WHITE ANTIRACISM IN SOUTHERN ONTARIO:
FRAMES, PRAXIS AND AWARENESS
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FRAMES, PRAXIS AND AWARENESS

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TITLE: White Antiracism in Southern Ontario: Frames, Praxis and Awareness

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ABSTRACT

There has been an increase in reactionary racial violence in the past eight years following the presidency of Barack Obama, and in response to perceived threats to the racial and cultural order posed by movements for racial justice and the refugee crisis. Complicit to the spate of organized racial violence are passive white bystanders, who, through their inaction, have tolerated and given free reign to a resurgence of racial violence. Only a minority of whites have responded to calls for solidarity from Black, Indigenous and People of Color (BIPOC). This study set out to uncover how these minority of whites respond to racism.

Drawing on narratives and questionnaires of thirty-eight white persons, I begin with an exploration of the frames that shape participants’ understanding of antiracism. Three frames are discussed: the (a) equality and human rights frame, (b) anti-oppression frame, and (c) whiteness-centered frame.

The core of this study is on antiracism praxis. I discuss two categories of praxis: quotidian antiracism and organizational antiracism. In the former category are three types of antiracism strategies: (a) confrontation, (b) counterclaiming, and (c) covert and clandestine antiracism. The latter category consists of equality and equity focused strategies in education that I distinguish based on setting: (a) classroom antiracism and (b) administrative antiracism. This discussion is enriched by an investigation of the enablers and obstacles of antiracism and what respondents consider when deciding to engage in bystander action.

In conversation with Frankenberg’s (1993) ‘race-cognizance’ concept, I present a subsidiary antiracism awareness that I call self-implication cognizance. I detail five ways participants stop themselves from ‘racing to innocence’ by implicating themselves in the hegemonic order of whiteness.

This study contributes a typological model of frames and praxis and a situated picture of enablers of antiracism to the scholarship of white antiracism. It also offers insights for progressive whites and organizations interested in racial justice, equality and equity.

Subject keywords: antiracism, activism, whiteness, white racial identity, racial awareness, frames, enablers, obstacles, racism
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- the unceded territories of the Musqueam, Tsleil-Wautut, Squamish, and Stó:lō Nations, and
- the territory of the Tsawwassen Nation.

Antiracism work must (re)connect with its global and local anti-colonial histories.

Finally, the role of serendipity, grace and sheer perseverance cannot be underestimated.
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DECLARATION OF ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT

The following is a declaration that the contents of the empirical research in this document has been completed by Ismaël Traoré.
Chapter 1: Introduction

Can one be antiracist and white? Or is white about culture rather than color? Is “white” a way of saying “racist?” Does “white” mean democratic and egalitarian and courageous? Or the reverse?

~ Andrew Jakubowicz (2002, p. 123)

Movements such as Idle No More and Black Lives Matter have stimulated public debates about the responsibility of white (settler) persons in racial justice and decolonization movements. Many condemn the white passivity and indifference of the ‘silent majority’ and conditional, paternalistic and savior complex manifestations of white antiracism. As a result of these debates and the resurgence of white nationalism following the election of Donald Trump, there has been an increasing interest in antifascism.

Predominantly populated by white youth, the ‘antifa’ movement espouses a diffuse set of communist, socialist and anarchist tenets and advocates for mass opposition to a matrix of domination and street level protection of vulnerable communities from hate groups. To achieve these goals, antifa mobilizes everyday people, instead of entrusting

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1 “Savior complex” refers to an attitude common among many white people that they have the responsibility and capacity to improve the life of a person or community of color. Usually, this entails the white person feeling that people of color are incapable of helping themselves. The “superiority complex” refers to an attitude common among many white people that white people have better education, preparedness, and intelligence than people of color” (Tochluk, 2013, p. 2)

them to the state, court, or police. Despite this movement’s increasing role in mobilizing white communities, it only appeals to a certain contingent of white people and is one of many ways that antiracism manifests (Bonnett, 2000). Those not drawn to this sort of ‘high risk’ activism but who remain committed to racial justice may seek other avenues for praxis. It is the desire to know the varied ways that whites engage in racial justice that inspired this research project.

This study maps the antiracism frames and praxis of white persons in Southern Ontario cities and how they situate themselves in the struggle for racial justice. My research set out to answer how white persons understand and practice antiracism. In exploring white antiracism frames and praxis, I also discuss enablers and obstacles of praxis and the consequence of antiracism discourse for how respondents view themselves. I use a qualitative methodology informed by critical race theory (CRT) and symbolic interactionism (SI) to explore white participants’ antiracism frames and actions and to unearth the social processes of antiracism praxis within their lives. Though I present variations in the framing and practicing of antiracism, there are threads of sameness suggesting that as antiracism shapes its social environment it is simultaneously shaped by it.

In this chapter, I explain the need for research on white antiracism, review key directions and strands in white antiracism scholarship, present a helpful ‘conveyor belt’ analogy on white antiracism, and conclude with an outline of the dissertation and definitions of key words. The underlying purpose is to situate this study in its relevant literature and identify underexplored areas in the scholarship that I hope to strengthen.
Antiracism: A Neglected Field

Much has been written about the pervasive and destructive nature of racism, but less has been written about the best ways to combat it.

~ Pedersen, Walker & Wise (2005, p. 20)

Scholars have neglected antiracism as an area of research. Eleven years after Pedersen et al.’s above quote, Paradies (2016) makes the same observation: “although numerous scholars have studied various aspects of race, racialization, and racism, relatively few have centred their work on anti-racism” (p. 1). Within sociology, Hughey (2009 & 2010) alludes to the existence of a cultural-sociology of white antiracism. Yet, indicators of the existence of an established sociology of antiracism, let alone of white antiracism, are absent. Besides Brown’s (2017) article, which uses ‘sociology of antiracism’ in its title, to my knowing, no handbook, encyclopedia, popular conference, or identifiable body of work with clear-cut tenets designating the explicit establishment of a sociology of antiracism exists (Niemonen, 2007). Though a body of work shares assumptions with macro-sociology and critical race theory (see Dei, 1993, 1999, 2008), the extant scholarship is heavily interdisciplinary, with scholars stemming predominantly from education, history, psychology, anthropology, social psychology, philosophy, sociology and the general social sciences.

Niemonen (2007) echoes this observation about antiracism education, which is the leading field of interest within antiracism: “A critical assessment of [160 peer-reviewed papers] concludes that antiracist education is not a sociologically grounded, empirically based account of the significance of race in American society. Rather, it is a morally based educational reform movement that embodies the confessional and redemptive modes common in evangelical Protestantism” (p. 159). The first part of the critique is applicable to Canadian antiracism research. To what extent it is ‘confessional’ and ‘redemptive’ is an empirical and arguably a perception matter.
Equally troubling, and marking the entry point of this study’s contribution, is the empirical shortage populating this already sparse research area. Hughey (2009) observes that “[o]nly a handful of empirical studies attempt to map the field of white antiracism” (p. 925). Indeed, white antiracism research is predominately prescriptive (advising whites, educators, and organizations what they ought to do) and theoretical or conceptual (defining its boundaries, meanings, assumptions, tenets, and importance). The few empirical studies in this area are primarily self-reflective (essays on an author’s race-cognizance awakening) and retrospective (biographical accounts of the lives, thoughts and actions of white antiracists). It is surprising that until O’Brien’s (1999) thesis, there had been “no published empirical investigation which focuses solely on contemporary white antiracists” (emphasis added, p. 4). Empirical studies have since then slowly appeared. Yet, thirteen years later, Case (2012) too finds that “despite attempts by critical white studies scholars to offer some description of what white anti-racism looks like, little research is based on White anti-racist activists’ own words” (p. 80). This study contributes empirically to the scarce existing research on contemporary white antiracism.

**White Antiracism: A Needed Alternative Model**

The suppression of white anti-racist activism, the erasure of stories of ‘race traitors,’ has been one of white supremacy’s most powerful tools for maintaining and sustaining white supremacy.

~ Sally Noland Nichol (2004, p. 196)

Scholars have made a case for investigating white antiracism. Nichol’s quote offers a strong stance on the matter. Evoking images of intentional suppression, she argues that several shortcomings result from the systematic erasure of white antiracist
activism: it keeps white people stuck in racial myths, secrets and silences; renders them politically paralytic and morally ambivalent; inculcates incompetency and wishful thinking in racial justice; and stifles imaginations of white identities unbound by domination, exploitation, and superiority. The obfuscation of white antiracism also encourages a bleak notion that racism is innate to whites and thus virtually immutable.

Janet Helms (1990) criticizes the double-standard of researchers and practitioners who consider as cause for alarm the psychosocial effects of racism on Black individuals (e.g., internalized racism and self-hate) yet fail to show similar panic about its negative costs in white persons (p. 50). Her popular and widely used empirically-driven white racial identity development (WRID) model argues that, generally, white people absorb racial biases and have unhealthy coping mechanisms to racism. Beneficiaries of systematic racial privilege perform numerous psychological contortions to ignore, deny or minimize racism and its implications, and may even aggress against real or perceived changes to the racial order (Helms, 1993, p. 241). Helms developed WRID theory to urge counselling interventions for whites expressing unhealthy racial identity attributes and to make more visible exemplars of healthy white racial identity. The latter is particularly important considering that high-profile antiracist role models can inspire bystander action (Paradies, 2005, p. 10).

Tatum (1994) argues that the historical amnesia of white antiracism activism impedes white students (and racialized students) to think beyond a white identity deficiency model and resolve inhibiting feelings about racism (e.g., guilt, overwhelm,
despondency, and anger). She identifies three models of white identity in critical
whiteness studies: the “actively racist, white supremacist” model, the “what whiteness?”
or colorblind model, and the immobilizing “white guilt” model. She argues that:

None of these three models of whiteness is attractive to the white individual
struggling to define a positive sense of whiteness. Such an individual may feel that
he or she is ‘re-inventing the wheel,’ and may retreat in frustration to [a less
mature] stage of racial identity development. However, this frustration might be
avoided if another, more positive model were readily available. (Tatum, 1994, p. 471)

Tatum is not the first to consider the consequential limitations of these three models.

Using stronger language, Kowal (2011) argues that critical whiteness studies excessively
associates ‘whiteness’ with somber characteristics including imperialism, colonisation,
dominance, and supremacy (p. 318). Similarly, Bonnett (1996 & 1997) bemoans the
manner that whiteness is predominately constructed in orthodox antiracism discourses
(see also Hartigan, 2000). Though anti-essentialism is a tenet of critical race theories and
the above-mentioned models accurately reflect a mass of white persons, antiracism
discourse tends to ignore historical geographies of whiteness as a variable, diverse and
socially constructed category. Bonnett (1996) believes the scholarship risks reifying
whiteness as “a ‘racial’ group characterized by its moral failings” (p. 102) and “a static,

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4 Tatum (1994) notes that most people can name nationally known groups or persons
described as racist, but she asks us to: “think now of a nationally known white person you
would consider to be an antiracist activist, a white man or woman who is clearly
identifiable as an ally to people of color in the struggle against racism. Do you find
yourself drawing a blank?... If we add the qualifier “still living,” who comes to mind? If
you have managed to think of someone who fits this description, notice that it probably
took significantly longer to come up with an answer to this question than it did to the
first” (p. 463).
ahistorical, aspatial ‘thing’: something set outside social change, something central and permanent” (p. 98).

These scholars propose a complementary or alternative model of whiteness; one based on a history of white protests against racism. Like Philomena Essed (2001), Tatum (1994) argues that such a model would encourage whites to interrupt their racist socialization, have a renewed sense of hope, and become proactive against racial oppression. She argues that even “allies need allies, others who will support their efforts to swim against the tide of cultural and institutional racism” (p. 472) and not succumb to the separation and isolation capitalism inculcates, which, in turn, hampers efforts at collective racial justice organizing.

This study is an attempt at empirically contributing to calls for alternative models of whiteness as a social identity and practice. Above, I mentioned the thematic, empirical, and social need for researching antiracism and, more specifically, white antiracism. Below, I focus on the literature on white antiracism that this study is situated in and identify interrogations about antiracism action as an underexplored area.

5 “It is equally relevant to make visible the many positive examples, of teachers, journalists, politicians, employers, colleagues, neighbours and others who are sensitive to issues of injustice and whose behaviors contribute to creating a [world] where diversity is not a problem but a fact of life and a potential source of enrichment” (Essed, 2001, p. 499).
Literature Review on White Antiracism

Conceptualizing Antiracism

Antiracism is a poorly defined concept (Essed, 2001, p. 496). O’Brien (2007) observes a lack of well-developed typology of antiracist theory and praxis in the social sciences (p. 427). Bonnett (2000) complicates efforts at defining antiracism when he argues that antiracism is not reducible to the inverse of racism, particularly because antiracist actors also deploy racism (p. 2 & p. 9). Moreover, as Paradies (2016) notes, one person’s conception of antiracism may be another’s conception of racism (p. 3).

Further complicating conceptual affairs, Brown (2017) maintains there is an irreconcilable difference between white people’s and racial subaltern’s antiracism. The former, she argues, “fails to secure liberation from White supremacy as its orientation is toward equality within existing systems rather than a disinvestment” (p. 2). In contrast, subordinate group antiracism is oriented towards disinvestment from hegemonic whiteness, defined as “the configuration of practices the dominant group uses to give legitimacy to White supremacy” (ibid, p. 3). Distinguishing white and BIPOC antiracism using ‘investment and disinvestment to the existing system’ is questionable considering that ‘bootstrapping’ is a practice racial subalterns such as Booker T. Washington have advocated and helped legitimate. Notwithstanding intra-racial variability in antiracism praxis, white and BIPOC antiracism differ along various other dimensions. Drawing from her study, O’Brien (2001) observes that:

6 The bootstrap narrative/myth is the belief that if anyone works hard enough and takes personal responsibility for their life they can achieve anything they set their mind to.
Since whites are in a very different position [than persons of color], it is not likely that their actions will be identical. Because whites are not the targets of the racism they are challenging as antiracists, the opportunities for action available to them are quite different. Although they also can directly challenge a discriminatory act against a person of color that they witness, they additionally can be present when whites commit racist speech and actions they would do in the company of other whites only—an arena to which people of color do not have access. However, they are less likely to face the accusations of bias and oversensitivity that people of color face when pointing out racism to other whites. Whites may also be less likely to retaliate by calling a white person who confronts them ‘racist’ because they are addressing a member of their race. (p. 67)

How antiracism should be conceptualized is also taken up by Bonita Lawrence and Enakshi Dua (2005). They critique antiracism theory and practice for failing to consider the ongoing Canadian colonial project. Antiracism scholars, they argue, rarely put ‘returning the land’ on their agenda (p. 125). Instead, they legitimize settler colonialism by naturalizing the erasure of Indigenous land dispossession and depicting Indigenous persons as having a similar relationship to the Canadian State as other racial minority groups.

Despite these varied conceptual debates, Hage (2016) introduces a basic 6-part typology of antiracism based on the multiple functions antiracism accomplishes.

Antiracism refers to activities that:

1. Reduce the practice of interpersonal, cultural, and institutional racism,
2. Foster a non-racist culture that prevents people from developing racist attitudes and practices in the first place,
3. Support the targets or survivors of racism,
4. Empower negatively racialized persons and groups to become more autonomous and resistant,
5. Transform racist relations into non-racist relations and offer an alternative to dominant racist relations, and
6. Foster a radical indifference to ‘race’; a culture in which ‘race’ is not a meaningful marker for identification.
O’Brien (2009) loosely describes antiracism as “any theory and/or practice (whether political or personal) that seeks to challenge, reduce, or eliminate manifestations of racism in society” (p. 501). Bonnett (2000) proposes a similar definition, but replaces “challenge, reduce, and eliminate” with “confront, eradicate and/or ameliorate” (p. 3). He lists six types of antiracism based on the manifestations of racism it opposes rather than its functions:

1. Everyday antiracism: “opposition to racial inequality that forms part of everyday popular culture”
2. Multicultural antiracism: “the affirmation of multicultural diversity as a way of engaging racism”
3. Psychological antiracism: “the identification and challenging of racism within structures of individual and collective consciousness”
4. Radical antiracism: “the identification and challenging of structures of socio-economic power and privilege that foster and reproduce racism”
5. Anti-Nazi and anti-fascist antiracism: the street level “confrontation of ultra-right wing groups who adhere to elements of Nazi” and of “anti-working-class politics”
6. Representational antiracism: “the policy and practice of seeking to [make] organizations representative of the ‘wider community’ and, therefore, actively favouring the entry and promotion of previously excluded races” (p. 88 & 112).

While conceptualizing antiracism remains a concern for some scholars (see Kowal, Franklin, & Paradies, 2013; Blakeney, 2005), others embed or ground definitional and conceptual issues in the lives of real people and provide empirical research on different facets of white antiracism. Below, I survey key strands in the extant empirical white antiracism scholarship and highlight its neglect of the antiracism praxis of contemporary persons.

**Researching White Antiracism**

Existing research on white antiracism predominantly consists of the following strands.
1. **White Antiracist Social Movements and Organizations:**

Marxist historian Aptheker’s (1992) investigation of 200 years-worth of white antiracism activism in the U.S. (1600s to 1860s) is a classic example of this strand. His book challenges the prevailing notion that poor whites were universally or the most racist. Evidence suggests instead that working class white antiracism has historically been more prevalent than middle- or upper-class white antiracism. Aptheker rekindles the memory of John Brown, memorialized by W.E.B. DuBois, and other white southerners who objected to slavery. He raises questions, however, when he argues that consensual white-black interracial sexual relations were a form of antiracism resistance against anti-miscegenation laws (see Denis, 2015). We are yet again left to wonder about the concept and criteria of antiracism.

Another popular work in this area is Hughey’s (2012) comparative study of a white nationalist and a white antiracist organization. Hughey is not interested in frames or action as he is in exploring the present-day meanings of whiteness and racism deployed in the two organizations and their respective movements. His principal finding is that contrary to popular notions, these mirror political organizations rely on similar racist rhetoric about ‘race’ to recreate a collective white racial identity predicated on a sense of group superiority. For example, he finds that they both use a narrative of black pathology to, respectively, advocate segregation or consider themselves “as a kind of messianic ‘white savior’ to people of color” (p. 187).
2. **Biographies on the Lives of White Antiracists:**

A latent preoccupation in studies on antiracist organizations “is to distinguish the ‘real’ antiracism from the rest” (O’Brien, 2009, p. 501). Rather than debating criteria of a ‘true versus false’ antiracism, the most popular strand of empirical research consists of rich descriptions of various facets of the lives of white antiracists.

Inspired by the works of Janet Helms and Beverly Tatum, educator Boyd’s (2015) recent book, *White Allies in the Struggle for Racial Justice*, consists of 17 biographies of white persons who resisted the seduction—the psychological and material wage—of white power. They joined various antiracism movements including the abolitionist and underground railroad movement, the desegregation movement, and the civil rights movement. Most of the persons profiled are deceased, four are contemporary figures such as Tim Wise. Boyd offers an interesting distinction between **antiracist activists** and **racial justice activists**. The former fight against racism, the latter seek to build, in Dr. King’s words, the ‘Beloved Community’. Both, however, are best understood as orientations that any individual can use based on their immediate situation. In this manuscript, I use these terms interchangeably. Boyd offers several examples of cross-racial antiracism alliances and useful advice on effective white allyship.

The earliest figure profiled in Boyd’s work existed in the early 1700s—Quaker abolitionist John Woolman. Sociologist Thompson’s (2001) history of white antiracist activism covers the period of the 1950s to the early twenty-first century. Thompson interviews 39 white antiracist/racial justice activists who stem from a number of social movements including the anti-war movement, second wave feminism, and prison
abolitionism. Along the way, she offers examples of private and public antiracism activism and details the conflicts, successes, and failures of white antiracism history.

Educator-historian Cynthia Brown (2002) tells the stories of 4 white allies, traversing the 1930s to the early twenty-first century. Like other scholars in this strand of the scholarship, the motivation behind Refusing Racism: Whites Allies and the Struggle for Civil Rights is to respond to the dearth of available and accessible white antiracist role models. Of particular interest in this book is the discussion on the costs that befell upon these activists, including exile, job and home loss, loss of friendships and clients, poverty, and jail time. The racial justice activists did not experience these losses as overwhelming, however, for of greater value to them is freedom from racism and its consequences. They see antiracism as central to their own personal wellbeing as it is to racialized people.

Sociologist Mark Warren’s Fire in the Heart: How White Activists Embrace Racial Justice (2010) is based on interviews with 50 respondents. In explaining the design of his study he writes that “much new scholarship on race concerns itself with what white people think or how they identify themselves. I take a different approach. I start with action” (p. 9). Instead of a study on antiracism praxis, however, by ‘a different approach’ Warren means his participants are actively involved in antiracism as opposed to being inactive despite believing in racial justice. The latter is at times defined as non-racism/non-racist and is differentiated from the antiracist who not only believes but is also active in racial justice. This book focuses heavily on the factors that led his participants to commit to antiracism. Warren discusses three key determinants: direct
exposure to racial injustice, interracial relationships that spurred a redefinition of who counts as in-group and out-group, and moral visions for a just society.

Last but not least, Cooper, Schaefer and Brod (2003) interview and recount the experiences of 35 white men who fluctuate in their success to live a racially just life. Instead of a descriptive exploration like the above presented works, this is a reflective book on various issues relating to racism, antiracism and, generally, ‘race’. Thematically, the authors cover admissions of gaffes and blind spots, limitations of antiracism strategies, accomplishments and victories, and pivotal and gradual events that stimulated activism. There is no set question tying the 35 stories but a general motivation to explore antiracism among white men. The focus on men is two-fold: white men have been at the frontier of racism and the overwhelming number of respondents in white antiracism research are women.

Though examples of antiracism actions are at times encountered in this strand of research, they remain mainly descriptive, reflective, prescriptive, and atheoretical. A concentrated analysis on antiracism action is needed. Unfortunately, in the next strand, antiracism action remains a secondary, if not tertiary, concern.

3. The Development of a White Antiracist Identity:

Overshadowing inquiries on antiracist action are matters pertaining to antiracist identity. White racial identity development (WRID) theory is one of the most empirically

7 Though not an empirical study, the following book also follows the tradition of white antiracists reflecting on various aspect of their journey and efforts: Moore, Penick-Parks, & Michael. (2015). Everyday White People Confront Racial and Social Injustice: 15 Stories.
studied topics that moderately touches upon white antiracism. It should not be confused with white *ethnic* identity research common in 20th century sociology (see Thomas & Znaniecki, 1974). Primarily couched in counselling psychology and emerging in the early 1980s with the works of Janet Helms, this field examines the varied ways whites perceive themselves as or identify with being white (as opposed to, say, ‘Anglo’, which is an ethnic designation).

The overwhelming majority of research rely on quantitative methods and survey instruments. The result is the existence of various typologies of white identity. Helms proposes a series of racial identity stages or statuses that whites may develop. Which racial identity status is dominant in an individual depends on the extent to which they have internalized ‘racism’ and resolved issues related to racism and ‘race’. In Helms’ model, white racial identity development begins with the ‘contact’ status. It is primarily characterized as being oblivious to or in denial of being white, of having white privilege, and of racism. The model culminates with the ‘autonomy’ status, characterized as the presence of a mature awareness of what it means to be white, the internalization of a humanistic nonracist white identity, and a strong commitment to antiracism (see Ponterotto, Utsey & Pederson, 2006; McDermott & Samson, 2005; Quintana, 2007). My study is inspired by WRID theory because it goes beyond a simplistic and binary ‘racist’ vs. ‘nonracist’ portrayal of white identity. Helms’ model describes six racial identity statuses and offers an exemplar of a healthy and racially conscious white identity. Malott et al. (2015) observe, however, that unlike the first five statuses in Helms’ model, there is an absence of empirical evidence behind the autonomy status, thus “limit[ing]
understanding and insight into the essence of an antiracist White identity” (p. 334). The autonomy construct in Helms’ model draws heavily from (auto)biographies of white antiracists as opposed to the survey instruments and quantitative methods used to generate the other statuses. This lack of methodological uniformity owes to the fact that white persons expressing ‘autonomy’ racial identity attributes are rare to find, hence the need to draw upon (auto)biographies of the few whites who show such attributes.

Though relevant for my study, this scholarship focuses on racial identity and its cognitive and affective qualities. Scarce attention is given to behavioral attributes, particularly, antiracism praxis. Below, I present the few empirical studies that touch on white antiracism action. O’Brien (2001) offers a robust description and analysis in this strand of the scholarship.

4. **Doing Antiracism while White:**

Besides O’Brien’s (2001) book, the identified empirical studies on white antiracism action are all articles. They discuss praxis as one theme among multiple other themes thus are limited in depth, scope and analysis. Smith and Redington (2010) do not offer much by way of the strategies of their 18 white antiracist respondents. Their finding on action is virtually limited to the following quotes and examples of praxis: “action through leadership roles, such as organizing programs and demonstrations or developing and implementing antiracist activities”; “ongoing membership and active engagement with committees and antiracist organizations”; and, finally, “conscious, purposeful communication about racism in daily life. These communications included ‘calling out
the truth about White privilege’… as well as articulations of alliance with people of color” (p. 544).

Matlock and DiAngelo (2015) observe inconsistency between white parents who identity as antiracist and their actual parenting practices. Though parents convey their awareness of racism and privilege to their children, they rarely model antiracist action, whether in regards to books, toys and media exposure, which neighborhood to reside in and school to enrol their children, and extra-curriculum activities. In short, their racial awareness does not translate into praxis and inform life decisions. Instead, it is predominately kept separate from their domestic sphere.

Patton and Bondi (2015) examine the complexities of allyship of white male faculty and administrators. Their short and largely descriptive finding section on ‘ally work’ includes examples such as challenging the status quo in the classroom (e.g., curriculum topics, teaching style, and general pedagogy frame); conducting research that disrupts the status quo; advocating for institutional policies (e.g., providing leadership opportunities to scholars of color, making a case for standardized test scores to be a tertiary consideration for student admission, and diversity hiring); and helping racially marginalized students (e.g., mentoring, sponsoring career interests, and listening to and acknowledging their racialized hardships).

Case (2012) interviewed and observed 21 members of a group called White Women Against Racism (WWAR). Respondents critiqued the traditional notion of antiracism activism as limited to rallies, protests, and boycotts. Though some have

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8 See Hagerman (2017) and Twine (1999) who also research white antiracist parenting.
attended racial justice marches and demonstrations, their most common type of antiracism action is in the everyday, such as: confronting or speaking up to family members, intervening when a store employee disregards a racialized customer, and teaching students about racism (p. 87). Like the above articles, with Patton and Bondi’s (2015) being an exception, Case (2012) does not sufficiently and clearly tease apart and flush out respondents’ antiracism praxis. Furthermore, the examples of praxis she provides are not grouped into an antiracism classification system; not even the basic individual vs. institutional antiracism typology.

Despite their limitations, the above studies offer pointers about the nature of white antiracist praxis. To date, O’Brien’s (2001) study is the most focused empirical examination on white antiracism behavior. For this reason, my research is particularly in conversation with hers.

O’Brien examined two white antiracist organizations: the Anti-Racist Action (ARA) and the People’s Institute for Survival and Beyond (PI). She interviewed 30 participants, 15 of whom are either ARA or PI members. Her findings begin with an exploration of how respondents became antiracists. Most owe it to “approximating experiences”—experiences that increased their sensitivity to racism, such as learning about racism through their BIPOC intimate partner or witnessing racism firsthand. She then investigates the organizational interpretive frames of ARA and PI on ‘race’ and racism and observes that they inform how their members conceptualize antiracism.

“Framing basically refers to how movement actors develop shared understandings of what their goals are and how to achieve them. The concept is an attempt at incorporating
interpretive sociology into social movement theory” (O’Brien, 1999, p. 9). Surprisingly, there is not much of a difference between the organizations’ frames. The key distinction concerns if and which dimensions of colorblindness/color-evasiveness they adopt. In a move unseen before in the scholarship, O’Brien distinguishes three dimensions of colorblindness: a) blindness to institutional racism, b) to the ‘race’ of persons of color, and b) to one’s own ‘race’ as white.

The PI group rejects all dimensions of colorblindness; considering it incompatible with antiracism. This frame O’Brien calls **reflexive race-cognizance** (RRC). RRC participants “are thoroughly reflective about their own positions of whiteness and their role in racism” (O’Brien, 2001, p. 56). They argue that the problem of racism is ‘white people and the institutional power they hold’ (ibid, p. 57). The ARA group espouses a **selective race-cognizance** (SRC) that is colorblind on the last two dimensions. ARA respondents do not see an incompatibility between colorblindness and antiracist action. Though “they recognize the institutional structure of racism and the historical and contemporary advantage that has been given to whites, [they] fail to reflect on themselves as whites and others as people of color in any meaningful way” (ibid, p. 57). In fact, they believe non-colorblind discriminating others perpetuate racism. Thus, rather than defining racism as a ‘white people’s problem,’ they see it as “overt and out there”, thus creating a dichotomy of ‘we/antiracist = good’ and ‘them/racist = bad’. Reflective race-cognizance eschews such a dichotomy, arguing that ‘we’, as in white people, are also part of the problem. Surprisingly, though the ARA is colorblind on two dimensions, they are more ‘out there’ action-oriented than the PI group.
O’Brien’s findings on antiracism describe individual and institutional antiracism strategies. **Individual antiracism** consists predominantly of ‘interrupting racism’. This refers to challenging everyday racist comments of other whites. Participants variably called this action ‘political discussion’, ‘preaching to other white people’, and ‘interrupting white business-as-usual’. Some manifestations of interruptions were defiant, including profanity, others appealed to “overlapping approximations”—to the agent’s own minority status (e.g., gender, sexuality, or ethnicity) in order to help them see their racial prejudice and understand racism. Others chose to articulate their appreciation for diversity to interrupt racism instead.

Another individual strategy is ‘strategic confrontation and privileged resistance’. It is unclear why O’Brien (2001) considers these as examples of antiracism as opposed to, respectively, an interpretive process, and the role of racial membership in antiracism praxis. Regardless, ‘strategic confrontation’ refers to evaluations about when, how, and if to confront an act of individual racism. It consists of “assessing the situation and deciding which response would be the most effective in terms of getting someone’s ideas to change” (p. 71) and “taking the setting into account and formulating the most fitting response given that information” (p. 72). By ‘privileged resistance’, O’Brien is referring to the decreased personal repercussions whites experience in confronting racism compared to racial subalterns. Phrased differently, it refers to the “larger variety of socially acceptable responses that white antiracists can practice without

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9 Hogan and Netzer (as cited in O’Brien, 2001) define this as the process: “whereby whites empathize with the pain of racism by relating their own analogous experiences of oppression—these could be women, lower class whites, gay/lesbian/bisexual/transgender (GLBT) whites, Jewish whites, or even those who had experienced sexual abuse” (p. 25).
as much risk stigma” (p. 107). It is an acknowledgement that “one’s race affects one’s credibility and effectiveness when challenging racism” (p. 104).

**Institutional antiracism** in O’Brien’s study refers to efforts at making institutional changes or using institutions to make changes. Within the setting of education, O’Brien lists the following strategies: informing authorities about incidents of racism, using one’s position as instructor to interrupt children’s racism and educate them on the subject, including racism in the curriculum, instituting a multicultural arts program, and challenging a fraternity’s racist paraphernalia. In the community, institutional antiracism takes the form of organizing press conferences to speak out against white racism and organizing with antiracist organizations. Examples of the latter include activities such as tabling, collaborating with Copwatch to litigate against police brutality, protesting, publishing an antiracist newsletter, compiling newspaper articles on racism and antiracism, and networking with other people to build antiracist communities by organizing national conferences, taking trips to schools, supporting antiracists in other communities, organizing workshops for young people, and countering historical amnesia by recovering the history and legacy of white antiracist/racial justice activists. In closing her chapter on antiracist strategies, O’Brien (1999) reiterates that her study “represents the first attempt made in social science literature to classify and categorize antiracist action in the same way that racist action, or discrimination, has been categorized” (p. 119).

My study investigates antiracism praxis and complements but differs O’Brien’s in a number of ways. The following items prefigure my areas of contribution to the
scholarship. **First**, the frames I present and explore are primarily derived from respondents’ accounts on *antiracism*. O’Brien’s antiracism frames are, ironically, primarily informed by participants’ statements on ‘race’ and racism. Though what participants say about the latter subjects help elucidate my antiracism frames, the material informing the foundation and construction of these frames stems mainly from respondents’ remarks on antiracism. **Second**, O’Brien limits her analysis of frames to two organizations and the 15 participants who are their members. My frames are not limited to persons who belong to a well-defined antiracist collective. They reflect the voices of all respondents. Succinctly put, they are ‘global frames’ instead of solely ‘social movement or social organization frames’. Participants’ global frames are informed by various sources, including social movements, scholarly traditions, and popular discourses about equality and justice. **Third**, O’Brien’s presentation of her participants’ antiracism actions was unfortunately uneven. She offers more description and examples of individual antiracism than institutional antiracism. In fact, most of her examples of institutional antiracism are not even fully developed into a paragraph. This portion of her findings presents more as a listing of respondents’ antiracism actions rather than a systematic analysis. My study complements O’Brien’s research by delving more deeply into what respondents have to say about doing antiracism. While O’Brien scantly differentiates between ‘confrontation’ and ‘challenging’ responses to everyday racism, I tease out antiracism strategies more carefully and mention key criteria that differentiate types of antiracism. **Fourth**, like other scholars (see Stewart, Pedersen & Paradies, 2014, Denevi & Pastan, 2006; Smith & Redington, 2010), O’Brien examines the obstacles of antiracism
praxis. Only in passing does she explore facilitators or enablers of antiracism. My focus is the reverse; I examine the social and psychological factors that enable or, at least, disinhibit antiracist praxis, and explore obstacles as a secondary concern.

In concluding this literature review, I reiterate the gaps and underexplored research areas my study fills and strengthens.

**Gaps and Underexplored Research Areas**

Antiracism is a neglected and empirically wanting area of research. This is particularly worrisome considering the recent public resurgence of white supremacy racism, which has many whites asking what they ought to do and who they ought to be, racially. Within the interdisciplinary scholarship on antiracism, whiteness is predominantly depicted through a deficiency discourse or lens. As legitimate as said discourse is, it risks reifying and essentializing whiteness, over-defining it by its moral failings, paying scant attention to historical geographies of whiteness, and stalling white readers from commencing the lifelong work of resocializing themselves based on a more humane and racial justice oriented white racial model. Conceptual concerns about antiracism aside, the call for alternative models of whiteness has led to the appearance of a number of research on white antiracist social movements and organizations, biographies on the lives of white antiracists, and white racial identity development. Exceptionally scant is the attention given to antiracism action and its enablers. Furthermore, to my knowing, no study on white antiracism in Canada exists\(^\text{10}\).

\(^\text{10}\) For non-empirical, non-academic but relevant reflective and prescriptive pieces see (a) Sheila Wilmot (2005) *Taking Responsibility, Taking Directions: White Anti-Racism*
This research explores and explains the antiracism frames and praxis of white persons in Southern Ontario cities. In light of existing research on obstacles, I examine in depth the enablers of antiracism praxis, and the consequences of antiracism for how respondents reflect upon themselves. Participants predominately describe antiracism as an action. It is evident however that antiracism also entails a project on the self; on one’s identity. While studies have paved the way in exploring how settlers in Canada understand and, to a limited degree, practice reconciliation and settler allyship (Denis & Bailey, 2016; Hunt & Holmes, 2015; Davis, 2010; Davis et al., 2016, Regan, 2010), this study is the first to research in depth the antiracism frames and praxis of white persons in Canada.

Below I offer an analogy by Tatum (1997) to visually represent three broad orientations whites have towards racial stratification. Following that, I offer a map of the sections covered in the thesis and define key terminologies used throughout this manuscript.

**The Conveyor Belt Model**

To various degrees, all white people are beneficiaries of settler colonial racism. Beneficiaries have three general deportments or stances to the question of racism.

Tatum’s (1997) analogy of racism as the structure and natural flow of a conveyor belt and white people’s behavior on this belt powerfully captures the three stances:

Because racism is so ingrained in the fabric of [North] American institutions, it is easily self-perpetuating. All that is required to maintain it is business-as-usual. I

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sometimes visualize the ongoing cycle of racism as a moving walkway at the airport. **Active racist behavior** is equivalent to walking fast on the conveyor belt. The person engaged in active racist behavior has identified with the ideology of White supremacy and is moving with it. **Passive racist behavior** is equivalent to standing still on the walkway. No overt effort is being made, but the conveyor belt moves the bystanders along to the same destination as those who are actively walking. Some of the bystanders may feel the motion of the conveyor belt, see the active racists ahead of them, and choose to turn around, unwilling to go to the same destination as the White supremacists. But unless they are walking actively in the opposite direction at a speed faster than the conveyor belt—unless they are **actively antiracist**—they will find themselves carried along with the others. So, not all Whites are actively racist. Many are passively racist. Some, though not enough, are actively antiracist. (pp. 11-12)

The **hegemonic order of whiteness** that pervades the Occident affords plenty of opportunities, in fact, actively pressures **toubabs** to reinvest in the order by simply, using the above analogy, standing still on the conveyor belt or, non-figuratively speaking, adopting a **dysconscious ideology** that sustains the racial order. Bonilla Silva (2006) calls this ideology **colorblind racism**. It functions to preserve in-group solidarity and interests and to rationalize and legitimize a system of racial stratification:

This ideology, which acquired cohesiveness and dominance in the late 1960s, explains contemporary racial inequality as the outcome of nonracial dynamics. Whereas Jim Crow racism explained blacks’ social standing as the result of their biological and moral inferiority, color-blind racism avoids such facile arguments. Instead, whites rationalize minorities’ contemporary status as the product of a) market dynamics, b) naturally occurring phenomena, and c) blacks’ imputed cultural limitations. (*alphabets added*, p. 3)

White people have opportunities aplenty to ‘stand still’ (to be complicit) and walk with (to be active agents of) the current of the conveyor belt because the hegemonic order of whiteness constantly beckons them to in-group solidarity. This study examines the few antiracist bystanders that are walking, if not running, in the opposite direction of the conveyor belt.
Outline of Thesis Chapters

In the next chapter, I present the theoretical discussions that informed my analysis. I draw from critical race theory (CRT) and symbolic interactionism (SI). The former is sensitive to the structural nature of the racial order, and the latter to processes of meaning-making, interpretations and situational factors. The methodology chapter describes the qualitative research tradition and constructivist epistemology informing my study, how I collected and analyzed my data, and profiles the participants in this study. A biography of respondents is offered in order to foreground the embodied and lived reality of antiracism and give readers a sense of the key life events and conditions that explain participants’ antiracism identity development.

The findings section consists of four chapters. The first begins by introducing respondents’ conceptualization of antiracism as primarily action or praxis rather than a personality or character trait. It then describes and explores three action-based frames participants use to articulate their understanding of antiracism: the equality and human rights frame, the anti-oppression frame, and the whiteness frame. This chapter is informed by symbolic interactionism’s (SI) emphasis on entering the world of meanings of respondents. Critical race theory’s (CRT) influence is present to the extent that its critique of conventional civil rights discourse on ‘race’, racism, and equality helps illuminate the popular narratives about equality that people may draw upon to make sense of how to address racism in the post-civil rights, 21st century. I put aside, however, as much CRT based assumptions as possible in order to allow participants’ own voices to inform the construction of the frames.
The **second and third chapters** describe and explain, respectively, varied examples of quotidian antiracism and organizational antiracism. The former details confronting, counterclaiming, covert and clandestine antiracism strategies. The latter chapter offers examples of organizational antiracism in education, which I subdivide based on their setting: antiracism in the classroom and antiracism in an administrative capacity. To flush out the data and move beyond a descriptive account of strategies, an additional theme is investigated. I explore factors that influence participants’ decision to do antiracism. More specifically, I identify enablers and, as a secondary concern, key obstacles participants encounter in antiracism praxis. Interestingly, enablers are mainly situational and structural in nature as opposed to psychological. Antiracism is portrayed as a transgressive act that shapes its social environment as it is simultaneously shaped by it. It is a fluid, penetrable, amendable, responsive and active social process that is embedded in and receptive to its social environment. The second and third chapters reflect George Herbert Mead’s and Herbert Blumer’s depiction of human action as interpretive and transactional. These founders of SI see society’s social structure (i.e., institutions, social groups, statuses, and roles) as generated from joint actions in micro-situations. CRT better accounts for the obdurate, covert, and business-as-usual characteristic of contemporary structural racism. Its strength in elucidating the racial order thus underlies the third chapter on organizational antiracism.

The **fourth** chapter shifts from action to a social-psychological exploration of participants’ self-views. It examines how participants, using an antiracism lens, reflect upon themselves as racialized subjects in a racially stratified society. Antiracism
discourse suggests behavioral etiquettes but also how white persons are implicated in the hegemonic order of whiteness. This chapter describes five dimensions of self-implication—five ways that participants implicate themselves in racism and antiracism: white privilege, racial bias, complicity, cultural/racial illiteracy, and awareness of the negative costs of racism on white persons.

The dissertation culminates with a conclusion chapter. I recap key findings, elaborate upon my contributions to the scholarship on white antiracism, discuss limits to this research, and end with directions for future research. In the following section I define key terms used throughout this manuscript.

**Key Terms and Definitions**

**Dysconscious**: not to be confused with unconscious, King (1991) defines dysconscious as uncritical mental processes (such as assumptions, beliefs attitudes and perceptions) that justify inequities by accepting the existing order as normal and fair even if unjust in consequence. Dysconsciousness shapes the identity and distorts the consciousness and agency of its beholder.

**Dysconscious racism**: following the above, dysconscious racism is a mind-set that fails to see, yet alone, critique systematic racial inequity. Being an outcome of miseducation, it distorts and/or accepts the reality of the existing racial order and leaves no room for imagining social change.

**Hegemonic Order of Whiteness**: see definition of ‘white supremacy’.
**Hegemonic Whiteness**: there are two definitions of this term in the literature. Hughey (2012) defines it as the ideal way of being white that exists in any given setting. Though there are variations in what it means to be white, ideal whiteness is hegemonic and an exemplar amidst the variations. Hegemonic whiteness is the ideal (image of) white identity. It is the valorized performance of whiteness, and defines the standard behavior, norms and values to which others are compared and evaluated against. Brown (2017) borrows from Hughey but defines hegemonic whiteness as the multiple practices whites use to maintain and legitimize their dominant position in the racial hierarchy.

**Minorities**: the term ‘visible minority’ has been criticized for implying that the sociorace of ‘majorities’ is invisible, and that minorities consist of a numerical small populace. In certain geographies, however, such as Markham, Brampton, Mississauga, Toronto, Richmond, Burnaby, Surrey and Vancouver, the numerical majority consists of those who are ‘visible minorities’, which applies too at the global level. Further, ‘minority’ is not a term chosen by those it signifies but by the dominant group that considers itself the reference or yardstick that other groups are compared to. In sociology, ‘minority group’ is given a different meaning than what it is colloquially taken as. Sociologist Louis Wirth (1945) defines it as:

> a group of people who, because of their physical or cultural characteristics, are singled out from the others in the society in which they live for differential and unequal treatment, and who therefore regard themselves as objects of collective discrimination. The existence of a minority in a society implies the existence of a corresponding dominant group with higher social status and greater privileges. Minority carries with it the exclusion from full participation in the life of the society. (p. 347)
In the discipline of sociology, a minority group is akin to a ‘historically marginalized group’. In this manuscript, I do not use ‘visible minority’. Instead, I use ‘minority group’ exclusively in the defined sociological sense. I also employ ‘racial minority’, ‘the racially marginalized’, ‘the negatively racialized’, ‘the racialized others’, ‘racial subaltern’ and Black, Indigenous and People of Color (BIPOC) to denote (non-white) groups that have historically been signaled out for systematic negative differential and unequal treatment based on their sociorace.

**Racial stratification**: similar to stratification, which refers to the hierarchical structuring of society or the vertical ranking of clusters of people through unequal distribution of social resources, racial stratification refers to the hierarchical arrangement of racial groups. A racial group’s rank within said hierarchy denotes its level of wealth, power, status and other resources (economic, educational, political, and cultural) (Tuan, 2012, p. 1112).

**Shognosh**: I came across this term in an article by David MacDonald (2014). He adopts the term Shognosh:

to refer to Canada’s European settler populations, primarily those of British origin (Spielmann 2009). This Anishinaabeg term may also refer to nonwhite people like me (of mixed Indo-Caribbean and Scottish ancestry) who are assimilated into European ways.... Since it is acceptable in scholarly work to refer to Aboriginal people as Aboriginal, we should be willing to categorize ourselves using Anishinaabeg, Cree, Haida, and other languages of this country. This helps create balance in how we represent theories and theorists—since our own ethnic and cultural backgrounds may have an impact on what we perceive as normal and reasonable. So the use of Shognosh throughout, is, in my view a crucial signifier in the interests of academic rigour. (p. 67)
I did additional research to see how else shognosh is applied. In the Mazinigan (Oct, 2012)—a monthly newsletter of the Anishinaabeg of the territory of Deshkaan Ziibing (also known as the Chippewas of the Thames First Nation), located Southwest of London, Ontario—Shognosh is defined as “white man/Whiteman” (p. 8). From a spiritual perspective, the Shognosh are described as having lost their way:

Four colors of people inhabit the earth of ours. The Yellow, Red, Black and White human being. Each of these people were given gifts. For a reason, the Whiteman, the Shognosh, lost his gift and he was lost in his grief over this. The Redman, the Anishinaabeg, allowed the Shognosh to have their gift, at the cost of him suffering himself without it. This is how much he loved his brother. The ancestors who wrote these scrolls describe a time that we are in now. The four peoples of the earth then come to a time when they have important decisions to make that will determine the fate of the earth, as they know it. (ibid, p. 8)

In this manuscript I use **toubab** interchangeably with shognosh to refer to ‘white’ people of European ancestry.

**Sociorace:** following the recommendation of Janet Helms, I make use of sociorace instead of race (without quotation marks) to stress the nature of racial categories as human-made constructs. I use ‘race’ (with single quotation marks) in the same manner as sociorace. Race (without single quotation marks) reifies racial categories to a biological or genetic reality. Sociorace or ‘race’ remind us of the fictive nature of this concept. If ‘race’ is part of a concept, theory or quote (e.g., critical race theory and race-cognizance), I do not use quotation marks.

**Toubab:** this word is native to the various Mandé languages in West Africa and is used to designate persons with ‘white skin’ irrespective of their nationality but not including Arab-Berbers. Toubab refers to white persons of European ancestry. I employ the term
for two reasons: one, to remind the reader that white people are not invisible and unnamed. The ‘invisibility of whiteness’ is a taken-for-granted assertion in critical whiteness studies that is not generalizable. By employing toubab, I hope the reader will appreciate that whiteness as a sociorace is also talked about by other inhabitants of this world as a curious, exotic, foreign anomaly, but rarely as an object of contempt and debasement as Blackness is in the Occidental imagination. As a citizen of Burkina-Faso who grew up in a Dyula-speaking household (Dyula is a Mandé language), employing toubab is also an intellectual subaltern everyday resistance\textsuperscript{11} strategy that gives space to my Afro-identity.

**Whiteness:** this concept refers to more than skin-color or the designation of people of European descent. In critical whiteness studies, which shares the anti-essentialism tenant of critical race theories, whiteness is understood not as a biological property but as a legal and cultural property that affords material and symbolic privilege to those designated white, honorary whites, or who can pass as whites (Harris, 1993). Frankenberg (1993) defines whiteness as a location of structural racial advantage, a standpoint and lens through which white people see themselves, others, and society, and a configuration of

\textsuperscript{11}**Everyday resistance** “is a theoretical concept introduced by James Scott in 1985 in order to cover a different kind of resistance; one that is not as dramatic and visible as rebellions, riots, demonstrations, revolutions, civil war or other such organized, collective or confrontational articulations of resistance (Scott 1985, 1989, 1990). Everyday resistance is quiet, dispersed, disguised or otherwise seemingly invisible; something Scott interchangeably calls “infrapolitics”. Scott shows how certain common behavior of subaltern groups (for example, foot-dragging, escape, sarcasm, passivity, laziness, misunderstandings, disloyalty, slander, avoidance or theft) is not always what it seems to be, but instead resistance. Scott argues these activities are tactics that exploited people use in order to both survive and undermine repressive domination; especially in contexts when rebellion is too risky” (Vinthagen & Johansson, 2013, p. 4).
cultural practices that are often unmarked (p. 1). Whiteness becomes visible particularly when whites believe their status, position or privileges are under threat.

**White Supremacy**: this concept specifically designates a system of racial stratification in which whites occupy the top, dominant, or supreme position. It is not restricted to violent or blatant manifestations of racial violence in the form of white nationalism. Patriarchy is to gender and sexism what white supremacy is to ‘race’ and racism. White privilege stems from white supremacy. This concept describes white domination.
Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework

This study is grounded in two theoretical perspectives that, together, are sensitive to structure, meaning-making, interpretations and social-psychological factors in understanding how participants respond to racism. Rather than an attempt at integrating or synthesizing the two theoretical traditions, I highlight some debates and ideas within them that inform my research questions and analysis.

Critical race theory (CRT) illuminates the historical and structural mechanisms of white supremacy in Western societies. I begin this chapter with an overview of its intellectual origins and tenets. While drawing insights from CRT’s analysis on post-1960s institutional racism, the empirical core of my thesis consists of interviews of white antiracist activists. Its analysis is informed by symbolic interactionism’s (SI) attention to situated meanings and the need to complement structural theories with an approach that asks researchers to bracket their personal views. Informed by this precept of SI, I examine what the frames, experiences, situated meanings and actions of white antiracists look like from ‘the bottom-up’. I also mention the strengths and limits of each of these traditions to elucidate their usefulness for this study.

Janet Helms’ white racial identity development (WRID) model describes the traits of a mature white antiracist identity. Though inspired by this model, this study is less on identity as it is on frames, praxis and participants’ awareness of their role in the ‘conveyor belt’. Foreshadowing however a future research plan drawing from my data, I review Helms’ WRID model, available in the appendices (Appendix 1). My concern in this dissertation focuses on how a grounded theory influenced qualitative approach can help
us understand white antiracist activities, thus moving forward the development of a sociological approach to white antiracism.

**Critical Legal Studies and Critical Race Theory**

Critical Race Theory (CRT) is a branch of Critical Legal Studies (CLS) coined in the late 1980s by Kimberlé Crenshaw. There are multiple branches within CRT, including Asian American Legal Scholarship, Critical Race Feminism, LatinX Critical Race Theory, Tribal Critical Race Theory, and Critical Whiteness Studies. Its predecessor, CLS, is a leftist legal scholarship that reflects radical movements and social theories of the 60s and 70s.

CLS posits that embedded in both jurisprudence and law are worldviews inspired by capitalism. The law is not autonomous, impartial, neutral, objective, or untouched by other social institutions, especially politics and the capitalist mode of production. It is not an impartial mediator of social conflict existing outside of politics and political choices (Mutua, 2006, p. 343). On the contrary, it “is a political product that results from the struggle of conflicting social groups” (emphasis in original, Russell, 1986, p. 9). As a by-product of group struggles and interests, the law “reflects, confirms and reshapes the social divisions and hierarchies inherent in capitalism” (ibid, p. 4). This is not to say that the law is merely an instrument of the ruling class but that by inception and outcome is preferential and serves contradictory functions:

one of which is to exercise and simultaneously legitimate the use of institutional violence within the prevailing social arrangements…. by deploying a distinct and elaborate discourse and body of knowledge (popularly perceived as objective and apolitical) to justify its decisions. These decisions, while generally supporting the power of elite groups, sometimes actually restrain the exercise of power and
occasionally provide justice to ordinary people. In doing so, however, they lend legitimacy to law and to many of the existing social arrangements and institutions of which law is a part. (emphasis in original, Mutua, 2006, pp. 343-344)

The instrumentalist view of orthodox Marxists that posits the law as merely a tool of class interest entering the legal sphere from outside—particularly, political and economic circles—paints the legal profession as a passive entity in the formation of social power. CLS theorists advance a non-instrumentalist explanation of the relationship between law and power; arguing that conventional legal discourses produce an ideology that perpetuates the existing corporatized capitalist order and justifies the unequal distribution of wealth, goods, power, privileges and burdens (Crenshaw, 1995, p. xxiv). The law does not merely regulate or ratify, it also constructs, maintains and legitimizes unequal group relations. It is “thoroughly involved in constructing the rules of the game, in selecting the eligible players, and in choosing the field on which the game must be played” (ibid, p. xxv).

To this end, CLS critiques liberalism. Liberalism is the dominant political and legalistic philosophy in the West on liberty and equality that, among other things, legitimizes social stratification. The irony, however, is that the stratified order produces the very inequality, especially, economic inequality, liberalism claims to oppose. To critical legal scholars, the law maintains the status-quo by operating through a political legalistic philosophy that caters to bureaucratic institutions and market interests more so than the public good, and masking the inherent tensions in capitalism by giving the false idea that the existing order is just and necessary rather than contingent and corporatized
[see Kelman (1987) for a review of CLS’s critique of liberalism, and Altman (1999) for a refutation of some of these critiques].

Critical race theory was developed within critical legal studies primarily by racialized progressive intellectuals to challenge the post-60s colorblind/color-evasive ideology in law, including CLS, and out of concern of the incremental, stalled and retracted gains of the civil rights movements (Delgado, 2000, p. xvi). Though CRT shares the anti-formalism and contradiction principles\(^\text{12}\) of CLS, it also observed that “CLS was not moving fast enough in its attempts to critique and change societal and legal structures that specifically focused on ‘race’ and racism” (Brayboy, 2005, p. 428). CLS writers critiqued liberalism and law but rarely investigated “the historical centrality and complicity of law in upholding white supremacy (and concomitant hierarchies of gender, class, and sexual orientation)” (West, 1995, p. xi). CRT positioned itself as the loyal opposition to dominant discourses on ‘race’ and racism—seeking to better understand, expose and transform the subtle but entrenched racism of the post-1960s era (Calmore, 1992, p. 2161). Within legal studies, it investigates how law not merely reflects white interests, but is active in the construction of ‘race’ and the ‘raced’ experience:

Racial power, in our view, was not simply—or even primarily—a product of biased decision-making on the part of judges, but instead, the sum total of

\(^{12}\text{Anti-formalism: The Critics reject the notion that, in every case, there is autonomous and neutral legal reasoning through which legal specialists apply doctrine to obtain results that are independent of the specialists' ethical ideals and purposes. Scholarly legal analysis, therefore, blends into political and ideological discourse.}\)

\(^{\text{Contradiction: The Critics reject the notion that legal doctrine contains a single, coherent and justifiable view of human relations. For them, such doctrine reflects two or more different and often competing views, none of which is dominant. Consequently, legal argumentation cannot be grounded in the law itself (Russell, 1986, p. 8).}\)
pervasive ways in which law shapes and is shaped by ‘race relations’ across the social plane. Laws produced racial power not simply through narrowing the scope of, say, of antidiscrimination remedies, nor through racially biased decision-making, but instead, through myriad legal rules, many of them having nothing to do with rules against discrimination, that continued to reproduce the structures and practices of racial domination.… [C]ritical race theory allows us to better understand how racial power can be produced even from within a liberal discourse that is relatively autonomous from organized vectors of racial power. (Crenshaw, 1995, p. xxv)

Critical race scholarship is diverse in its objective, emphasis, argument and methodology. Crenshaw (1995), however, identifies two threads that unify it. First, it investigates the structural—especially institutional—nature and maintenance of white supremacy and subordination of racial subalterns post-1960s. Second, it is interested in emancipatory praxis, which, within the scholarship, can take the form of antithetical or adversarial knowledge; “counter-accounts of social reality by subversives and subaltern elements of the reigning order” (p. xiii). CRT is thus both an intellectual and political oppositionist movement.

Critical race scholars acknowledge the gains won by the civil rights movement but are dissatisfied with the civil rights discourse that has become today’s predominant and governing ideology about ‘race’ and racism. Conventional civil rights discourse has allowed dominant society to embrace calls for racial justice while simultaneously inhibiting fundamental institutional changes. This results from its construction of racial power and racism as embedded in individuals and intentionality, and as an aberration arising from an irrational focus on ‘race’. Conventional civil rights discourse constructs racism as a deviation from an otherwise prejudice-free meritocratic social order; a
deviation from an otherwise “neutral, rational, and just ways of distributing jobs, power, prestige, and wealth” (Crenshaw, 1995, p. xiv).

Such construction obfuscates the systematically ingrained, intention-independent, and routine characteristic of racism. More specifically, it keeps meritocracy—the conservative and liberal yardstick of equality—lodged into hierarchies of oppression. Consequently, the law in its current state remains an inadequate instrument to remedy post-desegregation racial stratification that is predominately not the result of discrete, observable and overt racial discrimination of individual entities. Legalistic racial justice is often limited to ‘race’ reforms or conciliatory add-ons to tie up loose-ends to a social structure believed to be, at its foundation, racist-free. The limits of civil rights legal reforms are best described by Crenshaw (1995):

What we find most amazing about this ideological structure in retrospect is how very little actual social change was imagined to be required by the ‘civil rights revolution’. One might have expected a huge controversy over the dramatic social transformation necessary to eradicate the regime of American apartheid. By and large, however, the very same whites who administered explicit policies of segregation and racial domination kept their jobs as decision makers in employment offices of companies, admissions offices of schools, lending offices of banks, and so on…. Even more dramatic, the same criteria for defining ‘qualifications’ and ‘merit’ used during the period of explicit racial exclusion continued to be used, so long as they were not directly “racial.” Racism was identified only with the outright formal exclusion of people of colour. (p. xvi)

In addition to constructing racism as an aberration, the conventional civil rights discourse advocates colorblindness. It characterizes race-cognizance—the seeing, naming, and acknowledging of ‘race’ as socially important—as the cause of racism. Rather than locating racism in what a color-conscious discourse does, color-consciousness in toto is marked as a racist practice.
To reconcile, however, the contradiction between colorblindness and race-cognizance that exists in conventional civil rights discourse, affirmative action is articulated as an anomaly to the alleged normalcy of an inherently colorblind meritocracy; as a time-bound color-conscious remedy for past racist projects and a special consideration for the historically marginalized. In popular discourse, meritocracy is the ideal of both liberals and conservatives. CRT questions the very idea of meritocracy that institutions and organizations purport to follow. For critical race theorists, meritocracy does not function as an impartial distributing mechanism of resources, opportunities, and burdens. On the contrary, it masks the fact that the playing field is already unequal and its involvement in reproducing a system of stratification based on physical, cultural, and social features. Merit is not:

neutral and impersonal, outside of social power and unconnected to systems of privilege. Rather than engaging in a broad-scale inquiry into why jobs, wealth, education, and power are distributed as they are, mainstream civil rights discourse suggests that once the irrational biases of race-consciousness are eradicated, everyone will be treated fairly, as equal competitors in a regime of equal opportunity. (Crenshaw, 1995, p. xv)

Colorblindness ideology in an already racially stratified order obfuscates and, inadvertently, produces racial inequality. It leads to ‘colorblind racism’, which I defined in the introduction. CRT exposes the racism-as-aberration, meritocratic, and colorblind assumptions in legalistic civil rights discourse and seeks to reinvigorate a radical tradition of subversive color-consciousness.

Today, the scholarship is multidisciplinary and explores white racial power in numerous institutions, not just the law. Though diverse, there are basic tenets to CRT. It:
1. holds that racism is pervasive and endemic to, rather than a deviation from, [North] American norms;
2. rejects dominant claims of meritocracy, neutrality, objectivity, and color-blindness;
3. rejects ahistoricism, and insists on contextual, historical analysis of law;
4. challenges the presumptive legitimacy of social institutions;
5. insists on [the] recognition of both the experiential knowledge and critical consciousness of people of color in understanding law and society;
6. is interdisciplinary and eclectic (drawing upon, inter alia, liberalism, poststructuralist, feminism, Marxism, critical legal theory, postmodernism and pragmatism) with the claim that the intersection of race and law overruns disciplinary boundaries; and
7. works toward the liberation of people of color as it embraces the larger project of liberating all oppressed people. (Mutua, 2006, pp. 354-355)

Richard Delgado (2000, 2001), one of the three progenitors of CRT (including Mari Matsuda and Derrick Bell), also lists key CRT premises. The reader is encouraged to read Appendix 2 for elaboration on some of these tenets.

I now offer an overview of insights from symbolic interactionism (SI) that are relevant for my research. At the conclusion of this chapter, I explain the strength and limits of both CRT and SI for this study.

**Symbolic Interactionism**

Symbolic interactionism is a theoretical perspective that is sensitive to social interaction as the medium for the creation, maintenance and transformation of society. It challenges top-down macro-level explanations that conceive individuals as imposed upon, constrained by, and merely reflecting institutions and social structures. The latter explanations reify institutions and structures, generate a deterministic view of human action, and create an over-socialized view of the self (see Wrong, 1961).
Interactionists posit instead that society emerges from the bottom-up through social and joint action (Plummer, 2000, p. 224). Social action is not the product of psychological or external factors that play upon or through the individual—including biological drives, motives, attitudes, norms, values, sanctions, roles, cultural prescriptions, social system requirements, and institutional contexts. It is not a release of action from a pre-existing inner (e.g., antiracism frame or racial identity) or external structure playing upon the self. To apply such a formula is to perceive the individual as a medium through which factors determine behaviors: a stimuli \( \rightarrow \) (causes) action equation. Rather than the release of psychological or external factors, SI conceives of social action as a process informed by meaning-making and interpretation. It consists of two steps:

First, the actor indicates to himself \([sic]\) the things toward which he is acting; he has to point out to himself the things that have meaning. The making of such indications is an internalized social process in that the actor is interacting with himself. This interaction with himself is something other than an interplay of psychological elements; it is an instance of the person engaging in a process of communication with himself.

Second, by virtue of this process of communicating with himself, interpretation becomes a matter of handling meanings. The actor selects, checks, suspends, regroups, and transforms the meanings in light of the situation in which he is placed and the direction of his action. Accordingly, interpretation should not be regarded as a mere automatic application of established meanings but as a formative process in which meanings are used and revised as instruments for the guidance and formation of action. (emphasis added, Blumer, 1969, p. 5)

In this sense, outside of reflex action, social action is minded. It is the by-product of what an actor takes into account and their interpretation of the accounted in order to guide their behavior. Social action is meaning-ful; a process mediated through self-communication. Psychological and external factors enter action in so far as they are part of the indicating and interpretive processes (ibid, p. 66).
Many objects exist that individuals can take into account: their wishes and wants, availability of resources, the actions of others, their self image, correlates of racial identity, the perceived result of an intended action, antiracism frames, situational elements, group rules and/or peer pressure. Given this, the actor may decide to start, abandon, revise, suspend, postpone, confine, intensify, or even replace their intended or ongoing line of action. Whatever their choice, it occurs through a process of indication to self and other(s), and interpretation.

Of course, error may occur in the line of action; the actor may misinterpret what they take into account or fail to note an important object to consider. They may additionally be apathetic, recalcitrant or of another disposition (*ibid*, p. 64). Be it as it may, just as society is generated repeatedly anew through interaction—which is made possible because of pre-established, common meanings or schemes of interpretation that persons regularly take into account to guide their behavior—it is also through interaction that (aspects of) society, such as the racial order, is resisted. In other words:

> the meanings that underlie established and recurrent joint action are themselves subject to pressure as well as to reinforcement, to incipient dissatisfaction as well as to indifference; they may be challenged as well as affirmed, allowed to slip along without concern as well as subjected to infusions of new vigor. (*ibid*, p. 18)

The interactionist view thus acknowledges individuals as active agents responding to, facing and navigating multiple objects that they self-indicate and interpret. Rather than merely expressing their antiracism frames upon facing racial stimuli, the content of their frames is one of many objects that potentially takes part in the indicative and interpretive process, and that may or may not enter action.
This perspective on social action informs my analysis of participants’ antiracism action. Antiracism is generally a disruptive or transgressive act. It disrupts common pre-established schemes of interpretation (such as colorblind ideology) commonly used to make sense of ‘race’ and racism. There are many types of schemes of interpretation. Hunter (2004) identifies five racial schemes—ways of knowing—including:

1. the Black/White racial epistemology,
2. the assimilationist epistemology,
3. the colonial domination epistemology,
4. the critical intersectional epistemology, and
5. the neo-liberal positivist epistemology.

Schemes of interpretation influence how we conceptualize ‘race’, racism and antiracism. Antiracist participants in this study interpret their social surrounding differently than the status-quo; the usage of their antiracism frame is what distinguishes them from ‘non-racists’ and ‘racists’. To be an antiracist from a symbolic interactionist perspective is thus less an identity issue as it is the extent to which antiracist schemes of interpretation enter the indicating and interpretation process and inform and guide ensuing behavior.

If and how antiracism as praxis is manifested depends on many social and psychological variables. In positioning themselves to engage in bystander antiracism, respondents take into consideration various internal, situational and/or contextual objects that they interpret in order to construct (or not) a line of action. Their behavior is minded, and varied levels of saliency is given to accounted for and interpreted objects. Part of my task as researcher is to identify objects or factors respondents mention considering when engaging in a line of antiracism action and unmentioned factors that nonetheless appear to be important in forming a line of action. For example, not having ties to a person who
makes a racist comment and not expecting to have future association with them are social, or, more specifically, relational and circumstantial factors that may enter the interpretive process and shape the ensuing antiracism action in a certain way.

**Relevance and Limits of CRT and SI for this Study**

CRT offers much insight about how liberalism and its endorsement of conventional civil rights discourses on ‘race’ and racism coalesce to reproduce racial stratification through institutional channels. It provides a macro-context to understanding participants’ lived experiences with antiracism; especially, the form their antiracism may take in light of the obstacles they may face. Praxis and obstacles, at times and in part, reflect, even if unknown to participants, the liberal order and conventional civil-rights discourse of their socio-historical location.

Recall that the hegemonic ideologies in liberal civil-rights discourse include racism-as-aberration, colorblindness, individuality, intentionality, society as inherently just, and racial stratification as the outcome of a deemed fair process of allocating resources called meritocracy. When racism is acknowledged, these features create a context for antiracism that favors reform. Even agents that aspire for a horizontally structured order—an order of social differentiation but not stratification—may find themselves navigating contexts, such as a workplace, where said aspiration runs up against the established way of operating, which embodies some or all of the above-mentioned features of liberal civil-rights discourse. This is especially evident in the chapter on organizational antiracism, where the dual role of politics as enabler and
obstacle to antiracism is seen to be contingent on the extent to which provincial political governing bodies endorse colorblindness or color-consciousness.

In addition to illuminating the racialized macro-context participants are embedded in, CRT casts an evaluative eye upon respondents’ praxis. Through a CRT lens, the examples of praxis that participants share may be appraised or condemned. This is the risk in the political project of CRT. As both an intellectual and emancipatory movement, it suggests what ‘true’ or ‘real’ antiracism looks like. For instance, CRT may appraise participants that color-consciously redistribute organizational resources to achieve equality in access and outcome (e.g., programs specifically designed to increase the student admission of historically racially marginalized youth), while simultaneously condemning this strategy as an ‘incremental’ and ‘within the stratified system’ approach. CRT may also condemn a legalistic (as in courts, due process, legal penalty) strategy to antiracism because of its limited individual focus (a legal case is between a complainant and a defendant). In the outcome that the party who was the target of racism wins, CRT, though welcoming the victory, may consider this strategy as legitimizing the law in its current configuration as an adequate medium to addressing racial stratification.

This is the risk in applying CRT and its potential weakness for descriptive and explanatory research, such as this study. Though insightfully articulate on the structural manner racism operates outside explicit organized vectors of racial power, its deductive reasoning renders it several layers removed from the micro, lived, and embodied situations participants find themselves in. Indeed, as Clair and Denis (2015) write:

One difficulty of macro-level approaches is their tendency to present ‘grand’ narratives that abstract or totalize the way race operates. We may lose explanatory
precision on the nuanced operation of race in particular contexts, institutions, and organizations at particular times and places. (p. 860)

The same applies to antiracism; ‘we may lose explanatory precision on the nuanced operation of [antiracism] in particular’ situations. For example, critical race scholars’ insistence that colorblindness is incompatible with antiracism is not corroborated in O’Brien’s (2001) research. Recall that though members of ARA are colorblind on two of three dimensions (see Introduction chapter), they engage in more collective and institutional antiracism than the ‘fully’ color-conscious PI participants. Furthermore, if we apply CRT a priori we risk overlooking how silence in the face of racism may not mean complicity to it. It may not indicate a ‘standing still’ posture on the conveyor belt. As I explore in the self-cognizance chapter, when intentionally and strategically used, silence can in fact reflect and lend itself to an antiracism goal(s). For instance, a bystander may decide to strategically remain silent if the circumstance is such that overtly challenging a perpetrator will put a colleague ‘of color’ in an odd, uncomfortable or vulnerable position. Instead of confronting, the bystander may decide to console, support and strategize with the target after the incident.

These risks in CRT’s evaluative gaze calls for an approach that brackets its deductive assumptions and, instead, examines antiracism through the lives of participants. CRT has explanatory power in unearthing macro-processes; antiracism, however, is additionally shaped by circumstantial, situational, psychological and, if relevant in the lives of participants, even spiritual meanings (see Denis & Traoré [manuscript under review]). Instead of mechanically imposing concepts onto data, symbolic interactionism (SI) asks for an inductive and grounded approach that allows analysis to mirror as close
as possible the lives and stories of respondents. SI brackets the imposition of premade explanations for behavior, insisting, instead, on participants’ narration about their experience and unstated clues in the data that may explain a chosen line of action.

While CRT defines racism as a struggle revolving power over resources, SI calls attention to meanings and meaning-making as sites of group struggle. Redistribution of resources to achieve group power balance is tied to the struggle over schemes of interpretations; over which civil rights discourse (for indeed there are many) that institutions will legitimize and render the official and hegemonic narrative. From an SI lens, participants’ praxis is not solely a matter of action but first and foremost of interpretation; it is a battle of meanings informed by various objects. The subject of competing definitions is significant because it is consequential for antiracism action. In Ashburn-Nardo, Morris and Goodwin’s (2008) model on Confronting Prejudiced Responses (CPR), interpretation is the first step of five that lead to bystander action:

1. Interpretation of an incident as racism.
2. Decision on whether action is warranted.
3. Decision to take personal responsibility for intervening or confronting the agent.
4. Once decision to take responsibility is made, the bystander decides how to intervene or confront according to their skills and ability.
5. Finally, the actual bystander action.

Not all bystander actors follow such a deliberative process, and some actions are spontaneous or driven by feelings rather than a series of calculations. Regardless, the first two steps are a prerequisite to any eventual antiracism action; bystanders must first read a situation as racist and then decide if action is warranted. Without these two crucial steps, CRT’s advocacy for radical equity would not come to pass. In the lexicon of social
constructionist theory, successful ‘claims-making activity’ is a precondition for addressing social problems:

Claims making entails the activities by which groups of people (such as advocacy or social movement organizations, community groups, legislators, or journalists) attempt to persuade an audience (such as Congress, other government officials, or the general public) to perceive that a condition is a social problem in need of attention…. Consequently, our analytical interest is how or why a condition is or is not constructed as a ‘social problem’ via claims making, and what features of the claims-making activities are likely to facilitate public support of the claims makers’ cause. (Swygart-Hobaugh, 2008, p. 130)

SI sensitizes this research to situated meanings.

To be fair, though interactionism is generally considered a micro-level theoretical perspective, it is in fact multi-level because interaction occurs at all levels. It is the medium through which intimate, one-on-one relationships are built, civil rights associations are formed, and global trade agreements are constructed. Creation of policies and their implementation are all symbolic, mindful or meaningful activities. In that sense, SI sits well with CRT. The latter considers the obdurate context, its impact on agency and suggests a series of pre-established officiated meanings and interpretations (e.g., multiculturalism) that may bear on a line of action. Interactionists highlight the active, fluid and situated nature of interpretations and that an actor’s agency is, first and foremost, located in the meaning-making arena. In short, resistance and social change cannot occur without alternative or defiant interpretations to the status-quo.

In the next chapter, I discuss my methodology and research design. I conclude with short biographies of participants whose stories are predominately reflected in the findings section and situate myself in this research.
Chapter 3: Research Methodology

Research Question

This study examines white participants’ understanding and praxis of antiracism. The bulk of my analysis and findings pertain to the latter. I describe frequent antiracism strategies that participants use and examine what accounts for their appearance. More specifically, I unearth social and psychological factors enabling and shaping praxis and, to a lesser degree, the obstacles participants grapple with. Taken together, this study offers a developing model for mapping ‘privileged antiracism’.

In this chapter, I explain what methods I employed to select and recruit participants, collect and analyze data, and cultivate trustworthiness (research ethics and validity). I conclude with desegregated data on participants’ identities and their and my biographies.

Qualitative Methodology

My research design (the case study approach) is informed by qualitative methodology. The goal of qualitative inquiry is not prediction or to control variables under study. Instead, it is to understand an individual’s or group’s social reality by exploring their experiences and interpretations of their social world (Holloway & Wheeler, 2002, p. 3). In so doing, attention is paid to how social and psychological variables impact participants, their behavior and the researched subject. Consequently, qualitative inquiry embeds respondents and the research question in history, locality and
temporality. This is called *contextualization*, and is reflected in my findings (Holloway & Wheeler, 2002 p. 11).

Qualitative data is produced by focusing on participants’ accounts and exploring the phenomenon under study from the inside-out, the specific to the general, the respondents’ own voice to their social location and context (Patton, 2002, p. 47; Ormston, et al., 2014, p. 3). The emphasis on locality, temporality and situation sensitivity guides my relationship with the data. This is discovery-oriented methodology; concerned with questions about the what, why and how of social phenomena as opposed to how many (Flick, et al., 2004, p. 8). Thus, rather than seeking generalizability, this study captures a detailed, complex and nuanced picture about how and why participants respond to racism in a certain way. Through the recording of respondents’ perspectives, memories, feelings and behavior the collected data has more depth, is more powerful and, at times, is more absorbing and compelling than positivistic or quantitative data.

**Deciding Participants (Case Sampling)**

*Case sampling* refers to decisions regarding the selection of respondents to collect data from—in my case, to interview. Specifically, it is decisions regarding who to select and why, and how many (Flick, 2009, p. 115). Two motives informed my selection of participants. First, I sought to explore typical and atypical facets—or patterns and outliers—in antiracism. I achieved this by employing selective sampling and theoretical sampling. *Selective sampling* refers to selecting participants based on an already created...

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13 This is possible because of the smaller data set and methods used in qualitative methodology. As McCracken (1988) notes, “it is more important to work longer, and with greater care, with a few people than more superficially with many of them” (p. 17).
set of relevant criteria (e.g., demographic variables) for the study. My pre-established criteria for selecting participants were informed by the aims of the research and the need for information rich cases and a parameter for focus. The criteria included ‘race’, age, sex, education, employment and if a participant identifies as an antiracist or a synonym of this (e.g., ally, racial justice or antiracist activist, human rights specialist, and co-conspirator).

I did not limit the selection of participants to pre-established criteria however. New ones also emerged during the research and informed the selection of additional respondents. This method for selecting participants is called theoretical sampling. In this study, additional participants with a strong spiritual or religious perspective were selected to balance out participants who are atheists or who, though spiritual/religious, could not articulate how their faith informs their antiracism. Another emerging criterion pertained to ethnic variation within whites. Following an interview with a Jewish respondent it became important to include other Jewish participants to explore if and how anti-Semitism informs their commitment to antiracism.

The second motive informing the selection of participants was to avoid biasing my study. Within the context of case sampling, biasing occurs when researchers select informants who confirm their views and expectations about the subject (Yin, 2011, p. 88). Selective and theoretical sampling decrease the likelihood of biasing. My personal reactions during some interviews were evidence of having successfully sought maximal variation in participants. In a number of interviews, I experienced reactions ranging from discomfort, touchiness, and racial victimization. These reactions reflected areas of
intellectual differences between participants and I, thus indicating the successful inclusion of a broad range of participants rather than those who solely confirm my perspective.

Sampling ended upon reaching theoretical saturation. This refers to a significant drop in new information despite additional recruitment of participants and data collection (Flick, 2009, p. 138; Neuman, 2012, p. 145).

**Recruiting Participants**

Case sampling effectiveness depends in part on the chosen recruitment process to invite persons to take part in a study. Important items in this process are recruitment materials and recruitment channels (Ritchie, Lewis, Elam, Tennant & Rahim, 2014, pp. 140-142). I used two recruitment materials to generate awareness of the study and invite participants: a tear-off poster and an email script. I modified the latter depending on the online medium in use (i.e, social media vs. email). Appendix 3 and 4 are copies of the tear off poster and email script, respectively.

Recruitment channels in qualitative research vary, and any one channel may bias the selection of participants by limiting who is exposed to the study. Using multiple channels pluralizes the recruitment pool. My channels included informal conversations, emailing, social media platforms, poster boards, and snowball recruitment. The latter refers to asking participants if they know and/or can recruit other persons who would be interested in this study. Snowballing was used strategically and kept at minimum because people's social circles generally mirror them demographically (e.g., similar level of education, age, class, and lifestyle). As such, it leads to too much similarity in the pool of participants.
Another channel I used was to locate sites (recreational and professional) where I observed a concentration of persons gathered and engaging on topics related to (in)equality. In one of these sites, I was invited by co-organizers to do a brief presentation about the study and pass around a contact sheet to attendees to write their contact information should they like more information about the study. In other sites, I contacted the gatekeepers and asked them to circulate my poster and/or email script to their members and general listserv. Few requested a meeting beforehand. We discussed the study, my research experience, and my personal background and history. These gatekeepers suggested potential respondents and forwarded my email to a select group of persons.

Methods for Collecting Data

I used two types of methods to collect data: questionnaires and interviews. There were three questionnaires in total. The first was a demographic questionnaire. Following a brief evaluative exchange with potential participants, the selected participants were asked to fill the demographic questionnaire before the interview.

The second questionnaire was titled Types of Antiracism Strategies. Participants were asked to do two things. First, to select from a pre-written list of antiracism strategies the ones they have used to address racism. Second, of those chosen, to note the one(s) they consider to be the most and least effective in addressing racism. There are 40 options on this questionnaire plus an open-ended allotment for participants to write strategies they have used that were not on the list. The 40 options stem both from my familiarity with studies on anti-discrimination strategies (i.e., Greco, Priest & Paradies, 2010; Paradies et
al., 2009) and my personal experiences and reflection on the matter. The 40 strategies can be grouped in a number of ways: a) individual, interpersonal, and institutional strategies; b) lone-wolf and group-based strategies; c) strategies that focus on the perpetrator, target or other bystanders; d) online and offline/onland strategies; e) behavioral, emotional, cognitive or spiritual-focused strategies; f) and, last but not least, reactive and proactive strategies.

The third questionnaire is a list of *Situational Elements*. Participants were asked to choose from this list the objects or factors they have taken into consideration when deciding whether or not to respond to racism. 19 factors were listed including availability of support and resources, potential outcomes of intervening, knowledge and skill, location and time, cost and benefit analysis, and one’s mood or feelings at the time of the incident. The 19 factors were also inspired from my familiarity with the literature on factors that influence bystander anti-discrimination (i.e., Baynard, 2008; Nelson, Dunn & Paradies, 2011; Redmond, Pedersen & Paradies, 2014; Stewart, Pedersen & Paradies, 2014) and my own experiences and reflection on the subject. Participants had the option to write other factors not listed.

The theme of the last two questionnaires (strategies and situational elements) were explored during the interview as an open-ended question *prior* introducing the questionnaires. It was important that participants and I *first* have an open-ended discussion before them filling the questionnaire so as to give them the opportunity to share antiracist strategies and situational elements that stand out to them. The questionnaires enriched our conversation by jogging participants’ memory and allowing
for additional exploration of their understanding of antiracism. For instance, some participants had a strong reaction to the idea of interracial friendships or dating as an intentional antiracism strategy. Most considered the seeking of intimate or non-intimate interracial relationships as praxis as ‘weird’, ‘strange’, ‘problematic’ and borderline ‘racial fetishization’. Few, on the other hand, considered it an indirect outcome of their proactive efforts at making interracial contact; at diversifying their network and friendship circle; at ‘stepping out’ of their ‘white social bubble’. Interracial contact as a prejudice reduction strategy is a much researched and debated subject (see Denis, 2015; Richeson & Shelton, 2007; Trawalter & Richeson, 2006). As the above example indicates, questionnaires facilitated additional conversation on the socially embedded and interpretation contingent process of antiracism.

The bulk of the data was collected through semi-structured, open-ended, and in-depth two-part interviews. My interview guide consists of questions grouped into four themes for exploration: racism, antiracism, decision-making considerations, and whiteness. In this manuscript, I present findings predominantly pertaining to the middle two themes. The interviews remained fairly open and conversational in nature. I went with the flow of the conversation; permitting myself to change the order of questions, omit redundant questions, and follow-up or focus on relevant and emerging themes. This flexibility was important in order to capture many aspects of interviewees’ accounts and allow for unforeseen, emerging information to be explored. Interviews were separated into two-parts that took place on different days. Only a handful of participants had sufficient time to complete Part 1 and Part 2 interviews in one sitting. Part 1 explored
racism and antiracism questions (including decision-making considerations). Part 2 explored whiteness and its intersection with antiracism. Each interview took about 1 hour and 30 minutes.

**Ethics**

The McMaster University Research Ethics Board reviewed the research proposal for this study. I received ethics clearance prior to recruiting participants. A number of ethics protocols were followed. Participants were given a letter of information and a consent form during recruitment. The letter outlines the purpose of the study, offers a sample of interview questions, and details the potential harm, risk or discomfort from participation in the study and the steps taken to mitigate these risks. The letter informs participants that they can skip questions they do not want to answer and still remain in the study. They can also withdraw at any time before, during or after the interview without fear of repercussion, no questions asked and a guaranteed automatic deleting of their data. They were informed, as well, that withdrawal of their data is not possible upon the completion of the dissertation or the publication of an article or submission of a conference abstract that uses their interview. All participants signed a consent form, indicating that they have read the letter of information and are volunteering to participate. In commencing our interview, I went over the letter and gave them the opportunity to ask questions. Interviewees were also given a resource sheet consisting of services or departments (such as the Research Ethics Board) they can contact for emergency or other purposes related to this study.
Additional ethics protocols included confidentiality and privacy matters. Though participants are not anonymous to me as the researcher, their identity and information are confidential and private. I used pseudonyms during the interview, transcribing, data analysis and in this and other manuscripts. To increase confidentiality, preference for interview location was given to places where participants cannot be identified. Interviews recorded on a digital device have been transferred onto a password protected folder in an external hard drive and deleted from the device. To the best of my ability, unique characteristics or descriptions that would identify participants have been omitted. During interviews, participants also explicitly indicated identifiable descriptions and stories they would like kept off record. These descriptions and stories were not transcribed. Finally, participants were given the opportunity to edit their personal biography used in this study. All biographies below have been vetted and approved by respondents.

Data Analysis

Data analysis was a nonlinear and ongoing experience. Rather than moving in a sequential manner from one of the three below-mentioned cycles (noticing, collecting, and thinking) to the next, the process was recursive, iterative and holographic. Recruitment, data collection, transcription, analysis and writing are, in fact, not distinctive research phases but interrelated and concurrent (Yin, 2011, p. 179 & Marvasti, 2004, p. 89). Though more time is spent on each of these phases separately they mutually shape one another; requiring a constant back-and-forth, fact checking, refining, adding, removing, recoding, reinterpreting, reintegrating, and grounding. As Coffey and Atkinson write:
The process of analysis should not be seen as a distinct stage of research; rather, it is a reflexive activity that should inform data collection, writing, further data collection, and so forth. Analysis is not, then, the last phase of the research process. It should be seen as part of the research design and of the data collection. The research process, of which analysis is one aspect, is a cyclical one. (cited in Marvasti, 2004, p. 89)

Despite being a dynamic and iterative process, there are several organizing schemes that provide order and guidance for data analysis, including: discourse analysis, content analysis, narrative analysis, global analysis, genre analysis, and conversation analysis. All qualitative data analysis schemes consist of at least three basic cycles: data dissembling, reassembling, and interpreting (Yin, 2011).

I used the computer software *ATLAS.ti version 7* to analyze my data and was guided by the second edition of Susanne Friese’s book, *Qualitative Data Analysis with ATLAS.ti*. It offers a step-by-step guide to using the software. Friese (2012) and Seidel (1998) label the three basic cycles as noticing, collecting, and thinking about interesting things in the data. Rather than using a specific scheme, such as content analysis, which would dictate what specifically to look for in the data, I used the three basic cycles, remained close to the data, and allowed it to show me patterns that are relevant to my research question.

*Noticing-Dissembling* consists of looking for passages in the transcript relevant to my research question and breaking them down into smaller fragments. I dissembled or ‘fractured’ the data by using codes (or labels). Here are a few codes I constructed for the subject of doing antiracism: ‘shouted at perpetrator’, ‘insulted perpetrator’, ‘called

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14 “There is a simple foundation to the complex and rigorous practice of [Qualitative Data Analysis]…. While there is a great diversity in the practice of QDA I would argue that all forms of QDA are based on these three ‘notes’” (Seidel, 1998, p. 1).
perpetrator racist’. Coding is the process of categorizing mass data into chunks that cohere around the same subject and designating the chunks with a code. There are many types of codes including emotion coding, values coding, narrative coding, descriptive or topic coding, process coding, initial or open coding, and provisional coding (Friese, 2012, p. 93). My codes were predominantly inductive (as opposed to deductive), constructed (as opposed to in vivo), and, at first, descriptive. By rearranging the data into chunks labeled with a code it allowed me to compare and contrast the dissembled data within and across the codes. This first cycle of coding is called initial coding.

There is a second cycle of coding I performed called category coding. This occurs during the second cycle of data analysis. Collecting-Reassembling consists of identifying initial codes that cohere together in some way and forming a category (and subcategory if necessary) of these codes. A category subsumes several codes that correspond to one another. Categorizing condenses the data dramatically and reassembles it in a meaningful and structured way. For example, the above three codes formed the category ‘hot confrontation style’ for the subject of doing antiracism. Other codes formed the category ‘classroom antiracism’, and so on. In this second coding cycle, codes become more conceptual as opposed to merely descriptive.

In addition to clustering codes into categories, I also looked for patterns and relationships between (and within) categories. One can also look for sequences and even build typologies. This is the key task in Thinking-Interpreting. Looking for patterns (and deviations from the pattern) and relationships is the meat of data analysis. I identified, for example, a relationship between one category of doing antiracism (‘hot confrontation’)
and a situational element (‘perpetrator is a stranger’). In addition to looking for patterns, the researcher must also explain them. It is here that the analysis moves from description to really being explanatory, inferential or interpretive. Consequently, analysis becomes more abstract than previous cycles\(^{15}\). This third cycle formed the backbone for writing the findings chapters, and has to do with finding answers to questions about the how and why of what I am observing about antiracism. Thinking and interpreting, which coincides with writing, is grounded in the data, but is also in conversation with the literature, theoretical debates, my knowledge, and graced by a dose of serendipity.

Validity (Authenticity)

In qualitative research, validity refers to the extent to which a researcher has properly interpreted and presented their data so that their conclusions suitably mirror and characterize the phenomenon that was studied and the real world it is embedded in (Yin, 2011, p. 78). Validity is also known as authenticity. Authenticity consists of how honest, balanced and fair a researcher’s presentation or account of a phenomenon is based on the available empirical data (Neuman, 2012, p. 120). There are seven ways of increasing validity in qualitative research (see Maxwell, 2009). Of them, the most popular are respondent validation, triangulation, searching for discrepancies, and empathetic neutrality. I explain the four strategies I used to ensure validity.

\(^{15}\) Jorgensen (1989) summarizes the three cycles as follows: “[Noticing] Analysis is a breaking up, separating, or disassembling of research materials into pieces, parts, elements, or units. [Collecting]: With facts broken down into manageable pieces, the researcher sorts and sifts them, searching for types, classes, sequences, processes, patterns or wholes. [Thinking]: The aim of this process is to assemble or reconstruct the data in a meaningful or comprehensible fashion” (brackets added. as cited in Seidel, 1998, pp. 3-4).
1. **Respondent Validation:**

Also known as *member checking*, this refers to researchers presenting their material to participants in order to fact check the collected data and its interpretations. When the data precisely captures the verbatim words of participants, however, it is redundant to send them a recording of their interview for the purpose of fact checking. The voice recording itself functions as the fact checking mechanism. Sending participants one’s developing analysis is also a rare practice because in most research projects it does not guarantee validity. In this study, for example, significant time (3 to 4 years) had elapsed between the interview and the analysis of findings. Thus, participants’ potential comments about their interview several years later would have reflected their present interpretation and social location, not those at the time of the interview. Additionally, respondent validation may “generate antagonism or disapproval if [a researcher’s] analysis challenges people’s idealized images of themselves” (Marvasti, 2004, p. 144).

Sociological analysis is different than layperson analysis. The application of the sociological imagination is a skill. So too is coding, categorizing and analyzing data. Analysis is a laborious and time-consuming work that participants expect researchers to do with a promise of authenticity. This is not to claim that sharing one’s developing analysis with participants should never occur, but that it is a practice limited to when the need arises.

In the present study, respondent validity was assured through the voice-recording of interviews in addition to personal notes taken during the interview process. Member checking was limited to the biographies included in this study. Participants were given the
opportunity to edit their personal biography. Moreover, when the need for clarification or additional information arose, participants were contacted.

2. **Triangulation:**

   Triangulation refers to the usage of several methods to study one phenomenon. One can employ data triangulation (collecting data from different sources), investigator triangulation (more than one researcher collecting data on the same subject), theory triangulation (using different theoretical perspectives to study one problem), or methodological triangulation (using different methods to collect data) (Holloway & Wheeler, 2002, pp. 15-18). In this study, I used *methodological triangulation* by employing the questionnaire and interview methods. This approach enhances validity by allowing researchers to identify incongruences in the information participants share across different data collection methods. Small to minimal incongruences indicate high validity in the collected data.

3. **Rival Explanations:**

   *Rival explanations* is to consider segments in the data that do not fit a researcher’s analysis, interpretation and conclusion (Marvasti, 2004, p. 114). The researcher must reject or amend their original interpretation if they identify a rival explanation (Yin, 2011, p. 80). “The basic principle here is that you need to rigorously examine both the supporting and discrepant data to assess whether it is more plausible to retain or modify the conclusion, being aware of all of the pressures to ignore data that do not fit your conclusions” (Maxwell, 2009, p. 233).
Searching for rival explanations to my developing interpretations and conclusions strengthened the validity of my findings. For instance, identifying frames of antiracism meant constantly fact checking the data and, in the face of discrepant or rival explanations, refining or totally forfeiting a frame I believed to be a standalone or predominant one. One frame I had began developing (the ‘multiculturalism frame’) was forfeited entirely when upon further data collection and analysis I found that it was an outlier relative to other frames and, in fact, not a discrete or separate global frame but a characteristic of a few participants’ value system. Another example was a discrepancy between conceptualizations of racism. Paying attention to how participants understand racism is consequential for how they frame antiracism. Most participants conceived of racism as a one-way street; as something that happens from the dominant racial group towards racial subalterns; not in reverse. This coincided with my own understanding of racism. There was a rival explanation in the data however. A few participants defined racism as a two-way street and/or complicated the ‘reverse-racism’ debate by considering the historical period and location an act of prejudice or discrimination arises in. Consequently, in order to authentically represent participants’ viewpoints, I revised an earlier description of the equality frame by including a rival explanation of racism.

4. Empathetic Neutrality:

Empathetic neutrality requires that researchers do not “set out to prove a particular perspective or manipulate the data to arrive at predisposed truths” (Patton, 2002, p. 50). From an interactionist perspective, empathy is the act of putting oneself in someone else’s shoes and is characterized by understanding, interest and care in one’s communication.
Empathy is a stance towards another, *neutrality* is a stance towards one’s own thoughts and feelings. It refers to the act of suspending or bracketing to the extent that it is possible and constructive one’s own perspective. Together, empathetic neutrality facilitates the exploration of the life worlds of participants from their vantage point, thereby increasing research validity.

To achieve neutrality, researchers must develop awareness and be transparent about their assumptions on the subject under study. This allows researchers and others to evaluate the extent to which the findings differ from their assumptions. Discrepancy between the two hints at the extent to which the findings and analysis emerge from the data instead of reflecting an attempt to impose personal assumptions upon the data. In this spirit, I offer my personal biography below, alongside the biography of participants. I explain key life events, conditions and experiences that have led me to studying this question and my perspective on the subject.

**Description of Participants**

In total, 41 participants were interviewed for this study. More had contacted me and showed interest. Three of the 41 respondents interviewed were eventually dropped from the study. One due to a technological mishap with the recorder leading to the loss of the collected data. Another asked to be removed from the study and have their data deleted. No reason for the withdrawal was offered nor sought. The third participant asked to redo the interview and have their previous data deleted. Our life circumstances at the time however prevented a re-interview from occurring. The quantitative data, displayed in
the charts below and in the findings sections, are of the remaining 38 participants in this study.

The qualitative findings reflect my familiarity with and reflections on the 38 interviews and multiple memos. However, only 13 were chosen for the material sample (interviews chosen for transcription and analysis) and presentational sample (interviews chosen to present the findings) for the qualitative portion. Two reasons led to truncating the material/presentational sample. First was theoretical saturation in terms of breadth of frames and antiracism strategies. In other words, when data analysis failed to produce new information regarding variations in types of frames and praxis, it signalled that I had selected and analyzed sufficient data to represent the heterogeneity of frames and praxis. This marked the end of the material sampling.

Upon examining additional data and memos, it was evident that further material sampling would have produced variations within frames and types of strategies. For instance, it would have led to a ‘strong’ vs. ‘moderate’ or ‘weak’ spectrum within the ‘counterclaiming’ antiracism strategy type. It would have not, however, produced any new frames or strategy types. Additional material sampling would have also offered examples of more settings in which a particular strategy is applied, thus permit a denser consideration of the multiple interrelationships between social-psychological variables and antiracism strategies. This would have underscored the socially embedded nature of antiracism. The contextualization of antiracism, however, is already apparent throughout the findings, particularly in the antiracism praxis findings chapters. Antiracism is pictured
as a socially disruptive conveyor-belt activity embedded in and in consideration of circumstances, situations and contexts.

For these reasons, coupled with practical considerations about time and resource limitations to carry out this research, did I truncate the material and representational sample for the qualitative portion. At the end, however, all findings reflect my familiarity with and deliberations on all interviews and memos.

The pie charts below display characteristics of the demographic questionnaire respondents were asked to fill. Besides charts 3, 5, 6, and 7, where a few participants offered more than one answer, the other charts are out of 38.
Chart 3

Racial Self-Classification

Chart 4

Highest Level of Education

Chart 5

Industry of Occupation
All participants at the time of their interview resided in Southern Ontario. The bulk of participants are within the age groups of 18-29 and 50-59 (in each of these groups were 31.5% of participants, accounting for 63% all participants). For ethics purposes, only persons at the legal age of adulthood were allowed to participate in this study. The vast majority (84%) are women, and 77% identify as White, with others using Caucasian
and even Pink as racial classifications. Regarding their highest level of education, 37% of participants have a post-secondary education and 63% have a graduate education (Masters, PhD, or another post-graduate education). This exclusive university educated demographic characteristic of my participants limits the transfer of insights from this study to other people, such as those with a college or secondary education. Since education is, though imperfect, a relatively strong indication of an individual’s and/or their family’s level of income and socio-economic class bracket, the reader is advised to bear in mind that education, class, place of residence (with some being more racially segregated or homogeneous than others), and racism and antiracism interact in multiple ways. This presents an opportunity for a follow-up investigation of non-university educated participants for comparative purpose.

In order to increase participants’ confidentiality, I do not identify their occupation. Instead, I mention the industry their occupation falls under. Using the 2012 North American Industry Classification System (NAICS)\(^\text{16}\), 51% of participants’ occupation is within the Education industry, and 36% work in the Health Care and Social Assistance industry. This concentration of participants in two industries partly reflects the unequal gender distribution of employment and the predominance of women respondents in this study.

\(^{16}\) “The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) is an industry classification system developed by the statistical agencies of Canada, Mexico and the United States. Created against the background of the North American Free Trade Agreement, it is designed to provide common definitions of the industrial structure of the three countries and a common statistical framework to facilitate the analysis of the three economies. NAICS is based on supply-side or production-oriented principles, to ensure that industrial data, classified to NAICS, are suitable for the analysis of production-related issues such as industrial performance” (Statistics Canada, 2012)
There is more of an equal spread in terms of faith orientation. The top three include Atheist (25%), Christian (15%), and Spiritual (15%). Despite the varied faith orientations, only a few were articulate and specific about how their religious/spiritual beliefs shape their antiracism development, conceptualization, and/or praxis.

Finally, all participants are centre or left of centre of the political spectrum. Of those that specified the party they support, the biggest segment is NDP supporters (25%), followed by Anarchists (9%) and then Greens (6%). Surprisingly, none mentioned Liberal. None, as well, identified as Conservative. While I suspect that some respondents support the Liberal party, I suspect the political climate at the time played a role in none mentioning so doing. All the interviews occurred during the governance of Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s Conservative party. At the time (2011-2015), the NDP were the Loyal Opposition—the party with the second-most seats in the Canadian House of Commons. The close competition and, sometimes, bitter attitudes between NDP and Liberal party supporters—with both often accusing the other for ‘splitting up the vote’ and facilitating the rise of the Conservative party—coupled with the Liberal’s Third Party status at the time, may have rendered Liberal party supporting participants uncomfortable to mention their party preference. As the Loyal Opposition, however, NDP supporting participants may have had a sense of confidence afforded by their party’s status, thus, feeling less vulnerable or more emboldened in disclosing their party preference. Be that as it may, that none state being of the political right suggests not that the political right is uninterested in matters of racial equality (as the federal Conservative’s firm condemnation of anti-Semitism suggests)—though, admittedly, said condemnation rarely
extends to the struggles other racial and religious minorities face), but that its views on this subject tends to be expressed through key ideas such as assimilation, social cohesion, conformity, law and order, and “old-stock” “Canadian values” (Griffith, 2015), as opposed to ‘antiracism’, ‘affirmative action’, and ‘racial justice’, which are expressions used often by leftists.

While the above demographic statistics give us a sense of participants’ social location and identity, they do not tell us what launched them into an interest in antiracism, how they do antiracism, and their personal considerations in doing antiracism. Descriptive statistics do not tell us about the social process of antiracism. In the biographies of participants, I offer a sketch of ‘social determinants of antiracism formation’—the factors and social conditions that sensitized participants to adopt antiracism/pro-racial equity work. In future research, I will flush out this theme for analysis.

**Biographies of Participants**

Informed by the need for contextualization, a starting point for my analysis was to get a sense of the personal narrative of participants. As a by-product of respondents’ own curiosity and WRID theory’s inspiration for this study, the biography sketches the social determinants of participants’ antiracist commitment development. Readers will see various distant and proximal determinants that have shaped the awakening and cultivation of participants’ political consciousness and antiracism.

In the ‘distant’ unit, we find variables such as a history of Anglo-Canadian hostility and oppression towards Central, Southern and Eastern European immigrants. In
the early 1920s, said groups were restricted from immigration into Canada and threatened by organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan, the Native Sons of Canada, and the Orange Order. Through stories of grandparents and parents who grew up in or close to this period, participants were introduced to themes of marginalization, oppression, xenophobia, and organized violence. Proximal unit variables were more prominent than distant variables. Here we find the role of interracial contact, secondary and post-secondary courses, overlapping approximations (e.g., being a sexual minority), work roles, reading materials, and activism.

I list the biographies in alphabetical order by their pseudonyms.

Adyvaya:

Adyvaya is in her early 20s. She is a university undergraduate student and identifies as bisexual. She self-categorizes as white and has Canadian and Polish ancestry. Politically, she affiliates with the NDP.

She grew up in a multicultural neighborhood in Toronto. Diversity was her norm: “you would go over to one person’s house who you know during their religious holidays and they'd come over for yours. We would have cultural events in the neighborhood; like it was really positive.” Her family then moved to another city, where she attended a predominately white high school. She was shocked at the mono-racialness in her new environment and what she saw as poshness, privilege, classism and sentiments by some to wanting to keep the neighborhood white.

Though she was accustomed to diversity, it took a class on Race, Gender and Rights in high school to become sensitive to issues of racism and make sense of the
differential treatment she noticed non-white kids sometimes received in elementary school. In her RGR class, she developed a close friendship with a Vietnamese classmate. Though they live cities apart for university, they meet up regularly and talk about “antiracism, the LGBTQ movement, what we are learning in our theory classes and things like that.” She credits her friend as having “kept me conscious about” these subjects in the first two years of her university, especially that her courses did not cover these topics. Her race-cognizance further developed in her third year, when she took a course in critical race studies. This development continues today through her personal readings, friendships, activism, and work at a shelter for women.

Being a Quaker has had an important impact in how she interacts and views antiracism and allyship. “It is really nice and inclusive”, she says, and “you are responsible for how you interact with other people. And because of that I feel like a greater sense of responsibility because I try and have that amount of awareness in my everyday life.”

Essentially, a strong sense of justice and a desire to see suffering end, especially for women and girls, heavily influenced her desire to dedicate her life’s work to dismantling racial hierarchies. Exposing how fellow white women are complicit in these systems of control and how they need to work as a collective to liberate each other from interlocking oppression is of paramount interest to her. For the development of her racial awareness and antiracism work, she credits Patricia Hill Collins, bell hooks, Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, and the Huffington Post article “Explaining White Privilege to a Poor White Person” by Gina Crosley-Corcoran.
Alexandra:

Alexandra is a recently practicing lawyer and is in her mid 50s. She identifies as a ‘mostly straight’ white woman with ancestry from Byelorussia, England, and Germany. Before going to law school when she was in her mid 40s, she worked in the fields of human rights and community development. She started her first ‘real’ job working for the NDP when they were elected in Ontario in 1990.

Alexandra was socialized from a young age by her parents, in particular by her father who was a politician and a staunch justice advocate. “We had instilled in us from the beginning that you don’t just live your life, go to school, watch TV and come home. You live your life and you are part of the community. You look out for other people in your community; that is part of what life is.” However, she reflects that her two sisters who were socialized with the same influences did not develop the same political awareness, particularly not around antiracism.

One catalyst for her sensitivity to racial problems was traveling internationally in her 20s to Sri Lanka and Guatemala. Upon her return, Alexandra realized that “third world issues” happened in her community and sought to better understanding Indigenous struggles in Canada. Understanding the legal underpinnings of colonialism was one of her greatest motivations for attending law school. Inspired by the motto ‘think globally, act locally’, she volunteered with Canadian-based NGOs to give workshops using a cross-cultural and community development paradigm. She laments today at the limitation of this framework. However, this experience led to her being hired by the local police in a “community relations” role. It is while in this position that her antiracism analysis began.
A mentor challenged her to develop an antiracism lens and address her own privilege. Alexandra immersed herself in human rights education until she eventually attended law school. She continues to be involved in the community by volunteering on the Board of a centre where the need for antiracism work continues on a daily basis.

Most influential in the development of her racial literacy and antiracism include: Sherene Razack, Patricia Monture Angus, bell hooks, Charlotte Bunch, Carol A. Aylward, Denise Brooks, Nancy Sims, and, most recently, Desmond Cole.

Billy:

Billy is a white ‘Anglo’ professor at a prestigious university in Ontario. He is in his late 50s and has no specific political affiliation but aligns with a left perspective.

Dawit:

Dawit is a straight male in his early 50s. He is a professor in a Humanities program at a prestigious university in Ontario. He was born to Canadian parents in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. He classifies his skin-hue as pink but uses white to speak to the socio-historical construction of his racial group category. His ethnic background includes British Mongrel, Danish, and Icelandic. Politically, he is agnostic.

Dawit is a religious man. His parents were Protestant missionaries in Ethiopia. He elaborates how this shaped his life, emphasising in particular the racial and colonial discourses underpinning “Canadian missionaries going to Africa and teaching the word of god and bringing what they considered to be civilization and light”. Though his parents came to love Ethiopia and be loved by locals, he is cognizant of how race structured his
life. As examples he recalls attending a boarding school for foreigners as opposed to an Ethiopian school and reading his first African novel many years later, when he was in Canada, rather than in Ethiopia, which would be the logical context.

I went through a school system in Ethiopia that never introduced us to an African writer because it was the whole colonial thing of teaching us the canons of European thought which were seen as the future towards higher education, jobs, everything. Race shaped all of that.

To Christianity however he also owes his essential view that people are sacred and life is a gift. This is the fuel propelling his activism. Racism, he laments, denies people the experience of their sacredness and limits their gift. Dawit works with various Indigenous and non-Indigenous stakeholders to bolster and enhance Indigenous knowledge, thinking, and research. Years prior, he worked in refugee sponsorship services and did advocacy work in this area.

He teaches classes on oppression, and credits his understanding of the structures of race relations to various sources, including: his awareness of the kinds of shadism that shape Ethiopian society, of his white privilege and white fragility, and his encounter with the writings of Frantz Fanon, Peggy McIntosh, Edward Said, and John Mohawk in the 1980s and 1990s.

**Gloria:**

Gloria is a retired teacher who has taught for 30 years. She is in her early 60s, and holds a Master of Art’s in Equity Studies with a focus in whiteness theory. She identifies as a straight white woman with English ancestry on her mother’s side and Scottish ancestry on her father’s. Politically, she affiliates with the New Democratic Party.
Gloria has had a lifelong interest in injustice and activism. She fondly recounts as a teenager washing dishes with her sister singing “we shall overcome”, as they watched African American demonstrators on their TV set. “We shall overcome” is a gospel song that became a popular protest song for the African American Civil Rights Movements. Sexism and her working class upbringing played significant roles in the coming of age of her justice consciousness. Compared to high schools in middle class neighborhoods, in which were offered fine art classes and students were expected to go to university, the only option available at hers was to become a mechanic if you were a male, or a secretary if you were a girl. “It still makes my blood boil when I think about it”, she mentions. Gloria was 1 of 2 students from her grade 13 class to go to university. She found intellectual freedom there, but also experienced difficulty navigating the cultural mismatch between the middle-class norms of universities and the experience of first-generation students of working-class background; “those of us who were working class felt like a fish out of water in many ways; we were not groomed for this, and there was little money to support a university education as well”.

Sexism played another role in the waking of her justice and political consciousness. She recounts growing up in a male dominated household with a father who was incredibly and still is incredibly sexist. I knew gender injustice from a very, very young age. There was a lot of injustice in the home…. My father would sit and verbally denigrate women at the table. I had to endure that. I had a real sense of injustice in my family grouping; it was huge.

Impacted by the protest and riots displayed on her little black-and-white television, the assassination of MLK and JFK, a working class background and sexism, in
her 30s, Gloria joined a group focused on the injustices of the Persian Gulf War. She and an Israel-born Palestinian woman attempted to develop the group’s antiracism section for a magazine, but it was rejected. This rejection, she explains, was because of her then limited understanding of antiracism theory, movements and praxis. This prompted her to enroll in a Masters program to explore and better articulate issues related to racism, whiteness, settler colonialism, and patriarchy.

For the development of her race-cognizance and antiracism commitment, she credits Patricia Monture Angus, bell hooks, Audrey Lourde, George Sefa Dei, and Richard Wagamese.

Jennifer:

Jennifer is in her early 50s. She was born in Vancouver and identifies as a white, heterosexual cis-female with Welsh and English ancestry. She is the director of an environmental business. Politically her affiliations are with the Liberal party and the Green party.

The development of her race-cognizance began when she was in Grade 1 or 2 when an elder from a First Nations community shared his stories in her class. The seeds to pursue a career in the environmental sector was planted that day: “I learned much later in life that he was placed in a residential school and yet was so willing to share his culture with all of us white children. He had a huge impact on me. He talked about how everything has a spirit, which is perhaps why I do the work I do.” Though she is not religious, she credits Chief Dan George for kindling her animistic worldview.
Through her interest in varied spiritual traditions she developed a “curiosity about people”. She traveled to India, where she experienced for the first time not being a racial majoritarian. Her mother had fears of her boarding a plane with “Indians”. Jennifer described her as a somewhat intolerant person.

Jennifer did some antiracism training when she worked for the government, but does not identify as an antiracist. She calls her stance ‘non-traditional activism’ and rather consider her racial equity interests as the result of being “accepting of others and curious about others; curious about what they know or their perspective on life that might help my perspective on life. But also [because I am] intolerant of others that aren’t accepting.”

As the result of the growing diversity in her workplace she took it upon herself to do a Master thesis on the theme of inclusion; focusing on women in the workplace. She has seen many young women with degrees choose to enter the company in administrative positions and get stuck there regardless of their educational background. She presented her findings to her executive team, which led to her working with HR to help the company prepare for differences in opinion and diversity.

Influential books/reports that shaped her approach to racism and justice include: Anne Frank’s Diary, Guatemala: Nunca Más, The Last African, and books on the Pinochet Regime. Ted Talks is another source she cites.

**Kristin:**

Kristin is in her mid 20s. She is a student in a Master’s program in the Social Sciences and a Research Assistant. She was born in a small farming town into a United Christian Church family. Today, she identifies as atheist. Kristin classifies herself as a
straight white woman with French Canadian, Polish, and Loyalist settler ancestry. She
does not specify a political party she affiliates with but mentions to be left of centre.

She recalls going to a high school close to a reservation and the blatant spatial
segregation it generated: “Native students had their own hallway, their lockers were in
that one hallway, and their classes where in that one hallway.” Known as the ‘Native
Hallway’, it was avoided by non-Indigenous students and located next to the auto shop
class, the woodworking class and the special needs area. Kristin suggested a distibring
racial pattern in the academic streaming of students: “The low income area and applied
classes were down that end. And then everything that was English and Sciences were in
the other end.”

Kristin was exposed to anti-Indigenous racism growing up. What worked in her
favor is, in elementary school, being a child who was curious about other cultures. Her
curiosity had no mystical origin however. Her parents are professionals who often listen
to CBC. This meant that “when we grew up we had a lot of ‘why’ discussions: ‘why this?
why that?’ And we always had CBC on and you could ask about different conflicts. Diane
developed strong friendships with “very outspoken” people of different cultural, national,
and racial backgrounds; a circle of friends that others dubbed “the United Nations”.

Influential sources for her interest in (in)equality include news outlets such as
BBC, CBC, and Al Jazeera.

**Lauren:**

Lauren is in her mid 30s. She is a heterosexual, cis-gender female born in
Burlington and has a Master of Arts degree in anthropology. She identifies both as white
and Caucasian with English-speaking European ancestry. Faith-wise, she is a non-practicing Christian, but follows a spiritual tradition native to South Asia. Politically, she is a leftist with a penchant for the NDP and the Green Party.

Unlike most other participants, Lauren did not grow up in a politically conscious or activist family. She grew up in a racially homogenous white environment, which was replicated in her social network. It is in university that the coming of age of her antiracism began. Through her program, she learned about the constructed thus bias nature of her worldview, developed critical thinking skills and was taught how to deconstruct situations. “I did a lot of discourse analysis in my degree and symbolic analysis. I learned how to decode things and how the world is structured through a cultural lens.” This broadened her worldview and deepened her reflexivity on the social nature of her subjectivity. It would take topics on social inequality and political economy to develop her consciousness of power relations and a conflict approach to feminism, critical race theory, settler colonialism, and capitalism.

After university, she had some “intensive cross-cultural immersion experiences” in a small South American country. The immersion was part of an international development project. It required a pre-traveling training on antiracism and a critique of global power. After her Master’s program, Lauren worked in social services where, for the first time, she engaged in praxis and witnessed the intersection of poverty, ‘race’, gender, and class in ways she did not learn in books. She also volunteered for agencies that use an anti-oppression feminist and antiracist framework. “I was doing something
with myself other than writing papers”, she recounts. These would further spur the development of her antiracism commitment.

Sources that shaped her awareness on racism and antiracism include Maya Angelou, Jamaica Kincaid, Stuart Hall, Johannes Fabian, Peggy McIntosh, Kim Crosby, Alicia Garza, Patrisse Cullors, and Vanessa Watts. Other sources include www.nativeappropriations.com and a podcast named Another Round.

Lynda:

Born in Manitoba in an “overwhelmingly white space,” Lynda is a doctorate student in a Humanities program. She is in her early 30s, identifies as white with German and West-European ancestry, and is a leftist with a strong penchant for anarchism. Lynda is lesbian, dyke, and queer. These sexual orientations played a significant role in the development of her awareness and sensitivity to life on the margins.

An early catalyst to the awakening of her race-cognizance was her close relationships with persons of color. This began in elementary school, where she witnessed ‘superficial antiracism campaigns’ that prompted her to contemplate on racism. “I was one of those people who would say racism is bad, like my family, but would not have a sense of my implication in that as a concept. Whiteness was totally invisible to me.”

Her commitment to antiracism developed in her undergraduate when she took a women’s studies course that introduced her to Black feminist and antiracist intellectual traditions, and, at another time, when she read Richard Wright’s novel, *Native Son*. The principle character in the novel is an African American youth who is struggling with poverty in Chicago’s South Side. Though she has not returned to the novel since first
reading it “a lot of things fell into place”. Throughout her undergraduate studies, between the ages of 23 and 26, she experienced lots of ‘white guilt.’ This guilt, she recounts, coincided with a “very preachy” attitude. The guilt ended when she entered graduate school having addressed certain dilemmas related to being a white antiracist.

Lynda does not see the work of antiracism as one with an end but of multiple stages. She is vigilant in not acting out of privilege and mainly focuses on addressing systematic racism within organizations. Her most influential writers, websites, and speakers on the subject of racism/antiracism include Dionne Brand, Dean Spade, Tomson Highway, Jasbir Puar, Vivek Shraya Kim Katrin Milan, crunkfeministcollective.com, autostraddle.com, and feministing.com.

Maria:

Maria is a straight woman in her early 30s. She identifies both as white and Caucasian yet problematizes the assumed homogeneity of these labels. She experiences her whiteness as intertwined with ethnicity. She is “Slavic, which is a racial category in Europe” and in Europe, there is a hierarchy in whiteness; “Slavs are below Western and Northern Europeans”. Maria has two Masters, in Culture Studies and Sociology, and politically identifies with social democrats and the Green Party.

Prior coming to Canada, she worked in Ireland. It is there that she began to develop an awareness of racism. She encountered xenophobic sentiments against Eastern European immigrants and witnessed racist and xenophobic sentiments against racial minority immigrants. In Ukraine, where she lived prior Ireland, “nobody is Black so [racism] is not an issue in the sense that it doesn't really affect you or your friends. You
hear racist views but you don’t really know too much what it means until you really see it happening to real people.” Racism became an issue for the first time for her in Britain; where she saw it happen to ‘real people’.

The intense experience of her two close friends in Hungary would further impress in her the meaning and impact of ‘race’.

My Ethiopian friend got pregnant and she was mistreated by people on the Metro and regularly pointed at. She was also discriminated against by our professor because of her pregnancy and skin color. Hungary is a 99.9% white country. And then a friend of mine got hit and nearly killed; a Mexican guy. He was gay, so there was another layer to what happened to him. They ruptured his skull; he was in a coma for two weeks. So these experiences of my friends in Hungary, that was the moment where I consciously started to think about [racism] much more and started to do things like participate in political actions.

Maria mobilized classmates and sought to help her Ethiopian friend. This was her first time engaging in bystander antiracism in a strategic and focused manner. Her general participation in political activism also exposed her to a heterogeneous network of women. Some identified as lesbians, others as bisexuals, and “many are women of color.” Through her friendships and activism with these women her antiracism commitment solidified. At the time of this interview, she had also taken graduate-level courses on ‘race’ and racism.

Maria credits the communist proclivity and anti-anti-Semitic (against anti-Semitism) sentiments in her extended family as the early seeds for her political conscious. She owes her racial literacy primarily to bell hooks, Cornell West, Hannah Arendt, some of Trevor Noah’s guest talks, and websites such as counterpunch.org and democracynow.org.
Natasha:

Natasha is an Etobicoke-born early 50s professor in a Social Science department at a prestigious university in Ontario. She classifies herself as a straight white woman with Irish, Jewish, Polish and English ancestry and is an atheist. Politically, like other participants, she too affiliates with the left.

Her antiracism awakening began during high school in Calgary, where she adopted leftist perspectives that were inclusive to racial issues. Natasha finds the narrative that feminism is an all white movement as sweeping. She mentions that some white feminists were part of groups that brought racialization and racism into their analysis of patriarchy.

Calgary, where she spent her formative years, “is really redneck”. Yet it is there that she was immersed in a leftist group that simultaneously tackled racism. “We loved, loved, loved Angela Davis”, she recalls. She then moved to Toronto and New York for graduate school and work. These cities outshone Calgary in terms of diversity. Upon moving there however she noticed that their local women’s movement was fragmented; with the main core being the ‘white feminism’ brand and smaller groups adopting an analysis intersecting gender, immigration, and racialization. There was no such fragmentation in the left during the coming of age of her political consciousness in Calgary. Unlike bigger cities, the left in Calgary could not afford to break into smaller groups because of their numerical paucity, thus laying the groundwork for her intersectional politics.
Natasha was also exposed to ‘radical humanism’ and ‘Christian humanism’ during her upbringing. This part of the Christian movement stresses freedom from discrimination, human rights and it values science, rationality, and the earthly experience. Her mother’s opinions distinguished her from other Christians. Her mother “used to always stand up to her own mother who could be quite racist and so forth,” Natasha recalls. “That didn’t mean my mother couldn’t also be racist, but she was willing to learn.” Though she neither identifies as Jewish nor was not brought up with Judaism, antisemitism partly stimulated the development of her racial cognizance.

Key influential authors and works in the development of her antiracism include: Angela Davis’s *Race, Class and Gender*; Heidi Hartman’s *The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism*; almost everything bell hooks wrote; Nancy Fraser’s *Justus Interruptus*; and Raewyn Connell’s *Southern Theory*.

**Rose:**

Rose is a Nova Scotian born woman who identifies as a lesbian. She is in her mid 20s and is a midwife. She self-classifies as white when discussing inequality “because it has more power; it is more truthful.” She affiliates with left wing politics and supports a left party based on its members of parliament.

Rose’s race-cognizance awakening began in the Northwest Territories. She grew up in a Catholic household in a secular community surrounded by reservations and witnessed multiple instances of anti-Indigenous racism. The derogatory comments she heard about racialized people “was a running theme throughout my life. And [it became] more overt when we got up North and even when I moved back to [Nova Scotia].”
The Inuit resented the white population that had settled on their territory. This resentment was a reflection of the power differential between the two and the fact that settlers often exercised their group power paternalistically and to the detriment of the Inuit.

It is not until Rose went to university, volunteered in women centres, and was surrounded by “a really rad group of white feminists” that she learned about anti-oppression. This helped her understand her early experiences as shaped by racial and settler privilege. This group of white feminists have been invaluable to Rose. She emphasizes the importance of whites being proactive in developing their race-cognizance rather than doing so at the expense, request and time of racialized persons. Also influential in the waking of her antiracism is the hypocrisy she witnessed as a child. She was raised with “be kind to others”:

but then it's permissible to talk about other groups of people, especially Indigenous Canadians and Black Canadians. [Adults would] say the most awful things, but then as a little kid you are supposed to be super kind and nice and respectful and say please and thank you. I could sense that incongruence my whole life.

Most influential sources in the shaping of her antiracism include writers Sheila Sampath, James Baldwin, Maya Angelou, and Lisa Spanierman (academic); website Shameless Magazine; and presentations from El Jones and Black Lives Matter.

**Zoe:**

Zoe was born in the USA. She identifies as a queer white woman with English ancestry and is in her late 20s. She has a Master’s degree in History, and works as a coordinator in a social service. Politically she affiliates with anarchism; a fact she shares
hesitantly and discriminately. The seeds of Zoe’s antiracism awakening date to her
childhood. She was raised in a ‘pretty white town’. Her father however worked at the
local university. A lot of his colleagues were Chinese and Indian, most of them
immigrants. This normalized the idea of interracial friendships for her. This idea would
manifest during her high school in the close friendships she had with persons of varied
racial backgrounds.

Zoe grins at being the nonconformist in her family. At ten, she became a
vegetarian. This caused ‘a big fight in my family,’ she recounts. Her nonconforming trait
however was but an expression of her deep upset at cruelty towards animals, the bullied,
and rigid hierarchy. In high school she advocated for various causes; she wrote letters and
joined an environmental club. She was adamant about certain values and I suspect that the
family resistance she faced enforced her nonconformity. Her encounter with the topic of
racism was partly through high school subjects on the civil rights movements and slavery,
which she expressed as being superficially framed. More influential to the awakening of
her race-cognizance during her teens was her observation of the relationship between
‘race’ and place. Occasionally, she traveled to Lansing and Detroit from her ‘white town’:

and would wonder why is it that all the black people are over here and all the
white people are over here? Why do the cities look very different? And very
segregated? I started to take notice of things more. I also realized the way people
talked about Native people, they could get away with a lot of more than if that had
been a Black person or something. There were those differences. And a lot of
Mexicans and Latin@s in the US—I saw the different ways people would
discriminate and have these different notions. And so as I learned these nuances I
realized how messed up it was and how prevalent racism still was, and that made
me angry.
Her antiracism praxis occurred in Canada. During her post-secondary studies, she took courses in human rights and racism, peace studies, and the African diaspora. Her antiracism walk draws from legends including bell hooks, Ward Churchill, Marcus Garvey, and Malcolm X.

My Biography

I am a 30-year-old cis-gendered heterosexual man. Racially, I am a multicultural Black with West-African values. I did not know what it meant to be Black until I encountered the idea and, eventually, the presence of White people, which marked the genesis of the development of my race-cognizance. This was in the 1980s and ‘90s, in the backdrop of post-colonial West Africa and struggling nationalist movements. A continent struggling to find and recreate its identity in response to the devastation brought by Europe—the land of the insatiable white ghosts; the hungry ghosts. The first 9 years of my life was spent growing up in several countries—Burkina-Faso, Djibouti, Chad, Uganda, Republic of the Congo, and Ivory Coast—each for about a year or two.

Way before I had physically met white persons, I learned that to be White meant to be an envied status. I learned of this association especially by being in a diplomat family. Driving in a white Toyota Land Cruiser with big “UN” letterings on its doors was generally met with appreciation and respect on one side, and petitioning or begging on the other. These gestures were not directed to the black bodies in the Toyota however but to their status afforded by their proximity to whiteness embodied as the UN. The UN was then known as a charitable organization through which Europeans (white people) help Africans (black people). One need only look at the image it creates of itself: white helps,
black receives. It was thus as much about ‘race’ as class; to the popular imagination
White was a marker of class status. The idea of poor whites was as foreign as snow; more
than foreign, it was a sacrilege, an impossibility, an affront to the social order.

Whiteness as an envied status was at times bluntly articulated in my surrounding. Strangers, acquaintances, and even extended family members wished that one day I would go “chez les blanc” (to the white people place; to the West). These were compliments and blessings. But in these gestures and compliments was also a curse: a curse about blackness and the black place. The black place as a geographical area, but more than that, as a materially and subjectively wanting status. Relative to the White place, the black place, the black body was a repelling or neutral body; with no force of attraction of its own.

During my childhood, my race-cognizance developed further upon meeting the physical white body. From the affairs surrounding these meetings I learned that whiteness is terror. None had sat me down to tell me whiteness was terror, but my observation of the transformation the black body underwent in their presence revealed the message in the bottle. I recall the harsh warnings I received about how I should be when in the presence of the white subject. I had to be in my upmost behavior, which meant fluently mimicking European, white norms. It is not that we believed their norms to be more civilized; it is that we believed their perception of us was tied to our wellbeing; especially material wellbeing. The transformation of and on the body was a labour of stiffening my body. Like the Soldier that promptly straightens up when the Colonel walks in, white terror was
experienced as an evaluative gaze on my carefree, agile, black body. The gaze demanded a certain posture, demeanour, and conduct; one that is familiar to them but foreign to us.

Idi Amin was bad, that I was bluntly told, but in the 1980s and ‘90s the message in the bottle also had another narrative: don’t mess with Whites. After all, father is paid in American dollars; these dead presidents are white. Our anti-colonial heroes are dead; European powers played a role. And the continent is still licking its wounds. Yes, whiteness is terror. In this sense, I learned that to be black is to have to put on a show, a minstrel dance, to the white body. This show is a single-line script: “Allow me to make you comfortable”. To the age of nine I learned to be black as a diplomat’s child in the African context. After that, when I went “chez les blanc”, slowly and gradually, my Blackness became particularly political; a matter of resistance.

This selective biography is the early foundation that explains my interest in subjects pertaining to ‘race’, racism and equity, and, more broadly, oppression and human rights. Influential intellectual influences include Thomas Sankara, Malcolm X, bell hooks, Tupac, Frantz Fanon, the story of Jesus of Nazareth, Alicia Garza, Kat Blaque, Franchesca Ramsey, Patricia Hill Collins, Kimberlé Crenshaw, Andrea Smith, Ajamu Nangwaya, Cornel West, James Baldwin, and Karl Marx. My intellectual perspective in this field can be summarized with the following tenets:

1. ‘Race’ is a social construct; it takes different meanings in different places and times. It is a cultural, political, and economic concept.

2. Though it has no scientific basis, ‘race’ shapes our life experiences because of racialization.
3. In modern history, the meaning of ‘race’ is determined by a system that values people defined as “white”. This system is known as white supremacy.

4. Racism is the by-product of white supremacy and the social power to structure society in a manner that benefits “whites”.

5. Racism is interlocked with other forms of oppressions. It transforms the experience of, say, being gay, as being gay transforms the experience of being Black.

6. “Racism is like a Cadillac, there is a new model every year” ~ Malcolm X

7. White advantage is the outcome of years of affirmative action for whites.

8. Most of us are simultaneously privileged and underprivileged because of the coexistence of different types of oppressions.

9. Incremental steps will not do away with racism. No less than the effort that went into the creation of white supremacy racism is needed for the transformation of society.

10. Antiracism is most effective when it transforms both institutions and people.

11. Antiracism must challenge both race relations, sex-relations and class-relations for the struggle is not solely ideological or cultural, but also material.

12. Antiracism in the African diaspora must be in solidarity with Indigenous rights and sovereignty.

The next four chapters consist of my research findings. The first chapter explores participants’ frames. The second and third explore different types of antiracism praxis. The fourth explores participants’ self-implication awareness.
Chapter 4: Three White Antiracism Frames

When the individual in our Western society recognizes a particular event, he [sic] tends, whatever else he does, to imply in his response (and in effect employ) one or more frameworks or schemata of interpretation of a kind that can be called primary…. 

[A] primary framework is one that is seen as rendering what would otherwise be a meaningless aspect of the scene into something that is meaningful.

~ Erving Goffman (1974, p. 21)

Introduction

Participants in this study primarily understood their antiracism less in terms of identity (“I am antiracist”) and more in terms of action (“I try to do antiracism.”). Many rejected the term “antiracist” outright. Even those who used it linked it to the need for action. This tendency reflects much of the current discourse about antiracism among leaders of the antiracism movement which emphasizes action over identity. That said, participants gave voice to different understandings of the notion of “antiracism as praxis,” drawing on three different frames to explain themselves. The purpose of this chapter is to tease out the different underlying frames informing participants’ understanding of antiracism.

I begin with demonstrating participants’ inclination to conceptualize antiracism as action and the sources they draw from. I then examine the equality and human rights frame, which, though arguably composed of distinct traditions, both draw upon the dominant formal legal equality discourse on freedom, rights, discrimination, and justice in framing antiracism. The equality frame, to a certain degree, mirrors conventional civil rights discourses. Following is the anti-oppression frame. It differs from the former by its centering of group power struggles in how antiracism (and racism) is understood. Additionally, informants speak of antiracism as coexisting with other emancipatory or
justice efforts. The chapter culminates with the whiteness frame. Participants interpret antiracism first by conceptualizing racism as a ‘white people problem’, which is consequential for the meanings given to antiracism, particularly, who its audience consists of.

Erving Goffman is chiefly credited for the concept and study of frames in sociology (Snow, 2007). He introduced the concept in his book *Frames Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience* (1974). Frames refers to the interpretative structure individuals use to make sense of their experience and guide their action. They have three core functions: focusing, articulation, and transformation. Frames *focus* our attention by bracketing what we discard and notice in relation to an object we are oriented to. Frames *articulate* a particular meaning, story or narrative about the object(s) within the brackets. Frames also *transform* or reconstruct how some objects are understood *in relation* to each other and to the actor. An example of the transformative function of frames is “the de-eroticization of the sexual in the physician’s office” (Snow, 2007, p. 1779).

Like ideology, frames are fundamental to the interpretive process. They provide individuals with certain meanings to understand their experiences. These meanings, though malleable, are culturally embedded and brought into new experiences. Besides moments of ambiguity where pre-existing frames are experienced as unsuitable, they are routinely applied. Individuals rarely construct frames *de novo* as they go from one situation to the next. What is more common is the tweaking of frames and deciding which frame(s) to apply to a situation, encounter or experience.
I identify three prevalent action-based frames: the equality and human rights frame, the anti-oppression frame, and the whiteness-oriented frame. This chapter is guided by symbolic interactionism and critical race theory but with an emphasis on the former.

**Antiracism as Action**

Action-oriented interpretations of antiracism are prevalent in the data. Identity-based descriptions are too few for reasonable analysis. Generally, participants express antiracism as a kind of action that can be external (as in oriented towards social affairs) or internal (oriented towards the subject’s own psyche and lifestyle). More than an identity, antiracism is portrayed as a praxis, as bystander actions guided by a particular frame.

Consider Gloria’s hesitation on using the term ‘antiracist’ and Lynda’s conceptualization of antiracism. Gloria stresses that:

I don’t like the word ‘antiracist’ so much as *working in* [antiracism], you know? We strive to be antiracist as whites. Can we actually achieve that?

I am white, I have been inculcated by a racist system. Everything around me has taught me how to be racist. So it is a question of unlearning. That is how I see it. It is a question of decolonizing your mind and then doing something as you get information about yourself and about others; working with that in whatever way you can.

Unlike Gloria, Lynda accepts the label ‘antiracist’. Her framing of it nonetheless similarly emphasizes action:

I use antiracist a lot.... I also refer to myself as an ally from time to time, but I am increasingly uncomfortable with the term.

Ismaël: Why?
Lynda: I read this great blog post by a woman who goes by Black Girl Dangerous. She has this fabulous post about how ally is not an identity, it is a process and you show that you are an ally by doing the work everyday—without recognition potentially, without thanks potentially—because it is the decent thing to do. I have been thinking about that. She really articulated very clearly some stuff I have been thinking about for a while, which is, I am uncomfortable claiming a term like ally when actually what I believe is that this is what it means to be a decent human being; to not watch oppression happen and to intervene. So I do use antiracist [work] so that everyone is on notice on what will and won’t fly in the room.

Ismaël: What then does antiracism mean to you?

Lynda: I agree with Black Girl Dangerous that it is a process, a fraught process. That it means making some kind of intervention into oppressive practices or language or when something happens. It is always in a process of revision.

Antiracism is action for a particular purpose. The nature of the purpose differs based on the frame participants ascribe to.

A few participants attributed a psychological descriptor to their description of antiracism; portraying it not solely as a kind of action but also a feature of the self; a project on the self or a reflexive project of self-making. Traces of antiracism work as a feature of one’s self-concept is evident in Lynda’s passage where allyship and antiracism are considered an aspect of ‘human decency’. Adyvaya shared a similar description:

It is trying to be a decent human being, you know, and trying to have empathy…. [It is also] somebody who is continuously trying to deconstruct the systems of power that are in place that promote racism and being aware of one’s privilege too. You can’t just point the finger out at other things because you are also part of the big machine.

Though Lynda spends considerable time differentiating ‘identity’ from ‘praxis’, her and Adyvaya’s comment challenge convenient conceptual dichotomy. Identity projects and praxis crisscross. Identity and action interpretations of antiracism are not incompatible or mutually exclusive; they exemplify different entry points and emphases in the
conceptualizing of antiracism. In reality, doing antiracism shapes identity formation as antiracism identity projects shape antiracism praxis; the relationship is dialectical.

The proclivity of participants to emphasize antiracism as an action can be accounted for by the sources or milieu that most of them encounter the concept of antiracism—as Lynda’s above-quote on Black Girl Dangerous demonstrates. Gloria’s hesitation with the term ‘antiracist’ and preference of ‘antiracism work’ is primarily due to her immersion in antiracism theory and literature, particularly the works of George Dei of the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education of the University of Toronto (OISE-UFT), who coined the term ‘integrative antiracism’. She reports that after having left OISE following her Masters of Arts:

I didn't hear the word antiracism spoken. You hear 'diversity', you hear 'inclusion'. 'Inclusion, inclusion, inclusion' is the favorite word. It is everywhere. When I went back to OISE, just a few months ago, ‘antiracism’ is all over on all the books. Outside, every book is about inclusion, inclusion. Then I went into George's discussion group, it is antiracism. They haven't let go of the antiracism word. It's really an important word I feel. It's not like I want to call myself an antiracist; I don't need to call myself an antiracist. It is antiracism work that we are doing.

As participants’ biographies show, antiracism is an inter-subjective object; its meaning is fluid and created in interaction with others. Yet, a pattern emerges upon surveying participants’ comments on the sources that have informed their understanding of antiracism (and racism). Their sources chiefly consist of thinkers who are part of or who have been intellectually influenced by African American radical and civil rights traditions and who espouse an on-the-ground, activist oriented objective to antiracism. This concentration of American traditions in the formation of participants’ race-cognizance and praxis is noteworthy. Though tracing how knowledge travels and is taken
up by people across regions is beyond the scope of this thesis, the ‘Americanization’ of Canadian universities may partly explain Lawrence and Dua’s (2005) observation that Canadian antiracism research has for the most part failed to engage with Canada’s settler colonialism. The latter issue is more apparent in our national discourse, especially following inquiries on Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and in light of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, than it is in America.

I asked respondents to name some sources that have played a significant role in the awakening of their antiracism consciousness. In order, the top five include: bell hooks (6 mentions), Maya Angelou (2 mentions), Patricia Monture Angus (2 mentions), Peggy McIntosh (2 mentions), and Kim Katrin Milan (2 mentions). When sources are clustered into intellectual traditions, the predominant cluster is the Black radical and civil rights traditions. Other persons that participants named who are in these traditions include Marcus Garvey, Malcolm X, Audre Lorde, Patricia Hill Collins, James Baldwin, Black Lives Matter founders (Alicia Garza, Patrisse Cullors, and Opal Tometi), and Canadian activists and writers El Jones of Halifax and Desmond Cole of Toronto. Most of these sources are women and feminists, possibly suggesting that participants deliberately sought analyses that simultaneously stress racism and sexism (intersectionality) or, that for most participants, their immersion in racism and antiracism discussions came from their initial, core, or primary involvement in gender issues and feminism praxis.

An example of a movement leader that emphasizes action and intersectionality in their conceptualization of antiracism/allyship is Kim Katrin Milan (previously Crosby). Milan is a multidisciplinary artist and performer who is often invited to universities,
conferences, and panel discussions. She has created over seventy workshops and been featured on CBC Radio, the Toronto Star, the National Post, and other media stations. In many of her public talks, a few of which a participant in this study, Lauren, has organized, Milan uses the “allyship card” analogy to accentuate the action-oriented nature of antiracism:

Your ‘allyship card’ expires at the end of the day, every day. Allyship is not an identity; if anything, it’s a series of actions that are accountable to an individual or a group. They expire and they are not transferrable. (emphasis added, Crosby, 2016, para. 4)

In her Prezi presentation, available online, Crosby also quotes Haitian-American Blogger Feminist Griote: “being an ally is not an identity, it is a process” (Crosby, 2012, slide 1). This behavioral-focused conceptualization of antiracism is shared by all the sources listed above that influenced participants’ ideas on racial justice. In fact, most of them were/proficient organizers and advocates.

The three frames examined in this chapter mirror the action-oriented preference of participants’ definition of antiracism.

1. **Equality and Human Rights Frame: Fairness and Behavioral Focus**

A number of participants framed antiracism using a lens of equality and human rights. Consider Kristin’s definition of antiracism:

Somebody who is fighting for equality in every way that they can. For me I try through learning, through my education, but also when I’m talking with individuals I try to be outspoken about things they say or do that I don’t agree with. And I try to do it in a way that we can have a bit of a discussion about it.

Kristin articulates antiracism as a fight for *equality*. It entails challenging people who transgress codes of racial tolerance and pluralism. Kristin, however, uses the term
‘equality’ loosely. It is not explicit what tradition and principles of equality shape her conceptualization of antiracism. No reference, for instance, is made to whether she is referring to equality of opportunity or outcome. It appears, however, that she is using a conventional liberal(ism) approach to equality. In her words: “I definitely identify with sort of more liberal ideals; not the liberal parties, but leftist ideals…. But I always had those ideas before”. Kristin is not referring to the legalistic aspect of liberalism—courts, law and due process—that is the focus of the human rights frame, but liberalism as a **diffuse set of ideas about fairness, egalitarianism, tolerance, universalism, and relativism**.

According to Bonnett (2000), “within anti-racist discourses, [universalism] is often associated with the conviction that people are all equally part of humanity and should all be accorded the same rights and opportunities” (p. 19). In debates on racial equality, relativism, which is contrasted to universalism, is “the idea that cultural and/or physical differences between races should be recognized and respected; that different does not mean unequal” (p. 13). Traces of relativism undergird Kristin’s antiracism frame. Upon asking her about the foundation(s) of her conceptualization of antiracism, she mentions:

K: Compassion and understanding. I think that having compassion and trying to understand where other people are coming from is the best way of dealing with people. Everyone just gets along when they take time to understand. My feminism and my antiracism are based on that; a deeper understanding of where people came from. We also need to understand what they’re dealing with now. That’s the only way to move forward in building a society that is inclusive, that is understanding, and that people can survive in.

Kristin acknowledges that differences exist in terms of where people come from and the struggles they experience. She does not view differences as intrinsically
problematic. It is the distribution of burdens and privileges allocated to some differences that concerns her. Thus, Kristin is color-conscious in the dimensions of ‘race’ and racism. However, she reckons that having compassion for and understanding differences can lead to an inclusive society. She argues that these qualities should be applied equally to all, thus promoting colorblindness on the dimension of antiracism—on how to bring about racial equality.

I followed up on the comment that she ‘always had those liberal ideas before.’ This steered us to a conversation about her family upbringing: “when we grew up we had a lot of discussions of ‘why this, why that?’ ‘Why’ discussions. And we always had the CBC and BBC on”. Kristin regularly listens to the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) News networks. In fact, she mentioned BBC, CBC and Al Jazeera as sources that have shaped the awakening of her political and racial consciousness. These are centrist or slightly left of centre news stations from which she developed a liberal perspective. Liberal views also influenced the friendships she found most meaningful in high school. For example, she mentions: “I got to meet people that were likeminded with myself and I was like ‘cool there’s people that are reading the BBC and they care about different political issues, awesome! I’m not the only nerd here.’”

Of the two board types of equality, Kristin’s approach mirrors, though not exclusively, formal equality rather than substantive equality. The former is the idea that a person’s social or personal characteristics are irrelevant in determining whether they should be treated equally. It promotes the notion that one law or fair action and procedure
should apply to all persons without social or personal characteristics influencing due process or everyday treatment. Formal equality embodies colorblindness in general, but in this specific frame, it is found in the dimension of antiracism. It emphasizes equality in treatment as opposed to outcome. In the words of Crenshaw (1988), it is a “restrictive view” of anti-discrimination (a matter of equal or fair process) as opposed to an “expansive view” (a matter of equality in substantive conditions or outcomes). As such, formal equality is meritocratic in value. So long as persons are treated equally, diversity in outcome is deemed acceptable because, outside of extreme cases, it is assumed to be based on individual merit. To be sure, Kristin does not fully adhere to meritocracy. As we saw above, she is not colorblind on the dimensions of ‘race’ and racism. She does not deny or minimize “the existence of racism in its many forms (e.g., individual, interpersonal, cultural, and institutional) and the role of race in people’s lives”. Neither does she “ignore racism in explaining societal disparities [or blames] the targets of racism for their plight” (Neville, Poteat, Lewis, & Spnieran, 2014, p, 180).

In the dimension of antiracism, however, she does appear to ascribe to colorblindness, reflecting her egalitarian value. To the anti-oppression and whiteness frames, colorblind antiracism is an oxymoron because it ignores racial group power differences and its implication for antiracism. Borrowing the concept of Ruth Frankenberg (1993), a colorblind antiracism is power-evasive. To Kristin, though, equal treatment should apply to everyone; meaning, antiracism can be directed towards any persons that transgress codes of racial tolerance irrespective of ‘where they are coming
from’, such as their sociorace. This explains why in one of her accounts on praxis Kristin shares an experience of directing antiracism towards non-white persons:

I have some really good friends who are like family to me. They’re from the Middle East. I didn’t notice it before but they make racial comments about other groups but think because they’re a racial minority it’s totally ok for them to do it. And every time I’m there I start a hand tally. So the last time I made twelve. Just in the weekend I was there. I go like that (demonstrates) and I count them out…. They’ve become a little bit more aware. Sometimes they kind of joke about it and they’ll do it and they’ll be like ‘Oh! Is that a count?’ and I’ll be like ‘That was a count guys. Like, that’s not great.’ I’ve noticed that they catch themselves a bit more now.

Under the frame of liberalism—specifically, formal equality—it makes sense that Kristin would offer an example of antiracism in which its targets are racial subalterns. This suggests that she believes ‘racism’ to be a fitting concept to describe racial discrimination among or by racial minorities, which she explicitly mentions, as examined in the anti-oppression frame section. Such a conceptualization of racism and antiracism is contested by the other two frames.

The human rights frame is often connected to a legalistic approach to thinking about these issues. Owing to her training in human rights law, Alexandra is able to explicitly articulate racism and antiracism from a legalistic lens:

Because of my legal training, I differentiate between what is just a thought and what is an action. If it is an action, it is probably something that is against the human rights code or the criminal code. If it is a thought, so far in this country we have freedom of thought, and there is nothing you can do about it.

Alexandra does not believe in ‘thought policing’. Yet, she maintains that:

Thoughts can still be racist. Racism includes your thoughts as well as your actions but we have measures; we have legal instruments to deal with things that are actionable. There are a lot of racist thoughts that are the precursor to these actions; actions that we criminalize or outlaw by various codes.
Having explored how her legal training informs her understanding of antiracism, I proceeded to ask her what antiracism means for her:

Antiracism is a perspective that demonizes or critiques a certain kind of behavior. So you are not against a race of people. You are not saying all these people are bad. You are saying this particular kind of behavior that we are calling racist behavior—that is bad. We are against that behavior. I was partly influenced by the [law] environment that I was in, where you outlaw certain behaviors; you don't outlaw people—unless you are an immigration lawyer, but that's a different story. We can't control people's thoughts [either]. Although I'd like to but you can't, but no matter what you think of somebody else, it is not OK to throw eggs at their door; it is not OK to assault someone. And so I can train people to a particular policy or law and say if you cross this line you are breaking the law, you are breaking this policy. I can do that. So that is what I focus on. The antiracism training that I have been involved in would usually be around the human rights code. If you pass this line you are in violation of the human rights code, or hate crime laws, etc.

A human rights approach to antiracism permits a particular precision and legitimacy in addressing racism by evoking the authority of the state; a powerful symbol and arbitrator of the social contract. The precision of this frame is in its emphasis on discriminatory behaviors as opposed to prejudice (attitudes and feelings). However, not all discriminatory behaviors are illegal (e.g., someone refusing to date another person because of their sociorace or positive employment equity hiring). The human rights frame is limited to tackling unlawful discriminatory acts. Additionally, it uses laws, codes and policies to curtail, redress and/or punish grounds of discrimination in specific social areas: accommodation (housing), contracts, employment, goods, services and facilities, and membership in unions, trade or professional associations.

Alexandra has found the human rights frame to be effective in advancing antiracism in the workplace—where leadership, management, administration, and staff are the audience—because it entails judicial penalty for failure to abide by the law.
Failure to abide can yield human rights complaints, litigations, employment termination, and other legal penalties. These are costly and time-consuming disputes, especially in this epoch of austerity measures. The authority of the state and the consequence of transgressing the law thus instil an aura of seriousness to antiracism. Alexandra contrasts the seriousness this frame begets versus appeals to emotions and morals; what she calls “the touchy-feely” stuff. Having tried the latter approach early in her career as an antiracism trainer, she witnessed her audience “turn right off and say this is a waste of time and start looking at their watches and looking out of the window”.

From a critical race perspective, one concern about the legalistic approach is that it constructs racism as an aberration to the norm. It assumes that outside of unlawful racial discrimination, the social order is un-raced, racial bias-free and meritocratic. It views racism as an uncharacteristic add-on to a racially neutral system that can be addressed through case-by-case legal actions rather than see racism as “a fundamental, endemic, and normalized way of organizing society. Beginning with the appropriation of indigenous lands and building the economy on a system of slavery, White people created race and racism for their own benefit” (Sleeter, 2012, p. 491). Additionally, the focus on behavior means that only observable and blatant acts of discrimination by individuals and organizations can be addressed. Most manifestations of present-day racism, however, are unmarked and unintended for racism has been wedged into the business-as-usual of social institutions.

Alexandra would not disagree with these critiques; after all, her antiracism is a blend of various schools of thoughts including a cross-cultural paradigm, a critique of
whiteness and settler colonialism, human rights law, and a CRT-like antiracism approach.

As she states:

One of my early teachers was someone who does a lot of antiracism work and I learned a lot from him. He really got me involved in thinking and reading and really internalizing a lot of basically my insights that I have now in antiracism.

To Alexandra racism is not an aberration. She defines it as “the exercise of power and privilege” and refers to Canada as “without a doubt a racist society in every possible way”. She acknowledges that thoughts can be racist, so too systems, but because of her legal training, her entry-point or emphasis is on behavior—discriminatory actions of individuals and organizations prohibited and addressable by law. Addressable does not solely entail a punitive measure. Human rights is principally remedial; it focuses on redressing situations such that equity-informed changes are adopted by the offending party, whether an individual or an organization.

Nonetheless, from a CRT lens, a liberal legalistic approach to systematic change is incremental. Progressive changes are slow to come, easily thwarted or reversed, and very tenuous. The human rights frame assumes that the legal system can deliver the radical transformations needed for an equitable, just and truly meritocratic social order. It works through the legal system and usually fails to critique the legal system itself as an agent in maintaining contemporary racial stratification. Indeed, Delgado and Stefancic (2001) write that:

An impartial observer casting an eye over the landscape of the law would conclude that most of our stories are very similar—variations on a theme of incremental reform carried out within the bounds of dominant Western tradition. (p. 214)
Virtually all of Critical Race Theory is marked by deep discontent with liberalism, a system of civil rights litigation and activism characterized by incrementalism, faith in the legal system, and hope for progress, among other things. Indeed, virtually every essay in this book can be seen as an effort to go beyond the legacy of mainstream civil rights thought to something better. (p. 1)

Alexandra has faith in the legal system. She is a reformist, not a revolutionary. She does, however, express parallel critiques about a racial equity approach that excessively draws upon the legal apparatus and Ontario’s Human Rights Code. For example, she is disappointed with how easily retractable her previous workplace antiracism efforts have been:

I tried so hard to make things systematized, to take a systematic approach. But you realize that just one incident can set you back or someone’s personality can set you back…. So much is dependent on who the [the person in charge] is, what their vision is, and what kind of support you are really getting [for your antiracism work]. I tried to put things in place so that it is enshrined in policy and in training, so that it is in the system, but its execution depends so much on the higher ups. The person who replaced me when I left also had a different approach to issues [diversity and racism].

I had done a lot of work and felt like we really made progress. But then there was this incident with a [Black] guy…. And there are still ongoing incidents like that. Every time that I hear about them I cringe and think that all that hard systematic work seems to recede into the history. And nobody is capturing or recording the history; nobody knows what the history of antiracism was. I worked very hard at the time that I was there, building a relationship with the Aboriginal community for example. After I left the person who replaced me had an event and said it is our “first meeting” with the Aboriginal community! It makes me feel sad that that whole history of partnering with racialized communities was lost, you know? … I was involved in trying to make some real changes, using the Aboriginal community as an example, for things the Aboriginal people wanted to see. But since I left what it has evolved into now as far as I can tell is that every year there is a mini-powwow and people come and play the drums and sing songs and have this celebration, but what are you actually celebrating? I don't see any real work being done in terms of changes in hiring practices, or changing in policing practices.
Alexandra does not frame or link the hurdles of systematic change to “liberalism” as critical race theorists do. The concerns she raises, however, parallels CRT’s critique of conventional legalistic equality. For example, she bemoans progress as tenuous and reversible, workplace colorblindness, and structural change as too contingent upon individual employees. There is not much, if any, proactive provincial accountability measures for organizations with a certain staff size that do not adopt employment equity practices, hence the whimsical nature of workplace equity initiatives.

The behavioral focus in her framing of antiracism resurfaced in our discussion on how to identify racism through a human rights lens. Alexandra refers to legal principles on ‘impact and intention’, explaining that it is through impact that the case law in the Human Rights Code developed. Just as unintentionally driving through a red light does not make it less of a criminal offence than intentionally doing so, a lack of intent to discriminate is not a legitimate defence for human rights violations or in detecting discrimination. It is legally sufficient that one’s conduct has a discriminatory effect.\footnote{The following example from the Ontario Human Rights Commission clarifies: “An older man applies for a job at a trendy women’s clothing store. The young woman who interviews him finds him pleasantly similar to her favourite grandfather and tells him this as a compliment. Later, the man is told that he does not have the right qualifications, and that the person hired had “more energy” and could relate better to the mainly female clients. This may be discrimination based on age and gender, even though it is clear the interviewer liked the man on a personal basis, and the person actually hired may have been more qualified for the job.” (OHRC, 2008)}

Applying this to antiracism, Alexandra comments:

It is not a defense to say to someone 'oh I didn't mean that to be a racial joke'. It's the impact. So what we do as lawyers when we have this kind of case, part of the evidence that we have to marshal is what has been the impact on the person on the receiving end because that is the piece to look at; it's not the intention of the person doing it. This idea that intent isn't important means it takes the lens away
from us having to prove whether a white person is intentionally racist or not, because that's just like chasing a needle in a haystack or a dog chasing its own tail. Because of the way that racism is so pervasive and the way white people have been trained to not recognize it and not name it, if you have to prove something is intentional about something that they are not even trained to recognize in their own heads, how are you ever going to prove that? So by changing the focus on to the impact and what the adverse effects are of the impact, you take away that whole challenge of having to prove someone's intention.

Both the equality and human rights legal frames of antiracism hinge on certain principles of liberalism. First, though they are not colorblind on the dimensions of ‘race’ and racism, there is a degree of colorblindness in the dimension of antiracism. To be sure, the human rights frame has exceptions, called special measures, where attributes such as sociorace can be lawfully used to address discrimination. However, these are “special” measures, meaning, it is not the standard. The legal standard is formal equality, which is colorblind and universal in the application of the law and, thus, in addressing racial discrimination. Indeed, human rights is about the rights of all humans, unlike substantive equality, which is about the distinct substandard conditions of a discrete group that by virtue of their distinctive conditions require differential treatment in the application of the law.

Secondly, both frames emphasize antiracism as a response to discriminatory behavior, mainly—though not exclusively—of individuals. The equality frame has a broader benchmark for what said behavior entails. The human rights approach limits it to unlawful acts. In both cases, however, antiracism is viewed as a response to detectable or overt individual discrimination or, when at the level of organization, the consequence of de jure racism as opposed to the routine business-as-usual operation of contemporary institutions through colorblind values such as meritocracy, equal treatment, and promotion criteria within an already racially stratified society. Racism is mainly
conceived as actions contrary to conventional norms of racial tolerance and fairness, or to law, policy and the human rights code. Thirdly, more so than the human rights frame, the abstract equality frame is group power-evasive in its conceptualization of racism and antiracism. This is elaborated upon in the next section.

In concluding, I return to Kristin. Passages where participants compare-and-contrast themselves to a prototype of antiracism provide additional information on how they conceptualize, position and perceive themselves in relation to antiracism. Kristin expressed unease in self-labeling as antiracist, thus revealing an internalized prototype of antiracism she uses to evaluate herself against, one that she believes she falls short of:

I feel like I’m too flawed or something to take on that title. I’m not worthy of taking on these different titles. It’s not that I... I don’t know... that I have a thing against taking [on this title]. I just don’t feel like I can.... I just feel like somebody who’s committed to that label should be a bit more committed to taking part in activities that are against racism. But that said, I mean, there are people in different communities that are active in different ways. I’m just holding myself to a different standard I guess.

It was initially unclear what ‘activities’ Kristin considers as criteria to construct her dichotomy of ‘committed’ versus ‘flawed’ antiracism. Upon following-up, she specified:

I have a hard time taking on the label because I don’t see myself as... It’s not that I am actively joining groups or it’s my own little mission to sort of stop instances that I see.... I feel like maybe my scope should be a bit broader.

Kristin is holding a mirror of how she should be doing antiracism; of what ‘real antiracism’ consists of. I commented on her ‘looking-glass self’ or ‘reflected appraisal’ and its impact on her sense of unworthiness. She responded:

Yeah. That’s how I see it. One of my best friends who lives in Germany is sort of my ideal of what I’d like to be. He works with Oxfam a lot. He’s a PhD. He joins a lot of different, let’s call them antiracist groups and political groups, and is very
outspoken. And I’m just like *wooow*. That’s so great that he feels he can do that. And he’s *white*. That’s cooool!

Kristin feels she is undeserving of the label ‘antiracism’/‘antiracist’ because she falls short of her prototype. Her praxis is certainly not ‘armchair activism’, ‘slacktivism’, or ‘clicktivism’. These are popular terms that are often used derogatively for activism that is limited to, respectively, talking and criticizing, minimal effort and staying within one’s comfort boundaries, and digital activism such as ‘clicking’ a support button for a cause¹⁸. To Kristin, though, ‘calling people out’ is also insufficient. She believes her scope should be broader. Broadening means actively joining antiracist or political groups, doing equity-oriented work through a progressive organization, attending rallies, being very outspoken, and making racial equality a salient personal mission. These are her benchmarks of ‘committed antiracism’. Using the conveyor belt model, Kristin conceptualizes antiracism as running against the flow of the conveyor belt—like her friend in Germany. She however sees herself as walking, not running. Her uneasiness in self-labeling as an ‘antiracist’ stems from the mismatch between the ‘broader scope’ (running) and her personal praxis (walking), which is generally reactive as opposed to proactive, sporadic as opposed to customary, and individualistic as opposed to group-based. Case (2012) observes a similar prototype of antiracism in her study on white antiracist women. Like Kristin, “most of the women did not identify themselves as ‘activists’”. However, rather than viewing themselves as falling short of racial justice activism, they all “thought of

¹⁸ See Mary Butler’s (2011) thesis titled “Clicktivism, Slacktivism, or 'Real' Activism? Cultural Codes of American Activism in the Internet Era”. See also concerns of ableism as permeating narratives of traditional vs. digital activism: Sarah Washington (2017) “Labelling People as 'Armchair Activists' is Ableist”.
activism as something that expands far beyond the typical conception of rallies, protests, and boycotts” (p. 87).

Kristin’s peers also play a role in her reflective appraisal and construction of ‘real’ versus ‘flawed’ antiracism, yet again highlighting the intersubjective and interactional construction of meanings:

Ismaël: Are there any concrete situations or examples where you would say that you are acting on your antiracism?

Kristin: No, because I have been hesitant to join any rallies or groups or anything like that. Because I guess as a white female I feel hesitant to do it; I feel kind of a sham! I don’t fit in with the group.

I: That’s interesting. This is the second time you mention that. The first being ‘and he’s white!’ and now you’re saying this. But why is that, why don’t you think as a white person you can be part of an antiracist group?

D: I feel like there isn’t the legitimacy. I mean I know there is the legitimacy in my ability to call someone out and to talk with them. But even when I hang around with my friends that are of different minorities and I’ll say something and they’ll be like: ‘well, you’re just white.’

I: Like you do not know what you’re talking about in terms of racism or?

D: Along those lines yeah. So how can I participate in an organization or an active rally or anything like that when I don’t feel accepted for what I believe in?

I: Or you are accepted for what you believe in but you do not have the experiences to back it up is that it, or?

D: Yeah, maybe, yeah. I don’t have the positive experiences to back it up. Yeah. I still don’t feel… But I think that it’s my own personal issue that I think I am dealing with. I think it’s an anxiety kind of a thing. I don’t feel legitimate in joining a rally because ‘oh, you know what? I maybe am not legitimate enough to join it.’

Prototypes are constructed by a group during a certain period and location and are in response to aspects of the immediate and extended context. Kristin’s prototype of
antiracism consists of popular images of grassroots resistance that centre a community organizing and mobilizing model of change, and, more in her immediate sphere, student activism. Kristin’s praxis, however, is mainly expressed as lone wolf quotidian bystander antiracism. Though not mutually exclusive, this is dissimilar to grassroots or student activism that some other interviewees participate in.

During conversations about racism, Kristin’s sociorace situates her in a particular position among her racially diverse peers that she experiences as a sort of dilemma, confusion, tension; a position in which she ‘feels kind of like a sham’, does not ‘feel accepted for what she believes in’, and does not ‘fit in with the group.’ These dilemmas may be by-products of a ‘frame conflict’ between the colorblind equality frame and frames that explicitly implicate one’s sociorace in antiracism, such as the whiteness frame. More succinctly, Kristin’s moral dilemmas and concerns about being illegitimate may be by-products of debates about representation (who gets to speak and for who), positionality (where one stands in relation to others based especially on social identities), and racial epistemology (who can understand racism, how they can understand racism, and what evidence they can martial for racism) (Hunter, 2002, p. 12). These debates have implications for antiracism.

Regarding epistemology, Kristin’s moral dilemma may reflect uncertainty about where to position herself in the insider-outsider debate. The outsider doctrine argues that the “outsider has a structurally imposed incapacity to comprehend [experiences], groups, statuses, cultures, and societies [that he/she does not experience or is not a part of]” (Merton, 1972, p. 15). The insider doctrine, in its strong form, claims that only
“particular groups in each moment of history have monopolistic access to particular kinds of knowledge” (*ibid*, p. 11). Patricia Collins, a key contributor to CRT and Black feminism, merged the outsider-insider dichotomy by introducing her theory of partial perspective:

Partial perspective describes a situation where each identity group is in the best position to create knowledge about its own reality: Puerto Ricans are best equipped to describe Puerto Rican social life, for instance. This does not preclude other groups from representing someone else’s reality, but it does caution that the analysis from the group itself is to be taken most seriously. This way of defining authority in the knower contrasts slightly to the notion of epistemic privilege in the colonial domination epistemology (where members of the dominant group can never be knowers), and also contrasts to the universal authority granted to knowers in the neo-liberal positivist epistemology. (Hunter, 2002, p. 128)

The anti-oppression and whiteness frames offer a particular response to some of the moral dilemmas Kristin is experiencing.

2. **Anti-Oppression Frame: Group Power and Intersectionality**

Participants with an anti-oppression frame explained antiracism as a two-part process: the repudiation of racist practice and its opposition. Informants emphasized oppressive language and institutional racial homogeneity and inequality as that which is opposed. In practice, however, their opposition targets various appearances of racism and takes both proactive and reactive forms. As Lauren puts it:

> [Antiracism] often comes up in terms of a framework, so antiracist or anti-oppression is how I would think about how I respond to situations where I am hearing oppressive language or hateful language….

For Lauren, antiracism is an action that consists of two related practices:

I would define antiracism as—it has two parts. One is *not* participating in activities or actions or language that I understand to be racist. And two is intervening in situations that I am exposed to where I see racism taking place. So
there are two parts.

I recapitulated the two-part definition as ‘non-doing and doing’. She responded:

Yes! Not going along with something, and also intervening. I want to use the term ‘correcting’, but ‘correcting’ isn’t [the best word].

The two step distinction is reiterated by Zoe:

To be [an] antiracist is not only to actively avoid being racist but also to work towards a culture where other people in our community are actively not racist and trying to stop instances of racism. So not only being neutral or not racist but also going to the next step and trying to do something; trying to prevent racism and stepping in when things happen.

Additionally, in contrast to the previous frame, which constructs antiracism as colorblind efforts at addressing racial intolerance or unlawful racial discrimination, an anti-oppression frame emphasizes group power differences. This is a crucial distinction between this and the previous frame and is consequential for the resulting conceptualization of antiracism. For example, using an anti-oppression frame, Lauren and Zoe maintain that as members of the hegemonic or dominant group they cannot be the targets of racism. The human rights focus on the behavior of individuals, however, blurs the line between ‘discrimination’ and ‘racism’. For instance, in the human rights frame, racially motivated hate crimes are a type of racial discrimination. This begs the questions: is ‘racial discrimination’ the same as ‘racism’? If not, what explains the difference? Are how these two terms are used conditional on the racial background of an assailant and the target, or contingent upon racial group power differences? From an anti-oppression frame, the behavioral focus of the human rights frame is group power-evasive. It fails to account for how racial stratification and the relationship between a racial group’s stratum and its access to resources and power have implications for both racism and antiracism.
Similarly, the colorblind individual-centred egalitarian approach of the equality frame differs from the group conflict and power relations emphasis of the anti-oppression frame. This difference was revealed when participants were asked if they have experienced or been the target of racism. Kristin, who espouses an equality frame, responded affirmatively:

Yes. One time I got really uppity with a guy when I was in my hometown. We have an ethnic food festival in my hometown every summer. And I was there with my [Middle Eastern] ‘family’. They introduced me to a friend of theirs that they had met, and he goes, to them, ‘oh, you guys are [Middle Eastern]?’ And then he turns to me:

Kristin mimics a repugnant tone of voice:

‘What are you?’

I was like, ‘Canadian.’
And he goes: ‘no, but what are you from?’
I got angry. It was like why do you need to ask me? What does it matter? I’m not really anything because my family is this messed up dog’s breakfast of a whole bunch of different heritages. But that aside why do you need to say ‘oh she’s Polish. Oh she’s French Canadian’? Why do you need to know that? You haven’t even asked my name but you’re asking what am I? I kinda wanted to tell him to fuck off….

And then it was almost a daily occurrence when I was in Korea, because I am a white female and I am small. I got elbowed in the face once intentionally and I was spat on. Somebody also pushed me out of the way when I was reading a thing in the museum. Apparently I didn’t need to be there. I was reading about the Korean War and this woman and her husband came over and just pushed me right out of the way. Literally, with their hands, just pushed me out of the way.

My goal in asking participants their personal experience with racism was to unearth more about the frame they use to conceptualize antiracism. An anti-oppression frame would define Kristin’s examples not as ‘racism’ but as ‘prejudice’ or ‘discrimination’. This distinction is not semantics; it influences what is assumed to be an appropriate response to
racism (Unzueta & Lowery, 2008, p. 1491). While Kristin responds affirmatively to having experienced racism, Lauren is terse but unequivocal in her answer:

Ismaël: Have you ever experienced racism?

Lauren: No, I haven’t. I am white.

Lauren maintains that though she has no memory of it happening, theoretically, she can be the target of ‘prejudice’ or ‘discrimination’ but not racism. Her reference to her whiteness as an explanation for why she cannot be the target of racism is proxy for being part of the dominant group in the racial order; for having more social power. Rose and Zoe hold a similar perspective. I asked Rose if she had ever experienced racism:

No. I’ve felt prejudice when I grew up in places where I was the minority just in term of skin-color. Like I grew up in Northern Canada—but that's not about me. Like that's prejudice which is very different from racism. Racism is like—I keep using the word structurally entrenched. And prejudice is just sort of like an interpersonal attitude or a feeling.

Consider Zoe’s response to the same question:

I am sure people have treated me differently because I am white, but honestly like I don’t even view it as racism. It is not that I think that [I am not racialized]. I know that there are these ideas that race is about everyone else except white people; that is not what I mean. What I mean is that I am at the top of the 'races'. Because of the privilege [it affords me], if someone treats me differently because I am white then yeah it is based on my race but I also feel that because I have all this white privilege that it is sort of like.... I don't know how to describe it. It's not that I deserve it or something like that... I don't know. It's just not the same to me because I am not the person with less power in those situations.

Group power holds a central analytical function in the anti-oppression frame.

Majority and minority groups have unequal access to power, and, from a critical theoretical approach, power is derived from the degree of one’s monopoly over the means of production and key social resources, control over other’s labor conditions, influence
over social institutions, and, from a symbolic interactionism perspective, ability to
legitimize or officiate a particular definition/interpretation of reality. The terms ‘majority’
and ‘minority’ thus describe a different relationship with power and the resources that
beget power. At times, the dominant group uses its monopoly over power resources such
as political, economic, judicial, and cultural institutions to intentionally marginalize and
oppress other groups. At other times, merely considering their interests as priority agenda
items is enough to continue the marginalization and exclusion of other groups. This is
echoed by Gloria when I asked her what racism means to her:

Racism has to do with power; who has power and who doesn't have. You have to
look at racism within the context of where you live, because there's expressions of
racism absolutely everywhere. But where we are, in Canada, racism systemically
means that it's white men who have the power. We have a history of oppression, there is a historical legacy of racism that often is unacknowledged…. White skin
privilege exists.... [For example] poverty is racialized. That is an expression of
racism; it is economic. It's in institutions. It's in personal relationships. It affects
every aspect. I was in the school system and I saw it play that out in the school
system. My friend is a lawyer, and she sees racism play out in the justice system
with Aboriginal women. One of the statistics that came out of that conference on
Sunday is that they have been incarcerated 80% more. The increase is phenomenal
in the last 10 years. Why is that? The incarceration of young black men is 5 times
higher than for white men. Why is that? Why are opportunities for white middle-
class youths getting into universities greater than for youth of color? So the
ramifications are everywhere. Why is it that in my Buddhist community, it is an
all white group? Why is it we are not attracting diverse people? This city is
multicultural. So why is it that we're all white sitting around here? Is this a
privilege kind of thing that we participate in?

Trinidadian-American activist Kwame Turé, also known as Stokely Carmichael, was one
of the first to clearly articulate a power analysis to racism. He was the leader of the
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and the Black Panther Party during
the Black Liberation movement of the 60s-70s. Kwame Turé coined and popularized
“institutional racism”, what sociologist Joe Feagin calls systemic racism (Feagin &
Bennefield, 2014). He also coined the slogan “Black Power” to stress the centrality of power in understanding racial oppression and the struggle for justice and equality (Carmichael & Hamilton, 1967). The analytical tradition Turé developed is one of the big three approaches to racism: individual, cultural and institutional. The latter can take systemic (as in unintended) or systematic (as in intended) forms, though in the context of post-de jure segregation, Carmichael emphasized its subtle, unintended, and business-as-usual nature (Murji, 2007). In this tradition, shognosh people cannot be targets of racism because group power transforms individual discrimination into institutional racism.

One consequence of this group power approach for informants’ conceptualization of antiracism is that, without excluding treating everyone the same or penalizing unlawful discriminatory behavior, antiracism is chiefly a struggle to reduce the power gap between racial groups and, ultimately, eliminate racial stratification. Reducing or equalizing the power gap can take various forms. Lauren, for example, in responding to how she does antiracism, says:

I have been working behind the scenes in my own way. So, you know, I have access to lots of resources and quite a lot of privilege, so I make that available. Toubabs have disproportionate power in organizations and institutions and undue influence on its structure, culture, and operations. As Henry et al.’s (2016) four-year national study on racialization and Indigeneity at Canadian universities shows, for instance:

Racialized and Indigenous faculty and the disciplines or areas of their expertise are, on the whole, low in numbers and even lower in terms of power, prestige, and influence within the University. (p. 300)
Racialized and Indigenous professors are not only under-represented in universities (a situation which worsened over time); they also earn lower wages than do their white counterparts, even after controlling for variables such as years of service and academic level. (p. 306)

Aware of the racial gap in access to resources, Lauren uses her racial and workplace role and status privilege—her access to institutional power—to allocate or distribute resources to initiatives that advance racial equity and support racially marginalized groups. These resources include financial, administrative, organizational, management, networking, time, and emotional resources. More examples of reducing the racial power gap are explored in the next chapter on organizational antiracism.

A color- and power-conscious approach to antiracism also has implications for queries pertaining to representation (who gets to speak and for who), positionality (where one stands in relation to others based especially on social identities), and racial epistemology (who can understand racism, how they can understand racism, and what evidence they can martial for racism). While Kristin experiences some moral dilemmas concerning these matters, Lauren has achieved some degree of positive resolution. To be a white antiracist:

means listening and letting others lead; those who have lived experience with oppression. [It also means] being conscious of my assumptions about what I can do and what I can’t do, or what I should do or what I shouldn’t do. So having those conversations about what my role is, and where I can be of support.

Rather than a colorblind antiracism where one’s intervention is the same across racial contexts, Lauren suggests that white antiracists’ praxis must be contingent upon their and others’ sociorace—a matter of *positionality*. In other words, to be white has implications not only for one’s experience under white supremacy, but also for antiracism. Rather than
seek to be ‘accepted for what I believe in’—Kristin’s concern—Lauren’s racial epistemology is that those with the ‘lived experience with racial oppression’ better understand issues of racial oppression. Like most other participants, Lauren abides by an insider doctrine argument that the racial subaltern has monopoly over knowledge on racism. As such, in terms of representation, she stresses ‘listening and letting non-white persons lead’. This too is echoed by Rose, who stresses “listening instead of talking to people’s experiences.” Both Rose and Lauren consider their positionality as white women in their conceptualization and praxis of antiracism.

Dawit identifies as a political ecologist. His political ecology is partly informed by antiracism, anti-oppression, anti-colonial, and critical indigenous theories. For him, whether whites can be targets of racism is not a mere ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer. He argues that it is contingent upon the context, specifically, the location, period and socio-political conditions where one resides. He offers a view point that combines, on the one hand, Kristin’s, and on the other, Lauren’s and Zoe’s divergent answers. Both perspectives are true, he argues, depending on the level of analysis taken. I asked Dawit if he has been the target of racism:

Yeah, I guess. The experience of being categorized by my physiognomy; not by who I am, but my physiognomy. For me, there is race and racial difference; to notice that is not necessarily racist. We have differences and stuff like that: we look different and we have different backgrounds and so on. But as soon as that is attached to a negating activity of some kind or of a hierarchy of preferences then we’re getting into the domain of racism; especially if that is part of a system. You know if somebody doesn't like me because of the color of my skin and it's just an individual that doesn't do me too much harm. But if it's part of a larger system and I can't get a job because of it or I can't get an apartment because of it then we are into the systemic elements—and that becomes much more powerful.
So in my teens, in Ethiopia, there was a revolution. Haile Selassie was taken from power and it was an explicitly Marxist-Leninist revolution that named Westerners as imperialists and wanting to get rid of them. And that made us enemies of the state. I was dangerous to my Ethiopian friends. I lost a lot of friends because hanging out with me made them suspect in the eyes of the revolutionaries…. I remember a friend of mine walking with me getting punched in the head because he is with me. And so did I experience [racism]? There's a kind of international immunity that meant that the guy who punched him didn't punch me.

I hypothesized that the immunity may be because of fear. Dawit agreed, specifying it as a ‘fear of reprisal’. He then continued:

But I knew that I was the object of scorn and of rejection. And so I have had some experience of that; of the categorization based on how you look and then being treated as an inferior person because of it. But it is really important to say that I also knew that in the larger scheme of things that if something happened to me or my family, the Canadian government would come asking the Ethiopian government what happened. And so there was a larger global system that was a kind of a quiet protection. So yes, I have experienced some racism along those lines but I know that I have never experienced racism along the lines of friends I have known, people who I have studied in history who were enslaved and had nobody to protect them, or even—I am thinking of one of my [mentees] here, whose apartment was attacked and somebody drew [racial slurs and symbols] on the floor and so on. [They] called the police and the police wouldn't come. You know there is a whole lot of kinds of racism and levels of racism that I have never experienced. So [my answers is] yes, but a limited manifestation of racism.

I asked him specifically if he considers his negatively racialized experience as systematic in nature:

Yeah, it was part of the government system. It was a planned large systemic thing. There was a concentrated effort to create outsiders of white people and people who came especially from the west; the ideological west.

The crucial difference between Dawit’s and Kristin’s accounts is that he explains his experience as a product of a national political structure and hegemonic discourse; as hinging on group power relations. In other words, it is racism in so far as he was the target of a system in which his whiteness was marked as an enemy of the state. His
experience as a racialized other was “structurally” informed. Outside said system or structural arrangement, his experience would lack the group power and group conflict factor that render prejudice racism proper.

Under the ’70-80s military regime of Ethiopian president Mariam, anti-imperialism sentiments underwent personification; white Westerners were marked as ‘dangerous’ and to be expatriated. However, national and global systems overlap. European colonialism has spread white supremacy to all corners of the globe. It thus gave Dawit an immunity against corporeal expressions of anti-white animus. It offered him the privilege of protection. The threat of white violence, white retribution, is powerful enough that it evokes hesitation in the aggressor; a punch intended for Dawit is redirected to his Ethiopian friend. This redirection, this inability to follow through an intended act, is biopower. Micheal Foucault coined this term to differentiate the predominant system of social control in modern Western society from the physically coercive manifestation of control in old Europe. Commonly referred to as domination, social control in pre-modern Europe was principally repressive and centralized. Though it has not disappeared, physically coercive social control gradually decreased while disciplinary social control increased. The latter is a form of:

power as dispersed throughout society, inherent in social relationships, embedded in a network of practices, institutions, and technologies—operating on all of the ‘microlevels’ of everyday life. ‘Biopower’, Foucault asserted, operates on our very bodies, regulating them through self-disciplinary practices which we each adopt, thereby subjugating ourselves. Its force derives from its ability to function through ‘knowledge and desire’—the production of scientific knowledge which results in a discourse of norms and normality, to which individuals desire to conform. (Pylypa, 1998, p. 21)
The assailant negotiated conflicting desires derived from two sources of knowledge. On the one hand, a nationalistic, militaristic anti-imperialist body of knowledge, and, on the other, a transnational body of knowledge on the threat of white power. Irreconcilable as they are, a peculiar course of action is taken: physical violence upon a fellow native as symbolic violence upon the enemy.

Dawit nonetheless acknowledges the limits of his experience. His was ‘an imperfect racism’; an intention of state racism limited by the broader differential power between the Occident and Africa; Canada and Ethiopia. Furthermore, it is false equivalence to compare the racism of global white supremacy to an imperfect anti-white racism that develops in response to said supremacy. It assumes the two are equivalent in nature. From an anti-oppression frame, the violence of the oppressor is dissimilar to the retaliatory violence of the oppressed. They differ along various dimensions: motivation (e.g., resource exploitation vs. autonomy), rationalization (Terra Nullius vs. justice), intended outcome (domination vs. liberation), strength (encompassing vs. limited), and duration (enduring vs. momentary). This nuance is echoed in legal definitions of violence. Sections 34 and 35 of the Canadian Criminal Code, for example, list the criteria where use of force is permitted during self-defence and defence of one’s property. The violence of the victim in the act of self-defence is of a different nature than the violence of the aggressor. It is for this reason that Dawit is careful to refrain from portraying ‘reverse-prejudice’ or ‘reverse discrimination’ as illogical and motivated by presumptions and bigotry:

D: There are good reasons why people distrust white people in Canada. And if you are the representative in the classroom, like I am a teacher, whether I want it
or not I have a certain image of authority in that room. I have had students say ‘what are you doing teaching a class on critical race studies? I would rather have somebody who is not in white skin teaching that class.’

I: Do white students say that or is it mainly non-white students?

D: Mostly non-white, but they are asking a legitimate question. I try to talk about that question in the class. There are some people who have been soo hurt by their own personal history or by collective history that they have good reasons to wonder about those things and to feel distrust. I felt the same things doing activism in Indigenous communities: ‘what is he doing here?’ ‘why do we have those university types here?’ That kind of stuff! And there’s a good reason. Anthropologists have been stealing their ideas and culture for a long time. Yeah in Canada I felt some prejudice about those things but I also think that there is a long history for that prejudice that is not just about me and the person with whom we're exchanging.

Alexandra recounts a similar experience of prejudice and also does not believe in ‘reverse-racism’. Despite her behavioral legalistic approach, she also espouses an anti-oppression frame. In this account, she leaves an Indigenous organized ceremony when her presence was marked as unwelcomed by a participant and despite the objection of other attendees:

I was going to spend the day helping in the kitchen, and then some whispers started, and basically someone came up and asks me to leave because I wasn't from the community, basically because I was white. And the people I was with who are Aboriginal people, they were really offended and they said ‘No, this is for everyone. These teachings and these ceremonies are meant to be for everyone, we're not excluding anyone.’ But I said ‘You know what? You might feel that way but as long as my presence here is making anyone uncomfortable I am going to go’, and I left. This was like a four-day ceremony, so they had talks among themselves and they actually did invite me back for the fourth day, but it caused a big stir, you know, and they had to sit and talk it through. I said I do not want to cause offence to someone just for being there regardless if they are right or wrong. It is not about whether they are right or wrong, it is about I don't want to be the source of the discomfort…. I went back at the very end, but I didn't come back for the whole day or anything, I just came back at the very end. And actually it has happened more than once….

I asked Alexandra how she made sense of this experience:
Oh it is very easy to make sense of that, especially with Aboriginal people who—these very ceremonies, and their very existence have been threatened by the white colonial settler society for so long that it is no surprise at all that some people say, you know what, this is the last vestige of what we have as a community, this is for us and this is not for you. There is a lot of that attitude. In fact, I am almost surprised it doesn't happen more than it does because there are very few of us that go to those kind of ceremonies, and when we do [we act inappropriately]… For example, Powwows are a public ceremony where people from all Nations are invited and no one is going to turn away a white person from a Powwow because they are expected there and quite frankly they are useful. They come and buy things, you know, it is a commercial enterprise, and people are selling crafts. But even at powwows there are a lot of discussions—like there's a lot of discussions by Aboriginals on Facebook and online about white people who come to things like Powwows and behave inappropriately. They are often called ‘wannabes’; that they ‘wannabe an Indian’. And so there is this assumption that if you hang out at Aboriginal events that you actually want to be an Indian. There is this romanticism which is part of the racism that Aboriginal peoples have experienced that there is something romantic or noble about this idea of the—you know, the noble savage, of Aboriginal people. And it plays out in current times with these white people who sort of dress up in buckskins and show up at Powwows and like pretending they are an Indian. That is just another way that racism plays out. And so it is a challenge, it is a hard line to walk, to be actually with the community and celebrating in the ceremonies and everything but not taking on this appropriation. I am not an Aboriginal person. I am a white person. I am in solidarity with the community and their struggles and also because I believe in the validity of the ceremonies but not because I am saying that I am something that I am not.

Participants that conceptualize antiracism through an anti-oppression frame also connect two or more forms of oppression. Consequently, they consider antiracism as existing in a spectrum of multiple praxes (Corneau & Stergiopoulos, 2012, p. 268).

Natasha articulates this explicitly:

I call myself an antiracist but in my profession I call myself anti-oppressive because there is a big debate in the profession and the leading edge of the discourse at this point is intersectionality analysis, which we call anti-oppressive analysis and anti-oppressive practice… Intersectionality is very complex and very hard to do. The debate goes back two, three decades at least. There were folks like Angela Davis saying that class has to be [analyzed] with race and with gender, and so for a while we had this tripartite; the three variables: race, class, and gender. Davis wrote a book on ‘Women, Race and Class’ in the 80s. But I am sure
she was debating it before she put the book together, so the debate goes back a long, long time\(^\text{19}\). I was part of the race, class, and gender group that then went on to more and more intersections like sexuality, age, disability, etc.

I think we are in this complex web of intersection and that they have more importance at certain moments than other moments, and certain times of history and all that kind of stuff. [But unlike liberalism and pluralism] we call it anti-oppressive practice because we are trying to get to the idea that relations have exploitation and oppression. They are not benign things laying inertly besides each other but they crisscross in ways and at various points that emphasize and strengthen each other, and at other points they contest with each other. [So when you ask me what antiracism means to me] I would say that race is the entry point into trying to challenge relations of oppression and exploitation. Most people wouldn't look at race and nothing but race. They try to take a broader understanding and then bring in class and gender.

Natasha explains that she has been the target of antisemitism. In the context of her whiteness, however, because “Jews are also white though not all Jews are white”, she mentions that “racialized thinking” has been applied to her but “racism is different”. Zoe similarly takes an intersectional approach to her antiracist activism:

I call myself an antiracist but I don't usually go straight to that, like ‘I am an antiracist activist and this is what I do.’ But I think it is part of many identifiers and ideas that I identify with. I go to antiracist events or demonstrations or whatever; things that are described under that umbrella of anti-oppression.... I am against marginalization. I don't really have coined terms like ‘I am this’, you know? I feel like I am feminist and I also say activist even though it's really vague.

I asked Zoe what led her to start thinking of herself as an antiracist. In her answer she elaborates on the intersectionality approach:

Through activism I started to see these different strains of important issues and to build movements to address them. Antiracism was part of that. I sort of lump it in with other things. So like anti-immigration sentiments largely impact people of color. So I like groups like No One Is Illegal. I really like what they do. Or even like No Borders. Some of these people are white; it is not like every immigrant is

\(^{19}\) On this matter, the reader is encouraged to read: Patricia Hill Collins’ (2015) Intersectionality’s Definitional Dilemmas. Published in *Annual Reviews of Sociology*. **128**
not white obviously. But I think at the university as I started to take this identity of being an activist, I started blending those things as an affiliation with doing things against colonization and stuff with Native people especially in [the city]. I think also just trying to build stronger communities, for us in this city, that means more inclusion and working against the racism that is evidently here.

Zoe’s antiracism is part of a spectrum of identifiers that respond to multiple forms of oppression. ‘Building stronger communities’, though, is not commonly encountered in participants’ conceptualizations of antiracism; at the very least, it is not named as so. On the one hand, building strong and inclusive communities includes the various examples of antiracism thus far presented: speaking out against racism, illegalizing racially-motivated behaviors, providing human rights training, making policy changes, reallocating institutional resources, listening to and letting racialized others lead, respecting calls for ‘people of color only spaces’, attending events and demonstrations, and simultaneously responding to multiple forms of oppressions. At the same time, community building is a distinct science and art; a specialization with divergent traditions. In the third findings chapter, Dawit shares an example of an attempt at supporting the building of an intellectual Indigenous community.

Be that as it may, in the anti-oppression frame, antiracism is described as absolving from racist practices and responding to racism. At the structural level, this often means reducing the power gap through redistribution of resources or, also discussed in the third findings chapter, promoting equality in access and outcome. It also means being group power aware and color-conscious in one’s praxis, which, in turn, has implications for how a toubab practice’s antiracism. Finally, an anti-oppression frame is intersectional. It promotes an antiracism praxis that is sensitive to and contingent upon the set of
identities a racial subaltern has. Thus, for example, antiracism strategies in support of professional queer First Nations women would have to consider how class, gender, sexuality, settler colonialism and ‘race’ combine to create a new or unique experience of ‘First Nation-ess’. In many cases, no one antiracism strategy is appropriate for all subgroups of racial subalterns.

3. The Whiteness Frame: Redefining Racism and Disrupting Whiteness

The key difference between the anti-oppression frame and the whiteness frame is the extent to which the latter explicitly situates whiteness in the antiracism project. In academe, the whiteness frame goes by critical whiteness theory or studies (CWS) and is a direct offshoot of CRT. It turns a critical gaze on whiteness—defined as a particular social position of power, status, and privilege afforded to persons racialized or race-d as white.

Participants using this frame for antiracism focus especially on the consequences of racism upon the subjectivity of toubabs (e.g., internalized superiority, obliviousness and meritocracy) as a site needing challenge. More often than not, the antiracism action taken is that of raising awareness. Gloria, for example, wrote a Masters thesis drawing on critical whiteness theory. She believes that toubabs’ discomfort with the topic of racism is because it upsets their worldview, specifically:

It upsets their view of them as benevolent and as being superior even though they don’t want to think of themselves as being superior. It is so easy to have that patronizing view of ‘we have got so much to give, we have the superior attitude, and we are where we are because of who we are and not injustice.’ It really challenges people’s sense of identity and who they are and how good they are—and they don’t want to let go of that. It is also about not wanting [to take the] blame. That you don’t have to take any responsibility. That ‘it doesn't have
anything to do with me, it just has to do with them’, you know? ‘If they only did x y and z like I did.’

As such:

White people need to hear that we breathe racism. It is out there. It exists. And we are affected by it…. I think that is part of why white people resist so much; they have this image of being a white person that ‘I don’t have any racism! I am not racist. I am...’ They buy into that.

To Billy, a professor at a prestigious university, it is imperative that a counter-narrative be offered about who the problem of racism belongs to. Billy uncompromisingly argues that racism is a ‘white people problem’. Consequently, antiracism is above all about white people. I asked him what informs his particular framing of antiracism:

There is a writer called Judith Katz, she wrote on antiracism back in the 80s and that had the biggest impact on me because she said that racism is a white problem, and that white people have this problem. So that is what my [antiracism] focus is on. This issue of an ally; I accept if other people see me as that but I don't define myself as an ally.

(Re)defining racism as a ‘white people problem’ challenges, as Gloria mentions, narratives of white innocence and benevolence, just-world hypothesis and colorblind racism. It upturns the dominant discourse of racism as ‘the negro’ or ‘Indian problem’, implicating, instead, all white people on the conveyor belt. To Gloria and Billy, the racial subalterns are not the problem of racism—whiteness is the problem

In explaining why racism is a white problem, Judith Katz (2003) writes that: “the foundations of racism and the present-day racist system were established in western European, especially English, ideology and language. According to Schwartz and Disch (1970:6), ‘by the time the first English colonists had arrived in the New World they had already inherited a host of associations tied to the word ‘black’ which became important as men put language to use in first defining and later justifying the status they desired of non-whites.’ When the colonists arrived on this continent, these negative attitudes of whites towards peoples of color were codified in racist practices and policies…. Such is the basis of racism in [North America]. From the time of formalized slavery to the
(Re)defining racism as a white people problem is consequential for the ensuing antiracism. In fact, Billy’s critique of ‘allyship’—as he understands it—is that it (predominately or exclusively) frames racism as a problem belonging to racial subalterns. Billy posits that allyship education excessively depicts the racial subaltern as suffering, incapable and in need, and the toubab ally as being in the perfect position to help and take leadership. This Moses complex (‘I know the way, I have the true vision, I will part the seas, follow me’) erases the agency, knowledge, wisdom, and preferences of racial subalterns. Rose described the tension that this can produce. Referring to the North West Territories where she grew up, she reflects on Settler-Inuit tensions, framing it as a white settler problem:

There is a lot of resentment towards white folks who have come in and taken over things and positions and been very, very paternalistic; very like ‘we are here to help you and make your life better’. But what that has meant is taking away their autonomy, right?

I first lived in a community where Aboriginal people were mainly located on a reserve. There were all those attitudes about lazy Indians—all that stuff. And then I moved to a community where I was surrounded by Inuit people; like there was no reserve, we were on their land. That is when I saw ‘real’ racism; paternalistic stuff. Like my dad was in a very powerful position as a white man and he was kind of pushed out and his attitudes turned to ‘I was there to help! I was there to do things and I have all this education and all this experience and they didn't want me, they just wanted somebody who is Inuit in that position just because they are Inuit’. So I think he feels that ‘racism’ has been directed at him; he would probably say that.

Billy and Rose are critiquing ‘helper-helpee’ dynamics that centre whiteness not to deconstruct or interrupt it but to promote assimilation and shognosh leadership. Such present, whites have oppressed people of color through the perpetuation of racism at every level of life”. (pp. 8-9)
dynamics ignore the underlying social roots of racism as a Euro-white problem and rob
the autonomy and sovereignty of Indigenous people. Thus, for Billy:

If Aboriginal people think I am an ally, then they'll decide that. But I don't present
myself as an ally and say that you can rely on me, particularly when history shows
that you can't really rely on people like me. So let my action speak. [That is why] I
took the ally stickers off my door—because I was thinking that if my actions
aren't speaking then that's what needs to speak.

Framing racism as a ‘white people problem’ parallels the framing of sexual
violence as a men’s issue. Consider Jackson Katz’s TedxFidiWomen presentation:

Gender violence issues [have] been seen as women’s issues that some good men
help out with, but I have a problem with that frame and I don’t accept it. I don’t
see these as women’s issues that some good men help out with. In fact, I am going
to argue that these are men’s issues first and foremost. Now obviously these are
women issues and I appreciate that, but calling gender violence a women’s issue is
part of the problem for a number of reasons.

He goes on to list the problems of conceptualizing gender issues as women’s issues,
including: it becomes a pretext for men to ignore gender-based issues, it obfuscates the
male order that is the context of gender violence, it depicts the dominant gender group
(men) as uninvolved in patriarchy, and it ignores unequal gender-power relations. Katz
gives an analogy:

Let’s talk a moment about race. In the U.S., when we hear the word race, a lot of
people think that means African American, Latino, Asian American, Native
American, South Asian, Pacific Islander, on and on. A lot of people when they
hear the word sexual orientation they think it means gay, bisexual. And a lot of
people when they hear the word gender think it means women. In each case the
dominant group doesn’t get paid attention to. As if white people don’t have some
sort of racial identity or belong to some racial category or construct. As if
heterosexual people don’t have a sexual orientation. As if men don’t have a
gender.

This is one of the ways dominant society maintains and produces itself, which is
to say that the dominant group is rarely challenged to think about its dominance
because that is one of the key characteristics of power and privilege; the ability to
go unexamined, lacking introspection, being rendered invisible in large measure in the discourse about things that are primarily about us…. (Tedx Talks, 2013, 1:45m to 4:00m)

What happens when gender violence is framed as a men’s issue? To Katz, it means, we, men become potential ‘active bystanders’—we can make a habit of interrupting behaviors of boys and men that feed into gender violence.

What happens when racism is conceptualized as a white people problem? The whiteness-centered frame yields a praxis characterized as deliberately executing antiracism in white spaces. For example, to Gloria, a retired school teacher, this means “interrupting whiteness… the white patriarchal curriculum that exists out there. And giving kids new perspectives.” She gave several examples of interrupting whiteness that I explore in the next chapter. As a prelude, whiteness-oriented antiracism is fundamentally about doing antiracism among/with other whites, and raising their awareness about issues pertaining to ‘race’, racism, privilege and praxis. Inspired by Sherene Razack’s work on whiteness, Gloria also states:

Whenever there is antiracism work that is to be done, she’ll separate the whites from the people of color for safety reasons. So that the people of color feel safe; they’ve got a safe group to work in. And then the whites can work together. I like that idea. It’s not that I haven’t done work with mixed groups. I have, lots of times. But I like that idea of creating a safe container for [working with white people].

Referring to a time she interrupted whiteness among white attendees at a meditation studio, she says:

That was one of my arguments when I had this fallout with my friend [at the studio]. I said ‘I felt it was a safe container.’ She said ‘you made it unsafe for everybody.’ I said ‘but we are all white. I didn’t feel that I was making it unsafe. We’re just coming from such totally different points of views on this.’ I felt it was—yes—my duty to say something as I had the awareness to raise it; not to be silent. If you are silent you are part of the problem, that is how I see it.
Gloria and Billy share a similar definition of ‘safety’. As she and others observe, doing antiracism in a racially mixed group can place BIPOCs on the receiving end of white backlash, or, succinctly, whitelash. It can also mean double-isolation: the feeling of isolation from being a target of racism and the potential isolation that occurs when one speaks about or challenges racism. For these and other reasons, the whiteness-centred frame argues that doing antiracism among shognosh people is ‘safer’; there is less of a chance that a racialized person will be the recipient of whitelash. Indeed, many participants mentioned that white people are more likely to listen and react positively or, at the very least, with less hostility to them than a racial subaltern speaking truth to power. Gloria thus considers her primary antiracism duty as interrupting racist practices and raising awareness among whites.

Using the same critical whiteness frame, Billy is intentional about who and where his antiracism is oriented to:

As a white person, I need to unpack and deal with racism from inside this White Space. I see my role as challenging white people; making visible things that lie behind assumptions and the systems at work that benefit white people. In a scholarly sense I focus on this concept of whiteness.

Billy leveled additional critiques against allyship education, describing it as a self-pity ridden praxis of “confession, tears, and absolution”. In light of this, I asked him what he identifies as and how he would define it:

Billy: I would call myself an antiracist…. It means opposing racism and the structures that support it. [But] what that means for each individual is different. So for me as a white person it means working from the inside of that circle of whiteness and dismantling the boundaries around it. Dismantling the things that give me unearned privilege and unsettling people and helping people recognize the landscape that is there that creates the privilege.
Ismaël: So your focus is specifically on the sphere of whiteness and dismantling it from within?

B: Yeah, from within.

This way of framing antiracism is at the core of critical whiteness studies\textsuperscript{21}. Billy describes a frame of antiracism that interrupts whiteness and challenges or educates the toubabs who are standing on or walking with the flow of the conveyor belt. Participants using this frame relinquish aspects of their privilege by unpacking whiteness, unearthing institutional white bias, and challenging toubabs out of complicity to racial stratification.

There are some critiques levelled at critical whiteness studies and by extension this antiracism frame. It risks reproducing dynamics of inclusion and exclusion. Problems of representation (who gets to speak and for who), who is given space to write and/or lead, and which perspective on whiteness and antiracism are mainstreamed are issues that white antiracists have to navigate.

Billy mulls over the potential risk of ‘taking up space’ when he elaborates on his role as ‘working from inside the circle of whiteness’:

I can't have a role speaking for people outside the margin. I am not speaking for people of color or any other marginalized group. I am speaking for people in the middle of the circle and saying that what we are doing here is not right. Let's recognize that we are getting certain unearned privileges, that we built systems that do that, and we have to disrupt that. If I speak for people from the margins,

\textsuperscript{21} As Green, Sonn, and Matsebula (2007) write, “Locating whiteness, rather than racism, at the centre of anti-racism focuses attention on how white people’s identities are shaped by a broader racist culture, and brings to the fore the responsibilities white people have for addressing racism. This approach transcends the limitations of conventional studies of ‘race’ and racism by teasing out subtle or unconscious practices of racial discrimination, which are generally accepted as ‘normal’…. Critiquing whiteness includes addressing equity issues and examining institutional practices, while also accepting the multiple, hanging, and collective origins of knowledge and identity” (p. 390).
then that is just reproducing the whole thing. The white voice becomes the defining voice, the knowing voice. So yeah I am really clear that the audience I am speaking to is a white audience, which has got its problems too, because then in the classroom what does that offer people from the margins when I am dismantling that space?

Billy’s audience is shognosh people. He avoids making the white voice become the knowing voice which would occur should he direct it to those on the margins. However, what about the white voice becoming the knowing voice when speaking to a white audience? How is that ‘dismantled’? Also, note the question with which Billy ends. The voices of the racial subalterns have offered much to white persons; what is the whiteness-centered antiracist’s offer to the racial subaltern? Is the project of ‘dismantling whiteness’ so centred on whiteness that it has nothing to ‘offer to people from the margins’?

Some other participants also grapple with issues concerning occupying space. Rose, for instance, states that part of challenging white privilege is to “recognize that it is there, name it, know that it is happening in me, and then give space or give power back in whatever ways that I can”. I asked her what ‘giving space’ looked like pragmatically in her antiracism work. She shared two examples, an interactional and an organizational one:

When I am in a group, like I am in training right now to become a support line for an agency, and there are lots of other people of color in the room, it’s like maybe I have something really neat and interesting to say and everyone would love it, but I don’t say it because other people have neat and interesting things to say too and I don’t need to say what I am thinking in my head all the time out loud. Like little things like that.

Rose ‘checks-in’ with herself. She keeps a mental tally of times she has taken up verbal space and of times persons of color have spoken. By checking and reigning herself in, she gives the opportunity for another person, hopefully a racialized person, to speak. Such a
practice democratizes an important resource—verbal space; the podium. The podium is a consequential resource. It shapes the perspective others hear, the actions that ensue, the worldview that is accepted, and the resources that are distributed. In the language of symbolic interactionism, the podium is a powerful medium through which definitions of situations and meanings of objects are propagated and rendered real, inter-subjectively.

Democratizing the podium—of who takes up space—is further exemplified in Rose’s work at an independent teen magazine whose audience is mainly composed of marginalized groups, especially queer youth and women of color:

In the work that I do with the magazine, we always try to look for people of color as writers and as subjects first before we look for white subjects, for the pieces. Like for example I have this section where we profile a reader, like a youth under the age of 20 every month, and everybody always sends me white girls’ names. Which is great and they are doing super rad things, they started organizations and there is a 15-year-old who is raising money for such and such a cause, but you just don’t hear about youth of color stories that often do that. So I try to set those aside as much as I can and try and pick for every section if we can, people of color.

Examining concerns about representation (whose voice is heard), Thurber, Fenelon and Roberts (2015) describe three ways that white activists can lend their voice to the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement:

- **Framing (or modelling and channeling)** BLM directions and messages to other whites. The person acts as a leader—the defining voice—in white spaces but with implicit or explicit guidance from BLM chapters (e.g., speaking through a megaphone at a rally to let white participants know how to engage);

- **Amplifying** BLM goals, which is not a leadership position but that of a supporter. The person joins in and thus increases the ensuing activities led by Black persons (e.g., joining in the chants, marches, and spreading BLM pamphlets);

- **Relinquishing** is to stay off the podium and to step back from leadership activities—from taking up space—and, instead, creating and maintaining space for racially marginalized persons (e.g., refusing to speak to media at a rally and directing them to Black attendees instead).
Participants in this study use these three orientations, and a fourth, redistribution of resources, which is Lauren’s preference, as discussed under the anti-oppression frame. By “unpack[ing] and deal[ing] with racism from inside this White Space”, Billy is framing; he is using the platform white privilege affords him to frame racism and whiteness for white audiences. It is unclear, however, the extent to which his frame is informed by ‘persons on the margins’ compared to ‘persons in the centre’, such as Judith Katz.

Framing is also Gloria’s general stance, which I explore in depth in the ensuing two chapters and which is explicitly informed by Black feminists and Indigenous writers and activists. Billy also amplifies when he co-facilitates workshops with a Black colleague. They strategically use a method where she “would actually critique me in front of the groups we are training”:

We find that to be an effective way [to get to our white participants]. It is not a personal attack, but she would situate me in whiteness, and I present as the white guy right? So she would then critique that, like: 'So what benefits does [Billy] have here? What doesn't he have to think of, that I have to think of?' ‘Billy can walk into this place’ or ‘Billy can say this without even thinking.’ So when she wants to critique whiteness, what she can do is pick on me and then my response is to be quite comfortable with it. She would say to me for instance ‘if there is a positive discrimination, like an equity hiring, how would you feel as a white guy if you didn't get the job and a person of color got it over you?’ Sometimes I say ‘I probably wouldn't like it if I don't get a job, but we've had a positive hiring policy for white people for years and years and years, for White males especially, and so what I am worried about is how many times I have got a job where I am not the most qualified person.’ So she would ask me to speak about things that people would react to her differently if she said it.

Billy, like Rose, Alexander, Dawit and other participants, also relinquishes privilege.

Relating to the metaphorical podium, he says he must always be careful of:

where I go into spaces, where I speak or choose not to speak, and to make space. When I say ‘make space’ it sounds like I am in charge but by this I mean it is a
deliberate standing back and letting other voices speak, because people look to me to speak, and so I try not to always fit into that process.

Participants strategically use these three or four options. The whiteness-centred frame, though, emphasizes the first—modelling and channeling—for it situates its praxis as predominantly occurring within white spaces. Additional research is needed to examine how antiracist toubabs decide and navigate the risks in taking one or a combination of the four mentioned orientations: framing, amplifying, redistributing, and relinquishing.

In Closing

In this chapter, I discussed three frames of white antiracism. The equality and human rights frame is organized by a conventional and legal interpretation of equality. The accent is on the rights and freedoms of individuals. Though not colorblind on the dimension of sociorace and racism, formal equality favors a colorblind approach to antiracism. Everyone deserves equal rights and treatment without it being contingent on their social or personal characteristics. Despite special measures for positive discrimination, colorblindness is the criterion. This extends to how antiracism is conceptualized, producing what I call a ‘colorblind antiracism’. **Colorblind antiracism** takes a behavioral approach to addressing racism. It focuses on changing attitudes and behaviors that transgress norms of racial tolerance or break race-based policies and laws. Since anyone can transgress said norms, policies and laws, the target of antiracism intervention is not conditional upon the racial background of the bystander actor or transgressor. For instance, using this frame, a toubab can censure a Black person for using
the ‘n-word’ as they would a white person. Sociorace, and its implication, is irrelevant for antiracism in the equality and human rights frame.

The anti-oppression frame is fully color-conscious. Rather than the individual as its unit of analysis, group power relations take centre stage. Racism is thus framed as the outcome of unequal power struggles between racial groups that produces and maintains the white hegemonic order. Power is understood to derive from monopoly over important resources and influence over institutions. Consequently, antiracism consists of efforts at closing the power gap between racial groups, especially through redistributing resources to facilitate equality in access and outcome. Oppressions, however, intersect. Antiracism is an entry point to addressing multiple forms of oppressions, especially the tripartite of class, ‘race’, and gender. Reverse-racism is believed to be a myth. At most, whites can be the targets of an ‘imperfect racism’ contingent upon the macro-context their racialized experience occurs under.

The whiteness-centred frame builds upon group power analysis by explicitly defining racism as a ‘white people problem’. Our modern conventional understanding of ‘race’ was birthed in Europe during its colonial enterprise. The social consequence of the racial taxonomy has been the racialized order of white supremacy. In this frame, antiracism is the critical examination and dismantling of the ‘white side’ of the coin of white supremacy; the side that produces white privilege. Praxis is a matter of disrupting structures of white advantage and the varied psychological effects white supremacy has on whites (e.g., colorblindness, internalized superiority, unconscious racism, and white fragility). The individual is acting as a framer, amplifier, or relinquisher. Whichever the
chosen position, they are challenging shognosh people to acknowledge the conveyor belt and walk/run in its opposite direction.

Two important caveats are to be noted as a prelude to the next chapter. First, antiracism frames are ‘ideal types’ in the Weberian sense. They capture the spirit or organizing principle(s) of participants’ conceptualization of antiracism and, to a lesser extent, racism. Ideal types are deliberately constructed simplifications that approximate reality and allow for comparisons. They are not intended to mirror the infinite nuances of a phenomenon but to capture its essence or tendency. Most participants do not strictly subscribe to one frame. Instead, they use an assortment of belief systems, ideas, and values, some of which may even seem incompatible upon scrutiny. They generally operate from multiple or a blend of frames. Thus, although certain participants are chosen here as prototypes for a particular frame, participants’ conceptions on antiracism are actually eclectic, fluid, messy and mutually interactive or conjunctive. The three identified frames are evident in participant’s account but the distinctions were not always as clean and separate as presented. For analytical purposes, however, I teased out and polished the organizing principles and assumptions in how participants speak about antiracism.

Finally, participants’ antiracism praxes do not seamlessly mirror their definition or framing of antiracism. For instance, respondents that construct antiracism as ‘dismantling whiteness among white people’ also share accounts of antiracism action geared towards supporting BIPOC persons or employment equity initiatives that facilitate racial minorities’ access to institutions. This should come as no surprise. Recalling Herbert
Blumer’s theory on human behavior, frames are but one of many objects participants may take into consideration in deciding how to respond to racism. Respondents do not simply express whichever dominant frame they espouse upon witnessing racism. Instead, they interpret multiple factors which come into play in their line of action. Frames may inspire a particular praxis but do not unequivocally determine their expression.
Chapter 5: Quotidian Antiracism

Introduction

The next two chapters investigate antiracism in action. The central question they explore is how do participants do antiracism? What strategies do they employ when responding to racism or to advance racial diversity, inclusion or equity? The question foreshadows a descriptive chapter. I list key antiracism strategies under categories chosen to group them: quotidian/everyday and organizational/institutional. Strategies are drawn from accounts of participants responding to specific racism incidents. A few are drawn from how they have generally responded, thus are not embedded to any specific bystander action example but are a matter of proclivity.

To flush out the data and move beyond a descriptive account of strategies, an additional theme is investigated. I explore factors that influence participants’ decision to do antiracism. I ask, what do participants consider in deciding to engage in antiracism? What said or unspoken factors are present in their stories that shape bystander action?

What the findings show is that the decision to act and how is not confined to personality/psychological factors (e.g., confidence to speak up). Instead, it is chiefly the by-product of contextual (e.g., politics), relational (e.g., status differences), organizational (e.g., a workplace antiracism policy), resource (e.g., funds) and circumstantial (e.g., safety) factors. A comprehensive list of the social and psychological catalysts of antiracism behavior is beyond the scope of this study. My findings, however, contribute to the little developed research area of “privileged resistance”; antiracism from a racial privileged position (O’Brien, 2001, p. 75). Though obstacles to antiracism are revealed in
these two chapters, I focus on enablers of antiracism for the former receives significantly more research attention than the latter (see Stewart, Pedersen, & Paradies, 2014). The discussion concludes with graphs on the distribution of antiracism strategies and considerations in doing antiracism stemming from the questionnaires administered in this study.

This current chapter examines quotidian or everyday antiracism practices. I tease out three predominant praxes: confrontation, counterclaiming, and covert and clandestine antiracism. The first collapses the transgressor and racist behavior distinction and confronts the transgressor’s sense of self. The second separates the agent of racism from the act of racism and appeals to their rationality in order to inspire a change in behavior. Both are antiracism actions that respond to an agent of racism. The last is not in response to an identifiable or present racist offender, but is behavior informed by an awareness of racial issues. Here, the person stealthily engages in antiracism unknown to others.

Borrowing Essed’s (1991) “everyday racism” concept, quotidian antiracism counteracts racism or advances equity and inclusion in the routine, mundane fabric of everyday interpersonal interactions. It does not occur through the activation of an organizational role (e.g., as an educator, bus driver, or equity officer). Sometimes everyday antiracism is vocal, at other times it is unassuming. As showed in the examples below, it can occur at a dinner gathering, a market place, a meditation meeting, and even at a stop light.
1. **Confronting the Sinner: Fusing the Racist Action with a Racist Identity**

O’Brien (2001) defines confrontation as “instances when, within the time and space of an incident, an antiracist brings to a white person’s attention the racist impact of their speech and/or action” (p. 68). My findings corroborate yet expand this definition. Apparent in my study are additional features to confrontation. It is usually short in duration, blunt and forthright in tone, may contain explicit language, violates politeness etiquette, and its primary function is to challenge the agent’s (alleged) racist identity more so than the content of their racist act. In other words, the primary function of confrontation is to penalize a perpetrator by formulating their action as an exterior representation of who they are on the inside. Instead of ‘separating the sin from the sinner’, as a theological saying goes, the sinner—or perpetrator—is the focal point of the confrontation. Confrontation partly depends upon one’s awareness of and ability to marshal social mores to negatively sanction racism. Possessing such awareness and marshalling ability, the participant brings to the foreground the racist identity behind the racist act or conjures such an identity where there is none. The following is an example of the confrontation approach.

Maria’s colleague regularly made xenophobic and racist comments about certain immigrant groups under the pretext of ‘jobs loss’ and ‘economic anxiety’:

She had a problem with Ukrainian people; she didn’t like them. I had a conversation with her because she was saying: ‘Oh Ukrainians, they are everywhere.’ She also said things about Chinese and Filipino; Asian workers in general. I said to her ‘You know what? You’re racist. You don’t like Ukrainian people and you don’t like Asian people’. She told me ‘WHAT? You think I am

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22 Indeed, racism can occur without a racist identity. In Helms models, the racist identity is labeled ‘Reintegration’. See also Bonilla-Silva (2006) on Racism with Racists.
RACIST?’ She said ‘How can you say that? That is HORRIBLE. How can you say that?’ She was very aggressive and very offended. I asked her ‘What? You have a problem with [immigrants]? Like what?’ And she was like ‘No! I’m not racist. How do you think I am a racist?’ Of course she was racist and not only she was racist but also other people in that place where I worked.

I asked Maria about the consequence of her confrontation. Her colleague henceforth avoided her:

because I said to her straight in her face that she’s a racist, and she got scared because of the way I said it. I wasn’t polite or friendly about it. I said [assertively and in a matter-of-fact way] ‘oh, so you are a racist!’ I was really in her face. She got scared, and that’s good.

Far from beating around the bush, Maria’s retort is short, blunt, forthright and violates etiquette of politeness, which partly entails not labeling another a ‘racist’. Maria, who is new to Canada from Eastern Europe, is critical of the politeness etiquette. It can hamper antiracism action, or, at least, the naming of racism:

It’s just the politeness thing in Canada, just: ‘How can you even imply that I am racist? Obviously I am not racist. You think that this is racist because you are racist.’ Basically. They will tell you ‘Oh it’s your imagination. It’s not really racist. I was not racist. It’s you who thought it’s racist because you think racist. I don’t think racist…’ They will tell you ‘Oh you’re so impolite. How could you even, like, how dare you,’ you know?! It’s like farting in the company of people; you don’t do that. Politeness. Politeness is like a prison. It can be very stifling and sort of limit your freedom of expression. I come from Eastern Europe; we are in your face; you know?

Racism is a taboo in many liberal democratic regions (Doane, 2006, p. 260). Aware of this, Maria’s colleague strongly reacts at being labeled a ‘racist’. This reaction is revealing; rather than concern with how she is practicing racism so as to change her behavior, her reaction is about being called ‘racist’, indicative of the threat to one’s self-concept that confrontation can elicit.
By labeling another a ‘racist’, confrontation targets and spoils their self-concept; their personal identity (Osyerman, Elmore, & Smith, 2012). Czopp, Monteith, and Mark (2006) term this type of confrontation as *hot* or *hostile*. **Hot confrontations** overtly and directly mark the agent as a bigot. They are in contrast to *cold* or *non-hostile* confrontations, which make an appeal to principles of fairness and equality; encouraging the agent to be egalitarian in thought and action. Maria’s approach is to define her colleague as a bigot rather than addressing the *content* of her prejudice. The latter could take the form of stating that many immigrants open small businesses that create jobs for locals, draw attention to the country’s need for newcomers, or mentioning that jobs are competitive-based and do not belong to any racial or national group. Hot and cold confrontations differ by the degree of threat they pose to the self-image of the confronted person. The more a transgressor’s preferred self-image is impugned, the higher the ‘heat’ of the confrontation.

More than most participants, Adyvaya is comfortable with this strategy:

One of my closest friends is originally from Pakistan, and she and I were walking down the street. She doesn’t wear a hijab all the time but sometimes she’ll wrap her hair up. We were waiting at the cross light not too far from campus and someone rolled down their car window and yelled ‘take the rag off your head’. And I said ‘fuck off’ because she didn’t know what to say, which is understandable. Tongue-tied and embarrassed, the male driver drove off having lost face. Adyvaya believes he reacted so because she disrupted his expectations of white in-group solidarity: “the person who they were expecting to ally with their viewpoint didn’t put up with it.” Like Maria, she does not address the content of the driver’s Islamophobia. She does not retort with: ‘it is not a rag’, ‘would you say that to a nun?’, or ‘we have freedom of belief
in this country’. Her retort is a forthright and explicit dismissal of the person; the driver. ‘Fuck off’ is a demand for someone to end a behavior and marks them as a significant nuisance.

Confrontations also have an emotional function, they are cathartic. They provide a medium for the venting of racial frustration. This can escalate when unchecked and lead to a threat of physical violence. Consider Billy’s response to the racism his partner endured. She asked a vendor at a market for the price of plants, who retorted with “go home to Pakistan and started calling her all these names”:

I had a motorbike in those days. I went and parked my motorbike in front of his stall and I asked him the price of all the flowers, and he gave me the prices. And then I said ‘So pick on me like you did on my wife.’ And he said ‘Don't start that with me. I am on old soldier.’ I too was in the military for a while. I wanted to fight this guy. I was so mad. At the end, I told him what I thought of him and I rode away. I felt really ashamed that I had lost my temper like that. I didn't fight him but I felt that was really stupid.

Why did Billy feel ‘ashamed’? Why did he consider his action ‘stupid’? Unfortunately, I did not follow up with these questions. His shame, however, suggests internalized values or beliefs informing proper codes of behavior. While Maria and Adyvaya had positive recollections or interpretations of their confrontations, Billy regrets. He was caught in empathetic rage and hot confrontation. Having been in the military, which has a culture of hyper-masculinity that values aggression, toughness, and decisiveness (Barrett, 1996; Messner and Sabo, 1994; Morrell, 1994), he reckoned he could fight the vendor.

Concerns about ‘physical safety’ when responding to racism is rarely mentioned by participants, irrespective of their gender identification. This is an unexpected finding. Of the few times physical safety is referred to as a potential concern, it is exclusively
brought up by women. Rose, for example, said the following in response to what she takes in consideration when deciding if and how to respond to racism:

Rose: [I consider] whether it is safe for me to respond. But I feel like in my position it usually is.

Ismaël: What do you mean by that?

R: If it's just like a regular interaction in my everyday life it’s usually safe for me to say stuff. If I am at a bar and it's a big guy saying it—that’s what I mean by safe.

I: And so in this moment it wont be safe?

R: Yeah

Jennifer is a manager at an environmental company. She also discusses physical safety as a concern. Referencing the Lee Rigby Killers and the Angels of Woolwich—a trending news subject at the time of our interview, she says:

I was thinking about that woman in Britain who confronted the guys with the knife who cut up, hacked the soldier in London. She spoke to them. She was getting off the bus and she spoke to them. And I’m here thinking, if I saw somebody with a knife who had just cut somebody, I would not be speaking to them. I look at that and I’m not sure if I felt unsafe whether I would speak up.

Although all participants consider safety concerns when deciding if and how to do antiracism, men do not mention physical safety as a concern. Billy and I discussed matters of safety in responding to racism. He acknowledges that “safety is an issue, but safety for who?” Similar to Gloria, as discussed in the previous chapter, safety to Billy is unequally racially distributed; an unearned privilege some enjoy more than others:

How do you engage with [racism] as a white person when there may be people of color in that space? That is so complicated to navigate. I need to do it in a way that I am not speaking for the people of color. And then also not making that space less safe for them too. I can get away with disrupting spaces in a way that is
much safer for me than people [of color] who might be in that same space. So it's really then very complicated.

Research validates Billy’s and Gloria’s remark. Often, hot confrontations by members of equity-seeking groups are perceived differently than hot confrontations by persons in the dominant group (Czopp & Monteith, 2003). “Target individuals who confront prejudice tend to be evaluated negatively by those they confront” (Dickter, Kittle, & Gyurovski, 2012, p. 113). The reason is that people anticipate individuals from marginalized/target groups to confront prejudice because of their membership in said group. They thus perceive a target’s confrontation as motivated by group self-interest—as merely a display of group-based expectations and protection—or hypersensitivity and complaining (Petty, Fleming, Priester & Feinstein, 2001; Kaiser & Miller, 2001 & 2004). A majoritarian confronting another majoritarian for discriminating against a racial subaltern is perceived

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23 Regarding the first, in persuasion research, it is found that when people act in ways that support their group’s interest (as is expected of them), outgroup onlookers process their message with less weight; they may trivialize it as redundant and biased, as motivated by group self-interest and perceive it as ‘crying wolf’. Regarding the second reason, in their study, Kaiser and Miller (2001) found that toubab participants perceived Black students who blamed failing a test on a test evaluator’s prejudice less favorably than when they took personal responsibility. Disturbingly, this same result occurred even when toubab participants in the study were told by a study facilitator that all test scorers discriminate against Blacks. Even then, they still considered Black students as ‘complainers’ and ‘hypersensitive’. Czopp and Monteith (2003) also found that white and male participants in their study showed less guilt when a person of color or a woman confronted racism or sexism. They perceived them as overacting and unreasonable (p. 542). However, “participants indicated they would feel more guilty and be more likely to apologize when confronted about a prejudiced response by a White person than a Black person (in the case of racism) and by a man than a woman (in the case of sexism)” (Czopp, Monteith, Mark, 2006, p. 786). These studies shed further light onto Billy’s and Gloria’s comment that interrupting white racism—especially via confrontation—when a negatively racialized person is present, may render the space less safe space for them.
to be ‘objective’, ‘selfless’, and not have a ‘chip on their shoulder’ or an ‘axe to grind’ or to be yet another ‘complaining minority’.

Despite that toubabs employing a confrontation strategy are more positively evaluated by other toubabs than are targets using the same strategy, a number of participants, including Kristin, Jennifer, Dawit, and Billy, have a conflicted relationship with confrontation as here defined (sinner = sin) and as loosely defined as ‘conflict’. In various wordings, they question its effectiveness:

Jennifer: Perhaps why I don’t march is because I don’t like conflict and I don’t like it when what I’m doing creates conflict. So how can I do it in a way that doesn’t create conflict? And yet in the workplace I will stand up and create conflict (laughs). I have this internal struggle around conflict because you’re supposed to be peaceful but there’s an aspect of me that is not that. Yet when I’m in that more aggressive (hits palm of her one hand with fist) [mode] then I’m not really changing anybody except making them perhaps not like me and not accept me or my ideas. So how can it be done in a way that the people [will listen to you]? Maybe it’s because it’s happened to me; what happens is that if I do get aggressive about something then people just go ‘ugh! There she goes again.’

Jennifer’s internal struggle with confrontation stems from various sources: expectations of behavior to be peaceful, to not rock the boat, to be civilized, ‘respectability politics’, and resistance or turnoff from others. Though her struggle around conflict does not prevent her from creating it in the workplace, she experiences it as ineffective.

Kristin too is uncomfortable with confronting as an antiracism strategy:

I believe in calling people out. It’s just sometimes it’s not appropriate. My friend [from Germany] called the other guy [that we were with] out and pushed him and pushed him and pushed him. Not physically pushed him, verbally, but it was getting a bit aggressive. And then he called him a ‘bigot’ or he called him something just to see if he would react. I had to stop my other friend from punching my other friend.
The effectiveness of a strategy, however, must be operationalized and contextualized. If intended to halt prejudice in the immediate situation, the above accounts suggest that confrontation achieves this goal. Adyvaya’s strategy, for example, halted the agent’s verbal abuse in the moment. If intended to halt future expressions of prejudice in the presence of the same bystander actor, it too achieves this goal. In Maria’s account, in addition to halting prejudice in the immediate situation, her colleague did not make future xenophobic and racist comments in her presence. If, however, the expectation is to halt prejudice while facilitating a positive relationship with the transgressor, hot confrontations are not conducive to relationship maintenance. Additionally, it is unknown if halting another’s bigotry in a situation reduces their bigotry in the absence of the bystander actor that confronted them.

Effectiveness of this strategy aside, what explains its use in the first place? Few hints are offered in the above discussion, and one of them is national differences in communication styles. Maria, for example, compares ‘Canadian politeness’ to the ‘in your face’ communication style in Eastern Europe, where she is from. She elaborates that in Eastern Europe:

people are more honest in public spaces and pretty aggressive. You won’t find [people] talking behind your back or not telling you in your face what they think. They will be in your face telling you like “what the fuck are you doing with your life?”, “you are wasting your life,” you know? There’s a difference.

National and subcultural differences in communication style is a theme reencountered in the Self-Implication Cognizance chapter. Borrowing from Arlie Hochschild (1979), suffice it to say that the ‘feeling rules’ of a society guide emotional regulation by requiring individuals to meet certain expectations. Being Eastern European, Maria is used
to a communication style that is ‘more honest in public spaces and pretty aggressive’.

This, I suspect, partly explains why, more than most other participants, she is comfortable with a hot confrontation strategy. Adyvaya, too, who is from Poland, an Eastern European country, is also at home with hot confrontations. Interestingly, those uncomfortable with this strategy are mainly of Western European ancestry.

Despite this culturally or nationally observed distribution of comfort with hot confrontation, not everyone who confronts as a praxis is strictly Eastern European or would define the communication style they grew up with as ‘assertive’ or ‘aggressive’.

There are also cross-national, cross-cultural variables in participants’ stories that appear to enable hot confrontations. Below, I explore two main enablers.

**Enablers: Status and Interaction Fleetingness**

Two situational factors seem to enable the likelihood of a confrontational approach: occupying a higher status than the perpetrator, and the fleetingness of the interactions between bystander actors and perpetrators. Though they do not determine, these factors are linked to confrontation because they enable the violation of etiquettes of politeness and disinhibit participants from aggressively or assertively confronting.

Recalling Maria’s above-mentioned confrontation with her work colleague. Maria remarked that “I was working above her”, indicating that having a higher status in the workplace facilitates rebuking colleagues of a lower occupational rung. Empirical research confirms Maria’s supposition. There is a positive relationship between status-based power and the likelihood to take action and to act in certain ways (Galinsky, Gruenfeld & Magee, 2003; Brown & Levinson, 1987):
High-power individuals are more likely to violate politeness-related communication norms. High-power individuals talk more, interrupt more, are more likely to speak out of turn, and are more directive of others’ verbal contributions than are low-power individuals. In a recent survey of 775 employees, individuals reported that rude, uncivil behaviors were three times as likely to come from individuals higher up in the organization than from peers or subordinates (Pearson & Porath, 1999), although one could attribute these findings to the heightened social sensitivity of subordinates. (Keltner, Gruenfeld & Anderson, 2003, p. 227)

Power is a property of social relationships shaped by hierarchical structural arrangements more than it is a psychological property (Whitmeyer, 2005). Higher status and power in an organization enable higher frequency of antisocial (and prosocial) behavior for various reasons. High-power status individuals are less materially dependent on others, face organizational and social expectations for them to take leadership, experience less precariousness in and threat to their work, and doubt themselves less (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003). Additionally, high-power status offers its beholder more privilege to exhibit frustration or anger towards those perceived of a lower-status (Tiedens, Ellsworth & Mesquita, 2000).

The relationship between status and action is, of course, more complex than above-presented. Other organizational and individual-difference variables shape the status-power and action relationship. Despite the complexity, the positive relationship between status and one’s (sense of) ability to act in a particular way is a common finding in the scholarship.

While Maria hints at her higher work status as an enabler to confrontation, Jennifer explicitly articulates the role of power for her ability to take action. Upon asking her what she finds enables her to speak up against racism, she responds saying:
within the community. I have a power level from a hierarchical perspective that really assists me. I [also] think my size assists me. I’m not a small woman and I know how to make myself bigger. I think that is of assistance [too].

Earlier in our conversation, Jennifer mentioned that her status enables her to advance progressive changes in her workplace. This power stems both from her organizational rank as manager and the president’s active support of her endeavors:

Jennifer: The president said to the HR guy when he said something about drivers and the landfill and describing them by race or in racial terms rather than in what the issue is, [the president] said ‘why would you describe it that way? That’s not necessary.’ So the president I think gets it and speaks up about it.

He was actually very encouraging of me exploring [the topic of] women in the workplace. He would actually give me things about women in the workplace—articles and things like that. It’s almost like he knows I will do his dirty work. So that I would be the voice so I can take the consequences, not him. And he knows I’m willing, so that’s interesting. And it’s not just around racial intolerance issues, there are other things, like environmental issues, lots of different things. And I didn’t clue in to that until probably three or four years ago.

Ismael: That you had an ally so to speak?

J: Yeah, and that I’m doing his dirty work (both laugh heartily).

I: It's always good to have somebody with that much power [as an ally].

J: Oh yeah definitely, definitely. And that is why I think I can take things on that other women couldn’t in the company, because of my position of power.

For Jennifer, status and power due to organizational rank, height privilege, and support from a higher ranked colleague act as enablers for antiracism.

In addition to having a higher work status in the workplace, Maria had spatial distance from her colleague; they were stationed in different locations. This resulted in their interactions being relatively fleeting. I believe this decreases the pressure to maintain a collegial relationship with coworkers, thus disinhibiting a bystander to express
anger and frustration. Adyvaya’s and Billy’s confrontations also occur in situations where their interaction with the perpetrator is fleeting. The former was at a traffic stop light towards an unknown motorist. The lack of prior relationship and unlikelihood of a future relationship with the motorist meant Adyvaya was free from considering future repercussions resulting from explicitly confronting the driver. Relationship fleetingness is also a feature in Billy’s account. Additionally, Billy is the customer on whom the vendor is financially dependent. This relatively positions him in a higher status. Maria, Adyvaya and Billy do not have to answer to the perpetrator in a future scenario; they are not forced to interact or see them again. This makes confrontation safer or, at the very least, less daunting in consequence.

2. Counterclaiming: Challenging the Sin, Leaving the Sinner

While participants who use confrontation make internal/dispositional attributions to explain racism; while they consider racism as an obdurate aspect of who one is, counterclaimers make situational attributions to explain racist action—racism is considered a culturally learned behavior and thus a changeable aspect of how one thinks. Counterclaimers do not, at least explicitly, label the transgressor as racist, prejudiced or a bigot. They do not imbue a racist identity to explain an agent’s racist behavior. Their focus is on responding to the content of the perpetrator’s racism, not their identity. As such, the primary function of counterclaiming is to correct cognitive and affective processes in the hopes of changing behavior. This can take the form of providing information or education, stereotype debunking, myth-busting, or making a counter-narrative that centres the experience and viewpoint of racial minorities. Participants do
antiracism by challenging the faulty logic of the perpetrator without directly confronting their personal identity or self-concept. Consequently, compared to confrontation, counterclaiming is lengthier in duration for it requires speaking *with* a transgressor rather than speaking *at* them.

Kristin best describes this strategy when she asks:

Isn’t it [Pierre] Trudeau that says attack the beliefs not the man? You don’t have to call a person something. You don’t have to attack their personal characteristics. You can attack their beliefs though. You can attack their ideas or what they’re trying to promote; that’s fine, you can question that. But you can’t call somebody a name. That’s not a fair tactic.

Kristin is not promoting what some have disparagingly called **tone policing**. As the term implies, tone policing is an attempt at regulating or controlling another’s ‘tone’—more specifically, at controlling emotions and speech considered ‘disruptive’, that create discomfort and/or threaten one’s sense of self. Tone policing penalizes another for not being ‘calm’, ‘respectful’ or ‘gentle’ enough in their expression. It problematizes the speaker’s feelings and reactions and demands a ‘civil discussion’, which is believed to be void of ‘disruptive’ feelings. When tone policing is demanded of marginalized persons who express their frustration at inequality, the terms for being heard are set by the demanding party.

Kristin, however, does not shy away from anger. On the contrary, she thinks “that it is good to make people angry” because it challenges their “repetitive lifestyle” and forces them to engage with “differences”. When asked to elaborate on how she does antiracism, she mentions the ‘calling out’ technique. It enables her to create discomfort and pressure transgressors to think about and end a particular act of racism:
I hope to make people slightly uncomfortable by calling them out. I want to first make them really uncomfortable or slightly uncomfortable, depending on who it is. Once I make them uncomfortable I want them to start questioning why they did it because a lot of times people don’t take a step back and question why they’re doing it. They’ll apologize, but why did you apologize for? If I called you out I don’t want you to just apologize; to blanket say I’m sorry for saying it. No, why did you say that? Let’s work it out. After we work it out hopefully, and this is the end goal, that in the future you don’t say stupid crap because you don’t believe the stupid crap that comes from your mouth.

Kristin advocates for equality partly through this technique: creating discomfort, questioning, and discussing. By having power over the transgressor’s level of discomfort, in theory, it becomes easier to then reason with or compel them to discontinue a particular behavior. She believes, however, that calling out can be achieved without retorting to hot confrontations; without tarnishing or degrading another’s identity:

There is a tactful way for calling people out. My friend that is in Germany is sometimes not the most tactful. One time I had to stop a guy from punching him in the face. Calling people out and then when they are not agreeing, proceeding to calling them a ‘bigot’ just to see if you can push their button in that direction and make them question from that aspect… name calling isn’t the best approach. I believe in making people question but I don’t believe in making people angry to the point where they are going to violently assault you. That’s the line.

Kristin differentiates between ‘tactfully’ calling people out versus ‘pushing their button’.

Name calling and the potentiality of physical assault is where she draws the line.

Kristin’s instrumental use of discomfort is shared by Alexandra:

I have dedicated as much of my career to antiracism training because only by making people experience that discomfort do we get the learning. In most of my workshops I talk about how if you are feeling discomfort then I know you’re learning. If people are just sitting comfortably and if I have designed a workshop where nobody feels challenged, everybody feels safe and everybody feels okay—I am talking about white folks—if people are saying ‘oh that was a nice workshop’ at the end, I know I failed. I haven’t done a thing. It is only by expanding the comfort zone, by moving into that zone where you are a little bit uncomfortable and then gradually over time you expand that comfort zone, that is where the learning takes place. When you feel uncomfortable, that’s when you start to learn.
The whole reason that racism persists as much as it does is because white folks get to be very comfortable about stuff. By not talking about things that make them uncomfortable it means they ain’t learning anything.

Alexandra’s utilitarian deployment of discomfort is not limited to moments of ‘calling out’ discrimination or prejudice. It is also instrumental in how she designs workshops and engages in personal learning. Other participants share analogous opinions about discomfort’s utility.

I asked Kristin for an actual example of ‘calling someone out’. Kristin’s equality-based antiracism is not conditional on a transgressor’s sociorace, but most of her accounts are of praxis directed towards toubabs. Over an Easter dinner the stepfather of Kristin’s partner complained about Native people fishing in a private resort lake he frequently visits. He claimed that their presence was “chasing away the White Anglers” (White fishers):

He says they shouldn’t be allowed to come in because the Ministry of Fisheries stocks those lakes but [the Natives] don’t pay taxes. He didn’t think that the Native populations were helping out with that program and therefore they shouldn’t be allowed to fish in that area.

[His argument was] really about the people who were coming in. He wanted to keep it as the white resort that they go to; that the environment would be disrupted by [Natives] coming in. He was inching towards saying that but he could tell that we were fighting him on it. Eventually he said that it was fine when they [the Natives] were fishing to feed their mouths but now they’re fishing for commercial reasons. I said that the economy has changed and they are fishing to feed their own mouths. That they are doing it through business. That’s how you do it now.

His arguments were rational arguments to cover for the idea that he was afraid that these groups are coming in. Afterwards he sent us an apology saying that he was sorry for making those remarks and that he had looked into it further. He had found that there were Native organizations in the area that were helping out with stocking the fish populations….
I think he thought that we [my partner and I] would get on side with him. When we didn’t he had to start changing his argument… I was trying to bite my tongue because it is not my family. But after a while some of the arguments were just ridiculous. [My partner] was much more vocal; calling it ‘crap’. And I think he did say ‘you’re being border-line racist to one of the comments’.

Counterclaiming uses reasoning to challenge racial bias by correcting another’s comment. The stepfather’s statement that local Natives are ‘tax freeloaders’ is a common anti-Indigenous stereotype. Kristin’s and her partner’s counterclaims (coupled with the stepfather’s research) debunked this stereotype. Native organizations are in fact helping the Ministry stock the lakes. Another correction pertained to the ‘personal sustenance versus commercial motive’ argument. Kristin myth-busts, arguing that the motive remains personal consumption. In addition, she provides contextual information to explain why Native fishers use a private lake; due to the changing nature of the economy and the legitimacy afforded to businesses. “We were fighting him on it”, she mentions, indicating the back-and-forth, discussion-like nature counterclaims generally take—a speaking with as opposed to speaking at. At the end, her partner labels a comment his stepfather made as “border-line racist”. Though not a direct attack on his identity, this may have been implied for “after a while some of the arguments were just ridiculous”; it was “really about the people who were coming in.” Kristin and her partner assessed that the perpetrator’s comments were not solely based on a cognitive error but an actual prejudice towards Natives and a pro-white segregationist sentiment (see the Reintegration racial identity status in Helm’s WRID in Appendix 1).

During a Buddhist meditation session, few weeks before our interview, Gloria raised awareness about the usage of the colors ‘black’ and ‘white’ to signify, respectively,
‘bad’ and ‘good’. She endured a jarring whitelash. Her whiteness-centred frame is evident in the following account, particularly in her take on ‘safety’ and who the audience of her praxis ought to be. Gloria explains that:

There was a Buddhist article that the group was working with that is on compassion… They use the terms ‘black’ and ‘white’ a lot to mean ‘white’ being benevolent and ‘black’ to mean everything that is negative. We are passing the article around as we normally do and reading it out loud and then responding to it. But there is a part in there about planting ‘white seeds’ and planting ‘black seeds’. I am familiar with antiracism work. I looked at the group and we were all white, number one. That to me meant it was a safe group in a sense that I am not going to be putting a person of color on the spot or making them feel uncomfortable.

I raise the issue of white seeds and black seeds and that I feel that language is very important and that if we are trying to raise our awareness then we also ought to raise our awareness on the language that we use. That was met with resistance from the group facilitator who said ‘well that's just your opinion.’ Another woman said to me ‘well, you know in Nigeria they talk about the black stomach to mean an upset stomach or a sick stomach’ and I said yes but we are not in Nigeria and we live in a racialized world, we have a history of oppression. So we discussed it a bit. There was maybe two or three people that could see where I was coming from; the importance of raising our awareness around how we use language. And a couple of people weren't sure, like 'I have never heard anything about this' and there was one young guy, who I am friends with, that said 'I'd like to read more about this.' So that was interesting, he was open, curious, wanting to know more.

But it was controversial. Why is something so simple so controversial? We are only talking about language, ‘white’ and ‘black’. I thought everyone would see it. I thought it was pretty apparent…. So that was the discussion in the group, and it all happened within ten minutes.

Challenging by raising awareness can be a standalone strategy or part of several techniques (Pedersen et al., 2005; Pedersen & Barlow, 2011). In Gloria’s case, it was a standalone strategy. Researchers have also observed that “prejudicial attitudes and beliefs can operate without a person’s awareness or endorsement” (Paradies et al., 2009, p. 47). Gloria is aware of the pervasive cultural practice of associating symbols, characteristics and feelings with colors, and their impact upon children and adults in a society where
skin-color is an important signifier and charged with meanings. Knowing that this
linguistic habit in our contemporary context is not, necessarily, intended to cause racial
harm, she “said in the beginning that [my comment] is not to be taken personally. This is
not about any one particular person; this is about raising our awareness on how language
impacts us, that’s all.” Despite this caveat—a caveat that steers away from labeling and
confronting identities, speaking at, or accusing and assuming bigotry—she was met with
resistance. At the end, she had:

a falling out with one of the women, who was a friend of mine, over this topic. We
met for coffee and I was personally attacked. She said that I upset the facilitator
by raising this. I should have said nothing in the group. I should have waited and
said something at the end to him alone. She said that whenever I speak about race
I am emotionally charged and I emotionally charge other people. She said that she
didn't think my behavior was befitting of a leader and I shouldn't be on council.
She said a lot of really hard-nosed kind of things.... The same woman who just
said these things to me, if we were talking about feminism, she totally gets
feminism. She feels she has a feminist framework.

Despite a Buddhist milieu where ‘awareness’ is at the heart of their practice, awareness
was confined, limited, and distorted by attendees’ racial interpretative schemes, by their
hegemonic whiteness. Gloria’s good friend went so far as to attempt to tone police her.
She deflected from Gloria’s message about non-inclusive language and, instead,
penalized her because, allegedly, “whenever I speak about race I am emotionally charged
and I emotionally charge other people.” It is an irony that boundless awareness was
bounded by the very human racial schemes and identity statuses of the collective. One
person showed interest in learning more. For the majority, however, the simple awareness
of non-inclusive language was too unsettling to breathe into and meet with ‘mindfulness’.
Be it as it may, far from a knee-jerk reaction, in counterclaiming, bystander actors take time to formulate their point. They give the benefit of the doubt to the transgressor, giving them several opportunities to reconsider their statement or action in light of the discussion. In both the above accounts, length of time is marked: “after a while” (Kristin) and “within ten minutes” and “over coffee” (Gloria). This is a knowledge and discussion intense strategy. This approach to responding to racism is not as emotionally cathartic as it is mainly driven by cognitive reasoning. It is predominantly oriented to trying to change a perpetrator’s future behavior based on the belief that racism is learned and thus reversible. Seeing racism as part of someone’s entrenched identity, thus as not readily changeable, begets a ‘hotter’ approach.

Counterclaiming has two key enablers. I turn to the role of the presence of other bystander actors and knowledge in enabling counterclaiming.

**Enablers: Allies and Knowledge**

Unlike confrontations, which commonly occur during fleeting encounters between strangers, counterclaiming usually takes place between known persons: friends, family, colleagues, lovers—people with whom participants are emotionally, socially, and, at times, financially interdependent. Consequently, there are different constraints and opportunities that present themselves when challenging racist talk in such a milieu, especially that one function of racist talk is to facilitate and maintain social relationships, bonding and group boundaries (Scully & Rowe, 2009; Maher, 2009; Guerin, 2003; Eliasoph & Lichterman, 2003). Participants have longitudinal factors to consider, group norms and relationship power dynamics to navigate, and histories and memories to take
into account. They may thus perceive or experience more risk in doing bystander antiracism here than in fleeting situations between strangers. Conversely, long-term relationships may present more opportunities to bystander actors to change the attitudes and behaviors of a perpetrator. As Warren (2010) notes in his study on racial justice white activists, “relationships can help to mitigate defensiveness by building trust and creating the conditions where whites can feel more comfortable opening up” (p. 120).

Alexandra’s account shows how relationships can act as a hamper to antiracism action:

I told you about my sister and the kitchen antiques [of Aunt Jemima, and these caricature images of Black people] she collects, right? I have decided for the sake of my relationship with my sister not to make a huge deal out of it. I've mentioned it but I haven't—like I haven't said ‘I'm not coming to your house anymore until you get rid of that stuff,’ you know?

The extent that an intention to intervene hinges on “the sake of a relationship” is the extent that it is shaped by it. Thus, though the relationship does not prevent Alexandra from responding, it shapes her chosen bystander intervention method. Elaborating on her sister’s antiques, Alexandra specifies:

I find it hard to talk to her about it because when I say ‘why would you keep that stuff in your kitchen?’ she says ‘it's antiques, I collect antiques.’ She's into that stuff. She thinks it's nice nostalgic stuff and I look at her kitchen and it offends me. It is hard to have that conversation with my sister because she doesn't get it.

Relationships, however, have a dual role as hindrance and enabler. As such, it may be more accurate to state that it is the racial scheme and identity status (Helms, 1995) of a person coupled with the meanings and saliency bystanders give to a particular relationship that explain if a relationship is experienced as a facilitator or a hindrance in doing antiracism. In the above quote, to ‘not get it’ implies the sister uses a limited and/or
distorted racial scheme to process racial information. Coupled with the meanings and importance Alexandra gives to her relationship with her sibling, these may illuminate why Alexandra struggles to talk with her sister about the antiques.

Personal ties, however, can also facilitate praxis. Rose articulates this when she says that “It’s always easier to say stuff when in a room where people think like you”. Likewise, Kristin’s partner supported her in countering his stepfather. She remarks, he “was much more vocal; calling it crap”. Instead of meeting racism with silence or consenting with his stepfather, together with Kristin, they challenged his comments—acting as support for each other along the way. They were not alone in this mutual support: “His brother, sister, uncle and aunt were quiet. His mum though got into it. His mum took our side.” The presence of two ally bystanders was a facilitator for Kristin. Together the three were able to formulate counterclaims and confirm one another.

The supportive role of allies goes beyond their presence during a racially charged situation. Kristin, for example, credits the encouragement she received from a close activist friend of hers as reinforcing the development of her antiracism praxis: “he sort-of spurred me on with [taking] every little action on my own. I mean, I did it before, but he caught me doing it one time and he was like ‘that’s good. You should keep doing that.’”

Lauren recounted a heated argument between two clients at her workplace that escalated with a male toubab calling the Black client racial epithets and threatening him with violence. I asked her if the presence of other staff was helpful in the intervention strategy she chose, which included “shouting” and “getting the racist man away from the building”—not a counterclaiming or quotidian antiracism approach but here mentioned to
demonstrate the many situations where the presence of an ally facilitates antiracism action. She responded:

It just added to the intensity of the whole scenario. I think there was an element of—I don't want to say performance—but almost a performance in that there was an element of I am going to say this in public as loud as I can. So it added to it, and definitely having the [antiracism workplace] policy. I think that having the policy was a key sort of factor in my response because I didn't question if I should intervene.

Lauren identified multiple facilitators in her decision to confront the antagonist in the manner she did. First, her duty to respond to conflict between clients as per work role requirement; in her words: “It was my job to respond. I feel like it is a little different than when I witness racism in everyday life”; “my job was actually to intervene in those kinds of situations”. Second, an explicit workplace antiracism policy requiring antiracist intervention: “Fortunately in this workplace there was an antiracism policy. So the response was a suspension of service to the person who was arguing and making these racial slurs”. She elaborated upon the workplace policy when I asked her if without it she would have still intervened:

L: Yes, I would have intervened because of my job role, but with the policy it was just sort of (clicks finger) automatic. So I knew I wouldn’t have to defend or justify the action that I took to an employer or another person, because it is a policy; it is a rule. It’s right there. It's actually on the wall!! And it made it just a lot easier.

I: Oh so it is right there on the wall?!

L: It literally is on the wall.

I: Wow.

L: Yeah. Someone suggested at the Take Back the Night event—it was you I think—about [having an anti-discrimination policy visible in more public spaces]?
I: Yes.

L: Yeah. It does help; it does help. I mean there's all kind of complications about enacting policies around diversity and anti-oppression, but to have something visible on the wall that you can point to, I've experienced how helpful it is.

Finally, the presence of her colleagues—staff who are aware of the policy, have had antiracism training, and expect staff to disrupt racism—creates an organizational culture that rewards and normalizes bystander intervention. The presence of colleagues acts as a surveillance technology that increases the likelihood that the antiracism policy will be acted upon. In Foucauldian terminology, antiracism knowledge has disciplinary power.

Counterclaiming is an appeal to reason used in a discussion or debate format. Its use thus necessitates the possession of information, knowledge or insight about a particular issue in order to fluently make a rebuttal, correct an error, myth-bust, stereotype-debunk, or offer a counter-narrative. There is, however, a dearth of research on the importance of knowledge for enabling counterclaiming despite that “one of the key obstacles to bystander action is lack of knowledge of what to say, how to say it, and what else can be done in responding to, or preventing, racism” (Nelson et al., 2010, p. 38).

Knowledge is power; it is both the basis of racial schemes and a facilitator in doing antiracism, it enables the power to act.

Gloria completed a thesis using critical whiteness and antiracism theories. “I am familiar with antiracism work”, she says. Irrespective of how she was received at the meditation gathering, her knowledge was a key enabler allowing her to raise awareness about color-coded, racially charged language and sustain a ten-minute conversation responding and rebutting:
What I found interesting is that [my friend] knows my background; she knows I have studied in this area, she knows I have written in this area. Yet there wasn't one part of her that was curious: where are you coming from? Why did you say that? No openness at all. She was one hundred percent certain that she was right and that I was wrong; that I was so out of place of saying anything.

There are many other variables that shape the outcome of bystander intervention. While the possession of knowledge is vital for counterclaiming, in this situation, Gloria did not have what others above had—allies; likeminded people that support one another in doing antiracism within a white space. There is indeed power in numbers.

Adyvaya offers another articulation of the relationship between knowledge and verbal bystander action:

There was one course [in my high school in Mississauga] that a teacher taught that was on race and gender. We went through human rights, then we went through race and racism, white privilege, and then capped it off with the LGBTQ movement. I took that when I was 15 or 16, and it was interesting because I finally found a language to articulate the feelings that I had.

In discussing how her antiracism has changed over time, Kristin also links knowledge immersion, cross-cultural traveling, and bystander intervention:

It's become more vocal. I always felt a certain way but I didn’t want to say things. But in the past maybe 5 years I’ve become more vocal. The past 2 years I’ve become even much more vocal about things; which is since I’ve started my Masters. Since coming back from Korea I’ve been much more vocal because I think I always had those feelings but then being immersed and actually starting to question my own self-concepts around racism when I was in Korea and then coming back, made me want to be a little more vocal.

The role of knowledge in developing a commitment to antiracism and being empowered to act is evident. All participants’ intellectual transformation, transition between racial schemes and identity statuses, and activism have necessitated some immersion in critical race knowledge. Specific knowledge about antiracism action can teach potential
bystanders on how to respond to perpetrators, help targets, inform authority, and rally witnesses (other bystanders) (Nelson et al., 2010, p. 38). Antiracism knowledge is also useful when it reveals potential situational opportunities and obstacles, thereby forewarning bystanders and preparing them beforehand.

More than confrontation, counterclaiming as an antiracist strategy is an intellectual approach. Knowledge is an important enabler in successfully sustaining a debate. It does not guarantee, however, success in changing another’s cognition or behavior. Nonetheless, the additional presence of allies increases the likelihood of the intended impact of counterclaiming. Below, I explain another type of praxis, one that is rarely discussed in the scholarship on (white) antiracism.

3. Covert and Clandestine Antiracism

Confrontation and counterclaiming are interruptions of racist practices of identifiable perpetrators. Covert and clandestine antiracism focus on targets of cultural and structural racism rather than individual racism. It is a micro-intervention of macro- and historical patterns of racial discrimination. This type of antiracism is not frequently encountered in my data but merits a brief mention because it is overlooked both in research and workshops on praxis. The difference between covert and clandestine is that the latter, though also covert, is ‘morally grey’ and may elicit disapproval from some.

Maria is the sole person to share examples of covert and clandestine antiracism, the latter of which is through an organizational role but the first is in the everyday as a regular civilian. Starting with the first, covert antiracism:
I don’t sit next to guys when I am on a bus. I usually choose to sit next to women of color because I know that they have the experience that very often people don’t want to sit next to them. Actually, men [of color] have that experience—that women don’t want to sit next to them. And so I on purpose sat next to a man of color on a bus. I had a good conversation once or twice with him. I do that on purpose if I can. I sit next to people of color on a bus.24

Maria’s example is not an interruption of racism but interracial bridge-making or contact in consideration of *aversive racism*. The focus is on the target; the racial subaltern. Aversive racism refers to persons who are consciously egalitarian and support racial equality but implicitly have conflicting and negative feelings and beliefs about racial minorities, especially darker-skinned persons, which lead to avoidant behavior such as anxiety, discomfort, keeping distance or fear (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004). Aware of the everyday aversive racism negatively racialized persons may experience in public transportation, Maria’s antiracism takes the form of bridging or making interracial contact.

In another example of covert antiracism, Maria credits the documentary *Good Hair* with Chris Rock to have “opened my eyes” to the struggle Black women go through in navigating Eurocentric norms of what constitutes “good hair” (e.g., straight as opposed to curly, afro, or dreadlocked):

M: I noticed that it’s a thing with some of my friends who are from here, that it is a very sensitive topic—like I shouldn’t talk about it. If I do, I should be very careful. It’s talked about as a sort of a mystery; a sort of mysterious sphere of Black women that they don’t talk about that.

I: They don’t talk about it with white women.

M: With white women, yeah, about their wigs and extensions and, you know, weaving hair. One of my friends she was wearing a wig and I said ‘oh your hair

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looks great’. She told me ‘you didn’t discover wigs yet?’ But she said it in such a way that it was clear that this was like a mysterious thing that you don’t really talk about. So watching that movie made me…. What I did [from then on] with that friend of mine I would tell her that she looks great when she’s wearing braids rather than wigs and rather than extensions…. Whenever I see her I always tell her that she looks nice when she has her own sort of natural hair.

Maria’s covert antiracism here takes the form of affirming differences. Aware of Eurocentric norms of hair beauty, she compliments her colleagues ‘natural’ coiffure.

Maria, however, shared a type of covert antiracism that she called ‘an extreme case of personal affirmative action’; a clandestine antiracism strategy that she remains conflicted about:

I had a student; a very relaxed guy. He was basically not doing anything [in class]. I should have failed him but I didn’t, and that’s something I felt uneasy about. I didn’t because I only had very few Black students and I thought this was my first year of teaching and I thought ‘I don’t want to do that. I don’t want to fail him.’

I guess I thought that if he’s going to be such a slacker in other courses as well someone will fail him eventually. I just didn’t at that time feel strong enough about doing that. But I also felt that maybe he’s not such a slacker; maybe it’s just particular circumstances and maybe I would just cut his chances. I didn’t want to do that… It’s not because I felt sorry for him, I just thought [that] I only have 3 Black students, you know? So with him I felt a bit weird. I didn’t feel particularly perfect about [passing him]…. That was an extreme case of affirmative action on my part. Like I did it against my professional opinion.

Clandestine antiracism mirrors James Scott’s ‘everyday resistance’ theoretical concept. In Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Resistance, Scott (1985) breaks from political scientists’ focus on visible organized collective action in theorizing underclass resistance. He looks at the everyday, invisible and quiet defiance of peasants, enslaved persons, and factory workers against conditions of domination. Feigning ignorance, foot-dragging, sarcasm, false compliance, pilfering, passivity, intentional laziness, and other behaviors of subaltern groups are forms of infrapolitics action, hidden resistance. These tactics
occur in conditions where open resistance is impossible or would lead to mortal danger.

As a racially privileged person, Maria’s clandestine antiracism is qualitatively different, but is an infrapolitics informed by an awareness of structural discrimination in education and an attempt to undermine its embedded, routine and historical pro-white affirmative action.

Maria feels she went against her professional opinion in her decision to pass the student. Similar to critical race theorists, she suggests that there is some incompatibility between ‘professionalism’ and ‘affirmative action’. Critical race theory critiques meritocracy, which is the lens through which ‘professionalism’ is understood. Maria articulates this when she says the student “was basically not doing anything” and questions if an internal attribution, such as being a “slacker”, is the cause.

Simultaneously, however, she believes that ideas about ‘professionalism’ are, in some regards, biased and fictive. As a critical theorist herself, Maria argues that meritocracy assumes that the playing field is equal; that a student’s grade solely reflects their personal effort and that personal effort, in turn, is suggestive of their personality. She proposes a substantive equality approach when she says “maybe he’s not such a slacker; maybe it’s just particular circumstances”. Here, Maria is defying the official dominant narrative in her profession about professionalism. This interpretive struggle, however, remains a conflict for her.

Maria’s clandestine antiracism, and, arguably, antiracism in general, corroborates a symbolic interactionist perspective that would theorize antiracism praxis as first and foremost consisting of subversive meaning-making. Subversive because meanings are a
site of group conflict. Those who own the means of production, who have monopoly over resources—who are in power—create what become the official, legitimate or normal interpretation or definition of objects (including criteria, procedures, and work or professional ethic.). They “own the means of mental production; hence, their definition of the situation is usually accepted as legitimate and official” (Musolf, 1992, p. 174). Through a symbolic interactionist perspective, antiracism consists of particular interpretations and meanings that problematize, deconstruct, and defy official interpretations and meanings about racial issues.

Foreshadowing the next chapter, though organizations create official narratives about ‘race’ (e.g., ‘diversity management’), these undergo interpretation by participants. Participants negotiate the rules, norms, culture, and narratives of organizations. Conflict is thus an expected aspect of organizations for meanings are a contested site. At times, employees act as organizational representatives, accepting and applying its narrative. At other times, their interpretations and values do not coincide with the organization. The clash and conflict over meanings can, in turn, catalyze social change (Copp, 2005).

**In Closing**

The bulk of quotidian antiracism actions consist of verbally responding to a perpetrator *in situ.* This may take the form of confronting or stigmatizing the person’s self-concept or appealing to reason by counterclaiming. Besides covert and clandestine antiracism, most quotidian antiracism actions are oriented towards perpetrators. The role of social and psychological variables in shaping praxis stresses the interpretive, interactive, and socially-embedded nature of praxis. Various factors enable a particular
strategy, including ethnic communication style, status-power, type of relationship, racial scheme, presence of bystander allies, and the possession of knowledge. Regardless of the strategy used, they all involve a counter-interpretation about racism and antiracism.

To resist a definition of an incident away from racism—to refuse to ‘unsee’ the racial subtext of an incident or substitute it with an allegedly more plausible explanation—is an antiracism strategy itself, one that is inherent in all antiracism actions and one that can be a standalone strategy. As a standalone, take for instance Maria’s account. She shares a professor’s reaction toward her colleague when the latter gave the professor his wallet that he had dropped without knowing:

Instead of saying thank you, he said ‘now I have to recount the money to make sure that I have all the money.’ And I was thinking, first, that was a complicated situation because if I did this it would be funny, because I am white. But my colleague is not white. Second of all, that professor is German and is older. So I was thinking of all the connotations, like ‘what the fuck are you doing man? Like you cannot say these things.’ My colleague was offended. I thought it was racist of him, even if he didn’t do it on purpose. Later, some other girls were saying ‘oh, you know, he’s an older guy’ and I was like ‘no, he should be more sensitive. If he is in a [social science] department from [a prestigious university], he has to know these things.’ For me, that was [racism].

Maria resisted a redefinition of the situation; one that sought to ‘deracialize’, excuse or minimize it by referencing the age of the perpetrator. She centers the impact or target side of the experience and, touching upon positionality, explains that because she is white, if this had happened to her, the professor’s comment would have been ‘funny’. She argues that the professor’s comment can be experienced differently because it is embedded in multiple layers of collective and individual racially charged histories. Jokes are a social act, they occur in social contexts and thus are susceptible to contextual variables such as sociorace and history. Maria thus considers variables such as social stereotypes about
darker-skinned persons, the perpetrator’s nationality, the history of Nazism, and the correlation between age and espousal of racial prejudice. Considered together, it creates “a complicated situation” in which the comment is, at best, maladroit (or ‘insensitive’ and ‘offensive’) and, at worst, ‘racist’.

Another example of resisting redefinition is from Alexandra:

I am a lawyer for a profession across Ontario. There was a worker, a Black woman, who put in a complaint to grievance that she was being treated differently because of her race. When my co-workers who work with me first brought me the grievance for my legal opinion, it was our task to help the complainant, they said ‘oh I have taken all this stuff about race; she feels that she was treated unequally but I have removed all the stuff where she talked about race.’ And I said ‘well why would you remove all of that stuff?’ They said ‘well you know that is not really relevant. Isn't it?’ And I said ‘well what do you mean it is not relevant? If that is what she is saying in the grievances, that is what the complaint is, we have to look at this.’ Long story short, we eventually got them to do an investigation, and they noticed that there was friction between her and this one manager and that yes it turns out on that shift that no one else was treated the same way. Like they actually went and looked at some of the records and saw that she was being treated differently. But again, everybody wanted to back away from the fact that this might actually be racially motivated. They were happy to call it harassment or happy to call it some kind of friction or personality thing, but nobody wanted to call it racism.

Quoting Carrey (1988), symbolic interactionist Musolf (1992) writes that power is wedged to communication because through communication is reality “produced, maintained, repaired, and transformed” (p. 172). Because group relations within society are hierarchized, communication is also hierarchized. In other words, communication inherits the dominant-subordinate power-struggles in the workplace and in society. The colorblindness redenition attempt of the legal case is, by consequence, a move to operationalize a dominant narrative on ‘race’ and marginalize a color-conscious lens. Arguably, it reflects, to use Blumer’s role-taking concept, an initial reluctance to take the
role of the other, in this case, of the client. The colleagues fail to step outside of and, instead, apply a particular racial scheme that delegitimizes the complainant’s negative racial experience. At first, they deny the client’s claim of racism the right to due process, thus implicating the law in the order of hegemonic whiteness. Their move reasserts symbolic power by declaring legitimate the colorblind/color-evasive narrative of the dominant society. Alexandra however resists and challenges her colleagues’ redefinition of the plaintiff’s complaint. She is managing meanings; actively producing reality.

The attempt at erasing the core reason for the complaint is worrisome. Recalling CRT, we are reminded that colorblindness is a master narrative in mainstream society, including the legal institution. As Alexandra mentions, “they were happy to call it harassment or happy to call it some kind of friction or personality thing, but nobody wanted to call it racism.” Colorblindness is a normative lens of toubabs. It is the dominant lens shognosh people use to frame present-day ‘race relations’. When faced with racial material, erasure, distortion, denial, or minimization of said material is an information-processing strategy commonly taken to abate dissonance, maintain power, protect one’s self-image, and for other reasons. In Alexandra’s account, resisting a deracialized redefinition had direct consequences for the investigation of the case and its outcomes.
Chapter 6: Organizational Antiracism in Education

Introduction

In the previous chapter I teased out two predominant quotidian antiracism strategies, and a third, that is relatively unique. In this chapter, I detail organizational antiracism. This refers to antiracism that is acted upon through an organizational status or position. This may be a role within a workplace, a committee, or as a volunteer in an agency. O’Brien (2001) terms organizational antiracism as institutional antiracism and defines it as praxis focused on changing an institution or using an institution to make change. In this study, an example of the latter part of O’Brien’s definition (using an institution to make change) is captured in the New Democratic Party (NDP) under Bob Rae that used politics to advance antiracism initiatives in Ontario’s education system.

I use the term ‘organization’ as opposed to ‘institution’, however, to signify that participants’ praxis disproportionately seek to change an (aspect of an) organization (e.g., a particular university) as opposed to an entire institution (e.g., the Ontario education system). While social institutions are enduring patterns of social relationships and interactions that seek to fulfil a particular function in society, organizations are the engines or hubs that coordinate these patterns of relationships and interactions. Thus, the institution of education fulfils a manifest/blatant function of providing students with (what is assumed to be) culturally relevant and employment relevant knowledge. The educational institution, however, is generated by numerous recurring and enduring social relationships and interactions that are coordinated in specific and identifiable organizations (or services and groups) such as the ministry of education, library
associations, faculty unions, universities, publishing houses, and accreditation agencies. This specificity or differentiation between organizations and institutions is lacking within the scholarship, leading to conceptual confusion. Under ‘institutional antiracism’, O’Brien (2001) offers examples of praxis that impact a specific organization as opposed to praxis oriented towards changing an entire institution. It is important to differentiate the two for the antiracism strategies, and the enablers and obstacles encountered in these units likely differ. In this study, only Gloria offers an example of institutional (or, cross-organizational) antiracism when she worked at a school board. As discussed below, it had unique challenges that were not encountered in her classroom antiracism experience.

Quotidian antiracism and organizational antiracism target different audiences. The former is disproportionately geared towards an individual, often the perpetrator, and with the intention to stop or change their attitude and/or behavior. The latter is generally oriented towards an organization, in whole or in part, and, in my data, for the purpose of establishing, supporting or changing an organizational policy, procedure or process and raising the awareness of a secondary group (e.g., employees, donors, and students); people with whom participants have a task-oriented, formal and impersonal relationship.

Organizational antiracism may target an organization’s sequence of tasks and activities (e.g., hiring and retention, product development, resource allocation, and decision making), materials (e.g., training manuals, curricula, toys, and equipment), group dynamics (e.g., staff-employer relations, student-professor relations, and union-employer relations), communication medium and flow, organizational culture, vision and goals, and policies. One need not be part of an organization for their praxis to be organizational
antiracism. The sole requirement is that the target is the organization, in whole or in part. Having a position within an organization does, however, offer its beholder certain opportunities and resources to bring about structural change. Conversely, it may limit their actionable goals, tactics and style (see for example Desmond Cole’s resignation from Toronto Star in May 2017b). Most examples of organizational antiracism in this study pertain to education and are from participants who have an official role in this institution.

I begin below by setting the context, briefly mentioning racism in academia. I then explore antiracism praxis in education and the key obstacles and facilitators shaping it. As an institution, education is comprised of numerous sites. I tease out the differences between antiracism in the classroom and through an administrative or committee work capacity.

**Racism in Academia**

Henry and Tator (2010) list the following manifestations of racism in the educational system:

- Racially biased attitudes and practices of teachers and administrators
- Eurocentric/Anglocentric curricula
- Culturally biased assessment practices
- Hidden curricula and construction of “otherness”
- Racial harassment and racial-based incidents
- Streaming of minority students (especially Blacks) into nonacademic programs
- School disciplinary policies and practices (e.g., zero tolerance)
- Assimilationist culture of the school
- Lack of representation in curricula, administration, and staffing
- Devaluation of the role and participation of parents and the community. (p. 202)
Education is a contested terrain shaped by the political and public arena it operates in. In many ways, it reflects the socio-political dynamics of its locality and era. In their book *The Colour of Democracy: Racism in Canadian Society* (2010), Henry and Tator examine manifestations of racism in the Canadian education system, specifically, in the curriculum, pedagogy, the assessment, placement and streaming of minority students, parents’ experience with their children’s school, racial harassment on school grounds, and the effect of zero tolerance policies on disciplinary practices such as suspensions and expulsions. The above quote lists other examples of manifestations of racism in education (see also Henry & Tator, 2009).

Institutional racism in education is of no surprise. Speaking specifically about the field of psychology in higher education, Richard Shin (2008) writes that:

> Any given institution of higher education can be viewed as a microcosm of the larger society that promotes and reinforces dominant cultural values. In many ways, academia mirrors other institutions of power and privilege that are based on race, gender, social class, and other socially constructed categories. Not surprisingly, the transmission and reinforcement of these values are evident in the fields of counseling and psychology. Scholars have asserted that counselor education has been dominated by White privilege and mainstream societal values. The endorsement in U.S. society of rugged individualism and the illusion of meritocracy have been reinforced in the education and training in psychology that have had a strong bias toward framing human problems in ‘apolitical, intrapsychic, and deficit-oriented diagnoses’. (p. 181)

Shin’s comment extends to other disciplines with roots in the 1600s to mid-1900s, the era of scientific racism. Scientific racism was an academic field and popular cultural narrative alleging a link between ‘race, blood, and culture’ and a promoter of hierarchical racial classification (Brattain, 2007). It was only in 1950, following the second world war, and under the auspices of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO), that an international group of scientists made the first official and widely accepted disavowal of scientific racism. By that time, virtually all education disciplines had in various degrees advanced, adopted, and/or adapted to scientific racism.

Reflecting on Canadian education, Absolon and Willett (2004) write that:

In the 1700’s the social sciences, anthropology and ethnographic studies of ‘other’ portrayed [voyeuristic] account of Indigenous people… embedded in the values, beliefs, attitudes and agendas of the colonists…. [T]he role of research and written text was to propagate the superior intelligence and strength of Europeans. In the context of imperialism and colonialism, Aboriginal people were and continue to be misrepresented for the purpose of propagating, maintaining and justifying control, domination and genocide. (p. 8)


Curriculums, syllabi, pedagogies, teaching styles, and the teaching environment are sites of struggle between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces. They can be used to inculcate dysconsciousness and preserve the status-quo or to cultivate critical awareness and a fire for justice. In the latter scenario, ‘teaching to transgress’ (bell hooks) and a ‘pedagogy of the oppressed’ (Paulo Freire) are acts of academic resistance, advocacy, reconciliation, and/or healing. Education antiracist activists, such as the participants quoted below, are actors in this contested terrain, but are not the only players with a stake in the structuring of education. Legislators, federal and provincial departments of education, schoolboard sponsors, welfare agencies, corporations and their
representatives, major firms, charitable foundations, social movements, advocacy groups and coalitions, non-for-profits, legal bodies, associations, unions, university board of governors, and concerned parents or guardians compete and at times cooperate to sway (aspects of) the education system according to their respective interests.

The participants below shared a number of education antiracism efforts they have engaged in. I begin with an investigation of classroom antiracism.

1. Classroom Antiracism: Teaching and Curriculum Creation

Gloria has promoted inclusion and equity in the classroom and as a member of a district school board where she developed its antiracism policy. More rewarding for her was the former, classroom antiracism:

I work with what I know, and I know kids and I know schools. I have written curriculum and my curriculum brings issues of race and racism into the classroom at a young age. That's where my passion is; in interrupting whiteness. It's really important for kids to work with issues of race and racism, issues of identity and issues to do with all kinds of [oppressions]…. That's my antiracism work; that's where I entered in it. That's where I get my passion from; working with kids and teachers.

Gloria has taught kindergarten and elementary students. I asked her for specific examples of how she brings issues of racism into the classroom. She shared multiple pedagogical tools:

Working with a book like The Women Who Hug the Trees. It is a book about the first tree huggers being the women of India. So dispelling a lot of stereotypes around women, Indian women, [and showing how] these were activist women; these women were strong; these were women who united. And it is based on a true story. Although the legend ends happily, in real life everyone was murdered; they were all killed. But they were the original tree huggers. So bringing stories like that, about women from India being strong environmentalist and the original tree huggers. Bringing these to kids so they can see something that is new and different; a new perspective.
[Also] bringing in a film like *For Angela*. I don't know if you know that film. It is also based on a true story that took place in Winnipeg. It is about a woman and her daughter who were verbally racially attacked by young boys. The incident happened on a bus and no one on the bus said anything. I use a film like that with kids to talk about the bystanders who did nothing and said nothing and what that's all about and why, you know? We should say something; take a stand. And unraveling all of that for kids.

In the classroom, Gloria is ‘teaching to transgress’. She dispels stereotypes, interrupts biases and rationalizations of inequity, affirms and normalizes differences, raises awareness about racism and other –isms, teaches positive and empowering histories of racialized others, and encourages students to think critically about and to be bystander interveners. She is enacting, to use hooks (1994) words, “pedagogical practices that engage directly both the concern for interrogating biases in curricula that reinscribe systems of domination (such as racism and sexism) while simultaneously providing new ways to teach diverse groups of students” (p. 10). The classroom is a space of possibilities, radical possibilities. Gloria has power and it is here her significant contribution to organizational antiracism resides.

From Gloria’s perspective, any grade is appropriate to work with students; the sooner the intervention and educating the better. Even children in grade 1 and 2 “get it”, she exclaims. The art is in tailoring to the specific grade and demography of students. She reflected on having taught a class in a low-income area populated with immigrant families and students of color:

Almost immediately, I began to mull over ideas in my mind of how to deconstruct the ideology of racism with younger students. I wanted students to not just learn theory but to critically reflect on what they learned so that they could apply new learnings to their own lives…. I was conscious that my antiracism practice was privileging a male and mainly American perspective. I took on the challenge to
make the curriculum more inclusive and to strengthen the focus on the Canadian context. I did this by infusing a Black feminist perspective and a stronger antiracist feminist perspective into my everyday work. For example, [I had] students write a nonfiction report based on information they take from nonfiction books on Black History.

Gloria also introduced her students to colonialism by using Barbara Giriton’s novel *Indian Summer*, examining Indigenous stereotypes in media, and inviting Native guest speakers to speak about “Aboriginal spirituality”, the Indian Act, and residential schooling.

This recurrent inclusion of ‘voices from the margins’ is the prevailing strategy employed in critical race theory pedagogy (Lopez, 2003, p. 84). Called **counter-storytelling**, this practice is premised on the belief that stories have a disruptive and destructive function as they do a generative and propagative function. Dominant stories are not merely narratives of fictive or real events, but embedded in them are messages, taken-for-granted ideas, and tacit agreements about how objects and events are related. In the words of Polletta et al., (2011), they are “vehicles of ideology, and elements of collective action frames” (p. 112). The power of stories is further revealed by symbolic interactionists’ studies on the identity formation function of stories; on how stories help people define and organize who they are and to maintain in-group cohesion (see Polletta

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25 Stories reflect the culture of the teller; they are socio-historically laden, and unlike an explanation, a story evokes heightened empathy or affinity towards a character, thus allowing the audience to see the world through their eyes—to role-take. Herein lies its disruptive-destructive function; to the extent that the audience’s and protagonist’s social world and experiences are different, is to the extent that the views, ideas and belief structure of the audience will be disrupted as they role-take. Symbolic interactionists have studies how people use stories to organize who they are, maintain a subjective temporal or sequential sense of continuity, avoid threats to their self-image, fashion identities, maintain bonds of belonging and group cohesion, and how stories are the foundation of disciplinary authority and liberatory impulse.
et al., 2011; Scott & Lyman, 1968; Orbuch, 1997). Much about dominant stories, however, such as the state-sanctioned official narrative about Canada’s sesquicentennial anniversary, are self-serving, coercive and, to subordinate groups, may be experienced as gaslighting. Counter-storytelling thus functions as an ointment. It makes bare the myths and normative lies surrounding our existence, and reveals the struggles and humanity of marginalized groups, empowers them, and disinhibits them from suffering silently. Simultaneously, counter-stories have much to offer to the dominant group, including inspiring in them the disavowal of racism and developing racial consciousness.

Gloria’s curriculum creation and pedagogical practice is largely, though not exclusively, informed by Black feminism. We discussed how this social movement and intellectual tradition influenced her classroom antiracism work. She mentioned being immersed in the works of Annette Henry (UBC), Sherene Razack (OISE), historian Adrienne Shadd (Toronto), Mohawk lawyer and educator Patricia Monture-Angus, and, from south of the border, Patricia Hill Collins, and bell hooks. Their work helped her “resist systems of domination by transforming the classroom into a space of social and racial justice.” Pragmatically speaking, she found that teaching the poetry of Black feminists such as Maya Angelou, Langston Hughes, and Margaret Walter was “an effective way to present the work of talented, articulate Black authors and to teach students to express themselves through this form”. I inquired about her use of poetry in the classroom, she shared with me reflection notes she brought to the interview:

During the year, the students write rhyming couplets, limericks, and diamonte poems in which they reflect on and express their own identity and culture. Before they write, however, we look at the different ways a student can express his/her identity and then discuss how gender, race, culture, religion, language, and class
shape their sense. We take time to play with word combinations that express heritage and race. For many of my students this is an opportunity to explore their diverse heritage, a very new experience. A student born in Guatemala, for example, might express her/his identity as Latina/o, Central American, Latin American, and Canadian. For many students this was an opportunity to explore their diverse heritage. One student wrote that she was French Canadian, African Canadian, and aboriginal; an aboriginal student identified by saying, ‘I am Oneida, I am Mohawk.’ Other students expressed that they were of Cambodian, Vietnamese, or Chinese heritage. For the white students, this exercise seemed strange, as they simply said that they were Canadian. I tried to help them deconstruct this category by pointing out that I was a white woman, of British heritage and a Canadian. They then identified themselves as white Canadians, which can be seen as the taking of small steps toward politicizing whiteness and challenging its normality.

Turning the gaze onto her whiteness and her responsibilities as a white antiracist educator, she then shared that:

As white, antiracist educators we have a lot to learn from Black feminists. We need to listen to their stories, to their perspectives, and to their histories. We need to hear what they have to say, not only about their own lives and experiences but about the oppressiveness of white women, and of our power to silence. We need to acknowledge that we can be simultaneously oppressed and oppressors. When we impose our ideas, when we do not listen to the silenced voices, and when we speak for all people, we are acting in oppressive ways. As white antiracist educators we need to engage in the dual process of deconstructing Eurocentric power and decolonize our own minds, as we strive to live our lives and teach our students in more antiracist and liberatory ways.

Gloria urges educators to radically imagine what an inclusive and critical curriculum looks like. One that challenges eurocentric and androcentric paradigms and highlights Canada’s education system’s colonial inheritance. In the above quote, Gloria also hints at her positon pertaining to representation, positionality, and epistemology. These are themes I discussed in the Frames chapter, especially through Kristin and Billy, and that spring up again below with Dawit.
Gloria’s activism, however, went beyond her classroom. She shared her curriculum, specifically designed to raise critical awareness about inequality, with other teachers; encouraging them to adopt it and provided them with emotional and intellectual support in the process:

We did a lot of that; like we did a unit called ‘the skin I am in looks good to me’ as a school wide theme. So the kids made collages and they put together pictures of kids of all different colous, and then they wrote poetry about themselves. It was a whole school-wide theme. Young kids participated in it as well so. That kind of thing I feel most successful about. The board work was frustrating. Working with teachers can be frustrating. Working with teachers can be frustrating. Working with kids is inspiring because they are open, they are very open.

A curriculum that satisfies provincial education guidelines and outcomes and simultaneously promotes anti-oppression, inclusion and equity is an anomaly. What helped Gloria to not feel as an aberration among other teachers was the legitimizing role of the NDP on antiracism work in Ontario.

For five years throughout her three decades of teaching, the Ontario NDP was in power (1990-1995). Gloria got to experience the direct and varied effects of different political climates on antiracism education. Under the NDP, antiracism became an official lens for understanding and tackling racial issues, particularly in education and the Ontario Public Service. Gloria recalls Dr. Aliz Glaze who served in 1994 as the Commissioner for the Ontario Royal Commission on Learning and as the Adviser to the Minister of Education. She “was a very strong antiracism advocate” and “it made it easy”. By “it” Gloria means justifying to her colleagues why she developed and taught a transgressive curriculum. Under NDP leader Bob Rae, the Ministry of Education had created an official anti-discrimination curriculum and gave schoolboards the option to use it. Though
Gloria’s schoolboard chose otherwise, she “took it and developed a curriculum around it” and despite not receiving in-service on it. From an SI perspective, the NDP’s adoption of antiracism meant Gloria’s activism was suddenly ascribed with new meanings. By politically officiating antiracism praxis, Gloria found her views reflected in a ‘power resource’, a very influential institution.

Politics, however, can act as a deterrent as it can act as an enabler of organizational antiracism. Swiftly following the election of the Progressive Conservatives (PC) after the NDP, Gloria believes we saw a massive systematic and targeted erasure of anti-discrimination education in Ontario. This erasure became a heated topic in the Legislative Assembly, as shown in the following recorded October 7th 1998 debate between NDP Member Howard Hampton and the then Minister of Education and Training, Honorable David Johnson, a PC:

Mr. Hampton: Minister, can you tell us why, then, you have directed the curriculum project managers to change the grade 9 and 10 curriculum policy documents by deleting ‘education about discrimination and anti-discrimination,’ deleting ‘education about native people,’ and deleting ‘education about violence prevention?’ Why have you instructed that these things should be deleted from the curriculum?

Hon. David Johnson: I made no such instruction.

Mr. Hampton: I'm amazed that this government wants to control everything, but then when they get caught at it, they say, ‘It wasn't us.’ This is a Ministry of Education and Training memorandum to project managers of curriculum from Karen Allan regarding program planning. It says:

‘Part 1: Delete cross-curricular considerations’ - education with respect to anti-racism; education with respect to anti-discrimination – ‘delete violence prevention; delete education about native people.’

Why would one of your officials be sending out this kind of directive to the people who are working on the curriculum? Minister, don't you think these things
are important in our high school curriculum? Don't you think these things ought to be addressed? The last time I checked, this city is one of the most multicultural cities in the world. The last time I checked, some of these issues are very serious. Why are you deleting them? (as quoted in Pinto, 2012, pp. 98-99)

Though the political climate under the NDP facilitated and legitimized her antiracism curriculum, and though the election of the Tories disposed of these enablers, as a teacher, Gloria still had power over her curriculum. As long as it met the Ministry’s guidelines, she had creative licence over its content. In this sense, being a teacher offered her some legroom in which she had agency to bring antiracism in the classroom.

Unlike Gloria, who taught kindergarten and elementary school and thus was forced to find creative ways to introduce her students to the subject of oppression, equity, and inclusion, Billy and Dawit taught post-secondary courses directly on the subject of anti-oppression. Informed by a critical whiteness antiracism approach, classroom antiracism for Billy means that:

What I do is stand in this place of the white middle class professor and then talk about this stuff that unpacks it, and it unsettles people in a more effective way.

Billy is strategic about how he starts his course:

We start off with racism. I tell them my theory, which is that if you can understand how racism operates—and we spend a lot of time understanding racism—the other -isms are a bit different but it gives you clues about how the other -isms operate. So in class the first thing we have to do is get comfortable talking about racism. This year students said they thought using ‘the racism word’ was counter-productive because everyone just gets upset and it ends the conversation. My response to that is that, yeah, but they are in this class because they are becoming social scientists and this class is about anti-oppression so this is a thing that they're going to have to take up. Not using ‘the r word’ is a bit like teaching a doctor not to use ‘the cancer word’ because it upsets people.

I asked him for the specific pedagogical tools he has used to unpack whiteness in the classroom. He named a few, including Harvard’s implicit attitude test (IAT), developed
by Banaji, Greenwald, Nosek, and Sriram (see Banaji & Greenwald, 2013). Billy’s first step in classroom antiracism is to get students to recognize their biases. One way he does that is by using the IAT. The IAT measures implicit attitudes, beliefs, and proclivities that people have. It tests automatic associations we make between objects, even if consciously we may disagree with the associations. More specifically, it measures the strengths (slight, moderate, or strong) with which we associate concepts (e.g., Black people, white people) and evaluations (e.g., nice, untrustworthy). Unlike explicit attitudes, implicit attitudes are not as accessible to our conscious awareness and are not much in our control. An IAT may show that people moderately associate the word ‘leadership’ with ‘men’ more so than ‘women’ and by extension are more comfortable with men taking leadership, though consciously they believe in sex equality. In this case, one has a positive explicit attitude towards women + leadership, but a negative implicit attitude towards women + leadership. Billy gets students to do the IAT for various subjects, including skin-tone, ‘race’, and gender. He also intervenes when they start “doing this kind of whiny, feeling guilty thing where people then become self-centred. But it's like, take the test and then deal with it and think about the implications and what you need to do.”

Dawit spoke about the politics of teaching a course on racism as a white teacher. He is cognizant, for example, of the tension between the structure of academic work versus the needs of oppressed groups and communities who seek meaningful solutions to social problems. Academic work is largely limited to teaching, researching and university service. These are the ‘big 3’ criteria for tenure-track hiring and promotion. Dawit,
however, attempts to straddle both community and academic spheres. In one sense, he explains that academic work is community work for both of these domains overlap. In other words, academia is in community as much as community is in academia:

I am not one of those who separates the ivory tower from the world. Lots of very important activism happens in the classroom and in research. So much of racism comes from our beliefs and our ideas, that changing our beliefs and our ideas are some of the primary work. And you think back at what else were people doing? What was WEB Du Bois doing? What was Malcolm X, or Martin Luther King, or Ghandi doing? We see them as prominent political figures and they were—but it was intellectual work they were doing. So I don't apologize at all about being in classroom or writing books. I think that stuff is at the forefront.

The classroom provides a four months plus opportunity for a focused interrogation on ideas, ideologies, and hegemonic discourses that justify and support systems of stratification:

I believe in education a lot, and a specific kind of education. I believe in the power of changing people's minds by presence, by being with one another and talking these things through in ways that can kind of shift perspective. That could be everything from the classroom where you get a whole 70 people in the room and students who tell you at the end of the year ‘I’ve never encountered these things before. It's changed my view.’ I feel good about that.

In this sense, classroom activism disperses into the communities surrounding academia. Dawit, however, cautions against the limitations of academic activism when he says teaching, researching, and publishing are not enough: “It can’t be only that. If it is only that it can be trapped in the circuit of its own circulation. So the work goes only to the library and it only goes to the final exam.” For this reason, Dawit also participates in administrative antiracism and actively collaborates with community members.

Another issue toubab educators must navigate pertains to representation, positionality, and racial epistemology. White educators inherit a legacy of coercive white
power. They become the arbitrators of knowledge, provide and officiate interpretations, dictate the boundaries of the cannon, and regulate ideas and classroom conversations.

Dawit shares his experiences navigating this inheritance:

From time to time students often of color say ‘I don't want a white professor teaching’ race and racism studies because there's a perception that my inevitable [white] obliviousness will overlook things and present things in ways they may feel don't fit their experience and so on. But I feel that it is really important to have white people part of that discussion and at the front of that discussion and not just say that this has to do with other peoples’ issues. In this particular society it is a way of inviting white students into the conversation and to see themselves as part of that discussion and the movement towards race-equality or equity. There is a particular responsibility about being white in that domain that I think is important.

By encouraging shognosh people to be ‘at the front of that discussion’ Dawit is not promoting that they ‘take up’ or ‘occupy’ space. Instead, he is mirroring calls from the margins that persons with privilege use their privilege to advance equity:

People talk about using privilege. I see the point of that discourse of saying ‘Okay, I happen to be a professor, I have a salary, I have tenure, I have the capacity to publish things, I have the ability to teach. So what will I teach? What will I publish about? What will I use these capacities for?’ I must try and keep those priorities straight because whiteness shapes all of those things. But not just whiteness alone. It is also tenuredness and so forth. Ross Chambers talks about those as a deck of cards. These are the cards I have got, so what can I use them for?

There is another layer to this strategic subversive usage of privilege. Dawit is inviting white persons to recognize the negative costs of racism in their own lives and to be motivated to act from a combined understanding of how racism affects targets, majoritarians, and society at large.

Keith Edwards’ (2006) social justice ally identity developmental model may clarify how Dawit understands his role as a white educator. Partly informed by Janet
Helms’ WRID theory, Edwards’ model looks at the motivations that spur an individual from a dominant group to become a social justice ally. In Edwards’ model, Aspiring Allies for Self-Interest (the first type of ally)

often seek to be an ally to an individual with whom they have a personal connection rather than to a group or an issue, and see themselves as protectors who intervene on behalf of a specific individual from an oppressed social group, and frequently do so without consulting him/her…. Because the focus is on protecting those whom individuals care for, these aspiring allies may be unlikely to confront overt acts of oppression when the people they care about are not present and may even join in the oppressive behavior because those they care about are not directly harmed. (p. 46)

This ally is motivated to do allyship to protect or advocate for the individual marginalized person they care about. Aspiring Ally for Altruism, the second type of ally, is motivated to engage in social justice because they see marginalized groups as victims. They do ally work for them, they seek justice for them, they seek to empower them, they speak for rather than with them, and they see themselves helping them. Consequently, such allies risk seeking or taking credit and control over efforts at social change:

Because these aspiring allies do not see how members of the dominant group are also hurt by the system of oppression, aspiring allies view their efforts as selfless and altruistic efforts that should be welcomed with praise and approval from the subordinate group. (p. 50)

The last ally type, Ally for Social Justice, is motivated by a combined selfishness that Edwards summarizes as an “I do this for us” approach. Rather than allying to an individual person or a target group seen as victims void of agency, these persons ally to an issue and work with target groups. Key here is that:

Allies for Social Justice recognize that members of dominant groups are also harmed by the system of oppression, although the harm done to members of dominant groups is not the same nor comparable to the harm done to subordinate groups. By working towards social justice, allies are seeking not only to free the
oppressed but also to liberate themselves and reconnect to their own full humanity. Accepting the reality and influence of privilege, Allies for Social Justice see escaping, impeding, amending, redefining, and dismantling systems of oppression as a means of liberating us all. (p. 51)

It is in this third manner that Dawit sees his role as a white educator and encourages toubab students to adopt an antiracism praxis. He is encouraging in them the development of self-implication cognizance, which I argue is an important ripeness in antiracist identity development. However, like all identity, behavioral and cognitive models, it too has its risks.

White educators doing antiracism work in the classroom use an assortment of pedagogical tools to unearth, resist, and transform hegemonic narratives. In Marxist lexicon, dominant narratives are ruling class ideologies that legitimate the social order and obfuscate the violence, exploitation, and injustice it produces and stems from. In the classroom, ‘the community’—society in fact—is under interrogation; its racial order, power relations, histories of exploitation and oppression, obfuscating ideologies, and latent dysfunctions are under scrutiny. Simultaneously as whiteness and inequalities are interrogated, white educators face certain challenges, particularly political and interactional ones. Colleagues may question their curriculum and racialized students may, initially and legitimately, distrust them. Ultimately, respondents see classroom activism as complementing material struggles. In the words of Molefi Kete Asante (2006):

[The] nonmaterial legacies [of colonialism] are as important in our thinking as the material ones when we engage questions of resistance and recovery. The colonizer did not only seize land, but also minds. If colonialism’s influence had been merely the control of land that would have required only one form of resistance, but when information is also colonized, it is essential that the resistance must interrogate issues related to education, information and intellectual transformations…. An effective system of colonialism reduces the imposed upon to a shell of a human
who is incapable of thinking in a subjective way of his or her own interest. In everything the person becomes like the imposer; thus in desires, wishes, visions, purposes, styles, structures, values, and especially the values of education, the person operates against his or her own interest. (p. ix)

I explore below the ways participants engage in a material struggle over organizational resources and access from an administrative side.

2. Administrative Antiracism: Equity Hiring and Accessibility

Legal scholar Derrick Bell coined the term interest convergence, a core principle in CRT, to stress that, generally, white society will accept, pursue and advance racial equity so long that it converges with their psychological, cultural and/or material interests:

The point is that people in power are sometimes, in theory, supportive of policies and practices that do not oppress and discriminate against others as long as they—those in power—do not have to alter their own ways and systems, statuses and privileges of experiencing life…. (Milner, 2008, p. 334)

This concept stresses a macro-context to organizational antiracism. Participants’ attempts at organizational change is often contingent upon moments of interest convergence between antiracism advocacy and an organization’s interest. Consequently, interest convergence acts as a ‘master enabler’ of organizational antiracism. Consider, for example, Gloria’s struggle with administrative antiracism.

Gloria joined a schoolboard to advance equity and shape school procedures, processes, and operations according to antiracism and anti-discrimination best practices. During her term on the board, she worked:

with superintendents and the board’s antiracism consultant. I think it was actually at that time called the equity consultant. And then there were community members of people who came from the outside; members of different communities that also
sat on the board. Anyways it was a large board, maybe 15 of us. But for me it was
discouraging because there was a process in place for running the policy but then I
saw that process was not always followed in the end. In the end it was the person
who had the power that could go through and stop or do what he wanted to it.

The shift in power from the provincial NDP to the Conservative party impacted her policy
work; many enablers of antiracism work were gutted, halted or retrenched. These
included in-service antiracism training, equity hiring efforts, grants for anti-
discrimination initiatives, Ministry of Education resources, racial and cultural bias-free
assessments, monitoring and accountability measures, an antiracism curriculum designed
by Dr. Charles Pascal (OISE) following the 1992 Yonge Street riot, the Ontario Anti-
Racism Secretariat (then headed by Anne-Marie Stewart and which had a sizeable annual
budget of $743,000, equivalent to $1.1 million today), and top-down political
corroboration. Dr. Pascal, who had served as the former Ontario Deputy Minister of
Education and Training (1993-1995), shared his reflections, corroborating that political
climates can be both facilitators and obstacles for praxis:

June 9, 1992 [is] when Stephen Lewis, as Advisor to Premier Bob Rae on Race
Relations, tabled his report. Two things will stun anyone who reads the report.
One, it set a speed record. Lewis crammed an incredible amount of consultation
into a month and produced 37-pages of advice to the Premier. Second, the force
and quality of Lewis’s recommendations were remarkable. Sadly, many of them
remain timely today. Premier Rae wasted zero time in directing his ministers and
deputy ministers to implement recommendations related to several key ministries.

As deputy minister of education, my marching orders were clear—develop and
implement an anti-racism strategy for Ontario’s education system. The good news
is that under former Minister Dave Cooke, we made remarkable progress in a
short time with an effective process and a framework for action. The bad news?
With implementation well underway, Mr. Rae’s successor government scrapped
the entire plan and process. Unfortunately, successive governments have never
come close to re-instating this short-lived comprehensive plan…. 
Ontario was on its way to a major generational change to education equity. And then? The election of 1995 gave rise to a U-turn in many areas of public policy but none more devastating to our collective future than the complete elimination of the education equity plan. The notion of education equity was expunged from the landscape…on a dime.

Since then, nothing significant, nothing with depth of purpose has come close to this 1993 framework for change. (Pascal, 2016)

Gloria experienced difficulties in executing her antiracism policy work. As she put it:

I knocked my ahead against the wall until I learned the lesson; there is only so much you can do, and so you work with where you have power. The antiracism policy forming, I worked hard on that but I realized that it wasn’t in my control. The schoolboard can do whatever they wanted.

The schoolboard’s interest barely converged with the antiracism interest of racialized persons and allies. Though the schoolboard did not penalize individual teachers for using the Ministry’s anti-discrimination-focused curriculum, it did not provide in-service or follow-up on policy and organizational change. Gloria experienced this interest divergence as ‘knocking my head against a wall’ and expressed frustration that ‘the person who had the power could go through and stop or do what he wanted to.’ This is a similar experience articulated by Alexandra, as discussed in the equality and human rights frame chapter.

Dawit and Natasha had a more positive experience with administrative antiracism. In part because of the structural differences between pre- and post-secondary education, and the additional external and internal pressures for racial equity in universities, including the Contractors Federal Program and campus equity-focused committees and groups. Dawit’s and Natasha’s administrative equity work largely catered to equitable
hiring and increasing university access for students from equity-seeking groups, a type of antiracism praxis that over time has converged with the interest of higher education.

I asked Dawit to share some success stories of organizational antiracism. He spoke about his role as a co-chair of a committee focused on Indigenous issues; a position that entailed “a lot of managerial behind the scenes meetings work to support and enhance the Indigenous studies program on campus and Indigenous students here.” I inquired about specific outcomes during his term as co-chair:

When I started with the committee in [the early-2000s] there was one full time Indigenous professor on campus. At that point we said we’d love to see 5 professors in a 5-year plan. We had a retreat and thought about our objectives. We wanted to increase the number of Indigenous expertise on campus and to place Indigenous programs on its road to offering a full degree in Indigenous studies. We wanted to place Indigenous learners and research higher on the scale of the university’s self-awareness. We wanted to increase the connection between community-based research and university-based research. It’s five years later and there are 6 full-time professors now. There is space for the Indigenous Studies in the new building they are building, which will be right at the front door when you come onto campus. And when you come into the ground-floor of the building, the very first thing you are going to see is Indigenous Studies. They are going to move from the basement and will be over there in this turtle shaped designed space....

Dawit is grateful for having been offered the co-chair position. He was critical, however, of the mechanisms that allowed him, a shognosh person, to co-chair a committee focused on Indigenous issues. Aware of the settler-paternalistic governance structure and biases in the allocation of leadership position, he worked to restructure the committee “so that my position no longer exists. It should be an Indigenous person, not some non-Indigenous person who chairs such a committee.” Since then, someone else has had this position.

Another successful outcome he shared is the substantial increase in the number of “Indigenous leaders” on campus:
When you ask about what those meetings and committee work were all about, I feel delighted to see all that work is turning into concrete change in the institution…. We were able to establish an endowed chair in Indigenous studies…. This is a research chair. So there has been some significant infrastructural and structural changes in those given years I have been doing that. And I don't want this to be taken as a personal credit for it is a whole group of people. I have just been one among the committee, but sometimes you can think that you're on committees just to waste your time and so it is good to see that some things really were happening. There's been some significant development.

Prior to the above co-chairing role, Dawit was also responsible for the Indigenous Studies file as an academic officer for the university. This was in the 1990s, and he too felt the positive weight the newly elected NDP government placed on equity, inclusion, and diversity. He mentions the government’s Aboriginal Education and Training Strategy launched in 1991/1992 to provide resources for the participation and involvement of First Nations in institutional governance and to support post-secondary institutions set up and enhance Aboriginal support services and programming. This trickled into his work as academic officer, most notably, increasing and facilitating collaborations between the university and various Indigenous representatives and agencies. Dawit’s equity hiring work also turned towards his department:

I have been involved for years on campus trying to make sure that we diversify our faculty, and in hiring practices that we don't retain—think about my department, it has a long history from Britain and maybe the United States and there is a long white narrative in there. So who are the professors? A lot of time it is white people. And so one of the things that I have wanted to see is kind of a diversification. We worked on that for years and it's hard, it's ongoing, and when we manage to make good hires people leave and then we think oh man we've got to work on that again! So that is what I mean [when I say this work is an] aspiration. It has to be a way of life rather than just one specific project….

Some of the work that has been done is rethinking the fields of specialization and what we cover in the programme. So that means re-thinking the cannons of thought or of the texts that are seen as the great works of the literary tradition. Once you make some of those changes—and I’d say the department has
been really good at making those changes—that means you can start looking for different expertise when you're looking for new hires. You're not just replacing what we had before, but you're looking for new kinds of people, new kinds of experiences, new kinds of knowledge. And that is an ongoing struggle but then one of the challenges to it is that a lot of places are wanting to diversify their faculty. So that means that there is a real desire and there is a market for professors of various racial backgrounds who have expertise. And so what I am seeing is people who can move from place to place because the salaries are attractive or the situation is better, then it is hard to keep people. And so we have had a traffic through our department already. I have been here 16 years and I have seen a fair amount of movement. And so we think we have addressed an issue but then we need to address it again and again and again.

Though an avid and unapologetic ‘publish and teach’ professional academic, Dawit also sits on committees allowing him to channel his political ecology antiracism towards administrative-based structural transformation. His position as professor offers him access to certain resources (e.g., funding, people with expertise, proximity to decision-making power) and opportunities (e.g., joining committees) to facilitate organizational change.

Mirroring critical race theory tenants, Natasha explains that her organizational antiracism is in response to racism in absentia: “a really big way in the academy and in all kinds of [organizations] that you encounter racism is by absences as opposed to that presence” of blatant discrimination. When she started as a faculty in her department, “it was a really, really white department even though the rest of the university wasn't as white, and Southern Ontario certainly wasn’t that white.” This racial homogeneity of the faculty despite the surrounding diversity was a cautionary sign, a call for the need of intervention in the department’s recruitment and hiring process. I asked Natasha for specifics about this intervention. She shared two initiatives, an Access Program to facilitate university enrolment for students from certain equity-seeking groups, and a Pre-Doctoral Fellow as a pathway to equity hiring:
When I came to this department, there was an alternative admissions process…. This process is to get entry into the graduate project. Aboriginal students can apply through both processes or just one process. The Aboriginal process has more verbal content. They are part of a discussion and there is an elder involved in the admissions. We also have an admissions committee. On good years we might find four or five students who qualify that way. They can have different grade level if they can explain them because their lives have often been very difficult and that is why the grades look that way, and part of the difficulty is that the education system hasn't worked well for them… Over the past three years, I was the faculty member who was—because we didn’t have any Aboriginal faculty members—who was assigned to keep this process going and to keep the Aboriginal students society going. Anyways it was a good thing; it recognized historical wrongs and it recognized the kind of role that the department has played in perpetuating colonialism and the oppression of Aboriginal people.

Different universities and departments have variations of the Access Program, most of which focus on people of Native descent. A partial list of universities with a Native/Aboriginal Access Program include Lakehead University, the University of British Columbia, University of Saskatchewan, University of Calgary, University of Manitoba, McMaster University, Simon Fraser University, Mount Royal University, Western University, and Queens University. Students with proof of ancestry have the choice to be considered as enrollees through the Access Program. In her previous faculty position, Natasha helped run a similar admission process designed for Indigenous people, African Nova Scotians, Acadians, and people with disability. Each admission process had their slight differences. For instance, the Aboriginal track had an elder who was part of the admission process, unseen in the other access programs.

Natasha, however, was disappointed at the long track record of “zero success” her present department has had in hiring Indigenous faculty members. A few years ago, the department thus decided to experiment with a new strategy:
We developed this thing we call a pre-doc. We basically looked around for ways to pragmatically show that we had a commitment to Aboriginal faculty and to developing Aboriginal scholarship. We looked around and in the US there was a pre-doc named after Fredrick Douglass that was for African American studies. We modeled ourselves somewhat on them. The pre-doc is offered to a student once they finish their coursework and their comprehensive exams. Compared to how other students at the PhD level are supported, the pre-doc is quite financially generous. [Students] consult the department while they are on this. They might occasionally teach a course but we're trying to protect their time. They might sit on various committees in the university but again we try to protect their time.... So they get a good chunk of money to live on for up to three years to finish their thesis. Once they have finished that they are automatically folded into a tenure track position. And to fund that we had to talk to the provost into committing money and we had to give up the money that we usually get to give ourselves course releases after we have supervised a number of graduate students. So other departments get that money. We don't get that anymore because we have put it into the pre-docs.

The Pre-Doc strategy proved successful. Two Aboriginal faculty members were hired. Natasha describes them as talented colleagues who also get along with everybody and who are a source of support for each other. The Access Program and Pre-Doc Fellow continue to be used to diversify the student body and faculty.

As Dawit’s and Natasha’s accounts show, organizational antiracism almost always requires certain occupational sacrifices; a ‘giving up of privilege’. For both, this has meant, respectively, sacrificing professional advancement and employee resources in order to advance equity and diversity; in order to redistribute and democratize power. Dawit proactively made a co-chair position he held to henceforth be held by an Indigenous person and Natasha and her colleagues forfeited having a course release. The latter’s department made the choice that funds traditionally allocated for hiring sessional instructors be reallocated to new tenured faculty salaries:
So we don't get the break anymore, we just teach, no matter how many people we supervise, which is okay because it is okay, but also mostly because we needed to hire aboriginal faculty, and now we have two.

I asked Natasha how her department managed to ‘give away some privilege’, a decision that faculty in many other departments are defensive about. It was simple, she explained: “we call ourselves an anti-oppressive department and we have a mission statement for ourselves that says we are pursuing social justice”. In short, her department attempts to walk the talk, to do diversity and not merely claim to be anti-oppressive. This sacrificing of privilege is particularly significant considering that interest convergence stresses that:

The sacrifice necessary for real social change to take place is sometimes too painful or inconceivable; it may be difficult for those in our country to take serious strides toward racial, social, and economic justice because it means that, in some cases, some group has to give up something of interest to it, such as its privileges and its ways of life. The problem is that many worry about how change can threaten their position, status, and privilege and, consequently, the status of their children and future generations. (Milner, 2008, p. 334)

Accordingly, organizational antiracism is markedly contingent upon its benefit to the interests of toubabs in power. This can take many forms, including, avoiding a legal suit and negative publicity, alumni (dis)content, revenue concerns, or (dis)approval from donors and funders (Leigh, 2003; Donnor, 2006; Bell, 1980; Castagno & Lee, 2007).

I am uncertain if Natasha and Dawit would agree with my word choice, ‘sacrifice’, to describe their giving up of privilege. Regrettably, I did not inquire further into the backstory behind the ‘collective sacrifice’ their departments made. I am left to wonder the particulars of how they and other participants navigate interest disvergence, frame their advocacy such that convergence is gained, and the practicality and difficulties
of giving up privilege. This is all the more important considering that, generally, toubabs take racial equity to be a zero-sum game:

which can be summed up as ‘less against you means more against me.’ Indeed, previous research suggests that White Americans perceive increases in racial equality as threatening their dominant position in American society, with Whites likely to perceive that actions taken to improve the welfare of minority groups must come at their expense. (Norton & Sommers, 2011, p. 215)

When racial equity is perceived to threaten the interests of privileged groups, it will be opposed, contested or altered by said groups. A win-win perspective is generally developed when social stratification is seen as illegitimate or in some way corrupt (Wilkins & Kaiser, 2013). It takes, however, a certain critical analysis to go from a zero-sum to a win-win perspective in which giving up white privilege is deemed necessary for better gains. Despite these barriers to organizational antiracism (interest divergence and a zero-sum perspective), the ease and straightforwardness of Natasha’s answer to my question (“we call ourselves an anti-oppressive department”) suggests that her department has gone through a series of discussion and collective soul-searching, the conclusion of which is that diversity and equity are unquestionable values that must be implemented.

In addition to the expertise available in her department to facilitate change, Natasha also mentions that the department’s explicit anti-oppression mission statement acted as an enabler of organizational antiracism. We encountered a similar enabler previously with Lauren; the antiracism policy visible on a wall at her workplace promotes a culture that is actively intolerant of racism and expects bystander action. The department’s anti-oppression mission statement has the same effect. “In my department the issue of oppression is at the surface”, Natasha mentions. Furthermore, power in
numbers is another enabler for department-level organizational antiracism. Natasha explains that there are other faculty members who support the mission statement and actively lead discussions on its implementation:

lately we have hired two women; one woman of color and one out Lesbian so I don’t think it means anymore that when I come in the room that people go ‘Gender and Race are in the room we better pull up our socks a bit’. I think it is more dispersed than that; definitely.

Having the support of colleagues to advance equity-initiatives is a horizontal enabler in that it is support between persons of relatively similar statuses. Within an organizational setting, however, where multiple levels of hierarchy exist and where changes to the distribution of resources or the management of a department must first be approved by the relevant authority, vertical enablers are essential for the successful advancement of organizational antiracism. One such vertical enabler is vertical support, an enabler first encountered above with Jennifer, who had the backing of her company’s president to advance equity. Another is the political climate of the NDP under Bob Rae. Yet another vertical enabler facilitated the pre-doc strategy in Natasha’s department: “to fund [the pre-doc] we had to talk to the provost into committing money”. The Pre-Doc comes from two monetary pools, course release funds and funds from the provost. The latter is a senior administrative officer in the university. Dawit too mentions vertical support as an influential enabler in his equity efforts when he said, “we’ve got a good guy in that office these days”. He is referring to the president of the university he works in. This was not the first time I heard appraisals for this same president. Other participants too commented that their university’s president’s interest in inclusion and equity has facilitated various equity initiatives in their respective university.
The role of vertical enablers is more apparent in organizational antiracism efforts than it is in everyday interpersonal antiracism. I posit that this is because antiracism work in organizational settings must contend with its bureaucratic nature. Each ‘desk or office’ of a bureaucratically managed workplace is a potential enabler or obstacle to organizational antiracism. Navigating bureaucracy to bring about change necessitates certain decisions, skills and resources. In a decentralized organization, these decisions, skills and resources reside within the purview of certain offices, hence the significant role of vertical support.

In closing this chapter, I turn to participants’ answers from the questionnaires on antiracism strategies and considerations in responding to racism administered in this study. This data offers a complementary perspective to the themes explored in the last two chapters.

3. A Complementary Story: Questionnaire Data

In the first questionnaire, 40 strategies were available for participants to chose from. The following chart shows participants’ top antiracism praxis. There are eight columns in this chart, each represent a percentage count of certain antiracism strategies.

There are three strategies represented by Column A. These strategies were chosen by all 38 participants (100%) in this study. In this column are:

a. Self-education
b. Reflecting on and changing one’s internalized prejudices
c. Proactively seeking to hear/read racial subalterns views on ‘race’ issues.

Column B also consists of three strategies, each selected by 36 participants (95%):
d. Confronting a perpetrator

e. Developing inclusive language

f. Talking about ‘race’ issues with others.

In **Column C** there are two strategies, each chosen by 35 participants (92%):

g. Giving space to POCs to speak about their experiences

h. Organizing/attending multicultural or antiracism events.

The distribution then takes a sizeable decrease. **Column D** consists of two strategies, each chosen by 24 participants (63%):

i. Intentionally buying goods created by POCs

j. Structural antiracism.
20 participants (53%), represented by Column E, erased racist comments in public spaces or took down racist posters. 19 participants (50%), Column F, selected intentionally making cross-racial contact. 18 participants (47%), Column G, joined an antiracist group or organization. Finally, 15 participants (39%), represented by Column H, have used spirituality/religion to inform their antiracism praxis and/or as an antiracism strategy (e.g., praying).

Pertaining to participants’ antiracism orientations—towards self, perpetrator, target, bystanders, or an organization—the most popular orientation or object of praxis is towards the self. Limitations of the questionnaire method aside, this finding differs from the interview data, where participants’ antiracism praxis are predominantly aimed at a perpetrator. It corroborates, however, my earlier mentioned observation that antiracism-as-action simultaneously encompasses an identity transformative project; a project upon the self. Antiracism compels participants to re-socialize themselves racially: to develop racial consciousness, deprogram their prejudices, and change or develop new behaviors, such as inclusive language.

The next most popular orientation is towards racialized others. As previously encountered in the Quotidian Antiracism chapter, listening and giving verbal space to racial subalterns is an interpersonal redistributive strategy, one that is informed by concerns regarding representation, positionality and racial epistemology. In this orientation is also proactively seeking the viewpoints of BIPOCs, conscious consumerism or purchasing behavior, and making interracial contact.
Though individual and interpersonal praxis are predominant in the questionnaire data, 63% of participants have engaged in organizational antiracism and 47% have at one point joined an antiracist group. Surprisingly, these last two findings were not reflected during our discussion.

Chart 9

The second questionnaire asked participants to choose which variables they take in consideration when deciding to respond to racism. These variables do not suggest whether the participant actually engaged in praxis or not. They solely pertain to self-indication and interpretative processes. There were 19 options available. The above graph is of the top responses.

26 participants (68%) consider their skill and knowledge in deciding to form a line of antiracist action. As mentioned in the Quotidian Antiracism chapter, research finds that
lack of knowledge is a key obstacle to antiracist bystander action (Nelson et al., 2010, p. 38). Unsurprisingly, it is reflected in its prominence in the list of consideration.

Exceptionally more than was mentioned in interview discussions, 24 participants (63%) chose safety as a concern that crosses their mind. This same percentage also consider the amount of persons that are, at the time of the incident, agents/perpetrators, targets/victims, antiracists/allies, and witnesses/observers.

23 respondents (61%) think about the type of incident and its gravity or seriousness. 22 respondents (58%) consider who the persons are in the situation (e.g., their status, age, gender, and ‘race’) and their relationship with them. One participant during the interview mentioned age as exceptionally relevant because they associate the elderly with deserving respect. For this responded, an elderly must be given respect at all times. This shapes how they respond to prejudice.

21 participants (55%) consider the promises and commitments they have made while 20 (53%) take note of where they are located at the time of the incident, where the racism is taking place. Another 53% engage in a pros and cons or benefit and costs assessment. Finally, the same percentage considers the response they believe they will receive from others and are worried about backlash.

**In Closing**

In the previous and current chapters, I teased out manifestations of antiracism work. Quotidian interpersonal antiracism takes the form of confronting and counterclaiming individual racism in the moment it arises. Hot confrontation assails a real
or perceived racist identity while counterclaiming offers various information to elicit behavioral, cognitive and, to a certain extent, affective change.

Rather than ‘interrupting’ being the primary goal, though it certainly is a secondary or tertiary outcome, organizational antiracism is chiefly about the creation or reinforcement of processes, programs, policies, resources, opportunities, and partnerships to advance diversity, inclusion and equity. Most examples of organizational antiracism in this study occur in the education system and pertain to classroom and academic antiracism and administrative antiracism. Organizational antiracism is facilitated by vertical enablers, including interest convergence, support from the higher-ups, availability of funding, presence of policies, and the organizational and political climate. Unlike classroom antiracism, administrative antiracism is group-based work through committees and working-groups. As such, the time between antiracism intent and outcome is larger and the work is very incremental. Horizontal support is vital considering the group-based nature of administrative work.

Though participants draw upon multiple frames for antiracism, they share an action-oriented construal of antiracism and thus see themselves as having a personal responsibility in responding to racism. The ‘complicity’ section discussed in the next chapter suggests that the principle of personal responsibility is somewhat unique to antiracism. At the very least, it differs from conventional, everyday advices about racism, such as, ‘ignore it and it will go away’, ‘it was just a joke’, ‘it is an isolated incident’, and ‘it is not a big deal’. Action-oriented antiracism and the principle of personal accountability defy such advices.
In the next chapter, I explore the various meanings of antiracism for how participants view themselves and guide their behaviors. The discussion shifts from an action-oriented and organizational unit level of analysis and returns to an SI social-psychological and subjectivity focus.
Chapter 7: Self-Implication Cognizance

Introduction

Instead of focusing on a perpetrator, target, or organization, in this chapter, the focus is on the self. I detail how participants situate themselves within white supremacy as a beneficiary, an intentional or unintentional agent, and a recipient of its costs. Unlike the previous three chapters, here, the interest is on self-reflection shaped by an antiracism lens. I describe a subtype of self-awareness that eschews “race-ing to innocence”. More specifically, I explore forms of antiracism self-views.

Critical race theorists have observed the resistances and tensions of white students in relation to antiracism themes (Schick, 2000; Matias, Montoya & Nishi, 2016; Matias, 2013). Self-implication cognizance is unfortunately rare. This refers to an acknowledgement, understanding and articulation of how one is personally implicated in the benefits, maintenance, burdens, and costs of the hegemonic order of whiteness. It is a subtype of cognizance that is in conversation with three relatable constructs in critical race and critical whiteness research: race-cognizance, reflexive race-cognizance, and reflexive antiracism.

Ruth Frankenberg (1993) coined the term race-cognizance to refer to a discourse on ‘race’ that insists “on the importance of recognizing [racial] difference—but with difference understood in historical, political, social, or cultural terms rather than essentialist ones” (p. 157). There are two features to race-cognizance. First, contrary to colorblindness, it acknowledges that sociorace shapes people’s lives; that it matters in how persons are treated and in racial identity development. Second, rather than
employing essentialist or pathology discourses about ‘race’ to explain racial disparities, like critical race theory, it sees racial inequality as pervasive in Western societies. White privilege awareness is a type of race-cognizance (*ibid*, p. 160).

Frankenberg (1993) observes that race-cognizance is often employed by antiracists and that it also tends to generate “a range of political and existential questions about white *complicity* with racism” (emphasis added, p. 160). The white participants in Frankenberg’s study grappled differently with their complicity. Some attempt to resolve it through political activism while others have retreated back to a power-evasive and colorblind scheme or lens. Rather than retreating, self-implication cognizance refers to participants’ articulation of their *complicity* in the conveyor belt; of participants who do not retreat back to color- or power-evasiveness. It is not a unique construct in the scholarship as much as it is a focused exploration and naming of various articulations of complicity beyond an acknowledgement of white privilege and internalized bias.

O’Brien (2000 & 2001) borrows from Frankenberg to create her *reflexive race-cognizance* construct. O’Brien teases apart three dimensions of colorblindness that were conflated in Frankenberg’s study. RRC refers to white persons’ awareness (1) of institutional racism, (2) that ‘race’ matters for people of color, and (3) that one is white and of what this signifies. O’Brien (2000) maintains that the last two features of RRC warrant differentiating her construct from Frankenberg’s race-cognizance construct (p. 50).

Most participants in my study use a reflexive race-cognizance. They “think of the world ‘out there’ and themselves in racial terms, and… of colorblindness itself as racist”
or, at the very least, as incompatible with antiracist principles (O’Brien, 1999, p. 86). They are opposed to colorblindness, “race is seen as something that is not just present for others who are racist, but is inherent in the way the individual him- or herself views the self and others” (O’Brien, 2001, p. 51). RRC complements self-implication cognizance. In fact, the latter construct zones in on the third dimension of colorblindness listed above. The only difference is its focus is not solely on one’s awareness of being white, but on its multiple implications for racism and antiracism.

Lastly, Kowal, Franklin and Paradise (2013) propose reflexive antiracism as a “novel” approach to diversity training. They offer it to eschew two concerns they have with antiracism training: the essentialization of white identities and the negative emotions white participants experience. The authors do not offer a critical sociological analysis of emotions, socialization, positionality and an investment in self-views that one is racially innocent (Srivastava, 2006; DiAngelo, 2011; Ross, 1990; Flynn, 2015; Sleeter, 1992). They take for granted white participants’ defensive feelings as a matter of how antiracism training are structured. They propose reflexive antiracism as a practice of reflecting on one’s background and cultural baggage (p. 324). More specifically, it is:

characterised by a reflexive stance towards one’s own and others’ attitudes, beliefs and behaviors while striving towards both equanimity in emotional reactions and a positive white identity. A reflexive antiracist approach encourages reflection on, and ultimately acceptance of, these tensions. (p. 326)

The authors mention that their construct is similar to O’Brien’s RRC (ibid).

I hesitate to name my construct differently from Frankenberg’s race-cognizance in light of the proliferation of concepts that upon scrutiny are similar. The reason for this label differentiation, however, is because race-cognizance is a broader construct
subsuming various color- and power-cognizant discourses employed by (white) antiracists. From my point of view, reflexive race-cognizance, reflexive antiracism, white privilege awareness, and self-implication cognizance are, as it were, related concepts that exist under the umbrella of race-cognizance, which has also been called racial awareness (Johnson, 2002; Katz, 2003). Each of these concepts have their slight definitional differences, focus and application.

Exploring self-implication cognizance is imperative as articulated by Mary Fellows and Sherene Razack (1998; see also Pierce, 2003):

> When a woman fails to pursue how she is implicated in other women's lives and retreats to the position that the system that oppresses her the most is the only one worth fighting and that the other systems (systems in which she is positioned as dominant) are not of her concern, she will fail to undo her own subordination. (p. 336)

> [Many times] feminist political solidarity has failed because of… the problem of ‘competing marginalities.’ These moments… center around the deeply felt belief that each of us, as women, is not implicated in the subordination of other women. When we view ourselves as innocent, we cannot confront the hierarchies that operate among us. Instead, each woman claims that her own marginality is the worst one; failing to interrogate her complicity in other women's lives, she continues to participate in the practices that oppress other women. We have named the process through which a woman comes to believe that her own claim of subordination is the most urgent and that she is unimplicated in the subordination of other women as the ‘race to innocence.’ (p. 335)

As the authors describe, self-implication discourse is an uncommon feature among activists, advocates, and other change-agents. All antiracist participants in my study evinced some form of self-implication cognizance. The most popular of these, as commonly encountered in the literature, are awareness of white privilege and internalized racial bias. There are other expressions of self-implication cognizance, however, beyond statements of ‘I benefit from unearned, conferred racial privilege’ and ‘I have racial
biases’. Below, I explore and quote the best examples of each of the five forms of self-implication cognizance identified in this study.

1. admittance of white advantage/privilege,
2. introspecting on one’s racial bias,
3. acknowledgement of silence as complicity,
4. recognition of one’s cultural and racial illiteracy, and,
5. the psychosocial cost of racism to whites.

Cognizance of White Privilege

One form of self-implication cognizance is the knowledge of how being white shapes one’s life experience and outcomes. White privilege does not mean that shognosh people experience a hardship-free existence, especially considering that most toubabs are simultaneously members of a marginalized group. It also does not mean that hard work is not an equation in their life outcome. What it signifies, instead, is that outside of atypical individual situations the hardships whites experience is not because of their ‘race’; their racial membership does not act as a social barrier or obstacle in their pursuit of success. On the contrary, it functions as an unearned advantage relative to their racialized counterparts (see Oreopoulos, 2009 & 2011; Oreopoulos & Dechief, 2011).

This awareness is a core tenet in antiracism education. It has received significant attention especially following Peggy McIntosh’s (1988) publication of White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of Coming to See Correspondences Through Work in Women’s Studies. Alexandra articulated several examples of racial advantage. She recounts, for example, the different treatment she and her Black colleagues receive from a Chair (A) of an organization that oversees the social service she Chairs. Chair A
regularly questions the trustworthiness of the data Alexandra’s colleague, a Black woman, who is the executive director of the service, submits to him:

He would come to me as a white man to a white woman and sort of say ‘gee, we have a problem with the data’ and he would say things that would fall quite short of being blatant [racism]. But the underlying current is ‘can you really trust your ED and those numbers?’ The assumption being: ‘look where they are coming from; the ED of that organization is a Black woman’. He would make comments that are basically denigrating her work; saying ‘these numbers can’t be right, something must be wrong, do you really trust them? Are you really double-checking everything she does?’ To [call him] ‘racist’ in any kind of official correspondence or public correspondence would be unwarranted but you know the undercurrent is there. You know just by the comments that are made.…

The racially-laden differential treatment also takes place during other encounters:

The Vice Chair of the board is a Black man. We go [to Chair A’s organization] and they’ll shake my hand but they don’t shake his.

Alexandra names and explicitly describes her racial advantage; she is cognizant of how she is implicated, by default, in the hegemonic order of whiteness.

In addition to advantage in cross-racial interactions, she also articulates examples of historical and material racial advantage that have benefited her ancestors and thus, by extension, her as well. At the time of the interview, Alexandra lived on a street named after a slave owner. She interprets this as a symbol that like physical roads, the ‘road of privilege’ is long-ago created but preserved and is far from happenstance. It stretches centuries in the past and arrives right at her doorstep. She recounts a story she heard about an enslaved woman that lived in the Niagara and Ancaster regions, and reflects upon the insights it provides about how whiteness shaped the lives of her ancestors and shapes hers:

When I am [reading] about this woman Sophia Pooley who lived way back like over a hundred years ago, I am comparing her life to my ancestors who lived here
at the same time, as a way of thinking like yeah that’s where my privilege comes from. [While] she lived here as a slave, I had ancestors [at that time] who were getting pensions from the government because they were white folks who fought in the army. And she was owned by people who fought in the army....

So [I am] doing this historical research on her life vs. my ancestors’ life.... [I am] trying to place myself into a framework so I am not just reading about the others, but I am reading about me and my own experience and my own family.... I have to be part of the story instead of looking from the outside in at other people's story and othering other people. [I do this] to say, yes, this is how I came here. This is where my privilege comes from or where it didn’t come from.... That is what it’s about on some level’ is that I am [reading] about this stuff because it is my need to place myself in the context; to understand how I relate to this stuff.

Alexandra is active in situating whence her and her family’s unearned, white advantage stems from. By seeing the points where slavery, settler colonialism, and white-only government pensions lifted or boosted her ancestor’s material wealth, she developed a nuanced self-implication cognizance.

Of particular interest too is the street Alexandra lives on, which is named after a slave owner. This should come to no surprise. In fact, Hamilton’s Westdale Village, a predominately upper-middle class white neighborhood where McMaster University is located, was founded in the 1920s to be an upscale exclusive environment for white Anglo Saxon Protestants (WASPs). Covenants restricted Blacks, Asians, Slavs, and Jews from buying property in Westdale. “[N]ear the end of the Second World War, restrictions upon Jewish home ownership were lifted whereupon many relocated from the central part of the city. However, legal loopholes allowed for discrimination to persist into the 1950s” (Wikipedia, 2017; see also Lorinc, 2017, & Freeman, 2006, p. 131). It is unclear when restrictions against other groups were lifted. Regardless, as Alexandra explains, “this is where my privilege comes from”. This active unearthing of the legacy of white advantage
in her ancestry is reminiscent of Paul Kivel’s (1995) guidance for readers in *How White People Can Work for Racial Justice*. About himself, he writes:

When I began to take careful stock of my family’s history over the last 60 years, I could trace the powerful and long-lasting benefits that have accrued to me and to my family because of affirmative action programs for white people in general and white men in particular. I began to see the numerous ways that my father and I, and indirectly the women in my family, have benefited from policies that either explicitly favored or showed a preference for white men, or explicitly excluded people of color and white women from consideration altogether.

Kivel then details the racial benefits accrued to him and his family, including the G.I. Education Bill, the Veteran Administration Housing Authority, the Veteran Administration health care system, and the Federal Housing Authority—programs that primarily benefited white men.

Determined to uncover the psychological or subjective outcome of her racialization, Alexandra sought a therapist. She is the only respondent to have sought one for the purpose of uncovering internalized privilege. Upon the collapse of her interracial relationship:

Alexandra: I started going to a therapist, and when I was looking for a therapist I was actually looking for someone with a particular kind of analysis. And I found a Black woman who was a psychotherapist. I specifically said when I was looking for someone that I wanted someone to help me work on my own privilege. It was interesting because the guy that I was going out with at that time, he was really pleased about that; he said ‘I am really glad you found someone [with who you are] going to work on your own privilege’....

So I think it helped me understand maybe a little bit better his issues; what they might have been and where he was coming from…. I think it’s important to have some kind of support system, whatever that looks like to you. And a support system that’s critical; that doesn’t just say ‘yeah that's great; whatever you are doing is great.’ But someone who can actually give you constructive criticism....
Ismaël: What were you working upon when it comes to privilege? You wanted her to help you work on privilege. What specifically did you mean by that? And what was worked upon?

A: That was part of my journey at the time. I was trying to be a good antiracist person and doing this because I was told you have to work on your own stuff. I was still trying to uncover what my own stuff was.

Alexandra was unable to name specifically what about her “own privilege” she worked upon. There are many aspects to internalized privilege: feelings, behavior, thoughts, memories, desires, unconscious patterns, and automatic physical reactions. One specific example of “own privilege” is internalized dominance. Pheterson (1986) defines this as feelings of self-righteousness, superiority, and normalcy coupled with the denial or degradation of all but a narrow range of human perspectives and possibilities. Hardiman, Jackson and Griffin (2007) expand this definition to include behaviors, thoughts, and feelings of entitlement by members of the dominant group and expectation to be well treated and accommodated. In her book Revealing Whiteness: The Unconscious Habits of Racial Privilege (2006), Shannon Sullivan adds another layer to this definition: “bodying”, to refer to the manner that white privilege transforms the micro-activity of the body. It is unclear what specifically Alexandra worked on, however, her many different efforts at uncovering and acknowledging her racial advantage shows a high-level of self-implication cognizance.

Billy references the advantage white-skin affords him in passing as middle-class and in wielding influence:

Ismaël: Have you ever been in a space in which you were the racial minority?

Billy: Yes. In places I have travelled like China and Guyana in South America. But it has never been a negative thing; it has always been a positive thing.
I: If you were not experiencing prejudice in those places then were you experiencing the opposite of that?

B: Exactly, the opposite. In both places my race is actually a benefit to me. An example is when I went to a university in England, Prince Charles came one day.

Billy gaily recounts his “working-class resistance” as he passed as middle-class by putting on a “rich Prince Charles voice” and accompanying Prince Charles into the reception of the prestigious university.

I got cherry and sandwiches, and then people began to notice because I am wearing jeans, and so I left quickly…. Security is completely different in these days. You wouldn't get close. But I wonder even, being a white guy, security today would approach me differently. We say security has changed but the way it has changed has a disproportionate effect on some people [more] than others. I still don't think I'd get close but the police response might be quite different when they realize I shouldn't be close if I was of a different race or visibly different in some other way….

Billy then shared his experience in Guyana, where, as the only white person catching a steamer up the river, he was able to order the porter to open the closed gates:

I say to him in my fancy [British] voice ‘I say, let me in here’ and certainly he opens the gate and me and the other people I am with can catch the boat…. Then I realized that this guy didn't know the difference between a working-class and a middle-class English accent. So it wasn't that I sounded like Prince Charles that he opened the gate, it was because I was a white guy.

Billy demonstrates in these two accounts the privilege of not being marked as a foreign intruder, as a potential danger or, said in a positive, of being marked as safe, important, and powerful. He is also able to conceal the visible representations of growing up working-class and to present as nobility. The result is the ability to pass in spaces in a manner virtually impossible for certain racialized bodies. Like Alexandra, Billy is
cognizant of being a beneficiary of white privilege, not just in the abstract, but very personally.

Cognizance of Racial Bias

Awareness of internalized racial bias is another core tenet of antiracism education (see Byrd, 2011; Romm, 2010; Quillian, 2006; Green et al., 2007; Shepherd, 2011; Sonnett et al., 2015). It is practically impossible, so the tenet goes, for anyone who has made contact with mainstream society to not have internalized racial bias. In fact, evidence suggests that children develop racial prejudice as early as three or five years of age (Derman-Sparks, Higa & Sparks, 1980; Winkler, 2009; Levy, Rosenthal, Herrera-Alcazar, 2009; Baron & Banaji, 2006).

Participants are cognizant of some of their biases. Gloria, for instance, shared a contemplative piece she had written on her “Fear of the Black Man”. She prefaced it by explaining that her “education was a colonized education. I was inculcated with white superiority, white supremacy; that was the thrust in schools. So the journey then becomes one of getting rid of that, of seeing with new eyes, of hearing the Aboriginal and Black feminist perspective”. She calls this journey ‘decolonizing the mind’; a process she posits has no end given the unceasing beckoning of the hegemonic order to reinvest in whiteness. So self-implicating, she shared her shock and dismay when she realized she had a fear of Black men:

A number of years ago, one afternoon, I entered the small enclosed cubical outside of the bank to use the bank machine. A young black man was there, with his back turned to me withdrawing money. Standing behind him, for one short moment, I froze with fear as I realized that we were alone and a feeling of certainty that I would be robbed overtook me.
I was gratefully relieved when he walked past me and exited the building. After withdrawing money, I exited and walked past the parking lot to see this same man getting into his car along side of his wife and two young children. The contradiction between my perception of this person as a criminal and the reality of him as a family man, the father of two young children, stunned me. I looked long and hard at him in an attempt to imprint this image of him as a family man on my mind. I was flooded with emotion at that moment. I was angry at myself, and ashamed at the same time. I was seized by a desire to deny this experience, to disown it. Yet, surfacing even stronger was a need to know where this experience was rooted, and how it could be part of my psyche.

If she had disowned or minimized this revelation of her racialized psyche, she would have reinvested in whiteness, specifically, in a “discourse of denial” (Solomon et al., 2005).

Gloria resisted the seduction of white innocence by owning and exploring the genealogy and origins of her prejudice. She chose to self-implicate:

I could have disowned it, right? I could have not paid attention to it. Just let it go or not even become aware of how I was feeling. But I felt it. I owned it. And I said ‘Ok, that happened to me. That happened to me. I felt that fear. Where did that fear come from?’ And then I started reading about the fear of the Black man. And I started reading about how Black men have been portrayed in certain ways and educating myself about that whole thing. And then I also started noticing other white women and how they interact with Black men. There are certain stereotypes that are out there.

Gloria resisted the beckoning call to reinvest in a discourse of denial. She accepted that the experience was hers, imprinted in her mind the image of the gentleman with his family, and explored her internal bias through readings, reflection, writing and conversations.

Antiracism projects upon the self are not uncommon for my participants. They interpret antiracism ‘in here’ as complementing antiracism ‘out there’. Like Billy, Jennifer, has used the Implicit Attitude Test to uncover her biases:
and I was very surprised; really surprised that one, I have, from an old-and-young, I have a preference for older people and a slight non-preference for youth. And then the whole black and violence thing blew my mind at how, you know, click, click, click and how I really connected black and violence. That’s kind of disturbing. So I sent that out to everybody, ‘you have to try these tests,’ cause it’s something you—I wouldn’t know [without taking it]. And it was significant, the connection. And then when you think about the media, no wonder! No wonder I have it. Cause you turn on the TV and that’s there all the time…. I sent it out to the women in my circle [and] I sent it out to the VP’s. I don’t know if they ever took it, but to try and explain unwritten beliefs is hugely difficult…. Those tests hit you in the face; it really does! And then everybody is almost an equal there, you know? And the other one that really hit me is women in leadership…. I’ve never had women leaders to look up to. So of course I’m going to have a bias for men as leaders. And I told that to the executive team. I said, you know, ‘I have this incredible bias for men in leadership.’ [And their reaction] ‘What!? You?’ And it makes sense when you look at it but it’s like ‘oh my god—how significant it is.

Rose too is cognizant of her racial bias and practices ‘naming’ as a strategy to interrupt its impact:

A really important thing is checking in within myself when I feel uncomfortable about why I feel uncomfortable about situations. Like if I am walking alone at night and there is a black man walking behind me and I feel uncomfortable, like naming that: why do I feel uncomfortable? Is it something I should actually be worried about or is it just racism? Like straight up.

Rose is doing more than naming the discomfort, however; she is also claiming it. The purpose of so doing is to interrupt her prejudice. Alexandra calls this method ‘naming, claiming, stopping’. It is one of the many phrases she uses when facilitating antiracism workshops:

Name it, claim it, stop it. The first step is to name and identify it, and this is particularly for people in our society who aren't used to naming it. And then claiming it, making it your own, and that's particularly important when we are working with a white audience who think it is not their problem. So we have to claim it as our issue too. And then stop it!
Here Alexandra reiterates the uncharacteristic view that racism is a white people’s problem. The conventional practice is race-ing to innocence or, at the very least, to not self-implicate. Indeed, O’Brien’s construct of selective race-cognizance shows us that even among white antiracists, “claiming” is not a prerequisite to “stopping”. Toubabs need not define themselves racially or admit to internalized privilege or bias in order to engage in antiracism action. Yet, the praxis developed when “claiming” is omitted is strictly external and assumes that the self is impervious to the cultural and racial discourses it is surrounded by. For my participants, “claiming it; making it your own” is thus part of their antiracism praxis for the self too is a site that requires a project of actualization.

The process of ‘decolonizing the mind’, though, is often obstructed by a contrary moving structure. The hegemonic order of whiteness impedes and limits the transformation of the psyche. Dawit expresses sadness about this when he says that:

We live in a racially coded and racist society. Our own thinking is shaped by these ways of beings, and I am not outside of that. Nobody is outside of that. We apply these categories even when we don't know we are doing it. I would love to think that I am living consistently [an antiracism] politics, but I am aware of that as an aspirational project….

We can have our personal transformation, but the shaping is still in there. I don’t mean to say that nothing can be done or it is impossible to change anything but the transformations are within a much larger structure of relations that are constantly being enforced in that opposite direction.

As the maxim goes, there are known knowns, known unknowns, and unknown unknowns. Dawit acknowledges the unknown domain of the psyche, the mystery of the socialized self, the implicit application of racial categories. The psyche can undergo decolonization but this project is aspirational, continual, and unceasing. No better example of this is
Gloria’s abovementioned racial fear, a prejudice she had despite “always [having] had boyfriends that are Middle-Eastern or African or from other cultures”. Adyvaya too is aware that despite her best efforts, “even somebody like myself can unintentionally participate in these systems.” One’s choice thus resides in whether to collude with or work against racial oppression. To choose the latter, as I quote Lynda in the opening of the Findings portion of this manuscript, is to accept antiracism as “a fraught process” that is “always in a process of revision”. Therefore, pertaining to one’s implicit and, even, known biases, “name it, claim it and stop it” remains an aspirational goal.

Jennifer too reflected on her racial biases in detail. Despite the diversity and antiracism workplace training she received in the Ministry of Environment, despite Chief Dan George, who she met in grade 1 or 2, and who had a U-turn like influence upon her life, she still holds biases against Indigenous people:

I have prejudice against First Nations people, which is interesting because Chief Dan George—and it’s a discomfort.

I pointed to an irony, her home is decorated with plenty of First Nations art:

Yeah, I surround myself with it. I’m intrigued by it, but—I [used to] live in Calgary, and in Calgary it was ‘drunken Indians.’ Like you would see drunken Indians. And so from age 12 to when we left at 17 that’s what I knew of Indians. I’m very aware of [my prejudice]. And I think sometimes I overcompensate perhaps.

Jennifer did not see Native people who got inebriated. She did not see “alcoholics”, a medicalized term to refer to excessive drinking as a disease. She did not see people struggling with a spiritual relationship, an Alcoholics Anonymous frame. She did not see people responding to conditions of social depravation, a critical approach in the social sciences. Nor did she see the impact of the introduction of strong liquor by colonialists,
the role models and culture of alcohol consumption that came along with this introduction, and the little time Indigenous people had to regulate the use of hard liquor suddenly appearing on their lands. Instead, she saw “Drunken Indians”, a popular settler colonial narrative. The malicious nature of this narrative is particularly revealed by the fact that the alcohol consumption rate of Native Americans is comparable or slightly less than that of the shognosh, depending on the instrument used to collect cross-racial data on alcohol consumption (Cunningham, Solomon, & Muramoto, 2016).

Aware and uncomfortable with her prejudice, Jennifer grapples with the existential questions her complicity elicits not by engaging in activism, as few of Frankenberg’s (1993) participants did, but by overcompensating:

By almost being—trying to be more friendly perhaps. And it’s not like I meet them very often, but there’s a huge desire to connect more, but I don’t (chuckles)... I don’t because there’s an uncomfortableness with it. So I know there’s something there that... And it also is knowing this history of residential schools and all these things, so maybe there is this guilt about what we as whites have done to this amazing culture; like destroy it so there’s no memory, and forcing these people to try to rediscover who they are and all that incredible knowledge that they had that could help us today, but it was [destroyed].

A number of participants purchase and consume objects produced by other racial groups as a strategy to decolonize their mind. Jennifer’s account, however, shows that the commodification and consumption of otherness can reflect one’s attempt to bypass resolving internal conflicts about their prejudices. In *Eating the Other: Desire and Resistance*, hooks (1992) articulates that contemporary mass culture perpetuates racial difference as a potentially pleasurable experience; ethnicity is treated as a ‘spice’ that livens white culture (p. 368). Consuming the racialized other offers a postmodern and cosmopolitan high, an unconscious fantasy, a kick. “From the standpoint of white
supremacist capitalist patriarchy, the hope is that desires for the ‘primitive’ or fantasies
about the Other can be continually exploited, and that such exploitation will occur in a
manner that rewrites and maintains the status quo” (hooks, 1992, p. 367).

Despite the home decoration, these masks of overcompensation that signify
external attempts at resolving guilt of complicity, Jennifer’s prejudice is obdurate. It has
an embodied quality that no amount of décor can remove:

One of my friends is involved with—I’m not sure if it’s Six Nations or the New
Credit. She is white, and she was involved with something that the group had put
on and she invited me because they were interested in knowing the environmental
side of things. I went and spoke from my perspective about the future. I
rearranged things so I could make sure I was there. But there was and continues to
be, still, for some reason, an uncomfortable with that.

This embodiment of prejudice, its corporeal vibration, is reminiscent of Robert Jensen’s
(2005) passage:

I can feel the lingering traces of racism in my body... It’s easy to test. Put my
white body next to a black body. What do I feel? What reactions kick in
immediately before I have a chance to think? What facts about race can I feel in
my body in that moment? How honest can I be about that? The fact is, I feel
something different—a certain kind of fear—next to a black body than I feel next
to another white body. The difference matters, still, after years of actively trying
to overcome that learned reaction. (In Tochluk, 2010, p. 171)

Jensen names his embodied traces of racism as ‘a certain kind of fear’. Jennifer names it
‘an uncomfortable’ that persists and causes her to overcompensate, overconsume, and
desire genuine cross-racial connection. The latter is a silver lining. O’Brien’s (2001)
research on white antiracists seamlessly responds to hooks (1992) conclusion that
“whether or not desire for contact with the Other… can act as a critical intervention
challenging and subverting racist domination, inviting and enabling critical resistance, is
an unrealized political possibility” (p. 367). A number of participants in O’Brien’s study
speak of a desire they had at a young age to befriend racialized persons. As adults, they express embarrassment at what they describe as ‘naiveté’, ‘cultural appropriation’, and ‘selfish co-opting’. They state, though, that their curiosity and desire for difference acted as a stepping stone to developing race-cognizance. These interracial contacts functioned as “borrowed approximations”; they developed race-cognizance partly through proximity to negatively racialized persons. These borrowed approximations then acted as a springboard for a self-directed and proactive commitment to antiracism. Self-implication cognizance is indicated in my participants’ awareness of their racial bias.

**Cognizance of Complicity through White Silence**

“In the end, we remember not the words of our enemies but the silence of our friends” ~ Reverend Martin Luther King Jr.

Silence to injustice is complicity to injustice. The silence of the majoritarian—white silence, as termed by DiAngelo (2012)—has multiple effects that automatically implicate toubabs in white hegemony. DiAngelo lists several of these effects. White silence in racial dialogues:

- “shelters white participants by keeping their racial perspectives hidden and thus protected from exploration or challenge”;
- “leaves everyone else to carry the weight of the discussion”;
- “is critical to protecting whiteness, for white dominance depends, in part, on the silence of other whites”;
- “emboldens explicitly resistant participants because it establishes that no challenge will be forthcoming, and can even imply agreement”;
- “at the minimum, the resistant participants receive no social penalty from other whites, and the silence effectively maintains white solidarity”;
- allows “alliance with whiteness” and “white privilege” to remain intact;
- “serves to invalidate the story” of people of color who speak about racism;
• “serves to isolate [a white antiracist] person who [takes] a stand. This isolation is a powerful social penalty and an enticement to return to the comfort of white solidarity”; last but not least,
• “denies the support that is critical to other whites working to develop antiracist practice”. (p. 5)

There are moments when strategic silence is constructive (Bouette & Jackson, 2014).

Such silences are prudently informed by an antiracist lens. For most toubabs, however, white silence is a recurrent obstacle and tempting habit they grapple with when witnessing racism. Participants acknowledge that it is a site where reinvestment in hegemonic whiteness is easy. Lauren is sensitive about this and considers:

What is at stake if I don’t act? What happens if I don’t say anything, or I don’t intervene? Then there is a missed opportunity and it’s continuing this cycle of wrongness.

Alexandra is more forthright that white silence continues a cycle of racism:

My sense is that if I let something go I am complicit in it, and so my own personal goal is to reduce my complicity in it as much as possible. If I am silent about it and I just let it go then I can’t live with myself. It’s not like I am trying to get myself somewhere; to be on some pedestal or something. I just don’t want to be complicit in that behavior by turning a blind eye to it.

Like the discourse of denial and racing to innocence, white silence is a predictable dance. So much so that hegemonic whiteness is revealed in its silence (Mazzei, 2008). Yet, just as abstention does not efface its impact in an electoral outcome, so too is white silence an intimate participant—a partner in crime—in the preservation of racism. White silence, like the blue code of silence, is mainstream society’s anti-snitching code.

Like Lauren, Alexandra is concerned about complicity through silence. The degree to which antiracism is an internalized value—a guide for behavior—is the degree to which silence in the face of racism provokes uneasiness. Above, in the previous
cognizance discussion, we encounter an embodied, visceral experience of racial prejudice. Here, we see an embodiment of antiracism, an emotional reaction expressed as an inability to live with oneself for having remained silent in the face of racism. Borrowing from self-discrepancy theory, this embodied reaction to white silence suggests a conflict between one’s actual-self and one’s ought-self. The former refers to the attributes one believes they have. The latter refers to attributes they believe they ought to have. People are motivated to match their actual-self and ought-self (Higgins, 1987). Inconsistency between the two is experienced as a violation of a duty or obligation, which is generally associated with a sanction, hence feelings of agitation such as guilt, uneasiness or self-admonishment in participants’ reflections on not responding to racism.

I asked Alexandra for a specific time she failed to respond and why. She spoke about a hairdresser’s racialized comment about crime. This occurred over a decade ago yet she remembers it so vividly:

Because I have been kicking myself ever since for not responding adequately. When I don’t respond it stays in my head…. I can remember even back then I was thinking ‘oh I should [have responded]’ but I was there for a haircut man (giggles). And I think my [after-the-fact] response was I never went back. I never had my hair cut there again. But [in that moment] I never said anything. And so when you talk about those times when you respond and don’t respond, all these years later, like thirteen years later, that’s the first thing that pops in my head, because that time I didn’t respond…. There are times I am like ‘oh god, I’m just too tired for this today’. But I know it will bug me forever if I don’t say anything. So I usually say something even though sometimes it’s just a little bit ineffectual or a little bit mild—but I just speak up to just say I don’t agree with you. You know? Even if you leave it at that… sometimes it’s not effective, but at least you didn’t say nothing.

‘Kicking myself ever since’, ‘can’t live with myself’, ‘bugs me forever’, ‘sticks in my head’—inconsistency between commitment and practice, the ought-self and the actual-
self, troubles Alexandra. It is a site of struggle; reinvesting in whiteness is easy, being complicit is easy—not necessarily because of a lack of will, but chiefly because social individual factors strongly shape decisions about responding. Sometimes, as Alexandra says, “I’m just too tired. But”, she continues, succumbing to tiredness continues a cycle of wrongness. Thus, an ineffectual response is better than a non-response.

Maria shares Alexandra’s reflection and experience:

It is never ok [to not respond to racism]. It’s never ok. It’s never ok. However, life is complicated and sometimes you don’t respond and you feel shitty.

I asked her to elaborate upon this feeling:

If something strongly affects the other person, I would not feel well. I wouldn’t go to bed feeling comfortable about myself. For example, if there is some kind of racism or something horrible happening with a student of mine, I would have to do something because I would just feel shitty. I would cry all the time or complain to [my partner] like ‘Oh my god! ‘How could I or how could somebody do that?’ So I would probably do something.

Alexandra and Maria acknowledge their complicity: sometimes they are antiracist bystander actors, at other times, “life is complicated”, “I’m just too tired”, “I’m just here to get a haircut man”. They yield to reinvestment in hegemonic whiteness by standing still on the conveyor belt. Maria elaborates on the conditions that can hamper bystander action, suggesting that white silence is particularly informed by real or perceived social obstacles to antiracism:

I told you that story about my friends who basically were racists and I couldn’t do much about that because, you know, I needed a place to stay. I’m not naïve. I’m not mother Theresa. I know that sometimes I wouldn’t [respond], you know, because you are afraid or you have other, like... you know, this is life. Sometimes you can react and sometimes you cannot. Whenever you can, you do.
“Whenever you can” is not as objective a criterion as Maria appears to make it. Extremities aside, the dance between the objective and subjective is such that the former is differently experienced and navigated based on one’s “perceived ability to intervene”, including skills and self- and collective-efficacy (Nelson et al., 2010). However, “it is important to realize that [white] silence may not always be intentional or devious but rather reflect a broader cultural insistence” (Mazzei, 2008, p. 1132).

Lauren echoes the golden rule of responding to injustice in situ or, at the very least, after-the-fact. The discrepancy between her ought-self and actual-self emerges when she fails to live up to this golden rule. This discrepancy is vividly depicted in her embodied reaction to having failed to respond to racial prejudice:

I was involved with a conversation with someone who is senior to me in the workplace and it was about a recent sexual assault. And the person questioned whether or not it was because the campus was ‘urban’. And I just... I have often heard discourses around urban being code for ‘Black’. I had just been reading something about that as well. And then there’s the stereotypes about sexual assault—there are all kinds of stereotypes about sexual assault but in particular of certain racial groups [getting depicted] over another as perpetrators of sexual assault. And I didn’t, I didn’t challenge it. And it really, it still bothers me. LIKE IT STILL BOTHERS ME! LIKE I WAS LIKE URGHHH....

I had that feeling inside. This was triggering something for me. How do I have this conversation, you know? And I still don’t know exactly how I would have that conversation.... [pause] I guess I kind of do now. Now that I have had time to think about it I’d probably say just say sexual assaults happen all over the place, in urban and non-urban environments.

Respondents state that (the burden of) antiracism work should not be exclusively carried out by targets of racism who, in addition to responding and facing whitelash, must attend to the impact of racism. White silence places the burden of antiracism exclusively on its targets while protecting toubabs from potential vulnerability and repercussions.
This discussion, once again, indicates that participants conceive of antiracism primarily as an action, not an identity or even an ‘intention’. Additionally, it recalls complexities in the conceptualization of antiracism. Specifically, that the racist-antiracist conceptual dichotomy is faulty because self-implicating cognizant participants acknowledge both their complicity in and resistance against racism. As Dawit states, antiracism is an aspirational goal, the hope of which is for bystanders to walk in the opposite direction more often than standing still.

**Cognizance of Cultural Illiteracy/Incompetency**

Cultural incompetence refers to a lack of intellectual acquaintanceship with the perspectives, basic ideas, norms, and ways of minority cultural groups. A culturally incompetent person functions from a monocultural perspective and feels disoriented in spaces where their framework is not normative. They lack social fluency in cross-cultural interaction, inadvertently commit gaffes, violate other’s cultural norms, and assert the alleged normalcy of a majoritarian way of life.

Sue, Arredondo and McDavis (1992) identify three components in developing cultural competency: a) attitudes/beliefs about the self, b) knowledge about others, and c) contextually relevant skills. The first pertains to an active attempt by the subject to become aware of their own cultural, ethnic, and racial conditioning—more broadly, of their “assumptions about human behavior, values, biases, preconceived notions, personal limitations, and so forth” (p. 481). The subject also understands how their conditioning shapes their behavior. The second component refers to the subject’s knowledge of and active attempt to understand the worldviews of persons of another culture or racial group.
without negative judgement. The subject also develops an understanding of the sociopolitical context and conditions that others live under. The third pertains to one’s skill in using culturally appropriate communication and interaction etiquette. This may mean respecting religious observations and engaging in appropriate verbal and nonverbal communication. All together, a culturally competent person has the awareness, knowledge, and skills to fluently navigate in a pluralist and multicultural democracy.

A few respondents shared self-implication accounts of the cultural illiteracy kind and its relation to racism. Jennifer, for example, mentions that her cultural incompetency may accentuate a target’s feeling of racial exclusion. She recounts having hired and subsequently fired a Filipino employee. He had the right credentials but did not “understand his role”. She later pondered if his layoff (also) had to do with her failure to account for cultural factors in her assessment of his performance. His employment may have been preventable if the workplace and its staff were culturally competent:

It wasn’t until I let him go that I went ‘well, he communicates differently than me!’ Originally I said to him that ‘we’re hiring him for this position to ease my workload.’ That I think he heard louder than anything else—rather than ‘your role is to make sure that we comply.’ I wish I had spent a little bit more time understanding the Filipino culture and how he received information.

For surety, I asked Jennifer if it was an English barrier or a cultural interpretation barrier:

An interpretation barrier. I think that perhaps in the Philippines the boss is really superior, so the power dynamic is different than in Canada. So [in his culture] it’s not ok to ask your boss questions. Maybe he didn’t want to feel incompetent to ask me as his superior questions that he feels he should have known, or, you know, how would I [react]? So is there that power imbalance or difference in interpreting power where a Canadian would just ask and a Filipino might not? I’ve struggled with that for a long time.
Jennifer reveals considering cultural interpretation differences after having fired the employee, a fact she laments. In their study on the task and relationship orientation of Filipino and American employees, Mujtaba and Balboa (2009) maintain that effective communication is partly shaped by the cultural framework used to interpret communication. They offer examples on how Filipino culture shapes how Filipinos interpret the communication style and disposition of American immigrants:

These [immigrants] grew up and are educated in a foreign system. Their ways of thinking, believing, feeling and doing things are defined, structured, and sustained by an entirely different value system. Thus, many [immigrants] find it difficult to sustain good interpersonal relations with their Filipino managers, employees, and workers. Even their social interactions with the Filipinos outside of business are often fraught with miscommunication, misunderstanding and frustrations. For example, the [immigrant’s] frankness is often interpreted by Filipinos as rudeness. Their straightforward ways are viewed as ‘haughtiness’, and their seriousness is often seen as ‘arrogance’ or concealed prejudices.

All this is simply a matter of misreading each other’s cultural ways. Thus, the tendency of many [immigrants], given these frustrating encounters with Filipinos, is to seek out and interact with other [immigrants], thereby forming business and diplomatic enclaves. Apparently, only few foreigners seem to have transcended the cultural barriers and are able to interact with Filipinos without much difficulty. These few are the ones who cast aside their biases and go out of their way to learn the nuances of the local culture, including the language. They are also the most successful businesspeople who enjoy their stay in the country. (p. 86)

Jennifer’s deliberation on the role of cultural interpretation in employee-employer relations is an important one. Her Filipino employee may not have asked her questions fearing he would come across as ‘haughty’ or because he interpreted Jennifer’s seriousness as ‘haughty’, ‘arrogant’ or ‘concealing prejudice’. If the latter, then he would have experienced his layoff as racially charged. Indeed, Jennifer mentions witnessing intolerance from her white staff towards racialized employees.
Mujtaba and Balboa (2009) also find a difference in the task and relationship orientations of Filipino and American respondents. The former has a ‘moderately high task orientation’ and a ‘very high relationship orientation’. This means that Filipinos value relationships and joint communication styles where socio-emotional support is provided more so than top-down communication styles where the what, when, where, and how of tasks are emphasised. American respondents reported a high range in both orientations. Both cultures are interested in maintaining good relationships between colleagues, peers, customers, and employers, however, there is higher importance given to communication styles that facilitate relationships among Filipinos over styles that stress a ‘line of command’.

When the difference between task and relationship orientations is extreme, it “may cause [Filipino] employees to not complete their tasks in a timely manner. For example, they may not be assertive enough to pressure their peers toward working faster when there is a backlog or even to ask for help when necessary because they do not want to appear ‘pushy’ or ‘rude’” (p. 94). For all these reasons, cultural competency is important in the workplace, especially in countries that purport to value multiculturalism. Jennifer acknowledges this:

Those sorts of things make it much more complicated. So there is the blatant racism and then there is this underlying misunderstanding or misinterpretation because we all see our world as the centre: ‘everybody must understand how I think and they must think the same.’ And yet we’ve all been raised differently and no matter what color we are, somebody who looks like me but comes from elsewhere could have a totally different way of thinking about so many things like power, how to communicate, and the collective versus the individual. There are so many different aspects of cultures that I wasn’t taught when I was in school. And yet to survive in a multicultural world, we need a better understanding
The employee and I got along famously. He’s a lovely man. A lovely man. But he couldn’t do the work. So I judged him on not being able to do the work and let him go. And it was after I let him go that I started to think about cultural differences and I went ‘oh my god!’ And so then I just felt terrible.

This terrible feeling stems from Jennifer’s realization that should she have “spent a little bit more time understanding the Filipino culture and how he received information,” the layoff may have been preventable. She is aware of how her monocultural but developing worldview implicates her in xenophobia and, through this experience, has begun complicating the relationship between workplace diversity and inclusion. Though she mentions that her workplace translates written information in different languages reflecting the nationalities of its employees, she also observes “that doesn’t necessarily change the experience of the [workers]” for they continue to struggle with workplace racism and limits to inclusion.

Rose is a midwife in training and provides additional insights on workplace cultural incompetency. She explains how a birth clinic she works in espouses and reinforces whiteness due to its failure in valuing and incorporating principles of employment diversity, inclusion, and equity. I asked her to elaborate on how her workplace was to meet these principles:

I think it’s just a sense of ‘we weren’t expecting you’ (as in, racially marginalized persons). Like ‘the space wasn’t built for you and you are an outsider to this space’. Even things like images on the wall. I was at a birth once where the woman didn’t speak very good English; it wasn’t her first language. Rather than seen as an okay thing it was seen as a hassle, as an annoyance, as maybe we’re not going to explain things as fully to her because we just don’t want to bother, because we need to speak slower. I saw the clinicians behaving in that way. So it's just like addressing things like that.

How could this be addressed, I asked:
We could have a translator available. And not having an attitude that that's a barrier. It’s a barrier in a way but it's not a bad thing; it's not an annoyance. Their time is just as worthy as my time and I wouldn't mind speaking slower or taking more time or using visual aids as opposed to just speaking the way I always speak and [having this attitude that] it's annoying that I can't say things the way I always say them…. One thing that I have spoken with my mentors about, and that I hope to do [at the birth clinic], is that at volunteer organizations that I work with, we have a mission statement on our website that says that we are an explicit antiracist group and practice, and these are the things that we address. I don't [think] that midwifery clinics have that on their website. I would like that to be incorporated; a mission statement that this is what kind of space we are trying to create. I am going to be working in a clinic soon and I hope to talk to them about putting a little blurb like that online. That's a start.

When I asked if she thought the blurb would actually change dynamics on the floor, she responded:

Yeah because the attitude right now in midwifery is that we are ‘the feminist profession.’ I asked one midwife why they don’t have an explicit agenda online so that you can use, and have policies around it and then if people say racist things in the breakroom you have some way to be like ‘this is why this isn’t okay.’ She was like ‘well we hope that we all are that way anyway’ and ‘none of us are racist, we don’t use that language’ and bla bla bla. There is just this presumption of ‘it’s all okay, we’re all okay’, and not an explicit addressing of it which would be important.

The reproduction of white hegemony in the birth clinic manifests in the expectations and attitudes clinicians and midwives have about and during cross-cultural interactions. It is further reproduced through decorations, staff education, and organizational mission and policies. Each of these components presuppose that their clients would or should be white, middle-class and Anglo-speaking despite the multicultural diversity of the surrounding community. The workplace is thus structured to cater to a homogenous demography. This monocultural-anglo-eurocentrism is marginalizing; it excludes certain cultural bodies and offers them subpar service. In CRT, this would count as an example of institutional racism, often conceptualized as unintended. The boundary between
intentionality and unintentionality, however, collapses when attempts at inclusion and equity efforts are devalued and opposed. Institutional racism is not only generated by intended racism, but also by the undervaluing and hindrance of institutional transformation. Belittling organizational antiracism maintains, by default, the hegemonic order of whiteness. We see this undervaluing in the rhetorical strategies of minimization and denial employed by the midwife in her response to Rose: ‘we hope that we all are that way anyway’ (minimization), ‘none of us are racist’ (denial), ‘we don’t use that language’ (denial). These rhetorical strategies blocked the realization of Rose’s suggestion, thus maintaining the cultural-racial exclusion she witnesses in the birth clinic.

As the above-accounts show, cultural illiteracy has grave material and social consequences, including its role in employment termination and the ill-treatment of clients. Another of its aftermath is social exclusion from collegial gatherings, an issue that overlaps racial material disparities for gatherings and networks are important mediums for the distribution of resources, opportunities and information regarding them (Finneran & Kelly, 2003; Smith, 2000). Alexandra shared an incident where her cultural illiteracy produced social exclusion:

Back when I worked on an antiracism advisory group, I was planning the year end dinner. I thought I was being all sensitive, like instead of calling it a ‘Christmas dinner’ we were calling it a ‘year-end celebration’, I was trying to meet everybody's needs, right? And then there's one guy in the committee and he'd done a lot of hard work over the year and he said he doesn't think he's coming and I said ‘that is too bad’. It took me some prodding and prying until I figured. I forget where he suggested going but he was from the Sikh community and he said there are no vegetarian options. And it's like you know how I could I be soooooo stupid, right? I wasn't practiced enough at the time at thinking about what the barriers are. And that comes with [practice]. I get better over time. I have become much better than I used to be at sort of predicting it before it happens what is going to be a
potential barrier. As a young naive white woman I wasn't aware of the potential barriers.

She gives other examples of where her cross-cultural, cross-racial incompetency necessitated refining:

When I first started working with the Aboriginal society, all kind of things happened. Like some people in the Aboriginal community have very strong feelings against the church because of the way [it mistreated them]. Sometimes we would book meetings in church halls, and they would say don't book meetings in church halls; find a neutral place.

Or because a lot of people in the community are living in poverty, [they would say] don't have a meeting near the end of the month; everybody's cheques run out, they got no money. Have a meeting near the beginning of the month. Things like this you learn over time to become very conscious of. But much more profound issues, and this is where it gets really personal, I have been in a relationship before with someone of color, and that is where it becomes really personal and you really have to work on it. You know? When you're in an intimate relationship with someone you've got to really work on your stuff then.

In a pluralist democracy, cultural literacy is an important skill to develop. It helps, as the above example shows, in predicting potential organizational barriers and addressing them beforehand, thereby advancing inclusion. With today’s technology, economy, and migration patterns, the global citizen is in a higher demand than the national border-bound citizen. Alexandra is adapting to cultural differences, developing literacy and relativism over time. Importantly too, she reflects on her WASPyness, acknowledging its limitations in a pluri-cultural society and in personal relationships. ‘Young white girl naïveté’ can reproduce a white hegemonic order and maintain the racial undercurrent in social and material exclusion. In this regard, cultural literacy complements antiracism or, to some, is a component of antiracism praxis.
The Psychosocial Cost of Racism to Whites (PCRW)

“White”, as a racial category, was historically designed by law to restrict naturalization to white persons, among other motives. For decades, racial prerequisite for citizenship has existed in Canada and the USA (see Lopez, 2006). It is indisputable that toubabs are beneficiaries of a racialized system; after all, it is called white supremacy. However, some theses complicate the white and beneficiary equation, focusing on the white working or underclass as having been duped into false consciousness (see, for example, Roediger, 1991). Fearing economic anxiety and cultural plurality, the white working-class votes against its own class interest, uniting with union-busting white capitalists whose interests sustain its own class monopoly.

In an 1866 letter to Francois Lafrague, Karl Marx wrote “labor in white skin cannot emancipate itself where the black skin is branded” (Padover, 1972, p. 275), suggesting that the white—beneficiary equation, though true, coexists with another reality: the psychological cost of racism to whites (PCRW). PCRW refers to the “negative psychosocial consequences that whites experience as dominant group members in a system of societal racial oppression” (Spanierman, Todd, & Anderson, 2009, p. 239). The cost of racism on toubabs is a core message in WRID models, in which maturation is depicted to lead to a healthier, cleaner white racial identity (see Appendix 1). In The Price of the Ticket (1985), James Baldwin alludes to the price toubabs pay for whiteness:

The reality, the depth, and the persistence of the delusion of white supremacy in this country causes any real concept of education to be as remote, and as much to be feared, as change or freedom itself. What Black men here have always known is now beginning to be clear to the world. Whatever it is that white Americans want, it is not freedom—neither for themselves nor for others. ‘It’s you who'll have the blues,’ Langston Hughes said, ‘not me. Just wait and see.'
To Baldwin, it is not solely the white working-class, but the bulk of whites who, deluded by the wages of whiteness (Roediger, 1999), continue to deny themselves freedom as they forestall or delay others’ freedom. My participants’ self-implicating cognizance shows traces of the Langston blues. Few explicitly articulate it as a ‘cost of racism to whites’, but almost all share stories of said costs.

The blues of the white subject is incomparable to the losses of the racial subaltern. Acknowledging PCRW neither renders toubabs an oppressed group nor erases the conferred power they wield; neither does it render them a racially victimized body nor discount their role in the production and reproduction racial stratification. However, fire in one house exposes nearby homes to danger. In the same way, racial oppression is costly for its beneficiaries. The calamity of racial inequity cannot be confined to a particular place and people. Toubabs are not immune or impervious to the costs of racial oppression. Diane Goodman (2001) identifies several groupings of PCRW, including: psychological, social, moral/spiritual, intellectual, and material/physical costs. I alluded to material costs above. Consider a social/relational cost of racism. Before Billy had developed race-cognizance, his son:

In grade 1 or grade 2, [would] come home from school and we’d always have these debates about race, because he was aware of it then, even though I said it didn’t impact him. And he came home one day and said ‘despite what you say, I know that White is better than Brown’. That is the way he would describe it. And I said, ‘well how do you think that?’ And he said, ‘cause the teacher showed me a picture of god in the book and he was White and you don’t get better than that.’

The denial of racism is a common catalyst of tension in interracial encounters. To be **racially literate** is to understand “the powerful and complex ways in which race
influences the social, economic, political, and educational experiences of individuals and groups (Skerrett, 2011, p. 314). Colorblindness and racial illiteracy can thus strain interracial relationships. One cost of settler colonial white supremacy for shognosh subjects is it robs them of the opportunity to develop race-cognizance, thus limiting the depth of their cross-racial friendships. Neville et al. (2013 & 2014), for example, show a positive relationship between colorblindness racial ideology and racial prejudice, racial anger, and racial fear; factors that hinder (meaningful) cross-racial contact.

Discord between white parents and their biracial children on ‘race’ related subject matters is a common research finding. In Samuels and LaRossa (2009) study on multiracial children, for example, participants often described their white parent as:

unable to appreciate the unique weight of racial epithets when one is the target of them. Consequently, their advice and colorblind philosophies failed to map on to participants’ racial experiences and need to navigate a racialized world differently than their parents. As Brad noted, ‘there was this huge disconnect between what I was taught and what was outside.’ In most cases, children eventually confronted their parents about this racial disconnect. Monika remembered this confrontational moment with her parents as an adolescent. For her, passive resistance was no longer working: ‘One time we really clashed and I said, ‘Look. You are both White. You are not Black. You’re not a person of color. It’s not easy for me, when someone is walking behind me saying all of these racial epithets to me…. I don’t think you understand how it feels to be stripped like that....’ Ultimately, parental colorblindness meant children often navigated a highly racialized world on their own. (p. 88)

Billy’s interracial family dynamic is the main catalyst that propelled him into developing racial literacy and cognizance. It however was not a smooth developmental process but one fraught with interpersonal tension, not only with his biracial children, but also his white mother who initially did not approve of his interracial marriage.
Kristin, who once dated a Middle Eastern man, shares an account of what Goodman (2001) calls ‘barriers to deep, more authentic relationships’:

My family just didn’t know how to act around him. Like, they just couldn’t be normal. They were always sort of calculating their words; my mum more so. And just like (interviewee speaks very slowly, mimicking perceptions about language barrier) ‘doo-youuuu-eeeat-pork?’ And he’s like (in normal accent) ‘Yah! I eat pork, it’s fine.’ Things like that, and you’re just like oh why do you have to be so frigging awkward?

The awkwardness of some toubabs in interracial contact, as this account shows, stems from prejudices coupled with fears “about saying or doing the wrong thing and being offensive” (Goodman, 2001, p. 110), which is partly a product of limited exposure of and contact with racialized others, a theme that overlaps with institutional racism and residential segregation. The awkwardness Kristin describes had more severe or intense manifestations:

This is so embarrassing… We were having dinner, and [my grandma] was sitting across from him. She gets a stink eye on once in a while and glares at him across the table and you’re just like ‘oh no, what’s going to come out of her mouth?’ She’s looking at him, she goes: ‘your hair,’ I’m like on no, ‘is really black isn’t it?’ to my partner. And he’s like ‘Yup! It is!’ And she just kept staring at him the entire time. And then on another occasion she felt the need to throw down the ‘n’ word in front of him. He’s from the Middle East. But even still, my grandma had this sort of not quite coherent idea of race and ethnic relations. Anybody of visible difference is ‘n-word.’

Prejudice and racial-cultural illiteracy undermine cross-racial contact; they interfere in the development of positive relations. At other times, the cost is among toubabs. It is not uncommon for whites committed to antiracism to experience gradual isolation from other whites. This is seen in the account about Gloria’s attempt to raise awareness in her meditation group about racially-coded language. She elaborated on the fallout between her and her close friend:
It was very traumatic for me because I lost my friendship with her and now it's going to take us time. I don't feel badly about the loss of friendship because I feel we will come back together, but what I see is how far away our thinking is.

Gloria felt misunderstood, isolated, overwhelmed, attacked, and unwelcomed. This too is a cost Goodman (2001) mentions, ‘disconnection, distance, and ostracism within own group’. In Gloria’s account, the violation of colorblindness and racial dysconsciousness became a site of conflict as her friend felt threatened by the idea that the group partakes in the production of cultural racism. A commitment to antiracism can be a lonely path if one’s environment is bereft of high racial-identity status functioning peers.

More than other participants, Dawit is explicitly cognizant of the price of settler colonial racism to shognosh people. Touching upon Goodman’s PCRW categories, he explains that:

people are sacred and that their life is a gift is the basis for me of antiracism. I am angry and sad about racism because it denies the gift that any human being is and has the power to limit that gift. So if people come to believe these things about themselves we limit our own-giftedness, and that is one of the weird things about whiteness. A lot of times we talk about whiteness as privilege but the way whiteness shapes us to be afraid of a larger world or to lose the capacity for free and open inter-human communication, and the way it constructed a small view of what is civilization and knowledge and all these kinds of things, those are self-limitations, they are ways of crippling ourselves.

Racism, Dawit explains, is anti-life for its targets, agents and beneficiaries. It manufactures fear, hampers human communication, undermines civilization and limits knowledge. In this passage, Dawit mentions the spiritual, social, and psychological costs of racism and racial stratification. He acknowledges whiteness as privilege and is cognizant of its price. The double-pan balance scale is heavy on the side of costs.
Emphasizing the micro-costs of white hegemony and settler colonialism, he then continues:

I know what people mean by privilege but it is obliviousness and self-wounding and taking on a role of violence. Getting back to the spiritual, faith-based stimulus, that sense of we weren’t made for this; we weren’t made to divide ourselves in these ways and to refuse reciprocity and the capacity to learn. Maybe you are hearing in my voice some of the sadness, why sadness is an early response, because you think of the potential there is to be much more whole…. I have spent a lot of time recently investigating Indigenous philosophy because of its non-Enlightenment origins. So that too is about spirit and about how the world is animated and alive and has intelligences. And to have trained ourselves to have a view of the world that says ‘no, that is just dead matter, and we’re the only intelligences around here’ is the same kind of self-reduction and self-wounding.

Diane Goodman (2001) too lists a number of examples of PCRW: limited and distorted self-knowledge and of other people’s history and culture, discrepancy between perception and reality, fears, diminished psychological mechanisms (e.g., denial, disassociation, false justification, projection, transference of blame), limited interaction with non-whites or barriers to authentic cross-racial relationships, ostracism by whites for challenging white hegemony and the colorblind racial ideology, moral ambivalence, spiritual emptiness, incongruence, social unrest, waste of resources, and loss of customers, clients and employees. For Dawit, whiteness produces spiritual and moral decay, it limits the full human potential of its agents and beneficiaries, it homogenizes our idea of civilization and development, it coerces agents and beneficiaries to take a role of or in violence, it produces a criminogenic society, and it stunts social development by robbing opportunities from persons whose skills would significantly advance society. White supremacy is self-crippling and self-limiting; it is violence that masks and reproduces self-wounding and obliviousness.
As Edwards’ social justice ally development model suggests, it is one thing when white antiracism is solely oriented towards a target group (the Aspiring Ally for Altruism), and it is another when it is simultaneously cognizant of the negative consequence upon self (Ally for Social Justice). Speaking to the shadow side of an excessive target-oriented antiracism, Lillian Rose (1996) writes that:

If you see yourself as only 'lending a hand' in the fight against racism, you are on the fringe, perhaps feeling sorry for someone. Inherent in that view is condescension. If you feel guilty, this can eventually lead to anger, and your behavior then becomes reactive and resentful. If you see yourself as having nothing to do with racism, there is a level of detachment and numbness that inevitably leads to a loss of intimacy. (p. 27)

There is, I contend, a maturity and urgency that develops with self-implication cognizance. When one’s wellbeing is at stake, commitment to structural transformation is more guaranteed and proactive because social justice and equity is then conceptualized as a win-win rather than a zero-sum game.

Racial and cultural illiteracy in a multicultural democracy is strange but not happenstance. However, whites are not immune to the negative costs of racial oppression. The hand that punches will inevitably ache, though the damage done to the target is several folds. Society is a tapestry, whatever affects one affects others even if only indirectly. It is impossible to escape this social network of mutuality.

In Closing: Three Cognizance in the Critical Whiteness Literature

In the fall of 2014, public controversy erupted concerning a workshop by The Elementary Teachers’ Federation of Ontario (a provincial labour union) titled “Re-thinking White Privilege”. Education Minister Liz Sandals did not see cause for alarm,
but many in the public considered it “racist” and argued that “white privilege does not exist”. The submission of this newspaper columnist was the dominant reaction in the public:

As a white person who’s struggled all my life to become privileged, I really wish I knew what white privilege is, because I’d like a heaping helping. If I’d had a chunk of white privilege, I wouldn’t have had to bust my butt every day working to make a living. I could be eating bonbons on a yacht in the Mediterranean….

Well, here’s my understanding of white privilege:

It doesn’t exist. This is a racist notion put forward by ETFO and it is as dangerous as it is corrosive. I don’t know what “systemic issues” they’re talking about, but it’s presupposing a whole bunch of false assumptions. By their very nature and label, these workshops are aimed at creating resentment of one race by all others.

What on earth is a union doing giving workshops on something that’s so alien to Canadian society? (Blizzard, 2014)

Closer to date, in October 2017, Masuma Khan, vice-president of the Dalhousie University Student Union, received a barrage of Islamophobic, sexist, and racist verbal assault for daring to describe, on her personal social media, the negative reactions towards the Union’s vote to not participate in Canada 150 celebration as “white fragility” and “white tears” (Chiose, 2017). The first term was coined by Robin DiAngelo (2011) and the latter is a common gendered reaction to race-cognizance observed by Accapadi (2007), Spanierman, Beard and Todd (2012) and Srivastava (2006). A graduate student, Michael Smith, filed a written complaint concerning Ms. Khan’s comment to the university and wrote an op-ed for the National Post newspaper on the matter. Aside from erroneously considering Ms. Khan as an “immigrant”, he argued, in the complaint, and in response to Khan’s social media post that shognosh people have colonized the land known as Canada, that:
many white people (like myself) do not have family roots in the Americas, and no living white person here or anywhere had anything to do with colonization…. Specifically targeting ‘white people’ who celebrate Canada Day is blatant discrimination on. (Cole, 2017a)

Following public pressure, the university dropped the complaint and plan to proceed to a hearing on the grounds of free speech. Khan, however, continues to be targeted with Islamophobic, racist and sexist comments and threats of sexual assault.

These two incidents highlight the prevalence and danger of color- and power-evasiveness and, by contrast, the rareness of self-implication cognizance. In fact, so uncommon is this cognizance that it can remain undeveloped in white antiracists, as O’Brien’s (2001) selective race-cognizance captures. In this chapter, I explored respondents’ awareness of how racism and white hegemony shape their lives. Few white antiracists are as proactive as Alexandra—who does archival research to identify how the privilege of being white has historically functioned to protect and enhance the wellbeing of her ancestry—and as articulate as Dawit in detailing the multiple costs of racism to whites. Self-implication cognizance may facilitate the digestion of antiracism education by white attendees because it frames racism as adversarial to them, thus giving them a personal stake in its eradication and transformation. This hypothesis remains to be empirically explored.
Chapter 8: Conclusion

In this study, I used insights from critical race theory and symbolic interactionism to explore white respondents’ stances against racism. Instead of identity development, praxis was the core interest. I described and explained factors that shape participants’ line of action, with frames being one of many factors that at times guide participants’ praxis. Frames have implications for representation, positionality, and racial epistemology and how participants view themselves. In this closing chapter, I describe specific contributions this study has made to the scholarship. This is followed by an acknowledgement of the community’s historical context this project is embedded in. I conclude with comments on limitations to this research and future research directions.

Scholarship Contributions

Types of White Antiracism Strategies

Relative to ‘race’, racialization and racism, scholars have neglected (white) antiracism as a research area. Additionally, what exists of this sparse scholarship is empirically underdeveloped. Using in-depth interviews and questionnaires, this study distinguishes itself from the existing scholarship by its empirical focus on praxis. No other research, to my knowing, offers as concentrated an exploration of white antiracism as this study. I have unearthed and examined various white antiracism strategies in the everyday and organizational domains and grouped them into types: confrontation, counterclaiming, covert and clandestine, and classroom and administrative antiracism activism. In the Introduction chapter, I mapped the relevant scholarship and identified
white antiracism praxis as a research gap that this study begins to fill. Rather than reiterating this gap, I turn to explaining two other key contributions of this study to white antiracism scholarship.

**Antiracism Frames**

Scholars have described the attitudes or views of ‘recovering racists’. They have almost exclusively focused, however, on what recovering racists/white antiracists have to say about ‘race’ and racism rather than antiracism. Ruth Frankenberg (1993), for example, in her study on white feminist women, identifies three discourses on ‘race’: (1) race essentialism, (2) ‘colorblindness’ and ‘power-evasive’, and (3) ‘race-cognizance’. She acknowledges, as I do in this study, that these discourses have implications for antiracism. More specifically, that how whites view racism “has serious consequences for… how antiracist work might be framed” (emphasis added, p. 6). Despite this acknowledgment, nowhere in her study does she articulate actual frames of antiracism. Feagin and Vera (1995) before her also observe the rarity of race-cognizance among whites and that white antiracists generally reject colorblindness. Yet, other than examining how whites have come to terms with their own racism, not much is said about how they frame antiracism.

Existing biographies on white antiracists describe their views about a variety of subjects, a few of which directly pertains to antiracism. Unlike this study, however, these views about antiracism are not coalesced in any fashion that suggests a global frame; a perspective with internal logics, interpretations, and conclusions. No concentrated effort has been made to delineate between white antiracism frames. To my knowledge, O’Brien
(2000 & 2001) is the sole researcher to attempt at this endeavor. She uses a Goffmanian-inspired frame theory and explicitly calls the frames she identifies as antiracism. Upon scrutiny, though, her two frames (‘reflexive race-cognizance’ and ‘selective race-cognizance’) are constructed based on one theme: colorblindness. More specifically, “(1) blindness to institutional racism; (2) blindness to others as people of color; and (3) blindness to self as white” (O’Brien, 2000, pp. 47-48). Though ‘race’ and racism are relevant and consequential for antiracism, developing antiracism frames based predominately on ‘race’ and racism is conceptually misrepresentative and methodologically questionable.

In my study, colorblindness and color-cognizance represent one feature of a frame. My frames are primarily informed by what participants have to say about antiracism. Their views on racism and ‘race’ are considered when so doing elucidates their antiracism frame. To this end, a unique contribution of this study is the introduction of an empirically-derived typology of white antiracism frames. The equality and human rights frame is organized principally along two dimensions: fairness in process/treatment (a restrictive view of anti-discrimination that is colorblind) and a behavioral approach to antiracism that rebukes racially immoral or unlawful behaviors. The anti-oppression frame is organized along the dimensions of group power and intersectionality. It considers antiracism as a matter of closing the power gap by redistributing various tangible and intangible resources, and interconnects antiracism with other anti-oppression struggles. Antiracism is sensitive to and contingent upon the set of identities (one of which includes ‘race’) and concomitant oppressions (one of which includes racism) that it
is directed to. The whiteness-centred frame is organized along three key dimensions: it redefines racism as a white people problem, encourages whites to be responsible for antiracism, and dismantles structures, behaviors and ideas in white spaces. This study is, to my knowing, the first to delineate global white antiracism frames; to examine participants’ various ideas on the subject and identify a general lens or perspective.

*Situated Antiracism: Enablers and Obstacles*

Antiracism is an interpretive, situated and contextually sensitive praxis. This is not a novel idea in the scholarship. My contribution here primarily pertains to identifying the enablers of white antiracist action and, secondarily, the obstacles, using a qualitative approach.

Stewart, Pedersen and Paradies (2014) were the first to quantitatively examine a broad range of obstacles to bystander anti-prejudice action (p. 39). Though not specific to antiracism, they examined 7 barriers persons may face when responding to discrimination. This includes a person’s:

1. level of prejudice,
2. evaluation of risk and fear of reprisal,
3. belief that their intervention will be ineffective,
4. evaluation of a racist incident as not serious enough to warrant intervention,
5. desire to preserve interpersonal relationships,
6. belief that it is not their role or place to intervene, and
7. belief that everyone is entitled to their own opinion (anti-political correctness belief).

In addition to finding that demographic variables such as political standpoint and age are correlated with likelihood to act, they find that risk and fear of reprisal is the strongest obstacle to bystander anti-prejudice action. In high-risk situations, preservation of
interpersonal relationships was a significant obstacle. In low-risk situations, the key obstacles were evaluation of an incident as not serious, belief about entitlement to one’s opinion, evaluation of potential intervention as ineffective, and a ‘not my role or place to intervene’ belief—in this order.

There are some studies that have shed light specifically on barriers to bystander antiracism action (for a review see Nelson, et al., 2010; Nelson et al. 2011; also see Banyard, 2008 & O’Brien, 2001). These studies predominately use quantitative methods, particularly survey and laboratory methods. The following Table by Nelson et al. (2011) summarizes the findings of these studies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1. Potential Enablers and Obstacles to Bystander Action</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Enablers of bystander action</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge of what constitutes racism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Awareness of harm caused by racism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of responsibility to intervene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived ability to intervene—skills (optimism, self/collective efficacy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desire to educate perpetrator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affective responses to racism: empathy, anger, disapproval, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-racist social norms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Obstacles to bystander action</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusive group identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear of violence or vilification, being targeted by perpetrator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception that action would be ineffective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of knowledge about how to intervene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender role prescriptions for women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impression management, preserving interpersonal relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desire to avoid conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of speech/antipolitical correctness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social norms that are tolerant of racism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unlike the “obstacles” list, the “enablers” list is pulled from studies that chiefly investigate other types of anti-prejudice action or helping behavior in general. The authors use especially Ashburn-Nardo, Morris and Goodwin’s (2008) classic social-
psychological Confronting Prejudiced Responses (CPR) model to suggest enablers of antiracism. As such, what is known about enablers of antiracism in the scholarship is little and significantly less than what we know of obstacles to praxis.

My study complements and contributes to this research area in two main ways. First, my findings stem from a qualitative approach that offers a picture of enablers and obstacles that are grounded in the lives of participants as opposed to a researcher’s predetermined list or variables. This is not to discount quantitative approaches but to suggest that in-depth interviews may unearth findings that a researcher’s predetermined list or lab variables overlook. It also provides a more historically and contextually nuanced and situated picture of obstacles and enablers. Indeed, in the above table, ‘politics’ as both enabler or obstacle is nowhere to be found. It was a factor I was also oblivious to and did not include in my questionnaire on what participants consider when responding to racism. In-depth interviews, thus, offer additional and rich insights into a phenomenon.

Finally, most of the enablers and obstacles identified by researchers are cognitive and affective (which overlap with motivational) variables, as evident in the above table. To this end, Nelson et al. (2011) write that “bystander anti-racism models need to acknowledge the effects of context and social functions of the racism that bystander anti-racism is intended to challenge” (p. 278). My study responds to this call and fills the lacuna on contextual and social variables. The following Tables consists of the various enablers and obstacles in this study. I have grouped them into three and four categories. Though presented as discrete, some of the variables can exist in multiple categories.
Horizontal social support, for instance, can also be under the contextual column. I assigned the enablers and obstacles, however, in a data grounded manner—based on the milieu in which they appear in participants’ accounts.

For clarity sake, by ‘psychological’ I mean cognitive and affective variables. I also differentiate situation/circumstance from context/social in two simple ways: (1) a situation or circumstance exists within a broader social context, and (2) a situation or circumstance is shorter in duration than a social context.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: Antiracism Enablers</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Psychological/Behavioral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awareness of and ability to marshal social norms to rebuke racism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confrontational/blunt communication style</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training/confidence in one’s ability to fight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategically using discomfort to pressure perpetrator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge and information</td>
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<tr>
<td>Expertise in facilitating social change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong antiracism commitment and desire to walk the talk</td>
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<tr>
<td>Height privilege</td>
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<tr>
<td>White privilege (e.g., affords more positive evaluation for antiracism)</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situational/Circumstantial</th>
<th>Contextual/Social</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Horizontal social support (e.g., presence of other bystander actors) / Power in numbers</td>
<td>Social norms against racism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spatial distance from perpetrator</td>
<td>Provincial political party’s approach to ‘race’, racism and antiracism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fleeting contact with perpetrator</td>
<td>Organizational culture that normalizes and rewards bystander intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One-time encounter with perpetrator and unlikelihood of future contact</td>
<td>Higher organizational rank, status or position</td>
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<td>Long duration opportunity to examine ‘race’ issues (e.g., entire class semester)</td>
<td>Organizational position of influence or proximity to decision-making power</td>
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<tr>
<td>Presence of racial, gender and sexual minorities increases discussions and</td>
<td>Organizational opportunities for social change (e.g., committees)</td>
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<td>Vertical social support (e.g., support</td>
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interests in social change
- Affirmative action discourse

from higher-ups
- Access to resources (e.g., funding, literature)
- Interest convergence
- Antiracism policy
- Antiracism accountability measures
- Anti-oppression mission statement with clear goals, targets, and dates
- Work duty and requirement to respond to racism
- Hawthorne effect (expectations from someone who is observing you)
- Collective soul-searching
- Dispersal, as opposed to concentration, of antiracism commitment to several units (persons, offices, departments)

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<tr>
<th>Psychological/Behavioral</th>
<th>Situational/Circumstantial</th>
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<tr>
<td>Discomfort/struggle with conflict</td>
<td>Safety of self (mainly about physical safety)</td>
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<td>Lack of knowledge</td>
<td>Potential backlash upon racialized persons</td>
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<td>Not knowing what to say then and there</td>
<td>Resistance from others (especially perpetrators and bystanders)</td>
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<td>Taking too long to think about what to say</td>
<td>A need to preserve interpersonal relationships</td>
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<th>Contextual/Social</th>
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<tr>
<td>Expected codes of conduct</td>
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<td>Canadian politeness</td>
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<td>Professionalism discourse</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provincial political party’s approach to ‘race’, racism and antiracism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interest divergence (e.g., schoolboard not providing in-service or following-up on antiracism policy)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Structure of academic work, which is mainly oriented towards maintaining as opposed to changing the status-quo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Debates pertaining to representation, positionality, and racial epistemology (some experience this not as an obstacle but as a learning curve)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Distrust from racial subalterns (participants see this mainly as an outcome of white supremacy and a safety stance racialized persons must take)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglo-white canons, literary traditions, and fields of specialization in a discipline</td>
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In this study I have identified multiple enablers and obstacles to praxis. Most are contextual and social variables and many are new contributions to the scholarship. It is important to note that obstacles do not necessarily stop participants from antiracism praxis. Participants often find ways to navigate around obstacles or inform their ensuing or ongoing line of action based on the obstacle at hand. For instance, Alexandra’s interest in preserving a relationship with her sister does not prevent her from showing her disapproval to the Aunt Jemima and other stereotypical Black caricature antiques her sister collects. It does, however, explain why she engages with her sister on the matter in a less confrontational manner. The interview approach of this study is sensitive to history and social context. As such, a number of the identified enablers and obstacles are new contributions to the little research there is in this area.

**Local Community and Organizational Relevance**

A desire to map the ways white persons position themselves in and contribute to the movement for racial equity and justice inspired this research. Underneath this desire were two personal impetuses. First, an interest in a sociology of solutions (antiracism) rather than a sociology of problems (racism). Despondency arises as I immerse myself in the field of racism. The ultimate moral of the story of this field is the varied ways BIPOC bodies are branded, stigmatized, detested, and structurally shackled by the hegemonic white order. Exploring antiracism—the study of the responses to the problem—offers some restoration of agency; a sense of an internal locus of control. The second personal impetus was to make ‘race’ and racism a white issue. Ruth Frankenberg (1993), who has significantly shaped critical whiteness studies, observes that “when white people… look
at racism, we tend to view it as an issue that people of color face and have to struggle with, but not as an issue that generally involves or implicates us” (p. 6). The conveyor belt model and, especially, the Self-Implication Cognizance chapter powerfully demonstrate how whites are implicated in racism in Canada. This study makes ‘race’ an everyday, unescapable white problem but with antiracism rather than racism as the entry point to the discussion.

I would be remiss, however, to depict this project as merely informed by gaps in the scholarship and my personal impetuses. The inspiration of this study is also embedded in the history of racism and racial mobilization in my community, Hamilton. This dissertation is but one of a number of ways I have sought to give back\textsuperscript{26}, to the best of my capacity, knowledge and realization, to the traditional territory of the Haudensaunee and Anishnaabeg—where I have lived as a guest for many years. The history of racism and racial justice in Hamilton is centuries deep\textsuperscript{27}. The recent historical context that inspired this study, however, is the arson attack on the Hindu Samaj Temple\textsuperscript{28}.

Just four days after 9/11, the Hindu Samaj Temple, a then 17-year-old building on Twenty Road, Hamilton, was burnt by two arsonists. That same night the Hamilton Mosque on Stone Church was vandalized, and a day before there was an arson attempt on another mosque. Sergeant Maggie McKittick, of the Hamilton police force, declared these crimes as racially motivated. The arsonists added to the spate of violence towards

\textsuperscript{26} One of my proudest achievement being the production of a documentary with Dr. Lisa Watt, titled Hamilton’s Ugly Underbelly: Racism (2015).

\textsuperscript{27} For one historical context, the reader is encouraged to read historian, Adrienne Shad’s (2010) book, titled The Journey from Tollgate to Parkway: African Canadians in Hamilton.

\textsuperscript{28} See documentary Fifteen Years Later (2015), which documents this arson attack.
Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus in Hamilton. This incident became a critical juncture in the development of diversity and inclusion efforts in the city. With the aid of the Hamilton Community Foundation (HCF), a public rally bolstered by a poster slogan “an attack on one is an attack on us all” (see Appendix 5) was held, and about a dozen government, corporate, media, police, voluntary and social service organizations committees and initiatives were formed. The HCF, United Way, the District Health Council and the Social Planning and Research Council, among others, pressured then mayor Robert Wade to give precedence to addressing racial intolerance in the community. The outcome was the Strengthening Hamilton’s Community Initiative (SHCI). This was one of the earliest initiatives against racism in Hamilton. It was a two-year community-based project launched in March 2002 to explore ways to bring inter-cultural and interracial harmony. As the initiative drew to its end, members sought to transform the project into a permanent establishment. In 2005/2006, SHCI evolved into the Hamilton Center for Civic Inclusion (HCCI) as a result of a merger between SHCI and another initiative to develop a permanent Civic and Resources Center led by the Settlement and Integration Services Organization (SISO). Today, HCCI’s purpose is to “create an inclusive and welcoming city through respecting diversity, practicing equity, and speaking out against discrimination” (HCCI website29).

This history was regularly brought to my attention at the time I was thinking of a research to embark on. I would listen attentively. What sparked my curiosity were the white persons who knew of Hamilton’s history with racism and antiracism and offered a

29 www.hcci.ca
strong critique at how Hamilton City Hall has been slow and lukewarm at supporting and embracing antiracism initiatives, and, at times, even stalled antiracism efforts. At the time, it was surprising to hear toubabs make very nuanced and articulate antiracism critiques on the subject. Already despondent about the subject of racism and aware of how racialized persons—particularly Blacks—navigate and respond to racism, my curiosity about white antiracism was piqued during these conversations.

Participants in this study come from several cities in Southern Ontario with their own unique and overlapping histories on racism. The spirit of this project and a number of respondents in this manuscript reflect, however, the historical racial tensions and equity efforts in Hamilton. I hope this research and my contributions enrich their lives and further fuel their antiracism commitment and strategizing. At the very least, this study shows them that they are not alone, there are other whites walking against the flow of the conveyor belt.

Organizations can benefit from this research by drawing insights from the discussion on enablers and obstacles in order to consider how they can create an organizational culture that facilitates antiracism action. Most often, organizational antiracism is framed as a matter of a) removing barriers to access an organization, b) implementing initiatives to increase access to an organization, and c) responding to racism. I suggest that one frame to organizational change is to consider how organizations can make antiracism work easier by, for instance:

- creating or reinforcing vertical and horizontal support structures,
establishing accountability measures for failing to follow-up on antiracism goals, targets and timelines,

- adopting an expansive as opposed to restrictive antiracism discourse,
- maturing from a diversity management approach to an organizational justice and social responsibility approach,
- expanding criteria for tenure-track by including community service or investing in, for example, applied sociology permanent faculty positions,
- redefining ‘professionalism’ in a more inclusive manner, and
- proactively addressing potential backlash to racial equity through knowledge and information.

**Future Research Directions**

The interview method has many benefits. One limitation of this study, however, is it depends almost exclusively on this method. Two other methods would have offered additional insights on the socially and interactionally embedded nature of praxis: actual field observations of antiracism activity and participants keeping a diary in which they write about their daily experiences with sociorace, racism and antiracism. This study though was largely exploratory. Exploratory research is best suited for investigating phenomena that have not been (satisfactorily) studied for it provides rich and new insights that could then lead to a more focused or hypothesis-driven research project.

The following are two future directions I would like to take with this research. First, the biographies of participants foreshadow an empirical interest on the life events and social-psychological determinants that explain the development of their antiracism
commitment. This future research will be in conversation with Janet Helms’ white racial identity development model, which examines one trajectory white persons can take towards developing a humanistic antiracist identity. Though I did not have participants take an attitude assessment survey, such as the White Racial Identity Attitude Scale (WRIAS), one of four themes explored during interviews pertains exclusively to white identity. Participants in my study have dominant racial identity statuses that reflect the second phase of Helms’ WRID model. Most function from a blend of the fourth and fifth statuses, and fewer of the sixth status. Helms’ model, however, does not offer robust insights on the varied determinants of identity development. Foreshadowing this interest in unearthing the life events and bases that propelled participants towards a commitment to antiracism, Appendix 1 consists of a theoretical literature review of WRIDT that I will use for this purpose.

Second, upon analyzing the remaining interviews collected for this project, I will be in a suitable position to develop both descriptive and/or explanatory typology following Collier, Laporte and Seawright’s (2008) advice on typology creation. As O’Brien (2007) writes, “there is not a well-developed typology of antiracist theory and practice” in the social sciences (p. 427). Rather than an antiracist theory typology, this study has potential for introducing a more robust and teased out typology on white antiracism frames and praxis to the scholarship. This typology would be especially in conversation with the conceptual models in ally identity development research, many of which build off Helms’ WRID theory (see Bishop, 2015; Broido 2000; Broido and Reason, 2005; Edwards, 2006; Ford & Orlandella, 2015).
A more distant and entirely new research project would be to do a participant observation study of antiracist groups. O’Brien’s study compares and contrasts two white antiracist groups. A new line of research would be to compare and contrast white persons in a white antiracist group and a multiracial antiracist group. How does the racial composition of a group shape the ensuing white antiracism identity, commitment, praxis and frame? What new opportunities and challenges does it bring? What implications does it have for representation, positionality and racial epistemology? In light of antifascist groups’ increasing role in mobilizing white youth, it would also be particularly interesting to examine how this movement tackles 21st century racism and grapples with increasing demands for an intersectional antiracism.

Another distant project would be to explore how antiracism praxis has changed in the last decade following the resurgence of anti-Muslim and white nationalist groups through bodies such as the Alt-right, the Soldiers of Odin, Rise Canada, the Canadian Coalition of Concerned Citizens, Pegida Canada, the Canadian Nationalist Party, the World Coalition Against Islam, the Three Percent, Proud Boys, the Ku Klux Klan, Breitbart Network, and Rebel Media. How has antiracism praxis been affected by the recent climate of blatant white European supremacy in Canada, the USA and elsewhere? How have antiracist groups modified their practice and what new groups have merged? How has the equality-equity approach of organizations changed, if at all, in response to this climate? Is ‘diversity management’ still the favored approach of these organizations and has it proved useful in light of the recent climate of organized racial violence? These
are questions that would lead to a richer and more historically sensitive understanding of antiracism praxis in Canada.
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Appendix 1: White Racial Identity Development

Racial Identity Development Theory (RIDT) emerged in the late 1960s and 1970s with the works of Charles Thomas (1969, 1970), William Cross (1971), Sue and Sue (1971), Bailey Jackson (1976), and Thomas Parham and Janet Helms (1981). Initial theories concentrated on Black Americans and, to a lesser extent, Asian Americans. Rita Hardiman (1982) and Janet Helms (1984) were the first to explore the racial identity development of white Americans, arguing that the racial identity of white counsellors and psychologists was, if not more so than their clients of racial minority groups, due to the former’s power within a counseling relationship, a determining factor in the diagnosis, prognosis, and the overall counseling experience.

In developing their models, RID proponents:

put forth the powerful and unique notion that individual differences within racial groups were as compelling as those between racial groups. Racial identity theories focused the attention away from race per se by challenging the notion that ‘racial group membership alone dictates how people will react in counseling, respond to specific interventions, or show preference for the type of counselor’. (Reynolds & Baluch, 2001, pp. 153-154; see also Sabnani, Ponterotto, & Borodovsky, 1991)

Their focus made the profession sensitive to intra-racial identity differences or within-group identity variability. There are infinite racial identity types, stages, statuses, or levels; infinite ways that people can identify with their racial category. Racism has a significant bearing on racial identity development. It plays a role in the lifelong exploration of identity—the recurrent phases when persons ask themselves “where do I come from?” “what will I become?” “what do I want to be?” and “who am I?” (Ritchey, 2014, p. 100). These identity-questions and the answers they beget arise in a historical
period and context where racial membership has real social, material and psychological consequences.

White racial identity is the second most studied racial identity following Black racial identity. It was first developed by Rita Hardiman in 1982 but Janet Helms (1984, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1995, 2014) is the most recognized for her unmatched advancement of and in this subfield. Her contributions have been theoretical, conceptual, and empirical. For this reason, this study is inspired by Helms’ White racial identity development (WRID) model.

**Janet Helms’ White Racial Identity Development Model**

People are born into a racial category but not with a racial identity. Overtime, people develop a racial identity informed by their sociorace in a racially stratified society. Helms’ WRID (H-WRID) model describes the process by which white people develop a racial identity and the transformative potentiality towards a positive white subjectivity (Robinson, 2005, p. 130; Thompson & Carter, 1997, p. 17). At the core of H-WRID is the premise that the development of white identity:

is closely intertwined with the development and progress of racism… The greater the extent that racism exists and is denied, the less possible it is to develop a positive white identity… Because [individual, institutional, and cultural] racism is so much a part of the cultural milieu, each can become a part of the white person’s racial identity or consciousness *ipso facto*. In order to develop a healthy white identity, defined in part as a nonracist identity, virtually every white person… must overcome one or more of these aspects of racism. Additionally, he or she must accept his or her own whiteness, the cultural implications of being white, and define a view of self as a racial being that does not depend on the perceived superiority of one racial group over another. Thus, the evolution of a positive white racial identity consists of two processes, the [internalization] of racism and the development of a nonracist white identity. (Helms, 1990, p. 67)
Racial identity statuses are composed of attitudes, thoughts, feelings, and behaviors about oneself as a white person and about members of other racial out-groups. Helms’ model consists of six stages, now called statuses, of white racial identity development. In this model, a white person’s racial identity development begins with no awareness of themselves as racialized and culminates with an integrated antiracist white identity, which only a few attain.

The reader may have an image of racial identity statuses as mutually exclusive; that a person can only experience, exhibit or have one racial identity status at a time. Helms’ model, however, is cumulative. Rather than a person moving from one discrete racial identity status to the next, individuals retain previous statuses as they develop other statuses. Thus, at any moment, an individual has access to as many statuses that they have developed (Helms, 1994, p. 302). A person with a mature white antiracist status are thus able to deploy attributes of a lesser status. Most individuals develop and operate from several statuses simultaneously (Helms, 1995, p. 188; Carter, 1995, p. 125). Upon facing a racial event, a person generally perceives, encodes, and analyzes it through a combination of two or more statuses, assuming that they have developed two or more statuses. Helms employs the concept of blends to describe people’s racial identity profile and behavioral response (called schema) to racial information as reflecting various statuses, though not necessarily all the developed statuses. Only the statuses that are accessible or dominant have the potential to be present in a person’s response to racial stimuli.
Part of the attraction of Helms’ model is it associates each racial identity statuses with what Helms (1996) calls information-processing strategies (IPS). IPS consist of cognitive and affective strategies, such as attitudes, beliefs, rationalizations, and feelings, that people use to process, ‘encode, analyze, react to, and retrieve racial information’ (Helms, 1996, p. 155). Racial identity statuses at the lower end of the model are associated with IPS that function to protect white racial membership, privilege, and power and release discomfort associated with racial stimuli. These strategies include selective attention, denial, obliviousness, and idealization. Since each racial identity status has a number of IPS, two individuals with a similar racial identity status may respond differently to racial material.

Helms’ revised (1990, 1992, 1995, 1999, & 2014) WRID model proposes six racial identity statuses white people can develop. The first three statuses pertain to the process of internalizing racism (phase 1). The last three pertain to the evolution of a nonracist identity (phase 2). Helms observes that the majority of white persons do not evolve (in any meaningful or dominant measure) second phase statuses.

**Phase 1: Internalized Racism**

**Contact:**

White racial identity maturation begins immediately as a white person directly or indirectly encounters someone from another sociorace, especially if the latter’s skin shade is significantly darker. This cross-racial contact is experienced with naiveté and curiosity or shyness and fear of the racialized other, and is coupled with a superficial and fleeting awareness about one’s own sociorace as white. The person may have a subtle
identification with their racial category, but is generally unaware of it and certainly does not think of themselves as white. If pressed to answer what it means to be white, they often a) respond by claiming they are not, b) consider the question strange, c) get defensive, or d) list their national-ethnic origins as substitutes for sociorace (e.g., “I am 1/4 German, 1/2 Irish, and 2/3 English”) (Sue & Sue, 2008, pp. 259-262). Whether naiveté, curiosity, shyness, or fear follows a cross-racial encounter is largely contingent upon the meanings the subject picked up in their surrounding about racialized others.

The Contact person is a beneficiary of structural racism but is unlikely to display individual racism. If and when they do, it is neither sophisticated nor intentional largely because of the limited social meanings they attach to racial differences—a reflection of their naiveté. Racism here is mainly a faux-pas or a result of cultural and racial illiteracy. More common than intended individual racism is the person’s unconscious and automatic usage of white in-group criteria to judge out-group members. They do “so automatically without awareness that other criteria are possible, and that he or she might be as legitimately evaluated according to other racial/cultural groups’ criteria” (Helms, 1990, p. 57) pertaining to, for instance, communication style, power distance, tolerance level of ambiguity, ‘I or We’ emphasis, linear or intuitive thinking, time orientation, and preferred space during interaction. As a result of unreflexively adhering to white standards and evaluating racial minorities based on said standards, the Contact subject expects others to adopt their criteria for aesthetics, communication, behavior, intelligence, and such. The promotion of assimilation is thus customary when operating from this status and the subject may take it upon herself/himself/themselves to acculturate racialized others.
Considering the pervasiveness of cultural racism, contact persons eventually absorb negative stereotypes about racial subalterns. If naiveté and curiosity were their initial reaction during cross-racial encounter(s), internalized negative stereotypes now produce fearfulness and caution about cross-racial interaction. As a result of negative stereotypes merging with an already present white-centered ethnocentrism, the internalized racism of the Contact person gradually solidifies. Hereon, they may diminish or cease initiating cross-racial interactions altogether. If they do engage, they rather interact with racialized others who appear to have adopted and assimilated; who seem ‘white’, who ‘act white’, who are ‘different from those other [insert other sociorace] people’, and who can ‘safely’ teach them about the other’s sociorace.

Contact people eventually learn about the rules in speaking about and dealing with racial material. By and large, in most white communities, this means ignoring, avoiding, and remaining silent—especially when in the presence of racialized others. The Contact person may learn clichés such as ‘I don’t see color’, ‘I treat everyone equally’, ‘life is what you make it’, or ‘the only race is the human race’ that allow them to believe the world to be fair, safe, and just and thus condemn any meaningful exploration of racial information. As a result, a key cognitive feature of this status is obliviousness about racism—utter racial illiteracy. The information-processing strategies of this status are obliviousness, denial, or avoidance of anxiety evoking racial material.

The development of the next status necessitates a jolting event or series of events that together have a shifting impact in how the person perceives ‘race’ and racism. Their naiveté, faux-pas or intended racism, lack of awareness of being part of a racial category,
ethnocentrism, internalized stereotypes, and cliché beliefs must be confronted, contradicted, and/or showed to be undesirable. This may occur through them encountering information about racism that they cannot ignore or rationalize away or through witnessing racial discrimination.

**Disintegration:**

The second status is characterized by two features. For the first time, the person acknowledges or is conscious of being white and that being white has positive implications; it renders them a recipient of better treatment and unearned advantages. This awareness (coupled with other accurate information they have learned about racism) is in conflict with some of the naïve beliefs they previously considered true, which leads to the second feature of Disintegration; a *moral dilemma* due to having inconsistent beliefs. The moral dilemma may stem from any of the following conflicting opinions. The person’s:

- belief in freedom and justice stands in conflict with the reality of racism
- belief in treating others with respect stands in conflict with the belief that some socioraces are not worthy of respect
- desire to be moral and upright stands in conflict with remaining a silent bystander to racism
- belief in being racially colorblind stands in conflict with the reality that racial membership matters
- belief that each person should be treated according to her or his individual merit stands in conflict with stereotyping and homogenizing non-whites
- belief in love and compassion stands in conflict with belittling or ignoring the plights of racialized others.

As a result of their moral dilemma, the subject begins to question the previous racial reality they were taught. Their older status begins to disintegrate. They begin to realize that racial equality is a myth, whiteness is not the sole standard, their stereotypes are
unfounded, and the social skills they have thus far learned to deal with racial material and navigate cross-racial interactions are ineffective. Consequently, the Disintegration person develops a conflicted relationship with their white racial group.

The subject will eventually reveal aspects of their moral dilemma and budding knowledge to close others. If the vocalizing of this occurs in an environment unsupportive of their developing awareness, others will begin to question their whiteness and loyalty to in-group norms, and remind them about the white code of silence (DiAngelo, 2012). To various degrees the subject experiences in-group pressure to conform and toe the line; to be ‘white’: a particular kind of whiteness. The Disintegrating subject learns that to be accepted by their in-group, to gain in-group approval, they must split themselves; one side a self-supressing or self-deceiving self, the other side a self that realizes contradictions and falseness.

This moral dilemma ultimately produces cognitive dissonance. This refers to the inner discomfort and stress produced from holding inconsistent beliefs, values, or ideas or engaging in behavior contradictory to one’s beliefs, values, and ideas. Feelings of guilt, shame, anger, helplessness, anxiety, and even depression may ensue from dissonance. Borrowing from cognitive dissonance theory, Helms suggests that the Disintegrating person will develop strategies to reduce their dissonance. These strategies fall into three broad categories.

A) Changing behaviors that induce dissonance: the person may decide that being accepted by the in-group will afford them more security and is easier to do than challenging it. They thus choose to abide by Contact environment norms and avoid
visible minorities and materials that induce dissonance. This option leaves the subject recycling into the Contact status or fixated at Disintegration. B) Changing environmental beliefs that induce dissonance: the person may decide to change others’ attitudes in order to reduce their dissonance. They may, for example, try to convince significant others that First Nation people are not ‘lazy’ or ‘drunks’. This is the likely route of a person immersed in an environment open to or actively encouraging progressive thinking. The Disintegrating person’s attempts at changing others’ attitudes is, however, at this status unsophisticated and thus often a frustrating and isolating experience fraught with challenges. C) Developing a new belief: alternatively, the person may seek information and develop beliefs that free them from feeling culpable; e.g., “that either racism is not the white person’s fault or does not really exist” (Helms, 1990, p. 59). They selectively seek and absorb information that reinforces their new belief, e.g., ‘Black people sold black slaves to Europeans. It’s really their fault’; ‘if whites are advantaged it’s because they deserve it’; or ‘Native people of North America came from elsewhere. This land does not really belong to them’. Whatever rationalization the person chooses, “the person has resolved internal turmoil by becoming immoral. [The] person has chosen to be white in the limited ways her or his society offer” (Helms, 1992, p. 47).

Key information-processing strategies of this status include disorientation, confusion, ambivalence, and suppression of information. The outcome of choosing dissonance-reducing option one is mentioned above. If the person chooses the second option, it leads them to the fourth status. If they choose the third option, they enter the next and final status of the internalizing racism phase.
Reintegration:

The Reintegrating status is characterized as highly conscious of a white identity. To be white in the racially stratified Occidental is to have internalized discourses regarding one’s sociorace superiority—however measured and acknowledged, e.g., “we have the best because we are the best” (Helms, 1992, p. 53). The Reintegrating subject consciously accepts this belief; they internalize a sense of superior group position and idealize whites and white culture. Simultaneously, they regard a number of other socioraces as inferior. This belief in group superiority is formed through selectively attending to information.

In addition to internalized superiority, the subject considers racial minorities to be responsible for their subordinate conditions (see laissez-faire racism). They associate the latter’s problems to alleged physical, genetic, social, moral, intellectual or cultural qualities. There is a denial of white people’s role in the problems of the racial subaltern. By choosing the third cognitive dissonance reducing strategy, cognitive dissonance is not experienced by the subject for they have an arsenal of sophisticated rationalizations and justifications for their racial superiority. This arsenal of cognitive strategies allows them to deny or minimize the existence of racism while considering their racial group as the standard for what is socially desirable.

Feelings of guilt, anxiety, and shame about one’s whiteness held in the previous status are transformed into abstract anger and fear towards racialized people. These feelings are generally unexpressed because of social norms, but they shape much of the person’s cross-racial behavior. These feelings often erupt into the open when the subject
feels threatened by racial stimuli, such as when racial minority activists block traffic in protest. The individual may also express their group superiority actively or passively. The first may occur, for instance, through physical violence upon negatively racialized bodies or their property, joining white nationalist rallies, spreading propaganda, and expressing racist sentiments with peers who hold similar views. Passive expression may take the form of apathy towards and avoidance of racialized others and their concerns, and favoring harsh state policies such as the death penalty or the ‘war on drugs’ when its recipient are believed to be the racial subaltern. According to Helms (1992):

The Reintegration [status] is strongly represented in white society and may even be predominant at least in some of its manifestations.... Moreover, Reintegration is a stable and consistent [status] because cultural and institutional racism are so firmly established in American society. Thus, with only minimal psychic energy, the person can convince herself or himself that the reason why whites are at the top of the sociopolitical hierarchy is not only because they are best, but also because members of the other racial groups are not trying hard enough or do not have sufficient abilities or skills. (pp. 54-55)

**Information-processing strategies**, here, include distortion of information, stereotyping, rigidity, out-group debasement, and own-group enhancement. A significant event(s) is necessary for the individual to come out of this status. Ideally, this event would cause the person to question their sense of superiority and justifications of racism. Seeing inspiring white models, significant others, or peers engage in white antiracism or settler allyship, thus exemplifying a different way of being white, can also act as a catalyst for entering the beginning stage of the nonracist identity phase.
Phase 2: Nonracist Identity

*Pseudo-Independent*:

Also called the ‘white liberal’ racial identity status, this is the beginning of recovering from internalized racism and developing a more positive white racial identity. This order is intentional as a positive racial identity is contingent upon resolving the naïve, conflicted, distorted, and selective-information processing characterizing previous statuses. The resolution requires, in part, the possession of accurate racial knowledge, which the subject now begins to develop. In Helms (1990) words, “redefining a positive white identity requires that the person replace white and black myths and stereotypes with accurate information about what it means and has meat to be white in the United States as well as in the world in general” (p. 62).

The Reintegrating subject questions inferiority/superiority beliefs and reflects upon their stereotypes, prejudices and discriminatory behavior. For the first time, they acknowledge their role in racism and the responsibility of whites for racism. Uncomfortable with this discovery, they begin a search for a nonracist identity characterized by intellectual exploration. The intellectual pursuit of this status mainly stems from a desire to assuage tensions in one’s relationship with being white. The person is intellectualizing, which is a necessary process but that nonetheless has pitfalls for, generally, the intellectualization is not meaningfully integrated into their behavior, emotions, deeper value systems, and lifestyle. The subject attempts to recapture morality with respect to ‘race’ by:

‘thinking’ about racial issues rather than ‘feeling’ about them. Thus, in a psychological sense, the person remains aloof from racial issues even though he or
she may appear to be actively advocating ‘liberal’ perspectives with respect to such issues. So long as the person can remain aloof, so long as he or she remains personally untouched by racial events in her or his environments, then the Pseudo-Independent [status] is a safe place for the person to be. (Helms, 1992, pp. 60-61)

The person’s discomfort with their older racial statuses and beginning absorption of racial information may lead them to intellectually dis-identify with their in-group. They may feel uneasy with racial issues among their white peers and develop a snobbish sense of ‘betterness’ than them and whites in general. Towards racial minorities, rather than functioning from fear and anger, they have pity or sympathy. Like the notorious Rachel Dolezal, who shares more characteristics with the next status—but, recall, status profiles generally exist as blends—they may (claim to) feel more identified with, say, Black people and Black culture than their white in-group.

Increased race-cognizance, dis-identification from their racial in-group, and identification with racial minorities do not, however, render them immune to displaying racism. The subject’s over-intellectualization, snobbishness, and pity may manifest as paternalism towards racialized others:

that is, though the person may seek greater interaction with Blacks, much of this interaction involves helping Blacks to change themselves so they function more like whites on white criteria for success and acceptability rather than recognizing that such criteria might be inappropriate and/or too narrowly defined. Furthermore, cultural or racial differences are likely to be interpreted by using white life experiences as the standards. (Helms, 1990, p. 61)

This is often perpetuated unconsciously and with ‘good intentions’. Predictably, racial minorities may have suspicion towards white Reintegrating subjects who devote ample time to change them rather than other whites (Helms, 1990, p. 62). In this status, the subject is other-oriented, focused on the plight of racialized others and motivated by a
need to help by suggesting strategies derived from their racialized experience. Naturally, such strategies are usually racially biased in nature, application, and/or consequence. Rare is it to find the Liberal attempt “to re-educate [other] whites about the meaning of being white in this country and/or the benefits that one accrues as a partaker or expressor of racism” (Helms, 1992, p. 61).

Despite growing knowledge and recognition of white people’s role in racism—which Helms (1992) later limits to a racial view of racism as of the past and/or what ‘bad’ whites do (p. 60 & p. 61)—the Liberal seeks solutions for racism in alleged Black cultural dysfunctions, e.g., apparent ‘inner city youth’ disregard of formal education rather than critiquing the settler-racist and capitalist nature of education and the underfunded thus dilapidated condition of education in inner cities. The person may also acknowledge environmental explanations for the decrepit conditions of many non-white communities, but see no worth in these environments—effectively seeing them only as ‘broken’ or ‘depraved’ spaces, rather than spaces bustling with similar characteristics as elsewhere, such as friendships, courtship, networking, support, art, hopes, dreams, and possibilities.

For all their intellectualization of racial fairness, our white Liberal aspirant is not ready to give up white privilege or meaningfully and proactively engage in antiracism. They support fairness and equality as long as its implementation has no real or perceived negative implication for them (see interest convergence). Furthermore, their search for a positive white identity is largely motivated by wanting to be a ‘good white’; to be white without being considered ‘racist’. Consequently, the subject largely depends on racial minorities to affirm their goodness.
The information-processing strategies of this status are rationalization, functioning from a ‘liberal’ societal framework, dichotomizing ‘good whites’ from ‘bad whites’, avoidance of negative racial views about oneself, and selective perception. The paucity of white models with a critically-informed and positive white racial identity makes it difficult for the subject to identify their limits and modify their subjectivity in pursuit of a mature expression of racial identity. This would be an ideal catalyst for them to develop the next status. Encouragement to continue strengthening a positive white identity could also facilitate entry into the next status.

**Immersion/Emersion:**

The primary distinguishing feature between Immersion/Emersion and Pseudo-Independence is the former has a better grasp of racism and fully recognizes that racial stratification primarily stems from white society. Thus, questions about whiteness take centre stage. Here the subject earnestly searches to accurately understand whiteness at a larger scope, nuance and depth than ever before and to discover how/who the subject wants to be racially. The latter often takes the answer of a humanistic, nonracist-antiracist white racialized subjectivity (Helms and Cook, 1999, p. 92).

Consequently, the person immerses themselves in writings—especially (auto)biographies—of whites who have walked a similar racial identity trajectory. This is more than an intellectual exercise as it was in the previous status. Here, it is contemplative, introspective, emotional, and the subject makes intentional effort at altering their behavior, choices, and lifestyle to reflect the racial self they want to be. The person may immerse themselves in white consciousness-raising groups to be exposed to
varied and seasoned ideas and integrate these into action, to develop praxis. They are inclined to seek racially mature whites, if present in their environment, rather than placing the need for information and education on racial minorities. Whatever activity they decide to immerse themselves in, the purpose is usually four-pronged: to understand, recognize, and accept white culture and to discover a white identity distinguishable from racism (Helms, 1992, p. 75).

No longer focused on changing racial minorities, their orientation is on helping and challenging white people to develop a critical racial epistemology. One outcome of immersion is the subject no longer idealizes or romanticizes white people, culture or standards. They acknowledge both the positive and negative in being white and value cultural relativity. Additionally, feelings such as guilt, shame, anger, and anxiety that they previously denied, pushed out of their awareness, or submerged through intellectualization remerge to be better processed. It is not uncommon, however, for the Immersion subject to fluctuate between anger and embarrassment, both of which are directed towards themselves and whites:

Anger can be aroused when the person becomes aware of the extent to which he or she has been taken in by the ‘white lie’. The person may be angry at himself or herself for being so gullible; he or she may also be angry at the people considered to have participated in the conspiracy to distort the realities of race... One’s level of embarrassment generally rises as the person becomes aware of her or his own previous social ineptness with respect to race as well as that of other white people. When this affective condition occurs, the person may become socially inhibited because of continuous self-doubt and questioning and reluctance to be perceived inept. (Helms, 1992, pp. 75-76)

Rather than closing down, or fearing that these feelings assault, contradict or undermine their desire to be a humanistic nonracist white person, they consciously work through
them. The subject has developed brutal self-honesty and is more realistic about the process of self-discovery and its outcome, e.g., ‘good white’ is replaced with ‘responsible white’. Unsurprisingly, a few white people develop this status for self-investigation and self-honesty are processes that revive distressing memories most would rather avoid.

Social isolation is common at this status. Not only is there a paucity of whites operating at this mature status that the person can befriend, but as the subject becomes vocal and engages in a mission to convert other whites, the latter (e.g., peers, friends, and family) may distance themselves from the subject or abandon them. The Immersion subject can be critical towards themselves and other whites. As long as it is not vain or extreme, this is a positive characteristic as it suggests the use of analytical skills to overcome unhealthy racialization. The Immersion subject is advised to develop some empathy and patience for themselves, others, and the developmental process.

If they remain steadfast in their exploration, they eventually emerge/emerse from their frantic search with self-liberating qualities such as a definition of self not defined by external criteria, especially other whites’ definition of what it means to be white. The subject’s search for a personal meaning of whiteness has been met. This makes them less vulnerable to in-group coercion via guilt, fear, and pressure. Emersion often is accompanied by tears of joy and gratitude toward and group solidarity with white persons on a similar mission of rediscovery (Helms, 1999, p. 93). The Emersing subject can now begin to gradually withdraw from the community of re-educated white persons and chart their own way towards deeper self-knowledge.
The information-processing strategies of the first phase of this status (Immersion) are re-education, a search for internally defined racial standards, hyper-vigilance, probing, judging, and activism. The IPS for the second phase (Emersion) include pride, friendliness, and seeking positive group-attributes.

**Autonomy:**

The internalization, application, and nurturing of a humanistic, nonracist-antiracist white identity is the marker of Autonomy. Here, a white person is committed to being an antiracist and having a realistic relationship with their identity as white. This frees them from submitting to others’ racial expectations and criteria and from depending upon racial minorities to validate their nonracist racial identity status.

Autonomous persons neither feel threatened by racial material nor resort to avoidance, defensiveness or attack impulses upon encountering racial stimuli. They are open to new information and flexible in their worldview. This openness and flexibility permits them to socialize in cross-racial and cross-cultural encounters and settings with more ease and poise. In fact, Autonomy subjects truly and non-tokenistic-ly value diversity and seek settings and activities where there is increased opportunity for cross-racial contact. They consider diversity beneficial and enriching and as providing much growth and learning.

Gone is the need to oppress, denigrate, fetishize or idealize on the basis of racial markers. They are prepared to abandon both individual and institutional racism—ergo, the privileges it bestows—and are neither threatened by demands for and gains in the civil rights and human rights of equity-seeking groups. The Autonomy person actively engages
in the pursuit of justice, equality and equity and, more so than ever, from an intersecting or interlocking framework. There is a mature acknowledgement that matters of ‘race’ are simultaneously matters of gender, class, sexuality, ecology, and other struggles. There is also an acute awareness of the costs of racism upon them and other whites.

It is tempting to consider the sixth status as signifying racial transcendence or perfection. Helms (1990) suggests that we consider Autonomy as an unending process of maturation. “It is a process wherein the person is continually open to new information and new ways of thinking about racial and cultural variables” (p. 66). It is a “life long process of discovery and recommitment to defining oneself in positive terms as a white person” (Helms, 1992, p. 87). The subject has not transcended ‘race’. They are a member of a hegemonic group but adept at using a critical and complex racial lens. They have not transcended institutional racism but are active agents of its dismantling. The latter applies too to individual racism; earlier statuses can be revisited but functioning from a dominant Autonomy status means a short-lived revisiting and a quicker resolution of unresolved dilemmas, conflicts, and questions.

Regarding intersectionality, it is important to note that maturity in racial identity does not automatically yield maturity in gender, sexual, ethnic or other identity domains. Social identities overlap but do not overlie. Thus, an Autonomy man may still function from a less than optimal gender identity. He may still be in need to resolve tensions and dilemmas pertaining to gender identity development. For instance, socialization into stereotypical masculine gender scripts such as assertiveness, self-reliance, and to restrict emotions deemed ‘unmanly’ may produce tensions in the subject when experiencing a
role conflict (e.g., between manhood and caretaking) and reduce help-seeking behavior for fear of experiencing vulnerability (Gertner, 1996; Good et al., 1996).

Additionally, a mature racial identity status does not imply that the subject has positive traits in other domains of personality. As Helms (1990) notes:

Chances are if the person had a grouchy personality before he or she began movement through the racial identity process, then he or she will still be a grouch once the process is completed. It is just that his or her grouchiness will no longer be governed by cultural or racial determinants. In other words, one might find a variety of personality characteristics and styles among people who have reached the Autonomy [status]. (p. 66)

Development of a healthy white identity does not make one a perfect human being. It merely helps free one to potentially enjoy oneself and the society of a variety of human beings who will appear in many colors…. Even though developing your white racial identity is not a cure all, it does offer the possibility of a better you in the area of race and race relations. (Helms, 1992, pp. 88-89)

The information-processing strategies of Autonomy include flexible analyses and responses, integration, and deeper intellectualization. Recall, however, that most individuals develop multiple statuses which operate in concert. Meaning, blends of statuses characterize a person’s resting-state and reactions and responses (also called schema) to racial stimuli more frequently than one status. In a blended racial identity profile, one or more statuses may be dominant and others subordinate. The arrangement of statuses that yield a blend is theoretically infinite (Helms, 1999, p. 93).

30 Technically, the process never reaches completion.
Appendix 2: Key Tenants of Critical Race Theory

Richard Delgado (2000, 2001), one of the three progenitors of CRT (including Mari Matsuda and Derrick Bell), elucidates some key premises of critical race theory.

Racism is a normal rather than an aberrant part of society. So normalized it is that it passes off as invisible and unmarked. Consequently, racism is challenging to address. Formal equal opportunity—colorblind laws and rules requiring that people be treated alike irrespective of their sociorace—are effective for responding to extreme and blatant forms of injustice, but not to subtle racism and routine organizational practices that though void of racial labels or intent nonetheless maintain and exacerbate existing unequal racial conditions.

Using a social constructionism thesis, critical race theorists maintain that ‘race’ is the product of racialization. This refers to the social process of attributing meaning to biological or genetic traits and associating ‘race’ with qualities such as intelligence, morality, and ability. As a social process, ‘race meanings’ are time and space contingent—they are invented, manipulated, put aside and recalled when politically, economically, and psychically convenient. Critical race theorists prefer the term racialization over ‘race’ because the former emphasizes the active production and reification or objectification of certain biological/genetic traits. Critical race scholars are also curious about the contemporary persistence of racialization despite the scientific invalidity of ‘race’. What does it serve society to maintain the pseudo-science of ‘race’?
Interest convergence, developed by Derrick Bell, underlies CRT. It maintains that the dominant white society, generally, tolerates racial equality and advances only for Blacks (and other racialized people) only when they fall within the parameter of white self-interest. Modern day cries of ‘reverse racism’ from white liberals and conservatives alike and efforts at dismantling civil right gains exemplify the limits to which racial redress and social transformation is acceptable by the dominant group.

Though they deploy many methods, critical race scholars are fond of counter-narratives or counter-storytelling to unmask the façade of equality, progress, and justice and deconstruct self-serving hegemonic stories and negative preconceptions mainstream society constructs about racial minorities. Dominant discourses marginalize racialized others and/or reduce, obscure, and distort their humanity. For example, ‘black-on-black’ crime is a cruel narrative that serves the interests of whites and shapes legal and police department decisions. It also conditions the popular imagination to adopt a view of Blacks as suspect and places on them the burden to prove their innocence.

Critical race theorists emphasize the unique voice of the racialized other(s) in their research. The voice-of-color thesis argues that the experiences and life chances of racialized others and whites are differently shaped by racism. As the target of systematic racism and discrimination, racial minorities have little choice but to develop awareness about racial issues in ways that do not apply to whites. Accordingly, racialized minorities are better able to speak to matters of ‘race’ and racism than their white counterparts. The latter “cannot easily grasp what it is like to be non-white. Few have what W.E.B Du Bois

31 For example, the Brown v. Board of Education decision in favor of public school desegregation
described as ‘double consciousness’” (Delgado & Stefancic, 2001, p. 39). Emphasising the voice of those on the margins bridges the information gap, allowing some to know what life is like for others.

**Intersectionality** is also an important tenet in CRT. This maintains that no person has a singular identity but multiple. Most people have identities that concurrently locate them in the dominant/advantage group and the subordinate/disadvantage group. As a result, people’s loyalties and allegiances may overlap or be in conflict. Similarly, there are multiple types of oppressions and social hierarchies. These do not exist in silo but intersect and shape the life chances of subgroups of people in ways different than other subgroups. Though a system of oppression can act as a singular axis or force for disadvantaging some and benefiting others, often, systems of oppression work together. Intersectionality is thus not an additive approach to inequality. The latter aggregates the effects of having different identities. For example, the joint effect of being a woman, Indigenous, and middle-class is seen as a sum of the effects of these three separate factors. Intersectionality maintains instead that identities are not lived or experienced separately. I, for example, do not experience what it means to be Black separately from being a man, heterosexual, and a cultural minority. I experience these simultaneously. Rather than additive, intersectionality takes a conditional approach; the social effects of having an identity is conditional on it intersecting with other identities.
Appendix 3: Recruitment Tear-Off Poster

INTERVIEWEES NEEDED FOR STUDY ON ANTIRACISM

I am looking for White/Caucasian individuals who stand or speak against racism or identify as an antiracist, ally, activist, advocate or any synonym of these.

You are invited to partake in a 1 to 2 hours one-on-one interview on what it means to be an antiracist and how antiracism is done. Interviews will take place in a quiet, comfortable and mutually agreed upon location. Your participation in this study is confidential. I will explain the steps taken to protect your privacy and anonymity prior the interview. For more information about this study or to volunteer to participate please contact me at:

Ismaël Traoré (PhD candidate)
Department of Sociology
Kenneth Taylor Hall, KTH 727
Tel: (905) 525-9140 Ext. 21348
Email: Traorei@mcmaster.ca

This study has been reviewed by, and received ethics clearance by the McMaster Research Ethics Board.
Appendix 4: Email Recruitment Script

E-mail Subject line: Invitation to participate in a study on antiracism

Dear [name of person],

My name is Ismaël Traoré. I am a sociology PhD candidate at McMaster University. Your contact information was found through an online search on antiracism and diversity organizations in Hamilton. I am looking for White/Caucasian persons who stand against racism or identify as antiracists, allies, activists, advocates or any synonym of these to partake in a study on racism and antiracism.

This study provides the space for Whites to voice their experiences with racism and antiracism. There are many benefits for this. First, to correct the predominant view that racism is unchallenged by white people, which paints a biased picture of white men and women and disheartens people of other colors. Second, to encourage people to stand against racism. Third, to encourage a multi-racial antiracist collaboration. And finally, to give potential (or present) antiracists examples of strategies other antiracists use and inform them of the things to consider when deciding to engage in antiracism.

I am inviting you to partake in a two-part or one-part 60 to 90 minutes one-on-one interview in a quiet, comfortable and mutually agreed upon location. It is expected that there will be minimal risks in participating in this study considering the sensitive nature of the topic. I have attached a copy of the Letter of Information that gives you full details about the study and efforts to ensure your privacy, confidentiality and anonymity. If interested in participating, please contact me by the email listed below. I hope to interview as many people for this study. If you know of any other persons who may be interested in this study, I invite you to put me in contact with them and/or fast-forward to them the attached Recruitment Poster. To preserve your anonymity, please do not fast-forward this email. Also, please do not fast-forward the Letter of Information for it is only for those interested in participating in this study.

This study has been reviewed and cleared by the McMaster Research Ethics Board. If you have any concerns or questions about your rights as a participant or about the way the study is being conducted you can contact:

The McMaster Research Ethics Board Secretariat
Telephone: (905) 525-9140 ext. 23142
    c/o Office of Research Services
    E-mail: ethicsoffice@mcmaster.ca

I would like to thank you in advance for your time and consideration. After a week, I will send you a one-time follow-up reminder.
Appendix 5: Hamilton Faith Communities Against Hate