PARTIES AT THE WATER’S EDGE
PARTIES AT THE WATER’S EDGE: CANADA’S POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE FOREIGN POLICY DOMAIN

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Lay Abstract

Foreign policy is the nexus between domestic and international political systems. Studies in Canada have so far produced mixed findings related to the role of political parties in foreign policy. Drawing from campaign promise, issue ownership and foreign policy decision-making literature, this dissertation investigates whether there is a foreign policy domain consistently dominated by a particular political party in the Canadian context. Part I uses data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) combined with manually coded foreign policy promises to determine the extent Canadian parties focus on foreign policy in their election manifestos. Part II follows the well-established pledge approach to measure the promise fulfilment rates of foreign policy promises for Canadian governing parties following elections. Findings from this research will fill an existing gap in the literature related to policy-specific promise fulfillment in Canada and will bridge existing theoretical assumptions related to political party behaviour and foreign policy decision-making.
Abstract

Foreign policy is the nexus between domestic and international political systems. Studies in Canada have so far produced mixed findings related to the role of political parties in foreign policy. Drawing from campaign promise, issue ownership and foreign policy decision-making literature, this dissertation investigates whether there is a foreign policy domain consistently dominated by a particular political party in the Canadian context. Part I uses data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) combined with manually coded foreign policy promises to determine the content and scope of foreign policy-related election promises in Canada. Part II follows the well-established pledge approach to measure promise fulfilment of foreign policy promises of Canadian governing parties following elections. This dissertation not only seeks to determine whether parties matter in the context of foreign policy, but also whether one party consistently “owns” the foreign policy domain or specific foreign policy issues. Findings from this research will fill an existing gap in the literature related to policy-specific promise fulfillment in Canada and will bridge existing theoretical assumptions related to political party behaviour and foreign policy decision-making.
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List of Abbreviations

BMD: ballistic missile defense
CES: Canadian Election Study
CIDA: Canadian International Development Agency
CMP: Comparative Manifesto Project
CPPG: Comparative Party Pledge Group
EU: European Union
FPTP: first-past-the-post
FTA: Free Trade Agreement
FTAA: Free Trade Agreement of the Americas
ICC: International Criminal Court
IPCC: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
ISIS: Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
MNCH: Maternal, Newborn and Child Health
MVT: Median Voter Theorem
NAFTA: North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO: non-governmental organization
NDP: New Democratic Party
NORAD: North American Aerospace Defense Command
ODA: Official Development Assistance
PR: proportional representation
R2P: Responsibility to Protect
SOP: standard operating procedure
UN: United Nations
US: United States
USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WTO: World Trade Organization
Parties at the Water’s Edge Part I: Canada’s Political Parties, Election Promises and the Foreign Policy Domain
Introduction

With the exception of one Liberal promise to create a new Cabinet Committee for Canada-US Relations, the 2015 Canadian federal election included very few promises about our friendly neighbour to the south. This might be explained by Canada’s relatively strong relationship with the US during the Obama administration. Fast forward nearly four years and Canada’s relationship with our “closest” ally and trading partner looks drastically different. Trump’s America and the repercussions it has had for Canada are likely to play a more visible role in the upcoming 2019 election period. A common notion in the literature argues that foreign policy is outside the domain of traditional partisan politics. In Canada specifically, it has been recognized that elections are rarely fought over the direction of foreign policy issues (Gravelle et al. 2014, 112). This idea would suggest that the Liberal and Conservative Party platforms for the upcoming election will include relatively similar promises related to Canada-US relations, offering the Canadian electorate little choice. One possible explanation for this is that foreign policy is believed to be significantly different from domestic politics, mainly due to the speed of decision-making, specific actors and timing, the impact of dramatic events and crises, and at times, its requirement of secrecy (Joly and Dandoy 2016, 2).

Yet, at the core of modern theories of political democracy is the assumption that parties compete for votes by campaigning for support. Subsequently, it is assumed that parties and governments in a democratic system are responsive to the preferences of citizens. As is evident in the existing literature, elections are the key institution whereby parties can outline their policy commitments that citizens can base their vote on (Downs 1957, 138). It is generally believed that parties use their campaign promises before, during and after elections to influence voters, assert control of the policy environment and promote their own interests. There is a growing body of literature focused on election manifestos and campaign promises in both specific country case studies and cross-national comparisons (for example, Flynn 2009; Flynn and Marlin 2017; Born, van Eck, and Johannesson 2018; Håkansson and Naurin 2016; Petry and Collette 2009; Duval and Pétry 2019; Thomson 2001; Thomson et al. 2017).

These studies subscribe to the mandate theory of elections and ultimately find that parties matter. Accordingly, the theory of issue ownership argues that candidates and parties will emphasize issues in their campaign manifests that they believe to have an advantage over (Bélanger and Meguid 2008, 478). Election manifestos therefore supply the criteria for voters to base their decisions and each party will have a distinct reputation for handling specific policy issues. While there has been significant scholarly focus on the content and scope of election manifestos,
studies have often failed to go beyond general application into more policy-specific and promise-specific dynamics of party manifestos and electoral behaviour.

The purpose of Part I of this dissertation is to address the current shortcomings of the literature surrounding party competition and issue ownership. In response to this gap, this part of the dissertation uses foreign policy as a case study to analyze party behaviour within a specific policy domain. Not only does it attempt to address overarching research questions such as: How do parties structure their political competition? But it dives deeper by investigating how parties structure their foreign policy-related electoral commitments. Does the foreign policy domain contribute to our understanding of political parties and electoral competition?

In order to address these questions, Part I uses the theory of issue ownership to determine whether Canadian political parties structure their foreign policy priorities differently from one another. In order to sufficiently investigate the foreign policy domain in Canada, this dissertation focuses on the party manifestos of the Liberal and Conservative parties (and the former Reform and Canadian Alliance) at the federal level in Canada from 1993 to 2015. The selected timeframe (1993-2015) is sufficient in order to distinguish both short- and long-term trends in the ownership of foreign policy issues during elections. This dissertation uses the well-established approach associated with promise fulfilment to manually code individual pledges (or actionable promises). It also uses the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP)’s categorization of electoral statements to further understand the differences among parties in their election promises, which will permit a more promise-specific analysis within the foreign policy domain.

Findings highlight how much parties focus on foreign policy during elections and whether parties structure their foreign policy commitments differently from one another.

Through a content analysis of party manifestos, Part I argues that foreign policy is a worthy case study to investigate party behaviour and competition. Parties at the federal level in Canada differ significantly in their electoral commitments within the foreign policy domain. While issue ownership of the entire policy domain is inconclusive across the selected time period, it is clear that parties perceive to own specific policy categories within the foreign policy domain. These findings have implications not only in response to the question of do parties matter, but also on the overall direction of campaign promise literature and on the influences of foreign policy decision-making.

Part I of this dissertation is organized as follows. The first section highlights the current debate in the literature of whether parties matter, addressing theories
related to party competition, issue ownership and the factors related to the scope and content of manifestos. The second section provides a clear explanation of the research methodology, providing more information on both the CMP and pledge fulfilment methods. The third section gives a complete description of the research findings, while the fourth section provides an analysis in response to the research questions and major findings. Finally, this Part I of the dissertation concludes with further implications and avenues for future research.

**Literature Review**

Although literature on the structure and behaviour of political parties often includes interaction between their role, 1) in the electorate, 2) as an organization, and 3) in government\(^1\), Part I of this dissertation is primarily concerned with the electoral behaviour of parties or *party competition*. At the core of modern theories of political democracy is the assumption that parties compete for votes by campaigning for support. Stemming from this notion, there are two competing yet related theories of party competition: the spatial model or the convergence theory constructed and promoted by Downs; and the positional perspective which encompasses theories of issue ownership and saliency promoted by Budge, Petrocik and scholars associated with the CMP.

**Parties do not matter.** Convergence theory, or the spatial model, is based on the ideas of Anthony Downs (1957), and argues that parties tend to converge around a median policy point in order to appeal to the largest portion of the population and gain elected office (138). From this perspective, electoral outcomes are assumed to depend on the distribution of voters’ expectations and preferences (Fernandez-Vazquez 2014, 1920). Parties have an incentive to react to shifts in the preferences of the median voter. The Median Voter Theorem (MVT), originally proposed by Duncan Black (1948), states that in a majority rule system, the winning party will be the one which the median voter perceives as providing the best options. The ideal platform for a political party is therefore likely to converge around the median voter. The Downsian model of party competition views parties as purely strategic, vote- and office-seeking entities with no ideological or positional preferences (Pennings 2005, 30).

In line with Downs’ spatial model, more recent literature suggests that parties are constrained by processes of globalization, neo-liberalization and advanced modernization that restrict the ideological spectrum (Flynn 2009; Huber and Stephens 2001; McBride 2003). In this sense, parties have become increasingly more alike in the policies they advance and the positions they take on particular issues. As Krouwel (2006) notes, the rise of the “catch-all party type” has coincided with increased party strategy to downplay their ideological profile in order to appeal to a wider electoral base (250). Ultimately, convergence theory,

\(^1\) This is in line with political scientist V.O Key’s original methodology of political parties.
from both Downs’ perspective and more recent literature on modern party types, argues that the actions of political parties, among other political variables, are relatively insignificant factors in the development of public policy (Flynn 2009, 29).

In response to the ideas of convergence theory, partisanship theory has attempted to determine the level of influence political parties possess over the policy formation process (Ibid, 28). Literature on partisanship theory is divided into two main categories, one of limited influence and the other of strong influence. Lehner and Schubert (1984) argue that political parties are only one of several relevant actors in the policy process, and often have limited influence in comparison to that of the bureaucracy and strong organized interests (131). Similarly, Caul and Grey (2000) argue that the role of parties in the policy-making process and their powers to impact voter behaviour have been significantly diminished.

**Parties matter.** The opposing category within partisanship theory includes work by Castles and McKinlay (1979) and von Beyme (1984), who find a strong role for partisanship in policy-making and argue that ideologically-based parties often have a strong influence over policy outcomes. Further, Flynn (2009) highlights that parties have often pursued novel strategies to contest policy-making and remain the most significant policy-making actors (33). In contrast to Downs’ spatial model, this dissertation adopts the view that parties differ in their approach to both election campaigns and policy-making: in essence, *parties matter*. Further, since parties are critical elements of an electoral democratic system, studying party manifestos is particularly important to studying elections.

The theory most frequently encountered in the literature is the mandate theory of elections, which comes from the positivist school of thought (Petry and Collette 2009, 66). Mandate theory is predicated on the idea that political parties make specific pledges or commitments in their election manifestos and will ultimately attempt to fulfil these commitments once elected (Ibid). Important to the research problem related to electoral campaigns and party competition, mandate theory argues that the policy positions put forward by parties in their election manifestos are of extreme importance to voters in deciding who to vote for (Pennings 2005, 30). Manifestos are considered the only self-ascribed and unified party position during an election campaign. More importantly, they represent the position a party ascribes to itself that has not been mediated or altered by an external actor (Lehmann and Zobel 2018, 4–5). Parties use election manifestos to communicate strategic goals and priorities to the electorate, to highlight the promises that differentiate them from their competitors, and to express the general commitments that they will focus on and execute if elected (Flynn and Marlin 2017).²

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² See also (Budge and Farlie 1983; Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge 1994; Laver and Garry 2000; Petry and Collette 2009).
From here, literature on party competition and campaign promises have attempted to identify variables that influence both the content and the scope of party manifestos during election campaigns. Since the scope, or the number of policy priorities included in an election programme, influences the content, we can group both types of study together to establish a more comprehensive understanding of party manifestos. Consistent with Flynn (2009), the variables often identified as affecting the content of manifestos can be divided into three broad categories: institutional arrangements; the broader policy environment; and the strategic actions of parties (18).

**Institutional arrangements.** The institutional context within any country, including the electoral system; party system; party characteristics; and various political conditions, influences the structure and content of election manifestos. Katz’ (1980) study of the electoral systems in the United Kingdom, Italy and Ireland found that the election commitments of political parties in proportional representation (PR) systems tended to converge along similar ideological positions throughout the country compared to those in majority/plurality systems (70-71). Since this dissertation is focused solely on the Canadian context, with a majority first-past-the-post (FPTP) system, it remains more concerned with institutional factors that vary from election to election such as party size; party status; presence and strength of opposition parties; and incumbency.

The content and scope of a party’s election manifesto are influenced by the size, status and past experience of the party itself. With a focus on environmental issues, Farstad (2017) notes that the size and relative status of a party impacts its strategic incentive to support less popular policy issues such as climate change. She notes that non-incumbent parties and niche parties are more likely to emphasize niche or extreme issues (4). van Heck’s (2018) findings suggest that “challenger” parties often limit the scope of their manifestos to very specific issues (353). Similarly, Spoon et al. (2014) find that “niche” parties are more likely to emphasize green issues and often force mainstream parties to respond if their chances of electoral success are high (372).

A party’s experience in office or as the main opposition party also has an impact on manifestos. Greene (2016) explains that, “attention to issues reflects a balance of historical competencies and recent government experiences” (810). Experience in office contributes to a party’s perceived reputation on various issues which aligns with the theory of issue ownership and is more closely associated with variables of party behaviour. However, a party’s incumbency record is believed to

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3 Note: these categories of variables also align with those associated with promise fulfilment and the policy-making capacity of parties.
4 See also (Spoon, Hobolt, and Vries 2014; Chan and Safran 2006) for further discussion on electoral and party systems.
5 See also (Neundorf and Adams 2018; Meguid 2005; Bischof and Wagner 2017) for further discussion on party type.
influence the scope and content of their manifesto. Greene’s (2016) study finds that government parties will include a larger diversity of issues in their manifestos than their counterparts (813). However, incumbent parties that focus on fewer issues in their manifestos demonstrate a confidence in their own performance on those issues (Ibid, 817). Farstad (2017) explains that previous opposition parties are more likely to emphasize new issues, such as climate change, in order to find ways of attacking the incumbent party (4).

**Party behaviour.** In addition to institutional arrangements, the literature on campaign promises and party competition has focused significantly on the strategic behaviour of political parties and their ideological or foundational background. The positional perspective of party competition includes theories of both issue ownership and issue salience that include numerous variables related to party behaviour for explaining the content of election manifestos. Budge and Farlie (1983) advance the idea that political parties choose to selectively emphasize issues based on their perceived level of competence. Understanding issue ownership and issue salience means understanding what voters and parties view as the most important election issues and subsequently, which party has the greatest ability or competence to address those issues (Werner, Lacewell, and Volkens 2015).

The saliency theory posits that parties will emphasize issues that favour their targeted electoral bases and favour themselves (Facchini, Gaeta, and Michallet 2017, 201). Walgrave et al. (2015) note that the saliency theory does not, “expect parties to emphasize any issue they own” but rather, parties will emphasize, “issues on which they hold positions that a majority of the public favours” (790). The theory of issue ownership, originally advanced by Petrocik (1996), argues that candidates and parties will emphasize issues in their campaign manifestos that they believe to have an advantage over (Bélanger and Meguid 2008, 478). Through the lens of a candidate’s campaign, Petrocik (1996) claims that any campaign can be understood as a “marketing” effort. In this sense, candidates and parties aim to receive an advantage by highlighting “owned issues” within their election programmes (826). Election manifestos supply the criteria for voters to base their decisions and each party will have a distinct reputation for handling specific policy issues (828). The theory of issue ownership finds a campaign effect when a candidate or party successfully frames the vote choice as a decision to be made in terms of problems facing the country that he (or it) is better able to ‘handle’ than his (or its) opponent (826).

Issue ownership literature assumes that voters make their decisions along two dimensions: 1) the competence dimension, referring to the perceived capacity of parties to address specific policy issues; and 2) the associative dimension, referring to the “spontaneous identification between some parties and some

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6 See (Budge and Farlie 1983; Budge 2001; Pennings 2005; Mueller 2003; Alesina 1988).
issues, regardless of competence” (Walgrave, Tresch, and Lefevere 2015, 780). Studies on issue ownership often link the associative dimension of issue ownership with party behaviour, while those focused on the competence dimension focus on individual voters (Ibid, 789). Greene and Haber (2015) note that parties who gain a reputation of competence on a particular issue will possess enduring ownership with very little change over time (16). Similarly, Walgrave et al. (2015) argue that the associative dimension of issue ownership builds up over long periods of time (792). The competence dimension however, is believed to be more variable, allowing parties to seek out new policies over the course of a campaign or time in office to “own” (Ibid, 793). Ownership of a particular issue is therefore likely to influence the content of a party’s electoral programme for consecutive elections.

It must be noted that issue saliency and issue ownership are inter-connected, and both impact the electoral choices of political parties. Belanger (2003) has noted that party ownership of a particular policy issue is important to individual vote choice. However, the effect of this is often dependent on the perceived salience of the policy issue (540). In their study on issue salience and issue ownership, Belanger and Meguid (2008), found that the effect of issue ownership is conditioned by the, “perceived salience of the issue in question” (477). In other words, a party may choose to emphasize issues they feel are salient, or significantly important, to their electoral base.

Budge (2001) has argued that parties often view voters as favouring one course of action over others on most issues and will emphasize this favoured position in their election manifestos. This perception of salience is therefore related to voter preferences. As Fernandez (2014) highlights, shifts in public preferences will alter the campaign positions of parties (1923). The salience of issues and voter preferences are influenced by a growing number of factors beyond the scope of this research project. These include sociodemographic factors such as age, level of education, gender and socioeconomic status; the prevalence of media attention to specific topics; and external events.

In his study testing citizens’ perceptions of political parties, Belanger (2003) demonstrates that the Canadian electorate distinguishes between parties based on their issue-handling capabilities, explained mostly by the parties’ performance in government and their focus on particular issues (540). Not only does Belanger’s study prove that parties matter, but he also establishes that the concept of party image, or issue ownership, exists in Canada, although with fluctuating levels over time. The Conservative Party of Canada, for example, has successfully distinguished themselves as the leading competent party to handle the issue of deficits and debt, which indicates a clear ownership within the area of public finances, at least from the voters’ perspective (545). Consequently, the Liberal Party dominates at least three policy areas over other parties: national unity, constitutional issues, and international affairs (544).
Party ideology has also been used to explain variation across party manifestos with reference to specific issue areas. Farstad (2017) finds that left-right ideology significantly helps explain the variation of parties’ attention to climate change issues in their electoral programmes (1). Studies have also found that a parties’ political ideology influences both their objectives and policies related to citizenship and immigration (Abou-Chadi 2016, 2090). In the Canadian context, Cochrane (2010) found that members of the electorate from the “left” and the “right” organize their political circumstances and opinions in distinctive ways (592). He identifies key historical changes in the ideological spectrum of Canadian political parties. Specifically, he finds that the, “ideological gap between the left and right widens first during the 1980s, and it widens again in 1993 as the populist Reform Party supplants the Progressive Conservatives as the dominant force on the Canadian right” (591). He argues that this gap has persisted between the dominant parties in Canadian politics and suggests that these differences are present in the election manifestos of Canadian parties.

Policy environment. The surrounding economic and external conditions are likely to impact the electoral decisions, including campaign promises, of political parties. Since political parties are believed to structure their campaign promises to voter preferences, public opinion is considered to be one of the most significant environmental factors. According to Borghetto and Russo (2018), parties often react to other policy constraints by increasing their responsiveness to public opinion in order to maintain support (66). Economic conditions during elections are also believed to contribute to what types of issues parties choose to emphasize. During better economic conditions, for example, parties are more likely to emphasize non-economic issues (Spoon, Hobolt, and Vries 2014, 368). Similarly, Greene’s (2016) study explains the theory of issue scope in relation to economic conditions, indicating that parties will narrow their manifestos to issues they feel most strongly about when the economy is strong (812).

There is a growing body of literature that focuses on the impact of globalization on political party behaviour. Sen and Barry (2018) for example, find that parties have tended to shift their economic platforms towards the left in response to globalization and liberalization (1). However, there remains considerable variation across countries. According to the compensation hypothesis, governments might also respond to globalization with increased interventionist policies in order to enhance competitiveness and redistribute wealth (Ibid, 2). Work on the politicization of international politics indicates that parties are often forced to respond to the policies and procedures of international institutions in both their election promises and subsequent policies (Wagner et al. 2018).

Finally, it must be acknowledged that external shocks during elections and in between elections may have an impact on the campaign agenda. Literature on international conflict, for example, assumes that the ideological differences between parties are often suppressed in the face of external threat (Ibid, 4).
External shocks such as natural disasters or acts of terrorism are likely to shift public opinion, which is considered to be a significant factor of both the content of election manifestos and government policy-making. Borghetto and Russo (2018) for example, argue that during an international or economic crisis the strategic decisions of parties are forced to change because the, “menu of priorities offered by public opinion narrows dramatically” (66).

While there is substantial literature on the campaign promises and explanatory factors of party competition, many of these studies are broad-sweeping and lack focus on specific policy areas. More specifically, very few engage with the foreign policy domain. It is unclear whether the institutional, policy environment and party behaviour variables, along with the strategic action of parties more generally, will vary across different policy domains. Yet, scholars have gone so far as to conclude that party politics has played a relatively insignificant role in foreign policy (Quandt 1986; Collier 1991; Sjursen 2011). The purpose of Part I of this dissertation is to use foreign policy as a case study to examine party behaviour and competition in Canada.

**The Foreign Policy Domain.** Foreign policy is a broad-sweeping policy category, including issues related to military and defence; diplomacy; development; trade; peace operations and more. Although a heavily debated definition, foreign policy is assumed to be concerned with the practices by and between states in the global political arena (Beier and Wylie 2010, xii). Nossal et al. (2015) note that properly speaking, foreign policy is only concerned with the behaviour of actors who have the capacity to exercise supreme political authority within a given territory, which often excludes actors at more local levels (2). For the purpose of this research project, foreign policy is understood as Nossal et al. (2015) describe it, involving the external objectives of the Canadian government. This includes Canada’s “orientation in the international system; its relations with other governments; its positions and attitudes on world politics; and its actions, programs, and decisions” (6).

The sources and influences of foreign policy therefore might include: the environment the state operates within; its physical, geographic and political location; its economic structure and capacity for independence; group membership in the global arena; domestic political circumstances; institutional and bureaucratic politics; its capacity to make decisions for itself; and societal demands for particular foreign policy decisions (6-13). These influences are largely consistent with the three main categories identified above: institutional arrangements, party behaviour and policy environment. However, it seems that influences related to party behaviour within the foreign policy domain are not as widely-accepted within the literature.

Ostrom and Job (1986) identify four domestic dimensions that influence foreign policy decision-making, including: the public’s attitude toward the risks of international involvement during periods of high tension; the public’s attitude
toward risks of international involvement; the public’s aversion to war; and the condition of the domestic economy (544). Literature on the public’s influence over foreign policy has often been dominated by the Almond-Lippmann consensus, which assumes that ordinary citizens are, “incapable of formulating meaningful beliefs about foreign policy and, as a consequence, policymakers would be unwise to heed public opinion on such matters” (Gravelle et al. 2014, 133). Since scholars believed citizens were incapable of possessing coherent beliefs or attitudes about foreign policy, it was considered illogical to study the impact of foreign policy on voter behaviour (Aldrich et al. 2006, 478).

However, Nossal et al. (2015) identify domestic influences including domestic politics in general, societal demands, government and executive politics, and political parties. They acknowledge an increasing role of political parties in the formation of foreign policy, especially since the end of the Cold War (313). Kaarbo’s (1996) study on foreign policy decision-making found that party politics mattered with respect to foreign policy in both Germany and Israel. Similarly, Joly and Dandoy’s recent work found that party preferences towards foreign policy mattered among coalition governments in Belgium (Joly and Dandoy 2016). These ideas support the traditional theories within campaign promise literature, that parties matter, even within the foreign policy domain. Since in-depth discussions of the electoral behaviour of political parties with respect to foreign policy is limited within the literature, Part I aims to investigate the foreign policy priorities presented during elections in order to build on the existing literature studying election manifests and the role of political parties.

**Research Design**

The following section presents the methodological framework of this research project, including a discussion on case selection and the method of data collection to measure the scope and content of foreign policy promises in Canadian election manifests.

**Case Selection**

**Political Party Selection.** This dissertation focuses on the party manifests of the Liberal and Conservative Party at the federal level from 1993 to 2015. Often referred to as a “two party-plus” system, Canadian federal politics have historically been dominated by only two parties, the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party (including its previous forms such as the Progressive Conservative Party, the Reform Party and the Canadian Alliance). Although other parties must be acknowledged at the federal level, this research project is focused solely on those parties that have won government with arguably, the largest influence over foreign affairs.
The Liberal and Conservative Party (including the Reform Party and the Canadian Alliance) have been chosen because of their cumulative size and status over the selected time period. This project is primarily concerned with political parties that have historically secured government status, which includes the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party from 1993-2015. In order to provide a broader comparison, previous versions of the Conservative Party from 1993 to 2004 (the Reform and the Canadian Alliance) are also included in this analysis. These parties also remain relevant in terms of size and status. Although they have never secured government, the Reform Party was the third party following the 1993 election (the Bloc Quebecois won official opposition status but does not provide a thorough comparison to the Liberals over time), and the official opposition following the 1997 election. Similarly, the Canadian Alliance was the official opposition party following the 2000 election.

It is important to note the complicated history of the Conservative Party, especially during the period between 1993-2015. Throughout most of Canadian history, the Progressive Conservative Party represented the “centre-right” position in federal politics, including majority government wins in 1958 under Diefenbaker; and in 1984 and 1988 under Mulroney. In 1993, the Progressive Conservative Party witnessed their worst showing ever, winning only 2 of 295 seats. The right-wing populist party, the Reform Party, was established in 1987 and became the third party in the 1993 election. In 1997, the Reform Party under Preston Manning became the official opposition and held on to this status in the 2000 election as the Canadian Alliance. On October 16th, 2003, the Reform Conservative Alliance and the Progressive Conservative Party united under a new political banner: The Conservative Party of Canada. According to the Conservative Party’s website, “the unification of Canada’s conservative parties restored and rejuvenated the national political movement that has been building a stronger, safer, and better Canada for almost 150 years”.

It is possible to categorize the major parties in Canada along two separate spectrums: the ideological spectrum and the foundational spectrum. In accordance with data from the CMP, the ideological spectrum of party politics in Canada is as follows: the New Democratic Party (NDP) is to the left, the Canadian Alliance Party is to the right and the Liberal and Conservative parties are to the centre-left and centre-right, respectively (Cochrane 2010, 591). In considering the Liberal and Conservative ideological positions, there is a clear widening of the ideological gap between them during the 1980’s and again in 1993, presenting a clear difference between both for the time period selected (1993-2015) (Ibid).

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7 See Bickerton and Gagnon (2014) for a fuller description of Canadian political history.
In contrast, Flynn and Marlin (2017) consider different types of parties from a foundational purpose perspective. They adopt a dichotomous variable of brokerage versus wedge-based parties\(^9\). In this sense, the Liberal Party is considered to be a brokerage-based party, appealing to the widest range of voters through a more flexible approach to policy development. Arguably, the current Conservative Party is viewed as more of a wedge-based party that executes a more strategic approach focused primarily on its core voters. This approach is believed to create greater emphasis on promise fulfilment and therefore lends itself well to the current research study (Ibid). A thorough analysis of election manifests will help to draw conclusions based on both ideological and foundational differences of Canadian parties in relation to foreign policy.

**Electoral Time Period.** Canada witnessed eight elections at the federal level between 1993 and 2015. Within this time period, both selected parties won both majority and minority governments: the Liberal Party led by Jean Chrétien won three consecutive majority governments in 1993, 1997 and 2000, followed by a Liberal minority government under Paul Martin in 2004; the Conservative Party led by Stephen Harper won two consecutive minority governments in 2006 and 2008, followed by a majority win in 2011; finally, the Liberal Party regained power in 2015 with a majority government under Justin Trudeau\(^10\). For six of the selected elections, the Liberal or Conservative Party secured government status, while the other won official opposition. The Bloc Quebecois secured official opposition status in 1997, while the NDP won official opposition in 2011. Although these are notable, the election manifests and promises of the Bloc and NDP do not provide a thorough comparative study over time and are therefore not included in this analysis. The timeframe between 1993 to 2015 is sufficient in order to distinguish both short- and long-term trends in the content and scope of foreign policy promises.

**Organization of Research**

Empirical studies of campaign promise fulfilment, issue ownership, party and voter behaviour tend to use two main strategies for measuring issue ownership and issue salience: survey data and issue emphases in party manifests. Survey data, such as the Canadian Election Study (CES), measures issue salience based on closed-ended questions such as, “How important are the following issues to you personally in this election?” While issue ownership is based on questions such as, “In your view, which party would be best at…?” for specific issues (Bélanger and Meguid 2008, 481). Survey data at the individual voter level are used to determine party behaviour based on the theory of issue ownership (Walgrave, Tresch, and Lefevere 2015, 785). However, since parties often do

\(^9\) See also (Cairns 1968) historical work on brokerage politics in Canada.
extensive polling, the survey approach is believed to be at least somewhat captured within election manifestos.

In comparison, other studies analyze party manifestos in order to measure issue emphases at the party level and study campaign promise fulfillment (Ibid, 780). Within this group of studies, there are those who focus solely on the scope and content of election manifestos and others who focus solely on the promise fulfilment of the governing parties. While both are useful, Part I of this dissertation is primarily focused on the electoral behaviour of political parties and not promise fulfilment. The CMP uses the core ideas of the selective emphasis model to analyze election manifestos, with the understanding that parties, “focus only on issues that are favourable to them, while ignoring issues that could be electoral liabilities” (Werner, Lacewell, and Volkens 2015). Empirical studies that follow the CMP method use the CMP dataset to identify common themes and issues in election manifestos. The CMP method is closely linked to the saliency approach, which examines the association between parties’ emphases of policy themes in their election manifestos and often compares these to government spending in related policy areas. The coding unit in a manifesto is the “quasi-sentence”, or a specific argument regarding a political idea or issue (Volkens 2002, 3). Each quasi-sentence contains exactly one statement or message (Werner, Lacewell, and Volkens 2015, 6). It is important to note that these “quasi-sentences” are not always actionable promises, but simply represent statements dedicated to particular issues.

**Election Manifestos.** While the CMP method uses a “quasi-sentence” as the coding unit, empirical studies such as those found within the Comparative Party Pledge Group (CPPG) literature use specific actionable promises, known as “pledges,” as the coding unit to measure promises and promise fulfilment. Pledges are defined as the, “commitments in parties’ programs to carry out certain policies or achieve certain outcomes” (Thomson et al. 2017). In other words, they can be clearly measured based on fulfilment. This dissertation combines the methodology of the CMP and the pledge-approach by manually coding party manifestos based on the CMP’s categorization and the CPPG’s definition of “pledge”. Each election manifesto for the two selected parties from 1993-2015 is manually coded. This includes identifying the total number of pledges in each manifesto and isolating those specific to foreign policy commitments. The manifestos of the Liberal and Conservative Party from 1993 to 2015 are accessed through the database provided by the Canadian branch of the CMP, Poltext.12

Pledges include specific actions or outcomes, such as “we will increase the size of the Reserve forces” or “we will increase Official Development Assistance”. In

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11 One of this study’s limitations is the use of a single coder to analyze election manifestos and manually record pledges. It is recognized that the use of multiple coders results in a more reliable analysis (Potter and Levine-Donnerstein 1999).
12 The Poltext project website can be found at: www.poltext.org.
addition, this research project uses the CMP’s coding categories to systematically characterize the foreign policy-related pledges within each party manifesto. The CMP method’s standard coding frame includes fifty-six categories within seven policy domains (Werner, Lacewell, and Volkens 2015, 7). These seven policy domains include the external relations domain, and those mainly associated with domestic-level policy, including: 1) freedom and democracy; 2) political system; 3) economy; 4) welfare and quality of life; 5) fabric of society; and 6) social groups (“CMP Coding” 2008). It is important to note that if each category was represented evenly within each election manifesto, they would each represent approximately 14.3% of all promises.

This dissertation categorizes the foreign policy pledges within the CMP’s “external relations domain”, which includes the following categories: foreign special relationships (positive/negative), anti-imperialism, military (positive/negative), peace, and internationalism (positive/negative) (Ibid, 8).13 One additional category is added as “Other”, to include those promises or statements that do not fall within the CMP’s coding scheme. These often include promises related to international branding and parliamentary oversight of foreign policy.

Data collected therefore includes the number of foreign policy-related pledges, the percentage of foreign policy pledges compared to the total number for each governing party, and information on more specific categorized pledges within the external relations domain (or foreign policy). This allows an individual party-level examination along with a comparison across parties over time. A comparison of this data from 1993-2015 helps to determine whether Canadian political parties differ in their foreign policy commitments. A cross-tab analysis provides a means of describing the presence of foreign policy priorities in manifestos of Canada’s two dominant political parties from 1993-2015. A more detailed analysis of the content and types of promises fulfilled by Canada’s political parties is also conducted to determine key trends in foreign policy priorities and differences between parties within the foreign policy domain.

The theory of issue ownership (Petrocik 1996; Bélanger 2003; Walgrave, Tresch, and Lefevere 2015) indicates that political parties will selectively emphasize issues in which they perceive to own. While significant discussion specific to foreign policy is not often found within the literature, Part I of this dissertation expects to find that parties structure their foreign policy-related promises differently from one another based on issues which they perceive to have an advantage over. Although this is inconsistent with previous notions in the literature on foreign policy in elections, it aligns with more recent studies that have found political parties to have influence over foreign policy decision-making.

13 See Appendix for full explanation of CMP coding categories.
(Joly and Dandoy 2016; Kaarbo 1996). From these ideas, the following hypotheses are derived:

_Hypothesis I: Canadian political parties differ in the scope of their foreign policy-related electoral promises._

_Hypothesis II: Canadian political parties differ in the content of their foreign policy-related electoral promises._

If Hypothesis I is accurate, the party which perceives to own the foreign policy domain as a whole will likely provide Canadian voters with a higher level (scope) of foreign policy commitments. Similarly, if Hypothesis II is accurate, parties may signal ownership within the foreign policy domain over specific foreign policy issues (i.e. military or internationalism).

In contrast to this general hypothesis, the common notion in the literature (especially within Canada) has been that elections are rarely fought over the direction of foreign policy issues. Further, foreign policy has often been considered a nonpartisan or bipartisan issue with little differences between parties. If this were the case, a counter hypothesis is derived following the logic of Downs’ convergency theory (Downs 1957; Huber and Stephens 2001; Krouwel 2006):

_Alternative Hypothesis: Canadian political parties do not differ in the scope and content of their foreign policy-related electoral promises. They offer no distinct options to voters with respect to foreign policy issues in their election manifestos._

**Findings**

A total of 1,251 pledges were manually coded by the author for governing parties from 1993-2015, including 151 foreign policy-specific pledges. Table 1 sets out the findings on total pledges and foreign policy-related pledges coded for all eight governments under examination. As is evident, foreign policy-related promises represent approximately 12.4% of all promises coded. As with overall pledge numbers, foreign policy-related promises vary significantly in number from election to election. As a percentage of the total number of pledges made, foreign-policy related promises range from only 7.8% of total promises for the Harper Conservative government in 2011 to 18.8% for the Chretien government elected in 1997.

Overall, the Liberal and Conservative parties differ in the number of foreign policy promises they include in their election manifestos. On average, the Liberals dedicate approximately 14.7% of their platform to foreign policy pledges, while the Conservatives dedicate approximately 8.8% on average. While these findings represent a difference between the Conservative and Liberal party in regard to the
number of foreign policy promises made, both parties make an effort to address the foreign policy domain as a whole. These differences are therefore unlikely to wholeheartedly prove Hypothesis I, indicating that one party does not “own” the foreign policy domain as a whole from 1993-2015.

Table 1. Campaign Promises and Foreign Policy-related Promises, Canada 1993-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party/Election Year</th>
<th>Total Promises</th>
<th>Foreign Policy Promises</th>
<th>Foreign Policy Promises (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal 1993</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal 1997</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal 2000</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal 2004</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative 2006</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative 2008</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative 2011</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal 2015</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1251</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to the 1,251 pledges coded for governing parties from 1993-2015, another 140 foreign policy-specific pledges were coded for the “alternate parties” (the Liberal or Conservative parties that did not win government in each election) from 1993-2015. Tables 2 and 3 include the findings for the CMP categorization of all foreign policy-related promises for the Liberal and Conservative Party from 1993-2015 (including the Reform Party in 1993 and 1997 and the Canadian Alliance Party in 2000). This includes a breakdown of promises made within the external relations domain, including policy categories for: foreign special relationships (positive/negative), anti-imperialism, military (positive/negative), peace, and internationalism (positive/negative). One additional category is included as “Other”, for those promises not included within the CMP’s current categorization.14

As the two tables indicate, the Liberal and Conservative Party differ both over time and within each election period in the policy-specific breakdown of their foreign policy promises. When viewing all elections together, the Liberal Party clearly emphasizes internationalism more than the Conservative Party. Similarly, the Conservative Party emphasizes military (positive) more than the Liberal Party.

14 See the CMP Codebook for full details on each category of the External Relations domain.
over the selected time period. With the exception of the most recent Trudeau Liberal Party, the most frequent (or the mode) CMP category for each Liberal manifesto is internationalism. Note that the 2015 Liberal election manifesto has very similar rates of foreign policy promises related to both internationalism and military (positive). In contrast, the most frequent CMP category for each Conservative manifesto, excluding the two Reform Party election platforms in 1993 and 1997\textsuperscript{15}, is overwhelmingly military (positive). These findings prove Hypothesis II, indicating that parties perceive to own specific issue areas within the foreign policy domain.

**Table 2. Liberal Foreign Policy Domain: Breakdown of Category-Specific Promises (as percentage of total foreign policy promises made)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party/Election Year</th>
<th>Foreign Special Relationships Positive (101)</th>
<th>Military Positive (104)</th>
<th>Military Negative (105)</th>
<th>Peace (106)</th>
<th>Internationalism Positive (107)</th>
<th>Other (100)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal 1993</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal 1997</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>92.3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal 2000</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal 2004</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal 2006</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal 2008</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal 2011</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal 2015</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Categories with 0 promises throughout the selected period are excluded from the table.

**Table 3. Conservative Foreign Policy Domain: Breakdown of Category-Specific Promises (as percentage of total foreign policy promises made)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party/Election Year</th>
<th>Foreign Special Relationships Positive (101)</th>
<th>Military Positive (104)</th>
<th>Military Negative (105)</th>
<th>Peace (106)</th>
<th>Internationalism Positive (107)</th>
<th>Other (100)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reform 1993</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform 1997</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{15} It must be noted that the 1997 Reform Party manifesto only included two foreign policy-related promises, including a promise to expand trade opportunities and a promise to reduce the role of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C. Alliance</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While Table 2 and 3 demonstrate clear differences between the Liberal and Conservative parties in their foreign policy-related promises within the external relations domain, a more detailed content analysis of the parties’ election manifestos also helps to address questions of issue ownership. The following presents a breakdown and analysis of specific foreign policy trends in the election manifestos of the dominant Canadian parties from 1993-2015.

**1993 Election**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internationalism</th>
<th>Both the Liberal and Reform Party focused on promises related to internationalism the most. 58.8% of all foreign policy promises made by the Liberals and 45.5% of those made by the Reform Party. While the two parties are not at odds with one another in their environment-related foreign policy promises, the Liberals dedicate more of their manifesto to environmental issues and include more specific promises. Both make broad promises related to strengthening Canada’s role in peacekeeping. While the Reform Party only includes one broad promise in regard to peacekeeping, the Liberals make specific promises related to aid priorities and commitments to international conventions and institutions such as the Law of the Sea.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military/Security</td>
<td>The parties differ significantly in the scope and content of their defence-related promises. The Reform Party makes broad promises related to supporting the maintenance of the Canadian Forces and continuing with NATO and NORAD. The Liberals make much more specific promises related to cancelling helicopter purchases and introducing a defence conversion program. While the Reform Party acknowledges its commitment to UN peacekeeping efforts, the Liberal Party emphasizes transitioning military efforts to greater peacekeeping roles.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Both Reform and Liberal parties avoid making specific promises about Canada-US relationship. They both make broad promises related to maximizing the benefits of our relationship with the US and fostering a mutually respectful relationship. The parties do not vary significantly in their trade-related promises. The Liberals made specific promises to review the NAFTA side agreements and renegotiate the FTA and NAFTA to achieve specific goals. The Reform Party also made a specific promise indicating that it would not support NAFTA until certain adjustments (mainly related to water resources) were made. The Liberals also include promises related to building a new WTO and strengthening Canada’s trade commissioner service.

The Liberal 1993 election platform is consistent with findings in Table 2, indicating that the Liberal party consistently addresses issues associated with internationalism the most of all foreign policy-related categories. The Reform Party in 1993 and 1997 represents a clear distinction among the Conservative Party’s (and previous parties’) foreign policy commitments. The 1993 election does not present a clear divergence in foreign policy options between the Liberal and Reform Party, with similar promises found in all three major policy areas.

**1997 Election:**

Unfortunately, the comparison across manifestos for foreign policy-related promises in the 1997 election is limited. The Reform Party only made two foreign policy-specific promises, including one related to expanding trade opportunities and one related to reducing the scope of CIDA. The Liberal Party in comparison, includes 13 foreign policy-specific promises, including promises related to trade (trade promotion and international trade organizations), peacekeeping, environmental protection initiatives, and support for international institutions (such as the establishment of the ICC and the UN treaty for the elimination of nuclear weapons). Interestingly, the Liberal Party does not include any promises directly related to the size, status and funding of the military.

**2000 Election**

| Internationalism | Liberal promises are broad promises related to foreign aid simply express commitments to increasing resources to improve democracy and stability, along with providing debt relief for developing countries. They do not make specific funding commitments or plans to fulfil these promises. The Canadian Alliance makes no |

---

The Liberal 1993 election platform is consistent with findings in Table 2, indicating that the Liberal party consistently addresses issues associated with internationalism the most of all foreign policy-related categories. The Reform Party in 1993 and 1997 represents a clear distinction among the Conservative Party’s (and previous parties’) foreign policy commitments. The 1993 election does not present a clear divergence in foreign policy options between the Liberal and Reform Party, with similar promises found in all three major policy areas.
Military/Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Liberal Party</th>
<th>Canadian Alliance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Promises related to aid resources and instead, only makes specific promises related to replacing CIDA and exploring possibilities of working with NGOs in order to increase the accountability of aid.</td>
<td>The Liberals make broad promises related to ensuring the Canadian Forces are properly equipped and prepared. The Canadian Alliance makes specific funding commitments to expand the Canadian Forces and purchase equipment. Military promises only represent 10% of foreign policy-related promises for the Liberal Party in 2000 but represent 66.7% of foreign policy-related promises for the Canadian Alliance.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Foreign Special Relationship/Trade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Liberal Party</th>
<th>Canadian Alliance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Liberals make broad promises related to opening new markets and advocating fair trading rules. Their only specific trade-related promise is to press for a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA).</td>
<td>The Canadian Alliance also makes more specific promises in relation to trade. They promise to reduce foreign subsidies (related to agriculture) within NAFTA and the WTO. The Liberals make broad promises related to ensuring the Canadian Forces are properly equipped and prepared. The Canadian Alliance makes specific funding commitments to expand the Canadian Forces and purchase equipment. Military promises only represent 10% of foreign policy-related promises for the Liberal Party in 2000 but represent 66.7% of foreign policy-related promises for the Canadian Alliance.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The common finding for the 2000 election related to foreign policy-related promises is that the Liberal Party tends to make broad promises in almost all policy categories while the Canadian Alliance makes more specific commitments. Consistent with the findings in Table 2 and 3, the Liberal Party focuses most on issues associated with internationalism, while the Canadian Alliance focuses most on issues associated with military/security.

### 2004 Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internationalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Liberal party makes more specific promises related to aid and peacekeeping, while the Conservatives avoid the issue of peacekeeping altogether but make promises such as “work closely with international organizations such as the United Nations and in concert with our most important military allies to address international security threats from terrorism and rogue states”. The Conservatives include broad promises for supporting development in Africa and addressing health-related issues. On the environment, both the Liberals and Conservatives make relatively broad promises. The Liberal Party does not address international initiatives, while the Conservative party makes a specific commitment to leave the Kyoto Protocol agreement.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Military/Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Both parties make similar promises related to military. The Conservatives focuses most heavily on military-related promises (33.3%), but the Liberal military promises represent 37.5% of all foreign policy promises (second highest). Although slightly different, they both include specific promises about funding the Canadian Forces and increasing personnel. Conservatives make more specific promises related to equipment updates and the parliamentary oversight of defence procurement.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Foreign Special Relationships/Trade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>The Liberal Party makes no mention of trade relations or agreements with the United States or other countries. The Conservative Party dedicates 27.8% of their foreign policy promises to the foreign special relationships category, including a number of promises related to trade relations with the US.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

The 2004 Liberal platform represents a clear distinction in regard to Liberal foreign policy commitments, with only eight foreign policy-related promises compared to the Conservative Party’s 18 promises. Consistent with findings from Table 2 and 3, the Liberals focus most on internationalism-related commitments, while the Conservatives focus most on military/security-related promises. The parties present a clear difference in their focus on foreign special relationships/trade, with the Liberal Party providing zero promises and the Conservative Party dedicating 27.8% of all foreign policy-related promises.

### 2006 Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>The Conservatives dedicate only 11.8% of all foreign policy promises, while the Liberal Party’s internationalism-related promises represent 50% of all foreign policy promises. The Liberals make promises related to the Kyoto Protocol, while the Conservatives do not mention international environmental initiatives. Both parties maintain their commitment to Official Development Assistance, while the Liberals include more specific promises related to the United Nations and other international organizations, and peacekeeping.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>The Conservative Party dedicates 64.7% of its foreign policy promises to military, including specific promises for recruitment and increasing personnel, equipment and defence spending. They make specific promises about the Canadian Coast Guard and improvements to surveillance and intelligence agencies. The Liberal Party dedicates 38.9% of all foreign policy promises to</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
military, including specific funding commitments and procurement promises, along with a promise to restructure the military to improve efficiency.

| Foreign Special Relationships/Trade | Both parties include a limited number of promises related to trade and foreign special relationships. The Conservatives make specific promises related to NAFTA, FTAA and Asia-Pacific trade negotiations. The Liberals make more general promises related to expanding trade horizons (with the exception of one specific promise to remain strong through NAFTA rules). |

Both parties in the 2006 election make the same number of foreign policy-related promises (18), although with different issue emphases on specific categories. Findings for 2006 are consistent with those presented in Table 2 and 3, the Liberals dedicate the greatest number of promises to internationalism, while the Conservatives focus most heavily on issues related to the military.

| 2008 Election | | |
| Internationalism | Internationalism promises represent 56.5% of all foreign policy promises for the Liberal Party and 21.4% of all foreign policy promises for the Conservatives. The Liberal promises include specific commitments to international environmental initiatives; promises to increase foreign aid spending and focus on poverty reduction; and assisting the United Nations with health-related initiatives. The Conservative Party is much more focused on North America and a more regional cap and trade system for the environment (not international initiatives). The Conservative Party makes broad promises to continue supporting ODA and achieving development goals. |
| Military/Security | The Conservative Party dedicates 42.8% of its foreign policy promises to military. The Liberal Party dedicates only 13.2% of all foreign policy promises to military. The Conservatives focus more on equipment and increasing the size of the Canadian Forces, while the Liberals include specific promises related to projects and procurement. Both parties promise to end the Afghanistan mission: The Liberals promise the mission will end by July 2011 and the Conservatives promise it will end by the end of 2011. |
| Foreign Special Relationships/Trade | Both parties move away from the previous trend within the foreign special relationships category of focusing on |
the Canada-US relationship. The Conservatives focus more broadly on trade initiatives with countries such as Colombia, Peru, Jordan and Mongolia. The Liberals move more towards the Asia-Pacific, with a focus on China and Southeast Asian Trade. Both parties still include promises related to NAFTA but comparatively less than previous elections.

The 2008 election presents the best example where the two dominant parties present explicit differences in their foreign policy priorities. Consistent with Table 3 and 4, the Liberals focus most on internationalism while the Conservatives focus most on military/security. The parties differ in their regional and institutional focus, with the Liberal Party prioritizing the United Nations and the Asia Pacific, and the Conservative Party prioritizing North and South America more prominently.

| 2011 Election | Internationalism | Conservations dedicate only 15.4% and the Liberals dedicate 45.2% of all foreign policy promises to internationalism. Liberals make specific promises related to clean energy and environmental initiatives; multilateralism and “branding”, while the Conservatives do not. The Liberal Party focuses on international cooperation through the Arctic Council, while the Conservatives focus more attention towards domestic issues of the Arctic. Both parties make specific promises to focus more on women through foreign aid initiatives. The Conservatives make promises of efforts towards Afghanistan while the Liberals make promises to “return to Africa”. The Liberals make a promise to reinvest in ODA, while the Conservatives make no mention of ODA beyond the MNCH initiative. |
| 2011 Election | Military/Security | The Conservative Party dedicates 43.8% of all foreign policy related promises to military, while the Liberal Party which dedicates only 12.9%. The Liberals promise to cancel the F-35 purchase, while the Conservatives promise to continue with the purchase. The Liberals make promises to review spending and equipment of the Canadian Forces, while the Conservatives make promises to provide new equipment and increase personnel. The Liberal promises related to military and security are much more focused on peacekeeping and conflict prevention. The Conservatives focus |
significantly more on the military as a whole, but include promises related to the Arctic and anti-terrorism measures at home that might be considered more domestic-based policy than foreign policy.

| Foreign Special Relationships/Trade | The Liberals only make one trade-related commitment, while the Conservatives focus significantly more on specific trade agreements such as the Canada-EU FTA and the Canada-India FTA. Both parties make similar promises about strengthening the Canada-US relationship. |

Similar to the 2008 election, the 2011 election represents a clear difference in the areas each party chooses to focus on in their election manifesto. The Liberals focus most on issues of internationalism, while the Conservatives focus most on issues of the military (consistent with Table 2 and 3). In addition, the Conservatives focus more heavily on specific trade agreements beyond Canada-US relations.

### 2015 Election

| Internationalism | The Liberals dedicate 36.6% of their foreign policy promises to internationalism, while the Conservatives dedicate 22.6%. Both parties promise to accept refugees from Syria and commit aid to the region, although the specific numbers are different. The Liberals include specific promises in support of the United Nations, while the Conservatives rarely mention international organizations. |
| Military/Security | The Liberals dedicate 39.0% of their foreign policy promises to military, while the Conservatives dedicate 58.1%. Both parties promise to defend arctic sovereignty and increase the size of the Canadian rangers. Both make commitments to the Navy as a top priority and make promises related to cooperation with NATO. Both promise to remain committed to building peace in the Ukraine (coded under the peace category). The Conservative Party includes more specific promises for their commitment to the Navy. The Liberals are more explicit in their promises of commitment to NATO (and NORAD, which the Conservatives do not include). The two parties offer voters strikingly different options for the combat mission against ISIS. The Liberals |
promise to end the combat mission, while the Conservatives promise to continue.

| Foreign Special Relationships/Trade | Both parties dedicate less than 10% of their foreign policy promises to foreign special relationships/trade—the Liberals at 9.7% and the Conservatives at 6.5%. Both parties include promises for a trade promotion office or strategy, and both include a form of review for the trade commission service. The Conservatives are more specific in promises to implement a trade promotion strategy. |

Interestingly, the Conservative and Liberal Party both make similar foreign policy-related promises in the 2015 election (at least compared to previous elections). The 2015 Liberal platform represents the only exception to the general focus on internationalism. Instead, the Liberal’s focus slightly more on military/security. The Conservative Party’s foreign-policy related promises are consistent with findings in Table 3, focusing most heavily on military/security. While the convergence of foreign policy promises between the two parties is inconsistent with the theory of issue ownership, the parties still offer distinct policy options such as the ISIS combat mission and support for international organizations.

**Discussion**

**Scope/Content of Election Manifestos.** Based on the analysis of governing party manifestos from 1993-2015, foreign policy-related promises represent approximately 12.4% of all promises within Canadian parties’ electoral platforms. While 12.4% is slightly less than the expected 14.3% of evenly represented categories in the CMP, it far surpasses the common notions in the literature that issues of foreign policy do not contribute to election outcomes and parties therefore have no need to pay the domain significant attention. While the finding that 12.4% of all promises made from 1993-2015 by governing parties in Canada were within the foreign policy domain does not whole-heartedly disprove the Almond-Lippman consensus (and Hypothesis II), it does suggest that parties strategically choose to focus on foreign policy issues during elections.

The findings presented in Table 2 and Table 3 further demonstrate the differences among parties within the foreign policy domain. A more policy-specific analysis of foreign policy promises shows that the Conservative and Liberal parties vary in the policy areas they choose to emphasize within their election manifestos. While both the Liberal and Conservative parties tend to focus most on promises related to internationalism and military (positive), there are clear differences across the
selected time period. Seven of the eight Liberal election platforms from 1993-2015 focused most heavily on promises related to internationalism. These include promises such as the 1997 promise to, “propose the creation of an international forum of federations” and the 2004 promise to, “increase by $70 million, its financial commitment to the Global Fund to Fight HIV/Aids”.\textsuperscript{16} Similarly, six of the eight Conservative (including Reform and Canadian Alliance) election manifestos focused most heavily on promises related to military (positive), such as the 2006 promise to, “recruit 13,000 regular forces and 10,000 reserve forces personnel” and the 2011 promise to “follow through on the purchase of F-35” fighter jet.\textsuperscript{17}

Although beyond the scope of this project, these findings might be explained through an analysis of institutional and structural factors such as party size/status, incumbency record and party type. More important to the current project’s objectives, these findings have implications for theories of issue ownership and factors associated with party behaviour. The number of foreign policy-related promises does not differ to sufficiently prove \textit{Hypothesis I}. However, the differences found among the more policy-specific promises within the foreign policy domain helps to prove \textit{Hypothesis II}, that parties differ in the content of foreign-policy related election promises.

\textbf{Issue Ownership and Foreign Policy.} The positional perspective of party competition provides factors of both issue ownership and issue salience to explain the content of election manifestos and the policy-making capacity of political parties. Very rarely have foreign policy issues been considered among the main “valence issues” in Canadian elections. However, previous studies have suggested that foreign policy should be included in a discussion of issue ownership in the Canadian context (Bow and Black 2008; Bélanger 2003). Findings from this research project support this suggestion. Part I of this dissertation argues that foreign policy should be included in studies of issue ownership and party competition. More specifically, research on issue ownership should move beyond the treatment of foreign policy as a single policy domain “to be owned”. Instead, a more policy-specific approach within the foreign policy domain helps to explain party behaviour and perceived ownership over specific issue areas.

The more in-depth analysis provided for each election period attempts to address questions of issue ownership between the Liberal and Conservative parties from 1993-2015. Do parties offer unique or alternative options to voters within the foreign policy domain? Do parties choose to selectively emphasize issues in

\textsuperscript{17} See Conservative Party platforms: (The Conservative Party of Canada 2006, 2011).
which they perceive to “own”? As a whole, the findings presented in the previous section are inconclusive. When the 1997 election is isolated as a single case study for example, it is clear that the Reform party strategically avoids the foreign policy domain while the Liberal Party includes a number of promises related to the internationalism category. This might indicate that the Liberal Party perceived to own the foreign policy domain, or at least specific policy issues related to internationalism.

Across all elections, the Liberals clearly focus more on promises related to internationalism, including those associated with foreign aid, peacekeeping and support for international institutions. This is especially true for promises related to support for international institutions such as the United Nations, the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and support for the International Criminal Court (ICC). In comparison, the Conservatives clearly focus more on promises related to military, including those associated with the Canadian Forces, defence spending and procurement, and military missions. However, both parties often address the same policy categories, indicating that issue ownership within a specific policy area (such as foreign aid or international environmental initiatives) might not exist between the two dominant Canadian parties.

It must be noted however, that there are examples within specific elections where parties strategically emphasize issues and present voters with distinct options from their opponents. The 2000 and 2006 Liberal platforms for example, maintain a commitment to the Kyoto Protocol, while the 2004 Conservative platform promises to leave the Kyoto Protocol. During the 2011 election campaign, the Liberals promise to cancel the F-35 purchase, while the Conservatives promise to continue with the purchase. In addition, the Liberal and Conservative parties often differ in how broad or specific their promises are within specific policy categories. The Conservative Party (along with the Reform and Canadian Alliance) often make broad promises on their commitment to working with international organizations such as the United Nations. In comparison, the Liberal Party makes more specific promises such as “promoting the establishment of the ICC” and “see that the proposal for a Leaders’ G-20 summit is implemented”. On the other hand, the Conservative platform of 2015 includes more specific promises on a range of foreign policy issues compared to the Liberals. These include promises for their commitment to the Navy, to the Ukraine and to implementing a trade promotion strategy.

Consistent with the literature on issue ownership (and Hypothesis II), it is possible that parties structure their promises either broadly or more specifically based on their perception of their own issue-handling abilities and their perception of voter preferences (issue salience). They might choose to include broad promises on
policy issues that voters are likely to support but the party might not have strong “ownership” over. Subsequently, they might make more specific promises in order to set themselves apart and indicate a clearer position to the electorate over issues they perceive to “own”. In addition, parties often react to their opponents and often must respond to “hot topics” or valence issues during each election campaign. Bow and Black (2008) indicate that this was the case for the issue of nuclear weapons in 1963 and the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement in 1988 (14). During the selected time period, issues such as the specifics of NAFTA (1993 election); the Kyoto Protocol (2000-2006 elections); the purchase of the F-35 fighter jets (2011 and 2015 elections); the combat mission in Afghanistan (2008-2015 elections); and the mission to fight ISIS (2015 election) might be considered valence issues that received increased media attention and were more significant to voters.

Although the common trend in the literature has ignored the presence of foreign policy during elections, the content analysis of election manifestos from 1993-2015 demonstrates that overall, Canadian parties differ in both the scope and content of their foreign policy-related election promises. One party does not consistently dominate the foreign policy domain as a whole, but this analysis finds that first, parties often present clear differences to the electorate in the scope of their foreign policy promises, including both the number of foreign policy-related promises and how broad or specific those promises are, and second, they often differ in their focus of specific foreign policy issues or in their policy direction of specific issues.

Conclusion

Part I of this dissertation builds on the growing body of literature on party competition and campaign promises which largely proves that parties matter. However, many of these studies fail to investigate specific policy domains. Moreover, issues of foreign policy have often been considered outside the realm of traditional party politics. The purpose of Part I is to determine whether parties differ in both the scope and content of their election manifestos. It makes an important methodological contribution by using foreign policy as a case study to analyze party behaviour within a specific policy domain. Does the foreign policy domain contribute to our understanding of political parties and electoral competition?

This study analyzes the election manifestos of Canada’s two dominant parties from 1993-2015. The theory of issue ownership is used to determine whether Canadian political parties structure their foreign policy priorities differently from one another during elections. Issue ownership literature argues that political
parties will selectively emphasize issues during an election campaign that they believe they have an advantage over (Petrocik 1996; Bélanger 2003). Findings from this analysis indicate that a significant portion of Canadian parties’ election manifests are dedicated to foreign policy issues (12.4% on average from 1993-2015). The Liberal Party consistently includes more foreign policy-related promises than its Conservative counterpart and individual election case studies might prove that the Liberals perceive to “own” the foreign policy domain as a whole. However, when viewed across time, it is clear that both parties strategically emphasize issues within the foreign policy domain. In general, the Liberals clearly emphasize policies associated with internationalism more than the Conservative Party. Conversely, the Conservative Party emphasizes issues associated with military (positive) more than the Liberal Party during the 1993-2015 elections. However, both parties often address the same policy categories, indicating that issue ownership within specific policy areas might not exist within the foreign policy domain.

On the other hand, a more detailed analysis of individual foreign policy-related promises for each election shows that parties often differ in both the scope and content of their election manifests in relation to foreign policy. Consistent with the literature on issue ownership, it is possible that parties structure their promises either broadly or more specifically based on their perception of their own issue-handling abilities and their perception of voter preferences (issue salience). There are examples within specific elections where parties strategically emphasize issues and present voters with distinct options from their opponents. In addition, there are a number of valence issues across the selected time period within the foreign policy domain (i.e. Kyoto Protocol; the combat mission in Afghanistan; the fight against ISIS). Part I therefore finds that parties often present clear differences to the electorate in both the scope and content of their foreign policy promises.

Part I of this research project contributes to the theoretical discussion in the literature on both mandate theory and the theory of issue ownership by acknowledging the importance of political parties to democracy as a whole and the policy-making process more specifically. While foreign policy is often excluded from these discussions and considered to be less significant than domestic politics in the eyes of both voters and parties, Part I proves that parties make specific and strategic electoral decisions within the foreign policy domain. Whether they remain committed to these promises or not has important implications for the role of political parties in foreign policy decision-making. Future research is necessary to study the role of political parties as a significant domestic influence over foreign policy.
In addition, future research has the opportunity to study individual party behaviour over time within the foreign policy domain. Studying election manifests might shed light on how parties alter their policy stances over time in response to perceived issue ownership, opposition parties, public opinion and external influences. Further, it is possible to study how specific international events impact the electoral promises and behaviour of Canadian political parties. The growing acknowledgement of climate change for example was solidified in the 1988 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). While not universally accepted, international environmental initiatives were an early focus for the Liberal Party in the 1993 and 1997 election campaign. Similarly, peacekeeping initiatives were a major focus of the 1993 Liberal platform, but significantly diminished from election manifestos of both parties from the 2000 election onwards. These general findings spark new research questions on the content and scope of election manifestos, along with concepts of issue ownership within and across political parties.
Parties at the Water’s Edge Part II: Canada’s Political Parties, Promise Fulfilment and Foreign Policy Decision-Making
Introduction

Issues associated with national defence have long been considered outside the realm of party politics. At least, this has often been assumed the case in Canadian federal politics. Yet, the electoral promises made by the Conservative and Liberal party in the 2015 federal election campaign included a clear and distinct plan for the country’s future defence procurement. After the Harper Conservative government announced plans to buy 65 F-35 fighter jets in 2010 (amid controversy), the Trudeau Liberal Party promised to cancel their purchase upon winning government in 2015. Nearly four years after the Liberal victory, the Trudeau government is still one of nine partner countries in the F-35 stealth fighter program. The Liberal government has not only failed to fulfil its 2015 election promise, but it has continued to invest in the F-35 program (including nearly $54 million in 2018). Even though the two major parties clearly differed in their election commitments, their actions while in government in this particular issue have been less distinct. Recent commentary surrounding the F-35 purchase has complained about the politicization of Canada’s defence procurement process, but the literature on foreign policy decision-making has so far produced mixed findings related to the role of political parties in foreign policy.

To question whether political parties are a domestic influence of foreign policy is to question whether parties possess significant policy-making capacity within the foreign policy domain. There is a growing body of literature addressing the overarching question, do parties matter? The capacity of parties and elected officials to fulfil their electoral promises is a critical component of the mandate theory of elections (Downs 1957; Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge 1994). At its core, mandate theory assumes that political parties compete for votes by campaigning for support and will ultimately be responsive to the preferences of citizens to follow through on their electoral commitments. In support of mandate theory, this dissertation views parties as critical elements of an electoral democratic system, which means studying party manifestos is particularly important to studying elections and the policy-making capacity of parties.

While there has been significant scholarly focus on the role of political parties in policy formulation, studies have often failed to go beyond general application into more policy-specific and promise-specific dynamics of both party manifestos and promise fulfilment. There is substantial research on election manifestos and the policy capacity of political parties to implement their campaign promises, proving that parties matter. But do they matter in the context of foreign policy decision-making? Unfortunately, foreign policy issues have often been considered outside the usual domain of party politics. Moreover, political parties have rarely been considered one of the main drivers of foreign policy. The purpose of this Part II of
this research project is to address the shortcomings of the current literature surrounding foreign policy decision-making and the role of political parties. By bridging the literature on campaign promises and foreign policy decision-making, Part II argues that through their attempts to fulfil their electoral mandate, political parties represent an important domestic influence of foreign policy.

It draws on the well-established methodological approach within campaign promise literature to determine whether political parties possess foreign policy-making capacity following elections. This research project focuses on the party manifestos and government actions of parties that have won government at the federal level in Canada from 1993 to 2015. Promise fulfilment is analyzed through an examination of specific government actions in relation to foreign policy commitments or pledges identified within the election manifesto of the governing party. Fulfilment is measured along a continuum - fulfilled, partially fulfilled and not fulfilled. This method permits an individual party-level examination along with a comparison across parties, including: an analysis of the number and percentage of foreign policy promises fulfilled (and partially fulfilled) for each governing party; a comparison of governing parties across all elections; and a more promise-specific comparison based on the categories provided through the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP)’s external relations domain.

While the current literature on campaign promises and party competition is robust, it has often failed to address policy-specific trends. Further, since foreign policy is often considered to be outside the realm of party politics, political parties are often excluded from discussions on the influences of foreign policy decision-making. Through a multi-stage content analysis of party manifestos and government actions, Part II of this dissertation attempts to answer whether political parties matter in the context of foreign policy-making. It tests the mandate theory of elections in the context of foreign policy-making and finds that political parties in Canada fulfil their foreign policy-related promises at relatively respectable rates (and at differing rates) following elections. This ultimately implies that political parties matter in the context of foreign policy decision-making and should be included within wider studies on foreign policy.

Part II is organized as follows. The first section highlights the current debate in the literature of whether parties matter, addressing both theories related to party competition and campaign promises, along with foreign policy decision-making. The second section provides a clear explanation of the research methodology. The third section gives a complete description of the research findings, while the fourth section provides an analysis in response to the research questions and
major findings. Finally, Part II concludes with further implications and avenues for future research.

**Literature Review**

Part II of this dissertation aims to build on the work of scholars in the field of both foreign policy decision-making and those associated with campaign promises. Foreign policy is often considered outside the domain of party politics. In other words, political parties are rarely part of the discussion on foreign policy decision-making influences. The following literature review begins with a discussion on the critical debate found within the literature on campaign promises regarding whether parties matter or not. It then includes a discussion on how to define the field of foreign policy, followed by a review of the literature on foreign policy decision-making and the international and domestic influences of foreign policy.

**Critical Debate: Do Parties Matter?** As well-known political scientist V.O Key originally posited, literature on the structure and behaviour of political parties is often broken down into three critical silos: parties-in-the-electorate, parties in government, and parties as an organization. While these three roles constantly overlap and interact with one another, Part II of this research project is primarily concerned with the policy-making capacity of political parties. It is therefore first concerned with the electoral behaviour of parties, followed by the behaviour of those parties once in government. Modern theories of political democracy largely assume that parties and governments in a democratic system are responsive to the preferences of citizens. From here, the literature is divided into two main camps: 1) those that believe parties are forced to converge around the median voter and therefore do not matter; and 2) those that believe parties offer voters distinct policy options and have the capacity to fulfil their promises once in office.

**Parties Do Not Matter: Convergence Theory.** The spatial model, also referred to as convergence theory, is largely based on the ideas of Anthony Downs (1957), arguing that parties tend to converge around a median policy point or median voter in order to appeal to the largest portion of the population and gain elected office (138). Parties therefore have an incentive to react to shifts in the preferences of the median voter and electoral outcomes will depend on the distribution of voter expectations (Fernandez-Vazquez 2014; Black 1948). This model therefore views parties as purely strategic, vote- and office-seeking entities with no ideological or positional preferences (Pennings 2005, 30). More recent literature advances these ideas and argues that party behaviour has increasingly converged in response to constraints by processes of globalization, neoliberalization and advanced modernization. This ultimately argues that the

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18 See works such as (Cross 2004; Gunther, Montero, and Linz 2002).
ideological spectrum has been restricted and the actions of political parties are relatively insignificant factors in the development of public policy (Flynn 2009; Huber and Stephens 2001; McBride 2003; Krouwel 2006).

**Parties Matter: Mandate Theory.** In contrast to the Downsian model of party competition, ideas associated with the mandate theory of elections argue that parties have often provided distinct policy options and pursued unique strategies to remain the most significant policy-making actor (Flynn 2009; Castles and McKinlay 1979; von Beyme 1984). The mandate theory comes from the positivist school of thought and posits that political parties make specific commitments in their election platforms that they will ultimately work to fulfil once in office (François Petry and Collette 2009, 66). This dissertation agrees with the overarching views put forward by mandate theory and believes that parties possess policy-making capacity.

From here, a growing body of literature on promise fulfilment identifies the factors associated with a party’s policy-making capacity, or their ability to fulfil their election commitments. Consistent with Flynn (2009), the variables affecting the capacity of parties following an election can be divided into three broad categories: institutional arrangements; the broader policy environment; and the strategic actions of parties (18).

**Institutional arrangements.** The institutional context within any country, including the electoral system; type of government; party system; and various political conditions influences the structure and content of election manifestos, and the ability of parties to fulfil their campaign commitments. While significant differences are found across electoral systems (Katz 1980; Spoon, Hobolt, and Vries 2014; Chan and Safran 2006), this dissertation is more concerned with institutional factors that vary from election to election such as party/government status; party/government size; strength of opposition; incumbency; and length of party/government tenure.

A party’s ability to fulfil its campaign promises upon election to government is influenced by the size and status of the government (Thomson et al. 2017; Oktay 2014; Flynn 2009). Consistent with Lijphart’s (1999) argument that minority governments are weaker since they are at the ‘mercy of the legislature’, studies suggests that majority governments will remain more committed to their election pledges than minority governments. Flynn’s (2009) study finds one of the main institutional constraints of both the 2004-2006 and 2006-2011 Canadian governments to be its minority status (158). A party’s experience in office, or their incumbency record is also believed to influence their ability to fulfil election promises (Z. Greene 2016; Flynn and Marlin 2017).

**Party behaviour.** In addition to institutional arrangements, the literature on campaign promises and party competition has focused significantly on the organizational arrangements of parties and their strategic behaviour. Party
ideology and party type are considered major factors within the literature on promise fulfilment. In their massive comparative study, Budge, Robertson and Hearl (1987) argue that on a comparative basis, the prevalence of the left-right ideological dichotomy between parties exists within democratic regimes. Prior to using the methodological approach of pledge fulfilment, many studies used ideology as the sole tool for examination of party policy-making capacity (Flynn and Marlin 2017). Petry and Duval (2018) use evidence from public finance literature to hypothesize the ideological impact on campaign promise fulfilment, ultimately finding that centre/right parties (such as the Conservative Party in Canada) are more likely to make and implement commitments to reduce public spending than centre/left parties, who are more likely to fulfil promises related to increasing public spending. In the Canadian context, Cochrane (2010) finds that members of the electorate from the “left” and the “right” organize their political circumstances and opinions in distinctive ways (592). If the mandate theory is correct, parties will therefore make and implement promises that align with their voters’ ideological position.

Consistent with Flynn and Marlin (2017), political parties can also be viewed from a foundational purpose perspective. While there are a number of “party types”, there are two main types of political parties identified within the Canadian context. Brokerage parties are those that make appeals to the broadest possible coalition of voters by including widely accepted promises and avoiding promises that might antagonize or exclude significant societal groups (Bow and Black 2008, 17). In comparison, wedge-based political parties are more ideological driven and will make appeals to specific electoral bases (Flynn and Marlin 2017). Previous studies have hypothesized that wedge-based parties will be more likely to fulfil their election promises because they will often be more committed to their stated issues. However, Flynn and Marlin (2017) find this hypothesis to be inaccurate in the Canadian case, indicating that brokerage parties might be more successful in fulfilling their election promises.

**Policy environment.** The surrounding economic and external conditions are likely to a party’s ability to fulfil its election commitments. First, perhaps the most significant “environmental” factor found in the literature is public opinion. Consistent with the mandate theory and issue saliency, political parties are believed to structure their campaign promises and subsequent policies to voter preferences (Borghetto and Russo 2018; Flynn 2009). Second, studies predict that economic conditions will not only impact what issues parties choose to emphasize during elections (Spoon, Hobolt, and Vries 2014; Z. Greene 2016), but the larger economic situation is also likely to have a direct impact on a government’s ability to control the budget. In turn, the budget is a critical factor in the literature on the policy environment (Flynn 2009). Third, more recent literature suggests that process of globalization have an impact on the policy-making capacity of parties. Studies have found that parties tend to shift their platforms in response to globalization, liberalization and international institutions (Sen and Barry 2018;
Wagner et al. 2018). Finally, external shocks may have an impact on either the campaign agenda or the ability of governments to fulfil their policy commitments (Wagner et al. 2018; Borghetto and Russo 2018). These are perhaps even more pronounced within the foreign policy domain and are discussed in greater detail in the following sections.

**Canadian Context.** Current studies in Canada present an overall picture of promise fulfilment. Petry, Duval and Birch (2018) for example, find that of 828 pledges recorded and coded from the 1993 to 2011 elections, 565 (68.2%) were at least partially fulfilled and 253 (31.8%) were unfulfilled (91). In their study of a selection of twenty-four campaign promises from each election between 1993-2015, Flynn and Marlin (2017) find that both the Liberal and Conservative governing parties fulfil their election promises at “relatively respectable rates”, with an overall fulfilment rate of 67.9% and a partial fulfilment rate of 75.6%. These studies present a higher rate of promise fulfillment than the average of 60% of partial fulfilment in a recent cross-national comparison of 12 countries (Thomson et al. 2017, 534).

While both the main arguments presented by the mandate theory and the most recent studies of campaign promise fulfilment prove that parties matter, many of these studies are broad-sweeping and fail to engage with the foreign policy domain. The purpose of Part II is to connect the growing literature on campaign promises with the well-established literature on foreign policy decision-making. Do political parties matter within the foreign policy domain?

**Defining Foreign Policy.** Foreign policy is a broad-sweeping policy category, including issues related to military and defence; diplomacy; development; trade; peace operations and more. Although a heavily debated definition, foreign policy is assumed to be concerned with the practices by and between states in the global political arena (Beier and Wylie 2010, xii). Nossal et al. (2015) note that properly speaking, foreign policy is only concerned with the behaviour of actors who have the capacity to exercise supreme political authority within a given territory, which often excludes actors at more local levels (2). For the purpose of this research project, foreign policy is understood as Nossal et al. (2015) describe it, involving the external objectives of the Canadian government. This includes Canada’s “orientation in the international system; its relations with other governments; its positions and attitudes on world politics; and its actions, programs, and decisions” (6).

Foreign policy analysis, as described by Hudson (2013), attempts to understand decisions taken by, “human decisionmakers with reference to or having known consequences for entities external to their nation-state” (4). These decisions are increasingly analyzed through a “two-level” perspective, taking the interplay of domestic politics and international issues into account (8). The sources and influences of foreign policy often include: the environment the state operates within; its physical, geographic and political location; its economic structure and
capacity for independence; group membership in the global arena; domestic political circumstances; institutional and bureaucratic politics; its capacity to make decisions for itself; and societal demands for particular foreign policy decisions (Nossal, Roussel, and Paquin 2015, 6–13).

These influences are largely consistent with the three main categories identified in the literature on campaign promises including institutional arrangements, party behaviour and policy environment. However, it seems that influences related to party behaviour within the foreign policy domain are not as widely-accepted within the literature. Although Hudson (2013) notes that “deception, insincerities, and concealments,” (5) are common in foreign policy decisions, evaluating party manifestos and the fulfilment of foreign policy commitments might prove whether parties influence foreign policy and highlight an attempt by parties to distinguish themselves as the dominant force over a particular policy domain within the field of foreign policy.

**Foreign Policy Decision-Making.** Foreign policy decision-making is understood as the choices made by individuals, groups, and coalitions that impact a country’s actions on the world stage, often through a process dominated by high-stakes, uncertainty and significant risk (Renshon and Renshon 2008; Mintz and DeRouen 2010). Since foreign policy decision-making is believed to predominantly occur at the executive level of government, there is substantial literature on the role of leaders in the decision-making process. However, leaders do not operate in isolation and can therefore make decisions, as Hermann (2001) explains, at the individual, group, and coalition levels (47). In acknowledging this, there are six main theories in the literature on foreign policy decision-making, including: the rational choice or rational actor model; the cybernetic or bounded-rationality model; the prospect theory; bureaucracy politics; organizational politics; and the poliheuristic theory.

The rational choice model assumes that, “nations are led by rational, forward-looking, expected-utility-maximizing leaders” (Mesquita and Lalman 1990, 751). Essentially, leaders perform a cost-benefit analysis for each foreign policy decision and will select the option that is best. Rational choice theory has been used both to make decisions and to evaluate foreign policy decisions. Szalai (2008) for example, explains how the rational choice theory became the foundation of early Cold War US defense policy.

The cybernetic theory moves one step beyond the rational choice model and acknowledges that rational decisions are not made within a vacuum. Instead, the theory explains how decision making occurs in reality, under increasingly complex circumstances and often without complete certainty (Redd and Mintz 2013, 14). The decision-makers within this model are believed to possess only limited information-processing capabilities and therefore choose the most

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19 See (Kaarbo 1997; Hudson 2013; Jervis 2013).
acceptable alternatives without conducting a full evaluation of all other options (Ibid). In their examination of decisions related to the political use of military force, Ostrom and Job (1986) use a cybernetic model to argue that US presidents monitor a reduced number of critical factors and consider a limited set of possible decisions (543).

Prospect theory argues that, “individuals evaluate outcomes not from net asset levels but instead as a function of deviations from a reference point” (Redd and Mintz 2013, 15). Decision makers will evaluate foreign policy options in terms of gains and losses and choose the option with the smallest loss (Ibid). Based on work by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), the prospect theory explains a concept known as the endowment effect, where leaders and those who influence foreign policy decisions are weary of potential losses (270). Farnham’s (1997) study examined US President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s decisions during the Munich crisis between 1936-1938. She argues that theories related to the rational choice model cannot explain Roosevelt’s foreign policy decision-making because they ignore the influence of political factors. Instead, she finds that while Roosevelt was initially hesitant to intervene in the Munich crisis, his decision changed once the crisis was framed as a loss (233).

The bureaucratic politics model is based on Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow’s (1999) work *Essence of Decision* and examines how decisions are arrived at and what beliefs the decision maker has about his or her advisors within bureaucratic institutions (Redd and Mintz 2013, 22). In this sense, representatives from various government agencies and departments compete and negotiate specific foreign policy decisions (Ibid). As Smith (1984) states, some foreign policy decisions can be, “better explained as the outcome of bureaucratic bargaining than as a conscious choice by a decision-making group” or individual (10). Most important to the bureaucratic politics model is that foreign policy decisions are determined by bureaucratic position and can therefore be explained by analyzing the bureaucratic circumstances of policy-making (Ibid). Smith’s (1984) study examines the policy choices of President Carter during the 1979-1981 Iran hostage crisis and how they were influenced by the composition of advisors surrounding the President (9). He ultimately finds that in the three key meetings during the hostage rescue, President Carter adopted positions based on the location of his advisors’ opinions within the bureaucratic structure (23).

The organizational politics model is similar to the cybernetic model in that it recognizes foreign policy as “organizational output” (Redd and Mintz 2013, 21). The key concept of the organizational politics model is standard operating procedures (SOPs), which are used within organizations to make decisions and help determine how actors within an organization are likely to behave (22). One of the main SOPs is known as incrementalism, which Mandel (1986) describes as contributing to decisional inertia since the same decisions are made frequently (259). Incrementalism represents low risk, but it can also lead to chaos if left
unmonitored (Ibid). Although Allison (1969) applies the organizational politics model when examining the ExComm decision-making during the Cuban Missile Crisis, he ultimately argues that the bureaucratic politics model is best at explaining these types of foreign policy decisions (707).

The final model, known as the poliheuristic theory, focuses on both the why and how of foreign policy decision-making and refers to the, “cognitive mechanisms decision makers utilize in attempts to simplify complex decision tasks (Redd and Mintz 2013, 17). This theory views foreign policy decision-making through a two-stage process: first, an initial screening of available alternatives using cognitive-based heuristic strategies; second, policymakers use a variety of rules of choice to minimize risks and maximize rewards (Ibid). Specifically, decision makers view risks and rewards in terms of the political consequences such as challenges to their leadership and political survival (Ibid). Redd’s (2005) study for example, explains how President Clinton’s decision making during the Kosovo crisis between 1998-1999 was heavily influenced by his concerns regarding how Congress and the public would react to his initial decisions (129).

Although all of these models provide alternative explanations for the foreign policy decision-making process, it is important to note that both international and domestic influences exist over foreign policy decisions. Putnam (1988) develops the logic of a two-level game to explain the core influences of foreign policy. He explains that:

at the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments (434).

Many scholars have considered foreign policy to be significantly different from domestic politics and its uniqueness can be explained by its specific actors, requirements of secrecy and speed, and the impact of crises and other dramatic occurrences (Joly and Dandoy 2016, 2). The following sections identify important influences at both the international and domestic level over the foreign policy decision-making process. Regardless of the decision-making actor or the policy domain, there are a variety of institutional, behavioural and environmental influences of foreign policy priorities and decisions.

**International Influences of Foreign Policy.** Literature surrounding the international influences of foreign policy tends to ignore the role of domestic influences, including political parties. As James and Oneal (1991) explain, literature on international politics and foreign policy analysis has historically been
dominated by realists (307). Within the realist tradition, any detailed theory of the state and the decision-making process of leaders related to foreign policy and international politics is unnecessary (325). Instead, realists assume that state behaviour is constrained by the structure of the anarchic international system, leading to similar behaviour across different states (Ibid). In their relatively controversial work, Ostrom and Job (1986) indicate three specific international influences of foreign policy in reference to the US during the Cold War era. First, the level of international tension between the US and the USSR; second, the relative strategic balance of power of the US relative to that of the USSR; and third, the extent of US involvement in ongoing war (544). Although Ostrom and Job’s description of international influences is specific to the US during the Cold War, they can also be applied to cases more broadly. In effect, foreign policy decisions are influenced by the international environment depending on the level of international tension, the state’s relative position in the international arena and the state’s involvement in current conflicts.

Nossal et al.’s (2015) discussion on international and domestic influences of foreign policy is perhaps more applicable across cases and countries than Ostrom and Job’s (1986) single case study. They identify the international setting, location, group membership and power of the state in the international arena as key international influences of foreign policy decision-making. The international setting includes both, “the environment the state operates within and the condition in which the state finds itself in that environment (Nossal, Roussel, and Paquin 2015, 6). The location refers to the state’s geographic position as well as its position within the global hierarchy, including its economic strength relative to others (7). Group membership refers to the state’s relations with others in the international community, including alliances, agreements and any “enemies” (8). Finally, Nossal et al. (2015) explain that a state’s capacity to make decisions for themselves, or their relative power in the international system, significantly influences or constrains their foreign policy decisions (9).

Although not made explicit, Nossal et al. and Ostrom and Job’s discussion demonstrate similarities to the general influences discussed within campaign promise literature surrounding the policy environment. External conditions related to the economy, international events and foreign relationships are believed to have a strong influence over both campaign promises and the policy-making capacity of political parties to fulfil those promises. Part II of this dissertation aims to bridge these two bodies of literature to determine whether political parties play a role in foreign policy decision-making and whether these international influences impact the electoral behaviour and subsequent decisions of parties. It is recognized that international influences are likely to have increased significance within the foreign policy domain compared to domestic-based policy areas.
Domestic Influences of Foreign Policy. A growing literature within foreign policy and international relations explains how divergence between the foreign policy commitments, priorities and actions of different states highlights the significance of domestic factors (Carlsnaes, Risse-Kappen, and Simmons 2013, 314). Auerswald (1999) for example, argues that democratic states engage in varying foreign policy behaviour that can be explained by their domestic circumstances. Based on Ostrom and Job’s (1986) work, there are four domestic dimensions that influence the foreign policy decision-making process. Specific to the US’ decisions during the Cold War, the domestic influences include: the public’s attitude toward the risks of international involvement during periods of high tension; the public’s attitude toward risks of international involvement; the public’s aversion to war; and the condition of the domestic economy (544).

Current literature provides two dominant theories regarding the domestic influences of foreign policy in liberal democratic states. First, the pluralist theory of democracy assumes a “bottom-up” approach where the general public has a considerable impact on foreign policy decisions (Risse-Kappen 1991, 480). As Nossal (1983) argues, the pluralist interpretation is closest to the normative ideal, as it explains how all citizens, individually or in groups, have an equal opportunity to impact government decisions (3). In this sense, the policy process is viewed as a type of marketplace of ideas and political parties and candidates compete for the support of the electorate by tailoring their policies to public demand (3).

In comparison, the statist or state-centred theory assumes a “top-down” approach where, “popular consensus is a function of the elite consensus and elite cleavages trickle down to mass public opinion” (Risse-Kappen 1991, 481). This approach believes that the public is easily manipulated by political leaders, especially in the realm of foreign policy where there is low salience and low degree of knowledge (Ibid). Statists make four main assumptions about the relationship between the state and civil society: political leaders possess their own interests and policy preferences; these interests do not always align with those of civil society; if state and civil society interests diverge, leaders will act on their own preferences to shift the values within society; and government has the power to prevail if there is a conflict of interest between the state and society (Nossal 1983, 7–8).

Risse-Kappen (1991) identifies several criticisms of the dominant theories of foreign policy influences. First, both pluralist and state-centred approaches view the electorate and “elites” or political leaders as unitary actors. Both of these groups are frequently divided and can often be separated into smaller groups with varying degrees of knowledge and influence. Within the electorate for example, we can distinguish, “(1) mass public opinion, (2) the attentive public, which has a
general interest in politics, and (3) issue publics, which are particularly attentive to specific questions” (482). Second, both approaches offer only a simplistic view that ignores the idea that public opinion and civil society groups can influence the policy process in different ways and at different stages (Ibid). It follows that foreign policy decisions should not be viewed along such a strict dichotomy. Instead, Dewitt and Kirton (1983) argue that in order to understand Canadian foreign policy, we must study both the state and civil society. As Nossal (1983) notes, this mixed model “conforms to the dominant method of analyzing the relationship between domestic sources and the external behaviour of the Canadian state” (17). The state is therefore assumed to have some authority over foreign policy decisions, but media attention, public opinion and various domestic actors also influence the foreign policy process (20).

In their discussion of critical influences of foreign policy decision-making, Nossal et al. (2015) identify domestic influences including domestic politics in general, societal demands, government and executive politics, and political parties. Specifically, they argue that the nature, composition and background of Canadian society must be considered, “particularly the historical cleavages within the Canadian political system” (10). Societal demands include both the unorganized expression of public and elite opinion, consistent with a mixed pluralist and state-centred approach, and the articulated demands of organized interest groups (11). Ultimately, the government makes the foreign policy decisions that impact the state’s position and image within the international community. Politics within the legislature and the executive, along with the structure of federal politics, lead to competing views of the national interest and appropriate foreign policy priorities (12-13). Nossal et al. (2015) argue that parliament itself, and sitting MPs, are largely irrelevant to foreign policy decisions. They claim this is due to the lack of interest of MPs in international matters, the lack of resources available to the opposition and the, “oppressive role of party discipline” (316). However, Nossal et al. (2015) acknowledge an increasing role of political parties in the formation of foreign policy, especially since the end of the Cold War (313). These ideas support the traditional theories within campaign promise literature, that parties matter, even within the foreign policy domain

**Public Opinion and Foreign Policy.** There is a general acknowledgement in the literature that domestic issues have more direct and immediate consequences on the lives of voters (Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida 1989, 123). Domestic issues are more accessible to the electorate because they are more likely to be based on direct experiences and compared to foreign policy issues, do not require high levels of information to be fully understood (Ibid). Gravelle et al. (2014) explain that research on public opinion toward foreign policy and the relationship to party
support has been discouraged by the Almond-Lippmann consensus, which assumes that ordinary citizens are, “incapable of formulating meaningful beliefs about foreign policy and, as a consequence, policymakers would be unwise to heed public opinion on such matters” (133). Since scholars believed citizens were incapable of possessing coherent beliefs or attitudes about foreign policy, it was considered illogical to study the impact of foreign policy on voter behaviour (Aldrich et al. 2006, 478).

More recently, a number of studies have attempted to determine the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy, often using individual-level data from survey analysis (Landriault 2016, 249). Work by Landriault (2016), and Aldrich et al. (2006) have indicated that contrary to the notions put forward by the Almond-Lippman consensus, the public actually has a coherent understanding of world affairs and issues surrounding foreign affairs have an impact on vote choices. In their study on American foreign policy, Gelpi et al. (2007) for example, find that public preferences on foreign policy are not only well structured, but also have an impact on vote choice (155). More specifically, they find that retrospective judgements about the President’s decision to use force in Iraq are most influential in determining vote choice (171). Other studies using data from recent US elections confirm Gelpi et al.’s (2007) finding that voting behaviour in both the 2004 and 2008 elections was at least in part, a result of the attitudes toward the Iraq War.20

In Canada, findings regarding the impact of foreign policy preferences on vote choice have been mixed. Gravelle et al. (2014) argue that elections in Canada are rarely determined based on the direction of foreign policy (113). Similarly, Noel et al.’s (2004) study finds that foreign aid (as an example of foreign policy) does not rank high among Canadian’s policy preferences (43). However, Aldrich et al. (1989) indicate that specific international problems, referred to as “hot spots”, dominate the concerns of the public in an ebb and flow pattern (131). In their study on militarism and internationalism in Canada, Gravelle et al. (2014) find that members of the electorate who identify as Conservative differ from identifiers of other parties on a majority of topics related to military and international issues (125). They indicate that, “Conservative partisans are more apt to endorse the idea that there are occasions when military force is required and to support the use of military force in theaters such as Afghanistan and Libya” (Ibid). On the internationalism dimension, Conservative voters were found to be less supportive of peacekeeping missions, foreign aid and human rights initiatives (Ibid). These studies indicate a clear relationship between foreign policy

20 See (Hillygus and Shields 2005; Norpoth and Sidman 2007; Hill, Herron, and Lewis 2010).
preferences and vote choice among the Canadian electorate, demonstrating an issue ownership effect.

As clearly emphasized by Job and Ostrom (1986), public opinion is believed to be a significant domestic influence over foreign policy decisions. Nossal (1983) indicates that for certain foreign policy decisions, societal preferences expressed through public opinion and efforts of interest groups may determine the foreign policy pursued by the state (19). As outlined in the issue ownership literature, if a party perceives themselves to “own” a particular issue in the public’s eye, they will likely campaign and pursue that issue. This notion is consistent with a more pluralist perspective of foreign policy formation.

**Political Parties and Foreign Policy.** In-depth analyses of parties’ electoral behaviour based on the idea that domestic influences over foreign policy exist are limited within the literature. However, the importance of political parties throughout the foreign policy decision-making process is recognized by a growing number of scholars. Whether political parties recognize the salience of foreign policy for example, is addressed by Joly and Dandoy (2016) in their recent study on the influence of political parties on foreign policy formulation in Belgium. Following Ostrom and Job’s (1986) study indicating that domestic, political factors were more influential on the American president’s military decisions, Joly and Dandoy (2016) argue that political parties can be considered among the main influences in the creation of foreign policy commitments and policy outputs (1). Based on their findings, it must be recognized that domestic institutions and political factors such as party politics play a role in foreign policy decisions. Other studies that have built on this recognition include Wagner et al. (2018), which explains how deployment decisions are contested amongst political parties in France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom; Williams (2015), which links vote choice and partisanship to defense spending preferences; Auerswald (1999), which explores the domestic factors of military decisions, including party accountability; and Bjereld and Demker (2000), which addresses issues of party unity and national interest during foreign and military policy-making.

It is generally acknowledged that political parties must provide alternative platforms to the electorate on issues of both domestic and foreign policy (Gelpi 2017, 1926). The general belief follows that since political parties represent the preferences of those who voted for them in the most recent election, parties will enact changes in foreign policy areas if their voters indicated specific preferences (Tingley 2010, 42). Although clear indications of foreign policy preferences do not often present themselves during an election, foreign policy literature suggests that the public is often divided on ideological lines over specific issues. In this sense, political parties matter from a pluralist perspective based on how they
choose to respond to public demand. A number of studies have attempted to investigate the foreign policy preferences of voters. Martini (2012) discusses the idea of a “foreign policy ideology”, whereby citizens possess a specific ideology that drives their preferences for specific foreign policies and shapes their perceptions of specific events and government actions.\(^\text{21}\)

Party ideology has often been used to explain variation across party manifestos and promise fulfilment with reference to specific issue areas. In other words, these ideological lines have been found to exist at the party level within the foreign policy domain as well, indicating that parties matter from a state-centred perspective. Existing scholarship has tended to focus on two or more main dimensions within “foreign policy ideology”, these often include a militant or security-based dimension, and a cooperative or community-based dimension (Wittkopf 1990; Chittick, Billingsley, and Travis 1995; Bjørerd and Demker 2000; Martini 2012). In this sense, those more to the right of the political spectrum are expected to focus more on the militant dimension and those more to the left are expected to focus more on the cooperative dimension.

Studies have indicated that party politics and the policy positions of political parties clearly matter in foreign policy decision-making. Fleck and Kilby (2001) and Milner and Tingley (2010) indicate that a clear liberal-conservative ideology exists in the US Congress in regards to foreign aid. Moss (2007) finds that historically, Republicans are more generous than Democrats in their foreign aid commitments to Africa. Tingley (2010) ultimately argues that in reference to foreign aid policy, ideological beliefs, “channeled through an electoral process could lead to important changes in donor foreign aid policy” (42). Outside of the US, Kaarbo (1996) demonstrates that conflicts over foreign policy in both Germany and Israel occurred between differing ideological positions of parties within coalition governments (502). Similarly, Joly and Dandoy’s (2016) study finds that for coalition governments in Belgium, political parties differ in their foreign policy priorities and will often compete to ensure their own priorities are reflected in the government’s policy program (1). Hagan et al. (2001) found that foreign policymaking in the Netherlands takes place at the elite level, often within a sub-group of senior cabinet ministers (183).

There are several main studies that address the campaign promises and electoral behaviour of parties in relation to foreign policy. Consistent with the literature on campaign promises and issue ownership, Heffington (2016) highlights that parties in liberal democratic states are believed to, “signal their foreign policy positions prior to elections by selectively emphasizing concepts in their party manifestos”\(^\text{21}\).

\(^{21}\) See also (Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser 1999; Schoen 2007).
(77) 22. In the Canadian context, Nossal et al. (2015) explain that differences in foreign policy preferences between parties became more apparent following the end of the Cold War in 1991 and the transformation of the Canadian political system (311). In regard to military and defence policy between 1919-1991, there was significant “strategic consensus” between the dominant federal political parties on critical foreign policy issues. Both Conservative and Liberal parties for example, favoured going to war through a British alliance for both World War I and World War II. Similarly, both parties agreed to Canada’s membership in the Western camp throughout the Cold War (312). Policies related to diplomatic relations and trade were more distinct between the two parties from 1911-1993 (Ibid). However, from 1993 onwards, a clear dissensus emerges across nearly all aspects of foreign policy (313).

Nossal et al. (2015) argue that following 9/11, this divergence, “became more pronounced on a number of key foreign policy issues: how to best respond, how much to spend on defence, whether to join the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2002, whether to join the BMD program, and whether to expand the Afghanistan mission” (213). This period of dissensus continued with the election of the Harper government in 2006 and the subsequent minority governments (314). Although in-depth discussions of the electoral behaviour of political parties with respect to foreign policy is limited within the literature, it is apparent that the priorities and policy preferences of political parties can at least be considered as important domestic influences of foreign policy-decision making in Canada. Part II aims to determine whether there are clear differences between the two dominant parties in their rates of foreign policy promise fulfilment. It draws on campaign promise literature and the mandate theory of elections specifically to further investigate the role of political parties in foreign policy-decision making.

**Research Design**

*Case Selection.* The following section presents the methodological framework of this research project, including a discussion on case selection and the method of data collection to locate foreign policy promises in the election manifests of Canadian parties and to determine whether those promises have been fulfilled. The methodological framework has been constructed to determine whether parties matter and to answer the descriptive question, do Canadian political parties keep their foreign policy promises?

*Political Party Selection.* Part II of this research project focuses on the party manifests and government actions of eight successive governments at the federal

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22 See also (Trumbore and Dulio 2013; Lesperance 2016).
level from 1993 to 2015. Often referred to as a “two party-plus” system, Canadian federal politics in the last two decades has been dominated by only two parties, the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party (including its previous forms such as the Progressive Conservative Party, the Reform Party and the Canadian Alliance). Although other parties must be acknowledged at the federal level, Part II is focused solely on those parties that have won government with arguably, the largest influence over foreign affairs.

It is possible to categorize the major parties in Canada along two separate spectrums: the ideological spectrum and the foundational spectrum. In accordance with data from the CMP, the ideological spectrum of party politics in Canada is as follows: the New Democratic Party (NDP) is to the left, the Canadian Alliance party is to the right and the Liberal and Conservative parties are to the centre-left and centre-right, respectively (Ibid, 591). In considering the Liberal and Conservative ideological positions, there is a clear widening of the ideological gap between them during the 1980’s and again in 1993, presenting a clear difference between both for the time period selected (1993-2015) (Ibid).

In contrast, Flynn and Marlin (2017) consider different types of parties from a foundational purpose perspective. They adopt a dichotomous variable of brokerage versus wedge-based parties. In this sense, the Liberal Party is considered to be a brokerage-based party, appealing to the widest range of voters through a more flexible approach to policy development (Ibid). Arguably, the current Conservative Party is viewed as more of a wedge-based party that executes a more strategic approach focused primarily on its core voters. This approach is believed to create greater emphasis on promise fulfilment and therefore lends itself well to the current research study (Ibid).


The proposed time period allows for an investigation of broader institutional and structural factors such as government status and size of government related to the

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23 See also (Cairns 1968) historical work on brokerage politics in Canada.
policy capacity of political parties. The timeframe between 1993 to 2015 is sufficient in order to distinguish both short and long-term trends in foreign policy promise fulfilment.

**Organization of Research**

Empirical studies of campaign promise fulfilment traditionally analyze party manifestos in order to measure issue emphases during elections and the fulfilment of those promises following elections (Walgraeve, Tresch, and Lefevere 2015). Within this group of studies, there are those who focus solely on the scope and content of election manifestos and others who focus solely on the promise fulfilment of the governing parties. While both are useful, Part II is primarily focused on the policy-making capacity of parties upon winning government.

The CMP uses the core ideas of the selective emphasis model to analyze election manifestos, with the understanding that parties, “focus only on issues that are favourable to them, while ignoring issues that could be electoral liabilities” (Werner, Lacewell, and Volkens 2015). Empirical studies that follow the CMP method use the CMP dataset to identify common themes and issues in election manifestos and compare these to budget allocation. The coding unit in a manifesto is the “quasi-sentence”, or a specific argument regarding a political idea or issue (Volkens 2002, 3). Each quasi-sentence contains exactly one statement or message (Werner, Lacewell, and Volkens 2015, 6). It is important to note that these “quasi-sentences” are not always actionable promises, but simply represent statements dedicated to particular issues.

While the CMP method uses a “quasi-sentence” as the coding unit, empirical studies such as those found within the Comparative Party Pledge Group (CPPG) literature use specific actionable promises, known as “pledges,” as the coding unit to measure promises and promise fulfilment. Pledges are defined as the, “commitments in parties’ programs to carry out certain policies or achieve certain outcomes” (Thomson et al. 2017). In other words, they can be clearly measured based on fulfilment, allowing for a more “fine-grained analysis of the program-to-policy linkage” (Duval and Pétry 2019). This dissertation combines the methodology of the CMP and the pledge-approach by manually coding party manifestos based on the CMP’s categorization and the CPPG’s definition of “pledge”. This is followed by an analysis of government actions through official government documents (parliamentary debates/speeches, legislation) and government communications to measure promise fulfilment.
**Election Manifestos.** The first step of data collection is to manually code the election manifestos of the governing parties for each election from 1993-2015. This includes identifying the total number of pledges in each manifesto and isolating those specific to foreign policy commitments. The manifestos of the Liberal and Conservative Party from 1993 to 2015 are accessed through the database provided by the Canadian branch of the CMP, Poltext.

Pledges include specific actions or outcomes, such as “we will increase the size of the Reserve forces” or “we will increase Official Development Assistance”. In addition, this research project uses the CMP’s coding categories to systematically characterize the foreign policy-related pledges within each party manifesto. The CMP method’s standard coding frame includes fifty-six categories within seven policy domains (Werner, Lacewell, and Volkens 2015, 7). This dissertation categorizes the foreign policy pledges within the CMP’s “external relations domain”, which includes the following categories: foreign special relationships (positive/negative), anti-imperialism, military (positive/negative), peace, and internationalism (positive/negative) (Ibid, 8). One additional category is added as “Other”, to include those promises or statements that do not fall within the CMP’s coding scheme. These often include promises related to international branding and parliamentary oversight of foreign policy.

Data collected at this stage therefore includes the number of total pledges or promises for each governing party from 1993-2015, the number of foreign policy-related pledges, the percentage of foreign policy pledges compared to the total number for each election period, and information on more specific categorized pledges within the external relations domain (or foreign policy).

**Legislative Actions.** The second stage of data collection analyzes promise fulfilment through an examination of specific government actions in relation to the foreign policy commitments identified within the party manifesto of the winning party. A qualitative content analysis similar to that of Flynn and Marlin (2017) is conducted by exploring and consulting relevant budget documents, legislation, parliamentary proceedings, along with updates from government officials and legislative debates in Hansard. Following the work of Flynn (2009) and Thomson et al. (2017), promise fulfilment is defined on a continuum, including three types: fulfilled, partially fulfilled and not fulfilled. Data collected

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25 One of this study’s limitations is the use of a single coder to analyze election manifestos and manually record pledges. It is recognized that the use of multiple coders results in a more reliable analysis (Potter and Levine-Donnerstein 1999).

26 The Poltext project website can be found at: [www.poltext.org](http://www.poltext.org).

27 See Appendix for full explanation of CMP coding categories.

28 See also (Francois Petry, Duval, and Birch 2018; François Petry and Collette 2009; Thomson 2001; Thomson et al. 2017; Duval and Pétry 2019; Flynn 2009).
at this stage will include the number of foreign policy promises (within the external relations domain) fulfilled, partially fulfilled and not fulfilled by each governing party from 1993-2015. Promises are also coded as unfulfilled if no information on specific policy action can be found. Since the 2015 government period is not complete, several promises from this election are coded as “uncertain”. It is important to note that the focus of the second stage is on the decisions of policy makers- the policy outputs, rather than the effect of those decisions- the policy outcomes (François Petry and Collette 2009, 2). The use of qualitative content analysis also permits the analysis of policy-specific campaign promises within the foreign policy domain.

**Evaluation.** The final stage of the research involves a descriptive analysis of campaign promise fulfilment specific to foreign policy. This allows an individual party-level examination along with a comparison across parties over time. A comparison of this data from 1993-2015 helps to determine whether parties fulfil their foreign policy promises and whether Canadian political parties differ in their rates of foreign policy promise fulfilment. A method of cross tabulation is used in order to analyze and describe the data effectively. A cross-tab analysis provides a means of describing the presence of foreign policy priorities in manifestos and promise fulfilment of Canada’s two dominant political parties from 1993-2015. A cross tabulation therefore includes the data collected from both stages of the research process: first, the number and percentage of foreign policy pledges in each election manifesto, including specific categories within the CMP’s external relations domain, and second, the number and percentage of foreign policy promises fulfilled, partially fulfilled and not fulfilled for each governing party. A more detailed analysis of the types of promises fulfilled by Canada’s political parties is also conducted to determine key trends in foreign policy priorities and differences between parties within the foreign policy domain.

The mandate theory of elections indicates that parties will work to fulfil their electoral promises upon winning office. Based on this basic idea of democratic politics, an initial hypothesis can be derived generally and specific to Canada:

**Hypothesis I:** Regardless of the policy area, political parties will work to fulfil their electoral promises at relatively respectable rates.

Ia) Canadian political parties will therefore work to fulfil their foreign policy-related promises, demonstrating that parties play a role in the foreign policy domain.

However, studies demonstrating the importance of political parties within the foreign policy domain have been limited within the literature. Although Canadian political parties have been found to fulfil their electoral promises at consistent
rates, foreign policy has often been considered outside the realm of party politics. If this were accurate, a counter hypothesis can be derived:

*Alternative Hypothesis: Canadian political parties will not fulfil their foreign policy-related promises, demonstrating a limited influence of parties within the foreign policy domain.*

**Findings**

A total of 1,251 pledges were manually coded for governing parties from 1993-2015, including 151 foreign policy-specific pledges. Table 4 sets out the findings on overall foreign policy-related promise fulfilment for the governing parties between 1993-2015. As demonstrated, Canadian governing parties fulfil their foreign policy commitments on average 48.1% of the time and at least partially fulfilled (including full fulfilment) their foreign policy promises 74.6% of the time on average. Canadian governing parties fulfil their foreign policy-related promises at varying rates, ranging from a low of 27.8% with the Harper Conservative government in 2006 to a high of 76.9% with the Chretien Liberals in 1997. When foreign policy-related promises that were partially fulfilled are included, five of eight governments took action to fulfil more than 70% of their foreign policy election commitments. The Conservative government of 2011 at least partially fulfilled only 46.1% of promises, while the Chretien Liberal government in 1997 at least partially fulfilled 100% of foreign policy-related promises. When comparing across parties over time, the Liberal Party at least partially fulfilled their foreign policy promises nearly 80% of the time on average, while the Conservative Party at least partially fulfilled their foreign policy promises 61.4% of the time on average.

**Table 4. Rates of Foreign Policy Promise Fulfilment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election/Party</th>
<th>Total FP Promises</th>
<th>Fulfilled</th>
<th>% Fulfilled</th>
<th>Partially Fulfilled</th>
<th>% Partially Fulfilled</th>
<th>Not Fulfilled</th>
<th>% Not Fulfilled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal 1993</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal 1997</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>76.9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal 2000</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal 2004</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative 2006</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative 2008</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Note: Two promises are coded as unfulfilled, while four additional promises are coded as “uncertain” since the Liberal 2015 government has not completed its mandate yet.

Table 5 includes the findings for the promise fulfilment of foreign policy-related promises within each CMP category. This includes promises made within the external relations domain, including policy categories for: foreign special relationships (positive/negative), anti-imperialism, military (positive/negative), peace, and internationalism (positive/negative). One additional category is included as “Other”, for those promises not included within the CMP’s current categorization. As Table 5 indicates, the Liberal and Conservative Party differ both over time and within each election period in the policy-specific breakdown of their foreign policy promise fulfilment. Promises made within the foreign special relationships category are only partially fulfilled 58.5% of the time on average across both parties and all election periods. Rates for the Liberal and Conservative Party for these promises are relatively similar.

However, the Liberal and Conservative government differ in most other policy categories. While military-related (positive) promises are partially fulfilled 67.3% of the time on average, the early Liberal governments (1993 and 1997) fulfilled far more military-related promises compared to all other parties. The current Trudeau government’s record of military-related promise fulfilment (88.2% partially fulfilled) is also admirable. Although the Conservative Party is often associated more with military issues, they only partially fulfilled 50% of all military-related promises while in office. Internationalism promises are partially fulfilled 89.6% of the time on average. The Conservatives perform slightly worse with partial fulfilment rates of 88.9%, compared to 90% for the Liberals across the selected time period.

Table 5. Rates of Foreign Policy Promise Fulfilment for each Foreign Policy Category (Percentage at least partially fulfilled)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party/Election Year</th>
<th>Foreign Special Relationships Positive (101)</th>
<th>Military Positive (104)</th>
<th>Military Negative (105)</th>
<th>Peace (106)</th>
<th>Internationalism Positive (107)</th>
<th>Other (100)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal 1993</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Discussion**

**Campaign Promise Fulfilment.** In a recent cross-national comparison of campaign promise fulfilment, parties were found to at least partially fulfil their promises approximately 60% of the time (Thomson et al. 2017, 534). Similarly, recent studies on promise fulfilment in Canada indicate that Canadian political parties fulfil their campaign promises at relatively respectable rates. In their 2018 study, Petry, Duval and Birch find that 68.2% of all promises made by the governing party between 1993 and 2015 (excluding the most recent 2015 election) were at least partially fulfilled (2018, 91). Flynn and Marlin (2017) find an overall fulfilment rate of 67.9% among a selection of twenty-four campaign promises within the same time period. In contrast to previous literature, the conclusions of these studies highlight the importance of parties in the policy-making process. As Flynn and Marlin (2017) outline, “whether election campaign promises are actually put into place when a party achieves government is important from a normative democratic participation perspective”. But, do these findings apply within specific policy domains?

The purpose of this research project is to determine whether Canadian political parties play a role in foreign policy decision-making. It argues that if political parties take action to fulfil their foreign policy-related election promises, then they possess policy-making capacity in the foreign policy domain and therefore
must be considered an agent in the decision-making process. As Table 4 indicates, Canadian governing parties at least partially fulfil their foreign policy promises 74.7% of the time, surpassing the findings on fulfilment rates in Canada for all promises as a whole. The Liberal Party at least partially fulfilled their foreign policy promises 82.2% of the time on average from 1993-2015, and the Conservative Party at least partially fulfilled their foreign policy promises 61.4% of the time on average. These findings clearly support the mandate theory of elections and Hypothesis I of this research project, demonstrating that political parties will attempt to fulfil their electoral commitments once elected, regardless of the policy domain. While rates of fulfilment vary across parties and governments, it is evident that parties not only selectively emphasize foreign policy issues within their election manifestos, but they remain committed to fulfilling them once in office. This disproves Hypothesis II, and instead indicates a strong policy-making role for political parties in the foreign policy decision-making process. Although there are clear differences, this remains the case when broken down even further into more policy-specific categories within the foreign policy domain (as evident in Table 5).

**Influence of Political Parties on Foreign Policy Decision-Making.** The differences found between the rates of promise fulfilment in the foreign policy domain between the Liberal and Conservative parties from 1993-2015 could be explained by several different factors. While the purpose of Part II is focused more on the explorative question of foreign policy-related commitments and promise fulfilment, some speculations can be made based on previous findings in the literature to analyze the differences in foreign policy priorities and promise fulfilment in Canada. There is a growing number of studies within the campaign promise literature that focus on explanatory factors of promise fulfilment, including factors associated with institutional arrangements, party behaviour and the broader policy environment.

Government size and status are among the main institutional arrangements that help explain a party’s ability to fulfil their election commitments. Thomson et al. (2017) for example, find that parties with legislative majorities are more likely to fulfil their election promises than those with minorities or who are forced to share power with other parties. Flynn and Marlin’s (2017) study confirms this finding in the Canadian context, showing that majority governing parties partially fulfilled their promises 78.2% of the time, while minority governing parties partially fulfilled their promises 72.2% of the time. When this hypothesis is applied within the foreign policy domain, there are similar results for the Liberal Party but not for the Conservative Party. As Table 4 highlights, while the Liberal Party’s promise fulfilment demonstrates a clear decline in fulfilment during its minority
status of 2004, the Conservative Party’s worst fulfilment rate of foreign policy commitments occurred during its majority government win in 2011.

A governing party’s incumbency record is believed to impact its ability to fulfil campaign promises. This conclusion appears accurate for the Liberal Party from 1993-2000, where the rate of partial fulfilment of foreign policy promises increases significantly from 73.5% in 1993 (its first term in office) to 100% in 1997 and 90% in 2000. These high rates of promise fulfilment decline following the 2004 election, but this can likely be explained by both the minority status of government and the change in leadership. Rates of foreign policy promise fulfilment for the Conservative Party do not demonstrate a clear trend based on incumbency record. While the percentage of foreign policy promises partially fulfilled increased slightly between 2006 and 2008 (from 66.7% to 71.4%), this rate decreases substantially in the party’s third term in office in 2011 (to 46.1%).

In addition to institutional arrangements, studies have attempted to explain differences in promise fulfilment based on party type. First, ideological differences among parties have been used to explain variation across party manifests and promise fulfilment (Farstad 2017; Abou-Chadi 2016). Existing scholarship has tended to focus on two or more main dimensions within “foreign policy ideology”, these often include a militant or security-based dimension, and a cooperative or community-based dimension (Wittkopf 1990; Chittick, Billingsley, and Travis 1995; Bjereld and Demker 2000; Martini 2012). In this sense, those more to the right of the political spectrum are expected to focus more on the militant dimension and those more to the left are expected to focus more on the cooperative dimension. Findings from this research study largely support these ideas: The Conservative Party (centre-right) consistently focuses more on issues within the military category, while the Liberal Party (centre-left) consistently focuses more on issues within the internationalism category. However, the Conservative Party fails to fulfil a significant amount of their military-related promises and rates of promise fulfilment within the internationalism category are very similar across parties. This indicates that ideology might not explain differences in promise fulfilment within the foreign policy domain in Canada. Instead, it demonstrates that different types of policies within the foreign policy domain might be more difficult to fulfil than others.

Flynn and Marlin’s (2017) distinction of brokerage vs. wedge based parties might provide an alternative explanation, especially for the differences in promise fulfilment. The foundational purpose perspective classifies the Liberal Party as a brokerage-based party, while the Conservative Party is classified as a wedge-based party. While the hypothesis is generally that wedge-based parties will work to fulfil their election commitments more frequently, they find that the Liberal
governments fulfil their election commitments more often than their Conservative counterparts. This means that brokerage-based parties might be more likely to fulfil their campaign promises. This trend is consistent within the foreign policy domain, with Liberals partially fulfilling their foreign policy promises 82.2% of the time and Conservatives partially fulfilling their campaign promises 61.4% of the time.

Ultimately, the explanations for differences among promise fulfilment found within the literature do not whole-heartedly explain the results found within the foreign policy domain in Canada. The minority/majority status hypothesis is evident for most of the Liberal governments but not found to be true for the Conservative governments. Similarly, the incumbency record hypothesis is accurate for the election period between 1993-2004 but not from 2004-2015. In addition, the more policy-specific analysis of promise fulfilment does not embody the traditional assumptions of foreign policy ideology among Canadian parties.

Instead, the overall policy environment is believed to have a more significant impact on the findings presented in Tables 4 and 5 of foreign policy promise fulfilment. These include the surrounding economic and external conditions such as the economy, the budget status, globalization, international institutions, and overall public opinion. While these factors have been found to impact the overall policy-making capacity of political parties, their impact may be heightened within the foreign policy domain. There is a growing body of literature on foreign policy decision-making and the influences of foreign policy that might help explain the differences in promise fulfilment of foreign policy commitments. Changes in geopolitics, foreign relations and the global economy more broadly are more likely to impact the foreign policy decisions of governments and their ability to fulfil stated foreign policy commitments.

While a full analysis of these factors on the foreign policy promise fulfilment of Canada’s political parties is beyond the scope of this research project, it must be recognized that more policy-specific studies are necessary to fully understand party behaviour and policy-making capacity. The institutional and structural factors found to explain overall promise fulfilment in Canada and other countries are not considered to be accurate explanations within the foreign policy domain. Yet, this analysis finds that Canadian political parties fulfil their foreign policy promises a significant amount of the time.

**Conclusion**

Part II of this dissertation recognizes the important contribution of the growing body of literature on campaign promises proving that *parties matter*. However, these studies are often broad-sweeping and lack focus on specific policy areas,
including foreign policy. Instead, Part II acknowledges that the behaviour of political parties and the factors that work to constrain their behaviour are likely to vary across different policy domains. This is evident through the vast literature on foreign policy decision-making, which has only recently begun to acknowledge domestic influences as significant in the decision-making process. With a limited number of studies investigating the role of political parties in the foreign policy domain, Part II makes an important theoretical contribution by bridging the literature on campaign promises with that associated with foreign policy decision-making. Through their attempts to structure campaign promises and fulfil their electoral mandate, Part II finds that political parties represent an important domestic influence of foreign policy.

The well-established methodological approach within campaign promise literature is used to determine whether political parties possess foreign policy-making capacity. Part II of this research project makes a methodological contribution by using both the CMP method and the more common practice of measuring pledge fulfilment. While the CMP’s use of “quasi-sentences” is not useful to measure the fulfilment of actionable promises, its categorization of promises into broad domains and more specific categories provides an additional layer of analysis. Coding the foreign policy-related promises through the CMP’s external relations domain of categories permits an analysis of more policy-specific promises within the foreign policy domain and a more in-depth party comparison to analyze promise fulfilment.

Findings presented in Table 4 demonstrate that although Canadian governing parties fulfil their foreign policy-related promises at varying rates, both the Conservative and Liberal parties remain committed to fulfilling their foreign policy promises once in office. Nearly 75% of all foreign policy-related promises from 1993-2015 are at least partially fulfilled. Based on the mandate theory of elections, this demonstrates that parties not only possess foreign policy-making capacity, but also can be considered a significant influence over the foreign policy decision-making process.

It must be noted that the rates of fulfilment for foreign policy-related promises differ from recent findings on overall promise fulfilment in Canada. In addition, a rough analysis of common institutional and structural explanations for differences in promise fulfilment do not fully explain the foreign policy case. The Conservative 2011 government for example, represents an interesting case study within the foreign policy domain. The Harper Conservative government held a majority for the first time and was in its third term in office and yet had its lowest rate of promise fulfilment in the foreign policy domain. Common hypotheses in the literature on minority/majority status and incumbency record were found to be
inaccurate for explaining this finding. While political parties possess policy-making capacity over foreign policy areas, it is expected that factors associated with the overall policy environment, such as economic and external conditions, are more likely to impact the rates of promise fulfilment by governing parties for foreign policy-related promises.

Further research is required to connect the well-known international and domestic influences of foreign policy decision-making with the acknowledgement that parties matter. Future research can focus on individual election case studies to determine how influential parties are in relation to other acknowledged factors. The Harper Conservative government for example, only partially fulfilled 27.8% of all foreign policy-related promises in 2006 but partially fulfilled 71.6% of all foreign policy promises in 2008. What might explain these differences? Are there other more significant domestic factors, or do international influences provide the best explanation?

Finally, Part II touches briefly on the idea of “foreign policy ideology” as a key factor in both voter and party behaviour within the foreign policy domain. It has been recognized within the literature that the Conservative and Liberal Party are ideologically different from one another. Findings from Part II indicate that ideology might play a role in how these two parties structure their foreign policy-related promises but does not help explain the rates of promise fulfilment within specific foreign policy categories. Ultimately, Part II of this dissertation provides a basis of support for studying the role of Canadian political parties in the foreign policy decision-making process. While the established notion argues that partisan politics stops at the water’s edge, the findings from Part II indicate that through their electoral commitments, political parties have an impact on the content and direction of foreign policy-making in Canada.
Bibliography


Aldrich, John, Christopher Gelpi, Peter Feaver, Jason Reifler, and Kristin Thompson Sharp. March 2006. “Foreign Policy and the Electoral Connection.” *Political Science Faculty Publications*.


The Conservative Party of Canada. 2006. “Stand up for Canada.”


Appendix: CMP Categorization

SOURCE: (Volkens et al. 2017).

External Relations Domain

Per101: Foreign Special Relationships: Positive

Favourable mentions of particular countries with which the manifesto country has a special relationship; the need for co-operation with and/or aid to such countries.

Per102: Foreign Special Relationships: Negative

Negative mentions of particular countries with which the manifesto country has a special relationship.

Per103: Anti-Imperialism: Negative

Negative references to imperial behaviour and/or negative references to one state exerting strong influence (political, military or commercial) over other states. May also include:

Negative references to controlling other countries as if they were part of an empire;

Favourable references to greater self-government and independence for colonies;

Favourable mentions of de-colonisation.

Per104: Military: Positive

The importance of external security and defence. May include statements concerning:

The need to maintain or increase military expenditure;

The need to secure adequate manpower in the military;

The need to modernise armed forces and improve military strength;

The need for rearmament and self-defence;

The need to keep military treaty obligations.

Per105: Military: Negative

Negative references to the military or use of military power to solve conflicts. References to the ‘evils of war’. May include references to:

Decreasing military expenditures;
Disarmament;
Reduced or abolished conscription

_Per106: Peace_

Any declaration of belief in peace and peaceful means of solving crises – absent reference to the military. May include:

Peace as a general goal;
Desirability of countries joining in negotiations with hostile countries;
Ending wars in order to establish peace.

_Per107: Internationalism: Positive_

Need for international co-operation, including co-operation with specific countries other than those coded in 101. May also include references to the:

Need for aid to developing countries;
Need for world planning of resources;
Support for global governance;
Need for international courts;
Support for UN or other international organisations.