radicals and some Marxists want to integrate foraging peoples into the wider systems so they can find needed allies with those who share their present or future class interests.

The list could go on, but the point is that none of these formulations tell us much about the range of views we might find expressed among foraging peoples themselves. In my experience, the views of foraging peoples include all the above but also many other perspectives as well. These peoples have a wide variety of goals and means to these goals, means with which they seek to make their history. Their choices among means and goals are often unexpected; at the same time, their responses to these choices are often insightful and farsighted in addition to being pragmatic. To participate more effectively in whatever roles they are invited to play and are capable of playing in these historical processes, anthropologists will have to examine more precisely what the experiences have been with various strategies of response to the linkages of foraging societies into wider systems. This is a modest contribution to the latter need.

I present a case study of one foraging people’s efforts to restructure their linkages to wider systems of economy and nation-state polity within a developed liberal-democratic nation. I show that the linkages that already exist in such states are more complex than has generally been recognized in the existing prescriptive discussions on how foragers should respond. In doing so, I show that the James Bay Cree Indian people of northern Quebec had a distinctive set of aspirations for their linkages to the non-Cree world.

I also explore the limits for short-term restructuring within a liberal-democratic state. These limits are sufficiently narrow that fundamental conflicts between Cree aspirations and state aspirations and practice do exist which cannot be resolved in the short term. Nevertheless, within the limits of a liberal-democratic state, there are quite diverse and important short-term means by which a foraging people can enhance their opportunities to pursue their aspirations in the longer run. The future outcomes, however, remain decidedly uncertain.

The James Bay Cree have a long history of linkage. The mercantile fur trade reached them indirectly through Indian intermediaries, probably considerably before the Hudson’s Bay Company set up its first trading post in North America on Cree lands, three-fourths of the way through the seventeenth century. And specific government Indian policies and programs also reached them indirectly through the Hudson’s Bay Company and through Christian missionaries decades before a governmental administration was established in their region in the 1930s and 1940s. Their lands were opened to industrial
exploitation of wildlife and mineral and forestry resources following
the building of a railway one hundred miles south of their lands in
1914-15. But industrial resource exploitation was limited in scale by
problems of accessibility until the transportation networks for large­

scale activities were greatly expanded in the 1960s. From that point
on, a growing number of mining and forestry operations and towns
was established, along with development of the hydroelectric re­

sources of the region (Feit 1982, 1986).

The commencement of the James Bay Hydroelectric Project in 1971­

72 represented to the Cree a critical expansion of the rate of resource
exploitation and of threat to their own society and economy. Re­

ponses to the project became a focus of concern and challenge to
the external agencies initiating resource developments in the region.
A group of young Cree mobilized the Cree population to support
opposition to the hydroelectric project, while soliciting advice from
Cree elders on goals to seek in opposition (Richardson 1975). The
elders saw current development schemes as part of a long historical
process going back to the arrival of Europeans. The problem they
focused on was that throughout this history, resource development
was solely in the hands of outsiders and the needs of Cree people
had been given little or no consideration. In short, Cree had no voice
in decisions about the development of the resources of their region
(Feit 1985a).

In response, the elders saw the opposition to the hydroelectric
project in the context of the need to restructure long-term relations­

ships with nonnatives. The goal was not to completely stop the project
but to have an effective voice in modifying it so it would be acceptable
to the Cree and to have an effective voice in all nonnative develop­

ment in the region. Opposition to the hydroelectric project in the courts or
in negotiations was an essential immediate means toward the long­
term goals. The tone was conciliatory, the desired means were ne­

gotiation, but the change being sought was fundamental.

In a Cree view, the goal was obvious and reasonable as it expressed
the essence of a responsible reciprocity that Cree value in all rela­
tionships: reciprocity that permits others access to resources they need
but within a mutual respect for the autonomy and needs of each, so
that all can survive in security and well-being. In this view, mature
and responsible relationships respect the needs of others and demand
such respect in return. The Cree thus neither sought sole control of
land and resources nor did they deny access to nonnatives. Neither
did they seek to retreat into a self-imposed isolation. In a Cree view,
it was possible to maintain autonomy within an ongoing relationship.

They therefore did not see as incompatible outcomes the possibility
of maintaining an autonomous self-governing society while partici­
pating in wider linkages so as to permit, and to benefit from, develop­
ments by nonnatives. Elders sought the security and wealth that
would prevent the starvation known in earlier decades and that would
give them a share of the wealth accumulated by nonnatives during
centuries of fur trading. Younger Cree sought productive work for
those who could not hunt full-time and a share of the wealth they
knew was a taken-for-granted feature of everyday life for the sections
of Canadian society they could see around them. And Cree did not
see these as contradictory goals that could not be achieved simul­
taneously.

Cree opposition to hydroelectric development in negotiations and
in courts led over a four-year period to the James Bay and Northern
Quebec Agreement (JBNQA, also referred to as the Agreement)
(Anonymous 1976). Completed in 1975, it was the first modern com­
prehensive aboriginal rights agreement in Canada and the first such
settlement to explicitly specify a set of aboriginal rights, including the
means thought necessary to maintain the relative autonomy of a
group of indigenous hunters within a modern nation-state (Hunt 1978;
Feit 1980, 1985b; Asch 1984). The negotiation process was a difficult
one because while the Cree and Inuit were determined to maintain
and enhance their self-governance and their hunting cultures, soci­
eties, and economies, they had to accede to the asserted rights of
provincial and federal governments to promote the general develop­
ment of the natural resources of the region and to assure a clear
national sovereignty over the land and all the peoples thereon. These
conflicts structured the framework in which the negotiations with
Quebec provincial and Canadian federal governments proceeded.

The conflict was defined by two issues: development, which hinged
on control of economic resources, and sovereignty, which hinged on
the distribution of political power. On the one hand, government
insisted that it retain the final authority over all development in the
region, except on lands reserved for Indians, to assure that aboriginal
people could not block regional development; government also re­
taxed final jurisdiction over legal and administrative authority ap­
plying to lands and peoples, although this authority was divided
between the two levels of government and could be delegated to other
governmental institutions. On the other hand, Cree insisted that the
maintenance of their hunting societies depended on continuing access
to, and protection of, the wildlife resources of most of the lands of
the region, not just to those of the reserves, which covered only a
limited portion of their hunting lands. Further, they insisted on their need to continue, and indeed enhance, the areas over which they exercised self-governance, although this particular term was not used at the time (Feit 1980).

These positions had to be discussed through negotiation because neither side had the power to impose its views absolutely and without significant cost. From government's point of view, it was forced, by a partial Cree and Inuit victory in a court case against the James Bay Hydroelectric Project, to accept the fact that the aboriginal rights of Cree and Inuit had not been extinguished by any government action and therefore the aboriginal litigants were able to effectively ask the courts to intervene on their behalf against developers (Malouf 1973; Richardson 1975).

From the native standpoint, it was unclear whether the courts would maintain a strong definition of aboriginal rights and actually prevent development or merely recognize a usufructuary interest in the land, which would have a more limited impact on development activities. Given the parliamentary system, it was also clear that government legislation could extinguish, or more likely unilaterally define, what the aboriginal right was although not without a public outcry. These considerations made undefined aboriginal rights effective levers for court challenges to disrupt—if not permanently stop—development and for political protest. The same considerations made it unlikely, however, that a strict insistence on legal pursuit of aboriginal rights in the short or medium term would result in a fundamental redistribution of power within political structures or in adequate protection of the indigenous peoples from the immediate impacts of the ongoing development. In addition, the ongoing construction of the project put Cree and Inuit under significant pressure, because during the years a court case would take, they would suffer the impacts of the development, many of which would have long-term consequences.

The distribution of power and legal resources available to them, the ongoing construction of the James Bay Hydroelectric Project, and the overall package of benefits negotiated to support their hunting societies led the Cree and Inuit to seek a compromise within the framework of the negotiations when it became clear that they could not achieve a more comprehensive or just fulfillment of their goals. The main body of this chapter is a discussion of the short- and medium-term experience with the JBNQA and, more specifically, on the means it explores for reconciling conflicts over control and use of wildlife in the James Bay region of Quebec. This case material is used to examine the possible limits of aboriginal autonomy within a developed liberal-democratic state. Before proceeding to specific case materials, I provide below a brief, general outline of the Agreement provisions.

OUTLINE OF THE AGREEMENT

The main areas of Cree concern, and therefore the main areas addressed by the Agreement, were (1) modifications to the plans for the hydroelectric project; (2) native control of land; (3) protection of hunting rights and resources; (4) enhancement of Cree self-governance; (5) establishment of a balance of government powers between Cree and provincial and federal authorities; and (6) control of future developments. In each of these areas, Cree negotiators worked extensively to explore possibilities for achieving goals within the constraints of the negotiation context. And although several innovative and important measures were developed, in other areas no effective agreements were found.

The insistence of federal and provincial governments that the James Bay region be open for development significantly limited the land base the Cree could negotiate. The provincial government took the position that land under Cree control, effectively owned, be limited to areas immediately around the settlements and adjacent hunting locations. No satisfying arrangement was reached on this issue. The maximum land the province would transfer to Cree control was only 5,500 square kilometers, called Category I lands, of the approximately 375,000-square-kilometer region. This area was sufficient to provide an effective base for community sites, some buffer against adjacent development projects, and protection that mineral developments in the areas could only proceed with native consent. Cree local governments would generally control access and residence on these reserve lands as well as use of forestry resources. The land provided through the negotiations, however, gave only limited natural resources that could form a basis for economic development and only very limited protection for the hunting economy.

Cree negotiators sought to reduce their dependence on government authority and administration and to take more control of their own affairs through enhanced self-governing institutions. They thus negotiated with the governments for recognition of their rights to govern their own affairs in their communities and the need for new regional government structures but within the sovereignty of the existing Canadian state. Cree were a minority in their region, comprising ap-
approximately 7,000 people distributed in seven settlements in the James Bay territory, as opposed to 20,000 Euro-Canadians. They therefore sought regional autonomy and self-determination through the formation of distinctive, ethnically defined governments and boards with authority over Cree lands, which would assure native control and administration of their affairs under legal provisions established in the negotiations. This pattern was generally acceptable to government because it was compatible with their sovereignty; it transferred the Cree from federal to provincial jurisdictions, a goal being sought by both levels of government; and the province was prepared to accept the decentralization of provincial responsibility to regional boards and governments.

At the community level, the Cree got agreement that there would be special legislation for a Cree Act extending the powers of their band councils in new community governments and replacing the provisions of the existing national Indian Act. Among the provisions were (1) communal decision making, a reallocation of powers between the community as a whole, the band council, and the Minister of Indian Affairs to better conform with Cree values, and (2) additional powers over lands. In addition, a Cree Regional Authority would be established, controlled by representatives elected by the communities and mandated to manage compensation funds provided by governments. Several regional service administrations were also to be established, a Cree school board, a health and social services board, and police units within the provincial system; also, changes were to be made to the existing administration of justice. The education board would be established under provincial legislation but would be run by Cree members who would hire the school administration and teaching staff. In addition to the regular authority of provincial school boards, the elected Cree board would also have several special powers including discretion for hiring native teachers without completed teacher qualifications, instruction in their own language, development of a special curriculum, and alterations to the school year schedule. Similar special modifications were provided for other boards. The effect of these provisions was to give Cree substantially increased control of their own government and of the administration of basic services (for a different assessment of the effects, see LaRusie et al. 1979).

These complex and detailed negotiations also emphasized the diversity of the linkages that already existed between the Cree and the political and economic institutions of wider Canadian society. Key institutions of Cree self-governance, including existing band councils and new regional authorities, were already then established in Canadian law and required specific negotiations to modify or establish them. Basic education, health, social, and security services were already common in Cree communities, but their terms needed to be further negotiated to establish adaptations both to Cree needs and values and to Cree control. The extent of the shift, in the previous few decades, from relatively "traditional" foraging societies to societies with relative and changing forms of autonomy within a network of ties to wider systems was clear as Cree sought to systematically restructure those relationships.

The discussions also provided for monetary compensation and economic development for Cree. Their share of compensation funds was to total $137 million (Canadian, hereafter $) over twenty years. This was over and above the several tens of millions of dollars spent each year by governments for education, medical care, social services, housing, community infrastructures, and other services provided to Indian peoples by the Canadian state. In addition, specific moneys were to be available for the promotion of economic enterprises, and special funds were to be used for remedial works. With respect to project modifications, the Agreement included several changes to project plans. But these changes were not numerous or of large scale, so it was essential to provide funds for remedial works to be undertaken as future impacts were experienced. Cree negotiators, however, agreed only to a detailed description of the hydroelectric project. Because the project was still being planned, this assured that any future changes would require the consent of Cree regional authorities; in fact, this has provided an opportunity for occasional Cree responses to ongoing project design. These project modifications reduced the direct consequences around villages and assured future participation for Cree; but they also meant that the project would go ahead, substantially as planned, and that substantial impacts on the land and wildlife of the region would result. Despite major efforts by Cree negotiators, no other major project modifications could be agreed on.

The main legal provisions of the Agreement provided for eventual Cree and Inuit withdrawal of legal opposition to the hydroelectric project and of claims to other undefined land rights; they also provided for recognition by both governments of the rights spelled out in the Agreement. The detailed legal structure of the Agreement, involving over 450 pages of text and eventually requiring dozens of new laws and modifications to existing legislation to give it force of law, is also a testimony to the complexity of linkages in which aspects of Cree society had become embedded.
The agreement reached after two years of negotiation and discussion in Cree villages was taken back to each Cree community for approval or rejection as a whole. People did not consider the Agreement to be fair or just but thought it would increase their chances of maintaining their culture, society, and economy—given the alternatives—and all Cree communities accepted it. The key parts of this acceptance were provisions for the hunting, fishing, and trapping rights of Cree.

PROVISIONS OF THE JBNQA FOR MANAGEMENT AND USE OF WILDLIFE

I will examine the provisions of the Agreement relating to hunting, fishing, and trapping in some detail to better identify the constraints on Cree self-governance within Canada and to assess the opportunities and effectiveness of negotiable measures designed to enhance long-term pursuit of self-governance within the existing constraints. Discussion of the provisions of the Agreement relating to self-governance and management of wildlife focuses on five areas of conflict: recognition and definition of basic rights of native hunters; management of wildlife resources; allocation of resources among conflicting users; provision of adequate cash incomes for indigenous hunters; and protection of renewable resources from the effects of nonrenewable resource development. Each problem area, with its practical responses, is set briefly into three contexts: (1) the relation of the problem to capitalist or nation-state formations is identified; (2) the possibilities for relative autonomy inherent in those formations that the responses try to exploit, as well as the constraints on those possibilities, are identified; (3) the extent to which these responses have mobilized and enhanced, or endangered, Cree autonomy is also indicated.

RECOGNITION OF RIGHTS OF NATIVE HUNTERS

Throughout much of Canada, no basic and inalienable native right to harvest and use wildlife resources is recognized. Native peoples are accorded various rights to use renewable resources by the Crown; the rights so accorded are, in the view of government, subject to change by the will of the Crown alone. In the past, the exercise of the Crown’s authority has been constrained only partially, mainly by political considerations and by treaty obligations in certain areas. Indigenous peoples, however, have consistently asserted their aborig-
reconciliation of the interests of the governments and those of the indigenous population. The principle signifies the acceptance by both indigenous peoples and governments of the priority interest in protecting wildlife and environments, and it binds all action by Cree and governments.

The rights and the principles were binding because they are stated both in the Agreement and the laws that give legislative force to the terms of the agreement. The legislation is subject to parliamentary politics and discretion; however, because this legislation does not replace the Agreement, because the Agreement states that the legislation must reflect the provisions of the JBNQA, and because the Agreement is a legally binding contract between the Cree and the governments of Quebec and Canada, any change in the provisions must involve changes in the Agreement. Changes can be made only with Cree consent. Recourse in the event of a breach of this contract would be to the courts. More recently, the JBNQA has been given standing under the Canadian constitution, placing it beyond the powers of parliament and effectively denying the possibility of unilateral changes by any one government.

The right to harvest, as set out in the JBNQA, was also intended to give legal recognition to the Cree system of hunting and to provide the basis for hunters to pursue their way of life according to their own culturally ordered knowledge, decisions, and activities. The agreement does not try to codify or define the Cree cultural system but recognizes its existence and its key structures: the system of hunting territories and of “owners” of territories, which are called, respectively, “traplines” and “tallymen” (Tanner 1979; Feit 1986). A trapline is defined as an area in which harvesting is conducted under the supervision of a Cree tallyman. A tallyman is defined as a person responsible for a trapline and recognized by a Cree community. These definitions incorporate the essential cultural concepts and practices of Cree use and management of wildlife without forcing the specific features of the system to be codified; these features are, therefore, left flexible for definition and adaptation by Cree. The complex system of socially distributed rights and privileges to land and resources, expressed as normative rules as well as in everyday processes of dispute and decision, is thus alluded to but not directly altered.

The agreement that was struck by the JBNQA definition of harvesting rights was accepted because it provided an acceptable series of compromises on several issues but especially those relating to sovereignty: (1) it recognized Cree rights but left open the question of the source of those rights, a form that did not make them dependent on a delegation of government authority but that also did not challenge government sovereignty by asserting an alternative source of legitimacy; (2) while not challenging sovereignty of government, the rights limited governments’ claimed rights to unilaterally change Cree rights and thereby limited future exercise of government sovereignty; (3) both Cree and governments submitted themselves to a principle of protecting animals and wildlife; and (4) government recognized the indigenous Cree system of management of land and wildlife resources. These provisions have generally worked to date, although I will note below problems in the pursuit of conservation.

Management of Wildlife Resources

In northern Canada, values, goals, and methods of conservation and wildlife management differ among the culturally distinct populations of the area; in turn, these differ from goals of and methods used by government-mandated wildlife managers (Berkes 1977, 1981a, 1982). My own research among the Waswanipi Cree of Quebec emphasized the structure of one indigenous Cree hunting system. This system not only serves to constrain the use of wildlife resources but also, at least under certain conditions, serves to manage the resources (Feit 1986).

In general, the research on Cree hunting activities supports the conclusion that the Waswanipi seek to manage resources, and biological indicators support the conclusion that they usually achieve this objective. An important factor in this success is the extensive knowledge that senior hunters have of the land and wildlife they hunt. This knowledge comes from observing trends in game population indicators and harvests over many years. Harvests are adjusted in response to these trends. The observed indicators of moose and beaver populations include trends in numbers of animal signs and sightings, numbers of moose yards and beaver colonies, sizes of aggregations or colonies, age and sex structures of animals, frequency of births along with frequency of twinning in moose, the size of cohorts among beaver (judged in part from observations of placental scars during butchering), and the general health of animals. These are precisely the kinds of data that nonnative game managers try to get in order to manage moose and beaver populations. Senior Cree hunters who have returned frequently to the same hunting territories and who know in great detail these distinct tracts (which average about 1,200 square kilometers) have more detailed knowledge of the game populations they hunt and manage than nonnative game man-
In the widely decentralized system of hunting territories (there are about 300 in the James Bay region of Quebec), only the most general and ineffective regulations can be enforced by a centralized authority. This situation provides an incentive for reconciliation between competing interests in the management of wildlife; Cree cooperation is essential for effective management.

But if the fact that it can be regulated only by decentralized "owners" of hunting territory is a strength of the Cree system, this is not to say that it can be isolated from outside interventions. History shows that the actions of nonnatives can disrupt the system. The historical limitation of the system lies in its ability to regulate only the activities of members of the indigenous community, and this is why recognition of the system in the JBNQA was insufficient. Means were still needed to regulate non-Cree use and the effects of this use on wildlife. Governmental authority and cooperation were therefore also essential for effective management. This situation provided additional incentive for the expansion of efforts to achieve reconciliation.

There was a need to articulate the indigenous systems with management systems designed to regulate nonnative activities; there is mutual benefit in recognizing both systems. Therefore, the JBNQA, besides protecting hunters' autonomy by recognizing Cree rights and their culturally defined system, also recognized that there would have to be new structures and principles for articulating that system with government powers. Most of the specific provisions of the JBNQA are designed around this latter need. The structures are needed to continually regulate nonnative hunting and resource use with respect to the numbers of hunters and to the times, places, and sizes of their catches. The establishment of such structures was acceptable to Cree because it recognized primarily the need to regulate nonnative wildlife resource use and only secondarily Cree uses.

Given the effectiveness of indigenous management, the Agreement recognizes that there should be as little interference with Cree use as possible. Because harvesting is limited by the principle of conservation, so long as Cree conservation is effective, Cree are considered to be complying with this condition. Interference with Cree practices can occur only if and when one party—native or government—claims (and can plausibly show) that a conservation problem exists, whether it is caused by native or nonnative peoples. Depending on the nature of the problem, its solution may or may not involve alterations in Cree practices for the short or long term. When it does involve alterations, conservation decisions affecting native peoples will be implemented first through guidelines or advisory programs or both,
which amount to specific encouragements within native self-regulation. If these mechanisms are not effective or if they are inappropriate, government regulations may be used. However, regulations must be used in such a way as to create a minimum of interference with native peoples and harvesting activities. If regulations do not conform to this pattern, they are unlikely to be fully or even extensively enforceable. The underlying assumptions are that the new structures will come into play only when problems arise and that, when they are needed, the Cree people and the appropriate governments will wish to see the problem resolved to protect the resource.

The major area of conflict was the relative authority of native and nonnative institutions in these regulatory structures and processes. Cree wanted final decision-making authority or shared authority; federal and provincial governments claimed such authority as an aspect of sovereignty. The idea of coordinating management through a joint committee developed in response to this confrontation but failed to settle the issue of who would control the joint system and have the authority to take and implement decisions. With little common ground on this issue, the only proposal on which Cree negotiators could obtain agreement was that for the establishment of a coordinating committee with equal representation for the interested parties. This would be primarily a consultative body. The provincial and federal governments retained a final decision-making authority for most, but not all, issues; however, their authority would be constrained. The goals and principles for management decisions, such as conservation and minimal impact on Cree activities, are legally binding on government decision makers, and a complex procedural system of consultation must be followed before advice of the joint committees can be set aside. This system respects government sovereignty while significantly constraining any exercise of that sovereignty which might negate Cree rights or benefits.

Although key tests have not yet arisen, this system appears to be only partially workable in practice. The system is complex and bureaucratic; when it is not used in an atmosphere of goodwill, those using it can lose sight of issues in a plethora of procedures and rights. Furthermore, where there are significant conflicts between interests expressed by Cree and those expressed by governments, the system tends to inaction or slow action on the part of governments. Inaction has become a major tool of the governments for avoiding their legal obligations, thereby making it more difficult for Cree to bring court challenges based on contentions that government has acted in violation of the Agreement. Government does not, therefore, always respond effectively to Cree needs and sometimes undermines Cree rights (Feit, n.d.).

Beyond this, government has not always acted in the interests of conservation and has often responded primarily to political pressure from nonnatives rather than to conservation needs. To this extent, a fundamental assumption of JBNQA negotiations—that conservation was a shared priority goal—has not been systematically confirmed by experience with the implementation of the Agreement. Furthermore, the coordinating committee is still often treated as a body that is consulted only casually and after major policy decisions have been made rather than as an integrated system of advice with a role in all stages of government policy development and implementation. While some improvements have occurred as the process has been longer in place and as experience with it develops, it has, nevertheless, remained a largely paternalistic and only sometimes responsive process. The extent of governmental and bureaucratic backtracking and violation of specific provisions of the Agreement has raised questions about whether inherent trust in the responsibility of the governments to fulfill their commitments, essential to the effectiveness of even a detailed and legally forceful agreement, can be expected (Feit, n.d.). This finding has important implications for the use of legal structures to formalize and regulate relationships between indigenous peoples and nation-states, a point not lost on other indigenous groups seeking negotiations within Canada.

Regulation of Conflicts between Native and Nonnative Users

Conflicts between native and nonnative users of wildlife are common in many, but not all, areas of the North (Brelsford 1980, 1982, 1984; Usher 1981, 1984). In the James Bay region of Quebec, where the conflicts have long standing and are already deeply entrenched, the basic question of how resources will be allocated is of central concern to the Cree. The first key to dealing with these conflicts is agreement on the relative merits and strengths of claims made by various user groups. This relative ranking is largely a political process, shaped at various times by legal and ideological features of both societies. In the last decade, the principle of priority for native use has gained ground. It is still clouded, however, by questions of whether it applies equally to all indigenous peoples or only those with treaties or specific legal statuses within Canadian law, whether there should be an economic means or subsistence test, whether the priority should include nonnative peoples with similar life-styles if
These levels refer to balance in entire available catch estimated permissible levels over aspects of nonnative populations and through fixing the these to regulate the economic and political nature of the provision was intended to limit the extent of potential conflict by reserving certain species and geographic areas for native peoples; the second was to establish a mechanism to put into operation the priority allocation of resources for native harvesting over sport hunting and fishing; and the third was to design an outfitting regime that would provide an important degree of practical native control over aspects of nonnative hunting and fishing activities.

The measures for priority of harvesting guaranteed the native peoples a minimum fixed level of harvest, if permitted by animal population levels. This provision would effectively cut off sport hunting or fishing when animal populations declined and would reserve the entire available catch for the native peoples, thereby protecting subsistence production during the period of greatest vulnerability. The fixed level of guaranteed allocation was acceptable to the native peoples, however, only when it was linked to additional provisions stipulating that larger kills were possible when warranted by game populations and that allocations to native and nonnative hunters above the guaranteed level would be based on need. Because it is impossible in practice to guarantee actual harvests over time, the mechanism finally adopted provides for governments and native peoples to establish fixed, guaranteed levels of permissible harvests to natives. These levels are to be based primarily on the results of a joint research project concerning native harvests of wildlife during a seven-year period (James Bay and Northern Quebec Native Harvesting Research Committee [JBNQNHRC], 1982). Once the guaranteed level is established, it will determine partly how the permissible kill in any one year may be allocated among native and nonnative users. When the estimated permissible kill from a wildlife population in a given year is equal to, or less than, the guaranteed level, the entire kill will be allocated to the native peoples. When the permissible kill of a wildlife population in a given year is higher than the guaranteed level, native peoples will be allocated at least the guaranteed level; the balance of the permissible kill will then be divided between the native peoples and nonnatives according to their needs, provided that some of the balance is allocated to nonnatives. This mechanism for giving priority to native harvesting should provide a major means of controlling the actual kill by sport hunters and fishermen and of limiting conflicts with native hunters. The mechanism will be used only when conflicting uses create a conservation problem. Furthermore, although quotas are given priority as the means of implementing allocations, other management techniques can be used in ways consistent with these principles.

The legal and technical complexity of these provisions indicates the difficulties of formally encoding in specific and potentially legally defensible procedures even a simple principle, such as the recognition of the priority of native rights and needs over those of other resource users. It was thought that this combination of measures could regulate and restrict conflicts between native and nonnative users and that if it did not, the provisions were such that they could be the basis for court challenges to government violations. In practice, the verdict is not yet in, but two items have become problematic—the lack of personnel and funds for policing nonnatives and the tardiness of governments in enforcing the provisions (Feit, n.d.).

The compromise provisions of the JBNQA are based, in part, on the assumption that governments and native peoples take the conservation of renewable resources as an important objective. The extent to which provisions of the Agreement have not been quickly or fully implemented by responsible governments, particularly provincial government, reflects the fact that government sometimes has ignored its responsibility for the conservation of renewable resources of the territory or has made it subsidiary to its political interests, as indicated above. Legal action has already been required to enforce certain of these provisions of the Agreement and more may be required in the future. Legal and political action will test the defensibility of these specific Agreement provisions.

**Provision of Adequate Cash Incomes**

Native peoples in the Canadian North who continue to depend extensively on renewable resources have also come to depend on complex, extensive, and direct interactions with the Canadian market economy. They now depend on imports of some, although clearly not all, important and sometimes specialized components of their hunting technology and of materials to operate and maintain these components. They depend on the use of various commercial services, particularly in transportation and communications. They depend on use of imported foodstuffs to make up any difference between har-
vestable resources and the subsistence requirements of a growing population. All these imports require substantial annual cash incomes (Berger 1977; Asch 1982a, 1982b; Salisbury et al. 1972a, 1972b; Feit 1982). Cash incomes have come from several sources. Income from the sale of harvested products—most important are furs—is highly unstable because prices respond to unpredictable variations in international economic cycles as well as shifts in fashion and, more recently, the market impacts of public movements protesting the killing of animals. Government transfer payments have, since the 1940s, cushioned the effect of the unregulated market cycle on incomes but have not always kept pace with rises in import outlays. In addition, governments have attempted repeatedly to use dependence on transfer payments as a lever to force northern native peoples to comply with government development policies. Because these policies have typically either sought or assumed the demise of the harvesting economy, the effects have, in most cases, been detrimental to the support and maintenance of harvesting and income from harvesting (Feit 1986). Some important counterexamples can be cited, but it was clear to Cree negotiators that some insulation from economic markets and from economic effects of changes in government administration and policy was required.

The economic problems of hunting were addressed in JBNQA sections dealing with the Income Security Program (ISP), the Cree Trappers’ Association (CTA), and the provision for a corporation to undertake compensatory and remedial works, the La Grande Complex Remedial Works Corporation (SOTRAC). ISP is the key provision here, intended to provide sufficiently generous cash payments to Cree hunters to reduce their dependence on fur prices in the world economy and on government controlled transfer payment programs. JBNQA states that the objective of ISP is to “ensure that hunting, fishing and trapping constitute a viable way of life for the Cree people and that individual Cree who elect to pursue such a way of life shall be guaranteed a measure of economic security” (Anonymous 1976). ISP could only be used to accomplish this objective, however, because it was integrated into JBNQA, which contained the other provisions briefly mentioned above. The effectiveness of a cash payment to hunters depended on hunters having a right to hunt that could not be removed at the initiative of governments, on a continued priority access to wildlife resources, on continuing Cree wildlife management, and on regulation of the effects of future development (see below; Feit and Scott, n.d.; LaRusie 1979).

The general effectiveness of ISP payments depends also on the availability of the goods, services, and infrastructure necessary for hunters to make effective use of the funds available to them. This is the role of SOTRAC and CTA. These organizations, individually and jointly, can provide infrastructure, needed goods and services, and wildlife and harvest monitoring services. SOTRAC is funded by the James Bay Energy Corporation. CTA has been funded by joint contributions from the governments of Quebec and Canada and from the Cree themselves. Without these provisions of JBNQA, ISP could not contribute effectively to reducing the dependency of Cree hunters on world economic conditions and government welfare policies. Even with these provisions, it can only reduce, not eliminate, such dependencies (Feit 1983).

The actual amounts paid each year are indexed to the cost of living; in 1982–83, they amounted to C$23.64 per adult for every day spent in harvesting or related activities outside a settlement. The minimum number of days that can be paid to an individual is in effect 90, and the program establishes a limit of 240 paid days per annum per recipient. To the per diem amount, a second amount may be added, based on the difference between a basic guarantee, related to family size, and the total income of a family unit. The average ISP benefit paid during 1982–83 amounted to about C$8,500. And total benefits paid during the year amounted to about C$9.5 million.

The program is often justified in government literature as a means of reducing welfare payments and at the same time increasing productive employment. It should be noted, though, that the employment it creates is effectively outside the labor market (Scott 1979). Eligibility for the program is based on hunting activities of the previous year, and although the rules offer diverse criteria, most beneficiaries establish eligibility by spending at least 120 days in hunting or related activities, of which 90 are spent outside the settlements. The agreement established an overall limit to the total number of man-days payable annually under ISP so as to set an upper limit on costs to government. Since its initiation, this limit has been raised three times, and a procedure for future changes is now being discussed.

The incorporation of ISP into the framework of Cree claims settlement made it possible for the program to be structured in a way that would limit some of the dependencies inherent in other transfer payment programs. The costs of ISP, both program benefits costs and administrative costs, were to be paid by Quebec under the terms of the Agreement. In this sense, ISP is another transfer payment pro-
program and runs the risk of creating dependency of the kind experienced by Cree under previous welfare programs—dependency on funds controlled by changing government policies and politics. When the Cree negotiated ISP as part of JBNQA, they attempted to use the negotiations and the Agreement itself to limit this kind of dependency. As ISP is defined in the Agreement, it cannot be unilaterally changed by governments. In addition, ISP is not administered by the government that funds it but by a separate corporate entity, the Cree Income Security Board, made up equally of Quebec and Cree appointees, with a rotating chairmanship. The obligation of the Quebec government is to transfer the funds needed each year to the accounts of the ISP board. The board is also given considerable authority to implement and, where necessary, interpret and review ISP and its operations, in accordance with legislation and the Agreement (Feit 1983).

To summarize, the incorporation of negotiations over ISP within the framework of comprehensive aboriginal land claims negotiations permitted integration of ISP into the package of regimes, programs, organizational structures, and benefits thought to be necessary to assure the economic viability of hunting. It also made it possible to establish a program that, although funded by government, is significantly independent of government policy and politics, is jointly controlled and administered by the government and representatives of the beneficiary population, and legally encodes the specific rights of individual beneficiaries.

The actual impacts of ISP have been quite extensive. It has increased the number of Cree people who make hunting their main activity by about one-third. During the first year of ISP operation, people who had not hunted intensively during previous years could still register for ISP, if they declared an intention to hunt intensively. ISP initially, and almost immediately, increased the number of people hunting intensively from approximately 700 to 900 on average, or about 29 percent. The program therefore initially met the goal of enhancing participation in hunting activities by Cree (Scott 1977). To put the overall level of ISP participation in perspective, in 1982–83, when 1,122 beneficiary units were registered, they represented about 43 percent of the resident adult population of Cree villages. Variations between the eight Cree communities were considerable, however, ranging from approximately one-fourth to over one-half of community population of ISP. The amount of time hunters spent in the bush also increased significantly with the introduction of ISP and has risen slowly since that initial increase. In the first year of operation of the ISP program, the average amount of time beneficiaries spent in the bush increased about 25 percent over the time they had spent in immediately previous years. Since then, there has been a further 10 percent increase.

To give some idea of the extent of participation in bush life typical of ISP beneficiaries, the average number of days spent in the bush by hunters in 1978–79 (the last year for which there are full data) was over 225, or almost eight months. Over 50 percent of ISP hunters spend more than 7.5 months in the bush, and more than 75 percent spend more than half the year. The substantial increases in average time spent in the bush, therefore, came on top of an already time-intensive pattern of hunting that was common in Cree communities.

ISP has enhanced traditional social forms and practices. In particular, there has been a modest increase in the numbers of families going to the bush as groups, and the practice of women staying behind in the settlement, which had been growing, is now relatively infrequent, except when motivated by medical or employment concerns. There has also been a continuation of the practice of multifamily hunting groups as the main residential units in the bush. In some communities, there are clear indications that the numbers of women and children in the bush have increased and that the number of bush camps established has risen with the increased number of hunters and families. In this respect, the program has met another explicit Cree objective, the general maintenance of the traditional social organization of hunting (Scott 1977, 1979; Feit and Scott, n.d.). However, at the community level, there have also been several changes in social organization, most related to the emphasis the growth of hunting activity has put on coordinated decision making. As a result of the needs for greater coordination, community level decisions concerning hunting land and wildlife have become more formalized. Such decision making has developed because it meets a need that results from the increased intensity and use of land and resources.

Nevertheless, knowledge of the Agreement, and therefore of French and English, and knowledge of the administration structures set up after the Agreement, have become important resources in this decision-making process. As a result, middle-aged, and some younger, men probably have greater influence in the process than formerly. But it is also important that all of the active participants in decisions are intensively engaged in the hunting economy, so that decision making directly about harvesting rests with hunters and not with administrators. It is also the case that hunting activities are profoundly affected by decisions concerning other development activities, decisions that were formerly taken outside the communities and
Without Cree participation. Now there is frequently a Cree role in these decisions. Native communities and organizations now actively undertake some forms of land-based economic development, on their own or through various forms of joint ventures, and they play a role in decisions concerning development initiated by others. In these cases, Cree participation is often through Cree and nonnative administrators working for Cree organizations, and hunters often have a limited role (LaRusci et al. 1979). Interviews in the communities suggest that hunters are often not satisfied with this process. In this area, the Agreement has changed decision making, creating some Cree participation but without ensuring the full and effective participation of the full-time hunting sector of Cree communities. This is a problem the hunters thought the Agreement would resolve, but this has not occurred.

The introduction of ISP has led to substantial increases in local bush production of housing, specialized equipment, clothing, heating, and other bush services, including bush education and probably some traditional medical practices. This increase has occurred in both total production and per hunter/family production (Scott 1977, 1979). There have also been substantial increases in the uses of goods and services imported into Cree communities from the industrial economy of Canada. The emphasis here has clearly been on goods and services that increase the efficiency or security of bush life, but consumer goods have also increased. Items that aid transportation and communication have been especially heavily used. The long-term implications of this overall growth in the use of imported goods and services are not yet clear. Although this growth was not started by ISP, it was accelerated by the program (Brelsford 1983a). It is likely that certain of the goods and services now being used are coming to be seen not only as welcome additions to a hunting way of life but also as indispensable necessities. ISP was intended to stabilize this trend and insulate it from cycles in the industrial economy and from manipulation of the markets on which Cree depend. It seems likely to have done this, because the major cash incomes needed by Cree to purchase these goods and services now come from ISP.

But, at the same time, ISP has led to additional use of industrial imports and raised the threat that if the latter increases lead to a cycle of consumerism within Cree society, this could work against any stabilization and buffering effects. The long-term outcome is not yet clear. On the basis of limited data available from some communities, it appears that recent trends have necessarily been toward a reduction in the initial rapid growth in consumer expenditures that immediately followed the introduction of ISP and toward a stabilization in the growth of consumer goods consumption. Whether this is a long-term trend or simply a response to slower growth in incomes is not entirely clear, but a decline in comments about needed increases in ISP benefits in the last several years points to the latter.

ISP has permitted and helped the hunting sector of the Cree regional economy to expand during periods of recession in its employment, enterprise, and administrative sectors and to engage a larger number of Cree in intensive hunting activities. In 1982-83, the number of ISP beneficiary units rose from 929 the previous year to 1,122, an increase of 21 percent. I understand that this number rose again somewhat in 1983-84. About half were men joining ISP, probably for the first time, and many of these were young. In several communities, people feel that the recent rapid increase in the number of young people entering the program is related to declines in alternative economic opportunities in the present recession. How many of these young people will stay on practicing intensive hunting if employment is again more readily available cannot now be predicted. What is important is that the structure of ISP has worked so as to permit a rapid increase in levels of participation. This repeats the role hunting has played in the recent history of the Cree—the stable and secure economic sector, the one able to absorb some of the underemployment created by cycles in job markets. ISP clearly cannot absorb all, or even most, of that underemployment, however. Even so, the relative stability of hunting is perceived by some hunters as another indicator of its continuing long-term viability and importance to Cree.

ISP has created an increased confidence in the viability of the hunting way of life, and this is reflected in an increased encouragement to young people to pursue it (Feit and Scott, n.d.). Statistical data on the number of children being taken out of school to tend one or more years in the bush have been extremely limited. Existing data indicate that preschool children are now more frequently in the bush, whereas those of school age are at least as frequently in the bush as before ISP. The long-term effects of this pattern cannot be precisely predicted, but it is a good indicator for a potentially positive future for recruitment to intensive hunting. Finally, ISP has not resulted in any general or widespread overutilization or depletion of game resources, and the Cree system of hunting territory management by territory “owners” has generally continued to work to regulate harvests and conserve wildlife (ibid.). In summary, to date, ISP has been an effective means of maintaining, enhancing, and securing the subsistence sector of Cree economy and society, although the social
changes accompanying the implementation of the Agreement have not fully met hunters’ expectations.

PROTECTION OF RENEWABLE RESOURCES FROM THE EFFECTS OF NONRENEWABLE RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT

There is clearly no long-term future for renewable resource-based economies in the Canadian North if there is not, in fact as well as in policy, a real priority given to renewable resources in decisions about how nonrenewable resources and land are to be used in the region. Unless rights to have and to use renewable resources can be given more political weight, based on recent history, the prospect for northern development is not promising. There has been an extensive series of government policy statements and regulatory regimes designed to afford protection to at least some components of northern ecosystems. We have also seen the development of and, in many cases, the adoption of a range of tools to assist with the making of decisions and choices among various development objectives such as multiple use planning, land use planning, environmental and social impact assessment, and a plethora of others. Yet the history of northern development has shown that the key considerations in decisions concerning whether, where, and how projects and explorations have been undertaken have not been environmental considerations (Usher and Beakhurst 1973; Freeman and Hackman 1975). A series of investigations over the last decade has made it increasingly clear that policy statements and tools of decision making and administration have not been effective means to do more than moderate and, where possible, remedy the effects of nonrenewable resource developments. We have not yet seen the political will, or a sufficiently large lever, to alter the balance.

JBNQA uses most of these techniques in northern Quebec as well, and concerns with their effectiveness exist here too. On economic, ecological, and social grounds, I see reasons to believe that controlled development could be quite extensive and yet still be compatible with needed environmental protection as well as being of potential benefit to native peoples in the North (Salisbury et al. 1972b; Salisbury 1986). An effective way to assure the establishment of this balance has been elusive, however. Several types of provisions were negotiated in JBNQA in an attempt to help Cree hunters continue their activities and economy despite the effect of development. As I have already indicated, harvesting rights were recognized as exercisable wherever physically possible, subject to certain limited restrictions. This recognition assured that the legal taking of land for development purposes would not, in itself, preclude use of the land. The key problem was the actual physical transformation of the land and its wildlife resources by development activity and the effects of such transformations on harvesting activities (Salisbury et al. 1972b; SSIDCC 1982). Future development was subjected to social and environmental impact assessments and to ongoing environmental quality review, but final decisions on development rested with the responsible governments.

To survive the effects of the reduction of wildlife populations that would accompany even regulated development, native peoples clearly need access to other currently underused wildlife resources. In the James Bay area of Quebec, despite the maintenance of an intensive modern hunting society, despite the fact that all land was being used on some regular and recurring basis, and despite the fact that populations of some species were harvested very intensively, there remained significant opportunities to intensify the use of some renewable resources. There were important limitations on these possibilities as well, including limited biological productivity, low harvesting efficiencies, high cash costs, and cultural acceptability. There was no clear basis for claiming that the underused resources were fully equivalent in quality to those damaged, nor was there any assurance that they were equal in quantity to those that could be made unproductive by continued development in the long term. However, the need to provide immediate access to those wildlife resources that were available and were desired by Cree was clear.

Access to alternative wildlife resources could be provided in several ways. One attempt was to establish ISP, which provides hunters with the means to maintain, modify, or expand harvesting activities in changing circumstances. The funds made available to hunters could be used to finance travel to more distant or isolated wildlife resources, to improve the efficiency of harvesting by improving equipment, and to provide an increased level of security in the bush during a time of disruption caused by development. This buffer will work only at a general level. It will not reduce the effects on individual native hunters whose traplines are adversely affected by development. To date, the general provisions appear to have worked at the community level, although some individual hunters have experienced severe disruptive impacts. Between 1974–75 and 1978–79, no downward trends in total available weights of food from harvesting occurred in the affected
Cree communities (JBNQNHRC 1982). Nevertheless, the effects of future hydroelectric and other resource developments create uncertainty for the future (SSDCC 1982; Feit 1986).

It also needs to be emphasized that the major renewable resources used by Cree are species that are either relatively localized (e.g., moose, beaver, nonadromous fish), in which case the effects of development have also been localized, or migratory species (such as geese and smaller populations of caribou), whose patterns have been affected only marginally by developments to date. Future developments may alter this relative insularity for the Cree, just as current developments elsewhere in the North clearly and directly threaten other important renewable resources and the native peoples who depend on them. Thus, specific immediate opportunities for resource maintenance in the face of ongoing development need to be explored and used, while longer-term efforts to find effective resolutions in this area of fundamental conflict continue.

CONCLUSION: CREE AUTONOMY AND STATE LINKAGES

This case study of James Bay Cree efforts to restructure linkages to wider economic and political systems is relatively unusual in that Cree established an intensive and extended negotiation with government representatives which touched on almost all aspects of their relationships. And because the negotiations came to be directed toward a comprehensive set of agreements, the process provided a rare opportunity to examine the fundamental positions and conflicts between Cree and governments as well as the possibilities for a range of strategies for dealing with those conflicts. The implementation of the Agreement also provided an opportunity to examine the parallel implementation of dozens of specific provisions and to seek recurring patterns in the processes involved and their outcomes. A definitive account of the results of the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement probably cannot be made at this time. The processes of implementing the Agreement have been long and complex, and although they have already extended over a ten-year period, they are neither completed nor fully tested. Nevertheless, several general conclusions about Cree relations to wider systems can be drawn.

First, the James Bay negotiations appear to confirm the common assertion that the most fundamental conflicts between indigenous people and liberal-democratic states with a capitalist economy center around the control of land and resources, especially for development purposes, and around assertions of state sovereignty. However, it may have been less widely expected that Cree negotiators, and their legal and professional advisers, did find considerable opportunities to develop claims, rights, programs, structures, procedures, benefits, and agreements that had some promise of effectively responding to Cree interests within the context of these two fundamental conflicts. Some of these have worked; others have not.

The conflicts over sovereignty were met with a series of legal provisions. While these did not resolve competing claims, they did afford mutual recognitions of governance without resolving questions of the origins of legitimacy or authority. On the questions of practical decision-making powers, the separate existing systems were left in place, and coordination was provided. Coordination often involved, however, a recognition of governments as holding superior authority and final responsibility, although the powers of government to act unilaterally or contrary to Cree rights and interests were constrained.

The experience with these provisions has been mixed. Where Cree authority was recognized, it has continued to be exercised effectively. And in many areas where Cree authority was extended, as in the reformulation of local community governments and the formation of regional political and service oriented institutions, Cree governance and administration have been greatly enhanced. The autonomy of Cree communities has clearly been improved by increased local control over services and resources, by enhanced ability to initiate political and administrative actions, and by recognition of Cree powers accorded by external institutions and nonnatives more generally. Nevertheless, the political and administrative practices of governments, while often extensive and responsible, have also shown a consistent pattern of derogation from legal undertakings where political or economic conflicts are directly implicated. In addition, a thin veneer often covers a recurrent paternalism, as exemplified in the tendency of some departments to treat coordination as a mere formality of consultation after policy decisions have already been taken. In this respect, the coordination provisions that involved no direct sharing of government authority have repeatedly failed, whereas those based on decentralizing government authority to Cree entities have fared better.

Thus, Cree rights and legal protections have on occasion remained mere words, denied in practice especially when there are political, economic, or administrative costs to governments for implementing these legally binding but often difficult to enforce provisions of the Agreement. This is not to deny that many, indeed probably most, provisions have been implemented and are effective. Nevertheless, the pattern of government deciding when to violate its obligations
has occurred frequently enough to be general within the context of respecting the less burdensome or conflicting issues. Those conflicts over sovereignty that were dealt with by mutual recognition of responsibility have been generally successful, whereas those conflicts dealt with through coordinated decision making under government authority have only been respected insofar as they are compatible with government interests. This despite the structures and provisions intended to assure responsible government fulfillment of these provisions.

With respect to fundamental conflicts over the control of economic resources, the Agreement was clearly not successful in establishing a land base or adequate control of resource development activities for Cree, but it did provide a higher degree of economic support for the hunting economy and for Cree self-governance. That is, within the Canadian liberal-democratic state, it was possible to direct public resources to the support of the Cree hunting economy in such a way as to enhance a relative degree of autonomy from market conditions for Cree products, labor, consumer goods, and services.

But the Agreement did not resolve fully the Cree need to expand opportunities for productive economic activities for the rapidly expanding population of young adults (Salisbury 1986). True, Cree take-over and expansion of administrative services and programs in their communities has considerably increased employment opportunities in the villages. The thirty or so Cree who were fully employed as administrators before the Agreement has swollen to some three hundred since. But it is also clear that the number of administrative positions is insufficient to fully employ all those Cree who do not hunt as a primary productive activity. The provision of economic enterprises in the communities and additional employment opportunities for Cree people is a critical task facing Cree leaders. And while organizations and experience gained through JBNQA facilitate the task, the limited natural and financial resources available make the task a difficult one. Similar problems occur with respect to social development, where government funding for improved health and education have not fully met Cree expectations.

The threat to the hunting economy posed by relatively unregulated industrial development of the region pinpoints the other failure of the agreement process to effectively resolve conflicts over resource control and economic development. Large-scale industrial development projects are continuing on Cree lands. Future phases of hydroelectric development have been delayed but not abandoned. And commercial cutting of the forests is continuing on a large scale and at a rapid pace in the southern portions of the region, where it is seriously depleting wildlife resources on affected hunting territories and rendering them unusable for periods of at least several decades. In the eyes of an increasing number of hunters, the failure to adequately regulate development is a major future threat to the revitalized hunting sector. These threats demonstrate again that the agreement process was unable to resolve fundamental conflicts between the interests of Cree and those of wider economic and political institutions of the capitalist economy or the liberal democratic state. Nevertheless, the evidence seems clear that there were opportunities for Cree to expand their self-governance and to enhance their long-term capacity to carry on fights for a just and responsible relationship to wider political and economic institutions. To review these changes:

1. Basic rights to wildlife resources have been recognized and are no longer changeable by unilateral government action, although as formally codified legislation they will now be subject to continuing judicial and, in some aspects, political reinterpretation.

2. Cree also now have the organizations and political institutions needed for expanded self-governance along with experienced leaders to run them; in addition, they now have a broad consensus on goals and expanded resources.

3. Cree hunters are better insulated from changes in world and national market conditions and government policies, with assured annual incomes, but it is also the case that transactions with markets are now more extensive than they were before.

4. Cree hunters continue to manage wildlife resources essentially on their own and with less substantial inputs or threats from government wildlife administration and policy, but their use of wildlife is still threatened by large-scale resource development schemes.

The process has strengthened Cree ability to confront the problems that threaten them, but it has not fundamentally resolved those problems or provided a mutually acceptable new relationship of respect between Cree and governments. The highly focused and comprehensive nature of Cree-government negotiations suggest that this case may demonstrate the present outer limits for enhancing indigenous autonomy within extended linkages to state economies which characterize the current place of indigenous peoples in developed liberal-democratic states, subject always to the longer-term processes of change and transformation in those wider institutions themselves.
NOTES

1. This study was prepared with the aid of research grants from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC 410-84-0547 and 410-87-0715). An earlier version was presented at the American Indian Workshop of the European Association of American Studies, in Copenhagen, April 1-3, 1985. The first version was prepared while on research leave from McMaster University, with the assistance of a Leave Fellowship from SSHRCC. Attendance at the Copenhagen conference was made possible by an SSHRCC International Travel Grant. This presentation draws on several of my papers and reports touching on related issues but frequently updates and revises these where there is overlap.

In preparing this revised version, I have drawn extensively on ideas and discussion held over the course of several years with Cree administrators and colleagues extensively involved in implementing or reviewing the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement. At the cost of omitting many names, I would like to specially thank Michael Asch, Philip Awashish, Thomas Berger, Fikret Berkes, Taylor Brelsford, Lorraine Brooke, Brian Craik, Thomas Coon, Rick Cucureanu, Billy Diamond, Peter Hutchins, Johnny Jolly, William Kemp, Abel Kitchen, Steve Langdon, Ignatius LaRusic, James O'Reilly, Alan Penn, Richard Preston, Richard Salisbury, Colin Scott, and Paul Wilkinson.
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Politics of Aboriginal Land Tenure

Edited by
EDWIN N. WILMSENV
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