Rethinking Institutional Infrastructures: Institution Building as Social Movement Activity

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Social movements rely on institutional infrastructures—organizations and networks external to movements that provide supports to social movements—but comparative work is required to understand divergences in the strength of institutional infrastructures in similar movements across national borders. I conduct a historical, comparative analysis of the religious right in Canada and the United States using secondary sources. I examine the historical process of institution building in conservative, evangelical Christian communities from 1920-1950. I show that the large, dense network of para-church organizations established by conservative, evangelical Christians in the United States was not similarly established in Canada. I identify two historical factors in this critical juncture: the role of denominations and bureaucratic regulation of broadcast radio. I argue that this critical juncture produced divergences in institution building that, decades later, affected the supports available to the religious right movements in these countries.

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Scholarship on social movements is primarily concerned with movements over their lifespan: from emergence to decline. In this paper I argue that infrastructure-building activities that occur before movement emergence are worthy of the attention of social movements scholars, as the size and strength of movement-related organizations and networks affect the amount and quality of support that they can offer to social movements once they emerge. I use a comparative framework to highlight the importance of pre-movement institution-building to movement mobilization and success. I examine the case of the religious right in the United States and Canada—similar movements in similar political contexts—to focus on the historical predecessors of activism and their impact on the success of movements down the line. I argue that the differences in organizational development in conservative, evangelical Christian communities that occurred in the decades before the religious right’s emergence in these two nations is key to understanding variation in the movement’s strength and success.

On its face, the religious right movement looks very similar in Canada and the United States. It draws on similar communities composed in large measure of socially conservative evangelical Christians. It has similar policy goals, including elimination of abortion rights, denial of human rights to lesbians, gay men, bisexual and transgender communities (including the refusal to recognize same-sex marriage), and the diminishment of policies that support women’s access to the workplace, such as funding for childcare centers, all-day kindergarten, and parental leave. It uses similar framing and rhetoric to communicate its claims, emphasizing traditional family forms and an implied universality of a Christian identity. However, the success of the religious right in the United States has not been duplicated in Canada (Bean, Kaufman and Gonzalez 2008).
The movement in Canada is not nearly as strong in the United States, as measured by social movement organizations and the resources they command. In this paper, I argue that one of the key factors that explains the differences in policy outcomes for the religious right in these countries is the historical development of evangelical Christian communities in each of these nations. In particular, I focus on the institution-building efforts of evangelical communities in the mid-20th century. In the United States, a concerted effort to build para-church organizations—encouraged by policy on the one hand and religious denominations on the other—created a strong and resource-rich institutional infrastructure that supported the emergence of the religious right social movement in the 1970s. In Canada, fewer para-church organizations were established, and when their social movement emerged at the same time, its institutional infrastructure was much weaker than that of the United States.

Ahead, I discuss the historical development of evangelical Christian communities in each of these nations, paying particular attention to the mid-20th century, when evangelical expansion was substantial. I identify two key factors in the critical juncture that set Canadian evangelicalism on a slightly different path relative to U.S. evangelicalism, with a less substantial effort to build para-church organizations. I discuss the relationship between institution building and the financial, personnel, and cultural resources of social movement organizations at the end of the 20th century. This case effectively demonstrates that variation in size and density of the institutional infrastructures upon which social movements are built matter to the success of those movements. Further, the historical processes of institution building, including those that predate movement emergence, are important predictors of movement outcomes.
Movements and Institutional Support

It is no surprise to social movement scholars that institutional strength or community support is important to the success of social movements. Social movement theory has established several core claims regarding mobilization. Particularly relevant to the present analysis is social movements theory’s emphasis on organizational supports of social movements. For example, Aldon Morris’s (1984) research into the American civil rights movement makes clear the role of black churches providing space for participants to meet, recruitment of other constituents, communication across substantial geographic space, as well as training and support of movement leaders. These early studies make it clear that some strategies are not available to movements that do not have sufficient institutional supports. Studies like Morris’s push theorists to expand their thinking beyond the social movement organization to the network of organizations that support activism.

McCarthy (1996) developed the concept "mobilizing structures" to capture the wide array of institutional supports for activism that come from organizations that are not specifically oriented toward political advocacy, but that nonetheless facilitate the activism of the social movement. This would include the black churches of the civil rights movement, as well as labor unions, bureaucratic agencies, and any organization that provides support to social movement aims (McCarthy 1996; Minkoff 1995; 1997). Indeed, Campbell and colleagues (2005) argue that social movement organizations themselves are not as important as the field of organizations in which they operate, with movements competing for adherents in a wider field of organizations. And scholars no longer limit their analyses to the activity within social movement organizations, but rather consider how activists mobilize constellations of networks to amplify the voices of the constituencies for whom they speak (e.g., Diani 1997, 2003; McCarthy, Smith, and Zald 1996). Comparative approaches to social movements consistently demonstrate that these
organizational ties, as well as the ties between movement organizations and other organizations such as parties, schools, service providers or other bureaucratic agencies, are important predictors of social movement success (e.g., Almeida 2014; Smith 2008; Wang and Soule 2012).

Kenneth T. Andrews (2001, 2004) consolidates many of these insights in his movement infrastructure model of social movement influence. Using the case the Mississippi civil rights movement to test several competing models, he finds that the movement infrastructure, which he defines as the leadership, organizational structures, and resources, best explains the influence of movements. The concept of movement infrastructure calls upon students of social movements to seriously consider the sum total of organizations and resources that offer supports to activism rather than to focus on one or two key organizations or resources. Andrews’s approach, consistent with Amenta (1998), Quadagno (1994), and Taylor (1989), eschews singular measures of movement "success" or "failure" to consider the complex set of influences that movements have over the long run. In addition, Andrews calls for a historical approach to the study of movement impact, which aligns with historical institutionalism’s claims to political and social change. Precisely, this tradition argues that social change is limited by the historical paths that policymakers have created by earlier actions (see for example Moore 1967, Skocpol 1992).

I take Andrews’s (2004) concern for the process of movement building seriously, and I consider whether scholars should extend their analyses to the historical infrastructure-building activities that precede movement emergence. Below, I take a historical, comparative approach to analyze the development of social movement infrastructures by considering the paths of community development and the establishment and growth of organizations and their resources prior to movement emergence. I identify a critical juncture, when institutional infrastructure development parted ways, between 1920 and
1950. I argue that two key factors, denominational reorganization and radio broadcast policy, are influential to this divergence, leading to differences in the relative size of the institutional infrastructures available to the religious right in the United States and Canada decades later.

Case selection

I use a comparative case study of the religious right movement in Canada and the United States. These movements emerged in the 1970s first as countermovements to issue-specific movements on the Left. For example, the pro-life movement, the anti-feminist movement, and the anti-gay movements each organized more or less independently around specific policy issues (for details on these movements, see Fetner 2008; Ginsburg 1989; Mansbridge 1986; Smith 2008; Staggenborg 1991). In the 1980s, multi-issue organizations representing socially conservative policy change writ large emerged, framing their issues in terms of traditional Christian principals. As these organizations began to gain public recognition and advocate social change in the political sphere, the movement became known as the pro-family movement, the New Christian Right, or the religious right. Although the movement gained greater renown in the United States than in Canada in these early days, organizationally the movement was developing at about the same time. However, as I point out below, the movement organizations did not grow at the same rate. Nor did they have equal political influence, despite their similar strategies to align their interests with conservative political parties in the 1990s.

In selecting this pair of movements in neighboring states, I employ an approach that selects similar cases to highlight variations between cases. Lipset (1990) argues that Canada and the United States are excellent cases for comparison because both their political histories and their contemporary social and cultural contexts are so similar.
Because these cases have so much in common, they are akin to a natural experiment in which a good deal of variation is held constant. Thus, they are well positioned to reveal the causal chain events where their paths do diverge. For this paper, I do not follow Lipset’s (1990) path all the way back to the American Revolution, as he does for his classic work explaining value differences in the United States and Canada. However, I do use his insights to explore the period crucial to this case: the first half of the 20th century, focusing especially on 1920-1950, when evangelicalism was redefining itself in both of these countries.

There are substantial differences in the size and strength of the set of organizations that comprise the religious right movements in the United States and Canada (Bean, Gonzalez and Kaufman 2008). There is a stark difference in organizational strength of these movements. Even after accounting for the tenfold difference in population between these countries, the self-reported revenue streams flowing into religious right organizations in the United States is one or two orders of magnitude larger than those in Canada. For example, consider religious right leader James Dobson's influential organization, Focus on the Family. In 2002, when religious right activity was at its peak, Focus on the Family Canada, perhaps the largest religious right movement organization in the country, reported revenue of $9.5 million CAD (equivalent to $5.8 million USD). In the United States in the same year, its sister organization Focus on the Family reported revenue of $126 million, its lobbying wing, the Family Research Council, reported another $10 million, and Focus on the Family Action generated another $25 million in 2004 (People for the American Way 2016). Pat Robertson's multi-national corporate empire dedicated to supporting the religious right is similar. Robertson sold his Christian Broadcasting Network to News Corp in 1990 for $250 million while retaining controlling ownership interest. Last year, the Christian Broadcasting Corporation reported
revenues of $534 million. Robertson also owns controlling shares of Operation Blessing International, a missionary organization with offices in 150 countries and all 50 states; the company reported annual revenue of $407 million in 2002. Regent University, founded by Robertson, has an endowment of $186 million. His American Center for Law and Justice reports revenue over $14 million in 2006. He founded the Christian Coalition, a major religious right organization with branches in 49 states. Its 2004 self-reported revenue was $21.3 million. While some small portion of this empire resides in Canada, it is not near the powerhouse political force of Pat Robertson's U.S. influence. For example, Robertson's Canadian Christian Broadcasting Network affiliate does not report annual revenue, but its headquarters resides in a small strip mall in Scarborough, Ontario, and its Facebook page has fewer than 2,000 "likes" (the U.S. 700 Club has almost 2 million). This pattern is repeated many times over, Canada's institutional infrastructure is smaller, less resource rich, and less able to support the religious right movement than that of the United States (for additional information on religious right organizations, see Utter and Storey 2007).

Why is this conservative social movement organizationally smaller than the U.S. movement? Give that Canada has a rich, evangelical Christian tradition (Christie and Gauvreau 1996), why was the social movement that claimed to represent the interests of this community unable to establish a similarly large and resource-rich set of movement organizations? To answer these questions, I focus comparatively on the historical development of institutional infrastructures in the United States and Canada in the period 1920-1950. I examine why conservative, evangelical Christian communities in these countries engaged in divergent practices of institution building. I consider the social policies and the landscape of religious denominations that encouraged the explosive growth of para-church organizations in the United States and the moderate growth of such
organizations in Canada. Below, I discuss the specific data and methods I use to conduct this analysis.

**Data and Methods**

This historical comparative analysis relies on secondary sources to establish the historical record of evangelical development in the United States and Canada between 1920 and 1950, a period of substantial growth in conservative, evangelical Christianity. As I discuss below, this was a period during which the Canadian and U.S. paths began to diverge. Much has been written by historians, religious studies scholars, and sociologists of religion to establish the path that evangelicalism took in each of these countries. These works, usually in the form of book-length monographs and edited volumes, document the growth of these communities, the main sources of conflict and belief, and the expansion and decline of various denominations, sects, and neighborhood churches.

Historical scholars approach secondary materials with a skeptical eye, keen to expose any biases that the original authors may have or to reveal any contradictions between various histories (Amenta 2003). To ensure a robust and well-informed historical record, I engaged in an extensive library search of secondary sources. The literatures on evangelical history in Canada and the United States are largely separate from each other, but they are substantial. Further, there is a large degree of agreement among authors, at least to the level of detail required for this analysis. In reading these histories, I paid close attention to geographic spread of evangelicalism, movement between church denominations, the emergence of new denominations and non-denominational churches, patterns of shared belief, and the sources of theological conflict among evangelicals.

Since evangelical entrepreneurs are central to this argument, I sought out the historical record of their activities in each nation. I saw the same entrepreneurs mentioned
repeatedly, with a great deal of consistency surrounding their activities. In this analysis, I use a comparative lens to seek information about how these two cases overlapped and where they diverged, paying especial attention to community development and institution building.

In this inquiry, I am guided by historical institutionalism, which emphasizes the path-dependent nature of social change. A historical institutionalist approach considers long-term process as well as "critical junctures" that trigger feedback loops, changing the paths of long-term processes (Skocpol and Pierson 2002). The self-reinforcing dynamics of long-term social and political processes make it difficult to turn back after a critical juncture. In this case, I trace the development of these conservative, evangelical para-church organizations and cultural institutions back to their origins, which cluster in the decades between 1920 and 1950. This was the historical moment at which the long-term processes of market-based organizational development began rapid proliferation in the United States. In Canada, organizational development existed, but was much more limited. I identify key political and institutional factors that influenced this disparity to mark the moment of divergence in institutional development.

Clearly, this line of inquiry takes the analysis back in history decades prior to the emergence of the religious right as a social movement in either country, which I mark at the late 1970s and early 1980s. It even precedes the emergence of the socially conservative single-issue movements that predated the religious right: the anti-ERA, pro-life, and anti-gay movements of the 1970s (Fetner 2008). However, to understand the development of the institutional infrastructure that supports the religious right in each of these countries, it is imperative to look at the histories that preceded movement emergence. In this line of inquiry, social movement scholarship can benefit from the insights of historical institutionalism.
Historical Development of Evangelical Christianity

Christian evangelicalism was redefining itself in the first half of the 21st century. As secularism gained prominence and scientific advances undermined religious bases of knowledge, those who believed that the bible was the literal word of God and the source of all truth were pressed to reconcile their beliefs with new information in the news, in schools, and in the political sphere. Many held fast to their belief in the inerrancy of the bible; that is, a belief that the bible accurately describes the natural world and its historical progress. When scientific evidence came into conflict with the bible’s lessons on how the world began, or on the relationship between humans and animals, this information was rejected by ant-modernists as an attack on their way of life and their salvation (Rawlyk and Noll 1994). Known as the "fundamentalist-modernist controversy," this dispute forced denominations to consider their stance on science, secularism, and the changing relationship between church and state resulting from the pressures of modernity (Finke and Stark 2005).

Those we now know as evangelicals trace their history back to these defining moments. Although many theologically divergent traditions are included under the umbrella term "evangelicalism," most agree that one of the ties across these traditions is an adherence to biblical literalism, to varying degrees, in the face of the contradictory positions staked out by modernity (Smith 1998). Many biblical literalists at the time described themselves as fundamentalists, a term that has since become derogatory. I use the term evangelical here, which is an identity that was developed toward the middle of the century to unite fundamentalists and other biblical literalist traditions (NAE 2009).

Although Canada and the United States both experienced fundamentalist-modernist controversies, there were important differences in context to note. First of all, a smaller proportion of Canadians are Protestant. The United States has consistently had a
large Protestant majority, but this is not the case in Canada, where a substantial Roman Catholic and Anglican presence exists. In 1901, 42% of Canadians were Roman Catholic, 12% were Anglican, and 42% were Protestant (Canada Year Book 1948-49:155). In contrast, the 1906 Census of Religious Bodies reports that only 17% of Americans were Catholic in that year, and this was consistent through at least 1936 (Finke and Stark 2005). The English-French divide is an important factor in Canadian politics along many lines that are outside the scope of this analysis, but it is crucial to note that Catholic dominance in Lower Canada (Quebec) and language barriers between English- and French-speaking population means that the appropriate U.S.-Canada comparison is between the large group of evangelical Protestants in the United States and the smaller, more geographically dispersed population of English-speaking Canadian Protestants.

With Canadian Protestants fewer in number and more geographically dispersed, one might imagine that the fundamentalist-modernist controversy would lead Canadian evangelicals to become fractured and isolated from each other. However, this is not the case. Canadian evangelicals developed a robust religious tradition that is an important part of the cultural landscape of Canada to the present day (Christie and Gauvreau 1996). It was the United States where evangelicals became fractured, dispersed and isolated from each other (Finke and Stark 2005). Many moved away from denominations into standalone churches led by independent preachers. Christian Smith (1998: 9) describes the U.S. field of conservative evangelicals during this period in this way: "much of conservative Protestantism—under the banner of fundamentalism—had evolved into a somewhat reclusive and defensive version of its nineteenth century self."

Why did Canadian Protestant denominations retain most of their congregations in the fundamentalist-modernist controversy, when Protestant denominations in the United

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2 An important exception is the Southern Baptist denomination (see below).
States lost so many followers? The complex, historical case has many possible explanations that range from the macro, such as Lipset’s (1990) theory that draws the roots of American exceptionalism back to its revolution, to the micro, such as arguments about the persuasive styles of individual preachers who gained followers through revivals (Young 2006).

Among these multiple explanations, two factors stand out as particularly influential to the critical juncture that set U.S. evangelicals—more than Canadians—down a path of institution building: the responses of Protestant denominations on the one hand, and bureaucratic policies governing the growth of new media technologies (radio broadcasting) on the other. These differences, one in the social institutions directly involved in the lives of evangelical Christians, and one set of policies that seem quite distant from their lives, are two crucial factors that set these like-minded communities on different paths. As I will discuss below, the long-term processes that followed this critical juncture led to differences in the size and strength of the institutional infrastructures of the religious right.

_Divergence of Protestant Denominations_

First, the responses of religious denominations in the two countries were quite different. In the United States, many Protestant denominations responded to the fundamentalist-modernist controversy by rejecting biblical literalism. They developed theologies that situated the bible as an important set of lessons about God and humanity, without relying on it for history and biology lessons. For example, Presbyterians retained their understanding that God created the earth and all its creatures, but understood these first six days described in the bible to be a metaphor for a much longer period of time (Wuthnow 1989). Denominations like these who reoriented their theology away from biblical literalism became known as "mainline" denominations, a term that is still used today. While many congregants made this theological shift with their denominations,
others retained their belief in the literal truth of the bible, and saw the shift of mainline denominations as moving away from the path to salvation. As mainline denominations cemented a tradition that embraced science and modernity, many U.S. literalist congregants left denominations (Finke and Stark 2005).

Some denominations, such as the Southern Baptists, faced the fundamentalist-modernist controversy by moving to an evangelical, anti-modernist theological stance (see Smith 1998). Large numbers of biblical literalists left mainline congregations to worship on their own. Standalone churches, led by a single preacher, became very common, and many of these houses of worship drew conservative evangelicals to their congregations. Following Smith (1998), I count the small, independent churches as well as the literalist denominations together to understand U.S. evangelicalism in the 1920s to be a large, fractured and dispersed field with as many unique theological traditions as preachers in pulpits. Distrustful of mainline theology, of politics, of science and of public schools, conservative evangelicalism became isolationist. Home, family, bible study and the local church became the central institutions for this large segment of the American population (Diamond 1995).

In Canada, Protestant denominations had a much different response to the fundamentalist-modernist controversy. However, Canadian Protestantism managed in large part to stave off the schism between anti-modernists and the mainstream that marked the American evangelical experience. While a few denominations became "mainline," Canadian Protestantism in the 1920s underwent a major denominational reorganization that ensured the survival of denominations while making space for both modernists and literalists to worship together. The establishment of the United Church of Canada in 1925 marks a critical juncture from the path of U.S. denominations. In this year, all Canadian Methodists, almost all Canadian Presbyterians, as well as the
Congregational Union—a set of independent Protestant congregations—voted to merge to become the United Church of Canada (Eddy 1963).³

From its inception, the United Church of Canada developed an ecumenical approach to worship that embraced a wide spectrum of belief from biblical literalism to more modernist interpretations. One of the consequences of this reorganization is that most conservative, evangelicals remained tied to denominations in a way that U.S. evangelicals did not (Wright 1990). Thus, evangelicalism in Canada was not fractured as it was in the United States, nor was it isolationist. The United Church of Canada, while remaining inclusive of its theologically conservative laity, emphasized an active engagement with the social problems of the day, including ministering to the poor and advocating for women’s rights (Reimer 2003). This platform of social engagement and humanitarianism satisfied the evangelical impulse of their congregations while encouraging political engagement (Gauvreau 1994:220). This platform of civic engagement was also held by smaller evangelical denominations as well. One clear example of this is the Baptists of the Maritime provinces in eastern Canada. In 1921, the Maritime Baptists adopted a progressive social gospel that included points such as "the resources of the earth being the heritage of the people, should not be monopolized by the few to the disadvantage of the many," and "women who toil should have equal pay with men for equal work" (Rawlyk 1990: 35).

This cultural divergence is the basis for Lydia Bean and colleagues’ (2008) convincing analysis that the culture of Canadian evangelicals is not conducive to participation in the religious right social movement. As I argue below, the establishment of the United Church of Canada did more than affect the culture of evangelicalism. It also

³ A small minority (7%) of Presbyterian congregations voted to remain outside the United Church of Canada, continuing on as the Presbyterian Church in Canada, a mainline denomination.
left denominations more squarely in charge of developing religious institutions like summer camps, Sunday School curricula, and the like, which limited the opportunities for entrepreneurs to build independent para-church organizations of the sort that became common in the United States.

To be sure, the establishment of the United Church of Canada did not satisfy all conservative, evangelical Canadians. There were those who left the church to establish independent congregations, isolated from politics and seeking to create a conservative religious culture much like that of U.S. evangelicals. One important example is Thomas Todhunter (T.T.) Shields, who in 1927 established the Toronto Baptist Seminary, one of the leading voices for conservative evangelical Christians in Canada. Unlike American preachers who attracted large followings, T.T. Shields's legacy is rife with conflict, as moderate evangelical leaders refused to go along with his anti-modern vision for transforming Canadian evangelical institutions. Although he did attract a number of followers and successfully preached for forty-five years, he was considered an extremist among Canadian evangelicals (Stackhouse 1999). Other efforts across Canada were similar. For example, Burkinshaw (1994) recounts the history of a set of alternative churches established by conservative evangelicals that were independent from denominations in British Columbia. These conservative, evangelical communities are an important part of Canadian religious history. However, for our analysis here, it is important to note that the formation of the United Church of Canada staved off the large-scale retreat from denominations that we saw in the United States.

This is important to our understanding of the growth of institutions, because the large, fractured, and isolated community of conservative evangelicals in the United States turned to the market to purchase religious readings, schooling options for their children, and other offerings that are usually provided for and organized by denominations.
Entrepreneurs seized the opportunity to start new businesses to cater to conservative, evangelical families across churches. A whole host of para-church organizations were developed in the middle of the 20th century that relied on market logics to provide for a community of like-minded evangelicals outside of public life. Entrepreneurs developed summer camps, bible study, and organizations that coordinated missionary excursions to international destinations. Many of these para-church organizations grew into national and multi-national corporations that later became part of the institutional infrastructure of the religious right (Finke and Stark 2005). In Canada, where denominations organized the community life of their congregants, there was much less opportunity for evangelical entrepreneurship (see Christie and Gauvreau 1996 for a discussion of evangelical growth within denominations). This produced a smaller field of non-denominational para-church organizations and, decades later, a weaker institutional infrastructure.

**Divergence of Radio Broadcast Policy**

One of the most important sets of para-church organizations to come out of U.S. conservative, evangelical communities was a profoundly resource-rich set of multinational media empires dedicated to religious programming. Indeed, conservative, evangelical media stars—televangelists, as they are popularly called—have been some of the most central figures in the U.S. religious right. Jerry Falwell began the Moral Majority, and Pat Robertson changed the Republican Party dramatically with his unsuccessful bid for the presidential nomination (Fetner 2008). These figures sit atop media empires that include television studios, dedicated television stations, radio programs and stations, international media organizations, and even amusement parks. Profits from these organizations have produced universities, missionary programs, and of course many of the activist organizations that comprise the religious right. This media industry, of course traces its
roots back to the advent of radio, when evangelical Christian programs first became a raging success.

In Canada, there is a Christian media on television and radio. It is reasonably profitable and enduring, and has a reliable audience (Johnston 1994). However, it is neither as massive nor as profitable as the industry in the United States. One explanation might be simply the lesson we learned above: a smaller portion of the Canadian population is evangelical Christian, so the potential audience is smaller. However, there is more to the story. From the outset of radio broadcasting, Canadian bureaucrats retained direct control over who was allowed to broadcast on the radio, while the United States left the development of radio mostly to market logic (Fetner, Stokes, and Sanders 2015). This one policy difference allowed the entrepreneurial efforts of U.S. evangelical radio broadcasters to flourish, while Canadian religious broadcasting of all kinds was strictly limited and prevented from making a profit.

In the United States, evangelical Christians were among the pioneers of radio broadcasting (Apostolidis 2000). These efforts were massively successful. Finke and Stark (2005:219) report that early programs drew millions of listeners across the country. There seemed to be a station devoted to Christian radio in every small town across the country. When mainline churches tried to squeeze evangelicals out of radio networks, evangelicals invented syndication and began mailing tapes of their programs directly to independent radio stations across the country (Finke and Stark 2005: 223). Many of these endeavors blossomed into highly successful businesses, such as Billy Graham's "Hour of Decision," which formed the beginnings of Graham's multi-national evangelical enterprise. The profitability of many of these early radio shows cannot be understated. For example, Pat Robertson's Christian Broadcasting Network reported annual earnings of $230 million in 1986 (Oldfield 1996:99).
In Canada, evangelical radio entrepreneurs did not operate in the same, market-friendly, laissez-faire policy framework as their U.S. counterparts. The 1928 Aird Report, well known in Canada for establishing the Canadian Broadcast Company, a public radio company, also placed severe restrictions on radio programming in general, and religious radio in particular (Nolan 1989). Two of its restrictions are particularly relevant. First, it restricted most forms advertising, eliminating direct requests for donations, which were the primary basis of profitability among U.S. evangelical radio broadcasts (Bird 1988). Second, the policy called out religious broadcasting in particular, requiring that all religious broadcasts be ecumenical and uncontroversial, "prohibiting statements of a controversial nature" (Aird, et al., 1929: 13). These policy restrictions clearly sought to shape Canadian culture directly, setting it apart from the United States (Faassen 2011; Vipond 2000).

These restrictions, however, did not preclude evangelical Christian radio altogether (Cook & Ruggles 1992). One important figure in evangelical radio was William "Bible Bill" Aberhart, a radio broadcaster who used his popularity to launch a political career, becoming Premier of Alberta from 1935 until his untimely demise in 1943 (Stackhouse 1999). His legacy is a key piece of Canadian political history that laid the groundwork for much of socially conservative party politics in Canada to the current day. Even this successful radio broadcaster, however, did not build a giant media empire to rival those in the United States. The policy structure of Canadian broadcasting placed restrictions on the possibilities for fundraising over the air, so that even a very popular radio personality like Bill Aberhart experienced only modest financial success (Elliott and Miller 1987). Religious broadcast policy did loosen in Canada in the 1980s. However, the decades-long head start that U.S. broadcasters enjoyed fostered long-term processes of profit-making and institution building there to a much greater extent than in Canada.
The Divergence of Institution Building in Canada and the United States

The role of denominations in the lives of evangelical Christians and the bureaucratic regulations governing broadcast radio technology are two important causes of the critical juncture in the paths of evangelical institution building in the United States and Canada. In the United States, para-church organizations were developed to stand in for the services of denominations. Many of these para-church organizations were profitable, propelling the growth of this organizational sector further. Among the most successful were numerous media organizations, including print shops, radio programs, and later, television shows and stations. Over time, several of these organizations grew large and profitable enough to support grand visions of evangelicalism. For example, several evangelical entrepreneurs built colleges and universities to train future leaders of conservative evangelicalism; many of the current leaders of the religious right in the United States graduated from Wheaton College or Bob Jones University.

By the end of the 1950s through to the present, conservative Christian evangelicalism could be characterized as a highly integrated, densely networked set of para-church organizations, churches and denominations. Although the shared goal of entrepreneurs and leading this institution-building project was to support conservative evangelicals' ability to live apart from the secular political sphere, this major project of building Christian institutions apart from the secular world resulted in a firm foundation of institutional support for the conservative evangelical activism that emerged several decades later.

Conclusion

Before Jerry Falwell ever dreamed of the Moral Majority, major work was done in the United States to develop and connect Christian communities that were independent of
the state and other secular institutions. Though para-church organizations, Christian institutions replaced secular institutions for education, travel, literature, and other everyday needs. In Canada, evangelical communities developed without many para-church organizations; they continued to rely on denominations and secular institutions. In addition, many of the market-based para-church organizations in the United States generated substantial revenue, which created a cross-national disparity of resources in evangelical communities. These resources were put to work in the evangelical tradition of expanding its community, which further exacerbated the disparity in the numbers of conservative evangelicals between these nations. Moreover, the organizational disparity had effects on cultural factors, including identity deployment and communication networks among evangelical communities, which produced greater differences in movement strength. When the U.S. religious right emerged, it did so on a strong foundation of resource-rich, densely networked institutions. Canada’s religious right, though present and active, lacked this foundation. This case highlights the fact that the process of institution building that occurs prior to movement emergence matters to the growth and success of social movements, regardless of the activist inclinations of the institution builders.

For reasons quite unrelated to political activism, U.S. conservative evangelicals largely separated from both church denominations and from the secular world. This community developed through entrepreneurship in creating para-church organizations, through church involvement, and through the building of networks specifically designed to connect and sustain a community of like-minded families away from the influence of popular culture and secular institutions. Canadian evangelicals were more likely to stay with their denominations and choose a moderate vision of evangelicalism that did not include separatist, anti-modern doctrine. Evangelicals in Canada built far fewer para-church organizations and networks.
I argue that the disparity in organizational size and strength impacts the effectiveness of the religious right movements in each of these nations, despite the fact that the work of establishing these organizations was underway long before the movements’ emergence. The relative success of the U.S. religious right is built upon the work of non-activists who established these organizations and networks. On the flip side, the hard work of activists in the Canadian religious right will not produce the same results as similar activism in the United States, because the relative lack of organizational strength hampers their ability to produce social change.

This case emphasizes the need for social movement scholars to consider not only the institutional foundations of movements, but to think about how historical precursors to movement emergence may have explanatory power over both mobilization and movement outcomes. In particular, in the current context of global activism and cross-national social movements, one should not assume that mobilization is equally likely, or will have similar outcomes, across national borders. Instead, research should investigate the historical contingencies that produce variation in movement success, keeping in mind that much of the work of supporting activism may occur well in advance of the emergence of the movement itself. Social movement scholarship can gain important insights by tracking the historic contingencies and path dependencies of communities, institutions, and activism. Disparities in the size and strength of mobilizing structures and the networks that connect them may have a substantial impact on the ability of social movements to be successful across national borders.
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