VOICES FROM THE FAULT LINE
VOICES FROM THE FAULT LINE:
BEING MUSLIM IN CANADA

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Lay Abstract

This dissertation analyses the varying forms and intensities of Islamophobia that a diverse range of Muslims in Canada face and the powerful ways in which race and socio-economic class factor into their experiences, coping mechanisms, and stigma responses. The thesis explores three themes: 1) how Islamophobia may be structurally maintained and propagated through media discourse and coinciding political legislation, 2) how Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate is experienced differently by different groups of Muslims in Canada, and (3) how there may be a connection between race and social class in individual responses to Islamophobia. By adding the concepts of spiritual marginalization, spiritual homelessness, and social status optimization to the analytic vocabulary, this work is a unique contribution to existing literature, and to our understanding of the differing lived experiences of being Muslim in the West and the varying ways in which Islamophobia informs the day to day lives of Muslim Canadians.
Abstract

Previous literature, although helpful in demonstrating the insidious nature and effects of Islamophobia on Muslims, does not underscore the varying forms and intensities of Islamophobia that a diverse range of Muslims in the West face and the powerful ways in which race and socio-economic class factor into their experiences, coping mechanisms, and stigma responses. This dissertation contributes to the literature on Muslims in The West in three ways: (1) offering a qualitative approach to understanding the ways in which Islamophobia is perpetuated through media discourse and coinciding political legislation, and is experienced differently by a diverse range of Muslims in Canada, (2) adding the concepts of spiritual marginalization, spiritual homelessness, and social status optimization to the analytic vocabulary on integration and articulating their relationship with identity, and (3) making a connection between race and social class and the response to Islamophobia and articulating their relationship with human agency. In chapter one, I provide an in-depth literature review on Islamophobia in the West. In chapter two, I present the results of a discourse analysis study that highlights the structural dimensions of Islamophobia through media representations and framing of incidences involving Muslim vs. non-Muslim perpetrators of violence. In chapter three, I present the results of a study that showcases group level experiences of racism amongst a relatively powerless group of Muslim refugee youth in Hamilton Ontario and St. John’s Newfoundland and Labrador. In chapter four, I provide a contrasting response to stigma by reporting on the experiences and mobilization of a socioeconomically privileged group of first, second and third generation Muslims in Edmonton. Finally, I
summarize the conceptual findings of each paper, review and discuss the general theoretical and conceptual contributions of the dissertation to existing literature, and provide suggestions on future directions for studying Islamophobia and Muslim integration in The West.
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In loving memory of my mother, Mona Mukhtiar Ghaffar (1951-2006) and my brother, Haris Ghaffar (1982-2014)
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I, Sabreena Ghaffar-Siddiqui, am responsible for this program of research and thesis in its entirety. However, for paper 2, I have used data from a research project conducted by Dr. James Baker, for which I was the research assistant. I co-conducted a majority of the interviews for that project. I transcribed all the interviews and the analysis for paper 2 was performed solely by me. For papers 1 and 3, I am responsible for the design, research and analysis of the projects entirely. For paper 3, I designed the interview guide, recruited interviewees and conducted all interviews. I wrote all portions of this thesis, however, my thesis supervisor, Dr. Victor Satzewich, and my committee members, Drs. Dorothy Pawluch, and Neil McLaughlin have supported my analysis and writing processes through offering guidance on earlier versions of this thesis.
INTRODUCTION

Muslims in Canada are a mixture of descendants of those who settled here more than a century ago and newcomers who continue to migrate to Canada through various immigration channels, including family, economic and refugee class, however, the spotlight seems to consistently be placed on Muslims as a monolithic, problematic, whole. Islamophobic discourse that centres on “irrational fears” of the lack of Muslim integration continues to dominate media and political dialogue, and as a result, there has been a recent rise in far-right anti-Muslim groups, and Islamophobia/hate crimes towards Muslims worldwide have increased significantly in the last few years (Awan, 2019). But how do Islamophobia and anti-Muslim racism impact the integration experiences and outcomes of such a diverse population of Muslims in Canada? While Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) and The Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) have allocated a considerable amount of money to track the experiences of Syrian refugees by funding many research projects on this topic over the last few years ¹, the integration challenges faced by Muslim refugees from complex racial/ethnic/cultural identity backgrounds has gone somewhat unnoticed. Similarly, second and third generation-Muslims and those who come from higher socioeconomic class backgrounds seem to be absent from any discussion on Muslim integration in the West.

Previous literature on Muslims in Canada (Moghissi, Rahnema, Goodman, 2009; Kazemipur, 2014) has certainly been able to effectively underscore the ethnic, cultural, linguistic, national, and religious diversity of Muslim communities. However, although helpful in dispelling long-held myths of homogeneity when it comes to Muslims in the West, there still appears to be an absence in the literature on nuances of experiences - how various groups of Muslims experience Islamophobia and anti-Muslim racism in different ways, particularly on the relationship between social class and Islamophobia and the ways in which socioeconomic class can differently impact experiences and outcomes of multifaceted groups of Western Muslims. Moreover, what do we see when race, immigrant class, and religious identity intersect? Racialized Muslim refugees appear to be triply damned with three stigmatising identities. How do their experiences of racism differ from other Muslims in Canada? And what of those Canadian Muslims who are certainly marginalised by their faith identities, but they fill other “superior” social class categories and seem to not only be fully integrated, but socially optimal? In pursuit of the answers to some of these questions, this sandwich dissertation consists of three stand-alone empirical research papers to shed light on what it means to “be Muslim in Canada”.

In paper one, I provide the results of a media discourse analysis study that highlights the structural dimensions of Islamophobia through representations and framing of incidences involving Muslim vs non-Muslim perpetrators of violence. This study illustrates how islamophobia may be structurally maintained and propagated via the media, as they continue to reproduce a “form of racialized knowledge of the other” (Said, 1978), of Muslims, which results in their stigmatization. In paper two, I present the results of a co-authored study that showcases group level experiences of
Islamophobia and anti-Muslim racism amongst a relatively powerless group of refugee youth in Hamilton Ontario and St. John’s Newfoundland and Labrador. This paper underscores the exceptional difficulties faced by individuals carrying multiple stigmas, and how those who are triply damned- being Muslim, Black and a refugee understand and respond to stigma. Finally, in paper three, I provide a contrasting response to stigma by reporting on the experiences, responses and mobilization of a socioeconomically privileged group of first, second and third generation Muslims in Edmonton. In this paper, I lean on existing concepts like “optimal marginality and “third space”, and I introduce the reader to unique concepts, such as “spiritual marginalization” and “spiritual homelessness”. In this study, I present a somewhat promising antidote to the social and spiritual marginalization of Canadian Muslims through their involvement with Tarjuma, which can be described as a marginality facilitator that fosters their positive integration and “social status optimization”.

This dissertation, which presents multiple empirical analyses of the Muslim experience, is a unique contribution to understanding the ways in which the stigma of being Muslim in an age of rising Islamophobia\(^2\) is understood by Canadian Muslims and responded to from the fractured fault line of their identities. The following sections provide a background to some of the most relevant concepts and themes that I touch upon in the three studies. I pay particular attention to the ways in which Islam has been placed under a spotlight. I also focus on the conceptual relationships between racism, immigration and Muslims. As well, I draw attention to the theoretical discussion surrounding Islamophobia and anti-Muslim racism. I then present a

\(^2\) See Statistics Canada’s report on increase in police reported hate crimes motivated by religion.
literature review of some of the scholarly work done on the Muslim experience in the West. In this section, I explore studies that shed light on the post 9/11 climate for Muslims and the ways in which they have experienced discrimination on borders. I also highlight studies that have focused on Muslim youth and their experiences of Islamophobia in the education system. As well, I look at studies showcasing the experiences of Islamophobia within the healthcare sector, particularly for women. And finally, I explore studies that emphasise the ways in which Muslims have been found to be targeted through unequal employment opportunities.

Background

Muslims in Canada

At 3.2%, Muslims made up a significant portion of the Canadian population in 2011, as was recorded in the last census that asked the question about religious identity (Statistics Canada, 2011). Islam also continues to be the fastest-growing non-Christian religion in Canada (ibid). Considering changes in immigration from Muslim countries and higher than average fertility rates among Muslims (2.4 children per woman for Muslims, compared with 1.6 children per woman for other populations in Canada), the population of Muslims in Canada is likely higher today and projected to rise to 7.2% in 2036 (Statistics Canada, 2017a), at which time, Muslims will replace Jews as the largest religious minority in Canada (Hamdani, 1999).

A mixture of newcomers and descendants of families that settled here more than a century ago, and contrary to persistent misconceptions, Canadian Muslims are quite diverse, in fact, one of the most diverse Muslim populations in the world (Kazemipur, 2014). Canadian Muslims also belong to various ethnic groups, with 37 percent of
South Asian heritage, 21 percent of Arab descent, 14 percent from the Caribbean, and 28 percent from other ethnicities such as, African, Chinese, Turkish, Bosnian, Afghan, Persian, Indonesian etc (Environics, 2007). A majority of Canadian Muslims lives in large urban centres, with two thirds (62 percent) of Muslims in 2011 residing in the metropolitan areas of Toronto and Montreal.

Canadian-born Muslims made up 22% of Muslims in 1991 and jumped to 28% in 2011 (Hamdani, 2015). A point to pay attention to is that a glaringly large majority of Muslims fall into the visible minority category, with an estimated 88 percent of Muslim Canadians identifying as visible minorities (compared to 17 percent among the rest of the population). Canadian Muslims are younger on average than other Canadians, with 60 percent of Canadian Muslims under 35 years of age (compared to 43 percent among the rest of the Canadian population) and with a median age of 28.1 years, compared to the overall Canadian population average age of 37 years (Ibrahim and Janhevich, 2004). Canadian Muslims are more educated on average than other Canadians, with 44 per cent of the Muslims in the working age (25 to 64 years), having a university degree, compared with the national average of 26 per cent, and there are enough Muslim doctorate degree holders (13,955) to fill the academic faculty of two universities in the country (Hamdani, 2015). However, high education levels sadly coincide with high unemployment and under-employment rates for Muslims (Environics, 2007).

In 2011, 13.9 per cent (or 66,000) of Muslims were unemployed, as compared with the national average of 7.8 per cent (ibid). In fact, all visible minorities that share ethnicities and cultures with Muslims and probably studied at the same universities, tend to fare much better than Muslims, with a lower unemployment rate of 9.9 per
cent (Hamdani, 2015). Despite comparatively high education levels, the most common profession of Muslim-Canadians is sales and services at 27 percent, one that does not typically require advanced education (ibid). The inverse relationship between educational attainment and better employment opportunities for Canadian Muslims has reportedly led to feelings of dissatisfaction among them, who insist that their education, qualifications and contributions to Canadian society are consistently undervalued (Ibrahim and Janheviceh, 2004).

In “The Muslim question in Canada”, Kazemipur (2014) underscores the greatest impact of the uneasy relationship between Muslims and the West on the economic integration challenges faced by Muslims in Canada. He claims, the discrimination faced by Muslims in the employment sector can lead to a segmented economy in which Muslims are pushed into lower-paying jobs and unemployment (ibid). In fact, data from his 2014 study shows that Muslims in Canada often end up in jobs for which they are over-qualified, are over-represented among the unemployed and have higher rates of poverty compared to the wider population (ibid). Sadly, in 2001 Muslims were reported to be the highest percentage of those living below the poverty line in Canada, compared to other religious groups (ibid: 121). Moreover, according to a PEW Research Centre (2007: 3) report, in Canada the Muslim poverty rate is between 27 to 32 percent higher than the national poverty rate, which was around 12.5 percent in 2001 […] this gap is higher than that of all other Western countries mentioned in the report (in Kazemipur, 2014:123).

Despite the dismal economic integration struggles faced by Canadian Muslims, the dominant discourse surrounding Muslims in Canada seems to instead focus on whether or not they are ideologically integrated into Canadian society, which
is often mistakenly measured against their commitment to Islam. Such a notion, overlooks the fact that Muslims are also quite diverse in how they choose to practice their faith; “some view it as a spiritual guide, some as a manual for day to day practices, and some as a political manifesto, but even within these categories there are variations” (Kazemipur, 2014: 84). Unfortunately, the perceived non-integration of Muslims in liberal democracies is consistently brought to the fore and at the heart of it is the notion of “Muslim exceptionalism” – that is, a perceived fundamental difference between Muslim and other immigrants with regard to their interaction with host societies (ibid). The most popular explanation for the slow integration of Muslims into host societies is their “unwillingness or inability” to do so, due to rigid religious and cultural beliefs and an “illiberal, violent and uncompromising way of being” that is in direct opposition to the “democratic, liberal, tolerant” values of the West (ibid: 19). However, a study looking at Muslim integration into Western cultures conducted in 2012 indicates “the basic social values of Muslim migrants actually fall roughly midway between those prevailing in their country of origin and their country of destination” (Norris and Inglehart, 2012).

As existing assimilation theories suggest, “Muslim migrants do not move to Western countries with rigidly fixed attitudes; instead, they gradually absorb much of the host culture” (ibid). The authors of the study maintain that compared with Western nations, Islamic societies do demonstrate to be highly conservative on a number of social issues including homosexuality but according to their analysis, Muslim immigrants living within Western societies do not appear to share the same traditional values; instead, the basic values of Muslims living in Western societies, even on issues such as homosexuality, were shown to fall “roughly half-way between the
dominant values prevailing within their countries of destination and origin” (ibid). The authors argue that despite there being obvious “cultural cleavages”, immigrants are not creating a sub-culture that is completely separate from the predominant local mainstream Western culture; instead, “Muslim migrants living in Western societies are located roughly in the center of the cultural spectrum” (ibid). The findings from the previous study directly contradict the notion that immigrants merely import foreign and rigid values of their country of origin into their new country of residence. Rather, the basic cultural values of immigrants appear to change and conform over time. However, misconceptions surrounding their overbearing foreign cultural value system often lead to irrational fears about Muslims, as some suggest, even the “attacks on multiculturalism have become indirect attacks on Islam and Muslims” (Kalin, 2011:4).

Islam Under the Spotlight
Islam continues to be under a global political spotlight, making “being Muslim in the West” a difficult and stressful experience. As a result of global incidents of “Islamic terrorism” being emphasised in media and political rhetoric, and Muslims generally being lumped into an amorphous whole, Muslims in the West are erroneously and continuously framed as a potential “threat” for the Western community at large (Abbas, 2005; Bhattacharyya, 2008; Brighton, 2007; Fortier, 2008; Ingram and Dodds, 2009; Kundnani, 2009; McGhee, 2005, 2008; Moore et al., 2008; Nickels et al., 2010; Poynting and Mason, 2007; Werbner, 2009). Samuel Huntington’s now infamous ‘Clash of Civilizations’ (1996) points to Islam as being especially inherently incompatible with Western liberal values and democracy: “The fundamental problem
for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam” (211). Islam has been singled out by some scholars, as above all others, being at the base of the future clash of civilizations.

For Huntington, Islamic beliefs are the major source of cultural strain in the modern world, and the conflict between the cultures of Islam and the West would be at the focal point of his premonition pertaining to the clash of civilizations (Acevedo, 2008: 1711). Charles Krauthammer (1993) also indicates that Islam has been the ancient enemy of Western values such as tolerance, liberal cosmopolitanism, and respect for universal human rights which are inherited from the Judeo-Christian heritage. According to Kumar (2018: 9), “such a divide between the good Western civilization and bad Islamic civilization is understood from the perspective of West’s claims of having the ownership of modernity, and Islamic civilization’s lack of access to the same, and the ownership itself is underpinned by West’s claims of holding a superior value system as opposed to that of the Islamic world”.

Bernard Lewis has made similar claims about religious authoritarianism as culturally inbuilt in Islam, in fact, democracy and Islam are said by him to not only be incompatible to each other (Lewis 1994: 54–56), but he claims, the doctrines of Islam promote tyranny because no legal procedure or apparatus was ever devised or set up for enforcing the law against the ruler (Lewis 1972: 33). He also makes an interesting point that “Islam is not merely a religion but a political identity and allegiance that transcends all others” (Lewis 1993: 154–156). Even if he is wrong and Islam is not a political identity, the fact that it is so frequently considered to be, must make being Muslim in the West a very contentious experience. Echoing the narratives of Huntington and Lewis (1990) that problematize Islam as the ultimate nemesis of the
West, Harris (2011) claims, “while the other major world religions have been fertile sources of intolerance, it is clear that the doctrine of Islam poses unique problems for the emergence of a global civilization”. Kumar (2018: 17) argues that as a product of the demonization of Islam done by the aforementioned scholars, “the identity of individuals being Muslim does not remain merely as part of a normal religio-social process of primordialist structuration, instead, it becomes a complex phenomenon that gets inter-woven with intricate meanings for the followers of the faith”.

Muslims in Canada tend to be an overwhelmingly immigrant population (Kazemipur, 2014: 24). The latest Statistics Canada census data (2017a) suggests, immigrants account for almost a quarter of Canada’s labour force, and up to 90 per cent of its labour force growth. In fact, the Conference Board of Canada’s May 2018 report projects that without immigration, deaths in this country would exceed births by the year 2034, that the labour force would shrink, social services would face “significant difficulties” in funding, and the necessary tax hikes would likely cause businesses to forego investment in this country. However, opinions about immigrants are not always favourable.

Based on a recent EKOS public opinion poll (2019), while general opposition to immigration is not that different over the past several years, the incidence of those thinking there are too many visible minorities is up significantly and no longer trails opposition to general immigration (as it has historically) (Glavin, 2019). The same EKOS poll (2019) finds that roughly 40 per cent of Canadians harbour an unfavourable view of both the pace of immigration and the proportion of “visible minority” people among immigrants. Interestingly, among the EKOS poll respondents who said there were too many non-Whites among Canada’s newly arrived
immigrants, 69 per cent identified as Conservatives, while only 15 percent identified as Liberals. As NDP and Green voters, 27 percent and 28 percent, respectively, said the same. The results of this poll might explain why race and immigration are so central to political discourse amongst the Conservative Party of Canada (Glavin, 2019). Racial discrimination is now an equally important factor in views about immigration than the broader issue of immigration (ibid), with many politicians placing a spotlight on Muslim immigrants as particularly dubious.

In 2015, The Globe and Mail reported that the intake of Syrian refugees was halted while the Conservative government audited claims of 1,300 refugees already vetted by the UNHCR on the grounds of suspicions of terrorism (Friesen, 2015). An Immigration Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) official told The Toronto Star that the audit was sparked by unsubstantiated reports that Islamic State fighters were ‘actively’ trying to infiltrate the flood of migrants and make their way to Western countries (Campion-Smith and Keung, 2015). In the context of the 2015 federal election, Conservative politicians also publicly linked Syrians fleeing persecution with terrorism (Molnar, 2016). Joe Daniel, Conservative candidate for Don Valley North, claimed that there is a ‘Muslim agenda’ in the Syrian refugee crisis in Europe that he does not want to see replicated in Canada (Harper, 2015). Also, former cabinet minister Peter Kent tweeted a photograph alleging two Syrian asylum-seekers were actually Islamic terrorists in disguise, which was later debunked by the BBC as a forgery (Omar, 2015). As reported in a Toronto Star article in 2016, “an online Care2 petition asking the government to “stop resettling 25,000 Syrian refugees in Canada” garnered over 50,000 signatures in 2016, accompanied by comments such as “terrists [sic]” and “If the Liberal Government wishes to increase the number of refugee's [sic]
to Canada, BRING IN THE CHRISTIANS. I don't think Mr. Trudeau will as he seems to be dedicated to the Muslim Brotherhood” (Kanji, 2016). In 2015, the Harper Conservatives also vowed to create an RCMP tip line where Canadians could report suspected “barbaric cultural practices” such as honour killings and female genital mutilation—practices already illegal under Canadian law. The hotline would have allowed “citizens and victims” to directly reach out to authorities because such “practices have no place in Canadian society”—but the effect was to demonize new Canadians and polarize society around identity politics (Kemp, 2016).

In 2016, conservative candidate Kellie Leitch put forth a proposal in her campaign bid to screen all potential immigrants for “anti-Canadian values”. Her rallying call about the dangerous values that immigrants are importing to Canada has been argued to really be a way to rile up her base over thinly veiled stereotypes about Muslims. Although Kellie Leitch lost her position in the election campaign, her political talk can be seen to have affected public opinions about Muslim immigrants and concerns about them not having Canadian values. According to a 2017 Radio Canada poll, most Canadians (74 per cent) favour a Canadian values test for Muslim immigrants and nearly one out of four Canadians (23 per cent) would favour a ban on Muslim immigration to this country, a level of support that rose to 32 per cent in Quebec. While the survey found that 46 per cent of Canadians believe that immigrants in general make Canada “a better place to live”, the poll suggests clear trends of a lack of comfort with Muslim immigrants. Muslim immigrants also polled lowest with Quebecers on the question of which groups were best integrated into Canadian society, garnering 42 per cent compared with 72 per cent for Jewish immigrants, 82 per cent for Haitians, and 87 per cent for Asians (Radio Canada, 2019).
Starting in 2016, the religious accommodation and prayer debate at the Peel District School board that has dominated the news is yet another example of the ways in which Muslims, even children, not only continue to be central to national discussions on what values define Canadianness, but how Muslims stand to be on the receiving end of public and institutional scrutiny. During that time, Muslim practices were described by community members and political figures as patriarchal and as too often requiring special treatment (see, Bush in Peel Board, 2017). When the reasonable accommodation debates shifted to discussing the place of prayer in public schools, some statements became openly Islamophobic (Barras et al., 2018). On one occasion, Islam was said to “spread hatred” and “poison” (Spencer, 2017a), and in another instance, a former Mississauga mayoral candidate distributed flyers during a board meeting claiming that the Qur’an should be “banned as hate literature” (Johnston, cited in Spencer, 2017b).

Events in 2017 alone, the Quebec City mosque shootings, the public reaction to the subsequent anti-Islamophobia M-103 motion tabled and passed in the House of Commons by the federal Liberals, and Bill 62 on face coverings adopted by the Quebec provincial government, underscore the effects of the continuous negative spotlight placed on Muslims in Canada. The suspicion and fear of Muslims, be they Canadian citizens or newly arrived immigrants and refugees, has played out in social policy legislation through anti-terror laws such as Bill C-51, or Bill C-24, which gives the government the right to strip dual citizens of their Canadian citizenship. Seeing Islam as culturally incompatible with Canada – legislation such as Bill 62 can be seen as having an obsession with Muslim women's head scarves and face covers, or a patriarchal impulse to rescue them from "barbaric cultural practices". 
Political concerns about Muslim immigration and terrorism recently resurfaced at the arrest and subsequent release of Hussam Eddin Alzahabi, a 20-year-old Syrian refugee in Kingston, Ontario, by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) on January 24th, 2019. Although he did not mention Alzahabi by name or discuss his background, Conservative party leader Andrew Scheer released a provocative statement hours after the RCMP informed the media about the arrests:

It's clear that Canada's refugee screening process needs to be seriously examined [...] Conservatives will continue fighting against Justin Trudeau's attempts to weaken Canada's national security laws and implement real policies to ensure that Canada's streets and communities are safe. The arrests made it clear that Canada’s refugee screening process needs to be seriously examined. We’ve recently learned of several examples of dangerous individuals entering the country, due in part to lax screening procedures - (Kermalli, 2019; Austen and Bilefsky, 2019).

In Europe, Sakib and Ishraq Osman (2019: 1) recently tested whether Syrian refugee influx has increased the far-right rhetoric (e.g. ‘negative mention of internationalism’ and ‘negative mention of multiculturalism’) and found that “the shockwaves of Syrian refugee influx are coupled with the phenomenal rise of the far-right parties in Europe, as well as, far-right rhetoric in general”. Thousands of miles away in Canada, similar patterns have been observed between anti-immigration political rhetoric and a rise in right wing extremism (Perry and Scriven, 2018). According to a recent study examining the factors that are associated with the emergence of right-wing extremist groups and right-wing inspired violence in Canada, “American politics of hate unleashed by president Donald Trump’s right-wing populist posturing has also galvanized Canadian White supremacist ideologies, identities, movements and practices” (ibid: 17). Following Trump’s win, Canada experienced a rise in alt-right
activities including, “posters plastered on telephone poles in Canadian cities invited “White people” to visit alt-right websites; Neo-Nazis spray painted swastikas on a mosque, a synagogue and a church with a Black pastor; and online, a reactionary White supremacist subculture violated hate speech laws with impunity while stereotyping and demonizing non-White people” (ibid: 2).

The mainstream media continues to be a major source of information about Islam and Muslims for Western audiences and is seen as a primary carrier of the “closed views of Islam” (Laflamme, 2018). Although the othering of Muslims has been happening long before the events of 9/11, media discourse was mostly focused on issues related to race and immigration (ibid). Post-9/11 media discourse that has heavily focused on Muslim terrorism has contributed to the painting of all Muslims with the same damning brush, as potential threats to the cultural norms and “good” values of Canadian society. In representing ‘difference’, the “stereotyping” of the ‘other’ has profound impact as it “engages feelings, attitudes and emotions and it mobilizes fears and anxieties in the [reader/viewer]” (Hall, 1997: 226). Racially charged political and media discourse on Muslims have arguably contributed to Muslims becoming folk devils and has helped generate a moral panic in Canadian society that has fuelled the fear of Muslims. Muslims have been constructed as the “enemies within” that threaten the stability of the nation (Zine, 2019). As noted by Ali (2008: 23), certain language used in the media that equates terrorism to Muslims “can lead to the creation of categories such as ‘us’ and ‘them’ which in turn can give rise to discourses that ‘they’ (Islamic fundamentalists) pose a clear threat to ‘our’ (the democratic West’s) way of life”. Canadian newspapers played a significant role in constructing negative images of Muslims and this culture of fear has in turn further
alienated Muslim communities in Canada (Shah, 2017). The media’s unusually extensive coverage of issues related to Muslims has played a major role in shaping the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims in Canada (Kazemipur, 2014: 88). Harmful representations of Muslims have led to negative discourses that continue to fan the flames of an irrational fear. This Islamophobia has not only resulted in increased racism and discrimination against Muslims (Shah, 2017) but it may well be exacerbating an identity crisis for some.

Due to the continued anti-Muslim discourse from far-right groups, as well as from those in positions of political power, many Muslim Canadians are contending with the backlash of the debates, negative imagery, and incendiary news stories. As noted by the leading Muslim advocacy organisation in Canada, National Council of Canadian Muslims (NCCM), “every time a global incident of terrorism occurs, not only are Muslims experiencing the same shock and grief as any other person, they are also worried about the collective blame they will have to deal with if the perpetrator ends up being Muslim […] the first thing that comes to mind is ‘please God, don’t let it be a Muslim’ and when it is a Muslim, they feel like they have to put on their armour as they leave their homes” (NCCM, 2017). The spike of Islamophobic incidences post 9/11 sparked scholarly interest (Allen and Nielsen, 2002; Hanniman, 2008; Helly, 2004; Sheridan and Gillet, 2005). However, Muslims in the West have been on the receiving end of anti-Muslim discrimination long before the 2001 terror attacks (Conway, 1997; Gerges, 1997; Halliday, 1999; Poynting and Mason, 2007), and it continues today (Wilkins-Laflamme, 2018).

Anti-Muslim discrimination and stereotyping are prevalent in Canada (Environics, 2016). The irrational fear and hate towards Muslims that manifests itself
in various forms of discrimination and violence is reflected in the alarming rise in attacks against Muslims in Canada (NCCM, 2017). Although hate crimes were shown to have decreased overall, hate crimes against the Muslim community almost tripled from 2014 to 2015 (Statistics Canada, 2016; NCCM, 2017). In fact, according to Statistics Canada (2018) data, the number of police-reported hate crimes, driven largely by incidents targeting Muslim, Jewish and Black people, have been steadily climbing since 2014, but shot up by some 47 per cent in 2017, reaching an all-time high. According to incident reports collected by NCCM, there are daily occurrences of hate propaganda, verbal and physical violence, threats, vandalism, and online comments targeting Muslims.

According to a survey conducted in 2016, “one in three Canadian Muslims reports having experienced discrimination in the past five years, due primarily to one’s religion or ethnicity; this is well above the levels of mistreatment experienced by the population-at-large” (Environics Institute, 2016: 38). The survey highlights a variety of settings where such discrimination occurs such as, the workplace, in public spaces, in retail establishments, and in schools and universities. Further, irrespective of gender, age and country of birth, one in four Muslims reports having encountered difficulties crossing borders (ibid: 39). Poignantly, the study underscores the way in which such experiences reflect on a person’s hope for the future, with Muslim youth (those aged 18 to 34) found to be “least optimistic about the next generation facing less discrimination than their own” (ibid: 37). By way of mistaken association, those who are wrongly believed to be Muslim also become victims. The Sikh and Christian Arab communities are frequently targeted because people think they are Muslim. This,
of course, is telling given that Islamophobia is a form of racism that impacts anyone who “appears” to be Muslim.

According to a very recent (April 2019) Ipsos poll conducted on behalf of Global News, Muslims continue to be seen as the most likely targets of racism (59%) and over a quarter of Canadians (26%) believe it has become more acceptable to be prejudiced against Muslims/Arabs. Though nearly 60% of Canadians agree that Islamophobia is a problem that needs to be addressed, 3 in 10 actually agree with a stereotype that Muslims in Canada follow Sharia law instead of Canadian law. While Ontario residents (65%) are more likely to agree that Islamophobia needs to be addressed, Quebec residents (39%) are more likely to show agreement with the stereotype concerning Sharia Law. In comparison, only 2 in 10 Canadians believe stereotypes about Jewish control of the media and finance. As well, over a quarter of Canadians believe that in the past 5 years, it has become “more acceptable” to be prejudiced against either Muslims/Arabs, while 15% say the same about Jews. The results of this poll are sadly not surprising, but they underscore the difficulties faced by Muslims in Canada.

Despite many years of multicultural identity, Canada still struggles with who it is and its acceptance of diversity and tolerance of discrimination. Some have argued, in Canadian multiculturalism there is a brazen, “ingrained and acknowledged privileging of the majority’s history, values, and language” (Omar, 2011). Will Kymlicka (2001) goes as far to say that although appearing neutral on the surface, there is an evident favouring of the dominant groups. According to Taylor (1994) and Yusuf (2000), liberal multiculturalism adopts and universalizes a Christian perception of religion and so for Muslims, “religious freedom becomes merely the Islamic
identity freedom to conform to another society’s perception of what religion entails” (2000: 32). Religious minorities like Muslims, who offer different worldviews on the purpose and place of religion in society, seemingly pose a challenge to Canadian multiculturalism (Meer, 2007; Modood, 2007; Taylor, 1994). As such, perhaps the multiculturalism system in Canada was never intended to facilitate the integration of the Muslim community, nor was multiculturalism meant to eliminate the challenges that Muslims and similar minority groups face (Omar, 2011). The mistreatment of Muslim communities in the post 9/11 era brings to the forefront Canada’s foundation as a racial state, which has been argued is something that has been hidden by multiculturalism (Nagra and Maurutto, 2016). Canadian racism originates from Canada’s colonial identity (Charmaine and Camille, 2004) - “modern racism in Canada has deep colonial roots”, in that contemporary racism is simply historical racism; it is just a continuation and adaptation in another form, another guise of policies, strategies, systems (Charmaine, 2017: 1). As such, perhaps by the continuous “othering” of Muslims, Islamophobia has become yet another example of the ways in which colonial thinking can successfully co-exist in an optimistically egalitarian society. We need not look too far into Canada’s history to see how racism from the past has transformed into racism of today.

Racism
As described by Bonilla-Silva (2015: 1359), “racism produced (and continues to produce) “races” out of peoples who were not so before” as “the product of racial domination projects (e.g., colonialism, slavery, labor migration, etc.), and once this form of social organization emerged in human history, it became embedded in
societies” (Bonilla-Silva, 2001; Robinson, 2000). According to Garner (2010), the core of racism comprises three elements:

1) A set of ideas [ideology] in which the human race is divisible into distinct ‘races’, each with specific natural characteristics derived from culture, physical appearance or both; 2) A historical power relationship in which, over time, groups are racialized, that is, treated as if specific characteristics were natural and innate to each member of the group; 3) Forms of discrimination flowing from this [practices] ranging on spectrums from denial of access to material resources at one end to genocide at the other.

Defining racism as ideology, as done so by Miles and Brown (2003: 83), includes within its scope “unstructured and unsupported assertions, stereotypical ascriptions and symbolic representations; beliefs that are consciously held but not logically structured”. As such, racism is “primarily an ideology, but it is articulated and manifested in a plurality of forms” (ibid) and can be defined as a negative, dehumanizing, and oppressive view, attitude, behavior and action towards members of another group, which can be biological, scientific, academic, institutional and cultural (Zine, 2003). It also intersects with other markers of difference, such as ethnicity, class, gender, religion, and citizenship. In situations involving racism, individuals, groups, communities, or institutions exercise abusive power over other human beings. Racism facilitates and justifies political, social and cultural structures of inequality and the systems of dominance based on race and other markers of difference (Zine, 2003). The aforementioned definitions of racism are based on an understanding of ‘race’ as not being exclusively derived from phenotypes and this is the crux of the problems facing scholars addressing Islamophobia (Garner and Selod, 2014: 3) - more on this later.
There is a long and ongoing debate about the relationship between capitalism, colonialism, slavery and racism. Although some have described colonization as an economically driven capitalistic venture that did not arise out of racist motives (Massey, 1999), racism became an important driving force to justify the ongoing subordination of Blacks after emancipation (Hirschman, 2004). And so, colonialism gave birth to racism and racism was used to justify colonial ideology, forming a dialectic relationship between the two. Although racism is now considered to be immoral (despite its continuous presence), varying forms of implicit racism are imbedded in our society within institutional and social settings that limit the social mobility of all racialized individuals. The forced colonization of Indigenous peoples in Canada was not driven by racist ideology but has left a lasting legacy of racialized inequality. The sub-par socioeconomic condition of Indigenous peoples in Canada is not only a testament to the fact that the effects of colonialism linger, but that racism plays an important part in the treatment of Indigenous people.

The “colour line” (Du bois, 1903) referred to a worldwide system of racial stratification embedded in White supremacy and pseudo-scientific racism (social Darwinism) during the late eighteenth century, where people socially defined as non-White were ruled, exploited, and colonized by people socially defined as White (Mills, 1997 in Fleming & Morris, 2015). As Warren, (2010: 110) proclaims, “Whites historically have been the architects of the racist system, and many continue to be complicit in its operation”. Although racist ideas may not have directly caused slavery, imperialism, and cases of modern genocide, the ideology of White superiority provided legitimation and rationalization for them (Hirschman, 2004). By the twentieth century, a system of White supremacist racism was part of a global colour
line stretching across the world, rendering people of colour exploitable (Hanchard, 2003; Mills, 1997; Said, 1978 in Fleming & Morris, 2015). As racial ideologies lost official and scientific legitimacy, race started to be viewed as a social, rather than a biological category to describe those who may share common physical features (e.g., skin colour) or geographical origin (Hirschman, 2004). The focus was shifted to ethnicity, which Max Weber (1978:389) defined as an ethnic group’s “subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization and migration”. The ethnicity model takes into account cultural indicators and not just skin-colour based indicators of “race”. The focus also shifted to class-based explanations for racial antagonisms.

Marxist inspired explanations for racism (see Cox, 1948; Bonacich, 1972; Miles 1989; Hall, 1980 in Miles, 2003, Wilson, 1991 & 2001; McNally, 2006) tend to see “class dynamics as the real engine of racial dynamics” (Stasialis, 1989: 276), however, they are accused of being “plagued by economic determinism and class reductionism” (ibid). Roediger (1991: 8) explains, “to set race within social formations is absolutely necessary, but to reduce race to class is damaging”. Rather than viewing racism as an all-powerful ideology that explains all racial phenomena in a society, Bonilla-Silva (1997: 469) instead uses the term racism “only to describe the racial ideology of racialized social systems, which are societies that allocate differential economic, political, social, and even psychological rewards to groups along racial lines that are socially constructed”, and so, racism is only part of a larger racial system.

Racism is reproduced by societal structures (Allport, 1954) and “Whiteness”, like ‘colour’ of ‘Blackness’, is essentially a social construct applied to human beings
rather than a truth of universal validity (Henry & Tator, 2006: 23). Racism is thus conceived as an unstable, time- and context-dependent category (Hirschman, 2004:409) that is constantly being transformed by political struggle (Omi and Winant, 1994:63). Rather than just the Black/White binary, today, society is plagued by many types of “racisms” (Satzewich, 1998; O’Brien, 2009) that are dependent on historical circumstances (Backhouse, 2001:11), and as Bonilla-Silva (2014) describes, “smiling “discrimination”” by men in suits instead of angry men in white hoods should be of greater concern. New “implicit prejudice” theories have argued that modern prejudice is multidimensional, combining racial and seemingly non-racial beliefs (Quillian, 2006).

“Internalized racism”, which Hall (1986:26 in Pyke, 2010) described as “the ‘subjection’ of the victims of racism to the mystifications of the very racist ideology which imprison and define them” is experienced by colonized people. Many years earlier, Fanon (1952) also claimed that colonialism is internalized by the colonized, inculcating an “inferiority complex”. Confirming this point, Jeff Denis (2015: 232) recently found that despite the reclaiming of ethnic identity, due to the resurgence of ethnic pride and consciousness (Nagel, 1995 in Denis, 2015: 232), “some still carry the scars of internalized racism, engraved through residential schools or other traumatic experiences and are revealed today in stereotypes that some express about their own people, such as self-blaming explanations for poverty, and a tendency to buy into laissez-faire ideology. Such individuals often embrace and are embraced by Whites, who both subtype them and see them as validating their prejudice”. Du Bois’ concept of double consciousness (1903), which basically states that minority groups learn to read themselves through the impressions of the majority population, and
adjust their behaviour, accordingly, has supported a large body of work on African-Americans’ experiences in the USA. However, its basic premise can be applied to the stigma management practices of Muslims in the West, where, in a climate of rising negative attitudes towards them, “Muslims deploy brands of ‘double consciousness’ to manage the risks of discrimination, confrontation and abuse” (Garner and Selod, 2014: 9) - more on this later.

Despite the end of historical colonialism and the debunking of race as a biological indicator, we can say that both colonialism and racism have left their legacies, and in the spirit of the Thomas theorem, “are real in their consequences” (Thomas & Thomas, 1928: 571). Racialized groups are discriminated against in nearly all areas of life in Canada (Satzewich, 1993:147). Bonilla-Silva (2001: 12) laid the groundwork for a whole body of literature on a new system of racism that no longer relied on overt expressions of racism, he defined this “new racism” as the system or racial structure characteristic of the post–Civil Rights era that comprised the following elements:

1. The increasingly covert nature of racial discourse and practices
2. The avoidance of direct racial terminology
3. The elaboration of a racial political agenda that eschews direct racial references
4. The subtle character of most mechanisms to reproduce racial privilege
5. The re-articulation of some racial practices of the past.

Bonilla-Silva (2001: 12) warns us that in this new racism, “Blacks and Whites remain mostly separate and unequal in many areas of social life and that racial inequality is still produced in a systematic way (i.e., there is still a racial structure in America), but that the dominant practices that produce it are no longer overt, seem almost invisible,
and are seemingly non-racial”. Other scholars have called this new prejudice laissez-faire racism (Bobo et al., 1997), competitive racism (Essed, 1991), or symbolic racism (Kinder & Sanders, 1996). Bobo, Kluegel, and Smith (1996) and Sears and Henry (2005) refer to “the virtual disappearance of overt bigotry” in America. However, research done by Dovidio and Gaertner (2000: 318) on aversive racism indicates that old-fashioned racism is not no longer a problem, indeed, traditional racism is a force that still exists and can operate independently of contemporary forms of racism. Pillay and Collings (2004: 608) contend, “different forms of racism may [...] coexist, with different degrees of prominence, in any given society”. While suggesting that in the USA certain old-fashioned beliefs have largely been “discredited,” Collins (2005: 6) argues that such beliefs are still propagated in “White Supremacist literature” and that new racism can be seen as “past-in-present forms of racial oppression” (2005: 201).

In his more recent work, Bonilla-Silva (2015: 1364) expands on his previous definition of “new racism” by introducing us to a new dominant racial ideology that he labeled “color-blind racism” – a racial ideology (Bonilla-Silva, 2013) based on the superficial extension of the principles of liberalism to racial matters that results in “raceless” explanations for all sorts of race-related affairs. Bonilla-Silva (2015: 1365) argues that racism has always been systemic in America, but racial domination was structured differently during slavery than during Jim Crow, and since the late 1960s, the “new racism” regime has developed as a clever way of reproducing White rule in a seemingly nonracial way.

*Immigration and Racism*
“There is a dialectic relationship between migration and racism” (Miles, 2003: 117), as racism continues to characterize immigration policy (Simmons, 1998). Li (1998) found that the Canadian economy places a market value on skin colour—those defined as non-White suffer an income penalty, while most White Canadians receive an income premium. Canada’s visible minorities earn less, have chronic levels of unemployment, and live in poverty more often than ethnic groups of European origin (Galabuzzi, 2005). Racism has negative consequences for educational achievement (Davis & Guppy, 1998). There is also systemic racism and disproportionate representation in the criminal justice system, including the limiting of the free movement of Muslim, Arab, and Asian communities in the post-9/11 era, there is a lack of political representation (Galabuzzi, 2006), many experience police racial profiling, have higher incarceration rates (Satzewich et al. 1993:90; Henry & Tator, 2006) and are marked as perpetual “foreign threats” (Smith, 2006: 68). Also, the Reform Party’s attack on immigration and multiculturalism was underpinned by racist discourses (Kirkham, 1998). Although overt racism is not as commonplace today, varying forms of implicit racism are imbedded in our society within institutional and social settings that limit the social mobility of all racialized individuals.

A study that analysed the effect on employers of “non-Canadian accents and ‘ethnic’ sounding names” found that “the most significant amount of discrimination was directed at Indo-Pakistanis, followed by Black West Indians (Henry & Ginzberg, 1985:5 in Li, 1998: 125) – it must be noted that Pakistani’s are predominantly Muslim. In Quebec, Muslims, and in particular Arab-Muslims are found, with Blacks, to be the group hardest hit by discrimination (Bouchard & Taylor, 1998), making religion (non-visible stigma) and Blackness (visible stigma) the two most prevailing
characteristics of racial discrimination. Mixed race individuals who identify as both White and non-White, or “white skinned” Arabs, who are white-without receiving the privilege that comes along with it (Smith, 2006) are an example of those with complex identity who face discrimination. As victims of the “racial logic of Orientalism” they are cast as inferior and threatening and (ibid) face the same barriers as non-Whites due to other markers of difference (e.g. accent, dress-code). Discrimination and socioeconomic outcomes are further complicated and exacerbated by the intersections of race, class, gender, religion, and immigrant-class, with those falling in more than one category, such as racialized Muslim refugee women, being more likely to be targeted.

*Islamophobia and Anti-Muslim Racism*

In 1997 the Runnymede Trust on behalf of the Commission for British Muslims & Islamophobia (CBMI) published a report, “*Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All*”, that introduced the word Islamophobia into Britain’s political lexicon as “a useful shorthand way of referring to dread or hatred of Islam – and, therefore, to fear or dislike all or most Muslims” (6). The report encompassed the overt, covert and sometimes unwittingly unfavourable treatment of people from a Muslim background. According to the commission, the report was responding to “a natural worry about specific individual acts of rudeness and hostility towards Muslims, which seemed to be intensifying […] but the research for that report also pointed to broader concerns including the social and economic exclusion to which British Muslims were subject to then and now” (ibid: 6). Since its introduction by Runnymede Trust, others have given their own more detailed definitions of the term Islamophobia, which some have gone
as far to argue “translates into individual, ideological and systemic forms of oppression and discrimination that has been constructed as an ideological tool to legitimate campaigns of political, social, economic, and military domination” (Zine, 2003: 6).

A less seemingly conspiratorial definition was later offered by Allen (2010) who identifies three distinct components to Islamophobia: (1) Islamophobia as an ideology, (2) Islamophobia as modes of operation through which the ideology is sustained and perpetuated (such as the propagation of closed views on Islam); and (3) Islamophobia as exclusionary practices, which target Muslims and Islam in a variety of social spheres. In his attempt to consolidate the many broad and conflicting definitions of Islamophobia whilst incorporating Allen’s (2010) components, Robin Richardson (2012) describes it as “a shorthand term referring to a multifaceted mix of discourse, behavior and structures which express and perpetuate feelings of anxiety, fear, hostility and rejection towards Muslims, particularly but not only in countries where people of Muslim heritage live as minorities”.

More recently, Beydoun (2016: 111) proposed two further important distinctions to consider by delineating private Islamophobia, as “the fear, suspicion, and violent targeting of Muslims by individuals or private actors” and structural Islamophobia, as “the fear and suspicion of Muslims on the part of institutions—most notably, government agencies— that is manifested through the enactment and advancement of policies”. Beydoun (2016: 111) explains private Islamophobia to be informed by government policy and programming but furthered by “nonstate actors’ use of religious or racial slurs, mass protests or rallies, or violence against Muslim subjects”. Structural Islamophobia, on the other hand, takes place on a larger
institutional level with superficially neutral policies that in fact disproportionately target Muslims and is built upon the presumption that Muslim identity is associated with a national security threat and as a result, structural policies are put in place that unequally “jeopardize, chill, and curtail their [Muslim people’s] civil liberties” (ibid).

The concept of structural Islamophobia highlights that Islamophobia is a modern extension of “Orientalism,” (Said, 1978) a master discourse that positions Islam—a faith, people, and imagined geographic sphere—as the civilizational foil of the West” (Beydoun, 2016: 115).

The original Runnymede definition of Islamophobia has been the most widely used over the years but one that has also been heavily criticized, mostly for its apparently overly simplistic and binary approach. Those who are skeptical of the term Islamophobia argue that it confuses hatred of, and discrimination against, Muslims on the one hand with criticism of Islam on the other and the charge of “Islamophobia” is all too often used not to highlight racism but to silence critics of Islam, or even Muslims fighting for reform of their communities (Malik, 2005). The worry seemed to have been that if ‘closed views’ equal Islamophobia, the ‘open views’ must equal Islamophilia (Allen, 2010), consequently, legitimate and valid disagreement and criticism could be censured or at least conceived to be Islamophobic and thereby unsuitable for any use in policy and political interventions (ibid). According to Garner and Selod (2014: 5), the main problem with Islamophobia as a term is its linguistic base, since the word ‘phobia’ introduces the idea of irrational fears and often denotes a mental disorder, moving us further toward the individual and the psychological, and further away from the social, the collective and the structural or systemic. As such,
some have taken a step further to delineate anti-Muslim racism as analytically separate from Islamophobia (Hussain and Bagguley, 2012).

In her book on racism in a supposedly post-racial society, Angela Davis (2012) claims, “differently racialized populations in the United States - First Nations, Mexican, Asian, and more recently people of Middle Eastern and South Asian descent, have been targets of different modes of racial subjugation and Islamophobia draws on and complicates what we know as racism”. The term racialization is used to explain the categorizing of people into racial categories in general but it also refers to the way in which specific traits and attributes, which are connected in some way to racialized people, are reasoned to be ‘abnormal’ and inferior (Hanniman, 2008). Rather than being purely defined by immutable physical markers, the concept of race is in fact, shaped by social and political processes. Chon and Arzt (2005) argue that social meanings attached to phenotypical characteristics are what constitute race. Since 9/11, ‘Islam is acquiring characteristics of immutability, innateness, inevitable inheritability, and inferiority’ (ibid: 228), therefore, despite religion being a matter of choice and not immutable, it can be a decisive element in the social construction of an inferior racial category (Nagra, 2011). Individuals may have prejudices towards a variety of racialized characteristics such as, name, accent or manner of speech, clothing and grooming, diet, beliefs and practices, leisure preferences, places of origin and citizenship (Ontario Human Rights Commission, 2005). Racialization may explain the propensity to consider all Muslims/Arabs as terrorists or terrorist supporters (Chon and Arzt, 2005). Such an understanding can explain how the racialization of Muslim culture and religion emerged as a new form of racism in Canadian society after 9/11 (Shah, 2017). Garner and Selod (2014: 5) argue that
Islamophobia can be seen as “a set of ideas and practices that amalgamate all Muslims into one group and the characteristics associated with Muslims (violence, misogyny, political allegiance/disloyalty, incompatibility with Western values, etc.) are treated as if they are innate”. As such, they deploy the ‘religion can be raced’ logic by situating racialization as a way to explain and understand Islamophobia as racism towards a Muslim population (ibid).

As a response to the many criticisms and concerns, in their (2017) executive summary report, The Runnymede Trust provided a revised short definition of Islamophobia as simply “anti-Muslim racism”. The longer-form definition builds on the United Nations definition of racism generally and reads as the following:

Islamophobia is any distinction, exclusion, or restriction towards, or preference against, Muslims (or those perceived to be Muslims) that has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.

In line with this opinion, the new proposed working definition of Islamophobia provided by Tariq Modood (2018: 1) similarly states that:

Islamophobia is the racializing of Muslims based on physical appearance or descent as members of a community and attributing to them cultural or religious characteristics to vilify, marginalise, discriminate or demand assimilation and thereby treat them as second-class citizens.

According to Modood (2018), Islamophobia is a form of cultural racism because while the perception and treatment of Muslims clearly has a religious and cultural dimension it equally, clearly, bears a physical appearance or ancestral component.
Similarly, Sherene Razack (2008) argues that ideas about fundamental civilizational clashes between Muslims and the West generate the classification of “Muslim” as a racialized or ethnic designation, with individual religious affiliation not necessarily having much relevance for who is seen as “Muslim” and who is not. Since members of the Sikh, Christian Arab, Jewish Arab and Hindu communities have all reported incidents of Islamophobic and anti-Muslim harassment that were intended towards Muslims (Richardson, 2012), it is clear that anti-Muslim hatred tends to be broader in its scope than just towards practicing Muslims. Those who “appear to be Muslim” – non-White, donning beards, head coverings, and middle-eastern garb, may actually be as vulnerable to anti-Muslim hate as those who practice Islam. Conversely, those who practice Islam but are White and blend easily/ “pass” in society as non-Muslim and non- “other”, may in fact, fall under the radar and bypass the hate. Perceived religious difference is a critical component of the racial formation of the other in the context of terrorism (Chon and Arzt, 2005: 240) and so– it is also probably more likely that someone who is a darker skinned Muslim will be targeted more often than a lighter skinned Muslim. In this case, it would seem important to include race as central to the definition of anti-Muslim discrimination and hate that is experienced by those who appear Muslim.

British society had no laws in the 1990s that prevented religious discrimination, and so it is important to note that those who promoted the idea that Islamophobia was a form of racism may have done so, in part, to help frame anti-Muslim discrimination as a ‘race relations’ issue, because it “is” racism. However, many critics took issue precisely with the idea of Islamophobia being defined as a form of racism. In his policy exchange paper on “defining Islamophobia”, Jenkins
(2018) points out a myriad of faults with referring to Islamophobia as “anti-Muslim” racism. He claims that tackling Muslim disadvantage in fact demands different treatment for those who declare themselves to be Muslims – with prayer rooms, holiday arrangements and so on, however, combating racial disadvantage necessitates the opposite, ensuring that people are treated similarly irrespective of their ethnicity. Further, he argues that since Islamophobia is said to be a problem suffered by all Muslims as a single group because of their “Muslimness”, it would be very hard to argue that this is about “racism”, since Muslims are a conspicuously multiracial and multicultural group – some are secular, some highly devout, many in-between, some drink alcohol, some wear head coverings, others don’t (Jenkins, 2018). Similarly, for Miles and Brown treating Islamophobia as a form of racism risks treating all Muslims as an ethnically homogenous minority (Miles and Brown, 2003).

Other criticisms have ranged from Joppke’s (2009) outright dismissal of the concept, through accepting its empirical reality, but questioning the utility of the term (e.g. Halliday, 1999), to seeing it as a form of cultural racism (e.g. Modood, 2005). Lopez (2011) rejects the notion of Islamophobia as a form of racism, cultural or otherwise, because it is ‘devoid of any of the biological or cultural determinism . . .’ (Lopez, 2011: 559) of racist discourses. He claims that Islamophobia may reference somatic characterizations, but typically it refers to representations of supposedly Islamic beliefs and practices, whereas racist discourse about a Muslim minority may not entail any reference whatsoever to their religious beliefs and practices (Lopez, 2011). We of course already know from historical events that racism did not and does not depend on the actual existence of races, nor does it rely on a person’s practice of faith. In the last fifty years the two communities in Europe that have been subjugated
to some of the most intense forms of racist genocidal violence were the German Jews and the Bosnian Muslims and in both cases, being Jewish or being a Muslim was not about endorsing a set of beliefs or engaging in a set of practices (Sayyid, 2011: 3-4). Rather, in both cases, one only needed to belong to a perceived racialized ethnic group in order to be seen as the inferior other.

In their argument on how racialization enables an understanding of Muslim and Muslim American experience as racial, Selod and Embrick, (2013: 645) argue that for “newer immigrant populations, Muslim signifiers and symbols have become riddled with essentialized racial meanings such as foreign, violent, aggressive, and misogynistic, resulting in the belief that a Muslim body is incapable of upholding democratic or Western ideals and values”. For many Muslims, the process by which they become racialized has been called “ethno-racism - a concept that incorporates cultural markers, such as clothing, language, and beliefs, as the basis for racism” (Selod and Embrick, 2013). Rana (2011: 28) puts forth a similar argument in stating, “the conceptual history of Islamophobia is based in a theory of racial ascription of bodily comportment, superimposition, and dissimulation—that is the assorted ways to define ‘race’ based on visual attributes such as skin colour and phenotype, as well as customs and costumes. He argues, “the process of racializing Muslims involves placing biological and cultural determinism in a contradictory logic purporting that race is immutable and essential but simultaneously mutable and fluid” (Rana, 2011: 28). Thus, in a post-9/11 world, the Muslim terrorist body derives from an imagined Muslim nation through the conflation of South Asian and Arab countries (ibid).

On the construction of an “Arab/Middle Eastern/Muslim” category, Nadine Naber (Jamal and Naber, 2008: 278) says “the arbitrary, open-ended scope of the
domestic “war on terror” emerged through the association between a wide range of signifiers such as particular names (e.g., Mohammed), dark skin, particular forms of dress (e.g., a headscarf or a beard) and particular nations of origin (e.g., Iraq or Pakistan) as signifiers of an imagined “Arab/Middle Eastern/Muslim” enemy. As a result, persons perceived to be “Arab/Middle Eastern/Muslim” were targeted by harassment or violence based on the assumption “they” embody a potential for terrorism and are thus threats to U.S. national security and deserving of discipline and punishment. In this sense, the category “Arab/Middle Eastern/Muslim” has operated as a constructed category that lumps together several incongruous subcategories (such as Arabs and Iranians, including Christians, Jews, and Muslims, and all Muslims from Muslim majority countries, as well as persons who are perceived to be Arab, Middle Eastern, or Muslim, such as South Asians, including Sikhs and Hindus) (ibid).

The ‘religion can be raced’ argument put forth by Garner and Selod (2014: 4), which my research relies heavily on, uses the following five major reasons for referring to Islamophobia as a form of racism:

1. ‘Race’ has historically been derived from both physical and cultural characteristics: the long 19th century of body-fixated race theory is an anomaly in a longer history that evidences various combinations of culture and phenotype being combined to define racial characteristics.

2. On the basis of these definitions, groups thus racialized (made into either de jure or de facto ‘races’) are assigned to a hierarchy with White Europeans (later ‘Caucasians’) at its summit, and other groups in their wake. The process of racialization entails ascribing sets of characteristics viewed as inherent to members of a group because of their physical or cultural traits. These are not limited to skin tone or pigmentation but include a myriad of attributes including cultural traits such as language, clothing, and religious practices. The characteristics thus emerge as ‘racial’ as an outcome of the process. Racialization provides the language needed to discuss newer forms of racism that are not only based on skin colour, as well as older forms.
(3) Muslims have historically been one of these groups that experience racism, as have other faith-based groups, most obviously Jews. Their racialization is accomplished not only by reference to religion but other aspects of culture such as physical appearance (including but not limited to dress).

(4) Muslims can be racialized, and the ways (plural) in which this occurs can be understood as constituting Islamophobia.

(5) Islamophobia is therefore a specific form of racism targeting Muslims, and racialization is a concept that helps capture and understand how this works, in different ways at different times, and in different places.

According to a 2012 study in Britain that looked at Islamophobic discourses following the London bombings of 2005, local Muslims of South Asian origin experienced the backlash from the 7/7 bombings due to their skin colour and also their Islamic dress, which reflected local tendencies to identify Muslims using racialized criteria. The authors claim that Islamophobia, racialization and racism interact in specific historical and political circumstances and they argue against some recent tendencies either to dismiss the existence of Islamophobia or to treat it as a special instance of cultural racism (2012).

People read Muslim-ness onto individuals by using a combination of ideas about culture and appearance” (Garner and Selod, 2014: 9) and if the outward markers of Islam are absent, ‘passing’ as a non-Muslim is possible. Conversely, White converts to Islam often see their Whiteness questioned and downgraded as a consequence of their new belonging to the Muslim faith and outward expressions of Muslimness (ibid: 9). Racialization is thus an important concept to understand how, regardless of level of religiosity or lack thereof, physical appearance, country of origin, and economic situation, Muslims are homogenized and degraded by
Islamophobic discourse and anti-Muslim racism in various ways in their everyday lives (ibid), some of which are outlined in the following section.

**Previous Literature on The Muslim Experience**

*Post 9/11*

Although Muslims and Arabs have been victims of discrimination historically, “the political climate has, since September 11, 2001, become ardently Islamophobic” (Muyinda, 2007: 9). After the events of 9/11, the media, political and law enforcement spotlight was placed on Muslim communities and their institutions around the world (Nagra, 2011). The global war on terror put Islamic institutions under relentless scrutiny and continues to “confine a large number of Muslim communities to live under what could be described as psychological incarceration” (Omar, 2011: 25). In reaction to the events of 9/11 there was a sharp rise in anti-Muslim incidences across the United States, as well as in Canada and Europe (Allen and Nielsen 2002; Hanniman 2008; Helly 2004; Sheridan and Gillet 2005). Audaciously negative and stereotyped portrayals of Muslims became widespread in the mainstream media and pop culture post 9/11, and have only gotten more rampant since (Abu-Laban and Abu-Laban 1991; Aguayo 2009; Bullock and Jafri 2002; Eid 2014; Gerges 1997; Hamdon 2010; Helly 2004; Karim 2000; Perry and Poynting 2006; Richardson 2004; Riley 2009; Said 1997; Steuter and Wills 2009; Trevino, Kanso, and Nelson 2010; Watt 2011). While earlier immigrants and refugees were regarded mostly as a drain on social and economic resources, the Western Muslim population post 9/11 has been further ostracized as a group that poses a serious threat to the West (Thobani 2007). The image of the crazed non-Christian savage in the era of Western expansion
(attributed to earlier marginalized groups) has re-emerged on the global stage with a vengeance (ibid; Nagra, 2011).

For Muslims living in the West, negotiating their identities across different cultural terrains became decidedly more challenging after 9/11 (Cainkar, 2004). Ideologically represented as a threat, since 9/11 “‘they’”—Muslims in the US—have been watched, detained, deported, and invaded in order to protect and save “‘us’” and it continues today, reinforced every time there is news of a security threat (Sirin and Fine, 2007). However, according to some scholars, post 9/11 young Muslims in the US are at once becoming more religiously grounded and nationally rootless; transnational yet homeless (Bhabha, 2005; Levitt, 2000), which may be due in part to the rise in anti-Muslim sentiment towards them. Indeed, Islamophobia in Canada not only presents itself in the form of more negative attitudes toward Muslims living in the country (Laflamme, 2018), but Canada’s Muslims frequently experience racialization and systemic racism (Hanniman, 2008).

As Yousif (2005) has observed, since 9/11, Muslims throughout Canada have been subjects of threats, taunts, harassment, and in a number of instances, their places of worship have also been physically damaged (53). In addition, Zaman (2010) has also argued that more specifically Arabs and South Asians have been systematically scrutinized and are constantly suspected of being connected with terrorist activities (165). This portrayal in the media and political discourse connects racialized groups to constant criminalization and scrutiny, consequently reinforcing these groups as the “Other” and “deviant”. Amin-Khan (2013) refers to this as incendiary racism, a structural anti-Muslim racism that has occurred and is still taking place in Western societies. Many innocent Muslims have become subjects of various forms of
discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicities, and religious affiliations (Korenic, Kruger, & Mulder, 2004: 84). Through racial profiling Muslims are targeted on the basis of their race, ethnicity, faith or other aspects of social difference and can be described as a major systemic barrier that criminalizes and pathologizes their entire communities (Dei et al., 1997; Zine, 2002). The subsequent marginalization of Muslim communities has intensified the boundaries and borders that mark who belongs and who does not belong in Canada (Razack, 2007).

*Borders*

Increased regressive border policies throughout the West has been one of the major responses to 9/11 and the threat of “Muslim terrorists”, with the racial profiling and targeting of Muslim identity crucial to protecting borders (Sharma, 2006). The securitization of the Canadian border is increasingly justified through a highly racialized discourse that conceives of Muslims as a threat to Western civilizations (Khan, 2013). Muslims are subject to excessive forms of restriction and unfair treatment as they navigate through airports and borders (ibid). People of colour, women, men, and children, especially with Arab or “Muslim ‘sounding’ names, are suggesting, time and time, that they are being singled out at airports and searched when no ‘White’ passengers are being stopped or searched, [which suggests] that racial profiling is alive and well in Canada” (Dobrowolsky, 2007: 656). Arabs and Muslims (and those who look like them) have reported being unable to fly to their dying relative’s bedside and individuals have missed job interviews and been declined opportunities to attend career enhancing conferences because of perceived racial profiling by airlines (Bahdi, 2003: 310). Interestingly, conscious of the pervasiveness
of racial profiling of Muslim looking travelers, Arab employers in Windsor, Ontario, reportedly discriminated against Arab job candidates in favour of “White or Canadian" looking individuals because they did not want goods that they are transporting to the United States to be delayed at the borders (ibid).

A study in 2016, which consisted of 50 in-depth interviews with Muslims living in Vancouver and Toronto, found that young Canadian Muslims were being singled out, questioned, and subjected to intrusive security measures such as strip-searches, detention, being placed on no-fly lists, and being denigrated and humiliated by border staff by being yelled at, demeaned in public and in front of family members (Nagra and Maurutto, 2016). Respondents in the study claimed to be afraid for their family and friends and the long-term impact on their children because for them the border was not simply a site where they become the subject of racialized surveillance; it is an unpredictable, dangerous location where new technologies and practices are used to justify and mask a different level of humanity and legal protections for Muslims (ibid). Surveillance was seen as a direct attack on their Muslim identities and an erosion of their Canadian citizenship and so, they feared expressing their Muslim identities because their civil liberties are most at risk at the border. For them, security is not a right, but rather a racialized practice of punishment, condescension and derogation (ibid). The study points to the dangerous implications of racialized border practices on identity formation and citizenship depletion among Muslim Canadians. Asylum seekers in Canada have also been criminalized to the point that recent policy changes have eliminated the entry of those trying to escape the brutal poverty of globalization, institutionalizing “the targeting of Muslims and those who ‘look like’ them” (Amin-Khan, 2013: 1). As well, risks to national security continue to justify
deporting individuals (permanent residents and asylum seekers) from Canada to countries where they have a reasonable risk of torture or death (Muyinda, 2007: 10)

**Youth**

Post 9/11 young people experienced a relentless onslaught of challenges to their psychological well-being, social relations, and public life (Sirin and fine, 2007). Islamophobia and anti-Muslim racism do not only take place on the playground or amongst peers but can also take form as institutional discrimination (Ali, 2008). A study in England in 2000 found that some South Asian Muslim students reported being placed in English as a Second Language programs regardless of their English-level, and being directed towards less-academic and lower-paying future professions, despite them having good academic records (Desai and Subramanian, 2000). Canadian students interviewed by Jiwani (2006: 138) also talked about racism and discrimination on the part of their teachers, which would often go unaddressed by school administrators, who refused to acknowledge the presence of racism within their schools and would thus dismiss the students’ concerns.

Survey data collected in the US on the everyday experiences of discrimination and its implications for youth found that 84.3 percent of the survey participants (59 out of 70) had experienced discrimination because of their religion or ethnicity during the past year, either at school, on the playground, while shopping, on the street, or in other public settings (Sirin and Fine, 2007). Placed under “intense surveillance and rendered fundamentally invisible as human, critical, engaged citizens”, respondents reported they deal with a considerable degree of discrimination in the larger society as well as intergenerational tensions at home and within the community (ibid). The youth
described daily walks to school, on the streets, at the mall, in the library, on the bus, accompanied by the menace of terrorist (for boys) and oppressed/uneducated (for girls) (ibid). Evidence gathered in the study suggests that government policies, social relationships and media representations fundamentally affect youth development, with challenges to their psychological well-being, social relations and public life, as they deal with a “considerable degree of discrimination in the larger society as well as intergenerational tensions at home and within the community” (ibid: 159).

A 2013 study on Canadian youth experiences of Islamophobia found that their Muslim identity is often a target of discrimination and abuse in public spaces (Nagra and Peng, 2013). The study that included in-depth interviews with 50 young Muslims found that Canadian Muslim youth are stigmatized and marginalized for their religion. The study suggests, “in Canada, multiculturalism is not a given reality but an everyday micro-contestation” (ibid). Similarly, a focus group conducted in 2017 by the National Council of Canadian Muslims (NCCM), which brought 31 young people together to talk about their experiences as Muslim students in Ontario classrooms found that Islamophobia is rampant in Canada. According to the report, the stigmas associated with Islam and being Muslim, coupled with feelings of needing to always explain and defend Islam, has made it difficult for students to fit in and define their own identities at school. The youth shared stories of experiencing racist, Islamophobic and/or xenophobic commentary from their classmates. Many expressed that comments were passed off as jokes and overwhelmingly, students signaled that they were experiencing a kind of identity crisis, with many students drawing links between Islamophobia and mental health (ibid).
HealthCare

Jiwani (2006: 146) argues “the health care system as a hierarchical structure not only mirrors the dominant structures of violence inherent in the wider society but also perpetuates them in particular ways”. In her study on Muslim women’s experience with violence, Jiwani (2006: 157) found, “physicians tended to stereotype patients according to which cultural group they come from,” and that this affects, among other things, the diagnoses that get made, and the patients’ access to further referrals. Being a Muslim woman, particularly one who wears hijab, is especially stressful in an age of rising anti-Muslim sentiment (Riley, 2011).

Reitmanova and Gustafson’s (2008) study on immigrant Muslim women accessing maternity health services in St. John’s, Newfoundland, showed that various factors, including language barriers, cultural misunderstandings, and care providers insensitive to their needs, negatively impacted the Muslim women’s experiences with the maternity health care system. The same study found that as well as inadequate language services or religious accommodations; respondents talked about assumptions health care providers made about their cultural needs that they believed influenced the care they received (ibid). Although institutional ignorance rather than Islamophobia may have something to do with the poor treatment of the respondents in this study, the self-reported perceptions of discrimination based on Muslimness underscores the trepidations that many Muslims carry about their Muslim identity being a target for differential treatment in health care settings. In other studies, Muslims in the mental health care system have also been found to encounter similar assumptions and judgments, with some religious practices being “pathologized and seen as evidence of mental illness” (Zine, 2009a).
Employment

Haque (2010: 90) claims the experience of “being a visible minority in Canada means a lower return on education and persistent underemployment”. Some of this disparity has been attributed to hiring discrimination against Muslims, particularly Muslim women who wear hijab (Zine, 2008: 156), or stereotypes about their capabilities (Jiwani, 2006: 150). Testimonies of Muslim immigrants in various Canadian cities indicated that clothing (including hijab) and having a beard are examples of discriminatory factors in the workplace (Caidi & Mac-Donald, 2008). Canadian-born Muslims are not doing much better economically than their immigrant parents either (Hamdani, 2006), since “income disparities continue into second generation as does an increased perception of discrimination and sense of alienation from national belonging” (Haque, 2010: 90).

Hamdani (2006: 17) proposes that some of the reasons for this may include discrimination as well as the possibility that Canadian-born Muslims may be less qualified, perhaps having had less access to education because of their parents’ economic situation once in Canada, or because of having been marginalized within the education system - this point hints at class status as being important, even if it is not named as such by the author. Similarly, Kazemipur (2014: 120) suggests that “a lower level of return on education and the non-recognition of pre-migration work experiences” may explain the lower than average economic performance (employment and income) and relatively higher rates of poverty of Muslims in Canada. He warns, “an unusually high rate of poverty experienced by a group with distinct ethnic/racial features can quickly generate an ethnic/racial underclass” that can sometimes result in
them being “disenfranchised from the broader society and possibly taking extreme measures against the existing order” (Kazemipur, 2014: 124).

**Overview**

The previous section may appear to be painting a bleak picture of the experiences of Islamophobia amongst many Muslims living in the West, however, it is important to note, overall perceptions of discrimination, including those among Muslims in Canada, have also been said to be relatively low (Kazemipur, 2014; Environics, 2016). In some cases, Protestants feel more discriminated against than Muslims (Kazemipur, 2014:150) but less so than those Muslims who have been here longer. And, Muslims ‘are generally satisfied with life in Canada’ (ibid: 156, 160, 161), but admittedly, are worried about their future. Perhaps one of the most important points to note is that rather than Muslims being alone in their worries, native born Canadians are as likely as Muslims to recognize the importance of discrimination against Muslims, which as Kazemipur (2014: 154) notes, may be “an indirect confirmation of the magnitude and seriousness of Islamophobia” but it is also a confirmation that most non-Muslim Canadians are not denying that Islamophobia is a problem. Although some polls show positive integration perceptions of Muslims, bearing in mind that the Muslim experience is complex, the evidence in other surveys that point a bleaker picture warrant some further investigation.

Although previous literature, notably Kazemipur’s (2014) extensive data on Muslims in Canada, certainly demystify the idea of Muslim homogeneity, the implications of their diversity are less well developed and there is a general paucity in research on what that diversity means in terms of Canadian Muslims’ lived
experiences. Previous literature, although helpful in demonstrating the presence, insidious nature and effects of Islamophobia on Muslims in general, do not underscore the diversity of experiences of Muslim communities in the West. Existing literature appears to also be silent on the powerful ways in which socio-economic class factors into the experiences and coping mechanisms of Muslims, in the face of anti-Muslim sentiment. The homogenizing of Islamophobic experiences can inadvertently end up perpetuating the myth of Muslims as being a monolithic group.

As well, by not taking the intersectionalities of race and class into account, we may be missing the opportunity to understand how some Muslims who are at the intersections of marginality can be further damned by Islamophobia and others who, despite being marginalised in some ways, have other identity markers that privilege them to have greater opportunities for upward social mobility. Stigmatizing identity markers like being a refugee, being a woman, and being Black, in addition to being Muslim, may exacerbate experiences of Islamophobia, social integration and social mobility. Conversely, some identity markers like higher social class, ethnicity, and skin colour, may protect some Muslims from the harsher realities of Islamophobia. To provide a unique contribution to the existing literature, this dissertation uses three empirical studies to deliver a diverse range of accounts of the ways in which different types of Muslims understand, experience and respond to Islamophobia and anti-Muslim racism.

Reflexivity – the concept that researchers should acknowledge and disclose their own selves in the research, seeking to understand their part in it, or influence on the research (Cohen et al., 2011: 225) informs positionality and it requires an explicit self-consciousness and self-assessment by the researcher about their own views and
positions and how these might have influenced the design, execution and interpretation of the research data findings (Greenbank, 2003). Through the process of reflexivity, I have been continually aware of my position as a Muslim studying Muslims in Canada. That being said, although some aspects of positionality tend to be culturally ascribed or somewhat fixed (race/religion/nationality/gender etc), socio-cultural positionality is never completely fixed and is always situation and context-dependent. Personal life history, experiences, and identity are subjective and contextual (Chiseri-Strater, 1996) and play a big part in how a person sees and interprets the world around them and the data in front of them. The fixed aspects of my position may have predisposed me to wanting to study the experience of being Muslim in the West, however, that does not mean that my being Muslim necessarily automatically led to particular biased views or perspectives of my own because “…researchers’ identities are often relative, and can change, based on where and when the research is conducted, the personalities of the researcher and individual research participants and the topic of the research” (Kirstetter, 2012: 99).

Thus, in the blind pursuit of objective reality and ‘the truth’ (Greenbank 2003: 798), I worry that social scientists often forget that “there is no value-free, position-free, objective cold, hard, neutral ‘prove-able’ factual knowledge in the social world” because a researchers life history, experiences, identity and socio-cultural position will always impact research processes (Holmes, 2014: 24). As Smith (1999: 436) has stated, “…objectivity, authority and validity of knowledge is challenged as the researcher’s positionality…is inseparable from the research findings” and “what we refer to as ‘facts’ are…the writer’s and reader’s jointly agreed best approximations to the truth, these are always open to refutation and replacement by new ‘facts’” (Rolfe,
2007: 79). Accordingly, I too tend to err on the side of believing that “if academic researchers were to be continually questioning all their assumptions about what is currently known – and especially if they were to seek to avoid relying upon any taken-for-granted assumptions – then they could never hope to develop a body of knowledge. This is because there is always scope for raising doubts...” (Hammersley, 2011: 170).

Moreover, being an insider, at times, certainly gave me a ‘lived familiarity’ with and a priori knowledge of the groups being researched (Griffith, 1998 in Mercer, 2007), however, I was also an outsider at many other times, having no prior intimate knowledge of the experience of being a refugee or being Black (for example). As was described by Mercer (2007) “…the insider/outsider dichotomy is in reality a continuum with multiple dimensions, and that all researchers constantly move back and forth along a number of axes, depending upon time, location, participants and topic” (Ibid: 1). Since there is nothing fixed about the boundaries separating Insiders from Outsiders (Holmes, 2014: 23), throughout my research I too felt that as “situations involving different values” arose, “different statuses” of mine were activated and the “lines of separation” shifted (Merton, 1972: 28). In conclusion, whilst some aspects of my positionality may be fixed, other aspects will always remain fluid, open to change over time and specific to each situation. Also, whether I am an insider or outsider to a research project does not necessarily discredit its truthfulness. As Merriam and colleagues (2001: 415) argue, “what an insider ‘sees’ and ‘understands’ will be different from, but just as valid as what an outsider sees”.

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The preceding section, which provided readers with the theoretical framework of my dissertation and an extensive literature review, has laid the groundwork for the following three empirical analyses. The subsequent chapters consist of one paper that uses critical discourse analysis to examine how Islamophobia factors into the framing of Muslims as a social problem in media and political discourse and then two papers that present analyses of how Islamophobia intersects with race and class to create unique challenges and outcomes for two socioeconomically very different groups of Muslims in Canada.
PAPER 1

Naming and Framing the Muslim Problem in Canada
A Media Discourse Analysis

Abstract
The media are a means of communication between politicians and the broader public. Primarily through the presentation of “ethnic models,” the media has always played a major role in the reproduction of racism and racial inequality and even justifying and legitimizing discriminatory acts (Van Dijk, 1993: 268). As a powerful societal institution, media organizations have also contributed heavily to the development and maintenance of the “Muslim terrorist” narrative. Given that the news media represents an important and highly influential source of information for most people (Hall, 1997; Henry and Tator, 2002; Surette 1992; Van Dijk, 1991), this can have crucial consequences on public perceptions and attitudes towards Muslims. By looking at the type of language that is employed to describe Muslim perpetrators of violence vs. those who are not Muslim, in response to local events, this article highlights the ways in which Canadian print media plays an important role in the social construction of the Muslim problem, as well as informing legislative responses to it.

Keywords: Migration, integration, marginalization, terrorism, media discourse, social problems, Islamophobia, Muslim, acculturation, racism.

Introduction
Since the events of September 11 2001, media portrayals of Muslims with regards to violence and terrorism were amplified (e.g., Adelman, 2002; Belkhodja & Richard,
2006; Jiwani, 2005a; 2005b; Kutty, 2001), with innumerable media reports that demonstrate explicit links between terrorism and “Islamic” fundamentalism (Caidi & MacDonald, 2008). According to Eid (2014: 104), the conception of Muslims as a negative Other for Western societies and the general Western (mis)perceptions about Muslims are strongly linked to Western media portrayals of Islam and Muslims within two main frames: in clash with “the West” and associated with terrorism/extremism/violence. As such, political and media discourse have increasingly problematized “being Muslim” in the West, by fueling the flames of an “irrational fear” that imagines Muslims as a bona fide threat to Western society, which is arguably a form of Islamophobia (Abbas, 2005; Bhattacharyya, 2008; Brighton, 2007; Fortier, 2008; Ingram and Dodds, 2009; Kundnani, 2009; McGhee, 2005, 2008; Moore et al., 2008; Nickels et al., 2010; Poynting and Mason, 2007; Werbner, 2009).

Powered by a collective fear of immigration, anti-Muslim discourse is often fraught with references to a Muslim invasion that poses a considerable risk to “good” Canadian values. In fact, a widespread “demonization of Islam” has resulted in less interest among Western countries in immigrants from countries with large Muslim populations (Dossa, 2009: 104). As well, due to the fact that global terrorism is continuously associated with Muslims, it has not only become difficult for Muslims from other countries to migrate to Western countries but also for those who have been in the West for generations to feel like they belong (Awan, 2010). Even though in 2015 Iran, Pakistan and Syria were numbers 4, 5 and 6 in the top ten source countries of immigrants to Canada, Canada’s response to the Syrian refugee crisis of welcoming 50,000 refugees stoked public and political concerns of refugee integration, which some have argued may be a pretense for the fears associated with Muslim immigration.
(Molnar, 2016). Thus, a spotlight has been placed on what seems to be quickly becoming the “Muslim problem” in Canada.

A recent quantitative study conducted by Azeezah Kanji (2018: 1) has analyzed representations of ideological violence committed by Muslim versus non-Muslim perpetrators, by examining how “the figure of the Muslim “terrorist” has been constructed in Canadian national news media, and how it has been imbued with an aura of exceptional menace”. Kanji’s (2018) study compared representations of ideological violence by Muslim versus non-Muslim perpetrators in major Canadian national news media (the Globe and Mail, National Post, and CBC), thus highlighting the differences in how acts of violence are framed. In the present study, I build on the aforementioned report by honing in on some of the articles from her analysis, as well as including some others, to take a qualitative look at the language used by Canadian media outlets to describe two of the perpetrators of ideological violence in Canada.

This study is an empirical examination of the disparities in national Canadian news media coverage of acts of violence committed by Muslims, as compared to violence committed by non-Muslims who are associated to White supremacist and right-wing extremist ideology. I concentrate on media discourse relating to two Canadian incidences, (a) the Quebec Mosque shooting on 29 January 2017 and (b) the Edmonton Van attack on 30 September 2017. Although both cases were suspected to involve some sort of ideological violence, neither case was eventually charged as terrorism. I examine the first ten days of media articles written about both incidences by several media outlets to look at the ways in which media language was used to portray Alexandre Bissonnette (Quebec mosque shooting) and Abdulahi Hasan Sharif (Edmonton van attack)— as either a lone wolf or a terrorist. By looking at media
discourse around these two incidences, I also discuss how Muslims continue to be named and framed as only villains and not victims of terrorism, and how these discourses may perpetuate the problematizing of Canadian Muslims. I chose to concentrate on these two incidences because the two suspects were connected to similar cases of violence, but the two individuals are very different from each other, with one being a young White Quebecois male and the other a young Black, refugee, Muslim male. This made for a very clear analysis on the differing ways in which each man and their stories were framed in print media.

What makes my analysis different from Kanji’s (2018) study is the qualitative approach that I take in exploring how linguistic constructions, patterns and themes, and language use reflects and may in turn effect attitudes and opinions. Although both of our studies conduct content analysis of newspapers, Kanji (2018), coming from a media studies background, employs a quantitative approach, whereas I employ a descriptive textual analysis approach, taking a deeper look at the type of language used in the various articles and the overall narrative presented by them.

As a note to readers, this article builds heavily on a book chapter already published, however, I am presenting it here as a little different. There is a paucity of research in the ways in which media and political discourse contribute to the Islamophobia narrative in Canada and this study is a contribution towards filling the gap. There are obvious limitations to this kind of study, namely its inability to effectively analyze every single print media news story that covered the two cases. However, even with a snapshot analysis of some of the media coverage that was consumed on a mass scale by readers during that time, the study says something about the broader environment within which Muslims have to react.
Background

Muslims

Although increasing faster than any other religious group (Statistics Canada, 2011), the number of Muslims in Canada (3.2%) is not nearly what Canadians imagine it to be, and that by itself is very telling of the climate of fear when it comes immigration. According to the annual Perils of Perception Survey conducted by Ipsos, in 2018 Canadians again fail on every perception versus fact about their country in a unique socio-demographic knowledge test. The 2018 “Perceptions versus Realities” survey showed gross over estimation on many questions, including how many Muslims and how many immigrants there are in Canada. Approximately 1000+ individuals were surveyed in 37 countries, including Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, Great Britain and the United States of America and Canada ranked 27th on “ignorance” out of all surveyed countries. Canadians who took part in the survey over-estimated that 40% of the population is immigrants while the real figure was 21% in 2018-- a perception gap of -19 points. Similarly, respondents of the survey believed the Canadian population consisted of 22% Muslims, instead of the real number, which is 3% -- a perception gap of -19 points. The discrepancy between the actual number of Muslim Canadians and those who exist only in the public imagination was over 6 million people. Not only are there fewer Muslims in Canada than people think, the imagined figure exceeds the actual one six-fold.

As the aforementioned survey demonstrates, fears of Islam’s demographic triumph are greatly exaggerated in the minds of some Canadians. The perception versus reality survey and its results may seem satirical but perhaps they highlight the subtle but dangerous effects of misleading and fear mongering political and media
discourse that often portray Muslims as a “growing” problematic group and threat to Canadians. The kinds of misperceptions amongst ordinary citizens, which can create irrational fears about certain groups in society, may lead to micro aggressions and/or overt discrimination towards members of the “feared” group. This “irrational fear of Islam and Muslims” is known as Islamophobia. Garner and Selod (2015: 5) have described Islamophobia as “a set of ideas and practices that amalgamate all Muslims into one group and the characteristics associated with Muslims (violence, misogyny, political allegiance/disloyalty, incompatibility with Western values, etc.) are treated as if they are innate”. One of the stereotypes associated to Muslims has been their connection to terrorism.

_Terrorism_

In Canada, section 83.01 of the Criminal Code (1985) defines terrorism as certain acts of violence to people or property committed “in whole or in part for a political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause,” with the intention of “intimidating the public [. . .] or compelling a person, a government or a domestic or an international organization to do or to refrain from doing any act”. Others have defined it as “the unlawful use of violence and intimidation, especially against civilians, in the pursuit of political aims” (Schmid, 2011). However, since September 11, 2001, political and media rhetoric on terrorism seems to have slowly shifted to only apply to politically or religiously motivated ideology and related acts of extremism and violence perpetrated by Muslim individuals and groups.

The association of Islam with terrorism has come to be accepted as part of the discourse on security and terrorism, to the extent that terms such as “Muslim” and
“terrorist” have become almost synonymous (Eid, 2014). Themes of extremism, violence, and militancy are commonly associated with Muslims in Western media that portray Muslims as villainous assassins, kidnappers, hostages, and/or terrorists. Terrorism is portrayed as an act carried out by people claiming to commit such violence in the name of Islam (Karim, 2002; 2003). With the almost exclusive media attention on terrorist incidents involving Muslim perpetrators and non-Muslim victims, the narrative of “Islamic terrorism” appears to have been born. However, over time, the distinction of “Islamic” terrorism seems to have been abandoned.

According to Public Safety Canada’s 2019 public report on the terrorism threat to Canada, threats posed by those who harbour right-wing extremist views remain a concern for Canada. In fact, in April 2019, the head of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service told CBC News that his agency is "more and more preoccupied" with the threat of violent right-wing extremism and White supremacists (Tunney, 2019). Similarly, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) Director David Vigneault told a Senate committee on April 9th, 2019 that his agency is very troubled by "the number of ultra-right-wing extremists" active in Canada, citing the 2017 firearm attack on a Quebec City mosque and a 2018 vehicle-ramming attack in Toronto (ibid). However, Vigneault went on to say that the main threat and concern for intelligence and law enforcement in Canada continues to be violent extremism, often tied to religious beliefs, “traditionally, in the last number of years we've seen that form of extremism leading to violence being people invoking religion - Islam" (ibid). Such sentiments are supported by the fact that of the 60 groups included in Canada’s terrorist entity list only two are right wing extremist groups – Blood and
Honour and Combat 18, and they were only added to the list in June of 2019 (Platt, 2019), while the others can be described as predominantly linked to “Muslims”.

As such, the current political/cultural definition of terrorism can be described as applying chiefly to those politically motivated and radicalized individuals who harbor ideology that is linked to Islam and/or considered to be anti-West. As described in Public Safety Canada’s latest (2019) report, “Canada also remains concerned about threats posed by those who harbor right-wing extremist views, however, the principal terrorist threat to Canada continues to stem from individuals or groups who are inspired by violent ideologies and terrorist groups, such as Daesh or al-Qaida (AQ)”.

In official political, bureaucratic, and legal discourse there appears to be a racialization of the concept of “terrorism”, as it is continuously attributed to non-White actors. Non-White suspects in mass shootings who also happen to be Muslim have been very quickly identified as “terrorists” in media and political discourse, whereas the White male has been often labeled the “lone wolf.” Although the general definition of “terrorism” in the Criminal Code is textually neutral with respect to racial and religious identity, the term effectively functions in state national security discourse as a synonym for violence (or the threat of violence) by Muslims (Kanji, 2018). If we are to simply take a look at the most recent Public Report from CSIS, published in February 2017, which included a “Terrorism Timeline”, we can see a blatant imbalance in even the listing of Canadian incidents of terrorism. Incidents with non-Muslim perpetrators such as the Quebec mosque and Moncton RCMP shootings were shockingly absent from the report, despite the fact that both evidently meet the legal definition of “terrorism” as politically, religiously, or ideologically motivated
violence (CSIS, 2019). Instead, the report only listed those incidents committed by Muslims. As well, the identification of Muslim perpetrators as terrorists seemed to have bypassed formal legal designations.

Said (1997: XXII) argues, the covering of any act of terror involving Muslims by the media in the West is determined by Islamophobia, since it engages in the branding of Islam as a violent religion and Muslims as being Pseudonyms of terror. Some even argue that in this way, media has emerged as the latest inheritor of the whole repertoire of negative orientalism (Majid, 2000: 50). Consequently, it can be argued that since the events of 9/11, the media has played a major role in forming and sustaining the narrative of terrorism, as we understand it today – A Muslim problem.

**Alt-Right Violence**

Alt-right and White supremacist violence has frequently been excluded by definition from the domain of terrorism in the media. For example, the National Post recently reported on a Public Safety Canada study in which the news outlet classified “violent extremist” and “supremacist” incidents (including the Moncton RCMP shooting) in a separate category from “terrorism”—even though “violent extremism” and “supremacism” evidently fit the Criminal Code definition of terrorism as violence committed for “political, religious, or ideological motive,” for the purpose of intimidating the public or influencing governmental decisions or policy (Bell, 2016). Needless to say, such biased definitions from official institutions can have significant impact on public definitions and perceptions on what constitutes as a terrorist threat.

A survey conducted by the Angus Reid Institute and Canadian Race Relations Foundation (2018) reported that Canadians are far more concerned about the threat
posed by “homegrown radical Islamic terrorism” than by White supremacist/nationalists. This is particularly concerning since White supremacist and extreme right-wing violence has been considerably more frequent in Canada and has caused far more deaths (Perry and Scrivens, 2015; Monaghan and Molnar 2016; Kanji, 2018). White men are responsible for 71 percent of extremist-related deaths in America over the last 10 years, according to the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) (2017). In its annual assessment of extremist-related killings, the Anti-Defamation League’s Centre on Extremism found White supremacists and other far-right extremists were responsible for 59 percent of all extremist-related fatalities in the U.S. in 2017, up dramatically from 20 percent in 2016 (ADL, 2017). The following section provides the reader with a literature review and the theoretical orientations guiding this study.

**Theoretical Framework**

Knowledge is created and transmitted through language, and it is through language that news media socially construct the impressions we form about certain groups in society (Burr, 2015; Henry and Tator, 2002). More specifically, written or verbal texts are ideologies that are discursive and thereby representations within the news media are powerful discursive representations (Henry and Tator, 2002: 25). And it is precisely through their discursive power, the media “not only represent social groups but also...construct social groups – to establish who is “we” and who is “other” in the “imagined community” of the nation-state” (ibid: 27).

A number of studies have examined the ways in which media representations of “Muslim difference and dangerousness” (Kanji, 2018: 1) have helped shape
negative perceptions of Western Muslim identity, with Western civilization propped up against “an Orientalised enemy Other” (Kanji, 2018; Bullock and Jafri, 2000; Jiwani, 2005a/2005b; Marin, 2011; Thobani, 2003; Ismael and Measor, 2003; Jiwani, 2004; Poynting and Perry, 2007; Belkhodja and Richard, 2006; Jiwani and Dessner, 2016; Olwan, 2013; Meer et al., 2010; Moore et al., 2008; Kumar, 2012). Steuter and Wills (2009) found that Canadian media coverage of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq reinforce the broader political framing of Muslims as terrorists, mobilizing other negative metaphors and representations that fabricate an “enemy versus the West” dichotomy. Incidences of terrorism that are associated to a Muslim perpetrator and non-Muslim victims have been continuously pushed through Western media channels and given maximum airtime and written media coverage. According to new research from the University of Alabama, terrorist attacks committed by Muslim extremists receive 357% more US press coverage than those committed by non-Muslims (Kearns et al., 2018). The 2017 analysis of American news media found that attacks by Muslim perpetrators in the United States received, on average, 449% more coverage in American media than other attacks (ibid). In comparison, incidences of terrorism associated to a non-Muslim perpetrator or Muslim victims seem to be generally glossed over.

Kimberly Powell’s study, which analyzed the coverage of terrorism events in mainstream national American print and digital news media, discovered that “terrorism is framed primarily as a problem from Islam, with domestic terrorism being treated as less threatening” (Powell, 2011: 95). According to Powell (2011) Muslim perpetrators of violence were more likely to be defined as “terrorists,” labeled using their religious identity, represented as having more violent motives, and linked in
media reports to larger terror networks such as Al-Qaeda, long before motive had been established and confirmed by investigative law enforcement authorities. The threat represented by non-Muslim perpetrators, in contrast, was boiled down to individual motives such as, through the ascription of non-Muslim “homegrown” violence to mental instability: “the act is determined to be a lone act of a troubled individual versus part of the actions of a terror cell, thus, it is not a future threat to safety in the United States” (Powell, 2011: 106).

Powell’s findings have been confirmed by a recent study conducted by The Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (2018), which found that media reports on acts of ideological violence committed by Muslims were more likely to employ the terms “terrorist”/“terrorism” and “extremism,” and to specify the perpetrator’s religious identity. Another study that looked at Muslim representation in the New York Times reported that Muslim men were mainly featured in topics relating to terrorism, militancy, and illegal immigration, “establishing them as fanatics who needed to be controlled” (Mishra, 2007).

With respect to Canadian incidents of terrorism, American media watchdog organization Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR) reported that the 2017 Quebec mosque shooting, which was carried out by a White male and resulted in six times more deaths, received six times less coverage in American media than the 2014 Parliament Hill attack, which was carried out by Michael Zehaf-Bibeau, who happens to be a White convert to Islam (Naureckas, 2017; Kanji, 2018). Here we can see how Bibeau’s “Whiteness” may have initially protected him from the negative associations to terrorism. The language used to describe suspected criminals is often telling of the subconscious biases that exist in reporting on terrorism.
Robert Fisk’s (2006) analysis of Canadian news coverage of the “Toronto 18,” found that all of the accused, who are Muslims of South Asian or Arab ethnicity, were frequently referred to as “Canadian-born” rather than “Canadian,” a subliminal stripping of their Canadian citizenship (Fisk, 2006; Smolash, 2009). Recently, Kanji (2018: 1) conducted a comparative quantitative analysis of representations of ideological violence committed by Muslim versus non-Muslim perpetrators, examining how “the figure of the Muslim “terrorist” has been constructed in Canadian national news media, and how it has been imbued with an aura of exceptional menace”.

Kanji’s (2018) quantitative study compared representations of ideological violence by Muslim versus non-Muslim perpetrators in Canadian national news media (the Globe and Mail, National Post, and CBC). Items were checked for several features: (1) whether the incident was labeled “terrorism”; (2) whether the term “terrorism” was mentioned in the headline (indicating that the story was framed as one about terrorism); (3) whether any political, religious, or ideological affiliation was identified as a motive for the incident (religious and ideological identification were tracked separately for non-Muslim perpetrators, but together for Muslim ones, since the motivating ideology for Muslim perpetrators was represented as emanating from their religious identity—that is, Islam was depicted simultaneously as religion and ideology; (4) whether the ethno-racial identity or the immigration status of the perpetrator was noted; (5) whether other violent incidents were mentioned, in a way that represented the particular event as part of a broader pattern; and (6) whether the mental health or ability of the perpetrator was portrayed as an explanatory factor.
Based on the findings, Kanji (2018) reports that incidents with Muslim perpetrators received, on average, 1.5 times more coverage than incidents with non-Muslim perpetrators. Muslim violence and plots were 23 times more likely to be labeled terrorism than non-Muslim violence and plots. Coverage of incidents with Muslim perpetrators was three times more likely to refer to the perpetrator’s religious, political, or ideological motive; 8.5 times more likely to specify the perpetrator’s ethno-racial identity and/or immigration status; twice as likely to mention other incidents of violence; and twice as likely to discuss the mental health of the perpetrator. According to Kanji (2018), these patterns in representation serve to stabilize the racial formations of the Canadian national security state in the “war on terror”.

Through excessive coverage, other types of violence have also been consistently racialized as Muslim phenomena. Yasmin Jiwani’s review of the Canadian national newspaper the Globe and Mail discovered 66 articles on the widely publicized “honour killings” of multiple women in the Shafia family. The killers’ Afghan and Muslim culture became central to the reporting on the Shafia femicide case. This number (66) becomes more problematic when it is compared to the only 59 articles written on the “murder of women and domestic violence” in general from 2005 to 2012 (Jiwani, 2014; Shier and Shor, 2016). In addition to broader political narratives, journalists have also independently commented on the inadequacy of existing preventative counter-terrorism measures in response to the Parliament Hill and Saint Jean-Sur-Richelieu attacks by Muslim perpetrators (Mayer, 2014; Hall, 2014; Peritz, 2014; Postmedia News, 2014).
As shown in several of the aforementioned studies, the Canadian news media has regularly participated in the perpetuation of certain predominating discourses, one of which is a discriminatory discourse against minority groups (Henry and Tator, 2002). The news media play a pivotal role in socially constructing a reality, or a certain version of reality, which may not be entirely true (Chomsky, 1997). However, even if untrue, the media is complicit in manufacturing an image of Muslims that is threatening and violent and is effectively creating and maintaining a problematic Muslim identity that does not belong in Western society (Saeed, 2007; Steuter and Wills, 2009).

Furthermore, media representations certainly have the power to distort public perceptions of the frequency and etiology of ideological violence but what should be more alarming is how effective media narratives are in “tilting the terrain of public debate on appropriate measures to adopt in response” to the threat of terrorism (Kanji, 2018). In fact, research shows that people are far more likely to endorse the erosion of civil liberties for the purpose of countering terrorism after being exposed to media/political/public discourse that consistently pinpoints Muslim terrorism as the primary threat (Brinson and Stohl, 2012; Woods, 2011). As such, by selecting what is presented and what is excluded from the news, media discourse can “manufacture consent” from the public (Chomsky 1997, 41). The following analysis outlines the differing ways in which a Muslim vs a non-Muslim perpetrator of violence have been presented via Canadian news media.

Methodology
Content analysis is "the systematic reading of a body of texts, images, and symbolic matter, not necessarily from an author's or user's perspective" (Krippendorff, 2004). For this study, I chose content analysis as my method of evaluation, as it directly examines communication, allows for closeness to data, and provides insight into complex models of human thought and language use (Weaver, 2007). According to Cohen (2007: 476), “content analysis takes texts and analyses, reduces and interrogates them into summary form through the use of both pre-existing categories and emergent themes in order to generate or test a theory”.

In line with this methodology, I conducted an in-depth content analysis of 28 media articles from various Canadian news sources to better understand the language and framing of terrorism with regards to two Canadian incidents. I was able to examine the role of the print media and its use of news headlines and news coverage of the, then, suspects of the Quebec mosque shooting and the Edmonton van attack by observing a ten-day data set. The main question which I wanted to explore was: How did the news media depict Bissonnette and Sharif during the first ten days after the two separate incidents? Were there any differences in how the individuals were framed with regards to their connection to terrorism?

I used the purposive sampling technique, which refers to a form of non-probability sampling in which decisions concerning the elements to be included in the sample are taken by the researcher. It is considered to be superior to simple random sampling and consecutive day sampling because of its more adequate representation and because it enables researchers to select a sample based on the purpose of the study (Langer, 1997; Neuendorf, 2002; Palys, 2008). A simple internet-based search generated articles from various news sources including Canadian Press, Toronto Star,
In the Canadian landscape, the Toronto Star is considered to be Liberal/left; the Huffington Post is considered to be Liberal/center-left; the Globe and Mail and The Canadian Press are considered to be center-right open to center to left or centrist; the National Post is considered to be Conservative/right; and the Toronto Sun is considered to be Conservative/populist right (Anderson and Coletto, 2017). Other news sources used in the study include, Canada’s state-funded national broadcaster, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), which also provides ICI Radio services, Global News- owned by Bell Media, and CTV News- owned by Corus Entertainment, and City News- owned by the Rogers Media subsidiary of Rogers Communications, who are all seen as leaning a little more to the left than the right (ibid).

Only articles related to the two events/two suspects published during the first ten days after each incident took place were chosen for analysis. This time frame was elected to make the data more manageable in size, to allow for a truly in-depth qualitative analysis, and to shed light on how the print media reacted to the two incidents in their immediate aftermath. Clearly, there are limitations to such a narrow time frame and also a small sample size like this cannot be fully representative of all news coverage regarding the incidences, however, I do believe my study provides a starting point for further research in this area.

I initially conducted a google search only using keywords such as, Quebec Mosque Shooting, Edmonton Van Attack, Alexandre Bissonnette, and Abdulahi Hasan
Sharif. I also visited the websites of the selected newspapers and looked through their archives for news coverage of the two incidents during the selected time period. I first examined news coverage more generally regarding the two incidents and after I was able to identify emerging themes and patterns from my data set, out of the almost 40 articles retrieved from my search, I focused my analysis on 28 that paid specific attention to the backgrounds of the two suspects. The chosen articles were analyzed based on headlines, as well as full body texts.

A comparative analysis was conducted to see if the narrative framing of the two incidents and suspects differed in any way. I was able to make inferences about the narrative of the messages within the texts, the way they maybe be received by the audience, and the political/social climate within which they were being produced. With such a method of analysis, it is important to maintain a vigilant awareness of one’s own pre-understandings in order to avoid bias during analysis and in results, as such, I was fully aware at all times of my position as a Muslim looking at the way Islamic terrorism is framed in the media.

Analysis

The Quebec Mosque Shooting and The Edmonton Van Attack

On the night of 29 January 2017 Alexandre Bissonnette, a White Quebecois male, carried out an unlawful and violent killing rampage in a place of worship on innocent civilians as they prayed in a Mosque. Six men were killed, and several others injured, including children. Clearly evidenced in his online activity and his social media profile, Bissonnette was very quickly found and reported by media to have an extremist leaning to right wing, anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim, and White Nationalist
political ideology. Months later, on the evening of 30 September 2017 Abdulahi Hasan Sharif, a Black Muslim male of Somali origin, who had arrived as a refugee, carried out an unlawful and violent attack in Edmonton, Alberta by deliberately ramming a U-Haul truck into pedestrians and stabbing a police officer. The attack resulted in minor injuries to five people. Thankfully, there were no deaths caused by this incident. Initial reports suggested that there was an Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) flag discovered in his car, this was later proved to be a false lead.

In light of Bissonnette’s political ideology and the violence he carried out against a group of civilians, it would be reasonable to draw a connection to terrorism, as was defined earlier. However, although media discourse has included heated debates from advocates on both sides insisting on defining Bissonnette either as a politically motivated “terrorist” or as an alienated “lone wolf”, the police did not identify the incident was being investigated as an act of terrorism. In Sharif’s case, no political ideological leanings were found, but him being a Muslim refugee of Somali origin was spoken about extensively in the media and the attack was immediately reported as terrorism by multiple media stations. Police also very quickly announced that they were investigating the events as “acts of terrorism”, however, no terrorism charges were ever ultimately laid, “due to insufficient evidence”. Neither of the suspects were ever charged with terrorism. The following section is an analysis of the language used in some of the initial media reports that came out after each incident.

The Terrorism Label

The Quebec Mosque shooting, and the Edmonton truck attack were both initially identified as terrorism by political leaders, and neither was eventually prosecuted
under the terrorism provisions of the Criminal Code. However, based on Kanji’s (2018) study, in which her comprehensive search produced 96 articles on the Edmonton van attack and 395 articles on the Quebec mosque shooting, Abdulahi Hasan Sharif’s non-fatal truck attack in Edmonton was labeled terrorism in the media far more consistently (in 68% of media items) than Alexandre Bissonnette’s Quebec mosque shooting, which was labeled as terrorism in a mere 13% of the articles (Kanji, 2018).

As is presented in the following analysis, the inflammatory labels of "terrorism" and "terrorist" are increasingly being applied by news organizations in sloppy ways that leaves their kneejerk assumptions open to criticism. For example, on the evening of the Edmonton van attack Edmonton police, and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, quickly referred to it as a terrorist attack, primarily because police reported that CCTV footage had captured what appeared to be an ISIS flag inside the driver's car. Many news organizations, including CBC News, initially used that as their cue to use the word "terrorism" in their coverage. However, the suspect was later found to have no links to ISIS and was never charged with terrorism-related offenses.

In apparent contravention of its own standards, the CBC described the Edmonton truck attack as “terrorism” – immediately labeling it as a “terror attack” in headlines without using quotation marks or attribution, as is required by them (CBC News 2017a, 2017b). In CBC News’ guidelines for its journalists, it advises them to use extreme caution on using words such as terrorism or terrorist. In fact, they are explicitly told to "avoid labelling any specific bombing or assault as a terrorist act, unless the term is attributed […] don't judge specific acts as terrorism, or people as terrorists. Instead simply describe the act or individual, and let the viewer, the listener,
the reader decide” (Swain, 2017). It would appear that such discretion was not exercised on this story. A report prepared by The Canadian Press (Bennett, Cotter, Drinkwater and Purdy, 2017), with the headline “Suspect facing terrorism charges in Edmonton truck attack investigated in 2015” was used by multiple other news outlets including City news, CTV News, The National Post, as one of the first stories on the Edmonton van attack. The article was also used by Huffington Post Canada, with a different headline “Edmonton Attack on Officer, Van Rammed into Pedestrians Being Investigated as Terrorism” and repeatedly focused on terrorism throughout body of article:

“Mounties say the man accused of attacking a police officer and running down four pedestrians with a rental truck in a dramatic late-night downtown chase is a Somali refugee once investigated for espousing extremism. He is facing a number of charges, including five counts of attempted murder, dangerous driving and participation in a terrorist activity.

Prime Minister Justin Trudeau also condemned the violent events as a "terrorist attack" and a "senseless act of violence."

"We cannot — and will not — let violent extremism take root in our communities," he said.

Edmonton Mayor Don Iveson urged calm and compassion.

"It is vital now that we not succumb to hatred, that we not be intimidated by violence," said Iveson. "Terrorism is about creating panic and about sowing divide and about disrupting people's lives."

According to Kanji’s (2018) study, terrorism was included in the headline in 29% of the articles on the Edmonton van attack and only 4% of the articles on the Quebec mosque shooting. Multiple news outlets immediately referred to the Edmonton van incident as a terror attack, with headlines including:

“**Terrorist** attack: Edmonton defies hatred” (ICI Radio Canada, 2017),

“**Terrorist** attack: why Edmonton?” (ICI Radio Canada, 2017)

“**Terrorism** charges pending in Edmonton attacks - Suspect had been investigated in 2015 but wasn't deemed a threat, RCMP says” (CBC News, 2017)

“Edmonton attack suspect facing **terrorism** charges was investigated by RCMP in 2015” (Pruden, Klinkenberg, Howlett and Bocknek, The Globe and Mail, 2017)

“Abdulahi Hasan Sharif Identified as Edmonton **Terrorism** Suspect by Police Sources

“RCMP received a tip about a man ‘espousing **extremist** ideology’ In 2015” (Huffington post Canada, 2017)

“Edmonton **terror** suspect charged with attempted murder” (Parsons, French and Griwkowsky, Toronto Sun, 2017).

In comparison, the articles that reported on the Quebec Mosque shooting rarely referred to the incident as terrorism. In fact, with elusive headlines such as “Deadly Shooting at Quebec City Mosque Erupts After Evening Prayers (Andree Lau, Huffington Post Canada, 2017) the reader could be left wondering if the shooting just “erupted” within the mosque amongst those attending, an easy assumption to make, especially since terrorism is usually associated to Muslims. Although the body of the article includes references to terrorism, namely a part of the Prime Minister’s statement “We condemn this terrorist attack on Muslims in a center of worship and refuge", as well as an explanation that “A joint terrorism task force that includes provincial police, the RCMP and Montreal police has been deployed. Two men in custody have been identified as the gunmen”, the headline, which is sometimes all the reader catches as they are scrolling through their news feed, failed to make any connections to terrorism. Interestingly, the same report goes on to include an incorrect
bystander account that pointed to a witness stating, “he saw two men wearing black ski masks enter the Islamic Cultural Centre around 7:45 pm ET. One yelled something to do with "Allah" in a “strong Quebecois accent," he recalled”. Such false and sloppy reporting that misinformed thousands of readers on the association of Islam to the perpetrator may have led many to immediately form an opinion that this incident was yet another case of “Islamic Terrorism”. The same article also included the following section:

“'Terrorist threat level remains 'medium'. Last year, a federal report found that the terrorist threat level was "medium," meaning that a "violent act of terrorism could occur in Canada." It found: "The principal terrorist threat to Canada remains that posed by violent extremists who could be inspired to carry out an attack in Canada. Violent extremist ideologies espoused by terrorist groups like Daesh and al-Qaida continue to appeal to certain individuals in Canada." When he released the report, Goodale [Canadian Minister of Public Safety] said it was his duty to inform Canadians about the threats. "Homegrown terrorists" were behind two unrelated attacks in 2014 on Canadian soldiers. Warrant officer Patrice Vincent died of his injuries after being rammed by a vehicle in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Que. and Cpl. Nathan Cirillo was shot to death on Parliament Hill. The Ottawa shooter, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau, was reportedly admired by a fellow Canadian named Aaron Driver — who was killed during a police operation last August. Authorities believed that Driver, 24, planned to use a bomb to carry out a suicide bombing mission in a public area.” (Andree, Lau, Huffington Post Canada, 2017)

The preceding section taken from the Huffington Post Canada article is an example of how the article about the Quebec Mosque shooting, which involved the killing of Muslims, made it necessary to point the reader to the still very important and worse threat of “Islamic terrorism”, which is associated to Muslims.

In another Huffington Post Canada article that used a file written by Giuseppe Valiante of The Canadian Press, the headline, “Quebec Shooting: Canadian
Muslims Mourn Victims Of Deadly Attack On Mosque”, is written in large bold font, calling the incident a “shooting”, and then underneath the main headline in a much smaller font that is not in bold it says, “A terror attack killed six and injured 19 others”. Whilst sharing its main article in relation to the developing story of the Quebec mosque shooting, The Toronto Star (2017) called the then two suspects, “individuals”, leading the reader to assume that the individuals may have belonged to the mosque:

#DevelopingStory: Two individuals carried out a shooting at a Quebec City mosque Sunday evening that has killed at least five people, according to the president of the Islamic Centre of Quebec. Police Confirm fatalities, two arrests, after shooting at Quebec City mosque

In a Toronto Sun article headlined, “Quebec mosque attack suspect faces 11 charges (Solyom, 2017), there is mention of terrorism only as something that has been “spoken of”, not confirmed, “though police and politicians have spoken of terrorism […] Bissonnette was not charged with any terrorism-related offences”. In the front cover of The Toronto Sun Newspaper (shown below) that came out two days after the Quebec Mosque shooting Bissonnette is referred to as a “Lone Wolf?”. The large bold headline and the question mark seem superfluous. The Sun’s subheading points out that Bissonnette is “accused” of the crime and not charged with it. The paper also notes that he had “no links to terror,” despite holding “Islamophobic viewpoints”. Rather than making a connection to terrorism, a heading like this can instead point to the idea that Islamophobia, which is often incorrectly referred to as any kind of
criticism of Islam, albeit by mostly right-wing ideologues, and the violence stemming from Islamophobia is not connected to terrorism.

“Naming” is very important to the overall “framing” of entire groups of people as a social problem. As explained by Robert Entman, “to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (Entman, 1993: 52). In the aforementioned two cases, both types of perpetrators seem to have been framed by the media in differing ways. Bissonnette’s political ideology being almost absent from media coverage and him not being named a terrorist and Sharif being immediately associated with ISIS ideology and named a terrorist may have helped frame the narrative of “Islamic terrorism” as the real and present danger to Canadians. Since neither of these men was ever officially charged with terrorism, the incorrect media coverage simply served them on a platter to be used as pawns in a much bigger political game of axis and allies.

A Religion Problem

According to Kanji’s (2018) study, non-White Muslim perpetrators were much more likely to be labeled by their religion. The political/religious/ideological affiliation was mentioned in 46% of the articles (44 out of 96 articles) on the Edmonton van attack and for the Quebec mosque shooting the ideology was mentioned in only 19% of the articles and religion was mentioned in a mere 0.3% (1 out of 395) of the articles. Due to the consistent focus on Islamic terrorism and other forms of ideological violence falling under the media and political radar, many have come to understand and accept
that the ‘war on terror’ simply denotes a ‘war on Islam’. A war that is fought in 
metaphysical and ideological spaces has no boundaries, since there are over a billion 
Muslims who practice Islam and exist all over the globe. The essentialist orientalist 
depiction of Muslims and Islam constructs them as the ‘Other’ (see Said, 1978); 
problematic ethnic or foreign groups, with differing values, belonging in foreign lands 
who need to be managed or tolerated in ‘our’ country. However, the threat of global 
terrorism collapses the perceived separation between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ because 
nowadays ‘They’ are living in ‘Our’ communities. Although ‘They’ remain the 
‘Other,’ there is a new sense of fear of ‘Them’ because they are now near ‘Us’ in 
‘Our’ society. Therefore, the way in which the public understands ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ 
has been recreated to adapt to the new climate of fear.

After the CBC had already reported in several articles that the Edmonton van 
attack suspect was a potential terrorist and a Somali refugee another CBC news article 
included the headline, “Edmonton attack suspect had 'genocidal beliefs,' says former 
co-worker who reported him to police - 'He had major issues with polytheists. He said 
they need to die’” (CBC News, 2017). The body of the article went into more detail 
about the connection between Sharif and his religion:

“'A former co-worker of the Somali refugee CBC News has identified as 
the man arrested in a weekend attack in Edmonton says Abdulahi Hasan 
Sharif was an ISIS sympathizer years before Saturday's violent events […]

"He had major issues with polytheists. He said, they need to die."

Further down in the same article clarification is provided that the “RCMP said Sunday 
a 30-year-old Somali refugee was interviewed by the Integrated National Security 
Enforcement Team in 2015. But there was "insufficient evidence" to make an arrest
and the suspect was deemed "not a threat". However, by then the association between Sharif’s religion, his ideology, and his connection to terrorism was already alluded to, and most probably cemented in the mind of the reader.

A Race Problem/An immigration problem

According to Kanji’s (2018) study, non-White Muslim perpetrators were much more likely to be labeled by their race/ethnicity in ways that connected them to groups represented as distinct from normative Canadian identity—while the racial and ethnic identities of White non-Muslim perpetrators were rarely mentioned, preserving the invisibility and innocence of Whiteness. Sharif’s ethno-Racial identity/immigration status was mentioned in 46% of the articles and Bissonnette’s mentioned in only 2% of the articles. Kanji’s (2018) study, also pointed out that non-White Muslim perpetrators were much more likely to be labeled by their immigration/citizenship status. In the case of Sharif, his race, religion, and immigration status were often conflated and used interchangeably to make the same point about his Blackness, Muslimness, and refugee status as an important connection to his terrorism. For example, in the Canadian Press article (Bennett, Cotter, Drinkwater and Purdy, 2017) that was used by several news outlets, mentioned earlier, significant emphasis is placed on Sharif’s citizenship status, “Degrand initially said the suspect was the process of making a refugee claim in Canada, but a spokesman with the federal Public Safety Department later clarified that he had already been found to be a refugee by the Immigration and Refugee Board”.

Another article that was written by John Cotter of The Canadian Press and was used for Huffington Post Canada (2017), dedicates the entire report to Sharif’s
immigration status. Here, we see that the headline, “Abdulahi Hasan Sharif, Edmonton Suspect, Was Ordered to Leave U.S. In 2011”, to the entire body of the article is focused on Sharif’s precarious citizenship. The article explains, “Sharif was granted refugee status in Canada in 2012 […] Authorities in the United States say a Somali refugee accused of attacking a police officer and running down four pedestrians in Edmonton was ordered removed from the country in 2011 by an immigration judge”. In the same article clarification is given that “The RCMP has said the investigation is complex and no terrorism charges have been laid.” And at the very end of the article an explanation is given “RCMP have said Sharif was checked thoroughly in 2015 after police received a report that he may have been radicalized, but investigators determined that he did not pose a threat.”. However, once again, by the time the reader reaches the end of the article, flammable connections between Sharif’s varying “precarious” and stigmatizing identities and terrorism are already established.

A week later another article, written by Lauren Krugel of The Canadian Press (2017) and used by several other media outlets including Macleans Magazine, Global News, The National Post, Huffington Post Canada, The National Observer, CBC News, appears to again make connection to Sharif’s refugee status. The below section from the article mentions Sharif’s connection to Somalia and him being a refugee in the same sentence as the report on an “Islamic State flag” being found in the car involved in a “terrorist attack”. Although the last sentence explains that he is not currently facing any terrorism charges”, by the time the reader has reached the end, a connection between his Black, Muslim, refugee identity and Islamic terrorism has already been established:
“Edmonton police have said an Islamic State flag was found last weekend in a vehicle involved in what they are investigating as a terrorist attack. Abdulahi Hasan Sharif, a 30-year-old Somali refugee, is accused of hitting a police officer with a speeding car, stabbing him and then mowing down pedestrians with a cube van. He faces 11 charges, including five counts of attempted murder. Sharif does not currently face any terrorism charges.”

Another Edmonton Sun article written two days after the Edmonton attack with the headline, “Edmonton terror suspect charged with attempted murder” (Parsons, French and Griwkowsky, Toronto Sun, 2017) dedicates an entire section to Sharif’s citizenship status with the capitalized and bolded subheading, “DETAILS ON SUSPECT’S REFUGEE STATUS”. In this section the article points the reader to the fact that “the RCMP said he was a convention refugee — a person who is not able to return to their home country because of a "well-founded" fear of persecution”, perhaps bringing to question Canada’s refugee vetting system. Although in a later part of the article a statement is included that “there’s no indication at this stage” that there was a failure in the immigration procedures in Sharif’s case, though he noted the investigation was ongoing”, by the time the reader gets to this part doubts about Canada’s current immigration rules and regulations may already have been created in their minds.

In a CBC News article with the headline “Man charged with 5 counts of attempted murder for Edmonton attacks - No terror-related charges laid against man accused of stabbing police officer, running down pedestrians”, it is reported that Sharif is not charged with terrorism but yet again, him being absolved of a link to terrorism is only included in a small sub heading, “no terror related charges laid against man accused of stabbing police officer, running down pedestrians”, in light grey font that is much smaller than the main headline. Interestingly, as described in a
small print at the very bottom of the article, a previous version of the article had included him being charged with terrorism in the headline. Although a correction was made, it was not included in the headline, only in the small light grey font subheading underneath:

“A previous version of this story indicated that terrorism-related charges had been laid against the accused. At this time, only criminal charges not related to terrorism have been laid. Oct 02, 2017 10.04 AM MT”

Despite the claims in the subheading, the article includes a section that still makes a connection between Sharif’s Somali refugee identity, extremism and national security, “Sharif, a Somali refugee, was investigated in 2015 for allegedly espousing extremist views, but investigators said there was insufficient evidence for an arrest and decided he was not a national security threat.”

When Muslim perpetrators of violence have also been refugees or asylum seekers their Muslimness coupled with their refugeeness has reignited discussions on Canada’s immigration problem. Via Rail plotter Raed Jaser’s background as a Palestinian asylum seeker and Abdulahi Hasan Sharif’s status as a Somali refugee were regularly highlighted in media reports emphasizing the question of how Canada’s refugee and immigration system should be improved to bar the entry of future would-be “terrorists” (Friesen, 2017; Morrow, 2017; Canadian Press 2013; Bell 2013a, 2013b).

For example, in a much more direct attack on Canada’s immigration system failures, A Toronto Sun article, with the headline “Screening system failed in case of alleged Edmonton attacker Abdulahi Sharif” (Candice Malcolm, 2017) goes to great
lengths to make connections between Sharif’s refugee status and his involvement in a foreign terrorist group ISIS. By the time this article was published, a week after the attack, it was already confirmed by the RCMP that Sharif is not being charged with terrorism, however, this article continues to make a connection to Sharif’s citizenship status and the extremist violence he acted out, without using the word terrorism:

“Abdulahi Hasan Sharif should have been deported in 2015. Or, even better, his refugee application should have been rejected in 2012. He should have never been allowed into Canada, and when we had the chance, he should’ve been sent packing. Instead, he was welcomed into Canada and now is accused of committing heinous acts of violence over the weekend in Edmonton. An ISIS flag was found in his car. There were countless red flags about Sharif along the way — facts that were apparently ignored or pushed to the side.”

The Muslim terrorist narrative is often filled with villain-making explanations of his violence. As seen in the previous example, his alleged deviance/criminality is explained by his association to a religion and extremist groups like ISIS that are consistently reported as espousing for example, barbaric, misogynistic, homophobic, violent views that are anti-West and do not fit with Western values. This careful and effective labeling immediately denotes the Muslim as a criminally intentioned villain and the non-Muslim (often White) lone wolf attacker as a psychologically and socially troubled victim of social conditions.

*The Villain vs. The Victim*

Through media representations, in the case of the radicalized Muslim “terrorist”, by constant talk about his ethno-religious identity, responsibility seems to be assigned to
a collective and the blame attributed to an alleged collective characteristic (e.g. citizenship status, criminality, extremist religious ideology, barbaric practices, oppression of women etc.), but in the case of the “lone wolf”, by not talking about his multifaceted identity labels, responsibility is assigned only to the individual, with no blame placed on that individual’s collective associations (e.g. his Whiteness, White supremacy leanings, social media trolling, toxic masculinity, extreme right-wing political ideology, ownership of a firearm etc.). In fact, the non-Muslim lone wolf narrative is often polluted with a long list of almost victim-making explanations for his alleged deviant/criminal behaviour. He is frequently described in the media in sympathetic terms (e.g. as being alienated, marginalized, bullied, a loner so on and so forth).

In an article written by Zi-Ann Lum of Huffington Post Canada with files from The Canadian Press and Ryan Maloney, Bissonnette is described as having no previous history with authorities in the subheading. The reader is immediately alerted to the fact that he is not a seasoned criminal:

“Alexandre Bissonnette Identified As Quebec Mosque Shooting Suspect
He has no previous history with authorities, police said.”

The idea that he is not a threat is reinforced with the comment, “He seemed to want to co-operate […] the suspect said he was waiting for the police to arrive”. When describing his demeanour at the courthouse the article makes reference to him “wearing a white jumpsuit and in handcuffs” and appeared “tired-looking”, such language immediately humanizes a man who just hours earlier walked into a mosque
and opened fire on a crowd of people. The article goes on to report that, “during the hearing the accused stared at his feet and fidgeted”, painting him in almost a child-like manner. The article then talks about the fact that “Bissonnette’s now-deactivated Facebook’s account previously indicated he’s a student at Université Laval”, again, alerting the reader to the fact that he was an ordinary young man from a seemingly respectable social standing, as he was pursuing higher education. The body of the article then goes into a lot more detail about Bissonnette’s personal background, speaking about his family relationships, his participation in the Canadian armed forces, the difficulties Bissonnette faced with bullying, and his volunteer work:

“According to La Presse, Bissonnette and his twin brother were bullied in high school. The outlet reports they participated in the Royal Canadian Army Cadets program. On Facebook, Bissonnette would often clash with people over politics. To Vincent Boissoneault, a childhood friend, the idea of Bissonnette committing an act of violence never crossed his mind. Offline, Bissonnette worked for Hema-Quebec, a non-profit group responsible for managing the province’s blood supply. In a statement about Bissonnette, Hema-Quebec said its primary mission is one of being “devoted to the gift of life.” News of the arrest of one of their own sent a “shockwave” throughout the organization, it said.”

In a Toronto Sun article headlined “Quebec mosque attack suspect faces 11 charges (Solyom, 2017) Bissonnette is again described in sympathetic terms:

“Handcuffed in the prisoner’s box, Alexandre Bissonnette bowed his head as the charges against him were read out late Monday after a shooting spree at a Quebec City Mosque that has shaken the community, Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Though police and politicians have spoken of terrorism since the 27-year-old student allegedly opened fire just after the last prayers on Sunday, Bissonnette was not charged with any terrorism-related offences. The young man, who appears to have acted alone despite initial reports of a second gunman, did not have a previous criminal record and was known as an introvert, and a victim of bullying in school.
He dressed up as the Grim Reaper for Halloween, and his musical tastes ranged from Katy Perry to Megadeth. Bissonnette’s father is listed in the sales deed of the house as an investigator. And according to Bissonnette’s Facebook page, which has since been taken off-line, his grandfather was a decorated war hero.”

Here we are made to see Bissonnette as an ordinary man, playfully participating in a popular national tradition/celebration- Halloween. We are also given a strange description of his taste in music as being varied and popular. And, we are even alerted to his father’s respectable occupation as an investigator and his grandfather’s commitment to Canada as a war veteran. In this article, Bissonnette is repeatedly humanised and presented as not only “ordinary”, but a likeable person.

In a file prepared by the Canadian Press and used by several other news outlets including Huffington Post Canada, The Toronto Sun, The Toronto Star, and CBC News, Alexander Bissonnette is candidly referred to as a victim with the below headline:

“Alexandre Bissonnette, Quebec Mosque Attack Suspect, Was Victim of Extremism: Imam Hussein Gillett said, someone planted ideas in Alexandre Bissonnette’s head.”

And we see the Toronto Star use the same file and use of the word ‘victim’ but with slightly different wording for its heading:

“Quebec Mosque shooting suspect also a victim, imam says at funeral service”
In the body of the article the reader is told that a local imam named Hussein Guillet said, “Alexandre, before being a killer, he was a victim also […] the accused didn't wake up one day and randomly decide to commit the alleged crimes […] before shooting bullets into the heads of his victims, somebody planted ideas, more dangerous than the bullets, in his head”. The message of his victimhood is strengthened with the report that a Muslim religious leader is referring to him as such.

In the case of Bissonnette, several articles used the word “victim” to describe him in the first week after the Quebec Mosque attack, however, with Sharif, I could not identify any media article that spoke of him as a victim, especially considering that he came from a war torn country and presumably had been exposed to violence in his lifetime and numerous challenges as a refugee. Rather, his refugeeness became a problematic part of his identity that pointed to his more likely association to Islamic extremism. It must also be noted, even though most victims of terrorism are, in fact, Muslims (82-97%) (National Counterterrorism Centre NCTC, 2012), public perceptions persist that Muslim terrorists pose the greatest threat to non-Muslim citizens, namely those in the West. By not accurately reporting on the predominantly Muslim victims of terrorism, misconceptions that Muslims can only perpetrate ideological violence and not be victims of it are invigorated. The concepts of “naming” and “framing” highlight the importance of meaning making when it comes to using politically charged language and can explain corresponding government policies.

Media Talk and Political Echoes
Media is a powerful institution in how effective it is at shaping public perceptions on which type of political and ideological violence poses the most threat to Canadians. The various forms of media representations examined in the previous section come together to frame Muslim violence ("terrorism"), and by association Muslims, as an exceptional problem necessitating exceptional solutions. Although we cannot claim that the media is directly responsible for legislative responses to the Muslim Problem, the following section highlights how media framing about Muslims may have indirectly informed public policy, since there appears to be a parallel between the Muslim terrorist narrative and public policy that concentrate on Muslims. As a means to solve the Muslim Problem, various public responses and government policy suggestions have been given over the years.

Morality is often used as a way to define and measure acceptable and unacceptable social behavior. In the case of Muslims, the Muslim “veil” has been given all sorts of moral meanings that can appeal to anyone from the liberal feminist who sees it as a form of patriarchal oppression to the right leaning conservative, who believes in the “complete” integration of immigrants. If Muslims are framed as consistently violating the collective morality of Western society, immigration restrictions on them and policies that infringe on their citizenship rights can then be justified. Canadian parliamentary debates on Muslim women’s clothing have resurfaced with Quebec’s recent ban of religious symbols for public workers (Bill 21), including headscarves. This has made Muslim women’s clothing once again a matter of public and political concern and thereby, has problematized and securitized Muslim women.
In 2017, the Peel Region District School Board dominated the news after receiving backlash for a religious accommodation policy that had actually been in place for all students in the past 15 years. The criticisms have pointed to the accommodation of Muslim students and their right to pray in school if they so choose. Concerned parents and known right wing groups who claim to be simply advocating for a secular learning environment have demanded the removal of the accommodation policy that according to them accommodates “hate speech” and “violent Islamic ideology” in schools. There was extensive Media coverage of this debate that problematized and securitized Muslim youth. These types of discussions about whether Muslim practices informed by their faith fit into Canadian values can have detrimental effects on the well-being of Canadian Muslims and can not only contribute to the further alienation and marginalization they already experience but can stoke the fears that fuel Islamophobia.

The continuous naming and framing of Muslim perpetrators of violence as terrorists has ultimately led to Muslims being seen as a literal threat to national security. Since 9/11 the US-led “War on Terror” has led to the over securitization of Muslims in Canada, including, the tightening of Canadian border security and immigration policy. In 2015, the previous Conservative government passed new anti-terrorism legislation known as Bill C-51, which generated considerable controversy because of the expanded powers it grants to government agencies to counter terrorist activities in Canada. The Bill would naturally single out the Muslim community through racial profiling under the pretense of National security. Although Bill C-51 is claimed to be a legitimate and much needed national security measure, it can be seen as yet another extreme response to political discourse that points to Muslims as a
threat to national security.

Bill C-31, which came into effect in December 2012, can be seen as a governmental policy response to the “national paranoia and shame triggered by the “terror attacks”” (Thompson, 2013: 21). Titled, “An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, the Balanced Refugee Reform Act, the Marine Transportation Security Act and the Department of Citizenship and Immigration Act”, it primarily impacts the immigration of asylum-seekers and refugee claimants to Canada. In particular, Bill C-31 introduced shorter timelines for the refugee claims process, making it more difficult for many refugee claimants to prepare their case. It punishes refugee claimants who arrive in a group, which is often the only option for some who flee persecution. The Bill also includes extreme new measures to revoke the status of, and immediately deport refugees who are currently permanent residents. Bill C-31 can be seen as a policy through which “suspicion and criminalization of new immigrants, especially those fleeing political persecution or violence, is acceptable and normal under the rationalization that “legitimate” Canadian citizens must be protected” (Thompson 2013: 4.

Interestingly, in the Environics Institute’s 2016 survey of Muslims in Canada, a majority (52%) reported being worried about violent extremism among Muslim Canadians, even though only a very small percentage (3%) had actually seen or heard extremism being promoted in community spaces (Environics Institute, 2016)—pointing to Dubois’ (1903: 3) concept of “double consciousness” in which he describes “the peculiar feeling [as a Black man in America] of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity”. Similarly, we can see how the pervasive
public representations of the threat of Muslim violence has become powerful enough to override Muslims’ direct experiences of their own communities; to believe the threat of Muslim terrorism is a real threat for them to worry about (Kanji, 2018).

Conclusion
Although traditional media studies point to political slants of news sources as having some effect on bias in news coverage, my study cannot really speak to the issue directly because my analysis did not investigate this factor, specifically. However, an interesting point to note was that there seemed to be ideological convergence in the coverage across all the news sources, regardless of where they are positioned politically. As a point of acknowledgment and direction for future research, I would like to mention that there appears to be a kind of socio-political hegemony in the framing of the Muslim terrorist narrative that is shared by different Canadian newspapers, regardless of their otherwise well-known political leanings that deserves to be looked into further.

The findings of this study point to the notion that maybe the instinctual tendency on the part of the police, political groups, and media outlets to very quickly name and frame Muslim perpetrators of violence as terrorists and others as lone wolves has less to do with the technical definition of terrorism and more to do with the social construction of terrorism as only a Muslim problem. The analysis shows that by immediately attaching the terrorist label to Muslim criminals and stripping non-Muslim non-racialized criminals of the terrorist label the media reinforces the “Muslim terrorist” narrative. The analysis points to the ways in which religion, race and immigration status are central to media framing of terrorism and de-/humanizing
discourses are often used to frame non-Muslim suspects as victims vs. Muslim suspects as villains. As a result, Muslims in general, especially those who are racialized immigrants, are unceasingly seen as a threat to Canadians.

Since media and political discourse on Muslims appear to parallel each other, the analysis also points to the ways in which media framing informs public policy. As discussed, political talk and action on how to solve the Muslim problem through legislation plays on existing public anxieties towards Muslims and is strengthened in an ongoing way via the media. This cyclical relationship between the media and political bodies keeps the Muslim problem current and important and continues to justify the increased securitization of Muslims in Canada. Due to negative media and political discourse, Muslims continue to be imagined as a homogenous group with singular and static ideologies that stand in opposition to Western values. Western dominance in international communication and global influence, allow these views to develop and become normalized over time so that they are no longer questioned (Karim, 1997). Considering most of the public get information about minorities from the news media (Henry and Tator, 2002), it is deeply troubling that media and political discourses that continuously construct Muslims as a social problem may be playing a key role in perpetuating negative stereotypes about Muslims and in turn, fueling widespread Islamophobia in Canada.
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Abstract

Canada’s response to the global refugee crisis has been met with worldwide praise, however, there is a paucity of research to understand the integration challenges faced by refugees upon their arrival. With the numbers of hate crimes towards Muslims and racialized people in Canada rapidly increasing every year (Statistics Canada, 2019), there is some concern that refugees carrying multiple stigmatizing identities may be facing heightened racial and anti-Muslim discrimination. Representing the covert, subtle, and unintentional forms of racism, discrimination, and prejudice, we use racial microaggression theory (Sue et al, 2007) to explore the complex range of discrimination experiences amongst a sample of refugees in St. John’s, Newfoundland and Labrador (NL) and Hamilton, Ontario. The findings show that racial and ethno-religious microaggressions and overt discrimination/racism were quite common among our sample of refugee youth. Moreover, experiences of discrimination were compounded when multiple stigmas intersected. As well, racial and ethno-religious microaggressions and discrimination were found to have profound effects on emotional well-being and sense of self for refugee youth.

Keywords: Migration, integration, stigma, refugees, refugee youth, Muslims, racism, anti-Black racism, microaggressions, Islamophobia, hate crimes.
Introduction

Over the last few decades, there has been an alarming increase in the number of individuals fleeing persecution, human rights violations, and armed conflict. According to the Global Trends from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the worldwide total number of forcibly displaced people reached a record 68.5 million in 2017, with more than 16 million people newly displaced. Moreover, more than two-thirds (68 per cent) of all refugees worldwide came from just five countries; Syrian Arab Republic (6.3 million), Afghanistan (2.6 million), South Sudan (2.4 million), Myanmar (1.2 million) and Somalia (986,400) (UNHCR, 2017). It is important to note that all of the aforementioned countries can be described as either majority Muslim or ones that have a considerable Muslim population. Although 85 per cent of the world’s refugees are hosted in countries in developing regions, with one-third of refugees being hosted in the world’s least developed countries (UNHCR), a sizeable population is received in developed Western Countries, including Canada.

In 2015, the Government of Canada and Canadians responded overwhelmingly to the United Nations’ appeal for global humanitarian support for the Syrian refugee crisis. According to UNHCR (2017), the resettlement of 46,700 refugees in 2016 — including privately sponsored (14,274), blended visa office-referred refugees 3,931, and government-sponsored refugees (21,876) — marks a record for Canada since 1978. The top five refugee countries of origin in 2016 were Syria (33,266), Eritrea (3,934), Iraq (1,650), Congo (1,644), and Afghanistan (1,354). Between November 2015 and November 2016, more than 35,000 government-supported and privately sponsored refugees from Syria alone were resettled in Canada, making it the top source country, and Eritrea ranked second with around 3000. On September 8, 2016,
Immigration Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) jointly announced that a total of more than $600,000 would be invested in short-term grants to fund 25 research projects on issues that affect the successful resettlement of Syrian refugees (SSHRC, 2017).

However, while there has been unrelenting media coverage on the apparent influx of “foreigners” into Canada, the complex integration challenges faced by refugees from multi-layered ethnic, racial and religious backgrounds has gone somewhat unnoticed. With most refugees coming to Canada being racialized and filling other minority categories, such as being Muslim and being Black, and with the numbers of hate crimes towards Muslims and racialized people in Canada rapidly increasing every year (Statistics Canada, 2017), there is some concern that refugees coming from already difficult situations are facing the brunt of racial and anti-Muslim discrimination.

As a vulnerable population, refugees oftentimes face greater obstacles to their integration than those who arrive under other immigration categories (Hadley and Patil, 2009). While scholarship strongly suggests that both immigrants and refugees experience racism, discrimination, and prejudice, for the latter group, these experiences tend to have significant health and mental health implications (Hadley and Patil, 2009; Willis and Nkwocha, 2006; Beiser, 2005; Halcón et al, 2004; Fazel and Stein, 2003). First coined in 1970, racial microaggressions are brief, daily, verbal or non-verbal exchanges that communicate negative views, ideas, or beliefs to people of colour because they belong to a racial minority group (Houshmand, et al 2014; Solórzano et al, 2000; Sue et al, 2007; Sue, 2003; Pierce et al, 1978). Representing the covert, subtle, and unintentional forms of racism, discrimination, and prejudice, racial
microaggression theory (Sue et al, 2007) is well suited to understand the complex range of racial experiences of refugees. Houshmand and her colleagues (2014: 377) contend that racial microaggressions may be particularly salient in Canada because of its hidden, coded nature.

In this article, we assess the prevalence and effects of racial microaggressions amongst refugee youth by examining in-depth interviews with a community-based sample of 23 refugees aged 14-25 who have resettled in St. John’s, Newfoundland and Labrador (NL) and Hamilton, Ontario. According to the 2016 census, nearly 18 per cent of Hamilton's population identified as a visible minority in 2016, up from about 14 per cent in 2011 (Houle, 2019). Refugees make up nearly 26 per cent of the 108,805 newcomers to Hamilton who landed between 1980 and 2016 and Hamilton houses nearly six per cent of all refugees who landed in Ontario during that period (O'Reilly, 2017). Currently, NL has relatively low ethnic diversity: only 1.36% of the province’s population identified as visible minorities in the 2011 National Household Survey, compared to the national average of 19.07% (Statistics Canada, 2013). The provincial government of NL (2007; 2005) has identified a problem with retaining immigrants and refugees who come to the province. A report published in 2010 found that NL had the lowest immigrant retention rate amongst all Canadian provinces (Okonny-Myers, 2010).

Indeed, there is value in examining racial microaggressions within these two diverse cities. One study examining the experiences of school-aged refugees in St. John’s demonstrated that they face overwhelming racism and discrimination in the school environment (Baker, 2013). Considering the important ways that St. John’s differs from other Canadian cities where refugees are resettled, there is a need to
understand how refugees’ experiences of wellbeing are shaped in this city. In comparison to St. John’s, which receives relatively few refugees, Hamilton is a significant refugee-receiving city, and so it was postulated for this study that Hamilton might provide refugee youth with more formal and informal networks to mediate, make sense of, and manage micro-aggressions. Comparing young refugees’ experiences in these two cities point to the ways in which local contexts shape the experiences of, and responses to, racism.

The specific questions explored in this research that pertain to this analysis were:

1. How do young refugees understand the term racism? What is the nature of racial and ethno-religious microaggressions experienced by these refugees in St. John’s and Hamilton? How do the victims respond to, and cope with, these perceived incidents?
2. Do they experience stigma on the discrete category basis of their status as a refugee, as racialized, or as Muslim?

Given the relationship between race, religion, gender, social class and experiences of discrimination, we are particularly interested in how the intersections of identity triply affect the individuals highlighted in this sample. In inquiring about racial microaggressions as experienced by the refugee youth, the data highlight three major types of discrimination faced by them, refugee status discrimination, anti-Muslim discrimination, and racial discrimination. These three stigmatising facets of their identity become central to their prospects of integration into Canadian society. Given the relationship between context and societal perceptions of “refugeeness,” we were also interested in understanding how refugees feel about their status as refugees as well as their emerging Canadian identity. Although this research was focused
around microaggression theory and the ways in which racism can play out in the lives of refugees in subtle but pervasive ways, we found that the stories of the respondents were also, sadly, rich with examples of overt and oftentimes violent racism and anti-Muslim discrimination, too.

**Background**

Despite having come from traumatic situations, upon arrival to their new home refugees may also face uncertainty, strained resources, and even violence (Baranik, Hurst, and Eby, 2017). Such experiences may be also coupled with anticipatory stress, especially as it relates to finding employment, learning the language and culture, and connecting with those family members who may also be awaiting resettlement (Porter and Haslam, 2003). In fact, Beiser, Johnson, and Turner (1993), in their examination of Southeast Asian refugees in Vancouver, found that the stressors that result following resettlement exerted more of an influence on participants’ mental health than did such pre-arrival stressors as direct trauma. Given the impact that post-arrival stressors can have on the successful integration of refugees, it is important to understand the experiences of refugees within the context of their “refugeeness.”

This is especially important given that the label is loaded with stigma and refugees have no choice in how and when the label is applied to them. Empirical research in the United Kingdom (Kirkwood et al, 2007), Canada (Varma Joshi et al, 2004; Baker et al, 2016; Noh et al, 1999), the United States (Nugent and Roberts, 2013; Dow 2011; Hadley and Patil, 2009; Ellis et al, 2008; Willis and Nkwocha, 2006; Halcón et al, 2004), Norway (Fangen, 2006) and Australia (Schweitzer et al, 2005) has documented that refugees and visible minorities are often marginalized,
treated poorly due to their race, or experience racially motivated violence. In fact, Hadley and Patil (2009, 505: 6) suggest that resettled refugees “are at a particularly high risk of discrimination because they show many outward signs of their minority status, including dress, skin colour, language, neighbourhood of residence, religion, and socioeconomic status”.

Indeed, refugee youth are an especially vulnerable group given that they often enter countries of resettlement with high levels of trauma exposure and significant mental health needs including depression and post-traumatic stress disorder (Nugent and Roberts, 2013). Ellis et al (2008: 185) argue that on-going stressors such as those brought on by experiencing racism, discrimination, and prejudice can further increase refugee youths’ risk to healthy development and potentially function as traumatic reminders. This is especially relevant for those youth who have fled their country due to persecution associated with their ethnic or religious identity. Moreover, refugees who experience covert forms of racism often have difficulty discussing it, due, in part, to language barriers as well as a general fear or apprehension that by describing negative experiences within the host country might have negative consequences (Goodman et al, 2014).

A study examining barriers to health care for refugees in Canada found that some health providers were unwilling to accept refugees as patients. According to the study, refugees were perceived as more challenging, due to complex health needs, linguistic barriers, and/or complicated insurance coverage schemes that can delay payment for services delivered (McKeary & Newbold, 2010). Interestingly, in the same study a Muslim refugee said she stopped wearing a headscarf to not appear
“visibly Muslim” because “Muslim women who leave home and go into the community become targets”.

Islam continues to be the fastest-growing non-Christian religion in Canada with over one million Muslims representing 3.2% of the nation's total population (up from 2% in 2001) (Statistics Canada, 2011). Muslims also represent the youngest generation in Canada with a median age of 28.1 years, compared to the Jewish and Roman Catholic populations (41.5 and 37.8 years respectively). The number of Muslims in Canada is likely to rise further, considering, India, Syria, Pakistan, and Iran remain as the top 10 source countries for immigration to Canada (IRCC, 2016). Moreover, the top five source countries for refugees in 2016 were Syria, Eritrea, Congo, Iraq, and Afghanistan (UNHCR, 2017). Boasting an array of cultures, religions, and languages within its borders, Canada has become an oft-cited example of pluralism done right. Since November 4, 2015, 40,081 Syrian refugees have arrived in Canada (Government of Canada, 2017) but with global terrorism becoming increasingly associated with Muslims and the majority of refugees coming to Canada from Muslim countries, public and political concerns of Muslim integration and loyalties towards Canada have surfaced (Molnar, 2016), creating an irrational fear towards them.

Islamophobia is defined as an “unreasonable fear of Islam and Muslims” (Zimmermann et al, 2008: 454) and manifests itself in the form of intolerance, defamation, discrimination and racism (Annan, 2004; Schiffer and Wagner, 2011). As such, Schiffer and Wagner (2011: 79) call it “cultural racism”. Others have taken a step further to delineate anti-Muslim racism as separate from Islamophobia. While the term Islamophobia can be more broadly used to describe overarching public, political
and media discourse and stereotypes (Sivanandan, 2010), the term anti-Muslim racism is often used to refer to hate crimes, and to harassment, rudeness and verbal abuse in public spaces. It would seem important to include race as central to the definition of anti-Muslim discrimination and hate that is experienced by those who appear Muslim, even if they are not Muslim. As such, for the purpose of this research, we will be using anti-Muslim racism or ethno-religious racism to describe overt acts of hostility and microaggressions. Islamophobia will be used to underscore the wider narrative that comes from closed views and an irrational fear of Muslims and Islam within which, explicit and implicit types of hate take form. Sometimes explicit forms of hate towards Muslims are reported to police and can be charged as hate crimes.

The Criminal Code of Canada (1985) defines a hate crime as a criminal act committed to intimidate, harm or terrify any person belonging to an identifiable group. Sections 318-4 and 319 of the code define an identifiable group as one distinguished by their “colour, race, religion, national or ethnic origin, age, sex, sexual orientation, or mental or physical disability”. Accordingly, hate crime offences are expressed in four ways: promoting genocide, public statements and gestures inciting hate deliberately; promoting hatred of a group; or vandalizing religious property with hateful mischief. In 2017, hate crimes in Canada increased 47%, with Muslims seeing the greatest rise in numbers (Statistics Canada, 2019). The number of hate-crimes targeting Muslims more than doubled from 2016. Interestingly, according to victimization surveys, two-thirds of these crimes actually go unreported, so the numbers that are included in Statistics Canada data are probably only a fraction of what the true numbers of hate crimes in Canada are.
Although Jews were the biggest targets for hate crimes in 2017, with 360 incidents, Muslims came a very close second, with 349 incidents. Hate crime numbers increased for both populations between 2016 and 2017 but the increase was far greater for Muslims. Jews were targeted in 139 more incidents in 2017, for an increase of 63 per cent. Muslims, meanwhile, were targeted in an additional 210 incidents, for an increase of 151 per cent. Moreover, crimes against Muslims were more violent in nature. “Uttering threats” was the most frequent violent offence that Muslims faced last year, with 61 incidents, while Jews faced 22. They were also more prominent targets for assault (30 incidents versus 13), including both common assault (20 incidents versus nine) and assault with a weapon, assault causing bodily harm or aggravated assault (10 versus four). Incidents targeting Black people went up 50 per cent to 321, while incidents targeting Arab or West Asian people jumped by 27 per cent, to hit 142. This is important to note, since 88% of Muslims in Canada are racialized in comparison to 2% racialized Jews. And, the South Asian, West Asian, Arab and Black communities all include significant numbers of Muslims. The intersections of race/ethnicity and religion make recording hate crimes for Muslims very difficult, so it is safe to assume that the real numbers of hate crimes experienced by Muslims are potentially much higher than is captured in police reported data provided to Statistics Canada.

Hate crime numbers also fluctuate based on geography. According to Statistics Canada, Hamilton, Ontario remains as one of the top two cities in Canada for hate crimes (Armstrong, 2019). In 2017, Police services covering Hamilton, Peterborough, the York region and Guelph all recorded hate crime rates per 100,000 that put their cities among the top 10 highest in the country (Brownell, 2018). Hamilton saw the
highest rate of any jurisdiction in the region and the third highest in the country, at 16 incidents per 100,000 people (ibid). Although these numbers are important, some caution must be taken in coming to the conclusion that there are more hate crimes in these cities. Part of the issue is whether residents of certain cities have more or less confidence that the police will do something about their hate crime report. Individuals in Thunder Bay, for example, may experience a hate crime, but don’t bother reporting it to police because they don’t think it will do any good. On the other hand, it’s possible that Hamilton residents have more confidence that reporting a hate crime to police will result in some type of action/investigation.

Hate crime data can provide a useful start to understanding the discrimination faced by some Canadians, but it is important to note that hate crimes are massively underreported by victims and police. Groups that are more diverse or racialized are underrepresented in our hate crime statistics. It’s often difficult to determine which biases inspired a specific incident. Finally, hate crime statistics don’t necessarily measure racism in Canada. The aggregated data used annually to shed light on the negative experiences of some groups in society aren’t an accurate barometer of racism experienced by such a diverse range of Canadians who may be stigmatized in multiple ways.

**Theoretical Orientations**

*Stigma*

Stigma, as defined by Goffman (1963), is a deeply discrediting attitude associated to negative stereotypes. In Goffman’s (1963: 2) view, stigma occurs as a discrepancy between “virtual social identity” (how a person is seen and labeled by society) and
“actual social identity” (the attributes truly possessed by a person). Stigma has also been described as a situational threat; one that results from being positioned in a social situation that has great influence on how a person is seen and then treated. Jones et al. (1984) explained stigma to be a concept that is based on the processes of cognitive categorization, in that, stigma occurs when undesirable characteristics are attributed to a person that mark the individual and lead to them being discredited in society. Stigma at its essence is a “devaluing social identity” (Crocker et al., 1998: 505) that is socially constructed (Major & O’Brien, 2005). Stigma is not located within the stigmatized person, but instead occurs within a social context that defines an attribute as devaluing. The negative and stigmatized identities that are often ascribed to immigrants and particularly refugees begin to raise issues of identity management that Goffman (1963) has referred to as stigma management. However, just as not all ethnic immigrants experience stigma in the same way, they also do not have similar opportunities for coping with stigma. Not all immigrants experience the burden of ethnicity the same way. Members of various stigmatized ethnic groups experience varying degrees of discrediting and discriminatory practice (Eidheim, 1969).

Discrimination

A very real and harmful result of stigma is discrimination, which can be described as actions or exclusions that are directed towards those individuals who are seen in a negative light and therefore less deserving. Moreover, discrimination also encourages and reinforces stigma (Aggleton, P., Wood, K., Malcolm, A. and Parker R., 2005, p. 11). Thus, stigma and discrimination can be seen as interrelated- reinforcing and legitimizing each other. According to Valenta’s (2009) study, “coping with the burden
of ethnic stigma was a substantial part of the social life of Iraqi, Bosnian, and Croat immigrants in Norway”. Valenta’s (2009: 356) informants said that they have experienced everything from a “lack of respect to direct verbal racist insults”.

According to the majority of his informants, “constant ambivalence and anxiety about how their hosts categorize them, combined with sporadic acts of overt discrimination and all the negative headlines about foreigners in the mass media, have resulted in a constant uneasiness during daily face-to-face encounters with Norwegians” (ibid: 356).

Valenta (2009) situates the strategies that immigrants interactively deploy face-to-face with host community locals, in an analytical framework which is tentative to both racialized and ethnicized difference. Experiences and opportunities for coping with stigma vary among the sample group because, on a daily basis, “people make distinctions between Western and non-Western immigrants; white ethnics and racialized ethnics; Europeans and non-Europeans; Christians and non-Christian” so on and so forth (ibid: 356). Depending on the identity categories they fill “certain immigrant groups find face-to-face interactions outside their own group more negotiable and less problematic” (Purkayastha, 2005 in Valenta, 2009, 356). The value given to each group is different, based on the value system of any particular society (Sackman et al., 2003; Portes and Rumbaut, 2006; Purkayastha, 2005 in Valenta, 2009).

Valenta (2009) also points to the multiple categories included within the ethnic identities of his informants, which allowed for different opportunities for negotiation amongst the sample. Cultural distance (aka foreignness) or cultural similarity are ultimately the result of perception and are socially constructed, however, the cultural
characteristics that are used as relevant measures of cultural distance or difference are fluid and formed within a particular social context (Barth, 1969) and usually enforced structural powers. As such, there is an undeniable influence of power in determining one’s susceptibility and possible response to stigma. The perceived powerlessness of certain stigmatised groups in society, such as refugees, may play an important role in shaping their reaction to racism. In fact, the perceived powerlessness of refugees can even have profound effects on the way refugees see themselves through the eyes of the dominant and seemingly “more powerful” groups in society as inferior and deserving of contempt.

**Internalized Stigma and Discrimination**

Although the concept of “stigma” has been described as functioning predominantly in the social sphere (Scheff, 1966; Link and Phelan, 2001), it can be argued that self-conceptions develop from insights of how others view and respond to the self as a social object (Markowitz, 2005). The symbolic interactionist perspective suggests persons and actions as objects in the social world obtain meaning through social interaction (Mead, 1934) and the meaning of behavior is continuously interpreted through the utilization of language and symbols. Thus, social responses to behaviors and characteristics are created by shared cultural meanings. According to Cooley’s (1902) “looking glass self” concept, a person’s self grows out of social interactions with others and the perception of others, so the way we perceive ourselves is a reflection of how we think others perceive us.

This idea of individual identity being born of the perceived perceptions of ‘others’ can also be equated to Mead's (1934) theory of the “I” and the “Me”. The
individual takes the attitude of the “me” or the attitude of the “I”, according to situations in which he/she finds him/herself. Based on the symbolic interactionist perspective, self-stigma or ‘internalized’ stigmatization can be described as the process of seeing oneself in a negative light because of the negative perceptions of others. This type of stigma is ‘felt’, as opposed to ‘enacted’ stigma in that it mostly affects an individual’s or affected community’s sense of pride and worth (Aggleton, P., Wood, K., Malcolm, A. and Parker R., 2005: 9). Other outcomes of stigma can be “self-hatred, a feeling of worthlessness, helplessness, lack of control over the situation, attempting to prove his/her advantage over the other members of stigmatized group, inability to build relationships with people outside or within their own group, etc.” (Gryga, Semygina, Zubets, 2005: 77 in Smyrnova, 2015: 53).

Many social psychological models pinpoint the principal effects of stigma on the individual’s emotional response and self-esteem (Yang et al., 2007). Major and O’Brien (2005) incorporate an identity threat model in their analysis of stigma and its effects on an individual - a transactional analysis of stress induced by stigma and a look at coping strategies used by the stigmatized individual (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). The theory points to “immediate situational cues” that convey risk of being devalued. It also looks at “collective representations”, which are an individual’s existing knowledge of cultural stereotypes that influence assessment of threat to one’s well-being (Major and O’Brien, 2005). The main outcome of their research is that stigma predisposes individuals to poor outcomes by threatening self-esteem, academic achievement, and mental or physical health (Major and O’Brien, 2005). As described in the preceding section, stigma has far reaching negative outcomes that not only affect the way a person is treated by others, but also the way a person sees themselves.
Using Micro Aggression Theory to Measure Racism

In “Getting Respect” (2016), Lamont et. al examine how ordinary people understand and respond to experiences of stigma and discrimination and how those experiences differ based on geographical and social location. Based on 437 semi-structured qualitative interviews conducted, the authors identify two key forms of racial exclusion: racial discrimination (being deprived of resources) that can be proven and incidents of stigmatization (being assigned low status) that usually go unnoticed. They explain discrimination to refer to situations in which it is possible to give concrete accounts and definitive proof that an individual has been denied opportunities or access to resources such as being denied a job, housing, credit, and/or access to public places due to their race, ethnicity, or nationality. Stigma, on the other hand, is referred to by them as 'assaults on worth', which includes a broad spectrum of situations and subjective experiences and incidents in which respondents face disrespect and their dignity, honor, relative status, skill, or self-esteem was reduced and challenged (Lamont et. al., 2016: 6), for example, being treated according to a double standard, it being routine to be stopped by the police, not being called for job interviews, or being denied access to discos etc.

They found that across the five groups observed (African Americans, Black Brazilians, Arab Palestinian citizens of Israel, and Mizrahim and Ethiopian Jews) in three different countries (the United States, Brazil, and Israel) incidents of stigmatization were far more prevalent than incidents of racial discrimination. Their new concept, “assaults on worth”, is similar to the concepts of “everyday racism” (Essed, 1991; 2002) and “microaggressions” (Sue et al., 2007). All three stress the
pervasive nature of racial slights and ethno-racial exclusion that so many ethnic minorities experience and all three emphasize the subjective nature of these experiences—how individuals interpret and define their reality in differing ways. They also stress the impact of power inequities between ethnic minorities and whites (when they are the dominant group).

As Sue et al (2007) explain, the more subtle forms of racism have been labelled new racism (Barker, 1981), modern racism (McConahay, 1983), interpersonal context (Harrell 2000), symbolic racism (Sears, 1988), everyday racism (Essed, 1991), aversive racism (Dovodio and Gaertner, 2008), and within Canada, democratic racism (Henry and Tator, 2010; Satzewich, 2011). These new explanations for racism tend to emphasize the covert aspect of racism while eschewing the ‘old’ racism wherein overt racial hatred is consciously and publicly displayed. Indeed, contemporary sociology views racism ‘as individual- and group-level processes and structures that are implicated in the reproduction of racial inequality in diffuse and often subtle ways’ (Clair and Denis, 2015, 857).

As such, this ‘new racism’ is most potent because it reflects a covert and continued form of discrimination— even though an individual may not recognize that her/his actions are causing harm (Baker, 2013). It represents ‘the empty seat next to a person of colour which is the last to be occupied in a crowded bus, the slight movement away from a person of colour in an elevator, [and] the over attention to the Black customer in the shop…’ (Henry and Tator, 2000: 55). Ironically, research by Solórzano et al (2000) suggests that the daily common experiences that characterize racial microaggressions ‘may have significantly more influence on racial anger,
frustration, and self-esteem than traditional overt forms of racism’ (Sue et al, 2007: 272).

Sue and his colleagues (2007) have developed a racial microaggression taxonomy that comprises three types: microassaults; microinsults, and microinvalidations. The first type refers to verbal or non-verbal acts designed to defame an individual through name calling, avoidant behaviour, or purposeful discriminatory actions. While this type is most likely to be conscious and deliberate, it is generally expressed in private or what Goffman (1959) terms the backstage. The second type - microinsult - is statements/comments that convey insensitivity while demeaning an individual’s racial heritage.

Sue and his colleagues (2007) contend that microinsults represent subtle snubs, frequently unknown to the perpetrator, but clearly convey a hidden derogatory message to the person of colour. Finally, microinvalidations focus on subtle communications that negate the lived experience of the person of colour – for example, when a visible minority is complimented for speaking English well, the effect is to potentially negate their Canadian heritage. Despite the growing trend towards research on microaggression theory using psychology, few studies, if any, have been conducted using a sociological lens.³ To date, empirical research on racial microaggression theory has primarily focused on the United States (Ong et al, 2013; Mercer et al 2011; Sue et al 2008; Constantine 2007) and only two psychology-based studies have been conducted focusing on Canada (Houshmand, 2014; Hernandez, 2010). To our knowledge, no empirical sociological research has examined racial

³ As a note, David Embrick (Loyola University- Chicago) and Silvia Dominguez (Northeastern University) have issued a call for articles using racial microaggression theory for their co-edited special issue of Sociological Inquiry.
microaggressions among refugees or refugee youth.

**Methodology**

The research allowed for an in-depth understanding of racial microaggressions in two differently sized refugee-receiving cities. From 2015-2019, St. John’s welcomed around 1245 refugees, far fewer than the nearly 4000 refugees Hamilton received in the same period (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2019). We conducted in-depth, semi-structured interviews, comprised of 7-10 questions, with 24 self-identified visible minority refugee youth living in St. John’s, Newfoundland and Labrador (8), and Hamilton, Ontario (16). We chose in-depth interviews, as Bonilla-Silva and Forman (2000) argue that respondents’ experiences of racism tend to become more apparent through interviews as opposed to other methods. We audio recorded, and later transcribed, the interviews. In order to ensure an appropriate data set, participants were expected to have a reasonable fluency in English in order to eliminate the need for interpreters. For the purposes of this study, we defined a youth as aged 14-25 based on Statistics Canada’s *National Longitudinal Study of Children and Youth*.

In order to secure participants, we contacted refugee youth with the assistance of immigrant serving agencies in both cities. As these organizations are contracted by Citizenship and Immigration Canada to deliver resettlement programs, they were therefore best positioned to help identify potential participants. To ensure potential respondent’s anonymity, a member of the agency made the initial contact to advise potential respondents about the research project and provided them with the principle investigator’s contact information. In order to achieve the sample, we utilized the snowball technique. With this process, existing subjects recruited future subjects from
among their acquaintances. This was especially important given that the population, especially in St. John’s, was uncharacteristically small (i.e., refugee youth aged 14-25).

Of the 24 participants, 10 are female and 14 are male, representing 42 percent female. In addition, the majority of respondents (90%) are Muslim. The ages range from 15 to 22, with a median age of 19 (1 missing). The individuals interviewed have been in Canada for at least six months. The first author conducted the data analysis using theoretical (deductive) thematic analysis, as set out by Braun and Clarke (2006) and after listening to the audio recordings several times transcribed the interviews verbatim. The first author read and re-read the transcripts and examined them for themes relating to identity and experiences of discrimination and microaggression. The second author has analyzed several transcripts alongside the first author to enhance interpretative rigour and confirm the analytical approach.

**Analysis**

An analytical focus that started to emerge from the data is how individuals are stigmatized, othered, marginalized and excluded, with the subtle and not so subtle micro encounters that set them apart as different. The following section organizes the data as refugee youth experiences of racial microaggressions based on three discrete categories as the basis of discrimination - being a refugee, being Muslim, and being Black. The data shows that as each stigmatized identity category is layered on, the experiences of racial microaggressions experienced by the youth appear to be compounded.
“Being a refugee”

According to the 1951 Refugee Convention, and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 2017), the word ‘refugee’ is an internationally recognized legal status. However, this bureaucratic and legal label also carries negative and stigmatizing connotations. Zetter (1991; 2007) argues that ‘refugees conceive their identity in very different terms from those bestowing that label’ (1991: 40) and may then actively work to redefine themselves and their experiences in ways that move away from the implicit ways in which refugees are stigmatized. One of the ways in which the refugee identity is misrepresented and stigmatized by others is in using the refugee label as a means to denote victimhood or powerlessness. A 21-year-old male from Congo explained:

I don’t like to be called refugee…a refugee is someone who runs, who cannot protect themselves or feed himself, who needs help. I never say that I’m a refugee…Being a refugee is powerless. I just don’t like that word. I feel like a refugee is someone who can’t protect or feed his family.

Another one of the respondents described her experience of being labeled a refugee as a means to not only exclude her from the group but to also strip her of her national identification as Canadian:

When we went on this school trip to the US, we went to represent Canada as a debate team. People would say to me, oh I love the Canadian accent but this one student in our group, they went to them and said, she is not even Canadian, she is a refugee. It made me feel that no matter what I would do for this country I am not a part of it. (20-year-old female from Liberia)
This microinvalidation was used to define a young student as a refugee and thereby, not belonging to the group of students representing Canada. Another respondent told us about the struggles he faced in the workplace:

There was this one guy, all of a sudden, I never saw him in that area, he came to my manager and said why are you giving these refugees the job? They are not even from this country and they are coming here and taking our jobs… I felt really bad. (21-year-old male from Nepal)

In this microinsult, the refugee label is assigned to a young man as a means to reinforce existing stereotypes about refugees and immigrants stealing jobs from other Canadians. The word refugee carries many negative connotations. Due to stereotyping and negative media coverage, refugees are often portrayed as desperate, poor, needy and those that pose a burden on the host society (Schweitzer et al, 2005). This identity is difficult enough to negotiate, however in a time of rising Islamophobia, Muslim refugees are burdened with another negative identity that is increasingly associated with violence and terrorism.

“Being Muslim”

The data point to greater integration challenges for Muslim refugees. In our sample, most of the Muslim refugees, particularly those who were visibly Muslim (hijab) reported experiences of Islamophobic discrimination. In a more violent incident, a 21-year-old Muslim female from Somalia explained how she was attacked in broad daylight outside a bank on a busy high street as she was on her way to a job interview. Despite many onlookers nearby, she had her hijab pulled off her head and was repeatedly called a “terrorist” and told, “Go back where you came from”.
Apparently, no one came to her aid and she did not report the incident. Such stories of overt racism can be shocking to hear and easy to define as racially motivated. Unlike some of the other respondents, this girl was aware that what she had experienced was racist and Islamophobic, but she still did not report the incident. She told us she did not have time to deal with the situation because she was getting late for her interview and it did not matter more than getting a job. However, judging by her demeanour whilst retelling her story, it was very clear that the incident had left enough of a traumatic impact on her.

A 15-year-old girl from Syria explained, “on the street some people they walk, they drink and say bad words, he swear, he say bad word like F…and B…they say for my hijab”. She also said she had frequently heard Canadians who appeared to be White to “be racist” towards other refugees, describing one situation where “a White girl” called a Somali refugee girl the n word. She reported feeling “angry” at the time but said, “I couldn’t do anything”. Another 15-year-old girl from Syria felt uncomfortable because people stare at her on the street because of her hijab. When asked, "how does that make you feel?" She responded, “a little bit sad”. She didn’t tell anyone, other than her family, who apparently simply said, “it’s OK”. It appeared that her family did not want her to place too much importance on racism, as to not become distracted from other more important settlement goals such as education and employment, an issue that came up in several of the interviews.

A 19-year-old male from Iraq talked about the ethno-religious racism he has faced in the dating scene from other girls. He explained:

Some girls say something because of the colour of my skin, one of the time, one of my friends was supposed to pick her up and she said, oh
you're going with a brown guy? And I was like, “too bad what if I’m a brown guy?”, like it was too racist; she said that and I said, “Wow!” […] Sometimes people do treat you different because you’re Muslim; they say, “Oh, you’re Muslim”.

When we asked, “how do they know you’re Muslim?” he said, “because of the way I look and talk, they know, they say “oh you fucking Muslim, but I don’t want no trouble”. We went on to ask, “when someone says to you like you said, “oh you fucking Muslim, or Iraqi or Arab” does that feel the same as when they say “fucking asshole”? With a very serious look and after a pause he responded, “no different, its disrespect, but sometimes I have to take it”. When we asked a 21-year-old female from Liberia, “do you feel people treat you differently because you’re Muslim?” she replied, “I think so. Yes. Some people don’t like Muslim. I don’t want any problem on myself like that”. A 19-year-old Congolese male also stated, “It’s not just Black people, even if you’re Muslim or Arab you’re treated different because of the colour of your skin or your religion. That’s not fair”.

Others talked about being witness to anti-Muslim racism. A 20-year-old male from Somalia went into detail about an incident he witnessed in the mall:

I seen one guy. This guy, he seen this lady in a mall and he takes the hijab from the lady; she was just walking in the mall […] a White guy did it. She was just walking; she had her kid and she was wearing hijab. He just went up to her and pulled it. Me and my friend, we were about to punch him, beat him up, but we didn’t, thank God. I wasn’t trying to fight; my friend wasn’t trying to fight. We didn’t do anything to him because everyone was watching. But I was mad. See, there are racist, there’s nice people, it’s mixed. There is everything […] but I realized that it’s a White man’s world. This is not our country. This area its White man only. If she wanted to wear her hijab, she could have stayed back home (he got quiet for a while). But I don’t know, I can’t say that, because I don't want my mother or sister to have someone lift her hijab off for nothing. It’s religion; nothing else has to do with it […] but if you Christian you go there, you pray, nobody cut your hands. It’s just not fair.
It was clear that the respondent was struggling with his feelings towards an immigrant’s responsibility to adapt to Western standards of dressing versus a Muslim woman’s right to wear a hijab. At the same time as appearing to ‘put the blame’ on the woman for dressing in a way that might provoke an attack, the respondent conceded how unfair it was for a Muslim woman to be expected to change her religious practice in ways that women from other religious groups are not. Our study confirms the findings of previous studies (Hadley and Patil, 2009) that refugees are more likely to experience racism if their religion is outwardly visible.

“Being Black”

As we continued our interviews, it became clear that the darker their skin tone, the more likely the respondents were to have had a racially motivated incident to tell us about, and one that was more explicit in nature. However, being Black and being Muslim made the likelihood of being on the receiving end of racial microaggressions and hate much higher and the experience much more violent. Our research confirmed that racialized Muslim refugees experience three-pronged discrimination, in which all three stigmatizing parts of their identity come under attack. Irrespective of religion, all racialized respondents reported experiences of racial microaggressions. The precarious identity and integration struggles of racialized Muslim refugees came up during our interviews, where many expressed the heavy burden they felt, carrying multiple stigmatized identities. However, the experiences were significantly worse for Black Muslim youth with three stigmatizing identities to contend with. Somali’s are an example of such a group that has found itself in a triple bind. In the late 1980s,
Canada saw an influx of Somali families fleeing violent persecution, mass repression, and torture (Reitsma, 2001). An estimated 55,000 to 70,000 Somalis arrived in Canada just between 1988 and 1996 (Reitsma, 2001). And so, Canada has a significant Black Muslim refugee population.

Kusow (2004) illustrates that once in Canada, Somali immigrants confront a cultural context that organizes stigma-normal processes primarily along colour-based categories. Somali immigrants are exposed to processes of social exclusion and inclusion by the mass media, through which they learn that Blackness, along with other labels that are imposed on them are all undesirable identity categories. The majority (60%) of the respondents in Kusow’s (2003) study believed that they are perceived by White Canadians in terms of devalued identities and that they are stigmatized on the basis of their race, immigrant or refugee status, or as Muslim, and it was particularly problematic for women who wear the Islamic head covering/hijab. These insights follow Goffman’s notion that “the tribal stigma of race, nation, and religion” (1963:4) devalues all their attributes—be it immigrant, refugee, African, Black, or Muslim. Evidently, each of the labels- being Black, immigrant, refugee or Muslim carries a certain degree of stigma that is imposed on refugees involuntarily. Being stigmatized and discriminated against may have a negative mental health impact on an individual with resulting health issues related to depression, low self-esteem and despair. The consequences of stigmatisation vary from shame, blame, secrecy, the “black sheep of the family” role, isolation, social exclusion, to stereotypes and discrimination (Byrne, 2000 in Smyrnova, 2015). As such, stigma not only affects the way a person is seen and treated in society but also the way a person may internalize those negative labels and think less of themselves.
Several racialized refugees spoke of microinvalidations in the form of stares and body gestures from White people that made them uncomfortable. One such example is the old “crossing the street at night when you see a Black man” move, which is sadly a common experience for many Black men that has a lasting impact on their sense of self. A 19-year-old male from Congo explained, “when I’m walking at night time and if I pass a White lady and she walks to the other side it makes me feel uncomfortable because I think I’m not gonna hurt nobody, I’m just walking on the street”. Racial profiling in the form of store owners suspiciously watching racialized people closer than others in stores came up several times in the interviews. A 19-year-old male from Congo said, “I feel like when I go to the stores, the owners stare at me, even though I buy stuff”. Another 19-year-old male from Iraq became physically agitated as he explained how he feels when he walks into a store and is being racially profiled:

When I walk into the store the owner looks at me, he thinks I am going to steal or something […] It makes me feel uncomfortable, I think, why you looking at me if I have money. One time I said to the owner, “if you think I’m going to steal, I’ll do it in a smart way, I’m not going to go in front of you and steal, so don’t look at me like that. I’m buying stuff, I’m not gonna steal”.

The racism experienced in the playground can have lasting effects on a young person’s sense of self-worth and place in Canada. A 21-year-old female from Liberia was quite upset as she told us about her experience with racism in high school:

They say, “oh you’re Black”, and when I sit on the bench they say, “oh I don’t wanna sit there because she’s Black and she came from Africa”. I can’t say, “oh, Miss they say this”. I don’t like to talk too much. I just do
my work and go home [...] The White people just look at me differently; and sometimes they don’t even say anything. I feel bad. I go home. I cry.

She went on to tell us about her younger brother’s experience with racism at the same school, “My little brother fights with White boys sometimes. He says they don’t wanna be my friend because I’m Black, I’m from Africa. He is 15”. Talking about her brother seemed to make her more upset.

“Internalizing the Hate”

The concept of ‘double consciousness’, described by W.E.B. Du Bois (1903) as a very unique socio-psychological or socio-historical disposition of Black America is especially important to define the experiences of Black Muslim refugees in Canada. ‘Double consciousness’ describes the dual nature of Black America’s perception of self and the other, one that is deeply rooted in a traumatic history of slavery and segregation in a White settler society, which continuously reproduces racial classifications and social location (Mohamed, 2017). As a result, Black peoples’ sense of self continues to be shaped by a society that has historically repressed and devalued them (ibid), making it challenging for them to negotiate their Black identity with their American identity (Appelrouth & Edles, 2010:351-352). Du Bois accredits this double consciousness to what he termed as the “veil” or barrier that separates White and Black America. This ongoing defining and separating of Black Americans from White Americans produce and reproduce pervasive anti-Black racism that only allows for Black people to have a sense of self image that functions within the tight confines of White supremacy and saddled by socioeconomic marginalization. Du Bois’ double consciousness is a relevant concept for the case of refugees who are seeing themselves
through the eyes of the other, in this case, the majority of the host society. This places an immense burden on an individual's sense of self and identity. They are given new labels that are loaded with stereotypes and assumptions of either powerlessness - "the fleed", the oppressed or the violence – “the unwanted” “the intruder”. Regardless of which negative connotation is imputed on refugees, the danger remains of the possibility of those negative stereotypes becoming internalized to the extent that a refugee starts to see themselves from the eyes of the other. As a 19-year-old male form Congo described:

The most dangerous thing about racism is when you start believing it. When the person who is getting oppressed starts believing the person who is oppressing them. Like, when someone calls you the N word or ugly or stupid you start thinking maybe I am a n*****, maybe I am ugly, maybe I am stupid. So, it starts to affect you emotionally. It goes with any type of situation, when someone starts believing something, that’s the dangerous thing, and when that person has kids, they start believing that too, and you have a whole generation who believe a lie about themselves and they don’t know their true roots.

As discussed earlier, there can be detrimental effects of stigma on the individual’s emotional response and self-esteem (Yang et al., 2007). Corrigan and Watson (2002) argue that when individuals with mental illness are aware of and believe the negative social perceptions and images that typify their group (self-stereotyping), a personal response to stigma is instigated that results in self-prejudice and self-discrimination (Yang et al., 2007). Similarly, racialized Muslim refugee youth who start to internalize the hate that is being directed towards them may see significant and detrimental effects on their health and well-being.
“Racism in Small Print”

Houshmand et al (2014: 378) conclude that as a consequence of their multicultural views, Canadians often deny their own racism. Despite such beliefs, there is ample evidence to suggest that racism, be it overt or manifest more as micro aggressions, is commonplace in Canada generally (Nelson and Nelson, 2004) and directed towards refugees specifically (Baker et al, 2015; Noh et al, 1999). Of those respondents who were able to identify and define racism as a form of discrimination against a person because of their skin colour, many described Canadian racism as uniquely different to not only historical racism but also racism in America. A 21-year-old female from Somalia said, “I think Canadians are better at hiding racism than Americans. It exists but they it’s polite racism. They are not going to express that racism because of the Canadian reputation”. Other youth also described the racism they have experienced here as hidden or undercover. As one of the respondents put it:

Canada is secretly racist. My thing is that racism from a long time ago was different, it was honest racism, someone would say something, and you would be like “whoa!”, you feel it, but this racism, you never know exactly and so you can’t say anything to them, but you feel the hurt inside anyway. (19-year-old male from Congo)

He also criticised this insidious racism as entrenched in people’s core belief system, without the possibility of it being reformed. He explained, “I don’t think that if you have a certain belief that anybody can change you, they might make you not express it out in public, but it is still there”. Adding, how much harder it is to manage the hidden and coded racism that does not get openly expressed:
But I would rather see them express racism in public than keep racism inside. The most dangerous person is someone who doesn’t express their feelings. They don’t tell you what they think. If someone calls me a Black something, I would know not to mess with that person.

Some of the respondents commented on Canada’s reputation on the world stage as welcoming and open—reiterating how happy they are here and how much they love Canada. Yet at the same time, commenting on the racism they have encountered:

Everybody in the world says that Canada is nice, nobody ever heard of Canada being racist, they think that Canada is amazing, which Canada is an amazing country, a beautiful country. I wouldn’t want to live anywhere else but this country. But there are still lots of racist people here. (19-year-old male from Congo)

He went on to excuse the racism he experienced as a symptom of the environment and not the people:

In Hamilton the people are nice, but the environment is racist—stores, workers, businesspeople. Some can argue that’s classism but that’s racism too. In certain situations, you can feel the racism, but people won’t just come up to your face and say that because they might be afraid to say it to your face.

However, when we asked him what racism is, he said, “it’s when someone hates you but they don’t wanna say it […] its inside, a lot of people show you love but a lot of hate […] a lot of people hate me too here”. So, despite him attributing racism to a social structure, he still acknowledged that the racism directed towards him stems from individual hatred.

The preceding section speaks to the ways in which participants themselves sometimes experienced the subtleness of racism and then equated it to a unique type
of Canadian racism. The micro interactional dimensions of racism described by the participants in this study counter the widely held myth that Canada’s Multiculturalism project protects Canadians from racism.

**Conclusion**

When approaching this research, we were expecting racial microaggressions to neatly fit into discrete stigma categories that related to a refugee youth’s refugee status, race, and religion. However, the data led us to realise that we could not neatly categorise the respondents or their experiences into discrete categories because the young people did not organise their own experiences into discrete categories, with being a refugee, being Muslim and being Black often overlapping in their stories. The multiple stigmas at play often intersected with each other in their accounts, making their experiences as complex and multifaceted as their identities. We also expected local contexts to shape experiences of racism and Islamophobia. With Hamilton being more ethnically diverse, we expected the city to provide better support mechanisms for the refugee youth. As well, we postulated that refugee youth in Hamilton would be more likely to attach racialized meanings to their experiences than those living in St. Johns.

However, as we proceeded with the interviews it became obvious that local contexts did not matter as much as we had expected. All respondents in the study provided rich examples of racial and ethno-religious micro aggressions experienced by them, which provides important insight into the difficulties experienced by refugee youth in Canada, regardless of where they reside. The refugee youth in St. Johns were just as likely to experience racism and Islamophobia and name them as such. Not only
did racism seem to present itself in similar ways in both cities, the support mechanisms were just as limited in Hamilton as they were in St. Johns.

Moreover, respondents seemed to develop various deflection strategies to explain away the racism they experienced, or downplay their significance in their lives and understandings of their position in Canadian society. The refugee youth in this study often listed a variety of other reasons for why they were mistreated, making excuses such as, alcoholism, poverty, and homelessness for racist behavior. Some, compared current negative interactions and situations with worse ones from back home, while others spoke about more pressing integration burdens that they needed to focus on. Many, seemed to simply refuse to be labeled a victim, resisting the negative connotations attached to being a refugee. Not seeing racism as a reason for a negative interaction may dampen the blow of racism but it may not shield a person from the long-lasting negative effects of the incident.

In this article we sought to examine the ways in which refugees who carry multiple stigmatised identities understand and experience racism. We presented the diverse experiences of racial and ethno-religious microaggressions of a sample of youth in St Johns, Newfoundland and Hamilton, Ontario. Starting off with discrete categories to organise the data, we outlined the dangerous ways in which intersections of religion and racial/ethnic identity can compound experiences of discrimination for certain refugee youth, particularly Black Muslim refugees. Our research shows that racial and ethno-religious microaggressions and overt racism are quite common among refugee youth. However, seeing the complex ways in which multiple stigmas intersected to inform experiences of racism, the study proved to be a cautionary tale that we cannot think of stigma in discrete categories.
As a society, we tend to rely heavily on hate crime statistics to measure racism in Canada and to advocate for certain marginalized communities. However, current hate crime statistics fail to capture the insidious ways in which racism often presents itself. Unreliable data on hate crimes against Muslims in Canada can distort our understanding of the true extent of Muslim refugee integration challenges. Flawed data that minimizes the level of widespread Islamophobia can further feed the narrative of Muslims as only perpetrators of violence (Awan, 2008) and not victims of it, which in turn can fan the flames of public fears and anxieties towards Muslims. As such, Islamophobia and hate crimes against Muslims can end up in a never-ending cycle, with one contributing to the growth of the other. There are strong societal norms that downplay the significance of racism.

Only a few studies have examined the modern and subtle forms of racism among refugee youth (Baker 2013; Phan, 2003), and so till now, this area has remained under-researched and under-examined, especially within the Canadian context. A qualitative approach to measuring racism has a better potential to enhance our understanding of racism, discrimination, and prejudice in Canada and to facilitate the overall inclusion and integration of newcomers. Reliable research on racism in Canada can also offer much needed insight to policy makers, in order for necessary legislative proposals to be designed to protect marginalized communities. Only a robust and continued effort into the positive integration of refugees in Canada, can secure our countries global reputation for being a world leader in welcoming and protecting refugees.
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Citizenship and Immigration Canada.


PAPER 3

“Tarjuma translation”
A Canadian Muslim Response to Social and Spiritual Marginalization

Abstract

Whilst the media spotlight is consistently placed only on those “separated,” and allegedly “deviant” Muslims who appear to be at odds with Western values, those who are practicing, socially well adjusted, and positively integrated seem to have been blurred into the background. Previous studies fall victim to the homogenization of Muslims by excluding the role of social class and intersectionality on the experiences of being Muslim in The West. There is also an absence of research on the internal othering and marginalization that many Western Muslims encounter, which makes them, what I coin, *spiritually homeless*. By zoning in on a faith-based community organization called Tarjuma in Edmonton, this study sheds light on the distinct challenges faced by one faction of Muslims in Canada and the unconventional ways in which they exercise agency in their response to the growing stigma of their faith identity. This study also highlights the role of community organizations in becoming “third spaces” and “marginality facilitators” by enabling not only the positive integration of Muslims in Canada but facilitating their upward social mobility or what I call, *social status optimization*.

*Keywords:* Muslims; Islamophobia; social marginalization; spiritual marginalization; spiritual homelessness; integration; intentional community; third spaces; marginality facilitator.
Introduction

Despite media and political discourse that often point to Muslim integration in the West as questionable and scholarly literature that underscores the economic disadvantages that some of them face (Kazemipur, 2014), many Muslims living on the fault line of being Muslim and Canadian at the same time appear to not only be successfully integrated, but in fact, socially optimal. We already know that opportunities for economic advancement for immigrants and their children do exist in Canada (Picot, 2008) and economic and cultural capital is known to allow for upward social mobility/social status. However, those who tend to be stigmatized in society typically seem to lack both cultural capital and social status. Begging the questions, what of those hyphenated Canadians who are both externally and internally marginalized by their stigmatized faith identity but socially optimal at the same time? What makes some Muslims appear to integrate better? And is the experience as straightforward as it sounds?

In order to answer these questions, I lean on the concept of “optimal marginality” (McLaughlin, 2001), which explores the relationship between certain types of marginality and intellectual creativity or in this case, any form of social achievement or success. Watts (1994) describes a marginality facilitator as an institution that provides support to “the Black artist who finds him/herself stranded between intellectually resourceless Black communities and indifferent or hostile mainstream White communities”. This “betwixt between social status” that many Black intellectuals found themselves in is described by Watts (1994) as “social marginality”, however, “in the hopes of navigating this problematic social situation Black intellectuals developed concerted strategies for creating functional/intellectual
artistic creative spaces”, the strategies they employed became marginality facilitators for them. According to Watts (1994), “regardless of form, the social marginality facilitator purpose is to increase, protect and nurture the individuals artistic and intellectual space” […] for example, expatriation became a social marginality facilitator for some twentieth century Black writers […] who became expatriates in order to obtain access to an environment that affirmed their racial and artistic identities”.

Social support is important to both individual and collective wellbeing (Simich et al. 2005; Wilkinson and Marmot, 2003) and social networks are an important source of such support (Kingsbury, 2017; Simich et al., 2003; Wen and Hanley, 2016). Furthermore, social networks can be mobilized into social capital, allowing individuals and collectives to access resources and pursue their goals (Cattell, 2001; Lamba and Krahn, 2003; Zetter, Griffiths and Sigona, 2005). In line with Foley and Edwards (1998), I argue that social capital is the concrete help and resources garnered from networks. The support gained from social networks can be essential to facilitating the upward social mobility of marginalized people, making this often-difficult place a potential for optimality.

I also lean on Breton’s (1964) concept of “institutional completeness”, through which he argues that the direction and level of integration of immigrants may be determined in part by the ability of the ethnic community in the receiving society to attract the immigrant into its social boundaries, which is largely dependent on the degree of “institutional completeness” of the ethnic community. The degree to which the ethnic community maintains a highly organized social structure, which determines their level of institutional completeness, will then determine the degree to which the
immigrant is drawn into the community and as a result become better integrated into the larger society. According to Breton (1964), religious institutions have the greatest affect upon the ethnic community, since these unify the people in terms of both ideology and activities. In essence, one can argue that a community with a high level of institutional completeness will be able to provide all the support needed for an individual to feel belonging and not become socially marginalized.

I also use the influential cultural and post-colonial theorist Homi Bhabha’s (1994) ideas about third spaces as being places of potential and growth to understand how some Muslims appear to be better integrated. Bhaba (1994: 1-2) describes the apertures between colliding cultures as a liminal space “which gives rise to something different, something new and unrecognizable, a new area of negotiation of meaning and representation.” He claims, this “in-between” space not only serves as fertile ground where identities are formed, reformed, and constantly in a state of becoming, but it also becomes a creative “third space”, fostering the production and growth of those comprising it. Another concept to lean on is the “third place”, described by Ray Oldenburg in his 1989 book The Great Good Place: Cafes, Coffee Shops, Bookstores, Bars, Hair Salons, and Other Hangouts at the Heart of a Community as “places of informal gathering between home and work” (home is the first place, work is the second). These “third places” are central to developing a healthy community, as they can function as a home away from home.

Oldenburg (2002: 16) identifies "third places" as the public places on neutral ground that are welcoming and comfortable and that "host the regular, voluntary, informal, and happily anticipated gatherings of individuals – new and old friends, beyond the realms of home and work”. Providing the foundation for a functioning
democracy, these spaces are also seen to promote social equity by leveling the status of guests, providing a setting for grassroots politics, creating habits of public association, and offering psychological support to individuals and communities (Oldenberg, 2002). As such, third places are said to be “the heart of a community's social vitality” as “anchors” of community life that facilitate and foster broader, more creative interaction (Lukito and Xenia, 2017). According to Oldenberg (2002: 42), "The character of a third place is determined most of all by its regular clientele and is marked by a playful mood, which contrasts with people's more serious involvement in other spheres [...] and, although a radically different kind of setting than a home, the third place is remarkably similar to a good home in the psychological comfort and support that it extends”. Therefore, a “third place” can function as a home away from home for many people.

This study zones in on a Muslim organization in Edmonton Canada named Tarjuma, which might be described as a third place/space for Muslims. Using the postcolonial notions of “hybridity” and “third space” (Bhabha, 1990; 1994; Soja, 1996), Breton’s earlier concept of “institutional completeness”, as well as newer concepts of “third places” and “marginality facilitators”, this study is an ethnographic examination of the “in-between” cultural and religious identities of Muslims as liminal spaces. Through participant observation, in-depth interviews and both formal and informal conversations, my research examines how community based “third places” like Tarjuma foster integration by shaping, increasing, protecting, and nurturing the religious, cultural and political identities of Muslims. By focusing on the lived experiences of Muslims connected to Tarjuma, this project generates a more empirically grounded assessment of the role of faith-based communities in combating
the ambivalence and maladjustment of those Muslims who are socially and spiritually marginalized.

**Background**

According to a recent survey of Muslims in Canada by Environics Institute (2016), Canadian-born Muslims (most of whom are second generation) stand out from immigrants in several ways. On the one hand they are the most integrated into Canadian society (having been born in the country), and this is reflected in their rejection of the patriarchal values more strongly espoused by their forebears. On the other hand, Canadian-born Muslims are also much more concerned than immigrants about the treatment of their community by the broader society. Compared with newer immigrants, they are more likely to express concerns about discrimination, to have experienced it personally, and to have felt inhibited about expressing political beliefs. Muslim youth (who also tend to be second generation Canadians) stand out as being the most religiously observant generation in the Muslim community. They are most likely to visit mosques for prayer on a regular basis, wear the hijab, and support the right to pray in schools. They also report higher levels of discrimination and feel pessimistic about how Muslims will be treated in the future.

At 5.5%, Muslims are the largest non-Christian religious group in Edmonton, with the recent booming economy in Edmonton being responsible for much of the rapid population growth of Muslims (Waugh, 2018). However, Edmonton also has a historical relationship with Islam. The first Canadian Mosque was constructed in Edmonton in 1938, when there were only about 700 Muslims in the country (ibid). Edmonton is also home to Tarjuma. Launched in 2012, Tarjuma is a community-
based non-profit organization with a charitable status that serves the social, emotional and faith-based needs of Muslims by holding weekly gatherings and various community events. Tarjuma is not a mosque. The leaders of the organization call themselves community change makers by describing it as a place that is ideologically and in practice a place that is in between ‘home’ and the mosque - an open space for people to come, socialize and ask questions about Islam without being judged. Tarjuma gatherings claim to cultivate other parts of Muslims’ identity that make them relevant in the larger society.

Hearkening back to older Muslim traditions that explore the intersections between artistic expression, the spiritual path and the greater well-being of the community, Tarjuma events comprise various artistic endeavours such as spoken word, rap, poetry and more. These “out of the box” events claim to serve the multifaceted and nuanced needs of those who are both Canadian and Muslim. The gatherings usually consist of individuals who may not feel welcome at a traditional mosque. Many portray Tarjuma as a contemporary Islamic culture composed of some members who may not appear Muslim by traditional stereotypes, e.g. tattooed and pierced. By welcoming those who may be considered on the margins of Islam, Tarjuma provides a safe space for meaningful conversation and support regardless of personal histories or orientations. Away from the domestic sphere of family (Walsh, 2006) or the sphere of civic engagement, for these Muslims, this third space can be a place where they let their "real" selves show (Whitchurch, 2008; Hulme, Owens, & Cracknell, 2009). Tarjuma was conceived by a group of 16 people - teachers, social workers, activists, health practitioners, law enforcement and other members of the wider community who aim to build bridges and reinforce community fellowship.
Being the brainchild of second-generation Canadian Muslims, Tarjuma as an intellectual concept can be considered a product of the creative “third space”. However, it can also be described as a “marginality facilitator” and a “third place”, since it creates a meaningful place and ideological space for those Muslims in Canada who are feeling disenfranchised and culturally or spiritually “in between” or “homeless” because of their bi-ethnocultural identity.

Tarjuma began as a small organized group of friends who met regularly to share ideas and plan events to bring people together. They started with “Meaningful Expressions” – sporadic events that showcased an artist who would share his or her art and then a Muslim scholar would speak to the expression of his/her art as being born at the intersection of the spiritual path and creativity. After two years of no official leadership or governing body, the founders finally established Tarjuma and described it as an “intentional community”. The concept of “intentional community” began in the 60s and 70s with a focus on holistic practices and alternative lifestyles (Fellowship for Intentional Community, 2004).

Communes, collectives, and co-ops offered Americans opportunities to forge new communities outside of the rigid, conservative structures deeply embedded within American society, organized around shared beliefs as opposed to geographical proximities (ibid). Not always spiritual in nature, but many of these new communities were inspired and informed by Eastern religions and New Age spirituality (ibid). As described on their website, with the notion that community begins in the home “with familial wellness and spousal wellness and intergenerational exchange and mental health and spiritual health and socioeconomic wellness”, Tarjuma provides support to individual Muslims and their families. Rather than being defined by the type of
physical space it occupies, Tarjuma is described by its founders as an intentional community that seeks to practice forms of spiritually grounded community care in order to meet the communal needs of its constituents. At present, Tarjuma gatherings take place in a rented space at a Church described by the director to be an intentional move to build community ties. The organization also encourages other links with 'non-Muslim' networks to help produce social integration. The activities of Tarjuma can be seen as intentional attempts to nurture a fraction of the wider Muslim community that sits at the intersection of Canadian and Muslim identity.

In order to assess the role of Tarjuma as a third place and marginality facilitator, I focused my attention on some specific research questions: How does Tarjuma function as a third space? Who does Tarjuma want to appeal to? How does Tarjuma build and maintain relationships with their attendees? How does Tarjuma access and cater to Muslims who are marginalized? How does Tarjuma bridge a gap between Canadian Muslims and the wider society? How do others see this organization? Who are the attendees and how do they view the organization? How has Tarjuma helped shape their Canadian-Muslim identities?

Methodology
Tarjuma was the main unit of analysis in this study. Initial contact was made with Farooq Maseehuddin (the founder and director of Tarjuma) and two preliminary interviews were conducted with him over the phone in December of 2015. Farooq invited me to conduct research at Tarjuma and granted me open access to the organizers and gatherings/events, which allowed me to reach the members and attendees. There was a natural grouping that facilitated access to the organizers and
attendees of the events. I collected ethnographic data through participant observation by attending two organizers’ gatherings and one of the public Sunday gatherings in December of 2017. I also conducted several in-depth interviews during my visit that lasted anywhere from 45 minutes to two hours. During the group gatherings I, essentially, “hung around” for five-six hours to see what organizers and attendees talked about. I also had informal conversations with many organizers and attendees during the gatherings. A total of 45 formal and informal interviews were conducted with the directors, volunteers and attendees of Tarjuma. I conducted several in-depth in person interviews with Farooq during my visit. In order to assess how other Edmontonian Muslims viewed Tarjuma initiatives, I also talked to several Muslims who lived nearby and knew about Tarjuma but did not attend the gatherings. The ages of the respondents ranged from 18 to 75 years old.

There appears to be a direct correlation between an individual’s social capital and the intensity of his/her use of social networks (Valenzuela et al., 2009). Therefore, this study also assessed the role of networks in shaping an individual’s social status and identity. It was hypothesized that the role of social networks would be key to understanding the process of Muslim integration and identity perceptions. The focus of this study was also to analyse the intra-organizational and inter-organizational connections displayed in the formal or informal relationships and interactions between the organization members, attendees and their wider social networks. And so, I also analysed the identity perceptions and social interactions of Tarjuma’s attendees in the larger social context, by starting with their micro level networks and snowballing outwards to trace their relationships and interactions with meso and macro level networks. The social networks that connect Tarjuma members to the wider
community, for example participation in non-Muslim events and use of a non-Muslim organization’s facilities, were conceptualized to be 'integrative' and facilitated social capital. Conversely, networks that remove the members from the wider community and place them in a bubble per se were conceptualized to be 'non-integrative'.

**Analysis**

An overwhelming majority of my respondents provided rich examples of racism and Islamophobia that led to them feeling othered in society and socially marginalized. However, interestingly, almost every single one of the respondents talked about spiritual marginalization as having more of a profound impact on their identity and general well-being. Another theme that emerged out of the research was the concept of authenticity, as it pertained to their ethno-religious identities. An overwhelming majority of the respondents talked about the difficulties of always having to prove their authenticity to those around them, whether it be in regard to their authentic Canadianness or their authentic Muslimness. The following section goes into detail describing some of the experiences of the respondents in feeling both socially and spiritually marginalized.

**Social Marginalization**

With a rise in fears of perceived threats posed by Muslims around the globe both before and since September 11, 2001, the country has seen what Sedef Arat-Koç describes as “a campaign to increasingly define Canadian identity along civilizational lines, as part of ‘Western civilization’ and in a ‘clash of civilizations’ framework” (2005: 32). In this process, Muslims are seen not only as outsiders, but also as
potential threats, whether they come from outside of Canada’s borders or from within them (Isin & Siemiatycki, 2002: 192). Increasing efforts to exclude them from Canadian identity, Muslims—who often bear “the mantle of the allegedly unassimilable and undesirable immigrant” (ibid: 192)—have become an integral part of this Otherness.

Omar (2011) calls the Muslim identity a “marginalizing identity” because they are made to feel excluded, isolated, and targeted. An overwhelming majority of the respondents in this study spoke about the marginalization they feel as Muslims on a daily basis and many mentioned 9/11 as a catalytic moment in their lives that thrust their Muslim identity into the spotlight. As Mamdani (2005: 15) aptly states, “the terrorists of September 11, did not just hijack planes; they also hijacked Islam” for some Muslims. Farooq spoke extensively about the effects of the events of 9/11 on his Canadian Muslim identity, he said, “9/11 felt like an assault on my Muslim identity because it led to a whole bunch of anti-Muslim rhetoric”. One of the organizers of Tarjuma explained how the events of 9/11 made him aware that his identity has been “forcibly situated in geopolitics”. He told me that prior to 9/11 he felt Canadian and afterwards he just felt “isolated”. The deep sense of isolation after 9/11 was mentioned by many of the respondents, “9/11 was initially a shock and then this sense of indignation grew within me and I started feeling isolated said another co-founder.

Farooq also spoke about feelings of alienation, “I felt like I was a fish in foreign water- it was us vs. them. I was all of a sudden given an ultimatum of being one or the other, either Muslim or Canadian like, you’re either with us or against us”. The political climate post 9/11 also led to many Muslims feeling angry, “I had a deep sense of indignation and anger towards the political climate” said, another co-founder.
One of the Tarjuma attendees went as far as to say that he believes “Muslims seem to be the common enemy in society” and then provided rich examples of discrimination he has faced in the workplace saying, “in my last job, I dealt with a lot of Islamophobia in the workplace”. He also pointed to the “hidden” and coded nature of the discrimination adding, “it’s not in your face but it is there, and it is felt, 25 years ago it was in your face, but I can’t say it hurts less”. He also made mention of the name-based discrimination he experienced while applying for jobs, “When I was applying for a job my friend John and I applied to all the same companies, but I wouldn’t even get to an interview. I would not even get a call back. With my Muslim, middle eastern name, I am sure that I am just not an appealing candidate”. Another man shared the experience of his nephew, “My nephew did an experiment when he was applying for jobs. He applied with his Muslim name and didn’t get any call backs for months and then he changed his name on his resume to an English name and he got tons of call backs”.

Oreopoulos’ 2011 study, in which thousands of randomly manipulated resumes were sent in response to online job postings in Toronto to investigate why immigrants, who have been allowed in Canada based on skill, end up struggling in the labour market found substantial discrimination across a variety of occupations towards applicants with foreign experience or those with Indian, Pakistani, Chinese, and Greek names compared with English names. Listing language fluency, multinational firm experience, education from highly selective schools, or active extracurricular activities had no diminishing effect. Many of the respondents in my study also spoke about the negative associations to their Muslim names and how their name has acted as a barrier to success. Others expressed deep frustration with the
stereotypes they contend with on a daily basis. Considering the power of individual
groups’ need for, and vulnerability to labelling, “non-recognition and/or
misrecognition can inflict harm and literally constitute a form of oppression that
incarcerates people in a false, deformed and existentially reduced mode of being”
(Ghosh and Abdi, 2004: 27).

It was clear that for many of the respondents their Muslim name immediately
placed them in a category that was seen as inferior and restricted their access to jobs
and other social positions. As such, some felt the need to anglicize their names in
order to move ahead in life. One of the respondents spoke about having to change his
name but not being happy about doing it, “I change my name sometimes because it’s
just easier, I can’t deal with the headaches associated with being seen as a Muslim and
the negative stereotypes about us”. However, for others, changing their name was out
of the question. One of the respondents spoke about his refusal to change his or his
children’s names simply to “appease others”:

I want other people to learn my daughters’ Muslim names. I could have
made my daughters’ names anglicized to make their lives easier, so they
can easily assimilate but I don’t want to continue this negative association
of Muslim names. I want my daughters with their Muslim names to do
good and be good and change the negative assumptions.

Although I could sense the confidence in his tone and some pride in taking ownership
of the Muslim narrative, I could also sense a tone of frustration. He appeared to be
carrying a heavy burden on his shoulders as he expressed his responsibility in needing
to change the narrative of the Muslim name. This sense of indignation became clearer
when he expressed his fears about the “anti-Muslim climate” his children are growing
up in, “I feel there is a war against Islam at the moment. I am worried about my kids
and my kids’ kids - the 3rd generation, because they will not have any positive association with their culture and being Muslim”. Amin Maalouf’s (2003: 75) strong language is perhaps understandable in his description of some Muslim communities around the globe when he writes: “They are living in a world which belongs to others, and obey rules made by others, a world where they are orphans, strangers, intruders or pariahs”. They feel so because almost everything they see belongs to others; history, language, heroes, even what constitutes a good name, belongs to the dominant culture and its beneficiaries.

Like the refugee youth discussed in the previous chapter, people talked about the various microaggressions they experienced as being Muslim or what they had heard and seen take place towards Muslims in general. A young man, who appeared to “pass” as a non-Muslim, expressed his disappointment in how his faith is ridiculed by some people at his workplace, “people just laugh about Islam now, it’s a joke. It bothers me a lot but what can I do?”. Another young female, who also seemed to “pass” as a non-Muslim, expressed her fears of openly talking about being Muslim, “In the workplace people generally don’t talk about religion, it’s taboo, but I think with Islam it’s even worse, uh hell no, we can’t talk about being Muslim, you crazy?!”. The same girl then told me about an incident that took place in the staff room at her workplace, “I work in a college and I found two prayer mats from the staff room in the garbage. Someone had thrown the prayer mats in the garbage and no one ever bothered to investigate. It was just ignored”. A young male respondent, who didn’t outwardly appear Muslim, provided an interesting example of the microaggression he experienced during one of the rare occasions he had openly mentioned being Muslim:
One time at work, I was selling a gym membership to these very military looking guys. I walked up to them and said, “hello, my name is Muhammed”. One of the guys turned around and said, “what?! no, my name is not Muhammad”. He was so outwardly insulted. He basically didn’t want to be identified as a Muslim. I was surprised by his reaction, but what was more insulting for me was that everyone laughed. Even the people who knew me, who were my friends, were laughing at the whole misunderstanding and the fact that this guy did not want to be called Muhammad, knowing full well that my name is Muhammad. It felt like they were laughing at my name and at me being Muslim and it really bothered me.

Another young female expressed her frustration with “always being made fun of and picked on for not eating pork” at work. She said, “my co-workers used to look at me and say, ‘oh this pork tastes so good’. They knew I was Muslim and didn’t eat pork. It made me very uncomfortable”. Another young girl said that the questions she frequently faces at work in a professional setting such as, “why don’t you drink? Why don’t you eat pork?” are irritating and difficult. But other comments from co-workers such as, “my mission in life is to make you have bacon someday” feel more targeted and offensive. A young Muslim doctor mentioned, “people always ask me if I’m trained here. They assume that because I’m brown and I have a Muslim name that I am not a Canadian doctor”, expressing frustration towards what he called “widely held stereotypes about Muslim doctors being foreigners”. The same doctor spoke half-jokingly about a time when he was in middle school and “someone wrote Paki on my backpack”, but then he got serious as he started to talk about not wanting his kids to go through the same kind of racism that he did whilst growing up in Canada. Another young female who does not wear hijab was very quick to say that the situation is always much worse for hijab wearing Muslim women, as she shared a story about one of her friends who experienced racism whilst at work:
At the Bay, my White, blue eyed, Muslim friend who wears hijab was working and chatting with her co-worker behind the counter and this elderly man with an Italian accent was pacing and huffing and puffing and very visibly angry. He slammed his hand on the counter and said to my friend, “why can’t you be beautiful like her, why do you have to wear that on your head? go back to your country?” My friend then responded “sir, my mum was born here, I was born here, you are the one with the accent”.

Another young girl also mentioned how much harder she hears it is for her friends who wear hijab, telling me that one of her friends who once wore hijab “removed it because someone called her a terrorist on the street in broad daylight”. She also talked about an anti-Muslim incident that took place with another friend, “she told me that people would drive by and scream at us, saying, ‘hey, you effing bitches, Afghanistan is that way. Take that thing off your head’. That happened twice to them in their own neighbourhood”. A young male organizer of Tarjuma expressed deep disappointment with the anti-Muslim climate and said, “I honestly worry all the time about my mum who wears a hijab”.

Some scholars have suggested that the Canadian “identity is defined by those who position themselves as ‘ordinary Canadians’ or Canadian-Canadians—as opposed to ‘ethnic’ or ‘multicultural Canadians’—both referring to a category of unmarked, ‘non-ethnic’, White Canadians” (Arat-Koç, 2005: 40, emphasis is in original). So, those who are White and can pass as non-Muslim in society may have a much easier time in being a Muslim and Canadian at the same time. However, for others their ethnic/racial identity is not so easily disguised and forces them to be defined by their otherness above any other identity. Congruently, many of the respondents expressed their worries about those who don’t easily pass like they do, with one young girl saying, “I know for a fact that the darker your skin, the worse it gets. I see it first-hand with my Somali Muslim friends”.
When I asked a young Muslim Edmontonian about his experiences with Islamophobia, he immediately talked about living and functioning in a climate of negativity towards Muslims that has made him more acutely aware of being Muslim. He referenced the controversial then Political Conservatives led Zero Tolerance for Barbaric Cultural Practices Act passed by parliament in 2015 that had been accused of singling out the Muslim community. Although superficially the law appeared neutral by raising the age of marriage, criminalizing forced marriages and polygamy and banning "honour" killings, given that all these practices were already illegal under existing laws, the act was far from being innocuous. The act’s focus on what were labelled as immigrant "Muslim" practices clearly pointed to Muslims as a problematic group and stoked fears towards them. The young man explained how this type of political talk has had an effect on his everyday life as a Canadian Muslim:

I always have this feeling of uncertainty, always aware of being different, like with all the Islamophobic politics, like the whole barbaric cultural practices thing. I’m always wondering how many people around me harbour those feelings. I just always feel aware that I am Muslim and my Muslimness is in the spotlight and I can be targeted for it any time.

It became very clear through the conversations that all the respondents have experienced social marginalization through anti-Muslim racism and microaggressions. But an unexpected theme that arose was the spiritual marginalization that they have also had to contend with.

*Spiritual Marginalization*

The social marginalization/Islamophobia that many Western Muslims face can be described as an external othering that tends to place them outside the folds of national
identity. However, Muslims with bi-cultural identity, who are balancing their Muslim and Canadian identities, also appear to contend with a form of internal othering that often places them outside the folds of what is perceived to be “authentic” Muslim identity, which I have coined as being a type of *spiritual marginalization*. As Farooq proclaimed, “pre- 9/11 I was slowly distancing myself from Islam but after 9/11 the pendulum swung really hard the other way, I started to identify more with my Muslim identity, but I couldn’t relate to or trust the Muslim leaders popular at the time”. What I started to hear from many of the respondents was that after 9/11 it was more important for them to belong to a faith community but because they couldn’t fit into the one offered via their mosque, they became, what I coin, *spiritually homeless*.

Based on recent research from the Pew Research Center, *regular participation in a religious community* is clearly linked with higher levels of happiness and civic engagement (2019). This might be even more important for marginalized people, but those who are both externally (socially) and internally (spiritually) marginalised might not have a faith-based community they can belong to. In 2014, the “UnMosqued” documentary described, through interview clips, the phenomena of young Muslims “unmosquing”—leaving their mosques because they began to feel marginalized or alienated by their Muslim community. The term appears to have been borrowed from their Christian-American predecessors, who had coined the word “unchurching” to describe how, due to the emerging trends toward secularization, young Christians in the United States are gradually moving away from organized religion. This film spurred a nationwide debate among Muslims about the existing social conditions and their relevance to the waning of American mosques (Hafiz, 2013). Interviewing Muslim leaders and mosque-goers in New York, New Jersey,
Tennessee, as well as other parts of the country, the documentarians point to the marginalization of women, ethnocentrism, and inadequate youth programming as primary weaknesses of American mosques and, consequently, see these as crucial catalysts for unmosquing (ibid).

Many of the respondents in my study pointed to similar concerns about Canadian mosques. With many stating that the conventional mosques have not been able to address the concerns and interests of young Muslims. Canadian Muslims, in their post-9/11 predicament, find themselves, more than ever, alienated and in need of support but mosques were described to be ill-equipped to handle questions about social justice, sexuality/gender, racism, especially from a generation that seems to be very well-versed in the language of progressive “woke” politics. As one of the respondents stated, “the establishment of the mosque seems to not be changing fast enough to address the realities that young Muslim Canadians are facing”.

During one of our earlier interviews, Farooq spoke about his own experience with the traditional Mosque, claiming that the madrasa (Islamic school) he attended as a child was not a place that he found inspiring, “I think I could have been inspired and engaged but I wasn’t”, he said:

Most people didn’t speak English- they spoke Urdu and it honestly felt like the immigrant equivalent to a boarding-school. Kids were not there because they wanted to be, they went there to clean up- like naughty kids. But you weren’t being inspired there. It was just a prescribed course, enforcing corporal punishment, with strict teachers - focusing on the rule of the book (the Quran) rather than the spirit of the book.

The need for spiritual support and longing to be inspired during times of hardship came up as a concern for Canadian Muslims in almost all of the interviews. Many
described the loneliness they felt when dealing with a major life event, like the death of a loved one, as particularly tough and many described a yearning to be able to belong to a community that could provide support within a spiritual context because their spirituality was so integral to their way of looking at the world and what they felt would “help them heal from the traumas”. Farooq insists that “individual psychological health and social well-being depend upon community”. Tarjuma can be seen as a place that nourishes its Muslim community’s social and spiritual well-being by providing an opportunity and space for meaningful human contact within and outside the fold of being Muslim. Part of this happens through creating possibilities for personal relationships with fellow Muslims as well as crafting an environment geared towards connection and intentional engagement with non-Muslims. This would seem especially important in an era fraught with fear mongering, division, and alienation.

A key factor in the sense of internal alienation felt by many of the respondents boiled down to feeling a lack of trust, which I pointed to earlier. The issue of not being able to fully trust the mosque leaders or the ways in which Islam was being presented came up in several of my conversations. Many of the respondents felt a lack of trust, based on a cultural disconnect between them and the culture of their local mosques. For example, some mosques have rigid and conservative views on sex education and LBTQ+ conversations. Others felt like they couldn’t trust the way in which Islam was being presented to them and the wider community- as particularly dogmatic. The women, especially, did not feel that mosque leaders had their best interest in mind, as they seem to focus lectures and services more on issues of female
modesty and less on other challenges faced by Muslim women in Canada, like gender-based Islamophobia (more on this later).

\textit{The Good Muslim/The Bad Muslim and Authentic Identity}

Previous literature on the concepts of “good Muslim” and “bad Muslim” rely on the measurement of good and bad based on a Muslim person’s level of commitment to Islam as compared to their assimilation to western values. As Mamdani explains, “we are told that there is a fault line running through Islam, a line that separates moderate Islam, from extremist political Islam and we must distinguish between good Muslims who adopt moderate Islam and bad Muslims who adopt political Islam”. However, media and political “culture talk” has conflated personal religiosity with political ideology (Mamdani, 2005: 15) - religious experience has been turned into a political category in and of itself, differentiating 'good Muslims", as those not displaying outwardly religious characteristics from "bad Muslims, who outwardly appear to be Muslim. Mamdani argues, with regards to the post-9/11 context, “[all] Muslims were now under obligation to prove their credentials by joining in a war against ‘bad Muslims’” (2005: 15).

Riley (2009), in presenting “The case of the Good Muslim” explains that the “Good Muslim” is defined as one who rejects his faith, and “bad Muslim” as one who displays his faith proudly”. By examining the ways that “good” Muslim figures are constructed, and construct themselves, in Canadian media, her research describes how the good/bad Muslim label is internalized by Muslims and acted upon as a way to prove themselves to the wider society. Riley (2009) claims that “progressive” or “moderate” Muslims often present themselves as “good Muslims” in an attempt to
increase one’s claims to national belonging through a reification of tropes that
designate many Muslims as fanatical, scary and a threat to the Canadian nation”. Her
study looks at media portrayals of the “good” Muslim as a patriotic Canadian, as an
object of threat from other Muslims and as a protector of oppressed Muslim women.
However, she argues that in a context marked by rampant Islamophobia throughout
Canadian society, these nationalist practices may do more to produce further
racialization of and violence towards those that they positioned as “bad” Muslims than
to ensure any lasting claims to national belonging for those who assert themselves to
be representative of the “good” Muslims.

As such, Muslims who appear outwardly religious are often cast off as
naturally non-integrated and one of the “bad” ones. This can be detrimental to those
outwardly religious Muslims who were born and raised in Canada or spent most of
their lives here and have zero to little affiliation to a country or culture other than
Canada. These religious Muslims become marginalized and alienated in their country.
The problem of labelling outwardly religious Muslims as “bad Muslims” is even more
rampant for Muslim women, who are more visible if they wear a head covering. For
example, in contexts including official legislation (in Quebec), national media, and
everyday interactions, Muslim women – particularly those whose clothing makes
them visible as such – can often encounter heated debates and judgements from the
non-Muslim society in which they live - they represent, within a wider Canadian
context, “the battlegrounds which clearly demarcate the line between the civilized
secular modern nation and premodern religious fundamentalisms” (Haque, 2010, p. 80).
Religious clothing – in particular, the hijab (headscarf) and niqab (face-covering)
– is often the most visible symbol of such battles and has been at the centre of
numerous media stories and legislative battles. Aside from the high-profile media cases involving religious clothing, Muslim women and girls who wear hijab or niqab face every day acts of Islamophobia in response to their clothing.

Zine’s (2008) discussion with a group of Muslim female high school students revealed, for example, that the students regularly experience discrimination on public transit, where they hear derogatory comments about their clothing from both drivers and passengers, and where bus drivers have refused to stop for girls wearing hijab (ibid: 164). Muslim women and girls who wear hijab thus become marked as foreign and perpetually outside of Canadian society (Riley, 2011). Mainstream media sources often depict Muslim women either as oppressed victims, or as enemies and threats (Jiwani, 2006). Such images cast Canadian Muslim women as outsiders to Canadian society and favourable images of Muslim women are often limited either to those Muslim women who require (and welcome) the help of benevolent outsiders to save them (Jiwani, 2006: 73), or who can serve as the “good Muslim,” confirming stereotypes of the majority of Muslims as backwards and fanatical (Riley, 2009).

But it is not only from outside Muslim communities that Muslim women’s bodies are policed. Even within Muslim communities, women’s bodies may be seen as symbols of morality, chastity, and preservation of culture. The good Muslim/bad Muslim label is something that Muslim women also contend with from within their communities. As mentioned by one of the female respondents, “us women are marginalized within our own community and in the wider community. We aren’t welcome in the mosques if we don’t wear hijab and we aren’t welcome in society if we do wear hijabs, we are damned either way”. Another older female spoke about the difficulty she has in finding female mentors for her daughters, “in mosques, which are
very male dominated places, there might be the opportunity for a male mentor but there is absolutely no opportunity for young Muslim girls to find a female mentor who they can relate to or who can make them feel like they belong”.

Canadian Muslims seem to carry the double burden of having to prove their authenticity and allegiance to fellow Muslims as well as the wider society. Having to live with this hyphenated identity and persistently being in search of belonging can lead to complex identity issues. A concerning component of this struggle for belonging is the “double culture syndrome,” which Zine (2008: 4) describes in talking about young Muslims who can “develop a double persona in their efforts to resolve the cultural contradictions between home and school […] In the end they develop a double personality, with one side tailored to the social/cultural demands of home and family, the other to the demands of the outside world” (ibid: 4). Another concern that was echoed in some of the interviews was young Muslims “falling in the cracks and searching for belonging in the wrong places”. As expressed by a young female respondent:

People who already feel alienated in their own community, when they go through these microaggressions from the wider community they feel even more othered and then it just takes one thing to break the camel’s back. That’s when they get targeted by extremists, ‘oh look, you don’t fit in, they don’t accept you’, and they are the perfect picking for radicalization. It’s either sink or swim for some of the Muslims, unfortunately.

Tarjuma - a response to social and spiritual marginalization

(a) A place to feel at home

While the discussion about the phenomenon of being ‘unmosqued’ has mostly been centred around how unwelcoming Mosques are for certain Muslims, the underlying
concerns seem to be linked to a need for Muslims in the West to belong to a nurturing faith community. According to the unmosqued documentary, the vast majority of American Muslims might identify with a large and broadly defined national “Muslim community”, far fewer, however, would claim full participation in a particular expression of that community (as through a local mosque). An important theme that emerged in all the interviews was the concept of belonging to a faith-based community. When talking about his experience with mosques as a teenager, Farooq said, “I was looking for home, for belonging but could not find it”.

During our interview, Farooq brought my attention to a 2012 survey conducted by one of their founding members. In this survey, one of the demographic questions was, “to which community do you belong?”. Farooq went on to explain that a majority of the self-identified Muslims who took part in the survey ticked the box that stated, “I don’t feel like I belong to a community”. He added, “and these were the do’ers, who were actively engaged in the Edmonton community!”. According to the survey, all of them said they were Muslim but not all said they belong to a community. So, it became clear to Farooq and his team that there is something more about a community than demographic characteristics and people recognize that. According to Farooq, “Canadian culture is not community based, it’s not tight knit. Immigrants come from tight knit cultures, but once they are here, they have less culture, less community. Immigrants and their children are looking for a bond, for belonging- the space in between the mosque and the home”. As such, Farooq explained that Tarjuma was not designed to just take up a physical space but instead was always conceived to be a community that Muslims can belong to.
According to the founders, the Tarjuma approach uses the “Public Minimum/Private Maximum Model” to respond to the growing needs of Muslims in the community. The concept of Public Minimum versus Private Maximum is the brainchild of Dr. Sherman Jackson, also known as, Abdul Hakim. He defines the “Public Minimum” as the minimum it takes for someone to feel they are part of the community and the “Private Maximum” as our own practice and principles (Hamid, 2014). The Public Minimum is the least you have to do to be considered a Muslim. On the other hand, the Private Maximum is the most that a person does privately. A person might pray, read the Qur’an, volunteer at the mosque and wear the hijab, but her Private Maximum would very likely differ from another person’s Private Maximum. For some people, they would never think of missing praying in congregation while others may be content with the fact that they pray at all.

During our interview, Farooq even draws a picture of the model to highlight its significance (see figure a) and explain how many Muslims tend to exclude people from their community, or worse, the circle of Islam, for not subscribing to the same practices and ideals as they do. Farooq argues that when there is no consensus around the public minimum it makes us project the private maximum outwards unto others, so our private maximum is extrapolated to the public minimum. This, he says, becomes a “centrifugal force that pushes people out and you are repelled by it and pushed to the margins of your faith identity”, which can lead to spiritual marginalization. He argues:

The goal should be to have very few requirements to be part of a community and we should strive to be flexible/accommodating. People get excluded or feel isolated if we start implementing our own practice/standards/”private maximum,” on others. For example, if you
show up to the mosque, church, temple or synagogue, then you should feel that you are part of the faith community no matter how “practicing” you are of the faith. Often, we put too many standards on others that we eventually isolate individuals.

Figure a.

As explained by Usama Canon (Hamid, 2014), “When we export our Private Maximum to the public, it becomes all-or-nothing […] I will measure you based on my own Private Maximum and through micro-aggression, make you feel like you aren’t part of the community”. This is what he claims, “drives youths and many converts away from Islam, this all-or-nothing approach” (ibid). Farooq insists that in a healthy community there is an agreed upon consensus around the public minimum, which is simply one’s own healthy practice, and this leads to a “centripetal force that feels like an inward embrace that brings you closer to the core”. He adds, “on the surface, this can be applied to everything in life. If we try to apply this in our daily lives, there would be less hatred and exclusion in society (disability, gender, race/colour, religion)”. Farooq then explained that the Tarjuma founders decided to take this idea further by conceptualizing the model of the three missing Ss - *Sense of*
belonging, Shared goals, and Safety. He said that these are the three gaps that Tarjuma fills for their members.

i. Sense of belonging

When talking about Tarjuma, a middle-aged father of three gave his perspective on the importance of this sense of belonging for his children and it being a major factor in him regularly attending the gatherings with his family:

I bring my older two girls to Tarjuma. The organizers speak in English and are raised here so my kids understand them. The problem sometimes with the masjid is that the imam is often foreign, and English is their 2nd or 3rd language, they don’t speak on level of kids and culture plays a big role. Different areas in the world understand Islam differently. The kids here need somebody whom they can relate to, who share their experiences, who went to high school and university here and have faced similar struggles. Tarjuma bridges that gap for the youth. I go to the masjid all the time. They are very good at telling me what to do but they are not good at keeping you engaged. I have a thirteen-year-old, nine-year-old, and 1 year old. I need my kids to be brought in but the imams at the masjid keep pushing them away, they are losing them.

Farooq also made mention of the emphasis Tarjuma places on support for the younger generation. He said:

Part of the vision of Tarjuma is to foster a sense of support, by providing other adult mentors for the kids who attend. I did not have it, but I yearned for it. And I can say that we certainly have attracted young marginalized youth, but the problem lies in how to retain people. We believe the method to retaining anyone is to engage them with something meaningful, something life giving, and give them opportunities to mentor other younger kids, have their own small groups, give them responsibility.

ii. Shared Goals
The organizers also spoke about *shared goals* – described as shared values, a shared spiritual connection, sharing art, as being integral to Tarjuma’s mandate. In fact, art plays a big part in Tarjuma events, with many artists being invited and their art showcased. Farooq spoke further about his own connection to art:

> I am drawn to music in general, but in Madrasa I was taught that music is haram (impermissible), which I later learned was not the case (he laughs). It was through Usama Canon that I first heard Moroccan spiritual song in Western melody. What was especially compelling to me was the Western melodies being imposed by him, it felt like home to me, because I grew up in Canada. So, it was a melding of both my Sufi Islam and my Western roots.

Farooq told me that his exposure to this alternative way to express his spirituality appealed to him. He said, “Usama Canon’s vision seemed compelling to me. Once I was exposed to it, someone just being Muslim was not enough for me to share my life or my time with”.

### iii. Safety

The organizers also paid particular emphasis on the importance of *safety* – something they described as providing programming to people who seem divergent and “not judging members or excluding groups or kicking people out”. As Farooq explained, “if you are going up and to the right spiritually then there are plenty of places for that. But if your path is curved then there aren’t any welcoming spaces for you to be in”. He explained that part of its mandate is also allowing people the freedom to come and go:
With Tarjuma you get belonging but then there’s a separation because we are not family. Our involvement is less subjective. Your family might disown you for leaving Islam, but we won’t (he laughs). Tarjuma is one step removed, it gives you the comfort of community but objectively.

Another organizer explained:

We see ourselves as an extension of the family. The role of extended family is to provide support, child-minding, freedom to move around. The general disappearance of the extended family has resulted in people feeling more isolated to just their nuclear families. Leading to heavy burdens placed on the husband and wife and more so the wife, which otherwise would have dispersed onto extended family.

(b) A place for inclusion/equality

As highlighted in the UnMosqued documentary, there is a desperate need in the Muslim community for improved women’s spaces. Muslim women in the West have repeatedly testified to insufficient resources for women’s programming; small, cramped women’s spaces; lack of needed childcare for mosque-attending mothers; and a predominantly male-dominated mosque leadership. Many of my female respondents echoed similar sentiments:

- I find mosques more judgmental, what you say, what you wear etc.
- Even if there are non-prayer related events taking place in the Mosque you always feel like you have to be covered, even in a room or community center attached to the mosque. And that’s mostly because people will give you these horrible looks.
- Tarjuma is a very safe space, no judgement, show up when I want, leave when I want, I can come as I am, dressed as I want.
- More conservative people have a problem with music at Tarjuma, women not wearing hijab, mixed gender seating.
Tarjuma appears to be a reaction to external stereotypes and internal pressures by providing a space for women to come as they are and take up positions that they are not usually afforded in mosques - the leadership consists of women, gatherings are not segregated by gender, and free childcare is provided for all. Since Tarjuma is not a mosque, it is also more comfortable for those women to attend who do not always wear a hijab. As one woman said, “at Tarjuma gatherings I feel comfortable being myself and not having to wear the scarf just because of other people’s expectations”.

As well, women and men spoke about a lack of access to decision making roles in mosques. As a young father explained, “I don’t want my daughters to be second class citizens in the community. I want to empower our women. Tarjuma helps my daughters see and feel that they can do so much”. At Tarjuma, women are often invited as speakers and presenters. Farooq said, “at Tarjuma women are specifically at the front of the room, not in a tokenistic way but because we want to celebrate talent”.

Historically, from the communities some of the women have come from, they have been underprivileged and restricted from access to these spaces. Farooq went on to say:

After one of our female organizers delivered one of the best speeches ever, some guys who I grew up with in the same madrasas came up to me and said, this is weird, I’m listening to a female giving me spiritual knowledge and not just on motherhood. It proved to me how misinformed men become going to mosques and only hearing khutbas (sermons) from men. So, for me, Tarjuma is important because I want my daughter to feel affirmed and have a safe space to go forward and backwards and know she will be accepted and taken care of.

Another organizer told me that “often times the people most hesitant about Tarjuma are men, because they are welcome in mosques”. I spoke to two friends, fathers of
daughters who told me that they are regular attendees because of their children, “I have 2 daughters, that’s what attracts me to Tarjuma- the open mindedness of the people here makes kids feel comfortable”. I also spoke to a mother and daughter who told me that three generations of women in their family come to Tarjuma and it has become their weekly bonding time, “all of us are dealing with demons in our lives, studying, work, time management. Tarjuma brings issues to the table that are not just preaching about Islam but about common issues that we all face, inspired by a faith perspective, something we can all relate to”. Tarjuma also seems to cater to those couples and families who do not fit into any one particular ethnic community. A young second generation Arab woman told me, “growing up, we were always outcasts because we were not Arab enough, nor were we Canadian enough. We were just stuck in between both- in limbo”. A female organizer who is a third-generation Canadian with an Arab background and is married to a second-generation Canadian with an Indian background explained that Tarjuma welcomes people who come from mixed ethnic backgrounds and complex identities. She said:

> We can try and squish our kids into a community, but we are outgrowing our community. My kids will forever be outcasts in traditional spaces. I don’t want to squish my kid into that box of rigid expectations of what it means to be Muslim – something that usually is coloured by ethnicity and culture.

Another young man said, “Tarjuma is filled with some who are seen as outcasts in some traditional spaces, interracial couples, children born from mixed ethnic backgrounds, converts to Islam”. Mosques do tend to be separated by ethnicity and language. Across the various cities in Canada you will find Arab mosques, Somali mosques, Indian mosques, Pakistani mosques so on and so forth. As one Tarjuma
attendee explained while pointing to the friends in her group, “here you don’t have that separation, she’s from Fiji, I’m Arab, he’s Pakistani, he’s from India, we’re all different backgrounds but come together as one community”.

Another thing that makes Tarjuma special for the attendees is that “it’s the only place where couples and families can sit together and learn together” in a semi-sacred space. As one young father put it:

There is no such thing as couples and mosques. Young second/third generation couples with young families like us want to be together in sacred spaces. People who have adopted the cultural traditional gender roles won’t think that Tarjuma is special in that way, but to us it is. Our lives are so busy with work, chores, we want to be together on the weekends. Also, there’s something really special about being together in a spiritual sacred space. I want to share my devotional time with the person I love.

(c) A place to be proud of

The word tarjuma literally means “translation”. Farooq explained that the word inspires the idea of “translating Islamic tradition for ourselves and others […] we should be able to translate Islam [as a religion] in society, for a wider audience […] the translation of us for the wider community because it is important for them to understand us”. His emphasis on us and them and others was quite telling of the “othering” that he had felt his whole life, in which the us did not usually include him.

Community engagement and bridge building also came up in several of my conversations. Interestingly, they have many non-Muslim regular attendees. Farooq said, “one sister shows up with her three kids who is not Muslim herself, but she said she felt her kids got community here”. One of the organizers said, “I invited a White non-Muslim colleague of mine and she actually showed up with her husband, so that
was cool”. A young girl at the Sunday gathering said, “I bought my friend who is not-Muslim and she loved it, she made friends, I couldn’t have taken her to a mosque” (she laughed). Another young woman said, “this place is inclusive. People from different religions come here. Others commented on the “community driven spirit”. With one woman saying, “I feel Tarjuma is more about community than Islam even”. While another middle-aged attendee shared her thoughts about one of the talks she had attended, saying, “one of the topics at Tarjuma was “messiness” about messy people and messiness, not just in your space but in your life, anyone can benefit from that so it’s not about preaching Islam”. Another attendee told me that “Islam preaches the community approach anyway, so I feel this place embodies the Islamic approach.

Other than with what it offers in terms of programming that was said to be attractive and useful to anyone in the community, some pointed to the mere existence of an organization like Tarjuma to be changing the narrative of Muslims. With one young female attendee telling me:

Tarjuma or anything like Tarjuma is not just beneficial to the Muslim community but also the non-Muslim community not for them to attend even but for something to just exist in order to change the narrative of Islam that we have at present. Right now, the narrative of Islam is hard Islam, scary Islam, it even scares me, and I’m Muslim.

Another young male attendee told me, “Tarjuma is the only place in our city where I would feel comfortable to bring a non-Muslim friend and know that it would showcase Islam in a positive way”. And this way of thinking seemed to present itself across the board, with even some of the older folk who could be described as first-generation immigrants. An older female attendee was quite emotional in expressing her disappointment with traditional mosques run by “the older generation who have a
tunnel vision approach”. She said, “their focus is just on Islam but when you leave home there are so many other issues you face, you cannot live in a silo and expect people to understand you”. As such, it can be said that Tarjuma’s efforts not only include engaging with non-Muslims in order to build bridges but also taking control of the Muslim narrative by showcasing *their* Islam in their own unique way, through music/poetry etc., in order to disrupt existing stereotypes. In this way, I found Tarjuma to not only be a third space for marginalized Muslims to come together and find spiritual belonging, but also a liminal space where Muslims display agency in response to social marginalization and Islamophobia.

Being part of Tarjuma also provided an important social network for the attendees. Tarjuma seemed to behave as more than just a local community centre that throws special events and hosts weekly gatherings. Many of the members that I spoke to told me that they became friends after meeting at Tarjuma - they visited each other’s homes and attended personal events, like each other’s children’s birthday parties and dinner parties. Some of them even worked together or ended up helping one another find work or get promoted in their jobs. Many respondents also spoke about the ways in which Tarjuma connected them to spaces and people outside of their Muslim circles, through events being held in local churches, coffee shops and community centres. A young male organizer said, “I particularly love the fact that our events and gatherings are not in mosques because it forces many of the attendees, including myself, to step outside of our comfort zones and social bubbles and connect with the wider Edmonton community that we are a part of”.

As such, it can be said that Tarjuma plays an important role not only as a third space for those who may be feeling socially and spiritually marginalised, but it also
acts as a means for social integration and it behaves as a marginality facilitator. By providing them with a place for community fellowship and individual companionship, Tarjuma promotes general well-being and mental health resiliency to help marginalised Muslims be functional members of society. And so, seeing as it seems to attract already higher socioeconomic status Muslims, Tarjuma may not be causing socioeconomic growth and success but it still may be providing members with the needed social networks to facilitate their continued success. Thus, Tarjuma does not cause members to be successful but it helps to maintain and improve their social and economic status through the social networks found and nurtured at Tarjuma.

Facing the Criticisms

Even with the noticeable triumphs and praise, I realised early on in my research that like any other human idea, Tarjuma was not immune to disapproval. One of the criticisms that came up in my preliminary research was the ways in which Tarjuma blurs the line between sacred space and community space and has been impudently created as a substitute to the Mosque. Tarjuma certainly provides belonging for those who have come to feel spiritually marginalized at the mosque, but it also provides support to those who are looking for complementary services that the mosque cannot provide, often for a lack of resources. The organizers insisted, “Muslim people are looking for more than just standard Islamic services, for example, people are looking for bereavement services not just the funeral service and marriage counselling, not just the marriage ceremony”. In response to these needs, Tarjuma offers many services that are not available in traditional mosques, for example, their “couples’ continuum of care” project includes not just the marriage ceremony but before and after care for
the couple, pre-marital/post marital counselling and crisis management with trained counsellors.

Granted, many mosques have attempted to launch new amenities from within their existing institutions by building out schools and community centres and have attempted to offer different social services. However, most mosques do not have the money or manpower to run these kinds of programs. Sometimes the problem is a lack of resources, while other times it’s because the mosque leadership doesn’t actually understand the community’s needs. As explained by Usama Canon, “if a young kid struggling with depression walks into an imam’s office looking for advice, he or she may not receive the kind of guidance needed. That’s not the imam’s fault, necessarily—they’re just not equipped with the knowledge to deal with these kinds of specific problems” (Hamid, 2014). By providing services that are unavailable in mosques and an environment that is more inclusive, Tarjuma does seem to be filling in many of the gaps that had been highlighted in the unmosqued documentary.

However, Farooq made it very clear that Tarjuma should not be seen as a replacement for a mosque – “it is not an alternative mosque for all those who increasingly feel like outcasts and misfits within the Muslim community, it is simply an extension of it”. He went on to explain:

With the whole ‘unmosqued’ movement, people were saying, we don’t get any of these three Ss (sense of belonging, shared goals, safety) there. That’s true, mosques are not good at responding to these specific needs, but mosques are simply not designed to be that either, they are designed to be sacred spaces, structures of sanctity. In fact, they fail when they instead try to be a community too. Traditional mosques are not welcoming of people on the margins because they are contested spaces. They are historically sacred. They are not like local coffee shops (he laughs). They are meant to have rules, expectations, a set of standards, so the sanctity of them remains sanctified.
And so, Tarjuma should not be seen as a sacred space that is a replacement to the mosque but a semi-sacred community space that serves certain needs of the Muslim community, within a framework of spirituality, outside of the mosque.

Another criticism that repeatedly came up during my preliminary conversations with Muslims from the wider Edmonton community was the lack of ethnic and socioeconomic class diversity of Tarjuma members. Tarjuma was conceived by a group of 16 people, who Farooq often fondly referred to as the “sweet sixteen founders” of Tarjuma. The group which consists of more women than men and members from a wide range of backgrounds including, a White convert, South Asians, Bengalis, Arabs and a Filipina convert, appeared to be very diverse, in terms of gender and ethnicity. It became immediately visibly obvious to me during the Sunday gathering that Tarjuma is in fact very ethnically diverse with both the organizers and the attendees. The same is true for race, gender and age diversity among members. Although the organizers are all quite young (in their 30s) there is a broad range of attendees with young children and many who appear to be much older, in their 70s and 80s. In one of our conversations Farooq told me, “we attract people from all walks of life”, but I was still curious about the criticisms I had heard from other people about Tarjuma being an “elitist” organization. I was curious to see if I could pick up on the diversity in the attendees’ socioeconomic background during my visit.

Although I did not walk around asking people their annual income, I did take note of some of the cars people drove up in and the clothing/accessories of the attendees. As well, many spoke about their occupational background in our informal
conversations. Judging by the lack of extreme range in the aforementioned unofficial markers of socioeconomic status, it appeared that the gathering was indeed not very socioeconomically diverse. During my interviews with local community members, I heard recurring comments about the lack of socioeconomic diversity among Tarjuma attendees and that the “elite” organization only served the needs of “rich Muslims or professionals”, not refugees or new immigrants. While I can attest to the diversity of the group that I was able to speak with, in terms of race, ethnicity, gender and age, I recognize that Tarjuma seemed to serve a distinct community of Muslims from a higher socioeconomic status and not all Muslims. However, I tend to agree with Farooq in that maybe having one type of organization that caters to the entire Muslim population of Canada is not only an impossible feat in itself, but the idea alludes to Muslims being a homogenous group.

Other than the fact that Muslims in Canada are very diverse in multiple ways, there are over one million Muslims in Canada, over 500,000 Muslims in Toronto and over 90,000 Muslims in Edmonton (Statistics Canada, 2011) – can we really call 90,000 people a “community”? As Farooq so aptly noted, “not all Muslims will like Tarjuma or get what they need from it, but I don’t expect them to either; we have confined definitions of the word community and that needs to change”. Perhaps we need to remember that a community needs to be small enough in order to foster meaningful relationships. One of the effective team building exercises that many of the attendees mentioned was the “turn to the person next to you and ask them…” activity that takes place at every gathering. Not only did the activity force people to have a conversation with someone they did not know, many ended up becoming friends after the seemingly awkward introduction. Tarjuma is just one small
intentional community of Muslims, but because Muslims are not a monolith there
needs to be more intentional small communities of varying characteristics throughout
Canada. What if there were various different types of Tarjuma for the different types
of Muslims? Including those from a range of different socioeconomic backgrounds.

Contrary to how they often get painted in the media, Muslims are highly
diverse in all aspects of their beliefs and behaviour. In addition to their racial, national
and ethnic differences, Muslims also belong to different theological sects. Muslims
also differ in the ways they practice Islam and how they respond to modernity (Omar,
2011). In speaking about second and third generation Asian American immigrants,
Lisa Lowe (2003) explains that the diverse range of Asians in America are at
“different distances and generations” from their “original” Asian cultures”.
Erroneously, they are defined by an “Asian origin collectively that is actually unstable
and changeable, with its cohesion complicated by intergenerationality” and also “by
various degrees of identification with and relation to a homeland, and by different
extents of assimilation to and distinction from majority culture in the United States”
(Lowe, 2003: 137). The same could be said of Muslims in Canada who come from a
set of diverse racial, linguistic, ethnic and national origins and socioeconomic
backgrounds, and who are at different distances and generations to their original
religio-ethnic cultures. Muslims experience Islam in different settings and
circumstances; some of them bring with them practices and interpretations that are
sometimes unique to their particular familial ethnic background and for others their
Islam is a product of the West.

The truth is, although Muslims are often called upon to display their
authenticity in very confined and singular ways, there is no one authentic Muslim
identity. Muslims are also diverse in the ways in which their faith informs their community needs. To some, their need for belonging to a faith community is fulfilled via their local mosque and for others, the mosque is not the home that they seek for their spiritual well-being. For example, some of the attendees spoke of their friends and family who do not necessarily like Tarjuma, while others told me Tarjuma was just not for them. The following are some of the comments I heard:

- My older brother is not a big fan of Tarjuma because he thinks it’s too revolutionary, it’s too airy fairy, too feely. He says it’s not substantive enough and not Islamic enough. He thinks its fringe. He says, do you even learn about Islam or Quran? His thinking is that it is not traditional enough – middle-aged male attendee.

- My mum didn’t like coming here but others do – young female attendee.

- I feel a burn in my heart when I go to places like Tarjuma. It makes me uncomfortable, like I don’t belong there. I’m different because of my experiences, they don’t understand. They like to help, but they can’t understand who I am. I have a lot of baggage, but they don’t understand – young refugee male Edmontonian.

- My husband said, “what is this Baqwaas? (nonsense)- mindfulness, breathing exercises” –elderly female attendee.

- Tarjuma is not really for me, I don’t really need it – middle-aged female Edmontonian.

When I questioned Farooq about why he thinks they do not attract as many refugee Muslims and why so many of the people I spoke to did not think Tarjuma was appealing, he explained:

Yes, we have very few refugee members. Tarjuma isn’t excluding people, but just by way of its vibe, some people might not fit in. Part of me wanted it to be for everyone but that is an impossible task. Tarjuma cannot be fulfilling the needs of every kind of Muslim because Muslims are
diverse.

Speaking of vibe, one of the most striking features of Tarjuma’s Sunday gathering was the avant-garde atmosphere. As I walked into the room brightly lit with natural light coming in from a glass wall, to my left I saw a large table covered with an intricate Moroccan style tablecloth and on top of it an old school looking turntable/music system. To my surprise, it was being operated by a young man dressed in traditional garb - a long tunic, headdress, and large headphones, bopping his head to the music he was mixing. Rather than any traditional house of worship, it felt like I had entered a very cool Toronto lounge with a Muslim DJ. Having frequented mosques my entire life, I could attest to the fact that this would probably have never flown in a traditional faith space and especially not a mosque. I could also imagine that certain traditional Muslims may have had an issue with music being played in a faith-based gathering, even if it is not in a sacred building. In fact, a young Syrian refugee male respondent mentioned that exact point in our interview, that one of the reasons he doesn’t like Tarjuma is because “the women and men sit together, and they play music; they are not real Muslims”. The same young man, interestingly, said that the local traditional mosque also did not have “real Muslims” because they had once allowed a non-Muslim service worker to enter the building with his shoes on.

This seemingly new age “hipster vibe”, as some called it, may not be attractive to all Muslims, but could it be that it finally opens the doors to those Western Muslims whose hybrid and complex identities feel represented by and at home in such a space? While some mosques may very well repel constituents because of cultural and language barriers, it is important to note that more tangible barriers like those are not
the only obstacles that are keeping some Muslims away from mosques. The intangible barriers like no shared value systems or spiritual goals for those coming from complex cultural backgrounds may also be driving away Muslims who are looking for connection to other humans in a spiritual place. As such, Tarjuma seems to be attracting people who have a need for belonging but do not fit into any one particular spiritual community, even those vulnerable Muslims who end up looking for belonging in the wrong places. Tarjuma is for people straddling in the middle, somewhere on the identity hyphen and in this regard, as Farooq said, “it could interrupt a pathway to radicalization”.

Furthermore, seeing as Tarjuma is actually the only non-mosque community up and running in Edmonton, Farooq explained, “it will forever be perceived in trying to do more than it is actually trying to do”. The organizers were very adamant in asserting that Tarjuma was and is never trying to be a mosque, “what it actually does is inspire other intentional communities to pop up. With some organizations, another similar org popping up is seen as competition, but for us it is actually a sign of health. That is what we desire to inspire”. Thus, what was most promising in this study was the potential for an idea like Tarjuma to be reproduced. It became clear in my research that this organization was not confined to a physical space, a particular religious doctrine or a particular demographic. As Farooq said, “the vision and spirit of Tarjuma is free and replicable”. As described in many of the interviews, there are many Muslims who are on the margins and hyphens – on the fault line of identity, and they need belonging and meaning within a spiritual context. Muslim civilizations historically developed spaces besides the mosque for gathering for example, the zawiya/khanqa/darga all referring to an informal sacred gathering space or the
coffeehouse and bathhouse etc., thus, Muslim ‘third places’ like Tarjuma today can be seen as simply revitalizing a fundamental institutional practice. Perhaps, instead of focusing on religion as being a tool for extremism and radicalization, we need to put the emphasis back on the positive ways in which religion can nurture the individual and social well-being of Canadian Muslims without undermining their Canadianess. Perhaps, we need more faith-based community spaces, third spaces, that can provide a home for the *spiritually homeless*, as well as those who may go looking for that home and belonging in the wrong places (extremist groups).

**Conclusion**

Muslims make up a significant portion of the Canadian population, with numbers likely to continue to rise. However, Islam is under a global political spotlight at present, making “being Muslim in the West” a difficult and stressful experience. This study shows that the social and spiritual marginalization faced by many Canadian Muslims and the lack of belonging to existing faith-based spaces makes many of them feel *spiritually homeless*. The analysis has found that Tarjuma fills that gap, as it does indeed function as a “third place” for some Muslims, allowing them to feel belonging to a community. Also, as a “marginality facilitator”, it helps maintain and improve the attendees’ social and economic status through the social networks found and nurtured at Tarjuma. In this way, Tarjuma can be said to play an important role in the *social status optimization* of some Muslims in Canada. This research supports previous literature on optimal marginality, as it shows that certain types of marginality paired with support from certain organizations (third places) that become “marginality facilitators” (Watts, 1994), create a unique type of cultural capital, allowing for *social*...
status optimization in spite of stigma and marginalization. Thus, communities that have reached a high level of “institutional completeness” (Breton, 1964) can function as a means for positive integration, which can make this often described as contentious “third space” a site of production and innovation.

This study has generated a more empirically grounded and less speculative explanation for the role of community spaces in the integration of Muslims. The findings of this study are useful for religious and community-based organizations in re-evaluating their own programs and providing better services to their members, as well as in building inter and intra community ties. According to Usama Canon, “there is no single solution to the many challenges Muslims in the West face today” (Hamid, 2014). Perhaps, Tarjuma is just one of the many solutions to an increasing need to nurture the spiritual health and social well-being of Muslims in Canada and foster their positive integration in society.
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CONCLUSION

As Kazemipur (2014: 24) says, ‘Canada has a Muslim population that is both diverse and selected”, but while diversity is often acknowledged and recognized in previous research, it does not necessarily focus on how diverse groups of Muslims experience Islamophobia differently. Previous literature, although helpful in demonstrating the presence, insidious nature and effects of Islamophobia on Muslims, does not underscore the varying forms and intensities of Islamophobia that Muslims in the West face. Existing literature is also silent on the powerful ways in which socio-economic class factors into the experiences, coping mechanisms, and stigma responses of various Muslims in an age when anti-Muslim sentiment appears to be on the rise.

The homogenizing of Muslim experiences can inadvertently end up perpetuating the myth of Muslims as being a monolithic group. As well, by not taking the intersectionalities of race and class into account we are missing the opportunity to understand how Muslims who are at the intersections of social and spiritual marginality can be further damned by Islamophobia. Conversely, we are also missing the opportunity to see that rather than being seen solely as sites of contestation and constraint, liminal spaces could also be junctures of agency. This dissertation, which presents multiple empirical analyses of the Muslim experience, is a unique contribution to understanding the ways in which the stigma of being Muslim in an age of rising Islamophobia is understood, described, and responded to by Canadian Muslims.
Summary

The major findings of my dissertation research can be summarized in the following 10 points:

1. Islamophobia is perpetuated, in part, by media framing and corresponding political legislation that reinforces the Muslim terrorist narrative.

2. As a result, stigma, racism/discrimination and ethno-racial microaggressions are frequently experienced by Muslims and often lead to feelings of alienation and social marginalization.

3. The experience of anti-Muslim racism is complicated by multiple stigmas (for example, being racialized and a refugee).

4. Aggregated hate crime data do not capture the insidious and intersectional forms of discrimination that many racialized Muslims experience and so, are not the best barometer of racism in Canada.

5. Second/third generation Canadian Muslims and those who come from higher socioeconomic status/social class also experience racism and Islamophobia.

6. The resulting social marginalization they feel, especially post 9/11, propels them towards their faith identity and they express a greater need at this time to belong to a faith community.

7. However, these non-immigrant Muslims also experience internal discrimination/alienation and spiritual marginalization and feel a lack of belonging in traditional Mosques.

8. Tarjuma fills this gap and serves as a marginality facilitator for spiritually homeless Muslims.
9. We also see agency at play, with the creation and management of this type of organization by a group often marginalized in multiple ways.

10. However, social class matters - refugees may not have similar resources and time to organize in the same way as for example, economic/family class immigrants and their children, who are coming from higher socioeconomic backgrounds.

Altogether, this dissertation contributes to the literature on Muslims in The West in three ways: (1) offering a qualitative approach to understanding the ways in which Islamophobia is perpetuated through media discourse and coinciding political legislation, and is experienced in differing ways by a diverse range of Muslim in Canada, (2) adding the concepts of *spiritual marginalization, spiritual homelessness,* and *social status optimization* to the analytic vocabulary on integration and articulating their relationship with identity, and (3) making a connection between social class and the response to Islamophobia/anti-Muslim racism and articulating its relationship with human agency. Each of these contributions is considered in more detail in the following section. In chapter one, I laid the groundwork for my dissertation by providing an in-depth literature review on Islamophobia and anti-Muslim racism in Canada. In what follows, I summarize the conceptual findings of each stand-alone empirical paper of the sandwich dissertation. I then review and discuss the more general theoretical and conceptual contributions of the dissertation on a whole to existing literature. I conclude with some suggestions on future directions for the study of Islamophobia, anti-Muslim racism, and the integration of Muslims in The West.
Chapter two of this dissertation outlines the ways in which media and political discourse play an integral part in reinforcing the Muslim terrorist narrative. Using media discourse analysis, I examined the way in which the media contributed to the naming and framing of terrorism as a Muslim problem by their treatment of two Canadian incidences, (a) the Quebec Mosque shooting on 29 January 2017 and (b) the Edmonton van attack on 30 September 2017. I carefully analysed the ways in which media language was used to portray the two perpetrators, Alexandre Bissonnette and Abdullahi Hasan Sharif, as either a lone wolf or a terrorist.

The contrasting media treatment of two of these incidents of violence in Canada and its perpetrators is presented as an example of how the media takes part in the social construction of Muslims as a problem by reinforcing the “Muslim terrorist” narrative. I also discussed how Muslims appear to consistently be named and framed as only villains and not victims of terrorism, and how these discourses may be impacting legislation. The chapter discusses how political talk on how to solve the Muslim problem through legislation plays on existing public anxieties towards Muslims and is strengthened in an ongoing way via the media. As a result, Muslims continue to be imagined as a homogenous group with singular and static ideologies that stand in opposition to Western values. Thus, this cyclical relationship between the media and political bodies keeps the Muslim problem current and important and continues to not only justify the increased securitization of Muslims in Canada but also potentially fuels widespread Islamophobia.
Chapter 3 of this dissertation focused on the effects of Islamophobia, racism and anti-refugee discourse on a sample of refugee youth living in St Johns, Newfoundland and Labrador and Hamilton, Ontario. This chapter consists of an article I co-authored with James Baker, the principle investigator of the study. As his research assistant, I co-conducted all the interviews. I transcribed and analyzed the 23 interviews from his study and wrote this article in its entirety. In this chapter of my dissertation, I explored the integration challenges of Muslim refugee youth and their experiences of racial and ethno-religious microaggressions and overt discrimination. I discussed the ways in which refugees who carry multiple stigmatised identities understand and experience racism.

Our research shows that racial and ethno-religious microaggressions and overt racism are quite common among refugee youth. Starting off with discrete categories to organise the data, I outlined the dangerous ways in which intersections of religion and racial/ethnic identity can compound experiences of discrimination for certain refugee youth, particularly Black Muslim refugees. However, seeing the complex ways in which multiple stigmas intersected to inform experiences of racism, the study proved to be a cautionary tale that we cannot think of stigma in discrete categories. The racial and ethno-religious microaggressions and overt discrimination experienced by them affected how our sample of refugees viewed themselves. The experiences were found to have profound long-lasting effects on their emotional well-being, including internalized racism, as many of them spoke about believing the various disparaging characteristics thrust upon them.
Chapter four of this dissertation focused on the relationship between individual and society by looking at the role of a faith-based community organization, Tarjuma, as a “marginality facilitator” for socially marginalized and what I coin, spiritually homeless Muslims. I found in the interviews that being part of Tarjuma provided an important social network for the attendees - Tarjuma seemed to operate as more than just a local community centre, as it not only helps provide a third space for attendees but also provides them with social networks to help them navigate their social world and become optimised in society. Tarjuma not only gives members fellowship/companionship, general well-being, and mental health resiliency to help them be functional members of society, but it also helps people maintain their social and economic status through their networking, and in doing so, they are facilitators of continued growth. As such, the study found that even if Tarjuma may not necessarily cause individual success or higher socioeconomic status, it still serves to be a facilitator of continued success in society.

Seeing as there is an absence of research on the internal othering and marginalization that many Western Muslims encounter, this study also highlighted distinct challenges faced by some Muslims and the unconventional ways in which they exercise agency in their response to the growing stigma of their faith identity. Through Tarjuma, individuals who come from higher socio-economic backgrounds and immigrant-class and generational position were found to respond to collective stigma with the creation of a third place as an assertion of their Canadian Muslim identities. This study highlighted the role of community organizations in enabling not
only the positive integration of Muslims in Canada but facilitating their upward social mobility or what I coin, *social status optimization*.

Through the three empirical analyses I have demonstrated the different ways in which Islamophobia and anti-Muslim racism subsist in Canada. The following section provides a theoretical discussion on the perspectives of representation, integration and human agency as they pertain to the analysis.

**Contributions**

_The Orientalism of Today_

Islam is not homogenous; it is a diverse set of practices that vary from culture to culture. Yet the ways in which Western cultures have come to ‘know’ Muslims and Islam is largely through what has been termed Orientalism, the historically situated Western construction of non-Western cultures as the Other; as alien, distant, antiquated, irrational, sensual and passive (see Said, 1978). Orientalism is “systems of representation framed by the hegemonic political forces of colonialism, post-colonialism and neo-colonialism, which act towards bringing ‘the Orient’ into ‘Western’ consciousness, Western dispensation and under Western dominion” (Richardson, 2004: 5). “The orientalist approach to Islam can be summarized as essentialist, empiricist and historicist; it impoverishes the rich diversity of Islam by producing an essentializing caricature” (ibid: 5).

Orientalism is, in Said’s (1978) words, “a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction between ‘the Orient’ and (most of the time) ‘the Occident.’” The Orientalism that Edward Said described was a system of
representations, sometimes explicit, more often implicit, which aimed to produce an “Other”, in order to better secure the stability and supremacy of the Western self. Saïd (1978) called it a discourse of the powerful about the powerless, an expression of “power-knowledge”. The Orientalism of today, however, has been described as “Eurocentrism, which feeds off the idea that Europe is under threat from Muslim societies and other backwards countries, is an undisguised conspiracy theory” (Shatz, 2019: 2). It has spread by way of Twitter, Facebook, and the Dark Web and it has led to foreign policy with an increasing reliance on military force in its dealings with Arabs and Muslims. Today, it is more often seen through, for example, “a Western “expert” reducing Islamist terrorism in Europe to a psychology of resentment, without bothering to explain why European citizens of Muslim origin might feel alienated, or a number-cruncher who studies police reports on terrorist suspects and calculates degrees of radicalization” (ibid: 2).

This is the Orientalism of an era where Western society has been plunged into deep crisis- public and political talk driven by anxieties over Syrian refugees, borders, and terrorism with a backdrop of economic decline. It is an Orientalism in crisis, incurious, vindictive, and often cruel, driven by hatred rather than fascination, an Orientalism of walls rather than border-crossings (ibid). According to Shatz (2019: 3), “The anti-integrationist, Islamophobic form of contemporary Orientalism has assumed an increasingly hostile, Muslim-hating tone because the “East” is increasingly inside the “West.” This is a clash not of civilizations, but rather a collision of two overlapping phenomena: the crisis of Western neoliberal capitalism, which has aggravated tensions over identity and citizenship, and the collapse of the Middle Eastern state in war, which has fed the refugee crisis. As a result, two forms of
identity politics, both of which reflect a caricatured, Orientalist vision of the Muslim East, are feeding off each other: right-wing populism on the one hand, and jihadist Islamism on the other”. As such, Said’s “Orientalism” can be said to have laid the groundwork for today’s Islamophobia.

The essentialist depiction of Muslims and Islam constructs them as the ‘Other’; as immature, even backward ethnic or foreign groups who need to be managed or tolerated in ‘our’ country. Kevin Dunn (2001: 292) claims, “Social constructions of identity are given life through their articulation.” This means that recurring language used to describe Islam and Muslims (such as ‘Islamic terrorism,’ ‘Muslim fanatics’), as is discussed in chapter two, can come to be representative of all Muslims and Islam as a religion. It is also important to note that these representations are gendered. Dominant stereotypes portray men as foreign (and more recently local) terrorists or extremists, whereas women are constructed as repressed hijab wearers who need to be liberated from patriarchal oppression and violence. These Western perceptions of Islam and Muslims further suggest that Muslims are intolerant of other religions and Western cultures. Indeed, it is claimed that the media reproduces these images of Muslims and Islam as Other by describing them as fundamentalist, terrorist, sexist, militant, undemocratic, violent, suicide bombers, hijackers, orthodox/scripturalist, and fanatic (see Dunn, 2001). These stereotypes are linked to contexts of war, conflict, violence, disunity and sexism. Existing literature (mentioned above) reinforces the argument that the ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ dialectic is manifest in The West and that Muslims continue to be vilified via the media. Chapter two describes the ways in which Canadian print media fuels the Orientalism of today as it reinforces
the Muslim terrorist narrative by focusing on Muslim perpetrators of violence and naming and framing terrorism as a Muslim problem.

With the presupposition that Islam is monolithic, Muslims are assumed to have the same stereotyped characteristics and are erroneously lumped into one group. Common misconceptions and stereotypes include positioning all Muslims as one community that is opposed to and in opposition to the West, conflating Muslims and Islamic fundamentalist/jihadists, and assuming all Muslims share the same cultural practices, political positions, and levels of religiosity. These are some examples of stereotypes that can result in increasing suspicion and alienation of Muslims and may eventually lead to physical violence (United Nations 2004; Schiffer and Wagner 2011). Repetition tends to normalize, validate, and exacerbate stereotypes. Chapter two supports the findings of previous literature discussed in chapter one that claims stereotypes about Muslims are frequently perpetuated through media coverage of Muslims.

The selective coverage of news stories and political talk about Muslim terrorists, as shown in chapter two, perpetuate fear of the “Other” and stress the existence of those Muslims living in the West as different and separated in society. Since media and political discourses tend to draw attention to visible and easily identifiable elements of Muslim identity that are often considered to be in opposition to the wider society, such as the wearing of a hijab (head covering) or niqab (face veil), practicing Canadian Muslims are made to feel alienated. Moreover, biased media coverage of “Islamic terrorism” propagates the idea that Muslims are not only separated from, and in opposition to, Western values, but they are in fact a nuisance, or worse, dangerous. Such a narrative does not only fuel fear and mistrust that
manifests as Islamophobia, but it can also provoke anti-Muslim incidents and hate crimes, which are discussed in chapter three.

**Complex Identities Complex Experiences**

Rather than taking a straight path of integration, the cultural and religious identities of Muslim immigrants and their offspring undertake complicated journeys to selfhood, as was discussed in chapter four. Although often lumped into an amorphous mass, Muslims are not a monolithic whole. In fact, just like ethnic identity (Weinfield, 1981), the differences within the various Muslim communities and individuals in Canada are becoming more and more nuanced with each passing generation. Maalouf (2003) points out, finding pure and exclusive identity is hard, if not impossible, because identities are neither singular nor fixed and stable. Wimmer (2008: 1028) states, ethnicity is conceived as “a process of constituting and re-configuring groups by defining the boundaries between them”.

Struggling to maintain ties with their ancestral ethno-religious identity at the same time as adapting to the culture they are now a part of, Canadian Muslims can find themselves in a position of double or even multiple consciousness, in which they may feel an association to more than one cultural group and identity. With a complicated mix of cultures that make up their identity, these individuals are often referred to as “hybrids”. In this respect, we cannot simply talk about “one experience, one identity”. On the contrary, people need instead to reflect on all the changes, adjustments and adaptations embedded in the sense of “being”. In this way, cultural identity is a “matter of ‘becoming’ as well as of ‘being’” (Hall, 1990: 225). Rather than “eternally fixed in some essentialized past”, identities are “subject to the
continuous 'play' of history, culture and power’” (Hall, 1990: 225). As such, although identity is related to the past, people keep reconstructing their cultural identities.

As well, racial identity is mirrored by and affects the social, political, ideological, and economic struggles between the socially constructed races, which creates a constant flux at the edges of individual ethnic identity and ethnic group boundaries (Nagel, 1995). The meaning of racial categories, as well as the position of a racialized group in a social formation is constantly being challenged and reformed (Bonilla-Silva, 1997). The same can be said of Muslim identity. As is the case with ethnicity, ethno-religious identity may also not hold a very important place in the way a person defines him/herself, which was discussed in chapter four. Gans’ (1994; 1997:77) view is that by the third generation, ethnicity becomes symbolic in that “people are less and less interested in their ethnic cultures and organizations” and their ethnic identities do not shape their behaviour or their social relationships (Reitz & Breton, 1994), however, ethnicity is less "optional" for those groups defined by easily visible physical markers typically understood in racial as opposed to ethnic terms (Waters, 1990: 96). This was readily seen happening to the Muslim refugee youth in chapter three.

Social identities such as ethnic and religious identities are most often formed out of the dialectic between how groups define and see themselves and how they are evaluated by others, as a result, identities are sometimes imposed on racialized and diasporic people. Nagel (1995: 949) describes European and African Americans as “representing two ends of an ethnic ascription continuum” based on visibility, in which Whites are always free to remember their ancestry and Blacks are never free to forget theirs. Not only is ethnicity and race imposed on them, but African Americans
are the proverbial "faces at the bottom of the well" (Bell, 1992 in Bobo & Hutchings, 1996: 954). In a similar vein, Black Muslims or those who visibly appear Muslim may not have a choice in where their racialized Muslim identity is positioned in the hierarchy of social formation.

Another point to bear in mind is that although “White” often functions as a referent for those who belong to the in-group, not all who look White are considered part of the majority or “in group”, such as light skinned Arabs or Portuguese people, who are “White” in census data but socially not accepted as belonging to the White “in group” (Portes, 1997). As such, Ethnic identity “is not so much a matter of pigmentation as it is of politics” (Miles, 1989; Goldberg, 1993 in Synnot & Howes, 1996: 143). This was also readily seen in both studies, as many White/light-skinned hijab wearing respondents spoke of the racism they faced.

Mixed race individuals who identify as both White and non-White, or “white skinned” Arabs, who are white-without receiving the privilege that comes along with it (Smith, 2006) are an example of those with complex identity who face discrimination. As victims of the “racial logic of Orientalism” they are cast as inferior and threatening and (ibid) face the same barriers as non-Whites due to other markers of difference (e.g. accent, dress-code). Discrimination and socioeconomic outcomes are further complicated and exacerbated by the intersections of race, class, gender, religion, and immigrant-class, with those falling in more than one category, such as racialized Muslim refugee women, being more likely to be targeted. Although stereotypical perceptions, portrayals and the resulting labeling of certain immigrants and refugees are incorrect and unjust, they may nevertheless have very real consequences. One of which is internalized racism.
“Internalized racism”, which Hall (1986:26) described as “the ‘subjection’ of the victims of racism to the mystifications of the very racist ideology which imprison and define them” was shown to be experienced by the refugee youth in chapter three. Fanon (1952) claimed that colonialism is internalized by the colonized, inculcating an inferiority complex”. Confirming this point, Jeff Denis (2015: 232) recently found that despite the reclaiming of ethnic identity, due to the resurgence of ethnic pride and consciousness (Nagel, 1995 in Denis, 2015), “some still carry the scars of internalized racism, engraved through residential schools or other traumatic experiences and are revealed today in stereotypes that some express about their own people, such as self-blaming explanations for poverty, and a tendency to buy into laissez-faire ideology. Such individuals often embrace and are embraced by Whites, who both subtype them and see them as validating their prejudice”.

Du Bois’ concept of double consciousness (1903), which basically states that minority groups learn to read themselves through the impressions of the majority population, and adjust their behaviour, accordingly, has supported a large body of work on African Americans’ experiences in the USA. However, its basic premise can be applied to the stigma management practices of Muslims in the West, where as we see in chapter three, in a climate of rising negative attitudes towards them, “Muslims deploy brands of ‘double consciousness’ to manage the risks of discrimination, confrontation and abuse” (Garner and Selod, 2014: 9).

At a time when the representation of Muslims tends to fall on two ends of a spectrum, with Muslims either being shown as non-religious and therefore fully integrated or very religious and therefore, separated and non-integrated, there was a pressing need to fill the void in representation. Chapter four of this dissertation has
been able to showcase a group of Muslims who present as practicing religious Muslims who also appear to be very social integrated, very “Canadian”, and economically successful, albeit having had to overcome the struggles of being externally and internally marginalized. Which leads me to another important contribution that this study makes. It points us to one advantage that newer immigrants and refugees may have over those born and raised in The West- a clearer sense of belonging to a place they can call, and feel is home.

The study in chapter four revealed a disturbing inclination of those born and raised in The West to feel as though they do not belong to either the Western culture or their ancestral culture, hanging on a thin thread of liminality. In the preceding study, a common theme was for refugee youth to very easily assert that “home” was “back home”. Thus, those who may still have a connection to their “homelands” or refugees who spent their formative years in their homelands, seem to have one thing that many second/third-generation/Western Muslims do not, and that is a sense of belonging to a culture that is accepting of them, to some extent, and a place they can call home, even if that home is not within reach at present. Spiritual marginalization/spiritual homelessness appeared to be unique to those Muslims who do not fit the mould or belong within the folds of traditional Islam and also those hybrid Muslims with complex identities who did not grow up in a country that honoured their cultural and faith identity.

**Structural Constraints**

The concept of structural discrimination relies heavily on the view that the decision to stigmatize does not take place at the interpersonal level. Rather, discriminatory
policies exert their adverse effects through larger, systemic forces (Smyrnova, 2015). A broader framework of power and domination - social, economic, and political is central to reproducing structures of hegemony and control by creating and propagating stigma (Link and Phelan, 1995). Stuart Hall (1997) suggests that Edward Said’s (1978) ideas about “Orientalism” can be related to Foucault’s (1981) “power/knowledge” couplet. He claims that the various representations of the other produces “a form of racialized knowledge of the other (Orientalism) deeply implicated in the operations of power (Imperialism)” (Hall, 1997: 260). This cultural “hegemony”- a concept introduced by Gramsci (1971) but then explained by Hall as a “total social authority” (Hall, 1980: 331) can be seen in the various stereotyped representations of Muslims in the media. Foucault (1977) and Bourdieu (1977) proposed that forms of social control are embedded in established knowledge systems that legitimize structures of social inequality and thus limit the ability of marginalized peoples to resist these hegemonic forces. In that way, stigma occurs at the convergence of culture, power and difference- identifiable social actors utilize stigma to legitimate their dominant societal positions and as a result are successful in maintaining social inequality (Parker and Aggleton, 2003). Chapter two pays homage to this line of thinking, in presenting a discussion on the ways in which Islamophobia is perpetuated via media discourse on Muslims.

The structural influences on individual identity and stigma has been noted by many scholars, highlighting the role of both small-scale structures, such as social roles, relations, and networks, and more large-scale structures such as national policies and power distributions within society (Callero, 1994; Fine and Kleinman, 1983; Holstein and Gubrium, 2001; Stryker, 1987; White, 1992). The difficulties
immigrants/refugees face in daily life and interactions, as discussed in chapter three, are heavily influenced by the stigma associated to them (Eidheim, 1969). Stryker (1987) explains the self as “a structure of identities reflecting roles played in dedifferentiated networks of interaction” (ibid: 91). He suggests that selves are produced in concrete networks of social interaction and that “larger social structures are affecting objective possibilities for entering and remaining in particular kinds of networks and social relationships” (ibid).

Structural influences reduce immigrants/refugees and other racialized individuals to constructed or “imagined communities” (Anderson, 1983) and these stereotypes are perpetuated by social reification. Thus, we can argue that various micro and macro structures can potentially limit and harm how Muslims in the West display their ethno-religious identities, cope with stigma, and how they interact with those around them. The limited social networks and often-constraining identity markers of newer immigrants and refugees, like those mentioned in chapter three, directly affect their ability to combat stigma and reproduce desirable and acceptable hybrid identities in everyday life and in their interactions with the host community as well as their fellow compatriots (Goffman, 1974), as was done by Tarjuma members.

_Liminal Spaces as Junctures of Agency_

The Mead inspired Chicago tradition tends to emphasize agency over constraint and conceives of people as active creators of their social reality (Vryan, Adler & Adler, 2003), and although recent postmodernists emphasize the malleable and continually reconstructed quality of identity within a constantly evolving present moment (Gergen, 1991 in ibid), such conceptions of identity seem to counter the Foucaultian
self that is perpetually constrained. In fact, the Median approach echoes Berger and Luckman’s (1966) “man in society” concept, which views him as an active agent, with freedom of choice, choosing to conform, resist, rebel, or create”, unlike the postmodernist approach, which seems to echo the more structuralist “society in man” concept, seeing man as a passive recipient of social and cultural influences.

Discourses in postcolonial theory that take on the diasporic experience also suggest progressive ways of understanding and envisioning identity, moving away from previous essentialist conceptions towards more fluid and dynamic views of identity. When people move, they renegotiate their identities and re-imagine themselves into their new landscapes. The point at which two varying constructions of identity meet is where the conflict of identity usually occurs. For many, straddling the different cultures and identities pushes them into a “third space” (Bhabha, 1994) of existence. This “in-between” (ibid) place of contention and uncertainty can become a fault line of sorts. Living on a fault line of identity can produce ambivalence and contradictions in one’s being, especially when they do not have control over the representation or articulation of their identity (Hall, 1995), compelling one to act towards negotiating the differences (Zapata, 2010).

The contentious bicultural and ambivalent identities of hybrid Muslims may result in a sense of “malaise” that leads them to social “maladjustment” and possible deviance (Greenfield, 2013). However, hybrid identities also have the potential to open up in-between or liminal spaces of creativity and originality. The re-articulation and representation of hybrid and hyphenated Muslim identities in these spaces can be an example of how dynamic and useful these liminal spaces can be. Chapter four reaffirms, as a site of negotiation between different individual, communal and national
identifications, hybrid identities can challenge mainstream and fixed notions of identity (Zapata, 2010). Homi K. Bhabha asserts that, “[...] ‘in-between’ spaces provide the terrain for elaborating strategies of selfhood – singular or communal – that initiate new signs of identity, and innovative sites of collaboration, and contestation, in the act of defining the identity of society itself” (Bhaba, 2004: 1-2).

The essentialized representation of ‘others’ as seen in chapter two is challenged in chapter four, as I examine the ways in which the ethno-religious identity of Muslims is expressed by Canadian Muslims themselves. The work being done by Tarjuma organizers can be described as a form of “reactive identity formation”, as described by Nagra (2011). Canadian Muslims are certainly racialized and othered through increasingly stereotypical conceptions about their faith identities. As explained in chapter one, Muslim men are often perceived as barbaric and dangerous, in need of surveillance, and as discussed in chapter one, Muslim women are often imagined as passive and oppressed by their communities. However, as chapter four shows, the same place of contention and difficulty has produced hybrid Muslim Canadians who are exemplary citizens and socially optimal. These individuals defy essentialist representations of Muslims in the West as being a homogenous group that exist in opposition to Western values.

A 2011 study (Nagra) suggests that “as a result of these dominant conceptions, in their struggle against racism, young Canadian Muslims have to invest a great deal of time establishing themselves as thinking, rational, educated and peaceful persons”, as was echoed by so many respondents in Edmonton. Nagra (2011) extends the work done on ‘reactive ethnicity’ (see Portes and Rumbaut, 2001) and theorizes Muslim identity formation in a post 9/11 context as ‘reactive identity formation’. Nagra (2011)
says, “in order to cope with their marginalization/stigmatization of their religion and in a bid to reclaim Islam, many young Muslims assert and reclaim their Muslim identities”. As was shown in chapter four, some Muslims exercise agency in responding to the stigma by reclaiming their Muslim identities but social class appears to matter. There seems to be a privilege in understanding and responding to anti-Muslim racism and Islamophobia.

*Class Matters*

My dissertation points to the notion that whether it’s about understanding racism and Islamophobia or responding to it, certain Muslims appear to be better positioned. Some are privileged to better recognize Islamophobia and anti-Muslim racism because of their social locations, being second or third generation Muslims and having a language and cultural advantage over newer immigrants and refugees coming from non-English or foreign backgrounds. These Muslims who are non-voluntary minorities appear to have a better grasp of concepts of equality, the Canadian charter of rights and freedoms, what constitutes racism, Islamophobia etc.

Some Muslims are also better positioned to respond to the stigma, coming from higher socioeconomic class backgrounds or being, as Simmons (2010) calls “designer immigrants”, or descendants of, and having the time and resources to start-up and organize places like Tarjuma. There also is a privilege in expecting better from others, or as comedian Hasan Minhaj notes in one of his skits, “us children of immigrants have an audacity to expect to be treated as equals and not just accept racism”.

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Due to major changes in Canadian immigration policies in 1962 and 1989, today’s immigrants are racialized, but they also come from better socioeconomic backgrounds (Massey, 1999; Veugelers, 2000; Simmons, 2010). These “designer immigrants” (Simmons, 2010: 84) bring more social capital with them. Indeed, the life chances for various racial and ethnic groups are unequal – “the bottom’ has by no means been the same for all groups” (Bonilla-Silva, 1997:473). Race- as it manifests as lingering racism (Portes & Zhou, 1993 in Portes, Lynch, Haller, 2011) interacts with class- as it manifests as human capital, which leads to various paths of adaptation (ibid) and trajectories of racialized immigrants. Transnational self-employment is a response to labour market discrimination and disadvantages (Glick, Basch & Blanc, 1995; Zhou, 2004), however, transnational migrants tend to begin with higher social and class capital (Portes, 2003). Social background factors have also been found to be important determinants for the educational outcomes of children of immigrants (Glick & Hohmann-Marriott 2007; Lutz 2007; Vartanian et al. 2007 in Boyd, 2009). Children of low-wage labor migration are said to be likelier to experience downward mobility into the urban minority underclass than children of human-capital migration from the same ethnic group (Alba & Nee, 2003: 50).

However, as Portes et al. (2011: 5) explain “many second-generation youth succeed educationally and economically riding on high parental human capital, others succeed, despite low parental education and incomes, still others confront barriers to successful adaptation with the disadvantages linked to low parental human capital, a negative mode of incorporation because of race or undocumented status, and weak co-ethnic communities”. Thus, the ways in which social capital may or may not benefit various groups is not homogenous either (Kazemipur, 2014).
Similarly, a Muslim person’s experience of ethno-religious racism, as well as their response to it, may be heavily affected by the social class they belong to, both within and outside the community. Chapter four, which focused on Tarjuma as a marginality facilitator for some Muslims, highlights the positive impact a faith-based community organization can have on those living on the margins. The chapter underscores the founders’ response to stigmatization as a form of agency, but it also brings attention to the fact that a level of social capital was needed for the organizers to exercise agency. Although this study provides a positive outlook for those riding on the waves of higher social capital, we must remember that just like Muslims are not a monolith, neither are those Muslims who come from higher socio-economic backgrounds. There will always be various contributing factors that must be considered before making such an assumption.

In summary, this three-part sandwich dissertation has consisted of one chapter that uses critical discourse analysis to highlight the ways in which media and political discourse has socially constructed Muslims as a problem, which perpetuates Islamophobia, and then two chapters that present an analysis of how Islamophobia intersects with race and class to create unique challenges and outcomes for two socioeconomically very different groups of Muslims in Canada. Muslims are diverse and their experiences of social and external marginalization are diverse. Muslims have complex cultural and religious identities - some experience social marginalization, some spiritual marginalization, while some experience both of these types of external and internal marginalizations. Although these liminal spaces of existence are contested spaces, they can also be junctures of agency. Some Muslims exercise agency in responding to the stigma of being Muslim, however, socio-economic class
matters. There is a privilege in understanding and responding to anti-Muslim racism and Islamophobia and this in itself speaks to the diversity of Muslims in not only their more tangible traits but also the more intangible parts of their identity.

**Directions for Future Research**

In considering the negative effects of marginalization, recent studies have made connections between violent extremism and a quest for “personal significance,” which is described as “a sense that their lives have purpose and meaning” (Kruglanski et al., 2009; 2014). Those who feel a loss of self-worth or “significance loss,” caused by personal trauma, shame, humiliation, and/or perceived maltreatment by society, seek any means to restore “a sense of worth in themselves and appear worthy in the eyes of others” (Kruglanski et al., 2013). In an age when Muslims are often stigmatized even by political figures and media agencies, and with Islamophobia on the rise, Muslims can experience a great deal of “significance loss.” Those marginalized Muslims who feel culturally homeless (Stroink, 2007) or what I have coined as “spiritually homeless”, lack a sense of belonging, and therefore, may be attracted to ideologies that affirm their self-worth and offer them a clear sense of identity (Hogg, 2007; 2010; 2012; 2013; 2014). Lyons-Padilla and colleagues (2015: 2) suggest that dispossessed marginalized Muslims are “at much higher risk for feeling a loss of significance and hence are more susceptible to radicalization”.

My doctoral research initially stemmed from a curiosity that I had about pathways to radicalization. Incidences of homegrown terrorism were dominating the news in 2013 when I began my PhD. Being born and raised in the UK, I was especially drawn to the news stories about teenage British schoolgirls becoming ISIS
brides. Some studies have shown that racism/alienation, lack of social capital, acceptance and belonging in the West can lead people down the path to radicalization. The rise of “home-grown” terrorism is said to coincide with a steady increase in anti-Muslim sentiment in both the United States and Europe (Bail, 2015; Bansak, Hainmuller & Hangartner, 2016a; 2016b).

There is thus growing concern that anti-Muslim animus may feed the narrative of extremist organizations, such as ISIS, who argue that the West is at war with Islam. The findings of Bail et. al’s (2018) study suggests pro-ISIS sympathy is most prevalent in communities with high levels of anti-Muslim sentiment and that “violent extremism results from the failure of ethnic integration, as people of immigrant background experience a disconnect between their family heritage and their receiving society's culture and thus become vulnerable to extremist narratives” (Bail, Merhout & Ding, 2018).

The researchers also found that anti-Muslim prejudice is particularly high in ethnically homogeneous communities where most people are White and where darker-skinned Muslims stick out, sharpening perceptions of "us" and "them (ibid; Pettigrew, 1998; Allport, 1955). Having myself been raised in quite an ethnically homogenous, predominantly White, neighborhood and having experienced quite a bit of racism growing up in the UK, I could certainly relate to the feelings of alienation and social marginalization that could have made these home-grown radicals feel like they did not belong in England. But I also know that I and many of my friends, who had experienced sometimes incidences of traumatic racism and discrimination grew into very happy, well-adjusted and integrated British Muslims. I grew more and more
curious and wanted to know what makes certain Muslims on the margins go down the path of religious/political extremism and radicalization.

As I delved deep into my preliminary research, I noticed that many, if not all, of the ISIS foreign fighters that came from the West were second generation, young people (Bakker, 2006; Berrebi, 2003; Kruger & Maleckova, 2003; Sageman, 2004 & 2008; Kurzman, 2011; Hegghammer, 2013), which seemed to debunk scholarship (Böhmelt and Bove, 2017) that suggested Islamic extremism in the West is imported from elsewhere, from Muslim countries, and is inherent in the culture and religion of Islam. Others (Dreher et al. 2017; Forrester, Powell, Nowrasteh, and Landgrave, 2019), however, have found no evidence to suggest that immigration from Muslim countries of origin leads to higher terrorism risk in destination countries. Considering the profiles of some of the known ISIS foreign recruits, home-grown radicalism appears to be born and bred in the West but there seems to be some inconsistency in the explanations of what makes a person born and raised in the West turn to radicalization.

Poor social integration and political involvement is suggested to be a risk factor of radicalization (Buijs, Demant & Hamdy, 2006). Awan (2008) links poor political and socio-economic integration as a problem underlying people’s entrance to radicalization. In fact, economic deprivation and poverty are frequently mentioned in discussions about the origins of terrorism (see, for example, Gurr, 1970; Portes, 1971; Muller, 1985; Lichbach, 1989; Brock Blomberg, Hess, and Weerapana, 2004a; 2004b; Bravo & Dias, 2006; Franz, 2007). Many scholars have provided support for the hypothesis that relative deprivation can trigger violent, collective action, even for people who are not personally deprived but act on behalf of the group (e.g.,
Runciman, 1966; Koomen & Fränkel, 1992; Tiraboschi & Maass, 1998). Socio-economic disadvantage has been identified as placing an individual at risk of radicalization (Murshed & Pavan, 2009; Veldhuis & Staun, 2009). For example, Murshed and Pavan present detailed statistics depicting the serious unemployment predicament of Muslims compared to other groups in many European nations (Murshed & Pavan, 2009). Muslims may also be less educated and live in poorer housing in Europe (European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC), 2006) preventing them from integrating with mainstream society (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009). However, many terrorists in the West come from affluent, well-educated backgrounds (Bakker, 2006; Berrebi, 2003; Krueger & Maleckova, 2003; Sageman, 2004).

In fact, many of the foreign recruits I read about were educated, with professional careers, seemingly coming from higher SES (Krueger, 2008). Research into the demographic characteristics of jihadi terrorists in Europe and around the world has shown that homegrown radicals were generally middle-class, educated young men who often had wives and children (Sageman, 2004; Bakker, 2006). Hence, the greatest risk factor, especially in the West, is perhaps not actual disadvantage but perceived disadvantage of fellow Muslims, locally or internationally.

The demographic profiles of radical Muslims in the Western world show that they are generally not poor, religiously fanatic, or desperate due to suffering from extreme poverty, political oppression, or other deprived circumstances (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009; Rahimullah, Larmar & Abdalla, 2013). Rather, radicalisation among Muslims in the West has a home-grown dimension in the sense that many radical Muslims have been born and raised in the relative prosperity and freedom of a
modern, democratic country. They are often, in fact, quite well integrated and indistinguishable from the general population (ibid). They speak European languages, have been educated in Europe and have often had a relatively normal upbringing without – as far as researchers could tell - outstanding childhood traumas or conspicuous religious practices (e.g., Roy, 2008). This fact also seems to debunk the notion that if the lack of education is a risk factor for radicalization then education and better SES is the very simple antidote to radicalization (Kotite, 2002; Council of the European Union, 2015). Interestingly, according to a recent study (Gambetta & Hertog, 2016) on the educational backgrounds of both violent and nonviolent Islamist activists in Muslim majority countries, engineers were more prone than others to become radicalized. A recent study (Lyons-Padilla et al., 2016) has shown that Muslim immigrants who feel marginalized and discriminated against in countries that expect them to integrate into their culture and society are more likely to experience psychological threats to their own significance that could be related to increased support of radicalism. As the above discussion highlights, there are sometimes conflicting and contradictory explanations for radicalization.

Social marginalization can perhaps cause ambivalence and malaise which can lead to aggression and other forms of violent acting out, however, I was learning that social marginalization alone is not a determining factor to lead someone down the path of radicalization because not all Muslims who are marginalized become radicalized, as is shown in my research. Refugee youth from our study in chapter three appeared to be particularly vulnerable to marginalization with their multiple stigmas and the frequency of their experiences of overt racism, anti-Muslim hate and
anti-refugee hate, but we do not really hear of refugees and new immigrants becoming radicalized in the West.

My attention was now turned to scholarship that pointed to homegrown radicalism as being born from an identity crisis (Choudhury, 2007; Roy, 2004). An in-class qualitative study I conducted on ethnic identity and life events a few years ago found that ethnic identity is reclaimed after major life events. For all the respondents, marriage, the birth of a child, illness, or death of a loved one were some of the major life events that changed the way they felt about their ethnicity and ancestral culture, religion and language. Many called these crises, “catalysts”, that awoke their need for belonging to their familial culture, a symbolic place that felt like home. Typically, religiousness has been assessed as a helpful stress buffer (Hood et al., 1996; Koenig, 1998). Religious beliefs, a core component of religiousness, play a central role in the stress process as a buffering resource in preventing the effects of stress on mental health (Schieman and Bierman, 2011). It has been reported that one of the most common ways that people cope with trauma is through the comfort found in religious or spiritual practices (Pargament, 1997) and systematic research in many countries around the world finds that religious coping is widespread (Koenig, 2009). For example, research published in The New England Journal of Medicine found that 90% of Americans coped with the stress of September 11th (2001) by “turning to religion” (Schuster et al., 2001:1507).

Earlier research (Albrecht & Cornwall, 1998) had shown that the experience of positive events contributes to increased faith while the experience of negative events seems to be faith challenging. My in-class research, however, showed that both positive and negative life events seemed to have a significant impact on religious
identification, where respondents reported an increase in affiliation to their ancestral ethnicity and religion, rather than an increase in religious practice.

In their recent study, Ellison, DeAngelis and Güven (2017) point to the beneficial role of congregational support, particularly at high levels, in buffering the effects of major lifetime discrimination experiences on the mental health of African Americans. So, if social marginalization can indeed push people towards their religious identity as a means to cope with stressors like discrimination and alienation one can assume that if they have a healthy faith community to lean on all will be well. Anson et. al. (1990) reported that belonging to a religious community counterbalances the negative health consequences of recent life events. Moreover, individual religiosity (private praying, theodicity, and religious commitment) do not have the same stress-deterrent effect as belonging to a religious community (ibid). But what about those on the margins of their faith identity who do not belong to any faith community? I began to wonder about those individuals who did not have a community to turn to. It was around this time that I learned of a place called Tarjuma that described itself as a faith based intentional community for Muslims in Edmonton, particularly for those who do not feel welcome at mosques. As I was able to learn from my time spent with Tarjuma attendees and organizers, for those marginalized individuals who do not have a healthy, culturally competent, faith community to turn to, they are left on the fault line of identity, alone and spiritually homeless. This place of uncertainty and rife can become a breeding ground for a host of problems, including identity crises.

The events of September 11 can be described as a major life event for people who were directly affected by the tragedy, including Muslims, whose identities came
into the spotlight, due to the hijackers being Muslim. Many of my Tarjuma respondents spoke about 9/11 as a major life event for them. There are certainly multiple factors at play when it comes to seemingly ordinary people becoming willing to leave the comforts of their homes to partake in violence in far off lands. I argue that a major life event like 9/11 pushed many Muslims towards their faith identity to make sense of their experiences and to find belonging to a community. However, as was described by many of the Tarjuma respondents, a lot of second/third generation Muslims feel alienated in traditional mosque spaces, making them spiritually marginalized.

In their promotional recruitment videos and materials, ISIS recruiters, with their British/Australian/American (etc.) accents and “lingo”, make their faith-based community attractive/appealing and culturally relatable to those Muslims born and raised in the West, who were marginalized in society but also spiritually marginalized. These spiritually homeless individuals were promised a home, belonging, community-life amongst like-minded friends. Although my study is not a direct analysis of radicalization it certainly was born of my interest in learning more about socially and spiritually marginalized Muslims living contested lives in the West. If radicalism is in part caused by a lack of belonging to a religious community, my study points to the idea that maybe if those Muslims on the margins had instead been welcomed by a Tarjuma-type culturally concordant faith community, they may not have needed to find spiritual belonging elsewhere.

Those individuals who become criminally deviant as a response to social marginalization may be vulnerable to enacting such behaviour due to a host of factors, including major life events, mental health issues, lack of support systems - a
concoction of factors may have to take place to lead them down a path of formal
deviance. My study points to at least one of the factors that might contribute to the
problem of homegrown terrorism - a lack of spiritual belonging that when paired with
social marginalization, a major life event, and other possible contributing factors,
could create the catalytic causal mixture to lead someone down the path of
radicalization.

Considering the relationship between Muslim integration and religious radicalization,
there needs to be a focus on what kinds of institutions facilitate the positive
integration of Muslims in Canada in ways that foster spiritual and social well-being
and subvert radicalization. Future research could help answer questions that my
dissertation points to, do other organizations like Tarjuma exist in other parts of
Canada? Do they help overcome stigma and exclusion? Do they foster positive
cultural energy and productive relations with Canadian society outside the diaspora
communities? Does Ta’aleef in San Francisco, which inspired the creation of
Tarjuma, function and serve in the same way as Tarjuma? How do local political
contexts shape the experiences of Muslims in the US or Britain vs. Muslims in
Canada? More research needs to be done to answer these questions.

The findings of the dissertation can also be situated in the broader literature of
Chicago school symbolic interactionist (Mead 1934; Blumer 1969, 2004; Strauss
1993) approaches to self, identity, and agency. The interrelatedness among individual
experiences of being Muslim in the West and these concepts has long been left
implicit or taken for granted in interactionist research, but it is deserving of further
examination and specification. Particularly, my dissertation points to the liminal
spaces occupied by some Muslims in the West as junctures of agency and optimality.
Living on the fault line of identity – of being Muslim and Canadian at the same time in an age of rising Islamophobia, indeed, creates a sense of uncertainty and discontent in some, but for others, being pushed into this difficult third space seems to galvanize them to renegotiate, reassert and reclaim their identity as unapologetically Canadian Muslims. It would be interesting to see if the experiences of US or British Muslims are similar to those of Canadian Muslims.

Although this dissertation highlights the ways in which macro and micro level racisms persist through institutional discrimination and ethno-religious micro-aggressions and hate incidences, by focusing on the valuable role of faith-based community organizations like Tarjuma in Edmonton, it also shines a glimmer of hope on the positive integration and optimistic future of marginalized communities in Canada. At a time when the power to represent the Muslim identity lays mainly in the hands of the hegemonic culture, organizations like Tarjuma can become revolutionary forms of representation that contest previous stereotypical and essentialist notions of Muslim culture. The idea behind an organization like Tarjuma being an intentional community was described by the founders as a movement and not a singular organization. Like Tarjuma, can other organizations become a liminal space for the diasporic Western Muslims to contest misrepresentations of their identity?

Final Thoughts

My doctoral dissertation research began a few months after the Quebec Mosque shooting on January 29, 2017 and has sadly been bookended by the recent Christchurch, New Zealand Mosque shooting on March 15, 2019, making this research even more crucial to better understanding the lived experiences of those
Muslims living on the fault line - amid the current climate of rising Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate. The incessant problematizing of Western Muslims paired with the dearth of existing empirical research on their multifaceted identity related perceptions and experiences of racism and Islamophobia makes this an area that requires more attention and importance. Muslim acculturation trajectories and outcomes must be reimagined as a complex multidimensional process informed not only by the characteristics of the individual and their community, but also by those of the larger society (Schwartz, Unger, Zamboanga, and Szapocznik, 2010). Indeed, the attitudes and the behaviors of the dominant group and the institutions therein are crucial in facilitating the positive integration of Muslims (Khawaja, 2016) and subverting harmful stereotypes that perpetuate Islamophobia.
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