THE HARVEST OF SECESSION: A STUDY OF THE DYNAMICS OF ETHNIC BOUNDARIES BETWEEN SOUTHERN AND NORTHERN SUDANESE CANADIANS
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BY

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TITLE: The harvest of secession: A study of the dynamics of ethnic boundaries between Southern and Northern Sudanese Canadians

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Abstract

This thesis examines how ethnic boundaries are constructed among, and understood by, different groups of first generation Sudanese-Canadians in Kitchener, Ontario. In particular, it seeks to examine how historical factors related to Sudanese history, contemporary events in Sudan and South Sudan, and conditions of exit from Sudan shaped boundary processes within the Sudanese diaspora in Kitchener. In this connection, this thesis examines the effect of secession/independence of South Sudan on the dynamics of this boundary and relationship between Southern and Northern Sudanese Canadians. Thus, the thesis aims to fill a gap in the literature. It also hopes to inspire further studies on Sudanese Canadians, who tend to be understudied in Canada. The research builds on the growing research tradition and theories of ethnic boundaries, identity, nationalism, and transnationalism. Qualitative approaches were used for collecting and analyzing data. Participant observation at community events, and thirty-seven semi-structured interviews were conducted with key informants in Kitchener, Ontario. The thesis emphasizes that ethnic boundaries, identities, and relations between Southern and Northern Sudanese Canadians are dynamic and ever changing, in the sense that they are sometimes undermined and broken down, and yet other times they are enforced and reinforced quite strictly.

It also finds that the concept of ‘Northern’ is no longer geographic, as my respondents have limited its meaning to the riverine/Arab people. This concept contrasts with the concept of ‘black’ which includes many Northern Sudanese sub-national groups, in the geographic sense, along with Southern Sudanese. This indicates that the boundaries among the Southerners and riverine people have become stronger than between these Southerners and other Northerner groups.

The thesis also shows that the relationships between Southern and Northern Sudanese Canadians’ have been significantly affected by the referendum and independence/secession of South Sudan insofar as the social gap between them has by and large become wider. Joint activities organized in collaboration between both groups before secession have since ceased. Also, the degree of general interaction between them has significantly decreased. They now tend to treat each other as strangers and avoid interaction. Even simple greetings are lacking and when interactions do happen, they are characterized by harshness, and the exchange of accusations. Moreover, instances of mutual support have also diminished. Invitations to, and attendance at private, and public events has noticeably decreased. Despite this increase in social distance at a community level some close friendships remain intact, especially among those who came to Canada from Egypt. Interestingly, Southern and Northern Sudanese continue to come together for attending death ceremonies and soccer games, and seating orders continue to be mixed at soccer games.
The dynamics of intergroup relations in Canada have mainly followed their relations in Sudan. This means that transnational ties in this case tend to be unidirectional. This implies that living in the Canadian context has had a minor and indirect effect on these groups’ relations.
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DEDICATION

To all Sudanese people in the two Sudans and diaspora, especially those who suffered from persecution, aggression, and oppression
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INTRODUCTION

This is a study of the relationship between Southern and Northern Sudanese Canadians, particularly after the secession of South Sudan from the Sudan in 2011. The study takes the development and transformations of ethnic identity and boundaries between these two groups in Kitchener, Ontario, as its main theme. The dissertation explores the interaction between histories of discrimination, the slave trade, Sudanese government policies, national and sub-national ethnic identities and consciousness, national and sub-national movements, displacement, living in third countries or otherwise in refugee camps, and living in the Canadian context. The thesis discusses the interplay of how these aspects shaped and transformed ethnic boundaries, identities, and relationship between sub-ethnic groups in the host society in Canada. In doing so, it aims to contribute to the debate about, and deeper understanding of the processes of ethnic boundary and identity transformations and the factors at work for such transformations to occur.

The study accounts for how political, social and economic conditions and transformations in Sudan, as well as armed conflict, provide a framework for the engagement and relationship of Southern- and Northern-Sudanese in the Sudan as well as in Canada. These political and economic transformations and conditions have played a significant role in shaping, if not drawing and redrawing, immigrant ethnic group boundaries, patterns of ethnic identification, and the emerging relationships between the two increasingly differentiated communities of Southern and Northern Sudanese Canadians. Important to this relationship is the engagement of both Southern and Northern Sudanese in the rebellion against the existing Sudan government presided
by El Bashir. Further, the research includes various patterns of Sudanese-Canadians’ diaspora engagement in the Sudan and Canada, especially organized Southern- and Northern-Sudanese community activities.

Moreover, the study explores and analyses the possible effect of newly emerging subnational movements on the existing boundaries, identities, and relationships between national ethnic groups in the homeland, and how this experience affects, and/or is affected by, immigrants’ subethnic groups’ boundaries, identification, and relationships in the Canadian diaspora. It goes beyond the unquestioned and taken-for-granted ideas about ethnic group boundaries and identities, as it questions the continuity and salience of ethnic or national identity in the host society. It is this dissertation’s ambition to contribute to the understanding of immigrants’ intra-ethnic group boundaries, identities, and relations, especially the relationship between Sudanese-Canadian groups, which are understudied in spite of their growing numbers in Canada (Mosaic Institute, 2009).

This study also aims to benefit policy makers by shedding light on areas like immigrant integration, community-based organizations, multiculturalism, and foreign policy and actions, especially in terms of development and humanitarian assistance rendered to various developing countries, in particular those countries living with severe lethal conflicts. Nevertheless, this study does not aim to generate a comprehensive theory of boundaries and identity; but rather its more limited ambition is to generate a framework for understanding the ever changing situational factors that transform Sudanese ethnic boundaries and identities.

Historically, the former Sudan (the present countries of Sudan and South Sudan) was the largest country in Africa; it occupied an area of one million square miles (2.5 million square
kilometers). It had borders with nine countries; the Republic of Chad and the Central African Republic to the West, Eritrea and Ethiopia to the East, Egypt and Libya to the North, and Kenya, Congo, and Uganda to the South. Before the split, Sudan had a population of about forty million in 2010 as estimated by the Central Bureau of Statistics of Sudan. This population was, and still is, very diverse, as the country has an estimated six hundred self-defined ethnic groups and tribes. In 2010, the vast majority of Sudanese were Muslims, around 70%, both Sufis and Sunnis; less than 10% were Christians, and the rest were Animists. The official language was Arabic which was used in the government offices, education, media, and business.

Historically, Sudan has been governed by different regimes that led the country through significant political, social, and economic transformations. These regimes are: the Turco-Egyptian colonization (1821-1885), the Mahdist national regime (1885-1898), Anglo-Egyptian colonization (1898-1956), and a number of post-colonial national regimes (1956-up to date). The latter have fluctuated between military dictatorship, totalitarian, and democratic.

The national post-colonial government reigns were, and still are, characterized by lethal conflicts, especially between Southern and Northern Sudan. Yet, under the present Islamic fundamentalist government of the Sudan, which took power on June 30, 1989 by way of a coup d’état under the leadership of Omer el Bashir, these lethal conflicts were extended to different parts of the country such as Darfur in the West, and Nuba Mountains in Kordofan, the Bija area in the East, and Southern Blue Nile. The conflict with Southern Sudan resulted in the secession of South Sudan after concluding a peace agreement, known as the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), between the government of the Sudan and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) in January 2005.
The severity of these conflicts fragmented the country and brought it to near total collapse. The violent conflicts, which have amounted to various de facto civil wars, along with the persecution of political opponents, have internally displaced large numbers of Sudanese people from conflicts areas. Moreover, immense numbers were driven out of the country and relocated in other countries, mainly neighboring ones, and lived (and continue to live) either in refugee camps or in the larger society.

Large numbers of displaced people were resettled from neighbouring countries to different Western countries, including Canada. Many other people migrated indirectly to Canada from other countries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Those people who ended up in Canada are from both Southern and Northern Sudan.

In spite of their differences, Sudanese in Canada tend to be considered by Canadian government departments, policy makers, and academics as one ethnicity. These Sudanese established their different community-based, political, and religious organizations in various Canadian cities. Despite this homogenized view of the majority of the Canadian society about the Sudanese in Canada, some of the organizations of Sudanese Canadians are ethnic, in the sense that they are based on sub-ethnic, tribal, and/or regional belonging in the Sudan. Also, some organizations, especially political ones, are affiliated to, and keep active relations with, their mother organizations in the Sudan.

As far as the theories are concerned, many social scientists agree that racial and ethnic identities and boundaries are socially constructed. That is to say, rather than conceiving ethnicity and race as ascribed and immutable characteristics that individuals are born with, many social scientists conceive of race and ethnicity as ‘achieved’ characteristics in the sense that individuals
and groups, in the course of their socialization and social interactions, attach meanings to themselves and others, and to their relationships with each other (Pryor et al, 1992; Isajiw, 1974, 1993; Weber, 1978). These meanings, which in part, revolve around representations and understandings of both ‘the self’ and ‘the other’ have led social scientists to consider the question of how group boundaries are created, maintained, and negotiated (Alba and Nee, 2003; Barth, 1969; Miles and Brown, 2003; Wimmer, 2008). As a result, issues of who belongs to an ethnic or racial group, who is an outsider, and how groups maintain boundaries among themselves and others constitute an important and influential strand in the analysis of race and ethnic relations (Floya, 1992; Isajiw, 1993, 1999; Wimmer, 2008).

Some social scientists continue to adopt a primordial approach to ethnic identity (Eller and Coughlan, 1993; Geertz, 1973; Nagata, 1981; Shils, 1957), which considers identity as essential and fixed. In resonance with Fenton (2010), Rex (1996), and Scott (1990), this research appreciates the role of both primordialism as well as constructionism in ethnic identity. The former helps understand the stability and continuity of ethnic identities, whereas the latter answers for the changes that happen to these identities over time.

By the same token, it is clear that boundaries among ethnic groups and the wider meanings that individuals and groups attach to race and ethnicity are not static (Barth, 1969; Wimmer, 2007, 2008, 2013). A rich tradition of research points to the importance of life cycle, generational differences, gender, class, and institutional completeness in shaping ethnic attachments, understandings of the ethnic and racial self and others, and maintaining group boundaries (Barth, 1996; Floya, 1992; Isajiw, 1993; Lamont and Molnar, 2002; Li, 1990; Sorensen, 1990). Concurrently, ethnic attachments, and the nature of group boundaries, may also shift as a result of wider political and economic changes which exert pressure on the macro or
structural variables related to the formation and reproduction of nation states. These macro factors can play a key role in creating new, or breaking down old, ethnic identities and boundaries. As the case of the former Yugoslavia highlights, national identities can be reformed or transformed in the course of wider nation building projects. Nevertheless, under certain circumstances these new identities and boundaries can also be fragile, easily break down, and may lead to the reaffirmation of old identities and boundaries (Anderson, 2006; Satzewich, 2010).

As for the Sudan, the conflict, antagonistic ethnic relations, and the strengthening and sharpening of ethnic boundaries is presented, especially in the West, in terms of inherent conflicts based on ethnicity and/or religion. Example of this are the boundaries between Arabs versus Africans or non-Arabs, indigenous/natives versus immigrants/settlers, and Muslims versus Christians which coincides with distinctions between Northerners versus Southerners (Beny, 2015; Coghlan, 2005; Deng, 1995, 2015; Mukhtar, 2015; Okeny, 2015; Salih, 2015). Other scholars believe these conflicts arise as a result of various ethnic struggles, especially between sedentary farmers and pastoralists, for accessing scarce resources, especially in times of famine and drought (de Waal, 2005; O’Fahey, 2015; Moro, 2015). Still others argue that the history of colonialism and the slave trade is the main factor behind these conflicts (Idris, 2005, 2015).

Although all are to some extent valid, these theses are partial in the sense that they do not tell the whole story of the contested ethnic identities and boundaries in the Sudan, particularly the trajectories of their formation, development, and change.
Also, these arguments do not present the root causes of these antagonistic relations among various Sudanese ethnic groups. The reality in the Sudan shows that in spite of ethnic diversity, the history of the slave trade and colonization, and times when resources were scarce, ethnic group did live together in harmony for long periods of time. When conflicts occurred, effective traditional mechanisms were used to keep them limited and resolvable. In Darfur, the conflict is between different Muslim groups, making it implausible to explain it on the basis of religious or regional differences. It is also hard to explain that particular conflict in terms of ethnicity per se. The same is applicable to Southern Sudan.

On this basis, it is proposed that the primordial approach to ethnicity as fixed and immutable cannot fully explain the conflicts in many African countries, including the Sudan. The problems in these situations do not stem solely from ethnic or religious differences, but rather ethnicity is projected on these situations by the powerful ruling elites who try to use ethnicity to serve their interests. Many of these conflicts, antagonisms, and strong ethnic boundaries are attributable to problems of governance in the framework of the post-colonial Sudanese state- and nation-building projects. In their endeavor to keep and enhance their power, the ruling elites use the apparatus of the state to gear all the history of ethnic differences, racialization, religious differences, and enslavement in the pre-colonial and colonial reigns to serve their interests as reflected in their policies. These post-colonial governments’ policies followed the colonial policies, especially the British ones. This was particularly true in dealing with ethnic, religious, and cultural differences which took regional dimensions thanks to the policies of these powerful ruling elites.

This thesis tends to argue that the main factor that shapes ethnic boundaries, ethnic identities, and ethnic relations, and which cause antagonism, animosity, and protracted lethal
conflict in the Sudan, is the politicization of ethnicity/tribe by both colonial and post-colonial governments. Their policies, especially in the spheres of economic development and education, have helped to undermine the human, intellectual, economic, and social capital of powerless groups. This has resulted in the exclusion and deprivation of these powerless groups from opportunities to socio-economic advancement. These governments’ policies have relied on, and were supported by, such other factors as the migration of various groups to the Sudan, especially Arabs; the history of slave trade; and the formation of the tribes which occurred under the mediaeval dynasties such as the Funj dynasty.

This history of pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial Sudan has resulted in structures of ethno-regional and religious hierarchies, marginalization, discrimination, and exclusion. This history of differentiation, which still continues, has burdened and shaped the relationships between Sudanese people who migrated to Canada.

Small numbers of Sudanese began migrating to Canada in the early 1970s. Most of these early Sudanese immigrants basically came to pursue higher education and tended to remain in Canada. The limited migration of Sudanese people continued in the 1980s. Large waves of Sudanese immigration to Canada started in the early 1990s immediately after the coup d’etat of the present Sudanese government in 1989. These waves continued to the present day, mainly in the form of refugees from both the Northern and Southern parts of Sudan. These Sudanese refugees/immigrants consist of victims of the civil wars as well as the opponents of the current government of Sudan who were persecuted in their country.

The relations among various Sudanese ethnic groups in Canada, especially between the Southerners and Northerners, are shaped by a variety of factors. First, these relations are affected
by the long history of ethnic relations in the Sudan, especially after the referendum and the independence of South Sudan. Second, the experiences of the Sudanese in their transition to Canada, particularly in Egypt and refugee camps were contributing factors to Sudanese ethnic relations, especially the relationship between Southern and Northern Sudanese. Third, the context of Canada, the country of settlement, also contribute to shaping Sudanese-Canadian ethnic relations. Unlike some other Western countries, Canada is committed to multiculturalism as an official policy. Based on this policy, immigrants, refugees and members of ethnic communities have opportunities to remain involved in their homeland related issues. For example, multicultural policy has facilitated Ukrainian-Canadian involvement in democratization and electoral monitoring in Ukraine. Fourth, in an age of globalization Sudanese Canadians, like other populations, are more mobile, have access to information about, contact with, and opportunities to travel to Sudan. It is therefore reasonable to think that Southerners’ and Northerners’ ethnic identities, boundaries, and relations are formed and sustained by both historical and present factors in the Sudan and in the Canadian context. The Canadian context may have interactive effects with other factors, including the historical Sudanese ones. Like other immigrants, Sudanese Canadian interactions with ancestral homelands on a daily basis play an important role in shaping the formation of ethnic communities as well as their relationships and identification.

Although the majority of Sudanese Canadians, both from the South and North of Sudan, are opponents of the current government of Sudan, their relationship has undergone significant changes in the run-up to South Sudan’s independence referendum, and in the aftermath of the declaration of independence. These changes have occurred at the individual, collective,
organizational, and institutional levels within what was, before the independence of South Sudan, a relatively unified and undifferentiated Sudanese-Canadian community.

This Sudanese Canadians’ experience is not unique. The literature on various diaspora communities, such as Tamils, Serbs, Croats and Eritreans shows that subnational movements for independence or autonomy in ancestral homelands, and ensuing conflicts between majorities and minorities often have profound reverberations among members of ethnic communities who have settled abroad. These conflicts, which in many cases induce emigration to various Western countries, are also sustained or dampened by those who have moved out of their homeland.

For the abovementioned reasons, the relations between Southern and Northern Sudanese Canadians are characterized by continuous change. In spite of the long history of differentiation in the Sudan, during the early years of settlement in Canada, the Sudanese dealt with themselves as one group. This is evident in efforts to form umbrella Sudanese community-based organizations. Even in the cases when they failed to form such organizations, at least they repeatedly tried. With the passage of time during the transitional period after the conclusion of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Southerners and Northerners’ efforts to form umbrella organizations for all Sudanese have noticeably diminished. In some cities the Southerners have quit the Sudanese community-based umbrella organizations and formed their own Southern Sudanese organizations.

In the city of Kitchener, eventually the efforts of forming an all-Sudanese encompassing organization ceased after the secession of South Sudan. The relations between Southern and Northern Sudanese have worsened. This also happened to the relationship between the Dinka and Nuer, the two largest ethnic groups in South Sudan. Their relationship in Canada is now
characterized by antagonism and animosity following the eruption of the conflict in South Sudan in 2013. Immediately after it occurred in South Sudan, animosity between Dinka and Nuer increased in various Canadian cities, including Kitchener.

By the same token, after the eruption of the violent conflict in Darfur in 2003, a majority of Darfur people quit the all-Sudanese community-based organizations and formed their own organizations. With the start of the conflict in Nuba Mountains in 2011, Nuba Mountain people formed their own organization after abandoning their membership in more broadly-based umbrella organizations. This means that the ethnic boundaries and relations among Sudanese Canadian groups tend to follow the mother group boundaries and relations as they change in the Sudan.

**SUDANESE-CANADIANS UNDERSTUDIED**

There is some recent slim body of research conducted on Sudanese-Canadians (Abusharaf, 1997, 1998, 2002; Lovink, 2010; Association of Sudanese women in research, 2004; Baird, 2013; Este and Tachble, 2009; Este and Simich, 2008; Fanjoy, 2013, 2015; Gelein, 2008; Hayward et al, 2009; Higginbottom et al, 2013; Hittel, 2007; Johnson and Stoll 2013; Madibbo, 2015; Makwarimba et al, 2013; Mosaic Institute, 2009; Nakutnyy, 2013; Nolan, 2008; Simich et al, 2007, 2010; Stewart et al, 2011). Some studies are exploratory (Abusharaf, 1997, 2002; Mosaic Institute, 2009). The first inclusive study was conducted by Abusharaf (2002), which provides an account of Sudanese immigration to the United States and Canada between the 1900s and the late 1990s. It also focuses on the changing identity of the Sudanese, barriers of
integration, adaptation strategies, as well as the status of women and marital relations among Sudanese in North America. In a previous study, Abusharaf (1997) examines the social and economic characteristics of Sudanese migrants to North America, including Canada. Abusharaf maintains that, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the reason for Sudanese people’s migration to North America, which was temporary and in small numbers, was mainly to obtain higher education. From the early 1990s on, Abusharaf (1997) maintains, Sudanese migration to North America was motivated by political unrest, economic crises, and lack of choices in the Sudan. That is why these two waves of migration are different from each other in terms of their socio-economic characteristics.

The most recent exploratory study devoted to the Sudanese in Canada was conducted by Mosaic Institute (2009). It examines many aspects of the Sudanese-Canadian population, including their distribution among Canadian cities, their integration in mainstream society, and their community-based and political organizations. The Mosaic Institute (2009) study also identifies various social and economic barriers that Sudanese immigrants encounter in Canada, and concludes that these barriers constrain Sudanese immigrants’ opportunities for upward mobility. The same issue was studied by the Association of Sudanese Women (2004), focusing on Southern Ontario. This study discusses Sudanese newcomers’ settlement needs and expectations, barriers to integration, and wellbeing. The study concludes that the basic settlement needs of Sudanese newcomers, such as finding shelter and employment, are not properly met by service providing organizations. The report finds that these newcomers tend to seek help from their families, friends, and/or other community members. The study also concludes that some newcomers take more time than others to adapt to the new life in Canada. This delay is thought to lead to stress, which exerts negative effect on health and well-being.
Other studies focus on particular issues of integration and settlement of the Sudanese refugees and immigrants in Canada in different ways and from different perspectives (Association of Sudanese women in research, 2004; Este and Simich 2008; Este and Tachble, 2009; Hayward, 2009; Hittel, 2007; Simich et al 2010; Mosaic Institute, 2009; Nolan 2008). Some studies handled partial issues of the Sudanese immigrants’ wellbeing and integration to the Canadian society. For example, both Simich et al (2010) and Hayward et al (2009) looked at the mental health of Sudanese women in Canada. The latter took the city of Hamilton as its site for collecting data, whereas the former used urban centers across the country as sites for studying the challenges and barriers for these women to health care services. Simich et al (2010) identify women’s traditional believes, and the control imposed on them by their husbands, as the main barriers they face in accessing health care services.

Hayward et al (2009) concludes that Sudanese refugee women are subjected to both pre-settlement and post-settlement challenges that cause them various mental health problems. Since mental health problems are equated to ‘insanity’ in their culture, Sudanese refugee women often use culturally grounded healing practices and coping strategies. Based on these conclusions, this study made recommendations to various settlement service providers. They include the creation of culturally sensitive programs and using a pro-active approach to deal with refugee women’s problems. Moreover, they include using the elderly to help resolve some mental health problems, and providing cultural training for those who work in service providing organizations.

Although it is similar to Este et al. (2010) and Hayward et al.’s (2009) studies in terms of being gender specific, Nolan’s (2008) study of Sudanese refugee women in Canada differs because it examines whether English as a second language (ESL) needs are met. Nolan (2008) concludes that ESL teachers are not well trained and prepared to meet the unique needs of
illiterate people, like Sudanese, who have come from war-torn areas. This is consequential because the lack of language is a barrier to integration of Sudanese women. He recommends special training for ESL teachers as a means for resolving such problems.

In contrast to the above two studies, Este and Tachble, (2008) studied the experience of Sudanese men with parenthood in Alberta, and the challenges they face in working and taking care of their children at the same time. The study concludes that men are challenged by being unable to obtain a decent standard of living for themselves and their children. If they do find well-paying jobs, they will not find time to take care of their children. Conversely, if they stay home to take care of their children, they will not earn enough money to fulfill their needs.

The topic of children’s well-being was the subject of Este and Simich’s (2008) study which tackled the experience of the Sudanese communities with the child welfare system in Alberta. The study identifies the problems and tensions the Sudanese community in Calgary faces in dealing with child service workers. This tension mainly occurs because of the dissonance between Sudanese values of family relations, and child welfare agent values. This tension has led to many problems and often culminated in apprehension. The study recommends that child care agents be more sensitive toward immigrant cultures and hire Sudanese personnel to help provide child care services.

Like Nolan (2008), Hittel (2007) focuses on Sudanese immigrants’ experience with ESL. Unlike Nolan (2008) and Este and Simich (2008), who focus was on Sudanese women and on Sudanese children respectively, Hittel’s (2008) study was limited to the Sudanese youth. Hittel (2008) concludes that there are social, institutional, and cultural factors that constrain Sudanese youth achievement in Calgary schools compared to mainstream students. For this reason, he calls
on the city of Calgary to enhance trans-cultural skills, trans-cultural communication, and to create trans-cultural network in schools.

Others studies have compared Sudanese-Canadians with other immigrant groups (Este and Tachble, 2009; Makwarimba et al, 2013; Stewart et al, 2011). Following their study of the experience of men with fatherhood in Calgary (2008), Este and Tachble (2009) studied the experience of Russian and Sudanese refugee men as fathers in Calgary. The study gives insight into the meaning and roles of fatherhood, father interactions with children, child-related decision-making, and the challenges fathers face in Canadian society, especially the lack of time spent with children.

A study conducted by Makwarimba et al. (2013), focused on Sudanese and Somali refugees, and identifies various refugee needs and preferences, the availability of resources and programs, as well as barriers to obtaining support. The study concludes that refugees prefer to get support from their same gender co-ethnics. Sudanese and Somali refugees were also the focus of Stewart et al (2011) research on impacts of social support intervention. This study designed and tested culture-related intervention programs that tried to meet the needs of these refugee groups. This study concludes that intervention increases social integration and decreases loneliness. The study also encourages refugees to seek services and to deal with the challenges they encounter, because it is noted that refugees do not actively seek out services.

Some studies have been conducted on certain regions of Canada and/or on specific Sudanese regions or ethnic groups (Abusharaf, 1998; Lovink, 2010; Gelein, 2008; Fanjoy, 2013, 2015; Baird, 20013). All of these studies were conducted on South Sudanese Canadians, except for Baird’s (2013) study which focuses on Northern Sudanese-Canadians. For example, Gelein
(2008) studied the positive contributions of South Sudanese-Canadians to the social and economic development in Southern Sudan before independence. This happened, explains Gelein (2008), through remittances, which helped secure services such as education and health care for family members, relatives, and friends in Southern Sudan.

The sending of remittances was also studied by Johnson and Stoll (2013). Unlike Gelein (2008), this study focused on South Sudanese-Canadians and Vietnamese refugees in Canada. They found that in order to send remittance to their respective homelands, both Sudanese and Vietnamese refugees/immigrants worked hard, sometimes in more than one job, and consequently neglected their own self development. In turn, this constrained their integration into Canadian society. The study recommends that these immigrants give priority to their self-development, so that they first integrate and then focus on sending remittances.

Sending remittances is one dimension of transnational practices/ties with a homeland. The issue of South Sudanese transnational ties and their effects in various aspects of life was researched by Fanjoy (2013). The study, which was conducted in Canada and South Sudan, tackles issues such as identity formation, the challenges faced by community-based organizations, South Sudanese Canadian contributions to nation building, transnational marriages, and return migration. The study demonstrates that refugees/immigrants keep active ties with South Sudan and contribute to nation-building. In another study, Fanjoy (2015) studied a specific component of South Sudanese-Canadians transnational practices, namely the experience of those who returned to South Sudan after independence. These returnees were drawn by feelings of obligation to help build their new state. This study lends insight into the continuous negotiation of identity on the part of people who move back and forth between the host society and homeland. Homeland became, to great extent, different in the eyes of these
returnees, to the extent that some of them were not able to feel comfortable in their country of origin. Also, the study warns against using the binary of success/lack of success of return that oftentimes attaches to the ability/inability of these returnees to stay in their homeland or not.

The only study devoted for Sudanese religious affiliation in Canada was carried out by Lovink (2010). The study focuses on religious organizations, social capital, and adaptation patterns of the Christian South Sudanese-Canadians in Ottawa between 2005 and 2009. The study sheds lights on the importance of leadership in supporting South Sudanese Christians’ ability to accumulate social capital, which helps in the process of adaptation to Canadian society. It also points to the existence of family conflicts resulting from the difference between females and males in the degree of convergence to the Canadian values. This is, in turn, attributable to the difference between females and males in interpreting Holy Scriptures.

Only one study has been specifically devoted to studying Northern Sudanese-Canadians. Baird (2013) examined the effect of the region of origin in Sudan on political opinions and attitudes. The study demonstrates that there is a difference between those who belong to marginalized and non-marginalized region of Sudan in terms of their opinions and attitudes with regard to conflicts in Sudan. Those from Sudanese marginalized regions confirm the occurrence of genocide in Darfur, support armed struggle as a means of change, and approve of Western intervention to end violence. Those from non-marginalized regions tend to deny the existence of genocide, emphasize the role of peaceable uprising in changing the government, and oppose Western intervention.

This dissertation is the first study of the relationship among Sudanese-Canadians ethnic groups in Canada. Thus, it fills a gap in the literature on the Sudanese diaspora in Canada. The
thesis is divided into two broad parts. Part one is historical and contextual, part two is an in depth
analysis of the dynamics of community formation and boundary maintenance and transformation in
Kitchener. The empirical basis for part two is participant observation and semi-instructed interviews
with Northern- and Southern-Sudanese-Canadians key informants in Kitchener.

Chapter one provides the theoretical background for the study. It reviews the literature on
identity and ethnic boundaries, their processes, and the factors that lead to transformations in
ethnic boundaries and identities. The chapter also deals with the consequences of these
boundaries and identity processes on group relations in different settings. Chapter two examines
the political, social, economic, and cultural history of the Sudan from ancient time to the present
to provide a context for the understanding of contemporary boundary processes. Chapter three
describes the research methodology. Chapter four presents the results from semi-structured
interviews with those who lived in the refugee camps and in Egypt. It discusses the experience of
Southern and Northern Sudanese groups in their transition to life in Canada. The chapter
provides an understanding of how experiences in Egypt and in refugee camps affected ethnic
boundaries and identities as well as the relationship between groups. Chapter five uses the data
collected via semi-structured interviews with key informants in the city of Kitchener to present
the findings with regard to the relationship between Southern and Northern Sudanese Canadians.
This chapter also includes a discussion of the relations among sub-ethnic Southern groups with
each other and with Northern sub-ethnic groups and vice versa. The conclusion summarizes this
thesis’s contribution to knowledge, highlights some limitations to this research, and suggests
areas for future research.
CHAPTER ONE:

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Much of the recent political instability and conflict in Sudan and South Sudan is attributed to the ethnic diversity of the country and to ethnic group competition for power (Deng, 1995, 2015; Hagan and Rymond-Richmond, 2008; Johnson, 2003; Madibbo, 2010; Deng, L., 2005). Though it is tempting to attribute ethnic conflict to the deeply held primordial identities, thinking of ethnic identity and their related ethnic boundaries as fluid, and situationally and contextually determined is arguably a more useful way to understand patterns of ethnic relations.

This chapter is a critical review of the literature on how social scientists define the concept of ethnicity. In so doing, a distinction is made between definitions that emphasize subjective attachments versus objective characteristics as the defining feature of ethnic groups. It is argued that approaches that synthesize objective and subjective definitions are more useful than simply conceiving ethnicity as either subjectively defined or objectively given.

The bulk of the chapter focuses on the concept of ethnic boundaries and examines various processes and conditions that lead ethnic boundaries to shift and change in response to the changes that take place in historical, political and economic circumstances in which members of ethnic groups live. In particular, the issues of boundary formation, maintenance, and change, all crucial to understanding both inter-group and intra-group relations, are discussed. This is important because ethnic identities and boundaries are not just shaped by external circumstances, but also in turn exert effects on the context within which individuals and groups live.
These boundaries shape ethnic consciousness, solidarity, everyday attitudes and behavior, and relationships with other groups. Further, an account of various boundary properties as well as the strategies used by groups to maintain or, otherwise, resist, the existing boundaries is given.

Understanding the dynamics of maintenance and resistance provides an opportunity to understand the boundary changes that occur within existing power relations. Yet, understanding this dynamic, by itself, may not tell the whole story of ethnic boundary change. Processes of immigration, colonization and the maintenance of transnational ties also help shape boundary related processes.

ETHNICITY

Ethnic identity formation can be generally defined as a social process by which a group of individuals are connected to one another through a sense of peoplehood based on shared culture, ancestry, history, and/or race (Alba and Nee, 2003, P. 11; Isajiw, 1974, 1993; Wimmer, 2008a). From this definition, ethnicity can be thought of as an abstract concept that refers basically to the concepts of group and of identity (Isajiw, 1993). Individuals belong to an ethnic group and thus, identify with its other members based on certain social and historical aspects. Simply stated, an ethnic group is the collective expression of ethnicity, whereas ethnic identity is an individual experience of ethnicity (Isajiw, 1993).

On this basis, an ethnic group can be defined as a group of individuals who identify with each other on the basis of shared, actual or imaginary, ancestry and/or culture (Pryor et al, 1992; Isajiw, 1974, 1993; Weber, 1978). Beyond these generic definitions, this section examines subjective, objective and synthesized approaches to ethnic identity.
Some scholars use an objective approach that deals with ethnic groups as real social groups based on ‘categorical markers,’ (Wallman, 1986, P. 233) that can be observed regardless of how group members conceive and experience it. These markers include race, culture, language, religion, and/or geographic territories and any institutions and/or organizations that pertain to these markers. Other scholars use a subjective approach; this approach looks at ethnicity as a social-psychological phenomenon. Ethnic group members identify themselves as different from other groups based on their experience, feeling, and perception of themselves as ‘we’ or ‘us’ and other group members as ‘them’ or ‘other’ (Barth, 1969; Glazer and Moynihan, 1975, P. 34; Isajiw, 1975, P. 131; Pryor et al, 1992; Smith, 1986, P. 192-3; Waters, 1990; Weber, 1978, P. 389). These subjective dimensions of ethnicity determine group members’ attitudes that manifest themselves in dealing and communicating with in-group and out-group members (Isajiw, 1993; Jenkins, 2008, pp. 111-13). A synthesized approach to the definition of ethnicity is more useful than solely subjective and solely objective approaches because it is more realistic, in the sense that social reality reflects a combination of subjectivity, individual agency as well as objectively determined conditions that are often beyond an individual’s control.

Moreover, subjective and objective aspects of ethnicity are interrelated because the subjective aspects are, mostly, the reaction to objective ones which are, in turn, internalized by the individual’s subjectivity. As such, a synthetic approach does not overlook the role of ethnic group consciousness of their real or imagined shared ancestry, history, and pride in forming/transforming ethnic boundaries; at the same time it is not ahistorical. Put simply, this approach neither ignores the role of the circumstances and context nor the role of the individual agency in shaping ethnic identity and ethnic boundaries.
According to primordial perspectives, ethnic identity is based on objective, ascribed, and immutable shared traits such as history, kinship, race, territory, language, and religion (Eller and Coughlan, 1993; Fenton, 2010, p. 79-8i; Geertz, 1963, 1973; Isajiw, 1992; Nagata, 1981; Shils, 1957; Geertz and Pi-Sunyer quoted by Scott, 1990). This approach conceptualizes ethnicity as a priori to human interaction and thus, ethnic identity and attachment has little to do with the subjective attachments and individual and group interactions with others.

Although it gives an easy way for organizing the world, and arguably of predicting the inevitability of ethnic conflict, primordialism is criticized for dealing with ethnicity as fixed and static. It denies the role of both structure and agency in changing ethnicity and ethnic affiliation (Chai, 2005; Scott, 1990). As such, primordialism is unable to explain such phenomena as the appearance and disappearance of ethnic groups and even nations. They are also unable to account for such phenomena as immigration, colonization, and inter-ethnic marriage and their ramifications for ethnic identity formation, maintenance and change. Moreover, the primordial perspective is criticized for not being able to explain fluctuations in ethnic group solidarity in different circumstances (Chai, 2005; Scott, 1990).

Conversely, according to subjective, namely instrumentalist or circumstantialist approaches to ethnic identity, the sense of connectedness, belonging, and commonality are created, manipulated, and used by elites, especially political ones, for serving their interests through mobilization of masses (Brass, 1993, p. 111; Gurr and Harff, 1994, p. 79).

Contrary to primordialism, constructivist theories maintain that: ‘Ethnic identity is not something people ‘possess’ but something they ‘construct’ in specific social and historical contexts to further their own interests. It is therefore fluid and subjective.’ (Isajiw, 1992). That is
to say ethnic identity is neither ascribed nor fixed, but rather it is achieved (Fenton, 2010, P. 80-1; Rodulph, 2006, P. 5; Scott, 1990).

However, some scholars differentiate between circumstantial, situational, and instrumental approaches in terms of how and why individuals and groups are attached to ethnic identities. Circumstantial perspectives maintain that ‘… ethnic identity is important in some contexts but not others; identity is constant but circumstances determine whether it matters’ (Fenton, 2010, p. 82; Scott, 1990). Situational perspectives maintain that ‘… identity deployed or made relevant changes according to the social situation of the individual; the situation changes, the relevant identity changes’ (Fenton, 2010, p. 82; Scott, 1990). For example, an individual may choose to be recognized as a member of one group or another when it is advantageous to her in certain situations (Isajiw, 1993). Instrumentalist approaches maintain that the deployment of an identity can be seen to serve a material or political end and is calculated thus’ (Fenton, 2010, p. 82; Scott, 1990).

In spite of their differences, these perspectives share common ground; they conceive of ethnic identity as changing in relation to the shifting social, economic, and political structures, circumstances, opportunities, and situations (Fenton, 2010, P. 82; Rodulph, 2006, P. 5; Scott, 1990). These perspectives maintain that in addition to groups, individuals also have agency in effecting these shifts and changes (Banton, 1983, P. 109-10; Banton, 2000; Bonacich, 1972; Fenton 2010, P. 82; Hechter, 1971, 1978; Nagel and Olzak, 1982).

Nevertheless, instrumental and constructivist approaches are not devoid of criticism; the instrumental and circumstantial perspectives are criticized for not being able to account for the role of such factors as history, ancestry, race, culture, and emotions (Chai, 2005; Scott, 1990).
Also, these perspectives are criticized for not being able to account for the stability of identities, if relative, in different times and places in the world (Scott, 1990). Moreover, they do not account for why some people may not be able to choose a beneficial identity even if they want this (Scott, 1990). Further, they do not account for such phenomena as altruism and altruistic suicide; why people sacrifice themselves and die for their ethnicity, country, or religion.

In order to address the limitations of both primordial and constructivist approaches, a number of researchers have proposed a synthesis that focuses on ethnicity and ethnic identity as being composed of a combination of objectively given traits and subjective attachments to those traits (Herberg, 1989, P.3-4; Lieberson, 1991, P. 445; Scott, 1990; Woon, 1985). This synthesis, as Woon (1985) and Scott (1990) argue, helps to make better sense of ethnic group identities, and related processes of boundary maintenance and change. In a synthesized approach, ethnic groups are defined as the groups whose members, or their descendants, identify and/or are identified by others, as sharing, either entirely or partially, the same objective characteristics such as race, nationality, and/or culture which may also include such elements as religion, language, artifacts, folklore, music, and dance (Bissoondath, 2002, P. 91; Isajiw 1974; Scott, 1990). This ‘mixed’ approach seems to be more realistic as it is more comprehensive than the other two approaches by themselves. It considers the individual’s experience, feelings, and perceptions. At the same time it does not overlook the role of the group, because the group is not simply the total of the individuals and subgroups that constitute it, but also the relations among its individual members as well as sub-group members as part of the larger group.

Also, the synthesis of subjective and objective approaches does not overlook the objective categorical markers that exert effects on, and at the same time are independent of, the subjectivity of the group’s members. This synthesis includes self-identification of the group’s
members which depends on the social-psychological aspects of feeling and perception and, at the same time, it includes one’s identification by others based on the objective markers. In a nutshell, this synthesis addresses the shortcomings of both perspectives.

For example, in order to account for ethnic group solidarity, Scott (1990) concludes, the group solidarity changes with political, economic, social, and religious opposition, threats, and/or challenges encountered by the group. In such cases, aspects of primordialism – such as history, language, morals, and territory - may intervene to determine, Scott argues, the degree of ethnic group solidarity if these factors are meaningful to group members. This synthesis may explain, Scott emphasizes, the trajectories of ethnic relations, including ethnic movements, ethnic conflict, and even ethno-nationalism (Scott, 1990). Therefore, in Scott’s view, ethnic identity, and its manifestations, shifts and/or transformations may become more obvious in the times of drastic change, such as revolutions, civil wars, social movements, and acute conflicts (Scott, 1990), especially in the developing countries where resources are more scarce.

This approach helps us go beyond the debates about objectivity, subjectivity, primordialism, circumstantialism, and instrumentalism in ethnic identity. It recognizes that structures and circumstances play a significant role in identity maintenance. At the same time it recognizes that objective markers of difference and primordial attachments are often crucial to mass, and resource based mobilization (Chai, 1996; Erikson, 2005). Primordial attachments enhance the feelings of peoplehood and identity consciousness, thus it becomes a factor in ethnic boundary and identity processes. For this role of primordial attachment to continue, individuals must be socialized to attach to an identity. This process of socialization often plays on complex emotional attachments to the primordial aspects of identity (Chai, 1996, 2005).
In this connection, and based on the aforementioned synthesis, Isajiw (1993) develops a typology of ethnic groups based on the group’s immigration status. Using status and the time of immigration, this typology identifies immigrants versus established, or young versus old ethnic groups. Also, using place of origin and culture Isajiw (1993) distinguishes between primary and secondary ethnic groups. Primary ethnic groups, according to Isajiw (1993), are the groups that live in the society from where they originated, whereas secondary ethnic groups live in societies other than where they originally came from. This classification, especially in developed Western countries, goes hand in hand with the classification of ethnic groups as minority and majority (Isajiw, 1993). In most cases, when they newly migrate to other countries, ethnic groups can be thought of as minority groups.

On the other hand, because of differences in migration patterns and power, one or more groups come to be defined as the majority, especially if majority/minority depends on power rather than the number of the group’s members. Further, incorporating Zielik’s (1975) typology, Isajiw (1993) distinguishes between nationality-community and folk-community ethnic groups. The former is based on culture, whereas the latter is based on kinship.

However, when they migrate to another country like Canada, ethnic group members come with their statuses, as sub-ethnic groups, of their country of origin. Therefore, we can continue looking at these sub-groups in the host society, if partially, in terms of the same typology given by Isajiw (1993). An ethnic group, such as the Sudanese in Canada, may carry with it its historical sub-ethnic divisions. These include, but are not necessarily limited to, primary and secondary ethnic groups who are exemplified by the native African and Arabs respectively; majority and minority, or by and large the riverine people and the rest of the Sudanese; and folk-community and nationality-community ethnic groups such as the tribal and
regional groups. Such sub-ethnic divisions may exert an effect on these immigrants’ groups and sub-groups’ relations in the host country given the context they live in.

THE IMPORTANCE OF BOUNDARIES

Barth (1969: 15), followed by Wallman (1978:105), maintains that the analysis of ethnic group identity and relations should focus on ethnic boundaries because, generally speaking, boundaries are important for understanding the differences that distinguish things one from another. Boundaries are used in defining, classifying, and/or stratifying different things (Alba and Nee, 2003, P. 60; Cerule, 1997) by referring to their physical, temporal, emotional, cognitive, and/or relational limits (Ashfurth et al, 2000). For example, boundaries distinguish geographic regions or countries, institutions, academic disciplines, classes, sexes, and racial and ethnic groups as they separate the ‘categories of mind’ (Barth, 2000, P. 17), or social-psychological categories (Isajiw, 1993).

The distinction between the dynamics of social versus other boundaries is that social boundaries, such as those pertaining to ethnic groups, cannot be thought of in isolation from the group and/or member’s agency and their ‘subjective belief’ about mutual descent (Weber, 1978, P. 389-90) and/or history. However, boundaries do not only separate things or entities, but they also connect and imply relationships among them in a simple or complex ways (Barth, 1969, P. 15, 38).
One of the benefits of the focus on ethnic boundaries, rather than ethnicity per se, is that it helps avoid the confusing definitions and typologies of ethnicity; for example how it is conflated with race (Chai, 2005; Molohon et al, 1979). Also, the concept of an ethnic boundary provides researchers with the opportunity to focus not only on groups, but also on the relations among the individuals and among subgroups. Moreover the notion of an ethnic boundary gives the chance to focus on individual’s agency as an effective factor in the dynamics of social relations (Wimmer, 2008a; Wimmer, 2013, P. 2).

Further, ethnic boundaries, being symbolic or objective (Horowitz, 1975; Lamont, 2001; Lamont and Molnar, 2002; Wallman, 1978), define ethnic groups (Barth, 1969, P. 15-7), as they use certain markers for denoting the ethnic group’s membership, and therefore it is not necessary to take such ethnic groups existence for granted. Rather the trajectory and processes of these ethnic groups formation, performance in the social space, relations with other groups, and disappearance can be precisely followed (Wimmer, 2013, P. 3).

**DEFINITION OF ETHNIC BOUNDARY**

Barth (1969) defines ethnic groups on the basis of ancestors as internalized by a group’s members and recognized by other groups’ members. This subjective identification, as per Barth (1969), is crucial for determining the difference between in-group and out-group relationships and interaction. This is why Barth tends to give priority to ethnic identity over other identities, statuses, and roles taken by the group members (Barth, 1969, P. 17). In other words, Barth deems ethnic group identity as a master identity. Ethnic groups, as Barth (1969, P 10) and Chai (2005)
suggest, are identified by ethnic boundaries, which are based upon such markers as race, language, religion, and/or region.

Also, these ethnic boundaries, more or less, shape the dynamics of ethnic groups’ relationships and how they interact with each other, especially in terms of inclusion and exclusion (Barth, 1969, P. 10, 32-4; Sanders, 2002) or, in other words, in-group and out-group relations. Barth (1969) defines an ethnic boundary as a ‘cognitive and social’ demarcation, based on certain socially agreed upon criteria. This cognitive and social demarcation separates a group’s members from others based on that group’s members’ belief (Barth, 1969, 38).

In support of Barth’s definition of boundaries, Alba and Nee define social boundary as criteria that distinguish one group from others; this distinction is reflected in the groups’ members’ perceptions and behavior toward the in-group and out-groups’ member (Alba and Nee, 2003, P. 59), that is to say it is cognitive and behavioral at the same time.

However, Chai (1996) defines ethnic boundaries as ‘… the ascriptive criteria that determine membership in particular groups organized for collective actions.’ Although it seems to be departing from the above definitions, Chai’s definition actually resonates with them, because collective actions are based on cognitive as well as behavioral aspects which imply ethnic consciousness and group solidarity (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000).

Barth’s theory of boundary is criticized for not taking power relations into consideration (Wimmer, 2013, p. 205). Another criticism is that his postulation that an ethnic boundary is a psychological and environmental phenomenon, Barth (1969, P. 15-7) undermines culture as a determining factor of ethnic boundary processes. Barth (1969, P. 15-7) maintains that although they may have the same culture, different ethnic groups may not be considered as one group.
Yet, various cultural components such as language, norms, values, and other artifacts can be selected by the group to distinguish it from other groups or not. In such cases, culture should be considered as an effective determinant, if partially, of groups’ boundaries, as it affects group members’ judging (Bourdieu, 1979, P. 245), and interacting with, each other and also with other groups’ members. This is plausible because ethnic groups usually value their small differences as distinguishing factors as Barth (2000, P. 30) emphasizes. Therefore, any aspects of culture such as accent and other cultural artifacts suffice for creating ethnic or sub-ethnic boundaries within the larger group’s boundary.

Ethnic groups may be distinguished through ‘popular culture boundaries’ (Gans, 1992, P. xiii), or ‘symbolic boundaries’ as termed by Lamont (2001). Popular culture, or symbolic, boundaries are defined as the cognitive demarcation lines of group membership usually based on selected cultural differences. These ‘symbolic boundaries’ according to Lamont (2001), are the necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for constituting objective ethnic boundaries. Yet, these symbolic boundaries may not incur social costs or create intergroup problems such as animosity, antagonism, and violence. However, even in the case when symbolic boundaries do not lead to objective ethnic ones, Wimmer (2008a; 2013, P. 87) suggests, culture and boundaries by and large reinforce each other on the individual as well as the group’s level. This mutual reinforcement happens through various processes of socialization and resocialization (Munniksma, 1981, P. 8), which enhances and perpetuates the emotions of solidarity, empathy, and loyalty to the group (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000; Isajiw, 1993). That is how socialization and resocialization contribute to determining ethnic boundaries from within the ethnic group which, in its turn, contributes to determining these ethnic boundaries from without. That is to say ethnic groups’ relationships determine, and are determined by, ethnic boundary which is
comprised of internal and external layers of boundaries. This implies that ethnicity can be looked at as a product of double boundary process (Isajiw, 1993), whereas such a phenomenon as race can be looked at as a product of external ethnic boundary as per Isajiw (1974, P. 122, 1993).

However, it is more plausible to look at race as determined by both external and internal ethnic boundaries in their interaction. It seems that racism, stereotyping, ethno-centrism, and most of the other types of discrimination are principally determined by external ethnic boundary because the discrimination comes from without as a pressure on the group.

Given the context, ethnic boundaries may coincide with other boundaries, for example religious, cultural, and lingual ones. In a multi-ethnic civic state, boundaries among regions, or ethno-regions, stand as internal divisions of the country, or sub-national boundaries. Yet, in an ethno-national state the ethnic boundary coincides with the national boundary that separates the country’s population from other countries populations.

The above definitions are put in a dynamic way, and in a metaphoric mode, by Y. Cohen (1969), quoted by Wallman (1986), who defines social boundary, including ethnic, as “a limit or demarcation between two sets of pressures, inward and outward” (P. 231). This states that any internal or external pressure on the inter-group boundary creates a dynamic that affects both groups internally and externally (Saifullah Khan quoted by Wallman, 1986, P. 231) and affects the boundary as well. This resonates with Wimmer (2008a) who maintains that the actors’ negotiations and struggle produce mutual understanding of the boundary meaning and location. This mutual understanding determines ethnic boundaries properties, as ethnic boundaries have both categorical and behavioral dimensions. In the sense they involve groups’ division, and/or classification, as well as everyday life exchange and relationships (Wimmer, 2008a, 2013: 9).
With this connection it is important to state that although it identifies other groups’ members as strangers who use different standards of judgement and evaluation (Barth, 1969, P. 15), an ethnic boundary should not be understood as a barrier to the groups’ interaction. Ethnic boundaries cannot be thought of as implying the absence of interaction; boundaries are inherently interdependent (Barth, 1969, P. 10; Barth, 2000, P. 28; Chai, 1996; Izikowitz, 1969, P. 137; Tilly, 2004).

Based on these different definitions, an ethnic boundary can be considered as the categorical cognitive and behavioral distinction among various ethnic groups based on certain selected, and/or activated criteria which are transmitted to subsequent generations. These comprise a mix of primordial and changing or contextual and circumstantial criteria. The primordial criteria explain group and boundary stability and continuity, whereas the contextual and circumstantial ones explain the dynamics of change that happens to the group and its boundary.

BOUNDARY PROPERTIES

Boundaries have properties stemming from their nature as well as the group circumstances, and that is why they cannot be thought of as fixed. These properties include visibility, clarity, durability, permeability, resilience, and strength. Although they can be thought of separately for analytical reasons, these properties usually interrelate and interact in complex ways. Through this complexity they affect the whole ethnic boundary systems (Cohen, Y., 1969; Wallman, 1986, P. 233). These properties are not only analytical, but also practical, in the sense
that they can be thought of as determinants of strategies – or boundary-related processes to borrow Alba and Nee’s (2003, P. 60) notion – used by different groups’ members for creating or making, maintaining, transforming, or unmaking boundaries as discussed below.

One property of an ethnic boundary is clarity or brightness. Clarity refers to the clear-cut distinction between two or more groups in terms of certain characteristic(s) that group members have consensus about or that are otherwise imposed on the group by powerful group(s) in a society (Wimmer, 2013, pp. 83-4, pp. 98-100). A bright boundary is one that leaves no ‘ambiguity about the group’s membership’ (Alba, 2005). For example, the color line, arguably, constitutes a clear and visible boundary between the Black and White people in the United States (Alba and Nee, 2003, p. 90-2; Charles, 2001, p. 271-2). A less clear boundary, for example, could be between the Irish and British people in the United States (Alba and Nee, 2003, p. 72, 88, 119).

The degree of ethnic boundary clarity and visibility is related to the strength of the boundary, in the sense that the more clear the boundary is, the more difficult it is to be moved, crossed or blurred. The strength of a boundary can be defined as the degree of the boundary resistance to shifting from its location (Wimmer, 2013, pp. 95-7). It reflects the degree to which an ethnic group can make its members retain their identification (Molohon et al, 1979) and, at the same time, exclude out-group individuals. This is sometimes referred to as group closure (Neuwirth 1969).

The strength of a boundary is maintained and enhanced by the existence of exclusionary meanings that are widely shared by group members. If they are deep rooted in the culture, these
meaning are expected to provide more value to the identification with an ethnic group which, in turn, loops back into the clarity of group boundaries with other ethnic groups.

Boundary strength can also be enhanced by the defense mechanisms that the group has for dealing with threats (Molohon et al, 1979). Such defense mechanisms could, arguably, lead to different consequences for different groups based on their status within the power relations in the society. The role of defense mechanisms is related to conflict as a factor of boundary strengthening (Barth, 2000, P. 33), especially if the conflict is not well managed or transformed. Such conflicts may lead to lack of trust, which also counts as a factor in strengthening ethnic boundaries.

Another boundary property is permeability. Boundary permeability depends on the degree of boundary strength and closure (Molohon et al, 1979) and can be defined as the possibility for individuals to move or cross from one group to another without causing the boundary to shift (Wallman, 1986, P. 231). This is possible when small numbers of individuals cross the boundary. In a developed western host country, an example is immigrants assimilating into the mainstream societies (Alba and Nee, 2003, P. 60; Alba, 2005). In a developing country, an example is small groups of sedentary Fur tribe members in the Sudan crossing the tribal/professional boundary to become Baggara, which means cattle herders (Haaland, 1969, P.65). Another example, in Pakistan, is the Southern Pathan who crossed the ethnic boundary and joined the Baluch (Barth, 1969, P.23).

In this connection, crossing the boundary may at least need some degree of partial acculturation, if not assimilation, in the part of the crossing group(s). Also, boundary crossing
needs acceptance, or at least no objection, from the group whose boundary is crossed, especially if this group is powerful.

Ethnic boundaries are not permanent (Jenkins, 1986, P. 175). The ‘making’ or formation, maintenance, transformation, and ‘unmaking’ of boundaries – or boundary change which consists of formation, transformation, activation, and suppression as per Tilly (2004) – mainly depend on the social structure, situations, and/or groups’ circumstances (Barth, 1969, P. 11-6; Erikson 1993: Lamont and Molnar, 2002; Wallman, 1986, P 232, 235; Wimmer, 2008a).

Ethnic boundary ‘making’ (Wimmer 2007, 2008a), or formation, happens by way of shifting old ethnic boundaries. As such, the concept of boundary making or creation needs to assume that some ethnic boundaries already exist and then other ethnic boundaries come about due to the developments and changes of the human groups’ social life. Therefore, what happens to these boundaries through time are mostly processes of formation, transformation, reorganization or replacement (Tilly, 2004) rather than creation or ‘making’ from scratch.

Incorporating Isajiw’s (1993) concepts of deconstruction and reconstruction are significantly beneficial to boundary transformation, reorganization and replacement. Deconstruction is the process whereby some aspects of identity and, arguably, some elements of a boundary, lose their meaning and use. For example, some ethnic traditions and/or values, especially for immigrants’ younger generations assimilated in a new society, become no longer relevant to their new reality. This is evident in immigrants’ younger generation differences in eating traditions. Deconstruction may also entail some elements losing their meaning without completely losing their use. An example is following traditions in ritualistic situations such as condolence or marriage ceremonies. Still other elements may retain their meaning although they
are not put in use such as abstaining from using certain national or sub-national costumes of a
group, but rarely, for practical reasons.

On the other hand, reconstruction refers to obtaining new aspects of identity with
new meanings that can be attached to old aspects of identity (Isajiw, 1993). This is evident in
replacing the host society language for one’s ethnic language, music, and costumes.

Wimmer (2013) maintains that boundary-making strategies depend on the distribution of
power, dominant social networks, and the existing institutions and their set up (P. 11-2, 32-8).
Various actors - such as governments and majority or minority ethnic groups’ leaders - may use a
variety of means for making, enhancing, maintaining, policing, and/or resisting ethnic
boundaries. These means include discourse, symbols, discrimination, political mobilization,
conversion, and violence (Smith, 1986, pp. 218-22; Wimmer, 2013, pp. 64-72). Through their
influence and effect on the institutions, networks, and power distribution, government policies
have significant effects on boundary processes (Barth, 2000, 32), especially developmental and
educational policy.

Boundary shifting is the change of the existing boundary location, so it can include some of
the excluded groups’ members or otherwise exclude some of the included ones. This may happen in
a variety of ways such as overcoming the existing criteria that determine the inclusion and exclusion
in the group (Wimmer, 2013, P. 29). For example, changing from matrilineal to patrilineal lineage as
a condition for inclusion in the group may lead to including some members, and at the same time
excluding others. Boundary shifting may also happen through the processes of expansion,
contraction, and/or inversion (Wimmer 2008b; 2013, P. 50). This shifting is mostly shaped by the
elites’ networks which influence the groups’ decisions with regard to whether to
include or exclude a group from within the boundary (Wimmer, 2013, P. 96). Yet, this exclusion/inclusion applies to groups rather than individuals whose crossing from a group to another does not mean the exclusion/inclusion of the whole group. Also, group members as individuals can choose whether to positively or negatively interact with inter- or intra-group members (Barth, 2000, P. 30; Baerveldt 2004).

Boundary expansion refers to increasing the number of people who are included in the group by what Wimmer (2008b; 2013) calls ‘fusion’. Fusion happens by bringing in more groups to the main group so they can constitute one larger group with a wider boundary. Expansion happens in such cases as state-building; this is especially noticeable in the cases of colonial empires conquest when they divided the Third World colonized countries among themselves. Expansion can also happen within the framework of the national state giving the opportunity for other ethnic groups to be incorporated, if not assimilated, in the mainstream. In Canada the policy of multiculturalism is arguably about promoting boundary expansion. An example from the Third World is the incorporation of the Fulani and Hausa ethnic groups of Nigeria into the Sudanese society. These ethnic groups used to cross the Sudan, walking or on their camels, on their way to pilgrimage in Mecca. Some preferred to settle in the Sudan for a variety of reasons such as work, the study of Islamic religion, or for marriage. Today, they are considered as one of the Sudanese tribes, regardless of their West African origins.

Here it is worth mentioning that the expansion of a boundary may not necessarily cancel the existing boundaries among the smaller or subgroups included in the larger one (Wimmer, 2008b; 2013, P. 50-2). Nevertheless, boundary expansion may sometimes cause sub-ethnic boundaries to blur and/or even become weaker. This process of ethnic boundary expansion may also lead to the formation of a larger majority. This majority is not always all-inclusive because
the excluded, or at least marginalized, minorities usually exist (Wimmer, 2008b; 2013, pp. 81-3; Williams, 1989).

In contrast to expansion, contraction is narrowing the boundary (Wimmer, 2013, P. 55) via excluding some small groups from the original group, so they can constitute smaller group(s) (Wimmer, 2008b). Contraction can happen through splitting, or fission (Wimmer, 2008b), of one group into two or more groups. Usually the exclusion happens to one or more sub-group(s) of the larger one. This happens either voluntarily or involuntarily. The case of the separation of Eretria from Ethiopia is an example of the latter; whereas the case of the independence of the former Soviet Union republics from Russia is an example of the former. The former Soviet Union republics case, I believe, represents an instance where boundary contraction is enforced, albeit peacefully, by the less powerful groups. The alternative case that needs to be distinguished from this one is when the boundary contraction is imposed by the dominant and powerful group to isolate the less powerful one(s) and thus maintain their privileges (Lamont and Molnar, 2002; Sasson-Levy, 2013). The starkest example of it is the apartheid system in South Africa.

BOUNDARY MAINTENANCE

The aforementioned boundary processes mainly occur in response to, and also affect, ethnic group relations in the course of their coexistence, interaction, cooperation, or otherwise competition for power. These include ethnic groups’ efforts for boundary maintenance, which is one of the main factors of ethnic groups’ continuity (Barth, 1969, P.14; Molohon et al, 1979). It is therefore plausible to conceive of boundary processes as a conflict or struggle between
boundary maintenance, resistance, and/or violations by actors with competing interests. These processes lead to boundary transformation by either altering the boundary or causing it to fully or partially break down which can mean the collapse of the state as exemplified by the experiences of the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia.

There are many strategies for boundary maintenance which can be thought of as efforts at screening, keeping, and constraining, if not preventing, group members from leaving. These boundary maintenance strategies target is to exclude other groups’ members from joining the group in question. Because they affect the boundaries with other ethnic groups, these maintenance strategies will affect, and are affected by, other groups’ boundary maintenance, resistance, or other strategies. It goes without saying that the extent and the direction of the effect depends on the power of the group relative to other groups. In some cases, the effect of these strategies may reach to the whole boundary system in the society, given the power of the group(s) that uses these strategies.

Each boundary maintenance strategy contains two elements; internal elements which are directed to the very group’s members, so they can be included, and external elements directed to the out-group members, so they can be excluded.

One boundary maintenance strategy involves highlighting and codifying selected differences such as cultural and lingual characteristics (Knutsson, 1969, P. 94; Wimmer, 2013, pp. 30-1). These selected differences are usually considered as stable and standardized, or primordialized, so that ethnic group members are stereotyped and thereby ethnic boundaries become the most relevant and important factor to the group’s members in their interaction with in-groups and out-groups’ members (Barth, 1969, P.19).
Ignoring different groups' similarities could be thought of as the complementary process of using selected differences for boundary maintenance. It follows, as argued by Alba (2005) and Harris (1985), that socialization plays a pivotal role in boundary maintenance. Socialization transmits the ethnic language, values, norms, and perceptions to the new generations. These can coincide with religious ideals which may constitute a sanctions system that could be used for boundary maintenance from within. For example, some groups use the degree of command of the ethnic language, or accent, or commitment to a certain religion or sect, as a determinant of the degree to which a person is accepted as a full-fledged member in the group or, otherwise, stigmatized and excluded from it (Eidheim, 1969, pp. 55-6).

Phenotypical characteristics, such as skin color or facial features are sometimes used as markers for imposing or enforcing boundaries with other groups. This may manifest itself in segregation based on race, or racism, and/or based on belonging to certain geographic territories (Barth, 1969; Sanders, 2002) as signified by phenotypical characteristics. The use of these markers can be effective as a boundary maintenance mechanism, especially when they are used by the powerful groups who may also use other markers for excluding others from joining their group. This is reminiscent of Cox’s interpretation of racism against Black-Americans, where he proposes that colour was used against Black Americans by the powerful white capitalists for dividing the working class and curbing its struggle against these capitalists (Cox, 1970, P. 320, 322, 485-7). Yet, this does not mean that racism is an epiphenomenon to class, but rather it indicates that there is always a possibility to select some differences, but not the others, and use them as markers for differentiating human groups one from another. In the absence of phenotypical differences, other differences can be selected and used. For example, the difference in subsistence activity, such as the difference between sedentary farmers and cattle herding
nomads in Darfur, has been used as a boundary determinant (Blom, 1969, P. 80; Haaland, 1969, P. 61).

The practice of boundary maintenance may invoke reactions, including resistance, on the part of the excluded group(s), especially if this exclusion causes harm or deprivation or limits their participation in society. This is particularly the case if there are some benefits to be gained from such inclusion and/or participation. In this connection, Barth (1969, P.33) puts forth some alternative ways in which groups can react. Some groups may try to incorporate into the society and accept the minority status. Alternatively they may call for adopting new aspects of identity such as establishing special political, social, economic, and educational institutions (Yatsko, 1997). Some of these institutions may promote nativism and further reinforcement of boundaries (Barth, 1969, P, 33).

Institutions and networks are by and large crucial to the boundary system. They determine whether ethnic boundaries matter or not. Institutions and networks also affect the group members’ consensus about various issues, including the ethnic boundaries and their location. Institutions exert an effect on the state of inequality which, in turn, shapes ethnic boundaries by affecting various dimensions such as political salience, social closure, cultural significance, and historical stability (Lamont, 2001; Wimmer, 2008a), as well as boundary strategies, especially those meant to resist boundary maintenance as shown below.

**BOUNDARY STRATEGIES**
In response to boundary maintenance, ethnic groups may use a variety of strategies to deal with existing ethnic boundaries and/or deal with their effects; these strategies vary by ethnic group, and the nature of their membership, circumstances and social context (Wimmer, 2008a).

One of these strategies is known as ‘transvaluation;’ it includes ‘normative inversion’ and ‘equalization.’ These strategies are used to ‘reinterpret or change the normative principles of stratified ethnic systems’ (Wimmer, 2008b, Wimmer, 2013, P. 77). They are used by those actors who are not satisfied with the existing boundary system in the society to challenge and change the principles of inclusion/exclusion. Unsatisfied groups may opt to change their social positions (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000) without changing the nature of the boundary by normative inversion (Wimmer, 2008b). This keeps the nature of the boundary as it is – such as horizontal boundary for example - and changes the actors’ group position in it. This change of actors’ position happens in such cases when a lower status group uses some selected criteria, if symbolic, to consider itself as the superior, and view dominant group as inferior on the basis of other selected criteria.

Viewing the other group(s) as inferior is reciprocated by these other group considered inferior (Wallman, 1978, p. 212). Yet, when it is adopted by a lower status group, this strategy should not be looked at as a trial for changing existing power relations, rather it can be considered as a symbolic reaction and an expression of contesting these power relations through trying to keep their boundary with the upper status dominant group. In spite of its symbolic nature, this strategy of normative inversion can be used as the basis and rationale for further practical steps of challenging and changing existing power relations. For example, it can be used for mobilizing group members against oppression, discrimination, and exclusion from access to
resources and opportunities. This strategy can be looked at as a step that entails taking other steps for making change in the boundary system and in the society at large.

Contrary to normative inversion, ‘equalization’ is a strategy used for challenging and changing the nature of the boundary (Wimmer, 2008b). For instance, such challenges might seek to shift boundaries from horizontal to vertical. This is exemplified by the civil rights movement and Black Americans’ efforts to challenge the horizontal ethnic boundary with other American citizens and obtain equal rights. Another example is Aboriginal people in Canada, United States, and Australia, as well as many minorities, and discriminated against, groups in developing countries. This suggests that, unlike the case of a horizontal one, a vertical boundary does not entail using equalization as a strategy for transformation, because vertical boundary is among or between, more or less, equal groups, whereas the horizontal boundary is between, or among, vertically stratified groups.

Another set of strategies for dealing with boundaries is ‘positional movement’ as termed by Wimmer (2008b; 2013, P. 58). Positional movement involves moving from one side of the boundary to another. This set of strategies includes boundary crossing and repositioning (Wimmer, 2008b). Boundary crossing involves the moving of individuals, or small groups, from one side of the boundary to another, whereas repositioning - or site transfer as called by Tilly (2004) - is the move of an entire ethnic group from one side of the boundary to the other (Wimmer 2008b; Wimmer, 2013, P. 59). The process of boundary crossing may happen via assimilation and/or reclassification. Assimilation enables individuals from a different ethnic group to join the main stream, for example European individuals who assimilated into the American society.
However, the repositioning of groups needs approval by the powerful group. This is what Alba and Nee call reclassification which means changing the status of a certain ethnic group by the mainstream, or the powerful group(s) in the society. For example, unlike in the past, Irish people in the United States are now considered, or reclassified, as ‘Whites’ (Alba and Nee, 2003, P. 62). Individuals cross their groups’ boundaries for different reasons; one of these is when an individual fails to fulfill the requirements of his/her identity. This failure incurs a high cost for him/her when simultaneously he/she has the chance to be accepted in another group where such a cost does not exist (Barth, 1969, P. 132). At other times individuals may cross boundaries in order to find more opportunities for social mobility. Both cases go well with the circumstantial proposition.

These strategies of repositioning and crossing the boundary, Wimmer (2008b) points out, reinforce and give legitimacy to the hierarchy as those who cross are usually from the lower groups in the hierarchy. However, it is not necessarily always true that those who cross the boundaries are from the lower status, because sometimes individuals may cross the vertical ethnic boundaries, not the horizontal ones. This means that they are more or less equal to the other group. Also, sometimes people cross the vertical boundary back and forth without necessarily being of lower or upper status. On the other hand, some group members may cross the horizontal ethnic boundary back and forth based on the situation and/or the benefit they get from such a crossing. For example, as they encounter the sometimes contradictory ethnic boundaries between their parents’ ethnic groups, mixed origin Mexican-Americans in California may cross these parents’ groups’ ethnic boundaries, mostly symbolic ones, back and forth (Jimenez, 2004).
In all cases, boundary crossing exerts effects on ethnic boundaries as well as ethnic groups. If it occurs in large numbers, boundary crossing in the extreme cases may cause group boundaries to erode (Wimmer 2008b) or, at best, shift (Wimmer, 2008a), in the sense that insiders may turn into outsiders, or made strangers, and vice versa. If this process of boundary crossing is allowed to happen without controlling incomers, it may release pressure on the boundary system, which comes at the expense of the group integrity. On the other hand, group integrity may be preserved if boundary crossing is controlled, yet this comes at the expense of the system amenability to change (Wallman, 1986, P.231). When it occurs in massive numbers, boundary crossing and repositioning can be thought of as a means of boundary expansion, as for example the aforementioned groups of Bathan who became Baluch in Pakistan (Barth, 1969, P. 23). Here it is important to note that boundary expansion of one group may, in some cases, mean contraction in the part of another group(s) or, in some other cases, it may mean the loss of the independent identity of the group as it amalgamates into, and becomes a sub-group of, the larger group with expanded boundary.

Boundary crossing seems to be possible for some individuals and small groups, whereas it is not possible for others. For example, visible groups, such as African-Americans, could not cross boundaries with Whites, whereas the Irish and Italians were able to do so and join the American mainstream (Alba and Nee, 2003, P. 62). An extreme case of controlled boundaries is the case of the caste system of India where people cannot cross from a social stratum to another (Barth, 1969, P. 27).

In some underdeveloped societies, especially in the informal economic sectors, repositioning and boundary crossing may occur by changing the nature of subsistence activity. In other words members of an occupationally defined ethnic group might cross an ethnic boundary
or reposition itself by moving into a different occupation (Barth, 1969, pp 25-6). As noted earlier, members of the Fur tribe in Sudan joined the Baggara tribe of cattle herders. These Fur tribe sub-groups had to adopt the nomad Baggara tribes’ value systems and life style for the boundary crossing to be completed. This is not the case in the formal economic sector; a change of profession on the part of some members of an ethnic group in the formal economy does not incur boundary crossing.

Here it is plausible to think that, in most of the cases, ethnic boundary crossing is a process that takes place gradually, probably across generations, for its completion. From this, one can infer that in transitional periods, such crossing groups may temporarily maintain sub-ethnic boundaries within both the new and old ethnic boundaries. These sub-ethnic boundaries are expected to keep becoming brighter and stronger with the old group until a time comes when the sub-group is excluded from the membership of the old group or, to use boundary-related terminology, until they completely cross out of this old groups’ ethnic boundary. Concurrently, the sub-ethnic boundary within the new group’s boundary is expected to keep on becoming weaker through time until it disappears depending on the permeability of the new ethnic group boundary. For example when the Fur groups joined the Baggara ethnic group they continued to be distinguished from other Baggara sub-groups by being considered as Fur, albeit they were also different from the other sedentary Fur sub-groups. They kept on this status until, with the passage of time and the coming of new generations, they lost their membership, as sub-groups who have sub-ethnic boundaries, with other Fur groups and, simultaneously, the distinction between them and other Baggara groups disappeared (Haaland, 1969, pp 68-71). These groups became part of the Baggara sub-groups or, put differently, they became included within the ethnic boundary of Baggara and excluded from the ethnic boundary of the Fur.
Another strategy used in dealing with an ethnic boundary is boundary blurring. Boundary blurring is making the social profile of an ethnic boundary cloudy, less clear, or less distinctive (Alba and Nee, 2003, P. 60; Wimmer, 2008b). This happens by using other identities, rather than the ethnic one, as the bases of identification (Barth, P. 34), such as religion or political ideology. For example, religious cosmopolitan organizations, such as the Ismailis (Matthews, 2007), use religion as the basis of categorizing people instead of ethnicity or otherwise (Jacobson, 1997; Lamont and Molnar, 2002; Lamont et al, 2002; Saeed et al, 1999; Wimmer, 2008a, 2008b, 2013, P. 61-3). Boundary blurring may be enhanced by such phenomena as inter-ethnic marriages, inter-ethnic friendships, and joining political organizations with national, non-ethnic or non-regional, nature. An example joining the Sudanese Communist Party, rather than such parties as the Black Block and Darfur Development Front in the Sudan.

ETHNIC BOUNDARY CHANGE

The abovementioned strategies are affected, as Wimmer (2008a) maintains, by socio-political factors. These include institutions, - especially in the framework of the national-state - power relations, and social networks. These factors may interact to motivate groups’ agents of change - especially the elites - to focus on drawing ethnic, rather than other, boundaries (Wimmer, 2008a). This happens when an ethnic group’s leaders or elites capitalize on certain selected ethnic and/or cultural differences, and not on other difference, between them and other groups, regardless of the purpose of investment on these differences (Wallman, 1986, P. 230).
Wimmer (2008a) identifies three mechanisms of ethnic boundary change: endogenous shift; exogenous shift; and exogenous drift. Endogenous shift is the shift of ethnic boundary as a result of the efforts of the group members. It is an internal matter. It is caused by the accumulation of strategies pursued by ethnic group members. These include the abovementioned strategies of boundary maintenance, boundary resisting or challenging, or any other strategies used for dealing with ethnic boundary by different sub-groups. Such accumulation may affect the groups’ members’ interaction dynamics as well as boundary location. For example if sub-group members use certain strategies in order to distance themselves from the larger group, and the larger group members voluntarily or forcefully accept, then the consequence is boundary contraction for both groups. On the other hand, boundary expansion occurs when two groups, based on their own boundary-related strategies, come together to form a larger group. The abovementioned case of the sub-group of Bathan who joined the Baluch group can be thought of as an example for contraction in the Bathan ethnic boundary. At the same time it is an expansion of the Baluch ethnic boundary.

Exogenous shift is the change that happens to ethnic boundaries based on the change of political factors that are not controlled by the group’s members. In other words, exogenous shift of an ethnic boundary may happen through introducing new institutions, resources, or actors due to the emergence of factors that are exogenous to the group(s); for example, colonial conquest, coup d’états, revolutions, or the introduction of new political systems such as democratization. These factors affect the existing institutions, power distribution, and political networks and alliances which exert effects on ethnic boundaries.

On top of their effect on changing ethnic boundaries, exogenous shifts cause the boundary structure and dynamics to alter and thus bring forth a new equilibrium or consensus
about the new boundaries and their locations. As such, government policies, as well as changes in these policies, can be thought of as factors of exogenous shift for local ethnic boundaries. For example, the introduction of indirect rule by the British in their colonies in Africa, Asia, and Latin America can be considered as an exogenous shift factor that caused ethnic boundary change. Also, the post-colonial government economic, political, administrative, social, educational, cultural, and religious policies can be considered as exogenous shift factors to ethnic boundaries in a country (Wallman, 1986, P. 244).

Exogenous drifts are the changes in ethnic boundaries based on ethnic groups adopting strategies that are new, in the sense that they were not part of the known and practiced strategies in a certain society in the past. For example, the establishment of new national movements by some ethnic groups within an established state could be considered as a factor of exogenous drift. Such strategies likely occur in response to the emergence of new ideologies, understandings, and practices such as global waves of nationalism, new political ideas, or transnational practices, especially through trans-immigrants who make use of advanced communication technology to connect to their countries of origin (Ang, 2010; Briggs, 2008; Wimmer, 2008a). Here it is worthwhile mentioning, in this connection, that transnationalism from below (Satzewich and Wong, 2006, P. 10) can be thought of as a source of exogenous drift in ethnic boundaries, whereas transnationalism from above (Ibid, P. 10) can be thought of as a source of exogenous shift.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF BOUNDARY PROCESSES
It follows from the above that ethnic boundary changes, especially the exogenously
determined ones, are crucial to political mobilization (Isajiw, 1974; Wimmer, 2008a). This is one
major factor, among others, in intra-national ethnic conflicts in many countries such as Turkey,
Iran, Iraq, former Yugoslavia, India, Pakistan, the former Soviet Union Republics, Rwanda,
Eritrea, and Sudan. Although they may not fully explain intra-national conflicts and their
patterns (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000), ethnic boundaries and ethnic identity play a significant
role in such conflicts (Smith, 1986, P. 218).

In many cases, these abovementioned intra-national ethnic conflicts, and even civil wars,
can be thought of in terms of boundaries. The nation state, in many cases, is comprised of more
than one ethnic group (Smith, 1986, P. 215). Ethnic groups are defined by ethnic boundaries or
by sub-national boundaries, which may not correspond with national boundaries (Jenkins, 1986,
P. 184) for one reason or another. This constitutes the necessary, though not sufficient, condition
for intra-national ethnic conflicts to occur because, unlike ethnic boundaries, national
boundaries are defined geographically by international borders and legally, administratively, and
symbolically by citizenship in the modern state. However, the meaning of citizenship mostly
exceeds the legal status to become actual belonging and participation in the social, economic,
and political life of the society (Bloemraad, 2006, P. 1, 5; Glenn, 2002, P. 1, 19).

Before the European renaissance, the nation was being conceived as ethnicity, in the
sense that it is a cultural formation defined by such attributes as shared ancestry, history,
language, norms, and probably race (Isajiw, 1993). With the advent of the nation state, with
Westfalia agreement 1648, the nation started to be conceptualized as a political entity embedded
in the state with its territories. The feeling of belonging to a nation-state is the basis of national
identity. National identity is mostly, but not necessarily always, linked to a certain dominant
language, or certain dialects or accents, religion, norms, values, traditions, customs, costumes, symbols, and other artifacts. These markers stand as distinguishing manifestations of nations and national identity based on the meaning(s) given to them by the members, or majority of the members, of the nation.

This resonates with one of the definitions of nation as ‘a repository of heritage and repertoire of meanings and usages embodied in values, myths, and symbols that serve to unite a group of people with shared memories that differentiate them from outsiders’ (Smith, 1981, P. 14). This definition exemplifies the cases where national identity coincides with ethnic identity of the majority group to form an ethno-nation (Bacova, 1998; Cerulo, 1992). National boundary, in such cases, corresponds with an ethnic boundary, for example Czech or German. The ethnic groups other than the majority group, in such states, are ethnic minorities. These minorities share national, but not an ethnic, boundary with the ethnic majorities. The properties of these boundaries differ from country to country depending on the contexts, circumstances, and ethnic groups’ relations in those countries. In some cases, ethnic boundaries are prioritized over the national boundary, especially by minority groups, who are oppressed or excluded by the powerful majority.

The powerful majority, however, tends to prioritize the national boundary over ethnic ones, because national boundary often gives this majority the opportunity to use the state apparatus for the benefit of their ethnic group. In other words, it enables them, as the powerful ethnic group, to continue having the privilege of accessing resources and opportunities over the less powerful ethnic groups.
In contrast to the above definition, nation is defined as an imagined community that belongs to sovereign territories (Anderson, 2006, P. 7). This definition captures the cases of supra-ethnic or civic nation, which is comprised of more than one ethnicity (Eriksen, 2005). In the supra-ethnic state, national boundary is ideally prioritized over ethnic boundaries. Supra-ethnic national identity, as per Anderson, is shaped by structural factors, such as the socio-economic and political structure of capitalism, language, and the development of technology such as the advent of printing machine in some developed and developing countries (Anderson, 2006).

From the above, the prioritization of one type of boundary over other types depends on the contexts, circumstances, and conditions in which such prioritization occurs. It also depends on the conditions and circumstances of the ethnic group(s) in question. These factors affect different groups’ choices as they organize different types of boundaries in hierarchies. That is to say, based on these factors some sub-ethnic groups may choose to organize different boundaries in different hierarchies that may correspond with their larger group’s choices or not. For example, one group may prioritize ethnic, then religious, and then regional boundaries, whereas another ethnic group may prioritize regional followed by the religious, and then ethnic boundaries, and a third group may choose otherwise. The same is also true with respect to the individuals who may choose boundary hierarchies that differ even from their own small and/or large groups.

The ways of forming a nation state or, in boundary related terms, the expansion or contraction of a national boundary, differ from one country to another based on circumstances. Contraction may happen by way of voluntary or involuntary secession. On the other hand, expansion may happen through a variety of ways; these include voluntary unification via
referendums or agreements of two or more governments such as the cases of the United Arab Emirates.

Expansion may also happen by way of annexation through conquest either by neighboring ethnic groups or by colonizers. Moreover, expansion may be the result of immigration. In any case, nation building can be thought of as transformation of inter- and intra-ethnic boundaries or, in most cases, encompassing them into a bigger national boundary. This does not mean that these ethnic groups are equal in their status in these newly formed nation-states, nor all of them are even contented with being members of such states. In some cases, the discontentment may lead to violent conflicts as mentioned above. An example of this is what happened in Somalia and in the Biafra region in Nigeria. Nevertheless, the cases of Pakistan, Eritrea, and Southern Sudan represent extremes in this respect, because these countries eventually seceded from India, Ethiopia, and the Sudan respectively.

BOUNDARIES AND THE PROCESS OF COLONIZATION

Within the framework of competition for building empires, colonizing powers stood as effective actors in the processes of transforming or reorganizing ethnic boundaries in the Third World nation states in Africa, Asia, and Latin America (Wimmer, 2013, P. 52). Colonizers have imposed boundaries upon the colonized groups from without. This constitutes an exogenous shift without regard to the existing inter-groups boundaries (Barth, 1969, P. 36; Smith, 1986, P. 193). Using boundary-related terminology, some of the inter-group, and/or even intra-group, boundaries had to be replaced by new boundaries. This imposition, in many cases, has exerted a
negative effect on the boundary systems in these colonies. This is represented by the case of Africa where the colonizers have created many countries by imposing national borders without considering tribal, ethnic, and natural geographic boundaries. That is why we find some tribes splintered between two or even more countries, such as the case of the Fulani, Hausa, and Tuareq in West Africa (Smith, 1986, P. 193), and the case of the Zaghawa and Bani Amir tribes who live across the Sudan borders with Chad and Eritrea respectively. This rendered part of these tribes as insiders, whereas the other parts of the same tribes are outsiders to a country’s national boundary. This imposition of national borders by colonizers led to transforming the direction and processes of both tribal and national boundary ‘making’ which, in turn, affected the strategies and mechanisms of national as well as ethnic boundary maintenance. When they gained independence, these former colonies became post-colonial civic states which, supposedly, had to preserve sovereignty, govern the area, and define national identity of its citizens which include various ethnic groups (Murphree, 1986, P. 156). In many cases, ethnic groups are included in countries in which national boundaries do not correspond with the natural, social, and geopolitical boundaries of these ethnic groups (Jenkins, 1986, P. 179; Smith 1986, P. 193). This process of externally imposed ‘boundary making’ was sometimes used by the colonizers for limiting the size of an ethnic group (Molohon et al, 1979) for administrative reasons. This historical process has continued to affect the socio-political structure of the former colonies. Such a process certainly constrains state efforts of nation and/or state-building, including establishing a clear unified national identity (Murphree, 1986, P. 156; Jenkins, 1986, P. 179) that acquires the citizens’ allegiance regardless of their ethnic affiliation. That is why the identification with the nation in these post-colonial countries, or prioritizing the national
boundary, is weaker than identification with the ethnic group as ethnic groups’ members prioritize ethnic boundaries.

Another consequence of the colonial legacy is what Williams (1970) calls ‘tribal nationalism’ (P.130). Tribal nationalism is used, in some cases, by tribal and ethnic elites to establish ethno-national, or even what can be called tribo-national, movements such as the Nuba Mountain people’s movements in the Sudan, the Igbo in Nigeria, and Mau Mau in Kenya. Such movements seem to coincide, in a way, with class conflict, in the sense that one of the motivations of these movements is the feeling of deprivation from economic rights, which adds to the deprivation from other political and social rights.

Nevertheless, and contrary to Wallerstein (1977, P. 280-1) and Balibar (1991, pp. 52-5), ethnic conflicts, arguably do not seem to be mere manifestations of, and epiphenomena to, class conflicts because ethnicity and tribalism are still salient and emphasized by ethnic groups’ members regardless of their class differences.

Given the above, it is obvious that colonization contributed to determining the mode of ethnic groups’ incorporation, or boundary transformation and/or maintenance, in multi-ethnic states, to avoid using ‘plural societies’ as used by Smith (1986, P. 194-8) and (Schermherhorn, quoted by Jenkins, 1986, P. 180-1) in the context of their models of modes of incorporation.

On the other hand, through their oppressive policies, colonizers did contribute to unifying various groups in these colonies and thus, contributed to strengthening the sense of belonging of different ethnic groups’ members to the nation state. That is to say, colonization in some circumstances led to prioritizing national over ethnic and/or other subnational ethnic boundaries,
but such prioritization of national boundaries tended to vanish immediately after
the decolonization in the colonized countries.

Based on the differences between ethno-national and civic state, it seems plausible to
adopt the distinction between nationalism and patriotism, the former is embedded in the feeling
of belonging and commitment to an ethnicity and/or ethno-nation; the latter is embedded in the
feeling of belonging to supra-ethnic civic state (Fenton and May, 2010, P. 7).

In response to colonization, and under the leadership of political elites, nationalism or
patriotism has found expression in establishing anti-colonial national or patriotic movements in
the Third World countries, also known as national liberation movements. The main goals of
these movements were gaining independence as well as building the ‘nation’ state thereafter
(Young, 1976, P. 74). These movements started after WWII when the traditional colonizing
European countries, especially United Kingdom and France, started to lose their world leadership
and hegemony to the newly rising powers of the United States and the former Soviet Union.

Many of these national liberation movements received material and political support from the
former Soviet Union, the ideological enemy of capitalist and imperialist countries. This was for
ideological reasons or in response to capitalist countries’ assistance to the anti-communist
movements in Eastern Europe and some Third World countries. This explains how other boundaries,
such as the ideological and also what we can call circumstantial boundaries, may affect ethnic and/or
national boundaries. An example of this type of boundary is the boundary between West and East
Germany after its conquest by the former Soviet Union in 1941. An example from the Third World is
Yemen which was splintered into two distinct countries;
Northern and Southern Yemen in 1962. This separation was driven, in the first place, by ideological boundaries which transcend ethnic boundaries to a significant extent.

However, the majority of anti-colonial movements did not contest the national boundaries drawn by the colonizers, because their main endeavor was to rid themselves of European colonization. After independence, many of these countries indulged in ethnic and regional conflicts based on ethnic or ethno-regional boundaries. For example, even though the Algerian Berbers and Arabs cooperated with each other against French colonization, they returned to a state of animosity after the independence of Algeria (Bourdieu Quoted by Izikowita, 1969, P. 144). Some of these conflicts persist to this day.

After independence, and within the national state in the developing countries, many movements emerged in opposition to the national governments. Some of these movements emerged as an expression of different views, from the ruling groups’ views, about how the state should be governed. An example is the anti-monarchist movement in Yemen and Egypt, and socialist movements in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

The advent of other movements may be thought of as a reaction of minority groups to domination, marginalization, racism, aggression, and oppression of central governments (Omi and Winant, 1994, pp. 68-70). This is exemplified by the Darfur and the Nuba Mountain peoples’ movements in the Sudan. In such cases ethnic boundaries may coincide or correspond with other boundaries such as the regional and/or religious ones (Molohon et al, 1979).

Other movements may arise after independence because they contest the geographical boundaries drawn by the colonizers and which are endorsed by post-colonial national governments. These movements are considered by the national governments as separatist
movements that lead to national boundary contraction. Driven by their ethnic consciousness, these movements’ members regard their movements as legitimate ‘national,’ or ethno-national movements. Usually, the objective of such movements’ members is to maintain their ethnic boundaries and/or create their own national boundaries. These movements are thought to rise as a result of the contradiction between societal and political structures in the framework of national state (Smith 1986, P. 224), or a conflict between ethnic and national identities (Scott, 1990). In other words, these movements are cases of tension between national and ethnic boundaries reflected in these groups behavior. An example of these movements are the aforementioned national movements in Pakistan, Eritrea and South Sudan, which managed to achieve independence for their countries, or secession or separation as it is considered by the central governments of the mother countries. Regardless of it being considered as independence or not, the splitting of a country into two implies the ‘making’ of a new national boundary through contraction (Wimmer, 2008b).

Another example of national movements that contest and try to redraw ethno-national boundaries is the Greater Kurdistan national movement which struggles for unifying all Kurds in one nation state. If realized, this state will expand the Kurdish national boundary and, thereby, contract the national boundaries of Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran. It is in these countries that the Kurds are the minority having clear ethnic boundaries with the other nationals of these states (van Bruinessen, 1994).

Immigrant ethnic groups are expected by some researchers, such as Park (1926) and Gordon (1964), to eventually assimilate and lose their boundaries with each other and with the charter nation as they assimilate in the mainstream culture. Other researchers maintain that most likely these boundaries, if symbolic, will persist through generations (Gans 1979; Isajiw, 1974;
Palvak, 1976). The latter proposition is supported by the experience of the majority of immigrant communities in Canada such as the Ukrainians, Italians, Polish, Irish, and other old immigrant groups who are still retaining aspects of their identity, though symbolically, in spite of the passage of time.

Moreover, some immigrant communities in western countries have experienced subdivisions and emergence of new national/ethnic identities. Their internal and external boundaries have transformed in the aftermath of ethnic conflicts in their countries of origin which has led, in some cases, to the formation of new countries/nation states that seceded from their former mother countries. Different ethnic groups of those who immigrated to Canada from former Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, and recently Sudan have experienced this. It is plausible to deem that the boundary processes in host societies are different from the boundary processes in the countries of origin in terms of their driving factors and mechanisms. Such differences are exemplified in Canada, a country of immigrants, a democratic country that adopts the policy of multiculturalism.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, various approaches to the definition of ethnicity and ethnic identity were analyzed. Countering Barth (1969) and Wimmer (2008a, 2008b, 2013), it is argued that a synthesized approach is more useful as it uses the aspects of subjective and objective identification (Herberg, 1989, P.3-4; Lieberson, 1991, P. 445). This ethnic identification relates to ethnic boundaries as they reinforce each other. This is especially important for understanding
the situation of the Sudanese-Canadians, represented by the Sudanese in Kitchener, because in spite of their national identification, the Sudanese in Kitchener are divided into different ethnic, or sub-ethnic, groups both subjectively and objectively.

However, following Barth (1969) and Wimmer (2007, 2008a, 2013) the concept of an ethnic boundary is a better concept for studying ethnic relations in comparison to ethnicity. The ambiguity of the concept of ethnicity is particularly relevant to the Sudanese in Kitchener because they are divided along the lines of tribe. This intersects with race, religion, region, language, and culture. This intersection and overlap lead to a complexity that can be captured more inclusively by the concept of ethnic boundary. This involves both cognitive as well as behavioral dimensions reflected in these Sudanese-Canadian groups in the city of Kitchener.

Different definitions of ethnic boundaries together with some critique were presented and discussed. This enables a more inclusive definition to be used for understanding Sudanese’ ethnic boundary processes through time. It allows for a better understanding of how ethnic boundaries coincided with other boundaries to determine the relationship among Southern and Northern Sudanese ethnic and sub-ethnic groups in the Sudan. It also allows for an approach that examines how relationships are affected by experience and boundaries processes in Canada.

These ethnic boundaries processes can be captured in the concept of ethnic boundary transformation which, in its turn, results from putting the strategies of either maintaining or resisting ethnic boundaries in practice. This concept will be used to examine the strategies used by Northern- and Southern-Sudanese groups in the Sudan, as well as in Canada, to maintain or resist certain ethnic boundaries and/or boundaries system given the context, power and resources distribution, institutions set up, and social networks. These are effective factors in shaping, if not
determining, ethnic boundary processes, properties, and characteristics on the local, regional, national, and/or transnational levels.
CHAPTER TWO

SUDAN: THE HISTORY OF BOUNDARY PROCESSES

As discussed in the theoretical framework chapter, ethnic boundaries are neither given, immutable, nor static. They are dynamic; they change and develop through time with the changes and developments that occur in the society. Ethnic boundary processes are historical in the sense that their development is determined by the context and circumstances of the society as well as peoples’ perceptions about real or imagined shared ancestry, history, and collective fate. Social boundaries in the Sudan, including ethnic ones, are not simple, but rather they are very complex as they cross and overlap in a complex context in which various Sudanese groups exist.

In this chapter, ethnic boundary processes and transformations, as shaped by the development of the history of the area/country, starting from antiquity to the present time are examined. Ethnic boundaries and relations among different Sudanese ethnic and sub-ethnic groups, especially the relations between Northern and Southern Sudanese, within the political, economic, social, cultural, linguistic, and religious reality of the area/country are conceptualized.

In this framework, it is imperative to speak about the ancient dynasties in the area. Immigration of different groups, especially Arabs/Muslims to the country, which is one of the significant factors of diversity in the present Sudan, is then discussed. The emergence of the Turko-Egyptian colonization is also examined. Although it facilitated the emergence and institutionalization of modern state of the Sudan, the Turko-Egyptian rule has had many negative ramifications for the area, particularly because the slave trade has flourished during their reign.
The Mahdist revolution, a national revolution, which emancipated the country from the Turko-Egyptian rule is then discussed. Following this period, the time of British colonization and the significant role it played in shaping the ethnic boundary processes in the Sudan is examined. This is followed by an analysis of post-colonial governments, including the present government, whose policies led to the splinter of the country into two separate countries. This historical process is interwoven with the theories of ethnic boundary and processes.

Former Sudan, including its Northern and Southern regions, was the largest country in Africa before the secession/independence of South Sudan (see map 1). The Sudanese population is very diverse as the country is inhabited by almost six hundred tribes, who speak about one hundred and forty languages and dialects (Collins, 2008, pp. 4-8; Lesch, 1998, pp. 15-9). Anthropologists classify the population of the Sudan into Hermitic, Semitic, Nilotic, and Bantu groups (Bechtold, 1976, P. 9), and their main religious affiliations are Islam, Christianity, and animism or traditional African beliefs (Collins, 2008, pp. 15-8; Lesch, 1998, pp. 20-1; Voll, 1991, P. 1).
Source: United Nations, Cartography department. Available at:

The area of former Sudan (and present day Sudan and South Sudan), along with the Savanna area extends from the West of the Red Sea to the Atlantic ocean coasts, carried the name of ‘Sudan’ in antiquity. The population and space of this area was designated as black by ancient travelers, immigrants, and invaders, such as the Greeks, Arabs, and Egyptians who used different notions of blackness as opposed to whiteness or lighter skin color. As they considered themselves ‘white,’ the Arabs designated the area by the name of ‘Bilad As-Sudan’, which
means the land of the black people (Collins, 2008, P. 1; El Mahdi, 1965, P. 3; Holt, 1961, P. 1). This resonates with the name given by the Greeks to the area, ‘Aithiopia,’ which means the land of the burnt faced people (Burstein, 2009, P. 4; El Mahdi, 1965, P. 3). Ancient Egyptians denoted the area by the similar characteristics of blackness, as they named it ‘Tanehsu’ which means black (El Mahdi, 1965, P. 1).

Based on the diversity and differences among various Sudanese groups, the history of the Sudan is not a single history. Each area within the contemporary Sudan has its own history that differs in important aspects from other areas. This is the norm in most countries, especially post-colonial ones in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The problem is that such differences affect the writing of history. Some important historical events may not be included, partially included, or recorded with bias, mainly because the history of these countries was usually written by the colonizers and the citizens who held political power. Moreover, different groups, especially antagonistic groups, have contradicting visions and interpretations of the historical events (Lesch, 1998, P. 212). This problem exerted a significant effect on building consensus among a majority of Sudanese people from all regions, religions, and ethnicities about the history of the Sudan. This problem applies to, and effects, the conflict about the issues related to national identity as well as issues related to the trajectory of the national state-building. Some groups were excluded from participation in making decisions about national issues, and oftentimes the consensus on these issues was imposed on the less powerful by the powerful groups, especially in the political arena.

This state of affairs under the post-colonial national Sudanese state resulted, at best, in a false consensus about national identity; this false consensus was supported by the media and the government apparatus which was dominated by some ethnic groups to the exclusion of the
others. This false consensus did not bring unity to the Sudan, but rather it contributed to emphasizing, reproducing, thickening, activating, politicizing, and institutionalizing the ethnic boundaries among various Sudanese ethnic groups, especially between the Southern and Northern Sudanese as two distinct groups. This contributed to highlighting and emphasizing divisions and spreading antagonism between these two groups which eventually led, along with other factors, to the secession of South Sudan in 2011 (see maps 2 and 3).

Source: United Nation Cartography Department. Available at:
ANCIENT SUDANESE DYNASTIES

Although the ancient history of the Sudan is not very well known, it is known that in the first century BC, the area of former Sudan was inhabited by a highly civilized people who established dynasties. When established, these dynasties were based on regional rather than tribal belonging (Abdalla, p. 100). The oldest dynasty was Kush Kingdom, 760 BC – 350 CE (Collins, 2008, P. 1). Kush was located in the Northern part of the Sudan, South of the Egyptian borders, and extended to the South of Khartoum, the present capital of the Sudan. Kush was preceded by Meroe, 350 BC- 350 AD, which extended from the Egyptian borders in the North to the Upper Nile in Southern Sudan (El Mahdi, 1965, P. 16-7), including some parts of today’s Eastern Sudan, Meroe neither included the West nor the South of former Sudan whose ancient history is not well known.

In 350 AD, the Eastern part of Meroe was annexed by the Abyssinian dynasty Axum (El Mahdi, 1965, P. 19) which existed in the first century CE (Burstein, 2009, P.97). Axum officially adopted Christianity in the fourth century C.E. (Burstein, 2009, P. 112) and contributed to the Christianizing of Meroe. Christianity spread to Sudan during the dynasties of Alwa and Makuria through traders, travelers, and then later through missionaries (El Mahdi, 1965, P. 21). Before Christianity, Sudanese people were animists following their traditional religions.

In ancient Eastern Sudan, some groups who inhabited the areas closer to the Red Sea and northward to the Ethiopian borders were the offspring of the people of Axum dynasty of Abyssinia. Others were the offspring of the people of Meroe dynasty who were originally Nubians. These two groups came together when Axum annexed Meroe to its territories in the
fourth century AD, and a new group called the Bija resulted from this intermingling, its main tribes being the Hadandawa, Bani A’amir, Busharyeen, and Amar’Ar (Abdalla, 1986).

Another group of tribes lived in the Butana area in eastern Sudan. This group, called Butana Arabs, is mainly comprised of the Shukriya, Bataheen, and Lahawyeen who are camel herding nomads. They live in the area south of the Bija and West of the Western Ethiopian borders. Still another group is comprised of the tribes of Rashaida and Zubaydia who emigrated directly and relatively recently from Arabia. They identify as pure Arabs because they isolated themselves and did not intermingle with other Sudanese tribes. The economic activities of Eastern Sudanese are mainly nomadic camel herding with a minority in agriculture (Holt, 1961, pp. 10-1).

The tribes of the Nuba Mountains, in Southern Kordofan, claim that they were living in the area for about 6000 years. They consider themselves as one of the aboriginal or indigenous groups of northern Sudan (Meyer and Nicholls, 2005, P. 5; Nadel, 1947, P. xi, 4). Like the Dinka, Nuba is identified in this research as a tribal unit rather than a tribe, because they are composed of different tribes who are aware of their ethnic, religious, and linguistic differences (Nadel, 1947, P. xii), to the extent that people from different Nuba tribes are not able to communicate but in a special dialect of Arabic language called ‘Nuba Arabic’ (Nadel, 1947, P. 3). A different perspective put forth by Abdalla (1986). He maintains that Nuba is just a random name. This name was dubbed by the Arabs of Kordofan and Darfur on the groups of people who came to live in the mountains known in the present as Nuba Mountains. These groups moved from Darfur and other areas of Kordofan and dwelled this area for a long time. (p. 55-6)
SUDAN AND ARAB/MUSLIM MIGRATION

The relationships between Arabs and ancient Sudan began with Arab traders and travelers who crossed to the Western coasts of the Red Sea. Some of these traders settled in the area even before Islam prevailed (EL Mahdi, 1965, P. 3). Of more significance is the encounter with Muslim Arabs who invaded the Makuria dynasty from Egypt in 652 C.E.

Although they failed to conquer the area, the Arab invaders concluded an agreement with the Makurians called ‘baqt’ which means ‘the tribute.’ In this agreement, the Makurians agreed to guarantee safe passage for Muslim Arab visitors and traders. Also, they agreed to allow Muslim Arabs to build a mosque in Dongola, the capital city. Moreover, they agreed to sell Muslim Arabs a certain number of slaves annually for certain amounts of grain. Further, they agreed to return any fleeing slaves to the Muslim Arabs (Burstein, 2009, pp. 149-50; El Mahdi, 1965, P. 28).

This agreement set the groundwork for the influx of Muslim Arab immigrants to the Sudan through the northern borders. Another wave of Arabs came to the Sudan from East Africa, especially through Somalia, and these immigrants were characterized by being a mix of Arabs, Africans, and some East Asians (El Mahdi, 1965, P. 3; Poggo, 2009, P. 17). Other Muslim Arabs immigration to the Sudan occurred through Western borders from North West Africa after it was conquered by Muslim Arabs in the twelfth century (Levtzion and Pouwels, 2000, P. 2).

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1 Some writers maintain that Arabs have come even before the birth of Christ and that established a kingdom in Sudan even before the advent of the Funj dynasty. For details in this regard see El Sawi and Jadain (1990) who understand most of the history of the Sudan as part and parcel of the development of Arabism and Arab nationalism.
The migration of the Arabs/Muslims added three new significant elements to the ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural makeup of the population of Sudan; namely Arabic ethnicity, Arabic language and culture, and Islamic religion. These new elements contributed to transforming the boundary system, especially ethnic boundaries. This effect extended to inter- and intra-group relations. Before the immigration of Arabs to the Sudan ethnic boundaries existed among different tribes in the area. Yet, after the immigration of Arabs, in addition to the ethnic boundaries in place, a clear line had risen between two bounded groups, namely the Arabs and non-Arabs. The immigration of Arabs to Sudan can be thought of as an exogenous shift not controlled by the native ethnic groups, but imposed on them from without. This boundary has impacted all aspects of life in the Sudan up until the present time.

After their migration to the Sudan in large numbers, Arabs intermingled with the indigenous people (El Mahdi, 1965, P. 30). Some of the offspring of their intermarriages, such as the Kababeesh, Shukriya, and various Baggara tribes in Darfur and Kordofan, took paternal lineage and identified themselves as Arabs. Other groups identified as Africans or non-Arab. To limited extent, Southern Sudanese, Nuba Mountain people, Angessana, Fur, Zaghawa, and Massaleit also intermarried with Arabs.

These ethnic boundaries between Arabs and non-Arabs are complex as they overlap and cut across other boundaries. Arab and non-Arab groups are not homogeneous, in two ways. First, these groups have their intra-group differences in other aspects than simply being Arabs and non-Arabs. That is to say non-Arab as well as Arab sub-groups differ one from another at least in one aspects of their tribal, regional, religious/sectarian boundaries, and share certain boundaries with one or more sub-group(s). Second, the Arab tribes in the Sudan are divided into those who migrated from Egypt and those who migrated from West Africa. The former mostly live in the
northern Sudan at the River Nile bank in such provinces as the Northern and the River Nile provinces and are known as ‘awlad al bahar’ which means the ‘riverine’ people. This group is exemplified by Ja’alyeen and Shaigiya. This group of Arabs shares a boundary and the status of ‘awlad al bahar’ with some non-Arab groups such as the Danagla, Halfaweyeen, Mahas, and Sikkot (Abdalla, p. 44).

The latter is the group of Arab tribes who immigrated from north-west Africa; they live in Western Sudan provinces of Darfur and Kordofan. They are known, together with some non-Arab groups who live in Western Sudan, as ‘awlad al gharib’ or the Western people. This group includes such sub-groups as Kababeesh, Baggara tribes, Hamar tribe unit, and Dar Hamid tribe unit. Although they are included in the wider ethnic boundary with other Arab groups, the Western Sudanese Arabs have their own sub-ethnic boundary that distinguishes them from the riverine Arabs. Like awlad al bahar, awlad al gharib group includes some Arab and non-Arab groups in an ethno-regional boundary that distinguishes them from other Arabs and non-Arabs in other regions. These non-Arab tribes include Fur, Zaghawa, Angessana, and Nuba tribal unit to mention a few.

This difference in the sources, ways, and waves of their immigration to the Sudan created significant differences among the Arab cultures and ways of life, traditions, values systems, dialects and accents, as well as religiosity and sectarian belonging. Before their immigration to the Sudan, groups who did not come directly to Sudan were exposed to a different context and, thereby subjected to a different process of acculturation, and intermarriage. For this reason, the effect of the Arabs on the Sudanese population differs according to what they brought from these different sources. The context and the state of development of the receiving area/community shaped how influential Arabic culture was in each area. This is evident in differences between
the Arabs who immigrated to Western Sudan, mostly from North-west Africa, and those who came from Arabia, through Egypt and the Red Sea, in their understanding of Islam, their sense of sectarian belonging, Arabic dialect and accent, economic activities, and other cultural attributes. Those who migrated from West Africa brought with them the Tiganiya Sufi order, whereas those who came from Egypt brought such Sufi orders as the Khatmyia, Shazaliya, and Ahmadiya. Those who came from Arabia through the Red Sea brought with them the Qadiriya and Summaniya Sufi orders. These differences are manifested in these groups’ offspring’s ethnic boundaries and relationships as will be discussed later in this chapter.

The consequence of Arab immigration was that, the ethnic boundaries in Sudan changed from being vertical to horizontal. They became clearly hierarchical and characterized by ideologies of superiority and inferiority. For example, the riverine Arabs, mainly Ja’alyeen and Shaigiya, think of themselves as superior to both riverine non-Arabs as well as Western Arabs such as Nubians and Baggara respectively. Although they do not think of themselves as inferior to the riverine people, Western Arabs think of themselves as superior to other non-Arabs, including those who neighored, intermingled, and intermarried with them (Holt, 1961, P. xi). These non-Arab groups include the Fur, Zaghawa, Nuba Mountains groups, and Angessana. At the bottom of the hierarchy are the non-Arab, non-Muslim groups which are the majority of Southern Sudanese and Northern Sudanese non-Arab non-Muslim (Collins, 2008, P. 8).

The elements of the idea of superiority can be thought of as part of the strategies of boundary maintenance with other groups (Ibid, P. 8). These elements of superiority include genealogy and related aspects. For example, ‘Awlad al bahar’ Arabs believe that their genealogy extends to the Prophet Mohammed and his household, whereas awlad al gharib’s genealogy
pertains to some tribes in Arabia but they do not claim any kinship to the Prophet Mohammed’s household (Holt, 1961, P. 8).

Up to the present time, the riverine groups have considered the Western Sudanese as either slaves, savage, primitive, less educated, and/or ‘odd’ in speaking the Arabic language, whereas the Western Sudanese historically considered the riverine people as arrogant, deceitful, and exploitative. This led to strengthening ethnic boundaries among these ethno-regional groups.

The economic activities of the two groups were different, the Westerners, including Arab groups, were either animal herders or seasonal rain fed crop producers, whereas the riverine people grew vegetables and fruits year round using artificial irrigation.

Moreover, Arab immigration to Sudan led to setting religious boundaries between Muslims and non-Muslims. This was rendered more complicated by the existence of other religious boundaries, such as Christianity and Animism. Also the existence of sub-religious sects and Sufi orders boundaries, which arose among different Islamic, Christian, and Animists sub-groups, added more complexity to the scene.

It is noteworthy that all Arabs who immigrated to Sudan were Muslims, which means the ethnic boundary coincided, to great extent, with the religious boundary. Although some of their groups have adopted Islam, many non-Arabs are non-Muslims, as for example the absolute majority of Southern Sudanese are mostly animists, a minority either Christian or Muslim.

The effect of Muslims and Arabs continued through centuries, but it intensified in the sixteenth century, when the ‘Blue Sultanate’, or ‘Funj Sultanate’, an Islamic dynasty, managed to unify vast parts of the former Sudan under its central rule. This was a significant boost to Arab existence in the Sudan, especially those nomads in the peninsula between the Blue and White
Nile (El Mahdi, 1965, P. 31-2, 35). The Funj Sultanate enhanced the status of Islamic religion and Arabic language through encouraging the migration of Islamic missionaries and scholars from Arabia, West Africa, and Egypt. The Funj rulers moreover helped scholars to open traditional religious schools known as ‘Khalwas’. Further, they sent students to Egypt to study Islamic sciences and Arabic language in ‘Al Azhar’ Islamic University in Cairo (El Mahdi, 1965, pp. 44-7).

The Islamic religion and Arabic language were also enhanced by two contemporary dynasties of the Funj Sultanate using the same means; the Mussaba’at and Fur dynasties. Each competed with one another, and with the Funj dynasty, in spite of the fact that they were all Islamic dynasties. This rivalry is attributable to ethnic boundaries (El Mahdi, 1965, P. 49, 60), since the names Funj, Fur, and Mussaba’at have tribal connotations.

After signing the ‘baqt’ agreement, Arabs also contributed to strengthening the boundary between slaves and non-slaves. The slave trade existed before the immigration of Arabs, but was small in scale. After the ‘Baqt,’ the slave trade increased in size and importance under the Makuria dynasty, to fulfill their agreement with the Arabs in the seventh century AD. At that time, there was no targeting of specific groups for enslavement, but rather any groups who were defeated in battle were enslaved. The slave trade was also practiced by the Funj dynasty, 1504-1821, in the area of the Nuba Mountains and present Southern Sudan (Holt, 1961, P. 20).

Slaves had important economic value. The male slaves were used by their masters for labour in agriculture, animal herding, and construction. Female slaves were used for household work as well as for masters’ sexual pleasure.
Over time, the boundary between slaves and non-slaves was strengthened by Arabic culture, especially when Arabs became more powerful and their culture was adopted by increasingly larger numbers of the Sudanese population. Because the slave trade was active in the present South Sudan, Nuba Mountains, and Darfur areas, ethnic boundaries slowly transformed into a color-based scheme. This color scheme divided people into ‘zurq’ which means ‘blue’ which is used for black or darker skin people, ‘green’ for brown, and Arabs and other light skinned people were denoted ‘white,’ ‘yellow,’ and ‘red’ (El Sawi and Jadain, 1990, p. 44). According to this color scheme, and because the slaves were mostly dark skinned, there was a tendency in the society to consider all dark skinned people as slaves, especially if they had accents or spoke special modified versions of Arabic, such as ‘Juba Arabic’ in Southern Sudan, and also Darfur accent. Arabs stood on the top of this color hierarchy, as they considered themselves, and were regarded by others, as ‘white.’

SUDAN AND OTHER GROUPS IMMIGRATION FROM AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Some African tribes migrated to the area from neighboring countries, especially from the West such as Ghana, Senegal, Chad, and Central Africa (Nadel, 1947, P. 5). This includes some groups of Southern Sudanese people with Negroid features who came to the area from West Africa at different times as stated by Collins (2006). Their early migration began with a movement to Bahr Al Ghazal. They were not able to continue southward, because the area South

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2 Juba Arabic is a special version of modified Sudanese Arabic used in southern Sudan, it is called ‘Juba Arabic’ because Juba is the main city of southern Sudan where Arabic language started to be used
of Bahr Al Ghazal was made up of swampland unconducive to sedentary farming. By
approximately 100 BC, most of these groups were able to develop pastoral nomadic life styles
and were able to live in areas South of Bahr Al Ghazal like Equatoria (Collins, 2006, P. 9).
Before these groups’ migration, Southern Sudan was inhabited mainly by ancient aboriginal
African tribes such as Zande and Fertit.

The Nilotic tribes such as Shilluk, Anuak, Dinka, and Nuer are thought to have migrated
from today’s Senegal in West Africa. These migrants mixed with the indigenous people in the
areas constituting the present country of South Sudan (El Mahdi, 1965, P. 6).³

Although it can be thought of as exogenous shifts similar to the case of Arabs migration,
the migration from West Africa to the area was not as consequential because, unlike Arabs, those
groups were not unified in terms of their ethnicity, religion, language, and culture. Also, they
were majorly nomads which rendered their impact weaker than sedentary groups of Arabs who
were more effective in imposing their rule than were nomad Arabs.

Unlike Arab immigrants, immigrants from African countries, excluding some Arabs and
Muslims who came from North-west Africa, did not include intellectuals to bring new
knowledge and expertise to the area. Therefore, although it added more to the diversity of the
country, the immigration from African countries was not as transformational as the immigration
of Arabs.

SUDAN UNDER TURKISH RULE

³ For a different view point see Abdulla (1990) who maintains that these tribes migrated from Ethiopia.
Throughout its history, the area of the Sudan was invaded by many regional and international powers including Egyptians, Assyrians, Ptolemaist, Persians, and Romans (El Mahdi, 1965, P. 18). There is a consensus among historians that modern Sudan was not established as a unified state, until the Turko-Egyptians occupation in 1821 (El Mahdi, 1965, P. 3, 68). The main reason for the Turkish conquest was to obtain slaves and wealth (Abdalla, 1990, pp. 25-6; El Mahdi, 1965, P. 65). Some slaves were used by the Turkish rulers for establishing strong armies. These armies were used to annex new areas, suppress the rebellions in different areas of the Sudan (El Gaddal, 1993, P. 57), and hunt for more slaves. Thus, Turkish rule contributed to the boom in slave trade in the Sudan.

Although its policies fluctuated between centralized and decentralized governance systems, Turkish rule contributed to modern state building in the Sudan. It established public administration, taxation, and some other government systems and institutions (El Gaddal, 1993, P. 50). At times, the administrative system delegated some authority to the tribesmen in the villages and rural areas (El Gaddal, 1993, P. 58-9). This administrative policy contributed to promoting more divisions among tribes and among regions as well. Turkish rule contributed, if limitedly, to strengthening ethnic and regional boundaries.

The administrative system developed under Turkish rule, together with economic policies, contributed to the growth of existing towns and the advent of new ones (El Gaddal, 1993, P. 85-7). Although they brought together people from different regions and ethnic groups, some of these Sudanese towns, like Shandi, Kareema, and Dongola, kept their tribal identity. Other towns, such as El-Obeid, Kosti, Sinnar, and Wad Medani, did not have a tribal identity.
They were inhabited by Arabs and non-Arabs, and Muslims and non-Muslims who left the rural areas, in both Southern and Northern Sudan, to reside in these urban centers for various reasons, such as education, work, and/or joining a family members.

In spite of their tribal or religious identity differences, the inhabitants of the multi-ethnic towns were included in these towns’ broader identity, which in turn added to the complexity of the boundary system in the country. Often people of such towns as Wad Medani, Omdurman, and El Khartoum are referred to without ethnic identifiers. Unlike the case of uni-ethnic towns, ethnic boundaries and identities in multi-ethnic towns were often secondary to the town’s boundary or subordinate to it. That is to say, the ethnic boundaries of those who lived in these multi-ethnic towns and cities became less bright. Living in these towns also provided opportunities for people to cross ethnic boundaries and establish inter-ethnic marriages and friendships. Ultimately, these towns created space for deconstructing and reconstructing the ethnic boundaries among those who inhabited them.

In addition to the above, Turkish rule had other consequences for Sudan. The Arabic language became the official language of the country (Collins, 2008, P. 10). This was the first time for the Sudan to be bounded within one territory and one official language. Turkish rule established official Islamic institutions such as Islamic courts and Islamic councils of ‘fatwa’ (El Mahdi, 1965, P. 68), or religious ruling. Before Turkish rule, Islam was practiced in non-official ways Islamic religious scholars offered their own interpretation of Islam in the town or tribal area they lived in, and they adjudicated limited disputes among people, mainly about marriage and inheritance, according to their own understanding of Islamic Shari’at (Collins, 2008, P. 18). Marriage contracts were done either by those scholars, the leaders of the Sufi orders, or any other religious elite entrusted by people.
In spite of its contribution to the institutionalization of Islam in the country, Turkish rule allowed Christian missionaries to work in the Sudan as early as the 1840s (El Mahdi, 1965, P. 69).

Turkish rule introduced modern education, though limited, in the Sudan (Collins, 2008, P. 17; El Mahdi, P. 76-7). By encouraging the establishment of these institutions, Turkish rule can be thought of as being an exogenous factor contributing to the deconstruction, reconstruction, and shift of religious and ethnic boundaries in the Sudan. Turkish rule further defined the borders of the Sudan for the first time in its history (El Mahdi, 1965, P. 94), which set the geographical context for the establishment of a national boundary for former Sudan.

Although they conquered the Sudan mainly to obtain wealth and slaves, as time progressed, the Turks claimed to fight against the slave trade (Collins, 2008, 18-9; El Mahdi, 1965, P. 78-9). Compared to the past, the slave trade flourished during Turkish rule. It was practiced by some people from Northern Sudan together with some non-Sudanese such as Egyptians, Syrians and Armenians (El Mahdi, 1965, P. 78). Within this contradictory framework of practicing and, at the same time, fighting the slave trade, and after conquering the Northern part of the country, Turkish rule had extended the national boundary of the Sudan by way of annexing the regions of Bahr Al Ghazal and Equatorial region in Southern Sudan and Nuba Mountains in Kordofan, albeit without being practically able to have a full grip on governance (Collins, 2008, pp. 12-3; El Gaddal, 1993, P. 42, 47-8).

Unlike Northern Sudan, Southern Sudan was only symbolically ruled by the Turks for a length of time. This caused the Sudan to be divided into two parts; one under strong Turkish grip, while the other was under much looser rule. For the first time in history, Turkish rule
divided the country into two administrative units; Southern Sudan and northern Sudan. According to this division, Southern Sudan, as defined, was not limited to the present southern Sudan. It included parts of the present Northern Sudan down to the present capital of Sudan, Khartoum, and vast areas parallel to it in the East and West, whereas Northern Sudan included the areas north to Khartoum up to the Egyptian borders (El Mahdi, 1965, P. 76).

Later, in Bahr Al Ghazal and other areas in Southern Sudan, the Turkish rulers cooperated with the ‘Jallaba,’ which means petty traders, some of whom were from Northern Sudan. This cooperation enabled these ‘Jallaba’ to establish autonomous political units in Southern Sudan, mostly under Turkish rule and with its consent (Collins, 2008, P. 13-4; El Gaddal, 1993, P. 44-5). This state of affairs led to strengthening the ethnic boundaries and undermining the cohesion, between Southern and Northern Sudanese.

THE MAHDIST REVOLUTION/STATE

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the harshness of Turkish rule, heavy taxes, unfamiliar administrative systems and methods of governance led to the eruption of a national revolution against Turkish rule. This revolution is known as the ‘Mahdist revolution’ (El Gaddal, 1993, P. 110-1). The Mahdist revolution was based on the Islamic idea of ‘Al Mahdi Al Muntazar,’ meaning the expected guided person (Collins, 208, P. 21) who is also a Salvator of the Muslims.  

4 Al Mahdi was a Sudanese religious scholar whose real name was Mohammed  

For a different view about Mahdist revolution see El Sawi and Jadain (1990) who look at this revolution as Arabic-Islamic, with the Arabic component being the major part, rather than being merely Islamic revolution, and this is
Ahmed Abdullah, a man from far Northern Sudan. He started the revolution against the Turkish government in the Sudan in August 1881 (Collins, 2008, P. 21; El Mahdi, 1965, P. 93).

A majority of the Sudanese people supported the cause of Al Mahdi for a variety of reasons in addition to those mentioned above: The image of Turkish officials in the Sudan was one of arrogant and corrupt; the government monopolized the ivory trade; government policy seemingly abolished the slave trade but in reality monopolized it (El Mahdi, 1965, P. 94-5).

The Mahdist revolution was a politico-religious revolution whose main objective was to return to the ‘true Islam,’ and establish an Islamic constitution for governing the country (Collins, 2008, P. 21; El Mahdi, 1965, P. 96-7) after emancipating it from the corrupt regime of the Turks. The Mahdists won a number of battles against the Turks in different places of the country. In four years, toward the end of January 1885, the capital of the Sudan, Khartoum, fell into the hands of Al Mahdi troops putting an end to Turkish rule in the Sudan and establishing a new Sudanese national Islamic regime (Collins, 2008, P. 23; El Mahdi, 1965, P. 100).

Shortly after the emancipation of the Sudan Al Mahdi died and was succeeded by Al Khalifa Abdullahi, from Western Sudan, who belonged to one of the Baggara tribes called Ta’aisha (Collins, 2008, P. 24; El Mahdi, 1965, P.101-4).

In addition to using the Islamic constitution, laws, and institutions, Al Khalifa also made use of the modern administrative system initially developed under Turkish rule. In his highly centralized administrative system, Al Khalifa brought most of the prominent Sudanese tribal

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the main reason for the success of the revolution as per the authors, because, they emphasize, although the Turkish were Muslims, yet they were not-Arabs who colonized Arabs.

5 In connection, see El Sawi and Jadain (1990) who maintain that Mahdist state is the first to unify the Sudan under a national rule
leaders to Omdurman, the Mahdist state capital city (Collins, 2008, P. 27; El Mahdi, 1965, P. 12). This provided an opportunity for the Sudanese from different ethnicities to come together in the same city and intermingle. In the long run, Omdurman became a melting pot and an example of the cohesion of different ethnic groups from all over the country.

In order to strengthen his grip, Al Khalifa tried to crush all uprisings (Collins, 2008, pp. 25-7). To do so he used his tribesmen from Western Sudan, ‘Awlad Al gharib’ to the exclusion of the tribes of the Nile Valley, ‘Awlad Al bahar,’ or the riverine people. The latter group opposed Al Khalifa on the grounds of believing that they were more worthy than him of being the rulers. This state of affairs led to continuous tensions, strife, and conflicts between the two groups of awlad al gharib and awlad al bahar (Collins, 2008, P. 24, 27, 31; El Mahdi, 1965, P. 104). This strife continued through the Mahdist reign, resulted in more tension and antagonism leading to emphasizing, strengthening, and sharpening of ethnic boundary between these two groups for a long time to come.6

In spite of the fairly clear ethnic boundary between the two groups, neither awlad al gharib nor awlad al bahar was a homogeneous group. There were many differences, sub-ethnic boundaries, and even conflicts and animosities among their sub-groups. On the other hand, by bringing these two bounded groups together in his capital city Omdurman, Al Khalifa created a confrontation between awlad al bahar and awlad al gharib. This caused the ethnic boundary between these two groups to be strengthened for a long time in spite of their intra-differences.

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6 It is proposed that Al Khalifa wanted to abolish both tribalism and centralization, but this did not hold, mainly because of the troubles and anti-Mhdist movements that started after the demise of Al Mahdi. For details in this issue see Abdulla (1986)
In Southern Sudan, the Mahdist revolution extended to cover Bahr Al Ghazal as early as 1881. By 1884 all of Bahr Al Ghazal, and the adjacent area of Rizaigat tribe, came under the authority of the Mahdist regime (Collins, 2008, pp. 23-4; El Gaddal, 1993, P. 144).

In the Nuba Mountains, the Tagali Islamic dynasty, the strongest dynasty in the area, was one of the leading forces that supported the Mahdist revolution, thus the area became part of the Mahdist state from the outset (Meyer and Nicholls, 2005, P. 7). Notwithstanding their support to the Mahdist revolution, Nuba tribes were oppressed by Al Khalifa’s troops, namely ‘the Jahadiya’ (Ibid, P. 7), meaning the holy warriors or warriors for holy cause. This happened because the Al Khalifa’s government had lost control over these troops, especially those who existed in remote areas far from the capital city.

Though contentious and oftentimes divisive, the Mahdist regime did bring together, for the first time, most of the Sudanese people under one Sudanese national government. The Mahdist regime also brought together Sudanese people from various tribes, regions, religious sects, languages, and cultures of the Sudan in such cities as Omdurman (El Mahdi, 1965, P 112) and other smaller cities and towns of the Northern part of the country. Over time, this unification resulted in intermarriages and intermingling among Sudanese, including Southern Sudanese who came to live in northern cities, especially Omdurman (Collins, 2008, 27). These intermarriages resulted in mixing people with different ethnic boundaries whose offspring are still living in certain neighborhoods in the city of Omdurman. If they were not stopped by later policies introduced by the British, especially those of zoning and closed districts, the mingling and intermarriages could have resulted in cohesion among different Sudanese ethnic groups and could have consequently led to strengthening the national boundary at the expense of ethnic ones.
Based on the above, Mahdist revolution can be thought of as an exogenous shift, as it brought Sudanese people under one national boundary. The Mahdist state changed the institutions, power distribution, and networks in the country. Nevertheless, the Mahdist state contributed to enhancing ethnic boundaries, as those between awlad al some gharib and awlad al bahar. Being a theocratic state, the Mahdist state strengthened religious boundaries between Muslims and non-Muslims as well as among different Muslim sects and Sufi orders, as those between the Ansar, the followers of Al Mahdi, and other Sufi orders such as Khatmyia, Ghadiryia, and Tiganiya some of which were considered to be enemies of the Mahdist state. The Mahdist state also strengthened the boundaries between tribes as it classified tribes into supporters and opponents. Supporters were given opportunities, whereas the opponents were not only deprived of opportunities, but were also persecuted.

**SUDAN AND BRITISH RULE**

By the end of the nineteenth century, a variety of international, regional and internal factors in the Sudan combined to weaken the Mahdist regime; these included the conflicts among different tribes and tribal groups; Al Khalifâ’s harsh policies and internal wars, especially in dealing with the uprisings against his regime; favoring and entrusting his own tribesmen over others; the external wars against the neighboring states which were based on the intention to extend Islamic rule to the rest of the world, including Egypt and the United Kingdom; the Mahdist regime sympathy with, and support of, the revolution against British rule in Egypt; and
the occurrence of a severe famine and financial crisis in the country (El Gaddal, 1993, P. 213-5; Meyer and Nicholls, 2005, P. 104).7

Within their framework of colonization, European powers had conquered vast areas in Africa, including most of the countries neighboring the Sudan from all directions (Collins, 2008, P. 30; El Gaddal, 1993, P. 216; El Mahdi, 1965, P. 117). The conquest of the Sudan can be understood as part of this competition among colonial powers.

Immediately after suppressing the revolution in Egypt in 1882, the British, with the Egyptians, started preparing for conquering the Sudan. The conquest was accomplished in 1898 in the famous battle of Karari, Omdurman, or ‘the river war’, as it is called by Winston Churchill (1933). This battle put an end to the Mahdist regime in the Sudan (Collins, 2008, P. 30; El Gaddal, 1993, P. 216). Soon after the conquest, colonialists established what is known in the history of the Sudan as the Anglo-Egyptian condominium (El Mahdi, 1965, P. 121). Although they were considered as partners of the British in ruling the Sudan, the Egyptians’ role was nominal, or at least minor, compared to the British who were the actual rulers of the country.

7 The Mahdist era, as well as its leaders, including Al Mahdi and Al Khalifa, is very controversial in the history of the Sudan. This controversy, in some, was rooted in the mostly contradictory interests, prejudices, and viewpoints of those who wrote about it. Those writers were mostly not Sudanese, see for example A prisoner of the Khaleefa, Neufeld (1899); Ten years of captivity in the Mahdi’s camp, Ohrwalder (11893); Fire and Sword in the Sudan, Slatin (1896), and History of the Sudan, Fawzi (1319 H. / 1902), the four of them were originally not Sudanese. They came during the Turkish rule to work in Sudan, and were prisoners and/or captives of Mahdist revolution and/or state. Therefore, they tried to condemn the Mahdistism as a regime and to defame its leaders. Other writers, such as Russel who worked in Sudan but not imprisoned, he wrote ‘The ruin of Sudan’ (1892). The Sudanese who were involved with the Mahdist revolution/state did not write about it, therefore most of the Sudanese writings occurred no less than fifty years after the conquest of the Sudan in 1898. Some of those Sudanese writers were supporters of the Mahdists either because of their family background or their subscription to the Umma party which is based on the Mahdistism and led by Al Mahdi offspring. For example, see Questions on Mahdist, Al Mahdi (1979). Still, other writers, most of whom were academics, tried to strike the balance between these opponents and proponents, I relied heavily on those scholars’ writings in dealing with this era of the history of Sudan.
In the first two decades after occupying the Sudan in 1898, British rule defined the current international political borders and thus the national boundary of the former Sudan (El Gaddal, 1993, P. 232; El Mahdi, 1965, P. 3). It also extended this national boundary through annexing areas, such as Darfur with all of its ethnic diversity.

It is worth mentioning that despite the negative effects of Turkish rule and Mahdist regimes, sub-ethnic boundaries in the Sudan before British colonization were still relatively weak, thin, permeable, and loose, therefore they were not strongly emphasized and maintained until the emergence of the British colonization. In other words, although they intersected in some aspects, these boundaries did not have serious negative effects on the Sudanese intergroups relations. They did not seriously constrain interethnic mingling, marriages, friendships, and other types of cohesive and individual interaction. This changed after the emergence of the British colonization.

The British rule established the foundations of modern economic, social, political, legal, security services, and administrative systems and institutions in the country (El Gaddal, 1993, P. 233-9; El Mahdi, 1965, P. 123). Unlike Turkish rule, British rulers made efforts to gain the trust of the Sudanese people through appearing to be good, just, and having closer relations with the elites in various localities (Collins, 2008, P. 37; El Gaddal, 1993, P. 244-6; El Mahdi, 1965, P. 124). British rule can also be considered an exogenous shift, because it defined and extended the political boundaries of the state. The British also introduced new policies, institutions, resources redistribution, and new networks and alliances which exerted a tremendous effect on the ethnic boundaries in the Sudan as discussed below.
One of the most important factors that having effect on ethnic boundaries in Sudan was the implementation of British administrative policy and institutions, as well as the networks and alliances introduced by them.\(^8\) The British colonial regime used a centralized system in which the British Governor General, in Khartoum, was the head of the state. The Governor General was assisted by three British ministers, called secretaries, for financial, legal, and administrative and civil affairs (Collins, 2008, P. 36). On the regional Administration level, the British divided the country into nine units or states (El Gaddal, 1993, P.237). Some powers were delegated to the states’ administrators and district commissioners. In order to achieve efficiency and avoid high administrative overhead in local governance, the British used native rule, or indirect rule. Local tribal leaders were delegated some small administrative powers under the supervision of the British officials (Idris, 2005, P. 20; Collins, 2008, P. 36; El Gaddal, 1993, P. 245; El Mahdi, 1965, P. 125).

For the native administrative system to be more efficient and to cover all parts of the country, British rule created, in some areas, big supra-tribal administrative units comprised of small tribes (El Mahdi, 1965, P. 132). Each of these tribal units was headed by a local leader, called ‘Nazir,’ as in Dar Hamid and Dar Hamar in northern Kordofan. Some large tribes were considered as administrative units in their own right, each headed by its tribal leader who was also called ‘Nazir,’ as for example the Kababeesh, Ja’alyeen, and Shukryia (Woodward, 1990, pp. 29-31). Thus, the British rule added new dimensions to the ethnic boundaries. It institutionalized the tribes by including them in the politico-administrative system. This led to enhancing the status of the local elites and rendered them keen to keep their status, authority, and share in the distribution of resources through keeping their groups ethnic boundaries intact, and

\(^8\) For detailed description of the British administrative system see Abdulla (1986)
also by maintaining their relations and status in the new networks introduced by the British rule (Woodward, 1990, P. 30).

Although they brought some of the smaller tribes under larger administrative units or larger ethnic boundaries, these measures did not attenuate or weaken sub-ethnic boundaries among these sub-groups or tribes. Each of these small tribes stayed as a separate group under its leader, called ‘Sheikh’ or ‘Omda,’ who was delegated some powers and had to report to the ‘Nazir’ (Woodward, 1990, P. 30). Various ethnic and sub-ethnic groups used a variety of strategies in order to maintain their group boundaries. The accumulation of these strategies can be considered as an endogenous shift. These strategies included selecting, codifying, and emphasizing differences from, and at the same time ignoring the similarities with, other groups. Some of these groups used the differences in subsistence activities as elements of ethnic boundaries. For example, the condition of being settled on land was used as a factor of boundary construction and maintenance. This was evident in the boundaries between nomads and sedentary groups, especially in Kordofan and Darfur.

The nomads or pastoralists in Darfur region, who were Arabs with the exception of Zaghawa and Medobe tribes who herd camels, considered themselves as superior to sedentary people who, in their turn, thought of these nomads as unrefined. This view neither prevented the sedentary people from small scale animal breeding, nor did it prevent the pastoralists from practicing limited farming for their own subsistence.

The animal herders themselves were not homogeneous; there were sub-ethnic boundaries among them based on subsistence activities. Camel herding tribes thought of themselves as superior to cattle herders who, in turn, thought of themselves as superior to sheep herders.
Although they had their sub-ethnic boundaries blurred based on similar economic activity, those who practiced the same economic activities, such as camel or cattle herding, were also not homogeneous. They maintained their ethnic boundaries, especially in the times of conflict. It is noteworthy that sometimes the whole tribe, or tribal unit, adopted the same subsistence activity, as for example Kababeesh and Shukryia who herded camels, whereas Baggara herded cattle.

Southern Sudan was a somewhat different case. As there were no animals other than cattle to herd because of the climate, and because agriculture was not pervasive, there was little discrimination based on economic activities. The number of cattle owned by a man was a determinant of his social status. It also shaped the perception of which men were considered suitable as marriage partners. Even though economic activity as a basis for differentiating between tribes was absent, ethnic boundaries among Southern tribes were generally stronger than among Northern ones.

However, British rule led to the politicization of tribes and tribal/ethnic boundaries. Thus, these boundaries became brighter and stronger as the tribes were transformed from cultural entities to more pragmatic groups of differentiated administrative, political, and economic weights and interests.

On the basis of the aforementioned British administrative policy, these tribes and tribal units were bound to the regions in which they lived. Therefore, strong regional boundaries were added to, and mostly became congruent with, the ethnic ones. As it was based on conquest, British rule engendered various kinds of resistance, part of which was violent. To stop the
escalating resistance and the national movement initiated by educated elites in Northern Sudan⁹, the British resorted to strengthening native rule and enhancing the status of tribal leaders at the expense of the educated elite. This resulted in adding more administrative, economic, and even judicial powers to these tribal leaders. Also, tribesmen were given considerably higher salaries compared to the educated Sudanese civil servants. Moreover, these leaders were given 10% to 15% of the taxes they collected (Abdalla, 1986, p. 110). According to this policy, the tribal leaders were rendered more powerful and the British officials became closer to them than to the educated elites (Collins, 2008, P. 37, 40-2; El Gaddal, 1993, P. 244).

Before the emergence of British colonization, tribal boundaries in the Sudan were mostly cultural and ‘racial.’ These boundaries were thin, permeable, loose, fluid, and mostly not too bright, especially in the absence of seriously violent conflicts as mentioned above. Through its various policies, the British rule emphasized, enhanced and gave tribalism more practical, political, and symbolic meanings (Woodward, 1990, pp. 301).

British rule designed a special policy for Southern Sudan, known as ‘Southern policy’ (Collins, 2008, P. 36, 42, 54-5; MacMichael, 1930b, 1930a).¹⁰ According to this policy in the first two decades of colonization, the British were very cruel and violent with Southern Sudanese tribes that resisted their rule. This led to weakening the tribes but not the boundaries among them. The tribe, as a social institution, as well as tribalism, did not disappear or become less accentuated in Southern Sudan. The Southern policy was, indeed, responsible for strengthening the boundary between Southern and Northern Sudanese that, though strong, was not as sharp as

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⁹This tendency had particularly strengthened in the aftermath of 1924 revolution led by the educated Sudanese elites, including Sudanese military officers, for details in this regard see Abdulla (1986)

¹⁰The southern policy is detailed in Sir Harold McMichael, the administrative secretary’s, memorandum to the southern Sudan provinces governor (CS/1C1) Dated January 25, 1930
it is now. In other words, without the ‘southern policy,’ the boundary between Southern and Northern Sudanese could have been, more or less, similar to the boundaries between Northern Sudanese marginalized groups, such as Fur, Bija, and Angessana, and riverine people on the other.11

In response to these colonial polices, the Sudanese national movement escalated in the central region and disseminated to other regions. In its first stages, this movement was led by the vanquished Mahdist regime supporters, educated elites, and other opponents in different places in the country (El Mahdi, 1965, P. 136). For instance, ‘the Sudanese Union,’ an opponent organization that adopted civil resistance against British rule was created by some elites. This organization was preceded, in 1923, by the ‘White Flag League’, which called for the independence of the Sudan and unity of the Nile Valley under the Egyptian King (Collins, 2008, 39-40; El Mahdi, 1965, P. 137).

In a measure to prevent this national movement from spreading to other regions, and before implementing ‘southern policy,’ the British implemented the policy of closed districts. According to this policy, vast Sudanese regions - mainly Southern Sudan, Darfur, Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile, and Bija area in the East - were closed to stem the population’s patterns of travel and movement. Free movement was not allowed among these regions, and between any of them and the Centre, except with special permits (Deng, L., 2003). This policy of closed districts was responsible for enhancing ethno-regional boundaries and making them even brighter and stronger.

11 Abdulla (1986) maintains that this policy was intentionally designed as a time bomb, so it can cause troubles to the Sudanese in case of acquiring their independence!
By 1929, the national movement was weakened after crushing the armed uprising of the ‘White Flag’ group in 1924. Then the closed district policy was relaxed in most of the Sudanese regions. Yet, in order to stop the spread of Islam to central Africa (Collins, 2008, P. 36, 40-3), the British decided to separate the Southern from the Northern part of the Sudan, and annex it to one of the central or East African countries. This is the reason that the policy of closed districts was firmly and strictly applied to Southern Sudan but relaxed in Northern regions. According to this policy, the British administration had exiled all the Northern Sudanese officials from the South; banned travel between the North and the South but with special permits. Moreover, they banned the Southern Sudanese from using Arabic language or Islamic symbols, names, or costumes (Collins, 2008, P. 41-3; El Gaddal, 1993, P. 146-7).

This policy of zoning was a central factor that led to further strengthening and sharpening of ethnic boundaries. It impeded the development of cohesion between Southern and Northern Sudanese, and to a lesser degree impeded cohesion among various Northern Sudanese from various regions. This policy of zoning, eventually led to antagonism among some of these regional/ethnic groups, especially Southerners and Northerners.

Here it is worthwhile noting that this binary of Southerners and Northerners, as two distinct groups, was basically created and developed by colonization, both Turkish and British. The latter was more effective in maintaining the division than the former. This was the standard means of colonization, especially in African countries. For example, the Hutu and Tutsi were basically created in the course of colonization becoming two distinct ethnic groups in Rwanda (Rudolph, 2006, P. 169). Nevertheless, this did not render either the Hutu or Tutsi a homogeneous group, but rather there were, and still are, many differences, and sometimes contradictions, among their sub-groups.
The same British policy of zoning, based on a principle of divide and rule, was pursued within Southern Sudan (Abbas, 1973; Deng, L., 2003). This policy resulted in enhancing ethnic/tribal boundaries and rendered Southern Sudan a state inside the Sudanese state, as well as a miniature of the divided Sudan, based on ethnic, cultural, lingual, and religious boundaries (Deng, L, 2003).

This policy was removed and reversed in the late 1940s, given the administrative secretary’s memorandum of 1946. Nevertheless, it continued to be effective in strengthening ethno/regional boundaries; impeding the cohesion between Southern and Northern Sudanese, and constraining cohesion among various Northern Sudanese regions.

The regional boundaries created and emphasized by British rule coincided with the ethnic boundaries as aforementioned. These regions were treated as peripheries to the central region, especially the capital Khartoum in which all the government administrative, political, economic, and social institutions, along with public utilities and services, were concentrated. This centralization resulted in marginalizing other regions, especially the Southern, far Western, and Eastern regions, the Nuba Mountains and the Southern part of the Blue Nile province. By and large, boundaries were constructed and strengthened between Centre and peripheries.

In short, British administrative policies exerted cumulative effects on strengthening ethnic boundaries, further complicating the relationship between Southern and Northern Sudanese. These policies also added regional, racial, religious, cultural, and linguistic-based boundaries by preventing cohesion between these two groups. That is the main reason that, unlike Northern Sudanese, the vast majority of Southern Sudanese are non-Arab and/or non-Muslim. Also, these administrative policies and institutions strengthened sub-ethnic boundaries.
among Northern as well as among Southern Sudanese sub-groups causing animosity and antagonism in some cases. These boundaries and their ramifications are used for waging lethal conflicts that pervade and persist in the two Sudans at the present.

The strength of these boundaries, especially between Southerners and Northerners, is evident in that members of these two groups do not truly know each other well, because they were not involved in direct natural social interaction. They knew of each other through elite opinion, rumors, informal reports, plots, and stories that portray them one to another in distorted frightening ways.

Another important factor that exerted an effect on ethnic boundaries in the Sudan is the development policy associated with British rule. British rule, as articulated by Lord Kitchener in his Governor General’s report (1900, P. 75), did not want to burden British tax payers with the expenses of development in the Sudan. This led to the neglect of the infrastructure, services, and other development projects, except for projects that helped British rule. Upon their conquest of the Sudan in 1898, the British established infrastructure in the important areas for them. This is evident in extending a railway from the Egyptian border to Khartoum, the capital city creating an easy and cost effective transportation link for the conquering army and its supplies. The railway line was later extended to El Obeid for transporting gum Arabic. The rail line was extended to the ‘Gezira’ area, one of the most important areas of producing cotton.

The railway was extended to Port Sudan, the main port of the country, for transporting exports and imports (Roden, 1974; Nour, 2013). The rail line was extended to other places when deemed necessary for economic or security reasons.¹² The other regions of this large country

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¹² See Governor General’s report (1903, P. 2)
remained isolated, as there were neither roads nor rail lines built to connect them to each other and the Centre during the colonial era.\(^{13}\)

The establishment of the Gezira agricultural project, the largest project ever in the Sudan, was principally intended to provide the British textile factories in Lancashire with raw cotton (Nour, 2013; Roden, 1974). This project, along with other minor projects in central Sudan, was not balanced with development projects in other regions. This unbalanced development was intentional by the British, as lack of projects, and thereby lack of jobs in other regions, provided the labour intensive Gezira project with the needed labourers from other regions. The labourers would have had the opportunity to remain in their areas if there were development projects therein (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006; Roden, 1974).

Unlike Northern Sudan, Southern Sudan was totally ignored by the British in terms of development (El Mahdi, 1965, P. 133). The British did not establish any infrastructure or development projects in the South, except for one agricultural project in the Azande district after the Juba conference of 1947 (Woodward, 2005, P. 76, 84). This neglect of development was also an integral part of the abovementioned ‘Southern policy’ (Collins, 2008, P. 36, 54-5; MacMichael, 1930b, 1930a). Services such as health care, water, and electric power were not delivered to various regions of the country in a balanced manner, as most were concentrated in central provinces to the exclusion of other regions, including Southern Sudan.

\(^{13}\) For the whole period of the British rule, the paved roads outside the main cities did not exceed 150 miles, yet some other unpaved roads were built, as for the railways they did not witness any significant extensions until our present day, as Abbud government extended them in the early 1960s, though with one line, to Nyala in Darfur and Wau in Bahr El Ghazal province in the northern part of the southern region; see Beshir (1974), Collins, (2008) and Roden, (1974) for more details.
The British educational policy was another factor in strengthening ethno-regional boundaries in the Sudan. In order to avoid high administration expenses, the British established a modern education system in order to provide civil service with native staff in junior positions (Collins, 2008, P. 46-7; El Mahdi, 1965, P. 128; Holt, 1961, P. 119-20; Nour, 2013). That is the reason that, with the exception of Gordon’s college, the highest level of education in the country was the elementary level until the second half of 1930s (Collins, 2008, P. 47; Holt, 1961, pp. 195-7; Woodward, 1990, P. 80-1), as the first intermediate school was opened in 1937 (Collins, 2008, P. 47). To weaken the modern educated Northern Sudanese who became more active in opposing it, the British rule encouraged traditional religious schools, called ‘khalwas’ (Collins, 2008, P. 43).

The distribution of educational institutions, and thereby educational opportunities and attainment, was not equal. The priority was given to the tribes leaders’ offspring in various regions (Prunier, 2005, P. 30 quoting the British Governor of Darfur; Bashir, 1974, P. 55; Governor General’s report, 1901, P. 52). Also, preference was given to urban areas where education institutions, including schools were concentrated to the exclusion of the rural areas where inhabitants represented about 80% of the Sudanese population at the time (Bachtold, 1976, P. 8; Nour, 2013).

Moreover, preference in admission to schools was given to the riverine or awlad al bahar (Collins, 2008, P. 36). This was enhanced by concentrating education institutions in the central and Northern provinces as mentioned above.

These measures resulted in marginalization of the remaining regions. For example, in 1944 almost 95% of the Sudanese secondary school students were from the riverine provinces of
the North, whose population did not exceed 45% of the country population. This figure was reduced to 88% in 1956 (Beshir quoted by Roden, 1974).

Part of the rational for the concentration of education in the central provinces, especially the Northern parts of the Blue Nile province was economic. Cotton, which was necessary to the British textile industry, as well as some other cash crops were produced in this province. These measures resulted in more marginalization and disadvantage of all other regions, especially the South, in terms of education, other vital services, and development (Mohammed, 2006).

In their grave endeavor to separate Southern from Northern Sudanese, and within the framework of its ‘southern policy’ in the South (Abdalla, 1986, P. 178; El Mahdi, 1965, P. 133; Deng, L., 2003), the British ignored education, among other public services, for almost the first two decades. After that, education in Southern Sudan was left to the Christian missionaries for the last three decade of British rule (Abdalla, 1986, P. 177; El Mahdi, 1965, P. 129; Nour, 2013, Roden, 1974). The government did not assume any responsibility for education in Southern Sudan until the mid-1940s (El Gaddal, 1993, P. 249; El Mahdi, 1965, P. 135). This contributed to widening the cultural and religious gap between the Southerners and the Northerners. The Southerners were rendered less educated than the Northerners on average (Deng, L., 2003), albeit the Northern Sudanese themselves were not equal in the slim available education opportunities.

With increasing national consciousness, an association of the graduates of the modern schools, known as the ‘Graduates’ General Congress,’ emerged in the year 1938 (Collins, 2008, P. 48; El Mahdi, 1965, P. 138) beginning a new phase of the Sudanese national movement. This

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14 See Abdulla (1986) for detailed account of education in southern Sudan
organization played a future major role in the independence of the Sudan. The Graduates’ General Congress was the political framework combining two opposing factions; one called for the unity of the independent Sudan with Egypt; the other raised the slogan of ‘the Sudan for the Sudanese’;\(^{15}\) the former was the radical opponent and antagonistic to, whereas the latter cooperated with, British rule. Yet, the goal of each party was to achieve the independence of the Sudan in its own way. These two factions of the Graduates’ General Conference were the embryos of the biggest Sudanese political parties, the Umma Party and Al Ashiqqaa, later becoming the National Unionist Party (Collins, 2008, P. 51; El Mahdi, 1965, P. 140-1). Each played major roles in Sudanese politics including the present. These two parties, National Unionist and Umma, operated under the leadership of religious Sufi orders, ‘Khatmyia’ under the auspice of Ali Almirghani, a prominent Sudanese religious leader, and the other the Mahdists, known as ‘Ansar,’ meaning supporters, under the auspice of Abdul Rahman Al Mahdi, the son of Al Mahdi (Collins, 2008, P. 51; El Mahdi, 1965, P. 141).

These two major parties, together with other Sudanese political organizations, helped to accelerate the move to independence of the Sudan. Nevertheless, the stances of these political parties were contested. For example, the Umma Party was criticized by the Graduates’ Congress and other political organizations as being a tool of colonial policies. By participating in the ‘Advisory Council for Northern Sudan,’ a quasi-legislative body established by the British in 1944 (Collins, 2008, 52), the Party was thought to maintain, if not exacerbate, the divisions and antagonism between the North and South as it neglected the latter.

\(^{15}\) This slogan was thought of as a false one promoted by the proponents of the British rule in the Graduates’ General Congress, for details in this regard see Abdulla (1986) and El Gaddal (1992).
Notwithstanding their struggle against British colonization and their crucial role in the fight for independence of the Sudan, the Northern political elites’ rhetoric for mobilizing Sudanese masses was based on Arabism and Islamism without any mention of Africanism or use of any African rhetoric. For example, poetry, speeches, writings, and theatrical plays were mainly about the glorious history and splendid genealogies of the Sudanese people harkening either from prominent Arab tribes or prominent Muslim grandfathers belonging to the Prophet Mohammed’s household. Based on this Arabic/Islamic identity, Sudanese people felt pride in themselves for being characterized by being brave, patient, and tough fighters, yet, at the same time helpful, generous, friendly, and righteous. Since it was adopted by powerful groups, this rhetoric contributed to rendering Sudanese national identity as exclusively Arabic and Islamic to the exclusion of non-Arabs and/or non-Muslims. This rhetoric was mainly held by the larger parties in the Sudan, the Umma and National Unionist parties. It reinforced ethnic boundaries between Arabs and non-Arabs as well as between Muslims and non-Muslims.

These two parties were exclusively northern parties. Their constituencies coincided with the ethnic and regional map of Northern Sudan. The Umma Party dominated, and still dominates, the Western and the southern part of Northern Sudan, whereas the National Unionist Party, later the Democratic Unionist Party after the amalgamation with the People’s Democratic Party, dominated northern and Eastern parts of the country (Collins, 2008, P. 58). This political division overlapped sectarian divisions in Northern Sudan.

These two parties had and until the present an extremely negligible existence in Southern Sudan, which was diverse in its religions as highlighted above.
Since their intention was to isolate Southern Sudan from the rest of the Sudan and annex it to one of the neighboring countries (El Gaddal, 1993, P. 246-7), the British did not deal with Southern Sudan the same way they dealt with the North. Nevertheless, for a variety of reasons, including the refusal of Uganda and Kenya to accept the annexation of Southern Sudan, the British were convinced that the isolation of Southern Sudan from the North was not practical. Therefore, they changed their policy and declared in 1946 their intention of giving Southern Sudan the right of self-determination. A conference, called Juba conference, was held in 1947 (Collins, 2008, pp. 56-7; El Mahdi, 1965, P. 143). The conference was attended by the British and by Southern and Northern Sudanese representatives. The objective of the conference was to explore Southern and Northern Sudanese opinion with regard to the future status of Southern Sudan and whether it remains part of a unified Sudan.

In that conference, Southern Sudanese politicians agreed with a united Sudan as a federal state. They were promised, by Northern Sudanese politicians, that the Sudan would be a federal state if the Southerners’ politicians and Members of Parliament would vote for independence. This agreement facilitated the independence of the country by warranting a consensus of all Southern and Northern Sudanese politicians, especially Members of Parliament, that the country should be an independent state. Following the conference, a legislative body and an executive council for each of Southern and Northern Sudan was created (Collins, 2008, pp. 57-8; El Mahdi, 1965, P. 144).

In February 1953, the Sudan was officially granted the right of self-government in order to prepare for self-determination. A transitional Sudanese parliament was elected from Southern and Northern Sudanese, and the first Cabinet of Ministers was selected in 1954 (Woodward, 1990, P. 88). Until the time of independence in January 1956, both of the transitional Parliament
and Cabinet of Ministers were responsible for governing the country, albeit the British Governor General had limited veto with regard to issues related to legislation, public services, and Southern Sudan (Collins, 2008, P. 59).

One of the main mandates of this transitional government was to supervise the procedures of self-determination and also to replace British with Sudanese civil servants in what was known back then as the ‘Sudanization of jobs’ (El Mahdi, 1965, P. 146-8). Eight hundred Sudanized jobs in Southern Sudan were created. The committee of Sudanization, mainly comprised of Northerners, allocated the jobs to Northern Sudanese employees except for six junior positions allocated to Southern Sudanese (Collins, 2008, P. 65; Poggo, 2009, P. 36). This served to perpetuate resentment in South Sudan over the dominance of the North and Northerners (Collins, 2008, P. 66).16

Although the oppression of Western and Eastern Sudan was not much better than in the South, the case of Southern Sudan was exacerbated by a history of a more active slave trade and accompanying atrocities, a series of problems created by colonization policies, and Northern Sudanese politicians dishonoring agreements with Southern Sudanese.17

This combination of factors engendered and reinforced lack of trust between Southern and Northern Sudanese. One result of this lack of trust was a Southern Sudanese military mutiny in Turit in Southern Sudan in 1955, five months before the independence of Sudan (Collins, 2008, pp. 65-7; El Mahdi, 1965, P. 148). Despite the incident, independence was declared by the

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16 For justification of this maldistribution of jobs in the South see Abdulla (1986) who was sitting in the committee of Sudanization as a representative of the Ministry of local governance

17 For details on northerners’ dishonouring of agreements with southerners see Alier (1992)
transitional Parliament with the full consensus of both Southern and Northern Sudanese Members (Collins, 2008, P. 58).

The mutiny was the beginning of a long history of violent conflict and fragile peace between Southern and Northern Sudan. These conditions led to strengthening, brightening, and sharpening the boundary between them, and eventually resulted in the splinter of the country and formation of the state of South Sudan in 2011 after a referendum that same year (see map 2).

THE POST-COLONIAL PERIOD IN SUDAN

Since independence, Sudanese politics has been characterized by a vicious cycle of military coup d’états and dictatorships on one hand, and weak democratic regimes on the other (Collins, 2006, P. 71-2). Regardless of the nature of governance, whether democratic or dictatorial, Northern Sudanese politicians and civil servants who replaced the British started building the new state on the basis of Arabism as the national identity of the Sudan. Their plan for the non-Arabic ethnic groups, especially the Southern Sudanese, was assimilation into mainstream Arabic-Islamic Sudanese society.

Regardless of the nature of governance, post-colonial governments tended to mimic British colonization with minor nonessential modifications, in many administrative, developmental, and educational policies (Abdalla, 1986, p. 121).

Under the post-colonial Sudanese regimes, tribal leaders continued to play, more or less, the same administrative role assigned to them under the British. This applies to the first three
governments that followed British rule: the first democratic regime of 1956-8; Abboud’s military regime 1958-64; and the second democratic regime 1964-9. The ruling governments made few modifications in the administrative institutions and policies introduced under the British. The exception is their program of ‘Sudanization’, or nationalization of government jobs, where senior British officials were replaced by Sudanese. The administrative institutions and policy with its focus on the tribes and their leaders was not changed, but during the early years of Major General Numayri’s military regime, 1969-1985. ‘Native administration’ was dissolved, in 1970, and replaced with local councils whose members were not knowledgeable about administration (Collins, 2008, P. 173). This measure neither deemphasized tribalism nor brought more efficiency to the administrative system and so tribalism continued to be politically significant.

Although local councils were generally used by successive post-colonial regimes in the Sudan, tribes and tribal/ethnic boundaries were intensively abused by the present military regime of Major General Omer El Bashir (Gresh, 2003, P. 239-40). Under the El Bashir regime, tribal leaders were given more political weight. Yet, they were stratified in a hierarchy depending on their stance regarding the government and its actions. The tribes, and tribal leaders who supported the government were distinguished and given higher status than non-supporters and opponents. Some of the opponent tribal leaders were dismissed and replaced by government proponents, mostly from the same family. This is evident in Darfur after the eruption of the violent conflict between the Arabs and non-Arabs, known as ‘Zurga’ (Ateem, 2007) which means black people.

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18 For details on the changes that emerged on the native administration during Numairy’s military regime see Abdulla (1986)
In an odd step, and based on self-interest, the government divided some opposing tribes into two or more administrative units each with its own leader. In an unprecedented measure, some of the traditional and historical tribal lands were taken from opposing, and given to the supporting, tribes. Here it is worth mentioning that tribal territories or tribal land in the Sudan represent the tribe’s honour, dignity, prestige, and pride, to the extent that the tribes’ people can wage wars if their territories are attacked or taken.

Another manifestation of the enhancement of tribalism under El Bashir’s regime is that, unlike the past, a person’s tribe became part of the required information in official government documents and forms, such as the newly introduced national number, equivalent to the social insurance number in Canada. Job applications require this too. This indicates that the applicant’s tribe has relevance with awarding or denying jobs a situation well understood by most of the Sudanese people nowadays.

Tribalism is also manifested in government institutions. Important ministries are controlled by certain tribes’ members, as for example the ministry of energy is mainly run and controlled by people who belong to the Shaygyia tribe as identified in Sudan at present. Moreover, tribal identity is obviously considered in appointing people for the cabinet of Ministers and important senior government jobs. On a different level, the intra-ruling party strife and conflicts became, to great extent, tribally-based.

Given this heavy politicization of the tribe, the effect of tribalism was no longer limited to the political arena; but exceeded it and trickled down to the larger society. As a result of government policies, people have become extraordinarily sensitive to tribalism, to the extent that
when they introduce themselves, Sudanese people start by mentioning, asking, and/or being asked about, their tribal identity. This was not the case three decades ago.

Given the above, the British administrative institutions and policies continued to be implemented by all post-colonial governments. The present government illustrates this point. It attempted to pit different tribes against each other, and ally with some tribes against others when it was confronted with opposition in marginalized peripheries. This state of affairs resulted in more policing or maintaining, strengthening, and sharpening of the ethno-regional boundaries, especially with the eruption of the lethal conflicts in most of the regions of the country. This is especially true under the present government of the Sudan which has followed an even more racialized approach to governing the country.

Following the colonial regime policies, and using the Arabic-Islamic ideology, the Sudan government has been implementing ‘divide and rule’ on different Sudanese ethnicities. It discriminates against non-Arab and non-Muslims such as the Southern Sudanese, and also against some Muslims who are non-Arabs, especially those who oppose the government, such as some people of Darfur in the West, Southern Blue Nile, the Bija in the East, and Nuba Mountains’ tribal unit in Kordofan.

Following British practice, successive Sudanese post-colonial governments paid little attention to development in various geographic peripheries in the West, East, North, and of course the South. The latter continued to be isolated, poor, and underdeveloped compared to other parts of the country. These policies toward Southern Sudan engendered a lack of trust between Southern Sudanese and post-colonial regimes. This contributed to the eruption of lethal
conflict cycling with the sharpening of ethno-regional boundaries between Northern and Southern Sudan, eventually leading to the secession/independence of South Sudan.

Since independence, disparities in regional development, measured in terms of government spending on development, continued. One of the important reasons for this disparity was the lack of political will, as stated by Roden (1974) and Abdulbari (2013). More development funds were allocated to the regions that gave support to the governments, especially military regimes. In addition, favoritism was based on the regional identity of the senior government officials. It is worthwhile mentioning that most of the high government officials continued, until the present time, to be from the North and the center, rather than other regions of the country (The Black Book, 2000; Madibbo, 2012; Roden, 1974).

Another manifestation of the continuity of marginalization of most of the Sudanese regions/peripheries in terms of development was the distribution of the scarce industrial projects. For example, only one milk canning factory was established in Darfur region. One fruit canning factory was established in the Southern region.\footnote{Both stopped working after they got into technical problems resulting from lack of good planning, see Ateem (2007) and Roden (1974)} Sugar factories were established in the central and Eastern regions, to the deprivation of the Southern region where growing sugar cane is economically more feasible (Roden, 1974).

With respect to transportation, the only railway line extended to Darfur in early 1960s, and then extended to Wau in the Southern region to become the only land link between the North and the South (Collins, 2008, P. 77). Prior to this, the railroad was extended to Al-Damazin in
the Southern part of the Blue Nile province in 1959 just before the building of a new water Dam on the Blue Nile (Roden, 1974; Ateem, 2007).

Since early 1960s, and until our present day, the railway was not extended to any other region of the country. However, as recent as the 2000s, paved highway roads were extended to the Northern provinces, central region, and one road to Kordofan and Darfur under the present government.

In order to have a clear sense of the unbalanced development in the Sudan, it is important to know that the highest average per capita spending,\(^{20}\) about 80% of average spending on development, consistently continued to be in Northern regions. The Eastern region, Darfur, Kordofan, and Southern regions accounted for 11% of the government spending on development (Azzain, 2006; Ateem, 2007), although the latter group of provinces house more than half of the Sudanese population.

Development was unbalanced in terms of economic sectors. The focus for development was on agriculture rather than other sectors such as manufacturing and services (Azzain, 2006; Nour, 2013; UNDP, 2010). Development was understood by the government in terms of economic feasibility. This approach ignored social, political, and environmental aspects of development (Roden, 1974), which are crucial to influencing people with regard to all aspects of life. Successful political development leads to better democratic practice which is crucial to other aspects of development as it enhances such principles as transparency and accountability.

\(^{20}\) Per capita spending on development can be computed by dividing the total spending on development projects in the region by the number of the population in the same region; this indicator is thought to be more indicative of the state of development in a region compared to the absolute numbers which do not consider the population density.
Inter-regional inequality is apparent in the provision of vital services such as health and sanitation, education, access to clean water, and environment observation (Nour, 2013). It is indeed striking to note that in spite of the increase in the present government revenue due to oil production, the budget allocated for education, health, and clean water supplies together was only 6.3% of the state general budget in the period 2001-2003. Most of the budget was devoted to military and security priorities (World Bank, 2003).

Access to services is centered in the capital city and the riverine North rather than other Sudanese regions, especially the Western and Southern Sudan. This includes hospitals, health centers, and numbers of medical doctors and specialists. The ratio of medical doctors/patients averaged to 46/100000 in Khartoum, whereas it is about 2/100000 in Darfur, and 3/100000 in Southern Sudan. This marginalization of the peripheries is thought to be part of the present Sudanese government strategy for the regions other than the central region, known as Hamdi’s triangle. The rebellious regions have especially suffered from the unfair distribution of development projects as well as other services. This practice is an indication of bad governance on the part of the Sudanese government, a real threat to the unity of the reminder of the country (Azzain, 2006) after the split of its southern part. The same applies to South Sudan as it does not follow a balanced development policy.

The post-colonial governments tended to reproduce colonial policies in the field of education. This caused disparities among various regions, especially in terms of student enrollment and pupil/teacher ratios. Enrollment rates averaged up to 72% for Khartoum,

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21 For more details see UNICEF, 2000, black book 2000, world bank 2003
22 Hamdi is one of the prominent economic policy makers of the government, he presented a paper in an investment conference in the Sudan, in this paper he prompts the government to limit its investment and development spending to the riverine north and Centre rather than the rebellious regions such as Darfur, for more details see Hamdi (2005)
Northern, and Central regions, whereas it did not exceed 41% in the rest of the regions, with
the Southern Sudan enrollment rate the lowest as it did not exceed 13%.\textsuperscript{23} This is especially
ture under the present regime as reports indicate that the quality of education continues to be
degraded in the peripheries compared to the Centre (Coblam, 2005).

The average pupil/teacher ratio was always relatively better in the riverine Northern
regions, followed by the Eastern region as compared to Kordofan, Darfur, and Southern regions
(Nour, 2013). In the marginalized regions, large numbers of students originate from the riverine
regions, as their parents relocated to form the upper class of politicians, senior government
employees, merchants, and investors.

The successive post-colonial regimes continued teaching the same colonial curriculum in
all levels of schooling with few modifications (Deng, L., 2003). Like the British, post-colonial
regimes have neglected teaching social sciences and humanities in the intermediate and high
schools has been neglected. Even in the biggest and the best university in the Sudan, namely
University of Khartoum, there is no department for Sociology. There is a department of
Anthropology based on the old colonial perspective that anthropology, as the study of primitive
societies, was originally meant to help in understanding these ‘primitive’ societies so they could
be governed effectively and without conflicts. This absence has deprived the society of many
opportunities, including the opportunity of scholarly study of issues such as inequality and
inequity, and the implications in the society.

After independence, post-colonial regimes tried to reverse the colonial educational policy
in the South and impose Arabic Islamic identity through various policies, including education.

\textsuperscript{23} For more detail see UNICEF 2000 and the black book 2000.
They opened a few government sponsored schools whose language of instruction was Arabic. There was an option of teaching either Islamic or Christian religions to the exclusion of the traditional African religions. At the same time the missionary schools continued educating Southern Sudanese according to their own policies. This rendered educational institutions and policy in Southern Sudan not in resonance with the education policy followed in Northern Sudan.

As a result of such a policy, although they represented over 28% of the Sudanese population, the Southern Sudanese rates of enrolment in the general education institutions did not exceed an average of 13% for the period 1960-1983 compared to the Northerners’ rates (Deng, L., 2003).

This disparity among regions, especially in development and education, led to disparities in the accumulation of human and social capital between the centre and peripheries, and between the Southern and Northern part by and large. Many jobs were occupied by the riverine Northerners who attained higher education compared to the Sudanese in other regions, especially Southern Sudanese.

The discrimination and marginalization associated with unbalanced development was the result of policies first pursued by the colonial and then post-colonial governments. They concentrated the government administrative, political, economic, and even social institutions, along with infrastructure, agricultural, industrial, educational, public utilities, and other services

24 Sometimes, the present government grants high income jobs to some qualified people from the peripheries for political reasons, as for example a PhD. holder from Darfur, and more importantly a member of the ruling party, was appointed as a General Manager of the Gum Arabic Company in 1998. The main reason behind that politically-based appointment was to bring some stability to the region by putting someone with strong tribal background into such a leading position. For more details please see Elamin (2001, pp. 125-7)
institutions in the riverine Northern regions and marginalized other regions. This marginalization has contributed to creating class boundaries that coincide with the ethno-regional boundaries, as the rates of poverty are by far higher in the peripheries compared to the riverine core as mentioned afore.

**REBELLIONS AND CONFLICT IN POST-COLONIAL SUDAN**

Disparities in vital areas such as development and education have been a main reason, if not the main one, for the various rebellions and violent conflicts that have afflicted the Sudan since independence. As they developed and became intractable, these lethal conflicts led to incremental strengthening, brightening, and sharpening of ethnic boundaries in the Sudan. For example, the mutiny of 1955 had eventually turned into a guerilla war led by Southern Sudanese militias. These militias fled to the bushes as they were dealt with cruelly by the Sudanese army under the command of Major-General Abboud’s military regime, 1958-1964, which overthrew the first democratically elected government, 1956-8, by way of coup d’état (Collins, 2008, 72).

Moreover, the promises of federalism and/or self-governance, given by the Northern politicians to the Southerners during the Juba conference and the subsequent meetings about independence, were never fulfilled (Alier, 1992).

In October 1964, a popular uprising succeeded in overthrowing Abboud’s regime by means of political strike and civil disobedience (Collins, 2008, pp. 80-1), and it is ironic that the direct reason for the uprising was the objection to the policies and the harsh methods used by the
dictatorial government to resolve the ‘question of the South’ (Collins, 2008, P. 80-1). Nevertheless, the democratically elected government under the leadership of the Prime Minister Mohammed Ahmed Mahgub, which was brought to power by October 1964 uprising, was no less harsh than the military government (Collins, 2008, P. 86).

In 1965, a round table conference was held in Khartoum to resolve the problem of Southern Sudan. It failed to arrive at any viable solution, and contributed to aggravating the situation and decreasing the trust between the Southern and Northern Sudanese (Collins, 2008, P. 83-4).

Southern Sudanese along with others who live in peripheral areas, who were ethnically different from the powerful riverine people suffering more marginalization, oppression, and neglect by the central government started organizing themselves on geographic, ethnic, racial, and/or cultural bases. These organizations included, beside the Southern Sudanese ones of Sudan African National Union ‘SANU’ 1963 (Collins, 2008, P. 79; Poggo, 2009, P. 114), the Darfur Development Front, in the far Western Sudan 1963 (Prunier, 2005, P. 41), the Nuba Mountain General Union, in Kordofan province 1964 (Abbas, 1973), and the Bija Congress in Eastern Sudan, established on 1965 (Woodward, 1990, 114). These Dar Fur and Nuba Mountains’ organizations were preceded in 1938 by a political organization that included the Khartoum residents from Darfur, Nuba Mountain, and Fallata tribe (Bechtold, 1976, P. 93).25

Violent conflict continued in Southern Sudan from 1955, through the first dictatorship and the two democracies, until 1972 when a peace agreement was concluded, in Addis Ababa.

25 Abdulla (1986) has a very surprising viewpoint about these regional organizations. He thinks that these are racist and terrorist organizations established by malevolent elites who promote separation and disunion. 26 Fallata is a Sudanese tribe whose origin is Nigeria, They used to be pass by the Sudan on their way to Mecca to perform pilgrimage.
between the military Sudanese regime, headed by Major-General Ga’afar Numayri, and the Anya Nya forces, the main Southern Sudanese militia (Collins, 2008, P. 111; Poggo, 2009, P. 123).

The agreement gave the Southern region self-government under the united Sudan. It was eventually violated by Numayri in 1983, who wanted to capitalize on the sub-ethnic boundaries among the Southern Sudanese and divide the region into three regions contrary to the Addis Ababa peace agreement.

These developments led to another Southern Sudanese mutiny against Numayri in 1983. The mutiny was led by the ‘Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army/Movement’ SPLA/M, under the command of Colonel John Garang, a former officer in the Sudanese army. The SPLA/M was more organized, more comprehensive than the Anya Nya as it included people from most of the Southern Sudanese tribes, with stronger and more skilled leadership, and clear political vision and military program.

As is obvious from its name, the SPLA/M was a national, not a regional, movement whose objective was to fight for creating a ‘new Sudan,’ as opposed to the ‘old Sudan’ as mentioned in its manifesto. The new Sudan, according to the SPLA/M, would be a country where people live in real peace, achieved through replacing the dictatorial government and embracing ‘true democracy.’ This would guarantee equality, equity, social justice, and inclusion of all Sudanese people regardless of their racial, cultural, linguistic, regional, and religious differences (Collins, 2008, pp. 142-3; Garang, 2005, P. 40).

The vision behind the creation of the ‘new Sudan,’ as defined by the SPLA/M, involved replacing the old Sudanese socio-political mentality, especially among the political intelligentsia, by a new one tolerating of ‘the other’ and accommodating of diversity within a national
This idea of the ‘new Sudan’ attracted both Southern and Northern Sudanese to join the SPLA/M as fighters, politicians, and/or supporters, especially progressive and left wing partisans. Later, many people from Northern Sudan, especially from the peripheries such as the Nuba Mountains, Darfur, the Southern Blue Nile, and Western Sudan, joined the SPLA/M as individuals, and groups.

The situation was exacerbated when the regime, supported by the Muslim Brotherhood whose party was once named the Islamic Trend Party, ignored the religious, cultural, and ethnic diversity of the country and introduced the Islamic constitution as the sole source of laws in the country, including non-Muslims’ areas such as Southern Sudan (Collins, 2008, pp. 139-40).

Eventually, the Numayri regime came to an end through a second popular uprising in April, 1985. The regime was overthrown by way of political strike and civil disobedience. This uprising was led by various Sudanese political parties, along with professional trade unions (Collins, 2008, P. 156).

However, the SPLA/M continued its military operations against the new democratically elected regime in place for the period 1985-1989 because, the SPLA/M declared, the old mentality of exclusion and non-tolerance of diversity was still dominant, and that a military dictatorship was simply replaced by a civil dictatorship of the sectarian parties, that being Umma and the Unionists parties (Collins, 2008, P. 160). The war continued between the Sudanese army and the SPLA/M throughout the third democracy under the leadership of Al-Sadiq Al-Mahdi. During this war in an effort to increase the pressure on the SPLA/M, El-Sadiq Al Mahdi, the great grandson of Al Mahdi, armed Arab pastoral tribes in Southern Darfur and Southern

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27 For more about the idea of ‘new Sudan’ see Garang 2005, Chapter 1
Kordofan and encouraged them to form militias, called ‘Al Marahaleen,’ in order to fight the SPLA/M. Historically Darfur and, to less extent, Kordofan Arab tribes, were in continuous conflicts with each other and also with their Southern Sudanese neighboring tribes.

These conflicts were usually caused by competition for resources, especially grazing resources. The arming of these Arab tribes, mainly Masiryia tribes, led to increasing antagonism between them, on one hand, and some Southern Sudanese tribes, such as Dinka Ngok, on the other.

This state of affairs continued until the Muslim Brotherhood, changing their party name for the second time to become the ‘Islamic National Front’ INF, overthrew the democratic regime via a coup d’état in June 1989 and continued holding power in the Sudan until the present, 2016. The Brotherhood is a fundamentalist organization. Its roots extend to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Their declared objective was to govern the Sudan by means of ‘Shari‘at’ or Islamic laws. Since its advent in the 1950s until the mid-1960s, the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood organization had used legitimate peaceful political means to achieve its ends. The organization began to adopt violent tactics in the second half of the 1960. Their adoption of violence arguably stems from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood theorist, Sayyid Qutb’s argument that many Muslims in contemporary Islamic countries are ignorant of their religion; they are not true believers, and, Qutb maintains, holy wars, or ‘jihad’, should be waged against them, especially if they act against applying Islamic laws (Qutb, 1979, P. 10-12).

When they took power, the NIF leaders declared that they would change Sudanese individuals and society to comply with Islam as understood by the Brotherhood. Based on this argument, the government started intensive programs for Islamizing the state apparatus and other
institutions. This program was accompanied by a program of Arabization, especially in education institutions, particularly universities and colleges whose language of instruction was English. They declared their intention to end the war in the South, which continued throughout the democratic period 1985-9. This would be achieved by a war or ‘jihad’ (Meyer and Nicholls, 2005, P. 9). In this context, many atrocities and massacres were perpetrated against innocent Southern Sudanese civilians who were thought to be, by virtue of being Southern Sudanese, either sleeper cells or at least a reserve of recruits to the SPLA/M.

Shortly after the coup d’état, the Northern Sudanese opponents of the INF regime organized themselves in a body called the ‘National Democratic Alliance’ (NDA). With the exception of the Muslim Brotherhood, the NDA included all of the Sudanese political parties, professional trade unions, and later on the SPLA/M joined the NDA. This was the first time for a Southern Sudanese political organization to lead, or effectively work with Northern Sudanese parties for a political objective. The SPLA/M was the strongest partner in the NDA in part because it was highly organized, had effective leadership among the various allies and had recruited many intellectuals from both the South and North, and obtained effective political, financial, and logistic support from abroad.

By the early 1990s, the SPLA/M-led forces occupied large parts of Southern and Eastern Sudan. This compelled the government in Khartoum to begin negotiations with SPLA/M, first in Abuja, Nigeria and later on in Nairobi, Kenya. These protracted negotiations, along with the pressure of the international community, eventually led to the ‘Comprehensive Peace Agreement’ CPA between the Sudan government and the SPLA/M in January 2005 (Collins, 2008, P. 242). The agreement gave Southern Sudan the right of self-determination after a six-year transitional period. This transitional period was thought to be a chance for the Sudan
government to prove its seriousness in making the necessary democratic reforms. These reforms were expected to make unity of the country attractive, so Southern Sudanese would voluntarily choose it in the 2011 referendum.

With the implementation of the CPA and shortly after the repatriation of the SPLA/M Northern and Southern Sudanese membership, the SPLA/M became very popular among Southern and Northern Sudanese, to the extent that the newly registered membership of the SPLA/M, in Northern Sudan, exceeded two million in less than one month, and outnumbered all the Sudanese political parties. To accommodate this new development, the SPLA/M was organizationally divided into Northern and Southern sectors. After the independence of South Sudan, the Northern sector of the SPLM became a separate Northern Sudanese political party.

During this time, the INF government, which changed its name after the coup d’état, for the third time, to the National Congress Party ‘NCP’, failed to fulfill the promises/requirements of ‘attractive unity’ thus to motivating Southern Sudanese to choose secession from the North to form their new national state South Sudan.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, the history of the Sudan since antiquity until the present time has been reviewed. This history is the basis of today’s reality, especially the history of tribes and tribalism; the successive regimes in the Sudan and their policies, including the two colonial reigns, the Turkish and the British, as well as the post-colonial dictatorial and democratic
regimes; rebellions and stances against, or with, various regimes, national or otherwise
colonizers; various waves of immigration from diverse sources; slave trade; religious
diversity, including sects and Sufi orders; the imbalanced development in various regions; and
the development of economic activities, education, and employment in these regions.

Given these factors, this history is crucial to different processes of boundary making and change. These boundaries are complex as they intersect. This, in its turn, has created problems and complicated the reality and relations of different Sudanese groups. This extends to Sudanese people who migrated to various places, especially in the last two decades, including those who immigrated to Canada.
CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

This chapter presents the methodology used for accomplishing the research. The chapter addresses the research questions, the choice of research site, sampling, and methods used to collect and analyze the data. As previously noted, this dissertation addresses two sets of interrelated questions. The first set of questions include: what were the characteristics of the Sudanese national identity before South Sudan declared independence from Sudan? To what extent were there divisions between Southern- and Northern-Sudanese-Canadians, and were these divisions evident in different patterns of ethnic identification and community organization formation? The second set of questions are: How was South Sudanese independence experienced by members of the Sudanese-Canadian community? What role did immigrants from South Sudan play in supporting and/or opposing independence? And, how has South Sudanese independence reshaped Sudanese-Canadian community organizations and community politics?

KITCHENER AND THE RESEARCH PROCESS

To examine the boundary processes of Northern- and Southern-Sudanese-Canadians since the early 1990s until the present, this study takes the city of Kitchener, Ontario, as the site for data collection. Kitchener is home to a significant population of both Southern- and Northern-Sudanese-Canadians. The number of Sudanese Canadians are estimated to be 15,600
(Statistics Canada quoted by Mosaic Institute, 2009). They can be found in significant numbers in several large Canadian cities, including Toronto, Calgary, Montreal, and Vancouver. Sudanese-Canadians can also be found in relatively small cities like Brooks, Alberta.

There are many reasons why Kitchener is a suitable site for data collection.

First, Kitchener contains a relatively dense concentration of Sudanese-Canadians, many of whom have lived in Canada for ten years or more; it contains about 10% of Sudanese Canadians and as of 2013, it ranks fourth in terms of the numbers of Sudanese Canadian cities after Toronto, Calgary, and Edmonton. Secondly, it is medium sized, most Sudanese-Canadians by and large know each other better than those in large cities with larger Sudanese Canadian populations. Third, unlike other Canadian cities, Kitchener is inhabited by a large number of both Northern- and Southern-Sudanese, and the city is also well represented by the diverse Sudanese tribes, tribal units, and regional groups. This makes Kitchener unusual compared to most other cities in Canada. Some of the tribes in Kitchener, such as the Nuba and Bija, have their formal organizations to serve their social and political interests. Example of these are the International Association of Nuba Mountains People and the Bija Congress. Also, most of the Southern tribes, such as the tribes of Asholi, Nuer, Latooka, and Dinka, have their own informal traditional community organizations. These tribes are affiliated to their mother tribes in South Sudan. Moreover, these tribes and tribal groups have their religious affiliations, groups and/or organizations and places of worship for Islamic, Christian and traditional African religions. Fourth, unlike bigger cities with larger numbers of Sudanese, such as Calgary and Edmonton where the large majority tends to be either Southern- or Northern-Sudanese, Kitchener is inhabited by large numbers of both Southern- and Northern-Sudanese-Canadians. Although the
Southern Sudanese population outnumbers the Northern Sudanese, the difference is not as large as in the aforementioned cities.

Although most of the Sudanese came to Canada as refugees, either because of the civil war or opposition to the Sudan government, the majority in Kitchener, especially Southern-Sudanese, came indirectly to Canada. Many stayed in refugee camps in neighboring countries such as Ethiopia, Eretria, Uganda, and Kenya before moving to Canada. Other Southern- and Northern-Sudanese-Canadians came from countries where they lived in the wider society, outside of refugee camps. This was the case in Egypt where millions of Sudanese, from both south and north, lived for years. Those who came to Kitchener were diverse in terms of belonging to various ethnic groups of the Sudan.

This diversity provides a rich source of data for examining boundary processes and the dynamics of community formation among Sudanese-Canadians. This diversity also permits the comparison of different experiences and the effect of these experiences on boundary processes.

Data for this research were collected by using qualitative research methods. Qualitative methods are suitable for examining the real social empirical world (Blumer, 1969, p. 27; Rubin and Rubin, 2005, pp. 3-5). This social empirical world, as Blumer (1969) states:

‘[C]onsists of what they [people] experience and do, individually and collectively, as they engage in their respective forms of living, it covers the large complexes of interlaced activities that grow up as the actions of some spread out to affect the actions of others, and it embodies the large variety of relations between the participants’ (Blumer, 1969, p. 33).

Understanding the experiences and actions of certain people is based on the meaning they attach to these actions and experiences, as well as the interpretation of different situations based
on that meaning. This also applies to the reactions to these experiences and actions (Blumer, p.2, 49; Rubin and Rubin, 2005, p. 5). In addition to revealing the meanings attached to people’s actions and experiences, qualitative methods help to familiarize researchers with the context and social aspects of life (Blumer, 1969, p.39), especially when combining two or more qualitative methods, such as participant observation and interviewing.

Qualitative methods, especially when interviews are well designed and well conducted, allow participants describe their experiences, comment on what happens in their surroundings, and express their feelings. In this research, qualitative methods have enabled me, as it does, to observe, explore, examine, and eventually to develop an understanding of these groups’ social reality. They have also allowed for the understanding of various issues from the subjective point of view of those who represent different ethnic groups (Berg, 2007; Straus and Corbin, 1998).

Secondary data were collected using documents, though with limited success. These records include those of community organizations, political organizations, including SPLM, Canada chapter and its branch in Kitchener, video tapes of social, political, or recreational function in the community. The use of organizational documents was constrained by the lack of proper documentation and records. This lack of proper documentation and records may be attributed to the predominance of verbal communication and personal contacts over formal communication within the Sudanese contexts. This exerted an immense effect on the Sudanese-Canadians practice. Although it might adversely affect the Sudanese community groups’ and organizations’ functioning, this fact gives hints to the predominance of personalization over institutionalization within the Sudanese and Sudanese-Canadians practice.
As a result, participant observation and semi-structured interviews were heavily used for collecting primary data. The intention was to collect secondary data from previous studies and from documents pertaining to the Sudanese government, political institutions, and various organizations. Some of these documents are available on these institutions websites. Historical analysis for understanding the background of ethnic boundaries processes in the Sudan was conducted. Such analyses were used by Simmons and Plaza (2006) as well as Winland (2006) as a foundation for the study of Caribbean immigrants’ community in Canada, and for studying the Croatian immigrants’ community in Canada respectively.

Participant observation was used and triangulated with the data collected by way of interviews. Observation was made possible through personal contact with both Southern- and Northern-Sudanese-Canadians in Kitchener. These relations enabled the collection of information about public, and some private occasions and events that also normally take place in other cities where Sudanese-Canadians are concentrated. These relations also facilitated obtaining invitations to events. This was enhanced by my status as a community leader in Hamilton which has weight among the Sudanese-Canadians in cities across Ontario.

My relationship with Sudanese-Canadian communities began in 2000 when I came to Canada. Although I first lived in Kingston, I knew many people in other cities through my participation in singing, especially patriotic songs, as well as participation in social, cultural, and political events such as the celebration of Sudanese independence, the October 1964 uprising, and the April 1985 uprising.28 I was also a participant in other political activities such as rallies,

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28 These two popular uprisings were initiated by Sudanese civilians who were able to overthrow Abbud’s and Numayri’s military governments in 1964 and 1985 respectively, this happened through peaceable political strikes and civil disobedience
meetings, and public speeches. This provided me with an opportunity to befriend many Sudanese–Canadians in various cities, including those who are interested in the fields of music, arts, culture, and politics. Moreover, some of the invitations I received came in reciprocity to my practice of extending invitations to people from various cities, including Kitchener, to come and attend and/or participate in Sudanese community occasions in Hamilton. In addition to the events that I attended earlier, which contributed to formulating my research idea as well as research questions, I attended other events for the sake of this research. This occurred between October 2013 and July 2014.

Participant observation turned out to be an effective means of collecting data, especially since it is the Sudanese people’s tradition to gather on various social, political, recreational, and religious occasions. These include national celebrations, religious events, soccer games, condolence and funeral ceremonies, marriage parties, public speeches, and musical concerts. In some cases, people meet even without marking a specific occasion. Attending these community gatherings and activities provided insights into many aspects of the relationship between the two groups. I was interested not only in aspects of social life that might not be fully highlighted in interviews, but also in seeking validation for the information obtained from, or even before, those interviews. For example, many of my subjects related to the fact that people from Nuba Mountains and other Northerners did not usually mix when seated in public events. This information was confirmed when I attended a public speech organized by the SPLMN and the International Association of the Nuba Mountains People. At this event Southerners, Riverine, and Nuba Mountains people were sitting in separate groups. In this case, participant observation helped to define issues that were raised in interviews, or with follow up questions for the interviewees. For example, although they stopped getting together for public events, Southerners
and Northerners did not stop coming together for funerals and soccer games. This would not have been noticed have I not witnessed funerals and soccer games. For these reasons, the use of participant observation was effective for collecting part of the data and complementing the interviews (Lamont and Swidler, 2014).

The community events I attended are as follows. There were two marriage parties; two funerals and condolence ceremonies for a man and a woman from Northern Sudan who passed away in Kitchener, (one from the riverine and another from Nuba Mountains people); two condolence ceremonies for deceased who passed away back home and whose offspring are in Kitchener (one was a riverine and the other was a Southerner); some Islamic prayer congregations in the only mosque in Kitchener; two Christian services in the Sudanese community Church and the Hope Lutheran Church; three meetings for mediation among different Southern-Sudanese-Canadian groups in Kitchener in the aftermath of the eruption of violence in South Sudan; one social gathering of the riverine Sudanese-Canadians; one public speech organized by the International Nuba Mountains Association in collaboration with the SPLMN; and two soccer matches that included the Kitchener team as part of a Sudanese soccer competition organized by five Ontario cities. These events amounted to just above sixty hours of observation.

In these events I took the role of the participant, as well as the observer (Burgess, 1984, P. 81), as I have good relations with many people belonging to different groups in Kitchener. This made it possible for me to comfortably observe how people from different ethnic groups interact with each other; whether they mix with each other at these events or whether each group’s members stay separate from other groups; and their attitudes toward each other. This
was not hard to observe, especially since groups’ members are distinguishable by their features, languages, and/or accents.

Immediately after each of these events, I produced field notes. These field notes contain the start and end time of the event; the physical space and setting of the event; the people who took part in these events as performers, speakers, players, and/or audience; the objective as well as the content of the event. The explicit purpose of event activities was noted; for example whether it was a public speech, party, celebration, religious ceremony, or a soccer game. I also noted who organized the event, the sequence of activities, and the physical artifacts that were present in the event such as stages, chairs, tables, food, food making and/or serving items, musical instruments, sound amplifiers, folklore items, tools, cups and medals. Finally, I took note of the leaders of different groups that were present and their behavior during the event.

The other main data collection technique was the semi-structured interviews. From the beginning of January through the end of March 2014, thirty-one key informants were interviewed. The interviews were with representatives of various communities, including social and political organizations in Kitchener. In the interviews, clear differences between the interviewees who came from refugee camps, from a third country such as Egypt, and those who came from the Sudan were detected. After consultation with my supervisor, six other participants, five of whom were Southerners, were interviewed about their experience in refugee camps and in Egypt. This was to determine if this experience exerted any effects on ethnic boundary between Southerners and Northerners in Kitchener. The sum total of the interviews was thirty seven.
Semi-structured interviews were appropriate for this research because they enabled a comprehensive understanding of the processes, dynamics, and mechanisms of community formation, and boundary processes. Semi-structured interviews helped shed light on the meanings and interpretations of various details of the relationship between the two groups as they were seen by the participants. They also allowed posing questions without necessarily following the same format with all interviewees. This allowed tailoring of questions according to the situation and the interviewee’s responses. This was necessary because the interviewees are not homogeneous in terms of their belonging to Southern or Northern Sudan, their tribal identity, their levels of education, their membership in Sudanese political and social organizations, their levels of involvement with Sudanese and Canadian politics, and their social and political stances.

Semi-structured interviews gave flexibility to craft questions and clarify issues through probing. Unlike surveys, semi-structured interview gave both the interviewer and the interviewees a chance to reveal any possible ambiguities in the questions and/or answers (Berg, 2007, pp. 2-4; Rubin and Rubin, 2005, p. 3). Finally, in a few cases, the interviewees drew attention to, and provided information and insights that were missing in the original design of this study. This enabled the researcher to carry out important revisions of the interviews design, and also to add some follow up questions in response to the new aspects and puzzles that arose from the interviews. For example, with regard to the relationship between Southern and Northern Sudanese, it became known in the interviews that there was a big difference, in terms of social relationships in Canada, between the Sudanese who lived in Egypt and those who lived in refugee camps. This entailed adding a new set of interviews with the Sudanese who lived in Egypt and those who lived in refugee camps. After one respondent spoke of the efforts they made to unify Southerners and Northerners, this question was further explored with other
participants. Moreover, the definition of Northerners and Southerners was assumed to be on geographic basis, yet it was revealed that respondents used the term ‘Northerners’ for the riverine people or Arabs. Even those non-Arabs who belong to the geographic North of Sudan do not call themselves Northerners. This usage focused on the differences between the riverine people and other Northerners’ groups. This influenced interview design and questions thereinafter.

An interview guide was developed before the interviews began. The interview guide comprised of a list of questions that covered the aspects that I wanted to explore in the interviews. This interview guide was revised after each interview to accommodate the feedback from the previous interviews into the subsequent ones. This allowed me to use new insights or pieces of information that were obtained in the interviews. Occasionally, these new insights and pieces of information created follow up questions to those already interviewed. To manage the data, I created a research journal and update the journal using memos about the findings after each interview.

The key informant interviewees were chosen from those who identify as Southern- and Northern-Sudanese-Canadians; these key informants were expected to be well informed about the groups based on their involvement, positions, and/or activities in one or more of the communities’ formal and/or non-formal organizations in Kitchener at different times. Key informants had lived in Kitchener for between ten and twenty five years.

The key informants interviewed were highly diverse. They included old and young men and women from various Sudanese tribes, such as the Nuer, Dinka, Acholi, Latooka, Zaghawa, Fur, Baggara, Ja’alyzeren, Shaygiya, Halfaweyeen, Nuba, Angessana, and Bija. Interviewees from
different religions were recruited, including Muslims, Christians, animists or those who adopt traditional African religions, and atheists. Moreover, interviewees were from various regions of the Sudan, from the South, East, West, as well as riverine Northerners with various ethnic attachments. Further, interviewees with different political affiliations, as well as nonpartisans, were recruited.

Although some spent a longer time of their life abroad than others, all the respondents were born in the Sudan. Some, at some point of their life, lived in both Northern and Southern parts of the Sudan. Some interviewees were Northerners who did not see Southern Sudan, and some were Southerners who did not see Northern Sudan. The interviewees included ten Southerners and twenty one Northerners from various ethnic groups and regions.

With respect to the refugee camp experience, one Northerner and five Southerners who lived in refugee camps were interviewed. Two were re-interviewed, as they had been interviewed in the general interviews as mentioned above.

Gender was also considered in the sample, twenty eight of the respondents were men and nine were women. Two women were employed, three were homemakers, and four were single mothers. Two of those who were interviewed for the refugee camps experience were women. The interviewees’ ages ranged from forty to fifty nine years.

With respect to the respondents’ education, fourteen have university degrees, of which three are Southerners. Seventeen have a secondary school diploma; three interviewees did not complete secondary education, and two of the participants completed intermediate education. With regards to employment, twenty six of the participants are employed, one owns a businesses. The rest are unemployed and live on Ontario Works social assistance.
To reach the range of key informants, preliminary information about people in Kitchener was collected from my social network. That network is very diverse and spans various Canadian cities, including Kitchener and other Ontario cities. It includes community-based organizations, religious organizations, political parties, and interest groups in Kitchener. This provided the opportunity to observe, and talk to, Southern- and Northern-Sudanese-Canadians in different settings such as political, religious, and social activities and gatherings in order to pinpoint the leaders in the natural social settings.

To avoid the bias of recruiting my participants through the recommendations of their friends and the like-minded, those who were consulted were asked not to recommend only their friends and the like-minded, but also those whose opinions were different, or even contradictory. The rational given to the participants was that this research could be enriched by the differences and contradictions in interviewees’ opinions. This argument was supported because many of those consulted were educated. To recruit those who were not well educated, the notion of ‘inclusion’, pervasive in Canada, was used. I suggested to interviewees that when recommending other potential interviewees that I was aiming for inclusion of a variety of group members. Many proscribed to that.

More weight and focus in the sample was given to the leaders of formal and/or informal ethnic-based and other civil society organizations. Unlike those who belong to religious organizations, the leaders of political and ethnic units or organizations are expected to be more representative of their organizations membership. For this reason fewer religious leaders were interviewed. Ethnic leaders are expected to know more about ethnic boundaries and their dynamics than others, mainly because these ethnic boundaries are related to the groups’
members’ subjectivity and the meanings they attached to their belonging. This may not be necessarily the case of religious, and sometimes political, leaders.

One of the challenges of doing qualitative research is to build trust with interviewees. Nandhakumar and Jones (1997) maintain that the relationship between the interviewer and the interviewee rests on a base of trust. Building trust between the researcher and participants is not an easy job since there are many factors that interfere with it. These include likes and dislikes. Those who like the researcher are prone to trust and interact better with him. Likes and dislikes depend, if partially, on tribal, ethnic, religious, sectarian, and/or regional affiliation. People are prone to trust their people, being ethnic, geographic, religious, and/or sectarian co-affiliates. The likes and dislikes depend, especially in the Sudanese context, on the political stances of the individuals and political groups to which they belong. These shape the individuals’ attitudes toward one another, including researchers. Further, likes and dislikes depend on the relationship of the interviewee with the person(s) who introduce(s) the researcher to her.

Some participants were initially skeptical about my motivations since I am from the North and some of the respondents were from the South, Darfur, and Nuba Mountains. In Sudan there are ongoing conflicts between these groups and various northern groups and their government. It is noteworthy that the productiveness of the interview depends on the level of trust. Even if they have some trust in the researcher, some participants may have skipped over, or may not have given satisfactory answers about certain issues, especially sensitive ones, such as massacres, raping, stigmas, and/or whatever undermines the status of the participant’s group(s).

As a researcher, I believe I gained a good level of my subjects’ trust. First I know many Sudanese people in Kitchener personally. Second, I am well known among the Sudanese in
Ontario as a singer. Third, I am also known as a community leader who worked for a long time in this area. Finally, I am known as an opponent to the government of the Sudan which means that I am not suspected to be a secret agent of the government of the Sudan.

Generally, it seems like I was able to gain the trust of most participants. In one case, though, the interviewee responded harshly to me, to the extent that he was about to leave the interview. He was reluctant to answer some questions and kept saying: ‘You know the answer for this question, why do you ask me to answer a question that you already know its answer?’ In such cases, he was assured that he had every right to abstain from answering any question that he did not want to answer. Later I came to learn that this person received a phone call from one of his co-ethnics telling him that I was a friend of another person whom they do not like. Nevertheless, the interview with him was completed. Other than this exceptional case, all of the interviews went smoothly.

The settings of the interviews, in most cases, were comfortable as the majority of the participants were interviewed in their houses. In some cases the interviewees’ partners were present, albeit in an on and off manner. This did not prevent them from throwing in an answer or a comment here and there. When they occurred, I took the comments seriously and in many cases enriched the interviews. Two interviews were conducted in the interviewees’ offices. Both of them were carried out after the end of the official work day. Two interviews were conducted in religious institutions, namely churches, where two pastors were interviewed. Five interviews were conducted at Tim Horton’s coffee shops for the convenience of the interviewees at their suggestion.
One of the problems that arose in the interviews was punctuality. Coming to an arranged meeting on time by Sudanese respondents was a major issue. It is called ‘Sudanese time.’ In some cases, interviewees not only came late, they came a long time after the fixed time. This was one reason that made it more comfortable interviewing the participants in their homes rather than in public places. The wait time was more than two hours for three, out of the five participants who were interviewed in Tim Horton’s coffee shops. One interview was cancelled without notice and was carried out fifteen days after for this very reason.

Most of the interviews were conducted in Arabic languages, as the interviewees, from different Sudanese regions and ethnic groups including Southern Sudanese, deemed it is more convenient and easier for them to speak in Arabic. Other participants were interviewed in English. Still other interviews were conducted in a mix of Arabic and English. All but one of the interviews were audio recorded with the consent of the interviewees using a cell phone after the failure of digital recorder in the first interview. Notes were taken when deemed needed as the interviews progressed. One interview answers were wholly hand written because the interviewee objected to voice recording.

At the end of the interviews, it was the case that many interviewees, especially women, were very apologetic about ‘talking too much’, and in some instances they asked if what they said was relevant or of any use. Many times after the interview was completed, the recorder switched off, the interviewee would continue to comment on some of the issues raised in the interview. Some of these comments were interesting and valuable to the extent that, with the interviewee’s permission, the interview would resume.
The Sudanese in Kitchener know each other, as the community is not too large. In spite of some degree of integration into the mainstream, the Sudanese-Canadians in Kitchener still live in a small pocket at the margin of the host society. Thus they have all the characteristics of the small traditional community; they mostly know each other personally; news about individuals spreads through the community by way of chatting, and sometimes backbiting. This became easier, instantaneous, and more direct with the help of the social media. To protect the interviewees’ identities, pseudonyms were used, as most of the interviewees requested that their names not be revealed.

Qualitative comparative analysis was carried out in two steps. First, the interviews were transcribed and read, and then initial major ‘themes’ revealed from the interviewees’ answers were extracted (Morse and Richards, 2002, P. 112; Kvale, 1996, p. 88). The identified initial themes, based on the research questions, goals, and theoretical framework, were used for describing and organizing the data (Auerbach and Silverstein, 2003, P. 38; Boyatzis, 1998, P. vii). Similar themes were grouped together. This can be viewed as equivalent to identifying categories (DeSantis and Ugarriza, 2000, P. 358; Straus and Corbin, 1998, P. 124), as they emerge in the data rather than being predetermined as stated by Ezzy (2002, P. 83).

These initial themes, along with their subthemes, and their relationships to each other, were examined, screened, and summarized into fewer general ones. These fewer themes, or ‘essential’ themes, to use van Manen’s (1990, P. 107) expression, were integrated in terms of their similarities, to facilitate the interpretation of actions, interactions, and relationships that occur in reality (Rubin and Rubin, 1995, P. 57). As they were grouped based on their similarities and commonalities, some of these themes were discarded, others were placed under other themes, while others were kept as they were. These can be thought of as second order themes.
They were used, especially on the latent level (Boyatzis, 1998, P. vii; van Manen, 1990, P. 9), to find the patterns in the data, without disregarding the negative cases occurrences (Gibbs et al, 2002, P. 141-2, 243). This resulted in abstract constructs about the reality as described by the data (Bernard, 2006, P. 452; Grbish, 2007, P. 21; Gubrium and Holstein, 1997, 196; Richard and Morse, 2007, P. 137; van Manen, 1998, P. 87).

Each of the abovementioned patterns was then explained. The generated patterns were found to fit the data which were used, without selectiveness, as evidence for justifying the explanations. This fit, as explained by Eisenhardt (1989, P. 541), is important for building good theory. The next stage was to carry out comparisons of the generated patterns with the existing theories of boundaries, identity, transnationalism, and nationalism. This revealed the extent of relevance of the findings of this study to other researches’ findings. The interpretations of the similarities and differences with other researches’ findings was sought. Following Eisenhardt (1989), theories were used as a basis to research design, data collection, and data analysis leading to the final product of the research.

The process of thematization was done manually, as colour blindness prevented the use of computer software, such as NVivo, which use colours for coding the data. Computer software does not actually do the coding for the researcher, but it is a tool for efficient management of the data. Coding, as well as analysis, depend on the researcher’s reflection about the data (Saldana, 2009, P. 22). It is recommended, by some computer coding proponents, that some parts of coding need to be done manually (Saldana, 2009, P. 22).

For authenticity, and to evaluate the cases of people’s narratives about themselves (Freeman, 1993, P. 163), the consistency of the stories told was examined. Many participants
were interviewed, thus their narratives could be matched for authenticity. The research revealed that many of the narratives had many similarities. Nevertheless, the narratives that did not match the others were not ignored, rather they were cautiously considered as ways for finding new themes. Such themes were further studied through asking more questions about the newly occurred issues. This was used to validate or invalidate the findings. In such a case, explanations and interpretations were sought for negative cases (Miles and Huberman, 1994, P. 278-9). For example, one respondent stated that there were no social relationships whatsoever between Southerners and Northerners, and that they only pretend to have good relations. This was a point considered in subsequent interviews. This led to the finding that Southerners and Northerners in Kitchener were ambivalent in their relationship with each other. They think of each other based on their differences. They blame each other. Yet, at the same time, they claim to have friendships with each other. When this was subjected to further questioning and analysis, it was found that they define friendship differently. They consider generally good relations as friendship.

CONCLUSION

Researchers, including this researcher, may not be fully impartial and value free. They have their own inclinations, previous knowledge, interpretations, understandings, and propositions about the reality they study. Another consideration is that the researchers’ knowledge about this reality may not be complete, as suggested by Schutz (1970b, P. 5). One problem encountered in the data collection was the fact that the researcher shares the status of being Sudanese-Canadian with the respondents. This could be an essentialist marker.
My status as Sudanese raises a number of questions about potential bias: Did my knowledge and life experiences with other Sudanese from different regions, including Southern Sudanese, in the Sudan and in Canada, interfere with the research, particularly in the stage of data collection and analysis? Did my identification Northern Sudanese lead me to be perceived to be privileged and to be considered as part of those who racialized and marginalized Southern Sudanese? Did the fact that I am an opponent to the government of the Sudan affect the interviews in certain ways? After the completion of the interviews, did the fact that I am a Northern Sudanese writing about sensitive Sudanese issues shape the interpretation of the data from the interviews?

The utmost was done to avoid these potential biases. In some ways, I may be considered as both an insider and outsider. I am an insider, because, just like many of my interviewees, I am a Sudanese, Northern Sudanese, Muslim, and an opponent to the government of Sudan. At the same time, I am an outsider, because I am from Hamilton not Kitchener, and I am a graduate student/researcher at McMaster University. The positions of ‘insiderness’ and ‘outsiderness’ are not constant, but rather they change for different community members (Naples, 1996, P. 71) and each of them has its advantages and disadvantages. Being an outsider enables the researcher to keep emotional distance from the participants and the issues discussed. This helps her to be a more neutral, objective, and detached observer. Nevertheless, being outsider makes it more difficult for the researcher to access the right participants. Also, the lack of understanding the participants’ culture may affect the researcher’s ability to engage them in interesting conversations. Moreover, outsider researchers may come with prior information and/or impressions, sometimes faulty ones, which may negatively affect the quality of the data collected.
On the other hand, being an insider enables the researcher to engage participants in more information generating conversations, as they understand their culture. Also, the understanding of the language, words connotations, and turns of phrases enable the researcher to get richer information. On the other hand, being an insider has some potential problems; she may be emotionally affected by the situations, especially when discussing sensitive issues with participants. This may come at the expense of her detachment, neutrality, and objectivity to the extent that it may render trust between the researcher and participants an issue.

Notwithstanding the above, and although neither insiders nor outsiders can avoid the shortcomings of their status and become fully objective, both insiders and outsiders can collect relevant data of good quality if they are aware of their biases and if they do their homework.

In this research, I made good use of the advantages of my ‘insidedness’ to enhance trust. At the same time, I was aware of my own potential biases from the very start of the research, and was conscious of them when I designed questions. In the interviews, suggestive language was avoided. At the outset, respondents were reassured about my impartiality, and I asked respondents to view me as independent and as someone seeking to elicit information about the situation as it is, not as it should be in the normative sense. Therefore, I was well received by my participants and carried out my interviews in comfortable friendly manner. Some participants asserted that they were happy to discuss these matters with a Sudanese researcher who knows the background about important Sudanese issues. Other participants said that they had given me some information that they could not give to other non-Sudanese, or even some Northern Sudanese, researchers.

Despite this potential for bias, refraining from researching this issue is not a good alternative. In this case, it would lead to a situation where no Sudanese-Canadian could do research on the relationship between Southern and Northern Sudanese Canadians, which would help perpetuate the lack of research on the Sudanese in Canada. And, there are potential
problems associated with persons of non-Sudanese background studying Sudanese. In such a case, a researcher might lack appropriate and sufficient knowledge of the background and
circumstances that led to the present relationships, and lack the knowledge about complex realities faced by the Sudanese in Canada (Blumer, 1969, p. 34-5).

In the end, I feel I was well received by my interview subjects in Kitchener. Some of them were enthusiastic about the topic because the independence of South Sudan or the division of the Sudan into two countries, as it is called by many Sudanese people, woke many peoples’ feelings of loss. Some of the participants said they were happy to have a chance to discuss this very issue with a researcher who shares a background as Sudanese-Canadian. Some interviewees recognized this research will help fill a gap in knowledge and appreciated the opportunity to contribute to a project that would enhance the understanding of the Sudanese diaspora in Canada.
CHAPTER FOUR

SUDANESE DIASPORA AND THE TRANSITION TO CANADA

Diaspora starts when a people leave their country of origin - mainly involuntarily (Cohen, 1996, pp. 6-8; Safran, 1991, p. 83-4) - and take refuge in or transition to other countries due to such factors as wars or persecution by their governments. Those refugees are different and distinguished from the native born (Kunz, 1973) in terms of their general experiences; their identities as groups and as individuals; their relations with each other; and their relation to social life in the host country. This is due to the fact that their patterns of life become different from those of their countries of origin, and that there is an accumulation of experiences in refugee camps and/or safe third countries as they await for resettlement (Coker, 2004). These cumulative experiences may lead to significant identity as well as ethnic boundary transformations which, in turn, exert effects on refugees’ future lives whether in the same country of refuge, another host country of settlement, or repatriation to their country of origin. This chapter focuses on the experiences of Southern and Northern Sudanese people in the diaspora, specifically in Egypt and in refugee camps before coming to Canada in the early 1990s.

LEAVING SUDAN

Unlike Northern Sudanese, Southern Sudanese sought refuge outside the country as early as 1955, following the first mutiny when they fled to Kenya. This state of displacement
continued with the persistence of the first civil war in the Sudan, until the conclusion of the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement, signed in 1972 by the Anya Nya armed forces, a Southern Sudanese armed movement, and the government of Sudan (Idris, 2015, P. 48; Woodward, 1990, pp. 142-4). This agreement put an end, temporarily, to the displacement of Southerners.

The outflow of Southern Sudanese refugees from Sudan resumed from 1983 (Collins, 2008, P. 142; Woodward, 1990, P. 162) with the advent of the rebellion led by the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) and the eruption of the civil war in the South against the government of the Sudan. In 2005, an agreement, known as the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), was reached between the government of Sudan and the rebels (Collins, 2008, P. 268; Idris, 2015, P. 54). During this period, and since the National Islamic Front (NIF) seized power by way of coup d’état in 1989, an unprecedented number of both Muslim and non-Muslim Sudanese citizens fled the country and sought refuge in neighbouring countries. This was qualitatively different from past refugee movements. Unlike the past when only Southern refugees had fled the country, there was an exodus of both Southern and Northern Sudanese citizens.

The experiences of the Sudanese Canadians in third countries needs to be studied. Most of these Sudanese did not come directly to Canada; rather most of them lived in transitional third countries before immigrating to Canada. This situation is common to other immigrants who left their country because of the circumstances of conflict and/or the pressure of authoritarian governments. This was the case for the majority of those Sudanese who sought refuge for political reasons, those who immigrated as skilled workers, and - to a lesser degree - those individuals who moved for the purposes of family reunion.
Sudanese refugee experiences in third countries before coming to Canada differed from one country to another. They were exposed to different economic, political, and social contexts and circumstances as well as different cultures, norms, values, and languages. Some were well treated in these countries, whereas others were not. Some were placed in refugee camps, while others joined the broad social life of the country at large without many restrictions. Some were permitted to work, others were not granted this right.

At different times, even within the same third country, the circumstances of other countries’ citizens, including the refugees, fluctuated between good and bad. This variance was usually based on the changing political relations in the region and/or the relationship among the governments of these countries. This is evident in the attitudes, behaviour, and various ways of treating Sudanese citizens who fled to neighbouring countries. For example, before he was overthrown in 1991, Ethiopian President Mangistu Haili Mariam had a conflictual relationship with the government of Sudan and, therefore, Sudanese refugees were well treated by the Ethiopian government. After he was overthrown by Males Zinawi, relations with the government of Sudan improved and Sudanese refugees were ill-treated, while the SPLA/M fighters - who had been hosted by Ethiopia at length - were expelled from the country and were forced to move to back to Sudan, Kenya, and Uganda (Collins, 2008, p. 176; More, 2004).

Further, after the accusation that the government of the Sudan attempted to assassinate the Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak in Ethiopia in 1995, many Sudanese were harshly treated in Egypt (Idris, 2005, p. 58). This also included those who were active in the Sudanese opposition in Egypt. Sudanese government opposition members in most of the neighbouring countries were used as a means of putting pressure on the government of Sudan. For such reasons, the attitudes toward and treatment of the Sudanese opposition fluctuated based on the
instability of the host country’s relationship with the government of Sudan. Refugees were often treated as proxies by governments neighbouring Sudan; they were ill-treated when these relations improved and well treated when they soured. The reason is the authoritarian nature of governance in many of the countries that border Sudan, especially under what Bratton and van der Walle (1997, p. 62) call ‘personal rule’: when one person, namely the president, is in charge making most, if not all, of the important decisions without referring to the existing government institution. Personal rule deprives government bodies from the opportunity to practice their responsibilities. In all cases, Sudanese refugees were under continuous surveillance as part of precautionary measures by these neighbouring countries’ governments.

Based on the abovementioned differences of the countries of refuge, Southern and Northern Sudanese refugees were affected differently in terms of the experience, knowledge, and understanding they obtained about each other; the state of trust/distrust they accumulated; the restructuring of identity; and transformation of their groups and subgroups’ boundaries, including ethnic ones.

The Sudanese groups arrived in third countries and in refugee camps with their preexisting understandings of ethnic boundaries and a history of inter-groups tensions and conflict in the Sudan. This history has contributed to shaping their relations in these third countries and refugee camps (Mahmoud, 2008; Moro, 2004) which, in turn, exerted uneven influence on these immigrants’ sub-ethnic boundaries and inter-group relations in Canada. Unlike those who came from refugee camps, the Sudanese who lived in Egypt developed by and large cooperative relations with each other, which positively reflected on their relationships in Canada. For example, one respondent, Deng from Southern Sudan, stated that the relations among Southerners and Northerners in Kitchener, Ontario were good, but that these relations
were better in Egypt. In response to the question regarding the reason for these ‘good relations’ in Egypt, Deng said:

> Because both of us [meaning Southerners and Northerners] had come to Egypt as opponents to the Sudan government, we were all poor, and therefore we had to share the money and food we found. Some of us [meaning the Southerners] lived in the same houses with Northerners, and some of the Northerners lived with us too. We did a lot of things together: festivals, celebrations, public speeches, concerts, exhibitions, and a lot of things. I think this is the reason for the relationship between the group of Sudanese who came to Kitchener from Cairo (both Southerners and Northerners) to be better than between those who came from other places, especially refugee camps where people were isolated from each other.

The effect of the difference of Sudanese people’s experience in a third country, especially in refugee camps, was confirmed by Lam, another participant from Southern Sudan who lived in a refugee camp before resettled to Canada. He stated in contrast:

> Actually there is no relationship between the Northerners and Southerners, neither here in Kitchener nor in the Sudan. I came [meaning to Kitchener], from a refugee camp, I know that some Southerners are in good relations with Northerners, but the majority of us do not have relations with them [meaning Northerners], good or bad.

These initial testimonies about Sudanese people’s different experiences prior to coming to Canada, especially in Egypt and refugee camps, led to further exploration about life in a third country, its influence on Sudanese immigrant organization and identification in Canada. As a result, further interviews were conducted with both Southerners and Northerners who lived in refugee camps and those who came from Egypt. The differences in their experiences seemed to have led some of those Sudanese refugees to develop and attach different meanings to their
history in terms of the relations with the ‘Other.’ The being especially true when they lived together with this ‘Other’ in circumstances that were different from the Sudanese national setting in which inequality, marginalization, and oppression were the dominant conditions, particularly for Southerners. This led to the consideration, understanding, and comparison of the experience of Southern and Northern Sudanese life in different places and the impact on their relationships within Canada. These relationships are different for the Southerners who experienced living in both Southern and Northern Sudan; the Northerners who lived in both Southern and Northern Sudan; and the Southerners and Northerners whose experience was limited to living in Southern and Northern Sudan respectively.

The experience of seeking refuge in another country applied to many Southern and Northern Sudanese groups. Due to the ongoing war in their area since 1955, Southern Sudanese groups had different life experiences from their Northern Sudanese counterparts; they experienced forced migration earlier than Northern Sudanese (Idris, 2005, P. 57), as they fled the country in large numbers to East and Central African countries (Idris, 2005, P. 57). Also, Southerners were traumatized more than the Northerners, because war was happening on their land, and not in Northern Sudan.

Even though some fled to neighbouring countries, the majority of the Southerners who fled their homes were internally displaced and lived in large cities in Northern Sudan (Hovil, 2010). After concluding the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement in 1972 most of the refugees in third countries were repatriated to the Sudan. Many returned to Southern Sudan, however large

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29 For the abovementioned history of division and emphasis of differences between them, Southern and Northern Sudanese look at one another as the ‘Other’. ‘This ‘othering’ led to resentment and many conflicts as indicated above.
numbers of the repatriated Southern Sudanese went to live in the North. Most displaced Southerners living in the North before the peace agreement did not return to the South.

Since the early 1970s, in the same timeframe, Sudanese, especially Northerners, began voluntarily migrating to work in oil-rich Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait. The majority of workers, especially after the present government seized power in the Sudan, stayed in these countries quasi-permanently. Some immigrated to Canada as federal skilled workers and under the family class. Some of the immigrants joined various Sudanese groups in Canada, mostly on the basis of their tribal and/or regional belonging, friendships, and other kinds of relations.

Since the commencement of the war between the government and SPLA/M in 1983, Southern Sudanese have sought refuge in nearby countries. This has intensified since the present government seized power in 1989. Due to the escalation of war, harsh treatment, and persecution by the present government of the Sudan, many Southerners have fled to the countries neighbouring the Sudan to the South, East, and West: mainly Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Central Africa Republic. The majority of the refugees went to refugee camps in these countries. Other Southern Sudanese have fled the country to Egypt (Idris, 2005, P. 57).

The majority of Northern Sudanese fled Sudan to Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Egypt where they mainly lived in urban areas, joining the larger society in these countries. The experience of the Sudanese people in Egypt was significantly different from their counterparts in refugee camps. This difference is noted in their relationship with other Sudanese in the countries of settlement. Both the Southern and Northern Sudanese groups and individuals in exile kept various social,
economic, and political transnational ties with their country of origin, albeit in different ways. The types of transnational ties were dependent on the context and the circumstances of their exile. In most cases, those who had to flee the Sudan to neighbouring countries other than Egypt, especially those who ended up in refugee camps, were not practically able to maintain significant transnational ties with their country. They had difficulty following the news, communicating with their acquaintances, and practicing long distance politics. Nevertheless, some were able to go back and forth to the Sudan as the borders were, and still are, rather porous. This was confirmed by Thang, a Southern Sudanese respondent, who said:

In the camps we were almost isolated; we could not contact our relatives in Sudan or even know what was going on with them: no mail, no phones, and no internet. We got our relatives’ news after long times when somebody comes from them or, otherwise, when those who had radios find some information about them in the news, and these news were always not good news.

These weak transnational ties influenced the relations of Southern and Northern Sudanese in a third country, including those who lived in refugee camps. These influences extended to those who were resettled in Western countries such as Canada. The flow of information is better in Western countries allowing more effective communication with their people in their country of origin. Different ethnic groups in the diaspora heard news about daily interactions with other groups. That news tended to focus on the ongoing troubles and conflicts affecting the affiliated groups in the diaspora, albeit in different ways, especially in terms of their ethnic boundaries and thereby their inter-group relations in the host country. For example, like their mother tribes in South Sudan before the eruption of violence in South Sudan in 2013, the Dinka and Nuer in Canada and other Southern ethnic groups were living and acting as one group of nationals. After the eruption of violence between their mother tribes back home, the ethnic boundary between the
Dinka and Nuer became brighter, stronger, and sharper than before. The direct effect on the Dinka and Nuer of Canada was that the two groups became very antagonistic. This illustrates the changing ethnic boundary properties and processes in one’s homeland affect boundaries for immigrants and/or refugees in the diaspora. These consequences are mediated by transnational ties, such as communication of news from the homeland. This was also true in the case of refugee camps in the neighbouring countries where the conflicts between or among different ethnic or sub-ethnic groups caused their affiliates in the camps to act accordingly.

Generally, the experience of relocating to another country, including living in refugee camps, affected refugees group and individual self-definitions, sense of belonging, and also identity as they encounter a new society. This experience has transformative effects on the boundaries among their sub-groups wherever they end up, including returning to their country of origin.

THE EXPERIENCE OF SUDANESE IN EGYPT

Large numbers of both Northern and Southern Sudanese fled their country to Egypt. The exact numbers of the Sudanese in Egypt remains unknown; the Egyptian government estimate of the Sudanese population in Egypt in 1995 was three million. Conversely, the government of Sudan had conservatively estimated the Sudanese in Egypt to be no more than 300,000 (Idris, 2005, p. 120). The number of Sudanese refugees settled in actual refugee camps in Egypt in 2001 was nearly 4000 (Edward, 2007, P. 8), most of them were Southerners. The remaining Southern and Northern Sudanese lived in the general Egyptian population. Most of the Sudanese in Egypt
had applied to the United Nations Higher Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR, for
resettlement in different Western countries and waited many months and even years for their
applications to be processed (Briant and Kennedy, 2004; Coker, 2004; Mahmoud, 2007, 2008).

The Sudanese, both Southerners and Northerners, came to Egypt with their differences,
as well as their similarities. They came with their identities, life experiences, and circumstances.
The ways the Sudanese conceived and dealt with their dissimilarities and likenesses
significantly impacted the way different Sudanese groups in Egypt treated each other. These
factors also affected how the Egyptian government and public treated different Sudanese groups.
Based on the national boundary, Sudanese in Egypt were treated more or less similarly in many
situations. As an external factor, this treatment by Egyptians contributed to motivating the
Sudanese in Egypt, regardless of their ethnic and other differences, to activate their Sudanese
national boundary. Raj, one of my Southern Sudanese participants put it this way:

   Because we are all black, Egyptians, in many situations, did not distinguish us [meaning
Southerners and Northerners] one from another, they mostly call us ‘Ibn El Neel’
or ‘Samara’. Egyptians are generally not racists; they mostly respect those who
have money over those who do not have.

Nevertheless, in some cases Sudanese groups were treated as distinct groups based on their
differences and distinctions. One of these distinctions between Southern and Northern Sudanese is
based on colour tone and physical features. Southern Sudanese and some Northern minorities
identify themselves, and are classified by Northern Sudanese and Egyptians, as Africans, whereas
the majority of Northerners are thought to be Arabs. However, the distinction

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30 Ibn El Neel is an Arabic word which means the son of the River Nile, and Samara means the brown skinned,
one of these words is used pejoratively.
between Southern and Northern Sudanese in Egypt was mainly based on cultural, religious, and linguistic differences. At times, Egyptians have dealt differently with different Sudanese groups based on their sub-ethnic boundaries instead of national boundary.

Due to the protracted conflicts, many Southern Sudanese came from war-torn zones where they experienced displacement, loss of families and relatives, loss of possessions, and other hardships and traumas caused by war. Most Northern Sudanese came from regions untouched by war and did not experience the same traumas. Yet, as government opponents, many of these Northerners did suffer persecution and oppression by the Sudanese government. Unlike Northerners, many Southern Sudanese were militarized. Large numbers of Southerners have participated in the war in various Southern Sudanese rebels’ armed organizations since 1955, the beginning of first rebellion, through to 2005, when the CPA was concluded between the SPLA/M and the government of the Sudan (Idris, 2005, p. 61). The exception of this was the period of peace between 1972 and 1983.

Conversely, most of the Northerners did not participate in war in direct ways. The exception to this was those soldiers of the Sudanese army and those in tribal militias in the inter-tribal demarcation areas with the Southerners.

Unlike Northern Sudanese who were mostly Muslims, many Southern Sudanese who went to Egypt were either animists, Christians, or baptized therein. This religious affiliation categorized them with other Sudanese and Egyptian Christians such as the Coptic, as the Christian minority in Egypt. This religious boundary, which coincided with other boundaries, caused Southern Sudanese to encounter more difficulties than Northern Sudanese who were accorded better treatment by virtue of being Muslims. Compared to Northerners, more
Southerners in Egypt had difficulty finding work and/or establishing their own business. This was expressed by one Southern participant, who said:

We were not treated equally with Northerners because we are Christians. Although his qualifications are higher than many Northerners, my husband was not given a job, mainly because he is Christian. If he were a Muslim he would have got a job based on his high qualification.

The Southerners encountered informal restrictions on relationships; they did not have much contact with those who did not share the same religious identity, namely Muslims. Most of their social relations with the Egyptians were with non-Muslims, namely Egyptian Coptic. In spite of the treatment based on the religious boundaries, many Southern and Northern men were not able to marry Egyptian women even if they wanted to, simply because the majority of them were poor and Egyptian society tends to consider an individual’s class and religion rather than ethnicity in matters of marriage. This was confirmed by Southern Sudanese participant Raj, who said: ‘A lot of Southern and Northern people tried to marry Egyptian women, but most of them were not given this chance, because they were poor, not because they were Sudanese. In Egypt, the rich were given women to marry.’

Notwithstanding these abovementioned differences, the Southern and Northern Sudanese who relocated to Egypt were similar in some aspects; they were all Sudanese citizens with the same national boundary. Most had involuntarily left their country of origin because of the oppression and aggression inflicted upon them by the government of Sudan. Most of them were opponents of the government; they were against despotism and advocated for building a secular democratic state in Sudan. Neither of these Sudanese groups considered Islam or any other faith
as the official religion of the state; they considered religion and religious practices as personal matters (Deng, 1995, p. 190).

The majority of the Sudanese in Egypt were not in refugee camps or formally treated by the Egyptian government as refugees, especially before 1995. This does not exclude the shared experience of Southerners and Northerners of considerable social difficulties: they were poor and lived in poor neighborhoods; marginalized; and unemployed or employed in the informal economy in casual, insecure, and low paid jobs. The Egyptian authorities did not provide any financial support, medical care, or proper housing (Idris, 2005, p. 59), save for the United Nations bursary given to those who were waiting for the UNHCR to process their applications for resettlement. Many Sudanese in Egypt were subjected to the Egyptian authorities’ surveillance, and sometimes, ill treatment and discrimination (Briant and Kennedy, 2004; Idris, 2005, p. 60; Mahmoud, 2007). Both Southerners and Northerners in Egypt suspect that they were subjected to the Sudanese secret service agents’ activities in Egypt as maintained by Mahmoud (2008) and also expressed by some of my respondents. One interviewee remarked:

It was difficult in Egypt back then, we were poor and jobless; always suspected by the Egyptian security forces; and although we left the Sudan for them, the Sudanese security forces followed us to Egypt in order to see what we were doing over there.

One of the important similarities was that, in spite of their differences, and in spite of the fact that neither group was homogeneous in ethnic, tribal or religious identity, the Southern and Northern Sudanese in Egypt were identified by Egyptian authorities - and identified themselves - as refugees. This occurred after the Egyptian authorities accused the Sudanese government of trying to assassinate the Egyptian President in Ethiopia in 1995 (Idris, 2005, p. 57; Mahmoud, 2008). Before the assassination attempt, Sudanese were considered as ‘citizens in their second
country’ by both the Egyptian government and public, and therefore not considered refugees. Radi, a Northern respondent, said in this regard: ‘After the attempt of assassinating Hosni Mubarak, we were said to be refugees, but we were not admitted to camps, rather we were living with the Egyptians.’

In response to the question about conditions before the government of Sudan was accused of assassinating the Egyptian president, Radi said:

Before the government was accused of attempting to assassinate Mubarak, we were considered to be in our second homeland, this is what everyone [meaning Egyptian] used to say, we were not considered as refugees … [therefore] … we could not apply to the United Nations for resettlement or support.

This illustrates the change of the status of the Sudanese in Egypt was a result of accusations that the government of Sudan attempted to assassinate the Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak.

The emergence of this new post-1995 identity as undifferentiated ‘Sudanese refugees in Egypt’ distinguished and established boundaries between the Sudanese refugees in Egypt and the Sudanese who were settling and working in Egypt; refugees in other countries; those permanently or temporarily residing in other countries for whatever purpose; and the remaining Sudanese people in Sudan. The identity of ‘Sudanese refugees in Egypt’ had partially caused the Sudanese national boundary to be emphasized and strengthened and other boundaries to be weakened. This disparity in boundaries resulted in Sudanese refugees in Egypt prioritizing their Sudanese national boundary over other boundaries such as ethnic, racial, regional, religious, and linguistic ones. These boundaries were used by many Sudanese groups and individuals to prioritize their sub-group identity over the Sudanese national boundary when they resided in...
Sudan. The identity of ‘refugees’ bound them to other refugees in terms of their status in Egypt, legal rights, and consideration by various local, national, and international parties.

The identity of ‘refugees in Egypt’ was extremely new to the Sudanese. Before their exile to Egypt, the Sudanese went to Egypt for education, tourism, and business. Some of these Sudanese settled in Egypt. This new identity of ‘refugees in Egypt’ affected how these Sudanese refugees viewed themselves and others; how different Sudanese refugees’ sub-groups differentiated themselves from other sub-groups, and how they were perceived by others. Using the lens of refugee identity, Sudanese groups in Egypt, especially Northerners, started understanding what it means to be at the margin, or at the margin of the margin, of the society. That is how they came to understand the suffering of the Southerners in the refugee camps as well as in the Sudan, especially in urban centers in Northern Sudan. One Northerner respondent, Sami, commented:

Before coming to Egypt, we did not know much about the Southerners. They are good people, but they suffered a lot from the war and from the oppression of the government. We did not understand this suffering until we came to live together with them in Egypt … […] … In Sudan we used to see them selling cigarettes, working in construction, or as servants in the houses. We used to see them in the streets, or living in the wrecked houses, or houses under construction, but we did not have relations with them like we had in Egypt. In Egypt, we were all Sudanese, we suffered and knew how it feels to live with people who do not feel your suffering, and do not value you as a human being.

Different sub-groups of Southerners and Northerners, began to understand the situations of other sub-groups, and came to know that they held inaccurate beliefs when evaluating Sudanese of other origins. For the first time the ‘riverine’ Northerners were included with some other Northern Sudanese groups such as people of Darfur, Nuba Mountains, and Southern Blue Nile in a setting removed from the Sudan. In this setting these different groups were looked at,
and they looked at themselves, as equals. This is expressed by a Nuba Mountains respondent as follows:

Our life in Egypt was different from our life in the Sudan. In Egypt we, [meaning non-Arab or non-riverine Northerners], were put in direct contact with riverine people, we were equal, no one was better than the other because we were in the same situation; we were poor, unemployed, and helpless. That was the first time when we felt equal with the riverine people.

Based on their status, experience, and the understanding they arrived at about each other, both Southern and Northern Sudanese in Egypt started to recognize their similarities, rather than their differences. This resulted in bringing them closer to each other and led them to prioritize their Sudanese national identity over other identities. This national identity was also enhanced by the emergence of the SPLA/M as the sole Sudanese political party with real representation of both Southern and Northern Sudanese in its membership. The SPLA/M was an effective player in Sudanese politics, and it was an effective member of the Egypt-based Sudanese opposition organization. The SPLA/M called for building a ‘new Sudan’ in which equal rights were to be based on citizenship as an expression of a national identity rather than ethnic, racial, religious, regional, or linguistic boundaries. This appealed to the majority of Sudanese in Egypt, especially they were opponents of the government of the Sudan. Many Southerners as well as Northerners supported, and/or became active members of, the SPLA/M.

In their history, southern Sudanese political parties used to be exclusively for southerners without any representation of northerners. Yet, the representation of southerners in the traditional sectarian northern Sudanese parties, namely Umma and Democratic Unionist parties, were symbolic in the sense that they used to have a few southern Sudanese members for the sake of token inclusion. The only party, other than the SPLA/M, that had real representation of ideologically-based southern Sudanese members, if a few, was the Sudanese Communist Party.
Despite the considerable problems, hardships, and challenges they encountered in Egypt, Sudanese life in Egypt was not devoid of positive aspects. Most of those who went to Egypt were opponents of the government of the Sudan. These Sudanese groups used the relative freedom of speech and of organization in Egypt to form their own formal and informal social, political, religious, and cultural organizations (Idris, 2005, P. 65). In this respect, Luka, a Southern Sudanese respondent noted:

We [meaning Southerners] established a lot of organizations, I am from Latooka tribe. Like other Southerners’ tribes, we had our own Latooka organization. This organization was part of the Equatoria organization. These organizations were social and cultural. Some Northerners, like Nuba and Bija, had their organizations too. Some of the educated Southerners and Northerners established the Sudanese center for culture and information, this center was for all Sudanese cultural activities. Also, we had a chapter of SPLA/M in Cairo. The Northerners had their political parties. These parties came together and formed the National Democratic Alliance.

Southerners and Northerners in Egypt undertook many collective activities in collaboration with each other as ‘Sudanese’, this collaboration was a form of resistance to the government of Sudan and, at the same time, a reinforcement of their national boundary over other boundaries. From the early 1990s, Egypt became the base of the National Democratic Alliance, or NDA (Collins, 2008, pp. 211-2; Idris, 2005, P. 72), the organization that led the Sudanese opposition against the government of the Sudan for years to come. This organization was an alliance of the Sudanese political parties, professional trade unions, and national figures or individuals who opposed the government of the Sudan, regardless of whether they were Southerners or Northerners. These parties included the SPLA/M, Umma party, Democratic

The Sudanese national identity did not erase all sub-national identities. For example, although they participated in all-Sudanese umbrella organizations, Southerners also formed their own cultural, political, religious, regional, lingual, and ethnic-based organizations in Egypt. In spite of the significant differences among their sub-groups, some Southern Sudanese still tried to emphasize their Southern Sudanese identity (Idris, 2005, P. 64-7), and activate and prioritize their Southern Sudanese boundary over their Sudanese national boundary.

In addition to the relative unity at the level of political mobilization, their de facto condition of being refugees in Egypt gave both Southern and Northern Sudanese the opportunity, for the first time in their history, to meet each other as Sudanese in large numbers, in different settings, for more lengthy times, and to identify as one group, namely ‘Sudanese refugees’ in Egypt. This was not the case when they were in the Sudan where different Sudanese ethnic groups, especially the Southern and Northern Sudanese, looked at each other in terms of their differences, as ‘others’ with different ethnic identities, not in terms of their similarities as the same people included in one Sudanese national identity. This led to many changes in the everyday interactions between Northerners and Southerners in Egypt. Instead of considering all

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32 After the emergence of the coup d’état, the commandment of the Sudanese army was changed with personnel who were loyal to the new government after the old commanders of the army were laid off for political reasons, those commanders fled the country and formed what was known in the Sudanese politics as ‘the legitimate commandment of the Sudanese army’, and started calling for all of the former officers who were laid off from the army for political reasons to join them and form what they called the ‘legitimate Sudanese army’, this army’s mandate, as per its commandment, was to contribute to return the Sudan to the democratic governance. Although it was established in Egypt in mid-1990, the headquarters of this army was Eritrea since 1995. They were working side by side with the other parties which initiated their own militias, so they could take part in the DNA forces. These forces mandate was to work hand in hand with, and support, the popular uprising of the Sudanese people inside the Sudan
of the Northern Sudanese as oppressors, many Southern Sudanese in Egypt came to appreciate that the oppressor was the government of the Sudan, not the ordinary Northern Sudanese person. This was eloquently expressed by Raj, a Southern Sudanese respondent, who noted:

Before coming to Egypt, we [meaning Southerners] used to think of all Northerners as ‘Jallaba’ and look at them, all of them [meaning Northerners] as different from us, we considered them, all of them, as the cause of our problems as they were portrayed to us by our politicians. After coming to Egypt and living with them, we found out that they are ordinary people like us, many of them are oppressed and they came to Egypt because of that, because they opposed the government which is the oppressor of both Southerners and Northerners, and this was admitted by Southern as well as Northern political leaders. In Egypt, many of them [meaning the Northerners] were friendly and treated us in a good way, and we also treated them in a good way like brothers and fellows Sudanese.

Many Northern Sudanese in Egypt came to realize that the Southerners were oppressed by the government. Being against the oppressive policies of the government, both Northerners Southerners had to flee the country and relocate to Egypt. That is the reason that both Southerners and Northerners, for the first time in their history, began working together in one united political front. In other words, they blurred their ethnic boundaries, so they could overthrow the regime. That is why they carried out many political campaigns against the government of the Sudan in the forms of public speeches, symposiums, discussion panels, and workshops about Sudanese identity, culture, politics, as well as the relationship among different Sudanese ethnic groups, including Southern and Northern Sudanese were organized. One of the Northern participants explained:

Before coming to Egypt, we (meaning Northerners) used to look down at the Southerners, and think of them as unpolished and savage trouble-makers. Coming to

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33 Jallaba in the ancient Sudanese version of Arabic language used to mean the traders, this term was used in a good faith when it was initiated, yet with these traders involvement in the slave trade, the term started to be used pejoratively. Now, the term Jallaba has transformed to give the notion of the oppressor and politically incorrect in the Sudanese context.
Egypt gave us an opportunity to live with them, to know them, and to realize that they are nice people who were, like us, oppressed by the government. Therefore, we worked together against our oppressor. We cooperated in carrying out many activities to this end which also deepened our knowledge about each other.

Shared status and collaborative activities created the conditions that allowed Southerners and Northerners in Egypt to establish inter-ethnic friendships, cohabitation, and even, if rare, inter-ethnic marriages. Tutu, one Southerner respondent, said:

Our relationship with the Northerners in Egypt is way different from it in Canada and in Sudan. In Sudan we did not come closer to each other, all we knew is that those were the ‘Jallaba’ who oppressed us, they looked down at us, they thought we were slaves, they used to use us as house servants, they did not give us good jobs, they did not give us their daughters for marriage. Yet, in Egypt we were all poor refugees and working together against the National Congress government. In Egypt we really knew each other, we supported each other, lived together in the same houses, some of us worked in the same places, and worked together against the government. So, a lot of us became close friends with good relations, and also some intermarriages occurred among Southerners and Northerners in Egypt, this was impossible when we were in the Sudan.

Southern Sudanese came to observe and understand that not all the Northern Sudanese were Arabs or Muslims as they thought. They recognized that Northerners were diverse groups of non-Arabs - such as Darfur, Nuba Mountain, and Blue Nile people - and non-Muslims including Christians such Sudanese Coptic, some of Nuba Mountains people, and some of Southern Blue Nile people. Moreover, they recognized that there were atheists from all parts of the Sudanese (Idris, 2005, P. 68-9), including some Northerners who carry Islamic names.

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34 National Conference Party NCP is ruling party in the Sudan since 1989, NCP is just another name of the Muslim Brothers’ party which changed its name several times from the Muslim Brothers Party, the Islamic Covenant Party, Islamic Tendency, National Islamic Front, and the National Conference Party after seizing power in 1989 by way of coup d’état.
Further, like many Southern Sudanese, there were animists among Northern Sudanese, like some of the Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile people.

Like Southern Sudanese, Northern Sudanese had the chance to meet Southern Sudanese and appreciate the extent to which they were oppressed by the successive governments of the Sudan since independence in 1956. They came to know that Southerners were not innately primitive, violent, and criminal as they were portrayed by the Sudanese regimes and their media outlets. The development of such new knowledge and understanding about each other led Southern and Northern Sudanese to develop a level of trust that worked toward strengthening Sudanese national identity. This facilitated ability of both Southern and Northern Sudanese to see the feasibility of prioritizing a national boundary over other ethnic and sub-ethnic boundaries.

In sum, Southern and Northern Sudanese in Egypt had an opportunity to meet in a different setting to know, live with, experience, and understand each other in a way that gave them some hope in creating a ‘new Sudan’ where all Sudanese citizens could be equally included in the national boundary without marginalization or discrimination based on race, ethnicity, religion, region, culture, or language. This opportunity in Egypt was equally applicable to Southerners as well as Northerners’ subgroups. It was realized within the two groups that they were not unified and did not even know each other well, contrary to their prior conceptions. Refuge to Egypt granted Southern and Northern Sudanese and their subgroups the chance to hold discussions, dialogues, workshops, and to exchange ideas and patriotic emotions, to the extent that many of them thought that ‘… unity of the Sudan could be brought about, from abroad, by the refugees who discovered that the unifying factors were more and stronger than the dividing ones’ as expressed by one of the participants. This notion was expressed by many Southern and Northern participants who had lived in Egypt.
This does not mean that Southerners and Northerners in Egypt were completely in agreement with a pan Sudanese identity or fully prioritized national boundary. There were still instances in which some Southerners and Northerners in Egypt could not get along with each other. In spite of their similarities and the opportunity to come together and understand each other, some Northerners and Southerners, as well as some of their sub-groups and individuals, did not deal with each other in a way that reflected any feeling or understanding of their being part of the same imagined community. Some Southerners and Northerners in Egypt did discriminate against, undermine, and isolate each other (Mahmoud, 2007, 2008). One of my Northerner participants expressed his experience as follows:

My experience with the Southerners in Egypt was not good, they were neighbors in the same building where I lived; I tried to be good to them, but they were not good to me at all; they did not respond to my greeting but rarely, they did not talk to me, and even they tried to avoid me when we met by chance.

Such incidents helped to reinforce old identities and boundaries. Nevertheless, the experience of living in Egypt revealed to the Southern and Northern Sudanese sub-groups that, in spite of their commonalities and their identification as one group, the Southerners and Northerners’ sub-groups were far from being homogeneous. They had, and still have, active sub-ethnic boundaries which were based on traditional linguistic, ethnic and religious differences (Idris, 2005, P. 74). This was eloquently expressed by one respondents who said:

Before coming to Egypt, we knew that we had our differences as Southern Sudanese, but we did not realize that we were different to the extent that some of us could be even closer to Northerners than to fellow Southerners; we carried our ethnic problems with us to Egypt, some of our groups and individuals were even enemies one to another.
In this context, Southern Sudanese groups’ differences, especially between Dinka and Nuer, always existed. They were ignored in some situations and activated and emphasized in others depending on ignoring or activating their ethnic boundary. These differences were highlighted and emphasized in the newly independent South Sudan where they contributed to the waging civil war in this newly born state. This is especially evident within the framework of 2013 violent conflict in South Sudan. These differences were highlighted to the extent that many Southern Sudanese ethnic groups, namely the Nuer and Equatorians, did, and still, talk about ‘the hegemony of the Dinka tribe’ (Jok and Hutchinson, 1999; Moro, 2004). This resembles what the Southerners called the ‘Northerners’ hegemony’ before the independence of South Sudan. The discourse of the Dinka hegemony is not new; it goes long back in the history and continued up to the present time. Shortly after it was founded in 1983, the SPLM/A was thought to be controlled by the Dinka. This is the view of most of the non-Dinka Southern Sudanese groups (Idris, 2005, P.74).

Like Southerners, Northerners’ living in Egypt reinforced these sub-ethnic boundaries but at the same time reconstituted them in new ways. Some Northern Sudanese groups, especially the Nuba Mountains people, started to see themselves as closer to some Southern Sudanese groups than to some Northern groups and vice versa. This is expressed by a respondents from Nuba Mountains. He said: ‘Although we are Northerners, yet our relations with the Southerners are closer and stronger than with the Arabs.’

The Northerners in Egypt came to understand that they were heterogeneous to the extent that they did not know each other well. They already knew that there were different tribes such as Kababeesh, Jaalyeen, and Shukriya, but they did not know that their differences were actually
more than they thought. This was emphasized by Sami, a Northern Sudanese respondent, who noted:

> We, as Northerners, knew that we were not identical, we knew that there were some small insignificant differences among our groups, but when we came to Egypt and knew one another well, we discovered that our differences were big, actually they were bigger than we imagined.

In this connection, I participated in a series of lectures organized by the Sudanese Centre for Culture and Information in Egypt. These lectures were about different Southern and Northern Sudanese sub-ethnic groups’ cultures as represented by rites of passage. These lectures were attended by many Sudanese from different Southerners’ and Northerners’ ethnic groups. In these lectures many came to see that it was not possible to talk about one ‘Sudanese culture’ per se, rather there were different and diverse Sudanese cultures.

The lectures highlighted Southern and Northern Sudanese ignorance about many elements of different Sudanese cultures. Another important outcome was that most of the Southerners, as well as Northerners, sub-ethnics came to appreciate that they did not know one another’s cultures. These lectures revealed that some Southern groups’ practices were closer to some Northern groups’ practices than other Southerners’ groups, and vice versa.

Bringing the positive and negatives effects of their experience, Southerner and Northerner Sudanese who lived in Egypt for were resettled in such countries as the United States, Australia, and Canada together with other refugees who also experienced the life of refugee camps. The life experiences of the Sudanese who lived in refugee camps other than in Egypt were significantly different from those who resided in the broad Egyptian society. There is
evidence that those who experienced life in refugee camps outside of Egypt had different attitudes and behavior toward other Sudanese.

SUDANESE EXPERIENCE IN REFUGEE CAMPS

In addition to fleeing to Egypt, Sudanese people also sought refuge in other neighboring countries. Their experience in these countries was different from those who went to Egypt for a variety of reasons. First, although some Sudanese (particularly Northerners) lived in the host country’s broader society rather than in refugee camps, the majority of those who fled to the other neighboring countries were received in refugee camps where they lived for relatively long periods of time. This is especially applicable to Southern Sudanese.

Second, as the continuous wars have displaced hundreds of thousands from their land, most of those who sought refuge in neighboring countries other than Egypt were Southerners. Nevertheless, there were small numbers of Northerners who sought refuge in these neighboring countries and were received in refugee camps, especially from the Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile, and some Easterners like the Bija tribes.

Third, some of these neighboring countries, or at least some ethnic groups within them, were involved in the ongoing ethnic conflicts in the Sudan. In some cases ethnic boundaries cut across national boundaries represented by international borders of the Sudan with neighboring countries. Some tribes were divided between the Sudan and these countries. For example, the
Acholi were divided between the Sudan and Uganda; some Nuer lived in the Sudan, whereas others lived in Ethiopia; and the Bija lived across the borders of Eritrea and Sudan.

Fourth, unlike the case of Egypt, the borders between the Sudan and these neighboring countries were, and still are, porous, in the sense that people could easily move back and forth across borders without significant, if any, restrictions. This was made easier by the fact that the refugee camps in these neighboring countries were located close to the borders of the Sudan.

Finally, the experience of those refugees in the neighboring countries was influenced more directly by what was happening in the Sudan. For example, if someone from a certain tribe was killed in the Sudan by another tribe’s member, this could have reverberations between the members of the two tribes in the country of refuge, to the extent that they could fight in the refugee camp, and take revenge for their tribal members who were killed in the Sudan.

This could be thought of as a simple effect of rudimentary transnational ties with homeland. The news of incidents that took place in the Sudan were brought to those tribes’ members by those who crossed from the Sudan to these neighboring countries and vice versa. Although the recent advancement of technology, especially communication and transportation, rendered the news and information exchange between Sudan and neighboring countries easier and more instantaneous than before, those who were in the refugee camps did not have access to new communication and transportation technology. As a result, they depended on the traditional sort of transnational ties that were maintained by direct interpersonal communication with co-ethnics.

In spite of the existence of transnational ties among the Sudanese in Egypt and their country of origin, exporting the tribal conflicts and taking revenge across borders was not
experienced as much by the Sudanese in Egypt. The majority of those who fled to Egypt were Northerners, most of whom were educated. Taking revenge was not deep-rooted in their cultures.

Unlike the case of the other neighboring countries, the Sudanese in Egypt formed a visible minority in terms of their different color, facial features, and accented Arabic language. This rendered them, and any unsavory or illegal activity they might be engaged in, as highly visible by the Egyptian government.

Usually upon their arrival in the neighboring countries other than Egypt, Sudanese refugees were first accommodated in transitional camps and then transferred to permanent ones. After moving from temporary camps, Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia resided in camps near by the Sudanese border; these include Etang, Poniro, Dima, and Long Quay camps (Collins, 2008, P. 176, 203). In Kenya, the refugees were accommodated in such camps as Riro, Kakuma, and Walda camps. In Uganda, the refugees lived in such camps as Acholi Pii, Maaji, and Adjumani (Moro, 2004).

Although the camps in Ethiopia were populated by people from all Southern Sudanese tribes, the majority of the refugees were Nuer and Dinka majority populations of Southern Sudan. There were refugees from other Southern tribes such as the Equatorian tribes, in addition to a Northern Sudanese minority. The camps accommodated people with different ethnic boundaries. In addition, the refugee camps in Ethiopia accommodated those who were known as the ‘lost boys and girls.’ The lost boys and girls were children from different Southern Sudanese tribes; they were displaced by war after they lost contact with their relatives who were mostly killed, these boys and girls walked for months from Sudan to some neighboring countries,
mainly to Ethiopia, where they were admitted to the refugees’ camps (Chanoff, 2006; McMahon, 2007, P. 4).

Due to their young age, and also because they belonged to various Southerner Sudanese tribes, the boys were accommodated together in separate places from the tribal neighborhoods (Chanoff, 2006; McMahon, 2007, P. 4). The girls, on the other hand, were distributed amongst families in the camps (Chanoff, 2006). After the Mangistu Haili Mariam regime was overthrown in Ethiopia in 1991, attitudes towards refugees hardened. Their opposition to the Sudanese government became a liability. Refugee camps, including those of lost boys, were attacked. As a result, the lost boys returned to Sudan and then proceeded to Kenya where they were resettled by the UNCHR (Chanoff, 2006). This arrangement caused the ethnic boundaries of these ‘lost boys’ to be deemphasized.

Unlike in the case of the ‘lost boys’, it was the policy of the UNHCR by and large to allocate residence in the camps by tribe, in the sense that the camps were organized to accommodate each tribe or ethnic group in the same neighborhood within the camp. Ethnic boundaries among refugees in the camps were emphasized by UNHCR policy.

Although it succeeded in some instances, this policy of accommodating each tribe in the same neighborhood, within the same camp, did not always work. It worked in Ethiopia where the refugees from various tribes or ethnic groups lived without much of violent conflict. This policy did not work in many camps in both Kenya and Uganda. This is evident in the continuous violent conflicts among different ethnic groups/tribes inhabiting the camps (McMahon, 2007, p. 6; Chanoff, 2006).
In Uganda, upon their establishment, refugee camps were organized according to ethnic boundaries, as each tribe was accommodated in a separate neighborhood in the same camp. Due to the occurrence of inter-tribal violence, the policy then changed so that each tribe was accommodated in a separate camp. In addition to the inter-tribal violence, these camps were raided by Ugandan rebel groups and so some of the refugees had to flee the camps (Chanoff, 2006).

In Kenya different tribes were allocated to separate camps because of the continuous inter-tribal conflicts and fighting. This worsened after the splinter of the SPLA/M into two antagonist parts in 1992 (Collins, 2008, pp. 104-5). The two SPLA/M factions’ members used to attack each other even in the camps. This split had tribal dimensions; the mainstream SPLA/M was mainly supported by Dinka, whereas the dissidents’ party was mainly supported by Nuer and Shilluk.

The conflicts between Dinka and Nuer were rooted in the violent history of their relationship in the Sudan. This tended to reinforce and thicken the less permeable boundaries between the two groups. Historically Dinka view Nuer as less civilized, violent, and uneducated. Nuer view Dinka as cowards, selfish, and dishonest. This kind of stereotyping continued with varying degrees in the refugee camps, especially in Uganda, and Kenya as indicated by participants who lived in these camps.

Beside tribal antagonisms and violent conflicts, there were small-scale conflicts and fights over daily living matters. These conflicts were small scale. The number of people involved was small, the durations of fighting was short, the reasons and repercussions of fighting were
minor, and the resolution of conflicts was not hard. This was especially the case in the refugee camps in Ethiopia. Kar, one of the respondents who lived there explained:

The fighting [meaning in the refugee camps in Ethiopia] were not as big and long-termed as in Uganda or Kenya, they were mainly over the scarce resources, and they could erupt between different clans and/or individuals, even from the same tribe. Also, these fights were not too violent, therefore they were manageable … […] … Usually, beside the interference of the camps officials, such situations used to be mitigated through inter-tribal friends and inter-tribal spouses in the camps.

In spite of identifying themselves as Southerners, as opposed to Northerners, Southern Sudanese refugees in these camps used to mainly give priority to their ethnic/tribal boundary over the Southern Sudanese, or ethno-regional, boundary as well as the Sudanese national boundary. One respondents stated:

To be honest with you, we (meaning Southerners) have always focused on our tribal identity rather than our Sudanese or even Southern Sudanese identity. We did not use the Sudanese or Southern Sudanese identity unless were compelled to do so.

This was supported by another respondent who lived in refugee camps in Uganda. He noted:

Some Southerner refugees emphasized their Sudanese, Southern Sudanese, or tribal identity according to the situation they were in. This was usually happening. In the cases of fights with Ugandans, some Southern Sudanese refugees identify themselves as Sudanese, yet in the cases of conflict with Northerners, Southerners identify as Southern Sudanese. The same refugees emphasize their tribal identity in the situations of Southerners’ inter-tribal conflicts.

Contrary to the above respondent, another respondent stated that they always identified as Southern Sudanese in spite of their tribal differences.
The aforementioned boundaries and identities were utilized differently by different politicians who visited these camps. Southern Sudanese, including those who were in the refugee camps, were subjected to politician and other elite propaganda which stressed that the oppression and marginalization they faced in Sudan was a consequence of the deeds of the Northerners, as a people, rather than the Sudan government which was dominated by Northern Sudanese political elites. This was noted by one of the respondents. She said:

Many politicians used to visit us in the camps, they used to talk to us at length about the oppression and sufferings caused to us by ‘Jallaba,’ such as enslavement, killing, looting, displacing, marginalizing, and discriminating against us and that we have to force our independence from them. Yet, a few politicians, especially from SPLA/M, used to talk to us about working toward ‘new Sudan’ where Sudanese people become equal citizens in their country regardless of their ethnic, cultural, religious, and all other differences.

This overgeneralization is one mechanism for ethnic boundaries between Southerners and Northerners, including those in the refugee camps, to be internally maintained and strengthened through the endeavors of some Southern Sudanese elites. These endeavors were reactions to the cruelties as well as the propaganda of the government of the Sudan against the Southerners. The Northerners’ pressure on the external layer of the Southerners’ ethnic boundary has affected the internal layer of this boundary. As a result, the Southerners reacted by strengthening their internal side of the boundary which, in its turn, exerted external pressure on, and also led to strengthening of, the Northerners’ side of the boundary and thus, led to some reactions on the part of the Northerners.

One result of this boundary strengthening is that the ordinary Southerners, who were subjected to various kinds of oppression, aggression, and atrocities became socially distant from ordinary Northerners. The Southerner elite propaganda was very effective, because many of
those refugees, and other Southerners who did not live in the Northern part of the Sudan, did not have the opportunity to meet with Northerners in natural societal settings, so they could experience ordinary life, develop mutual understanding and build trust.

In addition to this propaganda, the image of the Northerners in the minds of Southern Sudanese refugees was dominated by that of the Northerner soldiers committing war crimes against innocent Southerners. This included killing relatives, orphaning large numbers of children, burning and looting villages, and displacing them from their land (Deng, 1995, P. 142-5; Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006, P. 61-3). One respondent said that he never saw any Northern Sudanese, other than the Sudanese army soldiers, until he came to Canada.

The SPLA/M nonetheless tried to change this image by continuously emphasizing that the cause of the Southerners’ oppression and marginalization was not Northerner citizens, but the successive governments of the Sudan supported by some Northerner elites. Nevertheless, this stereotyping of all the Northerners as the oppressors and the cause of the Southerners’ marginalization continued to be a barrier between Southerners and Northerners.

In addition to the effect of the external pressure from the Southerners’ side of the boundary, the Northerners’ internal side of the ethnic boundary was exposed to grave pressure by government agents and media. This pressure was translated into external pressure on the Southerners’ side of the ethnic boundary. This pressure, which increased since the first Southerners’ mutiny in 1955, led to a whole dynamic exchange between these two groups which led to the strengthening of the ethnic boundaries between Northerners and Southerners. This pressure was created through long term exposure of the Northerners, although the majority of them were opponents of the present government of the Sudan, to the successive Sudan
governments’ continuous propaganda that Southerners were uncivilized, violent, and troublemakers. This pertained to most Northerners, especially those who did not live in Southern Sudan. Their experience was limited to seeing the Southerners living in poor conditions in the Northern Sudanese cities’ outskirts, being overly involved in violent conflicts with each other and with Northerners, and holding marginal jobs in the informal economy such as selling cigarettes, making liquor, or working in small scale construction as casual labourers.

The aforementioned backgrounds, combined with the factors of slave trade, colonization, the policies of post-colonial national governments, and political propaganda rendered the relationship between Southern and Northern Sudanese in the camps, especially upon arrival to these camps, to be characterized by misunderstanding, misinterpretation, suspicion, and lack of trust. One Southerner respondent, who lived in a camp in Ethiopia, said:

When we first arrived at the camp, it was striking for us to find Northerners, who oppressed us, over there in the camp. However, they were very few to the extent that we, most of the time, did not even feel that they were living with us.

This was emphasized by a Northern respondent who said:

We were few in the camp. Probably that is why we tried to absorb any problematic situation or conflicts initiated by the Southerners which were a lot, especially at the beginning of our residence in the camp.

Even after spending time with each other, the boundaries between Northerners and Southerners in the camps still remained strong. One reason is that the small numbers of Northern Sudanese in refugee camps could not represent the diversity of Northern Sudanese. If the Northerners’ numbers in the camps were larger there would have been a realistic grasp of the
ethnic boundaries, and by extension of the relationship, between Southerners and Northerners in the refugee camps.

If the Northerners were larger in number and diverse, the relationships between the Southerners and Northerners in the camps would have been different. Each Northerner and Southerner sub-group with different histories of relationships with other Sudanese groups could have affected the relationships in the camps in way or another. Because of their status as a minority, Northerners needed to keep good relations with the Southerners, to avoid the risks of conflicts with them as mentioned by one of the respondents.

Also, because the Northerners in the camp were few and not representative of the Northern Sudanese population diversity, the relationship between Northerners and Southerners in the camps can be considered superficial. This relationship was not being forged in natural social situations but rather in a highly stressful, uncertain context of a refugee camp where resources were limited. This is the reason that this relationship was evaluated differently, and sometimes in contradictory ways, by respondents from different groups.

One respondent stated that the relationship between Southern and Northern Sudanese refugees was good, not only in the sense that there were not a lot of conflicts and fights between them in the camps, but also in the sense that there were good neighbours and some close friendships among Northerners and Southerners. When asked whether that was the general rule or the exception she stated that this happened on the individual level not the general societal level.

The fact that the Northerners were a minority in these camps does not necessarily explain the relationship between Southerners and Northerners in the camps. Unlike the situation inside
the Sudan, the Northerners were in a weak position compared to the Southerners whose numbers were large. Each group considered its numerical power, compared to the other group, in different situations. As such, Northerners may have thought they had to stick together for the purposes of protection in the case of eruption of hostilities.

Another respondent said that the relationship was not good in reality but only appeared to be so. This respondent attributed the non-occurrence of conflicts and troubles between Southerners and Northerners to the fact that the Northerners were helpless in the camps. This same respondent argues that if there were good relationship between Southern and Northern Sudanese, there should have been two way intermarriages between these groups. That is to say not only Northern men should marry Southern women, but Southern men should also be able to marry Northern women. This lack of two way marriage was a sign, to this respondent, that old boundaries were not changed.

A Northerner respondent who lived in refugee camps stated that the relationship between Southerners and Northerners was good. He said that there was interethnic cooperation, assistance and help, and close friendships. As for the lack of two way intermarriages, he attributed it to the fact that most of the Northern refugees were either men or families comprised of wives and husbands. Therefore, he argued, the only available option was that Northerner men marry Southerner women. Notwithstanding that it is applicable to the case of the refugee camps, this argument would not hold in the Sudanese society at large where it is generally not socially acceptable, by Northerners, for Southerner men to marry Northerner women.

Another factor having an indirect effect on the relationship between Southerners and Northerners, including those in the camps is the inability of Southerners to distinguish different
Northerners’ groups one from another. They considered all Northerners as one group, including the ‘black’ Northerners, as they are called by one respondents from Nuba Mountains. These ‘black’ Northerners include Blue Nile, Nuba Mountains, and Darfur people who were defined as Northerners and oppressors. Many of the soldiers in the Sudanese national army, which perpetrated horrific aggression, massacres, and atrocities against the Southerners, were from these areas, especially Nuba Mountains and Darfur.

After the establishment of the SPLA/M and the growing membership from the Nuba Mountain and Southern Blue Nile people within it, the situation has changed; the Southerners started viewing Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile people as part of the oppressed people in the Sudan. The same happened after the eruption of the lethal conflict in Darfur between the so-called Arabs and ‘Blacks.’ For this reason, the Southerners came to view the abovementioned groups as closer to them than other Northern Sudanese, to the extent that the notion of ‘Northerner’ became a signifier of the riverine Arabs.

This notion was also adopted by Nuba Mountain, Southern Blue Nile, and Darfur people to distance themselves from the ‘riverine’ Northerners. In spite of their small numbers in the refugee camps, the ‘black’ Northerners kept good relations with both Southerners and ‘riverine’ Northerners, albeit they were closer to the Southerners than to the riverine people as it was expressed by one of the respondents. At the same time, those ‘black’ Northerners were closer to the riverine or ‘non-black’ Northerners, so to speak, than all of the Southern Sudanese groups who were not close to the riverine people. This status likely resulted in ‘black Northerners’ noninvolvement in either Southerners’ or Northerners’ conflicts in most of the situations in the camps.
CONCLUSION

The experience of Southerners and Northerners in the refugee camps was differently interpreted by different sub-groups of Southerners and Northerners. This is not only based on their individual experiences, what they witnessed, or what they heard, but is also based on, or influenced by, elites and public opinion leaders’ takes on relevant issues, government and media portrayal of the situations, and the Southern Sudanese political parties’ stances and their interpretations disseminated by Southern Sudanese political leaders in their visits to the refugee camps.

We can think of the Southerners and Northerners as ambivalent toward each other. Although they considered each other included in the same national boundaries and recognized that they needed to have a good relationship, at the same time they looked at each other as part of the causes of the troubles in the country and therefore were considered enemies. This is why some of the Northern Sudanese unrealistically thought that the secession of South Sudan would cause the troubles in the Sudan at large to significantly diminish. By the same token many Southern Sudanese were thinking that the secession would end the troubles and violent conflicts in South Sudan. Unfortunately the reality proved both parties wrong, and now many Southern and Northern Sudanese respondents wishfully think that the Sudan should unite anew.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE ETHNIC BOUNDARIES AND RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOUTHERN AND NORTHERN SUDANESE CANADIANS

In chapter three, boundary making processes among various groups in Sudan was examined in an historical context. The focus was on the ways in which macro-level social processes related to migration, colonialism, and political independence shaped the nature of ethnic boundaries in the country. The previous chapter examined how ethnic boundaries became variously reinforced and muted in the context of different trajectories of emigration from Sudan in the 1980s and 1990s. This chapter focuses on the relationship between Southern and Northern Sudanese in Kitchener following settlement in Canada.

In the early years of settlement, the policy of multiculturalism, along with being regarded by wider Canadian society as an undifferentiated visible minority, helped create conditions for the muting of ethnic boundaries. These tendencies and pressures to break down traditional ethnic boundaries eventually collided with political events in Sudan connected to the struggle for independence of South Sudan. Though the early years of settlement involved efforts to break down traditional ethnic boundaries, these efforts eventually failed as the tensions in Sudan over the succession of South Sudan in the early 2000s spilled over into Canada. The conflicts, animosities and tensions that emerged in the course of debates about independence of South Sudan, and subsequent conflicts within South Sudan, continued to resonate among Sudanese in Kitchener. In part, these tensions were transferred to Canada via the transnational ties and connections that immigrants continued to maintain with Sudan, and now South Sudan.
This chapter involves an examination of three moments of memory involved in shaping the relationship between Southern and Northern Sudanese in Kitchener. The memory of these two groups as Sudanese in the Sudan; the memories of being Sudanese in Canada/Kitchener before the secession of South Sudan; and memories of being Sudanese in Canada/Kitchener after the secession of South Sudan.

**MEMORIES OF SUDANESE CANADIANS IN SUDAN**

Sudanese-Canadians in Kitchener maintain memories of their experience in Sudan. These memories, along with other factors, influence their relations in Kitchener. These memories affect their understanding of different issues, including the meaning of being Sudanese.

The meaning of belonging to any country can be thought of as geographical. Yet geography by itself does not suffice and it provides only a framework for understanding belonging. For the Sudanese, the content of this geographical belonging comprise such elements as their mutual history from antiquity to the present. Peoplehood is another factor. Notwithstanding their ethnic diversity, Sudanese people are bound by citizenship. Another element is culture. In spite of cultural diversity and the differences in traditions, norms, and values, there are many commonalities of the Sudanese. Language is another element. The existence of many languages spoken by different ethnic groups did not prevent Arabic from becoming the lingua franca in the Sudan. Arabic is dominant even among Southern Sudanese groups because they never had an opportunity to learn the languages of non-Arab groups with whom they were neighbours, and the majority were also unfamiliar with English. Even now,
after the independence of South Sudan, Southern Sudanese accented Arabic, called ‘Juba Arabic,’ continues to be the lingua franca and the language of the media in the newly born country.

As for the meaning of being Sudanese, the majority of respondents, being Southerners or Northerners, emphasized that it is based on geography, in addition to a variety of other elements closely related to location such as shared history, culture, and mutual fate. One interviewee noted:

A Sudanese is someone who was born, and lived in the Sudan, or someone whose ancestors are Sudanese. It does not matter whether they are Sudanese by birth or by immigration. It also does not matter where these ancestors came from or when they migrated to the Sudan as long as three or four generations of these ancestors were living in Sudan. Belonging to the Sudan also means having the same culture, language, and traditions with other Sudanese regions.

Although he did not deny the geography, another respondent insisted that the meaning of being Sudanese includes such traits as ‘generosity, brevity, helpfulness, and honesty’ without acknowledging that these traits can generally be found in any society.

Although they do not completely deny the role of geography, some other respondents indicated that the meaning of being Sudanese should not be limited to those who were born within the borders of the country. Rather it should include those second generation Canadians whose parents are Sudanese. One interviewee expressed it as follows:

Anyone who is born to Sudanese parents is a Sudanese, he belongs to the Sudan. It does not matter whether he is born inside the Sudan or not, for example our children who were born in Canada are Canadians by birth, but they are also Sudanese by virtue of being offspring of Sudanese parents, they share the history and all other things with other Sudanese.
Nevertheless, a few excluded those who belong to cross-borders tribes from being Sudanese. This is eloquently expressed by one person who said:

Those who belong to cross-borders tribes and keep relations with their tribes abroad should not be considered as Sudanese, because their belonging and loyalty is divided among countries and thus, their allegiance will not be limited to the Sudan. That is why these cross-border tribes’ members cannot be compared to those whose allegiance is limited to the Sudan.

Contrary to the general tendency to define Sudanese in national/geographical terms, two respondents, one from the South and another from the Nuba Mountains, insisted that ‘Arabs’ should not be considered as Sudanese because they are ‘immigrants’. The Southern Sudanese respondent noted that:

The meaning of being Sudanese does not include Arabs, they are not real Sudanese because they are immigrants. The real Sudanese are the Africans who are the native people of the Sudan. They were created here in the land of the Sudan.

Such a view overlooks the fact that the ancestors of the so called Arabs immigrated to the Sudan centuries ago, and that many Arabs have intermingled with native ethnic groups to create a population that identifies neither as pure Arab nor pure native. In addition, ‘Arabs’ who have not intermarried have no other place of residence and belonging than the Sudan, because they have a long ancestral history in Sudan.

Some respondents argued ultimately that there are no Arabs in the Sudan, and those who claim to be Arabs are misrepresenting their real ‘African’ identity. One Southern Sudanese participant said:
There are no Arabs at all in the Sudan. Those who think they are Arabs are deceiving themselves, because in fact they are Africans, not Arabs. Look at their colors, look at their hair, and look at their faces, where did this black color come from? Even Arabs in other countries do not recognize them as Arabs. They are faking their identity.

This view overlooks that identity is not fully objective, but rather it has a subjective element that depends on how individuals identify themselves. In case of the Sudan, where phenotypical differences among various groups are generally minor or not obvious, some try to impose an ‘African’ identity on the Sudanese people. This view seems to be a deliberate and conscious reaction to the successive post-colonial regimes in the Sudan attempt to impose an Arabic Islamic identity on the Sudanese people regardless of their racial, ethnic, and religious backgrounds, and regardless of their consent. This is true of the present regime which has adopted an Islamic Shari’at constitution.

Here it is noteworthy that when they compare ‘Arabs’ to ‘Africans’, respondents compare an ethnic group(s), namely ‘Arab’, to a geographic group, ‘Africans’. Although this distinction is commonly made among Sudanese people in Kitchener, such a comparison is problematic as it compares oranges to apples, because unlike Arab, ‘African’ is not an ethnicity or ‘race’. Even if it is intended to mean Arabs versus non-Arabs, the binary puts Arabism as the standard for ethnic belonging to the Sudan in the same way in which ‘whiteness’ is the standard in the West according to the binary of white/non-white.

The practical consequences of this binary of Arabs/non-Arabs is that, even after the secession of South Sudan the distinction between Arabs and non-Arabs still persists and continues to be the basis of the lethal conflicts afflicting the country in the present. This binary
presumes that non-Arabs are one group in spite of the distinctions, and sometimes animosity that exists among its sub-groups.

In spite of the diversity of Sudanese, many respondents reported that race, religion, ethnicity, culture, language, and political affiliation should not interfere with the meaning of being Sudanese, in the sense that these aspects of identity should not shape whether a person is considered a genuine Sudanese. Respondents generally agreed that these aspects should not determine the privileges and opportunities available to different groups of Sudanese citizens, whether they are from the North, South, East, or West.

Many noted that the policies of various post-colonial governments, which resembled colonial policies in depriving many Sudanese from equal opportunities and access to resources, are responsible for exacerbating the state of inequality among Sudanese people. They recognize that post-colonial governments in Sudan used ethno-religious as well as ethno-regional boundaries as a basis of discrimination, marginalization, and oppression against those who do not fit into the regime’s political vision for the country.

There was consensus among respondents that the meaning of being a Sudanese does not and should not differ for Southern than Northern Sudanese. In other words the Southerner is a Sudanese to the same extent, and in the same capacity, to which the Northerner is a Sudanese despite the inequality that characterized the Sudanese society for a long time. Most of respondents recognized that this sameness was not reflected in the distribution of political, economic, social, cultural, and symbolic resources and opportunities. One respondent said:

Sudanese is a Sudanese regardless of his race, colour, belief, region, culture, or any other thing. There should not be any difference between Southerners and Northerners, or Arabs and non-Arabs, or Muslims and non-Muslims. These things should not differentiate between people, especially in terms of their access to wealth and power. This
differentiation and discrimination, which was practiced by all of the governments of the Sudan, is the main cause of the marginalization and troubles in the South, Darfur, Nuba Mountains, and Blue Nile, because people were not dealt with in equality as Sudanese, so they feel that they are second class citizens.

This discrimination was also expressed by a Southern Sudanese interviewee who worked as a judge in Northern Sudan before the secession of South Sudan:

Although we (meaning Southern Sudanese judges) were accepted to work in the judiciary system, our number was so small compared to the Northerners. Also, unlike our Northern counterparts, we were not given administrative responsibilities, and we, in our turn, did not realize the negative effect of that but after the independence of South Sudan, I mean that was the main reason for the judiciary system in South Sudan to fail in performing its administrative responsibilities in spite of the excellence of its judges in the court rooms.

This is an example of how the Southern Sudanese felt they were institutionally discriminated against in different aspects of life. It is important to note that such treatment was not limited to the judicial system. It also reflects on how the meaning of being a Sudanese was considered by the government, or at least some of the powerful Northern Sudanese elites, as different for northern and for Southern Sudanese and other non-Arab groups.

The feeling of oppression and exclusion, especially by the Southern and other ‘non-Arab’ Sudanese elites has contributed to strengthening ethnic and regional boundaries among different Sudanese groups. This had consequently led to the advent of the Southern Sudanese national movement, which has its origins in the mid-1950s. This movement, along with the oppression of the Southerners and the strengthening of the ethno-regional boundaries, contributed to informing the Southerners’, and other oppressed people’s, views about the meaning of being Sudanese whether they are living in the Sudan or abroad.
As indicated above by one Southern respondent, the meaning of being a Sudanese is different in practice when comparing Southerners to Northerners. Southerners felt that to be a Southerner was to be a second class citizen compared to Northerners who had access to better opportunities and more resources. The same applies to some marginalized and oppressed Northern Sudanese groups such as Darfur, Nuba Mountains, Angessana, and Bija people. One of my Nuba Mountains interviewees put it this way:

We, in the Nuba Mountains, are just like the Southerners, we were marginalized and discriminated against by the Northerners [meaning ‘riverine’ people]. They dealt with us as inferior to them. They are arrogant. Also, all these Northern governments were not fair to us, they did not give us anything, no education, no health care, or anything, like services.

On this basis, Southerners and other non-Arab and non-Muslim Sudanese started distancing themselves from the riverine people because they looked at them as ‘arrogant’ and as oppressors. This sense of grievance between Southern and Northern Sudanese was the focus of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement CPA, between the present government of Sudan and SPLA/M.

The agreement emphasized the priority of the Sudanese citizenship over other types of identification. It gave priority to national boundary over other boundaries. Nevertheless, the CPA gave the Southern Sudanese the opportunity to express their feelings about their Sudanese citizenship, and the right to decide either to stay as a part of a united Sudan or to secede. Southerners eventually decided to secede, or contract the national boundary of the Sudan and ‘create’ a new national boundary. The main reason for that was the failure of the present government to improve the opportunities for Southern Sudanese during the transitional period that followed the conclusion of the agreement which extended for six years from 2005 to 2011.
This transitional period was meant to be a period where discrimination against the Southerners by the government was to be reduced, so Southerners would voluntarily choose to stay in the united Sudan. In Sudanese political literature, this preference for the unity by Southerners was known as ‘the attractive unity’ (Ibid, P. 5).

The meaning of being a Sudanese is closely linked to the issue of the national identity and national boundary, especially for those powerful Northerners who think of Sudan as an ethn-national state. This thinking manifested itself in the continuous insistence of the post-colonial governments, led by those Northerner elites, which were not sensitive to the diversity of the country, and thus identified the Sudan as an Arabic and Islamic country. These governments tended to favour Muslims and Arabs who spoke Arabic and excluded non-Arab and non-Muslim Sudanese from the definition of fully fledged Sudanese citizens. Such exclusion motivated the Southerners to adopt new strategies for contesting these boundaries and identities.

The same ethno-national stance, which is not sensitive to diversity, was adopted by many Southern Sudanese people, including many elites and scholars such as the prominent Southern Sudanese academic Francis Deng. In his endeavor to refute the claim of some Northern Sudanese groups to define themselves as Arabs, Deng (1995), in his book entitled War of Visions, insists that Sudanese people are not Arabs. He bases his argument on the African phenotypical traits of Northern Sudanese groups without considering their right to ‘self-identification’ which is an authentic part of identification (Barth, 1969; Glazer and Moynihan, 1975, P. 34; Isajiw, 1975, P. 131; Pryor et al, 1992; Smith, 1986, P. 192-3; Waters, 1990; Weber, 1978, P. 389).

Although some of them said that they are Arabs or otherwise Africans, many respondents stated that Sudanese people do not need to think of themselves neither as Arabs nor as Africans,
but rather as Sudanese, a mix of different groups including Arabs and Africans. Sami, a Northern Sudanese respondent, said:

I do not like those Sudanese who think that they are Arabs or those who think that they are Africans, because we are all Sudanese, we cannot say that we are Arabs. Also, we cannot say that we are Africans. That is why we should say that we are Sudanese, what is wrong of saying that we are Sudanese? Sudanese are a mix of Arabs and non-Arabs who came and lived in Sudan for long times in the history.

The majority of respondents from Southern Sudan, the Nuba Mountains, the Southern Blue Nile, Darfur, and Bija emphasized the racism of the riverine people or Arabs toward non-Arabs. Some respondents referred to Arabs as ‘whites.’ The above groups think that Arabs viewed non-Arabs as inferior, ignorant, primitive, and violent. For this reason the riverine Arabs distanced themselves from them. This was eloquently expressed by a Nuba Mountains respondent who said:

These white people [meaning riverine Arabs] are racists, they look down at the black [meaning non-Arab] thinking that they are inferior. They do not have relations with us, because they think that we are not equal to them as fellow Sudanese, they think that we are not educated, primitive, savages, and violent, but we are not like that.

One Southerner respondent condemned the Northerners for refusing to give their daughters to Southerners in marriage, and for not keeping close friendships with them in the Sudan. Yet, as illustrated in the previous chapter, this distancing diminished temporarily among the Sudanese who lived in Egypt where the relationship between Southerners and Northerners was strong to the extent that there were many close friendships, cases of cohabitation, and a few cases of intermarriage.
The aforementioned racism can be further illustrated by the treatment of the Southerners in the Northern Sudan compared to that of Northerners in the South. Generally speaking, Northern Sudanese went to the South as traders, professionals, government officials, or military officials. With the exception of the fighting troops, who were not welcomed in the South, it is noted by some respondents, both Northern and Southern Sudanese, that Northern Sudanese were well treated by Southerners in the towns and villages where they lived. One respondent emphasized:

They [meaning Northerners in the South] mixed with people [meaning Southerners], those who lived for a long time in the South have learned some local languages, did their works without encountering troubles, married to Southern girls, and practiced their religious rituals freely.

On the other hand, the experience of Southern Sudanese in the North was different. They were not well treated; most of them were poor and did not have equal access to education or health care system. They lived on the outskirts of the cities and towns in poor non-healthy housing and did not have access to secure jobs. As a result, they resorted to taking marginal, low-paid, insecure jobs mostly in the informal sector of the economy. Even those who worked in secure jobs in the formal economy were discriminated against in different ways. One Southerner respondent said:

Although I was a high school graduate, I was not treated like Northerner high school graduates, I was not given a job. The only job I found was selling cigarettes in the street. Even in this job I was not left alone. I was targeted, along with other Southerners, by the police and security forces. This is obvious racism
Racism is also manifested by considering Southerners and Westerners as slaves based on their region and skin color. This is a remnant of the history of slave trade in Southern and Western Sudan.

Although some of them admitted to the existence of racism on the part of Northerners, other Northerner respondents had a different view. One thought that the difference in treatment was not because of racism or discrimination against the Southerners or other darker skinned people, but rather ‘… because they are illiterate and lack the qualifications and work experience to obtain good jobs’. That is, he argued that the low socio-economic status of the Southerners was their own fault. He blamed the victim for not being educated and falling short of obtaining other requirements of human capital\(^{35}\) so they could be upwardly mobile. Southern respondents did not deny the fact that they were less educated, but they blamed it on colonization and on the successive Arab-controlled post-colonial governments for ignoring education in their areas, thus depriving them, along with other marginalized groups in the country, of accumulating human capital.

This pattern of treatment is not to be overgeneralized to include all of the Southern Sudanese in the North. One respondent, a Southern Sudanese woman who was brought up in a village in the North, said:

Me, my parents, and siblings did not experience any kind of racism or discrimination in El Qurashi (a village in El Gezira area in central Sudan) where we spent most of our life, we led good life and good relations with our neighbours; my mother would exchange visits, invitations, and gifts with her neighbours and friends in the village, and so did my father, we had a lot of good close friends in the village, we used to play with them in the houses and even in the street. After the secession, my family decided to go and live with our relatives (she means extended family) in South Sudan, so they went there, but they could not bear it there, especially my mother, because they felt that they were strangers

with our relatives, and they did not know the culture, that is why they could not endure living over there, and therefore returned back to the North.

There are other examples. Some Southern Sudanese respondents said that they were ‘… well treated by the Northerners,’ but the main problem was that they were ‘… ill-treated by the governments of the Sudan, especially El Bashir regime’ as expressed by one Southern respondent.

By the same token, some Northern respondents said that some of their acquaintances who lived in Southern Sudan tried to go and live in their cities/villages in the Sudan after the secession, yet they were not able to, and eventually they returned back to live in South Sudan.

This feeling of oppression and marginalization made it easier for the Southerners to be mobilized and recruited to join various Southern Sudanese political, military, or civic organizations and movements. These movements in turn have culminated in the creation of a larger Southern Sudanese national movement which contributed very much to the split of the Sudan. The continuing feeling of oppression, combined with experiences of lethal conflicts and memories, are responsible for strengthening ethnic boundaries between Northerners and Southerners whether in Sudan or in Canada.

**SUDANESE PEOPLE OF KITCHENER**

Like other Canadian cities, Kitchener started receiving Sudanese in the early 1990s when large numbers of Sudanese were either resettled to Canada from third countries, sought asylum
in Canada, or migrated directly to Canada as skilled workers or as sponsored family members. Some Sudanese moved to Kitchener from other Canadian cities for work, education, or to be closer to family and acquaintances. All respondents agreed that the first to come to Kitchener, in early 1990s, were Southerners, and then Northerners followed. Today, the majority of the Sudanese in Kitchener are Southerners. The consensus among respondents is that Northerners constitute a minority compared to Southerners.

According to Statistics Canada, the Sudanese population of Kitchener was 70 in 1996, 170 in 2001, 770 in 2006, and 795 in 2011 (Statistics Canada, Census different years), and their present number is estimated to be around 1500. The Sudanese in Kitchener were, and still are, very diverse in terms of their ethnicities, regions of origin, cultures, languages, traditions, values, religions, and political affiliations. This diversity applies to both Southerners’ and Northerners’ sub-groups.

Ethnically, Southern Sudanese include different tribal groups such as Nuer, Dinka, Asholi, and Latooka from various regions of Southern Sudan. Northerners include people from Nuba Mountains and other tribes from Kordofan, Darfur, Bija, and riverine Northerners such as Shaygiya and Ja’alyeen who are known as ‘Arabs’ by the ‘non-Arabs’ from both Southern and Northern Sudan. Also, there are the ‘Nubians’ who include Halfaweyeen, Mahas, and Sikkot.

With respect to the Sudanese organizations in Kitchener, the majority of the respondents agreed that there has never been an umbrella community-based organization that included Southern and Northern Sudanese. Some respondents did claim that there was an umbrella organization in the past. All those who said that there was an umbrella organization of Sudanese in Kitchener are from Southern Sudan. Further questions revealed that these respondents were
talking about a Southern Sudanese community-based organization, named the South Sudanese Canadian Association SSCA. The establishment of this organization reflected the fact that Southern Sudanese came in large numbers before the Northern Sudanese. One Southerner respondent said:

The first to come to Kitchener were us [meaning Southerners], we came here before the Northerners. We registered our organization in 1992 to include all Sudanese in Kitchener. We did not think of it as a Southern Sudanese organization.

In this connection, a Northern Sudanese interviewee said:

When we first came to Kitchener, we did not know about the SSCA. When we tried to register a community-based Sudanese organization we were told that there was an existing Sudanese organization.

This indicates a lack of communication between the Southerners and Northerners who came to Kitchener in the early 1990s. This is supported by Sami, a Northerner respondent, who noted: ‘When we came to Kitchener, we did not even know that there were Southern Sudanese in the city, but after sometime when we met some of them by accident in the street.’

As for the community-based organization, another Northerners’ respondent, Hamad noted:

After we knew that there was an existing community-based organization, we tried more than once to enlarge the existing organization in order for it to encompass all of the Sudanese, but we failed, because the Southerners who were leading the organization were reluctant to leave the leadership for others to replace them in case of conducting new elections, every time we called for a meeting they did not come.
When asked the reasons for these Southerners’ leaders’ reluctance to come to the meetings, Hamad’s answer was: ‘Probably they did not want to forgo the status of leadership they were enjoying, because there were no other benefits they would enjoy other than this status.’

Nya, one of the Southern Sudanese respondents, said, however, that this interpretation was too simplistic:

The organization leaders did not want to sacrifice their leadership not because of the status or any other benefits they got, but rather to send a message to the Northerners, who always think of themselves as the leaders, that this is Canada, Canada is not the Sudan, and therefore they cannot continue to be the leaders in Canada too, it is enough that they are monopolizing the leadership in the Sudan since its independence.

Some Southerner and Northerner respondents deemed that the failure of efforts to start an all-encompassing Sudanese organization was due to the arrogance of the Northern Sudanese. In fact one explained that they ‘looked down at the Southern Sudanese’. It can be surmised that in the early years of settlement in Canada, this reflected a strengthening of the ethnic boundary which resulted from the barriers erected between Southerners and Northerners on the basis of feelings of historical oppression suffered by the Southerners.

For these reasons, despite repeated efforts, the establishment of an all-encompassing Sudanese community-based organization in Kitchener failed.

Beside the Southern Sudanese community-based organization, there were Southern Sudanese formal and/or informal tribal groupings whose membership excluded Northern Sudanese. One respondent said: ‘Tribal [informal] organizations are more effective than the
SSCA umbrella organization.’ This indicates that for the Southerners, the sub-ethnic boundaries were valued more than their regional boundary as Southern Sudanese.

The same is applicable to the Northerners who, even after the independence of South Sudan, failed to establish an umbrella community-based organization for themselves in Kitchener. Recently some Northern Sudanese have established an informal social group for social gatherings, sharing food and holding parties. Even this organization is not inclusive of all geographically belonging to Northern Sudan. It is limited to the ‘riverine’ people or ‘Arabs’ together with some ‘Arabs’ from the region of Kordofan. One respondent from Nuba Mountains commented by saying:

Unlike the other Sudanese groups, the ‘riverine’ people do not need an organization with a mandate that goes beyond their own immediate needs in Canada, they do not need an organization that serves their communities in the Sudan; these ‘riverine’ people do not have severe problems in their areas like us, they do not live in war zones, they are not oppressed, they are not marginalized the way other groups are.

That is why this respondent considers various organizations established by people from marginalized and oppressed Sudanese regions as having important social, political, economic, and advocacy roles to play in all aspects of life in Kitchener, and more importantly in the Sudan. He added:

These organizations work in mobilizing and coordinating the efforts of their members in Kitchener, as well as other Canadian cities, in order to relieve their internally displaced people, send financial help to their needy families and relatives, advocate for their rights which are denied by the government of the Sudan, work for attracting support and development to their areas, and mobilize their groups members to stand for their rights. They have different social, political, economic, and advocacy mission that is different from the ‘riverine’ people’s organizations’ mission.
After the eruption of the violent conflict in Darfur in 2004, Darfur people, including those in Kitchener, started a Canada-wide organization. Similarly, Nuba Mountain people started the ‘The International Organization of the Nuba Mountains People’. This organization has a branch in Canada with affiliations in many Canadian cities, including Kitchener. Just like the Darfur organization, the International Organization of the Nuba Mountains People is multi-purpose in the sense that it is a political, social, and cultural organization. This phenomenon gives ethnic boundaries, in cases like the Darfur and Nuba Mountains’ people, a transnational dimension. Its membership is scattered throughout the world. It is true that traditional Sudanese political parties have worldwide memberships, but these are the first Sudanese ethnic or ethno-political groups to form a transnational organization.

The Eastern Sudanese ‘the Bija’ and the Angessana of Southern Blue Nile were too few in numbers to form their own organizations in Kitchener. For this reason, respondents indicated that they deal with different situations as individuals according to their personal convictions and preference. As for their relationships, ‘the Bija and Angessana are closer to the Southerners and Nuba Mountains people than any other group …’ as explained by one Bija respondent. That is to say their ethnic boundaries in Kitchener are not activated, but rather they are blurred.

With respect to the non-ethnic-based political organizations, many Southerners are members of the SPLM, Canada chapter to which the Kitchener branch, along with other branches in other Canadian cities, are affiliated. The Northerners have their political organizations such as Umma Party, Democratic Unionist Party, and Communist Party. These three parties are not

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36 They call their party unionist due to their past call for the unity of the Sudan with Egypt under the Egyptian King, they used to call it the unity of the River Nile valley. Yet, after the independence of the Sudan they kept the name but not the stance.
active in Kitchener, as it was noted by one of the Northern respondents who is a member of one of these parties. The members of these parties coordinate their political activities with branches in other cities, mainly Toronto.

After the independence of South Sudan, the SPLM split into two. The SPLM, the ruling party in South Sudan whose membership is now limited to Southern Sudanese in South Sudan or abroad, including those who live in Canada. The other is the SPLM North whose membership majority is from Nuba Mountains’ people, including those in Sudan and in Kitchener, and a very small minority of the Blue Nile Angessana, and a few ‘riverine’ people.

The fact that majority memberships of the SPLM North, and International Organization of Nuba Mountains’ People is made up of Nuba Mountains’ people means that the ethnic, regional, and political boundaries, as well as the boundaries of these two organization, coincide. These organizations have almost the same membership. This overlap blurred the ethnic boundary between the Nuba Mountains people and other members of the SPLM North.

Darfur people who were members of traditional Northern parties mostly quit these traditional parties and joined Darfur parties, mainly the Justice and Equity Movement ‘JEM’ and the Sudan Liberation Movement.

Since 2013, in the context of the civil war in Darfur, Nuba Mountains, and the Blue Nile, a political and military front, known as the Revolutionary Front ‘RF’, was established to lead the struggle against the government of the Sudan. The Revolutionary Front is comprised of the SPLM North, the Justice and Equity Movement, the Sudan Liberation Movement of Darfur, and the International Organization of Nuba Mountains People, which began taking a political role after the eruption of violence in the Nuba Mountains. The Revolutionary Front is now
functioning in Canada, and has an active branch in Kitchener. These newly established political organizations, based on ethno-regional belonging have gained membership at the expense of the traditional political parties. After the eruption of violence in these areas, which were part of the traditional domain of the Umma Party, large numbers of people from these areas switched from the Umma Party to these new political organizations.

Also, large numbers of the traditional membership of the Democratic Unionist Party of Bija people joined the increasingly politically active Bija organizations. This also applies to other Sudanese parties such as the communist and Ba’ath parties. This switch from traditional to new political organizations was also echoed in Kitchener where many people switched to these newly established political organizations.

Sudanese people are religiously divided into Christians, Muslims, and Animists who hold traditional African beliefs. Unlike in South Sudan where animism is the dominant religion, the majority of Southern Sudanese in Kitchener are Christians. They are affiliated with different denominations in the city; many of them, mostly Nuer, attend ‘Hope Lutheran Church’, with a South Sudanese pastor. Another pastor, from the Nuba Mountains, leads ‘the Sudanese Community Church.’ Attendees at this Church are from both Southern Sudanese and Nuba Mountain people with different denominations. Sudanese Muslims share the only mosque in the city with other Muslims. There is a consensus among the respondents that there are no religious-based Sudanese political or social organizations in Kitchener. This indicates that the religious boundaries of the Sudanese in Kitchener are not strong.

Both Southern and Northern Sudanese in Kitchener keep various kinds of transnational ties with the homeland. Socially, they communicate with their families and acquaintances in
Sudan via telephone and the internet using social media. Some visit Sudan and South Sudan. The exchange of information with Sudan was especially pronounced after the conclusion of the CPA when political tensions between the government and opposition was temporarily slightly attenuated. Moreover, some received visitors from Sudan. Further, most of the Sudanese indicated that they follow news of the Sudan using internet-based newspapers, social groups, and discussion forms.

Economically, many Southern and Northern Sudanese maintain these transnational ties by sending money to families in Sudan, especially to those whose members are poor. Politically, there was a consensus among the respondents that, being politicized and with refugee background, many of the Sudanese in Kitchener keep various political ties with the homeland. Most followed political news about the Sudan to stay informed, both before and after the independence of South Sudan, but particularly after the eruption of various conflicts in different parts of the country, whether in the South or the North.

**THE PERCEIVED DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SOUTHERN AND NORTHERN SUDANESE IN KITCHENER**

There are many perceived differences between Southerners and Northerners in Kitchener, as highlighted by the respondents in terms of education, employment, family relations, and behaviour. It is not clear whether these perceptions reflect a particular social reality in Kitchener or whether they are reflections of some of the stereotypes between the groups that have been brought over to Canada from Sudan. However, it is important to recognize that these perceptions
of differences exist and that they shape the nature of intergroup relations and the persistence of group boundaries, particularly between those from the North and the South.

With respect to education, many respondents, both Northerners and Southerners, noted that in comparison to Northerners, most of the Southerners are poorly educated. Some respondents, including a few Southerners, noted that the Southerners do not work hard at furthering their education and do not care about the education of their children. One well educated Southern Sudanese respondent said:

As members of the Southern community, we advised our brothers and sisters [meaning Southerners] to show their kids the importance of education, but they did not listen, and now there are a lot of school drop-outs, and only a few of Southern Sudanese children are resuming their post-secondary education.

Expanding upon this, one Northern respondent noted:

Due to their low levels of education and without steady jobs, some children of Southerners are involved in illegal activities such as drug abuse, drug trafficking, alcoholism, burglary, and gangster which put them in troubles with the legal system.

This was supported by a Southerner respondent who said:

To be honest, the gap between us and the Northerners is not only because the Northerners are arrogant or racists, which is true, but also because they do not want their children to associate with problematic people like our kids, this is a fact, a painful fact though.

In contrast, one Northerner respondent claimed:

The majority of Northerners are well educated, and they work hard to develop themselves and follow up with their children’s education. Our kids are generally good, they are not
involved in illegal activities or with gangs. Also, based on their higher level of education and their keenness to develop themselves, Northerners in Kitchener mostly hold better jobs compared to the Southerners. Majority of Southerners either depends on the social system, or holds marginal low paid jobs.

This state of affairs is perceived to put Southerners in a lower class position compared to Northerners who, in most of the cases are perceived as employed, provide good education for their children, and buy houses mostly in good areas of the city. Most of the Southerners, on the other hand, are seen as unemployed or hold minor jobs, provide no or little education for their children, and live in subsidized social housing. Even if they own houses, Southerners mostly live in poor areas.

With respect to family relations, some Northerner respondents indicated that Southern Sudanese families are different from Northern Sudanese families in many aspects. As one Northern respondent indicated:

There is more domestic violence, higher levels of divorce, and higher levels of infidelity and separation in the Southern Sudanese families compared to Northern Sudanese ones. This is attributable to the higher rate of alcoholism and drug abuse among the Southerners compared to the Northerners.

These claims were reinforced by some Southern Sudanese respondents, especially the educated ones, who also mentioned the absence of fathers as a factor in family dynamics. As expressed by a Southern respondent:

After the conclusion of the CPA and more after independence of South Sudan, some of the Southern Sudanese men left their families in Kitchener, so they could go and hold jobs in South Sudan. This factor contributed to increasing the children’s problems, because they had to live with single mothers. It also led to increasing the incidents of infidelity, separation, and divorce.
It is noteworthy that there are some Northerners who leave their families and work abroad, but their families are reportedly not affected as much as the Southerners’ families. Some Northerner respondents attributed that to the fact that ‘… most of the Northerners are Muslims and Islam strictly prohibits extra-marital sex. Also, the Northern Sudanese culture(s) mostly condemn and stigmatize those who engage in extra-marital sex, especially females.’

**THE SOUTHERN AND NORTHERN SUDANESE OF KITCHENER RELATIONS BEFORE THE INDEPENDENCE/SECESSION OF SOUTH SUDAN**

Given the perceptions of differences between Southern and Northern Sudanese in Kitchener, their actual social relationships are quite complex. In part, this is because though they perceive themselves to be different in many respects, Southerners and Northerners in Kitchener, as in other cities in Canada, tend to be thought of in Canada as one ethnicity: ‘Sudanese’. This externally imposed label exerts pressure on them to act as one ethnicity, especially in cases of direct contact with government departments and other organizations, such as registering their organizations, applying for funding for activities, or organizing cultural and other events.

There are also other features of the Canadian context that exert pressure on various Sudanese groups to modify their interactions. First, Canada, with its democratic political system and Charter of Rights and Freedoms, its commitment to multiculturalism, equity, equality and anti-racism gave various Sudanese groups an unprecedented degree of freedom that was not
available in their country of origin. On one level, this freedom led to the reinforcement of group boundaries because it provided a space for different Southern and Northern Sudanese groups ‘… to freely practice their religions, teach their languages to their children, and express their cultures,’ as expressed by one respondent. Such opportunities were not available for most groups on the so-called periphery of Sudan, particularly the Southerners who now value Canada highly because of this.

Second, Sudanese people share the status of ‘visible minority’ with other non-White ethnic groups, regardless of their differences from these groups (Synnott, and Howes, 1996). That is to say the ethnic and sub-ethnic boundaries of the Sudanese, both Southerners and Northerners, tend to be blurred in Canada by the boundary of ‘visible minority.’ This creates an opportunity for Sudanese-Canadians to identify with the broader category of ‘visible minority’, regardless of whenever they deem it appropriate and/or beneficial to them.

Third, unlike their experience in other countries in which they lived in the past, Sudanese in Canada are provided with basic needs such as minimum guaranteed income, equal right to free basic education, health care, and subsidized social housing. This eliminates pressures on the part of Southerners and Northerners to depend on, and support, each other to obtain basic needs. This frees them from the necessity of establishing economic-based relations with each other in Canada. This is in stark contrast to their life in Egypt, where Sudanese of various origins were forced by circumstances to economically rely on each other for obtaining basic needs.

Finally, Canada provides a reality where Southerners and Northerners are equal. They are considered as one ethnic group included in one racialized national boundary. Many Southerner respondents pointed to the equality between the Southerners and the Northerners in Canada,
which is absent in the Sudan. One respondent, with this in mind, said ‘now we are equal, we are all black in Canada.’ Southerners tend to compare themselves to the Northerners who are, just like Southerners, subjected to discrimination. They make intra-group, rather than inter-group, comparisons to use Taylor’s et al (1990) expression. Such a comparison seems to be psychologically comforting for the oppressed Sudanese groups.

Because of the dominance of ‘white’ people in Canada, some of the Southerners and Northerners experience or hear about various cases of overt and/or covert discrimination in the street, government offices, education institutions, employment, and housing. Nevertheless, the Southerners do not emphasize the discrimination they face in Canadian society as much as they focus on the equality with Northerners insofar as they are equally discriminated against in Canada.

The lesser emphasis that Southerners place on discriminatory experiences at the hands of whites in Canada is a result of the internalization of the discrimination practiced against them by Northerners in the Sudan, which is perceived as more harmful and painful. Moreover, discrimination in Canada is not as overt and severe as in the Sudan. The trauma of exclusion, discrimination, war, and displacement experienced by the Southerners, and other marginalized ethno-regional groups, in Sudan constitutes the measuring rod by which they favourably compare their live in Canada.

Since most of the Northerners did not experience discrimination in the Sudan, their views about discrimination in Canada differ from that of the Southerners. Some Northern respondents admit to, and condemn the discrimination against the Southerners and other non-Arab groups in Sudan and express regret for what these groups endured. Yet, many respondents try to blame this
practice of discrimination on others rather than themselves and/or their immediate families. For example, one Northern respondent said:

Southern Sudanese were oppressed in Sudan for a long time. They were marginalized and discriminated against in many ways. People who discriminate do not understand the effect of that on the Southern Sudanese. For me, I really did not discriminate against any one, and I do not appreciate treating people, especially fellow Sudanese, this bad way.

Other respondents who condemned discrimination in Sudan blamed it on the successive governments rather than the people at large. In spite of distancing themselves from any personal responsibility for racism and discrimination in Sudan, these respondents were very apologetic about this discrimination. They indicated that they would stand firmly against it if they were to go back to the Sudan. One Northern respondents said in this regard:

Ordinary Northern Sudanese people did not oppress or discriminate against Southern Sudanese. Rather oppression and discrimination were done by the governments. If I am to regret something in my life it is that I did not stand against this discrimination against Southern Sudanese in the Sudan. If I go back to Sudan I will never keep silent about it.

Despite the lack of a unified Sudanese organization in Kitchener, many Southern and Northern Sudanese helped, or tried to help, newcomers from both sides, whether they were friends or not, prior to the referendum and the secession of South Sudan. In this regard, one respondent noted that it was ‘… mostly Northerners who rendered help to Southerners rather than the other way round.’ This is perhaps natural because the Northern Sudanese of Kitchener were more educated and held jobs in government and service providing agencies.

Nevertheless, in some cases, and even before the referendum and secession, one Northerner respondent who works for a service providing agency, said:
Some Southerners did not want to get help from Northerners …. In one rather extreme case, a Southerner refused the help rendered to him altogether by a service providing organization, because I was the worker [Northerner], instead he went to seek help from his fellow Southern Sudanese.

Such incidents can be attributed to the trauma and negative experiences of many Southerners with the Northerners, especially with the pervasive history of violence and of atrocities perpetrated against the Southerners in the Sudan.

Other participants from both sides, but particularly Southerners, mentioned that sometimes the negative attitudes of some Northerner workers toward Southerners led Southerners to refuse the help of a settlement organization. A Southern Sudanese respondent commented:

Some Northerners are very arrogant, they think that they are still in Sudan, they deal with us [the Southerners] in bad ways. One time when I was new in this country, I went to one agency for help. I was so happy when I found out that my worker was Northern Sudanese. This guy was so harsh and dealt with me in bad manners. That was so frustrating to see such bad treatment from a fellow Sudanese.

This illustrates how the reality of war, atrocities, and discrimination in the home country can strengthen social boundaries between groups even when these conditions are absent in Canada.

With respect to intermarriages, all the interviewees emphasized that there was not even a single case of intermarriage between the Southern and Northern Sudanese in Kitchener. There has been no intermarriage among some Northern Sudanese subgroups either. For example, respondents could not think of a single marriage between a ‘riverine’ person and someone from
the Nuba Mountain people; some were able to recall rare cases of intermarriage between Darfur
and ‘riverine’ people.

As for friendships, a majority of Northerner and Southerner respondents indicated that
there exist a few close friendships among Northerners and Southerners which commenced in
Kitchener. Most of the close friendships, one respondent emphasized, ‘… started before coming
to Kitchener, especially in Egypt’ where some Southerners and Northerners had closer
relationships.

Unlike those who came from refugee camps, the Southerners and Northerners who came
from Egypt noted that they had good and close friendships in Kitchener, to the extent that some
bachelors from North and South Sudan cohabitated with their newly immigrated or resettled
friends. Nevertheless, there were instances when this cohabitation did not last long. As one of the
Northern Sudanese respondents explained:

I had a close Southern Sudanese friend in Egypt, when I came to Canada I was in
continuous contact with him while he was in Egypt. He was resettled from Egypt to
Windsor, but I urged him to come and live in Kitchener. When he came, I received him
and took him to my house where we lived together. After sometime he met with some
people of his tribe, they turned his head against living with ‘jallaba’ [generally meaning
Northerners] and took him to live with them.

One Southern Sudanese respondent commented as follows:

Moving out from a place to another or even from a city to another is a normal thing, it
happens for different reasons, not necessarily because one’s head was turned by this or
that. Also, moving out did not happen only by the Southerners, it also happened by some
Northerners, I can’t say they moved out because their heads were turned by their northern
friends, no one can turn your head unless you are convinced to do something.
Based on the abovementioned differences of Southerners and Northerners, one Southerner respondent claimed: ‘Northern Sudanese generally look down at Southern Sudanese and try to distance themselves from them. They do not want our children to associate with their children.’

This was supported by a riverine respondent who explained: ‘We [meaning riverine people] are different from them [Southerners] in everything, and that is why we try to keep general good relationships with them, rather than close friendships.’

Another riverine respondent said in this connection:

Since our childhood in the Sudan, we, as Northerners, had not have any problem with Southern Sudanese; we would meet with them, talk to them, play with them as kids, but we would not make close friendships with them or go with them to their houses, now I know a lot of Southerners and talk to them when we meet, but I do not have close friendship with them, and I don’t know the reason for that.

These comments reflect the effect of socialization in shaping the mentality, attitudes, and the behavior of Northerners toward the Southerners. In the same way, the role of socialization and resocialization is applicable to shaping the Southerners’ mentality toward the Northerners. The result of focusing on these differences is that, both parties try to distance themselves from one another in the Sudan.

Nevertheless, the Northerners in Canada have specific reasons for distancing themselves from the Southerners, which is especially applicable to younger generations. One riverine respondent pointed out that:

Most of the Southerners’ children do not behave well. They are drop outs, misbehaving, alcohol and drug abusers, and gangsters. That is why we do not want our children to
associate with them, because we do not want them to learn these bad things from them. We are keen to bring up our children in a good way, so they can be good people.

Contrary to this, another riverine respondent noted: ‘Some of our children had close friendships with some Southerners’ children, and we, as parents, did not object to these friendships because these Southern children are good.’

It is noteworthy that the Southern and Northern Sudanese younger generations’ relations are different from the friendship of first generation. They were not exposed to the same experiences and influences in Sudan. The effect of the Canadian context is stronger on younger generation compared to older ones. Most of the youth grew up and were educated in Canada. For this reason, they are more prone to internalize values of equality and inclusion, and to reject the negative stereotypes of their parents. One Northern respondent said:

We moved from one city to Kitchener, and my son went to school for the first time, he was so excited when he came home, he told me that he met with a Sudanese student, whose name was John, in his class. After that they became close friends. First we tried to stop that until we know the family and the child, but when we knew that the family and child were good, we approved their relationship, not only that but the two families became friends. Also, some of my son’s friends and John’s friends grouped together

When asked whether this relationship was affected by the referendum and independence of South Sudan, the respondent indicated that it was not, and that these youngsters did not like the idea of secession.

This indicates that Southern and Northern Sudanese Canadian youth are not as affected by the differences and discrimination between Southerners and Northerners. They do not have, if any, the same degree of negative attitudes toward one another. Rather they consider one another
as nationals and human beings who can be good or bad. The fact that children of Sudanese immigrants do not necessarily reproduce the stereotypes and tensions that exist among Sudanese immigrants’ first generation suggests that those stereotypes are strongly shaped by historical understandings of colonization, the slave trade, and the policies of successive post-independence governments.

In spite of the differences, prejudice, bitterness, distance keeping, it is interesting to note that many Southerner and Northerner respondents think that they have good relationships and even friendships with each other. One Northern respondent said: ‘I have a lot of Northerner friends, I did not lose them as friends and I want this good relationship with them to continue.’

This indicates that Southern and Northern Sudanese are ambivalent toward each other. They claim and want to have good relationships with each other, but even so, close friendships are not common because of the abovementioned differences, as well as the historical and political legacy of Sudan.

One Southerner respondent commented by saying:

Sudanese people make friendships within their people, for example a majority of the Southerners have Southerner friends. Also, the majority of Northerners have Northerner friends. Like anywhere else, there are not many friendships between Southerners and Northerners in Kitchener. Yet, there are more close friendships between the Southerners and non-Arab Northerners than between the Southerners and Arabs. Also, there are more friendship relations between Southerners and certain non-Arab Northerners. For example, there are more friendships between Southerners and Nuba Mountains people compared to Darfur people

The above illustrates that generally there are more intra-group than inter-group friendships. It also indicates that the boundaries between the Southerners and riverine people are stronger than between these Southerners and other Northerner groups.
The existence of more friendship relations between Southerners and Nuba Mountains’ people compared to Darfur people is, arguably, because large numbers of the Southerners and the Nuba Mountains’ people were long time working members of the SPLM. This political alliance rendered the ethnic boundaries between Southerners and Nuba Mountains’ people weaker.

Generally speaking the prevailing tendency is that, as some respondents indicate, Southerners and Northerners would know, meet, greet, talk to, and help one another. They consider this as a superficial, and not close friendship.37

Although they are by and large closer to each other than to other Canadian coworkers, Southern and Northerner Sudanese coworkers are not as close to each other as the Northerner coworkers one to another. This also applies to Southerner coworkers who are closer to each other than to Northern coworkers. One riverine respondent indicated:

Although I and my wife have been working together with a Southern Sudanese lady for three years, we did not exchange visits with her, this did not happen even on the occasion of the birth of her child … I know if this lady was a Northerner we would have visited her … [he continued in response to my surprise] … yes, you know that unlike Southerners, Northerners, especially women, tend to severely blame others when they do not visit them in such situations as death and giving birth.

Seating order is another indicator of intergroup relationships. With the exception of a few individuals, the majority of Southerners and Northerners in Kitchener do not mix seating when they meet at public events such as the Sudanese organizations activities, at invitations by a third party such as government entities, or at the functions of service providing organizations. The practice when they meet at such occasions is that, some Southerners and Northerners stand with

37 The word friendship is not used by Sudanese people the same way it is used in the West, for Sudanese people the word friend includes both close friends as well as those whom you know and deal with in a good way.
each other, exchange greetings, and have short conversations, and then they go back to their seats with their people. The Darfur and Nuba Mountain people who sit separate from riverine people also display this practice. Although some respondents suggest that it is natural for friends and people of close relationship to sit together, the separation in seating gives a vivid visual portrayal of the ethnic boundaries among Sudanese groups. This was observed in more than one occasion.

Respondents noted that invitations to different public and private occasions and events are generally not issued between Northerners and Southerners. They do not usually invite each other to their private occasions such as marriages, birthdays, and other parties. Nevertheless, when such invitations are offered, Southerners are more likely to invite Northerners than to be invited by them. At Northerner gatherings, Southerners tend to feel isolated. This is also felt, if to a lesser degree, by the Nuba Mountain people when they are invited by riverine Northerners. This feeling of isolation of Nuba Mountains’ people in riverine Northerners’ events is also applicable to the public social events such as the collective Ramadan (fasting month) breakfast for Sudanese Muslims. One Nuba Mountains’ respondent told me that:

Northerners say to Southerners and also to us [Nuba Mountains’ people] that we are friends, but when it comes to the reality, their practice is very different, for example they do not invite us to their occasions. And when they do, they ignore us. This happens even in collective Ramadan Iftar [meaning breakfast], they do not sit with us or talk to us.

There are exceptions to the general lack of mutual invitations. It is interesting that in the case of death, most Southern and Northern Sudanese come to each’s burial ceremonies and participate in the condolences regardless of whether the deceased was a Southerner or Northerner, and regardless of the religion. Yet, they still mostly sit separately. This is also applicable to soccer games. The Sudanese of Kitchener, regardless of being Southerners or
Northerners, come to these games, especially if these games are with other Sudanese teams from other Ontario cities. The Sudanese from each city cheer their team and, interestingly, sit mixed. The separation in seating is based on belonging to cities, such as London or Kitchener, rather than ethnicity. None of the respondents could give any rationale for that, except for a Nuba Mountains’ respondent who pointed out that this is ‘… because the majority of the players were from the Southerners and Nuba Mountains people.’

Although they agreed that there is a gap between the Southerners and Northerners in Kitchener, respondents from both sides were strikingly divided about whether the gap between the Southerners’ and Northerners’ males is wider or narrower than that between females. Some respondents indicated that the gap was wider between males than females. Others thought that the gap was wider between females. Those who thought the gap was wider between females attributed this to the way Sudanese women deal with each other. One respondent noted:

There is a cultural tendency among women not to forgive each other, and to be expressive and outspoken in blaming each other, and to interpret, or misinterpret, each other’s behaviour and link this behaviour to dignity.

Those who thought that the gap was wider among males attributed it to the fact that males were busier than females, and therefore they only have time for very few selected relationships.

As mentioned above, neither Southerners nor Northerners in Sudan or Kitchener are homogeneous, each has sub-ethnic groups. When asked about the closest Southern group to the Northern Sudanese in Kitchener with respect to social interaction, many Northerner respondents could not answer it, especially the ‘riverine’ people. Yet some Northerners thought that the Dinka was the closest group. However, some of the respondents from western Nuba Mountains
indicated that the closest were the Dinka of Bahr Al Ghazal, whereas some other respondents from eastern Nuba Mountains thought that the Shilluk was the closest group. The Angessana of the Blue Nile respondents indicated that the closest were the Nuer. It is clear these considerations of closeness are determined by geographic adjacency in Sudan, those Northern respondents thought of their neighbouring Southern groups in Sudan as the closest to them.

A different view was expressed by one respondent from Nuba Mountains, he commented as follows:

It is hard to identify a certain tribe as the closest to the Northerners, but rather the closest to the Northerners are the Southerners who are members of SPLA/M, regardless of their tribal affiliation, those are especially closer to the Nuba Mountains people than to the rest of Northerners, because they have been working together in the SPLA/M for a long time.

Most of the Southerner respondents thought that the closest Northern groups to them was the Nuba Mountain people, followed by the Blue Nile, and then the Darfur people. This is probably the result of the membership of many Nuba Mountains people in the SPLA/M before the independence of South Sudan, and also due to the fact that their political agenda and strategies remained the same as those of the mother SPLM after the secession of the country.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOUTHERN AND NORTHERN SUDANESE OF KITCHENER AFTER THE SECESSION/INDEPENDENCE OF SOUTH SUDAN

Before proceeding with the details of the relationship between the Southern and Northern Sudanese of Kitchener after the referendum and secession/independence of South Sudan, it is
appropriate to state the various respondents’ views of the secession/independence of South Sudan. Although a majority of the Southern Sudanese respondents called it independence, a minority of them called it secession. Those who called it independence thought of the Northern Sudanese as colonizers who, as one Southern respondent explained, ‘… denied the Southerners neither the right to equal treatment nor the right to establish their own country.’

One respondent of those who considered it as secession indicated: ‘The North was not colonizing us. Regardless of the oppression and discrimination, we were living in the same country as citizens, so it was rather secession than independence.’

In contrast, the majority of Northern Sudanese respondents called it secession. One respondent said: ‘It is secession because the Northerners were not given the chance to vote, it was only the Southerners who voted in the referendum.’ Yet, a minority called it independence because they had to respect the choice of the Southerners to stay or to depart from the Sudan. This view was expressed by a Northern respondent.

These two contradicting stances were synthesized by one Southern respondent who called it both independence and secession:

I do not see any contradiction between independence and secession, they both lead to the same result which is the splinter of the Sudan into two different countries. The most important thing is that it did not happen by violence.

What is important is that the secession/independence caused the Sudanese national boundary to contract and consequently a new national boundary of South Sudan to occur.
The effect of independence/secession of South Sudan on the relationship between Northern and Southern Sudanese in Kitchener was not uniform. It differs from one group of Southerners and/or Northerners to another. Nevertheless, there are some general patterns to how relationships changed as a result of independence.

Most of the respondents indicated that the gap between the Northerners and Southerners has widened after the secession/independence. Joint activities held before secession stopped. Sunni, a Northern Sudanese respondent gave the following example:

Before the secession, we collaborated in organizing some activities, for example we have carried out a big celebration when the CPA was concluded, and most of the Southerners and Northerners in Kitchener participated in it. This celebration gave us the hope that we could establish an effective umbrella community-based organization for all of the Sudanese in Kitchener, but unfortunately the sudden death of John Garang\(^\text{38}\) destroyed that hope. That was the last big function we carried out in collaboration with the Southerners … […] … there were other smaller political functions that included both of us [Southerners and Northerners], as for example political seminars and lectures held by the SPLM which membership was including Southerners as well as Northerners, such inclusive functions continued up until just before the referendum, yet these functions have completely stopped after the independence of South Sudan.

\(^{38}\) John Garang is the leader of the SPLA/M. He became the vice president of the Sudan after the conclusion of the CPA in 2005, he dies in a tragic airplane accident in a trip to Uganda. His sudden death caused considerable tension to arise between Southerners and Northerners. When they heard the news, large numbers of the Southerners took to the streets claiming Garang was killed by the Northerners. As a result, they started beating and killing the Northerners randomly. In Kitchener, the Southerners did not go to the extreme end and beat the Northerners. Yet, they were, as some Northern respondents explained, affected by that incident for some time. In an effort to rationalize what happened after the death of John Garang. One Southerner respondents commented on what happened in the Sudan: ‘Southerners were taken by surprise and reacted to it that way. No one had interest to kill him other than the government. Just out yourself in their shoes.’ This shows the inability of both parties to make up for the lack of trust between them, as they tended to accuse each other, and give priority to bad faith in interpreting each other’s behaviour. This lack of trust is a consequence of many violent conflicts that took place between the Southerners and Northerners as well as the propaganda of both sides against each other which, in turn, contributed very much to maintaining and strengthening the ethnic boundary between them in both Sudan and Kitchener.
In addition to putting an end to organized collaborative activities after the independence of South Sudan, Southerners and Northerners now rarely invite each other to such activities. Also they tend to ‘… not show up if they are invited to these activities’, as noted by one respondent. His interpretation is that ‘[they] are now citizens of separate countries and each country has its own activities’.

Another respondent noted:

… even those who were invited to and attended other party’s activities were very small in numbers and did it on an individual basis, mostly friends from both sides invite their friends whose attendance was based on their friendships with individuals from the other side.

The tendency of Southerners and Northerners to help each other has diminished, and is limited to co-nationals and close friends. As one Southerner respondents stated ‘… Northerners would help Northern Sudanese newcomers, whereas Southerners would help Southern Sudanese newcomers.’

As for the general social relationships, some respondents noted that unlike before secession/independence, most Southerners and Northerners now deal with each other like strangers when they meet in the street. As expressed by one interviewee, ‘… they do not even greet or talk to one another. Sometimes they avoid each other, and pretend that they do not see, one another.’ Further, discussions in meetings and public speeches have become harsher and characterized by frank accusations, especially by the Southerners who try to remind the Northerners that they are not the indigenous people of the Sudan and that they are the historical oppressors of Southern Sudanese.
With respect to this state, one Northern respondent indicated:

Both Northerners and Southerners, as well as their sub-groups, were being increasingly judgmental toward each other, and they do not tolerate discussion or difference of opinion, they deal with each other as if they are still back home in spite of spending long times in Canada.

This Northern Sudanese respondent, who is light skinned, revealed that at one of these meetings:

I went through a bad experience when I was accused, by one of the Southerners, of being a non-Sudanese. I was called a foreigner who has no right to attend Sudanese people’s meetings although I am a Nubian and my ancestors are indigenous people of the Sudan.

Most respondents from both sides indicated that although it was still existing, the degree of general interaction between the Southerners and Northerners has become significantly less frequent. Intermarriage between Southerners and Northerners remains even more unlikely now.

Regardless of the strength of ethnic boundary between the Southerners and Northerners in the Sudan, as well as in Kitchener and other countries of Sudanese diaspora, the conflict that started in South Sudan on 15 December, 2013 proved that the strength of sub-ethnic boundaries among Southern Sudanese tribes may sometimes exceed simply division based on identity and develop into lethal conflict and antagonism.

Although it began as political, with the thick ethnic boundaries among Southerner sub-groups that have been maintained and strengthened by the historical accumulation of tribal animosity and antagonism, this conflict was transformed into a tribal one, mainly between the Dinka and Nuer tribes. This conflict, which was essentially about the distribution of political
power in the new state, has caused horrendous bloodshed. As a consequence of this fighting, the
Dinka and Nuer in the Sudan as well as in the diaspora, including Kitchener, have become
particularly antagonistic to each other, as was expressed by many of my respondents. These
feelings of antagonism are evident on different blogs and web sites where Dinka and Nuer
exchange accusations, insults, and threats over the internet. Forty four comments were posted on
an article in the Sudan Tribune newspaper website entitled ‘Nuer community claims 17613 killed
in South Sudan violence.’ These comments are an exchange of expressions of hatred,
accusations, insults, and threats among various South Sudanese groups, especially Nuer and
Dinka. For example, one Dinka with the nickname Big Boy commented on the Nuer claim:

Dear poor Nuer and Food-lover, how many Dinka did you kill during the violence when you
talked about your peoples being killed in juba? Don’t cry out first you guys are cowards and
food-lovers, so we have no doubt for that you had killed double figures from
Dinka but we’re not crying like you guys.

Also, Tong Dut, from the Dinka tribe wrote: ‘Dinkas will kill Nuer all, they want to be
the only tribes in South Sudan. Soon we are going to send other tribes out. Nuer will never come
back to South Sudan, we have given them blood noise.’ Bentue Son from the Nuer responded by
writing:

Chol A, son of bitch, I know you are from Dinka Bor, Gok are well known for their
flattering, gossiping, inciting chronic hatred, jealousy, cowardliness, womanizing, and
conspiring others. Your chronic hatreds led into rebellions and insecurity in Jonglei up to
date. Notice, in South Sudan history, during brutal regime of their son Abel Alier,
Southern Region splintered into three regions because arrogance and ’kokora’.
These comments are written in the website despite the warning that insults and verbal violence are not tolerated. Verbal insults can also be found in discussion forums and web-based conferences focused on this conflict.

As a result, the relation between Dinka and Nuer of Kitchener has worsened to the extent that ‘… they do not even greet, talk to, or look at one another when they meet, this is not to mention the exchange of accusations and verbal violence sometimes when they meet’ as noted by a Southerner respondent.

These tensions were visible when efforts were made to mediate between the Dinka- and Nuer-Canadians of Kitchener, to allow them a positive role in the resolution and/or transformation of the lethal conflict in South Sudan. Other similar mediation meetings were unsuccessful when held separately in other cities such as Hamilton, Toronto, London, Windsor, and Mississauga.

The most obvious observation that can be made about these meetings is the unconcealed antagonism and animosity between the Dinka and Nuer. Again, such animosities occurred in other three meetings; one in Ottawa between Southerners from different tribes and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs representative; at York University; and at McMaster University. The purpose was to bring Southern Sudanese of Ontario, mainly Dinka and Nuer, together to develop some common ground. This lethal conflict in Sudan, as Southern and Northern respondents explained, widened the gap between the Dinka and Nuer, and at the same time, narrowed the gap between Northerners and Southerners in Kitchener.

Some Southerners now express regret for supporting the secession of South Sudan. One Southerner respondent said with bitterness: ‘I really regret voting for the secession, I thought that
it will bring peace and justice to my people, but instead it brought us war and death. By the way a lot of my fellow Southern Sudanese think the same way.’

Before this conflict, people thought that there was a consensus among Southerners to vote for independence/secession, yet it turned out there was not or at least it was false. Another Southerner respondent said:

I was not pro-independence because first I was afraid of the negative effect of tribalism on my new country, and many South Sudanese voted for the independence thinking that the bulk of the Southerners were pro-independence.

This tells us that the problem is not only between Southerners and Northerners, but also among various sub-groups within the South as well as within the North.

It is worthwhile mentioning that the civil war in Darfur, Nuba Mountains, and the Blue Nile areas has widened the social distance between the ‘riverine’ people on one hand and Darfur, Nuba Mountains, the Angessana of Southern Blue Nile, as well as the social distance between the Bija of Eastern Sudan on the other, to the extent that some respondents from different areas of Sudan proclaim that they are going to work for the secession of these areas from the Sudan if the policies of the government and the war continue.

It is noteworthy that after the secession/independence of South Sudan, Darfur people as individuals, sub-ethnic groups, and organizations became closer to the Southerners, because South Sudan started supporting Darfur rebels against the government of Sudan. After the eruption of violence in South Sudan, some Darfur organizations supported the Dinka, who were thought to govern the country, and fought beside them against the Nuer. This is why ‘… Darfur
people of Kitchener are now in good close relationship with the Dinka and, at the same time, in animosity with the Nuer’ as explained by a Nuba Mountain respondent.

CONCLUSION

This chapter addresses the respondents’ experiences with ethnic boundaries in three separate, though related, instances. First, respondents recalled their experience with various elements, manifestations, and developments of ethnic boundaries in the Sudan and their effect on various ethno-regional groups’ relations in the Sudan. Being formed by successive governments’ policies, these relations were characterized by high level of inequality and inequity between the powerful riverine or Arabs people, and other marginalized, excluded, and oppressed ethnic groups in various regions of the country, especially Southern Sudanese. This resulted in strengthening and sharpening ethnic boundaries and eventually led to the advent of sub-ethnic anti-government movements which contested these boundaries.

The second moment relates to the respondents’ experience with the development of ethnic boundaries, and the inter-ethnic groups’ relations, following their arrival to Canada. It includes the ways in which respondents experienced ethnic boundaries and relations in the Canadian context and the extent to which this context affected various ethnic groups’ boundaries and relations with each other before the secession/independence of South Sudan.
CONCLUSION

The central objective of this thesis is to examine the historical and situational factors that are responsible for the development of ethnic boundaries among Southern and Northern Sudanese-Canadians. This research helps fill a gap in the literature on Sudanese-Canadians insofar as it is the first to be wholly devoted to the study of the relationship between Southern and Northern Sudanese in the Sudan and in the diaspora. Also, the study contributes to the development of theories of ethnic boundary formation by its application to a largely understudied group in Canada.

The case of the Southern and Northern Sudanese-Canadians reveals the paradoxical situation of a differentiated ethnic group in the diaspora. Although they are considered and dealt with as one unified ethnic group in Canada, Southerners and Northerners, and their sub-ethnic groups, are not homogeneous. Although they are all Sudanese or South Sudanese in a geographical sense, most are opponents of the present regime in the Sudan. Southerners and Northerners, and their sub-ethnic groups, continue to display many differences. As a result, this study illustrates both the heterogeneity and the complexity of the reality of these two groups and their ethnic and their sub-ethnic senses of identity, belonging, and community. Moreover, ethnic and sub-ethnic boundaries have variously been shaped by the history of colonialism, current relations among these groups in Sudan, by period of residence in third countries and refugee camps, and by the Canadian context.

As noted in chapter two ethnic boundaries have been formed by a long history of interaction between ancient political formations, immigration, the slave trade, colonization,
decolonization, and the policies of successive national governments. Given prevailing power relations, these historical factors have contributed to discrimination against and marginalization of the Southerners, as well as non-Arab Northerner groups in Sudan. This history tended to render the ethnic boundaries between riverine people and other Sudanese groups stronger than the ethnic boundaries among, or between, these other groups.

In this research, many of these Southerner respondents lived in war-torn areas in Southern Sudan. Nevertheless, some managed to flee these areas either to Northern Sudan, where they lived in harsh and difficult circumstances, or to neighboring countries where they lived in the broader society or in refugee camps, mainly in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda. Other Southerners went to Egypt where most of them lived in the broader society, with small numbers relocated to refugee camps in that country. Unlike the Southerners, most Northerners who came to Canada fled the Sudan to neighboring countries, particularly Egypt, where they lived as part of Egyptian society rather than in refugee camps.

The history of the Sudan has contributed to the construction and transformation of Sudanese peoples’ ethnic boundaries, sense of identity, and relationships in the Sudan as well as in the diaspora. For example, through their colonial polices, both Turkish and British rule can be considered as exogenous shifts that contributed to the construction and expansion of the national boundary of the country and helped build the modern state in Sudan. Through their social, political, economic, and cultural policies and practices, post-colonial governments of the Sudan, especially the present one, can also be considered as exogenous shifts in transforming ethnic boundaries among various Sudanese ethnic groups.
The initiation and development of a patriotic/national movement, and the whole process of decolonization, can be thought of as an exogenous drift of ethnic boundaries insofar as it relied on nationalist ideas that emerged from abroad.

The slave trade stands as a combination of exogenous and endogenous shifts of boundaries. It is an exogenous shift because it was imposed on certain Sudanese groups from without, also it is also an endogenous shift, because it was practiced, if partially, by some Sudanese ethnic groups, among some non-Sudanese slave traders, against other Sudanese groups.

These factors, along with the immigration of different groups to the country, particularly the Arabs, have helped create the historical conditions for the construction of various binaries of identity and belonging between: Southern/Northern; Arab/non-Arab or African; Muslim/non-Muslim; Awlad albahar/Awlad algharib; and riverine or central/peripheral. These binaries have been the basis for the construction and reproduction, and brightening and strengthening of ethnic and ethno-regional boundaries. It should be noted that there is a consensus among the respondents that the terms Northerner is used to mean ‘Arab’ or riverine people as opposed to non-Arabs or ‘blacks’ as they are called by most of the respondents, it is not used in the geographic sense as it was thought at the beginning when this research was designed.

Many Sudanese-Canadians, both Southerners and Northerners, think that they are living temporarily in Canada, and are waiting for political conditions in their homeland to change so they can return back. This was particularly evident in Southerners’ return to South Sudan after the secession/independence from Sudan (Fanjoy, 2013, 2015). They think of themselves as part of the Sudanese diaspora. This applies to the first generation of Southern and Northern Sudanese
who also think of themselves as Canadians. Yet, their Sudanese origins tend to be of primary importance when it comes to their thinking about their identity.

For a variety of social, cultural, and religious reasons, the idea of returning back to their country of origin remains strong among Sudanese immigrants in Canada. As a result, Sudanese immigrants continue to maintain transnational ties with their homeland. It is interesting that transnationalism, as experienced by my respondents, tends to mediate ethnic boundary processes among Sudanese sub-national groups, especially those formed by nationalism/national movements. This effect, according to my respondents’ experience, was unidirectional. The effects on these boundary processes tends to move from the country of origin to the host country and not the other way round. In other words, the ethnic boundary processes in the country of origin continues to shape boundary processes in Canada rather than vice versa.

The knowledge and memories of the aforementioned history, along with the current state of affairs in the Sudan, did shape my participants’ responses to the questions I asked in this study. Despite the consensus among them on geography as the fundamental determinant of the meaning of being Sudanese for those who were born and lived for three or four generations in the Sudan, some respondents suggested that the Arab or riverine people should not be considered as Sudanese because they are not ‘native’ or ‘African’. This helps show that ethnic boundaries exist not only between Southern and Northern Sudanese Canadians, but also between Arabs and non-Arabs, including Southerners.

Here it is worth noting that the binary of African/Arab is implausible as it compares geography to ethnicity. Other respondents suggested that those who belong to cross-border
ethnic groups should not be considered as Sudanese. This reveals the intersection of national boundaries with ethnic ones.

The experience of the participants revealed that in certain contexts, and within certain power relations, ethnic boundaries can be maintained, strengthened, and sharpened through national government policies which engender, and/or enhance, marginalization, oppression, racism, resentment, lack of trust, and competition for scarce resources.

Although they did not determine the meaning of being a Sudanese, which is geographical in the first place, the aforementioned binaries were reflected in people’s definition of their identity and status as mainstream versus marginalized, powerful versus powerless, rich versus poor, discriminators versus discriminated against, and governors versus governed. In Sudan, the binaries of identity and ethnic boundary formations have helped reproduce the unequal distribution of resources among various Sudanese groups. This differentiation was mainly based on religion and ethnicity, two attributes employed by the post-colonial Sudanese governments, especially the present one, to determine which group(s) to include or to exclude and thus, which group(s) to discriminate against. This discrimination, which is admitted with regret by most of the Northern respondents, has led some Southern Sudanese and other marginalized Northerners’ respondents to argue that the meaning of being Sudanese for them is not the same as for the riverine people because they feel like they are considered as second class citizens. This sentiment is experienced in many situations, as expressed by Southern and other marginalized groups’ respondents, and is a consequence of not being treated as Sudanese citizens equal to Northerners. This is especially applicable in Northern Sudan where the Southerners were historically ill-treated compared to the comparatively favourable treatment of the Northerners in the South. This suggests that ethnic boundaries between Arabs and non-Arabs were, and still are, by and large
horizontal in the sense that they have class dimensions. Different ethnic groups are placed in a hierarchy based on the social distance between the group(s) in question and the charter group which, in this case, is the riverine group.

These feelings of marginalization, racism, and ill-treatment have resulted in resentment which, in turn, led to the advent of the Southern Sudanese national movement. This eventually led to the contraction of the Sudanese national boundary, namely the secession of South Sudan. This is a consequential endogenous shift. As a result of the continuous marginalization and violent conflicts, other embryonic national movements emerged in Northern Sudan, namely in the areas of Nuba Mountains, Darfur, Southern Blue Nile, and Bija. Many of my respondents, especially those who originated from these areas, warned that these movements may lead to more divisions, and thus to further fragmentation of the Sudan. This is also an endogenous shift occurring underway as a result of the current situation. The consequence of this endogenous shift will be further contraction(s) of the Sudanese national boundary.

These factors helped shape and reproduce the continuing social gap between Southern and Northern Sudanese in the Sudan as well as in Canada. The gap between Southerners and Northerners in Canada was maintained and then widened because both Southerners and Northerners tend to focus on, and use selected actual or imagined differences in Sudan as a way to organize their interactions in Canada. Both parties overgeneralize these differences, and stereotype the other. Many Northern respondents claimed that Southerners are not doing well in terms of education, employment, family relations, and their general behavior, especially when compared to the Northerners. This was corroborated by some educated Southern respondents. These stereotypes are partly behind why Northerners continue to distance themselves from Southerners.
This stereotyping was reciprocated by the Southerners who view Northerners, especially the riverine people or Arabs, as arrogant and racists. This claim by Southern respondents was also supported by some of my respondents from the North. Such overgeneralizations are, of course, faulty because they include everyone in the group and ignore the changes that happen to the group and/or its members.

In addition to the above, the independence/secession of South Sudan was also a factor in shaping the relationship between Southern and Northern Sudanese Canadians. Respondents’ felt that it caused the gap between these two groups to widen. These respondents did not agree among themselves about the nature of the splinter of the Sudan; Northerners tended to think of it as secession, which caused them sadness, whereas Southerners tended to think of it as independence, a joyful event. This was the belief prevalent before the eruption of violence in South Sudan in 2013.

The effects of the secession/independence of South Sudan on the relationship between Southern and Northern Sudanese in Kitchener can be summarized as follows. First, joint activities held by Southerners and Northerners before secession came to full stop after succession. Both parties, especially Southerners, saw no point in engaging in joint activities, as they saw themselves as two different groups with different national boundaries. It is worth mentioning that the sudden death of John Garang, the leader of the SPLA/M who became the vice-president of the Sudan after the conclusion of the CPA, had a profound effect on these activities. Following his death, the boundaries between Southerners and Northerners were reactivated, reemphasized, and strengthened. The boundaries were deemphasized and weakened with the implementation of the CPA. These boundary shifts occurred in the Sudan as well as in the diaspora, including Canada. Following independence, joint activities stopped, and mutual
invitations to attend public events significantly decreased. Mutual invitations have tended to become limited to those who are close friends from both sides, but are not extended by Southerners and Northerners at the group or organizational level.

Second, the independence of South Sudan decreased the degree of interaction between these two groups. It impacted personal interactions among group members. This applied to most Southerners and Northerners who are not acquaintances, including co-workers. They now tend to treat each other as strangers when meeting in the street. Now, avoidance and the absence of exchanges of greetings, seems to be the norm. When discussions at meetings and in the public sphere do occur, they have become harsher and are characterized by the exchange of insults and accusations.

A third effect of the independence of South Sudan has been to limit mutual aid to co-nationals or in-group members. Although it was limited prior to independence, the cooperation of Southerners and Northerners in assisting each other has become negligible.

In spite of the many changes in the relationship between Southern and Northern Canadians with the secession of South Sudan, it can be noted that some aspects of this relationship were not, or at least not directly, affected by the secession. Close friendships with the members of the other groups that existed before independence remained intact. Also, close friends continued to invite each other to private events, as well as to certain public ones. Attending these public events is based on these inter-group friendships. Inviting people other than friends to such events has almost stopped following the independence of South Sudan.

The patterns to inter-groups friendships seems to have followed a certain pattern. There are more friendships among Southerners and Northerners who came from Egypt compared to
those who were resettled from refugee camps. This is probably because relationships developed in Egypt were based on shared conditions of poverty, unemployment, and mutual status as refugees. This was experienced by both Southerners and Northerners. These conditions required cooperation between the two groups to ensure survival. This mutual support was facilitated by the fact that these Sudanese were opponents to the government of the Sudan and that they were labeled by Egyptian society as refugees.

Generally, Southern and Northern respondents noted that there were more intra-group than inter-group friendships. Nevertheless, it is noted that there were more close friendships between the Southerners and non-Arab Northerners than between the Southerners and the riverine people or Arabs. This indicates that the boundaries among the Southerners and riverine people were stronger than between these Southerners and other Northerner groups. Within the non-Arab groups, the cases of friendships between Southerners and Nuba Mountains’ people were more frequent than between Southerners and Darfur people. This is, arguably, because large numbers of the Southerners and the Nuba Mountains people were long-term members of the SPLM. This political alliance enabled ethnic boundaries among them to weaken.

Interpersonal boundaries were, at times, expressed as either in conformity or in nonconformity with inter-groups boundaries. The widening gap between Southern and Northern Sudanese Canadians and its impact on interaction has been noted. Yet, there were certain events where this was not observed. Attendance at death ceremonies, funerals, and soccer games did not change. Almost all Southerners and Northerners continue to attend death ceremonies regardless to which groups the deceased belonged. Soccer games are also attended by both Southern and Northern individuals regardless of differences and/or antagonism.
There is a difference in seating patterns at death ceremonies compared to soccer games. At death ceremonies each group sits together. At soccer games the seating is mixed. In both cases seating order did not seem to change after the independence of South Sudan.

The frequency of inter-ethnic marriages remained the same. No intermarriages occurred among Sudanese Canadians before or after the secession. There is virtually no intermarriage between the riverine people and other non-Arab Northern groups in Kitchener. The only exception is the very rare occasion of intermarriage between some riverine and Darfur people.

The relationship between Southerners and Northerners, as two large differentiated groups, is complex. In addition, this relationship is complicated by the existence of differentiated Southern and Northern sub-ethnic groups as well as their relationship with each other.

The relationship between these two broad groups and among their sub-ethnic groups in Canada is dynamic. It changes in different settings and in response to various incidents. It is sensitive to incidents that occur in the Sudan and South Sudan. For example, the eruption of violent conflicts in Darfur, Nuba Mountains, and Southern Blue Nile, resulted in the relationship between these non-Arab groups and Southern Sudanese groups to improve at the expense of the relationships between these groups with the riverine or Arabs. This became more pronounced after the secession, as the government of South Sudan began supporting these groups in their rebellion against the government of Sudan.

Interestingly after the eruption of violence in South Sudan, the relationship between Southern and Northern Sudanese Canadians, including riverine people, has improved, whereas the relationship between the Dinka and Nuer, the two largest ethnic groups in South Sudan, has worsened. This has happened despite their earlier common membership in South Sudanese
community-based organizations, and common membership of the majority in the SPLM, the ruling party in South Sudan.

Sudanese Canadian groups and their relations have been affected indirectly by the Canadian context. These indirect effects are attributable to the freedom available for various ethnic and sub-ethnic groups. Also, the policy of multiculturalism has helped to reinforce, rather than deemphasize, ethnic boundaries among various Sudanese Canadian groups, notably between Southerners and Northerners. This boundary reinforcement has been enhanced by the principle of equality maintained by the Canadian government and the prevalence of the culture of equality in the society at large. Economically, unlike the situation in Egypt, the guaranteed minimum income that provides the basics of life to everyone gave various Sudanese Canadian groups the opportunity to choose whom to acquaint with on voluntary basis.

Thus, the Canadian context provides an environment that enables these ethnic boundaries to be reinforced and/or transformed by Northern and Southern Sudanese. The Canadian context is one facilitating and supporting factor. It gave an environment to other deeper and stronger factors of reinforcing and/or transforming ethnic boundaries among various Sudanese Canadian groups.

The story of Southern and Northern Sudanese Canadians is the story of ever shifting boundaries, identities, and allegiance. It is the story of the ever changing and transforming relationship between these two groups and their sub-ethnic groups. These boundaries vary by sub-ethnic groups, and at times are undermined and weakened. At other times they are vigorously enforced and reinforced.
This study admittedly has limitations. First, the study is restricted to thirty seven key informants and it is limited to one location in Canada, the city of Kitchener. If this study was carried out in another city such as Ottawa, Toronto or Calgary, we might have drawn slightly different results because of the different sizes of the cities. Moreover, the Sudanese in these cities may not be as diverse as in Kitchener, and the proportions of Southerners and Northerners in the community may not be as balanced. For example, if some of these cities are dominated more by those from Sudan or South Sudan, it is possible that the boundary processes might be more or less intense. Second, in spite of the strong hints they give, interviews with thirty seven respondents in one city restricts drawing generalizable definitive conclusions about the entire population of Sudanese Canadians. This limits the scope of the study to exploring how various contextual factors shape the process of identity and boundary maintenance and change. Third, this study was limited to first generation Sudanese Canadians. We may have come to significantly different results if the second generation was included, because the second generation was not exposed to the same experiences of the first generation. Also, unlike first one, the second generation is exposed to secondary agents of socialization that are more powerful than family. These include school, media, and peers. Fourth, I may have also come to different results if I studied women on their own because, in a patriarchal society like the Sudanese one, women’s experiences are different from men’s experiences as their status and roles are different. Also, their involvement with political and military organizations are limited compared to men. Finally, I was afraid that my identity as a Northern Sudanese Canadian researching such a sensitive Sudanese issue, and interviewing Southern and Northern Sudanese Canadians, might have led to negative consequences during data collection and analysis. Yet, my social location had certain advantages compared to that of other researchers. My roots in the community, my considerable knowledge about the community based on longstanding patterns of interaction, helped me gain access and conduct interviews that resulted in relevant data. Some information
was shared with me specifically because of my status as a Sudanese Canadian. Some participants claimed to reveal information to me that they would not have told a non-Sudanese Canadian researcher. A researcher from a different background may have collected different data, but not necessarily better data. I do not believe that my status as Sudanese invalidates the data or the analysis.

In the process of doing this research, I have identified several other complementary and/or related future research topics. For example, comparative research can be done on the relationship between Southern and Northern Sudanese in different Western countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Another research could focus on the relationships among different immigrant groups to Canada to evaluate the effect of their national history on their relationships in Canada. The effect of transnational ties/practices on inter-ethnic
or inter-sub-ethnic immigrants’ groups’ relationship can also be studied. Moreover, the relationship between first and second generation Sudanese Canadians could be the object of further study, as how the second generation relates to the current conflicts in Sudan.
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APPENDIX 1

INTERVIEW GUIDE

THE HARVEST OF SECESSION: A STUDY OF THE DYNAMICS OF ETHNIC BOUNDARY AND RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOUTHERN AND NORTHERN SUDANESE CANADIANS

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1. Information about these interview questions: This gives you an idea what I would like to learn about the effect of the South Sudanese national movement, referendum, and independence of South Sudan on the relationship between the Southern and Northern Sudanese Canadians. Interviews will be one-to-one and the questions will be open-ended (not just ‘yes or no’ answers). Because of this, the exact wording may change a little. Sometimes I will use other short questions to make sure I understand what you told me or if I need more information when we are talking such as: ‘So, you are saying that …’), to get more information (‘Please tell me more?’), or to learn what you think or feel about something (‘Why do you think that is…?’).

2. Information about you: Your full name? Your age now? Your work? When did you come to Canada? Where did you live before moving into Kitchener? And for how long? Did you immigrate to Canada or came in as a refugee claimant? From where did you come? For how long you are involved in the Sudanese community at large in Kitchener, and/or in the Southern and/or Northern communities or organizations? In what capacities and/or roles?

3. What does it mean to be a Sudanese, before the conclusion of Comprehensive Peace Agreement, referendum, and independence of South Sudan? What is the role of the Southern Sudanese national movement in shaping this meaning? What is the role, if any, played by El Bashir, or other Sudanese, regimes in shaping this meaning? Did this meaning change after the CPA, referendum, and independence of South Sudan? If yes, please explain what are these differences? Are the aspects of racial, cultural, lingual, religious, political affiliation, and sense of belonging fit in your understanding of what does it mean to be a Sudanese? What is the role of religion in Sudanese identity? What does it mean to be Southern Sudanese and Northern Sudanese? Does this differ if you are in South Sudan, Northern Sudan, and/or Canada? What is the role of ethnic identity in the daily life of Southern and Northern Sudanese in Canada?

4. What are the similarities and differences between Southern and Northern Sudanese people? Did the Sudanese diaspora in Canada play any role in bringing Southern and Northern Sudanese people in Kitchener together? Can you compare it to the Sudanese transitional whereabouts such as Egypt and refugees camps in other places? How did
living in the transitional places, such as refugee camps, affect your ideas, stances, and political affiliation?

5. Please tell me about the Sudanese community in Kitchener when you moved in to it, in terms of their numbers; numbers of Southern and Northern people, and the relationship between them?
   a. Do you recall whether there were a lot of Sudanese in Kitchener when you came in to it?
   b. Was the majority from the South or the North?
   c. Were there any differences between Northern and Southern people in Kitchener? If yes, what you think the reasons are? Are these differences still there? Why did they continue/stop? And why? What distinguishes Southern from Northern people in your thinking? What do you think Southern and Northern people in Kitchener think about each other?
   d. Do you recall whether there was an organization for the Sudanese nationals when you came? If yes; what was its name? Who were its members? Who were the leaders of the organization from then until now in terms of being Southerners or Northerners? Are there any women’s, or any subgroups’, organizations? What did these organizations try to accomplish? What did these organizations do to bridge the boundaries, promote collective identity, and promote political alliances that transcend the ethnic grouping in Kitchener? Are there any relationships among these organizations? If yes, what kind of relationships were there? Were there any Sudanese people who were not members of the organization? If yes, what is the majority; was it from the South or from the North? In your thinking, what are the reasons for those who are not members not to enroll?
   e. Any Northern Sudanese people who used to be members of Southern Sudanese organizations and vice versa?
   f. What kind of support did these organizations render to its people? Did people from South and North used to support each other before CPA, referendum, and independence? Did this change afterwards?
   g. What are Sudanese groups in Kitchener and what are the similarities and differences among them?
   h. Are Southern and Northern Sudanese Canadians in Kitchener involved in the Sudanese politics? If yes, in what ways? Did this involvement exert any effect on the Southern Sudanese national movement in Sudan which led to independence? If yes, what is this effect? Did all of these factors have any implications on the relationship between Southern and Northern Sudanese Canadians in Kitchener?

6. Please tell me about the relationship between Southern and Northern Sudanese Canadians since you moved in to Kitchener until now?
   a. What about friendships, intermarriages,
   b. Are there any groups from the south that are closer than the others to the Northerners in general, or to a specific group from the North? Are there any groups from the north that are closer than the others to the Southerners in general, or to a specific group from the South?
   c. What are the other manifestations of the relationship between Southerners and Northerners in Kitchener?
   d. How they act in public/private social events/gatherings?
e. What do you call what happened in South Sudan; is it independence or secession?

f. Are there any changes in the Sudanese community after the CPA, referendum, and independence of South Sudan? OR What, in your thinking, the role, if any, of the CPA, referendum, and independence in shaping the relationship between Southern and Northern Sudanese Canadians in Kitchener? Is there any difference between the relationship between Southern and Northern women from that between Southern and Northern men?

7. Is there something important we forgot? Is there anything else you think I need to know about the relationship between Southern and Northern Sudanese Canadians in Kitchener/ Winnipeg?