THE ACTIVE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
IN ST. AUGUSTINE
CONTENTS

Introduction ................................................... 1

Chapter One .................................................... 1

1. Background to the Problem of Sense Knowledge.
   Manichaeism
   The Academy

2. The Active Theory of Sensation

Chapter Two ................................................... 28

Memory and Will

Chapter Three ................................................ 46

Skepticism and Truth

Chapter Four .................................................. 64

Faith and Reason

Chapter Five ................................................... 84

Conclusion

Notes

Notes ............................................................... 89

Bibliography ..................................................... 97
THE ACTIVE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

IN ST. AUGUSTIN

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Introduction

St. Augustine did not do epistemology after the fashion of a Descartes or a Kant. His writing on the subject is not systematic. Augustine's theory of knowledge has to be reconstructed from bits and pieces from several sources. Augustine makes reference to some aspect of knowledge theory while writing on such varied subjects as philosophy, theology and exegesis; rather surprisingly, his most lengthly treatment of epistemology is contained in an academic book on music. This does not mean, however, that there is no distinctive Augustinian epistemology. Augustine was acutely aware of the problem of knowledge. One of the first things Augustine was to do after becoming a Christian was to write a book against the Academics in order to expose the error of their uncertainty principle. Throughout his lifetime Augustine was always aware of the errors he had fallen into because of his previous acceptance of the materialistic sensualism of the Manichaeans and the skepticism of the New Academy.

The Augustinian theory of knowledge seems to follow from Augustine's theory of man. Man is basically his soul, using a body. The theory of knowledge that results from this can best be called an active theory since it is the soul that will be the active cause of knowledge. The soul radically transcends the body and is not subject to influences from the body. Hence, knowledge is produced solely in the mind.
On the first level of knowledge, sense knowledge, this active theory of the soul will make a rather surprising claim as to the status of sensation. True, sensation is the reception of an impression, but it is the soul that does the impressing as well as the receiving. Sensation becomes an activity of the soul upon the soul. There is no alternative since nothing from without (corporeal) can affect the soul (incorporeal).

In his discussion of memory and will Augustine will attempt to show how what is known cannot be divorced from what is loved; love being defined as a certain movement of the will. The will directs the soul's attention to the memory from whence comes all that enters into the understanding. In the memory are contained images of material things, arts and skills and even such abstract notions as eternity and God. The memory produces and stores images and it is the will which combines and unites these images and binds them to the understanding.

Skepticism itself suffers from internal contradictions. A strict skepticism is not only practically impossible to maintain, it is also logically impossible to maintain. The skeptic acknowledges that absolute element of truth when he asserts his skeptical principle. Even on the skeptic's program there are many things one can be certain of. Since the soul is directly present to itself, how can it be deceived in what it reports? If I say I see a red chair or feel a cool breeze how can I be mistaken? After all I am only describing what the soul has impressed upon the soul. Whatever knowledge we have is a knowledge of what is true. This is an antimanichaean,
antiskeptic principle at work. For the contrary of being is non-being and all things are true so far as they have a being.

But how does one come to a knowledge of the truth? How else but by faith. One must believe in order to understand. Faith is an integral part of all wisdom, science and social life. Faith is only possible to rational creatures, but reason itself is blind and therefore can raise no superstructure on its own foundation. Reasons and reasoning operate effectively only within certain shared belief structures. Reasoning operates on what is believed to be true. One does not arbitrarily choose the idiom of his belief structure and can interpret one idiom only from the standpoint of another. One does not reason from one basic belief structure to another, for there is a great gulf fixed between them. Those that pass over do so by a conversion of the will. Augustine was well acquainted with this experience, as he had been converted from Manichaeism to Skepticism to Christianity. He makes his most devastating attacks on his previous errors from the standpoint of a new belief structure - Christian Revelation.
It is helpful in understanding Augustine's epistemology to know something of the situation in which he was involved. I suggest there are two basic factors that influenced Augustine in his development of an epistemology, namely Manichaeism and the New Academy. Both of these were negative influences, that is, they represented positions Augustine would later violently react to. However, Augustine had held to the doctrine of both the Manichaeans and the Academy, in turn. He was to form his theory of knowledge only after he left the teaching of both these groups and interpret both from a radically different standpoint. Throughout his works Augustine seems always aware of the errors he propagated in his earlier life and for this reason some introduction to the background of Augustine's thought is required.

1. Background to the Problem of Sensation

MANICHAEISM. The Manichaeans taught that in the original state of things existed two eternal, infinite separate kingdoms. Above the earth and on all sides extending infinitely was the kingdom of Light. Below the earth and extending infinitely in the downward direction was the kingdom of Darkness.

The kingdom of Light contained the King (of light) or God, ether of light and an earth of light. The earth was composed of a fine
pure matter consisting of the elements of wind, light, breath, water and fire. In very mythical language the Manichaeans describe the darkness as personal and ruled by a personal being much like the personified "chaos" of the Babylonian Tiamat. The darkness was also composed of five elements, cloud, burning, burning wind, air and darkness.

A power from the world of darkness being envious of the light, decided to enter the kingdom of Light. The King of Light sent a representative to do battle, but it seems was defeated by the dark powers. There resulted a commingling of the elements of darkness and light. This produced the world of sense. Now the Manichaeans suggested that man was the offspring of the devil and five evil female powers. Man was born with a body of dark matter and a soul of light elements. The soul became entrapped by a body of dark elements. These dark elements were too dense for the light particles of soul to pass through. Man is affected by the material world according to the composition of the matter. For instance, matter composed of more light elements than dark produces an effect on man corresponding to its nature. Thus matter of a light nature produces beneficent and pleasant effects. Matter composed of a predominance of dark elements causes destructive and maleficent results. An example is fire, which belongs as an original element to both darkness and light. Fire has a twofold agency. On one hand it warms and is pleasant (if it is predominantly composed of light elements of fire) but on the other it consumes and is destructive (when dominated by dark elements of fire).

The Manichaeans taught that salvation is a release of the light from the dark elements, in other words a release of the soul from
the flesh. However, this soul that seeks release, which can only be accomplished by following the teaching of Mani, is still a material soul. It is distinguished from the flesh because of the rarity of its elements. When all the light elements have been released from the dark, sensation will come to an end. Sensation cannot occur in anything too dense, like a rock. The soul is basically passive. It is the heavy dark powers that are active. It is they that force themselves upon the light (the good). Later we will see Augustine bring up this point in regard to the effect of an external body on a sense organ, i.e. a body could not produce a sound on a listener were it not for the fact his ear drum is thin and there are passages of air between the different parts of the ear. Too dense an organ could not sense.

The Manichaeans were extreme literalists. For every emotion and every allegory they conceived a physical reality. For them there were no nonmaterial images, no completely intellectual entities. Even their god shared in the same materiality as the ether above the earth. God was the light within the light elements. Light is not considered in any allegorical way. Even knowledge is considered to be a corporeal element. Thus god himself is contained within the form of physical bodies.

It is against this excessive materializing that Augustine eventually reacted. In the Confessions he recalls that thinking of God and the soul as some kind of body "was the greatest and almost sole cause of my inevitable error."² "I had no conception of the mind excepting as a subtle body, and that diffused in local space."³ Augustine over and over admits that the greatest harm done him by the Manichaean doctrine was to prevent him from seeing the mind as something other than refined matter.
As strange as it sounds it seems the younger Augustine had little conception of allegory and myth. Though he read classical literature it seems the excessive personification of the Manichaeans made him see everything in extremely literal fashion, as if each word had to refer to some actual corporeal existent or property of it. Augustine seems amazed when he hears Ambrose expounding the O. T. allegorically — "which when I had accepted literally, I was killed spiritually". If only I could have realized a spiritual substance all their strong holds would have been beaten down.

Gilson says "Augustine's Manichaean experience is not forgotten; he forgets it so little that he makes use of it. Just as his "I think" makes skepticism provide a refutation of skepticism, so his analysis of sense knowledge makes Manichaean sensualism provide a refutation of materialism."

THE ACADEMY. After nine years with the Manichaeans Augustine became disappointed with their inability to answer his questions. He lost faith in the Manichaean doctrine, not because he gave up their doctrine of materialism, but because most philosophers seemed to hold more reasonable opinions about the nature of the world, i.e. cosmology, physics and especially astronomy. Augustine despaired of ever finding truth and turned to the New Academy whose basic principle was that probability in the realm of knowledge is all that man can hope to attain.

It seems Augustine's information about the doctrine of the Academicians was derived principally from Cicero's Academica. Augustine had a profound respect for Cicero as a philosopher and especially as a man of letters. Augustine considered his style to be
extremely elegant (in the Retractations Augustine regrets having placed so much admiration in Cicero). Augustine speaks of Cicero as a defender of the doctrine of the Academicians, though he did not originate any himself.

In Contra Academicos, at the request of a pupil, Augustine gives a summary of the doctrine of the Academicians. They held, he says, that man cannot attain certitude in regard to philosophic truth. It is the end of a wise man to merely seek truth. A wise man should never assent to anything, for by so doing he assents to what is uncertain and therefore falls into error. However, in practical life decisions must be made even by the wise man, i.e. he must decide whether or not to eat. The Academicians allowed for this by saying that though one could not know with certainty he could hold to a kind of probability which bears some resemblance to the truth.

Socrates, Plato and members of the Old Academy advised against giving assent rashly, but made no special inquiry as to whether or not truth can be known. Augustine believes the New Academy to have begun with Zeno, the Stoic, and to have been followed by Arcesilaus, Philo, Antiochus and Carneades. Though there seem to have been several different strains of thought in the New Academy ranging from dogmatism to skepticism at different times, Augustine is certainly influenced by the skeptical attitude of Cicero in the Academica. (However, Cicero's more dogmatic Hortensius, an exhortation to philosophy, was the work that first set Augustine on fire with a desire for truth).

What then is the cause for this skepticism in the Academy?
In the first book of the Academica Cicero writes an encyclopedic article on Zeno the Stoic philosopher. Zeno, he says, recognized only four elements, and these were originally derived from fire. Sensation and intellect are not separate substances, and certainly not non-corporeal substances as Xenocrates held. A non-corporeal substance would be incapable of any activity, for how could something nonphysical be acted upon by the physical? But the mind and senses do undergo changes, hence they must be material.

Zeno held sensation to be a combination of impact from without and mental assent from within, a voluntary act. However, not all presentations are trustworthy. He bases this argument on such standard examples as the bent oars in water and a sun appearing only a foot in diameter. That which is false can cause an impression on the senses as well as that which is true, as is the case in dreams and fever. How then do we know when to give mental assent, when can we be sure a true thing is being presented to us? Zeno's answer was that true objects carry with them something by which they can be identified. They are 'clear and distinct.' True impressions can be distinguished from false impressions by their stability and sureness. A sensation is simply a thing grasped by sensation. If this sensation is absolutely certain and irremovable by reasoning it can be termed knowledge, but a sensation that one cannot be absolutely sure of he termed ignorance. Between knowledge and ignorance Zeno placed 'the likely'. This was neither a right nor a wrong impression, but a credible one. Zeno did not think the senses to be completely untrustworthy because they could grasp the true. True things impress themselves on the mind and thus give it a measuring rod for knowledge and a first principle from which to judge subsequent impressions.
It was not long before Arcesilaus challenged Zeno on this matter. Arcesilaus asks, what can be perceived? Zeno would answer, 'a presentation impressed and sealed from a real object, in conformity with its reality'. The problem with this is that a false presentation proceeding from a nonexistent thing could be of the same form, as in a dream. The weak point in Zeno's argument was how one was to distinguish between true and false presentations. He never actually gave a criterion for doing this but begged the question by saying we do do it. Arcesilaus pointed out that, if a false sensation could be of the same character as a true one then no reality is ever actually perceived as it is. Keep in mind that for the Academicans certitude would have to come from the thing to the mind and not the other way around. Since a false thing (really for them nothing) could produce the same presentation as a true thing, then obviously we cannot trust the certitude the phenomenal object tries to thrust upon us. The conclusion is simple: one should give assent to nothing.

It follows also, if one cannot recognize for certain an appearance as that of something real, then nature can impress no absolute limits on the intellect so as to fix the form or standard for certitude. One does not have in his mind any standards for judgment. To show how evident this is Carneades puts forward such specious arguments as "at what number does 'a few' stop and 'many' begin," or "how big does a thing have to be in order to be large?" The Academy, like the Manichaeism Augustine left, taught a form of materialism. Neither had a conception of the mind as a noncorporeal substance. For each, sensation was an impression caused by a thing on
the mind. The mind was basically inactive, and receptive. Knowledge, if possible, could only come from the senses, there are no intellectual truths that are independent of corporeal things. The mind does not have its own standards to judge what is true, thus it is reduced to a sort of organ that helps the creature adapt to his environment. From a doctrine of materialism arises sensationism as the only possible epistemology, for nothing immaterial exists which would not be perceptible to sense.

2. The Active Theory of Sensation

Augustine praises Plato for realizing that the basis of knowledge is not to be found in either the nature of the body, or the nature of the mind, as the Stoics and Epicureans believed. However, though the basis of knowledge is not in the sensible world, Augustine in no way adopts any form of innatism with regard to knowledge of physical objects. Granted that the Platonists are right in holding that all things in time are made according to external exemplars "are they then able to look into the exemplars themselves, or to find out from them how many kinds of animals there are ... their conceptions, births, ages and deaths, what motions regulate them in desiring those things which are in accordance with their nature, and in rejecting those that are harmful to it?" Augustine thinks that if the Platonists really do have a vision of the world of ideas they should be able to put the historians out of work. Not only would these philosophers know the past, but they would know the future as well.

Augustine, though not rejecting intellectual archetypes, does not
claim they are immediate objects of intuition and he does not relegate
the material world to a shadowy resemblance of the real. In the realm
of knowledge "knowledge is born from both, from the one who knows and
the object that is known". The object is a quasiparent of sensation.
It is not a true parent, for vision is not completely begotten by the
form of the body alone, something else is required, namely the animated
physical apparatus of the sense organ of the one who sees. In other
words, the object is not the only cause of a sense being formed. It is
only a cause in a formal sense.

In opposition to the Stoics, Academics and Manichaeans Augustine
does not hold that sensible bodies by means of the senses impress their
form on the mind. These philosophers held that the mind is material
and that knowledge proceeds from objects through the senses to the mind.
They taught that after receiving a certain amount of information from
the senses the mind begins to sort and regulate the incoming data and
reasoning arises.

Democritus and Epicurus held that "there is no cause for any
tought of ours except images which, when we think, come from those
(material) substances and enter into our mind." It seems substances
give off, or emanate, very fine particles (atoms?), which are images
of that from which they come. Augustine thinks this impossible for he
asks, what substances is it from which our idea of truth is emitted?
Furthermore, if the mind is material, it is of a certain size. Now
images (collections of fine particles) given off by objects are either
smaller than or larger than the mind. If they are smaller than the mind
then there will be a certain passage of time until the image passes
through all the mind; for example, in viewing a mustard seed it would take some time before we came to a total experience of it. If the image was larger than the mind, say the image of a mountain range, only so much of it could enter the mind at one time. In either case there is a difficulty, in that we actually do experience both large and small things all at once. 23

Augustine presses the atomists further and asks them, if all that exists is matter and space, and all that takes place takes place in them, then in what class would they include the images which stream from material substances and come in contact with the eye? The atomists claimed substances are solid, but images are not. Now if the images which we perceive stream from the atoms then we are involved in a contradiction, for you cannot take a part away from an atom, which by definition is the smallest possible thing. We do not perceive the atoms themselves because certainly actual substances cannot enter the sense organs. If by chance a stick was to enter the eye it would not only not be seen but it would put an end to all seeing. 24

Augustine recalls in his Confessions that his greatest intellectual breakthrough came when he realized that the mind was not a corporeal entity. In a discussion with Evodius, Augustine asks him if he can remember anything bigger than his body. 25 Next he gets Evodius to agree that the memory is in the body. Thirdly he gets Evodius to recall the city of Carthage. Now the city seems much larger than our body, but if the memory was material, how could the city appear to be any larger than the body? If Evodius had known of a camera he might have shown Augustine how an entire city could be imprinted on a piece of material four inches
by four inches. However, Augustine probably would have been pleased with this example of material imprinting for he would say, 'do you really think Carthage is this small?' Evodius would answer no. Then Augustine would return that it must be the mind that presents to us an image of a large city, for a photo picture would present only a small city, say one where very tiny people lived. Of course no one would believe this because they know what the picture refers to because of their memory. But this is just the point. The memory contains images of large physical entities, larger even than the body that is associated with the mind.

Augustine says the soul pervades the whole body which it animates, not by a local distribution of parts, but by a certain vital influence, being at the same moment present in its entirety in all parts of the body. If one was to prick his skin with a fine-pointed pin, the place affected would be very small. The contact of the pin however, does not escape the notice of the whole soul and yet the contact is not felt over the whole body but only at the place where the contact took place. If another pin were to prick the skin at another location the entire mind would be present at this part of the body also. Augustine concludes that the mind is not to be conceived as a physical thing for the mind is entirely present in every part of the body at one time. This would be impossible if the mind was physical. Augustine's insistence on the spirituality of the mind becomes especially important for him in his development of sense knowledge.

Augustine defines sensation as any passion undergone by the body, which does not escape the notice of the soul. Gilson says Augustine's
The doctrine of sensation satisfies the requirements of absolute spiritualism. The Academics said objects created sense knowledge. The mind could assent to this knowledge or not. Since there is no way of knowing if a true object caused a sense impression or if a false object caused it, as in the case of a hallucination, it is wise to suspend mental assent. For Augustine, however, the mind not only passes judgment on sense knowledge, it creates it.

To understand this it must be kept in mind that for Augustine as for Plotinus there are ontological levels of reality. The inferior can never affect the superior, though the superior can affect the inferior. Augustine uses the analogy of a craftsman and his product to explain this. A potter, being a creator is superior to the clay, which is a creature. It is always the potter that informs the clay in making it into a vase. The clay exercises no formative power over the craftsman. The mind is like the craftsman, and the body like the material that is used by him. The mind is not in the body as a prisoner, the mind has a passion to watch out for and care for the body. It animates the body, though it is not the form of the body. Hence the mind can act on the body but the body being inferior cannot act on the mind.

Augustine cannot believe that the body senses. This can be seen from his view that the body and the soul are two different substances. The body is made of corporeal matter and the soul is made of incorporeal matter. Hence if one were to say that a man's body senses then he could just as well say a rock senses since a rock can undergo changes. An external body, as was said before, is a quasi-parent of sense knowledge. It affects the sense organs in a certain way, or causes a passion in them.
However this is all still in the area of the corporeal. As yet no sensation has been formed, and since the body cannot affect the mind the sense organ cannot impress its form on the mind. The soul is the active agent even in sensation. The soul forms an image via the informed sense by turning its attention to it. This image formed in the mind is an intellectual image.

There are a number of special relations between sensation and the image fundamental to Augustine's concept of sensation and understanding. He distinguishes four forms (species) each of which produces the form following it in the list:

1. the form of the object.
2. the form produced in the sense organ.
3. the form produced in the memory.
4. the form produced in thought when one actually remembers.

We actually distinguish between only two of these forms. The object's form is not distinguished from the sensed form nor is the form produced in the memory distinguished from the form used in thought. These four forms give birth to two kinds of vision (visions).

1. Corporeal Vision - the sense organ is informed (formatur) by the form (species) of the object.
2. Spiritual Vision - thought (cogitatio) is formed (formatur) by the form (species) preserved in the memory.

The image of sensation stored in the memory is called a similitude, image, or phantasia. A composite image arbitrarily formed to represent an object not sensed is a phantasma (apparition).

When Augustine speaks of the form in the external object he does so from a Platonic perspective. Augustine believed each actual material thing was created after a form or idea. Unlike Plato Augustine said these ideas resided in the mind of God. God created the world according
to these ideas or exemplars — thus Augustine's position is often
called exemplarism. An analogy of this doctrine on the human level
could be seen as the form of a building existing in the architect's
mind before the construction of the building. After the building is
erected it will be the form that the architect had in his mind though
the building will not rob the architect of anything. He does not lose
the form to the building. The form continues to exist in the creator's
mind. Augustine seems impressed by the fact that every corporeal thing
has some geometric shape, and some numerical ratio exists between
things and their parts. Augustine will speak of form and number
interchangeably. Not only does the Timaeus show God fashioning the
universe in accordance with the laws of number, but even the Old
Testament agrees. A material thing exists as a material thing only
as long as it has a numerical form. Sensible number is realized in
matter, but numbered things are not numbers. Numbers constitute the
only participation in wisdom possible to bodies. Bodies are incapable
of knowing wisdom but capable of receiving it (in numbers). Hence
both bodies and minds are subject to the same laws.

Augustine's thought led to the notion that knowledge of number
means power. The mind does not invent numbers, for everyone seems
bound to the same laws of number. No one is free to use numbers
arbitrarily. Now since material bodies are subject to the laws
of number, a knowledge of mathematics means a conquest of nature. This
would be comparable to modern science and to science (scientia) as
Augustine conceived it. Augustine does not seem unaware of the
consequences a knowledge of number could have in the advancement of
scientific knowledge of nature. Augustine, however, could not be called
a modern, not because he was unaware of the awesome possibility of conquering nature by reducing it to mathematical ratios, but because he thought this was of only secondary importance. Augustine began by being awed by numerical relations but instead of going on to see what could be accomplished by practical application, he thought it wise to proceed back to the foundation of the laws of number. Somewhat like Plato, Augustine only grudgingly allowed room for practical knowledge. Augustine did not accept Aristotle's explanation that numbers were abstracted from sensible things, because nature is constantly changing and mutable, and as such can never produce a basis for necessary truths. And there is something necessary and final about a statement like $3+7=10$. Also no one has ever gone through the entire number system, yet no one doubts that any ratio continued on indefinitely would be true and certain. No one ever doubts that numbers larger than any multitude they see in nature obey the same laws as familiar numbers. Augustine's concern is almost entirely in the direction of the foundation of number (wisdom) rather than in the practical consequences (science) of number. (Note: there are no actual numbers in the world. Augustine seems to speak of multitude as magnitude. Since there is no smallest magnitude there is no true 'one' in the world. All numbers are made from one, hence no number of any sort exists in the world, only numerical relations.)

This form of the object (the mathematical ratio) is impressed upon the sense organ. However, the external object does not produce a sensation in the organ. Only a living body can produce a sensation. Only a corporeal vision is produced by the body that is seen. Three things are required for vision: first, the external object that exists
without our perceiving it, secondly, a bodily sense, which has the capacity for receiving impressions, though it does not have to be exercising this capacity, thirdly, the intention of seeing, which may for example cause the eyelids to be opened in order that sight may take place. When the sense organ is turned to a physical object, that object impresses its form on the sense organ. This sense organ having something added to it (the form of the body) is called vision. This vision is produced then by three things: (i) by the visible thing, (ii) by the sense organ, for if the one who sees is not present no sight takes place, (iii) also on the side of the subject by the intention of seeing.38

Augustine's talk of sensation, sense and sense organ can become confusing because he often speaks of a 'sense' in two different ways. The Latin word sensus is used ambiguously by Augustine. In The Trinity for instance 'sense' (sensus) refers to the five bodily organs. Here Augustine uses the word sensus in a strictly physical corporeal manner. A 'sense' is simply an eye or an ear. In other works like On Music 'sensus' takes on a much different meaning. Here it becomes a power and an act. 'Sensus' takes on an incorporeal meaning. It is the activity of the soul in noticing impressions made upon its body. This use of the term 'sense' refers to the mental activity involved in sensation. In this later meaning of the term the physical organ is not considered as the 'sense' but only the instrument of 'sense', 'sense' remaining an essentially mental activity. This paper will distinguish the first meaning by speaking of the 'sense' as a 'sense organ'. 
The sense organ remains informed so long as the sensed object is present, but no longer. The eye (or any other organ) does not receive impressions from objects as does wax receive impressions from a signet ring, for if this were the case the eye would continue to be informed by an object long after the object passed away. If so, how could one ever know if the object was actually present or if just its impression remained? The analogy of sensible object to informed sense organ is more like that of a signet ring to water. When the ring is removed the form is also removed. But can we really say the form of the ring is one form and the form in water another? Augustine says there are in a sense two forms, however, we cannot distinguish between the form of the body and the form in the sense organ with the same sense. That is, the distinction is an intellectual one. As far as sensation is concerned no distinction can be sensed. The connection between them is so close that there is no room for distinguishing between them. This may be easier to grasp if we return to the example of a signet ring in wax. After the ring is removed, no one would doubt there is the form of the ring in the wax as well as the form still remaining in the ring. But nothing new occurs when the ring has been separated from the wax except that it becomes easy to see two distinct, though similar forms. As long as the ring is on the wax it makes a form in the wax, the form is not made by the removal of the ring. It existed in the wax before the ring was removed. In returning to Augustine's illustration of a signet ring in water, we can say there are two different, but similar images, though we cannot know this by our senses, since water does not retain forms impressed upon it. As we said, the distinction between the form of the object and the form in the sense organ
is an intellectual one. Though they are distinct they are not different; it is really the same form in two different things. No problem then arises, yet, as to the similarity between the thing as it is and the thing in vision for they both share the same form.

Augustine explains after-image as the fading away of this form in the sense organ. The sense organ, being like a fluid, soon gives up any shape, so it can take on new ones. We look at a candle and close our eyes, and a number of bright lights appear, and fade away. This is the form of light in the sense organ fading away. The form the sense organ takes is that of the outer object, when the organ is directed to that object. The form in the organ disappears when the sense organ is turned from the object.40

The idea of the after-image shows us that at least something remains for a while in the sense after the external object has disappeared. The question then is how do we distinguish or know when the object is no longer present to the sense organ. Augustine gives a rather Cartesian answer; while we are seeing an object there is a measure of clarity and distinctness which is not there when the sense is turned from the object.41 But if we were to say that a ship going out to sea gradually becomes less clear and distinct even though the eye is still fixed on it Augustine would be able to reply that this is just another example of the form of a body leaving the sense organ, not because the sense organ is turned away but because the object is removed beyond the range of the sense organ.
Even though there be sensible objects and senses capable of sight (Augustine like most philosophers uses the sense of sight as the prime specimen of the five senses), no vision would occur if it were not for the will. Augustine says desire and fear are the reasons the will turns the senses to sensible objects. Augustine sees the mind as watching out and protecting the body, helping it to adapt to its environment. When one is hungry the senses (sight, smell, taste) are awakened and sharpened so as to be receptive to impressions from without. The greater the fear or desire the more clearly the sense organ is informed, not because of anything different in the object but because the soul is more attentive. There are numerous empirical observations which would confirm such a belief. For example, anyone walking through a crowd will be exposed to many potential sights and sounds. Even though the background noise be very loud, if the will desires to hear what the person next to you is saying and turns the sense to his voice then that sound will be heard. Now if a parent has lost his young child in this crowd and fears for his safety, the will directs and intensifies his senses and tries to join them to some sight or sound of his child. If his voice is within the range of the parent's ear the will fixes the organ to the voice. The point Augustine wants to make is simply this; the mere coincidence of sensible object and sense organ does not create vision. The mind is active in choosing what it wants to sense. It is the will which combines the quasi-parent (species of body) and the quasi-offspring (species in sense). On the physical plane vision is the sense organ being informed by the object. More accurately Augustine would call this corporeal vision, an activity in which the sense organ receives a form. But the
sense organ receiving a form is not the mind receiving a form so that this corporeal vision is not to be confused with sensation.

So far then we have discussed corporeal vision which dealt with the form of the object and the form in the sense organ united by the will. In order to get to sensation we must pass beyond the body to a spiritual vision in which the will unites the form produced in the memory to the form produced in thought. Between a sensible body and the thought of that body, four species are found. Each one is born step by step from the other. "The species of the body which is perceived produces the species which arises in the sense organ of the percipient; this latter gives rise to the species in the memory; finally, the species in the memory produces the species which arises in the gaze of thought." Each time the will unites the parent with its offspring.

This should not be interpreted as if there is a mechanical causation involved, for the informed sense organ (vision) cannot impress itself on the mind. The informed sense organ is still corporeal, having size and place in space. The mind, though mutable (in time) is incorporeal and thus can receive nothing from a physical entity. Even one's own body does not directly affect the mind, though the mind is affected indirectly by changes in the body. It is the soul that senses by noticing changes in the body. The soul animates the body, which runs according to certain rules and ratios (like a machine). When these are upset by other bodies the soul notices it, e.g. when a foreign body strikes our body the soul becomes aware that something is interfering with the normal working of its body.
The soul which is animating the body is certainly aware of this interference. The soul then fully directs its attention to that part of the body which is undergoing the interference, in order to protect the body. It is this activity of the soul as it tries to persuade the body to respond that is the sensation of pain. The sensation of pain then is produced by the soul upon the soul. This doctrine of sensation is at the same time active and spiritualistic while recognizing that sensation is a passive state. Compared with the body the soul is very active. The soul actively creates sensation in itself. However there is a sense in which the soul can also be seen as passive in that it undergoes passions as a result of the soul's activity upon itself. For sensation, it is not necessary that the soul should receive anything from a sense organ, as if the soul was dependent upon the organ. All that is necessary is that the soul should vivify the sense organ and not be unaware of changes taking place in that organ.

Just as the sense organ has the potentiality for physical vision the soul has a potentiality for spiritual vision. The eye is not always informed by sensible things, and as soon as the organ is turned from the object the form vanishes. If this were not so confusion would result from many different images being in the organ at once. Likewise with the intellect, which must be distinguished from the memory. The memory supplies the material for forming images in the intellect. In thinking the will is again primary. It turns the intellect to the memory to be informed by a certain species in it. For instance, in the case of remembering the will seeks to turn the intellect to that which it desires in order to be informed by it.
The act of recalling is evidence that all things are not present to the intellect. Yet they must be within the memory or they could not be recalled. We can again use our analogy of the signet ring in fluid to explain the stamp of the memory upon the intellect. Again we see that the image soon fades from the intellect as the will directs the intellect to think new things. When one is not thinking of anything then he still has the capacity to know, if he is mentally healthy, and the immediate objects for thinking come from his memory.

We have been speaking of 'sense' as the physical organ and for the purposes of a literal analysis of Augustine's theory have not discussed the other aspect of 'sense', namely the incorporeal side. For Augustine no sensation is possible through a non-animated sense organ. It must be emphasized that it is the soul which senses through the sense organs. How then does Augustine bring together these two aspects of 'sensus'? What is involved in actually hearing a sound or seeing an object?

Following the current medical theories Augustine linked the four elements and the five senses. The soul itself senses but uses as its instruments the most active elements of fire and air. Air is diffused throughout the flesh and passes through the veins from the heart. The fire in the brain is the source of the visual ray and of the other rays which pass through tubes to each sense organ. The senses and memory are localized in the brain but the soul is not to be confused with either the brain or the instruments it uses. In On the Origin of the Soul Augustine poses a series of physiological questions. Of what importance are the nerves? Is the central principle the brain or the
heart? Unfortunately he does not provide any answers to these questions. The interesting point is his discussion of the visual ray proceeding from the brain. This ray directed by the attention of the soul goes from the brain out through the pupil of the eye and touches the external object in such a way as to cause a passion in the sense organ. This sense organ, being in a living body is at the same time receiving the action of the soul which operates upon it. Awareness occurs when the soul forms an image of the form in sense. In Augustine it is important to keep in mind that the soul reaches only the form in sense and is aware only of the image that it itself produces. The external object is necessary to maintain the impression on the sense, but what is known is an incorporeal representation of the impression. This ray that Augustine proposes is like Diogenes' stick. A man extends his feeling capacity by prodding with a stick, and likewise, the eye extends its vision with a stick-like ray. This is significantly different from Plotinus who rejected the idea of a light-ray because he argued such a stick-like projection would only offer indirect knowledge of an object.

Augustine was troubled about sight and sound at a distance. In Letter 137 he says, how do we say someone knocks at the door, unless we exercise the sense of hearing at the place where the knock is sounding? If this were so we would then live beyond the limits of our bodies. Augustine says imagine looking up at the stars at night. The soul would travel to the heavens in an instant. Augustine is faced with the dilemma that the soul is either living in that place where it sees or hears and consequently is itself in that place, or the soul exercises perception in a place and yet at the same moment is not there.
Augustine concludes that both of these alternatives seems absurd. Whether or not Augustine was familiar with Plotinus' work on sensation, there is no way of knowing. Despite some similarities between the two, Augustine certainly does not follow Plotinus in asserting that the soul somehow reaches out to where the sound or the sight is. This difference will eventually lead Augustine to quite different conclusions than would have been if he had followed Plotinus. Though hearing and sight have objects outside the body Augustine makes it clear that sound is carried to the ear and form to the eye.\textsuperscript{48} Augustine never offers a satisfying explanation of how this occurs other than to follow the medical theories he was familiar with. Somehow sound is transmitted by reverberating air to the inner ear and form is transmitted to the eye by light rays. The soul does not leave its body.

In Book XII of \textit{De Genesi ad Litteram} Augustine presents a similar view of the activity of the soul in sense knowledge in his discussion of the three levels of vision. On the first level of vision the external object is seen by the eye. The eye receives the form of the object by a sort of contact with it, whether it be by rays or reverberating air or something else. On the second level of vision the soul notices the change in the sense organ and forms an incorporeal image of the corporeal image in the organ. The third level of vision involves the intellect which recognizes either the sign or its signification of the image formed by the second level of vision. That aspect of the soul by which the image of the object is formed when the organ is affected Augustine calls \textit{spiritus}. \textit{Spiritus} is a certain power of the soul, inferior to the intellect wherein the likeness of corporeal objects is produced. \textit{Spiritus} has five types of activity which include forming
and storing images, the recall of past experiences, visions caused by disturbances in the body or by other spirits not controlled by the will. Even on the first level of vision the soul is active in that only a living and thus animated sense organ can receive impressions. This first level of vision however must not be confused with sensation. Sensation takes place on the second level of vision where the soul takes special notice and forms an image of the informed sense organ. Knowledge, if you can speak of sense knowledge in Augustine, comes with the third, the intellectual vision. Augustine generally does not call the primary sensation of the second level of vision knowledge of sensible things. He calls this second level of vision an animal capacity not directed to knowing but merely to reacting on the pleasure-pain principle.

There seem to be at least two major difficulties that appear on this view. The first problem deals with the recognition of size and distance. Augustine criticised the sensualists on this very point. If, as they held, an object gives off fine particles which go into the mind then this material image being directly in touch with the mind would not appear to be any distance away from the perceiver. Likewise, if a material image entered the mind the size of the external object could not be known. But does Augustine's view escape this same difficulty? Augustine starts with the assumption the sense organ is informed by the object. As to how this is done he is not sure. Either it can be explained by the rays emitted by the organs or rays emitted by the object or both. In any case a stick-like projection is involved and therefore Augustine is involved in much the same problem as the sensualists, the recognition of distance. To say the eye is not in
immediate contact with the object but only indirect contact does not help solve the problem. This is the reason Plotinus rejected the ray-medium theory. But let us grant Augustine that the sense is informed. The problem then arises when he says the soul sees the impressed form in the sense organ and not the external object. Now the form in the sense does not have the size of the object and since it is directly present to the soul, distance is not involved. How then can Augustine explain distance and size on these grounds?

The second problem this spiritualist doctrine of sensation produces is the more comprehensive problem of the relation of the mind and body. It seems to cut the mind off from the outer world. The imagination creates an image in the mind from the informed sense organ. The intellect does not see the object directly, it does not even see the image in the sense organ. Gannon in her article *The Active Theory of Sensation in St. Augustine* says "later writers, following Augustine's principles to their logical conclusions, develop theories in which the soul produces its own objects and has no means of establishing a direct relation between that object and the external world." 49

Augustine may answer in his defence that mental images are signs of external things and confusion results only if the signs are taken as things in themselves instead of using them to refer to the thing signified. Augustine does raise this very point in the short treatise *On the Teacher*. He distinguished between the first intention and second intention of a sign. For instance 'dog' in its first intention means the thing signified, i.e. a four-legged furry animal. In its second intention it is a noun or a word. That is, the sign is not used to refer but is looked at as something in itself. Augustine goes
on to point out that a sign cannot be learnt unless the thing signified is already known. As an example Augustine shows the difficulty involved in teaching someone what the word "walking" refers to. If you start off walking across the floor and say "this is walking", the pupil may think by "walking" you mean hurrying or walking ten paces. Unless the pupil already knows what walking is, he will never learn to use the sign "walking" properly.

If we apply this line of thought to the problem we have been discussing we could say that signs (images) taken as things in themselves lead to phenomenalism, but if they are considered in their primary intention they lead to realism. However, let us not forget that signs can only be learnt if we previously know what is signified. The mind however cannot go beyond images to things in themselves when dealing with physical entities (though it does know things in themselves when dealing with intelligibles). The mind is cut off from the external and does not know it directly; hence the doctrine of signs really fails to solve the problem. This conflict between phenomenalism and realism continues to come up in Augustine's works. He seems a confirmed realist but his body-mind theory make a consistent realism hard to maintain.
Chapter Two

MEMORY AND WILL

Memory. In common usage the word 'memory' means an ability to store up images of the past and produce them when needed. In Augustine's case however, the memory plays a much larger role. In one instance he called it the whole interior life of man. In order to understand Augustine's concept of memory it will help to keep in mind the materialist background from which Augustine is reacting. The materialists held that an external object gives off fine particles and these strike a mark upon the memory via the sense organ. The memory passively receives and stores up these impressions. Augustine reacts against such materialistic views and flatly states that the corporeal cannot affect the incorporeal. That which is lower in the scale of being cannot affect that which is higher.

If memory were somehow a blank sheet or a soft wax upon which the senses impressed images then a remembrance would never take place, and the mind would remain forever blank. This should not sound strange because memory cannot be the retaining of information in virtue of the lingering of an impression because an impression was in fact never made. The memory does not receive sensations ready made from without, it creates them from within. If sensations are not impressed on the mind by a body then memory cannot be made up of impressions that it has never received.
Though Augustine does not specify where this or that idea came from, some similarity between him and Plotinus can be found on the topic of the memory, since both held to an active theory of sensation. Plotinus argued that if the mind was passive like a bar of wax waiting for imprints then silly consequences would follow. The dullest, least intellectually active, say the old and senile, the most passive of minds would be the best recipients of impressions. Also, unlike the muscles, the less you used your mind the more reliable and accurate it would become. Plotinus and Augustine agreed that a false view of memory arises if it is considered as something that collects and stores mirror images of corporeal things. Both the external object and the mirror are material. One must not suppose it possible for a corporeal form to impress itself on an incorporeal mind.

If the memory then is not a storehouse for impressions, what is it? Augustine is one of the earlier philosophers to have thought at great length on the inner life of the mind. He concludes that the memory is indispensable in the formation of concepts. First, as we have noted, the mind absorbs the species of bodies into the memory by means of the bodily sense. Without first perceiving something corporeal no one can conceive anything corporeal. On this level the memory makes concepts possible. Augustine's favourite example is to take a line of poetry and read it aloud. There is a passage of time from the beginning of the line to the end. Take just one word or one syllable out of the line, and here too at least some time is required to speak the syllable. The beginning of the syllable is not spoken at the same instant as the end. So the memory is
involved even at the level of sense knowledge. The memory remembers each successive sound and presents it to the intellect in a single unified image. If not for the memory, there would be a continuous buzz which could at no moment express a sensation. This is why Augustine distinguishes between the sound and the sensation. Sound is the physical change undergone by the ear because of the vibration in the air. This is a temporal, constantly changing process. But a sensation, say of a melody, is the view of something temporal and changing in a noncorporeal fashion. The memory presents vision and sounds, temporal and changing in a nonspatial mode suitable for intelligibility and understanding.

Suppose a narrator was to tell you a story. This is the first time you have heard these words in this particular arrangement. But you understand what he says because you remember generically the individual things that he describes. Let us use Augustine's example. "He (the narrator) who describes to me a mountain that is stripped of its forest and is clothed with olive trees is speaking to one who remembers the forms of mountains, forests and olive trees; had I forgotten them I should not at all know what he was saying, and therefore I could not conceive that description." The mind is active in combining and recalling in order to make a concept intelligible. "Then, as the limit of perceiving is in bodies, so the limit of thinking is in memory. For the sense organ receives the species from that body which we perceive, the memory receives it from the sense organ, but the gaze of thought receives it from the memory."

Images (phantasies) in the memory can be divided into three classes. The first comprises true sense impressions; the second
images of things supposed; the third images of things thought.

Of the first sort of image Augustine includes mental images of a friend's face, of a familiar city or anything existing or having existed which one has actually seen or experienced.

The second class of images is ultimately dependent on the first, in that it uses the first class of images as its raw material. The mind takes an image from here and one from there and forms an image of something quite real and possible or something fantastic. One can imagine a mermaid because he has seen a fish and a woman, (if he had seen neither he could not imagine one) even though he doesn't believe anything real corresponds to his image. One can also imagine a situation a narrator relates, which though possible, may or may not be true.

The third class of images pertains chiefly to numbers and dimensions which are found partly in the nature of things and partly in the sciences. In the nature of things Augustine has in mind the image that is formed when the figure of the entire world is discovered, and one thinks upon it. In the sciences, for instance geometry, images of physical spaces and dimensions are imagined in order to facilitate the process of reasoning. Though numbers and geometric figures are true in themselves as objects of the understanding they nevertheless often lead to error when images are attached to them; images which are derived initially from sense experience.

These three classes of images do not however exhaust all that is contained in the memory. "There is a more profound depth of our
memory, where we also find those contents which we think of for the first time ... vision of vision, understanding of understanding, and knowledge, of knowledge."

In *The Trinity* Augustine argues that numbers are infinite and matter is infinitely divisible. When we reach the point where the divisions can no longer be sensed, phantasies cease to be created in the memory. However, the mind does not stop dividing, even though images can no longer be presented to the intellect. Augustine thus concludes "we do not conceive corporeal things, except those which we remember or those from some other thing which we remember." These objects which seem to be created from within entirely such as mathematical concepts, are not images at all in that they do not image anything. In the *Confessions* Augustine elaborates on this point when he says "... in the numberless fields and caves and caverns of my memory, full without number of numberless kinds of things, either through images, as all bodies are; or by the presence of the things themselves, as are the arts; or by some notion or observation, as the affections of the mind are ...." Besides the three classes of images that the mind contains Augustine adds two other classes of things. There are the arts or things themselves which the mind contains. In this class Augustine would include the art of geometry and arithmetic which in their pure form are present without any sort of physical vehicle upon which to rest. Into the other class of things which the memory contains Augustine adds introspective psychological notions such as ideas about one's own mental state or about one's emotions.

Book two of *On Christian Doctrine* teaches that "a sign is a thing which causes us to think of something beyond the impression the thing
itself makes upon the senses." Now mathematical entities cannot in light of this passage from On Christian Doctrine be taken as signs, i.e. as images. If they were signs what would they signify? Certainly nothing corporeal, for the physical world contains none of the entities of pure mathematics. You cannot verify in the imagination an infinitely large number. There are no actual physical entities to which these terms refer. Therefore they must refer to themselves, which is only another way of saying that the things themselves are in the memory.

It seems beyond question that Augustine does not accept any form of innatism with regard to sense knowledge. He tells Nebridius not to wonder that those things which are pictured according to nature cannot first be imagined by the self-activity of the conscious mind, when it has never perceived them exteriorly. It does happen that we think of physical things we do not perceive, but Augustine explains this by a power innate in the mind that enables it to increase and diminish, and subtract that which is presented to it. This is how winged horses can be imagined, by addition of parts, or how a giant can be conceived, by increase of size. This explains why a child, if he has seen water in a cup, can imagine the sea. But the mind does not have the power to enable us to conceive the taste of strawberries before we experience them for the first time.

Young Nebridius, in a letter to Augustine, asks him to discuss 'a subtle question concerning psychology'. Nebridius thinks it makes most sense to say that not every image comes from the memory, but each memory cannot occur without an image. Even when our eyes are closed and ears stopped we are able to form images in the mind.
If we can form images without using the sense (i.e. sensation) then it is possible that all images are formed without sensation. Nebridius expresses a view which would cut the mind off entirely from the outer world and would make memories of mental events without reference to an external world (as in Hume).

Augustine disagrees with both points made by Nebridius. Nebridius claims that memory cannot exist without images or mental pictures; Augustine says this is not so. For "if eternity itself always remains, and needs no mental image by means of which it may come into the mind, as it were on a vehicle, and yet if it were unable to enter our mind unless we recalled it, then there can be memory of certain things without imagination."

As to the second belief of Nebridius that the soul, deprived of bodily senses, can imagine corporeal objects, Augustine asks him how if this was the case, he could continue to distinguish the sane from the insane, the sleeper from the awake. If one can form images of things without sensing them then the insane and dreamers should be praised above the mentally healthy, because they (the insane) at least would not be deluded by the appearance of sensibility. But this argument certainly does not solve the problem, for it is obvious we form images of (apparently) corporeal bodies we have not sensed. (They fall under the second classification of mental images, images of things supposed.) Thus Augustine introduces the power of increase and decrease to explain the occurrence of images such as those of mermaids and giants. What Augustine does not provide Nebridius with is a criterion with which to distinguish the first class of images from
the second. What I am referring to is the occasional experience of
not being able to distinguish if a certain memory image was once a
sensation or not.

Bundy in his *Theory of Imagination in Classical and Medieval
Thought* seems to be on the wrong track when he divides the three
classes of images as they "originate in sensation, phantasy or reason." He
does not seem to realize a phantasy in the proper sense of the word
is an image of sensation stored in the memory, and composite or
supposed images are referred to as phantasmata. Bundy says phantasies
supplant memory images and phantasmata are made out of these memory
images when the external object is removed from sight. He says the
outer Trinity (will, body, and sense) produces a memory image and the
inner Trinity (will, intellect, memory image) produce a phantasm. But
this is obviously impossible for two reasons: (1) The first is textual.
Augustine, especially in a mature work like the *Trinity*, denies any
such doctrine. He claimed there was a third trinity accomplished by
a third act of the will, that being between the sense image and the
imagination to form the phantasy. Bundy in failing to notice this
gets himself into an internal problem, namely (2) he has used the
memory image in both the inward and outward trinities without bridging
the gap between the material and the spiritual. He makes no provision
for the transference of the form in sense to the form in memory, from
the corporeal to the incorporeal.

Bundy makes a very understandable mistake. He fails to keep in
mind the stress Augustine places on the activity of the mind in the
production of knowledge. Bundy seems to think of the memory as being
passive to impressions from the sense organ. In fact the memory never
receives any images from the sense organ. There is no sense knowledge on the physical level. The lowest level of knowledge, sense knowledge, is accomplished by the activity of the memory. Though it may sound strange it follows from Augustine's stress on the activity of the soul that even knowledge of the present is dependent upon memory. It is the mind which actively forms an image in the memory of the outer object via the image in the sense organ. Sensation is an activity of the mind on the mind. Augustine marvels that he could not hear a sentence if it were not for the memory. In fact his ears do not enable him to hear even a single syllable because a syllable is a sound of a certain duration having a beginning, a middle, and an end. When he says he hears a long syllable what he really means is that up to the moment the sensation ends his memory preserves the recollection of its beginning and all its intermediate moments and adds them together. Likewise the memory is active in visual sensation for the mind must "turn a solid body about in front of itself in order to study its various sides one after another and then remember each of them in order to perceive the form of the whole: a sphere, cube, etc." Augustine extends the realm of memory from retention of the past to the present and the future, "attributing to the memory everything that we know, even if we do not think of it." In the memory we find "those contents which we think of for the first time ... knowledge of knowledge, vision of vision, and understanding of understanding, for the understanding which appears in thought comes from the understanding which already existed in the memory but was latent there, although even thought itself, unless it had some memory of its own, would not return to those things which it had left in the memory when it thought
of other things." There is even a sense in which the memory contains what is as yet future. A composer singing or playing a new tune must have a foreknowledge of what he is going to sing or play. His knowledge does not derive from listening to his voice as it would with a listener, but must precede the voice. Another aspect of this knowledge of the future is implicit in his view of preknowing. Since this theory will be discussed at greater length later on let it suffice at present to say this theory of preknowing states that something cannot be sought unless it is in some way already known. Foreknowledge is not the same as prophecy. Augustine denied man can have any natural knowledge of actual events before they happen.

Augustine broadens the memory so as to have it include the present as well as the past, ideas as well as things; and to have it include even itself. This broad notion of the memory is possible in Augustinian psychology since he does not view the memory as a faculty of the soul. Augustine does not hold to a faculty theory of the soul at all. His psychology can best be described as trinitarian. Running throughout his work, *On the Trinity*, is the doctrine that man's remembering, understanding and willing is a substantial image of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. The whole force behind Augustine's psychology is this: the whole human soul can be called either understanding, memory or will.

The memory is not in the mind as an accident would be in a substance. The memory is not a distinct separable part of the mind. In one instance Augustine speaks of the mind as memory. By this Augustine is referring to the mind's knowledge of itself. The memory contains knowledge of many things that are not presently being thought of. I can however, recall them at a moment's notice. Augustine believed the mind always
to be present to itself and inseparable from self-knowledge. However
the mind often thinks of things other than itself. The mind is then
present to itself but not perceived. If my mind is present to me and
I know it but am not thinking about it where can it be but in my
memory? When the mind does come to notice itself it is not said to
know itself but to recognize itself. In one sense then mind is a
memory.

Gilson says from the texts of The Confessions and The Trinity that:

... the term 'memory' means much more than its modern
psychological connotation designates, i.e. memory of
the past. In St. Augustine it is applied to everything
which is present to the soul (a presence which is
evidenced by efficacious action) without being explicitly
known or perceived. The only modern psychological terms
equivalent to Augustinian "memoria" are "unconscious"
or "subconscious", provided they too are expanded to
include the metaphysical presence within the soul of
a reality distinct from it and transcendent, such as
God in addition to the presence to the soul of its
own unperceived states.

Gilson notes that in the last analysis Augustine extends the concept
of memory to the metaphysical order. It is here that the mind
encounters the higher reasons and even God. God however is not contained
in the memory as other hidden objects are contained as in a box.
God is present to the soul as He is to all things, but only in the
memory of man can there be any knowledge of this presence. Augustine's
soul is weighted in a certain metaphysical direction. It is God that
draws the soul toward himself, and when the soul seeks itself or even
beyond itself it is God which it seeks without being aware of it.

God is present in the memory in somewhat the same way the soul is
present in the body. The soul vivifies the body and God vivifies the
soul.
Gilson goes on to say:

... this alone reveals the real meaning of Augustine's theory of knowledge and the proof of God's existence which is based thereon. We misunderstand them if we see them as a chain of abstract concepts artificially linked together to evidence God's existence. On the contrary, Augustine's point of view assumes that this chain of concepts and even the activity of the mind in linking them together can be made intelligible only by the presence of God moving the mind toward Himself.

WILL Before the full significance of the memory can come to light we must proceed to the second aspect of Augustine's trinitarian psychology, the will. If a distinction can be made between a voluntarist and an intellectualist then Augustine would have to be labeled a voluntarist. This does not mean that the will produces a type of knowledge that is primary to understanding or intellect but that a certain movement of the soul (willing) is actually primary in any form of understanding. The will to understand precedes understanding.

In the Retractations Augustine defines the will (voluntas) as "a movement of the soul, with no compulsion, toward something that is not to be given up, or that is to be attained."

Will (voluntas) in man designates the whole soul as freely acting. Just as the whole soul can be called memory so can it also be called will. As acting or doing the whole soul is will. Augustine is not trying to do away with all distinction between will, memory and understanding. They are in a sense distinct, understanding and will are not the same thing. In Augustine's scheme of things it is quite possible to know the right and not do the right (contra Socrates). It is possible to have understanding without will and will without
understanding, in regard to particular ends. In the ethical and practical order all our decisions depend upon the will. Beyond this every operation of our cognitive powers in the theoritic order is under the will's control as well. A man's will determines that man. A will divided against itself is a man divided against himself.82

The will is essential even on the lowest level of knowledge, the sensual level. In our analysis of the different operations involved in sensation we found there to be three trinities present. First an image was formed in the sense organ by the external object only after the organ was turned to the object by the will. It is a simple matter to close the eyelids if one does not wish to have an image formed in his eyes. Secondly, the memory forms an image of the image in the sense organ and again it is the will that does the combining, i.e. it turns the memory to the sense organ. Even though the first trinity may be completed and the sense informed, unless the memory is turned to the sense organ no sensation occurs. Augustine offered as an example of this the experience of sitting through a lecture and at the end realizing he had not heard a word that was said. Now he did not mean that he had plugs in his ears. The sound did affect his hearing mechanism, however there was no will acting to turn the mind to the sense organ. The third trinity occurs when the intellect forms an image of the object from the image in the memory and presents it to the gaze of thought. Again the will is essential. If it were not present the desire to recall anything would never occur, and remembering would never occur. This is why Augustine says will is prior to intellect in the act of knowing. Though the intellect has the capacity to know it will never of itself know unless the will joins it to something.
The will appears to function on different levels. On the lowest level we speak of seeing (visio) as the end and repose of the will. Satisfaction means that the will is at rest. When the eye is turned to the object, and the mind turned to the sense organ a sensation occurs. But in seeing the will does not stop and will nothing else. If seeing were the end of the will it would rest with sight. However, if it refers what it sees to something else then seeing is not the end but only a means for the will. The way Augustine puts it is that the will to see is one will and the will to refer what is seen onto a broader spectrum of events is another will. (This should not be taken too literally for it might seem as if one man has more than one will and hence more than one soul. What Augustine intends here is to refer to the different actions of the will, that is, particular volitions). The second is higher or above the first though dependent on the first. Though in one sense dependent on the first will (volition), each will is accountable to the one that follows it. For instance, one may wish to see a scar in order to prove a wound. The will to see the scar is one will and it is satisfied in the seeing of a scar. The will to prove that one has been wounded by seeing a scar is another will. It is dependent on the first will, for without it no wound would have taken place. However, the first will is referred to the second for without the second the first would not have occurred. The knowing that one has a wound is also referred to another will and this to another. All the wills (volitions) that are bound together in a series are good if the end to which all are referred are good.

Gilson points out, "not only do all the resolutions and decisions we make in the practical order depend upon it (the will), but every
operation of our cognitive powers in the theoretical order is under its immediate control.84 We have shown how the will controls sensation and sense knowledge. The will also controls imagination. The will joins together and separates images and presents to the understanding the most diversified combinations of parts. The will has no power to generate ideas or images, its power lies in its binding images to the intellect or in turning images away from it. Images of things seen are created in the memory. The will can bind together one image to another and present the composite to the understanding as if it were a faithful representation of reality. Augustine uses the case of the black swan to illustrate this. Who, he asks, has ever seen a black swan? The memory can produce though the image of a white swan which has been seen. The memory can produce an image of something black. These images can be joined by the will so as to color the white swan black in the imagination and present this composite to the intellect. When the will acts in this fashion it leads the mind to err in thinking what is presented to it is an image of something real.85

Even beyond the sensible order, the will is a dominant force in the production of rational knowledge. Before we produce knowledge in ourselves, we have to desire it: we know because we want to know, and we only seek knowledge because we want to find it. If the desire for knowledge becomes strong we call it research. This is the passion for knowledge which leads to science. "A kind of desire, therefore, precedes the birth in the mind, and by means of it, that is, by our seeking and finding what we wish to know, an offspring, namely, knowledge itself is born."86
According to the physics of Aristotle every body is drawn to a particular place in the universe by a natural weight or force. For example, a stone left to itself has a tendency to fall towards the middle of the universe. Fire, being light, tends to rise above and away from the center. If all the elements were mixed up together we could imagine they would sort themselves out and go to their proper places. If bodies did not possess any natural weight the universe would be immobile, dead and lifeless. Augustine considers the will of man in somewhat the same way. In every soul as in every body there is a weight constantly drawing it to find its natural place of rest. This weight Augustine calls love. If love then is the inner force that moves the will and the will denotes the man, we can say man is moved by his love. Love is not an accident in man's nature, it is the inner force that is inseparable from man. The will's action on the whole man is exercised through the mediation of the images and ideas over which it has control. The will is not a generator of representations, it only binds them together. It applies the powers of sense, imagination and thought in the direction of one's dominating love.

Augustine suggests the will is perverted when it rests and finds satisfaction in any end which is not an ultimate end. Augustine's thought is dominated by the teleological character of learning. All knowing is an orientation. In the language of a modern Augustinian (Polanyi), knowledge has a from — to structure. All meaning tends to be displaced away from ourselves pointing toward a deeper coherence which comes only when individual meanings are subsidiary within ever higher integrations. We attend from them to ever higher truths and finally to absolute truths or transcendent values to which we are committed.
Augustine believes perfect knowledge to be a knowledge of first causes or transcendent ideas. The highest cause, God, is the one who created all levels of being below Him according to mathematical ratio and numbers. Augustine finds the temporal and changeable to be intelligible only when considered from the standpoint of their basic principles. Things and events only have meaning when seen as something. It is the will which can become lazy and satisfied and fail to relate images and ideas into the higher integration in which they ultimately have meaning. The mind in its willing function is active in the correlation and integration of knowledge. If the intellect was primary and dictated its orders to the will it would first have to will to dictate to the will. Hence it is impossible to escape the immediacy of the will. But we cannot conclude from this that the will is primary in a temporal fashion for the will can only arise from something that is already present in the mind. The will to know something can only be present if that something is already somehow present to the mind. Augustine is only pointing out the obvious, i.e. only that can be sought which is previously known or anticipated in some fashion. Though the will is not temporally primary it is primary in the order of knowing in that a new act of knowing could not take place without it. Unless the will joined the intellect to intelligible things or to sense images, the intellect would never be informed.

Augustine, going back to the mutability-immutability principle, emphasizes that if the will rests in what is contingent, thinking it absolute, it will be absolutely deceived. But if the weight of the will, love, should fall toward what is absolute, how do we know when we have arrived? How do we know when the weight has reached center,
how do we know when the will has referred all to the immutable unless
the absolute was already known in some way beforehand? We shall deal
with this problem in the final chapter.
Augustine's early work *Contra Academicos* was entirely directed against skepticism in knowledge. From the *Retractations* we learn why Augustine felt compelled to write such a refutation. After he resigned his profession he directed his attention to the problem of certitude, which he felt was of vital importance in establishing a foundation for knowledge. In order to permanently eliminate any influence which the doctrine of uncertainty professed by the Academicians might have exerted upon him, he wished to break down completely the arguments which they alleged in support of the impossibility of finding the truth, and the expediency of refusing to give assent to anything.

Paul Tillich expressed it well when he said, "Augustine in his refutation of skepticism has shown that the skeptic acknowledges and emphasizes the absolute element in truth in his denial of the possibility of a true judgment. He becomes a skeptic precisely because he strives for an absoluteness from which he is excluded." The Academicians based their doctrine that truth cannot be known on the definition of Zeno the Stoic. Zeno said that only whatever has no mark in common with that which is false can be grasped as true. Since very few things, if any, are necessarily so (that is they may be so or not) that left very little room for wholehearted assent. But if that definition is true, he who knows it knows something true; if it is false the
definition should in no way influence anyone. Further if one merely holds that it is either true or false but he does not know which, by his very admission he admits he knows something true. Augustine says even he who is far removed from being a wise man knows something definite about the physical world. "For I hold as certain either that there is or is not one world; and if there is not one, there are either a finite or an infinite number of worlds". Certitude then in regard to certain truths is furnished by the principle of excluded middle.

The skeptics also ran into a problem in regard to their practical living. As all skeptics, they claimed to believe one thing yet in practice they did not follow their belief. To escape this contradiction between theory and action the Academics had a probability theory. Certain things one could be reasonably sure of, because certain things resembled the truth. But if one admits that certain things are more to be trusted than others because they more closely resemble the truth, then does not this suppose you already know what the truth is? If truth doesn't exist how could anything be similar to it?

Augustine not only provides examples of things one can know for certain, but goes right to the heart of the problem and demands that he who doubts should provide a justification for his doubt. Merely to say you doubt without giving a justification is the same as to say you know without attempting to offer a proof. He challenges the skeptic to provide a basis for consistent skepticism, which does not ultimately rest on a certitude.
In many ways Augustine's *Contra Academicos* parallels Ludwig Wittgenstein's *On Certainty*. Like Augustine, Wittgenstein asks, "doesn't one need grounds for doubt?" If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty. Though Augustine does not speak in the same language-game idiom as Wittgenstein, his intention seems to be similar. Doubt itself rests only on what is beyond doubt.

It just would not make any sense to say one doubted everything. Doubt and belief go together. One doesn't make sense without the other. Every doubt is itself an affirmation of something. A doubt that doubted everything would not be a doubt. Say an Academician devised an argument to make me doubtful of my own name. But just because it is possible to doubt doesn't mean that doubt is necessary. The arguments that made me doubtful of my own name also rest on grounds that are either doubtful or not doubtful. If they are not doubtful, then we have reached certainty and we can be sure of something. The other alternative, that the grounds of doubt were themselves doubtful, would lead me back to a decision to retain my old belief (i.e. that I know my name).

Augustine uses this same argument to retain his belief in the validity of sense knowledge. The Academicians say, how do you know that a world even exists if the senses are untrustworthy? Augustine replies, "your method of reasoning has never been able to disprove the power of the senses in such a way as to convince us that nothing is seen and you certainly have never dared to try such a thing, but you have exerted yourself to persuade us urgently that a thing can be otherwise than it seems." Let's take the Academics seriously and
agree with them that everything is doubtful. Now the arguments they just gave to prove the senses untrustworthy are themselves to be doubted, and if they are to be doubted why not retain our belief in the validity of the senses? It seems the skeptic does not want his arguments for skepticism subjected to criticism. He mistakenly puts his own theorizing outside the domain of doubt, and Augustine calls him to task for this oversight. This is the general purport of Augustine's main line of argument against skepticism.

Augustine also presents a second line of criticism against skepticism which does not challenge the premises of skepticism as such but rather offers a number of things that cannot be doubted, even allowing the skeptic to retain uncritically his grounds of doubt. This line of argument is similar to the argument made famous by Descartes, i.e. 'cogito ergo sum'. Augustine says it is certain I exist, and that I know I exist. If the Academic says maybe you are mistaken, then I still exist for he who does not exist cannot be mistaken; so I exist even if I am mistaken. As I still exist if I am mistaken, how can I be mistaken in thinking I exist, when it is certain I exist if I am mistaken? Since therefore I should exist even if mistaken, I have no doubt that I am not mistaken in knowing that I exist. It follows that I am not mistaken in knowing that I know. Though the argument has certain similarities to the argument made famous by Descartes the importance placed on it by Descartes was of a quite different order.

Descartes, like Augustine wanted to put down the arguments of skeptics. But that aim was subsidiary to his major purpose of providing a rational reconstruction of our knowledge. Augustine was not really concerned to prove his existence. The notion would appear ridiculous
so. to him since nothing could be closer to oneself than the knowledge of his own soul. Augustine's purpose is contro skeptics. Augustine is not concerned to advance an argument to prove that he exists or that he knows he exists. His concern is to show that the skeptic's taunt ("But what if you are mistaken?") is vain. Augustine uses the argument to show the skeptic there are some cases where he cannot be mistaken. The skeptic did not doubt that he was alive but that he could be certain. Augustine never uses his Si Fallor, Sum argument as a starting point upon which to construct a system of reasonings. His argument was a task argument intended to count against a favourite doctrine of the skeptics.

Carneades raised a doubt about knowing the external world. The senses, he claimed, deceive and present things other than they are (e.g. oars appearing bent in water). He does not say nothing is seen, but rather tries to prove that what appears can be otherwise than the thing itself. Augustine says, let's call this entire thing which surrounds us and nourishes us, this object which appears, 'the world'. Carneades would say that what is false could just as well cause this appearance as what is true. Perhaps, but still something appears whether you call it true or false, and it is this something I call the world. If I say this appears white to me or this tastes sweet to me how can I be mistaken? Even if the sense organs somehow were untrue we could still be certain of how the appearance appeared. We would be as certain of the false object as the true object. This is roughly a distinction between the physical outer object and the phenomenal object. Though we may be mistaken about the outer object we are not mistaken about the private phenomenal object. We can be sure of our
sense perceptions even though we do not know the external object. Here we see the distinction appearing between the outer object and the private object. Augustine's intention again seems to be contra skeptics. However he does make a distinction, not only in this argument but also in his theory of sensation. The immediate objects of sense knowledge are mental images, not the outer objects themselves. Augustine seems forced by other priorities to adopt this private — outer object distinction. In sensation he was concerned to maintain the spirituality of the soul. In Against the Academicians he is concerned to refute skepticism.

Augustine, ever the realist does not want to cut himself off from the external world without a good reason. And there has not been given any good reason why the senses cannot be trusted. But what about the oar appearing bent in water, isn't this a case of our senses deceiving us? Not at all. What they report is true. Augustine gives the same answer to this question as did J. L. Austin, i.e. "for when the reason is added for its appearing thus, if the oar dipped in the water seemed straight, I should rather blame my eyes for the false report. For they did not see what should have been seen when such causes arose."105 The same with other classic examples of deception. If the senses did not report truly what they saw then contrived deception would not be possible. The magician who makes a living by deception has a tacit faith that the senses will report truly what they see. Being aware of certain basic laws of light refraction and background coloring he can seemingly drive a sword through his assistant, without injuring her. Now this is a deception, but it is not a fault of the eyes for they work on certain mechanical principles which have not been
violated by the introduction of deceptions. As a matter of fact the possibility of contrived deception merely proves that the senses operate according to fixed regular laws. In the case of the bent oar in water, if we know the theory of light rays we can see why the oar must appear bent and be surprised if it appeared otherwise. But what about such cases when we do not know what extraneous factors are working upon our sense organ? If someone was completely ignorant of light rays and oars in water, upon seeing an oar dipped in water for the first time he could confuse the appearance with the real thing. Augustine grants this and ultimately retreats to the world of phenomena for absolute certainty. Augustine, after the manner of much modern philosophy, distinguishes phenomenal qualities from actual self existent qualities inherent in the thing. He asks "are the leaves of the wild olive tree, which the goat so persistently desires, by their very nature bitter?" Augustine says they are bitter to me, but maybe not to the goat. When I'm sick the leaves seems to taste sweet. Honey tastes sweet not because it is sweet in itself but because if affects me in a certain way. So when Augustine says he knows with certainty this honey tastes sweet to him now, there is no way he can be mistaken because he is not making a statement about a physical entity as such but about an immediate psychic occurrence. Even if someone said maybe you are sleeping and only dreaming honey is sweet, Augustine would reply that it was possible, but that even in sleep he was sure the honey tasted sweet. In a number of works Augustine appeals to the immediate knowledge of psychic states to furnish certainty in knowledge. This cannot be construed though as a thoroughgoing phenomenalism in a Berkeleian sense, at least not in a metaphysical way. Augustine wants to maintain the independence of the real from the knower, while at the
same time proposing an epistemology that can only be called phenomenalistic. He does not suggest that mental images and ideas are all there is to nature. Nature has a real outer existence. However, in Augustine's knower the soul radically transcends the body and the body in no way influences the soul. As Gilson points out, the consequences of this fundamental metaphysical doctrine is that nothing enters the soul from without, and since nothing comes between the mind and its thought, it must follow that sensation itself comes to the mind from within. Descartes speaks then like a true Augustinian when he says that even sensations in a sense are innate. Certainty then does not come from a conformity between intellect and object, but the soul apprehending itself is the first of all certitudes and the criterion of truth.

In the Soliloquies Augustine toys with the idea that to be true means to be as it seems. That is, what we experience would be true if it was in reality just as it was in appearance. He then realizes that if this were the case nothing could be true without a knower. Also, even if there was a knower present, what would not be perceived would not be true. A block of wood appears as wood and is true wood. But the knower cannot see inside the block of wood to see if the inside is wood. Therefore, he is not compelled to say the block is a block of wood. If to be true is not to be as it seems the other alternative Augustine proposes is this: whatever is, is true. Augustine will ultimately hold to a version of this view, but it must be refined first, for as it stands there is no room anywhere for falsehood, and this is absurd. It goes against common experience. What then is falsehood? Augustine begins by saying everything is either similar or dissimilar to any other thing. If falsehood resided in dissimilars then everything
is false, for anything can be dissimilar to some other thing. So Augustine suggests falsity dwells in the similitude of the true, and of the various things which are subject to our sense, that is called false which tends to be anything and is not. This sounds much like the first definition, i.e. the false is that which is not as it appears, however, this is not the case. For Augustine there is a sense in which whatever is, is true. There are no false things as such.

Augustine explains this by reference to an actor portraying Hector or Hercules. The actor is a false Hector but a true actor. He is a false Hector only because he is similar to and tries to imitate Hector. He is a true actor not because he is similar to or dissimilar to an actor but because he is that very thing itself. One would not say wood is false silver, but one could say certain types of tin are false silver. The reason wood is completely dissimilar to silver but the tin is very similar. The tin is however not false tin. Nothing as such is false. That is called false which tends to be anything and is not. The false though is not the same as the misleading. Though the actor is a false Hector his purpose is not really to deceive. A picture of a horse is a true picture but a false horse. Here too there is no effort at deception. Deception and falsehood are not equivalent terms. The false approaches the likeness of something else without being that whose likeness it bears.

This seems to get Augustine into the difficulty he faced with dissimilars. If everything that is similar and bears a likeness to something else is false then everything is false for everything is similar to something. The picture of the horse is similar to the horse but is a false horse. Why then could we not say the horse is similar
to the picture and is therefore a false picture? Augustine would reply that you could say it but in our way of speaking it wouldn't make much sense. Or to make the point clearer take as an example the likeness of a man in a mirror. The mirror image is a false man but similar to him. We judge the image by the standard of the man. But to say the man was a false image would be to judge the man by the image, i.e. to judge the primary by the standard of the derived. Augustine assumed that usually everyone knows what is primary and what is derived. We would certainly think something wrong with a person who looked at the image in the mirror and then at the man who made the image and began criticizing the man for not shaping up to the perfection in the mirror.

From this it appears that no thing is itself false. There are not two classes of things, true ones that give true impressions and false ones that give false impressions. Neither is falsity in the senses, for the eye was simply made to see and the ear to hear. Error then must reside in the mind. "Anyone who thinks the oar is broken in the water and is restored when it is taken out has nothing wrong with his senses, but he is a bad judge of what they convey to him." Falsehood is thinking something is what it is not and truth is that which declares what is. "Falsehood arises not because things deceive us, for they can show the beholder nothing but their form, and that they have received according to their position in the scale of beauty. Nor do the senses deceive us, for when they are in contact with natural objects they report to their presiding mind nothing but the impressions formed upon them...the mind is deceived when it seeks something that is true but abandons or neglects truth." That is, it neglects the
rules whereby it judges. When the mind seeks a natural body it is necessarily a true body that it seeks, for every corporeal thing is a true body, but it is a false unity for it is not supremely one and does not completely imitate unity. Such categorical concepts as unity, substance and totality are not derived from bodies because no body is a true instance of any of these concepts. They may be similar to, and imitate, any particular concept, but as we noted before the false is what appears to be something else and is not. It is the mind that supplies the foundation concepts for a science of nature. Augustine especially emphasizes mathematical concepts as being fundamental to a knowledge of nature. Falsehood arises when the principles of nature are sought for within nature itself, as if the mind simply derived its concepts from bodies.

Since all bodies are true as such, i.e. all bodies are true bodies but false if considered as something conceptual such as a true unity or a true totality, truth appears to be in things and falsity in a certain act of the will. The will causes one thing to be presented as if it were something else. If we only remember what we have perceived, and only conceive what we have remembered, how is it we conceive false things? Our concepts are false if either they do not exist outside in the nature of corporeal things or if they do not appear to be expressed by the memory, since we have no recollection of having perceived such a thing. It is the will that unifies an image in the memory and presents it to the intellect. The will likewise forces the intellect to take from the memory composite or partial images of actual things and so forms concepts of things that have never been perceived. The will is
responsible for the activity of the creative imagination. Ultimately error is but an absence of being in a mind conceiving things otherwise than they are. There is never any falsity in things. The true is, the false is not.

Augustine realized that if knowledge was pure receptivity no grounds could be provided for the distinction between veridical and illusory apprehension. Augustine also realized that reality is always of a certain sort. That is, reality must be qualified somehow, as material reality, psychic reality or mathematical reality. Everything that appears to the knower has some degree of reality. Nothing is completely unreal or false as such. The mirage, though not of real trees and water, is a real state of the atmosphere and light. A mirage is not 'nothing', though it may be said to contain less being than actual trees and water. In this context Augustine's position that error consists in a lack of being on the side of the knower is slightly more intelligible. It is the knower in accepting the mirage as containing more being (that is, being higher in the scale of 'being') than it actually does that constitutes error. The mirage is a true mirage but false trees and water. An oasis is a true oasis but it is not a false mirage for the oasis is higher in the scale of being than the mirage. It is the function of the mind to subsume the different experiences under their proper categories. Error arises when the mind subsumes one reality under the category of a different reality. Again, it is not the passivity of the subject but the activity of the soul that is the cause of error.
Sense knowledge is infallible if we consider it as appearance, which in fact it really is. Sense knowledge though leads to error if used as a test for intelligible truth, which it resembles only. All sense knowledge is correct and the only error one can make is to go beyond mere sense data and affirm that things actually are as they appear. This is the very point that the skeptics use as an excuse for doubt. In Augustine's early philosophic writing, Against the Academicians, he says these arguments raised against the senses have no weight against all philosophers. There are those (the Platonists, whom Augustine originally sided with) who admit that whatever the mind receives through a sense of the body can beget opinion, but they deny that it can beget knowledge, which they wish to be confined to the intellect. They wish to live in the mind, far removed from the senses.119

In a much later work, The Trinity, Augustine recalls and still holds valid the arguments he used against the Academics. However, in his more mature philosophizing he finds complete skepticism even in regard to sense knowledge to be unrealistic.120 Though there is a difference in regard to intellectual knowledge and knowledge of mutables he is not willing to altogether deny a knowledge of outer nature. Things are not just objects of opinion, for a great deal of our knowledge is about the earth and sky and the objects therein. There are principles of reason (rationes seminales) even in the lowest of bodies, for this reason they are not beyond the range of intelligibility.
Augustine does not seem to see the problem that is posed when he claims to be a realist in regard to the external world and yet says that what is present to us is appearance only. Augustine's works taken as a whole do not, I believe, lead to the view expressed by Brett in his *History of Psychology* that science gives only a delusion of externality.\(^{121}\) Brett says that, according to Augustine, in perception there appears to be an external object and science is merely a system of such perceptions. But since the perceptions themselves are not outside us, they are really ourselves in action. Brett and this line of interpreters find justification for their views from such texts as the eleventh chapter of *The Confessions*. They try to construe Augustine's doctrine of time in such a way as to make him a forerunner of Kant, which may be possible to do, provided certain other texts are ignored. Metaphysically I believe Augustine a realist, though in a number of texts on epistemology he resorts to phenomenalism to provide a basis for certitude.

Augustine does not find the whole issue of the relation between the phenomenological object and the external to be too interesting. The reason for this is the difference in purpose between the two types of knowledge, 'science' and 'wisdom'. Wisdom, the highest knowledge, belongs to unchanging eternal ideas. Its purpose is contemplation. Science, however, has pragmatic ends. It seeks to discover easier ways of doing things, such as curing diseases, and producing goods for the purpose, not of contemplation but to enable the organism to live more comfortably.\(^ {122}\) Augustine's aim then is not to know things for their own sake but only in so far as they can become a good for us. We do not so much seek for truth
in science as we do for power. On a purely scientific level, if such and such works that is all that is necessary. The question as to whether things are exactly as they appear arises usually when a mechanical difficulty is encountered. A good instance of this can be found in certain locations where cars appear to roll up hill without their engine being engaged. This of course is a mechanical impossibility and the seeming hill is explained as an optical illusion. Because of the background, and the roll of the land, what appears as an uphill slope is in reality a decline. The common experience of seeing a car roll down hill however is a phenomenon that is seldom challenged. In the first case, what appeared did not fit in with our present accumulated body of knowledge. The experience of cars rolling down hill does fit in with our knowledge of the world. What we see is in both cases an appearance, but the appearance is only contrasted to the real if certain physical problems arise in the manipulation of nature. As C. I. Lewis puts it in *Mind and the World - Order*, "... the criterion of the objectivity of what is presented is always such a relation to further experience."123

Consistency as such is only a negative test of truth, for it is possible to be consistently in error. I do not think Augustine would say consistency insures truth by itself, seeing there is something external to our logic to which we must be true. Augustine does not believe fact follows from the logical structure of our thought. The consistency that Augustine believes there to be in nature is not a particular state of mind. Augustine anticipated Descartes in the mathematization of nature. Nature does not produce the laws of mathematics but it is created in accord with them and as such obeys
them. Mathematicals, as we mentioned before, are intellectual ideas. The man with a knowledge of numbers will then be able to anticipate nature in some way. This is not because nature is somehow subject to the human intellect, nor is it, as Kant would have it, a science of the possibility of experience. Nature is not affected by our knowing of it. The reason the intellect can know nature in some way is because both nature and intellect are subject to something higher. The concepts of the understanding do not come from nature nor do they ultimately come from the mind, though the mind uses them. Both the mind and bodies are subject to something beyond them. The mind being informed by these concepts has a rule whereby it can judge appearances. Consistency is not the only test for truth.

Going back to the oar in water, as an appearance the oar is bent. The senses report truly. But when the reason is seen whereby we judge the sensation, we know the oar to be different than its appearance. Granted that a reason is given and we distinguish between a phenomenal object and a real object - are we only making a distinction between phenomenal objects? This question is extremely difficult to answer, and will not be answered. Augustine never addressed this question as such. In the majority of his works Augustine seems to be saying we are in direct contact with reality, that what appears is the real. On the other hand, his spiritualistic theory of sensation seems to cut him off from the external world. How does one reconcile these positions? How can one hold to the relativity of knowledge and also to the independence of its object?
Kant recognized the relativity of knowledge, the dependence of the phenomenal object on the mind and thus the impossibility of knowing the real. Idealism takes the other alternative, that the real is dependent upon the mind. No reality exists apart from the knower. Realists try to escape the relativity of knowledge and say we know the real as it is. C. I. Lewis points out that these alternatives may be false alternatives and there may be no contradiction between the relativity of knowledge and the independence of its object.\textsuperscript{124} He shows that relativity is not incompatible with independent reality. As an example, he says, the weight of any body is relative to some other body, though this does not mean that bodies do not have weight in themselves. The size of any object is relative to the yardstick though it has a definite size apart from the yardstick. Color (or taste or smell) is relative while at the same time absolute. It is relative to the mind and at the same time an absolute color in reality.

"From the relativity of knowledge to the mind, phenomenalism argues to the impossibility of knowing the independently real. This is as if the question about the size of Caesar's toga were to be answered: 'Its size in our yards is so and so; in terms of some other measure which other creatures might apply, it would be different. Apart from yards or some other measure, size has no meaning. So you see that the real toga in itself is something outside the category of size. Whether it can have size at all or, if so, what that size would be, we can never know'. The premise is correct. The conclusion non sequitur'.\textsuperscript{125}

There is then a possibility that Augustine is not involved in a contradiction in asserting that what we know is relative to the mind on one hand and on the other claiming that we know reality as it is. Admittedly Augustine does not resolve the problem in any satisfactory way, but before we say he has overlooked the most obvious
error in his theory of knowledge we should first be sure whether it is really an error or merely an undeveloped problem. This solution posed by Lewis may, if developed, help to solve the dilemma that Augustine seems to create for himself. Though it is not a solution posed by Augustine himself, it at least may relieve Augustine from the suspicion of being involved in a contradiction.

At any rate Augustine was concerned to make falsity, skepticism and error states that were caused by the activity of the mind. The mind, and not external things are the cause of error. This has to be the case since the corporeal cannot affect the spiritual. False things cannot make false impressions and true things true impressions. Both are produced by the activity of the mind. The body is not to be praised or blamed, if is the mind which is responsible for the presentation of representations. It is also the mind which is responsible to judge and classify these representations.
Chapter Four

FAITH AND REASON

Nothing is more familiar to readers of Augustine than his claim, 'unless you believe you shall not understand', (nisi credideritis, non intelligitis). Augustine taught that all knowledge must be striven for under the guidance of antecedent belief. There is not 'faith' and 'knowledge' as if these were two types of knowing. Rather faith is a component of all knowledge. It may be easiest to follow up this section on faith by first examining what the term 'faith' does not mean. In his Third Letter on Toleration John Locke could make the following distinction between faith and knowledge:

How well-grounded and great soever the assurance of faith may be wherewith it is received: but faith it is still and not knowledge; persuasion and not certainty. This is the highest the nature of things will permit us to go in matters of revealed religion, which are therefore called matters of faith; a persuasion of our minds, short of knowledge, is the result that determines us in such truths.

Locke gives a fairly representative view of the notion faith in modern philosophy. Though Locke was quite sympathetic to faith many of his contemporaries did not share his view point. They considered faith as more or less wishful thinking. It is not a part of knowledge; as a matter of fact it is considered the foe of knowledge. 'Faith' is equated with credulity whereas 'reason' engenders enlightened progressive connotations. Actually there is
nothing new with this view of faith. It is the same view as was held by many of Augustine's contemporaries. Augustine is well aware of the rationalist view of faith, a view which Augustine will later call more credulous than the simple faith of the ignorant.

Michael Polanyi says that in the fourth century A.D. St. Augustine brought the history of Greek philosophy to a close by inaugurating for the first time a post-critical philosophy. Working within a rationalist background Augustine's theory of knowledge must have seemed a revolutionary development. Augustine's principle is simply this: The will is primary in all knowledge. What is known cannot be divorced from what is loved. At the very minimum, all cognition is directly dependent on interest, and nothing is fully known to which the consent of the will has not been given. There may be awareness of reality without complete cognition of that reality. The completion of cognition lies with affection. Thus full cognition is dependent upon the movement of the will. The fact that there may be objectivity in knowledge is given in the fact that there may be "cognitio" without "agnitio", acknowledgment. Faith, which is defined as a certain movement of the will, is required for complete knowledge. Augustine's view is not just that we begin with faith and go on to understanding. This point can be seen in Augustine's attitude to rational theology.

Augustine sees the rational approach to God to be an internal contradiction; it cannot reach God because it does not want to have God. It withholds commitment until it has sight; but it cannot achieve sight until it yields commitment. The Manichaeans deride Christian credulity which begins with faith. Augustine replies that
these rationalists wish to know God without acknowledging God. But there is no having or knowing God without also a turning toward Him by the will. To have God in the intellect alone is to have Him only tentatively, and the will is free to be its own master. In essence Augustine is denying the possibility of a detached purely intellectual knowledge of God. A knowledge of God requires the attention of the whole soul. The great philosophers (the Platonists) did not perceive that man does not know God because he does not love God. These greatest of the philosophers fail to comprehend the plight of man.128

One of Augustine's most important works on the primacy of faith is his On the Profit of Believing. The work was written shortly after his conversion, to a friend who was involved in the sect of Mani. Augustine, in the Confessions, recalls how he was attracted to the Manichaeans by their promise to prove everything and leave nothing to faith. They were much like modern positivists, believing only what could be empirically demonstrated. In this work Augustine attempts to show the impossibility of such a program and to show the inescapable necessity of faith.

Augustine returns to a Socratic notion that morality is directly related to knowledge. A certain disposition of the heart is required to know the truth. The intellectualist who denies that truth and morality are directly related will refer to mathematical examples to show how anyone can know certain things without any particular disposition of the will. Augustine chooses other examples and shows that if rationalism is carried to its extreme conclusion (i.e. to the exclusion of all faith) then the entire basis of society would crumble.
First, Augustine will grant the position (for the sake of argument) that what is not known must not be believed. Not only the Manichaeans but also the Skeptics held that consent should be withheld when certainty was not present. Next he points out that at the basis of society is the family and if the child does not love and trust the parent and vice-versa, the family unit and thus society are in jeopardy.

But, "if what is not known must not be believed, in what way may children do service to their parents, and love with mutual affection those whom they believe not to be their parents? For it cannot by any means be known by reason. But the authority of the mother comes in, that it be believed of the father; but of the mother it is not usually the mother that is believed but midwives and nurses. For she, from whom a son may be stolen and another put in his place, may she not, being deceived, deceive? ... who would not judge him to deserve banishment, who failed to love those who were perhaps his true parents, through fear lest he should love pretended. Many things may be alleged to show that nothing at all of human society remains safe, if we shall determine to believe nothing, which we cannot grasp by full apprehension."129

Not only is positivism pragmatically and morally unacceptable, it suffers from certain basic internal contradictions. Augustine says, look at the existential situation I am in. I believe in a number of things that I cannot prove, many of which no one can ever prove. Yet I continue to believe. A rationalist comes to me and says I should accept as true only what can be proven, and that what is merely believed on faith should be rejected in favor of a firm foundation for knowledge. But look what a predicament I am in. If I ignore the rationalist he will be disgusted by my continuing in rash and sloppy thinking, yet if I 'believe' him I am doing just what he cautioned me to avoid. "Therefore I should not come unto him who forbids me to believe, unless I believed something. Is there any greater madness, than that I should displease him by faith alone,
which is founded on no knowledge, which faith alone led me to him?"\textsuperscript{130}

That reason itself is sufficient is not proved by reason. But we
must start somewhere. "But will reason raise any firm superstructure
on the foundation of rashness?"\textsuperscript{131}

Augustine realized that one can voice his ultimate convictions
only from within his convictions. Polanyi calls this insight of
our
Augustine's "liberation from objectivism."\textsuperscript{132} Logical consistency
do not operate in a vacuum, but operates only on one's fundamental
personal beliefs. A system of thought may be logically consistent but
completely invalid. But does this mean one's fundamental beliefs can-
not be defended by reasons? Not necessarily, but it must be remembered
that in the order of knowing the reasons come after the belief and
make sense only within the framework of those particular ground
beliefs. Aristotle mentioned some place that it is not enough to
merely state your case or say your opponent is wrong and then decamp.
Reasons must be given. Even here it can be seen that an unreasoned
belief is being held to, i.e. that reasons must be given. Numerous
examples from theoretical physics and medicine can be offered to
show that reasons can be given to explain the same phenomena from
radically different points of view. The Greek astronomers were
certainly aware of certain anomalies while holding to a geocentric
theory of the heavens, yet even after Copernicus had set forth his
heliocentric theory, most astronomers did not accept it. Both sides
saw the same phenomena and both offered reasons to justify their
positions.\textsuperscript{133}

Polayni points out that the Confessions is an example of a
logically consistent exposition of fundamental beliefs.
"Its first ten books contain an account of the period before his conversion and of his struggle for the faith he was yet lacking. Yet the whole of this process is interpreted by him from the point of view which he reached after his conversion. He seems to acknowledge that you cannot expose an error by interpreting it from the premisses which lead to it, but only from premisses which are believed to be true. His maxim, 'nisi credideritis non intelligitis' expresses this logical requirement. It says, that the process of examining any topic is both an exploration of the topic, and an exegesis of our fundamental beliefs in the light of which we approach it ... Our fundamental beliefs are continuously reconsidered in the course of such a process, but only within the scope of their own basic premisses."\textsuperscript{134}

There are numerous ways in which 'faith' and 'reason' are used in the Augustinian corpus. Augustine at times speaks of 'faith' and 'the faith' interchangeably. 'Faith' is a certain disposition of the will while 'the faith' is a set of doctrines and precepts. In works like \textit{Against the Academicians} Augustine uses faith as a principle in knowledge quite apart from relying on the word of 'the faith' which is contained in the Old and New Testaments. He shows that a certain faith is required to be a skeptic. This justifies such people as Polanyi in using Augustine's principle of faith beyond the theological realm, since Augustine himself did not limit faith to religious matters.

Augustine never actually addresses himself to the problem of faith and reason, in the sense the question was posed in the Middle Ages. Augustine did not divide the knowable into what could be known by reason and what could be known by revelation. He believed that reason, understood as the universal logos of being was identical with revelation. When Augustine speaks of the reason being blind and fallen on account of original sin, he is speaking of neither the universal logos in its essential unity nor 'reasoning' as the activity
of a rational mind. Throughout Classical Philosophy is the idea that reality has an objective rational structure. Reason in a person refers to the rational structure of his mind which enables him to know reality. Now when Augustine claims 'reason' is fallen he is referring to this subjective reason in man. Because the 'reason' is darkened it can grasp the reason in reality only with great difficulty. Augustine then, is not denying that reality is rational, for it was created by God in accordance with a rational principle or logos. And neither is there anything essentially wrong with human reasoning (in the active sense). Augustine uses dialectical arguments to prove points in theology, and reasons by the common laws of reasoning (e.g. excluded middle, non-contradiction). The mind is however blind because its reason cannot see the reason in reality. Faith is not opposed to reasoning, for faith uses reasoning in providing a reasonable faith. Faith is in fact an existential necessity because of the state of human reason. It becomes a necessary complement to human reason. Since human reason cannot see, it must be guided by 'faith' and by 'the faith'.

Augustine divides the knowers into five categories. The first group are the wise men who 'understand' the truth itself. Secondly there are those who 'believe'. What we understand, we owe to reason; what we believe, to authority. Augustine gives as an illustration an event from ancient history. He can believe Cicero put wicked conspirators to death on the authority of historians, yet he cannot know it. Not only can he not know it, but he knows for certain he can by no means know. Both these groups of knowers Augustine approves of and gives the name of philosophers. The third type are those who hold opinions, that is, those who think they know what they
do not. Another is those who know they know not but do not seek in the proper manner (i.e. by faith) to find. The last class are those who neither think they know nor wish to seek. The first group believe the truth itself. The second, the earnest seekers, believe authority. The third are credulous and the last two believe nothing, as to any particular system of teaching (though in practical life this is impossible). Augustine thus agrees with the Platonists that one must be on his guard against mere opinion. He makes a great distinction however between opinion (thinking one knows what he doesn’t) and faith or belief (resting in a sufficient authority).

According to Polanyi this method of believing is in fact what takes place in the teaching and learning of scientific knowledge. If faith in authority breaks down so does science. The young learn from believing their teachers. No teacher is going to tolerate a pupil who questions everything. As the student gets older he is encouraged to be critical and question, within certain limits. This is a heuristic principle conducive to getting on in the discipline. The pupil gradually learns to ask the right questions but still within the framework of the authority structure. Authority teaches the pupil to question intelligently and in this way shapes the problem for the student. The student cannot ask just any question. Suppose in a simple experiment a numerical result of 8.2 was achieved. The experiment is repeated a number of times and the results vary from 8.2 to 8.4. The student learns to take the mean of all these numbers as the closest approximation to the correct answer. But what if a student questioned the practice of taking the mean as the nearest approximation to the truth? This question is not so simple to answer
and the student will be advised that one has to accept it in order to continue on in the science. As the young scientist grows older, his colleagues, accepted practice and learned journals become his authority. He can continue on to do meaningful work only by building on (i.e. accepting by faith) much of the groundwork that has gone before him.\(^{138}\) Augustine realized that the man who is going to attain new discoveries must "first believe that he shall attain unto that which he purposes; and do yield his mind as a suppliant; and submit to certain and great necessary precepts..."\(^{139}\)

Not just any authority is to be believed. The authority must be reasonable. Faith is only possible to rational creatures.\(^{140}\) Contrary to Tertullian who thought the more absurd a proposition was the more it should be believed, Augustine sees irrationality as being as great a threat to faith as it is to reason. The medical doctor, for instance is praised when he suggests a cure and backs up his reasons why it will work by the solid precedents set by other scientists and by reasonably fitting it within the framework and showing how it is an integral part of an already existing frame of reference. The doctor is not held blameless, nor is he even tolerated, if he is to choose as his authority supermarket magazines promising amazing cures from cancer for under a dollar. Authorities are not arbitrarily chosen, and are hardly ever actually conspicuous. Authority is in the very nature of the social structure. A child accepts more on authority than he can ever imagine. If left completely without authority and culture he would not be more critically minded but entirely mindless.
Augustine provides us with three things that lend credibility to an authority. First, a view is more credible if a large number of people hold to it, even though it is quite possible for a majority to be in error. A second aspect which lends credibility to a view is its possibility of being easily accommodated within established belief structures. A theory should be both internally consistent and outwardly consistent with what is already known. Thirdly, an authority should have some history behind it.

"Unless you believe you shall not understand" means, that understanding is a phenomenon that can only take place within a certain cultural and linguistic framework. Contrast this to the more or less prevalent attitude since Descartes that doubt is the universal solvent of error which leaves the pure truth behind, untouched. As we stated earlier, Augustine taught that doubt itself was only possible within a belief structure. Universal doubt is unintelligible. However, there is a form of doubt, i.e. reasonable doubt, which can serve as a heuristic principle for the advancement of knowledge. This doubt works within the belief structure and serves only to advance certain fiduciary beliefs. Doubt is unreasonable if it attempts to be skeptical of everything.

A good example of this can be found in Polanyi's *Personal Knowledge*. Polanyi says, today we say natural scientists are more critical than astrologers only in so far as we regard their conception of stars and men as truer than that of the astrologers. When we disregard the evidence for the veracity of horoscopes, we express the belief that this evidence can be explained, within the scientific view of stars and men, as being merely accidental or otherwise invalid.
To seventeenth and eighteenth century scientists skepticism regarding the supernatural discredited a whole system of supernatural beliefs. This doubt seems reasonable as long as we are unaware of the fiduciary beliefs that lie behind it. Fiduciary beliefs are most effective if they remain hidden from conscious inspection. During this same period of time a physician named Mesmer demonstrated that hypnosis could be used to operate painlessly on patients. He provided numerous cases to back up his theory. At one time he even painlessly amputated a leg in front of an audience. Yet the medical journals refused to print his findings. Demonstrations in front of medical societies failed to convince them that mesmerism was legitimate. They explained the obvious examples away with such excuses as, 'the patients were close friends of and very fond of Mesmer and lied about the pain for his benefit'. Mesmerism sounded too much like supernaturalism and the medical society of Great Britain was convinced it was defending science against imposture. We regard these acts of skepticism as unreasonable and preposterous today, for we no longer consider mesmerism to be incompatible with the scientific world view. But other doubts, which we now sustain as reasonable on the grounds of our own scientific world view, have once more only our beliefs in this view to warrant them.

The Inquisition's charge against Galileo was 'doubt'. They accused him of rashness for upsetting beliefs that had been held to for hundreds of years. Yet no philosophic skeptic would side with the Inquisition against the Copernican system, because that would not be a rational doubt. "Since the skeptic does not consider it rational to doubt what he himself believes the advocacy of rational doubt is merely the Skeptic's way of advocating his own beliefs."¹⁴³
Wittgenstein expresses a thoroughly Augustinian position when he says, "I must recognize certain authorities in order to make judgments at all." Like Augustine, Wittgenstein believes "something must be taught us as a foundation." At the foundation of well-founded belief lies belief that is not founded. Wittgenstein says "of course learning is based on believing". This is how the sciences are learned. There are certain bedrock beliefs which we hold to, that we do not think to doubt. How can one question the law of induction or the law of contradiction? By what yardstick can we measure them? Unless the hinges stay put the door cannot turn. Verification is only possible if the bedrock stays put. If everything is doubted what would verify what?

In the actual process of coming to know, the Augustinian position develops around three interconnected ideas: illumination, anamnesis, and conversion.

In Concerning the Teacher Augustine tries to show that truth is beyond both the teacher and the student. There is a reality to which both must show respect. "For do teachers profess that it is their thoughts which are perceived and grasped by the students, and not the sciences themselves which they convey through speaking? For who is so stupidly curious as to send his son to school in order that he may learn what the teacher thinks?" For Augustine, teaching (of rational truths) does not come from without but from within. The teacher merely prods the pupil to learn what is already in his mind. The teacher uses words and symbols so that the student may look within himself and consider whether what has been explained has been said truly. The teacher, therefore, conveys a meaning to which he
is committed and the student responds under the direction of an inner teacher—his spontaneity remains inviolable and his ability to respond is an irreducible attribute of his nature.

Suddenly after a struggle the pupil becomes illuminated and sees what the teacher sees. He becomes suddenly aware of the truth. A new sense of coherent meaning comes to life. The pupil recognizes the truth as if it had been in his memory all the time. He has the experience that what he has learned was already hidden in his memory but had never been brought to the fore. Augustine returns to the Platonist doctrine of anamnesis but develops it in a more sophisticated form. We do not recover our knowledge from a pre-existent state, because, if we take as an example the art of geometry, that would mean we must have been at one time geometers. But there are very few geometers and chances are most people were never geometers in any life. But anyone can be taught geometry. Therefore there must be a standard of truth present in every mind. Augustine speaks as if there were a teacher or an illuminator within the mind. This is not so difficult to conceive when we remember that the soul is an image of God and the memory a tendency toward God. The ideas or archetypes on which the world is created are ideas in the mind of God. Man, therefore, made in this image shares in a faint and darkened way a knowledge of things through their ultimate causes, aided of course by an inner illumination.

The theory of illumination, is both one of Augustine's most fruitful ideas and one of his most obscure ideas. The theory exercised much influence throughout the Middle Ages and even today is eagerly discussed, especially in European philosophy. Perhaps the best way
to begin a consideration of illumination is to state what it is not. Illumination is neither Platonic reminiscence nor innatism since the soul does not pre-exist and God does not bestow ready-made ideas in advance.\textsuperscript{154} Illumination is not the same as ontologism, which holds that man knows God directly and intuitively.\textsuperscript{155}

Illumination is the concursus of God operating in the order of knowledge.\textsuperscript{156} To say it from a creaturely point of view, human knowledge is a 'participation' in the knowledge of God in whom there is no distinction between knowledge and Being.\textsuperscript{157} Human knowledge is (in part) caused by things; God's knowledge on the other hand is the cause of things.

... this world could not be known to us unless it existed; but it could not exist unless it were known to God.\textsuperscript{158}

So far there is no problem. However, when one begins to ask how this illumination takes place and how the ideas which it is supposed to illumine get in the mind the trouble begins. Augustine finds in his personal situation: a process in his coming to know that resembles the process of the eye seeing as light dawns upon its object. Illumination on this analogy shows the reason what is true. How this takes place and what the status of the light and the enlightened are has been the subject of various controversies, and is beyond the range of this inquiry.

It seems there can be no question though that Augustine believes truth can only come from within. In \textit{On the Magnitude of the Soul} he says, "unless reason found in me something known, as a starting point for leading me on to what is unknown, I would never learn anything by reason and I would never call it reason. ... therefore prior to reason
there must be some knowledge in us which reason itself uses as a starting point.159 In that same book Augustine calls reason the sight of the mind but reasoning is reason's search, the actual moving of the sight of the mind over the things that are to be seen. When the sight of the mind sees some reality upon which it is focused, we call that knowledge, but when the mind does not see though it focuses its sight, that is called not-knowing or ignorance.160 Augustine simply reiterates what Plato had said. Unless you already in some way know, how can you set out to seek? Without a certain foreknowledge; seeking would be worse than grasping in the dark for if we were completely ignorant of what we were seeking how would we recognize it when we find it?

Augustine never suggests we can know individuals only because we already know the universal beforehand. Augustine never says we come to know physical bodies because we already have in our mind their universal. Knowledge of material things comes from the senses, either directly or indirectly. Indirect knowledge would be such knowledge as comes from the report of trusted authorities or the combination or increase and diminishing power of the memory. For example, we can have a foreknowledge of the sea before we have ever been to the coast if we have previously seen water in a cup, but there is no way to know the taste of a strawberry before it is actually experienced. Foreknowledge of material things comes from previous experience and the creative memory. Foreknowledge of intellectual things comes from their direct presence to the mind.

Polanyi offers a possible paradigm for Augustine's theory of foreknowledge. He agrees with Augustine and Plato that a knowledge
of things must be somehow already in the mind. Polanyi says these men saw the problem and provided an attempt at an answer. However, they could have made their theories more intelligible if they were acquainted with the work of the Gestalt psychologists. Polanyi describes two types of knowing, distal and proximate. Distal knowledge is foreknowledge. In scientific research the scientist has a sort of distant knowledge of what he wants to find. After hard and frustrating work he has a sudden illumination. He finds the answer at hand that he had earlier seen in the distance. He believes it to be true, but as yet cannot prove it. His next step is an attempt to get a knowledge of the particulars and supply proximate knowledge, i.e. objective knowledge to prove what he already believes to be true. The extreme empiricist is right in denying that universal statements are capable of verification. But it is not true that knowledge is limited to verification. 'We can know more than we can tell' is a favourite phrase of Polanyi. For example, you can say you know a certain person's face. When asked to prove this by giving particulars you may be at a loss for words, though you could recognize the face again in a thousand. He believes that all really important knowledge is not objective knowledge of particulars but knowledge of the whole. This knowledge of the whole is more than a knowledge of the aggregate parts. The knowledge of the parts might be scattered and lost in the memory and may or may not ever be recollected, even though a knowledge of the whole remains.

Notice how Augustine defines the word 'cogitation' in the Confessions as a marshalling and a re-collecting, a gathering together of particulars from their dispersion. If one were to forget completely, or never
know in the first place, the will to remember would never even arise, since whatever we wish to remember (or to know) we have already remembered that it either is or was in our memory. The will to know (to remember) proceeds from those things that are contained in the memory. Recollect that we said earlier that the memory contains not only images (from material things) but also arts and things themselves (intelligibles). We have already discussed how the images get in the mind. How the intelligibles get there is another matter. This is the problem faced by Plato, Augustine, Polanyi and many others who adopt this line of thought. They all deny intelligibles come into the mind by way of the senses, for only material images are taken from matter and intelligibles are not found in the material world. Augustine says, Plato postponed the issue by saying we learned these ideas in a previous life, which leads to an infinite regress. Augustine explains their presence in the mind from man's creation in the image of God, God being the ultimate home of the ideas. It seems that these ideas are what makes man essentially rational and man is rational because he was created rationally. This rationality though must consist of categories of understanding and not ready made concepts. At the point where actual concepts are subsumed under rational categories the doctrine of illumination is introduced to explain how judgments are possible. Augustine seems to use illumination to account for the knowledge of 'being sure'. Augustine seemed obsessed with the necessity for certitude in knowing. Both the material world and the immaterial soul are mutable. Since certainty (or unchangeableness) cannot arise from the changing it must come from that which is immutable and at the basis of truth itself.
The third aspect of learning, conversion, has a strongly epistemological basis in Augustine. The term is employed with physical connotations in mind. Conversion is a turning towards, as distinct from aversion or turning away. Conversion is a new orientation, a new direction. This is dramatically illustrated in the Confessions, especially in the third book where Augustine makes a play on the word vertere (turning). A conversion is more than an assimilation of new facts, it is rather a seeing of the old facts from a different standpoint. Brought up in the skeptical tradition, Augustine long sought for certitude first in one thing, then in another. He longed to find something that would be immune from the skeptic's doubt. He found nothing, and his anxiety increased. Finally in the eighth book of the Confessions he describes a traumatic conversion experience that brought with it the certainty and faith he had long looked for. Augustine no longer felt obligated to find a certitude that the skeptics could not doubt, instead he challenged the bases of skepticism and asked if their foundation was immune from doubt. He realized that universal doubt as a method for finding truth led, not to truth, but to moral inversion. Augustine came to doubt if doubt would dissolve the false and leave behind the true. Maybe doubt would just as soon discard and doubt the true as the false. But he could not see this as long as he accepted the skeptic's basic faith premisses. A turning on the part of the will was required to move the intellect to see reality in a new way.166

David Hassel in his study of conversion-theory in On The Trinity says Augustine's use of convertere closely parallels his use of the term participatio.167 Hassel argues that conversion, like participation,
stands not only for the initial substantial orientation of all creatures but also for the spiritual creatures' free, psychological development of this orientation toward the Good. Conversion-theory permeates all reality from its first beginning and lowest forms to its final ending and its highest forms. As a result any use of convertere connotes the total process of the cosmos as it is created and grows toward God. Conversion is a natural process of turning toward the truth. The will unites conversion-elements during the soul's act of conversion on some object.

The opposite of conversion Augustine calls aversion. Instead of the will uniting conversion-elements it can separate them by aversion, e.g., aversion of the eyes from visible objects or of the nose from smells or of the touch from body or of the memory from senses. When the will is averted it is left empty and unformed. For instance, the act of recall is without formation when it averts from the memory-similitude, and will become formed only when it converts to that similitude. What aversion means then is simply, 'non-conversion'.

The necessity for a conversion of the will and a criticism of autonomous reasoning is a historical necessity because of the nature of man. Augustine takes seriously the fallenness of man. For him the idea of an autonomous reason is an empty and shallow concept. In actual practice there is no such thing. This 'reason' can only act upon a groundwork that is not supplied by reason itself. At the ground level, faith, a certain movement of the will, is the only way man can come to the truth. Commenting on this notion of Augustine's, Dooyeweerd
"it is precisely in the light of this whole development of Humanistic philosophy that a radical transcendental critique of theoretical thought is highly necessary and actual. The foundations upon which our culture had sought to build have been shaken everywhere by the storms of a tremendous transitional period. Therefore, the autonomy of theoretical thought can no longer properly be posited as a philosophic axiom. It is understandable, that this has been done in the period in which the Humanistic ground-motive was practically unchallenged in philosophy. However, in the present spiritual crisis anyone who thinks he can take refuge on this dogmatic standpoint, in order to block the way to a radical critical self-reflection in philosophy, thereby displays he has understood nothing of the deepest causes of this crisis."

Like Dooyeweerd, Augustine felt a sense of despair in the philosophical development of his time, and his critical self-reflection has provided us with what Polanyi calls the first post-critical philosophy in the history of western thought.
Chapter Five

CONCLUSION

Augustine did what no Greek philosopher ever dreamt of doing. He made religious faith in some revealed truth the obligatory starting point of rational knowledge. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics had always tried to refine and rationally reinterpret the crude myths of Greek paganism. In the Confessions Augustine relates how, after vainly trying to reach truth, and eventually faith, by means of reason alone, he had at last discovered that all the rational truth about God that had been taught by the philosophers could be grasped at once, pure of all errors, and enriched with many a more than philosophical truth by the simple act of faith of the most illiterate among the faithful.

Augustine believes that one should seek to understand rational truths, rationally. The intellect, however, left to itself finds progress in truth slow and difficult, for it knows not where to begin. It is faith that comes to the aid of reason and provides a ground upon which the intellect can operate. This is the essence of Augustinianism, 'believe in order that you may go on to understanding'.

Augustine shows that some truth must be accepted on faith before knowledge begins. For him the Christian scriptures are the source of that faith. Wittgenstein also agrees that some faith is required as
a starting point. He says that it is possible to imagine a man brought up to believe the world came into existence fifty years ago. What could you offer as conclusive evidence to prove him mistaken? Belief that the world is older than fifty years is not an arbitrarily chosen personal belief. The belief is based on authority. It is a belief that is at the basis of our judgments, but to prove our view of the world is true is not so much a matter of providing evidence as it is a kind of persuasion or conversion.

E. E. Evans-Pritchard in a very interesting book, *Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azande*, tells how he was struck by the intellectual force shown by the primitive African in upholding his beliefs against evidence which to the European seems flagrantly to refute them. "They reason excellently in the idiom of their beliefs, but they cannot reason outside, or against, their beliefs because they have no other idiom in which to express their thoughts." A typical example is the Azande belief in the powers of the poison-oracle. The oracle answers questions through the effects on a fowl of a poisonous substance called benge. The poison is extracted from a small creeper and becomes effective only after it has been addressed in the words of an appropriate ritual. Evans-Pritchard says the theory of the poison-oracle is embedded in an idiom which interprets all relevant facts in terms of witchcraft and oracular powers. He goes on to describe the lengths the Azande go to, to resist any suggestion that benge may be a natural poison. Evans-Pritchard tells us that he often asked the Azande what would happen if they were to administer oracle-poison to a fowl without delivering an address, or if they were to administer an extra portion of poison to a fowl which
has recovered from the usual doses. "The Azande" he says "do not know what would happen and are not interested in what would happen; no one has been fool enough to waste good benge in making such pointless experiments which only a European could imagine ... Were a European to make a test which in his view proved the Azande opinion wrong, they would stand amazed at the credulity of the European. If the fowl died they would simply say it was not good benge. The very fact of the fowl dying proves its badness".175

Augustine goes further than just state the case that reasons only work within a belief structure. He thought that there really was one true structure of belief which corresponded to the true structure of reality. Unaided reason could not arrive at this true reality structure, and hence the need for revelation.

This revelation, through which Augustine found certainty to the questions he had been plagued with for a lifetime, became for him normative in knowledge as well as morality. From the scriptures he found the spirituality of the soul, which of all creatures was alone created to know God. Thus Augustine developed an active theory of sensation. The scriptures, however, did not say matter was essentially evil, as the Manichaeans had taught, nor did the scriptures totally degrade the value of sense knowledge; how could they when they claimed God appeared 'in the flesh'? So Augustine cannot keep company here with the Platonists. Sense knowledge must be more than a matter of opinion. Thus Augustine will hold not only to an active theory of sensation but he will also hold that this sense knowledge is in good part true of the real world. True, there seem to be problems in holding to both views, however, Augustine does not argue from a problem
to a solution but from what he believed the scriptures to teach.

Augustine said that one of his greatest intellectual breakthroughs came when he discovered the soul to be totally incorporeal. Augustine takes great care to refute any hint of materialism that may have clung to him from his years with the Manichaeans and the Skeptics. One of the most important areas to rid of materialism is a theory of knowledge, for what is the soul more concerned with than knowledge? Now Augustine wants to maintain the purity of the soul from the effects of matter, otherwise matter would exert a causal influence upon the soul. To do this Augustine erects a totally spiritual doctrine of sensation, in which the soul is the active cause of sensation. Furthermore, Augustine will deny that intellectual truth is caused in any way by corporeal bodies. Numbers do not come from numbered things, and figures do not come from figured things. Intellectual truths are free of all matter. Their proper home is the soul, and it is from the soul that they are recovered (recollection).

Throughout the Augustinian epistemological program the soul is the active cause of knowledge. The soul sees and hears, not only in sensation but also in intellection. The soul actively attends to its body and protects it. It discovers facts and relations in the material world (scientia). The soul actively produces memory images and is again active in their recollection. The soul is likewise active in intellection, causing the mind to turn and to seek that which lay hidden. The soul does not allow the intellect to rest till it has referred all truths to the source of truth, in whom alone the soul may repose (wisdom).
It can therefore be seen why in Augustinian terms man is chiefly his soul. In concluding his definition of man, Augustine says, "to the extent it is granted to man to know him, man is a rational soul using a body."176
NOTES

1Schaff-Herzog, Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge, "Manichaeism".
3Ibid., p. 69.
5Confessions, p. 71.
6Ibid., p. 72.
7Ibid., p. 72.
8From Garvey's introduction to her translation of Against the Academics (Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Press), p. 4.
10Against the Academics, III, VII. 15, trans. by M. P. Garvey.
12Confessions, III, 4.
14Ibid., II, 24.
15Ibid., II, 29.
16"Letter 118", The Fathers of the Church series.
17The Trinity, IV, 16, 21, The Fathers of the Church.
18Ibid., IV, 16, 21.
19Ibid., IV, 16, 21.
20Ibid., XI, 5, 9.
21Ibid., XI, 5, 9.
22Letter 118.
23Ibid., 118.
24Ibid., 118.
26Ibid., p. 25, 48.
27Gilson, Christian Phil. of St. Augustine, p. 63.
28De Genesi ad Litteram, VIII, 6, 9 in P. L. Vol. 34, Col. 245.
29Trinity, XI, 9, 16.
30Ibid., XI, 3, 6; XI, 8, 13.
33Ibid., II, 11 lines 30-31.
34Ibid., II, 8.
35Ibid., II, 8, 9.
36Trinity, XI, 2, 3.
37Ibid., XI, 2, 3.
38Ibid., XI, 2, 3.
39Ibid., XI, 2, 3.
40Ibid., XI, 2, 4.
41Ibid., XI, 2, 4.
42Ibid., XI, 9, 16.
43 On Music, VI, 5, 9; Letter 118; compare this to Plotinus Ennead IV, 3, 21-2.

44 Trinity, X, 5, 7.

45 De Gen ad Litt, III, 4, 6-7; VII 13, 15-20.

46 On the Origin of the Soul, IV, 5, 6.

47 For a fuller discussion of this see Mary Ida Gannon's excellent article "The Active Theory of Sensation in St. Augustine" in New Scholasticism, 1956, pp. 154-181.

48 De Gen ad Litt, XII, 9, 20.

49 Gannon's article.

50 Concerning the Teacher, chap. III, trans. G. C. Leckie, Basic Writings of St. Augustine.

51 Plotinus, Enneads, IV, 6, 1, trans. Mackenna (Boston: C. T. Branford).

52 Ibid., IV, 6, 3.

53 Trinity, XI, 8, 13.

54 Ibid., XI, 8, 14.

55 Ibid., XI, 8, 14.

56 Trinity, XI, 14.

57 Letter, 7.

58 Trinity, XI, 10, 17.

59 Trinity, XV, 21, 40.

60 Ibid., XI, 10, 17.

61 Confessions, X, 17.


63 Letter, 7.

64 Ibid., 7.
65 Ibid., 6.
66 Ibid., 7.
68 Music VI, 11, 32; On True Religion, X, 18; Trinity, XI, 5, 8.
69 On Music, VI, 8, 21.
70 On Music, VI, 8, 21.
71 Trinity, XV, 21, 41.
72 Ibid., XV, 21, 41.
73 Confessions XI, 31 and XI, 28.
74 Trinity, X entire chapter.
75 Trinity, XV, 3, 5.
76 Ibid., XIV, 6, 8.
77 Gilson, Christian Philosophy, p. 299.
78 Confessions, X, 20.
79 City of God, XIX, 26.
80 Gilson, Christian Philosophy, p. 104.
81 Retractations I, 15, 3.
82 Confessions VIII, 5, 11; VIII 9, 21-10, 24.
84 Gilson, Christian Philosophy, p. 132.
85 Trinity, IX, 10, 17.
86 Ibid., 11, 9, 16.
87 Trinity, IX, 12, 18.
89 Ibid., XIII, 9, 10; City of God, XI, 28; Trinity, XV, 21, 41.
90Ibid., III, 9, 16.
91Trinity, XI, 7, 12.
92Retractations, I, 1, 1.
93Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1951) I, p. 207.
94Against the Academicians, III, 9, 21.
95Ibid., III, 10, 23.
97Ibid., #519.
98Ibid., #450.
99Ibid., #516.
100Against the Academicians, III, 11, 24.
101City of God, XI, 26.
103Ibid.
104Against the Academicians, III, 11, 24.
105Ibid., III, 11, 26. A similar point is made by J. L. Austin in Sense and Sensibilities.
106Ibid., III, 11, 26.
108Gilson, Christian Philosophy, p. 244.
109Descartes quoted by Gilson in Christian Philosophy, p. 244.
110Gilson, p. 244.
111Soliloquies, II, 15.
112Ibid., II, 15.
113Ibid., II, 12.
114 Of True Religion, XXXIII, 62.
115 Ibid., XXXVI, 66.
116 Ibid., XXXVI, 67.
117 Trinity, XI, 10, 17.
118 Confessions, VII, 15.
119 Against the Academicians, III, 11, 26.
120 Trinity, XV, 12, 21.
122 Trinity, XII, 14, 22, Comm. on the Ps. 135, 8.
124 Ibid., p. 155.
125 Ibid., p. 173.
128 Confessions, VII, 21, 27.
129 On the Profit of Believing, #26.
130 Ibid., #30.
131 Ibid., #31.
132 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, p. 267.
133 Thomas Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, (2nd. ed.; Library of Unified Sciences, 1970) gives several such cases of different interpretations being placed upon the same phenomena. Another book dealing with the same issue but from an anthropological perspective is E. E. Evans - Pritchard's Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azande. (Oxford, 1937).
134 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, p. 267.
135 On the Profit of Believing, #25.
Lawrence Jansen has a helpful article on the role of archetypes in Augustine titled "The Divine Ideas in the Writings of St. Augustine" in The Modern Schoolman, 1945 (22), pp. 117-31.


Retractations, I, 4, 4.

Gilson, Christian Philosophy, pp. 95-6.


On the Trinity, VII, 10, 11.

City of God, XI, 10.
159 Magnitude of the Soul, 26, 51.

160 Ibid., 27, 53.


162 Ibid., p. 82.

163 "... should we for small intervals of time cease to recall, they (ideas) are again so submerged and slide back, as it were, into the more remote chambers that they must be evolved thence again as if new (for other sphere they have none), and must be marshalled (cogenda) again that they may become known; that is to say, they must be collected (colligenda), as it were, from their dispersion; whence we have the word cogitare. For cogo (I collect) and cogito (I re-collect) have the same relation to each other as ago and agito, facio and factito. But the mind has appropriated to itself this word (cogitation) so that not that which is collected anywhere, but what is collected (colligitur), that is marshalled (cogitar), in the mind, is properly said to be cogitated (cogitari)." Confessions, X. 11.

164 Trinity, XI, 7, 12.


166 For a parallel account of the role played by conversion in the attainment of scientific knowledge see Polanyi's Science, Faith and Society, p. 67 and Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.


168 On the Trinity, XI, 8, 15; XI, 4, 7.

169 Ibid., XI, 3, 6; XI, 8, 15.


172 Ibid., p. 16.

173 Wittgenstein, On Certainty #262.

174 Evans-Pritchard, Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic, p. 338.

175 Ibid., pp. 314-15.

176 The Morals of the Catholic Church, trans. by R. Stothert in Basic Writing, I, XXVII.
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