FORESTRY COMPANY SAFETY POLICY ON VANCOUVER ISLAND

FORSAKING PAUL BUNYAN: A GENDERED ANALYSIS OF FORESTRY COMPANY SAFETY POLICY ON VANCOUVER ISLAND IN THE MID-TWENTIETH CENTURY

By Jacqueline Kirkham, B.A., M.A.

A Thesis Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy

McMaster University © Copyright by Jacqueline Kirkham, June 2017

McMaster University DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (2017), Hamilton, Ontario (History)

TITLE: Forsaking Paul Bunyan: A Gendered Analysis of Forestry Company Safety Policy on Vancouver Island in the Mid-Twentieth Century AUTHOR: Jacqueline Kirkham, B.A. (Vancouver Island University), M.A. (McMaster University) SUPERVISOR: Professor Ruth Frager NUMBER OF PAGES: xi, 314.

Lay Abstract

This thesis looks at the safety policies implemented by three British Columbia forestry companies between 1943 and 1968. Companies sought to increase the efficiency of their operations by reducing the number of compensable accidents and fatalities among their workers. They took the lead in creating a safety regime in forestry, but were joined in the endeavor by the provincial Workmen's Compensation Board (WCB) and the forest workers' union, the International Woodworkers of America. Safety programs were heavily gendered, with companies promoting a hetero-patriarchal masculinity in an attempt to reduce worker's risk-taking. Efforts by companies, as well as the union and the WCB, were successful in reducing many of the hazards of working in forestry. However, many of the dangers in this industry persist into the twenty-first century.

Abstract

This thesis examines the safety policies implemented by three British Columbia forestry companies between 1943 and 1968. Companies sought to increase the efficiency of their operations by reducing the number of compensable accidents and fatalities among their workers. These companies, along with other member-companies in the BC Loggers Association and BC Lumber Manufacturers Association, took the lead in creating a safety regime in BC's coastal forest industry, but were joined in the endeavor by the provincial Workmen's Compensation Board (WCB) and the forest workers' union, the International Woodworkers of America. In order to obtain worker consent for new safety programs, companies targeted worker's masculinity. Workers who had seen themselves as following in the footsteps of the rugged and independent Paul Bunyan were a problem for companies who wanted to create a sense of mutual responsibility for safety across their entire workforce. Safety programs, accordingly, were heavily gendered and promoted a white, hetero-patriarchal masculinity. This masculine ideal was intended to reduce worker's willingness to take unnecessary risks. In the later years of this study, companies obtained greater control over the work process by introducing tight controls over the work process in the name of safety. Overall, efforts by companies, as well as the union and the WCB, were successful in reducing many of the hazards of working in forestry by the later 1960s. However, many of the dangers in this industry persist into the twenty-first century.

Acknowledgments

History can be an isolating discipline. I could not have made it through this process without the help and support of my family, friends, and academic community. Thank you to everyone who has taken an interest in me and my work over the ten year journey to this point.

My sincere thanks to my supervisor, Ruth Frager, for supporting me throughout my graduate education at McMaster. Thank you for always challenging me to look at my work from new angles. I am a better historian because of your guidance.

To my committee members, Karen Balcom and Nancy Bouchier: Thank you for going above and beyond the role of second and third reader. I am so grateful for your support of my academic and professional development. Your thoughtful suggestions have pushed me to gain the skills and confidence I need for post-PhD life.

This work was made financially possible by a number of travel grants, fellowships and scholarships. I am grateful for the financial support from the Edna Elizabeth Ross Reeves Scholarship, the Mildred Armstrong Fund, the Richard Fuller Memorial Scholarship, the James Robertson Carruthers Memorial Award, and the L.R. Wilson Institute for Canadian History. Without this generous financial assistance this project could not have been completed.

The McMaster Department of History has been incredibly supportive. Without Debbie Loban and Wendy Benedetti's incredible patience and consistent support I don't know how any of us would make it through. I also want to thank all of the faculty

v

members outside of my committee who took an interest in me and my work. Especially Tracy McDonald for always being a listening ear when I needed it.

I was fortunate to have the opportunity to work in several archives when gathering resources for this project. Thank you to the staff of the Provincial archives in Victoria and to the UBC archives in Vancouver. All of the archivists and staff I interacted with were wonderful, but I want to give special thanks to the staff and volunteers of the Kaatza Museum and Archives, Catherine Siba at Courtney & Comox Museum and Archives, and the staff of the Campbell River Archives. Thank you all for being so gracious in making room for me in your museums when I inevitably needed just a few more days than I had planned, and for taking an interest in my project.

This project has also benefitted from feedback from a number of people from across the continent. To all those who attended my conference talks at Qualicum Conference 2014, HERA 2015, IGHSC 2015, York History's Conference 2015, and the McMaster Graduate History Conference 2016, your questions and comments have shaped this project in dozens of small ways. Thank you.

I also want to extend a special thank you to the people who kept me sane and helped made Grad school one of the best times in my life. Ross Huyskamp: a massive thank you for reading countless drafts and helping me find an argument somewhere in the narrative. Jelena Cabro: thank you for keeping me grounded with your sense of humour and general disinterest in my research, and for reminding me that there is a life on the other side of all of this academia. To the Games Night crew (Alex, Andrew, Chelsea, Curran, Kelsey, Megan, Mica, Oleksa, and Scott): Thanks for all the laughter and for

vi

listening to me rant. I could not have survived this process without you. Maria Pinelli and her entire family: Thank you for adopting me as a temporary part of the family in 2013. I am so deeply grateful for your warmth and generosity. Vanessa Lovisa: I cannot believe it's been five years since we started this crazy process. Thank you for always being ready with words of encouragement and reassurance when I felt overwhelmed. From comps to defense and everything in between has been a lot easier with you along for the same ride. Chelsea Calder, Ateeka Khan, and Nadina Taylor: thank you for always being there with a comforting word and for sharing your beautiful families with me.

Last, but definitely not least, I need to thank my family. Mom: thank you for always believing I could do this. Knowing I always have your unfailing love and support to fall back on has let me roam much farther than I ever believed possible. Kaitlyn: thank you for being the best sister I could have ever wished for. Thanks for never letting me take myself too seriously and for always making me feel wanted and missed. Dad: thank you for always challenging me and for instilling in me a passion for union politics and strong opinions on just about everything. Grandma: Thank you for all the long talks on the phone. You helped keep me connected to home in the early years when Nanaimo felt a world away. Gramma and Papa: I miss you every day. I wish you could have seen this work completed, but I know you could not have been more proud of me than you were. Thank you for being there for me for the first 27 years of my life.

vii

Table of Contents

Lay Abstract	iii
Abstract	iv
Acknowledgments	v
List of Tables	ix
List of Abbreviations	X
Declaration of Academic Achievement	xi
Introduction	1
Chapter 1: Getting Organized	
Chapter 2: Creating a Regulatory Regime	91
Chapter 3: Keeping the Family (Alive) Together	147
Chapter 4: Standardizing (Safe) Work Practice	
Conclusion	
Bibliography	
Appendix A: Accident Statistics for Cowichan Valley Companies (Reith Tropl 1966	ny), 1954- 307
Appendix B: WCB British Columbia Forestry Accident Statistics,	211
1943-1900	
Appendix C: Workmen's Compensation Board Timeline	

List of Tables

Combined Sawmill and Logging Accident Frequency, 1954-1966	
Sawmill Accident Frequency, 1954-1966	
Logging Accident Frequency, 1954-1966	
Reith Trophy Statistics, 1954-1966	
WCB BC Forestry Accident Statistics, 1943-1968	

List of Abbreviations

BCFP	British Columbia Forest Products
BCLA	British Columbia Loggers Association
BCLMA	British Columbia Lumber Manufacturers Association
BCLW	British Columbia Lumber Worker
CLR	Comox Logging and Railway Company
CRCSA	Consolidated Red Cedar Shingles Association
DSI	Departmental Safety Inspectors
FIR	Forest Industrial Relations
ICA	Industrial Conciliation Act
IWA	International Woodworkers of America
LH	Loggers Handbook
LSWU	Lumber and Sawmill Workers Union
LWIU	Lumber Workers Industrial Union
NSC	National Safety Council
PLC	Pacific Logger's Congress
UBC	University of British Columbia
UOE	Union of Operating Engineers
VTC	Victoria Times Colonist
WCA	Workmen's Compensation Act
WCB	Workmen's Compensation Board
WFI	Western Forest Industries
WIUC	Woodworkers Industrial Union of Canada

Declaration of Academic Achievement

Jacqueline Kirkham is the sole author of this thesis.

Introduction

Wrong judgement in business ends up in loss of money, and if the wrong judgement is bad enough and/or continues long enough ends up in a company going bankrupt. This is the worst that can happen [to a business], although it is very bad. In these sorts of cases, however, wrong judgement can result in loss of life.¹

Written in 1952, these words from the Vice President and General Manager of BC Forest Products, H.G Munroe, captured the economic and human elements of accident prevention from the company perspective. The Vice President was responding to the death of a logger at the company's Caycuse logging operation. For forestry companies on the Pacific Coast of British Columbia, loss of life and loss of profit were tightly tied in the mid-twentieth century. Safety policy developed in the 1940s when war production, followed closely by unionization, forced companies to contend with the reality that workplace accidents -- whether caused by workers, management, equipment, or environmental conditions beyond human control -- were inefficient and could be extremely costly.² Accidents ate away at the working hours of the day and companies had to pay premiums to the Workmen's Compensation Board (WCB) at a rate concordant with the cost of covering the accidents suffered at the company.³ An investment in

¹ H.G Munroe to T.R Fraser, 3 September 1952. Fletcher-Challenge Collection, 997.54, box 1952 (2), file H.G Munroe 52, Kaatza Station Museum and Archives, Lake Cowichan, British Columbia. (Hereafter: KSMA 997.54: box, file).

² Stephen Gray, "Woodworkers and Legitimacy: The IWA in Canada, 1937-1957." (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation. Simon Fraser University. July 1989): 46-50. During the war high demand and a depleted labour pool decreased transiency and made it difficult for bosses to fire workers, with no guarantee they would be able to replace men on their crew. Unionization came to the forest industry in 1943. After unionization, transiency was less necessary as well as less appealing to many workers and arbitrary firing was no longer an option for bosses. These combined forces ensured that companies were forced to deal with safety problems internally rather than exporting them through firing.

³ British Columbia. Report of the Royal Commission on the Workmen's Compensation Board (Victoria, BC: King's Printer, 1942): DD 176, 181; H. Allan Hunt, Peter S. Barth, and Michael J. Jeahy, "Worker's Compensation in British Columbia: An Administrative Inventory at a Time of Transition," Report prepared

Accident Prevention, then, was the choice to accept a controllable cost rather than risk the unpredictable expenses of a continued high accident rate.⁴

This dissertation traces the evolution of safety policy from 1943 to 1968.⁵ I focus on three companies: Comox Logging and Railway Company (CLR), BC Forest Products (BCFP), and Western Forest Industries (WFI). These companies share several characteristics that make them ideal for comparison. All three are located on Vancouver Island, British Columbia and operated at least one logging operation and one sawmill. These companies belonged to the same professional organizations, most notably the BC Loggers Association (BCLA) and the BC Lumber Manufacturers Association (BCLMA). All of these companies hired the industrial relations firm Forest Industrial Relations to manage their contract negotiations with the workers' union: the International Woodworkers of America (IWA). CLR, the oldest of these companies, was founded in

for Workmen's Compensation Board of British Columbia by W.E Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 1991, pp 111-115. <u>http://research.upjohn.org/reports/176</u> accessed 2 April 2017. The WCB Experience Rating system divided companies within a class into subclasses based on their accident frequency rate in preceding years. Each subclass paid into the shared pool from which accident compensation payouts were deducted at different rates. Companies with the highest accident rates were responsible for the largest payments to the Board. As logging companies varied greatly in size, both accident statistics and required payments were calculated as rates based on man hours worked (for accident rating) and total payroll (a percentage of which would be required to be paid to the Board). For a large company with hundreds of employees, the difference between being in one category and another could be thousands of dollars each year.

⁴ Alvin Finkel, *Social Policy and Practice in Canada: A History* (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 2006): 82-83. Finkel asserts that the risk of unpredictable costs from successful individual law suits was enough to motivate companies to press for provincial Compensation through the WCB despite the fact that companies rarely actually faced lawsuits which could lead to a large payout and ultimately paid more in set costs to protect against the unpredictable than they had before this legislation passed.

⁵ 1943 was a key year in forestry history because this is the year that the IWA achieved union recognition in the province. Unionization forced companies to face safety problems head on by making it much more difficult for managers to fire and demote workers. Unionization also reduced the transiency of workers, making an investment in safety more worthwhile for companies.

1910 and operated until 1985.⁶ The other two companies, WFI and BCFP were both founded in 1946 and were later subsumed under the umbrella of large, multinational corporations.⁷ Looking at the three in comparison allows me to draw conclusions about safety policy for the coastal British Columbian forest industry. However, while the experiences of these three companies can be generalized to other companies of similar size who held membership in the BCLA and BCLMA, they are not representative of every BC forestry company.

In 1941, 30 of an estimated 600-700 forestry companies in the province belonged to the BCLA.⁸ These thirty BCLA companies were responsible for more than half the production in the province and employed roughly half of the workers. These companies were considerably larger than their competition. They were also generally safer. In 1941 the 30 member companies accounted for 40% of the fatal accidents in the industry (23% of all recorded workplace fatalities in the province for that year).⁹ Following the completion of a Royal Commission on the Workmen's Compensation Act in 1942, the

⁶ Though Comox Logging and Railroad Company continued to operate into the 1980s, the archival record only covers into the early 1950s when the company closed its north island camps and focused its efforts around its Ladysmith operations. Richard Somerset Mackie, *Island Timber: A Social History of the Comox Logging Company, Vancouver Island* (Sono Nis Press, Victoria BC: 2000), 284.

⁷ Sue Baptie, *First Growth: The Story of British Columbia Forest Products Limited.* (Vancouver: British Columbia Forest Products Ltd, 1975): 282; Bill Gibson, *Rails to Roads and the Million Dollar Camp: The Story of Gordon River*, (Kaatza Station Museum and Archives, Lake Cowichan BC: 2010): 211-212; Patricia Marchak, *Green Gold The Forest Industry in British Columbia.* Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1983): 87, 100-106; "Scope and Content," Fonds PR-0125 - Western Forest Industries Ltd. Fonds, BC Archives, Victoria BC. <u>http://search-bcarchives.royalbcmuseum.bc.ca/western-forest-industries_fonds</u> accessed 2 April 2017; "Administrative History," Series MS-1333 - Western Forest Industries Ltd. Records, BC Archives. <u>http://search-bcarchives.royalbcmuseum.bc.ca/western-forest-industries-records</u> accessed 2 April 2017. There are conflicting accounts of exactly what happened to controlling interest in these companies. However, records for BCFP's Cowichan division end in 1968. WFI retained its name into the 1980s, despite ownership passing to Rayonier Canada in the late 1960s.

⁸ British Columbia. Report of the Royal Commission on the Workmen's Compensation Board (Victoria, BC: King's Printer, 1942): DD 178.

⁹ Report of the Royal Commission, 1942, DD 179.

BCLA member companies were given their own category within the experience rating system for the industry. This meant that companies belonging to the BCLA paid a smaller premium into the accident pool than non-member companies. Association members were also under pressure to ensure all member companies operated more safely than non-member operations from year to year to ensure continued privileged ratings.¹⁰

The choice to focus on the years between 1943 and 1968 was largely driven by the availability of sources. Records for BCFP end in 1968.¹¹ While WFI continued to operate into the 1980s, the absence of a suitable company for comparison made extending the study beyond 1968 problematic without adding a fourth company to the study. The temporal scope of this study allows for an examination of three significant phases in the development of an accident prevention regime in BC coastal forestry. In the war years and immediate postwar period, a dedication to creating safe workers rather than merely firing 'unsafe' workers led to a focus on education and regulation both from the WCB and from within companies themselves. By the 1950s, this focus on educating and regulating transformed into a focus on persuading workers to adhere to prescriptive ideas about what made a safe worker rather than following specific steps on the job. The 1950s saw the standardization of personal safety equipment (such as the hard hat). Companies also moved towards family-oriented camps and communities in this decade. This helped create loyalty to companies and gave management a measure of coercive power over

¹⁰ Report of the Royal Commission, 1942, DD 181.

¹¹ Sue Baptie, *First Growth: The Story of British Columbia Forest Products Limited* (Vancouver: British Columbia Forest Products, 1975): 14, 282. Controlling interest in BCFP changed in 1969. The records for BCFP's Cowichan Division which were salvaged by the Kaatza Station Museum and Archives in 1992 were recovered after the Fletcher Challenge Company acquired the buildings and logging rights that had formerly belonged to BCFP and do not extend past 1968.

workers whose families were wholly dependent on their employed male breadwinner. Finally, in the 1960s companies took steps to improve their control over safety by rationalizing the safe work process. Companies began working to Taylorize the forest industry in the early twentieth century. Taylorization is a scientific management process which seeks to standardize best practices to increase production efficiency and eliminate waste. In forestry, Taylorization came first in the form of technological changes and a strict division of labour. Each worker in the logging crew had a specific role to play in the great forestry machine. Technology standardized the way many of these roles had to be performed and allowed management stricter control over individual workers. From the beginning of white, European settler logging in British Columbia in the late eighteenth century up to the introduction of the steam engine in the early twentieth century, logging knowledge was passed from individual to individual informally. Over the course of the twentieth century, these processes too were standardized and passed gradually into company control as part of the Taylorization process. In the 1960s, safety itself became part of that broader rationalization of the forest industry. The safety programs in this decade included increased focus on supervision and punishment for failure to adhere to prescriptive policies.¹²

Silences in the archival record limited the extent to which this project can speak to the issue of race in the logging industry. Chapters One and Two include brief sections on racialized minorities in the industry, but the voice of non-white workers is largely absent

¹² Rajala, *Clearcutting the Pacific Rain Forest: Production, Science, and Regulation* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1998); Gordon Hak, *Capital and Labour in the British Columbia Forest Industry, 1934-74* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007).

from this project. However, it is important to note that the absence of these voices in this work should not be taken as an absence of non-white workers in the woods and mills. What records do exist, largely rosters of workers by name and hospital visit reports, indicate that both BCFP and WFI continued to employ a number of non-white, non-European workers into the late 1960s (and in the case of WFI, into the 1980s).¹³ Furthermore, the IWA officially pursued a policy of racial inclusion from as early as 1939, although the extent to which individual union members or leaders lived up to this policy is unclear. Roy Mah, one of the first Chinese organizers the union had, was heavily publicized to show racial tolerance. Mah was the founder of the Chinese language edition of the *BC Lumber Worker* in the 1940s.¹⁴ The union continued to emphasize racial equality through the 1940s, officially opposing racism and supporting the franchise for racialized workers.¹⁵ The limited record that does exist of non-white workers at these

¹³ Dick Bird to H. Hobson, 7 March 1949. KSMA 997.54: 1949, Dick Birds, 49; Marc Close to B. Whiles, 28 April 1949. KSMA 997.54: 1949, Dick Birds, 49; Dick Bird to H. Hobson, 25 April 1950. KSMA 997.54: 1950, R.E. Evans, 50; "WCB Expenditures – Nitnat, August 1949," KSMA 997.54: 1950, R.E. Evans, 50; "List of Employees Completing 5 Years Employment Without Compensable Accident as of May 1, 1956," Series MS-1333 - Western Forest Industries Ltd. records, BC Archives, box 88, file 23. (Hereafter BC MS-1333, box, file); "Notice Re: 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, and 30 Year Safe Service Awards," 31 May 1977, BC MS-133 88, 23; "Notice Re: 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, and 30 Year Safe Service Awards," 27 May 1975, BC MS-133 88, 23.

¹⁴. "J. Keon, Chinese Organizer, Assists Local 1-85 in APL." *British Columbia Lumber Worker* (hereafter, *BCLW*), 9 Aug 1943, p2; "Roy Mah New Organizer," *BCLW*, 17 April 1944. p1; "Roy Mah to Join Army." *BCLW*, 18 September 1944. p3; "Chinese Paper Appreciated." *BCLW*, 17 October 1944. p9; "Popular Chinese to Go Overseas." *BCLW*, 12 February 1945. p5; "Roy Mah Back from Overseas." *BCLW*, 11 March 1946. p4.

¹⁵ For the IWA public stance on equal pay for equal work: "East Indians Get Equal Pay Granted." *BCLW*, 25 January 1943. p2; "False Creek East Indians Join in Body," *BCLW*, 8 February 1943, p3; "Youbou Orientals Demand Equal Pay for Equal Work." *BCLW*, 8 March 1943. p3; "Wage Payments through 'Boss Chinamen' Illegal." *BCLW*, 17 March 1943. p3; "Youbou Union Gets Equal Pay for Equal Work." *BCLW*, 12 July 1943. p1; "Retroactive Pay for Chinese in Circle 'F." *BCLW*, 18 October 1943. p3; "All Orientals Join IWA Equal Pay Established." *BCLW*, 1 November 1943. p5; "Equal Work, Equal Pay," *BCLW*, 4 September 1944. p2; "Chinese Are Well Organized." *BCLW*, 24 September 1945. p5; "Win Chinese Appeal to Selective Service." *BCLW*, 14 January 1946. p4. For examples of union's stance on racialized workers more broadly: Nigel Morgan, "'Scapegoating' a Clever Fascist Trick." *BCLW*. 21 August 1944, p2; "Don't

three companies from 1943 through 1968 does not allow for concrete conclusions. Yet, it raises some potentially interesting challenges to the dominant historiography of race in $BC.^{16}$

In contrast to other industries, racial minorities in forestry did not work the most dangerous jobs. In the sawmill, racialized workers could hold the same positions as white workers. While in logging, the more dangerous (and highest paid) work was reserved for white workers. High riggers, the men whose job was to scale tall trees and attach cables and pulleys which would be used to move timber from one place to another, were the highest paid workers in most logging operations. High riggers were predominately of Nordic heritage, either immigrants themselves or descendants of immigrants. The racial makeup of other highly paid positions is not easy to discern from the historical record. However, the Chinese crew at BCFP's Caycuse camp were primarily responsible for the low skill, low pay, and low risk work of building roads and maintaining the rail line. Cooks and "flunkies' (the cook's helpers) were often, though not always, Chinese.¹⁷ The racialized division of labour, which placed the most dangerous jobs in white hands, ensured that the idealized masculinity among forestry workers was a white masculinity.

Swallow 'Hate Bait.'' *BCLW*, 4 December 1944. p2; Pearl S. Buck. "Insecurity-Discrimination Breeders of Hatred." *BCLW*. 23 April 1945.p3; "Discrimination Must End." *BCLW*, 13 August 1945. p2; "Minority Workers." *BCLW*, 24 September 1945. p2; "Discrimination Protested." *BCLW*, 24 September 1945. p6; "'Hand in Glove," *BCLW*, 10 March 1947, p4; "No Racism." *BCLW*, 21 July 1949. p4.

¹⁶ Gillian Creese, "Exclusion or Solidarity? Vancouver Workers Confront the 'Oriental Problem'" *BC Studies*, 80 (Winter 1988-89): 24-51; Audrey Kobayashi and Peter Jackson. "Japanese Canadians and the Racialization of Labour in the Britich Columbia Sawmill Industry." *BC Studies*, 103 (Fall 1994): 33-58; Patricia Roy, *The Oriental Question: consolidating a White Man's Province*. (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003); Roy, *A White Man's Province: British Columbia Politicians and Chinese and Japanese Immigrants, 1858-1914*. (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1989).

¹⁷ Baptie, *First Growth*, 144; Mackie, 142; Hallberg, *An Autobiography*, 76, 83; Eli and Eleanor La Fleur, A016, Aural History Collection, Campbell River Museum and Archives, Campbell River, BC (Hereafter, CRMA, Interview Tape Number); Martin Fossum, CRMA A163; Evans to Hobson, 13 June 1949, KSMA 997.54: 1949, Evans, 49.

The promotion of limited racial equality in the forest industry stemmed from both practical realities and the ideologies of union leaders. Logging camps and communities were small and isolated. This forced loggers into closer interaction with their neighbours and fellow workers than they might have experienced in a larger center. In addition, the difficulty the union had in organizing encouraged a broader definition of worker in order to successfully defeat the powerful lumber industry. Ideological reasons were also part of the equation. The IWA's early organizers were Communist and likely took some of their ideals from the Communist International. In 1920 the Comintern called for racial equality.¹⁸ In the late 1930s the IWA's early struggles for bargaining rights on the BC coast included calls for equal pay for equal work.¹⁹ The commitment to equality espoused by the IWA was in line with communist ideals. It also served the practical purpose of depriving employers of an easy pool of scab labour and stop racialized strike-breaking.²⁰ Finally, the way loggers defined their masculinity may also have played an important role in the apparent tolerance of racialized others. Any man, regardless of his skin colour, could achieve recognition if he embodied the traits of manliness. While this was more

¹⁸ V.I. Lenin, "Theses on the National and Colonial Question" Minutes of the Second Congress of the Communist International, Fifth Session 28 July 1920.

https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/2nd-congress/ch05.htm#v1-p177 accessed 31 March 2017; "The Black Question," Fourth Congress of the Communist International, 30 November 1922 https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/4th-congress/blacks.htm accessed 31 March 2017; Andy Parnaby, "'We'll Hang All Policemen from a Sour Apple Tree!': Class, Law, and the Politics of State Power in the Blubber Bay Strike of 1938-39." (unpublished Master's Thesis, Simon Fraser University, 1993), 47.

¹⁹ Parnaby, "Blubber Bay Strike" 40; "East Indians Get Equal Pay Granted," *BCLW*, 25 January 1943, p2; "False Creek East Indians Join in Body," *BCLW*, 8 February 1943, p3; "Youbou Orientals Demand Equal Pay for Equal Work," *BCLW*, 8 March 1943, p3; "Youbou Union Gets Equal Pay for Equal Work," *BCLW*, 12 July 1943, p1.

²⁰ Gillian Creese, "Exclusion or Solidarity? Vancouver Workers Confront the 'Oriental Problem,'" *BC Studies*, 80 (Winter 1988-89) 35-37; Audrey Kobayashi and Peter Jackson, "Japanese Canadians and the Racialization of Labour in the British Columbia Sawmill Industry," *BC Studies*, 103 (Fall 1994) 37; Parnaby, "Blubber Bay Strike" 48-50. Bosses were known for using racialized workers as strike-breakers. However, during the Blubber Bay strike, Chinese workers were vital in maintaining the IWA picket.

difficult for racialized workers because the highest paid and most dangerous jobs were typically given only to white men, there were opportunities for racialized workers to prove their masculinity through feats of strength or skill. Logging was dangerous and required bravery and skill, any man who logged therefore could earn the respect of other loggers.

The complete absence of Indigenous voices in the historical record for this period surprised me. The logging taking place at all three companies was on territory never ceded by the Coast Salish peoples. Yet, the only mention of indigenous persons at all in my research came from historical novels, not the documentary record left by companies or the union. This is an area which needs to be explored further in order to determine whether this absence is because of an earlier displacement (which meant logging companies in this period did not deal directly with conflicts over land or directly displace indigenous persons) or whether conflicts existed which did not make it into the preserved record. Insofar as Indigenous voices appear in the fiction written by Roderick Haig Brown and Jock Fairlie, it is the 'natural' connection of Indigenous persons to the woods and their role as guides for hunting loggers, not their claims to the land, their grievance against restrictive and racist government policies, or their role as fellow loggers which captured the writer's imagination.²¹

Despite the curious silences in the archival record, there is a small but robust body of literature exploring the history of BC's coastal forest industry through the lenses of social, environmental, and labour history. While individual works within this literature

²¹ Jock Fairlie, *Lumberjack* (Hodder & Stoughton, London UK: 1954); Roderick Haig-Brown, *Timber: A Novel of Pacific Coast Loggers* (William Morrow & Company, New York: 1942).

are impressive, the field as a whole has many questions still unexamined. Works by Sue Baptie, Gordon Hak, Patricia Marchak, and Richard Rajala have historicized many aspects of the industry including conservation, technological change, and the labour process, creating a strong base on which further studies into life and work in BC coastal logging can be constructed. Though my work does not explicitly build on any individual work, it would be impossible to zero in on safety and gender issues if these scholars had not already provided analysis of the broad trends of industrialization and government (non)intervention.²²

Accident prevention ultimately had the greatest impact on workers and their families, but as is often the case, the policies that guided accident prevention and safety in the industry were not shaped by those they most profoundly affected. The story of safety in the forest industry on Vancouver Island from 1943 to 1968, therefore, is not a social history. Nor is it a labour history. Though accident and fatality rates were a source of grave concern for unions and their members, ultimately, unions were ancillary to the safety regulations and policies created and enforced primarily by companies, but also by the Workmen's Compensation Board. A rich historiography helps to explain why unions were limited in their ability to bring change in this area. Tracing the broad history of Canadian labour in the twentieth century, both Irving Abella and Bryan Palmer delve briefly into the history of the IWA, showing how the BC chapter conformed to national

²² Sue Baptie, *First Growth: The Story of British Columbia Forest Products Limited.* (Vancouver: British Columbia Forest Products Ltd, 1975); Gordon Hak *Capital and Labour in the British Columbia Forest Industry, 1934-74.* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007); Patricia Marchak, *Green Gold: The Forest Industry in British Columbia.* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1983); Richard Rajala, *Clearcutting the Pacific Rain Forest: Production, Science, and Regulation.* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1998); Rajala, *The Legacy & the Challenge: a Century of the Forest Industry at Cowichan Lake.* (Victoria: Lake Cowichan Heritage Advisory Committee, 1993).

trends, but also some of the ways in which the BC chapter of the union managed to resist, at least for a time, broader pressures. In the 1940s unions across North America were significantly weakened by a struggle between Communist and non-Communist factions.²³ The International IWA officially cut its ties to the Communist Party in 1941. The BC Chapter, however, did not.²⁴

Like many other unions in the province and across the continent, the BC IWA was formed by Communist organizers.²⁵ BC IWA Chapter President, Harold Pritchett, was a Communist as were other key organizers including Hjalmar Bergren. Instead of following the International Union's party line, the BC IWA distanced itself from the International and refused to purge its Communist members. The 1943 strike that ultimately won the union recognition in BC was run with little assistance from the International.²⁶ These strong ties to communism among BC IWA leaders were a cause of tension for the union. Palmer notes that by 1944 criticism of Pritchett and other Communists in the union leadership was significant. For example, the union's "'no strike policy' was constantly

²³ Irving Abella, Nationalism, Communism, and Canadian Labour: The CIO, the Communist Party, and the Canadian Congress of Labour (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1973); Bryan Palmer, The Working-class Experience: The Rise and Reconstitution of Canadian Labour, 1800-1980 (Toronto: Butterworth & Co. Ltd., 1983); Craig Heron, The Canadian Labour Movement: A Short History (Toronto: James Lortimer & Company, 1996); Andrew Neufeld and Andrew Parnaby, The IWA in Canada: The Life and Times of an Industrial Union (Vancouver: IWA Canada / New Star Books, 2000); Jerry Lembcke, "The International Woodworkers of America in British Columbia, 1942-1951," Labour/Le Travail, 6 (Autumn 1980): 113-148.

²⁴ Abella, Nationalism, Communism, and Canadian Labour, 114.

²⁵ Gordon Hak, "Red Wages: Communists and the 1934 Vancouver Island Loggers Strike." *The Pacific Northwest Quarterly*, 80, 3 (July 1989): 82-90; Neufeld and Parnaby, *The IWA in Canada*; Lembcke, "The International Woodworkers of America in British Columbia, 1942-1951"; Myrtle Bergren, *Tough Timber: The Loggers of British Columbia – Their Story* (Toronto: Progress Books, 1967); Stephen Gray, "Woodworkers and Legitimacy: The IWA in Canada, 1937-1957" (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Simon Fraser University, 1989) <u>http://summit.sfu.ca/item/5561</u> accessed 31 March 2017; Andrew Parnaby, "What's Law Got to Do With It?: The IWA and the Politics of State Power in British Columbia, 1935-1939." *Labour/ Le Travail*, 44 (Fall 1999): 9-45.

²⁶ Abella, Nationalism, Communism, and Canadian Labour, 114-138.

held up to derision" as a sign that Communists put their political allegiance to the USSR over the wellbeing of the workers.²⁷

The tensions within the BC IWA came to a head in the fall of 1948. In a move that union organizer Dasklog would later call a "terrible mistake," a September 1948 *BCLW* article proposed a split with the international union.²⁸ A month later, Pritchett publicly announced his intention to split from the International and form a Canadian lumber union: the Woodworkers Industrial Union of Canada (WIUC).²⁹ For the next thirteen months, the IWA and the WIUC engaged in a bitter, divisive struggle for control of BC's coastal forest industry. Ultimately, companies and government bodies favoured the 'white' IWA over the 'red' WIUC. The WIUC was defeated by January 1950. This struggle caused the BC IWA to lose an entire bargaining year, as the struggle for their survival against the communist WIUC took precedence over gains for workers in 1949.³⁰

The bitter struggle between Communist and anti-Communist factions was not unique to the IWA, nor were the compromises forced on the victorious union in order to ensure its survival. In *The Canadian Labour Movement: A Short History* (1996), Craig Heron argues that the "postwar compromise" made by unions in the late 1940s ultimately damaged their ability to push for revolutionary change. While unions across the country gained the legal standing to bargain with employers over wages, hours of work, and

²⁷ Bryan Palmer, *The Working-Class Experience: The Rise and Reconstitution of Canadian Labour, 1800-1980* (Toronto: Butterworth & Co. Ltd., 1983): 246-247.

²⁸ Parnaby and Nuefeld, *Thee IWA in Canada*, 117; Abella, *Nationalism, Communism, and Canadian Labour*, 132.

²⁹ Abella, Nationalism, Communism, and Canadian Labour, 134.

³⁰ Abella, *Nationalism, Communism, and Canadian Labour,* 134-138; Parnaby and Neufeld, *The IWA in* Canada, 119; Palmer, *The Working-Class Experience,* 247. The IWA engaged in strike breaking at WIUC controlled camps and mills, weakening their ability to make gains for workers. Furthermore, the Labour Relations Board frequently refused to recognize the bargaining rights of the WIUC.

working conditions more broadly, they also had to agree to follow the contract once signed and to adhere to a formalized grievance procedure when there were problems with how the employer enacted the contract.³¹ The union's power was limited by both the structure of collective bargaining and the language of the contract itself. In the Employer's Rights article of the Master Agreement, management was guaranteed exclusive purview over "the management and operation of, and the direction and promotion of the working forces."³² This clause prohibited union's from interfering with the day to day operations of the company except in cases where the company violated another clause of the collective agreement or discriminated against an employee.³³

After the revolutionary fervor and political upheaval of the 1940s, the 1950s were a time of relative peace and prosperity in union-management relations. Both Heron and Palmer characterize the 1950s as "tranquil, even complacent."³⁴ Unions, having gained legal standing, were able to gain concessions (though not without hard fights at times) in wages and benefits for their members. British Columbia continued to be more militant than the rest of the country, accounting for 21% of all work days lost to strike action and 28% of large labour strikes over the course of the 1950s.³⁵ These moments of militancy

³¹ Heron, *The Canadian Labour Movement*, 77-84; Don Wells, "The Impact of the Postwar Compromise on Canadian Unionism: The formation of an Autoworker Local in the 1950s." *Labour / Le Travail* 36 (Fall 1995): 142-173.

³² "Master Agreement – 1950," KSMA 997.54: 1950, Union IWA 50.

³³ "In the Matter of an Arbitration Between Local 1-118, IWA and BC Forest Products Ltd., Victoria Sawmill Division and in the Matter of a Grievance of John Cooper," 1 April 1957, KSMA 997.54:1957 (2), Grievances 57; "Re: Mitt Sharma Arbitration" 24 June 1958, KSMA 997.54: 1958 (1), Grievances, 58; J.K Fairbairn to K.A. Hallberg, 31 July 1958, KSMA 997.54: 1958 (1), Grievances, 58; Caycuse – Cowichan to J.K Fairbairn, 15 January 1960, KSMA 997.54: 1960 (2), Grievances, 60.

³⁴ Heron, *The Canadian Labour Movement*, 87.

³⁵ Heron, *The Canadian Labour Movement*, 87; Palmer, *The Working-Class Experience*, 525-253. 1952 and 1959 were the most significant strike years in the decade. In those two years, BC workers accounted for 50-60% of the man-days lost nation-wide.

were met with increased legislation to restrict "'illegal' strikes and picketing."³⁶ However, the efficacy of the new legislation was put to the test in the late 1960s, as a younger workforce engaged in an increasing number of 'wildcat' strikes. The workforce of the 1960s had weaker loyalties to union leadership and faced increased instability as automation as well as an increasingly diverse workplace (due to the increased entry of immigrant workers and women into the workforce). ³⁷

This broad political and social context helps explain why unions were limited in their ability to drive meaningful change to workplace safety in forestry in the first 25 years after certification. While the IWA was successful in winning many important victories for workers, larger struggles for union security, wages, and job security (which all affected every worker in the union equally) took precedence over fighting to influence safety (which varied by job). As this dissertation will demonstrate, accident prevention in the forest industry was incredibly complex and defied simple solutions. The union played an important role in keeping pressure on companies to always seek improvements to their safety records. But direct influence on the direction or character of company accident prevention beyond this was out of reach for the IWA in this period.

Nearly all books about logging mention the dangers of the industry, but only one work exists which focuses on these dangers. That work is Andrew Mason Prouty's 1985 transnational study: *More Deadly than War: Pacific Coast Logging, 1827-1981*.³⁸ Prouty

³⁶ Palmer, *The Working Class Experience*, 253.

³⁷ Palmer, *The Working Class Experience*, 253, 255-257, 275-281. Heron, *The Canadian Labour Movement*, 90-94, 149.

³⁸ Arwen Mohun, "On the Frontier of *The Empire of Chance*: Statistics, Accidents, and Risk in Industrializing America." *Science in Context*, 18, 3 (2005) 347. Prouty means this title literally, but the phrase "More Deadly Than War" carries a second meaning as well. The safety movement which arose in

was a logger for many years and lost many friends to the industry. His book counts all of the lives lost to Pacific Coast forestry from 1827 to 1981. The results of Prouty's research are impressive. The count he compiles of all the lives lost to forestry makes a compelling argument for more stringent safety regulation in the woods, which was his ultimate goal in the project. In creating this work, Prouty relied very heavily on WCB records and his personal experiences to explain why these accidents occurred and who was to blame. Conducting my own research more than thirty years after Prouty, I had access to company records and union documents that were not available at the time of his research.³⁹ These company records form the bulk of my primary research material, and provide the lion's share of information about safety policies and procedures in the industry.

With the addition of these records (and my narrower focus in time and region), I am able to probe more deeply than was possible for Prouty. My work brings to light the relationship between safety policies and masculinity. This gendered angle differentiates this dissertation from the literature. My subjects are not just workers, bosses, union leaders, and owners. They are white men, with lived experiences shaped by interlocking hierarchies of race (though my subjects are almost exclusively white, that does not preclude them from having a racialized experience), class, and gender. By focusing on the relationship gender had with safety in particular, I have been able to look beyond

³⁹ Authority record, Fletcher Challenge Canada Limited. Cowichan/Nitinat Division,

the United States in the late nineteenth century adopted "more dangerous than war" as a slogan in the early twentieth century.

https://www.memorybc.ca/fletcher-challenge-canada-limited-cowichan-nitinat-division accessed 2 April 2017. The Fletcher-Challenge collection was not acquired until 1992; Custodial history of Western Forest Industries Fonds, http://search.bcarchives.gov.bc.ca/western-forest-industries-fonds;rad?sf_culture=en accessed 25 April 2017. The Western Forest Industries collection at the Provincial Archives were compiled between 1982 and 2013.

accidents and accident prevention rhetoric to see how the gendered ideal of a male breadwinner has been created, re-created, and enforced by white men in power over other white men in order to achieve specific goals. These goals include reduced accidents (and, indeed, that is the goal which will be most prominent in my study), but also improved public opinion, reduced attrition, and increased profitability.

This dissertation concentrates on management strategies to handle workplace accidents. While the shifting technological landscape is an important factor in the story of safety, I focus on what the primary documents refer to as the "human element" of safety. However, an understanding of the technological landscape is important in workplace safety and the union grievances which coloured labour relations throughout this period. Over the course of the twentieth century, management embraced technologies which streamline the harvesting process and brought greater efficiency and profit. The union and workers often resisted these changes. However, Richard Rajala's work demonstrates that there was little workers or the IWA could do to stop the encroachment of technology.⁴⁰

The first example of this resistance to technological changes among loggers came with the introduction of the steam engine (called a "steam donkey") to logging in the opening decades of the twentieth century. The steam donkey was a steam-powered barrel which wound and released a steel cable to pull or lift lumber. When high-lead logging was introduced, the steam donkey was used to raise logs above the ground to transport them to the landing and then another donkey would be used to lift the logs from the

⁴⁰ Rajala *Clearcutting the Pacific*, 20, 34. Rajala notes that worker refusal to work with steam engines and later power saws was never particularly effective in slowing down the technological development of the work.

landing onto waiting train cars and eventually, logging trucks. ⁴¹ Initially, many loggers refused to work with this new machinery and operators were forced to import workers who would.⁴² This new technology brought speed up to the woods, but also eliminated the skilled worker known as the teamster. The teamster's job was to care for, train, and drive the team of oxen or horses used to haul logs down the skid road to the landing. In the days before the steam engine, the teamster was the most important man in the woods. Without him and his team, there was no way to get felled timber out in order to process and sell it. Before the steam donkey, a teamster was so vital to the operation that when a teamster quit production could not continue until he was replaced. However, steam donkeys soon did away with the need for teamsters, leaving previously highly skilled workers to either retire or find a new position within the crew.⁴³ Instead of teamsters and a team of horses or oxen, crews needed spool tenders and engineers, none of whom could exert the same level of control over the work flow as teamsters.

On the heels of the steam donkey came a transition for most coastal logging operations from ground- to high-lead logging. Instead of pulling logs along the ground, high-lead logging used a series of pulleys (hereafter called rigging) to lift the timber first and then move it minimal contact with the ground. This type of logging required technical expertise, but it was superior in a number of ways. High-lead logging was much faster

⁴¹ Interested readers can see a steam donkey in action on Port Alberni's Heritage website

http://www.alberniheritage.com/steam-donkey or by visiting the McLean Mill in Port Alberni, a heritage site which continues to saw local wood using steam power. The steam donkey being demonstrated was built in 1929 and therefore does not suffer from some of the issues of the earlier models, but it gives a very good idea of that these engines were built for.

⁴² Richard A. Rajala, "The Forest as Factory: Technological Change and Worker Control in the West Coast Logging Industry, 1880-1930." *Labour/Le Travail*, 32 (Fall 1993), 90. The first steam donkey was introduced to the Pacific Northwest in 1906, but some companies did not acquire this equipment until 1920.

⁴³ Richard A. Rajala, *Clearcutting the Pacific Rain Forest: Production, Science, and Regulation.* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1998): 13-14.

than ground-lead logging, and removed some of the control of the process from human hands.⁴⁴ In *Clearcutting the Pacific Rainforest*, Richard Rajala argues that despite real cost savings brought with high-lead logging, "the fundamental advantage of these [highlead] systems lay in their capacity to restructure timber capital's relationship to the environment, and in consequence, with workers."45 Certainly, high-lead logging diminished somewhat the skill and attention needed from chokermen whose job was to attach logs to the rigging (using loops of wire called chokers). Whereas with ground-lead logging called for a "coordinated effort by the yarding crew" to bring each log to the landing because of the need to constantly reposition the chokers to avoid obstacles such as stumps, high-lead logging required that chokers be only set once.⁴⁶ High-lead yarding also allowed for the transportation of logs over a greater distance. While a series of steam donkeys could be used to slowly manoeuver a log from a point deep in the woods to the landing, this was a very slow and tedious process. The ability to yard logs over 2,000 feet using the high rigging system meant that companies could save on rail construction previously required to access deeper stands of timber. For operators, high-lead logging was the "solution to the yarding problem."⁴⁷ As Rajala explains:

In ground logging... an experienced crew working on level terrain might bring in an average of 30 logs per day, but the time actually consumed in yarding each log and returning the chokers to the woods was not over eight minutes per log. Only four hours a day, then, was actually devoted to yarding. Under the overhead system, however, no time was lost preparing yarding roads and swamping and the time consumed in placing and

⁴⁴ Rajala, *Clearcutting the Pacific*, 16. While skilled workers were still necessary to keep the mechanized show running, the teamster's personal connection with his team was no longer a factor. The skills needed to run the steam donkey were also more easily taught than those of the teamster.

⁴⁵ Rajala, *Clearcutting the Pacific*, 24.

⁴⁶ Rajala, "Forest as a Factory," 88, 93-95. Yarding is the term used for the process of moving logs from where they were cut to the landing.

⁴⁷ Rajala, "Forest and a Factory," 93, 95. Rajala argues that rather than technological advancements being necessary to overcome environmental obstacles, these changes were brought in to control the work process.

throwing lines in and out of lead blocks and in blocking logs away from obstructions is devoted to hauling logs. 48

With less time and money devoted to preparation, and very few reasons to stop partway through yarding a log, the entire process of transporting the log to the landing became much more efficient.

High-lead yarding saved more than time. Because logs were raised above obstacles, lines were less subject to sudden changes in pressure that would occur when a log struck an obstacle when being yarded along the ground. This meant that companies saved not only time, but money as their equipment lasted longer and lines were less likely to break.⁴⁹ High-lead yarding also saved money by eliminating some skilled positions and replacing them with cheaper, less skilled men. Some companies even fired experienced loggers who did not want to work with new equipment which undermined the skill of their positions.⁵⁰

When camps transformed to high-lead logging, the high rigger became king of the woods. The high rigger's job required technical skill, physical strength and agility, and a measure of recklessness. It also looked spectacular.⁵¹ High-lead logging required a tall, stable tree (called a spar) to which all of the rigging would be attached. Once a tree had been selected as the spar tree for a new side, the high rigger was dispatched to top the tree and secure the rigging before the logging crew could be sent out to begin work. ⁵² The job

⁴⁸ Rajala, "Forest as Factory," 95. "Swamping" was the term for clearing undergrowth and brush. This had to be done for ground-lead yarding as any obstructions would slow down the process and put extra strain on equipment.

⁴⁹ Rajala, *Clearcutting the Pacific*, 24.

⁵⁰ Rajala, "Forest as Factory," 96.

⁵¹ Rajala, *Clearcutting the Pacific*, 26-27.

⁵² Many logging companies had more than one crew working at a time. The area worked by a single crew could be called a side. Logging operations more generally in a company were often called a show. A

of a high rigger was to climb 100 to 200 feet up a chosen tree, taking off branches, and cutting the top off, leaving only a straight, solid trunk without branches to entangle the rigging. This denuded tree was the spar. Once the spar was prepared, the high rigger was also responsible for fixing the rigging to the tree. It was a dangerous job. The high rigger climbed the tree by connecting himself to a flipline and then bracing against the bark with caulk boots and metal spurs attached to his boots (known as climbing irons).⁵³ Losing grip on the rope or letting the line slip could result in a dangerous, even fatal, fall. Once the rigger made it to the top of the tree, he had to secure himself and then use a saw or axe to take the top off the tree. Taking the top off destabilized the tree, causing the trunk to "[whip] back and forth with sudden release," increasing the possibility of a logger injuring himself.⁵⁴ The risks taken by high riggers helped to solidify the image of high riggers as manly, brave, and skilled, but not all risks taken were necessary to completing the high rigger's job. In his autobiography, Ken Hallberg (who was a logger before he became superintendent for BC Forest Product's operation at Caycuse), included a 1927 picture "of Herman Anderson standing on top of a 180-foot spar tree... [as an] example of the reckless bravado of many loggers before safety programs were introduced."⁵⁵ High Riggers were well compensated for their risk taking. The position earned the highest hourly wage in the logging operation. However, fallers (the men responsible for cutting

logging show could have multiple sides if there was more than one crew logging in specific areas as part of the operation.

⁵³ A length of rope or chain wrapped around the tree trunk and connected to a rigger's belt, the flipline was used to support the logger's weight and to keep him from falling. As he walked up the tree trunk he would losen and tighten the rope to move it gradually up the tree.

⁵⁴ Bergren, *Tough Timber*, 62.

⁵⁵ Ken Hallberg, *Ken Hallberg an Autobiography*, (Self-Published, 2010) 65; Richard Rajala, *The Legacy* & *the Challenge: a Century of the Forest Industry at Cowichan Lake*. (Victoria, British Columbia: Lake Cowichan Heritage Advisory Committee, 1993) 32-34; Prouty, *More Deadly Than War*, 62-64.

down the timber) and buckers (who removed branches from felled timber and cut it into lengths) were paid a piecework bonus until 1972 and could out-earn a high rigger.⁵⁶

Skill and pay were two components of the highly gendered hierarchy among forestry workers which placed workers in high-risk, high-reward positions (like fallers and high riggers- who were predominantly white) above lower risk and lower pay workers.⁵⁷ Unfortunately, the literature on gender in forestry is still largely underdeveloped. The best example of a gendered analysis of forestry in the Canadian literature is Ian Radforth's Bushworkers and Bosses: Logging in Northern Ontario, 1900-1980. While Radforth's analysis of the labour process is impressive, his work with gender is less developed. He recognizes that workers' sense of masculinity was tightly knit to their work, and that bosses "tried to take advantage" of this fact; however, he tends to present worker masculinity as monolithic over the eighty years covered by his book.⁵⁸ Radforth's study brings forth the idea that skill is socially constructed. Though he does not connect the social construction of skill to the social construction of gender, his insights are invaluable in trying to untangle the complex interlocked hierarchies of skill, gender, race, and class among the loggers in my study. My work will build on this foundation to add a much-needed gendered perspective to our understanding of work in BC's woods and the mechanisms underlying the constructions of masculinities more

⁵⁶ Wilmer Gold, *Logging As It Was: A Pictorial History of Logging on Vancouver Island*. (Victoria: Morriss Publishing, 1985): 205.

⁵⁷ Baptie, *First Growth*, 144; Evans to Hobson, 13 June 1949, KSMA 997.54: 1949, Evans, 49. The racialized division of labour in logging was not absolute, as some companies employed only non-white workers. However, the companies in this study employed both white and non-white workers. Fallers, buckers, and high riggers were predominantly (probably exclusively – though there is not enough evidence to state this conclusively) white.

⁵⁸ Ian Radforth, *Bushworkers and Bosses: Logging in Northern Ontario, 1900-1980.* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987) 75.

broadly. As my study will demonstrate, gender was not only an integral facet of individual lived experiences for forestry workers: gendered ideals shaped and were shaped by company policies.

This dissertation's contributions to the scholarly literature extend beyond that of the forest industry. By examining the complex issue of safety through a gendered lens, this work contributes to a growing body of work on masculinity in Canadian history. The male breadwinner/female homemaker dichotomy that underlay much of the safety rhetoric throughout the period of this study is a phenomenon that has received considerable attention from Canadian historians. Scholars including Nancy Christie, Gillian Creese, Margaret Hillyard Little, Joy Parr, Lisa Pasolli, Ruth Roach Pierson, Robert Rutherdale, Eric Strikwerda, and Shirley Tillotson have examined the ways assumptions of male work and female dependence have shaped Canadian society, government policy, and workplace politics over the course of the twentieth century.⁵⁹ My work adds to this body of literature by examining the ways companies, unions, and government bodies used a discourse of masculinity to shape workers' behaviour.

⁵⁹ Nancy Christie, *Engendering the State: Family, Work, and Welfare in Canada.* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000); Gillian Creese, *Contracting Masculinity: Gender, Class, and Race in a White-Collar Union, 1944-1994.* (Don Mills, Ont. : Oxford University Press, 1999); Margaret Hillyard Little, "Claiming a Unique Place: The Introduction of Mothers' Pensions in BC." *BC Studies,* 105-106 (Spring/Summer 1995): 80-102; Joy Parr, . "Gender History and Historical Practice," *The Canadian Historical Review,* 76, 3 (September 1995): 354-376; Lisa Pasolli, "A Proper Independent Spirit': Working Mothers and the Vancouver City Crèche, 1909-20." *BC Studies,* 173, (Spring 2012): 69-95; Ruth Roach Pierson, . "Gender and the Unemployment Insurance Debates in Canada, 1934-1940." *Labour/Le Travail,* 25 (Spring 1990): 77-103; Robert Rutherdale, . "Fatherhood and the Social Construction of Memory: Breadwinning and Male Parenting on a Job Frontier, 1945-1966." In *Gender and History in Canada,* edited by Joy Parr and Mark Rosenfeld, 357-376.(Toronto: Copp Clark Ltd, 1996);Eric Strikwerda, "'Married Men Should, I Feel, Be Treated Differently': Work, Relief, and Unemployed Men on the Urban Canadian Prairie, 1929-32." *Left History* 12, 1 (Spring/Summer 2007): 30-51; and Shirley Tillotson, "The Family as Tax Dodge: Partnership, Individuality, and Gender in the Personal Income Tax Act, 1944 to 1970." *The Canadian Historical Review,* 90, 3 (September 2009): 391-425.

Discourse is not limited to words, written or spoken, but instead is a system of meaning which can be constituted in words, but also in things and in acts. Discourse analysis seeks to understand the social meaning of these things in order to both understand social relations and to emphasise the constructed nature of these relations. When it comes to gender, discourse analysis has been used to challenge the fixed meanings of categories such as "woman" and "man."60 As Judith Butler argues in her work on the performativity of gender, "gender is in no way a stable identity or locus of agency from which various acts proceed; rather, it is an identity tenuously constituted in time – an identity instituted through a stylized repetition of acts."⁶¹ These acts are carried out in order to gain acceptance from society and therefore actors can be thought of as selfconscious of the meaning society ascribes to these acts, even if they remain unconscious of the artificiality of the discourse the meaning is part of.⁶² Individuals and societies both create and are created by gender discourse. Change occurs when conflicting discourses collide and individuals are able to use competing discourses to shape their own identities and experiences. This dissertation uses some of the tools of discourse analysis to expose the gendered message in safety campaigns. The priorities of bosses, union leaders, and workers shaped the dominant discourse of idealized masculinity over the twenty-five years covered by this study.

The final body of literature this dissertation contributes to is a wide, disconnected body of work dedicated to understanding and explaining workplace hazards and accident

⁶⁰ Mariana Valverde, "Poststructuralist Gender Historians: Are We Those Names?" *Labour/Le Travail* 25 (Spring, 1990): 231.

⁶¹ Judith Butler, "Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory." *Theatre Journal*, 40, 4 (December, 1988):519.

⁶² Butler, "Performative Acts," 520, 525

prevention. Much of this literature has been created not by historians but social scientists and business scholars. In order to analyze the safety policies the companies in this study enacted, I have drawn on the work of a number of scholars whose primary concern was the development of policies and regulatory regimes in the western world in the late twentieth century. John Braithwaite's work on regulation of industries under capitalism has proven invaluable in my attempts to analyze, compare, and contrast accident prevention programs between companies and over time.

Braithwaite's 1985 book, *To Punish or Persuade: Enforcement of Coal Mine Safety*, offers a comprehensive policy analysis of the regulatory regime in the coal mining industry across five countries. Regulators in this industry tackled a set of problems very similar to those facing the WCB in British Columbia's logging industry. Based on a study of 39 mining disasters (a term which is defined as an incident which causes five or more deaths) from 1960 through to the early 1980s, Braithwaite outlines a model for 'regulated self-regulation,' which I have employed to help explain the interconnectivity of the three parties invested in BC forestry safety: the union, the government, and companies. Braithwaite proposes that the most efficient and effective way to regulate a dangerous industry such as coal mining is to reduce the amount of direct regulation to an enforceable minimum while creating an environment which rewards those companies which exceed this standard. Regulated self-regulation aims to avoid the problem of selective enforcement and dual standards within a single industry, while still seeking to push most
firms beyond the enforceable minimum standard.⁶³ This model has the advantage both of enforceability and flexibility: enforceable because the new minimum standard could be uniformly upheld by inspectors and flexible because firms' self-imposed standards could easily be adjusted to changing circumstances or objectives.⁶⁴

In health and safety regulation, an experience rating system creates incentive for companies to establish internal regulations and norms that extend far beyond the enforceable minimum standard. Experience rating works on the principle that the firms with the worst record in accident prevention should pay the most in compensation. Each year the WCB rated companies based on the total cost of the accidents in the preceding two years. This cost was used to determine the percentage of a company's payroll to be paid to the WCB for compensation premiums. Companies with a strong safety record paid a reduced rate while companies whose record was poor paid higher rates. Experience rating was intended to decrease the difficulty regulating the diverse forestry industry. Scaling rewards and punishments aimed to promote self-regulation by individual companies. The addition of a stakeholder (the union) to the regulator/regulated relationship, Braithwaite argues, can add accountability outside of the regulator's ability to catch and punish infractions.⁶⁵

⁶⁴Braithwaite, "The Essence of Responsive Regulation," 490-493; Judith Healy and John Braithwaite,

⁶³ John H. Braithwaite, *To Punish or Persuade: Enforcement of Coal Mine Safety* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985) 99-102, 182-183; Braithwaite, "Fasken Lecture: The Essence of Responsive Regulation." *UBC Law Review*, 44, 3 (2011): 480-490; Cynthia Estlund, *Regoverning the Workplace: From Self-Regulation to Co-Regulation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010) 20.

[&]quot;Designing Safer Health Care through Responsive Regulation." *MJA*, 184, 10 (15 May 2006): S56-S59. ⁶⁵ Braithwaite, "The Essence of Responsive Regulation" 480-490; Healy and Braithwaite, "Designing Safer Health Care through Responsive Regulation." S56-S57.

This dissertation will demonstrate that a model of regulated self-regulation (in everything but name) existed in BC's forest industry. The WCB acted to enforce a minimum standard across the entire industry, the union placed pressure on companies on behalf of workers, and companies, along with the professional organizations they belonged to, strove to maximize their profitability by exceeding the minimum standard set by the WCB. Of course, lived reality is never as neat as a theoretical model and none of these parties was able to perfectly fulfill their role in the tripartite safety regulation relationship. The WCB sometimes failed to uphold its own regulations, unions were limited in what they could demand of companies, and companies were not always focused on safety first. Braithwaite's model, then, helps explain and expose the links between company policies and the (in)actions of the WCB and the IWA. I trace such dynamics throughout the four chapters of this dissertation.

I begin my analysis by looking not at safety policy itself, but at the struggle that faced those who wished to unionize forestry workers in the late 1930s and early 1940s. Unionization was a necessary precursor to the development of a sustained safety effort in the industry. Chapter One explores some of the dangers of the forestry industry for workers, and the struggles faced by the union leaders who claimed only organization could save workers from those dangers. Loggers held a very precarious position in the decades before unionization. They were subject to the whim of supervisors who were free to fire workers at will. They also faced an increasing use of technology which displaced and deskilled workers, weakening their already tenuous power. When it came to on the job safety, there was really no effective mechanism to force unscrupulous bosses to pay attention to safety regulations. Yet, for loggers, unionization was not the obvious choice. Despite the many grievances workers had, organizers struggled for decades before finally gaining a toehold from which to build the support which finally led to union recognition in 1943. The first industry wide strike came in 1946. Though the union did not win everything it sought, the strike showed the solidarity of the men. It brought 10,000 new members into the International Woodworkers of America (IWA) fold, and overcame the Federal Government's post-war wage controls. In this chapter, I focus on the dangers of forestry and the transiency of the logging workforce in the decades before 1946. I also look at some of the challenges workers' transiency presented to companies and to unionization efforts. Transiency was linked both to an idea of militancy and to logger's masculinity. Loggers who chose to compromise in order to stay in one location were perceived by transient workers as less militant and less manly. Masculinity was not a set point, but loggers valued strength, daring, innovation, and, above all, independence. These traits can be seen in the actions and reactions of loggers, and in the stories they told.

Chapter Two focuses on safety in the 1940s. Early safety programs largely focused on mechanical fixes to problems, in line with the focus of the WCB. Though statistics from the decade show a decrease in accidents from 1943-1945, this was because of the decreased work force in the forests as Canada intensified its war effort rather than a sign that companies had solved their safety problems. The first accident prevention programs were very simple. Believing accidents have simple, rather than complex and systemic, causes, companies and the WCB aimed to train foremen in best practices. They

expected foremen to then ensure worker compliance with these practices. The WCB set the tone for most of the safety programs attempted in this time period. Like companies, the WCB had an overly simplified view of what caused accidents which left their plans inadequate. Two Royal Commissions in this period sought to make the WCB more effective in preventing accidents and to modify compensation awards to keep up with inflation. While companies largely looked to the WCB when forming their safety programs in this period, some companies attempted to go beyond the minimums set by the WCB and create internal safety programs aimed at improving their accident record and reducing bad publicity and WCB premiums.

Masculinity among loggers in the 1940s was largely the same as in the 1930s. However, transiency became less important to a masculine logger-worker identity throughout this period, as the union became more secure and camp conditions improved. Independence continued to play a significant role in how loggers understood themselves and their place within the workforce. Viewing themselves as independent, skilled workers, loggers continued to engage in risk taking behaviours and seeking innovative solutions to problems rather than working through company structures.

Chapter Three focuses on the second phase of accident prevention in the industry. By 1953, it was obvious to companies that focusing on training foremen and managers would not solve the safety problem. The expectation that these men could pass on safe practices informally on the job was never realized. Companies and Workmen's Compensation Board officials both saw individual workers as the primary reason for accidents. They began to target workers' carelessness, ignorance, or willful disobedience.

28

Surveillance and control of every individual worker at all times was not possible, at least not if the only ones doing the surveillance were foremen and managers. Reflecting this realization, safety programs in the 1950s targeted workers and their families. Large scale programs like Safety Week aimed to reach the worker's whole family. In the 1940s and before that time, companies had developed programs in exacting accordance with WCB regulations, but in the 1950s, this changed. Unlike the safety programs of the 1940s, the lager programs of the mid to late 1950s started in companies and professional organizations. This is not to say that the WCB had no role in inspiring these changes; certainly, the continuation of the experience rating program for forestry motivated companies to improve safety. The presence of the union was another motivating factor. The IWA had little to do with safety programs in this period apart from its contractually established role on camp safety committees, but the threat of a strike was always in the minds of management.

Company safety programs of the 1950s sought to change loggers themselves, not merely their behaviours. Management wanted workers who would adhere to safety regulations because they were personally motivated to do so. To achieve this, the company coopted the existing discourse of men as breadwinners. Safety programs appealed to men as heads-of-households responsible for dependents or as single men who might one day have dependents and who had a manly duty to help men with dependents provide. Companies also employed a more general discourse of responsibility to encourage men to take responsibility for their fellow workers. In this period, the IWA understood its role in workplace safety as that of educator and watchdog. Union members served on camp safety committees, the union newspaper, *BC Lumber Worker (BCLW)*, published articles about safety, but the union did not enact any independent programs to train workers in safe practice. Though the IWA wrote that workers should adhere to company safety standards, ongoing tension between the union and companies over wages, hours of work, and other non-safety issues undermined the message of solidarity in the BCLW's safety section.

In the final chapter, I focus on company safety efforts from 1960-1968. WFI and BCFP both took on a Taylorized approach to safety over the course of the 1960s. Accident prevention programs moved away from the creative, persuasive strategies of the 1950s and towards a regulatory, punitive model in line with a larger focus on regulating the work process and exerting control over workers. Workers' masculinity was still problematic for employers. New safety models which dictated step by step the "correct" way to perform each job can be understood as an attack on loggers' understanding of themselves as independently skilled workers. Workers who violated safety practices could be fired. The focus for foremen was on enforcing prescribed work flows rather than encouraging men to think about safety. Safety committees were given a larger role within this punitive structure and workers were encouraged to report on one another if there were any safety infractions.

This dissertation explores the way companies created a safety regime in the coastal forest industry in BC between 1943 and 1968. While the safety problem was far from solved in this period, companies made important strides towards accident prevention. These programs were shaped by tensions between humanitarian reasons to

promote safety and companies' desire for profit. Accident prevention also shaped and was shaped by ideas of masculinity. The masculinity prized by forestry workers, especially in the early decades of the industry, ran counter to company ideals. It, therefore, became vital to the success of company accident prevention to change not only worker behaviour, but workers' masculine identities. The four chapters that form the body of this dissertation will explore the ways companies reacted to and shaped these competing ideals in pursuit of improved workplace safety.

Chapter 1: Getting Organized

It took a global crisis to unionize British Columbia's forest industry. Before the Second World War, attempts to organize loggers and mill workers into a cohesive bargaining unit under a union banner failed due to internal fragmentation, overt hostility from companies, and a complete lack of support from the provincial or federal government for unionization. Workers were fiercely independent and often transient making them difficult to organize. Even when workers could be signed on to the union, union leaders disagreed over the best way to overcome company resistance and government indifference. WWII did not fundamentally change workers or bosses, but it created a strong market for coastal wood products which created an opportunity for workers to exert pressure on the provincial government to create legislation which would recognize unions and force companies to bargain.

Much of what the union sought to change for workers was related to wages and the living conditions of isolated logging operations, but the union also promised workers that organization would solve the high accident rate in the industry. Forestry was indisputably dangerous in the mid-twentieth century. For the union, this was the end result of greedy companies left unchecked. Ideally, unionization would allow the union, then, to force companies to adhere to rulings from the Workmen's Compensation Board, keep equipment in good repair, and bring an end to piecework pay and speedup. Logging and milling were dangerous. The union promised workers that if they organized, it would make every organized camp safe, ending both the needless death and disfigurement of workers, and their need to constantly move from camp to camp in search of better conditions.¹

Though wage increases and reduced work hours would ultimately be the lasting legacy of unionization, in the years immediately preceding successful unionization of the industry, the union consistently used the high accident rate as a reason workers needed to organize. Most issues of the union newspaper, the BC Lumber Worker, from 1939 through 1943 included a short article on the front page identifying the number of workers killed so far that year in large, bold font. Accompanying this statistic was a short article that summed up recent fatalities. Invariably, this article was a variation on the theme of unionize to stop the slaughter.² Some of the causes of accidents, such as speed up and piecework pay or faulty equipment, could be tackled by the union. However, the union's claim that organization would make the woods safe and end the death of loggers was at best naïve. While much work needed to be done in the 1940s to improve safety, simply organizing the workforce would not be enough. Harvesting timber and processing it into lumber was a process rife with hazards, some of which were beyond the control of even the most cautious, skilled, and well equipped worker. However, an examination of the logging process shows that there were other dangers which strong union pressure on companies for change could mitigate.

¹ "Itchy Feet," British Columbia Lumber Worker, 28 June 1943, p7.

² "Five More Loggers Killed: Death in the Woods Shows Alarming Increase," *British Columbia Lumber Worker* (Hereafter, *BCLW*), 25 April 1939, p1 ("See your camp delegate now. That [sic] out a card. Do your bit to help stop this wholesale murder!"); "Lumber Death Toll Increasing Daily," *BCLW*, 12 June 1939, p1; "Need Deathless Days Campaign," *BCLW*, 28 July 1939, p1; "Two Killed in First Week 1940," *BCLW*, 9 January 1940, p1; "Seventeen Killed Already this Year," *BCLW*, 6 March 1940, p1.

The harvesting of timber happened in three distinct phases: (1) falling and bucking, which consisted of cutting down trees, removing limbs, and cutting the trunk into standard lengths; (2) yarding, which was the process of moving those felled and bucked logs from the forest to the train or truck that transported them from the woods to the mill or shipyard; and finally, (3) processing, which is the process of transforming the raw logs into a salable product. Within each of these phases lay a number of specified jobs, each with specific hazards. In order to fully examine the problem of forestry safety, it is first important to have an understanding of these processes and some of the dangers inherent within. The following description of the logging and milling process.³

Fallers began the wood harvesting process.⁴ As early as the late 1930s, companies in BC's coastal forest industry employed two types of falling crews: hand sawyers, and power fallers. In 1937 the first power saw used on Vancouver Island. It was manufactured by the German company Stihl.⁵ Hand sawing remained the dominant falling method into the 1950s despite the increasing availability and use of power saws. Hand sawyers used long cross-cut saws in a two-man team. Early power saws also required two men. In the 1950s these began to be replaced by the one-man power saw that is more familiar to us

³ For a more comprehensive look at technological change over time and the process of logging and milling see Richard Rajala, *Clearcutting the Pacific Rain Forest: Production, Science, and Regulation.* Vancouver: UBC Press, 1998. For a discussion of woods safety and the impact of technological change on safety see Andrew Mason Prouty, *More Deadly than War: Pacific Coast Logging, 1827-1981.* New York: Garland Publishing Inc, 1985.

⁴ Before fallers lay axe to wood surveyors completed analysis and determined where to cut, and road or rail crews built the necessary transportation routes if they were not already in place. These jobs are outside of the analytical scope of this project, but were all completed before harvesting could begin.

⁵ Alvin Brown, A179, Aural History Collection, Campbell River Museum and Archives, Campbell River, BC (Hereafter, CRMA Interview Tape Number); Reo and Winnie Pendergast, CRMA A191. Reo Pendergast remembers Industrial engineers from Vancouver creating their own (improved) version of the power saw during the war when Stihl saws could not be acquired.

today. Fallers working on the pacific coast had to be aware of four key hazards at all times: slipping and falling while carrying a sharp blade or active power saw, being struck by falling branches from the trees around them, the tree they were falling coming down in an unanticipated direction, and the butt end of the felled tree kicking back and hitting them, even if it fell in the anticipated direction. The first two of these hazards could be, and were by the mid-1950s, minimized by safety equipment such as caulk boots that gave better traction on the often slippery forest floor, and hard hats that helped deflect the impact of falling objects.⁶ The second two hazards could only be mitigated by skill and experience, or by replacing workers with machines.

Falling the giant fir, cedar, hemlock, and spruce trees native to the pacific coast was not a simple matter of running a saw through the trunk and letting the tree fall where it may. Fallers made a series of calculated cuts that gave them control over the direction of the fall, allowing the most skilled to predict within a matter of feet the place the tree would land. Cutting corners in the falling process was extremely dangerous. For fallers paid a piecework pay bonus, however, the risk-reward payoff was very high. One of the riskiest practices they undertook involved placing undercuts in a line of trees and then falling one tree at an angle that would bring all of the trees in that line down with it. In modern terminology this is called "domino falling" and is strongly discouraged by the WCB. The danger in this method is not that the tree felled to push the others over will

⁶ Gold, *Logging As It Was: A Pictorial History of Logging on Vancouver Island*. (Victoria: Morriss Publishing, 1985): 195. The first hard hats appeared in the woods around 1938.

miss its target, but rather that one of the precut trees will fall unexpectedly before it can be taken down by the first tree in the line.⁷

Buckers were next in the harvesting process. They cut felled trees into standard lengths and removed branches. Like fallers, they needed to watch out for falling branches and maintain a secure footing to avoid a slip/fall injury. These workers faced two specific hazards. The first was because buckers and fallers worked simultaneously and in close proximity to each other. The existence of piecework pay and demands from bosses for speed up encouraged buckers to work as closely as possible to fallers. If a tree did not fall in the direction planned by the faller, or if the faller did not know where the bucker was working, the bucker could be struck by the falling tree. The variable terrain of the forest was the second major hazard for buckers. Felled trees could land on one another, or on uneven or unstable ground. The process of removing the branches from a tree and dividing it into lengths could unsettle the tree and buckers ran a constant risk of being pinned or crushed by a moving log. Skill and experience could mitigate these dangers, but did not eliminate them. A bucker's safety relied on his ability to determine the safest places to cut a felled tree and which tree should be cut first when there were several stacked together. But each tree and each patch of ground was different, so even the most skilled bucker could find himself in trouble. His ability to get out of the way quickly, therefore, was as important as his ability to assess the best places to cut. Proper safety equipment (caulk boots and hard hats) could protect buckers from some of the hazard

⁷ "Fallers' & Buckers' Handbook: Practical Methods for Falling and Bucking Timber Safely," (Vancouver, BC: WCB Publications, 1993)

http://faculty.forestry.ubc.ca/bendickson/FOPRLibrary/Library/Safe%20Work/WCB%20fallers_buckers.pd <u>f</u> accessed 31 March 2017.

they faced, but ultimately it was their skill, experience, and caution that best safeguarded them from accidents.

After fallers brought down trees and buckers divided the felled trees into timber, the yarding crew came in to move the timber from the forest floor onto trucks or trains for transport. By the 1930s most logging operations on British Columbia's coast used steam power, trains, and high rigging to extract timber from the woods.⁸ A typical logging show centered around the selection of a single tall, straight, sturdy tree selected near a proposed landing. This tree would become the spar tree, topped and rigged by a skilled worker known as the high rigger. The selection of a good spar tree was the first step in a successful and safe logging show. The rigging attached to the spar would have to bear the weight of a turn (load of logs) as it was yarded towards the landing or raised onto a train car.⁹ Chasers, hooktenders, loaders, and engineers all worked with the spar in the process of moving felled and bucked timber from the woods to the train cars, or logging truck beds, for transport.

Once the rigging was set up, the yarding crew would begin the process of extracting the felled and bucked timber. Under the direction of the hook tender (often shortened to 'hooker'), chokermen attached chokers (a loop of steel cable) or grapples (a heavy metal tong with serrated edges sometimes used in place of a choker) to the logs.

⁸ Richard Mackie, *Island Timber: A Social History of the Comox Logging Company, Vancouver Island*. (Victoria, BC: Sono Nis Press, 2000): 206-221, 284; Gold, *Logging As It Was*, 193-197; Richard Rajala, *Clearcutting the Pacific Rain Forest: Production, Science, and Regulation*. (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 1998): 7, 15.

⁹ Ken Hallberg, *Ken Hallberg: An Autobiography*, (Self-Published, 2010), 81-82; Wilmur Gold, *Logging as It Was: A Pictorial History of Logging on Vancouver Island* (Morriss Publishing, Victoria BC: 1985) 205-209; Richard Somerset Mackie, *Island Timber: A Social History of the Comox Logging Company, Vancouver Island* (Sono Nis Press, Victoria BC: 2000) 64-70; Andrew Macon Prouty, *More Deadly than War: Pacific Coast Logging, 1827-1981* (New York: Garland Publishing Inc, 1985) 55, 61-78.

Once they secured a turn, the engineer used the steam donkey (large steam powered engine used to turn the drums that spooled and unspooled the rigging lines) to bring the turn to the landing. At the landing, chasers unhooked the chokers and the whole process began again. Loading involved a similar process, with chokers or grapples used to lift timber from the landing to the truck or train bed and chokers unhooking the load.

A number of points in the yarding and loading processed could prove fatal to workers caught in the wrong place at the wrong time. Equipment, for example, was far from infallible. Even when everyone did what they were supposed to, lines could tangle, or equipment could break. The steel cables used to move timber were tightly strung and when they broke one just hoped they were not in the way. High Rigger Gordon Dodd told historian Wilmur Gold, "I once saw a 2" diameter skyline part in mid-air; when the two ends hit the forest floor, they coiled and recoiled away from each other at terrific speed, like two gigantic snakes writhing in death throes – luckily no one was hurt. An awesome sight."¹⁰ Often it was human vigilance that kept an equipment problem from becoming a serious accident. When Ken Hallberg became entangled in cables while being raised to move the skyline block on spar tree in 1940, it was the quick reaction of the signal man and engineer that kept him from being injured:

When I was about 150 feet up, the part of a steel spur that was on the outside of my ankle caught under a cable, I screamed as loud as I could and the man on the ground signalled the engineer to stop. This likely only took two seconds; but it seemed much longer because the big powerful machine was trying to pull my body away from my leg and ankle. This was the closest I ever came to having a serious accident while working high up in a tree. When I got back on the ground I thanked the signal man and engineer. The engineer said he noticed something was wrong even before he received the signal because the big steam engines had slowed.¹¹

¹⁰ Gold, *Logging as it* Was, 205.

¹¹ Hallberg, *Autobiography*, 82.

The quick actions of the engineer saved Hallberg's leg and perhaps his life.

Even with a skilled engineer and state of the art equipment, high-lead logging posed dangers. If the spar tree itself gave way the results could be calamitous. A poorly chosen spar tree could cause a catastrophic accident, or be at least a serious inconvenience. Ken Hallberg tells the following story about replacing a broken spar with a raised spar in 1938, fortunately before anyone could be hurt:

One day the spar tree cracked at the skidding block, but the guy lines held it together. A plan of action was developed. Cliff [Halberg's brother] and half the crew would remove most of the guy lines and blocks from the tree and from the stumps. He would leave the receding guy lines in place so they would be used to raise another spar. I would take the loading machine and lower the spar tree that we had left standing. The locomotive, which was waiting at the side, left and brought back a bull car which we used to move the loading machine. The tree was lowered and tied to two rail cars placed 50 feet apart. We were back logging by the end of the second day. The reason that the tree broke was likely because one or two of the guy lines was not tight enough. It was a costly error, but a lesson for me to remember.¹²

Yet, not all poorly chosen or poorly rigged spar trees could be replaced before an accident

occurred. A broken spar could mean anything from the spar tree alone toppling, to an

entire suspended load falling and rolling downhill at break-neck speed. In Roderick Haig

Brown's 1942 novel *Timber*, an experienced logger is killed working as a loader because

of a poorly chosen spar:

[Johnny] heard the hash rattle of the yarder as Mac opened the throttle to bring in another turn and looked up at the [spar] tree. He shouted at once, his voice quick and sharp: "Watch her." He was up on the balls of his feet, ready to move and he shouted again: "Get under the cars."

Out of the corner of his eye he had seen Mac and Bob and the firemen go down, but he still watched the tree. Two great chunks broken off by the whip-back were sharp and clear, broken ends jagged against the sky for a moment, well out from the track, then falling. He tried to see Alec, could not, and shouted to him: "Keep running, Alec, for God's sake." Then he saw the break below the buckle guys, so slow that the tree and rigging seemed as though they would hang there for ever. He dropped to the brow log and then threw himself down under a load. He felt the heavy jar as the big chunk hit the ground. Almost as it hit he was out again, standing on the brow log.

¹² Hallberg, *Autobiography*, 73.

At first he could not see Alec, only the hooktender and chokermen coming in, running along the skid road, jumping from log to log. Then he saw him, fifty or sixty feet beyond where the big log hung slanting in the tongs. In a moment he was beside him, feeling over his body for life or injury. He could tell nothing, only see that he was unconscious and that one of the smaller chunks from the top of the spar tree was across his thighs, pinning him down....The leverman lifted, gently, in one slow, even pull and the chunk swung away, its free end levering against the ground. Johnny pushed a chokerman out of the way and went to Alec. The hooktender was kneeling beside him and looked up. "He's dead," he said.... Then Mac started on the whistle, seven of them, long, slow and mournful in the sunlit air, sounding across the valley and down the hills.¹³

The tragedy of Alec's death is increased because the reader knows that a high rigger refused to rig the chosen spar because he knew it was bad. He had been fired only days before Alec's death.¹⁴ When his replacement rigged it, all the men were well aware that the spar was no good, but complaining would likely lead to the workers also being fired so they coped as best they could.¹⁵ Haig Brown's novel captures the reality that accidents in the woods could be caused by human error and poor judgement from management just as easily as from mechanical failure or the unpredictability of nature. Human error's ability to cause damage was often compounded by technology which sped up and automated so much of the logging process and by pay structures that rewarded workers in certain positions (usually falling and bucking) for cutting corners by paying workers per board foot rather than per hour. The union frequently blamed companies for accidents, citing poorly kept equipment, speed up, and the existence of piecework pay as the main causes.¹⁶

¹³ Roderick Haig-Brown. *Timber: A Novel of Pacific Coast Loggers*. (New York: William Morrow Company, 1942): 231-232.

¹⁴ Roderick Haig-Brown. *Timber*, 210.

¹⁵ Haig-Brown, *Timber*, 230, 233.

¹⁶ "Time Lost by Accidents Holds Up Lumber Production," *BCLW*, 31 January 1942, p 1; "Union Organization Will Help War Production," *BCLW*, 23 May 1942, p 4; "Record Death Toll Looms for Major Industry this Year," *BCLW*, 21 February 1940, p 3. While the union railed against speed up and piecework both before and after unionization, this rhetoric disappeared from 1942 to 1945 when the union dedicated itself to the war effort. During this period the union flipped its focus. No longer were accidents the result of

Yet, not all accidents could be wholly laid at the employer's door. Worker carelessness or inattention could lead to an accident even if all equipment was functioning perfectly. One logger, Owen Brown, was being lowered by a pass chain when the engineer on the engine failed to keep his foot on the break. Brown plummeted nearly fifty feet before the engineer noticed and "dogged the brake," stopping the fall. "[T]he effect on [Brown's] body... was as if he had been hanged. His spine took the shock, with five vertebrae dislocated. He spent most of the next two years in hospital."¹⁷ The error made lowering Brown demonstrates one of the potential problems of relying too extensively on technology. In order to do their job effectively, loggers had to trust the technology they worked with, even if they were well aware of the potential for operator error or mechanical failure. In another anecdote from Hallberg's autobiography, he tells the story of a rigger named Koski who suffered a career ending injury when he asked a fireman with no experience on the steam donkey to help him get up to change a line. Koski decided to try sitting on a branch threaded through the straw line rather than sitting in a chain on the pass line, as was the usual practice.¹⁸ The fireman did not apply the brake soon enough and Koski's branch was broken by the pulley, causing him to fall 30 feet. "He suffered severe injuries to his hip and lower spine and never logged again."¹⁹

Even with perfectly functioning equipment several dangers plagued workers in the yarding crew. Snapped cables were not the only hazards capable of inflicting severe

speedup, instead, accidents were the cause of slow down. Accidents in the woods were equated with injuries on the front line and measured in terms of production rather than human cost.

¹⁷ Myrtle Bergren, *Tough Timber: The Loggers of British Columbia – Their Story* (Toronto: Progress Books, 1967): 169.

 ¹⁸ The straw line is a lighter weight cable used to pull the larger cables such as the haulback line into place.
 ¹⁹ Hallberg, *Autobiography*, 65.

injuries. At times during the yarding process a cable might have enough slack to form a loop on the ground. This section of slackline, known as the bight, was incredibly dangerous. Foremen and safety posters frequently reminded loggers: "don't stand in the bight!"²⁰ With no warning these loops of slack cable could be pulled tight as the cable was put into use. Anyone caught inside the loop could be severely injured. In the words of Andrew Mason Prouty, author of the 1985 monograph *More Deadly Than War: Pacific Coast Logging, 1827-1981:* "Men caught in the bight of the line occasionally got cut in two. Or, depending on how they were hit, they went flying through the air, for all the world like human chunks, shattering on impact into a mess of broken bones."²¹ After chasers unhooked each turn of logs, the chokers or tongs were sent back to the chokermen. This was sometimes done by hand, but more frequently they used an automated wire known as the haul back line. If a worker was not paying attention or was standing too close to the line, he ran the risk of being struck by the choker or grapple on its return.

The hazards did not end when logs were loaded onto trains or trucks for transport. Truck drivers and train engineers often had to navigate steep grades with heavy loads, making train accidents common. Brakes could fail or trains could derail. Fortunately few workers were injured in these incidents, as the engineer usually had enough time to leap free before a crash occurred. Truck logging proved safer and more versatile than logging by train and by the 1960s logging trucks had wholly replaced logging trains. While trucks

²⁰ Safety Posters, Fletcher-Challenge Collection, 997.54, box, 1960, file Safety Posters, Kaatza Station Museum and Archives, Lake Cowichan, British Columbia. (hereafter, 997.54:box, file).

²¹ Prouty, *More Deadly Than War*, 95.

were not immune to accidents, they were belter able to handle steep grades. When a truck accident occurred, it was less severe than a train accident – at least in terms of profit loss for the company.²²

Trains and trucks brought logs from the woods to a log dump where they deposited their load into the lake or ocean where the logs would be sorted and gathered into groups known as booms. These booms could then be moved by tug boat from one place to another more cheaply than over land around the lake or down the coast from the logging site to the mill. Men who worked on the booms, sorting logs and separating logs out for processing wore special caulk boots to help them keep their grip on the slippery bark. They carried a spiked pole which they used to move the logs. Foremen and the WCB encouraged men working on the boom to wear "life belts" (personal floatation devices) as there was a significant danger of falling into the water and drowning. However, the WCB did not make life belts mandatory safety equipment until 1957.²³ Making equipment mandatory was not always a guarantee that workers would wear it. In 1967, Western Forest Industries (WFI) still struggled with workers' noncompliance with using this safety equipment. A memo from the personnel supervisor complained of workers modifying their lifejackets to make them more comfortable, or their wearing

 ²² Biss to Ways, 14 May 1943. Comox Logging and Railway Fonds, Courtenay and District Museum and Palaeontology Centre, Series 3A, box 17, file 5. (Hereafter CLR, series, box, file); "Estimate of Insurance Costs for 1939." Undated. CLR, 3A, 20, 1.; Accident Report, 10 March 1944. CLR, 3A, 20, 2; Accident Report, 20 October 1944. CLR, 3A, 20, 2; Accident Report, 11 April 1944. CLR, 3A, 20, 2; "Cost of repairing white truck," 7 November 1944. CLR, 3A, 20, 2; Comox Logging and Railway to Ways. 10 April 1940. CLR, 3A, 20, 2; Comox Logging and Railway to Ways, 19 March 1940. CLR, 3A, 20, 2.
 ²³ Accident Prevention Committee Meeting Minutes, 1957 October, p4. Series MS-1333 - Western Forest Industries Ltd. records, BC Archives, box 89, file 3. (Hereafter BC MS-1333, box, file); Prouty, *More Deadly than War*, 135; Though the WCB did not mandate this equipment until 1957, companies were already supplying the equipment to their workers by this point.

jackets with broken clips.²⁴ Yet, these workers were in danger of drowning even if they wore all of the required and recommended safety equipment. The logs in the boom were in constant motion and a worker who fell in could not always reach the surface again before the logs closed in over him. Awareness of fellow workers' position on the boom, as well as advancements in lifejacket technology could mitigate, but not eliminate, the risks of working on the booms.

The sawmills that processed timber into saleable lumber held their own dangers. Mill workers had to be wary of flying debris, and cautious when working with the heavy machinery and massive circular saws used to process the wood. Despite the facts that sawmill hazards were easier to regulate, and that sawmill accidents were rarely attributable to uncontrollable factors such as weather and terrain, eradicating sawmill accidents was almost as difficult as eliminating accidents from the woods. Carelessness caused or compounded by haste resulted in many accidents. Though their work more closely resembled a factory than a logging operation, sawmill workers shared the same hyper masculine culture as loggers, increasing the hazards of their work. The more settled nature of the workforce made mills easier ground for establishing union support than logging camps.²⁵

For workers in all parts of the timber industry, danger could come from equipment (broken, damaged, out-dated, or cheap), from management (overwork, speedup, poor management decisions, and poor conditions), or from their own or fellow workers'

²⁴ "To: Foremen of Departments Using Life Jackets," A.F. Irwin. Undated. BC MS-1333, 88, 6.

²⁵ Creese, "Exclusion or Solidarity," 26, 34-36 ; Gray, "Woodworkers and Legitimacy," 54-56; Hak, "Red Wages," 83, 88, 90; Prouty, 114-115. While close quarters and a relatively stable workforce made it easier for unions to sign on members at sawmills, this did not translate to an easier time gaining concessions or recognition from bosses.

behaviours (inattention, lack of skill, carelessness, or recklessness). Union promises of improved safety focused on the first two categories and largely dismissed the responsibility of workers for their own safety.²⁶ However, it is possible that this was due to the political expedience of focusing on problems that could be addressed (such as equipment, hours in a work week, and piecework pay) rather than on the less concrete problem of workers who took too many risks or who took jobs they might not be qualified to perform. Certainly the union focused on significant problems, but in order to address any of these challenges, the union first had to overcome the obstacle of worker at times proved reluctant to make compromises for a union that they did not trust to stay within their control, or to act in their long-term best interests.

Both fiction writing and newspaper reports from the 1940s addressed the ability of a union to promote forestry worker's interests and protect workers from the dangers of the industry. For example, in his 1942 novel *Timber*, Haig-Brown presents unionization as the only solution to the precarious situation of the worker, despite the misgivings characters have about its long-term efficacy. Haig-Brown lived in the northern Vancouver Island logging community of Campbell River, BC for most of his life. He worked as a logger before serving as a magistrate from 1941 to 1974. He had an intimate familiarity with local logging culture. Characters in *Timber* discuss unionization as the best way to

²⁶ "Logger Crushed to Death; Need Deathless Days Campaign." *BCLW*. 28 July 1939, p 1; "APL Accident Rate Very High, Claims Writer." *BCLW*, 23 August 1939, p 2; "Death Toll Reaches 48 in BC Woods; Five Dead Last Month." *BCLW*, 10 October 1939, p 1; "Lumber Takes Record Toll," *BCLW*, 12 December 1939, p 5; "Two Killed in First Two Weeks of 1940," *BCLW*, 9 January 1940, p 1; "Record Death Toll Looms for Major Industries This Year," *BCLW*, 21 February 1940, p 3; "Seventeen Killed Already this Year," *BCLW*, 6 March 1940, p 1

protect workers and improve safety in the camps.²⁷ Most articles in the union newspaper, the BC Lumber Worker (BCLW), before 1943 also presented unionization as a selfevident cure for forestry accidents. Articles that focused on hazards, accidents, and fatalities also called for organization, implying that unionization would solve the safety problem. Yet, the matter of how unionization would eradicate hazards was left unsaid. This absence did not go completely unchallenged by the readers. However, the response to the challenge from readers demonstrated that the editors and authors of the BCLW did not know how exactly unionization would cure their safety ills. The closest thing to an explanation came in a 12 July 1940 article that stated that unionization would bring "less fear of the boss, of the blacklist etc. [which] will cut down accidents."²⁸ While the claim that unionization could solve accidents was rhetorically useful, the lack of a practical plan to overcome mechanical and human causes of accidents would prove problematic in the decades following the 1943 unionization of the industry. As Chapter Two demonstrates, the certification of a union was only one piece in the complex puzzle of bringing safety to BC's coastal forest industry.

The precariousness of workers in the dangerous forest industry made unionization necessary, but it also made the process of organizing and certifying a union extremely difficult. Worker independence and reluctance to compromise by giving up their transience or agreeing to allow a 'foreign' union dictate their behaviour inadvertently assisted bossed who desired to keep the union out of their workplace. The difficulty in

²⁷ William Connor, "Roderick Haig-Brown" in Tracy Chevalier Ed. *Encyclopedia of the Essay* (London: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 1997), 373-374.

²⁸ "Criticism Leveled at Last Article on Safety Rules," BCLW, 12 July 1940, p 2.

organizing a transient workforce kept the union from growing significantly until the events of the Second World War forced the hands of both parties. While union presence was significant before the outbreak of war in 1939, the importance of logging to the war effort and the full employment that came with Canada's total war effort limited both the ability of workers to move from company to company, and of employers to fire workers for perceived offenses or union affiliations. The demand for timber for the war effort also gave workers and their chosen union power with the provincial government.²⁹ However, before discussing the eventual success of the union, it is important to understand the factors that delayed this success for so many years.

Logging crews had a notoriously fluid composition that lasted well into the 1940s. The frequently repeated truism was that there were always three logging crews, "one coming, one going, and one working."³⁰ For loggers, quitting was often their best, if not only, recourse if they were unhappy with camp conditions.³¹ Workers had many reasons for leaving camp. They might quit in protest of the boss, the food served at the cookhouse, or the living conditions in camp bunkhouses, working only until they could catch the next boat or train out. The *BC Lumber Worker*, a newspaper first published by the Lumber Workers' Industrial Union (LWIU) in 1932, published reports about camp

²⁹ Gray, "Woodworkers and Legitimacy," 54-56

³⁰ Bergren, *Tough Timber*, 23; Linda Carlson, *Company Towns of the Pacific Northwest*. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003): 11; Andrew Mason Prouty, *More Deadly Than War*, 27; Al Ludgren, *Many Flowers: A Logger's Story*, (Duncan: Self-Published, 2007), 21.

³¹ Because of the existence of a blacklist, workers who tried to create change from within the company were likely to be fired and barred from finding work at reputable operations. Quitting was, therefore, the best if not only option available for workers to change their lot without risking losing their livelihood.

conditions in its pages to help loggers determine where they wanted to go.³² The paper used the precariousness of loggers' situation to press the cause of unionization. For union organizers, their ability to convince loggers that their situation could only be fixed through unionization was something vital to their cause.³³ This meant that, while union leaders wanted to fix the very real problems workers faced, there was a logistical advantage to keeping workers focused on the specific problems the union could solve through organization. Consider the arguments forwarded by a union organizer when rallying workers in Lake Cowichan before an attempted strike in 1934:

...when you walk into these camps, you have nothing to say. You have nothing to say about the hours you should work, or the conditions you work under. You aren't allowed to read the BC Lumber Worker. You have no rights to read anything that isn't put forward by the boss. In other words, a man working in these camps, in the logging industry, you are not a man at all – you are a serf!³⁴

He and other organizers correctly pointed out the lack of real power that workers had at this time. Legislation, where it existed to protect workers, was weak and bodies like the Workmen's Compensation Board lacked the strength to enforce it. However, what union organizers did not (or chose not to) understand the ways in which this industry's instability were ideal for a certain type of worker. This is not to say that every worker would not have benefitted from a measure of control and a generous helping of safer,

³² "Safety Last," *BC Lumber Worker* (hereafter, *BCLW*), 31 October 1939, p 2; "Looking 'em Over," *BCLW*. 28 July 1939, p 1; "Conditions in Camp 6 Need Immediate Action," *BCLW*, 29 November 1941, p
2; The *BCLW* began as the LWIU paper, but was taken over by the International Woodworkers of America in the mid-1930s and is published by that union through the period covered by this study.

³³ "Logger Crushed to Death; Need Deathless Days Campaign." *BCLW*. 28 July 1939, p 1; "APL Accident Rate Very High, Claims Writer." *BCLW*, 23 August 1939, p 2; "Death Toll Reaches 48 in BC Woods; Five Dead Last Month." *BCLW*, 10 October 1939, p 1; "Lumber Takes Record Toll," *BCLW*, 12 December 1939, p 5; "Two Killed in First Two Weeks of 1940," *BCLW*, 9 January 1940, p 1; "Record Death Toll Looms for Major Industries This Year," *BCLW*, 21 February 1940, p 3; "Seventeen Killed Already this Year," *BCLW*, 6 March 1940, p 1; "Criticism Leveled at Last Article on Safety Rules," *BCLW*, 12 June 1940, p 2; "Worker Says Union Necessary for improvement in Safety Conditions," *BCLW*, 20 September 1941, p 6;

³⁴ Quoted in Bergren, *Tough Timber*, 34.

cleaner, nicer working and living conditions. But what can be interpreted as a precarious situation for workers also stood as a position of relative freedom for them, at least during periods of full employment. The freedom loggers prized in times of full employment could be problematic for all but the most skilled or best liked by management in times when the labour pool was larger than the demand for workers.³⁵

Many loggers valued their freedom and prided themselves on their independence and bravery. Myrtle Bergren, a journalist and wife of logger and union organizer Hjalmar Bergren, published a history of the International Woodworkers of America (IWA) in 1966. She based her book on a blend of personal experience, interviews with loggers and their families, and newspaper sources from key points in the union's history from the 1930s through the purge of the union's communist members (including her husband) in 1948.³⁶ One of the many colourful characters sprinkled throughout Bergren's book exemplifies the logger's freedom:

8-Day Wilson made his name by staying eight days at a job. When he worked at Hemmingsen's camp one year at the head of Lake Cowichan, he was yanking off his caulk boots one night and bragging that his eight days were up. 'I'll tell ya what I'll do,' he said to the boys, 'I'll throw my boot up in the air, and if it stays up I'll stay another eight days!' Spoofing heartily at the chances of this, he threw his boot up and it stuck in a

³⁵ Prouty, *More Deadly Than War*, 27-28; Ken Hallberg, *Autobiography*, 61, 70-72. Sawmill workers did not practice the same transiency as loggers. Mills were further spread than logging operations, and workers in these mills were usually housed in company towns or lived in their own accommodations rather than being shipped in and out of camps. This made these workers easier to organize, but also made it easier for bosses to undermine fledgling union activity by bringing in (often racialized) strike breakers. For more on the early unionization of sawmills see Audrey Kobayashi and Peter Jackson. "Japanese Canadians and the Racialization of Labour in the Britich Columbia Sawmill Industry." *BC Studies*, 103 (Fall 1994): 33-58. ³⁶ Bergren's husband was among the unionists who split from the union in 1948 to try and form the Woodworkers Industrial Union of Canada and Bergren is openly critical of the anti-Communist direction the union took in the late 1940s. The lack of consistent citations in Bergren's book make it difficult to verify where she obtained some of her information. However, treated carefully, Bergren offers some extremely valuable insights into the minds of union organizers and founding union members during the tumultuous years of union formation and up to the purge of communists from the union in 1948.

chimney hole and he was bound to stay. And when he went back to town he went on a spree twice as long and twice as good as usual.³⁷

Tales like this were told and retold among loggers. Tall tales provided entertainment for loggers and their families, and served to glorify specific traits such as strength, independence and bravery. Transience, for men like Wilson, could be a point of pride and a source of pleasure. Though Wilson's situation was not secure by any measure, his premeditated quitting gave him a sort of pseudo power over his bosses. While unionization offered many benefits, it also came at a cost. In order to organize and successfully agitate for union recognition, loggers like 8-Day Wilson needed to stay put. Once the union was in place, seniority's central role in determining promotion and lay-offs meant that loggers would have to give up their freedom to shift from camp to camp.³⁸

Yet, not all loggers were transient in the years before unionization. Those who stayed long term at a single company were often called the "home guard" or "stump ranchers." In the 1930s transient workers showed open distain for these men, who were typically married with families and homes in the area. In a particularly vicious letter published by the *BC Lumber Worker* on 18 August 1937 entitled "Get the Dope on This Madhouse," a Youbou logger accused the home guard of keeping the union out of their camp, implying that the company paid them more than workers who were willing to quit or advocate for the union:

It doesn't matter what you do [around] here, it's okay. The camp is filthy with all manner of bedbugs in the bunkhouses and no accommodations to wash or bath for the number of

³⁷ Bergren, *Tough Timber*, 18-19.

³⁸ Neufeld and Parnaby, 70. Compromises of this type were not limited to transient workers. Unionization across Canada required workers similarly to give up freedoms, or the possibility of freedoms, in exchange for guaranteed stabilities. For more on the compromises that came with unionization see Craig Heron, *The Canadian Labour Movement: A Short History* (Toronto: James Lortimer & Company, 1996): 77-80.

men here. The home guards carry [union membership] cards but when it comes to action they're not in camp.

There's lots of room here for real men and organizers. There's a guy they call Pinhead Mahoney; he's known as the greatest bullbucker³⁹ on the coast, but one look at that gink, and you could tell he understands all he knows about bullbucking.⁴⁰ At any rate, the home guards don't get scaled,⁴¹ they tell him how many million [feet of lumber produced] a day, whereby the fallers from town can only count in the thousands. If you don't believe it, come up and see for yourself.

Now boys, this is an easy place to make a few dollars but no management. There's a few big shots in here same as you find in most camps that are not properly run, who only bum on the skidroad⁴² when they are out of a job, the grub is rotten and the place is filthy, and as I have already stated, it's easy to make a few bucks if you're broke. Owing to so many home guards around here it's impossible to get a hundred percent union camp. You can try.⁴³

For the transient militant union supporter, or even the logger whose preferred lifestyle was a week of work for a weeklong binge in town, the home guard were unfathomable at best, and more likely understood as traitors. Certainly, this letter's author considered home guards as less than "real men." From the transient worker's perspective, their willingness to stomach poor conditions in order to pursue a stable life was tantamount to siding with the bosses in the exploitation of their fellow workers. The reality that there were tangible benefits beyond a stable home life for workers who chose to stay with a single operation for years on end either did not register, or did not matter, to workers who saw quitting almost as a duty.⁴⁴ It was this perceived betrayal of the militancy considered vital to a logger's identity that separated the home guard from transient workers. For

⁴⁰ The assertion that the bullbucker understand all he knows is meant as a condemnation. "Gink" is slang for idiot and the idiom "he understands all he knows" is meant to indicate that "he" knows very little.
⁴¹ Scaling was the process of measuring cut timber to determine the number of board feet. Fallers and

³⁹ Bullbucker was the term used for the foreman in charge of buckers and fallers in a camp.

buckers received piecework pay bonuses. The author is accusing the boss of accepting the homeguards' own estimate of their production, implying that the home guard's bonuses are artificially inflated.

 ⁴² Originally the skidroad was the stretch of ground logs were yarded over to get to the landing. But here the author is using the term as slang for the section of Vancouver where logging hiring offices were located.
 ⁴³ Quoted in Bergren, *Tough Timber*, 98.

⁴⁴ Prouty, *More Deadly than War*, 27, 44-46; Erin Kathleen Melvin, "Peripatetic to Domestic: Gender and Change in Logging Camps." Unpublished MA Thesis, Queen's University (1972): 109.

transient men, quitting, as the only source of power available, was almost synonymous with masculinity; therefore, men who refused to quit were not "real men."

Contrary to what transient workers believed about the importance of quitting to gain concessions from bosses, the constant fluctuation of labour in the industry actually hindered early union formation.⁴⁵ Ultimately, it was the "home guard" and not the militant transient logger who facilitated the growth of stable union support in logging camps. Men who had chosen not to move from camp to camp in order to live in married quarters or in their own home built on a "stump ranch,"⁴⁶ could provide a constant unionsympathetic presence in camps. They and their families often housed union organizers or provided them with food and other provisions, at times risking the wrath of their superintendent.⁴⁷ The home guard were also a more reliable source for organizing a camp than their ostensibly more militant transient brethren. Worker transience meant that an organizer could come and sign on a dozen workers one day, only to have all of them move on to other operations by his next visit. While this transience likely helped spread the union message, with card carrying members traveling almost as much as organizers, it also made it difficult to gather union dues or to gain a majority support in any one camp in order to strike for recognition.⁴⁸ Stability offered a stronger base from which to push for change in the industry. While working in a stable, experienced crew likely had a

⁴⁵ Neufeld and Parnaby, *The IWA in Canada*, 70. For more on the impact of transiency on union formation see: W. Peter Ward, "Class and Race in the Social Structure of British Columbia, 1870-1939." *BC Studies*, 45 (Spring 1980): 21; James R. Conley, "Frontier Labourers, Crafts in Crisis and the Western Labour Revolt: The Case of Vancouver, 1900-1919." *Labour / Le* Travail 23, (spring 1989): 14, 22.

⁴⁶ A stump ranch is the term given to logged off land that has been settled. While some settlers did convert the land to farms, removing stumps from logged off land is a monumental task. Many "stump ranches" were merely houses on company-owned, logged off land.

⁴⁷ Bergren, *Tough Timber*, 82-83, 142, 144.

⁴⁸ Hak, Capital and Labour, 67-68.

tangible impact on an individual logger's productivity. This stability also created the environment in which the beginnings of a safety culture could be created in the logging industry.

As we can see in the *Lumber Worker* letter, quitting served to reinforce a certain kind of masculinity prized among loggers. "Real men" were independent: they may have to sell their labour, but they would not allow themselves to be used in support of the 'tyranny' of bosses. The home guard then, from this perspective, could not be "real men" because they had made a compromise with the bosses. By choosing to stay long term at an operation, these loggers traded their freedom for stability, which often came in the form of a wife and a home.⁴⁹ There is no doubt that loggers pursued heterosexual liaisons and saw these as integral to their manliness, but the homosocial fraternity of loggers was the frontier on which the rugged logger carved out his identity through solidarity, skill, and feats of strengths and daring. Marrying and settling down in a camp may have been seen as a betrayal of the fraternity, even if it in no way diminished a logger's abilities and likely provided him with opportunities to increase his technical skills and overall productivity.⁵⁰ Solidarity was not solely about common goals of unionization and

⁴⁹ Melvin, "Peripatetic to Domestic," 6, 101, 117.

⁵⁰ The author accused camp scalers of not measuring the output of the home guard. He believed that the home guard at Youbou were being paid for as much timber as they claimed to have cut, regardless of actual output, and, understandably, thought this practice was unfair. However, it is more likely that the home guard at Youbou were simply able to bring in more timber than newer, less stable workers. The scaler's job was to calculate the number of board feet brought in by each crew. Piecework pay was based on the scaler's assessment of the crew's work. The letter writer's accusation that "the home guards don't get scaled" is a reference to the role of the scaler's assessment on workers' pay. The writer appears to have noticed that the 'home guard' make more money than other workers and assumes this is because they have some kind of deal with the company which ensures they will be paid for more lumber than they actually bring in. There is no evidence that such deals existed, or any reason to believe they did. Rather, the home guard were at an advantage when it came to felling and bringing in timber; they worked long term in the same terrain, with the same equipment, and the same partners. While mistakes and accidents still occurred, crews working

improved conditions; for loggers who used quitting as their means of exerting power, solidarity meant never giving their boss a chance to gain advantage over them by staying put too long.⁵¹ Transient loggers' rugged, independent masculinity made them reluctant to make the compromises necessary for successful organization. Thus, in the interwar years, the most militant workers were not necessarily the ones whose commitment and effort would enable a lumber union to gain recognition.⁵²

The other side of the constant motion in the forest industry lay in the boss' power to fire indiscriminately and to use a blacklist to prevent known union men from gaining employment in his camp or any other.⁵³ The constant need to bring in workers meant that most companies worked with recruiting offices. The BC Logger's Association recruiting office in Vancouver was the largest and most influential of these offices. This association, a professional organization of logging companies of which all the companies in my study were members, opened this office in 1920.⁵⁴ On the surface, recruiting offices provided

together over an extended period understood each other's strengths and weaknesses, were familiar with the terrain, and knew the equipment they worked with. With the exception of fallers' and buckers' saws, which were owned by the men themselves, most of the equipment at an operation belonged to the company. Understanding the quirks of each machine and the limitations of each crew member likely helped to speed up the extraction process. Stability, thus, helped loggers to produce more lumber. This benefitted the company as well as the worker and, while the resentment the letter-writer felt at other loggers receiving higher pay is understandable, his assumption that the difference in pay was due to unfair advantage given by scalers to the home guard is likely false.

⁵¹ Melvin, "Peripatetic to Domestic," 109.

⁵² Bergren, *Tough Timber*, 98.

⁵³ Richard A. Rajala, "Bill and the Boss: Labor Protest, Technological Change, and the Transformation of the West Coast Logging Camp, 1890-1930." *Journal of Forest History*, 33, 4 (October 1989), 173; Gordon Hak "British Columbia Loggers and the Lumber Workers Industrial Union, 1919-1922." *Labour/Le Travail*, 23 (Spring 1989), 85.

⁵⁴ Rajala, "Bill and the Boss," 173. Gordon Hak dates the opening of this agency in the fall of 1919. (Hak, "BC Loggers," 85). All of the companies in my study are members of the BC Logger's Association. Membership in the association was voluntary and many small, owner-operator companies did not choose to join. In 1940 there were 30 companies in the province who were members of the BCLA and approximately 650 who were not. The 30 Association companies were responsible for half the province's production. British Columbia. Report of the Royal Commission on the Workmen's Compensation Board (Victoria, BC:

an efficient solution to logging camp's labour needs. The BC Logger's Association office placed approximately 75% of loggers hired across the coast during its first few years of operation.⁵⁵ However, these offices were much more than simply a place where qualified workers could find out what jobs were on offer and receive their marching orders. Instead, they enforced the open shop policy of logging companies on the coast by maintaining and strictly adhering to the Association's blacklist.⁵⁶ Because of the large share of the job market controlled by BC Logger's Association, any worker whose name ended up on its blacklist became largely unemployable.⁵⁷

The blacklist aimed to maintain open shops at forestry operations. However, no proof of union affiliation was required to blacklist a worker. Any worker collective action attempting to improve their situation or protest a poor situation could result in men being blacklisted. The blacklist constrained even the small power workers gained from quitting. Workers could choose not to return to camp from leave with minimal repercussions, but a worker who left the company short mid-week or who left on poor terms could find it difficult to find new employment. In terms of workplace safety, the blacklist likely enforced the idea that while in camp, workers were at the mercy of the boss. Refusal to work in unsafe conditions or with unsafe equipment could result in a worker being fired and blacklisted. Not all logging companies hired through the BCLA hiring agency, but

King's Printer, 1942). These smaller, non-Association companies have not been included in the current study because of their small size and often short duration.

⁵⁵ Hak, "BC Loggers," 85.

⁵⁶ Rajala, "Bill and the Boss," 173; Hak "BC Loggers," 85.

⁵⁷ Bergren, *Tough Timber*, 54. Bergren does point out that loggers could and sometimes did assume a false name in order to get work once on the blacklist, but those unwilling to engage in this practice "found it difficult or impossible to get a job."

those companies that did not were more likely to be small, 'haywire,' operations.⁵⁸ In order to stay employable at larger, more technologically up to date operations which were more likely to have proper equipment and adequate accommodations, workers needed to keep themselves off the blacklist.

Myrtle Bergren's husband, Hjalmar, was among those loggers blacklisted for union-related activities following a 1934 strike attempt, one of the key issues of which had been a call for union recognition in order to help destroy the blacklist.⁵⁹ After he was blacklisted, Hjalmar Bergren changed his name and got a job at Campbell River Timber, which belonged to the BC Logger's Association. Its camp superintendent, Hank Phelan, was strongly anti-union. In the few months he worked there, Bergren was nearly fired again for rousing the men to meet union organizers who had some into the camp to talk to them.⁶⁰ When the camp shut down for fire season, Bergren was unable to get back on. Unable to find logging work, he began to work full-time as a union organizer, travelling from camp to camp to talk to men about the union and to sign up new members.⁶¹ The blacklist epitomized the power of the bosses in the same way that quitting was integral to worker independence. In order to get rid of the former, loggers had to sacrifice the latter (at least as a regular practice for most workers). A union could not be built upon workers who were constantly on the move. Sacrificing transiency encompassed more than workers

⁵⁸ The BCLA companies were significantly larger than their competitors. Large companies could generally afford to make the investment required to keep equipment up to date. Small operations rarely had the latest equipment and may not be able to afford necessary repairs. These factors in addition to the fact that these places attracted a lesser calibre of worker because they rarely offered appealing living conditions contributed to the impact of the blacklist.

⁵⁹ Myrtle Bergren, *Tough Timber*, 54. Gordon Hak, "Red Wages: Communists and the 1934 Vancouver Island Loggers Strike." *The Pacific Northwest Quarterly*, 80, 3 (July 1989): 85; Hak, *Capital and Labour*, 69.

⁶⁰ Bergren, *Tough Timber*, 55.

⁶¹ Bergren, *Tough Timber*, 55-57.

giving up their freedom to quit. They had to compromise in their work process and accept the gradual encroachment of technology, which wrested control from skilled workers and transformed the forest into a factory⁶².

Unionization required more than militancy: it required compromise. A union recognized by the companies with rights to collective bargaining would offer employees a measure of security and power to control their situation, at least as far as their condition could be negotiated into a contract. However, once unionized, workers would be required to sacrifice their individual freedoms for a greater good. Unions aimed to protect all workers, which meant that, by default, they protected the weak as well as the strong. Tenure lay as a central tenant in union-secured job security. A worker who had been on the job longer than a fellow worker in the same or similar position was to be promoted first and laid off last.⁶³ While this system was clearly better for workers as a whole than the fire-at-will policy most companies followed without a union, it was not perfect. Nepotistic hiring and promoting as well as firing and promotion based on a boss' personal preferences created a precarious work situation for workers outside of union protection.⁶⁴ Loggers feared being fired if they voiced complaints or concerns about safety or working conditions. If the union had enough clout, it could eliminate this fear by protecting workers from arbitrary firing, and by eliminating the blacklist which kept some fired

 ⁶² Rajala, *Clearcutting the Pacific Rain Forest*, 7-50; Heron, *The Canadian Labour Movement*, 75-84;
 Palmer, *Working-Class Experience*, 238-255. The compromise made by workers to gain a union would lead to further compromises through the 1950s as unions were forced to sacrifice militancy for legitimacy.
 ⁶³ Roger I Abrams and Dennis R. Nolan, "Seniority Rights Under the Collective Agreement," *The Labor Lawyer*, 2, 1 (Winter 1986), 99, 101-102.

⁶⁴ Ludgren, *Many Flowers*, 21;

loggers from finding logging work.⁶⁵ However, the flip side of seniority was that skill and other personal factors such as how well a worker got along with his fellow workers, foremen, or boss would now come second to seniority in determining layoffs and promotions. While this put workers on steadier ground, it also resulted in conflict when a skilled worker was passed over for someone more senior.⁶⁶

If the union gained recognition and required that seniority be used as the primary determinant in promotions and lay-offs, loggers who regularly changed camps or who quit whenever they wanted an extra break in town would find themselves always the last to be promoted and the first to be laid off.⁶⁷ Being the lowest on the seniority ladder could mean that a logger worked several weeks less each year than others. Logging work was largely seasonal. Camps shut down in the summer when fire hazards precluded logging and at times were shut down in the winter months when there was too much snow to allow work to continue. When camps shut down all but a few necessary personnel were laid off and seniority determined who would be brought back on when operations resumed.⁶⁸ There was some work to be had in these off seasons, but it was limited. Off-season jobs, such as fighting fires, typically paid less than loggers' usual work and could

⁶⁵ "Criticism Leveled at Last Article of Safety Rules," *BCLW*, 12 June 1940, p 2; Hak, *Capital and Labour*, 69-70; Gold, *Logging as It Was*, 194.

⁶⁶ For example see: "Davidson Case," 8 December 1958, attachment to "Notes on the Meeting with Union on the Davidson Case." BC MS-1333, 99, 20; Minutes of Meeting with Camp Committee, 21 March 1960. KSMA 997.54: 1960, 2, Grievances.

⁶⁷ Abrams and Nolan, 99, 101-102;

⁶⁸ BCFP.1956.2.Grievances. Majority Award in Arbitration between Local 1-71, IWA and Canadian Forest Products, 20 April 1956, 1-2; BCFP. 997.54, 1942-1947, teletype messages, 47; BCFP. 997.54, 1948, Union IWA, 48. J.K. McRae and DB McLeod, "Report and Decision of the Board", August 1949, p3; BCFP. 997.54, 1948, Union IWA, 48. JM Billings, "To All Subscribers,"17 November 1949, p2 of attachment.

be just as difficult and dangerous.⁶⁹ Unionization would improve loggers' and mill workers' situation in many ways and help to ensure that they could count on having work at the end of a seasonal shut down, but it would mean the end to the transience that had characterized the industry for decades.

Regardless of loggers' awareness of their own situational precarity, their willingness to compromise, or the promises made by union organizers about transforming the worker's plight, getting loggers to actually sign on to a union was a challenging task. A number of logistical obstacles faced early organizers, from the isolation of logging camps and the hostility of bosses, to internal fragmentation within the union ranks and the rugged individualism of the men they wished to organize.⁷⁰ Individualism was most dramatically embodied in quitting, but it went far beyond transience. Unionization was a collective endeavour. It required loggers to work together, at times sacrificing their own wants or needs for others. This would be an issue in the initial decades of organization, and one that reasserted itself with each contract negotiation. While issues like food quality and bunkhouse cleanliness benefitted most employees in a camp, other issues that would be negotiated were specific to one or more positions rather than to an entire crew. Sticking to the contract might also mean that an individual logger would have to accept that he could not receive a promotion he felt he deserved on merit because he was not the most senior man in his position.⁷¹ At times gaining benefit for a majority of workers came

⁶⁹ Eli and Eleanor La Fleur, A016, Aural History Collection, Campbell River Museum and Archives, Campbell River, BC (Hereafter, CRMA Interview Tape Number).

⁷⁰ Bergren, 82-83, 102; Gold, 194; Baptie, 68, 98, 110, 156-157.

⁷¹ Abrams and Nolan, "Seniority Rights," 126.

at the expense of an entire section of the workforce.⁷² The celebrated independence of the logger, embodied in the mythical figure of Paul Bunyan, was fundamentally at odds with this reality.

The myth of Paul Bunyan started in the east, in the woods of Quebec and Michigan, but the famous folklore hero and his blue ox were important fixtures in Pacific logging culture as well.⁷³ Laurence Rogers asserts that Paul Bunyan gained popularity in the late 1880s because the exploited and beleaguered migrant workers who populated eastern logging camps "needed a symbol of strength, a larger-than-life hero to help them cope with their cruel world."⁷⁴ Rogers debunked the idea that the mythical Paul Bunyan was a figment of imagination alone; Rogers believed instead that Bunyan was based on a

⁷² As happened in 1972 when the IWA membership voted to accept a contract which fallers and buckers were unhappy enough with to engage in a wildcat strike that lasted more than 6 weeks. R.M. Bibbs to J.C. Hemmingsen, "FIR - IWA," 19 April 1972. MacMillan Bloedel Limited Fonds, D.W. Timmins Corporate Papers, University of British Columbia Archives, Vancouver, box 807, file 22. (Hereafter M&B D.W. Timmins, box, file); J.R. Forrest to All employees, 21 April 1972, M&B D.W. Timmins, 807, 22; R.M. Bibbs to R.W. Bonner. 1 May 1972. M&B D.W. Timmins, 807, 22; J.R. Forrest to All Employees. 4 May 1972, M&B D.W. Timmins, 807, 22; G.J. Towill to R.W. Bonner. "Fallers' Saw Rentals - Courtney Area" 1 August 1972, M&B D.W. Timmins, 807, 22; H.R. Chisholm to All MacMillan Bloedel Fallers. 28 July 1972, M&B D.W. Timmins, 807, 22; J.R. Forrest to all Port Alberni Employees, Building Material Group. 27 July 1972, M&B D.W. Timmins, 807, 22; J.R. Timmins, 807, 22; J.R. Forrest to all Port Alberni Employees, Building Material Group. 27 July 1972, M&B D.W. Timmins, 807, 22; J.R. Timmins, 807, 22; J.R. Forrest to R.W. Bonner to R.W. Bonner. 9 Aug 1972, M&B D.W. Timmins, 807, 22; R.M. Bibbs to R.W. Bonner. "Fallers" 14 August 1972, M&B D.W. Timmins, 807, 22; M.R. Bibbs to R.W. Bonner. "Fallers" 14 August 1972, M&B D.W. Timmins, 807, 22; R.M.

⁷³ Advertisement for Bethlehem, Steel, *Loggers Handbook (LH)*, 1948, p 61; "Anyone We Know?" *LH*, 1956, 36-37; Advertisement for One Stop Source for Trucker's Brake and Trailer Parts," *LH*, 1974, p 96; "New Blue Ox Slide Action Compression Brake," *LH*, 1976, 43; Richard M. Dorson, "Paul Bunyan in the News, 1939-1941 (Part III)," *Western Folklore*, 15, 4 (October 1956) 247-261. The ubiquity of Paul Bunyan in advertisements and newspaper articles tells us that the image of Paul Bunyan was familiar to loggers and the general public, so familiar that the mere mention of his name or the use of his image was expected to evoke a specific set of values and traits. Even after companies and professional organizations carried out their active attempts to dissociate their industry from Bunyan's image in the 1950s, advertisers continued to use the images of Bunyan and Babe to promote these traits and values.

⁷⁴ Dorson, "Paul Bunyan (Part III)," 252-253; Dan Hoffman, "Folk Tales of Paul Bunyan: Themes, Structure, Style, Sources," *Western Folklore*, 9, 4 (October 1950), 305-306. Hoffman also notes that Bunyan myths created an opportunity for loggers to laugh at their own plight be repackaging everyday hazards and stressors into humorous tall tales.
real life logger from Quebec, Fabian "Joe" Fornier.⁷⁵ To Pacific Coast loggers, who looked to tales of Paul Bunyan for amusement as well as perhaps some hope for their own situation, it mattered little if Bunyan was real or imagined He epitomized the kind of independence, resilience, creativity, and raw talent they prized.⁷⁶ Perhaps more important than any other part of the Bunyan myth was the fact that Bunyan, unlike themselves, worked for no one but himself. If there is a boss in the Bunyan mythology, it is Bunyan himself. As a boss, Bunyan did not fire loggers arbitrarily or care more about production targets than loggers.⁷⁷ Instead of terrorizing his employees, Bunyan provided innovative solutions to loggers' problems. He seemed to have a never-ending supply of goodwill for his workers. He conquered nature wholly, as we can see in the tale of The Whistling River⁷⁸:

Ol' Paul was logging on what was then known as the Whistling River. It got its name from the fact that every morning, right on the dot, at nineteen minutes past five, and every night at ten minutes past six, it r'ared up to a height of two hundred and seventy-three feet and let loose a whistle that could be heard for a distance of six hundred and three miles in any direction...

However it seems that the river was famous for more than its whistling, for it was known as the orneriest river that ever ran between two banks. It seemed to take a fiendish delight in tying whole rafts of good saw logs into more plain and fancy knots that forty-three old sailors even knew the names of. It was an old 'side winder; for fair. Even so, it is unlikely that Ol' Paul would ever have bothered with it, if it had left his beard alone.

It happened this way. It seems that Ol' Paul is sitting on a low hill one afternoon, combing his great curly beard with a pine tree, while he plans his winter operations. All of a sudden like, and without a work of warning, the river h'ists itself up on its hind legs

⁷⁵ Lawrence D. Rogers, *Paul Bunyan: How a Terrible Timber Feller Became a Legend*, (Bay City: Historical Press, 1993): 15.

⁷⁶ Dorson, "Paul Bunyan in the News, 1939-1941 (Part II)," *Western Folklore*, 15, 3 (July 1956), 187-188; Dorson, "Paul Bunyan in the News, 1939-1941 (Part III)," 252-253.

⁷⁷ Gold, *Logging as It Was*, 86-87, 99, 154, 201; Hallberg, *Autobiography*, 70, 72, 91.Union publications favoured portrayals of bosses that focused on arbitrary firing and callous disregard for life. The reality that there were as many types of bosses as there were workers was not acknowledged. Hallberg became a boss himself after years working as a logger. While he recognizes some bosses were not "benevolent," (70) his autobiography tends to interpret the action of most supervisors in the best light.

⁷⁸ Hoffman, "Folk Tales," 309-310. The conquest of nature is a repeated theme throughout the Bunyan mythology.

and squirts about four thousand five hundred and nineteen gallons of river water straight in the center of Ol' Paul's whiskers.

Naturally Paul's considerably startled, but says nothing, figuring that if he pays it no mind, it'll go 'way and leave him be. But no sooner does he get settled back with his thinking and combing again, than the durn river squirts some more! This time, along with the water, it throws in for good measure a batch of mud turtles, thirteen large carp, a couple of drowned muskrat, and half a raft of last year's saw logs. By this time Ol' Paul is pretty mad, and he jumps up and lets loose a yell that causes a landslide out near Pike's Peak, and startles a barber in Missouri so he cuts half the hair off the minister's toupee, causing somewhat of a stir thereabouts. Paul stomps around waving his arms for a spell then allows:

"By the Gee-Jumpin' John Henry and the Great Horn Spoon, I'll tame that river or bust a gallus tryin'."

He goes over to another hill and sits down to think out a way to tame a river, forgetting his winter operations entirely. He sits there for three days and forty seven hours without moving, thinking at top speed all the while, and finally comes to the conclusion that the best thing to do is to take out the kinks. But he knows that taking the kinks out of a river as tricky as this one is apt to be quite a chore, so he keeps on sitting there while he figures out ways and means. Of course, he could dig a new channel and run the river through that, but that was never Paul's way. He liked to figure out new ways of doing things, even if they were harder... [He] decides that the only practical solution is to hitch Babe, the Mighty Blue Ox, to the river and let him yank it straight.

Babe was so strong that he could pull mighty near anything that could be hitched on to him...But the problem is how to hitch Babe to the river, as it's a well-known fact that an ordinary log chain and skid hook will not hold water. So... Paul decides that the only practical thing to do is to invent a rigging of some kind himself.

...Being as how this was sort of a special problem, he thought it out in a special way. Paul was like that. As he always thought best when he walked, he had the men survey a circle about thirty miles in diameter to walk around. This was so that if he was quite a while thinking it out, he wouldn't be finding himself way down in Australia when he'd finished.

When everything is ready, he sets his old fur cap tight on his head, clasps his hands behind him, and starts walking and thinking. He thinks and walks. The faster he walks the faster he thinks. He makes a complete circle every half hour. By morning he's worn a path that is knee-deep even on him, and he has to call the men to herd the stock away and keep them from falling in and getting crippled. Three days later he thinks it out, but he's worn himself down so deep that it takes a day and a half to get a ladder built that will reach down that far. When he does get out, he doesn't even wait for breakfast, but whistles for Babe and tears right out across the hills to the north [where he sets a trap and captures two blizzards]....

About midnight he gets back to camp, and hollers at Ole, the Big Swede:

"Build me the biggest log chain that's ever been built, while I stake out these dad-blasted blizzards! We're goin' to warp it to 'er proper, come mornin'."

Then he goes down to the foot of the river and pickets one of the blizzards to a tree on the bank, then crosses and ties the other directly opposite. Right away the river begins to freeze... In the morning the river has a touch time r'aring up for what it maybe knows to be its last whistle, for its foot is frozen solid for more than seventeen miles. The blizzards have really done the business.

By the time breakfast is over, the great chain's ready and Babe all harnessed. Paul quick-like wraps one end of the chain seventy-two times around the foot of the river, and hitches Babe to the other. Warning all the men to stand clear, he shouts at the Ox to pull. But though the great beast strains till his tongue hands out, pulling the chain out into a solid bar some seven and a half miles long, and sinks knee-deep in the solid rock, the river solemnly refuses to budge, hanging onto its kinks like a snake in a gopher hole. Seeing this, Ol' Paul grabs the chain and, letting loose a holler that blows the tarpaper off the shakes in the Nebraska sandhills, he and the Ox together give a mighty yank that jerks the river loose from end to end, and start hauling it out across the prairie so fast that it smokes.⁷⁹

The exaggerated, implausible feats performed by Bunyan provided men with amusement in the evenings when there was nothing to do but talk, sleep, or gamble, but there was more to Bunyan than just entertaining tall tales. Underneath his wild exploits lay a character many Pacific Coastal loggers tried to emulate, consciously or unconsciously, in their own lives. For workers whose very ability to work was controlled by bosses, the rugged folk hero was the embodiment of everything they wished they could have, or be. In embracing Bunyan and rugged, hyper-masculinity more generally, workers may have been trying to compensate for their very real lack of power. Bunyan was completely, even defiantly, independent. When faced with a problem he could not immediately solve, he would think and think until, eventually, without fail, he devised a scheme to solve his conundrum. Bunyan always found a solution to every problem, and he typically did it on his own, or with the help of one or two skilled men.⁸⁰ Ole, the Big Swede, helped Paul with the whistling river, and the men of the camp marked out a path for him to walk, but there was a sense that Paul could easily do these things himself, if he did not have more important things to do.

The tale of the Whistling River also spoke to the most fundamental struggle of the logging industry: man versus nature. While bosses and technology were adversaries that the union and individual loggers struggled against, these were, in a sense, the easiest foes

⁷⁹ Glen Rounds, *Ol' Paul the Mighty Logger*, (New York: Holiday House, 1976), 13-25.

⁸⁰ Rounds, Ol' Paul, 13-25; Dorson, "Paul Bunyan (Part III)," 252-253.

a logger had to defeat. A much more challenging and central struggle for each logger, and one he needed to win for his own survival, was his struggle against the forest itself. Unlike bosses and technology, loggers could have no hope of changing or removing the natural elements of their work that threatened them. Trees are living things and like all other living things, trees did not always do what loggers wished or expected. Spar trees sometimes broke, felled timber did not always go in the direction it was meant to, and when these things happened loggers could lose their lives. Paul Bunyan did not have to worry about this type of precarity. His strength and ingenuity allowed him to overcome nature, even to the point of straightening the kinks out of a river.⁸¹

Bunyan was not the only folk hero shared by camp storytellers at night in the bunkhouse.⁸² Like 8-Day Wilson, many coastal loggers had their personas essentialized into a caricature to be told and retold, until their stories reached folk tale proportions. While these local tales never enjoyed the widespread fame of Paul Bunyan, they give us an insight into what was important to the men living and working in the camps. Thor Johnson, "Big John," was known for his super human strength, being "six feet four [inches] in height and weighing 250 pounds, built like a gorilla, all shoulders and back," Big John allegedly moved Canadian Pacific Railway rails, which were 600 pounds in weight and 32 feet in length, single handedly.⁸³

Then there was Sawmill Carlson...His real name was Emil Carlson and he was a Swede. The bigger and tougher the timber, the better Sawmill liked it. He was a human dragsaw. Working in a camp at [Cowichan] Lake, with two [loggers] falling [trees], he kept up with the bucking end alone. A stream of sawdust fell from his saw, and he didn't know how to

⁸¹ Hoffman, "Folk Tales," 303, 305-306, 309-310;

⁸² Gold, *Logging as It Was*, 167.

⁸³ Bergren, *Tough Timber*, 86.

quit. Bucking on the quarter at McDonald and Murphy's [operation] one day, Murphy came by to scale, and Sawmill never stopped or looked up.

"Tough Timber, Murphy!" was all he grunted, spitting a quid of snooze several feet. When the story got around it became a by-word for hard work: "Tough timber, Murphy!" men would laugh, wryly.⁸⁴

Sawmill Carlson and Big John's stories were told by loggers to one another along with many others, but these two stories in particular highlight a common theme in logging tales: independence. Big John did not wait for help to move the rails. He had no need of help. His physical prowess as well as his hardworking attitude and independence of mind meant that he did not loaf around waiting for the man to return with help. He simply got to work. Likewise, Sawmill Carlson did the work of two men. Standard practice had one bucker or a team of buckers per faller or team of fallers.⁸⁵ The fallers would cut down the tree and then the buckers would follow behind, removing the limbs and bucking the log into lengths to be rigged up and moved to the landing. Sawmill Carlson's speed allowed him to do as much work as two men, but no one criticised him for taking away a man's job. Instead, his efficiency was celebrated. In telling these stories, loggers reaffirmed their own independence and also the importance of skill. These were tales of individual achievement, not solidarity or collective action.

Not all of the tales told in bunkhouses were of daring feats on the job. Sometimes the lauded individual action took place in the camp. Tales about exceptional individuals and their actions in the bunkhouse or cookhouse focused less on skill, but no less on individualism than tales of exceptional feats in the woods. Some of these stories also served to celebrate innovation:

⁸⁴ Bergren, *Tough Timber*, 87.

⁸⁵ Whether these workers operated alone or in a pair depended on the type of saw being used. Two-man saws were still in use in this period.

Big Jack Nugent [was] a logger of six feet seven inches in height, who worked at one float camp up coast. Whole camps were floated on water. Loggers noticing a box stuck to the outside wall of the bunkhouse went to investigate and found that Jack, who had a corner bunk, had cut a hole in the wall and nailed a box to the outside so he could stick his feet into it.⁸⁶

Nugent's story was a source of great amusement for the loggers who shared it, but his innovation is also important. As an unusually tall man, Nugent would have been incredibly uncomfortable in a standard bunk. Rather than complain about this, he found a way to solve the problem on his own by modifying the bunk to fit his needs.⁸⁷ This type of independence was central to loggers' identities. It came out in a number of ways, from quitting in protest to adapting innovative ways of dealing with problems that arose in the woods. As the story of Koski's accident showed, not all innovations worked. Sometimes independence led loggers to work against their own interests. Unquestionably, this independence was an obstacle to union organization as the values of union solidarity were at times in direct conflict with loggers' own individualistic values. Even the most loyal union supporters likely struggled with the contradictions between union shop and the rugged, independent Paul Bunyan myth so integral to their understanding of themselves as loggers and as men.

Independence and innovation were necessary attributes for loggers working in isolated workplaces. Logging camps were far removed from population centers. Often it would be days between the arrival of the ships or trains that transported men, mail, and supplies to and from camp. This isolation reinforced the power bosses had over workers. Loggers had to live in camp in order to work. This meant that they relied on the company

⁸⁶ Bergren, *Tough Timber*, 86-87.

⁸⁷ Bergren, *Tough Timber*, 88-89.

for food, shelter, and medical treatment if it was necessary.⁸⁸ Until the 1940s, which brought significant structural changes to many logging camps that facilitated a more stable workforce, most loggers lived in bunkhouses with seven others. All of the men in the camp shared toilet and shower facilities that were houses in a separate building from their bunks.⁸⁹ All meals were prepared by the camp cookhouse. Because of this, having a skilled cook and quality food was extremely important. The Lumber Worker's reports on camps invariably included an evaluation of the "grub."⁹⁰ A bad cook likely meant a high turnover at a camp as loggers showed themselves unlikely to stick around if the food was not up to snuff. If a logger needed to buy supplies while in camp, his only option was to buy from the company store. While the presence of a store in camp could benefit workers, if mishandled, it could also function as "an instrument of abuse." Companies had a monopoly over prices. This gave them the power, if they chose to wield it, to mark-up goods to a point that loggers spent their entire paycheck, or even accrued a debt, at the company store. This might keep a logger in the camp because he lacked the cash to move on.⁹¹

Isolation did not just give companies control over loggers' lives while they were in camp; bosses also had significant control over who could enter a camp. They used this power to try to keep union organizers out. When Hjalmar Bergren became an organizer for the Lumber Workers Industrial Union in 1934 his new job was to travel, usually on foot, from one logging camp to another. He held meetings with men in camp, and tried to

⁸⁸ Gertie Kusha, CRMA, A228; Betty Landers, CRMA, A246; Linda Carlson, *Company Towns of the Pacific Northwest*. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), 208.

⁸⁹ Prouty, *More Deadly than War*, 38.

⁹⁰ "Looking 'em Over," *BCLW*. 28 July 1939, p 3.

⁹¹ Crawford, 30.

sign on as many union members as he could.⁹² This role put him in direct conflict with camp managers who were working to protect their company's open shop policy. Myrtle Bergren's book about the union's origins includes many stories of camp management kicking organizers out of camp, sometimes even calling the police to do it for them.⁹³ Superintendents' claims to private property rights over camp land were met with accusations from union organizers that management was violating the citizenship rights of workers who paid room and board to companies:

When we went into a camp, if there was [sic] two of us, or three of us, or one, you can't come in here. Well, there's two or three hundred people supposed to be citizens, but he [the superintendent or other management representative] prevented you from going in to talk to them, on the basis that this was his private property. And then he also had the right to call the police!

And the police come! ...Whether they 'ad the right is one thing. They only got that right insofar as you got a bunch of donkeys there. But any time the donkeys become men, then we automatically have that right [to talk to the men]!⁹⁴

Despite organizers' argument that the camp itself, where men paid to live and eat, was public property by virtue of being home to so many citizens, police upheld the company's right to keep unwanted individuals from its camp.

The hostility of management (and law enforcement) to union organizers meant that these men needed to channel their inner Paul Bunyan and find innovative ways to reach workers in camp. In 1937 Hjalmar Bergren and his partner Tod McLennan applied for and received Free Miner's Licenses. It gave them the right, under the Free Miner's Act, to travel through the woods unimpeded, on the assumption that they were prospecting. The organizers had built a small shack for themselves near Cowichan Lake on game reserve land. The shack gave them a dry, safe place to stay during their travel

⁹² Bergren, *Tough Timber*, 82.

⁹³ Bergren *Tough Timber*, 113, 138.

⁹⁴ Bergren, *Tough Timber*, 157. The first speaker is Hjalmar, the second, fellow organizer, George Grafton.

from camp to camp. Having an established union building, no matter how rudimentary, so close to their camp was not something management was willing to put up with. It wasn't long before representatives from Industrial Timber Mills' Camp 6 accompanied by the police came to try and evict the organizers and force them to remove the shack.⁹⁵ The resulting confrontation, as recalled by Bergren years later and told from one member to another as a good joke, went like this:

"Have you got a permit to build this?" the policeman asked.

"I don't think I have to have a permit," replied Hjalmar. "After all, the property doesn't belong to the company."...

"Oh yes, the company have foreshore rights to it," said an official.

"Yes, but they are not occupying it. After all, I need a cabin and I don't think anybody can stop me from building one."

"But we have the foreshore rights!"

"I think this is on the high water mark." Foreshore rights included from high water mark down. The company had the rights to boom their logs below. "I don't see why the company should object to me building a cabin here. They're not using this property, and if they want to boom logs here this won't be in their way."

Plunging around for some shattering remark, the policeman said, "Well, how would you like it if someone built a toilet on your lawn?"...

"You wouldn't interfere with its occupant, would you?" Hjalmar retorted.96

In the end, the shack stayed, providing a necessary resting place for organizers around the lake, and a telegram to the Gold Commissioner's office about the company's attempt to interfere with Bergren's prospecting ended any police attempt to remove them from the land.⁹⁷ Though the confrontation was reduced to a humorous story to be shared among union members at the expense of the police and company officials, the victory was an important one. The small shack provided a base of operations from which loggers could reach the camps all around Lake Cowichan. Since any worker who put up a union

⁹⁵ Bergren, Tough Timber, 109-110; Baptie, First Growth, 81.

⁹⁶ Bergren, *Tough Timber*, 109-110.

⁹⁷ Bergren, *Tough Timber*, 110-111.

organizer for a night could be fired for his union activity, it was vital that the union had a place of its own for loggers to stay.⁹⁸

Like organizers, union papers had to be snuck into camps as bosses were known to search employees upon arrival. Possession of union materials could be a fireable offense in a camp run by an anti-union superintendent.⁹⁹ Workers creatively overcame isolation and restricted access to the men in camps. They sent the *Lumber Worker*, "in chocolate boxes or in scented parcels addressed in a woman's hand. Or they went into Spencers and sent the precious papers up from the store wrapped in a shirt."¹⁰⁰ After being told not to bring the paper into camp, workers at one camp on Cowichan Lake ordered a number of subscriptions under their supervisors' and timekeeper's names: "When the mail came in, they'd throw it on the counter in the store, so we still managed to get the *Lumber Worker*."¹⁰¹ Once again, creativity was vital to spreading the word of the union without ending up on the employers' blacklist.

All managers were not equal in their hatred of the union. Some even showed sympathy. At Lake Log, a company on Cowichan Lake, the superintendent Neil MacDonald was not opposed to the union and in 1934 it believed that "there was a good possibility that a camp committee could be set up and recognized by the company."¹⁰² Lake Log had several features that made it an ideal testing ground for a unionization push. The company was large, employing roughly 300 men. Lake Log's location on an inland lake, rather than directly on the coast, meant that "[t]hey had to handle their logs

⁹⁸ Bergen, *Tough Timber*, 106-107.

⁹⁹ Baptie, First Growth, 81, 110; Gold, Logging at It Was, 194.

¹⁰⁰ Bergren, *Tough Timber*, 65.

¹⁰¹ Baptie, *First Growth*, 81.

¹⁰² Bergren, *Tough Timber*, 61.

twice, a costly procedure, bringing them down from the operation in the woods to Cowichan Lake, boom them there, then tow and reload them on the E&N Railway."¹⁰³ The cost of handling each log twice meant that the company needed skilled, efficient workers. Ideally, they would stay with the company long term, saving costs and maximizing worker efficiency. The company also needed to avoid a strike.¹⁰⁴ While the union was successful in organizing a camp committee that Lake Log recognized, this company "proved to be the exception." Other companies did not follow suit until nearly a decade later.¹⁰⁵

The union used organizers and creative shipping strategies to ensure that the men in camp could hear its message. But there was a serious problem with trying to organize this way in the 1930s: the union did not have a coherent platform on which to build support. Two schools of thought about the best way to organize could be found among the union decision-makers. One group wanted the union to focus on gaining recognition at one camp at a time, to build support based on grievances against the company. The other wanted the union to come up with a program detailing the things that it would do for workers throughout the region rather than trying to deal with the hundreds of individual grievances. It aimed to organize the entire industry at once.¹⁰⁶ Bergren belonged to the latter school of thought, saying: "A grievance is like a raindrop; there are thousands of them... You grab for it and when you've got it, where is it gone? You can't organize the

¹⁰³ Bergren, *Tough Timber*, 61.

¹⁰⁴ Bergren *Tough Timber*, 61-62.

¹⁰⁵ Bergren, *Tough Timber*, 64-65

¹⁰⁶ Bergren, *Tough Timber*, 97-98, 127-133.

lumber industry on grievances."¹⁰⁷ Unsuccessful strikes in 1934 and 1936 demonstrated that the existing union was not yet ready to take on the industry. Only after the Blubber Bay strike in 1938-39 did the two factions reach a consensus about the importance of a unified platform upon which to organize.¹⁰⁸

The Blubber Bay strike was the last in a series of strikes among lumber workers in the 1930s. While each strike was aimed to address site-specific grievances rather than a larger, organized union platform, the labour unrest of the 1930s cannot be understood outside the context of the Great Depression. The Canadian lumber industry struggled in the early 1930s.¹⁰⁹ The 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff exacerbated the financial impact 1929 stock market crash on the forest industry. It imposed a \$1 tariff on every thousand board feet of Canadian lumber imported to the USA. In 1932 an additional \$3 tariff was charged per thousand board feet on BC lumber.¹¹⁰ Historians Couture and MacDonald argued that in the first three years of the Depression, "lumber production fell by 61.6%, and pulp production decreased by 33.3%" across the country.¹¹¹ Employment rates plummeted, reaching their lowest point in 1931, before beginning to climb back up. In 1936, the Canada-United States Trade Agreement halved tariffs for lumber shipments to the USA.¹¹² By 1937, employment in the forest industry stood at an all-time high.¹¹³ This

¹⁰⁷ Bergren, *Tough Timber*, 97.

¹⁰⁸ Bergren, *Tough Timber*, 101-111, 139-141.

¹⁰⁹ Rajala, *Clearcutting the Pacific*, 155-156.

¹¹⁰ Hak, *Capital and Labour*, 19. Hak places the market price of a thousand board feet at \$12 in 1932, making the \$4 tariff prohibitive for many operators.

¹¹¹ Lydia Couture and Ryan Macdonald, "The Great US Recession and Canadian Forest Products," *Statistics Canada*, Last modified November 27 2015, <u>http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/11-626-x/11-626-x/2013028-eng.htm</u> accessed 2 April 2017. Statistics for British Columbia's production alone are not available before 1946.

¹¹² Hak, Capital and Labour, 19.

surge in demand for workers on the heels of three years of alarmingly high unemployment created a perfect climate for workers to try to gain concessions on existing grievances.

Blubber Bay was not strictly a forestry operation; it centered around lime mining for use in processing wood products. It had a small sawmill alongside the lime mine "which produced lumber for local markets, the tillings from which were used as fuel in the lime kilns."¹¹⁴ The Pacific Lime Company operated both the mine and the mill. It had effectively kept a tight control over its workforce for three decades before the Lumber and Sawmill Workers Union (LSWU) (a precursor to the IWA in BC) began to organize workers there in 1937. Before that, it had had only one strike since 1908, a brief conflict over working conditions in 1920, which the company quickly put an end to without resolving the cause of the dispute.¹¹⁵ Having had such success in controlling its workers for nearly three decades, the company strongly opposed unionization.

In 1937, the lime quarry workers organized under the LSWU in protest against proposed wage reductions. When red-baiting failed, company manager PJ Maw attempted to use the racial divisions in the workforce against the union. He accused the union of coercing Chinese workers into joining the union and the strike.¹¹⁶ The union responded to this tactic by asserting a policy of racial equality: "...the Chinese

¹¹³ "Historic Statistics of Canada" Statistics Canada, http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/11-516-

x/sectiond/4057750-eng.htm#2 accessed 2 April 2017. Using the 1948 Standard Industrial Classification (under which 1949 employment levels = 100), employment was at 62.6 in 1929. This dropped to 21.2 in 1932, but rose quickly, reaching 62.1 in 1934 and 94.2 in 1937. For complete Employment Index see Statistics Canada historic report table D528_539.

¹¹⁴ Parnaby, "Blubber Bay," 33.

¹¹⁵ Parnaby, "Blubber Bay," 34-35.

¹¹⁶ Parnaby, "Blubber Bay," 35, 38-40.

consistently attend union meetings, have a free voice in the proceedings and vote on every policy... in light of their rights as workers... there can be no differentiation between a worker, whether he be white, yellow or black."¹¹⁷ Of course, once the strike began, the union failed to live up to these high minded words, creating clear roles for striking Chinese workers to fulfill that were distinct from those given to white workers. Despite failing to treat racialized union members equally during the strike, a policy of racial equality became part of the union's demands in 1938 alongside equal pay for equal work.¹¹⁸

Yet, the inclusion of racialized workers was not the most significant aspect of the Blubber Bay strike. This strike stands out in the early history of the IWA in BC because it stood as the first real test of the 1937 Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act (ICA).¹¹⁹ The ICA, written by provincial Minister of Labour George Pearson, aimed to prevent economic problems in the province by forcing industry and labour to participate in conciliation and arbitration before companies locked out workers or workers began a strike.¹²⁰ In 1937 there was no federal legislation recognizing unions or collective bargaining rights for workers. The provincial legislation then was all unions had to build

¹¹⁷ Parnaby, "Blubber Bay," 40.

¹¹⁸ Creese, "Exclusion or Solidarity?" 45-46; Kobayashi and Jackson, "Japanese Canadians and the Racialization of Labour in the British Columbia Sawmill Industry" 51-53. Parnaby, "Blubber Bay," 41. Equal pay for equal work was an important demand from the union on two levels. For racialized workers, who could be paid less than half what their "white" counterparts received, equal pay could result in a significant improvement in quality of life. Equal pay for equal work could jeopardize the employment prospect of racialized workers, however, as companies no longer received a benefit from hiring racialized workers over white workers. For the union, including racialized workers in the union undermined the bosses' practice of hiring racialized workers as strike breakers.

¹¹⁹ Gordon Hak, *Capital and Labour in the British Columbia Forest Industry*, 1934-74. (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007): 71.

¹²⁰ Heather Jensen, "A History of Legal Exclusion: Labour Relations Laws and British Columbia's Agricultural Workers, 1937-1975" *Labour/Le Travail*, 73 (Spring 2014): 70-71.

their hopes around. Unions initially perceived the ICA as signalling provincial support for unions, along the lines of what the federal Wagner Act (1935) did for unions in the United States. However, they were to be disappointed. The Act itself was created not to support unions, but to protect companies from labour unrest. Pearson worried that increased labour unrest and efforts towards unionization in the province were caused by Communists. The Act was designed to give the province the necessary structure to deal with this threat.¹²¹ In a memo to premier Duff Pattullo in 1937, before the Act was passed in December, Pearson wrote:

The activity of the communists, latterly the C.I.O [Congress of Industrial Organizations] has caused the great majority of larger employers in British Columbia to resist any kind of organizing for the purpose of negotiations between employer and employee. This condition, however, cannot stand for long as it is an unnatural condition. Every sensible person will admit the justice of the claim of men to organize themselves for the purpose of discussing their problems with their employers and negotiating terms of employment. This being the case I am convinced that as labour conditions settle themselves in the United States a definite attack will be made upon British Columbia to completely organize it under the two great international organizations, the A.F.L [American Federation of Labour] and its offspring, the C.I.O. During this attempt industry will suffer tremendously in this Province, through strikes, unless we are prepared to meet it.¹²²

Despite his obvious sympathy with the plight of workers in the province, Pearson clearly articulated his main concern to be preventing industry from suffering at the hands of strikers. To maintain stability within the province he created a body whose purpose it would be to smooth over labour disputes before they disrupted the provincial economy.¹²³ When it came into effect in December 1937, the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act created a framework for one party in a labour dispute to request conciliation or arbitration to resolve the dispute. Neither party could disrupt labour, either through strike

¹²¹ Jensen, "Legal Exclusion," 70-71.

¹²² British Columbia Archives, Pattullo Papers, GR 1222, Box 142, File 142-7, Memo Pearson to Pattullo. Quoted in Jensen, "Legal Exclusio," 71. ¹²³ Jensen, "Legal Exclusion," 72.

or lockout, during the conciliation or arbitration. However, a major weakness of the Act was its lack of binding arbitration. While it required arbitration or conciliation before any work stoppage, it did not require that parties act on the recommendations that came out of this process. Nor did it guarantee unions the right to collective bargaining on behalf of employees if companies refused to recognize them. According to historian Heather Jensen, though it "recognized collective bargaining as lawful, and created penalties for employers who refused to bargain with employees," the Act did not mention trade unions.¹²⁴ Instead, it allowed for representatives who had been "duly elected by a vote of the majority of the employees affected" to represent employee interests to employers.¹²⁵ For unions, the ICA's failure to explicitly give trade unions the right to organize workers and work stoppages to address grievances not solved through the now mandatory conciliation and non-binding arbitration process.

In order to end the Blubber Bay strike and resume full productivity in the mill, the company agreed to union demands regarding wages. However, once workers returned to the job, it did not honour the agreement. Instead, management fired workers associated with the union. In 1938, the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration board recommended that the company re-hire 23 workers fired after the 1937 strike. However, the Board had no power to enforce its recommendations, and the company continued to fire employees for being union members.¹²⁶ In July 1938 workers began a strike that lasted for eleven

¹²⁴ Jensen, "Legal Exclusion," 73-74.

¹²⁵ "Conciliation and Arbitration Act of British Columbia." Monthly Labor Review (Pre-1986) 46, 4 (April, 1938): 895.

¹²⁶ Hak, Capital and Labour, 71; Bergren, Tough Timber, 116.

months and cost the IWA an estimated \$13,000.¹²⁷ In the end, the company won the battle and the long, violent strike "drained the union's strength, energy and resources," making it clear to organizers that the union's policy needed to change.¹²⁸

Ultimately, the loss at Blubber Bay demonstrated to union leaders that trying to organize a single camp at a time was not the way to achieve their goals. In January 1939 the BC district of the IWA, under then president Hjalmar Bergren, held a convention to work out a program for the union. Despite the ongoing, losing battle at Blubber Bay, not all members were on board with Bergren's ideas. One critic told him, "don't kid yourself you are going to organize workers on conventions. You never organize workers by conventions, you never organize workers on programs. You organize them on the needs of the day."¹²⁹ The conference proposed a resolution to create "an economic, social, and political program for the lumbering industry... The program should cover a practical trade union act; give the workers full rights to organize; unemployment insurance; union agreements, camp committees, union recognition, and other points, such as a forestry program, higher old age pensions, etc."¹³⁰ Yet the early union platform had nothing explicitly for workplace safety apart from the provision for a seat for the union on already existing camp safety committees.¹³¹ Organizers insisted that the old ways of unionizing the industry were not viable. They pressed loggers to see and accept the fact that the

¹²⁷ Bergren, *Tough Timber*, 116, 121; Hak, *Capital and Labour*, 71. Bergren places the beginning of the strike in May 1938, Gordon Hak places it in July. For an in depth analysis of the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act (1937) and the legal issues surrounding the Blubber Bay strike, see Andy Parnaby, "Blubber Bay."

¹²⁸ Bergren, *Tough Timber*, 122. Jerry Lembcke, "The International Woodworkers of America in British Columbia, 1942-1951." *Labour/Le Travaillieur*, 6 (Autumn 1980): 115.

¹²⁹ Bergren, *Tough Timber*, 129.

¹³⁰ Bergren, *Tough Timber*, 129-130.

¹³¹ "Convention Adopts 3 Demands: 25 Cents Per Hour Increase, 40 Hour Week, Seniority," *BCLW*, 14 January 1946, p 1,3.

failures of 1934, 1936, and the ongoing failure at Blubber Bay were not because they had

a weak cause, but because they had a flawed approach:

We are not going to establish an organization right away, there is no set time. We can do that only when the majority of the woodworkers are in agreement and we have to have an organization. We have to have a movement. We cannot organize the lumber industry one operation at a time, one camp at a time, because the bosses will exhaust us. The employers' position is that the workers are not going to have an organization in the lumber industry, they will fire you or lock you out...We gained concessions in wages and working conditions [in 1934]. But they exhausted us and we had to go back on the employers' terms as far as no union was concerned.

We had another effort in 1936, about 2,000 people [the same as 1934] were again involved, and the bosses exhausted us. They refused to bargain with us. We gained concessions which proved the effectiveness of organization. We gained improvements in wages and conditions again, which proved the effectiveness of, and how badly we needed organization, in order to maintain and keep up with living standards and our civil liberties.

We got these things, but at what cost? Those who were active were fired. Without those who were active, we would never have got the concessions.

Blubber Bay was another example where we tried to break through in a single place. We were defeated by the sheer weight of numbers. We could not win this way...¹³² The only way we are going to organize this industry is when the majority are ready for it...it is not enough that you discuss this question [of union organization] with your fellow workers. Discuss it all with your shopkeeper too. You want his support too. Your hotel keeper, or whoever you can talk to, your minister, your neighbour. Because your community has to be with us too.¹³³

Petitions sent out to logging camps outlining why the conference was being proposed and

asking for support came back with enough signatures to ensure union leaders that the men agreed that a program was needed.¹³⁴ Sixty delegates attended the conference and together they designed and adopted a program. To the disappointment of many, the new program could not immediately be put into action. Blubber Bay had left union finances and membership rosters in tatters and organizers needed to rebuild their base of support before they could push their newly developed united agenda.¹³⁵

¹³² Bergren dates this speech in 1938, the Blubber Bay strike would still have been going on. Workers did not return to work until the summer of 1939. I have kept the original tense of the quote.

¹³³ Bergren, *Tough Timber*, 139-140.

¹³⁴ Bergren, *Tough Timber*, 129-130.

¹³⁵ Bergren, *Tough Timber*, 131.

Their letter's call for public support reminded people that solidarity within the union alone was not enough to keep workers going through a long strike. Local stores extended credit, local church and ethnic organizations donated food, and individuals gave money. Without this support, it would be difficult for strikes to last beyond a few weeks. Understanding that public support was sometimes the only thing that kept the strike and the men going, the nascent union endeared itself to the public as much as possible. Public support was also vital if the union wanted to achieve legislative change in its favour. ¹³⁶ However, as important as public support was, the union did not abandon important issues if its stance went against public opinion.

The Hitler-Stalin pact during the early years of the Second World War, jeopardized the union's public image. Instead of supporting the war effort wholeheartedly, the union criticized the capitalist war on communism and pushed for higher wages for workers.¹³⁷ In 1940 Green Gold, the IWA's radio program, was banned from the air – a sign to many union members that Canada intended to use the war to supress union activity.¹³⁸ Union members who saw themselves as communists struggled to reconcile their dual allegiances, with Canada, on one hand, and the Soviet Union, on the other. It was not until after Germany invaded the Soviet Union in 1941 that the communist dominated BC chapter of the IWA declared its support of the war effort and turned its focus to "production for victory."¹³⁹ In 1942 it pledged itself not to strike.

¹³⁶ Bergren, *Tough Timber*, 119;

¹³⁷ Irving Abella, *Nationalism, Communism, and Canadian Labour: The CIO, the Communist Party, and the Canadian Congress of Labour* (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1973) 114.

¹³⁸ Bergren *Tough Timber*, 167-168.

¹³⁹ Hak, *Capital and Labour*, 103; "Urges Full Aid to USSR Against Fascism," *BCLW*, 22 July 1941, p1. Abella, *Nationalism, Communism and Canadian Labour*, 114-138. It is important to note that the

However, the events that followed in 1943, and the *BC Lumber Worker's* open support of other unions in time of strike while under a no strike pledge, raise questions about the sincerity of the union's commitment to the war effort.¹⁴⁰

While the union's asnti-strike position helped bolster public support for future battles against companies, some of its ability to maintain the industrial relations peace on the Homefront was likely a product of a favourable wartime labour market. Wood was an important war industry, creating plentiful opportunities for employment on the pacific coast. Archival records from the Comox Logging and Railway Company (CLR) in Comox BC show that a number of workers were given special leave from military service in the final months of fighting on the Pacific front in order to perform vital jobs in forestry.¹⁴¹ The high demand for young, healthy men overseas and in the woods meant that workers' situation was less precarious than it had been since before the Depression and employers were not able to easily fire any worker they wished without reason. This did not mean that all transiency stopped; however, the war effort did stabilize the workforce and allowed the union to gain some traction on the coast.

communist ties of the BC chapter of the union were both unique within the international IWA and a point of contention between the BC local and the International which had begun to try to cut ties with the communist party in 1941. BC, instead of cutting its ties with the communists, distanced itself from the International. Though the union retained the same name, the BC IWA functioned almost entirely independently in this period. The union did not even receive support during the 1943 strike which won it certification in the province.

¹⁴⁰ Bergren, *Tough Timber*, 167; Jerry Lembcke, "The International Woodworkers of America in British Columbia, 1942-1951." *Labour/Le Travaillieur*, 6 (Autumn 1980) 126; Lembcke argues, that the anti-strike pledge originated from the CCF, and that the distribution of CCF literature against strikes was funded by bodies outside of the province. Furthermore, he states that the IWA's no strike pledge was "bogus" because the union publication the *Lumber Worker* published articles in support of a 1943 steel worker's strike and the union fully supported the October 1943 strike on Haida Gwaii.

¹⁴¹ Filberg to Commanding Officer, 25 June 1945, "Re: Pte. E.V. Bailey." CLR, 3A, 19, 24; Yule to the Manager, 4 December 1944. CLR, 3A, 21, 17; Yule to the Manager, 30 October 1944. CLR, 3A, 21, 17; In addition to those given release from military service to work in forestry, active Airforce personnel stationed in Courtney were given permission to work in forestry during off duty hours for additional pay and to help the industry.

Despite the union's anti-strike commitment for the duration of the Second World War, there was one major woods strike in 1943, on Haida Gwaii (then the Queen Charlotte Islands) where loggers were felling the Sitka spruce used to build a wooden fighter plane called the Mosquito.¹⁴² In 1942 loggers working on Haida Gwaii entered conciliation with the companies (J.R. Morgan Logging Company, Pacific Mills Logging Company, and Kelly Logging Company) in a dispute over wages and seniority. The conciliator's recommendations would have given loggers what they were asking for, but the companies refused to sign it. The union then requested arbitration and once again, when the decision came down in June 1943 it was in the union's favour. The Federal Arbitration Board in Ottawa "[ordered] the employers to recognize the IWA Local I-71 for a period of one year, with the right of either party to abrogate the agreement after this time, and recommended a collective agreement be reached by the two parties."¹⁴³ Once again, the employer rejected the recommendation. When no progress has been made by October 1943, the workers went on strike.¹⁴⁴

The 1943 strike on Haida Gwaii was a landmark moment for the IWA in BC. The strike lasted fourteen days and resulted in the first contract between the union and the forest industry.¹⁴⁵ Though individual companies had agreed to recognize a union committee before 1943, the 1943 negotiation involved over 100 companies and gave the union real, if still tenuous, control over the coastal forest industry. Integral to this victory

¹⁴² Bergren, *Tough Timber*, 215.

¹⁴³ Bergren, *Tough Timber*, 218

¹⁴⁴ Bergren, Tough Timber, 215-218. Hak, Capital and Labour, 81-86

¹⁴⁵ Bergren, *Tough Timber*, 220, 223; Paul Graham Knox, "The Passage of Bill 39: Reform and Repression in British Columbia's Labour Policy." (Unpublished Master's Thesis, UBC, 1974): 45, 94; Hak *Capital and Labour*, 80-85.

was an amendment to the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act which finally gave unions the right to engage in collective bargaining on behalf of workers.¹⁴⁶ Though a 1938 amendment to the Act had attempted to do this, it had lacked a mechanism by which unions could be certified. It was only in 1943 that unions got the power they needed to engage in bargaining. This power came from an amendment which created a mechanism by which the ministry of labour could determine if a union's claim of worker majority support was valid.¹⁴⁷

Not long after their victory in British Columbia, unions received affirmation from the federal government. In February 1944 the Wartime Labour Relations Regulations (PC 1003) gave unions throughout Canada the right to collectively bargain on behalf of employees. PC 1003 gave unions the right to collective bargaining, but also included a "[William Lyon Mackenzie] King-inspired compulsory conciliation procedure."¹⁴⁸ Many historians have critiqued PC 1003, believing that the order actually weakened Canadian trade unions and labour militancy. The conciliation process especially can be seen as giving companies an unfair advantage over workers by allowing them to prepare for a pending strike in order to hold out longer and gain more concessions from labour.¹⁴⁹ Though conciliation was non-binding, it forced both parties to come to the table before taking any job stoppage actions. After decades of struggle, the forest industry in BC had achieved unionization. However, the newly empowered union did not immediately press

¹⁴⁶ Knox, "Bill 39," 17, 47-48.

¹⁴⁷ Knox, "Bill 39," 47-48.

¹⁴⁸ Knox, "Bill 39," 19.

¹⁴⁹ Labour Gains, Labour Pains: 50 Years of PC 1003, ed. Cy Gonick, Paul Phillips, and Jessie Vorst; Judy Fudge and Eric Tucker, Labour Before the Law: The Regulation of Workers' Collective Action in Canada, 1900-1948, pp 273-280; Peter McInnis, Harnessing Labour Confrontation: Shaping the Postwar Settlement in Canada, 1943-1950.

its advantage and push for change to camp conditions, or wages. The anti-strike pledge held for the remainder of the war.

When the war was over and unions were free to strike for increased rights for workers, safety measures were not among early union demands. However, the very basic demands of union recognition, union participation in camp committees and the use of seniority to determine layoffs and promotion can be seen as integral to the evolution of safety in the forest industry.¹⁵⁰ Unionization also meant workers could not be fired arbitrarily. These two changes meant that after 1943 logging camps began to build stable work crews who stayed all season with a company, and usually returned to the same camp again at the end of seasonal shut down. In 1944 and 1945, this end to transience was enforced by the war effort's need for men. Loggers, whose work on the coast was considered integral to the war effort, could be given permission to serve their time in the woods instead of overseas, but companies had to vouch for workers' skills.¹⁵¹ This newfound stability in the workforce for the first time made it practical for companies to invest in training programs including safety training. This is not to say that companies began to change their safety policy immediately in 1943, but it is important to understand the impact a stable workforce had on safety.

The first opportunity the IWA had to test the power given it in 1943 came in March 1946. At the 1946 union convention in January, an agenda was set for the March contract negotiations including a wage increase of \$0.25, a forty-hour work week, union

¹⁵⁰ Ludgren, *Many Flowers*, 21. Ludgren connects the end of transience and arbitrary firing with unionization and states that "This allowed safety measures to finally become established and entrenched into daily work life."

¹⁵¹ A.W. Rafter "Re: Industrial Mobilization Survey," 18 March 1944, CLR, 1, 14, 8; Baptie, *First Growth*, 144; Gold, *Logging as It Was*, 166.

security, and check-off for union dues.¹⁵² The union took a vote on whether or not to strike before negotiations began and the membership responded with 90% in favour of striking if that was deemed necessary to win their demands. Given that the wage increase requested was five times that allowed by the federal wage controls, intended to control inflation, in the immediate post-war period, a strike seemed likely.¹⁵³ The company initially offered the \$0.05 that was the maximum under federal wage controls, but when that was refused, they offered \$0.125 if the union would drop its demands for a 40 hour work week, dues check off, and union security.¹⁵⁴ This proposal was rejected by the union and on 7 May 1946 they sent out notice to their employees, the forest industry would go on strike effective 11am 15 May:

Sharp at 11 a.m. a province-wide industry employing 33,000 men and women... came to a halt. All along the Fraser River, from Hope to Mudpole in the False Creek industrial area of Vancouver and across the north shore of Burrard Inlet, great sawmills which had never before been closed by strike action grew silent with their thousands of workers streaming out past the time clock gates even before the echoes of the plant whistles had died away... By twelve noon on May 15, not one major lumber operation in these areas was working.¹⁵⁵

The strike lasted 37 days.

Public support for the IWA strike was high, partly because the country was in the midst of a massive post-war strike wave.¹⁵⁶ A tag day held in Vancouver to raise money for the strikers brought in \$4,000.¹⁵⁷ Even more important in the long run, the union signed on 10,000 new members during the strike, bringing membership in the province up

¹⁵² Bergren, 230; Baptie, 156-157; Lembcke, 127. The government passed legislation mandating a 44-hour work week for the logging industry earlier in 1946.

¹⁵³ Bergren, 231.

¹⁵⁴ Bergren, 231-232.

¹⁵⁵ Lembcke, 127.

¹⁵⁶ Elmore Philpott, "A Plan," Coast News, 21 June 1946, p4; Heron, The Canadian Labour Movement, 75.

¹⁵⁷ Bergren, 233.

to 27,000.¹⁵⁸ For the union, the high point of the strike came on 13 June when 3,000 loggers and their wives marched to parliament in Victoria. Loggers from the mainland took a ferry to Nanaimo where they joined a procession of workers from the island to make the trek down to parliament.¹⁵⁹ The Ladies Auxiliary of Lake Cowichan walked at the front of the procession, carrying banners. "The spirit of the lumber workers had never been higher or more proud of their union. They surrounded the Parliament buildings and began their march around, chanting their slogan, '25-40, Union Security!' while President Harold Pritchard and other union spokesmen conferred with cabinet ministers within."¹⁶⁰

The strike ended on June 19 with neither side completely victorious. Faced with the prospect of being mandated back to work by the provincial government with no gains because of the needs of the interior fruit industry, which relied on local mills for crates to ship its produce, the union settled. The final agreement included union check-off and a \$0.15 wage increase. Though they had not won further union security measures, were ten cents below their wage demands, and failed to reduce the hours from 44 to 40 per week, union members look back on 1946 as a tremendous success.¹⁶¹ Safety issues were not among the disputed issues in the 1946 strike. However, the 1946 contract did give the union a seat on the camp safety committee. To the loggers, it seemed they were finally in

¹⁵⁸ Lembcke, 129.

¹⁵⁹ Lembcke, 128.

¹⁶⁰ Bergren, 235.

¹⁶¹ Bergren, 235-236 ; Lembcke, 128-129; "Woodworkers Wage Demands Rejected," *Coast News*, 22 November 1946, p 2. While the \$0.15 wage increase fell short of the \$0.25 the union sought, it was \$0.05 higher than the wage increase the war labour board rejected for loggers on Haida Gwaii and at Pacific Mills in Ocean Falls that same year.

a position of power and hopes were high that the industry, and their lives would be transformed for the better.¹⁶²

Unionization would not prove to be the panacea it was presented as by early union organizers. However, unionization was a necessary precondition for the development of a strong safety program in forestry. As this chapter demonstrated, unionization promoted workforce stability by removing much of the incentive workers had to be transient. A strong union was able to address many of workers' concerns about living and working conditions through collective bargaining, but more importantly for accident prevention was the union's ability to know what companies were doing on a daily basis, though not why, and the constant threat of a strike if companies failed to live up to their promises. The potential for the union to stop work by engaging in strike action was, as the remaining chapters will demonstrate, its most powerful role in accident prevention. While the Workmen's Compensation Board set minimum standards with legislation and provided incentive for employers to exceed this minimum through an experience rating system, the IWA acted as an integral control within a workplace safety system

Roderick Haig-Brown's 1942 novel, *Timber*, presents a wonderfully nuanced portrait of the hopes of union supporters in the early 1940s. The novel opens with a coroner's inquest. The book's central character, Johnny explains to a jury of non-experts – and the book's audience – how young Charlie was killed while loading logs.¹⁶³ The accident itself is one that could, and did, happen regularly, Charlie was trying to work too

¹⁶² "Convention Adopts 3 Demands: 25 Cents Per Hour Increase, 40 Hour Week, Seniority," *BCLW*, 14 January 1946, p 1,3.

¹⁶³ Haig-Brown, 8-14.

quickly and was not able to get clear of an incoming load of logs, but the conversation the men have afterwards encapsulates attitudes and ideas that very likely predominated among loggers in the years before the union received its certification. Sitting together, a glass of alcohol each, three loggers discuss Charlie's death and the industry's safety problem more broadly.¹⁶⁴ For Crawford, the answer is a union. Johnny and Nelson are less convinced:

"I'm not saying you can do a hell of a lot about one particular case like that. Maybe Charlie would have got it anyway. But a good union would change things. Nobody would have to be scared for his job if he couldn't keep up the pace and everybody would be able to work slower and easier. And a union could get better safety regulations and make sure they were enforced."

"And we'd have a bunch of foreign bastards telling us what to do,¹⁶⁵ same as we did in the strike." Johnny said.

"Maybe that's just what's needed – outsiders to get a little sense into your heads. But once the thing was properly organized you fellow could control it if you would just get in there and do the work."

"We could like hell," Johnny said. "Vancouver would run it. And the East would run Vancouver and some outfit down in the States would have the last word about everything. If we tried to run things our own way they'd put us out of commission in no time at all."

"Johnny's right," Nelson said. "A union is okay when you've got work for it, like the strike. But in good times there's always a bunch of bohunks gets control of it and the ordinary guy who's minding his own business gets nothing but grief. They tell you where you can work and when and how and what for. And if you don't do it you're called a scab and a son of a bitch by a bunch of guys that never saw caulked shoes in their lives."¹⁶⁶

Crawford sat up and swung his legs over the side of the bed in an angry movement. "You guys make me sick. So goddamned independent you'd drown before you'd catch hold of a chunk of wood to save yourselves... Jesus, Johnny, can't you see that if you and Eric and Dick and a few of the others the boys trust would take hold and you could run a good union? You did it during the strike and kept those outside organizers right where you wanted them."

... "It's different in ordinary times," [Johnny] said at last. "The boys can't hang on to a union except when they want something out of it. Soon as they've got what they

¹⁶⁴ Haig-Brown, 15-19.

¹⁶⁵ The IWA, like many other unions in Canada, originated in the United States. The "foreign" element Johnny is concerned about is American, not a racialized other.

¹⁶⁶ Parnaby and Nuefeld , *IWA*, 112. The workers feared that a union created at the grassroots level would be cooped by organizers who were not loggers, but professional union men. For many, even those without communist leanings, this fear was realized in the expulsion of communist leader Harold Pritchett along with several other prominent IWA communists in 1948 which came about because of legislation passed in the United States.

want they lose interest and the first thing you know the union is bossing them in ways they don't want."

...Johnny let himself slump in the chair, feeling the liquor in his blood. It was good to have shaken the inquest so quickly, to be a whole man again and rid of the cold smell of the morgue. But it shouldn't have gone this way, straight into the old argument with [Crawford], having to defend the way Charlie had died all over again after the inquest had passed off without any trouble – because that was what it had all come up from, the way Charlie had died. And that had been the same as any one of a half dozen other accidents and [Crawford] had admitted it was and then someone hot the thing off on this angle, where everybody but him was at a disadvantage. It didn't help any to talk it that way, to gripe at the bosses and run off a whole line of radical stuff that made a man feel badly about himself for no good reason... "I don't see how you get that way, [Crawford], in your job. You know damn well they're pushing you right on up so you can take over a superintendent's job yourself one day..."

"It doesn't make any difference where I'm going. What matters is that the boys need a union to protect them. And if I'm ever in a boss's job I'll need one to check up on me."¹⁶⁷

The attitudes of Johnny and Nelson in this passage showed the struggles that union organizers faced when trying to get the men to join a union. Loggers' independence was a significant obstacle in the way of union organization. These two men saw the union as useful for helping to push back against certain grievances, as the IWA did with the 1934, 1936, and 1938 strikes, but they did not believe that as a stable institution the union would do them any good. They assumed that the union would be taken over by American bureaucrats and loggers would essentially be left with two bosses telling them how to work and live. Crawford was more optimistic. He bought into the union line and believed that if the men stuck together and got a union in the woods, the union would control the bosses and bring necessary changes to the industry. Among the changes Crawford imagined unionization would bring was improved safety. With the job security brought

¹⁶⁷ Haig-Brown ,17-19. The character Crawford is Alec "Slim" Crawford, I have used his last name for the sake of clarity. Haig-Brown logged for three years in the late 1920s, but the inspiration for Timber likely came from the thirty years he spent as a magistrate in Campbell River, a logging community on the Northeast coast of Vancouver Island. While Haig-Brown makes no claim of autobiography in his novel, he has made a point to maintain authenticity as much as possible in his work. The conversation the men have about the merits of unionization at the beginning of the novel could easily have occurred in any one of the logging operations on Vancouver Island. As discussed in Chapter One, unionization of the forest industry did not happen all at once, nor was it universally accepted by workers

by union contracts he imagined the work process would slow down and accidents like the one that killed young Charlie would become a thing of the past. Workers' speed was unquestionably a factor in many logging accidents; however, Crawford's understanding of why loggers pushed themselves to work faster than was really safe was too simplistic. This explanation ignored loggers' identification of speed with skill and skill with masculinity. It also failed to take into account piecework pay scales for some positions on the crew and the impetus to speed up that came along with piecework.

The overly simplistic explanation Crawford creates for accidents like Charlie's is important for two reasons. Firstly, as will be demonstrated in Chapter Two, this over simplification of safety issues prevailed through to the early 1950s among companies, union representatives, and provincial Workmen's Compensation Board officials. Early programs to combat accidents were based on the erroneous assumption that accidents had simple causes and therefore could be prevented by surveilling and controlling workers, and modifying or improving equipment to solve mechanical causes of accidents. Secondly, Crawford's belief that Charlie's accident was the fault of company pressure on loggers to produce more rapidly than was safe, and the consequent belief that the union would be able to control this and thereby eliminate these kinds of accidents, was in line with what the union believed, before its certification.¹⁶⁸ While unionization brought with

¹⁶⁸ "Five More Loggers Killed: Death in the Woods Shows Alarming Increase," *BCLW*, 25 April 1939, p1; "Loggers Crushed to Death: Need Deathless Days Campaign," *BCLW*, 23 July 1939, p1; "Death Mounts to Fifty-Eight," *BCLW*, 21 August 1940, p1; "Mill Organization Will Bring Wage Increases and Better Conditions," *BCLW*, 24 January 1940, p1. Unionization was given in the pages of the IWA's paper as an almost automatic solution to the problem of safety in the woods. Papers published before 1946 did not explain how unionization would improve safety; instead, the paper highlighted the deadly nature of the industry and promised that the answer to this problem was to certify the union at every camp.

it important changes, including union representation on safety committees and a less fluid workforce, it did not solve the safety problem.

The compromise the union made to gain bargaining rights on behalf of workers severely curtailed the union's ability to demand radical changes from industry. Furthermore, the union itself was weakened through the 1940s by infighting between communist and non-communist factions. The 'white bloc' was ultimately victorious and by the 1950s the infighting was over, but this struggle may have further diminished the union's ability to make good on the promises made in the years before certification to eliminate accidents. Though the union would not have a significant direct impact on safety in the twenty-five years after union certification, the indirect impact of the union on workplace safety cannot be ignored. The presence of union members on company safety committees, the threat of strike, and the end unionization brought to transience all worked to pressure companies into proactively working to combat accident rates. As the remaining chapters will demonstrate, safety was predominantly a company-led endeavor, but the dual pressures placed on companies by the union and the WCB respectively were a vital part of a tripartite system of safety regulation.

Chapter 2: Creating a Regulatory Regime

Chapter One examined how the union achieved recognition and bargaining rights in BC's coastal forest industry and why this was an important step to improving safety in the industry. The union, however, was not the only body responsible for protecting workers. The Workmen's Compensation Board (WCB) also played an important role in setting standards to protect workers from on the job accidents. Alongside companies, both it and the union form what John Braithwaite has labelled a responsive regulation model of workplace safety. This chapter focuses on the WCB and how this government regulatory body worked with and at times in opposition to companies and unions to create a safety regime in BC forestry.

Regulation was an integral part of the workplace accident prevention formula for the entire period covered by this study, but in in the 1940s the regulator's role was particularly important in laying a course for companies to follow in trying to make their workplace safer. WCB regulation drove company safety programs in the 1940s. The Board focused on those aspects of workplace danger that its inspectors could readily examine and make recommendations on. This meant that most of its recommendations in the 1940s focused on mechanical, rather than human, dangers. When it came to training workers in safe practice, the WCB and companies focused on training management and foremen with the belief that the safety knowledge would trickle down as foremen corrected workers' work practices to bring them in line with what was understood as safe. The WCB did not dictate accident prevention or safety training, but companies shaped their policies to line up with the WCB's approach to workplace safety. Not until the early 1950s did companies begin to move beyond the regulated elements of safety to try and bring their operations' accident rates down.

In *To Punish or Persuade: Enforcement of Coal Mine Safety* (1985) John Braithwaite describes a model for understanding the way regulatory bodies worked to drive industry wide accident prevention. He applies the term responsive regulation to describe the regulatory model for mining safety in Australia. Since then, Braithwaite along with Ian Ayers, have developed the model from a description of a single phenomenon to a prescriptive formula for regulators to aspire to. I use the Responsive Regulation model for its ability to contextualize and explain the interactions between the WCB (regulator), union (stakeholder), and companies. Studied in isolation, the policies and practices of each of these parties appear incomplete, perhaps even negligent. However, Braithwaite offers a way to understand the interlocking roles of three parties that, despite competing priorities and often virulent clashes, ultimately sought the same outcome when it came to safety: the elimination of accidents.¹

The goal of a responsive regulatory regime is to control the action of companies – seen by regulators and theorists alike as the root of the problem to be regulated. In our case, companies held the direct power to modify the work environment and impact worker culture in ways that would improve safety. At best the union and the WCB could

¹ John Braithwaite, *To Punish or Persuade: Enforcement of Coal Mine Safety*, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985); Braithwaite, "Fasken Lecture: The Essence of Responsive Regulation." *UBC Law Review*, 44, 3 (2011): 475-520. Over time, each of these groups grappled with the idea that not all accidents count be prevented. When it came to accepting some accidents as inevitable, it is probable that the 'acceptable' rate of accidents was different for each of these parties. Chapter 4 will demonstrate that even within a single company, there could be several opinions on what was a reasonable accident rate to deem acceptable. However, the acceptance of the fact that total elimination of all hazards was not possible without completely paralyzing the industry, should not be mistaken for an acceptance of preventable accidents by any of the parties involved in forest safety.

seek to control the company, inspiring management to invest in safety equipment, training, and policies that would reduce or eliminate hazards in the workplace. After 1946, when the union established its relative power through a bitter strike for better hours and wages for forestry workers, the WCB was better able to change actual workplace safety for the better. Unionization prevented companies from "solving" their safety problem by firing unsafe workers, forcing them to actually address workplace safety problems head on. Responsive regulation seeks to create an environment in which companies are incentivized to pursue excellence in a desired field (safety, environmental impact, etc.).

The regulatory body in this model ensures compliance by creating a pyramid of possible responses to non-compliance. At the base of the pyramid responses to non-compliance are non-punitive. These responses might be as simple as pointing out a problem to the company, or offering education on a problem issue.² If companies respond to this first contact by changing their practice or implementing recommended changes then no further sanctions are pursued. If the base of the pyramid does not produce a positive change, the regulatory body continues to move up the "pyramid of sanctions" until compliance is achieved. Ultimately, for this to be effective, the regulatory body must be capable of carrying out a sanction severe enough to guarantee compliance. The existence of such a sanction should ensure that lesser sanctions are effective in most cases.³ While the responsive regulation model relies on an implied threat by regulators, Braithwaite stresses the importance of not voicing this threat as such. Instead, the fact that

² Braithwaite, "Essence," 482.

³ Braithwaite, "Essence," 475, 489, 505-507.

companies know the government agency can take action against them should be sufficient to encourage companies to regulate their own behaviour without the regulator needing to threaten sanctions directly⁴

In addition to the ability to escalate sanctions to force compliance if compliance is not given willingly, the regulatory body employs a "pyramid of supports" to help companies to develop those areas of strength that they already have. Braithwaite emphasises the probability that each company may have strength in one area even while having severe weakness in another. The pyramid of support then is designed to help companies develop these areas along with their areas of weakness. The pyramid of strength starts as the pyramid of sanctions does, with dialogue and education, and escalates through levels of praise from informal praise to formal recognitions of excellence such as the yearly prize the WCB awarded for excellence in safety.⁵ In theory, the combination of these pyramids provides regulators with the ability to both punish undesirable behaviour, and reward desirable behaviour in order to create an atmosphere wherein companies have the maximum incentive to self-regulate in order to achieve maximum compliance with regulators' goals.

The regulatory body is aided in its policing of the workplace by stakeholders. Stakeholders can be shareholders in a publically traded company or, as is the case in this study, they can be the workers, represented by a union.⁶ The role of the stakeholder in responsive regulation is to monitor the company and report non-compliance to the

⁴ Braithwaite, "Essence," 475, 505-507. ⁵ Braithwaite, "Essence," 482.

⁶ Cynthia Estlund, *Regoverning the Workplace: From Self-Regulation to Co-Regulation*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010) 21, 178.

regulatory body or otherwise apply pressure on companies to comply with regulations, or even with their own promises. In this case, the International Woodworkers of America (IWA) fulfilled its stakeholder role by monitoring companies and reporting both through grievances to the company or WCB and by reporting infractions or failures in safety in their newspaper or the public press. Publicity was an important tool in the hands of the union to pressure companies to adhere to accepted best practices in accident prevention.⁷ The union frequently reported the name of companies when accidents occurred, but not all publicity was negative. If a company achieved something the union believed was good this too could receive coverage in the pages of the BC Lumber Worker. However, the union did not primarily use publicity as a means to ensure worker safety. Especially during times of contract negotiation or strike, the union frequently focused its publicity on wages or political agendas rather than workplace safety. Because the IWA represented a diverse group of workers with a diverse group of needs, it put most of its effort into gains that could benefit all groups of workers, such as hours and wages, rather than those issues which would need a specialized solution for each segment of the workforce (like safety).⁸ While the public's perception of the forest industry was important to companies, it was

⁷ "Jury Claims Neglect in Plywood Facility," *BC Lumber Worker* (Hereafter *BCLW*), 28 June 1943, p 3;
"Accidents at Youbou Drop by 70 Percent," *BCLW*, 21 April 1949, p 6; "IWA Victim Blameless,
Management Blamed for Death," *BCLW*, 7 April 1949, p 6; "Negligence – Death!" *BCLW*, 11 August 1949, p 4.

⁸ Irving Abella, *Nationalism, Communism, and Canadian Labour: The CIO, the Communist Party, and the Canadian Congress of Labour* (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1973) 128-132; Neufeld, Andrew, and Andrew Parnaby. *The IWA in Canada: The Life and Times of an Industrial Union* (Vancouver: IWA Canada / New Star Books, 2000) 117-119. The union also contended with significant internal struggles in the late 1940s over Communism. The BC IWA purged the Communist members from its leadership in the summer of 1948 (seven years after than International cut its ties with communism). The purged leaders, including former BC chapter president Harold Pritchard and union organizer Hjalmar Bergren, formed the Woodworkers Industrial Union and from the fall of 1948 until early 1950, the two unions engaged in a bitter battle for control of the BC coastal forest industry. The IWA was ultimately victorious, but the internal turmoil had a clear impact on the union's ability to push for change in that period.

the threat of a strike that was the most powerful tool available to the union. Especially in the 1940s when demand for wood was high and employment was plentiful, companies could not afford to alienate their workers or the union.

For the union, the ability to use publicity to influence company attitudes was just as important after unionization as it had been before. Chapter One identifies the compromises individual workers had to make in order to successfully organize the industry. However, these individual compromises were not the only ones made to achieve bargaining power and job security for forestry workers. By agreeing to a formal contractual relationship with companies, the union had to give up the right to engage in work stoppage or slowdown except when legally permitted during times of contract negotiation. At times of contract negotiation (which for forestry was yearly) the union could take a hard line in negotiations and strike in order to achieve changes to workers' pay, or other aspects of work encoded in the contract. But outside of contract negotiations, the union had limited ability to use militant action to bring change. Prior to official union certification, unions could press for change on any issue deemed important enough by its leaders and members – though such efforts had only minimal success due to companies' successful anti-union tactics. Recognition as the official bargaining agent for workers meant that the IWA gained the legal right to represent workers, but this came at a cost. The "postwar compromise" saw unions exchange the right to engage in militant action and push for revolutionary change for the right to bargain at the end of a contract for the terms of the next contract. Regulations about when and how and why the workers could strike limited the union's ability to push for change. Depending on the terms of the
contract, the union might be prevented from trying to bargain for or against technological change or other aspects of the workplace that were broadly considered to be management rights.⁹ The contract between the IWA and the coastal forestry companies in this study contained clauses for safety, but there is no evidence that the union tried to collectively bargain for workplace safety measures. What is unclear from the evidence is whether or not the union's silence on this matter at times of contract negotiation were because the union was more concerned with wages than working conditions, or if there was an understanding that workplace safety measures including equipment and other issues related to the labour process were non-negotiable.¹⁰

For everything outside of contract negotiation, the union was forced to use the grievance system. While grievances could be (and often were) decided in the union's favour, production continued no matter how many grievances were filed. Grievances posed minimal threat to the company's bottom line and rarely brought change on a larger than case-by-case basis.¹¹ For the union, then, one way to maintain worker militancy and to keep companies accountable for the promises made in their contract, was through publicity. In the pages of the *BC Lumber Worker*, the IWA worked to keep workers' class solidarity high and when necessary, it reached out to the public press to publicize the

⁹ Heron, *Canadian Labour Movement*, 75-84, 149.

¹⁰ There is one example in the 1960s of the union requesting prior notice of any technology change which was turned down by a company. But this demand was not made during contract negotiation, and I cannot find any evidence that the union ever pushed for changes to this section of the contract.

¹¹ For more on the postwar compromise see: Don Wells, "The Impact of the Postwar Compromise on Canadian Unionism: The formation of an Auto Worker Local in the 1950s," *Labour/Le Travail*, 36 (Fall 1995): 147-173; Craig Heron, *The Canadian Labour Movement*, A Short History, 75-84.

plight of the worker.¹² Throughout the period under study companies faced pressure from the WCB and the IWA to reduce accidents. The unprecedented power gained by workers during the war and immediate postwar period inspired change both at the company level and in the WCB. For companies, the 1940s brought a new focus on prevention through education and mechanical change, which laid the foundation for more comprehensive programs which would come in the 1950s. For the WCB, the 1940s were a turning point during which the Board increased its legitimacy and brought about changes to improve its impact on the province's workers.

Forestry workers were first covered by workmen's compensation legislation in BC in 1917. Before their inclusion in the Workmen's Compensation Act (WCA), a forestry employee who was injured on the job, or a family whose wage earner was killed at work, would have to resort to the courts to try to obtain compensation from the employer. While it might be tempting to assume that the awards won by individuals through the courts when an accident occurred far outstripped what the same accident might net an employee under a government workmen's compensation system, the reality in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was that most workers hurt or killed on the job received no compensation whatsoever.¹³ For immigrant workers, obtaining compensation was even

¹² "Press Committee Needed in Every Camp and Mill," BCLW, 19 April 1943, p3.; "Lumber Takes 2 More Lves," *BCLW*, 12 July 1943, p1; "Jury Claims Neglect in Plywood Fatality," *BCLW*, 28 June 1943, p3.
¹³ Robert H. Babcock, "Blood on the Factory Floor: The Worker's Compensation Movement in Canada and the United States," in *Social Welfare Policy in Canada: Historical Readings*, ed. Raymond B. Blake and Jeff Keshen (Toronto : Copp Clark, 1995) 110-111, 113-114. Though companies supported the creation of compensation boards throughout North America in order to avoid the potential of a large successful lawsuit, Babcock asserts that for forestry companies on the pacific coast of the United States, the actual cost of worker on the job injuries in the decades before compensation legislation was almost non-existent. Like any other form of insurance, investors and owners of companies preferred the idea of paying a consistent, predictable rate over the possibility that they might one day have to doll out a large payment. Though Babcock did not study BC's Worker's Compensation, companies on the coast of BC had strong ties to the

more difficult than for workers who had family in the province. The province's most dangerous industries, mining and logging, employed many immigrants whose families often remained in the home country. If a worker without family in the province was killed, his family had to travel to the province and begin a legal battle in a country whose language, let alone laws, might be entirely alien. Even if the family was able to begin the legal process of extracting monetary compensation from companies, the court process could be expensive and took months. Furthermore, there were no guarantees about compensation, nor was support available for families who likely went without any income during the process.¹⁴

Recognizing the inadequacy of the existing structure, British Columbia legislators attempted to enact legislation as early as 1878, when the Workmen's Protection Act was proposed only to disappear after the first of three required readings in the legislature. In 1891 the province passed the Employer's Liability Act. It provided a specific definition of employer negligence, but otherwise was too vague to be particularly useful beyond cutting down on the applicability of the "fellow-servant" defense which held that employers were not liable if a fellow worker had been involved in causing the injury.¹⁵ While the act itself did little to change the law surrounding worker suits against employers, it marked a shift in the court's attitude towards plaintiffs in these cases.

industry in Washington and Oregon and it is reasonable to suspect their motives for supporting Workmen's Compensation were similar.

¹⁴ Chaklader, "History of Worker's Compensation in BC." *Report to the Royal Commission on Worker's Compensation in BC*, May 1988, p 8-9. Chaklader estimates that the success of suits was 20-30% thanks to the doctrines of "contributory negligence," "assumption of risk" and "fellow-servant," if the employee, or fellow employee, could be proven to have done anything at all that contributed to his accident, or the employer could prove there were inherent risks to the job which employees should have known about before beginning work, the employer was not liable.

¹⁵ Chaklader, *Report to the Royal Commission*, 10-11.

Nanaimo MLA J.W. Hawthornwaite introduced the first Workmen's Compensation Act in 1902 as a way to get compensation cases out of the courtroom. It was based on Britain's 1897 Workmen's Compensation Act. The new BC compensation legislation (also called the Workmen's Compensation Act (WCA)) was met with approval from labour and vehement opposition from the lumber industry because of its no-fault compensation model. One of the WCA's major weaknesses was that it would not cover all workers. Loggers and woodworkers were among those excluded.¹⁶

The WCA did not work as intended. More cases ended up in a courtroom under the WCA than before its existence, contrary to the expectations of those who created it. Rather than simplifying the compensation process, the WCA had made a bad situation worse. In 1912 a Royal Commission was begun to make recommendations about workmen's compensation for the province. It conducted interviews with over 400 workers from various industries in the province as well as with company representatives and interested citizens.¹⁷ The Commission presented its recommendations to the legislature in 1914 and the Bowser Bill, written to try and address the problems it identified, was proposed in the summer of 1914. The Bowser Bill was subject to heavy criticism right from the start. "It is so limited in its scope, that it is to all intents and purposes useless..." wrote a labour union task force. It included loggers, but "excluded government employees, fishermen, longshoremen, clerical workers, and casuals." More

¹⁶ Chaklader, *Report to the Royal Commission*, 12-15.

¹⁷ Chaklader, *Report to the Royal Commission*, 14, 17.

problematically, its makeup "would consist of a single commissioner, drawn from the ranks of management."¹⁸

In September 1915 the province created a Select Committee to try and find a solution to its compensation problem. Chaired by Deputy Attorney General Avard B. Pineo, it also included J.H. McVety as the voice of labour, and David Robertson, from the forest industry, to represent employers. They were charged with creating an act to "eliminate so far as possible the economic waste attendant on the present system in force in the Province... protecting the employer against personal-injury claims and ensuring the employee an enlarged and better measure of compensation."¹⁹ They returned their recommendations in March 1916. Chief among them they proposed eliminating private insurers from the workmen's compensation equation. They believed that the system should be state-run and include no personal liability. Employers and employees.²⁰

A new Workmen's Compensation Act passed in May 1916 addressed all of the Pineo Committee's recommendations. According to historian Anjun Chaklader, the new WCA was "unquestionably the most comprehensive and progressive Workmen's Compensation Act in North America."²¹ It experienced a "honeymoon period" of nearly a decade before complaints began to surface, leading the provincial government to appoint

¹⁸ Chaklader, *Report to the Royal Commission*, 21-22.

¹⁹ Chaklader, *Report to the Royal Commission*, 23-24. Accident prevention was often discussed in purely economic terms, regardless of the humanitarian ideals that likely inspired many involved in bringing Workmen's Compensation legislation and accident prevention programs to fruition. In this rhetoric accidents were not looked at as individual tragedies or a humanitarian issue, but as "economic waste." The "economic waste" of industrial accidents was twofold: the injured worker was removed from the workforce and his family left without a breadwinner, and the industry was robbed of productive work hours and a worker from their workforce.

²⁰ Chaklader, *Report to the Royal Commission*, 24-26.

²¹ Chaklader, *Report to the Royal Commission*, 27.

a legislative committee to investigate the Workmen's Compensation Board (WCB) and the WCA in 1927.²² The committee recommended expanding the range of industrial diseases covered by the Act, but the government did not make any changes to the Act itself based on the committee's report.²³

The WCB's position in British Columbia was initially tentative. In January 1932, seventeen logging companies sought, and received, an interim injunction from the BC Supreme Court to prevent it from collecting money from companies until a trial could be held to determine the legality of its levying additional assessments to cover medical costs. The companies accused the board of using money paid in 1932 to cover medical costs from previous years, something they believed placed an unfair burden on the employer since it was the WCB's responsibility to levy fees each year to cover the costs for that year.²⁴ In March 1932 Merrill Ring Wilson Ltd. v. British Columbia was heard by the BC Supreme Court. Its presiding judge decided in favour of the WCB. The companies then worked to have the decision appealed, first through the BC Court of Appeals and, finally, in 1933 taking their appeal all the way to the Privy Council in London England.²⁵ It ruled against the companies, requiring them to resume payments as levied, and to pay for the cost of the appeal.²⁶ A victory for the companies would probably not have dismantled the Compensation Board, but a ruling that it was negligent in its collection and distribution of funds would have seriously undercut the Board's legitimacy. Instead, the decision of the

²² Chaklader Report to the Royal Commission, 27-28

²³ Chaklader, *Report to the Royal Commission*, 29

²⁴ Merrill Ring Wilson Ltd. V. British Columbia (Workmen's Compensation Board), [1932] B.C.J. No. 67, 46 B.C.R. 110.

²⁵ Merrill Ring Wilson, Limited and others v. The Workmen's Compensation Board, [1933] UKPC 62.

²⁶ Merrill Ring Wilson, [1933] UKPC 62.

courts to uphold the WCB's rights to assess and levy premiums garnered it significant legitimacy.

Likely in a response to the underlying concerns of Merrill Ring Wilson Ltd. v. British Columbia, the WCB instituted an experience rating system for logging operations in 1932.²⁷ This two tier system determined a company's assessment rate based on its safety record and aimed to ensure that companies who had the most accidents paid the largest share of the compensation costs. Experience rating first sorted companies into categories of inherent risk. Then, within those categories, it further sorted companies by their accident record (their experience rating). The first grouping was by industry or sector. All of the companies in my study were grouped first into a category based on their size and the fact that they operated both logging and sawmill operations. This distinction determined a base rate ("the base rate is a function of the entire sector's recent claims cost history") which was then further nuanced by the experience rating within that group ("Firms with 'adverse experience' pay a rate that is proportionately higher than the base rate, while firms with more favourable experience pay a lower rate.").²⁸ Experience rating was predicated on the assumption that accidents could, to some extent (excluding the varieties of chance), be controlled but could not be entirely prevented.²⁹ This system was

²⁷ British Columbia. Report of the Royal Commission on the Workmen's Compensation Board (Victoria, BC: King's Printer, 1942): DD 176.

²⁸ Michele Campoleti, Douglas Hyatt, and Terry Thomason. "Experience Rating, Work Injuries and Benefit Costs: Some New Evidence." *Relations Industrielles/Industrial Relations*, 61, 1 (2006) 119.

²⁹ Walter Y. Oi, "On the Economics of Industrial Safety" *Law and contemporary Problems*, 38, 4 (Summer-Autumn 1974) 670, 691, 699; Monroe Berkowitz, "Occupational Safety and Health." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 443. (May 1979) 41, 47. Experience rating systems, at their core, attempted to persuade the owners of capital to invest in safety measures, but neither companies nor government compensation bodies expected that all risk could be eliminated. Rather, government intervention in industrial safety sought to optimize the safety level in industry. In forestry, the persistence of fatal accidents into the twenty first century across both large companies and small owner-operator outfits

eventually extended beyond the forest industry, but this move happened slowly. Until 1986 the only industries subject to experience rating were the high risk "logging, construction, forest products, and metal mining industries."³⁰

While the overall impact of the WCB on safety in the interwar years is difficult to quantify, experience rating offered companies a way to measure themselves against others in their industry and WCB safety awards were given to the companies with the lowest ratings which could be an important point of pride and fodder for public relations campaigns. However, the board lacked the power to enforce regulations beyond the experience rating model. Safety committees mandated in 1920 do not appear to have been taken very seriously.³¹ Even ascribing the best of intentions to operators, and acknowledging the absence of preserved safety committee records prior to unionization,

provides support for the assertion that forestry cannot be practiced with an absolute guarantee of safety. Experience Rating then, looks to improve safety as much as possible, by providing incentive for the owners of capital to improve conditions and regulate workers in pursuit of safe work. While union leaders and labour historians might disagree on the amount of investment in safety and reduction in productivity is acceptable, or who ultimately should determine the acceptable accident rate, total safety in forestry is incompatible with a functional industry. Looking at federal intervention in workplace safety in the United States surrounding the 1970 creation of the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA), Walter Y. Oi asserts that there is a "socially optimal level which minimizes the sum of accident and accident prevention costs." Assuming that industries carry inherent risks, absolute risk prevention would mean industrial paralysis. Therefore, risk mitigation is the best case scenario from accident prevention measures. Government regulation of accidents in the form of Worker's Compensation Boards then sought not to directly prevent all accidents, but to pass the cost of accidents, otherwise born by the injured individual, on to the company. That these programs did successfully impact accident prevention programs was a result of a cost-benefit analysis by companies, in which they determined that the savings brought by preventing accidents outweighed or equaled the costs of investing in prevention. In this way, market forces worked to find a balance between accidents and prevention which was acceptable to society as a whole. It is only when these market forces fail in their regulation of industry that Oi argues governments should intercede directly in safety policy.

³⁰ Campoleti, Hyatt, and Thomason, 119, 120, 122, 140. Experience rating was extended to all industries in the province by 1987.

³¹ After 1946 when the unions gain a place on safety committee, minutes from meetings are plentiful in company archive records. Before 1946 there are very few indicators that a safety committee even exists at CLR. Union insistence on the creation of safety committees with a union presence on them also suggest that the union was unsatisfied with existing committees, if there were even committees.

early safety committees suffered from a fatal flaw: the absence of a worker voice or any

external presence to help balance corporate interest against the interests of the workers.

The WCB acknowledged both its own lack of enforcement power and the better

placement of company officials to educate workers and enforce safe practice in the

following letter:

In the logging industry alone during the first ten months of this year [1938] there were 45 fatal accidents, 170 accidents resulting in permanent impairment, either partial or total, and nearly 3,000 time-loss compensation claims compensated for out of the Accident Fund provided by employers.

While in this office, the dependents of workmen who have lost their lives in logging camps frequently refer to the hazards attendant upon the work which caused the death of their relatives. Widows, other dependents, and impartial observers as well state that they advise their sons against going to work in the woods on account of the number and severity of accidents in the logging industry.

Accident Prevention in any camp is primarily the function of the employer. We believe it is the duty of the employer through his superintendent, woods foreman, bull bucker, hook tender, or other official in charge of a crew to fully instruct the workmen as to the safety of themselves and their fellow workmen. When all mechanical safeguards, devices, equipment and tools are provided to comply with sound practice it is still necessary to follow a safe plan of operation. The person in charge of each crew in any logging camps should know his workmen, their experience, ability to concentrate, their working habits, and their physical and mental fitness to act with safety in an emergency. Adequate training and supervision of workmen is imperative for the safety of those employed. The management should hold those in charge of the crews responsible for correcting dangerous practices of doing work, and they should, with a knowledge of the work and workmen, be able to forestall the disastrous results of any particular job. If the responsibility is not dully discharged by the operators the only alternative is the appointment of a corps of inspectors at a substantial cost to the Accident Fund.

Even if five or six additional accident prevention inspectors were employed it will be seen that to call on over 1,000 logging camps the visits would necessarily be infrequent. At best such inspectors could not begin to do as effective educational work in safety as could be done by those constantly in charge of each crew of men."³²

This letter demonstrates both the helplessness and what is perhaps best called the naiveté

of the WCB in the late 1930s. It also shows the widespread criticism the industry faced

over its safety record from the general public, revealed through letters written to the WCB

directly as well as in newspaper records. Official WCB statistics from 1938 show the total

³² "Re: Logging Accidents," 21 November 1938, CLR, 1, 11, 12.

death count for that year at 51.³³ Even as this letter was being written and sent off to camps, unsafe practices continued to kill and injure workers. If we look solely at the statistics, it would seem this plea for vigilance and better training of employees fell on deaf ears. Logging fatalities continued to climb, not dipping below the 1938 count of 51 deaths until 1943.³⁴ This 1943 low is likely due to fewer loggers working in this time than in previous years because of the demands of Canada's war effort rather than any change in safety practice or general improvement of work conditions.

It is not especially surprising that a letter calling for employers to take on full responsibility for accident prevention, with little incentive to do this well, had no immediate effect. Experience rating was in place for the forest industry by 1938, but demonstrably, experience rating alone was not enough to motivate companies to spend substantial capital on accident prevention measures. In part the reluctance of companies to invest heavily in safety in the 1930s can be understood as a function of the high transiency that still characterized loggers, but if we apply Braithwaite's tripartite model of Responsive Regulation, it is possible to explain company inaction in the pre-war years as well as the sudden intensity of company interest in accident prevention after the war was over. Namely: the WCB's system of positive punishment (fines for infractions) and negative enforcement (the possibility of reduced WCB payments for firms with strong accident prevention records) did not lead to a successful model of regulated selfregulation amongst forestry companies on its own. It was only when a third interested

³³ Provincial Accident statistics obtained through a Freedom of Information and Privacy Protection Act request to Worksafe BC, July 2014. (Hereafter, WCB Statistics) See Appendix B for raw data.

 $^{^{34}}$ WCB Statistics (Appendix B). Though the fatality rate in 1943 dropped to 42 for the year, it is likely that this dip had more to do with a wartime decrease in the workforce than an appreciable change in policy as fatality rates begin to rise again in 1946.

party was added to the equation that meaningful change came to forestry safety. The IWA decried the high death toll in the woods in nearly every issue of its newspaper, *The BC Lumber Worker*. Perhaps in a pragmatic reaction to the often extremely localized hazards of logging, and its lack of appreciable power before 1946, the union's role in actually acting to reduce accidents was limited to participation in company safety committees and generalized educational campaigns. However, the IWA's most significant contribution to promoting safety in this period was the threat to companies' public relations if companies failed to live up to WCB standards, or their promises to employees or the union.³⁵

Not only did the WCB fail to motivate companies before it was backed up by the threat of a strong union, but as the letter writer above demonstrated, WCB inspectors fundamentally misunderstood the reality of camp life in the 1930s. The 1938 letter ignores the situation that most crews in the industry were in constant flux, something that unionization would also reduce. Supervisors were unlikely to have any intimate knowledge of new employees' skills and competencies, and the constant movement of workers made on the job training and evaluation of skills impractical. The use of hiring agencies ostensibly helped logging companies avoid problem workers through the use of the blacklist, but these agencies often relied on individual applicants' self-assessment to place a worker in a job. Self-assessment of workers' honesty in reporting their abilities

³⁵ For some examples of how the union publicized company safety records, both positively and negatively, see: "Jury Claims Neglect in Plywood Facility," *BCLW*, 28 June 1943, p 3; "Accidents at Youbou Drop by 70 Percent," *BCLW*, 21 April 1949, p 6; "IWA Victim Blameless, Management Blamed for Death," *BCLW*, 7 April 1949, p 6; "Negligence – Death!" *BCLW*, 11 August 1949, p 4; Letters written in by members also named the company they worked for, both for negative and positive letters. "Lake Log Men Cut Accidents," *BCLW* 3 May 1943, p 2; "Hammond Plant Safe, Not Lucky" *BCLW*, 21 April 1949, p 6.

was problematic. Especially in times of underemployment workers might be tempted to overstate their qualifications in order to be hired on and the isolation of logging camps meant companies with under-skilled workers had great incentive to use these workers rather than sending them back to town, possibly leaving a crew unable to work until a more suitable worker could be hired and shipped in.³⁶

The call for assistance from the company in regulating the industry's safety was not unprecedented. Limited as they were by their own small staff of inspectors and the sheer number of logging operations to be regulated, the WCB relied on the aid of employers both in reporting problems that needed to be addressed through improved legislation, and in facilitating WCB agents' access to loggers themselves. On 9 November 1938, Comox Logging and Railway company (CLR) superintendent R.J. Filberg arranged a meeting between representatives from the Compensation Board and his men. In a thank you note dated 14 November 1938, Commissioner J.H. Pillsbury praised the loggers' input writing, "We got some very good ideas and I was glad to be able to meet so many intelligent and earnest workmen."³⁷ Even when companies fully cooperated with the Board, the fundamental disconnect in understanding between its members and inspectors, and members of the industry meant that Board recommendations did not always make sense, or at the very least, were often inefficient

In the late 1930s the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) attacked the WCA in the provincial legislature. When amendments put through in 1938 failed to appease the CCF, the Government decided to convene a Royal Commission to investigate

³⁶ "Re: Logging Accidents," 21 November 1938, CLR, 1, 11, 12.

³⁷ J.P.H. to R.J.F. 14 November 1938, CLR, 1, 11, 12.

the problems with the WCA and make recommendations for further amendments. The 1941 Royal Commission was the first on Workmen's Compensation since the WCA was enacted in 1917, but it would not be the last. Over the course of 25 years there would be three Royal Commissions called to address ongoing problems with the WCA and the WCB. Chief Justice Gordon McGregor Sloan presided over the 1941 Royal Commission. Over the course of seven months, Sloan heard testimony from 160 individuals including representatives from all the province's industries, labour representatives, and medical professionals.³⁸ Based on the evidence gathered from these hearings, he released a 400 page report in September 1942 that recommended changes to the existing legislation, most of which were adopted.³⁹

A key issue for the 1941 Sloan Commission was to determine whether or not the 1932 Experience Rating System should remain in place exactly as originally created, be modified in accordance with a request from the BC Loggers' Association, or be eliminated entirely. Scholars interested in the role of regulatory bodies in Canada and the United State in the late nineteenth century and throughout the twentieth century stress that regulation does not develop in a vacuum. In fact, much of the scholarship on regulation understands it as something that primarily serves the interests of the business it is designed to regulate.⁴⁰ While the Commission heard from representatives of labour and

³⁸ Chaklader, *Report to the Royal Commission*, 30.

³⁹ Chaklader Report to the Royal Commission, 32, 33

⁴⁰ For more on responsive regulation and regulatory capture see: Morton Keller, *Regulating a New Economy: Public Policy and Economic Change in America, 1900-1933.* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990); Thomas K. McCaw, Editor. *Regulation in Perspective: Historical Essays.* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981); Daniel Carpenter and David A Moss, editors, *Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence and How to Limit It.* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014);

medical professionals alongside representatives of corporate interests, it was companies with their legal experts and unified front that won many of the most heated issues. For example, union representatives wanted the WCB to enact a policy of blanket coverage, arguing that under the current system of compensation, which limited coverage to workers in specific occupational categories meant that "too many workers were falling 'through the cracks." Blanket coverage, by including all workers in the province under Workmen's Compensation legislation, would, business representatives argued, cause "skyrocketing assessments." Ultimately, Sloan rejected the proposal for blanket coverage in favour of maintaining occupational categories. He also maintained the three day waiting period which labour had strongly opposed, again, favouring corporate interests. Labour refused to take its losses on the issues of blanket coverage and the waiting period lying down. It continued agitation on these issues after the release of the Commission report in 1942 forced the government to implement further amendments to the WCA in 1946, in what would prove to be a vain attempt to forestall a second Royal Commission.⁴¹

For forestry companies, the most important victory of the 1941 Commission was the addition of a BC Logger's Association sub group to the existing experience rating system. This would allow the BC Logger's Association to, as a whole, pay less in compensation if they were able to reduce the accident rate of the entire sub group. There would still be differentiation between subgroup members, but their maximum and minimum costs would differ from the rest of the industry. In 1941 the BC Logger's

Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen and Christine Parker. "Testing Responsive Regulation in Regulatory Enforcement." *Regulation and Governance*, 3, 4 (2009): 376-399.

⁴¹ Chaklader, *Report to the Royal Commission*, 31-34.

Association comprised 30 companies. They produced over half the total board feet of lumber in the province, and employed roughly half of the men. However, BC Logger's Association companies reported less than one half of the accidents or fatalities in the industry.⁴² Though the exact reasons for these companies' relative success in accident prevention are not known, there are several factors that likely contributed to the supremacy of BCLA companies over their competition in accident prevention in the interwar years and into the early 1940s. BCLA member companies tended to be larger ones with a significant amount of capital that could be invested in up-to-date equipment. Larger companies also employed more first aid attendants than smaller ones. Companies employing fewer than 25 employees were not required to have any first aid attendants at all. The BCLA itself also likely played a role as professional organizations were a perfect venue for companies to share successes and failures, engage in first aid or safety competitions and generally passively assist fellow member-companies in achieving shared goals. When it came to experience rating it was in the best interest of all BCLA member companies for their organization to have the strongest safety record in the province – in order that their request to be rated separately be considered seriously.

Ultimately, Sloan recommended that the system be continued and called for the creation of a BC Logger's Association sub group. The 1942 report included an excerpt of the interview with P.A. Wilson, the managing director of Merrill, Ring & Wilson, Limited, to illustrate both the stated willingness of companies to implement safety

⁴² *Report of the Royal Commission*, 1942, DD 178-181. From 1932 to 1941 there were 494 fatalities, 202 of these occurred in BC Logger's Association operations.

policies and training, and the difficulty and expense they encounter when trying to do

this:

A:...how successful our [safety] campaign would be is problematical. We tried it before, and I think I am not over- stating it when I said we had practically no success. We had safety committee meetings in the camps every month and reported them. I think I am correct, they reported to the Compensation Board that in some camps, in order to get enough employees to come to safety -first meetings to hold meeting they had to pay them. Q: IS there any objection to paying them?

A.-No, it is only that it shows their lack of interest.

Q. What would your judgment be as to the advisability of a sub-class [within the experience rating system] in order to promote this sort of activity?

A.-In view of the number of accidents, viewed from the point of humanity first and cost second, anything is worth trying, but I am not in a position to state how successful it might be⁴³

While Wilson was convinced that employees lacked interest in safety committee work because the only way the company got men to attend meetings regularly was by paying them, his interpretation was problematic. In 1941 loggers worked extremely long hours at a difficult job. It should not have been surprising that they did not choose to voluntarily give up their limited free time to attend safety meetings. Before union certification in 1943, they likely feared being fired if they expressed any opposition to their bosses. Attending a safety meeting, therefore, would likely not have been seen as a productive use of workers time. Rather than evidence of a lack of interest in safety, we can interpret the workers' desire to be compensated for their work as a logical step for them in a capital-labour relationship. By continuing the system of experience rated assessments, the Sloan Commission reinforced the idea that companies' pursuit of profit was a sufficient motive to drive accident prevention, a belief that would continue to underlie compensation legislation for decades.

⁴³ Report of the Royal Commission, 1942, DD 180.

In his analysis of the Workmen's Compensation Board from its origins to 1994, Anjun Chaklader asserts that, "Chief Justice Sloan struck a delicate balance in trying to look at each issue individually while keeping a 'scorecard' in mind so that both labour and business could embrace his recommendations overall."⁴⁴ However, despite changes intended to increase the Board's ability to inspect industry and enforce its regulations, it failed to address the fundamental problem of accident prevention in this period: that those making the legislation did not fully comprehend the actual, on the ground conditions that needed to be addressed in order for any sort of effective accident prevention model to be created.

Despite a lack of insight into the problems in the forest industry, WCB regulations did offer workers some protection from the dangers of their industry. The earliest measures to do so involved accident mitigation rather than prevention. As a May 1943 report from the WCB explained, "A very slight difference in conditions means a fatal instead of a non-fatal injury, and vice versa."⁴⁵ First aid was often literally a matter of life or death. Beginning in 1922, Workmen's Compensation regulations required that every operation with more than twenty-five employees have a certified, dedicated first aid attendant. However, companies like BC Forest Products and Comox Logging and Railway went beyond this regulation, offering free training for any employee or camp resident who was interested.⁴⁶ The logic behind such a move is obvious: the more individuals who were able to perform first aid, the greater likelihood someone would be

⁴⁴ Chaklader, *Report to the Royal Commission*, 32.

⁴⁵ WCB report May 1943, CLR 3A, 23, 15.

⁴⁶ St. John's Ambulance, "Annual Report," 1941, CLR 3A, 22, 4, p1; Memo 4 Feb 1948, KSMA 997.54 1948, Beed 48.

on hand to prevent a serious accident from becoming a fatality. In addition to bringing tragedy to workers and community members, fatal accidents were expensive. As of the 1948 master agreement between the IWA and members of the BC Loggers Association, when a fatality occurred, all employees working on that side could take the rest of the shift off without penalty or prejudice. While the agreement could not force companies to pay the wages of these workers, the result was a lost day of productivity.⁴⁷ Fatal accidents also cost the company in terms of WCB payments. After 1932, companies paid a premium to the WCB based on the cost of all claims from their employees for the preceding two years. The 1942 Sloan Commission increased the amount of money paid for fatalities. The new regulations set the pension paid by the WCB to the widow of a deceased worker at \$40 per month until her death or remarriage. Children under sixteen years of age received \$10 per month.⁴⁸ The total cost of a fatality could be in the tens of thousands of dollars.⁴⁹ This cost was passed on to companies through increased premiums for poorly rated companies and fines for companies found in violation of WCB regulations.

A company's WCB experience rating category was determined by the number of claims submitted and by their severity. In minor cases, reporting injuries was up to the First Aid attendant. First aid was not solely for preventing bad injuries from becoming fatalities, attendants also dealt with minor injuries. Workers were expected to report injuries to the first aid man as soon as it occurred or at the end of the shift if the injury did

⁴⁷ 1948 Master Agreement. KSMA 997.54, 1948, Union IWA 48.

 ⁴⁸ Report of the Royal Commission, 1942, DD 42; Chaklader Report to the Royal Commission, 71.
 ⁴⁹ "Injury Costs," 24 Jan 1949, KSMA 997.54, 1949, Evans 49; Farris to Macklin, "Re: Workmen's Compensation Act Amendments," 18 Jan 1943, CLR 3A, 23, 15.

not require the worker to lay off working for that day. The WCB often solicited these reports when processing a claim, and workers who failed to report an injury could find themselves fighting the company in order to receive compensation payments.⁵⁰ When camps employed a doctor as well as a first aid attendant, they struggled to get the men to report to the first aid office before going to the doctor. While many injuries would be immediately referred onwards to a doctor, especially any accident that might have effected a worker's eyes, it was more cost effective for the company to have workers treated by the first aid attendant when possible since the company had to pay for each doctor's visit, either through the hospital insurance they supplemented or in a potentially increased WCB premium.⁵¹

R.J. Filberg, Superintendent of Comox Logging and Railway's Courtney division maintained a very close relationship with the St. John's Ambulance Association. In 1940, it created a Comox Logging & Railway Branch with Filberg as the Vice President. The company remained a sustaining member of the St. John's Ambulance Association throughout the 1940s. A 1941 list of sustaining members showed the CLR donated twice as much as the next highest donor.⁵² This close relationship between the company and the first aid association can be seen in the money donated, and in the promotion of company-wide first aid training. Filberg had special rooms built at his camps specifically for holding first aid classes. In 1940 the CLR ran free first aid certification in both its Courtney and Ladysmith operations. The classes were very well attended, with over 100

⁵⁰ "Re: Carl Lieb, #4018862," 14 August 1940, CLR, 4, 28, 3; Claims Department ,17 August 1940, CLR, 4, 28, 3; "Re: Claims 4021011 and 4019459," 24 August 1940, CLR, 4, 28, 3.

⁵¹ Hobson to Parker and Horning, 16 August 1948, KSMA 997.54, 1948, Misc 48.

⁵² "Sustaining Members, 1941" undated. CLR 3A, 22, 4.

people in each location being trained, including both loggers and their wives. Not only did the opportunity for free first aid training give them skills they needed in their day-to-day lives, but there was a social aspect to the training as well. Certification would open up the possibility for every individual in the camp to join in first aid competitions which sometimes included company sponsored travel. The company was also commended for its excellence both in offering training and in its Air Raid Preparation work.⁵³ Filberg also made his safety supervisor, A.J. Taylor, available to the Courtney school to teach children first aid.⁵⁴

First Aid was not solely for white workers and their wives. Though company run first aid training likely was only available in English, St. John's Ambulance did occasionally run special training sessions for training non-white individuals. Unfortunately, the archival record of these classes does not give sufficient detail to know how much this impacted workers in forestry. However, based on the fact that white workers attended sessions run by the St. John Ambulance, it is possible that non-white workers also received first aid training when classes were offered.⁵⁵ In its 1941 annual report, the Victoria chapter of St. John's Ambulance reported that it had successfully run, "a Warden's Class in First Aid for Chinese and a Home Nursing class for Indians from the Craigflower District."⁵⁶ It went on to say that, "the members of both these classes

⁵³ "1941 Annual Report from Centers," CLR 3A, 22, 4, p14; CLR 3A.22.4, "1940 Annual Report," CLR 3A, 22, 4, p13.

⁵⁴ Costain to Filberg, 27 June 1945, CLR, 2(1), 14, 30.

⁵⁵ Unsigned to J Taylor, 18 March 1937, CLR, 28, 7; Edwardson to Taylor, 6 October 1944, CLR. 29, 14.

⁵⁶ It is not clear whether these classes were for indigenous workers, or immigrants from India. Both groups were at times referred to as Indian. There was a large proportion of south east Asian workers in the Cowichan valley working at Paldi in this period.

were keenly interested in their work and passed examinations for certificates with credible results."⁵⁷

In addition to their practical benefits, first aiders contributed to positive public relations for forestry companies. First aid classes were run at logging camps and in community centers, and teams of workers or community members competed in first aid competitions.⁵⁸ The earliest first aid competitions were held by the Mine Safety Association.⁵⁹ Later, the St. John's Ambulance Association and then forestry companies themselves organized first aid competitions throughout the province.⁶⁰ The Comox Logging and Railway first aid teams were especially successful, as in 1940 when its St. John's Ambulance Associations than any other district.⁶¹ These victories both boosted the camp's morale and gave the company an important opportunity to publicize its commitment to safety. For employees, the existence of first aid teams and competitions offered both a social activity and a point of pride.

Unlike Accident Prevention programs that aimed to improve the safety of workers, first aid focused on accident mitigation. In the 1940s it was necessary for companies to maintain rigorous first aid training since they could not confidently expect that accidents would not occur, or would only occur occasionally. The investment in first

⁵⁷ 1941 Annual Report from Renters, CLR. 3A.22.4, p22. The report does not give details about the attendees of these classes. Those in the first aid class may have been workers in the logging industry. It is likely that most in the Home Nursing class were women, which could have included wives of workers in a number of different coastal industries, but exact details of who took these classes and for what purpose are not available.

⁵⁸ "Official Circular No. 1 – 1939" Vancouver Island & Coast district Branch, British Columbia Mine Safety Association, CLR, 2(1), 12, 20; Wood to Sheasgreen, 24 June 1948, CLR 2(2), 16, 112; Dick to Lloyd, 5 May 1949, KSMA 997.54, 1949, Dick Bird 49.

⁵⁹ "Official Circular No. 1 – 1939" Vancouver Island & Coast district Branch, British Columbia Mine Safety Association, CLR 2(1), 12, 20.

⁶⁰ Dick to Lloyd, 5 May 1949, KSMA 997.54, 1949, Dick Bird 49.

⁶¹ St. John's Ambulance Association, "1941 Annual Report," CLR 3A, 22, 4, p14.

aid in the 1940s, then, can be interpreted as a limited admission of failure, or, if not failure, the fact that the forest industry's dangers were beyond the companies' or WCB's ability to control. Though WCB literature and company programs were rooted in the belief that accidents were preventable, and therefore should be prevented. Sometimes correspondence about safety programs expressed a pessimism, or realism, towards the end of the decade. In a letter dated 24 January 1949, BC Forest Products Safety Supervisor R.E. Evans admitted that, "[i]t is not possible to prevent all the accidents." Evan's statement was followed by a stark accounting of the monetary reality of accidents.⁶² It might be tempting to reduce Evans' resignation to the reality of accidents to indifference and avarice. However, the continued efforts made by him, and others at the management level, indicated a continued belief in the core assumptions of accident prevention laid out by the WCB in 1940:

1. That accidents are a most serious problem, jeopardizing happiness, industrial efficiency

and economic well-being.

2. That every accident has an ascertainable cause and does not 'just happen'.

3. That accidents can be prevented.⁶³

Though company accident prevention programs were, of necessity, rooted in a belief in these principles, the inherent dangers of the industry were not as easily overcome as was hoped. However, this simple plan for accident prevention in 1941 was part of a foundation laid during the Second World War which led to a significant decrease in fatal and non-fatal accidents over the next twenty five years.

The Second World War had a massive impact on the BC forest industry. As we saw in Chapter One, the total mobilization of the industry created the conditions for union

⁶² "Injury Costs," 24 January 1949, KSMA 997.45, 1949, Evans 49.

⁶³ "Re: Accident Prevention," 23 May 1941, CLR 3A, 23, 15.

certification, but unionization was not the only significant result of the war. During the war, the demand for workers at home, and for soldiers overseas, worked to reduce transiency. This aided the cause of the IWA. Companies saw increased profits due to the increased demand for wood during the war. Full employment and dramatically reduced transience also encouraged companies to invest in training workers in safer ways to work to avoid slow-downs or shut downs because of injury. The war also provided powerful public relations and industrial relations rhetoric. Both the WCB and companies used the rhetoric of the total war effort to gain public support. Companies believed that public support helped ensure favourable legislation from the provincial government.⁶⁴

Safety and accident prevention measures during the war reflected the industry's desire to improve its public image – which had been damaged by a series of unsuccessful but virulent strikes in the 1930s – by tapping into the public's concern for Canadian lives. Attempts to improve public relations were not in themselves a product of the war; the BCLA created a publicity department in 1935 to ensure positive press coverage of its members, but companies did not waste the opportunity the war offered to improve their public standing.⁶⁵ Safety and accident prevention were not officially part of the public

⁶⁴ Because provincial rulings governed conservation, and fire prevention through the Forest Branch (renamed the Forestry Service in 1947), as well as making recommendations about technology, harvesting practices, the public opinion on how BC's forest resources should be managed could have a significant impact on companies' ability to make profits. By 1947, having strong public support for forestry was vital. The province began to enforce an allowable cut on crown land and companies needed public support if they were to successfully campaign to have this amount increased. The public also influenced modifications to the Workmen's Compensation Board (WCB) through participation in Royal Commissions. Getting the public on side, and keeping them there, was therefore a central motivator for many policies forestry companies adopted in the 1940s.

⁶⁵ "Report of the Publicity Committee" 1938, CLR 3A, 19, 25; W. Bruce Hutchinson "Confidential" to R.V. Stuart, 20 September 1935, CLR 3A 19, 25, p1-2. Founded in May of 1935 in response to the loggers' strike in 1934 and the negative publicity which accompanied it, the BC Logger's Association Publicity Committee was responsible for improving the public image of the forest industry broadly and the

relations agenda in the 1940s, but that did not mean they were not of concern or that the Publicity Committee did not attempt to mitigate the industry's poor safety record. In a letter to Bruce Hutchinson, an editor with the Victoria *Times*, Comox Logging and Railway Superintendent R.J. Filberg wrote:

Kanway Supermendent K.J. Phoerg wrote.

Believe me Bruce when I state that in the matter of accident prevention I am certainly for it, and anything anyone does which will reduce the number of accidents in the woods suits me OK [sic]. I would not attempt to protect any operator who is not doing his share to make logging safe employment. On the other hand it does not seem right that an entire industry should be put on the spot because of a small minority. Logging operators who successfully conduct their operations with less than the average number of accidents should receive credit instead of condemnation.

...It might be interest to know the total number of hours worked and number of accidents in the coal mines at Nanaimo for comparison with a logging operation. I understand the work is so intermittent in the coal mines that a comparison would be of little use unless it is on the basis of man days. I am certain that at least in our case the mines have more accidents than logging.⁶⁶

This is not to say that safety programs during the war were nothing but public relations spin, but the BC Loggers Association companies were certainly aware of the public relations impact their attempts to improve safety could have. In 1940 Filberg sent a shipment of safety stickers and stencils to the company's operation at Fraser Mills, writing in the accompanying letter: "I don't know how much, if any, good this sort of safety publicity will accomplish but it can certainly do not harm and will identify our

companies in the Association more specifically. The Publicity Committee wrote articles and press releases for British Columbia's daily papers, but also weekly papers, business papers for Eastern Canada, and industry papers published in the United States. The goal was to create a positive image through "consistent presentation of [the Association's] case over a long period" in order to keep a positive impression in the "public consciousness." The newspaper space, "an average of about 20 columns per month or about threequarters of a column a day" across the publications, was in unpaid articles which were "far more valuable... than any space which could be bought as advertising, since advertising in support of the logging industry would naturally be largely discounted." Furthermore, there was an "effort to make [the] material as unobtrusive and matter-of-fact as possible" to avoid "the impression that we are spreading a heavy propaganda."

⁶⁶ Filberg to Hutchinson, "Personal and Confidential," 2 November 1935, CLR 3A, 19, 25; *Report of the Royal Commission*, 1942, 178. BC Logger's Association was responsible for more than half the timber production in the province, but they were consistently the safest companies in terms of reported accidents and fatalities.

Company with the interest we all feel for safety."⁶⁷ Clearly, for Filberg, who described himself in 1935 as someone who had studied accident prevention, and as an ally to anyone who would work to prevent accidents, it was not enough to try and improve safety: a good safety program was also a public relations matter.⁶⁸

Like the safety stickers Filberg ordered in 1940, the public relations benefit of a "Safety School" organized to coincide with the Pacific Logger's Congress held in Victoria in 1940 was held as equal to the potential benefit the "school" would have on its attendees.⁶⁹ The "Safety School" involved a two-day first aid and safety conference designed to coincide with the Pacific Loggers' Congress, held for company management. The two conferences would overlap, with a one-hour First Aid demonstration done by the Safety School on the final day of the Pacific Logger's Congress, the only segment on safety scheduled for the Congress.⁷⁰ In a letter urging Filberg to send at least one delegate from his camp to ensure there was a decent turnout for the Safety School, BC Logger's Association chairman Dewey Anderson wrote: "I need hardly point out that in supporting this very constructive project [the Safety School] we shall not only assist our men in improving their knowledge of First Aid and safety practices, but we shall also accomplish something very worthwhile in public relations."⁷¹

⁶⁷ Filberg to Murray, 14 May 1940, CLR 2, 12, 15.

⁶⁸ Filberg "Personal and Confidential" to Hutchinson, 2 November 1935, CLR 3A, 19, 25.

⁶⁹ Anderson to Filberg, 28 August 1940, CLR 2, 12, 21.

⁷⁰ Brown to Filberg, 26 Aug 1940, CLR 2, 13, 3. The PLC did not include a full length panel on safety until 1955.

⁷¹ Anderson to Filberg, 28 August 1940, CLR 2, 12, 21. Though safety was used to create positive publicity, the focus of company publicity campaigns had more to do with favourable legislation regarding harvesting process and allowable cut than safety. Company officials believed that if the public saw logging as destructive not only to the environment but also to the human agents who worked in the woods, voters would be less inclined to side with the industry on matters of public policy.

The Safety School was in line with the 1940s idea that safety problems could be fixed through trickle-down education. The two-day event was directed at men in middle management, such as the Safety Executive or engineer, rather than the rank-and-file employees who were the likely victims of logging accidents. This was not an anomaly. For the most part, safety programs in the 1940s aimed at educating foremen and supervisors, with the expectation that these men would pass on their knowledge to employees and supervise them closely to ensure that every worker adhered to safety regulations. This logic, however, was flawed. Though there was a rigid chain of command in logger operations, most loggers did their work out of sight of their foreman. Even the most vigilant and well-trained foreman could not watch every part of every worker's process in order to ensure workers were doing exactly as this training dictated. Passing their knowledge down to individual workers was also not viable since time spent discussing how work should be done was time in which work was not actually being done and profit was not being made. Especially for workers paid a piecework bonus, this was not a practical option. Accidents also cut into profit margins, but companies in this period seemed to see trickle-down training as the right balance between investing in accident prevention and protecting their profits by maximizing productive hours. During this period no evidence suggests that companies attempted to run training sessions during non-working hours. Instead, they assumed that the training given to their foremen, managers and superintendents would somehow trickle down to the workers and work to improve the camp's overall safety record. If companies acknowledged the flaws in this approach to accident prevention, they did not discuss it in internal memos or correspondence.

Though safety programs in this period focused predominantly on supervision and prescriptive documents as the key to a safer workplace, the lack of training for individual workers should not be seen as a lack of interest in promoting safety on the part of companies, or a tolerance for unsafe behaviours that were recognized as such. In addition to any humanitarian reasons for wanting to reduce their accident rates, companies were motivated by a desire both to create a positive public image and to mitigate the impact of accidents on their bottom line. Accordingly, as one worker told it, "[i]f a person did something wrong that was detrimental to the safety of others he was fired immediately and when he got to camp that night his cheque was waiting for him – much to his surprise."⁷² While the ability to fire an employee for unsafe behaviour was curtailed somewhat when the International Woodworkers of America (IWA) gained certification in 1943, companies continued to dismiss employees they deemed unsafe throughout the entire period covered by this study.⁷³

The WCB used the war effort to help motivate companies to follow its regulations. Workers were reconceptualised as, "the man-power which makes maximum production possible... in this present life and death struggle" and accidents were portrayed as "stoppages in the chain of production." Forestry was a war industry, this meant that, "A falling object which strikes down a workman... and a flying bullet which

⁷² Trevor Goodall oral history in Gold, *Logging As It Was*, 168.

⁷³ The firings we have records of are the ones the IWA disputed which ended up in arbitration. Depending on the type of violation of safety the board at times upheld the firing and other times required that the man be rehired. See Chapter 3 for some examples of these disputes.

kills or wounds one of our fighting men may both be put on the record as an advantage gained by our enemies."⁷⁴ This overt focus on the importance of production to the war effort did not always work in the WCB's favour, however. In 1943, the Comox Logging and Railway Company claimed to be unable to complete upgrades to their camp that the WCB inspection had shown necessary stating, "We are operating with much less than normal staff... We don't know which is most important, if you let us alone we will do the work you order at the first possible moment or if you order us to do the ...job at once we will do so and let our timber production suffer."⁷⁵ The company, faced with the wartime labour shortage chose to favour its overall ability to produce as much lumber as possible over the potential for an accident if the requested changes to the wiring of their machine shop was not completed. Commissioner Pillsbury responded that:

Slowing down the production of materials vitally needed in the war effort is the last thing which the Board would want to do, and I am just a little surprised, in view of the cooperation which you have always extended... However, we can let the matter lie until Mr. Taylor [the WCB's Chief Electrical Inspector] himself has an opportunity to get into [your camp at] Headquarters, where I hope he may have the privilege of discussing the matter with yourself.⁷⁶

The WCB's response indicates that this kind of push back was not common, at least not from Filberg's camp. Certainly the preserved record indicates that CLR usually complied with WCB requests.⁷⁷ However, in this instance the company's use of the WCB's own rhetoric against it made it difficult for the Board to push any harder or implement any punitive measures on the company for refusing to comply immediately.⁷⁸ This exchange

⁷⁴ WCB, "The Production Front," 15 October 1942, CLR 3A, 23, 15.

⁷⁵ Filberg to WCB "Your File Firm #1829" 3 April 1943, CLR 3A, 23, 15.

⁷⁶ WCB to Filberg, 7 April 1943, CLR 3A, 23, 15.

⁷⁷ Workmen's Compensation Board Inspection Report, November 1940, CLR 4, 28, 3; Letter to WCB, 20 November 1940, CLR 4, 28, 3; WCB to company, 22 November 1940, CLR, 4, 28, 3.

⁷⁸ WCB to Filberg, 7 April 1943, CLR 3A, 23, 15.

took place nearly three months after the initial report had required the company to make the necessary upgrades. Yet, the most the WCB was willing or able to do was send its Chief Electrical Inspector to try and make a personal entreaty to the company to get the change taken care of.

Companies did not always want to comply with WCB recommendations or regulations, especially if doing so would slow production at a time when demand eclipsed possible production rates. However, both groups agreed high accident rates were the result of either employee non-compliance with or ignorance of safe practices. In a 1941 letter on accident prevention, the WCB advised management:

...we believe that those engaged in the industry should be frequently reminded that the SAFE way of performing any task is the RIGHT way...The task of teaching and training industrial workers is the responsibility of the management. This can be done by the foreman, supervisor and others in direct charge of the work being performed. From our records it would appear that there had been a relaxing in active supervision and education during the past year...The Accident Prevention Regulations should be carefully studied by all those in charge of work. Strict compliance with the Regulations and frequent inspection would have materially curtailed the number and severity of accidents which occurred last year...No surer way of developing safety consciousness has been evolved than by making it known that the management insists on safe methods of doing work within its organization. The example shown by the employer, supervisor or foreman, will quickly be reflected in the attitude of the workmen in doing their particular jobs. Curtailment in accidents means a reduction to employers in accident cost.⁷⁹

The final line of the letter refers explicitly to the experience rating system (discussed earlier in this chapter), reminding companies that there is a financial incentive available for safe operation. This call to the avaricious nature of corporate culture rather than the humanitarian side of managers suggests that the WCB believed that the way to the corporate heart was through its pocketbook. Certainly the WCB's policies in the 1930s and 1940s were rooted in this understanding of the best way to ensure company

⁷⁹ WCB, "Re: Accident Prevention" 23 May 1941, CLR 3A, 23, 15.

compliance. The author avoided the humanitarian implications of a successful safety program and instead chose to appeal to managers as part of a profit driven corporation, rather than as men who had concern for their workers. This letter's explicit direction that supervisory staff should be charged with every man's safety is further reinforced by the fact the writer assumed that an increase in accidents in 1940 directly resulted from a lack of training and supervisory oversight, rather than inquiring into other factors that could have contributed to the accident rate, such as an increase in inexperienced men as many loggers left to serve their country overseas, or the pressure to produce faster in order to meet the needs of war production, and to maximize company profits.

This focus on compliance and top down enforcement of safe practices came to the forefront during the war years, spurred on by the spirit of collective responsibility that underlay Canada's war mobilization, and continued to shape the safety policies in the immediate postwar period. New companies formed in booming postwar lumber market, including BC Forest Products (BCFP) and Western Forest Industries (WFI), created their company policies based on this understanding of safety and in some ways never completely moved away from the focus on worker compliance, though as we will see in Chapter Three, the methods for ensuring worker compliance changed over time. Certainly, for the remainder of the 1940s and into the 1950s, forestry safety was rooted in the idea that a "right" way should be taught by management and enforced by the WCB as the primary solution to forest safety.

After the war, the Canadian public demonstrated a broad interest in preventing unnecessary loss of life at home, presumably a reaction to the high human cost of the war.

126

From 1946 through the 1950s, articles about road safety, safety in the home, and industrial safety peppered the *Victoria Times Colonist's* pages. Most prevalent in these years was the issue of automobile safety. The newspaper published reports of children killed when they fell out of automobiles because they were not wearing their seatbelts, and in 1950 a stretch of highway on the Malahat was labelled "death alley."⁸⁰ The articles called for modifications to the road itself and to the posted speed limit. Concerned citizens even paid to place advertisements in the paper with headings like "Death Alley Must Go."⁸¹ While this focus on traffic safety is not directly related to safety in the woods, the general passion displayed by those who wrote letters to the paper or paid for advertisements in pursuit of safer roadways was remarkable. It indicates a public consensus regarding the need for accidents and accidental deaths to be eliminated wherever possible. For logging companies, this meant that an important part of getting the public on its side was to demonstrate its similar commitment to accident prevention.

The policies undertaken by companies to promote safety in the 1940s were devised primarily to improve the image of the forest industry and to ensure basic compliance with the Workmen's Compensation Board. As such, they tended to be *ad hoc* and ineffectual in implementing long term change. Rather than formulating a long term strategy to deal with the problem underlying accidents in the woods, individual accident prevention initiatives were reactionary – after an accident occurred because of an

⁸⁰ Malahat drive is a stretch of the Island Highway between Victoria and Mill Bay. The narrow highway winds over a mountain with cliffs on both sides. In the 1940s the road was primarily two lanes and with minimal dividers between the lanes. Subject to extreme weather and generally a dangerous section of road even in good weather, the Malahat's nickname was well earned.

⁸¹ "Death Alley Must Go" 12 September 1950, *Victoria Times Colonist (VTC)*, p 1; "Death Alley" 13 September 1950, *VTC*, p 4; "For Safer Roads" 16 September 1950, *VTC*, p 4.

identifiable problem such as an employee not wearing a hard hat, the company might implement a local policy to address that specific incident. If many accidents occurred along similar lines, companies or the WCB would step in to recommend a fix for that specific type of accident, but there was no broader sense of trying to determine if larger steps could be taken to transform the industry. However, by the late 1940s this began to change. Though records do not indicate the thought process behind this change, there is an underlying ideological slant to some of the safety discourse circa 1948 which shows the beginnings of a broader safety promotion tactic companies would adopt in the 1950s.

By the late 1940s, safety discourse began to draw connections between following safety regulations and a specific, white, heterosexual masculinity. For example, the 1948 payroll insert showed a picture of Betty Grable in a sparkling body suit across from a cartoon man falling hard after tripping over a cable with a poem in between to remind men to watch their step in the woods:

Falling hard is quite alright If the girl's like Betty Grable, But falling hard is not so fun, When you're falling over cable.⁸²

While companies sought to decrease accidents across the board, and non-white workers were included in safety committees and accident prevention training, safety literature and the ideals embodied by the safe work discourse companies promoted were heteronormative and white.⁸³

The only specific discussion of the safety of non-white workers as distinct from white workers in the documentary record was a single discussion from BCFP's Caycuse

⁸² Payroll Enclosure, KSMA 997.54, 1948, Evans Roy 48.

⁸³ Evans to Hobson, 13 June 1949, KSMA, 997.54, 1949. Evans 49.

camp in 1949 where management discussed the use of a bell on the camp speeder following an incident where an elderly Chinese resident of the camp was nearly struck by the speeder. The concern expressed in the correspondence was that language barriers between Asian and Euro-Canadian workers might create distinct hazards within the camp itself.⁸⁴ Chinese workers at BCFP worked in a Chinese crew with a Chinese boss who represented his crew at safety meetings.⁸⁵ The correspondence after the speeder accident suggests that this was the first incident of a Chinese worker being injured in camp. That the company's reaction was immediately to look for ways to eliminate the hazard by changing white workers' behaviour rather than blaming the Chinese worker was not anomalous. When it came to safety and accident prevention, as far as I can tell from the available evidence, there were no clear distinctions between the treatment of white and non-white workers. There is no breakdown of accidents by race available in the documentary record. However, when Chinese workers were injured, the evidence available indicates they received the same treatment as white workers. Part of the personnel manager's job was visiting injured workers or wives of workers in hospital and reporting back to management on their condition. These reports include non-white workers alongside white workers.⁸⁶ When it came to accident prevention measures in the

⁸⁴ Evans to Hobson, 17 May 1949, KSMA, 997.54, 1949. Evans 49.

⁸⁵ Evans to Hobson, 13 June 1949, KSMA, 997.54, 1949. Evans 49.

⁸⁶ Bird to Hobson, "Re: Weekly Visit to Duncan Hospital" 7 March 1949, KSMA 997.54, 1949, Dick Bird 49; Close to Whiles, "Hospital Trip," 28 April 1949, KSMA 997.54, 1949, Dick Bird 49; Bird to Hobson, "Re: Weekly Visit to Duncan Hospital" 2 May 1949, KSMA 997.54, 1949, Dick Bird 49; Bird to Hobson, "Re: Weekly Visit to Duncan Hospital" 9 May 1949, KSMA 997.54, 1949, Dick Bird 49; Bird to Hobson, "Re: Weekly Visit to Duncan Hospital" 16 May 1949, KSMA 997.54, 1949, Dick Bird 49.

camp, posters, safety broadcasts, and camp safety meetings were exclusively in English and enforced white, heteronormative values.⁸⁷

Posters promoting safe work often came loaded with images enforcing values beyond proper work techniques. In 1950 BC Forest Products Safety Supervisor, R.E. Evans forwarded a series of safety posters to BC Forest Products' superintendents asking them to reply with how many they required of each. He suggested the posters be printed in miniature as payroll enclosures, or as flyers to be sent to employees or "handed out at Safety or other meetings."⁸⁸ In the letter Evans mentions proper lifting specifically: "So many people are hurt by the IMPROPER method of lifting that it is profitable to spend a little extra time teaching this process. Very few seem to know that very serious injury results from simple back strain." The attached posted labelled "How to Lift" addresses this concern, illustrating the eight rules for lifting safety. Like the 1948 payroll insert, this poster uses a woman to help make its point. For the seventh instruction - "keep the load close to you" - the worker does not lift a box or board: he carries a woman.⁸⁹ The underlying message in these two publications is subtle, but integral to understanding the direction safety promotion would take in the 1950s. Safety was not merely about a logger keeping himself accident free; working in accordance with safety guidelines was consistent with a heteronormative, white, masculinity. These images, Betty Grable in a tight fitting, glittering body suit, and the woman curled against the worker's chest so her

⁸⁷ The Chinese crew at BCFP's camp 6 had a Chinese boss. If there were workers who did not speak English on his crew, it is likely that the boss acted as a translator so workers could understand what was expected of them. However, it is unlikely that Chinese workers were as saturated by accident prevention messages as their white coworkers.

 ⁸⁸ Evans to Superintendents "Special Employee Safety" 9 November 1950, KSMA 997.54, 1950 Evans, 50.
 ⁸⁹ NSC "How to Lift," KSMA 997.54, 1950 Evans, 50.

face was hidden from view – but not her blonde hair, knee length dress, or high heels – were not chosen at random by the National Safety Council when designing their safety literature, nor were they the sole choice offered companies. These images were chosen because they were expected to have a specific impact: to teach men that safety, not risk-taking, was the epitome of manliness. Manliness itself, as defined by these posters, was white, and heterosexual. While posters and other externally created publications show some consistent themes, espcially around the maculinity of safety, in the late 1940s, company accident prevention efforts in this period were not closely tied to any ideology.

Despite the often *ad hoc* nature of safety in this period, there were some significant improvements made to safety in the woods in the form of safety equipment. The first mention of hard hats for woods employees in the archival record is in 1949, but it is clear from this letter that this equipment had been available, if underused, for at least a few years. Hard hats offered workmen protection from one of the serious causes of injury for loggers: falling objects.⁹⁰ Pacific Coast loggers had slang for a falling branch: they called it a "widow maker." While this may sound melodramatic those unfamiliar with the Pacific rainforest or coastal logging, the slang was fitting. The trees being harvested by loggers on Vancouver Island were Douglas fir, spruce, hemlock, and red cedar, and most were at least 100 years old. These massive trees had long straight trunks without a single branch until far up the trunk, this made them ideal for processing. Loggers recounting their experience talk about massive fir trees without a branch for 150

⁹⁰ WCB memo "Safety Hats," CLR 3A, 23, 15; 1956 WCB report on Accident frequency by type, Series MS-1333 - Western Forest Industries Ltd. records, BC Archives, box 88, file 4 (Hereafter BC MS-1333, box, file).

ft. The branches on these trees were thick, and when they fell they came down with enough force to crack a man's skull or break his neck. While hard hats could not protect a man from a widow maker heavy enough to fracture a spine, they could, and often did, prevent a cracked skull. Yet, despite the obvious benefit offered by hard hats and the fact that the company purchased and supplied hard hats until 1954, BC Forest Products struggled to convince loggers to wear them.

A number of possible explanations exist for loggers' refusal to wear hard hats in the 1940s. Early hard hats were ill fitting, heavy, and uncomfortable. Various methods of adding padding to make the tin hats comfortable were tried by manufacturers, but the first few incarnations of hard hats were one size only and offered only foam blocks to protect the worker's head from the hat. The weight of the hard hats was also significant. Loggers needed to be able to move quickly at times in order to avoid an accident. For some workers, extra weight on top of their heads likely felt more like an increase to the existing hazard of their job than like a protective measure. Loggers also complained the hats made them too hot in summer. Though the hats were painted white, for visibility and to protect loggers from the sun, some men believed covering their head inhibited their ability to stay cool in warm months.⁹¹ Ideology also likely played a role in loggers' resistance. Used to defining their masculinity at least in part based on their daring, loggers may have resisted the hard hat as unnecessary or perhaps even emasculating. The work of Jussi Turtiainen and Ari Väänänen on steel workers in Finland following the Second

⁹¹ Beed to Atchison, "WCB Regulations re: Hard Hats," 7 Oct 1947, KSMA 997.54, 1942-1947, Beed 47; Evans to Logging Superintendents, "Hard Hats," 20 September 1950, KSMA 997.54, 1950, Evans 50; "MSA Skullguards," 6 July 1949, KSMA 997.54, 1949, Evans 50.
World War also offers an explanation: Men who had fought in a war may have been reminded of their time in battle when donning the tin hats.⁹² While we will never know for certain, it was likely a unique combination of both material and ideological factors that prevented individual loggers from donning this safety equipment. What we do know is that companies and safety organizations went to great lengths to convince loggers to wear hard hats.

Company efforts ranged from education and regulation, to celebrating those whose hard hats had saved their lives. Many of these initiatives were company level, but a key part of the BC Forest Products' (BCFP) campaign to promote the wearing of hard hats was membership in the Canadian Forest Products' Turtle Club. Any logger whose life had been saved by his hard hat could apply to become a member. Membership was taken very seriously, with the Turtle Club often checking back with the camp management to confirm that the accident was as the applicant had described it.⁹³ Successful applicants to the Turtle Club received a framed certificate and gold lapel pin. One of the first BC Forest Products' loggers to be inducted into the Turtle Club was Elgin Garnett, who received his membership when his hardhat saved him from a widow maker in 1951.⁹⁴ In addition to the public presentation of Garnett's Turtle Club certificate and pin, the company held a special safety meeting where Garnett and the camp safety committee talked to the men about the importance of hard hats and performed a

⁹² Jussi Turtiainen and Ari Väänänen, "Men of Steel? The Masculinity of Metal Industry Workers in Finland after World War II." *Journal of Social History*. 46, 2 (Winter, 2012) 461.

⁹³ "Turtle Club," 31 March 1950, KSMA 997.54, 1950 Evans 50; Minutes, General Safety Meeting, 15 Nov 1951, KSMA 997.54, 1951 Safety 51.

⁹⁴ Minutes, General Safety Meeting, 4 December 1951, KSMA 997.45, 1951 Safety 51; Minutes, General Safety Meeting, October 1951, KSMA 997.45 1951 Safety 51(2); Minutes, General Safety Meeting, 29 October 1951, KSMA 997.45, BCFP 1951 Safety 51.

demonstration using a glass bowl to represent a worker's skull struck by a falling limb. Without a hardhat to protect it, the bowl shattered on impact, but with the hard hat, the bowl remained intact. These hard hat demonstrations and re-enactments were a regular feature at BC Loggers Association company safety meetings from 1946 through 1954.

BC Forest Products also used its regulatory powers to force loggers to wear safety equipment. However, like safety programs which relied on foremen passing down their knowledge and closely watching individual workers for infractions, hard hat regulations suffered from unenforceability. Workers required to wear a hard hat in the woods could easily shed the unwanted safety gear once out of sight of camp. Inconsistency between company and WCB regulations also likely contributed to a general ineffectiveness in hard hat regulation in the late 1940s. Where BCFP tried to make the hard hat mandatory for every worker in the woods, the WCB regulations for forestry specified only certain positions as needing hard hats.⁹⁵

Ultimately company and WCB efforts to get men to wear hard hats when working in the woods were successful. By 1951 Safety Supervisor R.E. Evans' seemed confident that all workers now understood the importance of hard hats. "Since January 1st, 1951 at least four employees in our company alone have had their lives saved because they were hearing a HARD HAT at the time of an accident...There is no doubt in anyone's mind that a Hard Hat has become standard equipment in our industry... Live SAFER, live LONGER."⁹⁶ Two years earlier, Evans had written: "Possibly we cannot hope to have everyone in the woods wearing a hard hat this year. On the other hand, I feel we all

⁹⁵ "WCB Regulations re: Hard Hats," 7 Oct 1947, KSMA 997.54, 1942-1947, Beed 47.

⁹⁶ "Hard Hat Protection" 2 April 1951, KSMA 997.54, 1951, Safety 51 (2).

agreed that our fallers and buckers should use this protective equipment."⁹⁷ This improved compliance may have been the result of successful promotion of hard hats by the company, but improvements to hard hat technology likely helped the company's case. In 1949, the MSA "Skullguards" being used at BCFP's Cowichan Division were replaced by a newer, lighter model. This model was further improved with the addition of a rubber cushioned lining in 1950.⁹⁸ Reports of workers refusing to wear safety hats disappeared in the early 1950s and in 1954 BC Forest Products required that men purchase their own hard hats, indicative perhaps of a company cost saving effort, but also a sign that hard hats had achieved sufficient penetration to allow the company to pass on their expense to the men without significant fear that hard hat use would disappear.⁹⁹

Another piece of important safety equipment was the caulk ("cork") boot. Caulk boots were so named for the caulks, replaceable spikes, on their soles. These boots were designed to help loggers keep their balance on the often slippery or uneven terrain of the woods and had the potential to help eliminate the most common cause of accidents: slipping and falling. Some loggers had already adopted caulk boots before the 1940s, but the company did not actively promote their use outside of select jobs until the end of the decade. Men who worked on the log booms wore spiked boots to allow them to grip on the wet logs.¹⁰⁰ High riggers likewise wore spiked boots along with their detachable spurs

⁹⁷ "Hard Hats," 3 March 1949, KSMA 997.54, 1949, Evans 49.

⁹⁸ Evans to Cowichan Logging Division, "Attention: Compulsory" 9 July 1949, KSMA 997.54, 1949, Roy Evans 49; Evans to Hobson, "Rubber-Cushioned Linings," 3 May 1950, KSMA 997.54, 1950, Roy Evans 50.

^{50.} ⁹⁹ Evans to All Logging Personnel & Safety Supervisors," 9 January 1953, KSMA 997.54, 1953, Turtle Club 53.

¹⁰⁰ After they were felled logs were placed in the lake or ocean in groups called booms to await transport to shipyards.

in order to let them climb to the top of the spar tree with minimal chance of slipping. BC Forest Products began to promote caulk boots for more general use in 1949 following two accidents which it was determined could have been prevented by the wearing of caulk boots.¹⁰¹ Widespread adoption of caulk boots appears to have been more easily achieved than the adoption of hard hats, although it is impossible to know what percentage of loggers were not already wearing them voluntarily before this. The absence of resistance to company insistence on wearing caulk boots may have been because the equipment was already widely used among loggers or because there was no disadvantage to replacing standard work boots with caulked work boots from the perspective of comfort or masculinity.¹⁰²

Overall, the forest industry made significant strides in reducing the mechanical causes of accidents throughout the 1940s. The WCB enacted regulations governing equipment design and use in order to reduce the likelihood of equipment-related accidents during normal operation.¹⁰³ In order to remain compliant with WCB regulations, and avoid the fine associated with non-compliance, companies had to make modifications to their equipment, such as installing guards on tractors. While fines likely played some part in motivating companies, it is probable that a desire to maintain positive relations with the

¹⁰¹ Evans to Peterson, 13 June 1949, KSMA 997.54, 1949, Evans 49: "I am pleased to note that you state safety shoes would have prevented Stanley's accident. An identical case to this happened the other day at the West Coast and safety shoes there would also have prevented the accident. The problems of preventing accidents in the woods seem many and varied but, where protective equipment like safely shoes can be worn, everyone should be a safety shoe salesman and, more especially, a wearer."

¹⁰² There is anecdotal evidence in oral and popular histories that suggest most loggers identified the caulk boot with being a logger and wore them even when in town on leave. Though the company does not seem to realize that caulk boots are something they should be encouraging everyone to wear until the end of the decade, it's entirely probable that the loggers themselves had reached this conclusion earlier and that it was only those who could not afford caulk boots- usually new employees – who were ill equipped.

¹⁰³ Workmen's Compensation Board, "Logging Accident Prevention Regulations." 3 March 1947, CLR 4, 28, 7.

Board and its inspectors was equally important in ensuring compliance. The costs associated with installing guards were never explicitly discussed by companies; however, it was unlikely to be high enough for companies to risk alienating the WCB. The work of creating and installing guards on machines was taken on by existing employees in the shop who already worked repairing equipment that broke down.¹⁰⁴ WCB inspectors might made recommendations for changes at specific work sites to prevent potential accidents. They wereat times openly impressed by companies' ability to comply with these recommendations.¹⁰⁵ However, the WCB's ability to enforce its own rulings was subject to the willingness of the Board to carry through when companies pushed back. The Board was cognizant of the possible threat to its power wrought by over-regulation or unenforced regulation, as expressed in this letter dated 7 May 1941:

One of [WCB Inspector] Mr. Taylor's chief recommendations is that he is not carried away by every whiff of a theory that is circulated and oftentimes gets a lot of support. In other words, he keeps his feet on the ground and recognizes the inadvisability of getting into the regulations things which are unsound and, further, that regulations should only be made when found to be absolutely essential for safety protection. During the last few months there had been a never-ending number of suggestions as to regulations that should be brought into effect for protective purposes. Offhand I don't know of one of them capable of enforcement.

Unenforceable regulations are useless and would be only an unnecessary annoyance to the operators. Not only that but they might be used by those who are looking for trouble. Possibly you will agree with me that there is such a thing as over-regulation. If we keep on we will be regimented to death, and in this I am speaking generally.¹⁰⁶

As a whole, the WCB's strategy in the 1940s aimed to make many recommendations but only few regulations. This allowed them to place responsibility for training and enforcement of recommendations in the hands of the companies. The fear of

¹⁰⁴ Chief Inspector to J. Sheasgreen, 14 January 1939, CLR 4, 28, 7; Filberg to Pilsbury, 16 March 1939, CLR 1, 12, 12; Pilsbury to Filberg, 13 March1939, CLR 1, 12, 12.

¹⁰⁵ "Re; Accident Prevention,"31 January 1942, CLR 3A, 23, 15; Chief Inspector to J. Sheasgreen, 14 January 1939, CLR 4, 28, 7.

¹⁰⁶ Chairman to Filberg, 7 May 1941, CLR 2(1), 13, 20.

overregulation can be interpreted several ways. However, given the context of the relationship between the WCB and BC forestry companies in the 1930s, it seems most likely that the troublemakers referred to in the letter are companies who might seek to undermine the legitimacy of the Board rather than union militants or external agents. Certainly the lawsuit against the WCB in 1932 demonstrated to the WCB that companies would not bow down to legislation they deemed unfavourable. Rather than attempting to enforce strict adherence in the forest industry, then, the WCB focused on maintaining a minimum standard through punitive regulations, with fines for non-compliance, and expected that companies would be motivated by the potential savings under experience rating to improve their accident prevention practices beyond the prescribed minimum regulated by the board.

The Chairman of the WCB, E.S.H. Win, skillfully navigated timber operators' desire to maintain near total control of their men and their industry. In the following except from a letter dated 14 October 1941, Win expresses complete agreement with Filberg of CLR over the respective roles of companies and compensation board inspectors in the prevention of accidents. From the language he employs, Win was likely complying with his own beliefs about government intervention in addition to giving forestry companies what they wanted:

I quite agree with your opinion that there are ample Inspectors in the Department now to meet the needs. My own experience bears out your conclusion that the problem of education is one for the employers, superintendents, foremen and key-men and, as you say, if you have too many Inspectors there is a tendency on the part of these men to relax their efforts and leave it to the government action. This would be unsound and would develop a further leaning on the part on those whose obligation is it to do certain work. There seems to be a tendency in some groups to want to flood the country with governmental employees. I have always fought excess appointments because

unfortunately the tendency in such a process is to develop a species of parasite, oftentimes well-intentioned but definitely ill advised¹⁰⁷

Win was concerned that too strong an interventionist approach would encourage companies to rely too strongly on the WCB for keeping them and their employees in line with safety regulations. His language in this passage suggests that Win was concerned more broadly with limited state expenditures by employing a modest number of inspectors who always had work to do rather than an excess who might only be kept earning their pay by overregulation, which he was firmly against.

Though rooted in a fundamentally different conception of BC corporations, the WCB's fear of overregulation dovetailed perfectly with the independent minded logging operators' desires. The dependence on the WCB for every aspect of a safety program was unlikely to ever become a reality. Like their workers, the corporate minds driving the forest industry valued their independence too highly to easily give in to close regulation let alone become dependent on it. Unfortunately, under this understanding of the role of the WCB, companies alone were responsible for interpreting, applying and regulating its recommendations, a right which companies were only to eager to maintain. While this system had obvious appeal for management, minimal interference as well as minimal requirements for actual investment in safety, it did not prove particularly effective in developing a sound and effective safety practice in BC forestry.

Machines, it turned out, were much easier to control than loggers. Where the WCB failed in its attempt to instill in all workers safe practices through a trickle down education, they, in cooperation with companies, were able to make significant strides

¹⁰⁷ Win to Filberg 11 October 1941, CLR 2(1), 13, 20.

towards removing equipment-related hazards. A February 1946 article in the Victoria Times Colonist included a claim from Provincial Government Safety officer A. M. Whisker that, "the logging management has largely overcome mechanical causes of accident... It remains for the loggers themselves to come to a full appreciation of the hazards of their work."¹⁰⁸ This statement was probably premature, as companies continue to modify equipment and introduce new policies and procedures to limit the possibility of mechanical accidents into the 1960s, but it gives an interesting insight into the mindset of the industry in the 1940s.¹⁰⁹ Safety was a problem to be solved, and while controlling men proved more complicated than their early programs could deal with, those invested in improving the forest industry's safety record were confident in their ability to modify equipment to a point where they could say that all accidents were the result of random chance or human error. This modification of equipment served dual purposes for companies. If mechanical causes for accidents could be eliminated by attaching guards to existing machines - a procedure that was relatively inexpensive when compared to the cost of accidents – then the company would enjoy increased productivity and decreased WCB expenditures. WCB inspectors' primary concern when investigating a company was the mechanical safeguards.¹¹⁰ Eliminating mechanical accidents would also help company public relations. Companies could show their goodwill by investing a small

¹⁰⁸ "Province Will Intensify Loggers' Safety Drive." 10 February 1946, VTC, p 15.

¹⁰⁹ "The Top 10 of Safety," *Industrial Supervisor*, July 1966, KSMA, 997.54 1966 (1), Safety/Accident Prevention, 66, p11; James Roughton, "Simple Rules for Safer Operation of Woods Equipment," in "Logging Safety" reprinted from *BC Lumberman*, April 1951, KSMA 997.54 1951, 1, Safety 51.

¹¹⁰ Workmen's Compensation Board, "Re: Accident Prevention," 31 January 1941, CLR 3A, 23, 15; BC Truck Logger's Association, "Problems" 1946, CLR. 1, 15, 141; The Workman's Compensation Board, "re: Accident Prevention," 31 January 1942, CLR 3A, 23, 15; The Workman's Compensation Board, letter with proposed amendments to WCA attached, 7 June 1941, CLR 3A, 23, 15; The Workman's Compensation Board, "Re: Accident Prevention," 23 May 1941, CLR 3A, 23, 15.

amount of money into having guards installed on machines and help to create in the mind of the voting public the idea that companies were interested in sustainability and safe practice.

By the end of the 1940s, it was clear to those in charge of safety programming in logging companies that their strategy of targeted training of foremen and reliance on workers' willingness to work according to prescribed best practice was not having the results they wished. In 1951 sawmills across the province tried a larger scale project, one which was emblematic of the direction accident prevention would take for the decade. This project was Safety Week. This event did not originate with the BC Loggers Association; it was first conceived and orchestrated by the BC Lumber Manufacturers Association, but it proved inspirational. The BCLMA Safety Week was open to BC sawmills, but not the adjacent logging operations. In 1953 the BC Loggers Association organized its own Safety Week, incorporating both the sawmill and logging divisions of the participating companies. The BCLA Safety Week represented a new direction in the development of BC logging safety, which will be explored in Chapter Three. The 1951, BCLMA event was less developed than BCLA's 1953 Safety Week. The 1951 Safety Week was solely a competition between participating mills to see who could maintain the lowest accident rate from 14 to 18 May 1951.¹¹¹ In a memo to superintendents of BC Forest Products about the 1951 Safety Week, safety Supervisor R.E. Evans emphasised the importance to the company of a good showing in the competition if they were to enter:

¹¹¹ Evans, "SAFETY WEEK in BC Sawmills" 25 April 1951, KSMA, 997.54. 1951 (1), Safety 51.

Our Sawmills and our Logging Camps have set the pace in much of the accident prevention field during the past two years, therefore I am sure we can participate in the Province wide venture with considerable confidence. Every opportunity should be taken to talk up a No-Accident record during the period... We should enlist the help of every last man in our Mill Operations.¹¹²

Evans' statement that the company already was at the forefront of safety measures in the industry is important. As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, public relations drove many companies' actions in the 1940s. By 1951 the wartime controls on the industry had lifted, but the union had become fully entrenched. The industry continued to rely on favourable legislation from the WCB and the Forestry Service in order to continue operating freely and at a profit. Participating in a safety week competition was an opportunity for BC Forest Products to show its commitment to safety, and, assuming Evans judged rightly about BCFP's general superiority in the field of accident prevention, to prove the measures they had implemented worked.

Proof that existing safety programs and legislation were sufficient in 1951 was especially important since yet another Royal Commission focused on the Workmen's Compensation Board. The second Sloan Commission on the Workmen's Compensation Board began in 1949. In order to ensure the revisions made to the Board's powers and recommendations were favourable to corporate interests, companies needed to show that further encroachment on their power was unnecessary. It held hearings for two full years (from November 1949 to November 1951) and "testimony was heard from 630 witnesses in four BC cities, most of them individual workers and medical factors."¹¹³ Much of it centered around the dramatic changes in both medical and industrial technology in the

¹¹² Evans, "SAFETY WEEK in BC Sawmills" 25 April 1951, KSMA, 997.54. 1951 (1), Safety 51.

¹¹³ Chaklader, *Report to the Royal Commission*, 26.

seven years between Royal Commissions.¹¹⁴ Commission resulted in some victories for both sides: Labour won increased minimum and maximum payments for injured workers as well as increases to funeral allowances and the allowances paid to widows and orphaned children.¹¹⁵ However, business interests won on "questions of philosophy, principle and administration," such as the issue of blanket coverage and the three day waiting period.¹¹⁶

When it came to the question of whether or not to maintain the Experience Rating system and the independent tier for members of the BC Loggers Association, Sloan sided with business over even his own judgement.¹¹⁷ He doubted the efficacy of experience rating, but business interests in forestry were loath to give up any advantage over less compliant competitors – especially member companies in the BCLA that across the board paid lower premiums than companies not in their rate category. Though experience rating would eventually be adopted in the 1980s as the ideal model for workers' compensation across all industries in the province, Sloan's 1952 report made it clear he was unconvinced about its effectiveness. In his assessment of the experience rating system, Sloan listed three advantages, compared to nine disadvantages, concluding with the equivocal statement that, "…the assessor, has opposed the B.C. Loggers' Association request. I am unable to say his objection is not well founded"¹¹⁸ Sloan struggled with the

¹¹⁴ Chaklader, Report to the Royal Commission, 36-37

¹¹⁵ Chaklader, *Report to the Royal Commission*, 38, 40.

¹¹⁶ Chaklader, *Report to the Royal Commission*, 37, 38-39.

¹¹⁷ There is no evidence that labour weighed in on the issue of experience rating. Sloan's evaluation was based on his understanding of similar policies in other places and his general concern about the sustainability of the system.

¹¹⁸ British Columbia. Report of the Commissioner Relating to the Workmen's Compensation Act and Board (Victoria, BC: Queen's Printer, 1952), 187.

principle point of whether or not there should be a limit placed on the discount available to firms with good safety records. Ultimately, a set amount of money needed to be collected each year: it was a matter then of which companies would pay what percentage of the estimated compensation costs for the year. In his report, Sloan quoted Ontario Justice Middleton:

'Great care would have to be taken in the application of any such merit-rating system because the whole principle of collective liability is based upon the doctrine of average. It is not enough that for a year, or even a short series of years, a particular factory escapes having any serious accident. The whole principle is that the fortunate must bear some portion of the burden of the unfortunate. This is illustrated in fire insurance. The rate is fixed having regard to experience, but no householder ever expects to receive fire insurance at a reduced rate simply because he has carried fire insurance for so many years and never had a fire.'¹¹⁹

Despite the fact that he asserted that BC, "unlike any other Canadian Province, had at

least formulated a workable and apparently practicable scheme," Sloan obviously agreed

with Middleton's assessment of the pitfalls of experience rating, stating himself that:

If everyone with a favourable record were to have his premiums reduced in accordance therewith, it would be difficult to know where the insurance-carrier would find the money to pay the claims of those with an unfavourable experience. It should not be forgotten that " collective liability " is the principle upon which our workmen's compensation laws are based, and that rates are set to cover the " cost' in so far as the group is concerned and to cover the " risk " in so far as the individual firm is concerned.¹²⁰

Notwithstanding concerns that without limits on the merits individual companies or groups could earn the system would fail to bring in sufficient funds to ensure its continuance, the experience rating model was maintained for the forest industry, and the BCLA kept the separate tier it had asked for during the first Sloan commission a decade earlier.

¹¹⁹ Report of the Commissionner, 1952, 185.

¹²⁰ Report of the Commissionner, 1952, 184-185.

Keeping their separate tier of experience rating was an important victory for the member companies of the BCLA in the early 1950s. The assurance that they would pay lower WCB premiums than non-member companies gave the BCLA incentive to ensure its collective accident frequency rates merited the privileged rate category. Further, the ranking of BCLMA companies within this tier created incentives for each individual company to best the others in their Association when it came to accident rates. In 1952, as he had in 1942, Sloan sided with business in matters concerning the structure of workmen's compensation in the province while siding with the union on issues of payment rates that ultimately were less significant to the direction of compensation legislation in the province. However, the skepticism Sloan professed when considering the merit of continued experience rating for forestry indicated to companies that their ability to avoid high WCB premiums by maintaining a safety record better than their competitor was far from guaranteed for the long term.

By the early 1950s, companies within the BCLA, the IWA, and the WCB had slotted into their respective roles within a responsive regulatory model. The WCA set out a minimum standard to which all forestry companies must adhere and then offered, through the experience rating system, a monetary incentive for companies that went beyond the minimum and proactively improved their safety record. With its successful strike in 1946, the IWA proved that its hard won bargaining power was not a wartime fluke. The union was there to stay, and was capable of achieving significant victories.¹²¹ Companies within the BCLA also responded to the developments of the 1940s by taking a

¹²¹ Though the IWA did not receive all of their demands, they were successful in winning a wage increase for their members which exceeded the maximum set out by the wage control board.

more active role in workplace safety. By the mid-1950s, they enacted broad, far reaching programs designed to take their workplace's safety above and beyond the minimum standards set by the WCB. As will be demonstrated in the next chapter, the safety programs of the 1950s were company-specific and aimed at creating a safety first culture that would encourage every worker to see himself as part of the formula for an accident free company.

Chapter 3: Keeping the Family (Alive) Together

Over the course of the 1950s, accident prevention evolved from a series of disconnected reactions to a structured and focused program with stated goals and consistent underlying messages. Unlike the 1940s, when safety was about following rules and adding guards to equipment to protect workers, safety in the 1950s was about mutual responsibility, keeping the heteronormative nuclear family intact, and organizations and individuals alike sharing successes and failures. This chapter examines these aspects of safety policy in the 1950s by focusing primarily on two companies, BC Forest Products (BCFP) and Western Forest Industries (WFI). These companies took different approaches to accident prevention, but shared broad goals of accident reduction, and broad themes of responsibility and family survival. For these companies, the male breadwinner was the central character in the narrative of safe work.

Gender tropes, and especially idealized constructions of workers' masculinity, were important tools towards realizing operators' goals in accident prevention in their camps and mills. The rugged Paul Bunyan logger, who typified logger masculinity into the 1940s, was too independent to buy into a program rooted in mutual responsibility for safety, and would never be motivated by the idea of winning a plaque for his department or company. To get loggers on board with safety programs rooted in shared goals and symbolic rather than tangible rewards, companies needed to eradicate Paul Bunyan.¹ The

¹ The final bastion of Bunyanesque logger masculinity was a logger's identity as a skilled worker. While this would come under attack in the late 1960s and in the 1970s, there were no widespread, significant technological or work process changes between the introduction of high-lead logging in the early twentieth

new masculinity loggers were pushed towards was one rooted in male responsibility as providers. Married loggers were reminded of their responsibility to their families – which they were consistently reminded would be destitute without their wages. Single men were expected to play their part in ensuring they did not rob a family of its breadwinner by causing an accident.²

The male breadwinner role promoted by companies and professional organizations was in sharp contrast to the rugged, Paul Bunyan masculinity loggers modeled themselves after from the 1880s through to the 1950s. For companies, the Bunyanesque logger became a risky investment in the postwar period, though before the WCB and union began working simultaneously to pressure companies towards a safer work environment, his willingness to take risks was advantageous in the hazardous industry. In the early years of logging, when trees were cut by hand with a cross-cut saw and hauled out of the woods by the teamster and his team, loggers understood themselves as rugged, independent, skilled bush workers. Many loggers embraced the hard working, hard living stereotype and engaged in reckless behaviour both on and off the job.³ Up to the Second World War, workers prized themselves on independence and

century and the mid-1960s. The new technologies introduced in this period, such as the power saw, changed the skills required to perform a job, they did not challenge the position of workers as skilled. Fallers for example, could switch from hand saws to power saws, but they continued to own their own equipment and be responsible for maintaining it until 1973.

² "Plant Safety Bulletin" vol 1, No 11, 15 July 1958, Series MS-1333 - Western Forest Industries Ltd. records, BC Archives, box 88, file 16 (Hereafter BC MS-1333, box, file); "Plant Safety Bulletin" vol 1, No 2, undated, BC MS-1333, 88, 15; Lindo to Evans, no date, p2, Fletcher-Challenge Collection, 997.54, box 1953 (2), file Safety Week, Kaatza Station Museum and Archives, Lake Cowichan, British Columbia. (hereafter, KSMA 97.54, box, file).

³ Ken Hallberg, *Ken Hallberg an Autobiography*, (Self-Published, 2010) 65; Richard Rajala, *The Legacy & the Challenge: a Century of the Forest Industry at Cowichan Lake*, (Victoria: Lake Cowichan Heritage Advisory Committee, 1993) 32-34; Andrew Mason Prouty, *More Deadly Than War: Pacific Coast Logging*, 1827-1981. (New York: Garland Publishing Inc, 1985) 62-64.

transiency was understood as a militant and masculine act.⁴ Not all loggers conformed to the stereotype, as discussed in Chapter One, some made a single region their home and stayed with companies long term. However, these "home-guard" men were seen by transient loggers as weaker, less militant, and ultimately less masculine.⁵ Sawmill workers did not work in the same rugged, isolated conditions as loggers, but independence and skill were also prized among these workers.⁶ The increasing use of technology in logging throughout the early twentieth century undermined some of workers' claim to skill and independence, but by the outbreak of the Second World War, companies were still faced with a group of quasi-independent workers who freely took shortcuts, engaged in risky behaviours, and otherwise refused to conform to a rationalized workplace.⁷

These modern-day Paul Bunyans were problematic for operators who wanted to standardize and control the work process and workers. Companies tried to instill their workers with a sense of responsibility to family and fellow worker, which tied workers to company goals. The idealized worker acted as part of a team to achieve maximum productivity by following rules and prescribed behaviours and did not take risks or allow others to take risks that might result in lost time because of an injury. This idealized worker earned money not just for himself, but for his current or future dependents. His

⁴ Myrtle Bergren, *Tough Timber: The Loggers of British Columbia – Their Story*, (Toronto: Progress Books, 1967) 98.

⁵ Bergren, 98; Prouty, 27, 44-46; Erin Kathleen Melvin, "Peripatetic to Domestic: Gender and Change in Logging Camps." (Unpublished MA Thesis, Queen's University, 1972): 109. "Home Guard" was the derogatory term transient loggers used to describe those men who stayed long term in one camp. They could also be called "stump ranchers."

⁶ Bergren, 18-19, 86-87.

⁷ Hallberg, 65; Rajala, *Legacy and Challenge*, 32-34; Prouty, 62-64.

ability to provide proved his masculinity, rather than his ability to avoid injury when engaging in dangerous actions. Workers were inundated with male breadwinning ideology both from company management and from Canadian society more broadly.⁸ Companies' concerted effort to eradicate Paul Bunyan and was helped greatly by this broader discourse of masculinity as hetero-patriarchal responsibility. Over the course of the 1950s, there was a discernible shift in workers' masculinity. However, the transformation from Bunyan to breadwinner was different for each worker. While there is strong evidence to suggest workers bought into the rhetoric of mutual responsibility and the responsibility of a breadwinner to his family, this did not necessarily mean that they relinquished their identity as independent, skilled men. The changed outlook on accident prevention was gradual. Companies continued to experience issues with employee noncompliance with safety regulations and their refusal to wear safety equipment into the 1960s. However, despite the continued presence of problems in the forest industry when it came to promoting safe practices, the more comprehensive programs developed over the course of the 1950s proved more effective than the trickle down safety of the 1940s. Accident rates dropped and both BCFP and WFI won awards for their low accident frequency several times in this decade.⁹

⁸ Bryan Palmer, *The Working-Class Experience: The Rise and Reconstitution of Canadian Labour, 1800-1980.* (Toronto: Butterworth & Co. Ltd., 1983) 271; Nancy Christie, *Engendering the State: Family, Work, and Welfare in Canada.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000.

⁹ 11 January 1961, KSMA 97.54, 1961 (2), Reith Trophy, 61; "Programme" KSMA 97.54, 1961 (2), Reith Trophy, 61; Safety Awards and Prizes, Reith Trophy, "Reith Trophy," BC MS-1333 88, 26; "Safety Record Cowichan Lake Area Operations since Inauguration of Reith Trophy," 4 February 1969, BC MS-1333 88, 26. For example of safety awards see: "Gold Certificate Award of Merit" 30 October 1959, BC MS-1333, 19, 2; "100 Proclamation," undated, BC MS-1333, 19, 2; Lyle Wicks to J.G. Stothers. 31 December 1958, BC MS-1333, 88, 23; D.F. Hammond, "Re: Centennial Award," 7 May 1958, BC MS-1333, 88, 23; Terry Dinham to J.K. Fairbairn, "Re: BC Centennial Safety Awards," 1 April 1958, KSMA 997.54, 1959(1), Accident Prevention/Awards 59; Dickey to Managers and Superintendents, 3 May 1960, KSMA 997.45,

Companies and the professional organizations they belonged to drove this new approach to accident prevention and workplace safety. For companies, increased safety meant improved efficiency and increased profit in their day to day operations. Increased safety would also bring reduced Workmen's Compensation premiums in subsequent years. The Workmen's Compensation Board (WCB) remained the arbiter of rules regarding safe equipment and accident payouts. In some ways the WCB fell behind companies in developing novel strategies to resolve enduring high accident rates over the 1950s. This happened because the Board continued to see accidents as the result of poor supervision or faulty equipment. By focusing too tightly on the mechanical causes of accidents and company supervisors' responsibility for combatting human causes for accidents, the WCB failed to keep up with the broad, creative solutions companies began to experiment with in this period. However, as a regulatory body, the WCB continued to play an important role in motivating company actions by setting a minimum standard and maintaining a fee structure that rewarded the companies with the strongest accident prevention record. The Royal Commission report released in 1952 recommended raising the compensation rate for injured workers and to increase the pensions for widows and dependent children, providing companies with a financial motive to pursue novel accident prevention strategies to avoid increased premiums.¹⁰

The self-styled guardian of workers, the International Woodworkers of America (IWA), likewise did not directly contribute to decreased accident rates in the 1950s.

^{1960 (1),} Safety Committee, Accident Prevention; Dinham to Pearce, "Safety Awards" 10 June 1963, KSMA 997.45, 1960 (1), Safety Committee, Accident Prevention.

¹⁰ Anjun Chaklader, "History of Worker's Compensation in BC." *Report to the Royal Commission on Worker's Compensation in BC*, (May 1988) 38; British Columbia. *Report of the Commissioner Relating to the Workmen's Compensation Act and Board* (Victoria, BC: Queen's Printer, 1952) 164, 168.

Rather than implementing its own programs or fighting to change the safety clauses in the collective agreement, the IWA largely worked within the company safety committees established at each camp and within the pages of the *Lumber Worker*.¹¹ However, the animosity between the union and company undermined the union's self-ascribed role of educator and watchdog. The safety pages of the *Lumber Worker* aimed to educate workers and support company safety efforts, but the rest of the paper often focused on the contentious aspects of labour relations. Union participation in safety committees was also inconsistent, suffering by the middle of the decade from a lack of interest among union members.¹² Though the IWA did not devise and implement any significant independent safety programs, it did publish a safety section in its biweekly newspaper that affirmed company responsibility for workplace safety.¹³

Responsibility was an important factor in forestry safety from the beginnings of accident prevention policy in the 1940s. The WCB favored recommendations over regulations throughout the 1940s, placing the yoke of responsibility on companies. Though companies ultimately accepted this responsibility, they also sought to share its burden with workers. The message that all members of the company must pull together to

¹¹ John Braithwaite, *To Punish or Persuade: Enforcement of Coal Mine Safety*, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985) 8-10, 13-14; Cynthia Estlund, *Regoverning the Workplace: From Self-Regulation to Co-Regulation*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010) 21, 178. Though the IWA often appears passive in the struggle to improve workplace safety in this period, Braithwaite's Responsive Regulation model shows how the threat of action from the IWA helped place pressure on companies to work towards improving their safety beyond mere compliance with the minimum standard set out by the WCB. ¹² "Accident Prevention Committee Meeting" 21 November 1956, p3, BC MS-1333.89.3[2]

¹³ "Safety Committee Solves Problem," February 1960, *British Columbia Lumber Worker (BCLW)*, 1, p 8; "Successful Safety Committees Need Workers' Co-Operation," January 1960, *BCLW*, 1, p 5; "Increased Fatalities Demand Better Effort States Morris," November 1959, *BCLW*, 2, p 5; "Open Letter to BC Coast Lumber Operators and Accident Prevention Officials, Workmen's Compensation Board," October 1959, *BCLW*, 2, p 5. In the late 1950s and into 1960, the IWA still held companies responsible, while heavily criticizing the WCB for not living up to its role in workplace safety.

lift the industry up out of the quagmire of high accident rates can be found in most of the safety rhetoric coming from companies and their professional organizations. Company safety programs consistently reinforced the idea that if each worker devoted himself to the effort, he could realize the bright, accident free future desired by all.¹⁴ There is no single simple explanation for why companies felt they needed to convince workers to accept responsibility for their own safety and that of other workers. Rather, there are a number of factors which together explain why so much effort went into spreading this message of mutual responsibility. Companies used mutual responsibility to increase compliance and encourage surveillance. A focus on collective safety also worked to improve public and employee relations, in part by shifting blame away from the company. Finally, the rhetoric of responsibility tapped into wartime tropes that made it easier for companies to create links between fraternity and surveillance, cooperation, and manliness.

The 1940s focus on safety regulations, changes to equipment, and education to change the way men did their work was not as effective as companies or the WCB had wished. In absence of adequate surveillance and enforcement, many men continued to defy safety regulations, for example working without donning the recommended safety equipment into the 1950s.¹⁵ The main problem with a trickle-down approach to safety

¹⁴ Lindo to Evans, "Logging Safety Week – 1953," undated, KSMA, 997.54, 1953(1) Safety Week; National Safety Council, "How to Lift". Undated, KSMA 997.54, 1950(1), R.E. Evans; Allison,

Consolidated Red Cedar Shingles Association "Safety Department Newsletter," No. 62. December 1958, p 1-2, BC MS-1333, 88, 5; Allison, BCLMA, "Safety Department Newsletter," No. 131, November 1958, BC MS-1333, 88, 5.

¹⁵ BCLMA Newsletter January 1958, BC MS-1333, 88, 5; BCLMA Newsletter October 1958, BC MS-1333, 88, 5; The failure of the 1940s approach to address these individual acts of rebellion is explained in greater detail in Chapter Two.

was its reliance on supervisory surveillance, which proved impractical. It was not feasible to have every individual worker's behaviour policed at all times and it remained too easy for workers to adopt new methods and equipment when being directly observed, and then to slide back into old habits as soon as the surveillance lifted. Surveillance was possible to a greater extent in sawmills than in logging, but even in the mill the foreman could not be expected to see everything.¹⁶ However, if the company could convince each man in its employ that he was responsible for accident prevention for his entire crew, workers would be more likely to interfere or report when another worker committed an unsafe act or failed to act in a way that promoted safety.

Experienced loggers were especially likely to refuse to follow new practices. In October 1955 a company newsletter distributed at WFI's Honeymoon Bay logging operation admonished experienced men for setting a dangerously bad example for new employees:

The place where you can do the most good or the most harm is in the <u>EXAMPLE</u> your set in matters of safety. The average new workman is a little scared when he starts a new job. Everything is new, he knowns he doesn't know the score, he's been warned about hazards, and he isn't sure yet just how to avoid them. So he looks at you to see how you meet the problem. If he sees in you a guy who can get the work out, yet who takes all the necessary precautions, then he'll try to do the same, and the chances are he'll be alright.

But suppose he sees in you a guy who pretends not to give a hoot about safety; who debunks the safety instruction; then he's likely to figure that safety is for the birds. He's likely to figure that you really know your stuff, and that he can act just as carelessly and recklessly as you do. But he's the rub! The chances you take are bad enough. In the long run, it's likely that carelessness or refusal to follow proper work rules will get you hurt. But for the new fellow, an attempt to imitate your bad habits is just about certain to cause trouble – and quick!

...Maybe we don't want to be our brother's keeper. Maybe we don't figure we're paid to be teachers. But in this crowded world we live in, <u>everything we do is an</u>

¹⁶ Though the work environment of a sawmill was dramatically different form that of a logging operation, neither BCFP nor WFI made a distinction between logging and sawmill safety when developing their accident prevention programs.

influence on those around us. And the more a fellow worker respects and admires us, the more influence our every action must have.¹⁷

The letter offered a reproof to men who believed that their own abilities exempted them from safety rules. Skilled individuals might not need to follow ever regulation in order to be safe. However, skilled worked had a responsibility to new workers. This emphasis on the capacity of one man's actions to ripple through the entire workforce had a paternalistic slant. Workers who had experience were admonished to take precautions they might not personally need to adhere to, because it was their responsibility to show new employees the right way to work - much like a father might teach his son to drive safely by following every precautionary sign including those he might ignore otherwise.

While the paternalistic focus of this letter helped to promote the desired mutual responsibility, it also likely served another purpose. Men who had been in the woods or working in the sawmill for years without serious accident who were not already predisposed to adhere to regulations would be unlikely to suddenly decide that their accustomed way of performing their job was inferior to a newer, possibly less efficient or less comfortable, way. Especially for workers in piecework positions, any policy that reduced efficiency would likely be ignored, even if safe work was ultimately the most efficient. By tying rule following to the induction of new employees rather than to personal safety, the company was able to push for a change in behaviour without

¹⁷ Accident Prevention Safety Bulletin, Honeymoon Bay, 18 Oct 1955, BC MS-1333 88, 16. Emphasis in original.

criticizing or undermining the skill of the workers whose behaviour they wanted to change.¹⁸

Setting a positive example for fellow workers was not the only way in which companies used mutual responsibility to convince workers to change their practices. As the following excerpt from a 1958 BC Lumber Manufacturer's Association (BCLMA) newsletter distributed to camp safety committees shows, helping one another and working as a team was a vital part both of staying safe and getting the job done. And, of course, teamwork was manly, just ask the BC Lions:

Everyone's a football expert when it comes to the fortunes of the BC Lions. We'd need a working crystal ball to see what's coming in the second half of the season – but it's no trick to know what hit them in the lamented first half. The Lions had as good a start as any team – good players, good training camp, and coaching that was good enough to take the measure of a couple of pretty fair clubs in the pre-season exhibition ball. And then the roof fell in.

All the evidence shows one thing: the Lions didn't' function as a team during the first half of the season. Open differences of opinion, trouble in the front office, mixups [sic] in the backfield all contributed to a general hooraw. A few individual performances were all that kept things alive. Everybody could see that team spirit didn't exist, and team achievement was at zero. Even with a second half winning streak, there was enough trouble created that the team will take a while to shake loose.

Why all the football emphasis in a newsletter on safety?

Because there's a thought in it. If a team in an organized game can get into trouble by lacking teamwork – what happens when a business team suffers from the same lack?

Take this example. Not long ago, a workman went to hospital when his hand was drawn into a pulley by a four-inch belt. The man was greasing the machine at start-up time; the switch was not locked out. His working partner started the machine up.

Like a quarterback calling a third-down running play on his own goal line, the personal responsibilities stick out a mile. Compensation Regulation No. 133 prohibits cleaning or oiling moving machinery when danger exists of contacting the moving parts. The man doing the work is responsible for stopping the motion, and ensuring it remains stopped until he's through. A primary rule is never to start up until you are sure everyone is in the clear: and that's the responsibility of the man with his finger on the button.

Here we have a two man operation, a two man responsibility – and one of the men gets hurt. Neither man played his part. One didn't make sure enough of his shut-

¹⁸ Accident Prevention Safety Bulletin, Honeymoon Bay, 18 Oct 1955, MS-1333, 88, 16; "Proceedings of 49th Bi-Monthly Safety Conference of British Columbia Manufacturer's Association" p2, BC MS-1333, 88, 3; *Logger's Handbook (LH)*, 1946, p 43. Induction was a matter of consistent concern for companies throughout the 1950s. Many in management believed that poor induction set up new employees for accidents.

down machine before he put his hand in the bight. The other <u>didn't' make sure enough</u> that everybody was in the clear before he hit the go ahead.

Putting two and two together, you get two wrongs making bad teamwork. They also made an injury.

...The point is, when we work together we must work TOGETHER. If a job takes two men, let's be sure there are two men on it, and able to work. That means each man had to undertake some personal responsibility, for himself and for his partner. Anything less is bad teamwork and inefficient.

The BC Lions are fighting to shake loose from the effects of bad teamwork, and we all hope they'll make it. How about helping our plant teams to improve their scoring punch? All it takes is people working <u>together</u> with intelligence and interest in each other's welfare.

Is that too much to ask? ¹⁹

The football metaphor served several purposes. Its story about the local football team likely engaged readers, and, accepting the author's assumption that a significant number of workers were active fans of the local team and understood the references to the team's rough start to the season, the metaphor helped workers to visualize and fully understand the teamwork they were being encouraged to undertake. On the field each man had a specific job that was his to fulfill. If every player did his job perfectly, moving to predetermined positions, engaging with specific tasks, the football team would work almost as if each man was a cog in a much larger machine. If even one player went against the plan, running to a different part of the field, stepping aside instead of blocking, or choosing to throw the ball instead of running it as planned, the result could be disaster for the entire team, its organization, and its fans. While teamwork in the woods or the mill looked very different from that on a football field, the basic realities were remarkably similar. Each worker had a specific job, from the fallers and buckers working in partnership to fell the timber to the riggers, chasers, chokermen and engineer responsible for yarding and loading the logs, to the signalman and truck driver responsible for getting

¹⁹ George Norris, "Safety Department Newsletter," No. 129. August 1958, BC MS-1333, 88, 5.

logs to the mill and processed timber to market. If one of these workers stopped paying attention, or deviated too far from what his fellow workers expected him to do, it could spell disaster.²⁰

A lack of teamwork could result in a serious or fatal accident. The example given in the football newsletter came from a sawmill, but teamwork was just as important in the woods. For example, in the first six months of 1953 three buckers "were killed when the Fallers dropped trees on them."²¹ Both fallers and buckers worked in relative isolation; first fallers would bring down the trees, then buckers would set to work removing limbs and cutting the logs into specific lengths. It was only after the fallers and buckers were done with a section that the rest of the crew would come in to set up rigging and begin the process of getting the timber out of the woods. Usually a falling and bucking team consisted of two fallers and a single bucker. The density of the bush and the necessary distance between fallers and bucker meant that buckers had to rely on a faller's ability to land a tree where he intended. If a tree fell too far from its expected point or if the bucker failed to pay attention to his own location the end result could be a bucker crushed beneath a falling tree. Poor communication between a faller and his bucker or too much haste on the part of either worker increased the risk of an accident. Ultimately, it was only through attention both to their individual responsibilities and the positioning of the other that fallers and buckers could complete their job safely and efficiently.²² Like the

 ²⁰ BCLMA Newsletter, August 1958, BC MS-1333, 88, 5; BCLMA Newsletter 1959, BC MS-1333, 88, 5.
 ²¹ "Five Minutes about Safety" July 1953, KSMA 997.54, 1953, 2, BC Logger's Assoc. 53. There are fourteen accidents listed in the bulletin, eleven of which happened to either a faller or bucker.

²² Wallace to Hallberg, Dinham et al. "WCB Regulations – Proposed changes," 6 April 1961, KSMA 997.54, 1961 (1), WCB.. WCB Regulation 831 specifically aimed to improve woods safety by ensuring

quarterback in the football metaphor, the faller was responsible for making sure he told his bucker where he was going to be, and for following through on what he said he was going to do.

The football metaphor worked on another level as well, serving to emphasise a point that was carried through most of the accident prevention literature in the 1950s: safety is masculine.²³ The mutual responsibility promoted in accident prevention discourse could be easily confused with a caretaking role, which was associated with femininity. Loggers were unlikely to be enthusiastic about taking on a role they may have seen as more suited to the women of the camp. But football was not feminine, and if football players needed to accept mutual responsibility in order to practice good teamwork, then loggers could too without any risk to their masculine identities. It is impossible to know exactly how deliberate the underlying message of masculinity was, but the consistency of the masculinity message, and its often heavy handed delivery, suggest a purposefulness that is not explained merely by the fact that these articles were written by men for men.

Mutual responsibility extended to the availability and proper use of safety equipment. Workers' continued reluctance to wear hard hats was a significant frustration for management.²⁴ In a 1951 Logging Safety bulletin an article was reprinted from the National Safety Council Newsletter. In his article, "Why Do They Die?" James Roughton

fallers were made aware of the movements of everyone in their area so that accidents of this type would no longer occur.

²³ National Safety Council, "How to Lift," undated, KSMA, 997.54, 1950(1), R.E. Evans; BCLMA Newsletter June 1958, BC MS-1333, 88, 5.

²⁴ BCLMA Newsletter, January 1958, BC MS-1333, 88, 5; BCLMA Newsletter October 1958, BC MS-1333, 88, 5; Evans to Fraser, 26 January 1950, KSMA 997.54, 1950(1), RE Evans; Lindo to Fuller, 19 April 1952, KSMA 997.54, 1952 (1), Turtle Club.

forcibly emphasized the importance of hard hats and the continued difficulty in getting workers to wear them. Roughton studied 43 logging fatalities in the Pacific Northwest and concluded that:

Fallers are still failing to swamp out around the base of the trees for working room and for safe getaway. They forget to check for 'widow makers.' They fail to make adequate undercuts, or to leave enough wood holding for guiding the tree's fall. They fall into standing trees or snags. **They don't wear hard hats**.

Buckers are dying because they forget to examine trees lying above the one being bucked; because they fail to block the tree they're working on; because they begin to buck from the top of the hill down. **They don't wear hard hats**.

Choker-setters and **riggers** are being killed because they don't get in the clear of logs before signaling them in; because signals are given before they are in the clear; because they fail to observe and make allowances for the swing of the turn against standing snags or saplings. **They don't wear hard hats**...²⁵

Roughton did not exaggerate the problem. Throughout the accident reports and safety meeting minutes of the companies in my study are numerous examples both of fatalities that supervisors and safety committee members believed would have been prevented by wearing a hard hat. The company also highlighted accidents that happened to those wearing hard hats which might have been fatal if not for the protection the hat provided.²⁶

The emphasis on teamwork and mutual responsibility was an indirect solution to this problem. Wearing safety equipment was an individual choice for individual safety. However, by promoting teamwork and safety equipment together, the company likely hoped to increase the likelihood that individual employees would act as proxy for foremen who were physically incapable of surveilling all workers at all times. The company also implemented more concrete programs to promote safety equipment which will be discussed later in this chapter. However, the potential to create a workplace

 ²⁵ Roughton, "Why do they die?" March 1951, KSMA 997.54, 1951 (1), Safety. Emphasis in original.
 ²⁶ Minutes from General Safety Meeting 16 Aug 1950, KSMA 997.54, 1950 Accident Prevention;

[&]quot;BCLMA Bi-Monthly Safety Conference," undated, BC MS-1333, 90, 17; The *BCLW* encouraged men to wear safety hats as early as 1944, see: Joe Paynter, "Safety is Sense," 4 September 1944, *BCLW*, p 8.

environment where each employee felt it was his duty to ensure his fellow worker was working as safely as possible drove the concerted corporate campaign to inculcate workers with a sense of shared responsibility. If companies could successfully create a sense of mutual responsibility for safety within their organization and in the minds of the public more broadly, then they could also change the public discourse surrounding accidents in forestry.²⁷ The union often laid the blame for forestry's poor safety record at the feet of companies, but the companies' doctrine of mutual responsibility shared the burden of blame with the injured party and his fellow workmen. Chapter Two examined the importance of good public relations; the focus on shared responsibility can be understood through the same lens. Especially juxtaposed against the rhetoric of the IWA that continued to present forestry companies as uncaring machines which took men's sweat, blood, and tears in exchange for a paltry wage and poor living conditions, mutual responsibility rhetoric could create an impression that companies were working with employees, not against them.

Finally, the rhetoric of mutual responsibility was convenient. It tied easily into wartime tropes workers and their families were familiar with. In a newsletter distributed to their Honeymoon Bay Logging Division, WFI asked workers to consider the effects of accidents, and their cause:

DID YOU EVER -

- Try to tie your shoe laces with one arm in a sling?
 Try to see straight and clearly after an eye injury?
 Try to sleep with an infected hand?
- 4. Try [to] walk with an injured foot?
- 5. Try to button your shirt with a burned finger?
- 6. Try to eat a meal with a fractured jaw?

²⁷ LH, 1956, 35-49; BCLMA Newsletter March 1957, BC MS-1333, 88, 5.

If so, you know full well the EFFECT of an Accident. What did you do about the CAUSE? Could it happen to you again? What have you done to prevent a similar accident happening to one of your family, your friends, or a fellow worker?

Many things in life we take for granted – Safety is one of them. But Safety, like Freedom and Security, has to be worked for. Not till[sic] EVERYONE does his share toward Accident Prevention are you truly safe from Accident Injury.²⁸

The newsletter invoked a similar rhetoric to that used in propaganda a decade earlier to win support from Canadians for the war effort. Freedom and security had little to do with workplace safety. Yet, workers were encouraged to think of safety along the same lines they thought of freedom and national security, as a value, even a right, that they needed to protect.²⁹ Those who thwarted its realization were not simply going against the company; they were traitors in a battle against a common foe. Workers were not being told to avoid necessary risks, they were being told to band together and fight against their enemy: accidents at home and on the job.

Both WFI and BCFP implemented programs designed to get their workers engaged with ideas of mutual responsibility and accident prevention on a daily basis. Rhetoric and on the ground projects were mutually reinforcing. The message carried in newsletters and displayed on posters was also embodied in safety draws, workplace promotional events, and through participation in the Canadian Forest Products' Turtle Club. Moving beyond mere rhetorical commitment to the masculine ideal embodied in the worker as a team player discourse helped companies to create and enforce ideas of worker mutual responsibility.

The Accident Prevention Committee at WFI used cash and prize draws as a way to incentivize workers to stay safe on the job. The Safety Draw program promoted mutual

²⁸ Accident Prevention, Honeymoon Bay, Safety Bulletin 28 Oct 1955, BC MS-1333, 88, 16.

²⁹ Accident Prevention, Honeymoon Bay, Safety Bulletin 28 Oct 1955, BC MS-1333, 88, 16.

responsibility by tying the size of a prize to a department's safety record, or to the record held by the operation as a whole.³⁰ While individuals with exceptional safety records were recognized with pins celebrating years without an accident, the bulk of WFI's program was rooted in rewarding company-wide accident free streaks. The longer the workers could collectively go without a compensable or lost time accident, the greater the prize. The plateau points at which money would be awarded for accident free days as well as the amount of money earned were established in 1956 and carried into the 1960s. The first plateau point was 30 days without an accident. Once reached, the company would contribute \$50 to the pot. If the company remained accident free another 20 days and reached the 50 day mark, an additional \$100 would be added to the pot, then \$200 for 80 days, \$300 for 100. If the company managed to make it past 100 days without an accident it would add \$5.00 every day without an accident. When there was an accident it would reset the counter and the workers would begin accumulating accident free days from scratch, building again to 30, 50, 80 et cetera. The company did not hoard prize money until an accident occurred. Instead, it distributed the prize money through regular draws and contests.³¹

The company spent a lot of money on this safety program. However, it amounted to a fraction of the cost to companies for compensable injuries or deaths.³² For companies, money spent on accident prevention was truly an investment. By spending

³⁰ "Plant Safety Bulletin," 14 February 1958, BC MS-1333, 88, 16; "Target for Today," BC MS-1333, 88, 16; "List of Winners during Safety Week" 16 May 1957, BC MS-1333, 88, 23; "A Pledge." BC MS-1333, 88, 23.

³¹ "80 Accident Free Days" 14 May 1957, BC MS-1333, 88, 23; "List of Winners during Safety Week" 16 May 1957, BC MS-1333, 88, 23; "Plant Safety Bulletin," 14 February 1958, BC MS-1333, 88, 16.

³² Frequency and cost per M reports 1957-58, BC MS-1333, 88, 4; "Shingle Mill Frequency Rate and Cost per Square Report,"10 May 1957, BC MS-1333, 88, 4.

money to pre-empt workplace accidents, they hoped to maximize the hours their employees could give the company and minimize the amount of money paid to the WCB. Accidents carried a cost beyond that assessed by the WCB. However, since company executives deemed the total cost of an accident (including the loss of profit caused by lost working hours, the cost of repairing any damaged equipment, and the cost to replace any lost product) incalculable, they discussed the cost of accidents in terms of "direct costs" (usually expressed as WCB expenditures alone).³³ Widows' pensions and payments to injured workers were paid out by the WCB from the fund all logging companies in the province contributed to. However, the company's experience rated premium was based on a calculation of the total costs of claims made by employees of that company. This meant that companies felt a direct, if delayed, impact when a costly accident happened at their operation.³⁴ Each month the BCLMA generated a report that showed the accident frequency rate for each of its member companies. These reports also included a calculation of the "WCB expenditure per [million] feet production."³⁵ The Consolidated Red Cedar Shingles Association released a similar report for WFI's Shingle Mill. These reports also included one or two example accidents to demonstrate "the increasing cost of compensation."³⁶ They described the accident in a brief sentence and then broke down the associated costs to the company:

Workman was bucking log on jack ladder. Power saw grabbed, throwing workman about 10 feet down on to log refuse pile.

³³ Evans to Managers "Injury Costs," 24 June 1949, KSMA 997.54, 1949.Evans, Roy. 49.

³⁴ *Report of Royal Commission* 1952, p. 185-187; CRCSA 8 Aug 1958 "Shingle Mill Frequency Rate & Cost Per Square Report," BC MS133, 88, 4; Frequency and cost per M reports 1957-58, BC MS133, 88, 4.

³⁵ Frequency and cost per M reports 1957-58, BC MS153, 88, 4, Frequency and cost per M reports 1957-58, BC MS153, 88, 4.

³⁶ BC MS133, 88, 4. See documents in first half of folder.

Injury – skin abrasions to left ear and top of head. Complained of severe headache and dizziness.

Cost of compensation and medical aid	\$1,488.72
Pension awarded	\$ <u>27,678.24</u>
Total direct cost of injury	\$ <u>29,166.96</u> ³⁷

The reports from these professional organizations served to highlight the costs of accidents and help companies see where they ranked compared to other companies in their associations.³⁸ Certainly their central message was clear: accidents ate into company profits and the tipping point at which accident prevention investments would override the fiscal benefit from accident prevention programs was far from being reached.

WFI's Safety Draw program's accumulation scheme did not change appreciably over the years it operated, but the method of awarding the money varied over time in order to maintain workers' interest. In 1958 and 1959, Safety Draw money was awarded through a Bingo game rather than a simple draw. A turkey draw near Christmas provided another creative way to distribute this money from 1958 through 1962. In 1960, after a particularly successful year, the company gave away 240 turkeys.³⁹ To maintain worker interest, prizes varied from year to year. In 1957, rather than a cash prize of \$200 for 80 days accident free, the company arranged a vacation in Seattle.⁴⁰ In 1962 WFI offered \$2,000 towards the purchase of a brand new car for one lucky employee if the whole

³⁷ CRCSA 8 Aug 1958 "Shingle Mill Frequency Rate & Cost Per Square Report," BC MS133, 88, 4.

³⁸ Evans to mill managers, "A Healthy Safe Christmas to all BCFP employees" 17 November 1950" p2, KSMA 997.54, 1950. Evans. 50. Internally, safety directors also kept management apprised of total WCB costs.

³⁹ "Safety Draw" 10 December 1958, BC MS-1333, 88, 23; "Accident Prevention Committee Meeting," 29 October 1959, p3, BC MS-1333, 89, 3; Untitled Memo re: Safety Program 1956-1962, BC MS-1333, 19, 1. ⁴⁰ "80 Accident Free Days" 14 May 1957, BC MS-1333, 88, 23.

operation could go accident free for 365 days straight.⁴¹ The company held draws of one kind or another regularly to ensure that the program was never far from workers' minds.

Shared responsibility was central to company safety promotions, but the Safety Draw program did not ignore individual responsibility. In order to be entered into the Safety Draw, employees were required to sign the following pledge:

I pledge my wholehearted support. In a sincere effort to prevent injury to myself and my fellow workers I promise

to do my best to observe all safety regulations and, when required, to assist my fellow workers in the safe performance of their jobs⁴².

While it is impossible to know whether the workers attached any real meaning to signing the pledge, we can assume that the company expected workers to treat it with at least a measure of gravity. Taken to heart, it embodies everything the Safety Draw program sought to enforce: individual workers ensuring their own safe practice and extending the promise of help and caution to other workers in order to achieve a shared goal of preventing injuries. Safety Draws served to keep accident prevention active in the minds of workers, as well as their responsibility to one another and the company at large. Each draw was accompanies by company messages or posters announcing and promoting the contest and reminding workers that their personal attention to safety was part of something much larger. One worker's ability to escape accident was not enough; the company demanded that every single worker escape accidents. Just as one worker could be hurt by the carelessness of his crew, this incentive program created an opportunity for one worker to receive a large reward thanks to the dedication of his entire crew.

⁴¹ Irwin, "New Safety Incentive Plan," 29 May 1962, BC MS-1333, 19, 1.

⁴² "A Pledge," BC MS-1333, 88, 23.

Tying in to the same underlying message as the Safety Draw program were two other WFI initiatives in the 1950s: a 'Safety Man of the Week' contest and the Plywood Man on which accidents were marked for all workers to see. Each highlighted a different part of the rhetoric of responsibility central to WFI's safety program. The Safety Man of the Week highlighted individual workers who had embraced their personal responsibility for safety. The Plywood Man reminded workers that an injury to one was an injury to all. The Safety Man of the Week Contest only ran for a few months before being terminated in December 1956. Each week, "a joint committee of Union and Management" chose one employee to be honoured for his commitment to safety. In a press release accompanying the announcement of the first winner the company explained that, "These awards are made on the basis of length of employment, hazard of the job and safety record of the man."⁴³ The company archives only retained records for three contest winners. Each received a short, formulaic write up describing the man's experience and safety record, and including a quote from him about staying safe on the job.

The first Safety Man of the Week was J.M. "Mickey" Mitchell. He worked 32 years in the woods without an accident. His words of wisdom: "When I'm on the job I watch myself and see that my crew works safely too."⁴⁴ He was joined as Safety Man of the Week by H.V. "Harry" Harwood and Lloyd E. Williams. Harwood worked as a construction engineer for 40 years without an accident. He advised: "Look and think before you act and instruct your crew to do the same."⁴⁵ Williams was a gangmill

⁴³ "Safety Man of the Week" undated, BC MS-1333, 88, 23; 19 September 1956, p1, BC MS-1333, 89, 3.

⁴⁴ "Safety Man of the Week" undated, BC MS-1333, 88, 23

⁴⁵ "Safety Man of the Week" undated, BC MS-1333, 88, 23

edgerman with a "notable Accident Free Record," though the release does not give any details of his record. Like Mitchell and Harwood, his secret was paying attention: "I try to keep alert to the job and its recognized hazards... and make full use of the safety equipment provided..."46 Two important themes emerge from the Safety Man of the Week records: caution and teamwork. For each of these men, being aware of dangers and taking all available steps to avoid them lay at the core of their successful safety record. This awareness and caution was not an individual endeavour however. Both Harwood and Mitchell mentioned explicitly that their safety record was not rooted solely in their own caution, but that they had to ensure their entire crew was exercising this same caution. Even though Williams' quote did not explicitly refer to other workers' behaviour as integral to his personal safety record, his mention of safety equipment reminded readers that dangers came from outside of the worker's own behaviour. If a careful worker could control all of the variables of the workplace, he would have no need for a hard hat, safety glasses, gloves, or safety shoes. Because workers could not control every variable through their actions alone, a safe worker needed to act cautiously and take precautions against actors, actions, and events outside his control.

WFI used the Plywood Man as a visual reminder of accidents. It showed workers the consequence of not exercising caution or working together as a team. It showed each injury that occurred at the plant, colour coded according to severity: "Blue for doctor's cases, White for First Aid and Red for compensable accidents."⁴⁷ To further emphasise the team effort involved in combatting accidents, and consequently the failure of

⁴⁶ "Safety Man of the Week" 16 October 1956, BC MS-1333, 88, 23.

⁴⁷ "Safety Program 1958" BC MS-1333, 89, 3; "Plywood Man." BC MS-1333, 89, 23.
teamwork assumed when accidents occurred, the Plywood Man was physically moved inside a department the day after it recorded a compensable accident as a constant visual reminder that its workers had let down the company and each other by allowing one of their members to be hurt on the job.⁴⁸ Records of the Plywood Man are scarce. However, from the records that have been preserved, this initiative appears to have only been carried out in 1958.

Daily and weekly programs like the Safety Draw program and the Plywood Man kept accident prevention and the importance of teamwork on the agenda for WFI all year round. BCFP had a different approach to these important themes. One of the things that set its accident prevention program apart from its competitors was how it seamlessly used external organizations with shared agendas, such as the Turtle Club described in Chapter Two, to promote a desired change. While the Turtle Club emphasised individual accomplishment, the way in which BCFP used it in its safety program reflected a broader ideal. When, for example, Elgin Garnett received his Turtle Club certificate in 1951, the company had him run a hard hat demonstration to show his fellow workers how it had saved his life.⁴⁹ Garnett was an experienced logger. He did not have an accident because of carelessness, instead, he acted cautiously by wearing the proper safety equipment. BCFP took advantage of the opportunity his actions presented to remind workers both of the importance of safety equipment and, more subtly, of the role of experienced workers' in keeping their fellow workers safe by constantly demonstrating best practices. The hard

⁴⁸ "Safety Program 1958" BC MS-1333, 89, 3; "Plywood Man." BC MS-1333, 89, 23.

⁴⁹ Evans to Lindo, 29 October 1951, KSMA 997.54, 1951, Safety.

hat had saved Garnett's life, but by sharing his experience with the entire camp, he could save the lives of others.

The Turtle Club was just one of the external organizations BCFP used to shape its early safety program. In 1953 and 1954, rather than running a steady stream of contests or events, BCFP focused its energy on a single week of heightened accident prevention activity: the BC Loggers Association's Safety Week. The first logging Safety Week was held in 1953. It was supported by the BC Loggers Association and the IWA. But the events making up Safety Week lay in the hands of individual companies. WFI also took part in Safety Week but its Safety Week program was much less developed than BCFP's, likely because of its investment in year round safety programs. While BCFP invested time, money and creativity into making Safety Week drastically different from the status quo, WFI seemed to see Safety Week as an opportunity to show other BCLA member companies that its regular safety program was a strong deterrent against accidents all year round.⁵⁰

BCFP had a year round, safety program, but unlike WFI, which reinforced messages of responsibility and desirable masculinity with a number of distinct but connected accident prevention initiatives, its regular safety programs lacked a cohesive underlying message in the early 1950s. The company promoted safety, but rather than creating a dialogue of safety as masculine and mutual responsibility, its early safety program consisted of a series of reactions to incidents. When an injury occurred the

⁵⁰ "Safety Week Program" 4 May 1959, MS-1333, 89, 3; BCLMA bi-monthly safety conference, 29 May 1958, p3, BC MS-1333, 88, 3; "Safety Week Programme," undated. 1958, BC MS-2333, 89, 3. Most of the documents in WFI's archival collection discussing any change to safety policy for the duration of Safety Week were created by the BCLA and BCLMA.

company used this to promote a specific aspect of safety, yet it did not explicitly connect these incidents and messages to one another or to a central ideal. While the difference between these approaches is subtle, it is important. Accidents in forestry could be caused by any of a vast number of variables. While a special safety meeting to discuss one of the hazards of the woods or the mill could help prevent an identical or similar accident from occurring, this approach did not address the broader lack of a safety culture within the workforce. Though BCFP would create a more cohesive safety culture by the end of the decade, in the early 1950s it was only during Safety Week that it aggressively pursued a change in the way its workers saw themselves and their responsibility to the company and to one another. Safety Week served another ideological purpose which will be discussed later in this chapter: it served to enforce the hetero-patriarchal family.

Safety Week did not originate in logging. As discussed in Chapter Two, sawmill operations were the first among forest industry workplaces to hold a Safety Week, modeled after those already being honoured among highway workers and firefighters.⁵¹ It aimed to bring awareness to the danger of the industry and to inspire individual operations to strive to improve their safety record. Accordingly, BCLA member companies participating in Safety Week each sought to go longer than their competition without an accident. Though it may have been company rather than individual pride on the line, BCFP used the opportunity presented by Safety Week to get its men excited about safety.

⁵¹ "Logging Safety Week – 1953," p1, KSMA 997.54, 1953 (2), Logging Safety Week.

Each morning during Safety Week announcements aimed to excite men about the idea of working safely. This was in contrast to announcement throughout the rest of the year which focused on giving men important information about potential hazards they might face that day. Every morning of Safety Week a different member of camp management gave a brief talk about safety on the job over the PA system. They wrote their talks themselves. Ultimately their talks all stuck to a very similar theme, indicating that managers were on the same page when it came to what workers needed to do to improve the company's safety record.⁵² Likely some of this cohesion came from the strong focus on management training that characterized company safety programs and WCB rhetoric in the previous decade.

To kick off Safety Week at Caycuse camp in 1953, the entire crew was gathered together to hear an announcement from Ed Peck, foreman for yarding and loading. They watched the raising of the green cross flag that would fly over the operation as long as it remained accident free. Peck worked hard to build the men's enthusiasm for the event, zeroing in on the competitive element to get them engaged right from day one:

...I feel sure that with a little added effort from all of us working together, we can have not only a No Accident Week, but build up a record that no one can top, and that includes North West Bay [sic].

Competition in the business of Accident Prevention has never been as keen in the Lumber industry as it is today. It is our objective in Caycuse to obtain first place in this field. The hard work and effort which we put into Accident Prevention will pay off just a long as we want it to.⁵³

Northwest Bay Logging was one of the fiercest competitors that BCFP faced for top honours in Accident Prevention during this time. It won the WCB award for holding the

⁵² Hallberg, "Re: Safety Message Broadcast" 15 Sept 1953, KSMA 997.54, 1953 (2), Logging Safety Week; Lindo, Re: Logging Safety Week, Sept. 28th to Oct. 2nd" 15 Sept 1953, KSMA 997.54, 1953 (2), Logging Safety Week.

⁵³ "Logging Safety Week – 1953." 28 Sept 1953, KSMA 997.54, 1953 (2), Logging Safety Week.

lowest accident frequency rate in 1949, narrowly beating out Nitnat, and consistently beating out Caycuse from 1949-1952.⁵⁴ By mentioning this company specifically in his Safety Week opening announcement, Peck likely hoped to fire the men up and inspire them to work their hardest at Accident Prevention in order to beat a company that had bested them in the past. By focusing on the competitive aspect of Safety Week, Peck positioned safe work as a matter of company, and masculine, pride.

His announcement went on to tell the men exactly how they could ensure their

team was victorious:

I think we all should be reminded once more of the most common cause of accidents. The first one is carelessness – This week especially we should be very careful about being careless. Think before you act and think in terms of Safety.

Another common cause of accidents is ignorance of danger – Let's all keep our eye on the new man and help him to understand the danger points of his occupation. Let us make sure he doesn't form any bad habits at the stat. Habits are hard to break – If a habit is a dangerous one it must be corrected at once in order to assure the safe performance of the worker. This may mean non-efficient performance at first. It will also mean extra exertions on you part to break the habit. Most new men are not Safety-Wise. They do not know nor do they have the ability to analyze all the aspects of a situation. They need assurance that they are doing the right thing. They have a great need to have someone tell them what is right, what to do, and how to deal with things on their minds. You older employees with years of experience, can help guide these younger men in the safe performance of their jobs. Co-operation and good will are necessary for safe production.

I will deal briefly with a third cause of accidents – People who are emotionally distracted, people who are physically incapable of keeping up with job demands and people who cannot grasp or apply Safety principles are unsafe workers. We must constantly be on guard against workers such as these and report their unsafe practise to a member of your Safety Committee before an accident occurs.⁵⁵

As in the BCLMA newsletter discussed earlier in this Chapter, the company used new

workers as a reason for workers to follow safety regulations. However, in line with the

message of mutual responsibility, it did not blame the young or inexperienced workers for

lacking the skill to know what was safe; this responsibility lay on the shoulders of the

⁵⁴ Munro, "Safety Program – WCB 1949 Award" 6 June 1950, KSMA 997.54, 1950, misc.; "Comparative Accident Frequency Figures" 1953. p1,3, KSMA 997.54, 1953(2), BC Loggers Association.

⁵⁵ "Logging Safety Week – 1953," KSMA 997.54, 1953 (2), Logging Safety Week.

more seasoned workers, who needed to lead by example to ensure a safely running operation.

The "third cause" Peck lists was more a series of potential problems than a cause. However, he linked each of these problems - distraction, inability, and ignorance - to a call for every man to police his fellow workers to ensure that potential problems did not develop into accidents. Even more than the call for senior workers to set a positive example, this call to be "on guard" epitomized mutual responsibility. One of the reasons shared responsibility worked to the company's benefit lay in its potential to increase surveillance. This would increase the efficacy of regulations and best practices and ensure mass compliance. Here, Peck explicitly told every worker in the camp that their job required them to report their fellow worker if he did not practice prescribed safety standards. The flag raising announcement, the longest of those given during Safety Week 1953, conveyed the desired rhetoric much more thoroughly than the other announcements. While messages on the next three mornings were brief, they each zeroed in on a specific potential hazard facing the men rather than a more general desire to change the culture. Each day's message reinforced the prominence of mutual responsibility.56

⁵⁶ "Logging Safety Week - 1953" 30 Sept 1953, KSMA 997.54, 1953 (2), Logging Safety Week; "Logging Safety Week - 1953" 29 Sept 1953, KSMA 997.54, 1953 (2), Logging Safety Week; "Logging Safety Week - 1953" 31 Sept 1953, KSMA 997.54, 1953 (2), Logging Safety Week. Chokermen warned about the danger of choking a log too near to the center were simultaneously reminded that their mistake could result in a broken line, or bring danger to the chaser or loading crew. Hooking the choker in the right place on the log was a one man job, but the ramifications if it was done incorrectly could affect the whole crew both in terms of their ability to get their job done, as a broken line would bring the operation to a halt until it could be replaced or repaired, but also in terms of the safety of each worker. Other announcements included admonishments to supervisors to make sure the whole crew was in the clear before giving an order and general calls for all men to do their part to make sure the green cross flag continued to fly.

Though these ideas were given more ceremony than usual during Safety Week, this was not the first time loggers at BCFP's camp heard a message of mutual responsibility in their morning announcements. Two weeks before Safety Week began, one morning announcer singled out a number of different crew positions, pointing out how each one's work habits directly affected other crew members. Head fallers, for example, were reminded to watch out for their bucker: "be sure they are in the clear before you drop a tree - don't guess"; hookers and rigging slingers are reminded to keep their chokerman safe; signal men to always keep their equipment in perfect condition as the failure of a whistle "may cause a serious accident"; and "Everyone - if you know of an unsafe condition that exists - notify your foreman or a member of the safety committee this morning. Think safety all day -- Work safely all day."⁵⁷

The final broadcast of Safety Week 1953 came from the camp Superintendent, Ken Hallberg on the Monday following the weeklong intensive safety drive. His congratulatory tone told the men that the strides the camp made during Safety Week pleased their management. He also told them that they would need to wait to know the impact the week had on the industry's accident statistics as a whole. While Hallberg was happy with his men's efforts during the week, he was not content to allow Safety Week to stay contained as a single week of exemplary work. He saw its success as a simple stepping stone towards a larger shift in the company's attitude towards safety and their safety record:

Safety Week was a success here. There has never been as much interest, participation and co-operation as there was during Safety Week. Now that we have achieved this high standard I am sure we are going to hold on to it, and keep right on going to even higher

⁵⁷ "Mon 16/53," KSMA 997.54, 1953 (2), Logging Safety Week.

standards... Before closing I would like to set a new objective. Let us now work till [sic] the end of the year without an accident. That is my objective and I am sure it will be yours.⁵⁸

Given the somewhat disastrous safety record of the industry in general, and the fact that Caycuse was the only of the BCFP operations in their Cowichan Lake division to keep the flag flying all week long, Hallberg's hope that the camp could carry on its accident free streak for the remainder of the year can be read as naively optimistic. Yet, this optimism pervaded Safety Week.

Of course Safety Week's success was not all due to inspiring morning announcements. The company got its men thinking about safety, and acting on these thoughts, throughout the week in other ways. The most cognitively involved of these was a safety slogan contest. The company asked workers and their families to think about safety and come up with a brief, catchy, creative slogan to be used in BCFP's safety literature for the following year.⁵⁹ To win the slogan contest, contestants needed to identify safety principles in the industry, understand these principles well enough to determine which were most important, and then convey that principle in ten words or less. This kind of creative activity may have come more easily to some than others, but across the board it required workers to actively, mentally engage with ideas about on the job safety.

Workers and their wives participated in the slogan contest, often submitting several slogans.⁶⁰ Each camp picked one winner from these submissions and then sent

⁵⁸ "Logging Safety Week - 1953" 5 October 1953, KSMA 997.54, 1953 (2), Logging Safety Week.

 ⁵⁹ Evans, "Safety Slogan Contest" 16 September 1953, KSMA 997.54, 1953 (2), Logging Safety Week.
 ⁶⁰ KSMA 997.54, 1953 (2), Logging Safety Week. There are a number of entry slips in this folder containing between one and six slogans with the name of the person who submitted them.

their pick to the BCFP head office in Vancouver where a final winner was chosen. Art Taylor, a store clerk at Caycuse camp, won in 1953. His winning slogan, one of six that Taylor submitted, focused on the sometimes flippant attitudes workers displayed towards safety: "Laughing at safety may be your last laugh."⁶¹ While this slogan did not promote the kind of mutual responsibility that was central to the Accident Prevention programs at this time, the message to take safety seriously, if taken to heart, could serve the same function as the message that each employee was responsible for both his safety and the safety of those around him. Both messages aimed to get workers to adhere to existing Accident Prevention regulations, wear safety equipment, and generally exercise caution in order to avoid accident or injury on the job.

While the winning slogan can give us insight into BCFP head office's priority when it came to safety, looking through the submitted slogans can give some insight into what safety messages workers and their wives believed were most important. In all, the company record preserved 26 slogans from the 1953 competition. Most of these focused on the personal consequences for failing to follow accident prevention recommendations rather than on mutual responsibility. This contest was repeated as part of the 1954 Safety Week. Only 13 slogans were preserved from that year. Yet, most of the 1954 submissions focused on mutual responsibility, indicating that in the eight months between these two contests, the company had effectively demonstrated to their workers that teamwork was the goal of their accident program. Whether or not workers and their families internalized the company's message, those submitting slogans clearly understood what the company

⁶¹ Lindo to Evans, 7 Oct 1953, KSMA 997.54, 1953(2), R.E. Evans.

was looking for.⁶² The winning slogan in 1954, submitted by Len Ronnback, was less elegant than Taylor's 1953 winner, but its focus aligned perfectly with company rhetoric:

Safety reflects Common Sense! Heeding others --- prepared, cautious. "ALWAYS ALERT!"⁶³

The first two Safety Weeks followed the same pattern. The largest difference between these years was that companies tried to maximize the impact of Safety Week 1954 by moving the event to May instead of September.⁶⁴ The success of the 1953 event likely left management with the impression that its program was adequate to achieve the result management wanted for the week, if not for the whole year. Once again the company planned a dual pronged attack on the causes of accidents, targeting both on the job actions and men's attitudes towards safety. Mutual responsibility continued to hold a central place.⁶⁵ Though BCFP continued to participate in Safety Week after 1954, the event ceased to be central to its safety program in 1955. Instead, the company began to develop a year round safety plan that aimed to keep safety always in workers' minds. The company's program after 1954 was in many ways similar to the WFI initiatives already discussed, though smaller in scale. The Safety Committee set goals for accident free periods, with draws for awards either as door prizes at safety meetings or more general rewards drawn for successful completion of accident free stretches. However, unlike WFI, the central focus of BCFP rhetoric in this period was less on mutual responsibility among workers and more on the responsibility of the male breadwinner to his family.

⁶² "Safety Slogan," KSMA 997.54, 1954 (1) Logging Safety Week; "Safety Award Supper & Dance" 28 May 1954, KSMA 997.54, 1954 (1) Logging Safety Week.

⁶³ "Safety Award Supper & Dance" 28 May 1954, KSMA 997.54, 1954 (1) Logging Safety Week.

⁶⁴ "Announcement to Workers" undated, KSMA 997.54, 1954 (1), Safety Message Broadcasts; *Forest and Mill*, 8 April 1954. p8, KSMA 997.54, 1954 (1), Safety Week.

⁶⁵ "Special Safety Meeting Talk Re Safety Week," KSMA 997.54, 1954 (1), Safety Week.

Just as each worker was held responsible for his fellow workers, each worker was held responsible to his dependants, and the dependants of other workers. The heteropatriarchal family, like mutual responsibility between workers, proved a useful tool for companies in several ways. They used imagery of a dependant wife and dependent children to illustrate the importance of safety – accident consequences were often presented in terms of their effect on an entire family deprived of wages rather than a single individual – and to convince workers to fall in line with proposed accident prevention measures. Workers' wives were not only used to motivate workers, but themselves as agents of the company's safety agenda. In short, a male breadwinner with dependents was an ideal employee for companies, and so companies took strides both rhetorically and practically to encourage their men to marry and, whenever possible, to settle their families inside the camps.

In her unpublished Master's Thesis, Erin Kathleen Melvin argues that the presence of women in Cowichan Valley logging camps in the mid twentieth century had an inherent taming effect on loggers. She asserts that it was the arrival of women that convinced men to stay put, bringing an end to the transience previously inherent in most loggers' lifestyles. For Melvin it is not anything that women did, but rather the assumptions men made about expected masculine behaviour in in a community that contains women. This taming or civilizing of the logger then, according to Melvin, occured because women entered logging camps as wives and daughters of their own accord.⁶⁶ While the arrival of women in Cowichan Valley logging communities like

⁶⁶ Melvin, 6, 101, 117, 120.

Caycuse and Nitnat coincided with a reduction in transience and a gradual move away from the hyper masculine, rugged type of masculinity, my research indicates that Melvin has put the cart before the horse. Yes, more women could be found in logging camps when men gave up transience for a more settled life; yes, where women lived in larger numbers there was an increase in activities and amenities that transformed utilitarian logging camps into communities which outlived the companies who formed them; and, yes, the presence of families in camps had a significant impact on how workers defined their masculinity.⁶⁷ However, these changes were not because women arrived. Rather, it was only when loggers gave up their transience for stability that they brought their wives into camps; it was only with the active support of companies that married quarters were made available, that schools were constructed and staffed in order to encourage families to stay in camp; it was only when corporate, government, and union rhetoric united to emphasise the importance of the male breadwinning role that we see a dramatic shift in attitudes among workers away from the Paul Bunyan, independent, rugged masculinity and towards a more responsible, breadwinner masculinity. Women were part of the changes, but they were not the cause. Logging camps and loggers were 'tamed' but not because the mere sight of women in the camps had shifted the paradigm.

Women were the result, rather than the cause, of logging camps' transition towards community building. However, once they moved in to company land, women became the backbone of camp social life. Women's auxiliaries and individual women worked hard to organize social events and push for the creation of libraries and schools.

⁶⁷ Melvin, 6, 101, 115, 117, 120.

The women of Lake Cowichan were especially active in the 1950s, when they formed the District of Cowichan Lake Hospital Association to raise money and support for the creation of a hospital in the village of Lake Cowichan. The Association raised considerable funds, but ultimately the scheme failed when the provincial government did not support it.⁶⁸ Many of these same women were also members of the Ladies Auxiliary of the IWA. The Auxiliary for local 98, Youbou, played an important role in camp life in the early 1950s by organizing events for all members of the camp, but also in bringing a travelling library service in to it. However, after a road was constructed into BCFP's Cowichan Valley operations in 1955, many families moved out of camp and the local 98 Ladies Auxiliary was disbanded in 1957.⁶⁹ As mentioned in Chapter Two, wives of workers were also active in the company's first aid training and competitions.

The impact of women on the social lives of logging camps and communities is undeniable, but the mere presence of women was not what led to dramatic changes in the way loggers understood their own identities and roles within the company. Rather, it was the way these women were framed within the larger discourse coming from the company and later the union. The company aimed to control and change its workers' behaviour, but it did not limit itself to educating men about desirable masculinity. Wives of loggers, too, were targets of a gendered discourse of safety both directly, through letters and other publications aimed at them, and through passive consumption of the materials produced for male eyes.

⁶⁸ Fonds description, MG03 - Lake Auxiliary of Cowichan District Hospital Fonds, Kaatza Station Museum and Archives, Lake Cowichan BC.

⁶⁹ Fonds description, MG18 - International Woodworkers of America Ladies Auxiliary No. 98 (Youbou, B.C.) Fonds. Kaatza Station Museum and Archives, Lake Cowichan BC.

At its most overt, the companies' desire to enforce preferred worker behaviour by influencing workers' wives came out in letters sent to each household in the days leading up to Safety Week in 1953 and again in 1954. The idea that how a wife acted could lead a man to have an accident on the job came from the top down; however, it was not a message that came solely from companies. Professional organizations and the union also played into this idea of gender roles. In the guidelines sent to each camp before the 1953 Safety Week managers were told explicitly that:

[Home background] can influence the mind of the worker. We know a man who was killed in the woods one morning when he first got out on the job. Investigation showed he had a row with his wife at breakfast. His mind wasn't on what he was doing. Appeal to the families through wives, to help keep thing running smoothly at home, to encourage the husband, and to keep his mind free from worry.⁷⁰

Management then passed this message of male breadwinning and blame to the women living in the camp. A letter sent to the "family manager" of each household immediately prior to Safety Week in 1953 explicitly enlisted women's help, by appealing to them as consumers and homemakers and warning them that accidents that occurred because a man was distracted by his home life were hers to prevent.

Many accidents occurring in the past have been due to the fact that the injured man didn't have his mind on his work at the time. No-one but the victim himself knows, but it might have been due to worry over some domestic problems. May I suggest you can help him work safely, first by a constant endeavor to keep the atmosphere pleasant around the house, and secondly, by reminding him occasionally that the future of the family happiness depends on the care he exercises. You will be much better able to obtain the things you need for your home when he draws a full month's pay rather than a Compensation cheque.⁷¹

⁷⁰ "Memorandum A-1", undated, p 2, KSMA 997.54, 1952 (2), Logging Safety Week.

⁷¹ "Suggested draft of letter to wives of employees from superintendent or manager," undated, KSMA 997.54, 1952 (2), Logging Safety Week; "Dear Family Manager," undated, KSMA 997.54, 1954 (1), Safety Meeting. While there is no way to confirm if this exact letter was sent, a similar letter was sent in 1954, stressing the same theme of female responsibility for accidents.

These messages of female responsibility for male mindset are perhaps not surprising in the 1950s. Certainly Canadian society broadly was engaged in selling a similar ideal of the perfect, supportive housewife.⁷² However, the familiarity of the message should not be mistaken for a lack of significance. Rather, the fact that the company was able to latch on to an idea of gender that most wives would recognize from the pages of magazines and newspapers could only increase its efficacy. Women living in logging camps might eke out a more rugged existence than their suburb dwelling peers, but even in the isolation of the logging camp, they could not escape the post-war message that a woman's role was to create a haven in the home.

The company hoped that by appealing to worker's wives it could increase the efficacy of its safety program. If wives were on board with safety initiatives and took an active interest in promoting the safe work message in their homes, then workers would be surrounded by company safety discourse every single day. Wives then were important allies in the battle against logger apathy to workplace safety. To get women to work in accordance to company ideals, the letter circulated to families played on the fact that in most families the shopping and penny pinching were female occupations. Not only was any potential income brought in by wives completely ignored, but women were reminded

⁷² There is a considerable historiography in the Canadian literature of the idea of a male breadwinner. For more on the impact of this ideal on Canadian society prior to the 1950s see Joy Parr, *The Gender of Breadwinners* (Toronto, Ontario: University of Toronto Press, 1990); Eric Strikweda "Married Men I Feel Should Be Treated Differently;' Work, Relief, and Unemployed Men on the Urban Canadian Prairie, 1929-32," *Left History*, 12, 1 (Spring/Summer 2007): 30-51; and Ruth Roach-Pierson, "Gender and the Unemployment Insurance Debates in Canada, 1934-1940." *Labour/Le Travail*, 25 (Spring 1990): 77-103. For more on the post-war development of breadwinning see Jillian Creese, *Contracting Masculinity: Gender, Class, and Race in a White-Collar Union, 1944-1994* (Don Mills, Ontario: Oxford University Press, 1999); Nancy Christie *Engendering the State: Family, Work, and Welfare in Canada* (Toronto, Ontario: University of Toronto Press, 2000); and Shirley Tillotson, "The Family as a Tax Dodge: Partnership, Individuality, and Gender in the Personal Income Tax Act, 1944-1970," *The Canadian Historical Review*, 90, 3 (September 2009): 391-425.

that their spending – frivolous and not – was only possible because of the hard work of the male breadwinner. This message of shared interest in workplace safety was secondary to a message that women were to blame if what was portrayed as a petty need to nag or worry their breadwinner caused him to be absent minded on the job.

These letters provide a dramatic example of the rhetoric the company aimed at women, but letters alone were not responsible for driving home the message that safety was the responsibility of loggers, and that non-compliance and inattentiveness, on which accidents were largely blamed, would rob loggers' families of necessary support. This same message was echoed in safety posters. Like the message of mutual responsibility, the gendered message of safety posters was often told through familiar tropes. The use of wartime imagery in a safety poster, like an image of a woman and her daughter praying "Please keep our daddy safe," tied safety, patriotism, duty, and the heteronormative nuclear family together.⁷³ Like the call to teamwork among workers to protect the basic right of safety, this poster played on the memory most Canadians would have of wartime messages. Women were once again being recruited to support their men in a battle greater than their own need for survival, the family was the home front of the war against accidents. Women were expected to provide support for their men by making the home a haven of support and comfort. They were invited to engage in the pursuit of company safety goals, but in very female ways. They could attend safety events like Safety Dances

⁷³ National Safety Council "Please Keep Our Daddy Safe," undated, KSMA 997.54, 1950 (1), R.E. Evans; Lindo to Peck "Re: Logging Safety Week Sept. 28 to Oct 2," KSMA 997.54, 1953 (2), Safety Week; Lindo to Evans, undated, p 2, KSMA 997.54, 1953 (2), Safety Week.; "Logging Safety Week – 1953", 2 October 1953, KSMA 997.54, 1953 (2), Safety Week.

or First Aid Competitions, but their real work was in encouraging men to work safely and ensuring that the home he was being told to protect was as ideal as possible.

How deeply women internalized the message that their actions and the quality of the home life they single handedly created was largely responsible for the safety of their husband is impossible to know from the record that has been preserved. What we can surmise is that the company believed this tactic was worth pursuing. In 1954 the company again targeted wives directly with a letter spelling out their responsibility for their husbands' actions under the euphemistic heading of 'Family Support':

What is Family Support? We think it includes a good breakfast and a cheerful smile in the morning, an effort to keep the breadwinner's mind free from petty worries, an interest in his job. He knows his responsibility to his family and the suffering that must be undergone by them if he is hurt. Encourage him to work safely and avoid mishaps on or off the job.⁷⁴

Once again, the company reminded women that they would suffer along with their husband if they did not do their part to keep him safe. The repetition of this message in 1954 indicates that the company perceived its use in 1953 was part of their success.

Further evidence that this message of female responsibility for male moods in safety promotion literature can be found in the pages of the National Safety Council's monthly publication distributed to member companies' management: *Industrial Supervisor*. The *Industrial Supervisor* was circulated to members of the National Safety Council, which primarily meant supervisors and managers of companies; however, it was not uncommon for companies to repurpose articles or information found in its pages for internal safety campaigns. Most workers almost certainly saw some content that originated in this publication, but it is impossible to know the exact level of saturation the

⁷⁴ "Dear Family Manager," KSMA 997.54, 1954(1), Safety Meeting.

Industrial Supervisor had among laymen in the forest industry.⁷⁵ In 1965 the Industrial

Supervisor's December issue ran the following story titled "The Little Woman":

MANY WIVES should try to learn more about safety – not only for what it can be to the entire family, but to gain a complete understanding of what the plant safety program means to the life and limb of her man while he's at work.

Such an understanding can have an important bearing on the attitude of the husband toward accident prevention. Management had recognized this fact in many instances and forward looking companies often have safety publications mailed to the man at home, so that the family can be enlightened.

Aside from the desirability of building such positive attitudes about safety in the home, it is urgent that wives be aware of their contribution to the frame of mind their husbands take along to the workplace each morning.

If Wifey chooses breakfast time to air all her grievances of the previous day to complain about that bully in the next block who's been picking on Junior again or about Susie's unwillingness to help with the dishes and keep her room cleaned up; to whine about her sorry lot because he can't afford to buy that new fur coat she wants – if all these worries are piled on top of his natural, healthy concern for his job – then you can color him as an accident looking for a place to happen.

By contrast, take a look at that lucky guy who enjoys a good breakfast and homey chatter about pleasant family affairs, who gets a warm kiss and a cheerful 'goodbye' as he takes off for work. Can't complain about his frame of mind, can you?

There are some wives who couldn't care less about safety programs. **Widows know better.**⁷⁶

This letter, unsurprisingly, was not popular with female readers. Two months later, in

their February 1966 edition, the Industrial Supervisor published this letter submitted from

a woman in Washington State under the title "Reaction From the Little Woman":

WHY is it the housewives get heckled about safety?

We have little Work Safe signs about the house, head periodic lectures and read articles advising us how to run the house and care for the family.

It was just a little sickening to read the article 'The Little Woman' in INDUSTRIAL SUPERVISOR. Most wives, getting up at the crack of dawn, just haven't the time of the 'right frame of mind' to spill our grievances to Dear Hubby. The conversation is practically nil. However, we do manage that 'warm kiss and cheerful goodbye.' Maybe it would be better just to stay in bed and forget the whole thing!

Other articles I've read refer to how we should greet Dear Dad when he comes home. Again we should be full of smiles, well groomed and have a hot, nutritious meal waiting. 'Never upset Hubby with the day's trials and tribulations: have a delightful meal and hand him the evening paper.'

⁷⁵ Hallberg to Fraser, 16 September 1959, KSMA 997.54, 1959 (1), Hallberg, Ken, 59; Hallberg to the Supervisor, 3 February 1959, KSMA 997.54, 1959 (1), Accident Prevention, 59; Dinham, "Nitnat Camp, Cowichan Division: Minutes of the Regular Safety Meeting," 7 February 1956, KSMA 997.54, 1956 (1), Safety/Accident Prevention, 56.

⁷⁶ "The Little Woman," *Industrial Supervisor*, 33, 12 (December 1965), p2, KSMA 997.54, 1965 (2), Safety/Accident Prevention. Emphasis in original.

Then Hubby flips off to a meeting or the bowling alley!

Just when and to whom are we poor Gals supposed to pour out our little troubles? Maybe at night when he's asleep? .. Or put notes in his lunch bucket?

The last sentence, 'Widows know better,' really touched me! Seems that if we housewives can't share our day, our grievances or our pleasantries with our husbands, we are lost anyway!

Some day the 'lucky guy' the article referred to will come home to a flooded basement because Wifey couldn't 'gripe' about a faulty gasket.

Careless Wife⁷⁷

More than a decade after BCFP first sent a letter to wives implicating them in workplace safety, the same message with little variation of content was still everywhere women looked. As the "Careless Wife" wrote in her rebuttal, this message placed an entirely unrealistic burden on wives of men in industry. The letter trivialized any concern a woman could possibly need to discuss with her husband, portraying women as materialistic and shallow. It also set up a worker untroubled by his home life as the standard every family should strive for. These unrealistic and insulting portrayals of the family, and wives in particular, undermined an important source of support for industrial safety programs. But in the 1950s, the message that women needed to take responsibility for keeping their husband's safe by creating a haven at home was relatively new, and likely had not yet lost its lustre.

The company sold family support in a different form to men than to women. Rather than telling men that their wives and families were responsible for ensuring the worker began each day in the right mood to complete his work safely, it told men that their family depended wholly upon the wages they brought home and that an injury to a man was a tragedy for his whole family. It also encouraged workers to think beyond workplace safety, and to see accident prevention at home and on the job as their sole

⁷⁷ "Reaction From the Little Woman," *Industrial Supervisor*, 34, 2 (February 1966), p2, KSMA 997.54, 1965 (2), Safety/Accident Prevention.

responsibility as husbands, as fathers, and as men. To this end, companies included families in events and literature in a way that laid the responsibility for everyone's safety on the male breadwinner's shoulders.

Part of getting men to see safety as their job was creating a sense that accident prevention was manly. In 1958 three different publications employed the metaphor of an escaped zoo lion, based on two separate instances of zoo lions injuring children, to highlight both the multifold dangers not just of forestry but of life in general, and the inherent manliness of hunting for possible dangers before they could manifest in accidents.⁷⁸ The BCLMA newsletter took advantage of a local incident to drive home a

message about accident prevention:

British Columbia has only recently set up a law controlling operation of private zoos. It wasn't done until after a tiny Vancouver Island girl was killed by an escaped lion.

The tragedy disturbed us all, particularly when we learned that child was so familiar with the beast that she scolded it for hiding in the bushes. Seconds later, she was dragged down. If news reports were accurate, it appears the animal's cage door could have been better secured, and that the zoo staff could have been considerably less casual about such potentially murderous exhibits.

Your safety department wants to suggest that this applies to all of us - at work, at home, in our recreation. We are all familiar with another kind of lion, and we become very casual about him in spite of his killer nature.

Our lion lurks around our plants inside every poorly-piled load, under every loose plank in the desk, behind every inadequate or missing guard. His menacing eyes glare out at the face of every man who take a shortcut, takes a chance, hurries a bit too much or just plain doesn't think.

Workers can safely face that lion during the 23.8% of their time that is spent on the job but he can tear them away from their jobs during the other 66% of their time. And he can maul their loved ones at any time.

He doesn't hide in the brush, but in that kerosene-filled pop bottle forgotten in the garage, ready to leap down the throat of the child who tilts the bottle to drink. That box of headache pills on the bathroom shelf is a lion to the child playing 'hospital' – and quite as deadly.

There's a lion in the back seat of every car, ready to leap on the hasty, irritable or show-off driver. He pads alongside the kid riding a bike, and he stalks the tots playing at the roadside. It becomes a grim game for us, if we don't hunt out our lions and destroy them or lock them up until after one of our loved ones have been mauled.

⁷⁸ "Plant Safety Bulletin," Vol1. No6, 2 Sept 1958, BC MS-1333, 88, 16; Allison, "Safety Department Newsletter," No. 62. December 1958, p1-2, BC MS.1333, 88, 5.

Why not look on hazard-hunting around the plant, around our streets and homes, as a 'lion hunt'? The thrills may not be quite so spine-chilling, but there's more reward in it than in an expense-paid African safari!⁷⁹

It is unlikely than any worker reading this story or the other similar stories published by the Consolidated Red Cedar Shingles Association or in WFI's internal Plant Safety Bulletin actually believed that hunting for hazards at home or at their worksite was equal to an African Safari. It is equally unlikely that the author of this piece thought workers would be duped into thinking accident prevention held the thrills of hunting game. Yet, like the football metaphor discussed earlier in this chapter, the lion metaphor was chosen for a specific message about both safety and masculinity.

Hunting was a popular hobby among loggers and their management. R.J. Filberg, the superintendent of Comox Logging and Railway Company frequently planned and hosted hunting parties for management from other companies and other individuals or groups who came to see his operation at work. A hunting trip is a significant plot point in both Roderick Haig Brown's novels about loggers. It also features prominently in many of the oral histories and memoirs from people who lived and worked in forestry. Hunting stands out as one of the most important and beloved hobbies for many.⁸⁰ While women at times hunted small game, primarily birds, or enjoyed fishing, it is clear from the stories men tell that they associated hunting with manliness. In his autobiography, Ken Hallberg

⁷⁹ "Safety Department Newsletter," No. 126. June 1958, BC MS-1333, 88, 5.

⁸⁰ Beatrice Gark A239, Aural history Collection, Campbell River Museum and Archives, Campbell River, BC (Hereafter, CRMA Interview Tape Number); Bill Granlund, CRMA A224; Mel Parker, CRMA A042; Gold, *Logging As It Was*, 185; Joe Garner, *Never Chop your Rope: a Story of British Columbia Logging and People Who Logged* (Nanaimo, Cinnibar Press, 1988) 109; Mackie, *Island Timber*, 269-272; Even novelizations of logging including Roderick Haig-Brown's *Timber* and Jock Fairlie's *Lumberjack* portray hunting as an important part of the logger's life. Even when men were not hunting, the presence of dangerous game animals in the woods feature in stories, highlighting the inherent masculinity of the woods themselves, for example: Garner, *Never Chop Your Rope*, 176, 178, 192-194.

tells a story about his wife fishing off their float house on Cowichan Lake which illustrates the attitudes men had towards women fishing and hunting. Mrs. Hallberg and Ken's grandmother fished all day and believed they had caught a lot of fish, but too timid to kill the fish, they placed the live fish in a bucket of water. When they found their bucket empty, they believed the fish had been escaping and they had caught the same fish over and over again all day.⁸¹ Certainly such a comedic mishap would never have happened if a man, who would be unafraid to club each catch, were fishing instead. Equating hazard-hunting with game-hunting then played off the closely held belief of many that hunting was both an inherently masculine task and a venue for proving masculine superiority. Just as the man with the largest fish or the biggest buck at the end of a fishing or hunting trip could claim to be the best hunter, the man who prevented the most accidents could lay claim to greater skill at his job than his fellows.

Lions were not the only dangerous animal used to represent workplace and home hazards in a hunting metaphor. In February 1958 an article in the BCLMA newsletter used rattlesnakes in a similar way, telling a story of a farmer in the American South who accepted the possible danger of hunting rattlesnakes because it was safer than the potential danger he would face if he left a known hazard untended.⁸² Like the lion metaphor, this story sought to encourage men to see workplace dangers as something they should actively root out because one way or another they were going to have to handle the problem, and it was better to be proactive than to be a passive victim.

⁸¹ Hallberg, *Autobiography*, 83-84.

⁸² "Safety Department Newsletter," Feb 1958, BC MS-1333, 88, 5.

Beyond the assumption of an inherent masculinity in hunting, the article about the lion highlighted the vulnerability of dependants. The lion of danger was not lying in wait for the worker, but for his innocent child. Once again, as we saw in the mutual responsibility literature, the authors were careful not to cast aspersions on individual workers' skills. By focusing on hunting hazards because of the potential for harm to a workers' dependents, the author was able to push a message of constant vigilance against danger without suggesting that workers were incapable of protecting themselves. Especially in logging camps where workers' sense of skill was something they guarded closely – reacting negatively to any change which they identified as threatening their place as skilled workers rather than as the potential cause or victim of an accident, even if the reality was that accident prevention programs were built around those assumptions.

Worker's families were not only used rhetorically. At times companies actively worked to involve workers' families in their operation accident prevention programs. In 1956 WFI safety committee decided to include families in their Safety Draw program. It carried a motion for "a brief address by one of the employees' wives, or some speaker; while perhaps one of their children could make the draws." ⁸³ Wives and children did not work in the company and therefore were not directly involved in helping the company to reach its target, yet the committee determined that giving an active role to wives and children would add something to their program. Taken within the safety program as a whole, with its focus on male responsibility both to his fellow workers and to his family,

⁸³ "Accident Prevention Committee Meeting," August 1956, p 32, BC MS-1333, 89, 3.

this decision seems to have been made with a belief in the symbolic value of having the family and the safety event in the same space. The Safety Draw was a time to both celebrate the company safety record, and to remind men that continued success was dependent on their actions. Adding the family to this event would bring another element. Not only would men think about safety and their personal stake in it, but about the benefit to their family or to their fellow workers' family and the potential harm suffered by these families if the record was broken. Like the Plywood Man, the families' attendance did not itself increase the safety of the workplace, but, instead, served as a reminder of the consequences of accidents and thereby had the potential to increase each workers' individual commitment to accident prevention.

This was not the only instance of WFI involving workers' families in programs that on the surface had nothing to do with them. During Safety Week from 1957 through 1959 the company ran a Safety Quiz specifically for wives. The quiz was given over the phone, "the wife [was] asked a simple question. (she must give the answer to her husband who will advise the Time Office the next day in order that the wife will win her prize)."⁸⁴ The prizes were small, including things like cigarettes or chocolate, but every correct answer earned a prize and for those who chose cigarettes (the majority) the company supplied their preferred brand. The company kept track not only of winners, but of whose wife could not answer the question, and of who could not be reached on the phone. ⁸⁵ The questions were not about safety in the home, they focused on workplace safety, requiring

⁸⁴ "Safety Week Programme," May 1959, BC MS-1333, 89, 3; "Winners for Monday Telephone Quiz," BC MS-1333, 88, 23.

⁸⁵ "Winners for Monday Telephone Quiz," BC MS-1333, 88, 23.

that men actually talk to their wives about the safety initiative in order for the wives to know the quiz question answer.

BCFP also included family activities in their Safety Week. It engaged children with a safety poster design contest. Wives who belonged to the Ladies Auxiliary were brought in to plan the Safety Dance that would wrap up the week, and all women in the camp were invited to be part of the flag raising ceremony for which the PA system was turned up high enough that every house in the camp could hear it. This inclusion of women and children in Safety Week created a unique opportunity for the company to get entire families excited about safety. Children needed to understand at least one aspect of logging safety in order to design their poster, something their teacher and their mother would likely be responsible for helping with. Women, who had already been given their role in workplace safety in the letters discussed earlier, were deliberately included in both the opening and closing celebrations of the week, likely in an attempt to get women as excited about their husbands' safety as the company hoped the men were.

Including the whole family in Safety Week and other programs worked on yet another level: it created a sense of community. Safety Supervisor at Caycuse camp used the word "patriotic" to describe the feeling of men, women, and children during the 1953 Safety Week. Certainly the structure of BCFP's Safety Week with its celebratory flag raising on the first day and dinner and dance to close the event was designed to maximize enthusiasm and show the company's interest in safety in the best light.⁸⁶ While there were indisputable economic motives behind accident prevention in forestry, Safety Week

⁸⁶ Lindo to Evans, "Logging Safety Week – 1953," KSMA, 997.54, 1953 (2), Safety Week 53.

focused instead on the camp as a community achieving an important, company set, goal *together*. This sense of community can be seen as a goal in and of itself for companies.

The hetero-patriarchal family was not only a stick with which to threaten recalcitrant workers into following regulations, it was also the answer to increasing board costs and continued – though greatly decreased – transience. Married men were not only easier to target with safety literature because of their dependents, but they were also perceived as more stable employees. While new technologies did not require more skilled workers than hand logging methods, they did allow for greater exploitation of timber resources in each area, which meant that companies themselves became more stable, further motivating companies to establish a stable company-centric community to ensure continuous production. A single man without dependents was a free agent. He could choose to quit on a moment's notice and if he injured himself on the job he inconvenienced only the company and himself. A married man in contrast was beholden to his dependents. If he wanted to quit he would have to uproot his family and find a new residence for himself and for his family (if he moved into a camp that did not have married quarters available he may have to leave his family in a home in town and pay room and board to stay in the camp during the week) before he could settle again. It was more difficult for a married man then to make a decision in haste. Married men had roots and the deeper those roots sank in, the less likely he was to move on. Furthermore, as debunked in Chapter One, there was a perception that married men were poor union members. While the loggers of the Cowichan Valley disproved the belief that stable workforces could not form a successful union, the idea that married workers were less likely to react militantly than transient workers persisted.⁸⁷

For companies that operated bunkhouses and cookhouses there was financial benefits to employing married men. Married men earned the same wage as single men, yet most lived in houses they rented from the company, and were not permitted to take meals in the company funded cookhouse. BCFP's Cowichan division was not accessible by road until 1955 and, therefore, needed to provide housing options for all of its employees. Even after the road opened, the company continued to operate an elementary school for married workers' young children as well as bunkhouses and cookhouses for single men and married men who lived away from their families.⁸⁸ Men living in bunkhouses cost companies more money than men living in married quarters or men who lived away from camp and commuted in each day. They paid room and board and the company cookhouse supplied all of their meals.

⁸⁷ N. Smith to Hobson, 6 March 1950, KSMA 997.54, 1950, Accident Prevention; Peterson to Hobson, 9 March 1950, KSMA 997.54, 1950, Accident Prevention: Hobson to N. Smith, 10 March 1950, KSMA 997.54, 1950, Accident Prevention; Evans to Lindo, "Safety Award Prizes," 13 April 1951, KSMA 997.54, 1951 (1), Safety 51; Evans to Hallberg, "First Aid and Stock Room Assistant," 5 May 1950, KSMA 997.54, 1950, Roy Evans 50; Lindo to Fuller, "Re: William Kier," 17 January 1952, KSMA 997.54, 1952 (1), Turtle Club 52; Personnel Supervisor to B. Hughes, 3 July 1951, KSMA 997.54, 1951(1), Camp Life 51.; Beed to Munro, "Notes on Shutdown - - Cowichan Logging," 24 November 1948, KSMA 997.54, 1948, Beed, Joe 48; Hobson to Daniels, 4 June 1947, KSMA 997.54, 1942-1947. Companies do not explicitly discuss the benefits of hiring married workers. However, in a letter to The Juvenile and Family Court in 1950, the company was asked to confirm an employee's statement that Caycuse was "A Family Camp" as part of a custody dispute. Though management determined they did not want a housekeeper (assumed necessary since the worker was asking to bring his children to camp under his sole custody) living in the camp, they affirmed his statement that the camp was a good place to raise children, while denying him a home in the married quarter. In general, decisions made by BCFP management regarding camp planning, hiring, lay-offs, and even the purchasing of prizes for camp competitions all point to a marked preference for married men. During times of full or partial shut-down, companies even attempted to ensure work was available for married workers, even if they were not the most experienced in the positions they were filling. ⁸⁸ Hallberg, 118-122; "Caycuse Elementary School: School History," KSMA.985.78. Caycuse School Collection, Kaatza Station Museum and Archives, Lake Cowichan, British Columbia. (Hereafter KSMA 985-78); Healey, Jo. "New access road means finish of Caycuse 'school boat' run." unknown paper, dated April 30, 1955, KSMA.985. 78.

BCLA cookhouses operated at a loss throughout the time period in this study. In 1947 Forest Industrial Relations (FIR) conducted a study for the BCLA to aid in a dispute over board costs that was part of the 1948 contract negotiations with the IWA. From 1946 on, board rates were negotiated as part of the agreement between companies and the union. The study relied on company's self-reported data extending back to 1942 and sought to calculate the actual cost and losses of bunkhouses and cookhouses.⁸⁹ In 1949, FIR released the results of their ongoing study of cookhouse costs, "Report of an Investigation into the Problem of Feeding Men in Coast Logging Camps."90 The report compiled data from 80 cookhouses across 53 companies, and covered "approximately 95 percent of all the men who board in Coast logging camps."⁹¹ It assigned each participating company a number and gave each company its number with the report; other companies in the report remained anonymous.⁹² The primary reason for studying cookhouses was not to compile evidence to force an increase in charge. Rather, FIR sought to find ways companies could achieve peak efficiency in feeding their crews and perhaps cut their losses. In addition to cost and loss statements the report included standard menus and a dieticians report. FIR recognized that while companies wanted to

⁸⁹ KSMA 997.54, 1947,Cookhouse Losses; Stuart Research Services, "Re: Camp Board Dispute" 21 Jan 1949, CLR 3B, 25, 13; Lyle Wicks, "Report," 1 August 1958. p3, MS-1057, Gordon McGregor Sloan Fonds, BC Archives, (Hereafter BC MS-1057) 1.3.11; Billings to All Logging Subscribers, "Circular No. 220" 30 April 1947, CLR.3B, 24, 10; Accountant to Billings, 14 May 1947, CLR.3B, 24, 10; "First Six Months 1950, Boarding Questionnaire – Cookhouse Section," p1-3, CLR.3B, 24, 10; "I949, Boarding Questionnaire – Cookhouse Section," p1-3, CLR.3B, 24, 10; Circular No. 49-114, "Cost Information" Ladysmith, CLR 3B, 24, 10; Circular No. 49-114, "Cost Information" Comox Lake, CLR.3B, 24, 10; "Comparison of Cookhouse Direct Costs: 1948 and First Six Months of 1949," CLR.3B, 24, 10; Stuart Research Service Ltd. "Report of an Investigation into the Problem of Feeding Men in Coast Logging Camps," January 1949, CLR 3B, 24, 10.

⁹⁰ Stuart Research Service Ltd. "Report of an Investigation into the Problem of Feeding Men in Coast Logging Camps," January 1949, CLR 3B, 24, 10.

⁹¹ Stuart to Sheasgreen, "Strictly Confidential" 24 January 1949, CLR 3B, 24, 10.

⁹² Stuart to Sheasgreen, "Strictly Confidential" 24 January 1949, CLR 3B, 24, 10.

cut costs if possible, this could not be done at the expense of adequate nutrition to support the heavy labour workers were needed to carry out.⁹³ The dietician's report compiled by an assistant professor in home economics at the University of British Columbia (UBC) and a student in the Home Economics program at UBC found no fault with the quality of food being served, but rather pointed out that the method of service and way companies overproduced food was wasteful and changes to the way meals were served could drastically cut down waste and costs⁹⁴. The 1949 report did not mark the end of this research. FIR continued to solicit cost and loss statements from company accountants after its release.⁹⁵

The IWA did not dispute the findings of FIR's studies insofar as investigators found cookhouses and bunkhouses to be operating at a loss. But the union did dispute any attempt companies made to increase board costs to reduce these losses.⁹⁶ Following a Labour Board ruling that required companies to include board costs in the collective agreement, and thus attain union approval for any increase, companies made no attempts to increase board to a break-even point, likely because they knew the union would never accept such a drastic increase in costs to workers.⁹⁷ In August 1949 the *BCLW* published two articles arguing that companies should absorb the loss of board costs and return board

⁹³ Stuart Research Service Ltd. "Report of an Investigation into the Problem of Feeding Men in Coast Logging Camps," January 1949, p 39-40,42-45, CLR 3B, 24, 10.

⁹⁴ Stuart Research Service Ltd. "Report of an Investigation into the Problem of Feeding Men in Coast Logging Camps," January 1949, CLR 3B, 24, 10; Appendix A.

⁹⁵ Stuart to Filberg, 23 August 1949, CLR 3B, 24, 10.

⁹⁶ Munro to Hobson, Fraser, Beed, and Mahony. 9 April 1948, KSMA 997.54, 1948, Union IWA 48.

⁹⁷ "Statement to the Labour Relations Board Sub-Committee, Re Board Dispute," 20 January 1949, KSMA 997.54, 1948, Union IWA 48; Stuart Research Service Ltd. "Report of an Investigation into the Problem of Feeding Men in Coast Logging Camps," January 1949. p1, CLR 3B, 24, 10.

to \$2 per month.⁹⁸ Workers who resented the control the company exercised in their daily lives likely tied this resentment to the fees extracted each month in room and board.⁹⁹

For companies, the loss in profit from operating cookhouses posed a difficult problem, in large part because of the animosity between the union and the company. The cookhouse played a vital role in camp life from the earliest logging camps. As discussed in Chapter One, a bad cook in a camp was often enough to drive workers out. While transiency was no longer a central issue for operators in the 1950s, companies would have been wise to fear making too great a change to their cookhouse lest they upset the workers enough to trigger a strike. In 1949 when BCFP implemented a \$0.50 rise in the cost of board, the IWA immediately disputed the increase. At that time the board was raised from \$2.00 to \$2.50 per day and companies were losing, according to a report compiled by Stuart Research Services, on average, \$0.68 per day on cookhouse labour and food costs alone; the report did not include a calculation of equipment and building upkeep costs for operating a cookhouse or bunkhouses.¹⁰⁰ Board prices did not rise from \$2.50 per day until 1966, at which point the average cost to the company of \$5.75 per man per day.¹⁰¹ Single men, and married men who lived apart from their families, drained company resources.

⁹⁸ "Gargrave Wants Boost; \$2 Board; 3 Holidays; Security," 23 Aug 1949, *BCLW*, p 3; "IWA Refutes Boss Arguments with Facts and Figures," 23 Aug 1949, *BCLW*, p 4.

⁹⁹ Ray Stockand, CRMA, A188; Martin Fossum, CRMA, A163; "IWA Refutes Boss Arguments with Facts and Figures," 23 Aug 1949, *BCLW*, p 4. One interviewed worker acknowledged the cookhouse losses, but believed companies should absorb the cost because well fed workers made up for it in production. ¹⁰⁰ Stuart Research Services, "Statement to Labour Relations Board Sub-committee Re: Board Dispute" 20

Jan 1949, CLR 3B, 25, 13.

¹⁰¹ "Newsletter from the forest industry." 16 Mar 1966, MacMillan Bloedel Limited Fonds, C.A. Specht Corporate Papers, box 703, file 6, (Hereafter M&B C.A. Specht, box, file) p 5.

Though company safety rhetoric from 1953-1959 idealized and focused on married men with dependents, single men were not forgotten. Like married men who were perceived as plagued by their wives' complaints, single men were warned away from female distraction. In an announcement made to workers returning after a seasonal shut down at Caycuse in 1954, single men were told to "leave the thoughts of your holiday at home. By that I don't mean that you should forget the girl you left behind – that would be demoralizing."¹⁰² The men were encouraged to have a girl, and even to think about her, just not while they were on the job. Single men were also not immune from the hetero-patriarchal breadwinner rhetoric. While they did not have wives or children to safe guard, the messages of mutual responsibility discussed at the beginning of this chapter made sure that single men understood they were at least partly responsible if a fellow worker was not able to support his dependents.

At times the message that a single man's actions could destroy a family, his own or that of a fellow worker, could be heavy handed. For example, this poem published in a December 1956 newsletter from the Consolidated Red Cedar Shingles Association:

If you're not a prankster You'll never have to shun The widow and the children Of the man you killed in fun.¹⁰³

The poem was part of a message on the danger of horseplay in the workplace but is especially noteworthy for its dark tone. Most of the newsletters and circulars on safety from the CRCSA, BCLMA and other professional organizations were upbeat in tone.

¹⁰² Hallberg. "Safety Message Broadcast" 15 February 1954, KSMA 997.54, 1954 (1), Safety Message Broadcast.,

¹⁰³ CRCSA Dec 1956, BC MS-1333, 88, 5.

Even when reprimanding men for not conforming to a recommendation of regulation, the message was always that accident prevention was achievable and focused on what men could do in prevention rather than on the potentially tragic consequence of failed prevention. This poem is a rare example of the exact danger workers face being spelled out rather than merely implied.

Convincing workers to take responsibility was integral to company safety initiatives, but shared responsibility was not restricted to workers and their dependents. Through membership in professional organizations and an ongoing practice of sharing accident prevention successes and failures with other companies in the industry, BCFP and WFI practiced the kind of cooperation they attempted to foster in their workers. Both companies held membership in a number of organizations, ranging from provincial professional industry-specific organizations to international multi-industry organizations. Membership in these organizations was entirely voluntary and served a number of functions, both social and professional.

In their month to month operations, it was the industry-specific provincial associations which played the greatest role in company policy and practice. BCFP and WFI were members of several organizations including the BC Lumber Manufacturer's Association (BCLMA), the BC Loggers Association (BCLA), and the BC Truck Loggers Association. WFI was also a member of the Consolidated Red Cedar Shingles Association (CRCSA).¹⁰⁴ Each of these organizations was made up of member companies who shared common interests and challenges. Associations facilitated the sharing of

¹⁰⁴ In the 1960s these associations would join under the Council of Forest Industries; however, they continued to publish newsletters and operate as distinct entities under the shared umbrella.

information between member companies and helped companies to work together in promotion of shared interests, for instance, to gain favourable legislation or, as demonstrated in Chapter One, against a common foe like unionization. One such association, the BCLMA, epitomizes the ways in which professional associations influenced company policy and helped companies in their fight against the industry's poor safety record. Though member companies were one another's direct competition, companies within the BCLMA practiced a high level of cooperation with one another. Companies shared their best practices and biggest mistakes with one another through newsletters, plant tours, and conferences.

Bi-monthly plant tours were held as part of a Safety Conference. This conference provided an opportunity for members to discuss sawmill safety best practices. A different organization hosted each conference. It included a tour of the entire operation, a discussion of both that company's specific program and facilities as well as a more general discussion of safety policies and practice, and wrapped up with a dinner and awards presentation. Each host company arranged the event with some micromanaging participants more than others.¹⁰⁵ Following the tour, the host company presented delegates with questions designed to elicit discussion and foster the exchange of safety information. In 1957 one company asked: "What did you see that you could pass along to

¹⁰⁵ "Proceedings of 50th Bi-Monthly Safety Conference of British Columbia Manufacturer's Association," 29 November 1957, p2, BC MS-1333, 88, 3; "Proceedings of the 47th Bi-Monthly Safety Conference of the British Columbia Lumber Manufacturer's Assn." 29 March 1957, BC MS-1333, 88, 3; "Proceedings of Bi-Monthly Safety Conference," 29 May 1958, BC MS-1333, 88, 3; "Proceedings of the 51st Bi-Monthly Safety Conference of British Columbia Manufacturer's Association." 7 February 1957, BC MS-1333, 88, 3.

the host companies which would help in their safety program?" and "What did you see that would benefit you in your safety program?"¹⁰⁶

The sharing of safety programs and suggestions happened throughout the year. The minutes of the 1957 conference at Western Plywood Company and Silvertree Sawmills demonstrates that the BCLMA facilitated an ongoing dialogue among its members: "Safety programs for 1958 were discussed. It was suggested that a letter to the managers asking for a resume of their projected programs for the ensuing year. The answers were to be collected, a report prepared and mailed to each company within the three associations served by the Safety Department. In this way each operation would benefit by the experience of all the operations."¹⁰⁷

In 1957 the BCLMA also began encouraging companies to submit the full details of any fatalities at their operations. The publication of logging fatalities was not new. The IWA's biweekly newspaper, the *BC Lumber Worker (BCLW)*, frequently wrote about fatal and near-fatal accidents among its membership. Yet, the BCLMA 1957 Fatalities Circular was significant because it contained an unprecedented level of detail. The *BCLW*, and sometimes even city or provincial papers, published the basic facts of a fatal accident (the name, age, seniority and job of the deceased as well as a cursory recounting of the accident). In contrast, the BCLMA circular included full details of the accident alongside an assessment of why the accident had occurred (when the union included a similar assessment the usual supposition was that the company was directly to blame

¹⁰⁶ "Proceedings of 50th Bi-Monthly Safety Conference of British Columbia Manufacturer's Association,"
29 November 1957, BC MS-1333, 88, 3.

 ¹⁰⁷ "Proceedings of 50th Bi-Monthly Safety Conference of British Columbia Manufacturer's Association,"
 29 November 1957, p2, BC MS-1333, 88, 3.

either because of speed up, faulty equipment, or a failure to properly enforce safety regulations) and how similar accidents could be prevented.¹⁰⁸

While the reporting of specific examples of safe and unsafe work and providing opportunities for member companies to meet together to discuss these matters were important aspects of the BCLMA's function, the monthly newsletter the organization put out moved beyond specific incidents and organizational details, expressing instead a larger ideological thrust. As has been demonstrated throughout this chapter, the pages of the BCLMA newsletters from 1953 through 1959 show consistent themes of responsible masculinity both in the workplace and within the hetero-patriarchal family model.

Transnational professional organizations served a complementary but different purpose for forestry companies. The flow of information between the National Safety Council (NSC) and companies was largely one-way, with companies submitting their accident records in order to compete for awards but otherwise passively consuming safety literature, posters, and films produced by the NSC. An annual conference was the only opportunity companies had to actively engage with the agenda of the American based NSC. Two other transnational professional organizations, the Pacific Logging Congress and the Forest Products Safety Conference, allowed for greater company involvement. These organizations met once annually for a multi-day conference. Between conferences members often corresponded privately, but the organizations were not designed to

¹⁰⁸ For example see: "Port Alberni Logger Dies After Accident," *Victoria Times Colonist (VTC)*, 7 January 1940, p 28; "Logger Receives Fatal Injuries," *VTC*, 12 January 1940, p 10; "1950 Coast Logging Accidents" *BCLW*, 21 December 1950, p 6; "1950 Coast Logging Accidents," *BCLW*, 15 February 1951, p 6-7; "I-80 Probes Death," *BCLW*, 11 February 1952; "A Bucker Died Here," *BCLW*, 20 November 1952, p 6-7; "Fallers' Deaths Too High," *BCLW*, 6 August 1953, p 6-7.

facilitate more than the one annual event.¹⁰⁹ Because of their limited scope, these organizations could not facilitate a smooth or rapid transfer of ideas. Yet for this very reason, they provide insight into the origin of some of the big ideas found in company safety policy. They allow us to see which ideas appear first in the company or local professional organization before showing up at a conference, and, likewise, which ideas companies likely took home with them from one of these events.

The Pacific Logging Congress dates back to 1909 and is still held today (the 108th Congress will be held in Napa Valley, California in July 2017), but the 1950s were a time of transition for the Congress as it brought its programming and annual publication into line with the changed priorities of coastal logging operators.¹¹⁰ In 1955, for example, the Congress held its first dedicated panel on safety. In 1956 the content of the Congress' annual publication, the *Loggers Handbook*, was broadened to include five regional conferences in addition to the main conference. The increased content in the *Loggers Handbook* came at the same time as a format change which altered the advertisement to content ratio to make reading the entire publication a more pleasant and interesting experience.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹ Pacific Logging Congress 1941, unsigned to Wisnant, 18 December 1941, CLR, 13, 17; Pacific Logging Congress 1941, unsigned to Fred Brown, 17 October 1940, CLR 29, 7; RJ Filberg 1952. Filberg to Wisnant, 21 October 1952, CLR 29, 16. This is just a sampling of the correspondence between members of the PLC which can be found throughout the archival record. The subjects discuss range from details about the conference to plans for hunting trips and operation tours to suggestions and questions rising from congress or these visits to one another's operations.

¹¹⁰ www.pacificloggingcongress.org/content/convention, accessed 31 March 2017; *Pacific Loggers Handbook (PLH)* 1951-1959; *Men of Timber* (Peoria, Illinois: Caterpillar Tractor Company, 1955).

¹¹¹ The pre-1956 *Loggers Handbook* was over half advertisements and tended to backload the articles. After 1956, advertisements were interspersed throughout the stories and the number of pages dedicated to content outnumbered those for advertisements.
The presence of a full panel on the topic of workplace safety at the 1955 Congress responded directly to management interests. Congress President, Comox Logging and Railway's J.C. Sheasgren, introduced the panel that detailed why the Congress executive decided to make safety part of the general program at Congress: "Five or six years ago the Pacific Logging Congress advanced as a kind of side issue the idea of Safety First, and by last year it had developed to the point where there were a hundred people present at the meeting, and we then felt that the time had come to make it part of the general session."¹¹² This decision would prove a good one, with safety continuing to hold an important role in the Congress more than 50 years later. But in 1955, its executive was concerned that interest might not hold. The 1955 safety panel, titled "Utilization of Manpower", was formed around a four act play titled "Anyone We Know?" It told the story of Doug - a young man who, against his family's wishes, decided to go work at a logging camp. Fulfilling his parents' fears, Doug is injured on the job. After each act, a speaker gave a brief contextualizing talk to draw out its main themes. Students from the University of Washington's drama department performed the play. Its contents highlighted the importance of public relations, recruitment, and induction to the logging industry.

As discussed in Chapter Two, forestry companies were concerned about their public image. The first act of "Anyone We Know?" highlighted a persistent public relations problem that faced the industry: people's belief in the myth of Paul Bunyan.

¹¹² *PLH* 1956, 35.

When Doug told his father he was going to go work in logging, his father's response was vehemently negative:

"...the logging camp is no place for you, or for anyone in our family. We aren't logger material, and I don't intend to have you shoved in with that tough-talking crowd. There's nothing respectable about being a swearing, swaggering logger, and I will not have you drag our name down to the level of those 'dirty collar' workers."¹¹³

While Doug tried to defend his position by stating that the horrible accidents and poor working conditions his father was thinking of were only at some outfits, while more respectable companies did not have these problems, his father's reaction epitomized the kind of knee-jerk negativity that company Public Relations Committees had been fighting against since the 1940s. Doug's father believed that the news stories he read recounting gruesome deaths on camps, or recounting union grievances, were the whole story of the industry. Loggers in his imagination were uncivilized men eking out a living on the margins of society. He wanted his son to take a 'respectable' job, by following in his footsteps. Doug, on the other hand, believed that logging could be safe, as long as he worked for a reputable company and not some "gyp joint" or "fly-by-nite" operation. Neither was wholly right, but Doug's view was the one companies would most like the public to have. The plan intended to deconstruct the father's (society's) view.

In his contextualizing talk, Weyerhaeuser Timber Company representative Walter D.E. Long reminded the audience that they were fighting an uphill battle against sensationalist journalism and fiction writers who had not moved on from the dangerous, rugged logging that prevailed twenty years earlier. The image of Paul Bunyan was given a fair portion of the blame for continued misconceptions about logging. The Bunyanesque

¹¹³ *PLH*, 1956, 37.

traits that early loggers, and their employers, so valued from the early decades of the industry into the interwar years had no relevance for management in the increasingly regulated and mechanized industry. The persistence of the Bunyan mythos in popular imagination was a thorn in the side of company public relations machines:

Old-time logging practices, the bull-of-the-woods management, the burly 'He-Man' called loggers, big rough and tough supermen and their feats of strength and skill. These men have long been the background for fiction writers, and as loggers we have gloried in this Paul Bunyan reputation... Well now our reputation is us. It is hard, you know, for city folks to visualize the true facts that are in this modern ... logger; the logger who might well be the mayor of his own home town or a member of the city council... We need to point out the fact that more of today's loggers live at home with their families... These are things that people need to be aware of.¹¹⁴

Long implied that this lingering spectre of Bunyan inspired news reporters to play up the danger of the job when reporting accidents or fatalities. Certainly journalists could not write sensational accounts if the Canadian public did not readily believe them. Therefore, Long asserted, it should be foremost on the agenda of logging companies to publicize the improvements that they had made to life and work in logging, so that when a reporter published a sensational story that played on the negative "He-Man" stereotype, the public would prove to be a more critical audience.

Long used one story in particular to demonstrate the obstacle facing the company's public relations. In dramatic prose, an article titled "Go Up and Get His Body" told of a young man sent up to cut free the body of a high rigger who had been killed because he was allowed to work drunk. The death depicted as the fault of a dissolute industry: "Everybody in camp knew that Swede has been on a big drunk the night before. When he went up that tree for the last time, he wasn't over it. There was a flask in his pocket." The article also used vivid language to describe the event, with descriptions

¹¹⁴ *PLH*, 1956, 3.

designed for maximum impact: "I looked at my shirt and almost got sick. It was smeared with Swede's blood dripping down on me. I flipped the rope, leaned to one side, and eased away from the dripping." ¹¹⁵ Long urged his audience to focus on improving their safety programs in order to improve the public's opinion of their industry, stating "Public opinion of a company is but a shadow cast by what a company does."¹¹⁶ Though this statement would seem to be an acknowledgement that the logging industry had a public relations problem because it had a safety problem, most of Long's talk focused more on the fact that the public was predisposed to believe everything bad about the industry. While he acknowledged that it had a safety problem, he pointed out that even the smallest accident could cast a long shadow in the media.

The rest of the play followed Doug as he went first to an employment office, where he bribed an agent to send him for a job that he was too young and inexperienced to do, and then to work at a "Bad Luck Logging Company" camp where his bosses sent him to figure out the job on his own, with no training. Ultimately, unsurprisingly, Doug was injured. The play closed with him panicking at the thought of his parents learning about what had happened: "I can't let my folks know about this. What am I going to do? What can I do?"¹¹⁷ The other speakers continued where Long left off. Each added context to the drama and was careful not to offend anyone in the audience, stating that while some outfits followed the dubious acts portrayed in the play, they were certain none of the companies present did. W.C.R. Jones of Powell River Limited spoke of the importance of

¹¹⁵ *PLH*, 1956, 37-39.

¹¹⁶ *PLH*, 1956, 37-39.

¹¹⁷ *PLH*, 1956, 37-47

judicious employment practices. His talk highlighted the idea that hiring the wrong sort of men (inexperienced, mentally unstable, and men who did not know what they were getting into or were otherwise unsuited to logging) would negatively impact the quality of work, the safety of workers, and, consequently, the public image of the industry.¹¹⁸

Beyond hiring the right sort of worker, Professor of Management at Washington University, Robert Sutermeister, advised that workers needed to be treated "with common courtesy and decency, helping them to retain their self-respect and pride, helping them to feel worthwhile in their jobs."¹¹⁹ This process, he claimed, would help to retain good employees and companies would ultimately reap the financial benefits of a less transient and more satisfied workforce. The process of treating employees with dignity and respect had to start with their induction into the company. Understanding that new workers could not know the history of the operation and working conditions, he urged companies to take steps to shape a new workers' attitude along the right path on his first day:

"Most new employees... when they first get a job with an organization are glad they've been hired, they want to make the person who hired them feel that he didn't make a mistake... All of us know what happens to that good constructive attitude and what can happen to it, and all of us have seen that attitude completely eliminated from the man during the first day of work, or the first hour, or the first week. It seem to me that we should look upon this good attitude of most new employees as a very valuable asset which any company would be glad to have in trying to get the maximum utilization from their employees... What kind of job an employee will do depends upon how he feels about it... and that in turn is influences strongly by the way he is introduced to his job and by the way he is supervised from day to day."¹²⁰

Good workers, it would seem, could be destroyed by bad induction practices. If men were inducted properly, shown what was expected of them and treated as a valued member of the workforce, they would become good workers. Sutermeister even went so far as to

¹¹⁸ *PLH*, 1956, 40-41.

¹¹⁹ *PLH*, 1956, 44.

¹²⁰ *PLH*, 1956, 44.

criticise companies, like WFI, that 'babied' their employees by offering bonuses for men who did the basic requirements of employment – arriving ever day on time or even adhering to safety restrictions.¹²¹

The panel concluded with a call to action, warning supervisors at all levels that it was all too easy to be enthusiastic about changing one's operation when at a conference, only to lose that zeal once back at work. To be effective, the changes promoted in the panel needed to be adopted across an entire management team and practiced with regularity. These changes aimed to transform the entire character of the logging operation, not only its public image but its mechanisms for hiring, training, and supervising workers. Ultimately, it called for the transformation of each logger at an operation away from rugged individualism and towards co-operation, mutual respect, and accountability – values that BCFP and WFI had already begun trying to create in their respective workforces.

The play's central message reinforced some of the assumptions that underlay safety policies throughout this decade. In its opening act, Doug's little sister provided comic relief with her interjections of humorous one-liners into the serious discussion between Doug and his parents. She also bounced on the furniture. Long used this behaviour to open his talk with a discussion of safety in the home and its impact on safety at work:

We have just witnesses a near home tragedy here. I think that little girls should be told that safety begins at home and that they should not irritate their fathers to such an extent that they might have a heart attack or blow a fuse or something like that. And so probably we should start by saying that more accidents begin in the

home than they ever do in business or in industry. People don't pay much attention to the

¹²¹ *PLH*, 1956, 46.

seriousness of home accidents. Few home accidents regardless of their severity ever get into the newspapers. If people were more accident conscious at home they would unconsciously be more careful workers on the job...¹²²

Safety began at home. A careful patriarch needed to protect his family from accidents. He also needed to be protected from family stress and distractions. This was the same rhetoric that BCFP distributed to its employees' families during Safety Week in 1953 and 1954. This consistent secondary message was sprinkled through the industry's safety literature over the next decade.

Safety remained a key part of the program at the Pacific Loggers Congress throughout the period under study, but the tone of the message changed over time. In 1958, the panel on accident prevention, titled "Safety Pays," focused largely on the economic benefits of a strong prevention program.¹²³ A talk given by Dr. O.H. Schrader, a professor at the University of Washington before his appointment as General Manager for the Northwest division of the United States Plywood Corporation, centered around "the fact that the cost of industrial injuries and fatalities in logging amount to about 10% of the industry's potential gross profit."¹²⁴ His argument for increasing the investment each company made in safety was largely financial. Schrader was also quick to point out that accident prevention was not wholly avaricious:

While dollar savings or increased operating earnings are attractive regardless of their source, safety had an additional attraction dealing with the human element. Without exception, all of us – management, supervision, and labor – are basically humanitarians. Even without regard to dollars, we are all interested in preventing bodily injury and physical pain.

We have, therefore, two very powerful incentives in attacking the problem of better safety in logging, to increase earnings and to prevent injuries to our personnel.¹²⁵

¹²² *PLH*, 1956 37-38.

¹²³ *PLH*, *19*59 34.

¹²⁴ PLH, 1959, 35.

¹²⁵ *PLH*, 1959 35.

Once he had offered this salve to the collective consciences in the room, however, Schrader was quick to zero in on the dollars and cents of a strong safety program.

Shrader's talk focused on the positive strategies companies could take to decrease accidents, including everything from making sure everyone was using the proper safety equipment and all machines were equipped with good guards to creating a strong sense of mutual responsibility for company safety records. It also illustrated one of the dangers inherent in the way company safety statistics were calculated and recorded. WCB rate categories and the safety awards from the WCB and third party organizations relied on a company's accident frequency, something calculated as a factor of time lost accidents and hours worked. Accidents that did not cause an employee to lose time did not factor into these statistics. When companies worked to set safety records, or designed safety contests that rewarded employees for long periods without reporting an accident, there existed an inherent danger that accidents would fail to be reported or workers would continue working while injured in order to earn the desired reward. The following anecdote from Schrader's talk demonstrates that this practice was not something companies discouraged:

We had a resident manager... who used to fill in for one or two of the operators during a smoke break or to run out to take care of the personal needs. And on one occasion he was filling in for about 10 or 15 minutes for the clipperman on the second deck. In order to get up there he had to climb a fairly steep flight of stairs. Two-thirds of the way up he slipped and fell and he bounced on every step as he came down and he hit the bottom right on his tail, hand was virtually out. In fact, later on it showed up he had a number of bruised ribs and some black and blue spots and so on.

But he had no more than hit the floor than three or four of the employees picked him up and hauled him to his office and said, "You SOB, you're not going home today." And that's the kind of spirit and morale than can develop in an organization when you have a record of that kind going.¹²⁶

¹²⁶ *PLH*, *19*59, 35.

Schrader, a self-described humanitarian, was not horrified that the workers had covered up an accident, he was elated. Rather than a sign that the plant was still not safe enough, or that the practice of having an untrained worker filling in during breaks was a poor one, Schrader shared this story as an example of remarkable morale and team commitment to a shared safety goal. The problem, of course, is that the safety goal he described was safety on paper, yet a potentially extreme danger in practice. Evidence of these types of situations is virtually non-existent, but it is hard to imagine that Schrader was alone in wanting his company to achieve a reputation for safety, even if that reputation was not legitimately earned. Safety statistics, accordingly, were an imperfect measure of companies' actual attitudes towards keeping their employees safe on the job. They tell us only how many compensable accidents employees chose to report that companies did not successfully dispute.

Despite their reliance on company and employee reporting, accident statistics and frequency rates were, and continue to be, the only tool available for comparing accident prevention achievements. The WCB collected statistics on compensable accidents, short and long term, and on fatalities and distributed monthly reports. From these numbers and the number of hours worked at the operation each month, companies calculated their American Standard Frequency Rate (the number of accidents multiplied by 1,000,000 divided by the total number of hours worked year-to-date).¹²⁷ The American Standard frequency rate was a measure of accident frequency used when comparing company

¹²⁷ James P. Mitchell, United States Department of Labor, *Techniques of Preparing Major BLS Statistical Series*, Bulletin No. 1168, Edited by Benjamin Lipstein, Office of Statistical Standards, (US Government Printing Office, 1955): 35. In addition to this frequency rate, the American Standard Association calculated the severity of accidents (The days lost to injury divided by the number of injuries) and an accident severity rate (lost days due to injury multiplied by 1,000,000, divided by year-to-date man hours worked).

safety records. This rate was calculated by the relevant professional organization (BCLMA, CRCSA etc.) and circulated to all member companies. Frequency rates were then used internally to measure a company's progress and the success of accident prevention programs and, externally, to determine the winners of safety competitions.¹²⁸

The Reith Trophy, founded in 1954, rewarded the Cowichan Lake region forestry operation with the lowest accident frequency for the entire year. While this was not the only safety accolade that BCFP and WFI competed for, it was the one that involved the tightest competition since only three companies competed for it: BCFP, WFI, and Hillcrest Lumber Co.¹²⁹ WFI won the first competition in 1954, with Hillcrest taking top honours in 1955, and BCFP cleaning up from 1956 through 1961. WFI did not reclaim the trophy until 1965.¹³⁰ The Reith Trophy was unique because it was given for the best combined sawmill and logging safety record. Many other safety awards had separate divisions for mills and woods operations, allowing companies like WFI which excelled more in one area than another to celebrate themselves as winners of top honours in accident prevention even while struggling to get an entire portion of its workforce to work

¹²⁸ "Frequency Report 4 Months 1959" KSMA 997.54, 1959 (1), Accident Prevention 59; "Comparative Accident Frequency Figures," KSMA 997.54, 1952 (2), BC Loggers Association 52; "Report of Safety Committee Meeting for the Month of January 1954." KSMA 997.54, 1954 (1), Safety Committee 54; "Nitnat Camp, Cowichan Division." 7 February 1956, KSMA 997.54, 1956. Safety/Awards 51; CRCSA, "Safety Department Newsletter," no. 62, 1958, BC MS-1333, 74, 14; BCLMA. "Safety Department Newsletter," No. 128, August 1958, BC MS-1333, 74, 14. See full Reith Trophy, accident statistics in Appendix A.

Appendix A. ¹²⁹ "Plant Safety Bulletin," vol 1, no 2. Undated, BC MS-1333, 88, 23. Program continued at least until 1971

¹³⁰ Simmons, "Reith Trophy Statistics" 26 Feb 1968 p2, BC MS-1333, 19, 1.

accident free. For example, the BC Safety Council awarded Bronze, Silver, and Gold certificates depending on the safety record of a specific section of the operation.¹³¹

The National Safety Council's award system also allowed forestry companies to split their operations rather than requiring the combined record to reach the merit award threshold. Sawmill, shingle mill, and logging operations were submitted separately for consideration. In 1956, WFI's shingle mill operation received a congratulatory letter from the president of the National Safety Council for "working the entire year of 1955 without a disabling injury," while its sawmill and logging operations received no award for their insufficient safety record.¹³² In addition to running a yearly safety contest for all of its members, covering a wide range of North American industries, the National Safety Council (NSC) considered itself the arbiter of non-governmental industrial safety programs. Each year it held a conference to discuss the success or failure of the previous year's program and to set the agenda for the following year. Unlike the other organizations the companies in my study were members of, the NSC did not limit membership to company managers. The NSC counted among its members and allies individuals from labor organizations, churches, women's groups, and public health organizations.¹³³ Two representatives of the BCLMA (W.M. Allison and G.W. Norris) attended the 45th annual National Safety Congress, held in Chicago, IL in 1957. They reported back to the Association about what they had learned. The Congress represented an important opportunity for the BCLMA delegates to share with and learn from a diverse

¹³¹ Gold Certificate, Award of Merit, 25 November 1949, BC MS-1333, 19,2. In the 1959 competition WFI won Gold for the Gang Mill – Day Shift safety award "for having operated 192, 252 consecutive man hours without a lost time accident.

¹³² Dearborn to McRae "Re: Shingle Mill (WS 114), 2 May 1956, BC MS-1333, 88, 23.

¹³³ BCLMA, "A Resume of 45th National Safety Congress Sessions" p2, BC MS-1333, 88, 18.

group of people about the latest issues and solutions in industrial and public safety, many of the topics covered and suggestions made would not have been novel for the delegates form the BCLMA.

The congress covered a diverse range of safety problems a significant number of which BCLMA member companies had already been grappling with for some time. A female employee of the New York Phone Company spoke on safety in the home and the success her company had uniting women into a club under the slogan "keep the family together" and later, "using the emotional appeal of family life to our women, and their abhorrence of the maiming and crippling accidents that interrupt family life, the theme of these clubs was changed to 'Keep the Family Alive Together'".¹³⁴ This program was similar in many ways to how BCFP worked to get wives on board during Safety Week in 1953 or 1954. Though the women of New York Phone Company were a mix of employees and employees' wives, rather than entirely wives of employees, both companies focused on women's role in making sure male workers had "proper rest, food and attitude." A speaker from Kroehler Manufacturing Co could have been reading WFI's safety program instead of its own. From the use of safety incentives to the creation of their own safety character, "Hopalong Casualty".¹³⁵ Even the speaker from Florez Inc., who talked about selling safety as a concept rather than enforcing it as a series of rules, described something both WFI and BCFP already did when approaching safety as something men had to want before it could be achieved.¹³⁶ This is not to say that either of

¹³⁴ "A Resume of 45th National Safety Congress Sessions" p2-3, BC MS-1333, 88, 18.

¹³⁵ "A Resume of 45th National Safety Congress Sessions" p4-5, BC MS-1333, 88, 18.

¹³⁶ "A Resume of 45th National Safety Congress Sessions" p5, BC MS-1333, 88, 18.

these companies had a perfect safety record, or could not have gained a useful perspective from listening to the speakers. Rather, the fact that each speaker's ideas can be seen in programs already used these operations should indicate how advanced, comparatively, forestry safety was in terms of thinking through ways to reach workers, if not in the actual on the ground success of accident prevention.

Unlike company safety programs that were comparatively advanced in the 1950s, the International Woodworkers of America's (IWA) role in accident prevention over the 1950s was under developed. The union's safety program was simultaneously without tangible substance and vital to the success of companies' and professional organizations' plans. Despite the appointment of a Safety Director in 1953, the crux of the Union's safety policy in the 1950s lay in cooperation with company programs, rather than the development of independent initiatives to improve workplace safety.¹³⁷ While companies were investing money and creative energy into initiatives like Safety Week or Safety Draws, the union's safety program of the 1950s existed primarily in the minds of the editors of its newspaper, the *BC Lumber Worker*, with few actions being taken outside of

¹³⁷ "Three-way Safety Cooperation," BCLW, 6 April 1950, p 7; "Foremen Must Teach Safety," BCLW, 3 August 1950, p 7; "New Approach Demands Facts, Co-Operation, Job-Training," BCLW, 16 February 1950, p 6; "For 1951 This Is My Pledge," BCLW, 4 January 1951, p 4; "IWA Backs 'Safety Week' Set for May 14-18," BCLW, 5 April 1951, p 7; "Indifference to Safety is Industry's No. 1 Killer," BCLW, 17 January 1952, p 6-7; "Aggressive Plans for '52; District Talks Jan 28th to Step Up Program," BCLW, 17 January 1952, p 7; "No Work On Unsafe Jobs; Contract Change Urged," BCLW, 11 February 1952, p 6; "Teamwork!' Says Francis," BCLW, 11 February 1952, p 6; "A Safer 1952; Expanded Activity Planned By Officers," BCLW, 11 February 1952, p 7; "Program Pays Rich Rewards," BCLW, 15 January 1953, p 7; "Program Planned," BCLW, 5 February, 1953, p 6; "IWA Peps Up Campaign," BCLW, February 1954, issue 2, p 9*; "Every Accident Is a Symptom of Something Wrong," BCLW, January 1955, issue 2, p 7; "Officers Report Program Now Sweeping Province," BCLW, February 1955, issue 1, p 6; "Convention Hears Director Tell Best Safety Story on Record," BCLW, February 1956, issue 1, p 8-9; "District Safety Director Reports IWA-Organized Operations Safest," BCLW, February 1958, issue 1, p 6; "Safety Director Reports Marked Reduction in Frequency Rates," BCLW, February 1959, issue 1, p 6. *The way issues were dated and labeled changed in 1954 with two issues each month, often undated. Instead of a date, these issues were marked by the issues number and month.

the work of union members within the confines of company safety committees. Yet, it was exactly this passive participation in workplace safety that helped make the accident prevention programs of this period successful. Unlike the 1940s, when the union reacted to accidents in accordance with its own political agenda which at times placed the IWA at cross purposes with companies or the WCB, in the 1950s, the union's rhetoric aligned with company practice and the union's lack of direct actions meant they offered no challenge to the company programs. This shift was not coincidental. After the war and the hard won victory of the 1946 strike, the union implemented a deliberately non-confrontational plan for safety promotion in forestry in which it allocated itself the role of educator rather than actor. To put it another way: by *doing* little, but *saying* much, the union acted, intentionally or otherwise, in direct support of company driven accident prevention.

The lack of direct action from the union on safety matters was not due to a lack of interest in workers' well-being, but because of its belief that the way to improve workers' lives was through increased wages and leisure time, rather than by focusing energy on accident prevention.¹³⁸ In the first 1953 issue of the *BC Lumber Worker*, the IWA looked back on its "Record of Progress." The measure of success, according to the article, was

¹³⁸ Heron, *Canadian Labour Movement*, 149. While there were constraints on what the union could and could not demand during contract negotiation, the contract between the IWA and the companies in this study included a section on safety and the union did occasionally ask for and even receive changes to this section – though the changes demanded and received were related to hours of work and the freedom to take un-penalized time off in the case of a fatality on a workers' crew, not about accident prevention. There is no evidence to suggest the union ever tried to bargain for issues of safety itself. Whether or not this was because they believed that management rights to control of the workplace prohibited such items was not something I could ascertain from the available records.

two-fold: hours in a work week, and wages paid.¹³⁹ The union took credit for "the increase in happiness resulting in the lives of the workers... because of their vastly improved standard of living." However, management rights to control the labour process limited the union's ability to influence many aspects of workers' experience. The "increase in happiness" and "vastly improved standard of living" then came down more to wage increases than material changes the union had brought to the men's living conditions.¹⁴⁰ For the editor of the *BC Lumber Worker*, "standard of living," "working conditions" and wages were synonymous. He wrote that the "living standards among lumber workers" was not yet adequate and promised the union would fight until it was. This declaration was sandwiched between two paragraphs specifically dealing with wages, both the gains made and the distance still to be travelled before they will be where the union believes they should be. In 1958 an IWA circular titled "10 Years of Progress" detailed for workers the gains made by the union in the decade since the organization "threw off the LPP [Labour Progressive Party] communist domination and put out men who were disloyal and were using the Union for their own political purposes" (among those purged were the first president of the BC IWA, Harold Pritchard and union organizer Hjalmar Bergren).¹⁴¹ As it had in 1953, the union focused on financial gains

¹³⁹ "A Record of Progress." BCLW 2 Jan 1952, p4

¹⁴⁰ "A Record of Progress." *BCLW* 2 Jan 1952, p4

¹⁴¹ "10 Years of Progress," 1958, Kaatza Station Museum and Archives, International Woodworkers of America BC, District 1 Fonds. A.1.1.3-2 – Advertisements; Like many other unions in North America, the IWA purged its communist members in 1948. The split caused significant upheaval as the ousted members were accused of stealing from the union and using those funds to try to start a new labour union. However, for the BC chapter of the IWA, which maintained its links to the Communist party through the war, despite the International beginning to remove communists as early as 1941, the upheaval was short-lived, beginning in 1948 and resolving before the end of 1950. The union did fail to earn a raise for workers in 1949, the height of the conflict between the IWA and the Woodworkers Industrial Union of Canada which was formed by the ousted IWA leaders to try to maintain a pro-communist union. Ultimately, companies

and union security as measures of success to support its highly political claim that the union in 1958 was both unrecognizable and superior to what it had been a decade earlier.

Though the lion's share of the 1953 editorial was dedicated to wages in one form or another, its author did make one noteworthy mention of safety: "Not long ago, lumber workers were considered expendable as regards life and limb. Now, thanks to the enlightened program of the Union, safety standards are accepted in the industry as an essential of efficient operation."¹⁴² While the editor is correct that in the previous decade a material shift in safe practices happened in logging and sawmilling operations, as we saw in Chapter Two, this claim that companies saw workers as expendable in the years before 1946 and that this changed at the behest of the union is at best an oversimplification. Unionization, by helping to decrease transiency and by giving companies an added incentive to take interest in the overall welfare and satisfaction of their workforce certainly played a role in instigating the first notable safety programs; however, the programs themselves came first from the WCB and then from the companies. The union held an ancillary role in safety.

The union's most effective contribution to worker safety in the 1950s was its lack of an independent safety program. Rather than splitting the workers' time and attention by presenting an independent program, it worked within the existing framework set up by the WCB and the companies themselves. Direct union participation in safety activities in this

preferred the union they knew over a new, ostensibly more radical, union they did not and the new union floundered. For more on the role of communists in the formation of the IWA in BC and the 1948 purge, see Neufeld and Parnaby, *The IWA in Canada*, 117; Palmer, *The Working Class Experience*, 245-255. Abella, *Nationalism Communism and Canadian Labour*, 128-129

¹⁴² "A Record of Progress," *BCLW* 2 Jan 1952, p 4.

period was often initiated from outside the union. For example, the 1958 Department of

Labour Centennial Award for safety included an award for unions as well as companies:

Recognizing that employees have an important stake in accident prevention and play a significant part in attainment of safety records, it had been decided that their co-operation and participation in the safety program of any operation winning a Centennial Safety Award is worthy of recognition. Therefore, separate Centennial Safety Awards will be presented to all Trade Unions representing employees of any operation attaining its target. Now that employers, industrial organizations and trade unions have all been made eligible under the Centennial Safety Award Competition I urge you most sincerely to join in this worthwhile effort to make British Columbia a safer place in which to work.¹⁴³

For a company to win the award, it had to work a predetermined number of consecutive hours without an accident.¹⁴⁴ Unions, on the other hand, only had to represent workers at the company that won the award. They did not attempt to have the union membership as a whole or even specific locals achieve a set safety goal to broaden the scope of the contest beyond the individual companies that participated. This inclusion of the union does not appear to be an attempt to motivate it to create its own safety promotion programs, but to encourage it and its membership to work with and within existing company accident prevention plans.

There is conflicting evidence about whether or not the union intended to take an ancillary role in safety through the 1950s, or if they understood its role as being more central. In 1953 and 1954, the *BCLW* stressed the importance of cooperation between government (the WCB), companies (including professional organizations as well as individual companies' management), and the union in the pursuit of improved industry safety. Yet, alongside this message of cooperation and mutual responsibility for accident prevention, the paper published a number of articles in which the union took full credit

¹⁴³ Lyle Nicks, untitled letter, "Dear Sirs," 3 February 1958, p1-2, BC MS-1333, 88, 23.

¹⁴⁴ The target for each company was intended to be achievable within a few months.

for the improved safety record seen in the industry after 1948.¹⁴⁵ However, it never explicitly stated what union actions brought about these successful safety results. Instead, the articles spoke vaguely about the union's strong safety program, its dedication to safety, and the importance of organization in bringing a reduction of accidents. When articles identified tangible programs, policies, results, or changes, they were without fail implemented by one of the other parties in the three way cooperative model. In an article published in the 15 January 1953 *BCLW*, its author defined the necessary features of successful accident prevention accordingly:

A safety program is made efficient only by means of a three-way cooperation on the part of labour, management, and government.. Management had the primary responsibility in accident prevention work.. The government, acting through the Workmen's Compensation Board, must accept the responsibility of law enforcement... The functions of the trade union in this program are mainly organization and education, in cooperation with all these other agencies.¹⁴⁶

Throughout the 1950s this idea of responsibility for safety proved very consistent. The *BCLW* safety section sought to educate workers about hazards, accidents that had occurred, and safety equipment while leaving the implementation of safety policies to companies and the WCB.

In its self-assigned role as educator and organizer, the IWA frequently used its safety section to drive home a specific message to workers. In April 1954, following two fatalities that it blamed on workers' lack of caution when operating machinery, the *BCLW* published a two page spread of "gruesome" accident photographs and a passionate article criticising men who disregarded safe practices:

¹⁴⁵ Any gains made before 1948 or programs begun under Pritchett that paid dividends later are not explicitly mentioned. The editors of the paper seem to have made a concerted effort to create sense that the union did not really accomplish anything before they purged their communist members. ¹⁴⁶ *BCLW* 15 Jan 1953 p7.

Too many workers start cutting corners as their knowledge of machines increases, and scorn the fundamentals of safe operation as time-consuming and 'sissy.'... The safety regulations [serve] one purpose – the protection of life and limb and [prevention of] death in the terrible form portrayed in these pages.¹⁴⁷

Though it frequently placed blame on equipment failures and a failure of companies to properly supervise their workers, the union's willingness to blame worker carelessness and even worker hyper-masculinity for accidents is important, especially since the safety pages were usually bracketed by articles relating to contract negotiations and other matters that painted companies as the enemy, at times attacking company's motives in promoting safety directly.¹⁴⁸ The inconsistency in the way contributors to the *BCLW* presented companies was problematic. Unqualified union support for safety policies could have only helped companies achieve accident prevention goals by minimizing the likelihood that workers would interpret company safety policies as attacks against workers rather than attempts to reduce accidents. But the *BCLW*'s support for company safety programs were never unqualified. Instead, the paper presented a contradictory set of images of companies that could not help but undermine the union's support of company policies in accident prevention regardless of the editor's intentions.

Beyond the pages of the union paper, there is evidence that the IWA struggled to keep workers interested in a union response to safety in the mid-1950s. In 1956, the safety director of IWA local 1-80 (Cowichan), James M. Milmore, sent a letter to Western Forest Industries asking to be sent a copy of the company's safety rules:

¹⁴⁷ *BCLW* issue 2 April 1954. P6-7. The article was published in the fold of the paper and some words were cut out in converting the paper to microfilm. Square brackets denote those words I filled in based on context and partial words in the print version.

¹⁴⁸ "Real 'Fancy Dan' Safety Program," *BCLW*, February 1960, issue 1, 7; Joe Morris, "We Are Warned," *BCLW*, October 1959, issue 1, 1; Dill, "Otto Knowbetter," *BCLW*, October 1959, issue 1, 6; "Safety Factors Set to Suit Company," *BCLW*, June-July 1959, issue 1, 11.

Dear Sir,

I am taking this opportunity to write to you on a matter, which I feel if explained to your earnestly can do a great deal in furthering the cause for Safety in this Local Union.

At the present time individual Companies in the area of our Local Union have a set of standing Safety Rules applicable to their operation.

The purpose of writing to you is to find out if you would be willing to send me a copy of such rules.

It is not my intention to go through these rules and find fault with any of them. The purpose is to compare your rules with those of other operations, and then try to arrive at basic rules that seem to apply to all operations. From there it is my intention to have the Local Union or District Council publish a text which would give the transient workers in our industry the basic fundamentals of Safety, in order that when they enter your operation they would have an understanding of the fundamentals of Safety and the job would be less on the part of the Plant or Camp Committees.¹⁴⁹

There are several things about this letter that suggest that the IWA membership at WFI did not turn to the union regarding matters of safety. First, the letter was not addressed to a specific member of the WFI management team, suggesting that Milmore did not know who the company safety director was at the time. Second, the request itself makes it clear that the union did not know what the company's safety rules were. The letter writer assumed that company policies went beyond legislated regulation. Finally, the tone of the letter with its reassurance that the IWA was not looking to find fault, but simply to educate themselves and their members of current safety regulations suggests a strained relationship between the company and the union. At the very least, Milmore expected the company to jump to the worst possible conclusion.

The only tangible union participation in creating accident prevention programs in this period came in the form of union representatives serving on company safety committees. However, by the late 1950s, even this participation was in question at some operations. Western Forest Industries had two unions certified at its operation: the IWA and the Union of Operating Engineers (UOE). Only the IWA held seats on the camp

¹⁴⁹ Milmore to Western Forest Industries, "Circular Letter" 11 September 1956, BC MS-1333, 88, 23.

safety committee up to 1957. At the monthly safety meeting in November 1956, the matter of union representation on the six person safety committee was raised under "Old Business."¹⁵⁰ The Union of Operating Engineers had requested a seat on the committee, but as the IWA currently held both union seats, the company wanted the IWA to cede one of theirs to the UOE representative. Given that the IWA had previously expressed difficulty in finding two suitable representatives to serve on the committee for each four month cycle, the members present tentatively agreed to give a seat to the UOE.¹⁵¹

The ease with which the two IWA members present for that committee meeting envisioned giving up half of their representation on the camp safety committee demonstrates the disconnect between the rhetoric of the *BCLW* and actual union members working on the job. The *BCLW* presented safety as a central concern for the union, with safety gains portrayed as the result of tireless union effort on behalf of the workers.¹⁵² Yet, at WFI, workers were not motivated to give their time to serve on the safety committee. There were a number of reasons why individual men would not want to give up their time or take on added responsibility on top of their full time jobs with the company beyond apathy for workplace safety. However, the difficulty of filling these union seats on the committee strongly suggests that workers in general were not highly motivated to support union involvement in camp safety in 1956. This could mean that workers were content with the practices already in place by the latter half of the decade.

¹⁵⁰ "Accident Prevention Committee Meeting" 21 November 1956, p3, BC MS-1333, 89, 3.

¹⁵¹ "Accident Prevention Committee Meeting" 21 November 1956, p3, 21 November 1956, p3, BC MS-1333, 89, 3.

¹⁵² "A Happy and SAFE New Year... It's up to You," *BCLW*, December 1959, issue 2, 1; "IWA Safety Program Praised by Atkinson," *BCLW*, October 1959, issue 1, 4; "Workers Protected by IWA Programme," *BCLW*, August 1957, issue 2, 7; "Unions Must Have Voice in Prevention Measures," *BCLW*, June 1959, issue 1, 6; "Pres. Morris Claims that BC Program Leads World,: *BCLW*, May 1950, issue 1, 7.

As the visible promotion of safety came from the company, union members may not have seen value in giving their time and energy to support the union's involvement in a program that was already in place. Workers may also have doubted the union's ability to bring real change to workplace safety, given the disconnect between BCLW rhetoric and observable accident prevention initiatives. Again, the fact that if the union was acting on workplace safety it was only through a company organ, the safety committee, may have led workers to conclude that safety programs would come from the top down whether they actively sought them or not. More troubling for both the union and the company was the possibility that workers were not apathetic to union-lead accident prevention, but to accident prevention itself. Certainly the heavy investment companies made to try and create an interest in safety in the 1950s, and the failure of top down accident prevention programs of the 1940s, indicate that workers were not particularly enthusiastic about the changes required by a comprehensive accident prevention program. Yet, the UOE's request for a spot on the safety committee suggests that if there was apathy to accident prevention, it was not universal.¹⁵³

Western Forest Industries' documentary record gives us two examples of union's struggle to engage productively within the company-lead accident prevention culture of the 1950s. While BCFP's records do not show the same struggle, the lack of evidence of worker apathy to union-lead safety programs should not be mistaken for a proof that BCFP workers were more engaged with union attempts to change workplace safety. Looking at available minutes from IWA Local I-80 (the Cowichan division) from the

¹⁵³ "Accident Prevention Committee Meeting" 21 November 1956, p3, BC MS-1333, 89, 3.

1950s, safety is mentioned only under grievances focused on potential mechanical hazards.¹⁵⁴ While BCFP did not noticeably struggle to find union members to participate in the camp safety committee, the union local did not dedicate any real effort to accident prevention outside of its membership in the safety committee. Like WFI, the Cowichan local seems to have been content to allow the company to run accident prevention into the early 1960s.

Though the rhetoric found on the pages of the *BCLW* helped to stress to employees the importance of on the job safety and served to reinforce the ideas promoted in company accident prevention programs, the ongoing struggle between companies and the union over other matters including wages, hours of work, and vacation pay complicated and ultimately undermined the efficacy of union support for company safety policies.¹⁵⁵ Regardless of how justified the union critiques of companies were, the conflicting messages coming from the union are problematic for union support of company policies. In addition, the union clearly faced an uphill battle against worker apathy when it came to union-specific safety participation in the 1950s. Workers were not apathetic to accident prevention; rather, they did not feel the need to work with to union to promote safety. Instead, as demonstrated in the earlier sections of this chapter, it was company initiated safety programs that drove change in this period.

¹⁵⁴ Minutes 31 May 1956, p, KSMA, IWA, A.2.4.1-1 Camp 6/Caycuse; Minutes 25 June 1955, KSMA.IWA.A.2.4.1-1 Camp 6/Caycuse.

¹⁵⁵ "Wage Talks Bog Down; Bosses Reject Demands," *BCLW*, 7 July 1949, p1; "Mobilize to Beat the Boss! No Surrender to Greed." *BCLW*, 7 July 1949, p1;"The Situation," *BCLW*, 21 July 1949, p1; "Bosses" Happy Home Split by Divorce," *BCLW*, 17 November 1949; "IWA Opens Campaign for All-Out Safety Teamwork," *BCLW*, 6 October 199, p7; "Goon Squad Defied," *BCLW*, 22 Septmber 1949, p1; "Editorial: To IWA Members," *BCLW*, 27 April 1950, p1; "Plyqwood Talks Collapse: Brush-off from Employer. Breach of Faith Charged by Alsbury," *BCLW*, 6 April 1950, p1.

The 1950s were dominated by company initiated safety programs. With the union setting itself up as part of a three way cooperative model that placed them in an ancillary role in accident prevention, companies were free to experiment with new methods of accident prevention. Aware of the impact that accidents had on company profits, corporate officials and professional organizations were highly motivated to invest money into initiatives that might significantly reduce WCB expenditures and lost time. Companies, in short, had nothing to lose and everything to gain. This allowed company safety committees to try a number of different ways to get men to work more safely. Not all safety initiatives were successful, however. The Plywood Man disappeared soon after being announced, suggesting that he did not have the impact WFI's safety committee hoped. Similarly, the Safety Man of the Week contest did not continue beyond a few months. Novelty played a role in the impact of any program. Even the largely successful Western Forest Industries' Safety Draw had to be modified regularly in order to keep workers engaged.

Gimmicks were part of company safety programs, but the most important aspect of accident prevention in this period lay in the consistent emphasis on responsibility. Workers were inundated with messages of mutual responsibility and family responsibility. In contrast to the 1940s when accidents were understood as a failure of the individual injured party to adhere to safety regulations or the unfortunate result of a mechanical error, accidents in the 1950s were interpreted more often not as the direct result of one individual's non-compliance but as the result of a broader problem such as a breakdown in teamwork, a pattern of carelessness, or insufficient training. The solution to

228

these human causes was for every worker to take responsibility for his safety, but also, and more importantly, for him to take responsibility for the safety of those around him – be they fellow workers or his family. This emphasis on shared responsibility helped companies and workers to construct accident prevention as manly. Workers were not "sissies" who followed regulations to save their own skins, they were protectors whose safe practice kept their fellow workers and their families safe both from physical and financial harm.

Accident frequency rates proved to companies that their safety programs were a wise investment. Though accidents did not disappear completely, both WFI and BCFP saw significant improvements over this decade. WCB statistics for the province as a whole for this period likewise show an overall downward trend in the number of compensable accidents and fatalities throughout the province over the course of the 1950s.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁶ Provincial Accident statistics obtained through a Freedom of Information and Privacy Protection Act request to Worksafe BC, July 2014. (Hereafter, WCB Statistics) See Appendix B for raw data.

Chapter 4: Standardizing (Safe) Work Practice

In the 1960s, companies transformed every job in the woods and the mill into a set of prescribed practices, all in the name of accident prevention. No longer was worker experience and expertise considered a sufficient preventative against accidents. By 1968, both Western Forest Industries (WFI) and BC Forest Products (BCFP) had adopted strict policies which allowed for the punishment, and even the dismissal, of employees whose work did not adhere to a specific work flow laid down by the company. Though many of the individual accident prevention initiatives carried out in the 1960s appeared to be a continuation of the safety program of the 1950s, there was a subtle but key difference: safety rhetoric no longer made an effort to protect workers' identities as skilled artisans. In the 1950s, the authors of safety literature carefully reminded experienced men that inexperienced men needed to learn from their superior example. The 1960s literature (and, by the end of the decade, company policies) made no allowance for worker experience or skill. It considered divergence from prescribed best practice a fault, regardless of the relative safety of the workers' action.

The individual skill of workers was the last piece of Bunyanesque masculinity to come under company attack. In as much as it was possible, the 1950s had done away with worker independence. Though it is probable that some men continued to understand themselves as deeply independent skilled workers in the 1960s, this independence faced significant challenges in the 1940s and the 1950s. In the 1940s, unionization encouraged them to see themselves as part of a collective and to focus on shared needs. The union

required men to compromise individual freedoms and desires for the collective good. In addition to the message of solidarity from the union, workers were inundated with the ideal of a male breadwinner, both from companies and Canadian society more broadly. Canadian society as a whole was newly dedicated to the ideal of male breadwinning in the aftermath of the Second World War. As Nancy Christie and Alice Kessler Harris have both demonstrated, the social policies of Canada and the United States after the war were heavily influenced by a firm belief in the male breadwinner, female homemaker dichotomy.¹ This ideal was deeply embedded in the government policies which made up the welfare state, as well as in popular culture, advertisements, and private company policies. For forestry workers, the male breadwinner ideal underlay union policies, private health insurance plans, and company safety rhetoric. Certainly, those who could be persuaded to see themselves as part of a collective or as responsible breadwinners (rather than independent workers responsible only for their own personal wellbeing) had been persuaded to do so by the end of the 1950s. This victory left only the glorification of individual skill to be overcome to transform the Bunyanesque worker into the ideal employee.

In the 1950s, while promoting shared responsibility for safety, companies showed respect for worker skill. This changed over the course of the 1960s and into the early 1970s as companies actively worked to reduce their reliance on the skill of individual workers and instead sought to standardize the work process. While these changes were

¹ Nancy Christie, *Engendering the State: Family, Work, and Welfare in Canada.* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000); Alice Kessler-Harris, *In Pursuit of Equity: Women, Men, and the Quest for Economic Citizenship in 20th-Century America.* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).

implemented in the name of safety, it is impossible to ignore the impact of rationalization on work and workers. Like the technological changes of the early twentieth century, the introduction of standardized work processes in the 1960s gave companies increasing control over both the work process and workers themselves. If jobs could be reduced to a series of steps to be followed, then individual workers could become interchangeable and wages could be rolled back as there would be a decreased need to recruit especially skilled workers. Linking deskilling to safety also allowed companies to take back some power from the union. While the union retained the power to dispute dismissals or promotions, companies believed they would be able to use violation of safety regulations as a reason for dismissing workers – whether or not these violations represented an actual danger.²

The first step in deskilling forestry work came with the introduction of the steam engine. In his monograph *Clearcutting the Pacific Forest: Production, Science, and Regulation,* Richard Rajala describes the arrival of mechanization in forestry as the "forest as a factory." What he meant by this was not that everything about working in the woods was standardized, but rather that new technologies (from the steam donkey in which became ubiquitous by the 1920s to the introduction of the power saw in the late 1930s) allowed bosses to take control of the pace of work. This process was similar to what happened to other skilled jobs in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

² There is no record of any disputed safety-related dismissals. However, because the records for the IWA are not yet available to researchers, it is not possible to determine the reason for this omission. It seems unlikely that the company did not try to dismiss workers for unsafe acts, and equally unlikely that none of these dismissals would be disputed. Future research will hopefully be able to shed light on the implications of this move towards punitive safety for labour relations by looking at the BC IWA collection when it is opened for researchers.

While skill could not be wholly removed from forestry, the standardized job procedures and safe practices allowed management to view and enforce safety as a set of acts rather than an immeasurable attitude towards work or a function of a worker's skill. This chapter traces the evolution of this punitive, prescriptive model of safety from 1960 to 1968. Even more than previous chapters, it focuses upon company actions and the possible motivations for them. The union criticized some aspects of the new punitive accident prevention program, but management rights allowed the company full control over the work process. The Workmen's Compensation Board's (WCB) focus on mechanical and work flow causes of accidents in this same period was in line with the new direction of company safety programs.³

There are several reasons why companies likely adopted a Taylorized model of accident prevention by the late 1960s. Taylorizing safety meant standardizing safe work practices and placing the creation and enforcement of these practices firmly in management's hands. Among these reasons was the overall disappointing accident rates of both WFI and BCFP. On the heels of the extraordinary success of 1959, the BCFP Safety Committee entered the 1960s with an extremely optimistic view of accident prevention. It announced a quota for accident frequency in 1960 would be 10.0, or ten accidents for every million man hours worked.⁴ Management, however, did not share the Safety Committee's optimism. Or, if it did, it feared possible repercussions if the operation failed to meet its goal. Superintendent of Caycuse camp, Ken Hallberg, wrote to

³ British Columbia. Report of the Commissioner Relating to the Workmen's Compensation Act and Board (Victoria, BC: Queen's Printer, 1965).

⁴ The accident frequency was calculated as the number of accidents times 1,000,000 divided by the number of man hours worked.

the General Logging Superintendent T.R. Fraser stating: "I personally feel this [10.0 accident frequency quota] to be a most ambitious figure. Our frequency rate of 12.82 last year was the lowest ever attained and did not reflect too well our potential as we feel we were fortunate to avoid a higher frequency and/or serious injury on some occasions."⁵ The memo was copied to BCFP's Industrial Relations Manager, H. Dembicki, who responded:

"We feel that this target [10.0 accident frequency in 1960] is most acceptable and, while you indicate that it is quite ambitious, we are sure that with constant effort and vigilance on the part of all supervisors you can perform within that budget. In performing to a frequency rate of 12.82 last year, Cowichan established a new record for themselves, and, in view of this and recent steps to formalize and intensify safety activity efforts, we feel that your target of 10 is all the more realistic.⁶

Whether or not Dembicki spoke for all of the corporate office or for himself is impossible to know, but this reaction was almost assuredly the opposite of what Hallberg hoped to receive with his letters of caution.

BCFP did not meet the 10.0 frequency quota in 1960. Its failure to meet accident prevention targets continued throughout the decade. The Caycuse operation, for example, never bettered its 1959 record.⁷ Nonetheless, and even though the BCFP Cowichan operation proved unable to improve on its 1950 safety record, it stayed competitive with the other logging and sawmill operations in the region. The Reith Trophy, awarded to the operation in the Cowichan Valley with the lowest accident frequency each year went to

⁵ Hallberg to Fraser, 29 February 1960, KSMA 997.54, 1960 (1), Safety Committee, Accident Prevention. ⁶ Dembicki to Hallberg, "Re: 1960 accident Frequency Budget" 2 March 1960, KSMA 997.54, 1960 (1),

Safety Committee, Accident Prevention.

⁷ BCFP ceased to be BCFP in 1968 when the company merged with Crown Zellerbach. Logging continued in the region into the 1980s. It is likely that the accident frequency of 12.82 was eventually beaten as the introduction of even more mechanization and the subcontracting of the most dangerous jobs (falling and bucking) to independent owner operators minimized the number of company men in the woods to be injured. However, the records consulted for this study do not go beyond 1968.

BCFP in 1960, 1961, 1963, 1964, and 1967. Despite losing to WFI in 1965-1966, and to Hillcrest Logging Company in 1962 in the competition for lowest frequency across both milling and logging operations, BCFP consistently achieved the lowest logging accident frequency from 1954-1967.⁸ While BCFP consistently beat out other companies in terms of its safety record, the company was unable to match their 1959 record, let alone improve their accident frequency by over 2 points.

WFI's main success in the 1960s was in saw and shingle mill safety in the second half of the decade. It won the Reith Trophy in 1965 and 1966 thanks to the strong performance of its mills. From 1963-1965 the company's sawmill accident frequency was less than 8.0, and from September 1961 until January 1968 the company's shingle mill had no lost time or compensable accidents. This accident free streak, however, did not last; it was broken in 1968, never to be recreated. Rather than investigating why the accident free streak was so difficult to reproduce, the safety committee at WFI blamed worker complaisance. Committee members did not challenge the safety program itself, believing that its efficacy had been proven during the mill's accident free years. If this streak could not be recreated, the committee reasoned that workers were losing interest in safety incentives or being allowed to violate company policies and safe work practices.⁹

BCFP pursued similar policies in the 1960s, but with less success than WFI. While the company outperformed many competitors, their record did not meet projections

⁸ See full Reith Trophy, accident statistics in Appendix A.

⁹ "Single Mill Accident Free Days Record Broken," 5 February 1968, BC MS-1333, 19, 1; J.R. Harrison, "Safety Performance – 1968," 23 August 1968, BC MS-1333, 19, 1; T.E. North, Report on Number of Days Since Last Compensable, 13 September 1968, BC MS-1333, 19, 1; T.E North, "Number of Days Since Last Compensable," 17 May 1968, BC MS-1333, 19, 1. The record 2310 days accident free was a significant point of pride for the company through the 1960s, and made the struggles the company had with their record in 1968 all the more frustrating for management.

for a continuation of the rate of improvement experienced in the 1950s. WFI, in contrast, experienced some of their most significant victories in accident prevention in the 1960s. However, these victories meant increased frustration for WFI's Safety Committee when projections could not be met every year. For both companies, the 1960s lacked the optimism and excitement of the previous decade. The 1950s saw accident rates across the province decline. In the 1960s, companies set out to solidify this success. In doing so, they failed to recognize that their earlier success came from their fluid approach to forestry accident prevention in the 1950s. When management attempted to turn accident prevention culture into an enforceable set of prescribed behaviours, they undermined their earlier work to create a sense of collective responsibility for safety. Companies no longer encouraged workers to teach one another how to be safe. Instead, workers were instructed to look to the company to tell them how to work safely. They were also expected to police one another to ensure everyone performed exactly as management dictated.

The difference between the surveillance of the 1950s and that which was pushed for by the late 1960s is subtle but extremely important. In both cases, companies asked workers to watch one another and correct unsafe behaviour. However, in the 1950s this surveillance was fraternal. Experienced workers helped train the next generation of loggers and mill workers. Management and workers both assumed that experienced workers had skills to share with new workers. Therefore, experienced workers took on a quasi-paternal responsibility for passing on their skills. By the end of the 1960s, surveillance was divorced from skill. Companies expected workers to work according to a prescribed set of practices and to correct workers who deviated from the company-

236

defined work flow. Worker experience was no longer deemed relevant to safety. It was only the prescribed work practices that were assigned value by management.

Company's approach to safety in the 1960s did not change all at once. Early in the decade there was more continuity than change. Safety committees at both BCFP and WFI addressed accident prevention by targeting workers' attitudes. Whether or not the safety committee members believed everything possible was being done to address mechanical causes for accidents, they focused wholly on the human element in their accident prevention efforts. Companies and their safety committees continued to participate in external programs such as the Turtle Club; to engage families and workers in creative endeavours including essay-, slogan- and poster- contents; and to offer cash or prize incentives for collective safe work in the form of safety draws.¹⁰ As the decade progressed, safety committees and management both became concerned that their programs were not having the expected impact on safety. Safety initiatives that had been exciting to workers in the 1950s were not received with the same enthusiasm in the 1960s. This may have been because the times when safety committees most needed workers to be enthusiastic about safety (immediately after a streak was broken) were also the times when the available incentive was the smallest and least attainable.¹¹ In addition. incentive programs were not conducted with the same passion in the 1960s as they had

¹⁰ "Application for Turtle Club Membership, KSMA 997.54, 1960 (1), Safety Committee, Accident Prevention; Safety Committee Minutes 7 December 1960, KSMA 997.54, 1960 (1), Safety Committee, Accident Prevention; "Minutes of the Regular Monthly Meeting of the Plant Accident Prevention Committee" 28 September 1966, BC MS1333, 89, 3; BCFP. 1961.1.Safety Committee, Accident Prevention. "Staff Safety Meeting" 2 February 1961.

¹¹ "Minutes of the Regular Monthly Meeting of the Plant Accident Prevention Committee" 28 September 1966, p3, BC MS1333, 89, 3; "Quarterly Incentive Safety Award," April 1967, BC MS-1333, 88, 23; Dinham, "Meeting of Safety Program Committee" 17 December 1962, KSMA 997.54, 1962 (2), Safety Committee/Accident Prevention.

been in the late 1950s. As a consequence of the move towards regulation of work process, accident prevention rhetoric was less impactful in the 1960s and individual safety initiatives were not as widely or enthusiastically advertised.

We can see this contrast by looking at the difference in how BCFP used the Turtle Club in the 1960s compared to earlier decades. Chapter Two and Three showed how the awarding of a Turtle Club Certificate at BCFP worked to support the overall safety message of the Safety Committee. Certificates were presented publically, special safety meetings were convened, and incidents were transformed into educational posters displayed for all workers to see. The worker whose life had been saved by his hard hat was awarded with a lapel pin and certificate, as well as a day or two of minor celebrity within the operation.¹² In the 1960s, the company continued to apply for Turtle Club membership on the behalf of workers, but all fanfare was stripped from the award.¹³ This was not because hard hats no longer needed heavy promotion. Companies continued to struggle with workers refusing to wear safety equipment in the 1960s.

Safety equipment inspections were a regular part of operations for BCFP and their competitors.¹⁴ After a visit to Hillcrest Logging Company's Safety Meeting, Personnel and BCFP Safety Supervisor Terry Dinham wrote that Hillcrest too struggled with poor

¹³ "Application for Turtle Club Membership," KSMA 997.54, 1960 (1), Safety Committee, Accident Prevention. There are a number of these applications in the folder, and no mention of special demonstrations or the use of these incidents in the existing program of safety meetings.

¹² Evans to Lindo, 29 October 1951, KSMA 997.54, 1951, Safety; Lindo to Fuller, 19 April 1952, KSMA 997.54, 1952 (1), Turtle Club; 31 March 1950, KSMA 997.54, 1950 Evans 50; 15 Nov 1951, KSMA 997.54, 1951, Safety 51; 4 December 1951, KSMA 997.54, 1951, Safety 51; 29 October 1951, KSMA 997.54, 1951, Safety 51; 9 January 1953, KSMA 997.54, 1953, Turtle Club 53.

¹⁴ "Notice" 18 April 1961, KSMA 997.54, 1961 (1), Safety Committee, Accident Prevention; "Notice: Inspection" 24 August 1960, KSMA 997.54, 1961 (1), Safety Committee, Accident Prevention; "Findings of Safety Program Development Conference" 27 May 1962, KSMA 997.54, 1962 (1), Accident Statistics, Frequency Rates.

hard hat compliance. This was despite Hillcrest providing this equipment to their workers free of charge (a practice BCFP stopped in 1954).¹⁵ In 1962 BCFP tightened their hard hat regulations in response to workers continuing to wear hard hats improperly, or refusing to wear them entirely.¹⁶ As companies moved towards more prescriptive and punitive safety policies, management and Safety Committees erroneously assumed that workers would be motivated to comply with hard hat regulations simply because they were told to do so.¹⁷ This approach failed to recognize that some men continued to understand themselves as independent, skilled workers and made decisions about which regulations to follow based on their own assessment of hazards and benefits.

Both WFI and BCFP continued holding draws to reward safe work through the 1960s; however, problems plagued these programs.¹⁸ Safety Committees expressed concern that worker enthusiasm for draws was waning, but employees clearly wanted the prizes. This is evident in a 1966 complaint from WFI workers. They were unhappy when their accident free department was paired with a department which suffered an accident and both departments were ineligible for the draw. Departments had been grouped together to equal out the size of each group for the competition. However, after then 1966 complains, the Committee recommended eliminating the groupings altogether. Instead, the whole operation would be required to go accident free to earn a draw: "It was agreed

¹⁵ Dinham to Chairman – Safety Committee, "report on visit to Hillcrest Safety Committee," 3 May 1961, KSMA 997.54, 1961 (1), Safety Committee, Accident Prevention.

¹⁶ Minutes "Meeting of Safety Program Committee" 19 June 1962, KSMA 997.54, 1962 (2), Safety Committee/Accident Prevention.

¹⁷ "Meeting of Safety Program Committee" 19 June 1962, KSMA 997.54, 1962 (2), Safety Committee/Accident Prevention.

¹⁸ Safety Committee Minutes 7 December 1960, KSMA 997.54, 1960 (1), Safety Committee, Accident Prevention; "Minutes of the Regular Monthly Meeting of the Plant Accident Prevention Committee" 28 September 1966, BC MS1333, 89, 3.

that in order to stimulate good overall plant performance, an accident in one department should be 'felt' by all."¹⁹ The Safety Committee's goal was not one department with a perfect record, or even a number of departments. They wanted an accident free operation.

BCFP implemented a similar cash incentive program in 1961. It was directed at the entire operation rather than awarding prizes on a departmental basis. The program encouraged workers to adhere to safe practices by offering an award that increased in size the longer the entire operation went without an accident.²⁰ But, in direct contrast with WFI, the BCFP Safety Committee was concerned that this program (with its focus on an accident free operation) failed to award departments and individuals who worked safely. In December 1962, the committee proposed modifying the program. The revised program would divide workers "by department with hazard rating applied… with crew Foremen acting as leaders or captains…"²¹ Grouping workers by hazard rating, and assessing each crew's safety record accordingly, the company could offer a crew-departmental safety incentive scaled to the relative hazard each worker faced. However, this program would not be easily created and there is no evidence that it was implemented.

Another approach suggested by the BCFP Safety committee was to split workers into randomized groups. WFI implemented a version of this in 1967, dividing workers

¹⁹ "Minutes of the Regular Monthly Meeting of the Plant Accident Prevention Committee" 28 September 1966. p 3, BC MS1333, 89, 3.

²⁰ "Staff Safety Meeting" 2 February 1961, KSMA 997.54, 1961 (1), Safety Committee, Accident Prevention. They offered \$1.00 per day for first 50 days accident free, \$1.50/day for 51-100 days; adding another \$0.50 every fifty days with an added \$200 bonus if the camp could go until shut down without an accident. Prize money was given out as a number of \$25 prizes awarded in a draw each time the company hit another 50 days accident free.

²¹ Dinham, "Meeting of Safety Program Committee" 17 December 1962, KSMA 997.54, 1962 (2), Safety Committee/Accident Prevention.
alphabetically into teams for their safety draw program.²² The BCFP Safety Committee believed randomized groups could help "achieve maximum interest and participation," something they did not believe they were getting with the operation-wide incentives currently offered.²³ In 1963, the company split workers into groups of approximately 15, each with a foreman acting as their 'team Captain.' Each group would be eligible for a \$25 prize draw each month the group was accident free.²⁴ As they prepared for the November prize draw, the Safety Committee described their 1963 draw program as having created "more interest in safety than anything else has for some years."²⁵

In addition to these small cash draws, BCFP tried offering a single large prize across the whole operation if the safety goal for 1962 was reached. Responding to a suggestion from a Safety Program Development Conference held that spring, the company purchased a vacation for two at Harrison Hot Springs Hotel. The vacation would be all-inclusive, with the company paying for the room, food, and entertainment. When inquiring about the price of a week holiday at the hotel, Dinham specifically asked for the cost for a married couple. It is unclear which employee won the holiday, or if he was married, but the company covered the costs for two people sharing a room and bed. The expectation that the winner would be married shows the persistent belief that workers were male breadwinners. When the operation successfully worked 200,000 man hours

²² "Quarterly Incentive Safety Award," April 1967, BC MS-1333, 88, 23.

²³ Dinham, "Meeting of Safety Program Committee" 17 December 1962, KSMA 997.54, 1962 (2), Safety Committee/Accident Prevention.

²⁴ Dinham to Hallberg, "Safety Program," 30 January 1963, KSMA 997.54, 1963 (1), Accident Prevention / Safety.

²⁵ "Minutes if the Accident Prevention Committee" 27 November 1963, KSMA 997.54, 1963 (1), Accident Prevention / Safety.

without suffering a compensable accident, the holiday was awarded via a draw.²⁶ The success of this initiative inspired the company to offer another large prize for their "major objective" in 1963. If workers could achieve 240,000 man hours without an accident, the Safety Committee would hold a "Draw for Merchandise (TV, Hi-Fi, outfit of men's clothing, Photography set or cash to \$300.00)."²⁷

Safety awards were not just for workers. During the 1960s WFI and BCFP applied for and won external safety awards. Both companies sent their statistics to the National Safety Council (NSC) for consideration for its annual safety award. They also competed for the Reith Trophy and awards from the WCB. For companies, these awards were an opportunity to improve public relations. Holding awards for workplace safety could also help to ease industrial relations between management and the union. Independently verified records of excellence in safety carried more weight with the union than the company's word alone.²⁸

Company safety committees used awards to foster worker enthusiasm and reinforce the safety message. However, Safety Committees only saw value in celebrating these awards if they could do so immediately. In September 1961, the Committee

²⁶ "Findings of Safety Program Development Conference" 27 May 1962, KSMA 997.54, 1962 (1), Accident Statistics, Frequency Rates; Dinham to Manager of Harrison Hot Springs Hotel. 9 April 1962, KSMA 997.54, 1962 (1), Accident Statistics, Frequency Rates; Dinham to Hallberg, "Accident Prevention Award Program." 14 November 1962, KSMA 997.54, 1962 (1), Accident Statistics, Frequency Rates; Dinham to Hallberg, "Safety Program" 6 April 1962, KSMA 997.54, 1962 (1), Accident Statistics, Frequency Rates.

 ²⁷ Dinham to Hallberg, Nowichi, and Long. "Program Committee Meeting," 26 March 1963, KSMA 997.54, 1963 (1), Accident Prevention / Safety.

²⁸ "Operations Win NSC Awards," *BCLW*, October 1959, issue 1, 5; "Reith Trophy Awarded," *BCLW*, April 1959, issue 2, 8; "IWA Logger Received Turtle Club Award," *BCLW*, April 1959, issue 2, 5; Praise company record in accident prevention: "Flag Raising Ceremony to Open Safety Week," *BCLW*, April 1959, issue 2, 5. Despite strained relations between companies and the IWA, the BCLW publically praised employers who won the WCB award each year for safety.

recommended against holding any kind of event to celebrate a BCLA award because: "the significance had virtually been lost due to the long period of elapsed time since the effective finishing date of the period covered in winning [the award]."²⁹ In the same meeting, the committee recommended that "any time a major award was presented that this should be done at a social or dance which would be attended by wives of employees."³⁰ Clearly, sharing successes with workers and their families was an important part of the committee's vision of accident prevention in the company, but only if the celebration could be timed so that it would have a significant impact for workers. The committees' desire to include families demonstrates some continuity between the programs of the 1950s and the 1960s. To the safety committee, families continued to have an important role to play in keeping workers engaged with accident prevention.

Celebrating their safety record and giving out prizes for accident free streaks were only one, relatively small, part of companies' overall safety program. Achieving accident free streaks required adequate training. A focus on training as fundamental to improved safety was not new in the 1960s. As Chapters Two and Three demonstrated, training was integral to accident prevention from the 1940s. However, in the 1960s, worker training and the expectations of management changed significantly as companies sought to standardize work and the workplace. Education came in the form of on the job training for new workers, and through meetings, seminars, and conferences. Professional organizations and the WCB offered training for management. In the 1940s only managers

²⁹ "Meeting of Program Sub-Committee (Safety)," 25 September 1961, KSMA 997.54, 1961 (1), Safety Committee, Accident Prevention. Minutes.

³⁰ "Meeting of Program Sub-Committee (Safety)," 25 September 1961, KSMA 997.54, 1961 (1), Safety Committee, Accident Prevention. Minutes.

received specific safety training. This was because they believed that a well-trained foreman would pass his training down to all the workers he supervised. In 1960s, all levels of the operation received training, from the newest employee to the most experienced, from the superintendent down to the chokerman. Education covered prescribed best practices in each job, Workmen's Compensation regulations, first aid, and any other aspect of safety the company wanted to promote.³¹

Companies continued to believe they had conquered the mechanical causes of workplace accidents in the woods and in their mills. Their ability to "engineer" away mechanical hazards, therefore, had to be paired with safety training for workers.³² At a 1967 conference for BC coastal forestry companies, BCFP President, A.D. Hamilton summed up this attitude, stating: "Even in a physically perfect plant, if there is such a thing, it does not follow that untrained employees will work efficiently or safely."³³ He reaffirmed the importance of training, pointing to the (poorly trained) individual worker as the primary site of risk. His message also reinforced the limits of mechanical solutions to accidents. This was both demonstrably true, as accidents continued to occur which could not be explained by any mechanical failure or lack of technology, and extremely convenient for any company which lacked either the capital or the impetus to acquire more technology solutions for workplace hazards. Companies expressed their belief that

³¹ "Minutes of Safety Program Sub-Committee" 27 February KSMA 997.54, BCFP. 1962 (2), Safety Committee/Accident Prevention; Dembicki to Hobson, "Re: Accident Prevention" 13 June 1963, KSMA 997.54, 1963 (1), Accident Prevention / Safety; Hallberg to Hobson, "Re: Chokermen's Meeting" 30 Jan 1963, KSMA 997.54, 1963 (1), Accident Prevention / Safety.

³² North to Managers, Personnel Supervisors. 8 December 1967, BC MS1333, 89,13.

³³ Hamilton, "Address by A.D. Hamilton to 85th Bi-Monthly" 23 June 1967, BC MS1333, 89, 8.

they had successfully addressed mechanical causes for accidents as early as the 1940s.³⁴ The IWA, however, accused companies of failing to make necessary mechanical changes on several occasions.³⁵ The companies in this study were never directly implicated and WCB inspection of WFI and BCFP consistently found both companies to be in full compliance with regulations.³⁶ When an inspector called for a change to be made, these companies were quick to comply.³⁷ By emphasising that even a mechanically perfect plant would have accidents if workers were not properly trained, Hamilton, was likely reacting against the union's critique.³⁸ Certainly, company officials did not believe that accident prevention could be achieved without the proper worker training.

Training new workers correctly was critical. To measure the efficacy of their induction practises, companies made tracked how long a worker had been employed each time there was a compensable accident. In 1960, BCLA Safety Director Tom Hallis congratulated BCFP on having a sound induction policy, basing his assessment on the fact that none of the workers injured in accidents in the first three months of the year were

³⁵ "Violation Causes Death," *BCLW*, September 1959, issue 1, 6; "No Life Jackets Available," *BCLW*, September 1959, issue 1, 7; George H. Mitchell, "Open Letter to BC Coast Lumber Operators and Accident Prevention Officials, Workmen's Compensation Board," *BCLW*, October 1959, issue 2, 5.
 ³⁶ Workmen's Compensation Board Inspection Report, May 1960, KSMA 997.54, 1960 (1), WCB; Workmen's Compensation Board Inspection Report, October 1960, KSMA 997.54, 1960 (1), WCB; "Inspector Report," 2 Oct 1962, KSMA 997.54, 1962 (2), WCB. It is possible that companies were not always compliant; however, there is no archival record of non-compliance.

³⁴ "Province Will Intensify Loggers' Safety Drive." 10 February 1946, VTC, p 15.

³⁷ "Inspector Report," 23 October 1962, KSMA 997.54, 1962 (2), WCB; Accident Prevention; Safety Committee - Departmental Safety Inspector. Walker to Allison, "16 June 1969, BC MS-1333, 89, 1. In 1969, after completing significant upgrades to their machinery, WFI requested a WCB inspection to ensure the new equipment met all standards, and likely to pre-empt an unscheduled inspection.

³⁸ "Accident Control Department Newsletter," 21 February 1968, BC MS-1333, 89, 8. Companies were also faced with the problem of workers removing guards from machines in sawmills in order to make their work easier. For the union, an accident that occurred on an unguarded machine would be blamed entirely on the company, but management blamed these kinds of incidents on a lack of training which lead workers to see the removal of a guard as a viable was to improve their efficiency. Ultimately, this kind of an act was a failure for both the company and the individual who removed the guard, but responsibility for ensuring every machine was properly guarded at all times had to rest with the employer and supervisors.

new to the company.³⁹ While these statistics seemed to indicate the induction practice at BCFP was successful, they also indicated that time on the job eroded the positive impact of early training. Hallis warned that complacency caused experienced workers to have accidents and "recommended crew talks on the job by their Foremen as a good method of combatting this evil."40 Accident reports from 1960 support the assertion that familiarity with the job and working conditions led workers to disregard the danger of their work. For example, an experienced loader was demoted in August of 1960 after he failed to clear the mud from his boots before walking along a load of logs, leading to a slip and fall injury.⁴¹ However, carelessness was not the only reason for accidents. Production needs and profit sometimes came before safety. On 17 February 1960 an employee was injured within an hour of taking over a job that was not normally his to do.⁴² Despite the importance of proper training for all workers, foremen were under pressure to ensure the operation met its production goals. If a worker holding a particular position was unable to work for any reason, another crew member could be asked to fill in in order to ensure the crew was able to continue working, whether or not he had the training to do this safely.⁴³

Yet, not all accidents could be clearly attributed to workers' experience, or lack thereof. Two accidents illustrate the complexity of determining accident prevention measures from accidents suffered on the job and the ultimate futility in trying to prescribe a single safe practice. The first occurred on 28 March 1960. That day, a faller with eleven

³⁹ Report on Management Meeting, 9 March 1960, KSMA 997.54, 1960 (1), Safety Committee, Accident Prevention.

⁴⁰ Report on Management Meeting, 9 March 1960, KSMA 997.54, 1960 (1), Safety Committee, Accident Prevention.

⁴¹ "Report of Lost Time Injury," 18 Aug 1960, KSMA 997.54, 1960 (2), Accident Investigation.

⁴² "Report of Lost Time Injury," 17 Feb 1960, KSMA 997.54, 1960 (2), Accident Investigation.

⁴³ "Report of Lost Time Injury," 17 Feb 1960, KSMA 997.54, 1960 (2), Accident Investigation.

years' experience in this job -- but who was on his first day working at Caycuse -- was killed when the log he was bucking kicked up and struck him.⁴⁴ The accident report emphasised the thorough induction training the faller had received from the Assistant Bullbucker, and argued that the worker was appropriately supervised after the training:

Induction interview held by T. Dinham, 35 minutes with explanation of Company Safety regulations and policy explained: Emil Channasyk, Ass't. Bullbucker, spent 1 ½ hours with the set on the quarter before they started work discussing safe job practices in general and specifically, the particular hazards when working in windfall areas such as; roots, springy timber, rolling and swimming logs, etc. He then watch [sic] them at work and was satisfied they were experienced men and were planning on carrying out their work properly.⁴⁵

The report indicated that the worker could not have anticipated or prevented the accident.

Yet, though the accident investigation confirmed that no mistakes were made, the company planned to sketch out the accident to be used to educate other Fallers and Buckers about the hazard.⁴⁶ The investigators also made two recommendations:

That, for Safety reasons, fallers be allowed to fall any standing timber they deem necessary when bucking in windfalls.⁴⁷
 That when possible, new sets be placed or put in standing timber or on reasonably level ground when bucking windfalls for a period of at least one week.⁴⁸

The follow up training and policy adjustment after this accident were not based on any mistakes make by the deceased, but rooted in the assumption that a similar accident was likely to occur if no changes were made. Company officials do not seem to have cared that the new policy would not have prevented the accident in question. The investigation ruled the incident accidental and suggested no possible preventative measures.

⁴⁴ "William – Jones. Fatal accident – March 28, 1960," KSMA 997.54, 1960 (2), Accident Investigation.

⁴⁵ "William – Jones. Fatal accident – March 28, 1960," KSMA 997.54, 1960 (2), Accident Investigation.

⁴⁶ "Report of Lost Time Injury," 28 Mar 1960, KSMA 997.54, 1960 (2), Accident Investigation.

⁴⁷ A windfall was a tree which had been felled by the wind rather than by fallers.

⁴⁸ "William – Jones. Fatal accident – March 28, 1960," KSMA 997.54, 1960 (2), Accident Investigation.

A second accident, a non-fatal accident involving a faller, demonstrates the difficulty management faced when interpreting accidents. The worker dropped his saw immediately after finishing his cut. The worker was concerned that the saw would fall over the edge into a 100 foot canyon. Instead of waiting for the tree to settle, the worker moved to stop the saw from falling. Unfortunately, on its decent, the felled tree struck a snag 58 feet away and sent a chunk of wood flying back at the faller. The foreman wrote that the accident could have been prevented: "By workman stepping back away from stump to watch and wait until time had elapsed for everything to settle." He recommended "continuous warnings to all fallers to stay well back in the clear until the dust settles."⁴⁹ By contrast, Caycuse superintendent (and former faller), Ken Hallberg defended the worker's instinctual action in trying to stop the saw from falling.⁵⁰ Both men agreed on the unlikelihood of the tree striking the snag, but their differing assessments (of whether this was an accident the worker could have prevented) indicate different priorities within the ranks of management. The faller's immediate supervisor blamed him for not putting his own safety over the preservation of his equipment. The camp superintendent empathised with the faller's decision to risk stopping the saw from falling and assigned no blame for the accident. Fallers owned their own saws and were responsible for their repair. Hallberg who started as a logger likely considered the accident through that lens rather than as a manager.⁵¹ In cases like this, where no

 ⁴⁹ "William – Jones. Fatal accident – March 28, 1960," KSMA 997.54, 1960 (2), Accident Investigation.
 ⁵⁰ "Report of lost time injury" 29 Nov 1960, KSMA 997.54, 1960 (2), Accident Investigation.

⁵¹ Until 1972, fallers and buckers both owned and maintained their saws. G.J Towill to R.W bonner.

[&]quot;Fallers' Saw Rentals - Courtney Area" 1 August 1972, MacMillan Bloedel Limited Fonds, D.W. Timmins Corporate Papers, box 807, file 22, (Hereafter M&B C.A. Specht, box, file).

regulations dictated what the worker should have done, managers struggled to make sense of the accident, let alone use it to create preventative policies.

While WCB regulations formed the basis for company safety policy, the Board had a limited ability to enforce comprehensive safety regulations which would aid companies in such cases. In order to have enforceable standards, it could only pass regulations that it reasonably expected all companies to fulfill. This meant that the Board was limited in its ability to drive change, even if it was interested in seeing safety progress well beyond its regulations. Instead of driving change and dictating comprehensive safety policies, the Board was relegated to enforcing the lowest common denominator in workplace safety. WCB regulations provided a baseline that companies could expect their workers to adhere to. Companies could be fined for non-compliance with regulations. Some companies reprimanded, suspended, or even dismissed workers who did not adhere to WCB regulations. They wanted to avoid the fines associated with non-compliance, but this was not their sole motivation for following WCB regulations. Companies, the WCB itself, and the IWA all believed that compliance with WCB regulations provided an essential first step towards a safe workplace.⁵² When accidents were more frequent than management expected in the first half of 1962, BCFP Caycuse's Safety Committee immediately called for increased education for all employees about

⁵² "Minutes of Safety Program Sub-Committee" 27 February 1962, KSMA 997.54, 1962 (2), Safety Committee/Accident Prevention; "Your Responsibilities as Departmental Safety Inspector" 23 February 1967, BC MS1333, 89, 1; "Report of the Regional Safety director" Safety Conference Proceedings, 1964, Interational Woodworkers of America BC District 1 Fonds, Kaatza Station Museum and Archives, Lake Cowichan BC (Hereafter KSA. IWA.) This collection was in the process of being curate d when tese records were accessed. Call numbers may have changed.

WCB regulations. It suggested including this training in the general safety meeting to ensure every worker knew what he needed to do on the job.⁵³

For the Cowichan division of BC Forest Products, education almost exclusively focused upon modifying each employee's work process to comply with an agreed upon best practice. It aimed to standardize the work process and eliminate faults that led to accidents.⁵⁴ In March of 1960 the company held a "Safety Blitz." This series of meetings across all departments sought to educate workers on the right way to conduct their work in order to minimize risks.⁵⁵ Another series of meetings held in April 1960, focused on two aspects of safe work: the proper way to perform a job, and being alert to unplanned events which could pose a hazard. Each foreman and his crew met between 18-22 April, ensuring every employee heard the desired message within the same three-day period. This gave foremen the flexibility to choose the most convenient time for their crew. For BCFP accident prevention was part of an overall drive to improve their operations' efficiency. By allowing flexibility in scheduling, it emphasised the fact that safety did not to come at the expense of production levels.⁵⁶

BCFP's early effort to standardize the safe work focused primarily on worker attitudes, reflecting the priorities of the 1950s safety program while foreshadowing the stricter, Taylorized changes that were to come by 1967. This shift from a focus on worker attitudes towards safety to a prescribed single set of practices happened gradually. It

⁵³ "Minutes of Safety Program Sub-Committee" 27 February 1962, KSMA 997.54, 1962 (2), Safety Committee/Accident Prevention.

⁵⁴ For more on the rationalization of forestry see: Rajala *Clearcutting the Pacific Rainforest*, 7-82.

⁵⁵ "Report on Safety Blitz" 1 March 1960, KSMA 997.54, 1960 (1) Safety Committee, Accident Prevention.

⁵⁶ "Forward Planning Meeting – Safety" 18 April 1960, KSMA 997.54, 1960 (1), Safety Committee, Accident Prevention. Minutes.

began with a shift in accident prevention language. BCFP began to replace the rhetoric of mutual responsibility with one of "engineering safety." Yet, it took several years before practices reflected this new ideal. In the summer of 1961, after more than 100 days without an accident at the operation, Hallberg wrote a circular titled "Engineering for Safety." It urged foremen and employees to be constantly on the lookout for hazards:

Recently we have experienced several minor accidents... Investigation shows that a hazard existed in ...these cases as well as numerous others which resulted in little or no injury. All of them had something in common – something could be done immediately to prevent a recurrence. We could and did <u>engineer the hazard out of existence</u>... <u>When it comes to engineering –</u> everyone can help.

Very often in the course of our work an incident occurs where there is a near miss or a minor injury is sustained. Because nothing serious happens no action is taken. If nothing is done it will happen again – sooner or later someone gets seriously hurt.

What can we do about it?

Everytime [sic] this happens the workman doing the job is the best source of information for <u>engineering</u> a change in method, tools or equipment. If it happens to you, think about it. Try to find an effective way to prevent it. Tell your supervisor. Talk to your Safety Supervisor. We are all in this together. Between us we can <u>engineer</u> this type of accident out of existence.⁵⁷

This circular contained many messages. The most prominent being the idea that the failure to identify and eliminate hazards caused accidents. In various forms, this was the central thrust of all accident prevention training, policies and promotional programs over the 1960s. While in the 1950s safety messages focused on creating mutual responsibility among workers, the program of the 1960s asked each worker monitor his work and his environment. Workers were also encouraged to actively think about ways their foreman could make that environment safer. This circular, designed to be seen by workers, foremen, and Safety Committee members, contained some of the optimism that characterized Hallberg's writing on accident prevention in the 1950s. Despite a

⁵⁷ Hallberg, "Engineering for Safety" undated, KSMA 997.54, 1960 (1), Safety Committee, Accident Prevention. Minutes.

disappointing year in 1960, Hallberg continued to publically project an aura of confidence in his workers' ability to completely eliminate accidents if they complied with the regulations and recommendations of the company, its Safety Committee, and the WCB. However, as demonstrated earlier in this chapter, Hallberg was less optimistic in his private correspondence with the head office in Vancouver.

In 1963 BCFP looked to intensify its accident prevention efforts. Taking advantage of the willingness of companies to share their programs with one another, BCFP compared its existing program with that of Crown Zellerbach, which had been quite successful in 1962. BCFP management zeroed in on the way Crown Zellerbach had intensified of supervisor's responsibilities. BCFP's Industrial Relations Manager, H. Dembicki, expressed concern that the company's policy of holding supervisors responsible for safety of their crew had not been effectively communicated:

We have now for a number of years made accident control the direct responsibility of our line supervisors but I am concerned that possibly they only consider their participation on a camp-wide basis and do not fully appreciate that they are being held accountable for the performance and experience of their particular department.

In addition to the above Pederson [safety director of Crown Zellerbach] pointed out that they have intensified disciplinary action for breaches of job procedure whether or not an accident occurrence is suffered. In this regard we reviewed attitudes and disciplinary action during one of our superintendent's conferences. I am now wondering whether our key supervisors are possibly reluctant to exercise disciplinary action because they are unsure of the respect to disciplinary action is not clearly defined. I would like you to consider this matter carefully and if you feel that this is a problem area I would propose that through our Industrial Relations Department we conduct specific training sessions at the divisions in order to give our supervisors the confidence they might now need.⁵⁸

S. Techy from BCFP's Vancouver head office, responded:

I feel that more intensified disciplinary action will be accepted by all supervisors (hourly included) in order to deal with incidents where other measures to correct attitudes and procedures have failed to produce the desired results.

⁵⁸ Dembicki to Techy, "Re: Accident Prevention," 25 July 1963, KSMA 997.54, 1963 (1), Accident Prevention / Safety.

I would hope that the intended training session will include a reiteration of Company policy regarding intensities training in job procedures and development of attitudes that are consistent with good working habits. I got the feeling from some personnel that disciplinary action would be taken for all breaches of correct procedures, and it was not recognized that the supervisor himself may be subject to disciplinary action for failure to give the required training to the personnel under his direction. I am certain that further training will be helpful to all personnel to improve their understanding of good supervisory concepts.⁵⁹

Both Dembicki and Techy favoured adopting the harder line towards infractions of regulations suggested by Crown Zellerbach's procedures. Still the doubts raised by Dembicki are important. A program of strict discipline with mandatory repercussions for workers or foremen found in violation of company or WCB policies was beyond anything the company had attempted, or felt the need to attempt, up to that point.⁶⁰

The company's willingness to push onwards with a punitive safety program despite anticipated resistance from workers can be interpreted two ways. First, this can be seen as management taking advantage of an opportunity to further Taylorize the work process and exert greater management control over workers. Secondly, it also reveals the concern of management that a slipping safety record would increase WCB premiums and decrease profits due to lost time. The focus on supervisor and worker responsibility also highlights the extent to which management believed mechanical causes of accidents had been overcome. Both Dembicki and Techy agreed: it was the human element which was letting the company down. In 1962, the company's Cowichan division lost the Reith

⁵⁹ Techy to Dembicki, "Re: Accident Prevention," 12 August 1963, KSMA 997.54, 1963 (1), Accident Prevention / Safety.

⁶⁰ Crown Zellerbach was also a member of the BCLMA and BCLA. In 1988 both companies were acquired by Fletcher Challenge Ltd. However, the archival record for BCFP ends in 1968 and ties between these two companies beyond their shard membership in the professional organizations are unclear.

Trophy for the first time since 1955.⁶¹ Faced with evidence that the supremacy BCFP once enjoyed in safety was disappearing, in 1963 management chose to take action to try and get back to where they thought it should be.

The adoption of Crown Zellerbach's harsher disciplinary approach to workplace safety came at the same time as the standardization of work practices and safety rules across the entire company. In 1963 BCFP set out to create a single set of work practices for all of its divisions. To this end, it asked division managers to circulate their job procedures to one another to aid this standardization process.⁶² At the end of the year, the company released standard job descriptions to all of its divisions. These consisted of itemized breakdowns of the responsibilities of each position in the crew which were to be used in the training of new and existing workers.⁶³ Over the rest of the decade, the company continued to use and to modify these job descriptions in pursuit of a standardized, controlled workforce. Part of this program also involved creating a standard rule book for BCFP workers, a task completed in 1963.⁶⁴

Standardization across the company facilitated the move towards a more punitive approach to accident prevention. Something in line with long term company efforts to rationalize the industry and reduce its reliance on individual workers' skills.⁶⁵ In January 1963, management ordered supervisors to meet and discuss the topic "A Disciplined

⁶¹ Dinham to Pearce, "Safety Awards" 10 June 1963, KSMA 997.54, 1963 (1), Accident Prevention / Safety.

⁶² Dembicki to Hobson, "Re: Accident Prevention" 13 June 1963, KSMA 997.54, 1963 (1), Accident Prevention / Safety; Techy to Dembicki, "Re: Accident Prevention – Job Procedure Write-Ups," 12 June 1963, KSMA 997.54, 1963 (1), Accident Prevention / Safety.

⁶³ "Correct work procedures," KSMA 997.54, 1963 (1), Accident Prevention / Safety.

⁶⁴ Minutes "Staff meeting" 3 January 1963, KSMA 997.54, 1963 (1), Accident Prevention / Safety.

⁶⁵ For more on the rationalization of forestry up to 1965, see: Rajala *Clearcutting the Pacific Rainforest*,7-82.

Crew," so the company could "define areas for improvement in control over actions of others."⁶⁶ Supervisors would be educated in the best way to establish "areas of responsibilities for every member of the working crew... areas of accountability... [and] control procedures."⁶⁷ The meetings would also explain the "actual disciplinary procedure" to supervisors and give them the information and tools needed to share this information with every employee in the company.⁶⁸ These meetings aimed to ensure that no one in the company was ignorant of the new policy and to maximize the impact of the renewed commitment to following prescribed safe practices.

The 1963 focus on discipline in accident prevention carried throughout the remaining years of BCFP's operation. Through the next five years, the company continued to hold supervisors responsible for the accident rate of their crew. It expected that standardized work processes, combined with adequate supervisor surveillance and enforcement, would ensure a strong performance in safety. Management did not address the fact that much of its workforce continued to be composed of independent minded, skilled workmen, with their own complicated reasons for following, or not following, prescribed procedures. After 1963, it was the foreman or manager who was ultimately held accountable if a crew did not perform to the expected standard. As this excerpt from the "Logging Supervisor Newsletter" from December 1965 demonstrates, poor accident rates were understood as supervisory failures:

This may be over-simplifying the problem. It's just possible that you have little or no control over the particular situation that's keeping your frequency rate too high, but this is the exception rather than the rule. In almost all cases involving accident prevention,

⁶⁶ Minutes "Staff meeting" 3 January 1963, KSMA 997.54, 1963 (1), Accident Prevention / Safety.

⁶⁷ Minutes "Staff meeting" 3 January 1963, KSMA 997.54, 1963 (1), Accident Prevention / Safety.

⁶⁸ Minutes "Staff meeting" 3 January 1963, KSMA 997.54, 1963 (1), Accident Prevention / Safety.

supervision had the ability to either turn the key, or to leave the door locked. Once again the supervisor is the man in the middle, and if your frequency rate looks like the national debt, you probably regard accident controls as just one more cross the supervisor has to bear. Right here is the nub of the problem.

Until you accept, without reservation, the fact you're cutting your own throat by sidestepping your accident control responsibilities; this year, next year and the year after that will be conspicuous only by one thing – lack of progress. <u>But</u>, once you're convinced of this, the mechanics of successful accident control are straightforward.

After you supply the desire, all you have to do is what comes naturally.⁶⁹

The newsletter contained no actual advice to supervisors about how to fix their accident problem. Instead, the author asserted that supervisors could just "do what comes naturally" and accidents would fix themselves. What was meant by "what comes naturally" was left up to the reader to determine. The standardization and close management of workers did not extend to a strict plan for how individual supervisors were supposed to handle enforcing safety on the job.

Although BCFP held supervisors largely responsible for accidents, the ideal of shared responsibility promoted in the 1950s did not disappear altogether. The new safety regime of the 1960s built these ideals, but added a new understanding that foremen (rather than workers) carried the bulk of the responsibility for ensuring their crew stayed accident free.⁷⁰ Training targeted all levels of employees from the superintendent down. However, the consistent emphasis on supervisory responsibility coming from camp superintendents and the corporate head office meant that foremen likely felt added pressure to have an accident free crew. Part of the new safety program involved a re-

⁶⁹ BCLA "Logging Supervisor Newsletter" December 1965, KSMA 997.54, 1965 (3), WCB.

⁷⁰ Memo to all managers and superintendents, 6 April 1961, KSMA 997.54, 1960 (2), AccidentStatistical, Frequency Rates; Dinham to Hallberg and Hobson. "Foremen's Meeting – proposed agenda." 8 May 1962, BCFP. 1962.1.Accident Statistics, Frequency Rates. KSMA 997.54, 1962 (1), Accident Statistics, Frequency Rates.

articulation of the supervisor's role in job safety.⁷¹ A circular given to all managers in

November 1960 defined a supervisor's responsibility for surveillance of employees and

enforcing company accident prevention policy. Supervisors needed to:

1) Know all WCB and Camp logging rules and regulations.

2) To teach each employee what the hazards are on his job and how to avoid them: paying particular attention to new and transferred employees.

3) If training must be delegated to others, follow up to insure required training has been done.

4) Notify immediate supervisor of unsuitable workers.

5) To impart to each employee the understanding that violation of established safety rules will not be tolerated.

6) To see that needed safety equipment and protective devices are provided for each job.

7) To take prompt corrective action whenever unsafe conditions and/or unsafe acts are noted.

8) To teach employees that accidents are caused and can be prevented.

9) To investigate and find the cause of all accidents, even those which result in minor injuries.

10) To see that all injuries are reported and properly treated.

11) To install a safety awareness in each employee through personal safety contacts and by group safety meetings.

12) To conduct regular safety appraisals of his section. This includes a careful check of all new and relocated equipment before it is placed in operation.

13) To give full support to all safety activities and procedures.

14) Ensure that only qualified operators handle equipment and vehicles.

15) The development and administration of an effective program of good housekeeping and the maintenance of high standards of personal and operational cleanliness in your section.⁷²

This list of duties placed the onus for safety not on workers but on foremen. However, it

was not possible for foremen to perform the level of surveillance required to carry out this

agenda without worker's assisting them.

To supplement the surveillance role of the foreman, safety meetings throughout

the 1960s focused upon getting workers to report injuries, damaged or broken equipment,

⁷¹ Hallberg, 8 June 1960, KSMA 997.54, 1960 (1), Safety Committee, Accident Prevention; Hallberg to Department Heads, 19 May 1960, KSMA 997.54, 1960 (1), Safety Committee, Accident Prevention; Dinham to Grant, 31 Aug 1960, KSMA 997.54, 1960 (1), Safety Committee, Accident Prevention.

Throughout 1960 Hallberg sent repeated appeals to department heads to have their foremen increase their efforts in Accident Prevention and hazard hunting to combat the rising frequency rate.

⁷² "Duties of first-line supervisor in discharging his responsibility for safety" 16 Nov 1960, KSMA 997.54, 1960 (1), Safety Committee, Accident Prevention.

and violations of safety policy immediately to their foreman.⁷³ Meetings held with workers emphasised the vital importance of reporting minor injuries immediately to the first aid attendant.⁷⁴ They explained that workers who suffered a minor injury could wait until the end of their work day before reporting the accident. At the same time, companies warned workers that the WCB would refuse claims made for injuries that weren't reported to the first aid attendant by the end of the day when the accident occurred.⁷⁵

The final goal of training and induction was to establish clear communication about safety between all levels of the company. This was an area that upper management of BCFP felt the company was not succeeding at in the early 1960s. Safety Supervisor Dinham described the communications failure as being two-fold in nature:

[Communication] continues to be one of our most troublesome areas. It is evident when investigating accidents that we are often not communicating effectively. All levels of supervisors and individual workmen have the same problem. One thing not yet accepted is management sincerity in the safety program, and/or the employees' welfare. Special sessions should be set up to train supervisors in effective communications. The use of special films and tapes should help. Maybe extra emphasis on the 'Art of listening' would be well applied.⁷⁶

⁷³ "Accident Prevention History," KSMA 997.54, 1961 (1), Safety Committee, Accident Prevention; Dinham to Hallberg, "Safety Program" 6 April 1962, KSMA 997.54, 1962 (1),Accident Statistics, Frequency Rates; Dallamore, "Of Interest to Everyone" undated, KSMA 997.54, 1968(4) Safety.
⁷⁴ Dinham to Wallace. 19 April 1960, KSMA 997.54, 1961 (1), Safety Committee, Accident Prevention; Hepburn. "Special Safety Regulations," 22 January 1970, BC MS-1333, 89, 1; Allison to Stothers, 20 March 1968, BC MS-1333, 89, 8. Accident Prevention; Safety News, Bulletins, Correspondence.
⁷⁵ Dallamore, "Of Interest to Everyone" undated, KSMA 997.54, 1968 (4) Safety; IWA. "Report of the Regional Safety director" Safety Conference Proceedings, 1964. P3 KSA, IWA. ; Chief Justice Charles W. Tyscoe's 1965 *Report of the Commissioner* following the 1962-1964 Royal Commission on the Workmen's Compensation Act, addressed the issue of refused claims. "So long as the Board neglects to take the trouble to clearly explain to workmen the real and precise reasons why it does not recognize their claims, suspicions and inferences unfavourable to the Board will arise in workmen's minds. The Board may, in its own eyes, wear a halo, but certainly to workmen it is invisible. Nevertheless, in my opinion, the remedy, if one should be required, does not lie in the abandonment of long established principles of proof, but in a change in the methods of operation of the Board," pp193-194.

⁷⁶ Dinham, "Accident Prevention" 6 August 1962, KSMA 997.54, 1962 (1), Accident Statistics, Frequency Rates.

Clearly Dinham believed that everyone in the company needed to communicate more effectively about potential hazards and the causes of accidents. He also worried that workers did not trust company communication. Sincerity was a consistent theme when BCFP management discussed the foreman's role in training and managing workers throughout the 1960s.⁷⁷ During a Safety Department Workshop in 1967, for example, a participant identified sincerity as being central to a strong safety program:

On the question 'what do you believe constitutes the basis of a good program?' we could sum up quite easily I think by saying management should be sincere and be able to communicate sincerity to their employees. I think if employees trust what you have to start with, this is a big help. Also, that each employee is responsible for himself firstly, but they also have to be responsible for others too.⁷⁸

Worker's behaviours rather than their attitudes towards safety were of primary importance to the 1960s accident prevention program. However, the rhetoric of mutual responsibility continued to be present as a basic assumption in management's view of safety. Safety programs of the 1960s often presupposed that workers had internalized these ideas of masculinity and shared responsibility. Management and safety committees did not employ gendered rhetoric to explain why workers needed to look out for one another's safety. Both incentive programs and the intention to have workers police one another's unsafe behaviours were rooted in assumptions about worker's masculinity. In the 1960, companies rarely stated the rhetoric of hetero-patriarchal masculinity outright. Instead, they hid these masculine ideals within a more pragmatic discourse about regulations and proper work practice. Companies still understood the ideal worker as a

 ⁷⁷ Dembicki to Hobson, and Techy. "Re: accident Control" 26 August 1963, KSMA 997.54, 1963 (1),
 Accident Prevention / Safety; Dinham to Hallberg and Hobson. "Foremen's Meeting – proposed agenda." 8
 May 1962, KSMA 997.54, 1962 (1), Accident Statistics, Frequency Rates; Findings of Safety Program
 Development Conference," 27 May 1962, KSMA 997.54, 1962 (1), Accident Statistics, Frequency Rates.
 ⁷⁸ "Minutes of the Safety Workshop" 9 December 1967. p 3, KSMA 997.54, 1967 (1), Accident
 Statistics/Prevention/Safety.

team player, a part in a larger machine, but they no longer felt that it was necessary to convince workers that this was their proper role. Instead, they talked about mutual responsibility and a positive attitude towards safety as if the two were synonymous.

A 1961 publication about the evolution of safety policy at BCFP since 1948, described its central goal as:

..the acceptance on the part of each and every employee, supervisor and workman alike, of a personal responsibility for his own safety as well as the safety of those in his own work area. Only the best climate in his working environment will induce the employee our program is worthy of his support. This climate, careful selection and induction, along with good supervision, maintained in support of our 'tailgate' – 'standup' meetings, will, we hope, further reduce our accident frequency and severity.⁷⁹

This understanding of the vital role of mutual responsibility to a successful safety program shows a rhetorical consistency with programs of the 1950s. It continued to be an underlying message of the BCFP safety program throughout the 1960s.⁸⁰ The theme of responsibility, also integral to accident prevention initiatives held by professional organizations, likewise shifted the focus of their safety promotion in this decade. At the Forest Products Safety Conference in 1967, keynote speaker Charles Specht, President of McMillan Bloedel, emphasised the importance of workers looking out for one another's safety as well as their own.⁸¹

In December 1960, after a year in which BCFP failed to reach its ambitious 10.0 accident frequency goal, Hallberg described the attitude of his camp's men to Logging Manager, H.E. Hobson. He wrote: "The attitude of our crew seems to be very good.

 ⁷⁹ "Accident Prevention History," KSMA 997.54, 1961 (1), Safety Committee, Accident Prevention.
 ⁸⁰ Hallberg to Hobson, "Re: Chokermen's Meeting" 30 Jan 1963, KSMA 997.54, 1963 (1), Accident Prevention / Safety; Dembicki to Hobson, and Techy. "Re: accident Control" 26 August 1963, KSMA 997.54, 1963 (1), Accident Prevention / Safety.

⁸¹ Proceedings "33rd Annual Forest Products Safety Conference." 27 April 1967, p 5, KSMA 997.54, 1967 (1), Accident Statistics/Prevention/Safety.

When interviewed about their accident all of the men injured this year have been apologetic about any oversight of safe working procedure on their part and have shown concern for our Safety record."⁸² He based his assessment of the crew's attitude around worker responses to disciplinary interviews. The company began to hold these interviews with workers who had violated a safety regulation and suffered an accident that year. Yet, making any assumption about workers' attitudes based on disciplinary interviews is problematic. In 1960, the company instituted a policy of "one or two day suspension in several cases where there was an obvious disregard of safe work practice."83 This meant that workers called in to discuss their actions following an accident were highly motivated to show remorse for their actions and awareness of their fault, whether their remorse was genuine or not. Hallberg himself may have felt pressured to overstate employee engagement with accident prevention policies given his camp's disappointing performance. Though he expressed trepidation in January regarding the ambitious frequency quota devised by the camp safety committee, his company's head office had deemed the goal attainable. Hallberg likely felt obliged to put a positive spin on the year's poor performance.⁸⁴

BCFP officials recognized a positive attitude towards safety as vital to the program's success. Unfortunately, their definition of a positive attitude was problematic. Management tended to mistake an apology after an accident for safety consciousness.

⁸² Hallberg to Hobson, 12 December 1960, KSMA 997.54, 1960 (1), Safety Committee, Accident Prevention.

⁸³ Hallberg to Hobson, 12 December 1960., KSMA 997.54, 1960 (1), Safety Committee, Accident Prevention.

⁸⁴ Hallberg to Hobson, 12 December 1960, KSMA 997.54, 1960 (1), Safety Committee, Accident Prevention; Hallberg to Fraser, 29 February 1960, KSMA 997.54, 1960 (1), Safety Committee, Accident Prevention.

This was especially problematic in the 1960s when accident prevention became more punitive. If the company assumed that workers who showed remorse after an accident actively followed accident prevention measures on the job, this could create a false sense of the efficacy of the company safety program. Because the company reserved the right to fire workers who were non-compliant with stricter safety policies, expressing remorse after an accident was as likely to be a survival tactic for workers who feared losing their employment. What management wanted was a workforce who would proactively seek out and rectify hazards and unsafe practices. What their policies encouraged were workers who apologized after an accident occurred in hopes they would not be penalized. The company's failure to make a clear distinction between active prevention and passive remorse did not only affect their ability to accurately assess their safety program's success; it also had implications for the future development of effective safety programs.

Hallberg, along with other divisional superintendents, had a measure of autonomy over the accident prevention program at their camps. While the corporate office instituted company-wide policies in some cases, superintendents who were more familiar with the peculiarities of their crews and the conditions in which they were working were able to implement policies they judged to be most effective. In the spring of 1961, in an attempt to improve the overall safety of the company, BCFP proposed the institution of a formal "Serious Incident Information Exchange" between all of its divisions on a regular basis. Each week or month, management at each division would describe a serious incident, near miss, or successful accident prevention story in order to help all operations learn from one another's experiences.⁸⁵ In 1961 BCFP sent a memo to all its management to hail the usefulness of recently distributed cards explaining artificial respiration:

A few days after the distribution of cards describing direct artificial respiration, a Hammond Division nightshift employee was asked for help by a neighbour, whose infant had gagged in the bath and ceased breathing. Remembering the card he had received, the employee told the woman how to apply mouth-to-mouth respiration to the baby, while he called the inhalator. The baby was breathing again when the inhalator arrived. Through the application of his knowledge, the employee was instrumental in preventing the baby's death.⁸⁶

The company framed the story to enhance both the dramatic timing of the incident and the vital role workplace safety knowledge played in the community at large. Corporate and professional organization materials were often repackaged and used to promote desired attitudes among workers. It is likely that this well-timed story was brought out to prove to workers that safety was not just another corporate policy, but something they should be aware of in every part of their lives.

Certainly, this type of reminder that safety should always be on employees' minds was one BCFP was eager to get across in the early 1960s. Consistently, accident prevention committee and managements' correspondence express concern that workers did not exercise proper levels of caution. Discussing a slip and fall accident at Victoria Plywood, which that company had blamed on worker carelessness, W.H. Wallace of the Vancouver Bay Division wrote to BCFP management:

...employees ignore hazardous conditions even though they may be aware of them or may even have caused them. This disregard of dangerous conditions is most serious, and unfortunately, it does not stop at spills on the floor. Many experienced employees have been injured, not through lack of knowledge, but through a lack of awareness in doing

⁸⁵ Memo to all division superintendents, 3 April 1961, KSMA 997.54, 1960 (2), Accident Statistical Frequency Rates.

⁸⁶ Memo to all managers and superintendents, 8 September 1961, BCFP. 1960.2.Accident Statistical Frequency Rates.

things like trying to adjust a running machine, or standing in front of a turn, or neglecting to wear protective equipment.⁸⁷

Workers, Wallace asserted, did not exert the right amount of caution in their daily tasks. One solution to this problem aimed to train workers to be cautious at all times, and to supervise them closely in order to enforce that training. In sharp contrast to the 1950s, when the company targeted workers' general attitudes, this approach focused on worker behaviours that could be observed and corrected by a supervisor. While vigilance could not easily be broken down into a prescribed list of behaviours, the focus on measurable actions was in line with the broader Taylorization of the workplace. A "Safety First" attitude meant wiping up a spill immediately, before it became a slip and fall hazard, or reading carefully a card explaining how to perform artificial respiration as soon as it was received. This kind of attitude, management stressed, would save life and limb.

The message of caution and awareness of hazards before they become accidents was just as strong in 1968 as in 1960. In a circular sent to all members of the company, W.A.R. Dallamore, BCFP Safety Director, discussed two issues raised during a plant tour with IWA I-80 representative, Jack Munn. The first of these was one the company had struggled with since 1960 – that employees failed to report minor accidents to first aid:

We are talking about INJURY PROTECTION for OURSELVES, nothing less or nothing more. If we are fortunate enough to spot a potential danger to life and limb and make the adjustments before a person is injured, so much the better. But if the first step fails, the second means injury, pain, perhaps loss of life. A very sickening way of recommending a change. If you get caught up in the second stage by being involved in receiving an injury... REPORT IT, so no one else will get hurt.⁸⁸

⁸⁷ Memo to all managers and superintendents, 9 February 1961, KSMA 997.54, 1960 (2), Accident Statistical, Frequency Rates.

⁸⁸ Dallamore, "Of Interest to Everyone" undated, KSMA 997.54, 1968(4), Safety.

Dallamore's second issue involved not taking immediate action to fix equipment problems. These two issues were very closely related. The failure to report to first aid and the failure to report unsafe conditions to management showed worker reluctance to comply with policy which management and Safety Committees did not comprehend.⁸⁹ However, if these issues are examined through the lens of masculinity, these workers' non-compliance makes a great deal of sense. Prior to the push from companies in the 1950s to get workers to see themselves as part of a team and responsible for the safety of others as well as themselves, workers saw themselves as skilled, independent men, whose expertise did not require anyone else to tell them how to do the job properly. This rugged masculinity dissuaded workers from reporting minor injuries. Their reluctance may have been compounded by a belief that injured workers would be punished.

Oral histories about logging from the 1930s to the 1950s testify to workers' willingness to suffer in silence rather than report an injury that they could treat themselves.⁹⁰ In the 1950s, the concerted effort to transform workers into responsible breadwinners undermined this rugged independence. Yet, the company never completely succeeded in eliminating workers' understandings of themselves as skilled workers, or the sense of independence that came with that self-identification. Its efforts to get workers to think and work as a team had an impact on how workers viewed their jobs and on the job safety, but this did not necessarily come at the expense of their independence. For workers in highly standardized or deskilled roles, the male breadwinner ideal and the

⁸⁹ Minutes, "Safety Committee Meeting WFI Gordon River," 18 December 1968, KSMA 997.54, 1968(4), Safety.

⁹⁰ Mel Parker, CRMA, A042; Willie Granlund, CRMA, A184.

focus on teamwork made sense. But for those whose work continued to rely on individual skill or place them at risk of injury, the internalization of a breadwinner ideal could easily have existed alongside their continued dependence on individual skill and ability to take risks. The trouble companies had with workers not reporting minor injuries indicates that they were not willing to entirely relinquish their understanding of themselves as too tough to visit the first aid man for minor injuries (such as a muscle sprain or splinter – minor injuries which could become more severe if untreated).⁹¹ BCFP's safety program evolved over the first half of the 1960s from a focus on worker's attitudes towards their jobs, to a focus on their compliance with safety regulations. For management, the shift towards focusing on regulating workers' behaviours was rooted in the assumption that workers had internalized the messages of the 1950s, just as they assumed the mechanical hazards of the job had been "engineered" away. The new focus on compliance required another piece be added to the accident prevention picture: surveillance.

Both WFI and BCFP saw worker training as tightly bound with surveillance. It was not enough to teach workers the correct way to perform their work. BCFP charged foremen and supervisors to keep workers under their surveillance. WFI cast broader net, asking safety committee members, foremen, and workers all to watch for mistakes and step in either to correct recalcitrant workers or report their failure to follow procedure. Those who did not abide by company regulations were immediately corrected or

⁹¹ Allison to Stothers, 20 March 1968, BC MS-1333, 89, 8; "Your Responsibilities as Departmental Safety Inspector" 23 February 1967, BC MS-1333, 89, 1; Hepburn. "Special Safety Regulations," 22 January 1970, BC MS-1333, 89, 1; Dinham to Wallace. 19 April 1960, KSMA 997.54, 1960 (1), Safety Committee, Accident Prevention; "Duties of first-line supervisor in discharging his responsibility for safety" 16 Nov 1960, KSMA 997.54, 1960 (1), Safety Committee, Accident Prevention; "Findings of Safety Program Development Conference" 27 May 1962, KSMA 997.54, 1962 (1), Accident Statistics, Frequency Rates; Dallamore, "Of Interest to Everyone" undated, KSMA 997.54, 1968 (4), Safety.

punished.⁹² This surveillance took various forms in order to meet the specific needs of each operation. WFI enlisted employees designated as Departmental Safety Inspectors in the surveillance of workers. At BCFP, foremen were the ones responsible for enforcing company safety policies and ensuring workers adhered to prescribed work practices.

Departmental Safety Inspectors (DSI) assumed an important role in WFI's safety program in the 1960s. These men were workers empowered by the Safety Committee to help carry out its policies.⁹³ DSI accompanied foremen on regular safety inspections. Both men were required to sign off on the inspection report. The company encouraged DSI to perform their own inspections, and bring any violations or hazards to the immediate attention of the foreman.⁹⁴ Though DSI were charged with ensuring the safety of their department, they did not have any actual power to implement changes, or to discipline fellow workers found in violation of safety regulations. Rather, their job was to be the eyes and ears of the Safety Committee and to report back to their foreman so that he could determine how best to handle a situation.⁹⁵

These workers were expected to look for both human and mechanical problems. As WFI addressed mechanical problems (eventually reaching a point where the company believed it had eliminated these problems in its mills), surveillance increasingly turned to the human element. Foremen and DSI were urged to focus on "people and on the unsafe act," rather than on whether or not machines could be further modified to reduce the risk

⁹² Memo to all managers and superintendents, 6 April 1961, KSMA 997.54, 1960 (2), Accident Statistical Frequency Rates.

⁹³ "Proceedings of the 72nd Bi-Monthly Safety conference" 27, September 1963, p 3, BC MS-1333, 90, 17.
⁹⁴ Irwin to all foremen and departmental safety inspectors. 1 November 1966, BC MS-1333, 89, 1; Irwin, 23 July 1965, BC MS-1333, 89, 1; Irwin, "Departmental Safety Inspectors' Meeting – March 11, 1963," 15 March 1963, p1-2, BC MS-1333, 89, 1.

⁹⁵ "Your Responsibilities as Departmental Safety Inspector" 23 February 1967, BC MS-1333, 89, 1.

of accidents.⁹⁶ The cost of further modifying mill machinery may have contributed to the company's focus on human cuases of accidents. To improve the safety of machinery may have required the installation of entirely new equipment rather than the relatively inexpensive addition of guards to existing machines which the company had already complted. However, company officials' internal correspondence shows no evidence of any improvements being rejected as too costly.

In 1968, WFI implemented a new safety policy. Modelled after Rayonier Canada's program, it urged a stricter response to worker non-compliance, noting:

We have been too tolerant, but now each foreman must enforce our Safe Work Practices. These are posted at every job and must be thoroughly explained and reviewed with new and old employees. Written Warning, suspension or dismissal must be considered in any unsafe act that violates our Safe Work Practices or Company Regulation.⁹⁷

This new, less tolerant, policy towards infractions of Safe Work Practices brought a number of immediate changes. It increased the disciplining of employees who violated company safety regulations, and changed how the safety policy was carried. Departmental inspections would no longer be performed by that department's foreman. Instead, foremen would perform inspections in departments other than their own. This was intended to combat any tendency for a foreman to overlook an unsafe act or situation in his department. The company also implemented a new training course for managers to help them administer this new policy.⁹⁸

While the policy change in 1968 did not eliminate the DSI position, it represented a significant change to WFI's approach to safety. Where the company's program for

⁹⁶ "Report on our Safety Program" 11 June 1968, BC MS-1333, 89, 13.

⁹⁷ "Report on our Safety Program" 11 June 1968, BC MS-1333, 89, 13.

⁹⁸ "Report on our Safety Program" 11 June 1968, BC MS-1333, 89, 13; "Guide Lines for a Stepped-Up Safety Program for 1968," BC MS-1333, 89, 13.

much of the 1960s had held supervisors and workers equally responsible for surveillance, the new program gave supervisors the "prime responsibility" for workplace safety. The "Guidelines for a Stepped-Up Safety Program" described accident prevention as the most important part of the company's operation. The Guidelines stated: "It is our moral responsibility to maintain an active and effective safety program not only to facilitate production and efficiency but also to assure our employees that their families that every effort is being made to eliminate accidents."⁹⁹ This encouraged each supervisor to see himself as "the 'manager' of his own safety program."¹⁰⁰ As such, supervisors were encouraged to take ownership of their crew's safety. Every supervisor was asked to:

- a) Set the goal for his crew
- b) Provide the leadership
- c) Motivate his crew
- d) Get the crew to develop the program by doing the following:
 - i. Analyze the problems
 - ii. Decide on action to correct
 - iii. Organize the action delegate assign work
 - iv. Assess results
 - v. Adapt the program to get better results
- e) Get the crew to do the work to carry out the program
- f) Get each man to work safely.¹⁰¹

A supervisor ultimately became responsible for the performance of his crew. His job under the new policy was to go beyond enforcement of company rules. The 1968 program required the foreman to take a larger, but less overt role. It suggested that each crew act as a "safety team," electing a "safety captain" from among the workers. At "safety team" meetings, the foreman was to act as its secretary, recording the decisions made by the crew and providing them with needed information. Each foreman would then be

⁹⁹ "Report on our Safety Program" 11 June 1968, BC MS-1333, 89, 13; "Guide Lines for a Stepped-Up Safety Program for 1968," BC MS-1333, 89, 13.

¹⁰⁰ "Rayonier Canada Safety Program," p 2, BC MS-1333, 89, 13.

¹⁰¹ "Rayonier Canada Safety Program," p 2, BC MS-1333, 89, 13.

responsible to turn in a written safety plan, devised by his men, and returned to management.¹⁰² This program aimed to increase worker engagement with safety and create at least the illusion that this was a collective, rather than top down, process.

In 1970, WFI reaffirmed its commitment to safety and the harsher company line on safe work violations by releasing a new set of "Special Safety Regulations." These would be distributed to all new employees. Along with a list of six regulations that ranged from forbidding "horseplay" to requiring all workers to wear safety equipment, the regulations laid out the company's policy regarding safety infractions:

In the interest of SAFETY and the promotion of Safety Consciousness, employees must abide by the following Safety Regulations. Disregard of these regulations will result in the issue of ONE WARNING ONLY, or could render the offender liable to immediate dismissal, depending upon the seriousness of the infraction. Action upon such infractions shall be taken by Management Directly, or upon written recommendation of the Plant Safety Committee.¹⁰³

Like the 1968 policy change, this reaffirmation of its hard line on safety violations shifted authority over accident prevention. Before 1970, Safety Committees held very circumscribed power. They primarily existed to make recommendations to management and promote workplace safety through organized activities. However, the shift in policy allowed for these Committees to take a direct role in disciplining workers whose behaviour was deemed to be unsafe.

Precisely why the company chose to give its Safety Committee the power to recommend dismissal for employees who violated safety policies is not in the archival record. However, looking at this change in context of the other changes to safety policy in the late 1960s and into the 1970s, it is reasonable to suggest that the company hoped to

¹⁰² "Rayonier Canada Safety Program" p2-3, BC MS-1333, 89, 13.

¹⁰³ Hepburn. "Special Safety Regulations," 22 January 1970, BC MS-1333, 89, 1.

legitimize its own policy of dismissal for safety infractions by sharing this power with the Committee. By creating an illusion of democracy in the process of dismissing unsafe workers, the company could avoid accusations of arbitrary dismissals. This also increased the legitimacy of the Safety Committee itself. A Committee that could inflict real punishments on recalcitrant employees would be taken more seriously than one that had no real power to enforce its own recommendations. By giving its Safety Committee the hypothetical ability to fire an employee, management increased the likelihood that lesser sanctions, such as letters of warning, from the Committee would be taken seriously. As John Braithwaite asserts in his model of Responsive Regulation, the implied threat of maximum sanctions can serve to ensure these sanctions rarely have to be used.¹⁰⁴

When it came to reporting fellow workmen for an unsafe work practice, neither the Bunyanesque masculinity which dominated through the 1940s, nor the male breadwinner masculinity promoted in the 1950s, favoured this practice. Workers likely interpreted any criticism of their own work practice as a slight against their skill and would be reluctant to perpetrate such an offense against a fellow worker they respected. Even if a worker was inclined to criticize another, they were unlikely to do so to management.¹⁰⁵ If workers outside the Safety Committee did police one another' work, they would likely do so on a one on one basis, something the Safety Committee and management could not measure. The failure to understand the complex reasons that workers might have for acting against company recommendations is summed up in the

¹⁰⁴ Braithwaite, "Essence," 505-507.

¹⁰⁵ Workers who had been in the industry since the 1940s would likely see reporting an infraction to management as a betrayal of the union fraternity. For workers who joined the industry in the 1950s, the teamwork and mutual responsibility rhetoric promoted also discouraged reporting infractions to management.

circular's conclusion: "We are living in the space age, a time when old habits drop by the wayside for new ideas and methods. Keep up to date. Don't turn the other way if you notice a problem spot take it by the horns and do something about it."¹⁰⁶ Workers may have been living in the space age, but the old ways had not entirely passed away.

Workers did not embrace the proactive surveillance of one another that WFI's management and safety committees wished for. Even the Departmental Safety Inspectors had to be coached to overcome their reluctance to call out a fellow worker on his practice. After a meeting with DSI in March 1963, WFI's Personnel Manager, A.F. Irwin wrote:

The 'Duties' of Inspectors were reviewed. The one which prompted the most discussion was the one calling for pointing out hazardous work practices or violations to fellow employees. It was agreed by everyone that this is not an easy job. Good judgement on the part of the Inspector is probably most important here. He must know the man. Perhaps most effective action in some cases would be through the Foreman. Development of an attitude among us all that such action on the part of inspectors or foremen or in fact fellow workmen is not intended as fault finding criticism but a positive approach with no other intention than an effort to prevent accidents. It was also agreed that an early Safety Bulletin should feature this problem. One of the Inspectors said he had considerable success in using this approach when calling attention to unsafe acts - 'I remember clearly what happened to another employee who did that; -- and then go on to explain. This is good. Most of us have seen these violations because they have caused accidents, most likely accidents with which we are all familiar. Let's use them to advantage, if we can. Certainly our own thoughtless actions cause many accidents. Elimination of these will reduce accident frequency to a negligible figure. Can we adopt a policy of never letting an unsafe act we see go without taking some positive action – whatever it may be?¹⁰⁷

Irwin expected inspectors to overcome their reluctance and find a way to gently correct the work process of their coworkers. He also recognized the importance, and even perhaps the fragility of, the fraternal bond workers shared. The approach he suggested to DSI was based on the friendly relationship between the two men rather than the DSI's authority to act on behalf of management. Using the fraternal connection shared by two

¹⁰⁶ Dallamore, "Of Interest to Everyone" undated, KSMA 997.54, 1968 (4), Safety.

¹⁰⁷ Irwin, "Departmental Safety Inspectors' Meeting – March 11, 1963," 15 March 1963, p1-2, BC MS-1333, 89, 1.

skilled workers, Irwin expected that the DSI would be able to impart his superior knowledge without making the chastised worker feel he had been reprimanded.¹⁰⁸

The 'friendly' intervention of a safety captain or DSI to correct his fellow worker was the ultimate expression of the safety program companies created in the 1960s. Not only did this hypothetical worker know what the company expected him to do to work safely, but he knew how others were supposed to work and was on the lookout for safety violations. Rather than merely reporting the unsafe work to management, this worker corrected his fellow worker. By stepping in and stopping the unsafe act, this worker would ensure an immediate return to safe work practices and spare management from having to deal with the employee in question. If workers took on this role voluntarily, workplace safety programs could be reduced to updating the safety protocols and equipment with the occasional education for workers when policies changed. Of course, this hypothetical safety captain was not the reality. Safety violations which were reported were subject to discipline and workers were unlikely to embrace a role which could make them responsible for disciplining fellow workers.

It was this worker on worker surveillance that was central to the union's critique of the 1960s company safety plans. The standardization of function that was central to companies' programs was in line with the International Woodworkers of America's (IWA) plan for safety in this period, though union leadership did not openly recognize the similarities in their plans. At their 1964 Regional Safety Conference, representatives from

¹⁰⁸ Minutes, "Meeting of Departmental Safety Inspection," 24 February 1967 and 27 February 1967, BC MS-1333, 89, 1; Irwin, "Departmental Safety Inspectors' Meeting – March 11, 1963," 15 March 1963, p 1-2, BC MS-1333, 89, 1.

locals all over the province gathered to share ideas and concerns about safety in forestry. Consistently, delegates expressed their distrust of companies' motives. Ben Thompson, the representative from IWA local I-71 (the northern part of Vancouver Island and Powell River), accused companies in his region of "destroying swiftly what it took years to build – Safety being gained only through mutual cooperation" by "conveniently using Safety Inspections as an excuse for dismissal."¹⁰⁹ At the same time, Thompson was excited to tell the gathering about a new initiative that his local was helping to initiate: "Approximately 400 members are participating, in a job category basis, to examine and re-assess their jobs. This is being done outside of any Company guidance or interference and we are sure that if any logger can find a safer way to work he will be sure to describe the method."¹¹⁰ Of course, this program that Thompson proudly asserted was "outside any Company guidance or interference" fell exactly in line with the policy Rayonier, Crown Zellerbach, BCFP, and WFI enacted at this same time.

The focus of this criticism lay not in the standardization of function, but the ways in which companies enacted and enforced their Taylorized accident prevention program. J. Ross Davis, representing the Cowichan local I-80, criticized the company's use of surveillance, stating that: "We still find it necessary to keep a constant vigil over some of the tactics and methods being pursued by the Companies, i.e. attempting to have workmen spy on one another."¹¹¹ For companies, a focus on work process rather than on

¹⁰⁹ IWA. Ben Thompson, "Report of Local I-71 to the Regional Safety Conference" Safety Conference Proceedings, 29 February 1964. P2, KSA, IWA.

¹¹⁰ IWA. Ben Thompson, "Report of Local I-71 to the Regional Safety Conference" Safety Conference Proceedings, 29 February 1964. P2-3, KSA, IWA.

¹¹¹ IWA. J. Ross Davis, "Report of Local I-80 to the Regional Safety Conference" Safety Conference Proceedings, 29 February 1964. P1, KSA, IWA.

worker attitudes could only be truly upheld with the use of surveillance. Management believed that without workers "spying" on one another, the company could not enforce a consistent adherence to the work process that it believed represented the safest way to work. For the union, this practice was problematic and required a counter surveillance of companies by the union to ensure these policies were not being used to discriminate against workers or penalize them unjustly. Davies also criticized the circulation of accident investigation reports between divisions and companies. He did not see a problem with sharing practices or even descriptions of accidents, but he took issue with the fact that these reports usually included the name of the injured employee and blamed the accident on the worker rather than on mechanical or environmental factors.¹¹²

The tendency of companies to target human factors in accident prevention stood as a central point of critique for W.F. Schumaker, representing local I-413 in the interior of the province:

This past year we have noted with sharp disapproval, a trend which Management are embarking on and this is, simply, they are trying now, to put the onus on our people for poor safety records, accident, etc. Management is now quoting us WCB statistics which show 94.5% of accidents are caused by 'How we work habits, etc. [sic]'and not unguarded machinery. They are simply taking the attitude, everything is guarded, the people in the plants and woods, are just plain careless.¹¹³

Though conditions in the interior differed significantly from that of the coast (interior companies were years behind their coastal competition in terms of unionization, labour relations, and safety), Schumaker's comments likely resonated with all of the delegates at the conference. Certainly, management at both WFI and BCFP tended to believe in their

¹¹² IWA. J. Ross Davis, "Report of Local I-80 to the Regional Safety Conference" Safety Conference Proceedings, 29 February 1964. P1, KSA, IWA.

¹¹³ IWA. W.F. Schumaker, "Report of Local I-413 to the Regional Safety Conference" Safety Conference Proceedings, 29 February 1964. P1, KSA, IWA.

ability to eliminate the mechanical causes of accidents. They therefore blamed human error for most accidents. This human error could be a failure in supervision, or a failure of the injured worker himself. For union representatives sympathetic with Schumaker's position, this attribution of blame was not a realistic assessment of the situation, but a cop out designed to allow companies to avoid the expense of modifying unsafe equipment.¹¹⁴

The relationship between companies and the IWA remained contentious during the 1960s. The distrust between union officials and company management went both ways in the 1960s and was, on at least one occasion, used as the excuse not to implement an experimental accident prevention measure. In March 1961, after reviewing information gathered over the previous year determining hazardous times of day for their operations, Dinham wrote to Industrial Relations Manager J.K. Fairbairn about the possibility of altering the shape of the work day to reduce accidents. The highest accident frequency, they had found, lay between 9-11 am and between 1-3 pm. Hypothesizing that fatigue and hunger were the most likely contributing factors, Dinham suggested moving the lunch break up from 11:30 to 11 or even 10:30, and adding a fifteen minute break in the afternoon.¹¹⁵ Fairbairn strongly opposed any change to the working day.¹¹⁶ While he wrote that there was nothing in the IWA contract to prohibit giving workers a break in the afternoon or moving the lunch hour to a different time in the day, he warned Dinham:

¹¹⁴ It is plausible that there may have been instances where companies determined some equipment too expensive to purchase, there is no archival evidence of this for either BCFP or WFI and the union documents available at the time of this dissertation do not offer any concrete evidence or specific accusations to back up these instances of company negligence.

¹¹⁵ "Time Study – accidents," 2 March 1961, KSMA 997.54, 1961 (1), Safety Committee, Accident Prevention. Dinham to Fairbairn,

¹¹⁶ Linder to Fairbairn, "Re: John Holman – vacation day," 4 Aug 1960, KSMA 997.54, 1960 (2),
Grievances; Fairbairn to Linder, "Re: John Holman – vacation day," 24 Aug 1960, KSMA 997.54, 1960 (2),
Grievances. Some of Fairbairn's reluctance may have been personal. Correspondence between he and the IWA were less than friendly.
I would not recommend introducing [a break period] at this time at all. When break periods for manufacturing plants were negotiated into the Agreement, the Union wanted the same application for logging and it was strongly resisted at that time. Since there is no change in this position, we should not start a break period which could quite likely compromise the rest of the industry.¹¹⁷

Fairbairn's response assumed that the union would immediately use any leaway given by the company on this issue to their advantage and demand the same for all other workers in the industry. Dinham's logic was that a fifteen minute break in production could save the company money if it resulted in a decrease in accidents. The amount of production time lost by giving workers this break would be made up in decreased WCB premiums and reduced damage to equipment. Unfortunately, because of the company's unwillingness to give the union anything beyond what was required by contract, these assertions could never be tested. The company's Industrial Relations Department feared setting a precedent that the union could potentially use against not just BCFP but all coastal logging operations during their next contract negotiations.

The same unwillingness to give the union anything beyond what contract and law demanded coloured the industrial relations between the companies and the IWA beyond issues of safety. In 1961, A.S. Lanksail the Assistant Manager and counsel for Forest Industrial Relations (FIR) wrote to all of the companies within the area of IWA local I-80, advising them to refuse to comply with a union request regarding notification of technological change. The union had asked that companies inform it as far in advance as possible of any impending technological changes. Advanced notice would help the union to determine its response to these changes and help its members prepare for these changes

¹¹⁷ Fairbairn to Dinham, "Re: accident Time Study" 13 March 1961, KSMA 997.54, 1961 (1), Safety Committee, Accident Prevention.

- which often came along with layoffs, promotions, or wage renegotiations. However, Lanksail warned companies that the union had no jurisdiction over technological changes apart from negotiating wages and job change. He strongly recommended that companies remind union representatives of the limits of union jurisdiction.¹¹⁸

When proposing to change their safety program in 1968, WFI officials worried about how they would get the union on board with the plan. Specifically, they feared that the union would not believe their sincere desire to use this policy for safety. The new policy was, as previously discussed, much stricter than previous safety policies, and union officials were understandably reluctant to give unqualified support for a policy that allowed the company to dismiss a worker who violated safety regulations. Demotions and dismissals were the subject of many grievances filed by the IWA throughout its first twenty-five years of operation in BC's coastal forest industry. Certainly a policy which made it easier for company officials to dismiss or avoid promoting workers, even in the name of improved safety, would not receive union support. However, the way that company officials discussed the union's anticipated response suggests their concern was not about union grievances down the line, but about its complete withdrawal of support for the company's policy.¹¹⁹ Despite these fears, the union continued to understand and present its role in safety as ancillary to company-led and WCB sanctioned accident prevention throughout the 1960s. The union did critique company plans, but the core of

¹¹⁸ Lanskail, "To all companies operating within jurisdictional area of local I-80 IWA" 17 May 1961, KSMA 997.54, 1961 (2), FIR.

¹¹⁹ North to Managers, Personnel Supervisors. 8 December 1967, BC MS-1333, 89, 13.

the dissent between the union and company continued to be issues of wages, hours, seniority, and travel time, not safety.

The IWA represented a broad range of workers in the forest industry. This gave the union power in times of strike, since an IWA work stoppage could cripple the whole industry. However, in the early 1970s, when companies took the ultimate step in their decades long attempt to standardize the industry, the union's diversity of interests prevented it from representing all of its workers. In order to unite the diverse group of workers under its leadership, it focused from its inception on issues that affected the largest number of workers: wages, the number of hours in a work week, seniority, and getting workers paid for travel time. These issues were important, and the union made many gains for workers in the decades covered in this study.

During the 1960s, companies' approach to safety shifted from the innovative and culture-based programs of the 1950s, but this change can be seen in some ways as a return to company policies more broadly. While some of the incentive programs of the 1950s persisted, and even continue to persist in companies today, the overall approach to safety in the 1960s was ideologically aligned with the 1940s. After a brief decade where companies focused on creating a safety-first culture among their workers in order to address broader concerns about risk taking, carelessness, and complaisance, the 1960s saw companies return to the idea that safety was best embodied in a set of practices and regulations that every worker should follow. This rationalization of safe work lay in line with the rationalization of the work process which companies began in the early twentieth century, and continued into the 1970s.

Conclusion

The forest industry is dangerous. This fact is as true in 2017 as it was in 1943 or 1968. British Columbia's forestry industry has never experienced a fatality-free year.¹ A 2013 WorkSafeBC study of hand fallers in BC's interior revealed many of the same problems operators identified and attempted to remediate in the twenty-five years covered by this study.² Yet, in 1968 BC Forestry Products (BCFP) and Western Forest Industries (WFI) could both boast of comprehensive accident prevention programs and numerous awards for workplace safety. The persistence of workplace accidents, injuries, and fatalities in the forest industry does not render the work of safety committees, companies, the union, or the Workmen's Compensation Board (WCB, now WorkSafeBC) obsolete. Rather, the persistence of accidents with the same causes (reckless behaviour, poorly maintained equipment, and workers or their bosses taking shortcuts in order to turn an acceptable profit) make understanding the successes and failures of the earliest attempts to prevent accidents in the industry relevant today.

In this project I have sought to trace and explain the ways companies grappled with the safety problem in BC's coastal forest industry. By focusing on three companies that operated within the largest professional organization in the industry, I have highlighted the complexity of the safety problem in forestry, and the many ways that

http://www.bcforestsafe.org/node/2602 (last accessed, 31 March 2017) As of 31 March there has been 1 faller fatality and five additional forestry worker fatalities in 2017. There were 11 fatal accidents in 2016.

¹ For a current listing of forestry related fatalities in BC, see the BC Forest Safety website:

² Melanie Rock and Patrick Patterson, "What Was He Thinking?" Cultural Factors in Manual Tree Falling Safety, WorkSafe BC, February 2013.

companies tried to decrease worker injuries and fatalities. Comox Logging and Railway Company (CLR), Western Forest Industries (WFI), and BC Forest Products (BCFP) serve as windows into larger trends among mid- to large-sized forestry companies operating on Vancouver Island. All three of these companies operated more than one logging camp and at least one sawmill. Each employed hundreds of men. Each had a multilayered management structure with a head office and camp/mill superintendents. All belonged to the BC Loggers Association (BCLA) and the BC Lumber Manufacturers Association (BCLMA). The International Woodworkers of America (IWA) was the uion which represented these companies' workers. All three companies used the private labour relations firm Forest Industrial Relations (FIR) to handle both contract negotiations and union grievances that went before conciliation. While further studies of safety policy among forestry companies in BC's coastal logging are needed to fully determine how representative these companies' policies were of larger safety trends, I argue that this study's findings can be generalized to the other member companies of the BCLA and BCLMA. Since the BCLA accounted for more than half of employment and production in the province, this case study can be used to make broad assertions about the state of the industry's accident prevention in this period and to suggest avenues for future study towards understanding the ongoing problem of safety in BC forestry.

Workplace safety is not a simple issue. Accident prevention relies upon the cooperation of a number of interest groups as well as upon positive industrial relations between workers and their employers. Ultimately for the BC coastal forest industry, safety was a tripartite endeavour. Both the IWA and the WCB played integral roles in the

evolution of accident prevention, in line with Braithwaite's model of regulated selfregulation. The regulatory and educational roles these bodies embraced over the decades following the Second World War created an environment that permitted, even forced, companies to develop their own accident prevention policies. The WCB's implementation of experience rating for the forest industry in 1932 played an important role in motivating companies to unilaterally tackle their high accident rates. The threat of negative publicity and labour unrest helped to keep companies from making big promises they had no intention of keeping.³ This responsive regulatory relationship was not perfect, however. The WCB lacked sufficient power to ensure complete compliance. Further, the corporate capture of these provincial systems limited the union's ability to represent workers as stakeholders in the company's accident prevention practice. Though the WCB exerted pressure on companies, a combination of corporate, government, and labour priorities ultimately set the Board's agenda.⁴ BC businesses consistently presented a strong united front when changes to the structure or the implementation of new policies were under consideration. Accordingly, corporate interests won favourable provisions and regulations more often than groups who were less organized or had inferior funding, such as labour. However, the relative success of accident prevention under this imperfect responsive regulation model offers a potential direction for future safety policy development.

Before any real progress could be made in accident prevention, the dual problems of transiency and arbitrary firing and blacklisting had to be solved. Therefore, it was only

³ John Braithwaite, "Fasken Lecture: The Essence of Responsive Regulation." *UBC Law Review*, 44, 3 (2011); British Columbia. *Report of the Royal Commission on the Workmen's Compensation Board* (Victoria, BC: King's Printer, 1942), DD176-181.

⁴ Anjun Chaklader, "History of Worker's Compensation in BC." *Report to the Royal Commission on Worker's Compensation in BC*, May 1988.

with unionization that a safety culture in the forest industry could be conceived. While transiency was less of a problem for sawmill workers, a boss' ability to fire indiscriminately created a precarious environment that undermined a safety-first attitude. The IWA was not a panacea for the dangers of the forest industry, but unionization created a relatively stable workforce within which a safe work culture could be constructed. The union also kept companies accountable in their efforts to prevent accidents.

Accident prevention was not a simple endeavour. The causes of accidents were many, and causal factors varied across crew positions and from one physical work environment to another. Weather, terrain, and the grain of individual trees could all create new hazards. Even in the relatively standardized sawmill, a flaw in one log could create a unique hazardous situation. Early accident prevention efforts which attempted to impose monolithic solutions to multifaceted problems were only successful some of the time. As Chapter Two demonstrates, safety programs in the 1940s did not solve the industry's safety problem, largely because they failed to account for the extreme variabilities of circumstance, as well as the differences between workers and machines. Though they were too narrow and top-down to have the desired impact, they laid a foundation on which future safety programs built. The focus on mechanical causes of accidents in the 1940s led to the creation of legislation requiring certain workers to wear safety equipment, and for companies to make modifications to equipment to reduce accident hazards. The top-down safety education practices during this time also created a class of management who were knowledgeable in safe practice – something that would serve the industry in the 1950s when safety became a 'culture,' rather than a simple set of practices.

Over the course of the 1950s, both WFI and BCFP strove to create a safety-first workplace culture in their logging and sawmill operations. "What a contrast!" observed faller Al Lundgren, when he started work at BCFP's Caycuse camp in the 1960s. Caycuse was equipped with modern equipment and accessible by a well-graded road, and "...was [Lundgren's] first operation where the safety committee had a dominating presence amongst the crew and management staff."⁵ The explosion of safe-work messages that Lundgren observed began in the 1950s when WFI and BCFP (as well as professional organizations such as the BCLA more broadly) began extensive efforts to create safer workers by instilling their crews with a sense of responsibility. The IWA's certification in 1943 and decreased transiency after the Second World War meant that companies could no longer easily fire workers who did not adhere to company safety standards. To ensure a safety-conscious, obedient workforce, companies had to create it. Professional organizations and company management constructed a discourse of responsibility in posters, newsletters, and other safety messaging. They inundated workers with the message that they were responsible to their fellow workman and to their dependents. Management also expressed concern to one another in memos and letters as well as at conferences about the hyper-masculine worker willing to take risks or unwilling to follow accident prevention policies. Though bosses did not explicitly state that they were trying to shape worker masculinity, they clearly identified worker masculinity as being

⁵ Allan E. Lundgren, *Many Flowers: A Logger's Story*, (Self-Published, 2007) 120.

problematic, and took steps to bombard workers with messages to cultivate a masculinity more in line with corporate objectives. Workers' families were used by companies to create a hetero-patriarchal masculinity rooted in the role of man as provider and protector. This male breadwinner ideology also put pressure on workers' wives to embody the female homemaker ideal. Women who failed to make the home a haven were blamed for making their husband unsafe on the job.

Forestry companies continued many of the policies of the 1950s into the 1960s, although with a subtle but important shift in focus. In the 1950s, the safety program had centred around convincing men to work safely out of a sense of responsibility for their family's welfare and the welfare of fellow workers. In the 1960s, the program grew to focus on defining one 'safe' way to work. It pressed men to adhere to that best practice. The hetero-patriarchal male breadwinner became an unspoken assumption underlying safe work rhetoric, rather than a central tenet of safety promotion. Workplace safety became about a strict adherence to prescribed work processes. This rationalization of safety stood in line with broader trends towards mechanizing and standardizing industrial work across Canada.⁶ The standardization of work allowed management to gain greater control over workers, and facilitated a more punitive approach to accident prevention. By defining safe work in a measurable way, maanger could identify unsafe work and penalize workers who did not adhere to safe work practices.

⁶ Craig Heron, *The Canadian Labour Movement: A Short History*, (Toronto: James Lortimer & Company, 1996) 90-93, 120; Bryan Palmer, *The Working-class Experience: The Rise and Reconstitution of Canadian Labour, 1800-1980*. (Toronto: Butterworth & Co. Ltd., 1983) 140-141.

Further research on safety in forestry extending beyond 1968 is required to understand the full impact of the punitive shift of the late 1960s. However, WFI records stretching into the early 1980s suggest that the 1960s trend toward segregating and deskilling the work process had serious repercussions for the industry. In the early 1970s BC coastal forestry companies (including but not limited to WFI, Elk River Timber, and MacMillan Bloedel) began to contract out some of the falling and bucking work needed to keep their mills running constantly. Contract workers paid union dues and were union members, but were not company employees.⁷ Fallers and buckers were among the highest paid workers, and among the most likely to suffer a compensable accident. By contracting this work out, companies could save on accident costs as well as wages for days of suboptimal production, and worker benefits. In 1972 the position of fallers and buckers in the industry were further undermined by the removal of piecework pay bonuses across the province. Company-employed fallers and buckers were also required in 1972 to use company saws rather than their own. In response to these perceived attacks on their livelihood and their identities fallers and buckers engaged in a series of wildcat strikes which threatened to shut down the entire forestry sector that summer.⁸

⁷ G.J. Towill to R.W. Bonner. "Fallers' Saw Rentals - Courtney Area" 1 August 1972, MacMillan Bloedel Limited Fonds, D.W. Timmins Corporate Papers, 807, 22 (Hereafter M&B D.W. Timmins, box, file); J.O. Hemmingsen to R.W. Bonner. 9 Aug 1972, M&B D.W. Timmins, 807. 22; R.M. Bibbs to D.A. Dowsley. "Fallers Daily Rate" 8 March 1973, M&B, D.W. Timmins, 807, 22; R.M. Bibbs to H.R. Chisholm "Fallers Daily Rate," M&B, D.W. Timmins, 807, 22: Contractors were subject to the term of the collective agreement when it came to working conditions, hours, and pay structures. Whether or not contracted workers earned a similar way to their day labouring brethren employed directly by the larger forestry companies is uncertain.

⁸ R.M. Bibbs to D.W Timmins. "IWA Vote" 10 July 1972, M&B D.W. Timmins, 807, 16; H.R. Chisholm to All MacMillan Bloedel Fallers. 28 July 1972, M&B D.W. Timmins, 807. 22; Robert W. Bonner to All Salaried Employees, 28 July 1972, M&B D.W. Timmins, 807. 22; G.J. Towill to R.W. Bonner. "Fallers' Saw Rentals - Courtney Area" 1 August 1972, M&B D.W. Timmins, 807. 22; J.O. Hemmingsen to R.W. Bonner. 9 Aug 1972, M&B D.W. Timmins, 807. 22; R.M. Bibbs to R.W. Bonner. "Fallers" 14 August

The evolution of safety policy in the forest industry was never simply about policy. Worker identity was integral to the success and failures of company safety programs. Therefore, the narrative of safety policy development is also a narrative of shifting constructions of masculinity. Before unionization and concerted attempts to create a safe workforce, loggers relied heavily on their independent skill and their ability to cope with and overcome the daily dangers of the job.⁹ They lived most of the year in isolation and prided themselves on feats of hyper-masculinity at work and on leave. The stories loggers told each other, the stories others told of loggers, and the embodied acts of daily life in a logging camp or on skid row shaped this Bunyanesque masculinity. Loggers understood exactly who a "logger" was. Loggers were men. They were rough, tough, independent, and white. Stereotypes of loggers, even at the dramatic ends of the laudatory/derogatory spectrum, enforced these characteristics and loggers themselves more often than not embodied the stereotype fully.¹⁰

After unionization, worker independence became a problem for companies which had previously benefitted from logger's willingness to live rough and work tough. Individual loggers may have practiced safe work (as much as circumstances allowed)

^{1972,} M&B D.W. Timmins, 807. 22; IWA Negotiations, Vol 2, 1972. "Labour Relations Assessments International Woodworkers' of America" 5 June 1972, p 2-3, M&B D.W. Timmins, 349, 19; Jack Wolff. "Day Rate Falling and Bucking" *Pacific Loggers Handbook*, 1965, 29-30; F.H. Britton to R.W. Bonner. "IWA Negotiations" 16 June 1972, M&B, D.W. Timmins, 807, 22; R.M. Bibbs to D.A. Dowsley. "Fallers Daily Rate" 8 March 1973, M&B, D.W. Timmins, 807, 22; R.M. Bibbs to H.R. Chisholm "Fallers Daily Rate," M&B, D.W. Timmins, 807, 22; R.W. Bonner to H.R. Chisholm and J.R. Forrest. 6 March 1973, M&B, D.W. Timmins, 807, 22.

⁹ While companies targeted both sawmill workers and loggers equally with messages of masculinity in the period of study, it was loggers who embodied the masculinity management complained about and actively sought to change.

¹⁰ As demonstrated in Chapter One, loggers who failed to adhere to the accepted ideas about how loggers should live and act were often viewed with suspicion. The derision aimed at the "home guard" is an excellent example of how loggers placed value on behaviour that reinforced popular notions of what a logger was.

long before unionization. It was not until the 1940s that this became a priority for those engaged in the discourse of logger masculinity. Stability in the logging workforce brought on by unionization led to a dramatic redefinition of "logger." Loggers were still white men, but companies worked to convince them that loggers were skilled workers who held a responsibility to themselves and others to be careful and safe. This message corresponded with the union's concerns over the loss of life in the industry, yet, the discourse of masculinity as responsibility began with companies. This rhetoric positioned loggers as skilled leaders, responsible for teaching new workers through example. They were to be protectors of and providers for dependents, who were increasingly brought into the camps as companies expanded married housing and build roads that connected logging camps to nearby communities. The dominant discourse no longer promoted risk taking as a trait of a skillful logger. Rather than encouraging reckless behaviour and rewarding those who took risks, companies sought to reduce workers' risk-taking. Recklessness was reconstructed as a problem to be eradicated, a mistake of the unskilled.

In the late 1960s and into the early 1970s, companies further redefined what a logger was. In their attempt to fully rationalize the workforce, they began to break down individual jobs previously the purview of skilled workers into a set of simplified, standardized steps. However, in sharp contrast to the successful campaigns in the 1950s to dissociate recklessness and skill, this attempt to eliminate the association between logger and individual skilled worker failed dramatically. Skill itself was open to redefinition, but the equation of skill with logger and, in turn, with masculinity, was not. The 1973 wildcat strike by fallers and buckers was not simply about wages, since most of

these workers would actually see a pay increase with the conversion to day wages over piecework; the 1973 contract threatened fallers' and buckers' relative independence and to some extent their skill as well. The job itself was not transformed by the eradication of piecework or the transfer of ownership of equipment to the company. However, the elimination of piecework and the scaling that went with it meant that these men could no longer show their superiority by bringing in more board feet than other fallers and buckers. Nor could they claim any ownership or control over the means of production. After 1973, company-employed fallers and buckers worked on the same terms as every other member of the logging crew. They worked set hours, used company equipment, and collected a set paycheque. The definition of manliness in relation to safety and even to family life was open to change, but for these men, the attack on the skilled nature of their work was one step too far.

Gender is constructed by discourse but also, phenomenologically, gender is constructed through acts.¹¹ Workers in the forest industry daily lived out their gender identities. Especially for fallers and buckers, the inherent dangers of their jobs worked with, and against, the dominant discourse of masculinity that inundated them from companies, government, and even their union. While earning was important to these workers, ultimately piecework pay and the isolation of their work made room for a masculine identity which equated earnings with skill, and skill with masculinity. The revolt of these workers after 1973 demonstrates that gender identities were constantly being constructed and reconstructed by lived realities as well as through discourse.

¹¹ Judith Butler, "Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory," *Theatre Journal*, 40, 4. (Dec., 1988): 519-531.

Neither bosses nor workers questioned if they were men, or if there was such a thing as "men" to begin with, but individuals within both groups constituted this gender identity in different ways, and in ways that changed over time.¹² Yet, the presupposed inherent masculinity in certain acts and embodied in discourse tells us that while masculinity itself was constantly being redefined, masculinity existed as something immutable. Workers may have been persuaded to adjust their understanding of masculinity or to see a different set of acts as embodying this identity over time in accordance with discourse and changes during their life cycle – such as marrying, having children, or even suffering a serious accident. However, while masculinity proved mutable, the inherent masculinity of the work, or the worker, was never questioned. Therefore, while we can see the constructed nature of masculinity in the embodied lives of workers and bosses in the forest industry, these lived experiences also highlight the way in which individuals experience gender as something concrete, despite its constructed nature.

Like workers' masculinity, safety in logging was constructed. Shifting constructions of loggers' masculinities reflected the shifting construction of safety, a change in one often triggering a shift in the other. Before the unionization of the forest industry and the solidification of the WCB's power, logging and sawmill work were both understood as dangerous, and workplace safety was seen as a luxury most workers would never see. At best the WCB offered workers financial protection against the worst

¹² Butler, "Gender: A Useful Category for Historical Analysis," in *The Feminist History Reader*, ed. Sue Morgan (Routledge, London: 2006) 133-148; Denise Riley, "Does a Sex Have a History? 'Women' and Feminism." in *The Feminist History Reader*, ed. Sue Morgan (Routledge, London: 2006) 149-159.

offenses by companies. This conception of safety changed in the 1940s when war production followed by unionization created a previously unknown stability in the industry's workforce. By the postwar years, accidents were collectively understood as preventable and as antithetical to efficient operation of a mill or woods operation. Companies believed the cause of accidents to be a lack of training or mechanical dangers, both of which could be remedied. This understanding of safety was not fixed. By the 1950s companies constructed accidents and workplace safety as human problems caused by individuals failing to look out for themselves and their fellows. Accidents were family tragedies rather than inefficiencies - though realistically they were always both. By the 1960s the inefficiency of unsafe work stood at the forefront of the industry, which blamed inefficient individuals, rather than an inefficient operations, for accidents. This construction of accidents drove companies to create elaborate guides to control each worker's work process and ensure a standardized safe work environment. Ultimately, accident prevention measures taken by companies had some success in decreasing the number of accidents and fatalities. However, as the WCB statistics in Appendix B indicate, for the province as a whole, forestry continued to be a dangerous occupation long after 1968.

Beginning in 2010 anthropologists Melanie Rock and Patrick Patterson conducted a study into the "safety culture" (or lack thereof) among loggers in the interior of BC. The final report, released by Worksafe BC in 2013, underscores why it is important to understand the history of safety in the BC forest industry. After spending nearly a year interviewing and observing eighteen forestry workers, Rock and Patterson concluded that

291

in order to positively impact the safety of fallers, programs needed to address logging culture. They found financial vulnerability and an acceptance of risk among loggers to pose significant challenges to any attempts to intervene in forestry safety¹³ Regulatory approaches rooted in standardization are not effective for twenty first century loggers. These workers "expect policy-makers to misunderstand their work; [and, therefore,] increased regulation reinforces their cynicism and can intensify resistance to change."¹⁴ Rock and Patterson suggest that safety policy makers must make a visible effort to understand loggers' realities, and their culture, in order to develop effective safety policies.

While the technological reality of loggers in 2017 is different in many important ways from that of loggers in the mid-twentieth century, and most loggers are contractors rather than employed by stable companies, logger culture in 2010 was not a great departure from logging culture in 1943. The workers interviewed by Rock and Patterson expressed reliance on their personal skill and ability to adapt to an uncertain environment as key to staying safe on the job. They also accepted that there would always be risks and only experience and individual skill could protect workers from these risks. While the interview excerpt included in the report show that safety equipment, like safety regulations, are not always taken seriously by workers. Many workers expressed the belief that regulations were more about "covering our ass" than actually promoting safe

¹³ Rock and Patterson, 5, 7, 29-31.

¹⁴ Rock and Patterson, 5, 31-32.

work and admitted to "bad habit[s]" that contravened regulations but were deemed a better practice by the individual loggers.¹⁵

In order to reach these loggers and bring positive changes to forestry safety, regulators need to understand workers' culture. A significant part of this is understanding the characteristics of the logging industry which allowed for the development of a safety culture. While company approaches to safety were often driven by a desire for profit, the end results were a significant decrease in compensable accidents and in fatalities. The current state of the forest industry places loggers in increasingly precarious positions both financially and in terms of personal safety. The scarcity of work encourages contractors to underbid on projects and creates speed up conditions which places workers at risk for fatal accidents. Workers have responded to this precarity by relying on individual skill rather than prescribed safe work practices. It is this culture which will need to be addressed if regulators want to protect workers and improve the safety of this industry.

¹⁵ Rock and Patterson, 34-48.

Bibliography

Newspapers and Periodicals

Coast News

BC Lumber Worker

Victoria Times Colonist

Pacific Loggers Handbook

Archival Collections

- 985-78.Caycuse School Fonds. Kaatza Station Museum and Archives, Lake Cowichan, British Columbia.
- 997.54. Fletcher Challenge Collection. Kaatza Station Museum and Archives, Lake Cowichan, British Columbia.
- Aural History Collection. Museum at Campbell River, Campbell River, British Columbia.
- Comox Logging and Railway Fonds (series 1-5, 9). (Courtney Museum)
- GR-1229 BC Forest Service Fonds. Provincial Archives of British Columbia, Victoria, British Columbia.
- GR-1295 BC Forest Service Public Information Fonds. Provincial Archives of British Columbia, Victoria, British Columbia.
- IWA District 1 Fonds. Kaatza Station Museum and Archives, Lake Cowichan, British Columbia.
- MacMillan Bloedel Limited Fonds, University of British Columbia Library Rare Books and Special Collections, Vancouver, British Columbia.
- MS-1057. Gordon McGregor Sloan Fonds. Provincial Archives of British Columbia, Victoria, British Columbia.
- MS-1333.Western Forest Industries Fonds. Provincial Archives of British Columbia, Victoria, British Columbia.

Fiction

Fairlie, Jock. Lumberjack,

- Haig-Brown, Roderick L. *Timber: A Novel of Pacific Coast Loggers*. New York: William Morrow Company, 1942.
- Rounds, Glen. Ol' Paul,

Government Documents

- Chaklader, Anjun. "History of Worker's Compensation in BC." Report to the Royal Commission on Worker's Compensation in BC, May 1988.
- Gurmail, S. Gill, Oksana Exell, and Gerry Stoney. For the Common Good: Final Report of the Royal Commission on Worker's Compensation in British Columbia, 1999.
- The Supreme Court of British Columbia. *Merrill Ring Wilson Ltd. v. British Columbia* (Workmen's Compensation Board). 18 April 1932.
- The Court of Appeal for British Columbia. *Merrill Ring Wilson, Limited and others v. The Workmen's Compensation Board.*. 28 July 1933.
- The Court of Appeal for British Columbia. *Dinning v. British Columbia (Workmen's compensation Board).* 6 October 1931.
- The Court of Appeal for British Columbia. British Columbia (Workmen's Compensation Board) v. Nichols. 5 January 1932.
- Rock, Melanie. "What Was He Thinking?" Cultural Factors in Manual Tree Falling Safety, WorkSafe BC, February 2013.
- Sloan, Gordon McGregor. Report of the Commissioner Relating to the Workmen's Compensation Board. 1942.
- Sloan, Gordon McGregor. Report of the Commissioner Relating to the Workmen's Compensation Act and Board. 1952.
- Tysoe, Charles W. Commission of Inquiry, Workmen's Compensation Act Report of the Commissioner, 1966.

Secondary Sources

Abella, Irving. Nationalism, Communism, and Canadian Labour: The CIO, the Communist Party, and the Canadian Congress of Labour. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1973.

- Abrams, Roger I. and Dennis R. Nolan, "Seniority Rights Under the Collective Agreement," *The Labor Lawyer*, 2, 1 (Winter 1986): 99-144.
- Ayers, Ian and John Braithwaite. "Tripartism: Regulatory Capture and Empowerment." *Law and Social Inquiry*, v, i (1991): 435-496.
- Baptie, Sue. First Growth: The Story of British Columbia Forest Products Limited. Vancouver: British Columbia Forest Products Ltd, 1975.
- Barnetson, Bob. "Framing and Blaming: Construction of workplace Injuries by Legislators in Alberta, Canada." *International Journal of Occupational and Environmental Health*, 19, 4 (2013): 332-343.
- Bergren, Myrtle. *Tough Timber: The Loggers of British Columbia Their Story*. Toronto: Progress Books, 1967.
- Berkowitz, Monroe. "Occupational Safety and Health." *Annals of the American Academy* of Political and Social Science, 443. (May 1979): 41-53.
- Bock, Gisela. "Women's History and Gender History: Aspects of an International Debate." *Gender & History*, 1:1 (1989), 7-30.
- Bowles, Roy Tyler. Little Communities and Big Industries: Studies in the Social Impact of Canadian Resource Extraction. Toronto: Butterworth, 1982.
- Boyer, Marcel and Donatella Porrini. "Modelling the Choice between Regulation and Liability in Terms of Social Welfare." *Canadian Journal of Economics*, 37, 3, (2004): 590-612.
- Bradbury, John H. "Towards an Alternate Theory of Resource-Based Town Development in Canada." *Economic Geography* 55 (April 1979):147-66.
- Braithwaite, John. "Fasken Lecture: The Essence of Responsive Regulation." UBC Law Review, 44, 3 (2011): 475-520.
- Braithwaite, John. *To Punish or Persuade: Enforcement of Coal Mine Safety*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985.
- Breslin, Curtis, Peter Smith, Mieke Koehoorn, and Hyunmi Lee. "Is the Workplace Becoming Safer?" *Perspectives on Labour and Income*, 18, 3 (Autumn 2006): 36-41.
- Butler, Judith. "Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory." *Theatre Journal*, 40, 4 (December, 1988): 519-531.

- Campoleti, Michele, Douglas Hyatt, and Terry Thomason. "Experience Rating, Work Injuries and Benefit Costs: Some New Evidence." *Relations Industrielles/Industrial Relations*, 61, 1 (2006): 118-145.
- Carlson, Linda. *Company Towns of the Pacific Northwest*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003.
- Carranco, Lynwood. "Logger Lingo in the Redwood Region" American Speech. 31, 2 (May 1956): 149-152.
- Carranco, Lynwood. "More Logger Lingo in the Redwood Region" *American Speech.* 34, 1 (February 1959): 76-80.
- Cave, Robert Bruce. *Roderick Haig-Brown a Descriptive Bibliography*. Craig Heights, California: Privately Published by the Author, 2000.
- Chaklader, Anjan K. "The Impact of Royal Commissions on Public Policy: Workers' Compensation in British Columbia, 1941-1968." Unpublished Masters Thesis," University of British Columbia, 1992.
- Cheng, Lucie and Edna Bonacich. Editors. *Labor Immigration Under Capitalism: Asian Workers in the United States Before World War II*. Berkley: University of California Press, 1984.
- Christie, Nancy. *Engendering the State: Family, Work, and Welfare in Canada*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000.
- Cohn, Werner. "The Persecution of Japanese Canadians and the Political Left in British Columbia, December 1941-March 1942." *BC Studies*, 68 (Winter 1985-86): 3-22.
- Comacchio, Cynthia. "'A Postscript for Father': Defining a New Fatherhood in Interwar Canada." *The Canadian Historical Review*, 78, 3 (September 1997): 385-408.
- Conley, James R. "Frontier Labourers, Crafts in Crisis and the Western Labour Revolt: The Case of Vancouver, 1900-1919." *Labour / Le* Travail 23, (Spring 1989) 9-37.
- Connor, William. "Roderick Haig-Brown" in Tracy Chevalier Ed. *Encyclopedia of the Essay* (London: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 1997), 373-374.
- Crawford, Margaret. Building the Workman's Paradise: The Design of American Company Towns. New York: Verso, 1995.
- Creese, Gillian. "Exclusion or Solidarity? Vancouver Workers Confront the 'Oriental Problem'" *BC Studies*, 80 (Winter 1988-89): 24-51.

- Creese, Gillian. Contracting Masculinity: Gender, Class, and Race in a White-Collar Union, 1944-1994. Don Mills, Ont. : Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Danzon, Patricia M. and Scott E. Harrington. "Workers' Compensation Rate Regulation: How Price Controls Increase Costs." *Journal of Law and Economics*, 44, 1 (April 2001): 1-36.
- Davis, Elrick B. "Paul Bunyan Talk." *American Speech*, 17, 4 (December 1942): 217-225.
- Di Stefano, Diana L. "Disasters, Railway Workers, and the Law in Avalanche Country, 1888-1910." *Environmental History*, 14, 3 (July 2009): 476-501.
- Dorson, Richard M. "Paul Bunyan in the News, 1939-1941." Western Folklore, 15, 4 (October 1956): 247-261.
- Dummit, Chris. *The Manly Modern: Masculinity in Postwar Canada*. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007.
- Dunk, Thomas M. It's a Working Man's Town : Male Working-Class Culture in Northwestern Ontario. Montreal : McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991.
- Dupré, Michèle, Julien Etienne, and Jean-Christophe Lecoze. "The Regulator-Regulatee Interaction: Insights Taken from a High-risk Business Firm." Conference Paper presented to the 2nd Annual Cambridge Conference on Regulation, Inspection & Improvement : The End of Zero Risk Regulation: Risk Toleration in Regulatory Practice, Peterhouse, University of Cambridge, September 2007, Cambridge, United Kingdom. Accessed 26 November 2015: [http://www.cibampreview.jbs.cam.ac.uk/pdf/Dupre_et_al_Paper.pdf]
- Estlund, Cynthia. *Regoverning the Workplace: From Self-Regulation to Co-Regulation*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010.
- Figueira-McDonough, Josefina. "Gender, Race, and Class: Differences in Levels of Feminist Orientation." *Journal of Applied Behavioural Science*, 21, 2 (1985), 121-142.
- Finkel, Alvin. *Social Policy and Practice in Canada: A History*. Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 2006.
- Fisher, E.G. "Strike Activity and Wildcat Strikes in British Columbia: 1945-1975." *Relations Industrielles / Insustrial Relations*, 37, 2 (1982): 284-312,
- Forrest, Anne. "The Industrial Relations Significance of Unpaid Work." *Labour/Le Travail*, 42 (fall 1998): 199-225.

- Frager, Ruth A. "Labour History and the Interlocking Hierarchies of Class, Ethnicity, and Gender: A Canadian Perspective," *International Review of Social History*, 44 (1999), 217-247.
- Freeman, Joshua. "Hardhats: Construction Workers, Manliness, and the 1970s Pro-War Demonstrations." *Journal of Social History*, 26,4 (Summer, 1993): 725-744.
- Fudge, Judie and Eric Tucker. Labour Before the Law: the Regulation of Workers' Collective Action in Canada, 1900-1948. Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2001.
- Garner, Joe. Never Chop your Rope: a Story of British Columbia Logging and People Who Logged. Nanaimo, Cinnibar Press, 1988.
- Gendered Pasts: Historical Essays in Femininity and Masculinity in Canada. Eds. Kathryn McPherson, Cecelia Morgan, and Nancy M. Forestell. Don Mills, Ontario: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Gold, Wilmer. Logging As It Was: A Pictorial History of Logging on Vancouver Island. Victoria: Morriss Publishing, 1985.
- Gould, Ed. Logging: British Columbia's Logging History. Saanichton, BC: Hancock House Publishing, 1975.
- Goutor, David. Guarding the Gates: The Canadian Labour Movement and Immigration, 1872-1934. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007
- Gray, Stephen. "Woodworkers and Legitimacy: The IWA in Canada, 1937-1957." Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation. Simon Fraser University. July 1989.
- Haines, Fiona. "The Show Must Go On: The Response to Fatalities in Multiple Employer Workplaces." *Social Problems*, 40, 4 (November 1993): 547-563.
- Hak, Gordon. "British Columbia Loggers and the Lumber Workers Industrial Union, 1919-1922." *Labour/Le Travail*, 23 (Spring 1989): 67-90.
- Hak, Gordon. "Red Wages: Communists and the 1934 Vancouver Island Loggers Strike." *The Pacific Northwest Quarterly*, 80, 3 (July 1989): 82-90.
- Hak, Gordon. *Capital and Labour in the British Columbia Forest Industry*, 1934-74. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007.
- Hallberg, Ken. Ken Hallberg an Autobiography, Self-Published, 2010.
- Hardwick, Walter. The Forest Industry of Coastal British Columbia: A Geographic Study of Place and Circulation. Ann Arbour: University Microfilms, 1963.

- Healy, Judith and John Braithwaite, "Designing Safer Health Care through Responsive Regulation," *MJA*, 184, 10 (15 May 2006): S56-S59.
- Heron, Craig. "The Boys and Their Booze: Masculinities and Public Drinking in Working-class Hamilton, 1890-1946." *The Canadian Historical Review*, 86, 3 (September 2005): 1-24.
- Heron, Craig. *The Canadian Labour Movement: A Short History*. Toronto: James Lortimer & Company, 1996.
- Hillyard Little, Margaret. "Claiming a Unique Place: The Introduction of Mothers' Pensions in BC." *BC Studies*, 105-106 (Spring/Summer 1995): 80-102
- Hoffman, Dan. "Folk Tales of Paul Bunyan: Themes, Structure, Style, Sources," *Western Folklore*, 9, 4 (October 1950), 302-320.
- Holdsworth, Deryck W. "'I'm a Lumberjack and I'm OK': The Built Environment and Varied Masculinities in the Industrial Age." *Perspectives in Vernacular Architecture*, 5, Gender, Class, and Shelter (1995), 11-25.
- Hunt, Allan H., Peter S. Barth, and Michael J. Leahy. "Worker's Compensation in British Columbia: an Administrative Inventory at a Time of Transition" W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. November 1991.
- Irving, Abella. Nationalism, Communism and Canadian labour: the CIO, the Communist Party and the Canadian Congress of Labour, 1935-1956, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973.
- Jensen, Heather. "A History of Legal Exclusion: Labour Relations Laws and British Columbia's Agricultural Workers, 1937-1975" *Labour/Le Travail*, 73 (Spring 2014): 67-95.
- Johansson, Bo, Kjell Rask, and Magnus Stenberg. "Piece Rates and Their Effect on Health and Safety – A Literature Review." *Applied Ergonomics*, 41 (2010): 607-614.
- Keller, Morton. *Regulating a New Economy: Public Policy and Economic Change in America, 1900-1933.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990.
- Kessler-Harris, Alice. In Pursuit of Equity: Women, Men, and the Quest for Economic Citizenship in 20th-Century America. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.
- Knight, Rolf and Phyllis Knight, A Very Ordinary Life. Vancouver: New Star Books, 1974.

- Knox, Paul Graham. "The Passage of Bill 39: Reform and Repression in British Columbia's Labour Policy." Unpublished BA Thesis. University of British Columbia. April 1974.
- Kobayashi, Audrey and Peter Jackson. "Japanese Canadians and the Racialization of Labour in the Britich Columbia Sawmill Industry." *BC Studies*, 103 (Fall 1994): 33-58.
- Kolko, Gabriel. *Railroads and Regulation: 1877-1916*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc., 1970.
- Kolko, Gabriel. The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American History, 1900-1916. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1963.
- Kuffert, Leonard B. "'Reckoning with the Machine': The British Columbia Social Credit Movement as Social Criticism, 1932-1952." *BC Studies*, 124 (Winter 1999/2000): 9-39.
- Kwak, James. "Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis." In Daniel Carpenter and David A Moss, editors, *Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence and How to Limit It.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
- Labour Gains, Labour Pains: 50 Years of PC 1003. Eds. Cy Gonick, Paul Phillips, and Jesse Vorst. Halifax,: Fernwood Publishing, 1995.
- LaTourrette Tom, and John Mendeloff. "Mandatory Workplace Safety and Health Programs: Implementation, Effectiveness, and Benefit-Cost Trade-Offs" RAND Center for Health and Safety in the Workplace, 2008.
- Lawson, James. "Explaining Workplace Injuries Among BC Loggers: Cultures of Risk and Desperation." *BC Studies*, 164 (winter 2009/10): 51-74.
- Lawson, James. "Pressurized Timber: Occupations Health and Safety Prevention Initiatives in BC." Unpublished. University of Victoria.
- Lee, Carol F. "The Road to Enfranchisement: Chinese and Japanese in British Columbia." *BC Studies*, 30 (Spring 1976): 44-76.
- Lembcke, Jerry. "The International Woodworkers of America in British Columbia, 1942-1951." *Labour/Le Travaillieur*, 6 (Autumn 1980): 113-148.
- Lemsky, Rick. "The Use of Training to Decrease Workers Compensation Costs in a Mid-Side Manufacturing Plant." Unpublished Masters Research Paper, University of Wisconsin-Stout. May 2007.

Lundgren, Allan E. Many Flowers: A Logger's Story, Self-Published, 2007.

- Mackie, Richard, Island Timber: A Social History of the Comox Logging Company, Vancouver Island. Victoria: Sono Nis Press, 2000.
- Marchak, Patricia. *Green Gold: The Forest Industry in British Columbia.* Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1983.
- Martinello, Felice and Ronald Meng. "Workplace risks and the Value of Hazard Avoidance." *The Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue Canadianne d'Economique*, 25, 2 (May 1992): 333-345.
- May, Peter J "Regulatory Regimes and Accountability." *Regulation and Governance*, 1, 1, (2007): 8-27.
- McCaw, Thomas K. Editor. *Regulation in Perspective: Historical Essays*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981.
- Melvin, Erin Kathleen. "Peripatetic to Domestic: Gender and Change in Logging Camps." MA Thesis, Queen's University, 1972.
- Miles, Robert. *Capitalism and Unfree Labour: Anomaly or Necessity?* London: Travistock Publications, 1987.
- Miles, Robert. Racism. London: Rutledge, 1989.
- Mohun, Arwen. "On the Frontier of the Empire of Chance: Statistics, Accidents, and Risk in Industrializing America." *Science in Context*, 18, 3 (2005): 337-357.
- Moore, Bill. "The Forest Around Us: The Trees that Didn't Fall Last Summer." *British Columbia Lumberman,* (September 1972): 23-25.
- Morantz, Alison D. "Has Devolution Injured American Workers?: State and Federal Enforcement of Construction Safety." *The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization,* 25, 1 (December 2007): 183-210.
- Mylek, Melinda R. and Jacki Schirmer. "Beyond Physical Health and Safety: Supporting the Wellbeing of Workers Employed in the Forest Industry." *Forestry*, Advanced Access 2 May 2015. 1-16
- Nelles, H.V. The Politics of Development: Forests, Mines & Hydro-electric Power in Ontario, 1849-1941. Toronto: MacMillan, 1975.
- Neufeld, Andrew, and Andrew Parnaby. *The IWA in Canada: The Life and Times of an Industrial Union*. Vancouver: IWA Canada / New Star Books, 2000.
- Nielsen, Vibeke Lehmann and Christine Parker. "Testing Responsive Regulation in Regulatory Enforcement." *Regulation and Governance*, 3, 4 (2009): 376-399.

- Nordlöf, Hasse, Birgitta Wiitavaara, Ulrika Winblad, Katarina Wijk, and Ragnar Westerling. "Safety Culture and Reasons for Risk-Taking at a Large Steel-Manufacturing Company: Investigating the Worker Perspective." Safety Science, 73 (2015): 126-135.
- Oi, Walter Y. "On the Economics of Industrial Safety" *Law and contemporary Problems*, 38, 4 (Summer-Autumn 1974): 669-699.
- Palmer, Bryan. *The Working-Class Experience: The Rise and Reconstitution of Canadian Labour, 1800-1980.* Toronto: Butterworth & Co. Ltd., 1983.
- Panitch, Leo and Donald Swartz. "Towards Permanent Exceptionalism: Coercion and Consent in Canadian Industrial Relations." *Labour / Le Travail*, 13, (Spring 1984): 133-157.
- Parnaby, Andy. "'We'll Hang All Policemen from a Sour Apple Tree!': Class, Law, and the Politics of State Power in the Blubber Bay Strike of 1938-39." Unpublished MA Thesis. Simon Fraser University. July 1995.
- Parnaby, Andrew. "What's Law Got to Do with It? The IWA and the Politics of State Power in British Columbia, 1935-1939." *Labour/ Le Travail*, 44 (Fall 1999): 9-45.
- Parr, Joy. "Gender History and Historical Practice," *The Canadian Historical Review*, 76, 3 (September 1995): 354-376.
- Patterson, Patrick B. "Attributions of Danger and Response to Risk Among Logging Contractors in British Columbia's Southern Interior: Implications for Accident Prevention in the Forest Industry" in Donald C. Wood, editor, *The Economics of Health and Wellness: Anthropological Perspectives*. (Bingley, UK: Emerald, 2007): 103-127.
- Patterson, Patrick Brooke. "Safety on a Shrinking Margin: Manual Fallers, Uncertainty and Culture in the Southeastern BC Logging Industry." Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation. University of Calgary. April 2014.
- Penfold, Steven. "'Have You No Manhood in You?': Gender and Class in the Cape Breton Coal Towns, 1920-1926," *Acadiensis*, 23, 2 (Spring 1994), 21-44.
- Pierson, Ruth Roach. "Gender and the Unemployment Insurance Debates in Canada, 1934-1940." *Labour/Le Travail*, 25 (Spring 1990): 77-103.
- Porter, Glenn and Robert Cuff. Editors. *Enterprise and National Development: Essays in Canadian Business and Economic History*. Toronto: Hakkert, 1973.
- Prouty, Andrew Mason. *More Deadly Than War: Pacific Coast Logging, 1827-1981.* New York: Garland Publishing Inc, 1985.

- Pyke, Karen D. "Class-Based Masculinities: The Interdependence of Gender, Class, and Interpersonal Power." *Gender & Society*, 10, 5 (October 1996): 527-549.
- Quinlan, Michael, Claire Mayhew, and Phillip Brohle. "The Global Expansion of Precarious Employment, Work Disorganization, and Consequences for Occupational Health: Placing the Debate in a Comparative Historical Context." *International Jurnal of Health Services*, 31, 3 (2001): 507-536.
- Rabinowitz, Randy S. and Mark M. Hager. "Designing Health and Safety: Workplace Hazard Regulation in the United States and Canada." *Cornell International Law Journal*, 33, 2 (2000): 374-433.
- Radforth, Ian. *Bushworkers and Bosses: Logging in Northern Ontario, 1900-1980.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987.
- Rajala, Richard A. "Bill and the Boss: Labor Protest, Technological Change, and the Transformation of the West Coast Logging Camp, 1890-1930." *Journal of Forest History*, 33, 4 (October 1989): 168-179.
- Rajala, Richard. *Clearcutting the Pacific Rain Forest: Production, Science, and Regulation.* Vancouver: UBC Press, 1998.
- Rajala, Richard A. "The Forest as Factory: Technological Change and Worker Control in the West Coast Logging Industry, 1880-1930." *Labour/Le Travail*, 32 (Fall 1993): 73-104.
- Rajala, Richard. *The Legacy & the Challenge: a Century of the Forest Industry at Cowichan Lake*. Victoria: Lake Cowichan Heritage Advisory Committee, 1993.
- Roach, Thomas R. "Stewards of the People's Wealth: The Founding of British Columbia's Forest Branch," *Journal of Forest History*, 28, 1 (Jan., 1984), 14-23.
- Rogers, D. Lawrence. *Paul Bunyan: How a Terrible Timber Feller Became a Legend*. Bay City: Historical Press, 1993.
- Roy, Patricia. A White Man's Province: British Columbia Politicians and Chinese and Japanese Immigrants, 1858-1914. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1989.
- Roy, Patricia *The Oriental Question: Consolidating a White Man's Province*. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003.
- Rutherdale, Robert. "Fatherhood and the Social Construction of Memory: Breadwinning and Male Parenting on a Job Frontier, 1945-1966." In *Gender and History in Canada*, edited by Joy Parr and Mark Rosenfeld, 357-376. Toronto: Copp Clark Ltd, 1996. 36

- Sager, Eric W. "Women in the Industrial Labour Force: Evidence for British Columbia, 1921-53." *BC Studies*, 149 (Spring 2006): 39-62.
- Sarathy, Brinda and Vanessa Casanova. "Guest Workers or Unauthorized Immigrants?: The Case of Forest Workers in the United States." *Policy Sciences*, 41, 2 (June 2008): 95-114.
- Scott, Joan W. "Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis." American Historical Review, 91:5 (1986), 1053-1075.
- Strikwerda, Eric. "Married Men Should, I Feel, Be Treated Differently': Work, Relief, and Unemployed Men on the Urban Canadian Prairie, 1929-32." *Left History* 12, 1 (Spring/Summer 2007): 30-51.
- Taylor, Jeffrey. "The Struggle for Rights at Work: The United Electrical Workers, Contract Enforcement, and the Limits of Grievance Arbitration at Canadian General Electric and Westinghouse Canada, 1940s to 1960s." Unpublished Paper presented to the Canadian Historical Association Annual Meeting, Saskatoon, 2007.
- Turtiainen, Jussi and Ari Väänänen. "Men of Steel? The Masculinity of Metal Industry Workers in Finland after World War II," *Journal of Social History*, 46, 2 (2012): 449-472.
- Tillotson, Shirley. "The Family as Tax Dodge: Partnership, Individuality, and Gender in the Personal Income Tax Act, 1944 to 1970." *The Canadian Historical Review*, 90, 3 (September 2009): 391-425.
- The Feminist History Reader. Ed. Sue Morgan. Routledge, London: 2006.
- Tompa, Emile, Scott Trecithick and Chris McLeod. "Systematic Review of Prevention Incentives of Insurance and Regulatory Mechanisms for Occupational Health and Safety." Scandinavian Journal of Work, Environment & Health, 33, 2 (April 2007): 85-95.
- Tosh, John. "What Should Historians do with Masculinity?: Reflections on Nineteenth-Century Britain." *History Workshop Journal*, 38 (1994), 179-202.
- Traves, Tom. The State and Enterprise: Canadian Manufacturers and the Federal Government 1917-1931. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979
- Turtiainen, Jussi and Ari Väänänen. "Men of Steel? The Masculinity of Metal Industry Workers in Finland after World War II." *Journal of Social History*. 46, 2 (Winter, 2012): 449-472.
- Valverde, Mariana "Poststructuralist Gender Historians: Are We Those Names?" Labour/Le Travail 25 (Spring, 1990): 227-236.

- Vecchio-Sadus, Angelica M. and Steven Griffiths. "Marketing Strategies for Enhancing Safety Culture." *Safety Science*, 42 (2004): 601-619.
- Verzuh, Ron. "The Smelter Poets: The Inspiring Role of Worker Poetry in a BC Labour Newspaper during the 'Age of the CIO."" *BC Studies*, 177 (Spring 2013): 85-126.
- Vindokumar, M.N. and M. Bhasi. "Safety Management Practices and Safety Behaviour: Assessing the Mediating Role of Safety Knowledge and Motivation." *Accident Analysis and Prevention*, 42 (2010): 2082-2093.
- Warburton, Rene and David Coburn. Editors. Workers, Capital, and the State in British Columbia: Selected Papers. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1988.
- Ward, Peter. "Class and Race in the Social Structure of British Columbia, 1870-1939." BC Studies, 45 (Spring 1980): 17-35.
- Watchman, Gregory R. "Safe and Sound: The Case for Safety and Health Committees under OSHA and the NLRA." *Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy*, 4, 1, (Fall 1994): 65-125.
- Webber, Jeremy. "The Malaise of Compulsory Conciliation: Strike Prevention in Canada during World War II." *Labour/Le Travail*, 15 (Spring 1958): 57-88.
- Weil, David "Are Mandated Health and Safety Committees Substitutes for or Supplements to Labor Unions?" *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, 52, 3 (April 1999): 339-360.
- Wells, Don. "The Impact of the Postwar Compromise on Canadian Unionism: The formation of an Autoworker Local in the 1950s." *Labour / Le Travail* 36 (Fall 1995): 142-173.
- White, Neil. "Global Industrial Enclaves: Company Towns and Export-Processing Zones Compared, 1900-2000." In *Empires and Autonomy: Movements in the History of Globalization*, ed. Stephen M Streeter, John C Weaver, and William D Coleman, 117-37. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2009.
- White, Neil. *Company Towns: Corporate Order and Community*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012.
- Yeung, Karen. "Privatizing Competition Regulation." Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 18, 4 (winter 1998): 581-615.
- Zinn, Matthew D. "Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement: Cooperation, Capture, and Citizen Suits." *Stanford Environmental Law Journal*, 21, (January 2002): 81



Appendix A: Accident Statistics for Cowichan Valley Companies (Reith Trophy), 1954-1966

Table 1: Accident frequency was the number of accidents per million man hours worked. WFI MS-1333 B88, F26, Accident Prevention; Safety Awards and Prizes, Reith Trophy, 4 February 1969, "Safety Record Cowichan Lake Area Operations since Inauguration of Reith Trophy."



Table 2: WFI MS-1333 B88, F26, Accident Prevention; Safety Awards and Prizes, Reith Trophy, 4 February 1969, "Safety Record Cowichan Lake Area Operations since Inauguration of Reith Trophy."



Table 3: WFI MS-1333 B88, F26, Accident Prevention; Safety Awards and Prizes, Reith Trophy, 4 February 1969, "Safety Record Cowichan Lake Area Operations since Inauguration of Reith Trophy."

	Company Frequency			Company Frequency			Association	Company Frequency		
	Total Operation			Sawmills			Average	Logging		
Year	Hillcrest	WFI	BCFP	Hillcrest	WFI	BCFP	BCMLA	Hillcrest	WFI	BCFP
1954	33.14	25.8	26.37	11.6	9.75	15.6	19.87	81.37	69.17	44.36
1955	29.09	37.75	29.63	10.17	29.8	17.43	21.04	99.95	56.23	53.54
1956	32.4	32.46	17.35	11.64	27.97	17.01	19.56	101.02	38.14	18.22
1957	27.17	33.5	14.73	9.76	19.02	5.73	20.56	79.33	60.32	27.66
1958	29.02	15.64	13.59	11.65	6.07	8.38	15.82	107.04	66.97	25.48
1959	24.12	31.65	11.12	8.36	9.81	6.08	14.3	79.03	78.2	12.82
1960	20.6	14.92	11.21	15.75	5.68	2.7	14.8	42.32	36.26	27.96
1961	19.56	23.79	9.07	6.56	15.38	4.62	16.4	69.83	44.4	23.13
1962	13.94	30.76	16.62	10.69	16.83	13.13	17.4	25.56	61.25	24.87
1963	22.18	18.38	10.9	13.9	7.6	8.12	18.3	47.83	40.65	20.34
1964	30.47	17.01	15.86	21.77	7.05	10.84	17.1	57.12	41.04	32.6
1965	16.49	13.26	17.08	10.86	7.46	14.98	16.2	34.24	29.73	22.75
1966	25.77	18.51	19.94	15.11	11.78	18.29	23.36	62.64	43	24.07

Table 4: WFI MS-1333 B88, F26, Accident Prevention; Safety Awards and Prizes, Reith Trophy, 4 February 1969, "Safety Record Cowichan Lake Area Operations since Inauguration of Reith Trophy."

Year	Short-term disability claims accepted	Long-term disability claims accepted	Fatalities
1935	2,602	162	48
1936	3,448	146	45
1937	4,466	124	57
1938	3,608	195	51
1939	3,791	165	57
1940	5,009	179	76
1941	5,236	192	75
1942	4,680	214	57
1943	4,057	155	42
1944	4,674	165	45
1945	4,835	197	38
1946	5,704	193	56
1947	7,133	198	67
1948	6,543	232	70
1949	4,867	264	65
1950	5,280	277	60
1951	5,477	271	75
1952	4,742	265	70
1953	4,359	230	69
1954	4,178	201	67

Appendix B: WCB British Columbia Forestry Accident Statistics, 1943-1968

1955	4,744	239	66
1956	4,723	237	66
1957	3,681	216	56
1958	2,892	189	46
1959	3,322	187	67
1960	3,602	161	60
1961	3,110	204	51
1962	3,507	213	55
1963	3,946	191	45
1964	3,879	196	64
1965	3,519	224	49
1966	3,174	187	49
1967	2,571	201	43
1968	2,741	176	41
1969	3,397	208	39
1970	2,840	212	41
1971	2,750	202	52
1972	3,398	198	54
1973	4,709	128	59
1974	3,936	187	35
1975	3,094	246	28

Table 5: Statistics obtained through a Freedom of Information Request to WorkSafe BC July 2014
Appendix C: Workmen's Compensation Board Timeline

- 1924: BC Lumber Manufacturers Association appoints first safety director
- 1927: Worst year on record for forestry, 73 fatalities
- 1932: An incentive program created specifically for logging industry to try and get companies to take safety more seriously.
- 1932: 17 logging companies in BC sue the WCB over special assessment costs, they lose.
- 1940: "Lumber industry injuries account for nearly half of all accidents reported."
- 1941-42: First Sloan Commission -- Workmen's Compensation Board (WCB) appeals to employers to focus on safety to help war effort.
- 1944: WCB rules that safety committees must be equal numbers company and union representatives
- 1946: "Collections from workers for medical aid fund are discontinued on April 12.Employers now pay for total cost of compensation and medical aid."
- 1950-52: Second Sloan Commission
- 1953: "The [International Woodworkers of America] appoints John T. Atkinson as safety director, the first full-time union safety director in Western Canada."
- 1954: "Penalty for infraction of safety regulations increased from \$50 to \$300."
- 1956: "For the first time, the construction industry passes the lumber industry in number of injuries."

- 1959: "Penalty on employers whose negligence is responsible for accidents is increased from \$300 to \$10,000." "Penalty for infraction of safety regulations is increased from \$300 to \$500"
- 1961: "New logging safety regulations go into effect" need to elaborate from company sources WCB gives no details
- 1962-1965: Third Royal Commission
- 1964: "For the first time, 13,000 workers employed by members of the B.C. LumberManufacturers Association work the entire year without a fatal accident"
- 1968: "Despite a 3.8% decrease in the number of new injury claims processed over the previous year, compensation costs reach an all-time high as a result of increased benefits provided for injured workers and dependants of fatally injured workers"¹

¹ This timeline is based on a timeline formerly available on the WorkSafe BC website. Sections in quotes are verbatim from that timeline. Unfortunately, this timeline is no longer available through WorkSafe BC site.