
62 Ibid., 3.
Western consensus. Nkrumah’s mixed-planning grand economic policies were seen as misguided and even irrational within the context of the existing needs of the developing economy. Nkrumah’s white elephant projects were costly, reliant on loans and provided opportunity for Soviet influence in technical and financial exchanges. The idea that an economic crisis was underway in Ghana between 1963-65 requiring the adoption of disciplinary reforms advised by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) became a widespread view held within the international development departments in Britain. Ghana’s foreign exchange reserves were nearly depleted, rising inflationary pressures in export and import products leading to a shortage of essential consumer commodities, combined with lowered business confidence and import crisis.

Replying to Davies and the Board’s stance, one official (J.D Hennings) reiterated the position of the ODD. He argued that the ODD’s attitude towards alternative use of the balance of the Volta loan is reserved and that an economic crisis in Ghana was pending due to anticipated difficulties in meeting debt service payments.⁶³ He further noted that although the crisis was temporarily postponed, it seemed that Ghana would scrape through until 1965.⁶⁴ However, the projected GDP earnings of Ghana in 1965 would not meet the requirements of service payments for the fiscal year of 1964 but that Ghana’s chances of avoiding a crisis the following year in 1965 would be correspondingly worse.⁶⁵ However, if the crisis were to be postponed there was concern over the viability of British firms in

⁶³ John B. Hennings, Correspondence to V.E. Davies (August 5, 1964). DO221/49 2-WAE 60/10/1 (The National Archives Kew, UK).
⁶⁴ Ibid.
⁶⁵ Ibid.
Ghana as they were awarded profitable contracts and sometime engaged in corruption as will be explored later in this Chapter.

The CRO believed that the Treasury would oppose this argument toward exercising caution as “the Treasury are jealously eying the balance of the Volta loan as a first tranche of loan assistance that Britain may have to give to Ghana in support of the new SYDP.”66 It was therefore debated within the CRO that an Inter-Developmental Review of Ghana be established. It would function to not only cover the supplier credit side of things, but also the aid front relating to the balance of payment difficulties and that it might be useful if this study were completed by September or October [1964], after the Bank and Fund meetings in Tokyo when Ghana will come up for discussion in the context of her application for an increased quota. However, it was advised by the CRO to not reveal their thinking to the Board of Trade or the Treasury and to reject the railway extension scheme proposed by Nkrumah.67 In other words, as of August 4, 1964 Hennings believed that it would be “Perfectly reasonable for us to drag our feet on this” but that if the Ghanaians evoked the Side Letter, then they are entitled to have specific proposals examined and to be given a decision without much delay.68

This is precisely what Nkrumah had done at the Prime Ministers Conference and when he contacted John Howard directly at the ECGD requesting between £8 million and £10 million for railway improvements and electricity extensions. Also asked in the Aid

66 J. Chadwick, Correspondence to J.B. Hennings (May 13, 1964). DO221/49 2-WAE 60/10/1 (The National Archives Kew, UK).
67 Ibid., 2.
68 John B. Hennings, Correspondence to V.E. Davies (August 5, 1964). DO221/49 2-WAE 60/10/1 (The National Archives Kew, UK).
Memoire was £5 million towards the construction of a Volta Lake Transport System, which includes a new railway line from Accra to Kumasi. In regards to this Henning viewed that it would be years until traffic on the lake justified the expenditure towards a transport system. He suggested to Nkrumah that “it should be possible to do a great deal by improvisation.”

The existing roadway between Akosombo and Tema was able to handle transporting construction and power equipment for the Volta Dam and smelter. It was seen as sufficient infrastructure for handling traffic and movements through the lake route for the foreseeable future, investment would be better spent elsewhere. But the Kaiser report indicated that there should be a railway link to Tema. There was no inter-departmental disagreement on giving Nkrumah a negative reply on the $5 million new loan while the request for the balance of the Volta loan, according to the secretary of state, was “causing difficulties.”

Evidently, the ODM was trying to “wriggle out of this pledge” and make a decision on Nkrumah’s requests which balanced the Volta commitments and prospectively help Ghana to address indebtedness. As far as Nkrumah and Armah were concerned, these were legitimate proposals being presented for the long term use of the remaining Volta loan balance and additional loan request. The requests were also pursuant to the Side Letter of the original Volta agreement.

However, Howard delayed giving an immediate answer, inquiring with John Hennings at the CRO and ODD whether part of the Volta loan disbursement could be paid

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69 FCO 38/118 TE 18/213/2, 36/51 (The National Archives Kew, UK).
70 Ibid.
71 Secretary of State, C.C’d Mr. Snelling and Mr. Hennings, “Aid for Ghana,” (1965), 39/51 FCO 2-WAE 60/10/1. (The National Archives Kew, UK).
72 Ibid.
to fund the proposed extensions and whether it was advisable to contract a new loan at the present time. These discussions are significant because they reveal the politics of entanglement and debate that goes into responding to Nkrumah’s request. Howard had spent over 6 weeks previously in Ghana, mainly the Accra-Tema region, early in 1964, and was scheduled to head back to Ghana in late May. Before leaving, he met with J. Chadwick on May 13, 1964 to discuss the upcoming trip and the Volta loan extension request. Reporting on this meeting to Hennings, Chadwick described Howard as a man on “the warpath regarding the balance of our Volta loan,” determined to have it released promptly.73 Chadwick assured that he gave him no hopes in that policy direction. Importantly, Chadwick included a breakdown of the requested loan disbursement: Akosombo extension £4.5 million, Aworra Sekondi £7.3 million, and Rolling Stock £1.5-2 million.74 It was also stated that Howard would be approaching the BAC for further financial assistance in the near future, requesting Ghana’s exemption from the “existing contract in respect of the third V.C 10.”75 The V.C 10 Side Letter of the Volta loan contract (1962) between Ghana and the BAC had required that any loan disbursement was to be subject to a soft approval by the High Commission and other stakeholders, in line with intended use for the Volta Akosombo Dam project.76 Against this line of cautious deliberation and what was rationalized as a pragmatic response to pending economic crisis and Nkrumah’s policy, Howard wanted Ghana to have the ability to utilize the remaining

73 J. Chadwick, Correspondence to J.B. Hennings (May 13, 1964). 2-WAE 60/10/1 (The National Archives Kew, UK).
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Copy of Original Volta Loan Contract (PRAAD Accra, Ghana).
funds consistent with the Side Letter without the V.C 10 clause allowing the money to be released immediately without soft review.

Despite this, there was little room for debate, as is clear in a CRO telegram to the ECGD in which one official emphasized that the Volta contract restricts expenditure to the actual dam, hydro electrical generating plant and the main transmission system. Any granting of funds for other schemes required a diligent process of consultation and approval. Overall, it was determined by Davies that the Side Letter should be encouraged if it amounts to being “good business for British exporters” and it left over funds from the Accra distribution scheme.77 In reply on March 12, Hennings remarked that he agreed and queried whether the Ghanaians “should be aware that to get more than £1.5M they would have to award us a major contract.”78 In response to this stance, one official issued a challenge against Henning stating:

I am not entirely happy with what appears to be your line, that we should use Ghana’s present desperate financial straits as an argument to justify the withholding of the balance of the Volta loan.79

Since Ghana had evoked the Side Letter and had a contract for the £5M, Davies argued “we must so far as possible honour the commitment.”80 He went as far as to state that “I do however feel that we have a moral commitment to make the money available for

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77 V.E. Davies, Correspondence to John B. Hennings in reference to the Exporter Credit Guarantee Organization (March 8, 1965), DO221/49 2-WAE 60/10/1 (The National Archives Kew, UK).
78 John B. Henning, Correspondence to V.E. Davies (March 12, 1965), DO221/49 2-WAE 60/10/1 (The National Archives Kew, UK).
79 V.E. Davies, Correspondence to John B. Hennings (March 16, 1965), DO221/49 2-WAE 60/10/1 (The National Archives Kew, UK).
80 Ibid.
development purposes.” This disagreement over the justification for the use of the Volta loan balance speaks to the lack of coherence among the British departments. It highlights the diverse policy rationalities. For example, Davies took a stern position but ultimately wanted Ghana to succeed and not be taken advantage of. He was attempting to conduct pragmatic economics that would prevent a crisis.

In addition to the consensus regarding Ghana’s economic performance, there were also fears in Britain and the IMF that given the recent American rejection of Ghana’s request for development aid that it might cause Ghana to abandon any intention of working with the IMF or IBRD. Ghana would then drift further into Soviet influence, finding lenders and investors from alternative sources. Therefore, it was assumed that if Britain stepped in and granted use of the Volta loan extension, potentially funding the railway extension project, on mutually beneficial terms then Britain’s multilateral relationship with Ghana would improve. However, even this ambivalent position of accepting in principle Britain’s acceptance of the Volta loan extension, aroused an immediate response from the Ministry of Overseas Development (MOD). Replying to the telegram sent on August 6th 1965 the MOD stated there position:

Upon receipt of your urgent letter… [we] see insurmountable difficulty over what is proposed, i.e. that the Commonwealth secretary need to indicate to Nkrumah next week that we should be willing in principle to apply the balance of the Volta Dam loan to the electricity scheme.  

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81 High Commissioner H. Smedley Telegram sent to John Hennings (November 27, 1965), 2. DO221/49 2-WAE 60/10/1 (The National Archives Kew, UK).

82 Commonwealth Relations Office, Immediate by Hand 68a, R.B King, (July 30, 1965), 2. 2-WAE 60/10/1 (The National Archives Kew, UK).

83 Ibid.
Despite the inclination to delay release of the funds until the effects of the economic crisis are known, and accepting in principle legal commitment to the Volta side letter, there was still opposition. Until Nkrumah was ready to implement reforms and reduce development spending to address negative economic performance, there could be no action taken.

In trying to persuade Ghana to adopt policies to improve economic performance and ambivalence regarding the appropriate response to request for loan extensions, Hennings determined that development finance procurement should be halted. Any further indebtedness was thought to be a danger over the horizon.\(^84\) Any decision to back out of the Volta Side Letter would not only potentially cause Nkrumah to turn to Soviet countries, but would be considered highly embarrassing for Britain.\(^85\) The solution was to recognize simultaneously the right of Ghana, in principle, to have its loan disbursement request and electricity extension reviewed, as a right granted pursuant to the original Side Letter contract. In a correspondence with Hennings regarding Nkrumah’s proposal for the use of the Volta loan balance, Davies contended that the FCO did not consider it practical or appropriate for Ghana to be contemplating additional debt obligations for development when the causes of financial difficulty remained unaddressed. He also noted that Ghana “has not implemented the measures which the IMF has advised to be necessary to restore the equilibrium in her economy.”\(^86\) Equilibrium used here referred to addressing loan commitments and rejuvenating foreign reserves to lessen the risks associated with investing

\(^{84}\) John Hennings Meeting Minutes, 68A (June 28, 1965), 36/51 FCO 134/293, 2-WAE 60/10/1 Part A (The National Archives Kew, UK).

\(^{85}\) Ibid.

\(^{86}\) Confidential C.R.O Telegram No. 352 to Accra (August 6, 1965), 2. 134/293, 2-WAE 60/10/1 Part A (The National Archives Kew, UK).
and/or capital exchanges. Therefore, Hennings finalized that Britain should not accept
Nkrumah’s proposal to use the available Side Letter funds and that “we should do no more
than indicate our readiness in principle to release it… only if the contracts are largely
awarded to this country and subject to a review.”87

Hennings, rebuking Davies arguments for agreeing to the Ghanaian proposal,
asserted that that they have the authority to review development proposals to make sure that
they were in-line with British political and economic interests. He went on to state that:

By energetic lobbying we have succeeded in persuading a number of
Ghana’s other creditors not to entertain approaches for bilateral
assistance… but rather to urge her [Ghana] to take her problem to the
IMF.88

Agreeing to Ghana’s proposal for loan balance dispersion and railway electricity extension
scheme would also risk reawakening American suspicion that Britain intended to be lenient
on Ghana’s policy directions if Ghana goes to the IMF.89 Any lack of available finance that
are causing the Volta and Accra electricity grid scheme to fall behind are the direct result of
Ghanaian mismanagement and the unwillingness to adopt effective stabilization policies
guided by the IMF.90 Hennings issued a final warning noting that the economic difficulties
overhanging Ghana may bring about changes in the political configuration of the country

87 Confidential C.R.O Telegram No. 352 to Accra (August 6, 1965), 2. 134/293, 2-WAE 60/10/1 Part A (The
National Archives Kew, UK).
88 John Hennings to Mr. Chadwick and Sir Arthur Rumbold, (April 6, 1965), 1. 2-WAE 60/10/1 Part A (The
National Archives Kew, UK).
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid., 2.
which would then allow for the balance of the Volta loan to be used as a form of development assistance.\textsuperscript{91}

The inability for Ghana to pay foreign creditors and the emergent liberal disciplinary consensus regarding Nkrumah’s development vision, meant that there was pressure against expanding the aid cap or to initiate new loans until the crisis had been settled. As Nkrumah’s request to use the remaining portion of the Volta loan as outlined in the Side Letter was made, it became a contentious issue. Different departments with an interest in the affair had separate solutions. There was recognition that the remaining £3.5m loan that would be diverted was an essential contribution to the Ghanaian economy and therefore was a legitimate development project. However, there was also concern that any loan extension risked contributing to a ballooning debt, no matter how well-reasoned.\textsuperscript{92}

Within the context of pragmatic response to a perceived pending economic crisis in Ghana in 1965-66, there were further concerns that by releasing the funds it would imply a willingness to inflate the aid ceiling cap with new loans. The Western consensus, informed by IMF and IBRD reports in September 1965, and practiced by Britain in their ambivalence being ‘in principle’ in favor of development aid while intending not to divert the entitled Volta loan balance or supply new credits, became increasingly disciplinary.

One of the primary recommendations in the IMF mission report was to reduce, not shut down, capital expenditures for development projects. It was recommended that all forms “of expenditures should be limited to what can be covered by regular Government

\textsuperscript{91} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{92} Ibid. 

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revenue and non-inflationary borrowing, and that in general there should be a temporary halt on new projects which required to be financed from supplier-credits.”

While these are non-binding recommendations, Nkrumah was not interested in their findings, urging the Ghanaian parliament to resist the narrative of economic crisis being used to hide the successes of Nkrumaism. However, he was wrong. The translocal nature of development finance procurement, on which Nkrumah depended to fulfill his development vision in the SYDP, meant that he was subject to the perceptions, review, and debates within the FCO, EGCD, and the IMF. This translocality is seen in the entanglement of the Volta project with international interdepartmental debates, policy rationalities and political climates. Once a policy consensus emerges, it takes a significant event to alter that consensus. Since Nkrumah was unwilling to implement reforms to appease international lenders, Britain and the US actively lobbied against other Western states from financing proposed development projects from Ghana.

Responding to a series of ad hoc negotiations between Nkrumah and West Germany in 1965 that took the form of a meeting, the British FCO and ECGO lobbied Bonn to halt negotiations and to uphold the ‘Western consensus’ vis-à-vis supplying Ghana with development loans. The position of Ghana towards what became known as the “German Problem” among African countries, that is the separation of the country into Cold War blocs – West and East Germany. Nkrumah had previously regarded post-World War II Germany as having been subject to neocolonial forces, an enforced military and economic

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93 Mr. Hennings Minutes, (July 7, 1965), 2-3. 2-WAE 60/10/1 Part A. (The National Archives Kew, UK).
constraint upheld by foreign states. As of 1965 Nkrumah’s government re-iterated that the solution to the German Problem should be left to the German people and thus Ghana’s position was one of non-alignment and neutrality. The prevailing news was that those countries now politically and economically manipulating Germany had to open up this impasse while respecting views of non-aligned countries such as Ghana.95 While neutral, Ghana had encouraged the exchange of technical labour and technology, both at the level of capital investment and aid, as well as through share purchasing and migration of expats. In 1965 Nkrumah, still needing to garner foreign capital for the SYDP, believed that “aids and other soft loans should as far as possible be completely devoid of political strings.”96 Taking up this request, the German foreign office contacted Nkrumah to discuss supplying credit to fulfill the railway extensions in which the British departments were reluctant to release.

When news of this proposal to the Germans by Nkrumah reached Britain, the CRO sent a priority telegram on October 18, 1965 to the capital Bonn, presenting arguments urging against providing any new loan commitments to Ghana. The Western Position, as the CRO termed it, had not changed since a year earlier in October but only intensified with newly released reports by the IMF and WB missions. Given the balance of payments crisis, they advised the Germans to adopt a policy of general aversion toward entering into any “commitments to Ghana for long term development.”97 These were the same reasons given

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96 Ibid., 22. Discussion on compensatory finance and measures for stabilisations of primary commodity export proposals.
97 October 18, 1965. 2-WAE 60/10/1 (The National Archives Kew, UK).
a year earlier, and reiterated in 1965, which justified the permanently delayed distribution of the remaining Volta loan of 1962 while preventing other aid and investment Western Bloc partners from getting involved. The telegram tellingly read: “We [CRO] would like to take the advantage of this development to urge the Germans in interest of unity of general Western policy towards Ghana not to proceed.”98 The general Western policy consisted of providing no new development loans to Ghana as a means to pressure Nkrumah into making pragmatic economic adjustments based on the recommendations of the IMF and IBRD to remedy the balance of payments deficit and long term debt crisis.

The CRO further commented on the prospects for Nkrumah submitting to IMF disciplines, describing their view:

We doubt whether Nkrumah sincerely intends to submit himself to IMF disciplines; we believe that he should be exposed to the full logic of the present generated by Ghana’s economic circumstances and should be encouraged by further promises of bilateral aid… [as] inducement to submit himself to those disciplines.99

The German authorities responded to the request of the CRO explaining that they had approved D.M20 million capital aid for the German share of the Accra power distribution scheme, conditional on Britain extending similar credit for their share in the EICC cable.100 However, no further commitments were to be made, and it appeared the CRO had overblown the readiness of Bonn to participate. The inter-departmental discussions and the context of pending economic crisis made it necessary, from the perspective of free-market

98 Ibid.
100 Ibid., 101.
lenders, for a united Western policy in development finance to address Ghana’s indebtedness.

**Debating Indebtedness: Parkinson Howard and the Tema Dry Dock Project, 1965-1967**

In 1965, the IMF facilitated a new policy which allowed for compensatory drawings from the Fund to help address price fluctuations for primary export developing countries. While some commentators praised this move as allowing developing countries to survive the fiscal year, Nkrumah believed that it did little to address the long-term balance of payments problems. In attempting to remedy this gap, Nkrumah proposed the creation of a Development Insurance Fund to address long-term needs, involving Commonwealth countries. The aims would be to have each member contribute a proportionate percentage of GDP, creating a fund to inject capital to remedy structural deficits while balancing supply and demand. This capital injection would be different than a loan, subject to regulatory examinations and would be reimbursable. There was little enthusiasm for this proposal. Economic crisis in Ghana was looming as the impending IMF report on Ghana potentially required Britain and others to mount a debt refinancing operation.

Prior to the release of the IMF mission report, the policy implications for development finance were notable. Commenting on the looming crisis in Ghana, Hennings remarked on Nkrumah’s SYDP that Ghanaians may be forced to re-examine the “whole of their development priorities and programmes.”

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101 Immediate by Hand, R.B.M King, Ministry of Overseas Development sent to John Henning (July 30, 1965). 2-WAE 60/10/1 Part A (The National Archives Kew, UK).
Ghana from alternative countries, such as Germany, in order to maintain a united Western policy toward encouraging liberal self-disciplining directed by the IMF. Emphasizing this point, the CRO coordinator noted:

…we have made a considerable diplomatic effort to ensure that other nations to whom Ghana applied for help should support us in urging that she should take her problems to the IMF. This she has done and the IMF Mission… have recommended the measures of economic stabilisation and self-discipline which Ghana needs to introduce to restore her economy to an even keel… We are all of us, alas, doubtful of the readiness of the Ghana government to take the steps recommended by the IMF.\(^{102}\)

It was understood that Nkrumah had to liberalize imports and reduce spending to address foreign exchange deficits and curb inflationary pressures to meet debt obligations.

In May 1965 the IMF conducted an exploratory economic survey of Ghana, followed by the World Bank mission in September 1965. Their joint reports emphasized the immediate need for economic liberalization and adjustment to achieve stabilization.\(^{103}\) The report was striking in its succinct diagnosis and prescription of the economic crisis. It argued that:

The balance of payments deficit that has persisted in Ghana since 1959 reflects an excess of domestic demand originating largely in the public sector. A part of this excess demand has been deliberate, representing a preparedness to draw down reserves for purposes of economic development; but another part has resulted from the fact that the Government's budgeted expenditures were predicated on expectations

\(^{102}\) Ibid., 157/293.

\(^{103}\) Hutchful, 1987 and 2002.
regarding cocoa export proceeds which did not materialize because of the fall in cocoa prices….104

The negotiations between Ghana and the IMF and World Bank between 1965 and 1966 show that Nkrumah was unwilling to meet the adjustment requirements of the lending institutions.

In contrast to the economic realities presented by the IMF and reflected in earlier reports by the Bank of Ghana, Nkrumah’s Finance Minister on February 22, 1966 publicly rejected the IMF and WB recommendations.105 Shortly after on February 26, Nkrumah was overthrown in a military coup led by the National Liberation Council (NLC). Under the direction of the NLC, the Bank of Ghana Governor Albert Adomakoh on February 28, 1966, sent a formal request to the IMF stating that the National Liberation Council wished to take up negotiations with the Fund immediately.106 Adomakoh had previously worked at the Bank of Ghana, but the Bank had supported his appointment as senior economist to the newly created African department at the IMF. The African Department had been requested by the Ghana delegation to the 1960 annual meeting of the IMF in Washington and the Bank believed that the move would be good for Ghana and Africans generally.107 It is within this context of trust in the monetary institutions that Adomakoh agreed to work with the NLC in order to address the systemic financial difficulties.

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106 Adomakoh, 1966.
107 Annual International Monetary Fund Meeting (1960). (The National Archives Kew, UK).
Were balance of payments and depleted reserves brought about by a narrative of irrational development policy and unwillingness to reform, the whole story? In addition to Nkrumah’s development spending and bloated bureaucracy, the situation was complicated by the role of British and European firms such as Parkinson Howard. Parkinson Howard was a British shipping firm that had a contract with Nkrumah, for the Accra-Tema motorway, Tema Harbour extensions and other smaller projects. In 1966 an attorney, Graham Page, accused Parkinson Howard of a bribe made to Nkrumah for securing the contract.\textsuperscript{108} Page noted that the payment “was part of the business of dealing with West-Africa” expecting no punitive action for the post-Nkrumah NLC.\textsuperscript{109} Ghana also conducted an inquiry that led to the publication of the Apaloo Report in January 14, 1966, which accused a Parkinson Howard representative, Granville, of making two payments of $38,000 to CPP ministers Kojo Botsio and Komla Gbedemah, and later $85,000 to the same two men and Krobo Edusei and Ayeh Kumi.\textsuperscript{110} The creation of a dry dock in Tema contracted to Parkinson Howard became a recognized white elephant project that caused controversy within the CRO and FCO in Britain. The interdepartmental records on development finance procurement several individuals in positions of administrative authority in the FCO knew about private firm corruption in Ghana, and about Parkinson Howard in particular. Yet, there were debates about how to respond to this information and the role of Britain and British firms more generally in contributing to Ghanaian indebtedness. Two perspectives

\begin{flushright}
109 Ibid. Copy of official press statement.
\end{flushright}
emerged, one which empathetically sided with Ghana, seeking to relieve debt interest in the face of private firm corruption. The more dominant counter position stressed Nkrumah’s freedom of choice to engage in contracts and take on debt. As a historian, in addition to corruption, firms had the ability to entice the Ghana government to pursue a development scheme which had little market value and demand.

In a revealing correspondence between British High Commissioner A.W Snelling and Mr. Willie Morris of the FCO in May of 1967, Snelling condemned the FCO for ignoring the existence of corruption by private British firms in Ghana since independence. Importantly in this letter he drew attention to the awarding of firm contracts for development projects under Nkrumah, the abuses of these firms and their role in contributing to debt dependency. The Tema Dry Dock was one such project that the British regarded as inefficient and would not generate a return on investment for the government while private firms involved in its construction received payment. I draw attention to this letter because it provoked discussions within the FCO about the role of British enterprises in Ghanaian indebtedness. In an impassioned plea, he described that given that the financial situation in Ghana is depressing the FCO should “put ourselves in the position of the Ghanaian government.”111 He continues, describing how private firms connected to the British government practice nepotism and corruption by influencing the Nkrumah regime to undertake vast expenditures with little risk, such as the dry dock.112 This then results in the British government covering the risks for the firms while Ghana borrows to pay contracts,

111 A.W. Snelling Letter of Correspondence to Mr. Morris, (May 19, 1967), C. FCO 38/18. TE 18/213/2 (The National Archives Kew, UK).
112 Ibid.
contributing to Ghana’s overall indebtedness. Knowing these facts, Snelling questioned why the British government was unwilling to reduce the amount of indebtedness or soften the rate of interest. Snelling, Priority Telegram from Accra to Commonwealth Office (February 4, 1967). FCO 38/18. TE 18/213/2 (The National Archives Kew, UK). No assistance was given to stopping corruption and the project ultimately turned out to be a white elephant.

In a confidential telegram regarding the management of the Tema Harbor Dry Dock, sent from Accra to the Commonwealth Office, Smedley, stated that the CRO should not encourage British firms to take up management as it was a “load of trouble.” Indeed, “trouble” was Ghana raising concerns over the legitimacy of the incurred debt. The Apaloo Report published January 14 1967 in Accra, issued a serious of claims of corruption. Mr. Gane, a previous employee of the firm, testified to payments of $38,000 and then $85,000 to two CPP ministers, Kojo Botsio and Komla Gbedemah, by Parkinson Howard. The Daily Graphic newspaper commented on the findings:

As for the greedy foreign contracting firms that allowed themselves to be blackmailed by the disgraced redeemer, they should be given their marching orders out of this country immediately. Those foreign operators who actively corrupted the ‘Redeemer’ and his immediate cronies and collaborators, should get similar marching orders.

In an earlier conversation with S.J Gross, John Howard expressed belief that British firms should be responsible for managing, creating a market for steady export supply of commodities and manufactured products to West-Africa. Howard reached out to the

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113 Ibid.
firms Vickers, Swan Hunters, and Harland and Wolff to solicit their help in arranging a transfer of management to an American or German firm to get rid of the problem and ensure that Ghana did not seek USSR assistance.\footnote{Ibid.}

There was an active search for someone to manage the dry dock upon project completion. It was rumored that a Norwegian firm had interest, but according to a FCO official there was no evidence of such interest.\footnote{Ibid., 2.} Since the project was considered a white elephant, the FCO recommended that British firms should take caution in getting involved in the management of the dry dock. However, the project was already partly operational, with the final stages of construction to be completed by July 1, 1967. Despite the prospects for poor return, it was suggested that Ghana could minimize their losses by good management but that overall there were doubts that any substantial capital was to be gained.\footnote{S.J. Gross, Correspondence to Mr. Stapleton (January 16, 1967), 4. FCO TE 18/213/2 (The National Archives Kew, UK).} Mr. Stapleton of the British Shipbuilding Exports notified that Cammell Laird of Birkenhead was willing to look at the proposal for operating the dry dock, thereby allowing Parkinson Howard “to be rid on behalf of himself and of the Ghanaians of this enormous white elephant.”\footnote{V.E. Davis (February 14, 1967). FCO TE 18/213/2 (The National Archives Kew, UK).} By April 24, 1967 it was decided by the High Commissioner and Snelling that official policy would “keep clear of any commitment to Tema.”\footnote{A.H. Birch to V.E Davies High Priority Telegram (April 24, 1967). FCO TE 18/213/2 (The National Archives Kew, UK).} As of May 4, 1967, the Tema project was officially regarded as a white elephant by the British High
Commission, the FCO and CRO. In addition to management, it was advised by Davies that Ghana provide subsidies for its operations to export finished ships. While the construction was considered first class, another £250,000 was needed for stocks and materials to conduct repair work of basic ships while shipbuilding would take a considerably higher investment.

Snelling provided a series of policy responses that he felt were appropriate for the Ghana government. The first was to alert the international media about corrupt contractors persuading the governments of developing countries to undertake prestige schemes. Britain was still navigating the impacts of decolonization in Sub-Saharan Africa and managing a shaky international image. Secondly, Snelling proposed that Ghana should move to force the British Government to address indebtedness caused by corrupt development schemes in which the Government is involved. This could be done by conducting investigations and criminal liabilities for private firms involved. If these problems remained unaddressed after attempting to lobby the British government, Snelling remarked that he would be tempted to default on debt repayment and that Ghana should implement a policy similar to Britain in which allowed the government to re-open contracts if it feels that it was overcharged too much. Thereby he proposed that Ghanaian

123 V.E Davies Esq., West and Central Africa Department Correspondence to British High Commission, Accra, (May 4, 1967). FCO TE 18/213/2 (The National Archives Kew, UK).
124 Ibid.
125 Snelling commented to Mr. Morris that “In this situation, if I were the Ghana Government... I would try to get the maximum publicity and make the biggest noise I could about corrupt contractors persuading the Governments of under-developed countries to undertake lunatic prestige schemes; especially when those contractors are operating with the direct and indirect support of their Governments.” Quoted in FCO 38/11 (The National Archives Kew, UK).
126 Ibid. Snelling commented that “Failing satisfaction, I would be tempted to default, but if I could be scared out of this by the blackmail that a default on corruptly obtained schemes would prejudice my chances of
indebtedness for the Tema Dry Dock, at minimum, be reduced by 50%."127 This proposal would fall on deaf ears, Morris made no reply.

However, the inference that the British government and private firms were somehow responsible for Ghana’s overall indebtedness provoked replies from members of the FCO. One official stated that to believe Parkinson Howard had committed corruption, was to believe that the dry dock had been forced on Ghana by “Sir John A. Howard’s powers of persuasion.”128 One official, M.E.J. Gore, emphasized the position of the FCO, agreeing with the assessment that the “dry dock is undoubtedly a complete white elephant.”129 The overall costs of the dry dock aside, it was located out of the way for container ships leaving from South Africa and therefore ships would have no need to dock in Tema.130 Even if emergency circumstances deemed it necessary for ships to dock, it would be more cost effective for ships to travel to Dakar.131 The design of the docks was also meant for smaller ships meaning that if a ship was already docked than a larger ship would have to turn away.132 Furthermore, even though the dock would be managed by Parkinson Howard, any dry docking by British ships would be done in the United Kingdom. Gore suggested that no international firms, including those aligned with the U.S.S.R., would take the [financial] risk of docking in Tema.133
Discussing Snelling’s accusations and the criminal charges against Parkinson Howard, Miles doubted that a bribe took place. His opinion was that there lacked evidence showing that Parkinson Howard been corrupt and that any money being paid to Nkrumah was for party purposes. However, the Nkrumah government and CPP were known to have received payments for appointments and contracts. In addition, the size of the administration meant there were opportunities for illegal deals with individual party leaders and ministers. This wasn’t the first time Parkinson Howard had been accused of corruption. In another correspondence, Miles noted that Ghana had brought forward claims of corruption and was told to gather evidence to lodge a formal complaint. When the Apaloo report was filed, Miles considered the general findings as being inconsistent with the reputation of Parkinson Howard and direct evidence linking the money to bribes or inflating material and labor costs didn’t exist.

This is significant because Miles also drew attention to the freedom of choice that a state has to pursue policies independent of foreign coercion, which would become the prevailing position of the FCO. He stated that as an independent country Ghana was “free to waste its money as it wanted, and free to reject ‘neo-colonialist’ advice as to what was good for them.” Nkrumah had invited the British firm, Parkinson Howard, to Ghana and decided to contract their expertise in the construction of a dry dock in Tema despite the

134 F.S. Miles, Correspondence to Mr. Norris, (June 9, 1967). FCO 38/18. TE 18/213/2. (The National Archives Kew, UK).
135 F.S. Miles, Correspondence to Mr. Smedley, (October 17, 1966). 2-WAE/82/10/5 FCO TE 18/213/2 (The National Archives Kew, UK).
136 Ibid.
137 F.S. Miles, Correspondence to Mr. Norris, (June 9, 1967), 4. FCO 38/18. TE 18/213/2 (The National Archives Kew, UK).
advice of advisors.\textsuperscript{138} It could not be the fault of a foreign government for the content of construction contracts between another government and a private firm. Reflecting to some extent the position of Smedley, Miles further stated that the Ghanaians:

\begin{quote}
...have to make the best of a bad world. They must continue to try to interest some overseas firm in the running of the dock. They have not yet sought our help...if they do, we shall be sympathetic. The main difficulty is that Tema is not at the beginning or end of a shipping route.\textsuperscript{139}
\end{quote}

Shipping firms would have to alter trading routes, with no incentive to do so, for Tema to operate successfully. There was also the preference that a British firm would secure the management contract.\textsuperscript{140}

The importance of these discussions is that there was a recognition, to some extent, that private firms were conducting nefarious business practices in Ghana. They were inflating material-labour and contract costs, also engaging in bribes with Nkrumah and specific CPP ministries. However, when it came to punishing these firms or addressing their role – and to a larger extent the role of the British – in overall Ghanaian indebtedness, there was just discussion toward a consensus of inaction. Ghana is an independent state that engages in its own contracts. If the Ghanaian government wished to submit a formal report of firm corruption they are encouraged to do so by Miles. Yet as Snelling reasoned, firms such as Parkinson Howard did indeed commit crimes, externalized risk, and persuaded with bribes Nkrumah to commit to construction contracts for white elephant development projects. The dry dock at Tema served no strategic, economic, or logistical advantage

\textsuperscript{138} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{139} Ibid., 5.
which meant that there was a possibility the project would not produce any short or long
term monetary returns on investment. Snelling was right, the FCO, despite the formal
charges of bribery, helped search for a dry dock managing company so that the burden
would not fall on Parkinson Howard. As the IMF report of 1965 contains no mention of
private firm corruption, it nonetheless was a factor in the cycle of soliciting loans to pay
European contractors for joint-designed prestige development projects which contributed to
indebtedness more generally. The crisis in Ghana was multifaceted, but the dominant
international monetary consensus was that blame rested on Nkrumah’s undisciplined
economic policies.

**Development Finance under Review: Standby Credit and Payment Rescheduling, 1966-1969**

With the NLC’s implementation of a new budget for 1966/67, Ghana was presented with,
and accepted, a standby credit of $36 million from the IMF. The new budget deficit was
reduced from a projected $90 million under Nkrumah to $10 million. In accepting the
standby credit, the NLC had also agreed to submit to a policy reform package and the
external review process. The IMF devised a three-stage economic stabilization and
redirection of economic policy plan. The conditionalities included the reduction of
government ministries from 31 to 17.\footnote{International Monetary Fund Standby Agreement with the Government of Ghana, 1966. 2-FD 122/1165/01 (The National Archives Kew, UK).} These were seen as inefficient, and led to nepotism
in licensing and within government ministries. The total of state enterprises was also
reviewed and salvaged to keep only those with efficient returns. Some enterprises were
transferred to the private sectors while others were terminated. An immediate reduction of
10% in spending was also implemented, work on development projects were suspended. Over $175 million in contracts relating to jet airplanes, diamond mining, timber processing, food storage centers, and fishing trawlers, and work on all Russian, East German and Chinese projects was halted. The NLC budget had already abandoned financial planning for the Seven Year Plan for Reconstruction and Development 1964-1969, but the limitation on foreign capital exchanges prevented finance procurement without external IMF review. Capital controls were becoming a standard strategy to conserve foreign exchange and address balance of payments difficulties. In accepting this stabilization package, and the broad liberalization reforms which will be discussed, Ghana was on the path from non-alignment to Bretton Woods and external review in development finance spending, procurement, and debt repayment.

The halting of projects and agreements with Soviet bloc countries in part reflects the bias of IMF and international monetary institutions toward its members and the US. While it was also part of reducing foreign debt commitments, the IMF allowed for limited market access for Capitalist bloc countries. In the same month that the NLC accepted the conditions of the standby credit, the IMF allowed Ghana to temporarily resume foreign capital exchanges and market access with select countries. With the depletion of foreign reserves and inefficient import licensing, imports declined and consumer demand increased, causing inflation for domestic prices. In conjunction with the balance of payments crisis that devalued the Ghanaian cedi, a central political concern was easing inflationary

143 Ibid., 17.
pressure. By June 1966 a total of $22 million in project grants and loans from the US, West Germany, and Canada had been newly committed.\textsuperscript{144} This was rationalized by the IMF as being essential for the import of staple foods which were being under-produced and to ease consumer inflationary pressures by 6%.\textsuperscript{145} Despite these initial reforms and selective reduction of foreign capital exchanges, arrears on scheduled debt repayments increased for the fiscal year 1966. The GDP showed no growth because of an overall decline of exports and industrial output.\textsuperscript{146} The miserable economic performance in 1966, attributed to be the result of the policies of Nkrumah, led Ghana to receive an official credit devaluation in 1967 by the Fitch Group London office.

To address the debt payment difficulties, the NLC asked for payment rescheduling among IMF member countries. Payment rescheduling refers to a process by which the original agreed upon terms of credit are amended. Often the repayment period is extended, a grace period may be provided, and cumulative interest reduced. Since the NLC had agreed to the terms of the standby credit, the IMF considered Ghana to be committed to fiscal discipline and meeting its financial obligations to foreign creditors.\textsuperscript{147} As a percentage of the total foreign debt in arrears as of 1966 by country, those effected were the United Kingdom 29%, West Germany 22%, Netherlands 6%, France 4%, Japan 4% and Italy 2%.\textsuperscript{148} These creditors, along with other IMF member countries, held a closed door

\textsuperscript{144} Projected Development Spending Report, Washington.
\textsuperscript{145} International Monetary Fund, 17-18.
\textsuperscript{147} This is clearly laid out in the terms of the 1966 rescheduling agreement as well as the subsequent 1968 rescheduling, which in both cases, concerned only IMF member countries, no guarantees for Soviet bloc states.
meeting in the United Kingdom in February 1966 to discuss the prospect of payment rescheduling for Ghana. Participants were Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. There were no non-IMF members or participants from the non-aligned or Soviet blocs.

The loans that could be considered for rescheduling had to meet a set of criteria outlined by the IMF. It was required that the loans be confined to those that were conducted or neglected by the Nkrumah government, with all contracts completed before the overthrow of the CPP on February 24, 1966. The loans also had to have a maturity of at least 1 year and could not be longer than 12 years. Most importantly, they had to have insurance guaranteed by creditor countries or institutions. This meant that all future NLC agreements, and the standby credit itself, were excluded from rescheduling. Substantial private contracts, such as all of the Noe Drevici contracts of over $100 million, were exempt from consideration. These contracts were part of under the table deals made between Nkrumah and Drevici for construction of cocoa factories in Tema with the West German firm MIGA Braunschweig. In terms of the repayment period agreed to, all insured suppliers’ credit debt had to be consolidated between June 1, 1966 to December 31, 1968, with 80% of interest and principal payments due during this period. The

149 Ibid.
150 Ibid., 18.
151 Ibid.
152 Ibid., 19.
154 International Monetary Fund – Payment Rescheduling Ghana Agreement, 1966. 2-FD 122/1165/01 (The National Archives Kew, UK).
consolidation period scheduled was 2.5 years while the total repayment period for the outstanding credits would be 8 years beginning on July 1, 1971. The World Bank assisted the IMF with the preparation of the rescheduling agreement, but it was an IMF organized process in line with the standby credit agreement and policy reforms.

While the overall framework for debt repayment rescheduling was agreed upon, it was up to individual creditors to determine the appropriate interest rate reductions. The member countries at the 1966 meeting also decided upon bilateral debt agreements with the total average being 6% annual interest. The IMF’s standby agreement also meant that Ghana had to adopt new terms for borrowing, doing so for purchases only related to those deemed high priority by the IMF. Ghana also had to adopt strict management for foreign exchange, non-discrimination, periodical economic review and debt reporting to the IMF. Under the auspices of the IMF, the creditor countries with the presence of the World Bank (WB), met in 1968 to work out the terms of payment rescheduling. Ghana and the IMF considered this the final comprehensive debt settlement with creditors. There are a few differences between the 1968 debt settlement schedule and that of 1966. The new consolidation period from January 1, 1969 to June 30, 1972 was longer, but the grace and total repayment period of 7.5 years.

Available data suggest that the effects of the 1966 and 1968 rescheduling was mixed. The terms allowed for Ghana to have higher rates of foreign spending on staple  

155 Ibid.  
156 Ibid., 18.  
157 Ibid.  
158 International Monetary Fund – Payment Rescheduling Ghana Agreement, 1968.  
159 Ibid., 1.
imports. However, this caused significant stress, as the rates during the consolidation period rise above maturities, between 1967-1969 actual repayments’ on supplier credits $70 million. This required 8% of foreign exchange on annual merchandise export earnings yearly. The standby arrangement however was successful in that Ghana had not contracted new suppliers’ credits, only $9 million in 1969, and the outstanding amount of loans dropped from $347 million in 1966 to $317 million at the end of 1969.\textsuperscript{160} Foreign borrowing requires the approval of the National Executive Council under the Progress Party, formerly the Economic Committee of the NLC. Repayment schedules on loans also have to be approved by the Bank of Ghana.\textsuperscript{161} The exchange and trade system was also liberalized with a reduction of ministries, yet the IMF still expressed concern that the licensing requirement for the majority of imports was unnecessary, and that the licensing administrative process for the country was inefficient in terms of response and turn-around.\textsuperscript{162} Foreign reserves were still in a dire condition. Reserves were dangerously; some of this was due to lags between the receipt of trade receipts in foreign exchange and outgoing payment.\textsuperscript{163}

Despite these concerns and need for further improvement, the IMF collected data reveals that the standby credit, reforms, and rescheduling in 1966-1968 were achieving their stated goals. There was a steady improvement, from a deficit $64 million in 1964 to

\textsuperscript{160} bid., 5.
\textsuperscript{162} Ibid., 23-24. Discussion about the “overall economic trends after the two rescheduling operations” including the performance, similarities, and differences between 1966 and 1968 in the fiscal year of 1969.
\textsuperscript{163} Ibid.
$13 million in 1968, with an estimated small surplus in 1969.\textsuperscript{164} This was attributed to the reduction of accounts from $223 million in 1965 to $45 million in 1969 as a result of a drop in imports and price recovery of cocoa on world market from $0.14 US per pound in 1965 to US$0.45 per pound in 1969.\textsuperscript{165} While GDP growth was zero in 1966, it resumed to 2\% in 1967-1968 and 1\% in 1968-1969 in part to the rise of development expenditures, which according to the IMF, give “rise for some concern.”\textsuperscript{166} In 1969 the outstanding debt for member countries was $225 million, CMEA countries $66.1 million, private sector obligations $31.5 million, with 244.0 long term debt, totaling $566.6 million.\textsuperscript{167} In economic terms then, as far as the IMF had perceived the crisis as one of fiscal irresponsibility, the performance of the standby credit and policy reform arrangement and rescheduling agreements were successful. In unstated political terms, Ghana was now in a position to repay IMF member countries with future contracts and trade projected to be done with Western rather than Soviet bloc countries.\textsuperscript{168} The state was on the correct policy path away from the naiveties of Nkrumatism toward stable rational expenditures.

Summing up the fears that the new government would not go far enough in implementing reforms, the new Conservative Secretary for the FCO, Alec Douglas Home stated in a telegram to the UK Director at the IMF and World Bank in Washington that the new UK government could not have complete confidence that Ghana would uphold the

\textsuperscript{164} Ibid., 24.
\textsuperscript{165} Ibid., 25.
\textsuperscript{166} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{167} Table 6: Ghana Medium-Long Term Debt Outstanding at the end of 1969 and Related Debt Service Payments, 26. 2-FD 122/1165/01. 55/326 (The National Archives Kew, UK).
\textsuperscript{168} Ibid.
terms of the 1968 payment rescheduling. For the FCO, the real problem was that its officials believed that the NLC’s policies were a welcomed move in the right direction, they were not adequate to the needs of the balance of payments crisis or that they would be applied rigorously enough. However, FCO officials recognized that they were not the ones pressuring the Ghana government. Rather, in line with development finance procurement and the role of IMF review process, the FCO asked the UK Director of the IMF to “take a firm line… to press for a rigorous implementation of policies which go far enough towards reconstructing the balance of payments and controlling the government recurrent budget.”

In many ways, the standby credit and agreements among IMF member countries to reschedule credit payments were rationalized in the same terms as the denial of development aid procurement to Nkrumah a few years earlier in 1964. The consensus regarding the economic performance of Nkrumaism was that it was filled with bureaucratic and nepotistic inefficiencies, irrational state interventions and failing enterprises. This created the conditions for economic crisis in Ghana, characterized by a depletion of foreign reserves and inability to pay foreign creditors which created currency and consumer inflation, stalling economic growth. Yet, Nkrumah was unwilling to submit to IMF disciplines fearing that Ghana’s development would be controlled by foreign neocolonial interests. The new military government of the NLC established by a coup d'état, and later,

170 Ibid., 2 and 5.
the Progress Party, decided to cooperate with the performance review process and policy conditionalities laid out by the IMF and creditor rescheduling agreements. Nkrumah had been resistant to accepting IMF terms the SYDP had promised continued fiscal spending and increased foreign and domestic debt to realize his Pan-Africanist vision of the future. However, the fact that Soviet Bloc countries were omitted from the rescheduling process, reveals that the IMF had an unstated bias of enforcing a new liberal disciplinary consensus in which Ghana’s national development was aligned with Bretton Wood’s financial institutions and the values of Western capitalist countries.

**The Translocality of Development Finance**

In keeping with the central argument and chronology, this Chapter explored translocality through the politics of development finance procurement and the contested interpretation of the national economic policy direction of Ghana by liberal governments and international creditors. Procuring funding was translocal in the sense that central national development projects and the future planning of Ghana depended on the outcome of external monetary review and international inter-departmental debates over economic performance and consensus building regarding which corrective reforms were needed. Ghana’s national development was co-constituted and entangled with communities of career diplomats, liberal economists, and non-governmental financial institutions. The national development plan designed by Nkrumah’s planning committee relied upon foreign creditors to fund existing, extended and new projects. As shown through interdepartmental discussions in Britain among the FCO, ECGD and the IMF, a Western consensus emerged. Each department became increasingly concerned with the economic performance of Ghana, and
in 1962-64 increasingly unified around delaying giving a concrete response to Nkrumah’s requests for loan extensions until IMF assessments were completed. After the announcement of the SYDP and IMF mission reports in 1964, this strategy of delay became a pragmatic response to what was considered as an unwillingness of Nkrumah to submit to economic disciplines. With the confirmation of economic crisis, a new unofficial policy of accepting in principle Nkrumah’s requests, while in practice delaying and denying indefinitely, became adopted. It was believed that the economic crisis coming in 1966 would have severe political consequences, leading to either the government willingly submitting to reforms – which was viewed as unlikely – or Nkrumah’s government being replaced due to political-social unrest.172 This consensus was so prominent that it led to an active lobbying against other countries, such as West Germany, from engaging in new financial dealings with Nkrumah to uphold a united policy against granting or extending loans. Within the context of the Cold War, lending to Ghana would not only contribute to non-payment and crisis, but also encourage drift toward Soviet influence.

The economic direction of Ghana, its association with Bretton Wood’s financial institutions and non-association with communist countries was also central to the debt payment rescheduling of 1966 and 1968. Ghana was of strategic and economic importance for Cold War grand strategy, as well as what they saw as pragmatic economic liberal reforms to address the failures of Nkrumah and reorient the development direction of Ghana. To some extent, the non-alignment and Pan-African foreign policy of Nkrumah

172 I am not implying that the IMF had any direct knowledge of the military coup d’état. The evidence does however reveal that the IMF observed a connection between economic crises to political instability and the potential to produce new political arrangements.
opened the door to Soviet influence. Recalling the reaction to Neocolonialism by the U.S government and the debates about Nkrumah’s economic policy in development finance procurement, Nkrumah’s ideas were both threatening and irrational. His undisciplined economic policies created the conditions for a foreign reserve and balance of payments crisis, ballooning inflation for citizens, and was evidence of the need for disciplinary reform. Once Nkrumah had been removed, Ghana had an opportunity to accept a standby credit and implement reforms. This allowed creditors the opportunity to receive payments; the path was clear too for the IMF external review of economic policy and for a government to adopt its policies in whole or in part. The quantitative performance of the state, the identified causes of that performance and the subsequent policy debates and recommendations shows that the politics of development funding in the case of Ghana, was translocal. The national development of Ghana was co-constituted within non-national political and economic communities while also entangled in international markets and Cold War ideational considerations.

The concluding Chapter explores the unmaking of Nkrumaism, the dismantling and re-conceptualization of educational, political, and economic policies by the NLC and Progress Party from 1966 to 1969. The new military government issued a series of comprehensive reports on various sectors and issues confronting the state. Each report rebukes Nkrumah’s policy vision, offering scathing criticism and sets of policy prescriptions. They further reveal the ways that national development was inherently co-constituted with the debates and desires of those moving Ghana’s development future away from Nkrumaism towards liberal market reforms aligned with the West. The Pan-African
core of national development was seen as costly, ineffective, and a product of the egoism of Nkrumah “viewing himself as leader of Africa.” The reports on education were concerned with international students, funding abroad, and using institutions as ideological-activist platforms. The reports on domestic-foreign indebtedness, economic development, and political appointments describe Nkrumah’s policies as nepotistic and irrational, requiring widespread reform. This indicates that much more than reforming economic policy, the NLC was concerned with dismantling Nkrumaism at all levels, scaling back the translocal and decolonial vision of his Pan-Africanist project.

Despite this unmaking, the translocal legacy of Nkrumaism lives on and is referenced, sometimes ahistorically, in political discourses in Ghana and the diaspora. This dissertation concludes by showing the translocal legacy of Nkrumah’s development vision in Ghana, the African continent, and in the West. Evocations of Nkrumaism in the present, while seemingly elastic, point to a yearning for economic justice, solidarity, and peace on the continent and an expansive definition of development as a means to achieve those aims. Nkrumah’s vision, situating the nation and its development within the wider Pan-African revolutionary struggle, had a mixed record. Yet, from Accra to various parts of North and Southern Africa, and the diaspora, translocal networks of solidarity and engagement around the vision of Nkrumaism persist. The vision these evocations mobilize,

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174 There is also a recent trend for some African and European countries to appropriate historical individuals to further nationalist and xenophobic agendas. For a discussion of contemporary nationalisms see Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism A Study in Its Origins and Background (Routledge, 2005 and 2017); Fernando López-Alves, Diane E. Johnson, Populist Nationalism in Europe and the Americas (Routledge, 2018).
in conferences, monuments, and statues, is one of understanding the interconnectedness of 
the world and the yearning for a decolonial future.
**Table III.** GHANA: International Reserves  
(In millions of U.S. dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>End of Period</th>
<th>Monetary authorities</th>
<th>Commercial banks</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assets</td>
<td>Liabilities</td>
<td>Net</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>277.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>277.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>163.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>162.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>172.0</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>149.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>151.6</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>135.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>122.7</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>88.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>114.3</td>
<td>101.4</td>
<td>13.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>138.4</td>
<td>138.0</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>151.5</td>
<td>189.3</td>
<td>-37.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>117.9</td>
<td>159.7</td>
<td>-41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>101.0</td>
<td>156.3</td>
<td>-55.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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1/ Exclude holdings of official and private entities (primarily those of the Cocoa Marketing Board), which still amounted to some $550 million net at the end of 1960 but dropped to $55 million at the end of 1961 and $18 million at the end of 1965.

*Table 1: International Monetary Fund Report 1969, page 33. FD 122/1165/01 (The National Archives Kew, UK).*
Conclusion – Unmaking Nkrumaism, 1966-1968: Translocality and its Aftermath

When the National Liberation Council (NLC) led by General Ankrah and comprised of army officers assumed authority over the military and government, they immediately rendered the Convention Peoples Party (CPP) illegitimate, forcing Nkrumah into exile and killing many central political and military leaders. The military government immediately halted all work related to state projects and industries which subsequently became open to privatization. International media outlets such as the Wall Street Journal and New York Times declared that the “Coup Brings an End to Lavish Projects”\(^1\) and described the event as a “Reversal of [the] Nation’s March Toward Socialism.”\(^2\) The NLC also announced the abandonment of the Seven Year Development Plan. Commenting from exile, Nkrumah called this an abandonment of African Unity and a move to “destroy our socialist gains and achievements.”\(^3\)

Heads of private businesses such as Edward Spears, the Chairman of Ashanti Goldfields, were among the first to congratulate and commend the NLC’s redirection of the economy. In a report to shareholders on March 30, 1966, Spears commented, “Before I had my talk with General Ankrah, there were already indications that we would find the new regime much more satisfactory to deal with than the old.”\(^4\) Major state enterprises in key sectors became open to foreign private investment such as the Timber Products Corporation, Cocoa Products Corporation, Diamond Mining Corporation, The National

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\(^3\) Kwame Nkrumah, Dark Days in Ghana (Hasrek Ghana Ltd, 1967), 113.
Steel Works, The Black Star Shipping Line, Ghana Airways, and all state owned hotels. In addition to this privatization, the NLC scaled back the role of the state in service delivery and development, describing that state participation would be limited and public-private partnerships would exist only on a voluntary basis.

Despite the NLC’s justification for the cancellations of what they considered prestige projects, some had a positive economic outlook. The Juapong Textile and Knitting Factory being developed near Akosombo was months away from completion with prospective employment of 800 Ghanaians and the use of 400,000 tons of cotton produced from the region. It was not a matter of the productivity of the enterprise or project. The NLC expelled nearly 3000 Chinese and Russian experts who were constructing Juapong and other sites, and no effort was made to complete them. All projects that involved Russia or China were sold to foreign firms in Washington or Bonn. Over 300 Russian fishing trawlers were returned despite them being needed for commercial fishing and transportation in Ghana. As one journalist reported in the *Ghanaian Times*, at the end of 1966 “…the whole area was desolate, with the half-completed buildings almost overgrown with weeds.” The NLC was actively aligning with Western states and creditors, moving Ghana away from Nkrumah’s Pan-African and non-alignment position. William Beaty, vice president of Chase Manhattan Bank, visited Ghana and praised the NLC for its “remarkable strides.” Beaty also commended the openness of the new government to the

7 Ibid.
market analysis of international investors and for agreeing to make broad concessions including free transfers abroad and a ten-year tax break for foreign companies. In addition, as discussed in the previous Chapter, the NLC took up negotiations with the IMF, submitting to a process of economic review and structural adjustment. It was a different economic vision compared to Nkrumah, who sought to tightly control the operations of foreign firms in the country through state institutions. Health care facilities, educational institutions, and housing schemes were also abandoned by the NLC in an effort, they argued, to get the economy under control.

The effects of these transfers and closures was that thousands of Ghanaians working in state industries suddenly became unemployed. Those that continued to show support for Nkrumah and the CPP, members of the African Bureau, party officials, newspapers, were victimized and threatened. Bob Bannerman, who worked for the Ghana Press described that when the army threatened to burn the press, journalists and editors had to publish critiques of Nkrumah and fake letters coming from citizens.\(^\text{10}\) Military and police officials were empowered by the NLC and were involved in abuse, unlawful incarcerations, bribery, and market racketeering. Many set up joint multilateral businesses with other countries to manufacture and distribute products such as milk powder, shirts, soda, and furniture. They were also involved in charging local tax on market goods. Prices of food stuffs and everyday products became even more inflated than they were under Nkrumah. In this

\(^{10}\) This is based on a conversation between Nkrumah and Bannerman reported in Kwame Nkrumah, *Dark Days in Ghana* (Hasrek Ghana Ltd, 1967).
context, Ghanaians were told by the NLC to tighten their belts, to be more responsible financially as the country was making economic changes.

As a response to structural adjustment and liberalization, there were widespread riots and strikes in the first six months of the NLC. Increased unemployment, cuts in government funded education, and the shift away from social service infrastructure and Pan-African policy, caused dissatisfaction with the NLC that cut across political allegiances. In August 1966 approximately 400 workers at the Ghana Textile Manufacturing Company went on strike, with its leaders sentenced to twelve months in prison. In December over five thousand miners from Ashanti Goldfields Corporation went on strike. Students also engaged in political activity, organizing events and protests against the NLC. As reported in the Ghanaian Times (after the press had been taken over by the NLC), the secondary school children were described: “We are dismayed by the reports of yet another outbreak of rioting and vandalism by secondary school boys and girls… First it was a school at Koforidua, next it was in Accra.”11 In November 1966 over three hundred students at Cape Coast University conducted a demonstration calling for the end of the NLC.

In conjunction with economic adjustments to rollback Nkrumaism and responding to public opposition, the public image and translocal scope of Nkrumaism was disavowed by the NLC at every opportunity. The NLC engaged in an unrelenting smear campaign and staged public events. The NLC organized the relocation of the bodies of a women and child

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who had died during the military takeover to a refrigerator at the Presidential Office at Flagstaff House. The NLC officials opened the refrigerator to the public and described it as a common practice for Nkrumah’s “juju,” a kind of sacrificial ceremony in which Nkrumah gained power from the blood of a women and child. There is no evidence to suggest that Nkrumah engaged in these practices. Most significant however is the way in which the NLC provided a rational and technical de-legitimization of Nkrumaism through the issuing of a series of reports on the education, the economy and aid, the military and government corruption. These reports describe an alternative vision for Ghana’s development future and place in the world. These reports also provide a glimpse into the ideas that justified the NLC’s actions. The report on the economy provides direct insights into the NLC’s re-direction of the national economy and condemnation of Nkrumah, toward submitting to external review to address balance of payments issue. The NLC described its new role as ameliorating the economy and saving it from total collapse.12 This mission of privatization and abandonment was characterized as a process of rationalizing development expenditures in-line with expert international opinion. This was a project of “re-organisation, retrenchment and redeployment in almost all fields and especially in agriculture, manufacturing and education.”13 It was the unmaking of Nkrumaism.

The preface of the report on the economy reveals that the recommendations were created from consultation with the IMF, IBRD, UNDP and OECD and is an analysis of

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Ghana’s economic problems, efforts made by the NLC to address imbalances, and the need for foreign aid.14 The report makes clear that:

The financial and other problems that the present Government has inherited do not lend themselves to any immediate or spectacular solution, but there is every reason to believe that as a result of the corrective policies now being pursued, and given the assurance of continued support by friendly governments and international financial agencies, the Ghanaian economy will be substantially rehabilitated by the second half of 1968…15

Ghana’s development, though more narrowly defined and anti-Nkrumaist, remained at the intersection of foreign interests, financial technocrats, and the ambitions of politicians and entrepreneurs both foreign and local. In other words, it remained translocal in the sense that it was co-constituted with international monetary institutions, foreign governments, and the global political economy.

It was expected that the NLC, international creditors, and Western Media would frame the takeover as a failure of Nkrumaism, but what was unexpected was that the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was ambivalent about formally condemning the NLC. Developments in Ghana were seen as an internal matter of national politics and the OAU wanted to see how the transition to civilian elections, which were planned by the NLC’s Constitutional Committee to be held by 1969, would play out. The OAU conducted a mission to Guinea to interview those Ghanaians who fled to be with Nkrumah. The Guinea foreign minister was arrested in Accra on October 29, 1966 en-route to an OAU

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15 Ibid.
meeting. At the meeting, the delegation from Ghana was treated with contempt. Nkrumah’s supporters drafted an open letter and presented it at the OAU. They stated:

We declare that we do not recognize the so called National Liberation Council as a Government in Ghana. For us and indeed for all true Ghanaians free from the threat of guns, bayonets and protective custody, the so-called National Liberation Council is no more than a clique of four soldiers and four policemen who represent only themselves and the interests of neo-colonial imperialism.16

Upon return from the OAU conference, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania commented in reference to the events in Ghana that “Africa is in a mess.”17 Nkrumah took the inability of the OAU to denounce the NLC as a result of the OAU being rendered ineffective, where “many nominally independent states have puppet regimes, and large areas of our continent remain unliberated.”18 The secretary of the CPP overseas branch in London, and The Socialist Ghana Defence Committee published harsh criticisms of the NLC, labelling it a rebellion: “The rebellion is being made out as liberal democratic. It is not. It is an extreme right-wing movement which, if allowed to entrench itself, will turn the clock of progress many years back in Ghana.”19 They called on the British Government to not recognize the NLC, but were unsuccessful. In January of 1967 the Peoples Progressive Front in Ghana was formed in London with the stated goal of creating an alliance to impact consensus against the NLC, but it had limited resources and was an ineffective organization that was not able to sway the opinions of Western or African governments. Nkrumah never returned to Ghana and the

16 Nkrumah, Dark Days, 170.
17 This is a well-known quotation.
18 Nkrumah, Dark Days, 171.
CPP, which was banned in 1966, reformed in 1996 as Ghana returned to democratic civilian rule.

**Translocality and Postcolonial National Development**

This dissertation is about translocality, the postcolonial connectivities which defined the idea, operationalization, and networks associated with, inspired by, or the result of, Ghanaian national development. Nkrumaism, in this sense, promoted international-global connections while simultaneously being shaped and influenced by the tensions and contradictions of translocality. Translocality within Nkrumaism meant to be connected is not to be intertwined, a joining of what is separate, but to be intimately co-constituted and entangled. The very idea of imagining a Pan-African future and Ghana’s place on the continent and in the world was entangled with ideas about equality, non-exploitation, development, unification, and/or peace against dividing impulse of the Cold War. Because of the global orientation that Nkrumah envisioned for postcolonial Ghana in the 1960s, it was therefore subject to the imaginations and interests of all those connected to the realization of Nkrumah’s plans for Ghana, or by those who viewed Ghana through the lens of civil rights, Pan-Africanism, or the Cold War. The guiding political-economic ideology of the state presupposed that decolonization could not be achieved without the liberation and unification of the continent. At the level of social and economic planning – from education to the Seven Year Development Plan – Ghana’s development was conceived of in relation to Africa and the world. Ghana was described by Nkrumah as a resource in the struggle for Pan-Africanism and peace in the Cold War. The very idea of naming the independent country as Ghana, a mid-medieval African kingdom in what is now present-
day Mali, was also an act of creating a particular image linking the past to the present for
the future – to join the country together in pursuit of Nkrumah’s vision. While Nkrumah
attributes the name to himself, J.B Danquah insisted that he first came up with the idea and
Nkrumah had never heard of it.\textsuperscript{20} The planning for Postcolonial Ghana does not pre-exist
interactions and imaginative ideas about its becoming. Rather, it emerged through and as
part of transnational and global ideational, political, and economic considerations, contexts,
and exchanges. The politics of the CPP and the socialist development direction was
inherently apart of a process of reconstituting Ghana in the global political economy,
involving disciplining, discouragement, and new forms of regulatory access and
relationships to Britain, the US, and other African, socialist and non-aligned states.

The point is not solely that there is a web of relations that are implicated in and the
consequences of the translocality at the heart of national development. More broadly,
Nkrumaism challenged conventional ideas about how states conceptualize and
operationalize postcolonial national development. Ghanaian national development was rife
with contradictions, it was both economic and political, national and international, socialist
and capitalist, populist and statist. As Priya Lal observed in the context of Tanzania, such
contradictions reflect internal tensions of national development in the Third World.\textsuperscript{21} But
perhaps even more-so, at least in the case of Ghana, development was inherently translocal
and the tensions and contradictions were born of that translocality. Ghanaian development,

\textsuperscript{20} J. Boakye Danquah (April 30, 1957), 16. RG 17/2/289 (PRAAD Accra, Ghana). Danquah provides a detailed
rebuke of a number of claims in Nkrumah’s autobiography.

\textsuperscript{21} Priya Lal, \textit{African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania: Between the Village and the World} (New York:
as an idea and policy mandate dictated by Nkrumah and the CPP, was oriented as a resource in the struggle for Pan-Africanism – continental liberation – and aligned with struggles for peace and non-exploitation in the context of the Cold War global political economy. Furthermore, in the context of the Cold War, Ghana simultaneously accepted development finance, experts, and assistance from both the free market West and the Communist East while remaining committed to non-alignment. These transnational and international interactions reflect the entanglement and co-constitution of Nkrumaism and of postcolonial national development.

What translocality offers that other perspectives do not in the case of postcolonial Ghana, is an understanding of the multiple entangled futures and the politics of differential relations that define the idea and practice of development. Ghana’s development future differed depending on who is asked and who is doing the imagining. Rather than describe a holistic account where start and end points are neat, translocality reveals a world of tension, contradiction, and paradox by which multiple actors, subject to power and hierarchy, are entangled within processes. But these connectivities are also open to being re-worked and changed through the activisms of individuals and groups, within and beyond the geography of the state which can change the nature of translocal entanglements, not erase them but make them more equitable. Thinking beyond development, translocality might also be a useful tool to think about environmental crisis, activisms, human rights, markets, and structural racism.

In addition, the case study of postcolonial Ghana in particular, also offers an early example of neoclassical economics in the developing world and structural adjustment
through the debt crisis. As a result of ballooning debt and an inability to service it, lenders colluded together to pressure states to abandon particular development policies while implementing liberal reforms. This became a central theme in development economics even in the contemporary. Predominately, this narrative rests on cases in the Americas such as Mexico or Brazil. When this focus switches to take into consideration the translocality of Ghana’s postcolonial development, greater attention is paid to the entangled nature and messiness over debates about the future. Furthermore, the fall of Nkrumah and its significance for development possibilities continues to influence thinking about development alternatives. As a newly independent country, Ghana’s development was entangled with a disciplinary politics reflective of the colonial relationship with Britain and a new liberal consensus among international creditors. It also demonstrates the limits of the decision-making power of developing countries. Policy choices and the freedom to choose particular development paths are constrained by an international liberal disciplinary consensus which uses lending as a mechanism to influence developing states.

There is also a degree of generalization that may be possible from the case of postcolonial Ghana and Nkrumaism. Although there are diverse contexts with unique empirical circumstances, translocality has identifiable features. If translocality can be seen in postcolonial development processes in other countries, one reason is that there must be a convergence of ideas, practices, migrations, networks surrounding the subject of analysis to

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the extent that it can be thought of as co-constituted. Co-constitution refers to the ways in which seemingly separate phenomenon are actually interdependent and connected. It addresses what Serenella Lovino and Sepril Oppermann identify as “the complex interrelations between discourse and matter… to shed light on the way bodily natures and discursive forces express their interaction whether in representations or in their concrete reality”\(^2\). The ideas, networks, and movements that result from, inspired by, or are connected to postcolonial development processes – beyond explicit statements from individuals or groups – are co-constituting interdependent phenomena. They are interdependent and in many cases the transnational or internationalist connections would not exist without the translocality of the referent objects and there entanglement. In the case of Ghana, national development was conceptualized with Pan-Africanism, the hopes and desires of all those involved or inspired by its realization, and entanglement with the global political economy of the Cold War and emergent structural adjustment paradigms. While the case of 1970s Tanzania or 1980s Burkina Faso are very different from Ghana, it may be possible to trace and identify the ways in which development processes in those contexts are translocal and intimately apart of, connected to, and co-constituted from/within, transnational, international, and global movements of peoples, ideas, and networks. The application of translocal thinking may show important commonalities between development processes in Ghana and elsewhere in the postcolonial world.

This does not mean that transnational or internationalist histories are not important. Indeed, studies that trace movements or a particular object, idea, or phenomenon across

state lines are essential to narratives of translocality. Transnationalism and internationalism are important characteristics of translocality, but in and of themselves do not equate to translocality. It may seem to be inconsequential or a matter of language. But in fact, by focusing on translocality rather than transnationalism or internationalism, the whole analytical framework and interpretation of historical facts become shifted from the interaction of independent factors to co-constitution and entanglement. While each can be separated and seen as relational, only when examining this translocality in total possibilities then emerge for potentially rethinking historical studies about transnational and international processes.

But it is not only that development processes can be translocal at the level of ideas and practice, as the development institutions, experts, and dominant theories do not adequately reflect this reality. Development successes and failures are predominately presented as reflecting the rational-responsible actions of policymakers or in cumulative historical processes. Debates about the nature of the postcolonial state in Africa and the expansion of state power since the 1970s has been centred on colonial legacy, underdevelopment, and institutional performance. However, if the conceptual category of analysis shifts to translocality then a more holistic understanding of the postcolonial state, development, and global politics emerge. But the question is how to make that shift. I argue that translocality provides the explanatory mechanism to better understand postcolonial development as entangled and co-constitutive. There is also a growing body of decolonial and feminist work in the broad theoretical frameworks of actor network theory and new materialism which, I claim, provides an ontology for the theory of translocality that I have
offered here. These works explore the inaccuracies of ideas about agency and separation of the discursive, body, and matter. Agency is a central ontological presupposition of history in which the individual as sovereign is an independent entity with a capacity to act within the constraints of the natural-material environment. In contrast to this position, Karan Barad shows that all matter is entangled, unfolding through encounter with the world. Any agential cut, assigning and dis-assigning agency, silences this world of entanglement and does not fully capture the ways in which agency and matter is co-constituted.

As shown in the case of postcolonial Ghana, development functions in a similar way, it exists by becoming enfolded through, entangled with, inspiring or provoking, and intimately apart of transnational, international, diasporic, and global ideational, material, political, and bodily connectivities. What these insights reveal is the possibilities for reconceptualising postcolonial development and global politics as entangled, interdependent, and co-constitutive. Translocality offers a bridge for moving beyond matters of agency between individuals, the material world, to political-economy. Aside from translocality as an instructive unit of analysis for understanding postcolonial development in the past and present, there is also a direct ethical claim which emerges from understanding development as co-constituted and entangled. If development is co-constituted, then there is a mutual obligation, a responsibility that cuts across nation states. Predatory lending practices and production zones financed by foreign capital and sold on international markets regulated by international norms, global institutions combined with the unique perspectives of development offered in ‘national’ contexts, means that 20th and 21st century development is inherently translocal. Successes and failures in economic
outcomes, often presented as the marker of development, are also contingent on this translocality. This does not mean that national policy decisions don’t matter, but that there is a fine line between the national and international. The seemingly isolated policy decisions that governments make and their consequences, are actually part of broader processes of exchange and co-constitution in regional and global political-economies. Furthermore historians and other scholars have to be responsible for the agential cuts they make in research, what they choose to highlight, ignore, or privilege.24

By exploring the tensions and contradictions of Ghana’s postcolonial connectivities between 1958 and 1968, our understanding of postcolonial national development re-centres to the translocal. The ideational apparatus, financial and political networks that co-constitute the way development is perceived and applied, as well as the spaces it opens up for wider contestations and participations beyond the state, how it attracts and becomes an imaginative arena for interaction on a global scale, are all inter-related. As explored in Chapter 1, Nkrumaism centred on a non-atheistic materialism that sought to reconcile indigenous beliefs with development economics, tying Ghana’s struggle to that of the continent and the world. While this outward direction in official diplomacy and development policy was tightly controlled, it opened the door for global actors, Afro-Americans, activists, international monetary institutions, European expatriates and states, to have their own imagination about what constitutes Ghana’s development future.

In application, the political roles of women in the 1950s and early 1960s were expanded and their involvement was promoted by the CPP, in which women issues were

24 This dissertation is no different.
advanced and they practiced an internationalism linking Ghana’s development to global politics. Nkrumaism and women activisms further inspired diasporic Afro-Americans and Europeans to participate in administrative, educational, and financial duties in the government and society. These varieties of experiences, whether Ghanaian, African, European, or Afro-American and their unique participations as editors or writers, orators, activists and in government positions, existed within and promoted Ghana as translocal. While they often worked within the constraints of Nkrumaism, propaganda secretariats such as Mabel Ellen Dove were internationalist and Pan-Africanist, condemning nuclear atomic testing and commenting on continental and global politics. Because of transnational education and print culture, women were on the front-lines of organizing and promoting the Nkrumaism. They organized conferences bringing together Ghanaian, African and diaspora women to advance women’s issues with national development and liberation. The participants from the U.S saw Ghana as an ally of the civil rights movements while the moderates in the contingent, as well as the CIA, saw the conference as promoting anti-Americanism and socialism. The activisms and experiences of women were also translocal in the sense of being situated within the politics of the Cold War and for transcending Nkrumah’s control, creating solidarities and links among women that influenced the scope of Pan-African development in Ghana and the OAU. In contrast, European women technical expertise were also valued by Nkrumah and as the case of Erica Powell, who was his personal secretary, was able to escape formal conspiracy charges to receive generous compensation. The translocal context Nkrumaism promoted nurtured the activisms and participations of Ghanaian women in print-culture, formal politics, and activisms, and the
movements of ideas and white European expat women to work in administrative and financial sectors.

Moving from civil society and the gendered dynamics of Ghana’s postcolonial connectivities, Chapter 3 explores Ghana’s economic diplomacy and how Nkrumah’s aim of economic unification functioned in practice. As a member of the Casablanca Group, Ghana committed to radical proposals for economic unification through the creation of a common market and development policy, an African Development Bank, and supporting institutions to facilitate continental trade and coordination. Nkrumaism, which entwined national development with Pan-Africanism, was reinforced through mediated state visits, diplomatic missions, conferences and party propaganda. Ghana had to balance loyalties in the commonwealth, but maintained a general policy of non-alignment, despite the increasing tensions this created with the US and Britain. Despite this, there were administrative and financial limitations to this coordination. In the case of the ministry exchange program, it was limited by disputes over mutual financing of residents and accommodations. Ghana was responsible for bearing financial responsibility for these costs, expending resources in joint-defence and economic coordination initiatives. The tensions of the application of Nkrumaism and the Casablanca Charter, the politics of prudent self-interest and a less radical vision of economic unity after 1963 came to define the vision of the OAU. When Pan-Africanism was not convenient or overly costly, disputes arose over the responsibilities and policies. This created further tensions among member states and between radical leaders like Kwame Nkrumah or Julius Nyerere. However, Nkrumah remained committed to the principles of the Casablanca Charter and vision of
economic unification and development for Pan-Africanism. Ghana’s role in trying to promote mutual economic development and Pan-Africanism, despite the tensions in the ideas and practices of pursuing a Pan-African and global vision of national development, reflect translocality.

Extending to the central development project of Nkrumah’s Seven Year Development Project, the Akosombo Dam, Chapter 4 shows the translocal politics of finance procurement for national development. Nkrumah’s development plan relied on foreign creditors to fund and extend projects. The Akosombo Dam was partly financed by Britain, who had agreed to contract terms. However, when Nkrumah requested the remainder of the loan, Britain did not honor the agreement pursuant to the side letter contract. Inter-departmental and institution debates in the British Foreign Office with the IMF about accepting in principle Ghana’s right to the funding pursuant to the contract, but that in practice the Office would delay giving an answer. This strategy reflected an emerging consensus within international monetary institutions that Ghana was undergoing a balance of payments and foreign reserve crisis caused by corruption, prestige and white elephant projects, and Nkrumah’s irrational economic policies. Underlying these debates were policy prescriptions about Ghana’s need to submit to an external monetary review and international technocratism to improve economic performance and implement corrective reforms in development spending and government ownership. A consensus emerged between government and monetary creditors that Ghana was approaching an economic crisis that would have severe political consequences, leading to either the government willingly submitting to reforms – which was viewed as unlikely – or Nkrumah’s
government being replaced due to political-social unrest. This led Western states to promote a united policy toward financing Nkrumah’s government in the hopes of reorienting the development direction of Ghana. As shown, Ghana’s national development and the Akosombo Dam specifically, reliant on the procurement of international capital was translocal at the level of finance and subject to global Cold War politics.

The story of postcolonial national development and connectivities here is not exceptional. Other African leaders and states were also subject to entanglement with international financial institutions, continental and diasporic liberation and human rights struggles and have had to navigate shifting ideas, foreign interventions, and financial institutions in regional, continental and global political economies. Therefore, further studies on translocality in other postcolonial African contexts is needed. Lastly, future work will try to understand the ways in which Ghana – not just as a historical-geographic object – was conceptualized by Eastern European expatriates, political refugees, diaspora and Caribbean intellectuals, continental activists, spiritualists and artists, who all travelled to Ghana in the 1960s to ‘witness’ and/or participate in the Pan-African revolutionary struggle led by Kwame Nkrumah. Postcolonial Ghana became a contested arena of solidarity that held the promise of ushering in a global future premised on decoloniality, dignity, nuclear disarmament, economic independence, peace, humanism and unity. It was also a place of imagination, where individuals and groups crafted their own image of Ghana’s future, largely because of the ways in which Nkrumaist national development was conceptualized as a political, economic, and translocal project. Therefore, future considerations of postcolonial national development in Africa and elsewhere should not only explore the
tensions at the level of ideas, planning and operationalization, but also of translocality; the knots and transnational, international, and global co-constitutive connectivities in all their tensions and contradictions.

**Translocal Legacies: A non-Conclusion**

Walking through the Kwame Nkrumah Memorial Park and Mausoleum located in Accra near Independence Square, one encounters trees planted by dignitaries and leaders from countries ranging from Ethiopia, Hungary, Poland, to Iran. As a symbol of strength, life, and perseverance in Akan and Ga culture, these trees function more than diplomatic niceties. They are acts of memorialization that capture the translocal impact and reach of Nkrumah and his development vision of Pan-African engagement with the world. Each tree marks a relationship and cooperative political gesture. Walking further through the synchronized fountains, before the resting place of Nkrumah and his wife, stands the bronze statue of the leader next to its decapitated head, famously photographed and reproduced after the military overthrow. This stark reminder, the symbolic destruction and alternative policy path taken by the NLC after 1966, reminds of the translocal contestations and tensions of Nkrumah’s postcolonial development imaginary for Ghana in Africa and the world.

Reflective of the translocality of Nkrumaism, Nkrumah received letters while in exile in Guinea between 1966 and 1968 from student unions, academic faculty members, Ghanaians, and those in the African-diaspora and around the world. The African Students Union in the Netherlands, for example, were resolutely in support of the restoration of Nkrumah as President. After thanking Nkrumah and criticizing the military takeover, a
Gambian student named N.K Sanyang reflected on what Nkrumaism has meant to him and to Africa more generally:

…whatever else the future may hold, the principles of the Ghanaian Revolution, which form the corner-stone of your political philosophy, will be the main determinant of the ultimate destiny of Mother Africa… Whatever the mysterious future holds for me, as a human being with finite capacity, I do not honestly know, but of this I am more than certain, that whenever I am called upon (and I am sure I will be) to play an effective part in the political life of my country and of Africa, I will always look upon your career and the principles for which you stand as the guiding light in my life.25

Ideas are worth remembering, evaluating, and learning from. Nkrumaism promised to usher in continental unification and national development for Pan-Africanism, born of a particular moment in history. The ideals and translocal orientation of Nkrumah’s vision for Ghana and the countries co-constitutive entanglement in the world is still with us today.

Nkrumah’s enduring translocal vision of an economically independent decolonial nation unified with Africa and playing a sovereign role in global politics, despite all its tensions, still persists in the contemporary consciousness of activists, politicians, students, and emerging leaders around the world. In September 2018, leading Pan-Africanists, socialists, and trade unionists gathered in Accra to celebrate the birthday of Kwame Nkrumah and to discuss strategies for implementing Pan-African unity in the 21st century.26

This was the third Pan-Africanism Today conference. The first was held in Lusaka, Zambia in 2016, the second meeting in the following year took place in Borj Cédria, Tunisia. The unifying theme across the conferences was to discuss the potentials and prospects for

25 N.K. Sanyang, 21A Dobson Street, Bathurst, Gambia to Kwame Nkrumah, Guinea (December 1966).
26 Paul Emiljanowicz, “Is the State the best we got?” Africa is a Country (September 2019).
socialist Pan-Africanism. In this way the Accra conference built off of the previous meetings. It was different in that it took an explicitly Nkrumaist line. The mission of the Accra forum is summarized by the organizers as follows:

In resonance with Kwame Nkrumah’s thinking, Pan-Africanism Today must attain a socialist character. Socialism is the only frame of reference that would allow the African continent to: a) overcome the hegemony of the neo-liberal ruling class, b) enable the exploited and oppressed working masses to assume state power through a revolutionary process, and c) reorganise economic, political, social and cultural life under genuine democratic control.27

This evocation of Nkrumaism as a model for liberation in the present for African countries reveals the enduring legacy of his ideas.

But how should the historian appraise this legacy and the translocal national development project of Ghana and it’s unmaking by the NLC, between the years 1957 to 1968? Rather than inscribing a normative value, this study has sought to explore the translocality of postcolonial national development through the tensions, ambiguities, and contradictions of Nkrumaism as an idea and in practice. Because of the foundational ideas of economic development and Pan-Africanism, the connectivities in which Nkrumah cultivated in the spheres of economic development for Pan-Africanism, and the movements associated with, inspired by, or connected to Nkrumaism, made Ghana subject to the involvement of transnational actors at the level of civil society organizations and movements – as in the case of woman activisms – or international monetary institutions and foreign states. Beyond the level of interests, in practice these connectivities generated

tensions between realizing development and unification for peace in the context of the Cold War. Ghana was subject to political and liberal disciplining, as a narrative of crisis and the need to put Ghana on a different development path, undoubtedly more Western, emerged.

Nkrumah positioned Ghana at the forefront of the struggle for non-exploitation, racial justice, and peace in the world through continental unification, economic harmonization and mutual development. Any account of 1960s Ghana, or postcolonial development more generally, has to grapple with this translocality and the intersection of overlapping and competing co-constituting ideas about development with the realities of application and the navigation of complex layers of intersecting dynamics – between Ghana, world and future.
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