THE AFFECT OF THE POLITICAL
THE AFFECT OF THE POLITICAL
ON THE POLITICS AND PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERNALIZING THE INTERNATIONAL

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A Thesis Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy

McMaster University © by Michael N. Di Gregorio, January 2018
McMaster University DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (2018) Hamilton, Ontario
(Political Science)

TITLE: The Affect of the Political: On the Politics and Psychology of Internalizing
the International

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NUMBER OF PAGES: [ix, 261]
ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates the historical relationship between understandings of human emotion, and how they manifest in our understanding of the political. Specifically, this thesis returns to the presentation of individual political psychology in ancient Greece (Thucydides, Aristotle), the 17th and 18th centuries (Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant), and the 20th century (Schmitt, Fukuyama, Lebow) to illuminate how these understandings have shaped our idea of Sovereignty as an idea, institution, and practice. By turning to the rich history in political thought on emotion and affect, this thesis demonstrates a consistent and prolonged constitutive relationship between presentations of individual political psychology and international political order. This thesis also rehabilitates the full scope of affective insights into political phenomena—by turning to literature on rhetoric and aesthetics—in order to open up new space to critique common understandings of Sovereignty. Moreover, given that the institution and concept of Sovereignty is central to research in the disciplines of International Relations and Political Theory, this thesis also argues for a much-needed closure of intellectual space between these two branches of Political Science. In short, this thesis demonstrates the centrality of the politics of affect and the divergent and disparate pictures of individual political psychology that are taken for granted in defenses and critiques of the concept of Sovereignty.
Acknowledgements

I am not the first person unable to meet the task of adequate praise and thanks for all the friends and family who helped bring this project to fruition. Being “in the game” as long as I have means one accumulates many friendships, colleagues, teachers, and students, all of whom have had an influence on this project, big and small.

First, to my committee, Marshall Beier, Peter Nyers, and John Seaman, your examples of humanity, generosity, and scholarship were their own kind of education. I hope only that in some small way the example that all three of you set for me (and all of your students) lives on in this work. I recall many conversations about your graduate years, and your supervisors – know that the tradition you so fondly recall lives on in you. John Seaman took me under his wing during my Master’s year, and was a living testament to the tradition of excellent Theorists at McMaster with every conversation that we had. Peter Nyers never hesitated to be available with time and advice, and his breadth and depth of understanding are truly awesome. None of this project would be possible without Marshall Beier. Marshall’s encouragement during my MA that I could in fact “do IR” is, in hindsight, a true turning point for me. Marshall’s toleration, encouragement, and challenging of my often heterodox approach was always exactly what I needed to hear. For those of us that remember the community of his graduate seminars, and how formative they were for so many of us, it will be no surprise if I say that some ideas from those classes live on in this thesis.

On this score, one chooses a programme because of the faculty but one stays because of the colleagues. This is true of the generation of students that shared the fifth floor of Kenneth Taylor Hall with me, as we grew into our own McMaster School. Thank you to Mark Busser, Philippe Frowd, Heather Johnson, Calum McNeil, Jessica Merolli, Jennifer Mustapha-Vanderkooy, Scott Smith, Liam Stockdale, Nicole Wegner, Mark Williams, and Katie Winstanley for being the best graduate colleagues one could hope for and the continued (daily!) conversations. Thanks also to my wonderful class and office mates, Sarah Batten, Mohamed Khan, Koray Mutlu, and Jen Vermilyea.

People who deserve special mention for their personal and professional encouragement that was entirely unnecessary and entirely appreciated are Richard Stubbs, Peter Graefe, Catherine Frost, and James Ingram. James deserves a special note of gratitude from me, as I always felt he was an unofficial fourth member of my committee. I had the good fortune to be his TA for many years and learned a great deal from his example of scholarship. I would like to thank as well the incredibly generous and dedicated administrative staff in the Department of Political Science – Manuela Dozzi and Kathleen Hannan – who provided more support than any of us in the department could think possible. I am also grateful for the financial support of the Social Science and Humanities Research Council.
I would be remiss if I did not mention colleagues at other institutions that were influential at various times of writing this project: Matt Gravelle, Rob Joustra, and Rob Oprisko. Marco Paoli and I have had what is now a lifetime of conversations, and he was often the sounding board for the first formulations of these ideas. His clear sightedness on many philosophical points over the years have been endlessly helpful.

For the last three years I have found a welcome home in the startup and edtech community working at Top Hat, which has been a truly wonderful professional home for me. I want to thank especially Delan Hamasoor, Lindsay and Dovi Kregersen, Chandler Jolliffe, and Mumin al-Shawaf for their constant encouragement and persistent reminders to “finish your thesis, Mike.”

At various times one of Johnny Cash, Son House, Dave Grohl, and the symphonies of Ludwig Van Beethoven formed the soundtrack to writing this dissertation.

To my mother Mary Di Gregorio, and my in-laws, Paul & Elizabeth Bisson, and Madeleine Bisson & Quintin Peirce – your encouragement and ceaseless support as Elise and I both pursued graduate studies was appreciated more than you know. Near or far, all of you were always close at hand, and this project has been made better through your love and support for which I am truly grateful.

Two people deserve mention, though they are not able to read this. My late father Philip Di Gregorio was a tireless reader and thinker, an artist, humanist, and academic at heart. His influence can be seen in this project very clearly, as he was the person to push me to see C.S. Lewis as a political and historical thinker, and not simply a religious one (which is pivotal in Chapter 2 of this work). The late Peter MacKenzie, my history and politics teacher in high school who also left us far too soon, was the ideal of what a teacher and friend should be. He was the first to teach me anything about Hobbes and Rousseau, and set an example of magnanimity that was never matched. These two men are, in many ways, the silent audience for this project.

Thank you to our dogs, Molly (may you sleep soundly) and Sugar, who were constant late-night companions for every ounce of writing.

All of this said, my primary debt and dedication is to my wife Elise Bisson, without whom not one word could be written. You have been with me through each step of this journey, the highs and lows. This is your project as much as it is mine. In an ideal world I would dedicate not my first work but my best work to you, as that (and only that) would be just. As luck has it, my best work is now our life’s work together, as our sweet boy Wesley arrived just in time to be present for the end of this project. Thank you, Wes, for playing a part in helping me finish this thesis too, because of that one long nap you took on a Sunday afternoon that let me put the last few sentences onto the page.
For Elise
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List of Abbreviations

**APV**

**CP**

**EOL**

**FFM**

**GM**

**History**

**LD**

**Lev.**

**Levite**

**LST**

**ND**


“The same choice that a group of our ancestors found themselves facing thousands of years ago still stands before us today, and with the same unflagging intensity: a choice that is just as basic and categorical as then. How should we relate to Others? What attitude should we take to them?”

- Ryszard Kapuscinski, The Other
Introduction

“Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or justice to our enemies, justice will be done.” So said President George W. Bush in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 to a Joint Session of Congress on 20 September 2001.¹ For President Bush, the War on Terror ushered in a time of moral clarity for which there was no middle ground: “Every nation in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.” This dissertation is about the middle ground. It is about the middle ground precisely because the feeling and pursuit of justice which President Bush invoked, or the desire to see justice done, has long been presented as the central part of human political psychology. Plato, in the first presentation of a psychology that is explicitly political, places thumos (the part of the soul that experiences justice and injustice) in the middle of his tripartite scheme of appetite-spirit-reason. The final decision to be “with us” or “against us” is, to put it plainly, the final and least interesting decision in a series of affective, political, philosophical, and psychological events.

This thesis has two guiding lights: the individual and the international. My aim is to present the story of the unity of these two concepts that has simmered beneath the surface of the key debates in the discipline of International Relations (IR) and great books in the history of Political Philosophy that have shaped IR. My intention, however, is not to sanctify a tradition or to appeal to the authority of the

¹ The speech is available here: [http://www.c-span.org/video/?166196-1/presidential-address](http://www.c-span.org/video/?166196-1/presidential-address)
canon. My intention is to revisit this tradition in order to open up new space for critique within the tradition itself. It is for this reason that I (re)turn to the concept of Sovereignty as a problem or question rather than a settled institution (cf. Morgenthau 1946; Bartelson 1995a), throughout this project.

Sovereignty is the concept and the institution that is at the heart of IR, both as a discipline and also a practice of political organization. This thesis argues that our understanding of the modern variant of sovereignty has taken for granted the account of the human being that is at its foundation. I argue throughout this thesis that an attention to human emotions, passions, and political psychology—our affective capacities tout-court—discloses an account of humanity that is much broader than the adumbrated account of humanity that wears the mask of “human nature”. If we are able to understand something about the phenomenon of affect, especially something of its political importance, then we can also learn something about international relations.

This much is given away by the title of this project. To internalize the international is to take the first movements, stirring, and feelings of affect and emotion as the starting point of international politics. This is a more difficult point to argue, despite the ubiquity of attention paid to affective phenomena in political life (Massumi 2002; Massumi 2015). The essence of international relations—the kind, the class, the form of politics that IR represents—begins with our internal reactions to political phenomena. International relations begin with our affective responses
and the affective representations of the political. To use language that is somewhat more familiar, international politics is essentially and irreducibly constituted by reactions that are inside of me to events that are outside of me. To put the same thought in yet a different formulation, the invention of the phrase “foreign policy” was possible only with a radical alteration of our political view, taking what is foreign to be of primary political importance ahead of the familiar (this is the focus of Chapters 3 and 4, especially).

In this alteration of worldview, in this turning away from orienting political life around what is familiar and from what is one’s own, toward what is foreign or radically other, is the movement from antiquity to modernity. It is the movement, in political terms, from the question of the just and good regime as the fundamental question of political life to the question of the secure regime. Thomas Hobbes, more than any other thinker, is responsible for this reorientation.

This is best explained by enumerating the guiding assumptions in the chapters that follow in this dissertation:

1. Our affective capacities, in the form of feelings, passions, emotions, and so on, are the primary movers of politics and first instances of the political
2. Sovereignty, as a theoretical concept and practical institution, is based on a specific on understanding of this political psychology of emotion and affect
3. Because emotions are the essential representations of politics, emotions are therefore aesthetic representations of the political
(4) Affect and emotion are fundamentally relational; they are the internal states that are the beginning of relations with others.

The chapters of this dissertation focus on thinkers that had a key influence on Hobbes by his admission, or that take special issue with Hobbes’s political philosophy. The opening chapters rebuild the picture of political life with reference to the emotions and the passions as they exist in two key thinkers of Hobbes’s early period: Thucydides and Aristotle. Thucydides, despite being spoken of in the same breath as a founding father of realism along with Hobbes and Machiavelli, had a vastly different understanding of the primary emotional motivators in political life. Hobbes’s admiration for Thucydides is well documented but the deep disagreements between the two thinkers on their interpretation of individual political psychology in relation to regimes and institutions is too often overlooked. Chapter 3 of this dissertation returns to Thucydides’ *History of the Peloponnesian War* in order to rebuild Thucydides’ account of the compelling feeling of hope against Hobbes’s emphasis on fear. Likewise, Chapter 4 of this dissertation focuses on Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* because Hobbes’s highlights its importance to the picture of human passion upon which he builds his conception of sovereignty.

Returning to the thought of Thucydides and Aristotle on its own terms will allow us to see what decisions, amendments, distortions, and embellishments in their worldview for which Hobbes is responsible. It is my hope that by returning to thinkers that Hobbes identified as authorities one can open up a new space for
critique. The chapters the follow in the second half of the dissertation are devoted to thinkers that either critique or build on Hobbes’s picture of psychology and politics, such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Carl Schmitt, or provide a different picture of the centrality of emotion to universal political judgments, such as Immanuel Kant.

It should be clear by now that there is one last assumption that guides the work of this thesis:

(5) Any distinction between Political Theory and International Relations in thought or practice is non-existent. International Relations Theory is best understood as modern political theory.

I say this while acknowledging the important recent disciplinary interventions under the names of Comparative Political Theory (Dallmayr 2004; Williams & Warren 2013) and International Political Theory (Rengger 2000; Brown 2013) that demonstrate the definition of “political theory” is itself in transition. This said, the closing of the gap between these two sub-fields is on the plane of the questions that they ask. Schmidt (2002) locates in Held, Walker, and Connolly (all writing around the early nineties, in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War) questions of democracy that are being globalized or non-territorialized by political theory and international relations alike. These new questions are a better starting point than some bifurcation of responsibility between internal domestic governance and international order (as was the case for the second half of the twentieth-century).
This is a good start, but I would make the following amendment to the argument: International Relations is itself a political theory. By this I mean it has its own vision of the just and good political order. Political theory has always been concerned with the good life, with answering the question of how a community should govern itself under particular circumstances to best approximate a just and good regime. IR answers these questions with two words: sovereignty, security. What I aim to demonstrate throughout this dissertation is that the traditional relationship at the heart of political theory, that of citizen and the city, the soul and the regime, is replicated in the tradition of IR theory as a relationship between political psychology and international order. Thus, the fundamental relationship of particulars and universals is a common thread; indeed, given its prominence in the history of political philosophy, the presence of this dichotomy in IR is evidence that IR is not a separate subfield of political theory. It is evidence that IR is modern political theory, even its paradigmatic orientation.

Having said this, the globalizing and non-territorializing of IR and Political Theory must be qualified. Saying that Political Theory or IR is globalizing because one influences the other obscures the great privilege of the political and philosophic tradition out of which both of these disciplines emanate. Despite their superficial differences, they share a history that begins either with the poems of Homer or the books of Moses. It is the Liberal (if we are being specific, European Liberal) art of separation, the drawing of lines across the surface of the Earth, that has artificially
divided the study and experience of politics into contestable domains (Walzer 1984; Walker 2010). Still, it would be impossible to deny that it is precisely this tradition that continues to be the most influential in world politics. While there exist much older and mature outlooks on political and social life in Confucian (Hobson 2007) and Hindu (Sarkar 1919) traditions for example, we continue living in a world of Westphalian states. There are many, many, traditions through which one can know the world from the perspective of one’s particular life, the *cosmopolis* from one’s *polis* (cf. Agathangelou and Ling 2004). This thesis speaks about one of these ways-of-knowing, the one that has influenced the concept of Sovereignty more than any other, and the one whose assumptions about the nature of politics and the nature of human life exert the greatest influence.

With this in mind, my approach and approaches that identify as postcolonial and poststructural critiques all share the judgment that the biggest mistake IR theory makes is the story that it tells about itself. Recognizing the importance of unpacking this mistake and its political consequences is another point of agreement. Despite the fact that this thesis concentrates its attention on a series of privileged voices, names, and theorists (Aristotle, Rousseau, Kant, etc.), I therefore do not see an opposition between the intention of this project, and interventions guided by postcolonial, poststructural, or gendered critiques of the current international order: it is not this project or those but this project and those (cf. Bhabha 1994: 108ff.; Jabri 2014). My preference for speaking about books and authors generally recognized as
part of “the canon” and already privileged voices in modern politics rests on the hypothesis that there is an opportunity for critique to be developed by returning to these familiar places. Here my method and intention are similar to Walker’s (1993; 2009) in that both he and I recognize the critical value in returning to a text as a site of critique and political possibility.

Politics as we understand it and experience it is based on a concept of human nature (what I will call while discussing Rousseau and Schmitt a political anthropology). Yet this picture and image of human nature is vastly more complicated—intentionally so—in the texts that have come down as political gospel. As will become especially clear in chapters four and five, this project depends a great deal on the path-breaking work done by emotion theorists such as Carol Gilligan (1997), Virginia Held (2006), and Joan Tronto (1987). At issue in the research in the Ethics of Care is that the picture of human nature, of what it means to be a human being, has been unjustly and indefensibly adumbrated by modern political thought. There are different ways of knowing and communicating as human beings than the typical picture of the human-as-rational-actor model that has been so prevalent. Human political psychology is not simply rational. More importantly, human emotion in politics is not limited to the feeling of fear. This thesis agrees with this critique of modernity and its assumptions about human nature, but advances this critique in a different direction. As will become clear in my discussion of Thucydides and Aristotle, this gendered critique of modernity takes as its enemy a tradition that
is as fixed as words written in sand. The paradigm of the rational, self-interested, actor that seeks only to maximize power and profit should never have come to the prominence that it did. This fact is clear once one returns to the books that have apparently shaped this image of human political behaviour. Indeed, it is especially clear in the thought of Thucydides, writing in the fourth century BCE, that he is providing a comprehensive and thorough critique of politics grounded on precisely this picture of a power seeking, selfish, rational human being.

A reader with even a cursory familiarity with the discussion in Affect and politics will notice some startling omissions from this list of authors, specifically: Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, Martin Heidegger, and Benedict Spinoza. Their absence is intentional. While Spinoza’s formative influence on how affect and emotion is widely studied and known, the figure of Hobbes’s thought is yet again the silent interlocutor. This point is one that both Hobbes and Spinoza understood, and is one that has been left unremembered since then in the literature that followed. Consider, as an obviously starting point, John Aubrey’s biography of Thomas Hobbes, and specifically Aubrey’s report of Hobbes’s reaction after reading Spinoza. Hobbes replied when asked for his judgment on the Theologico-Political Treatise that Spinoza “cut through him a barre’s length” (i.e. Hobbes has had his “guts spilled” or his insides turned to the outside). What Hobbes means by this is that his ultimate intention, specifically with regards to his political theology and belief in Biblical revelation, was stated by Spinoza more explicitly and immoderately than Hobbes was
willing to do. This would seem a minor point of rhetoric and presentation. Yet, the entire disagreement is about the extent of divine political authority, and especially legitimate sovereign authority, in the light of affective political faculties and human emotion. The disagreement is about the precedence that is to be set between Affective authority and Political authority, or authority derived from strictly human sources versus authority derived from divine sources. Hobbes, intentionally, does not explicitly resolve this issue in *Leviathan*. Spinoza’s excommunication results from his immoderation when writing on precisely these issues. Hobbes’s Christian readers would have been fully aware of the implications of associating awe with worldly power; they also would have understood the implication of saying that the first thing that human beings hold in awe is their imagination (*Lev.* XI.26). That is, our imagination—where we experience, activate, and interpret the movement of emotion—is held in awe in the same manner as divine authority. The fear and hope that Hobbes focuses his attention on in his simile of the state of nature are but two ways that our imaginations figure into his grounding of modern sovereignty. This is the point of interpretation upon which Spinoza jumps. Though much ignored in international relations scholarship that seeks political insights by focusing on affect, treatments of Spinoza’s thought in the context of medieval philosophy, and especially medieval Jewish and Islamic philosophy, have understood his aim here. His *Ethics* precedes his *Theologico-political Treatise*; his discussion of affect precedes and is the precondition of his discussion of sovereign authority. *Individual* psychology
and answering the question, “What is a human being?” precedes any question about the just and unjust structures of domestic and international politics. The “barre’s length” that Spinoza cuts through Hobbes is revealing a much louder proclamation of atheism and thereby a brand-new foundation for sovereign political authority.

**B. To Affect and Be Affected**

All of these thoughts are worth a dissertation of their own, and the reasons that the focus of my attention is away from the tradition that has been popularized by Brian Massumi (2002; 2015) that runs from Spinoza, through William James and Martin Heidegger, to Deleuze and Guattari should now be clear. Massumi returns consistently to his synopsis of Spinoza’s definition of affect, which is consistently and intentionally presented self-referentially as “to affect and be affected”. The challenge to the reader, however, is that one will not find Massumi’s terse formulation in Spinoza’s *Ethics*. What one finds instead in Spinoza’s *Ethics* are postulates and formulations of the following character:

> By affect I understand affections of the body by which the body’s power of acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same times the idea of these affections. (*Ethics*, IIID3)

> For each one governs everything from his affect; those who are torn by contrary affects do not know what they want, and those who are not moved by any affect are

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2 If one appends the phrase “…in turn” to this definition, the parallel with Aristotle’s definition of citizenship becomes especially clear, though Massumi does not draw out this connection.
very easily driven here and there. (*Ethics*, IIIP2S, my emphasis)

Because each one judges from his own affect what is good and what is better, what is better and what worse it follows that men can vary as much in judgment as in affect. (*Ethics*, IIIP51S)

...an affect can neither be taken away nor constrained except through an opposite and stronger affect... (*Ethics*, IVP7D)

Man’s lack of power to moderate and restrain the affects I call bondage. For the man who is subject to the affects is under the control, not of himself, but of fortune. (*Ethics*, IV Preface)

Each of these passages indicates how Spinoza’s presentation and understanding of affect is not *ethical* so much as *political*, in the fundamental way that discussing the driving forces behind how one governs oneself, or exercises control and power over oneself and others is fundamentally political. For Spinoza, affect is at the root of our relations with other individuals, at the roots of our understanding of our identity, and the medium through which we form bonds within our political community. Spinoza’s presentation of affect is not unique so much as it is a capstone of a longstanding tradition of debate on the affective foundations political life.

My concern here is not which of Hobbes or Spinoza is *more correct*, but rather that a body of scholarly literature has focused on a narrow and limited set of insights that obscures the larger potential of using affect as the lens through which to view the political. What is worse is that following Spinoza’s insight that the dualism of body-
mind is utter fiction, contemporary scholarship has turned to flawed scientific studies, or turned in a flawed way to sound science. Ruth Leys (2011) identifies this clear tradition in the scholarship on affect scholarship that starts with Spinoza, and moves throughout Deleuze and Guattari, to Massumi and Connolly, but finds it lacking. Leys argues that this newfound interest in affect to explain political phenomena owes its understanding of the social impact of emotion to the “Basic Emotions” paradigm of Silvan Tomkins and Paul Ekman (Leys 2011: 439; Chapter 4 below). Leys highlights critiques of this paradigm that point to the unsound scientific basis of the experiments on which it stands, or the misapplication of conclusions from these experiments (Leys 2017). That influential emotion theorists like Antonio Damasio and Joseph LeDoux have ascribed to this framework in their own books is further proof of the extensive influence of the Tomkins-Ekman approach. The point of agreement between the cultural theorists that are reviving the study of affect, and the emotional psychologists that follow the Tomkins-Ekman emotional paradigm is, according to Leys, a “shared anti-intentionalism”:

What the new affect theorists and the neuroscientists share is a commitment to the idea that there is a gap between the subject’s affects and its cognition or appraisal of the affective situation or object, such that cognition or thinking comes “too late” for reasons, beliefs, intentions, and meanings to play the role in action and behavior usually accorded to them. The result is that action and behavior are held to be determined by affective dispositions that are independent of consciousness and the mind’s control. (Leys 2011: 443)
It is precisely this “anti-intentionalism” that Leys puts to the test in her research by interrogating the experiments that Massumi appeals to in his work.

It is worth remembering at this point the insight of Christine Sylvester (1996) that all of this theorizing has made people acting politically conspicuously invisible: theories “go to the individual level of analysis but they do not go to the ground” (Sylvester 2013: 614). People are doing international relations but IR is convening panels, publishing in journals, and having yet another debate about theory (Sylvester 2013: 621). This also reminds of Zalweski’s (1996) worry that we have all these theories and yet “the bodies keep piling up.” Her solution, of course, was more and better theory: one must not take the “bodies piling up” as an invitation to get back to basics and return to the same small horizon of approaches that bounds theoretical and political possibilities (Zalewski 1996: 350). It is in the spirit of this hope of returning human relations and lives lived to the centre of IR theory that I suggest we (re)turn to affect, thumos, and political psychology properly understood.

The chapters in this project interrogate this aforementioned “anti-intentionalism” by returning to a tradition of political philosophy that remains in the background of these interventions. In so doing, I aim to convince the reader of the truth of the following theses:

(1) Affect is the primary site of political life, and the first representation of the political. Therefore, this is evidence that feelings about justice and injustice are the primary movers of emotional political life
Sovereignty as a theoretical concept and political institution is built upon a specific understanding of the affective capacity of individual human beings. As such the traditional soul-regime framework gets replaced with the individual-international framework.

Given (1) and (2) one must rethink precisely what it means to do and theorize about modern political life.

C. Notes on Methodology

My method of analysis in each chapter will following a similar path to this one that I have just laid out. Rather than seeking to critique modernity by moving beyond it, I seek to open up critique by returning to modernity’s foundations. The path that I take to get here is through an interpretation of classic works from Antiquity and Modernity. My archive, so to speak, is the background conversation, or subtle dialogue that is taking place between epochs, in the works of political philosophy that have shaped ideas of the political.

There is an important point of contact between my method in this thesis and one of the key arguments of the thesis itself: the relationship between the individual and the international. This follows the common thread in political thought of linking the soul to the regime, to put it as simply as possible. What I argue is happening in the works that I discuss is that there is a lesson about reflecting assumptions about human nature onto general political principles and vice-versa. This follows the
insights of Nicholas Onuf, Friedrich Kratochwil, and Richard Ned Lebow, but also Homi Bhaba (1994) writing from the perspective of a response to colonialism. This thesis could easily be titled “Internalizing the Interstices”. But where these authors have their gaze fixed on international politics, I have mine fixed on the assumptions about human nature and political psychology that must be at the foundations of these political insights.

The first chapter of this project is devoted to my evaluation of the literature I in the field, its strengths and weakness, and the trend that I believe has been heretofore undeveloped that necessitates this project. Chapter two is devoted to a discussion of two of the noteworthy attempts at a new general theory of politics based on a specific understanding of political psychology. Francis Fukuyama’s *End of History and the Last Man* is often brought up in the context of its trumpeting of the American variant of capitalism and democracy after the end of the Cold War. What it is at a deeper level, however, is an attempt to discuss the questions of identity, recognition, and equality at the most universal level in political life by focusing attention on *thumos*, or political spirit. Likewise, Richard Ned Lebow, writing over twenty years later derives a universal theory of politics on the basis of *thumos* as well, with special attention for the initiation to *thumos* when discussing motives for seeking either war or peace. I begin by comparing these two approaches to *thumos* because the relationship between identity and political order, emotion and political structure, is presented in opposing ways. For Fukuyama these relationships are materialist; for
Lebow these relationships are ideational. What both agree on is the fact that political spiritedness is the seat of the passions and affect in general, and is thus worthy of one’s attention.

Chapter three moves on to an interpretation of Thucydides and his presentation of the “greatest movement” of war in his *History of the War between the Peloponnesians and Athenians*. Thucydides’ influence on political science cannot be understated, especially in the self-understanding of International Relations and the Realist interpretation to world order. As we will see, these readings are not how Thucydides understands his own work, and the lessons for politics are rooted in an understanding of political psychology (properly so-called) because we see a specific interpretation of human life that undergirds the political structures that are grafted on top of it. Returning to key episodes of his *History*, such as the Mytilenian debate and his account of the Civil Strife in Corcyra, reveal a much more nuanced picture of human motivation and emotion than is immediately apparent in the typical summaries of his views.

Chapter four forms a unit with chapter three. Chapter four discusses the formal political psychology of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*—specifically, his presentation of anger and hope and their political consequences—in light of Thucydides presentation of the same. The reason they form a unit is because of the influence that Thucydides and Aristotle have on Hobbes and his articulations of sovereign power and human passion. Hobbes is in many ways the central figure of this project,
and the chapters pivot (so to speak) between the thinkers that influenced his work, and the thinkers that took up his understanding of the passions and politics to critique it.

Chapter five presents a difficult conversation between Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Carl Schmitt on the theme of emotion and sovereignty, and how humanity forms particular bonds as a result of these common affections. Schmitt radicalizes Hobbes’s presentation, where Rousseau is commonly understood to present a more gentile picture of human nature. This chapter complicates both of those views, and demonstrates the centrality of affective politics to the understanding of communication and community, sovereignty and security, in both Rousseau and Schmitt.

Chapter six addresses the representative aspects of affect. Affect, after all, is the visible expression of internal emotion. As such, there is a clear need to address the communicative and representative politics buried in affective expression of the political. To do this I turn to the literature on the aesthetic turn in International Relations theory, in light of Immanuel Kant’s *Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view*. Kant’s *Anthropology* presents affect and passion as the first representative signs of political beliefs, and therefore the vista through which one can start to be autonomous. Implicated here is a theory of political judgment and decision making, or a clear path to claims about political responsibility from the aesthetic expression of affect.
My conclusion takes a bird’s eye view of the problem of passion and politics by discussing the treatment of *thumos* once again, the feelings of justice and injustice that it discloses, and what rethinking international relations in theory and practice around the idea of *thumos* entails. This recapitulation takes its bearings from the “End of IR Theory?” debate.

I want to emphasize the extent to which—broad and extensive as these chapters are in themselves—they only scratch the surface of what is needed to fully develop a study on the “affect of the political” or to fully measure the possibilities in “internalizing the international.” But one is always in search of beginnings.
Chapter I

Emotion’s Empire and Sovereignty’s Affect

Movements of thought within International Relations [IR] have long been concerned with the study of empires, be they the ancient empires of Athens, Rome, and China, or more recently the Dutch, British and American empires.¹ But the study of empires necessarily goes well beyond the study of the mechanics of imperial rule: the study of imperial rule is to provide an account of the beginning and source of political authority. Put another way, to study empire is to study the beginning of political things. The ideas of beginnings and origins are so coincident with the study of empire and ruling that the opening line of the Gospel of John, famously rendered “In the beginning he was the word” can be literally rendered, “in empire he was the reason.”² An account of empire—of arché—must necessarily be an account of the beginning of politics and of political questions; the question of empire is ipso facto the question of the source of power and authority. IR, therefore, can be understood as concerning itself with beginnings: it is concerned with providing an account of the

¹ I will follow Martin Hollis and Steve Smith’s (1991: 10) useful convention of capitalizing IR when referring to it as a discipline of political science, and reserve the phrase “international relations” for discussing its subject matter.

² The Gospel of John, 1.1. In the original Greek, the sentence reads ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος and is traditionally rendered “in the beginning he was the word.” However, ἀρχῇ [arché] means in a larger sense the beginning or source of political authority, and can be translated as “beginning” or “empire” or “political authority.” λόγος [Logos] simply renders “word” or in the broader sense “reason” or “rational account”. The first line of John’s Gospel, therefore, carries with it the notion of empire as the founding or origin of political authority, and the coincidence of political and theological authority.
The beginning of politics, or an account of the beginning of political relations simply, despite the qualifier international. It is the study of what is first for us, even if what is first in a political sense is foreign to us. The prominent place that the account of empire traditionally holds in IR is of a piece with this desire to account for origins, and especially demonstrative of the desire to account for the beginning of political relations. Where do politics begin? What is the beginning, the *archē*, of politics? This is a question that IR is in a privileged place to answer.

The first and obvious rejoinder to this focused set of questions is that IR is first and foremost concerned with relations between states and nations, and that individual political relations occur only subsequently to the relations between countries. But to presume IR focuses solely on relations between states is already to presume the existence of political relations. The nation, or the state, presumes community, family, reason, and culture; that is, the interaction of nations already presumes a number of relations which have yet to be examined but must be examined in order to account for the beginning of political relations. How do we relate to each other? What manner are these relations? Simply, what is the nature of

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3 For example, consider Kenneth Waltz’s (1986: 116) observation that balance of power between states is the most likely candidate for a “distinctively political theory of international politics.”

4 This question is the focus of the opening chapters in Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s *Essay on the Origin of Languages*, of which the most famous—and for IR the most relevant—commentary is Jacques Derrida’s *Of Grammatology* (esp. pp. 242-268). For Rousseau, political communities are built on the accidental occurrence of familial relations, and these familial relations are dependent on the development of language. Language, says Rousseau, develops out of our emotional and instictual reactions to the outside world. See *Essay on the Origin of Languages*, Ch. I ¶1-10, Ch. II ¶3, and *Discourse on Inequality*, Part I ¶23-29. Rousseau is responding here to Aristotle’s Politics (1305a1ff.) and the opening verses of Genesis (2:18-20) where Adam is seen inventing human speech and naming animals. The ambitious reader will also consult Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura*, Book V.
political relations? Famous and currently influential formulations of an answer to this question include Carl Schmitt’s friend-enemy distinction in his *Concept of the Political*, or Michel Foucault’s (1982) suggestion that these questions focus on the “economy of power relations” within politics. Hannah Arendt (1968: 150-5) has argued that politics requires action and performance, “for to be free and to act are the same” and it is only through political actions that principles are made manifest in the world. More recently, and most relevant to recent IR scholarship, Jacques Rancière has argued that politics is the confrontation of the logic of exclusion with the logic of the distribution and legitimization of power, places, and roles: politics is the confrontation between the “part that has no part” and its accompanying desire to be heard, with the established order of social and power relations (Rancière 1998: 28ff.; cf. Manning 2004).

Even among this small sample of concepts of politics there appear to be two types of political relations: those that are physical and those that are non-physical, or approaches that emphasize the material versus the immaterial aspects of political relations. Material approaches are far and wide in theoretical approaches to IR. Both neorealism and structural realism emphasize the distribution of economic power and security resources when devising theories to understand the international order (Waltz 1979: 39-59; Gilpin 1981: 50-105). Liberalism and marxism also share this concern with the distribution of economic resources in relation to the behaviour of states and classes, where the former sees only benefits with capitalist expansion
and the latter only oppression (Keohane 2005: 18-64). Constructivist and functionalist approaches begin with similar assumptions about the way material conditions affect the preferences and rational calculus of international actors, though they introduce a greater concentration on the role that ideas and norms play in international relations, as well as developing a place for the concept of identity (Wendt 2001; Fearon & Wendt 2002; cf. Bull 1977: 40-52). Feminist critiques of these mainstream approaches begin by asking questions about the material condition of women compared to men within political societies (Peterson 2003: 21-43).5

The most immediate form that material political relations take on involves relations of the body. This interpretation of politics is especially prevalent thanks to Giorgio Agamben’s (1998) influential distinction between \( \zeta \rho \varepsilon \) (qualified political life) and \( \beta \iota \alpha \sigma \) (material life as such). Due to Agamben’s reflections and his expansion of Foucault’s understanding of biopolitics,6 there has been a re-centring of the body in IR analyses—especially in the subfield of security studies—with recent interventions posing questions about whether the “politics of touch” may contest traditional understandings of the use of state force and relations between different body

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5 Cf. Tickner (1988), Enloe (2004: 99-130). The feminist critique of rationality centres on the traditional duality of rationality-passion paralleling active-passive states, which gets mapped onto masculine-feminine gender constructions. The difficulty is that passion as passivity was not implied by the word \textit{passion} until passions became “emotions” in Eighteenth Century philosophy. The passion of Achilles is an active state, because it was fuelled by an angry desire for justice or retribution. The Passion of the Christ, by contrast, was a passive state where Christ appears to have suffering thrust upon him, though the term has gone on to evolve in meaning and lose some of its original force as it has come into contact with scientific investigations of the soul. For a comprehensive treatment of this theme see Dixon (1999: 301-310).

6 See also Foucault (2008: 19-22, 27-30).
This politics of touch takes its bearings from Jacques Derrida’s thoughts in his *Politics of Friendship*, but it is not without its dangers. While recognizing the emancipatory possibility inherent in what Stephen Dougherty (2011: 83-6) has termed the “rhetorics of touch,” a “post-deconstructionist” approach to these rhetorics must recognize that this reorientation of the body is the hypothetical basis for resistance to the power of the state, but also must recognize that unleashing this resistant power of “emancipatory touch” opens up new avenues for oppression because the state has its *own* “oppressive touch.”

This concentration on the role of the body in politics makes strategic use of the mind-body dichotomy that has so infused political psychology since René Descartes wrote *The Passions of the Soul*, and uses the foundation of rationalist human science for the sake of critiquing rationalism (Papoulias & Callard: 2010 33-6). Rationalist or cognitivist approaches proceed with the assumption that emotions are visceral bodily reactions that corrupt the calm reasoning of the mind. However, beginning with William James’s two-part study for the journal *Mind* (1884), the body and the emotions begin to be thought of as connected. James’s hypothesis is that bodily states follow perception, and that perception or emotion in the absence of the associated bodily reaction would be “purely cognitive in form, pale, colourless, 

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7 Manning’s (2007: 49-60) insights seem impossible without Agamben’s insights into the confrontation between sovereign power and the body.

8 A more specific word to use than psychology is *pathology* (πάθος = passion, λόγος = [rational] account), though “pathology” has been burdened with implying disease, sickness, and malady. When I use this word, I have the literal definition in mind. I would also like to distinguish pathology from psychology insofar as *psyche* [ψυχή] implies more than just the passions but reason and appetite as well.
destitute of emotional warmth” (James 1884: 190). Thus does a renewed focus on bio-politics usher in the opportunity to reconsider the role of the emotions or the passions in politics. We can relate to each other and to the state by touch, through bodily interactions, and material connections; however, there is a strong case to be made that the prima facie interaction and political relation is not physical but emotional or affective, and scholars have increasingly emphasized the important role that immaterial and emotional relations play in the theatre of politics.

Prior to any relation and movement of the body, the first manifestations of relations are emotional and passionate, such as anger, fear, pity, hatred, friendship, and so on. Approaches that recognize this can be divided into two broad but distinct groups. First, there is the desire to integrate psychological approaches for understanding decision-making into IR in a way that does not dismiss emotional reactions as either mistakes or cognitive errors in judgement (Mercer 2005; McDermott 2004a). This approach descends from Charles Darwin’s The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, though its philosophic locus classicus (of which it is in tension) must be Descartes’ The Passions of the Soul. At the risk of imposing disciplinary boundaries where there ought to be none, this cognitivist and psychological approach has spawned a body of critical work within IR that we can identify as the Affective turn, or part of a critical political psychology that treats questions of reparative justice, reconciliation, memory, and trauma while appealing to
homologous scientific authority.\textsuperscript{9} The second less well travelled approach to emotions and affect in Political Science (and especially not travelled in IR) concentrates on this assumption that psychological explanations for political behaviours are incomplete, and a different political psychology, an account of the soul in politics, is required. This approaches makes explicit what the orthodox and critical approaches to political psychology keep opaque: a reinvigoration of the study of the soul, of psyche, is required to truly lay claim to the insights and critiques of political psychology. By treating the topic of the emotions philosophically it looks to the tradition of political theory for an understanding of what it means to act politically and to be part of a political community. It is this philosophic return in political psychology that, I will argue, is the most fruitful, the most important, yet the most neglected within the literature in IR. By incorporating questions of soulcraft alongside questions of statecraft, this approach incorporates an understanding of the emotions into the foundations of the institution sovereignty and sovereign power. As the chapters of this study will demonstrate, statecraft is grafted onto soulcraft in an attempt to govern, control, and manage the political and unstable passions: statecraft and the invention of sovereignty are conjured up against soulcraft and the internal development of emotions, passions, and affect. IR has a privileged

\textsuperscript{9} n.b. I dislike both of these categorical labels. The Affective “Turn” implies IR has never dealt with affect-emotion-passion before, and one of the main points that I would like to advance is that this turn is actually a \textit{return}. While I prefer the implications of the label “critical political psychology”, this implies too close an association with the body of literature in political psychology proper. The approach here speaks to much more than this by forcing us to consider what it means to \textit{do} political psychology, and what subjects of study catch our attention.
opportunity to engage this dialectical relationship precisely because the institution of sovereignty is the concept around which all approaches within IR gravitate for or against, and without which international relations would be an abstraction from nothing.

Jonathan Mercer presents an emphatic case for avoiding the use of psychology to only explain mistakes, as this misunderstands the role that emotions play in the decision-making process (Mercer 2005: 81-9; McDermott 2004b: 46ff.). Mercer’s interventions (re)ignited the most recent foray into the study of political emotions, though his approach eschews an important disciplinary question that I will pursue throughout this project, asking whether politics is the better venue for the study of emotions rather than psychology. Mercer, for his part, tries to incorporate psychological approaches into political methodology. The peak of Mercer’s approach has been the combination of psychological understandings of decision-making with rational choice theories, especially as they relate to elite individual actors who exhibit a great amount of influence on international politics and the construction of foreign policy. I will suggest that a better understanding will

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10 Mercer’s work, though less well known at the time, was promoted by Neta Crawford’s (2000) seminal article on passion and world politics. Crawford points readers in the direction of a paper delivered at the 1996 International Studies Association conference by Mercer, “Approaching Emotion in International Politics.”

11 Cf. Welch (2005), and for an early effort, also Jervis, Lebow, and Stein (1985). Political psychology has always been a part of the traditional three level System—State—Individual analysis of international relations. Now, however, the diminution of the role of the state has caused helped political psychology shift its focus from the decision-making of leaders to a social psychology, or a psychology of identity and identity development. It suffices to mention Erik Erikson’s work, specifically his *Identity: Youth and Crisis*. The International Society for Political Psychology has named
recognize that psychology is engaging in a pseudo-political investigation of emotion, leading to understandings that are only partly helpful because they have been divorced from their inherently political context, and by political here we understand the question of justice to be at the centre. Mercer’s political methodology assumes that the disciplinary boundaries of psychology have been settled; this need not be the case. The Greek etymology of *psychology* means “account of the soul” which, along with the question of the just or good regime, is the account that the tradition of political philosophy has endeavoured to provide. Mercer attempts to mend this gap by suggesting that IR scholars incorporate the relationship between norms and emotions because “norms explain behaviour, and if norms depend on emotion, then analysts can use emotion as a part of a third-image approach to behaviour” (Mercer 2006: 298).

Mercer (2006) appeals to the work of neuroscientist Antonio Damasio to assert that emotions are necessary for the adherence to norms: norms are violated because actors do not care for the feelings of others, or feel no sense of pride or embarrassment. Mercer wants to use this insight to address the debate between realists and constructivists over the influence of international norms. If emotions are part of a third-image or system level analysis, and emotions are the foundation of

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12 In an unintentionally ironic twist, if one replaces “norm” with “justice” in Mercer’s account of emotion and the three images of analysis, we have an account of emotions and politics that is stunningly close to Aristotle’s (*i.e.* emotions are necessary for adherence to justice and the pursuit of the good life).
norms, then one can find common ground between the assumed asociality of realism and the construction of norms (Mercer 2006: 299). Mercer concludes his argument by observing that private expressions of emotion suggest the presence of norms, meaning that private emotion and international politics are linked; however, he refuses to connect the dots between feeling emotional over norm violations and the inherent justice claims in the emotions.

In order to properly interpret the behaviour of political actors, Mercer (2005) suggests the use of Kahneman and Tversky’s famous Prospect theory. Prospect theory explains and predicts the behaviour of political actors based on whether they view themselves in a “domain of gain” or a “domain of loss” in comparison to the perceived status quo. For example, if an actor perceives itself to be in a domain of gain, the actor will be more likely to undertake otherwise risky behaviours, whereas if an actor perceives its situation to be one of loss then it would likely want to return to a pre-crisis status quo (Mercer 2005: 4-5). In the final analysis, Prospect theory identifies loss aversion as the primary determinant of state behaviour based on buried and opaque assumptions about the nature of human motivation (Bueno de Mesquita & McDermott 2004: 279-83). For example, Mercer (2005: 10, 17) readily admits that “subjective feelings of gain and loss influence my choices” because people “value what they have more than what they covet.” Yet, this overwhelming

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13 I should quickly note that this situation in a domain of loss vis-à-vis the status quo will obtain unless the actor perceives itself to be in a such hopeless position that it risks losing nothing more by taking on risky behaviour.
sense of valuing “my own” things is fundamentally a claim about esteem and being treated justly. Mercer locates this stream of thought in David Welch’s argument that feelings of injustice make policy makers take big risks for small gains, in opposition to the claims of Prospect theory (Welch 2003). Likewise, the very idea of a domain of gain or loss implies that political actors make decisions with reference to some opinion about the good or the just, a value-laden point that Mercer (or his presentation of Prospect theory) never cares to take up.\footnote{One could also launch a critique based on Prospect theory’s use of rationality, given that it necessitates a shared standard of rationality in order to make sense of state behaviours. However, the famous example of Thucydides’ Melian dialogue, and the competing definitions of rationality therein require one to rethink the fundamental claim of prospect theory that loss aversion rather than hope for gain is the primary political motivation.} Prospect theory thus goes through a lot of work to evaluate the psychology of actors only to end up at the same road-weary conclusion of Realism, that fear of loss “causes most great wars” or if felt strongly enough can lead to cooperation (Mercer 2005: 12).

Rose McDermott’s work presents another example of attempting a straightforward union of political psychology with international relations. Her efforts are aimed at using political psychology to understand the tools used and insights produced for explaining all manner of security phenomena (though, her understanding of security is within the state oriented tradition, prioritizing state actors, leadership, decision making, and the like) (McDermott 2004b: 2). This attenuation of her political horizon is mirrored in McDermott’s (2004b: 4-6) description of the origins of political psychology: only in the 1920s (after Woodrow
Wilson invented Political Science! did Charles Merriam attempt a unification of politics and psychology that “reached adulthood” fifty years later with the founding of the International Society of Political Psychology, reared in the light of Harold Laswell’s belief that psychology influences political behaviour. To this end, discussion of the relationship between political psychology and different theories of international relations—despite writing in 2004—covers Waltzian realism, Keohane’s liberalism, Marxist theory, rational choice and functionalist approaches, and Wendtian constructivism, with a deep bow to the concern with the psychology of leaders at the individual level of analysis (2004b: 45-8). McDermott’s description of theories of psychology is similarly limited to Prospect theory and the advances in neuroscience and the mapping of emotions popularized by Antonio Damasio and Joseph LeDoux.15

Mercer and McDermott represent the attempt to bridge traditional social and cognitive Psychology with traditional approaches in IR.16 McDermott’s (2004a: 700) stated goal is to bring cognition and emotion together through theoretical integration to provide a model for optimal decision making “which may prove useful in... strategic calculation and strong emotion.” The incorporation of traditional psychological approaches in IR reaches a pseudo-peak with Heise and Lerner’s (2006) Affect Control theory, which attempts to predict impressions and reactions

15 McDermott celebrates the B.F. Skinner’s turn to behaviourism against the psychoanalytic tradition because it studied what was material and visible, rather than unconscious and invisible motivations. It is quite the twist of fate that psychological and emotional interventions in IR are now being employed precisely because they move analysis in the opposite direction.
16 For a thorough accounting of this trend in Political Science, see Marcus (2000).
between nations using the equation:

\[ A_e' = -0.26 + 0.39 \times A_e + 0.48 \times B_e + 0.25 \times B_e \times O_e \]

This equation is meant to calculate the outcome evaluation of the actor in an event, using the values A, B, and O to represent the actors expectations before the event (A), behaviour during the event (B), and the judgment of the outcome (O). It is puzzling, however, how a body of literature will, on the one hand, shy from the implications of the phrase “human nature” while on the other employ the natural laws of numbers to predict human behaviour.

A more helpful and scientifically sound (in the traditional sense) approach to the emotions has been outlined by Antonio Damasio in his presentation of the somatic-marker hypothesis, and Joseph LeDoux’s research into the neuroscience of emotion and the role of the amygdala and subcortical—that is, not of the *higher* evolved processes of the brain—connections in cognition, emotion, and action.\(^{17}\) Damasio’s (1994: 173-80) research indicates that emotion and rationality are intrinsically linked, as emotional feelings help us make faster more efficient decisions. Emotional signals are “felt”—Damasio uses the phrase *gut feeling*—in a way that allows us to focus attention on a problem, enhancing the quality of our reasoning over it (Damasio 2003: 147-50). These emotions/feelings play the role of an intermediary between past experience and future decisions, as these emotional signals

\(^{17}\) My comments will focus on Damasio’s work, but LeDoux’s (2000: 223-30) work on the importance of the neural basis of emotions, especially fear, has made neuroscientific insights into the nature of emotions accessible to a wide audience. On the issue of cortical and subcortical processes in relation to emotions and mechanisms of “self-regulating” activity (especially in relation to motivational urges with dire political consequences) see Lewis & Todd (2007: 416-20).
mark possible outcomes and options as positive or negative, narrowing the space for
decision and increasing the possibility that actions will conform to past experiences
(cf. Damasio 1994: 174-5). Damasio thus marries the body to the faculty of reason
in decision-making through the phenomenon of affect. We are introduced to this
“neurobiology of rationality” through the example of Phineas Gage and a patient
Damasio refers to as Elliot. Both of these men suffered trauma to those parts of the
brain necessary “for reasoning to culminate in decision making” causing them “to
know but not to feel” (Damasio: 39-51; Damasio 2003: 148). What was especially
prevalent in the case of Elliot was the disparity between his ability to perform well on
many psychological tests measuring intelligence and memory, and his defective
decision-making in real life (Damasio 1994: 49). Emotions were removed from
Elliot’s decision-making process because of his brain trauma; his body was removed
from his experience of reasoning. Emotions, Damasio implies, are necessary for
making well-reasoned decisions: the mind that no longer allowed the body to feel
prevents one from making decisions that would be generally advantageous (Damasio
1994: 165-70). This is what he identifies as Descartes’ error, this “abysmal separation
between body and mind” that has been so influential (Damasio 1994: 249). Because

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18 This suggests that the construction of memory plays a very important, indeed biological, role in the
affective make-up of human beings. It also suggests that memory is a part of the somatic-marking of
feelings that result from experience and learning, influencing our prediction of future outcomes. If so,
memory begins to take on the role usually associated with ancestral authority or heritage (i.e., religion,
inheritance, etc.), and we can speak of memory as sort of political authority that acts (indirectly) on the
bodies of individuals and the body politic. Memory’s influence on affect suggests that, pacc Agamben,
eschewing the concerns in politics of material life, of the body, denies individuals part of the necessary
apparatus for making effective and advantageous decisions. Thinking politics without bios lets us know
Descartes’ ideas about the separation of the body from activities of the mind have come down to us in the form of an authoritative tradition, Damasio’s insights take on the air of a philosophic rebuttal for how we study emotion, psychology, biology, and so on. It is with this in mind that Damasio turns to Spinoza for the philosophical justification of his position, highlighting Spinoza’s argument that mind and body are parallel, mutually correlated processes constantly imitating each other (Damasio 2003: 211-17).

Damasio and LeDoux have built their understanding of emotion on the foundation of the William James’s hypotheses, commonly referred to as the James-Lange Theory.19 James’s argument is that a total reconsideration of the relationship between passion and action must take place in order to understand all the phenomenon of affect. The usual way of thinking about emotions is that “the mental perception of some fact excites the mental affection called the emotion” giving rise to bodily experience (James 1884: 189). James suggests that the reverse of this relationship is more accurately the case: the bodily experience of emotion follows from our excitement, and “our feeling as the same changes as they occur is the emotion” (James 1884: 190). In his famous example, we do not see a bear, become frightened and run (this sequence would be incorrect); rather, the “bodily manifestations must first be interposed between,” and so we are afraid because we

19 The William James – Carl Lange theory has seen two further developments, and is usually understood to also include the subsequent research of Walter Cannon and Philip Bard in the 1920’s, and Stanley Schacter and Jerome Singer’s Two-Factor Theory of Emotion from the 1960’s. Here, however, I will speak only of William James and the response his work elicited from John Dewey.
tremble and run. Emotional moods are felt as bodily changes “acutely or obscurely” the moment they occur. In James’s words, “the vital point of my whole theory” is that if we fancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstract from our consciousness of it all the feelings of its characteristics bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind, no “mind-stuff” out of which the emotion can by constituted, and that a cold and neutral state of intellectual perception is all that remains. (1884: 193)

James (1884: 194) asks us to consider what grief would be like without tears, rage without a flushed face, and so on: “emotion disassociated from all bodily feeling is inconceivable,” it would be nothing but “feelingless cognition that certain circumstances were deplorable.”

John Dewey (1894) responds to James’s theory of emotion by taking issue with the idea that emotions can express something. Dewey (1894: 555) says that James (and Darwin on whom James relies) is wrong to say that emotions involve expression because expression as a concept implies an observer. To an onlooker, one’s affects and movements appear to be expressions, but this commits the “psychologist’s fallacy” of confusing “that standpoint of the observer with that of the fact observed.” While Dewey throws doubt on the expressive ability of emotion,

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20 James opposes those “ancient sages” who preferred this “apathetic life,” but this life is surely no longer choice-worthy for “those born after the revival of the worship of sensibility.” Just as there was a politics around memory and the appeal to ancestral authority within Damasio’s presentation, we can see here a definite value judgment from James that the apathetic life is not worth living. Whether he is correct in his judgment of the “ancient sages” is a discussion that will take much more space than a footnote. In both cases, though, the role of memory and the authority of the ancestral are a mask for issues of political theology. Cf. Aristotle posing the question, “how must one live?” (NE 1162a30).
he revives its intellectual content: emotion is defined as a “mode of behaviour” that is purposive (or has intellectual content), reflected affectively, and is a “subjective valuation” of the idea or purpose it expresses (Dewey 1895: 15). Human political agency maintains a place in Dewey’s theory of the emotions that it was denied by James.

One outlier within this general debate is the roguish psychology theory of Silvan Tomkins. Tomkins’ Affect Theory, developed over thirty years and four volumes in *Affect, Imagery, Consciousness*, understands affect to be a form of communication through facial physiognomy. In the final two volumes of *Affect, Imagery, Consciousness*, Tomkins develops a nuance of Affect Theory he calls Script theory. Script theory argues that one’s course of action falls into a “script” in the manner of a character in the script of a story. Mimicking the classification of emotion into nine types of affects, our path through life can be scripted. I will discuss this aspect of Tomkins’ affect theory in Chapter four.

Lev Vygotsky, Russian psychologist of the early 1900s, sets out this idea in his *Thought and Language* (which should be translated *Thought and Speech* says the editor who retains the traditional though misleading English title). Vygotsky (1986: xli) judges the relationship between thought and speech “one of the most complex problems in psychology,” and his analysis of this most complex problem encroaches

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21 Dewey says that the source of his arguments are Plato and Aristotle. For James, Dewey says he finds a rudimentary version of his thesis in Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Dewey appears, therefore, to be taking up the mantle for the ancient approach to emotion (being guided by the intellect) against James’s modern view and emotions materialism.
on “neighbouring disciplines” like linguistics, art, philosophy, and anthropology. Vygotsky’s (1986: 5-6) work bridges, at an incredibly early historical stage, the themes of communication and affect in his examination of word meaning, or the symbol of a concept referring to a generalized class of object: because word meaning is dually “thought and speech” it can reveal the nature of verbal thought, at a level more hidden than verbal thought. Vygotsky continues:

Understanding between minds is impossible without some mediating expression ... in the absence of a system of signs, only the most primitive and limited type of communication is possible. Communication by means of expressive movements, observed mainly among animals, is not so much communication as a spread of affect ... the rational intentional conveyance of experience and thought to others requires a mediating system, the prototype of which is human speech born of the need of communication during work. (1986: 7)

So for both human and animal, Vygotsky says, we have the ability to affectively communicate certain emotive states and feelings. I apologize for another lengthy quote, but this is worth drawing out:

If the developing structural and functional peculiarities of egocentric speech progressively isolate it from external speech, then its vocal aspect must fade away ... In the end, [egocentric speech, internal speech] separates itself entirely from the speech of others, ceases to be vocalized, and appears to die out. But this is only an illusion ... behind the symptoms of the dissolution lies a progressive development, the birth of a new speech form. (Vygotsky 1986: 230)

What is this new speech form? “External speech is the turning of thoughts into words, their materialization and objectification. With inner speech the process is
reversed, going from outside to inside” (Vygotsky 1986: 226). Vygotsky makes it his task to prove that in the development of children, inner speech, and therefore thought, develops as a result of social speech. It is communicating with others, this movement of speech from outside to inside, that influences the eventual operation and affect of internal speech. This development requires a dialogue, not a monologue, meaning that the art of rhetoric—being the art of speech—implicitly plays a role in the development of inner thought, speech, emotion, and affect from an early age, while these inner thoughts turn themselves into an affected non-verbal a-logicoric rhetoric (Vygotsky 1986: 239-49). There is nothing here that Aristotle could not divine in his own investigation of political psychology, but Vygotsky allows us to build a necessary bridge between two bodies of literature. Communication, thought, and affect come together in Vygotsky’s work in a way that is helpful for our present affinity for affective insights into the political. Affect results from an egocentric, internal speech; this internal speech is itself the product of a bevy of external and social verbal and nonverbal communications. Vygotsky has helped us understand the development of internal speech. Aristotle, and those participating in this ancient conversation, will help us understand the context and content of these social (i.e. Political) interactions.

Vygotsky makes our case easier in one sense, and harder in another, because of the quality of affective communication. For Vygotsky (1986: 8), affect is such a low form of communication it is not communication at all because it carries no
meaning “In the sphere of emotion, where sensation and affect reign, neither communication nor real communication is possible, but only affective contagion.” Vygotsky’s (1986: 7) example of this “affective contagion” is a goose, suddenly aware of danger, rousing its flock with its cries: “[the goose] does not tell the others what it has seen but rather contaminates them with its fear.” In Tomkins’s discussion of affect we detected a movement from inner feeling to expression/affectation to communication. Vygotsky’s investigation has reversed this relationship, as we move from social speech to egocentric speech to inner speech.22 If we, instead of egocentrism, use the word *amour-propre* Vygotsky’s implied reliance on Rousseau becomes explicit.23 Vygotsky’s understanding of the development of speech is in direct opposition to the received orthodoxy of his times: he is responding to Jean Piaget’s interpretation that in human development, because we are egocentric beings, egocentric speech precedes external speech. Vygotsky responds to this Genevan with a Rousseauan inspired reversal. Human beings are essentially social creatures and our egocentrism is a consequence of our sociability; external speech provides the concepts upon which egocentric speech, and later inner speech, will be built. Our egocentrism is a consequence of our *sociability*, not our nature. To put it in plainer language, the affect of the political is the effect of the political: affect is foreign policy by other means.

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22 e.g. “inner feeling—>affect—>communication” vs. “social speech—>egocentric speech—>inner speech”

23 We will note only in passing that everything one could hope to say about the social or internal phenomenon of affect has already been said by Rousseau under the auspices of his teaching on metaphorical and theatrical masks in his *Emile.*
At this point, it should be clear that the variety of different approaches to studying affect and emotion are attempts to offer an account of how to study social and political phenomena writ large. There is a tendency, however, within the Affective turn to rely on a specific set of scientific literature, risking the assembling of disciplinary practices in the effort to escape such boundaries. Papoulias and Callard (2010: 31) argue that the way neuroscientific research has been taken up in Affect theory is only a “strange and partial (mis)translation” of complex scientific models into the epistemologies of the humanities and social sciences. They discuss the dangers and mistakes inherent in the effort to turn to affect to compensate for the neglect of the body—that “non-reflective bodily space before thought”—in the social sciences (Papoulias & Callard 2010: 34). These mistakes result from the desire to make affect accord with a specific political project. The new materiality of the body is supposed to open up space for critique, especially of nature and natural law, that prefers a biology that is an open system with no fixed or determined order (Papoulias & Callard 2010: 35). The authority of nature cannot be used, in this scheme, to strengthen political or religious rule, but instead provides a “paradoxical foundation” for a politics of change: “affect theory provides the language for an imagining of biology that...can act as a prototype for a certain progressive politics” (Papoulias & Callard 2010: 36). There is a certain dishonesty, however, in that the political use of neuroscience goes unstated, and the specific evidence that is summoned is only a “helpmeet for a distinctly political project.” The prototype of
this use of affect, according to these critics, is William Connolly’s *Neuropolitics*, in whom they locate a systemic contradiction in the *grammar* of his approach: affect shows how a biology of “afoundational foundations” can be imagined the language in which these findings of neuroscience are invoked is the language of the experimental method, it is “through the old foundational language ... that the afoundational biology is appropriated” (Papoulias & Callard 2010: 37). The over-reliance on the neuroscience of Damasio and LeDoux is a result of its somaticism; to remedy this, Papoulias and Callard (2010: 42) suggest that attention be turned to developmental psychology, and especially the relationship between infants and adults because with infants behaviour and mental state are understood to coincide: infants do not dissimulate, dissemble, or conceal. My discussion of Vygotsky’s work attempts such a new orientation, but as we noted at the time, highlighting the relationship between affect and communication implies a wide range of political questions about the method and definition of IR, none of which Papoulias and Callard take up.24

Axel Honneth has also paused to reflect about the theoretical implications of the relationship between psychoanalysis and sociability. Presenting an interpretation

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24 Using Vygotsky to fill in the gaps of affect theory also has the benefit of turning the critique of Papoulias and Callard against them. They spend a great part of their article speaking about the reception of Daniel Stern’s concept of *attunement*, or a concentration on the inner *feeling* of affect instead of its visual representation, a process that takes places through “affective contagion” (2010: 44). Papoulias and Callard seem utterly unaware that this phrase was used 50 years earlier than Stern, as they neglect to mention or cite Vygotsky’s *Thought and Language*. Andrew Ross (2014) similarly speaks of “contagious affect” without reference to Vygotsky. I take it to be a fortunate occurrence that I was introduced to Vygotsky’s work before a confrontation with any of Papoulias, Callard, or Stern took place, allowing me to see this omission.
of Freudian psychoanalysis, Honneth (2009: 127) argues that allowing psychoanalysis to be taken over by brain science denies Freudian theory its central legacy: “the insight that, to begin with, the human is always a divided, inwardly ruptured being, yet one which...has the ability to reduce or even overcome that rupturedness through its own reflective activity.” What disappears in the rush to neuroscience is the natural “capacity for freedom of the will” and “the idea of one’s own freedom [that] motivates one to set about the process of working through one’s own life history” (Honneth 2009: 128, 138). What Honneth seeks to impress on readers is the centrality of the concept of anxiety for Freud, especially in his limited comments on affect. Honneth (2009: 143) draws our attention to Freud’s singular mention of affect, as Freud never expands on his assertion that the “taking back of repression” is an “affective process.” Honneth wants to push this understanding of the self a step further and suggest that the affective acceptance of repression is not enough to reappropriate the self and exercise the will’s capacity for freedom; rather—in strongly Heideggerian undertones—what is required is “a protracted and strenuous process of working through and remembering” that anxiety is inherent in human self-relation and cannot be fully purged from the will (2009: 144-5). This human self-relation is “the process of self-appropriation of one’s will by affectively admitting anxiety.”

Eva Brann (2007) takes on many of these same issues when trying to answer the question “Are human beings ultimately affective?” Where Honneth turns to psychoanalysis, and others turn to brain science, to answer this question Brann turns
to the history of political thought. She follows the same general pattern in her approach as many others, insofar as she discusses Spinoza’s *Ethics* and Damasio’s popular adaptation of neuropsychology, but she touches on an aspect of the passive-active dichotomy that is often overlooked: “the deepest difficulty in getting hold of affect, feeling, passion, emotion, sentiment ... is to understand how being in the passive mode can be experienced as vigorously us and as being the voucher for our being alive” (Brann 2007: 60). It is Brann’s intention to widen the scope of possible answers to the question of human affectivity by turning to the uniquely human pursuit of philosophy. Philosophy combines the ideas of *phile* [friendly feeling] and *sophia* [wisdom] infusing this apparently rational pursuit with passion, implicating both logic and rhetoric in the question of affective activity (Brann 2007: 61-2). One must then reconsider the classical Platonic relationship between *logos* and *thumos*, or the calculating and passionate parts of the soul. According to the ancients, thumos is non-rational but capable of being obedient to reason, allowing Brann to assert that human beings are not ultimately but centrally affective. The alternate argument that humans are ultimately affective is to be found in Martin Heidegger’s essay, “What is Metaphysics?”. Speaking of affect not as emotion but as a “mood” or disposition—“The possibility of possibility”—casts human life as constant anxiety, as constantly diffused or unfocused feeling. But this constant anxiety reveals an ontological “openness to the world” and serves as the ground from which emotions and understanding sprout (Brann 2007: 66-8).
We have here the opportunity to speak of affect in the light of security studies. Barry Buzan and Ole Waever (2009) in a revisitation of the securitization theory of the Copenhagen school to bring it into line with “higher securitizations” (grand/global struggles, climate change, religion, etc.) note that this opens up more difficult questions about how to theorize fear or a general social anxiety. Anxiety seems to allow for a securitizing move against the indissoluble objects of two types of fear: the Freudian fear of a lack of self-knowledge or ignorance about oneself, and the fear of mortality. That is, anxiety compels solutions for the problems of self-knowledge and the fear of death. Now that we have given the securitization problem its most Socratic formulation, we can do no more than recognize that possibilities opened up by turning to affect in securitization theory for solving them. A possible next step is to develop the latter parts of Tomkins’s Affect theory known as Script theory, or the treatment of personality structure and dynamics in the “scene”, or the basic element of lived experience (cf. Demorest & Alexander 1992). Simply, or actions and feelings can be interpreted as falling into “scripts” (like that of fictional character) as indicated by our affective responses, just as our affections can be categorized as one of Tomkins’s nine affects. If one were to combine this with Aristotle’s understanding of the relationship between rhetoric and the movement of the political passions—for example, one uses specific rhetoric to make a crowd angry

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and intend the adherence to a script of vengeance—one could develop new insights into the politics of identifying and reducing security threats.27

Such an analysis, though, takes us further down a psychoanalytic rabbit hole. Jenny Edkins picks up this theme of anxiety and identity especially as it relates to politics through the construction of memory. The psychoanalytic subject, says Edkins, is “formed around a lack, and in the face of trauma,” and her goal is to investigate the connection between trauma violence and political community (2003: 11-5). The performance and construction of memory is meant to repair this lack in our subjectivity by creating a linear historical narrative which obscures the original moment of trauma. That is, trauma is treated as existing only in the past, because to recognize it in the present tacitly admits to the lack in knowledge about “who we are” because it says something only about what “we used to be” (Edkins 2003: 15). Bearing witness to trauma and remembering the past threaten to destabilize the historical narrative—we could say, the ancestral authority—upon which political identity, subjectivity, and ontology is built.28 The forgetting of trauma is how politics deals with this constant anxiety; the remembrance of trauma admits of our anxious political existence. Just as affectively admitting anxiety was the precondition for

27 I point to Aristotle’s general scheme for analyzing the passions, of which his analysis of anger is the paradigm: What is anger? What is the state of mind of people who become angry? Why do people become angry and for what reasons? To whom is anger directed? Aristotle’s answers to these questions give rhetoric a preeminent role in understanding and controlling political affects (Rb., 2.2.1-17 [1378a-1380a]).

28 Edkins wants to distinguish between not-forgetting and remembering, of which the latter is understood to be an act of remembering that should make someone a member of the political community once again (i.e. the person is re-membered). For further reading on Heideggerian anxiety, see Jacques Derrida (1978: 87-92).
freedom of the will for Honneth, admitting that the anxiety that is the affect of a traumatic act is ever present allows politics to reintegrate the critical voice of survivors in the construction of memory and in acts of remembrance (Edkins 2003: 231-2).

Memory can also be implicated in the construction of individual or collective identity, causing it to become a site of contestation when memories need to be defended if a group has been treated unjustly, or if identities that have derived justification from memory become problematic (Lebow 2008c: 29). Memory thus introduces issues of ethics and issues of justice into the political conversation, through its use of apologies, reparations, and truth and reconciliation committees: memory implies that something is owed to victims of past injustice (Bell 2009). Bell (2009: 356-8), in noting that memory can bind together or drive apart, highlights the ethical impulse in memory that one owes something to the dead. Recognizing this means that memory is the source and location of traditional authority; contesting the content of political memory is therefore also a critique of the founding principles of a nation. The politics of memory are therefore a critique of the story that the modern state tells about itself: the rise of the politics of regret and reparations indicate the increase in challenges to traditional authority. If postmodernity is understood in part to include the decline in the traditional authority of the sovereign

29 Bell has also edited a collection of excellent essays, *Memory, Trauma, and World Politics* (2006).
30 I understand “memory” in the broadest possible sense of the term, so as to include the metaphorical movement from a long forgotten state of nature to present day civil society.
state, then post-memory is the more accurate term.

Jeffrey Prager (2008) uses traumatic memories as a way to psychoanalyze fractured groups. Trauma, for Prager, is the breakdown of one’s natural sense of self-importance, or the breakdown of the feeling that one is at the omnipotent centre of one’s own life. The memory of trauma causes self-fragmentation within a political community that is best dealt with through a process of “overcoming” that entails the remembrance of the traumatic events and a “corrective emotional experience”: trauma’s assault on the self can only be undone by re-engaging the memory of trauma in the present (Prager 2009: 409-11). Prager employs the language of disaster and distress in his discussion of trauma, but Peter Suedfeld (1997) suggests that we move away from discussion of distress and focus on the way that present stress can provide an ability to cope with future disasters, or eustress. Focusing only on disasters can cause us to miss macro-societal changes for the better. Mervyn Frost (2008) attempts to interpret international events through the lens of tragedy and the passions it evokes, because tragedy focuses attention on the societal and political contexts of decisions. Frost identifies the contest between sovereign state power and the respect for human rights in global civil society as the greatest tragedy of our time, as the former entails preferring those members of one state first in all manner of disputes despite our global community. His suggestion is to bring both of these practices into harmony with each other, or to provide a new ideal standard to which or politics must progress. Sadly, it seems lost on him that idealism is the most tragic
What is inherent in all approaches is that affect and affective activity are implicated in relations between one’s inner self and the outside political world. We could put things this way: what is first for us politically is the experience of a politics that is initially foreign to the experience of individual human beings. There is an affect of the political, and this affect is foreign policy by other means. Brian Massumi (2002) asserts that the affective faculties are primary in image reception. Massumi outlines a four-part nexus of affect: content, effect, intensity, and quality. All images are indexed with cultural meanings and have a “sociolinguistic qualification.” These qualifications mean that there is no straightforward link between the content of an image and its production of an effect: the content of an image is indexed “to conventional meanings in an intersubjective context” (Massumi 2002: 24). It is very clear that affect is not to be confused with emotion: whereas affective states equate with intensity, emotions are subjective content that work like other elements to inform the narrative to which affect autonomously reacts (Massumi 2002: 27-8). This sensation of the body moves so fast as to be “virtual” because it “happens to quickly to have happened” (Massumi 2002: 30). The “autonomy of affect” is its ability to participate in the virtual, this open space of virtual perspectives anchored in actually existing bodies (Massumi 2002: 35). Affect is autonomous to the extent that it escapes confinement in the particular body for

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31 Lebow’s *Tragic Vision of Politics* (2003) is a much more careful and nuanced presentation of the relationship between Greek tragedy and IR. See esp. Lebow (2003: 14-64).
which it is vital; emotion, by contrast, is the capturing of affect, the diminution and closure of affect’s openness (Massumi 2002: 36-7). Affect as a phenomenon that happens, somehow, independent of time, is a subject reflected on a greater length by William Connolly with the added help of neurobiological research. Connolly concentrates on the speed of body-brain-culture relays in order to reorganize politics around the idea of cellular-time instead of subjective time; more importantly, Connolly (2002: 76ff.) wants to know if education and intellection can operate at a level that is both “beyond the steady control of intellectual governance” and temporally imperceptible. Connolly’s student Andrew Ross (2002) tries to apply affect in a more direct manner to politics by using it to supplement constructivist approaches to identity. Ross (2002: 213) also recognizes that affect has an “unstable or fugitive quality” with a micropolitical character, as affect is “not a property of an individual but a capacity of a body” that brings this particular body into a specific social or political relation.

Up to this point, I have attempted to demonstrate a chain of connection between the themes of affect, communication, and foreign/other political relations with the link of psychology. What is left for us to examine is the idea that the Affective turn makes the idea of justice central in political analyses because affective and emotional responses are the manifestation of a claim to justice. I take very seriously Papoulias and Callard’s critique of the way the turn to affect has been

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32 One could say that Connolly is asking whether it is possible to educate the contagion of affect.
fraught with errors and omissions; however, I also assert without reservation that the solution to this methodological problem is a reconsideration and reminder of the roots of the political philosophic tradition that informs the neuroscience and psychology of the emotions. Taking Papoulias and Callard’s diagnosis of theoretical problems as correct, the solution must be to return to the literature that first reckoned on the passions, psychology, and political life rather than improving on halfwitted appeals to recent scientific authority.

The progenitor of this second approach, or the philosophical approach to political psychology, as with all modern political insights, is Thomas Hobbes. A more recent subscriber to this approach is Hans J. Morgenthau (1971), who provides a tripartite understanding of human motivation in the harmony of reason, will, and action. Morgenthau’s presentation of his six principles of political realism, and the role he played as a founder of the Realist approach is the aspect of his thought most emphasized by scholars, yet Morgenthau (1945) also exhibits a great interest in the behaviour of individuals that this specific form of politics cultivates. On Morgenthau’s (1971: 617-8) understanding, it is in the will where we feel emotions, but it is also the will that mediates the relationship between political theory and political practice, or we could say the dispute between scientific man and power politics. For Morgenthau, the will is that aspect of human nature that urges one to act in defence of the status quo, or seek change for the better. The classical word for this phenomenon is *thumos*, identified by Socrates in *Republic* as one of the three parts
of the soul, along with *logos* (reason) and *epithumia* (appetite) (*Republic* 439e-41c). Thumos is the part of the soul where the desire for justice lies: it is the part of the soul (*hē psychē*) that seeks to avenge injustice against oneself or others close to one, as well as the part of the soul that wants recognition, esteem, and honour (cf. *Lev.* XIII.3-5). Thumos is the honour seeking part of the human character: it seeks to dominate over others, but also to free others from unjust domination.

Feminist scholars in particular have taken issue with this oversimplified characterization and overly violent picture of political behaviour (Tickner 1988: 434ff). The emphasis on rationality and self-interested power seeking is opposed to a picture of emotional altruism, which mirror previously inscribed gender norms in IR of male-female dichotomies that inherently privilege the male part of the equation. The result is a theory of politics that by definition inscribes irrational behaviours as mistakes. Strong as this critique may be, there is sufficient reason to believe that the realist emphasis of rational self-interest is itself a mistake and mischaracterization of the political theory of those thinkers most associated with the realist school, first and foremost it is an oversimplification of the thought of Thomas Hobbes. Returning to Hobbes’s work with questions of the emotions and justice in mind can both respond to this critique of realism and also correct what is essentially a flawed interpretation of Hobbesian and Thucydidean realism, which we will do in chapters two, three, and four.

Roland Bleiker and Emma Hutchison (2008) argue that the study of emotion
has been around for a long while in IR, and Realists have had a monopoly on its study because of the role that fear plays in the Realist worldview. This very minor and a quick rereading of Hobbes’s original presentation, however, reveals that fear is not the problem: these other emotions that surround feelings of justice and self-esteem are what current scholars would like to bring back in to IR theories (e.g. Muldoon 2008; Roberts 2010). Bleiker and Hutchinson’s primary innovation, however, is to integrate the revived interest in the emotions with the Aesthetic turn in IR theory. Emotions are the site of representation of inner feeling, a move usually associated with the logic of political aesthetics. In Bleiker’s (2001) seminal essay on the Aesthetic Turn in IR he argues that the constant gap between a form of representation and the thing being represented is the site of politics; moreover, rather than trying to narrow this gap aesthetics highlights the inherent political nature of representation in all of its forms. Bleiker (2000) also points our attention to the importance of poetry, insofar as poetry is “ideally suited” to rethink global politics, as poetry recognizes that aesthetic form and political substance cannot be separated; furthermore, the essence of poetry, Bleiker says, its self-conscious link between language and political reality.

Margaret Lyon, a cultural anthropologist that has written widely on the subject and study of emotion, presents case for understanding emotions as primarily
social phenomena, precisely because of their affect on the body. She argues that emotions both re-embbody individuals and are social in nature (Lyon 1995). Emotions and ideas are both located in the self, and thus emotion and cognition are “linked” through the body. Our bodily existence, says Lyon, means that we exist in relation to other material entities, and understanding the agency of the body requires understanding that its communicative and emotional capacities are closely linked to its sociality (Lyon 1995: 256). There is a point of comparison with Hobbes on this score, as Hobbes makes humans all wholly body, all pieces of matter coming into contact in political ways. We are bodies, first and foremost, hence his beginning with those things that seem to move the body in specific ways, the emotions. We must say that Lyon and Hobbes agree on this, and that Lyon’s argument is immanent in Hobbes’s analysis. Hobbes’s attachment to Aristotle’s Rhetoric rests on the Rhetoric’s concentration on the study of the passions, those things that move bodies in political relations. But for Aristotle, the passions and not bodily but psychological; they are of the soul. To control one’s passions is to exhibit the proper and virtuous ordering of one’s soul. The response, therefore, to the orthodox understanding of material well-being and emotion in Hobbes, and the same connection of body-passion in

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33 I should note that when I use the term affect not as a verb but, referring to the study of emotion, I understand affect to mean the representation of inner feeling. For example, if someone declares that they have a feeling of extreme happiness, but do not exhibit the expected external signs associated with happiness, he or she can be said to have a flat affect, or no affect. Interestingly, affect then becomes the first form of communication, but through non-verbal bodily cues, in a sort of biopolitics that can grant a political “voice” to someone through the communication of bodily movements. For a fuller explanation of the theory of affect as a physical phenomenon, see my discussion of Tomkins, Affect, Imagery, above.
contemporary literature—what we can loosely call a sort of materialistic psychology—finds its response in Aristotle, and in the study of rhetoric.

The approach to the study and integration of affect into political analyses that has made the greatest effort to reconcile the history of political philosophy with new advances in brain science, political psychology, and critical or postmodern theory is to be found in the work of two English professors. Daniel Gross’s (2006) *Secret History of Emotion* and Philip Fisher’s (2002) *Vehement Passions* are pathbreaking attempts to understand *what* passion is and *how* passion, affect, and emotion influence individual and political life. Gross and Fisher both provide invaluable tools for our excavation of sovereignty. My approach is indebted to the insights of these two writers in two ways. First, Gross—by using Aristotle as a touchstone—recognizes that the rhetorical tradition is a resource that is at least as rich for insight into the emotions as psychology; however, where Gross emphasizes Aristotle’s insight that all passions are social phenomena in contrast to Antonio Damasio’s belief that they are “psychophysiological sufferings of the individual,” Gross does not develop Aristotle’s connection between the practise of rhetoric and the pursuit of justice in political relations (cf. Gross 2006: 9). Fisher, though he does not discuss the concept of sovereignty, provides an heuristic through which we can better understand the

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34 Gross’s treatment of the various literatures on the passions is especially impressive, as is his unwavering humanistic critical eye. He centres out Martha Nussbaum and Judith Butler for refusing to go far enough in their analyses of affect and their critique of orthodox approaches to political psychology that have their basis in Cartesian naturalistic philosophy while neglecting the tradition that appeals to Aristotelian rhetoric. Nussbaum is especially guilty for appealing to the authority of neuroscience rather than justifying her conclusions on purely humanistic terms, abrogating previous theoretical gains (Gross 2006: 74-84).
assumptions sovereignty makes about the operation of the passions in politics, with his distinction between *episodic* and *dispositional* passions. Fisher reserves the phrase “vehement states” for passions that are “eruptive momentary impassioned states” rather than those “more enduring underlying states” that we often refer to as passions (Fisher 2002: 19-27, 71-9).\(^{35}\) If we understand sovereignty to be an attempt to manage the passions to bring about and maintain long-term political stability, then Fisher’s distinction between these two passionate states reveals an assumption buried in the pathology of sovereignty: sovereign power must treat episodic passions as if they were dispositional or constant. The disturbance to the status quo that an eruption, for example, of anger or fear represents must be treated as if it is a dispositional characteristic of the subjects of sovereignty in order to justify the continual and ever present disciplining threat of sovereign power.\(^{36}\) If Hobbes’s rhetoric convinces us that sovereign power is the required solution for the occasions of violence emanating from the fear of violent death, than sovereignty is a *permanent* reaction to something merely episodic. If we instead believe Hobbes’s more evasive argument that vanity, pride, and the unabashed political hope are the actual dangers and sources of political violence, the distinction between dispositional and episodic

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\(^{35}\) Examples illustrating this difference are falling-in-love versus love itself, or being afraid versus avarice and jealousy. We can also compare Nussbaum’s metaphor of “upheaval” to describe these vehement episodes and disruptions.

\(^{36}\) The benefit of analyzing sovereignty in this way is that it separates the actions and deeds of a sovereign power from the philosophic speeches that have justified it. I draw the following conclusion for our current situation. Hobbes disguises his true argument for sovereignty underneath the veil of an ever-present fear of violent death, with the actual threat to peace and stability being eruptions of righteous indignation in a vain hope for justice in the absence of an arbiter of justice. Whether one has been convinced either by Hobbes’s rhetoric or his esoteric justification for sovereignty, both presentations require sovereignty to treat as dispositional psychic aspects that are merely episodical.
passions still presents itself as a viable tool for understanding the political psychology
at work in the foundation of sovereignty. In both cases, the security state presents
itself as the permanent solution to psychological or pathological problems that are
merely episodic and occasional.37

Let us restate a question with which we began. Why are the emotions
necessary for IR? Because they carry the potential to incorporate the study of justice
once again into the discipline that has too long thought that the world is anarchic, or
denied the study of just in the rush to trumpet anti-foundationalism. More
importantly, IR’s disciplinary boundaries can now be read as a tacit benefit to the
study of politics as a whole. The question of government, or ideal government, has
for all intents and purposes been settled at the domestic level: if history has not
ended with the universal equality, freedom, and dignity that liberal democracy
affords, it has certainly slowed to a bureaucratic crawl. Precisely because the
question of a world government has not been settled, IR allows students to ask the
question of what justice is in the absence of any interference from the functions and
form of government. The confrontation with the idea of justice is, therefore,
unmediated, or at least less mediated, in ways that questions of the “just society”
cannot be. Put differently, in IR we can contemplate justice separate from the law

37 Aristotle’s definition of calmness complicates our presentation in an important way, and in a way
which is important for the current argument. Aristotle defines calmness as the “quieting of anger”
implying that anger is the dispositional state of humanity while calmness is the occasional state. We
should remind ourselves that, though Hobbes is indebted to Aristotle’s political psychology for his
own, Hobbes’s political philosophy and the invention of sovereignty are intended to be critical
reactions to the same. What Hobbes says, which neither Aristotle nor Thucydides say, is that
excessive fear is enough to discipline this angry (i.e. thumotic and retributive) state.
(with a deep bow to the ever-growing number of reified international laws and agreements). Precisely because IR has been unable to settle the question of government in the way that domestic, national, and state level politics has allows IR to pose the question of justice on behalf of the discipline of politics as a whole. IR, following Morgenthau’s original desire for IR, becomes a different way to *do and study* politics, not just another subfield of political science.

But these assertions lead already to a difficulty: to revive the study of political emotion is to give renewed privilege to the art of rhetoric in politics, to the art of persuasion, which is a tool that can be abused and misused much easier than it can be wielded responsibly.\(^{38}\) Focusing on affect necessitates a renewed focus on the art of rhetoric, because these affective, emotional, passionate states are the substance of the art of rhetoric. Saying that affect matters in politics means, *a fortiori*, that rhetoric (the movement of the passions) rather than reason will rule the political day. If this passion is love, or compassion then perhaps this need not be worrisome. But we cannot put the lid on passions once they are released into the political arena. They are an all or none proposition: with friendship comes enmity; with courage comes fear; with love comes hate. Hobbes, in some sense, knew this; that is why he identifies Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* as “something rare” because he deals with the human

\(^{38}\) Plato is the classical exponent of this view. Both *Gorgias* and *Republic* end with demonstrations of Socratic rhetoric meant to convince politically spirited young Athenians to pursue justice instead of injustice, precisely because Socrates’ reasoned and dialectical attempts have been unsuccessful. Doubtless, rhetoric can be used to educate, and to improve an audience. Plato – but especially Diodotos – let us see the difficulty in practising the socially and politically responsible rhetoric. Examples abound of speeches that rouse crowds to anger; the quieting of anger through speech is a very difficult task.
passions systematically. That is also why Hobbes is the first to translate Thucydides—the “most politic historiographer that ever writ”—directly into English: speeches and rhetoric are the hallmark of Thucydides’ *History*, and those dramatic moments are the arias of the opera war, that most violent teacher.

A return to Hobbes is necessary because he was the *founder* for all intents and purposes of IR in particular and of Modernity generally, but of a specific modernity, of a modernity that tried to infuse politics with the assurance of the burgeoning natural sciences. He was trying to understand humanity from how humans actually experience the world, modifying Galileo’s “resolutive-composite” method to build a political *theory* on top of this. Hobbes’s political *theory* is Hobbes’s response to his own political *philosophy*, to his understanding of the horizon of humanity, the place of the human in the cosmos, and an understanding of humanity in light of the “whole”. And his political *theory* is based on an understanding of the relationship between political *psychology* and political *theology*. This presentation of political psychology, theology, and philosophy provides us with our first theory of sovereignty; we can say that sovereignty has a political psychology or pathology, a political theology, and a political philosophy (This has been an attempt at an excursus on the first of these).

Only by giving primacy to the question: “What is politically first for us?” do we end up with the theory of the state as Hobbes presents it, and at the centre of his presentation appears the Sovereign as the greatest of all political affects. Hobbes

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required a specific political theory that could liberalize Christianity (i.e. Hobbes’s critique of Christianity in the name of nature), or Christianize Liberalism (Hobbes’s political theology of equality) for the sake of peace, stability, and security. But it is Hobbes’s political theory, not his political philosophy that has been influential in the discipline of IR, and in politics writ large. His political philosophy—if we are permitted to continue making this distinction—is much more evasive, barely revealing itself. Hobbes’s answers to the political questions—what is the nature of human political relations? And how should society be organized as a result?—appear as brazenly contingent and incidental solutions in light of the permanence of these questions.

All this is to say that a return to the beginnings of modernity, to that time when Hobbes’s Leviathan and the Treaties of Westphalia were shaping to political landscape, we must return with eyes open to the reality that Hobbes’s solution to the political problems is only his preferred solution. Stating things somewhat differently, confronted with Hobbes’s understanding of political philosophy would we have made the pragmatic structural choices that he did, or is there another foundation upon which a facsimile of the just society can be built? The short road we have taken through the literature and understanding of the human passions, affect, and political emotions, reveals the critical potential of such an endeavour and the inherent dangers concomitant with that potential. This research programme requires going beyond Hobbes to his authorities in these matters: Thucydides History and
Aristotle’s *On Rhetoric*. Turning to Thucydides’ “permanent possession” needs no justification, but why this oft neglected work by Aristotle? Because Hobbes lets *On Rhetoric* escape his tongue-lashing: “I believe that scarce anything can be more absurdly said in natural philosophy than that which now is called Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*; nor more repugnant to government than much of that he hath said in his *Politics*, nor more ignorantly than a great part of his *Ethics*” (*Lev.* XLVI.11). Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, is absent. Throughout his intellectual journey these two works remained at the forefront of Hobbes’s thought, explicitly and implicitly, and remain the untapped resources for a full exposition of the beginnings, the *archai*, of modern sovereignty and the political psychology on which it rests.
Chapter II

On the Greek and German Inheritance in IR Theory:

Lebow and Fukuyama on Statecraft and Soulcraft

“The differences between us may go all the way down.”
- C.S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man.

A. Political Psychology, Ancient and Modern

International Relations (IR) has long been the province of grand theories, and the “grandness” of its theories is in no way diminished by the base motives and actions they attempt to explain. All grand theories take as a point of departure an assumption about the nature of politics as it appears in the light of human life. I share this desire to speak of grand theories, though my primary concern is to explain “the particular with reference to the grand” (Lebow 2006: 439). Thumos has been at the heart, so to speak, of attempts to understand “the political problem” since the philosophers of ancient Greece provided the first parallels between individual psychology and political community. Thus, this topic is not a new, nor is the “political problem” unique to our contemporary situation, but it is being treated anew. To speak very generally, IR has returned to the problem of the relationship—the nature of the relationship—between the human passions and human society. But how and why did IR get here, and why should it be of any interest to scholars of IR theory? Let us address the latter in the hopes of shedding light on the former.
Thumos (θυμός) carries a wide range of meanings, including an especially political spiritedness, heart, courage, anger, soul, or wrath. Thumos is that part of the soul (ἡ ψυχή) that is the seat of emotions like pride and anger. Etymologically it is related to the verb thuein (θείεν), which means, “to sacrifice.” Thumos, while referring in the most immediate case to something like the vehemence of passion, carries with it a connotation and reminder of divine and religious authority (cf. Fisher 2002). Readers of Plato’s Republic will recognize thumos as that part of the Platonic soul that is identified with the guardians of the City in Speech because of how it seeks justice and preserves nomos (i.e. laws and customs). It is where we feel indignant, and where the aspects of human life that makes us political beings reside. The first discussion of the tripartite soul and the relation of thumos to the rational and appetitive parts of the soul takes place during Plato’s discussion of political theology, the place of the poets in the city in speech, and the censoring of Homeric verses in the education of the Guardians. From the outset, then, political psychology is related to questions of order and governance. Thumos as political spiritedness at times seeks to preserve the prevailing order of things, while at other times takes offense at injustice when it arises. ¹

Xenophon, that famous Athenian war hero and less-famous student of Socrates, presents the political problem—who should rule, how one should rule, and under what conditions people might obey—as a problem of how to rein in

¹ I will follow Lebow’s recommendation here not to privilege one writer from the Greek tradition over another, and refer to this concept as “spirit” or “spiritedness” (Lebow 2008: 14n56).
spiritedness in the opening remarks of his *Education of Cyrus* (1.1.1):

How many democracies have been brought down by those who wished the governing to be done in some way other than democracy; how many monarchies and how many oligarchies have been overthrown by the people; and how many who have tried to establish tyrannies have, some of them, been at once brought down completely...We thought we also observed many in their very own private households—some indeed having many servants, but others with only a few—and, nevertheless, they, the masters, were not able to keep even these few at all obedient for their use.

As is typical of Greek writers like Thucydides, Plato, and Aristotle, the discussion of various regimes is the equivalent of an international outlook. The problem of obedience is universal, existing in all regimes and ways of life, and both in the public and private sphere. Xenophon writes histories about Cyrus of Persia and the Spartan king Agesilaus because they have been able to solve, so he initially claims, this universal problem. No longer should we be of the opinion that “it is easier to rule any other kind of animal rather than human beings,” but instead believe that ruling humans is not an impossible task “or even among those that are difficult, if one does it with knowledge” (*Education of Cyrus*: 1.1.3).

Why is it necessary to addresses the often overlooked concept of political spiritedness? The direct answer is that this metaphysical aspect of human nature is classically understood to be the seat of the passions, and the source of affective or external expressions of essentially political desires. More importantly, political spiritedness is at the heart of the story that modernity and the state tell about
themselves, and is implicated in how we understand the key concepts of sovereignty and security. For these very preliminary reasons, one cannot ignore the role that spiritedness plays in Hobbes’s depiction of the natural condition. While, on the one hand, it is true that the more commonly understood “continual fear and danger of violent death” is motivating human action, it is not the primary or fundamental mover, or the fundamental “interior” “voluntary motion” in Hobbes’s scheme (Lev. VI, XIII.9). Hobbes uses the language of esteem in his presentation to describe the function of spiritedness, and it is as a result of the attempt to moderate this political passion that sovereignty is constructed.

Speaking very generally, the belief exists that non-rational responses to political phenomena have been ignored, or that the Realist paradigm has had an indefensible monopoly on the study of the non-rational aspects of politics—especially the emotion of fear—despite emphasizing rational self-interest. A main underlying argument of this project is that a concern for spiritedness, and by implication the wider roles of emotional and affective faculties play in our understanding of politics, is not new. IR theory can only benefit from realizing that the return of emotion in the so-called Affective Turn is actually a return to certain assumptions and insights about the motivating factors for human behaviour. Thus the recent attention paid to affective faculties is not the introduction of a new and improved way to understand and explain politics, but rather the return of an earlier, or the first, approach to understanding politics by beginning with the basics of
individual political psychology.

**B. ‘The Beast with Affect’**

To imply that *thumos* or spiritedness has been under theorized despite its ubiquity is not quite correct, because two very visible theoretical interventions in post-Cold War IR theory have taken the problem of spiritedness to be of central importance. The first is Francis Fukuyama’s famous and controversial *The End of History and the Last Man*; the second is Richard Ned Lebow’s more recent *A Cultural Theory of International Relations*. Both authors understand the problems of politics to be inherently reducible to the problem of political spirit, and therefore understanding its operation can teach us something about the political problems that are our “possessions for all time.” It is too easy to discover in appropriations of Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis only critiques of his apology for capitalism and democracy as it existed in the early 1990s, just as it is in glosses on the Greeks to read only about fear, self-interest, and the “strong doing what they can” rather than the operations of the spirit, honour, and esteem. Even if traditionally excluded from the story IR tells about itself, *thumos* is at the heart of IR. It is at the heart of the story IR does not tell about itself, but should.

Fukuyama emphasizes those aspects of the spirit that seek recognition from others, a presentation that reaches its peak in George W.F. Hegel’s presentation of the rationality of the state in *Philosophy of Right*, and the master-slave dialectic in *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Fukuyama 2006: 171-91, *n.b.* 147.). Lebow’s conception is
rooted in the Homeric, Thucydidean, Platonic, and Aristotelian presentations of spirit, but especially in that presentation that opposes spiritedness to appetite and reason (Lebow 2008a: 125ff.). It will be possible to increase the tension between these two accounts, beyond the differences in Lebow’s Greek roots and Fukuyama’s German ones. For Fukuyama, spirit is essentially defensive; that is, recognition spurs political change through an unabashed belief and reliance on progress, or the movement towards a universal and homogeneous state where the inherent dignity of each and every individual is recognized. Fukuyama presents those aspects of spirit that align with political order in the hope to prevent change for the worse, a loss of status, and with a certain political caution (1989: 222). Lebow, by contrast, emphasizes those aspects of *thumos* that align with seeking change for the better, though *better* is often defined as anything that inflames one’s sense of self-esteem (2008a, 82ff.). In this sense, *thumos* is the breaking down of or breaking away from order; it is revolutionary, it is innovative, and in some sense it is also educative or enlightening. In both presentations, *thumos* is the passion that binds individuals to

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2 Despite the similarity between Lebow’s and Fukuyama’s desire to provide a general theory of politics, Lebow does not mention or cite Fukuyama by name in *Cultural Theory of IR*, though Fukuyama’s essay and book on the “End of History” are listed in the bibliography. When Lebow does turn to an explicit address of the end of history thesis (2008: 27) he refers readers to Wendt (2003) as an alternative to Liberalism and Marxism on this score, but with an important similarity: “Liberalism, Marxism, and Wendt’s version of constructivism are rooted in appetite. They view appetite positively and imagine peaceful, productive worlds in which material well-being is a dominant value” (Lebow 2008: 509). A possible reason for this is that Lebow detects an adumbrated presentation of thumos in Fukuyama’s work. Fukuyama’s depiction of thumos is martial, violent, and material: it is subdued by what is traditionally “lower” in us, our base bodily needs, and so on. This is not the whole story for Lebow, or for the Greeks, but perhaps Fukuyama’s presentation is an accurate presentation of Spirit in the Hegelian sense, that is, insofar as spirit seeks and risks a fight to the death in order to feel alive.
political society, or the primary affect of the political.

Lebow sees a benefit in building a theoretical approach to IR with spiritedness at its core because it “embodies the insight that all human beings value and seek esteem” while making manifest the tensions between power, freedom, and obedience. That is, while appetite (epithumia) can move someone to accept domination because it can ensure material survival, spirit cannot accept this order of things because it resists domination in the name of self-esteem (Lebow 2005a: 558, 569). There is, therefore, a tension between the material desire for security and the immaterial desire to be treated justly, to be esteemed. To use the language currently in fashion thanks to Agamben (1998), material life is being interpreted in the light of immaterial life, bios (material life-as-such) is interpreted in the light of zoe (politically qualified life).

The most immediate objection to this presentation of the problem of security is that it repeats the contestable realist trope that all political behaviour is reducible to the quest for survival, and all actions are understood as self-interested in the respect that they all aim at this end. By reincorporating the original understanding of thumos, one can open an avenue of critique that can rewrite the traditional understandings of the realist position, while maintaining a space for the role that emotions other than fear play in political relations. As Lebow (2009: 27) puts it, incorporating Greek lexicon “allows a more sophisticated analysis of such concepts as power, hegemony, and persuasion [and] can enrich our understanding of power.”
The concept that will benefit from a concern for ancient political philosophy is the concept of sovereignty. The concept of sovereignty is the distinctive feature of modern political science, and the organizing principle of international relations as subject matter and as a field of study. Yet, if we recall that Hobbes’s *Leviathan* is published a mere three years after the treaties of Westphalia come into effect in 1648, a new picture emerges around the genesis of the concept of sovereignty and its relation to a specific picture of political psychology. Hobbesian and Westphalian sovereignty begin to appear as specific interpretations about the way that politics affects us. As such, the particular tradition of sovereignty in thought and practice that has come down to us is predicated on the ability of fear to overwhelm hope and to moderate human action. That is, sovereignty is built on an understanding of human emotion that privileges the compelling force of fear ahead of all other passions. Only by recalling the choice that Hobbes made in his presentation of human political psychology to privilege the emotion of fear when spirit was primarily at work can one begin to dig the concept of sovereignty up at the roots.

Hobbes’s presentation of sovereignty and security is put forward with the assisting rhetorical strength of his materialist metaphysics. Hobbes’s materialistic metaphysics is of concern insofar as it takes the body in politics as its starting point, as a sort of progenitor to biopolitics, thus orienting politics around the experience and fate of the body. These *experiences* are the emotions, passions, and affect, while the *fate* of the body is simply its orientation towards the ever-present Hobbesian fear
of violent death. Hobbes’s depiction of a violent and anarchic set of relations in his image of the natural condition is the *locus classicus* of the Realist understanding of relations between states. This interpretation, however, oversimplifies Hobbes’s understanding of the source of the violence in his metaphorical natural condition by failing to appreciate his gloss of political psychology. It is understood traditionally that faced with violent death, the emotion of fear becomes the primary motivator for all actions in these conditions (*Lev.* XIII.9). Hobbes, however, identifies a certain set of emotions and imaginings apart from fear that are at the heart of the violence in the natural condition. The central one is the seeking of self-esteem:

...Men have no pleasure, but on the contrary a great deal of grief, in keeping company where there is no power able to over-awe them all. *For every man looketh that his companion should value him at the same rate that he sets upon himself*, and upon all signs of contempt, or undervaluing, naturally endeavours, as far as he dares (*which amongst them that have no common power to keep them in quiet, is far enough to make them destroy each other*), to extort a greater value from his contemners, by damage, and from others, by the example. (*Lev.* XIII.5, my emphasis)

The feeling that we have not been valued by our companions at the same rate by which we value ourselves is, for Hobbes, the source of violence in the anarchic state of nature. That this passion *governs* behaviour is proof that the word *anarchy* has been continuously misapplied: the feeling of justice *is* itself an *archē* (cf. Lebow 2009: 30).³

³ I will leave open, for the moment, the question of whether evolutionary psychology and the neuroscience of emotion can more firmly establish the ubiquity and ever-present status of emotions and affect as first feelings and political drives.
It is this affront to one’s self-esteem, and the assumption that one has been treated unjustly that leads people to destroy each other.\textsuperscript{4} Humans have a propensity to pursue these sorts of actions “farther than their security requires” because some people simply take “pleasure in contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest” (\textit{Lev.} XIII.4). It is not so much that our equal fear of violent death results in the quest “for power after power that ceaseth only in death” but that this quest for power is fueled by the “equality of hope in the attaining of our ends” (\textit{Lev.} XI.2, XIII.3).\textsuperscript{5} The political consequence of pursuing this security of mind and body farther than is necessary is the institution of sovereignty.

Hobbes qualifies this desire “for power after power” by saying that its cause is “not always” hope: sometimes one “cannot assure the power and means to live well ... without the acquisition” of more power. With the qualifying “not always” Hobbes indicates that hope is the default cause of violence, \textit{unless} this situation of unease, fear, and anxiety for the future obtains (\textit{Lev.} XI.2).\textsuperscript{6} The fear of violent death, important though it is to the rhetoric of Hobbes’s project, is not the primary

\textsuperscript{4} I should add that one, presumably, might always overvalue self-worth in one’s own eyes, resulting in a situation where we must always receive more than we are due in order to avoid this affront to our self-esteem. One solution is self-knowledge, and awareness of one’s limitations. But this is the Platonic-Socrates’s advice, and it is by no means practical. The general idea, however, that security problems can be framed fundamentally as problems of knowledge and ignorance, will be taken up in due course. N.B. Hobbes’s definition of the sovereign is “a common power to keep them all in awe” (\textit{Lev.} XVII.4). His first use of \textit{awe} occurs six chapters earlier: “And they that make little or no inquiry into the natural causes of things...are inclined to suppose and feign unto themselves several kinds of powers invisible, and to stand in awe of their own imaginations...” (\textit{Lev.} XI.26).

\textsuperscript{5} This statement begins to bring out the larger theme of the relationship between knowledge and security, and how a lack of knowledge or an ignorance about oneself and one’s condition can increase feelings of insecurity.

\textsuperscript{6} The obvious comparison here is Aristotle’s relative definition of calmness as the quieting and negation of anger from \textit{On Rhetoric} (2.3.2).
motivator of violent behaviour—nor the source of insecurity—in the natural condition.7

What we see in Hobbes’s initial depiction of realpolitik is the operation of spiritedness: the desire to be treated justly, the willingness to act in order to seek out this justice and to remedy injustice, and the desire to rule over others without being ruled over oneself. This said, the primary presentational device in Hobbes’s presentation is the role of the “continual fear and danger of violent death” (Lev. XIII.9). The fear of violent death is one of the “passions that incline men to peace” precisely because it is a fear of other human beings rather than “spirits invisible”:

The passion to be reckoned upon is fear, whereof there be two very general objects: one, the power of spirits invisible; the other, the power of those men they shall therein offend. Of these two, though the former be the greater power, yet the fear of the latter is commonly the greater fear. The fear of the former is in every man his own religion...The latter hath not so, at least not place enough to keep men to their promises, because in the condition of mere nature the inequality of power is not discerned but the by the event of battle. (Lev. XIV.31, my emphasis)

The fear of violent death at the hands of another human being replaces the fear “in every man” of one’s own religion. That is, the fear of violent death replaces in Hobbes’s scheme the role that prophecy or divine authority would normally fill “in

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7 Arash Abizadeh (2011: 305ff.) stresses that the debate about whether Hobbes’s anthropology is fearful, sinful, or vainful, is the crux of the implicit conversation between Carl Schmitt, Hans Morgenthau, and Leo Strauss on Schmitt’s friend-foe distinction in Concept of the Political.
the nature of man before civil society” (ibid.). Fear of violent death is the new ordering principle because of how it affects us, and because of how this fear encourages the disciplining of our behaviour in the name of security. Yet this fear for survival does not derive from the desire to seek “the preservation of [our] own nature” by any means, but from the offense of other human beings, from our inability to esteem, recognize, and value another person “at the same rate that he sets upon himself” (Lev. XIV.1; XIII.5). “The event of battle” is a most violent teacher that educates us, says Hobbes, by revealing the “inequality of power” to which our spiritedness was blind. The passion, the “interior motion” laying the foundation of the modern security state is not fear of violent death, but the affective attachment to the pursuit of justice. Fear comes to sight as “the passion to be reckoned on” not because it is the primary motivator of human action, but because it is capable of educating, of making us reasonable, despite our inherent thumotic tendencies. The first sovereign Leviathan is, in the final analysis, the “King of the Proud”, or king of those that value themselves relative to others more than they ought (Lev. XXVIII.27). Thus, we can conclude that security, the desire to avoid battle and seek peace, arises out of the hope to be esteemed at the rate that we think we should be esteemed. In other words, the desire, the hope, the affect of justice is represented by the security state, or we could say that the institution of sovereignty is the greatest of all political affects. Yet at the basis of this picture is a lack not in safety but of

8 One must mention the name of Carl Schmitt here. The event of battle is the precondition of political life, but where Hobbes seeks to escape this origin, Schmitt seeks to return to it.
knowledge, either of our condition or the condition of others. Violence erupts when we act in ignorance of our condition relative to others.

Lebow (2010: 75) argues that such a reading of Hobbes reflects Hobbes’s desire to replace vanity and the search for self-esteem with actual material interests. For Hobbes (and in a qualified way, Thucydides) the drive for honour and standing is potentially disruptive and war-prone. Forcing people to reckon on their material interests—first and foremost, one’s bodily survival in the face of violent death—can curb these immoderate tendencies and adjust the framing and calculation of risk (Lebow 2010: 77). This search for self-esteem is an affect, mediated by the intellect and the recognition that others are granting esteem (Lebow 2010: 69). The opposite of esteem in Lebow’s scheme is shame, making it the third characteristic of the spirit: justice, esteem, and shame (2008a: 63, 125). Just as esteem is a relational and social concept, shame is the result of being judged to have fallen into disgrace or to have violated the nomos of the community (Lebow 2008a: 148-9). Thus, our affective makeup of esteem and shame plays a foundational role in the maintenance of order and the source of discord. Thumos is, to use Lebow’s (1984) phrase, the middling element between peace and war, always waiting to be satisfied and placated, but also ever-ready to rebel, fight, and seek recognition.

Lebow (2012) does a better job than most could hope to do of demonstrating the importance of Greek philosophy and culture to Germany’s intellectual development (and the devastating political consequences) after the
French Revolution and up to World War II. Lebow emphasizes the role that Kant’s judgment of art and aesthetics plays, first in reversing the Platonic tradition’s preference for philosophy over literature to understand the human condition, and then by its renewed focus and concern for ethics (Lebow 2012: 158). The German revival of Greek tragedy places a greater emphasis on the unfolding of collective destiny rather than the destiny of individuals as is typical in the Ancient plays (2012: 164). This revival is not without difficulty, though. Thinkers such as Morgenthau or John Herz represent an indirect influence of Greek philosophy on IR Theory, mediated by the political experience of Europe in the 1930s. Lebow (2011: 557-9) credits Morgenthau’s synthesis of his European and American experience for providing the common thread in his thought that the animus dominandi can be allayed with the balance and separation of powers, and dispersed authority. Guilhot (2008: 298-9) argues that German émigré scholars seeking refuge in America came to criticize the growing popularity of behaviourism as a new kind of political utopianism reminiscent of the interwar years. IR theory became the battleground for determining the political relevance of that peculiar mix of Greek tragedy, a belief in collective German identity, and the conspicuous slight of the Treaty of Versailles (Lebow 2011: 560-2; Lebow 2008a: 386; Guilhot 2008:, 300).

Missing in this narrative is the retrieval from Greek culture of the humane realism of Thucydides, or the qualifiers of Platonic idealism, or even Aristotle’s worries about civil discord (Politics 1302a15-1304b20). Lebow’s summary reminds of
the critique Carl Schmitt makes in *Political Romanticism* of this romantic view of politics and human nature, which he says is derived especially from the political philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau: the retreat into romantic individualism hides the violent confrontation at the heart of politics, and obscures the conditions necessary for freedom of and within a political community. The Greek influence in Germany was not from Greek society (and the philosophy it produced) as it existed in actuality, but rather as it existed in speech (Lebow 2012: 174-5). In actuality, political spiritedness, standing, and esteem did not impel history forward in a predictable path towards equality and freedom, as spirit-based societies are prone to breakdowns, disorder, and regression (Lebow 2008a: 85, 103). It is too easily forgotten that “politics is different from science and medicine in the sense that faith in progress can have negative consequences when it is based on incorrect assumptions and leads to naïve and unsuccessful policies” (Lebow 2005b: 334). So far as the idea of history is concerned, Lebow opposes the determinative and linear disclosing of truth that came to characterize German thought in the “Kantian aftermath” in favour of the permanent problems or permanent cycles between order and decay, peace and war, *kinesis* and *stasis* (cf. Pippin 2005).

**C. Recognition and Remembering**

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9 There is a famous anecdote about Kant never missing his daily walk—and citizens could set their clocks by him—except for the morning that Rousseau’s *Émile* arrived in Königsberg. Peter Nyers has suggested to me that this can be interpreted as an example of the importance of rupture against our habitual political activities.
Fukuyama’s (1992) treatment of appetite, reason, and spirit is directly contrary to Lebow’s in that the satisfaction of appetitive and material desires is the precondition of the satisfaction and recognition of the spirit. Whereas Lebow’s outlook sees the movement between appetite and spirit based worlds as part of the natural flow of political life, Fukuyama observes that the scientific revolution makes it effectively impossible to return to a previous era or epoch of existence. He posits a new universal history based on a new universal “mechanism of desire;” specifically, a desire for knowledge and facts that is at the heart of historical progress. Scientific knowledge accumulates slowly, over long periods of time, but all the while constantly accumulating new facts based on the advances of old insights: “Discovery of the scientific method created a fundamental, non-cyclical division of historical time into periods before and after. And once discovered, the progressive and continuous unfolding of modern natural science has provided a directional mechanism for explaining many aspects of subsequent historical development” (Fukuyama 1992: 72-3). Fukuyama (1992: 80) locates the universality of modern natural science in the desire of communities to defend themselves in war, and to thwart aggressive foes in order to preserve their way of life. It is because of this necessity that humanity cannot “go back” or uninvent scientific progress. All societies will need to maintain a certain level of technological sophistication in order to defend themselves, and therefore the only way to “un-invent” modern natural science would be the physical annihilation of the human race (Fukuyama 1992: 88). If the march of science in the
world cannot be reversed, neither can its social, political, and economic consequences (ibid).

This story, however, is insufficient because it fails to take into account the human psychological drive to be recognized and esteemed by another, and a political science that fails to do so has misunderstood “something very important about human behaviour” (Fukuyama 1992: 152). The linear and progressive movement of history is the story of how material necessities are met so that the struggle for recognition can be settled. Scientific progress allows for economic progress which prevents and secures us from suffering indignity and shame as a result of our material condition (Fukuyama 1992: 174). Where there is recognition and freedom from want, there will be less anger, less shame and embarrassment, and fewer “red cheeks.” To attend to these nuances in his understanding of spiritedness, Fukuyama (1992: 182) coins a pair of neologisms: megalothymia or the desire to be recognized as superior to others, and isothymia or the desire to be recognized as the equal of others.10 Hobbes’s image of the seeking of esteem in the state of nature is replaced with Hegel’s master-slave dialectic and struggle for pure recognition (Kojève 1969: 45-9). That is, the risk of violent death is not the unintended consequence of the search for esteem and recognition as Hobbes implies; rather, one is willing to freely risk one’s life for the sake of being recognized as superior. The story of modernity

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10 If Lebow’s turn to the Greeks cannot escape a hint of German influence, Fukuyama’s turn to Germany cannot entirely escape Greece. The benefit of leaning on Hegel, says Fukuyama, is that his dialectic of history mimics Socratic dialectics, beginning with what is immediately apparent and ascending towards truth.
has been a story of the attempt to account for both of these psychological drives in the structure of political order. The attempt of early modern political philosophy to solve this manifestation of “the political problem” was to frame this *animus dominandi* as vanity or pride, blame it for tumult and war, and thus pit appetitive and material interests against *megalothymia* (Fukuyama 1992: 185).

Of course, Fukuyama’s understanding of history, political order, and spirit can only hold water if he is correct about human nature or if human nature does not change as a result of biotechnological innovations, a point he addresses in *Our Posthuman Future*. It is entirely possible that technology will allow for the mutability of human nature and psychology, meaning the structure of sovereignty and order constructed on a specific interpretation of spiritedness (be it Lebow’s or Fukuyama’s) would be of little use. Fukuyama launches this critique of his own thesis by discussing the two great dystopian novels of the twentieth century: Orwell’s *1984* and Huxley’s *Brave New World*. The thrust of Fukuyama’s introduction is that Huxley’s dystopia is more subtle and therefore more challenging than Orwell’s: “the evil is not so obvious because no one is hurt; indeed, [Huxley’s] is a world in which everyone gets what they want” (Fukuyama 2002: 5). Fukuyama notices a kinship between Huxley and C.S. Lewis, as Huxley presents readers with a picture of the confluence of technology and biology bringing about the “abolition of man,” and bringing about an evolution in the definition and conception of “human nature.” Fukuyama provides his readers some hints of where his argument is going, already in *The End of
History. In the seventeenth chapter—“The Rise and Fall of Thymos”—devoted to human nature and the struggle for recognition, Fukuyama deploys C.S. Lewis’s language and imagery:

The attempt of liberal politics in the Hobbes-Locke tradition to banish the desire for recognition from politics or to leave it constrained and impotent left many thinkers feeling quite uneasy. Modern society would henceforth be composed of what C.S. Lewis called “men without chests”: that is, people who were composed entirely of desire and reason, but lacking that proud self-assertiveness that was somehow at the core of man’s humanity in earlier ages. For the chest was what made man man: “by his intellect he is mere spirit and by his appetite mere animal.” (Fukuyama 1992: 188; cf. Lewis 1944: 25)

Fukuyama goes on to draw a parallel with Nietzsche’s revival of *thumos*. I will leave this argument aside and note in passing that it is Nietzsche—and the turn to value creation and self-assertion out of the sentiment of the spirit, in opposition to the last man—that Lewis takes as his interlocutor in *Abolition of Man*.

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11 Lewis’s slim volume is dedicated to a discussion of the grammar of the whole political cosmos and natural right, and how this inherent order of the whole is increasingly being hidden beneath emotions that are assumed to be nothing more than sentiments of the speaker rather than expressions or affective representations of natural and universal truths. More interesting is Lewis’s conclusion for world politics, drawn out of his picture of psychology, which appears as a reversal of the end of history thesis. Humanity begins from a universal and homogeneous starting point, which gets forgotten as history proceeds: “The idea of collecting independent testimonies presupposes that ‘civilizations’ have arisen in the world independently of one another; or even that humanity has had several independent emergences on this planet. The biology and anthropology involved in such an assumption are extremely doubtful. It is by no means certain that there has ever (in the sense required) been more than one civilization in all history. It is at least arguable that every civilization we find has been derived from another civilization and, in the last resort, from a single centre” (1944: 83-4). Despite this universal starting point, we should be wary of the onset of a universal homogeneous state: “Man’s conquest of Nature, if the dreams of some scientific planners are realized, means the rule of a few hundreds of men over billions upon billions of men. There neither is nor can be any simple increase of power on Man’s side. Each new power won by man is a power over man as well. Each advance leaves him weaker as well as stronger” (1944: 58). The end of history looks much less
Part of the difficulty in meeting the demands of recognition is the uneasy fit between group identity and national borders, with the former being the primary locus of the spirit and the latter of governance mechanisms. Fukuyama suggests that something “premodern” needs to remain in modern solutions to the needs of the spirit because the liberal democratic state—that form of government that best represents the ability of scientific progress to provide material survival—cannot be preserved in the absence of non-rational supports blurring the line between culture and politics (1992: 222; cf. Wendt 2003: 55). It is for this reason unclear whether history necessitates a universal and homogenous state, or if history “ends” when forms of government coalesce around one predominant form (Fukuyama 1992: 393n10).

D. The Enlightenment of Biology

Fukuyama’s “end of history” shares with Lebow’s theory of culture the starting point of the importance of political spiritedness on the one hand, and the demonstration that the connection between grand questions of political order and how it should be theorized (e.g. the constitutive relationship between sovereignty and political psychology) run deep. Their political theories build upon the description of people in general, upon a picture of political anthropology, and those traits that we share on a common enough basis that it makes sense to start with them. If spirit’s like an end to the struggle for recognition than a decline into tyranny, reminiscent of Rousseau’s historical conjecture at the end of his Discourse on Inequality.
recognition is the universal end point, one might suggest that Fukuyama looks to
biology and humanity’s early evolutionary period for a universal beginning (cf. Bell
2006: 496 & 501). Biology and evolutionary psychology, rather than history,
memory, and identity, provide the genetic basis of in-group solidarity. Fukuyama
(2011: 31ff.) explicitly attempts to apply observations about chimpanzee politics to
human politics based on the facts of common ancestry and shared DNA. Even the
struggle for recognition is hardwired into biology: in the case of chimps it confers
alpha status, whereas in the case of humans being recognized as a member of a
group secures ways of life and in-group autonomy by naturalizing identity (Fukuyama
2011: 41-2). This said, Fukuyama’s biological history of political community is
buttressed by the “irrational supports” he identifies in End of History, but where
modern human societies have nationalism and patriotism primitive societies have a
reverence for ancestry and a respect for future generations (2011: 61). The hard
work politics is therefore carried out by biological tendencies that disclose
themselves over time, rather than the overt and clear exercise of power, coercion, or
consent.

Duncan Bell (2006) discusses the benefits but mostly the costs of buying
wholeheartedly into evolutionary psychology. One cannot deny that the
reinvigoration of biological studies in social science and especially politics has been
important, and especially so because it elucidates one of the oldest theses about
political life – that human beings are political animals. But Bell is quite wary that it
also reduces human life unnecessarily to strictly biological evolution and misleadingly downplays evolution in intellectual history, for example. So the science that attempts to prove that a universal human nature exists does so in a way that adumbrates the very picture of human nature that it hopes to vindicate: it provides a scientific (i.e. fixed, static) picture of psychology, anthropology, and biology, where the Greeks—of whom the most forthcoming is Aristotle—present a picture of capacities and potentialities that are developed by education, community, and culture (Bell 2006: 500, 504). Thus the knot of this dependence and deployment of science that must be disentangled is, on the one hand, the way it is invoked to speak about social and political topics beyond its horizon, and on the other its policing of an epistemological structure that confirms or denies the status of insights that do not immediately exhibit scientific formalities. Jan Slaby (2010) casts a stern warning against the anthropological assumptions built in to neuroscientific and biological approaches to politics that replace “personhood” with “brainhood.” By employing a form of argument that states whatever is true of the portion of nature under discussion should guide political action in that area, this turn to biology and evolutionary psychology disempowers political subjects (Slaby 2010: 404). The attempt to build political theories on the biological representations of spirit and recognition rather than their immaterial ones has the unintended effect of denying standing and reducing esteem.

In contrast to an overreliance on hasty appeals to scientific authority, Lebow
criticizes Hegel, along with Kant and Schmitt for an overreliance on hostility towards others for identity formation. This hostility, in combination with the Realist assumption about violence between states, naturalizes the violence and “othering” in the international system, despite the legitimate bases for critiquing either assumption (2008b: 487). Collective and institutionalized memory is, for Lebow, a foundational part of group identity and solidarity (2008b: 480). Jennifer Mitzen’s concept of “ontological security” demonstrates how difficult it can be to undo habitual but pernicious interactions. Such security is “internal and subjective” because it imposes a cognitive ordering on the outside world (Mitzen 2006: 346). Routines—even those that appear to be against an actor’s material self-interest—provide the grounding of agency and identity, reduce generalized anxiety about roles and standing, making states loath to break away from them despite that these routines could easily be otherwise (Mitzen 2006: 349-52). Memory is much more mutable than is often realized due to the contingent and often accidental course of history that shapes memory, and because of memory’s close connection with identity development (Lebow 2008c: 30-1). Memory operates in a way that is similar to the political authority of tradition or a respect for the old instead of the new. Memory and identity—the former disciplining the spirit and determining the scope of nomos, and the latter being the expression of spirit in search of esteem—come to sight as the two phenomena that bind political psychology at the individual level to overarching questions of order and justice that permeate a community. The site of the self is the
middling element between the inside of consciousness and the outside of culture. Judith Butler identifies in this relationship between internal consciousness and external culture the operation of norms at the psychological level. If the spirit is subject to political power, yet also a participant in the continued production of political power, the distinction between psychology and politics breaks down and begs the question of how such norms were “incorporated” at the start (1997: 19ff).

Butler (1997) and Ian Hacking (1994) in different ways try to supplement Foucault’s understanding of power and subjectivity in order to develop the connection between exercises of power and the formation of political psychology; more simply, they develop the account of nomos and psyche that they deem to be missing in Foucault’s account. Hacking focuses on the importance of recognizing the politics of memory to be a “surrogate science of the soul” (1994: 34). The politics of memory are all the more important because Foucault’s concept of power has a wide application and participation: “the power of which Foucault wanted to speak runs through our lives; you and I are part of its exercise” (Hacking 1994: 35). Because soul and spirit cannot be subject to scientific inquiry, the politics of memory—and by implication the historical identity of a community—became the public forum for the political investigation of the soul: the soul is the centre of the self, and the internalization of social order (Hacking 1994: 46). It is a chief concern of this thesis that the opposite is also true: the international order is the externalization of an internal self. In fact, that the international order reflects a
picture of the internal self that is too easily assumed to be fixed and frozen.

E. Conclusion

It has been the task of this chapter to outline two new universal theories of IR that seek to say something about the nature of politics *writ large*. Lebow and Fukuyama share important touchstones—first and foremost is the centrality of *thumos* and spiritedness—but also they ultimately reach approaches and orientations towards the permanent political problems of freedom and obedience that are incommensurable. This said, the dedication to the dialogue between *thumos* and political order, or more accurately psychology and sovereignty, makes clear the conditions upon which politics is possible in the modern era, and the extent to which ancient concepts can open up possibilities for critique (cf. Shilliam 2009).

Lebow’s attempt at a grand theory on the grounds of culture is (using Morgenthau’s phrase) a rejection of Realism’s godless and justice-free view of politics “under an empty sky” and he devotes the final words of *Cultural Theory of IR* to the resuscitation of *thumos* and the pursuit of the just or good world society (2008a: 569-70). Fukuyama’s presentation of the struggle for recognition has, since the end of the Cold War and concomitant expansion of liberal market principles, retained some explanatory force.

Nicholas Rengger offers what is, to my mind, the strongest (albeit implicit) challenge Lebow’s theory, when he wonders why Lebow has omitted a reflection on *eros* or longing (2010: 457). Surely, *eros* is also at issue in Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian War, just as it is in Plato’s dialogue set directly in the historical moment of the most *erotic* policy of that war: the desecration of the Hermes and the expedition to Sicily. More importantly, Lebow focuses on the role of *thumos* in order and disorder which is central to Thucydides’ narrative of *stasis* during the Corecyraean civil strife. The episode that is paired with *stasis* is the Plague in Athens, where Thucydides is clear to point out that both episodes witnessed the breakdown of *nomos*, at the level of the city, family, and religion. The passion motivating behaviour during the plague is *eros*.

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Whereas thumos represented the middling element of the human psyche in classical political philosophy between appetites and reason, affect is revealed in contemporary political psychology as the middling element between the body and the mind. We can say that affect is the element at the centre of human life because of how it reduces or denies dichotomous distinctions between body and mind, passion and reason, and distinctions that usher in the belief in a purely rational and objectivist Science. But to state the matter as clearly as possible, studying the concept of affect necessitates concern with a host of other concepts, the first among them being spiritedness or thumos, and the ways in which sovereignty has sprung up to quell the side of spirit that is prone to instigating insecurity.
Chapter III

Thucydides and the International

“History is a bath of blood... Greek history is a panorama of jingoism and imperialism—war for war’s sake, all the citizen’s being warriors. It is horrible reading—because of the irrationality of it all—save for the purpose of making “history”—and the history is that of the utter ruin of a civilization in intellectual respects perhaps the highest the earth has ever seen.”

- William James, The Moral Equivalent of War

A. The “Perpetual Possession”

The long shadow that interpretations of Thucydides’ History of the War Between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians casts on International Relations theory has been well documented.¹ Thucydides’ depiction of the war between the Athenian and Spartan empires easily mapped on to the common sense understanding of the Cold War as a material and metaphysical fight for the best way of life. In a stroke of rhetorical genius, Thucydides’ name and gravitas has been invoked to make sense of the rise of China in the early years of the 21st century by no less than Chinese President Xi Jinping—with a nod to Robert Keohane’s and Graham Allison’s language—urging the world to avoid “the Thucydides trap” of conflict between

¹ All quotes will be from the Lattimore translation unless otherwise noted. I will follow the standard practice of cited book and chapter (e.g. 1.23). I will often include the standard sentence numbers provided with many editions (e.g. 1.23.6), though Lattimore does not provide these in his translation.
current and rising powers and eventually hegemonic war.\(^2\) There is, simply, no great movement in global politics that fails to remind someone, somewhere, of an episode in the Peloponnesian War, be it competition between great powers or mistaken imperial excursions. Imagining the similarities between America’s invasion of Iraq in March 2003 and the Athenian expedition to Sicily was rote (Hornblower & Stewart: 2005).\(^3\) Thucydides’ *History* has become a “permanent possession” for translating our present problems into familiar tropes of great power politics; indeed, it was Thucydides’ account of civil war that was the framework for Thomas Hobbes’s analysis of the English Civil war (ibid.: 270). But is such a practice sufficient, either for understanding Thucydides or for interpreting the current state of worldly affairs?

If our interpretation of Thucydides’ *History* is the hammer we take with us as we hunt down nails, then what happens if Thucydides might have understood his own work drastically differently?\(^4\)

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\(^2\) President Xi of China made the remark in a November 2013 interview with the Berggruen Institute on Governance. Interestingly, invoking the “Thucydides trap” in relation to China’s influence in international affairs was common in the six months prior to this, thanks to editorials from Graham Allison in the New York Times, and the Financial Times. Somewhat more interesting than this reliance on the tropes of great power politics is the literature that views China’s “rise” through the prism of religion rather than hegemonic and bipolar rivalry. Here one should consult Van der Veer (2013) and Casanova (1994).

\(^3\) Hornblower and Stewart (2005) report that Colin Powell had a quote on his desk paraphrasing a speech of Nikias before Athens’ disastrous Sicilian expedition: “It is senseless to move against men if they cannot be subjugated when conquered, and if after failure there will not be circumstances comparable to those before the attempt” (cf. Thucydides, 6.11.2). Thucydides’ muted judgment of Nikias is the source of much commentary, especially given that Nikias’ attempt to discourage Athens from conquering Sicily had precisely the opposite effect (Connor 1984: 163-7).

\(^4\) This famous metaphor belongs to Abraham Maslow, from his *Psychology of Science* (1966). It is the conclusion of a series of sentences critiquing the scientific definition of a “human being” as employed by psychologists and psychoanalysts, a definition that treats all attempts to capture the breadth and variety of human experience outside of psychology’s norm as “nonscience” or unscientific. Maslow is
Half a century ago, when Martin Wight explained why there was no international theory, Wight identified Thucydides as the only counterpart in IR to the insights provided by political philosophers to political science: “To understand this statecraft one can turn to no work of international theory...but only to historical writing” (1960: 48). With the exception of the mistakes separating international theory from political theory, and Thucydides from political philosophy, Wight is correct. Wight concludes his famous essay with the ominous warning that “[political theories] are the theory of the good life. International theory is the theory of survival. What for political theory is the extreme case...is for international theory the regular case.”

Wight does not make much of international theory, but this does not mean that international theory is what Wight makes of it. Wight is right in one sense, and wrong in another. There is no international theory because what counts as “the international” in this scheme is not divorced in political theory from the questions of domestic politics. Simply, the questions “how must we live?” or “What

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5 Wight is certainly correct on this score, especially given the attention that emergency politics and states of exception of received in the time after 9/11, and the resulting popularity of Schmitt’s language regarding normal and exceptional cases. One easily gets the impression that Wight did not consider whether “survival” is the new content of “the good life.”

6 Nancy Kokaz (2001a; 2001b) is but one of many commentators to have resuscitated Thucydides thought in opposition to Wight’s claim. This is especially true with Kokaz’s treatment of international law in Thucydides, correctly noting the importance of oaths, treaties, and the rules of warfare, the transgression of which a city would fall into disgrace.

7 I have in mind here the recent discussion of the end of IR theory, to which an entire issue of the European Journal of International Relations was dedicated. My contention is that the form of the Thucydidean inspired reply would be the same as my formulation. The question is not whether IR theory has ended; rather, the proper question is whether IR theory was ever meaningfully in existence. A very instructive account of the role that political philosophy plays alongside theories of international relations is offered by Cox (1962). Cox nowhere mentions Wight’s argument or his essay, but offers
is the just and good regime?” or “what is the nature of power relations?” cannot be addressed without attention to the reality that one’s political community must interact with other communities. Aristotle (Politics 1325b25) considers a city that chooses to live with no foreign relations whatsoever, and concludes that even such a city would not be “inactive” because the relations between the parts of the city are as active as relations between cities. This active, internal, relation is “available in a similar way to any individual human being as well” because the “active life” is best for cities and individuals.

Thucydides’ History, pace Wight, deals with all of these questions which are typical of political philosophy not because Thucydides is unaware of the international domain but because he believes maintaining the (modern) division between inside and outside and the autonomy of the international to be a fiction. Wight is correct that there is no international theory, but there is no international theory because political theory is now and always was international theory, and was always concerned with life outside the city’s walls. Despite the popularity of passing references to Thucydides, he never assumes nor asserts the autonomy of an international sphere, an autonomy that is too readily assumed in the modern

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the following thought which can and should be read as a contemporaneous response: “[International Relations Theory] presupposes, in short, what it should question: the legitimacy of the decline of political philosophy and its replacement by modern history” (1962: 292). And also: “The difficulty remains, however, that political philosophy is still considered a means to an end, that end being an operational ‘theory’” (op. cit.: 273). The belief in progress replaces the belief in permanent questions.
Indeed, the very premise of this debate is anachronistic. The word *international* was introduced into the English language in 1780 by Jeremy Bentham to “express in a more significant way” the branch of law that was known as the law of nations (1907: 326n1). The activity that Bentham is describing—“the mutual transactions between sovereigns”—was the province of treaties and the swearing of oaths in Thucydidès’ time. Thucydidès’ understanding of hope, religious belief, and justice in politics would all fall within the realm of politics Bentham is classifying as “international” (cf. Kokaz 2001b: 95-6).

Thucydidès is also keenly aware of the problem of action and inaction to which Aristotle alluded above, but discusses it much more broadly under the polarity of motion and rest, or *kinesis* and *stasis*. The Peloponnesian War, says Thucydidès, is the greatest movement because it followed the greatest and longest rest. Rest (*stasis*), however, has a dual meaning for Thucydidès. On the one hand, it refers to the peace that preceded the twenty-seven years of recorded war between Athens and

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8 One need only consider Thucydidès’ description and presentation of oaths and the gods throughout his recounting of the war. Oaths in this context function like treaties or international law would in the contemporary context, with an authority that is adumbrated by domestic concerns (i.e. the need to respect the domestic gods). This was an insight that Hobbes understood and shared, and thus the state of nature between princes is less violent than the “war of all against all” because princes must always be aware of domestic political concerns at the international level: “But because [kings and persons of sovereign authority] uphold thereby the industry of their subjects, there does not follow from it that misery which accompanies the liberty of particular men” (Lev. XIII.12). There is a strong case to be made that politics never occurs—especially in this foundational realist tract—under an empty sky. At the very least, “the international” is not anarchic because it is not autonomous.

9 For Kokaz (2001b: 95-6) events such as the Olympic Games and the Oracle at Delphi injected a “degree of order into international interactions.”

10 Lebow (2004: 122ff.) argues that this period of rest, referred to as Thucydidès’ account of the fifty years preceding the outbreak of war or the *pentecontaetia*, is decisive for understanding Thucydidès’ judgment of the Athenian empire, where to apportion blame for the outbreak of the war, and what Thucydidès’ own aim is in writing his *History*.
Sparta. On the other, it refers to the most deadly and violent part of the war: the
civil war that started in Corcyra and spread through Greece. This *stasis* or “uprising”
is a key part of Thucydides’ narrative because it describes a breakdown of political
society and an absence of law usually associated in our modern context with relations
between states, but in this episode describes relations between people.

This discussion therefore has a series of goals that will frame the discussion
in what is to come in the subsequent chapters of this dissertation. First, Thucydides
has a very specific and important influence on how modernity answers the question
“What is Sovereignty?” and this influence is *most clearly* seen in his recounting of the
plague in Athens and the strife in Corcyra. It is most clearly seen in these episodes
because they are where Thucydides lets his readers see what has been called the
“domestication of the Athenian Thesis” (Orwin 1994). Readers get to see how the
grandest and most general thesis of human action—that we are compelled by “the
greatest things” of honour, fear, and profit—operates at the level of individuals
interacting between and amongst each other rather than between states, cities,
regimes, or other organizing political units. Simply, the subject of politics in these
episodes is the individual rather than the city, and therefore the link between
Thucydides’ understanding of individual political psychology and politics writ large
achieves an unmatched clarity.

Second, by returning to Thucydides to reconstruct the picture of political
anthropology that Hobbes utilizes (i.e. general trends in behaviour and capacities that
can with some justification be subsumed under the banner of “human nature”), it will be much easier to see what Hobbes omits, what he alters and what avenues of critique remain. One can just as easily critique Hobbes by “getting behind” him as one can by “going beyond” him.\(^\text{11}\)

**B. “Sovereignty is always shaped from below, and by those who are afraid”**

For my part, I see a critique that “goes beyond” Hobbes to already grant too much authority to his interpretations of political and individual life. Doing so relies too strongly on Hobbes’s own assumptions, making these assumptions the hidden ground of critique. Thus my purpose for returning to Thucydides in this chapter and Aristotle in the next is to open up an avenue of critique that sees Hobbes’s privileging of the psychology of fear as a deliberate choice rather than a truth. Robert Howse (2013) has a similar method in mind in his comparison of Michael Walzer’s and Leo Strauss’s critiques of realism and interpretations of Thucydides. For Howse the point at issue is, as Walzer would have it, to be “open to the possibility that the realist elements in Thucydides’ own work are different from the realism that results from Hobbes’ appropriation of Thucydides” (2013: 18).\(^\text{12}\)

\(^{11}\) My method here follows the relatively new trend in IR of attending to intellectual history within discussions of concepts and theoretical debates. David Armitage (2004; 2013) has been the pathbreaker for studying intellectual history in international theory. Earlier works from Schmidt (1998) and Guilhot (2008) share many of the same concerns as an approach from the perspective of intellectual history, though their concern is specifically with IR and disciplinarity. Thucydides bears out, perhaps more than any other thinker, Guilhot’s realization that the discipline of IR is best understood as “intellectual irredentism” insofar as IR theory and the Realist school of thought were intended to provide a general orientation for the study of politics.

\(^{12}\) The efforts to reinterpret Realism and move beyond its simple caricature is of a piece with this sentiment (Williams 2007; Bell 2009; Scheuerman 2009; Guilhot 2011; Levine 2012b). Thucydides is a
In his series of lectures now titled *Society Must be Defended*, Michel Foucault (2003) takes the Hobbesian construction of the state and sovereignty as his point of departure for rethinking the politics of modernity. This is important for at least two reasons germane to my attempt to present the groundings of the political psychology of sovereignty. First, Foucault’s approach recognizes that the creation of the *subject* and the *sovereign* in the modern context are coeval and coextensive with each other. The specific form of subjectivity created by modern (legal) structure reinforces this architectonic relationship between the subject and the sovereign. Second, this mutually constitutive relationship between individual psychology and the legal framework of politics reminds of the psychological constructivism of the ancients, from which Hobbes’s political science was the clearest (and earliest) divergence.13 With this in mind, it is also noteworthy that Foucault’s genealogy does not consider Hobbes’s appropriation and distortion of Thucydides’ teaching.14

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13 By “individual psychology” here, I mean “psychology” in the broadest sense, as I will always use it, to mean character, soul, political outlook, and so on, at the individual level.

14 It is important that I clarify what I mean by accusing Hobbes of appropriating or adumbrating Thucydides’ thought. I do not mean that Hobbes misunderstood Thucydides, or that Hobbes’s appropriation and limiting of Thucydides’ horizon is accidental, mistaken, or unintentional. Rather, I posit that Hobbes was absolutely aware of the new orientation for political science that he was affecting, how this new orientation required the rhetorical amplification of certain aspects of individual political psychology versus others, and the ways in which his teaching borrowed and adjusted Thucydides’ thought. Hobbes can be viewed as the first to present Thucydidean scholarship with the argument that *stasis*, psychology, and their relation to Athenian imperialism in particular (and civilizational development in general) is the primary theme of the *History*. The most thorough treatment in this vein is Price (2004). Lebow (2004: 180ff.) concludes his long re-reading of Thucydides’ *History* with the observation that *stasis* (internal strife) and *nomos* (law, customs, and conventions) are the inescapable poles of political life to which Thucydides would like to draw our attention.
Foucault’s aim in his analysis of modern sovereignty is “precisely the opposite” of Hobbes’s in *Leviathan*: where Hobbes speaks of “the problem of sovereignty” in relation to the institutions of sovereignty and how people become obedient and submit to them, Foucault focuses on “domination and subjugation” in place of “sovereignty and obedience” (2003: 28). Foucault is identifying a “crisis of legitimacy” insofar as all that is usually discussed with regards to sovereignty are the terms of obedience that grant sovereign right; that is, all that is usually under consideration is the legitimacy of sovereign power not the nature of that power itself (2003: 27). Left undisturbed in this account is the exercise or the *how* of sovereignty; one must not ask solely, “What is Sovereignty?” but also, “How does Sovereignty operate?” According to Foucault—and this is a point on which Thucydides agrees, given his presentation of politics in Melos and Corecyra—buried underneath the common sense understanding of legitimately exercised sovereign power is a race and class war (Foucault 2003: 61; Lebow 2003: 152-3). It is this internal war, defending society from those who cannot be party to it, that Foucault identifies as a break from antiquity and with this break the creation of the modern state (Foucault 2003: 74). It is this new orientation to all things “outside” political society and the mentality of security that is coeval with this orientation that designate the beginning of modernity and the break with classical political thought.

More importantly, Foucault presents Hobbes’s war as one where “there is no blood and there are no corpses… We are in a theater where presentations are
exchanged, in a relationship of fear in which there are no time limits; we are not really involved in war” (2003: 96). Thus the basis of sovereignty is not a warlike condition that ends with consent to the state, but a permanent picture of “primal diplomacy” that constantly represents and manifests human will (ibid.: 92-3). What Foucault sees as the basis of Hobbesian sovereignty is the picture of individual human psychology that privileges the compelling force of fear ahead of all other forces. A specific kind of politics produces a specific kind of fearful citizen, who then reproduces those politics. This sort of arrangement has been called a truer constructivism because of its psychological foundations and its recognition of a much greater role for identity in the maintenance of political order, and Foucault is not alone in suggesting that there is this psychological element to the construction of power relations (cf. Lebow 2008: 3 n.7; Hymans 2010; Shannon & Kowert 2012).

But if Foucault is correct about this “polymorphous mechanics of discipline” then I suggest that the stirring of emotions and affect are a good place to begin. What becomes the central issue here is nomos, or written and unwritten laws, customs, and conventions. Foucault believes disciplinary power to be the alternative to sovereign power.

Thucydides, for his part, argues the following. It is possible to ground sovereignty on fear, but there is also an alternative motivation in human political
behaviour that is worth one’s attention: hope. The passion of fear upon which Hobbes constructs his concept of sovereignty is necessary for disciplinary society. Yet, it is possible to share Foucault’s desire to provide an alternative account of the workings and manifestations of sovereign power without granting so much authority in one’s retelling of the story to Hobbes.

C. Antecedents of Modern Sovereignty

Thucydides and his *History* have long been associated with the Realist school, and even the neorealist school (Sears 1977; Forde 1992; Garst 1989; Johnson Bagby 1994; Forde 1995). This view has increasingly come under scrutiny for its lack of fidelity to Thucydides’ text, to say nothing of the difficulty with defining Realism simply (Connor 1977; Ahrensdorf 1997; Bedford & Workman 2001; Lebow 2001; Welch 2003). Interpretive difficulties aside, Thucydides exercised an undeniable influence on Hobbes, and for this reason is deserving of attention with regards to my concern for the concept of sovereignty and its psychological foundations. In Hobbes’s words, Thucydides is the “most politic historiographer that ever writ” whose “narration itself doth secretly instruct the reader, and more effectually than can possibly be done by precept” (Greene 1989: xxi, 577). Hobbes’s terse and famous remarks indicate that Thucydides is writing with political concerns in mind, rather

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15 Two works on affect and hope worth some attention have recently been published by Ben Anderson (2014) and Joel Schlosser (2013). For Anderson (2014: 4) hope appears as a disruption of despair, and way to temporarily organize life around an affective reaction to social and political reality. Schlosser (2013) focuses on the role that hope (*elpis*) plays in Thucydides’ *History*, how immoderate hope accompanies dangerous and destructive political action, but also how hope is the last hedge against utter despair.
than with concerns that are merely historical or descriptive, according to the modern sense of what it means to write a *history*: “the principal and proper work of history being to instruct and enable men, by the knowledge of actions past, to bear themselves prudently in the present and providently towards the future” (Grene 1989: xxi).\(^{16}\) As such, the concern for the rest of this chapter is to demonstrate the character of this influence, and which episodes from Thucydides’ *History* are of a particular interest for Hobbes. Two are particularly informative: the Plague in Athens during the second year of the war, and the Corcyraean civil strife referred to as *stasis*.

The connection between Hobbes and Thucydides has been assumed and almost exhaustively discussed, but often not well, because of a failure to see the differences and disagreements with Hobbes and Thucydides on the most fundamental of issues. The habit within the tradition of IR scholarship is to begin by grouping Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes in the realist school, opposite Plato, Kant, Locke and Woodrow Wilson in the idealist and liberal school. This

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\(^{16}\) Michael Palmer (1992) compares Thucydides as a historian with Aristotle’s distinction between poets and historians from *On Poetics*. Aristotle says that the difference between the task of the historian and the task of the poet is that “the one speaks of what has come to be while the other speaks of what sort would come to be...for poetry speaks of general things while history speaks of the particular things” (*Poetics* 1451b). Based on Aristotle’s definition, Palmer suggests that Thucydides is not a historian in the Aristotelian sense, though he is a historian of a unique sort. Thucydides certainly speaks and reports about particulars, though his own statement of methodology indicates he has universal and cosmopolitan principals in mind at all times (*History* 1.22; cf. Orwin 1989: 354ff.). Cornford (1907: 79-81) sees a blend of myth-making and history in his interpretation of Thucydides. This reading is equally problematic. Myths and myth-making are associated with the Gods and Divine authority, yet Thucydides is clearly critical of the ancestral—that is, Homeric—account of the past in the opening chapters of his *History*. Lebow (2004: 95) reminds that *historia* in Greek meant observation and was meant to counter the attribution of causation to deities.
categorization, however, assumes that the similarities between Thucydides and a modern thinker like Machiavelli are more important than their differences, or that the differences between Locke and Hobbes and not their similarities are of a decisive importance (Cox 1962). As a result, the criticisms of Thucydidean scholarship tend to emphasize the ways that Thucydides is read incorrectly within the terms of modernity; i.e., that his idea of the balance of power is more nuanced than at first appears, or his version of realism is more demanding than assuming a crude quest for power, and so on. One especially popular trend is to read Thucydides as a realist who is providing a diagnostic text rather than a handbook for politicians (Gomme 1930; Sears 1977; Orwin 1994; Kokaz 2001a). Thucydides’ role as a diagnostician influenced by the Hippocratics extends this school of thought in order to diagnose ills in civilization itself (Lebow 2001). This theme usually concludes that Thucydides’ realism is of a tragic variety, urging care, caution, and moderation in the face of the necessities of war and political life.

Two specific mistakes have edified in such a way as to make it difficult to see beyond the interpretation they represent. The first mistake is the misinterpretation

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17 The paucity of concern with Thucydides’ use of prophasis in 1.23 in commentary linking Thucydides with balance-of-power theories or structural realism is difficult to account for. Careful reading of Thucydides’ text seems to correlate with a greater concern for how one must understand the “truest cause/justification/excuse” for the war. In the prequel to Thucydides’ discussion of the cause of the war, he mentions the increased frequency of earthquakes, solar eclipses, droughts and famines, and plague. I mention this only because these uncanny events exert an influence on decision-making during the war, depending on the mood of the populace or the piety of the politician (esp. 7.49-50). One can only speculate on the reasons why the literature has not turned to humanity’s relationship to the divine in order to explain the “truest cause” of war between Athens and Sparta, given its textual proximity to the “increasing Athenian greatness and resulting fear among the Lacedaemonians” assertion.
and disregard of Hobbes’s political philosophy in favour of his political theory. This is due to assuming that Hobbes’s moral outlook is a consequence of his discovery of Euclidean geometry and his application of Galileo’s resolutive-compositive method in the opening chapters of *Leviathan*. That is, Hobbes’s new scientific language and his *rhetoric* of a science for politics is mistaken for the substance of his thought, the moral foundations of which are visible in his Aristotelianism and his study of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* in his so-called humanistic period.¹⁸ Both Skinner (1996) and Strauss (1952) recognize the importance of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* for Hobbes’s early thought and its remaining influence in his later work, despite their great disagreements on basic issues, methodology, and judgment (n.b. Skinner 1969). The second mistake is the failure to appreciate the compassion and humanity that pervades Thucydides’ presentation in favour of aligning him simply and thoughtlessly with the speeches and deeds of Athens (of which the most famous speech is the Athenian dialogue with the Melians [5.85-113], and the most famous deed is the genocide of Melos [5.116]). Thucydides’ own view is difficult to decipher, but can be determined by considering his work not as a *history* in the modern sense but as a

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¹⁸ The most well-known treatment of this theme is Skinner’s *Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes* (1996: 214-44). A full exposition on the importance of Hobbes’s humanist period for his political philosophy would have to address the “hidden dialogue” in the years 1932-38 between Carl Schmitt’s *Concept of the Political* (1932) and *The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes* (2008), and Leo Strauss’s *Hobbes Critique of Religion* (2011) and *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes* (1952). What is at issue in this debate is the status of Modernity as a political program and political philosophy (i.e. its status as a vision of the good life). The main point of difference is how Hobbes intended his political anthropology to be understood. That is, whether humans are fundamentally sinful beings (Schmitt) or fundamentally vain beings (Strauss). Nicholas Rengger (2009: 147-51) employs the language of this “hidden dialogue” between Schmitt and Strauss to argue that by reflecting on the reality and possibility of *stasis* one can learn something about the nature of political society.
work of political philosophy. As such, I would suggest, in contradiction to the popular view, that Thucydides and Hobbes disagree in the most profound and fundamental way about the one aspect of their thought each takes to be the most important aspect of their thought: the relationship between politics and philosophy. In practical terms, this disagreement can be seen in how each treats the status of law and what the absence of law reveals about human behaviour.

There are many episodes of great import in Thucydides’ work, but my concern with relation to Hobbes’s thought will necessarily take a narrower view. The next sections will first concentrate first on Thucydides’ presentation of the plague and stasis, and the debate between Kleon and Diodotos and the narrow avoidance of the genocide of Mytilene. I will begin with these two related episodes of the plague and stasis because more than any other chapters of Thucydides’ History these two recount the breakdown of politics, and because this civil unrest bears an uncanny resemblance to Hobbes’s depiction of the natural condition. I stated that Hobbes and Thucydides disagree in a fundamental way; however, what Hobbes does take from Thucydides is an understanding of the fear/hope dynamic. Most importantly, while Thucydides and Hobbes agree about the philosophic import of

19 Full attention to this question demands reckoning on the role of Perikles in Thucydides’ narrative, and Thucydides’ judgment of Perikles. One would then have to determine what Hobbes’s judgment of Perikles would be, given that Perikles – like the Hobbesian Leviathan – was the Athenian monarch in a legal democracy (History 2.65.9). Given the high praise of Perikles, the “first man” in Athens, commentators have focused on Thucydides presentation of him as fundamental to deciphering the key themes of the History. Cf. Jaegar (1939: 405-11), Bruell (1981), Orwin (1994: 15-29), Lebow (1996; 2003), and above all Plato’s Menexenus, where Socrates attributes the Funeral Oration to Aspasia, the wife of Perikles.
the Athenian thesis—the psychological motivations for political action—they disagree about its applicability to politics, and the applicability of philosophy to politics generally. The role of philosophy in politics is linked for both writers to concerns for one’s body, and whether politics can handle an emancipation from material and bodily concerns. This concern for bodily security leads one to consider what it means to act in one’s self-interest, and the role that specific passions play in considering one’s self-interest. Hobbes’s thought makes a slight but significant modification to Thucydides’ presentation: Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty presents the politics of stasis in the light of the passions unleashed during the plague, mapping the psychology of fear onto the politics of hope. This relationship between fear and hope informs the Hobbesian political psychology that eventually undergirds the idea of sovereignty.

To state the matter as clearly as possible: Hobbes’s state of nature has been understood to be a metaphor or image of relations between states, and the institution of sovereignty derives its legitimacy from its apparent ability to relieve humanity from a nasty, brutish, violent condition. By returning to the sources that inspired Hobbes’s picture, it is possible to open up the full horizon under which Hobbes’s was writing, and thus allow this project to put into motion a critique (or at least provide an avenue of critique) that for too long has remained at rest. Foucault’s remarks on sovereignty, fear, and the mechanics of order and discipline, aimed as they are at the foundations of modern political life, are thus not antifoundational
enough: the psychology of fear, important as it is, is only half of the story of sovereignty. By highlighting the differences between Hobbes's presentation and its antecedents, Thucydides’ thoughts on the same will remain a touchstone in my analysis for what remains of this chapter, and in subsequent ones. Developing the Thucydidean political psychology will be the first step in bringing to light the buried assumptions within the political psychology of sovereignty. Lest I be accused at the outset of standing far afield of the intentions of either philosopher, consider Hobbes’s apology for Thucydides against the criticism of Dionysius:

> It is true, that there be some sentences in him somewhat long: not obscure to one that is attentive: and besides that, they are but few. The obscurity that is, proceedeth from the profoundness of the sentences; containing contemplations of those human passions which either dissembled or not commonly discoursed of, do yet carry the greatest sway with men in their public conversation. If then one cannot penetrate into them without much meditation, we are not to expect a man should understand them at the first speaking. (in Grene 1989: 584)

Hobbes learned something about fundamental relations between human psychology and political order by meditating on Thucydides. Returning to Thucydides’ History provides the necessary perspective to judge Hobbes’s political psychology as political: it is a freely chosen project, and a presentation of the passions that could have been otherwise. It is in fact presented differently in the writer that Hobbes claims is the authority on these matters.
D. Fearless Hope and Hopeless Fear

The plague in Athens during the second year of the Peloponnesian War and the civil strife in Corcyra during the fifth stand out in the History for the suffering, violence, and utter devastation of social life. The bulk of the History is dedicated to recounting the deeds of Athens and Sparta and the speeches of their most prominent citizens during this “greatest disturbance” (1.1.2). Thus, the work is understood to be more concerned with issues akin to international relations than with the question of the best regime that usually animates classical political philosophy. However, the accounts of the plague and of the civil strife bring to the fore issues regarding the nature of political life at all places and all times. Thucydides goes so far as to suggest the greatness of the current war is due to its possessing two attributes other wars have not: a plague “that did the most damage and destroyed the most number,” and “faction” that saw the largest number of Greeks slaughtered or exiled in addition to the war itself (History 1.23).

Because the plague and civil strife play such a large role in making the war between Athens and Sparta the greatest disturbance, the nature of these two episodes is therefore similar to the nature of war itself. Thucydides says his work is a “possession for all time” because it reveals the “plain truth” about past and future events, in “accordance with human nature” (History 1.22). The episodes of the plague and civil strife, by virtue of the prominence Thucydides gives them in the
introduction to his History, must be read as offering perennial insights into human nature and politics. As such, Thucydides’ “truest cause” of the war will be, by implication, the cause of the plague and civil strife as well, and this truest yet “least openly expressed” cause will be made more clear in Thucydides’ account of the plague and civil strife.

There are three important shared consequences of the plague and civil strife, all relating to a fundamental breakdown of the common bonds of society: the breakdown of the laws of the city (History 2.53; 3.8.2.5); the subversion of customary family and kinship relations (2.51; 3.8.2.6); the contravention of the laws of the gods, and traditional displays of piety and respect for oaths (2.52; 3.8.2.7). The political consequences of the plague and the civil strife are therefore identical; however, the passions that animate these two episodes and cause the breakdown of these three sets of laws are in opposition. The breakdown of the city’s laws, piety, and kinship relations during the plague is due to extreme fear and utter hopelessness at the situation that the plague has wrought. By contrast, the breakdown of the same

20 My use of “perennial” here may imply too great a concern for history. The word Thucydides uses to describe the civil strife is stasis, meaning “to stand still”. This opposes the word he uses to describe the war, kinesis, which means movement. (The negation of stasis is anastasis, meaning “to get up” and rendering “resurrection” in the religious context). While Thucydides obviously offers a transhistorical understanding of human nature, his understanding is also meant to apply to the two states of political life: movement and stasis. It is during the time where there is a lack of movement that may be the most revealing for an understanding of human nature. There is a similarity here between Thucydides’ motion/rest dichotomy and Aristotle’s anger/calmness dichotomy. Rest and calmness are negations of motion and anger.

21 It is surely no accident that these three signifiers of a loss of political order parallel the accusations against Socrates (cf. Apology 19b-d). The more difficult question is what that similarity means, and what one can learn about the relationship between philosophy and politics because of this similarity.
institutions during the strife is due to a combination of extreme hopefulness and fearlessness about the consequences of one’s actions.

One important aspect in which the plague and stasis differ is with respect to their immediate causes. The plague originates from Ethiopia and Egypt as a result of Athens’ naval power and trading prowess (History 2.48). The effects of the plague are exacerbated by the advice of Perikles to move the farmers that resided outside of the Athenian walls into the city to improve its ability to defend against the pillaging of the countryside (History 2.21; 2.52).22 This relocation to a new home immediately prior to the plague arriving in Athens makes the city more populous than it ever was within the walls, ensuring that victims of the plague would be quite numerous (History 2.22). Thus a combination of economic trade and Perikles’ wartime strategy provide the opportunity for the plague to be very dangerous. The source of the civil strife, however, is quite different. The civil war that originates in Corcyra and engulfs all of Greece – with the exception of Sparta – does not have a proximate cause in the same way that the plague does. The plague is either accidental because of Athens’ dependence on maritime trade, or avoidable because of Perikles’ defense strategy. The civil strife, however, arises out of the natural ebb and flow of politics in the Athenian empire, and especially out of the disruption of everyday politics.

Both of these episodes must be understood in light of the Funeral Oration of Perikles at the end of the first year of the war, immediately preceding the outbreak of

22 There is something reminding of biopolitics in the advice of Perikles.
the plague. Perikles does not take the opportunity of his funeral oration to praise the fallen or offer condolences to their families—providing only a few lines about this at the very end of his speech—but he chooses instead to praise Athens, the Athenian character, and the Athenian empire. Perikles proclaims two reasons for avoiding praise of the fallen Athenians, corresponding to the two sorts of people who are listening to his speech: those who will think he understates the achievement of those who have lost their lives in the war by not speaking well enough, and those who will think he exaggerates the accomplishments of the dead and envy the honour they have received by his speaking too well (History 2.35). Perikles says he must speak in “due proportion” because one is apt to feel envy “when he hears anything going beyond his natural endowments” (History 2.35.2).23 Preferring Hobbes’s translation of this phrase, one feels envy when hearing praise “above the pitch of his own nature.” Introducing the relation between envy and human nature in this way implicitly raises two important themes: first, Thucydides is alluding to the difficulty of governing passions that aim or desire for equal treatment between individuals; second, the reality of one’s “natural endowments” is apparently inferior to, or “below

23 This phrase is specifically referring to those in the crowd who are ignorant of the deeds of the war dead, rather than those with knowledge of their deeds and good will towards them. These latter people pose a different problem for Perikles: because of their knowledge, his speech may be judged as insufficient in its praise. He is confronted with an impossible task: the knowledgeable listeners will think that he has insufficiently praised the dead, while the ignorant listeners will believe that he has praised them too strongly. The underlying point of a disproportion between the demands of different parts of the audience and the demands they make on Perikles highlights the challenges of moving and governing the passions. Perikles, therefore, is left in the unenviable position of having to lie or speak evasively (hence his praise of Athens & Athenians rather than the specific soldiers who have died) if he hopes to please all of his listeners. I note in passing that democratic politics creates a tension here between what is pleasant and what is truthful.
the pitch” of, one’s belief about them.\textsuperscript{24} It is this false estimation, imagination, and belief, in one’s natural endowments that will prove to be of greater political significance for the picture of political psychology that Thucydides presents.\textsuperscript{25}

This difference between one’s self-estimation and one’s actual abilities is the seat of envy, a passion that Perikles – “the first man in Athens at the time” – is explicitly worried about inflaming in his speeches, as well as one that caused his own political misfortunes (\textit{History} 1.139.4; 2.65.13).\textsuperscript{26} Perikles reinforces these implicit points about nature and envy when he says that praise of others “can only be endured as long as each believes himself capable of doing something of what he hears about” (2.35.2, my emphasis). As is clear in the context of the Corcyraean civil strife, Thucydides tells his readers that envy possesses a destructive power capable of placing “revenge above pity” and “gain above justice” (3.84.2). The disproportion between one’s beliefs and the reality about one’s endowments is sufficient to cause political turmoil and unrest when individuals are given the opportunity to act on these beliefs. Perikles’ funeral oration on the whole is a demonstration of this tendency to esteem ourselves at a greater value than is justified, especially if we

\textsuperscript{24} One can see how easily the tragic vision of political life maps onto the picture of psychology that Thucydides is presenting, that is eventually picked up by Morgenthau (1944) and has been the source of much commentary as an approach all its own in International Relations (Frost 2008; Chou & Bleiker 2009; Erskine & Lebow 2012)

\textsuperscript{25} cf. “In the state of nature there is in all men a will to do harm, but not for the same reason or with equal culpability. One man practises the equality of nature, and allows others everything which he allows himself; this is the mark of a modest man, one who has a true estimate of his own capacities. Another, supposing himself superior to others, wants to be allowed everything, and demands more honour for himself than others have; that is the sign of an aggressive character” (\textit{On the Citizen}, 1.4).

\textsuperscript{26} Connor (1984: 73) suggests that the fate of Athens after the death of Perikles, and even the immoderation and panic suffered during the plague, reflects the difference between Perikles’ call for peace and calm and the “innately restless character of the Athenians.”
consider what Perikles says of the Athenian empire and character “in speech” against the actual behaviour of Athens.

The plague serves as a dramatic response to the speech Perikles makes about Athens in his funeral oration at the end of the first year of the war (Connor 1984: 63ff.). In his oration, Perikles says that the Athenian empire is a freely chosen project, and that through devotion to the city – “becoming her lovers”—Athenians can ensure Athens “will be admired by this and future generations … since we have compelled every sea and land to become open to our daring and populated every region with lasting monuments of our acts of harm and good” (History 2.41). Part of the greatness of Athens that Perikles praises is the virtue of her citizens, and what follows is a psychological portrait of the ideal citizen as Perikles understands it. Perikles says that Athenians are especially law abiding because of fear of punishment, but Athenians are also moderate because they obey unwritten laws to avoid public shame (History 2.37). Athenians, Perikles continues, “are willing to face danger with a mind at ease … with bravery owing no more to law than to character” (History 2.39). Directly foreshadowing the source of the plague, Perikles demonstrates the importance of Athens by observing “everything is brought in from every land, and it is our fortune to enjoy good things” (History 2.38).

— Perikles is asking Athenians here to become Athens’ erastai, her lovers in the erotic sense of a lover and a beloved. For all that Perikles gets wrong in his judgment of Athenian character in his funeral oration, his call to become lovers of the city is heeded, and heeded so well that it culminates in the condemnation and almost-genocide of the Mytileneans (History 3.38).
These political, social, and moral virtues for which Perikles praises Athens are utterly undone once the plague enters the city. The modesty and shame that Perikles praises is stripped away in the face of assured death and shortened life: “everyone was ready to be bolder about activities that they had previously only enjoyed privately” (History 2.53.1). Faced with the grave threats of a shortened worldly life and contracting a painful plague, Athenians “thought it appropriate to use what they had quickly and with a view to enjoyment” (History 2.53.2). Seeing that both pious and impious people were contracting the disease, the laws of the city and the laws of the gods no longer had any ability to deter the behaviour of the Athenians because “no one anticipated that he will live till trial” and a much greater penalty had already been pronounced (History 2.53.4). Familial bonds also withered as lamentations for the dead became all too common and too wearying to maintain (History 2.51). More ominously, Athenians’ nobility and virtue was also among the victims of the plague. Those “making some claim to virtue” suffered under the plague more than those lacking virtue, because they did not stop visiting friends with the sickness (ibid.). Finally, while Perikles recently extolled Athenians on the virtue of giving up their personal needs for the needs of the city, nobility during the plague is conflated with the immediately useful and the pleasurable (History 2.53.3).

In Thucydides’ view, therefore, the moment that Athenians were given the opportunity to demonstrate the virtues that Perikles had praised them for, they act in exactly the opposite way. The danger of the plague was not faced with a mind at
ease but with restless desires requiring immediate satisfaction. The apparently brave Athenian character turned to cowardice in the face of sure death and in the absence of coercive laws with deterring punishments. One should take note of the order in which the laws become undone. It is only once Athenians realize that those who, living a pious life, are victims of the plague to a greater degree—greater because of the special danger it poses to virtuous behaviour—than those living an impious life that the authority of the city’s laws dissolves (*History* 2.53). That is, political stability and social order may have survived in the absence of the city’s laws if Athenians had reason to believe that godly punishments and rewards correlated with earthly pious and impious behaviour. The slight fear of punishment has been replaced by a total fearfulness of death; however, it is the hopelessness of reward for one’s behaviour that presents itself as the real undoing of civil and divine law. Thucydides highlights the necessity for what Sharon Krause (2008) has called the *affective authority* of the law, or the need to feel an attachment to the conventions and customs that bind us together for their continued legitimacy. This stability is especially important for avoiding the immoderate boldness that subverts traditional understandings of nobility: political stability and security allows the noble to maintain its place as something difficult to achieve and separate from simple bodily pleasure (Orwin 1994: 175). The hope that virtue will be rewarded, or that at minimum vice will be punished, has two related benefits: first, it provides the basis upon which political stability and order might be maintained; second, building on this stability, it allows
those who would pursue virtue, honour, and prestige for its own sake regardless of any rewards associated with it to do so.

The subversion of nobility and virtue is for Thucydides the greatest tragedy of the plague, and the most important element that it shares with the account of civil strife: just as nobility was the first casualty in the plague, noble natures are the first in danger during civil strife. When war strips away access to daily needs it becomes a “violent teacher” aligning human passions with their present situation; war revolutionizes thinking and forces a change in the meaning of words (History 3.82.2). Recklessness becomes courage, anger becomes manliness, deliberation is treated like a form of dereliction of duty, and there is a race to see which faction breaks the laws of the city in a novel way (History 3.82.4). Kinship is replaced by partisanship, because kinship allows for excuses where partisanship encourages swift action, and oaths are no longer respected but broken at the first opportunity to enjoy an advantage over others (History 3.82.6). Like the plague, strife induces the breakdown of civil, godly, and familial laws. Strife, again like the plague before it, subverts traditional understandings of nobility and virtue: “the simplicity usually found in noble natures disappeared because it became ridiculous” (3.83). The defeat of noble natures, however, is more tragic under conditions of strife than during the plague. The lesser intellectual lights among the Athenians, “out of fear of their deficiencies and their enemies’ craft,” were more often survivors because they went straight into
action to eliminate those who fancied themselves stronger intellects, lest the weak intellects become the first victims (ibid.).

Unlike the plague where nobility was lost when it was conflated with immediate pleasure, nobility and intelligence are now actively sought out and eliminated because of the threat they pose to ignorance, and the limits they place on reckless action and vengeance (History 3.82.7). The consequences of the civil strife are similar with those of the plague insofar as they involve the breakdown of political rule, religious conventions, and familial bonds. However, whereas the actions of the plague were animated by fear and hopelessness, the actions of civil strife are animated by hope and fearlessness. This juxtaposition of passions is not insignificant. The fear of the plague caused Athenians to act in ways detrimental to themselves alone. The hope, greed, and ambition of stasis cause Athenians to act in ways that are actively destructive and violent towards others. The unrestrained hope and desire for political power and reward of political goods, and the envy of others that this implies, reveals human nature to always be ready to “act in violation of laws,” “be powerless over passion,” put gain above justice, and show hostility to any kind of superiority, preferring revenge to the law (History 3.84).

28 Cf. Hobbes in the first chapter of On the Citizen: “Intellectual dissension too is extremely serious; that kind of strife inevitably causes the worst conflicts. For even apart from open contention, the mere act of disagreement is offensive. Not to agree with someone on an issue is tacitly to accuse him or error on the issue, just as to dissent from him in a large number of points is tantamount to calling him a fool; and this is apparent in the fact that the bitterest wars are those between different sects of the same religion and different factions in the same country, when they clash over doctrines of public policy” (On The Citizen, 1.5).
In both episodes, the thesis enumerated by the Athenians at the first Lacedaemonian congress is domesticated by its application to the behaviour of individuals in political upheaval. Referring chiefly to the behaviour of cities, the Athenians argue that they are expanding the empire because they are compelled to do so by the three “great forces” of fear, prestige, and self-interest (History 1.75). Submitting to these great forces means Athens has done nothing “contrary to ordinary human behaviour” (History 1.76). The plague and civil strife depict situations where individuals within the same community act in general accord with the compulsions laid out in the Athenian thesis. However, these two episodes also encourage us to alter the thesis as presented, incorporating a concern for hope with self-interest and prestige. Fear and hope reveal themselves in Thucydides’ narrative as the “great forces” capable of determining human political activity, and hope more than any other force presents problems for political stability and prudent action. Hope encourages the miscalculation of one’s realistic objectives, just as the Melians chose to fight the Athenians when doing so meant certain death simply because political surrender also mean the surrender of their hope for freedom (History 5.102). Hobbes has drawn this lesson from Thucydides as well, remarking that “man by nature chooseth the lesser evil, which is danger of death in resisting, rather than the greater, which is certain and present death in not resisting” (Lev. XIV.29).

Realists have also assumed that the Melians acted imprudently in their refusal to acquiesce to Athenian demands. Hope that Melos might remain free is irrational and imprudent if self-interest is understood as survival. The Melians’ rational calculus is complicated by the fact of their religious convictions, a point passed over all too often in contemporary commentary. If the gods will punish
Thucydides’ underlying lesson is that the presence and lack of hope is responsible for the political, moral, and social consequences that result from the plague in Athens and the Corecyraean civil strife, and the workings of hope must be understood if one is to read the History in accordance with Thucydides’ presentation of human nature.

E. The Mytilenean Debate, or Affecting the Other

This desire or hope to overcome our natural limitations is at the heart of Thucydides’ realistic understanding of politics. The pervasiveness of this irrational hope of individuals and political communities in their own abilities is a key reason why Thucydides’ account makes us question the soundness of the realist psychology of self-interest. As Thucydides makes most clear in the Melian dialogue, one’s understanding of what constitutes self-interest is not fixed or easy to identify because of the constancy of competing claims between a desire for justice and the compulsion of necessity. Nor can one presume to predict how another political actor will determine or calculate what is in his or her self-interest. Both sets of anonymous Athenian envoys in the History believe that it is in the Lacedaemonian and Melian interest to seek peace or surrender, and both times battle ensued (History 1.72.1; 5.85-90). It seems that the Athenian thesis is therefore a poor guide for political policy. Yet it is incorrect to assert that the insight of the Athenian thesis—that individuals and states act in accordance with what they believe to be in their

injustice in this life and the next, how can prudence counsel that the Melians give in to the demands of the impious Athenians who now claim to act as the gods themselves (History 5.105.1-3)?
interest—is essentially flawed. The difficulty arises in trying to determine what is truly in one’s self-interest. The most substantive treatment of this difficulty is offered by Diodotos in his speech arguing against the genocide of Mytilene. Despite being treated by Athens with more consideration than other allies, Mytilene rebels, and Athens—on the advice of Kleon—decides to put to death the Mytilenean oligarchs that initiated the rebellion, as well as the Mytilenean demos that did not (History 3.35-36). However, Athens comes to regret this decision the day after it is made and reopens the debate over the proper punishment for Mytilene. It is in this setting that Kleon urges the swift execution of all of Mytilene, not so much because it is in Athens’ interest but because it is also the just course of action (History 3.40.1-4). Diodotos makes the argument that Athens must treat Mytilene with compassion because Mytileneans has acted only in accordance with their own advantage and self-interest—indeed, as the Athenian thesis predicts they would—and that it is not in the Athenian interest to put to death all of Mytilene as Athens will then appear to be an enemy of the demos in every city (History 3.41-48).

Although Kleon and Diodotos argue for the opposite treatment of Mytilene, both speakers appeal to the psychology of the Athenian thesis. Kleon says that he can “make allowance for any who cannot bear our rule or were compelled by the enemy” if they were to revolt, in accordance with how the Athenian thesis would interpret such behaviour (History 3.39.1). However, despite the appeal to the logic of self-interest in speech Kleon appeals to a desire for justice in deed: the thrust of his
argument is that Mytilene deserves to be punished because they were “conscious conspirators” and “did not harm involuntarily” (*History* 3.40.1). Moreover, Kleon wishes to clothe his language of justice in the language of self-interest and expediency by arguing that if Athens punishes the Mytileneans “as they deserve” then others will be deterred from revolting and Athens can concentrate on fighting her enemies instead of suppressing her empire (3.40.4). Kleon, like the envoys at Melos, speaks the language of necessity and self-interest but keeps the desire for and hope for justice beneath the surface of his remarks. By contrast, Diodotos argues that the Mytileneans have only acted in accordance with human nature, “led on by their hopes” to take risks and act in the face of danger (*History* 3.45.4). Diodotos, in language reminiscent of the “great forces” of the Athenian thesis, says that human passion “ruled by some irresistible force” will lead people into danger:

> And in every case, hope and desire – the one leading while the other follows, the one thinking up the scheme while the other holds out he full assistance of fortune – do the greatest damage, and although invisible, they have power over perils that can be seen. (*History* 3.45.5)

Diodotos asserts here the primacy of hope in human decision-making, just as Thucydides draws our attention to the same. Moreover, Diodotos has put into words what Thucydides reveals implicitly through both sets of envoys and Perikles’ oration: hope is a dangerous element of political life because it clouds judgment and encourages immoderate, intemperate, and inhumane behaviour (Ahrensdorf: 2000; Orwin 1994: 172-185). Diodotos makes clear that the Athenian thesis is equally
applicable to individuals as well as cities, because these invisible agents of hope and
desire lead to attachments to justice in the fashion that Kleon expresses them and
therefore immoderate politics (Bruell 1974: 17). Thucydides and Diodotos
demonstrate that “hope and desire” have an “invisible” influence under each of fear,
prestige, and self-interest, making the prediction of human behaviour almost
impossible.\footnote{This statement begs comparison with Thucydides’ enumeration of the truest cause for the war “the
one least openly expressed” (1.23.6).} It is unrealistic to think that politics can be completely rational and
devoid of any consideration for justice. Athenian realism, according to Thucydides,
is naïve for believing that self-interest is all that needs to be considered in politics.
This said, Thucydides does not deny the soul/regime or psychology/order
parallelism of which the Athenian thesis is but one example, though he understands
the character of this relationship very differently. Thucydides cannot whole-
heartedly support the Athenian thesis, and by implication the founding tenet of
modern realism. Hope, or the false estimation of one’s abilities in spite of reality, is
the truest cause of war and violence.

I can now address the second implicit theme of Perikles’ Funeral Oration—
estimating one’s “natural pitch”—and in doing so determine the extent to which this
account of realism that Thucydides presents differs from the presentation of
Hobbes. Recall that Perikles praised Athenians for being “lovers of wisdom” but
that this love of wisdom was subordinate to love of Athens or the city itself because
it is the city, it is one’s immediate political community, that provides the first window
through which one sees and knows the world (Strauss 1964: 228-30; Lev. XIII.14, XIV.3, XLVI.6). All politics, and all knowledge, is radically local in the Periklean scheme, despite the traditional understanding of wisdom as cosmopolitan in intent. Philosophy on Perikles’ account is subordinate to patriotism; therefore, wisdom is not loved for its own sake but for the glory it can bring Athens (History 2.40-41).

Thucydides understands the Athenian thesis to express a philosophic truth about human nature, while being an impracticable political policy, because it is unrealistic to evacuate concerns for justice from politics. Concerns with and for justice do not give way to the force of necessity, nor disappear under the pressure of anti-foundationalism. Thucydides’ argument can be reformulated as follows: the philosophic insight of the Athenian thesis, if understood, prevents the estimation of abilities and hopes “above the pitch of one’s nature” and understands the danger of allowing irrational hopes to unduly influence politics.

Thucydides directs us toward an understanding, therefore, of the fundamentally limited nature of our political capacities, especially the capacity for justice. To claim to live beyond necessity or compulsion as the Athenian envoys do is to claim to be emancipated from one’s mortality and humanity. Thucydides’ philosophic insight is that misunderstanding the limits or bounds of human nature can lead to dire political consequences; believing oneself to be free of the limits of mortality allows a pseudo-philosophy to infiltrate politics because of the impossibility of genuine philosophy providing a lasting political influence. This interpretation of
the relationship between philosophy and politics is in direct contradiction to the vision Perikles outlines towards the end of his Funeral Oration. At the end of his speech, Perikles exhorts Athenians to become “lovers of Athens” and to offer their lives and virtue to her, “in shared hopes” (*History* 2.43.1-4). Simply, he exhorts Athenians to emancipate themselves from concerns for their bodily security, overcoming the limits of necessity (Orwin 1994: 26-8, 173-5, 182-4). The judgment on this emancipation of the body from politics is effectively leveled against Perikles in Thucydides’ depiction of the Athenian reaction to the onset of the plague in the second year of the war. When Athens is presented with the first opportunity after the Funeral Oration to demonstrate her virtue in the face of hardship, Athenians instead develop “indifference towards the sacred and profane alike” (*History* 2.52.3). Specifically, when one contracted the plague, one would lose all hope and experience of total isolation from the fear of approaching others (*History* 2.51). Faced with the threat and reality of death that would “devastate every sort” of bodily constitution, no one was keen to take on the hardships of nobility, and everything that was deemed immediately pleasant became “both noble and useful” (*History* 2.51, 2.53.3). When Athenians are confronted with the reality of bodily insecurity, they did not “face danger with a mind at ease” as Perikles predicts, but rather disregard the

31 On this point, Bedford and Workman (2001) misread the influence of Perikles on Athenian politics. Their reading abdicates Perikles of responsibility for the way that Athenians behaved during the plague, or responsibility for the demagoguery of Kleon, when Perikles’s invocation to take the city as a lover is directly responsible for unleashing these passions into the political arena. Perikles may have done a better job governing the city than his successors, but Thucydides implies very strongly that he set the stage for the immoderation that followed his death.
traditional burial rites and laws of the city (*History* 2.39.1ff.; 2.52-53). Thucydides’ implicit assertion, therefore, is that even this pseudo-philosophy is inapplicable to politics because of the influence it has on political breakdown.

**F. Our Hobbesian Inheritance, Part I**

The extreme hopelessness and fearfulness that Thucydides presents as foundational to the events of the plague are directly related to the passions that Hobbes argues will prevail in his account of the Natural Condition. Hobbes’s natural condition appears, at first blush, to be animated by the same fearfulness as Thucydides’ account of the plague. Hobbes tells us that in such a condition when people “live without a common power to keep them all in awe” we are always in a state of war “of every man against every man” (*Lev*. XIII.8). Hobbes’s natural condition is characterized by the absence of an effective political authority to keep us overawed and in a state of quiet (*Lev*. XIII.5). Under such conditions of anarchy, and under such a state of war, Hobbes asserts that individuals will have a “continual fear and danger of violent death” (*Lev*. XIII.9). Like the account of the plague, the natural condition presents human beings as being entirely fearful for their safety and security because the common power that is to maintain this safety and security is absent. However, the picture of the political psychology and motivation Hobbes presents bears greater similarity to the account of the Corcyraean stasis rather than the politics of the plague. During stasis, Thucydides tells us that kinship was less
important than party affiliation (*History* 3.82). Trust was earned by committing some illegal act, and the universal laws that were meant to help everyone in times of adversity were overthrown, and war prevented access to daily necessities causing a competition for resources (*History* 3.83-84). Similar to the state of war of everyman against everyman, Thucydides observes, “every form of viciousness was established in the Hellenic world” (*History* 3.83.1). The passion that animates the civil strife, however, is not fear but hope: “All [of the civil strife] was caused by leadership based on greed and ambition and led in turn to fanaticism once men were committed to the power struggle” (*History* 3.82.8ff., my emphasis).

Hobbes directs the reader’s attention to fear instead of hope in a number of ways: he describes the continual fear of violent death; he suggests that fear of death is a passion that, despite its prevalence in the state of nature, can incline men to peace; and most importantly, Hobbes says that “the passion to be reckoned upon is fear,” especially because fear of spirits invisible, before civil society, will reinforce the covenant of peace (*Lev.* XIII.9; XIII.14; XIV.31). Hobbes appears to be reformulating Thucydides’ account of the passions during the plague and to cohere with the politics of stasis. Yet, while the psychology of fear was preeminent during the plague fear is not the only cause of the violence and competition Hobbes describes in the natural condition. Hobbes begins his explanation of the war of all against all in a discussion about anxiety for the future, which is precisely the sort of anxiety exacerbated by the politics of strife and plague. Hobbes says that human
felicity is a continual progress of desire, from one object to another, not for enjoying these pleasures once but to assure forever the satisfaction of these desires (Lev. XI.1). Hobbes calls a successful life such as this a “contented life.” The difficulty is that all humanity suffers “a restless desire for power after power” because someone “cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more” (Lev. XI.2). This anxiety or restless desire presupposes certain relationships between human beings, prior to Hobbes’s description of the natural condition. These restless desires and the constant need to acquire power assume competition between individuals, and are the first movements of a war of all against all, but they differ in a decisive respect: the war of all against all asserts a postulate about equality and the natural equally ability to kill one another. It is this postulate about equality that will make the war in the natural condition perpetual. The restless desire for power after power does incline to war, but not of the perpetual sort because it is not between equals: this war would end when the strong subdue the weak.

This postulate about the equal natural ability to kill one another is conflicted about its equality. Hobbes says he finds a great equality in the faculties of the mind, if we set aside the arts grounded upon words (Lev. XIII.2). Moreover, he says that prudence “is but experience, which equal time equally bestows on all men in those things they equally apply themselves unto” (Lev. XIII.2). This implies an inequality of prudence and experience based on age, especially if we consider Hobbes’s remarks
(Lev. III.8) that some with more prudence cannot be equaled at a task by any advantage in natural or extemporary wit. Hobbes’s natural condition requires a material equality in the faculties of the body, but even this equality is qualified: Hobbes says that all of us have different strengths and abilities, but no one is so incredibly superior to legitimately claim any benefit, especially a political one (Lev. XIII.1). Where we are equal—following the themes Thucydidès weaves into Perikles’ funeral oration—is in our propensity to think that no one else is as wise as we estimate ourselves to be (Lev. XIII.2). From this equality of belief in our abilities comes an equality of hope in attaining our ends (Lev. XIII.3). Importantly, this equality of hope in attaining our ends takes on a greater importance when we feel that we have not been valued by a companion at the same rate at which we value ourselves (Lev. XIII.5). Hobbes says that this desire, or hope to be treated at least as an equal, is so strong that at any sign of undervaluing everyone “naturally endeavours, as far as he dares (which amongst them that have no common power to keep them in quiet, is far enough to make them destroy each other), to extort a greater value from his contemners, by damage, and from others, by the example” (Lev. XIII.5). The assumption of our natural equality, as well as the equality of hope in attaining our ends, lead to this violent end in the natural condition. It is not from the fear of violent death but from this equality of hope from which the characteristic violence of the natural condition flows.
On this score, Hobbes is in complete agreement with Thucydides. Both understand that hope is at the heart of human political action, and that this passion can severely distort the perception of reality leading one to engage in political folly. Hobbes, in contrast to Thucydides, holds out hope himself that hope can be moderated by the continual fear of violent death. Hobbes says that that fear is the passion “which inclineth men least to break the laws” (*Lev.* XXVII.19). Hobbes says that the “force of words” is too weak to hold men to their covenants, but that two “imaginable helps”—fear and glory—can strengthen these covenants (*Lev.* XIV.31). Hobbes says that glory—or the pride in appearing not to need to break an oath—is too rarely found to be presumed or depended on for obedience; however, fear is the one to reckoned on, coming in two forms. First, there is fear of spirits invisible; second, there is fear of the power of men. Hobbes says that because the power of individuals is not discernable in the state of nature, only the fear of spirits invisible can “strengthen a covenant of peace agreed on, against the temptations of avarice, ambition, lust, or other strong desire” (*Lev.* XIV.31). The implication is that within the bounds of civil society the inequality of power between people is discernable, primarily between the sovereign and the subjects. Therefore, civil society can make use of this “greater fear” of the power of people to thwart the temptation to break covenants.

During the debate at Melos after having contemplated the offer and threats of the Athenians, the Melians respond that they will not surrender to Athens and
give up the freedom of a city that has lasted 700 years, “by trusting in the favor from the gods, which has preserved it up till now, and in the help of men as represented by the Lacedaemonians” (History 5.112, my emphasis). Hobbes says the fear to be reckoned on is of two sorts: fear of the gods, and fear of humans. Thucydides, by contrast, wants us to reckon on two sorts of hope: hope in the gods and hope in humans. Neither of these hopes is trustworthy or rational, and Thucydides wants to impress upon his readers the danger of the human tendency of “entrusting desire to heedless hopes, while using arbitrary reasons to dismiss what is unacceptable” (History IV.108, ll 18-9). The Corcyraean civil strife depicts people faced with the sort of violent death that Hobbes describes; however, what is noteworthy about these people is that they want to demonstrate their ability to overcome this fear and limitation.32 The fear of violent death is insufficient to moderate the hope in one’s ability to attain the ends one desires (cf. Lev. XIII.3). If we turn to Hobbes’s translation of the relevant passages from Thucydides’ History, we see that Hobbes translates the following: “The cause of [stasis] is desire of rule out of avarice and ambition, and the zeal of contention from those two proceeding” (History 3.82.8, my emphasis). According to Hobbes, avarice and ambition are two of the temptations that will influence the dissolution of covenants in the absence of fear (Lev. XIV.31). The difficulty is that

32 Thucydides says stasis engulfed, “almost without exception” all of Hellas, but it in fact engulfed Athens but not Sparta (History 3.81; Orwin 1988: 839-40). The Spartan regime was able to avoid the horrors that Hobbes posits as the negative standard for political life. This said, in the absence of a population willing to play the role of the Helots, Hobbes cannot posit the Spartan regime as his political solution. This should at least make one question whether Hobbes’s preferred organization of the Sovereign and the Laws of Nature is a suitable solution for the problem of security, or if the cost of peace is not as light as one would assume.
avarice and ambition, causing stasis, are responsible for a situation of utter fearlessness and complete hopefulness. It is incorrect to suggest that they would, therefore, be moderated by the continual fear of violent death or punishment at the hands of the Hobbesian sovereign. The reality of violent death does not moderate action during stasis; rather, the psychology of stasis is such that the fear of death inflames the desire for glory and the passion of vainglory.  

The last, but by no means final, issue to be addressed is the manner in which Hobbes understands the relationship between science and politics, in comparison with Thucydides’ understanding of the same. I have argued that Thucydides believes the Athenian thesis, and the two fundamental Realist insights that might makes right and politics is the pursuit of self-interested, to function better as a philosophic insight into human interaction rather than a tool for political policy. Hobbes must have such an interpretation in mind when he recapitulates the Athenian thesis in his definition of quarrel. Quarrel, Hobbes says, has three causes: competition, which invades for gain; diffidence, which invades for safety; and glory which invades for reputation (Lev. XIII.6-7; n.b. Bull 1981: 721-3). It is for the specific purpose of quieting quarrel and inclining to peace that Hobbes seeks to leverage the continual

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33 cf. Ahrensford (2000: 588-9). Many of the arguments in this paragraph follow Ahrensford’s astute analysis. However, he is more concerned with drawing out the theme of anarchy in Thucydides and Hobbes than I am partly because, I believe, he treats the natural condition too much as a quasi-historical period rather than a rhetorical construction.

34 In his translation, Hobbes renders the controversial and difficult phrase ten alethestaten prophasin regarding blame for the war at 1.23.6 as “truest quarrel” instead of Lattimore’s “truest cause” or Crawley’s “real cause” or Orwin’s “truest allegation”. We can assume Hobbes does so because he recognizes that the issues of blame and responsibility, so visible in Diodotos’s presentations, and introduced by the Athenian thesis are at issue for Thucydides from the very start.
fear and danger of violent death. The tools for doing so are the Laws of Nature. These “convenient articles of peace” are suggested by reason so that people can be drawn into agreement (Lev. XIII.14). Natural right, according to Hobbes, is the “liberty each man hath to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature…of his own life” (Lev. XIV.1). Each law of nature is a “precept or general rule, found out by reason” whose purpose is to place boundaries on the liberty of natural right (Lev. XIV.3-4). Since the right of nature is self-preservation, and one has the natural right to do anything that is necessary for preserving himself, “it followeth that in such a condition every man has a right to everything, even to one another’s body” (Lev. XIV.4). In the absence of the laws of nature, one’s self-preservation is threatened by another’s self-preservation. Consequently, Hobbes builds his politics on the survival of the body and on bodily security, and the new role he envisions for philosophy is the articulation and generation of the laws of nature that are to maintain this political system.35

The role of philosophy or science for maintaining peace in Hobbes’s political system is not insignificant. Hobbes says that the science of the laws of nature is the “true and only moral philosophy” (Lev. XV.40). In the same context Hobbes says

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35 It is unfortunate, but much of the scholarship that attempts to apply Hobbes’s understanding of politics to International Relations does not give adequate attention the whole of Hobbes’s thought. Hedley Bull (1981), for example, despite recognizing the kinship between Hobbes’s definition of quarrel and Thucydides’ Athenian thesis, assumes that Hobbes’s anarchic state of nature can simply be applied to relations between states, that the there is a temporal movement from the state of nature to civil society, and emphasizes Hobbes’s remarks about fear to the neglect of hope. By contrast, Mark Heller (1980) recognizes the difficulties in applying Hobbes’s individualist model of anarchy to state behaviour, but does not give enough consideration to the nuances in Hobbes’s remarks on equality. Such interpretative minutiae could be overlooked if they did not have the tendency to be edifying.
that “moral philosophy is nothing else but what is _good_ and _evil_ in the conversation and society of mankind” and good and evil signify appetites and aversion (Lev. XV.40). Hobbes tells readers much earlier in _Leviathan_ that appetites and aversions are, in the first instance, bodily desires such as thirst and hunger, which later develop into appetites or aversions for particular things based on experience (Lev. VI.2-3). Therefore, the moral philosophy of good and evil that Hobbes envisions will be oriented from the beginning around the survival and satisfaction of bodily needs. This orientation of philosophy with the body takes on a new significance when we recall that Hobbes says he is at the point of believing his labour to be useless “till sovereigns be philosophers” (Lev. XXXI.41). The orientation of philosophy with bodily needs is required because Hobbes equates the role of the sovereign with the public practice of philosophy, and bodily security is the sovereign’s responsibility. To put it another way, this reconceptualization of philosophy is required by Hobbes because of his principle of an equal and natural right to self-governance: this self-governance starts with bodily security, and so too must his new political philosophy. The ultimate consequence of this new and modern orientation to what is “outside” of one’s experience is the increasingly asymptotic relationship between the concept of sovereignty and the practice of security.

**G. Conclusion**

The logic of Hobbes’s argument for the place of philosophy in his new politics and understanding of sovereignty seems to be as follows: philosophy
requires leisure; leisure requires social peace; social peace requires a sovereign; the Sovereign requires the laws of nature; the laws of Nature require philosophy to articulate them. The circularity of the argument does not matter if we recognize that there is no movement from a state of nature into civil society: the laws of nature cannot be recognized in the state of nature because these laws are precepts of reason and a moral science, and arts and science are impossible in the warlike natural condition (Lev. XIII.9). Hobbes, therefore, conforms and departs with Thucydides in two respects. First, both Hobbes and Thucydides believe that a concern for bodily security must be at the foundation of politics for there to be social stability. A concept and practice of sovereignty that fails to account for this fundamental aspect of political psychology will be doomed to fail. Second, Hobbes and Thucydides disagree about the ability of philosophy to bring about a better and more stable politics. We learn from Thucydides that philosophy is impossible to apply to politics, either because its political positions are too demanding for quotidian concerns—as in the case of Diodotos—or because we will end up with pseudo-philosophy in the attempt to bring philosophy into politics. This pseudo-philosophy does not make the body the centre of politics but rather seeks to emancipate the body from politics because it confuses the belief about the abilities of human nature with the reality of the same. Thucydides’ critique of Hobbes, therefore, would be that his method and his solution for the permanent problems of politics are fundamentally at odds. Philosophy, the study of humanity, a political anthropology,
and so on, can do much to bring to light the psychological phenomena that are reflected and reproduced in the most general customs and conventions of political order. Philosophy cannot be the source of political stability, as Hobbes understands it, because the attempt to incorporate philosophy into politics is more likely to result in episodes like the plague rather than the contended self-preservation Hobbes is seeking.

To speak of Hobbes and Thucydides as influencing the realist tradition of International Relations is to engage in some obfuscation about the fuller intention of their political philosophies. Modern realism has chosen certain specific aspects of these thinkers' broad and deep reflections, and turned them in some cases to pathologies. Thucydidean realism must not mistake the Athenian envoys and their hard-headed self-interest as the voice of Thucydides himself. His account of the reality of politics begs us to ask questions about the status of blame, morality, and appeals to justice that realpolitik can too quickly ignore. Likewise, Hobbes's manner of writing and teaching by precepts facilitates the disregard for the bigger picture of his thought. That his account of anarchy is applied without recognizing its metaphorical nature, or anarchy's status as the standard that politics is to escape is only one habit of modern realism that should be corrected. If either author has something approaching a realist perspective on politics it will involve deep reflection on their part about the nature of politics and human behaviour, and a consideration of human nature and political psychology that is more comprehensive than the
power-seeking caricature of realist logic. In a sense, while both philosophers are concerned with something resembling what we now call International Relations, this concern is subordinate to a concern for politics as such, a concern for the reality of the demands of human nature, and the potential for philosophy and those who live this way of life to exist within a political community. To this end, we note in closing that reality of stasis is of foundational importance for both Hobbes’s and Thucydides’ political philosophy, and it is in stasis that we witness the dissolution of the law of the city, religious law, and familial bonds. It is surely no coincidence that these three dissolutions recapitulate the charges against Socrates specifically and the philosopher generally. A realistic account of politics worthy of the name must begin by reflecting on the meaning of this apparently coincidental relationship between political instability and the pursuit of wisdom.

If it is true that the stasis and the plague cannot properly be discussed independently of each other, then one must also give some consideration to the events that lead up to stasis. As with all of Thucydides’ History, the speeches of the actors must be read alongside the speech of Thucydides himself, as he makes his thoughts known in the narrative he provides. The longest such narrative digression occurs in the winter of the fifth year of the war, in the form of the Coreclyraean civil strife (History 3.82ff) that spreads through all of Greece. The attempt by Diodotos to thwart the Athenian desire to commit genocide against the Mytileneans for a betrayal during the war should make us reflect on exactly what realism demands of its
understanding of political psychology. In the end, Thucydides offers a picture of the emotions that recognizes their ubiquity (the accounts of stasis and the plague) but requires their governance (Mytilenean debate) in order for politics to be peaceful, stable, and just. Part of the success of Diodotos’ speech is his attempt to make the Athenians understand or affect the position and condition of the Mytileneans that they are about to condemn: Diodotos asks the Athenians to imagine themselves in the position of Mytilene—or to internalize their position—and ask whether they would have behaved differently when compelled by necessity and self-interest as were the Mytileneans. I can only note in passing that Diodotos’ antagonist is Kleon, described by Thucydides as the “most violent of the citizens and the most persuasive of them at the time,” who features prominently in Aristotle’s paradigmatic teaching on the passions in On Rhetoric. It is worth reflecting on the distinction between anger (orge) and spirit (thymos), and how this distinction plays itself out politically under discussion of the concepts of recognition and redemption. A feeling that one has been wronged serves to inflame either passion, and both play a role in the image of human psychology that the modern concept of sovereignty takes as its starting point. More will have to be said about this under the consideration of Aristotle’s teaching on the passions and political stability.
Chapter IV

Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, Affect, and International Relations

A: The Affective (Re)Turn

John Aubrey, in his brief essay on the life of Thomas Hobbes, records this remark from Hobbes on Aristotle: “I have heard [Hobbes] say that Aristotle was the worst teacher that ever was, the worst politician and ethick—a countrey-fellow that could live in the world would be as good: *but his Rhetorique...was rare*” (1898: 357, my emphasis). The renown with which this remark is held is demonstrably less than Hobbes’s more famous excoriation of Aristotle in *Leviathan*: “I believe scarce anything can be more absurdly said in natural philosophy than that which is now called *Aristotle’s Metaphysics*; nor more repugnant to government than much of that he hath said in his *Politics*; nor more ignorantly than a great part of his *Ethics*” (Lev. XLVI.11).¹ Why is Aristotle’s rhetorical treatise spared from this famous tongue-lashing? What is it about Aristotle’s *On Rhetoric* that allows Hobbes, the progenitor and founder of the concept of modern sovereignty, to rank it as “rare”? Superficially, what sets Aristotle’s rhetorical thought apart from his political and ethical works is that *On Rhetoric* is the only place within Aristotle’s body of thought where he treats the political psychology in a systematic way, where the passions are

¹ I will cite chapter and paragraph from Edwin Curley’s (1994) edition.
the primary movers of political life (cf. Gross 2001: 313-9). Moreover, despite all the dangers Hobbes identifies in pursuing the good society in the light of ancient political philosophy, Aristotle’s Rhetoric is deemed a work of such high quality that Hobbes reproduces Aristotle’s thoughts almost verbatim in The Whole Art of Rhetoric under Hobbes’s own name.

These remarks, admittedly, are strange to include in a discussion of sovereignty, political psychology, and affect. Yet, begin with Hobbes one must: it is Hobbes’s revivification of Aristotle’s psychology of the passions in On Rhetoric that provides the political psychology upon which our modern institution of sovereignty is built. Simply, even Hobbes’s “harshest critics themselves admit that he was the first to develop the concept of sovereignty with full clarity; and since this concept is not just one concept among others but the foundation of modern politics, Hobbes is the founder of modern politics. An understanding of Hobbes’s political science, then, is

2 Consider also Hobbes’s remarks in the Epistle Dedicatory to his Elements of Philosophy. After praising Galileo’s science of motion and “the science of man’s body” developed by Physicians, both being universal philosophies of nature big and small, he continues: “There walked in old Greece a certain phantasm, for superficial gravity, though full within of fraud and filth, a little like philosophy; which unwary men, thinking to be it, adhered to the professors of it, some to one, some to another, though they disagreed amongst themselves, and with great salary put their children to them to be taught, instead of wisdom, nothing but to dispute, and, neglecting the laws, to determine every question according to their own fancies. The first doctors of the Church, next the Apostles, born in those times, whilst they endeavoured to defend the Christian faith against the Gentiles by natural reason, began also to make use of philosophy, and with decrees of Holy Scripture to mingle sentences of heathen philosophers; and first some harmless ones of Plato, but afterwards also many foolish and false ones out of the physics and metaphysics of Aristotle; and brining in the Enemies, betrayed unto them the citadel of Christianity” (Molesworth Vol. I, ix-x). Hobbes does not defend the church from this “pernicious philosophy” so much as he disdains the wars that resulted from its influence, and the new orthodoxy that sprung up because of the political use of “natural reason.” Hobbes pulls no punches in the Latin Leviathan, where he says Aristotle is taught in universities “as if the whole of the sciences were in one man, who was then also the greatest father of the Church” solely to “establish among adolescents a demeanor of deference” (Lev. XLVI.14 OL).
the elementary precondition for any *radical* understanding of modern politics” (Strauss 2011: 25, my italics). The institution of sovereignty is also, from the very beginning, a *securitizing* institution: the Hobbesian understanding of the relationship between politics and emotion is the Archimedean point for the strictly modern notions of sovereignty and security. Sovereignty and the security state are coeval with modernity making International Relations the paradigmatic and architectonic modern pursuit. By returning to the basis of Hobbesian sovereignty we avail ourselves of the full horizon of critique for this concept and institution.

I attempt here the preparation for such a critique by presenting the argument that the idea of security is the affect of the desire to have more than we need. The security problem, as it comes to light in the philosophic picture that is the basis of sovereignty, is reducible to the problem of the gap in knowledge between our wants and our needs. One could say, therefore, that the security problem is a problem of

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3 Linklater (2002: 332ff.) believes that we cannot speak of such an Archimedean point, and at best can only make a historical comparison between state systems on the basis of the reduction of physical harm. Likewise, Monteiro and Ruby (2009: 17) argue that “IR must come to terms with the fact that there is no Archimedean point capable of settling, once and for all, the debate among foundational positions.” IR can and should remain open to meta-theory or avoiding the strictures of scientific method for defining legitimate knowledge. Preliminarily, one can see that IR has very clear assumptions about what it means to be a human being, making the question, “what is a human being?” a suitable Archimedean point.

4 Architectonic here, in the classic Aristotelian sense of the term, is the guiding, general, and more choiceworthy pursuit: “…so in the same manner, some arts fall under one capacity, others under another – in all of them, the ends of the architectonic ones are more choiceworthy than all those that fall under them, for these latter are pursued for he sake of the former” (*NE* 1094a15; cf. 1141b20ff., 1152b1ff.). I recognize that this imputes *grandness* to IR. I see little use denying the common impression and opinion that IR deals with grand politics and big questions. By accepting this opinion, it is possible to concern ourselves with whether or not it is possible to move beyond a way of politics that begins from the assumption of external necessity and internal freedom. IR might be modernity’s architectonic pursuit; the question that remains is whether it is possible to resist this fact.
knowledge, or of the reduction of a specific ignorance regarding our condition.\textsuperscript{5} What Hobbes understood, and what he takes from Aristotle, is that we do not seek the security of the body so much as a sense of security \textit{of} and \textit{in} the mind.\textsuperscript{6} Affect theorist Silvan Tomkins refers to this as the affect of affect, or the fear of affect itself.\textsuperscript{7} This frames the problem of sovereignty in a philosophical sense, but this philosophical problem leads to a political problem when the metaphysics of sovereign power come into contact with the material reality of our political life.

One will notice some slippage in these opening remarks in my use of the terms affect, passion, and emotion. These three concepts are not identical but they are related. Brian Massumi (2002: 35) provides a terse though dense description of the difference between emotion and affect: affect is autonomous and this autonomy is characterized by openness, while emotion is an adumbrated potentiality of political experience or “the most intense” capture of affect. Regarding the conceptual difference between passion and emotion, it was not until the Scottish Enlightenment of the 18\textsuperscript{th} Century that the word emotion began to supplant the word passion for

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{5} This is not equivalent to intelligence in the professional political sense of “intelligence gathering.” We have in mind here a more basic knowledge of our sense of self and our being-in-the-world. See also Mitzen’s (2006) discussion of \textit{ontological} security and its importance to political identity and agency. Paradoxically, actors in a situation of persistent physical danger can be quite ontologically secure.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{6} This contention may sound surprising or even incorrect to close readers of Hobbes. I would, however, also consider that Hobbes’s remarks about the “repose of a mind satisfied” and the intention behind his emphasis on humanity’s fear of violent death, is to calm our inner vanity by educating individuals of their natural and unavoidable mortality. War is a violent teacher, says Thucydides. Death is a violent teacher, says Hobbes. Where for Thucydides war disclosed the nature and limits of politics and therefore the limits of what can be expected by politics between cities, battle discloses for Hobbes the limits of what the vain search for glory and honour can accomplish between people.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{7} I should restate that when I use the term \textit{affect} I understand it to mean the representation of inner feeling; cf. p.39, above.}
the descriptions of these sorts of affects on/of the body. Thomas Dixon (2003: 62-97) provides a clear account of the difficulty differentiating emotions from passions in the history of the psychological sciences. The difficulty in providing a clear and distinct definition of “emotion” stems from emotion’s critical and political introduction into scientific vernacular: “the term ‘emotion’ suited the purposes of a self consciously secularising and scientific cadre of psychological theorists in the late 19th century, detached as it was from the centuries of moral and theological connotations that had accrued to the terms ‘passion’ and ‘affection’” (Dixon 2012: 342). For Dixon, the history of the “folk,” “everyday,” or “commonsense” understanding and definition of emotion in contrast to its scientific category is important to tell, and we risk losing important complexity by trying to reduce the “fuzziness” of the emotion to scientific jargon (Dixon 2012: 343). Albert Hirschmann, in his influential treatise The Passions and the Interests, argues that our understanding of “passion” has gone through a quiet but politically profound evolution. Passions were at first set against each other so that a countervailing passion could “repress” or govern another. “Interest” was originally a term void of economic meaning, referring to this phenomenon of repressive passions: “[interest] comprised the totality of human aspirations, but denoted an element of reflection and calculation with respect to the manner in which these aspirations were to be pursued” (Hirschmann 1977: 32). That is, the countervailing passions were in one’s “interest” because they aimed at human happiness. Once this competition between
passions got mapped on to the burgeoning capitalist economy—an economy understood to produce beneficial rational outcomes—one’s interest came to be framed as opposing one’s irrational passions (Hirschmann 1977: 39-42). In sum, the inclination to provide a terse and steady definition of “emotion” or “passion” risks hiding a political history.

Hobbes understands passions to be internal, voluntary, motions. Voluntary motions, in turn, are initiated in the imagination, a faculty which Hobbes stresses is based on one’s memory. While there has been a genuinely impressive evolution in the amount of attention devoted to the topic of affect within the IR literature, this attention signals a return to a dormant debate rather than the discovery of a new disciplinary movement. The concentration on affect and emotion has grown up as a critique of orthodox rationalist methods within IR specifically and Political Science generally. Originating with René Descartes’s Passions of the Soul a dichotomy has existed between rationality and emotion, such that emotions were assumed to be deviations or corruptions of rational thinking. This distinction parallels Descartes’s distinction between body and mind, of which the literature on affect and emotion has made strategic use insofar as it uses these preconditions of rationalist human science for a critique of rationalism (Papoulias & Callard 2010: 33-6).

Rationalist or cognitivist approaches proceed with the assumption that emotions are visceral bodily reactions that corrupt the calm reasoning of the mind.

8 Recent treatments on memory and politics abound. For a sampling see especially Edkins (2003a), Bell (2006), and Lebow (2008).
However, beginning with William James’s (1884) two-part study for the journal *Mind,* the body and the emotions begin to be thought of as connected. James’s hypothesis is that bodily states follow perception, and that perception or emotion in the absence of the associated bodily reaction would be “purely cognitive in form, pale, colourless, destitute of emotional warmth” (1884: 190). Thus does a focus on the body, a materialist metaphysics, usher in the opportunity to reconsider the role of the emotions or the passions in politics. The previous chapters have all pushed forward an argument that the *prima facie* interaction and political relation is not physical but affective.

### B. The Mutability of Affect

Making the argument that implicit and subtle attention to Aristotle’s political psychology is already present within the concept of sovereignty will be our task. But this alone is not quite sufficient: our task is to make the implicit and subtle treatment of Aristotle’s political philosophy in IR explicit and robust. A similar set of intentions leads Chris Brown (2012: 440) to claim that the “Aristotelian moment is slowly arriving in International Relations Theory” thanks to what he calls the Phronetic Turn or the new focus on Practice taken from the work of Vincent Pouliot and Emmanuel Adler (2011).\(^9\) Pouliot has been especially influential in directing attention once again towards the practices involved in the maintenance of international relationships and the practice of diplomacy. Pouliot (2008: 260-5) does

\(^9\) For an account of the importance of Aristotelian *phronesis* to IR’s great debates, see McCourt (2012: 39-41).
this by paying special attention to Toulmin’s critique of the “imbalance” between rationality and reasonableness effected by Modernity. Pouliot’s emphasis on the logic of practice seeks to move analyses away from the representational bias that obscures the “background knowledge” and hunches that make rationalization and deliberation possible.\(^{10}\) He introduces Aristotle’s *topoi*, those things which one acts *with* but not *on*, as a touchstone for the logic of practice in distinction to the representational approach to knowledge found in Plato or Descartes that has been much more influential (2008: 266).\(^{11}\) The overriding concern and intention in the Aristotelian moment is to reinforce the importance of common sense and the everyday experience of political life in all its manifestations (2008: 270ff.).

Making Pierre Bourdieu’s understanding of habitus centrally important facilitates this turn to common sense. If habitus is the embodied disposition of common sense, this common sense must be political. If practical sense results from the interplay between habitus and field—because habitus is “embodied at the subjective level but it is comprised of intersubjective positions”—the field is inevitably political; the field is the relational sense of one’s place in society or attunement with common sense (cf. Pouliot 2008: 276).\(^{12}\) The Aristotelian link here becomes obscured thanks to jargon like “habitus” and “field.” The field is built from

\(^{10}\) This is true of a wide variety of approaches to IR, argues Pouliot.

\(^{11}\) *Topoi*, in Aristotle’s words, are “applicable in common to questions of justice and physics and politics and many different species of knowledge” (Rb. 1.2.21). Aristotle’s example of a *topos* that can be applied to any particular subject or genus of knowledge without teaching the audience anything about it would be “the more or less.”

\(^{12}\) One should consider the full range of meaning in the concept of *nomos*, especially those unwritten laws with which one comes into disgrace and shame for having transgressed them.
common *topoi* or articles of belief that are so fundamental as to be unstated, as well as *endoxa* or common opinion (*Rh.* 1.2.21). Bourdieu speaks of doxic modes or “schemes of thought and perception” which come to produce a false objectivity about the conventional world, “causing the world of tradition [to be] experienced as a ‘natural world’” (1976: 164). For Aristotle, it is the persuasion produced by the art of rhetoric where *endoxa* is used, manipulated, framed, and analyzed. George Kennedy takes the purpose of Aristotle’s instruction in rhetoric to be the art of “*seeing* how persuasion may be effected;” that is, rhetoric is the art of seeing how to adjust the interplay between habitus and field, between one’s “ontologically prior” disposition and the common sense of political reality.\footnote{Appended to George Kennedy’s translation of “rhetoric,” he speaks of Aristotle’s defining rhetoric as a *dynamis* or potentiality: “In [Aristotle’s] philosophical writing *dynamis* is the regular word for “potentiality” in matter or form that is “actualized” by an efficient cause. The actuality produced by the potentiality of rhetoric is not the written or oral text of a speech, or even persuasion but the art of “*seeing*” how persuasion may be effected” (*Rh.* 1.2.1n.34). This is clearly phronetic in the way that the Practice Turn wants to speak of *phronesis*, as a specific but hard to describe *knack*.}

This return to Aristotle and to the logic of practice, to the *topoi* and by extension the more familiar Greek concept of *nomos*, is a revival of what political philosophy calls conventionalism, or that attempt to understand political phenomena first and foremost by one’s immediate experience and first impressions. Now, it is also true that this explanation of practical logics and an Aristotelian inspired understanding of *phronesis* still take as their grounding assumption the rational and reasonable citizen. To state this somewhat differently, the criticism that neoliberalism privileges the *rational* citizen in opposition to the *neurotic* citizen is
equally applicable to the Bourdieusian inspired attempt to theorize politics from the point of view of practice logics (cf. Isin 2002). Consider that the logic of practicality is “ontologically prior” to communicative action, norm compliance, and “any and all conscious and reflexive action” (Pouliot 2008: 277). In Aristotle’s, we are political animals whose faculty of speech is “ontologically prior” to our ability to reason, necessitating our living in political communities.

Aristotle has always-already been a part of the philosophic grounding of International Relations—be it as Hobbes’s negative political bulwark or as his positive psychological one—even if this new focus on Bourdieusian habitus puts us in mind of hexis and characteristics from the *Nichomachean Ethics*, what is upon us is an Aristotelian remembrance rather than a new disciplinary moment. For example, Anthonly Lang demonstrates how Hans Morgenthau was “continuously engaged” with Aristotle’s ideas while developing his understanding of human nature, ethics, and the goals of politics, even though this influence was subtle and hard to detect (2007: 23-7). Bourdieu’s understanding of habitus and the “logic of practice” has breathed new life into the possibilities for linking Aristotelian understandings of habit (hexis), common opinion (endoxa), and his view of political perspicacity to studies in IR.

Aristotle’s instruction for the practice of rhetoric is ultimately a cosmopolitan education. A rhetor that can speak persuasively in different regimes can speak
persuasively to different peoples. To be clear, “the greatest and most important of all things in an ability to persuade and give good advice is to grasp an understanding of all forms of constitutions [tās politeías] and to distinguish the customs and legal usages and advantages of each” (Rh. 1.8.1). Moreover, speech that persuades must always reveal character, and that character that should “become clear by deliberate choice” for the sake of persuasion is determined by the regime (1.8.6). A rhetor needs to be able to persuade but also affect the character of the regime and the citizens of the regime in question.

Aristotle’s discussion of the status of natural right, its mutability, and political decisionism is relevant here, though it is an issue shrouded in darkness (NE 1134b; Rh. 1.13.2.). To begin, Aristotle’s discussion of endoxa addresses whether what modernity has come to describe as the anarchy between states is actually anarchy in the Greek sense of the word, or if international relations is simply to be understood as a domain of politics that remains free of modernity’s benefits and therefore free of its vices. Aristotle defines rhetoric in two ways. His first definition is comparative: “Rhetoric is an antistrophos to dialectic; for both are concerned with such things as are, to a certain extent, within the knowledge of all people and belongs to no separately

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14 Aristotle elucidates this point by referring readers to Socrates’s critique of the funeral oration of Pericles in Plato’s Menexenus. “Consider also the audience before whom the praise [is spoken]; for, as Socrates used to say, it is not difficult to praise Athenians in Athens. And one should speak of whatever is honored among each people as actually existing [in the subject praised], for example, among the Scythians or Lacononians or philosophers” (Rh 1.8.30). Aristotle offers no explanation here for why philosophers should be equated with independent communities. This remark in general speaks to the practical mutability of rhetoric.

15 Johnson (1985: 343-6) has treated this aspect of Aristotle’s thought in relation to Hobbes most explicitly. In this account, Aristotle is as quick as Hobbes to “go behind the law” to whoever makes the law, and finds there the “ultimate sovereign” whenever the law fails or is otherwise silent.
defined science \([\text{oudemiâs epistêmês aphôrismênes}]\). A result is that all people, in some way, share in both... Now among the general public, some do these things randomly and others through an ability acquired by habit” (Rh. 1.1.1-2, my emphasis).16 Aristotle’s position that rhetoric is a learned habit explicitly points to the discussion of habits from his \textit{Nicomachean Ethics}, and the practice of the intellectual and moral virtues. By saying rhetoric is an \textit{oudemiâs epistêmês aphôrismênes}, Aristotle is saying that rhetoric “is of no understanding marked off by boundaries.” Therefore, a more immediately relevant set of arguments from the \textit{Ethics} that concerns me here are his thoughts on the relationship between conventionalism and a common—that is, international—natural law. Rhetoric is a boundary-less and border-less understanding, which corresponds to that part of the political world that is not marked off by boundaries, or what we commonly understand by “the international.”

“Of the just in the political sense,” says Aristotle, “one part is natural, the other, conventional” (NE 1134b20). The “natural part of political justice has the same capacity everywhere and is not dependent on being held to exist or not” whereas “the conventional part is that which at the beginning makes no difference whether it is thus or otherwise, but once people have set it down, it does make a difference” (NE 1134b18-23). For Aristotle, natural justice is international justice: it

16 There has been a large amount of literature and speculation on Aristotle’s meaning of this term. It is often translated “counterpart” but, as George Kennedy notes in his translation of this passage, “counterpart” obscures the critique of Plato that Aristotle is partaking in here, specifically with the search for a knowledge specific to rhetoric in Plato’s \textit{Gorgias} 464b.
knows no city wall. It is the same in all places and at all times, but it does not have
to come into existence—it does not have to be—because it exists without disclosing
itself, though once disclosed it is not the same here and there. Aristotle’s list of
examples of conventions that people set down—that make a difference in practice—
matter a great deal. His list is as follows: sums of money for ransom, whether to
sacrifice goats or sheep, and particular legislation (referring to Thucydides’s account
of Brasidas). That is, his examples are contracts, sacrifices, and laws; or, three
activities that require praising or swearing to the gods. The gods are conventional—
they matter here, not there. Theology is always “political theology” because it
addresses the conventional half of the duality of political justice. Yet “in the opinion
of some people” justice is always conventional because nature is unchangeable. “Fire
burns both here and in Persia” but the just will tend to differ: natural justice is
mutable, natural justice is “perhaps” not changeable amongst the gods, even though
there is “something that is just by nature, though it is altogether changeable” (NE

17 Political justice is dual; it is not a singular whole. It is always-already pointing beyond itself by
pointing to itself. Political justice, by concerning itself with “convention” is both natural and legal, or
must be concerned with both of physis and nomos. There are clear hints here of the inside/outside logic
developed in Walker’s Inside/Outside (1993). Towards the end of his argument, Walker associates
Aristotle with the traditional story of the development of sovereignty, a story that draws a straight line
from polis centred politics to the modern state (1993: 167). In the sequel to this retelling, Walker says
the following: Both the presence and the possibility of something that might usefully be called world
politics or human identity flatly contradict the understanding of political identity affirmed by claims to
state sovereignty. Yet, paradoxically, it is precisely the possibility, and in some respects the presence
of some kind of world politics and common human identity that has continued to produce an account
of the world as a spatially demarcated array of political identities fated to clash in perpetual
contingency or to converge somewhere over the distant horizon at a time that is always deferred.
(1993: 169) Walker’s prolixity obscures his simple argument that there is a human nature in common
that the conventions of spatial sovereignty mistakenly interpret to be conflictual (n.b. “...has continued
to produce…”). The root of the political problem is mistaking a produced political psychology for
universal natural tendencies. Walker, in other words, is in search of political philosophy and a world
politics that are not aphoristic.
Thus the vagaries of material conditions and realities must be taken into account when determining what is politically *just*:

Comprehension is concerned neither with beings that are eternal and unmoved nor with just any or every one of the things that come into being, but rather with the things about which someone might be perplexed and deliberate. Hence it is concerned with the same things as prudence [*phronesis*]. Comprehension and prudence are not the same thing, however, for prudence is characterized by the giving of commands: its end is what one ought or ought not to do. But comprehension is characterized by decision alone. (*NE* 1143a5-10)

The conventional and the natural are “similarly changeable” and should be so changed with deliberation and *phronesis*. The natural and the conventional share in their mutability as they share in politics. What Aristotle means by justice that is changeable is that principles differ according to regime; the conventional things and the human things, “are not everywhere the same, since the regimes are not either” (*NE* 1135a4). Nonetheless, “everywhere there is only one regime that is in accord with nature, the best regime” (*NE* 1135a5). The natural world, the world “outside” conventional political life, rather than providing fixed prescriptions for the “inside” admits of the mutability of political right. The just and good society requires prudence, legislation, and applying the logic of practice; put slightly differently, the cosmopolitan character of rhetoric and education of the rhetor imply the possibility of the pursuit of the just society.

If one must draw a conclusion for international relations, the “just by nature”
is universal and its comprehension is accessible through the study the psychology of the passions. Natural law, while mutable, exists everywhere. Insofar as there is something, even in Ancient Greece, called “the natural” it exists in materials—fire in Persia and fire in Greece—but the principles that might be divined from these facts for political life are both mutable and immutable. The “natural” regime for a people (as we see in Aristotle’s proscription for legislators in the Politics) is adjusted to all kinds of circumstantial realities that then usher in the conventionally just and unjust. But there always remains something universally common: the duality of politics. This is another way of making R.B.J. Walker’s argument in Inside/Outside about citizenship being the universalizing particular, and that the politics of inside and outside is in fact not natural but a political theory, one that can be deconstructed and replaced just as it replaced previous organizing principles. In Aristotle’s terms, affect is the new universalizing particular, and IR is not just political theory but political psychology. But one of many possible rejoinders would be to point out the famous practical alternative to the inside/outside logic of modern sovereignty: the world state. This solution, however, should be even more anathema to a critic of sovereign practices than Westphalian state sovereignty. While war is possible under sovereignty, civil war and stasis are all that is possible in a world state. It is also impossible to seek refuge or to escape an evil regime if there are not other regimes to which one can flee. More directly, while the logic of inside/outside contemporaneous with all manner of sovereign violence it is also contemporaneous
with a politics of possibility, change, and motion. Simply, different ways of life are possible under this political organization, for better or worse, while the same cannot be said in an attempt to escape the evils of inside/outside with a world state. Finally, there is purchase to the counterintuitive claim that an “outside” that remains untouched by liberal modernity is a necessary and useful precondition for critique.

Where the Bourdieusians and Phronetic Turn have erred is in failing to connect the logic of practice to the practice of statesmanship with the duality of law in view. The interplay between field and habitus takes place solely in the world of human made things, within the conventional and particular world. Yet part of the phronesis that Aristotle presents as necessary for politics is an awareness of the problem of natural right or natural law—of those parts of the human experience held in common—and of the different demands that it places on political practitioners at all times and in all places. It is a revival of what political philosophy calls conventionalism, or that attempt to understand political phenomena first and foremost by one’s immediate experience and first impressions of these phenomena. This aspect of Aristotle’s political science has not received much attention within the wider body of IR literature, but it is incorrect to say that Aristotle’s views on nature have been totally ignored. The focus on the practice of politics that we have traced back to Aristotle has a counterpart in the renewed focus on the naturalness of political judgments, and the link between politics and human biology. The return to affect and emotion in IR and security studies is initially bound up with the
integration of political psychology into the same.

Jan Slaby has coined the phrase “critical neuroscience” to discuss the hidden anthropology buried in displacing the idea of personhood with that of brainhood, and the consequent slow disempowerment of the moral and political agent. Slaby ultimately appeals to Ian Hacking’s ideas of memoro-politics and biolooping to highlight the dialectical, rather than antagonistic, relationship between nature and nurture, because our neurology is never fixed or given outside of our social relations, and social relations play a part in the development of our neurotics (Slaby 2010: 402-5; cf. Gunnell 2007).

This new “materialistic metaphysics” denies that it is either materialistic or metaphysical (cf. Strauss 1939: 170). Yet, the (re)turn to affect and emotion necessitates the admission that the body is at the centre and foundation of the political. The blindness to affect results from the failure to recognize “nature as having its own dynamism” (Massumi 2002: 39). To use Massumi’s phrase, affect’s “matter-of-factness” needs to be taken seriously by political theory (2002: 46). Just as we look to Hobbesian philosophic antecedents regarding sovereignty, Massumi looks to Benedict de Spinoza as the philosophical antecedent of affect, identifying Spinoza’s Ethics as a project for “thinking Affect” (2002: 28). Spinoza defines the body in terms of “relations of movement and rest,” demonstrating an awareness of

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18 Massumi follows a long tradition, from Socrates to Rousseau, by beginning to study politics from its common sense presentation. Prioritizing the face and its movements as affect does is beginning with the surface of things as literally as can be done.
the body’s political power to affect and be affected (Massumi 2002: 15). This affective politics is by definition relational: “affect is autonomous to the degree to which it escapes confinement in the particular body whose vitality...it is” (Massumi 2002: 35). But Spinoza shares Hobbes’s care to view affect, passion, and politics in light of the problem of political theology. The autonomy of affect is in a constant competition with the obedience of theology for human attention, offering competing explanations for human behaviour.

C. Our Hobbesian Inheritance, Part II

These issues bear a relation, albeit not an immediately clear one, to an exchange between Michael Williams and Simon Dalby, later recounted by Mark Neocleous (2008) in his closing thoughts to Critique of Security. In a personal correspondence with Dalby (1997), Williams asks, “if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that’s left behind?” For both Dalby and Neocleous, the response is “maybe there is no hole.” Dalby takes the opportunity to doubt Hobbes’s influence on the creation of the security state, given that it was only in the twentieth century that “security became the architectonic impulse of the American polity” (1997: 21). For his part, Neocleous warns against filling the hole with

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19 Joshua Parens (2012: 193-202) argues that Spinoza’s Ethics is a sequel to Spinoza’s treatise on political theology, implying that questions of the source and character of political authority shape understanding of affect and psychology, for which the Ethics is famous.

20 To state the matter as plainly as possible, the essential duality of human—as a defense of one’s way of life, or the passion behind revolution—is once again a central issue. We must always be aware of that first delineation of inside and outside, or one’s moral conscience and one’s political community. A full reflection on the politics of memory—one that includes, for example, the memorypolitics that Ian Hacking (1994) argues are necessary addenda to Foucault’s project—would end with this tension between autonomy and obedience.
another vision of security, and instead politics must “return the gift” of the protective arms of the state and the current language used to discuss security (Neocleous 2008: 186). We cannot agree with Neocleous. Refusing to “think” security does not simply “return the gift” of the state handling all questions of security so politics can avoid them. Refusing to think security requires a new political theology. Exercising some hyperbole, the hole that is left when we remove security is the whole of political theology. This last assertion is utterly incomprehensible absent a discussion of the centrality of the contest between affect and political theology to Hobbes’s account of sovereignty his understanding of the security state.

It is for these reasons that we could not agree with Dalby and Neocleous against Williams. The idea of security derives from Hobbes’s rhetorical use of the “fear and danger of violent death” as a replacement for the divine authority of punishment and reward to govern human behaviour. Certainly one can agree with the spirit in which Neocleous and Dalby respond to Williams, but the problem of security is somewhat more complicated than a simple tradeoff between liberty and safety, freedom and obedience, and so on. The fear of violent death is the new modern political theology, but is based on experience rather than belief. We cannot think about the idea of security in itself because it is coeval with the idea of sovereignty. Sovereignty replaces the appeal to divine law or prophecy in the structure of politics with the fear of violent death at the hands of another human
being. More specifically, the idea of God is replaced by the fear of violent death as the new orienting principle for political life. But this is a fear of things visible not invisible. As such, this newfound fear for our life, this lack of security, is felt equally and the Leviathan, the Sovereign, is conjured up to reduce this fear. Insofar as sovereignty is the political phenomenon that demarcates the movement from antiquity to modernity, the idea of security and all concepts that flow from it—especially rights, liberty and equality—must be understood to have their origins, their beginnings in the concept of sovereignty. Sovereignty cannot be conceived without security, nor can security be conceived without sovereignty. Sovereignty is the affect or expression of this desire for security. \[21\] “If you take away security, what do you put in the hole that’s left behind” when the hole is the whole of modernity, sovereignty, and political theology, with the idea of natural freedom and equality that have flown from these? This is not to say that critiquing security is not a worthwhile pursuit; rather, we must acknowledge the high stakes of such critique.

**D. Paradigmatic, Episodic, and Dispositional Passions**

Hobbes’s attachment to Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* with which we began rests on the *Rhetoric’s* concentration on the study of the passions, “those things through which, by undergoing change, people come to differ in their judgments,” those things that move bodies in politics (*Rh*. 2.1.8). The response to the orthodox understanding of material well-being and emotion in Hobbes, and the same connection of body-

\[21\] Complicating matters, this desire is not born of knowledge but of imagination.
passion in contemporary literature—what we can loosely call a sort of materialistic psychology—finds its response in Aristotle, and in the study of rhetoric. The passions affect judgment, and rhetoric “is concerned with making a judgment” (*Rh.* 2.1.2). Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* is famous for its analysis of the “enthymeme” as a rhetorical tool for persuasion, and its systematic account of the passions that occupy the central part of the work. Aristotle enumerates fourteen individual passions, or seven pairs of negative and positive passions of which anger is understood to be the paradigm, receiving the most sustained attention because of its especially political character (cf. Sokolon 2006).

Aristotle defines anger as “desire, accompanied by [mental and physical] distress, for conspicuous retaliation because of a conspicuous slight that was directed, without justification, at oneself or those near to one” (*Rh.* 2.2.1). What makes this emotion political is the “dreamlike” pleasure “that follows all experience of anger from the hope of getting retaliation” (*Rh.* 2.2.3). That is, anger is necessarily relational and therefore a social and political passion. Aristotle is explicitly speaking here of *thumos*, which he describes as “a thing much sweeter than honey in the throat” (ibid.). The source and feeling of this slight that leads to the pleasure of imagining retaliation is the feeling of “belittling” by others. Belittling causes pleasure in those who do it because “they think they themselves become more superior by ill-treating others” (*Rh.* 2.2.6). “In general” says Aristotle, “those longing for something and not getting it are irascible and easily stirred to anger, especially against those
belittling their present condition”, and all the more easily stirred if one was expecting the opposite treatment, “for the quite unexpected hurts more” (Rh. 2.2.9-11).

The parallels with Aristotle’s presentation of anger and Hobbes’s depiction of the natural condition should be readily apparent. In both cases, the desire for revenge causes one to seek retribution, not out of fear or loss, but for the sake of indulging the imaginary pleasure of revenge. Where Hobbes uses the language of esteem Aristotle uses the language of belittlement; however, in both cases the belittling is judged to be “without justification” because it does not accord with the way one understands one’s own “present condition.” Turning momentarily to Aristotle’s thoughts on fear, he tells us that we are more apt to fear something that “seems near at hand” rather than far off, and anger is just such a sign “of something that causes fear” close at hand (Rh. 2.5.2). As a result, Aristotle says fear makes people “inclined to deliberation, while no one deliberates about hopeless things” (Rh. 2.5.14). Once again, fear can be reckoned with because it is inclined to deliberate, and fear makes one inclined to deliberate because of the “fear of powers visible” that is represented by one who is angered. The dangers from which one seeks protection are the actions of those who have not been valued as they value themselves, or those who have been belittled. Perhaps the most striking aspect of Aristotle’s presentation of the political passions is his definition of calmness. Calmness is the “settling down and quieting of anger” (Rh. 2.3.2). Calmness does not receive its own definition, but is simply the absence or negation of anger. Aristotle is implying that the affect of
anger is the dispositional political behaviour. Given that the imaginary pleasure of retribution can only be moderated by the fear of imminent danger in Aristotle’s presentation, it is little surprise that Hobbes judged this work to be “something rare.”

Aristotle’s definition of calmness complicates my presentation, and in a way that is important for the argument. Aristotle defines calmness as the “quieting of anger” implying that anger is the dispositional state of humanity while calmness is the occasional state. We should remind ourselves that, though Hobbes is indebted to Aristotle’s political psychology for his own, Hobbes’s political philosophy and his institution of sovereignty are intended to be critical reactions to the same. What Hobbes says, which neither Aristotle nor Thucydides say, is that excessive fear is enough to discipline this angry (i.e. thumotic and retributive) outlook because modern human beings seek to extend their existence in ways ancient humanity does not.

E. Going Nuclear, or the Script of Security

We have here the opportunity to speak of affect in the light of security studies. Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, in a revisitation of the securitization theory of the Copenhangen school to bring it into line with “higher securitizations” (grand/global struggles, climate change, religion, &c.) note that this effort opens up more difficult questions about how to theorize fear or a general social anxiety (2009: 267). Anxiety seems to allow for a securitizing move against the indissoluble objects of two types of fear: the Freudian fear of a lack of self-knowledge or ignorance
about oneself, and the fear of mortality (cf. Honneth 2009: 126ff.). That is, anxiety compels solutions for the problems of self-knowledge and the fear of death. Now that we have given the securitization problem a pseudo-Socratic formulation, we can do no more than recognize that possibilities opened up by turning to affect in securitization theory for solving them. Jennifer Mitzen’s (2006) provocative thesis is that people and states seek certainty with their identity first and foremost. This means, counterintuitively, that states and people seek comfort and certainty in their relations with others, even if this requires living with physical insecurity. It is the consistency of habits and everyday routines that makes the self known: one must be socially recognized as something in order to be that thing. More importantly, it is this consistency of identity and the imposing of cognitive mastery on an unruly outside world that is the grounding of agency and makes political action possible (Mitzen 2006: 355-61).22

The parallels in the presentation of the political emotions in Hobbes and Aristotle demonstrate the extent to which a fundamental lack of knowledge about oneself (i.e. the value or standing of oneself in relation to others versus one’s self-perception), and how this lack of knowledge is addressed by affecting the fear of violence, structures the architecture of the security state. A possible next step is to develop the latter parts of Silvan Tomkins’s Affect theory known as Script theory, or

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22 Mitzen is not so far from the classical modern accounts of state formation as she might believe. Her new starting point for thinking through ontological security dilemmas is a fear of disorder, or an anxiety and uncertainty that does not rule out committing physical violence for the sake of maintaining an established order. In this respect either traces of Hobbes remain or Hobbes was also aware of these psychological tendencies.
the treatment of personality structure and dynamics in the “scene,” or the basic
element of lived experience.\textsuperscript{23} Simply, our actions and feelings can be interpreted as
falling into “scripts” (like that of fictional character) as indicated by our affective
responses, just as our affections can be categorized as one of Tomkins’s nine
affects.\textsuperscript{24} If one were to combine this with Aristotle’s understanding of the
relationship between rhetoric and the movement of the political passions—for
example, the use specific rhetoric to make a crowd angry and intend the adherence to
a script of vengeance—one can develop a path for new insights into the affective
politics of identifying and reducing security threats.\textsuperscript{25}

The “maverick” psychology of Tomkins is an outlier within this general
conversation of affect and politics. Tomkins’s Affect Theory understands affect to
be a form of communication through facial physiognomy with an underlying streak
of Freudian psychoanalysis. For example, Tomkins says that “the crying response is
the first response the human being makes upon being born”:

\begin{quote}
In the cry the mouth is open, the corners of the lips
are pulled downwards, rather than upwards as in
laughing, and vocalization and breathing are more
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{23} As will become clear, Tomkins understanding of Affect and Scenes roughly parallels Bourdieu’s
understanding of the relationship between habitus and field. Both are metaphors for the interplay
between individual experience and external political reality.

\textsuperscript{24} These are separated by Tomkins into positive affects (interest-excitement, enjoyment-joy), neutral
affect (surprise-startle), and negative affects (fear-terror, anger-rage, distress-anguish, shame-
humiliation, contempt-disgust, and “dismell”).

\textsuperscript{25} We point to Aristotle’s general scheme for analyzing the passions, of which his analysis of anger is
the paradigm: What is anger? What is the state of mind of people who become angry? Why do
people become angry and for what reasons? To whom is anger directed? Aristotle’s answers to these
questions give rhetoric a preeminent role in understanding and controlling political affects (Rhet.
2.2.1-17). Anger and fear, their mobilization, socialization, and so on, occupy a prominent place in
Tomkins’s psychology, just as they do for Aristotle.
continuous, rather than intermittent as in laughter. In addition, there is an arching of the eyebrows which accompanies crying, which, if it appears without crying, gives a sad expression to the face. (2008: 289)

Tomkins distinguishes this “distress-anguish” crying affect from the affects of “fear-terror” based on how “they appear on the face” (2008: 291). The critical distinction between distress-crying and fear-crying is “the difference between the wide-open eyes of fear versus the characteristic contraction of the muscles around which produces the arched eyebrow” (2008: 290). This relationship between affect and the body is, as it is with William James and Damasio, not mono-directional: the awareness of “the feedback of crying is the experience of distress or suffering” (ibid.). Tomkins uses the physiognomy of affect to conclude that one can experience different types and degrees of suffering as indicated by the variation in their duration and intensity, especially of tonus or constant low level muscle activity.\(^\text{26}\) Tomkins is emphatic that it is the movement of the face that expresses affect to others and to oneself via sensory feedback (Tomkins 1962: 201-42).

The face is the dominant medium of communication for voluntary and involuntary affective responses. Movements of the face are how we communicate inner feelings. These observations allow us to suggest that a path exists which we can trace from inner feeling to expression/affection to communication. Thus we see a preliminary relationship between affect and techniques of communication,

\(^{26}\) There is obvious space here for the development of a biopolitics of affect, or at least a biopolitical critique of an overly scientific approach to affect.
language, and rhetoric. If this scheme is correct, we can identify a step in between feeling and the expression of feeling where the *choice* to communicate exists. This nuance is also present in Aristotle’s discussion of the emotions, if only implicitly. To use Damasio’s terms, emotional marking is the first step of the communication of inner feelings. Thus, we must be prepared to recognize that the concern for affect makes the art of rhetoric, the art of communication, centrally important because of the way that speech can work to construct and inform affective responses.

Tomkins’s insights into affect evolve to include something he refers to as Script theory. Script theory is a way to interpret the link between stimulus, affect, and response (Tomkins 1995b: 178). The basic unit of a script is the scene, or “the basic element in life as it is lived” which includes one affect and at least one object of that affect (ibid.). Interestingly, the object of affect can be affect *itself*. For example, regarding the question, “Why am I afraid?” or “Will my fear abate?”, affect is generated by the affect of fear (ibid.). If security requires an object to be securitized, we must leave open the possibility that the object of security is affect.27 Script theory, emerging out of affect theory and personality development, intends to theorize the difference between the interpretation of scenes from the perspective of the individual and the perspective of society. Societal change comes about when there is tension between society’s definition of a certain situation and an individual’s script: “If society is to endure as a coherent entity, its definition of situations must in

27 We cannot speak about the objects of security without thinking of the subjects of security. It may very well be the case that we are securing is the feeling of security, or that affect is the object of security.
some measure be constructed as an integral part of the shared scripts of its individuals” (Tomkins 1995b: 180-1).

Society’s coherence is therefore founded on similar affective responses to the political; that is, its coherence is founded on the shared participation in affective scripts. The politics of memory play an integral role here, as “memorially supported plots” and “cultural inheritance” are required for the augmentation of partial or incomplete scripts (Tomkins 1995b: 182). Also important is the idea of ideological scripts, which provide a “general orientation of the place of human beings in the cosmos” (Tomkins 1995a: 342, 353). These are inherited simply by being a member of a group as large as a civilization and as small as a school (Tomkins 1995a: 353). These ideological scripts represent the faiths by which humans live and die, and are the source of bonding and division; moreover, they endow worldly facts with “value and affect.”

An individual resonates to any organized ideology because of an underlying ideoaffective posture (or scripts as I would now call it), which is a set of feelings and ideas about feelings that is more loosely organized than any highly organized ideology. (Tomkins 1995: 355)

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28 Unintentional echoes of this idea are found in Ben Anderson and Peter Adey’s (2011) concept of “affective atmospheres.” Likewise, much of the work on the politics of trauma and memory reflects the linearity of scenes and scripts—e.g. the way we speak easily of the theatre of security after 9/11—even if they do not use Tomkins’ highly technical, predictive, and proscriptive language (cf. Bleiker & Hutchison 2008; Aradau & Munster 2012). Given that one of the main technological innovations in airport security after 9/11 is the adaptation of Paul Ekman’s science of facial recognition, it is no wonder that Ekman collaborated with his teacher Tomkins early in his career. This would but one of the potential outcomes of treating affects as the fundamental revelatory political phenomena. And no wonder Ekman believes his facial recognition system can spot terrorists; the subtle political claim in the banal scientific statement that visible emotions and affects represent deeper beliefs is a very effective rhetorical syllogism.
Additionally, destructive war scripts can be generated by states in the defense of ideological scripts or in defense of a series of aggregated scripts that define a shared way of life (Tomkins 1991: 490).

Ideology stands out in Tomkins’s scheme because of how it demonstrates that affect is the medium through which all political phenomena are revealed. Ideology is that “organized set of ideas” about which people are “most articulate and passionate, and for which there is no evidence and about which they are lest certain” (Tomkins 1995a: 111). There is a tension between the individual and the community insofar as societal changes brings about a crisis of ideology, and subsequently an adjustment of affect at the individual level (1995a: 114). Ideology and affect usually “fit” together in psychologically comfortable ways. Unrest occurs when “the directive of poorly fitting ideology may subject the members of that society as well as other societies to excessive strain in the attempt to accommodate a somewhat alien ideology” (1995a: 115). An ideology and the society built upon it will die if the ideology is incapable of adapting to the evolving “ideo-affective” postures within it (1995a: 116). In other words, affect influences ideology and ideology educates affect. There is the possibility of tension between an individual’s and a community’s flourishing, because ideology will “interpret, evaluate, and sanction” affect (Tomkins 2008: 762). Moreover, ideology is inherited and ideo-affective posture developed simply by being born a member of a culture or nation; as such, ideologies “are the chief agents of bonding and differentiation” (ibid.: 763). Affect therefore exists as
the site of political difference and particular beliefs; yet, affect serves this function universally, and our political psychology should therefore be treated as the ground upon which modern politics is built.

Such an application of affect theory should make us wonder whether there is in fact any differentiation between the study of politics and the study of affect; at the very least this confirms our suspicion that affect is the site of the political, as the critique or restructuring of ideology must begin (in Tomkins’s scheme) with an account of affect. Political change would begin with a transformation of affective make-up and political psychology. We must be clear about the extent to which Tomkins believes one’s political psychology can be reconstructed. He describes the affective human as a “humanomaton” because affect is programmed into the body as software into a computer, implying an obedience to affect and the broader political ideology it represents (1995b: 441ff.).

From the perspective of the relationship between affect, security, and sovereignty, the aspect of Tomkins’s work that appears especially helpful is his idea of the Nuclear Script. Nuclear scripts are the “central phenomena in any human being” that “govern that large and ever-growing family of scenes we define as nuclear scenes” (Tomkins 1995b: 183, my emphasis). Nuclear scripts grow in intensity and duration of affect; they “never stop seizing the individual,” and are the “good scenes we can never totally or permanently achieve” (ibid.). When striving for them rewards us with positive affect, we are “forever greedy” for more. In contrast to ideological
scripts, nuclear scripts are not self-validating; that is, nuclear scripts are not as coherent as ideological scripts in their attempt to balance the good and the bad in the favour of the affected individual (Tomkins 1995b: 188). Thinking and feeling an ideology brings it into existence, whereas nuclear scripts point to the constant lack of achievement in a fundamental element of life (ibid.).

The paradigmatic nuclear script is the script of mortality and death. The mortality script cannot be dealt with effectively because humans cannot “master the threats to which they are exposed” (1995b: 184). This “victimage” is perpetuated “by reason as well as affect” (ibid.). Tomkins’s observations suggest that there is an element of our affective makeup that is constantly and inescapably anxious, and our interpretation of various scripts are efforts to maximize our positive affects in the face of this anxiety.

Returning to the Hobbesian-Aristotelian picture of anger, sovereignty is written in accordance with a certain script of revenge and the seeking of particular ends. This much is clear form Aristotle’s presentation of passion and rhetoric: an orator can affect a crowd for the sake of a particular end. Affect, through the movement of the passions under the thumb of rhetoric, can be seen to follow a script. If we can speak of a script of security, it appears as the solution to the gap between the scripts of individual lives and the script of society as a whole in the effort of each to understand their general “orientation in the cosmos.” Security takes affect as its subject and object in turn. Likewise, since such a security script would
also be *nuclear*—because the goal of reducing anxiety cannot be fully achieved so long as human beings remain held to the script of mortality—sovereignty must extend its power over the world to calm these anxieties. That is, the script of security takes as its object affect *itself*, in an endlessly futile effort to satisfy and care for these desires.

I will close with this thought. A commitment script “validates the importance and necessity of the struggle” but achieving that to which one is committed erodes the script, or requires its redefinition to continue (Tomkins 1995: 181). The last decade has seen American foreign policy follow just such a script. The War on Terror, having been framed around the initial conspicuous slight of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, follows just such a script, with the commitment to capture Osama bin Laden, “Dead or Alive.” Thus, in an echo of Aristotle’s remarks on dream like pleasure, “Operation Infinite Justice” inaugurated by President Bush in September 2001 can be brought to its necessary and predictable conclusion by President Barack Obama on 02 May 2011 with the words “Justice has been done.”
Chapter V

Rousseau’s Speech & Spectacle

Being theorists that share a concern for sovereignty at the centre of their political thought permits of a comparison between Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Carl Schmitt; yet, these two writers do not make for a common and thus not a ready comparison. In one sense, this is to be expected. Rousseau, identifying himself in his written work as a “Citoyen de Genève” was an exiled and reviled figure, whose *Social Contract* and *Emile: Or, on Education* were condemned upon their joint release in 1762. Far from being exiled by his regime, Carl Schmitt rose to prominence as a legal theorist in the Weimar Republic before becoming a member of the Nazi Party—in the same month as Martin Heidegger—in May of 1933. Schmitt eventually earned the title “Crown Jurist of the Third Reich” but his relationship with Nazism is not our focus at present (*PT* vii). It might suffice to remind

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1 This is not to say that Schmitt’s Nazism and anti-Semitism are irrelevant. Anyone who reads and writes about Schmitt must acknowledge this aspect of his life, and the easy segue between his critique of liberal constitutionalism, his formal political theory, and the most horrific spectacle of the twentieth century. John McCormick attempts to provide an objective analysis of Schmitt’s (complicated) association with National Socialism and how it relates to his legal thought and career (1993: 266-70). Louiza Odysseos and Fabio Petito gloss over Schmitt’s anti-Semitism as merely “an element of opportunism” on his part, highlighting how he had his teaching “monitored” starting in 1935, and then faced public criticism for his political and religious views in 1936 (2009: 305). Tracy Strong, in a frank and direct address of Schmitt’s anti-Semitism, concludes that in 1938 Schmitt would have us believe he was guilty only of a refined anti-Semitism, and not the crude anti-Semitism of Hitler: “If there was such a thing as a non-cruel anti-Semitism, Carl Schmitt seems to have it. (And I repeat: in life these distinctions mattered little if you were in Auschwitz.)” (*LST* xvii). Odysseos and Petito’s odious gloss silently and unintentionally affirms Schmitt’s “non-cruel anti-Semitism” because it is in *The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes* that Schmitt would have us believe he is critiquing the
ourselves that Rousseau was exiled and persecuted for his presentation of political theology while Schmitt’s gained qualified recognition and prominence.

Schmitt has laid the groundwork for avoiding the comparison with Rousseau. Only rarely does Schmitt mention Rousseau, and almost always is it disparaging. Rousseau is either presented as a depoliticizer, as in Schmitt’s *Neutralizations and Depoliticizations* lecture (ND 83), or the chief Romantic individualist in *Political Romanticism* (PR esp. 25ff). Schmitt sees in Rousseau a renaissance and retreat into individualism that is the birth of Romanticism, in opposition to the political philosophy of the seventeenth century, and the death of the political (PR 27). Romanticism replaces the anthropomorphized state with “*la patrie c’est moi,*” or the substitution of one’s person and nationalist identify for the state and therefore the dissolution of the state (PR 59). The most pressing proof, however, comes not from something Schmitt says but from an omission. Despite writing in *Political Romanticism* that the eighteenth century political worldview is a Rousseauian one—“Since the eighteenth century, since Rousseau…”—a claim he restates in the *Neutralizations* lecture, Rousseau is never mentioned by name in *Concept of the Political*

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2 This will not be Rousseau’s last word on *patrie.*
This is despite Schmitt’s argument that a concept or anthropology of humanity must precede a concept of the political: “the problematic or unproblematic conception of man is decisive for the presupposition of every further political consideration” (CP 58). Schmitt goes on to say that the concept of humanity in the eighteenth century was “universal”, denying friend-enemy groupings thus obliterating any possibility of politics (CP 55). Rousseau’s thoughts on civil religion and political theology are also insufficiently specific for Schmitt with regards to sovereign power (PT 46-7; cf. LST 91-3).

Yet for both Rousseau and Schmitt, sovereignty is the concept around which their formal political thought revolves. And this revolution regards either a rejection or a valorization of Hobbes’s thought, specifically his state of nature. Even more striking is Schmitt’s dismissiveness of Rousseau despite Schmitt admitting on numerous occasions that any concept of politics must rest upon and be preceded by an anthropology or psychology. Rousseau for his part explicitly provides an anthropology and implicitly provides a political psychology. What is more, Rousseau also has Hobbes’s political anthropology and psychology in mind as a point of departure. Previously, we saw that Thucydides and Aristotle were the necessary philosophical antecedents of Hobbes’s concept of sovereignty. Here we will be concerned with Rousseau’s critique of Hobbes’s account of sovereignty in the name

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3 The second edition of Political Romanticism appeared a full two years before the first edition of Concept of the Political in 1927, meaning Schmitt has already established Rousseau’s opposition to his own revival of Hobbes’s natural condition by the time Concept is written.

4 Note the last words of §7 in Concept, and Schmitt’s judgment of the Reign of Terror in 1793: “spectacle ridicule et terrible.”
of freedom, and Schmitt’s attempt to revive Hobbesian politics in the name of the Sovereign. Thucydides and Aristotle helped us bring the formation and purpose of Hobbes’s concept of sovereignty to light; Rousseau and Schmitt develop competing accounts of how sovereignty operates using Leviathan as a touchstone.

Rousseau famously begins and ends his Social Contract, his treatise on sovereignty, with the words je and moi, thus placing the problem of the relationship between the individual and politics clearly into view. Our attention here will not be on this most famous of Rousseau’s works but on his less famous Essay on the Origin of Languages. It is in the Essay that Rousseau argues the nation or one’s particular political community is built on language. Language is in turn built on our passionate and affective reactions to the political. Language, therefore, is for Rousseau the product of our passions and coming together into a political community, reversing the course of events from Aristotle’s presentation that was our concern in Chapter four. In Rousseau’s presentation, language depends on the affect of the passions within one’s community and natural environment; politics presupposes a certain understanding of anthropology in the broadest sense of the term. The passions, in

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5 Rousseau begins and end his fragment The State of War with the same self-referentiality: “I open the books on right and on ethics, I listen to the scholars and jurisconsults and, moved by their ingratiating discourses, I deplore the miseries of nature, I admire the peace and justice established by the civil order…” and also “I ask my readers not to forget that I am not inquiring into what makes war advantageous to the one who wages it, but what makes it legitimate” (SW ¶¶1, 54). Rousseau consciously repeats the language that he uses to open his treatise on sovereignty (SC I.i). There is also a clear connection between his conclusion in Social Contract and the beginning of State of War. “…what remains to be done is to buttress the State by its foreign relations, which would include international law, commerce, the right of war and conquest, public law, alliances, negotiations, treaties, etc.” We will note in passing that three out of the seven items so listed to “buttress the State by its foreign relations” explicitly involve the law.
turn, can be moved through discourse and speech but also importantly through images and spectacles. Rousseau provides numerous demonstrations of the breadth of the passions, should one choose to cast their vision over them. Rousseau therefore compels us to reconsider the relationship between the individual and the state—to consider the problem of the political psychology of sovereignty—by demonstrating through his analysis of language that political society is ultimately founded on the basis of the passions, reinforcing our earlier claim that the institution and concept of sovereignty is the greatest of all political affects, or an affective state.

A. On Emotion & Nations

Rousseau’s thought with regards to the relationship between the emotions and politics that resembles international relations is primarily accessible through an oft-neglected work which presents itself to us as a work of imitation. Rousseau’s *Levite d’Ephraim* is an explicitly logographic imitation of the story of the Levite from the last three chapters of the Bible’s *Book of Judges*. The story in *Judges*, in turn, imitates the famous scene from *Genesis* (19:4-9) of Lot extending hospitality to Abraham’s family in Sodom. Rousseau’s *Levite*, written as it is while he is escaping Paris and seeking refuge after the condemnation of his *Emile* and the burning of *Emile* and *The Social Contract* in Geneva, dramatically reminds of the apology of Socrates, as this piece is Rousseau’s first response to the accusations against him, his first deed as a political exile, of which the reader is explicitly reminded in its preface (*Levite* 351). Within the *Levite* itself we witness what appears to be an imitation of
Thucydides’ famous Mytilenian debate, as the Levite calls the Tribes of Israel together to wage war against Gibeah in order to avenge the murder of his beloved, which concludes with the intended genocide of the Benjamites. Thus this small work is an exercise in literary imitation of Greek and Biblical texts. But it is not enough to treat the Levite as a work of imitation; it is also a work of abstraction, or an aesthetic alteration and adjustment of its original sources for the purposes of conveying Rousseau’s own teaching. The particular aspect of Rousseau’s broad and deep body of work of immediate concern to us is his understanding of the relationship between the passions and language during the founding of political communities (using the language that we have been employing, between the foundation of sovereignty and affect). Rousseau’s Levite certainly speaks to this theme, given that the movement to exterminate Gibeah is initiated by sending the severed limbs of the Levite’s wife to all of the Israelite tribes to persuade them to make war, and the Levite concludes with the daughters of Shiloh imitating Axa’s memorable self-sacrifice for the sake of the Benjamites survival (Levite 365). As such, the Levite is particularly instructive because of its presentation of the founding of a new political community precipitated by the murder and mutilation of the body of the Levite’s wife.

I fear, however, that this frames our current subject matter too simply. Speaking about and invoking the idea of imitation necessarily connects us to

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6 One might compare the epigraph that adorns Jacques Derrida’s essay “Violence and Metaphysics” as well as the general context of that quote.
Rousseau’s thoughts on theatrical imitation, his thoughts on the theatre—*le spectacle*—in general, and the relationship between the movements of the passions and the pursuit of the good society.  

Our task in this section is to put these aspects of Rousseau’s political philosophy in conversation with how he has traditionally been interpreted within the cannon of International Relations (IR) theory.

Beginning at least with Kenneth Waltz’s famous meditation, in his *Man, The State, and War*, on Rousseau’s image of the stag-hunt from his *Discourse on Inequality*, Rousseau has been unproblematically associated with the Realist school of IR thought (*SD* §II¶9; Waltz 1959: 159-86). In consonance with Waltz, Stanley Hoffman begins his investigation of Rousseau’s thought on international relations with the lack of an international general will. This indicates, says Hoffman, Rousseau’s sensitivity to the fragmented nature of power and politics between states, because the lack of an international general will means the “patriotism and virtue” within the state do not translate to “cosmopolitan solidarity and virtue” internationally (Hoffman & Fidler 1991: xvi). Therefore we must read Rousseau as what Waltz calls a Third Image theorist, because he locates the cause of war in the structure of the international system itself (ibid.). Michael Doyle (1997) also reads

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7 Cf. “A relativistic bourgeoisie in a confused Europe searched all sorts of exotic cultures for the purpose of making them an object of its aesthetic consumption. The aristocratic society in France before the Revolution of 1789 sentimentalized “man who is by nature good” and the virtue of the masses. Tocqueville recounts this situation in words whose shuddering tension arises in him from a specific political pathos: nobody scented the revolution…*spectacle ridicule et terrible*” (*CP* 68).

8 One wonders how Hoffman might change his judgment if he were to reflect on the paragraph that opens the preface to Rousseau’s *Letter to M. D’Alembert On The Theatre*: “But consideration outweighs duty only with those for whom all morality consists in appearances. Justice and truth are man’s first duties; humanity and country his first affections” (p.3).
Rousseau as a member of the Thucydides-Machiavelli-Hobbes tradition of *realpolitik*, but he classifies Rousseau’s realism as a *constitutional* realism. Doyle locates Rousseau’s realism in his argument that the construction of foreign policy must be suitable for the variety of different political and social conditions, in the same way as the pursuit of the just and good regime is attenuated by the particular circumstances of a particular community (Doyle 1997: 137-60). Michael Williams (2005: 57-61) has tried to combat this “international anarchist” reading of Rousseau by returning to Rousseau's thoughts on the state of nature from the Second Discourse, arguing that Rousseau’s state of nature is a “relational concept allowing human beings to understand what they are through a comparison to what they are not” rather than a situation where “essentially unchanging beings existed in time prior to society and government.”

Proceeding in this way, however, is fraught with difficulty. Trying to properly interpret Rousseau’s image of the state of nature as a way to reduce these disagreements requires reckoning on the dual sense of *natural law* to which he is responding. Williams’s approach, unlike others mentioned, retains the benefit of being open (if not attentive) to Rousseau’s obscure but important distinctions between the “state of nature” and the “pure state of nature” (Gourevitch 1996: 25-7). According to Roger Masters, Rousseau recognizes that there is a law of nature of the moderns or the law of physical nature that operates regardless of its discovery, and there is a natural law of the ancients that operates only after it has been discovered.
by reason within society (1964: 23). Rousseau, with “extraordinary audacity” says Masters, attempts to demonstrate that these competing understandings of natural law are not necessarily inconsistent (ibid.). With this in mind, we will tread carefully as we attempt a response to the reading of Rousseau in IR theory that has preferred to focus on the place and importance of anarchy in his state of nature, rather than on how nations are founded or come into being out of the natural condition, and has ignored Rousseau’s own avowed interest in the relationship between politics and law.

In the Essay on the Origin of Languages, Rousseau provides us with some ability to answer this question of the beginning of political society, and reminds his readers of the story of the Levite with which we are concerned. Rousseau opens his discussion by declaring that speech differentiates people from animals, and it is language that differentiates one nation from another: “where a man is from is known only once he has spoken” (OEL 1.1).⁹ After establishing voice, gesture, and touch as the ways of acting on someone else’s senses, Rousseau tells the reader to “consult ancient history” where one will find it filled with examples of arguments addressed specifically to the eyes and to the field of vision. Such visual arguments never fail “to produce a more certain effect than all the discourses that might have been put in their place” (OEL 1.7). It is with this picture of the strengths of images to persuade more successfully than the written word in mind that Rousseau turns to the example of the Levite. Rousseau recounts the story of the Levite in this instance

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⁹ Cf. Giorgio Agamben’s remarks on Judges 12:6 in Homo Sacer 1.1.4n
as follows:

When the Levite of Ephraim wanted to avenge the death of his wife, he did not write to the Tribes of Israel; he divided her body into twelve pieces which he sent to them. At this ghastly sight, they rushed to arms crying with one voice: *no, never has anything like this happened in Israel, from the day when our fathers left Egypt until this day!* And the Tribe of Benjamin was exterminated. *(EOL 1.8)*

This is meant to be an example of the persuasiveness of the language of gesture, that natural language that is “easier and less dependent on conventions”: objects strike our eyes more than our ears, are more varied than sounds, and are “more expressive and say more in less time” *(EOL 1.4).*

The difficulty with Rousseau’s presentation of the Levite’s story here is that Rousseau omits the end of his Biblical quotation: “consider it; take counsel; and speak” *(Judges 19:30).* Rousseau focuses our attention only on the persuasive power of the image of the Levite’s dismembered wife, suggesting this sight alone is enough to urge the extermination of the Benjamites. However, in the Biblical original, and in Rousseau’s rewriting during his escape, the Levite also makes a speech to urge the Tribes of Israel to war, though Rousseau alters the Biblical “give here your advice and council” to “I have spoken the truth; do

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10 In this small passage, Rousseau has managed to anticipate and summarize virtually all of the innovations in the area of Affect theory, or the investigation of the effect of images and visuality on one’s physical and mental state, in the last twenty years of scholarship. Rousseau’s most prescient observation is that images “say more in less time”. This theme has been the focus of a popular body of neurobiological research in the phenomena of the emotions and affect, under the guise of the difference between the speed of cellular time and subjective time such that we feel something before we know it. Cf. Antonia Damasio’s *Descartes’ Error* (1994), Brian Massumi’s *Parables for the Virtual* (2002), and William Connolly’s *Neuropolitics* (2002). This body of literature descends from the insights into emotional psychology of William James, and Charles Darwin’s *Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*. On the comparison between Darwin and Rousseau, see Masters (1997: 116-26).
what will seem to you just before the Almighty” (Judges 20:7; Levite, 359). The spectacle of the dismembered body, “ghastly sight” though it may be, is not enough to persuade the tribes to act; a discourse, a speech is required to move their hearts and inflame their passions (EOL 1.10).

Stating the issue in this manner, though, implies that discourse or arguments will supplement the persuasive power of an image, gesture, or spectacle. In the opening of the Preface to Narcissus, Rousseau intimates that persuasion requires more than arguments: “I will be attacked with witticisms, and I will defend myself with nothing but arguments: but provided I convince my adversaries, I do not much care whether I persuade them” (PN ¶2). This juxtaposition of convince and persuade calls to mind some of Rousseau’s remarks on the figure of the Legislator:

Wise men who want to use their own language, rather than that of the common people, cannot be understood by the people...Since the legislator is unable to use either force or reasoning, he must necessarily have recourse to another order of authority, which can win over without violence and persuade without convincing. (SC 68)

This method of the Legislator is no different than what has “forced the fathers of nations to have recourse to the intervention of heaven and to attribute their own wisdom to the Gods” (SC 68; Kelly 1987: 324-6). In the case of the legislator, as in the case of the prophet, one must use visible objects—acting on the senses mediately through gesture, extending over the field of vision—because these “spoke to [the
people)” better than “long discourses” (OEL 1.8, 1.3). Christopher Kelly, quoting Judith Shklar, observes that an alteration of public opinion which will “impinge on behaviour” can only be accomplished through the use of an example “so impressive” that it imposes “the will to imitate” (Kelly 1987: 325).

Rousseau provides just such an example of the will to imitate impressing and imposing itself in his *Levite*, but it is not the image of the Levite and his wife; rather, this imitation is to be found in the story of Axa, Rousseau’s aesthetic addition to the Biblical original. The story is as follows. Once the Tribes of Israel are convinced to wage war and seek vengeance against the Benjamites on account of the Levite’s ordeal, they first attack Gibeah and are slaughtered in the first battle by the Benjamite army (*Levite* 360). Demoralized, they ask God if they are right to wage this war against the Benjamites, to which God responds that they should not have faith in their superior numbers, and if instead they have faith in the Lord who gives and takes away courage as he pleases Benjamin will be delivered to them (*Levite* 361). During the ensuing battle, the Tribes of Israel are so successful in their defeat of the Benjamites that all but six hundred Benjamites who fled the battle are killed (*Levite* 362). The victorious Tribes now “bemoan the evil they had done in their anger,” while Rousseau casts this narrative judgment against them: “Unhappy humans who do not know what is good for you, you have desired well to sanctify your passions;

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11 Compare Rousseau’s remark from *Social Contract*, Book II, Ch vii: “One must not conclude from all this … that politics and religion have a common object for us, but rather that at the origin of nations, one serves as an instrument of the other.”
they always punish you for the excesses they make you commit...” (ibid.). To atone for their actions the Tribes vow to reestablish the race of Jacob in its entirety. The method the Tribes of Israel employ, however, is highly dubious: their pity for the Benjamites compels them to meditate on new carnage. They decide to see whether any tribes had failed to comply with the solemn oaths to attack Gibeah, and discover that Jabesh-gilead had “turned away from vengeance more atrocious than infamy without considering that perjury and desertion of the common cause are worse than cruelty” (Levite 363). Jabesh-gilead, which saw the original injustice in vengeance, is now being persecuted for breaking its solemn oaths and not participating in the war. All of the Jabes are killed except for four hundred virgins.

These events spur the following advice from an old man of Lebonah: the surviving Benjamites will be allowed to kidnap women of Shiloh during a religious festival, and take them for wives (Levite 364). When the families of the kidnapped women inevitably protest, says the old man, the Benjamites will appeal to their pity and compassion and ask them to aide in the effort to reestablish the race of Jacob, and allow the marriages. The strategy works, and two hundred women are captured. However, the assembly of Tribes are “torn between justice and pity” once they hear

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12 To state things more plainly, the Benjamites pose the question of whether Jabesh-gilead is “with us or against us?” Thus Rousseau’s presentation of rhetoric, passion, and genocide is not so dissimilar from Thucydides’ presentation of the same. See especially Thucydides’ account of the Plataian/Thban affair (History, 3.52-68).

13 Rousseau follows Thucydides here by recognizing that the area of political relations that exists between nations and states is hardly lawless: even in the absence of a world state the possibility of oaths still exists. This, however, only opens up the question of political theology. Cf. Rousseau’s remarks from his fragment, The State of War: “there is no war between men; there is war only between States” (¶25).
the indignation of the fathers of Shiloh, and allow the women to decide for themselves whether or not they will stay with their captors (Levite 364). It is here where we reach the culmination of Rousseau’s commentary. The old man of Lebonah, who had suggested the kidnapping of the women of Shiloh, had lost his daughter Axa to one of the captors; furthermore, Axa is promised to a young man named Elmacin, whom she cares for very much. In spite of this, the old man tells Axa that “the salvation of your people and the honour of your father now win out over [your beloved Elmacin]” (Levite 365). Axa must do her duty, suppress her own feelings and desires in order to do what is best for her “fatherland,” and help to re-establish the tribe of Benjamin.

Axa hears her father’s plea and finally “raising her eyes, she encounters those of her venerable father. They said more than his mouth” (Levite 365, my emphasis). She makes her choice and falls into the arms of a Benjamite, leaving her beloved Elmacin “at whom she dares not look” (ibid.).

Additionally, by choosing this course of action Axa saves her father from the opprobrium of his brothers as he suggested to the council this very solution of which his daughter is now victim. Axa’s duty requires that she give up the object of her desires and erotic longing in order to honour her father and save her fatherland (cf. Plattner: 185, 189-91). Axa’s virtue, Rousseau begs us to conclude, consists in moderating her selfish longings for the sake of the greater goods of her family and her people. As a result of this display, all

\[14\] One assumes that she dare not look at her beloved lest she be persuaded to change her mind yet again.
the kidnapped young women, “carried along by the example of Axa” imitate her sacrifice. More than this, Axa’s actions inspire her beloved Elmacin to remain moderate and pure the rest of his days to prove he is worthy of her (Levite 365).

Axa’s virtue is clearly an example so impressive that it “imposes the will to imitate”. It is this imitation of virtue that allows Rousseau replace the Biblical verse, “In those days there was no king in Israel; every man did that which was right in his own eyes” with his exclamation, “There are still virtues in Israel” (Judges 21:25; Levite loc. cit.). The discourse of Axa’s father was not enough to persuade any women to stay with their captors, re-found the tribe of Benjamin, or bring virtues to Israel. The imitation of Axa’s actual virtue, however, was enough. This is, I believe, worth drawing out. Rousseau is able to claim that there are still virtues in Israel because of the imitation of virtue; that is, Axa’s original virtuous act was not enough, only the wide imitation of her virtuous act could bring this virtuous refounding of the Benjamite nation. This sort of imitation is classified by Rousseau as the third order of imitation, as Axa’s actions represent the idea of virtue as it appears to her and the imitation of her action is an abstraction from her representation: “no image being exact and perfect, the imitation is always one degree further from the truth than is thought” (OTI 338). Perhaps it is of some help that visible signs “make for more accurate imitation” and that we can characterize Axa and her imitators as obeying

15 The “spectacle” of Axa’s self-sacrifice begs a comparison with Rousseau’s praise of Cato as the “greatest of men” for his virtue and his willingness to die for Rome (SD II ¶57).
nothing more than self-imposed restraints (EOL 1.10).\textsuperscript{16}

**B. Peace and its Presuppositions**

The theme of strangeness or otherness is the focus of Mira Morgenstern’s analysis of the *Levite d’Ephraïm*, and runs throughout Rousseau’s interpretation and the Biblical original (2008: 365). Her focus, however, is a discussion of the feelings of strangeness and displacement as seen in the Levite himself, the dual status of the women as prisoners of war and mothers of a reborn nation, and the general exclusion of the Benjamites by the end of the drama. It is unclear how far Morgenstern is willing to push these ideas. For example, if Axa will be forever in but not truly of her new nation, is this a metaphor for Rousseau’s political predicament? And can we then pose questions about the relationship between the political and philosophic communities, the competing inheritances of the citizen and the philosopher, and the ideas of citizenship and cosmopolitanism? Simply, it seems that Morgenstern’s conclusions compel us to investigate the theme of patrie, and its

\textsuperscript{16} The story of Axa is so pregnant with the politics of gender that it almost defies comment. The relationship between Rousseau’s thought and gender is fraught with trouble, mostly of Rousseau’s doing. Subtler readings of Axa’s story, for example, and the important role Sophie plays in the education of Emile, and Rousseau’s famous praise of the Spartan mother suggest that his crude pronouncements conceal a deeper belief that virtuous women are the most important members of a political society, and thus deserve any and all praise. Bonnie Honig (2000: 19-25) focuses our attention on the way that the foreignness of a lawgiver or political founder is a necessary and ever-present part for any (re)definition of the “nation” in any republic, but especially in a Rousseauan one. Honig’s thoughts about the Biblical Ruth bear directly on the story of Axa: “Ruth is different from Rousseau’s foreign-founder in that she is not a lawgiver per se, and her foreignness is not a way of modeling distant impartiality, objectivity, or neutrality. Her function is not to lead a people nor to address directly the narrowness of a people caught up in corrupt factionalism and self-interest…Ruth does introduce two new wrinkles into the foreign-founder script. She is a woman, not a man, and she does not leave when her work of refounding is done. She stays and so becomes an immigrant” (2000:42). Also consider that because law and tradition are (re)born as a woman the people’s relation to the law transforms from one of violent compulsion to loving devotion (Honig 2000: 10).
difference from the theme of *le pays* in Rousseau’s political philosophy, even if this investigation is beyond the intention of her analysis (Cf. Meier 1989: 224-7).

Axa, in an important way, reflects the relationship between the theatre and virtue that Rousseau so vehemently criticizes in his *Letter to M. D’Alembert*. This political “performance” ensured questions of virtue and vice were not overawed by the practice of “greatness”; the corrupted and inhumane state of the Tribes meant that Axa’s spectacle was good for her people, just as the theatre is good for a bad or corrupted people (*LD* 28-9, 65). As one commentator puts it, when political relevance is absent from our lives, “spectacles” become dangerous (Strong 2010: 97). Continuing in this fashion, however, puts us at risk of stating the case of Axa as a founder or legislative figure too strongly. Jonathan Marks suggests that while Axa reminds of a redemptive Christ figure, Rousseau would also say that there is nothing distinctly Christian about sacrificing the object of one’s desire for one’s father and fatherland (2010: 477n). A further difficulty is that the parallel in the

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17 I assume Strong to have the re-enchantment of the state and the Schmittean understanding of political theology in mind here. Tracy Strong and Heinrich Meier are (to my knowledge) the only interpreters to devote extensive energy and time to understanding the thought of both Schmitt and Rousseau, though neither provides an explicitly sustained treatment of the two thinkers together. Meier (2011: 98) demonstrates that Schmitt must have Rousseau in mind as his “true antipode” in the discussion of anthropology in *Concept of the Political*. Rousseau remains in the background of Meier’s discussion of the contest between philosophy and revelation in Schmitt’s thought, precisely because Rousseau asserts the natural goodness of humanity (because of natural autonomy, wholeness, and freedom from obedience) against the doctrine of original sin (2011: 80-6). Cf. Paul Kahn, *Political Theology*: “[Liberal political theory] has an inauthentic understanding of the political. It is in flight from recognizing the centrality of sacrifice—of killing and being killed—to the construction of the political imaginary. To put, at the origin of political experience, the pledge to sacrifice instead of consent to the social contract has broad implications for political philosophy.” (2011: 28-9).

18 A formulation in the current vernacular might be closer to “she who can be sacrificed, but not killed”.

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Rousseauian corpus between Axa and her father is the relationship between Emile and his Tutor, a relationship which was not meant to be (nor could be) imitated, but one that was also based on appeals to pity (Marks 2010: ibid.). Perhaps the most we can say about Axa’s role as a founder of a political community is that she is, by virtue of her actions, the new original ancestor—the “mother of all mothers”—in the rebirth of the Benjamite community (cf. Strauss 1953: 91-2).

Axa was able to persuade without convincing; her example was imitated without an effort to coerce. Tracy Strong (2010: 94), in addressing how and why one can be persuaded without convincing in the context of Rousseau’s own rhetoric, turns to the problem of the movement from individual and collective judgment. On Strong’s reading of Rousseau, when language loses its musicality—that is, its ability to represent emotional intelligence—it is unable to persuade or create real social bonds (Strong 2010: 104). This leaves open the possibility that the nonvocal communication Rousseau speaks of at the beginning of the *Essay on the Origin of Languages* has a role in navigating the gap between individual and collective judgment.

These questions have been taken up on somewhat different terms by Russian psychologist Lev Vygotsky, in his *Thought and Language*.¹⁹ Vygotsky’s work is perhaps the seminal text in a tradition of developmental psychology that gives primacy to the faculty of language in the development of intellect. Vygotsky is responding in particular to the psychology of Jean Piaget, who believed humans are essentially

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¹⁹ The editor suggests the alternate title translations “thought and speech” or even “thinking and speaking”.

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egocentric beings and as such egocentric speech—that is, inner speech or speech to oneself—must precede external speech, or speech directed towards an other. One concept worth drawing out of Vygotsky’s work in relation to Rousseau is his understanding of affective contagion, a concept very similar to Rousseau’s understanding of the movement of the passions from within the field of vision. Imagine, says Vygotsky, a goose, suddenly aware of danger, rousing its flock with its cries: the goose does not tell the others what it has seen but “contaminates them with its fear” (ibid.). This type of affective communication is a very simple form of communication because it cannot carry meaning. To a great degree this affective communication also prioritizes the needs of the body in politics, while assuming a stark division between the workings of the mind and those of the body. Rousseau, however, concerned with sentiment and feeling as he is, is straddling this particular interiority/exteriority divide. Rousseau brings the heart—“...in order to move a young heart...”—back into the equation: “in its mechanical aspect [the first language] would have to answer to its primary aim, and convey to the ear as well as to the understanding the almost inescapable impression of passion seeking to communicate itself” (EOL 3.3, 4.2; cf. Abizadeh 2001: 562-3).  

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20 We might be stretching the example beyond any recognition, but the actions of the women of Shiloh, following on the heels of Axa’s decision, can fit under the rubric of an affective contagion infecting a group.

21 One is compelled to make a connection between this description of an independence and autonomy of affective responses to the political and Brian Massumi’s influential account of the same: “On the biological level, it is the margin of undecidability accompanying every perception, which is one with a perception’s transmissibility from one sense to another. On the human level, it is the same undecidability fed forward into thought, as evidenced in the deconstructability of every structure of
Rousseau provides his own well thought out interpretation of the origin and beginning of language and community. It is due to the moral needs rather than the physical needs that languages originate (EOL 3.3). There is some indication, however, that these moral needs are not universal but particular: the origins of the earliest morals “are a function of the climate and of the nature of the soil. Hence, the diversity of languages and their opposite characteristics must also be explained by the same causes” (EOL 9.20). But this very diversity is what dictates the form the best government should take in a particular context (SC 33). Language and politics, both being built upon the passions of our moral needs, will change and deteriorate as these needs change (EOL 20.1). One consequence of this is that public force or coercion has replaced persuasion in the public arena. This parallelism between the origin and degradation of language and that of the law should encourage us to ask to what extent Rousseau is rehabilitating the concept of nomos? That is, if moral needs shape language, which in turn is musical or not, and those same needs shape the form of government, one can use nomos in any of its traditional senses—law, custom,
convention, music—in reference to Rousseau’s political and philosophic project. Moreover, if we can assume Rousseau to intend some rehabilitation of this concept, we can easily see how diverse writings about, for example, French and Italian music belong alongside his writings on civil religion, anthropology, and so forth. They all speak to the difficulty of contemplating the grandest political questions without losing sight of the life of the individual within politics.

Rousseau’s remarks on the importance of climate to the cultivation of the passions and language may help support this point. Rousseau asserts that the cause of the difference between languages is local—a “consequence of the climates in which they are born”—and one must go back to this truest cause to understand how warm climates encourage the development of different languages than cold ones (EOL 8.1). As a result of the different abilities of the climates of the south and north to meet the physical needs of their inhabitants, the relationship between passion and language moved in opposite directions. In the south, where nature was prodigal, needs developed out of passion; in the north, where nature was miserly,

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22 I am tempted to say that one’s disposition is informed by one’s position, by being in a political society, or that they interact in important and unseen ways. Can one’s outlook ever be divorced from one’s outside?

23 I take Rousseau to be recapitulating on the one hand his “science of the Legislator” from Social Contract, but on the other to present the “science of the Legislator” rather as a dialectic between the natural world and the conventional one. That is, my assertion that Rousseau is rehabilitating a more comprehensive idea of “the law” can easily be construed as Rousseau merely being a conventionalist, or concerned solely with what Hans Kelsen later calls the “pure science of the law” or that the study of the law must be divorced from political concerns. This is construal is not my intention. An inspired interpreter can certainly draw out a connection from Kelsen’s nomostatics, or the rejection of the confluence of law and morality that results from a political psychology, to Rousseau (Kelsen 2006: 20-37). Certainly, Kelsen has a critique of Schmitt in mind and would have at least this much in common with Rousseau’s presentation (cf. Dyzenhaus 1997: 108ff.). The necessity of the current moment however causes such inspiration to lay dormant.
passion was born of the needs (EOL 10.1). Rousseau now takes this opportunity to launch a critique against Aristotle’s famous picture of the beginning of political society from the *Politics*:

> Before one could think about living happy, one had to think about living. Mutual need united men far more effectively than sentiment would have done, society was formed solely through industry … and their first word was not love me [aimez-moi] but help me [aidez-moi]. (EOL 10.3)

Rousseau here is clearly trying to use the innovation of the method of the natural sciences to establish a science of politics based on the particular history of a people, for the sake of laying the groundwork for a proper reflection on the regime appropriate to this people and climate. If we can return for a moment to the assumption that Rousseau can be described as an adherent of *realpolitik*, we see that he in fact uses the passions and the pursuit of justice to orient his theoretical investigations, rather than rationality and necessity. But this conscious orientation of politics towards passion and justice does not refute the opinion that Rousseau is an adherent of *realpolitik*. It is still possible that he merely provides a new psychological basis for realism in place of the assumption that fear and self-interest are the primary compelling political forces.

These thoughts require us to question whether we could have been correct to say that Rousseau is after the revival of the full sense of *nomos*, given his meditation

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24 Of course, we must be aware that a proper investigation into the realist tradition would reveal that Thucydides, and even Hobbes (in some ways), is not so far away from this position. But this would first require establishing a new definition of *realism*, which is a question best handled in remarks on Thucydides.
on the nature (\textit{physis}) of politics and human life. Turning to the nineteenth chapter in his \textit{Essay on the Origin of Languages}, we find the following remarks discussing the degeneration of music:

As language became perfected, melody imperceptibly lost some of its former vigor by imposing new rules on itself … the study of philosophy and the progress of reasoning, having perfected grammar, deprived language of the lively and passionate tone that had originally made it so songlike. (\textit{EOL} 19.1-2)

Philosophy, the study of nature from within society in the language for the few, deprives the many of their language that developed out of a natural process (cf. \textit{SD} Ex.6; \textit{LD} 3; \textit{SC} 78, 69). The problem, therefore, is a problem of the grammar or structure of the language of political inquiry.\(^{25}\)

Language, as we have seen, depends on the affect of the passions within one’s community and natural environment. The passions, in turn, can be moved through discourse or images. Rousseau, therefore, demonstrates just how wide the field of passion is, should one wish to attend to it. Rousseau compels us to reconsider the relationship between the individual and the state by demonstrating through his analysis of language that political society is ultimately founded on the basis of the passions.

\(^{25}\) This is precisely the problem taken up in Jacques Derrida’s \textit{Of Grammatology}, or the book-length treatment of Rousseau’s \textit{Essay on the Origin of Languages}. Derrida’s influence on attempts to address the problems of the grammar of world politics cannot be understated, though they cannot be taken up here (Edkins 2003: esp. 211-4; cf. Pin-Fat 2010: 7-37).
C. The Psychological Structure of Sovereignty / “The Bond Among the Beings”

To paraphrase a thought belonging to Emmanuel Levinas: if war presupposes peace, peace presupposes the “face-to-face.” According to the usual order of things the state of war is negated in order to enter a peaceful civil society. What Levinas’s statement puts us in mind of is that peace is prefaced on the first interactions with others, or what Rousseau has depicted as our initial affective responses to the political. Rousseau’s picture of the origin of political society in the passages that have caught our attention has a counterpart in his fragment The State of War, a small and unfinished essay where he develops explicit thoughts on the nature of international politics.

The social state is a “new order of things” where the “artificial concord” of society is a sure way to bring about the horrors of war in hopes of preventing them (SW ¶21). “With the first society formed” Rousseau says, “the formation of all the others necessarily follows. One must either belong to it or unite to resist it. One must either imitate it or let oneself be swallowed by it. Thus the whole face of the earth has changed” (SW ¶22, my emphasis).26 I began with some broad and general comparisons between Rousseau and Carl Schmitt, and one can detect a trace of Schmitt’s Friend-Enemy grouping in Rousseau’s remarks. The difference at this

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26 Cf. “The political entity presupposes the real existence of an enemy and therefore coexistence with another political entity. As long as a state exists, there will always be in the world more than just one state” (CP 53).
point is that Rousseau’s picture of union and resistance is fundamentally a result of circumstance or chance than about a conscious relationship of political intensity. But it would also be incorrect to deny that Rousseau shares with Schmitt the opinion that political society resembles Hobbes’s warlike natural condition, though Rousseau laments this fact while Schmitt seeks to reinforce it. Rousseau takes aim at Hobbes (but also Spinoza) for narrowing the gap between popular enlightenment and philosophic education by making a “retreat into consciousness” in order to create the ground from which a critique of theology can be launched. Schmitt looks at the same thinkers and the same turn to the interior mind and discerns the dilution of the homogeneity of the political, with an especial distaste for the freedom this logic affords minority groupings. Rousseau rejects the distinction between the freedom of interior consciousness and external obedience found in Hobbes and Spinoza, in the name of the community, of the general will, and ultimately of the law: “man in society seeks to expand, isolated man contract” (EOL 9.7). Schmitt rejects this same distinction between “outer and inner” by turning not to the generality of sovereignty but to its particularity; that is, he rejects the logic of inside/outside in the name of an obedience to a sovereign that decides on exceptions to the law (LST 53).27 Rousseau turns sovereignty “inward” for the sake of autonomy; Schmitt turns sovereignty

27 This seems absolutely counter-intuitive, given that Schmitt’s entire political theory is premised on the idea of friends on the inside and enemies on the outside. Yet, a political community is strongest when it is most homogeneous, when there is as little internal dissent as possible. Internal dissidents will make the fact of a friend-enemy grouping difficult to discern, and bad for the “friends” in this equation. The inside/outside logic has its place for Schmitt, but its place is not within political communities, with the sole exception of rooting out dissidents.
“outward” in order to politicize it.

These superficial oppositions belie more fundamental antagonisms between these two thinkers. These antagonisms result from the fact that Rousseau and Schmitt take aim at Hobbes’s founding of modern sovereignty but proceed along lines of critique that move in opposite directions. Rousseau apparently rejects Hobbes’s diagnosis and solution; Schmitt valorizes what Hobbes’s seeks to negate. Consider Schmitt’s remarks on the “huge man” – μάκρος ἀνθρώπος – of *Leviathan*:

The decisive step occurred when the state was conceived as a product of human calculation…Through the mechanization of this “huge man,” the μάκρος ἀνθρώπος, Hobbes leapt decisively ahead of Descartes and made a significant contribution to the anthropological interpretation of man. Nevertheless, the first metaphysical leap was made by Descartes at precisely the moment when the human body was conceived to be a machine and the human being, consisting of body and soul, was postulated in its entirety an intellect intent on a machine. The transfer of this conception to the “huge man,” the “state,” was thus near. It was consummated by Hobbes. It led, however, to the transformation of the soul of the huge man into a part of a machine. After the body and soul of the huge man became a machine, the transfer back became possible, and even the little man could become a *homme-machine*. (*LST* 37).

In Schmitt’s interpretation, one’s individual political psychology is the result rather than the presupposition of politics. That is, after the “myth” of the Leviathan turns into the machine of the state, the “anthropological image of man” is fashioned after this initial myth, and one’s political psychology becomes part of a mechanization of
politics. “By extension” says Schmitt, “the machine, as all of technology, is independent of every political goal and conviction and assumes a value-and-truth neutrality of a technical instrument” (LST 42).28 Schmitt is clear on how he understands the functioning of this “state machine”: “law became a means of compulsory psychological motivation and calculable functioning that can serve different aims and contradictory contents” (LST 68). Schmitt goes on to say that the “formalizing and neutralizing of the concept of the state” is essentially “legal positivism” (ibid.). What he does not say, but begs his readers to conclude, is that the concept of the state that prefers decisionism and partisanship to “formalizing and neutralizing” is the properly political state. This political state, like any other, constructs a psychology that then serves to reinforce the political.

As early as his Political Theology, Schmitt speaks of the motion and rest of the law, associating rest with a fixed and neutral state and motion with the moment of sovereign decision (PT 3, 32). Motionlessness is associated with the “eternity” of the law or what is normal in the widest sense, and unrest with the moment of decision:

28 Compare Schmitt’s restatement of these arguments in the Appendix on Hobbes and Descartes: “The mechanization of the concept of a state thus complete the mechanization of the anthropological image of man. Just as a mechanism is incapable of any totality, the here and now of an individual’s existence cannot attain a meaningful totality. For the word and concept totality to remain meaningful and not to become a misleading catchword, it must rest on a specific philosophical connection…Totalization thus means mythization” (LST 99-100). The “philosophical connection” that Schmitt has in mind to critique is that “decisive metaphysical step” taken by Hobbes and Descartes that splits body and soul, and enables the mechanization of politics. These remarks from Rousseau’s Geneva Manuscript are not irrelevant: “Certainly, the term human race suggests only a purely collective idea which assumes no real union among the individuals who constitute it. Let us add to it, if you wish, this supposition, and conceive the human race as a moral person having…a universal motivation which makes each part act for an end that is general and relative to the whole. Let us conceive that this common feeling is humanity, and that natural law is the active principle of the entire machine.” (GM Iii).
Unlike the normal situation, when the autonomous moment of the decision recedes to a minimum, the norm is destroyed in the exception. The exception remains, nevertheless, accessible to jurisprudence because both elements, the norm as well as the decision, remain within the framework of the juristic” (*PT* 12-3; cf. *CP* n.9). Yet, if this antagonism between the norm and the decision is the presupposition of Schmittean sovereignty then it must be the case that the being of sovereignty itself is fundamentally *political* in the way that Schmitt understands that concept: “The phases of [sovereignty’s] development are characterized by various power struggles, not by a dialectical heightening inherent in the characteristics of the concept” (*PT* 6-7).

Schmitt’s answer to the question of how sovereignty operates presupposes and depends on a specific anthropological picture of humanity. This said, Schmitt’s use and understanding of “anthropology” is very much political, speaking to the assumptions about the motivations for human action—simply, psychological assumptions—that ground political theories: “The *problematic* or *unproblematic* conception of *man* is decisive for the presupposition of every further political consideration” (*CP*

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29 Compare Rousseau: “If the general society did exist… it would be, as I have said, a moral being with qualities separate and distinct from those of the particular beings constituting it” (*GM* I.ii.159).
30 Cf. “The exception in jurisprudence is analogous to the miracle in theology” (*PT* 36). Agamben attempts to flush out his archaeology of the concept of sovereignty in *The Kingdom and the Glory* by drawing our attention to the truncated view of political-theology that Schmitt has popularized. Christian political theology is not just “political-statist” but “economic-managerial” and attends to how “these two paradigms live together and intersect… to the point of constituting a bipolar system” is the “preliminary condition” for “any interpretation of the political history of the West” (§3, *Threshold*).
All concepts of the political presuppose an understanding of human nature, and it is this understanding that Schmitt elucidates with his friend-enemy opposition. However, Schmitt’s presentation of how to understand a “people” and the political is far more reciprocal and relational than it at first appears. Schmitt is clear that the friend-enemy opposition cannot be understood “as a psychological expression of private emotions and tendencies” (CP 28). To this point he stresses that the image of a people receives its meaning “from the further distinctive trait of the political” or the friend-enemy grouping (CP 20). But this is already to make the political the presupposition of anthropology and psychology, which reverses Schmitt’s explicit argument. Still, war “which has its own grammar” is an “ever present possibility which determines in a characteristic way human action and thinking and thereby creates a specifically political behavior” (CP 34). This is what war teaches or “discloses,” but this can only be accomplished by psychologizing, by disclosing that the possibility of a “friend-enemy” grouping lies

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31 Schmitt’s small treatise is divided into eight sections, and each section basically conforms to a discussion of one theme relating to the political (sovereignty, decisionism, foreign policy, anthropology, liberalism, and so on). In the seventh section of Schmitt’s treatise he deals with the anthropological presuppositions of politics, and his remarks from this section are of a special concern to this project. What is rather striking about his presentation is that unlike Political Romanticism, when it appears that Rousseau would be the ideal interlocutor, he remains unnamed. For example, it is Hegel, not Rousseau, identified as offering “the first polemically political definition of the bourgeois…under the justification of his possessive individualism” despite Rousseau’s clearly “polemically political” presentation of the bourgeois in Discourse on Inequality and Emile, both written before Hegel was born. In a gloss at the end of this section, Schmitt points out that “the aristocratic society in France before the Revolution of 1789 sentimentalized “man who is by nature good” and the virtue of the masses.” (CP 68). This naturally good human being is Rousseau’s anthropology, developed in opposition to the Hobbesian one that Schmitt is attempting to revive (cf. CP 65).
underneath “every political idea” (CP 35). These “psychic motives” ensure that the sovereign political entity “is by its very nature the decisive entity” (CP 43-4). The friend-enemy opposition that ceaseth only in the death of either one’s friends or enemies is *caused by* rather than *resulting from* Schmitt’s concept of the political. The sphere of the political is “in the final analysis” the concrete possibility of enmity; *because* of this, says Schmitt, “political conceptions and ideas cannot very well start with an anthropological optimism” (CP 64). The Schmittean political psychology is thus the consequence of his political conception. The friend-enemy opposition that justifies sovereign decisionism constructs the pessimistic anthropology and psychological structure as its own roots. A “problematic” conception of humanity can precede Schmitt’s concept of sovereignty because he has made this very political psychology the structural consequence of his politics. With this psychological structure of enmity in place it is only natural that political decisions reflect the supposed friend-enemy grouping: the law becomes “a means of compulsory psychological motivation” (LST 68).

War discloses for Schmitt the fundamentals of political psychology. Rousseau in what is perhaps the starkest contrast between these two authors focuses instead on what peace discloses:

> [Peace] conveys to the soul a fullness of sentiment that makes us love at once our own and other people’s

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32 The hidden assumption in Schmitt’s argument is the role that education *must* play in political relationships, in “evaluating concrete situations” and “being able to distinguish correctly the real friend and the real enemy.” These moments of “clarity” are the “high-points” of politics (CP 37, 67).
Rousseau’s concepts of sovereignty and security are as aware of political theology as Schmitt’s. For Rousseau sovereignty is the law’s basis and genesis. For Schmitt sovereignty exists at the law’s limit and as an exception. For Rousseau, the being of sovereignty is the writing of laws, or autonomy. For Schmitt, sovereignty begins where the law ends and is revealed in the oblivion of law. For Rousseau our affective communion is the presupposition of sovereignty; for Schmitt, sovereignty’s structure places an affective opposition at the heart of politics, and with this heart in place builds the body politic. Rousseau compels us to assert that the political community is the greatest of all affects, or an affective state, perhaps narrowing the gap between pursuing knowledge about oneself and the pursuit of the just and good regime. Schmitt might not necessarily disagree. My task in the previous chapters had been to present an understanding of what sovereignty is, abstracting from its operation. The present remarks were intended to address the how, or the operation, of sovereignty.
Chapter VI

A Perpetual Piece? Constructing the Middling Self

“But this faculty of abstraction is a strength of mind that can only be acquired through practice.”

- Immanuel Kant, *Anthropology*, §3:132

A. Affect, Aesthetics, Politics

For the majority of the Twentieth Century the discipline of International Relations has been dominated by realism or realist inspired discourses, for the purposes of interpreting and predicting state action. The pursuit of self-interest defined as security was posited as the primary concern motivating state action in the international sphere. International politics, therefore, was understood to be nothing more than the observance of normative claims about political behaviour and human nature playing themselves out in the form of state interaction. Hidden beneath the grand claims, reasons, and predictions for state action was an account of human motivation that wavered between rational action and fear. Realism especially, but other paradigmatic approaches to IR as well, assumed states to be acting in accordance with universal unalterable principles of human nature. Politics, in this interpretation, is therefore thought to be independent from moral and ethical claims because all action is compelled and unavoidable. In this scheme, however, politics is an afterthought for the most part, and solely the practice of the state.
The aim of this chapter is to turn to Kant’s *Anthropology* in order to provide a counterpoint to the much more influential and troubling anthropology of Carl Schmitt. Both Schmitt and Kant build visions of cosmopolitan order on the ground of a particular account of individual antagonism, but where Schmitt’s friend-foe antagonism leads ultimately to *decisionism* and the clear definition of an “inner and outer,” Kant’s antagonism is to develop autonomy and a capacity for judgment that recognizes the universality (rather than partiality) of law. Simply put, Kant’s theory of judgment makes it possible to discuss the fraught political practice of “decision” without devolving into the “decisionism” that is a constant risk in Schmitt’s political thought. Instead of internalizing the concept of “the political” in the form of the friend-enemy conflict as Schmitt would have it, there is the possibility of internalizing a concept of “the international” that can serve as the basis for a humane political outlook (Schmitt 1932: 38-9). Such an ethical outlook is especially clear in the literature dealing with the Aesthetic Turn in IR and the responsibility that it places on us as spectators of global politics. As such, the individual, rather than the state, is now situated at the centre of international politics.

The specific reason for considering the Aesthetic Turn in relation to ethics in works devoted to affect and judgment such as Kant’s *Anthropology* is the parallel logic at play in the politics of affect and the politics of aesthetic abstraction. Most clearly enumerated in Roland Bleiker’s (2001) seminal essay on Aesthetics and IR, the issues of imitation and replication in aesthetics are salient to the politics of affect and vice-
versa (Bleiker 2001). Aesthetics recognizes that the inevitable location and site of politics is the space between the represented and its representation. Bleiker assembles the full array of humanity’s affective makeup in his attempt to use aesthetics to reorient our understanding of the political, as imagination, sense perception, and reason must all interact without “any of them annihilating the unique position and insight of the other” (2001: 511). In a similar vein, Kant believed that aesthetic works—such as histories, biographies, plays, and novels—are legitimate sources for empirical anthropological research, because while exaggerated in degree they must “correspond to human nature in kind” (APV Preface: 121). The benefit in turning to aesthetics, then, is the continued redemption, justification, and value of insights into world politics that are not strictly derived from rational and reasonable faculties. There is an alternative picture of humanity, an alternative anthropology, assumed by the Aesthetic turn that makes it possible to construct a new vision of modern, international, politics.

I will begin by setting out the logic of politics within aesthetics as taken up in IR theory, and the importance of locating the activity of politics in the space between an original object and its representation. Next, I will reflect on this space of representation as it relates to Kant’s thoughts on judgment, aesthetics, and affect in his development of a cosmopolitan anthropology. Finally, I will conclude by discussing the picture of political judgment that emerges from these themes as it relates to the possibility of establishing an international ethical outlook.
B. Representations of the Aesthetic Turn

The newfound concern with aesthetics and international relations is one part of a larger intellectual movement to critique the alleged fundamental rationality and mechanistic nature of human and state actors. Neta Crawford (2000) provided one of the first systematic attempts to account for emotion in international relations theory. Jean Baudrillard’s seminal series of essays collected in *The Gulf War Did Not Take Place* argued that the experience of the reporting of the Gulf War had replaced the actual war with the virtual and the aesthetic; what was left were only *simulacra* or copies of abstractions with no relationship to reality (1995). It was Bleiker (2001), however, who most clearly developed the activity of politics implicated in the aesthetic representations of international relations.

Politics is relocated by aesthetics away from the level of state interaction to the level of individual interpretation and understanding. Buried in the turn to aesthetics is the intention to reclaim political value and, more fundamentally, a reorientation of how we approach learning about world politics. What also remains underdeveloped is the desire for a radical transformation of the manner in which students of international relations should come to knowledge about its subject matter. Reaching back to Descartes’s separation of body and soul, the “Enlightenment tradition” has emphasized rationality and the scientific method for understanding international politics while recognizing passions as deviations from one’s true interest (Descartes 1989: aa.40-7). Aesthetics wants us to exploit the
potential breadth of our insights in the “production of knowledge about world politics” by incorporating the previously ignored faculties of sensibility and imagination. Bleiker emphasizes aesthetics as a corrective approach to mimesis (imitation, representation) because of its ability to hold imitation accountable for its errors. The productivity or “making” Bleiker describes introduces a mode of interpretive activity that subsumes both aesthetics and mimesis in its call for a more artistic mode of political discourse (Bleiker 2009: 44-6). The preferential status of reason cannot be assumed according to this approach, and we are responsible for marshaling all of our interpretive and comprehensive abilities when practicing politics. Sensibility, imagination, and reason, are individually required and only collectively sufficient for a truly comprehensive understanding and representation of international relations. It is neither the submission of one faculty to another, nor the synchronization of faculties, but the “productive interactions across faculties” that will generate novel understandings (Bleiker 2001: 514).

The next significant conceptual shift in the aesthetic turn is the manner in which power is understood in distinction with orthodox discourse; specifically, it is the location of power in politics that is at issue. Claims of authentic knowledge and of perfect representation are not only revealed by aesthetic approaches to be the location of politics, but all acts of representation are revealed to be acts of power. In fact, “power is at its peak if a form of representation is able to disguise its subjective origins and values” (Bleiker 2001: 515). The implication here is that although the act
of aesthetic representation is the locus of both politics and power, it is the centre of legitimate politics and the centre of illegitimate power. Power is no longer located at the state level but at the level of the individual performing the act of representation. A concern with aesthetics demands that we must provide an account of how we come to knowledge about politics, and in doing so locates international politics in the perspective that one has on the surrounding political landscape.

However, the claim here goes further still: although the individual is the centre of power, he or she only becomes so when the subjective origin of claims is “disguised.” We must be careful to acknowledge, however, the difference between purposeful false representation, and false representation that results from ignorance: the former is an act of power politics; the latter is an innocent mistake. Judith Butler (2007) speaks of the “framing of the frame” as a way to understand the politics and ethics of what is left out of presentation, in the light of the wider societal norms that structure reality. Aesthetics carries with it political responsibility precisely because it represents and transmits or relays affect and feeling (Butler 2007: 955; cf. Dauphinée 2007). This transmission process of affect through aesthetics, from sign to subject, becomes stronger and more “economical” the more such signs and representations circulate (Ahmed 2004). The space between sign and subject—that is, the space of aesthetic abstraction—is occupied by affect. For these reasons, attention to aesthetics makes individuals responsible for intentional representation and unintentional misrepresentation. This responsibility is centred on the individual
because the turn to Aesthetics demands that every claim to knowledge be recognized only as a claim, and encourages claims to be subsequently altered, refuted, upheld, or affirmed (cf. APV §53:219). We might assert, therefore, that this perspective not only makes demands on individuals and not states, but that a specific demand being made of individuals is that they assume an initial position of ignorance when trying to come to knowledge of international relations.

The act of representation is the location of politics, but it is also the case that representation is an act of power. The necessary implication, therefore, is that all politics too easily dissolves into power politics. Aesthetics reproduces at the individual level the political outlook that Realism affirms at the state level. Aesthetics, however, proposes a solution for the eradication of power politics by demanding a non-aggressive orientation of oneself towards others within political relations. A virtue of the aesthetic approach is that it allows both itself and political agents to be self-reflexive about this tendency toward power politics and the inescapability of this tendency (Bleiker 2001: 527). The result of this is that the “full register of human perception” cannot and is not employed to try to solve the problems of world politics, hence the need to legitimize new approaches to IR.

This is not Bleiker’s language, but he is calling for an approach to human perception and world politics that inspires Kant’s investigations into anthropology for the sake of cosmopolitan morality. Aesthetics broadens our insight into political dilemmas thereby broadening the range of possible responses, legitimizing “a greater
variety of approaches and insights to world politics:” it shifts us away from common sense models of thought towards a new appreciation for the importance of common sense (Bleiker 2009: 182ff.). However, this shift is not situated outside or beyond current practices of power and domination, requiring what Daniel Levine calls a sustained effort at reflexivity and critique (2012a: 14, 240).

Jacques Rancière (2006) provides a very subtle but profound account of the relationship between politics and aesthetics, treating the political community as something “created” where “people” are transformed into the “population” and “right” transformed into “fact.” At each step of the argument the logic of politics is located at the moment when something is made into something that it is not, be it a political community turned into an ethical one, a heterogeneous people turned into a homogeneous populace, or morality turned into facts. In this creation of consensus and homogeneity out of a political community that hides and obscures the fact that dissent is what constitutes the community’s political core: “everything is representable…The problem is not to know whether one can or cannot represent, but to know what one wants to represent and what mode of representation one must choose for this aim” (Ranciere 2006: 13). It is the aesthetic distance between “populace” and “people” that is the site of political activity.

The politics of aesthetics also recognizes instances when the attempt to represent something that cannot be represented. This is the case with overwhelmingly traumatic and terrible events that Bleiker and Leet identify as
sublime. Aesthetics play a crucial role in commemorating and providing insight into such events because they can communicate the emotional dimension of such spectacles more readily than usual forms of communication (Bleiker & Leet 2006: 724). In fact, the role of emotional representation is politicized precisely because, while representations are all that we have to investigate these internal phenomena, it is in times of crisis when they become most visible (Bleiker & Hutchison 2008: 129). By contrast to the difficulties representing the sublime, aesthetics is also capable of disrupting the linguistic bond between the language of high politics and mundane everyday processes that shape international politics (Bleiker 2000: 277). This requires, Bleiker suggests, a poetics of the everyday that can stretch the scope of what counts as the international. It is processes, in the view of Theodor Adorno, rather than signs or representations that are the proper site of aesthetic understanding. Rather than searching for a fixed meaning, the truth of aesthetics or the determination of meaning is ongoing and processual. Thus, aesthetics point not towards some knowledge of a thing but to increased uncertainty and indeterminacy (Rajaram 2000: 362). The anthropological outlook that develops out of Adorno’s aesthetics is one that reminds of the humanist goals of the Enlightenment by critiquing the narrow and overly rationalist picture of humanity that came to be predominant (Rajaram 2000). It is this rationalist picture that neglects affect and passion in the human capacity to judge that Kant replaces with a pragmatic anthropology.
C. “…the mind feels its freedom in the play of images…”

We scholars of International Relations have with a recurring regularity rediscovered the philosophy and political outlook of Immanuel Kant, be it as the philosophical influence behind the League of Nations, the democratic peace thesis, to ground the cosmopolitan vision of the post-Cold War world. While the importance of his three Critiques is well established (to say the least), it is the universal and cosmopolitan outlook announced in the very titles of some of his works – Perpetual Peace, Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent, A Conjectural Beginning of Human History – that makes Kant’s thought an easy site of return for IR theory. Certainly, Kant’s philosophical influence on early idealist approaches to international relations is well documented, even though subsequent interventions have question the status of Kant’s idealism (cf. Bull 1977: 244; Williams 1992). It is very difficult to discuss one aspect of Kant’s thought without invoking his philosophy as a whole; however, my hope here is to (with some justification) address in some isolation his discussion of aesthetics, affect, and judgment in his late work Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View.\(^1\) While acknowledging Kant’s ubiquity in IR theory generally, one can legitimately turn to a study of Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, as its subject matter is germane to a number of recent disciplinary movements focusing on Practice and Pragmatism, Aesthetics, and Affect. As R.B.J. Walker puts

\(^1\) I will cite the Louden edition of the Anthropology. Standard citation of this work usually provides the volume from Kant’s collected works and the page number, e.g., (7:119-333), however, I will provide the article number and page number, e.g. (APV §1:127).
it, Kant is an attractive source for framing questions and perhaps finding a small number of ready answers to questions of global order, but his intentional imprecision and ambivalence are much more instructive. The conditions of possibility of Kant’s questions rather than his formal reflections on cosmopolitan politics should be the focus of attention in IR Theory (Walker 2010: 158). If the attention to aesthetics has placed a renewed importance on the role of the individual in international thought, than Kant is at least the natural starting point in so far as his most far-reaching and universal statements about the providential progress of history are always joined with a picture of individual autonomy, freedom, and morality. It is with Walker’s warning in mind that we turn to the Anthropology, where Kant discussion the question upon which his other investigations must rest: “What is a human being?”

Regarding the status of the Anthropology in relation to Kant’s system of thought as a whole, Michel Foucault urges students to focus on the way that Kant’s account of humanity and “mind” is bound up with Kant’s typical cosmopolitanism and the status of the individual as “a citizen of the world.” (APV Preface:120; Foucault 2008: 54). Foucault treats the Anthropology as something like a capstone to Kant’s thought because he recognizes the similarity in the structure of the Anthropology with the structure Kant identifies in the first introduction to his Critique of the Power of Judgment regarding the “faculties of the mind:” cognition, feeling pleasure and displeasure, and desire. These correspond to the three books of Part I of the Anthropology. The second part of the Anthropology sees Kant’s focus move from
the particular concerns of individuals to the general concerns humanity at the global level. A pragmatic anthropology is necessary for the “progressive organization of citizens of the earth into and toward the species as a system that is cosmopolitically united” (APV §E:238). One cannot take this as a repudiation of Kant’s famous support for republicanism in favour of a belief in anthropological cosmopolitanism since the republicanism of which Kant was so fond always existed alongside historical antagonisms; in fact, it was the outcome of such antagonisms. Here, it seems, it is fair to say that Kant’s anthropology is meant to supplement Kant’s republicanism, and his understanding of history as essentially providential. The philosophers that are to guide the foreign policies of states toward a perpetual peace must also guide “citizens” towards a “cosmopolitically united” end (cf. Perpetual Peace 114-5).

Foucault also highlights the status of the Anthropology as a work that was meant for a popular audience. This doctrine of what a human being “as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself” is written by Kant not just from a pragmatic point view but also from a view that is “systematically designed and yet popular (through reference to examples which can be found by every reader) yield[ing] an advantage for the reading public” (APV Preface 119-21). Kant thus implies that this picture of humanity is something akin to a work of art presenting humanity as something made, or as an education for guiding humanity in the process of becoming self-made. In the Logic, Kant identifies anthropology as the discipline
that answers the questions “What is a human being?” (Kuehn 2006: xii). Yet, in the last section of the Anthropology, Kant admits that it is impossible to answer this question or to properly discern the determinative character of humanity because there is no other rational species against which one can compare humanity: “the problem of indicating the character of the human species is absolutely insoluble, because the solution would have to be made through experience by means of the comparison of two species of rational being, but experience does not offer us this” (APV PtII:321). This would lead one to conclude that the account of humanity in the anthropology as a whole is aesthetic or fabricated (cf. APV §71:246nC). Kant’s picture of anthropology, individuality, and humanity is, in this work, essentially aesthetic, or an abstraction (cf. APV §3:131).

Thus, by reading the Anthropology it becomes possible to cultivate in the target popular audience a truly international or cosmopolitan outlook in the faculty of judgment. The turn to pragmatic anthropology to offer “knowledge of the world, which must come after our schooling” would seem to be implied by the aesthetic status of the work and the ensuing exercise of one’s faculties of taste and judgment (APV Preface 120). Foucault also links this notion of popular education to language: “The Anthropology, as a work in the form of “popularity,” is grounded in itself in the sense that it is knowledge of man and of the world. “Popular” knowledge and knowledge of the “popular”—in order to exist, it is what it implies. This circle is not to be undone, but to be taken as it presents itself—that is, in language” (Foucault 2007:
94). Foucault, then, does not doubt that Kant’s work shares in a common sense understanding of humanity, and that as a result the aesthetic distance between the author and the audience, or in this case between the original and the representation, has been reduced: it is “knowledge of man that man himself can immediately understand, recognize, and extend” (Foucault 2007: 95). If natural understanding is enriched through instruction, but the faculty of judgment is only exercised and not instructed, Kant is providing the environment in which his readers can both reflect upon their rational and affective development by virtue of his anthropology, and in so doing exercise their faculty of judgment by refining their taste for knowledge of humanity (APV §42:199).

Kant provides some indication of the necessarily political character of this education in his characterization of the aesthetic egoist. Kant delineates three types of egoism (logical, aesthetic, and practical) which correspond to three presumptions (understanding, taste, and practical interest).² The aesthetic egoist “is satisfied with his own taste… he deprives himself of progress towards that which is better when he isolates himself with his own judgment; he applauds himself and seeks the touchstone of artistic beauty only in himself” (APV §2:129-30). Kant recognizes a responsibility and a benefit of aesthetic representation, with regards to the gap between the original and its representation, that the aesthetic egoist eschews. The ability to

² “Logical egoism” is how Kant describes the importance of trusting the judgment of one’s own senses when there may be no popular support for one’s views. The freedom to trust one’s own judgment in matters is the basis of freedom of speech and thought, yet Kant also recognizes that it is a “hazardous enterprise, even for intelligent people, to entertain an assertion that contradicts generally held opinion” (APV §2:129).
abstract from a representation is a greater faculty than the ability to pay attention to representations, because it demonstrates “a freedom of thought and an authority of the mind” because one’s representations are under one’s control (APV §3: 131). To the extent that one’s tastes are egoistic, one is failing to take advantage of opportunities to improve on one’s knowledge of humanity and develop one’s capacity for moral autonomy. The aesthetic egoist would seem to be missing the benefits of autonomy and freedom implied in “representations under one’s control,” while also neglecting the responsibility to a wider audience for their taste. This responsibility is distinctly human:

The fact that the human being can have the “I” in his representations raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person, and by virtue of the unity of consciousness through all changes that happen to him, one and the same person – i.e., through rank and dignity and entirely different being from things, such as irrational animals, with which one can do as one likes. (APV §1:127)

The shirking of responsibility for one’s judgments and tastes is especially likely in moral matters, says Kant, not because human beings are incapable of making these decisions but because the responsibility for such decisions is deemed too weighty (APV §43: 200). Thus, one prefers “submitting passively and obedient” to a preordained formula rather than using one’s own reason.

The free production of the imagination is, according to the Anthropology, the training for the proper exercise of judgment. There are fewer constraints in the imaginative faculty, a fact which is beneficial for creativity and intuition, but
detrimental for mistaking subjective for objective knowledge and losing one’s connection with “common sense” ($APV$ §57:225; §53:219). It is in the imagination where reason can properly order or correct one’s judgments and make sense of the outside world. It is certainly possible for “the free play of rationalizing” to lead one astray, but reason is the corrective. Moreover, it is the “friction” and “connection” between minds looking at the same objects that prepares the way for full autonomy: “the most important revolution from within the human being is ‘his exit from self-incurred immaturity’” ($APV$ §59:228-9). Autonomy is possible, it seems, by correcting one’s own thoughts in light of the common sense made possible by participating in a political society ($APV$ §53:219).

The importance of practice for one’s faculty of judgment in aesthetic matters prevails especially in Kant’s discussion of physiognomy, which occupies the opening section of Kant’s empirical discussion in the *Anthropology*. Physiognomy is discussed by Kant (somewhat unproblematically) as the “way of judging a human being’s way of sensing or way of thinking according to his visible form;” simply, we judge a person’s interior by their exterior ($APV$ PtII:295). Physiognomy is both the site of affect and also the first moment of communication. One can posit that the distance between inside and outside that inner feeling and outer affect parallels the view of political responsibility in aesthetic representation between an original and its representation. This makes physiognomy particularly important, especially for how it has been taken up as a window in the entire ideological makeup of a human being in
the work of Silvan Tomkins and Paul Ekman. In this particular tradition of studying emotion and what it represents, there is the dual belief that emotions are subject to *interpretation* and *scientific explanation*. Daniel Gross, in an attempt to defend the breadth of Darwin’s original vision of human emotion against the narrower application it currently receives, argues that Darwinians like Tomkins and Ekman have boiled down human affective makeup to essentially two ingredients: disgust and enjoyment (Gross 2010).

Kant would seem far ahead of his time, then, by discussing pleasure and displeasure at the centre of his anthropology; moreover, Kant captures that communicative element of affective expression by defining taste as the communication of pleasure and displeasure in order to feel a satisfaction about it in common with others (APV §69:244). Philip Fisher (2002) locates in Kant’s language a reversal of the traditional philosophic description of the passions. Whereas it was common prior to Kant to discern two types of emotional states—eruptive moments versus abiding states (or what Fisher eventually refers to as episodic and dispositional passions)—Kant reverses this language by excluding emotions (*Affekte*) from passions (*Leidenschaften*) because their relationship to *practice* is not always fixed. In the *Anthropology*, Kant says that episodic states act right away or not at all, whereas abiding states, dispositional passions take time and reflection and are better understood as “enduring conditions of the soul” (Fisher 2002: 20). Frazer (2010: 127ff.) credits this easily missed distinction between *affects* and *passions* for causing
confusion when interpreting Kant’s teaching on compassion and sympathetic feeling. Keeping in mind that for Kant affects are episodic and vehement rather than dispositional traits, it is the dispositional passions that are especially pernicious to the pursuit of freedom and autonomy.

The freedom of thought that is needed to intuit universal moral laws is impossible for an affected person because affect is “rash…it quickly grows to a degree of feeling that makes reflection impossible (it is thoughtless)” (APV §74:252). Where an affective state constitutes a “lack of reflection,” to have passions is to live “as no human being wishes…For who wants to have himself put in chains when he can be free?” (APV §74: 253). Once again, however, the faculty of judgment in this aesthetic representation of inner feeling is only exercised properly if wisdom and taste exist in the proper proportion (APV PtII:296). That is, wisdom must be the guide for taste (and therefore the guide to outer representation of affect, expressed in one’s physiognomy), and taste must not guide wisdom, if these two traits are to be “united in the human being for one and the same end” (APV PtII:296).

Physiognomy, though, is not a science but an art (Louden 2002: 78). Just as the aesthetic egoist cannot move beyond immediate and superficial taste to the development of proper judgment, physiognomy mistakes taste for general moral characteristics. It can never become a science because of the “peculiarity of the human form” (APV PtII:296). At best, physiognomy should be cultivating taste in “morals, manners, and customs, in order to promote human relations” in order to
critique the flawed anthropology that is usually developed on the basis of physiognomy (APV PtII:297).

**D. Aesthetics, Judgment, & International Politics**

We must still address the question of why Kant would devote the longest single section of the *Anthropology* to physiognomy, when it is ultimately a flawed and misleading part of a pragmatic anthropology. There appear to be two immediate possibilities; first, that the ascendance from superficialities to knowledge implied in the movement from taste to morals is necessary for cultivating the moral cosmopolitanism that should be the goal of a pragmatic anthropology; second, if our conjecture above that the work as a whole is itself an exercise in aesthetic abstraction, then the inclusion of physiognomy would be of a piece with Kant’s subtler attempt to educate his audience through the action of the text itself, in consonance and with his explicit statements. Regarding the first possibility, the expression of passions stirred up in the mind is, in this context, generated from one’s activities rather than some natural or inherent causes (Frazer 2010: 137). As such, these are not passive sufferings but actively felt and engaged feelings. They signify *character*, which is the “property of the will by which the subject binds himself to definite practical principles that he has prescribed to himself irrevocably by his own reason” (APV PtII:292). Physiognomy, therefore, is not simply the representation of passion corrupting reason but the first indicator of the possibility of autonomy (Frazer 2010: 138). Regarding this second possibility and the difficulty of interpreting affect as an
empirical fact, Kant observes that a person who is “too weak to govern his affects will expose his interior through the play of expressions (against the wish of his reason)” (APV PtII:300). In this context, Kant’s first mention of affect in the work occurs in relation to political life and the practice of communication: “Paying attention (attentio) to oneself is necessary, to be sure, when one is dealing with others. But in social intercourse it must not become visible; for then it makes conversation either embarrassed (self-conscious) or affected (stilted)” (APV §4:132). Thus the aesthetic representation of the self is the norm: “On the whole, the more civilized human beings are, the more they are actors. They adopt the illusion of affection…” (APV §14:151). Such artificial interactions are, in fact, the seat of virtue and morality because virtues that are “merely affected for a considerable length of time, will gradually really be aroused and merge into the disposition” (APV §14: 151).

Kant’s discussion should not be mistaken for developing a relationship between the concepts of aesthetic, affect, and politics at the level only of the individual. The propensities and dispositions that aesthetics and affect reveal at the individual level represent the basis of a construction of international politics. It is this common behaviour of concealing “a good part of one’s thoughts, which every prudent human being finds necessary” that betrays the “propensity of our species to be evil-minded towards one another” (APV PtII:332). Yet, it is precisely this objectionable behaviour towards each other that destines humanity “by nature, to [develop], through mutual compulsion under laws that come from themselves, into a
cosmopolitan society” \( (APV \text{ PtII:331}) \). It is affect in the form of aesthetic representation that demonstrates the “unsocial sociability” of humanity \((UH \text{ 44})\). Individuals would like their judgment and taste—understood as “social judgments”—confirmed as correct and good, because they are chosen “according to a certain rule which is represented as valid for everyone” \((APV \text{ §67:240})\). Just as Kant’s categorical imperative treats the “will of every rational being as making universal law,” taste is the “faculty of the aesthetic power of judgment to choose with universal validity” \((FMM \text{ IV:432}; \ APV \text{ §67:241})\). The universal qualities of Kant’s philosophy are ultimately grounded in an antagonistic understanding of individual will. That is, the revelation through history of a more rational and more just form of political order develops from an essentially competitive and conflict ridden state of affairs. The cosmopolitan moral vision of the \textit{Anthropology}, and the cosmopolitan moral and political vision of works like \textit{Perpetual Peace} and \textit{Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose}, are ultimately quite complementary. The “pathologically enforced social union” that is transformed into a “moral whole” is the product of the human inclination to live in a society but also to live as an individual \((UH \text{ 44-5})\). Taste that presupposes a “social condition which is not always sociable” but “purely competitive” tends towards the “external advancement of morality” by making a person well-mannered \((APV \text{ §§67-9})\). The aesthetics of taste and the human artifice of the law both tend towards a condition of a perpetuated peace \((PP \text{ 112-3})\). Neither solves the “most difficult of all tasks” of reconciling human authority with the “just
in itself,” but that warped wood of humanity is made somewhat straighter (UH 46).

There is a case to be made that rhetoric creates aesthetics as a discipline, even in the case of Kant’s political philosophy and despite his misgivings about persuasion’s corrupting influence on reason and judgment. Kant’s aesthetic theory, in fact, points beyond itself towards the tradition of rhetoric in its Aristotelian vein; this is especially true of his inclusion of the imagination as an important component of political outlook at the individual level. John Poulakos (2007) argues, drawing on the relationship between Kant’s theory of judgment and aesthetics, that rhetoric is only partially rejected by Kant. Kant retains a space for the type of rhetoric that Aristotle classifies as *epideictic* or demonstrative rhetoric, whose end is praising and blaming, rather than legal rhetoric and deliberative rhetoric, that both seek to move a political audience to make a judgment (Rh. 1358B). For Kant, however, demonstrative rhetoric is ranked as the most important politically, in direct opposition to Aristotle’s ranking. This type of rhetoric can be part of the aesthetic domain because it is does not require that one depend on the weakness of others for its success (Poulakos 2007: 346). Rhetoric and poetry, says Kant are “aimed at a frame of mind whereby the mind is directly aroused to activity, and thus they have their place in a *pragmatic* anthropology” (*APV* §71:246). Rhetoric belongs in a pragmatic anthropology because it exercises one’s faculty of judgment through taste; that is, rhetoric that is a *fabrication* or creation similar to poetry, is necessary within a full anthropology because it can aid the development of one’s tastes and judgments
by appealing to the mind in the proper manner: rhetoric is understanding animated with sensibility, and is so rich with information that one’s sensibility confuses one’s understanding (APV §9:145). Michael Frazer is especially clear on the importance of the relationship between affect and rhetoric for sound political judgment and decision-making (Frazer 2010: 132). Affective and passionate states make people susceptible to persuasion and being “moved like a machine” rather than being appealed to as a rational and inherently reasonable human being; simply, affect clouds one’s judgment in such a way that it ensures obedience to what is external to one’s self more readily than it secures freedom.

E. Conclusion: Aesthetics and World Spectators

It is clear that the faculty and practice of judgment, according to Kant, has an important relationship with common sense and the political community. There is a particular set of events and conditions under which a human being can properly and morally exercise the faculty of judgment. Along with the attachment to common sense and the measuring of taste against the judgments of others, the proper conditions for judgment include the appropriate cosmopolitan and universal ethical outlook. At the outset of our discussion we made reference to the important picture of judgment that one could develop from Kant’s *Anthropology*, and how this picture of judgment and anthropology can provide a basis for challenging the more prevalent notion of decision filtered through Schmitt’s understanding of sovereignty. Kant’s thoughts on human passion and its representations, and the faculty of judgment that
develops from these basic traits, nicely parallel the logic at work in aesthetic
representations. Additionally, Kant’s internationalism does not only stand above
political life as the moral outlook that must be reconciled to it, because his pragmatic
anthropology is a type of internationalism that is the ground of human political life as
well (Bartelson 1995b). Thus, the Aesthetic Turn in IR not only provides a critique
of how we come to know and experience the international but provides the
beginning of a critique of sovereignty’s exceptionalism and decisionism that has
come to be the predominant form of “judging” in analyses of sovereignty.

In her Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, Hannah Arendt does not believe
Kant does enough to emphasize his important achievement regarding the
maintenance of public space for political activity. For Arendt, there is no question
that the preconditions for political judgment are the proper exercise of the
imaginative faculty and the inescapable necessity of living in a community with other
people (Arendt 1992: 67). Common sense—with the emphasis on “the common” as
community in Arendt’s interpretation—is the shared political activity that puts the
basis for freedom and judgment in the free play of the imagination (Zerilli 2005:20).
The imagination is like a “silent sense” that judges right and wrong; it transforms
sensed objects into objects of “inner sense” by reflecting on an objects
representation (Arendt 1993: 65). Arendt supplements the picture of political life in
Kant’s presentation of judgment by discerning the figure of the “world spectator:”

One judges always as a member of a community,
guided by one’s community sense, one’s sensus
But in the last analysis, one is a member of a world community by sheer fact of being a human; this is one’s “cosmopolitan existence.” When one judges and when one acts in political matters, one is supposed to take one’s bearing from the idea, not the actuality, of being a world citizen and, therefore, also a Weltbetrachter, a world spectator. (Arendt 1993: 75-6).

The spectator is that mode of being in the world that creates a space for politics and a space that is analogous to the aesthetic distance between an original and its representation. The World Spectators do not produce judgment that ought to then serve as principles for action or for other judgments; they create the space in which the objects of political judgment, the actors and actions themselves, can appear (Zerilli 2005: 179). Here Arendt emphasizes the ability of aesthetics to be receptive to the world, a trend that was evident but underdeveloped in Kant’s thoughts on rhetoric and overwhelming sensory evidence. Rhetoric in the aesthetic realm enables making a sound judgment in the future because the reasoning for one’s tastes cannot compel agreement: there is no single correct argument that might persuade reasonable people when discussing aesthetic merits (Zerilli 2005: 170).

We are very far, at this point from the idea of decision or exception as a practice of sovereignty only in the imagination of the sovereign, as Schmitt would have it. Immanent in Kant’s depiction of the faculty of judgment is the possibility of a cosmopolitan anthropology whose practical moral outlook can serve as the basis for an ethics of international politics. What the Aesthetic Turn has done is re-open a path in International Relations for attendant concepts such as taste, morality,
representation, and common sense to form the basis of a new relationship between anthropology and the international.
Concluding Thoughts:

The Autonomy of the International

"Turn your insides out to the outside
Turn the outside in to the inside
Trade your outside in for the inside
Turn it around again
I'm amounted"

- Dave Grohl, Lyrics to “Live-in Skin”

A. From Beginning to End

My discussion of the affect of the political throughout each chapter of this work recast this story that IR tells about itself in a way that preserves the full horizon of what “IR theory” can and should be. This project enters the discourse at a time when the idea of IR theory, and what it means to do IR theory, and indeed whether IR theory means anything substantive anymore, draws much attention. I want to conclude this thesis by situating my work and thinking through these issues in light of the recent conversations in the literature of IR writ large. The recent conversation about the “End of IR Theory?” has done an admirable job of putting into stark relief the general set of issues at stake in this practice and thought of world politics. But it now appears that the activity the discipline of Political Science calls International Relations Theory has come to an end. The intellectual history that moved from the competition between idealism and realism, to a critique of behaviouralism, and finally to positivism and post-positivism has now been replaced by an implied consensus on
middle-range theorizing and analytical eclecticism (Jackson & Nexon 2013; Lake 2013; Guzzini 2013; Sil & Katzenstein 2010).

One can tell the story of IR theory over the last 60 years by posing the two questions that mark the beginning and the end of this timeline. The first question was famously asked by Martin Wight (1960) in the title of his seminal essay: ‘Why is there no International Theory?’ The second question was the guiding light in the recent forum on “The End of IR Theory?” hosted by the European Journal of International Relations, edited by Tim Dunne, Lene Hansen, and Colin Wight (2013). On the surface, it appears that an important part (if not the whole) of the story of IR theory after World War Two until the present can be subsumed under these two questions: “Why is there no international theory?” and “The end of IR theory?” Yet appearances can be deceiving: for the end of IR Theory to be upon us it begs the question of when, if ever, it began (cf. Williams 2013)? If Robert Cox (1981) is right that theory is “always for someone and for some purpose” then who founded IR theory? And for what purpose? Admitting that IR theory is for someone and for some purpose means only that it has a politics, or that it is a political theory. One cannot claim that we have reached an endpoint for political theory.

This thesis, therefore, answers the question about whether we have reached the end of IR theory in the negative; however, as should now be clear it does so by rejecting the frame of the question altogether and focuses instead on the affective capacities that are the engine of political life. One mistake the “End of IR Theory?”
forum consistently commits is also one that this project risks committing: assuming the autonomy of the international. It is far more accurate and fruitful to recognize that IR Theory as a whole is part of—if not the paradigmatic example of—modern political theory tout court. It is not a discrete activity, as the chapters on Thucydides, Aristotle, and Rousseau especially showed. This mistake has produced often bizarre and untenable interpretations of the great and influential works in early modernity.

For example, students of IR Theory would likely be of the opinion that Hobbes is in agreement with the realist Machiavelli, and in disagreement with the liberal Locke on matters of war and peace, rather than noting the overwhelming similarities on issues like founding compacts and natural rights that exist between Hobbes and Locke but not between Hobbes and Machiavelli. As chapter three demonstrated, a more important and foundational inaccuracy is the belief in an unbroken chain of Realist political thinking inaugurated with Thucydides’ account of the Melian Dialogue, continued in Hobbes’s metaphorical natural condition, and reaching maturity with Morgenthau’s (1947: 165) teaching on the animus dominandi. This story of IR theory as an unbroken chain ignores the deep disagreements between Thucydides and Hobbes on issues that each held to be most important: whether hope or fear is the primary psychological motivator for human action. My opening chapters on the Greek and German understanding of thumos or political spiritedness sought especially to move beyond this orthodox horizon of IR theory by promoting a reorientation of the conversation.
Reorienting IR around a concern for thumos or a particularly political spirit will reveal that what we call IR is now and always has been a vision of the good life predicated on a specific relationship between the individual and the international, between individual psychology and cosmopolitan order. Christian Reus-Smit (2013) plays on the ambiguity of the word “end” to point out that the ‘end’ of IR theory also implies it has a goal or a purpose, and IR theorists would do well to be clear about this. One should also pause at the word ‘theory’: there is no such thing as IR theory because there is a great difficulty establishing a theory of politics in any form. Political knowledge as a whole consists of more than the collection and analysis of data: it is the ‘coherent reflection carried on by politically minded people concerning the essentials of political life’ in the hopes of establishing the right standards for judgment of institutions and actions (Strauss 2007: 516). In this light the problems that IR theory seeks to solve are rather permanent: What is the good life and how can it be secured? What is a just and good regime? What are the ideas that inform institutions and practices? These questions, and therefore IR theory, are in the orbit of political philosophy.

R.B.J. Walker (1993; 2010), Jens Bartelson (2009), and Evgeni Prozorov (2014) have begun the important work of freeing political theory from the boundaries to which understanding of “the international” has subjected it, and I follow their desire to interrogate the philosophical assumptions of world politics, international life, and IR theory to expand the horizon of political possibilities. This
project used the affect of the political for this reorientation of IR theory around this traditional set of questions associated with political philosophy, and in so doing move IR’s theoretical discussion beyond its traditional boundaries. Paying attention to *thumos* as one of the oldest sources of human political action reveals that it is wrong to speak of a *theory* of international relations in any sense.

My approach in this regard follows Williams (2013) and his reading of Guilhot (2008) on the political intention of the classical realists of the twentieth-century. Williams (2013) description of an “IR Enlightenment” re-introduces some of the issues usually associated with political philosophy back into thinking about IR, and thinking beyond IR. For Williams, the IR Enlightenment of the post-World War Two era, of which thinkers like Morgenthau, Nitze, Wolfers, and Niebuhr were contributors, was concerned with positing IR not as a *domain* of politics (which could then be subject to theorizing) but as a vision of political life and Political Science itself. The “irredentism” of IR theory was for the purposes of reforming and reimagining liberal politics in general, and American liberal politics in particular (Williams 2013: 654). It was an ‘enlightenment’ because the gap between a theoretical understanding of politics and political life itself was to be narrowed.

B. The Universality of The Spirit

*Thumos* or spirit is the source of the first relations between people. This has been established in the introductory chapters, as well as on Aristotle, Thucydides, and Hobbes in this project. But I want to pause for a moment and survey the
landscape of *thumos*. It carries a wide range of meanings, including an especially political spiritedness, heart, courage, anger, soul, or wrath. It is often mistaken for ‘manliness’ in that tired binary construction of the masculine and the feminine, but this is only half the story. *Thumos* is the site of the passions and also of reason. It is that spark in humanity that seeks to rebel, and that passion that desires to rule. It is the site of the sacred and the profane; indeed, it sanctifies the profane and profanes the sacred. It is where we feel injustice suffered upon ourselves and those we think of as “our own”. It is where we feel injustice suffered by others and for whom we want to fight. It seeks change for the better and seeks to prevent change for the worse, and is wholly Janus faced.¹ In a short and rich treatise titled *The Abolition of Man*, C.S. Lewis (1944) argues that if people are understood solely as rational, calculating, actors or solely compelled by material appetites, what distinguishes the human *qua* human will have disappeared. He refers to this (with Plato’s psychology firmly in view) as a chest-less humanity because we no longer possess heart, and a humanity that is only attentive to intellect and appetite has missed a great deal of the human experience. Morgenthau (1971) echoes this tripartite scheme in his discussion of thought, will, and action, where the will “determines the relationship

¹ I will try to use thumos or thumotic to discuss this emotional and psychological phenomenon. However, when I must stray from transliterations and variants of Greek I will follow Lebow’s recommendation not to privilege one writer from the Greek tradition over another and refer to this concept as “spirit” or “spiritedness” (Lebow 2008: 14n56). “Spirit” obviously connotes something religious, and though that is not my intention to include this meaning it is unavoidable. This said, Philpott (2000) reminds us that the entirety of the modern international system and the Westphalian Peace was constructed against the established religious order and belief. In this light, reminding ourselves of this political inheritance by using the word “spirit” is not illegitimate.
between theory and practice...The influence of [thought] upon practice is at the mercy of that will.” Bonnie Honig (2001: 16) also picks up on this theme in her reading of the *Wizard of Oz* and the metaphor of political founding that is represented by the need for a brain, a heart, and courage.

*Thumos* has a dual political nature, insofar as it divides the self on the one hand and connects us with people on the other. The divided self that *thumos* effects is associated with militarism because *thumos* will “quiet” the feeling of trepidation or fear when heading into battle either for the shame of lacking courage or for the pursuit of glory; likewise, *thumos* also connects us with others in order to act in political concert with the feeling of a shared goal (Ludwig 2002: 200-211). *Thumos* is where we feel indignant, and where the aspects of human life, which make us political beings, reside. *Thumos* as political spiritedness at times seeks to preserve the prevailing order of things, while at other times takes offense at injustice when it arises.

There is an adumbrated view of *thumos* put forward by Mansfield (2006: 207) and Fukuyama (1992: 171ff.) that mistakes it—albeit, with many qualifiers—for a specifically aggressive masculinity. Fukuyama’s account of *thumos* is subdivided into two kinds of recognition that propel political history forward: *megalothymia*, or the desire to be recognized as superior and rule over others, and *isothymia*, or the desire to be recognized as an equal (Fukuyama 1992: 181-191). These two psychic drives have provide history its forward progress and we have reached history’s end when
politics is able to quiet these drives in the universal and homogeneous state that recognizes the inherent dignity of every human being. *Thumos* certainly plays a role in political recognition but it is also not reducible to the politics of recognition. Thomas Hobbes’s “vain glory”, Immanuel Kant’s “unsocial sociability”, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s “*amour propre*” all place the politics of *thumos* at the centre of political life and interactions between people, societies, and states. Koziak (1999) explicitly links the study of *thumos* to a feminist philosophy and a critique of orthodoxy because of how *thumos* enlarges the sphere of politics to include hitherto ignored psychic phenomena. *Thumos* is “the seat of emotion” and therefore is a perfect starting point for incorporating the “panoply” of political experience that is ignored by political theories that assume humanity is rational, calculating, and self-interested (Koziak 1999: 1069). *Thumos* or spirit transcends the long recognized and long criticized binary of the masculine and feminine that maps onto the rational and the emotional. Returning to the *thumos*, despite its association with masculinity, manliness, honour, recognition, courage, and so on, is the first step of a critique of these same concepts.

In this light it is worth recalling that Gilligan (1982) introduced the Ethics of Care as a new approach to psychoanalysis and political life. The ethics of care speaks directly to the divided and separate self or the individuated atomistic person that is at the basis of political theory, law, and psychology (Gilligan, 1995). The great American philosopher, psychologist, and pragmatist William James recognizes this
positive and caring potential in political spiritedness as well. In *The Moral Equivalent of War* James searches for an outlet that might sublimate the immoderate nationalism that can turn into violent war-making. His solution is to conscript the youth into farming and labouring on the land rather than military service for the purposes of maintaining civic virtue absent militarism:

So far, war has been the only force that can discipline a whole community, and until an equivalent discipline is organized, I believe that war must have its way. But I have serious doubt that the ordinary prides and shames of social man [sic], once developed to a certain intensity, are capable of organizing such a moral equivalent as I have sketched... (James 1987: 1292)

*Thumos* will be the eventual undoing of its own education. Once we recognize that *thumos* is the site of these many political passions, another host of theoretical relations is possible via the now wide and popular literature on the emotions. Crawford (2000), and Mercer (2005; 2006) provided early arguments to incorporate a fuller understanding of human passion into the study of IR. Bleiker and Hutchison (2008) and Lebow (2006) likewise rescued passion from the clutches of Realism by expanding the emotional horizon of IR theory to include trauma, memory, reconciliation, honor, and esteem. Fisher (2002: 59) sees a “vehemence” in these passions that is of a particularly modern political importance. The ability of passion to destroy any boundary between inside and outside, between inner feeling and outward expression, recasts the distinction between the public and private realm, and therefore recasts how we relate with other citizens in a modern polity. By disturbing
notions of public and private, *thumos* disturbs the status of that private modern space treated as the bastion of the individual private rights which are to be recognized and respected.

Clearly *thumos* is a well-travelled concept that wears many different masks. The literature on recognition and reputation is its most widely recognizable one, which presents *thumotic* political tendencies (Mercer 1996) as the core of IR, as does the related literature on humiliation and shame (Saurette 2006). Writers such as Oprisko (2012), Brennan and Pettit (2000), and English (2005) have treated *thumos* under the auspices of the pursuit of honour, prestige, and esteem. This literature treats the importance of relational inequalities, especially in markets, economies, and communities of prestige in a way that recaptures the importance of *value* in a world of social-scientific *facts*. Oprisko (2012: 31ff) captures the evaluative—and, by implication, moral—elements of honour, esteem, and *thumos* that would otherwise disappear under the theorization of necessity and self-interest. In so doing, this work implies that political analysis must incorporate concepts just as justice and honor that are notoriously difficult to measure. Yet, the pursuit of honour and esteem, or the protection and defense of standing and reputation are simply another formulation of the “justice motive” that Welch (1993) reminds us is a key analytical tool for understanding war. More importantly, the recognition that norms and justice matter in the world of international politics is the first step to recognize and reducing the injustices of international politics.
The concept of honour and the justice motive for war should put us in mind of that first attempt at explaining international politics with a recourse to individual motivation: the thesis of the Athenians that people and cities are compelled by the “greatest things”: fear, honour, and profit (History 1.75.3). The word translated as honour (timē) can also be translated as esteem or prestige. Lebow (2006; 2008; 2010) appeals to thumos to build a theory on the basis of honour and standing because it is thumos or spirit that is awakened when one loses standing and is dishonoured. His formulation of “fear, interest, and honour” is an explicit reference to the Thucydidean formulation. Yet, Thucydides only uses the word thumos three times in his History, and each time in relation to honour-loving Sparta or her allies (Benardete 1989: 55). Thucydides (2.11.7) even goes so far as to present thumos as the opposite of considered action: those most ready to fight will be thumotic and not calculating.

If there is merit to these arguments that the study of thumos is an exercise that crosses theoretical boundaries, paradigms, and the various “isms” that have proliferated in IR theory, then it is peculiar that Lebow’s three part rehabilitation of classical political thought did not receive better and greater attention in the “End of IR Theory?” forum. It is especially puzzling, given that he finds revenge and standing—both expressions of thumos—account for the motives behind 68% of all wars between 1648 and 2008 (Lebow 2010: 127). More importantly, countries and rising powers are beginning to seek standing through non-military means because to seek standing through military force brings one into disrepute (ibid.). If there is a call
for better theories and insights to explain the complex late-modern world of international politics, why ignore a key motivating factor in these theories? Thumos is the motivation for war and peace. It is universal.

C. The Idea of International Relations

Why has it been necessary in this project to address the often overlooked concept of political spiritedness? The direct answer is that this metaphysical aspect of human nature is classically understood to be the seat of the passions, and the source of affective or external expressions of essentially political desires. More importantly, political spiritedness is at the heart of the story that modernity and the state tell about themselves, and is implicated in how we understand the key concepts of sovereignty and security. Speaking very generally, the belief exists that non-rational responses to political phenomena have too often been ignored, or that the Realist paradigm has had an indefensible monopoly on the study of the non-rational aspects of politics—especially the emotion of fear—despite emphasizing rational self-interest (Bleiker & Hutchison: 2008). A main underlying argument of this project is that a concern for spiritedness, and by implication the wider role of the emotional faculties in our understanding of politics is not new. Thus the recent attention paid to affective faculties is not the introduction of a new and improved way to understand and explain politics, but rather the return of an earlier, or the first, approach to understanding politics by beginning with the basics of individual political psychology (cf. Massumi 2002; Ahmed 2004).
I have also stated that International Relations is a typically modern approach, and representative of the politics of Modernity (however one seeks to define this latter term). Yet, International Relations has a cognate intellectual pursuit in the Ancient world in the study of different regimes and comparative constitutionalism such as Aristotle’s *Constitution of Athens* and Xenophon’s *Constitution of the Lacedaemonians*. As is typical of Greek writers like Thucydides, Plato, and Aristotle, the discussion of various regimes is the equivalent of an international outlook. The division of regimes into those ruled by the one, few, and the many, ruled with virtue or with vice, and the ways of life that result from such a taxonomy, is indistinguishable in form and method to what we now call IR theory (Aristotle, *Politics* 1279a25ff.). Insofar as something like international relations exists in the Ancients, spiritedness and how it can be managed is at the heart of the analysis. Xenophon, that famous Athenian war hero and less-famous student of Socrates, presents the political problem—who should rule, how one should rule, and under what conditions people might obey—as a problem of how to rein in *thumos* in the opening remarks of his *Education of Cyrus*. This problem is, indeed, “international” as it manifests itself in every type of regime:

How many democracies have been brought down by those who wished the governing to be done in some way other than democracy; how many monarchies and how many oligarchies have been overthrown by the people; and how many who have tried to establish tyrannies have, some of them, been at once brought down completely…It is easier, given his [sic] nature,
for a human being to rule all the other kinds of animals than to rule human beings. (1.1.1-1.1.3)

As I noted at the outset of chapter two, Xenophon writes histories about the emperor Cyrus of Persia and also the Spartan king Agesilaus because they have been able to solve this universal problem of rule. The problem of obedience is universal, existing in all regimes and ways of life, and both in the public and private sphere. The solution to this universal problem is education, usually through laws and customs, to harness one's natural spiritedness (Newell 2000). The paradigmatic example of all of these tendencies in ancient literature is the decline of regimes in Plato’s Republic (543a-569c) where Socrates describes the way of life in each sort of regime and the individual psychology that corresponds to it. The recognition of this link between individual education at this emotional and passionate level and the ordering of politics at the highest level is what allows Lebow (2013) to claim that his is the only true constructivist theory: paying attention to culture (i.e. the cultivation through education of human beings) is both a truer form for constructivist theory and also allows for a reinterpretation of constructivism. The link that is shared across these orders is the connection to a passionate drive, such as appetite, spirit, reason, or fear (Lebow 2010: 65-89).

For these very preliminary reasons, one cannot ignore the role that spiritedness plays in Hobbes’s depiction of the natural condition (cf. Patapan 2011). While, on the one hand, it is true that the more commonly understood “continual fear and danger of violent death” is motivating human action, it is not the primary or
fundamental mover, or the fundamental “interior” “voluntary motion” in Hobbes’s scheme (*Lev.* VI; XIII.9). Hobbes uses the language of esteem in his presentation to describe the function of spiritedness, and it is as a result of the attempt to moderate this political passion that sovereignty is constructed. The relevant passage is a familiar one:

> Men have no pleasure, but on the contrary a great deal of grief, in keeping company where there is no power able to over-awe them all. For every man looketh that his companion should value him at the same rate he sets upon himself, and upon all signs of contempt, or under valuing, naturally endeavours, as far as he dares (which amongst them that have no common power to keep them in quiet, is far enough to make them destroy each other), to extort a greater value from his contemners, by damage, and from others, by the example. (*Lev.*, XIII.5, my emphasis)

In the middle of Hobbes’s description of the violence of the state of nature, we have an argument not about fear for survival but about the hope for esteem. It is the hope that others “should value him at the same rate he sets upon himself” and the extraction of this recognition that leads to the violence of the natural condition that the sovereign Leviathan must overawe. What is more, we are prone to pursue this hope for justice “farther than [our] security requires”. To put this another way, security is the modern solution to the politics of thumos. In this context, one must remember that the first description of a power that “awes” humanity in *Leviathan* is our own imagination (*Lev.* XI.26). This honour-and-recognition seeking should also teach us something about the presence and absence of authority in anarchy. In the
absence of a visible authority the “power invisible” of thumos or spirit is what governs our behaviour. Anarchy, so called, is not quite correct: the arche in this condition is the spirit and all of its variegated desires for justice, honour, and recognition.

The idea that thumos runs amok in the absence of political authority does not belong to Hobbes: it belongs to Thucydides (cf. Orwin 1994). Thucydides longest digression in his History (3.80-84) is his account of the stasis (civil strife) that started in the city of Corcyra and then spread through Greece (though not to Sparta). On Lebow’s (2004) reading of stasis, spirit upholds nomos and vice-versa, and the absence of nomos that is characterized by civil strife means that nonviolent outlets for the satisfaction of esteem do not exist. A genealogy of the metaphor of international anarchy brings us here. Thucydides shows his readers an image of political life in the absence of legal authority, divine authority, and familial bonds, all of which have been undone because of the desire for the spirit to find recognition and honour in the eyes of others. Usual evaluations were inverted and words took on new meanings:

irrational recklessness was now considered courageous commitment, hesitation while looking to the future was high-styled cowardice, moderation was a cover for lack of manhood, and circumspections mean inaction, while senseless anger now helped define a true man, and deliberation for security was a specious excuse for dereliction. The man of violent temper was always credible, anyone opposing him was suspect...with public life confused to the critical point, human nature, always ready to act unjustly even in violation of laws, overthrew the laws themselves and gladly showed itself powerless over passion but stronger than
In addition to this depravity familial bonds no longer took precedence over political bonds of partisanship, because the former counsels caution and the latter does not. We see here an unadulterated presentation of thumos and political honour seeking that provides the most violent episode of the twenty-seven year war. Like Hobbes’s natural condition, fear is not the motivator of this violence: the passion to be reckoned on is thumos as anger.

Aristotle is the other great influence on Hobbes’s state of nature metaphor, and once again it is Aristotle’s treatment of thumos that makes its way into Hobbes’s political philosophy. Aristotle, like Thucydides’ account of stasis, notes that thumos is roused more easily against friends and family than against strangers when we believe we have suffered a slight (Politics 1328a1). Unfortunately for politics, thumos is the source of rashness and the element of “ruling and freedom” (Politics 1328a6). Aristotle also judges the nations of Europe, Asia, and Greece on their ability to rule based on an investigation of thumos in each country (Politics 1327b25ff.). For Aristotle, studying the passions is the beginning of a cosmopolitan education. “The greatest and most important of all things” when giving political advice is to understand the different forms of constitution and ways of life associated with each, and therefore what each considers advantageous or disadvantageous (Rh. 1.8.1). The education in the passions—a political psychology in the true sense—coincides with
the comparative study of regimes and constitutions, or the ancient equivalent of international relations.

Despite his criticism of Aristotle in *Leviathan*, Hobbes remarks that Aristotle’s *On Rhetoric* is “something rare” because of its methodical treatment of the human passions. In that instance, Aristotle treats anger as the paradigmatic passion but uses two words to describe it: *orge* and *thumos*. Anger is a desire for revenge because of a “conspicuous slight” that was directed at oneself or those near to one (*Rh.* 2.1.1). A totally imaginary pleasure flows from this rage (*thumos*) when one dreams of retaliation (*Rh.* 2.2.2). Suffering insults, spite, belittlement, and so on, will all usher in this desire for revenge.² Yet again, violence results not from fear but from the hope and feeling of justice, and the desire to have one’s *thumotic* desires satisfied. Hobbes is right to say that fear is the rational passion because it moderates behaviour, but he underestimates the extent to which *thumos* in the form of anger, honor, and esteem refuses to be moderated. *Thumos* is the source of the violence and insecurity that we have come to associated with Hobbes’s natural condition and with the international anarchy (cf. Bull 1981). At least this much can be said for the implicit influence of *thumos* on the images that shaped the self-image of IR theory.

² It is worth remembering in this context that the original name of America’s Operation Enduring Freedom was Operation Infinite Justice.
D. From End to End

International Relations should be approached as contemporary political philosophy because it is in a particularly privileged place to critique established opinions and power relationships. Paradoxically, it is the very absence of a world government and the vestiges of international anarchy that create the conditions of possibility for thinking and doing a different kind of modern politics. Recall that Fukuyama claims we have reached the end of history because the question of the best government has only been settled at the domestic level with the answer: liberal democracy practicing universal recognition of dignity. We can take seriously Walker’s call to treat IR as political theory (1993; 2003) only if we are willing to leave behind the opinions about world politics that limit our ability to think about it. This search for a knowledge of IR phenomena, per se, is philosophy properly so called. Putting thumos at the centre of such a quest can place human beings back at the centre of the study of IR and begin the hard work of recasting the possibilities of IR as a discipline, with one such possibility being that it might not remain as a discipline at all.

In an article contemporaneous with Wight’s (1960) “Why is there no International Theory?”, Richard Cox (1962) argues that political philosophy has much to teach international relations, and international relations turns away from the tradition of political thought at its peril. To quote Cox:

[International relations theory] presupposes, in short, what is in question: the legitimacy of the decline of
political philosophy and its replacement by modern theory. Until that presupposition is treated with all the critical power and energy of application which we are today urged to expend on the creation of a theory of international relations—without knowing whether what we seek to do is possible—we are in grave danger of being the possessors not of knowledge, but only of the hollowed-out, dead shell of what we claim to have surpassed. (1962: 292)

Cox nowhere makes mention of Wight (1960), though he critiques the work of Stanley Hoffman, Paul Nitze, Morton Kaplan, Arnold Wolfers, John Herz, and so on. Yet, Cox addresses Wight’s thesis that there is no international theory because history (i.e. “modern theory”) informs international relations just as political philosophy informs domestic policy. Essentially, IR theory eschews the important theoretical questions by refusing to ask “the prior question whether such a theory is not a contradiction in terms” (Cox 1962: 262). Then, as now, debates about the status and substance of IR Theory eschewed the questions that occupied and occupy political philosophy. Brining *thumos* back in is the first step in reorienting IR theory towards political philosophy.

*Thumos* and its politics have been a constant and under-theorized companion to the story that IR has told about itself. Recognizing the politics of the spirit for what they are, and the germane nature to the questions that IR theory still seeks to answer, reduces the space between IR as a separate domain of political life. By building on the two major theoretical and philosophical interventions in IR that gave *thumos* and political spiritedness central importance, I have tried to indicate a way
forward for IR theory that will encourage it to face directly the political questions that only get oblique treatment when they are not ignored. It is too easy to miss the forest for the trees while critiquing Fukuyama’s apology for capitalist-democracy or glossing over the details of the claim that the “strong do what they can and the weak what they must.” *Thumos* has been excluded from the story that IR has told about itself, and continues to retell about itself with each new exercise in introspection. *Thumos* is at the heart of modern political philosophy and is the middling element that blurs any line between internal and external politics. *Thumos* is at the heart of the story that IR does not tell about itself, but should.
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