RETREATISTS AND INNOVATORS

RETREATISTS AND INNOVATORS
IN
AN INDIAN COMMUNITY

BY

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Selected aspects of a theory of social change formulated by Everett E. Hagen are related to observations made by the author on an Indian Reservation in western Canada. Field data serve to illustrate a number of propositions derived from Hagen's theory, and furnish a basis for the discussion of some possible theoretical shortcomings.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This thesis attempts to relate selected aspects of a theory of social change to data gathered in the course of studying a community development project on an Indian reserve in western Canada. The theory is that formulated by Everett Hagen to explain how traditional societies undergo the transition to economic growth and modernization.[1] Field work was not performed to test the theory in any of its aspects, but had a different objective. The original study had an "applied" orientation, and focused on decision making by leaders in the Indian community.

When research was undertaken in the summer of 1964, the community development program had been underway for about two years under the sponsorship of the Indian Affairs Branch of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration. Designed to encourage greater participation by Indians in the management of their own affairs, this program had helped to stimulate several major changes in community organization; it provided an opportunity to observe some ways in which social change was being introduced, and to examine some of the effects of change.

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[1] Everett E. Hagen, On the Theory of Social Change, Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1962.

The research was essentially exploratory in nature; it was not guided by a single theoretical orientation, but employed instead a number of orientations and concepts which appeared appropriate to the situation observed. There were several interrelated objectives, among them an attempt to assess the degree of autonomy and initiative exercised by community leaders, or the extent to which they themselves made political and economic decisions affecting the community. It was recognized that the ability to make "independent" decisions is not determined solely by the capabilities of leaders, but may depend on additional factors such as the attitudes of band members, the pressures and influences exerted by them, and the opportunities for decision making in a reserve situation, where certain regulations and legislative provisions govern action by officials, by agents of social change, and by the Indians themselves. These considerations prompted an effort to identify factors which might influence the leaders' choice of problems and goals, and which functioned to stimulate or to inhibit goal-oriented activity. A good deal of attention was paid to factors which seemed to have their origins in the system for administration of reserves, or which appeared to stem from the structure of social relationships that the system had helped to create. A number of hypotheses relevant to these considerations were formulated and subjected to such limited testing as could be undertaken in a brief period of three months, with no expectation that any conclusions could be more than tentative.

Since Hagen's theory of change was not employed in the research design, the present thesis may be said to constitute a secondary analysis of data gathered for other purposes. In these circumstances

it will not do to argue that the analysis constitutes a test of the theory or any part ot it. Instead, our data may be said to illustrate certain aspects of the theory, while at the same time the theory provides a perspective for viewing and interpreting the data in a different way and helps us to establish new interrelationships among the various kinds of material gathered. Furthermore, our field observations permit us to offer certain criticisms of parts of Hagen's formulation, and to distinguish what appear to be some inadequacies in the theory. More will be said of this later.

Hagen's theory, while broad and general in scope, contains at the same time enough "middle range" formulations to make it useable. Although our original hypotheses were not derived from the theory, some of them relate so closely to the theory that with slight modification they might have been so derived.[2] This indicates why Hagen's theory was chosen for consideration, for it suggests the extent to which some of his formulations are relevant to our data.

Method and Source of Data

Methods employed in the research included participant observation, informal interviews and conversations, formal semi-structured interviews, attendance at meetings of community organizations, and the study of materials in local, agency, and regional offices of the administration.

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[2]The reader is invited to compare some of the hypotheses guiding the original research, as shown on page 179 in Appendix I, with propositions derived from Hagen's formulations on page 19 of the main text.

One of the principal objectives of formal interviewing was to gather comparative data concerning attitudes and value orientations in two groups in the community. One of these groups was labelled the "political-economic elite", hereafter called the elite, the leadership group, or simply the "leaders". The elite consisted of eighteen individuals who were band council members or the directors or officials of three co-operative societies. The other group consisted of "rank and file" band members, defined as persons who did not hold offices in any of these organizations.

Thirty-nine formal interviews were conducted, fifteen with members of the elite and twenty-four with rank and file band members. The latter were randomly selected from among male heads of households in the community. Shortage of time made selection of a larger random sample impossible. While the sample size limits the significance of the findings, the results are at least suggestive. Further details of the methods employed, including sampling procedures, are given in Appendix I.

Finally, it bears mentioning that presentation of the findings is influenced by the need to preserve the anonymity of informants and of individuals observed. All names of individuals in this report are pseudonyms. The community's identity has been disguised as far as this is consistent with the accurate presentation of background information, and of findings which appear to be significant.

Organization of the Thesis

Chapter II presents an outline of Hagen's theory, points to the relevance of the theory for our data, and outlines the central problems

to be discussed. The third chapter offers such background information about the community as seems necessary for an understanding of the data and analysis presented in the remaining four chapters.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL ORIENTATION

Hagen's theory of social change deals with factors contributing to modernization and economic growth in societies which have been stable and traditional. Although an economist himself, Hagen is dissatisfied with conventional economic theories purporting to show why growth has occurred earlier in some societies than in others; these theories assume that capital formation is the central determining factor, while neglecting the importance of innovation and creativity in the societies concerned, not only in technology but in related social and economic spheres. Hagen considers that their ethnocentric bias inclines many economists to take for granted that the capacity for innovation and change is "a fact of human nature rather than a culturally acquired trait". [1]

The importation of western technology into underdeveloped areas is not enough in itself to ensure economic growth; techniques must be adapted and modified in many ways to meet the conditions peculiar to the society importing them. Furthermore, technological progress includes "not only scientific and technical advances but also the devising of new forms of organization or methods of procedure which

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[1] Hagen, p.50

make the society more efficient in production".[2] Of the economic and social innovations required, the social ones "may be the more complex".[3]

While admitting the importance of economic variables, Hagen considers that the essential factors in economic development are social and psychological, and the central question to be answered is: How does innovational behaviour make its appearance in a traditional society, where by definition ways of behaviour continue with little change over many generations?

In posing an answer to this question, Hagen develops a complex analytical model of social change "which stresses the chain of causation from social structure through parental behaviour to childhood environment and then that from childhood environment through personality to social change".[4] On the most general level, this model undertakes to outline the fundamental processes whereby the foundations of change become established in virtually any traditional society past or present; traditional societies which became subject to colonial domination are treated as special variants of the general case. It is impossible to describe the model in detail here, for its complete formulation occupies a large portion of his book. In addition to its sociological aspects, the formulation makes extensive use of psychoanalytic constructs, including a set of hypotheses concerning

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[2] Ibid., p. 11. Hagen says that "To term all these somewhat varied activities 'Technological Progress' is not to use the term as a catchall. They have in common the devising of new concepts, which is the essence of technological progress".

[3] Ibid., p. 35

[4] Ibid., pp. 8-9

personality formation. These are of marginal concern and will only be touched upon. However, Hagen's ideal-typical constructs of three personality types are of more central concern, and will be described in some detail hereunder.

The essential characteristic of traditional society is that behaviour tends to continue unchanged over many generations. In such a society the modal personality type is authoritarian; traditional social structure and authoritarian personality are mutually supportive. The authoritarian individual perceives the world as "arbitrary, capricious, not amenable to analysis, as consisting of an agglomeration of phenomena not related by a cause-and effect network".[5]

Furthermore, he perceives that "the caprice of the world is not accidental but the play of willful powers far greater than his which serve their own purposes and disregard his unless he submits his will to theirs".[6] These perceptions generate anxiety at the prospect of exercising initiative, uncertainty in making independent judgements, fear of unfamiliar situations, and a tendency to rely on traditional rules and on the judgement and will of superiors.[7] Such cognitive and

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[5] Ibid., p. 97

[6] Ibid., p. 97

[7] It may be asked whether the term "authoritarian" is descriptive of personality in traditional cultures of North America. Regardless of the term used, it would seem that at least some of the characteristics here described as authoritarian correspond to characteristics in Saulteaux society as outlined by A.I. Hallowell. For example, on page 364 of his book Culture and Experience, Hallowell speaks of "the old passive attitude of dependence on natural products and superhuman helpers" as adaptive in traditional times among the Saulteaux. A Saulteaux band was the subject of the present study.

evaluative orientations are perpetuated for generations by factors in the social environment, and particularly by the home environment during childhood.

Authoritarian personality characteristics render individuals relatively incapable of innovation and highly resistant to change. Furthermore, many elements of culture and social structure interact to ensure stability in traditional society. Stability is such that only powerful forces could disrupt it and give rise to the emergence of a group willing to abandon traditional ways and to direct creative energy to the task of economic growth, and to the development of new forms of social organization capable of accommodating growth. For Hagen, the basic cause of such change is a phenomenon which he calls "withdrawal of status respect".

In traditional society, the status and role of each social group is valued and respected by other groups. Even those who are low in the status hierarchy find satisfaction in their position because they and the groups whose opinions they value (their reference groups) consider that position to be appropriate and worthy of some measure of respect. Should the members of a group perceive that their position is no longer valued and respected, they experience tension at the impossibility of maintaining gratifying self definitions and at the same time believing that the judgement of their reference groups is trustworthy. They experience a conflict of values, for they "value both their position in life and the opinion of other social groups but they cannot pursue the

one and still have the other".[8] Disparagement may result from some sudden social disruption such as the displacement by force of one traditional elite group by another, or more gradually through the development among an established elite of attitudes, beliefs, or values which are no longer congruent with those of the subordinate group. Two polar types of withdrawal are distinguished; these are:

> ... disparagement by an elite group within the society which has traditionally had high place and is therefore an accepted and respected part of the social structure; and, in contrast, conquest and social disruption by an external group which does not share the society's culture and which therefore has little claim to respect or prestige in the society except for its one characteristic of overwhelming importance, its power.[9]

Essentially, there are two differences between the types.

> In the first case, because the elite group shares the society's culture, its violation of old values is apt to be limited. In the second case, because the conquering group is alien its system of values differ from that of the society and, whatever its deliberate policies of government may be, by its very pattern of life it will indicate contempt, repugnance, or at least a low valuation for a wide array of the characteristics of the society. The differences between the cases are thus two: in the degreee of moral acceptance of and regard for the offending group by the groups being injured, and in the limitations or comprehensiveness of the aspersion cast on the society's culture by the offending group.[10]

By distinguishing two types, Hagen in effect expands the concept of withdrawal of status respect to include generalized and comprehensive derogation by an alien superordinate group of the entire culture of an indigenous subordinate group. This enables him to subsume under a

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[8] Hagen, p. 186

[9] Ibid., p. 203

[10] Loc. cit.

single general theory of change the somewhat special case of change in a traditional society dominated by a colonial power.

The first generation to experience withdrawal of status respect responds with anxiety, frustration, and rage. These experiences and responses of adult individuals are reflected and expressed in their behaviour in the home. The father experiences anxiety and inner conflict because he values both his old way of life and the opinion of superior groups. The son perceives the source of his father's anxiety and seeks for a way to avoid the same painful conflict in himself; in time he solves the dilemma by denying that either value is important. In denying the worth of the old way of life, the son rejects the culturally approved goals of the traditional society. In rejecting the opinions of those who disparage him he denies himself access to goals which might be achieved through identification with the alien group. The son denies that he has any high expectation for satisfaction or happiness in life; he becomes apathetic, and thereby finds safety and avoids pain. These and other related attitudes formed in the home are reinforced in peer groups whose members have been subjected to similar parental influences. By such mechanisms the foundations of retreatist personality are laid, and retreatist orientations may become more pronounced in succeeding generations in the face of continued disparagement.

> The retreatist is the person who, during the process of personality formation, has met the problem of being unable to satisfy conflicting values by repressing them from his consciousness without being able to replace them by others. He continues to function within the society, but without much interest either concerning his work activity or in the attainment of position. He is possessed of a high degree of anomie,

> or normlessness. But even he has only suppressed within himself the norms of the society and of his group in it, not eliminated them. If he had done the latter, he could live a successful autonomous life, but this he cannot do.[11]

While retreatism occurs in varying degrees, in the ideal-typical case the individual's values are "so conflicted, and, to solve the conflict, so buried, that the individual is immobilized".[12] On the other hand, in the colonial situation the retreatist may cling compulsively to some of the traditional values even if they are no longer adaptive other than as a means of protecting himself from the threat to his identity which acceptance of Western values would constitute. The retreatist is apathetic not only because he perceives that it is not worthwhile or safe to pursue goals, but because he expends so much energy in repressing his internal conflict that little energy is left for anything else. He learns that it is dangerous to reveal the rage he feels, both as a child faced with arbitrary treatment by an anxious and conflicted father, and as an adult faced with disparagement by the powerful superior group. He therefore represses his need to express rage; he becomes passive, inhibited, unassertive.[13]

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[11] Ibid., p. 197

[12] Ibid., p. 213

[13] Hagen's model of retreatism is based on R.K. Merton's formulation and is in effect a modification of it. Merton holds that retreatism "involves...the repeated frustration of strongly held goals", and their consequent abandonment. In these terms, retreatism is an adaptation to the frustration of failure; the individual rejects both the culturally approved goals and also "the institutionalized practices directed toward those goals". Merton recognizes passivity as a prominent feature of retreatism. See his Social Theory and Social Structure, p. 185 and pp. 187-188.

Retreatism is an intervening stage in the transition from authoritarian to innovational personality. Within the group or society subjected to long continued disparagement there occur variations in home environment which are conducive to the formation of a new, more dynamic and creative personality type. Hagen presents a number of hypothetical situations to account for the emergence of creativity out of retreatism. His propositions are both speculative and complex, and will be touched upon only briefly and superficially to illustrate the general nature of the argument.

The position and role of women in traditional society protects them somewhat from the full impact of withdrawal of status respect, and they are not apt to become as retreatist as men. Therefore, the mother may be less withdrawn and more nurturant than the father who, unlike his authoritarian counterpart, exercises little control over the relations between mother and son. If she feels shame at the weakness of her husband and male relatives, the mother may encourage her son to be stronger than they, rewarding him with affection for childhood initiative and achievement. Consequently, the child feels a sense of security which gives him "boldness to explore the world",[14] and he may develop a continuing need to exercise initiative and to experience the satisfaction of achievement.

Hagen argues that where a large number of families are subjected to disparagement for generations, circumstances favourable to the formation of creative personality can be expected to occur in many home

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[14]Hagen, p. 221

environments. With peer group reinforcement of attitudes learned in the home, there emerges a deviant group of innovational personalities, a group sharing new needs, values, and cognitions which are in sharp contrast to those of the traditional culture.

The characteristics of innovational personality are precisely those most conducive to the stimulation of social change. In the ideal-typical case, they include:

> ....openness to experience, and, underlying this, a tendency to perceive phenomena, especially in an area of life that is of interest to the individual, as forming systems of interacting forces whose action is explainable; creative imagination, of which the central component is the ability to let one's unconscious processes work on one's behalf; confidence and content in one's own evaluations; satisfaction in facing and attacking problems and in resolving confusion and inconsistency; a sense that one has a duty or responsibility to achieve; intelligence; energy; and, often related to several of these, a perception that the world is somewhat threatening and that one must strive perpetually if one is to be able to cope with it.[15]

If innovational personality characteristics appear only in isolated individuals, they will be defined as deviant by the group. They may be subjected to overwhelming pressures to conform to group values, and to reject those values which the group holds in low or negative regard. However, if a group appears whose members share their deviant values, it provides the members with protection, reassurance, and confirmation of their beliefs. Existence of such a group "greatly increases the prospect of effective innovation in technology or human relations".[16] The actions of one deviant group cannot explain

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[15] Ibid., p. 88

[16] Ibid., p. 247

widespread economic growth and social change. If change is to continue, the group must be widely imitated by members of other groups. The most likely imitators in the first instance are members of former elite groups who see their position threatened by the innovators. However, imitation may not occur if the initial innovating group is too alien to the society. In colonial societies and elsewhere, "the fact that an alien group holds technological activity in high value is apt of itself to cause indigenous groups to reject it in defence of their own identity".[17]

Whether or not creative energies will be directed into economic channels depends on a number of factors. If markets, capital, and technical knowledge are available at the time when creative personality appears, then energies may turn to economic innovation. However, favourable economic conditions are not enough in themselves to induce this kind of activity; there must be a group ready and willing to take advantage of these conditions. Hagen makes the point in stating what he calls "the principle of relative social blockage".

> Other influences being equal, creative energies within a group from which social recognition has been withdrawn will seek expression where the opportunity seems best to exercise one's talents, prove one's worth to oneself, and gain social recognition. To state the principle from the obverse viewpoint, the channel in which creative energies will flow depends in part on the degree to which other possible channels are blocked.[18]

If the opportunity exists to develop economic prowess, and if at the same time economic prowess is accorded social recognition by one's

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[17] Ibid., p. 248

[18] Ibid., p. 241

reference groups, there exists the stimulus to achieve in this direction.

The foregoing covers those main points of Hagen's theory with which we will be concerned. Before examining the data, however, it is adviseable to consider the relevance of these formulations to the situation observed in the field.

Relevance of the Theory

Hagen specifies that his theory is relevant to Indians on reservations, and himself employs evidence from two Indian communities in the United States to illustrate the effects of comprehensive derogation of the culture of a subordinate group under conditions of colonial domination. Here is how he justifies the use of the term 'colonial' to describe the situation of North American Indians:

> The essence of the colonial situation is that a people has been conquered, the functioning of its culture and social structure disrupted and suppressed in some degree, and alien control imposed with such force that resistance is futile. By this definition the position of American Indian tribes is the archetype of colonialism, for their social structure and culture have been disrupted and suppressed more completely than those of any people conventionally regarded as colonial. ....In some respects the problem of economic, political and social development of the American Indians is that of underdeveloped countries distilled, concentrated, raised to a power.[19]

Indians living on reservations are among "the classic cases of retreatist groups in the American society",[20] but today they are

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[19] Ibid., p. 471

[20] Ibid., p. 198

"beginning to emerge" from retreatism.[21] If these assertions are correct, it is perhaps not surprising that some of the conditions Hagen describes on two Sioux reservations in South Dakota have their counterparts on the reservation which is the subject of the present study.[22]

Quite apart from the fact that Hagen's theory was not used in the original research design, it would be manifestly impossible on the basis of only three months of field work on a single reservation to test it, or to apply the model of social change in all its complexity to the situation observed. The model in its totality is only applicable to processes of change spanning generations, and data are not available either to confirm or refute the hypothetical processes whereby retreatist personalities, and subsequently innovational personalities, may have developed. Data are available however which suggest not only the fairly widespread occurrence of retreatism on the reserve studied, but also the more limited occurrence, within a fairly distinct and definable group, of individuals exhibiting characteristics which approximate those of innovational personality. Furthermore, there is evidence that the entire Indian community is subject to continued and rather severe disparagement by members of adjacent non-Indian groups,

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[21] Ibid., p. 214

[22] While it may be true that initially the Sioux were disrupted and suppressed more forcibly than the Indians to be discussed here, it is suggested that differences in disruption and suppression were more in degree than in kind, for the Indians of western Canada were also confronted with overwhelming force and obliged to accept the conditions imposed on them by an alien government. See, for example, George F. Stanley's account of the Second North-West Rebellion of 1885, in his The Birth of Western Canada, University of Toronto Press, 1960 pp. 350 - 379.

so that conditions conducive to the perpetuation of retreatist orientations appear to be present. These observations render at least plausible the notion that certain socio-psychological processes approximating those outlined by Hagen did take place in this Indian community, as in others.[23]

However, the emphasis here is not on processes of personality formation, past or present, or even on personalities as such. The emphasis is on retreatism and innovation as contrasting sets of cognitive and evaluative orientations. Stated another way, retreatism and innovation are viewed as modes of adaptation in groups subject to a "colonial" type of control, and the focus is on these adaptive modes and their possible significance for economic development and social change in a reservation situation. Several propositions will be suggested and viewed in this perspective, among them the following:

(1) that the perpetuation of attitudes, beliefs, and values associated with retreatism tend to inhibit autonomous action and the making of decisions related to economic and social

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[23]Hagen's formulation also seems plausible in the light of the history of contact between Europeans and North American Indians generally. Almost everywhere the Indians were deprived of their ancient hunting lands and herded on to reservations where the agents of western civilization's major social institutions, economic, religious, and governmental, combined to force upon the Indians, deliberately or not, the perception that their traditional values, beliefs, and activities were held in low regard. The perception by the Indians that their culture and society were the objects of "comprehensive derogation" by a powerful foreign group whose valuation mattered, would constitute the necessary condition for the formation of retreatist personality. Stanley (see previous note) tells us that in 1885 Crowfoot, a Blackfoot chief, and Kahweechetwaymot, a Cree headman, spoke of whites treating Indians "like dogs". Stanley, pp. 278 and 286.

development;

(2) that the limited development which has occurred is due in large measure to the simultaneous existence of other attitudes, beliefs, and values which are in contrast to those associated with retreatism, and which are conducive to decision making and innovation in the economic sphere and in related areas of behaviour;

(3) that orientations conducive to innovation are shared by groups which are defined in some sense as deviant by a significant proportion of the reservation's population;

(4) that members of these groups have managed to persist in their innovative behaviour, more or less effectively and over a considerable period of time, in part because the orientations they share provide mutual protection and support in the face of pressures to conform and to adopt orientations which are more widespread in the community.

While support for these and other related statements will be based on data from one reservation, the statements themselves are similar to and in fact are derived from broader generalizations which Hagen claims are applicable to any disparged society or group in which innovation is beginning to emerge from retreatism. Thus some of the data can be said to illustrate, if only in a limited way, propositions which constitute important elements in his theory of social change.

When we focus on retreatism and innovation as modes of adaptation in groups, we modify Hagen's formulation so that it provides a more truly sociological perspective for viewing developments on the reservation,

a perspective highlighting factors which may influence innovative behaviour among Indian groups, but which may not influence similar activity among comparable groups in the surrounding white society. It suggests how Indian reactions to change and the prospect of change may be different from the reactions of non-Indians and offers at least plausible and tentative explanations not only for this difference, but for differences observed among groups within the Indian community itself. Adopting this perspective does not mean that the sociological dimension of Hagen's theory will be viewed uncritically, however, and several apparent shortcomings will be discussed in the concluding chapter.

CHAPTER III

THE COMMUNITY

General Characteristics

The Trout River Reserve is located in western Canada, in what might be described ecologically as the zone of transition between treeless prairie and boreal forest. The land is mostly flat, and largely covered with mixed coniferous and deciduous forest which is rather stunted and interspersed with open farming areas. The quality of the farmland seems to range from poor to fairly good.

The reserve occupies an area of approximately 20,000 acres. The Trout River, a broad and sometimes swift-flowing stream, divides the reserve in two parts, roughly equal in size, hereafter called the East Side and West Side.

The population was estimated to exceed 1600. Local records showed 179 households in the community, of which 161 had male heads. At the same time, there were 223 nuclear families each consisting of a husband and wife and, in most cases, several children. The homes of people were dispersed along both banks of the river, over a distance of perhaps eight miles. Since the only bridge was located a mile south of the reserve, communication between the East and West Sides was somewhat difficult. About sixty per cent of the populations lived on the west bank.

Both sides of the river were served by roads and electric power,

and power lines appeared to be connected to most of the houses. There was no community water system, and water was purchased from a trucker who hauled it from Birch Rapids, an adjacent white community with a population of approximately 1500.

Housing standards at Trout River varied widely, partly because of new housing provided by the government and partly because a few Indians with steady jobs had considerably higher incomes than the average for the community. Small, neat houses, some built by their owners and others by the government, were interspersed among the log cabins and decrepit shacks. The appearance of a house was not necessarily an indication of the industry, income, or status of its occupant. Responsibility for the allocation of new government housing rested with the band council, and in at least one recent year the community's annual quota of houses was distributed by lot.

Families were large and housing mostly overcrowded by white middle class standards. No accurate official figures were available, but of 39 households surveyed, the mean number of persons per dwelling was about 7.4, and the mean number of rooms per house was about three. The interiors of a few homes visited were quite attractively decorated and decently furnished, but most seemed to lack all but the barest necessities.

The community had four schools, three of them situated at strategic intervals along the river's east bank, and one on the West Side. The latter school was part of a complex which included a large Catholic hostel, and served both resident and day students of the Catholic faith. The East Side schools, on the other hand, were under

secular control and were attended by children of the community's two principal religious denominations, Anglican and Catholic. On the West Side, all Protestant children and some Catholic children attended racially integrated schools in the nearby town.

The Economy

There were not many opportunities for wage employment on the reserve, and certainly not for year-round jobs. A few men found part-time or seasonal work as caretakers or handymen in hostel, school or mission. Some women worked at cleaning, or as part-time domestics. One man was permanently employed by the only white retail merchant on the reserve, and a few others may have had full-time work within the community. During four or five months in fall and winter, pulpwood cutting operations on and near the reserve, under Indian management, provided work opportunities for a large proportion of the able-bodied men. Apparently winter jobs were not available on anything like the same scale before the Pulpwood Co-operative was formed in 1962. Prior to that time, an undetermined number of men (informants said about 20) worked each winter for a band member who contracted to cut wood for the nearby pulp mill.[1] In the same year, the Indian Affairs Branch sponsored a winter work project to clear a tract of band land for cultivation, thus providing temporary jobs to a number of men.

For the most breadwinners, spring was a season of enforced

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[1] One informant claimed that more than 50 men were employed in winter bush work prior to 1962, and that total annual income from pulpwood operations had not risen significantly following the formation of the co-operative.

idleness, and summer was little better for those who chose to say in the community. The reserve was said to contain good arable land, and many cleared areas attested to earlier efforts at farming. However, during the period of field work, only two individuals were observed to be farming in anything like an organized and continuous manner, and a third man to whom farm machinery was available seemed to take minimal advantage of his opportunity. Gardens were not much in evidence, although a few were seen. One or two persons claimed that gardening was impractical, since vegetables required cultivation and care just at the time when summer jobs were available, including harvest work on distant farms. A farming co-operative, begun in the summer of 1964, gave intermittent part-time work to about 20 men for perhaps two weeks.

For the most part, and with the notable exception of opportunities provided by the Pulpwood Co-operative's winter operations, jobs had to be sought outside the community. The men found work primarily with the pulpwood company, the only industry in the nearby town of Birch Rapids. In the summer of 1964, ten band members had full time jobs with the company, either in the mill, in the bush, or in some related field of operations. Their incomes ranged from approximately $3,600 to $5,500 per year. At least eight others are known to have been employed at the same time on a seasonal basis, and the total number of part-time Indian employees probably was greater than that. The company provided part-time bush work to about 80 Indians in the season of peak activity in the bush, and part-time mill work to about 30 during the busiest season at the mill. A few men left the reserve in summer to work as farm labourers. Some were gone for a few days or

perhaps weeks at a time, often taking their families with them to harvest root crops or other farm produce. Others found summer work in road-building or other construction projects.

In early autumn, wild rice picking at lakes within a radius of roughly 80 miles occupied a large proportion of the population for a week or ten days, and sometimes longer. Informants said that it was no longer productive to hunt and trap on reserve lands. A registered trapping area some distance from the reserve was set aside for the Indians, but apparently few of them trapped in any systematic way. An official said that the Indians tended to trap only in the most accessible places, some even preferring to set their traps in roadside ditches or other spots which could be reached easily by car. Many Indians said that fishing had been ruined by river pollution. However, a small group living on the East Side fished on a modest commercial scale in a lake not far from the reserve.

Probably most families depended on relief during at least part of the year, and spring saw the greatest extension of the relief rolls. As in many other such communities, there was a core of chronic relief seekers, not all of whom had the excuse of physical disability or other valid reasons for being unable to support themselves. On "relief days", even in summer, there were queues from morning until night outside the Indian agent's office.

The general impression was of a severely depressed economy, relieved only by seasonal employment opportunities. However, judging by the extent of land available and the fact that one or two men seemed to be making a moderate success of farming, it seems that many more

people could have been engaged in agriculture. This was recognized by some of the Indian leaders, who expressed the hope that the new agriculture co-operative, if successful, might inspire some of the people to exert themselves to undertake independent farming operations. It is suggested that for many of the Indians, failure to engage in farming was a reflection of apathy and of orientations to dependency on the government, of which more will be said in later sections of this report.

Economic Organizations - The Co-operative Movement

There were two co-operative organizations within the community, and a third co-operative which drew its membership from nine reserves had its focal point in the Trout River Reserve. As defined by the administration, the goals of these organizations were both economic and social: to create employment and income, and to educate the Indians to "manage their own affairs".

The first co-operative was formed in 1962, and its immediate economic purpose was the production and marketing of pulpwood. Its formation took place not long after a federally appointed community development officer came to the reserve. Within a few months, he was able to win the support of a small group of men who were among the more energetic and progressive members of the band. A long series of private and public meetings was followed by the establishment of a co-operative registered under provincial law, and financed by a $10,000 government loan. However, this was accomplished only after strong opposition from several members of the band council of that day, and a group of their

supporters. It seems likely that these people saw the beginning of a co-operative movement as a threat to their own prestige and influence. More about this and other aspects of opposition to the co-ops will be said in a later section. The main arguments put forward by the opposition group were two: first, that band enterprises should be under the direction and control of the band council, the only body consisting of elected representatives of the entire community; and second, that the co-operative movement was leading to involvement with the provincial government in ways which were perceived as threatening the Indians' treaty rights. These arguments were used in an effort to persuade the general band membership not to support the movement, and were aimed also at the organizers themselves, both before and after the co-operative received its charter. Resistance seems to have decreased somewhat after several prominent opponents became persuaded of the worth of co-operatives and were in fact taken into the movement, and after a band election in 1962, in which most of the principal candidates were aligned according to their views on the co-operative issue.

In 1964, co-operative supporters were inclined to suggest that the election of 1962 was an overwhelming victory for their cause, pointing out that the candidate they favoured for the chief's office received more than half of all the votes cast for chief, while the leading opponent of co-operatives received only a relative handfull of votes. In fact, the candidate supported by the co-operative received 136 of the 246 votes polled while the man who was regarded by co-operative leaders as their principal opponent received 41 votes. But 69 votes were cast for a third candidate who opposed the

co-operative, suggesting that the co-operative enjoyed less popular support than its spokesmen claimed, either because of antipathy or indifference.

In spite of expressions of optimism by some co-operative leaders that resistance to the movement largely had disappeared, there remained a hard core of opponents in 1964, and a substantial number who were doubtful or uncommitted. The original leader and chief spokesman of the opposition group, an intelligent and articulate man, continued to invoke democratic ideals in explaining the reasons for resistance, claiming that the directors of the co-operatives made decisions which affected everyone on the reserve, yet the people did not have a voice in these decisions.[2] Furthermore, he expressed fear that the band might lose its treaty rights through provincial government encroachment in the administration of Indian Affairs, and considered that the co-operatives were playing into the hands of the province by accepting provincial loans.

The relationship between mistrust of the co-operatives and concern for treaty rights deserves elaboration. Many Indians viewed the province as attempting to take over the administration of Indian affairs, and argued that their treaty was with the federal government, not with the province. They felt that the provincial government would not consider itself bound to honour treaty rights, and thought they saw evidence of this in the province's alleged insistence that Indians be

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[2]The belief that the co-operatives were "undemocratic" seemed to be reinforced by the fact that the directors usually did not invite members to their meetings, although the Pulpwood Co-operative held two open meetings each year.

"treated like white men" so far as game laws were concerned. It seems that provincial law did grant a number of special hunting privileges to Indians, but the Indians did not know this, or did not want to believe it. The local game officer said that Indians never came to him for clarification of their hunting privileges. On the other hand, it seems that little if anything was done by the provincial authorities to educate the Indians in this regard.

Having this image of a progressively encroaching provincial government, some Indians considered that the managers of the co-operative were "selling-out" to the province. Not only had the co-operatives borrowed extensively from the provincial government, but they had received a good deal of business advice and technical and legal assistance from the same source. Some Indians believed that this created obligations to the province, and gave it further means to exercise control over their affairs.

For related reasons, many were opposed to voting, not only in provincial but in federal elections. Indians were not very articulate about their reasons for such opposition, but seemed to think that voting was one more step serving to blur the distinction between treaty Indians and other citizens of the province and nation, and that if Indians became too much identified with the rest of the population, their distinctive treaty status might no longer be recognized. For similar, if not identical, reasons, many Indians distrusted the National Indian Council, which was headed by a non-treaty Indian and showed concern for the betterment of the Metis as well as treaty people. Again, identification with the Metis might mean that government

eventually would fail to make any distinction, and treaty rights would be lost.

The foregoing suggests that many Indians felt rather intensely dependent on the federal government, and experienced anxiety at any prospect of social change or of innovations which might in any conceivable way threaten their status and identity.

The Pulpwood Co-operative

At the time of the study, the Pulpwood Co-operative had completed two winter seasons of "bush work". It had 167 members, and was headed by an elected board of directors consisting of seven men. Membership was open to all persons in the community, and each member paid a one-dollar annual fee which entitled him to employment in the cutting season, and to a vote in the yearly election of directors. Actually there were 152 members from the Trout River Reserve, and 15 from another reserve about 30 miles away. One of the latter group was a director.

Not all paid-up members worked during the 1963-64 cutting season. While the exact number of men employed was uncertain, an officer of the co-operative estimated that about 120 members worked in the bush during at least part of the season, and local government records stated that 103 men were "active in the operation". Presumably a few of these "active" members were not from Trout River, but from the reserve nearby. According to one spokesman for the co-operative, exactly 100 of the members from the Trout River Reserve were heads of nuclear families. Since most of them probably worked, it appears

likely that more than 40 per cent of the community's 223 recorded family heads benefited from at least some employment with the co-operative, in the 1963-64 operation. The men worked on a piece-work basis at rates ranging from $2.00 to $7.35 per cord of wood, depending on the phase of operations in which they were engaged. It was said that a man who was willing to work hard could earn more than $100.00 per week.

There is no doubt that the Pulpwood Co-operative made a significant contribution to the community's economy. One informant who was in a position to know what he was talking about estimated that the co-operative brought between $70,000 and $80,000 to the reserve during four months of operation in 1963-64. However, it is difficult to know what this means. Almost certainly it does not mean that this entire sum went directly to the people as personal income. The Co-operative pulpwood sales in that period totalled just over $60,000 and the total deficit at the end of the operation, after all wages and other expenses had been paid, was about $3,000.

This $3,000 deficit, contrasting with a surplus of about $1,700 in the previous year, was attributed primarily to errors in record-keeping (some of them allegedly stemming from carelessness "in the bush") which resulted in payment being made to workmen for about 350 cords of wood that never were cut. At the same time, a small part of the loss was said by one informant to be the result of theft by a supervisory employee. Whatever the facts of the case, the loss of 350 cords of wood did nothing to enhance the co-operative's public image, and was one factor perpetuating distrust of the organization

among some members of the community.

The Agriculture Co-operative

The Agriculture Co-operative was formed in the spring of 1964. It had a provisional board of directors consisting of seven men, and until the farming season was well advanced there was no ordinary membership. At the end of the season, membership totalled more than 20, and consisted of men who had been hired to perform casual labour in the course of the summer's operations - primarily to hoe potatoes. These men were persuaded to pay membership fees when they received their wages.

In the first season of operation, the Agriculture Co-operative had about 58 acres under cultivation. Approximately 48 acres were planted with oats, and about ten acres were in potatoes. The co-operative began operations without equipment of any kind, and had to rent or borrow farm machinery, or hire the services of machinery owners and operators. Land had to be leased, fenced, cultivated, seeded, tended, and harvested. There is no doubt that the cost of these operations was considerable. The study ended before the crops were sold, and it was impossible to obtain accurate data on either revenues or expenditures. However, all the available evidence suggests that expenditures were the higher of the two.

While the co-operative may have lost money, it did succeed in generating enthusiastic involvement in a group enterprise, and provided occasional employment for a membership of more than 20 men. Furthermore, several contracts for cultivating and harvesting services went to band

members who owned, or had access to, the necessary machinery. There were plans to expand operations in the coming year, and to buy equipment with the aid of a government loan.

The Wild Rice Co-operative

The Trout River Reserve is not far from a major wild rice producing area. Before 1964, the government leased the main producing lakes to Caucasian rice dealers, who paid pickers from Trout River and other Indian communities within a wide radius of the lakes. Pickers were paid a flat rate of so many cents per pound, the rate varying from one year to the next, depending on such factors as prevailing market conditions, and the quality of the rice crop. It was said that some rice dealers had become wealthy men, and predictably there were stories, some of them perhaps true, of how the dealers had exploited the Indians.

With the guidance of the community development officer, a movement began at Trout River in 1964 to form a co-operative for harvesting and marketing wild rice. Since all Indians had the legal right to pick rice, and since people from many communities had done so for years, it was necessary to involve all interested communities in the movement. During the summer, there were meetings and complex negotiations involving officials of the provincial government and representatives from 11 reserves. In all these dealings, leaders of the Trout River Reserve played a dominant part; they had the advantage of previous experience in the co-operative movement, and of guidance from a resident community development officer.

Membership in the Wild Rice Producers' Co-operative was open to entire Indian bands, and not to individuals. After the co-operative's final formation in mid-summer, there were nine bands participating. Both the president and the business manager were Trout River men; the latter being a paid official. Operations were financed by a $10,000 bank loan, with repayment guaranteed by the provincial government.

Each band paid a $100.00 membership fee, these payments providing working capital in the initial stages before the bank loan was received. Only members of bands which agreed to pay fees were allowed to pick rice in the lakes leased by the co-operative. The only exception to this rule permitted Metis who had traditionally picked rice in the area to continue picking. The combined population of member bands was about 6,500, and an estimated 700 Indians took an active part in the harvesting.

Not without some difficulty, the co-operative obtained from the provincial government virtually exclusive harvesting rights to all lakes within a large productive area. With help and guidance from the community development officer, they invited tenders to purchase the rice and negotiated final arrangements with the one dealer who tendered. In a period of from two to three weeks in September, the co-operative bought approximately 70,000 pounds of rice from the Indians and sold it to the dealer for 57 cents per pound. Pickers were paid at the rate of 40 cents per pound, and a royalty payment of 12 cents per pound went to the provincial government.

The field study ended before the co-operative had made a final financial reckoning. Shortly after the rice season closed, one

supporter of the venture called it a "tremendous success" financially. Without going into details, it can be said that the evidence available suggests otherwise, and probably expenses equalled or exceeded revenue. Even if the first season's operations were less than a total financial success, the co-operative did succeed in putting a large sum of money (at least $25,000) into circulation among a large number of Indians. And once again, the enterprise led to the involvement of a group of Indian people in a common undertaking in which they exercised at least some measure of control and direction.

Political Organization

The band council consisted of a chief and four councillors, all of whom were elected by majority vote of the entire band electorate. Band councils are empowered by the Indian Act to make by-laws relating to such matters as health, traffic regulations, control of livestock, road maintenance, and the like, but the council of the day had not enacted any by-laws during nearly two years in office. Apparently no by-laws had been enacted by any previous council. Under Section 82 of the Indian Act, the government may declare that a band has reached "an advanced stage of development", thereby empowering the council to raise money by taxation and licensing, to appropriate and spend band funds, to pay councillors for their services, and to make other provisions not unlike those within the power of a governing body of a municipality. The Trout River Band did not have the priviliges extended under this section of the Act.

Councillors did, however, work closely with the several economic

organizations in promoting the co-operative movement, and some actually were supported by the senior co-operative when they sought election. They also had a hand in administering the business of co-operatives, both collectively and as individuals. Two councillors belonged to the board of directors of the Agriculture Co-operative, and a third was on the Pulpwood Co-operative board.

When not concerned with the co-operative movement, the Council was involved in a variety of band matters, such as relief, housing, road maintenance, and school transportation. However, in most of these matters the councillors acted as intermediaries between the local agent and the general band membership. The flow of communication seemed to be largely one-way, with council or its members relaying to the agent requests or demands originating in the band. Except when meeting with the agent, the council appeared to conduct its business in a generally informal manner. Apparently formal minutes were not recorded prior to the arrival of a new agent in the summer of 1964. Councillors met one another frequently in their day-to-day movements about the reserve, and often called at one another's homes. During these casual encounters, groups of two or three men would discuss current subjects such as housing, relief, or the prospects for a good rice crop. These conversations often led to agreement on courses of action, and to appropriate representations being made at later council meetings. Contributing to the frequency of these casual visits was the fact that in spite of the reserve's large area and its scattered population, the chief and three councillors were close neighbours. The Council had no official meeting place, but met irregularly in the

chief's house or in the agent's office, if the latter attended.

The council called general band meetings when important issues had to be discussed, or major decisions made. Normal attendance at these gatherings was from 30 to 40 persons. Probably there was a whole set of factors contributing to this low attendance rate, including wide population dispersal, poor communications, inconvenient meeting hours, and general public disinterest.

Social Groupings

Informants frequently said that "just about everybody on the reserve is related to everybody else", and in fact there were a few widely extended kin groups which, taken together, included most of the people in the community. The four surnames which occurred most frequently in the agency's band list were shared by 810 persons, or about 50 per cent of the population. This did not include married females whose maiden names were among the four dominant surnames.

There was evidence to indicate that a large group sharing a common surname was in fact a kin group, in which each individual recognized his kinship with others in the group, even when such relationships were remote. For example, several members of the largest group with a common surname, to be called the Favreaus, acknowledged that "all the Favreaus are related", and one or two seemed rather surprised that anyone might think otherwise. Agency records did not show a single case of a Favreau marrying another person with that name, suggesting something not unlike clan exogamy. Families with the same surname showed a tendency to have their homes close together,

thus forming little colonies of kin which suggested an inclination to patrilocality.

While intermarriage among extended kin groups undoubtedly contributed to community solidarity, other factors tended to reduce solidarity. Perhaps the most immediately obvious line of social cleavage was between Catholics and Anglicans. While this division involved more than religious differences, the denominational labels are convenient for introducing a discussion of the two main factions on the reserve.

Mission records showed that there were 325 nominal and practicing Anglicans, comprising about 20 per cent of the population. Of 56 male nuclear family heads classed as Anglicans in agency files, 52 had Anglo-Saxon (or at least Anglicized) names, while only two had names which were unmistakably French. On the other hand, of 166 such family heads who were Catholics, 126 had names readily classifiable as French, and only 34 had names which were definitely Anglo-Saxon, or borrowed from the English language. Several "French" Catholics (who, like the Anglicans, spoke only English in addition to the local Indian dialect) said that their surnames could be traced to the days when a group of French Canadians operated a sawmill in the area and intermarried with the Indians, but it seems probable that at least some of these names originated with the fur traders of the Northwest Trading Company. Both Indian and white informants said that some of the Anglicans still retained Indian names as well as the English ones they had adopted, while the Catholics with French names had not retained Indian names. According to one story, the Anglicans assumed English names as

a means of emphasizing their distinctiveness. For reasons that soon will be made clear, it seems equally probable that they retained Indian names for the same purpose.

The Anglicans tended to live to themselves. Nearly all of their homes were concentrated at one end of the reserve on both sides of the river. However, there was some overlapping of residential location, and several informants claimed that the pattern was changing, with the geographical "boundary" becoming progressively blurred. In particular, the numerically stronger "French" Catholics seem to have infiltrated Anglican territory quite extensively.

There was some intermarriage between the two groups, and agency records showed 11 currently existing marriages in which the spouses were of different faiths. Seven of these unions were between Catholic males and Anglican females. The number of common law unions across denominational lines was unrecorded, but informants said these occurred rather frequently.

The Anglicans had their own informal leaders, and held occasional meetings of their own. However, they did not participate much in the affairs of the larger community. Of the 18 individuals classed as belonging to the political-economic elite, only one was an Anglican and it was said that his appointment as a co-operative director was engineered by the group in power for political reasons, apparently to counteract charges that the Catholics were "running everything", and "keeping everything for themselves". It is difficult to say to what extent the Anglicans voluntarily excluded themselves from leadership positions in formal organizations, and to what extent they were excluded

by the Catholic majority. Evidence will be presented which suggests that the Anglicans were inclined to withdraw, and tended to be disinterested in or opposed to the co-operative movement. However, they were by no means the only group so opposed. The leading opponent of co-operatives, whose views were described previously, was a "French" Catholic known to have the support of some Anglicans.

Actually there was another line of cleavage which was almost, but not quite, superimposed on the denominational one. This was the line separating those who defined themselves as the only bona fide members of the band from those whom they defined as interlopers who had "taken over" band affairs. The group claiming bona fide membership was composed of most if not all of the Anglicans in the community, together with a small number of Catholics. These people regarded themselves as the "only true Indians" on the reserve, and claimed that the others were "Metis", although legally both groups consisted of treaty Indians. Casual observation suggested a real biological difference, for in general the self-styled "true Indians" appeared to be darker complexioned. The close correspondence between this "ethnic" line of cleavage and the denominational one is illustrated by the religious affiliations of persons who signed a petition to the government in March, 1964, protesting alleged favouritism toward the "Metis". Of the 15 individuals who signed, ten definitely were Anglicans, two apparently were Anglicans, and three apparently were

Catholics.[3] The petition asserts that the "Metis" obtain all material benefits provided by the federal government, "such as cattle, tractors, farm implements, nets, traps, and other articles", while the "native Treaty Indians are ignored". It calls for a judicial inquiry to determine why this alleged situation exists, and asks that "consideration be given to give the Native Treaty Indians their own Treaty Contract".

The historical basis for the self-styled "true Indians'" definition of the situation seems apparent enough. When the Indians of this region signed their treaty in the 1870's, there lived among them a large number of people of mixed blood, many of whom "were recognized as Indians... and were taken into the bands among whom they resided".[4] It seems, however, that while the government recognized these Metis as Indians and gave them treaty status, the Indians did not so recognize them. Probably hostility was stimulated by the rise to numerical and eventual political dominance of the "half-breeds".

It goes without saying that the "French" Catholics defined the situation differently. If the opinions of the elite are any guide, perhaps Catholic attitudes can be summarized by saying that this numerically and politically dominant group was rather patronizing

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[3]These signatures suggest that it may be the Catholics with Anglo-Saxon names who tended to side with the Anglicans in claiming bona fide band membership. A tendency of many of this same group of Catholics to live in close proximity to the Anglicans also points to the same tentative conclusion.

[4]Indians of the Prairie Provinces, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Indian Affairs Branch, Ottawa, 1961. p. 9

toward the Anglicans. Far from defining themselves as Metis, the Catholic leaders laid claim to just as much "Indianness" as any other group. They made a clear distinction between their own group and non-treaty people of mixed descent, whom they in turn called Metis. They ridiculed the racial distinction made by the Anglicans, arguing that just about everyone on the reserve was of mixed blood, if the truth were known or admitted.

The Catholic leaders with whom the issue was discussed said that they did not know why they were called Metis, or said the issue resulted from religious differences, or from Anglican "backwardness". The Anglicans were said to be "still living in 1871" (the year the treaty was signed). In contrast, the Catholic leaders defined themselves (and at least by implication, the entire Catholic group) as more "progressive". Several informants claimed the Anglicans were more inclined to think the government owed them a living, and were more inclined to heavy drinking and delinquent behaviour than the Catholics. Police in Birch Rapids gave some support to this latter view, pointing to the members of one Anglican family in particular as being "the worst trouble makers".

It seems likely that the deepest gulf lay not between Anglicans and Catholics as such, but between the group which claimed special qualities of "Indianness" for itself alone, and the group which declined to recognize the former's claim to these distinctive qualities. If so, then religious distinctions may only have served to accentuate the deeper difference. There was some evidence to support this idea. Each group tended to avoid referring to the other in religious terms.

Informants on both sides spoke of "the people at that end of the reserve", waving a hand in the appropriate direction. Several Indians and whites referred to indifferent attitudes toward religion, and even to anti-religious attitudes among both factions.

While there appeared to be one or two other minor social divisions in the community, (for example, between people on the East and West Sides), they seemed quite unimportant in comparison with the cleavage already described. Evidence will be presented in a later section which suggests that the Anglican group (and, by extension, the entire "true Indian" faction) was more retreatist than other groups on the reserve. In fact, the material already presented suggests this tentative conclusion; apparently these people tended to live to themselves, to drink more heavily than others, and to withdraw from participation in band affairs.

CHAPTER IV

HOW THE COLONIAL ENVIRONMENT IS PERPETUATED

In terms of our theoretical framework, continuing disparagement is a condition for the perpetuation of retreatist orientations. Likewise, a condition for the emergence of innovational personality out of retreatism is continued disparagement over time, indeed over a span of generations.[1] We are not concerned primarily with a history of ways in which Indians have been held in low regard in the past, but with evidence of the continuation into the present day of disparagement, and of circumstances which Indians may perceive to imply disparagement.

The rationale for viewing Indian reservations as colonial societies was explained previously. To further clarify the use of the term "colonialism" it is here defined as a state of inferiority experienced by a community or society which is dominated politically, economically, and culturally by another more developed society.[2]

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[1] See above, p. 11.

[2] This closely follows the definition by H. Maddick on page 101 of A Dictionary of the Social Sciences, where he says that colonialism "refers to a state of inferiority or of servitude experienced by a community, a country, or a nation which is dominated politically and/or economically and/or culturally by another and more developed community or nation; applied especially when the dominant nation is European or North American, and the less-developed, a non-European people".

In the colonial situation, theoretically, the dominant alien group "by its very pattern of life" indicates contempt and a low valuation for culture of the subordinate group.[3] Generalizing from the history of colonial domination, Hagen points out that typically members of the dominant group "build their houses differently, used different furniture, wore different clothing, showed repugnance for traditional methods of preparing food, and so on through every aspect of living".[4] Differences parallel to these existed between Trout River and the neighbouring white community of Birch Rapids. The life style in Birch Rapids was predominantly middle class, in sharp contrast to that on the reserve. Certainly this did not go unnoticed by the Indians. One white informant said: "The Indian sees how the white man lives and he says 'either I'm inferior or he is cheating me'. He can't face the possibility of being inferior, so he decides the white man is cheating him". Furthermore, and apart from any inferences that Indians may have drawn from differential living standards, there was evidence that some local whites overtly disparaged them.

No less important were certain essentially "colonial" elements which persisted in the system for administration of Indian affairs, carrying with them the implication that Indians were the object of derogation. Observations at Trout River indicate that within the system there existed concurrently two approaches to government handling of

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[3]Hagen, p. 203

[4]Ibid., p. 413

Indian affairs: the "non-directive" community development approach dedicated to fostering Indian initiative and self-direction and the traditional "paternalistic" approach which focussed on the administration of rather precisely defined legislative provisions governing what both Indians and officials could or could not do, and treated Indians like wards of the state even while it proclaimed them to be full and responsible citizens. Although the avowed objective of government was to promote Indian autonomy, a residue of paternalism conveyed the implication that Indians were defined as incapable of knowing what was best for themselves. Without doubt some of the leaders at Trout River perceived themselves to be defined in precisely this way.

There is no intention of calling into question the sincerity of the government or of individuals who were its agents. The point to be illustrated is that factors perpetuating a degree of "colonial" control were built onto the administrative system. This element of control appeared to prevent Indians from exercising initiative, to reinforce their feelings of dependency, and to convey to them the impression that they were defined more as children than as responsible adults. We are reminded of Hagen's assertion that in any colonial situation the dominant group will convey an impression of low regard for the subordinate group "<u>whatever its deliberate policies of government may be</u>".[5]

To indicate how a colonial environment is perpetuated, we look first at factors in the administrative system, and then at evidence of disparagement in the community at large.

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[5] Ibid., p. 203. Italics are the present writer's.

Continuities in Colonial Control

The Indian Act

The principal instrument employed in the administration of Indian affairs is the Indian Act. This defines not only the powers of both government administrators and of band councils, but also the rights of individual Indians as Indians, in quite specific terms. From the most casual perusal of the Act it is clear that the government has sweeping powers with respect to many aspects of the Indians' lives. Of course, all citizens and local administrative bodies in a modern state are subject to laws which restrict the choices and initiatives they may take. But Indians are the only minority ethnic group in the country subject to a body of legislation which applies to them and only to them. This carries with it certain special privileges, but also certain special disprivileges.

The Act was created as an instrument for alien control of a people whose culture and social structure had been disrupted and who, whether or not they may be said to have been conquered by force or the threat of force, were at the very least obliged to relinquish their claims to the lands they traditionally occupied. Whatever the intentions of the legislators, the Act was in effect an instrument of colonial control. It is suggested that even as it exists today, and despite many revisions over the years, this statute serves to perpetuate colonialism in some degree.

An avowed purpose of the original Indian Act was to "protect" the Indians and to provide them with certain unique safeguards not

because they were regarded with special favour, but because they were looked upon as lesser beings.[6] The persistence of this paternalistic objective is evident in the new Act, passed in 1951 and still in force.[7] Furthermore, a good many sections of the new statute carry the implication that Indians are regarded as less than fully competent adults, and appear to result in their being treated as such. For example, the Act prohibits Indians in the prairie provinces from selling livestock or farm produce to anyone but fellow band members, "unless the superintendent (a government official) approves the transaction in writing".[8] It provides for the surrender of reserve lands provided such surrender is approved by a majority vote of band members, but on the condition that band meetings called for this purpose "shall be held in the presence of the superintendent or some other officer of the Department designated by the Minister".[9] It provides for government management of the financial resources of bands, stipulates how band revenues from certain sources are to be allocated, and reserves to the

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[6] When the Indian Act was tabled in Parliament in 1876, much of the debate focussed on matters relating to the need to protect Indians, both from the anticipated results of their own shortcomings and from unscrupulous whites. With regard to the central issue, namely that Indians must be protected, there apparently was unanimous agreement on both sides of the House. Hon. H.L. Langevin no doubt expressed the opinion of many parliamentarians when he said that "Indians were like children to a very great extent" and "therefore required a great deal more protection than white men". Debates of the House of Commons, Ottawa, 1876, p. 752.

[7] This refers to the new Act as amended to 1961.

[8] The Indian Act, Section 32(1).

[9] Ibid., Section 39(5).

government the right to decide whether or not a particular band shall be permitted to spend its own money.[10]

These provisions and others like them demonstrate the paternalistic intent of the legislation. While the objective is to protect Indians from exploitation, the implication is that Indians are not competent to protect themselves or to perform in the market place like normal adults either corporately or individually. Of course one cannot be certain how restrictive the Act is in practice without knowing in detail how its provisions are interpreted and applied by the administration. However, there is little question that the legislation provides an administrative framework conducive to the perpetuation of a colonial type of control. It is suggested that many of the manifestations of government paternalism to be described hereunder are directly or indirectly attributable to the provisions of the Indian Act.

Conflicting Orientations Within the Administrative System

In 1964 a community development program, then being extended to other reserves, was in full operation at Trout River within the framework of the federal administrative system. This program was oriented to the task of encouraging Indian self-direction, while other programs had a paternalistic orientation which focussed on the administration of the Indian Act and of regulations under the Act. The co-existence of two such essentially opposed orientations within the same system led to various contradictions.

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[10] Ibid., Sections 61(1), 62, 68.

The Branch maintained guardianship and strict control of band funds; for example, the Indians were refused permission to use about $300. in one of their trust accounts to pay for repairs to a tractor, and were instructed instead to reapply for permission to use money from a different account, in accordance with regulations governing the expenditure of band moneys. However, at the same time the Branch granted loans totalling thousands of dollars to the co-operatives, as part of the program for helping the Indians to learn to manage their own economic affairs.

The local Indian agent, at least partly committed by the demands of the system to maintenance of the status quo, worked side by side with a community development officer committed to the establishment of a new order. These opposed orientations did not go unnoticed by the Indians; most of the leaders placed a lower valuation on the agent's role than on the development officer's role. The contrast in roles may explain why one leader thought the development officer was a provincial official, although he had been in the community for two years.

The development officer was granted certain special privileges of freedom and discretion which the agent did not enjoy. For example, he reported direct to the regional office, bypassing the agency superintendent's office. His discretionary powers were supposed to enable him to foster and encourage programs which would involve the Indians in greater responsibility for decision-making. But there were limitations to these powers, beyond which he met the same or similar restraints as those imposed on the administrator. He could not delegate to the co-operatives responsibility for the loans they received

from the Branch. Being held accountable for them, he was obliged to supervise their use. This is not intended as a value judgement; it simply states a fact of government administration which inhibited the delegation of responsibility to the Indians.

The civil service system is a competitive one wherein the field officer's performance is subject to comparison with the performance of his peers, and he is under pressure to show results. This generates a strong desire to "get things done", and an accompanying temptation to perform for the Indian functions which might be performed by the Indian. I attended a meeting in Trout River of several resident and visiting officials at which plans for harvesting, storing, and marketing the Agriculture Co-operative's oats and potatoes were enthusiastically discussed in detail. It was obvious that the participants relished formulating a plan in which efficiency and economy were the keynotes. The development officer attempted to introduce a new perspective by saying: "Let's see what the Indians want to do about this. I try to let them handle things, and they <u>are</u> going ahead on their own". In fact the Indians did make many of the arrangements without outside help. What this incident illustrates is not actual interference in co-operative projects, but a collective orientation which had potential for interference.

The Indian agent was a new arrival at Trout River, but had served as agent at another reserve for some years previously. At his first meeting with the band council, he quickly assumed control of the proceedings, even though apparently there had been no previous opportunity for him to assess the capabilities of the councillors as a

group. His assumption of the role of secretary provided the principal vehicle of control. The pattern of interaction was roughly as follows. A councillor would raise a subject for discussion and others might offer information, opinions, or suggestions. A suggestion might stimulate one or two nods of agreement, whereupon the agent would formulate a statement to be placed in the minutes. He would then ask the Indians if they agreed with his formulation, no one would object, and one or two might nod agreement. The statement then became the officially recorded decision of the meeting, even though it might have added significantly to what had actually been said. By quickly formulating an item for inclusion in the minutes and reading it back to the councillors, most of whom obviously were still thinking about the problem at hand, the agent effectively terminated discussion of the problem, after which he himself might introduce another. During the course of the meeting, he also drafted a short document for the councillors to sign, without showing that it had occurred to him that the councillors might be competent to draft it themselves.

By "putting words in the mouths" of the Indians, the agent profoundly influenced the rate or frequency of decision-making, as well as the quality of the decisions. Of the solution to a problem under discussion the agent would say repeatedly, "It's up to you fellows", and very likely he thought that the Indians really did take much of the initiative. Following the meeting, the agent said he had been favourably impressed that the councillors had deferred decision on one problem in order to "think it over", when in fact he himself had suggested the postponement of action.

This kind of performance by officials restricts Indian initiative and can serve to perpetuate or reinforce dependency orientations. It seems to reflect attitudes associated with the traditional approach to reserve administration. But it is not simply a matter of individuals harbouring notions that the Indians cannot manage their own affairs. Rather it is an orientation imposed on participating individuals by the system. For many years the system has been geared to perform a guardian role, and implicit in this collective role definition is an image of Indian incompetence. Again, it seems likely that the actions of the agent reflected a need to conform to the demands of a system in which rewards are allocated on the basis of performance and performance is measured in terms of tangible results. If band councils, Indian co-operatives, or other community organizations appeared to be active and viable, then some credit for their performance would be conferred on the officials who gave them guidance.

In the planning and advancement of its programs, the Branch must also try to take into account the reactions of other organizations with interests in the Indian population. One of these is the Catholic Church. Due to the power and influence of the church, the Branch must behave cautiously in its relations with church representatives. At Trout River, there was evidence indicating that where the granting of greater autonomy to the Indians might endanger cordial relations with the church or its agents, the demands of diplomacy may sometimes take precedence over advancement of the goal of Indian autonomy.

There was a rather complicated involvement with the church in the matter of education at Trout River, where a school and hostel complex

was administered by a priest on behalf of the Branch. During the period of field work, there was a move to reorganize the local school committee and to broaden its terms of reference to include certain responsibilities for school matters on the West Side. Previously, the committee's work had been confined to the East Side, where Anglican and Catholic children attended the same schools, and the schools were directly administered by the Branch. The proposal to extend the committee's work to the West Side meant that for the first time, the committee would be expected to participate in matters pertaining to the school operated by the priest.

A public meeting of the school committee, called to discuss these proposals, was attended by about 40 Indians and perhaps a dozen interested whites, including the priest and several local and visiting officials. Technically, the Indian chairman of the committee presided over the meeting, but in fact most of the proceedings were directed by whites. One official gave a lengthy speech in which he outlined the functions and powers of the school committee as these are stated in Branch regulations. The committee was supposed to "assume active responsibility"[11] for school attendance, truancy, care of school property, attendance of Indian children at non-Indian schools, and a number of other matters. Furthermore, the committee was supposed to "act in an advisory capacity"[12] in matters of school accommodation, school

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[11] Quoted from "Regulations for the Organization of School Committees on Indian Reserves", Indian Affairs Branch.

[12] Ibid.

maintenance, janitorial services, lunch supplies, and so on. In his address to the meeting, the official exhorted the committee to take its existing responsibilities seriously, and to show firmness in exercising them.

However, the committee's new role with respect to the Catholic residential school was to be a different matter. The official stressed that the committee "could not interfere with students in the residential school", adding that "any interaction with day students in the residential school must be through Father ---". Furthermore, he made it clear that the other matters which he had stressed as committee responsibilities were not to be so regarded where the Catholic school was concerned. Instead of assuming a supervisory or directive role, committee members "should go to the father, and say 'father, can we help you?'" On the day following the meeting, an Indian commented: "What's the use of having a school committee if it can't do anything without Father ----'s say-so".

The above incident exemplifies the directive approach which contradicts that of community development. While it may have been partly an expression of the individual orientations of the official, its origins can be seen also in the traditional role and goal definitions of the administrative system, and in the system of relations which have become established between the administration and the church. It seems that the administration was systematically deferential to the church in areas where interests overlapped, and this situation was compounded by the interlocking of church and government functions in the education field.

Further Evidence of Colonial Control

The Indians at Trout River lacked control of even the simplest administrative apparatus that might have enabled them to exercise more autonomy. The band councillors did not have an office of their own where they could do business, make phone calls, keep records, or have documents or letters typed. Council's resolutions were typed in the Indian Affairs office, by a white stenographer paid by Indian Affairs. At one time, signed, blank resolution forms had to be sent to headquarters for typing - a practise somewhat equivalent to turning over a signed, blank cheque to an acquaintance whose reliability is rather in doubt. This practise stopped after the Indians raised objections. In a sense, the Indians were "divorced from the means of production".

As mentioned before, band funds were controlled from Ottawa, and Ottawa sometimes told the Council what it could or could not do with band money. Indian Affairs called for tenders and generally controlled the allocation of construction and related projects on the reserve. Indian Affairs handled the administrative arrangements for the surrender of land to the province for a new highway through the reserve. While the Indians could not handle such undertakings alone, little attempt was made to involve them, or to give them an idea of the workings of such transactions, or their results.

Councillors complained that they were not consulted by the administration and not told what Indian Affairs was doing. "We don't know what's going on" was a comment frequently heard. They claimed they were never told if the band had been paid for the surrender of highway land, or how much money they were supposed to have received. When tenders for the hauling of gravel were turned down, they were not

told why. They did not receive intelligible statements from Indian Affairs, showing how much money was in band funds. Councillors showed me what was supposed to be a statement of band funds, but it was in an unintelligible code. Councillors said they had complained repeatedly about this without results.

These points indicate that the Indians were restricted in their access to channels of communication. If they wished to do something to "help themselves" they had to ask Ottawa for money, going through Indian Affairs channels. At any point, an official might obstruct the channel, if only temporarily. Officials in Ottawa were inclined to minimize the degree of control exercised over band council actions, and suggested that the Branch tended to give automatic approval to proposals advanced by the Indians. This account did not coincide with the definition of the situation held by most Indian leaders at Trout River, who claimed that all the important decisions were made in Ottawa, that the council merely "rubber-stamped" Branch decisions, and that officials at any level could and did prevent or withhold approval of council resolutions. These demonstrations of the old paternalism, occurring as they did simultaneously with an ongoing community development program, could only serve to hamper the progress of that program.

Moreover, there can scarcely be any question that the impact of paternalistic treatment, in its totality, could only serve to impress upon the Indians the perception that at worst they were held in contempt, and at best defined as less than fully competent adults. As one leader pointed out: "Maybe if the people were consulted more they wouldn't feel so childish". No doubt the feelings of inferiority many

of them felt were offset, at least in some measure, by other more satisfying experiences with the administration and with individual officials. Most of the Indian leaders expressed satisfaction regarding their relations with the community development officer. Significantly, one said that the development officer "isn't afraid to treat us like people".

Disparagement

No systematic research was conducted into the attitudes of local whites towards Indians. However, evidence that the Indians were disparaged came to light in casual encounters with whites living in the nearby town of Birch Rapids and vicinity. In this small community strangers were noticed, and it was necessary to explain a good many times that I was living on the reserve and conducting research into the problems of the local Indian people. This explanation was met, more frequently than not, with such comments as "How do you stand living out there?"; "How do you sleep nights?"; "Well, they sure as hell have plenty of problems"; and other remarks to the effect that Indians were drunken, lazy, violent, undesirable neighbours and responsible for their own depressed circumstances.

One small businessman who claimed to have had much experience with Indians appeared to subscribe to most of the usual stereotypes. He spoke of the Indian's evasiveness, irregular work habits, lack of punctuality, and inability to accept direction, concluding with the remark that "An Indian's an Indian and you can't change him". During a casual meeting, a local handyman who claimed to "know Indians"

vented a stream of invective to the effect that they were lazy, shiftless, complaining, deceitful, vandalous, immoral, drunken, and ready to ostracise those among them who showed ambition.

While no data are available to suggest what proportion of the Birch Rapids population entertained derogatory images of the Indian, it can be said impressionistically that disparagement seemed rather common, perhaps especially among tradesmen, clerical workers, and other members of the lower middle class.

Again, no systematic effort was made to discover the extent to which Indians perceived disparagement by whites, but evidence of these perceptions appeared frequently during formal and informal interviews, and in ordinary conversation. Twelve cases are recorded in which Indians showed spontaneously and explicitly that they perceived their group to be the object of low valuation by one or another segment of the dominant society. These people, among them six members of the leadership group, spoke of "prejudice" or "discrimination" or were in other ways quite specific in expressing their perceptions.

Two spoke of the negative regard in which they were held by whites in general, one thought that provincial game management officials were prejudiced towards Indians, and nine recognized disparagement by people in Birch Rapids. Among the latter, three spoke of generalized prejudice or discrimination, three alleged that the management of the local paper mill discriminated against Indians in its hiring and promotion practises, two claimed that Caucasian parents objected to their children attending school with Indian children, and one worried that the white children themselves might disparage Indian children,

although he did not know of any previous friction at the integrated school. Finally, one individual complained bitterly of disparagement of Indian children by those responsible for educating them, without specifying educators in any particular school or school administration system. His comments, slightly paraphrased, serve to illustrate the type of explicit verbalization of perceived derogation which has just been discussed:

> "I was at a meeting of big shots and I heard a school principal say that Indian children stink. If there's something wrong with our children,[13] they have them for ten months of the year why don't they do something about it? Why blame us for something about our children when we only have them for two months? Am I not what I was educated to be? Why do they blame us for our faults?"

Many other Indians volunteered comments which, while less explicit than those of the twelve discussed above, distinctly implied the perception of being undervalued. They complained that the mill management had not kept its promise to employ Indians, that the provincial government disregarded their hunting and trapping rights, that the federal government ignored them and did not bother to consult them on such important matters as amendments to the Indian Act, that the administration did not keep them informed about the disposition of band funds. Among band members formally interviewed, more than 40 per cent of leaders and 75 per cent of non-leaders considered that the federal government did not keep its promises to the Indian people.[14] The extent to which these allegations may or may not have had any basis in

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[13] Apparently a reference to Indian residential schools.

[14] See Table 16, p. 104.

fact is immaterial in the present context. No doubt many were half-truths at best. The point is that they demonstrate Indian definitions of the situation. Those who discerned that they had been cheated, exploited, or ignored must have defined themselves as members of a disparaged group. In one way or another, most of the Indians interviewed indicated that the defined themselves in this way; it seems probable therefore, that most of the reserve population perceived disparagement by the dominant society.

Furthermore, there was evidence that the leaders were disparaged by a substantial proportion of the band population. Members of the Anglican ("true Indian") faction declared that band affairs were controlled by "Metis", a term spoken in a noticeable tone of disparagement. This is not surpising since, as we have seen, the Anglican minority viewed the others as interlopers, as people who had laid an unwarranted claim to treaty status.[15] However, derogatory attitudes toward the leaders, and especially toward the co-operative directors, were also evident outside the Anglican group. About half the respondents in the sample of ordinary band members showed some degree of alienation from the co-operative while one third (eight respondents) more or less explicitly called into question the motives or competence of directors.[16] Again, six subjects spoke disparagingly of the band council, offering such comments as "The chief and council we've

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[15] See p. 40, above.

[16] See p. 101, hereunder, for some examples.

got now aren't any good", and "The chief and council only help themselves and the white man, but not the people around here". Since the council worked in close support of the co-operatives, no doubt it shared some of the disparagement directed toward them.

As might be expected, there were indications that the leaders perceived themselves to be disparaged. A few apparently recognized th some measure of disparagement by a substantial proportion of the reserve population, while others seemed to think that only a small group held them in low regard. These perceptions sometimes were implied when leaders spoke of the Anglican faction, or of opposition to the co-operative movement, but more direct evidence of perceived disparagement was obtained by asking six leaders if they thought that band members respected those who held offices in the council or on the boards of co-operatives. Five made it clear that they did not think office holders were universally respected, and two of these suggested that perhaps most band members did not respect them. The chief considered that only councillors were well regarded by the majority, and that most did not respect the co-operative directors. However, the chief also suggested that he himself was the object of some disparagement because of his active participation in the co-operative movement. "It's o.k. to be chief if you just make speeches and sit around and do nothing", he said, "but if you try to do anything for the reserve, you just get criticized".[17] Finally, several leaders said that individuals who

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[17] In fact there was not much evidence that the chief was personally disparaged.

tried to "better themselves" were "looked down on", implying that they themselves were among those so disparaged.

Later it will be shown that leaders were under pressure to conform to certain traditional values of the reserve culture;[18] no doubt some were disparaged precisely because they entertained values and cognitions which deviated from those held by the "traditionalists". There are even indications that the leaders' orientations tended to deviate from those of the majority of the band members,[19] but the available evidence does not warrant the conclusion that the leaders, as a group, were negatively regarded by the majority.

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[18] See pp. 111-116.

[19] For example, the leaders tended to be less dependent and more future oriented than subjects in the sample of ordinary band members. See Table 4, p. 74, and Table 8 p. 82.

CHAPTER V

RETREATISTS AND INNOVATORS

Introduction

Before proceeding to examine in detail the evidence of retreatist orientations among members of the band, it is necessary to define more precisely some of the concepts involved, and to point to certain indicators of retreatism. Hagen tells us that among the principal aspects of retreatism are apathy, passivity, and value conflict. Analytically these concepts seem closely related and may overlap, and therefore it is not surprising that attitudes and orientations indicative of one aspect may likewise be indicative of other aspects.

For present purposes the operational definition of apathy is indifference, and especially indifferences of the individual to the activities and goals of his group. We shall treat as indicative of apathy whatever evidence we have of indifference in this sense. Thus the individual who shows little knowledge of or interest in prominent community issues and activities will be regarded as probably apathetic.

It may be open to question whether or not indifference to the possibilities of personal economic advancement can be considered a mark of apathy in the context of Indian culture. However, some members of the band under study showed distinct achievement orientations while others did not, despite apparently identical cultural backgrounds. While the evidence is inconclusive, it does suggest the inadvisability

of dismissing low achievement orientations as simply an Indian cultural trait.

We define passivity as readiness to permit the social environment to act upon the self without the self attempting to exercise control in return. Thus passivity is a kind of withdrawal of commitment to autonomous action, or is expressed by such withdrawal. Hagen says that passivity involves the repression of aggressive needs when it is perceived that the expression of rage is dangerous; the passive individual is described as weak, unassertive, and inhibited. This suggests that the individual defines himself as powerless to cope with a social environment perceived as hostile and threatening. He does not think that he can effectively influence the environment because it contains too many powerful forces. When these forces are perceived to exist outside his own group, we may reasonably anticipate that the individual will define the group as similarly powerless.

The passive individual is almost certainly dependent. He must depend on the environmental forces, perhaps even on those which he defines as somehow threatening, for he feels powerless to cope with or overcome them. If the environment provides abundant opportunities to be dependent, then passivity, and likewise apathy, are reinforced; the individual learns to value his dependent position because it removes the need for autonomous action and permits him to continue in a state of indifference and withdrawal. It is suggested, therefore, that evidence of dependency orientations and of perceptions of personal and group powerlessness are indicative of retreatism.

Withdrawal of commitment to personal and group goals appears to

be closely related to apathetic and passive orientations. For Hagen, such withdrawal apparently is virtually synonymous with retreatism. He suggests that withdrawal stems from value conflict and constitutes an attempt to avoid the anxiety of conflict by rejecting the values and goals of both the traditional and the alien cultures. It is also suggested by Hagen, and by the foregoing discussion of passive orientations, that withdrawal results from the fear of failure in an environment perceived as threatening. There seems to be a connection between these causes of withdrawal. The retreatist rejects the traditional values because he perceives that they are disparaged; he rejects the alien values partly because they are the values of his disparagers and partly because he perceives that even if he were to accept these new values he would still not succeed in overcoming the disparagement which threatens his identity.

The retreatist therefore lowers his expectations for satisfaction or happiness in life, knowing that if he does not hope for too much he will not be disappointed, if he does not strive he will avoid the pain of failure. In theory, this in itself is enough to explain his withdrawal of commitment to personal economic goals. Disregarding for the moment the possibility of intervening cultural variables we shall say that low achievement and future orientations likely are indicative of withdrawal in this sense. The retreatist probably is pessimistic not only about his own life chances but also about the chances of success of other individuals or groups whom he perceives to be in approximately the same situation as himself. It seems likely that he will project his own low expectations for satisfaction on to his group, and will

express doubts about the likelihood of the achievement of group goals. Pessimism thus functions to justify his refusal to become involved. It seems also that such an individual will be suspicious of the motives or competence of others who say they want to help him improve his life chances, for he finds safety in his low expectations and feels threatened at the prospect of elevating them. Suspicion may function as a mask for anxiety. If an individual wants to retain his position of safety, if he does not want to get involved, then by expressing suspicion of others who want him to join some co-operative effort he protects himself from involvement, for suspicion is sufficient to justify avoidance. It is suggested that alienation from task-oriented groups within the community, as manifested in expressions of pessimism, suspicion, hostility, and rejection, probably indicates withdrawal of the retreatist type.

Value conflict differs from the other aspects of retreatism in that theoretically it is the cause of them; apathy, passivity, and withdrawal are modes of adaptation to conflict. This suggests that where there is evidence of the adaptive modes, value conflict is implied. Perhaps more directly, value conflict may be indicated by or inferred from inconsistant behaviour (including verbal behaviour) where the individual's values appear to be involved. Thus if an individual changes his allegiance back and forth from one to another of two opposing groups, one committed to social change and the other to the old "reservation traditional" order of things, it may be inferred that the individual experiences value conflict of the kind associated with retreatism. This example suggests that value conflict and perhaps other aspects suggestive of retreatism may exist within an innovating group as well

as in other groups in a society subject to disparagement. This is not surprising since the innovators also perceive themselves to be disparaged in some measure. Retreatism may vary in degree, and it is at least plausible that its milder forms may co-exist with other contrasting orientations which are conducive to innovation, without immobilizing the individual. Finally, the co-existence of an attitude of hostility with an orientation to dependency, both directed toward the same social object, suggests a conflict of values. Manifestations of hostile dependency therefore will be interpreted as probably indicating value conflict. This will be discussed subsequently in more detail.[1]

Discussion of Significant Variables

This chapter will offer comparisons between the attitudes and orientations of community leaders on the one hand and of ordinary band members on the other; the purpose is to present evidence in support of the notion that there are differences between the two groups with respect to the distribution of retreatist orientations. In offering these comparisons, it is advisable to consider the possible effects of several variables.

Sex and marital status are automatically controlled, since all respondents in both groups are married males. Table 1 suggest that educations is not a significant variable; there is no indication of major differences in educational achievement between the two groups,

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[1] See p. 104 ff.

and the mean number of years of schooling is actually slightly higher in the sample of ordinary band members. Among the leaders, the two who appeared to be most progressive and dynamic had completed grades seven and two, respectively.

Table 1

Years of Schooling Completed

Years	Leaders	Non-leaders
0-2	2	4
3-4	3	1
5-6	5	7
7-8	4	5
9-10	1	4
11-12	0	1
	N= 15	N= 22

Leaders $\bar{x}$ = 5.3 years Non-leaders $\bar{x}$ = 5.7 years
(Means computed from ungrouped data).

The random sample is more heterogeneous than the leadership group with respect to age and religious affiliation. Both variables may be significant in determining attitude differentials. However, the significance of the religious variable per se may be more apparent than real. As previously indicated, Anglicanism and "true Indianness" tend to coincide, and the latter may be more important as a correlate of retreatism. But because of this coincidence, Anglicanism can be used with some measure of confidence in predicting which subjects in the sample may be relatively more withdrawn and dissident. There are six Anglicans in the sample, but none in the leadership group.

Age is a variable which might be expected to have some influence on our results. Table 2 shows age distribution in the two groups. The mean age of leaders is about 42 years, the range being from 29 to 57 years. In the random sample the range is much greater (21 to 78), while the mean is virtually the same at just over 41.

Table 2

Age Distribution for Leaders and Non-Leaders Interviewed

Age	Leaders	Non-leaders
20-24	0	1
25-29	1	6
30-39	5	8
40-49	5	2
50-59	4	2
60-69	0	2
70-79	0	3
Totals:	15	24

Mean age for leaders - 42.5 years.
Mean age for non-leaders - 41.6 years.
(computed from ungrouped data).

A much larger proportion of subjects in the random sample is under the age of 30. It is assumed that for present purposes of comparison this age differential would not have a significant affect on attitudinal differences, or at least that any differences which might be attributed to age should not be such as to bias the results in favour of the leaders. Indeed, if it is reasonable to hypothesise that younger men will feel less dependent and less powerless than older men in equivalent socio-economic circumstances, then the fact that there are more young men in the random sample might operate to reduce any

difference in frequency of retreatist orientations between the two groups. On the other hand, the sample includes five subjects whose ages ranged from 60 to 78, whereas no leaders are in this age range. If these elderly respondents can be expected to show stronger manifestations of retreatism, then their inclusion in the sample may introduce an element of bias unfavourable to the ordinary band membership. As a partial control for age, the elderly will be excluded from the sample or treated separately when the context in which comparative data are presented suggests that age may be a significant determining factor.

Dependency

Four items were included in the interview schedule with the specific objective of obtaining data pertaining to dependency orientations. For two of these items comparative data were obtained from all of the leaders and ordinary band members interviewed. Results are less complete for the third item, while the fourth was poorly constructed and produced a number of ambiguous responses. In addition, other questions which did yield relevant data were asked about the nature of treaty rights and about possible threats to those rights.

Respondents were asked if they agreed or disagreed with the following statement:

> In general, the white man has grown rich from the land that once belonged to the Indian, while the Indian still has less than he needs for a decent living. Because of this, the Indian has a right to expect the white man to share some of his wealth.

The results are shown in Table 3, which reveals rather marked differences in the proportions of those who agreed and disagreed in the two groups. Controlling for age and religious affiliation, we find that

the proportions of leaders and non-leaders who entirely agreed are 27 and 69 per cent, respectively. The six Anglicans and five Catholics over age 60 all agreed.

Table 3

"...The Indian has a right to expect the white man to share some of his wealth"

	Leaders		Non-leaders			
			Full Sample		R.C.'s Under 60	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Agree	4	27	20	83	9	69
Partly agree	3	20	0	0	0	0
Disagree	8	53	3	13	3	23
Don't know	0	0	1	4	1	8
	N=15	100	N=24	100	N=13	100

Three leaders who "partly" agreed offered the qualification that Indians must also bear responsibility for helping themselves. Said one: "People are always saying they sold our country and now they should give us everything, but I don't agree with this. I think people need to get out and help themselves. It's true what they say, in a way, but people have to help themselves". Another refused to "commit" himself by answering within the categories provided, but said: "I believe the Indian has the same opportunity to get rich, if he wants to, but there's always the problem of education....I wouldn't see anything wrong with the white man helping Indians in isolated areas, but here with the mill we're lucky. You can always get a job if you want it". These responses indicate that in their orientations to economic

independence, those who partly agreed with the statement differed very little from those who disagreed. In contrast, none of the ordinary band members who agreed made any qualification, although one indicated that he though what needed to be shared were employment opportunities. More typical of rank and file responses were the following:

(1) "I agree, because what can I live with on the reserve? There's nothing here to live on".

(2) "This mill is on our lands, but we can't go and get jobs there. We were promised to get jobs there anytime".

(3) "I agree. The land below six inches belongs to the Indians. The Indian is supposed to get a share of the mineral wealth".
Interviewer: "Did they ever get it?"
Respondent: "No, not that I know of".

Response (2) above is in interesting contrast to that of the leader who said jobs were always available at the local paper mill. There were repeated accusations of discriminatory employment practices at the mill, but only from one or two of the leaders. This was one of several situations which tended to be differentially defined by members of the two groups. Some who accused the mill management of discrimination may have been seeking to justify their own lack of effort to find or keep employment there; others may have simply been succumbing to the temptation to complain about everything, to express their generalized alienation and suspicion. It can be said without much qualification that the 80 per cent of ordinary band members who agreed with this statement were expressing an attitude of dependency, and perhaps more specifically of hostile dependency toward Euro-Canadian society generally. Those who disagreed, however, including more than half the leaders, were expressing an orientation to independence and

autonomy. As previously stated, even the three leaders who "partly" agreed indicated by their comments that they valued personal economic independence.

Before formal interviewing began, one or two Indians were heard to define themselves as "children of the Queen", and expressed the belief that the Queen had promised to care for them "for as long as the sun shines and the river flows". A local government official commented that such beliefs formed part of the folk-lore of the reserve. These observations prompted the inclusion in the schedule of the following statement, with which respondents were asked to agree or disagree:

> Years ago when the treaty was signed, the Queen promised to look after the people for as long as the river flows, and for this reason, the Indian people should be able to depend on the government to look after their needs.

Table 4 shows the results.

Table 4

"...the Indian people should be able to depend on the government to look after their needs".

	Leaders		Non-leaders			
			Full Sample		Under 60	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Agree	4*	57	22	92	17	89
Disagree	3	43	2	8	2	11
	N=7	100	N=24	100	N=19	100

*Includes two who offered qualified agreement (see text).

Unqualified agreement with the statement is considered to indicate a relatively strong orientation to dependency on the government.

As indicated, over 90 per cent of non-leaders agreed, there being no appreciable change in the proportion agreeing when age is controlled.[2] All six of the Anglicans showed agreement, as did 11 (85 per cent) of the 13 Catholic non-leaders under 60. Thus there is little to indicate that religious affiliation and its correlate, "true Indianness", have a significant affect on responses to this item.

Unfortunately, comparable data were obtained from only seven leaders. Of the four who agreed, two offered noteworthy qualifications. One said, "I would agree, providing it's the right type of help", and indicated that for him the "right type" meant assistance to the sick and disabled, and to individuals who were "getting started in business". The other interpreted the statement as referring to the needs of those who were unable to work, and said: "Sure, it's the same with white people; when the need comes they go on relief". Earlier in the interview, this respondent volunteered the opinion that "a man should help himself" and not "let the government do everything".

Although the evidence is rendered somewhat inconclusive by the limited amount of comparative data, the results are consistent with responses to other items and suggest that the leaders place a higher value on independence than do ordinary band members.

Subjects also were asked if they thought that Indians should manage more of their own affairs. The precise wording of the question constitutes the title of Table 5.

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[2]The band chief estimated that 90 per cent of people on the reserve entertained the notion that the government owed them a living.

Table 5

Do you think there is a need for Indians to manage more of their own affairs than they do?

	Leaders		Non-leaders			
			Full Sample		R.C.'s under 60	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Yes	15	100	17	71	10	77
No	-	-	4	17	2	15
Uncertain	-	-	3	12	1	8
	N=15	100	N= 24	100	N=13	100

The table shows that whereas all the leaders thought the Indians needed to manage more of their own affairs, seven non-leaders thought there was no such need, or showed marked uncertainty. Although the elderly might be expected to exhibit relatively greater dependency, all affirmed that there was a need for more band autonomy. Of the six Anglicans, two rejected the need for greater autonomy, two endorsed it, and two were uncertain.

Affirmative rank and file responses ranged from rather mild and indifferent ("I guess so") to strong and emphatic ("absolutely yes"), with more tending toward indifference than concern. Predictably, the leaders' responses tended to be more emphatic. Following are two examples of responses from leaders:

(1) "Yes, to understand responsibility, they've got to (manage more). You have to understand responsibility, to worry about the future".

(2) "Yes. It's the only way to educate the people. They (the band council) will be more responsible and the people will look up to them more".

Responses from ordinary band members include the following, of which the

first three are classified as negative, and the fourth as "uncertain".

(1) "According to the agreement, they (the government) said they would look after the Indians. That's the only answer I can give".

(2) Respondent: "This would mean there'd be no Indian agent? No welfare?"
Interviewer: "Well, in time yes, maybe".
Respondent: "That would lead them out of treaty".

(3) Respondent: "Not necessarily".
Interviewer: "Why not?"
Respondent: "Because the Indian agent is supposed to look after them".

(4) Respondent: "Lots don't agree with the co-op being on the reserve".
Interviewer: "But do the people need to learn to manage more on their own?"
Respondent: "Yess, they should learn - and get help from from the government too".

It would appear that in many cases, concern with the preservation of treaty rights is associated with dependency. When there is specific dissatisfaction with government protection of treaty rights, hostile dependency may be indicated. Table 6 summarizes responses to the question: "Are you satisfied, or not satisfied, with the way the federal government is protecting your treaty rights?"

Table 6

"Satisfied" and "Not Satisfied" with Government Protection of Treaty Rights

	Leaders		Non-Leaders			
			Full Sample		R.C.'s Under 60	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Satisfied	6	40	8	33	6	46
Not Satisfied	2	13	10	42	2	15
Undecided	4	27	2	8	2	15
Indifferent	3	20	4	17	3	23
	N=15	100	N=24	100	N=13	99

There are rather striking similarities between leaders and non-leaders in all response categories when age and religious affiliation are controlled, for the Anglican and the aged, and particularly the former, showed the highest rate of dissatisfaction. Five Anglicans exhibited definite dissatisfaction, and one was indifferent. Two Catholics over age 60 were "satisfied", and three were not. The table gives no indication of varying degrees of satisfaction or dissatisfaction although rough graduations were discernible in the comments of respondents. Five of the leaders said without qualification that they were satisfied, while only three non-leaders (all Catholics under 60) offered no qualifications. Five non-leaders might be classed as only "fairly satisfied"; these offered such comments as "I guess I'm satisfied, so far", and "it (government protection) isn't too bad". Of the ten ordinary band members who were not satisfied, two expressed rather mild concern and the rest showed stronger dissatisfaction.

The "undecided" category includes those who said they were "partly" or "half" satisfied, while the"indifferents" professed no concern whatever with treaty rights. Responses in the latter category are worth considering. For example:

(1) From a leader: "People are relying too much on the government. If they'd learn to handle their own affairs it would be better. I'd just as soon we forgot about the treaty".

(2) From a non-leader: "I never go into that. I worry about my family and nothing else. I don't care if the government don't support me. I do my own work".

These and other similar comments demonstrate self-assertiveness, rejection of the widespread preoccupation with treaty rights, and of

the dependency on government which this preoccupation often seems to entail. Thus "indifference" in the present context is not indicative of the type of apathy associated with retreatism. Retreatist apathy is indifference to depressed economic or social circumstances and to the means of improving them.

The above quotations give support to the argument that concern with treaty rights frequently is related to dependency orientations, for they show that some band members perceive the relationship themselves. Furthermore, when asked to identify their treaty rights, five ordinary band members indicated that they thought themselves entitled to free food or clothing under the terms of the treaty, while none of the leaders spoke of these as treaty rights. In contrast, four leaders but only one non-leader mentioned the right to education, indicating a greater interest in the acquisition of means to independent achievement, rather than in passive dependence.[3] Significantly one of the leaders declared that Indians had been promised "the right to be helped to help themselves".

Some who were "not satisfied" may have been concerned with protection of treaty rights as a means of preserving their individual status and identity as Indians. However, the implication remains one of dependency, for this concern suggests some awareness that the very preservation of their identity depends on the action of government.

Finally, it must be admitted that concern with preservation

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[3]Ten leaders and 24 non-leaders were asked to identify treaty rights. Thus the proportions mentioning education were 40 per cent and four per cent, respectively.

(as distinct from government protection) of treaty rights need not in itself be a mark of dependency in all cases. Certain rights and privileges (under the treaty or under the Act - the Indians make little or no distinction) appear even to the outside observer to provide present and future opportunities for social and economic advancement which might not otherwise be available. Examples are free higher education, and opportunities to borrow business capital. Therefore concern with treaty rights may reflect rational appraisal of the reserve situation rather than indulgence in retreatist dependency and fantasy.[4] It is impossible to make statements about the precise nature of the relationship between dependency and concern for treaty rights without research into the reasons for concern. However, the foregoing data suggest that there is a rather strong relationship in some cases.

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[4]Table 7 below shows responses to the question: "does it ever worry you that the Indian people may be losing their treaty rights".

Table 7.

	Leaders		Non-leaders	
	No.	%	No.	%
Worried	9	60	13	54
Not worried	6	40	11	46
	N=15	100	N=24	100

Four leaders indicated that they worried about provincial incursions (notably on hunting and trapping rights), or about the band's neglect in protecting its own rights, rather than about neglect by the federal government. There may be a difference between the groups therefore, as to the reasons for being worried.

This may be especially true of the Anglican ("true Indian") faction, since this group showed the strongest dissatisfaction with government protection, and also the strongest dependency orientations in response to other questions.

Perceptions of Personal and Group Powerlessness

The argument has been made that retreatist passivity as described by Hagen is probably associated with self definitions of powerlessness, and with the individual's perception that the group to which he belongs is powerless like himself.

An item designed to test the hypothesis that leaders are more future oriented than non-leaders was included in the interview schedule. It will be argued that negative future orientations reflect perceptions of personal powerlessness, while positive orientations denote different self definitions. Respondents were asked to agree or disagree with the statement that "There isn't much point in worrying about the future, because we never know what it will bring". The results are summarized in Table 8, which shows that more than three-quarters of the non-leaders and only one-third of the leaders agreed with the statement.

Table 8

"There isn't much point in worrying about the future..."

	Leaders		Non-leaders			
			Full Sample		R.C.'s Under 60	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Agree	5	33	19	79	10	77
Disagree	10	67	3	13	3	23
Don't know	0	0	2	8	0	0
	N-15	100	N-24	100	N-13	100

The proportion of non-leaders who agreed remains unchanged when age is controlled, and changes by only two percentage points when controlling both for age and religious affiliation. Four older respondents (80 per cent) and five Anglicans (83 per cent) agreed, while none disagreed in either group. The comments of leaders who disagreed did not suggest that they indulged in passive or ineffectual worrying about the future. On the contrary, for the most part they demonstrated a propensity to establish goals and to plan for future contingencies. Following are some examples:

(1) "If a man plans right, he should expect ... (pause). If he plans for it, he should know what it (the future) will bring".

(2) "I always worry about the future. If I didn't I wouldn't be working on Sunday".

(3) "I disagree. A man <u>should</u> worry. Not to the extent that ... You know what I mean. But It's always good to worry to some extent. Maybe it's o.k. not to worry about bombs dropping the next minute. But no one's going to bring me grub. I've got to do some worrying to keep the pot boiling".

(4) "I disagree with that. I always thought <u>you</u> shaped your future".

Among those who agreed (leaders and non-leaders) were some who volunteered comments such as "I never think of anything ahead of me", and "You can't do anything about it".

Of course there is an element of ambiguity in simple agreement offered without additional comment to indicate the reason for agreeing. It is possible that some individuals agreed because they considered worry ineffectual; if so, a few respondents who are not necessarily lacking in future orientation may be counted in the "Agree" category in Table 8. This ambiguity could have been avoided easily by asking for reasons for agreement, but unfortunately the point was overlooked during field work. However, the nature of the comments we do have indicates that some of those agreeing (including at least one leader) definitely lacked future orientations, and very probably others were similarly unconcerned. Furthermore, there can be little doubt that those who disagreed were demonstrating positive orientations to the future, so that the differential in proportions of leaders and non-leaders who disagreed (67 and 13 per cent, respectively) lends support to the hypothesis that leaders are more future oriented than non-leaders.

Orientation to the future indicates that the individual has some sense of control over his own destiny. He perceives that his environment is in some degree manageable, and defines himself as a person with at least a modicum of power to manage it. For such an individual the future is in part predictable; he probably perceives at some level of consciousness that the world functions according to certain laws or regularities, and not merely according to the caprice of unknown powers. It is reasonable to hypothesize that underlying his future orientation are perceptions similar to those which, as previously noted,

Hagen says typify the innovative personality, notably the perceptions that environmental phenomena form "systems of interacting forces whose action is explainable", and that one must strive to cope with the world.[5] This is not to suggest that simple disagreement with one item permits us to identify an innovative personality, but is merely to say that an orientation to the future bears a relationship to certain other orientations associated with innovative behaviour, and is in fact an essential precondition of innovation.

In contrast, the individual who lacks a future orientation probably feels that he cannot control his destiny.[6] For him the environment is essentially unmanageable; he defines himself not as having power, but as being powerless to resist the forces which surround him. Lack of future orientation is a reflection of passivity, of readiness to permit the environment to act upon the self without making the effort to react in return. As such, it seems to be an element in a constellation of orientations which constitute retreatism. This interpretation may be open to challenge on the ground that negative future orientations are a vestige of traditional culture pre-dating European contact, and hence are not indicative of retreatism. This will be dealt with in a later section.

Table 9 shows responses from 22 rank and file band members who

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[5]Hagen, p. 88. See also above, p. 14.

[6]The comment of one respondent serves to illustrate this point: "I'm a Christian and I trust God to look after me. It gives you peace. You don't have to worry about what happens or where the next meal is coming from".

were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement that "There is no use taking serious problems to the band council, because the band council cannot do anything about them". This item was used, directly and as a basis for probing, to obtain some indication of the extent of alienation from the council, and of the extent to which council was defined as an instrument of autonomous group action.

The perception that council has severely limited autonomy, or none, is of course an indication that it is defined as powerless in its relations with the federal government. It would appear that if the council is defined as powerless then by implication the entire band is so defined, since the council is the group's principal administrative instrument for dealing with the central government.

Table 9

"There is no use taking serious problems to the band council.."

Non-Leaders Only

	Full Sample		R.C.'s Under 60		Anglicans	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Agree	11	50	5	46	4	67
Disagree	6	27	2	18	2	33
Uncertain	5	23	4	36	0	0
	N=22	100	N=11	100	N=6	100

The eleven subjects who agreed were probed to find out why they thought the council could not "do anything". Nine (including four Anglicans) showed their perception of the council's powerlessness vis-a-vis the federal government. Five of these claimed specifically

that the local Indian agent blocked action by the council, and without blaming any individual, three others indicated that the Indian Affairs Branch obstructed action, or disregarded the needs of the people and the requests of their elected representatives. The ninth said that council members were "not well-educated enough" and did not know how to "go through the proper channels", by which he seemed to mean that the council failed to apply appropriate political or legal pressures on the Branch. One of these nine also appeared to blame the general band membership for failing to give the council the support it needed in order to make effective decisions. He said:

> "We don't have one mind here. There are different opinions. People don't want to go to meetings. Only a few people go to meetings. They say 'what's the use, we don't get no help from the government'.... They (council) need the backing of the people. If the people had one goal, then they could do something.

A tenth respondent who agreed also suggested that band apathy weakened the council's position. In a sense it was the entire band, and not just the council, which these individuals seemed to define as powerless; the suggestion was that of a band membership immobilized by general apathy. Another subject seemed to consider that the council was not powerless but that both council and band were lethargic. He said: "The band would have to <u>force</u> the council to do something, but they don't".

In summary, ten out of 22 responses show evidence of perceptions of group powerlessness. Judging by other recorded comments, it is almost certain that others in the sample, notably some who were undecided, entertained similar definitions of the situation.

Six subjects (including three Anglicans) indicated varying

degrees of alienation from council. Most of these defined council as not necessarily powerless, but as lethargic, indifferent, or preoccupied with their own aggrandizement.

These data do not support one of the original hypotheses guiding the field work, namely that band members would tend to be alienated from council. More clearly demonstrated was the prevalence of a sense of group powerlessness, itself a form of alienation, but of alienation from the federal government.

The question asked of ordinary band members to determine perceptions of group autonomy was not appropriate for the leaders; four were themselves councillors and several others, being directors of co-operatives, were in close association with council. Instead, they were asked to agree or disagree with the statement:

> Indian Affairs Branch makes just about all the important decisions for the band, and the band council pretty well has to go along with the Branch decisions, whether it wants to or not.

Table 10 shows the results.

Table 10

"Indian Affairs Branch makes just about all the important decisions.."

Leaders (N=15)

	No.	%
Agree	9	60
Disagree	4	27
Uncertain	2	13
	15	100

Nine subjects agreed with the statement, including three councillors. Of course, not everyone defined the council as powerless in the same degree. Said one councillor: "We become just messengers between the government and the chief (sic). When they tell you to do something you've got to do it". On the other hand, two respondents who agreed perceived a trend to greater autonomy, and did not define the council as completely powerless. Similarly, the "uncertain" subjects thought the council had some power of decision, but perceived that it was limited.

In summary, seven leaders offered strong or unqualified agreement. Assuming that unqualified agreement denotes a strong sense of powerlessness, and assuming that responses to this item can be compared with responses to the item presented to the rank and file, we can say that the proportions of leaders and non-leaders who showed "definite" powerlessness are about the same. Certainly the evidence offered here does not demonstrate any significant difference. However, there is an obvious difference between the two groups in their degree of involvement in political and administrative affairs. Occupation of a leadership role itself suggests that the incumbent perceives himself and his group to have some capacity for autonomy and control. Two of the more prominent leaders showed "powerlessness" in their responses, but it did not prevent their active participation in community affairs. It is just possible that leaders perceive a lesser degree of group powerlessness than non-leaders, but this would have to be tested by further research.

Responses to another item in the interview schedule also seem relevant to the discussion of powerlessness. Included to obtain data

on the extent to which band members defined their group as competent to exercise greater autonomy, this question asked: "Do you think that, in general, the people are ready to take on more responsibility, right now, for managing their own affairs?" Obviously when the group is defined as competent it is perceived as capable of exercising some measure of control, and presumably where it is defined otherwise, the group is perceived as essentially powerless.

The results in Table 11 suggest that the leaders tend to be slightly more confident of the band's ability than do non-leaders.[7]

Table 11

"Do you think...the people are ready to take on more responsibility...?"

	Leaders		Non-leaders			
			Full Sample		R.C.'s Under 60	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Yes	9	60	11	46	7	54
No	3	20	9	37	3	23
Doubtful Uncertain	3	20	4	17	3	23
	N=15	100	N=24	100	N=13	100

While the difference is not great, it remains in the predicted direction when age and religious affiliation are controlled. Catholics over age 60 showed the least confidence, with one affirmative and four negative

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[7]The table shows that nine leaders replied affirmatively but does not show that 11 leaders thought the band council which was then in office was capable of greater responsibility.

responses. Anglican responses were three affirmative, two negative, and one doubtful. Several rank and file subjects in particular showed little conviction in responding affirmatively, and seemed scarcely more confident of the band membership's ability than some of those classed as "uncertain".

Of the 11 non-leaders who thought the people were ready for more responsibility, 10 were asked: "Exactly what things do you think they should take over now, and manage themselves?" Five could offer no opinion, four suggested the people could do more for themselves in the economic sphere (particularly in farming, fishing, and manufacture of handicrafts) and one said they could take over management of schools on the reserve. Setting aside the possibility that some failed to understand the question,[8] it appears that those who had no opinion had not given much previous thought to the question of band autonomy; the suggestion is that they lacked conviction about the band's competence and were essentially indifferent toward the matter.

The leaders were not asked to say what the band should "take over", but in the course of formal and informal interviewing, a number mentioned spontaneously several economic or administrative activities and projects which they though might be undertaken. Among these were a charcoal manufacturing plant, a fishing co-operative, a sewing

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[8] If failure to understand the question were a significant factor we might expect those with no opinion to show a lower level of educational achievement, but this is not the case. The average number of years of schooling was six for subjects having no opinion, and 4.2 for those having opinions.

factory, a canning factory, a sawmill, construction of houses, and expansion of farming operations. Leaders also thought that local Indians could manage or participate more in the management of a number of public administration functions. These included control of band funds, control of liquor and motor vehicle traffic on the reserve, school administration and enforcement of game laws among Indians.

Apathy

Apathy, defined as indifference toward social and economic issues and activities in the community, was evident in a variety of ways.

Subjects in the sample of ordinary band members were asked several questions intended to gauge their interest in band affairs. Table 12 summarizes answers to the question: "Do you ever go to band meetings?" The table separates those who replied "Yes" from those who qualified their affirmative responses by saying that they "sometimes" attended meetings, or attended "seldom" (or "not very much").

Table 12

"Do you ever go to band meetings?"

	Full Sample	Catholics Over 60	Anglicans Under 60
Yes	7	2	1
Sometimes	3	2	1
Seldom	8	1	2
No	6	0	2
	N= 24	N= 5	N= 6

Fourteen respondents (58 per cent) said they seldom or never attended

meetings, and only two claimed regular attendance.[9] As might be expected from other data, the Anglicans showed less inclination to attend meetings than did others in the sample. The one Anglican who indicated that he went to all band meetings said:

> "They very seldom have band meetings.[10] Whenever they do I go and listen to their bullshit, but nothing ever comes out of that.... From the Anglican church west, three-quarters of the people are half-breeds. They have a chief and council, but we get nothing up here".

A further question asked respondents when they last went to a band meeting. Even those who previously had said they never went to meetings indicated in response to this question that they had attended at one time or another. Table 13 shows that half of the rank and file subjects had not been to a band meeting for at least one year. Those in the "four months" category reported attending a meeting the previous spring. Apparently this was the annual meeting when treaty payments were made, hence the relatively high frequency of responses in this category.

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[9] As mentioned earlier, councillors estimated that normal attendance at band meetings was about 30 or at the most 40 persons. Other factors besides apathy may have contributed to low attendance, including those mentioned on p. 37.

[10] It seems true that band meetings were not held regularly. Some leaders said they were supposed to be held monthly. During the period of field work, one regular meeting was held, and one special meeting open to the band public was called to discuss reorganization of the local school committee.

Table 13

Approximate Time Elapsed Since Attendance at Last Band Meeting.

	Full Sample	Catholics Over 60	Anglicans Unger 60
One month*	5	1	1
Two months	2	1	-
Four months	5	-	1
One year	3	1	1
Two years	4	-	1
Three years	2	2	-
Six years	1	-	1
Twelve years	1	-	1
Don't know	1	-	-
	N=24	N=5	N=6

*Refer to the most recent meeting.

Twenty subjects were asked if they ever voted in band elections. Seventeen claimed they had voted at least once, and three (two Anglicans and one Catholic aged 21) said they had never voted. At first glance this might seem to indicate a very high rate of participation in band elections, but the results must be compared with other available data on voting behaviour. Forty-five per cent of eligible voters cast ballots in the band election of 1962. The percentages were 32 in 1960, and 25 in 1954, indicating that interest in band politics was growing. But there is another viewpoint to consider. From all reports, the establishment of the first co-operative in 1962 precipitated one of the greatest community controversies in years. The co-operative was the central issue in the election of that year and caused, apparently for the first time, the polarization of candidates into two opposing camps. Opponents of the co-operative proclaimed the imminent threat to treaty

rights posed by the movement. They denounced the co-operative as a menace to democratic processes. The fact that 55 per cent of eligible voters did not participate in so momentous an election is itself suggestive of widespread apathy in the community.

Rank and file respondents were asked to name the co-operatives operating on the reserve. When this proved too difficult (as it did in most cases) they were asked to say how many co-operatives there were.

Table 14

"How many co-ops are on the reserve?"

	Full Sample	Catholics Over 60	Anglicans Under 60
One	12	4	5
Two	3	-	1
Three	3	-	-
Over three	1	-	-
Don't know, Uncertain	3	1	-
	N=22	N=5	N=6

Table 14 shows that only three respondents knew there were three co-operatives. Most were aware of the pulpwood organization, which of course had been established for two years. The Agriculture Co-operative had been established for five or six months, while the Wild Rice Co-operative had been operating only a month or six weeks, before most respondents were interviewed. On the other hand, as the latest child of the movement, the latter organization was currently in the limelight. Rice picking was in progress at the time of interviewing, and the principal oponents of co-operatives were at that moment directing

their strongest verbal attacks against the rice operation. In spite of this, only five subjects showed an awareness that the Rice Co-operative existed. Several seemed to think that all collective economic activities on the reserve came under the direction of a single organization, most often perceived to be the Pulpwood Co-operative.

There are still other indications of apathy in the data presented earlier to demonstrate the existence of passive orientations. In the discussion of group powerlessness we saw that of ten non-leaders who thought the band was ready for more responsibility, five were unable to offer any opinion as to precisely what the band should be responsible for.[11] Of the five who did offer opinions, four mentioned the desirability of one or another means to greater economic self-determination, while only one showed any awareness of a need for greater political or administrative autonomy. These data suggest rather widespread indifference to the question of more self-government for the band.

The preservation of treaty rights appeared to be a rather important issue on the reserve, and for some band members it seemed to be a major preoccupation. Time and again Indians were heard to express concern about provincial threats to their hunting and trapping privileges, and the way in which the co-operatives were perceived to threaten treaty rights has been discussed.

Sixteen non-leaders in the sample either "worried" about the loss of treaty rights, were "not satisfied" with government protection

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[11] See Table 11, page 89, and text, page 90.

of treaty rights, or were both worried and not satisfied.[12] Of this number, seven could not name any treaty rights, real or imagined. At the same time that these individuals professed concern with the issue, their lack of knowledge indicated essential indifference or apathy. That this was a widespread phenomenon was suggested by the chief, who said: "Nobody knows what treaty rights they have, but they all talk as if they knew". Parenthetically, people who are worried and dissatisfied without knowing what they are worried and dissatisfied about may be exhibiting the kind of diffuse anxiety which Hagen associates with retreatism.

Unfortunately a full set of comparable data is not available for the leadership group. Ten leaders were asked to name treaty rights; seven did so, two dismissed the treaty as meaningless or incomprehensible, and one gave a simple "don't know" response. All six "worried" leaders who were asked the question were able to name treaty rights.

Further evidence suggestive of apathy came to light when leaders and non-leaders were asked to identify "some of the problems facing the people on the reserve today". Those who named one or more problems were asked: "And what do you think is the most important problem?" Individuals who experienced difficulty with these questions were probed ("Well, what do you think the people need most for a better life?"). Many respondents spontaneously mentioned a variety of social and economic conditions which they defined as problems; Table 15 shows those which

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[12] See Table 6, p. 77, and table 7, p. 80.

were mentioned by two or more respondents without prompting by the interviewer. The table does not include problems mentioned or implied in response to other questions.

Table 15

"Important Problems" Identified Most Frequently

	Leaders* (No. 16)	Non-leaders (No. 24)
Unemployment (general).....	10	8
Lack of jobs "on the reserve".....	4	2
Lack of capital for private enterprise ..	2	5
Lack of housing.....	1	4
Mill pollutes river.....	2	1
Lack of education.....	5	3
Lack of co-operation within band.....	4	2
People too dependent on government.....	2	1
Heavy drinking.....	2	3
Families waste money.....	3	-
Broken homes.....	2	-
Child neglect.....	2	-
Need for self-direction.....	2	-
Unsatisfactory management of co-ops.....	-	2
No response (cannot identify any problems)	-	8

* No. is 16 because one leader who was not interviewed formally was nevertheless asked this same question in the course of an informal (unstructured) interview.

For the moment we focus attention on the "No Response" category noting that eight subjects, or one-third of the random sample, were unable to identify any community problems without prompting, despite the fact that the question was carefully introduced prior to the commencement of each interview, and was repeated or re-phrased for those who had difficulty with it. Of the eight, six gave "don't know" responses and two were unable to suggest anything but their own personal problems.

The average educational level for these respondents (4.6 years) was about one year below the sample average. While inability to understand or to articulate may have been factors influencing the high rate of failure to respond, it is true nevertheless that all subjects showed these abilities in some degree when replying to other questions. An equally plausible explanation may be that individuals who failed to respond appropriately were too apathetic, too indifferent to band affairs, to have given much previous thought to anything beyond their own immediate personal problems.

All members of the leadership group were able to identify community problems. It seems evident that simply by virtue of their involvement in the management of band affairs, the leaders would be less apathetic (and more knowledgeable) than ordinary band members. Of course those classed as leaders exhibited varying degrees of involvement and commitment, and we have seen that some showed signs of retreatist orientations. A few appeared to be leaders in only a nominal way, so that it is perhaps not entirely unmeaningful to compare the two groups with respect to awareness of community problems.

Other Indications of Retreatism

We have suggested that withdrawal from a social environment perceived as threatening, including withdrawal of commitment to personal and group goals, is virtually synonymous with retreatism. Withdrawal seems to be implicit in dependency orientations of the type previously discussed, and is likewise indicated, at least indirectly, where there is evidence of apathy. It has also been suggested that alienation from

the group and from the dominant society and its agents may be viewed as correlates of withdrawal. With these considerations in mind, it is worth turning again to the table of "important problems" identified by members of the band,[13] looking at the "Lack of Co-operation" category.

Table 15 indicates that four leaders and two non-leaders identified lack of co-operation among band members as an important community problem. In fact, this does not show by any means the full extent to which lack of co-operation was perceived; in the course of interviewing, no less than 12 subjects (seven leaders and five non-leaders) spoke of the failure of band members to work together toward common goals. Four respondents suggested this was the community's most important problem. Their comments suggested that mutual hostility, suspicion, and apathy were the principal reasons for failure to co-operate. Following are some examples, the first two from leaders and the remaining four from non-leaders:

(1) "The biggest problem is within ourselves. If we want to go ahead we must encourage one another to work with one another. If a man wants to work, there are people who will delay him and talk against him. Whether it should be taught in school for us people to work together better, I don't know.
Interviewer: "Why don't they co-operate more?"
Respondent: "We live too much in bunches. We.... we aren't enough concerned with sports.... More sports would be the thing".

(2) "Unity (is a problem).... We have to treat our people like eggs - carefully. If you twist them too much they'll break. The people were cheated too much in the past so they couldn't even trust each other".
Interviewer: "Like eggs?"
Respondent: "Yes. You may lose their trust. If something went wrong they'd...." (withdraw)

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[13] See Table 15, p. 97.

(3) "We're all mixed up. No one wants to help one another. That's a problem we got here". And again, the same respondent (who himself had not been to a band meeting in 12 years): "We don't have one mind here.... people don't want to go to meetings. Only a few people go to band meetings. They say 'what's the use, we don't get no help from the government'".

(4) "They (band members) should get together more. Each has his own way of pulling. They don't go to meetings. Only the chief and council seem to know what's going on. The rest haven't got any idea of anything. I guess we need more organization".

(5) Said in rejecting the idea that Indians should manage more of their own affairs: "The Indian wouldn't help his own people. He'd say 'the hell with them' and walk off".

(6) "Last year the co-op didn't do very well. Poor management".
Interviewer: "By the Indians?"
Respondent: "Yes. Without helping each other it's pretty hard to start something. I've been talking to my neighbours about getting something started, farming, but...."
Interviewer: "No co-operation?"
Respondent: "Yes, no co-operation. And if they do start something, one guy backs out, then another, and they start breaking up".

Together, these comments portray a community where interpersonal and intergroup relations are characterized by mutual suspicion and hostility, and where collective activities, economic and social, are inhibited by pervasive apathy, withdrawal, and lack of commitment to group goals. Implied in response (1), and in similar comments from other informants, is the rejection of personal economic goals and of associated Euro-Canadian values; those who "talk against" the man who "wants to work" do not value economic advancement for themselves.[14] Response (2), "the people were cheated too much in the past so they couldn't even trust each other", even indicates a perception of how

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[14]Several other respondents said that Indians who "don't want to work" tend to "look down" on those who wish to improve their own economic circumstances.

retreatist orientations might have been implanted, a perception which in itself offers some support to Hagen's theory of the origins of retreatism. Implied in the perception that one has been continuously cheated is the perception that one is the object of continued disparagement and ill regard.

In responding to several questions designed to probe attitudes toward the co-operative movement,[15] thirteen ordinary band members expressed varying degrees of doubt, suspicion and hostility toward the co-operatives' directors, often combined with pessimism regarding their chances of successful operation in the future. The following quotations serve to illustrate:

(1) "They(re trying to make some money for I don't know who".
Interviewer: "What do you mean?"
Respondent: "The guys who work there have a hold-back on them. They hold back so much a cord on you and you don't know where that money goes at the end of the season".

(2) "The shareholders....pay so much to get in and get the cream.... It's a pretty sneaky outfit. I told them it'd never make the grade. Same with rice picking....It's just a racket".

(3) "We need employment. Some people think the (pulpwood) co-op will do it. But the people who run it don't know much about the bush. They do it the hard way....If they had good men running it it'd be all right. I feel sorry for them".

(4) "They're trying to help the Indians, but they're not.
Interviewer: "Why not?"
Respondent: "The white people will get the benefit".
Interviewer: "How?"
Respondent: "The Indian gets a little bit for cutting pulp, it goes to the mill and the mill gets the real profit".

(5) "It's not big enough yet to do any harm. If the co-op gets too big it'll run everything on the reserve. Then the white men will run it".

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[15] Appendix II, Items 16 to 19 in the interview schedule.

(6) "This co-op should be run by white man. Indians can't run it, but they're trying to".

While the third response offers inefficient management as the reason for the co-operatives' unpromising future, the fifth reveals the curious perception that success itself might lead to unwanted results. Responses (4) and (5) reflect perceptions of group powerlessness; by implication the band is defined as helpless vis-a-vis economic predators in the larger society.

While a sense of inferiority is implicit in any self definition of powerlessness, response (6) makes it explicit. There were other signs of Indians perceiving themselves as inferior; one band member offered the suggestion that "Indians are stupid", and a white informant reported hearing other Indians voice the same opinion. Some leaders spoke of the Indian's need for help and guidance, of how the Indian was prone to become discouraged and confused, depicting the group with which they identified themselves as backward, childlike, and unable to cope.

Derogatory self definitions reveal alienation from the self. They are almost certainly a mark of retreatism, for they suggest the lowering of expectations for satisfaction in life, and abandonment of the effort to cope with the world. Derogatory definitions of the group in which the definer finds his own identity indirectly reveal derogatory perceptions of the self, while at the same time, in the form outlined above, they function to absolve the band of responsibility for its own plight.

It seems reasonable to infer that individuals who are pessimistic

about the co-operatives have projected their own low expectations for satisfaction on to the group. Apparently for some band members, suspicion perpetuates a conspiratorial myth about the co-operatives, and functions with pessimism as an excuse not to become involved. These orientations may underly such comments as "I don't know nothing about them and I wouldn't want to know".

Most respondents who showed alienation from the co-operatives likewise showed evidence of apathy, dependency, and powerlessness. Anglicans were the most alienated, five of the six exhibiting rather strong antagonism or mistrust. Although they constituted only 25 per cent of the sample, Anglicans accounted for 38 per cent of those who showed some degree of alienation. This suggests a rough correlation between alienation from the co-operative movement and retreatism, since the Anglicans also showed a generally higher rate of dependency, powerlessness, and apathy than the rest.

One further dimension of alienation remains to be mentioned - alienation from the federal government. Here we have comparative data for leaders and non-leaders, based on agreement or disagreement with the statement that "the government in Ottawa has shown many times that it does not keep its promises to the Indian people". The results, set down in Table 16, are in the predicted direction when age and religious affiliation are controlled. All the Anglicans and four of the five elderly respondents agreed with the statement. Two leaders thought that any blame for broken promises must fall on individual local officials rather than on the bureaucracy itself. One ordinary band member volunteered a similar opinion, but without completely absolving

the government of blame. Criticism of local officials was heard rather frequently in the course of interviewing, and is also mentioned in discussing perceptions of group powerlessness.[16]

Table 16

"The government in Ottawa ... does not keep its promise..."

	Leaders		Non-leaders.			
			Full Sample		R.C.'s Under 60	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Agree	6	43	18	75	8	62
Disagree	5	36	2	8	2	15
Don't know, Undecided	3	21	4	17	3	23
	N=14	100	N=24	100	N=13	100

Value Conflict

The point was made earlier that attitudes of hostile dependency may be indicative of value conflict. In the context of an Indian reservation, the individual displaying such an attitude is hostile toward the government at the same time that he feels dependent on the government. He feels, as we have seen, that the government has not kept its promises, has not "lived up to the treaty". He perceives himself the member of a group which has been unjustly treated and exploited. Since he cannot conceive that anyone who respected his people would exploit them, he

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[16] See p. 86.

perceives that his group is not respected but disparaged. In similar ways he perceives disparagement by the whole of white society. Even whites who strive to establish cordial relations are defined as disparagers if cordiality is perceived to carry the taint of condescension, for the Indian's whole life experience has sensitized him to condescension. Government paternalism, however benevolent, carries the implication of disparagement, for it suggests that Indians are defined as incapable of knowing what is best for themselves.

The Indian is hostile, then, in part because he feels disparaged. Hostility expresses his rejection of the low regard in which he is held by the dominant group. He rejects the definition which this group holds of him, for of course to do otherwise would be to accept an ungratifying self definition. In rejecting the opinion of the dominant group he feels compelled to reject its values for to accept them would be a threat to his own identity.

However, politically and economically, the Indian finds himself in a position where he can scarcely avoid placing some value on the opinion of the dominant group, nor can he avoid accepting some of the values it disseminates. That group has power, and controls the resources and facilities which he values and needs for his comfort and even his livelihood. Really to reject them is impossible, for he must depend on the dominant group in some measure, whether he wants to or not. He can only claim not to value their opinion, or struggle against accepting it with only limited success. That he does not always succeed is shown by his occasional overt acknowledgement of the validity of the derogatory

definitions others hold of him. He comes to believe about himself the worst that the whites could believe about him, that "Indians are stupid" and "can't run the co-ops". No better evidence could be found to illustrate value conflict, or to show that even Indians who are most withdrawn do in fact look upon the dominant society as a reference group.[17]

In summary, the Indian values a gratifying self definition and at the same time he values the benevolence of those whom he perceives to be his disparagers, but in Hagen's words, he "cannot pursue one and still have the other".[18] It is in this sense that we may speak of hostile dependency as denoting a conflict of values.

Some evidence of hostile dependency already has been presented. It may be inferred from agreement with the statement that "...the Indian has a right to expect the white man to share some of his wealth" (Table 3),[19] and it is noteworthy that 27 per cent of leaders and 83 per cent of non-leaders were in full agreement with this. Again,

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[17]Hagen discusses hostile dependency among the Sioux, but his concept of its origin differs somewhat from that hypothesized above, being couched in psychoanalytic terms. (See Hagen
Other writers also have noted in Indians the simultaneous existence of hostile and dependent attitudes towards white authority. See, for example, A.F.C. Wallace, "Some Psychological Determinants of Culture Change in an Iroquois Community", Symposiom on Local Diversity in Iroquois Culture, ed. by W.N. Fenton, Washington: Smithsonian Institution, Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 149, 1951, pp. 59-76.

[18]Hagen, p. 186

[19]See above p. 72.

hostile dependency seems indicated by those who were "not satisfied" with government protection of treaty rights (Table 6);[20] more than 40 per cent of subjects in the random sample fell in this category. Furthermore, it has been shown that 75 per cent of the sample showed alienation from the government in response to one question (Table 16),[21] while 92 per cent showed straightforward dependency in response to another (Table 4).[22] With such high percentages of response in both categories, it goes without saying that a large proportion of subjects demonstrated both hostility and dependency in answering these questions. Bearing in mind the apparent relationship between hostile dependency and value conflict discussed above we may say therefore that there was much indirect evidence of value conflict in the community.[23]

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[20] See above p. 77.

[21] See above p. 104.

[22] See above p. 74.

[23] We may hypothesize that hostile dependency feeds on itself. It seems probable that each time the individual accepts help from his disparagers his self image is further tarnished and hostility consequently becomes intensified. As hostility mounts, he thinks that his disparagers owe him more and more by way of compensation - he becomes correspondingly more dependent. Probably at some point in the cycle the sense of diminished personal worth is repressed; the conflicted individual convinces himself that whatever he can get from the government is his right, and an exploitative attitude develops. Whatever its psychological origins, there was evidence that such an attitude was widespread in the community. The Indian agent, recently arrived on the reserve, said that Indians repeatedly tried to "make a mark of him". He told how Indians came directly from picking rice (normally a highly profitable activity) to ask for relief. When challenged, they admitted having money and explained that "'We just thought we'd ask anyway'". The chief said there was a widespread notion that "the more you can get out of your agent the better man you are", and added that "it's hard even to get the councillors not to think just about getting things out of the agent".

Other more direct observations of value conflicts were made, although not in any systematic, comparative way which would justify the conclusion that members of one group were more conflicted than members of another. Value conflict seemed to be evident in certain inconsistencies in the responses of individuals. For example, several ordinary band members rejected the idea that Indians should manage more of their own affairs,[24] then said in response to the next question that their people were ready for more autonomy immediately. The latter response indicates either that these subjects defined their groups as competent to perform more autonomously, or that they wanted the group to be so defined by outsiders. In either case, it would seem that the capacity for autonomous group performance was valued even while dependency was valued.

Similarly, half a dozen rank and file subjects showed strong dependency orientations, but also spoke of the need for "equipment" (frequently farming equipment was mentioned) which would enable them to be self-supporting. In effect, these respondents were saying that the government had a duty to look after them, and at the same time that they would like to look after themselves but lacked the necessary means. Significantly, in most cases the government was explicitly or implicitly blamed for not giving them equipment. Other band members who appeared less dependent also mentioned the need for equipment; no doubt some of these genuinely wished to be self-supporting and perhaps considered it the government's duty to "help them to help themselves".

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[24]See Table 5, p. 76.

However, it is suggested that where strong dependency orientations were evident,[25] most complaints about lack of equipment probably provided an excuse for inertia and reflected an essential conflict between dependency and autonomy as values. The comments of one respondent, more eloquent than some of the others, will serve to illustrate this point:

> "They (the government) don't give us nothing. No equipment to get started on farming. We got nothing to start with.... My father knows the treaty rights right down A to Z. The government promised the people it would help them like we help our own kids. To give us hens, cows, and other animals. To give us what the white man has--two of each animal. To help them and feed them like the Queen's own children. To give them equipment to get a start, and clothe them each year. As long as the sun shines and the river flows the Queen will look after the people and not give them any firewater or allow firewater on reserves. There were a lot of promises".

It is noteworthy that this respondent's evident aspiration to be self-supporting conflicts with his perception that the government should clothe and feed him. His perceptions seem to typify those of a significant proportion of the band population, and will be used as a basis for the discussion which follows.

We have seen before that other band members also defined themselves as "children" (or as child-like).[26] These self definitions are congruent with the value attached to maintaining a dependent position in life. Apparently they conform to cultural values which have developed under conditions of life on the reserve, to values which

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[25]The basic criterion of "strong dependency" is agreement with Items 5 and 9 in the interview schedule (see Tables 3 and 4, pp. 72 and 74 and Appendix II). For examples of other responses indicative of strong dependency, see text, p. 77.

[26]See above pp 74 and 102.

might be called "reservation traditional". At the same time, people like the respondent just quoted apparently aspire to defining themselves, and to being defined, as independent and self-supporting. However, to acquire such an identity requires rejection of the value placed on dependency in the reservation traditional culture, and acceptance of opposing values corresponding to those of the dominant culture. These latter values appear to be partially accepted already, otherwise there would be no conflict. But full acceptance would involve identifying the self with a dominant group perceived as threatening and depriving, and a corresponding withdrawal from the familiar reference group which retains the values traditional to the reservation culture.

For individuals thus conflicted, one mode of adaptation may be to "retreat into fantasy"[27] cloaking the treaty in an aura of myth and convincing themselves that they could be self-supporting if only they "had equipment" which the Queen had promised to give them. It seems possible that in more extreme cases, these preoccupations may not be too far removed from those found in Melanesian cargo cults.

No doubt preoccupation with the need for farm machinery and other forms of equipment was in part realistic, but in part it seemed to afford a justification for doing nothing. Apparently little use was made of such farm equipment as the government did provide. One leader thought that many people could buy equipment if they saved their money and spent less on alcohol. "They have the opportunity to have equipment and make more money if they want to", he said.

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[27]Hagen, p. 214

Four cases of apparent value conflict in leaders will be discussed. It is noteworthy that all were co-operative directors who were related to one another and to Jake Favreau[28] the principal opponent of the co-operative movement, and that at some point Jake apparently had managed to influence at least three of them. The point was made earlier that value conflict seemed indicated where an individual switched his allegiance back and forth from one to another of two opposing groups, one committed to social change and the other to maintaining the status quo. The first two cases will illustrate this mode of behaviour.

Case 1

Paul Favreau, a cousin of Jake, was a member of the Agriculture Co-operative's board of directors. Paul was in the throes of indecision during the time of field work. Both Indian and white informants said that he had quit and rejoined the co-operative a number of times, and that Jake had tried repeatedly to influence him. When I interviewed him formally, Paul was undergoing a phase of allegiance to the movement, and spoke as one who had experienced a kind of conversion which had left him intensely committed to co-operative principles. He mentioned repeatedly that he had once been blind to the worth of co-operatives, and spoke contritely of his former opposition. Here are a few of his comments:

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[28] As mentioned on p. 37, "Favreau" is a pseudonym for the largest extended kin group on the reserve. The Favreaus were substantially over-represented in the leadership group relative to their proportion of the reserve's population.

> "At first I was against the co-ops. Didn't realize what I was bucking. I just couldn't see it. But I found out. As long as they don't jeopardize my treaty rights, I'm in favour of co-ops....
>
> Mr. -- (the development officer) is a good man. He knows his business. If I'd done it right away (joined the co-op) he'd have nothing to do today.... But I see now things are going to go smooth".

Asked if he thought the co-operatives were being successful in providing employment for band members, Paul made an interesting response. He changed the subject to talk about how much Jake had done to find jobs for band members: "I must give credit to one man. Not because he's a Favreau or anything, but he did a lot to give employment . He went to the mill and persuaded them to give the people jobs".

Not many days later another leader hinted that Paul was thinking of resigning once more. However, he did not resign during the remaining few weeks of field work. Paul's own comments suggest a good deal about his divided loyalties. Clearly his kinship with the "leader of the opposition", together with his own orientation to preservation of the status quo (as manifested in his expression of concern for treaty rights) conflicted with an opposing "progressive" orientation which he also entertained. Like so many other Indians on the reserve, he appeared to entertain some mistrust of the provincial government. This suggests that he perceived derogation by the provincial authority and that he rejected the values which it sought to disseminate among Indians (he specifically rejected the provincial electoral franchise for Indians). At the same time, his leadership role required him to be a party to accepting provincial assistance in establishing and operating the co-operative. Hence one of his role requirements was the acceptance

of values disseminated by the provincial authority.

Case 2

Percy Favreau, cousin to Paul and to Jake, was a councillor and member of the Pulp Co-operative board since its formation. He was known to have had difficulty in reconciling himself to some of the ways whereby he thought the co-operative movement might be a threat to his people. Informants said that he too was influenced by Jake to the point of resigning in the middle of the pulping season, and going on an extended alcoholic binge. According to one informant, his colleagues had had to "go and dry him out" and in the process, persuade Percy once again that the co-operatives were neither a threat to treaty rights nor to the democratic processes of band decision making. It is suggested that by going on an extended drinking spree, Percy exhibited a mode of adaptation to conflict that was classically retreatist. On the other hand, with the help of one or two fellow Indian leaders he was apparently able to resolve his conflict, overcame its immobilizing effect, and resumed his leadership role. He showed little or no indication of internal conflict when interviewed.

Case 3

Alec Favreau, brother to Percy and cousin to Jake, was a recently appointed member of the Pulp Co-operative's board of directors. There was no evidence that he had been a strong opponent of the co-operative movement before joining the leadership group, or that he had made any shifts of allegiance. However, he did reveal both his respect for the

opinion of the "leader of the opposition" and his own uncertainty regarding the co-operative movement. After being formally interviewed he said:

> "You oughta ask Jake Favreau those questions. He's read up on the treaty and studied a lot of these things, and he's probably the only guy around here who could answer them. A lot of what Jake says is true. He says the co-ops may hurt the treaty rights. I've got no education, and don't know nothing about these things".

It is worth noting that Alec was one of the "nominal" leaders; while classified as a member of the elite by virtue of his board membership, he was outside the locus of decision making. His marginal position is demonstrated by the fact that, like most of the non-leaders interviewed, he thought there was only one co-operative on the reserve.

Case 4

Martin Favreau, brother of Jake, underwent initial "conversion" to the movement during the time of field work. When I first met him, he had just been persuaded to join the Rice Co-operative board, then in process of formation. A member of the band council and one of the most active supporters of the co-operative movement said that Martin had been persuaded to join precisely because he was opposed; by co-opting him other leaders sought to reduce resistance among his relatives. The method of co-optation apparently was to elect Martin in absentia, on the theory that when told of his election, Martin would be so gratified at the prospect of occupying a prestigious office that he would not refuse. This strategy seemed to work.

During an informal interview, Martin confirmed that initially he had opposed the movement because it was a "new thing", but now he

had changed his views. Speaking like a true convert, he expressed enthusiasm for the Wild Rice Co-operative and high hopes for its future.

However, there were indications that he was experiencing some measure of internal conflict, or at least that the seeds of conflict were implanted. He expressed strong distrust of the provincial government at the same time that he was relying on that government to assist in establishing the new co-operative. The province was enforcing the game laws against Indians, he said, and this was contrary to the meaning of the treaty. Speculating about the motives of provincial authorities, he wondered if they disliked Indians, or if they had no concern for Indian rights, or if they were trying deliberately to nullify the treaty. Despite his apparent fear and mistrust, Martin was directly involved in negotiating with the provincial government in order to establish the new co-operative. At the time of being interviewed, he was engaged with other leaders in plans to meet with provincial authorities to discuss the leasing of rice lakes, to obtain a provincial charter, and to seek the advice and assistance of provincial co-operative experts. He was, in effect, showing acceptance of the values of those whom he perceived to be his disparagers.

Some weeks later Martin was again interviewed. He remained a convert, and showed no sign of "backsliding". He too apparently had resolved whatever conflict he must have experienced, for he spoke in glowing terms of how he personally had benefited by assuming an active role in the movement. He had, he said, "picked quite a lot of knowledge up . How to face a big room full of people. I learned why

you musn't play favourites. I've learned to think beyond the needs of one reserve — as a Canadian".

In conclusion, it may be said that the bulk of the evidence of value conflict in leaders pertained to the roles they played in the co-operative movement. They had to cope with a provincial administration perceived as threatening, and strove to reconcile their rejection of certain values disseminated by the province with their acceptance of other values disseminated by the same authority. Through their kinship affiliations, and no doubt in other ways as well, a number of leaders were under great pressure to conform to values traditional to the reservation culture. Individually, they undertook to reject the values of a familiar reference group and to identify themselves with new reference groups, both on the reserve and in the larger society. The case histories suggest that some leaders accomplished this at both the community and societal levels.

On the reserve, the new leadership group was itself a reference group, providing its members with protection, reassurance, and confirmation of their values in the face of pressure to conform to the old values. Without the protection of the group, Percy Favreau (Case 2) might not have returned to the seat on the co-operative board which he had resigned. In the larger society, other groups almost certainly consituted reference groups for the leaders. For some these appear to have included the federal government itself, for several leaders, far from showing alienation, were ready to co-operate with government officials,£valued their good opinion, and showed confidence in their motives and performance. The leaders were not unaware of

successful co-operative enterprises in the surrounding society, and in a sense these would constitute reference groups as well. More abstractly others may have found a reference group in the larger society as a whole; we recall that Martin Favreau (Case 4) had "learned to think beyond the needs of one reserve -- as a Canadian".

Comparing Distributions of Retreatist Orientations - A Scaling Procedure.

Comparative data have been presented which suggest differential distribution in the groups under study of certain cognitive and evaluative orientations associated with retreatism. It may be helpful to summarize some of these comparisons, using an impromptu scaling procedure which suggests itself from the nature of the data. The object is not to attempt construction of a "retreatism scale", but to present a few carefully selected categories of response which can then be treated as if they were items in a scale. The effort should at least permit us to bring into sharper focus and compare more concisely the differences observed. Considering only those items in the interview schedule for which we have adequate comparable data for the majority of leaders and non-leaders, we find respondents who fall into one or more of the categories shown in Table 17, page 119. Only those subjects for whom there are complete data in all categories are counted in the table.

Clearly, these categories cannot be said to constitute items in a scale for measuring retreatism. A scale should consist of a set of items which, taken together, form points on a continuum with respect to

some variable.[29] The variable being considered here is retreatism, conveived as itself consisting of several component variables. This along is enough to make any attempt at scale construction hazardous, for we seem to be dealing with a series of discrete but interrelated continuaa, rather than a single continuum. But even if a single continuum were assumed, the categories in Table 17 present still further difficulties for they do not constitute a series of discrete items. There are four categories suggestive of some degree of dependency (or a mixture of dependency and hostility), and two which indicate perceptions of group powerlessness. This overlapping presents analytical difficulties. If, for example, several items are selected as indicators of dependency, then consistently "dependent" responses from one subject would give him a "retreatism score" considerably higher than that of an "independent" subject whose responses are equally consistent but in the other direction. We do not know that either dependency or perceptions of group powerlessness are more important factors than any of the others being considered; therefore, there is little justification for using several items to indicate one factor and only one item to indicate another.

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[29] W.J. Goode and P.K. Hatt, Methods in Social Research, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1952. pp. 232-234.

Table 17

Comparative Summary of Responses Suggestive of Retreatist Orientations

Responses.	Leaders (N=14)	Non-leaders (N=22)
1. Cannot identify any community problems (suggests apathy, indifference).	0	7
2. Agrees without qualification that government does not keep its promises to Indians (defines self as member of an exploited, and therefore, disparaged group).	5	18
3. Worries about losing treaty rights (suggests concern with preserving Indian identity and maintaining dependent status).	8	12
4. Not satisfied with protection of treaty rights (suggests hostile dependency toward government).	2	10
5. Agrees without qualification that whites should share riches of land that once belonged to Indians (suggest hostile dependency toward white society generally)	4	18
6 Disagrees there is need for more band autonomy, or displays marked uncertainty, ambivalence (suggests dependency - lack of commitment to collective goals)	0	7
7. Lacks future orientation (defines self as powerless, unable to exercise control over own destiny).	5	17
8. Says man should "work 8 hours and enjoy life" (suggests negative orientation to work, lack of commitment to economic goals).	10	14

Table 17 Cont'd

	Leaders (N=14)	Non-leaders (N=22)
9. Defines band council as powerless (suggests sense of group powerlessness)	7	10
10. Doubts band is ready for more autonomy (suggests sense of group powerlessness).	5	9

Note: Because this table includes only subjects for whom there are complete data in all categories, the enumerations differ slightly from those in previous tables.

Certain items can be deleted to meet the problem of overlapping, and others omitted because they may be less clearly indicative of retreatist perceptions and orientations. After drastic pruning, the following items remain to constitute what will be called, for want of a better name, our "retreatism scale".

1. Cannot identify any community problem (shows apathy, indifference toward conditions affecting self and group).
2. Agrees without qualification that government does not keep its promises to Indians (defines own group as disparaged, exploited).
3. Agrees without qualification that whites should share riches (shows hostile dependency toward white society generally).
4. Lacks future orientation (shows personal powerlessness).
5. Defines band council as powerless (shows group powerlessness).

We can assign a score of one to each subject each time his response is recorded in one of the five categories, so that the maximum score for any subject is five. Summing the scores for each subject yields the following table:

Table 18

Number of Leaders and Non-Leaders
in Six Scoring Categories

Scores	Leaders (N-14)		Non-Leaders (N-22)	
	No.	%	No.	%
0	3	21	1	5
1	6	43	2	9
2	2	14	3	14
3	1	7	5	23
4	2	14	8	36
5	0	0	3	14
	14	99*	22	101*

*Percentages rounded, and therefore do not total 100.

Table 18 reveals that proportionately fewer non-leaders than leaders score in the lower ranges of our improvised "retreatism scale", while proportionately fewer leaders than non-leaders have high scores.

Classifying those respondents who score five points as "highly retreatist", those who score three or four points as "moderately retreatist", and those who score fewer than three points as "not retreatist" produces the results shown in Table 19.

Table 19

A Comparison of Scores on Five
Items Associated with Retreatism

	Leaders (N=14)		Non-Leaders (N=22)	
	No.	%	No.	%
Highly retreatist	0	0	3	14
Moderately retreatist	3	21	13	59
Not retreatist	11	79	6	27
	14	100	22	100

The cutting points for separating the "highs", "moderates", and "lows" are of course quite arbirtary. If lower cutting points were selected, then the proportion of non-leaders classed as "highly retreatist" would sharply increase; in fact, if a score of 4 or more were designated "high", eleven non-leaders but only two leaders would fall in the top category.

Table 20 shows the results when age and religious affiliation are controlled in the sample of non-leaders.

Table 20.

Scores on Five Items Associated with Retreatism, Age, Religious Affiliation Controlled.

	Catholics 60 and over	Catholics Under 60	Anglicans Under 60
Highly retreatist	0	2	1
Moderately retreatist	5	4	4
Not retreatist	0	5	1
	N=5	N=11	N=6

While the difference between Catholics and Anglicans in the same category is not great, it is in the predicted direction. Nearly half the Catholics scored "low" and proportionately more Anglicans are in the combined "moderate" and "high" categories. It is suggested that larger sub-samples probably would produce a greater difference in the same direction.

It is interesting to note that remarkably similar results are obtained if all ten categories in Table 17 are treated as "scale" items and the same scoring procedures followed. This is illustrated by a

comparison of Table 19 with Table 21, where the "highs" scored from eight to ten, the "moderates" from five to seven, and the "lows" less than five.

Table 21.

A Comparison of Scores on Ten Items Probably Associated with Retreatism

	Leaders		Non-Leaders	
	No.	%	No.	%
Highly retreatist	0	0	3	14
Moderately retreatist	2	14	12	54
Not retreatist	12	86	7	32
	14	100	22	100

If the minimus score selected for "highs" is seven, then eight non-leaders and only one leader fall in the high category. Controlling for age and religious affiliation while using the ten-item procedure, we find a greater difference between younger Catholics and Anglicans than before, as shown in Table 22. Here Anglicans and the aged account for all high scorers in the sample of non-leaders.

Table 22

Scores on Ten Items Probably Associated with Retreatism, Age and Religious Affiliation Controlled

	Catholics 60 and over	Catholics Under 60	Anglicans Under 60
Highly retreatist	1	0	2
Moderately retreatist	3	5	4
Not retreatist	1	6	0
	N=5	N=11	N=6

These scaling procedures serve to summarize the findings previously outlined in this chapter,[30] and to illustrate further the difference between groups on the reserve with respect to the distribution of attitudes and values relevant to the study of retreatist and innovative behaviour. We have noted a number of apparent differences between leaders and non-leaders, and between two sub-groups or factions within the band which for convenience have been labelled according to their respective religious affiliations. While it is true that firm conclusions cannot be drawn on the basis of so small a sample, nevertheless the data presented here seem highly suggestive, and it is fair to hypothesize that similar results would be obtained if the sample size were significantly increased.

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[30] For a further summarization of the main findings, see pp.

CHAPTER VI

INNOVATION IN THE LEADERSHIP GROUP

We have seen that, more than the ordinary band members who were interviewed, the leaders tended to share attitudes, beliefs, and values which are in contrast to those associated with retreatism, and which appear conducive to innovation in economic, political, or related spheres of activity. It remains to demonstrate how in fact the leaders were innovative, both individually and in organized groups.

In Hagen's view, innovation is essentially "problem solving" activity involving new concepts or new methods of dealing with physical or social phenomena. In the general case, innovation consists of two steps or phases, which he describes as (1) "arriving at a new mental conception", and (2) "converting it into action or into material form".[1] In technological innovation, "the second step may involve only design or rearrangement of some items of physical equipment or it may involve the organization of a group of human beings into a going concern that carries out a new concept".[2] In some cases, innovation will involve "overcoming resistance by other persons".[3] The innovator typically encounters unforseen circumstances and events in the course of

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[1] Hagen, p. 86

[2] Ibid., p. 87

[3] Loc. cit.

converting ideas into action, and therefore requires at least some capacity for "creative adjustment and revision".[4]

Without doing much violence to Hagen's formulation, it could be said that innovation in its second stage is largely decision making activity where the decisions made relate to the implementation of what are, for the actor, new methods for coping with perceived problems.

Needless to say the "first step" of innovation would be observable only under rather special circumstances. It is the second step which is observable, and in the present study it was possible to gather a good deal of evidence to the effect that Indian leaders did indeed "convert" new ideas into action, although one could not always be certain of the extent to which the ideas were their own. Even in the "converting" stage, it was not always possible to determine whether the community development officer or the Indian leaders were responsible for a particular decision or line of action, or to what extent he and they shared the responsibility.

In cases where decisions were observed in the making, as at co-operative and council meetings, it was a relatively simple matter to observe who initiated ideas, who performed leader roles, and so forth. However, many decisions were made that could not be observed; some of the most important of these were made two years before the study began, when the first co-operatives were formed. Where decision making or problem solving was not observable for whatever reason, it was necessary to rely on the word of informants, checking the account of one informant

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[4] Loc. cit.

against that of another where possible. This method, together with direct observation and the examination of written records, made it possible to obtain a reasonably clear picture of how certain major innovations were accomplished.

We look first at the cases of two individuals who were outstanding innovators, then at a few examples of group innovation. This approach involves some overlapping, since both individuals to be discussed operated within an organizational framework, and an account of their behaviour necessarily involves some description of group behaviour.

The Bookkeeper

We recall that innovation sometimes involves "the organization of a group of human beings into a going concern that carries out a new concept", and also that it may involve "overcoming resistances by other persons". The case of one leader in particular, to be called Fred Monette, exemplifies both types of innovative activity. Although one of the most influential men on the reserve, Fred occupied a minor office in the Pulpwood Co-operative. He was not one of the directors, but rather a part-time bookkeeper for the organization.

When the community development officer first arrived in Trout River and began talking about co-operatives, it was Fred who first came to him and suggested that the time had come for action. Subsequently, Fred gathered interested people together for the first meeting called to discuss formation of a co-operative. The Pulpwood Co-operative was formed shortly before the 1962 band election, and in the face of strong opposition from the council of the day. Jake Favreau was a councillor at

that time, as was Paul Favreau.[5] Both became candidates for the chief's office in 1962, running on an anti-co-operative platform. The co-operative's supporters evidently perceived that Jake posed the most serious threat to the movement.

Information from several sources permits an attempt to reconstruct a few political events at that time. Prior to the band-wide nomination meeting which preceded the election, a number of interested people, most of them directors or members of the co-operative, met several times to discuss the idea of running a slate of candidates for council. Fred played a prominent part in organizing this drive to recruit candidates sympathetic to the co-operative cause. He approached the man who subsequently became chief, and promised him the co-operative's support if he would run for that office. More private meetings followed, and it was agreed that certain other members of the group who were interested in the chief's office would not run against the candidate favoured by Fred. Two of these men ran instead for council and were elected. At the public nomination meeting co-operative supporters, acting by pre-arrangement, nominated the men they had privately chosen. From what could be gathered, such sophisticated behind-the-scenes political activity had no precedent at Trout River.

Of these manoeuvers Fred said:

> "We had to organize like that, if we were going to beat Jake Favreau. You see, Jake has a lot of relatives, and they'd all vote for him. Our candidate didn't have so many relatives, and we had to do some mathematics to figure whether the co-op members could swing enough votes to beat Jake's relatives". He added: "The way it used to be at

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[5] See page 111.

> elections, everybody voted for his own relatives and the guys with the most relatives got in. But it was different at the last election. People voted for guys they weren't related to".

Fred was active in the Conservative Party, and familiar with the techniques of political campaigning. He tried to persuade the co-operative's candidates to do door-to-door canvassing, but without success. Apparently the nearest thing to campaigning by co-operative leaders consisted in privately urging their members to vote for the candidates they were supporting. "We had the co-op office set up here in my house", said Fred, "and when the members came in, we'd say 'Well, if you want this co-op to go, you'd better vote for these fellows': and we had the biggest turnout there's ever been at a band election".

The election resulted in victory for co-operative supporters. Due in large measure to Fred Monette's efforts, the first co-operative had been organized and major resistance constituting an imminent threat to its existence had been overcome. During the period of field work, Fred continued his efforts to ensure the continuation of a political climate favourable to the co-operatives, and thereby to sustain them as "going concerns".

The chief announced his intention not to run for re-election in the fall of 1964, apparently because the duties of office were too burdensome and time-consuming. Fearful that this might mean the reactionary group's return to power, Fred was busy looking for someone suitable to run in the chief's place, and at the same time was trying to persuade the chief to stand for re-election. Asked why he did not himself become a candidate for the chief's office, he said:

"I like to work in back. I sit in the back seat and watch

> what's going on, and if something goes wrong I don't get criticized. Oh, I might run for councillor again, but never for chief. I was a councillor for four years, and even in that job you have some tough decisions to make. A councillor has to act a certain way. There are things he can do and things he can't do. But sitting in the back seat, I'm not so restricted".

There was abundant evidence that Fred wielded a great deal of influence in the community. White and Indian informants testified to his influence, two of the latter identifying him as a man who had "some of the best ideas" of anyone on the reserve. He had many visitors at all hours of the day. His home was situated close to those of the chief and several councillors, and they visited him frequently. There is no question that the chief valued him as an advisor. As bookkeeper for the Pulpwood Co-operative, Fred had no official voice in board decisions, but in fact he played an important, even dominant, role in decision making. At one board meeting, attended by the president of the co-operative but not by the development officer, Fred played the role of task-oriented leader, particularly in matters of business strategy. He introduced most of the topics discussed, and offered many suggestions to which the directors agreed with never a dissenting voice. Although he had no formal voice whatever, he decided virtually single-handed when the next board meeting would be, and outlined a rough agenda for it.

Fred had little formal education, but intelligence, business acumen, capacity for informal leadership, and mastery of the art of political manoeuvering made him the innovator par excellence. His commitment to white middle class value orientations and his participation in a political organization centered in the larger white

society marked him as something of a "cosmopolitan" rather than a "local" influential, in Merton's terms.[6] Without this orientation to a reference group outside the Indian community it is unlikely that he could have played so vital a role in launching the co-operative movement.

The Chief

The chief was an energetic and ambitious man who had worked hard for himself and for the band. Of 10 full-time Indian employees at the paper mill in Birch Rapids, he was one of two who earned more than $5,000 per year, and whose duties were classed as "responsible" by company officials. In addition to his job, the chief operated a small trucking and general contracting business. During the period of field work, he was under contract to the Indian Affairs Branch to clear a tract of band land for farming, using a bulldozer which he owned in partnership with a non-Indian. The chief worked in his spare time, including Sundays, on this land clearing project. Despite these varied economic activities he managed to devote a good deal of time to band affairs, attending meetings of the co-operative boards, the school committee, and other community organizations, to say nothing of his participation in the business of the band council. Much of this

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[6] Merton, R.K., "Patterns of Influence", in P.F. Lazarsfeld and F. Stanton (eds.), Communications Research, 1948-1949, New York: Harpers, 1949, pp. 189-92.

This is not to suggest that the bookkeeper exhibited all the characteristics of the cosmopolitan identified by Merton. One typically "cosmopolitan" element in his background was extensive experience of the world outside the reserve, notably during military service in World War II.

official activity, perhaps most of it, was devoted to the co-operative movement. However, his efforts to improve local economic conditions were not confined to the promotion of co-operatives, and in the summer of 1964 he was negotiating with a private firm to establish a sewing factory on the reserve, even though the community development officer objected to the scheme.

To illustrate the energy which the chief gave to his duties, on one occasion he came from the night shift at the mill and left immediately for the provincial capital to lead a delegation of Indians meeting with senior government officials to discuss arrangements for rice harvesting, and for the formation of the new Wild Rice Co-operative. While it is true that the development officer was a key figure in making arrangements for the new co-operative, it is also true that the chief played a highly active role. For example, the development officer did not attend the above-mentioned meeting with provincial officials, although before the meeting he advised the chief and his delegation with respect to strategies of negotiation. Undoubtedly the chief was more active in these negotiations than any other band member, and indeed probably more active than any representative of the other reserves concerned. When at one point discussions with the province took an unsatisfactory turn, it was the chief and not the president of the co-operative who called upon the local member of the provincial legislature in an effort to have political influence exerted. The provincial member came to the reserve and met with councillors and co-operative directors. A brief description of one or two relevant features of this meeting will serve to demonstrate further the chief's

energy, initiative, and leadership capabilities.

Although the community development officer was present, the chief initiated proceedings, introducing the visitor, outlining the problem to be considered, and generally performing the role of task-oriented leader. He spoke forcefully about the need to acquire harvesting rights in more rice lakes than those to which the province had hitherto granted concessions, and objected strongly to the government's proposal that Indians from a neighbouring province be permitted to pick rice in the co-operative's preserves.[7] The development officer took little or no part in the proceedings until the meeting was far advanced, when he commenced to summarize the discussion and to guide the meeting to a close. Of course the importance of the function which he performed should not be under-rated, but the point to be made here is that the chief also performed his leadership role appropriately and with some effectiveness. It would be a mistake to over-emphasize the chief's administrative and leadership skills. He did not always demonstrate the same assertiveness and competence at meetings, although his performance was usually more impressive than that of most others in the leadership group. His formal education was quite limited. The beginning of his term of office roughly coincided with the beginning of the co-operative movement, and his tenure had been a period of "in job" training for the acquisition of relevant skills. Apparently his relative competence as a public

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[7]It is not know what, if anything, the member of the legislature did about the points at issue. He did not, however, attend a subsequent meeting between Indian and provincial authorities, at which concessions were granted to all the rice lakes in the district in question.

speaker was acquired after coming to office.

However, the chief unquestionably possessed many of the cognitive and evaluative orientations conducive to innovative behaviour. He was future-oriented, and placed a high valuation on economic independence for himself and the band. He clearly possessed the intelligence, energy, and motivations to achieve and to exercise control of his environment which Hagen associates with innovative personality. Apparently he had some confidence in his own evaluations (his performance at the Rice Co-operative meeting and efforts to negotiate for a sewing factory without the development officer's support attest to this) and very likely possessed many of the other psychological attributes of innovational personality.[8]

Finally, there seems to be little doubt that much of his behaviour was genuinely innovative. From the beginning he played an important role in the introduction of co-operatives, themselves major innovations in the social organization of the community. He was instrumental in "the organization of a group of human beings into a going concern" for the purpose of carrying out a "new concept".[9] In the context of the reserve culture, the "newness" of the co-operative concept is indicated by the resistance which the movement engendered. Apparently many band members perceived the co-operatives as threatening not only their local political institutions but also the existing structure of relations between their group and the larger society;

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[8] See above, page 14.

[9] See above, page 125.

this testifies to the magnitude of the social change which the chief was endeavoring to bring about. His role in overcoming resistance, first in the band toward the movement in general, second in the provincial administration toward certain objectives of the Rice Co-operative, seems to exemplify the kind of "creative adjustment" to unforeseen events which Hagen suggests is one capability of innovators. Creative adjustment also seems indicated by his relative mastery of public speaking and other skills after assuming office and coming to grips with the problems of introducing change. These new skills appeared to serve him well on a number of observed occasions. In summary, it seems fair to say that the chief was an agent of social change as surely as was the community development officer.

Group Innovation

In discussing the innovational behaviour of two individual leaders, we have already touched upon group innovation. Clearly the Wild Rice and Pulpwood Co-operatives were not organized solely through the actions of the chief and the bookkeeper respectively, nor even by their efforts combined with those of the development officer. These complex innovations quite obviously resulted from concerted group action involving other members of the co-operative boards as well. Similarly, Fred Monette did not overcome political opposition to the co-operative movement by himself, but within the context of a group whose members shared with him common values and goals.

Another illustration of group innovation is provided by events connected with the formation of the Agriculture Co-operative. Initially the Pulpwood Co-operative planned to venture into agriculture, and

borrowed a sum of money from the band council to prepare a tract of land. Later, on the suggestion of the development officer, the directors decided that it would be best if a separate organization were formed to conduct farming operations, since this would provide an opportunity for more people to participate and gain experience in co-operative management.

Accordingly, councillors and co-operative directors collaborated to call a public meeting in the spring of 1964, at which it was decided to form a new co-operative. A provisional board of seven agricultural directors was elected from a slate of 14 nominees. Despite this democratic procedure, several reliable informants in the leadership group said that councillors and Pulpwood directors engineered the nomination and election of individuals they had selected by pre-arrangement. In particular, they voted in a block to elect two men who up to that time had been expressing opposition to the movement. As mentioned earlier, a third opponent was similarly co-opted when the Wild Rice Co-operative was formed. Asked what arguments were used to persuade opponents to take office once elected, the chief said that "they want power, so you give it to them", and added, "we elect them first, then tell them they've been elected.... You don't need any arguments, once they're elected". The development officer said that these manoeuvers to co-opt opponents were carried out by the leaders themselves without external help or advise. "All I said to them was 'you know who your opposition is', and they took it from there", he said.

The leaders were observed to operate on their own initiative in a variety of other ways, making decisions and solving problems

apparently without help from the development officer, or with only a minimum of assistance. The Pulpwood Co-operative called an important organizational meeting during his absence from the reserve, and the president was heard to say some days before the meeting: "The CDO's away, but we don't need him". The Pulpwood directors defined themselves as fully competent to make decisions with regard to the practical aspects of cutting and hauling pulp. When it came to operations in the bush, the directors assumed the role of experts, and the development officer became a naive bystander.

The Indians were even taking some initiative in financial and contractual matters. Pulpwood directors bargained with the paper company for a contract to sell thousands of cords of pulp, and apparently one group of Agriculture directors negotiated a loan from the local bank without aid.[10] This latter group investigated the possibilities of buying farm equipment, negotiated with farmers to harvest the co-operative's oat crop, and engaged in many other like activities.[11]

The directors of the Agriculture Co-operative were anxious to prove themselves, and to show that they could manage a business as effectively, or more effectively, than their counterparts in the pulp production field. Their desire to "show a profit" in the first season

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[10] At least without any apparent <u>direct</u> aid, since the development officer was away at the time. However, it may be significant that he was a personal and business acquaintance of the bank manager.

[11] It is interesting that Paul Favreau, the conflicted director whose case is discussed on page 111, was an active and evidently enthusiastic participant in these affairs.

of farming stemmed partly from the fact that the Pulpwood Co-operative lost money in the previous pulp-cutting season. The Agriculture directors seemed sensitive about the fact that their organization was a child of the Pulpwood Co-operative, and that the latter took a somewhat proprietary or paternalistic attitude toward them. The comments of several Agriculture directors showed that they wished to assert their independence from the parent organization. There was a certain spirit of rivalry which itself seemed conducive to innovation, and suggested that the community development program was enjoying a measure of success.

Also conducive to Indian innovation were certain expectations attached to the development officer's role. He was expected to foster and encourage participation by Indians in the management of their own affairs, in fact the entire development program was oriented to this end. Therefore, he encouraged the Indians to exercise initiative in situations which he defined to be within their competence. For example, he remained in the background as much as he could when the Indians dealt with outside individuals and agencies. Sometimes he stayed away from meetings with representatives of these agencies, but prior to an important business encounter he might advise the Indians on strategy, suggesting what they should or should not say, or what commitments they should avoid or be prepared to make.

On occasion this behaviour was also in conformity with other more general role expectations concerning the kinds of behaviour deemed appropriate for all civil servants. As a federal official, he was expected to maintain cordial relations with non-federal agencies and to

avoid participation in any activities which might have political implications. These were important considerations when the co-operatives were dealing with the provincial government, for any clash of interests might have repercussions for federal-provincial relations. Conformity with the expectation that he should avoid political involvement was, by his own admission, one reason why the development officer did not always attend meetings between Indians and the provincial authorities. Thus in certain situations conformity with these role expectations functioned to give initiative to the Indians and stimulated innovative behaviour on their part.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Recapitulation of Some Theoretical Points

An object of this paper has been to illustrate certain aspects of a general theory of social change with data from one Indian community. Before summarizing the principal findings, it will be useful to recapitulate the main theoretical points which concern us.

The theory states that members of societies which are subjected to domination by an alien group will perceive their own culture and system of values to be severely disparaged by the dominant group. The subordinate group will value the opinion of the dominant group, if only because it has power. However, the subordinate group cannot pursue this value and still continue to pursue its own cultural values. Its members will experience humiliation, anxiety, and value conflict.

Through a number of social and psychological mechanisms, some of which have been previously discussed,[1] continued severe disparagement over a span of generations leads to widespread formation of a retreatist personality type. The principal characteristics of retreatism are apathy, passivity, and value conflict. To overcome the pain of conflict, the retreatist rejects both traditional and new values, or he may cling compulsively to traditional values, the better to reject those of the

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[1] See above pp. 9-11.

dominant group. He lacks energy, represses his needs, and lowers his expectations for satisfaction in life.

Under conditions of long continued disparagement, other mechanisms may function to produce an innovational personality type. Within the disparaged society there emerges a group sharing new needs, values and cognitions which, in contrast to those of retreatism and of the traditional culture, are conducive to innovation. The innovative group provides its members with protection and reassurance in the face of pressure to conform to traditional values. Innovative or "deviant" individuals may also be sustained in some degree by images of outside reference groups. Where there are opportunities to engage in economic activities, where economic prowess is accorded recognition by reference groups, and where other avenues to social recognition are blocked, conditions are favourable for the channeling of creative energies into economic pursuits. For economic growth and attendant social change to continue, the original innovating group must be widely imitated by members of other groups. In the early stages of change, members of former elite groups who perceive their own position threatened by the innovators are the most likely imitators.

Summary of the Main Findings

Our main findings appear to illustrate many of the above-mentioned theoretical points, and also to support several related propositions derived from Hagen's theory and stated in Chapter II.[2] However, no attempt is made to illustrate those aspects of the theory dealing

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[2] See above, pp. 18-19.

with processes of personality formation, for the obvious reason that relevant data are not available. It bears repeating that our chief concern is not with personality formation or even with personality types as such, but with retreatism and innovation as contrasting modes of adaptation in groups subject to what is here called a "colonial" environment. Having said this, we turn to a summary of the findings.

A condition for the beginning and perpetuation of widespread retreatism in a colonial society is continued derogation by the dominant alien group. Without going into the history of ways in which Indians have been disparaged in the past, we have found evidence suggesting continued and rather severe disparagement by local whites of the Indians at Trout River. A general knowledge of the history of contact between whites and Indians persuades us that such disparagement has been of long duration.[3] There is abundant evidence of the perpetuation of a colonial type of control within the framework of an administrative system dominated by Euro-Canadians. We have suggested that, however benevolent its intent this paternalistic control fosters in the Indians the perception that they are defined as incompetent to manage their own affairs, and hence as inferior. Data have been presented to suggest that local Indians do indeed perceive themselves to be so defined.[4]

The Evidence of Retreatism

There was evidence that retreatist orientations were widespread

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[3]See footnote, p. 18.

[4]See above pp. 56-57.

among members of the band. Summarizing this evidence serves to illustrate the first proposition stated in Chapter II: that the perpetuation of attitudes, beliefs, and values associated with retreatism tend to inhibit autonamous action and the making of decisions related to economic and social development.

In our random sample, a large majority of respondents (approximately 90 per cent) exhibited varying degrees of dependency, about three-quarters gave responses suggesting that in some measure they defined themselves as powerless to cope with their environment, and nearly half indicated that they defined the entire band as powerless. These cognitive orientations are suggestive of the passivity which Hagen associates with retreatism. Generalizing from the interview data and from other observations, it would seem that a large proportion of the band members were apathetic concerning group activities and goals. Apathy was evident in voting behaviour, in low attendance at band meetings, in apparent widespread ignorance and disinterest regarding local issues and activities, and in indifference toward the possibilities of greater autonomy and self government.

Apparently the community was divided by interpersonal and intergroup suspicion and hostility, and collective activity appeared to be inhibited because many individuals lacked commitment to group goals. Suspicion of the objectives of the co-operatives probably functioned as an excuse for many individuals to withdraw from collective effort. It seems at least possible that by expressing low expectations for the future of the co-operative movement, individuals were projecting onto the group their own low expectations for satisfaction in life.

Value conflict seemed evident in a number of ways. For example, attitudes of hostile dependency toward the federal government were apparent in a majority of ordinary band members interviewed. Hostile dependency suggests both the acceptance and the rejection of values disseminated by the dominant group; it suggests that the individuals who perceive themselves to be disparaged experience conflict in striving to preserve gratifying self definitions while at the same time accepting values disseminated by their disparagers.

In view of the evidence which has been presented, it seems appropriate to speak of a retreatist syndrome which, at least hypothetically, might be said to include the following interrelated elements: lack of future time perspective, negative achievement orientation, low energy level, orientation to passive dependence, indifference to collective goal-oriented activity, derogatory definitions of self, diffuse anxiety, low expectations for satisfaction in life, and the perception of a hostile and unmanageable environment. More precise definition and classification of these elements or "symptoms" and more careful specification of their interrelationships would have to await further research.

The Evidence of Innovation and of Innovative Potential

All of the above indications of retreatism were likewise evident in the leadership group. However, proportionately fewer of the leaders appeared to entertain retreatist orientations. In general, they were less dependent on government, less alienated from the federal administration, and showed a lesser tendency to perceive themselves as

powerless. Members of the leadership group who participated actively in band affairs were manifestly not apathetic. However, some individuals have been classed as leaders simply by virtue of their organizational memberships. Some of those who participated only marginally in the activities of their respective organizations may have been scarcely less apathetic than many ordinary band members.

Nevertheless, the more dynamic members of the elite group, among them the chief, the bookkeeper, and a few others, formed a leadership nucleus which in many respects appeared to conform to Hagen's model of an emergent innovative group whose members share new needs, values, and cognitions. In positive terms, these men were future oriented, achievement oriented, energetic, self-confident, and independent. They perceived that their environment was in some degree manageable, and that they themselves had some capacity to manage it. They were oriented to co-operative effort, and apparently were able to resolve whatever conflict of values they may have experienced as a result of participation in the local community development program. In many respects, the value orientations of these men seemed similar to those of the "elite acculturated group"[5] identified by the Spindlers in their studies of the Menomini of Wisconsin, although the Menomini elite appear to be more competitive, more achievement oriented, and more concerned with status differentials (hence, perhaps, more acculturated)

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[5]Louise S. Spindler, Menomini Women and Culture Change, Memoir 91, American Anthropological Association, Vol. 64, No. 1, February, 1962, pp. 51-52.

than were the Saulteaux elite of Trout River.[6]

It was this "nuclear" group of leaders which had worked closely with the development officer in establishing three producer's co-operative associations. It was this group which, without apparent aid from outsiders, organized politically to overcome resistance to the co-operatives and conspired successfully to absorb its opponents into the co-operative movement. In these and in other ways described in Chapter VI, a few key leaders demonstrated the initiative and the capacity for "creative adjustment" which we here associate with effective innovation. Thus the weight of evidence seems to support the second proposition set forth in Chapter II: that the limited development which had occurred was due in large measure to the simultaneous existence of other attitudes, beliefs, and values which are in contrast to those associated with retreatism, and which are conducive to decision making and innovation in the economic sphere and in related areas of behaviour. Our interview materials lead us to believe that a substantial proportion of the band membership was critical or suspicious of the actions and motives of the leadership group. Of course we do not know

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[6]While our data are limited, we have some evidence that the Trout River elite were not wholly unconcerned with status differentiation. For example, seven members of the elite were asked if people on the reserve recognized different levels of social standing, and five replied affirmatively. Five also thought that band members accorded high status to persons whose educational achievements were above the average for the reserve. Among those questioned, however, opinion was about evenly divided as to whether or not people with steady jobs enjoyed higher status than those who did not work when they could. Similarly, opinion was divided on the question of whether low status was accorded to people who sought relief when they could be working. While the data do not by any means provide conclusive evidence, they do seem to suggest that concurrently with the emergence of a group sharing values and cognitions conducive to innovation, a class system patterned after that of the surrounding white society was also emerging.

if this critical element constituted a majority of the population, but there is a possiblity that it did. It was noted, for example, that more than half of ordinary band members interviewed expressed at least some degree of doubt, suspicion, or hostility toward the directors of the co-operatives.[7] A smaller proportion offered critical and derogatory comments regarding the band councillors.[8]

Concerned with the need to introduce social change, the leaders were under pressure from those who placed a high value on preservation of the status quo, including the preservation of a dependent position vis a vis the federal government. The leaders were accused of placing the band's treaty rights in jeopardy, of "selling out" to a provincial administration perceived as threatening and perfidious, of making decisions in a manner which violated the democratic values of the band,[9] and of being preoccupied with their own personal economic gain.[10] Apparently this latter accusation did not necessarily reflect a moral judgement in terms of the values of white society; it was just as likely to reflect the negative valuation which the "reservation traditional"[11] culture placed on personal economic success. In other words, while some band members may have cast aspersions because they considered it wrong for public officials to use their position for

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[7] See above p. 101.

[8] See above p. 61.

[9] See above pp. 27-29.

[10] See above p. 87.

[11] The term "reservation traditional" refers to cultural elements which we suggest, have developed under conditions of reservation life. See above pp. 109-110.

private advantage, others probably did so because they condemned any kind of effort whatsoever aimed at personal economic gain. It was noted that many band members "looked down" on others who "wanted to work" or to "better themselves";[12] these others were in effect calling into question values traditional to the reservation culture. Support for this interpretation is provided by Zentner who, in his study of another Indian community, identified "a strong negative attitude toward non-Indian culture traits and standards" and discerned that "the acquisition of wealth for its own sake is regarded as an out-group trait and therefore to be despised on that ground alone".[13] In light of the foregoing, there seems to be ample support for our third proposition: <u>that orientations conducive to innovation are shared by groups which are defined as deviant by a significant proportion of the reservation's population</u>.

In the performance of their "deviant" roles, the leadership group provided its members with protection and reassurance in the face of popular criticisms and pressures. This illustrates Hagen's "principle of protection by the group",[14] and was evident in our case histories of co-operative directors who experienced value conflict in consequence of their efforts to introduce major organizational innovations to the community. In particular, we are reminded of the case of Percy

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[12] See above, pp. 99-100.

[13] Henry Zetner, "Factors in the Social Pathology of a North American Indian Society", <u>Anthropologica</u>, N.S. Vol.V, No. 2, 1963. pp.119-130.

[14] Hagen, pp. 245-247. See also above, p.14.

Favreau,[15] who, with the moral support of his colleagues, was able to overcome internal conflict so serious that it temporarily incapacitated him and nearly removed him permanently from performance of a leadership role. The solidarity of the core group of leaders was apparent in their neighbouring patterns, in their expressions of mutual regard, and in the manner of closing ranks to meet their opposition in the political arena.[16] The fact that council and co-operative board memberships were interlocked no doubt contributed to group solidarity as well, whether or not such interlocking was consciously devised for that purpose. The evidence, therefore, supports our fourth proposition: that leaders on the reserve were able to persist in their innovative behaviour more or less effectively, in part because their shared orientations provided mutual protection and support under pressures to conform to the more widespread orientations of the traditional reservation culture.

Imitative Behaviour

Hagen points out that the original innovating group must be widely imitated in the society if change is to continue. It was apparent that imitation was occurring at Trout River. There are no data which enable us to say with precision just how widespread such imitation had become. However, we have some suggestion of the extent to which imitation had spread if we compare the number of individuals involved in the management of co-operatives in 1962 when the first co-operative was

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[15] See Case II, p. 113.

[16] See above, p. 36, and pp. 128-129.

was formed, with the number involved in 1964. In 1962 there were nine or perhaps ten persons concerned with directing a single co-operative enterprise, whereas in 1964 there were 18 persons involved in the management of three co-operatives. Of course, these figures do not tell the entire story. In the first place, it seems that only about five or six of those involved in 1962 played active roles in establishing and managing the first co-operative, while the rest more or less followed the lead of these activists.[17] Secondly, there were a number of resignations and new appointments to the several co-operative boards during the two year period, so that the actual number of individuals occupying offices in co-operative organizations during this time was certainly in excess of 20 and may have been closer to 25.[18]

Hägen tells us that in the initial stages of change, the imitators will tend to be members of the established elite who perceive that the new innovating group threatens to displace them from their positions of superiority. Informants said that for a period of years prior to 1962, band politics had been dominated by a small group of Favreaus. This group was led by Jake Favreau, and included his father, brother, and at least one or two cousins. From the beginning, they strongly opposed the co-operative movement in ways which have already

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[17] Apparently the activists included the chief, the bookkeeper, the president of the Pulpwood Co-operative, and two members of the original board of directors who were also band councillors.

[18] In illustration of this point, of the seven members of the Pulpwood Co-operative's board of directors, five had been newly elected just one month before the period of field work.

been described. However, by 1964, two and perhaps three of the former "elite" group had become prominent in the co-operative movement.[19] The chief himself said that it had been relatively easy to "convert" members of the old guard to the co-operative cause by the simple devise of electing them in absentia to the various co-operative boards. He said that they readily accepted their new offices, and commented: "They want power, so we give it to them".

The "Principle of Relative Social Blockage"

Economic innovations at Trout River took place in circumstances which appear to illustrate Hagen's "principle of relative social blockage". His statement of the principle was quoted in Chapter II and bears repeating here:

> Other influences being equal, creative energies within a group from which social recognition has been withdrawn will seek expression where the opportunity seems best to exercise one's talents, prove one's worth to oneself, and gain social recognition. To state the principle from the obverse viewpoint, the channel in which creative energies will flow depends in part on the degree to which other channels are blocked.[20]

Traditionally honoured economic roles such as hunting and trapping were no longer open to individuals at Trout River; informants said repeatedly that hunting and trapping had ceased to be worthwhile activities either on or near the reserve. Furthermore, few if any traditionally honoured roles were available outside the economic sphere. There was no evidence, for example, that shamanism or sorcery continued

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[19] The two cases of which we have definite knowledge are those of Paul Favreau and Martin Favreau; see Cases (1) and (4), pp. 111 and 114.

[20] Hagen, p. 241

to provide channels for gaining social recognition. Even granting the possibility that the practice of these arts may have persisted still in some sectors of the society, they had most certainly been rejected by those "progressive" individuals who concern us here. Again, many of the channels sanctioned in Euro-Canadian society were closed to members of the leadership group. They lacked the formal education required to occupy professional, technical, or managerial positions in the larger society. With a very few exceptions,[21] they lacked the private financial resources necessary for individualistic entrepreneurship. However, the leaders were presented with one outstanding opportunity to exercise their talents for innovation and to gain social recognition, an opportunity requiring participation in collective economic activity on a scale hitherto unknown to them.

Hagen does not of course deny that many economic factors, among them the availability of markets, capital, and technical knowledge, help to determine whether or not innovation will take place in economic and related spheres rather than in other areas of human behaviour. However he does insist that favourable economic conditions are not enough in themselves to stimulate economic development, and that if creative energies are to be directed into economic channels, social recognition must at the same time be accorded to economic prowess.

At Trout River, several favourable economic conditions prevailed. In the vicinity of the reserve there existed ready markets for the commodities produced by both the Pulpwood and the Wild Rice Co-operatives.

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[21] The chief was one of these exceptional individuals. See p. 131.

At the time of field work a market for the Agriculture Co-operative's produce had not been established definitely, but the organization's directors perceived that marketing prospects were good. Capital was available to each of the three co-operatives in the form of provincial and federal government loans. The Indians possessed the technical skills necessary for farming and for harvesting wild rice and timber resources. While initially they may have been deficient or lacking in certain organizational, managerial, and marketing skills, these were provided by government agents in the early stages and were rather quickly acquired by the Indians themselves as the community development program progressed.

There is no question that the more dynamic leaders aspired at least to limit mastery of basic economic skills, in part to gain social recognition from reference groups within and without the reservation society. It was partly for this reason that some directors of the Agriculture Co-operative were anxious to "show a profit" in their first year of operation, hoping thereby to demonstrate their superior business competence to the other co-operative leaders. The fact that the elite exhibited value orientations commonly found in Euro-Canadian society is itself a strong indication that some of their reference groups were Euro-Canadian. There was no question of this in some individual cases. We know, for example, that Fred Monette[22] was oriented to one of the national political parties and participated in a local white constituency

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[22]See above, p. 127 ff.

association. Martin Favreau[23] repeatedly identified himself not only as an Indian, but as a Canadian. Given such orientations, the elite undoubtedly had some motivation to achieve in Euro-Canadian cultural terms, and specifically to gain recognition in the wider society. A few were explicit in stating that the co-operative movement, if successful, would win them a measure of respect from white people generally.[24]

The Theory Reconsidered

Until now Hagen's theoretical formulations have been treated rather uncritically; in conclusion we shall consider some possible difficulties and shortcomings, but without pretending to examine these exhaustively. Among the objections which might be put forward are the following:

(1) that Hagen underestimates the flexibility of traditional cultures and social structures, thus placing undue emphasis upon the intrusion of powerful disruptive forces as a necessary condition for social change in these societies.

(2) that in placing so much stress on disparagement as the cause of behaviour patterns defined as retreatist, Hagen tends to neglect or underestimate the importance of other factors which may

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[23] See above, p. 114 ff.

[24] It would be possible to interpret some of our data in terms of Parsons' pattern variables of value orientation, and to hypothesize that, relative to that of the rank and file members of the band, the value system of the leaders is changing in the direction of affective neutrality, universalism, and functional specificity, and that they are adopting new achievement and collectivity orientations. To test such an hypothesis would, of course, require considerable research. See Talcott Parsons, The Social System, pp. 58-67

likewise contribute significantly to these modes of behaviour.

(3) that he neglects certain characteristics of task-oriented groups which may be important for the understanding of social change.

There is still another consideration which has nothing to do with the adequacy of the theory per se, but rather with its applicability to the data which have been presented. Throughout this paper it has been assumed that Hagen's conception of the nature of retreatism is applicable and relevant in the context of Indian culture. More specifically, we have chosen to assume that indications of apathy, passivity, and related orientations do in fact constitute evidence of retreatism, without much regard for the possibility that we may be dealing not with retreatism but rather with manifestations of personality or culture traits which have persisted since before the time of European contact. This assumption may be open to challenge, and will be considered before examining the three points of criticism listed above.

Retreatism and Traditional Cultural-psychological Traits

Many writers have related Indian psychological traits to traditional cultural factors, and commented on the persistence of these traits despite seemingly overwhelming acculturative influences. On the basis of available ethnographic evidence the Spindlers endeavour to outline in general terms certain psychological characteristics which were widely shared by Indians in most of the major culture areas of aboriginal North America. According to the Spindlers, these "'core' psychological features" included the following:

> ...nondemonstrative emotionality and reserve accompanied by a high degree of control over interpersonal aggression within the in-group; ...autonomy of the individual...; a generalized fear of the world as dangerous...; attention to the concrete realities of the present... in contrast to abstract integration in terms of long range goals; a dependence upon supernatural power outside one's self— power that determines one's fate...[25]

It is interesting that each of these features bears a rather clear correspondence to one or another of such allegedly retreatist characteristics as repression of rage, withdrawal from collective effort, perception of a hostile and unmanageable environment, lack of future orientation, and passive dependence.

Similarly, Barnouw describes the aboriginal Wisconsin Chippewa (whose culture and personality characteristics he roughly equates with those of the Canadian Saulteaux)[26] as undemonstrative, inhibited, suspicious, and at once both individualistic and dependent. He says that

> ...the social atomism of the Chippewa was reinforced by cultural-psychological factors which served to imbue the individual with a sense of isolation. Culturally induced fears, and particularly the fear of sorcery, led to mutual suspicions which inhibited the development of co-operative activities.[27]

And again:

> It is true that discussions of the Chippewa usually emphasize

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[25]George D. Spindler and Souise S. Spindler, "American Indian Personality Types and Their Sociocultural Roots", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 311, 1957, pp. 147-157

[26]Victor Barnouw, Acculturation and Personality Among the Wisconsin Chippewa, Memoir Number 72, American Anthropological Association, 1950, pp. 71-72.

[27]Ibid., p. 27

> their independence, fostered and encouraged from the earliest years by parents. Nevertheless, there is also a dependent attitude intermixed with this feeling of autonomy. Indeed, it would not be surprising if a desire for dependence should spring from a growing child's reaction to being pressed toward autonomy in a world characterized as dangerous and fearful.[28]

Hallowell remarks on the passivity which characterized the Ojibwa, including a Saulteaux band which he observed little more than one hundred miles from Trout River. Tracing this passivity to the pre-contact period when it was functionally adaptive to depend on the help of supernatural powers, he says:

> Thus the Ojibwa was far from considering himself the "lord of creation". He was only one of the "children" of nature, a suppliant... Fundamentally, therefore, his relationship to nature expressed a passive attitude. He did not enter the creative process in order to control it for his own ends, as does the horticulturist....[29]

In short, there seems to be rather wide agreement concerning certain features of modal personality structure and world view within the Northeastern Woodlands culture area. Prominent among these are passive dependency, emotional inhibition of introversion,[30] and a sense of personal isolation and powerlessness - all features heretofore associated with retreatism.

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[28] Ibid., p. 53

[29] A.I. Hallowell, Culture and Experience, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, p. 361.

[30] Hallowell specifically mentions introversion among the Saulteaux, and deals at length with what he calls "a multifaceted pattern of emotional restraint or inhibition", relating this to fear of sorcery and to the consequent isolation of the individual in Saulteaux society. See Culture and Experience, pp. 132-150.

There is some question, however, as to the degree of accuracy with which it is possible to reconstruct aboriginal personality and world view by analysing the observations of early writers (missionaries, traders, explorers), or by observing directly in the present day the behaviour of Indians several generations removed from the period of initial contact with Europeans. It seems entirely plausible that the characteristics described by the Spindlers, Barnouw, Hallowell, and others would have developed in the pre-contact period in a society where sorcery was widely practised, and where men perceived that the world contained overwhelming natural and super-natural forces. However it seems just as plausible that among Indians of the present day, these characteristics developed or became intensified in response to the overwhelming forces of western culture. If Saulteaux individuals felt powerless and dependent under aboriginal conditions, in all likelihood these perceptions would progressively be reinforced with the coming of the white man, with the establishment of the reservation system, and with the incursions of a powerful, benevolent, and paternalistic colonial administration. Hallowell's "children of nature" would become "children of the Queen", and of course this is precisely how a good many Indians at Trout River seem to define themselves. Hallowell himself perceives that this is exactly what has happened, and suggests that correlative with this development has been the emergence of retreatism, although he does not use the word.

> In the course of acculturation their personality structure has been skewed in a nonintegrative direction, instead of being reconstituted. One of the reasons for this seems to lie in the fact that, despite many outward manifestations of acculturation, no substitute for the value system of the old culture has become

> psychologically functional. Consequently these people exhibit a psychological impasse. Their characteristic personality structure can no longer function at its optimum level, so that there are many signs of regression, withdrawal, and aggression to be observed. Individuals can no longer depend upon culturally constituted group support, since the old mode of life has disintegrated for the most part. The only positive avenue open for psychological readjustment is for the individual to struggle through alone as best he may. This in turn places an enormous burden upon him with highly variable consequences. On the whole, an optimum of mental health has not been maintained.[31]

Significantly too, Hallowell speaks of deepening apathy among those Ojibwa who have been most exposed to western influences, and says that "These Indians....are attempting to survive in a situation which offers them no culturally defined values and goals that they can really make their own".[32]

His observations correspond very closely with Hagen's assessment of the reservation situation, the principal difference being more in perspective than in substance. When Hallowell speaks of a "psychological impasse" precipitated by loss of old values and failure to substitute new ones, he appears to refer to essentially the same phenomenon as Hagen, who says that the conflict between traditional and western values leads to the rejection of both, and to the subsequent "immobilization" of the conflicted individual. Hagen adopts a somewhat different point of view in his attempt to explain the origins of the "psychological impasse"; his hypothesis that value conflict follows the perception of being disparaged by a powerful group whose opinion is respected, has no parallel in Hallowell's work. Nevertheless, the two writers seem to be substantially in agreement in their identification

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[31] Ibid., p. 359

[32] Ibid., p. 365

of elements in the contact situation which precipitate apathy, withdrawal, and passive dependency.

Other anthropologists likewise give support to the view that the attitudes, orientations, and behaviour of reservation Indians in the present day cannot be explained by reference to some inherent conservatism which perpetuates aboriginal cultural traits and personality types. Graves speaks of "the dependency-fatalism fostered by years of government control".[33] Zentner perceives the rapid erosion of traditional norms and a concomitant rejection of non-Indian standards of conduct, with the result that "the Indian individual finds himself in a rapidly changing and complex cultural conflict in which he lacks group support regardless of the direction he selects for personal growth and development".[34] Vogt advances the opinion that most attempts to explain the apparent persistence of Indian culture tend to neglect "what is perhaps the most important factor of all: our persisting Anglo-American 'racial' attitudes, derived historically from Puritan Colonialism, which strongly devaluate other physical types bearing different cultural traditions".[35]

In short, viewpoints such as these recognize the significance of comprehensive derogation and of value conflict, and perceive that

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[33]Theodore D. Graves, "Psychological Acculturation in a Tri-Ethnic Community", Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, Vol. 23, 1967 pp. 337-350.

[34]Zentner, Op. cit., p. 128

[35]Evon Z. Vogt, "The Acculturation of American Indians", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 311, May 1957, pp. 137-146

passive dependency in the present day is more than a cultural remnant of the aboriginal past. These viewpoints tend to support the idea that Hagen's conception of the nature and origin of retreatism is indeed applicable to the context of the Indian "reservation" culture.

We turn now to a brief consideration of the three points of criticism enumerated on pages 154 and 155. It should be stressed that these points cannot be treated exhaustively here, for they raise some highly complex and even fundamental theoretical issues which are beyond the scope of the present paper, and which might themselves constitute the subjects of one or more separate research papers. At the same time, no criticism of Hagen should ignore these questions completely.

The Question of Flexibility in Traditional Societies[36]

Hagen does not entirely dismiss the possibility that change may occur in traditional societies without the intrusion of powerful disruptive forces from the outside. Nevertheless, there is no question that his major emphasis is on the essential stability of traditional societies, on their basic inflexibility, conservatism, and resistance

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[36]This question of flexibility exemplifies the fundamental nature of some of the questions raised. As Oliver points out in his study of cultural flexibility among the Kamba, "A consideration of the factors of cultural adaptability and variation leads logically, if not inevitably, to a consideration of the nature of culture itself...we cannot speak meaningfully of variations...without concerning ourselves with the larger question of what it is that is varying". S.C. Oliver, "Individuality, Freedom of Choice, and Cultural Flexibility of the Kamba", American Anthropologist, Vol. 67, No. 2, April 1965, pp. 421-428.

to change, and on the necessity for the intrusion of powerful disruptive forces to stimulate change.[37] In fact, it is fair to say that the stability or inflexibility of traditional cultures and social structures is a basic assumption underlying his theory of social change. Even a cursory examination of relevant literature indicates that this assumption is somewhat open to question, while there is the distinct impression that Hagen is not alone in entertaining it.

S.C. Oliver considers that many anthropologists have been too ready to accept uncritically the thesis that traditional societies are inherently stable and inflexible. He suggests that many acculturation studies portray "peoples clinging grimly to the culture of the 'good old days' in opposition to the presumed cultural breakdown of the present",[38] without much regard for the possibility that "cultures may differ significantly with respect to tightness of organization, flexibility, and capacity and readiness for change".[39] In his own study of the Kamba, Oliver found "a loose structural orientation, a shallow cultural commitment, and a relatively high degree of adaptability".[40] More specifically, he relates this adaptability to a weak and diffuse power structure, to an emphasis on individualism, and to an indifference on the part of the Kamba toward their own history and

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[37] Hagen, pp. 161-182, also pp. 174-180

[38] Oliver, Op. cit., p. 421

[39] Ibid., p. 422.

[40] Ibid., p. 427.

traditions. Quoting a number of earlier observers, Oliver presents a picture of an atomistic society characterized by mutual suspicion and mistrust that is in some ways rather remarkably similar to accounts of North American Indian cultures.

Similarly, Belshaw notes that traditional Fijian society contained "many highly flexible and adaptive elements" conducive to modernization.[41] Chance says that the Eskimos of Kaktovik in Alaska were able to adapt successfully to rapid change precipitated by the establishment of a DEW Line radar site nearby, in part because "the people had a predisposition to change already built into their socio-cultural system in that a greater value was placed on adaptability than on conformity".[42] Redfield found in the traditional culture of a village in Yucatan values conducive to economic growth and modernization, and notes that in their high valuation of industry, thrift, and

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[41] C.S. Belshaw, Traditional Exchange and Modern Markets, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965, p. 44.

In elaboration of this point, Belshaw says of Fijian society that "Patrilineages combined, recombined, segmented, and separated to provide village residential and co-operative units, and beyond these to develop political and territorial groups with military power....the power and status of a lineage or its leader depended partly on its own prowess and partly on the alliances it could muster. Internal prowess depended on agricultural production and ritual standing, and above all the entrepreneural ability to generate and control events of ceremonial significance..." Belshaw suggests that these elements of aboriginal culture and social structure have made possible certain adaptive modes of response to modernizing influences, including orientations to co-operative effort and to the accumulation of wealth. p. 45.

[42] N.A. Chance, "Culture Change and Integration: An Eskimo Example", American Anthropologist, Vol. 62, No. 6, December 1960, pp. 1028-1044

productive effort, "these villagers had much of the Protestant ethic before ever they heard of Protestantism".[43] Mead observes that the Manus whom she studied were "most favourably inclined toward change"[44] because certain factors in the traditional culture imparted a "sense of being driven and oppressed by a tyrannical system"; the Manus seized upon new ways with "great avidity", partly because of their driving discontent with things as they were".[45]

It is interesting that despite the diversity of cultures observed, so many researchers have reached the conclusion that traditional societies are by no means universally characterized by stability, inflexibility, and resistance to change. Yet Hagen sets out to sketch an "equilibrium" model of traditional society, incorporating precisely these elements.[46] While the adequacy of such a model seems open to question, further research would be needed to establish the precise limitations on its usefulness as a tool for the analysis of social change.

The Emphasis on Disparagement

It was suggested that while emphasizing disparagement as the cause of retreatism, Hagen neglects other factors which may also function to induce retreatist forms of behaviour.

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[43] Robert Redfield, A Village That Chose Progress, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950, p. 157.

[44] Margaret Mead, New Lives for Old, New York: William Morrow and Company, 1956, p. 458.

[45] Ibid., p. 158

[46] Hagen, p. 180.

Conceivably, members of disprivileged groups may exhibit apathy, passivity, and related manifestations of retreatism not because they are disparaged (or not for this reason alone), but because they perceive alternative behavioural modes to be unrewarding. It is reasonable to hypothesize, for example, that negative achievement orientations may stem from the perception that economic success and upward social mobility are impossible, and from an accompanying sense of resignation in the face of hopeless odds. It also seems possible that other aspects of retreatism, including lack of future time perspective, low expectations for satisfaction in life, and low energy level, may likewise result from a sense of resignation or futility. These speculations are, of course, reminiscent of the formulation advanced by Merton, who speaks of retreatism as one of several possible adaptations to "pressures created by the discrepancy between culturally induced goals and socially structured opportunities".[47]

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[47] Merton, Op. cit., p. 178
Although Merton's formulation emphasizes the "success goal" in modern American society and has therefore been described as "culture bound", nevertheless it seems possible that discrepancies similar or analagous to those he specifies may operate in other societies as well, including societies in which aspirations to upward mobility are not culturally prescribed for members of all social groups. If we consider only those relatively acculturated Indians who have internalized white middle class values in some degree, it becomes possible to envisage goals-means discrepancy which is identical with that hypothesized by Merton. In theory, Indians who become highly committed to the success-value and who find themselves blocked from avenues to achievement could turn to any of the adaptive modes in Merton's typology, including retreatism. D.H. Clairmont suggests that certain of these adaptive modes occur in "young settlement natives" who have become oriented to white middle class values in the Mackenzie Delta. See his Deviance Among Indians and Eskimos in Aklavik, N.W.T., Ottawa: Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, 1963.

There was abundant evidence that many people at Trout River perceived a lack of opportunity for self-betterment, and experienced a consequent sense of hopelessness or resignation. Many spoke of the uselessness of pursuing traditional economic activities, either because the fish and game had disappeared or because of legal restrictions on the exploitation of these resources. Others spoke of the difficulty and even futility of seeking wage employment, either because employers would not hire Indians, or because they themselves lacked the necessary skills. Repeatedly, Indians were heard to say that "there's nothing here for us to do", or "we've got nothing to start with", or "if only we had the equipment we could do something for ourselves". It is suggested, therefore, that attitudes of hopelessness and resignation probably contributed significantly to retreatism at Trout River, and that in some degree they functioned independently of the perception of being disparaged.

S. Schulman employs the concept of "intellectual under-development" in explaining essentially retreatist behaviour among disprivileged social groups in Columbia.[48] The intellectually underdeveloped are restricted in their access to knowledge; consequently there are restrictions on their ability to cope with new situations and to solve new problems which cannot be met by recourse to traditional means. These restrictions, coupled with the perception of occupying an inferior social position, contribute to "a psychosocial milieu...

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[48] S. Schulman, "Intellectual and Technological Under-development: A Case Study -- Colombia", Social Forces, Vol. 46, No. 3, March, 1968, pp. 309-317.

that is dominated by passivity".[49] The "knowledge-denied person" who encounters strange and unfamiliar circumstances is liable to "retreat from the new situation or react to it in an 'illogical' way".[50]

Although Schulman writes with special reference to disprivileged groups in Colombia, his analysis seems just as applicable to the disprivileged inhibitants of Indian reservations in North America. It was apparent that over the years a sizeable proportion of the population at Trout River had repeatedly and habitually retreated from or rejected changes of every kind, changes ranging from the earlier introduction of hydro-electric power to the later initiation of co-operative economic enterprises. There is every reason to suspect that this persistent and largely passive resistance to change resulted in part from restrictions on access to knowledge and consequently limited intellectual horizons, as well as from the perception of being disparaged by the agents of change.

Some Neglected Aspects of Groups

The thesis that retreatist modes of adaptation are characteristic of Indians on reservations, and that a pre-condition of change is the emergence of a group capable of protecting the new and 'deviant' values and cognitions of its members, may be acceptable as far as it goes; however, it neglects certain aspects of group structure and group process with may have significance for a theory of social change.

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[49] Ibid., p. 316

[50] Ibid., pp. 313-314

In the first place an innovative group, like any group once formed, can mould and change (not just reinforce or protect) the attitudes and values of its members, and indeed may determine important aspects of each member's behaviour. The four cases of apparent value conflict in leaders, cited earlier, seem to illustrate such attitudinal and behavioural change. The case of Martin Favreau is particularly germane since he appears to have undergone a complete conversion from strong opponent to ardent champion of the co-operative cause in a period of about three months. Whatever propensities to conversion he may have harboured prior to his co-optation into the movement are, of course, unknown, but the more obvious and overt manifestations of this transformation occurred after he joined the leadership group.

Furthermore, a member of an organized, task-oriented group may not necessarily or even usually behave within the group as a whole personality; that is to say, his behaviour may not be determined by his entire set of values and cognitions, but by what he perceives to be relevant in the context of the group. He tends to behave in ways appropriate to the role assigned to him by the group, to do what the group expects of him, and not simply to follow his personal inclinations. Robert Faris points out that

> ... an organized group is not composed of persons, but of aspects of persons, and the aspects are quite different according to the place each person has in the organization. Attempts to predict the behaviour of an organization from the characteristics of the members as whole persons fail because a considerable part of the whole person is irrelevant, and also because the behaviour of the man who acts in an office may be detached from other aspects

of his personality.[51]

It is worth mentioning also that members of a group may feel committed to group values and goals in varying degrees. Some may be only marginally committed; some may begin their period of membership with marginal commitment and under the group's influence become progressively more committed, or they may not. In spite of these fluctuations in the orientations of the membership, the group may continue to function over time as a viable decision-making unit.

Several members of the elite group seemed to harbour varying degrees of ambivalence toward co-operative values and goals. Moreover there was evidence that one leader was not merely ambivalent, but rather remained covertly opposed to the co-operatives even after two years, during all of which time he was a member of the band council which consistently endorsed and supported the pursuit of co-operative goals. He gave no outward indication of his opposition either during interviews or at council or other meetings, yet two informants said that he privately denounced the co-operatives. As a member of a group which officially supported the co-operative movement this councillor behaved within the group not as a "whole person", but rather in accordance with the group's expectations.

The foregoing considerations suggest not only that group decisions do not necessarily reflect the attitudes and values of all the members in the group, but that groups engaged in activity leading to social change may not consist entirely of 'innovative personalities'. It seems conceivable that for reasons of self-interest some individuals

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[51] Robert Faris, "Interaction Levels and Intergroup Relations" Intergroup Relations and Leadership, ed. by M.Sherif, New York, Wiley 1962, p.36

may seek and retain membership in such a group without themselves being more than marginally committed to group goals, and without harbouring values and cognitions conducive to innovation and creativity. In this connection, it should be recalled that about one half of the Trout River elite showed orientations to dependency[52] and perceptions of powerlessness,[53] and three so-called leaders scored as "moderately retreatist" in the application of our improvised scaling procedure.[54] The performance of such individuals may serve to inhibit the achievement of group goals, or the group may achieve in spite of them. Alternatively, they may contribute to goal achievement simply by meeting the minimum standards of performance requisite for continued membership in the group, or under the group's influence they may in time become more highly committed and raise their performance to a level exceeding the minimum standards.

All this calls into question the idea that for change to begin there must first be a solidary group whose members all possess innovative or creative capacities and share the same values, cognitions, and motivations conducive to change. It seems just as likely that change may be initiated by a group consisting of a minority of innovators with relatively high commitment to group goals, and a majority of followers who, although less committed and perhaps not at

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[52]See Tables 3 and 4, pp. 72 and 74 respectively.

[53]See Table 8, p. 82, and text, p. 88.

[54]See Table 19, p. 121.

all inventive, provide varying degrees of moral and administrative support.[55] Hagen does not deal explicitly with the possibility of marginal commitment, neglects the fact that individuals in organized groups do not bring their whole personalities into play in performing roles assigned by the group, and does not deal with the implications of the group's capacity to determine some aspects of the behaviour of its members. The point is not that Hagen's formulation is necessarily wrong, but that it is something of an oversimplification, and fails to take into account the complex nature of task-oriented groups.

Concluding Remarks

Hagen's broad theoretical framework incorporates the perspectives of a number of disciplines, including economics, sociology, psychology, and psychoanalysis. Focusing primarily on the sociological dimension, we have sought to relate selected aspects of the theory to data gathered on an Indian reservation. For reasons stated at the

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[55]Apparently this was the case at Trout River. Reference was made earlier to a leadership "nucleus" consisting of a few members of the elite who seemed at once highly committed and highly innovative relative to others in the group. It was mentioned that only five or six individuals were active (showed high commitment) in establishing the first co-operative in 1962; speaking somewhat impressionistically it seems fair to say that very few more could be classified as "highly committed" in 1964, despite the fact that in the intervening years the number of individuals involved in the management of co-operatives had approximately doubled. Of the few who were highly committed, it is reasonable to hypothesize that still fewer would obtain high scores on any scale designed to measure innovative capacity. Briefly, the majority of those here classified as leaders appear to have been essentially followers.

outset, one purpose has been to illustrate these selected aspects and hence to underline their plausibility, rather than actually to test the theory or any portion of it. At the same time, the relevant formulations have furnished a perspective for interpreting our data and, more generally, for viewing developments on the reservation during a period of relatively rapid social change. Furthermore, our field observations have been helpful in determining what appear to be certain theoretical inadequacies.

Finally a word should be said about the value of a theoretical approach to social change which combines the perspectives of several disciplines. This broad approach provides a healthy counterbalance to an opposite tendency among social scientists, a tendency to adopt narrow and unnecessarily restricted points of view, rigidly bounded by the real or imagined confines of particular disciplines and sub-disciplines. It seems fair to say that such intensive specialization can function as a perceptual screen, blinding the investigator to phenomena relevant to the object of investigation. Hagen suggests that this is what has happened to many of his fellow economists in their efforts to explain why economic growth has occurred in some societies and not in others. Also, anthropologists point to the necessity of incorporating inter-disciplinary perspectives in studying problems of acculturation. Chance says, for example, that valuable insights can "accrue by combining the study of intra-psychic processes occurring <u>within</u> acculturating individuals with those interpersonal

processes occurring between acculturating individuals".[56] and Barnouw points to the need to take into account personality, cultural, historical, and socio-economic variables in studying differential rates of acculturation.[57] We suggest therefore, that despite its obvious inadequacies, Hagen's synthetic approach constitutes a significant contribution to the study of social change.

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[56] N.A. Chance, "Acculturation, Self-Identification, and Personality Adjustment" American Anthropologist, Vol. 67, No. 2, April 1965, pp. 372-393.

[57] Barnouw, Op. cit., p. 76

APPENDIX I

Further Notes on Method and Sources of Data

Methods employed in the research included participant observation, informal interviews and conversations, formal semi-structured interviews, attendance at meetings of community organizations, and the study of materials on Indian Affairs Branch files in local agency, and regional offices, and at Branch headquarters in Ottawa.

On the reserve, care was taken to avoid identification with any faction or interest group. An effort was made to minimize the possibility of being identified with the Indian Affairs Branch, or with any government agency. Informants were told that the study was sponsored by the Hawthorn Indian Research Project, described as an independent temporary organization with headquarters at the University of British Columbia, directed and staffed by social scientists, and established to investigate Indian problems throughout Canada over a two-year period. It was emphasized that the present study was part of a larger program that included, and would continue to include, similar studies in other communities.

When questioned, or where it seemed otherwise necessary, informants were told that the government had in fact requested the research and provided the funds, but that no conditions were attached, and the Indian Research Project was completely independent of

government influence and direction. Most persons seemed to accept these explanations, although it seems likely that some did not understand them, while others chose not to believe them. The importance of stressing independence from the administration was demonstrated on at least one occasion, when an informant refused to be interviewed until convinced that the investigator was not "just a goddam government man".

Community leaders were told that the central purpose of research was to study the ways in which they made decisions and tried to solve reserve problems. In most cases, attention to problem solving processes was de-emphasized, or mentioned not at all, in explaining the objectives to Indian informants outside the leadership group. With a few exceptions, rank and file band members were told simply that the aim was to identify reserve problems and to seek suggestions for solutions. All informants were given firm assurance that they would not be quoted by name or otherwise identified.

Interviewing

First contact with the band was made through an Indian Affairs official, who introduced me to the Chief and one or two other members of the leadership group. This was followed by a meeting with the council and with leaders of other reserve organizations, during which the aims of the study were outlined, and permission was sought to carry out the research. Thereafter, I ranged freely over the reserve, concentrating initially on establishing rapport and on holding informal interviews with a number of leaders. While informal, these interviews employed a set of predetermined questions which, as far as

possible, were asked in the course of normal conversation. Notes were neither consulted nor taken during these informal sessions. Opinions were obtained about some of the main problems and issues in the community, and about the nature of relationships among the various organizations on the reserve.

On completion of this exploratory phase, a program of formal interviewing was begun, and proceeded concurrently with a continuing effort to maintain informal contacts with the leadership group, and generally to observe activities and social relationships in the community. Two separate but related interview guides were constructed for use with more or less clearly defined groups in the community, labelled the "elite" and the "rank and file". Initially, the elite were defined as all those band members holding "offices" in organizations on the reserve. These included members of the band council, executive members of three co-operatives, the school, health, and church committees, and members of the community newspaper's editorial board. So defined, the elite consisted of 27 individuals occupying a total of 37 more or less identifiable offices.

For several reasons, the advisability of focusing attention on a more narrowly circumscribed group soon became apparent. In the first place, a number of so-called offices were obviously minor, and preliminary enquiries led to the conclusion that their incumbents wielded little if any influence in the main stream of band affairs. Again, the leading executive members of certain relatively inactive and apparently uninfluential organizations were also key members in other organizations which held central positions in the economic

structure of the community. In these cases, only the dominant members of peripheral organizations were retained in the elite group, and then only because they held other positions of greater influence in some other body. Since the focus of the study was on community development activities, it was decided finally to concentrate attention on what can be called the "political-economic elite", consisting of band council members, together with officials and members of the boards of directors of the three co-operatives. The political-economic elite contained 18 persons, but unfortunately the criteria for selection excluded a few informal leaders, among them an articulate and persuasive man who was chief spokesman for opponents of the co-operative movement. He was not ignored, but was treated as a special case.

The interview guide used with the political-economic elite contained a core of 38 questions. Most of these questions were asked of 15 persons in the 18-member elite. They ranged from simple enquiries about the sizes of the respondent's house and family to questions designed to test value orientations and to gather information about community relations. Four sets of additional questions were constructed, each set specifically related to the activities of one of the four organizations of central concern to the study, and designed to gather additional information about that organization. Members of the band council were subjected to more questioning than those of any other group, and some respondents were asked more than 60 questions. The duration of single interviews ranged from 45 minutes to two hours, depending on the scope of the interview and the readiness of the informant to co-operate.

Twenty-four formal interviews were conducted with rank and file band members, defined as persons who held no offices in community organizations. These respondents were randomly selected from among 138 male heads of households. Since the purpose was to make comparisons with the elite, and since members of the elite group under study were all males, females were eliminated from the sample. A household was defined as a single occupied dwelling unit, and might contain a single occupant, a nuclear family, or an extended family. A list of heads of households which had been compiled in a local government office was used in selecting the sample.

A map purporting to show the location of every dwelling on the reserve, each labelled with the name of the household head, was obtained from a government office. Observation on the ground indicated that a few households were not included on the map. However, these omissions were few enough that for practical purposes, the map was regarded as constituting a full enumeration of households. These were numbered consecutively according to physical location, beginning at one end of the reserve and omitting households with female heads, or with heads classed among the elite. Numbers corresponding to those on the map were placed on slips of paper which were folded and mixed in a large container. The numbers were drawn randomly, and the corresponding householders were interviewed. Twenty-six names were selected in this fashion, and 24 interviews were completed. Lack of time meant that a larger sample could not be selected. Interviewing even this small number of persons involved repeated trips to homes scattered over a wide area. The sample size limits the significance of the findings, but

the results are at least suggestive, and could provide some basis for further research.

The purpose of interviewing rank and file band members was to determine if there seemed to be any important difference in attitudes and value orientations between that group and the elite. It was assumed that the elite consisted of individuals who had, on the average, greater propensity for commitment to the aims of community development before the community development program was initiated, or who had experienced some form of conversion after the program was underway. Broadly speaking, the rough working hypothesis governing this phase of research was that, at least in some ways, the goals of the elite with respect to community betterment did not correspond completely to the "felt needs" of the people. If this were the case, popular attitudes might tend to inhibit decision making processes, place restraints on goal selection, or exert pressure toward goal displacement.

In an effort to examine these notions, and with the realization that any conclusions could only be tentative, the following hypotheses concerning rank and file band members were formulated:

(1) that they were more alienated from the administration than the elite;

(2) that they were less committed than the elite to white middle class value orientations;

(3) that they would be less capable of stating the problems or needs of the community;

(4) that they would be less certain of the band's need and ability to manage its own affairs;

(5) that they would exhibit less appreciation of the value of education;

(6) that they would exhibit greater concern for the protection of treaty rights;

(7) that they would show relative disinterest in community activities generally and in the co-operative movement particularly, and would tend to be ambivalent or uncertain about the worth of co-operatives;

(8) that they would be critical of the band council on the ground that the council did not provide the services which they believed it should provide.

Respondents in the rank and file sample were asked a total of 31 questions, of which 19 were identical to those asked of the elite. Single interviews lasted from 30 minutes to more than an hour. As with the elite, a good deal of flexibility was maintained in presenting the questions. Standardized probes were used with a few questions, but in general if a respondent did not appear to understand a question as first presented, it was re-phrased in any way that might make it more understandable. This semi-structured approach was necessary because of the generally low level of education among respondents, and because some had difficulty with English. However, the language problem was not serious, and certainly not serious enough to warrant use of an interpreter, with all the risk of bias that this might have added.

Of course band members were not the only source of information and opinion, and much material was gathered in conversations and informal interviews with non-Indians on the reserve and in the nearby

white community, including government officials, missionaries, and business people. Thanks to the co-operation of both Indians and whites, I was able to attend a variety of meetings, including meetings of the co-operatives, the band council, and the school committee.

APPENDIX II

The Interview Schedule

Following is the interview schedule (or guide) used with the random sample of "rank and file" respondents. Items (1) to (13) inclusive, and (25) to (31) inclusive, were used likewise with respondents in the leadership group. Although structured, interviews were conducted as casually and informally as possible. Prior to the beginning of each interview, the respondent was told about the general objectives of the research project, with emphasis being placed on the effort to identify community problems.

This was an exploratory study and some items were, of course, much more useful than others. Item (6) was poorly formulated and yielded unsatisfactory results. Similary, Item (10) seemed to be of little use in seeking to identify individuals with negative orientations toward work.

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1. (a) I'd like to begin by asking you this: what would you say, offhand, are some of the problems facing the people on the reserve today?

   (b) And what do you think is the most important problem?

   (Probe) Well what do you think the people <u>need most</u> for a better life?

   If the respondent hesitated unduly, this question was returned

to at the end of the interview.

2. Does it ever worry you that the Indian people may be losing their treaty rights?

3. Are you satisfied, or not satisfied, with the way the federal government is protecting your treaty rights?

4. What do you think <u>are</u> your main treaty rights?

Now I am going to read several statements, and ask you if you <u>agree</u> or <u>disagree</u> with them. Remember there are no right or wrong answers - it's just your personal opinion I'd like to have.

5. In general, the white man has grown rich from the land that once belonged to the Indian, while the Indian still has less than he needs for a decent living. Because of this, the Indian has a right to expect the white man to share some of his wealth.

Agree_____ Disagree_____

6. It is good for a man to work for his living, and to look after himself when he can, but when the government is willing to help him, he is wise to rely on that help.

7. The government in Ottawa has shown many times that it does not keep its promises to the Indian people.

8. There isn't much point in worrying about the future, because we never know what it will bring.

9. Years ago when the treaty was signed, the Queen promised to look after the people for as long as the river flows, and for this reason, the Indian people should be able to depend on the

government to look after their needs.

10. Suppose a man plants a garden, and he finds that the weeds grow faster than the vegetables. He works in the garden in much of his spare time, but still the weeds are choking out the vegetables. This man doesn't want to spend all his spare time in the garden, because he wants time to visit with his friends. What should he do? (PAUSE) Should he work a little harder, spending more time in the garden and giving up his pleasant talks with his friends, or should he stop working the garden, since it looks to him as if the weeds are going to win anyway?

11. Suppose a man is working in the mill (the pulp mill at Birch Rapids understood), and suppose that if he works eight hours a day, he can earn just enough money for his family to live on fairly comfortably. He can afford a fairly old car, a TV set, clothes for his children, and enough money to take his wife to the show once in a while.

    Suppose that if he worked two more hours a day, he would be able to afford a better car, a newer TV set, and more expensive clothes for his children. Also, he'd be able to put a little money in the bank. But to do all this, he wouldn't have much time to spend with his family or his friends, or to look at his TV set. Do you think he should work longer and have more money, both now and in the future, or should he take the time to enjoy life a little more, when he has the chance?

12. Do you think there is a need for Indians to manage more of their own affairs than they do?

13. (a) Do you think that, in general, the people are ready to take on more responsibility, right now, for managing their own affairs?

(b) If yes to (a) - Exactly what things do you think they should take over now, and manage themselves?

14. Would you agree or disagree with this statement? There is no use taking serious problems to the band council, because the band council cannot do anything about them.

15. Can you name the co-ops now on the reserve?

(Probe) Well, how many co-ops are on the reserve?

16. What is the purpose of the co-ops?

17. Are you a member of one of the co-ops, or have you ever been a member?

18. Do you think the co-ops are doing any good for the people?

19. Do you think the co-ops are doing any harm?

20. Do you ever go to band meetings?

21. When did you last go to a band meeting?

22. Do you ever read the Saukgeen News?

23. Do you ever vote in band elections?

24. Are you in favour or not in favour of Indian children going to the same schools as white children?

(Probe) Why are you in favour? (or not in favour?)

25. Do you think that education can be of much help to the Indian people, or not?

26. What is your main line of work?

27. Do you work the year round, or part of the year?

28. How many months of the year do you usually work?

29. May I ask how many years of schooling you completed?

30. How many people live in your home?

31. How many rooms do you have?

32. Religion of respondent: (usually known from records, and not asked).

33. Return to 1(a) and/or 1(b) if not previously answered. The question was reintroduced as follows: Now, we've talked about a lot of problems on the reserve; we've talked about treaty rights, education, ... (add employment, etc., if respondent mentioned it himself). Finally I'd like to ask you, which of all these problems we've talked about would you say is the most serious one facing the people on the reserve?

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