POLEMOS AS KINÉSIS
POLEMOS AS KINÉSIS: THE EFFECTS OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR ON
ATHENIAN SOCIETY AND CULTURE

By JONATHAN M. REEVES, B.A., M.A.

A thesis Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy

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Abstract

This is a study of war as a force for socio-economic, demographic, and political change in late fifth-century Athens. Thucydides famously describes the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC) as the greatest *kinēsis*, or upheaval, ever to affect the Greek world. This protracted war placed great stress on the traditional social systems and institutions of the polis and the generation-long conflict is commonly regarded by historians as the nadir of classical Greek civilization and a cause of the decline of the Greek city-state. Drawing on the testimony of Thucydides and his literary contemporaries, as well as on archaeology and epigraphy, I offer a richly textured account of the impact of the Peloponnesian War on several key aspects of Athenian life. In the first half of my thesis, I consider the material effects of the war on Athenian agriculture and food supply, investigating how the Athenians, as individuals and as a state, adapted to the economic pressures generated by the war. I argue that the material deprivation of Attica throughout the war prompted adaptive economic strategies that hastened and intensified the monetization of Athens and that the rebuilding of the agricultural economy in the aftermath of the war was a key factor in the commercialization of Athenian society in the fourth century. In the second half of the thesis, I document, diachronically, the distribution of the various burdens and opportunities engendered by conditions of protracted warfare among different citizen groups. I then demonstrate how the performance of the two essential civic obligations, military and financial service, was invoked in renegotiations of social and political privilege in the last decade of the fifth century. While there was some centralization in respect of these two areas, I argue that military mobilization and state finance in Athens continued to reflect the organizational principles and civic commitments of the democratic citizen-state into the fourth century. Thus, while offering a fine-grained account of the ways in which the Peloponnesian War was seriously disruptive to life in Athens, I demonstrate that it did not destroy the material and political conditions that provided for the flourishing of the democratic polis.
Acknowledgements

It is my pleasure to offer acknowledgement and to express my debts of thanks to the many people who have helped me to bring this project to completion. I am foremost indebted to my advisor, Sean Corner, an incomparable humanist, historian, and mentor for his guidance at all points during my studies at McMaster. It is my hope that the pages to follow can do some justice to the profound impact Sean has made on me as a student of Greek history.

I would like to thank as well the other members of my committee, Kathryn Mattison and Claude Eilers, for their encouragement and comments with respect to both the final draft and the research and planning stages of this dissertation. Special thanks are owed, too, to Daniel McLean, who fostered in my early days at grad school first a fondness for and then a command of ancient Greek.

To my other friends and colleagues in the department I am no less indebted for years of supportive friendship and collegiality. Special thanks goes to Patricia White, who carefully read every draft of nearly everything and saved me from more formatting errors than I care to ponder let alone specify; fond thanks must also go to Graeme Ward with whom conversations over ancient warfare proved equally stimulating, whether they occurred in the office or at the pub. It would also be remiss of me not to acknowledge the constant and warmhearted administrative support of Carmen Camilleri and Louise Savocchia.

I would like to extend my gratitude to Ben Akrigg at the University of Toronto, who very attentively examined my work and improved it with keen editorial corrections and incisive commentary. I am also grateful to David Hitchcock for his contribution as the chair of my defense.

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For Jen
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Abreviations of journals and works of reference

Abbreviations for ancient authors and their works follow those of the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*. Abbreviations for journals follow the conventions used by *L’Année philologique*; abbreviations for reference works are those commonly used by modern scholars.

1. **Journals**

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td><em>L’Antiquité Classique</em></td>
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<td>AH</td>
<td>Ancient History</td>
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<tr>
<td>AHB</td>
<td>The Ancient History Bulletin</td>
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<td>AHR</td>
<td>The American Historical Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>AJAH</td>
<td>American Journal of Ancient History</td>
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<td>AJPh</td>
<td>American Journal of Philology</td>
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<tr>
<td>AncPhil</td>
<td>Ancient Philosophy</td>
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<td>AncW</td>
<td>The Ancient World: A Scholarly Journal for the Study of Antiquity</td>
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<tr>
<td>ArchRW</td>
<td><em>Archiv für Religionswissenschaft</em></td>
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<td>BABesch</td>
<td>Babesch: Bulletin Antieke Beschaving</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCH</td>
<td>Bulletin de correspondance hellénique</td>
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<td>BICS</td>
<td>Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies</td>
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<td>C&amp;M</td>
<td><em>Classica et Mediaevalia, Danish Journal of Philology and History</em></td>
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<td>CB</td>
<td>The Classical Bulletin</td>
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<td>DHA</td>
<td>Dialogues d’histoire ancienne</td>
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<tr>
<td>G&amp;R</td>
<td>Greece and Rome</td>
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<tr>
<td>GRBS</td>
<td>Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Historia</td>
<td>Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte</td>
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<tr>
<td>HPTh</td>
<td>History of Political Thought</td>
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<tr>
<td>HSPh</td>
<td>Harvard Studies in Classical Philology</td>
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<td>The Journal of Hellenic Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>LCM</td>
<td>Liverpool Classical Monthly</td>
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<td>OJA</td>
<td>Oxford Journal of Archaeology</td>
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<tr>
<td>P&amp;P</td>
<td>Past and Present: A Journal of Historical Studies</td>
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<td>PAPhS</td>
<td>Proceedings of the American Philological Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>RÉG</td>
<td>Revue des études grecques</td>
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<tr>
<td>RH</td>
<td>Revue historique</td>
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<td>RhM</td>
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<td>YCIS</td>
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<td>ZPE</td>
<td>Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik</td>
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2. Reference Works


**APF**  Davies, J. K. 1971. *Athenian Propertied Families* (Oxford)

**CAH**  *Cambridge Ancient History*


**CIG**  Curtius, E., and Kirchhoff, A. *Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum* (1877-; Berlin)


**FGH**  Jacoby, F. 1923-1958. *Fragmente der griechischen Historiker* (Berlin/Leiden)


**IG**  *Inscriptiones Graecae* (1873-; Berlin)


**Kock**  Kock, T. 1880-1888. *Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta* (Leipzig)


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<td>SEG</td>
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<td><em>Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum</em> (1923-)</td>
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καὶ ὁ πόλεμος οὗτος εὖ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἔτι βεβηκυῖαν διέσεισεν ἐκ βάθρων

Pausanias 3.7.11
Introduction

This study is an examination of the Peloponnesian War (431-404 B.C.) as a watershed period in the history of the city of Athens. In the chapters that follow I offer a more finely-grained view than that provided by recent treatments of how the war did and did not impact the Athenians and of how its reverberations in Athenian society waxed and waned over the war’s 27-year course. The Peloponnesian War is traditionally viewed as the first protracted and ‘total’ war fought amongst Greek poleis. It is generally accepted to have been a turning point in Greek history, witnessing dramatic changes in the practice of warfare and the dissolution of the conventional rules of war, placing great stress on the polis and eroding its traditional order.¹

Students of Greek history for the past century have tended to regard the Peloponnesian War as the nadir of classical Greek civilization and culture, a generation-long period of profound and perverse novelty that precipitated the decline of the autonomous Greek city-state.² The subtitle to the 1963 paperback of Jowett’s translation of Thucydides well encapsulates this view (albeit in sensationalistic register), presenting Thucydides’ account of the war as “The stirring chronicle of the holocaust that destroyed Greece’s Golden Age.”

To most scholars, the Peloponnesian War, beginning with the Athenian avoidance of battle in 431, fatefuly represents “an entire rejection of the 300-year tradition of hoplite battle as the sole mode of war,” which led to the introduction of wholesale novelties in every facet of war, from technologies and logistics to tactics and operations.³ Moreover, the nature of

¹ The view was first articulated by Schaefer 1932 and has enjoyed widespread support. See the notable recent treatments by Hanson 2005, 292-314 and 1995, 333-396 and Ober 1996; also see: Kagan 2003, 485-490; Dawson 1996, 61-62, 79-80.
² Cartledge 2001a, 105.
³ Hanson 2004, 111.
participation in warfare changed over the course of the war as poleis desperately fielded armies of professional mercenaries or marginalized townsman, and even non-free fighters. In the effort to win a non-traditional war of attrition, cities for the first time reached beyond the rural economy for material resources and beyond the civic militia for human resources; expediency and necessity replaced the socio-cultural logic of the agrarian citizen-state as the chief determinants of how, when and where engagements would be fought. The disentangling of the conduct of warfare from the ideology of the parochial, agrarian city-state entailed a reorientation of society towards its very antitheses: urbanism, commercialism and monetization, taxation, professionalism and mercenarism, to name a few.

This narrative, in broad outline, is familiar to all modern students of Greek history. Recent challenges to historical accounts of the development of Greek warfare up to the mid-fifth century, however, call into question many of the premises that underlie such traditional accounts of the transformative effects of the Peloponnesian War. The present study examines how the Peloponnesian War impacted the organization, structure and character of polis life, without presumption about the way war was fought previously. In the chapters that follow I aim to provide a socio-economic and cultural account of the impact of war on different aspects of life in Peloponnesian-War Athens; this account is synthetically and critically implicated in the complex of scholarly controversies surrounding the nature and practice of Greek warfare described below, but in itself mine is not chiefly, or even primarily, a military study.

The conventional argument that the ‘total’ war waged from 431-404 destroyed the conditions for the economic, cultural, and political achievements of the early polis rests on the traditional view that Greek warfare from the early archaic period (c. 725 B.C.) to the mid-fifth
century was hoplite warfare, a peculiar form of combat unique to polis Greeks that took its shape from the unique cultural sociology of the polis.

In this view, the Greek battlefield was dominated (if not monopolized) for some three centuries by the hoplite, or heavy infantryman, who took his place alongside his countrymen in his city’s phalanx. The phalanx comprised a civic militia of independent, middling citizen-farmers who, as they farmed for themselves, also shared in governing themselves and, having equipped themselves with bronze panoplies, fought for themselves. Thus scholars have understood the phalanx as an instantiation of the civic community at war, and the rules, customs and tactics governing phalanx warfare as a product and an expression of the polis’ civic ethic and the interests of its citizen-farmers. Military and civic participation coincided, informing and reinforcing one another to such a degree that it is possible to describe the polis, for the archaic and early classical periods, as a ‘hoplite republic’. According to Victor Hanson, the early polis “is best understood as an exclusive and yet egalitarian community of farmers that . . . produce[d] its own food, f[ought] its own wars and ma[d]e its own laws.”

As it was primarily the middling citizen-farmers who fought the wars of their respective poleis, a series of conventions developed over time reflecting their interests and effectively limiting the impact of war on the fighting demographic—in terms of both economic and human cost—while at the same time more or less restricting the experience of war to hoplite

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4 Hanson 1995.
5 Raaflaub and Wallace 2007; Garlan 1995; Hanson 1995, passim; Detienne 1968.
6 Hanson 1995, 247: “[I]f the countryside was a patchwork of roughly similar farms worked by leather-clad yeomen, the phalanx was an analogous grid of identically bronze-clothed fighters.” For the idea of an isonomic hoplite and civic class, see: Raaflaub 1997; Detienne 1968.
7 Hanson 1995, 3. See also: Raaflaub 1999 and 1997; Bowden 1993; Cartledge 1977; Salmon 1977; Detienne 1968. The linkage between soldiering and political enfranchisement in Greece goes back at least as far as the Homeric poems. See van Wees 1992.
combatants. The self-equipment principle that obtained in Greek states meant that the poorest members of society were excluded from serving as ‘meaningful combatants’ altogether. This exclusion supported the social hierarchy of the polis by making war into both the privilege and the obligation of the enfranchised class. In the battles of the archaic period waged by phalanxes comprising massed ranks of like-armed politai, who depended for success and security on the integrity of the formation and who were willing to sacrifice themselves for the 

8 Raaflaub 1999 and 1997; see Hanson 1995, 287-318 for arguments on the ways that hoplite fighting limited the financial costs of war. See also Ober 1996, 53-71.
10 Cartledge 1977, 23.
12 I use the term ‘middle class’ here and elsewhere, as is conventional, as short-hand to describe the middling (neither the very rich, nor the very poor) group of citizens, or mesoi, and do not intend to convey anything in the way of a unified class consciousness among this group.
13 For the development of the theory of agonism in Greek warfare, see Dayton 2006.
14 1963 [1898], 112.
military encounters between neighbouring communities from the eighth to the end of the sixth centuries, and it was not until the fifth century that conflicts between poleis took on the shape of outright, endemic warfare. The influence of Burckhardt’s conception of archaic Greek warfare can be seen in Delbrück’s monumental four volume work, *The History of the Art of War*, published in successive editions from 1900-1920, in which Delbrück characterized the warfare of the archaic and early classical Greeks as simple contests of heavy infantry phalanxes. For Delbrück and his followers, the traditional Greek way of war had no significant role for cavalry or light-armed troops and saw little investment of cities or siegecraft. In the 1920s, Walker, in his article on the First Peloponnesian War (in the *Cambridge Ancient History*), inferred from the Greeks’ apparent distaste for long pursuits of defeated enemies that they fought their wars around a sort of chivalrous code. From the 1940s on, the theory has become increasingly more articulated, so that it is now commonplace for scholars to talk of a series of ‘protocols’ governing Greek warfare during the period of hoplite dominance, which roughly coincides with the zenith of the polis. These protocols include:

1. War was to cease during Panhellenic festivals and sacred sites in general were to be spared in war;
2. War was to be declared openly and through heralds, and battles were to be agreed upon by both parties with respect to time and place (µάχι ἡξ ὁμολόγου);
3. Pitched battles were considered decisive and therefore there was no need to fight wars of annihilation; pursuit of defeated enemies was thus limited, as were military actions outside of the pitched battle, such as sieges or occupations and annexations;
4. In order to symbolize their victory, the conquerors erected a trophy (τροπαιόν) made of perishable materials so as not to kindle rivalry and incite conflict beyond a generation.

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15 1963 [1898], 106-114.
16 1975 [1920], 123-126.
17 Walker 1926.
18 See Hdt. 7.9.
19 See Thuc. 5.73.4.
These military *mores* were first all tentatively advanced as a set by Brelich, who saw Greek land battles as essentially high-stakes initiation rituals wherein rival poleis pitted their youth against one another in competition for contested borderland, often with control of a religious shrine at stake.\(^{20}\) The notion of a set of Hellenic martial *mores* then gained widespread currency after its adoption by the French structuralist school of thought. In the 1960s, a number of French scholars argued for the priority of structure—how Greek institutions like the phalanx both reflected and helped to order the society to which they belonged—over function in trying to understand the unique character of Greek warfare.\(^{21}\) These studies crystalized the idea of Greek warfare as ‘ludic’, alleging that Greek warfare shared many characteristics with Greek athletic contests, as rule-bound competitions among relative equals. Warfare among Greeks was seen as analogous to true *agônes* like those held at Panhellenic festivals, which were themselves viewed as essentially a continuation of warfare in peacetime: “battle without the carcasses.”\(^{22}\)

In the 1980s came the contributions of two American scholars, Hanson and Connor, whose models of Greek warfare have been treated as definitive until very recently. Connor, influenced by French structuralism and Burkert’s work on Greek sacrificial ritual,\(^{23}\) synthesized the two and produced a theory of ritualized combat fought by hoplites whose landholdings represented their stake in the community. For Connor, warfare amongst the Greeks took on the

\(^{20}\) Brelich 1961.
\(^{21}\) See Vernant (ed., 1968), the publication of papers from *Centre de Reserches Comparées sur les Sociétés Anciennes*; Detienne 1968, 123.
\(^{22}\) Dayton 2006, 20. For the analogy to Panhellenic games, see Vernant 1968; for the analogy of the battlefield to the gymnasium, with an agreed upon *champ clos*, see Detienne 1968; for the argument that agonal warfare was confined to inter-polis conflict, see de Romilly 1968. These ideas reached a wider audience and became orthodoxy with their endorsement by Lonis 1969, Garlan 1972 and, especially, Vidal-Naquet 1986.
\(^{23}\) Burkert 1977.
peculiar character it did because war in the context of the polis was as much about the city’s self-representation on the battlefield and the symbolic reaffirmation of the internal civic order through the ritual slaughter of its political class as it was about the defense of the city from external threat.\textsuperscript{24}

The most explicit articulation of the rules of hoplite warfare has been that offered by Ober, who drew on the work of de Romilly (via Hanson, Garlan and Lonis), expanding her list of five tenets of inter-polis warfare (which was itself a more explicit treatment of Brelich’s protocols) to twelve.\textsuperscript{25}

At the same time as scholars were viewing the aims of Greek warfare at a macro level as agonal and something less than ‘total’, a new focus on the actual experience of battle inspired by Keegan’s \textit{Face of Battle} led to theories about the ritualized nature of combat itself.\textsuperscript{26} The distinctively defensive nature of the hoplite panoply has been thought to presuppose the massed tactics of the phalanx and to have been ill-suited to (especially prolonged) open-order fighting to such an extent that hoplite battles, although they featured a degree of weapons play (δορατισμός) and hand-to-hand fighting (ἐν χερσί), were characterized and decided by the mass shove (ὁθησιμός).\textsuperscript{27} Hanson, more than anyone, has written on the connection between the hoplite’s arms and phalanx tactics.\textsuperscript{28} For Hanson, the prohibitive cost and extreme bodily discomfort associated with the distinctively defensive arms of the hoplite (the heavy, double-

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[24]{Connor 1988.}
\footnotetext[25]{Ober 1996, 56.}
\footnotetext[26]{Keegan 1983.}
\footnotetext[27]{Scholars disagree on the ordering of these elements and indeed how formations transitioned between them, but traditionalists, especially since Pritchett (1971-85) identified these as distinct stages of combat, have maintained the fundamental importance of the \textit{othismos}. See: Schwartz 2009; Hunt 1997; Raaflaub 1997; Hanson, esp. 1995 and 1989; Luginbill 1994; Cawkwell 1989; Connor 1988; Holladay 1982; Donlan 1980; Cartledge 1977; Latacz 1977; Salmon 1977; Detienne 1968.}
\footnotetext[28]{Esp. 1989, but see also 2000 and 1995; cf. Raaflaub 1997; Cartledge 1977; Detienne 1968.}
\end{footnotes}
gripped *aspis*, the closed-faced ‘Corinthian’ helmet, and the restrictive and uncomfortable bronze cuirass), are indications of a desire amongst the Greeks to limit fighting to a propertied class (γεωργοί) and to limit the impact of warfare on this same group. The highly defensive arms meant that casualties would be limited, while the unsuitability of these arms for long periods of prolonged use and for use outside of the phalanx reflects a desire of polis-Greeks to limit warfare to decisive infantry clashes.\textsuperscript{29} This desire arises again out of the unique political organization of Greek states into poleis, essentially stateless societies, or associations of autarkic farmers (αὐτόνομοι), who enjoyed financial and political self-determination. The limited control of the state over finances and foreign policy meant that its citizens not only voted on every military action, but also financed it individually, providing both their own arms and their own provisions specific to each campaign (Thuc. 1.143.2-3).\textsuperscript{30}

These hoplite republics, however, along with the conventions of Greek warfare, which helped to buttress them, began to break down in the late-sixth and early-fifth century in the face of new pressures and traumas not encountered in the previous centuries. The mass enfranchisement of Athenian males in 508/7 provided an enormous military resource for the city (Hdt. 5.69, 78). Furthermore, when faced with the existential threat posed by the amphibious Persian invasion of 480, the Athenians famously “became nautical” (Thuc. 1.18.2) and employed *thêtes* (the lowest socio-economic class of free men in a Greek polis and men who did not meet the census qualifications in traditional poleis for inclusion in the infantry) as rowers aboard their triremes. Moreover, since men of meagre means did not have estates to

\textsuperscript{29} Low casualties could be absorbed by the defeated polis, while at the same time tolerated by the victors because it was possession of the field that was decisive, not the number of casualties.

\textsuperscript{30} Hanson 1995, 287-320.
look after, Athens could commit manpower to extended military campaigns and was thus able to carve out for herself an Aegean naval empire in the aftermath of the Persian Wars.

At the dawn of the Peloponnesian War, then, the Athenians found themselves in the position to fight a new kind of war. In some ways the war might be regarded as a clash between the hoplite republics of the Peloponnesian League and the naval empire of democratic Athens. Rather than allowing the war to be decided by a few set-piece hoplite battles, the Athenians withdrew behind their walls and resolved to fight a war of attrition relying on their navy (Thuc. 2.13-17). Thus the Peloponnesian War developed into a nearly-thirty-year struggle predicated upon complete victory for one side and complete defeat for the other. In such conditions, the rules of limited hoplite warfare disintegrated. The Peloponnesian War saw extended campaigns, prolonged sieges and the destruction of entire cities. For many scholars, the changing treatment of war-captives throughout the war’s duration typifies the descent of the Greek cities into total war. Indeed, in the final stages of the war our sources speak on several occasions of the slaughter en masse of prisoners of war. Moreover, the stresses of the war contributed to factionalism, which resulted in the collapse of many poleis into civil wars between oligarchs and democrats. At the same time, poleis began to look beyond the citizen militia, employing mercenaries and drawing on those outside the franchise to fight in their armies, most often as psiloi, reducing the supremacy of the citizen hoplite on the battlefield. All these changes placed great stress on the traditional socio-political order of the Greek polis.

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31 As first distinguished by Schaefer 1932 from the limited, instrumental warfare waged up until that time.
33 Hanson 2005.
34 Panagopoulos 1978 (summarized in Panagopoulos 1985).
35 Hanson 1995, 284, 321-50.
The Peloponnesian War has thus been regarded as a great sea-change in Greek life as, under the pressures of the war, long-held conventions began to erode and the traditional ‘rules’ of war began to break down. At the same time, the generation-long conflict profoundly disrupted Greek life and placed great stress upon the social contract and civic fabric of the polis.\(^{36}\)

Among the most frequently cited scholarship that points to the Peloponnesian War as bringing about a great reshaping of the life of the polis is the formulation of Austin and Vidal-Naquet:

> The Peloponnesian War marks a decisive turning point in the history of Greece, whether one considers it from its political, social or economic aspects. It ushered in the beginning of the decline of the city as it had existed in the fifth century. Many of the characteristic features of the fourth century made their appearance with the Peloponnesian War and were in part caused by it, or at least were chronologically linked with it, such as the transformation of military techniques, social and political conflicts and their consequences, and innovations in the economic life of Athens . . . \(^{37}\)

Once the Greeks had abandoned the traditional conventions of war that had defined the archaic and early period, there was no stopping the trend.\(^{38}\) In the fourth century we find a style of warfare that looks more like that of the Peloponnesian War than what had obtained previously. Gone is the hoplite agôn, as well as the close coupling of citizenship and the hoplite militia. The

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\(^{36}\) Hanson 1995 puts equal emphasis on the Persian Wars as a great watershed period in Greek military history but still holds that the last quarter of the fifth century was the most disruptive to the traditional order of the polis as a result of the changed nature of fighting. Some scholars, notably Kagan 1974, have viewed the Archidamian War as more traditional, judging the Sicilian-Decelean War a more systemically damaging conflict. Cf. Kagan 1995, 15-16, writing of the whole War as “a terrible watershed in Greek history, causing enormous destruction of life and property, intensifying factional and class hostility, dividing the Greek states internally and destabilizing their relationship to one another, ultimately weakening the Greek capacity to resist conquest from outside.”

\(^{37}\) 1977, 131.

\(^{38}\) Matthew, in a recent monograph on hoplite warfare, writes: “The period of the Peloponnesian War . . . witnessed an increase in the use of peltasts, cavalry, missile troops and other light skirmishers to directly engage hoplites, often from a distance where the offensive and defensive advantages of the phalanx could not be brought to bear” (2012, 240). This explicit claim typifies the traditional hypothesis. It should cause some uneasiness, however, that all of his citations, except for Thuc. 4.32-35 (Spahktoria) refer to either the fourth century (e.g., Xen. Hell. 3.4.15ff, Eq. 9.4, Ages. 2.5; Diod. 15.32.1), or, curiously, to the quasi-mythical archaic period (Paus. 4.11.5).
fourth century is characterized by protracted wars, sieges, mercenaries, light-armed troops and skirmishing tactics. Above all, the impression is of warfare having escaped the neat bounds of the earlier period and being given over to novelty and experimentation, while at the same time contemporary Greeks looked back nostalgically at the earlier period (Dem. 9.47-50).

Against this traditional model of the development and decline of Greek warfare a number of studies have emerged over the past decade that call into question some of its central assumptions. All three of the central tenets of the orthodox position have been criticized, and we now have a much more complicated picture of the development and nature of Greek warfare. There is currently no consensus and the state of scholarship is in flux.

In the first instance, there has recently been debate over the degree to which military participation mirrored civic participation in the Greek polis. In a series of articles, van Wees has called into question the idea that either citizenship or hoplite status was the purview of a dominant ‘middle class’.\textsuperscript{39} According to van Wees, the traditional linkage between middling citizen-farmer-soldier has been overstated and represents, in our sources, an ideologically charged ideal that was unlikely ever to have corresponded to actual practice.\textsuperscript{40} His is a different model of the early polis, one far less egalitarian and featuring a very high degree of socio-political stratification, while at the same time allowing for a much higher percentage of the community (including the rich and the poor) to be mobilized in times of war.\textsuperscript{41} His revisionist stance has proven attractive to scholars of the archaic period, as can be seen from three recent

\textsuperscript{39} Van Wees 2006, 2004, and 2001; for similar skepticism for the classical period, although particularly to do with Athens, see Trundle 2010.
\textsuperscript{40} Van Wees 2002.
\textsuperscript{41} See also Foxhall 1997.
treatments of warfare in that period. The neat equation of the hoplite class in Athens with a broad ‘middle class’ of zeugitai seems no longer tenable given the recent demonstration, by van Wees and several others, of the dubiousness of the supposed connection between the Solonian telê and military roles. In addition, Hunt has shown that throughout the classical period poleis were ready and willing to employ those outside the franchise, even slaves, as soldiers in their armies.

At the same time as there has been a questioning of the historical reality of the Greek ideal of the autarkic farmer-citizen-soldier, there has been a reassessment of the ‘rules’ of Greek warfare, which have traditionally been understood as protocols defined by and reflective of the ideology and organization of the polis. A number of scholars have argued that the character of warfare practiced by the Greeks was more ‘total’ than ‘agonal’ or limited. They point to a number of embarrassments in the sources, which betray a neat picture of rule-based, limited war-making. Sieges, protracted conflict, ruse, mass enslavements, annexations and the complete annihilation of cities do appear occasionally in the sources for the archaic and early classical period, offering tantalizing glimpses of what may have been more pervasive phenomena than has been assumed: “probably only a few tips of a large number of nasty icebergs.” The revisionists also contend that our understanding of the earlier period has been

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42 Singor 2009; Hall 2007; Krentz 2007. For a more moderate criticism of the orthodoxy, see Storch 1998, who presents a revising, but not revisionist, model of the role of hoplite farmers in the development of Greek warfare.
43 Van Wees 2006; Rosivach 2002; Foxhall 1997; but cf. Valdés and Gallego 2010. Detailed discussion of this problem is taken up below in Section II, Chapter 6.
46 Fisher 1993, 33, quoted in van Wees 2003. For a description of this sort of warfare in archaic Greece, see Pausanias 4.10-23. For further instances of a lack of restraint shown by archaic Greek warriors, see van Wees 2006b.
influenced overmuch by later sources, who peddled nostalgic myths about the moderation of their ancestors in war. These sources include fourth-century historians and orators, such as Ephorus\textsuperscript{47} and Demosthenes (e.g., 9.47-50), as well as much later writers, such as Polybius (13.23-6) and Strabo (10.1.2).

Finally, the mechanics of hoplite battle have been reconsidered with attendant consequences for understanding phalanx warfare as defined by the concerns of agrarian citizens. The traditional linkage between hoplite arms and close-order, massed tactics has continued to be undermined by scholars who point to their use outside of the phalanx.\textsuperscript{48} The loosening of the hoplite from the phalanx and the possibility that hoplite arms could be effectively used by individuals in dueling has opened the door for a variety of new interpretations on the nature of phalanx battle itself—the most radical being those that suggest phalanx battles were the aggregate of many hundreds or thousands of individual combats occurring in relatively loose-order formation.\textsuperscript{49}

There has been some pushback by more traditional scholars in response, but the new revisionist scholarship has effectively destabilized the notion that Greek warfare of the archaic and early classical period ever truly represented a ‘golden’ hoplite era, or that warfare in Greece was ever as neat a reflection of the logic of the agrarian-based, egalitarian polis or as truly rule-

\textsuperscript{47} Via Polybius, Diodorus and Strabo; see esp. Wheeler 1987; but cf. Wheeler 2007 for his criticism of Krentz.

\textsuperscript{48} Brouwers 2007 is basically a restatement of the opinion that the hoplite panoply was first developed and used by a small warrior elite of mounted warriors who, after dismounting, fought as infantrymen if not as champion duelists. These ideas have been espoused by scholars such as Helbig 1902 and Detienne 1968. For more traditional accounts, see Wheeler 2007; Storck 1998; Goldsworthy 1997; Snodgrass 1993 and 1965; Salmon 1977; cf. van Wees 2004.

\textsuperscript{49} Krentz 2010, 1994, and 1985; Goldsworthy 1997; Cawkwell 1989.
bound and conventional as we have long assumed.\textsuperscript{50} Scholarship surrounding the polis at war is, thus, in a state of post-revisionism. There is no broad consensus among scholars on many of the most fundamental historical questions. While most historians acknowledge the merit of serious revisionist challenges to the old model of the neat co-development of the social, political, economic and military aspects of Greek society, it is also widely recognized that such challenges have yet to coalesce into a grand narrative that would satisfactorily replace the traditional explanatory model.\textsuperscript{51}

In light of these developments, we are left with the question of how to understand the change that Thucydides and his contemporaries perceived in the Peloponnesian-War period. If we regard as dubious the traditionalists’ claims of radical military innovation in the late-fifth century, we need to explain the economic, political, social and cultural changes from the fifth to the fourth century that have traditionally been understood as corollaries of the changing dynamics of warfare from 431-404. Despite the insistence of scholars, such as Krentz and van Wees, that some of the elements of warfare that were thought to be a product of the Peloponnesian War were in fact present earlier, we still have a tradition, firmly imbedded in the primary literature, that regards the period as one of profound change and decline in the Greek world.\textsuperscript{52} Meanwhile, we have a body of scholarship on Athenian literature that understands the pressures and tensions explored therein as a reflection of the great \textit{kinēsis} that Thucydides

\textsuperscript{50} For scholarship that resists revisionist interpretation, see: Valdés and Gallego 2010; Schwartz 2009; Luginbill 1994; Holladay 1982.

\textsuperscript{51} This state of the question is nicely illustrated by the recent publication of the essays presented by leading scholars at a conference hosted by Kagan, which was in part an attempt to settle the debates outlined above. See Kagan (ed.) 2013, esp. 1-56.

\textsuperscript{52} E.g., Hanson 2005a; Kagan 1995, 15-16 and 1987, 413-426; Mossé 1973; Ehrenberg 1943. What has traditionally strengthened this position is a general tendency of scholars to see the culmination of the Peloponnesian War as a natural turning point leading from the fifth to the fourth centuries and to view the fourth century in a negative light compared to the fifth. This historiographical problem is what Strauss 1997 and Cartledge 2001, 105-108 call ‘the periodization problem.’
describes and its reverberations through Athenian society.\textsuperscript{53} To what degree was the Peloponnesian War different from those that had come before it? Is this a difference in kind or simply in scale and intensity?\textsuperscript{54} Thucydides presents arguments in his introduction (1.1 and 1.23) and throughout the ‘Archaeology’ as to why his war was greater and more worthy of report (\textit{\'\upsilon\zeta\iota\lambda\omega\lambda\gamma\omega\tau\alpha\upsilon\nu}) than those that came before.\textsuperscript{55}

Historiography, of course, has no shortage of authors who claim the unique importance of their subject.\textsuperscript{56} The claim of an author to have recorded unprecedented events in terms of scope, severity and duration represents a topos in ancient historiography, to which Thucydides contributes. Herodotus, for example, claims for his subject, the Persian Wars, preeminent importance owing not least of all to their sheer scale, eclipsing the Trojan War, which was merely among the first engagements in an ongoing conflict between east and west, of which his history is the momentous culmination (1.1-5; cf. 7.20-21). What is striking and novel about Thucydides’ claim for the importance of his subject is that he casts his war as a \textit{kinêsis}.\textsuperscript{57}

Scholarly interpretation has settled on Thucydides’ declaration of the war as the \textit{\kappa\i'n\i\kappa\i\supserscript{\textbeta} \mu\varepsilon\gamma\iota\sigma\tau\eta} as a statement that the Peloponnesian War affected, that is to say, confused and disturbed, all areas of Hellenic life.\textsuperscript{58} Accepting Thucydides’ claim that the war had profound effects on the Greek world, scholars have focused on the historian’s accounts of the sufferings

\textsuperscript{53} E.g., Mills 2010; Olson 2010; Moorton 1999; Newiger 1980; Saxonhouse 1980; de Romilly 1967; J. Finley 1938.
\textsuperscript{54} Rawlings 1981, for example, has suggested that Thucydides argues for the latter in his archaeology.
\textsuperscript{55} Connor 1985.
\textsuperscript{56} G. Parker 2013, 248. Thucydides himself anticipates objection on this front (1.21.2).
\textsuperscript{57} In this Thucydides was consciously followed by Sallust, \textit{Jugurthine War} 5.1-3: the war “confuses” (\textit{permiscuit}) all things, both human and divine; Josephus, \textit{Jewish War} 1.1-4; \textit{polemos me gistos} is variously referred to as \textit{megiston kinêma} and \textit{hyperbolê thorybôn}. On emulation of Thucydides, see Marincola 1997, 16-7.
\textsuperscript{58} Price 2001, 207-209; Hornblower \textit{CT} I, 6; Parry 1981, 94, 114.
(παθήματα) that it saw, both those caused by human agents (destruction and depopulation of cities, murderous civil wars, monstrous battlefield casualties) and those of a (super)natural origin (sufferings caused by earthquakes, droughts, famines, the Athenian Plague). “This war,” says Thucydides, “produced sufferings in Greece in a concentration unequaled over any comparable length of time.” As is clear from the preceding discussion, it has been usual for scholars to locate much of the cause of Thucydides’ kinēsis in the changing nature of warfare itself between 431 and 404, but such contentions now rest on extremely shaky grounds.

It will have become obvious that I have resisted offering a direct translation of kinēsis to this point. This is because the translation that I am inclined to, “movement, motion,” begs the question. Thucydides does not employ the noun often, and nowhere else in the History does he use it in the same sense as at 1.1. By contrast, kineô is common throughout Thucydides’ work and nearly always denotes actual movement of a thing from one place to another across space or time rather than a more abstract or metaphorical disturbance or upheaval.

If the war was, as Thucydides believed it to be, a powerful force for change, a motion or kinēsis from one state to another, it should be possible to trace in the available evidence changes in the Athenian way of life and in the organization and functioning of the polis. The question to which I attempt to provide an answer in the following chapters, then, is: how, and in what ways across its 27-year duration, did the experience of the Peloponnesian War affect the Athenians and the life of their city? To this end, it is necessary to reexamine both Thucydides and his contemporaries as a way of elucidating these questions without making unwarranted

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59 Thuc. 1.23.1: τούτου δὲ τοῦ πολέμου μηκός τε μέγα προοίμη, παθήματα τε ζωνηνέχθη γενέσθαι ἐν αὐτῷ τῇ Ἑλλάδι οίᾳ σώχ ἔτερα ἐν ἰσοχρόνω.
60 Rusten 2015.
presumptions about the conditions that had prevailed previously, especially with respect to the relationship between war and society. The way the Athenians thought about and practiced war throughout the last third of the fifth century and any discernable changes therein is surely only part of the great *kinēsis* Thucydides perceived. Certainly, then, my findings have important implications for the debate about the status of the Peloponnesian War as a watershed in Greek military history, but my primary aim has been to elucidate how the war generated pressures on the socio-economic and cultural order of the city—how the war was experienced by the Athenians and how it transformed various aspects of the life of their city.\(^\text{61}\)

My analysis throughout is informed by economic, social, political and demographic theory as well as scholarship on the psychology and sociology of warfare. Drawing on these various fields provides methodological tools and conceptual models through which to approach the Greek testimony. In addition to modern theoretical scholarship on the impact of war on the individual and society, I draw insights from pertinent historical comparanda.

Although Thucydides wrote his history about “the war *between* the Peloponnesians and the Athenians” (1.1), that is, about an international conflict amongst city-states, by far the majority of his narrative concerns actions and conditions *within* these cities. Although the historian’s eye did lead him to investigate more purely military affairs, including some of the greatest pitched battles of the fifth century, Thucydides’ historical genius lies in his analysis of the disturbance caused by the war on the internal workings of the state, on the relationships between and among citizens.\(^\text{62}\) To understand how exactly the war represented a great *kinēsis*,

\(^{61}\) Such an approach, tracking the war’s effect on Athenian ‘systems’ and ‘subsystems,’ is advocated by Cartledge 2001a.
\(^{62}\) See Hunt 2006 for the suggestion that Thucydides embraced the opportunity to describe novel military practices, especially those beyond hoplite warfare.
detailed study must be made of its impact on various areas of life. The chapters that follow are divided into two sections, which broadly concern the two activities that our sources represent as fundamental in the ideological construct of the polītēs: farming and fighting.63

A study of the Athenians’ capacity to conduct the war, to manage public finance, and to mitigate private economic threats also affords the opportunity to test two very influential hypotheses advanced in the fields of political sociology and economics that are increasingly of interest to ancient historians.64 The first concerns the role of the state in the creation of market economies. A considerable body of scholarship going back to Jeremy Bentham65 and John Stuart Mill66 argues against a role for state intervention and socialist policies in the creation of free allocative markets. In the case of classical Athens, furthermore, economic historians have been puzzled by the rather sudden appearance in fourth-century sources of evidence for sophisticated economic institutions and a very highly market-driven, thoroughly monetized, economy.67 The very large fifth-century population of Attica, which far outstripped the region’s agricultural carrying capacity, is a strong a priori argument for the existence of a market-focused economy already in that century, but we lack much in the way of direct attestation. A systematic investigation into how the Athenians kept themselves fed during the Peloponnesian War and how the polis endeavoured to find material and human resources and to finance these resources for the war effort may illuminate the development in the late-fifth century of some economic phenomena that we find in evidence for the fourth century.

63 Raafflau 2015, 91-92, 1994, 140, and 1983, 531; Vernant 1983, 248-70. Descriptions of individual chapters can be found in the introductions to each Section.
64 E.g., Ober 2015 and 2010a.
65 In his 1787 Defence of Usury.
66 In his 1848 Principles of Political Economy.
The second hypothesis I wish to test is Tilly’s famous articulation of the theory of state-formation: the state makes war and war makes the state.\textsuperscript{68} According to this theory the formation of stable states occurs through the process of political communities energetically eliminating or neutralizing external threats. The cost of this activity is so high that the state must create permanent structures to extract resources, revenues and labour, from its population in order to pursue this end.\textsuperscript{69} Hence the rise of many European nations through the process of ‘predatory state formation.’

Of course, democratic Athens, like any ancient state, differs considerably in its organization from those considered by Tilly (European states from AD 990-1990) in the construction of his models.\textsuperscript{70} Nevertheless, the prediction, \textit{ex hypothesi}, is that the development of robust mechanisms of state-level coercion and extraction should be observable in Peloponnesian-War Athens conditioned by the generation-long conflict. If the evidence substantiates this prediction, Peloponnesian War- and post-Peloponnesian War- Athens can fruitfully be used to buttress Tilly’s general claims. If the opposite is true, the case of Athens in the late-fifth and early fourth centuries can help to shed light on the historical particularity of the democratic city-state.

\textsuperscript{68} 1990, 67-95.
\textsuperscript{69} So, for example, states prior to the fifteenth century were characterized by patrimonialism and state budgets consisting predominantly of tributes, dues, rents and other fees. Sovereign leaders were required to borrow money from their subjects or allies in their own names to finance state projects, offering personal collateral. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as the scope of European warfare widened, states began to standardize national taxes and to employ sophisticated budget projections for the first time. See Tilly 1990, 72-76, 78-87.
\textsuperscript{70} On the polis as a kind of stateless society, see Section II, Ch. 5.1.
Section I: Athenian food supply and finance during the Peloponnesian War

“ώς δεινόν ἡ φύλαξαρία” – Wasp 834
Section I, Chapter 1: 
Introduction

The economic base of the polis was agriculture. Although some poleis in the classical period developed significant industrial and commercial economies, it remained nevertheless true that their economic foundations were agricultural.\(^71\) According to Aristotle, most of the citizenry of any polis engaged in agriculture (\textit{Pol.} 1.1256a, 4.1290b 39).\(^72\) This is true even of the greatest economic power of the classical age, Athens.\(^73\) Any disruption to a city’s agricultural economy, therefore, was a matter of import. Ancient Greek farmers were all too familiar with natural interruptions to the rhythm of the agricultural year.\(^74\) The vagaries of the Mediterranean climate played cruel games with smalltime farmers cultivating moderately fertile lands.\(^75\) These farmers employed any number of adaptive strategies ranging from individual- to polis-based responses in order to survive periods of food shortage. It is a testament to efficacy of these strategies that large-scale and prolonged famines were something of a rarity in the history of the polis.\(^76\) In addition to the whims of nature, the Greek farmer faced what must have at times seemed the equally capricious impact of the human element to his livelihood.

Greek land warfare throughout the archaic and classical periods typically followed a seasonal

\(^71\) Burford 1993, 66-7, stressing that even in such ‘commercial’ societies, land was the primary source of income (wealth or subsistence) for most households; cf. Isager and Skydsgaard 1992, 108-114.

\(^72\) Scholarship has long recognized the thoroughly agrarian character of the polis and its institutions. For thorough recent treatments of this topic, see: Hanson 1995; Burford 1993.

\(^73\) Davies 2007, 343, who argues that agriculture and specifically dry farming of cereals remained the predominant economic activity even “during the classical period, when the cereal production of the older-established Greek communities was proving seriously inadequate, requiring regular imports from the Black Sea, Sicily and north Africa.”

\(^74\) Moreno 2007, 27; Garnsey 1988, 104. On the frequent occurrence of rainfall shortages, see below, 75-76.

\(^75\) That the soil of Greece, and Athens in particular, was thin and mean was a trope among ancient authors; see, for example: Thuc. 1.2.5; Str. \textit{Geog.} 9.18; Plut. \textit{Sol.} 22; Men. \textit{Dysk.} 3; but cf. Xen. \textit{Por.} 1.3; Plato, \textit{Crit.} 110d-111e; Bloedow 1975, 26-27. On the fragility of the ancient agrarian economies of the Mediterranean, see Horden and Purcell 2000, 330-332.

\(^76\) Garnsey 1998, 1-86; Gallant 1991, 113-142.
rhythm of summer campaigning that targeted the harvests of the enemy. This pattern was so regular that modern scholarship has likened Greek warfare to a game of “agricultural poker.”

“For nearly 300 years, war in Greece was inaugurated and often defined by a struggle to destroy, or protect, grain, vines, and olive trees.” These ‘seasonal’ struggles have been regarded by many scholars as similar to natural disruptions both in terms of their frequency and their limited long-term impact on farming activity.

Ideas about the nature and degree of war’s impact on farming have indeed given rise in modern times to powerful explanatory models of the development of ancient Greek warfare. While all scholars would agree that invading Greek armies targeted the agriculture of the enemy polis, the relationship between warfare and agriculture is complex and contentious. Since Hanson’s seminal *Warfare and Agriculture in Classical Greece*, many scholars have accepted his thesis that the goal of agricultural devastation was to provoke a decisive hoplite engagement rather than to affect much in the way of lasting and widespread economic hardship; the latter, Hanson argues, was not feasible given the means available to ravagers in the ancient world. In Hanson’s model, the limited destruction of agricultural goods, rather than producing lasting economic harm or threatening the livelihood of poleis at war, actually served to curb the economic impact of war in Greek society as it tended to evoke a swift response from defenders and thus to foster short, decisive campaigns. For Hanson, therefore, agricultural devastation is the culturally accepted challenge to the pitched hoplite battle that characterized polis warfare. Hanson finds support for this thesis in his close study of the Peloponnesian War, the first

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77 Snodgrass 1967, 62.
78 Hanson 1998, 5.
79 E.g., Burford 1993, 159-166.
80 Hanson 1995, 287-318.
protracted war of attrition between poleis, which he sees as the exception that proves the rule. This in turn has prompted many scholars to follow him in downplaying the extent of the damage done to Attic farming during the war. Much of Hanson’s case for the ineffectiveness of crop devastation as an economic weapon in antiquity, however, has been buttressed by what we shall see is an incomplete assessment of the impact of warfare on agriculture in precisely this period.

The Peloponnesian War represented an unprecedented disruption to the lives of farmers in the Athenian countryside. For an entire generation, Athenian farmers lived under either actual invasion conditions or else the threat of invasion. What is more, the adoption of Pericles’ policy of avoidance of pitched battles and the evacuation of the countryside to the city led the frustrated Spartans to adopt novel forms of economic warfare, the most infamous of which was *epiteikhismos*, the garrisoning of a permanent, fortified forward base inside enemy territory from which to conduct raids and to harass farmers and keep them from their fields.

Thucydides comments on the Athenians’ decision to give up their *khôra* and the deep psychological traumas this caused (2.13-17, 2.21, 2.65.2). The historian refers to the profound sense of disruption for a people who had been “accustomed always” to living in the countryside (2.14.2). The strategy of Pericles adopted by the Athenians at the outset of the war caused

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82 Deme membership was hereditary and unaffected by changes in actual residence (*Ath. Pol.* 42.1; see Osborne 1991b), but if Thucydides, who belonged to the extramural deme Halimous, resided and held property in his deme, the historian would have had firsthand experience of the evacuation in 431. In *Against Eubulides* (delivered in 346/5), the defendant, Euxitheos, alludes to the economic hardship experienced by citizens and demesmen of Halimous in his parents’ generation “owing to the misfortunes of the city in those days” (Dem. 57.45).
them to abandon their traditional commitment to self-sufficiency (αὐτάρκεια) that was so fundamental to character of the polis.\footnote{See Introduction, 1-20; Foster 2010, 174-182; Taylor 2010, 7-81; Hanson 1995, 338-343, 357-390 (esp. 372-373).} In Thucydides’ estimation, the Athenians (2.16.2)

were deeply troubled and were suffering badly because they were deserting their homes as well as what had been their ancestral shrines going back to their ancient form of government and because they were about to change their way of life; each of them was doing nothing short of abandoning his own city.\footnote{2.16.2: ἐβαρύνοντο δὲ καὶ χαλεπῶς ἐφερον οἰκίας τε καταλείποντες καὶ ἱερά ἀ διὰ παντὸς ἦν αὐτοῖς ἐκ τῆς κατά τὸ ἄρχανον πολιτείαν πάτρια διαιτάν τε μέλλοντες μεταβάλλειν καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ πόλιν τὴν αὐτοῦ ἄπολείπον ἐκαστος.

This last statement is arresting given that the Athenians are in fact abandoning their countryside demes for the centre of the polis.}

The dramatic, apocalyptic tone of the passage might cause readers to forget that the evacuation of Attica was not a recourse unique to 431. As Thucydides himself alludes in the passage just preceding the last excerpt (2.16.1), the Athenians had abandoned their hinterland and indeed their very city in the face of the Persian invasion in 480.\footnote{See also: Hdt. 8.40-41; 9.3, 6. See Garlan 1989, 101-102 for non-Athenian examples of evacuation strategies in the fifth century.} What was different in 431? Why now, in 431, we might ask, does the historian perceive for the Athenians a “change in the way of life”?

It is this question that I seek to answer in this first section of my study, through an examination of the changes to Athenian food supply and livelihoods during and as a result of the Peloponnesian War. My inquiry is divided into four chapters: the remainder of the present chapter will complete the preliminaries by establishing the extent to which the Athenians relied on Attic produce in the late-fifth century. In chapter two, I proceed with an historical sketch of Peloponnesian activity in Attica throughout the war and in chapter three I analyse the effects, both immediate and systematic, of this Peloponnesian presence on the rural economy. As we
shall see, there is good reason to believe that the disruption to the working countryside has been underappreciated by scholars of the past generation. In chapter four, I consider the implications of the disruption to Attic farming and the adaptive measures this elicited and I conclude this section by surveying the reflections of the ancient sources on the changes in the Athenian political economy precipitated by the loss of Attica.

1.1 The fertility of Attica

Before moving on to examine the war’s impact on the countryside, a few comments must be made here concerning the nature of Athens’ food supply in the fifth century in order to contextualize my analysis. The degree to which Athens’ population relied on imported versus domestic produce to feed itself is currently the subject of lively scholarly debate. The evidence is ambiguous or incomplete and will likely never permit a truly satisfactory answer. We can perhaps, unlike Xenophon’s Socrates, sympathize with the young Glaucon, who despared at the “wholly daunting task” (παμμέγεθες πράγμα) of reckoning the proportions of grain, domestic and imported, needed to sustain the city’s population from year to year (Xen. Mem. 3.6.13). There are, however, some general observations that can be made and some deductions that seem safer than others.

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86 A list of some recent publications arguing the matter demonstrates the crux. For scholars arguing for the importance of domestic grain and depreciating that of imports (especially from a regular ‘grain route’ from the Black Sea), see: Tsetskhladze 2008; Braund 2007; N. Jones 2004; Keen 2000; Foxhall 1993; Sallares 1991; Garnsey 1988; Osborne 1987 (but see now his reservations in Osborne 2004, 140); Ober 1985; Bloedow 1975. For scholars maintaining the traditional notion that the Athenian population far outstripped the carrying capacity of Attica and relied extensively on imported food, see: Moreno 2007; Garland 2001; Whitby 1998; Isager and Skydsgaard 1993; de Ste. Croix 1972; A. Jones 1957; Grundy 1948; Jardé 1925.

87 Although most likely completed sometime after the battle of Leuctra in 371, the dramatic date of the Socratic conversations is the end of the fifth century. It is imagined that the Athenians were still feeding at least a part of their population with Attic grain (ὄ ἐκ τῆς χώρας γιγνόμενος σῖτος). Interestingly, this grain is imagined to have fed “the polis” (διατρέφειν τὴν πόλιν) rather than a specific segment of Athenian society for a certain time (πόσον χρόνον), after which it would have to turn to imported grain. The passage...
Prior to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, most of the Athenian citizenry (οἱ πλείονες) lived in the countryside.\(^{88}\) Thucydides is unequivocal on this point (2.16.1), and there is no reason to doubt him.\(^{89}\) The total area of Attica has been estimated at 2400 km\(^2\), of which something between 35-40% seems to have been under cereal cultivation.\(^{90}\) The average size of a family landholding in Attica was between 40 and 60 plethra (about four hectares)\(^{91}\)—enough to maintain a family of four or so at a level well above subsistence, but without generating great surplus (for consumption rates see below).\(^{92}\) These estimates taken together yield a picture of a cultivable territory able to accommodate at least 22 500 families (though likely more): better than half of the total number of Athenian households. The total yield of Attica in the fifth century has most recently been calculated at some 18 144 metric tons.\(^{93}\) These calculations are based on comparison with early modern yields and the evidence of the aparkhai requirements; these requirements of 1/600 and 1/1200 for barely and wheat respectively for the Two Goddesses at Eleusis (\textit{IG} I\(^3\) 78) are set against the figures for the actual aparkhai recorded in

\(^{88}\) It is impossible to say, of course, what sort of figure Thucydides meant to imply by the generic adjective \(\piλείον\), but he is certainly speaking about citizens. Moreover, Dionysius of Halicarnassus tells us in his preface to Lysias 34 that the proposal of Phormisios calling for the disenfranchisement of all landless Athenians in 403 would only have affected 5000 citizens.

\(^{89}\) See: Hornblower \textit{CT} I, 268-269; Rosivach 1993; Osborne 1985, 15-22; Gomme 1933\(^a\). The question of permanent migration to the asty will be discussed below.

\(^{90}\) Moreno 2007, 11-14. It should be noted, however, that farmers normally intercropped olives (Whitby 1998, 104).

\(^{91}\) Or nine to thirteen acres.

\(^{92}\) See Andreyev 1974 for average farm sizes. His arguments have been generally accepted by scholars (Hanson 1995; Ober 1985); see also Burford 1993, 68, who cites comparative evidence for republican Rome where, according to Pliny, 7 \(iugera\), or about 20 plethra were considered to have been sufficient for the lowest class of Roman citizen (\textit{NH} 18.18). The relationship between this modest plot size and subsistence agriculture is for the most part consistent with what we find in the subsistence economies of other cultures.

\(^{93}\) 20 000 U.S. tons: Moreno 2007, 11-28.
329/8 (IG II² 1672). Moreno, who downplays the contribution of the domestic grain supply to feeding classical Athens, nevertheless concludes that Attica produced annually 580,000 and 120,000 medimnoi of barley and wheat respectively. Assuming an average yearly consumption of seven medimnoi (one khoinix or 1/48 medimnos per day for an adult male, slightly less—2/3 a khoinix—for women and children), Attic grain, it seems, could support at least 100,000 people.

Estimates of the total population of Athens vary, among the highest being Moreno’s recent calculation of 337,000 on the eve of the Peloponnesian War. Domestic produce, therefore, may reasonably be estimated to have comprised between just under 30% and 40% of the Athenian grain supply in good years. It is striking to observe in this context that, according to our only two reliable figures for grain production in Attica, the amount of grain grown

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94 There is no guarantee that the requirements of 1/600 and 1/1200 remained the same for the near century between the two inscriptions. Indeed, there is some implication that the ratios were variable in the simple fact that in the fifth-century inscription the amounts had to be specified (see Moreno 2007, 14). Finally, and no less discouraging, there is great skepticism about whether or not the agricultural yield in the year 329/8 can be regarded as at all typical. For criticism, see Moreno 2007, 14.
95 Ober 1985, 23-26. The figures given here are for wheat. For the equivalency of barely-meal (alphita) to weath flour (aleuron) at 2:1, see O’Conner 2011, 589-602. These data are, of course, problematic and probably represent a high estimate of daily cereal consumption. The assumption that a single khoinix per day of grain (wheat) was the usual consumption rate for an adult male is based on the speculation of Herodotus concerning the rationing of Xerxes’ army (7.187; but cf. Polyb. 6.39.13 who seems to confirm Herodotus’ calculation: Markle 2004, 109). The daily ration of one khoinix given by these sources is for very active men: soldiers in the field. Furthermore, while cereals and starches accounted for the majority of the caloric requirements of ancient Greeks (about 70%), a full khoinix represents some 2784 calories, or 98% of the estimated caloric requirements of the average adult male (Foxhall and Forbes 1982, 56). Finally, the minimal (starvation) ration of 0.5 khoinikes of barley meal (alphita) provided to the Athenian captives in the Syracusan quarries provides a useful minimum daily ration (Thuc. 7.87.2; Diodorus 13.20; Plut. Nicias 29.1). To this we should add a fragment from Pherecrates’ Agathoi which suggests that 2.5 medimnoi (120 knoinikes) was the daily sitia for the crew (about 200 men) of an Athenian trireme (Fr. 1 Henderson = Athen. 415c). All of this is to say, therefore, that the figure of 100,000 for the number of people who could be fed on Attic grain likely represents an absolute minimum. Finally, in connection with these estimates, it is worth noting here that the 700,000 medimnoi of grain that Attica produced, divided by 28 medimnoi, the (generous) yearly requirements for a household of four, yields a figure of 25,000, very close to the number of average sized plots calculated for Attica above.
96 Moreno 2007, 28-31 posits an average total population for Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries of 270,000. For other estimates, see: Sallares 1991: 270,000; Garnsey 1988: 250,000; Hansen 1983: 300,000.
domestically was approximately equal to the amount said by Demosthenes to have been imported annually (Dem. 20.30-33).\footnote{Ober 1985, 27; but cf. Braund 2007, 60 for a discussion of the value of this passage to the Athenian food supply debate.}

Clearly fifth-century Athens was reliant on foreign grain to meet the nutritional needs of its large population. The considerable role, however, of domestic produce in the city’s food supply may have been even more significant where citizens and their families were concerned. Since most Athenians lived in the countryside and most farmers operated not too far above subsistence level, it seems reasonable to surmise that the produce of Attica was feeding a very high portion of the citizen family population even at its largest in 430s. The citizen population in 431 has been estimated at 40 000-60 000;\footnote{40-50 000: Garnsey 1988, 89-90; 50-60 000: Strauss 1986, 70-81; Sallares 1991, 95; 60 0000 (as a minimum): Hansen 1982, 1985, 25-27, 1988b; Gomme 1933a, 26. Most recently, Akrigg 2011, 57-59 has supported Hansen’s figures.} adopting the standard Athenian household of two adults and two children, this gives a citizen family population of 160 000-240 000.

The extent to which the Athenian rural economy was integrated with the agora in the fifth century is a complex question that has recently been approached by a number of scholars. The traditional picture, articulated by Finley and his followers, of the classical Greek countryside as essentially a closed, self-supporting agricultural system continues to be disputed.\footnote{M. Finley 1999 [1973].} Many economic historians now criticize the model of autoconsumptive localism as ‘Rousseauian’ and posit an economic system in which there is much greater scope for interconnectivity between regions as well as more production oriented toward markets, which drive interregional exchange.\footnote{Bresson 2007, 205-228; Horden and Purcell 2000; Hanson 1995; Morris 1994c; E. Cohen 1992, 1-8, 87.} The continually emerging archaeological record of classical Attica has in recent
years added weight to the revisionist model. Areas of Attica particularly ill-suited for sufficient cereal production to meet the needs of their populations could be turned over to specialized cash crops (usually olives and vines), the proceeds from which would be used to purchase grain. Moreno has recently shown this to be case with the deme Euonymon. Even those areas, however, for which cash-cropping of non-cereals might seem to have been the most rational economic strategy often reveal evidence of extensive cereal cultivation as part of polyculture systems. Leases of public or sacred land, for example, in Axione (IG II 2 2492) and Rhamnous (IG II 2 2493), assume that at least half of the cultivable land would have been sown with barley (κρθί), which should caution against generalizing Moreno’s findings: polyculture was the norm in most ancient Greek agriculture. This is not, however, to deny the importance of the market in the Athenian economy. The majority of Athenian farmers who did largely subsist on their own produce were nevertheless dependent upon the market. As Bresson has recently argued, the smalltime farmers who ate most of their produce would have been more, not less, dependent upon markets because they operated so close to margins of subsistence. Nor should it be assumed that Athenian farmers never sold their produce at market; small surpluses could always find a buyer.

In the case of a staple crop, however, many farmers, when they generated high yields, might elect to store any surplus not consumed by their families against poorer yields rather than

101 E.g., Acton 2016; Tsakiris 2016.
105 Hanson 1995 posits an agricultural model at a much farther remove from subsistence farming with more intensive strategies designed to produce for domestic markets. In any case, grain produced under such conditions was destined for Athenian markets to be sold within Attica.
sell it off.\textsuperscript{106} Studies of modern Greek smallholder farmers reveal that it is common practice for farmers to attempt to stockpile surplus grain amounting to at least year’s supply before they will consider selling any off or trading it with neighbours.\textsuperscript{107} Mutatis mutandis most of the grain grown in Attica was, we may conclude, consumed in Attica by those rural Athenians who produced it, with any surplus stored, exchanged with friends or neighbours, or else finding its way to Athenian markets.\textsuperscript{108} Even for rich landholders, for whom it was a natural way to dispose of agricultural surplus, it was unusual to focus one’s economic strategy solely upon the market. Pericles’ economic strategy, for example, is described by Plutarch precisely because it is peculiar.\textsuperscript{109} We are told that he was accustomed to sell all his produce at market, using the profits to purchase necessities as required on a daily basis (Plut. \textit{Per}. 16.4). Most Athenian households, we can safely assume, did not engage in this kind of household management; rather, they ate what they produced, looking to stockpile or to profit from modest surpluses, and purchased or traded for what they did not produce. Whatever the particulars of distribution, we can be certain that Attic grain did not often leave Attica. Plutarch preserves a law of Solon prohibiting the export of any natural product from Attica excepting olive oil (\textit{Sol}. 24.1-2) and by the fourth century at the latest, Athenians and metics were forbidden by law to lend money

\textsuperscript{106} Osborne 1987, 93.

\textsuperscript{107} Halstead 1990, 152 suggests that farmers aimed to hoard up to two years’ supply before considering exchange. More recently, however, Halstead has noted the practice of disposing of surplus grain by sale or by exchange with needier neighbours, especially since storage beyond a year or two increased the risk of losses to pests or spoilage (2014, 159, 163). Cf. Gallant 1991, 94-95 suggesting typical hoarding amounted to a year’s supply. For average household supply, see Foxhall and Forbes 1982, 49 n. 26.

\textsuperscript{108} This observation is accepted by scholars, who wish to move beyond the debate. See, Gallant 1991; Ober 1985; Gomme 1933a, 45 n. 1; most recently, see N. Jones 2004, who argues that the difference in the ways they obtained their food was one of the fundamental differences between countrymen and townsmen; from the vantage point of the Athenian market, Isager and Skydsgaard conclude that most of the products for sale in Athens did not originate in Attica (1992, 144).

\textsuperscript{109} For an explanation of Pericles’ behaviour as an extension of his politics, see von Reden 1995a, 106-111.
for the transport of grain outside of Attica ([Dem.] 34 Phorm. 37; 35 Lacr. 50-1; Lyc. Leocr. 27).\textsuperscript{110}

The domestic rural economy thus supplied a significant part of Athens’ food. Although Athens was unique among poleis in the degree to which it relied on imported foodstuffs throughout the fifth century, the loss of its agricultural land could not be suffered without profound implications.\textsuperscript{111} Indeed, Thucydides tells us several times that the expectations of other Greeks at the outset of the war were that the Athenians would not be able to endure the devastation of Attica for more than a few years (1.121.2, 4.85.2, 5.14.3, 7.28.3). Clearly these other Greeks anticipated that the threat to Athens’ domestic food supply would place significant pressure on the polis. But to what degree were the Athenians actually denied the fruits of their land?

Two schools of thought have emerged on the extent of the damage to Athenian agriculture resulting from the Peloponnesian War. Grundy was among the first to give serious treatment to the economic effects of agricultural warfare in the latter half of the fifth century. He argues that, as a rule, in the fifth century the populations of Greek states outstripped the carrying capacity of their territories.\textsuperscript{112} Consequently, agriculture took the form of intensive cash-cropping of olives and vines, the profits of which were used to buy imported grain. This economic system made classical poleis uniquely sensitive to invasions and attacks against

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\textsuperscript{110} Rhodes \textit{AP}, 577-578.

\textsuperscript{111} For the importance of the local food supply in war, see Foxhall 1993; cf. Ober 1985 for the argument that throughout the Peloponnesian War the population of Athens subsisted nearly entirely on imports. Recent studies of the ancient Greek economy have begun to question the uniqueness of Athens in this regard, positing greater scope for imported foodstuffs in other poleis. See, for example, Ober 2010c, 10-11.

\textsuperscript{112} This argument, in the post-Finley era of ancient economic history, has been somewhat revitalized; see Ober 2011.
\end{footnotesize}
agriculture. The ravaging of an enemy’s land threatened in a very real way his economic viability and defenders, therefore, were obliged to defend their khôra or to sue for peace immediately. Grundy’s arguments enjoyed widespread scholarly acceptance throughout much of the last century. Consequently, many scholars posited an almost complete collapse of the rural Athenian economy as a result of the supposed irreparable damage done to the land. Glotz, for example, read the poverty of Khremylos in Aristophanes’ Wealth (produced in 408 and again in 388) as indicative of the general poverty of the Athenian peasantry as a result of the war. Mitchell held this view, too, but posited an agricultural crisis at the end of the century wherein, as a result of the dormancy of the land during the war, subsistence farmers faced too great a burden of capital reinvestment in the land and consequently were forced to sell their plots at less than fair prices to shrewd capitalists like the father of Iskhamakhos, the model interlocutor-farmer of Xenophon’s Oeconomicus. For Mitchell, therefore, the nature of Athenian agriculture changed as a result of the war from predominantly small-scale, subsistence farming to intensive, capitalist cash-cropping. Mossé takes a similar view, arguing for a decline of the free peasantry during the war that led to an agrarian crisis at the end of the fifth century in which an immiserated peasantry gave way to an increasingly monopolistic landed ‘bourgeoisie.’ This thesis, popular in the first half of the last century, was substantially weakened by Finley’s analysis of horoi, boundary markers upon which liens against private properties were inscribed. These showed that the debts listed were not those incurred by smalltime farmers as previously thought, but rather those of wealthy Athenians borrowing

113 Grundy 1948, 86-89, 91.
114 Grundy’s Thucydides and the History of his Age was first published as a single volume in 1911.
115 Glotz 1926, 253.
against their properties to meet ‘unproductive’ (that is, nonagricultural) expenses, for example, recourse to dotal *apotimêma*\(^{118}\). Since Finley, even scholars who believe there was significant damage to the Athenian countryside during the war have nevertheless moved away from theories of peasant pauperization and ‘agrarian crisis,’ positing a swift agricultural recovery in the post-war decade.\(^{119}\)

On the other side of the debate, scholars have minimized the extent of the damage done to the land and, therefore, the time and capital needed to reclaim the *khôra* in the years after the war. Brunt, already in 1965, recognised the difficulty of damaging crops with the means available in antiquity, and particularly when harassed by enemy cavalry patrols bent on the preservation of rural property.\(^{120}\) Burford, Foxhall, and especially Hanson have since argued that the methods of crop devastation available to the invaders in classical Greece were inefficient and thus insufficient to bring about very wide-scale damage to actual crops in invasions that normally lasted only a matter of weeks. Moreover, they claim that the course taken by invaders was desultory and haphazard, and the terrain and landholding patterns in Greece were so variable and fragmented that (large) areas of an invaded city’s territory remained untouched and some farming occurred even under actual invasion to say nothing of its threat.\(^{121}\) Thus, Hanson has proposed that in Greek warfare the ‘challenge to battle’

\(^{118}\) M. Finley 1983, 62-73 and 1951, 79-87; see also Millet 1982, 223-224.


\(^{120}\) Brunt 1965, 266-7.

\(^{121}\) Hanson 1998, 42-71; Burford 1993, 69-71, 159-162; Foxhall 1993.
represented by attacks on cropland was far more important than the effects of such attacks as an economic weapon.\textsuperscript{122}

I would argue, however, that while the tactic of crop devastation in the classical period was generally incapable of producing real, polis-wide economic hardship, the attacks on the rural economy of Athens during the Peloponnesian War were of a different order. The Peloponnesian presence in Attica was at different points from 431-404 exceptional and the effects of this presence on the Athenian food supply were significant. Although attacks against crops and other physical capital in the fifth century might normally have produced minimal and short-term results, the Peloponnesians’ efforts against rural Athens profoundly affected the Athenian food supply, with considerable consequences for state finances and politics. This can be shown by narrowing our attention from the damage done to the Mediterranean triad treated by Hanson and others to the most important staple crop to subsistence agriculture—grain—as well as by investigating the effects of the war on various forms of capital not considered by Hanson in his singular focus on natural and physical capital.\textsuperscript{123}

\textsuperscript{122} Hanson 1998, 14-16, 174-184 and 1995, 219-318.

\textsuperscript{123} Hanson gives more consideration to the effects of invasion and occupation on other forms of capital in his revised edition, but the focus remains to a very large degree on the physical capital of farming and in particular on crops (e.g., 1998, xiii, 172). See especially Hanson 1998, 132 where the need for wider scope is implicitly recognized with the raising of additional “practical questions” asked of Peloponnesian activities in Attica.
Section I, Chapter 2:
Historical sketch of the attack on Attica

The Peloponnesians invaded Attica five times during the ten years of the Archidamian War. In 431, they entered Attica with the strongest Greek land army assembled since the battle of Plataea in 479. The later invasions, we may assume, were less impressive, but the Peloponnesians nevertheless returned in force in 430, 428, 427 and 425. They opted in 429 to eschew an invasion of Attica, where the plague had broken out, and instead mounted an expedition to Plataea (Thuc. 2.71). In 426, the allies marshaled under King Agis at the Isthmus, but the invasion of Attica was aborted in the face of numerous earthquakes (Thuc. 3.89). Prior to the initial invasion in 431, the population of Attica was evacuated from the countryside and settled in the fortified zone comprising the asty, Piraeus, and the Long Walls between (Thuc. 2.14). In addition, garrisons were placed in forts throughout the countryside, although it is unlikely that these amounted to any serious strategic attempt to keep the invaders out of Attica. All told, the Peloponnesians spent a total of approximately 150 days in Attica throughout the five invasions of the Archidamian War. When they returned in 413, the Peloponnesians would maintain a continual presence in Attica for nearly a decade until the end of the war in 404.

Thucydides is our best source for these events but is fairly terse in his descriptions of Peloponnesian activity in Attica apart from the first invasion and the Decelean fortification. His

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124 Thuc. 2.18 explicitly shows that Oenoe was fortified in 431; presumably the reserve hoplites mentioned in 2.13 by Pericles as ἐν τοῖς φρουρίοις refers to installments throughout Attica.
125 Ober 1995, 97-8, contra Hanson 1983, 75-8 arguing that the system of phouria proved unable to repel the Peloponnesians. Diodorus (12.42.6) says that in 431 Archidamus, in addition to ravaging much of Attica, made assaults on fortresses (τοῖς δὲ φρουρίοις προσβολάς ἐποιήσατο). The plural phouria are interesting here, as is the use of the imperfect.
126 Hanson 1998, 147. The shortest of the invasions was a mere fifteen days but this was clearly unusually short; the longest about forty days. The average length was probably about thirty days.
testimony can be supplemented with that of Xenophon and the Oxyrhynchus Historian, as well as that of the much later Diodorus Siculus.\textsuperscript{127} Aristophanes, of course, is an invaluable source for Athenian social life during the war, and his comedies have many references to the deprivations caused by the war and acts of destruction, mostly of olive trees and vines.\textsuperscript{128} These anecdotal references in comedy, however, are often ambiguous, and not always easy to interpret.\textsuperscript{129} Aristophanes can tell us more about contemporary debates about and Athenian attitudes towards issues of food supply and the impact of these debates on the political economy at Athens than he can about the actual extent of damage to the countryside. Evidence of this latter type, not treated by Hanson, will be treated below after a general historical sketch of the Peloponnesian activity in Attica has been presented.

In the summer of 431, the Peloponnesians invaded Attica under the leadership of Archidamus, one of the Spartan kings (Thuc. 2.19.1). Although the ultimate target of this action would turn out to be the populous deme of Akharnai, Archidamus, we are told, delayed for some time on the outskirts of Attica, investing Oenoe (2.18). Thucydides explains that Archidamus intended to leave the Eleusinian Plain untouched as long as he could, because he expected some concessions to be made by the Athenians while their lands were yet inviolate, not being able to bear the thought of Attica ravaged (2.18.4). There is some good sense in this explanation, for this is precisely what happened in 445 when Pleistoanax halted his invasion at Eleusis (1.114.2, 2.21).\textsuperscript{130} Archidamus’ delay at Oenoe may also reflect his hope that the

\textsuperscript{127} Our understanding of the invasions comes predominantly from Thucydides, supplemented, sometimes tantalizingly, by Diodorus.
\textsuperscript{128} Hanson 1998, 136-139.
\textsuperscript{129} For difficulties in interpretation, see Hanson 1998, 140-142.
\textsuperscript{130} Cf. Hdt. 5.74-6; Herodotus does not seem to be aware of the invasion of 445. It is also worth noting here that, according to Hdt. 5.74.2, the capture of Oenoe was an important part of the strategy of the
Athenians would take the field against him. Thucydides tells us that the king anticipated an Athenian expedition to meet him at Akharnai but also implies that this was only after his hopes of an engagement at Eleusis went unfulfilled (2.20.2; cf. 2.11.6-7). Eleusis was perhaps a likely place to expect opposition. The invasions of Cleomenes and Pleistoanax had stopped there (albeit without battles) and the Athenians had indeed repelled past invasions of Attica here by force (Hdt. 1.30.3-5). Moreover, the chief goddess celebrated at Eleusis was associated with sovereignty and the maintenance of boundaries. Archidamus may, therefore, have tarried around Oenoe to allow time for the Athenian phalanx to muster at Eleusis.

Whatever the reasoning behind Archidamus’ decision to invest Oenoe, the time spent there allowed the Athenians additional time to gather in their possessions from their fields (Thuc. 2.18.3-4). Archidamus then descended from Oenoe and encamped near Eleusis, from where his army ravaged the Eleusinian and Thriasian Plains. An Athenian cavalry force put up some resistance, but was routed near the Rheitoi, after which the Peloponnesians advanced through the deme of Kropia between Mt. Parnes and Mt. Aigaleos to Akharnai, where they again encamped. Here they “remained for a long time, ravaging” (2.19.2). Archidamus

combined invasion of Boeotians and Peloponnesians in 509. In 431, it may have been hoped that the removal of the fortress would afford the Boeotians easier access to Attica.

131 Boedeker 2007.

132 The strategic value of Oenoe should not be overlooked. The fort stood in what was probably already in the 5th century the most commonly used pass (Eleutherai) through the Kithairon and Parnes ranges. Xen. Hell. 5.4.14 called this passage ‘the road through Eleutherai’. Oenoe commands the river valley between the viallges of Eleutherai and Panakton, which bookend the pass. Finally, from Oenoe to Aigosthena, situated along the coast of the Hkyonis Gulf in the northernmost Megarid, there is a very passable corridor across which supplies or troops could be sent to and from the Corinthian Gulf.

A final possibility, unmentioned by any source, is that Archidamus was targeting the very fertile Mazi Plain as much as he was the fort that overlooked it.

133 The contrast is surely intentional here between the Athenians and the less fortunate Plataeans caught unawares and still in the fields with their property by the Thebans just a short time before (2.5.4).

134 As Hanson 1998, 134 points out, Thucydides repeated use of the word ταξινομείω to describe the actions of the Peloponnesians suggests that crops were the primary targets of their attacks. See also Hanson 1998, 13-20.
remained at Akharnai instead of descending into the Attic plain in an attempt to draw the Athenians out of the city (2.20.1).

Thucydides conveys the intense reaction this provoked amongst the Athenians, about which more will be said below. For now, it is enough to note that sentiment was evenly split among the Athenians as to whether or not the defenders should meet the invaders in the field, causing the atmosphere in the city to grow stasiotic, the passion of the hawks being only narrowly curtailed by the influence of Pericles (2.21-22). This influence does not seem to have come without a practical compromise. Ober and Spence have shown that although Thucydides may wish to present Pericles as an unchallenged leader at this time, there were concessions made to the rural Athenians, who were suffering most as a result of his policy. Chief among these concessions was Pericles’ practice of “constantly sending out cavalry sorties lest the advance parties from the [Peloponnesian] army fall upon and do damage to the fields near the city” (2.22.2). Thus the enemy seems to have been largely barred from the Athenian Plain in 431.

The Boeotian and allied Athenian cavalry skirmished again, this time at Phrygia, between Athens and Akharnai, after which the Peloponnesians, raising a trophy, marched north and

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135 Hanson 1998, 125-126; Spence 1993 and 1990; P. Harvey 1986, 207; Ober 1985b. The importance and effectiveness of cavalry in harassing foraging soldiers is well understood by Thucydides. The historian has Nicias advise the Assembly that the Athenians will need a strong cavalry force of their own, or at least many skirmishers, in order to match the Sicilian cavalry, or else they will not be able to supply themselves in the field (6.21). The truth of this was learned from the Athenians’ experience of trying to keep the Peloponnesian armies from foraging in the Athenian Plain during the Archidamian War. Cf. Erdkamp 1998, 217, suggesting, unconvincingly, that undue emphasis is given by sources to cavalry sorties attacking scattered invaders because they make for dramatic and interesting reading. Alternatively, Thucydides may in fact have meant to imply that Pericles, while largely unchallenged in political influence, nevertheless faced a great task in persuading the Athenians to abandon their fields. The historian references ongoing harangues by Pericles leading up to 431 and into the second year of the war in defence of his policies (1.140.1; 2.13).

136 2.22.2: ἵππας μὲν τοῖς ἔξεστι τοῖς ἐξῆς δρόμοις ἀπὸ τῆς στρατιᾶς ἐσπίτωντας ἐς τοὺς ἀγροὺς τοὺς ἐγγύς τῆς πόλεως κακουργεῖν.
“ravaged some other demes between Mt. Parnes and Mt. Brelessos” (2.23.1). Decelea, however, seems to have been spared (Hdt. 9.73.3).

While the Peloponnesians were in northwestern Attica, the Athenians equipped a fleet of one hundred triremes, embarking a thousand hoplites and four hundred archers, to sail around the Peloponnese. Thucydides lists the strength of the expedition and its general aim (Thuc. 2.23.2), going on to say that soon after the departure of the fleet, the Peloponnesians left Attica through Oropos and Boeotia, ravaging Graike along the way, and leaving only, he says, when their provisions ran out (2.23.3). Diodorus, however, connects the expedition of the Athenian fleet explicitly with Periclean policy. He, like Thucydides, explains Pericles’ deft handling of the political situation at Athens during the invasion. But he includes mention of a promise by Pericles “that he would expel the Lacedaemonians from Attica without the peril of battle” (Diod. 12.42.6). He goes on to say in the next section that the force sent out by Pericles (under the command of Karkinos) struck great fear into the Peloponnesians by plundering their littoral and capturing some fortresses; in consequence, the Peloponnesians recalled their army from Attica in order to provide security to the Peloponnese (12.46.1).

Neither Thucydides nor Diodorus provides any real clue as to the duration of the first invasion. Estimates vary based on the statement of the former that the Peloponnesians stayed in

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137 The demes in question may have been Sypalletos, Upper and Lower Pergase, Kholleidai and Aithalidai/Hybadai.
138 A town inhabited by Oropian subject allies of the Athenians.
139 οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι χρόνον ἐμμείναντες ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ ὅσου ἐίχον τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἀνεχώρησαν διὰ Βοιωτῶν . . .
140 See also Frontinus, Strat. 1.3.9; Polyaeus, Strat. 1.36.1; Westlake 1945, 77, noting that the hasty withdrawal of Agis in 425 (Thuc. 4.6.2) in light of the Athenian action at Pylos may be cited in support of Diodorus. Westlake, nevertheless, expresses doubt concerning the claim of Diodorus for the year 431.
Attica “as long as they had provisions.” A duration of between fifteen days (recorded as the shortest of the invasions by Thucydides at 4.6.2) and forty days (recorded as the longest at 2.57.2) is to be assumed.

The next summer, in 430, Archidamus led another Peloponnesian army into Attica (Thuc. 2.47.4) and undertook a much more widespread ravaging campaign which, due to its scope and length, led Thucydides to suggest that “they ravaged the entire territory” (2.57.2). It would seem that in this case they spent some time closer to the city, ravaging the Athenian Plain itself. Thucydides relates that, “[A]fter they ravaged the plain (τὸ πεδίον), the Peloponnesians proceeded to the Paralia or coastal areas as far as Laureion” (2.55.1). The plain in question here, as in 2.20.1, generically referred to as to pedion, is the Athenian Plain. From here they presumably headed southeast, through the Mesogeia and the small fertile pockets of the western coastline before reaching Laureion and Sounion. They would eventually head north along the eastern coast of Attica in the direction of Rhamnous, although, according to Diodorus, the Tetrapolis was spared. This second invasion, Thucydides tells us, was the longest of the five, lasting approximately forty days (2.57.2). Moreover the effects of this invasion on the Athenians were, in the estimation of the historian, “most severe” (3.26.3: χαλεπωτάτη).

In the summer of 429, the Peloponnesians did not invade Attica, choosing to campaign against Plataea instead (2.71.1). The third invasion of Attica, therefore, occurred in 428 when

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141 E.g., Thorne 2001: 30-35 days; Busolt Griechische Geschichte III: 2, 913, 931: 25-30 days; Gomme HCT II, 79: 30-35 days; for the provisioning of Greek armies, see Pritchett GSW I, 38-39.
142 2.57.2: . . . τὴν γῆν πᾶσαν ἐτειμών.
143 Diodorus 12.45.1; Gomme HCT II, 162; followed by Hanson 1983, 113.
144 Thucydides reports, but does not seem to accept, a popular notion that the Peloponnesians left Attica sooner than they had intended because of their fear of the plague.
145 Diodorus (12.45.1, 4) reports that this invasion had targeted fruit trees and farm buildings. He twice uses the verb δεσδροκόπω to describe the damage to the khôra.
Archidamus would lead the Peloponnesians for the last time (3.1.1). Of this invasion, Thucydides provides only the most cursory of descriptions: the Peloponnesians entered Attica “when the grain was at its ripest” (3.1.2), encamped and ravaged the land, staying again only “as long as they had food” (3.1.3). Thucydides is silent about the areas targeted by this invasion, but we might presume that the Thriasian and Athenian Plains were again the most affected, for we are told that while the enemy was in Attica, “[t]here were the usual attacks by the Athenian cavalry at every opportunity, and they prevented the main group of light-armed from going beyond the hoplites and damaging the areas near the city” (3.1.2). The Lacedaemonians reportedly ordered their allies to muster for a second invasion in the summer of 428 to coincide with the revolt of Mytilene, but the plan was aborted when “the allies assembled slowly, involved in their harvests and sick of campaigning” (3.1.2). In 427, the fourth invasion of Attica was led by Cleomenes, acting as regent for Pausanias, son of Pleistoanax (3.26.1). The regions ravaged included some of the same ones targeted in previous years “in case anything was budding” (ἐὰν τὰς πρὶν ἐσβολακείς παρεξέπετο). There is no mention of the Athenian cavalry in connection with the invasion of 427 and Gomme makes the interesting suggestion that in this year they had failed to perform their usual service, as a result

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146 Gomme HCT II, 253 suggests that ἄμα τὸ σῖτο ἀκμάξοντι indicates a slightly earlier time than the familiar τὸ σῖτο ἀκμάξοντος (2.19.1, see also 2.79.1). Diodorus, too, seems to think that this invasion occurred slightly earlier in the year. He states that the invaders “destroyed the grain, which was in first growth” (12.52.1: ἐν τῇ χλόῃ).

147 See above and Thuc. 2.22.2; Spence 1990, 91-109.

148 As Gomme notes, since this was mid-late August (Metageitnion), the harvest mentioned here cannot be cereals—which are harvested even in regions with later growing seasons by mid-July—but [figs] olives, and grapes (HCT II, 270).

149 Echoed by Diodorus (12.55.6).
of which the *hippeis* were prosecuted by Cleon for *lipostrateia*.\(^{150}\) This would explain the hostility between Cleon and the knights represented in Aristophanic comedy. Thucydides explicitly states that this was the second most severe of the invasions; the Peloponnesian troops busied themselves in the countryside, pursuing their ravaging over a great part of Attica ([\(\tau\) \(\pi\) \(\alpha\) \(\lambda\) \(\lambda\) \(\tau\) \(\mu\) \(\nu\) \(\nu\) \(\tau\) \(\varepsilon\) \(\varepsilon\)] \(\tau\) \(\alpha\) \(t\) \(\iota\) \(\kappa\) \(i\) \(\zeta\) \(\alpha\) \(t\) \(\iota\) \(k\) \(i\) \(\zeta\) \(\tau\) \(\iota\) \(o\) \(n\) \(\nu\) \(n\) \(\tau\) \(e\) \(z\)) while they awaited news of the fleet at Lesbos (3.26.4). The army withdrew from Attica when “its food was exhausted” (\(\varepsilon\pi\varepsilon\lambda\varepsilon\lambda\o\i\pi\varepsilon\i\mu\alpha\) \(\sigma\) \(i\) \(t\) \(o\) \(z\)).

Following a year in which there were no invasions, resulting from a fear of earthquakes (3.89.1), the Peloponnesians mounted in 425 the fifth and final invasion of the Archidamian War under the leadership of Agis. This was the shortest of the invasions, lasting only fifteen days (4.6.2). Evidently Agis mistimed the invasion, arriving before the grain was ripe (4.2.1), and consequently faced a food shortage for his troops, which compelled him—as much as did the Athenian action at Pylos—to withdraw prematurely (4.6.1).

After the summer of 425, Attica presumably could be reoccupied and the regular work of farming resumed without interruption (although no source explicitly says so) until the occupation of Decelea by Peloponnesian forces in 413.\(^{151}\) The campaigning season of that year began with an invasion of Attica under Agis, although this was undertaken earlier than usual. The approach taken into Attica is not specified, but presumably it was the familiar route via the Megarid, which would mean that the army once more made its way through the Eleusinian Plain. Thucydides states that the Peloponnesians first ravaged the Athenian Plain before

\(^{150}\) Gomme *HCT II*, 290.

\(^{151}\) A substantial agricultural recovery can be presumed on the basis of statements by Thucydides (6.12, 96) and the Oxyrhynchus Historian (12.5). See also below.
fortifying Decelea (7.19.1). For the (entire?) summer (ἐν τῷ θέρει τούτῳ) of 413, the fort was used by “the whole army” (7.27.3). After this, a rotating garrison of allies would remain in Attica at Decelea, a mere 120 stadia (about 18 km) from the city until the end of the war in 404, close enough for the garrison to observe those in the city and vice versa (7.19.2; Xen., Hell. 1.1.35). The fortifications were constructed to face the Athenian Plain “and the best parts of the land” in order to “do it harm” (ἐς τὸ κακοουργεῖν). Perhaps because of the novelty of the presence of an enemy base inside Attica, Thucydides devotes considerable energies to the description of the nature of this harm.

The historian states that the fort “hurt the Athenians greatly and by the destruction of property and the ruin of the population it was foremost in damaging their affairs” (7.27.3). Unlike the earlier invasions, which here Thucydides says were “short” and “did not prevent the Athenians from benefitting from the land the rest of the time,” the incursion was now permanent (7.27.4):

Since they [sc. invasions] became a continuous occupation sometimes also with superior forces invading and sometimes with the garrison, a match for themselves, overrunning the land out of need and pillaging, also with Agis the king of the Lacedaemonians present, who did not consider the war an incidental matter, the Athenians were suffering great damage.  

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152 7.19.1: . . . καὶ πρότον μὲν τῆς χώρας τὰ περὶ τὸ πεδίον ἐδήσωσαν, ἕπειτα Δεκέλειαν ἑτείχξον, κατὰ πόλεις διελόμενοι τὸ ἔργον.  
153 This interpretation takes ὑπὸ πάσης τῆς στρατιᾶς with both τειχισθείσα and ἐπωκεῖτο, as seems logical. See next note.  
154 7.27.3: ἐπιδίδῃ γάρ ἡ Δεκέλεια τὸ μὲν πρότον ὑπὸ πάσης τῆς στρατιᾶς ἐν τῷ θέρει τούτῳ τειχισθείσα, ὅπερον δὲ φρουραῖς ἀπὸ τῶν πόλεων κατὰ διαδοχὴν χρόνου ἐπιουσίας τῇ χώρᾳ ἐπωκεῖτο, πολλὰ ἔβλασπε τοὺς Αθηναίους, καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρῶτον χρηματῶν τ᾽ ὀλέθρῳ καὶ ἀνθρώπους φθορὰ ἐκάκωσε τὰ πράγματα.  
155 7.27.4: πρότερον μὲν γὰρ βραχεία γιγνόμεναι αἱ ἑσθολαὶ τὸν ἄλλον χρόνον τῆς γῆς ἀπολαύσειν οὐκ ἐκόλουθον: τότε δὲ ξυνεχῶς ἐπικαθημένοι, καὶ ὅτε μὲν καὶ πλεόνων ἐπιούσων, ὅτε δ᾽ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τῆς ἴσης φρουρᾶς καταθεούσις τε τὴν χώραν καὶ λητείας ποιομένης, βασιλέως τε παρόντος τοῦ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων Άγιδος, δὲ οὐκ ἐκ παρέργου τὸν πόλεμον ἐπουσίτω, μεγάλα οι Αθηναίοι εβλάστηντο.
The Peloponnesians, that is, always maintained some force in Attica in addition to periodically reinforcing it with “superior forces” in order to conduct foraging and pillaging operations, an important point of detail that has not always been appreciated by scholars.\(^{156}\) Indeed, the size of the Peloponnesian forces at Decelea should not be underestimated. Although in 413 the Athenians were certainly preoccupied with events in Sicily, it is curious that we never hear of an attempt or even a plan of the Athenians to retake Decelea—a noteworthy silence given the impact of the fort and the Athenians’ reputation for skill in taking fortified places (Thuc. 1.102.2).\(^{157}\) The best explanation for this is, I think, that the garrison at Decelea was a very substantial force. Thucydides tells us that in the winter of 413, the Peloponnesian allies looked for direction to Agis at Decelea rather than to the authorities in Sparta “because wielding military might, he was feared wherever he went” (Thuc. 8.5.3).\(^{158}\) Moreover, although the Ionian theatre increasingly attracted the attention of the Peloponnesians over the final decade, it is likely that a large garrison remained in Attica for the duration of the war. This supposition is supported incidentally by the Oxyrhynchus Historian, who explains the ascendency of the pro-Spartan faction at Thebes during the Decelean War as owing to the strong Peloponnesian presence in Decelea. Leontiades and his followers, he writes, became

\(^{156}\) Hanson, for example, believes that there was normally only a small holding force in the fort and that this force was essentially confined to Decelea, to the defense of which it had constantly to look in light of Athenian sorties (1998, 161). But this is hardly the impression Thucydides gives. In his eyes it is clearly the Athenians, not the Decelean garrison, that are under a continual siege. Cf. 7.28.1-2, and esp. 3. Here Thucydides compares the Athenians, “besieged by the Peloponnesians with their epiteichismos,” with the “likewise besieged” Syracusans.

\(^{157}\) Cf. Thuc. 1.142.3 (where Pericles confidently cites the difficulties in maintaining a fortified position in enemy territory).

\(^{158}\) καὶ ταῦτα άνευ τής Λακεδαίμονοι πόλεως ἑπάρσετο: ὁ γὰρ Ἅγης, ὅσον χρόνον ἦν περὶ Δεκέλειου ἔχων τὴν μεθ’ ἐαυτῷ δύναμιν, κύριος ἦν καὶ ἀποστέλλειν εἰ ποί τινα ἐρώτητο στρατιάν καὶ ξυναγεῖν καὶ χρήματα πράσσειν. καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ὡς εἰπεῖν κατὰ τὸν τόν καρύν αὐτῶν οἱ ξύμαχοι ὑπήκουν ἢ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει Λακεδαίμονοι: δύναμιν γὰρ ἔχων αὐτὸς εὐθὺς ἐκασταχός δεινὸς παρήν.
more powerful “when the Spartans spent time in Decelea, and gathered a great part of their allied army there” (17.3).\footnote{17.3: ὅτε γὰρ πολέμοιν ὁι Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοῖς Αθηναῖοι ἐν Δεκελείᾳ δείητο ἐν καὶ σύστημα τῶν αὐτῶν συμμάχων πολὺ συνείχον, οὕτω μᾶλλον ἔδωκαν ἔποιησαν . . . (Note, too, the use of the verb, diatribó, which also means ‘consume’ or ‘wear away,’ an apt description of the effects of the garrison on the resources of its environs.)}

In addition to ravaging and robbing the countryside, the operations out of Decelea ensured that the Athenians “were deprived of all their land” (Thuc. 7.27.5).\footnote{7.27.5: τῆς τῇ γὰρ χώρας ἀπόστης ἔστησαν . . .} Whatever livestock the Athenians were able to accumulate throughout the last decade perished (we are not told how) and “more than 20 000” slaves deserted. Most of the slaves were “workmen” (χειρωτέχναι), but scholars argue about whether the work was related to agriculture or to mining.\footnote{Burford 1993, 266; Hanson 1992, 210-228; P. Harvey 1986, 215-216.} The Athenians took measures to mitigate the damage to their property in Attica, especially in the form of cavalry attacks on raiders. However, the constant menace to the Attic countryside throughout the occupation is demonstrated by the loss of significant numbers of cavalry mounts merely from the exhaustion of their daily patrols, now aimed at Decelea itself, then “over the territory” (7.27.5). The Oxyrhynchus Historian explains that the ascendancy of the Thebans in the fourth century was due in part to their having profited from the extensive plundering of Attica, which allowed them to buy slaves and spoils from the countryside cheaply. Moreover, “the Thebans carried off to their homes all the furnishing material in Attica, beginning with the wood and the tiles of the houses” (17.4). Evidently Decelea served as a sort of clearinghouse for stolen goods and absconded slaves.

Indeed, Thucydides assigns equal responsibility for the decline in Athenian fortunes to the economic harm done by the presence of a fort in Attica as to the vast sums spent on the
Sicilian campaign, for it was through the combination of these that “the Athenians became impoverished” (7.28.4: ἀδόνατοι ἐγένοντο τοῖς χρήμασιν). In response to losses in rural revenues, the Athenians radically altered their imperial policy, cancelling the phoros and instituting the pentekostê in the hopes that this would provide them with more income.\footnote{See \ref{footnote1}, below.}

The agricultural losses appear to have been severe and to have profoundly affected Athens’ food supply. The Athenians were cut off from their territory (7.27.5) and “the city needed to have everything alike imported, and instead of being as a city it existed as a fortress” (7.28.1). The importation of foodstuffs, moreover, was made more difficult with the loss of the road that ran from Athens to Oropus via Decelea, along which travelled goods sent from Euboea.\footnote{On the importance of Euboea to the food supply of Peloponnesian-War Athens, see: Thuc. 2.14.1, 8.96.1; [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 33.1. These passages are discussed below.}

Most scholars who agree with the arguments of Hanson (who himself followed Hardy) interpret the statements of Thucydides at 7.27-8 in light of the comments of the Oxyrhynchus Historian on the effects of the Decelean War on Thebes mentioned above.\footnote{Hanson 1998, 138-140; Hardy 1926, 347.} The Thebans enriched themselves, he explains, at the expense of the territory of the Athenians, which “at that time was the most lavishly equipped part of Greece, for it had suffered only slight damage from the Spartans in the previous attacks” (17.5).\footnote{17.5: τότε δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἡ χώρα πολύπελεστατα τῆς Ἑλλάδος κατεσκεύαστο· ἐπειδὴ οὖν γὰρ μικρὰ κακῶς ἐν ταῖς ἐμβολαῖς ταῖς ἐμπροσθεν ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαίμονίων . . .} Scholars have thus wished to use the combined testimony of Thucydides 7.27 and Hellenica Oxyrhynchia to downplay the effects of the Peloponnesian invasions of the Archidamian War. Hanson and Hardy see in Thucydides’ estimation of the effects of the invasions a contradiction between the earlier books in which he
described them as “severe” (χαλέπις: 3.26.3) and the later comparison with the epiteikhismos in which they are characterized as “short” (βραχιός: 7.27.4). Although it is true, as Thucydides indeed says, that the epiteikhismos “harmed the Athenians greatly” because it represented essentially a permanent invasion (ξυνεχός [τὸν ἐσβαλόντων] ἐπικαθημένων), this only tells us, however, that the fort was more harmful than the invasions. The epiteikhismos did indeed represent a departure from esbolai in terms of quality as well as quantity as both Thucydides and the Oxyrhynchus Historian make clear: the invaders now had the opportunity, largely absent in the relatively brief invasions, to destroy, steal, or to receive (in the case of slaves) all the material captured in the war (τὰ . . . πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἄλσκομενα), including all the (agricultural) ‘equipment’ from Attica (τὴν ἐκ τῆς Ἀττικῆς κατασκευὴν: Hell. Oxy. 17.4). The invasions were not long enough to strip the countryside bare, and we should, with Hanson, remove from our minds a picture of a completely barren landscape of felled trees, uprooted vineyards and ruined houses for the 420s. Damage done to viticulture and arboriculture was probably minimal and the destruction or theft of rural infrastructure and moveable property sporadic. In this way, the invasions of the Archidamian War were less harmful than the occupation of Decelea. There is evidence, however, to suggest that the Archidamian invasions were just as disruptive as the epiteikhismos to cereal farming, the mainstay of Athenian agriculture.

166 Thucydides, upon reflection, calls the invasions “short” (βραχιός) in comparison with the occupation. Hanson contends that this goes against the impression created by the earlier books. There is, however, no contradiction between what Thucydides says here and what he says earlier. He gives the duration of two of the invasions—forty and fifteen days—and of the others simply states that they lasted until provisions ran out. This explanation would have been perfectly clear to an ancient audience and it is a safe assumption that this lack of precision implies that the length of the other three invasions fell between the two extremes.

167 Cf. Thuc. 6.91.7, where Alcibiades says of the potential benefits to the Spartans of an epiteichismos: “Whatever property there is in the country will become yours.”
Section I, Chapter 3:
The impact of the war on the rural economy

On the question of whether or not Athens’ rural economy suffered badly during the war, Hanson answers firmly in the negative.\(^\text{168}\) His arguments for minimization are based in large part on his assertion of the inability of armies in the classical period to effectively bring about long-term and permanent damage to crops, for which he presents some good ancient evidence for the survival of olives and vines as well as equally relevant experiential knowledge.\(^\text{169}\) Damage to agriculture in the ancient Greek context, however, need not have been long-term or permanent to have had a profound impact on the economy of a polis, or indeed to have been predicated on the destruction of these perennial crops that Hanson focuses on. Widespread, short-term damage to crops, specifically cereal crops, would certainly have the effect of, if not devastating the rural economy, at least incapacitating it.

Cereals were by far the most important crop to any (near) subsistence farmers;\(^\text{170}\) in the case of the classical Greeks, cereals comprised more than 70% of daily nutrition.\(^\text{171}\) Although Hanson admits that cereal plants are more easily damaged than olives or vines, his assessment of the damage to Athenian agriculture during the Peloponnesian War largely ignores the impact

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\(^\text{168}\) See, for example, Hanson’s conclusion that: “The five Peloponnesian invasions of Attica during the Archidamian War did no widespread or lasting damage to the agriculture of Attica” (1998, 151). Hanson’s central thesis that agricultural devastation by polis-Greeks was more an invitation or a provocation to pitched battle than a form of real economic warfare may be tenable for the earlier period, but the extent to which it relies on the Peloponnesian War as a test case leaves it vulnerable if Hanson’s assumptions about this period cannot bear scrutiny.

\(^\text{169}\) For vines, see Hanson 1998, 68-71; for olives, see Hanson 1998, 55-68; cf. Hanson 1998, 143-167.

\(^\text{170}\) Even Hanson’s model, middling farmer, who operated well above the level of bare subsistence, typically ate the grain he produced himself. The loss of this crop, therefore, would substantially alter his economic practice.

\(^\text{171}\) Foxhall and Forbes 1982, 74.
of their destruction because he does not think grain crops could be systematically destroyed.\footnote{172}{Hanson 1998, xii: “The Peloponnesian War was a watershed, and it caused suffering and turmoil throughout the Greek world, but the destruction of orchards, vineyards, and rural infrastructure was not at the head of the catastrophe” [original emphasis].} Overlooked in his analysis, however, is the fact that, in the case of a subsistence crop like barley on which both invaders and defenders rely, large quantities of grain would necessarily be consumed as forage in addition to any that was destroyed. Moreover, the central importance of cereal crops in the ravaging strategies of the Peloponnesians is surely reflected in their timing of invasions to coincide with the full ripening of the grain. And since grain crops required the least amount of capital reinvestment and the quickest return on this investment, the fact that there is no evidence that agriculture remained derelict in Attica after the war does not justify the inference that farming continued uninterrupted from 431-404.\footnote{173}{Cartledge 2001a, 110-111; Hanson, 1998, 156-173, 176-177, 184; Foxhall 1993.}

### 3.1 Lost harvests

Let us begin with the scope of the damage to Attica during the war. In order to assess this, we must pose the question: how much area could an invading force cover in a finite period, given the limitations of manpower, difficulties of terrain and the effectiveness of defensive counter-measures? A second, related question is: does the ancient evidence speak directly to this question?

The first question has been treated by Hanson, but in light of some recent developments in the study of Greek warfare requires rethinking. Hanson’s original publication of *Warfare and Agriculture* was lauded for, amongst many other things, offering a plausible explanation to a crux in the scholarship of Greek warfare: what was the purpose of *psiloi* in Greek armies when it seems that phalanxes of hoplites did all the real fighting? The answer Hanson provides is that
in the game of ‘agricultural poker’ it was the agile psiloi, particularly the peltasts, who did the lion’s share of the ravaging, while the cumbersome, and indeed otherwise exposed and vulnerable, hoplites remained safely drawn up in ranks. The hoplite, it is argued, “virtually encased in bronze” is ill-suited for wandering over variable terrain and for nearly any activity other than standing, thrusting and pushing.174 The argument is echoed in Burford:

If thorough devastation was the aim, special tactics and special forces were required. Heavy-armed hoplites whose success depended on holding the line could not afford to step out of rank to hack trees or drive off cattle, so that light-armed skirmishers would be brought in for such purposes.175

This need of the hoplite to maintain fastidious care for the tight phalanx formation is frequently cited by scholars as one of the limitations of Greek armies in effecting widespread agricultural damage. It is argued that the individual hoplite, who strayed from his neighbours, was vulnerable to cavalry and skirmishing troops and that for this reason hoplites could not or would not dare to spread out into agricultural plains to ravage or to forage.176

As a generalization, this argument surely requires too narrow a role for the hoplite in the field of operation. Without doubt the hoplite’s cumbersome and ponderous arms were best suited for combat within the ranks of the phalanx. But the case against the effectiveness of hoplites outside of the phalanx has been overstated—as has the uniformity and ponderousness of their equipment.177 The typical hoplite was probably not so burdened by his arms so as to be incapable of activity outside of the phalanx. Furthermore, a formation of heavy-armed men

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174 Hanson 2009 [1989], 57.
175 Burford 1993, 160.
177 For the hoplite outside of the phalanx, see Rawlings 2000, 233-260; for low estimates of the weight of especially fifth century panoplies, see: Krentz 2010a, 183-204; Franz 2002, 339-349; but cf. Schwartz 2009, 18-95; for piecemeal and non-universal adoption of the complete panoply, see van Wees 2000, 47-60.
itself, provided it was not so compact as to render it immobile, could reak havoc on large swaths of farmland.\textsuperscript{178} Hoplites could assist in ravaging activities by cutting or, more probably where cereal crops were targeted, simply by trampling.\textsuperscript{179}

Thucydides makes plain that, at least in 431, Archidamus expected resistance from the Athenians, and it is perhaps valid to assume that this expectation was never truly absent from the minds of the invaders. Archidamus, Thucydides tells us, exhorted his troops to display the utmost discipline and order while in Attica (2.11.3-9). Still, this would not have prevented the hoplites from participating in the ravaging of the countryside. That hoplite armies should maintain discipline and order does not mean that they adopted rigid battle formations while despoiling enemy territory.

If not under imminent threat from the defenders, an army did not necessarily march in close order, as a passage from the Oxyrhynchus Historian clearly reveals. After defeating Tissaphernes at Cayster in 395, although pursued at some distance by the Persian army, Agesilaus:

\begin{quote}
led his forces forward to Greater Phrygia. He made the journey no longer having his soldiers drawn up in square formation but allowing them to attack what land they wanted and to cause harm to the enemy.\textsuperscript{180}
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[178] See Hanson 1998, 21-22. If Hanson is right about the ubiquity of field-walls in addition to broken terrain, this effectiveness might be diminished. His arguments for the existence of field-walls checkering the Greek plains, however, do not find support in the archaeological evidence and have not been widely accepted (Foxhall 1993). Cf. Ober 1991b for hoplites and obstacles.
\item[179] It is worth noting that \textit{phalanx} as the term to describe an infantry formation may ultimately derive from the term for a grain ‘roller’ used to crush grain: \textit{LSJ}, s.v. φάλαξς.
\item[180] 12.1-2: προήγεν τὸ στράτευμα εἰς Φρυγίαν πάλιν τὴν μεγάλην. ἐποιεῖτο δὲ τὴν πορείαν οὐκέτι συνεταγμένος ἔχον ἐν τῷ πλινθίῳ τοὺς στρατιώτας, ἀλλ᾽ ἐδών αὐτοὺς ὄσην ἥβουλοντο τῆς χώρας ἐπιέναι καὶ κάκδς ποιεῖν τοὺς πολεμίους.
\end{footnotes}
Thucydides gives some idea of the role hoplites might play in a remarkable, albeit brief, passage describing the invasion of 428. In reaction to the Peloponnesians plundering (ἐδήσουν) the land, the Athenians mounted:

the usual attacks by their cavalry at every opportunity and they prevented the main group of light-armed (τὸν πλείστον ὄμιλον τὸν ψηλὸν) from going beyond the hoplites (τῶν ὀπλῶν) and damaging the areas near the city.\(^{181}\)

This is the first we hear of *psiloi* in the context of the invasions. Earlier, at 2.22.2, Thucydides refers to the advance parties generically as *prodromoi*. What is clear, however, is that these *prodromoi* ranged ahead of a main body of hoplites. In the passage just quoted, *tón hoplón* is normally translated as “camp.”\(^{182}\) This sense is essentially correct. Thucydides uses the term similarly elsewhere (e.g., 1.111.1, 6.64.3, 7.28.2), but it is clear that what is meant is not a fortified position, and the English term ‘camp’ is something of a misleading gloss conveying an idea of fixity not implied by the Greek.\(^{183}\) What the term is intended to convey in our passage is a concentration of heavy-armed troops.\(^{184}\) This main body was, to be sure, less mobile than the *prodromoi* to whom it offered protection, but Hanson himself has shown that the main body of hoplites would not remain stationary.\(^{185}\) It seems both logically possible and to fit the evidence that, even in sight of the enemy, hoplites could march through fields, flattening cereals and vines, while the *psiloi* ranged ahead and foraged or plundered, retreating to the hoplites if they were hard-pressed. *Psiloi*, being unencumbered by heavy arms, were, no doubt, more effective than hoplites at foraging. They could engage in foraging for the benefit and in the proximity of

\(^{181}\) 3.1.2: καὶ προσβολαί, ὀσπερ εἰώθεσαν, ἐγένοντο τῶν Αθηναίων ἱππέων ὅπη παρείκοι, καὶ τὸν πλείστον ὄμιλον τῶν ψηλὸν ἔργον τῷ μῆ προεξίζοντας τῶν ὀπλῶν τά ἐγγύς τῆς πόλεως κακουργεῖν.
\(^{182}\) E.g., Lattimore 1998; Smith 1920 (‘watch-posts’); Jowett 1881; Crawley 1874.
\(^{183}\) Indeed, at 7.28.2, the phrase ἐφ’ ὀπλοῖς is expressly contrasted with ἐπὶ τοῦ τείχους.
\(^{184}\) Marchant 1909, *ad. loc*.
\(^{185}\) Hanson 1998, 20-21.
the entire force while simultaneously hoplites trampled and scavenged what they could—foraging and trampling of grain being complementary activities. It should not be imagined that the hoplite force remained ‘dug in’ or entrenched while the light-armed and cavalry ventured from the camp.\textsuperscript{186}

Trampling did not, of course, ensure the complete destruction of a crop, but it could be expected to slow its ripening and to significantly reduce its yield.\textsuperscript{187} Although it is conceded by Hanson that a compact body of men could inflict severe damage on a relatively restricted area,\textsuperscript{188} he maintains that, given manpower constraints, it was impossible for a hoplite army to despoil anything but a small part of the territory of even a small polis.\textsuperscript{189} This may be true generally of Greek armies in the classical period, but perhaps not of the Peloponnesian armies of the 420s.

The size of the invasion force under Archidamus in 431 was unprecedented in Greek history. Thucydides does not specify the number of troops involved, saying only that the expedition comprised two-thirds of each allied city’s total fighting strength (2.10.2) and that the Peloponnesians had “never set out with a larger force” (2.11.1).\textsuperscript{190} There are other hints that the force was much greater than that of the Athenian hoplite army of 13 000 (2.13.6). For example, Archidamus mentions his countrymen’s doubts that the Athenians would dare to face such a superior force (2.11.3, cf. 1.81.1), as well as the natural confidence and the expectation of an

\textsuperscript{186} This tactical arrangement is illustrated, albeit on a much smaller scale, in Thucydides’ description of an Athenian amphibious raid against Kotyrta, a small coastal town in the Peloponnese (4.56.1).

\textsuperscript{187} Foxhall 1993, 140.

\textsuperscript{188} Hanson 1998, 20 n. 2.

\textsuperscript{189} Hanson 1998, 54 n. 30, 140 n. 40. His calculations are accepted by Ober 1985, 34.

\textsuperscript{190} The phrasing here seems specifically designed to recall the largest Peloponnesian force to date, that which fought at Plataea. Gomme suggests that the passage recalls the theme laid out in 1.18.3-1.19: that the war was undertaken when the resources of each side were greater than the sum of their strength in the homoichmia (HCT I, 13). Cf. the reservations of Hornblower, arguing that 1.19 refers to the resources of Athens alone (CT I, 55-56).
easy victory among the troops of such an army (2.11.5). Based on these observations, scholars have estimated the size of the Peloponnesian army at two or three times the size of that of the Athenians.191 Plutarch records the number of hoplites as 60 000 (Per. 33.4).192 Kagan, pairing this with Thucydides’ two-thirds, arrives at a total Peloponnesian hoplite force of 90 000, which he rightly argues is too large.193 Plutarch’s figure, however, should not be entirely dismissed. The source of Plutarch’s information is unknown and it may be that the number of troops is not so far from reality. The mistake, rather, may be in that the number he records does not represent only hoplites. Even if the number of hoplites was half as large as that provided by Plutarch, this was an enormous hoplite army, larger than any of those to engage in an actual battle during the course of the war, and nearly as large as the allied Greek force at the Battle of Plataea in 479 (Hdt. 9.29).

Moreover, Hunt has raised scholars’ awareness of the regular presence of attendants and light-armed troops in Greek armies of the classical period.194 Although they are rarely numbered in the description of forces by ancient historians (Hdt. 9.28-9 is something of an exception), psiloi were a regular feature of Greek land forces and indeed, although they go unmentioned by Thucydides in his reports of the Peloponnesian armies, they suddenly appear at points in the narrative of the ravaging of Attica (3.1.2). We know from elsewhere in Thucydides that Athenian hoplites were normally aided in the field by at least one attendant.

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191 Busolt Griechische Geschichte III: 2, pp. 858-61, conjectured 22-23 000 hoplites from the Peloponnesse and another 7000 from Boeotia for 30 000. This is the number generally accepted and it is endorsed by Beloch (Bevölkerung, 152 and Gomme HCT I, 13).
192 Cf. Androtion Fr. 39. The text is corrupt, but one possible emendation yields 60 000. Neither Thucydides (2.10.2) nor Ephorus (via Diodorus 12.42.3-6) give precise figures so it is tempting to identify Androtion as Plutarch’s source. See: Harding 1994, 148-149; Jacoby 1954, 150.
(3.17.3, 7.75.5), and it seems that this practice was not unique to the Athenians. Herodotus tells us that at the battle of Plataea there was one light-armed man for every hoplite from Lacedaemon and the rest of Hellas (9.29.2). Now it is possible that hoplite attendants, or batmen, and the psiloi were the one and the same, serving a dual function on campaign.\textsuperscript{195} If this is correct, when these light troops are added to the hoplite force the size of the total Peloponnesian force doubles to 60 000, on a conservative estimate.\textsuperscript{196} This total excludes the Boeotian cavalry force, which was an important part of the invasion force and its ravaging strategy (2.19.2, 2.22.2, 4.95.2), as well as any non-combatants and camp-followers.\textsuperscript{197}

Despite the often-cited reluctance of the League allies to muster (Thuc. 3.15.2, 3.16.2), Thucydides gives the impression that the size of the invasions in subsequent years did not diminish (2.47, 3.15.1). What seems obvious is that the invasion forces fielded by the Peloponnesians in the first five years of the war were anything but typical. These were massive armies capable of a degree of widespread damage not normally seen in the Greek world. A force of this size, as it moved repeatedly through Attica, could have a truly devastating impact

\textsuperscript{195} But cf. Thuc. 6. 64.1, where the light-armed (ψυλοῦς) as well as the ‘crowd’ (δῆμον) of the Athenians is targeted by Syracusan cavalry. In this case, the ōkhlos presumably comprises rowers.

\textsuperscript{196} There is enough evidence in Greek historiography to draw the conclusion that the number of hoplites in classical armies was equaled, if not surpassed, by that of supporting light-armed infantry. See Hansen 2011, 242-243 for references.

\textsuperscript{197} Cf. Hanson 1998, 211 and 1992, 210-228 for the argument that hoplite attendants were nearly always slaves and, therefore, for fear of desertion, could not be used in ravaging. Hunt, however, has shown that slaves were regularly employed by their owners in Greek warfare. To modern sensibilities, slaves seem very untrustworthy associates for hoplites in the field. In addition to the problem of desertion, the slave, it is sometimes thought, is liable to take opportunities to physically harm his master amidst the confusion of war. We should not assume that fighting or providing other wartime services need reflect affection on the part of slaves for their masters or for the institution of slavery (Hunt 1998, 6-7, 102-120). Certainly we should imagine that some desertion—as well as some outright treachery—took place, but it is salutary to consider what an absconding slave could actually achieve by running away. The case of the slaves who deserted to Decelea, I think, proves instructive. Many of these slaves likely (but by no means certainly) worked in the particularly wretched conditions of the Athenian silver mines and so perhaps had more reason than most to desire any change in circumstance. Nevertheless, their fate was simply to be resold to Theban masters (\textit{Hell. Oxy.} 17.4).
on the countryside. An invading force, simply by marching around an enemy’s territory, could inflict serious damage to cereal crops.\(^{198}\)

Hanson argues for the incapacity of the Peloponnesians to cover most of Attica by calculating the ‘work days’ represented by a force of (only) 23,000, from which he concludes that to cover most of the cultivated land in Attica would take 150 days (the sum of the duration of the five Archidamian invasions), with each soldier ravaging 1/15 of an acre per day. Thus, for Hanson, it is just possible (though hardly plausible) for the Peloponnesians to have visited some kind destruction on all of Attica over the course of the Archidamian War.\(^{199}\) These estimates, using the concept of a ‘work day,’ are perhaps appropriate for assessing the ability of large armies to fell fruit trees and to dig up densely planted vineyards. Both of these activities, as Hanson demonstrates, require tremendous physical labour and singular focus; marching through grain fields, however, requires neither, and what is more, is an activity that may be undertaken by men in formation, making the concept of individual work days irrelevant.

Erdkamp, analyzing the impact of warfare on food supply in the Roman Republic, has proposed a formula for cereal crop wreckage that should supersede that of Hanson.\(^{200}\) He calculates that three lines of 100 men each, walking across a 100-metre-wide field with men spaced one meter apart, will take about six minutes to walk 100 metres, trampling and beating down densely growing grain stalks. If a mere 300 men can cover 1000 square metres in six minutes, a force of 3000 men (spanning 1000 metres across) would then be capable of covering

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\(^{198}\) We occasionally hear of elaborate tactics employed in the destruction of grain. For example, Cleomenes had his men drag planks across grain fields to flatten crops (Plut. Cleom. 26.1); Alexander’s men used their sarrisai to the same effect (Arr. Anab. 1.4.1-2). But such measures were not necessary to ensure damage to grain crops.

\(^{199}\) Hanson 1998, 148, n. 40.

1 000 000 square metres (or one square kilometre) in a single hour.\textsuperscript{201} When we consider the massive force available to Archidamus and his successors, even if only a fraction of the hoplite force (to say nothing of the support troops) were involved in ravaging at any one time, the potential to cover very large areas quickly is obvious.\textsuperscript{202} The total area of Attica under cultivation in the classical period is estimated at around 850 square kilometres.\textsuperscript{203} If the invaders were allowed relatively free access to Athenian lands, taking into account difficulties of terrain and inconsistency in progress, ‘all of Attica’ could be covered in a single invasion lasting 30 days, to say nothing of the nine-year-long occupation of Decelea.\textsuperscript{204}

The impact on the landscape of large armies on the march was considerable and trampling cereal crops underfoot was probably the most effective method of damaging them. Cutting the grain was more laborious and slow. What grain was cut was used to supply the invaders themselves.\textsuperscript{205} Hanson has argued convincingly against the efficacy of burning grain.\textsuperscript{206} Several factors severely curtailed the widespread use of combustion. The fragmented pattern of Athenian landholding meant that vast sprawling acreages of grain fields were something of a rarity in Attica.\textsuperscript{207} The discontinuity of plots meant that it was not easy for fire

\textsuperscript{201} The effectiveness of this organization in covering large tracts of land can be seen in modern archaeological survey techniques wherein large groups of volunteers walk the landscape in formation, meticulously recording any surface remains the discover—surely a more tedious process than simply walking through a grain-field.
\textsuperscript{202} It is worth noting here that 1 m (or 3 ft.) is the distance traditionally assumed between hoplites in formation (Cawkwell 1989; cf. Krentz 1985)
\textsuperscript{203} Moreno 2007, 10-24; Sallares 1991, 79, 310, 386; Garnsey 1988, 92; Cooper 1977, 171; Jardé 1925, 49-50, 78-79.
\textsuperscript{204} This estimate involves a great deal of speculation and assumption, but is only meant to give an idea of the potential for ground coverage of an army the size of Archidamus: 15 000 men ‘working’ a mere six hours each day and covering just five km\textsuperscript{2} in an hour could traverse some 900 km\textsuperscript{2} in thirty days, the average length of the Archidamian invasions (see above, 36 n. 126).
\textsuperscript{205} On this, see below.
\textsuperscript{206} Hanson 1998, 50-52.
\textsuperscript{207} Foxhall 1993, 140 noting the variable ripening periods for crops of different varieties and at different elevations.
to spread from one field to another.\footnote{Foxhall 1993 136-138; Hanson 1998 does not accept the degree of fragmentation of landholding in the countryside, but makes a similar claim about the ability of field-walls and ditches, which marked property boundaries, to limit the easy spread of fire.} Furthermore, cereals are difficult to ignite even at their peak dryness, just before harvest in mid-May.\footnote{Hanson 1998, 50-52, 54, 219; Spence 1990, 101; Watson 1950, 150-157.} And indeed, the paucity of references to effective burning in the ancient sources seems to confirm that this tactic was not very widely, or at least successfully, employed.\footnote{Hanson 1998, 50 (with references).} The suggestion by Thorne that Hanson and others have underappreciated this tactic with particular reference to the Archidamian War is largely unconvincing. The challenge is based primarily on Thucydides’ description of the Peloponnesian attack on Akharnai, which Thorne claims must have used fire since it was visible from Athens (2.21.2).\footnote{Thorne 2001, 231.} Sixty stadia (about 10.8 km) is too far for the Acharnians behind the walls of Athens to have made out soldiers in the act of cutting their crops, but smoke is not mentioned by Thucydides and there is no need to assume that this is what was visible. That the devastation of Akharnai could be witnessed from Athens looks, in fact, like more evidence of the tactic of trampling when we consider the cloud of dust that would have been raised by an army of some 60 000 men marching about the deme.\footnote{On the dust created by the movement of soldiers generally, see: Thuc. 4.34.2-4, 7; 4.44.4; Hanson 2009, 147-8.} The dust cloud rising from Eleusis witnessed by Demaratos and Dikaios from the Thriasian Plain (about 15 km away) was, according to Herodotus, of such a size “as some 30 000 men might make” (8.65.1).

Thus Hanson’s assertions on the inability of the Peloponnesians to effectively devastate large areas of Attica are in need of rethinking. They are based on an estimate of troop numbers that is far too low (effectively half of what seems to have been the case) as well as the
assumption that the relatively time-consuming work of cutting was the usual tactic of invaders—a tactic that he and others reserve mainly for *psiloi*. It has been shown that Peloponnesian hoplites were actively involved in the effective damage of crops in Attica and that, given the size of the Peloponnesian forces, wide-spread damage could be inflicted during even brief campaigns. What direct ancient evidence there is supports these conclusions.

Although it is conceivable that incursions into Athenian territory from Decelea were aimed at various regions at different times, what evidence we have points to the continuous targeting of the fertile Athenian Plain (Thuc. 7.19.2; Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.33). As we have seen, for the invasions of the Archidamian War, however, there is just enough information in Thucydides and Diodorus to piece together the likely routes taken. Thucydides gives somewhat contradictory testimony on the scope of these invasions (although this has been pressed too far by modern scholars).²¹³ He claims for the second invasion (in 430) that “the entire countryside was ravaged” (2.57.2),²¹⁴ while for the fourth (in 427) that “they plundered both the part of Attica already ravaged, in case anything was still growing, and whatever had been left alone in the previous invasions” (3.26.3). While there is certainly a contradiction here, it is not so glaring as to warrant the importance Hanson gives it. The argument essentially is reduced to what Thucydides means by “all” (*póz*) in the earlier passage referring to 430.²¹⁵ We recall that, at 2.55, Thucydides gives the route taken by the Peloponnesians in this invasion. He explicitly mentions the Athenian Plain, the Paralia down to Laureion, and the eastern coast, with the Eleusinian Plain presumed as the entrance point into Attica. Moreover, the Peloponnesians had

²¹³ See Hanson 1998, 138-139.
²¹⁴ Note again that Diodorus claims that the tetrapolis was missed (12.45.1), perhaps relying on Istros *FGrH* 334 Fr. 30. Decelea, too, appears to have gone untouched during the Archidamian War (Hdt. 9.73).
²¹⁵ Cf. 1.43.4: . . . τιμηθήναι καὶ τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἄπασαν.
been in central and northwestern Attica the year before. There is every reason to think that, in the mind of the historian and the Athenians, (virtually) “all” of Attica had been violated by the time the invaders withdrew in 430. Although perhaps slightly hyperbolic, this use of πᾶς in the sense of πολύς conveys the widespread systematic damage planned by the Peloponnesians.

The conviction that the Spartans’ strategy in the Archidamian War was wholly naïve and ineffective has proven remarkably intractable, despite important scholarly challenges. This is thanks, chiefly, to the brilliance of Thucydides as a critical observer of the national character of the Athenians and their foes. Tied up in modern explanations of Spartan naivety is the assumption that the Spartan-led invasions of Attica were desultory. Thucydides’ careful reporting of events does much to give this impression. His brief descriptions of the Peloponnesian efforts within Attica are always followed in the narrative by an energetic flurry of Athenian activity. This has the effect of casting the Peloponnesian land strategy as blinkered by contrast to Athens’ naval strategy. The details he does include, however, provide us with just enough information to glimpse a pattern that seems anything but desultory. Significantly, all three of the major, fertile plains of Attica were ravaged at some point in the Archidamian War: the Eleusinian/Thriasian Plain stood at the gateway of Attica and probably suffered more than any other area; the Athenian Plain was intentionally not harmed in 431, but was targeted in subsequent invasions; the Mesogeia and Paralia were invaded at least once in 430. Other fertile

\[216\] The ancients’ sense of topography did not demand such exactitude as that of modern military historians. It should also be kept in mind that Thucydides was himself a present observer of the Peloponnesians in the field. He presumably observed the general route taken by the invaders from behind the walls, but learned details from Peloponnesian informants and disgruntled Athenian farmers after the fact—who, it may be conceded, would be prone to some exaggeration.

\[217\] For example, see: Cartledge 2009b, 51-54; Kelly 1982, 25-54.

\[218\] Luginbill 1999, 105-133.

\[219\] See, for example, Kallet-Marx 1993, 204-205, whose estimation of Spartan strategy in the Archidamian War as naïve and uninspired in the face of the ‘new warfare’ of the age reflects the communis opinio; see also Hanson 1998, 181 and 1995, 340; Ober 1985 35-38; Hardy 1926, 348.
regions were sought out as well, including the Mazi Plain and the Koundoura Valley. Although summer invasions with their attendant attacks on agriculture were commonplace in classical Greece, the Archidamian War marks the first time we find repeated invasions deep into the agricultural heartland of a polis, affecting virtually all of Attica (1.43.4).⁴²²⁰

Now it is surely the case that this repetition was in reaction to the (somewhat) novel Periclean strategy of withdrawal and avoidance of battle.⁴²²¹ However, it is not inconceivable that, in response to this Athenian strategy in 431, the Spartans ratcheted up their land strategy and embarked upon a new kind of systematic economic warfare in the spring of 430, aimed at a more complete exploitation of Attica. That the invasion of 431 progressed slowly and appears to have lacked the intensity of those that followed can be explained by the different objectives of its leader. In 431, Archidamus still hoped that the Athenians might be induced to fight (Thuc. 2.11, 2.20). He was, therefore, careful not to do too much harm, wanting to “use Attica as a hostage” (1.82.4; cf. 2.18.5).⁴²²² It is not an insignificant detail that Archidamus urges the Spartans in 431 not to invade Attica before they are fully prepared for a long war lest they prematurely expend their trump card. The underlying assumption in this argument is that damage to the countryside, once begun, would be wide-spread and would persist throughout the war.

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⁴²⁰ The invaders are ἐποιητῶντες at Thuc. 1.81.1, a passage that bears evidence of revision (Gomme HCT I, 247).

⁴²¹ For other instances of the avoidance of battle in fifth century, see Krentz 2002, 28 n. 23; Garlan 1989, 101-103.

⁴²² It is significant, I think, that the Peloponnesians were able to stay in the field longest during the second year of the war. It was not certain in the first year of the war that the Peloponnesian invasions would be annual and the enemy had not, in the invasion of 431, penetrated very deeply into Attica. It is more likely, therefore, for this interval than for any other that many Athenian farmers returned to their fields and resumed their customary farm work. When the Peloponnesians returned the next summer, however, this meant that Attica was literally ripe for the picking.
While ravaging in the form of trampling was effective against grain crops and was likely the preferred method used, there were further ways in which the Peloponnesian presence in Attica affected cereal farming and thus the Athenian food supply. The economic consequences of enemy foraging and the disruption to the agricultural rhythm of Attica caused by even limited hostile occupation are two further factors that Hanson has underestimated in the case of the Peloponnesian War. Scholars accept that Greek armies, lacking sophisticated commissary and logistical support,\footnote{Rawlings 2007, 77; Engels 1978, 20.} were forced to maintain themselves at least in part with supplies purchased or stolen from the territories in which they operated.\footnote{On the limitations on carrying provisions see [Xen.] \textit{Ath. Pol.} 2.5; on the need for invading armies to forage for supplies see Xen. \textit{Poroi} 4.46-8. The Greek word for ‘forage’ here, \textit{μεταμεταμεταμεταμεταμετασεις}, literally “to go with/among,” accentuates the degree to which invaders were forced to live off of enemy land. While they were in enemy territory, they literally had to “go after” grain and “go among” the inhabitants of that territory.} This picture is confirmed by the experience of the mercenary army serving under Xenophon in 401. The army of the Ten Thousand was forced to take an alternate route back to the Ionian coast not so much because of the disposition of the King’s forces as much as because the Greeks and the former allies of Cyrus (a force comparable in size to that of the Spartans and their allies in the 420s) had already eaten its way along its present course (Xen. \textit{Anab.} 2.2.11).

Thucydides likewise makes perfectly clear the need of large armies to forage when he has Nicias argue that in Sicily the Athenian host will be without supplies, “depending on a land wholly strange” to them (6.21.2).\footnote{Pritchett \textit{GSAW} I, 30-34.} Pritchett has shown that Greek soldiers were expected to furnish their own rations. The number of days for which rations were required is known with certainty only for Athenian expeditions, where it evidently was only three.\footnote{Three days would be enough for a relatively short campaign and three days on the march were enough for the other day of the month long campaign Xerxes launched in 480 B.C.}
seem to be the minimum amount of time for which a soldier could be expected to carry along his own provisions and it is hardly surprising that we find this practice in Athens during the Peloponnesian War where an established system of *misthos stratiótikos* and control of the sea meant that Athenians on campaign would have the ready cash and could easily find sellers to meet their needs.\(^{227}\) For more traditional poleis, like most of those comprising the Peloponnesian League, a somewhat heavier burden should be imagined.

Here, Pericles’ analysis of the restrictions of campaigning on the Peloponnesians because they are *autourgoi* is instructive (Thuc. 1.141.3). Many Athenians, of course, were also men who worked their own lands. The difference is that Athens’ imperial revenues helped to underwrite the cost of campaigning. The Peloponnesians, by contrast, “have neither private nor public funds . . . [T]heir incursions against one another are kept brief by poverty” and on campaign they must “spend out of their own resources” (1.141.4). This being the case, the fifteen days that Agis spent in Attica in 425 evidently reflects the absolute maximum amount of time armies could provide for themselves without much supplementing their meagre provisions with local grain. Thucydides tells us that the early withdrawal had at least as much to do with the mistiming of the invasion—they had arrived before the grain was ripe—as with events at Pylos (4.6.1-2). Agis’ men were probably, however, able to procure *some* food in the field and Peloponnesian troops carried with them something closer to ten days’ worth of supplies.\(^{228}\) This

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\(^{227}\) The evidence for the three-day ration comes mainly from Aristophanes (Ach. 197, *Wasps* 243, *Peace* 312). For the Athenians’ relatively developed provisioning, see the remarks of Nicias in 415 (Thuc. 6.22).

\(^{228}\) Delbrück 1975, 425; F. Stolle, *Der römische Legionär und sein Gepäck* (Strasbourg, 1914) argues that the post-Marian the Roman legionary was required to carry rations for sixteen days; cf.; Erdkamp 1998; J. Roth, *The Logistics of the Roman Army 264 B.C.-A.D. 325* (Leiden, 1998).
is the estimate accepted by Thorne.\footnote{Thorne 1998, 235.} Since thirty days was the average length of the five
invasions, the invaders must have maintained themselves for at least twenty days on Attic grain
during four of the five invasions. The losses this entailed for Athenian farmers are
substantial.\footnote{Other sources, too, give the impression that the impact on the countryside of armies (both friendly
and hostile) passing through was profound. In Euripides’ Hecuba (performed in 424), the Thracian king,
Polymestor, argues in defense of his reprehensible murder of the Trojan prince, Polydorus, that he was
trying to avert the passage of another Achaean army through his land (1132-1144). Even passing through on
their way to Troy, the Greeks “would waste away the plains of Thrace” (Θρήκες πεῦτος τρίβοις τάδε).
\footnote{Or approximately 2 022 800 kg: 1 medimnos = 52L x .778 (dry density of hulled barley
according to Measurements Canada (mc.ic.gc.ca). The requirement of two khoinikes per day seems to be a
secure assumption, especially given that the grain consumed was most likely barley, which is 2/3 the dry
density of wheat (when compared as unprocessed cereals).}} Thorne accepts that a military force would require at least two khoinikes of
barley-meal per man daily (Thuc. 4.16.1; cf. Xen. Anab. 1.5.6) and calculates that an army of
some 60 000, then, would require 2.4 million khoinikes (or 50 000 medimnoi),\footnote{See above, 27. On the daily nutritional requirements of soldiers in the classical period, see
O’Connor 2011, 589-606.} which is
approximately one-tenth of the total estimated annual yield of Attica.\footnote{Thorne 2001, 235-6.} For the longer invasion
of 430, the total rises to over 75 000 medimnoi, effectively one-seventh of Attic yield.\footnote{Thorne 2001, 248-50.}
When all five invasions are taken together, the total loss of Attic grain to Peloponnesian foraging
during the Archidamian War is some 237 500 medimnoi.\footnote{For the price of barley and the comparatively high cost of wheat (six dr. per medimnos), see
Prichett 1956, 197-198.} The monetary value of this amount
is, on a low estimate, in the neighbourhood of 120 talents, assuming that the majority of the
grain was barley, the cost of which was three drachmas per medimnos.\footnote{235}

The total amount of grain lost to enemy foraging in the Archidamian War amounts to just
over half of an annual yield for all of Attica. When, however, we consider that foraging would
take place alongside ravaging and that not all of Attica suffered uniformly in a given year, the
loss becomes very significant, especially regionally. The amount of grain consumed alone was worth on average some 37.5 talents and this cost was borne by only a portion of Athenian farmers from year to year. It is a small wonder that the mood within Athens in 431 became stasiotic as it was debated whether or not to offer battle to the invaders (2.21.2-3).

For the Decelean War, we can be less sure about the amount of damage done by foraging. Since the Peloponnesians now had a base from which to operate, it is conceivable that they could bring in supplies from the Peloponnese and Boeotia. However, Thucydides suggests that the base was supplied in the main by foraging. One of the explanations for the fort “damaging the Athenians’ affairs” and “ruining the population” is that the garrison, sometimes supported by superior troops, constantly “ravaged and pillaged the countryside out of necessity” (7.27.4). The phrase εξ ἀνάγκης surely implies that these raids were required for the subsistence of those in the fort. It is, therefore, to be assumed that they were continual. No

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236 The total cost of losses of grain to the Athenian state is discussed by Ober (1985, 26-7): assuming an entire grain crop was lost to an invasion, the state would have to import as much grain as had been lost in the countryside to meet the needs of its rural refugees. “At the rate of six drachmas to the medimnos for wheat and three drachmas for barley, the price of replacing the crop would be over 220 talents, swelling to nearly 330 talents if, as has been suggested by some, the Athenians demanded wheat alone.”

237 As Taylor 2010, 64 notes, 2.20.4, where Archidamus predicts the tension within Athens as a result of the invasion, is the first appearance of the noun stasis since the Archaeology and only the fourth in the Histories up to this point. This has the intended effect of underscoring the gravity of the political situation. Furthermore, Athens has been explained in the Archaeology as the polis “most free of faction” (ἀστασίαστον: 1.2.5). On the near stasis at Athens in 431 more will be said in the following chapter, but see Foxhall 1993, who argues this was the main purpose of crop ravaging. Since the countryside was a patchwork of individual farms and farming was in no way regulated by the state, it was as much individual oikiai that were being ravaged in the invasions as ‘the Athenian khôra.’ It is also worth noting in connection with this that trittyes suffered very disproportionally: nine coastal demes lay in the known path of the invasions as opposed to only six or seven inland and only one urban deme (Kropidai).

238 7.27.4: . . . εξ ἀνάγκης τῆς ἱερᾶς φυσικῆς καταθέτουσι τε τὴν χώραν καὶ ληστείας ποιομένης. Complicating matters, our text of Thucydides here is corrupt. The problem is with ἵσες, which here must mean something like “regular” but for which no parallel usage of ἵσος has been produced (Hornblower CT III, 590). Dover’s suggested emendations of εξ ἀνάγκης φυσικῆς, “the garrison which the allies were compelled to provide,” or ἐν ἀναγκαίος, “the minimum garrison” have met with some approval, but the phrase ex anagkês should probably remain since the emphasis appears to be on the garrison’s self-sufficiency.

239 That fort garrisons extracted their subsistence from the local countryside seems to have been assumed by the Greeks. Xenophon’s Memorabilia presents Socrates pressing the would-be statesman,
source gives the size of the garrison or the frequency of their incursions, but Xenophon’s *Hellenica* may provide a clue to these questions.\footnote{Cf. above, 60; *Hell. Oxy.* 17.4 on the presence of “a large part” of the allied army (σύστημα τῶν αὐτῶν σωμάτων πολύ).} In 410, Agis, who remained himself at Decelea, led a foraging expedition (προνομῆ) up to the very walls of Athens. When Thrasyllus confronted him, he hastily withdrew his force, losing some of his hoplites to Athenian *psiloi* (1.1.33). Unless from sheer military incompetence, why would Agis attempt such a dangerous mission? A likely answer is that in the three years since the establishment of the fort at Decelea, the Peloponnesians had exhausted the ready supply of grain in the area and were compelled to search farther afield for supplies. It is also likely that, by this point, much less was being grown in Attica because of the continuous occupation and that the Athenians were now almost entirely dependent upon imports.

### 3.2 Disrupting agriculture

Thus far, we have seen that significant losses to Attic cereal farming accrued from the ravaging and foraging activities of the enemy. A final effect to consider is that of an armed force in Attica interfering with agricultural tasks. It is clear that many Athenians continued to plant cereal crops throughout the Archidamian War. This can be deduced from the fact that the Peloponnesians always found grain to ravage (Thuc. 2.22.2, 3.1.2, 4.6.1; Diod. 12.58.4; cf. Ar. *Wasps* 264-5). Moreover, Thucydides states that during the Archidamian War the Athenians were able to make some use of their land between invasions (7.27.4). It seems clear that the permanent occupation of Decelea was much more harmful to the Athenians in terms of

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Glauc, on matters of local defense. When he asks if the youth knows which forts he ought to repair and which to get rid of as inefficient, Glauc's answer is surprising: he says that he would get rid of quite all of them because “the only effect of maintaining them is that our crops are stolen” (3.6.11). Apparently even friendly garrisons were assumed to have adverse effects on the rural economy.

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\footnote{Cf. above, 60; *Hell. Oxy.* 17.4 on the presence of “a large part” of the allied army (σύστημα τῶν αὐτῶν σωμάτων πολύ).}
discouraging farming activity. Hanson makes much of this, suggesting that during the Archidamian War farming in much of Attica continued relatively unaffected. However, no source specifies which parts of Attica remained cultivable throughout the Archidamian War. Thucydides’ later statements about the invasions, moreover, need not imply that all, or even most, of the Athenians had use of all of their land. It may be that he has in mind the Athenian Plain, which was protected to some degree by Athenian patrols (2.22.2; 3.1.2).

To what extent, then, could the non-continuous, transitory presence of armies have impacted farming activities? Classical sources give the impression that the conditions of war discouraged agriculture in general. Xenophon, for example, lists war as a reason for economic disruption and for agricultural land falling into disuse owing to the fact that the presence of the enemy renders farming unsafe (Xen. Hell. 4.4.1, 5.4.56, 7.2.17; Por. 4.9). Elsewhere, Xenophon connects invasions with famines because farmers are prevented from sowing (Hell. 4.6.13). Some historical comparanda are useful here too. The Hanniballic invasion of Italy (218-203 B.C.) is thought to have been more ruinous to Italian agriculture because of the disruption to the growing cycle than because of any actual ravaging done by Punic forces. In the much later, but still pre-modern, Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648), worse damage was done to the local economies of Germany by the long-term dysfunction inflicted on the countryside by

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241 Perhaps: in this light we might consider that the Athenians had been able to plant a crop in the interval between the two Persian invasions of 480 and 479 (Hdt. 8.109, 142).
242 See also Cyr. 3.2.2, in which he mentions large tracts of land rendered uncultivable as a result of constant warfare; Ober 1985, 40.
243 Cf. Dem. 19.123, arguing that it was impossible for Philip to remain at Thermopylae owing to a lack of provisions precipitated by a local famine because the inhabitants had been unable to sow.
244 Cornell 1996, 107. Although it should be noted that Cornell accepts Hanson’s arguments for the limited effectiveness of crop destruction.
the presence of armies than by any direct damage perpetrated by soldiers. In these cases, the occupations were significantly longer than the month-long stays of the Peloponnesians in Attica to be sure; nevertheless, Aristophanes’ plays of the 420s, especially *Acharnians* and *Peace*, give the impression that the Athenians were likewise prevented from farming as a result of the war (*Ach. 32-3, 994-9; Peace 550-81, 596-7, 706-8*). Scholars who wish to minimize the impact of the invasions on farming attribute this to poetic license. And it must be admitted that the timing of the invasions, in mid-May until mid-June, meant that they would only interrupt the harvest and threshing periods and would not interfere with sowing, which typically took place in October or November. This interruption, however, was not just an inconvenience. Delaying the grain harvest by even a few weeks could result in considerable losses in yield. As Hanson himself points out, invasions timed carefully to coincide with peak ripening, catching the grain at its most combustible and edible, had the additional aim of depriving the invaded of their entire year’s work simply by keeping farmers from their harvests. The Athenians thus stood to lose their crop just before harvest time when their stores would be at their lowest.

Smalltime Greek farmers customarily aimed to store about a year’s worth of grain, which for an average household would be about 22 *medimnoi*. Thorne has shown the logistical difficulties involved in transporting even these modest reserves from the countryside to the *asty*.

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246 Cf. Pausanias (3.7.10), who, while not representative of an independent tradition, nevertheless writes that “Archidamus did terrible damage (μάλιστα ἐκάκωσις) to the land of the Athenians, invading with an army every year, on each occasion carrying destruction from end to end” (διὰ πάσης ἐπεζημεία φθείρων).
247 See Hanson 1998, 140-142.
249 Halstead and Jones 1989.
250 Hanson 1998, 106.
251 For twelve months’ storage, see: Gallant 1991, 94-95; Arist. *Oec.* 1348b33-1349a2. For average household supply, see Foxhall and Forbes 1982, 49 n. 26.
He calculates, based on logistical load capacity and energetics, that for a household fortunate enough to have a wagon, moving the stores would typically require two trips; for those with only a mule, five; and for those relying solely on human muscle, eight. Clearly, we should expect that many Athenians were not able to remove their entire grain stores to the safety of the city. Stored grain left in the fields would have been very vulnerable to damage or theft from invaders. Stored, threshed grain is much more flammable than standing grain and, having been dried, is also susceptible to rot if exposed to moisture—a common occurrence since storage vessels were sought out and broken by ravagers. Athenians cooped up behind the walls, then, could expect to lose significant amounts of their harvest, as well as their previous years’ stores, which included, crucially, their seed grain. Typically Greek farmers reserved about one-third of their stores for seed grain. The loss of this seed grain, either through theft, damage or because the Athenians themselves were forced to eat it for want, can be expected to have had a cumulative effect on cereal cultivation.

Hanson, criticized by Harvey for his inattention to the cumulative effects of the Archidamian invasions in the first edition of *Warfare and Agriculture*, flatly states in the revised edition that the Peloponnesians were not able to invade in consecutive years and thus their invasions were not able to generate any cumulative effect. Although it is somewhat

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252 Thorne 2001, 243-4; P. Harvey 1986, 216 also notes the limitations of evacuation, citing Thucydides’ statements on the overcrowded conditions in the city (2.17.1-3, 52.1-2).

253 On the vulnerability of stored grain, see: Thorne 2001, 232; Hanson 1998, 37-39, 50 n. 21, 51, 54. On the breaking of storage vessels, see Ar. Peace 630-1, where the chorus leader complains of a κυψέλη smashed in with a rock.

254 Jameson 1977, 129.

255 Cf. Burford 1993, 128: “The presence of Peloponnesian armies in the summer months during the Archidamian War . . . will not have effected the Athenians practice of planting per se; rather it was indirectly affected by the lack of planting seed if the previous summer’s harvest had been interrupted or spoilt.”

misleading to refer to them as “annual,” as historians often do, invasions of Attica occurred in 431, 430, 428, 427, and 425. Despite the fact that the five invasions together were not consecutive, invasions one through four occurred with only a single year’s interruption—a year in which Athens was being ravaged by plague.\footnote{While denying that the Peloponnesian War produced it as such, Hanson is well aware of the potential for cumulative and ruinous damage with successive poor harvests. See Hanson 1995, 121-123 for his suggestion that successive poor harvests were responsible for widespread indebtedness and ultimately for the phenomenon of hektemorage in the sixth century.}

Scholars have generally recognized a trend towards continuous economic pressure beginning with \textit{epiteikhismos} in the latter stages of the war and developing into the fourth century. It is surprising that, although there has been agreement that these methods did significant socio-economic harm, scholars have ignored the fact that, already for the early stages of the Archidamian War, the Spartans and their allies brought considerable continuous pressure to bear on the Athenians, especially relative to what was normal for warfare at this time.\footnote{Ober 1985a, 36-39 and 1985c, 96-97.} I have argued above for the unprecedented scale and scope of the ‘annual’ invasions. The Peloponnesians invaded Attica with massive armies (by classical Greek standards) and took what appears to be a systematic approach to its devastation. To this we should add constant harassment of northern Attica by Boeotian cavalry. Small-scale incursions by Boeotians are mentioned twice in Aristophanes’ \textit{Acharnians}: Derketes of Phyle complains that his cattle have been rustled by Boeotians (1023) and Lamachos is summoned to defend the passes from Boeotian bandits (\lambda \eta \sigma τ \alpha \varsigma: 1073-7). Thucydides also alludes to a regular Boeotian presence in Attica when, before the battle of Delium, he has Hippocrates encourage the Athenians with the observation that, if they defeat the Boeotians and destroy their cavalry, they...
will be gaining not just a foothold in Boeotia, but will be retaking control of Attica as well (4.95.2).  

The campaign of Antigonus Gonatas against the Athenians in 263 illustrates what harm repeated invasions, of the sort seen during the Archidamian War, could do. After ravaging Attica in the summer, Antigonus withdrew his troops and allowed the Athenians to sow their crops from what stored grain they had managed to save from the Macedonians. The Athenians naturally saved as much grain as would be required to feed them until the next harvest, and sowed the rest. Whereupon, Antigonus invaded again in the spring, interfering with the harvest and forcing the Athenians to capitulate or starve (Frontinus, *Strat.* 3.4.2; Polyaenus 4.6.20).  

A much less explicit, but closer comparandum may be found in Xenophon, who reports the daring attempt in 377 to secure grain by the Thebans who “were under great duress because of a lack of grain since they had not been able to take in their harvest for two years.”  

Once the pattern of successive invasions became established in 430, fewer and fewer farmers would have been eager to rush out and replant their crops. Although probably not confined to the fortified Athens-Piraeus zone except for the two months of the early summer, it would have been an unpromising prospect for farmers to return to replant their crops.

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260 Something of this order may have been in the minds of the Greeks who, Thucydides tells us, predicted that Athens could only hope to survive invasions of Attica for a few years (1.121.2, 4.85.2, 5.14.3, 7.28.3).
261 *Hell.* 5.4.56: μάλα δὲ πιεζόμενοι οἱ Θηβαῖοι σπάνει σίτου διὰ τὸ δυοῖν έτοῖν μὴ ειληφέναι καρπον ἐκ τῆς γῆς, πέμπουσιν ἐπὶ δυοῖν τρίηροι ἀνόρδας εἰς Πελάγης ἐπὶ στόν δέκα τάλαντα δόντες.
262 N. Jones 2004, 205. Some scholars, notably Foxhall (1993), have suggested that Athenian farmers might have planted emergency second crops in response to the devastations, but the success rate of such crops, if they were planted, must have been woefully low. Rainfall patterns in Attica mean that the kind of dry-grain cereal farming practiced by the Greeks was not likely to produce a yield over the summer months. Intensive irrigation would have been required to make up for the lack of rainfall and this was simply outside the capabilities of the Greek farmer. Hanson argues that some irrigation occurred, but this was mostly for fruit-trees and vines (1995, 60-63); cf. Halstaed 2014, 230-232, 277-281. Most scholars doubt the
production, consequently, would have been significantly reduced until 425 and would have been in more or less complete abeyance from 413 until the end of the war.

3.3 Conclusions on the loss of Attica

Although grain production likely never completely ceased during the war, and probably recovered soon after Athens’ surrender in 404, Athenian agriculture was more adversely affected by the Peloponnesian War than the current orthodoxy admits. It would seem that many Athenians suffered badly the effects of the invasions of the Archidamian War. Things surely recovered to some extent in the period of relative peace from the armistice of 423/2 through to the end of the Peace of Nicias and perhaps until the fortification of Decelea in 413 (Thuc. 6.12; 6.91.7), but, thereafter, most Athenians were truly cut off from their land (7.27-28).

The Athenians appear to have been ready to negotiate with the Spartans following the Peloponnesian invasion of 430. Thucydides reports that envoys were sent to Sparta, but they were unable to accomplish anything (2.59.1-2). Diodorus writes that after the third invasion the Athenians were “oppressed by plague and a lack of food” (12.52.2: σποδείας). It appears that during the summers during when the Peloponnesians were in Attica, it was not possible for the Athenians to harvest enough grain for their regular first fruit offerings at Eleusis: although we possess fragments of records from Eleusis plausibly dated to the decade 431-421, no aparkhai are recorded until 421. When the epigraphic evidence for aparkhai resumes in 421, the records reveal exiguous sums (a mere 6 dr. worth for 421 and 31 dr. for 420). There is thus an appreciable reduction in the actual cult ritual of Demeter and Kore during the Archidamian War.

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263 Even Decelea was farmed shortly after the end of the Peloponnesian War; we have an inscription (IG II^2 1237) attesting to its reclamation by Athenians.

There is some degree of recovery during the Peace of Nicias, but even then the amount of grain collected for the *aparkhai* remained a mere pittance compared to other years (for example, 329/8: *IG II²* 1672).

That the popularity of the Two Goddesses and their cult at Eleusis suffered during the Archidamian War is also evinced by a sharp decline in the depictions of Triptolemos on Athenian red-figure vases in the last quarter of the fifth century. Hayashi finds only two red-figure scenes featuring him dating from the period of the Peloponnesian War.²⁶⁵ This is in stark contrast to the eighty-four examples that he assigns to the Pentecontaetia. Even allowing for a significant margin of error due to interpretive problems in identifying Triptolemos scenes and imprecise dating, the drop-off is striking. We might expect to see some decline in interest in an agricultural hero through the mid-century, as the Athenian economy became more diversified owing to the development of the *arkhê*,²⁶⁶ but the near complete disappearance of Triptolemos at this time is remarkable.

The cult of the Two Goddesses at Eleusis functioned regularly again during the Peace of Nicias and in 422/1 a stone bridge was built over one of the Rheitoi to accommodate foot travel for initiates processing to the Mysteries (*IG I3* 79).²⁶⁷ The fact that the Athenians only resumed processions and public building in the Eleusinian Plain upon the establishment of a formal truce should suggest to us the unlikelihood of enthusiastic annual reinvestment in the *khôra* on the heels of Peloponnesian withdrawal. That building projects such as the Rheitoi bridge had to await a truce reflects Athenian anxiety that the Peloponnesians would return and also suggests

²⁶⁷ Lawton 2009, 69.
that even the Spartan hostages from Pylos did not inspire sufficient confidence for the Athenians to eagerly reinvest in Attica while even the possibility of another invasion existed.

Under the Decelean occupation, the vast majority of the Athenians were now permanently cut off from their lands, their farms thoroughly pillaged for provisions by the fort garrisons and their farm buildings systematically robbed (Hell. Oxy. 17.4). Unlike the Oxyrhynchus Historian, Thucydides does mention ravaging as an activity of the garrisons. Nevertheless, the Spartans’ tactic seems largely to have been to keep Athenian farmers off of their lands and to discourage agriculture by maintaining a hostile presence in the countryside (Thuc. 7.27). So Alcibiades affirms at 6.91.7. The fort routinely targeted the Athenian Plain for provisions and cut the Athenians off from the Eleusinian Plain: they were prevented from making the traditional land procession from the city to the sanctuary of Demeter for the Mysteries (Xen. Hell. 1.4.20; Plut. Alc. 34). The conclusion reached at this stage is that there were significant reductions to harvests of Attic grain as a result of ravaging, plundering and occupation during the Archidamian War and this is probably true to an even greater extent for the Decelean War.

We are now in a position to ask how greatly the decreased harvests affected the Athenians. Because the average yearly rainfall in Attica is 400 mm, very close to the minimum amount required by most staples, crop failure was a risk in most years.\textsuperscript{268} Barley requires a minimum of 200 mm, wheat at least 300 mm and legumes 400.\textsuperscript{269} Statistically, therefore, the probability of crop failure in Attica is 5.5% barley, 28% wheat, and 71% dry legumes. Athenians would have been accustomed to the odd year with very poor yields and they

\textsuperscript{268} Moreno 2007, 27.
\textsuperscript{269} Garnsey 1988, 10; Osborne 1987, 33.
developed adaptive measures to cope. To what extent, then, were the Archidamian invasions any different from these lean years? Gallant has shown that while households facing subsistence risk due to crop failure might to some degree supplement their diets with wild flora or fauna, or by selling household assets to purchase necessities, the most common adaptive measure was to seek aid from friends and kin, what he calls “interpersonal risk-buffering.”

Social networks were a crucial element of the ancient Greek rural economy. The next section will examine the effects of the war on these networks and show how, under the combined strain of dislocation caused by the war and of catastrophic population loss as a result of the plague, Athenian farmers endured a considerable loss of social capital in addition to crops and physical assets. With the cratering of social networks and the adaptive strategies predicated upon them, many Athenian farmers would be forced to seek other livelihood.

3.4 Evacuation, plague and the loss of social capital

Subsistence farming was and is a social activity. As Xenophon says (Oec. 5.14):

Moreover, husbandry helps to train men for corporate effort. For men are essential to an expedition against an enemy, and the cultivation of the soil demands the aid of men.

Social networks were essential to the success of the Greek farmer; without them, he would lack crucial support in times of shortage and crisis. Wealthier neighbours could be relied upon by needier ones. Kimon, who allowed public access of his lands to his fellow-demesmen for “moderate support” as they required (Ath. Pol. 27.3; Plut. Cim. 10.1-2, 6; Per. 9.2), was exceptional in his generosity, but similar exchanges should be imagined on a smaller scale and

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271 Xen. Oec. 5.14: συμπαθείς δὲ καὶ εἰς τὸ ἐπαρκεῖν ἄλληλοις ἡ γεωργία. ἐπί τε γὰρ τούς πολέμιους σὺν ἀνθρώποις δεῖ ἵναι, τῆς τε γῆς σὺν ἀνθρώπους ἔστιν ἡ ἐργασία.
predicated on reciprocity rather than generosity throughout Attica. Furthermore, for the small landholder—who might not be able to justify keeping slaves to work his small plot(s) and could not afford the capital expenditure on day-labour—reciprocal, non-monetary service, especially cooperative labour, was an essential part of farming practice. This labour, required at key periods of intensive manual input in the agricultural calendar, was as indispensible for the smallholder as it was to the wealthy, who might employ slaves or free-hired labour.

Menander’s Dyskolos, performed in the fourth century, drives this point home. In Gorgias’ description of the intractable Knemon, the most striking thing about Knemon’s misanthropy is that it compels him, very unusually, to work his sizable holding by himself:

He owns this farm here, worth maybe two talents. He keeps farming it himself by himself (αὐτῷ ἑνίδικτον), with no one to work with him, not a slave from the house, not a hired man from the neighbourhood, not a neighbour (οὐχὶ γείτονε), but himself by himself.

For less ill-tempered Greeks, the countryside was a place of communities of farmers whose livelihoods and identities were based on the local village and its associations (e.g., Thuc. 2.14, 16; Ar. Ach. 32-3, 406-7; [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 21.4). However, as an indirect but crucial consequence of the evacuation of the countryside during the Peloponnesian War, these important rural social networks suffered significant breakdown—owing to the outbreak of the plague in Athens and Piraeus.

The combined (cumulative) effects of the invasions of 431 and 430 and the short-term demographic effects of the plague on Athenian farming need to be considered more carefully.

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273 Osborne 1985, 146.
274 Osborne 1985, 144.
275 329-331 (trans. Rosivach).
than has usually been the case. Historians since Thucydides have argued that the plague was more harmful to Athens in the Archidamian phase than the other effects (presumably economic and demographic) of the war.\textsuperscript{277} This assessment is surely correct, but it is gainful to ask in what ways the plague was most harmful.\textsuperscript{278}

The plague affected the lives of every individual Athenian, most of whom, including Thucydides, experienced it personally. Sallares has shown that the epidemic was unique in ancient Greece.\textsuperscript{279} From the description of Thucydides and comparison with modern epidemics, a morbidity rate of 85\% is estimated; casualty rates are around 40\% of those infected.\textsuperscript{280} The severity of the epidemic was increased, as Thucydides knew, by the presence of rural refugees within the city (2.52.1-2).\textsuperscript{281} Thucydides’ casualty figures for the plague are consistent with virgin-soil smallpox epidemics, that is, approximately 34\%.\textsuperscript{282} The immediate effects of so many fatalities on the food supply would, of course, have been that there were now fewer mouths to feed. We should, however, consider the harmful longer-term effects on the Athenians’ ability to farm the countryside and to produce food domestically.

\textsuperscript{277} Thuc. 3.87.2; Hanson 1998, 152-153; Kagan, 1974, 350-362.
\textsuperscript{278} \textit{Pace} Hanson.
\textsuperscript{279} Sallares 1991, 256. Such density-dependent, ‘virgin-soil’ epidemic requires a population of some 200 000, which only classical Athens could boast.
\textsuperscript{280} Sallares 1991, 250.
\textsuperscript{281} Sallares 1991, 256-7. The disease may have been particularly virulent among the rural population if it was an endemic virus like smallpox, although this seems unlikely since Athens could not normally support an endemic, aggressive disease. Sallares cites a modern parallel in the 1927/8 dengue epidemic that struck an Athens crowded with refugees fleeing from Turkey. Here there was a 90\% morbidity rate.
\textsuperscript{282} Casualties from the plague, according to Thucydides: 4400 hoplites, 300 cavalry, and “an indeterminable number of the common people” (3.87.3). Hansen 1988 estimates the number of citizen deaths at 15 000, exclusive of course of women, children, metics and slaves. Some comparison might be made with Hagnon’s expedition to Potidaea, which brought the plague to the Athenian army there. Thucydides says that Hagnon lost 1050 out of 4000 men in just over a month (2.58). Assuming conditions in the Athenian camp were somewhat comparable to those of the crowded fortified zone at Athens, a casualty rating of 1 in 4 in the case of Hagnon’s army lends additional support to Hansen’s estimate.
With the deaths of so many Athenians within the walls of the city, the loss of social capital for the survivors likely translated into new economic difficulties. Community trust and knowledge, and socio-economic networks—including neighbourly ties, so essential to Greek subsistence farming—might be severed and irreparably damaged by dislocation caused by evacuation, made permanent by the effects of the plague. Of those who were fortunate enough to have caught and survived the plague, Thucydides tells us, many were left crippled, having lost fingers and toes (2.49.8), leaving them incapable of returning to agricultural work and thus less likely to return to the countryside.

It is perhaps unsurprising that Hanson, in his treatment of warfare and agriculture, does not really consider the impact of the plague on social capital in Attica. Hanson’s model of the Greek countryside is very different from that of scholars like Osborne and Foxhall and allows for a much greater degree of self-sufficiency for the oikos: a much more actual than ideological autarkeia. Nevertheless, dependence on neighbours for information and expertise, as well as for exchange and borrowing, was a crucial economic practice for Greek farmers. Sociologists stress the importance of ‘social webs,’ a complex series of interconnecting and diverse relationships, organizations and social structures for ‘mooring’ an individual within his community. The degree to which this was true of classical Athenians can be seen in the practice of formulaically defining the borders of a piece of land or mine in rural Attica by reference to one’s neighbours inscribed on horoi. This also implies a measure of stability in

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283 Hanson 1998, 171 quotes Gutman (1980, 204-205) for 17th century Holland on the importance of neighbourly relations to pre-modern agricultural economies but does not apply the argument to Peloponnesian-War Athens.
285 For example, see: Kibreab 2004; Baker 1991.
landholding throughout the countryside, as well as a faith in that stability. The sociological consequences for displaced persons are, as Kibreab puts it, that:

they become uprooted from their social and cultural moorings... The loss of relationships... represent[s] an enormous threat and challenge to the individual’s coping and adaptive capacities in the new environment.

Breakdowns in social networks typically occur across populations over long periods of displacement because members of communities are divided or dispersed and because interpersonal relationships change according to changes in socio-economic contexts. Sociological studies of displaced rural populations reveal that, in the face of dislocation, social relationships encompassing familial relationships, kinship ties, friendships and neighbourhood networks—through which membership in community is defined—quickly disintegrate. It is unclear whether the majority of Athenians who sought refuge in Athens during the Archidamian War returned to the countryside soon after the Peloponnesians’ withdrawal. What is abundantly clear is that, regardless, by 430 many Athenians would not have the opportunity to return at all.

In contrast to the usual cases documented by sociologists of social breakdown occurring over the long term as a result of rural communities being dispersed and adapting to new social conditions within an urban zone, the social breakdown at Athens began immediately in 430 because of the radical demographic changes caused by the plague. Thucydides gives a striking account of its effects on social relations. He notes that, as one of the unhappy

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286 Andreyev 1974, 19.
289 As we shall see, the ancient evidence is ambiguous. Scholarly opinion is split. For example, see: Hanson 1998, 147-153; Foxhall 1993, 137-141; Hornblower CT I, 258-259; cf. Rosivach 2011, 179-180; N. Jones 2004; Rhodes AP, 337; MacDowell, 1995, 47.
290 Bascom 1998.
The relational term used here, ἐπηθείς, is wide-ranging in its meanings but strongly connotes the practical utility of a relationship. The loss of the aid or benefit drawn from these relationships is again highlighted a few passages later when Thucydides writes that some Athenians had to resort to shameless burial practices in the absence of relatives (2.52.4: σπάνει τῶν ἐπηθείων), who might otherwise be of assistance, because of the number who had already perished. This lack, or absence (σπάνις) of ‘useful’ or ‘necessary’ relations would continue to be felt by any survivors who returned to the countryside. Upon return to their farms, Athenians would be confronted with the realization that their familiar social networks were at best altered and at worst extinct.

The immediate economic consequences of the plague included rapid transfers of property as people died (Thuc. 2.53). Athenians spent what inheritance they came into quickly, reckoning that their lives, as much as their possessions, were fleeting. Athenian society thus witnessed a sudden, rapid change (ἀγχίστροφον τὴν μεταβολήν) in the ownership of property, which, up until 430, was stable. Andreyev writes:

An immediate result of the war and of the internal upheavals which followed it, was a decline in the stability of agrarian conditions. As a result of the extinction of entire

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291 This has been deemed credible by Holladay and Poole 1979 in their study of Thucydides’ plague. If, however, modern authorities express doubts over disease-induced amnesia, this is all the more reason to see the inclusion of this symptom in Thucydides’ narrative as an important statement on the effects of the disease on social relations.

292 This, too, in addition to the threat of repeat invasions would have doubtless made many Athenian farmers less than eager to return to their fields after Peloponnesian withdrawal. Bascom 1998, 166 reveals that in modern refugee situations, displaced persons oftentimes are more fearful of the crises associated repatriation with its attended social breakdown than they are attracted by the new opportunities offered by a much changed socio-economic landscape.
families . . . land ‘in abeyance’ appeared. Land which had ceased to be part of family property easily changed hands.\textsuperscript{293}

Although it is important not to overstate the extent to which the countryside was abandoned and to which farmland fell into permanent ruin as a result of neglect, it seems certain that the Athenian farmer, who had sought refuge in Athens during the Peloponnesian invasion of 430, faced, if he was brave and motivated enough to return to his fields, a much changed socio-economic environment. The sense of confusion that permeated the countryside is well captured by the Proboulos in Aristophanes’ \textit{Lysistrata} who asks the title character, “So how will you women be able to put a stop to such a complicated mess in the lands (\(\chi\'\rho\alpha\varsigma\)) and sort it all out?”\textsuperscript{294} In the context of asking how Lysistrata means to put a stop to the war, \(kh\'\omicron\alpha\omicron\) obviously conveys some sense of ‘cities’ or ‘international communities,’ but Henderson points out that this is unparalleled elsewhere in Greek.\textsuperscript{295} The choice of word here is driven by the Athenians’ experience of the disruption to life in Attica, which is much mixed up and confused (\(\tau\tau\alpha\rho\alpha\gamma\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\alpha\) . . . \(\pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\alpha\)).

In addition to fatalities, the plague had a disastrous effect on the birthrate for 430-427. Smallpox, even if it were not the actual disease responsible, is at least comparable. It is most dangerous to pregnant women, unborn foetuses (about 75% of pregnancies in infected women terminate in miscarriage), and infants. Live-birth rates would have fallen and the infant mortality rate would have been high. The impact on the Athenian soldiery of a sharp decline in birthrate is noted by Sallares, who calculates that it would have been felt between 412-409. Similarly, the impact on the availability of farm labour would have continued to manifest itself

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{293} Andreyev 1974, 18; Lys. 7.4; cf. 7-8.
  \item \textsuperscript{294} 565-6: \(\pi\omicron\omicron\varsigma\ \omicron\nu\omicron\ \eta\omicron\omicron\omicron\ \delta\omicron\nu\omicron\omicron\alpha\varsigma\ \pi\alpha\omicron\alpha\omicron\gamma\omicron\mu\omicron\epsilon\nu\alpha\ \pi\omicron\alpha\gamma\mu\omicron\omicron\alpha\ \pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\alpha\ \epsilon\nu\ \tau\alpha\iz\zeta\varsigma\ \chi\omicron\rho\alpha\varsigma\ \kappa\alpha\omicron\ \delta\alpha\omicron\lambda\omicron\omicron\alpha\).
  \item \textsuperscript{295} Henderson 1987, 140 citing Dover but without providing a reference.
\end{itemize}
well beyond 430 inasmuch as households normally relied on sons to perform agricultural work. Coupled with a probable slight, short-term increase in the size of average land holdings because of the deaths of siblings, this is a recipe for a labour crisis. *Oliganthrôpia* would have been as much an economic problem as it was a military one. The demographic impact of the plague on the rural economy would have been profoundly felt both in the immediate shock of the fatalities of 430 and over the course of the war as demographic changes disrupted, or indeed destroyed, social networks.

The first choral ode of Sophocles’ *Oedipus Tyrannus* gives us a vivid impression of what contemporary Athens was suffering owing to the combined effects of the plague and Peloponnesian invasions:\(^{296}\)

> Ah, countless are the troubles that I bear! Sickness lies on all our company, and thought can find no weapons to repel it. The fruits of the glorious earth do not increase, and no births come to let women surmount the pains in which they cry out. You can see one here and one there, swifter than destroying fire, speed like a winged bird to the shore of the god whose home is in the West.

> Countless are their deaths, and the city is perishing; unpitied her children lie on the ground, carried off by death, with none to lament; and by the row of altars wives and white-haired mothers on this side and on that groan as suppliants on account of their sad troubles. Loud rings out the hymn to the Healer and the sound of lamentation with it! For these things, golden daughter of Zeus, send the bright face of protection!

> And may savage Ares, who now without the bronze of shields is scorching me as he attacks with shouts, turn his back and hasten from our land, carried back either to the great chamber of Amphitrite or to the Thracian billow bare of harbours.\(^{297}\)

The passage takes into account the several woes afflicting the city at once: the deaths of many citizens from the plague; the infertility of the land; and the infertility of Athenian women.

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\(^{296}\) That is, if we can assume a production date in the early 420s for Sophocles’ *Oedipus Tyrannus*, as many scholars have (though admittedly much of the argument rests on topical consideration for the plague in Oedipus’ Thebes). Knox 1979 argues for production in 425; Newton 1980 prefers the year 429, detecting allusions to Sophocles’ play in Euripides’ *Hippolytus* of 428; Newton’s view has been endorsed by Janko 1999. The early 420s is generally accepted.

\(^{297}\) 167-197 (trans. Lloyd-Jones).
Scholars have been puzzled by the designation of Ares as the primary source of the woes of a city suffering from plague. An explanation is not easily discovered using the logic of the play itself. Ares was especially venerated at Thebes and enjoyed a strong association with that city. It has been noted that Ares, for Sophocles, is not simply the god of war (cf. *Ajax* 706) and is in general a destroyer of men (βροτολογογός), as he is called elsewhere (especially in Homer, Tyrtaeus and Aeschylus). However, this adjective is found nowhere in Sophocles and where it does occur ‘Ares, Destroyer of men’ nevertheless usually carries a martial association. This passage is unique in its linkage of Ares with disease. An answer to the puzzle, which is actually fairly straightforward, presents itself: the likely explanation does not come from the play itself, but from the situation at Athens in the 420s, wherein the Archidamian War and the plague had become linked in the mind of playwright and audience.

We can, with Hanson, take Thucydides at his word when he states that “nothing was more damaging to the power of the Athenians” than the plague (3.87.2), but the combination of wartime conditions and the plague was crucial. Thucydides acknowledges that the evacuation of the countryside into the urban zone exacerbated the disease and its effects (2.52.1-3), but, in the minds of other Athenians, as the previous dramatic passage attests, the two phenomena may have been more firmly, negatively, conjoined. The Archidamian War and its attending agricultural loss, together with the great plague, were ruinous to Athens and transformative to her accustomed way of life. That this was so is reflected in Aristophanic

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298 Larson 2007, 156.
299 Jebb 1887, *ad. loc.*
300 Knox 1957, 200.
301 Cf. Thuc. 7.27.3 for a similar assessment from the historian of the effects of the Decelean occupation.
302 See Thuc. 2.64.1, 6.12.
comedy and is hinted at by Thucydides in his general statements concerning Athenian sentiments during the evacuation with which we began above.

We know something of the living arrangements of the Athenian refugees from Thucydides, who states that they carried what they could with them into the city, some of them even managing to save their expensive wooden doorframes (2.14.1). The Athenians were apparently aided somewhat by the delay of Archidamus, first at the Isthmus and then at Oenoe (2.18.4). Upon entering the city, the refugees from the countryside found shelter wherever they could; some were fortunate enough to have their own urban houses; others found accommodations with friends or relatives; the majority, however, had to settle for living in shanties and lean-tos (καλύβαις) in the empty spaces (τὰ ἔρημα) of the city or else in fortification towers, temples and sanctuaries (2.17.1; 2.52.1-2). It should be borne in mind that the logistics relating to the evacuations were not centrally planned or financed, resulting in haphazard settlement within the city as well as, evidently, a considerable financial burden borne by individuals. Although the actual costs of transporting one’s goods and family from the countryside to Athens are beyond us, they were likely considerable. Herodotus says of those who remained to defend the acropolis in 480 that they were “the stewards of the scared precinct and poor men,” the latter “having not withdrawn to Salamis” in part “because of poverty”.

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303 But cf. Thorne 2001 for the difficulty in transporting household items.
304 Hdt. 8.51.2: καὶ αἰρέσασι ἔρημον τὸ ἁπτομα, καὶ τινὰς ὀλίγοις ἐφύππεσαν τὸν Ἀθηναίων ἐν τῷ ἱρῷ ἔοντας, ταῖς τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ πένητας ἀνθρώπους. Ὁ φραζόμενοι τὴν ἄκρωσιν θύρησι τῇ καὶ ἔσοδοι ἠμόνοντο τοῖς ἐπίστασι. Ἐν δὲ αὐτοῖς ἀσθενείας βίου οὐκ ἐκχερσάσαντες ἐς Σαλαμίνα. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοι δοκέοντες ἐξεχέκηκαν τὸ μαντήλον τῇ Πυθίῃ σφι ἔχθησι, τὸ ἔσοδον τεχήσαν ἄνωλον ἐπεσεθαί: αὐτὸ δὴ τούτο εἶναι τὸ κρησφύγοντον κατὰ τὸ μαντήλον καὶ οὐ τὰς νέας. It could be argued that Athenians in the later fifth century, on average, would be much wealthier than those in 480 and thus could more easily absorb the financial cost of evacuation. The point here, however, is not so much to stress the cost involved, but to highlight that logistics were left in the hands of individuals.
Aristophanes’ plays allude to the miserable living conditions within the city. Dicaeopolis complains of living “against a wall,” surrounded by garbage and filth (Ach. 71-2).\(^{305}\) In the much later Ecclesiazousae, Praxagora explains to one of her coconspirators that she learned to speak well “having lived, during the displacements (ἐν ταῖς φοργαῖς), with my husband on the Pnyx.”\(^{306}\) It is unclear whether this refers to the Decelean occupation from 413-404 or to the forced migrations under Lysander after the defeat at Aigospotamoi in 405, but the Pnyx would have been occupied in any of the displacements, including, of course, those of the Archidamian War.

Some of the temporary, hastily built structures have left archaeological traces in the Agora.\(^{307}\) The city was unbearably crowded by throngs of refugees and eventually the area between the long walls to Piraeus was occupied as well. The space remained insufficient and the conditions must have been truly apocalyptic for those forced to suffer the cramped confines of public spaces in the summer heat.\(^{308}\) It is in his description of the plague that Thucydides offers the most vivid picture of the overcrowding in the city: “The dead,” he writes, “lay as they had died, one upon another” (2.52.2).

The overcrowding in the city does not seem to have wholly abated after the withdrawal of Peloponnesian forces, or indeed even with the cessation of the invasions in 425. In Knights produced the next year, Aristophanes’ Sausage Seller demands of Paphlagon:

\(^{305}\) Ach. 71-2: σφόδρα γὰρ ἐσφόξομην ἐγὼ παρὰ τὴν ἐπαλέξειν ἐν φοργαῖ κατακείμενος.
\(^{306}\) 243.
\(^{307}\) Thompson and Wycherly 1972, 57, 120-1, 170.
\(^{308}\) Compare with Xenophon’s whimsical question in the Oeconomicus (5.9): “Where is it pleasanter to spend the summer enjoying the cool waters and breezes and shade than in the country?” Morris 2007, 115 estimates that on the basis of settlement patterns in the urban zones that about 10% of the 350 000 population lived in the asty; perhaps another 10% in Piraeus. The evacuations, therefore, meant the influx of tens of thousands of people from the countryside (as many as 280 000 lived in the khôra).
Just how can you claim to cherish him [Demos], when you’ve seen him living in barrels and shanties and garrets for eight years now and instead of feeling any pity, having shut him up you harvest him?\textsuperscript{309}

During the Archidamian War the Athenians were ostensibly free to return to their homes in the countryside following the month or so during which the enemy was in Attica (Thuc. 7.27.4). Moreover, while the \textit{Knights} was being composed, the Athenians had secured their victory at Pylos, the upshot of which was that they now held Spartiate hostages as a guarantee against further invasions (Thuc. 4.41). Is the passage just quoted, then, simply a comic exaggeration? Surely there is more to this passage. The accusation that Athens’ politicians keep the demos at war, cooping the people up (καθείρζας) so that they can systematically ‘harvest’ them (βλίττεις), is much too interesting to simply brush aside. Aristophanes’ language here is striking: rather than being free to getting back to the business of farming, the demos is itself cultivated and harvested by its leaders. The accusation of the Sausage Seller, and the Paphlagonian’s response, in which he claims he is trying to secure livelihood for Demos, is representative of an internal debate at Athens over the fateful decision in 432 to abandon the countryside and the consequences to Athenian society. The displacement of so many citizens from their traditional form of livelihood in the fields of Attica, in addition to causing a desperate housing crisis within the city and exacerbating the plague, also compelled thousands of Athenians to look for alternative means of income.

\textsuperscript{309} \textit{Knights} 792-4: καὶ πῶς σὺ φιλεῖς, ὥς τοῦτον ὅρθιον οἰκοῦντ’ ἐν ταῖς φιδάκναισι καὶ γυναῖκ λοις καὶ πυργίδοις ἔτος δύον οὐκ ἐλεφθείς, ἀλλὰ καθείρζας αὐτὸν βλίττεις;
Section I, Chapter 4:  
Adaptation and a ‘new Athenian economy’

4.1 A foreign supply

We have already seen that most of the urban population of Athens relied on imported grain in the fifth century. The steps taken already in 431 in response to the Peloponnesian invasion attest to the fact that Athenian policy was now greatly concerned with the upkeep and the expansion of this foreign supply. A number of literary passages speak to the special importance of Euboea to the Athenian grain supply at this time. Thucydides tells us that the Athenians sent their flocks and draught animals to the island in 431 (2.14.1), but it is clear that Euboea’s importance to Athens during the war was primarily as a supplier of cereals. The transportation of provisions (ἐπιτιθεία) from Euboea via Oropos was a regular component of the Athenian food supply before the fort at Decelea interrupted the land route (7.28.1). Thucydides reports that news of the loss of Euboea itself in 411 caused a greater panic in Athens than anything hitherto, including the surprise attacks on Piraeus and the disaster in Sicily; this was because “the Athenians were supported (ὄφελοντο) much more from Euboea than from Attica” (8.96.1-2; cf. Ath. Pol. 33.1). Furthermore, references scattered throughout Aristophanes’ plays reveal Athens’ reliance on this important source of grain. In Wasps of

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310 We possess an Athenian decree proclaiming the set-rate for transportation among Hestiaia, Khalkis and Oropos (IG I 41, 67-72), which mentions livestock.
311 At 8.96.3, it is clear that the most immediate concern of the Athenians is not for their food supply, but for an attack on Piraeus, which was now unprotected with the fleet lost in the battle in the Euripus. There is, however, no contradiction in the passage. The food supply was as pressing a concern as security.
312 Clouds 211-13 with scholia.
422, Bdelycleon argues that whenever politicians feel threatened they promise the demos Euboea and to supply grain in abundance, but only ever deliver meager amounts (715-7).\textsuperscript{313}

Scholars have noted the lack of direct evidence for the importation of foodstuffs from Euboea for the period before the 420s.\textsuperscript{314} This silence has been explained with reference to Athens’ complete dominance at sea and her control over the Aegean: since control of the lands that produced the grain as well as the shipping routes by which it was delivered was uncontested, Euboean grain did not attract the attention of our sources. But throughout the Archidamian War was Athens any less dominant a naval power than she was previously? The increased concern with imported foodstuffs, especially from Euboea, reflected for the first time in the historical record in Thucydides and Aristophanes, may rather be a result of the body politic—the voting population—now taking a greater interest in foreign grain as a result of their lost harvests. That is, the Athenians now had to rely more heavily on imports from the island to replace domestic grain, which in the past had gone a long way to meeting the requirements of rural Athenians. In addition to the literary passages just cited, an Athenian decree dated by Mattingly to 424/3 governing the treatment of Khalkis provides a final clause for “the protection of Euboea, [that] the generals shall have the responsibility, to the best of their ability, that it be as excellent as possible for the Athenians” (\textit{IG} I\textsuperscript{3} 40).\textsuperscript{315} Athenian actions following the initial invasion of 431 also imply great concern for the security of Euboea as an Athenian

\textsuperscript{313} The scholiast to this passage, citing Philochorus, writes that this remark refers to an expedition to Euboea in 424/3 not mentioned by Thucydides. Jacoby thinks such an expedition plausible, especially since Athenian action might be required in the area to quell dissent in the aftermath of the Athenian disgrace at Delium (\textit{FGrH} 328 Fr. 130.)

\textsuperscript{314} Garnsey 1998, 132-133; de Ste. Croix 1974, 49; Westlake 1948, 2-5; cf. Moreno 2007, 89-117. Athenian campaigns and cleruchies are well attested before this, but direct evidence for the importation of supplies arises only in the 420s.

\textsuperscript{315} Mattingly 1961, 124-132; but cf. Wallace and Figueira 2011, 247-8 for a date of 446/5; Moreno 2007, 100 n. 114; Fornara 1977, 109-112.
‘bread-basket’ in relation and in reaction to the loss of Attica. These include campaigns against Lokrian towns to ensure easy access to Euboea (Thuc. 2.26, 32; Diod. 12.44.1) and the establishment of a fleet to safeguard the island (Thuc. 2.33; Diod. 12.44.1).\textsuperscript{316} For 428/7, the Athenian navy, then at its acme, devoted 100 ships to the protection of Attica, Euboea and Salamis (Thuc. 3.17.2).\textsuperscript{317} These policies are paralleled in the events following the summer of 413/12. The fortification at Decelea deprived the Athenians of the convenient land route via Oropus by which they were accustomed to bring in supplies from Euboea. In response, they hastily fortified Sounion to protect grain ships, which now had to make the long voyage around the coast to Piraeus instead of simply across the Gulf of Euboea (7.28, 8.1, 4).\textsuperscript{318}

Euboea, therefore, although exploited in some ways by the Athenians since at least the last decade of the sixth century, seems to have been of especial importance during the Peloponnesian War (until its cities revolted in 411). Most scholars accept that Athens was importing grain from Euboea prior to 431 and the efforts of the Athenians in the first two decades of the war represent an intensification of preexisting practice rather than entirely new policy.\textsuperscript{319} The Athenians can be seen taking particular care for the protection of the island after every crisis (the initial invasion of Attica, the revolt of Lesbos, the Sicilian defeat and the fortification of Decelea and a last ditch attempt to reinforce the fleet near Khalkis before the Euboean revolt). Moreover, Thucydides says of the founding of Heraclea in Trakhis by the

\textsuperscript{316} Cf. also the concern with the Spartan foundation of Heraklea in Trakhis, intended to disrupt Athenian interests in the region (Thuc. 3.91-93).
\textsuperscript{317} This represents a commitment in manpower of some 20,000 men.
\textsuperscript{318} The archaeological remains of the fort attest to its hasty construction, corroborating the building project as a reaction to the loss of Oropus-Decelea route (Wrede 1933, 10-11, 19). Moreno 2007, 118 stresses the massive expense involved in protecting the new, longer sea-route with trireme fleets.
\textsuperscript{319} For the earlier period, see Wallace and Figueira 2011, arguing that Euboea saw only “moderate Athenian exactions from 446 into the 420s.” For the Athenians’ heavier reliance on Euboea during the Peloponnesian War, see: Garnsey 1988, 132-3; Westlake 1948, 2-5. Cf. the discussion in Moreno 2007, 77-116, arguing for heavy exactions from the late sixth century.
Spartans in 426 that the city would be of use to them for damaging the Athenians specifically because it lay on the route to Thrace, but more importantly because from here the Spartans could muster a fleet to attack Euboea, which was only a short distance away (3.92.4). The increased attention in our sources on Euboean goods reflects increased Athenian concern with securing and maintaining a ready and nearby supply of imported foodstuffs as an adaptive measure to replace, or at least heavily supplement, Attic production.\(^\text{320}\)

### 4.2 Imperial allotments

Another way in which the Athenians sought to make good the losses in Attica was through the imposition of cleruchies. During the war, Athens appropriated portions of the territory of recalcitrant allies as it had done since the mid-460s, beginning with Thasos (Thuc. 1.100-101) and most recently in 446 with Hestiaia (Thuc. 1.114.3; 7.57.2).\(^\text{321}\)

Thus they seem to have expanded a practice well attested in the previous period. Two cases, however, of large-scale land expropriation during the war deserve special consideration for the role they played in mitigating the property losses of Athenians. The first is the unprecedented decision of 431, associated with Pericles, to displace the entire population of Aegina and to resettle the island with Athenian *epoikoi* (Thuc. 2.27; Hdt. 91.1; Diod. 12.44.2). It is likely that Aegina, as a potential staging point for a naval attack on Piraeus, was viewed as a real concern to military security. Thucydides implies that the displacement occurred very shortly after the Peloponnesian invasion, however, and it is very tempting to associate this

\(^{320}\) Supply of grain from Lemnos and Imbros also seems to have been crucial to the Athenians during the war as can be seen in their resolve not to give up these imperial possessions in various treaties. Judging by the evidence of the Eleusis inscriptions (*IG* II\(^2\) 1672, 276, 297), Lemnos and Imbros produced a barley crop 80% as large as Attica’s and a wheat crop more than 2.75 times larger (Seager 1966, 172).

\(^{321}\) E.g., the colonies established at Potidaea in 430/29 (Thuc. 2.70.3; Diod. 12.46.7), Skione in 421 (Thuc. 5.32.1; Isocrates 12.63) and Melos in 415 (Thuc. 5.116.4; Isocrates 12.63).
action with the statement of Pericles to the effect that, deprived of Attica, the Athenians could find substitute lands throughout the mainland and Aegean (1.143.4). 322

An even more illustrative case of the strategy to use Aegean territory as a replacement for Attica is the settlement after the Mytilenian revolt. The establishment of cleruchies on Lesbos in 428 is unique in character and speaks to wartime expediency. Thucydides offers a full explanation of the novel settlement of affairs in the aftermath of the revolt:

On Cleon’s motion, the Athenians killed those Paches had sent back as especially responsible for the revolt (these were slightly more than a thousand), and they tore down the walls of Mytilene and took over its ships. Later on, instead of imposing tribute on the Mytileneans, they divided the land, except for Methymna, into three thousand portions, selecting three hundred as sacred to the gods and sending out their own citizens to the rest as cleruchs according to lot. The Lesbians themselves worked the land after being assigned a payment to them in silver, two minas for a year for each allotment. The Athenians also took over all the towns that the Mytileneans had ruled on the mainland, and in the future they were the subjects of Athens. This was how things turned out regarding Lesbos. 325

The decision to divide the island into cleruchies instead of forcing the Lesbians to pay an indemnity is a curious one, especially coming as it does in 427/6 when, according to the traditional view, Athens began to experience real financial difficulties. 324 For this settlement meant that the annual rents, amounting to six talents, were parceled out to individual Athenians rather than paid to the state treasuries. This marked a departure from prior policy in dealing with recalcitrant allies. 325 As such, it has been interpreted by scholars as a shift away from the civic-

322 Pericles’ involvement seems assured given the saying attributed to the statesman in Plutarch’s biography, in which he calls for the removal of Aegina as “they eyesore of the Piraeus” (Per. 8.7). On Pericles’ imperialist policy of replacing Attica with lands throughout the empire, see: Taylor 2010, 45; Longo 1974, 19-20.
324 Kagan 1974, 144, 164-5; but for a more optimistic view of Athenian finance at this time, see: Blamire 2001, 110-111; Kallet-Marc 1993, 138. On this we shall have more to say below.
325 The Thasians had been forced to pay indemnities (Thuc. 1.101.3) and the Samians had been assessed substantial reparations (1.117.3). We do not have total figures, but special payments from the
minded policies advocated by Pericles towards a policy driven by personal self-interest on the part of citizens.\textsuperscript{326} While the year 428 did indeed witness a change in Athenian financial management, the creation of cleruchies on Lesbos should nevertheless be seen as exactly the sort of adaptive measure Pericles had in mind when he convinced the Athenians to abandon their traditional livelihood in Attica.

In the summer of 427, Athens had already suffered four invasions, with only a single year’s respite (the year in which the plague broke out). The invasion of 427, moreover, was the second most destructive of the five (3.26.3). Athenians in the lowest category of significant landholdings, that is the zeugitai—whose fortunes were modest and who, up until 431, drew their income from their lands—can be expected to have felt the impact of the invasions particularly sharply.\textsuperscript{327} The Solonian telê were originally based solely on the ownership of land. Many scholars assume that in the fifth century there was a cash-based census put in place to reflect the diversifying economy but there is no direct evidence for this.\textsuperscript{328} Some kind of mixed monetary-agricultural system notwithstanding, those zeugitai who drew their living from the fields (and there were still many) stood to lose their status as a result of the invasion. For these individuals, the klêros allotment might mean economic salvation.

We possess a few tantalizing pieces of evidence supporting the hypothesis that allotments were reserved for those on the economic margins. First, there is the very interesting inscription outlining regulations for the establishment of an Athenian colony at Brea dated by Meiggs to

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\textsuperscript{326} Samians show up in an Athenian decree from 426 (IG I\textsuperscript{3} 68) as well as Athenian financial records for 423/2 (IG I\textsuperscript{1} 369), 418/17 (IG I\textsuperscript{1} 370) and 414/13 (IG I\textsuperscript{1} 371).\textsuperscript{326} Kallet-Marx 1993, 121-123, 143-149.\textsuperscript{327} Cf. Foxhall 1997 and van Wees 2001, arguing that zeugitai were possessors of considerable landed wealth.\textsuperscript{328} Rhodes \textit{AP}, 142. For a full discussion of the Solonian telê, see Section II, Ch. 6.
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426/5 (IG I² 45 = IG I³ 46; Fornara 100).\textsuperscript{329} It stipulates that only \textit{thêtes} and \textit{zeugitai} are eligible as \textit{apoikoi}. Next is a tradition preserved by Libanius in his \textit{Hypothesis} to Demosthenes’ speech, \textit{On the Chersonese} (8), which states that it was ancient custom for the Athenians to establish cleruchies for the purpose of turning the poor and landless (πένητας . . . καὶ ἄκτήμονες) into hoplites (8.1.2).\textsuperscript{330} Libanius is admittedly very late (4\textsuperscript{th} century AD), but this tradition finds support in a fragmentary passage from Antiphon comprising the phrase “to make all \textit{thêtes} into hoplites” (F 61.2 T: τοὺς τε \textit{θῆτας} ἀπαντας ὀπλίτας ποιήσας), which may reflect a similar scheme. Most intriguing, however, is Gauthier’s observation that the two-minae rents reported by Thucydides roughly correspond to a notional capitalized hoplite ‘property threshold’ in the first two decades of the war, prompting the suggestion that the cleruchs who received the rents would be ‘upgraded’ to hoplite status.\textsuperscript{331} The Lesbian cleruchies probably do represent a strategy consciously crafted to buoy the fortunes of impoverished Athenian landholders and it may well be that this strategy paid hoplites especial mind, but we should be careful not to draw too close an equation between the Solonian groups and military categories.\textsuperscript{332} Regardless, the settlement of which these cleruchies were a part would appear, by virtue of its scale and its unique parameters, to be a response to particular hardships being experienced in Attica in the

\textsuperscript{329} Meiggs 1972, 158. But cf. Fornara 1983 for proposed earlier dates.

\textsuperscript{330} Lib. 8.1.2: ἐδοξος δὲ ἦν τοῦτο παλαιὸν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ὁσοὶ πένητες ἦσαν αὐτῶν καὶ ἄκτήμονες οἶκοι, τούτους πέμπειν ἐποίκοις εἰς τὰς ἔξω πόλεις τὰς ἑαυτῶν, καὶ ἑλάμβανον πεμπόμενοι ὀπλα τε ἐκ τοῦ δῆμοσιον καὶ ἐφόδιον. The mention of the provision of arms “from the public fund” would seem to fit a later, fourth-century, date. Compare IG I³ 1, an inscription from the late 6\textsuperscript{th} century, stipulating that all cleruchs to Salamis must pay taxes and provide military service to Athens and must provide their own arms to a value of 30 drachmae.

\textsuperscript{331} Gauthier 1966, 64-88.

\textsuperscript{332} Cf. Figueira 2008, who argues that the aim was to provide social advancement to \textit{thêtes} in order to provide the state with more hoplites. This, thesis, however, rests on the assumption, which is manifestly false, that members of the lowest Solonian class did not regularly serve as hoplites.
The exploitation of Euboea through trade and through cleruchies and the imperial colonization ventures just discussed reveal the network by which the Athenians assured themselves of access to foodstuffs adequate to replace whatever was lost in Attica. To be sure, other sources of foreign grain played their part in contributing to Athens’ external food supply as well.\(^\text{334}\) This imported grain, however, was purchased by individuals rather than given them.\(^\text{335}\) We know that Athens had some mechanism for doling out grain for free or at very reduced prices to its citizens in times of great crisis. Plutarch tells us that during a food shortage in 445/4, when King Psammetichus of Egypt sent 40 000 medimnoi of grain to Athens to be distributed among its citizens, almost 5000 claimants were discovered through informers to have been illegitimate and were disqualified and sold into slavery (Plut. Per. 37.3).

Notwithstanding this extreme case, the state must not have regularly provided grain subsidies, otherwise the institution of the \textit{diòbelia} in 411 is unintelligible.\(^\text{336}\) The next section will discuss

\(^{333}\) See further, below, Section II, Ch. 6.8, 222.

\(^{334}\) Few attestations of sources of grain other than Euboea are available for the years 431-411: Thuc. 3.2 mentions preparations for the Lesbian revolt included the seizure of grain ships, presumably referring to grain from the Black Sea, but there is no necessary implication here that these ships were bound for Athens; \textit{IG I} \textsuperscript{1} 62 (428/7) limits the amount of grain that Aphytis could import to 10 000 \textit{medimnoi} at the same price as the Athenians allowed the Methonaians to pay, which, coupled with \textit{IG I} \textsuperscript{1} 61 (426/5), allowing Methonaians to import (?)000 \textit{medimnoi} of grain directly from Byzantium and mentioning the \textit{Hellespontophylakes} again presumably refers to Black Sea grain. See: Tsetschkladze 2008, 47-62; Moreno 2007; cf. Keen 2000, 63-73. In contrast, after 411, the Athenians can be seen casting farther afield for imports: the Black Sea (Xen. \textit{Hell.} 1.35-6, 2.1.17, 2.2.9, 2.2.21) and Cyprus (\textit{IG I} \textsuperscript{1} 113; [Dem.] 12.10; Andoc. 2.20) now appear with some frequency in the historical record.

\(^{335}\) The scholiast to \textit{Acharnians} (45) tells us that the Alphitopolis Stoa in the Emporion was developed at the insistence of Pericles. Garland 2001, 27 sees its construction as “firm evidence” that the Athenians were increasing their dependency on imported cereals at this time. On the purchase of imported grain by individuals, see: von Reden 2007, 405; Garnsey 1988.

\(^{336}\) \textit{Ath. Pol.} 51.3 tells us that there “used to be” ten \textsuperscript{σιτερώλακες}, five for the city and five for the Piraeus, but by its time this number had been increased to twenty. The Athenians also elected by lot ten port superintendents (\textit{ἐξωνάριον ὅ ἐπιμελητὰς}), whose job included the important responsibility of ensuring that 2/3 of the grain coming into Piraeus reached the city. We cannot say with any certainty when these
how Athenian farmers, who were accustomed to grow much of their own subsistence, paid for the imported grain that either supplemented or replaced that grown domestically.

4.3 Misthophoria

Pay for public service in Athens is normally held to have been introduced by Pericles in the middle of the fifth century in the form of the dikastêria misthophora and is traditionally viewed as part of the reforms initiated by the weakening of the power of the Council of the Areopagus by Ephialtes (Arist. Pol. 2.1274a; Pl. Gorg. 515e). The Ath. Pol. interprets the popular measure to introduce jury pay as a political stratagem of Pericles to outdo Kimon in generosity (27.2), which would place the move sometime before 450, the year in which Kimon was killed in Cyprus.\(^{337}\) Pericles is also credited with the introduction of military pay (schol. Dem. 13), although there is no indication whether this was later.\(^{338}\) Further clouding the picture is Ath. Pol.’s (certainly mistaken) assertion that Aristeides convinced the Athenians to move into the city from their farms and subsist on the proceeds of empire, a large amount of which was earned by individuals in military service (24). The passage is dismissed by Rhodes as “a result of later theorising.”\(^{339}\) Rosivach has recently proposed that the Ath. Pol. conflates the tradition of Aristeides and the phoros assessment with the only known migration to the asty, that of the Peloponnesian War.\(^{340}\) Without these two data—the putative association between

\(^{337}\) Cf. Plato, Gorgias 515e.


\(^{339}\) Rhodes AP, 297.

\(^{340}\) Rosivach 2011.
dikastic pay and Pericles’ rivalry with Kimon and Aristeides’ putative policy—we can only date both *mishphoriai* to before Pericles’ death in 429.  

Busolt believed that military pay for citizen soldiers was introduced at Athens during the Pentaconaetia, but provides no evidence. This has not prevented many from following him. To suggest that state pay for jury and military service at Athens was only introduced at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War would surely make most scholars uncomfortable, owing to the long-held assumption based on the sources just cited that state pay was established following the democratic reforms of Ephialtes. Nevertheless, if state pay was not introduced during the war, it was certainly expanded. State subventions increased both quantitatively and qualitatively over the course of the war in response to Athens being cut off from its hinterland, and the politicians associated with them loom large in sources dealing with the war.

The Pseudo-Aristotelian *Athenaiôn Politeia* includes a fascinating editorial remark in its description of Periclean Athens:

> In the archonship of Pythodorus, the Peloponnesian War broke out during which the populace was shut up in the city and became accustomed to gain its livelihood by military service, and so, partly voluntarily and partly involuntarily, determined to assume the administration of the state itself.

Plutarch’s *Life of Pericles*, too, tells us that it was under the influence of the great statesman that the Athenians *en masse* began to derive their livelihoods from state pay. Plutarch, who had great admiration for Thucydides as an historian, is nevertheless critical of his assessment of Periclean leadership:

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341 Plutarch’s account (*Per*. 9.2-3) seems to follow the *Ath. Pol.* and to conflate it with Aristotle’s *Politics*. Here, Pericles courts the masses with jury-pay and then uses his political capital to strike at the Council.

342 Busolt *Griechische Staatskunde* (1926), 582.

343 For example: see Rhodes *AP*, 337-338; Stadter 1989, 115-118; Pritchett *GSAW* I, 1, 7-14.

344 27.2.
Thucydides describes the administration of Pericles as rather aristocratic—‘in name a democracy, but in fact a government by the greatest citizen.’ But many others say that the people was first led on by him into allotments of public lands, festival-grants, and distributions of fees for public service (μηθόδων διανομὰς), thereby falling into bad habits, and becoming luxurious and wanton under the influence of his public measures, instead of frugal and self-sufficing (αὐτοπρογοῦν).\footnote{9.1. This is a direct quotation from Thuc. 2.65.9; cf. Plut. Per. 7.6.}

He goes on to say that Pericles’ policies were guided by a vision for turning the revenues of empire into state maintenance for the whole city (12.4). We cannot be certain who the “many others” are upon whom Plutarch is relying, but the \textit{Ath. Pol.} and Old Comedy are as likely candidates as the Atthidographers. Finally, at 16.3-4, Plutarch describes the peculiar approach that Pericles supposedly took to the management of his own household. He writes that the statesman’s practice was to annually sell all of the produce from his lands at once on the market and from the proceeds to procure all necessities for his household as they were required on a daily basis.\footnote{16.4: τοὺς γὰρ ἐπετείους καρποὺς ἀπαντας ἀθρόους ἐπίπλωσκεν, ἕτα τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐκαστὸν ἡς ἀγορᾶς ὑπομένους διώκει τὸν βίον καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν διάταν.} Plutarch does not name a source for this information either. Stesimbrotus, Theopompus or Theophrastus are all plausible candidates, but, as Stadter suggests, the source may also be a mocking reference from comedy, allegorizing Pericles’ peculiar household management of state funds.\footnote{Stadter 1989, 198-199.} Plutarch seems to be rather uncritical of the source in question: note that the practice of selling in bulk after the harvest and buying from the market would result in selling low and buying high. It is likely, therefore, that Plutarch has taken too literally the source in question in which the philosophical theory, or else the comic effect of the anecdote, was more pertinent than actual farm management. The possibility that Plutarch was using a comic source is particularly attractive; the comedic allegory would have been even more apt if we imagine it to have operated not simply on the level of finances, but on the nexus
of state finance and food supply, that is to say, that his purported private practice, of earning money from his estate from which to buy daily maintenance, allegorized his public policy of feeding the Athenians by provision of state subventions. This is, of course, highly conjectural, but would seem to fit the Periclean position that League revenues be used to “make nearly the whole polis wage-earning (ὅλην ... ἐξαισθῆθων τὴν πόλιν), at once able to sumptuously adorn herself and to feed herself” (τρεθομένην).

4.3.1 Misthos stratiótikos

Beginning in the 420s, we have a relative wealth of information regarding the payment of Athenian soldiers. As mentioned above, Thucydides explicitly states that the regular earnings of a hoplite on campaign were two drachmas per day: a drachma for himself and one for his attendant (3.17.4). That this was the standard for most of the first two decades of the war is supported by a passage in Acharnians in which Dicaeopolis responds with outrage to the two drachma per diem of some Odomantian mercenaries, adding that the rowers in the fleet would surely be incensed (162-3). The standard rate of pay for sailors too seems to have been a single drachma per day (Thuc. 6.8.1, 6.31.2). A passage in Wasps suggests a rate of two obols per day, but this is probably only the portion paid out during the mission (sitêresion), the full amount (misthos entelês) presumably due to be paid out at the conclusion (1187-88).

Such misthos was given out in preparation for naval campaigns, as can be seen from Dicaeopolis’

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348 Per. 12.4: δεὶ δὲ τῆς πόλεως κατεσκευασμένης ἱκανός τοις ἀναγκαίοις πρός τὸν πόλεμον, εἰς ταῦτα τὴν εὐπορίαν τρέπειν αὐτῆς ἀφ’ ὧν δόξα μὲν γενομένων ἀδίκως, εὐπορία δὲ γενομένων ἐτοιμὴ παρέσται, παντοδαπὴς ἔργασις φανερῆς καὶ ποικίλων χρεῶν, αἰ πάσαν μὲν τέχνην ἐγείροντα, πάσαν δὲ χεῖρα κυνώσει, σχεδὸν ὅλην ποιοῦσιν ἐμμεθὺν τὴν πόλιν, ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀμα κοσμομεθεὶν καὶ τρεθομένην.

349 Pay for infantry service is also attested in Aristophanes (Birds 1363-1368).

350 But cf. Pritchett GSAW I, 24, arguing that three obols was the standard rate throughout the fifth century with fluctuations as circumstances dictated.

351 Alternatively it has been suggested that the low rate alluded to by the elderly Philocleon may be evidence for an increase in rowing wages over the course of a generation: MacDowell 1971, 285. For the two-obol minimum as sitêresion, see Gabrielsen 1994, 113-114.
description of the dockyards at Piraeus (544-54). The rate of a full drachma rose slightly in 415 as trierarchs used their own personal wealth to court the best sailors (Thuc. 6.31.3) and, in the aftermath of the defeat of the armada, the rate was probably permanently cut to three obols (Thuc. 8.45.2). How the state would find the resources to pay the salaries of its rowers was an important political issue throughout the war.

In *Knights*, stratiotic *mistroi*, particularly naval pay, is mentioned both as a concern for Demos and a political tool used by politicians (1078-9, 1366-8). An overriding concern of Demos is how competing *prostatai* propose to ensure that sailors are paid their *misthos* (1065-6). The cost of paying soldiers and sailors was enormous. At the height of its power, Thucydides tells us, the Athenian navy floated 250 ships during the summer of 428 (3.17.2). The expense to the state in crew alone for the 50 000 sailors would be 50 talents per day. At this rate, a single week would cost the Athenians more than half of the annual tribute received from the allies (Thuc. 2.13.3). The number of ships given for 428 has been doubted by many as impossibly large. A fleet of half this size, however, would still provide ample opportunity for Athenians to supplement their income by rowing.

Plutarch says that, in addition to providing the demos with entertainments, Pericles also made it policy to annually equip a fleet of sixty triremes for training and patrol duty, which would operate for eight months of the year (*Per*. 11.4). Plutarch explains, “many citizens sailed in these ships” (πολλοὶ τῶν πολιτῶν ἐπλευν). Notwithstanding the imprecise *polloi*, if

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352 Cf. Thuc. 7.27.2, where, in 413, Thracian mercenaries are deemed too expensive to use for the Decelean War at one drachma per day; on the high pay of sailors 415, see Section II, Ch. 8.
353 The two-year siege of Potidaea alone cost the Athenians some 2000 talents (Thuc. 2.70.2).
354 The full complement of a classical trireme was 200 (about 175 rowers, the remainder officers): Hdt. 7.184.1; 8.17; Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.4-7.
355 A standing fleet of (only twenty) patrol ships (νῆς ἡ πολιτίδες) is also mentioned by *Ath. Pol.* in the list of those who receive state pay (24.3).
only half of the crew involved were Athenians, this would provide a livelihood for 6000 citizens. Ps.-Xenophon says explicitly that Athenian slaves were employed to row in the fleet in order to earn money for their masters (1.11). This need not imply that slaves regularly took the place of their masters on triremes. Rather, as was the case with the work performed by agricultural and manufacturing slaves, a slave’s work at the oar was likely done in cooperation with his master. Naval pay could thus function as a significant mechanism for redistribution of the wealth of empire. Thucydides tells us that state outlay for equipping fleets from 431-428, together with the siege of Potidaea, used up the state revenues (τὰ χρήματα . . . ὑπανήλωσεν: 3.17.3). In the parabasis of Knights, the chorus refers to misthophoroi triēreis, suggesting perhaps that the phoros collected in these ships was destined to become pay for rowers and jurors (555; cf. 1070-1071). Epigraphic evidence for the period 432-422 reveals transfers recorded by the logistai from the sacred treasuries to stratēgoi in massive amounts (e.g., IG I3 364, IG I3 369). Additionally, state pay for trireme crews was supplemented by individual trierarchs from their personal wealth. The distinction between the two sources of pay (misthos and epiphorai) is made clearly by Thucydides in reference to the Sicilian expedition (6.31.1-3),

356 Unfortunately, we cannot be certain which sources Plutarch used for this passage (Stadter 1989, 137-138). Scholars have expressed doubt over the claims made. The number of ships would have required an enormous investment. Thucydides tells us that, in 415, sixty talents would be required to maintain the same number of ships for a single month. A fleet of sixty ships, therefore, serving for eight months, effectively the entire sailing season in the Mediterranean, would cost some 480 talents, although, as Stadter suggests, the rate of pay for sailors may have been lower prior to the Peloponnesian War. The proposed emendation of Eddy 1968 of sixty to sixteen ships has been largely rejected on paleographic and logical grounds, and specialists on the Athenian navy, such as Jordan 1975, 105 and Amit 1965, 51, have not been troubled by Plutarch’s figures.

357 See below, Ch. 8.5, 355-356.

358 Edmunds 1987, 253. Alternatively the intended reference may simply be to the wages earned by rowers of triremes.

359 On these loans, see Blamire 2001, 112.
but the liturgical complement doubtless became more significant and more regular as state revenues depleted.\textsuperscript{360} In the mid-420s, the Old Oligarch complains:

In the case of providing financial support for festivals, for athletics in the gymnasia and for manning triremes, [the Athenians] know that the rich pay for the choruses, while the common people are paid to be in the choruses, the rich pay for athletics and for triremes, while the common people are paid to row in triremes and take part in athletics. The common people think that they deserve to take money for singing and running and dancing and sailing in the ships, so that they get more and the rich become poorer.\textsuperscript{361}

The trierarchy thus, too, acted as a redistributive mechanism throughout the war. However, the Athenians relied in the early stages of the war chiefly upon the massive state outlays derived from imperial revenue, from which large numbers of citizens could be maintained.

It is in connection with this great state expenditure that, as Thucydides reports, the Athenian soldiery was most eager for the Sicilian campaign, seeing it as a present source of money (τὸ παρόντι ἀργόριον) and as an inexhaustible supply of pay (ἀδιόν μισθοφοράν) for their future (6.24.3). It is in this light that the remarkable passage in Thucydides on the Athenian fleet of 428/7 should be examined. The Athenians, already having committed a fleet to subdue the Mityleneans, face a second Peloponnesian land invasion planned to coincide with the revolt on Lesbos (3.15.1).

The Athenians, aware that these preparations were based on contempt for their weakness, wished to show that this judgment was mistaken, and that without touching the fleet at Lesbos they were also able to defend themselves easily against the advance from the Peloponnesos, and they manned a hundred ships with both citizens (excluding the

\textsuperscript{360} Gabrielsen 1994, 116-118; on the increased liturgical burdens on the elite during the war, see Section II, Ch. 8.

\textsuperscript{361} [Xen.] \textit{Ath. Pol.} 1.13: ἐν ταῖς χορηγίαις ἀδὸ καὶ γυμνασιαρχίαις καὶ τριηραρχίαις γιγνώσκουσιν ὅτι χορηγοῦσιν μὲν οἱ πλοῦσιοι, χορηγεῖται δὲ ὁ δῆμος, καὶ γυμνασιαρχοῦσιν οἱ πλοῦσιοι καὶ τριηραρχοῦσιν, ὁ δὲ δῆμος τριηραρχεῖται καὶ γυμνασιαρχεῖται. ὧξιοί γὰρ ἄργοριοι λαμβάνειν ὁ δῆμος καὶ ἄδων καὶ τρέχον καὶ ὀρχούμενος καὶ πλέον ἐν ταῖς ναυσίν, ἵνα αὐτὸς τε ἐξῆ καὶ οἱ πλοῦσιοι πενέστεροι γίγνονται.
wealthiest class and the cavalry) and metics and made a show of force around the isthmus and landing on the Peloponnesos wherever they chose.\textsuperscript{362}

It is clear from Thucydides’ language that the presence of zeugitai aboard triremes, particularly as rowers, was exceptional, perhaps even unprecedented since the battle of Salamis in 480. The usual view is that hoplite marines, epibatai, were normally drawn from the thêtes, as was the entire crew of oarsmen.\textsuperscript{363} So the use of zeugitai at all for trireme service, let alone as rowers, is striking. Many scholars have commented on the unusual arrangement and some interesting explanations have been given for it. Gomme suggests that this measure was taken as a result of a lack of manpower caused by the recent plague.\textsuperscript{364} Kagan, critiquing this view, holds that the reason was purely financial, that Athens’ public reserves were already dangerously low by 428 and, faced with the revolt of a powerful ally, economies were necessary. He writes:

the usual rowers were Athenians of the lower class, the thetes, supplemented when necessary by hired rowers from the subject states. This time Athenians of the hoplite census, who normally fought as heavily armed infantrymen only, and resident aliens were pressed into service as rowers.\textsuperscript{365}

More recent work on Athenian war finances has questioned the assumption of financial mismanagement and crisis that underlies Kagan’s analysis.\textsuperscript{366}

Gabrielsen, too, seems to regard this, and the embarking of hippeis in 406 for the battle of Arginusae (Xen. Hell. 1.6.24), as exceptional instances of the conscription of citizens for

\textsuperscript{362} 3.16.1 (trans. Lattimore): αἰσθόμενοι δὲ αὐτοῖς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι διὰ κατάγνωσιν ἀσθενείας σφῶν παρασκευαζομένους, δηλώσας βουλόμενοι ὅτι οὐκ ὅρθως ἐγνώκασιν ἄλλ’ οὗτοι τε εἰσὶ μὴ κινοῦντες τὸ ἔπι Λέσβῳ ναυτικόν καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου ἐπὶ τῶν ῥαδίων ἀμύνεσθαι, ἐπήλθοσαν ναὸς ἐκατὸν ἐπὶ ἀνάπτυχές αὐτοὶ τε πλὴν ἰππεῶν καὶ πεντακοσιομεδίμων καὶ οἱ μέτοικοι, καὶ παρὰ τὸν Ἰσθμὸν ἀναγαγόντες ἐπιδείξῃ τε ἐποιοῦντο καὶ ἀποβάσεις τῆς Πελοποννήσου ἢ δοκοῖν αὐτοῖς.


\textsuperscript{364} Gomme HCT II, 271.

\textsuperscript{365} Kagan 1974, 141.

\textsuperscript{366} See, for example, Kallet-Marx 1993, 139-151. Cf. Blamire 2001, 110.
service as rowers. There is nothing in the language of Thucydides, however, to suggest that this need have been a forced levy of citizen rowers. The recruitment of oarsmen was the responsibility of individual trierarchs (Ar. Peace 1234) and the state seems to have had limited ability to compel its citizens to serve in the fleet. For example, Xenophon records that in 373, Timotheos, unable to find suitable manpower for his fleet, was forced to tour the Aegean in search of rowers (Xen. Hell. 6.2.11-12). To the best of our knowledge, service in the fleet, unlike service in the city’s hoplite corps, was always strictly voluntary, incentivized by the allure of pay. There was no conscription *kata logou* as was the case with hoplite armies. The linkage, moreover, between money-earning and naval service was strong in ancient Greece. Van Wees has recently shown, based on an Eretrian inscription, that *misthos* for (mercenary?) oarsmen goes back at least as far as the last quarter of the sixth century. The probability that the *zeugitai* rowers of 428/7 were volunteers has very interesting implications for how we should understand the Athenian economy of the early 420s.

We recall that the *Ath. Pol.* follows a tradition wherein the Peloponnesian War occasioned a process in which the populace began to make ends meet by earning *misthos stratiótikos* (27.2). We have also seen that, in all probability, military pay for citizens was not an invention of 431, but that the war provided greater opportunity for earning— for some. It is

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367 Gabrielson 1994, 107. The case of 406 is a much stronger one for conscription: here Athens faced a severe manpower crisis as evinced by the decision not only to embark *hippeis* as rowers, but also to manumit and naturalize slaves who fought in the battle (Ar. Frogs 190-191, 693-702 with *schol.* citing Hellanicus, *FGrH* 323a Fr. 26; cf. Hunt 2001). Here Xenophon makes reference to an actual *psêphisma* (*ἐνεπιστάνει* in which the Assembly ordered the embarkation of all citizens of military age. The verb here, *εἰσβάλανα*, in place of the more familiar *εἰσβάλον*, seems to imply that the Athenians “compelled” or “caused” these men to board the ships. This rarer usage is used by Thucydides to describe the generals’ desperate attempt to make their rowers fight it out in the Syracusan Harbour (7.60) and by Herodotus to describe Darius’ embarkation of his land army from Cilicia (6.95.2), but is not used by Thucydides at 3.16.1.

368 For full discussion of naval recruitment, see Section II, Chapter 9.2 and 9.5.5.

369 Cawkwell 1984, 338 suggests that conscription was exceptional; volunteerism was the rule.

370 van Wees 2010, 205-226.
intriguing to consider the possibility that what we find in 428/7 are zeugitai in need of a way to supplement their income due to losses suffered in the invasions. The invasion of that year was the third in four years. If we keep in mind that Greek farmers typically stored only about a year’s worth of grain against subsistence threat, the effects of the successive (and mostly consecutive) invasions would be most keenly felt in the years following as each year, no doubt, farmers’ yields were decreased by the interrupted harvests and the lack of seed grain (owing to the combination of consumption and poor harvests).\footnote{See Gallant 1991, 94-5 for grain storage practices.} We recall too that, in the year 428/7 alone, the enemy had consumed some 40 talents worth of grain, to say nothing of that which they destroyed by other means.\footnote{Thorne 2001, 250. Forty talents represents no less than ten percent of total domestic income (400 talents: Thuc. 2.13.3), most of which, scholars posit, came from harbour taxes and mining revenues and other non-agricultural sources (Ar. Wasp 658-9; Blamire 2001, 106).} If already by 430 Pericles could allude to the loss of “use” (\(\zeta\rho\epsilon\iota\alpha\nu\)) of the khôra (2.62.3), the problem had only compounded by 428. It was again zeugitai whose fortunes were most badly damaged by the loss of their land. Moreover, it was in 428/7 that the Athenians levied the eisphora for the first time in the course of the war (Thuc. 3.19). The tax was a modest (though not negligible) burden on the zeugitai but, coinciding with a time when agricultural fortunes were low, these several factors might have prompted the desire for zeugite citizens to earn a little extra income.\footnote{On the eisphora, see below, Ch. 6.8 and 8.3.2. For wage-motivated service in 428/7, see Burford 1993, 226, who, although minimizing the damage done to crops, also makes this point.} Thêtes quite naturally looked to naval service in order to replace lost income, being already accustomed to hire themselves out as labourers in order to supplement whatever living their meagre landholdings might provide as well as habituated to naval service. Moreover, the wealthiest two telê were far better insulated against bad times than were zeugitai, especially those near the bottom of the census. The savings of
such men were likely to have been exhausted by several straight years without good harvests and, no doubt, some even risked a loss of status. We have seen that thêtes might achieve social promotion to zeugite status based on increases in their household wealth and there is every reason to believe that the inverse was also true.

If Athenians of zeugite class were compelled to volunteer as rowers for the first time in 428/7, it would testify to the degree to which the rural economy of Athens had been disrupted in the 420s. The acceptance of wage-earning tasks considered socially marginalizing in better times is a hallmark of displaced rural populations navigating economic hardships. There were other ways, in addition to rowing, by which Athenians could support themselves during the dislocations, and we should not envision a wholesale change of attitude that saw zeugitai flock to the dockyards. It is impossible to say just how exceptional the situation in 428 remained thereafter; unquestionably the navy continued to be in the main the purview of thêtes. Nevertheless, the year 428 throws into high relief the reality that Athenians were looking toward misthos to maintain themselves.

4.3.2 Misthos dikastikos

Another stable source of state-paid wages was the misthos dikastikos. As noted above, scholars are unsure when it was instituted, but most place its introduction sometime in the late 460s, our sources unanimously attributing it to Pericles. The Athenian dikastêria required some 6000 Athenian dikasts each day they sat, providing a modest wage for their services. Regardless of when it was introduced, it is clear that in the 420s jury pay was in great demand

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374 Jacobsen 2005, 12.
375 Ar. Wasps 656-664.
and was expanded from two obols to three. Let us begin with the increased wage before moving on to discuss the role played by jury pay in the Athenian economy.

Aristophanes’ *Knights*, produced in the winter of 424, provides the firm *terminus ante quem* for the raising of the *mîsthos dikastikos* to three obols (50-1, 255-6). The *scholia* to *Wasps* of the next year claim that Cleon was responsible for the motion and that this was done “when the war with the Lacedaemonians was at its height” (ἄκμαίζοντος τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ πρὸς Λακεδαμινὸς). A passage in the earlier play would seem to corroborate Cleon’s agency:

Paphlagon, who is to be associated with Cleon, refers to the *hêliastai* as “brothers of the three obols,” whom he “feeds” with his political machinations (255-6). The timing of the introduction of the third obol is significant. Since Cleon is known as the author of the proposal, and it occurred “at the height of the war,” it should be considered to have come in or just after 429/8. The years prior to this, although they would meet the latter criterion, fall within the period of Periclean influence. The year during which Aristophanes will have been preparing *Knights*, 425/4, is not impossible, and, indeed, the play’s singular focus on demagogic politics makes this an attractive option. An earlier date, however, would better fit the scholiast’s temporal statement. The best candidate is the year 428/7, when Athens was still reeling from the severe invasion of 430, the plague, and the death of its preeminent statesman. The introduction of the *trîôbolon* afforded Cleon the opportunity to make a political splash when individual Athenians’ fortunes and spirits were low.

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376 *Schol*. to *Wasps* 88a; cf *Schol*. to *Birds* 1541.
377 255-6: ω γέροντες ἡλιασταί, φράτερες τριοβόλου σὺς ἐγὼ βόσκω κεκραγώς καὶ δίκαια κάδικα.
378 This, of course, does not preclude Cleon’s proposing it in the year 430/29, when he was instrumental in securing Pericles’ conviction. For Cleon’s opposition to Pericles, see Plut. *Per*. 33.6-7; Hermippus Fr. 47 K-A.
Dikastic pay was a tremendously important part of the redistributive economics that allowed individual Athenians to capitalize on the revenues (direct and indirect) of empire and that helped to cushion the blow of the loss of Attica for farmers during the Peloponnesian War. The cost to the state of paying 6000 Athenians their three obols is estimated by Aristophanes’ Bdelycleon to be 150 talents annually (Wasps 656-664). This would represent an absolute maximum: the amount required if the full complement of jurors sat on every available business day.379 The linkage between imperial revenue and dikastic pay is made several times in comedy in the 420s (e.g., Knights 1350-54, Wasps 698-702). In Lysistrata (411) the elderly chorus worry that the Athenian women have been influenced by some antidemocratic Spartans to seize the state treasury on the acropolis and thus their misthos, from which they draw their living (624-625: καταλαβεῖν τὰ χρήματα ἶμων τὸν τε μισθὸν, ἐνθεν ἔξων ἐγώ). The connection is not only found in comedy. In the mid 420s, Ps.-Xenophon could comment:

[T]hose sympathetic to the common people think it even more of an excellent thing that each individual Athenian should have the allies’ money, and that the allies should have just enough to live and work on, while being unable to plot against them.381

Moreover, the allies, he complains, are forced to present legal cases in person in Athens and to pay costly deposits, from which the Athenians derive (dikastic) misthos annually (1.16: ἀπὸ τῶν

379 Juries did not sit on festival days ([Xen.] Ath. Pol. 3.8) or on some forty days on which the Assembly met (Demosthenes 24.80). Mitchell 1956, 369 claims the figure is much too high, preferring a sum of 100 talents and citing Ath. Pol. 24.3 for the number of dikasts—6000 as in Aristophanes. Cf. Markle 2004 [1985], 131 and Hansen 1979, 243-246, who focus on the number of days the dikastêria met.

380 The misthos is not defined as dikastic pay, but the advanced age of the male chorus (γερόντων ὀλέθρων: 325) does not bring military pay to mind. Elsewhere in the play we find allusion to the jury service of the male chorus (380). Throughout Aristophanes’ plays, the figure of the elderly citizen and the dikast are “virtually synonymous” (Sommerstein 1990, 187 [ad loc. Lysistrata 624-5] with references). That the treasury in question is the store of imperial phoros is clear from the women’s plan to prevent its use to finance the war (173-179, 486-489). The abolition of all state-pay apart from stratiotic misthos was a central element of the constitutional changes in Athens that occurred shortly after the performance of Aristophanes’ play (Thuc. 8.67.3; Ath. Pol. 29.5).

381 [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 1.15: τοῖς δὲ δημοτικοῖς δοκεῖ μεῖξον άγαθον εἶναι τὰ τῶν συμμάχων χρήματα ἐνά ἐκαστὸν Ἀθηναίων ἔχειν, ἐκεῖνος δὲ ὅσον ζῆν, καὶ ἐργάζεσθαι ἀδυνάτους ὄντας ἐπιβουλεῦειν.
This latter statement has been doubted by commentators, but it is likely true that, as he goes on to say at 1.17, the Athenians also derived much income from the one per cent harbour tax that allies had to pay when arriving to plead lawsuits. The system served to affirm the power of the Athenian juror over the allies, and also to provide him with a livelihood. Ps.-Xenophon charges that “in the law-courts [the Athenians] put their own self-interest before justice” (1.3: ἐν τῇ τοῖς δικαστηρίοις οὖ τοῦ δικαίου αὐτοῖς μᾶλλον μέλει ἢ τοῦ αὐτοῖς συμφόρου); one can imagine that the privations of the war and the promise of fines being added to the state treasury might have encouraged harshness among dikasts. In Aristophanes’ Peace, the chorus promise that, with the return of the goddess, they will no longer be “bitter jurors” (348-9: δικαστήν δρμῶν). And of course, the sting of the vindictive Athenian juror is immortalized in Wasps.

The extent to which individual Athenians relied on dikastic pay to supplement their income during the war is reflected above all in comedy. Aristophanes associates jury pay with the need to buy food and it is regarded by some characters as a substitute income in hard times. In Knights, misthos is linked with “need” (χρείας) and “necessity” (801-9: ἀνάγκης); in Wasps, Philocleon praises his misthos saying, “I obtained it as a shield from troubles, ‘a

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382 In Aristophanes, all old men are assumed to be jurors (Wasps, passim, Ach. 375-6, Knights 255, 977-9, Birds 109-10, Lys. 380, Eccl. 460). For the view of jury pay in Athens as a sort of old-age pension, see: Adkins 1972, 120; Robinson 1959, 33; cf. Markle 2004, 96 n. 3. Although the dikastēria may have comprised old men in the majority (Hansen 1991, 185-186), we should not associate jury service and pay only with the old. To Aristophanes’ Strepsiades, the most recognizable feature of Athens are the dikastēria (Clouds 208). The right of all Athenians over thirty and in good standing, that is, not under atimia, to participate in court cases was fundamental to the democracy (Ath. Pol. 63.3). That this was so in the fifth century is shown by various passages in which Bdelycleon is accused of being a traitor or an antidemocrat because of his lack of enthusiasm for jury pay (410-4, 474).
bulwark against missiles”’ (615: τάδε κέκτημαι πρόβλημα κακῶν, σκέψῃν βεβέλεον ἥλεωρήν).\(^{383}\) Later jury pay is referred to as ‘daily bread’ (1112: βίον) and is used to purchase barley, firewood and dinner (300-3: ἀπὸ γᾶρ τούδε με τοῦ μισθαρίου τρίτον αὐτόν ἔχειν ἄλφιτα δεῖ καὶ ξύλα κῶψον). Furthermore, the chorus despairs at the possibility of there being no cases to hear, crying “Alas, ah me! I surely don’t know where our dinner’s coming from” (310).\(^{384}\) Jury pay was used to supplement or replace the livelihood of Athenians, both urban and rural, as a passage from Aristophanes makes clear. In response to the question do apêliasta (jury-phobes) grow in Athens, Euelpides of Aristophanes’ Birds answers, “you’ll find a few in the country (ἐξ ἄγροῦ), if you look hard” (110), the implication being that even most rural Athenians had taken the Heliastic Oath.\(^{385}\) The reliance of Athenians on misthos to support themselves and their families is not purely the stuff of comic fantasy.\(^{386}\) Personalized jurors’ tickets (pinakia) interred with their owners have been found as far east of the asty as Erkhia and the many inscribed with legible demotics actually suggest a predominance of jurors from coastal and inland demes.\(^{387}\) Furthermore, Markle has shown that jury pay, even at the earlier rate of two obols, was enough to provide the daily essentials for a family of four, making it an attractive supplemental, or even primary, income for poor Athenians.\(^{388}\) Thucydides records a speech by

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383 Admittedly, remuneration is not Philocleon’s primary concern. He is enthralled with the power he wields as a dikast and is unwilling to be supported by his son, who clearly has the means to do so (Ar. Wasps 503-7). The chorus, Philocleon’s jurymen peers, are much more concerned with misthos as bios.

384 These associations are direct. Aristophanic comedy is filled with metaphorical allusions to misthos as food; these will be considered below.

385 Hansen 1991, 184-5; cf. Ar. Knights 797-809 and Peace 505 where the Athenians are dismissed from the rescue team of geôrgoi because they do no job but jury service.

386 Cf. Isoc. Areopagiticus (7.54).


Alcibiades in which the role of the *dikastèria* in the Athenian economy is highlighted. Listing the many benefits to the Lacedaemonians of fortifying Decelea, he claims:

> Any commodities around the countryside will come into your possession, most by seizure, some running to meet you; the [Athenians] will be deprived at once of the income from the Laureion silver mines, all the current profit from the land (*προσόδους ἀπὸ γῆς*) and from the law courts (*δικαστηρίων*), above all by reduction in revenues handed over by the allies, who will become less punctilious after concluding that there is now to be serious fighting on your part.\(^{389}\)

It is not immediately clear how a loss of profits from the law courts will result from the occupation of the countryside and, as a result, the passage has puzzled scholars. Textual corruption has been suspected. Gomme surveyed the various proposed emendations, but settled on none.\(^{390}\) He suggests that the meaning, if *dikastèriôn* is correct, must be that the Athenians will be occupied themselves in manning the walls against sudden attack (something Thucydides later tells us did happen: 7.28.2) and will not be able to sit cases. As Gomme notes, however, since the cessation of cases would actually save the *state* money, what Thucydides must have in mind here is the courts as a means of livelihood for individuals. This reading remains problematic. The wages lost in *misthos dikastikos* might presumably be replaced with *misthos stratiótikos* if Athenians were obliged to remain under arms; however, it is likely the case that guard duty did not pay the same rates as active campaigning. Nevertheless, what it would seem we have here is a clear reference in Thucydides to the important role of the *dikastèria* in the economy of Peloponnesian-War Athens. If the role of *misthos* in the Athenian economy during the war has been exaggerated, it has been so by multiple sources, both contemporary and later.

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\(^{389}\) 6.91.7 (trans. Lattimore).

\(^{390}\) Gomme *HCT* IV, 365; Hornblower *CT* III, 515 does not address the problem.
4.4. Subventions, food supply and the political economy

If Thucydides does not put the impact of the invasions at the centre of his account, Aristophanes, in his comedies of the period, does, showing indeed the connection between the impact on agriculture and the very changes in political culture with which Thucydides, too, is concerned. From the heartfelt yearnings of Dicaeopolis, Trygaeus and the farmer chorus of Geôrgoi for their lands and the country life to the persistent image of a cooped up and exploited populace in Knights, Wasps and Peace, the plays of the 420s, though produced years after the most severe Peloponnesian devastations, nevertheless depict a citizenry cut off from its farmland.391 Peace, in particular, has as its theme a long-awaited return to the countryside. In this play, the call for a movement back eis agron is a refrain.

In Aristophanes, refugee life within the city undermines the autarkeia of the citizen-farmer in forcing him to rely on others for his maintenance. In Wasps, a play that concerns the livelihood of jurors, the Athenians are pejoratively called “olive-pickers” (ἐλαολόγοι), who “follow along after the one who hands out their pay” (712).392 A sensitive interpretation of this metaphorical slur should take into account both the remunerative and provisional aspect of olive picking. This was seasonal employment (required only at the biennial, labour-intensive olive harvest) looked to by poor farmers to augment their regular livelihood in the same way that Athenians cut off from their regular living might turn to jury or military pay to sustain themselves.393 Any economic activity that resulted in wage earning was potentially problematic

392 712: νῦν δ’ ἔσπερ ἐλαολόγοι χορεῖθ’ ἂμα τῷ τῶν μυθόν ἔχοντι.
393 For olive-picking as an activity of poor Athenians, see von Reden 1995, 92; MacDowell 1971, 229.
to conservative Greek sensibilities, at once threatening the individual and the community. Work
for pay undermined the autonomy of the one earning it by making him dependent upon others
for his livelihood, and the consequences of making money, profit-seeking (κέρδος) and
acquisitiveness (πλεονεξία), were seen as antisocial and fundamentally selfish. Agriculture, not
paid service, was viewed as the proper basis of the life of the free citizen.

Hermes’ explanation of the migration to the asty in _Peace_ is illustrative of the way
Aristophanic comedy linked the displacement to a dependence upon _misthos_ and subsidies,
which in turn gave support to hawkish policies (stoked by _pleonexia_) that promised imperial
revenues:

And as for [Athens], when the working folk arrived from their farms, they didn’t
understand that they were being sold out in the very same way, but because they lacked
raisins and were fond of their figs, they looked (ἐβλεπον) to the orators for help. The
orators, fully aware that the poor were weak and needed bread, took to driving (ἐόθουν)
this goddess [Peace] away with double-pronged bellowings, though many times she
appeared of her own accord out of longing for this land, and they started to disturb
(ἐσταν) the rich and substantial among the allies, pinning on them charges of ‘siding
with Brasidas.’ Then you’d mangle (ἐσπαράττει) the man like a pack of puppies,
because the city, pale and crouching in fear, was quite happy to swallow (ἡσθεν) whatever slanders anyone tossed its way.

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394 von Reden 1995, 89-92, 219: _misthoi_, unlike _dôra_, were not reciprocal and, therefore, could not
be transacted between equals.
395 von Reden 1995, 86-87. People did what they had to do to survive: in addition to looking toward
state employment, _ad hoc_ businesses, which were typically the province of metics or quite poor citizens,
were probably thrown up overnight. Analogy with seventeenth-century England is perhaps instructive. Even
as relatively well-insulated from the direct ravages of the Thirty-Years’ War as England was, the social and
economic forces surrounding the enclosing of land forced many peasants to look for alternatives to farming
as their essential livelihood. Farm work alone no longer supported the English peasantry, but became
merely one of a number of cash supplements to a subsistence based on the cultivation and sale of cottage-
garden produce and the exploitation of common rights (G. Parker 2013, 75). Of Peloponnesian-War Athens,
we can note that Demosthenes admits, rather sorely, that his mother was constrained to sell vegetables in
the Agora; Aristophanes slanders Euripides’ mother as a grocer (their family was certainly not poor—at
least before the war); Aristophanes’ Dicaeopolis famously complains of the constant hawking that goes on
in the crowded confines of the fortified zone. Indeed, in modern refugee situations, hawking is the most
common form of economic adaptation and improvisation (Jacobsen 2005, 12).
396 ὡς ἐκ τῶν ἄγρων ἐξηλθεν ὁφρύντης λέως; Olson 1988, 201 stresses that the meaning here is
individuals from individual farms.
397 632-43.
This explanation of the absence of the goddess, Peace, from Athens illustrates the implication in the poet’s mind of the citizens’ need (as a result of the loss of Attica), demagogic politics (the provision of misthos by ambitious prostatai) and the redistribution of imperial resources made possible by the aggressive propagation of the war. The series of imperfect verbs indicates a long, inceptive process. The reduction of the autarkic citizen throughout the war to a state of dependence upon state subsidies and handouts is a trend that disturbed observers like Aristophanes, who witnessed these developments throughout the 420s.

Knights is the most important, sustained reflection on the political negotiation between mass and elite that developed as a corollary to the abandonment of Attica: the rustic demos has become beholden to its prostatai, corrupt demagogues, to provide its daily living by extracting the resources of wealthy subjects and fellow-Athenians. The Athenians are personified in the play as Mr. Demos, who is referred to as agroikos orgên, ‘of rustic temper,’ a ‘bean-chewer’ (41: κοκταρωτζ). At 752, the Sausage Seller complains that Demos is “most shrewd” when sitting at home (oikoi) but that when seated at the Pnyx he becomes a gaping fool. At 805, it becomes clear that the implication is that ‘home’ is out in the fields. Clearly the demos in Aristophanes is emblematized by farmers, and should not be thought of as an urban throng. As already noted, Knights portrays a demos “shut-up” (καθειρześας) in the city, living off the scraps of empire provided it by its politicians while they shamelessly steal the good things, allegorized as food, that should belong to the people. In Aristophanes, as in Thucydides,

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398 Cf. Acharnians 307-374, where it is the ‘rustic crowd’ who are led astray by public speakers. 399 By way of contrast, see [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 1.2, 1.4, where ‘demos’ refers only, and pejoratively, to the (urban) poor. Cf. Ath. Pol. 41.2. 400 Here a fragment from the 410s of the comic poet Eupolis is also relevant. In the fragment, an anonymous character, probably a farmer, observes wryly: “It is right for Kallias to fuck over those within
Cleon, “the kharybdis of robbery” (*Knights* 248), and other demagogues are portrayed as hawkish, aggressive promoters of the war for their own private gain, often with disastrous consequences for the city (*Wasps* 698-712; *Peace* 632-48; *Thuc.* 5.16.1). The aggressive imperialism of the Athenians at *Thuc.* 4.21.2 is connected with the truculent and grasping politics of Cleon. The same verb, *oregô*, is used to describe the Athenians’ “wanting more” out of the peace negotiations in 425 as well as the ‘grasping’ of the leaders who followed Pericles (2.65.10). These demagogues, “grasping at supremacy, ended by committing even the conduct of state affairs to the pleasures of the demos” (2.65.10). In chastising Paphlagon, who has just compared his service to the city to that of Themistocles, the Sausage Seller claims that Themistocles, in adding the Piraeus to Athens, “served up new seafood dishes while taking away none of the old”

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The aggressive imperialism of the Athenians at *Thuc.* 4.21.2 is connected with the truculent and grasping politics of Cleon. The same verb, *oregô*, is used to describe the Athenians’ “wanting more” out of the peace negotiations in 425 as well as the ‘grasping’ of the leaders who followed Pericles (2.65.10). These demagogues, “grasping at supremacy, ended by committing even the conduct of state affairs to the pleasures of the demos” (2.65.10). In connection with this, see also the reference in *Knights* to a proposal of Hyperbolus to send a hundred triremes against Carthage (1303-1304; cf. 174). The proposal is probably not simply the product of Aristophanes’ fertile imagination. Thucydides has Hermocrates claim that, at least in 415, the Carthaginians feared Athenian expansion (6.34.2).

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Conversely the ‘new dish’ of Paphlagon, *misthos*, accompanies and to a certain extent is predicated on, the loss of Attica.

From early on, the association is made between food, especially luxury foodstuffs, and rhetoric. Although food and alimentary associations are an integral part of the comic genre, in *Knights* these themes are especially prominent; rather than simply providing a festive, market-place atmosphere in which the political debate between Paphlagon and the Sausage Seller plays out, the themes of food processing and provision are central to the debate itself. Throughout the play the distinction between food and flattering speech, each pleasing to the demos, will be ambiguous (215-16). In a prolonged political battle, Paphlagon and the Sausage Seller try to outdo each other with announcements and proposals to the Boule relating to food (624-82). Paphlagon offers the Councilors enormous sacrifices of oxen, only to be outdone by his opponent, who proposes an even grander sacrifice. The image of the thieving politician feeding the demos as a (wet-) nurse a child or as an animal its young is recurrent. At 715, Paphlagon claims “I know [Demos], by what tid-bits he is fed” (*επίσταμαι γὰρ οἷτὸν οἷς ψωμίζεται*). “Sure,” responds the Sausage Seller, “you feed him just like the wet-nurses—badly! You chew some food and feed him a morsel, after you’ve bolted down three times as

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404 On this metaphor, see Marr 1996.
406 215-16: Slave A advises the Sausage Seller, at this stage a would-be politician, to “always attach the demos to yourself, adding sweetness to delicious little expressions” (*καὶ τὸν δῆμον ἀεὶ προσποιοῦ ὑπογλυκαίων ῥηματίων μεγερικοῖς*). For the critique offered by comedy of political flattery, see Hubbard 1991, 50-51.
407 On the use of such ‘combative capping’ in Aristophanes, see Hesk 2003.
408 The numbers of oxen in the passage are perhaps comically large, but on the prioritization of the sacrificial calendar in Peloponnesian-War Athens, see Pritchard 2012, 18-65.
409 ψωμίζω: used of feeding bits of food to children (*LSI*, s.v.)
much for yourself” (717-18).\textsuperscript{410} The orators vie for Demos’ favour with various proposals of festivals and misthos until Paphlagon, desperate and seeing he is outdone at every opportunity, eventually offers complete state welfare: “I assure you, Demos, for doing absolutely nothing I’ll provide you with a bowl of state pay to lap up” (904-5: ἔγώ γάρ φημί σοι παρέξειν, δὲ Δῆμε, μηδὲν δρόντι μισθοῦ τρόβλων ῥοφήσαι). The word for ‘bowl’ (tryblion) here is an obvious pun on the trióbolon. Paphlagon later offers to provide Demos with daily barley meal (καθ’ ἣμέραν κριθᾶς) as well as a livelihood (βίον). When this is refused, he offers barely meal already prepared: ἀλλ’ ἄλφιτ’ ἣδη σοι ποριῶ ‘σκευασμένα. Again he is outdone by the Sausage Seller, who offers the ultimate state welfare: ready-made barley cakes and a hot meal in addition; all Demos need do is eat: ἔγώ δὲ μαζίσκας γε διαμεμαγμένας καὶ τούψων ὀπτόν· μηδὲν ἄλλ’ εἰ μὴ σῆμε (1100-5).

The politics of the Knights has been much discussed.\textsuperscript{411} I do not wish to offer any novel interpretation here, only to discuss the question of the play’s politics where it bears on the subject of food supply. The play suggests that, although he holds ultimate sway over the rhêtores, Demos acts like a petulant infant waiting to be breast-fed. The chorus upbraids Demos for being powerful yet so easily led astray by flattery—his mind is ἀποδήμητι and he sits on the Pnyx gaping, waiting to be filled, expecting his appetites to be met (1112-20).\textsuperscript{412} The response of Demos to this criticism, while underscoring his ultimate sovereignty, nevertheless admits of the chorus’ criticism:

\textsuperscript{410} 717-18: καθ’ ἄσπερ αἱ τίθαι γε στιξίως κακῶς. μασόμενος γὰρ τὸ μὲν ὀλίγον ἐντίθης, αὐτὸς δὲ ἐκεῖνον τριπλάσιον κατέσπακα. Cf. 1135-50, where Demos forces the prostatai to regurgitate what they have stolen from him; see also: Ach. 6, where Cleon is said to have regurgitated five talents.

\textsuperscript{411} See, for example: McGlew 2002, 86-111; Bennet and Blake 1990; Olson 1990; Edmunds 1987a and 1987b; Brock 1986.

\textsuperscript{412} Cf. 1263 for the characterization of Athens as “the city of the Gapenians” (τῇ Κεχναίων πόλει). On the persistent image of the gaper in Aristophanes, see J. Henderson 1991, 68.
There’s no mind under your long hair, since you consider me stupid; but there’s purpose in this foolishness of mine. I relish my daily crying for milk, and I pick one thieving political leader to fatten; I raise him up, and when he’s full, I swat him down.

Demos is equated to an infant, his daily food, misthos, provided by demagogues. Impulsive if not irrational and driven by his appetites, he is the antithesis of the ideal, self-mastering, autarkic citizen-farmer (50-1, 799-800; cf. Peace 632-6). However, the image that Knights presents of the Athenians is ambivalent: the demos is at once powerful sovereign and beholden infant. Through the prosecutions of the next politicians to find favour with him, Demos ensures that current prostatai eventually return what they have managed to steal in their period of preeminence (1141-50). He explains that he allows them to steal, monitoring their thefts, and then forces them to regurgitate the ‘food’ they have stolen: this is precisely the language used in Acharnians where Cleon is said to ‘disgorge five talents.’ Thus at the same time as the Knights’ Demos is criticized for passivity and dependence, associated with its displacement from Attica, he sovereignty arbitrates the competition of the prostatai and uses them as his agents to tyrannize the wealthy (258-265).

To be sure, Aristophanes’ characterization of the Demos in Knights and of jurors in Wasps as the hirelings of prostatai on whom they are dependent for misthos is a

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413 ἀυτὸς τε γὰρ ἡδομαὶ βρώλλων τὸ καθ’ ἡμέραν: βρώλλω from βρῶν εἰπάν, to cry for a drink, used of children: Ar. Clouds 1382.
414 1121-1130.
415 Ach. 6; cf. the imagery of politicians feeding Demos from regurgitated food quoted above: Knights 716-8. On the demos’ exploitation of prostatai, see further Pl. Gorg. 519a-520b.
416 The knights justify Paphlagon’s beating because he “pick[s] off the outgoing magistrates like figs, pressing them to see which of them is green or ripe or not yet ripe . . . and you seek[s] out any private citizen who’s a silly lamb, rich and not wicked and frightened of public affairs, and if [he] discover[s] one of them who’s a simple fellow minding his own business, [he] bring[s] him home from the Chersonese, take[s] him round the waist with slanders, hook[s] his leg, then twist[s] back his shoulder and plant[s] [his] foot on him.”
misrepresentation. The funds from which they were paid came from the public treasury rather than from wealthy individuals, and service to the polis was not inherently dishonourable. Thus, Aristophanes elides the superordinate position of the polis in relation to the Demos (i.e., in relation to itself) with that of the rhêtores whose actual role is not to provide misthos but to secure its provision. This elision, however, is fundamental to the criticism of the demos that Aristophanes offers, especially in Knights. It is not simply, as some commentators have thought, that Aristophanes stages a demos duped by the flattery and demagogic tricks of its rhêtores. Rather this conceit is an essential part of the drama as itself a piece of democratic rhetoric. This is revealed in Aristophanes’ staging of Demos’ complicity in the ‘trick’ played on the rhêtores. Demos uses competing prostatai to feed its appetites, but then can blame these same prostatai who indulged it for its very voracity. Therefore, while it can be the claim of competing rhêtores that the demos has been shut up and is being harvested, Aristophanes, in fact, holds the demos accountable and reveals rather how the demos harvests its own prostatai. Aristophanes’ political message is that the demos actually is accountable for its own decisions and that its decisions are such that it is acting immoderately, driven by its appetites, like an infant or slave, or else a tyrant. Thus the play stages the demos simultaneously

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418 Cf. Ar. Lysistrata 625.
419 Ford 1965. The idea that the political message of the play centres on the passivity and gullibility of Demos remains current. For example, see Slater 2002, 84. However, it is not, as Slater suggests, simply that the reformed Demos has by the end of the play ceased to be a spectator and has taken on a more active part in his own political determination; rather this is precisely the thing to which Aristophanes gives the lie with Knights. Demos, as he himself admits, has always been responsible for his own decisions and is culpable for them. It is the rhêtores who have been tricked by the duplicitous and tyrannical Demos, not the reverse.
420 On the importance of rhetoric in democratic Athens, and especially on democratic discourse as a mechanism for the demos’ dominance over the elite, see Ober 1989.
at each of the political extremes balanced by the sōphrosynē and self-mastery of the political ideal, the metrios, which it should strive to be.⁴²¹

As the war waxed and waned, and Athens entered into the twilight of its supremacy in the last decade of the fifth century, the demos, still cut off from the resources of Attica, continued to require state subventions—which placed increasing financial demands on its rich citizens as Athens’ empire foundered and phoros diminished. The dystopian, complete welfare-state would eventually be staged by Aristophanes in Ecclesiazousae in the decade following Athens’ defeat—a scenario in which the citizen, entirely reliant upon others to feed and clothe him, is stripped of his civic agency and identity. The inspiration for Aristophanes’ Cockaigne fantasy can easily be found in the mythological tradition of free abundance (e.g., Hes. W&D 109-139), but the institution during the latter stages of the Peloponnesian War of the diōbelia and the grain dole provided more immediate grist for the comedian’s mill.⁴²² The diōbelia, a daily stipend of two obols to needy Athenian citizens, was introduced in 410 (Ath. Pol. 28.3) after the oligarchs had abolished all civic stipends in the previous year (29.5).⁴²³ It is attested in the epigraphic record from 410/9 to 406/5;⁴²⁴ it seems that what modest sums the Athenians were still drawing from epeteia went almost exclusively to funding this subsidy.⁴²⁵ The diōbelia was paid in 406/5 in the emergency currency approved by the Assembly early in that year (Ar. Ran. 725-6 with schol., Ar. Ecc. 815-16). The sole purpose of this Notgeld seems to

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⁴²² On the theme of free abundance in Old Comedy, see Wilkins 1997, 264.
⁴²³ For the diōbelia as poor relief, see Rhodes AP, 355-356.
⁴²⁴ Ar. Frogs 140-2 (δῶς ὀφελός) may be a reference to the diōbelia, although the ubiquity of the two-obol fee remarked on by Dionysus may also refer to military pay.
⁴²⁵ IG I² 304, IG I² 375: the sums were modest indeed compared to the massive borrowing of the previous two decades. For example, from 408/7-406/5 a mere 2500 drachmas are recorded, all for the purpose of funding the diōbelia (Blamire 2001, 119).
have been to facilitate small scale, domestic exchanges, the bulk of which involved cash from the *diôbelia*, since the gold coinage minted from the *Nikai* (Hellanicus *FGrH* 323a Fr. 26; Philochorus *FGrH* 328 Fr. 141) was too highly valued for small exchange. The two-obol payment was then reduced to a single obol before being replaced by a straight grain dole, a payment in kind for civic service probably on the motion of Kallikrates (*Ath. Pol.* 28.3). This must have occurred between 406/5 and 405/4, since we find the distribution of grain payments in the hands of state treasurers during the siege of Athens (*IG I* 3 379). That a grain dole could replace the *diôbelia* strongly hints that this cash subsidy was provided expressly to subsidize the purchase of grain.

Although it must be realized that Athenians imported and purchased food from foreign markets regularly throughout the fifth century, and although we lack the rich historical record for the earlier period, it is nevertheless striking to find so much attention paid to the habit in the writers of the late fifth century. What is more, writers focus explicitly on the subject; these are not mere incidental details in Aristophanes’ plays or Thucydides’ historical narrative. This tells us that Athenians were aware of and reflecting on the ways in which the nature of their food supply affected the identity and character of their city and their fellow citizens. The ability to import food from the far reaches of the Athenian Empire was an aspect of Athenian society celebrated in democratic ideology. Democracy furnished Athens with its naval power, which translated into empire, which itself literally fed the democracy. The political pamphlet of Ps.-Xenophon makes this point (*Ath. Pol.* 1.2, 2.7) as does the funeral oration of Pericles (Thuc. 2.37-38). Because of the empire, the average Athenian is able to enjoy foods typically reserved

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for more well-to-do citizens. Ps.-Xenophon carries this even further, arguing that in democratic Athens even slaves enjoy an elite lifestyle (μεγαλοπρεπὸς διατάσσεται) and live luxuriously (1.11: τρυφῶν). Comedy, too, reflects and partakes in this ideology. A fragment of Hermippus’ *Basket-bearers* of the 420s contains a list of items brought into Athens by Dionysus returning from his travels (Hermippus, Fr. 63 K-A = Athenaeus 1.27e-28a). This passage is similar in some respects to a fragment from Aristophanes’ (undatable) *Seasons*, in which two gods discuss the goods made available to the Athenians year-round (Ar. Fr. 581 K-A = Ath. 9.372b). Aristophanes’ *Merchant Ships* was probably performed in 423; several fragments list the goods that the chorus of *holkades* carries to Athens, the most important of which are not luxury but staple goods: “chickling, wheat, hulled barley, spelt, rice-wheat, wheat-flour and darnel” (Fr. 428 K-A).

This rhetoric of imported goods for all in fifth-century texts represents a democratic ideology of equality, a leveling-up into mass prosperity rather than a “leveling-down into severe austerity.”

The ideology of luxury and prosperity for all is a powerful rhetorical tool in the politics of the 420s and later. As Braund observes, it:

foregrounded the material benefits (including food) that might be ascribed to naval empire at the very time when the Peloponnesian War, the consequence of that empire, was bringing material devastation to the land of Attica itself.

Pericles’ funeral speech celebrates Athens as “the most self-sufficient city (τὴν πόλιν . . . αὐτὰρκεστάτην) both in war and in peace” (Thuc. 2.36.3) even as Athenian anxiety over the loss of Attica reaches fever pitch (2.22.1). Moreover, imperial Athens, it is claimed, has created the only true self-sufficient man (2.41.1: τὸ σῶμα αὐτὰρκες) in contrast to the traditional

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427 Braund 1994, 47.
428 Braund 1994, 46.
(Peloponnesian) *autourgos* (1.141.3) who, although autarkic, is nevertheless a slave to his land as the Athenians are encouraged not to be (1.143.5; cf. 1.81.6). Thucydides, however, does not necessarily share Pericles’ confidence in Athens’ novel *autarkeia* as his repetition of the Periclean phrase in connection with the plague narrative reveals. Against a destructive force like the plague, no imperial resources could fully buttress Athens and no Athenian was self-sufficient (2.51.3: τὸ σῶμα αὐτάρκες).\footnote{Foster 2010, 202-220.} As the war went on, a sinister corollary to the capacity to import foodstuffs manifested itself: dependence. The celebrated control of the seas that had allowed the Athenians to neglect Attica and to treat the lands of their empire as though they were their own resulted, at least in 413 if not much earlier, in a slavish dependence upon external sources of food (Thuc. 7.28.1; cf. 6.20.4). The dependence of the populace on imports created a feedback loop in which the demos relies on its *prostatai* for sustenance; the *prostatai* pursue aggressive imperialist policies in order to satisfy the material wants of the demos and the war—the consequence of empire and the cause of the demos’ dependence in the first place—is prolonged. During the Peloponnesian War, the issue of Athenian food supply went from the confident observation of Athenians like Pericles—that Athens could import enough grain to sustain herself while ceding the resources of Attica to Sparta—to a desperate struggle to maintain the security of foreign networks through imperialist ventures like the acquisitive campaign against Sicily, and aggressive, quasi-piratical extortions in the Aegean (κατάγειν, the forcible bringing into port of grain ships).\footnote{Jordan 2000b, 66 argues that in Thucydides’ account, the military expedition to Sicily “virtually become[s] a commercial venture.”} Thus for Aristophanes as well as Thucydides, the war witnessed changes in Athenian leadership, domestic politics and foreign policy, a central
concern in each case being how the Athenians would feed themselves without the resources of Attica through subventions and foreign food supplies.

For Plato, a critic of the democracy who grew up during the war, democratic notions of luxury for all are utopian, or perhaps more sinisterly, dystopian: “the luxurious city is never satisfied and is driven to expand by its unwarranted desires” (Rep. 372-3). The pursuit of material goods, then, leads to imperialist ventures as it had in the case of the Sicilian expedition, which promised “αιδιον μισθοφοράν” (Thuc. 6.24.3). Moreover, the democratic man, emblematic of the constitution, is one who equates all desires as equal and, thus, strives equally after pleasures and needs as they occur—as if drawn from the lot—to preside over his soul (Rep. 561b). The man who relies on external, luxury foodstuffs “is one who has taken up his abode in the land of the Lotus-Eaters, driven by useless desires, among which is the desire for food more exotic than bread and cakes necessary for sustenance” (Rep. 559c-560c). The appetitiveness of the demos leaves it open to flattery and manipulation on the part of its greedy leaders, who in turn lead it into unwise imperial ventures abroad, such as the Sicilian expedition, and into divisive policies at home, such as the eisphora.

The abandonment of the traditional source of income for most Athenians in 431 may not, in fact, have meant that all farming in Attica completely ceased from then until the Athenian surrender in 404. It may also be the case that Athenian agriculture recovered fairly rapidly in the generation after the war. Nevertheless, in the eyes of Thucydides and his contemporaries, the disruption to Athens’ domestic food supply precipitated significant and long-term changes to the Athenian political economy.
Section II: Winners and Losers: the differential effects of the Peloponnesian War across Athenian civic society

“καὶ περὶ μὲν τοῦ πολέμου ὡς χαλεπῶν . . . οὐδείς . . . οὐτε ἄμαθα ἀναγκάζεται αὐτὸ δρᾶν, οὐτε φόβος, ἣν οὐχ ἦταν τι πλέον σχῆσειν, ἀποτρέπεται” (Thuc. 4.59.2)
Section II, Chapter 5: 
Introduction

“We do not need peace; let the war drag on!” cry members of the Athenian council in the *Knights*, while “let us have an end to our toils,” was the plea raised by the war-weary supporters of Nicias at the end of the 420s: these two sentiments, expressed by different speakers in Athenian literature, may be fairly thought to represent the opposing refrains of different groupings of Athenian citizens with regard to the war with the Peloponnesians. The first is perhaps easy enough to understand as the battle cry of a beleaguered but indignant populace wishing nevertheless to stubbornly keep up the fight against the enemy. The latter expression is very interesting in the context of fifth-century Athenian attitudes towards war. Anti-war or ‘pacifist’ sentiments were not unknown among the ancient Greeks, particularly among elite intellectuals. Peace, furthermore, could be broadly associated with abundance and prosperity (e.g., Thuc. 2.61.1; Hdt. 1.87.4, 8.3.1; Andoc. 3.12; cf. Xen. *Por.* 5.5-13), but calls for an end to violent conflict between cities normally took the form of appeals against particular campaigns or wars in order to conserve or buttress strength and to refocus energies toward other military ventures. Overall, however, the experience and acceptance of war as an omnipresent

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Boegehold 1982.
434 Throughout the fifth century, Athenian playwrights routinely and openly criticized war’s brutality and stressed the desirability of peace over conflict. For ‘anti-war’ as a Euripidean theme, see e.g., *Elec.* 385-390, *Hec.* 313-320, *Her.* 162-164, *Tro.* 400-2; for scholarship on the place of peace in tragedy, see:
aspect of life was normative (e.g., Pl. *Leg.* 832c, 878b-d, *Rep.* 551d-e; Arist. *Pol.* 1291a, 1324b, 1333a-b).435

In the event, the Athenians, exhausted by the almost three decades of conflict with the Spartans and their allies in the Peloponnesian War, found themselves just eight years after their final defeat at war once again with the very same foe. We might ask, then, what motivation lay behind such calls for peace during the Peloponnesian War?

In this section, I explore the impact of the war on different Athenian citizen groups and the conflicts and tensions that arose among them as a consequence. Scholars frequently speak of tensions between rich (οἱ πλούσιοι) and poor (οἱ πενήτες), or mass and elite, arising from a perceived imbalance of obligations and opportunities falling across these groups during the war, but I intend a closer analysis, looking to the various and overlapping social roles, identities, and groupings that articulated Athenian society.436

The categorization itself of these very social roles and socio-economic groupings is an important element of what is at stake in my investigation, for two reasons. The first is that recent scholarship has generated vigorous debate around the composition of some of the groups whose fixed membership the majority of scholars have traditionally assumed. For example, one

treatment of war and peace in Plato and Aristotle, see Ostwald 1996b. On the pragmatic military reasons for calling for peace, see, e.g., the speech attributed to Diodotos at Thuc. 3.42-9; cf. Aeschin. 2.173-177; Andoc. 3.1-12; Hunt 2010b, 240-50.

435 The normative, cultural acceptance of war, of course, is not found only in abstract philosophical literature but is also abundantly reflected in Athenian monumental art (see Hölscher 1998, 153-83), inscriptions (see, e.g., *IG* I 1 1162), religious dedications (e.g., the dedication of the Spartan shields taken from the prisoners at Sphakteria), dramatic festivals and performances (Aeschin. 2.154 on festivals; for performances, see, e.g., Eur. *Elec.* 385-90, *Hec.* 313-20, *Her.* 162-4, *Tro.* 400-2; Ar. *Ach.* 178-85, 676-701, *Eccl.* 679-80, *Thes.* 830-45, *Frogs* 1005-43), oratory (e.g., Aeschin. 3.169-70; Andoc. 1.56), and importantly historiography (note here Thucydides’ criticism of his predecessors who essentially have composed panegyrics: Thuc. 1.22). See: Hunt 2010a and 2010b, 268; Pritchard 2010.

436 For ‘class’ tension between οἱ πλούσιοι and οἱ πενήτες, see, e.g.: Ober 1989; M. Finley 1983; de Ste. Croix 1981; Vernant 1976; A. Jones 1957; with special reference to the Peloponnesian War, see Whibley 1889.
very important area in which this bears on the present study is the relationship between the Solonian class of *zeugitai* and the body of Athenian *hoplitai*.\footnote{Such recent developments in scholarship are enough on their own to necessitate an in-depth reconsideration of the impact of the war on Athenian groups as I am undertaking here. Much of the important work done previously that bears on this question has been undertaken under the assumption of a coterminous and clear division of the citizen body into *telê* membership and military division. The conclusions reached in these studies are predicated on the near perfect overlap of socio-economic status and military role. See, e.g., Hanson 2005 and 1995, 321-350; Ober 1996b, 53-71; Strauss 1986.} I discuss this question, as well as the nature of the Solonian *telê* generally and their relevance to fifth-century and Peloponnesian-War Athenian society in the next chapter. The second is that Athenian society experienced two severe demographic shocks during the war years in the form of losses from the plague and colossal casualties in the Sicilian Expedition (Thuc. 3.87.3, 8.1.2).\footnote{Akrigg 2007; Hansen 1988.} These shocks and the attendant changes to the make up of the citizenry and its subdivisions must be taken into account in any study that seeks to elucidate and to track the differential distribution of the costs and benefits of the war across the population.\footnote{It is important to bear in mind the parochial nature of the polis, even one as large as Athens. Despite its size, the imperial polis was nevertheless an essentially closed political system (often rightly contrasted with early imperial Rome), wherein naturalization was extremely rare (M. Osborne 1981-1983) and the impact on the polis of losing as many adult males as Athens did (3-5000 citizens from 415-413), was keenly felt. By way of perspective, this was, percentage-wise, much higher than British and Commonwealth casualties in the Second World War (which was around 5.2% according to the annual report of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission from 2010/11).} In the two final chapters of this section, which survey the performance of civic obligation during the war, close attention has been paid, therefore, to these demographic changes and what impact they had on the allocation of public responsibilities across the citizenry.

My aim in this section is to document how the experience of the war affected Athenians at different stages and variously according to their economic, social and political status and military role. This allows for a more complex and finely textured account of the conflicts of interest and ideological tensions that developed over the course of the war. It also provides an
opportunity, by using the Peloponnesian War as a test case, to contribute to an ongoing scholarly debate over how the performance of various types of civic service by certain elements of the Athenian civic body affected the group composition and identity of these subdivisions of the citizenry.\footnote{For example, the argument has been made that acculturation in naval service by the poorer segment of Athenian society was an education in democratic values and norms and thus it is no accident that we find the rowers of the Athenian fleet at Samos standing up for the democratic regime and opposing the oligarchs at home in 411—essentially functioning as the democratic polis in exile. See, e.g., Strauss 1996; cf. Mossé 1964.} As with the first section, the aim will be to consider the relevant data from a variety of different vantage points, but in practice much of this will consist in the comparison of Thucydides, our chief historiographical source, with other kinds of evidence, namely drama, oratory, and political tracts, all of which evidence and are themselves artefacts of the contentions of this period.\footnote{The texts of Thucydides, the so-called Old Oligarch (Ps.-Xenophon), the Aristotelian writer of the \textit{Athenaión Politeia}, and other historical and biographical texts, such as those of Diodorus and Plutarch, represent the reflections of elite writers from varying degrees of distance from Peloponnesian-War Athens. Although certainly formulated by elite members of the Athenian community, dramatic and oratorical texts were composed to be performed before large cross-sections of the Athenian public, as high-stakes \textit{agônes} between elite citizens adjudicated by the mostly non-elite citizens who comprised the majority of their mass audiences. As a result, playwrights and speechwriters crafted their pieces with an eye toward existing popular morality. At the same time, these pieces are themselves the prime \textit{loci} for debating and systematizing communal identities and shared cultural norms (Boegehold and Scarfuro 1994; Ober 1989). That is to say, these sources allow the historian access to the civic ideology shaped by ongoing public discourse (Ober 1996a). The funeral orations composed by Pericles, Lysias and Plato, contemporaries of Thucydides, in particular provide historians a picture of an idealized Athens as the Athenians themselves imagined it (Loraux 1989). On the vexed question of the political nature of Athenian drama and the relationship between the theatre and politics in democratic Athens, see, e.g., Goldhill 1990; Ober and Strauss 1990; Winkler 1990; Zeitlin 1990; Euben 1986a; cf. D. Carter 2011 and 2007; Rhodes 2003; Griffin 1999. For arguments specifically about Old Comedy’s relationship to democratic politics, see summaries in Olson 2010a. Finally, documentary evidence, Athenian casualty lists (\textit{IG} I\textsuperscript{1}, 199-230) and the formal decisions of the \textit{demos} (\textit{IG} I\textsuperscript{1}, 39-80, 90), as well as public monuments and epitaphic commemoration, provide direct, albeit contextually limited, access to official public commitments. Ecclesiastical decrees uniquely reveal the opinions and anxieties of the majority of Athenians and give us a much broader perspective than does contemporary literature.} When combined, these sources permit a close account, from multiple vantages, of conflicts of interest and the civil strife that the war engendered, and of the conditions that saw Athens succumb to \textit{stasis} in 411/10 and again in 404/3.
In order to flesh out most fully the effects of the war on specific groupings and subgroupings of Athenians, this section will proceed in the following manner: the current chapter (Five) presents a contextualizing discussion of the nature of civic participation and obligation in the democratic city and demonstrates the need to more accurately discern both the distribution of civic burdens and the very groups upon which those burdens fell. In Chapter Six, I offer a review of the literature on the state of the question and proceed to outline my view of how historians should best understand the Athenian civic body to have been articulated. Once various groups of citizens have been delineated and the nature of their obligations provisionally defined, Chapters Seven and Eight present surveys of these obligations throughout the last third of the fifth century. Given the close connections both ideologically and concretely between civic participation and military service to the polis, the nature and scope of Athens’ military activities throughout the war merit examination for how they affected the social and political life of the city. Chapter Seven, therefore, will provide an analysis of how the war impacted the Athenian soldiery, specifically attending to how the realities of fighting a protracted war in disparate theatres affected the traditional Athenian citizen militia.

5.1 The democratic polis: memberships, privilege and obligation

Before we are in a position to assess the various levels of participation and performance of civic duty by different Athenian groups, it is necessary to contextualize the analysis with a brief outline of the various views on the nature of ancient democratic citizenship. In recent decades, the polis has come to be understood by most scholars as a stateless society, in which centralized, autonomous government is absent. Many such societies are characterized by modern political theorists and social anthropologists as pre-political and
primitive. In support of this characterization, such theorists claim that, as a rule, as societies increase in complexity they tend to develop increased socio-economic stratification concomitant with greater concentration and centralization of political authority. The Greek polis clearly resists some elements of this characterization while admitting others. Greek cities were complex and socio-economically stratified, though the degree of socio-economic inequality in classical *poleis* appears to have been much lower than in comparable Mediterranean and Near Eastern societies. And while, nevertheless, the polis lacked the centralized authority characteristic of the Weberian state and found in almost all other historical, complex societies, it was characterized by impersonal institutions and processes of government. As such, the polis represents a unique socio-political development and is more accurately described not as a stateless society, but as a citizen-state: a civic organization in which there was no autonomous, centralized government, but in which the citizens themselves formed the government on the basis of impersonal office-holding and juridical authority. In the political culture of the polis, the centralized state and its various capacities were minimal, as a consequence of which it was necessary for the civic body, *hoi politai*, collectively, to perform voluntarily and directly the functions of government.

In contradistinction to other historical political societies, to be a free and fully enfranchised member of a polis, therefore, was not primarily defined as civil liberty or having

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442 E.g., Johnson and Earle 2000.  
444 For an up-to-date review of the vast literature on the nature of the decentralized Greek city and the culture of civic participation the polis, see Beck (ed.) 2013, 22-37, 159-218, esp. 285-348; Corner 2010, 5-6; Berent 2000.
the freedom from the state to do as one pleases (ζην ὡς ἄν τις βούληται), but rather to have the freedom to engage in the public domain and be a contributing member to the state;\textsuperscript{445} that is, to share in the governance and political activity of the state.\textsuperscript{446} Citizenship, therefore, did not, for the ancient Greeks, consist in a series of rights so much as in having the dignity or honour (τιμή) that came with full civic status and which granted the single prerogative to be able to share in the polis (μετέχειν τῆς πόλεως/μετέχειν τῆς πολιτείας).\textsuperscript{447}

As Ostwald observes:

When we read . . . that a specified amount of property determines eligibility for office in oligarchies and in some democracies, ‘eligibility,’ that is, the ‘right’ to hold office, is expressed by the phrase ἔξοσισίν εἶναι μετέχειν (to have the possibility to share). However, a closer look reveals that it is not a ‘right’ that is expressed.\textsuperscript{448}

\textit{Exeinai metekhein} does not imply a grant of civic rights; rather \textit{exeinai}, refers to the minimum standard or baseline at which it is possible, having met the economic necessities of domestic life, for a citizen to engage in public affairs. \textit{Exeinai}, therefore, is a precondition for public service since it allows the means—that is, the necessary leisure—to share and actively participate in the public sphere. In the fully developed democracy of fifth-century Athens, this precondition was theoretically achievable by all adult male Athenians thanks to high levels of opportunity for wage earning and through state subvention. Thus in ancient Athens it was open to all adult males to share in the polis. This cut two ways: all Athenian citizens enjoyed whatever benefits

\textsuperscript{445} As seminally defined by Berlin 1969, who distinguished ‘negative’ liberty, the freedom from obstacles such as state control as barriers to human action, from ‘positive’ liberty, the freedom and means necessary for self-realization; this thinking, however, can be traced back to Constant’s essays on the differences between ancient and modern liberty (1806-1819) and his critique of Rousseau, and back further to Hobbes’ rejection of the ancient model of freedom. Cf. Liddell 2007; Ober 2005; Ostwald 1996, 49-61; Hanson 1991.


\textsuperscript{447} Arist. \textit{Pol.} 1276b; F. Miller 1996, 905.

\textsuperscript{448} Ostwald 1996, 55-6.
were held in common, but all were expected to undertake their share of the duties required of the citizen.\footnote{449}

The proposal in 483 attributed to Aristeides by Plutarch to distribute the newly discovered silver resources of Laureion evenly amongst the citizenry, although ultimately not implemented, illustrates the tendency, in the absence of a centralized state, for public things, even public moneys, to be considered the possession of the citizens.\footnote{450} To take another example, when, in 445/4, during a food shortage, King Psammetichus gifted the Athenians with a massive grain shipment, this donation was viewed as the strict prerogative of \textit{politai}; that is, the grain represented a public good in which each citizen could claim his share (Plut. \textit{Per}. 37.3).\footnote{451} The citizen thus had certain claims on the polis and public goods—that is, to his share of public resources or offices. In Athenian ideology, the cost of these entitlements and prerogatives was civic service. In the language of Athenian oratory, the fulfillment of civic obligations is either cast as voluntary or else compared to the repayment of an \textit{eranos} loan (Thuc. 2.43.1): although civic participation was voluntary (as was membership in an \textit{eranos} group), once one had participated and received the benefits of citizenship, one was then constrained to repay the \textit{eranos} by obeying the rules established by the association (in this case the polis) and fulfilling the obligations expected of its members.\footnote{452} This concept of social obligation is also to be found in Athenian drama (e.g., Eur. \textit{Heracl}. 824-827; cf. Aesch. \textit{Sept}. 10-20; Eur. \textit{Phoen}. 994-}

\footnote{449} Todd 1993, 182-184.  
\footnote{450} Hdt. 7.144.1; Plut. \textit{Them}. 14.2.  
\footnote{451} M. Finley 1981, 81-82.  
\footnote{452} Christ 2012, 67-9; Liddel 2007, 143. See, e.g., Lys. 31.5,7; Lycurg. 1.133; Dem. 21.67.
and in the epitaphic tradition (esp. Lys. 2.70). As the examples above show, individual citizens had positive claims on the state, or, to be more precise in the context of the polis, that which was considered public (ta politika). Such claims, however, entailed a moral obligation to take one’s share of public burdens. The pronouncement of Kritias to the assembled soldiery in 404 exemplifies this civic logic: “Just as you share in the privileges [of the city], so you should share in the dangers” (Xen. Hell. 2.4.9).

In Athens, civic obligation and service normally took the form of political and military service, and, for those of means, economic contributions. Since the central institutions of the polis did not tend to look after the welfare of individuals, privately the citizen was obliged to steward the resources of his household and to provide for aged parents. Failure to do so was cause for public scrutiny and sanction. Publicly it was a part of many citizens’ duty to contribute monetarily through taxes (e.g., the eisphora) the telê that financed the goods of public life, such as the dikastêria or the Athenian navy (though direct taxation was not the norm in the fifth century). For wealthy Athenians, this could include providing such goods directly through the formal institutions of public benefaction known as leitourgia, as well as through

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455 Xen. Hell. 2.4.9: δέι οὖν ύμᾶς, ὡσπερ καὶ τιμῶν μεθέξετε, οὕτω καὶ τῶν κινδύνων μετέχειν. Cf. Pericles’ admonition to the Athenians in 430 (Thuc. 2.63.1): “Again, it is right that you defend that which you all take delight in, the prestige that the city derives from ruling, and that you either not flee its hardships (τοὺς πόνοις) or not pursue its honours (τὰς τιμὰς).” Several important texts dating from the Peloponnesian War or slightly later reveal the correlation between the performance of civic service and privilege. Aristophanes’ Wasps gives the fullest articulation. The performance of a citizen’s military duty was the basis of his claim to partake in the commonwealth and its benefits (684-685, 1114-1121). See also: Thuc. 2.40; cf. Lys. 2.18; 28.12-13.
457 See above, Ch. 2 and below, Ch. 6.8.
occasional large donations of private funds to the public treasuries known as *epidoseis*.\(^{458}\) Thus, while membership in the polis conferred benefits upon individuals, it also entailed a litany of civic duties (*tὰ δέοντα, τὰ τέλη, τὰ προστεταγμένα, οἱ πόνοι*) that ranged from care of one’s parents, to monetary contributions, to military service.\(^{459}\) By far the two most prominent duties of Athenians were to perform military service in times of war and, if of sufficient means, to do their part to underwrite the costs of public goods.\(^{460}\) These two considerations, more than any others, underlay what it meant to be a useful (*khrêstos*) citizen.\(^{461}\) The preeminence of military and financial service is reflected in the expression found commonly in Athenian sources that the good citizen should serve the polis “with person and property.”\(^{462}\) The motivations underlying the performance of such onerous duties require consideration. Although legal scholars are able to identify a number of statutes that regulated the performance of civic duties by promising penalties for deviants, for most citizens the likelihood of prosecution, let alone conviction, for dereliction was not great.\(^{463}\)

\(^{458}\) See below, Chs. 6, 8, on the nature of these institutions in Athens; on the functioning and development of these during the Peloponnesian War, see Ch. 8.

\(^{459}\) The basic obligations of the Athenian citizen are essentially laid out in the questions asked during *dokimasia*, the formal review of citizens to ensure their fitness and eligibility for office-holding. Before taking up his post, an Athenian was asked by members of the Boule ([Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 55.3-4): “Who is your father and to what deme does he belong, and who is your father’s father, and who is your mother, and is your mother’s her father and what is his deme?”; then whether he has a Family Apollo and Homestead Zeus, and where these shrines are; then whether he has family tombs and where they are; then whether he treats his parents well, and whether he pays his taxes (καὶ τὰ τέλη ἐὰν τελεί), and whether he has done his military service” (καὶ τὰς στρατευές ἐὰν ἐστράτευσα). See further, Hansen 1991, 218-220.

\(^{460}\) Christ 2012, 68-90; Hansen 2006, 117-118. In the city’s official oratory, it is military service and personal sacrifice on the battlefield that is the *kallistos eranos* (Thuc. 2.43.1).

\(^{461}\) According to Aristotle, a proper citizen should be ‘useful’ to the city militarily (*τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς πόλεμον*: *Arist. Pol.* 1321a6-7); cf. Thuc. 6.31.3; Dem. 60.27; *Ar. Ach* 595-597, where to be a useful citizen (*χρήστος πολιτής*) is to be a “soldier through and through” (*στρατιωτικός*).

\(^{462}\) E.g., Thuc. 8.65.3; Lys. 19.58; Andoc. 2.18; *Ath. Pol.* 29.5, 33.1, 55.3; Dem. 10.28, 42.25; cf. Thuc. 8.97.1-2; *Xen. Hell.* 2.3.48.

\(^{463}\) For statutes and substantive law in classical Athens generally, see Todd 1993, 54-60, 105-109. For the unlikelihood of prosecution and conviction, see, e.g.: Christ 2006, 120-121 and 2004, 41, and below, 238-242.
To some extent participation in public affairs was an end in itself.\textsuperscript{464} In Aristotle’s conception, man is a species of political animal, whose natural potential is only realized in community, and so full participation in and engagement with the moral and political life that defines the polis is fundamental to human flourishing.\textsuperscript{465} To participate in \textit{ta politika}, to be a citizen, was to partake of ‘the good life,’ above and beyond mere animalistic subsistence. The goal of living the ‘good life,’ then, entailed certain public commitments and obligations on the part of the individual; virtuous engagement in the community of citizens, however, is not seen as antithetical to (economic) personal interests but is rather identical with the good for the individual insofar as political association has as its end not merely living but living well.\textsuperscript{466}

Athenian ideology tended to assume that all Athenians contributed willingly to the public good. This idealizing gloss is most strongly at work, for example, in the epitaphic tradition (e.g., Lys. 2.14, 61; Dem. 60.37).\textsuperscript{467} In the Periclean funeral oration, Thucydides hints that Athenians in reality fall short of this ideal. Pericles is scathing on this point: the Athenians regard any citizen who does not actively share in the affairs of the polis not simply as private or withdrawn (\textit{\'aprap\'ymo\nu\sigma}), but as useless (\textit{\'achre\io\nu}).\textsuperscript{468} With Pericles as with Aristotle, the ethos of civic

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\textsuperscript{464} Hansen 2006a, 115; Manville 1994, 25; Murray 1990, 19-22.
\textsuperscript{465} Both Plato and Aristotle take it for granted that a good life can only be lived within a polis and that it is the moral obligation of the citizen to contribute to the life and well-being of his city, see, e.g., Pl. \textit{Ap. Crito}; Arist. \textit{Pol. Book 3}; Ober 1989, 160; Rahe 1984, esp. 275-276. For this idea with especial reference to the performance of military service, see \textit{Pol.} 1291a1-29.
\textsuperscript{466} Arist. \textit{Pol.} 1252a-1253b.
\textsuperscript{468} “μόνοι γὰρ τὸν τε μὴθὲν τὴνδὲ μετέχοιτα οὐκ ἀπράγμονα, ἄλλο ἀχρείον νομίζομεν” (Thuc. 2.40.2). Cf. Thuc. 2.63.3. Athenian uniqueness (\textit{monoi}) represents an epitaphic topos (e.g., Thuc. 2.41.5; Lys. 2.18, 20, 57; Pl. \textit{Menex.} 240d4, 245c51; Dem. 60.4-5, 11). Moreover, this, of course, is an ideologically charged passage; that there was room in Athenian social practice and space in relative safety from the teeth of Athenian legislation for ‘quiet’ or apolitical individuals has been well-argued by L. Carter 1986; see, however, Thuc. 6.18, where, in a deliberative speech in the Assembly, Alcibiades chastises Nicias for his caution (\textit{\'aprap\'ymosovn}) and warns the Athenians about what he considers harmful inactivity. Such arguments were routinely marshaled in deliberative oratory. On the theme of Athenian \textit{polyp\'rap\'ymosovn} outside of Thucydides, see, e.g., Eur. \textit{Suppl} 576-577; Ar. \textit{Birds}, \textit{passim}. Pericles’ oration,
participation produces a particular style of civic personhood; this is reflected in Athenian discourse wherein the fully realized man can only be understood in his role as citizen. Conversely, individuals who did not fit civic norms were reviled as antisocial.

Politai thus faced limitations on the degree to which they were free to act out of calculated self-interest at the expense of the community because their actions or inactions directly affected public institutions such as government (the Assembly and the Boule), the courts, and the military. In the absence of a standing army or a state prosecutor, public goods, such as social justice or communal defense, were conceived of in terms of shares in the civic community and demanded an extraordinarily high intensity and frequency of voluntary participation and public service for their upkeep. Since the choices and actions of private citizens had a direct impact on the public interest, there was in Athens no clear demarcation between public (ta politika or ta pragmata) and the private sphere (ta idia). In the interest of preserving the political arrangement that maximized individual autonomy and freedom from

while admitting of a certain tension between Athens’ celebrated individual eleutheria and civic obedience, nevertheless, affirms the ideological norms of good citizenship, deference to the laws and compliance with social expectations (Thuc. 2.37.2-3). Cf. Thuc. 2.60.2-4, for Pericles’ admonishment of the Athenians for putting private interests ahead of public commitments.

Sources less sympathetic to the democracy are critical of the degree of individual liberty enjoyed by the Athenians (e.g., Ps.-Xen. 1.10). For their parts, both Plato (Rep. 557b3-557c2) and Aristotle (Pol. 1310a29) identify personal freedoms as a defining feature of the democracy, citing ἐλευθερία, παρηγησία, and ἑξουσία . . . ποιεῖν ὁ τί τις βούλεται (Rusten 1989, 146). It is certainly true that Athens’ culture of eleutheria provided scope for quietism— and the official discourse even grudgingly tolerated it. Nevertheless, the official discourse presents the predominant civic ethic: even in democratic Athens, those who turn to their own business—that is who do not take part in or care of (ἐπιμέλεια) politics—are expected to keep informed of public affairs (Thuc. 2.40.2). Since every Athenian is a politēs, every Athenian has a direct stake in τὰ πολιτικὰ. Thus, while political disengagement was possible—even admissible—in the democratic city, public engagement was inevitable.

Indeed, in Thucydides’ famous estimation of the Athenian national character given in the Corinthians’ speech, which resonates heavily with epitaphic themes, the Athenians are said to wear themselves out (μυθοῦσι) undertaking every kind of toil and risk (πόνον πάντα καὶ κινδύνον) and individually spending both their bodies and their minds in the service of the polis as if these were not even their own (Ἀλλὸς ρωστοῦτος) [Thuc. 1.70.6-8]. Cf. Lys. 2.24: ὑπαξία ἀλλοτρίως. Such men “regard doing what is necessary as a holiday and quiet retirement from affairs as no less a misfortune than busyness full of toils” (μὴ ἐπιτίθῃ ἄλλα τι θετίσθητι ἢ τὸ τὰ δέοντα πράξῃ ξυμφοράν τε οὐχ ἥσσον ἥσυχίαν ἀπράγμανα ἢ ἀσχολίαν ἐπίπονον: Thuc. 1.70.8).
centralized government, subjection to which the Greeks viewed as a form of slavery, the *politès*, far from a private citizen in the familiar modern sense, became instead a civic official who voluntarily had to undertake the role and functions of government and bore a large weight of public accountability and obligation to the community.\textsuperscript{470} Dependence on voluntarism, however, always stood in some tension with cultural commitments to individual liberty, particularly in a democracy, and regular exhortation to the civic ideal, and castigation of those who should fall short of it, stands as itself testimony to the fact that public commitment was in tension with private interest.

A political organization lacking much centralized authority, the polis at once required broad, regular civic and military participation and at the same time had limited means by which to compel its individual members to participate. Given the absence of an economically extractive and bureaucratically centralized government, the polis as a political organization creates a considerable free-rider problem.\textsuperscript{471} Previous scholarship recognized the potential for collective action problems within the polis but argued that these were largely avoided because the individual in the classical period conceived himself as fundamentally part of the superordinate polis rather than an autonomous agent. The citizen was, to use Weber’s influential terminology, *homo politicus*: that is, a type of human agent whose psychic self was indissoluble from his identity as a citizen.\textsuperscript{472} Thus the traditional view holds that the discovery

\textsuperscript{470} Farrar 1988, 5-6.
\textsuperscript{471} Economy: Bresson 2008; government: Hanson 1995; on the application of game theory and collective action problems to democratic Athens, see, most recently, Herman 2006, 392-394. This, of course, did not escape Greek thinkers. See, e.g., Thuc. 2.40.1-3, 2.63.1-3.
\textsuperscript{472} Weber 1921, 756; cf. Fustel de Coulanges 1864, 281-287; Ehrenberg 1943, 2-4; M. Finley 1981, 93-94; Vernant 1988 [1981], 49-84.
of a truly autonomous individualism was an achievement of the Greeks that occurred in the later fourth century just as the structures of the classical polis began to erode.\footnote{E.g., Berlin 2002 [1962], 288-321; Arendt 1958. For these scholars, crass materialism and rationalism were anathema to the polis and the political consisted in precisely what was non-economic, non-utilitarian (Cartledge 2009a, 15). On the development of autonomia as a personal rather than communal quality, see Farrar 1988, 97-98, 105-106. Others have seen the first articulations of an ‘enclosed’ self in the deeply personal content of monodic lyric poetry of the late-seventh century: see, e.g., Campbell 1982, xi-xxix and 1983; Bowra 1961. These views are discussed and rejected by Lefkowitz 2012 [1981], 30-45, who argues against the autobiographical nature of the poems.}

More recent scholarship has called into question this view of the total dominance of the collective mentality of citizens of the polis, especially in democratic Athens. A number of scholars have traced the Athenians’ respect for diversity and personal freedom of choice and action even as they demanded civic participation and could celebrate the Demos as the hypostatization of the collective citizenry.\footnote{E.g., Liddel 2007; Ober 2005; Hansen 1991.} Other studies have focused on the normative and idealizing nature of the most influential ancient texts and have furthermore elucidated a variety of divergent, overlapping, and sometimes competing, social identities and ideologies within Athens.\footnote{Pritchard 2013 and 1991; Osborne 2011; Dougherty and Kurke 2003; Wohl 2003; Loraux 1981.} Carter, for example, has comprehensively studied the concept of the apragmôn in Athenian culture and has demonstrated that Athenians from various and disparate walks of life might lead relatively quiet and politically unengaged lives.\footnote{L. Carter 1986, esp. 76-130; cf. Gabrielsen 1986.}

Scholarship is presently divided over the extent to which the ideal of voluntary civic altruism was practiced in reality. A crucial question underlying this debate has been the degree to which egoistic and competitive values or communitarian and cooperative values governed Athenian behaviour.\footnote{Liddel 2007; Christ 2006 in support of the former as opposed to the views of Meier 1990; Herman 2006; E. Cohen 2000; Farrar 1996; L. Carter 1986.} Questions of civic motivation and evasion of obligation have recently
been highlighted by Christ in *The Bad Citizen in Classical Athens*.\textsuperscript{478} Christ focuses on two separate calculuses masked by the ideals of civic voluntarism, altruism, or communitarianism that our sources present as uniquely characteristic of the Athenians. The first is the rational calculation of citizens between the expenditure of energy or capital on civic projects and the personal benefit derived therein;\textsuperscript{479} the second is the citizens’ fear of legal sanctions arising from the dereliction of duties.\textsuperscript{480}

Much of what the ‘official’ accounts (to use Loraux’s term) of Athens and the behaviour of her citizens present, then, represents an ideal and in practice it is plain to see that there were occasions for the pursuit of narrow-self interest as well as scope and opportunity for the kind of ‘bad citizenship’ outlined by Carter and Christ. Indeed, the analysis I provide in Chapters Seven and Eight of civic duty during the Peloponnesian War owes much by way of inspiration to these scholars and, at several points, highlights shrewd practices of individuals or groups within Athens that fall far short of the civic ideal. Nevertheless, a model for civic behaviour must consider the pull of the ideal and its role in shaping reality. Furthermore, any explanation of the motivational psychology of Athenian citizens must take fully into account a third rational calculus on the part of the citizen: the payoff for voluntary and supererogatory service.

Voluntary and supererogatory performance of the functions required by the polis in the absence of a central government, including military service, was rewarded in a culture of public honours

\textsuperscript{478} Christ 2006; see also E. Cohen 2000, who is skeptical of the degree to which communal altruism, rather than rational economic calculation, motivated civic participation.

\textsuperscript{479} Christ 2012, 69 and 2006, 1-44. Christ is concerned with narrow personal interest; that is, self-interest beyond what Athenians recognized as the general personal benefit to the individual arising from living in a city that is doing well. On this, see, for example, the explicit statements of Pericles at Thuc. 2.60.2-4; cf. Eur. *Fr.* 360, 19-42 (Austin). In this fragment, belonging to the lost *Erechtheus*, Praxithea rationalizes her decision to sacrifice her daughter along lines similar to the Periclean argument: the fortunes of the city are of much more worth than those of a single house (19-21); if the city should suffer defeat, all is lost for individuals anyway (39-42).

\textsuperscript{480} Christ 2012, 68-70 and 2006, 45-204.
and esteem such that individuals’ own self-interested ambition translated into social and political capital in an economy of honours. What is needed is an approach that fully appreciates the crucial role played by rivalry, competition, and emulation as the fuel that sustained the social and political institutions of the polis, including its armed forces. We must not view the duties of citizen as mere statutory obligations but as “moral action[s] grounded in social norms,” which Athenians undertook “to [benefit] themselves and the polis that they comprised.”

Supererogatory service is often associated with the elite citizens of a polis. There is good reason for this—wealthy citizens could bring their abundant resources to bear in the public sphere. But this is only part of the picture. Citizens who might not be in a position to make outstanding contributions to the city financially may well have done so with the most precious resource of all—their bodies. As Thucydides explains through the mouth of Pericles: “Farmers who work their own lands are the kind of men more ready to wage war with their bodies than with their property” (Thuc. 1.141.5). This statement, of course, refers to the Peloponnesians, but certainly a large majority of Athenians, too, fit the description of autourgoi. One need only consider how prevalent are both the citations of military service and the accusations of dereliction of military duty in the literature of Peloponnesian-War Athens to appreciate the importance of competitive rivalry in military participation and the role played by such service in claims to status and distinction.

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482 Thuc. 141.5: . . . σώμασί τε ἑτοιμότεροι οἱ αὐτουργοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἢ χρήμασι πολεμεῖν . . .
483 See below, Ch. 7.
5.2: Who wants a peace?

While modern historians are aware of the complex social geography of ancient Athens and of the many and various categories into which the Athenian civic body is known to have been sub-divided conceptually and practically (for example, on the basis of military roles, the Solonian τελῆ, occupation, cultic associations, or place of residence), the distinction that classical sources employ most often, and which most plainly cut across other social divisions, was that between hoi plousioi and hoi penêtes. Athenians writers commonly employed a binary division and classed all those belonging to social strata below ‘the rich’ (from the truly impoverished beggar [ptôkhos] to those quite comfortably off) amorphously as ‘the poor.’ At other times, a tripartite division is imagined with hoi plousioi and penêtes on either side of a clearly very broadly conceived group of mesoi (e.g., Eur. Supp. 238-244; Arist. Pol. 1295b1) who, according to Aristotle, are “equal” and “alike” (ἰσον . . . καὶ ὀμοίων: Pol. 1295b26).

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484 E.g., Ar. Knights 222-224, Wasps 463-468, 575, Peace 838-841, Thea. 289-290, Frogs 1066-1007, Eccl. 197-198, Wealth 29-30, 149-152, 500-503, 1003-1005; Ps.-Xen. 1.2, 1.4, 1.10. It is only natural that ancient authors should resort to this most basic division as often as they do for, as Aristotle explains, whatever overlap there may be in the identities and roles of citizens, it is impossible for the same person to be both rich and poor, so that these two elements are most consistently parts (µὴρη) of any state (Arist. Pol. 1291b6-9). M. Finley 1983, 1-11 highlighted the centrality of class in the ancient political consciousness in part by demonstrating the frequency of the terms like plousios and penês and their synonyms in classical sources. On the various permanent and non-permanent social divisions among Athenians, see: Osborne 2010, 55; Ober 2003; Davidson 1997, 227-238. The plousioi/penêtes division is, of course, a gross overschematization that ignores variations of wealth both among and between these two poles. For the sake of greater precision, where possible in this study, more precise terms for ‘elite’ and ‘rich’ citizens will be employed, e.g., triérarkhoutes, leitourgontes, eispheronetes.

485 A particularly striking example of this is Aristophanes’ Peace. While by no means to be interpreted as a technical commentary on class division across the Athenian populace, it is nevertheless worth noting that in the play the Athenian farmers (οὐργάνης κλώς), eager to return to their properties in Attica, are referred to as “τοὺς παγνησ” (632-636); cf. Wealth 552-554: the condition of the penês is described as one of hard work, thrifty living, not having much, but not lacking necessities whereas the life of the ptôkhos consists of having nothing at all.
Whether or not Aristotle’s *mesoi* correspond to an actual and economically defined, broad ‘middle class’ in the fifth century has been the subject of debate.\(^{486}\) Hanson and others suggest that the figure of the *mesos* as the ideal type of citizen in the essentially agrarian polis developed and crystallized in the archaic period because it represented the worldview of the emergent independent, smallholder—the hoplite-citizen-farmer.\(^{487}\) Others have been critical of this view.\(^{488}\) Certainly, Aristotle’s own usage of ‘*mesos*’ often diverges from any modern (that is economic) sense of the term ‘middle class,’ as when, for example, he refers to Solon and Lykourgos as *mesoi* (1296a19-20).\(^{489}\) Aristotle’s theoretical *mesoi* are ‘equal’ (ἰσοὺς) and ‘alike’ (ὁμοίους) in a more philosophical and ethical sense than in terms of their material conditions; they span a very broad socio-economic range indeed.\(^{490}\)

Therefore, although Aristotle is our most explicit source on matters of constitutional arrangements and socioeconomic class division, his distinctions are necessarily confusing to modern readers, because they are obfuscated by ethical concerns and assumptions. In the

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\(^{486}\) Ober 1989, 27-33. For his part, Aristotle is often imprecise and inconsistent (Ober 1991a, 112-135): at *Pol.* 1296a23-26, Aristotle says that in *poleis* (democratic or oligarchic), the *meson* (the middle element) is often small, being outnumbered by the rich (οἱ τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντες) or the commons (ὁ δῆμος). Van Wees 2004, 47 makes much of this passage. Yet just a few lines earlier, he claims that large *poleis* are freer from stasis than small ones because of their greater population of *mesoi* (ὅτι πολὺ τοῦ μίσους: *Pol.* 1296a10). Moreover, democracies are more stable than oligarchies owing to the fact that *hoi mesoi* are more numerous and have a greater share of honours in democracies (*Pol.* 1296a13-16).


\(^{489}\) On the lack of satisfactory correspondence between Aristotle’s concept of the middle element in the polis and modern notions of middle class, see: Van Wees 2004, 60; Ober 1991a, esp. 119-120. To judge from 1296a, it would seem that Aristotle could conceive of a ‘middling’ man being anyone below heads of state, since he qualifies the definition of Lykourgos among the *mesón politón* “because he was not a king” (οὐ γὰρ ἦν βασιλέα). Alternatively, that Solon was a *mesos* he discerns “from his poetry” (δηλοῖ δὲ ἐκ τῆς ποιημάτως), the lawgiver having created laws that were regarded as moderate and intended to obviate tensions between rich and poor in archaic Athens.

\(^{490}\) Morris 1994b, 57-58.
context of the polis, class and circumstance always carried with them moral connotations.\textsuperscript{491} The model citizen-type was the autarkic citizen-farmer who was neither so rich as to become aloof and haughty nor so lacking in means that he was unable to support himself and his household.\textsuperscript{492} As Aristotle explains, an excess (σφόδρα) either of wealth or of poverty generates moral deficiency; conditions of luxury lead the rich man to flout sōphrosynê or temperance and to commit hybris, while the desperate need of the pauper compels him to become subservient to others (\textit{Pol.} 1295b-1296a). Neither is the mark of the ideal citizen, who, for Aristotle, is defined by his commitment to self-mastery and to ruling and being ruled in turn (that is, participating in collective self-government and the decisions of the state, but at the same time being subject to them).\textsuperscript{493} Thus, as Morris has shown, ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ in classical Athens could be deployed as “categories of exclusion.”\textsuperscript{494} It is important to recognize, too, that terms like \textit{penia} and \textit{penês} are used in a relative sense by ancient authors. In the mouth of an upper-class speaker who found himself in court, \textit{penia} could be cited as a negative quality and a motive for his opponents’ crime (e.g., Lys. 7.14, cf. 22.13). At other times \textit{penia} has decidedly positive moral connotations, especially when Greeks employed the concept in comparing themselves and their

\textsuperscript{491} This is nowhere more noticeable than in Pseudo-Xenophon’s political tract; cf. Dem. 21.83, 95. On the creation of a complicated nexus of wealth (\textit{olbos}) in material (\textit{khrēmata}) versus non-material goods, such as health, beauty, and virtue as a response to social mobility in the archaic period, see Figueira 1995.

\textsuperscript{492} Corner 2013b, 229-230; Fisher 1992; Ober 1989, 208-212.

\textsuperscript{493} Arist. \textit{Pol.} 1277a26-b18, 1238b42-1284a4. Thus, in addition to the realities of class composition, there was in Athens, as in other Greek \textit{poleis}, a dominant ‘middling’ ideology that tended to mitigate and to obviate socio-economic disparity among citizens (Corner 2013a and 2013b; Morris 2000, 109-154 and 1994b, 55-59; Davidson 1997, 232-238; Ober 1989, 256-259, 266-267, 271, 275, 282-285, 306-311). Both rich men and poor adopted and embraced the values of the ‘middling man’ (\textit{ho metrios}) and of \textit{metritotês}, in doing so avoiding the moral associations of wealth (being indolent and hubristic) and of poverty (being slavish and dependent).

\textsuperscript{494} Morris 1994b, 57.
way of life to those who lived outside of the polis—namely the Persians (e.g., Hdt. 7.102.1, 9.28.3).  

Despite these complexities, most scholars readily adopt the more prevalent and more basic twofold division of society into ‘rich’ and ‘poor,’ and claim, furthermore, that what commonly defined the varied members of the underclass of people (hoi penêtes) in the ancient taxonomical mind was a lack of leisure (skholê), or the ability to make a living from one’s capital resources and the physical labour of others. The common characteristics of all men considered ‘poor’ were a need to work and a lifestyle that was parsimonious and moderate in its pursuit of luxuries, in contradistinction to the men of leisured wealth who were associated with indulgent spending on non-productive goods. To a certain extent, ancient sources bear testimony to this schema. Aristotle is the most explicit. Several passages in his Politics describe skholê as the exclusive prerogative of the rich (e.g., 1273a21-36, 1291b17-30, 1326b30-32). Social historians thinking about these apparent dichotomies, however, should

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495 Todd 2007, 240-241. Admittedly, the moral elevations of penia cited in Herodotus are delivered by Spartans, whose devotion to austerity—real or projected—was not typical of other Greeks (Thuc. 1.6.3), but cf. Thuc. 1.2.3-6. Penia also could be contrasted positively in moral terms, despite its material disadvantages, with the undesirable traits that accompanied wealth (e.g., the koros, which breeds hybris) as, for example, in the poetry of Solon and Theognis (Solon Fr 15 = Plut. Sol. 3.3; Thgn. 149). On the Greeks’ idealization of penia as a major component of their self-image as plucky and hardened warriors, see: Desmond 2006, 27-142, esp. 116-123; Hanson 1995, passim and 1989, 27-39. On the importance of reading Greek penia as relative, see Ober 2011.


498 Fisher 1976, 30. Indeed, the pursuit and consumption of such goods was itself a make of honour and status. On the ‘aristocratic life-style’ of ancient Greek nobility, see Kurke 1991.

499 Pritchard 2004, 211 and 1999, 51-63. In addition to spending on non-productive goods, leisure also provided the elite with opportunity to engage to a disproportional extent in especially polis-level festival activities; cf. Fisher 2011, 173-219. No one has exerted more influence on the study of ancient economy and society than M. Finley. In Finley’s account (1981), all but the poorest citizens lived an autarkic and contemplative life, made possible by the systematic and widespread exploitation of slave labour.
exercise some caution. Aristotle’s *Politics*, although it draws on constitutional arrangements of real *poleis* as exempla, is a heavily theoretical work that tends to gloss inconsistencies. Apart from *Politics*, the scholarly equation between *hoi* *penêtes* and *askholia* has been deduced mainly from fifth-century Old Comedy and fourth-century oratory and should probably not be accepted *tout court*.

For their part, comic productions were staged as part of dramatic competitions, adjudicated in a technical sense by ten randomly appointed judges, but, in practice, these judges themselves were heavily influenced in their decisions by the reactions of the mostly non-elite audience. Playwrights thus were likely to appeal to popular, non-elite sensibilities, and not only to ridicule but also to embellish and elaborate upon those habits of the elite that marked them as aloof, soft, unmanly, and unrestrained.

The discourse surrounding elitism and wealth in Athenian oratory is equally complex. In both forensic and deliberative speeches it was the aim of the (usually elite) speaker to convince a mass audience of mostly non-elite citizens of his point of view and either to find for him in court or to adopt his policy at the expense of his rival(s). A common rhetorical strategy was to cast one’s opponent as an hubristic and antisocial aristocrat, the antithesis of the respectable and moderate citizen. In so doing, speakers need not suppress details of their own wealth. In fact, they are often at pains to advertise their wealth and to show how, in spite of being rich, as

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500 For example, see below, 149-151, on Aristotle’s categorization of *geôrgoi*.

501 More problematic still is M. Finley’s adduction of Ciceronian material (*De officiis* 1.150-1) to bolster his case that in “the popular mind” (that is, the ancient popular mind generally), the labour associated with *penia* was disparaged (1999 [1973], 40-61). While many scholars of ancient economics continue to see patterns of economic thought and practice within culture zones (e.g., Horden and Purcell 2000), this kind of synchronic treatment of ancient attitudes, assuming a deeply embedded and static economy of ‘the ancients,’ is no longer credible. For the degree to which the fifth-century Athenian economy was characterized by market orientation and rational economic calculus, see Ch. 1, 30.


503 Ober and Strauss 1990, 237-270.
responsible citizens (metrioi) full of sôphrosynê, they do not use wealth to indulge their
passions but spend lavishly on the needs of the city. On the other hand, speakers are wont to
exploit to the full their mass audience’s inherent suspicion of elitism and their assumptions of
wantonness, profligacy, and unaccountable arrogance in rich men. They thus censure their
opponents as traitors or malcontented agitators and schemers against the city (e.g., Aeschin. 1,
passim) or else arrogant and unrestrained in their dealings with fellow-citizens (e.g., Dem.
19.198, 211). Part of this negative characterization of the wealthy man as hybristês were
allusions to indolence and aloofness (e.g., Dem. 18.45).

It is certainly true that Athens’ propertied citizens possessed wealth sufficient to free
them from quotidian, manual labour. However, this defining characteristic of the very
wealthy has sometimes been applied by scholars to a comfortably off ‘middle class’ of
gentlemen farmers owing to yet further imprecision on the part of our sources. More typically,
such considerations have led scholars to posit a fundamental divide between ‘the rich’ and the
‘middle class,’ the latter being defined “[e]conomically [as] men, great and small, who lived on
their earnings, not on property.” Classical sources at times include smallholder farmers and
tradesmen among the aporoi/penêtes (e.g., Ar. Ach. 578-597; Arist. Pol. 1291b, 1327b), other
times ranking them among the euporoi/plousioi, those generally believed to lead lives of leisure
(e.g., Ps.-Xen. Ath. Pol. 2.14; Arist. Pol. 1321a5-6; cf. Ar. Eccl. 197). This has led scholars to
imagine a socioeconomic middle class of mostly agrarian smallholders (a yeomanry to use

504 Ober 1989; M. Finley 1981, 91; Adkins 1972, 99-148; and see below, Ch. 4.
505 Here hoi idiôtai (private, unengaged people) are distinguished from hoi polloi and are “caught up
in indolence and leisure” (ραστώνη καὶ σκολῆ δελεκαξιμένων).
506 probably about ten to twenty per cent of the citizen population in fifth-century Athens; see Ch. 2
and 4.
507 Ehrenberg 1943, 112.
508 Hanson 1995, 432-3.
Hanson’s term), associated with Solon’s zeugitai, who possessed sufficient property to achieve near perfect autarky and has led to overstated accounts of middle class armies of gentlemen farmer-hoplites. The nature of the zeugite telos is currently the subject of intense scholarly debate, which receives full treatment below.

In addition to these issues, recent scholarship has further complicated the skholê/askhelia dichotomy. Corner, for example, has demonstrated by plumbing the politics of the parasitos that the distinction between ‘leisure-class’ and ‘working-class’ is not as straightforward as is commonly thought. This despised figure of the purportedly elitist symposium was more reviled in the sympotic poetry of high society than the poorest labourer or wage-earner precisely because of his skholê. It is the parasite who is considered to be truly slavish and morally bankrupt—not the day labourer who works for wage—because he scorns work and must utterly disgrace himself, pandering to his hosts in an effort to meet his material wants and living lifestyle of illiberal leisure. The wage-earner, by contrast to the truant, is compelled by necessity and material need to seek work. Crucially, Corner shows that rather than the symposiast, “the anti-type of the parasite is that ideal figure of the free citizen: the autarkic and autonomous farmer.” Corner thus liberates the working citizen (autourgos) from the moral

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509 Van Wees 2004, 47-60, 2002, and 2001; contra Hanson 1995, 115-119. It is worth noting here that in Aristotle’s work terms like euporoi and aporoi themselves are used with marked imprecision and inconsistency. In the passage cited above, euporoi can include working farmers. Elsewhere (e.g., Pol. 1291a34) the term is used exclusively for those with ousia enough to perform liturgies.

510 Ch. 6.

511 Corner 2013a and 2013b. On the foundational distinction between slave and free man underlying the sociology of the polis, see M. Finley 1981. Free men, no matter what their social standing or material conditions, enjoyed privileged status as a community of persons with political and economic autonomy over and against the population of slaves, who enjoyed neither personal liberty nor control of their own labour and its fruits.

512 Even the destitute ptôkho, who must beg for his keep, is esteemed above the parasitos, who willingly subordinates himself to others, relying on their charity to feed his luxurious tastes.

513 Corner 2013a, 56.
specter of *askholia* that has been imposed on him by modern readings of Old Comedy, oratorical texts, and Aristotle.\(^{514}\)

The Athenians do not appear to have made a distinction between *plousioi* and *penêtes* solely on the basis of the presence or absence of leisure—at least not in the Veblenian sense. Indeed, the Athenians seem to have had a rather complex conception of leisure and how it attached to status. Leisure was not a straightforward determinant of class. What mattered and was discussed by ancient sources was a person’s status vis-à-vis the nature of his work or his leisure, whether either might be considered liberal or illiberal.\(^{515}\) Productive, autarkic, and subsistence forms of labour were not disparaged and did not normally place those who performed them in an illiberal class of labourers, a ‘working class’, even in the minds of conservative and upper class writers. Indeed, such work could be considered virtuous as well as productive.\(^{516}\)

It would seem best, then, not to apply too rigid a distinction between ‘the rich’ and ‘the poor’ on the basis of the presence or absence of leisure. What emerges from this brief discussion is that designations such as ‘*hoi plousioi*’ and ‘*hoi penêtes*’ do not represent homogenous or even necessarily discreet ‘groups.’ The former comprised men who could be

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\(^{514}\) Corner 2013a and 2013b. See also, Samaras 2012. Cf. M. Finley 1981, 194; Humphreys 1970, 14. Previous scholarship claimed that, to the Greeks, labouring for a private employer was regarded as a form of slavery. There has been some slippage, however, and scholars tend regard the need to work as marking a division between *plousios* and *penêtes*, *euporoi* and *aporoi*. See, e.g., van Wees 2006; Pritchard 2004, 212 and 1999 51-63; Ober 1991a, 118-119 and 1989, 129-134; Strauss 1986; Davies 1984, 28-29; de Ste. Croix 1981, 116-117, 122; Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977, 16.

\(^{515}\) Corner 2013a and 2013b.

\(^{516}\) Hes. *WD* 298-308, 381-382, 396-404; cf. Eur. *El.* 77-80; Andoc. 1.144; Desmond 2006, 33-34. Indeed, Aristotle observes in his treatise on economics that farming is the noblest occupation because the wealth it brings is not derived from other men. Aristotle may well have in mind a substantial landholder, but the principle behind such an observation holds for poorer men as well. The comment is simply that landowning is the most autarkic livelihood—whether one works one’s own land or can afford to hire others to work it.
conceptually classed among the *euporoi* but who nevertheless were not so rich as to be free from the need to work: for example, Aristotle’s *geōrgoi*. For its part, ‘the poor’ represented an enormous and variegated group with various and overlapping roles, socially, politically, economically, militarily.517 Nevertheless, our sources frequently lump these together in monolithic categories such as *hoi aporoi, hoi penêtes, ho dēmos, hoi ouk ekhontes, hoi demotikoi*.

Given this inclination on the part of our (especially elite) literary sources, it is not surprising to find in modern scholarship a tendency to employ the same imprecise terms and to generalize about the motivations and actions of the few rich and the many poor Athenians in the Peloponnesian War. A quotation from a recent study of the Athenian democracy’s performance during the war by a leading scholar illustrates the *communis opinio* with respect to the disposition of burdens and opportunities across the citizen-body:

Despite the farmer Dicaeopolis’ desire for peace,518 we may safely conclude that it was the wealthier Athenians who most wished to end hostilities with Sparta. Paying the property tax and serving as a trierarch were expensive and dangerous propositions, and Athens was waging this war against the state that many Athenian aristocrats admitted as the most well-governed (possessing *eunomia*) and moderate (possessing *sophrosyne*) in all Hellas.519

But who are we really talking about when we speak of ‘Dicaeopolis the farmer,’ or ‘wealthier’ Athenians as types? And can it really be said that the rich suffered the effects, burdens, and obligations of the war uniformly as a class and disproportionally relative to other Athenians,

517 Arist. *Pol.* 1291b1-5. See next chapter for a modeling of these overlapping identities and roles.
518 See Section I on the privations of Athenian farmers during the war.
519 Samons, 2004, 86. Compare the statement of Jaeger 1938, 77: “It is well known that from time immemorial the rich men of Athens were the peace party, while the demos was always eager for war.” While more recent scholarship normally disavows talk of parties and party-interest in democratic Athens, the idea that the economic elite comprised doves has in the main persisted. Cf. Harding 1981.
themselves understood in this respect as a unitary group? If so, is this generally true of the entire twenty-seven year period? At least since the publication of Ehrenberg’s sociological study of the Athens of Aristophanes, scholars have tended to schematize Athenians’ attitudes toward the Peloponnesian War in terms of economic groups. This approach is not in itself misguided. Indeed, Aristophanes’ earliest play, *Banqueters*, even in the meager fragments that survive, is evidence for class tensions already in 427. However, conditions of war and instability always create winners and losers, and the waxing and waning fortunes of Athens throughout the last third of the fifth century must be examined in this light. Moreover, it must be considered whether farmers such as Aristophanes’ Dicaeopolis represented a homogenous group that was uniformly affected by the economic privations of the war. Finally, there is a notable absence in the quotation above of any thought of the poorer sort of Athenian, who, it is generally (and I would argue naively) assumed on the basis of his being least fiscally burdened by war, derived most in the way of opportunity from it vis-à-vis employment in the fleet, and was, therefore, a vigorous supporter of hawkish policy. Such an assumption does not take into account the likelihood that much of the Athenian fleet’s citizen-manpower comprised

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520 For the full statement of this thesis, see: Mossé 1976, 12-16, 30 and 1973, 23-28. The argument, however, is anticipated by no less a figure than Ps.-Xenophon (*Ath. Pol.* 2.14-16).


522 Fr. 232 K-A: “I’m the one who’s spent all this time playing aulos and lyres, and now you tell me to farm?” (Ὅστις αὐλοῖς καὶ λύραις κατατέτρυμημι χρόμενος εἶτα μὲ σκάπτειν κελάως); Fr. 230: “I must spend all this money for the triremes and the walls . . .” (Εἶς τὰς τριήρεις δὲ μ’ ἀναλούν ταύτα καὶ τὰ τεῖχα); Fr. 248: “thêtes do not perform their military service” (θῆτες . . . οὐκ ἐστρατεύοντο).

523 On Dicaeopolis as representative of the Athenian farmer, see below, 181-182, 205-206. The argument that farmers were in favour of peace with the Spartans because of the vulnerability of their farms is found already in Ps.-Xenophon’s *Ath. Pol.* (2.14) and is often repeated uncritically. Even within *Acharnians*, the situation is more complex as Dicaeopolis, a farmer who longs for peace and a return to his land, is hounded and threatened by the chorus of farmers for whom any talk of peace is anathema.

524 E.g., Tritle 2013; Raaflaub 1999 (but cf. 1994, 135); Millet 1993, 184; Garland 1987, 68-72; Kagan 1987, 121; M. Finley 1978a; Mossé 1976, 12-16, 30. For a more nuanced view, see Pritchard 2010, 27-33. These questions are taken up in Chapters 7 and 8 below.
faminers whose prospects in Attica were being damaged even as they earned pay for their service.  

We need to nuance the groups under discussion. To follow the sources by drawing contrasts between large socio-economic groupings, like ‘the rich’ and ‘the poor’ simply follows the elite narrative together with its attendant ideologies and biases and does not allow us a very close look at how the war affected the lives and social experiences of Athenians. As well as attempting to more finely articulate the groups under consideration, we must also remain sensitive to changing conditions in Athens during the war. Of course, a complete picture of the impact of the war on all the various groupings and subgroupings that articulated Athenian society, from the collective and encompassing dēmos to the smallest of voluntary associations, is beyond us due to the state of the evidence. Historians of ancient Athens do not have the luxury of consulting village records of citizen-registration, individual wills, or even personal

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525 Rosivach 1985; nor does this assumption appreciate the considerable hardship and sacrifice endured by Athenian nautai. While it is true that Athenian sailors were not subject to conscription, and that there existed nothing in the fifth century like the hoplite katalogos for rowers, it will not do to simply read the fact that thousands of Athenians voluntarily undertook naval service as evidence that the lower classes alone enthusiastically and perennially embraced pro-war policies that would lead to demand for their services. Furthermore, it is inconceivable how these underclasses would be able to maintain a stranglehold on the democracy’s foreign policy for more than half a century and, critically, for the last three decades of the fifth century when hawkish policy was clearly at odds with agrarian interests. If most Athenians lived in the countryside prior to 431, as Thucydides plainly states (2.14), the clear implication of this is that a large majority of citizens were farmers, including many of those who would fulfill their military obligation by serving in the fleet. Too often naval service is presented simply as employment (argyrion lambanein) and a craft (tekhnê) and juxtaposed implicitly or explicitly with more noble infantry service. This, again, simply follows the ancient, elite prejudice of writers like Ps.-Xenophon (2.13) and Plato (Leg. 706b-707b, Menex. 241b). It is clear from the plays of Aristophanes and from Athenian oratory that naval service fulfilled the citizen’s military obligation. See below, Ch. 7.4.1.

526 Cf. The admonition of Hanson 1995, 248: “Military historians . . . should be wary of introducing the old dichotomous class struggle—poor/rich, mass/elitist, exploited/exploiter, powerless/powerful—into the sociology of Greek polis warfare.” As we shall see, mutatis mutandis, Hanson’s observations of the overlap between farmers—neither rich nor poor—and hoplites is apt, even for democratic Athens.

527 How the various civil associations, to use de Tocqueville’s terminology, whose primary function was not political (e.g., orgeônes, hetairiai, phratai, etc.), reacted to and contributed to Athenian war-making and the experience of war is irrecoverable. Of the larger and more overtly political of Athens’ social units, such as demes and phylai, a close reading of the available evidence yields some tentative hypotheses.
correspondence—the staple sources for demographers and social historians of more recent historical periods.\textsuperscript{528} What is more, Thucydides, our most comprehensive source, presents a significant source-problem for the study of subordinate social organizations and socio-economic class interest precisely because the historian programmatically avoids discussion of sub-polis social organizations in his history; his is a meditation on the actions (and reactions) of the polis—his history has a public face.\textsuperscript{529} This is not to say that Thucydides’ work is not instructive where the sociology of the polis is concerned. Far from it: Thucydides, while covering the war in annalistic fashion, focuses disproportionately on a handful of important moments in order to explore and reveal the workings and mentalities of the democratic polis.\textsuperscript{530} Nevertheless, Thucydides’ narrative does not give much explicit testimony regarding benefits or burdens generated by the war apart from some very influential comments about the source of revenue it provided to the lower classes (e.g., 6.24.3). In this respect, however, Thucydides is no different than other sources for Peloponnesian-War Athens.

While ancient Greek certainly has equivalent terms for ‘burden’ and ‘opportunity,’ fifth-century sources rarely apply them to specific groups.\textsuperscript{531} It is much more common to find in the literature of the late-fifth century the language of ‘toiling’ or ‘undertaking toils’ or ‘facing

\textsuperscript{528} E.g., Theibault 1997. Indeed, in the case of classical Athens, a predominantly oral rather than documentary society, registration records and personal testaments may not have even existed in the main. See J. Dillon 2004, 50-77.

\textsuperscript{529} For the way in which Thucydides’ history privileges the polis over the household, see: Hunt 1998, 121-143, who shows how Thucydides’ version of the war elides class distinction; cf. Crane 1996. Thucydides’ lack of interest in personal heroic exploits or in precise casualty figures, except where they seem aberrant, has been discussed by Bosworth 2009.

\textsuperscript{530} Ober 2001; Connor 1984, esp. 237-245.

\textsuperscript{531} For ‘burden’ and ‘obligation,’ denoting required, compulsory, or necessary action, Greek authors typically employed a rich vocabulary around ἀνάγκη, τὰ δέοντα, the impersonal forms of verbs of necessity, such as δι᾿ ἀνάγκης, ή δέοντα, or else the combination of a verb and the -τέον, -τέα, -τέων adjectival marker of necessity. See: Liddel 2007, 158-159; Schein 1998, 294-295.
dangers,’ especially in the context of military service.\textsuperscript{532} Our sources employ lexical variety to describe the performance of public tasks, but the most frequent are the nouns πόνος and κίνδυνος and the verbs πονέω, ταλαπωρέω and κάμω.

Normally these toils are connected, conceptually, with the actions required of citizens. It is important to recognize, however, that the duties performed by citizens in the democratic polis were not merely placed upon them by constraint as, for example, the remittance taxes in the modern nation state.\textsuperscript{533} The citizen of ancient Athens inhabited a much different social and political world in which citizenship itself consisted of much more content than the narrow legal definitions or juridical status with which it is mainly concerned in other types of state.\textsuperscript{534} Moreover, there is an important ambivalence that surrounds such ‘toiling.’ Very often ponoi

\textsuperscript{532} E.g., Soph. Trach. 18-22; Ar. Ach. 695-697, 1071, Knights 579, Wasps 684-685, 1114-1121, Peace 346-348, 918-921, Eur. Supp. 189, 323, 373, 576-577, Cyc. 282, 347; Thuc. 1.70.6-9, 1.99.1, 2.38.1, 2.41.5, 2.62.1-3, 2.89, 3.3.1, 3.59.2, 4.27.1, 4.35.4, 7.16.1, 7.27.5, 7.82.1, 8.63.4; cf. Lys. 2.3, 47, 55, 61; Dem. 9.71.

Ar. Peace provides a further example wherein Trygaios metaphorically prepares to ride his dung beetle into a legal ‘battle’ (τράγουμαντις 107) with Zeus. He performs his labours on behalf of the Athenians (χαίρετε. ὑμεῖς δὲ γ', ὑπὲρ ἐν τούς πόνους ἐγώ πονό μὴ βδέλυμε μὴδὲ ἥξετο ἧμερῶν τρίδον: 149-151). On the constant toiling of the Athenians as a tragic theme, see Raaflaub 1994, 104-106. For the equation of military toil and bravery with the carrying of legal accusations in Athenian forensic oratory, see: Brock 2013; Roisman 2005; Arendt 1958, 36.

\textsuperscript{533} Laws in ancient Athens were not “purely negative preventions” or positive liabilities; rather they were “guidelines with moral purpose that ultimately reflect and define shared values of the members of the political community” (Manville 1994, 25).

\textsuperscript{534} See: Ober 1996a and 1989; Boegehold and Scarfuro 1994. For the purposes of defining and articulating Athenian conceptions of citizenship and citizens’ roles, the civic ideologies distilled from Athenian public discourse are of paramount importance. It is true that “citizenship entailed a nexus of privileges and obligations in many spheres of activity, [which were] juridically defined” (M. Finley 1999 [1973], 47); however, what was expected of an individual Athenian, as well as the claim that individuals might make to privilege, could be highly subjective and situational. The polis, as a political organization, lacked the strong mechanisms of coercion of most historical state-systems and compulsion of its members was anathema to the ideals of autonomy on which it was predicated. This is especially true of the democratic polis (Christ 2006). As will become clear in my discussion of the norms and ideals surrounding military service in Athens (Chapter 7), I agree with Ober in his stance against Hansen 1991 concerning the priority of ideology over institutions. Civic ideals themselves, while they represent imaginary projections of how a society wishes to see itself, nevertheless are not divorced from reality and practice, and they play an active role in shaping such reality. Public institutions, then, and the practices which they govern, are both generative of civic ideologies and reflective of them (Manville 1994, 25).
represent, on the one hand, the cause of hardship and grief and, on the other hand, opportunity through their performance for both material and social gain.\textsuperscript{535} It should not be assumed that Athenians across the socio-economic and political landscape viewed ponoi and its related terms as burdens and opportunities the same way as our elite authors do.\textsuperscript{536} The privileged perspectives of authors like Thucydides or the so-called Old Oligarch have the potential to obscure or to distort the view of what, to a common Athenian, represented opportunity or obligation.

Aristophanes and Old Comedy, the epigraphic record, and the early fourth-century orators provide much different vantage points from Thucydides with respect to the expectations and obligations placed upon individuals by the polis as well as their various motivations for fulfilling them. By reading Thucydides’ account of the war against and in comparison with these other sources, we can attempt to answer some fundamental questions surrounding the performance of civic duty in conditions of war. Some examples, to be discussed below, are: Did Athenian hoplites take the field out of a sense of obligation or opportunity? Were they compelled to? If so, by what forms of compulsion?\textsuperscript{537} Was naval service normally regarded by the typical Athenian rower as a privilege and an opportunity for wage-earning?\textsuperscript{538} For that matter, did the rich citizens, who performed the trierarchy, always stand to lose when they

\textsuperscript{535} See the important discussion of military privilege versus obligation in M. Finley’s incisive work on Greek freedom (1981, 88-90); cf. Sinclair 1988, 49-53.
\textsuperscript{536} For example, in the following chapters I offer examples of how, paradoxically, military service to the state could be viewed as a personal good and how financial contribution, particularly in the form of the trierarchy, could result in material gain.
\textsuperscript{537} Christ 2006 and 2001; and below, Ch. 7.2.2.
\textsuperscript{538} As, e.g., Thuc. 6.24.3, and accepted wholly by Raaflaub 1999 and 1994; Garland 1987, 68-72; M. Finley 1978a and 1978b.
performed the liturgy? As already mentioned above, most scholars have assumed that the wealthy were generally opposed to both war and empire because it was they who underwrote its costs, while the poor benefitted from payment for military service.

As Raaflaub has shown, material and economic considerations should not be discounted as part of the motivational psychology of the citizen when it came to matters of war. Such considerations “should not be underestimated even if they were perhaps not decisive.” This observation, however, is too frequently only applied with respect to poor Athenians. Thucydides himself makes the claim, through the mouth of the Syracusan, Hermokrates, that “nobody is deterred by a fear of war if they expect to gain from it” (Thuc. 4.59.2). Even so, there is a need to qualify and categorize exactly what kind of gain is meant in various instances. To be sure, sometimes economic motivations are discernibly present; other times they are not, or at least less discernibly so, and are tied up with other considerations.

The fact that economically-motivated class tensions were evidently a factor in the staseis that overtook Athens in the last phase of the war has led to a certain teleological thinking when it comes to evaluating the costs and benefits generated by the war over its twenty-seven year duration. The conditions that obtained in Athens between 413-404 and that had led to constitutional debate, reflection and, in 411, reorganization, are presumed to have existed throughout the last third of the fifth century. The danger of such presumption is that it, in turn, leads to imprecise and misleading generalizations such as: the poor benefitted from war, the

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539 See below, Chapter 8.5.
540 E.g., M. Finley 1978, 1-15; Mossè. 1976, 12-16, 30; cf. M. Finley 1978b, 123-124; Andrewes 1978, 101-102, who argues that there is no good evidence that the Athenian elite resented imperial endeavours, which is likely because they too profited materially from empire just as the underclasses. Cf. A. Jones 1957, 35, who argues that in the fourth century the richest Athenians contributed the least amount relative to their wealth to Athens’ war efforts.
elite were burdened by it. This section aims to provide a much more nuanced analysis, which demonstrates, even with respect to these two overgeneralized groupings, the burdens and opportunities associated with war did not remain fixed over the course of the last third of the fifth century.
6.1 Introduction

The purpose of this section is to assess the burdens and opportunities engendered by the Peloponnesian War for Athenian citizens. Of course, different things were expected of different citizens vis-à-vis their socio-economic standing. There was an expectation in Athens, as in all poleis, that wealth and social standing in the community would be put, in part, toward communal ends.\(^{542}\) At the same time, it was acknowledged as part of the dominant public discourse that a relative lack of means, even poverty, while perhaps creating certain practical barriers to communal service (Thuc. 2.40.1), was not an excuse for evading public service (e.g., Thuc. 2.40.2).\(^{543}\) This chapter seeks to sketch how the two main public obligations of the citizen—military service and financial contributions—fell across the civic body in Periclean Athens in order to lay the groundwork for individual chapters on the performance of these obligations throughout the Peloponnesian War.

In order to come to grips with how the Athenian citizen body was articulated in the last third of the fifth century and to understand upon which Athenians what expectations fell, it is necessary to deal with a notoriously vexed topic in ancient Greek historiography: the makeup of the Solonian telê and their relevance to fifth-century Athenian society. An exploration of the

\(^{542}\) A concept of noblesse oblige in Greek communities goes back to our earliest sources. The locus classicus is the dialogue between Sarpedon and Glaukos at Il. 12.310-328. See Donlan 1999, 1-34, 345-357. For discussion of this and other Homeric passages, which attest the development in early archaic Greece of the concept of civic responsibility, see Raafflaub 2001, 72-89. As we shall see, an ability to contribute to the commonweal became the sine qua non of citizenship at Athens during the political strife towards the end of the war when the anti-democrats sought to limit the franchise to “those best able to aid the city” (Thuc. 8.65.3). On the ideology and practice of elite munificence in classical Athens, see: Ober 1989, 226-239; Chapter 9, below.

\(^{543}\) Thuc. 2.40.2: ἐνι τε τοις αὐτῶις ὀικεῖοι ἁμα καὶ πολιτικῶν ἐπιμέλεια, καὶ ἐτέροις πρὸς ἔργα τετραμμένοις τὰ πολιτικὰ μὴ ἐνδεῶς γνῶναι: μόνοι γὰρ τὸν τε μηδὲν τόνδε μετέχοντα οὐκ ἀπράξμονα, ἀλλ’ ἄρρειπον νομίζομεν.
Solonian groupings would be necessary enough given the fact that Athenians in the last third of the fifth century still categorized themselves according to these classifications.\textsuperscript{544} Crucial, however, for the present study is the fact that membership in one \textit{telos} or another has, since antiquity, been linked to the performance of civic responsibilities, though, as we shall see, whereas ancient authorities point to a relationship between census class and taxation, modern scholarship has traditionally associated the \textit{telê} with military roles.

The scholarship on the \textit{telê} is extensive and debate surrounding their composition and function has been ongoing and vigorous since the discovery and publication of the pseudo-Aristotelean \textit{Athenaion Politeia}.\textsuperscript{545} Although the four Solonian classes are attested in other sources, which will be discussed below, \textit{Ath. Pol.} provides our fullest description of them and investigation must begin here.\textsuperscript{546} As part of a package of reforms meant to deal with the socio-

\textsuperscript{544} Plutarch preserves a fragment of a play by Cratinus that riffs on the observation that the Solonian laws inscribed in the Agora were no longer being enforced by the mid-fifth century: the Athenians of the poet’s day use the inscribed boards to sun-dry their grain (Plut. \textit{Sol.} 25.1). Against this evidence, however, \textit{IG} I\textsuperscript{1} 46, an inscription outlining provisions for an Athenian settlement at Brea dated to 440-432, provides explicit testimony of the vitality of the \textit{telê} in Periclean Athens. The rider attached to the inscription reads: “the colonists to go to Brea shall be from the \textit{thêtês} and the \textit{zeugitai}” (44-46). On this inscription, see also Chapter 4.2, below. Thucydides, though he never mentions Solon at all (Rhodes \textit{AP}, 118), provides just enough information to make it clear that, despite a remarkable dearth of evidence, membership in the various \textit{telê} was still somehow relevant in the latter fifth century to the way the Athenians grouped themselves, and there is a strong indication that such membership was a determinant of public obligation. Thucydides explains, in reference to a naval expedition for the year 428, that the Athenians embarked a fleet crewed predominantly by citizen sailors, “πλὴν ἵππασον καὶ πεντακοσιωμεδίμνων” (3.16.1). The mention of \textit{pentakosiomedimnoi} makes it clear that the historian has in mind the hippiad \textit{telos} rather than the cavalry corps. See below, 179-180, 216-220. On this passage, see also, above 103-104. [Arist.] \textit{Ath. Pol.} 22.1 explicitly states that the years of the tyranny had seen the laws established by Solon “obliterated through disuse” (συνέβη τούς μὲν Σόλονος νόμους ἀφανίσας τὴν τυραννίδα διὰ τὸ μὴ χρήσθαι) so that Cleisthenes was responsible for a wholesale revision of laws. The \textit{telê}, however, were evidently still used to determine certain legal liabilities in the fourth century (Dem. 43.54), and, as late as 353, Demosthenes makes it clear that it was still somehow possible to identify citizens according to their \textit{telos} (24.144). On the continued relevance of the \textit{telê} into the fourth century, see Hansen 1991, 44-45, 106-116.

\textsuperscript{545} Rediscovered in the 1880s and originally published as \textit{AP} in 1891 by Kenyon (Rhodes \textit{AP}, 2-3). See Rhodes for bibliography.

\textsuperscript{546} Plutarch’s biography of Solon diverges from the account of \textit{Ath. Pol.} in a number of instances with respect to Solon’s program of reforms, but in his description of the \textit{telê} it follows \textit{Ath. Pol.} quite closely and the two appear to have used the same source (probably an \textit{Atthis}). See Rhodes \textit{AP}, 28, 47, 54.
economic and political problems experienced by the Athenians at the end of the seventh century, \textit{Ath. Pol.} writes that Solon “ordered the politeia in the following way” (7.2-3):

he divided the people by assessment into four units, as they had been divided before, the five-hundred-measure unit, the hippiad, the zeugite and the thetic. He distributed the major offices to be held by those among the pentakosiomedimnoi, hippéis and zeugitai—the Nine Archons, the Treasurers, the Vendors of Contracts, the Eleven and the Paymasters, assigning each office to the several classes in proportion to the amount of their assessment; while those who were rated in the thetic class he admitted to the membership of the assembly and law-courts alone.

\textit{Ath. Pol.} goes on to define the terms of inclusion into the various ‘units’ (7.4). It is a reasonable enough inference that a man was rated a pentakosiomedimnos if his property yielded, as \textit{Ath. Pol.} claims, at least five hundred measures of combined dry and wet measures (\textit{metra}). The hippiad designation is more contentious. The writer of the \textit{Ath. Pol.} is aware of competing traditions, of which one holds that hippeis were so named because their wealth was sufficient that they could afford to maintain horses. This was indeed traditionally a mark of considerable wealth in ancient Greek societies. Ps.-Aristotle himself decides in favour of what, as he sees it, is “the more logical” explanation (ἐὐλογώτατον): that hippeis were, like the

\begin{footnotes}

547 7.2: διέταξε τὴν πολιτείαν τόνδε τὸν τρόπον.
548 Cf. Plut. \textit{Sol.} 18.1-2, where the suggestion is that the \textit{telē} were a wholesale Solonian invention.
549 7.3: τιμήματι διείλεν εἰς τέταρτα τέλη, καθάπερ δήλητο καὶ πρότερον, εἰς πεντακοσιομεδίμνων καὶ ἵππεα καὶ ξυλίτην καὶ θήτα. καὶ τὰς μὲν ἄλλας ἁρχὰς ἀπένειμεν, ἁρχαῖν ἐκ πεντακοσιομεδίμνων καὶ ἵππων καὶ ξυλίτων, τοὺς ἐνέα ἄρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ταμίας καὶ τοὺς πολιτάς καὶ τοὺς ἰδίκας καὶ τοὺς κολακρέστας, ἐκάστους ἀνάλογον τῷ μεγέθει τοῦ τιμήματος ἀποδίοις τῇ ἁρχῇ: τοῖς δὲ τῷ θητικῷ τελοῦσιν ἐκκλησίας καὶ δικαστηρίων μετέδοκε μόνον.
550 There is debate over what constituted a ‘measure’ and whether ‘liquid’ and ‘dry’ were indeed equal as Ps.-Aristotle implies: see, Rhodes \textit{AP}, 141-142. De Ste. Croix 2004, 39, 42 suggests that the standard \textit{medimnos} rating was barley and, against this, equivalences of goods in other measures were ready to hand.
551 On horse-rearing (ἵπποτροφία) as a mark of elite privilege, see: Thuc. 6.12; Arist. \textit{Pol.} 1297b18; Steiner 2005; Bugh 1988, 6-8, 24-25. It is, of course, significant that by the 330s the original meanings behind the \textit{telos} names was a matter of confusion and debate, with one side arguing for the primacy of absolute wealth as the defining criteria, the other for levels of wealth relative to one’s ability to maintain an animal. Indeed, it may be that the only \textit{telos} for which absolute levels of wealth truly mattered was that of the pentakosiomedimnoi. The implications of this will be explored below.

\end{footnotes}
pentakosiomedimnoi, assessed on the basis of measures produced by their landholdings. In the case of former, however, he claims that the assessment was three hundred combined measures. Finally, he claims that the zeugitai were assessed at two hundred measures and that any Athenians who fell below this threshold were assigned to the thetic class.  

6.2 Source problems and \textit{Ath. Pol.} 7.2-4

There are a number of major problems of historical interpretation surrounding the use of \textit{Ath. Pol.} as evidence for the relationship between telos-membership and civic obligation. Most troubling is that its writer does not appear to have been able to consult the actual record of the Solonian laws. That the axones were not consulted directly is evident in \textit{Ath. Pol.}’s confusion over the hippiad census qualification. Evidently the nature of the Solonian divisions was a matter of some confusion and debate already by the late classical period, and it is striking that \textit{Ath. Pol.} does not bolster his own testimony with reference to any definitive source. The conclusion of several scholars, deduced from this observation, is that neither the original laws nor authoritative copies of them existed any longer in the fourth century.

\footnote{Plut. \textit{Sol.} 18.1 is also ambivalent but seems to privilege horse-rearing slightly.}
\footnote{Very curiously Aristotle himself lists the Solonian \textit{telê} in order of \textit{pentakosiomedimnoi, zeugitai, hippēis and thētes} (Pol. 1274a 20-21).}
\footnote{These laws were codified and inscribed (or painted) upon slabs for display, either on wooden axones (Plut. \textit{Sol.} 25.1-2) or clay \textit{kurbeis} (\textit{Ath. Pol.} 7.1). As argued by Rhodes, who follows Ruschenbusch and Andrewes, it is possible that these two names, despite the attested different media, referred to the same body of inscribed laws. These were displayed in the Stoa Basileios. By the Common Era, the remnants of these perishable display boards had been moved for display in the Prytaneion (\textit{Sol.} 25.1); see Rhodes \textit{AP}, 131-132. There is some evidence that already in the fifth century, these \textit{kurbeis} had become illegible, defaced (perhaps in the Persian sack of Athens?) or simply neglected and ignored; see the fragment of Cratinus (Plut. \textit{Sol.} 25.1) cited above.}
\footnote{de Ste. Croix 2004, 29; Rosivach 2002a 38-39; Hignett 1952, 100.}
\footnote{As part of the restoration of the democracy in 410, the Athenians made some attempt to recodify the laws of Solon (as well as those of Draco). They elected \textit{anagrapheis} to perform the tasks of copying the Solonic laws onto stone and of bringing contradictions before the Boule and the Assembly for resolution. This program, however, does not seem to have produced a full publication of the whole list of Solon’s laws. Again, in 403/2, there was an attempt to create a more coherent collection of laws (Andoc. 1.85-6). This
Confidence in the figures that *Ath. Pol.* provides, therefore, for the hippiad, zeugite and thetic census classes is shaken by the real possibility that they are merely inferred from the one *telos* whose name itself reflects the amount of its membership’s annual income. Some scholars have been more troubled than others over this possibility. Rosivach and Gabrielsen, notably, have argued forcefully for the rejection of *Ath. Pol.*’s figures entirely, whereas Rhodes maintains “we have no information which would justify us in rejecting *A.P.*’s figures as correct for Solon’s definition of the classes.” Even if the figures it provides are not simply the *Ath. Pol.*’s own inferences, numerical figures are notoriously vulnerable to manuscript errors, and some scholars have suspected the zeugite census in particular. Furthermore, the *Ath. Pol.* does not elaborate on how wet measures (μετρηταί of wine or olive oil) were factored together with dry bushels (μέσιμα of barley or wheat). Even if the size of the vessels were standardized, the agricultural products of Attica had different densities and, furthermore, as was proposed in the previous section, polyculture was probably the norm in archaic and classical Attica such that any attempt to calculate equivalences is fraught with difficulty, not to say hopeless.

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The reason *Ath. Pol.*’s figures themselves are so important is that neither the *Ath. Pol.* itself nor any other source provides any information on the relative size of the *telê*. It is, therefore, left to scholars to work out a plausible socio-demographic curve for the citizen population of Athenians and to fit this to the Solonian scheme. So long as we reckon with the stability and longevity of a census solely based on an agricultural *timêma* or assessment, demographic calculations can be grounded with some degree of security in the estimated potential agricultural yield of Attica.\(^{563}\) It has been inferred from Athens’ economic growth in the fifth century in the spheres of commerce, manufacture and craftsmanship, along with the increase in landholding overseas, that the basis for a citizen’s *timêma* had changed at some time between the sixth century and the Periclean period. There is, however, no evidence for this.\(^{564}\) It is worth considering again, here, Thucydides’ explicit claim that as late as 431, “most Athenians lived in the countryside” (2.14.2; cf. 2.16).\(^{565}\) Most Athenians, therefore, for much of the fifth century still derived their livelihood from the resources of the countryside and thus it is not unlikely that *timêmata* were also still calculated on the basis of agricultural income.\(^{566}\)

Given the insecurities surrounding the *Ath. Pol.*’s figures, scholars have plumbed the names of the Solonian groups themselves for insights into the relative socio-economic standing of their members. The names, however, are difficult to understand and, with the exception of the *pentakosiomedimnoi*, the etymology of the name of each *telos* is controversial.\(^{567}\)

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\(^{563}\) On the fertility of classical Athens, see Ch. 1.1. This scholarly approach is discussed below.

\(^{564}\) On the changed economy over the course of the fifth century, see: Raaflaub 2006, 419-420 and 1998b; Hanson 1995, 292; *contra* Rhodes *AP*, 142; Varstos 1978, 228-229.

\(^{565}\) See above, Chapter 1.1, 6.

\(^{566}\) It is worth noting, also, that for the purpose of assessing liturgical suitability, property held by Athenians outside of Attica was probably exempt from consideration in the fifth century as it was in the fourth (Dem. 14.16); cf. below, Ch. 8.3.1. On the economic effects of the Peloponnesian War, see Section I.

\(^{567}\) Mossé 1979 [2004, 250].
A final great historical problem is that *Ath. Pol.* does not explain, apart from political entitlements, what significance the *telê* held in the functioning of Athenian society. The hypothesis, based on the designation ‘*telos,*’ that each group was responsible for the performance of certain duties seems reasonable enough. In its most basic sense, the verb τελέω and its derivatives refer to any kind of performance rather than to the payment of taxes, which meaning they take on in the classical period. The latter, no doubt, would have made sense to the writer of *Ath. Pol.*, but a monetary tax is clearly inappropriate for the early sixth century (despite *Ath. Pol.* 10). If the term *telos* points to another obligation, then we are permitted to ask: what is entailed in the ‘performance’ of the *pentakosiomendimnon*, the *hippada*, the *zeugision* or the *thêtikon*? Despite the various obstacles to interpretation outlined above, scholars over the past several generations have built something of a consensus with respect to the place of the *telê* in archaic and classical Athens. This consensus has only recently begun to erode in the face of mounting criticism. In the following paragraphs, I offer an outline of the

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568 Van Wees 2013b, 86; Mossé 2004, 251 [1979]. For access to political office, at least of the *pentakosiomendimnoi*, see also Plut. *Arist.* 1.2.

569 On the original meaning of *teleô*, see: Ostwald 1996, 55-57; Waanders 1983.

570 A payment of a tax in kind cannot, perhaps, be ruled out, but consideration of such a tax raises the obvious and unanswerable questions of how it was collected and for what purposes. There is no hint in the evidentiary record for archaic Athens of the kind of complex and centralized administration (or other institutions) that would require levies such as we find in Bronze Age Greek settlements or in contemporary Near Eastern societies (Bresson 2016, 97-110).

571 A further complication to this, however, is the fact that the *Ath. Pol.*, the earliest source to make explicit reference to the Solonian categories *as such*, calls them variably either *telê* (as in *Ath. Pol.* 7.1-4) or *timêmata* (as in 8.1). The former entails some kind of obligation on the part of the *telos*. The later term, *timêma*, is used of a valuation and does not imply anything about obligation. *Telos* in Homer is the word used to describe a unit of the army. In the *Iliad*, the Greek army takes its meals κατὰ στρατὸν ἐν τελέσισιν (7.380, 11.730, 18.298). At 10.56 we find a sacred *telos* of guards commanded by the son of Nestor. And at 10.470, Odysseus and Diomedes make their way through the *telos* of Rhesus’ Thracians. When Nestor gives advice to Agamemnon, however, for marshaling his troops, he says nothing about *telê*, instead instructing him to organize his troops by *phrētrai* and *phylai* (2.362). The military use of *telos* in Homer, therefore, tells us nothing about the composition of Homeric armies.
several main theories that have been offered in recent decades before moving on to my own criticism and synthesis.

6.3 The traditional view

The most influential scholarly position on the Solonian telê over the past generation has been that of Hanson.\(^{572}\) According to Hanson and those on whose work he draws, the telê were important determinants of military roles in Athens. For Hanson, the reforms of Solon broke the political monopoly of the aristocratic families (the eupatridai) and gave political rights to an emergent group of yeoman farmers, whom he identifies as Solon’s zeugitai. In Hanson’s model of the development of the archaic polis, these yeoman farmers tilled private plots of land of about 10 acres (or 4 ha)—enough land to sustain an autarkic household of four family members and a slave or two.\(^{573}\) For Hanson, the zeugitai of Athens represented not less than a third and as much as a half of the population of the polis,\(^{574}\) much as the population of middling hoplite farmers in other cities.\(^{575}\) Hanson lumps together the zeugitai of Athens with other middling geôrgoi throughout Greece.\(^{576}\)

As part of these middling farmers’ economic success, they were able to acquire the newest military weaponry, the hoplite’s panoply. Furthermore, having thus armed themselves, these yeomen organized into militias of farmers in order to protect the very agricultural

\(^{574}\) 1995, 208, 406, 436.
\(^{575}\) On the population of Athens, see: Hansen 1988a, 14-28, 1988b 26-27, and 1982. For discussion and other scholarly estimates, see above, Ch. 1, 29. Estimates of citizen numbers in 431, based largely on the size of the regular Athenian hoplite force (13 000) outlined at Thuc. 2.13.6, range from 40 000-60 000. Herodotus provides some useable figures for the earlier period. He records the size of the hoplite contingent sent to Plataea at 8000 (9.28-29). This figure accords well with other sources on size of the force at Marathon (9000), which Herodotus does not specify: Plut. Mor. 305b; Pausanias 10.20; Cornelius Nepos Milt. 5. Less reliable is Herodotus’ suggestion that in 500/499 the citizen body comprised 30 000 Athenians (5.97.2).
hinterland they farmed.\footnote{Hanson, 1995, 219-268 (esp. 248) and 1996, 289-294; on Hanson’s model of the agricultural rhythm of seasonal campaigning and the agrarian logic of the ‘rules’ of hoplite warfare, see Introduction.} These yeoman or middling farmers continued to comprise “the bulk” of Athens’ hoplite force even into the fourth century;\footnote{Indeed, Hanson sees a sharp division between citizens of hoplite class “in [a] strictly political sense (rather than military) sense” and thètes (1995, 379).} the top two classes comprised the cavalry or else served as hoplites alongside Hanson’s middling agrarians, while the thètes, who were too poor to afford hoplite arms, either did not serve militarily at all or else served in an ancillary and minimal role as light-armed support troops (psiloi) to the hoplite army.\footnote{Hanson 1996 and 1995, 234-236, 246-247, 292. For the principle of self-equipment, see, e.g: IG I³ 1.8-10; Thuc. 8.97.1.}

There are two serious problems with Hanson’s identification of zeugitai with middling hoplite farmers. The first is that from what is known of the admittedly very incomplete archaeological record, there is no evidence in the Attic countryside (or that of other more fully explored regions) for the tens of thousands of small, autarkic farmsteads Hanson envisions for the archaic period.\footnote{Foxhall 2013 and 1997.狐hall 2013 and 1997.} If one turns a blind eye to the imperfect material record, Hanson’s zeugitai must then find definition in the literary sources like Aristotle, Ps.-Aristotle and Plutarch. Such evidence, again, disappoints. If one accepts *Ath. Pol.*’s figures (as Hanson evidently does), the size of the typical zeugite farm increases from Hanson’s 10 acres to at least 22 acres (9 ha), the minimum amount of arable land required to grow at least 200 measures of produce.\footnote{Adopting de Ste. Croix’s barley standard, see: van Wees 2006 and 2001; Raaflaub 1999; Foxhall 1997.} If, however, one rejects the authority of *Ath. Pol.* or one regards its figures as spurious or at least corrupt, the designation of the zeugitai as a ‘middle class’ seems arbitrary.\footnote{Especially so in light of Arist. Pol. 1274a 20-21. Of course, to argue that the zeugitai must be a broad middle class because they are coterminous with ‘the hoplites’ is to beg the question.}
Hanson, of course, is only one of a number of historians who regard the *telê* as essentially military categories based on a citizen’s socio-economic status. It has been regularly and, until recently, almost universally maintained, moreover, that hoplite service in particular in Athens fell upon those citizens who comprised the top three Solonian *telê*.\(^{583}\) In a paper edited and published posthumously,\(^ {584}\) de Ste. Croix condemns the quantitative assessments outlined in the *Ath. Pol.*, save for that of the *pentakosiomedimnoi*, and argues that the classes would broadly overlap with military categories.\(^ {585}\) Much of de Ste. Croix’s argument focuses on hoplite service and he offers forcefully the thesis that,

> a man had himself registered in the hoplite *katalogos* if he could afford to provide himself with arms and armour and was financially able to bear the burden of going on campaign when required . . . [T]here was no fixed quantitative *timêmata* possession of which made a man a hoplite.\(^ {586}\)

These arguments have been adopted in several important studies of the Solonian *telê* that have appeared since.\(^ {587}\) Notwithstanding the probable anachronism surrounding the *katalogos*, which institution we shall examine in the next chapter, I am sympathetic to de Ste. Croix’s position. If, however, in regards to the socio-economic standing of Athenian hoplites the *timêmata* cited in our late sources are irrelevant, what justification is there to equate hoplite service with the *pentakosiomedimnoi*, the *hippeis* and especially the *zeugitai*?

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\(^{585}\) 2004, 48-49.


\(^{587}\) Valdés and Gallego 2010; Raaflaub 2006; Rhodes 2006 (tentatively, and cf. *AP*, 143). Raaflaub agrees with de Ste. Croix in broad strokes, but rather than ignore the *timêmata* altogether, he down-dates their introduction to the 460s, which allows him to factor *apoikoi*, *klêroukhoi* and *epoikoi* into the number of *zeugite* hoplites. For their part, Valdés and Gallego argue for an even later date, fixing on the *eisphora* of 428 for the introduction of hard census qualifications.
There are two central assumptions that underlie nearly all of the accounts of.telê that include the hoplitai/zeugitai equation. First is the assumption that the name ‘zeugitês’ suggests a link to the hoplite phalanx. The second assumption is that Athenians who comprised the thêtikon telos, which name reveals a low socio-economic status, were too poor to participate in military campaigns. Both of these assumptions need to be carefully examined.

6.4 What’s in a name? The etymology of ζευγίται

The identification of zeugitai with hoplites begins in the German scholarship of the late 19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} century\textsuperscript{589} and is based on a military etymology of the term ζευγίτης first proposed by Cichorius.\textsuperscript{590} No less an authority than Beloch endorsed Cichorius’ etymology in his Griechische Geschichte.\textsuperscript{591} A generation later, Cichorius’ military explanation was picked up by Stier in his updated version of Meyer’s Geschichte des Alterums, through which it was cited by Andrewes in Greek Tyrants and in his entry on Solon in the Cambridge Ancient History.\textsuperscript{592} Andrewes’ confident equation of zeugitai with an Athenian hoplite class was picked up by leading scholars like Snodgrass, Detienne, and Vidal-Naquet, and by the 1970s Ehrenberg could confidently claim,

the zeugitai can be explained either as those who owned a pair of oxen under the yoke (zeugos) or those who are joined to their neighbours in the ranks of the phalanx.\textsuperscript{593}

\textsuperscript{588} For recent scholarship that has advanced arguments based on etymology for the identification of zeugitai as hoplites, see: Valdès and Gallego 2010; Raaflaub 2006; de Ste. Croix 2004; Cartledge 2001b; Hanson 1995; Vidal-Naquet 1986, 89-90; Rhodes \textit{AP}, 138; Whitehead 1981.

\textsuperscript{589} Well-known for its interest in taxonomies as well as its privileging of military and economic history.

\textsuperscript{590} 1894, 135-140.

\textsuperscript{591} Beloch 1912, 303 n. 1.

\textsuperscript{592} Andrewes 1982 (= \textit{CAIt} 3.3, 385 and 1960, 87; Meyer and Stier 1937, 60 n. 1. The military etymology is also cited by Adcock in his influential study, \textit{The Greek and Macedonian Art of War} (1957, 5).

The agricultural metaphor of farmer-hoplites ‘yoked’ in the phalanx is irresistible to Hanson, who frequently uses the phrase ‘yoked-men’ equivalent for ‘hoplites’.594

The word ξενγίτης is not attested in any fifth-century source.595 This in itself is enough to raise serious doubts about the hoplitai/zeugitai equation.596 One might be tempted to explain this away, arguing that fifth-century writers took the correspondence of the two groups for granted, but in Thucydides’ description of the plague casualties, the historian gives figures for the number of hippeis (“three hundred”) and hoplitai (“no fewer than 4400”) who perished and adds that “an untold number of the crowd” also died (Thuc. 3.87.3).597 The word Thucydides uses for ‘crowd,’ okhlos, is odd here. If there was in Thucydides’ day an assumed correlation of military function vis-à-vis telos-membership, we should certainly have expected Thucydides to have mentioned the deaths of an untold number of ἑθῆ.598

Another crucial piece of negative evidence is an inscription dated to the early 430s, which outlines tithes to Apollo Lykeios from various categories of soldiers. The tithes are based on a soldier’s misthos and, for all those listed in a lèxiarkhikon grammateion (i.e. citizens), they are collected by the dèmarkhoi (IG I3 138, 1-6). Even here, where issues of census and taxation are clearly involved, it is hoplitai rather than zeugitai that are named. If fifth-century sources,

\[595\] IG I3 831, a dedicatory inscription from the acropolis accompanying a lebēs, contains the letters ‘-γτες’ and, if correctly restored, might refer to the dedication by a member of the zeugite telos, but see Keesling 2015, 116-122.
\[596\] The noun ὀπλίτης (to say nothing of its derivatives and related expressions, like oi ἐν ὀπλοῖς/οἱ ὀπλα παρεχόμενοι) occurs 444 times in fifth-century literary sources alone (TLG) and on dozens of inscriptions (http://epigraphy.pakhum.org/inscriptions/main).
\[597\] Thuc. 3.87.3: τετρακοσίων γὰρ ὀπλιτῶν καὶ τετρακυκλόμων ὀχὺ ἐλάσσοσιν ἀπέθανον ἐκ τῶν τάξεων καὶ τριακοσίων ἱππῶν, τοῦ δὲ ἄλλου ὤχλου ἀνεξώρετος ἀριθμός.
\[598\] Hornblower CT III, 1062-1063; but cf. Hornblower CT I, 494-495.
despite their keen interest in the affairs of hoplites, are completely silent with respect to their socio-economic classification, we should heed this silence.\(^{599}\)

Furthermore, the orthodox model, compelling as it seems, rests on shaky evidentiary foundations. One of these is the argument that etymologically the term *zeugitai* relates to hoplites’ position within the phalanx. Since the root of the word, ‘ζυγος’ ought to refer to a yoke (τὸ ζυγὸς), it has been suggested that the term *zeugitai* was metaphorically applied to hoplites who were ‘yoked’ to one another when they took the field in close order formation. That Greeks did occasionally describe pairs of people or groups of people as ‘yokemates’ on analogy with the agricultural practice of tethering animals together adds some credibility to this etymology. Athens and Sparta, for example, are depicted as the twin hegemons of Greece, “yokemates,” in the early fifth century (Plut. *Cim.* 16). This kind of analogy, however, is not found with reference to hoplites. The argument from silence is strengthened, moreover, by at least two problems with this etymological argument.

The first problem is general. Namely that in Attic Greek, nouns formed with the suffix -της are used to denote agency and are not found in this sort of passive sense.\(^{600}\) That is, Solon’s third telos comprised, evidently, ‘yoke-men’ rather than ‘yoked-men.’ *Zeugitai* ought to be men who make use of either a *zugon* (plough) or a *zeugos* (a yoke-team of draught animals).\(^{601}\) It is also sometimes suggested that the *zeugitai* were symbolically ‘yoked’ by their obligation to

\(^{599}\) In fifth-century Athenian discourse, the figure of the hoplite was normative, see: Pritchard 1998a, 121-127; Hanson 1995, 268, 377-82 and 1996, 305-306. Furthermore, in our literary sources the actions of hoplites are privileged to such a degree as to nearly wholly elide the existence of any other kind of citizen-soldier; see Hunt 1998.


\(^{601}\) Although not precisely synonymous, the terms *zeugos* and *zugon* were apparently interchangeable enough for Greek writers to use them without much discernment. See *scholia* to Thuc. 6.31.3 and to *Ar. Ach.* 162a-b, *Frogs* 1071, 1074.
perform hoplite military service, but this argument is open to the same criticism on etymological lines as the ‘yoked-to-fellows-in-the-phalanx’ argument.

The other complication for the view of 
zeugitai as members of a rank or ‘crossbar’ of men in formation is that support for this view rests precariously upon the presumed extreme closeness of hoplite formations, which is itself currently a matter of serious scholarly debate, and, more problematically, upon a single ancient reference to hoplites in ranks as 
zeugitai. This is found in Plutarch’s Pelopidas. In the passage, Plutarch is describing a unique feature of the highly abnormal and unusually well-disciplined and articulated Spartan phalanx (23.2). In his account, the Spartans are hard pressed as a result of Kleombrotos’ blunder at Leuktra, but manage to stave off even greater slaughter than might otherwise have occurred because they were able to reform the cutting edge of their formation by switching the disposition of ranks (zeugitai) and files (epistatai). As simple as this maneuver might seem, it appears that the counter-marching and drill required to carry it out were skills unique in ancient Greece to

Van Wees 2004, 56-57, 99-101. Van Wees argues that in Athens, as in other states, hoplite service was compulsory for those who met a certain wealth criterion. The issues of compulsory service and conscription of hoplites in Athens will be taken up in the next chapter. Here it is enough to point out that a politically relevant group like the 
zeugitai would hardly have found such a designation flattering and that, according to van Wees’ own argument, the polis did not reach a sufficient level of centralization such that it could command large levies until after well after the Solonian reforms.

There are analogies formed from the farming concept of yoke-mate; Athens and Sparta for example as yokemates in the early fifth century (Ion of Chios FGrH 392 Fr. 14 = Plut. Cim. 16.10; cf. Diod. 11.81.3). But this kind of analogy is not made with reference to hoplites.

The space occupied by individual hoplites as well as the distance between hoplites in formation remains a matter of controversy. For the traditionalist view, espousing extremely dense ranks with a hoplite’s shield touching, if not overlapping that of the man next to him, see, e.g., Lendon 2005, 41; Hanson 1995, 225-231 and 1989, 160-170; Holladay 1982. Others have attempted to modify this view, either positing various degrees of compactness for hoplite formations according to transitional stages of battle (as, for example, Cawkwell 1989) or have preferred a more open formation and fluid fighting-style, see: van Wees 2004, 185-191, 197; Goldsworthy 1997; Krentz 1994 and 1985; cf. van Wees 1994. This debate, of course, is implicated in a wider, ongoing scholarly battle concerning the precise date by which the canonical phalanx formation of massed hoplites had come into use. For scholars like van Wees, Krentz and Hall (2007), the advent of the tight-formed phalanx of hoplites massed to the exclusion of other, lighter troop types did not occur until the late archaic period. For such revisionist scholars, then, the putative connection between the Solonian 
zeugitai and hoplites begs the question.

Cichorius 1894.
Sparta before the professional armies of Philip of Macedon made their appearance.\textsuperscript{606} That the Spartans organized their formations across rank and file cannot be taken as evidence of general Greek practice.\textsuperscript{607} Indeed, the subdivisions of the Spartan army (syssitia, triakades, enômotiai, pentêkostyes, lokhoi, morai) were unique and considered worthy of comment by Athenians who were clearly impressed by them.\textsuperscript{608}

In fact, while the Greeks did make much of the close connection, physically and emotionally, within the phalanx, the organizational structure of military formations was based on files rather than rows. Organizationally, stikhoi mattered to the Greeks much more than zugos. In the heat of hoplite battle, the parastatês/-ai, one(s) who stand(s) at a man’s flank, are of critical importance for morale and personal safety.\textsuperscript{609} Nevertheless, that the position one occupied in the phalanx was determined not by rank but by file is made clear in the Ephebic Oath: “I shall not disgrace my sacred arms nor abandon the man standing next to me wherever I am stationed (ὁποὺ ἄν στοιχῆσο).”\textsuperscript{610} The men on one’s flanks in the phalanx are not zeugitai but parastatai or those para aspidos.\textsuperscript{611}

\textsuperscript{606} Arist. Pol. 1338b25-29. In fact, the amateur character of polis armies, their lack of sophisticated drill, and thus their inability to perform even simple maneuvers after initial deployment, are central supporting theses of the orthodox model of the phalanx fighting in the archaic through the classical period. See, e.g: van Wees 2004, 90, 186-188, 112; Hanson 1989, 27-38 and 1995, 246-268; Goldsworthy 1997; Luginbill 1994.

\textsuperscript{607} Rosivach 2002b, 37-38.

\textsuperscript{608} Hdt. 1.65.5; Thuc. 5.66.2-4; Xen. Lac. Pol. 11.4.10. See, further: van Wees 2004, 97-99, 243-249; Lazenby 1985. Despite the assertion of Whitehead 1981, 286 that zugos was commonly employed to describe a lateral rank as opposed to a file in a phalanx, there is in fact only one instance of this in classical Greek: Thuc. 3.68.3, a passage that describes the Spartan phalanx.

\textsuperscript{609} Hdt. 6.117.3; Xen. Cyr. 3.3.59; Lycurg. 77; Tod GHI II, 204.

\textsuperscript{610} Lycurg. 77: . . . Οὐκ αἰσχροῦ τὰ ιερὰ ὀπλα, οὐδὲ λέιψω τὸν παραστάτην ὁποὺ ἄν στοιχήσω . . .

\textsuperscript{611} E.g., Hdt. 6.117.3; Xen. Cyr. 3.3.59; van Wees 2006, 354 and 2004, 151-197; cf. Tod GHI 204, line 30: συμμαχεσάμενοι; cf. Tyrt. Fr. 10.15W, 11.11W: παρ’ ἀλλήλοις μένοντες; 12.19W: τὸν πλησίον ἄνδρα παρεστάτως.
It is a striking fact, given the evident importance to the phalanx of lateral cohesion noted by the ancient sources, that the file not the rank served as its organizational unit. Sources overwhelmingly speak of τάξεις as divisions of hoplite forces, but when occasionally we hear of sub-divisions, the word used is stoikhos. For example, Thucydides, describing the atrocities committed in the civil war at Corcyra, includes a gruesome parade of the oligarchs through an armed group of opposing democrats. The prisoners were led “between two lines of hoplites stationed on each side of them” and were beaten or speared by any of the hoplites who spotted a personal enemy (4.47.3). Despite the fact that the prisoners travel across the hoplite formations, the units are referred to not as rows, but as stoikhoi hoplitôn. Aristophanes, too, refers to files rather than ranks with respect to infantry formations, as the following fragment from his Babylonians reveals: “I suppose about forming into files they will cry out something like barbarians” (Ἡ που κατὰ στοίχους κεκράζοντα τι βαρβαριστή: Ar. Fr. 81).

Additional support for the classical Athenians’ conception of the phalanx as a formation defined by files rather than rows can be found in the fact that the latter appear to have lacked

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612 Wheeler 2007b, 207-8. The reason for this paradox many scholars attribute to the very limited military training of citizen militiamen. The most straightforward tactical orders for individuals to follow are simply to follow the man to one’s front. On the absence of institutionalized military training at Athens in the lifetime of Socrates, see Xen. Mem. 3.12.5. The hoplite experts of Sparta were unique in that they marched rather than ran into battle, slowly dressing their lines (Thuc. 5.70). For most hoplite armies, including those of the Athenians, the dromos as the final prelude to contact with the enemy would result in considerable disruption to organized ranks. See, e.g., Goldsworthy 1997, Krentz 1985 and 1994; cf. Cawkwell 1989, who argues that polis armies in general were capable of sophisticated drill. Indeed, whether or not one accepts the traditional view of the hoplite othismos, the engagement of massed bodies of spearmen would quickly obliterate any sense of the line. What an Athenian, or any other hoplite, could be much more sure of in a battle, as in a muster, was the man immediately in front of him and the constancy of the file.

613 Thuc. 4.47.3: παραλαβόντες δὲ αὐτοὺς οἱ Κερκυραῖοι ἐς ὀκτίμα μέγα καταβρέων, καὶ ὑστερον ἐξάγοντες κατὰ ἑκάστων ἀνήρας διήγον διὰ δυὸν στοίχων ὑπὸ δύον ἐκατέρθειν παρατεταγμένων, δεδεμένους τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ παισμένους καὶ κεντουμένους ὑπὸ τῶν παρατεταγμένων, εἰ ποῦ τίς τινα ἴδοι ἐχθρῶν ἔαυτον.

614 Starkey 2013 has recently argued that the plot of Babylonians involved the instruction of the oriental god Dionysius in the Athenian manner of fighting.
officers. Rather each file represented a discrete tactical group with a *prostatēs* leading from the front and an *ouragos* bringing up the rear. We have no information about terms for rankers. Finally, the root *stoikh-* , unlike *zeug-* or *zug-* , is found in a verbal context in classical Athenian texts for the marshaling of ranks (Aesch. *Pers.* 81, *Septem.* 467, 922-925, *Ag.* 81; Soph. *Ant.* 808; Ar. *Eccl.* 757; Eur. *Heracle* . 676; Aesch. *Sept.* 922-925; cf. Ar. Fr. 72 A.-K.). That the *stoikh-* root should be applied to denote members of the phalanx is not in itself surprising. *Stoikheion* was the common word for ‘element’ as employed by the philosophers of the fifth and fourth centuries.

In nearly all extant descriptions of the phalanx, emphasis is consistently on the depth of files, while ranks and width are rarely mentioned. Greek writers, from historians to tacticians to comedians, typically describe the size and deployment of hoplite phalanxes in terms of their depth rather than their width or frontage. So conventional was this mode of description that a kind of shorthand arose whereby authors frequently referred only metonymically to the number of shields ( *aspides* ) in a file to describe the deployment of a hoplite army. Again, the emphasis is on files rather than on rows. This observation is perhaps not fatal to the proposed military etymology of *zeugitēs*, but it does, I suggest, reveal a certain conceptual paradigm of the phalanx as an entity comprised not of men strung together in horizontal ranks, but rather of men who took their place in a file. If the Athenians were to assign a name rooted in the tactical

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615 Wheeler 2007b.
616 Cf. *ll.* 2.833, 16.258. The verb ζωγέω used in opposition to στοιχέω does not appear until the military handbooks written near the beginning of the Common Era by Asclepiodotus and Aelianus.
617 *LSJ*, s.v. στοιχέον.
618 Pritchett *GSAW* I, 134-143.
619 E.g., Ar. *Lys.* 282: οὖτος ἐπολύρκηστι ἐγὼ τὸν ἄνδρ’ ἐκεῖνον ὅμοιοι / ἐφ’ ἐπτακαϊκόν ἀσπίδαν πρὸς ταῖς πύλαις καθεδὼν. Cf. the scholion to the passage, which quotes from *Babylonians*: ἱστασθ’ ἐφοξής πάντες ἐπὶ τρές ἁσπίδας (Fr. 72 K.-A.).
arrangement of the phalanx to an organizational subdivision of the civic body, a term derived from \textit{stoikh-} rather than \textit{zug-/zeug-} might have been more likely, but, as van Wees points out, more straightforward names were at hand: \textit{aikhmètai, aspistai, panoploi, parastatai}.\footnote{2006, 355. The term \textit{hoplitai} is not attested until the first quarter of the fifth century (Pind. \textit{Isthm} 1.23; Aesch. \textit{Sept.} 717). See Echeverría 2012, 291-299.}

Given these factors, then, together with the general lack of direct equation of \textit{zeugitai} with \textit{hoplitai} in the ancient sources, it would seem the sensible thing to do to abandon the ‘military’ etymology proposed by Cichorius. The agricultural etymology, at any rate, is overwhelmingly better evidenced.\footnote{van Wees 2006, 354; Rosivach 2002b, 36-37, 39-41 (with reservations); Hansen 1991, 329; Mossé 1979 [2004, 251].} It is worth appealing to the recently published etymological analysis of \textit{zeug-} in Beekes’ \textit{Etymological Dictionary}. The fact that \textit{zeugitai} have a Mycenaean antecedent almost certainly privileges their agricultural identity over their military one. The word \textit{ze-u-ke-u-si} (the dative plural) is found in the Linear B tablets from Pylos, referring to ‘men who look after the plough.’\footnote{Beekes 2010, s.v. \textit{ζευγωροφούντες} (p. 498, vol. 1); cf. Palaima 1989.} This identification is further strengthened by the parallel sense behind the Latin \textit{iugerum}.\footnote{Cf. Latin \textit{iugerum}, deriving from the same root, which evidently meant, in its original sense, the amount of land a man could plough with a tandem of oxen in a single day (Pliny, \textit{NH} 18.3).}

Previous scholarship that has invoked the agricultural etymology is not, however, without its own share of problems. Whitehead and Rosivach are right to argue that the testimony of Pollux 8.132 with respect to \textit{ζευγωροφούντες} paying a ‘yoke tax’ (\textit{ζευγίσιον}) has nothing to do with the Solonian \textit{zeugitai} as a group.\footnote{Contra Valdés and Gallego 2010, 270. This passage in Pollux comes from a different entry on taxation and is not part of his earlier definition of the Solonian \textit{telē} at 8.130.} To use this passage, as previous generations of scholars have, to argue in support of an agricultural etymology for Solon’s \textit{zeugitai}, therefore, is...
not justified. Nevertheless, the exclusion of this passage from the adducible evidence is by no means fatal to the agricultural etymology. While it cannot, without Pollux, be said with as much confidence that the Solonian *zeugitai* were ‘men who reared teams of plough animals’ (on analogy with *Ath. Pol.*’s rejected τοὺς ἵπποτροφεῖν δυναμένους), the connection intrinsic in the name with ζεύγος is enough to suggest that they were men who performed *some* action with a plough. From the archaic period on in Athens a special priestly family, the Bouzygai, functionaries of the cult at Eleusis, was responsible for the divine protection of the plough ox in Attica, suggesting their regular use.

Evidence collected by Ehrenberg in passages from Aristophanes reveals that the *zeugos* in Attic usage frequently refers to a yoke for draught animals. Thus, on the basis of the available evidence, an original agricultural identity for Solon’s *zeugitai* is to be preferred.

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626 Aelian, *H. V.* 5.14; Varro, *De re rustica* 2.5.3.
627 Ar. *Birds* 582-585 τὸν ζυγαρίου...τὸ βοιαρίου; Ar. Fr. 83 K-A: βοιαρίων...ζυγός; Ar. Fr. 111 K-A: ζυγάριου βοεκόν; Ar. Fr. 402 K-A: κακτημένου ζυγάριον οἰκεῖον βοοίν; cf. Thuc. 4.128.3; Ar. *Ach.* 1022-1036 (Derketes laments the loss of a pair of oxen [τὸ βόσκ.], but mentions their use as providers of manure rather than as plough animals). Ehrenberg 1943, 76; cf. Whitehead 1981, 283.
628 Nevertheless, this does not necessarily exclude metaphorical meanings attached to the *telos* as a whole. The metaphorical meaning of *zeugitai* as ‘yoked’ hoplite, we have seen, is improbable given the passive sense that would entail (and the very limited likelihood that *zugos* were ever used in a technical sense to refer to ranks of hoplites). The etymology of *zugon* is very interesting, and may possibly have lent itself to the use of the metaphor in other ways. In its basic sense, τὸ ζυγόν or ὁ ζυγός seems to have signified a yoke or the wooden crosspiece used to connect draught animals. Eventually the term comes to mean any kind of connective device, such as the crossbeam of a ship, which connects the two sides of the hull (and on which the *zugitai* of the Athenian triremes sat); see, e.g., Schol. to Ar. *Frogs* 1074. A ship’s *zugos* seems to have functioned as a built-in rowing bench, distinguished from the specially built benches (*thranoi*) on which the *thranitai* sat (Morris and Coates 1986, 132-151). By extension, therefore, an agent responsible for connecting things could also be called *zugitís*. Hera, for example, is known in her capacity of the goddess of marriage (joining) as Ἡρη ἐνίκτης (Beekes 2010, s.v. ζυγόν [p.502, vol. 1]; Ap. Rhod. *Argon.* 4.96). That Athenians venerated Hera Zugitis is perhaps implied by a fifth-century red-figure *khous* now in the Metropolitan Museum (24.97.34), which depicts youths processing towards a wedding and carrying a *zugon* (Boardman, J. 1989. *Athenian Red Figure Vases, The Classical Period* (London): FIG.370). The point, at any rate, is that Hera is so called not because *she* is yoked in marriage, but because she symbolically yokes couples in marriage. It is intriguing, though admittedly speculative, to consider whether the Solonian *zeugitai* also were associated with such metaphorical joining. To be clear, it is beyond doubt that the original and most basic sense of the term *zeugitês* has to do with an agricultural function.
6.5 Indigent infantrymen

In addition to the proposed military etymology of the term zeugitês, support for the thesis that zeugitai (and the two upper telê) comprised Athens’ regular hoplite armies has also been gleaned from several ancient passages that appear to state that thêtês did not go on campaign. The opinion held by many scholars is that while thêtês might have served in emergency situations, they did not serve in infantry roles with any regularity until late in the fifth century.\(^{629}\) The presumption of the existence of a high census qualification for hoplite service has led to the assumption that there was at this time a lowering of property qualifications for service.\(^{630}\) Thus, much in the same way as Sparta was forced to lean on those outside of the traditional franchise to perform military service, equipping neodamôdeis as Brasideioi,\(^ {631}\) the Athenians increasingly encouraged the service of the marginalized thêtês.

Solon, however, does not seem to have invented the term. As indicated by a related term in Linear B, a Greek noun for ‘ploughman’ created from the nominal stem zeug- was already in use long before the sixth century. It is unlikely that such a noun was not already in use in Attica. Indeed, apart from the pentakosiomedimnoi, Solon does not appear to have invented the names of any of the telê.\(^ {628}\) It may, therefore, have been the case that Solon derived the name for his third class from an agricultural/economic function or status but that, collectively, the name zeugitai took on new meaning in the context of Solon’s reforms. To my knowledge it has not been previously proposed that the zeugite telos was so named by Solon for its symbolic function—a group of citizens linking the very rich with the very poor. That is, the zeugision represented a sort of crossbeam of citizens symbolically linking the two sides of the ship of state, the rich and the poor. There are parallels here to social and economic reforms at Sparta around the same time. In Sparta, the reforms took a more extreme course, completely leveling socio-economic disparity in order to achieve political harmony, making homoioi of all Spartiates. It is tempting to see in the reforms of Solon an attempt to elevate a group of fairly well-off Athenians to order to bring into balance a political system that had previously been monopolized by the ultra-rich. Indeed, zugos and its derivatives often refer to the act of balancing or weighing by counterweight (LSJ, s.v. ζύγος; Ar. Clouds 745). The concepts of ‘muffling’ or ‘those in the middle’ as political terms to describe those who lent stability to the political community, goes back to at least the end of the sixth century; see: Starr 1977, 126; Phocylides Fr. 12; Theognis 219-20, 331-32. For the mutually implicated concepts of the middle and of moderation and their importance in Solon’s own thought, see: Arist. Pol. 1273b35-1274a22, 1296a1-22; Solon Fr. 4 W = Dem. 19.255, Fr. 4a, c W = Ath. Pol. 5; Suda, s.v. Σόλος; cf. Hanson 1995, 110.

\(^{629}\) Ehrenberg 1943, 213, citing banqueters; Hanson 1995, 365.

\(^{630}\) See, e.g.: Serrati 2013, 324; M. Anderson 2005, 279-280.

\(^{631}\) Thuc. 5.34, 67; cf. Willets 1954.
The evidence marshaled in support of such arguments, however, is thin. Of the several passages that use the term *thês* in relation to military service, the earliest is Thucydides’ description of the troops who joined the expedition against Syracuse. Among the Athenian troops, he lists (6.43.1):

five thousand one hundred hoplites altogether (fifteen hundred of these were Athenians from the list, seven hundred were *thêtes* on board as marines).\(^{632}\)

On the basis of these few words two important theses have been drawn: first, that *thêtes* did not serve as hoplites drawn *ek katalogou*; second, that if they served at all, they did so as heavy-armed marines (*epibatai*) rather than as regular *hoplitai*.\(^{633}\) That the *thêtes* Thucydides has in mind here are members of the Solonian *telos thêtikon*, however, is far from certain: it cannot be ruled out that Thucydides uses the term θῆς in its more frequently attested sense—that is, simply to mean “labourer”.\(^{634}\) Pritchard, accepting this latter interpretation, proposes that Thucydides deliberately chose the term ‘labourers’ instead of the more usual and natural *ethelontes* to contrast with the hoplites “from the list” in order to emphasize the notion that they were attracted to the expedition by the prospect of *misthos*.\(^{635}\)

The other two passages cited in support of the thesis that *thêtes* did not serve as hoplites are fragments preserved in Harpokration’s lexicon and, divorced from context as they are, are just as difficult to interpret as Thucydides’ testimony. Under the entry for θῆς καὶ θητικόν, the lexicographer quotes a speech of Antiphon in which the orator apparently made the suggestion

\(^{632}\) Thuc. 6.43.1: . . . ὀπλίτας δὲ τὸς ζύμπασιν ἕκατον καὶ πεντακισχίλιοι (καὶ τούτων λθηναίων μὲν αὐτῶν ἦσαν πεντακόσιοι μὲν καὶ χίλιοι ἐκ καταλόγου, ἐπτακόσιοι δὲ θῆτες ἐπιβάται τὸν νεόν . . .).


\(^{634}\) Rosivach 2012b; for fifth-century usage, see, e.g., Soph. *OT* 1029: ἐπὶ θητική (“in wage earning”) labour; Eur. *Alc.* 6-7; and θῆς defined as a wage-earner in contradistinction to a δοῦλος at Isoc. 14.48.

\(^{635}\) Pritchard 2010, 25; on the importance of *misthos*, in the eyes of Thucydides, as a motivation for service in 415, see: Thuc. 6.24.3; Jordan 2000b, 66. For a discussion, see Section I, Ch. 4.3.1.
“to make all thêtes hoplites.”\(^{636}\) To take this as an indication, as Harpokration does, that thêtes did not normally serve as hoplites is a possible reading of the proposal; Antiphon’s words, though, could also be taken to mean that the Athenians should make hoplites of any thêtes who were not already in possession of hoplite arms.\(^{637}\) Indeed, I think the use of ἃπας (“quite all”) makes this likely. Harpokration also cites, but regrettably does not quote, Aristophanes’

*Banqueters* (performed in 427):

> The thêtes are called the most lacking in means of the four groups into which the Athenian state was divided... because they did not perform military service as Aristophanes says in *Banqueters*.\(^{638}\)

Without any context for the statement in *Banqueters*, it is dangerous to draw strong, generalizing inferences.\(^{639}\) We simply cannot know whether Aristophanes was referring to a particular campaign in which thêtes did not participate for one reason or another. If one considers the military situation in 428/7, a reasonable enough explanation is at hand. Thucydides reports that in the summer of 428, the Athenians exceptionally embarked an all-Athenian fleet in response to the crisis of the Lesbian revolt. He notes that besides metics the fleet was crewed by citizens (οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι... αὐτοί), “except hippeis and pentakosiomedimnoi”

\(^{636}\) Antiphon Fr. 61 Thalheim: Ἀντιφων ἐν τῷ Κατά Φύλλου φησί· τοὺς τε θῆτας ἅπαντας ὀπλίτας ποιήσαι. Nothing of this speech is known besides these words and three allusions to what is possibly the same prosecution against Philinos made in *On the Chorus Boy* (6.12, 21, 35).

\(^{637}\) Van Wees 2001, 71 n. 72: the only information the fragment can tell us for certain is that “not all thêtes were hoplites, which is obviously true.” For instances of mass provision of arms, see, e.g.: Thuc. 3.27.2, 6.72.4, 8.25.1; cf. Xen. *Poroi* 4.42, for the proposal to turn state-owned slaves from the mines into pezoī.

\(^{638}\) Ar. Fr. 248 K-A: εἰς τέσσαρα δημημένης παρ᾿ Ἀθηναίοις τῆς πολιτείας οἱ ἀπορώτατοι ἐλέγοντο θῆτες... ὃτι δὲ οὐκ ἔσχατον εἴρηκε καὶ Ἀριστοφάνης ἐν Δαιτάλευσιν.

\(^{639}\) Several scholars have done so. Valdés and Gallego 2010 use this passage as their point of departure from the most recent restatement of the orthodox zeugitai/hoplitai equation. Similarly, Ridley 1979, 519-522 grounds his discussion of the socio-demographics of the Athenian hoplite force in Harpokration’s paraphrase of Aristophanes.
Admittedly this does not tell us much, but given the acute manpower needs of the navy, the Athenian portion of which was at all times supplied in the main by poor Athenians, the fact that thêtes may have been noticeably absent in other military wings at precisely this time would not be all that surprising. Nevertheless, if Harpokration faithfully paraphrases Aristophanes, the claim remains curious since we know from other sources, including Aristophanes himself, that thêtes did perform military service.

It would be useful to know the exact wording of the Aristophanic passage that Harpokration adduces. The strength of any argument that thêtes did not regularly perform military service made on the assumption that στρατεύω on the one hand describes hoplite service exclusively, or on the other hand is not associated with poor citizens or thêtes, is seriously undermined by fifth-century testimony. Andocides, in his speech on his return, provides a general corrective to both these assumptions; he refers to the crew of the fleet at Samos as “those on active service” (οἱ ἐπὶ στρατιάς ὄντες). Surely the vast majority of Athenians with the fleet at this time, as at any, were thêtes. Aristophanes himself, furthermore, uses the verb strateuo and its participle to refer to military participation generally, not merely hoplite service.  

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640 Thuc. 3.16.1: . . . ἐπιλήωσαν ναὸς ἐκατὸν ἐσβάντες αὐτοῖ τε πλήν ἱππέων καὶ πεντακοσιομεδίμνων καὶ οἱ μέτοικοι . . . Cf. Xen. Hell. 1.6.24. Xenophon claims that the Athenians passed a decree to embark all citizens of military age for the Arginusae campaign, adding that “even a good number of hippies embarked,” although it is unclear whether this refers to troop types or members of the telos. Most scholars think this is a reference to the former, in which case this passage would be irrelevant to the discussion of telê and military roles (Gabrielsen 2002a and 2002b).

641 The term stratos, in the late fifth century, often included the navy, just as stratiótês could designate an infantryman as well as a sailor (Raafeldt 1993, 43).

642 [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 1.2; Plato, Laws 707a-b; Arist. Pol. 1321a5-8.

643 E.g., Ar. Thesm. 232 refers to campaigning (στρατεύομαι) as a psilos; Ar. Lys. 1133 refers to Persians campaigning (στρατεύματι) against Greeks; in Frogs the chorus deem the audience of common Athenians, many of whom will have been thêtes, particularly suitable to judge a ‘war’ (πόλεμος: 1099) between Euripides and Aeschylus “because they have military experience” (ἐστρατευμένοι γάρ ἐίσιν: 1113).
The testimony of Harpokration is thus confusing in light of what appears to be directly contradicting fifth-century evidence. Scholars have been far too confident in their assertions, based on Harpokration’s text, that thêtès did not normally perform military service.\(^{644}\)

Furthermore, there is positive evidence for thêtès serving as hoplites. The service of the economic elite as hoplites is well-attested in early fourth-century oratory; Lysias’ wealthy clients in particular frequently discuss their participation in campaigns dating from the last decades of the fifth century.\(^{645}\) Thêtès’ involvement in Athenian hoplite armies is less frequently and less unambiguously attested; however a demographically sensitive analysis of what positive evidence there is can demonstrate that a neat and rigid socio-military stratification in democratic Athens was more imagined than real.

Fifth-century testimony begins with Thucydides. The Periclean funeral oration, which clearly glosses the war dead as a group of hoplites (as the epitaphic genre is wont to do), repeatedly makes reference to the fact that both rich and poor men valiantly soldiered and died for their city (2.37.1, 2.42.3-4; cf. 2.40.1).\(^{646}\) Certainly hoplites outside of Athens were envisioned by Thucydides as farmers of modest means: the Peloponnesians, whose conservative hoplite armies are contrasted to the dynamic naval forces of the Athenians, are labeled as farmers who work their own lands (autourgoi) and can only afford to serve their cities with their bodies. They have no capital (χρήματα) and poverty (πενίας) dictates that in wars with one another, they restrict their campaigning (Thuc. 1.141.3-5). The plays of Aristophanes give the impression that ‘typical’ Athenian farmer hoplites—if that is who the

\(^{644}\) See, most recently, Valdés and Gallego 2010, 258-261.

\(^{645}\) See next chapter, 297.

\(^{646}\) For the hoplitic gloss, see Loraux 1989. See esp. [Dem.] 60.19-24.
comic heroes of *Acharnians* and *Peace* are meant to represent—were likewise not very wealthy. Dicaeopolis, for example, can credibly describe himself as a *ptôkhos* (*Ach. 577-578*). It is, of course, dangerous to attempt to draw too fine a picture of the socio-economic conditions of comic characters, but it will hardly be contentious to say that the protagonists with whom the audience is meant to sympathize are regularly contrasted and at odds with figures who typify wealth.\(^{647}\) Other sources similarly speak to the limited wealth of hoplites.

Dionysius of Halicarnassus preserves fragments of a speech against a proposal by a certain Phormisios in 403/2 that evidently sought to limit the citizen franchise in the restored democracy “to those who possessed land” (τοῖς γὰρ ἔχουσιν).\(^{648}\) Dionysius, presumably drawing on a part of the speech not included in his quotation, tells us that this proposal, had it passed, would have disenfranchised 5000 Athenians.\(^{649}\) There is a very interesting passage in the quoted material that bears on the identity of Athenian warriors. Arguing against the proposal to limit the franchise to land-owning citizens, Lysias’ client claims (34.4): “[I]f you take my advice we will not, in addition to losing our walls, deprive ourselves of many hoplites and cavalry and archers” (34.4).\(^{650}\) Certainly in a speech given before the Assembly it would have had to be a credible claim that hoplite, and even cavalry, service, in addition to the expected light-armed service, could be performed by the ranks of landless Athenians.

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\(^{647}\) E.g., *Ach. 572-625*, *Peace* 301-304, 444-451, 473-474, 632-647, 919-921; Fr. 102 K-A (*Farmers*).

\(^{648}\) Lys. Fr. 34.32

\(^{649}\) *Ibid*. Given the rhetorical aims of the speaker, we may view this figure as suspect; we may also be dubious of the assertion found several sentences later that Phormisios’ proposal was in line with the Spartans’ demands. There is no reason, however, to regard as unfounded the implication that most of Athens’ citizenry of some 30 000 at the end of the Peloponnesian War owned some land in Attica.

\(^{650}\) 34.4: “... ἔμοιγεν πείθοντες, οὐδὲ μετὰ τὸν τειχὸν καὶ ταῦτα ἡμῶν αὐτῶν περιεσθόμεθα, ὀπλίτας πολλούς καὶ ἵππες καὶ τοξότας.”
The most explicit passages connecting men of meager means to hoplite service are two later references from Athenian oratory. In his case against Meidias, Demosthenes produces as a witness the aptly named Straton, a hoplite of many campaigns, and “a poor man perhaps, but at any rate not a bad one” (πένης μὲν ἰσως ἐστίν, οὐ πονηρός δὲ γε). This evidence is late (c. 350) and refers to a man who served as a hoplite under the age-group mobilization system (τὰς ἐν ἡλικίᾳ στρατείας) rather than the ek katalogou system that was in place in the fifth and early fourth centuries. Under the later system it is possible that Athenian youths who graduated from the ephebeia were presented with state-supplied hoplite arms even prior to the Lykurgan reforms of the 330s. Even so, the fact that a penês had served on many campaigns (21.95) suggests that penia was not such large a barrier to hoplite service as is so commonly assumed.

In an earlier speech, another of Lysias’ clients, Mantitheos, claims that when he appeared at his deme for the hoplite muster prior to the campaign against Haliartos (395), upon seeing so many of his fellow demesmen and fellow hoplites unable to provision themselves (ἐφοδίων δὲ ἀποροῦντας), he himself provided thirty drachmas to two of them (16.14). Apart from the potential economic strain involved in absenting himself from his primary livelihood to go on campaign, there are two chief financial barriers that had to be overcome by poorer citizens who

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651 Dem. 21.83, 95; A. Jones 1957, 31-32. Jones argues that in the time of Demosthenes “many hoplites were quite poor men” (31).

652 Penia is listed by Pericles as one of the barriers to the Peloponnesian poleis’ ability to make war on each other (Thuc. 1.141.3-5). Sparta alone, through the creation of a leisure class comprising its entire citizenry through the system of helotry, was able to transcend this limitation and become a hegemonic power. What the Spartans did through helotry, the Athenians did through subvention, using imperial revenues.

653 For this expedition, see Xen. Hell. 3.5.16-25.
wished to serve as hoplites: the cost of the hoplite’s arms and the cost of campaign-rations. In the case of the latter, the generous state-subventions in fifth-century Athens were more than sufficient to defray the direct costs of campaigning; where these fell short, personal connections and sponsorship could help meet the needs of poorer citizens as the Mantitheos passage clearly demonstrates. Sponsorship could also defray the cost of arms. At his dokimasia, a certain Philon was attacked by a speaker on the grounds of poor democratic citizenship. The speaker alleges that not only did Philon not serve himself among the counter-revolutionary troops at Piraeus, but also failed, despite having wealth, to do “what many others did” and “to provide arms for some of his demesmen” (ὀπλίσαι τινὰς τῶν ἐαυτοῦ δημοτῶν: Lys. 31.15-16).

A final strand of evidence in the ancient literary tradition bears on the question of thêtès seeing regular service as hoplites. Socrates is the best-known non-affluent Athenian from classical literature and was almost certainly a thês. Nevertheless, Socrates is known to have

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654 Scholars who argue that prolonged absence from farms would prove as great an economic barrier to service as the cost of arms (e.g., Raaflaub 1998) ignore the same realities for rowers of the fleet and light-armed troops. In consideration of these kinds of questions, the fragment of Lysias 34, which implies that only a small minority of poor Athenians owned no land, should be borne in mind along with Thucydides’ explicit testimony that most Athenians still in the late fifth century lived in the countryside (2.14.1, 2.16); that is to say, that a percentage of the thetic class may indeed have lived in the asty and Piraeus and have eked out a living as wage-earning rowers and dockhands, but certainly that most thêtès will have lived in Attica and, therefore, off of its products (even if this livelihood was supplemented in important ways). In any case, both infantry and naval service in Athens were remunerated (quite generously) at least as early as 432 (Thuc. 3.17.4; see below), which would have relieved servicemen of some of the worry attached to service abroad. For remuneration, see below, Ch. 4.3.

655 The thirty drachmas offered by Mantitheos to his demesmen would be sufficient to ration a soldier on campaign for more than a month. On the cost of rations and state subvention, especially the misthos stratiotikos, see Ch. 4.3.1.

656 Van Wees 2004, 55.

657 No fifth- or fourth-century author explicitly claims that Socrates was a thês (cf. Eup. Fr. 352 Kock: πτόκhos adoleshēs), but several anecdotes in the writings of Xenophon and Plato certainly point in this direction. In Oeconomicus, Xenophon’s Socrates claims that his entire estate would not fetch more than five minas, or 500 dr. (2.3); cf. Laches 186c. Plato’s Socrates professes to be poor throughout Apology (37c, 38b), claiming that the most he could personally afford to pay as a legal fine would be a single mina. The portrait of Socrates given by contemporary sources (especially Xenophon’s Memorabilia and Plato’s dialogues) is consistently of a man paradoxically indigent and yet almost wholly leisured. Skeptical readers might object that Socrates’ leisure—to say nothing of his consummate hoplite service—exposes his poverty.
served as a hoplite in no less than three Athenian campaigns (Potidaea, Delium, Amphipolis).\textsuperscript{658} Despite not having much wealth, Socrates moved in very wealthy circles, and certainly any number of his associates or pupils could have underwritten the costs of his hoplite equipment and soldier’s upkeep without seeing it as a hardship.\textsuperscript{659} It is tempting to see Socrates and the support he must surely have received from his friends as emblematic of the Mantotheos-demesmen-type exchange outlined above. How much financial subvention would typically be required depends on how prohibitively expensive the hoplite’s arms and kit are assumed to have been.

The price of a panoply, or at least the core elements of it, was, at any rate, less prohibitive than is commonly assumed.\textsuperscript{660} In the late sixth century the cost of hoplite arms was evidently only 30 drachmae—not a trifling sum, but a far cry from the 200 drachmae cited as the average cost of a panoply by Hanson.\textsuperscript{661} The price of arms may well have risen in the fifth century;\textsuperscript{662} at the same time, however, late-fifth century iconography and the archaeological record suggest

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  \item Plato, \textit{Ap.} 28d-29a, \textit{Symp.} 219e-220e, \textit{Laches} 181a; Plut. \textit{Alc.} 7.3; Ridley 1979, 510-511.
  \item One cannot help but think that his close friendship with the notoriously lavish spender Alcibiades would have all but guaranteed the indigent Socrates a handsome kit, even if not one quite as egregious as the panoply sported by Alcibiades himself (Plut. \textit{Alc.} 16.1-2; cf. Xen. \textit{Mem.} 3.10.9, which provides other examples of outlandishly expensive arms). Socrates’ affluent friends were certainly keen to help him out in other ways. Plato, Crito, Critobulus, and Aristobulus were all evidently eager to provide Socrates with an eighth of a talent at his defense in 399 (Plato, \textit{Ap.} 38b).
  \item The traditional opinion is that the cost of hoplite arms in themselves effectively ruled out participation in the heavy-infantry by citizens of thetic status, see: Ridley 1979, 519-520.
  \item Hanson estimates the cost of a ‘full’ panoply at 75-100 drachmas (1995, 294-301), but the average cost of the “bare necessities” (van Wees’ phrase) was certainly much lower than this in the late archaic and classical period. The evidence for the cost of arms is desperately thin. The various items offered for sale by the Arms-dealer in Aristophanes’ \textit{Peace} (1210-1261), given the nature of the comic scene, certainly do not inspire confidence. Pritchett 1956, 253 has collected the usable evidence and finds that a spear at public auction in 415 sold for less than two drachmas. Later evidence, adduced by van Wees 2004, 52-3, 267 n. 14, suggests a price of around twenty drachmas for an \textit{aspis} (recorded as the cost of a prize at an athletic event: \textit{IG} XVII.5, 647, 31-32).
\end{itemize}
that most hoplites of the Peloponnesian War era did not wear much, if any, body armour, which components—the *thorax* and *knêmides*—represented the most delicately crafted and thus expensive elements of the panoply.\(^663\) Certainly, there were (wealthy) individuals who prided themselves on their arms and competed with their peers for the distinction of the finest arms.\(^664\) However, literary evidence, too, suggests that many, and probably most, ‘panoplies’ consisted of the basic *aspis* and *dory*, perhaps augmented with a side-arm (*makhaira*) and a *pilos*, a relatively light and cheaply made head protection.\(^665\) Whenever the polis provided arms to citizens—to orphans of those killed in war and to graduates of the fourth-century *ephebeia*—only a spear and shield were provided.\(^666\) It is telling that in 401, Xenophon’s army of more than ten thousand hoplites, in desperate need to furnish itself with a cavalry corps to counter those of the enemy, could scarcely find fifty cuirasses (*θώρακες*) to outfit the newly established *hippeis* (*Anab. 3.3.20*).\(^667\) Another well-known anecdote from the *Anabasis* would seem to confirm the suspicion that the average Greek hoplite did not wear body-armour. As the Greeks raced the army of Tissaphernes for the high ground around the city of Mespila, Xenophon, chided by one of the hoplites on account of his mount, claims to have jumped off his horse, grabbing the shield of the hoplite and to have marched alongside him. This feat was more impressive, he maintains, “because he happened to have on his cavalryman’s cuirass”


\(^{664}\) Thuc. 6.31.3; Plut. *Alc.* 16.1-2; cf. the fine arms of Lamakhos at Ar. *Ach.* 1095-1140 and the fine arms for sale in *Peace* 1210-1264. On the internal competition among hoplites in polis armies, see below, Ch. 7.3.

\(^{665}\) Relative to the heavy and expensive ‘Corinthian’ style helmet that is so often associated with the figure of the hoplite, see van Wees 2004, 52-55.

\(^{666}\) Orphans: Isoc. 8.82; Aeschin. 3.154; cf. Thuc. 2.46.1; Pl. *Menex.* 248d; Lys. 2.75-76; Dem. 60.32. *Ephebeia*: [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 42.4; Lycurg. *Leoc.* 76-78. For the provisioning of arms by the state, see Bertosa 2003; cf. Ridley 1979, 519 (with caution) and 513.

\(^{667}\) For the armour of the Persian cavalry, see Xen. *Anab.* 1.8.6-9, 3.4.35. On the pressing need for cavalry: Xen. *Anab.* 2.4.6, 3.1.2.
The implication is that hoplites did not normally wear thôrakes. Finally at the start of Cyrus’ anabasis, the Greeks marshaled for a display (epidexis) before Cyrus’ consort, the Queen of Cilicia. Xenophon notes with pride how impressive the Greek force was to the non-Greeks arrayed: “for they all had helmets of bronze, crimson tunics, and greaves, and carried their shields uncovered” (1.2.16). If a significant portion of the army was equipped with impressive body-armour, the historian would surely have made note of it.

Even giving due consideration to the cost of the hoplite’s arms and the fiscal constraints of campaigning, it seems clear from the evidence surveyed above that Athenians of lesser means, and even impeccunious citizens, could find paths to military participation as hoplites. The evidence of patronage of demesmen by wealthy citizens cited above may admittedly reflect the changed circumstances of Athens in the immediate aftermath of the Peloponnesian War and it is impossible to say how frequent or systemic was such private subvention, but the official remuneration of hoplites in the fifth century is in itself sufficient to suggest that not all hoplites were well-off.

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\text{Anab. 3.4.48: έτύγχανε δὲ καὶ θόρακα έξων τὸν ἰππικόν: ὡστε ἐπιέξετο.} \]

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\text{Cf. Anab. 4.2.28, where Xenophon remarks that the large Persian arrows are capable of penetrating both shields and breastplates. (Indeed, such was the fate of a certain Leonymos [whose fighting role is not established: 4.1.18].) Here, however, the point being made seems to be that even such men as wore thôrakes were vulnerable to Persian bowshot, and the point hints, I think, at the reality that most men were not so well armoured and were thus the more vulnerable.} \]

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\text{Indeed, since individuals accrued considerable social capital through hoplite service, as I argue in the following chapter, there would have been every incentive in fifth-century Athens for citizens to find creative ways to circumvent the de facto economic barriers to campaigning with the heavy infantry.} \]

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\text{Payment for military service was probably in place by 450/9. In the so-called Milesian Decree (IG I² 20), line 13 of the inscription mentions a four-obol (payment?) in connection with τῶν στρατιωτῶν three lines above. Thucydides mentions a full drachma wage for hoplites for the Potidæa campaign of 432 (3.17.4); see Meiggs 1972, 331. Certainly by the 430s, citizens were only expected to provide for themselves a small amount of campaign rations. The typical formula seems to have been three days’ victuals consisting of very modest fare: barley breads, onions, and cheese (Ar. Ach. 197; Peace 312, 637, 528; Wasps 243; Xen. Symp. 4.9). For campaigns longer than three days (as most surely were), part of the mîsthos stratiôtikos was intended to supply soldiers with sîtos.} \]
On the other side of the debate, the fact that most Athenian hoplites appear to have campaigned alongside slave attendants (Thuc. 3.17.4, 7.75.7; Ar. *Ach.* 1123-96) is sometimes cited in support of the view that hoplites comprised a moderately wealthy class, which corresponded to Solon’s *zeugitai*.\(^{672}\) That most Athenians, however, irrespective of their socio-economic classification, not only owned slaves, but normally brought them along to serve on military campaigns, is clear from the practice of rowers in the fleet (normally assumed to be poor, thetic Athenians) bringing along their slaves in order to farm out their labour for cash payment.\(^{673}\)

Finally, the well-known, but unfortunately not thickly evidenced, episode of the dismissal of the Athenian hoplites under Kimon in the 460s can perhaps shed some additional light on the socio-demographic composition of Athens’ hoplite force. Both Thucydides and Plutarch report that shortly after 465 (the end of the Thasian Revolt), at the Spartans’ request, Kimon led an expedition of Athenian hoplites to Lakonia to help suppress a massive helot revolt (Thuc. 1.102; Plut. *Cim*. 16.8). A line from Aristophanes’ *Lysistrata* puts the number of hoplites at 4000 (1143). Thucydides further reports that the Spartans’ ill-treatment of the Athenians on this campaign began the first open quarrel between Sparta and Athens. The Spartans allegedly gave offense when they dismissed their Athenian allies, “fearing their boldness and revolutionary spirit” (δείσαντες τῶν Ἀθηναίων τὸ τολμηρόν καὶ τὴν νεωτεροποιίαν: Thuc. 102.3; cf. Plut. *Cim*. 17.2). Traditional scholarship has identified these hoplites as a fairly homogeneous group

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\(^{672}\) E.g., Hanson 1995, 69, 245-246, 449 n. 26.

\(^{673}\) Thuc. 7.13.2; [Xen.] 1.19; *IG I\(^*\) 1032. For discussion of these passages, see Graham 1998 and 1992; cf. below, Ch. 8, 355-360.
of conservative, or ‘Kimonian’, Athenians.\textsuperscript{674} In Pausania’s account of the episode, the detail that the men under Kimon were “picked troops” (ἐπιλέκτους ἄνδρας) might lend credibility to this notion (1.29.8), but the second-century geographer is clearly working within the framework of an established discourse of anti-democratic Laconism that is anachronistic for Kimon’s own day.\textsuperscript{675}

It is perhaps naïve to assume that all wealthy Athenians would have been sympathetic to the Spartan regime and to oligarchy or, at best, a relatively restricted democracy. Certainly wealthy democrats were a reality throughout the fifth century, and it is perilous to press arguments around ‘Kimonian’ ideologies too hard, given the lack of contemporary sources. Indeed, the anecdote, as Thucydides presents it, likely more accurately reflects the socio-demographics and political ideologies of the 430s and 420s than those of Kimon’s own time. Nevertheless, in Thucydides’ account, it is striking and perplexing that the Spartans would fear a large group of Athenian hoplites, if hoplites at this time are to be identified as gentlemanly zeugitai. The Spartans’ apprehensions make much better sense if we understand the Athenian hoplite force to have been a more representative cross-section of the Athenian citizen body. All this should at least cause us to consider whether Athenian hoplite armies of the fifth century comprised a middling class of zeugite farmers to the general exclusion of thetic citizens.

\textsuperscript{674} E.g., de Ste. Croix 1972, 172-180; cf. Hornblower 2011, 23, who offers a welcome correction to the view that these were 4000 ‘Kimonian’ hoplites; that is, that they represented 4000 hand-picked, ultra-conservative Athenians. Some scholars have assumed this to be the case, seeing their absence from Athens in 462 as the opportunity for the ‘democrats’ at home to push through their program of reforms. \textsuperscript{675} This is not to dispute that Kimon supported friendly relations with Sparta. Kimon was proxenos to Sparta, as was his son, Lakedaimonios; see de Ste. Croix 1972, 76.
6.6 The revisionist socio-economic model

In recent years, many scholars have abandoned the traditional notion that zeugitai represented a middling class of hoplite farmers. Foxhall and van Wees, in particular, have tried to show on the basis of *Ath. Pol.*’s figures that members of the zeugite telos should be reckoned among the agricultural elite. In theory, this thesis can be defended by deriving the approximate size of the land holdings of the Athenian elite from the available evidence: the formula is to assess the minimum amount of land required to produce the number of annual measures recorded by the *Ath. Pol.* and then to compare this against the total cultivable square acreage of Attica. Van Wees has refined and substantiated this approach over a decade of publications. In order to estimate the relative wealth implied by the annual production of 200 *medimnoi*, he extrapolates from the daily nutritional requirements of individuals (one *khoinix* of grain for an adult male) the precise number of family members each of the *Ath. Pol.*’s *timêmata* could sustain. Alternatively, he has attempted to monetize the value of the measures provided by *Ath. Pol.*, calculating that a crop of 200 *medimnoi* of barley (the cheapest agricultural staple of Attica) had a market value of as much as three times the amount a typical family of four required for its upkeep.

All of these calculations produce similar results and lead to similar conclusions: if the figures preserved by *Ath. Pol.* are anything to go by, zeugite estates operated many times above

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677 On the daily nutritional requirements of Athenians, see above, Ch. 1, 28. A *khoinix* (1.09 L) was equivalent to 1/48 *medimnos*; thus an adult male required something in the range of 7.6 *medimnoi* of grain annually.

678 For cash-valued subsistence rates in classical Athens, see Markle 1985, 293-297. For full discussion of living-wages, see above, Ch. 4, 110-111.
subsistence level and their owners properly belonged to the agricultural elite. The arguments put forward in support of this thesis are well-crafted and cogent, but they rest on a number of dubious assumptions: that the figures in *Ath. Pol.* 7.2 are reliable; that the measures mentioned by the *Ath. Pol.* are for barley (or can at least be converted accurately to a barley standard), the predominant cereal crop grown in Attica; that the total amount of cultivable land in Attica can be safely estimated. The precise demographic calculations van Wees produces give the impression of unwarranted certainty in respect of each of these variables. Thus, while van Wees has called into question the traditional notion that the zeugite *timêmata* reflects a middling standard of living enjoyed by hard working farmers, his own arguments in favour of the zeugitês being an elite gentleman are destabilized by a number of shaky assumptions.

It is more fruitful, I would to suggest, to think about the relative wealth of the zeugite *telos* by focusing in again on the agricultural etymology of ζηγότης. The term, as we have seen, relates to the use of draught animals, which certainly implies a certain degree of landed wealth. This is true whether one considers the economically efficient use of draught animals in farming or simply their cost of ownership. While it is impossible to be precise given the notoriously dubious information from the ancient world with respect to the price of livestock, consideration

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679 Van Wees 2013a, 229-232 and 2013b, 83-90.
680 Contra Rosivach 2002a; see above, 162-163.
681 On the cultivation of barley, see above, Ch. 1, 33 and Ch. 3, 80. For the conversion of agricultural measures to a ‘barley standard,’ see: Scheidel 2010 (on the conversion of economic currencies to a standardized ‘wheat wage’); de Ste. Croix 2004.
682 On the total number of cultivable square kilometers in ancient Attica, see above, Ch. 1, 27 and Ch. 3, 57-58.
683 See, for example, below, 205.
of the relative wealth implied by the ownership of work animals allows for some interesting and perhaps less radical socio-economic and demographic models to be drawn.\footnote{Van Wees’ interpretation of the Solonian telê is part of a wholesale remodeling of economic, social, political and military developments in the archaic period. Van Wees postulates radical (as compared to traditional views of the archaic polis) economic and social inequality as a feature of the early polis and sees the emergence of relatively egalitarian societies only in the latter sixth century. For a useful summary of van Wees’ proposed ‘alternate narrative, see van Wees 2013a, 236-245. The most current research into patterns of wealth distribution, political equality and military participation rates meanwhile points again in the direction of the traditional model of historically atypical egalitarianism; see: Ober 2015 and 2010; Pitsoulis 2011.}

Ever since Busolt’s association of the zeugêson in Pollux with the Solonian zeugitai, scholars have assumed that Solon’s yoke-men were the owners of a pair of oxen. This assumption stems from Busolt’s confident assertion that “ancient sources described zeugitai as farmers who maintain a yoke of oxen.”\footnote{Busolt 1926, 822-823.} The identification of a Gespann Ochsen with the zeugos, and thus the zeugitês, is so often repeated in scholarship that rarely are any other draught animals even considered. Even scholars who specialize in the areas of agricultural production and labour, such as Burford, tend to draw a hard economic line between farmers who employed oxen and those whose family farms were small enough to make do without them. Burford claims that “hoplite” (i.e. zeugite) farms were those of about five hectares (or 55 plethra) in size—the minimum size required to make the use of a team of oxen economically rational; farms smaller than this she describes as thetic or subhoplite.\footnote{Burford 1993, 67.} The use of other kinds of animals for draught purposes apparently does not occur to Burford, who seems to draw an equally hard line between animals used for ploughing and those kept for other purposes:

Most farms had a stalled animal or two at least, an ox, mule, donkey or even a pig; many farms had a yoke of draught animals and other beasts.\footnote{Burford 1993, 67. For the decades-long scholarly debate on the degree of animal husbandry practiced by the ancient Greeks generally, see Bresson 2016, 132-141. Clearly Thucydides reckons with a great host of farm animals when he reports that the Athenians undertook to move their livestock (πρόβατα}
Certainly the use of the ox as a draught animal in Attica is well attested both in the iconographical and literary record. At least one ancient authority on farming, however, defines draft animals as including several species (Xen. Ec. 18.4), and consideration of the use of livestock besides oxen as plough animals opens the way to a range of new interpretive possibilities pertaining to the relative wealth of zeugitai. At the top of the draught-animal (ὑποξύγα) owning class were those who could afford to keep a pair of mules. Burford concedes that in Greek literature, mules were regarded as effective draught animals, but qualifies this with the familiar dogma: “oxen were generally regarded as the most suitable form of power.”

Yet the passage from the Iliad cited by Burford explicitly claims that mules are better, literally “more excellent” (προφερέστεραί) than oxen for ploughing (Il. 10.351-353). Our evidence, furthermore, for the use of mules as plough animals is not limited to Homer. Theognis laments that, since losing his lands, “mules no longer drive the curved plough” through his fields (1200). Shifting from Megara to Athens, an Attic black-figure cup manufactured in the early sixth century depicts a team of yoked mules driven by a ploughman in the same frame and opposite a

dὲ καὶ ὑποξύγα to Euboea for safekeeping during the Archidamian War (Thuc. 2.14.1) and when he reports for 412 that with the loss of Euboea, “all the sheep and draught animals were lost” (πρόβατά τε πάντα ἀπολόγει καὶ ὑποξύγα: 7.27.5).


Xen. Ec. 18.4: . . . καὶ ὑποξύγα γε καλούμενα πάντα ὀμοίως, βοῦς, ἡμίονους, ἵππους.

Burford 1993, 126, citing only Il. 10.351-353.
team of draught oxen. In Hesiod (WD 814-818) and in Aristophanes (Frogs 290) one finds the implication that oxen and mules are more or less interchangeable, but mules surely were more versatile than the powerful but lumbering ox. On the black-figure cup just cited, a second team of mules appears in the scene as haulers of wagons loaded with grain-filled amphorae, indicating their versatility. Moreover, mules can be used in mixed tandems with other animals such as cattle or donkeys. Mules are also valued by farmers for their ability to work in conditions too harsh for other kinds of draught animals. The versatility and toughness of the mule made it an ideal choice for the semi-arid conditions of Attica.

In addition to their utility, mules appear to have been acknowledged markers of wealth and status in ancient Athens. On the basis of the available evidence, good mules seem to have been much more expensive than oxen. Rosivach does make much of mule ownership among zeugitai:

If we understand that the ζεδογος with which the Solonic ζευγιται were concerned was a pair of fine mules we will have . . . the correct explanation of the name of the census class composed of men who were, in terms of wealth, just below the ‘horsemen’ ἵπποι. Rosivach’s line of argument moves us beyond the fixation with oxen, but what reason is there to limit the zeugitês’ zeugos to either mules or oxen? If we widen the scope to include less

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692 On the question of how widespread the ownership of work animals was in Athens, Burford 1993, 148-149 estimates the population of oxen in fifth-century Attica to be around 25 000 with “nearly as many” donkeys and mules, although she does not connect the latter with draught usage in this discussion.
693 Garrett 1990, 925–930.
695 Van Wees 2006, 384-385. On the basis of fourth-century evidence (Isaeus 6.33), mules appear to have been four or five times more expensive to purchase—though perhaps not to keep—than oxen. The high purchase cost of mules over oxen probably reflects the sale of mules that display greater equine than asinine characteristics.
696 Rosivach 2012a, 149.
expensive animals we will find within the zeugite telos a wealth continuum ranging from those who are nearly able to afford horses (the best mules are very equine) to those of more modest means, who could afford only cows or donkeys.

Cows and donkeys do not have the strength of oxen or mules, but they can plough. Burford hints at the use of cows for draught labour when discussing the existence of dairy cattle in the *Iliad* (16.641-644), but ignores their economic impact as plough animals. For small farms that required less robust animal muscle than that provided by oxen or mules, the animal traction provided by cows or even donkeys may have been a welcome supplement to human muscle. As Plato’s Socrates famously puts it, if mules were widely available, donkeys were obviously to be found in the countryside in abundance, where they may well have been a more suitable choice for animal power on small farms. Cows, furthermore, are much more economically versatile than oxen, mules or even donkeys: they can be bred and milked.

Modern estimates of the landholding required to make efficient use of a pair of plough-oxen

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697 M. Griffith 2006.
698 Burford 1993, 150. Cows are listed as among the property for sale from Panaitos’ estate in 414, together with their calves, where they are distinguished from two ‘work’ oxen (βόει ρύγατα) and two unspecified oxen (IG I 426). Panaitos, however, was a very wealthy citizen; he also possessed large flocks of mature sheep (87 head) and goats (67 head). Athenians of more modest means would be less likely to have distinct work and breeding stock.
699 Donkeys were the cheapest of all the beasts of burden used by the Greeks. While widely praised for its use as a pack animal (κάρυθων: Ar. *Wasps* 179, *Peace* 82, Lys. 290) the ὄνος is not attested as a draught animal in Greek literature. This may have much to do, however, with the interest of sources like the Homeric and Hesiodic poems focusing on the *ideal* type of draught animal. Modern studies of subsistence, non-mechanized farming communities show that donkeys are a viable alternative to oxen, especially in semi-arid agricultural environments (areas that see between 400-800 mm rain annually, as ancient Attica did). See, e.g., Halstead 2014, 36-37, 43-48; Hagmann J. 1995. “Use of donkeys and their draught performance in smallholder farming in Zimbabwe,” *Trop Anim Health Prod*. 27, 231-9; Pearson, R. A. *et al*. 2003. *Working animals in agriculture and transport: a collection of some current research and development observations* (Wageningen), esp. 14-15.
701 The ancient Greek aversion to drinking milk as a marker of uncivilized behaviour is, of course, well-known, see, e.g., *Od*. 9.296-298; Aeschyl. *Pers*. 611; cf. Eur. *Or*. 115, for a honeyed mix of milk and wine as an offering for the dead Clytemnestra. However, presumably the closer one lived to the economic margins, the less one cared about such ideals. Certainly the milk and cheese derived from sheep was prized, see, e.g., *Il*. 4.434, 11.639; *Od*. 4.88; Ar. *Wasps* 896, Lys. 23.6; Howe 2008, 58.
settle on an average of five hectares.\textsuperscript{702} This is considerably smaller than the size of the farm (6.9 ha) that van Wees and Foxhall have argued would be required to produce 200 \textit{medimnoi} of barley, but still significantly larger than the 3-4 hectare farm envisioned by Hanson for his hoplite-\textit{zeugitai}.\textsuperscript{703} Part-time draught and dairy animals would seem ideal for small-time farmers with holdings of less than four hectares, who naturally had an interest in as diversified a use of their farm and stock as possible. Even donkeys, of course, represented a very valuable agricultural commodity beyond their tilling capabilities; their manure was vital fertilizer.\textsuperscript{704} Ownership of these less powerful animals, therefore, may have been more economically rational for much smaller farms than is usually assumed. Certainly Athenian farmers could be expected to know what sources and quantities of labour would be economically productive on their own holdings (Xen. \textit{Poroi} 4.5).\textsuperscript{705}

Rational economic calculation, however, was surely not the only determining factor in the ownership of \textit{hypozygia}. Research into comparative, preindustrial agricultural societies reveals that ownership of animals and access to animal labour is often a mark of status.\textsuperscript{706} Ownership of draught animals is an area of economic activity where markets regularly fail, and a strong ideological association between animal ownership and status is a characteristic of

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{702} Van Wees 2006, 382-385; Foxhall 2003, 80-83; Halstead 1987, 84.
\bibitem{703} Van Wees 2006a, 360-367 and 2001, 48-51.
\bibitem{704} Bresson 2016, 133-134; Scheidel and von Reden 2002, 19-22; Hodkinson 1988, 35-74; Halstead 1987, 77-87. Additional economic rationales might underlie the decision to keep oxen as well. For example, records of sales of oxen suggest that bovines were kept only a few years before sale for slaughter (Bresson 2016, 134-135) and, given the demand for cattle flesh created by the classical Athenian sacrificial program (Pritchard 2012), farmers, not to say would-be liturgists, may have looked at this festival-driven market for opportunity (Xen. \textit{Mem.} 2.7.6; cf. Pl. \textit{Laws} 743d; Dem. 19.265; Howe 2008, 60-61).
\bibitem{705} Xen. \textit{Poroi} 4.5: "...οι μὲν ἀγρόφις κεκτημένοι πάντες ἔχουν ἄν εὑρέθην, ὡσα εὖα ἄρκει εἰς τὸ χωρίον καὶ ὅπως ἑργάται: ἢν δ’ ἔπει πλεῖον τὸν ἱκανοῦ ἐμβάλλῃ τις, ζημίαν λογίζονται."
\bibitem{706} Van Wees 2006, 356, 366-367.
\end{thebibliography}
Greek societies in the archaic and classical periods. Hesiod’s poor, ‘ox-less’ man (ἀνήρ ἀβοῦτης) provides a Boeotian analogy. The aboutēs appears not only to suffer the economic hardship of not owning his own draught animals, but also the indignity of his situation, since he is forced to prevail upon his wealthier neighbours to borrow their animals in order to meet his needs (WD 448-157). Athenian farmers whose modest estates did not include hypozygia would have been immediately recognizable as aporoi in two important senses. Those too poor to own or make use of animal power of any kind were obviously constrained to farm their plots with mattocks (μάκκλαια), hoes (σμίνωα or δίκελλαια) or other hand tools. Additionally, since draft animals were also used for threshing (Xen. Ec. 18.3-4; cf. Ar. Thesmo. 1-2 with schol.; Pherocrates Fr. 71 Henderson), there was at least this occasion each year at which a poor farmer’s lack would be displayed, which would allow for informal, communal census-taking. Thētes would have to thresh their harvested grain by hand (if yields were modest enough) or else have it threshed by the animals of their wealthier neighbours. Such reliance, in addition to needing to supplement their modest agricultural income through seasonal labour for others, I would suggest, lies behind Solon’s designation of the poorest Athenian geôrgoi as thētes.

If it is accepted that a zeugite rating was predicated on the ownership of a zeugos rather than a fixed agricultural timêma, but that the hypozygia could include a variety of animals, the zeugitai turn out to be a much larger and much more socio-economically heterogeneous group than that imagined by Foxhall and van Wees. A more inclusive zeugite class has important

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708 Soph. Ant. 250; Ar. Clouds 1486, 1500, Peace 546, Birds 602; Eur. Phoen. 1155.
709 For the term thēs and the related verb thêteuô as indicators of hired dependency in Greek literature prior to Solon, see, e.g., Il. 21.444, Od. 4.644, 11.489; Hes. WD 602. See further, Bravo 1992, 71-96.
implications for how we should understand the nature of obligations and entitlements of this segment of the Athenian citizenry.

6.7 Civic obligations of wealthy Athenians

As outlined above, traditionally scholars have viewed the zeugitai as nearly coterminous with the body of Athenian hoplai. The arguments employed in support of this, however, are prone to circularity: the Athenian hoplite body is estimated at approximately half to two-thirds of the civic body, therefore zeugitai represent a broad middling class of one half to two-thirds of the citizenry. More recently, scholars have challenged the identification of the zeugitai with the body of hoplites and have argued that, in fact, the zeugite class represented an elite minority. Despite being among the several scholars who have highlighted the contribution of thetic citizens to Athens’ hoplite armies, van Wees’ assertion of the considerable wealth of zeugitai (based on his acceptance of the Ath. Pol.’s figures) has led him to develop some ingenious arguments concerning the nature of hoplite mobilization in Athens. Van Wees distinguishes between ‘leisure-class’ and ‘working-class’ hoplites, firmly placing the Athenian zeugitai in the former. Working-class (i.e. thetic) hoplites were “small but independent farmer[s] who owned about 10-15 acres of land (4-6 ha), worth 2,000-3,000 drachmas, and who could just about afford a hoplite panoply,” but who often fought with less than a full bronze kit.\(^710\) Furthermore, van Wees contends that it was only leisured citizens who were legally liable to infantry service; that is, only these Athenians were subject to call-up by katalogos. In exchange for their legally defined obligation to serve as hoplites, those of zeugite status and above were fully

enfranchised and permitted to hold office, while those of thetic status, who were under no obligation to campaign, were given political access to the assembly alone.\textsuperscript{711} 

Van Wees’ \textit{quid pro quo} hypothesis is plausible enough for the pre-classical period. Hoplite phalanxes in the archaic period were small.\textsuperscript{712} They were probably nothing like the large hoplite armies marshaled by classical poleis either with respect to organization or size.\textsuperscript{713} Athens, prior to the enfranchisement of all native males in 508/7, was likely no different.\textsuperscript{714} Thucydides reports (in an account explicitly offered to correct what he sees as mistaken popular opinion) that, as late as 514/13, Hippias received news of Hipparkhos’ death and moved to disarm whomever of the Athenians was assembled under arms for the Panathenaic procession. This he did with only a small mercenary force (Thuc. 6.56-58). Leadership and recruitment of Athenian land forces before Cleisthenes was also differed markedly from the fifth-century model. Though the (often-late) sources are frustratingly imprecise, they often suggest that recruitment was in the hands of individual leaders relying on personal support from their volunteer soldiers (e.g., Plut. \textit{Sol.} 9.2; [Kylon] Hdt. 5.70.1; Plut. \textit{Sol.} 12.1-9; [Megacles] Plut. \textit{Sol.} 12.1; [Peisistratos] Hdt. 1.61-64; [Arist.] \textit{Ath. Pol.} 15.2, 17.4). Notable, too, is the complete

\textsuperscript{712} On the absence of a polis-level army in Athens before Cleisthenes’ reforms, see: G. Anderson 2003, 148-149; Singor 2000; Frost 1984; Siewert 1982; van Effenterre 1976. 
\textsuperscript{713} Frost 1984 has analyzed Athenian military forces and war-making in the period before Cleisthenes. Both the size of the forces involved and the infrequency of their deployment stand in stark contrast to the fifth century. The sources record less than twelve major military engagements from the attempted coup of Kylon in c. 640 (Hdt. 5.70.1; Thuc. 1.126) to the assassination of Hipparkhos; cf. Pritchard 2010, 8 n. 38. On the absence of a polis-level army in Athens before Cleisthenes’ reforms, see also: Singor 2000; Siewert 1982; van Effenterre 1976. It is worth noting that even in the classical period, the hoplite phalanxes of most poleis did not exceed 1000 men, and even those of larger poleis such as Thebes and Sparta did not typically include more than 5000 (Ray 2009, 9; Hansen 2006, 73-85, 116-118). 
\textsuperscript{714} Pritchard 2010, 7-15; Singor 2009 and 2000; Hall 2007, with some reservation and distinguishing between ‘true hoplites’ (those who could afford heavy armour and complete panoplies) as \textit{promakhoi} and less fully armed rank-and-filers; Foxhall 1997; Snodgrass 1993 and 1965. For the alternative, traditional view of early archaic phalanxes comprising the mass of a broad, smallholder class of agricultural citizen, see: Schwartz 2009; Raaflaub 1997 and 1996; Hanson 1995; Bowden 1993; Donlan 1980; Cartledge 1977; Salmon 1977; Detienne 1968.
lack of large and coordinated military responses to the various attempted aristocratic coups from the mid-seventh to the mid-sixth century. Nor were the Athenians any more able to muster a large force to oppose the external threat of Kleomenes in the field in 508/7. Instead, the Spartan king marched through Attica and took the Acropolis “with no great force” (οὐ σῶν μεγάλη χειρί: Hdt. 5.72.1). Thus an Athenian hoplite force, comprising only the top three Solonian telē is a possibility for the pre-classical period.

Classical sources give the strong impression, however, that the Cleisthenic reforms were responsible for a great increase in the size and quality of Athens’ infantry (Hdt. 5.74-8, 5.97-103). Shortly after these reforms, the Athenians reorganized themselves militarily such that they would be marshaled and commanded on a tribal basis by a board of ten generals, created in 501/0. Whatever was the case in the sixth century prior to 507/06, it would seem that under the pressure of war (against the Boeotians and Khalkidians) any Athenian willing to take up arms to defend Attica, which was “ringed with foes” (ἀμφιβόλη), found himself joining the ranks of his fellows in the phalanx.

Thucydides gives 13 000 as the number of Athenian hoplites in 431 (2.13.6). This represents reasonable growth based on the figures from other sources for the battles of

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715 Pritchard 2010, 10-11.
717 While van Wees’ arguments are tenable for the early period, given the low troop numbers involved, the absence of a polis-level hoplite army is a strong a priori argument against the notion that Solon established his telē, which were public institutions, on the basis of military divisions (Rosivach 2002b, 39).
719 That this figure represents those liable for service in the field army must be inferred simply from Thucydides’ rather imprecise language. Pericles is made to claim that the Athenians have 13 000 hoplites “not including” (ἂνω) the other 16 000 hoplites comprising the oldest and the youngest Athenians and the metic hoplites that he goes on to mention as garrison troops (ἐν τοῖς φρουρίοις). Elsewhere Thucydides mentions hoplites “from the divisions” (ἐκ τῶν τάξεων: 3.87.3), which must refer to the ‘field’ army specified by Pericles at 2.13.6, though this association has been challenged. Beloch (Bevölkerung, 66) and
Marathon and Plataea and Thucydides’ own figures for Tanagra (457 BC). It also is consistent with the troop totals that Thucydides provides for the earliest military ventures of the war (prior to the outbreak of plague). Nevertheless, despite such evidence for large hoplite armies, for the fifth century, van Wees reckons with around between 5000-7000 citizens (of zeugite status or above) liable to call-up under the katalogos, which figure he bases on his socio-demographic model of the classical Athenian population, as well as the fact that hoplite armies raised “from the list” (ek katalogou) routinely appear in our sources as forces of around
3000 men. Thus, van Wees argues that in the fifth century, the leisured-class 
(pentakosiomedimnoi, hippeis and his elite zeugitai) provided Athens with its conscript hoplite 
army, which was bolstered by equal or greater numbers of thetic volunteers, who were under 
moral rather than legal compulsion to serve. As we have seen, van Wees’ socio-demographic 
modeling is only as secure as Ath. Pol.’s figures, from which it derives. One way to test van 
Wees’ hypothesis surrounding the military obligation of the top three Solonian telê, however, is 
to consider the various, and sometimes overlapping and competing, civic obligations of citizens 
in the fifth century.

According to van Wees’ estimation, there may have been as many as 7000 and as few as 
5333 citizens in 431 who belonged to the top three Solonian telê. If, for the sake of argument, 
the telê were being used as the basis from which to determine legal liability to military service 
in fifth-century Athens, then surely they were still the basis on which other civic obligations 
(leitourgiai, eisphorai) and civic entitlements (arkhai) were distributed (as Ath. Pol. and 
Plutarch maintain). The problem that this leaves is that there simply were not enough 
Athenians of zeugite status or higher to run the imperial democracy. The hoplite forces called 
up ek katalogou in the fifth century, according to van Wees’ model, would require the 
manpower of some 75% of the city’s upper classes. This, prima facie, seems like too large an 
investment of the city’s elite for any campaign; but additionally we have to reckon with

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723 2004, 56.
724 2013b, 173 n. 23 and 2001, 53. On the nature of hoplite katalogos and its function as mechanism 
for legally defined conscription, see below, Ch. 7.2.2.
725 2001, 51-54.
726 Ath. Pol. 7.3-8.3; Plut. Arist. 1.2; van Wees and 2013b, 88-89 and 2004, 879-83.
exemptions from infantry service.\textsuperscript{727} In any given year, infantry exemptions, excluding those simply physically unfit for service (\textit{adumatoi}), would have included:\textsuperscript{728}

- the 200-300 men who performed the trierarchy plus the ten or so officers (\textit{hyperésia}) they each selected to serve with them;\textsuperscript{729}
- 100 men who performed various other liturgies (the \textit{gunmasiarkhai, hestiaséis, arkhitheòrias} and \textit{arrhephoriai}, and the \textit{khorègias}), more in a Panathenaic year;\textsuperscript{730}
- many hundreds of \textit{khoreutai};\textsuperscript{731}
- at least 400 imperial officials (\textit{arkhontes, episkopoi, phrouarkhoi, kërukes}), not including the various forces and officials responsible for “money collection,” which appears to have been a frequent but irregular imperial enterprise;\textsuperscript{732}
- large numbers of polis officials (perhaps 1100 including \textit{bouleutai});\textsuperscript{733}

\textsuperscript{727} On legal exemptions from hoplite service evidenced by extant Athenian forensic and political oratory, see Ch. 7, below. Cf., Christ 2006, 53-58.

\textsuperscript{728} The proportion of physically disabled individuals for any pre-modern adult population is estimated at 10\% (Hansen 1986, 19). Athens, because of its historically atypical efflorescence, may have been substantially below this figure, but the number of individuals who were physically unfit for war in a population of 5000-7000 was probably not negligible.

\textsuperscript{729} On the number of Athenian trierarchs in Peloponnesian-War Athens and on the nature and performance of the trierarchy, see Ch. 8, below. A speech of Lysias reveals that a certain Philokrates had been “removed from the ranks of the hoplites” in order to serve as the trierarch Ergokles’ \textit{tania} (Lys. 29.3-4). \textit{Epibatai}, or hoplite marines, ten of which were normally detailed to each Athenian trireme, may or may not have typically been \textit{théseis}. The evidence is ambiguous. Thucydides reserves the highest praise for the 120 \textit{epibatai} who died fighting in Aetolia under Demosthenes in 426, lauding them in language that hints at their high social status: “οὗτοι βέλτιστοι δή άνδρες ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τούτῳ ἐκ τῆς Αθηναίων πόλεως διερθαρμένοι” (3.98.4). On the other hand, thetic volunteers serving as \textit{epibatai} (explicitly commented on by Thucydides) are a feature of the Sicilian Expedition (6.43.1; see above, 180-181). Nevertheless, it seems clear enough from this passage and from Thuc. 8.24.2 that \textit{epibatai} were typically not drawn \textit{ek katalogou}. Cf., however, Gabrielsen 2002a.

\textsuperscript{730} For the number of Athenian festivals and annual \textit{leitourgountes}, see Pritchard 2012.

\textsuperscript{731} That choreic service normally exempted otherwise eligible citizens from hoplite service is clear from a speech of Demosthenes, in which his client’s brother was charged with desertion even though he ought to have been formally exempt as a chorister (Dem. 39.16-17). If Pritchard is right in his on-going argument with Fisher over mass participation in festival competitions, and only wealthy Athenians participated in competitive festivals including the City Dionysia, this would imply the exemption (for the Dionysia alone) of upwards of 100 eligible hoplites from van Wees’ restricted \textit{katalogos}. The highest numbers for participation in all the various festivals and choral competitions in the Attic calendar, plus those singers performing abroad under the liturgy of the \textit{arkhitheòria}, is estimated for the second half of the fifth century to be some 5000 men and boys serving as \textit{khoreutai} for various dithyrambic and dramatic festivals (Csapo and Miller 2007, 5 [in Fisher 2011]). Based on Fisher’s discussion of the evidence in 2011, a number of 1038 men of military age would seem to represent a (perhaps unnecessarily cautious) absolute minimum requirement (see also, Fisher 2010, 71). This does not take into consideration other participants in performative events, who may also have been exempt from other state service, such as those selected as tribal representatives for various torch races and pyrrhic competitions (Fisher 2011). The figure may well have been, in fact, more than double 1038. Whatever the true figures may have been, it is clear that in a given year many hundreds of Athenians of military age would have been entitled to claim exemption from infantry service on the basis of their festival commitments.

\textsuperscript{732} On money-collecting ships (\textit{argyrologoi}), see Thuc. 3.19.1-2; cf. Ch. 8, 322 n. 1134.
• 1000 men for the cavalry.

This last group requires some additional comment. In Periclean Athens, the provision of *katastasis* allowed those who could not afford to purchase or to maintain a horse from their own means to perform cavalry service. The price of mounts naturally varied with respect to quality, and Xenophon records the cost of the best stallions from the Near East at 1200 drachmae (Xen. *Anab.* 7.8.6), but cheaper, serviceable mounts were available in Athens. Furthermore, the democratic state made regular subsidies for its cavalrymen in the form of the *sitoi*, allowances for feed amounting to four obols daily. Nevertheless, Athens’ 1000 *hippeis* (Thuc. 2.13.8) were drawn, overwhelmingly from well-to-do families. The exemption of cavalrymen from infantry service under the democracy is well-attested (Lys. 15 *passim*, 14.7, 4, 16.3; cf. Xen. *Anab.* 3.2.19). *Hippeis* appear not only to have been exempt from hoplite service while on active campaign, but as long as they held the *katastasis* (Lys. 15.7). It seems

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733 *Ath. Pol.* 24.3. On the number of Athenian magistrates receiving state pay in the 330s (at least 658), see: Pritchard 2014, 9-23; A. Jones 1957. Although we are not as well informed about such magistracies for the fifth century, the number of Athenian officials during the acme of empire can scarcely have been less than this, traditional arguments about the rise of democratic bureaucracy in the fourth century notwithstanding.

734 Bugh 1988, 66-67, 70, who estimates the *katastasis* as 1200 drachmae, paid upon enlistment in the cavalry. The state also guaranteed the replacement cost of a mount injured or killed in battle, an institution known as *timēsis*, from the recording of the horse’s value. Cf. Lys. Fr. 34.32, discussed above.

735 On the price of horses in fifth-century Athens, see Bugh 1988, 56-57. *Ar. Nub.* 21 (cf. 1223), too, lists 12 minae as the cost of a fine horse purchased by Strepsiades for Pheidippides, but this, given the line of humour, probably either exaggerates or represents the upper limit one might pay for a horse in Athens. Records of surviving *timēseis* collected by Camp reveal figures of 700 drachmae (1986, 119). See Worely 1994, 71 n. 68, who seriously underestimates the cost of a ‘good horse’ at 3 minae, citing and ostensibly mistranslating *Nub.* 31: τρεῖς μιᾶς διφρίσκου καὶ τριχονί Ἀμώνια.

736 Xen. *Hipparch.* 1.19; *IG I1* 375; Bugh, 1988, 60-62.

737 Bugh 1988, 62. At. 2.13.8, Thucydides lists the total mounted force as 1200, including 200 mounted archers (ἱπποτοξόται) as does Ps.-Aristotle, who follows him (*Ath. Pol.* 24.3). Aristophanes, Andocides and Philochorus all speak of an Athenian cavalry force of 1000 (Ar. *Kn.* 225; Andoc. 3.7; *FGrH* 328 Fr. 39; see further, Spence 1987, 167). Two possible explanations for the discrepancy are: the *hippotoxotai* mentioned in Pericles’ speech were non-Athenians under hire to the number of 200; the round figure outside of Thucydides is merely convenient and the *hippotoxotai* are simply a part of the 1200-strong cavalry corps.

738 In Lysias, one finds that individuals might find it expedient to avoid infantry service by enrolling in the cavalry; on the avoidance of hoplite service, see below, Ch. 7, 238.
that *hippeis* actually required the permission of their commanders to exempt themselves from cavalry service in order to serve as hoplites (Lys. 16.13).\(^{739}\)

Given the number of exemptions in the fifth century, it would seem very unlikely that Solon’s *telê* indeed were used to determine both liability to infantry service and entitlement to various civic *timai* and *arkhai*, as Van Wees believes. In a given year, as few as 3000 and as many as 4938 citizens of zeugite or higher rating would be formally exempt from hoplite service, leaving only a couple of thousand liable to call-up. It may be objected, of course, that the restriction on *thètes* holding office was relaxed already in the fifth century as *Ath. Pol.* says it was for his own day (7.4).\(^{740}\) Even if this were the case, those duties performed exclusively by Athens’ wealthy citizens—liturgies, cavalry service (and perhaps choral and athletic training and performance)—would still have entailed the exemption of several thousands of Athenians from the pool of liable hoplites.

Two further objections to van Wees’ hypothesis are more impressionistic, but are certainly worth consideration. It is noteworthy that in his publications on the *telê* and in his major contribution to the field of Greek military history, van Wees omits any mention of some of the more notorious farmer-hoplite figures of Athenian literature: Aristophanes’ Dicaeopolis and Trygaios.\(^{741}\) These characters and their peers, the choruses of truculent, rustic Acharnians and hoplite *geôrgoi* hardly appear to be the gentleman farmers that van Wees envisions for

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\(^{739}\) The polis had an interest in not allowing *hippeis* to risk their lives as hoplites—they had specialized skills and they were invested with a long-term state loan (*katastasis*) for the purchase and upkeep of their horses (Bugh 1988, 56-8).

\(^{740}\) For poor citizens serving as magistrates from the 350s-330s, see Pritchard 2015, 71-72.

Athens’ zeugitai. On the other hand, their dutiful service as hoplites is presented as less than voluntary and references to call-up by katalogos abound.\textsuperscript{742} While neglecting important, contemporary fifth-century evidence, like Aristophanic comedy, van Wees makes much of Aristotle’s claim in \textit{Politics} that in the polis “the hoplite force belongs much more to the rich than to the poor” (1321a13-14).\textsuperscript{743} As discussed in the previous chapter, however, distinctions between ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ (here euporoi and aporoi) in Greek writers are fluid and even within \textit{Politics} are inconsistent.\textsuperscript{744} Van Wees interprets Aristotle to be distinguishing between ‘working class’ and ‘leisured class’ according to military function, but in the passage just cited the distinction Aristotle seems to be making is between people who work for themselves and those who earn wages in the pay of others. The euporoi in this passage appear to represent farmers (\textit{γεωργικόν}), tradesmen (\textit{βανωσικόν}), and merchants (\textit{ἀγοραῖον}), while the aporoi represent wage-labourers (\textit{θητικόν} in its non-Solonian sense: 1321a5-6).\textsuperscript{745} At any rate, many members of the thetic class were also members of the \textit{geōrgikon} at this time (Thuc. 2.14.1, 2.16.1). The Solonian \textit{thētikon}, whether one accepts the \textit{Ath. Pol.}’s definition based on absolute \textit{timēmata} or the definition offered above of citizens

\textsuperscript{742} Dicaeopolis is described as “a useful citizen” (\textit{χρηστός πολίτης}) and a “soldier through and through” (\textit{στρατοποιηθεὶς}) since the beginning of the war (\textit{Ath.} 595-597). His obligatory service is contrasted with the opportunistic office- and pay-seeking of Lamakhos. References to small-time \textit{geōrgoi} being called up \textit{ek katalogou} include: \textit{Ach.} 1051-1066, \textit{Peace} 311-312, 1173-1186; cf. \textit{Peace} 355-357.


\textsuperscript{744} See, above, Ch. 5.

\textsuperscript{745} Aristotle’s discussions of \textit{politeia} seem to offer the clearest connection between hoplite service, civic participation, and wealth requirements (e.g., \textit{Pol.} 1265b28, 1279b4, 1297b1-2, 22-23, 1289b31-32, 1321a12, 1305b33). Even in these passages, however, he argues that full civic enfranchisement should be afforded only to \textit{hoi hopliteuontes} or to \textit{to hoplitikon}. These do not represent any kind of hard census class; that is, there is never a firm wealth minimum attached to them with reference to any figures (at 1297b 1-4, an absolute \textit{timēma} [τοῦ . . . τιμῆματος τὸ πλῆθος ἄπλως] is explicitly disavowed). \textit{Hoi hopliteuontes} or to \textit{hoplitikon} refer only to that segment of society that currently performs or is able to perform hoplite service.
who lack hypozygia, was not a category of landless citizens. Insofar as it is assumed that they comprised the bulk of the Athenian citizen population, they should not be considered to have been mainly a property-less group. Thucydides is unequivocal: most of the Athenians prior to 431 lived in the countryside and (therefore necessarily) upon the resources of Attica (cf. Arist. *Pol.* 1256a, 1290b39), even if they were partially dependent on supplemental wages for agricultural or other labour. As evidence to bolster the case for a connection between military role and membership in the Solonian telê in Periclean Athens, the passages from *Politics* cannot bear the weight that van Wees has put upon them.

Indeed, elsewhere in the same work, Aristotle explicitly says that hoplites generally came from ‘the middle’ (*Pol.* 1297b16-28). Van Wees is right to be skeptical of the claim that this refers to an economically defined group of citizens who were ison with respect to their moderate incomes—especially if this notion is tied to a traditional understanding of the zeugitai as the vast majority, or even the entirety, of the city’s hoplites. Nevertheless, all this passage seems to be expressing is that in states that can field large hoplite armies, these armies generally comprise neither the super-elite (who in the case of Athens are in any case occupied with other forms of civic obligation) nor the poorest (who ostensibly lack the means to campaign unless facilitated by others).

For Periclean Athens it is more appropriate to think in terms of citizens of hoplite status than hoplite class. Crucially this status was mutable and cut across rather than formed Athens’

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746 Lys. Fr. 34.32 clearly implies that thêtes owned some land; cf. above, 184. Furthermore, even accepting *Ath. Pol.*, there is no warrant for the assumption that nearly all, nor even a majority of the thêtes, would be at the lower end of the 0-199 medimnoi scale (Foxhall 1997).
747 Van Wees also adduces *Pol.* 1303a 8-10 and [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 26.1, both of which claim that under the katalogos system, disproportionate numbers of distinguished Athenians serving as hoplites in the Peloponnesian War. For discussion these passages, see below, Ch. 7, 288-290.
748 2004, 81.
socio-economic joints. The hoplites of the Athenian democracy can be defined only as those citizens who served as the heavy-armed troops who comprised their tribal *taxeis* and thus the city’s *phalanx*; these men represented a putative middle group precisely because this group cut across class lines. Because of the principle of self-equipment, which, as we have seen, was often circumvented in practice, the poorest citizens were often, but not always, *de facto* prevented from hoplite service. With scholars like Rosivach and Gabrielsen, it would seem prudent to envision a fifth-century Athenian hoplite force that comprised Athenians of all social ranks. Athenian expeditionary forces included citizens of various means, each campaigning with the equipment afforded by these means, with the cost of arms and service (that is, the cost of absenting oneself from one’s regular livelihood) as the only determinant of the capacity and duration of military service. In practice this meant, indeed, that many Athenians of quite humble economic backgrounds served as hoplites alongside their more affluent fellow-citizens.

This picture is thus not very different from the one modeled by van Wees in his arguments about the thetic contribution to Athens’ infantry. Unlike, van Wees, however, I do not think that one can confidently defend the existence of a two-tiered system of infantry.

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749 Instances in which light-armed and ‘poor’ men in Thucydides’ history are provided with heavy arms and thus ‘become hoplites’ hint at the permeability of any socio-economic line between hoplite and ‘sub-hoplite’ citizens in Athens (e.g., 3.27.2, 6.72.4, 8.25.1). Cf. Gabrielsen 2002b, 85. Gabrielsen distinguishes between the historical hoplites of Athens and the heavy-armed spearman “constructed and kept alive” in the imagination of some elite classical writers. The latter is “a wealthy or fairly well-off man [who] support[s] oligarchy.”

750 Recent work on the economies of ancient poleis generally, and Athens in particular, however, should caution against the assumption that most, or even a majority, of the classical Athenian population was badly impoverished: Bresson 2016, 141-174; Lagia 2015; Ober 2015, 71-100 and 2010, esp. 9-16, 257-266; Acton 2014, 44-72; Kron 2014, 2011, and 2005; Scheidel 2010. Recent estimates put the average Athenian income at between three- and four-and-a-half times subsistence requirements. Even the modest amounts paid to *nautai* and *dikastai*, the majority of whom were *thètes*, in the late fifth century appear to have been at least one and a half times bare subsistence wages; cf. Markle 1985.

obligation based on the very limited and obfuscated ancient evidence for the Athenian telê as determinants of military obligation. There is no doubt that the body of Athenian hoplites in the fifth century was socio-economically stratified, but, as with other fifth-century polis-level institutions (the Boulê, the Hêliaia, the Ekklêsia),\(^{752}\) membership and participation in the city’s hoplite phalanx was open to all Athenians. As we shall see in the next chapter, military service was required of all citizens and, in the context of the democratic polis, the hard distinction between obligatory and voluntary or supererogatory service is dubious. The performance of heavy-infantry service represented an ideologically charged ideal of the citizenry at large, and thus there was strong motivation for all Athenians to serve among the heavy-armed. In the next chapter, I shall demonstrate that while there was no official hoplite census below which men were barred from service and that there was no census above which the state might compel its citizens to serve, there were robust mechanisms—both inducements toward service and deterrents against dereliction—that made service attractive for all citizens.

If, then, military duties were not defined by a citizens’ timêma, what was the nature of the social obligation implied by the term telê? Recent scholarship on the fiscal and economic policies of the archaic and classical polis has shown that while direct taxation remained irregular, the Greek citizen-state did often feature various forms of wealth taxes and the ancient sources unambiguously testify that in Peloponnesian-War Athens, these tax burdens were assessed on the basis of Solon’s telê.\(^{753}\)

\(^{753}\) Bresson 2016, 97-110; Migeotte 2014, 230-244 and 1995; van Wees 2013b.
6.8 The Solonian telê as the basis of Athens’ wealth tax

Already in the mid-sixth century, there is clear evidence that public spending in some poleis had reached a level that would have required some kind of direct taxation. The public building programs and especially the state-financed navies in evidence from this period imply the polis’ capacity to levy resources from its citizenry. Because, in the experience of most poleis, the most important and most expensive public good—communal defense—was provided directly by citizen militiamen and because, prior to the fifth century, war-making was on quite a small scale, such levies were probably quite modest and infrequent. By the last third of the fifth century, annual state spending at Athens was in excess of 1000 talents and this total ballooned to an average of some 1500 talents for the years of the Peloponnesian War. Of course much of this was covered by the phoros exacted by the imperial democracy from its arkhê, but the contribution of Athenian citizens to state expenditure was not negligible.

Affirmation of the existence of state-level extraction of private resources in the archaic or classical period may seem perverse to students of Greek history raised on the fibrous diet of Hanson’s The Other Greeks, with its emphasis on the fiercely enshrined rustic ideal of autarkeia. Surely the economic independence of the Greek citizen-farmer was a widely held ideal in the polis societies constituted by freehold farmers, but realities approached or diverted from this ideal according to time and circumstance. New research into the economies of the polis is revealing that while the ideal of the fully autarkic and autonomous middling farmer was a deeply entrenched and fundamental Greek axiom, the average citizen-farmer was rather an

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755 Pritchard 2012.
auto-consumptive producer who nevertheless relied on market-focused trade in order to acquire specialized goods and labour and who paid a modest amount of direct tax.\textsuperscript{756}

In Athens, direct taxation took the form of two wealth taxes that fell on affluent citizens: \textit{leitourgiai} and \textit{eisphorai}. Liturgies, literally ‘public services,’ entailed the outlay of personal wealth by the wealthiest citizens in order to cover the cost of certain and specific public goods (for example, athletic or dramatic festivals, public feasts, or the Athenian fleet). The \textit{eisphora}, literally ‘a transferring’ of personal wealth into a public fund, was an irregular property tax levied to meet extraordinary war-costs.\textsuperscript{757} While each of these should be fundamentally understood as a tax on wealthy citizens, the performance of each these very different financial obligations was distributed among Athenians according to their level of personal wealth. The most expensive liturgies, the \textit{khorêgia} and the trierarchy, the cost of which could reach a talent or more, were performed only by the richest Athenians (the \textit{pentakosiomedimnoi} and the \textit{hippeis}), but minor liturgies, such as \textit{hestiaseis}, which might cost as little as a mina or two, could be performed by wealthier \textit{zeugitai}.\textsuperscript{758} The performance of even minor liturgies by zeugite citizens, however, was likely voluntary.

Since liturgies entailed public visibility and distinction for the liturgist, their performance was encouraged by \textit{philotimia}. Athens’ wealthiest citizens vied with one another for the \textit{lamprotês} (“outstanding brilliance”) and \textit{kharis} (“gratitude” or “thanks”) that accrued from

\textsuperscript{756} Bresson 2016, 97-110; Migeotte 2014, 230-244 and 1995.
\textsuperscript{757} The frequency of fifth-century \textit{eisphorai} is discussed in Chapter 9 below. Before the tax reforms of the fourth century, the \textit{eisphora} was an irregular tax voted for by the Athenians when state expenditure threatened to exceed their imperial \textit{phoros} (\προσδιόμενοι δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι χρημάτων: Thuc. 3.19.1).
\textsuperscript{758} On liturgical performance, and especially the financial burden on \textit{triérarkhountes} over the course of the Peloponnesian War, see Ch. 8.
such service. If a man found himself under obligation to perform a liturgy and wished to avoid such service, he could try to compel another citizen to undertake the burden in his place through the legal process of *antidosis*. Citizens formally challenged to *antidosis* were obligated either to accept the liturgy or to agree to an exchange of property with the challenger. If the citizen challenged with an *antidosis* refused both the liturgy and the exchange of property, the matter went before the courts, where it was decided which of the two men would perform the liturgy. The least affluent members of the liturgical class, then, the *zeugitai*, would have found it fairly easy to avoid liturgical service if they were so inclined, by challenging wealthier men to *antidosis*, making liturgies for zeugite citizens essentially voluntary.

While zeugite citizens, especially the wealthiest of these, may thus have occasionally and voluntarily joined *hippeis* and *pentakosiomedimnoi* in the ranks of *leitourgountes*, they were obligated to contribute to the city’s wartime levies. That duty to contribute to the *eisphora* was a burden placed upon citizens of a certain wealth-threshold is beyond doubt. In a passage from *Knights*, Paphlagon threatens to have the Sausage-Seller registered (έγγραφης) among the rich (τοὺς πλουσίους) so that he will be weighed down by taxes (πούμενος ταῖς ἐσφοραῖς: 923-926). There is also evidence that *eisphorountes* were assessed their individual contributions at a graduated scale.

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761 On the *antidosis* procedure, see: Christ 1990; Gabrielsen 1987.
762 On the number of citizens liable to liturgies, and on *trierarchhountes* and *khoregoi* in particular, see below, Ch. 8, 300. Traditional estimates (which do not account for *zeugitai*) on the size of the liturgical class in the fifth century range from 300-1200; see, e.g., Gabrielsen 1994, 179; Ober 1989, 117; Rhodes 1982, 1-5; Davies 1981, 15-27.
The most explicit evidence comes from Pollux (8.130), who claims that *pentakosiomedimnoi*, *hippeis* and *zeugitai* contributed to the *eisphora* at various levels relative to their yearly income (8.130):

There were four property classes of *pentakosiomedimnoi*, *hippeis*, *zeugitai*, and *thêtes*. The first were so named because they produced 500 dry and liquid measures, and they paid a talent into the public treasury. Those who paid the *hippad* rate seem to have been named because they were able to keep horses, and they produced 300 measures, and paid half a talent. Those who paid the *zeugésion* were reckoned from 200 measures, and they paid 10 minae. Those who were of the thetic class held no office at all and paid nothing at all.  

That Pollux has in mind the *eisphora* is all but certain, since this is the only attested direct tax for which Athenians would have “spent money towards the public treasury” (άνήλισκον δ’ εἰς τὸ δημόσιον). The evidence of Pollux, however, is fraught with interpretational difficulties. As a document of the second century AD, which, moreover, does not seem to be independent of the tradition of the *Ath. Pol.*, the source may not inspire much confidence of historical accuracy. Fortunately, there is independent and classical evidence that hints at the fiscal function of the *telê*. Even if we accept that Pollux is, then, transmitting some accurate information about these groups—namely that they had something to do with the payment of money to the state—the details of his account of a graduated tax system have seemed

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763 Pollux 8.130: Τιμήματα δ’ ήν τέταρτα, πεντακοσιομεδίμνων ἵππεων ξευγητῶν θητῶν. οἱ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ πεντακόσια μέτρα ἔχοντα καὶ ἤγα ποιεῖν κληθέντες· ἀνήλισκον δ’ εἰς τὸ δημόσιον τάλαντον· οἱ δὲ τὴν ἱππάδα τελούντες ἐκ μὲν τοῦ δύνασθαι τρέφειν ἱπποὺς κεκληθαί τοις δοκοῦσιν, ἐποίοι δὲ μέτρα τριακόσια, ἀνήλισκον δὲ ἠμιτάλαντον. οἱ δὲ τὸ ξευγήσιον τελούντες ἀπὸ διακοσίων μέτρων κατελέγουσαν, ἀνήλισκον δὲ μνά δέκα· οἱ δὲ τὸ θητικὸν οὐδεμίαν ἄρχην ἰχθῶν, οὐδὲ ἀνήλισκον οὐδὲν. Cf. the scholiast to Plato’s *Republic* (550c), who reproduces Pollux’s account to comment on a discussion concerning the distribution of honours and obligations.

764 Van Wees, 2013b, 92.

765 De Ste. Croix 2004, 56-59; contra van Wees 2006 and 2001, who argues that Pollux is following a source independent of *Ath. Pol.* based on Pollux’ readiness to accept the etymology for *hippeis* that *Ath. Pol.* rejects (7.4); Rosivach 2002a; see above, 162.

766 Dem. 24.144 and 43.54, both of which passages are concerned with various amounts of money owed in a particular circumstance by Athenians according to their *telos*; cf. Lys. Fr. 207 Suapple = Harpokration, s.v. *pentakosiomedimnoi*.  

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hopelessly muddled, leaving some scholars to reject the idea of a census-based *eisphora* before the tax reforms of 378/7 or else to posit a flat tax on all those liable.\(^{767}\)

The first problem is that the figures paid by each of the *telê* according to Pollux are far too low to represent the contribution made in a given *eisphora* for the whole *telos*.\(^{768}\) On the other hand, the figures are much too high to represent the contributions of individual members of the various groups.\(^{769}\) The scheme described by Pollux, then, presupposes the existence of *eisphora*-paying sub-groups not directly attested by classical sources before the creation of tax symmories in 378/7.\(^{770}\) In this year, the Athenians appear to have established 100 *symmoriai*. Each of these groups seems to have paid the same total toward the *eisphora* while their membership, which comprised the wealthiest citizens, paid as individuals according to their *timêmata*, but without reference to the Solonian groups.\(^{771}\) In order to ensure reliable and timely payment of the tax, the wealthiest three members of each symmory paid their group’s

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\(^{768}\) If this were the case, the total *eisphora* would amount to a mere 10 000 drachmae. The only *eisphora* for which we know the total amount raised is that mentioned by Thucydides for 428, which brought in 200 talents (3.19.1). Even if this amount was unprecedented, which seems the most plausible interpretation of the passage, 10 000 is surely much too low a total to have elicited the kinds of complaints from *eisphora*-payers that we hear about in the late-fifth century.

\(^{769}\) Payment of a full talent, for example, by *pentakosiomedimnoi*, would mean that the *eisphora* was as expensive or more so than Athens’ costliest liturgy, the trierarchy. On the cost of the trierarchy, see Ch. 8.2.

\(^{770}\) An alternate suggestion, universally rejected, is Böckh’s argument that the figures provided refer to capitalized portions of individual properties on which taxes would be levied at different rates according to a man’s *telos*; that is, a *pentakosiomedimnos* would have paid tax on a talent’s worth of his holdings, *et cetera* (1886, 580-590). The tax reform of the fourth century is attested by Philochorus (*FGrH* 328 Fr. 41); cf. Dem. 22.44; Polyb. 2.62.6-7. In a tantalizing fragment, the Attidographer Kleidemos claims that the reforms of Cleisthenes included the creation of “fifty sections (*µéρη*), which they called *naukrariai* just as now they call the one hundred groups formed by division ‘symmories’” (*FGrH* 323 Fr. 8). It is not clear, however, what to make of this claim. Kleidemos was writing no later than 350, by which time the Athenians also used symmories for the administration of the trierarchy, and his association of *symmoriai* with *naukrariai* may reflect that he had naval organization rather than taxation in mind (Rhodes 1982, 5-11).

\(^{771}\) Christ 2007, 63-68; van Wees 2006, 369. For enrollment of citizens into symmories, see: Dem. 27.7; Rhodes 1982, 6-7.
contribution in advance (*proeisphora*), and then saw to the collection of contributions from the other *symmoritai*.

The notion that such a scheme, or something similar, could have existed in the fifth century has been, for the most part, rejected by scholars. The objections have been on two grounds: the lack of direct attestation and the assumption that such a system is too complex for the fifth century. The first objection is, I think, easily met. An absence of evidence in this case is not evidence of absence. The *eisphora* itself is well attested and it must have been collected somehow. This is not a flippant observation; the point is, a state-level, direct tax on citizens in a society as large and complex as democratic Athens necessarily implies a complex system of management and collection.

It is a reasonable proposition to suggest that the fifth-century system assessed liability to the *eisphora* on the basis of the Solonian *telê*. After all, the very fact of Athenians being ranked according to their economic capacity seems to point in this direction. This hypothesis, furthermore, finds support in the ancient evidence outside of Pollux. Polybius writes

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772 Christ 2007, 64.
773 E.g., Christ 2007, 57-58; de Ste Croix 2004, 57-58, 1966, 92, and 1953, 42-45; Thomsen 1964, 105-118, is an exception. Thomsen’s arguments were accepted by van Wees in his earlier work (2001), but he has since professed a more agnostic view (2013b, 93-94 and 2006).
774 Lack of evidence: de Ste. Croix 1953, 42-45; too advanced for fifth century: Christ 2007; de Ste. Croix 2004, 56-60 and 1966, 91-92. Christ argues that liability to the *eisphora* was assessed at some standard wealth threshold after which all *eisphorountes* paid a flat tax. It is difficult to imagine how a flat tax would, on the one hand, have raised the kinds of objections we hear to the burden of the *eisphora* among Athens’ super-rich; for that matter, would the payment of a flat tax, contributed by thousands of Athenians, even have been worth inclusion among the claims to special *kharis* by elite orators (e.g., Lys. 21.3)? For the claims of elite speakers on the courts’ gratitude in recognition of service as *eisphorountes*, see Ch. 8.3 and 8.6.
775 Van Wees 2013b, 85 and 2006, 369; Rhodes *AP*, 140. Cf. Pl. *Laws* 744b-c, which establishes four classifications (*timêmata*) by which to determine the distribution of *arkhai*, *eisphorai*, and *dianomai* in the ideal polis.
776 It is worth noting here that if Pollux’s description does not refer to the fifth century, we would have to explain away this passage as a complete fiction. As mentioned above, the tax system established in 378/7 was not based on the *telê*, and we know of no other tax-reforms related to the *eisphora* apart from a
explicitly that in the new arrangements of 378/7, liability to the *eisphora* was based on all kinds of property, while he gives the strong impression that prior *eisphorai* were assessed on landed property alone (2.62.7; cf. Dem. 14.19). Furthermore, the context surrounding Thucydides’ account of the levy of 428/7 (3.19.1), which is the earliest unambiguously attested *eisphora*, appears to link the *telê* to the performance of this civic duty. Thucydides writes that in this same year, the Athenians embarked an emergency fleet of 100 triremes manned, unusually, with all-citizen crews (*ἐσβάντες οἴνοι*) in order to make a strong show of force in the face of crippling plague-losses and the revolt of a major ally in the Mytilenians. The historian includes the odd detail that *hippeis* and *pentakosiomedimnoi* were absent from the crews (3.16.1). Van Wees has made the attractive suggestion that the reason for their exemption from service in the emergency fleet was that these wealthy citizens had earned reprieve from military service by contributing to the city’s war-tax. This, certainly, is the opinion of the scholiast to Thucydides, who notes, the *pentakosiomedimnoi* were not compelled to go on the ships since, because they pay the highest tax in the polis, they are held in esteem.

Under the system outlined by Pollux, the top two classes would have contributed 150 of possible innovation in 347/6 that saw the tax become a regular, annual levy of a modest 10 talents (*IG* 2\(^2\) 244.12-13, 505.14-17). Scholars disagree, however, over whether this was a new tax under the same name as the earlier one or a modification of the *eisphora* in existence from 378/7 (Christ 2007, 53; Hansen 1991, 112; Thompson 1964, 238-239). At any rate, the testimony on the *eisphorai* after 347/6 is silent with respect to the *telê*.

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777 Polyb. 2.62.7: . . . ὅτι τότε κρίναντες ἀπὸ τῆς ἀξίας ποιεῖται τὰς εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἐσφοράς ἐτιμήσαντα τήν τε χώραν τὴν Αττικὴν ἅπασαν καὶ τὰς οἰκίας, ὁμιλοῦσι δὲ καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν οὐσίαν.


779 *Schol. to Thucydides* 3.16.1: οἱ μὲν οὖν πεντακοσιομεδίμνοι οὐκ ἦναγκασθήσαν εἰσέλθεν εἰς τὰς ναῦς ὡς μεγάλην τιμὴν ἔχοντες ἐν τῇ πόλει διὰ τὸ πολλὰ τελέειν. Κ. Hude. 1927. *Scholia in Thucydidem ad optimos codices collate* (Leipzig). This observation does not inspire the greatest confidence because, under the same note, the scholiast appears to have confused the Solonian *hippad* class with actively serving *hippeis*. Nevertheless, when taken together with Pollux 8.130 and Thuc. 3.16.1, this evidence demonstrates the connection between *telos* membership and *eisphora* payment.
the 200 talents raised in 428 (Thuc. 3.19.1), while the zeugitai, who were a much larger group, would have paid only about 17 talents.

In order to fully model how the distribution of the tax burden fell on Athenians in the fifth century, it is necessary to offer some further suggestion for how the system described by Pollux worked. There were several sophisticated organizational sub-associations available to the Athenians in the fifth century that may have served as basic tax-paying groups before the creation of symmories. Deme and tribal affiliation were used from the time of Cleisthenes to ensure a broadly inclusive and equitable distribution of military and administrative commitments among the citizenry. If the Athenians needed a way to similarly disperse tax-burdens among themselves, the Cleisthenic apparatus would seem a suitable one for this purpose as well.\footnote{780}{The symmories created in the 370s, at any rate, appear to have been organized around the existing deme-level administrative structure (Dem. 50.8). Van Wees has recently, following Davies (1984, 143-150), proposed a very attractive solution to the interpretive problems caused by Pollux’s testimony (2013b, 94-97). What follows builds upon their suggestions. That one of the functions of deme administration was to see to the extraction and management of polis-level eisphora is claimed by Ath. Pol. 21.5. Recent research on local land tenure in Attica and the mention of the eisphora on five extant deme inscriptions appear to corroborate this claim; see: Fawcett 2016, 168; Papazarkadas 2011, 125-126.}

If it is agreed that the sums mentioned by Pollux refer to payments of groups of eisphorountes within a tax-paying unit, let us say a deme, the total of these amounts for each contribution group is 10,000 drachmae.\footnote{781}{The variations in deme populations and in wealth distribution across demes would have resulted in a less equitable system than the symmory system of the fourth century, which ensured the same number of eisphorountes in each tax-paying group. Similar inequities were likely inherent in the tribally and ultimately deme-based katalogos system of military call-up (see Ch. 7), which was overhauled in the fourth century in an attempt to improve military efficiency and to more fairly distribute the burden of military service across the citizen population. On this reform, see Christ 2001 and Conclusions, below. In the fifth century, the tribe and trittyes system would perhaps have mitigated the random distribution of population and wealth across the demes for tax purposes as they did for military call-up and representation in the Boule.} What limited data there is for the amounts raised in various eisphorai are always given in talents (i.e. multiples of 6000 drachmae),\footnote{782}{Thuc. 3.19.1; cf. Polyb. 2.62.6-7; Dem. 14.19; IG 2\textsuperscript{2} 244.12-13, 505.14-17.} which makes...
Pollux’s system again look strange. There is evidence to suggest, however, that metics also contributed to the *eisphora* (Lys. 12.20, for the fifth century; cf. 22.13 for the year 385).\(^783\) If metics contributed to the *eisphora* at a rate different from citizens as fourth century evidence suggests (Isoc. 17.41) and their contribution amounted to ‘a sixth’ (τὸ ἐκτὸν μέρος; Dem 22.61; *IG* 2\(^2\) 244.20), this would bring the contribution of each deme up to a full two talents, which would have been a natural multiple by which to levy the tax (e.g. 200 talents: Thuc. 3.19.1; 10 talents: *IG* 2\(^2\) 244.12-13, 505.14-17).\(^784\) The Assembly would simply have had to decide what multiple was appropriate to cover projected expenses.

Collection of the tax would have been in the hands of the *demarkhoi*, who had at their disposal official registers of the citizens of their demes and their property ratings for the purpose of selection for offices.\(^785\) From at least the mid-430s these *lêxiarkhika grammateia* are explicitly attested as being used for the purpose of managing taxation. A regulatory inscription,  

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\(^783\) Cf. Scholiast’s note to Ar. *Peace* 296, which explicitly connects the payment of the *metoikion* with the Peloponnesian War and equates it with the payment of *phoros* by the allies (*nêsiôtai*), suggesting that the metic tax was similarly used to finance the war.  

\(^784\) Christ 2007, 60-63; Thomsen 1964, 96-104.  

\(^785\) *Ath. Pol.* 21.5 states that the *demarkhoi* were introduced by Cleisthenes and that these had the same responsibility (τὴν ὁτὴν . . . ἐπιμέλειαν) as the former *naukraroi* (cf. 8.3), who had previously supervised the fiscal administration of archaic Athens’ *naukrariai* (which Cleisthenes replaced with the demes); cf. van Wees 2013b 45-53 on the duties of the *naukraroi*. Cf. Gabrielsen 1994, 19-24; Whitehead 1984, 33-34; Amit 1965, 104-105, all of whom express deep skepticism over the functions of the *naukraroi* in the pre-Cleisthenic period. The debate over the value of *Ath. Pol.*’s testimony on *naukraroi* hinges on whether we can accept (against the implication of Herodotus 7.144.1) that Athens did, in fact, have a publically financed fleet before the adoption of Themistocles’ proposal to build 200 triremes in 483 with public money. For the present argument, it does not matter, however, whether Athens had a system of public taxation like the *eisphora* in place to finance a navy. What is relevant is that the author of the *Ath. Pol.* thought that a significant part of the role of the *dēmarkhoi* was to supervise tax collection from their demes, which served as tax-paying associations. What makes this even more significant is that at the time of composition, the collection of the *eisphora* from *symmoriai* was in the hands of the *proeisphorountes*. Further evidence of the demarch’s fiscal role is provided by Aristophanes: *Clouds* 167; Fr. 484 Kock = Harpokration, s.v. δήμαρχος.

Isaeus 7.16-17, 27 and Dem. 44.35 attest the process by which citizens were enrolled in the *grammateia* (cf. Cratinus [Younger] Fr. 9 Kock; Pollux 8.115). On the deme rosters and their political functions, see: Christ 2001, 401; Munn 2000, 74; Ostwald 1995, 377-379; Jones 1987, 55; Whitehead 1986, 35, 98, 103-111, 122-133, 340. These rosters are often assumed additionally to have been the basis of military mobilization in the fifth century (see Ch. 7, 238).
dating to around 434, which outlines the collection of taxes for the maintenance of the cult of Apollo Lykeios (IG I3 138), mentions that the contributions will be supervised by the démarkhoi for all those who are listed (γραφόντων) in the deme registers (τὸ λεξισαρχικὸν γρ[α][μι[ματ[ειον]]. Since these lists were never centralized, and the population and socio-economic composition of individual demes was not uniform, calculations were perhaps somewhat messy, but they need not have been at all arbitrary. It is reasonable to think that the Athenians kept a more or less up to date estimation of the total citizen body as well as how this was distributed into tribes, trittyes and demes (Xen. Mem. 3.6, esp. 3.6.13). Thucydides states with confidence the number of citizens from Akharnai (2.20.4) and the Cleisthenic Boule, dependent upon its quota system, implies knowledge of population distribution among the demes. A tolerably equitable method of assessing an individual deme’s liability to the city’s eisphora could plausibly be found in the bouleutic quotas assigned to each deme. Theoretically, each deme large enough to have annual representation in the 500-member council by its own bouleutês would be assigned a proportion of the eisphora at 20 drachmae for each 10 000 drachmae levied. The job of the démarkhos, then, was to ensure that his demesmen contributed at the rate required by their Solonian classification: 12 drachmae for pentakosiomedimnoi, 6 for hippeis and 2 forzeugitai. The precise amount remitted by each member of the top three classes within each deme depended on the sum voted by the Assembly

786 Davies 1984, 147; Whitehead 1984, 132. Cf. IG I3 78 (a collection of the aparkhai, a religious tithe of produce, collected and delivered by the demarchs to Eleusis; see further, below, Section I, Ch. 1.1). That liability to liturgies was assessed also on the basis of local officials’ knowledge of property holdings is implied by Isaeus 3.80.
789 That is, since according to Pollux the contribution of Athenians to the eisphora was in multiples of 10 000 drachmae.
790 For demes only contributing a councilman every other year, the assessment would theoretically be scaled back to reflect the smaller population: 10 drachmae per 10 000 levied and paid at a rate of 6:3:1.
and on the number of his demesmen who were liable to the tax. Under this arrangement the wealthiest Athenians paid nearly 50% of the tax, while hippeis paid 25% and zeugitai contributed only 8.3%, with the metics making up the 16.6% difference. Furthermore, since there were surely many times more zeugitai in a given deme than hippeis or pentakosiomedimnoi, the contribution of an individual zeugitês was probably only in the tens of drachmae.

The Athenians’ use of the demes as the administrative unit through which to levy taxes is confirmed by a rarely discussed fragment of Middle Comedy (Cratinus Junior Fr. 9 Meineke):⁷⁹¹

> After man years I have come home from war and, through great effort, locating my kinsmen and phrateres and my demesmen, I have been registered on the drinks-stand (εἰς τὸ κυλικεῖον ἐνεγράφην). I have a home, I have a phratry, I shall pay my dues (τὰ τέλη τελῶ).⁷⁹²

The plot of the play is irrecoverable, but since the speaking character is describing his arrival in Attica, it is likely that these are some of the first lines spoken by a soldier who has returned home from extended campaign. His registration into his demes’ kulikeion is an obvious pun on the grammateion register, while the dues he owes after prolonged absence are comically turned into an obligation to drink.⁷⁹³ Behind the joke, what are the taxes (τὰ τέλη) owed by demesmen whose names were inscribed in local records? While the demarchs are known to have managed the payment of agricultural tithes and to have remitted them to Eleusis, references to these taxes

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⁷⁹¹ The Younger Cratinus was a contemporary of Plato (427-347) according to Diog. Laert. *Plato* 28. 
⁷⁹² Cratinus Fr. 9: πολλοστὸ δ’ ἔται / ἐκ τῶν πολεμίων οὐκαδ’ ἦκον, ξυγγενεῖς / καὶ φράτερας καὶ δήμοσις εὐρῶν μόλις, / εἰς τὸ κυλικεῖον ἐνεγράφην· Ζεὺς ἐστι μοι / ἔρκεις, ἐστὶ φράτριος, τὰ τέλη τελῶ. = Athen. *Deipn.* 11.460d; Edmonds 1959, 6-7. While, admittedly, the Younger Cratinus was, like his elder namesake, incredibly long-lived, his *Kheiron* is not datable on any grounds but the content of this sole fragment; cf. Capps 1904. 
⁷⁹³ Whitehead 1986, 340; Edmonds 1959, 7.
in kind consistently refer to *aparkhai* or *eparkhai* (*IG* I\(^3\) 8, 78, *IG* II\(^2\) 1672). The only *telê* known to have been determined on the basis of local registration were the tithe to Apollo paid from *misthos* of actively campaigning soldiers and contributions to the *eisphora*.

In light of evidence presented above, it would seem safe to conclude that the *eisphora* was collected at a local, deme level and that the demes constituted the primary tax-groups in the fifth century. Nevertheless, many of the particulars of the system outlined above are conjectural. If skeptics are dubious about such a sophisticated system of deme-level collection,\(^{794}\) however, a rougher way of modeling the tax distribution is available and produces similar results with respect to the tax burden on individuals. The number of *pentakosiomedimnoi* can be estimated within an acceptable margin of error. Estimates of around 1000 have been proposed based on conversion of the measures entailed by their title to a barley standard calculated against the estimated cultivable acreage of Attica and plotted along a plausible socio-demographic curve that includes the *hippeis* and *zeugitai*.\(^ {795}\) Of course, what counts as a plausible socio-demographic curve differs from one scholar to the next, and opinion concerning the degree of economic inequality is currently deeply divided.\(^ {796}\) Even economic distribution models that assume the greatest possible concentration of wealth and economic stratification, however, result in very low payments for *zeugitai* in a graduated tax system, such as the one described by

\(^{794}\) Whatever system existed for the collection of the fifth-century *eisphora* must have been local and personal, reliant on a demarch’s (or some other official’s) fairly intimate knowledge of his *dêmotai* and their relative wealth. This would be the case even if one postulates a simpler system—say a flat tax (Christ 2007). Even a flat tax levied on wealthy citizens above some unknown property threshold was in one sense a progressive tax, since it only taxed the *plousioi*, and liability would have to be assessed by officials on some discernable quantitative basis (Fawcett 2016, 157-158).


Pollux. For example, according to van Wees’ calculations, there were in the sixth and fifth centuries about 1000 pentakosiomedimnoi, 1000 hippeis, and 5000 zegitai.\footnote{2001, 47-53.} Applying these population estimates to Pollux’s figures produces calculations to suggest that the eisphora of 428 (200 talents) would have seen each pentakosiomedimos pay about 600 drachmae; each hippeus about 300, and each zegites about 30 or less.\footnote{2001, 54-55.}

If, as I have argued above, zegite status should be understood to have represented a quite broadly inclusive, yet liminal, status between the liturgical, large-landholding elite and the very modestly propertied thetes, then it is quite possible that the number of zegitai in the fifth century was significantly larger than van Wees allows, and that, individually, zegitai contributed only a handful of drachmae, even for very large levies.\footnote{Perhaps as little as 10-12 drachmae; the latter amount is the same set for the annual tax paid by metics: Harpokration, s.v. metoikion; Hansen 1991, 117. Such a small amount may not seem like much of an imposition, but of course not all metics were wealthy, and as argued above, there was considerable variation in the level of wealth possessed by zegitai. Moreover, direct taxation of any kind was viewed with hostility by citizens (Thuc. 6.54.5), and our ancient sources bear witness to the burden felt by metics regarding the small amount required from the metoikion: Xen. Poroi 2.1-2; Harpokration, s.v. isotelês; cf. scholiast to Ar. Peace 296.} As we saw in the previous section (Ch. 3.2), many scholars have interpreted the unusual settlement between the Athenians and the Lesbians in 427 (the imposition of 2700 cleruchies: Thuc. 3.50.2) as an attempt to mitigate the losses of zegite farmers in Attica. Because Thucydides provides the detail that the former Lesbian landowners owed to each Athenian cleruch an annual rent of two minae, some scholars have been tempted to see here an overt strategy to increase the number of hoplite citizens.\footnote{Figueira 2008; Gauthier 1966, 64-88. Two minae (200 drachmae) is the assumed (somewhat rashly) to be the cash conversion of Ath. Pol.’s 200 “liquid and dry measures” for the zegite census. An estate worth ten minae was the property threshold for citizenship under the oligarchic regime imposed by Antipater in the aftermath of the Lamian War (Diod. 18.18.5). The same figure is also given as the} This suggestion, however, rests on the presumed identification of zegitai.
with hoplites. Furthermore, although it is conceivable that the plan was to make the Athenian cleruchs *instantly* qualify for some notional property threshold, the fact that such considerable rents were due annually strongly implies an ongoing fiscal element to the Mytilenean cleruchies. Coming just months after the Athenians had taxed themselves to the unprecedented sum of 200 talents, and on the heels of the most damaging of the Archidamian invasions, the unconventional settlement may well have been aimed at maintaining or expanding the number of citizens liable to the *eisphora* for future levies. The frequency of *eisphorai* and the burden these represented to Athens’ wealthy citizens will be discussed in Chapter 9.

### 6.9 The Athenian *telê* in Peloponnesian-War Athens: an overview

The aim of this chapter has been to describe the nature of the Solonian classification system and to discern what relevance this system still had to the Athenians by the late fifth century. This is not a simple task. As de Ste. Croix notes to begin his treatment of the *telê*, “the problems concerning the Solonian census classes appear simple, but are in reality very complicated and difficult to solve.”\(^{801}\) As we have seen, the most complete sources of evidence pose a number of very difficult problems of historical interpretation, and what supplementary evidence there is is often ambiguous. As a result of this ambiguity, scholars have advanced radically different accounts of the composition of Solon’s *telê* as well as explanations of how these groups functioned within Athenian society. In the preceding sections I have tried to bring together and to reconcile these accounts where possible and to propose new solutions to scholarly impasses.

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\(^{801}\) 2004, 5, citing Meyer 1937, 608 and 1893, 656.
The model that emerges is that the *telê* were originally, and continued to be in the fifth century, a way to rank citizens along socio-economic lines (based on agricultural quantification). The Athenians used these classifications to determine the distribution of civic prerogatives and obligations among the civic body. It has been usual for scholars to describe the latter chiefly in terms of military service—namely, the duty of heavy infantry service. In one sense, this is no doubt correct. There may well have been a time, in the archaic period, when Athens’ hoplite army would have comprised (virtually) only the top three census classes.\(^{802}\) I view it as unlikely, but not impossible, that *thêtes* continued to eschew (or indeed to be denied) heavy-armed service in the post-Cleisthenic period, but at any rate our evidence demonstrates that this arrangement had changed by the Periclean period. The suggestion that only citizens of zeugite status or above were obligated to fight as hoplites throughout the Peloponnesian War, then, does not seem to fit the evidence. In the next chapter, I shall take up the discussion of military service from 431-404.

It has been less common for scholars to treat the Solonian groups as the basis for progressive taxation.\(^{803}\) Whether or not one is prepared to accept that an assessment for direct taxation (in kind) indeed lies behind the original quantification scheme introduced by Solon,\(^{804}\) it is nevertheless all but certain that membership in these groups determined liability to fifth-century *eisphorai* and *leitourgiai*. These conclusions may seem modest in light of the breadth of evidence and scholarly opinion presented above, but in parsing this material and disentangling

\(^{802}\) Cf. Krentz 2013.

\(^{803}\) Valdés and Gallego 2010, 268; de Ste. Croix 2004, 8; Rhodes *AP*, 140.

\(^{804}\) Van Wees argues that the *eisphora* went back to Solon and this provided the impetus for quantification. He argues, furthermore, that the *telos* quantifications (*timêmata*) remained the fundamental basis of the direct tax under the Peisistratids, and that the tax burden on individuals was not abolished, but reduced under the Cleisthenic reforms, which created the fifth-century *eisphora* (2013b, 83-100).
the duty of military service from the telê and establishing their fiscal role we have laid some important groundwork for the final two chapters in which we examine these two chief civic duties respectively.
Section II, Chapter 7:
For deme and country: military service from 431-404 BC

7.1 Introduction

Thucydides begins his history very simply, stating that he “recorded the war between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians and how they fought against one another” (1.1.1). Unfortunately for the modern historian, much of ‘how they waged war’ (ὅς ἐπολέμησαν) is never explained by Thucydides in the detail we would like. This, of course, is because the methods of military mobilization and the mechanics of battle were taken for granted by his original readership. Despite a keen interest in military decision-making and innovation, Thucydides never pauses (nor does his continuator, Xenophon) to explain the fundamental recruitment procedures and organization of Athenian armed forces.\(^{805}\) In order to get at the question of which Athenians fought in the Peloponnesian War and under what conditions, it is necessary to look outside of our main historiographical source.

The great problem facing historians interested in questions of military participation in the ancient Greek world generally is to precisely delineate the intersections between social, political and military roles. While vigorous debate surrounds the exact nature of the relationship, most scholars accept that there was an “inseparable connection between warfare and politics” in ancient Greece.\(^{806}\) As we saw in the previous chapter, scholars have traditionally assumed a rather crisp division of the Athenian body politic under the timocratic constitution of Solon into wealth classes that simultaneously defined a citizen’s political and military role. Upon careful

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\(^{805}\) Hunt 2006. We can compare the Thucydidean silence on such matters to the lengthy descriptions of the Romans’ systems of recruitment and deployment provided by Polybius (6.19-42), who writes purposefully to explain such phenomena to an unfamiliar audience.

\(^{806}\) Cartledge 2013, 75. Thus, famously, Vidal-Naquet 1986, 85 states that in Athens, as in other Greek cities, “especially in the Classical period, military organization merged with civic organization; it was not as a warrior that the citizen governed the city, but it was as a citizen that the Athenian went to war.”
scrutiny of the available evidence, it seems that while wealth class served to define certain
privileges (e.g., access to the highest offices of state) and obligations (e.g., level of financial
impost), when it comes to the military duty of the politês, socio-economic standing appears to
have determined one’s role only insofar as it was left to individuals to provide their own arms
and bear the costs of campaigning. As has been made clear, these costs were likely much less
onerous than is usually assumed, and Athenians of quite modest means often found themselves
in the ranks of Athens’ armies.

This chapter aims to parse the nature of Athenian military obligation and to outline some
of its consequences for Athenian political society in Peloponnesian-War Athens. Because of the
nature of the available sources, most of what can be said concerns the Athenian heavy-
infantryman. As is well known, Greek sources tend to view hoplite warfare as the ultimate
expression of many virtues and civic obligations. Athenian citizens in the last decades of the
fifth-century could fulfill their military obligation to the city in a number of capacities (Lys.
6.46-49), and, in general Athens, more than other poleis, recognized the contributions of its
non-hoplite warriors, especially nautai (Thuc. 1.143.1; Ar. Ach. 162; Wasps 1095-1102; Lys.
2.34-44; Paus. 1.29.4, 6-7, 13-14), the derisive comments of some influential authors
notwithstanding (e.g., [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 1.2, 2.4-5; Thuc. 6.69.1-2; Pl. Laws 706c).807
Nevertheless, hoplite service was the ideal, and the quality and standing of the city’s phalanx
was a chief communal concern. Despite the general acknowledgement of the importance of the
Athenian fleet to her successful arkhê and the horrendous naval casualties suffered in the late
fifth-century (especially from 413-404), it is striking to read that it was defeats in the hoplite

engagements at Koroneia (447) and Delium (424) that most affected the Athenians’ reputation and their self-confidence (Thuc. 5.14.1, 5.15.2; Xen. Mem. 3.5.4). Conversely, the hoplite victory at Oinophyta can be viewed as the Athenians’ crowing achievement, eclipsing even Marathon and Plataea because here the Athenians defeated in pitched battle “the best of the Greeks” who had a reputation for being second to none at “contending with their foes” and “standing firm amidst the perils of war” (Diod. 11.82). The Athenians’ preoccupation with the figure of the hoplitês and hoplite warfare will be discussed in much greater detail below, but the point here is that such sentiments reveal that even the imperial polis was measured and measured itself according to the quality of its civic militia and how it faired against those of rival cities (cf. [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 2.1).

The importance of the hoplite in the city’s self-expression has implications for how scholars should understand the distinct psychic constitution of the democratic citizen. Being numbered among the hoplitai and performing hoplite service before one’s peers represented not merely an abstracted ideologically charged ideal, but a real achievement to which Athenian citizens of all walks of life aspired. This section will demonstrate how the cultural and ideological civic gravitas attached to the hoplite acted as a spur towards participation in hoplite armies in the Athenian democracy, and how this in turn continually reinforced the dominance of hoplitic norms in Athenian public discourse, even in the face of the rising importance of the navy and naval service. Crucially, it will be shown that these norms encompassed all Athenian citizens, both igniting and fuelling a drive toward heavy-infantry service, a point that has not

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808 Contribution of navy to Athens’ success and security: Thuc. 2.66.7; cf. 1.15, 1.122.1, 3.13.5-6; [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 1.2. For calculations of naval casualties during the Peloponnesian War, see Strauss 1986.
809 Diod. 11.82.3: δόκοστι γὰρ οἱ Βοιωτοὶ κατὰ τὰς τῶν δεινῶν ὑπομονᾶς καὶ τοὺς πολεμικοὺς ἀγῶνας μηδὲνός λείπεσθαι τῶν ἄλλων.
received enough attention from scholars to date. Thus, in this chapter I attempt to reestablish a bridge between the ideal and the lived realities of Athenians; I shall demonstrate the ways in which civic ideals and cultural norms informed the moral psychology of Athenian citizens and manifested themselves in individual decision-making and actual behaviours with respect to military service. Hanson, of course, has done more than anyone to fully articulate the agrarian logic, values and ideology that shaped the practice of hoplite warfare. In this chapter, I seek to build on this and to add new ways of thinking about the hoplite, or at least the Athenian hoplite, as the embodiment of the ideal citizen. To this end, I examine the role played by altruistic and communitarian values in fifth-century Athenian military participation. In particular, I demonstrate that hoplite service was undertaken in the main not as a statutory obligation, as some have recently argued, but on a more or less voluntary basis; such voluntarism, however, was not wholly altruistic in character and could be motivated by egoism and self-interest. I will then show how the performance of military service was invoked in renegotiations of social and political privilege in the last decade of the fifth century.

7.2 Coercion, egoism and altruism in Athenian military mobilization and practice

Military service, especially heavy-armed infantry service, in late archaic and early classical Greece has traditionally been viewed as a quintessentially communal endeavour. The citizen of the polis mobilized for war, motivated by a sense of patriotism and obligation to defend his community. Military service, like other civic obligations, was readily undertaken by the citizen, who conceived of himself not as an autonomous individual, but fundamentally as a

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810 Treatments of the ‘hoplite imaginary’ to date focus on the degree of difference between ideal and real or myth and reality: e.g., van Wees 2004; Pritchard 1999; Hunt 1998.
part of the superordinate polis. This line of thinking can be traced back to the ideal of ancient liberty and citizenship descending from antiquity to Machiavelli and the Renaissance Humanists, Rousseau, Weber, Fustel de Coulanges, and Arendt, and critiqued by moderns such as Hobbes, Constant, and Berlin.

Traditional scholarship likewise holds that the manner in which the Greeks fought—in relatively homogeneous formations of like-armed warriors—reflected the political equality (if not the near socio-economic parity) of the combatants. Just as, in the civic sphere, the individual subordinated himself and his desires to the polis and to the common good, so, in the military arena, the hoplite phalanx embodied the ethic of self-sacrifice for the safety and integrity of the collective. In the estimation of Raaflaub and Wallace, who reflect communis opinio, “phalanx fighting was inherently communitarian, cooperative, and egalitarian.”

Individual jealousies and suspicions were suppressed, trumped by the necessity of communal defense. Traditionally, scholars have seen in the polis the birth of patriotism and of patriotic warfare.

Scholars of the past generation, however, have questioned how closely reality approached this idealizing account. Recent scholarship is skeptical of the dominance of the

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812 So, for example, Murray 1993, 131-136, which is representative of a vein of scholarship that tried to show how the new collective martial ethic of the polis was presented by poets, like Tyrtaeus and Kallinos, in terms familiar from Homeric epic but given new meaning. Areté was now redefined in contradistinction to other Homeric excellences as personal sacrifice on behalf of the community and expressed in the individual’s unflinching resolve to keep his place in his city’s phalanx (Tyrt. 12W).

813 Arendt 1958; Berlin 1962; Fustel de Coulanges 1864, 281-287; Weber 1921, 756; Constant 1806-1810; Rousseau 1762; cf. Veyne 1990; Herman 2006; Liddel 2007. See also, above, 140.


815 S. Mitchell 1996, 100.

816 Vidal-Naquet 1986 [1968], 85; for further bibliography, see above, Introduction 10 n. 11.

817 See above, 151-152.
collectivist ethic posited by previous scholars and has identified in democratic Athens a
cosmopolitan society that valued diversity and personal freedom of choice and action.\(^{819}\) Such
studies are often dubious of the most influential ancient texts, which they regard as normative
and idealizing and have tried to uncover divergent, overlapping and sometimes competing
social identities and ideologies within Athens. Scholarship is presently divided over the
question of whether the democratic polis was animated by a competitive and egoistic or
communitarian and cooperative ethics, and there has been much discussion of the extent to
which the ideal of voluntary civic altruism was practiced in reality.

As a part of this reappraisal of the mentalité of the democratic citizen, the idealized
picture of the willing democratic warrior has been called into question by scholars who have
focused on the practices of ‘bad citizenship,’ of self-interested rational calculation and
individualism in ancient Athens.\(^{820}\) Skeptical of the degree to which cooperative values
governed Athenian behaviour, these scholars have highlighted the coercive power of the state
and its mechanisms of compulsion, such as the hoplite katalogos and the threat of legal
punishment for military misconduct (e.g., ἀστρατεία, ῥημαστία, λιποταξία, δειλία).\(^{821}\)

In what follows, I offer an account of the Athenian warrior’s motivational psychology
that strikes a balance between these two apparently opposed views. I argue that the Athenians
were in no way preternaturally altruistic or communitarian with respect to their performance of
military duty. Nevertheless, I do not see the choice as either one of altruism/egoism or

\(^{819}\) See, e.g.: Thuc. 2.37.2-3, 7.69.2; Pl. Rep. 557c2; Arist. Pol. 1310a29; cf. [Xen.] 1.10, which
complains of Athens’ excessive tolerance for diversity. For a recent review of the question and bibliography,
see: Liddel 2007. For representative scholarship, see: e.g., Herman 2016 and Meier 1990 on communitarian


\(^{821}\) Andoc. 1.74; Lys. 14.5-6; Aeschin. 3.175 provide the fullest lists. Todd 1993, 106-108 identifies
astrateia, deilia and lipotaxia as possible graphai.
communitarianism/individualism. Understanding Athens (and its citizen-militia) not as a face-to-face society per se, but as a superordinate complex of many parochial sub-societies in which competition for distinction was a motive for voluntarism and emulation, I shall demonstrate that these dichotomies are false. Indeed, the ways in which scholars have tended to use words such as ‘obligatory’ and ‘voluntary’ have unhelpfully imported modern presuppositions about military mobilization into ancient Greek history.

Drawing chiefly on Thucydides, Old Comedy and oratory, I will attempt to bridge the gap between the ideal and the real with respect to the problematics of military mobilization and performance. I shall show that what has been missing from this discussion, though it has been conspicuous in discussion of other areas of Greek life, is awareness of the fact that in polis society—where voluntary and supererogatory service was rewarded in a culture of public honours—the pursuit of distinction through communal (and especially military) service was itself a personal good that had to be weighed along with other personal interests, such as self-preservation. I shall also argue that in Peloponnesian-War Athens, conditions of protracted warfare provided increased opportunity for individuals to achieve such distinction, and that the cultural assumptions about military participation that underpinned Athenian hoplite mobilization played a key role in the constitutional debates of the last decade of the war.

822 In an article on the freedom of the citizen, M. Finley focused on “the state and its governmental machinery” while taking for granted the important social pressures that helped to shape citizen behaviour, which were all the more keenly felt by the citizen of the polis “because Greek poleis were small, face-to-face communities” (1981, 93); cf. E. Cohen 2000, 104-129, who argues that Athens was too large and cosmopolitan to be considered a traditional face-to-face society.
823 Gabrielsen 2002b, 85-87.
824 Recognition of supererogatory service to the city was a hallmark of Athenian culture. Every year, before the commencement of the dramatic competitions, the names of individuals who had performed outstanding service to the community were read aloud in the Theatre of Dionysus (Dem. 18.120); cf. Goldhill 1987, 63. On the privileges offered in the Prytaneion to distinguished individuals, see Miller 1978. Of course, Athenian oratory is replete with individuals’ claims to kharis from the community of jurors owed for exemplary service of civic duties; cf. Ober 1989, and below, Ch. 8.
7.2.1 Factors against voluntary service

In a series of publications, Matthew Christ has argued that despite the heavy emphasis in Athenian public discourse on civic voluntarism and altruism as explanations for energetic Athenian mobilization and war-making, most Athenian hoplites were conscripted. The democratic Athenians, he argues, uncomfortable with the idea of centralized coercion of citizens, in actuality practiced mandatory conscription, but maintained an idealizing fiction of voluntary infantry service. This fiction is most present in the most idealizing of Athenian literary works, the *epitaphioi*. Indeed, in the *epitaphioi*, military service is consistently depicted as voluntary and altruistic: men act “not compelled by *nomos* but persuaded by their nature” (Lys. 2.61; Dem. 60.37). Real Athenians were a shrewder lot. In The Bad Citizen, Christ outlines several rational calculations that may have dissuaded citizens from voluntarily undertaking military service.

Most obvious is the wish to avoid hardship and danger. Even apart from running the risk to personal safety (*kinduneuein*), Athenian servicemen had more to complain about than the rations of onions and poor wine on which they lived while on campaign (*Peace* 527-529). The toils (*ponoi*) of soldiering, especially in protracted campaigns, are adumbrated by the disgruntled hoplites of Xenophon’s *Anabasis*:

Packing and unpacking, marching and running, lugging heavy arms, standing in formation, fighting while on guard, fighting in open combat.
Military service was also in some very real ways in conflict with a citizen’s role as the head of his household, and so service to the city was at odds with economic considerations and duties to the oikos. Life and property were both put at risk when a citizen went on campaign (Andoc. 2.18). Death or incapacitation in action might bring hardship to his family, both material and emotional (Lys. 19). Parents might lose support and orphans would receive only subsistence level maintenance from the state until they reached eighteen (Thuc. 2.46.1).

During absences on campaign, a man’s property might decline or his wife might take a lover. The fifth-century dramatists’ predilection for the Orestes myth might well reflect the anxieties of Athenian servicemen over the conduct of their wives during prolonged military absence. In Euripides’ Orestes (produced in 408), for example, Clytemnestra is called a “wicked and godless woman who would prevent men from taking up arms (ὅπλα ἐγείροντα) and leaving their homes to campaign” (στρατεύειν ἐκλαμπόντα δῶματα: 925-927). To this we can add the chilling speech delivered by Euripides’ Elektra (c. 415) over the corpse of Aigisthos. Aigisthos is chastised as a cuckolding seducer, an effeminate playboy who, unlike the true men, never sailed to Troy, staying behind and using his wealth to do what he liked at home (907-951). Reflections in Athenian drama on the tension between domestic and public life created by the absence of the kurios on campaign reveal that this was a topic of considerable concern for fifth-century audiences. Aristophanes’ Thesmophoriazousae offers a glimpse of the anxieties felt by husbands who were taken away from the home for military duty. Men fear the indiscretions of their wives while they are away guarding the Long Walls (493-829 Cox 1998, 155-161. 830 The date of the play is not certain, but such sentiment might well reflect the anxieties of the Athenians surrounding the Sicilian Expedition.)
496). Later on in the same play, the character Euripides threatens to reveal the clandestine offenses (literally the things done hidden in the *oikos*) committed by Athenian wives while their husbands are off on campaign. These passages from late-fifth century drama speak to the anxiety felt by Athenian men at leaving their homes for service abroad. Aristophanes’ *Lysistrata* speaks to the same male suspicions of the wife’s infidelity, but from the vantage of Athenian (and other Greek) wives who are anxious at the (mostly sexual) unavailability of their husbands (cf. *Ach. 1047-1068*).

Thus, private considerations could make military service unattractive and, assuming that ancient Athenians were as calculating and shrewd a lot as any, Christ highlights the hoplite *katalogoi* as the mechanism by which the state compelled enlistment. Such compulsion was necessary when the conventional ideals of communitarianism and martial valour did not prove strong enough enticements in the contest against individual self-interest to achieve general acquiescence among the soldiery.

I am sympathetic to much of this. Athenians, no less than other historical actors, will have made rational choices based on calculations of risk and reward, however much these decisions may also be culturally imbedded. I find two objections, however, to the idea of hoplite

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831 *Thesm.* 1167-1169: ἡν δὲ μὴ πίθησιν μοι, / ἄ νόν ὑποκουρεῖτε τοῖσιν ἀνδρᾶσιν / ἀ πό τῆς στραταίας παράσοιν ὑμῶν διαφαλῶν.

832 See above, Ch. 5, 152. It is important to point out that explanations of ‘culture’ as a determinant for individual behaviour do not necessarily limit individual possibility, agency and decision making; rather it is only that culture shapes individual vision—and decisions necessarily take place within the framework of this vision. On culture as a determinant of individual behaviour in the context of military action, see W. Lee 2011, 2-9. On individual ‘improvisation’ and its effects on cultural norms over time see, Bourdieu 1977, 72-88. Suffice it to say, however, that in societies before the advent of liberalism, actors were more strongly influenced by custom in their decision-making than is true in liberal societies. The Athenian man was a strongly ‘encumbered.’ That is, being born into an Athenian household predicated on the full social and political engagement and implication of its *kuriōs* with wider social and political networks (the neighbourhood, deme, tribe, polis, an Athenian was claimed by certain duties he could not choose to ignore without ceasing to be Athenian in any real sense.
conscript in fifth-century Athens. The first is that, by Christ’s own analysis, the *katalogos qua* conscription roll does not seem to have represented a very strong system of compulsion. The second concerns what I see as the unfair downplaying of positive enticements to voluntarism that are concerned with honour and prestige. Too often in discussions of citizen motivation, in which actors are characterized as rational and shrewd, appeals to honour and its pursuit (*philotimia*) are placed to the side. Hoplite service was undertaken in the democratic city by virtue of a “just calculation” (τὸ δικαίον λογίσμο) that more is to be gained than lost through the self-sacrifice of service.⁸³³

### 7.2.2 Conscription in fifth-century Athens

Military historians identify three main types of military recruitment: volunteer citizen-soldiers or militiamen, motivated to serve by allegiance to their country or region; professional soldiers or mercenaries, motivated by pay; and conscripts, motivated by fear.⁸³⁴ Professional soldiers, both those recruited from within and from outside of the polis (*xenoi, epikouroi, misthótai, mistophoroi*), were common enough in classical Greece.⁸³⁵ The other two typologies are harder to establish for the classical polis. Each of the two poleis for which there is sufficient evidence to determine any particulars surrounding military mobilization, Athens and Sparta, appear to have featured elements that characterize both militia and conscript armies.

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⁸³³ [Dem.] 60.32.
⁸³⁴ Neiberg 2001, 4. It is worth noting at the outset here, however, how traditional distinctions of the twentieth century, such as those between volunteer and conscript, amateur and professional soldiers, have become blunted in the present. For example, consider that the United States of America is currently home to the world’s largest all-volunteer, professional army (http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs RB9195.html). Consider likewise that until 2011, all German nationals were subject to national conscription (*Wehrpflicht*), with the option to opt out and to perform voluntary *Wehlersatzdienst* or *Zivildienst* (http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-world-from-berlin-end-of-an-era-as-germany-suspends-conscription-a-737668.html).
⁸³⁵ Van Wees 2004, 40-42, 71-76; Trundle 2004, addresses the complexity involved in determining the appearance in our sources of true mercenaries, who served for a wage (*misthos*), and other types of professional or expert troops.
It is a truism that the Spartans mobilized for war and conducted themselves in the field according to their laws (e.g., Hdt. 7.104.4-5; Thuc. 2.39.4; Xen. *Lac. Pol.* 9-12). Clearly, though, to say that Spartan warriors were not motivated by patriotic sentiment would be absurd (Tyrt. 10W, 15-32; 11W; 12W, 10-44). Scholars generally have assumed that the Athenian, not to say the classical Greek, style of recruitment represented a pure militia comprising non-professional citizen-soldiers. Indeed, for many historians, the Athenian system is the paradigm to which all subsequent citizen-militias are compared. Christ has been rightly skeptical of this view, arguing that patriotic voluntarism was a cherished ideal of the democratic polis, but that hoplite recruitment in democratic Athens, at any rate, did feature an element of coercion.

We are not well supplied with information about how the hoplite rolls worked in Athens. Christ himself has done much of the best work on this subject dating back to 2001. Crucially, he has shown that there did not exist in Athens a central register—a single *katalogos*—of hoplites liable for enlistment. Rather, when our sources speak of hoplites levied “ek *katalogou,*” they are referencing a fairly messy system whereby the *stratêgoi* were given broad powers of selection to make lists of hoplites whom they wished to call up for specific campaigns (Thuc. 6.26.1-2; Lys. 9; [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 26.1; Arist. *Pol.* 1303a8-10). These *katalogoi,* which consisted of individuals’ names inscribed with charcoal on white-washed wooden boards (*πνακία*), were then displayed prominently before the statues of the *Eponymoi* in the Agora, one for each of the ten tribes (Ar. *Peace* 1183-1184, *Birds* 450).

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837 In this, Christ follows earlier work by Hansen 1985; Hornblower 1991, 256; and Hamel 1998, 24 against the older belief in a central register espoused by A. Jones 1957, 163; *HCT IV*, 264; Vidal-Naquet 1986, 88-89; and recently by Burkhardt 1999 and 1996, 21 n. 31.
839 Camp 1992, 97-100.
These lists, of course, were necessarily based on some more stable repository of data. It is not as if hoplites simply sprung fully armed from the generals’ heads. Most scholars agree that the lists were somehow based upon the registration of citizens in the ληξιαρχικά γραμματεῖα (or deme registers) maintained locally by the various demarchs, though the specifics are beyond the state of our evidence. These records could be consulted by taxiarcs (or tribal commanders) who then assisted the stratêgoi in compiling their katalogoi. Individual hoplites then either noticed their names on their tribal katalogos (as famously in Aristophanes’ Peace) or else would hear word that they had been placed on the list.

If a citizen found himself on a list and did not wish to serve, he could petition the general on various grounds for exemption, such as illness or other physical incapacity (Plut. Phoc. 10.2), holding political office (Ar. Ach. 598-609; Lyk. 1.37), or performing a liturgy (e.g., Dem. 21.15, 103 and 39.16). Exemptions were refused or granted on a discretionary basis by the generals. If an exemption was sought but not granted, or if a citizen did not think he had plausible enough grounds for exemption, he might decide simply to absent himself from muster. A formal charge for such negligence, the graphê astrateias, is in evidence from the early fourth century, but a

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840 Liddel 2007, 184-185, 283; Christ 2001, 401. An inscription dated to the 440s outlines the variable tithes payable to the cult of Apollo by those registered by the demarkhoi in the lexiarkhikon grammateion as hippeis and toxotai (IG I 138). The restoration of “hoplitai” in the second line has been accepted by most scholars. See further: Whitehead 1986, 135; Hansen 1985, 85. Cf. Prichard 2010, 26, who argues definitively for the use of deme registers in producing katalogoi, inferring from Lys. 16.14, where Manitheos claims to have marshaled with his fellow-hoplites in his deme and to have proposed that the more well off of them contribute to the provisions of those willing to serve, but lacking means. Risky though it may be to apply late evidence for naval katalogoi to the present context, the process described by Demosthenes to meet a naval recruiting crisis in 362 can perhaps shed some light on the relationship between the deme registries and the fifth-century hoplite katalogoi. The orator reminds his audience that faced with such a crisis, “the Assembly voted that the bouleutai and the demarkhoi should draw up katalogoi of the demesmen” ([Dem.] 50.6).
survey of Athenian oratory suggests that its use was exceptional.\footnote{The term astrateia is flexible and can very loosely be applied to a number of different situations: simply to the absence of pressing military duty (Ar. Peace 526; Lys. 9.15); to considered and lawful exemption (Dem. 39.16); to shameful, malevolent dereliction of duty (Ar. Knights 443, Wasps 1117; Lys. 14.7; 15.1, 4; cf. Pl. Laws 878d, 943a-c; Aeschin. 1.29; 3.148, 176; Dem. 21.58; 24.58, 102, 103, 105, 107, 119; 59.27).} Scholars who want to make the strongest possible case for conscription are able to marshal only four known cases of prosecution for dereliction, several of which are dubious (Christ 2004, 41).\footnote{Only Lys. 14 and 15, two related speeches over the same circumstances, concern astrateia, although this charge is often conflated with others. It is suggestive, however, that the prosecutor attempts to cast Alcibiades’ astrateia as lipotaxia—he evidently does not have a very strong case; [Dem.] 59.27 (Stephanus v. Xenoeleides) identified as astrateia is allegedly a case of lipotaxia; Demosthenes also alludes to a case of lipotaxia brought against Sannion and Aristides—who had been serving as khorêgoi and so should have been formally exempt from service (Dem. 21.58-60)—and mentions a case for lipotaxia brought against himself that was dropped before going to trial (Dem. 21.103).} Internal evidence from the one unambiguously attested case brought for astrateia (against the younger Alcibiades in 395) suggests that this was the first such charge heard by Athenian jurors in at least a decade (14.4). In contrast, references to dereliction of military duty abound. Comedy and oratory are replete with references to ἀστρατεία, λιποταξία, ἄταξία, ἀκοσμία, ῥησιστία, and δελία.\footnote{Public charges for abandoning one’s taxis, for cowardice, and for throwing away one’s shield are attested (Andoc. 1.74; cf. Aeschin. 3.175), but significantly there is no known instance of prosecution in the surviving evidence for any of these offenses apart from ῥησιστία; see below, 269. Moreover it is highly suggestive of the limited extent of formal prosecution to discover that Athens’ most notorious shield-tosser, Kleonymos had not suffered atimia as a result of conviction for the offense despite being a favourite victim of Aristophanes, pilloried for his battlefield cowardice in every extant play between 424-414. In 415, Kleonymos was still active in high-level Athenian politics (Andoc. 1.27). See Storey 1989, 255-256.} I will return to this point below. But what I wish to make clear here is the very limited extent of formal prosecution for avoidance of military service. Prosecution depended on the private initiative of a willing prosecutor (ὁ βουλόμενος).\footnote{Lys. 14.15 (cf. Plato, Laws 878d) suggests that graphei astrateias were tried before juries comprising hoplites from the campaign in question and presided over by the generals, but, crucially, there is no evidence that a general could himself bring a suit. In fact, this seems likely to have been prohibited given the conflict of interest (Christ 2006, 120-121). For the absence of any kind of public prosecutor in democratic Athens, even admitting the existence in the fourth century of synégories, see Todd 1993, 92; MacDowell 1978, 53-54. The Athenian case can be contrasted to Sparta, where the investigation of allegations of dereliction of service and cowardice was apparently systematic: Plut. Ages. 30.2; cf. Xen. Lac. Pol. 9.4-5; Hdt. 7.231-232.} Moreover, prospective prosecutors had to...
overcome considerable disincentives to launching such a suit. A fine of a thousand drachmae and partial atimia was imposed on anyone who failed to win a fifth of the votes at trial.\textsuperscript{845} It was not entirely baseless, then, when a prosecutor claimed the city’s gratitude simply for bringing a suit to prosecute transgressors of the law (e.g., Lyk. 1.3). Athens’ adversarial system of law and its complete reliance on volunteer prosecution meant that many legal suits, and especially most graphai, were launched more as a result of personal competitive rivalries and enmities between the prosecutor and the defendant than out of a general concern for the public good.\textsuperscript{846} In general, given the high stakes involved in bringing legal suits to the popular courts in Athens, there seems to have been “systematic under-enforcement” of many statutory laws with only sporadic prosecution.\textsuperscript{847} This would have been especially true in the case of non-elite Athenians, who were less likely to find themselves engaged in public trials.\textsuperscript{848} There was, therefore, in democratic Athens, very weak negative reinforcement of the hoplite draft.\textsuperscript{849}

To take stock, then, the system of mandatory conscription imagined for Athens is one characterized by: dispersed, regional and parochial registration; but centralized selection of troops based on that dispersed registration, and in the event that enforcement was required, this once again operated through decentralised mechanisms, namely, the private initiative of individuals who might have something to gain by bringing a personal rival to court in what

\textsuperscript{846} On the important role of enmity in the Athenian legal system, see Alwine 2015.  
\textsuperscript{847} Lanni 2009, 28.  
\textsuperscript{848} Ober 1989, 112-118.  
\textsuperscript{849} Prosecutions for shield tossing (ῥίω αὐτῇ ἀσπίδα or ἀποβεβληκέναι αὐτῇ ἀσπίδα) are rather better attested than those for astrateia (Lys. 10.1, 12, 21-22; Aeschin. 1.29-30), but special penalties surrounding these charges for convicted slanderers (τις ἐξη/τίς φάσκη) probably likewise acted as a drag on the launching of suits (Lys. 10.9-12, 23).
amounted to a high-stakes *agón*. It was, then, a rather complicated, haphazard, and inefficient means of mass mobilization that, as Christ allows, created considerable scope for draft evasion.

Yet given the coercive deficiency of the *katalogos* system, I do not think it is quibbling to ask: how is this a system of conscription at all, which, on any usual definition of that term, should imply forced compliance, such as the use of impressment, and/or substantial risk of punishment for the draft evader? In fact, as I shall demonstrate below, Athenian hoplites of the Peloponnesian War-era were only conscripted in the most literal sense of that term: that is, men had their names listed together on public media. Beyond this literal sense, the use of the term “conscription” to describe the hoplite draft in fifth-century Athens is misleading.

A comparison with historically analogous states demonstrates that coercive recruitment—at least as Christ understands it—does not seem to describe the situation in fifth-century Athens. Such recruitment typically entails impressment or enslavement, or else mandatory national service laws. In the closest historical *comparandum*, the Roman Republic, citizens subject to the annual *dilectus* faced severe summary punishments for evading the draft; these punishments ranged from disenfranchisement or confiscation of property to being sold into slavery (e.g., Val. Max. 6.3.4). The historical record is replete with anecdotes describing the attempts at intervention by the people’s tribunes to relieve common citizens from magisterial exploitation (e.g., Livy 24.56.9-13; *Per.* 48, 55; DH 8.87.3-5). Magistrates of the republican city appear to have been both able and zealous to bring the full authority of the state to bear in order to man their legions in a way that Athenian officials could not.\(^{851}\)

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\(^{850}\) Nicolet 1988, 96-102.

\(^{851}\) In this light we might also note the language of Herodotus used describe troop levies under the Persian monarchy. Xerxes is said to ‘take for himself’ (καταλαμβάνει: 7.38.2) men from his domain just as a force of nature or calamity might seize upon men unexpectedly (8.21.1, 8.109.5, 9.56.1, 9.75, 9.60.3,
The motivations behind hoplite service in the democratic polis are not sufficiently understood. This uncertainty lies behind Crowley’s recent monograph entitled *The Psychology of the Athenian Hoplite*.\(^{852}\) Crowley’s work, however, drawing on modern military theory, has focused on combat psychology and finds the hoplite’s forbearance in battle to have been motivated by personal obligations and primary-group loyalties.\(^{853}\) Crowley is content to believe in the efficacy of the coercive draft (*katalogos*) for mobilization, despite the limitations of the state in enforcing adherence to the draft in the absence of public constabulary or a state-sponsored prosecution and the apparent ease with which unenthusiastic conscripts could avoid service as documented by Christ.\(^{854}\) Another influential contributor to the study of ancient Greek warrior psychology, Runciman, for his part, is likewise willing to assume that the compulsion of the state via the *katalogos* and potential legal sanctions against those who shirked service were largely responsible for getting men to the battlefield.\(^{855}\) I think that the problematics of military mobilization in Athens needs to be approached the other way around. In what follows, I will argue that the behaviour of Athenian hoplites corresponded more to what social anthropologists refer to as ‘evoked’ and ‘acquired’ behaviour than ‘imposed’ behaviour—that which is governed by rules, created and enforced by political institutions (the hoplite *katalogos* or the Roman *dilectus vel sim.*).

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\(^{852}\) Crowley 2012.

\(^{853}\) The application of such theory to the ancient battlefield has drawn criticism, as have the methodologies underpinning the psychological studies that produced ‘small group’ theory. See, also, Wessely 2006.

\(^{854}\) 2012, 27-34. Crowley recognizes the decentralized nature of the *katalogos* process, rejecting the traditional assumption of a central roster of hoplites (see above, n. 838), but nevertheless fails to reconcile the notion of the coercive draft with Christ’s observations on the scope of potential draft-evasion.

\(^{855}\) Runciman 1998, 737.
By contrast, ‘evoked’ and ‘acquired’ behaviours are those conditioned by immediate local environment and those consciously in emulation of a phenotype (a parent, elder, or peer).\textsuperscript{856}

7.3 Political hoplites: egoism and altruism in heavy-infantry service

If we think that the Athenians were not preternaturally altruistic or communitarian and that they made decisions as rational actors based on personal risk and reward, as all people do to some extent at least, we must ask why Athenian hoplites consistently volunteered their services as they evidently did—taking as evidence not just the ideologically charged epitaphioi, but deducing the fact from the lack of effective coercion. Besides the occasional hint of an inequitable burden of service, which is not the same thing,\textsuperscript{857} I cannot think of a single instance of hoplite-recruiting difficulties in Peloponnesian-War Athens.\textsuperscript{858} In fact, Thucydides’ narrative consistently corroborates the claims made in the Funeral Oration (2.39) that the democracy was exceptional among Greek cities (but especially Sparta) in that it could inspire widespread and regular non-coercive social cooperation.\textsuperscript{859}

In order to address this, I want to turn to the role of honour in military participation. The Athenian funeral oration aimed both to eulogize the war dead and to spur the living to action through epideixis of the exploits of both the recently dead and their ancestors and the honours

\textsuperscript{856} Runciman 1998, 736-737.
\textsuperscript{857} Ar. Ach. 595-597, Peace 1187; Lys. 9; [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 26.1; Arist. Pol. 1303a8-10.
\textsuperscript{858} Cf. Christ 2006, 64: “While draft evasion never constituted a crisis in Athens as far as we can tell . . . it presented the city with a serious and persistent challenge.”
\textsuperscript{859} Ober 2010b, 67. Scholars have been impressed by that the degree of mobilization in Rome from 218-202 (Patterson 1993, 93-94; Hopkins 1978, 33; Brunt 1971, 67, 512). The Romans, using a means of census-based conscription, the dilectus, reached military participation levels comparable to those of European countries during WWI. On the dilectus, see: Polyb. 6.19.5-20.4; Livy 25.5.8, 36.3.13; Plut. C. Gracc. 5. In broad strokes, based on casualty figures from the Peloponnesian War, which, as a percentage of population, are as high as those suffered by the Allies in WWII, we should reckon with an extraordinarily high military participation rate in Peloponnesian-War Athens. For casualty figures, see Appendix 1.
consequently bestowed on them.\textsuperscript{860} The orations performed frequently (perhaps annually) and before mass audiences formed part of the education or instruction (\textit{paideusis}) of citizens. In his \textit{epitaphios}, Lysias explicitly states that it is the purpose of his speech to inculcate the living with reverence for the deeds of the dead.\textsuperscript{861} Indeed, later in the same speech, Lysias reveals this \textit{paideusis} in action when he claims that those who fought for the democracy at Piraeus “mimicked (\textit{mimêstaten}) in new dangers, the ancient virtue of their ancestors” (2.61).\textsuperscript{862}

Demosthenes’ funeral speech best illustrates the use of the occasion of the \textit{epitaphios nomos} to exhort (\textit{parakaleî}) the Athenians to military virtue.\textsuperscript{863} The verb \textit{parakaleô} is used nine times in this short speech (which is half the length of Lysias 2 or the Periclean oration). The same sentiment, however, is present in Pericles’ plea to the Athenians attending his funeral oration to “emulate [the dead soldiers], having judged happiness freedom and freedom courage, and not to stand aside from the dangers of war” (2.43.4).\textsuperscript{864} The exhortatory force of the funeral oration, with its focus on the exploits of past generations, is abundantly clear from Xenophon’s spontaneous use of epitaphic material to inspire the Ten Thousand to fight on after the death of Cyrus and the treachery of Tissaphernes (\textit{Anab}. 3.2.10-14). It would appear that Athenians

\textsuperscript{860} Dem. 60.27.

\textsuperscript{861} Lys. 2.3: . . . ἄξιον γὰρ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις κάκεινων μεμνήσθαι, ὑμνοῦντας μὲν ἐν ταῖς ὁδαῖς, λέγοντας δ’ ἐν ταῖς τῶν ἀγαθῶν γνώμαις, τιμῶντας τοῖς καυροῖς τοῖς τοιούτοις, παϊδεύοντας δ’ ἐν τοῖς τῶν τεθνεότων ἐργοῖς τοῖς ζῶντας.

\textsuperscript{862} Cf. Dem. 13.26, where the \textit{tropēa} erected by the Athenians’ ancestors are meant to inspire the imitation of \textit{aretē} in future generations.

\textsuperscript{863} For this sense of \textit{parakaleô}, see: Thuc. 8.92.11; cf. Aeschin. 1.117: παράκλησις τῶν πολιτῶν πρὸς ἄρεττην.

\textsuperscript{864} Thuc. 2.43.4: ὃς νῦν ὑμεῖς ζηλώσαντες καὶ τὸ ἐνδείμων τὸ ἐλεύθερον, τὸ δ’ ἐλεύθερον τὸ εὕψυχον κρίναντες μὴ περιορᾶσθε τοὺς πολεμικοὺς κινδύνους.
accustomed to hearing such speeches had internalized the memes of epitaphic remembrance and the *mores* that these conveyed.865

Most Athenians would have had heard such speeches praising the valour of Athenian servicemen on several occasions throughout their lives. Just as the epitaphios logos helped to promote military participation, so, too, did monuments to the war-dead in fifth-century Athens by inducing shame and fostering rivalry in onlookers. Scores of austere casualty lists published throughout the public spaces in Athens made the monumental city-centre a kind of permanent exhibition of the military service that had won Athens its *arkhê* and made the city the jewel of Greece. The many thousands of names of generations of Athenians who had fallen fighting for the city silently exhorted onlookers to action and shamed those who might shirk their duty. Martial epigrams that sometimes accompanied these lists or else adorned other public monuments also exhorted onlookers to emulate the toil and bravery of dead Athenian warriors. One such epigram, evidently inscribed on one of three Hermae in the Agora to commemorate the Battle of Marathon, read explicitly, “Whoever, in time to come, reads these things, will be willing to exhaust himself for the sake the commonwealth.”866 The force of these commemoratory inscriptions on the civic and military psychology of the Athenians is evident from references in Attic oratory. In the 330s, Lykourgos brought a charge against Leokrates for removing his family and household to Rhodes in the aftermath of the Battle of Khaironeia (338) rather than helping to defend his city; this was in direct contravention of a psêphisma passed shortly after the battle, which forbade Athenians to leave the city (1.16-17, 41). Even if he

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865 Cf. Xen. *Mem.* 3.5.9-13, where Socrates counsels the younger Pericles as general to recall the past exploits of the Athenians in order to inspire his compatriots. His advice for the *epainos* of the Athenians of old contains the stock elements of the epitaphios. Cf. *Mem.* 3.5.3.

ignored the will of the demos, Lykourgos says, Leokrates should nevertheless have been
shamed into defending Athens by “the elegies inscribed on the memorials” (tà ἑλεγγεῖα tà
ἐπιγραμμένα τοῖς μνημείοις: 1.142). Finally, dedicated weapons would have provided almost
daily silent exhortation. And sons of hoplites especially would experience a powerful
inculcating effect, viewing their fathers’ arms proudly displayed at the family hearth. 867

In the scholarship of the past generation, it was still common to find either the assumption
or the assertion of the Athenian citizens’ willingness to take up arms. Thus Hanson: “There
were no conscientious objectors in the Greek city-state.” 868 It has, nevertheless, become
unfashionable to speak of the classical Athenians’ obsession with honour and rivalry.
Motivations based on rational economic calculus have pushed philotimia to the side. For that
matter, rivalry and strife, typically invoked in discussions of elite competition and desire for
military distinction through the stratêgia and the trierarchy, have never played a large enough
role in discussions of military mobilization generally. For his part, Christ argues that the notion
of honour governing the performance of military duty “underestimates the pull of self-interest
on individuals.” 869 Christ, furthermore, considers “the assumption that considerations of honor
would dictate compliance” to be “a major obstacle to appreciating the reluctance of some
conscripts to serve.” 870

This, I think, is to miss the point of what it meant to act honourably in democratic Athens.
Part of the reason why scholars have become skeptical of the primacy of honour in motivating
civic action is the tendency of past generations of historians to view what is honourable as that

867 Jackson 1991, 233-236. Hearth: e.g., Ar. Ach. 279; Hdt. 1.34.3. Temples: e.g., Eur. Andr. 1117-
1124; Plut. Cim. 5.3.
869 2004, 36.
870 2006, 51.
which is straightforwardly self-effacing and communitarian. This brings us back to the myth of
the uniquely patriotic Greek hoplite. A good example of this is Murray’s account of the
development of the ‘new cooperative ethic’ of the polis, which he distinguishes from the
competitive ethic of the world of epic.\footnote{1993, 131-136.} No less an authority than Finley, too, observed “the
replacement of the almost pure egoism of heroic honour by civic pride.”\footnote{1964, 133.}

This dichotomy is reductive. In the Hellenic context, honour holds primacy precisely
because it is social currency (\textit{timē}).\footnote{For a classic statement of the spirit of agonism that still animated the Greeks in the fifth century,
see Hdt. 8.26.} Even in the democratic polis, egoistic competitiveness
(\textit{āμιλλα} or \textit{άγονία}) is not the antithesis of communitarianism. Egoism is always held in some
tension with communitarianism in terms of the interests served, but they are not inherently
contradictory.\footnote{See, e.g., Corner 2010 on the dynamics of competition within the citizen symposion.} In the democratic polis, it is competition among citizens, paradoxically, that
upholds and protects the deep ideological commitments to individual liberty, self-determination
and autarky. It is emulative rivalry (\textit{zélos}) and agonism towards one’s fellows that ensures
participation in Athenian institutions and the fulfillment of the functions of the state in the
decentralized polis.\footnote{On the ‘action tendency’ of emulative envy (\textit{zélos}) in the Greek world, see Sanders 2014, 18-20.} Competition does serve individualistic ends and can indeed be
destructive of communal goods and interests if unchecked. But the polis socializes competition.
That is, the competition that takes place among \textit{politai} is normally in the performance of civic
duty and serves to benefit the community as a whole (Hdt. 5.77-79). I would suggest that this is
as true of the agonism among common hoplites as it is among rich liturgists. The pursuit of

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{871} 1993, 131-136.\textsuperscript{872} 1964, 133.\textsuperscript{873} For a classic statement of the spirit of agonism that still animated the Greeks in the fifth century,
see Hdt. 8.26.\textsuperscript{874} See, e.g., Corner 2010 on the dynamics of competition within the citizen symposion.\textsuperscript{875} On the ‘action tendency’ of emulative envy (\textit{zélos}) in the Greek world, see Sanders 2014, 18-20.}
distinction through communal (and especially military) service was itself a personal good that had to be weighed along with other personal interests, such as self-preservation.\textsuperscript{876}

7.3.1 The hoplite agôn

Hoplite service was uniquely placed of all the options for military service in Athens to facilitate the cultivation of a reputation for martial service and excellence. First, the disposition of troops along tribal lines meant that the phalanx comprised men who knew one another; secondly, the peculiar nature of hoplite combat leant itself to agonism. That Athenian hoplites marshaled and fought in tribal contingents (or \textit{taxeis}) that were ultimately based on deme affiliation is well documented.\textsuperscript{877} Athenian hoplite mobilization and tactical deployment thus mirrored Athens’ civic organization.\textsuperscript{878} The heavy-infantry is the only military wing that we can say with certainty was organized in this way in the fifth century.\textsuperscript{879} Hanson’s hypothesis is that this contributed to a sense of community and obligation to fight on behalf of one’s peers—he

\textsuperscript{876} It is surprising that two recent monographs that focus on the agonal elements of hoplite warfare do not address the details of mobilization at all (Dayton 2006; Lendon 2005).

\textsuperscript{877} Athenian hoplites drafted and mustered by tribe: \textit{Ar. Peace} 1181-1184, \textit{Birds} 450; Christ 2001, 398-409. Deployed in tribal divisions: Thuc. 6.98.4 (where \textit{phylê} appears synonymously with \textit{taxis}: the scholiast to this passage notes, “\textit{έν τάγμα ἀπὸ φυλής μιᾶς}”); Thuc. 6.101.5 (where the first \textit{phylê} to comprise the Athenian right wing, i.e., the \textit{taxis} stationed on the extreme right and therefore most vulnerable, is thrown into a panic by the Syracusan horse); Thuc. 8.92.4; Lys. 16.15; Plut. \textit{Arist.} 5.3-5, \textit{Cim.} 17.3-5. Commanded in the field by \textit{stratêgoi} elected from \textit{phyletai}: [Arist.] \textit{Ath. Pol.} 22.2, 61.1; cf. [Xen.] \textit{Ath. Pol.} 1.3. Note, however, the debate on whether election by tribe was practiced in Periclean Athens: Hamel 1998, 85-87; Hansen 1988, 69-70. Commemorated by tribal affiliation: Thuc. 2.34.2-4. For the formulaic listing of war casualties by tribe on Athenian casualty lists, see Bradeen 1969, 1967, and 1964. For further evidence on tribal organization, see Hanson 1989, 121-124.

\textsuperscript{878} R. Osborne 2010a, 246; for the tribal basis of hoplite service, we need only consider the monuments for the Athenian war dead, which listed casualties according to tribe. For widespread participation in civic contexts by tribe as well as the ongoing debate concerning the degree of popular participation in such events, see: Pritchard 2013, 34-83, 2009, and 2004; Fisher 2011. My own view aligns with that of Fisher, who argues for mass participation, extending well beyond the elite socio-economic classes. For deme-registration as the basis for citizenship, see Osborne 1985, 64-91; Whitehead 1986a, 97-108.

\textsuperscript{879} The cavalry corps, too, may well have been, but the best evidence for this comes from \textit{Ath. Pol.} 61.4-6. \textit{Epibatai}, normally armed with the usual hoplite panoply (Thuc. 3.95.2, 3.91.1-4, 3.98.4) may not have been recruited according to tribe (Pritchard 2000, 112-115, however, see IG I\textsuperscript{1} 60, 9-11). Nevertheless, the nature of naval warfare, with its extended campaigns, meant that the few \textit{epibatai} assigned to a trireme would have time to become familiar.
locates in the hoplite phalanx the origins of regimental *élan*. But Greeks being Greeks, we should also expect that such familiarity fostered rivalry and competition within the ranks. As Herodotus observed of his fellow-Greeks through the imagined vantage of the Persians:

“Indeed, it is thoroughly Greek to envy success and hate superior strength” (7.236.1).

Leveraging the competitive energies inherent among well-acquainted Greek men is precisely the rationale behind Nestor’s advice to Agamemnon to marshal the Greeks at Troy according to *phrētrē* and *phylon*:

so that you may know who among your leaders and your soldiery is a good or bad man: for they will fight amongst themselves.

In the case of classical Athens, the subdivisions of the army, which as a whole was an instantiation of the large, impersonal, superordinate polis in arms, gave common hoplites an arena in which to compete under the gaze of their fellows in the closer sub-associations of the city.

1989, 25-31, 119-121. Other studies (e.g., Crowley 2012; Tritle 2000; Shay 1994) have likewise stressed the strong personal bonds formed in military small groups. Crowley especially argues that the sense of duty to one’s comrades was the prime motivator for Athenian hoplites to fight bravely in the phalanx and to overcome a natural and rational impulse to flee danger. In building his case, Crowley relies heavily on theories of military psychology underpinned by the extensive study of US veterans from the Pacific theatre in WWII undertaken by Marshall (1947). For criticism of the universal application of Marshall’s findings and methods to other historical societies, see: Wessely 2006; Spiller 1988. As I discuss below, I accept socio-psychological factors as the impetus behind hoplite mobilization and soldiers’ willingness to fight, but, in my opinion, self-effacing duty to the polis or to one’s comrades is not a sufficient explanation for hoplite behaviour in classical Athens.

In Hellenic culture, competition and rivalry permeated everyday life and any occasion for performance was construed as an opportunity to demonstrate excellence over one’s peers (see Dover 1974, 231-233).

Cf. 8.26. The natural mistrust and rivalry among citizens, bred of closeness and equality, is given comment by Xerxes’ advisors in Herodotus 7.237. *Politai* cannot stand to see their follows do well, but are perfectly happy to assist *xenoi* in prospering. See also Thuc. 2.37.2 for the natural—and, the sense is, unavoidable—suspicion (ινωψίαν) that arises among Athenians.

For competition among demesmen at the local level, see: Liddel 2007, 250-253; Whitehead 1986, 150-152. On the structure and organizational logic of the sub-associations of the city mimicking those of the polis, see Osborne 2010, 47-8. Athens, even the Athenian *asty*, was too populous a place to be considered a face-to-face society. Testimony from Thucydides makes this very clear: during the tense initial
Thucydides offers explicit testimony of the force of competitive energies within hoplite ranks in his famous description of the preparations for Sicily (Thuc. 6.31.3-4): the hoplites compete (ἀμμυλλάομαι) with one another in the quality of their arms and strife ( зрες) arises among them as to where each of them will be stationed.\textsuperscript{885} Competition between members of a community, here, crucially is constructive in respect of communal ends. The competition among hoplites makes the army better.\textsuperscript{886} Military leaders were well aware of the positive effects that could be achieved through competition and emulation, as many passages of Xenophon’s corpus reveal. For example, we find Socrates counseling a young man, who would be general, to station the city’s most honour-conscious men in the front ranks of the phalanx (\textit{Mem.} 3.1.10: φιλοτιμοτάτους προτακτέων). In his treatise \textit{On Cavalry Command}, Xenophon suggests that in order to raise the most effective and impressive citizen cavalry force, the commander should augment his citizen-troops with a portion of foreign horsemen (ιππέας ξένους) in the belief that “these men being added would demonstrably increase the rivalry of the whole force with respect to the display of manly bravery (9.3).”\textsuperscript{887} Xenophon also records that, in the forces of Agesilaos mustered at Ephesus for his Asian campaign, prizes (ἄθλος) were

weeks under the oligarchy in 411, potential democratic resistance fell victim to the Athenians’ unfamiliarity with one another. Owing to the city’s great size, democrats were ignorant of one another’s intentions and suspicious of one another and so remained silently acquiescent, even as the oligarchs openly went back on their promises to expand the civic body (Thuc. 8.66).

\textsuperscript{885} Cf. Dem. 60.22: the Athenian army that fought at Chaeronea is described as “φιλοτιμος” and is said to “inspire rivalry” (it is ἐφάμιλλον).

\textsuperscript{886} The unprecedented scope and grandeur of the Sicilian campaign doubtless added to the competitive spirit of the troops involved. Thucydides uses a very distinctive word to describe the competitiveness of Athenian troops in the Battle of Syracuse: ἄγχονσιμος (7.70.3), which is \textit{hapax} (Hornblower \textit{CT} III, 696). He points to the contest in ingenuity (ἀντιτεχύς) among the helmsmen of the ships as they contended against their enemy counterparts. In the same section, however, when Thucydides describes the contribution of the epibatai, he says, “they took pains that, whenever a ship struck ship, what was done on deck should not fall short of skills elsewhere. Everyone was striving to show himself foremost in the position to which he had been assigned.”

\textsuperscript{887} 9.3: δοκοῦσα γὰρ ὁμοίοις προσπέχοντες καὶ εὐπεισιτότερον ἔν πᾶν τὸ ἰσπικὸν ποιήσαι καὶ φιλοτιμότερον πρὸς ἄλληλος περὶ ἁνήμαθες.
given out to the entire cavalry *taxis*, which was deemed to ride the best, and to the hoplite division which displayed the best physical fitness, “and to those of the peltasts and archers displaying the greatest efficiency in their particular duties” (Ages. 1.25). The effect of this was, according to Xenophon, to turn the entire city into a kind of gymnasium with the mass of soldiery vying with one another for eminence (1.26). As a general himself, Xenophon appointed as captains (λοχαγοί) and lieutenants (ὑπολόχαγοι) men “who for a long time had contended with one another over their manliness” (*Anab.* 5.2.11: οἱ πάντα τῶν χρόνων ἄλληλοις περὶ ἀνδραγαθίας ἀντεποιοῦντο). Finally, in order to inspire voluntary service for a risky action against the particularly ferocious Kardoukhians in 401, Xenophon and his fellow generals challenged the troops: “is there anyone who wishes to prove himself a brave man and undertake the expedition as a volunteer?” When several hoplites came forward, others too “claimed to be willing to go, since they were rivals in competition with these” (*Anab.* 4.1.26-27: ἀντιστασιάζον δὲ αὐτοῖς ... οὕτως ἥρη ἐθέλειν πορεύεσθαι). 888

Xenophon, furthermore, explicitly links the competitive energies of the Athenians to their conduct in the realm of civic and military service. In his estimation:

The Athenians are more honour-conscious (φιλοτιμώτατοι) and more high-minded (φιλοφρονέστατοι) than all others; and these qualities are among the strongest incentives (παροξύνει) to undertake risks for the sake of glory and patriotism (κινδυνεύειν ὑπὲρ εὐδοξίας τε καὶ πατρίδος). 889

Of course these are favourable claims about Athenian character made by an Athenian, perhaps suspiciously in the mode of the idealizing *epitaphioi*, but there is no reason to suppose that

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888 Cf. Plut. *Arist.* 14.2-3: At Platea, Aristeides is said to have asked for volunteers to undertake the dangerous task of relieving the beleaguered Megarians.

889 *Mem.* 3.5.3. Xenophon’s Socrates also mentions the unusual keenness for honour among the Athenians in his advice to a young cavalry commander. Athenians, he says, win so often in contests involving men from various cities not because they excel other men in strength or stature or skill, but rather because they surpass them in their love of honour (*Mem.* 3.3.13).
Xenophon went out of his way to put the city in a positive light or to offer blandishments to Athenian readers. The *Memorabilia*, from which this passage comes, was probably composed, along with the encomiastic *Lacedaemonian Politeia*, sometime during or after Xenophon’s exile from Athens. In the work of an even stauncher critic of Athens’ democracy, we find the observation, again in the mouth of Socrates, that what matters to the Athenian in the street is acquisition of property and the cultivation of reputation and honour (δόξης καὶ τιμῆς) rather than the pursuit of wisdom and truth (Pl. *Ap. 29d-e*). Plato’s Socrates helps to underscore the point, here, that concern for personal reputation and prestige was a characteristic not just of Athenian elites, but of average Athenians or “anyone whom [Socrates] happens upon” (ὁτιο ἄν ἀεὶ ἐντυρχάνῳ ὑμῶν). Rather than acting in a straightforwardly self-sacrificial or self-effacing manner, the Athenians described by Xenophon contribute to the public good and specifically to the defense of the city as a result of their pursuit of personal distinction. Their patriotic service is, in this respect, a kind of virtuous consequence of egoism. Service to the state, therefore, is not simply a matter of altruism as it is often presented in the *epitaphioi*. Even in this genre, however, which provides the most heavily idealized accounts of Athenian actions, the motives for such action are not wholly altruistic or communitarian. Demosthenes describes the Athenian force that

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890 *Mem. 3.5* seems to presuppose the end of Spartan hegemony after Leuktra, but there is no reason to believe that such a lengthy work might not have been started sometime prior to 371.

891 On the concern for personal honour on display in forensic and political oratory, see Roisman 2005, 64-83. The characteristic touchiness of the ancient Greeks when it came to slights against personal honour or eagerness with which Greek men pursued opportunities for aggrandizement was not simply a feature of the Homeric world. On the dynamics of honour, revenge and aggrandizement in classical Athens, see, e.g., D. Cohen 1995. Indeed the reverence for Homer among Greeks of all stripes in the classical period speaks to perseverance of such concern for honour and standing in the world of the polis. On the ‘status warriors’ of Homeric epic, see van Wees 1992, 109-125.
fought at Khaironeia as being full of "invincible spirit, and an unhesitating competitive love of honour" (θυμόν ἀήττητον καὶ ἀρετοφάσιστον καὶ φιλοτιμίαν ἐφάμαλλον: Dem. 60.22).

That Athenian hoplites saw campaigning as an opportunity to vie with one another for distinction is strongly suggested by the vocabulary used to describe war and battle. Battle is described as a contest (ἀγων) and a trial (πείρα) of war. David Pritchard and Ryan Balot have drawn attention to the similarities in democratic discourse between athletic competition and military participation, particularly hoplite service. Both involve stalwart perseverance in the face of πόνοι and κίνδυνοι within generally agreed upon codes of conduct, and Greek sources draw strong analogies between training for athletics and preparing the body and the mind for the rigours of battle. For Xenophon’s Socrates, one should no more, as a private citizen (ἰδιώτης), neglect to keep himself fit for military service (ὅ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους ἀγών) than for a competition at Olympia (Mem. 3.12.1). The Hellenic fascination with athletics is read by scholars as a manifestation of the extraordinary competitiveness of the ancient Greeks. I would suggest that the preoccupation of the polis-Greeks with the heavy-

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892 E.g., IG I3 1163; Thuc. 2.46.1; Dem. 60.25; cf. Ar. Frogs 1099-1103, in which passage, war, athletics and poetic agônes are conflated.

893 For the association between rigours of battle (ponoi) and the toils of athletics (ponoi), see Pritchard 2015, 2013, passim, and 2009, 212-245, 2013. The connection in literature goes at least as far back as Pindar: e.g., Isthm. 5.22-25, Ol. 6.9-11. This vein of scholarship, of course, goes back further than Pritchard and Balot. See, e.g., Lämmer 2010 [1982-3], with bibliography. It is worth noting here, however, that the vocabulary surrounding war was not simply adopted from that of athletics. The relationship between war and sport in archaic and classical Greece went deeper than this. Far from representing non-violent occasions for the promotion of Panhellenic peace, the ekekheiria and the competitions they allowed for provided a venue for inter-polis rivalries to play themselves out, and, not infrequently, the settings of athletic contests themselves were fertile breeding grounds for bellicose exchanges. The Altis is illustrative of this. The sanctuaries of Olympia were covered with monuments to the Greeks’ military victories over one another (Lämmer 2010, 57-58). Pritchard, furthermore, has collected references to suggest that even in the athletic venues proper, the stadia and their grandstands, the Greeks customarily hung up votive weapons inscribed with the names of military victors and their defeated opponents (2013, 185-190).

894 Poliakoff 1987, 115. The characterization of Greek society as agonal can be traced back to Burckhardt (see above: Introduction, 5).
infantryman and phalanx fighting is at least in part attributable to the same aggressive drive for distinction.\(^{895}\)

The particular mode of phalanx fighting and the hoplitic ethos of standing firm lent themselves particularly well to a competition in endurance not only between phalanxes but also within them. Lendon has even proposed that phalanx warfare developed out of a desire on the part of the honour-obsessed Greeks to form objective criteria for martial courage, settling eventually on the passive courage of the hoplite. Weapons play and other martial skills associated with skirmishing were marginalized as the plethora of military aretai familiar from epic were subordinated to the hoplitic definition of andreia—to remain in one’s place.\(^{896}\)

Modern historians often note how examples of acts of martial prowess that recalled the aristeiai of Homeric heroes, like Diomedes, were condemned by classical authors as ‘rash’ or ‘unmeasured.’\(^{897}\) As most fully defined by Aristotle, courage, for the classical Greeks, consisted

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\(^{895}\) In this light, we can read Xenophon’s telling pronouncement on the Spartan cavalry, which was “especially bad” (πονηρότατον) because “only those of the soldiery who were weakest in bodily strength and least stirred by ambition served as cavalrymen” (Hell. 6.4.11: τόν δ’ αὖ στρατιωτῶν οἱ τοὺς σώμασιν ἀδυνατῶσιν καὶ ἡμικεδαστήρας φιλότιμοι ἐπὶ τὸν ἐπονομαζόν ἔνσην).


\(^{897}\) Hanson 1995, 68, citing the example of Aristodemos at Hdt. 9.71.3. For a catalogue of aristeia and references, see Pritchett GSAW II, 276-290. The standard opinion holds that in phalanx fighting there was “no room for aristocratic aristeiai” (Raaflaub and Wallace 2007, 35; M. Finley 1964, 133). The argument runs that individual awards of excellence for fighting belong to the worldview typified by the Homeric poems, and as the phalanx expanded to become more inclusive, and at the same time eventually excluded all fighters but hoplites, martial aretē was communalized. When the communal hoplite army did well, all hoplites were recognized as aristoi (Raaflaub and Wallace 2007, 35). Hanson is surely right to suggest that “any reckless departure from the line by individuals in quest of personal success” was little valued (1999, 168), as indeed Aristodemos learned to his discredit at Plataea (Hdt. 9.71.3). Just because we do not hear from Thucydides about individual aristeia voted by armies and meted out to individuals as we do in Herodotus, however, does not necessarily mean that they ceased to be awarded, as many scholars assume, after the Persian Wars. Thucydides’ silence about prizes for individual valour should not surprise, given his work’s focus on the polis at war. Indeed, the occasions on which Thucydides uses ἔρις or ἐρίζω are typically when he describes deep divisions or quarrels within the civic body at large or of entire poleis in contention with one another: e.g., 2.21.3, 6.35.1; 5.79.4. One very important exception to this, where the historian most certainly has individual competition in mind has already been mentioned (6.31.4).
in measured and controlled response to the natural instinct of fear. Courage was the ability of the good man (ἀνήρ ἰγαθός) to control his fear, allowing it to propel him neither into senseless...
and reckless action nor into headlong flight (NE 3.6-9). A passage from Euripides’ Heracles (performed in 416) makes explicit the equation of the hoplite with the anêr agathos (Her. 158-164): a bow cannot not reveal a man’s courage since its user is “ready for flight” (τῇ φυγῇ πρόχειρος):

The test of manly courage is standing your ground, looking straight at the swift swathe cut by enemy spears, and holding ranks.

Such sentiments are traceable to the earliest Athenian martial expressions as evidenced by a mid-sixth century grave marker (IG I3 1200 = IG I2 984): “[He who] pauses and beholds your grave marker, Xenocles, the marker of a spearman, will know your manliness.”

Without going quite as far as Lendon, it is nevertheless striking, once hoplite warfare is established, how deeply the ordeal of the hoplite and the ethic of steadfastness permeate civic discourse in Athens. If the dominance of the hoplite in military practice in democratic Athens diminished in the fifth century and especially under Pericles’ island strategy, the place of the heavy-armed infantryman in the ideologically constructed civic imagination certainly did not.

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899 Cf. the classical Greek reservations over the opposite kind of behaviour. Conspicuously aggressive displays of martial valour were not regarded as such, but as insensible and rash as Herodotus’ report of the actions of Aristodemos at Platea makes clear (9.71). It is possible to detect traces of counter ideals, which may reflect popular recognition of the aretê of other types of warriors. Plato, for example, is aware of an argument that ‘some people’ make for “a kind of flight that is not shameful” ( Laws 706c: “τινας ὁκ αἰσχρᾶς, ὡς φαίνει, φυγᾶς). Of course, the point is brought up in Plato’s argument only to dismiss it—the hoplitês monimos is the only warrior who deserves “infinite praise” (ἐπαίνοις πολλάκις). Such a reward is likely a reference to epitaphic επαίνοις.
901 Many scholars have, of course, observed that, in the mentality of the ancient Greeks, the hoplite’s particular brand of courage and his service to the polis were normative and hoplite warfare developed through constant “reference to the distinctive set of norms, values and beliefs which encouraged and legitimated it” (Runciman 1998, 773). See, further: Osborne 2010, 247; Trundle 2010, 141; Pritchard 1999, 76-161 and 1998a 44-9; Hunt 1998, 190-4; Hanson 1995, passim; Loraux 1986, 161-71.
902 I would accept this traditional claim with reservations. Careful documentation of the deployment and casualties of Athenian hoplitai reveals that claims of the hoplite’s irrelevance (e.g., Hanson 2005, 146-161) have been overstated. Hanson is not wrong that Delium and Mantinea were exceptions to the rule that huge hoplite armies rarely engaged—but they had rarely done so over the course of Greek history—most battles involved thousands rather than tens of thousands. See, below, 275.
The figure of the hoplite in fifth-century Athens became a normative ideal. The hoplite became the quintessential symbol of the areté of the soldier fighting for his polis. Thus Cartledge:

The dominance of hoplite ideology in democratic Athens is fully confirmed by examples drawn not only from anti-democratic rhetoric and political theory but also from the two main publically approved democratic discourses of drama and oratory.

Hoplite chauvinism in Athens in the fifth century was not simply borne of conservatism or deference to a traditional socio-military elite, the existence of which, in post-Cleisthenic Athens, is a misnomer, as the last chapter has shown. It is true that, in the Athenian imagination, the hoplite represented a kind of middling figure, even if the borders of anything like hoplitikon as a social stratum were permeable and ill-defined. Nevertheless, there were important factors besides that contributed to the democracy’s sanction of the hoplite as the bona fide warrior of the polis.

In the democracy, hoplites earned social and political cache precisely because, like acts of financial service to the state, such as lietourgiai and epidoseis, their martial contribution was publically performed and measurable in a way that other military service was not and was, in the case of those drawn up ek katalogou, broadcast in semi-permanent media. Hoplitic courage was more easily measurable than other kinds of martial courage. A man’s courage could be gauged by his peers depending simply on whether or not he remained in his taxis (Dem. 60.19)—and by extension by whether he had managed to keep his shield or even by the disposition of his wounds: whether they were in the front or the back. Athenian orators who had

905 See above, Ch. 6.
cultivated a reputation for courageous military service could exploit this rhetorically, by metaphorically associating the *agón* of deliberative or legal debate with the hoplite *agón*. Demosthenes’ use of this imagery to argue that Aeschines had, in changing policy, abandoned his *taxis* is the best-known example,906 but he is anticipated by the Socrates of Plato’s *Apology* and by Thucydides’ Pericles.907 At least as far back as the end of the fifth century, we find that the ideological equation of exemplary hoplite service and good citizenship gave rise to a political vernacular that had adopted hoplite memes. Thus, Pericles assures the demos of the soundness of his policy by broadcasting his own resolute faith in it (Thuc. 2.61.2): “I am the same man—I have not been moved (οὐκ ἔξισταμαι),” whereas the *demos*, whom he chastises, is like one who retreats, turning to a different policy when faced with hardship (κακουμένος).908 Indeed the commonplace metaphor of an interlocutor ‘standing his ground’ in the face of argument or criticism is martial in origin. Thus the Sausage Seller in *Knights* can challenge Demos, who shrinks out of shame at his past errors (αἰσχύνομαι τοι ταῖς πρότερον ἀμαρτίαις), “Why do you concede? Will you not stand your ground” (τί κύπτας; οὐχί κατὰ χόραν μενεῖς; 1354-1355)? It is suggestive that the word that the Athenians used for a political

906 Dem. 19.302; Brock 2013, 140; Balot 2009, 283-287 and 2008. The charge is leveled perhaps in reaction to Aeschines’ attack on Demosthenes as “ῥήτωρ ἀστράτητος καὶ λιπῶν τὴν τάξιν” (Aeschin. 3.148). See also, Dem. 21.120: “If I were to let Meidias off I would be a deserter from the ranks of justice” (λειτουργοῖς . . . τὴν τοῦ δικαίου τάξιν); Roisman 2003, 139. A similar rhetorical tactic is used against Leokrates by Lykourgos, who alleges that, in leaving the city after Chaeronea, Leokrates became “a deserter of his stalwart comrades, a dodger among those who embraced military service” (1.142).

907 Cf. Carey 1994b, 33: “From the speeches of Thucydides it is clear that already in the fifth century political oratory concerned itself with many of the topics found in judicial oratory.” For another metaphorical use of *lipotaxia*, see Pl. *Menex*. 246b.

908 A connection between staunch, hoplitic resolve and politics is also implicit in the strange anecdote of the squabble between Amompharetos and Pausanias recorded by Herodotus in his account of the battle of Plataea (9.54-56). Amopharetos is ordered by the Spartan commander to withdraw from his initial position, but refuses, citing that Spartan *nomos* is on his side and casting his vote by pebble (τὴν ψηφοδοτῆς ἄρρητης) to remain steadfast in the original place. Since the Spartans did not vote with *ψεόθαι*, it would seem that Herodotus is consciously drawing on Athenian political memes to relate a story that would resonate with an Athenian audience.
leader or steward of the *demos*, προστάτης, is a repurposed military word and first appears in its political sense in Periclean Athens.\(^{909}\) Plato’s Socrates makes the most explicit rhetorical use of his service as a hoplite, leveraging his reputation as an outstanding heavy-infantryman and comparing his obligation as a public figure to his duty as the hoplite. If, he argues, he had remained in the place assigned to him in the battles of Potidaea, Delium and Amphipolis, how could he abandon the role assigned to him as gadfly by the *daimôn*?\(^{910}\)

Orators could expect to exploit the Athenians’ mistrust of shifty speakers and vacillating politicians or could allude to their reputations as hoplites to suggest their own constancy of character and policy.\(^{911}\) This is in part because hoplitic *andreia* also served more than other kinds of military service to showcase the characteristics befitting a model citizen. That a hoplite showed *sôphrosynê* in his commitment to defensive posture and maintaining his place among comrades is commonplace, and is often touted in arguments for the communitarian ethic of the phalanx. On display in hoplite battle, however, as a precondition of the soldier’s steely nerve, was his ability to control his emotion, namely fear. An Athenian citizen was expected to exercise self-control (*ékkrátêma*) over physical appetites and emotion, and the equation of a

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\(^{909}\) Connor 1971, 110-115, notes that the term in this sense is absent in references to sources that predate the Peloponnesian War and is first securely attested in 424 (Ar. *Kn* 1128).

\(^{910}\) Pl. *Ap*. 28d-29a; cf. 39a: “Neither in court nor in war is it right for me or any one else to plan to escape death by any possible means. For in battles it is often the case that a man may avoid death by casting away his arms and turning himself to the supplication of his pursuers . . . But, gentlemen, it is not difficult to escape death; it is much more difficult to escape wickedness, for that runs faster than death.” (ό̣̓ypes γάρ ἐν δίκη οὔτ’ ἐν πολέμῳ οὔτ’ ἐμὴ οὔτ’ ἀλλὸν οὐδένα δεὶ τοῦτό μηχανάσθαι, ὥσπερ ἀποφεύξεται πᾶν ποιῶν θάνατον. καὶ γάρ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις πολλὰκις δῆλον γίγνεται ὅτι τὸ γε ἀποθανεῖν ἂν τῖς ἐκφυγοί καὶ ὀπλὰ ἀρείς καὶ ἐρ’ ἱκετεῖαν ὑπὸ τῶν διοικόντων . . . ἀλλὰ μὴ οὔ τοιτ’ ἵππας ἄρες, θάνατον ἐκφυγεῖν, ἀλλὰ πολὺς ἱππεύσατος πονηρίαν); on the gadfly, see 30e.

\(^{911}\) E.g., Lys. 31.28; cf. Dem. 19.302: ἠτείμησε καὶ προδίωκε . . . ; Aeschin. 3.148: ῥήτωρ ἀστράτευτος καὶ λιπῶν τὴν τάξιν . . .
stalwart hoplite with a loyal and respectable citizen became proverbial.\textsuperscript{912} Thus Alcibiades can make the argument in favour of an easy Athenian conquest of Sicily: for on the island there are no steadfast \textit{politai} to resist, but only rabble (\textit{okhloi}) who own neither their own land nor their own arms and who will scatter at the Athenians’ advance (6.17.2-3). Sophocles’ \textit{Antigone} expresses the link between citizen and hoplite in especially clear terms:

\begin{quote}
Whoever is a useful man in the case of his own household will be found upright in the polis as well . . . And I would feel confident that such a man would be a fine ruler no less than a good and willing subject, and that beneath a hail of spears he would stand his ground where posted, a loyal and brave comrade in the battle line. But there is no evil worse than disobedience. This destroys cities; this overturns homes; this breaks the ranks of allied spears into headlong rout.\textsuperscript{913}
\end{quote}

These arguments reveal how the military ethic of hoplitic discipline was subsumed by the civic ethic of \textit{enkrateia}.\textsuperscript{914} It is widely observed that the figure of the hoplite, from (at least) the sixth to the fourth century, was emblematic of the Greek ideals of self-sufficiency and independence.\textsuperscript{915} Scholars routinely adduce Aristotle’s \textit{Politics} in support of this, which focuses on the economic self-sufficiency of \textit{hoi ta hopla ekhontes} (1297b1-2). I would not disagree with this at all, but it is important to add that while, indeed, the hoplite was a symbol of autarky and independence, he also gave expression to Greek civic ideals of autonomy and self-mastery.

What the hoplite embodied equally in Greek mentality was freedom from or transcendence of one’s instincts and desires—most obvious of course in his suppression of fear and the desire to

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{912}{On the development of the concept of self-mastery as a civic requirement, see Harris 2001, 80-87, 157-200.}
\footnotetext{913}{\textit{Ant.} 661-675: ἐν τοῖς γὰρ οἰκείοις διάτης ἑστ’ ἀνήρ / χρηστός, φανεῖται κἂν πόλει δίκαιοι δὴν . . . καὶ τοίχων ἐν τὸν ἄνδρα θαρσοῦν ἐγὼ / καλὸς μὲν ἄρχειν, εὖ δ’ ἂν ἄρχοντα θέλειν,δορός τ’ ἂν ἐν χειμῶνι προστατευτῷ / μένειν δίκαιον κάψῳ παραστάτην. / ἀναρχίας δὲ μεῖξον οὐκ ἔστιν κακῶν. / αὐτὴ πόλεως ὀλλωσίν, ἥδ’ ἀναστάτους/οἴκους τίθησιν, ἢδε συμμάχου δορὸς / τροπάς καταρρήγνυσι.}
\footnotetext{914}{Harris 2001, locates the development in Athens of a doctrine of \textit{sôphrosynê} or \textit{enkrateia} as mastery over passions in the 420s (80-87, 157-182).}
\footnotetext{915}{E.g., Trundle 2010, 141; van Wees 2004, 78-9; Hanson 1995, 214-9.}
\end{footnotes}
flee—that was so foundational to the ideological construct of the proper citizen.⁹¹⁶ Indeed, hoplites on campaign actively competed in displays of *enkrateia* and self-denial.⁹¹⁷ According to Plato’s *Alcibiades*, Socrates “excelled all his peers” at enduring the toils and hardships of campaign at Potidaea.⁹¹⁸ Some years later, at Delium, he says, where he had an even clearer view of Socrates owing to the fact that he himself was mounted, he noticed by how much his mentor had surpassed their mutual friend, Lakhes, in being collected and composed (τὸ ἐμφρον ἔνσω) even in defeat (*Symp.* 221a).

Men who endured the rigours of campaign and succeeded in taming their fear to stand firm in battle were thought to possess the proper stuff, which qualified them for other civic roles (*Aeschin.* *Tim.* 29-30).⁹¹⁹ Indeed, the fourth-century oath sworn by youths upon entry into the civic body places considerable emphasis on the citizen’s duty as a soldier, fully embracing the hoplitic memes familiar from the martial poetry of Tyrtaios where they first appear in our sources.⁹²⁰ The oath begins (*Lyk.* 1.77):

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⁹¹⁶ On self-denial and civic ideology and on the symposium as another context in which *enkrateia* was put to the test, see Corner 2010.

⁹¹⁷ Herodotus’ account of Sophanes at Plataea takes this to the extreme (9.74).

⁹¹⁸ *Symp.* 219e-220b, where the philosopher famously traverses the frozen Chalcidice barefoot while his fellow soldiers desperately try to improve their footwear to guard against frostbite. Cf. *Xen.* *Mem.* 1.6.4-10, esp. 6. Whether or not such stories surrounding Socrates in the fourth century were true, of course, hardly matters. Indeed, if they are not true (as, for example, Athenaeus vigorously maintains [5.215d-219f]) the claim that Athenian men competed in displays of fortitude and self-control while on campaign is bolstered by the choice of authors like Plato and Xenophon to attribute such displays to Socrates. Cf. *Hyper.* 6.23. Hyperides claims that the campaign of Leosthenes revealed the *aretê* of the soldiers like no other campaign because of the necessity of withstanding (*ὑπομένω*) extreme material deprivations and weather ἐγκρατῶς.

⁹¹⁹ See also Lys. 16.18. Cf. *Thuc.* 2.42.3 for the claim that “steadfastness in war is a cloak to cover a man’s other imperfections.” The association of citizenship with service as an infantryman is evinced also by the formulaic language of honorific decrees awarded by the Athenians to outsiders to in which it is granted for them “to march with the Athenians in the army” (Liddel 2007, 282).

⁹²⁰ We do not need to concern ourselves here with the debate over whether the heavy-armed men exhorted by the poet are to be imagined as fighting in a closed or loose order phalanx (see van Wees 2004, 167-183; Hanson 1989, 160-189). Questions and debates surrounding the origins, development and mechanics of the closed hoplite phalanx do not detract from the ethos, which surrounds *menein*. Tyrtaios’s
I will not disgrace my sacred arms nor will I abandon the man next to me wherever I shall be stationed.\textsuperscript{921}

The Oath of the Greeks purportedly sworn at Plataea but modeled after a traditional Athenian oath begins similarly:

I shall fight as long as I live, and I shall not consider it more important to be alive than to be free, and I shall not fail the Taxiarch or the Enomotarch, be he alive or dead, and I shall not retreat unless the Hegemones lead (the army) away, and I shall do whatever the generals command.\textsuperscript{922}

The content of these oaths, cited by Lykourgos in his speech against Leokrates in the 330s but not preserved in the manuscripts of the speech, is known from a text inscribed in the early fourth century on a stone recovered from Akharnai.\textsuperscript{923} Current scholarly consensus holds that while the texts as we have them are of fourth-century origin, there are sufficient verbal echoes of fifth-century sources, including Aeschylus and Thucydides, to justify the inference that the fourth-century text, especially of the ephebic oath, is a copy of an oath of some antiquity and may well originally date from the foundation of the democracy (cf. Lyk. 1.75).\textsuperscript{924} The Oath of the Ephebes is a civic oath, but it is telling that there is a prominent military tone. The oath probably did not, in the fifth century, accompany any formal graduation from an official and centralized system of ephebic training as it did under Lykurgan system in the fourth century.

\textsuperscript{921} Paraphrased at Lyk. 1.76 as an oath “\(\mu\iota\nu\eta\;\tau\alpha\;\iota\;\iota\phi\alpha\;\iota\alpha\delta\alpha\;\kappa\tau\alpha\omega\iota\sigma\chi\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\epsilon\iota\;\mu\iota\nu\eta\;\tau\eta\nu\;\tau\acute{a}\zeta\iota\;\lambda\epsilon\iota\varsigma\epsilon\iota\nu\).”

\textsuperscript{922} Lyk. 1.81-82. Translation is that of Fornara 1983, 57.

\textsuperscript{923} Tod \textit{GHI} II, 204; Cartledge 2013, 12-40.

\textsuperscript{924} Kellogg 2013, 264; Kennel 2006; Rhodes and Osborne 2003, 448-449; Rhodes 1993, 494; Siewert 1977, 104-107. Thucydidean allusions to the \textit{ne\o\i\tau\alpha\i} serving in a military capacity as a home guard (together with the \textit{preshut\alpha\tau\alpha\i}) may, but do not necessarily, suggest some kind of military service and training for young Athenians in place in the late fifth century (1.105.4; 2.13.7).
(described at [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 42.3-5). This makes it all the more striking that the role of the citizen is so imbued with the ethos of the hoplite soldier.

7.3.2 Lions at home, foxes on the battlefield (*Ar. Peace* 1189-1190)

Those who conspicuously failed in respect of the expectations of a hoplite might bear public stigmata. Such was the fate, famously, of Kleonymos, a favourite target of Aristophanes, who had the misfortune of hearing reference made to his cowardice and shield tossing in various plays for ten years after the incident (probably Delium). Kleonymos was also attacked for being a gluttonous, fat man, and I would suggest that the two attacks are related, as, indeed, is explicitly and literally the case in *Wasps* (592: “the great shield-tossing parasite, Kleonymos”; cf. 822). Both his shield tossing and his obesity could be cast as evidence of his *akrateia*. In a similar vein, the scholiast to Aristophanes’ attack on the feeble military officials of the 420s which ridicules the taxiarchs as “shield throwers (ριψόσπαδες) in the eyes of gods and men” (*Peace* 1186), adds that the cowardly taxiarch:

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925 Dillery 2002.
926 Ancient testimony leaves it unambiguous that all Athenians, from every walk of life, undertook ephebic military training (*Ath. Pol.* 42.1, with Lycurg. 76).
927 Kirchner *PA*, 8680.
930 A similar connection can be made between allegations of the Younger Alcibiades’ dereliction of military duty and his insobriety and sexual incontinence and deviance (Lys. 14.25-26). For treatment of the political and social and political stakes involved in these accusations of deviancy, see: Corner 2013 and 2011; Davidson 1999, 167-174; D. Cohen 1991, 171-202; Winkler 1990, 45-70; Dover 1978, 23-31.
Is giving himself up to lustful passion with the result that he is unable, though his indulgence, to hold sway over what he must.\textsuperscript{931}

The incapacity to control one’s emotions and desires (\textit{\acute{a}krat\textepsilon{}a}) is as strongly connected in Athenian literature with poor military service as \textit{enkrateia} is linked with exemplary service. References to cowardice and shield tossing in Old Comedy reveal a cultural presupposition in the late fifth century—the measure of a man could be found in his reputation as a hoplite. Even prominent figures could be laid low by failing to live up to martial standards such that “to be a great man in all but one’s shield” (\textit{\acute{a}n\grave{h}r \acute{a}rist\textepsilon{}o\acute{z} \acute{e}\textnu\acute{a} \textit{\tau\acute{a}l\acute{a} \pi\acute{l}\nu \acute{e}n \acute{a}sp\texti\acute{d}i\acute{\o}}) became a proverbial knock against a citizen’s character.\textsuperscript{932}

An Athenian citizen was expected to exercise self-control and self-denial; to curb and have command over his base appetites and emotions; literally to be ‘better’ or ‘stronger’ than himself (\textit{\kappa\nu\epsilon\textita\tau\epsilon\nu\epsilon\acute{w}\acute{e} \\acute{e}\acute{a}v\nu\epsilon\acute{t}o\lambda}), and the Athenians universally condemned the man as an unfit citizen who was weaker than himself (\textit{\eta\textita\tau\epsilon\nu\epsilon\acute{w}\acute{e} \\acute{e}\acute{a}v\nu\epsilon\acute{t}o\lambda}), prone to appetitiveness and governed by his desires and emotions rather than measured rationality.\textsuperscript{933} Such a man was ill-equipped to serve in any public or managerial capacity (Xen. \textit{Mem.} 1.5.1-5; cf. \textit{Econ.} 12.13; Aeschin. 1.29-30, 2.150-151).\textsuperscript{934} If a man could be characterized as selfish and given to the indulgence of his passions (\textit{\tau\acute{a}r\acute{e}s\textita\tau\acute{a} \acute{a}v\texti\acute{t}[\acute{o}] \acute{a}r\acute{e}\textit{\epsilon}\textita\sigma\texti\acute{t}a}),\textsuperscript{935} it was “a short rhetorical leap” from the picture of a

\textsuperscript{931} Schol. to \textit{Peace}: εις κιναιδιαν διαβ\textita\lambda\textepsilon{}ται, ὥστε μηδὲ τῶν ἄναγκαιων διὰ τὴν εὐρ\textepsilon{}τητα κρατεῖν δύνασθαι (1186).
\textsuperscript{932} Unattributed fragment of Old Comedy, cited by Plut. \textit{Crassus} 36.6 = \textit{Adespota} 697 Henderson: ἔδοκει κατὰ τῶν κομικῶν ἀνὴρ ἄριστος· εἶναι τάλλα πλὴν ἐν ἀσπίδι.
\textsuperscript{934} Foxhall 2013, 83-84; Davidson 2007, 453; Winkler 1990, 181, 188-190.
\textsuperscript{935} Lys. 14.5, specifically with reference to military desertion.
man willing to betray himself to one willing to traitorously give up the city.\footnote{Ober 1989, 269.} In Athenian discourse, failure to maintain control of one’s emotions and appetites was the mark of unmanliness, effeminacy and of the despised figure of the \textit{kinaidos}.

The stalwart hoplite was the embodiment of civic and manly virtue while the man who deserted his post was thought to be deficient.\footnote{Balot 2014, 189; Winkler 1990, 182; cf. Halperin 1990, 88-112 for the concept of the gendered civic ideal. Scholarship on gender and sexuality in the context of Greek warfare has revealed that defeated enemies were effeminized—as most clearly revealed in the Eurymedon Oinochoe (Museum für Kunst und Gewerbe, Hamburg, inv. 1981.173). The language used to describe defeated enemies can carry sexual overtones as, for example, Xenophon’s description of Abydos, defeated along with their Peloponnesian garrison by the Athenians in 411 (Xen. \textit{Hell.} 1.1.5) The town is described as broken/effeminate/violated/literally opened up (\kappatayvuma): Athenaeus 12.524. This sexual euphemism lies behind a joke in Euboulos about the Greek force at Troy (Fr. 118 K-A): “Nor did any of them see a \textit{hetaira}, but they kneaded themselves for ten years. Bitter was the military service they saw, who, having taken but one city, went away far wider-arsed (\textit{euryprôktoterol}) than the city, which they took at that time.” As Ogden 2009, 133 has demonstrated, it is clear that defeat in battle was associated with submission and penetration (pace Davidson 2004).} In \textit{Laws}, Plato discusses the offense of \textit{rhipsaspia} and suggests that, were it possible, the most fitting punishment (\mu\alpha\lambta\tau\eta \tau\mu\iomega\riaj) would be a change in sex for the offender from male to female (12.944d-e).\footnote{In Sparta, the penalty for cowardice was in part that a convicted \textit{tresas} was required to undergo a metaphorical sex change, shaving half of his beard to symbolize that he had revealed himself as an \textit{androgyynos} (Plut. \textit{Agis}. 30.3); on \textit{tresantes} see further, Ogden 2009, 134. This practice is likely behind the joke in Aristophanes’ \textit{Thesmophoriazusae}, where Euripides exhorts his kinsman, who cannot withstand the pains of depilation, “then won’t you look ridiculous, walking around with one side of your face shaved!” (226). According to Diodorus, the preeminent law-giver Kharandas of Katana issued a law in the seventh century whereby deserters were forced to sit in the agora in women’s clothing (12.16.1-2).} In the end, Plato has to settle for the punishment of a prohibition on reassignment in the ranks, but only because gender reassignment is not practical. What makes the latter “the most fitting” dessert, however, is that it would simply accomplish in a physical sense what had already transpired on a metaphysical level, some confirmation of which was entailed in the display of cowardice. Failure to live up to the hoplite standard was equated with sexual intemperance and a lack of virility as evidenced by the treatment of Kleonymos after Delium. Kleonymos is said by
Aristophanes’ Strepsiades never to have ‘kneaded’ (ἐμάττετο) with a pestle (κάρδοπος), but to always have used his ‘rounded mortar’ (ἐν θυείᾳ στρογγύλη). To this one might add, also from Clouds, the claim that the gendering of Amynias’ name as female (耛 whereby) is just for someone who does not campaign (685: δικαίως ἢ τις οὐ στρατεύεται).

Any man who throws his shield shows, as Plato writes, “that he loves life at any price” (φιλοψυχίας). Furthermore, if he is not willing to sell his life for his city, it may be expected that the coward might sell his city for his life. Better, then, to disbar him from any public role, and, in the mind of the philosopher, there is no surer way to enforce atimia than for a man to actually become a woman. Of the number of dichotomies and ideological hierarchies that gave structure to Athenian public discourse and governed social and political structure, that between man and woman was most fundamental. As Foxhall has shown, “[g]ender . . . was the most vigorous expression of meaning available to ancient Greek culture.” In Peloponnesian-War Athens, men who failed to live up to the standards of hoplite andreia were open to the charge of effeminacy, which, given the contentions of the time, entailed the kind of immoderation and akrateia that justified the exclusion of women from civic life. Comic plays dating from the

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939 Ar. Clouds 375-376. At Wasps 822-23, an altar attendant is mistaken for Kleonymos because he is conspicuously fat and lacks ‘hopla’; the slave’s costume lacks the customary comic phallus and the scene puns on the fact that Kleonymos threw his manly ‘equipment’ away. See, McDowell 1971, 242.

940 Cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. 1124b, where the great-souled man will not seek dangers, but he will face them for a great cause and, “when so doing will be ready to sacrifice his life, since he holds that life is not worth having at every price.”

941 Cf. the tethering of poor hoplite performance with allegations of illegitimacy and thus atimia at Peace 674-678: Kleonymos’ father is not who he claims, but rather Kleonymos was born ἀποβολμαίος τῶν ὀπλων. Kleonymos makes his parentage clear as soon as he presents himself as a soldier (ποτ’ ἐξέλθοι στρατιώσις ἐυθέως).

942 Foxhall 1989, 23. For the binary opposition of man and woman in the gendering of military bravery and prowess, see, e.g., Thuc. 4.40.2; Hdt. 8.88.3, 9.107.1 and esp. 9.20.1, where Herodotus claims that the Persian horsemen at Plataea tried to goad the Greek forces into committing to battle by riding up to them and calling them ‘women’ (γυναίκας σφέας ἀπεκάλεσαν).

last third of the fifth century, appear to have regularly featured choruses of effeminate men, often with the implication of shirked military duty or disgraceful martial conduct.\textsuperscript{944} The stalwart hoplite alone was immune to allegations of flighty akrateia. Old Comedy makes clear the ideological equation of the hoplite with the \textit{anēr agathos} in its punning on the term \textit{psilos}, a common term for ‘depilated’ and a general one for ‘light-armed warrior’ (literally one who fights naked of \textit{hopla}).\textsuperscript{945} During the effeminizing depilation scene in \textit{Thesmophoriazousae}, Mnesilokhos, with his beard removed, declares, “οἱ οἱ κακοδαίμων, ψιλός \textit{αὐτὸς στρατεύομαι}” (233; cf. 582). A fragmentary line from Eupolis’ \textit{Demes} has a character crying, “Alas! What shall I do with half my face shaved?” (οἱ, τὶ \textit{δράσῳ σῶμβολον κεκαρμένος};). Finally, a fragment from Pherecrates’ \textit{Deserters}, with only the words “their hair shaved” (ἐν \textit{χρυφό κοιφιώντας}), is tantalizingly consonant with these fuller references.\textsuperscript{946} The \textit{psilos}, then, stood out as the antithesis to the manly, citizen-hoplite.\textsuperscript{947} Observing this, it is not difficult to understand why there appears to have been a cultural bias against citizens serving as \textit{psiloi} or \textit{peltastai}.\textsuperscript{948}

\textsuperscript{944} Cratinus’ \textit{Malthakoi} and \textit{Drapetides} cannot with confidence be placed in this group, but they cannot be ruled out on the basis of surviving fragments. The title of Eupolis’ \textit{Astrateutoi} or \textit{Androgynoi} (c.427 [see below, 0]) certainly does suggest this theme, as does Hermippos’ \textit{Stratiótides} (likely performed after 411, if the association of “the one from Abydos” [Fr. 58] with Alcibiades is correct: Alcibiades had been instrumental in the Athenian victory at Abydos [Xen. \textit{Hell.} 1.1.5]).

\textsuperscript{945} The stock joke is a double pun on the meaning of ψιλός, which, being the term for ‘naked’ or ‘bare,’ can equally refer to an unarmed or light-armed warrior (cf. the archaic \textit{gymnêtês} of Tyrtaeus Fr. 11 W) or to any smooth figure (e.g., a furless animal or a hairless youth or woman). The joke turns on the cultural assumption that fighting as a skirmishing \textit{psilos} is less manly than serving as a hoplite in the phalanx.

\textsuperscript{946} Pherecretes Fr. 35 Henderson = Pollux 2.33; cf. Ar. \textit{Knights} 1054-1057, where the victory of Cleon and his \textit{psiloi} at Pylos is referred to as the work of \textit{gynai}.

\textsuperscript{947} Indeed the weapons of the light-armed skirmisher could be contemptuously referred to as \textit{atraktoi}, women’s weaving implements (Thuc. 4.40.2).

\textsuperscript{948} Thucydides states unequivocally that, as late as 424, there were no Athenians who “regularly equipped” (ἐκ παρασκευής . . . ὑπαλλελῶν) themselves as \textit{psiloi} (4.94.1). It is clear, however, that Athenian citizens could and did take up skirmishing weapons when the occasion required, for example, as in 458 when Athenian \textit{psiloi} stoned to death (κατέκλεψαν) a contingent of Corinthian hoplites held in place by
Thucydides’ description of the final moments of the battle for Amphipolis and of the death of the hoplite and general Kleon, whom he despises, nicely illustrates several of the concepts presented above. The hoplites around Kleon make a valiant stand, “closing ranks and repulsing [the enemy] two or three times.” These stalwart Athenians only give way after being utterly surrounded. Despite this brave showing by his peers, however:

Kleon, since he did not intend to stand his ground in the first place, fled immediately and was killed having been overtaken by a Myrkinian peltast.\(^4\)

Kleon, who presumes to lead citizen hoplites, lays bare his real character when he flees the ranks before contact is even made with the enemy and is slain on the run by a light-armed barbarian. Ideologies are difficult to pin down, but all of this points to a basic claim: the politics of the hoplite is the politics of the citizen. The citizen-warrior is to stand firm in service to his city and to kill and risk being killed in a contest of mutual slaughter (Eur. \textit{Suppl.} 700; Xen. \textit{Hell.} 4.3.19).\(^5\) Once more, however, it is important to stress that the hoplite \textit{agôn} was at once a struggle between his city’s phalanx and that of the enemy and Athenian hoplites (Thuc. 1.106.2). On the cultural aversion to serving as \textit{peltastai}, see Trundle 2010. Athenians did serve as archers (\textit{toçótau}), as fifth-century casualty lists and the \textit{mishthos} inscription (\textit{IG} I\(^3\) 138) clearly show. \textit{IG} I\(^3\) 1147.67 lists four archers among the dead for from the tribe Erekhtheis for 459. In later lists, names are given under the heading \textit{barbaroi toxotai}; the distinction suggests a willingness to honour the contribution of citizen archers (\textit{IG} I\(^3\) 1190.136; 1192.152; 1172.35). For more, see Hornblower 2007, 40-2; Trundle 2010, 151.

\(^4\) Thuc. 5.10.9: τὸ δὲ δεξιὸν τῶν Αθηναίων ἐμενέ [τε] μᾶλλον, καὶ οὐ μὲν Κλέων, ὡς τὸ πρῶτον οὐ διενεκέτο μένειν, εὐθὺς φεύγον καὶ καταληψίεις ὑπὸ Μυρκινίου πελαστῶν ἀποθῆκεν, οἱ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἔστι τοῖς ἀπελεύθεροι ὕπαται ἐπὶ τὸν λόφον τὸν τῆς Κλεαρίδου ἡμύοντο καὶ δις ἢ τρὶς προσβάλοντα, καὶ οὐ πρότερον ἐνέδοσαν πρὶν ἢ τε Μυρκινία καὶ ἤ Χαλκιδικῆ ἴππος καὶ οἱ πελασταὶ περιστάντες καὶ ἐσακοντιζόντες αὐτοὺς ἔτρεπον.

a competition between the individual and his fellow warrior-citizens. As an ancient commentator to Euripides remarks, “μένον ἔπαινος ὀπλίτου.”

 Allegations of cowardice on the battlefield (*deilia, rhipsaspia* or *lipotaxia*) or dereliction of military duty (*astrateia*) feature regularly in the character assassinations of forensic oratory. As, of course, do the counterparts to these: claims to exemplary hoplite service. Moreover, as important as a good record of military service was to an Athenian who found himself in court, it was also essential for a citizen in respect of his ability to perform various civic functions, because the issue was raised formally in *dokimasiai*. Although due to their sheer number *dokimasia* hearings must have been somewhat perfunctory, any candidate for office could be challenged by any citizen. Unlike formal charges for *astrateia*, allegations of military dereliction in *dokimasia* challenges appear to have been frequent. All five Lysian speeches that concern *dokimasiai* discuss the military career of the citizen on trial.

 In such trials, or even in the initial *dokimasia*, a crucial question at issue was, “has he gone on expeditions?” Where witnesses were demanded, it will have been expedient for a citizen to point to a record of hoplite service to which demesmen, with whom he had campaigned, could attest. This is precisely what Lysias’ client, Mantitheos, does, even stating

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951 Scholiast to Eur. *HF* 164.
954 Lys. 16, 20, 25, 26, 31.
955 *Ath. Pol.* 55.3: καὶ τὰς στρατείας εἰ ἐστράτευσαν. We might compare the question posed to Trygaios by Hermes, who wants to know Kleonymos’ credentials: ποιὸς τις οὖν εἶναι δοκεῖ τὰ πολεμικά / ὁ Ἐλέανυμος; (*Peace* 674).
956 The claim to be a *systratiôtês* and “to have shared in dangers both on land and sea” was, not only in the verbiage of the funeral oration, but also in the political discourse of the late-fifth century. See the impassioned pleas of the democrat Kleokritos at Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.20: γεγενήμεθα καὶ συστρατιώται, καὶ πολλὰ μὲθ’ ἱμάνων κεκινινδούκαμεν καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν ὑπὲρ τῆς κοινῆς ἀμφοτέρων ἡμῶν σωτηρίας τε καὶ ἐλευθερίας; or the *parabasis* of Aristophanes’ *Frogs* (686-703).
that he performed his military duty with an eye to one day defending himself against unjust
prosecution (16.14-18). Other Lysian speakers, too, provide fellow-demotname as witnesses,
claiming that they will have the best knowledge of what sort of man the speaker is and of who
is or is not an anêr khrêstos. From first-hand knowledge of their fellows, these witnesses can
attest to the frequency and quality of their demotname’s military service (Lys. 20.22-23). A line
from Aristophanes’ Peace, if it is authentic, is very interesting in this context. In the Chorus’
tirade against the corrupt and cowardly taxiarkhoi, it says that, in the heat of battle, the
peacock leaders will be the first to flee, while the Chorus “stands firm as a dependable
hoplite, just like the net-watcher in a rabbit hunt” (1178: ἐγὼ δ’ ἔστηκα λινοπτῶμενος).957
Hestêka is hardly surprising language, but linoptaomai is striking. Older translations, influenced
by the rejection of the word by some editors, have tended to gloss over it, for example,
O’Neill’s: “I am left to do the real work;”958 Rogers’: “I stood gaping while he flew.”959 The
technical function of the linoptês, here, however, surely adds something to the passage
(particularly if the word choice consciously broke meter).960 The linoptês was the man
appointed to remain in place and to keep watch fastidiously over the linen nets, while the hunter
and his hunting dogs tracked and pursued hares toward the nets (Xen. Cyneg. 6.5-10, 11-26). In
the metaphor, it is not the enemy who run into the Chorus’ nets, but fellow Athenians, like the

957 The word λινοπτῶμενος has been suspected on metrical grounds. The first syllable should be long,
but Sommerstein (1985, 189-190) cautions that lino- compounds elsewhere feature a long initial syllable
(e.g., Soph. Fr. 44 and Antiphanes Fr. 49). Olson’s suggestion of a correction that substitutes λινοπτῶμενος
for an original θοροχθεῖς λῖνο is as unlikely as it is unnecessary (1998, 293). Platnauer’s objection that “the
sense of the word does not suit the context here” (1964, 164) is particularly unsatisfying, for reasons I shall
explain.
958 O’Neill and Oates (eds.), The complete Greek Drama (1938).
960 More recent translators, accepting the presence of the term, translate it as follows: “while I stand
there like a net-watcher” (Sommerstein 1985); “while I hold my position like the snare guard in a rabbit
hunt” (Henderson 1998); “and me stood there hoping he gets put in the bag” (Beake 1998).
pusillanimous taxarch. Aristophanes’ use of the image of the hoplite as a net-watcher thus captures the heavy infantryman’s steely steadfastness while at the same time, given the tenor of the passage, emphasizing the place of the hoplite as an observer of the conduct of his peers.

News of the outcome of campaigns and battlefield reports spread quickly through the public spaces of Athens (e.g., Plat. Charm. 153a-c; Plut. Nic. 30.1-2), but this kind of public news was not likely to include details of how units or individuals fared. Crucially, whenever questions of the latter sort are raised, it is claimed that dêmotai are able to speak to the number of campaigns undertaken and to matters of individual performance (Lys. 20.2, 23). Conversely, when Athenian litigants were at pains to disavow a close relationship with their opponents, they could cite a lack of campaign experience together, serving in the same taxis (Isaeus 4.18). The highly agonistic social environment and the adversarial legal system of democratic Athens meant that neighbours, especially rivals, were forever observing and inquiring after one another’s affairs (e.g., Lys. 7.18; Dem. 55.1). The tribal arrangement of the phalanx meant that hoplite service was observed by one’s fellows in the sub-communities of the city.\footnote{Other evidence, too, hints at the intimate knowledge hoplites, mustered according to tribe, had of their peers. Thucydides reports that in the stasis at Megara following the Athenian and Peloponnesian attempts to take the city in 424, the oligarchs came to power and called a review of the hoplites ἐξετάσειν ἀδίκως in order to discover who among the citizens had supported the Athenians and to have these men executed (4.74.2). For the probability of Megara’s militia having been organized on a tribal basis in the fifth century, see Smith 2008, 114-115. Herodotus, furthermore, reveals incidentally in his famous explanation for Athenian women’s dress (why Athenian wives are not permitted broaches) how even the wives of systratiôtai were familiar with one another. Following a battle with the Aeginetans, the widows of dead Athenian hoplites stab to death a man who had fought with their husbands and who had alone survived the battle (5.87).} A good reputation for military service was important to citizens’ standing in other significant public and institutional ways besides the dokimasia. Naturally, a history of military service was also an important consideration in one’s suitability for military command (Xen. Mem. 3.4.1). Military service and prowess in democratic Athens served to justify social and
political prestige and power, just as it had in Greek communities from Homer on.\textsuperscript{962} In the democratic polis, however, competition for such status distinction generated by military participation was not solely the purview of the elite; the mass of Athenians were not, as I have argued, disbarred from hoplite service by a firm census qualification, as some have thought.\textsuperscript{963} Rather, the nature of hoplite mobilization and combat provided citizens with an agreed upon and observable standard of service which served as a proxy by which the civic and moral worth of men of all socio-economic standings could be judged.

We can see clear examples of how these dynamics played out in Athenian society by looking at the popular courts and how hoplite service was constantly invoked and scrutinized as an element of character evidence. Out of eighty-seven extant forensic speeches, seventy contain some kind discussion of the character of the litigants.\textsuperscript{964} Character evidence was not only relevant, but also was frequently decisive in the democracy’s adversarial legal system.\textsuperscript{965} The following plea to an Athenian jury illustrates the rhetorical strategy through which such evidence was put to use. At the end of a long discursus on his estimable service to Athens, which has nothing whatsoever to do with the charges against him, the speaker implores his judges: “You ought to take these things as proof for the purpose of this case that the charges against me are false” (Hyp. 1.18). Conversely, when deployed by plaintiffs, character evidence was intended to convince the jury simply that the defendant was the kind of man who would commit offenses of the sort at issue:

\textsuperscript{962} See above, Ch. 6, 158. Van Wees 2004, 79-80 and 1992, 31-36, who argues that preeminence on the battlefield was a sophisticated mirage through which the ascribed nobility of the archaic age elite could be cast as achieved status. Van Wees thus sees the Homeric poetry itself as an artifact and a tool through which the social elite developed the ideology of the warrior-chief.

\textsuperscript{963} See above, Ch. 6.

\textsuperscript{964} Lanni 2005, 121.

\textsuperscript{965} Lanni 2006, 175; Christ 1998, 193-196.
If you knew the shamelessness of Diocles and what sort of man he was in relation to other matters, you would not doubt any of the things I have said.\footnote{Isoc. 8.40. Both passages are cited by Lanni in her chapter “Relevance in Athenian Courts” (2005, 122.)}

The military career of individuals regularly features in both the \textit{ethopoeia} and character assassinations of litigants in forensic speeches from the early fourth century (e.g., Lys. 3.45; 6.46; 10.1, 27; 14.5; 16.13-15; 21.26; 30.26; 31.7; Isoc. 6.1; 18.47-48; Is. 7.41; Aeschin. 2.167-169).\footnote{Lanni 2009; Roisman 2003, 128.}

Moreover, it is revealing that even in the one area of Athenian law for which it is known that there was a prohibition against giving character evidence—homicide court—the military record of citizens on trial creeps in. We know from several extant cases concerning homicide that character evidence, including the commonplace lists of dutiful performance of civic obligation, was not considered relevant in such cases and was officially banned.\footnote{Lys. 3.46; Lyk. 1.11-13; Ant. 5.11, 6.9, allude to the fact that in homicide cases the sort of formulaic listing of past services to the polis and denigration of opponents for lacking such service records was formally forbidden. Such material was considered “outside the issue” (\textit{\v{e}ξω το\d{e} πράγματος}). See Lanni 2005, 124.} Nevertheless, litigants appear to have been unable to resist a breach of the formal rules when it came to military service in particular. In Lysias’ defense of an unnamed client for attempted homicide, the speechwriter sneaks in through \textit{praeteritio} an attack on his accuser’s moral character vis-à-vis his poor military track record:

\begin{quote}
I wish I were permitted to prove to you the baseness of [Simon] with evidence of other things . . . I will exclude all the other evidence but will mention one thing which I think it is fitting that you hear about, and that will be proof of this man’s rashness and boldness.\footnote{Lys. 3.45.}
\end{quote}

It is significant that Lysias chooses to \textit{end} his defense with this brief intrusion of formally prohibited material for maximum rhetorical impact. Clearly the character of the plaintiff, it was
expected, would matter as much to the jurors as the defendants’ presentation of the facts directly related to the actual incident of assault. Significant, too, is that military performance was expected to efficiently demonstrate Simon’s character—or in this case, the lack thereof—and provide the fundamental supporting evidence in this plausibility argument. Simon is described as arriving too late to partake in the battle against the enemy at Koroneia (394), instead fighting a battle with his own taxiarch. On a second occasion, when the Athenians were about to give battle, Simon is said to have completely refused to stay in his assigned place, being “the most disorderly and misbehaved” (ἀκοσμότατος καὶ πονηρότατος) such that he alone was publically expelled from phalanx (ἐξηκηρύχθη) by the generals (3.45).

7.4 Military service in the Peloponnesian War

For all the reasons that have been outlined above, military service in democratic Athens was conceived of as infantry service. And for all the analysis, ancient and modern, of the Peloponnesian War as a war between sea-powered Athens and land-based Sparta, Athenian war-making between 431 and 404 paradoxically placed an enormous burden of service on Athenian hoplites. This is especially true of the phases of the war prior to 412/11 and the shift of operational focus from mainland Greece and the western Aegean to Ionia and the eastern Aegean. Not until the huge losses of men and ships in the Sicilian campaign did the Athenians lose a significant battle at sea. The loss of naval supremacy in 413/2 resulted in a near decade-long anguished pursuit of material and men to preserve the Athenian fleet; at the same time, the loss of supremacy also and made naval service much more perilous for Athenian

970 For figures, see Appendices 1 and 2.
nautai as Peloponnesian fleets reached parity, but between 431 and 411 it was, in fact, Athenian hoplites who most frequently met the enemy outside of Attica.\(^{971}\)

The Peloponnesian War is recognized by many scholars as the first conflict among Greek poleis in which hoplite engagements did not play a decisive role. The point is often made that aside from a few large, set-piece battles (Delium, Mantinea, Epipolai) the war was chiefly fought on and for control of the sea.\(^{972}\) Nearly all of the engagements described by Thucydides, from skirmishes to sea-battles to sieges, feature sizable contingents of hoplites, typically numbering between 50 and 600 men. A close reading of Thucydides’ text reveals that hoplites played a significant role in fighting the Peloponnesian War.\(^{973}\) Moreover, it seems that large battles featuring many thousands of hoplites on either side were the exception to the rule for most of the archaic and classical periods, where the norm was battles featuring an aggregate of between 400 and 5000 hoplites.\(^{974}\) The Peloponnesian War may have intensified the frequency of such modest engagements, but it does not seem to have introduced them to Greek warfare.

According to most scholarly accounts, the ordeal of the hoplite, along with the nature of hoplite engagements, changed over the course of the Peloponnesian War from set-piece, decisive clashes.\(^{975}\) In the last third of the fifth century, in addition to major battles featuring phalanxes of many thousands of hoplites, several large contingents of Athenian hoplites

\(^{971}\) The role of the Athenian cavalry in the defense of Attica in both the Archidamian (Thuc. 2.19.2, 2.22.2; Ar. Knights 576-580) and Ionian (7.25.5) phases of the war has been well-documented; see: Spence 1993, 126-133; Ober 1985a; cf. above, Ch. 1, 42-46, 51.
\(^{973}\) For a list of engagements, troop numbers involved, and reported casualties, see Appendix 1.
\(^{974}\) Rawlings 2000, 233-234.
participated in protracted siege operations and urban fighting. Athenian hoplites also served as *phylakes* in garrisons throughout Attica and the Aegean. From the occupation of Decelea in 413 (Thuc. 7.19.1), Athenian contingents of hoplites were on near constant guard-duty along the fortifications of Athens and the Long Walls (7.28.2, 8.69). In the Archidamian War too, Athenian hoplites frequently served as defenders of Athens’ walls when the enemy was nearby (2.13.6-7, 6.61.2). The sight of fully armed hoplites in the public spaces of Athens became commonplace over the course of the war as several passing references in Aristophanes attest (*Lys.* 555-558, 631-633). Away from Athens, hoplites served as *epibatai* on Athenian triremes (Thuc. 7.62, 8.24.2) and contingents of hundreds and even thousands of hoplites also routinely served as part of sea-borne expeditionary forces aboard special troop transports. Although the Athenians had used triremes to convey large numbers of hoplites throughout the Aegean prior to the Peloponnesian War, the strategic vision of Pericles doubtless contributed to this emergent specialty. Thucydides’ use (and perhaps coinage) of the term *hoplitagôgos* is intriguing in this respect. *Οπλιταγόγοι* make their first appearance in the context of the Sicilian campaign (6.25.2). The specialized term then recurs twice more in Thucydides’ final chapters, each time in the context of expeditions to Miletus involving very large numbers of troops (8.25.1, 8.30.2).

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976 As, e.g., at Potidaea (Thuc. 3.17.3-4), Mytilene (3.18), Syracuse (6.97-102); cf. Ithome (Thuc. 1.102). Inscriptional evidence makes clear that hoplites who fell in such engagements received praise and commemoration in the same terms as those who fell in the crush of phalanx warfare. *IG I^3^* 1179 names the dead who fell at Potidaea as *promachoi* who provided proof of their virtue (*σεμαίνει άρετ[ε]ν*). “Laying down their lives as the price, they acquired valour” (*φυγάξ δ’ άντίρρησαν θέντες / ἐλ[λ]άξαντ’ ἁρετ[έ]ν*). 977 Thuc. 2.13.6-7; *Ar. Ach.* 1022-1023, 1173-1177, *Wasps* 325-237, *Lys.* 102-6; *IG I^2^* 98, 99. 978 Thucydides does, however, use the term *στρατιώτ[ίδες]* [*ή*] of troop ships under Pericles in the early 430s (1.116.2; cf. *IG I^3^* 60). The term ‘martial’ ship appears to be synonymous with *hoplitagôgos* and to have fundamentally distinguished a troop transport from a nimble, combat vessel or ‘fast trireme’ (Thuc. 6.43). Unlike horse-transports (*ιππαγόγοι*), which make their first appearance in the Archidamian War (Thuc. 2.56.2, 4.42.1; *Ar. Knights* 598-600), troop carriers had been in use for some time by the 430s. Plutarch preserves a tradition in which the innovation to convert ‘fast triremes’ (*τρε[τέ]α* into vessels suited for transport of large numbers of hoplites is attributed to Kimon in the 460s (*Cim.* 12.2).
Outside of Thucydides, the word occurs only once in extant ancient Greek (Pollux 1.83), and it is tempting to read Thucydides’ neologism as an indication of the specialized use of Athenian hoplites during the Peloponnesian War. Conservative critics’ ambivalence or disdain about such sea-borne raids and invasions also speaks to the widespread deployment of hoplites in this way during the last decades of the fifth century ([Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 2.1-7; *Pl. Laws* 706b-c).\(^979\) Indeed, Thucydides’ narrative reveals that the deployment of thousands of hoplites in amphibious expeditions throughout the Aegean was a routine feature of Athenian war-making.\(^980\)

In addition to the widespread use of hoplites in campaigns outside of central Greece, the Athenians also deployed heavy infantry as an important element in mixed-armed forces. The Athenian victory at Pylos is the most outstanding example wherein heavy-armed Athenians were used to pin down enemy hoplites while these were outflanked and harassed by skirmishing *psiloi* (Thuc. 4.33-36). As exceptional an event as the Pylos affair was, Thucydides himself provides a clear precedent for such tactics in his narration of a battle near Geraneia in 447 (1.106). There, Athenian hoplites pinned down their Corinthian counterparts while *psiloi* rained stones down upon them from an elevated position. These tactics are presented very matter-of-factly, suggesting that Thucydides does not consider them particularly remarkable and it is probably rash to regard the Athenian strategy at Pylos as unique (the Aitolians also anticipated the use of such tactics against the Athenians the year prior: 3.96-99). What makes Pylos stand out, indeed what “made it the most unexpected thing in the war for all the Greeks was that they thought the Spartans were not supposed to surrender” (4.40.1).

\(^{979}\) Plato, for example, compares the use, familiar in his day, of hoplites in amphibious expeditions to their (quasi mythical) role at Marathon and Plataea (*Laws* 707c-e) and decides that fifth-century, sea-based tactics make the Athenians morally worse than their ancestors.

\(^{980}\) Thuc. 2.17.4, 2.23.2, 2.25.30, 2.26, 2.32, 2.56, 2.58.1, 3.16, 3.94-95, 8.25.1, 8.30.2; Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.34, 1.2.1, 1.4.21.
While Athenian hoplites may have been deployed in irregular, and sometimes novel, situations throughout the Peloponnesian War, it is certainly misleading to assert as Hanson does, that there was “almost no” hoplite involvement in the generational conflict. Only for the first few years of the Archidamian War did Athenian hoplites avoid major engagements with the enemy. In these years, however, large numbers of hoplites were involved in the investment of Potidae and, up to 424 and the capture of Nisea, though it met little if any resistance, the Athenian army invaded the Megarid annually (Thuc. 2.31, 4.69). Beginning with the defeat in 429/8 at Spartolos (2.79), Athenian hoplite armies took part in significant engagements in each year of the war down to the Peace of Nicias: Mytilene, Akarnania, Solygia, Tanagra, Pylos, Delium, Mende, Scione, Torone, Amphipolis. Thousands of Athenians must have identified with Aristophanes’ Dicaeopolis, who fancied himself a consummate and decorated veteran campaigner (πολίτης χρηστός . . . στρατωνίδης: Ach. 595-596).

The casualties resulting from these clashes amount to 2200 on the most conservative estimate, but were probably significantly higher. Nevertheless, this aggregate figure represents 17 percent of the hoplite force adumbrated by Pericles in 431 (Thuc. 2.13.6). From 419/18 to the end of the war, a further total of 3400 hoplites (again an absolute minimum) fought and died in contingents that saw action at Mantinea, Melos, Syracuse, Miletus, Ephesos, Koressos, Nisea, Byzantium, Andros and Arginusae. These total casualties represent a staggering 35 percent of the hoplite force of about 9500 in the interwar period. The high number of war casualties

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982 See Appendix 2 for specifics and references.
983 See Appendix 2.
among Athens’ hoplites coupled with the deaths of some 4400 from plague (3.87.3) created significant demographic shocks for the city.

While historians do not have at their disposal the kinds of figures that would provide a complete picture, the scale of the demographic crisis seems evident from other types of evidence. Diogenes Laertius (2.26) and Aulus Gellius (15.20) claim that the Athenians allowed bigamy for a period during the late fifth century in an attempt to increase birthrates. This measure has been doubted since antiquity (Athenaeus 555d-556, who preserves the testimony of Diogenes and Aulus), but less uncertainty surrounds the fact that, during the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians revoked Pericles’ citizenship law of 451, not reinstating it until 403 (Athenaeus 577b-c). The first campaigns following the ravages of the plague were those in which allied infantry first appear in our sources working in concert with the Athenian phalanx (Thuc. 4.90.1, 5.81.1), after which they are a regular feature, perhaps revealing the need to address population shortages.984

On a local scale, the deaths of Athenian hoplites will have been highly visible. Even if we assume that many Athenians did not actually live in their ancestral deme, which is certainly far from a secure assumption, the impact on these atomic social and civic units will have been plainly observable to dēmotai. Ober creates a vivid picture of the “sixty or seventy men” who counted among the hoplites of the small deme of Prasiai mustering locally for periodic campaigning.985 Mutatis mutandis, in the late fifth century, even when the population of classical Athens was at its zenith, the numbers of hoplites contributed by individual small

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984 Meiggs 1972, 345.
985 2008, 41. Prasiai was represented by only two or three bouletai, which is below the 3.59 average established by Traill. For three bouletai, see Traill 1975, 68, revised to 2 in 1986 (Map 1), 125-140.
demes like Prasiai will have not usually exceeded a hundred or so. Their deaths would have been highly apparent.\footnote{Osborne 1985, 45 estimates the citizen population of most extramural demes in Attica at about 150—contrasted with 15 000 – 20 000 for the asty. For the impact of hoplite casualties on demes, we can follow Dow 1961, arguing that 3000 is a credible number of citizens rather than hoplites for Akharnai. Thus 3000 / 22 (the known bouleotic quota) = 136 gives the proportion of citizens to demesmen-\textit{bouletai}, in which case 500 \textit{bouletai} represent a total of 68 000 citizens. Alternatively, we can adopt the formula of Todd 1998, 163-164. Very roughly speaking, based on Cleisthenic logic, each \textit{bouletês} sitting on a council of 500 should represent 1/500 (or 0.002) of the total citizen body or 40-60 citizens for 4\textsuperscript{th} century Athens; 80-120 citizens for Periclean Athens (e.g., Akharnai = 22 x .002 x 60 000 = 2640). Both models yield roughly the same results: 136 citizens per councilor representative or 120 citizens per councilor. A small deme like Prasiai, therefore, which, if represented by two members of the Boule, included some 240 citizen-demesmen, probably contributed something like 60 hoplites (25\% of the total, which is the percentage of citizens I deem to be of hoplite status to judge from the 14 000 [of 54 780 military-age citizens in 431]). See further, Appendix 1. At least 72 or 139 (or 140) Attic demes had a bouleotic quota of two or fewer. This means that more than half of Attic demes probably fielded less than 100 hoplites. Their loss would have been very ‘visible’ among demesmen of these smaller demes.} The conspicuous loss of so many of Athens’ most esteemed citizens in major defeats lies behind the anguished laments of Athenians who bewailed, “there is not a single man in the land!” (Ar. \textit{Lys.} 524; Thuc. 8.1.2). Before turning to the social and political implications of the vital combat role played by hoplites during the Peloponnesian War, comment must be made on the military contributions of Athens’ other critical military wing, the fleet.

\textbf{7.4.1 Athens’ other warriors}

The navy was crewed overwhelmingly by poor Athenians or those of modest means ([Xen.] \textit{Ath. Pol.} 1.2, 1.11; Thuc. 3.16.1; Xen. \textit{Hell.} 1.6.24). These naval servicemen, moreover, appear to have represented a fairly specialized and permanent subgrouping of Athenians. In \textit{Politics}, when discussing the various classes in Greek cities, Aristotle makes a special addition to his list for Athens (1291b 23-24). Here there is a significant subsection of the population (\textit{πολύχρωμος}) defined as ‘naval’ (\textit{τριπτηρίκον}). The adjective, used of people rather than equipment (\textit{σκοπεμένη}), appears only here but surely describes the same Athenians whom...
Aristophanes calls “the people of the oar” (ὁ ἰφανής λέως: Ach. 162) or, more humorously, the ‘yo-ho’ folk (τὸ ῥυππαρὰξ: Wasps 909; cf. Frogs 1073). It is also generally accepted that naval service in Athens was nearly wholly voluntary. These two observations have led many scholars to assume that poor or ‘sub-hoplite’ Athenians were attracted to serve in the fleet for the promise of pay and that the Athenian naval empire, therefore, and the campaigns fought to maintain it, including the Peloponnesian War before Athens fortunes in this conflict fell, were a boon to “thetic” sailors.

It is clear from our sources, however, that misthos stratiotikos could provide a livelihood to infantrymen as well. Thucydides states that the pay for hoplites outside of Attica during the Archidamian War was two full drachmae—one for the soldier and one for his attendant (3.17.4). Unlike the pay for sailors, we do not hear of fluctuations in this rate. Aristophanic Comedy, too, evinces the fact that infantry service, or at least garrison duty, was well enough paid that soldiers could earn a living at it: Peisetairos’ advice to the father-beater at the end of Birds is: “Serve in the garrisons! Go on campaign! Earning a soldier’s wage, feed yourself!” The notion that it was only the poor who served the city out of economic necessity or to make crass financial profit is one perpetuated by our elite sources ([Xen.] Ath. Pol. 1.13; Thuc. 6.24.3; cf. Ar. Wasps 655-664). The picture looks very different in more demotic sources. Consider the following lines spoken by the elderly Chorus of Wasps:

The problem is that there are drones among us who have no stingers, who, without toiling, devour the fruits of our tribute. This is most distressing to us, if someone who does not campaign (ὑπράπτωντος) gulps down our pay, when on behalf of this land he has never

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987 See, Ch. 4, 103-104
989 Birds 1367-1368: . . . φρούρει στρατεύεται μεθηρωφορῶν σωτήραν τρέφε . . .
990 In the next chapter, I examine the war-time opportunities and obligations of wealthy Athenians.
picked up an oar, a spear, or a blister. But it seems to me that in the future whichever citizen does not have a stinger should not make off with three obols. 991

This passage reveals that rowers and lower-class citizens were subject to the same expectations of military service as citizens of ‘hoplite status.’ All military service, by land or sea, is seen as patriotic service, regardless of remuneration; taking pay is only problematized when it occurs in the context of a failure to serve and to be a useful citizen. Athenian citizens of all socio-economic strata were expected to contribute to the city’s defense and imperial success; part of the payoff for such contribution was entitlement to the fruits of that imperial success. 992

As was mentioned above, the Athenians were prepared to recognize publically the contribution of lower-class Athenians, especially those who served as nautai, to the defense of the city, even if the figure of the hoplite predominates in public discourse. This, as I have shown, has largely to do with how deeply complementary were the ethics of democratic citizenship and those of hoplite warfare rather than being simply an indication of class-dominance. We should not allow the relative public obscurity of the nautês to confirm the biases of our elite sources. Citizen nautai played a critical role in the success of the city, and even as, contrary to the impression given by those sources, economic motivation was not peculiar to them, so at the same time their motivations to serve were surely in good part patriotic and honour-driven as

991 *Wasps* 1114-1121: ἀλλὰ γὰρ κηρήθησεν ἡμῖν εἰσιν ἐγκαθήμενοι / οὐκ ἔχοντες κέντρον, οἱ μένοντες ἡμῶν τοῦ φόρου / τὸν πόνον κατεσθίενσιν, οὐ ταλαιπωρούμενοι. / τούτο δ’ ἦστ’ ἀληθινόν ἡμῖν, ἣν τις ἀστράτευτος ὄν / ἐκροήθη τὸν μισθὸν ἡμῶν, τής τίς γύρως ὑπερ / μήτε κάπην μὴτε λόγχην μήτε φλόκταιαν λαβὼν. / ἀλλ’ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ τὸ λοιπὸν τῶν πολιτῶν ἐμβραχ’ / ὅστις ἂν μὴ ἥρμι τὸ κέντρον, μὴ φέρειν τριώβαλον.

992 Balot 2014, 195.
well as economic, just as they were for the infantry. After all, remuneration at similar rates was available for much less risky and onerous occupations.\(^\text{993}\)

Thucydides writes that the first defections from the *arkhê* (then still an Athenian hegemony of autonomous allies) came about in part because the allies found it preferable to contribute ships and funds rather than to campaign in person as naval personnel (1.99.1-3).\(^\text{994}\) The allies, Thucydides says, were neither accustomed nor willing to toil (*οὐκ εἰσθόσιν οὐδὲ βουλομένοις ταλαπωρεῖν*). This surely is evidence, if any is needed apart from what we know of the campaigning conditions experienced by Greek seamen, for the onerous nature of naval campaigning.\(^\text{995}\) Indeed, Herodotus’ account of the doomed Ionian Revolt pins the lackluster effort of the Ionian Greeks on their “being unused to [naval campaigning] and being worn out by the such hard work and by the heat of the sun.”\(^\text{996}\) It is conceivable that wages were not high enough in the early years of the Delian League to attract the islanders to serve as rowers, but we should not overstate this possibility. That sailors would have been remunerated is beyond doubt. There is good evidence from the earliest period for which we have evidence of polis-based fleets of triremes (c. 525) that rowers were given a daily allowance (*misthos*) and that this was paid for from public monies.\(^\text{997}\) Such payments were necessary to facilitate trireme warfare. The

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\(^{993}\) Raaflaub 1998, 24; cf. Garlan 1995, 60-62. On the wages of *nautai* throughout the Peloponnesian War, see above, Ch. 4.3.1.

\(^{994}\) Plutarch (*Cim*. 11) provides what appears to be independent evidence, perhaps following Hellanikos (cf. Blackman 1969, 188-189). With the Persian menace removed from the Aegean by the 450s, the allies preferred to contribute at first empty ships and then only money rather than vigorously campaign themselves.

\(^{995}\) Notoriously, the cramped confines of the classical warship entailed deprivations of food and drink as well as other unpleasantness, such as the proximity of warm bodies (Morrison and Coates 1986, 238) and the casual discharge of bodily functions (Ar. *Frogs* 236-239, 1074-1075). At the same time the blistering and callousing of rowers’ hands and buttocks was proverbial in classical Athens and a comic trope in Aristophanes (*Wasps* 1121, *Frogs* 236).

\(^{996}\) Hdt. 6.12.2: . . . ὁλὰ ἕπαθες ἐόντες πόνων τοιούτων τετρυμένοι τε ταλαπωρήσθι τε καὶ ἥλιο . . .

\(^{997}\) van Wees 2010, 205-226.
trireme’s design, sleek and light, privileged space for rowing-power above all else, with the result that hulls had very limited capacity to store provisions. Daily, a trireme commander had to ensure that he found shore, both for the good of his ship, which had to be allowed to dry lest it become waterlogged and heavy, and, more importantly, so that his crew could provision itself at local markets. 998

If the harsh campaigning conditions of Athenian nautai are enough to cause us to question the assumption that naval servicemen were motivated solely by misthos, the risk to personal safety involved in naval campaigning should force us to reject this notion altogether. On the one hand, naval service was much more dangerous than infantry service. Defeat in large naval battles could yield appalling casualties. 999 Scores of men must have been instantly crushed to death whenever a ship was rammed by the enemy. When ships were disabled or sunk, survivors in the water might drown or be dispatched by enemy missiles. Thucydides describes the exuberance of the Corinthians in the aftermath of the battle of Sybota (432) as they slew some of their own survivors in an attempt to dispatch the shipwrecked Corcyreans (1.50.1). The description conjures up a moving passage from Aeschylus’ Persians, which tells of the slaughter of Persian seamen in the water by Athenian crews in the aftermath of Salamis. The Persian Messenger laments that:

As if our men were tuna or some haul of fish, they went on clubbing them and cleaving them with broken oars and pieces of wreckage. 1000

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998 Thuc. 8.95; Xen. Hell. 2.1.27; cf. Ps.-Xen. Ath. Pol. 2.5.
999 Strauss 2007, 223-47, 2000a, and 1986, 179-182; Krentz 1985. The most famous examples are the Athenian losses of more than 3000 at Aigisopotamoi (Xen. Hell. 2.1.31-32) and of the staggering losses (more than 10 000?) resulting from the loss of the massive Athenian fleets in Egypt (Thuc. 1.104, 109-110) and Syracuse (Thuc. 7.87.5-6).
1000 424-426.
Finally, even on undamaged ships, sailors were badly exposed to the spear-thrusts and javelins of enemy marines. Thucydides reports the great damage done to Athenian sailors in the Battle of Syracuse by Syracusan javelin-throwers, both those on the decks of enemy triremes and those who, in small, fast boats, sailed alongside Athenian triremes and discharged volleys at the unprotected nautai (7.40.5). There is no way to quantify naval casualties in Peloponnesian War (or any period) because our sources do not record them as they often do for hoplite engagements.\(^{1001}\) Given the extreme vulnerability of nautai, both to the elements and to the enemy, it has often been accepted by scholars that whenever our sources speak of a lost or sunken trireme we can assume that the ship’s entire crew was in severe jeopardy of death or capture.\(^{1002}\)

The danger to life and limb posed by naval campaigning was thus considerable. There was, however, an additional, and very significant, psychological disincentive to naval service that had to be overcome by Athenian nautai. Death at sea and by drowning was greatly feared by the Greeks.\(^{1003}\) The psychological aversion to death at sea can be traced back at least as far as Hesiod (W&D 618, 687).\(^{1004}\) Beyond the self-evident observation that drowning is a pitiable fate in itself, for the Greeks there was a practical and religious consideration underlying the terror of drowning. In the Greek religious paradigm, the soul (ψωρή) remained restlessly associated with the body (σῶμα) and could not truly pass into the realm of the dead until the

\(^{1001}\) That names of nautai were included on Athenian casualty lists is all but certain. IG I^3^ 1032 records the names of citizen (astoi) nautai, but the inscription’s designation as a casualty list is far from certain (see Ch. 8, 00). Pausanias lists several monuments in the Kerameikos that list the names of those who fell in naumakhiai (1.29). Sources like these, however, cannot provide the kind of statistical data set required to create a comprehensive casualty list.

\(^{1002}\) Strauss 1986, but see also Strauss 2000, 268-269; Hornblower CT III, 1061-1066.

\(^{1003}\) Strauss 2000. The events surrounding the battle of Arginuse illustrate this most clearly: Xen. Hell. 1.7.1-35.

\(^{1004}\) 687: “It is a terrible thing to die among the waves” (δεινὸν ἕστι θανατί μετὰ κῶμασιν).
body had received formal rites of burial. The most famous illustration of this conception is the moving passage from the *Iliad* in which the shade (*psykhê*) of Patroclus confronts Achilles, exhorting him, “bury me as quickly as possible” (θάπτε μὲ ὅστι τάχιστα). The apparition explains that he wanders vainly between the world and the gates of the underworld and that, without burial, he cannot make his way to Hades (*Il. 23.65-74*).

A body lost at sea posed a particular challenge in this respect, as the example of Polydorus in Euripides’ *Hecuba* makes clear. Murdered by Polymestor and cast into the sea, the phantom (*eîðolon*) of Polydorus lingers unburied (*âtaφoç*) and appears to Hecuba in desperation to find a *taphos*, which denotes both a physical resting place and its marker and the associated burial rites.\(^{1005}\) The proper burial of war dead was one of the most sacred and unanimously acknowledged of Greek customs, already firmly established in the Homeric poems.\(^{1006}\) The respectful treatment of the dead, moreover, was a quintessential and binding *panellênôn nomos* (*Eur. Supp. 526; Lys. 2.9*), breaches of which are unanimously condemned in Greek literature.\(^{1007}\) The moral obligation to recover those who died in war was strong enough that a pious man like Nicias could risk turning victory into defeat in an attempt to

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\(^{1005}\) *Eur. Hec.* 1-50, esp. 47-50: φανήσομαι γάρ, ώς τάφου τόλμους τόχου, / δούλης ποδών πάροιθαν ἐν κλωδωνίῳ. / τοὺς γάρ κάτω σθένοντας ἐξητησάμην / τόμβου κυρήσας κάς γέρας μητρὸς πεσεῖν. Cf. Callim. *Ep.* 45 (*CEG 470 = Rhobes AP, 7.271*): If only there were no swift ships! Then we would / not be mourning Sosipolis, son of Dioclides. / But now his corpse is adrift somewhere / on the sea, and instead of that / man we go by his name and an empty grave marker.

\(^{1006}\) Pritchett *GSAW* IV, 94-259 catalogues references to this *nomos of anairesis*, which can refer equally to the picking up of *nekroi* from the field or the performance of burial rites over those corpses. On the importance of proper identification and retrieval of battlefield dead for burial in the classical period, see Vaughn 1991.

\(^{1007}\) For example: the Thebans’ refusal to allow the burial of Polyneikes and his companions was proverbial and a favourite Athenian myth, as the examples of dramatic treatment show—*Seven Against Thebes, Antigone, Suppliants, Phoenician Women*; Achilles’ attempted mutilation of Hector’s corpse is prevented through Apollo’s intervention (*Il. 22.395-404, 24.12-21*); the actions of the Boeotians in the aftermath of the battle of Delium (*Thuc. 4.97-99, 101*); Lysander’s failure to bury the Athenians prisoners whom he had executed following the Battle of Aigospotamoi (*Paus. 9.32.9*; cf. *Xen. Hell.* 2.1.31 [which records the execution, but not the prohibition on burial]). See also *Thuc. 7.75*, where the Syracusan assault on the hapless Athenians in retreat is so relentless that men under Nicias are unable to bury their dead.
reclaim the bodies of two Athenian soldiers as he did following the Battle of Solygeia (Thuc. 4.44.5-6; Plut. Nic. 6.5-6). In Athens, at least, nomoi surrounding the dead were not constrained to those who died in war. Athenian law, famously, contained a provision that anyone who happened across a corpse was under obligation to cover it with earth (Ael. VH 5.14). Nevertheless, the importance to Athenian sensibilities of recovering the war dead and appropriately honouring them is evidenced generally by the tradition of the funerary patrios nomos and, in particular, by the inclusion in this of a cenotaph (κλάνη κενή) “for the missing who could not be found for burial” (οἱ ἄν μὴ εὑρεθῶσιν ἐξ ἀναίρεσιν: Thuc. 2.34.3).

Anairesis of the dead in war was a fundamental obligation for survivors to perform and to grant, irrespective of the fortunes of battle. Anairesis was also a central expectation that underlay the social contract between soldier and community. There was a profound presumption on the part of the soldier that, should he fall in service to his community, his remains would be recovered and properly presided over. Just as the risks involved in war were common (τὰς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τύχας κοινὰς ἀπάντων ἀνθρώπων), so too were the expectations of respectful treatment of those who were misfortunate. Such an expectation was a koinê elpis.

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1008 According to Greek custom, it was generally acknowledged that a request for permission to retrieve one’s dead was tantamount to a formal admission of defeat. See; van Wees 2004, 136; Pritchett GSAW IV, 153-235.

1009 Thucydides’ description of the breakdown of burial customs during the most severe effects of the plague is also relevant (2.52.3-4).

1010 Cf. Ar. Birds 393-399.

1011 Cf. the so-called ‘Oath of Plataea’ cited by Lykurgos, which includes the provision: τοῖς ἐν τῇ μάχῃ τελευτήσαντας τῶν συμμάχων ἀπάντας θάψω (1.81; Tod GHI II, 204, lines 29-31).

1012 Assurance of a proper burial was of paramount importance even to men who fought on behalf of others besides their polis, as is revealed in the terms of employment for a group of mercenaries under Jason of Pherai which included provisions for care of the wounded and the adornment and burial of the dead (Xen. Hell. 6.1.6). See also Xen. Anab. 6.4.9, for the importance of giving mercenary soldiers anairesis and the provision of a cenotaph for the unrecoverable.

1013 Lys. 2.7-10.
The lack of an anairesis for Athenian sailors was, according to both Xenophon and Diodorus, the chief issue at hand in the prosecution of the generals for their actions at Arginusae. And in the epitaphic tradition, the unrecovered sailors from Arginusae were singled out as meeting an “undeserved misfortune” (ὦνακίου τούχης) because they were could not be buried in the dēmosion sēma (Pl. Menex. 243c). Athenian sailors thus willingly undertook intense discomfort on campaign and the risk of dying the extremely pitiable death by drowning, which often meant a lack of anairesis and, which, according to some ancient writers, was inglorious, a thing of disgust (δοξηπής) and not capable of illustrating andreia (Arist. NE 3.6.7-11). It would seem perverse to suggest that nautai performed their service out of mere financial incentive and without a sense of moral obligation similar to that of the infantrymen. Even poor Athenians, who could not afford infantry service, were expected to do their part in the defense of the city as nautai, while those who shirked this obligation were conceived of as astrateutoi. The payoff for such service, however, in social terms, fell well below that of the Athenian infantryman. This was because the nature of hoplite combat was thought to reveal the inherent andreia or aretē of an individual. Rather than manliness and virtue, the quality that was displayed by Athenian naval personnel was tekhnē (Thuc. 1.142). The skill and loyalty of Athenian sailors clearly earned them the respect of their countrymen and other Greeks (Thuc. 1.143; [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 1.19-20), but the nature of naval service, “corporate and not personally

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1014 Discrepancy between the two accounts is found in that Xenophon’s lengthier description of the Arginusae affair (Hell. 1.7.1-35) refers to the failure of the generals to “pick up” (anaireô) shipwrecked Athenians (ναοαχόν), by which he means both the sailors who had survived the battle but later drowned and those who were killed in action; Diodorus’ more succinct account (13.100-103.2) refers only to the Athenians who had died fighting.

1015 Raaflaub 1994, 139-142; Loraux 1986, 34, 212-213; Vidal-Naquet 1968, 93. For a collection and discussion of passages in Athenian literature that denigrate the andreia or deny aretē of troops other than hoplites, see Hanson 1995, 344-345. For a discussion of Athenian naval tekhnai, see Starkey 2013.
confrontative,” did not do the same work to reveal a combatant’s manly courage or civic virtue as did service among the infantry.\textsuperscript{1016}

\textbf{7.5 Enrolling citizens: civic obligation, performance and claims of inclusion}

The ancient notion that military service, and hoplite service in particular, revealed moral qualities of a citizen brings me to a radical hypothesis about the fifth-century \textit{katalogoi}, which I have argued above do not seem to have represented an effective mechanism for mass compulsory conscription. What strengthens this impression is that whenever our sources explicitly mention hoplites “from the list,” the troop numbers involved never exceed a few thousand—perhaps 10 percent of Athenian hoplites (e.g., Thuc. 6.26.2, 6.31.3, 6.43.1, 7.16.2, 7.20.2, 8.24.2; Xen. \textit{Hell}. 1.1.34; Diod. 11.84.5). \textit{Katalogoi} are never mentioned in the context of mass levies, for which our sources tend to use the adverb \textit{pandēmēi} (e.g., Thuc. 1.73.4, 1.107.5, 1.126.7, 2.31.1, 2.94.2, 3.91.4, 4.90.1, 8.94.3; Xen. \textit{Hell}. 2.4.43), or a special noun for full mobilization, \textit{panstratēia} (e.g., Thuc. 2.31.1-3, 4.66.1, 4.94.1; Lys. 3.45; cf. Htd. 1.62.3).\textsuperscript{1017} Partial call-up and serving in turn, of course, are not incompatible with mandatory conscription. But what is striking is the notion found in multiple ancient sources from Thucydides to Aristotle that service ‘from the list’ was associated with the best or the most

\textsuperscript{1016} Winkler 1990b, 179 n. 21.
\textsuperscript{1017} The terms \textit{pandemei} and \textit{panstratia} are used more or less synonymously, as can be seen in Thuc. 2.31 and 4.90-94, but often the former is used in situations where mobilization is hasty or even spontaneous (e.g., 1.126.7).
useful citizens: it would seem that for a citizen to be καταλεγέις was itself a mark of
distinction.

Diodorus, relying on Ephoros, reports that when the Athenians voted to allow Tolmides
to enroll 1000 hoplites, they assumed that “he would enlist (καταλέξειν) for his army young
men in the prime of youth and most vigorous in body” (11.84.5). Likewise, Isocrates states that
his father had served as one of a thousand hoplites under Phormio in 432 in an expedition to
Thrace for which the general had “enlisted the best men” (ἐπιλεξάμενος τοὺς ἀρίστους; 16.29).
Ps.-Aristotle claims that call-up by katalogos resulted in intolerably high casualties
among the city’s “respectable men” (ἐπιεικεῖς: Ath. Pol. 26.1). Here, epieikeis has definite
moral force. As we have seen from the introduction to this section, morality and socioeconomic
class were intertwined in Greek thought—especially the thought of an upper-class student of
Aristotle. It may thus be tempting to interpret Ath. Pol.’s comments here as pointing to service
ek katalogou as the prerogative or liability of only wealthy citizens, as some scholars have.
It is worth noting here, however, that Ps.-Aristotle says explicitly that it was the epieikeis “from
among the demos and the rich” (καὶ τοῦ δήμου καὶ τῶν εὐπόρων) who died in numbers as a
result of the katalogos system. Furthermore, a little earlier in the same passage, Ath. Pol. notes

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1018 Hamel 1998, 25 n. 70, following Andrewes 1981, documents the highly selective nature of the
These studies, however, focus on the potential for abuse (inferred from Lys. 9.4, 15) and assume that the
lists represent statutory obligation. The situation appears more complex.
1019 It is surprising that the two recent monographs to focus on the agonal elements of hoplite warfare
(Dayton 2006 and Lendon 2005) do not address mobilization at all.
1020 Hamel 1998, 26. Cf. Thuc. 1.64.2 (where the hoplites under Phormio number 1600).
1021 This argument seems to have a parallel in Arist. Pol. 1303a8-10; Hamel 1998, 25 n. 70;
Andrewes 1981, 3; Rhodes 1981, 328.
1022 See van Wees 2004, 55-57, and above Ch. 6.7; cf. Gabrielsen 2002b, 93, who disavows any
historical value to this passage and Ar. Pol. 1303a8-10, claiming that they are Aristotelian inferences based
on the theorist’s belief in the connection between hoplites, broad oligarchies (politeiai) and rich citizens.
Gabrielsen goes too far, I think, in divorcing Aristotle the theorist from Aristotle the researcher.
that “the multitude” (τοῦς πολλοὺς) had suffered seriously (ἐφθάρθοι) in war (in reference to the years 465-450) because of the army being drawn up ek katalogou (τῆς γὰρ στρατείας γεγομένης . . . ἐκ καταλόγου). 1023 Polloi is obviously a very uncomfortable term for scholars who want to use this passage to argue for the exclusion of poor citizens from the katalogoi, and in these passages the quality of the men drafted seems to admit of socio-economic inequality.

One passage, in particular, cited above, deserves further consideration: at 6.31.3, Thucydides says that, for the Sicilian expedition, the hoplite force was carefully selected (ἐκκριθέν) from the καταλόγοι χρηστοί. 1024 Evidently, Athenian generals kept lists of the most capable soldiers. A scholiast notes that khrêstois here is synonymous with ἀληθέσι and βεβασανισμένος, the true and the tested. This latter is especially interesting. Basanizó refers to testing a metal (especially gold) 1025 for its purity and quality, and also, metaphorically, to the testing of people, and is used to describe close questioning of litigants, 1026 or the torture of slaves, 1027 to ensure the genuineness of their testimony. 1028 Citizens, of course, were not subject to legal basanismos, and the scholiast obviously uses the term metaphorically, but the gloss is intriguing.

1023 For our purposes, the precise historicity of Ath. Pol.’s claims, which are dubious, is not paramount, but rather the significance of the fact that Aristotle and his pupils had evidence that the katalogos system resulted in disproportional casualties among the city’s gnôrimoi (cf. Plato, Charm. 153b-c). With Rhodes (AP 326) and Gomme (HCT I, 310) it is difficult to account for any campaigns in which the Athenians lost two and three thousand men, let alone to account for this happening year to year as Ath. Pol. contends. The expedition to Egypt may account for one such occurrence, but the mass of (naval) casualties involved here make it highly unlikely that the author has in mind these for epiēkeis. Gomme suggests the infantry engagements of Eurymedon and Tanagra citing the heavy losses reported by Plut. Cim. 17.6.

1024 Thuc. 6.31.3: . . . τὸ δὲ παῖδι καταλόγοις τε χρηστοῖς ἐκκριθέν καὶ ὀπλών καὶ τὸν περὶ τὸ σῶμα σκεῦῶν μεγάλη σπουδὴ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀμιλληθέν. ξινέβη δὲ πρὸς τε σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἄμα ἔριν γενέσθαι, ὥ τις ἐκαστος προστέθη . . .


1026 Ar. Ach. 110, Frogs 1121.

1027 Antiphon 2.4.8; Thuc. 7.86.4; Ar. Frogs 616-672.

1028 Mirhady 2000.
Kurke, in her study of Greek coins and the politics of meaning in context of polis, shows how Greek thinking about coined money was imbued with ideological assumptions about civic virtue and utility.\(^{1029}\) Some of her observations about Athenian coinage can be heuristically applied to the foregoing discussion of hoplite service in Athens. Crucially, what is at stake in the establishment of a currency is an “agreed upon value” (τὸ νόμωσιμο δόκιμο), marked with a civic stamp.\(^{1030}\) One of Kurke’s theses is that the Athenians’ commitment to pure silver coins and their aversion to token currency, such as the emergency gold and bronze currencies issued in 407/6\(^{1031}\) and 406/5,\(^{1032}\) stemmed from the idea of the silver coin “as a civic token that wedded nomos and phusis, pure and valuable essence imprinted with a civic stamp.”\(^{1033}\) The seal of the city, placed by civic officials, on a lump of inherently valuable material instantly told anyone who came into contact with an Athenian coin that its worth was inconvertible. That the Athenians conceived of hoplite service as revealing the inherent value of a citizen has already been shown. It is striking to see that the same considerations for testing and stamping a coin enter into Athenian thinking about citizens and military service. Indeed, Xenophon’s Socrates confidently declares that good and bad men can be identified through military service just as one might test a coin (Mem. 3.1.9). I would suggest that the ‘testing’ (dokimasia) of citizens through hoplite combat was one way in which citizens—especially those of unassuming lineage—could achieve for themselves an uncontestable status as a useful (khrêstos) and ‘proven’ (dokimos) citizen in a regime that suppressed the traditional marker of such

\(^{1029}\) 1999, 299-331.  
^{1030}\) 1999, 300.  
^{1031}\) Ar. Frogs 720-733 with scho.; Philochorus FGrH 328 Fr. 141; see Howgego 1995, 111-112.  
^{1032}\) Ar. Eccl. 815-822.  
^{1033}\) 1999, 309.
status—paternal identity—in an effort to achieve civic equality.\textsuperscript{1034} Hoplite service in classical Athens democratized valour.

Given the broad discretion of generals in compiling their \textit{katalogoi} (Lys. 9; [Arist.] \textit{Ath. Pol.} 26.1; Arist. \textit{Pol.} 1303a8-10), and given that generals would naturally want to enlist the most able troops (Xen. \textit{Mem.} 3.4.4-5; Lys. 9.15; Isoc. 16.29; Diod. 11.84.5; cf. Thuc. 3.98.4), to be a hoplite from the list meant that one could lay claim to status as something of an \textit{epilektos} or a \textit{logas}.\textsuperscript{1035} As we have seen, a record of exemplary hoplite service was considered to be an indicator of goodness and usefulness such that reliable hoplites were “consider[ed] to be distinguished over other citizens in character” (δοκοῦσι καλοκαγαθία προκατέχοντο τῶν πολιτῶν: Xen. \textit{Mem.} 3.5.19). The lists announced publically who of the citizenry was thought, by the generals and their taxiarchs, to be useful and dependable.\textsuperscript{1036} The \textit{katalogoi} did for the living warrior (in a less ostentatious, less permanent way) some of what the monumental casualty lists did for the dead, whose manly courage and benefaction to the city were wholly beyond reproach (Thuc. 2.42.2-3).\textsuperscript{1037}

\textsuperscript{1034} This had been the case, I believe, since the earliest wars fought under the democracy, from 507/6. Even as the Cleisthenic system was being worked out, there was evidently a sudden rush of average citizens to arms as under the conditions of \textit{isagoriē}, many Athenians abandoned their former timidity (\textit{ethelokakia}) Hdt. 5.74-78.

\textsuperscript{1035} Xen. \textit{Mem.} 3.4.4-5: Socrates notes how an ambitious (\textit{philonikos}) general is at pains to select the “best men in war” (ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς τοῖς κρατίστοις), both officers (τοῖς τάξεως) and fighting men (τοῖς μαχητέροις) For ‘picked’ units of hoplites in Thucydides outside of Athens, see 1.62.6, 2.25.3, 4.125.3-127.2, 5.60.3, 5.67.2, 5.72.3, 6.96.3, and in Xenophon, see \textit{Hell.} 5.3.23, 7.1.19, 7.2.10, \textit{Anab.} 3.4.43 (cf. 3.4.21); for ‘picked hoplites’ chosen by Athenian generals, see Thuc. 4.129.4, 6.100.1, 6.101.4 and Hdt. 9.21.3. The hoplites taken by Cleon to Torone in 423 are said by Athenaeus (though citing Thucydides 5.2.1 who does not use the term) to have been \textit{epilektoi} (5.215d).

\textsuperscript{1036} A scholiast to Thuc. 5.60.3 explains that \textit{λογάδες} were \textit{ἐκκλησία}; \textit{Λογάδες} were \textit{ἐκκλησία}; ‘those called by name’.

\textsuperscript{1037} Arrington 2014, 113.
That hoplite service was generative of *kharis* has already been established the paragraphs above.\(^{1038}\) The most explicit passage to consider, however, comes from Xenophon’s *Memorabilia*. Socrates instructs his friend, Epigenes, on the importance of not being overweight for, just as in athletics, when it comes to war, fit citizens will:

> save themselves decorously (εὔσχημώνως)\(^{1039}\) on the battlefield and escape all the dangers of war; many will help friends and do good to their country and for this earn gratitude; get great glory and gain very high honours, and on account of this they will henceforth live more pleasant and better lives.\(^{1040}\)

Socrates, of course, who had saved the life of Alcibiades in battle at Potidaea, and who was very nearly awarded the prize of valour (Pl. *Symp.* 220c-e; Plut. *Alc.* 7.3), was the very embodiment of his own advice to Epigenes. Contrary to the common assumption, which holds that the conscript soldier has less of a claim to recognition than a volunteer, it seems that serving ‘from the list’ might have been deemed worthy of additional *kharis*.\(^{1041}\) For example, in *Memorabilia*, Nikomakhides complains to Socrates that he has not been chosen general despite “having worn himself out campaigning”; he is careful to specify ἐκ καταλόγου (3.4.1).\(^{1042}\)

\(^{1038}\) Athenian litigants routinely bring up their hoplite service in the same breath as their financial service, expecting to evoke the *kharis* of their judges (e.g., Lys. 7.41, 12.38, 16.13-18, 18.24-27, 21.5-11, 25.4, 12-13, 30.26); Pritchard 2010, 38-39.

\(^{1039}\) The adverb powerfully invokes at once the desirable aesthetic of the fit male form, the managed and disciplined behaviour of the hoplite (for this use, see Xen. *Anab.* 1.10.10), and the moral goodness or nobility of character of the citizen.\(^{1040}\) Mem. 3.12.4.

\(^{1041}\) The distinction between compulsory hoplite service and voluntary service is not as straightforwardly dichotomous as has usually been assumed; moreover, the claim that in any historical society compulsory service would be antithetical to social recognition for that service is unfounded. Social anthropologists assert that the customs of any community develop such that all manner of contributions to the social group, whether requested or not, whether coerced or not, entail obligation on the part of the community to recognize the benefactor (Sahlins 1974, 191-221).

\(^{1042}\) Cf. Lys. 15.6, where Mantitheos claims to have petitioned his general to transfer him from the cavalry to the hoplite *katalogos* for the expedition to Haliartos. As for recognition for military service generally, Thucydides’ funeral oration alludes to social benefits that attend recognition for defending one’s city (2.43.1, 2.46.1).
Finally, since there was no centralized, permanent *katalogos*, and the lists generated for specific campaigns were subject to considerable changeover year-to-year to account for casualties and natural death rate, the system might naturally encourage citizens to aspire to be listed for a future campaign. The creation of lists and other forms of publication of the contributions of individuals to the state was considered by the Athenians to be an important motivational driver of civic behaviour.\(^\text{1043}\) In his recent book on civic obligation, Liddel has observed that the function of other temporary lists of citizen names in Athens had this exhortative function, rather than a purely coercive one.\(^\text{1044}\) I think it is worth considering, once hoplite service is set into its social and political context, that the hoplite draft was not straightforwardly a system of mandatory conscription, but an institution that expressed the self-interested rivalry that fuelled the public institutions of the democratic polis.

This is not to say that the lists did not represent a kind of compulsion. Two references to call up *ek katalogou* explicitly mention ἀνάγκη (Thuc. 8.24.2; Diod. 11.84). The threat of legal action for non-compliance, however, was only one aspect of the imperative to serve. Necessity that arises as a result of force (or legal action) is too narrow a reading of anangkê, which also covers necessity arising from compelling social practices and expectations.\(^\text{1045}\) Hoplites

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\(^\text{1043}\) On the publication of individuals’ names and deeds through proclamation, see Dem. 18.120. Indeed, so strong was the allure of public distinction in Athens that Xenophon imagines that “many foreigners” besides “certain kings and tyrants and satraps” would eagerly make contributions to the Athenian state (εἰσενεγκέιν) “out of a desire to share in this reward” (ἐπιθυμήσας μετασχέιν ταύτης τῆς χάριτος; Xen. *Ways and Means* 3.11).

\(^\text{1044}\) Liddel 2007, 184-198 (with reference to Goody 1977, who offers a theoretical account of the activity of list-keeping in political societies). Particularly Liddel points to the published accounts of the naval *epimeletai*, which adumbrated information about a trireme’s captaincy and its equipment (188-191). These have been read traditionally as records of the debts of *triérarkhoi* to the state for borrowed (and unreturned) equipment. Liddel has provocatively suggested rather that such lists served to honour former *triérarkhoi* for their liturgical outlay and simultaneously to stoke the philotimic drive of future liturgists. On philotimia and elite citizens, particularly *triérarkhoutes*, see next chapter.

\(^\text{1045}\) Rickert 1989, 7-34.
compelled into service on the basis of the *katalogoi* (ἐκ καταλόγου ἀναγκαστοί) may have felt additional pressure to serve as a result of the public display of their names. These publicized lists focused both positive attention (honours, claims to *kharies*) and negative attention on individuals (liability to legal challenges of dereliction). The negative compulsion under which individual heavy-infantrymen went to war, however, was likely not greatly different from that of other Athenian servicemen (Thuc. 2.23.2, 3.16.1, 7.13; Xen. *Hell*. 1.6.24), or the various supporting labour and resources “pressed into service” by the polis. Unless it is imagined that there existed in Peloponnesian-War Athens a constitutional and legal basis for state level conscription and requisition of everything from bakers (σποτοῖοι) to masons (λιθολόγοι) and carpenters (τέκτονες) to privately owned merchant ships (ὀλκάδες), we should resist equating the imperative to serve in simple, or even predominantly, legal terms.\(^{1046}\)

The fact that hoplite *katalogoi* publically advertised the honour and status of certain citizens while implicitly denying these to others, together with the reality of perennial deployment of Athenian hoplites during the Peloponnesian War, made considerations of hoplite service a natural part of the debate about civic status when these arose. Contentions over who was and who was not *khreóstos* were in the air in Peloponnesian-War Athens, and the political and social privileges of ‘useful’ citizens were increasingly a matter of debate and negotiation as the war went on. Military participation and distinction were factored heavily in debates around civic enfranchisement and social privilege. Already in the 420s, appeals for limiting the

\(^{1046}\) For *sitopoioi*, *lithologoi*, *tektones*, and *holkades* compelled to serve with pay (*emnithoi*), see: Thuc. 6.22.1, 6.44.1; and Gomme *HCT* IV, 259. Cf. Xen. *Lac. Pol.* 11.2, where the ephors publically announce the age-groups of *hippeis*, hoplites and craftsmen (*χειροτέχναι*) who are to go on campaign. The point of Xenophon’s encomiastic description of the Spartan’s military organization, like their *politeia* generally, however, is to impress his Athenian audience, which appears to have regarded Spartan military organization as bewilderingly complex (11.5).
franchise to those who performed military service could be heard in Athens. In 424, Aristophanes’ chorus of wasps could argue that only those citizens with a ‘stinger’ should be entitled to the privileges of citizenship, to the exclusion of the astrateutos. In Thesmophoriazousae (produced in 411), Aristophanes lampoons the social debate around (military) khrēsis:

Of the many accusations we could justly bring against the men of Athens, this one is the most monstrous. One of us who bears a man useful to the city (αὐτός Χρηστόν τῇ πόλει), a taxarch or a general, ought to receive some honour (τιμήν τινα), a front seat should be reserved for her at the festivals of Stenia and Skira and at similar festivals conducted by women. On the other hand, she who bears a coward and base man (δειλόν καὶ πονηρόν ἄνδρα), a bad trierarch or a cowardly steersman, should sit with a shaved head (σκύφιον ἀποκεκαμένην) behind her sister who gave birth to the brave man (τὸν ἄνδρεῖον).1047

Just a few weeks after Aristophanes’ play, these contentions were raised to a fever pitch in the constitutional upheavals under the oligarchy. The historical accounts of the implementation of Athens’ oligarchic constitutions (the Four Hundred and the Five Thousand) are confused, but both of our main sources, Thucydides and Ps.-Aristotle, agree that the rhetoric of the oligarchs involved limiting the franchise to five thousand Athenians hoplites (Thuc. 8.65.3, 8.97.1; Ath. Pol. 29.5).1048 It is almost certain, furthermore, that the fictive hoplite republic under Draco was dreamed up in this climate of political theorizing; this, at any rate, is strongly suggested by the publication in 410 of Draco’s law on homicide, which act speaks to an interest in the archaic lawgiver and past constitutions.1049 Those Athenians who invented it retrojected this hoplite

1047 Ar. Thesm. 830-839.
1048 Cf. the moderate Theramenes’ appeal in 404 that the franchise be open to “those who can serve the city with shields and horses” (Xen. Hell. 2.3.48). The accounts of Thucydides and Ath. Pol. on the course of the revolution have been the centre of a large and robust scholarship, see, e.g.: Rosivach 2012c; Rhodes 1972 and AP, 362-415; Mossé 1964; de Ste. Croix 1956; Hignett 1952, 268-280, 356-378; Hornblower CT III; Dover HCT V, 201-206.
1049 Osborne 2010, 276; Rhodes AP, 86-7, 385-389.
politeia to a time before Solon in order to give it the air of an ‘ancestral constitution,’ and the
Ath. Pol. preserves this fiction (3.1-6).

Some scholars have interpreted the attempts to limit the franchise to hoplites in 411 a plan by the oligarchs to restore the timocratic system ascribed to Solon (Ath. Pol. 5-12).\textsuperscript{1050} If this were the case, we might expect to hear about it directly from our sources.\textsuperscript{1051} Rather than appealing straightforwardly to a timocratic structure, what the Ath. Pol. says the Athenians wanted was a civic body comprised of those “best able to serve the state with their property and their bodies” (τοῖς δυνατοτάτοις καὶ τοῖς σώμασιν καὶ τοῖς χρήμασιν λητουργεῖν: 29.5). In other words, citizenship should be limited to the best liturgists and to the best soldiers. Thucydides’ language is very similar: “those most able” (οἱ . . . μάλιστα . . . οἱ οἱ τε ὁσιν). These important qualifications in the language of Thucydides and Ath. Pol. have, of course, been noticed by others;\textsuperscript{1052} but the assumption that expressions like “those who serve with their bodies” or hoi hopla parakhomenoi (Thuc. 8.97.1) refer only to citizens of zeugite status and above has usually led scholars to conclude that both qualifications for enfranchisement (financial contribution and military contribution) were strongly tied to socio-economic class. Having done so, scholars have been much troubled over such an implausibly low number of non-thetic Athenians in 411.\textsuperscript{1053}

\textsuperscript{1050} Thus van Wees (2013, 240 and 2006, 374) resurrects the traditional argument of Mossé (1964, 6-7).
\textsuperscript{1051} Either Thucydides, who considers the telê elsewhere (3.18), or, of course, Ath. Pol. itself, which devotes considerable efforts to describing the regime of 411 (29-34) and to the comparison of past regimes (47).
\textsuperscript{1052} E.g., Rosivach 2012c; Strauss, 1986 78-79.
\textsuperscript{1053} E.g., Rosivach 2012c; Valdés Guia and Gallego 2010; Raaflaub 2001, 100; van Wees 2006; Strauss 1986, 79; Rhodes 1972 and AP, 383-384; Jones AD, 178-179; de Ste. Croix 1959.
As a solution to this problem, I would suggest that the first proposals of the oligarchs, even if they were mendacious, (Thuc. 8.66; cf. 8.72) were to limit the franchise to the ἐπαικεῖς and γνώριμοι who regularly found themselves on the katalogoi of Athenian generals and who could certainly lay documentable claim to having best served the city (Ath. Pol. 26.1; Pol. 1303a8-10). Initially, the proposal called for the enfranchisement of “not more than five thousand” (οὔτε . . . πλέοσιν ἢ πεντακισχιλίοις), and these were to be those “most able to serve the city with their possessions and bodies” (8.65.3), implying that there were many others less able who would not be included. The hoplites from the lists were positioned as those citizens who were most dependable and khrêstoi to the state, and their inclusion on previous katalogoi no doubt could be leveraged as justification for this claim. Compare the second oligarchy set up in 404 under the Spartans and The Thirty. The broader oligarchy of 3000 they promised was putatively to limit the franchise to those citizens who are beltistoi or kaloi kai agathoi. This was objected to on the grounds that these designations seemed “arbitrary” (ἄτοπον δοκοῖ) to men such as Theramenes (Xen. Hell. 2.3.18), who favoured a broad enfranchisement of hoplites and was prepared to countenance a politeia based on khrēsis (2.3.48).

A few weeks after the oligarchs had begun their machinations in 411, at the assembly in Kolonos, the official proposal was more inclusive in its language: affairs would be entrusted to “not less than five thousand” Athenians (Ath. Pol. 29.5). In the event, the oligarchic leaders appear not to have followed through on their promises to register the Five Thousand; however, shortly after the dissolution of the regime of the Four Hundred, the interim constitution was

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1054 The hoplite katalogoi were the only public rosters available centrally in Athens upon which the oligarchs might have based their civic rolls. Consulting the locally dispersed lexíarkhika grammateia would have been impossible. Regime change itself seems to have been a driver of the creation of military and civic rosters: Lys. 25.16; Lys. Fr. 9 Todd; Liddel 2007, 197 n. 323.
based on the rule of the Five Thousand, “all of whom would also possess arms” (Thuc. 8.97.1).

It would seem that ‘the Five Thousand’ had become a term of convenience since, in the event, 9000 hoplites showed up to be registered by the anagrapheis. In a speech dating from 410, it is claimed that a certain Polystratos, serving as one of the katalogeis, enrolled some 9000 men into the lists of the Five Thousand (Lys. 20.13). The figure of 9000 hoplites sits well with the information we have concerning Athenian hoplite strength to the end of the war and into the 390s. The inclusion of all hoplites in the interim constitution reveals why Thucydides can praise it as “a moderate mixing together of the few and the many” (μετρία γὰρ ἢ τε ἐς τοὺς ὀλίγους καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς ζύγκρασις: 8.97.2). It would be very strange if Thucydides here excludes thêtes in his use of the adjective polloi. As de Ste. Croix notes, thêtes, in the mind of Athenian authors, are “the Many par excellence.”

Military service in Peloponnesian-War Athens fell on citizens of all walks of life. Such service ambiguously represented both obligation and opportunity, at once entailing exposure to toil, hardship, expenditure and danger while simultaneously promising income, renown and status. The heavy combat role of Athenian hoplites, in particular, over the course of the first two decades of protracted warfare together with the peculiar dynamics of infantry selection ek katalogou worked to position this group as the most prominent stakeholders in the state.

1055 Polystratos’ account, even if not precisely accurate, must have been at least plausible given the speech’s proximity to the events in question (Rosivach 2012c, 65).
1056 Munn 1993, 227-228 estimates a total hoplite force of about 10 000 based on the expedition of 6000 to Nemea in 394 (Xen. Hell. 4.2.17).
1057 1956, 7. Of course, accepting the validity of this claim does not oblige us to accept the overall thrust of de Ste Croix’s argument that the intermediate regime was actually a democracy (cf. de Ste Croix 1981, 291); for criticism of de Ste Croix, see Andrewes HCT V, 325, 339; Rhodes 1972, 123; Hornblower CT III, 1034-1035. All of these scholars take for granted, however, a hoplite class that is roughly coterminous with zeugitai and which excludes thêtes.
Section II, Chapter 8:
Financial obligations and opportunities: the impact of war on Athens’ economic elite

8.1: Introduction

In this chapter, I will focus on the obligations and opportunities the Peloponnesian War created for the Athenian elite. Traditionally the elite has been understood as comprising the richest 1500 citizens, or roughly two to three per cent of the Athenian citizen population, whom our sources refer to as “hoi plousioi” or “hoi plousiôtatoi”. Scholars normally identify the former as those upon whom Athens relied to contribute to its irregular war-tax (the eisphora) and to undertake and finance various public services (leitourgiai). This propertied class has been traditionally understood to comprise the top two telê of the Solonian classification system, the pentakosiomedimnoi and the hippeis. Recent re-examinations of the Solonian classifications, however, have made it difficult to avoid the conclusion that, if the telê figures provided by Ath. Pol. have any validity, zeugitai, too, merit inclusion in this group of rich Athenians. When the zeugite telos is added, the putative group of hoi plousioi grows to roughly 15-20 per cent of the citizen population, that is, the 9000-12,000 Athenians with property worth nearly a talent or more who comprised the eisphorontes from the period from 428/7 to 378/7. However,

1058 The most important works contributing to this traditional consensus are Davies 1981 and 1971. Synonyms, of course, abound in the ancient literature. A good sampling of these can be found in the short pamphlet produced by the so-called Old Oligarch in the mid-420s. In this short, focused and very elitist analysis of the roles and privileges in the Athenian democracy respectively by the commons and the socio-economic elite, synonyms (all of them connoting moral supremacy) for hoi plousioi include: hoi khexstoi, gennaioi, dunatatótai, dextiótai, aristoi, oligoi, eudaimones, dunamenoi, beltioi, and beltistoi. In addition to these, sources often contrast the euporoi with the aporoi.
1061 van Wees 2006, esp. 360-374.
1062 For the property value of zeugitai, see van Wees 2001, 48-51, and above, Ch. 6.7. Those close to the hippad threshold likely had property worth around 6000 drachmas. For payment of the eisphorai and the connection to the Solonian telê, see Pollux, Onomastikon 8.130. van Wees argues that Pollux’s figures
since payment of the *eisphora* seems to have been graduated, based on assessment of assets, those at the lowest end of the census may not have contributed more than around thirty drachmas each.\(^\text{1063}\)

Athens’ liturgical class in the fifth century included only a small portion of the *plousioi*. In the fifth century, liturgical service fell upon Athens’ ultra-rich; in the fourth century, the large group of rich citizens who formed the *symmoriai* for the payment of the war-tax was coterminous with the group of (naval) liturgists (organized likewise into *symmoriai*), and its civic obligations were commensurately more substantial. In the fifth century, although they were liable to the same requirements of military service and special taxation as their less affluent countrymen, the 1200-1500 wealthiest Athenians were also liable as individuals to selection to the trierarchy and other liturgical posts.\(^\text{1064}\) These wealthy, propertied Athenians, naturally, stood to lose more in absolute terms than their poorer counterparts as a result of the damage done to property in Attica during the war. These citizens, however, commanding abundant capital were, of course, much better insulated against subsistence

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Footnotes:

\(^{1063}\) While these propertied individuals belonged to the leisure class that enjoyed such *euporia* as to be free of the need to work for a living, they were not so wealthy that they found it difficult to identify with the working class (*hoi penêtes*), and, but for their contribution to the sporadic *eisphorai*, the nature of their civic obligations was essentially the same as that of the *penêtes* (*contra* van Wees 2006 and 2001). The idea that Athenians paid the *eisphora* at a progressive rate goes back to Böckh 1886 I, 581-589; cf. Gabrielsen 2002, 216; Thomsen 1964, 15-23, 147-193. Cf. Christ 2006, 147-148, who argues that the fifth-century *eisphora* was paid at a fixed rate by all *eisphorontes*. For criticism of this view, see below, 324-326.

\(^{1064}\) Ober 1989, 117, following Davies 1981, 15-27, estimates the smaller group of *leitourgountes* at between 15 and 30 per cent of the leisureed class.
risk than the commons. The far greater threat to the fortunes of elite citizens, it is usually assumed, stemmed from the demands of the Athenian state. The burden on Athens’ wealthy of providing leadership and performing *leitour giai* (literally, “works for the people”) represented a greater cost than was incurred owing to wartime privations, and several sources indicate that the war (and its end, namely *arkhê*), while being welcomed by the poor, to whom it gave employment, was opposed by the socio-economic elite for whom it represented financial strain ([Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 2.14; Thuc. 6.24.3; cf. Ar. *Eccl.* 197-198).

In examining the impact of the war on the class of *leitourgountes*, greatest attention will be paid to the performance of the most important liturgy, the trierarchy. The reason for this is twofold. The trierarchy, as the military liturgy, was especially important during the Peloponnesian War, and, not incidentally, the ancient evidence allows us to examine the trierarchy more closely than the *khorê gia* or other festival liturgies.\(^{1065}\) Military spending in wartime outstripped all other *polis* expenditures combined.\(^{1066}\) In the best of times, this cost was merely underwritten by the city’s elite; at the worst of times, as the evidence suggests and as this chapter will argue, it was borne directly by them. Athens’ war spending during the

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\(^{1065}\) The performance of *gumnasiarkhiai*, *hestiaseis*, *arkhitheoriai* and *arrhephoriai*, for example, were far less expensive than the trierarchy and the choregry and do not receive much attention in our sources. That the trierarchy represented a much more significant financial commitment can be inferred from the fact that *triêrarkhountes* were granted a two-year exemption from liturgical service while all other *leitourgountes* earned exemption for only a single year. See Gabrielsen 1994, 86, and below. Despite the focus on the trierarchy, it should be borne in mind that this liturgy was normally performed by the same men who performed festival liturgies both at a polis and at a deme level. There is no indication that these municipal liturgies, which no doubt could be expensive (e.g., the sponsorship of a chorus for a local theatrical festival), provided any kind of polis-level exemption for those who discharged them. See: Whitehead 1986, 151-152, 215-217; Davies *APF*, 28-29.

\(^{1066}\) Pritchard 2012, 39-45. Even in peacetime, the Athenians appear to have spent more on their military endeavours than on their annual program of festivals or on the institutions of the democracy (Pritchard 2012, 58).
Archidamian War and the Sicilian Expedition is impressive, averaging some 1555 talents annually from 432/1-423/2 and totaling more than 4000 talents for the two armadas sent against Syracuse from 415/14-413/12.\textsuperscript{1067} Furthermore, Athens’ incredible resilience in the face of the Sicilian disaster and the loss of Euboean and other critical alliances in the Aegean in 412/11 surprised Thucydides and his contemporaries (8.1.1-2) and continues to impress scholars. Even after the collapse of the arkhē, the Athenians continued to launch fleets and to spend enormous sums on waging war. To judge from Athens’ yearly naval commitments during the Ionian War, the average annual military expenditure for this period should not be estimated at much lower than 800 talents.\textsuperscript{1068} Astonishingly, Athens continued to expend vast amounts of capital annually even without the income of imperial phoros. In the next period for which there is detailed financial information, the 370s through the 360s, the Athenians appear to have spent an average of some 500 talents annually.\textsuperscript{1069}

The reason Athens was able to spend so lavishly on its naval enterprises, even without the imperial resources it enjoyed for much of the fifth century, was that the cost of these enterprises was underwritten by rich liturgists. Liturgies were a kind of democratic tax on the rich.\textsuperscript{1070} Although functionally liturgical contributions from Athens’ richest citizens had a sort of minor wealth-redistributive effect, and, therefore, share some similarities with a centralized tax system

\textsuperscript{1067} Pritchard 2012, 44-45; Blamire 2001, 106-114.
\textsuperscript{1068} On annual naval commitments for the Ionian War, see Appendix 2. To this expenditure must be added the costs of the wages of Athenian land forces, who were “worn out” (ἐταλαπωροῦντα) from permanently guarding the long walls (Thuc. 7.28.2) and the various phouria throughout Attica (2.24.1) and those of the 1200 hippēis and hippotoxotai (Thuc. 2.13.8; cf. Aeschin. 2.174), who earned between one and two drachmas per day and whose horses were lamed from constant service against the inroads of the invaders at Decelea (7.27.5). See: Spence 1993, 74-163 and 1990, 102-104; Bugh 1988, 82-5, 221.
\textsuperscript{1069} Pritchard 2012, 45-57.
\textsuperscript{1070} Hansen 1991, 110; Ober 1989, 99, 199-201; see also, above, Ch. 6.8. Although the Athenians themselves regarded liturgies as a kind of tax (τέλος), most obviously apparent through the designation of those exempt from service as ἀτέλατοι, as will be seen the liturgy must be distinguished and disassociated from any modern sense of the term ‘tax’ as a compulsory contribution to a centralized government.
such as the *eisphora*, they are distinct from mandatory taxes and levies in that they were nonimally voluntary.\(^{1071}\) In performing *leitourgiai*, elite citizens were motivated by *philotimia*, the object of which was *lamprotès* (“outstanding brilliance”) and *kharis* (“gratitude” or “thanks”), which was to be exploited “as a lever to office and as a refuge in times of trouble.”\(^{1072}\) Citizens could be compelled to undertake liturgies through the process of *antidosis*, the legal challenge of a liturgical appointee to one of his wealthy peers to undertake the service in his stead on the basis of the latter’s greater means. Those formally challenged to *antidosis* were obligated either to accept the liturgy or to agree to an exchange of property with the challenger.\(^{1073}\) However, even in these circumstances, litigants exercised the option to perform the liturgy and the *antidosis* itself required the voluntary initiative of a private litigant to initiate the process. The state only became involved in the event that the parties engaged in *antidosis* refused both the liturgy and the exchange of property, in which case the question of who ought to be liable was referred to a trial by jury. Thus state compulsion was minimal. Notwithstanding squabbles among rich citizens over who could most afford to, and therefore ought to, undertake liturgical performance, the voluntary character of public service was always maintained and, not surprisingly, stressed whenever the elite citizens had occasion to speak of their liturgical careers.\(^{1074}\)

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\(^{1071}\) Rhodes 1982, 7. It is worth comparing the Athenian attitudes toward *eisphorai* as detectable in Pericles’ final speech to the Assembly before the outbreak of the war. Here he describes the lack of available public monies available to the Peloponnesian *autourgoi* and says that they must resort to “violent” or “forced” contributions from their own citizens (βίαιοι ἔσφοραι: 1.141.5); cf. Hornblower *CT* I, 403-404.

\(^{1072}\) Citation from Davies *APF*, xvii; see also Ober 1989, 243, 333; Whitehead 1983, 55-74. Cf. Christ 2006, 143-204.


\(^{1074}\) Christ 2006, 200-204.
The high cost of undertaking liturgies and trierarchies was proverbial among classical writers. Theophrastus’ prototypical “oligarchic man” complains aloud in the busy street, “When will we get a break from liturgies and trierarchies wiping us out?” (*Characters* 26.6; cf. Xen. *Economics* 2.6; Antiphanes Fr. 202 Edmonds). This trope has found traction in scholarly accounts of the trierarchy. Nevertheless, despite the potentially ruinous cost to the individual inherent in the trierarchy, there were also considerable benefits that might accrue to a trierarch given the right conditions. This chapter will demonstrate that these conditions were present during the initial stages of the Peloponnesian War and that it was only when they ceased to be so that the trierarchy began to represent an unavoidably oppressive burden on Athens’ super-rich. Even then, these burdens could be accompanied by certain privileges and possibilities for social advancement and distinction. In the account that follows, then, I take a middle position between scholars such as Davies and Herman, who have assumed that Athens’ liturgical system was fueled by communitarian spirit and *philotimia*, and others such as Christ and Cohen, who have been skeptical of the degree of altruism or feeling of social responsibility involved, while at the same time downplaying the pull that *philotimia* would have on prospective *trierarkhountes*, preferring to see compulsion, especially the threat of *antidosis*, as the operative principle in maintaining the liturgical system.

Several factors must be considered in making an assessment of the burden of the trierarchy upon the body of liturgy-paying citizens. The cost of the trierarchy must be ascertained with as much precision as the sources will allow. Next, the size of the pool of potential triarchs must be examined. Finally, the potential benefits of triarchic performance

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1075 E.g., Davies 1981.
1076 E.g., Christ 2006.
must be weighed against its costs. Only with a firm understanding of each of these factors can we provide a sufficiently nuanced account of the effects of the Peloponnesian War on Athens’ richest citizens.

8.2: Trierarchical outlay

8.2.1: Pay and provisioning

As already mentioned, the operating costs of the fifth-century Athenian navy were staggering and the expenses involved in discharging the triarchy were considerable. With the state providing the hulls and rigging to its captains (Thuc. 6.31; cf. Ar. Knights 912-919),\(^{1077}\) the pay for sailors represented the largest potential cost in terms of trierarchical outlay. Since triremes were designed for maximum propulsion and maneuvering efficiency, space on board that otherwise might be reserved for the storage of foodstuffs was sacrificed for rowing benches, spare oars and ships’ tackle.\(^{1078}\) Provisions for the crew, therefore, had to be purchased daily from sea-side ‘markets’ or vendors, making the payment of crews in usable coin a necessity of any naval operation.\(^{1079}\) This daily maintenance allowance (referred to variously as *misthos*, *trophê*, *sitêresion* or simply as *sitos*) was theoretically provided by the state and could be supplemented or complemented by individual trierarchs.\(^{1080}\) There is much that was peculiar about the resources allocated to the Sicilian expedition in 415, but Thucydides’ description of the triarchs’ role in provisioning the fleet vis-à-vis the state suggests ordinary practice (6.31.3):

\(^{1077}\) Cf. *IG* I\(^3\) 127: 236 and [Dem.] 51.5. It is all but certain that the state was obliged to provide fully equipped ships to its trierarchs: see Gabrielsen 1994, 108.

\(^{1078}\) Morrison and Coates 2000 [1986], 127-157. As an illustration of the lack of spare room aboard Athenian warships, consider Phrynikhos’ advice to the victorious Athenians at Miletus in 412 to abandon their booty on the mainland so as not to hinder the campaign (Thuc. 8.27.4).

\(^{1079}\) Casson 1995b, 261-269; see, e.g., Thuc. 8.95.3-4.

\(^{1080}\) Gabrielsen 1994, 111-112.
And this expedition sailed with expectations of a long campaign and furnished with both ships and men, to use either resource as needed, its naval component fitted out at great expense (μεγάλας διπάναις) to the trierarchs as well as the city, since the public fund was paying the drachma a day to each sailor and providing the hulls for sixty warships and forty transports and the best personnel to go with them, while the trierarchs were giving bonuses (ἐπιφοράς) on top of their state pay to the lead rowers (τοῖς θρανίταις τῶν ναυτῶν) and the rest of the staff (ταῖς ὑπηρεσίαις), adding expensive ornaments and furnishings, each one going to the greatest lengths to make his own ship preeminent for both good looks and fast sailing.\footnote{1081}

The historian is at pains in this passage and in the chapter of which it forms a part to stress the exceptionality of the current enterprise, however, there is nothing in Thucydides’ language here to suggest that state provision for the basic pay of nautai was at all novel or exceptional. The emphasis, rather, is clearly on the epiphorai paid out by trierarchs to ensure that they could recruit quality staff.\footnote{1082} That public funds (τῆς πόλεως ἀνάλωσιν δημοσίαν: Thuc. 6.31.5) normally made a solid contribution to the funding of naval campaigns may also be inferred from the enormous sums assigned to generals as loans from public treasuries during the 420s and in 415, such as the 3000 talents allocated to the stratêgoi of the first Sicilian armada (IG I³ 93).\footnote{1083}

Pay for sailors in the fifth century seems to have been standardized at a drachma per man, per day, cut to half (three obols) after the Sicilian disaster (Thuc. 8.45.2; Xen. Hell. 1.5.4-5).\footnote{1084} Normally a portion of this would be withheld until disembarkation (misthos entelēs) in order to

\footnote{1081} ὁποῖός ἐστι ὁ στόλος ὡς χρόνιος τε ἐσόμενος καὶ κατ’ ἀμφότερα, οὔ ὅν δέη, καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ πεζῷ ἀμα ἐξαρτθεῖς, τὸ μὲν ναυτικὸν μεγάλαις διπάναις τῶν τε τριφίρρων καὶ τῆς πόλεως ἐκπονηθέν, τοῦ μὲν δημοσίου δραμὴν τῆς ἡμέρας τοῦ ναυτῆ ἐκάστῳ διδόντος καὶ ναῦς παρασχόντος κενά ἐξήκοντα μὲν ταχείας, τεσσαράκοντα δὲ ὀπλαταγωγοὺς καὶ ὑπηρεσίας ταύταις τὰς κρατιστὰς, τῶν δὲ τριφίρρων ἐπιφοράς της πρὸς τό ἐκ δημοσίου μισθὸ διδόντων τοῖς θρανίταις τῶν ναυτῶν καὶ ταῖς ὑπηρεσίαις καὶ τάλλα σημείοις καὶ κατασκευασίς πολλαπλάσιον χρησιμένων, καὶ οἷς τὰ μικρότατα προδημιοθέντος ἐνός ἐκάστου ὅπως αὐτὸ τὴν ἐπιφράσει τῇ ναύς μάλιστα προέζει καὶ τῷ ταγχανοτείνῃ . . .

\footnote{1082} Hornblower CT III, 388-392; cf. 6.31.5: what impresses Thucydides is the trierarchs’ individual outlays over and above the regular amount of state funding.

\footnote{1083} See Blamire 2001, 113.

\footnote{1084} Gabrielsen 1994, 111.
discourage desertion and this lump sum might, presumably, have been dispensed by dockyard officials upon arrival at Piraeus, but there is no evidence of this. The state thus theoretically provided for the single largest overhead cost of naval campaigning. Later sources make clear the distribution system for naval pay involved the transfer of public funds from generals to trierarchs, which might result, given the unpredictability of the length of naval campaigns, in the trierarch having to cover unforeseen wage-related expenses. For example, Apollodoros, seeking damages against a fellow trierarch, Polykles, for expenses incurred while serving beyond his appointed tenure claims that he received only two months’ pay from his stratēgos for a period of a year and five months ([Dem.] 50.10; cf. 50.12).\(^{1085}\)

Thus it was the payment of bonuses and unforeseen costs arising from the unpredictability of naval campaigns (from battle or such events as might increase the length of a campaign, such as poor sailing weather or storm-damage to ships requiring immediate repair) that fell to individual trierarchs.

8.2.2: Supererogatory expenditure and unforeseen costs

The out-of-pocket payment of bonuses probably represents a more constant and significant cost to trierarchs than most scholars have realized given the general recruitment difficulties during the naval acme of the latter fifth century and the outright recruitment crises of the latter stages of the Ionian War. Already in 431/0, Thucydides’ Pericles must assure the Assembly that there is enough Athenian manpower to meet the needs of the navy should the enemy acquire funds and seek to entice foreign rowers away from Athens (1.143.1), revealing conditions in which there was competition for naval labour even at this early stage. In 415,

\(^{1085}\) Cf. [Dem.] 51.11, which refers to the practice of the trierarch receiving from his general in advance 30 minae per month of anticipated service intended for the payment of oarsmen.
disgruntled Athenian crews deserted in large numbers before Syracuse (7.13.3) and, in 407, Lysander was able to convince Kyros to raise the pay of his Peloponnesian sailors from three to four obols per day in order to encourage desertion from the Athenian fleet (Xen. Hell. 1.5.4). These passages speak to the limited ability of trierarchs to prevent the desertion of crews under their command. One tool at their disposal, the partial withholding of earnings, has already been mentioned. The other means by which trierarchs could foster loyalty was through the payment of *epiphorai*. Indeed, since ships were remitted to captains empty (*kenas*: Thuc. 6.31), and it fell to the trierarch to hire his own crew (e.g., Lys. 21.10), bonuses paid to crewmembers were probably an ongoing and considerable expense. A later source reveals that the cost of a trierarchy could balloon should a captain find it necessary or be ordered to put in at Piraeus between his initial launch and his final disembarkation (as was the case during several Peloponnesian-War campaigns). Under such circumstances, Apollodorus explains, there were normally mass desertions of crew and new crews had to be sought or high wages and incentives offered to existing crew in order to retain their services ([Dem.] 50.11-12). As

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1086 Cf. [Dem.] 50.65, where Apollodorus complains of the desertion of his *nautai* and the loss of their wages, which they took with them.

1087 The changing roster of trireme crews in the field has recently been noted by Bakewell 2008, 147, who argues on the basis of the frequently rotating and augmenting of crews found in the ancient literature that trierarchs must have had lists of their active crews on perishable and erasable lists like *sanides* or *leukomata*.

1088 Later naval inventories make it clear that *kenas* here refers to crewmembers and not to naval equipment, which the state did provide along with the hull (e.g., IG I3 127.25-36; cf. [Dem.] 51.5); see Gabrielsen 1994, 108: only after the naval reforms of 357 did the state look after the conscription of crews (Dem. 21.154-155).

1089 E.g., in 431/30, some of the same ships involved in the expedition to Potidæa appear to have been re-embarked after their use in raiding around the eastern Peloponnesse under Pericles (Thuc. 2.56, 58, 69; 6.31.2); in 428/7, ships used in initial raiding of the north-eastern Peloponnesse returned to Piræus and were reassigned to either the guard fleet around Euboea or the expedition against Mytilene under Paches (Thuc. 3.7; 17-18); in 413/12, some of the ships in Konon’s original fleet of eighteen triremes at Naupaktos (7.31) presumably also took part in Kharikles’ earlier troop-gathering mission to Argos (7.20, 26), otherwise the total number of active Athenian ships for this year grows from approximately 220 to more than 250, which contravenes Thucydides’ explicit statement at 3.17.4 that the 250 vessels in 428 were the most Athens had ever floated at one time.
Gabrielsen points out, even fleets of moderate size, such as the squadrons of thirty triremes Athens routinely sent to circumnavigate the Peloponnese during the war, “represented a labor-purchase transaction the magnitude of which was unmatched by most other sectors of the city-state.” As outlined above, much of the capital required to pay for such enormous human resources came from public funds, but “the share of the trierarchs, consisting in advance payments and bonuses, was by no means negligible.”

In addition to the cost of paying crew, trierarchs were held liable for the condition of their ships. Lysias 28.4 alludes to the potential for legal punishment of trierarchs and generals who returned ships in dilapidated condition (παλαιός). Included in the earliest of the official naval records is mention of inspection of returned hulls by epimelētai as well as by a designated ‘tester’ (δοκιμαστής), whose function appears to have been to assess the seaworthiness of the hull (IG I 1604.56; 1612.220). In the inscription, the condition of the ship is to be related to the Boule, and, if found to have suffered damage or loss of equipment, an inquiry, or skepsis, would be made into suitable compensation, with ultimate consideration of the matter deferred to the Assembly. Damage incurred through confrontation with enemy ships was presumably discounted. Evidence for this supposition comes from a late inscription identifying three horse transports (hippagógoi) that were declared useless kata polemon with no stipulated compensatory payments from their trierarchs. Nevertheless, trierarchs must have been responsible for the costs of any repairs made in the field overseen by the ships’ naupēgos, and

1092 παλαιός in the sense of ‘worn’ or ‘ragged’ is the common adjective used in contradistinction to καυνός in the sense of ‘fresh’ by the naval inscriptions to describe dilapidated hulls.
1093 Gabrielsen 1994, 137.
there does not appear to have existed any mechanism for reimbursement of individuals in such cases.\textsuperscript{1095}

\textbf{8.2.3: Total cost of the trierarchy}

As we shall see, there is reason to believe that the cost of the trierarchy was not static during the Peloponnesian War. The assumption that it was has led scholars to accept the complaints of impoverishment from rich orators of the fourth century at face value and to apply these uncritically to the whole period covered by the trierarchy. These speeches themselves, however, along with some crucial information supplied by Thucydides, provide unambiguous evidence that neither the costs nor the opportunities associated with the trierarchy remained fixed from 431-404.

As noted above, the costs involved in undertaking the trierarchy could be ruinous and were proverbial in classical Athens (Theophr. \textit{Characters} 26.6). Orators never tired of reminding their audiences of how much personal financial outlay went into their public service, though they almost always speak in generalities and actual figures are hard to come by.\textsuperscript{1096} On an Athenian stage in the midst of the Archidamian War, Aristophanes’ irascible Paphlagon threatens to make his opponent take charge of an old trireme, repairs to which will never cease wasting his resources (\textit{Knights} 912-14). Regrettably, the average cost of a trierarchy cannot be established with certainty for the fifth century. Historians simply lack sufficient usable

\begin{footnotes}
\item[1095] Additional expense might also be incurred through philotimic ends. Athenaeus preserves an anecdote about Alcibiades’ lavish expenditure on his hull in 410 in order to ensure that he had the most impressive ship in the fleet (\textit{Deipn.} 12.49).
\item[1096] To give just a few examples: Lys. 3.47; 7.31; 12.19-20, 38; 18.7; 20.23; 25.12.
\end{footnotes}
Costs can be ascertained for later periods, however, which, mutatis mutandis, can provide some useful numbers for establishing a model of trierarchic burden versus benefit.

Most of our figures come from Attic oratory, and may be inflated or understated as dictated by the rhetorical agenda of the speaker. In order to gain some control over the potential for rhetorical embellishment, Gabrielsen has used the career of Konon (III), son of Timotheos (II) (PA 13700), as presented by epigraphical sources as a test case.1098 The benefit of this choice is also its weakness: the surely unusually high number of trierarchies attested for this individual makes him an extreme case from which it is not very safe to generalize. During his eleven trierarchies in the seventeen years from 342/1-325/4, Gabrielsen estimates, Konon spent more than 67,923 drachmas (over eleven talents). Complicating matters is the fact that Konon was liable to replace several hulls and complete sets of equipment at the cost of approximately one talent each.1099 If, however, we adjust for these extraordinary expenses, his average outlay totals something in the range of 3000-5000 drachmas (or between half and fourth-fifths of a talent) per trierarchy. This figure accords well with other known amounts for trierarchical outlay. The speaker of Lysias 19 claims to have spent 8000 drachmas on three trierarchies (19.42), and another Lysian speaker claims to have lavished 36,000 drachmas on seven trierarchies (21.2).1100 Clearly these liturgies were extremely expensive and beyond the reach of

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1097 Demosthenes’ First Philippic, delivered in 351, provides the most explicit testimony for the aggregate cost of trireme crew, which amounts to 20 minae (or a third of a talent) per month (4.28). This amount, however, is based on a proposal to pay sailors only the essential (sitérēsion) portion of their tropê, and explicitly discounts misthos.
1098 Gabrielsen 1994, 222.
1099 Gabrielsen 1994, 222 n. 4: Konon is listed in no less than four separate inscriptions as liable for the replacement of entire hulls ranging from 3333 to 10,000 drachmas.
all but a tiny minority of citizens. The composition of this small group of citizens may have remained relatively static in the decades of Athenian imperial growth during the Pentekontaetia, but already in the first years of the Peloponnesian War, war and plague casualties introduced significant pressures upon and changes within this small but very important group.

8.3: Mounting costs: eisphorai, population loss and their effects on trierarchical families

8.3.1: The number of trierarchs in fifth-century Athens

The size of the fifth-century pool of trierarkhountes has been the matter of some debate. Estimates range from 300 men, who could boast a fortune of over four talents each, to 1200 men, who possessed estates worth more than a single talent each. Four hundred would seem an implausibly low number for two reasons. First, such a figure represents an unrealistically minuscule 0.66 per cent of the Athenian civic body. Second, Pseudo-Xenophon tells us that 400 trierarchs were chosen at the start of each year (τριήραρχοι καθίστανται τετρακόσιοι ἐκάστου ἐνιαυτοῦ: Ath. Pol. 3.4). There would not have been much need to ‘establish’ which citizens would be the trierarchs annually if captains were drawn perennially from the same fixed group of 400 men. Silverman may be correct that there existed in Athens a body of ultra-rich citizens

1101 Compare the wages of skilled labour in the late fifth century at one drachm or, more rarely, one drachma and three obols per day as revealed in the Erekhtheion accounts of 409/8-407/6: IG I² 373-374 = IG I² 474-479).
1102 The disastrous Egyptian campaign (c. 460-454) in which the Athenians lost something in the order of 100 triremes and crew, even as they were waging the First Peloponnesian War, is an exception that bears close study, but which unfortunately cannot be undertaken here. See Thuc. 1.104-110, whose reporting implies a loss of some 230-40 ships on the scale of the Sicilian disaster and whose language at 1.110 parallels that at 7.87.6 (Hornblower CT I, 176) with Holladay 1989; Meiggs 1972; cf. Westlake 1950, who downplays the losses in Egypt.
1104 Gabrielsen 1994, esp. 74-75, 176-179; cf. Philoch. FGrH 328 Fr. 45 = Harpokration, s.v. khiloi diakosioi, referring to “twelve hundred who were the wealthiest Athenians, who preformed liturgies.”
1105 [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 3.4: καὶ τριήραρχοι καθίστανται τετρακόσιοι ἐκάστου ἐνιαυτοῦ . . .
(plousiōtatoi), who might comfortably and routinely discharge the trierarchy, but the group of those liable for the liturgy, our evidence suggests, was significantly larger than this.

Trierarchs were appointed, importantly, not on the basis of absolute wealth, which was difficult, if not impossible to determine, but on the basis of presumed ability to discharge the liturgy.\footnote{Ami 1965, 110; cf. Gabrielsen 1994, 95.} In the 420s, 400 men were selected annually; any claims to exemption were heard prior to designation to ships.\footnote{Gabrielsen 1994, 74-5, 176-177; cf. Ami 1965, 110 who rejects the testimony of Ps.-Xenophon, insisting that the number of trierarchs chosen was 300 to correspond roughly with the number of available triremes in the 420s.} During the Archidamian War, and presumably for the whole period before the defeat in Sicily, the Athenians had about 300 seaworthy triremes (τρήρας τὰς πλωίμους; Thuc. 2.13.8; cf. Ar. Ach. 545; Diod. 12.40.4), so that around 100 of the trierarchs designate would have been de facto exempt from active service each year.\footnote{The reason for the larger number of designated trierarchs compared to available hulls was probably to allow for potential shortages during the many disputes (διαδικάσιαι) over liability to the liturgy. This at least seems to make sense of the otherwise odd appearance of Ps.-Xenophon’s chapter 3.4, whose context is a description of the various legal actions in Athens. Andokides 3.9 MSS mentions 400 ships, but this is probably a corruption, perhaps introduced by a copyist who was aware of Ps.-Xenophon. Aeschines’ borrowing from Andokides 3.9 in his speech on the embassy to Philip reveals the original reading of 300 (2.175).} Additionally, Thucydides reports that in 431/0 it was decided that “one hundred ships, the best [i.e. the newest hulls] from each year, should be set aside with their trierarchs” (Thuc. 2.24.2), so that those who were appointed as trierarchs for this special, reserve fleet would not have seen regular, active service.\footnote{Thuc. 2.24.2: τρήρεις τε μετ’ αὐτῶν ἐξαιρέτους ἐκατὸν ἐποιήσαντο κατὰ τὸν ἑνιαυτὸν ἐκατὸν τὰς βελτίστας, καὶ τριηράρχους αὐταῖς . . .} This means that there were around 200 active trierarchs annually throughout the 420s. There is no explicit evidence to confirm that this number remained constant throughout the period 421/0-404/3, but to judge from the numbers of ships attested in descriptions of Athenian campaigns in the surviving historiographical record, naval
commitments remained remarkably constant throughout the entire Peloponnesian War and if
anything expanded in its latter stages.\footnote{Formal and reliable naval records date only as far back as 378/7 with \textit{IG II} \textsuperscript{2} 1604. For annual Athenian naval commitments, see Appendix 2.}

The process of selection for the trierarchy that is attested for the fourth century is
generally assumed to have been in place in the fifth, whereby it fell to \textit{stratêgoi} to assign
citizens to the role of trierarch (Dem. 35.48; 39.8; \textit{Ath. Pol.} 61.1).\footnote{It is inferred from the threat of Aristophanes’ Paphlagon to the Sausage-Seller that he will appoint him trierarch of a dilapidated vessel (\textit{Knights} 912-14) that the generals also assigned each trierarch his ship, but \textit{Knights} 912-14 can only be adduced if Paphlagon can be safely identified with Cleon who could reasonably expect, at the Lenaea in 424, to be elected \textit{stratêgos} within a few weeks. Problems persist, however, since Paphlagon’s threat to appoint the Sausage-Seller as trierarch of a particularly decrepit ship goes beyond the apparent authority of the \textit{stratêgos}: it was evidently up to \textit{epimelêtai tôn neôrîôn} to assign ships to individuals. See Jordan 1975, 30-46, 61-9. In Aristotle’s day, the selection of trierarchs was the special prerogative of one of the ten generals who was elected “for the symmories” (ἐπὶ τῶν συμμόριῶν). See further, Rhodes 1982, 3.}
The generals presumably worked from a list of known trierarchical households. In the fifth century they no doubt could consult the property ratings included in the various \textit{lexiarkhika grammateia} for their tribe, but it is also likely that generals, who themselves often saw consecutive annual terms of service, kept lists of candidates who had served as trierarchs in the past.\footnote{That there were no standing \textit{katalogoi} of those liable for the trierarchy has been shown by Gabrielsen 1994, 68-70. The lists of trierarchs’ names referred to at Dem. 18.105-106 is not a list of those \textit{liable} but rather a list of those already designated by the generals and those who had actually been assigned to ships. At any rate, this evidence postdates the trierarchic reforms of the fourth century and so is not very relevant to the current discussion. The fifth-century system was, like other bureaucratic organs of the state, messy, convoluted and ad hoc. On the selection of \textit{stratêgoi} by tribe, see [Arist.] \textit{Ath. Pol.} 22.2; on the equal tribal representation in the \textit{stratêgia} until at least 360, see Hansen 1988a, 69-70. There are strong indications that trierarchs also both served and were selected on a tribal basis. While there is no evidence that rowers or crewmembers were selected along tribal lines (Pritchard 2009 and 2004), fourth-century naval inventories list trierarchs according to tribe as do, more importantly, the Athenian casualty lists of the late fifth century (see below, 363-364). \textit{IG I} \textsuperscript{1} 1191, for example, which identifies at least 17 men as trierarchs, lists six from Aigêis, three from Pandionis, four from Leontis and four from Oinêis. Such a high number of casualties among trierarchs from only four of ten tribes suggests that captains were selected and deployed along tribal lines.} Indeed, one of the strongest
criteria for deeming a household liable to trierarchy was that it had performed the liturgy in the past.\footnote{Gabrielsen 1994, 43-67.}

The number of potential trierarkhountes needed to sustain a fleet the size of Athens’ during the Peloponnesian War can be estimated, in part thanks to Davies’ important work on the liturgical class. His modeling of a liturgical class divided into agonal liturgists and trierarchs has met with criticism, but Davies’ conclusion that approximately 100 individuals were needed annually to perform various festival liturgies has been generally accepted.\footnote{Davies 1981, 16: more precisely, 98 festival leitourgountes annually, rising to 118 in a Panathenaic year. For acceptance, see e.g.: Pritchard 2012, 31-39; Ober 1989, 117. On the great variety of Athenian festivals that would require liturgical financing, see: [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 3.2; Ar. Clouds 307-310; Thuc. 2.38.1.} Fourth-century sources make it clear that all leitourgountes enjoyed a period of respite, or legal exemption, between liturgies (e.g., Dem. 20.8; cf. [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 56.3). Moreover, explicit attestation in speeches dating from the immediate aftermath of the Peloponnesian War make it likely that the rules for liturgical exemption operated in the decades prior to the turn of the century.\footnote{Gabrielsen 1994, 85-87. Lysias 19.29, delivered in either 388 or 387, presents the speaker’s three consecutive years of trierarchical service as though it were supererogatory.} On the basis of the claim (made albeit some sixty years after the fact) that Thrasyllos served as trierarch in Sicily “continuously, not taking the two years off,” the exemption appears to have been in place before 415-13 (Isaios 7.38); that it cannot have been introduced later than 411/0 is strongly recommended by the litany of services, including seven consecutive years of supererogatory trierarchical outlays from 411-404, cataloged by the speaker of Lysias 21 (1-11).\footnote{One other piece of evidence can support the existence of liturgical exemption already in the fifth century. IG 1\textsuperscript{1} 254, from the Athenian deme Ikarion, and dated to between 440 and 415, stipulates the selection of chorégoi from those who have not previously served as chorégos. The underlying motivation, here, however, may be less to prevent excessive cost to individuals than to spread around the kharis of this"}
These references, alongside the statement of Ps.-Xenophon around 425 BC that disputes arose annually among those appointed to the trierarchy (3.4), imply that the exemption was in place since at least the 420s. In the fourth century, exemption from liturgical service for a period of one year was granted to all leitourgountes; for the trierarchy, presumably because of the potential for very costly outlays, the period of exemption was doubled.\textsuperscript{1117} Gabrielsen has demonstrated the need, in light of these exemptions, to examine liturgical service in cycles.\textsuperscript{1118} Official exemption requires us to reckon with a pool of trierarchs significantly larger than the 400 annual appointees. If Athens required 300 nominal trierarchs (one for every available hull) for a given year between 431 and 413, as well as 100 festival liturgists, around 300 of these men (the active trierarchs plus other liturgists) would be legally exempted from trierarchical (or other liturgical) service for at least one year, the trierarchs for two.\textsuperscript{1119} Consequently, the same number of men are required in the following year and an additional 200 the year after that before the 200 active trierarchs were once again liable in year four. Such a system requires at

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\textsuperscript{1117} Gabrielsen 1994, 85-87, 178-9; Rhodes 1982, 3.
\textsuperscript{1118} Gabrielsen 1994, 178.
\textsuperscript{1119} On the reasonable presumption that nominal trierarchs did not, in fact, gain exemption. See above. Festival liturgies show no sign of diminishing during the war. If anything they proliferate. This has led to some criticism over Athenian funding priorities (e.g., Böckh, \textit{Staatshaushaltung}, vol. 1; more recently Wilson 2008, Kallet 1998; Gabrielsen 1994, 178; for the sentiment in ancient writing, see Plut. \textit{De gloria} 6). Pritchard 2012 has recently argued against the view that in the late fifth century the Athenians prioritized festival over military spending. It is interesting to consider, however, a possibility not mentioned in the discussion: whether the high amount of festival spending, good evidence for which only first appears during the late fifth century, might not reflect attraction of \textit{hoi plousiôtatoi} and potential trierarchs to the relatively cheap and more publically-facing festival liturgies, which offered a year’s respite from any liturgy, including the trierarchy. Christ 2006, 195 notes the potential benefits of gaining exemption from the more expensive trierarchy through voluntarily undertaking festival liturgies. For the number of available hulls in the 420s, see: Thuc. 2.13.8; cf. \textit{Ar. Ach.} 545; Diod. 12.40.4.
least 900 potential liturgists, likely expanding to require some 1200 in the latter years of the Peloponnesian War when the syntrierarchy appears to have been introduced.\textsuperscript{1120}

Of course, some caution must accompany these estimates. For one thing, individuals were not bound by the year exemption; supererogatory service, such as that boasted of in Lysias 21.1-6, is well attested. There is, doubtless, room for skepticism over the rhetorical claims of a speaker to such sterling public service. Nevertheless, while the rules allowing for respite would have meant that an individual faced no obligation to perform continuous trierarchies, there was nothing to prevent this kind of supererogatory service, and certainly there will have been scope both in the Archidamian and Ionian Wars for continuous service of this kind.\textsuperscript{1121} If the example of the defendant of Lysias 21 was followed and supererogatory service was common, one could reckon with a smaller trierarchical class.

On the other hand, the performance of festival liturgies and recent trierarchical service were probably not the only grounds for exemption. From at least 432/1 when the exemption is first attested, some 1000 young, propertied citizens would have been exempt from the trierarchy due to their nearly constant service in the Athenian cavalry corps (Thuc. 2.13.8).\textsuperscript{1122} Furthermore, although it is very late evidence to bring to bear on the fifth century trierarchy, Demosthenes’ speech \textit{On the Navy}, delivered in 354 BC, lists the properties of heiresses \textit{(epikêroi), orphanoi, klêroukhoi}, corporations \textit{(koinônika)} and \textit{adynatoi} (disabled men) as being

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1120} Contra Ober 1989, 117, 128; Davies 1981, 15-24. On the syntrierarchy, see below, 334-336. Gabrielsen’s proposed formula is about 300 potential trierarchs (about a fifth being co- or syntrierarchs) for every year of 250 trierarchic ‘units’. He reaches a conservative total of 11 000 men (900+ trierarchs and 200 festival liturgists would be needed) required for all Athenian liturgies. Gabrielsen 1994, 179 argues further that the reforms of Periandros in 358/7 formalized the body of trierarchical properties at 1200. (There were fewer ships requiring captains in the fourth than in the fifth century, but more attested syntrierarchies than sole trierarchies, the former being now the rule [180].) See also Rhodes 1982, 4-5.
\item \textsuperscript{1121} On the dubiousness of the Lysian speaker’s claims in this passage, see Gabrielsen 1994, 77 n. 18.
\item \textsuperscript{1122} For frequent cavalry service in both the Archidamian and Ionian Wars, see above, Ch. 3.2 and this chapter, above; Rhodes 1982, 4.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
exempt from trierarchical liturgy. In Demosthenes’ day, there were apparently around 800 such Athenian estates (Dem. 14.16). It would be reckless to assume a similar number of exempted fortunes for the fifth century, but more important for the present argument is the fact that the likely reason for the these exemptions was that none of these fortunes would be owned by a single, able-bodied male who could serve as trierarch. This offers support for the idea that the ability to command a warship personally was a factor in the consideration of potential trierarchs and makes it likely that the property of currently serving hippeis was not liable; this in turn raises the likelihood that the trierarchical class should be reckoned somewhat larger than the 1100-1200 men established above.

Nevertheless, trierarchical properties in the last third of the fifth century represented only 10-15 per cent of the comfortably off citizens known designated hoi plousioi and two to three per cent of the whole civic body. On this small body of citizens fell a disproportionally vital contribution to the functioning of the naval state. The institution of the trierarchy was thus particularly vulnerable to demographic shocks such as occurred as a result of the plague and the losses in Sicily.

1123 On exemption for war-orphans from a date before 400, see Lys. 32.34; for an example of the infirm and elderly nevertheless serving as trierarchs, see Lys. fr. 35 (Thalheim); Dem. 21.165.
1124 Klēroukhika is problematic in this respect. Jordan, 1976, 67 accepts that holders of klēroi lived and did military service in the region of their holdings; cf. Gabrielsen 1994, 87-88, who rightly argues that this should not apply to klēroukhoi. The debate has not been settled, but it no longer seems necessary to view klēroukhiai as military garrisons; see Moreno 2011, who convincingly argues for absentee landownership as the norm and klēroukhoi as imperial rentiers.
1125 Additionally, there is also the possibility that the syntrierarchy, established around 411/0, gained in popularity immediately after its inception, which would necessitate a widening of the pool of trierarchical properties.
1126 Since it is clear that properties, rather than individuals, were the basis of assessment for suitability for the trierarchy, these figures may be very slightly increased to account for trierarchical families in which there were one or more adult sons.
According to the figures Thucydides records for plague deaths at 3.87.3, Athens experienced a death rate of approximately 30 per cent of the population between 430 and 427.\footnote{The figure of 30 percent is consistent in the casualties provided: 300 of 1000 hippeis (Thuc. 2.13.8) and “no less than” 4400 hoplai ex tön taxeón (which I take to mean the 13 000 regular hoplites in Attica in 431 plus the 1600 in Potidaea with Phormio: Thuc. 2.13.6 and 1.64.2); on the difficulties of interpretation of ex tön taxeón, see: van Wees 2004, 241-243; French 1993; Strauss 1986, 75-76; Hansen 1985, 36-43, 66-69.} Even if the super-rich, having access to better sanitation and to marginally less crowded conditions within the fortified zone of Athens, did not contract the disease at the same rate as other Athenians, it can hardly be imagined that they were more immune to any considerable degree unless they retreated to properties outside of Athens. If that were the case, we might expect some comment from Thucydides. Instead, the historian makes explicit mention of the rapid transfers (ἀγχύστροφος τὴν μεταβολήν) of inheritance from the well-off (εὐδαμόνων) to their heirs as a result of plague deaths (2.53.1-2).\footnote{Thuc. 2.53.1: . . . ἀγχύστροφος τὴν μεταβολήν ὀρόντες τῶν τε εὐδαμόνων καὶ αἱρητικῶς θησακῶν καὶ τῶν οὐδὲν πρότερον κεκτημένων, εἴδος δὲ τάκειν ἐγόντων. Hornblower CT I, 326 accepts this passage as evidence for the sudden emergence of nouveaux riches. For the equation in upper-class writers of eudaimones with hoi plousioi and hoi oligoi, see, e.g., [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 2.10.} Moreover, Thucydides’ inclusion of separate casualty figures (1050 out of 4000) for the expeditionary hoplite force under Hagnon reveals that the case-fatality rate, the percentage of people who die from a disease with which they are infected, was not much below the generalized death-rate (just over 26 per cent).\footnote{For the distinction between death rate and case mortality, see Holladay and Poole 1979.} In this light it is instructive to consider again the cyclical nature of trierarchical service from 431-427. In the four-year model described above, 900 or so of the richest Athenians would have been appointed nominal trierarchs, and between 700 and 800 would have actively commanded triremes. On reasonable analogy with the plight of Hagnon’s expeditionary force, these triremes would have been filled with crewmen infected with
As a result of the demands of the trierarchy, rich Athenians likely found their wealth to be no bastion against infection.

The number of infected ships’ crews, of course, cannot be reliably estimated given the total lack of figures, but given a case-fatality rate so close to the total death-rate, the level of infection must have been quite near one hundred per cent, making it unlikely that many of the trierarchs who served between 430 and 427 could have avoided contracting the disease and, consequently, that Athens lost any fewer than 156 triērarkhountes within these years. Choosing, for the sake of argument, a conservative figure between this minimum and the thirty per cent general death rate, the generals who selected trierarchs in the mid-420s very likely had to contend with the sudden disappearance from their rosters of some 250 former trierarchs.

After the demographic shocks of the plague, the richest Athenians may have come under pressure to take on trierarchies every other year. This seems likely since, according to Thucydides, the size of the fleet, far from shrinking in proportion to Athens’ plague losses, had actually increased from 430 to 428, during which year it was at its largest—some 250 active ships (Thuc. 3.17). There was thus a significant and sudden reduction in the number of citizens who qualified to serve as trierarchs at a time when naval commitments were increasing.

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1130 Naval personnel, traditionally drawn from the lower end of the economic spectrum, would have had high rates of infection even outside of active duty, to say nothing of the ideal conditions for the spread of virulent disease in the cramped confines of warship hulls.


1132 The average between 156 and the 360 men representing 30 per cent of the 1200 available liturgists gives 258.

1133 Cf. Rhodes 1982, 3 for the suggestion that the institution of the extra year of exemption for trierarchical liturgy was in response to the heavy burden on the trierarchical class during the 420s.
and even as, in the face of high spending from 432-428 and the first major defection from the arkhé, imperial resources were (albeit just) beginning to wane.\textsuperscript{1134}

It might be objected that those who perished were simply replaced in the liturgical pool by those who received their estates. The very high mortality rate over so short a period, however, coupled with the Athenian law of partible inheritance, will have seriously disrupted the smooth transference of patrimony and will have fragmented trierarchical fortunes among living heirs. The ramifications of this have not been fully appreciated by scholars. As mentioned above, absolute levels of wealth, which were difficult, if not impossible for outsiders to ascertain, were not the driving factor in the community’s assessment of an individual’s suitability to perform the liturgy. What mattered was people’s perception that a potential liturgist was wealthy enough relative to other propertied citizens to undertake public service.\textsuperscript{1135}

Moreover, inheritance from a liturgically viable property seems to have been a chief factor in the transfer of trierarchic liability to successors from one generation to the next. There was thus a deeply-held assumption that if a father had performed the trierarchy, the heir(s) to his trierarchical patrimony should be in a position to do likewise, actual financial ability to do so

\textsuperscript{1134} On high spending, see Blamire 2001; on waning resources, see Kagan 1974, whose pessimistic assessment of Athenian finances from 430-428 represents the traditional view; see also Kallet 1993 and 2009, who offers a corrective to Kagan, reading against Thucydides and his desire to highlight the mismanagement of Athenian resources under post-Periclean leaders. Despite this corrective, it is worth noting that 428/7 is the first time money-collecting ships (argyrologoi) appear in Thucydides’ account of the war (3.19.2), perhaps suggesting a reassessment of tribute levels to deal with current or anticipated shortages. The domestic incomes of many of the elite whose fortunes still depended heavily on the agricultural resources of Attica would also by the mid-420s have been much reduced. We have seen how serious the economic damage to Attica was already in the early stages of the war, and, although it has been stated above that the wealthy citizens will have been insulated from subsistence risk, it is worth pointing out that of the 41 liturgical oikoi whose demotics are identified in Davies’ \textit{APF}, 31 belong to extramural demes, and 25 of these lay directly in the path of Peloponnesian invasions as outlined above.

\textsuperscript{1135} This valuable observation was originally made in Amit 1965, 110. On the difficulties of assessing the absolute wealth of propertied citizens in classical Athens, see Gabrielsen 1986. On the professed ease with which elite citizens could conceal wealth, and therefore liability to public service and levies, see Lys. 20.23.
In many cases, therefore, sons of former trierarchs may have undertaken their own trierarchies at a potentially much greater personal cost proportional to their own property rather than face the social stigma of initiating *indicosis*. Alternatively, *indicoseis* must have played a crucial role in temporarily relieving those most seriously burdened and in ensuring that the state could rely on a relatively stable number of active appointees, since overburdened liturgists were responsible for finding and challenging their own replacements and could legally force their peers via this procedure to make public their wealth, an advantage not available to generals or other state officials seeking to nominate trierarchs.

### 8.3.2: Eisphora

Further strain was put upon the group of surviving trierarchs when the *eisphora* was levied in the same year as the zenith of Athens’ naval activity (Thuc. 3.19.1). There are three strands of evidence, which, when taken together, strongly suggest that while all three of the top Solonian *telê* were liable to pay *eisphorai*, the heaviest exactions fell upon the very rich. The

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1136 On the inheritance of trierarchical liability, see Gabrielsen 1994, 43-67. The sons of trierarchs were expected to continue the liturgical legacy of the family. A failure to meet this expectation voluntarily could trigger suspicion of concealment of property, and, thus, an *indicosis*, or more damagingly, the charge of having squandered a liturgical patrimony.

1137 Recourse to *indicosis* could easily be construed as behaviour unbecoming of a *philotimos* and patriot. For fourth-century instances of liturgists borrowing capital in order to discharge liturgies either in response to a defeat in an *indicosis* challenge or else to avoid one, see Lys. 19.25-26; Dem. 21.80; [Dem.] 49.11-12; 50.23. Indeed, despite the alleged prevalence of this procedure ([Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 3.4), and frequent mention of its existence in the fourth century naval records, there are very few instances in the historical record of confirmed recourse to *indicosis*. For the scholarly debate over its frequency, see, e.g., Christ 1990 and 2006, 196-198; Gabrielsen 1987.

1138 On the function of *indicosis* as a mechanism for self-regulation in the hands of the elite, see Gabrielsen 1994, 92-94. Here, V. Hunter’s analysis of the role played by slaves in potentially providing courts with intimate knowledge about their masters’ households and financial matters may be brought to bear (1994, 74-75, 94-95).

1139 That liability for *eisphora* payments was limited to the wealthy is put beyond doubt by Ar. *Knights* 923-926. Whether or not different payments were exacted from the different property ratings is more contentious. For arguments in favour of this, see van Wees 2006 and 2001; Thomsen 1964, 183. Cf. A. Jones 1957, 23-28 (on *proesphorai*) and, more importantly, Christ 2007, who argues for a fixed payment.
case for a graduated tax rate in fifth-century Athens on the basis of information from Pollux’s entries on the *telê* has been set out in detail in a previous chapter.\(^{1140}\) Complementary fifth-century testimony can be adduced from Aristophanes and Thucydides. In a passage from *Knights*, Paphlagon threatens to have the Sausage-Seller registered (ἐγγραφῇς) among the rich (ἐς τοὺς πλουσίους) so that he will be weighed down by taxes (ἵπτομενος ταῖς ἐσφοραῖς: 923-926).\(^{1141}\) That the *ipôsis* under *eisphorai* would have been most strongly felt by the same men who performed the trierarchy is implied by the appearance of this threat just below the earlier one to saddle the Sausage-Seller with the trierarchy of a dilapidated ship (lines 912-16).\(^{1142}\)

There are traces in Thucydides’ description of events surrounding the *eisphora* of 428/7 that lend support to the idea that it was the two highest property ratings that were taxed most heavily. Faced with the revolt of a major ally in Mytilene and still reeling from the plague, a show of force in the summer of 428 was a major desideratum for the Athenians. They, therefore, launched an enormous fleet of 100 triremes filled with citizen crews (ἂσβάντες οἱ τοι) to sail around and do damage to the Peloponnese. Thucydides clarifies that while these were Athenian-manned ships, absent from the crews were *hippeis* and *pentakosiomedimnoi* (3.16.1). The reason for this may well have been that members of these classes were already in service as liturgists, hoplites or cavalrymen, but van Wees has made the intriguing suggestion that another reason for their exemption was that they had earned reprieve from military service through among all *plousioi* before the reforms of 378/7 and the introduction of the symmory system for the payment of the *proeisphora*.

\(^{1140}\) See above, Ch. 6.8.

\(^{1141}\) This passage and a fragment of Eupolis (probably from *Khrysoun Genos* of 424) connect the voting of the large *eisphora* of 428 with Cleon (Fr. 287 Kock = Pollux 10.140).

\(^{1142}\) Cf. Christ 2007, 55 n. 10 who argues unconvincingly that we should expect *es tous plousiôtatoi* if Aristophanes was aware of a graduated tax.
particularly onerous financial outlays.\textsuperscript{1143} This proposition is confirmed by the scholiast to Thucydides, who notes, “the \textit{pentakosiomedimnoi} were not compelled to go on the ships since, because they pay the highest tax in the polis, they are held in esteem.”\textsuperscript{1144} Although the evidence is slight, when viewed synoptically, these passages from Pollux, Aristophanes and Thucydides attest the fact that the Athenians who contributed to the \textit{eisphora} did so according to their means.

The Athenians undertook at least three, and perhaps as many as four, \textit{eisphorai} during the course of the Peloponnesian War. The best evidenced is that of 428, but Diodorus’ account suggests a levy in 411/10 or just before (Diod. 13.47.7, 52.5, 64.4). The references in Thucydides to the heavy burdens placed on Athens’ most powerful citizens (\textit{dynatótatoi}) leading up to the stasis of 411 also point in this direction (8.48.1, 63.4). Moreover, a Lysian speaker defending himself on a charge of bribery claims to have contributed to two \textit{eisphorai} dating from the archonship of Theopompos (411/10) to the end of the war, making all but certain that an \textit{eisphora} was held in 411.\textsuperscript{1145} Finally a fragmentary inscription relating to the Sicilian expedition and including the words \textit{ἀπὸ τοῦ τμήματος} and \textit{ἐσφέρειν} (ML 78f. c = IG I\textsuperscript{3} 93) together with allegations of non-remittance of payments for \textit{eisphorai} in \textit{Lysistrata} (654) are evidence that an \textit{eisphora} may also have been levied in 412 (or late 413).\textsuperscript{1146} Unfortunately,
no source except for Pollux provides any information about the amount of funds raised in *eisphorai* subsequent to that of 428. Thucydides’ description of the levy at this date is uncharacteristically imprecise. He writes (3.19.1):

> The Athenians, because they needed money for the siege [of Mytilene], and despite themselves contributing for the first time to a levy a total of 200 talents, also sent out twelve money-collecting ships to the allies with Lysikles and four others in command.\(^{1147}\)

Debate about Thucydides’ meaning here has formed a crux in Athenian economic history. Some scholars believe that Thucydides implies that the levy in 428 was the first time *ever* that the Athenians taxed themselves.\(^{1148}\) Others hold the opinion that, without specifying it, what Thucydides means is that this is the first time in the Peloponnesian War that the Athenians resorted to a direct tax on citizens.\(^{1149}\) A third interpretation, which has gained much traction, argues that Thucydides means to say that this was the first occasion (of many) on which the *eisphora* had yielded 200 talents.\(^{1150}\) Definitive interpretation of Thucydides is impossible without help from additional sources.\(^{1151}\) Yet even if each *eisphora* subsequent to 428 did not raise the considerable sum of 200 talents,\(^{1152}\) *eisphorai* represented a significant and unwelcome exaction from the city’s rich citizens.\(^{1153}\) What is more, these mandatory imposts

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\(^{1147}\) Thuc. 3.19.1: προσδέομενοι δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι χρημάτων ἐς τὴν πολιορκίαν, καὶ ἀυτοὶ ἐσπευσκόντες τότε πρὸς τὸν ἐσφοράν διακόσια τάλαντα, ἐξέσπευσαν καὶ ἐπὶ τὸς ἐξισμάχους ἀργυρολόγους ναὸς δώδεκα καὶ Λυσικλέα πέμπτον αὐτῶν στρατηγάν.

\(^{1148}\) E.g., Sealey 1984, 77-80; against this view, see above, Ch. 6.8.

\(^{1149}\) E.g., Gomme *HCT* II, 278.

\(^{1150}\) E.g., J. Griffith 1977; Thomsen 1964, 146; Hornblower *CT* I, 403-404.

\(^{1151}\) One of the Kallias decrees mentions an *eisphora*, but it cannot conclusively be said to predate 428/7 (Kallet 1989, 112-113), and even if some scholars date it to 434/3, Rhodes 1994, 193 points out that the actual levy may have not taken place until 428; cf. Christ 2007, 54 n. 4. Van Wees 2013b argues that *eisphorai* were a regular feature of Athenian public finance from the early sixth century (83-106).

\(^{1152}\) Van Wees 2006 and 2001; Thomsen 1964, 104-118; both scholars maintain that 200 talents was the standard amount raised by *eisphora*.

\(^{1153}\) Athenian attitudes toward direct taxation on citizens are hinted at in Pericles’ assessment of the Peloponnesians’ recourse to “violent *eisphorai*” to finance their war-making (Thuc. 1.141.5); cf. Eupol. Fr. 278 Kock, referring to Cleon the ‘barber’ (κουρείς), who shears away the *eisphora* from his victim.
appear to have fallen across the rich just when the *triërarkhountes* could least afford additional outlays.

**8.3.3: Sicily and its aftermath**

Just as the *eisphora* of 428 landed in part on a trierarchical class in flux and beleaguered by plague, those that followed the defeat in Sicily also fell across a small subset of the Athenian rich who had been badly mauled by that experience. Of the more than 170 triremes sent to Sicily from 415-413, the majority did not return; nor presumably did their captains (Thuc. 7.87.6; 8.1.2). The property of war orphans was exempt from trierarchic liturgy in the fourth century (Dem. 14.6) and this appears to have been the case, too, for the fifth century (Lys. 32.34), making it likely that both the men in Sicily and their sons were now lost to the state as trierarchs. The burden of the trierarchy (and other of the more expensive liturgies) and a significant portion of the *eisphorai* must have been born for these years by a group of men reduced in the aftermath of Sicily by up to twenty per cent of the original 1200.

Moreover, the solid contribution made by the state to Athenian naval funding, which is observable in preparations for the Sicilian campaign (Thuc. 6.31.1-5; *IG I³* 93), quickly diminished in this period, even as the navy took on desperate importance. The Athenians now required flotillas of guardships to ensure the safe passage of grain ships from the Hellespont and massive fleets to keep pace with the rapidly expanding Peloponnesian fleet, now financed with Persian money. In the face of the loss of so much human and material investment in Sicily, the Athenians finally, in 412, decided to tap the emergency financial reserve of 1000 talents that they had set aside in 431 (Thuc. 8.15.1; cf. 2.24.1). Nevertheless, when the oligarchs came to

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1154 *IG I³* 1191 attests to the high casualty rates of active trierarchs.
power in 411, it seems that they inherited an empty treasury (Thuc. 8.76.7; cf. [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 29.5), despite a desperate attempt to increase revenues by abolishing the phoros payments in favour of an empire-wide five per cent impost (*pentêkostê*) on all seaborne goods (Thuc. 7.28.4). By the end of 411, it was decided by Theramenes and the moderates to use all available resources for the war effort at home (8.97.1; cf. [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 33.1), and the generals in the Hellespont were left to raise whatever emergency funds they could in the field (Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.8, 12). Given the scarcity of public funds, the dwindling imperial income and the strict economies undertaken by the restored democracy, it is no wonder that a larger share of the costs of naval finance was transferred from the state to individual trierarchs, making the liturgy more burdensome.

Indeed, both contemporary Athenian literature and sources that look back on this period from later decades reflect the perception of an increasingly large share of public expenses being shouldered by the richest citizens. Aristophanes, for his part, hints at the scarcity of available trierarchs: in *Frogs*, produced toward the end of the war (405 BC), Aeschylus jokes about rich men dressing in rags after the fashion of Euripidean tragic figures in order to hide their wealth and avoid the trierarchy (1065-1066). Similarly, in his economic treatise, Xenophon’s Socrates is found showing a modicum of sympathy for the wealthy Kritoboulos of Alopeke in a scene imagined taking place in the late fifth century (2.6):

> I observe that already the state is exacting heavy contributions from you: you must provision horses, pay for choruses and gymnastic competitions, and accept presidencies; and if war breaks out, I know they will oblige you to perform trierarchies and so many eisphorai that you will not easily bear their weight. Whenever you seem to fall short of

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1156 Cf. *Frogs* 432-434, where Kallias of Alopeke (Davies *APF*, 7826) is accused of shirking naval service (presumably as trierarch) at Arginousai in order to pursue sexual interests.
what is expected of you, the Athenians will certainly punish you as though they had
c caught you robbing them.\footnote{1157}

Fourth-century oratorical texts, too, paint a similar picture. The boasts of many Lysian speakers
about high liturgical expenditures and \textit{eisphora} payments date from this period.\footnote{1158} And later
speakers, looking back on the war, suggest that its last decade was substantially more exacting
for the rich than the Archidamian War had been. For example, the orator Aeschines, in his
speech \textit{On the Embassy} (delivered in 343) speaks of the wealth of his father, Atrometos, a
propertied young man in the late 420s, being destroyed by the war (πρὶν τὴν οὖσιαν ἀπολέσας
διὰ τὸν πόλεμον: 2.147).\footnote{1159} Isocrates alludes to the heady days of his youth in the 420s when
being rich (τὸ πλουτεῖν) was secure (ἀσφαλές) in contradistinction to the Athens of the mid-
fourth century, when having wealth incurs envy and attracts lawsuits (15.159-160). It must be
admitted that Isocrates is in this speech defending himself in an \textit{antidosis}, and so not much faith
should be placed in his comparison, but elsewhere the orator speaks of ruinous “\textit{prostigmata}
and \textit{leitourgiai}” (8.128), and at 15.161 he claims that his father’s patrimony was destroyed
during the Peloponnesian War (cf. [Plut.] \textit{Mor.} 837a-b). Aristophanes evidently mocked
Isocrates’ father, Theodoros, for having made his fortune owning “flute-making slaves,” and
since Isocrates was educated “as well as any Athenian” ([Plut.] \textit{Mor.} 837a), and had engaged in
horse-racing in his youth ([Plut.] \textit{Mor.} 839c), his family’s misfortune must have begun

\footnote{1157}{Xen. Ec. 2.6: ἐτὶ δὲ καὶ τὴν πόλιν αἰσθάνομαι τὰ μὲν ἢδη σοι προστάτισαν μεγάλα τελεῖν,
ἰπποτροφίας τε καὶ χορηγίας καὶ γιμνασιαρχίας καὶ προστατεῖας, ἀν δὲ δὴ πόλεμος γένηται, ὡδ᾽ ὅτι καὶ
τριμερῆς [μισθών] καὶ εἰσφοράς τοσαύτας σοι προστάξουσιν ὅσα σὺ οὐ ραδίως ὑποσχέσαι, ὅπου δ᾽ ἂν
ἐνδείξης δόξης τι τότες ποιεῖν, ὡδ᾽ ὅτι σε τιμωρήσονται Αθηναῖοι οὐδὲν ἢτον ἢ εἰ τὰ αὐτῶν λάβοιεν
κλέπτοντα.}
\footnote{1158}{E.g., 3.47; 12.38; 18.7; 20.23; 25.12; 32.24, 26.}
\footnote{1159}{Atrometos was born in either 437/6 or 436/5 (Davies \textit{APF}, 544).}
sometime well into his young adult life (413–404).\textsuperscript{1160} Davies has identified the loss of family-owned slaves to Decelea as “the obvious proximate cause.”\textsuperscript{1161} In addition to this plausible explanation for a decline in the family’s source of wealth, Isocrates explicitly attributes the erosion of his family’s estate to his father’s liturgical spending along with the cost of his own education (15.161).\textsuperscript{1162}

These anecdotal references create a strong impression of the increasingly heavy financial burden placed on the city’s elite in the late-fifth century. There is, however, even stronger evidence that the trierarchs as a group perceived themselves to be facing unusually heavy exactions following 413, and it is to this that we shall now turn.

8.4: The Ionian War, revolution and reform

The model outlined above, which argues for an increased financial burden placed upon the group of Athenian ultra-rich by the loss of many of its members between 430 and 413 and the dwindling of imperial revenue, is corroborated by the evidence for two phenomena surrounding the trierarchy in the final decade of the Peloponnesian War: the role played by trièrarkhountes in the oligarchic revolution of 411 and the creation of the syntrierarchy shortly thereafter.

According to Thucydides’ account of the events leading up to the revolution, it was the trierarchs and the most powerful (dynatótatoi) of the Athenians present with the fleet at Samos

\textsuperscript{1160} According to Ps.-Plutarch, his father, Theodorus, who derived his wealth from a flute-making factory, was wealthy enough in the 420s to have caught the attention of Aristophanes and his fellow-comedian, Strattis, who mocked him as an autopoios (Mor. 836e).

\textsuperscript{1161} Davies APF, 246.

\textsuperscript{1162} Isoc. 15.161: καὶ τὰ δεῖ λέγειν περὶ τῶν κοινῶν; αὕτου γὰρ οὗ μικρὸν διήματον διὰ ταύτην τὴν μεταβολὴν τῶν ἐμαυτοῦ πραγμάτων, ἤτο γὰρ ἐπαμύνειν ἤργομεν τοῖς ἵδιοις, ἀπολομένου ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τῷ πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους ἀπάντησιν τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἡμῖν, ἄρ’ ὅπως ὁ πατὴρ ἡμᾶς ἡ εἰς τὸ πόλεμον χρήσαν ἀὑτῶν παρεῖχεν, ἡμῖν θα’ ὑπερμίλλος ἐπικύπτας ἐναντιῷ ἐπιπλέοντος τῆς ἐν τῇ και ἐν τῇ ἑλικιώτας καὶ συμπαιδευομένος ἢ νῦν ἐν τοῖς συμπολίτευομένοις...
who were agitating for political reform (8.47.2; 48.1; 63.4). Furthermore, he notes that they were moved partly by the promise of Alcibiades to attach the Persian satrap, Tissaphernes, and his money to Athens’ cause, “but more so by their own inclination” (τὸ δὲ πλέον καὶ ἀπὸ σφόν αὐτῶν). The notion that members of this class were naturally predisposed towards oligarchic government may be quickly dispensed with. As Kagan has pointed out, among the trierarchs at Samos in 412/11 were moderates like Theramenes and, as the next years would show, some of the most staunch defenders of the democracy, like Strombikhides and Thrasyboulos. Moreover, the protestations of ill-tempered philaconists notwithstanding (e.g., Ps.-Xen. Ath. Pol. 1.1-3, 13), triérarkhounetes played a prominent role in the democracy. For the fourth century, when the quantity of evidence allows for such consideration, trierarchs and former trierarchs are heavily overrepresented in Athenian political contexts. Out of the 373 attested rhêtores and stratêgoi noted by Hansen for this century, 114 are found in Davies’ Athenian Propertied Families, and 58 of these can be identified as trierarchs on the basis of explicit testimony. Even in this very incomplete catalogue of politically active citizens, trierarchs, who it must be recalled represented about two to three per cent of the Athenian population, enjoy a 15.5 per cent share. To these considerations must be added the evidence collected by Carter for rich apragmones, which makes this level of overrepresentation all the more significant. Thus the trierarchs’ disaffection with the democracy in 411, not being attributable to any necessary

1163 Christ 2006, 164; Gabrielsen 1994, 12, 173.
1165 On the various motivations of the known conspirators, see Kagan 1987, 113-130, 150-155.
1166 Gabrielsen 1994, 214-15. For the list of Athenian politicians and generals, see Hansen 1989a 34-72; cf. Potts 2011, who argues, contra Strauss 1996, that socio-economic stratification and social hierarchy was acknowledged and reinforced by service aboard Athenian triremes with effective and generous trierarchs enjoying a certain degree of preeminence through the patronage of their citizen crewmembers.
ideological leanings of their class, requires further explanation. Upon conferring with

Alcibiades, who promised them Persian aid if they would no longer “be a democracy” (8.48.1):

The most powerful of the citizens had great hopes for themselves, as the ones enduring the greatest hardships, that they would also gain control over public affairs, and that they would prevail over the enemy as well.  

Here and elsewhere, describing the genesis of the oligarchic movement, Thucydides refers to the great “toil” or “hardship” of those who first entertained ideas of revolution. His linkage of trierarchs at 8.47.2 with the “most powerful citizens who toiled hardest” for the city (οἱ δυνατότατοι . . . οὔπερ ταλαιπωροῦνται μάλιστα) at 8.48.1 (cf. 8.63.4) strongly suggests that the cost to trierarchs of underwriting Athens’ navy was a major cause of their disaffection. The verb talaipōreō and its cognates are widely used by Thucydides, but it is only at this point in his history that the term is associated with a distinctive subgroup of citizens rather than to a civic body at large. It has been shown above, furthermore, that the civic obligations of the top liturgies and eisphora fell together uniquely upon the richest citizens, indeed the most powerful (dynatōtatoi). The conclusion that financial grievances were prominent among the various motivations within this small group of citizens to participate in revolution is all but certain. The case, however, can be strengthened even further.

Shortly before the ouster of the oligarchic government, the Athenians pioneered a new approach to the trierarchy, which allowed two men to share the liturgy over the course of a

\[Thuc. 8.48.1: \text{καὶ ἔκινήθη πρῶτον ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ τοῦτο καὶ ἐς τὴν πόλιν ἐνεδύθην ὅστερον ἔθεν. τῷ τῷ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ διαβάντες τινὲς ἐκ τῆς Σάμου ἔς λόγους ἥλθον, καὶ ὑποτείνοντος αὐτοῦ Τιτσαφέρνην μὲν πρῶτον, ἔπαιτα δὲ καὶ βασιλέα φίλον ποίησεν, εἰ μὴ δημοκρατοῦντο, οὔτω γὰρ ἄν πιστεύσαι μᾶλλον βασιλέα, πολλὰς ἐλπίδας εἶχον αὐτοῖς θ’ ἕαυτος οἱ δυνατότατοι τῶν πολιτῶν τὰ πράγματα, οὔπερ καὶ ταλαιπωροῦνται μάλιστα, ἐς ἕαυτος περιποίησεν καὶ τῶν πολεμίων ἐπικρατήσειν.}\]
The earliest attested syntierarchy, as it was known, is that of Diogeiton (APF 3788) and Alexis (APF 551) (Lys. 32.24). We know that this trierarchy was undertaken after 409, since Lysias tells us that Diogeiton was undertaking it on behalf of his dead brother, Diodotos, who was killed fighting as a hoplite under Thrasyllos in Ephesos (32.5-7). There is nothing in Lysias’ speech to suggest that in 409 there was anything novel about the arrangement between Diogeiton and Alexis, so perhaps the date of its institution can be pushed back slightly earlier. Indeed, if recent arguments for the backdating of the Triremes Inscription (IG I3 1032 = IG II2 1951), which includes the names and partial names of eight co-trierarchs, are accepted, the institution may be traced back to 412/11, when it would have been first employed in the flotilla under Strombikhides.

The purpose of the joint trierarchy was twofold: it allowed the expense paid by individuals to be shared and it served to widen the pool of potential trierarchs since men who might try to avoid the costs of a trierarchy could presumably be more easily induced to share the obligation with another. Such an innovation was required given the simultaneous or slightly earlier institution of the two-year liturgical exemption that would have made it more difficult for generals to find men to captain their ships. The decreased costs involved in the shared

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1169 Cf. Silverman 1994, 120, who connects the introduction of the syntierarchy with the financial crisis that forced the introduction of the emergency coinage in 407/6 (Ar. Frogs 718-720 with scholion).
1170 For this campaign, see Xen. Hell. 1.1.34-1.2.9; similarly, another fourth-century speaker claims to have undertaken a joint trierarchy with his brother and to have engaged his ship in a battle in period between Aigospotamoi and the final Athenian surrender in 404 without any hint of novelty (Isoc. 18.59-60).
1171 The inscription has been variously thought to commemorate Athenian action at Khios (412), Arginousai (406) and Aigospotamoi (405). For the dating controversy, see: Gabrielsen 1994; Graham 1998 and 1992; cf. Laing 1965.
1172 As a consequence of more trierarchs serving to fulfill a more or less static number of trierarchical ‘units,’ generals would have found it necessary to widen the pool of potential appointees (Gabrielsen 1994, 224). See, also, Gabrielsen 1994, 174: a similar innovation was introduced to the khorêgia in 406/5 according to the scholiast to Ar. Frogs 404, who cites Aristotle as his source. Scholars who down-date the inception of the two-year trierarchical exemption from the 420s nevertheless see its
trierarchy would have had the effect of lowering the threshold of property deemed liable, thus expanding the group of potential liturgists. Since the syntrierarchy provided a mechanism to dramatically reduce the immediate costs to individuals while also spreading the trierarchical burden amongst a somewhat wider group, it should be regarded as an ameliorative response or a concession to its richest citizens on the part of the Athenian demos. This opinion is shared by a number of scholars, who view the syntrierachy as in innovation of the oligarchs. However, previous work on the trierarchy and its sociopolitical context has tended toward rather loose and broad characterizations of the strain placed by the Peloponnesian War on Athens’ trierarchs, which do not get us very far in trying to understand the revolutionary movement in 411 in which the trierarchs at Samos featured so prominently. The previous discussion of the socioeconomic and demographic consequences of the plague and of the losses in Sicily helps to texture Kagan’s observation that there was “a stunning diminution in the number of Athenians available in 411 to pay the state’s expenses,” resulting in increased financial burdens on the survivors.

The Athenians had experienced the severe casualties of the plague already in the early 420s, at a time, when, as we have seen, new financial burdens were placed on the rich; in spite of these difficulties, our only indication of stasisiotic behaviour from the rich at this earlier time are the grumblings of a philaconic pamphleteer. While it is true that the cumulative effects of casualties and financial exhaustion on the trierarchical class were a factor in its involvement with the revolution in 411, these are not by themselves sufficient explanation. In the final sections of this chapter I will demonstrate the need to set the expense of the trierarchy against intro


\[^{1174}\text{Kagan 1987, 110-111 (quotation: 110).}\]
the potential for trierarchs to profit financially from their service. As will be shown, the waxing and waning fortunes of the city had a direct impact on the cost-benefit ratio of trierarchical service, which in turn led to increased demands for social and political rewards for the *triērarkhos*.

8.5: Profitability and material benefits of military leadership

In his description of the initial stages of the oligarchic movement in 411, Thucydides includes a remarkable account, in indirect speech, of a dissenting voice among the conspirators (οἱ δὲ ξυνιστάντες τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν). Phrynikhos, who was then *stratêgos*, disapproved of Alcibiades’ proposal to replace the democracy with oligarchy. In particular, he objected to the argument that the allies, both those who had revolted and those who remained, would look more favourably upon an Athenian oligarchy ruled by the *kaloi kagathoi*, countering that freedom from the *arkhê* mattered most to the allies, irrespective of the constitution of its hegemon (8.48.5). Phrynikhos, Thucydides says, argued that:

Th[e allies] believed that the so-called *kaloi kagathoi* would present them with no less trouble than the common people would, since these were the purveyors (ποριστάς) and the instigators (ἔσηγητάς) to the common people of evils, from which they themselves benefitted the most.\(^{1175}\)

This is a remarkable passage and may contain something of the popular sentiment to counterbalance Ps.-Xenophon’s assertions that it was the commons who benefitted most from war and empire (1.13, 1.17-18 cf. 1.2). Both Finley and de Ste. Croix underscored the paradoxical claim Phrynikhos makes, and noted Thucydides’ apparent approval of the “acuity

\(^{1175}\) Thuc. 8.48.6: τοὺς τε καλοὺς κάγαθοὺς ὅνομαζομένους οὐκ ἔλάσσω αὐτοὺς νομίζειν σφίσι πράγματα παρέξειν τοῦ δήμου, ποριστάς ὄντας καὶ ἐσηγητάς τῶν κακῶν τῷ δήμῳ, ἢς ὃν τὰ πλείον αὐτοὺς ὑφελεῖσθαι.
Neither, however, could find a mechanism beyond foreign property acquisition through which the elite might so benefit. As Hornblower comments, however, Thucydides’ text seems to be driving at something besides land-ownership. The image of the kaloi kagathoi, amongst whom triérarkhoi are both implicitly and explicitly included (8.47.2), as poristai or “suppliers” of evils for the demos surely alludes to their capacity as leitourgountes. At the risk of reading too literally, it is worth considering

M. Finley 1978b, 123-124; de Ste. Croix 1972, 290-291 and 1954, 37-38. Quotation: M. Finley 1978b, 123; similarly de Ste. Croix 1954, 37: Phrynihkos’ comments are of all the more historical value because Thucydides puts them “without contradiction into the mouth of an oligarch, who could have no possible reason for making an admission so damaging to his party if it were not true.” Cf. Hornblower CT III, 899.

To be sure, the elite strata of Athenian society must have accumulated overseas landholdings. Certainly, Athenian magnates appear at times in our sources as almost regal figures in their foreign spheres of influence. Moreno 2007, 77-143 provides a good overview of the evidence for elite landholdings abroad. However, as M. Finley 1978a has shown, even taking into account the few pieces of evidence that seem to point to this directly, the assumption that the kaloi kagathoi swallowed up vast swaths of allied territory throughout the Aegean is unfounded. The classic example is the Euboean property holdings of Oionias, charged as one of the Hermokopidai, which were listed at public auction after their confiscation and which were larger and more valuable than any land privately owned in Attica. According to Andokides (who surely exaggerates), the confiscated amounts did not even represent the whole of his foreign property. For the amounts, see: IG I 3 422.375-8; Andoc. 1.13. Certainly, much land throughout the empire was given over to Athenian klêroukhoi. Plutarch claims that Pericles alone established, sometime in the 440s, some 2000 klêroi in the northern Aegean and fortified the isthmus of the Thracian Khersonēsos in order to protect Athenian holdings there (Plut. Per. 19.1; cf. Pericles’ expedition to the Black Sea region in c. 436 described by Plutarch at 20.1-2). For the year 431/0, Diodorus has the general Kleopompos stationed with a fleet of 30 guard ships around Euboea, home to numerous Athenian klêroukhoi since the 440s (Diod. 12.44.1; cf. Thuc. 2.26). The Athenians continued to establish klêroukhia during the Peloponnesian War: the strategic advances and re-subjugation of rebellious allies during the war provided both the opportunity and the justification for doing so, e.g., Lesbos: Thuc. 3.50; Melos: Thuc. 5.116.4 (on this as a klêroukhia along the same lines as the settlement on Lesbos, see Moreno 2009, 215). There is some evidence to suggest, however, that official klêroi were reserved mainly for those from the lower economic strata. Plutarch regards the Periclean settlements as a kind of social welfare program intended to rid Athens of and to find employment as garrison troops for a “lazy, unemployed and impoverished mob” (Per. 11). As Moreno argues, Pericles’ biographer has probably been over influenced by his experience of the Roman social and military conditions of his own day (2009, 213, 219 n. 18 and 2007, 93 n. 78). I have argued above that there certainly was no urban mob of destitute poor in fifth-century Athens such as the considerable population of urban plebs that concerned Roman policy-makers in the second and first centuries. The more compelling piece of evidence is the rider attached to the decree establishing the Athenian colony at Brea (IG I 3 46.43-46) stating that allotment be reserved only for thêtes and zeugitai.

Poristai were financial officers who ‘purveyed’ or ‘devised’ funds, first attested between 419 and 405 (Rhodes AP, 356: attested in Antiphon 6 Chor. 49 and Ar. Frogs 1505). Here, in their capacity as ‘pursers,’ who facilitate, in addition to that of eiségētai, who propose and lead (as elsewhere: e.g., Thuc.
how elite citizens might “benefit most” from their providing the demos with the means to maintain their naval arkhē, the cause of ta kaka for the allies.

There has not been serious enough study of the possibility that triérarkhountes had opportunity to benefit from their trierarchies economically as well as socially and politically.\(^{1180}\) Given the limited bureaucracy\(^ {1181}\) and complete lack of a public prosecutor (the 500 phrouroi neórión notwithstanding\(^ {1182}\)) in Peloponnesian-War Athens, there was considerable opportunity for less than scrupulous trierarchs to enrich themselves while simultaneously performing their public service. A thorough reading of our sources suggests, in fact, that it was fully expected of individuals to seek personal profit from their appointments as ships’ captains and that it was only in the most egregious cases of flagrant profiteering at the clear expense of the commonwealth that legal action would be brought.

Old Comedy and late-fifth to early-fourth century oratory provide us with most of our evidence. This suggests a number of ways in which individual trierarchs might seek to profit from their terms of service. Each of these will be discussed in due course, but it is also worth noting, for the moment, how commonplace in these texts is the assumption of corruption among rich Athenians serving in public capacities. In Athenian oratory, elite Athenians dragged before the courts on charges unrelated to their terms as trierarchs at times must defend themselves against the presumption that they had only undertaken the liturgy with the aim of

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6.89.5), elite citizens entice the demos to wage war and advance the arkhē, which is the source of evils for the allies.

\(^{1180}\) Most commentators have focused on political and social power and prestige as the ultimate rewards of leitourgountes nearly to the exclusion of material reward: see, e.g., Gabrielsen 1994, 48-49; Millet 1991, 67; Sinclair 1988, 176-190; Davies 1981, 26; Fisher 1976, 33-34; cf. Christ 2006, 171-190.

\(^{1181}\) By modern standards at least: by the standards of the ancient world and of polis Greeks, the fifth-century Athenian arkhē was astonishingly bureaucratized. The passage is highly problematic, but [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 24.3 suggests that at least 700 Athenians were employed annually as various arkhai and perhaps as many as 1400.

\(^{1182}\) On these figures, see Ath. Pol. 24.3, and below, 355-356.
personal gain (e.g., Lys. 28.2, 4; 29. 4). To judge from the extant oratorical corpus, providing a glittering record of service to the state militarily and financially was a crucial part of the process of any legal proceeding in so far as these were crucial elements under scrutiny in the process of *ethopoeia*, the rhetorical effort by which elite citizens carefully crafted an image of themselves and their position in civic society as patriotic and contributing (if rich) average citizens.\(^{1183}\)

Unlike infantry service, however, the joint military/financial duty of the trierarchy seems to have generated a good degree of suspicion concerning the motivations for its undertaking.\(^{1184}\)

Not only did an elite citizen have to recall past service as a trierarch in order to cast himself as a patron of the community and a useful and worthy citizen (*khrêstos*), he had to deflect accusations from his opponents and allay public anxiety that he had used the liturgical contribution as a means to secure selfish ends.\(^{1185}\) At best, the pursuit of those ends might have distracted from his public duties and concerns as a naval officer responsible for expensive public equipment (hulls and tackle) and precious citizen lives; at worst, private interests might positively contradict public ones.\(^{1186}\)

**8.5.1: General statements about profiting**

Just how lucrative command of a warship might be is suggested by a number of Lysian speakers. The speaker of Lysias 19, which concerns the state-confiscated property of the disgraced and executed Aristophanes, alleges that the majority of the property in question was

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\(^{1183}\) Ober 1989, 192-247.

\(^{1184}\) On the central place of infantry service in Athenian forensic oratory, see above, Ch. 7.3.1.

\(^{1185}\) On the democratic suspicion of wealth and the need for political leaders, invariably members of the wealth-elite, to mediate against this, see Ober 1989, 117, 205-221. Cf. Xen. *Symp.* 4.30-31.

\(^{1186}\) On Athenian ambivalence toward money-making in office and in public life, see Sinclair 1988, 185-186; F. Harvey 1985, esp. 108-113; Fisher 1976, 33-34. For the fourth century, Harvey adduces what he calls the ‘Hypereides Principle,” citing Hyp. 5.24-25: “You give full permission, gentlemen of the jury, to the orators and generals to reap substantial rewards. It is not the laws, which grant them this privilege but your tolerance and generosity. But on one point you insist: your interests must be furthered, not opposed, with the money they receive.”
gained through the tenure of Aristophanes’ father, Nikophemos, as a military officer serving alongside the general, Konon (II).\textsuperscript{1187} Prior to his career as a ship’s captain under the patronage of the Athenian general (19.35),\textsuperscript{1188} Nikophemos’ estate consisted of nothing but a small house at Rhamnous; after Konon’s victory at Knidos (in 394 BC), his son (Aristophanes) served as khorêgos twice and three times consecutively as trierarch within five years, contributed to eisphorai and acquired a large estate of more than 300 plethra (nearly a third of a square kilometer) (19.28-29).\textsuperscript{1189}

Later on, too, we hear specifically that Aristophanes had spent the impressive sum of 80 minas (one and a third talents) on lavishly equipping warships in the aftermath of Knidos (19.42-43). Lysias, defending his client from accusations that he had profited from Aristophanes’ estate, has reason to minimize the amount of Aristophanes’ property, arguing that the confiscation has already removed all of the latter’s estate. Exaggeration of Aristophanes’ outlays from 394-390 may well be a part of this strategy. The figures provided, therefore, may be suspect; nevertheless, the mere fact that it could plausibly be claimed that a man with no appreciable wealth could, as a result of having profited from successful naval officership,

\textsuperscript{1187} Kirchner \textit{PA}, 8707.

\textsuperscript{1188} The nature of Nikophemos’ officership is not clear from the details provided by the speech, which says only that Nikophemos was a personal friend of Conon (12-13) and that on campaign in Asia Minor he did the general’s bidding: Νικόφημος δὲ ποιοῦντα δι’ ἓκαίνου προστάτου (35). Diodorus (14.81.4) specifies that Konon at this time was ὁ τῶν Περσῶν ναύαρχος and claims that he invested this command in two subordinates, one of whom was Nikophemos (Diod.: Νικόδημος). This testimony has been rejected by scholars since Shuckburgh (1899, 301). Xenophon identifies Phanabazos as nauarkhos at Knidos, adding that Konon had command of ‘to Hellenikon’, presumably those (Persian) ships that were crewed with Greek mercenaries (4.3.11). Further on, in the aftermath of Knidos and in conjunction with the Persian assault on the Peloponnesse, Xenophon states that Konon left Nikophemos (misidentified in the MSS as Νικόφημος) as harmost of Kythera (4.8.8). It is unsafe to assume much about Konon’s official role in the Knidos campaign, let alone that of Nikophemos, but the likelihood is that he served as some sort of lieutenant and as such would doubtless have been in command of his own (Persian supplied) trireme.

\textsuperscript{1189} By way of perspective, an estate of 300 plethra is among the largest attested within Attica in the classical period and is equal to that owned in Erkhia by Alcibiades (Plato, \textit{Alcib.} 1 123c; Moreno 2007, 111 n. 157).
undertake the trierarchy out of his own resources speaks to the potential for profit in naval campaigning (to say nothing of the potential in Athens for social mobility built on war profiteering).

In speech 29 we find further reference to the top echelon of Athenian society selfishly profiting rather than sacrificing their personal wealth in times of war.\textsuperscript{1190} This speech is something of a cousin to 19 and here Lysias’ client finds himself playing the part of the prosecution in circumstances very close to those surrounding Aristophanes’ estate. The speech dates from 388 BC, and the circumstances to which the speaker refers are those of the Corinthian War, but there is no reason to believe that similar scenarios did not play out in the previous decades.\textsuperscript{1191} The speaker asserts that this opponent owes his entire public career to Ergokles, of whose enormous property (more than 30 talents’ worth) Philokrates remains partly in possession.\textsuperscript{1192} Ergokles is alleged to have removed Philokrates “from the hoplites” (τὸν μὲν ὑμετέρον ὀπλιτῶν),\textsuperscript{1193} made him treasurer of the general’s funds abroad (tamias) and, finally, to have appointed him a trierarch in his fleet (29.3). Surprisingly, it is from the trierarchy rather than the financial office that the speaker alleges Philokrates to have profited (29.4):

It is remarkable that whereas those with property lament their service as trierarchs, this man, who had not previously possessed anything, at that time voluntarily undertook this liturgy. Ergokles did not appoint him trierarch in order that Philokrates would suffer loss,

\textsuperscript{1190} On this occasion, Lysias’ purpose is to convince a jury that the confiscated property of the disgraced Athenian general, Ergokles, does not represent the entire estate, and that more exactions ought to be imposed.

\textsuperscript{1191} The specific events alluded to are probably connected with Ergokles’ campaigning with Thrasyboulos in the Northern Aegean, on which see Xen. Hell. 4.8.25-34; cf. Lys. 28.

\textsuperscript{1192} Philokrates: Davies APF, 14574; Kirchner PA, 14596. It seems that Philokrates rose to such prominence that he was eventually elected stratēgos (or possibly nauarkhos) himself. He features in Xen. Hell. 4.8.24 at the head of a small fleet of Athenian ships bound for Asia Minor.

\textsuperscript{1193} Or perhaps from the “citizens”: πολίτῶν MSS, rejected by Todd 2000 and Lamb 1930.
but so that he would benefit and would protect Ergokles’ money, because Ergokles did 
not have anybody else in whom he could put more trust.  

It would seem that it was easy enough for the speaker’s audience to accept that a trierarch 
could find ways to enrich himself through his service. Philokrates, like Aristophanes before him, 
built his considerable fortune solely upon his successful military career, at least as Lysias 
represents it. In the related speech Against Ergokles the speaker claims that Ergokles and 
Philokrates “have gone from poverty to wealth at the expense of [the demos’] property” (28.1), 
and that while the fleet is in a state of ruination and lack of funds they have “rapidly acquired 
the largest property of any of the citizens” (28.2).  

These and like passages in fourth-century oratory speak to the assumption that the 
trierarchy could serve as a means of acquiring wealth even as it obliged one potentially to a 
considerable outlay of personal wealth.  

They also suggest, although anecdotally, a degree of 
fluidity in the pool of Athenian trierarchs in the period immediately following the 
Peloponnesian War. The veracity of the speakers’ accounts, of course, is beside the point. Their 
arguments about trierarchs profiting from their service must have been at least plausible to 
Athenian jurors in order for them to be effective. Moreover, we are fortunate to possess 
documentary evidence (albeit late) that state-owned ships had been involved in shady dealings. 
This takes the form of annotations in dockyard registration records naming (ἐρημένη) individual 
triremes in legal proceedings (phaseis).  

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1194 Lys. 29.4: καίτοι δεινόν εἰ οἱ μὲν τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντες ὀλοφρόνονται τριήραρχοιντες, οὗτος δὲ 
οὐδὲν πρότερον κατημένος ἐν ἡκείνῳ τῷ χρόνῳ ἐπελευθύνεται ὑπάρθῃ ταῦτῃ τὴν ληπτωργίαν. οὐκοῦν δὴ οὐχ 
ὡς ἐγκαθισθώμενοι αὐτὸν τρήραρχον κατέστησαν, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐγκαθισθώμενοι καὶ φιλάξαντα τὰ αὐτοῦ 
χρήματα, οὐκ ἔχον δὲ τῷ χρῆ μᾶλλον τούτου πιστεύσαι.  
1195 Cf. Lys. 19.57; 25.9, 19; 27.10-11; 30.25.  
1196 IG II² 1631.169; 1632.182-90.
Nor does it seem that such activities were peculiar to the fourth century. Similar sentiments are expressed in another speech of Lysias that forms the bridge to the earlier period.\(^\text{1197}\) The speaker of Lysias 27, a speech dating from 394 BC, claims that (27.9-10):

During the war, the defendants have used your property to go from poverty to riches (ἐκ πενήτων πλούσιοι γεγόνασιν), and you have become poor on account of them. The task of honourable leaders (ἀγαθῶν δημαγωγῶν) is not to take away your property during your misfortunes, but to give you their own property. We have reached a point where those who previously, in peacetime, were not able even to maintain themselves, are now contributing to your war taxes (εἰσιφόρας) and serving as khorέgoi and building large houses.\(^\text{1198}\)

That the war in question must be the Peloponnesian War is put beyond doubt by the fact that the Corinthian War had only just begun by the time that the speech was delivered. It is clear that Lysias is indulging in rhetorical hyperbole. We cannot take seriously the claim that the same men who are leaders and ought to be giving to the people of their own resources (i.e., leitourgontes) are at the same moment penêtes and unable to maintain themselves (οὐδὲ σφᾶς αὐτοῦς ἐδύναστο τρέφειν).\(^\text{1199}\) However, the assumption underlying the argument here is the important thing: the speaker alleges that, during the Peloponnesian War, powerful citizens, leitourgontes (those who ought to be providing for the demos from their own means), had leveraged their high positions for profit.\(^\text{1200}\)

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\(^{1197}\) See also the statement in Lysias 19.48 that Kleophon, a sympathetic figure and opponent of Kritias and the Thirty (Lys. 30.9-12), was widely thought to have made a huge profit from his various official positions during the Peloponnesian War.

\(^{1198}\) Lys. 27. 9-10: . . . οὖτοι μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ ἐκ πενήτων πλούσιοι γεγόνασιν ἐκ τῶν ύμετέρων, ύμεῖς δὲ διὰ τούτων πένητες. καίτοι οὐ ταῦτα ἄγαθον δημαγωγῶν ἔστι, τὰ ύμεταρα ἐν ταῖς ύμετέραις συμφοραῖς λαμβάνειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἐαυτῶν μὴν διδόναι, καὶ γὰρ τοι τε καὶ τεσσάρων ἰκομοί, ἐσθέ' οἱ πρῶτοι ἐν τῇ εἰρήνῃ οὐδὲ σφᾶς αὐτοῦς ἐδύναστο τρέφειν, νόν ύμην εἰσιφόρας εἰσφέροντι καὶ χορηγῶσι καὶ οἰκίας μεγάλας οἰκοῦσι.

\(^{1199}\) This passage does, however, probably speak to the conservative bias of upper-class writers who characterize the ‘new’ politicians of the late fifth century as tradesmen or sellers; that is as nouveaux riches who do not derive their wealth from traditional landholding (Connor 1972; de Ste. Croix 1972, 290).

\(^{1200}\) Cf. [Dem.] 51.14: “It is not right that a man who serves as trierarch in the interest of Athens should expect to become rich at the public expense, but by means of his own resources he should store the
Contemporary, late-fifth century sources are less explicit, especially with reference specifically to trierarchies, but Old Comedy preserves some tantalizing, if interpretively challenging, testimony. Certainly, in Aristophanes, there is an explicit linkage of the condition of continuous war during the 420s and the profit and opportunities grasped at and monopolized by the rich. In *Thesmophoriazousae* (411 BC), the chorus complains of the unfairness of the current state of affairs at Athens: why should the mother of a useful citizen (ἀνδρα χρηστόν) share a seat of honour at festivals beside the mother of a useless coward (δειλόν καὶ πονηρόν ἄνδρα). For specific abuse, they single out the mother of Hyperbolos who is not only a coward, but also a worthless trierarch or a bad steersman (ἵ τριήμαρχον πονηρόν ἤ κυβερνήτην κακόν: 838). That Hyperbolos actually equipped a warship is strongly suggested by fragments of the comedies of Eupolis, which quite possibly refer to his trierarchy having been undertaken sometime in the latter 420s (Fr 192, 311 K; Fr 195 312 K).

It is noteworthy that in *Thesmophoriazousae* Hyperbolos is attacked both for cowardice and for his worthlessness in performing the trierarchy. He is vilified, that is, both for his lack of martial areté and his failure as a liturgist. Some commentators have argued that the concept of losses of the city, if you are to have the service which you require. But each commander goes out determined to pursue the opposite course, and the losses resulting from their own evil ways are restored by the damages which fall on you.”

1201 E.g., Ar. *Ach.* 595-617, *Knights* 247, 443-444, 573-576, 716-718, 779-780, 824-835, 930-933, 991-996, 1141-1150, 1218-1226, *Wasps* 240-4, 554-558, 664-669, 681-685, 921-925, 957-972, 1187-1189, *Peace* 632-648, 668-669, 1177-1178, 1188-1196. On the profits of military and political leadership in democratic Athens, see Sinclair 1988, 179-188. These allegations must be treated with some caution, however. Aristophanes himself, in the *parabasis* of *Acharnians*, claims to have been responsible for many benefits to the Athenians in the advice that he provides (i.e., as a xymboulos: 651). We must keep in mind that the dramatist too is a member of the elite, competing for public recognition and favour, that Comedy itself participated in the rhetorical *agôns* of the city’s elite, and that Aristophanes has motive for portraying other elite citizens as narrowly self-interested and shameless opportunity-seekers.

1202 *Thesmo* 830-845.

1203 Davies *APF*, 13910; Swoboda 1916, 256; cf. Storey 2003, 212, who notes that the reference in Ar. *Kn.* 1300-1315 to Hyperbolos’ alleged proposal for an expedition to Carthage may also support the idea that he was a trierarch in the 420s.
“bad trierarch” refers likewise to the *aretê* of the trierarch in terms of his leadership and performance in battle as opposed to his level of financial outlay.\(^{1204}\) When fifth-century sources speak about the trierarchy, however, they most regularly speak of the financial rather than the military aspect of the institution. Aristophanes is consistent in this regard (*Knights* 912; *Frogs* 1065).\(^{1205}\) We might ask, then, what specifically made a *triērarkhos ponēros*?

Trierarchs had to keep track of income as well as expenses. The task of tracking income and expenditure in any financial venture in classical Athens was made all the more difficult in the absence of the double-entry accounting ledger.\(^{1206}\) Mistakes were made and no doubt expected. Scholars of the Athenian navy normally assume that this resulted in a negative liability for the trierarch in his capacity as the ultimate underwriter of the costs of a campaign. However, it is worth considering whether the opposite might (if less frequently, or at least less frequently attested) be true as well. As we shall see, there are several ways in which the decentralized nature of military and naval authority created scope for trierarchs to profit from their liturgies.

8.5.2: Extortion and profiteering

Simple extortion and seizure of goods and money was probably the simplest way that a trierarch could use his ship to profit himself (and his crew). For example, Demosthenes’ *Against Timocrates* alleges that, in 355 BC, a sum of nine talents, 30 minae were exhorted from a merchant vessel by the trireme commanded by the trierarchs Arkhebios and Lysitheides (Dem. 24.11-14). While the demos was complicit in the decision to keep the spoils, which happened to

\(^{1204}\) Silverman 1994, 124-125.  
\(^{1205}\) For Ar. *Kn.* 912 and *Frogs* 1065, see above, 329. Cf. [Dem.] 50.44 where κακός . . . τριφαρχήσεως has a financial rather than military connotation.  
\(^{1206}\) Bakewell 2008, 149.
have originated from a neutral state, Demosthenes charges the two captains with embezzlement
(ἀποστεροῦντα) of the funds. Ironically, while the presence of Athenian warships in the Aegean
and the Hellespont may have curbed (it would be a naïve exaggeration to say eliminated) piracy
in these waters, merchantmen and small traders would have been at the mercy of the goodwill
of Athenian captains, having little recourse, as non-citizens, to Athenian authorities at home.1207

8.5.3: Personal networks

Another way in which individuals could use their state-owned vessels for personal
advantage was to cultivate and expand their networks of xenia. It clearly was not completely
taboo for generals and trierarchs stationed outside of Attica and its environs to use the
opportunity to establish and solidify personal commercial and philial connections abroad.1208
Oftentimes such foreign connections engaged the interests of both the individuals and their
wider communities, especially when the foreign contacts were in regions strategically important
to the Athenians.1209 International, personal relationships among rich citizens from different
poleis and powerful barbarian magnates were an important element of diplomacy and of
economic interconnectivity in the classical world. Moreno has argued, for example, that the
foreign contacts of rich Athenians generally, but of generals and trierarchs in particular, in and
around the Black Sea were an instrumental and, indeed, structural feature of Athenian foreign

1207 For a thorough account of the relationship between piracy and warfare and the Athenian role in
the suppression of piracy in the Aegean, see de Souza 2002, 26-36.
1208 According to Cornelius Nepos, Alcibiades owned at least three private estates in the area of the
Northern Aegean alone: Orni, Bizanthe and Neontikhos, all of which sites he fortified as strategic points
along the Hellespont with public money, presumably while serving as stratēgos, nauarkhos or triērarkhos
(7.4; cf. Diod. 13.74.2, where Alcibiades departs from the fleet at Notion as captain of a trireme; also Thuc.
6.50.1, suggesting that he possessed his own personal trireme).
1209 Herman 2002, 116-161; Gabrielsen 1994, 100; Sinclair 1988, 179-190. For similar connections
in evidence for fourth-century naval commanders, see Gabrielsen 2015, 191-205.
relations and food supply in the fourth century.¹²¹⁰ For Moreno, Athenian reliance on grain specifically from the Hellespont began in earnest after the loss of Euboea in 411 and intensified in the fourth century, but such systems of elite patronage to the *demos* through *proxenia* had their genesis much earlier and are already well established in other regions in the fifth century.¹²¹¹

Indeed, relationships of *xenia* and *proxenia* were as crucial to Athens’ naval enterprises as they were to her food ways, without which the Athenians would lack the necessary access to raw materials for shipbuilding.¹²¹² The task of securing timber and rigging materials (flax, iron and bronze) was left to wealthy individuals acting on their own initiative rather than to state agents as, for example, can be seen in a laudatory decree (c. 430-405 BC), which honours Phanosthenes (PA 14083) and an otherwise unknown Antiokhides for the importation of Macedonian oars (free of the one per cent universal harbour tax) and their delivery to the *triêropoi*.¹²¹³ Similarly, Andocides claims to have benefitted the Athenians when, in 411, he received exclusive permission from his *xenos*, the Macedonian king, Arkhelaos, to “cut and export” as many oars as he wished, which he then sold to the fleet at Samos. The orator further asserts (one suspects perhaps protesting too much) that on this occasion he sold them at cost “although [he] might have sold them at five drachmas apiece” (2.11).¹²¹⁴

¹²¹⁰ Moreno 2007, 211-308.
¹²¹² See [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 2.11. Such connections within Macedonia were particularly important for the Athenian naval program since most of the timber used in Athenian triremes was sourced there (Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.11).
¹²¹³ *IG* I 182 = *IG* I 122; Walbank 1976.
¹²¹⁴ The event is not to be doubted and can reasonably be connected with a decree from 407 honouring Arkhelaos for supplying *ξύλα* and *κοπέας* (wood[en equipment] and oars): *IG* I 105.
Seen in this light, popular complaints against the monopolization of ambassadorial roles to places like Macedonia, Thrace and Persia by prominent citizens, and the high pay (*mishon polun*) they received, take on a new significance.\(^{1215}\) The elite stood to benefit both financially and politically from these contacts, but Athens, without much timber, iron and tin in Attica itself, required most of its shipbuilding materials to be sourced abroad, and it was the elite, with their ties of *xenia*, who could secure them.

### 8.5.4: Private property in public hulls

Ships could also have been employed more directly in personal business endeavours and with more narrowly personal interests served. The evidence is scant, but an allegation in his speech against Meidias, written by Demosthenes sometime after 348, raises some interesting possibilities. Among a litany of crimes and offenses, Demosthenes charged his opponent with having used a state-owned trireme to carry back goods from the recent, unsuccessful Euboean campaign.\(^{1216}\) The list of property includes: “fences and cattle and door-posts for his own house and pit-props for his silver mines” (Dem. 21.167). “And so,” Demosthenes argues, “his command (τριμηραρχία) was not a *leitourgia* but an abomination (καταπατώστω).” Remarkably, Demosthenes has no less than five fellow-trierarchs as witnesses to corroborate his charge. These witnesses add that while all trierarchs were under strict orders to evacuate Athenian troops from Styra and to sail home in formation (ἐν τῷ καθεύδει), Meidias alone, “having remained apart from the fleet” (ὑπολειαρθείς τοῦ στόλου),” loaded his ship and returned to Piraeus two days later without having taken any part in the conveyance of Athenian troops (168).

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\(^{1215}\) E.g., *Ar. Ach.* 65-90, 132-150.

\(^{1216}\) For the Euboean campaign, see Dem. 5.5, where Demosthenes claims to have cautioned against it. Meidias, however, was outspoken in his support for the action according to Dem. 21.110, 200. Meidias’ personal connection to the Eretrian tyrant, Ploutarkhos, is linked to his personal gain in his public role as trierarch in order to cast Meidias as wholly selfish and indifferent to public consequences.
Demosthenes, of course, certainly has good reason to exaggerate Meidias’ offenses, but the provision of witnesses allows us to have some confidence in the factual basis of his account. Moreover, since this was a large-scale military operation (τῷ στόλῳ παντί: 21.168), not merely the five trierarchs in question and their crews, but also many hundreds of other Athenians would have been able to corroborate the story. Brazen though he is reported to have been, if Meidias could flout the orders of his general in full knowledge of his colleagues, it is reasonable to infer that much more latitude existed for trierarchs who operated in the small squadrons of triremes that routinely crisscrossed the Aegean at the height of the Athenian arkhê.

8.5.5: Manipulation of crews

The best evidenced, however, and probably the most common way in which a trierarch could turn his public service to individual gain, was through the manipulation of his crew and its pay. As discussed above, it was the responsibility of individual trierarchs to enlist and maintain their crews.1217 There was no centralized method of recruitment and no aggregate roster of rowers.1218 However, the state did, via its generals and their tamiai, allocate funds to individual trierarchs for the purposes of maintaining trireme crews.1219 The manner in which this worked is fairly well attested.1220 Once the Athenians had voted to undertake an expedition, the Assembly voted next on what funds it should provide the generals whom it had appointed; next it authorized these generals to make withdrawals from the sacred treasuries. The generals

1217 307-309.
1218 On recruiting systems and lists of servicemen for land warfare, see Ch. 7.2.
1220 Blamire 2001, esp. 109-123.
then allocated funds to individual trierarchs, who subsequently dispensed payments to their crews.\footnote{1221}{Gabrielsen 1994, 116; a fragmentary decree concerning preparations for the Sicilian expedition appears to mention the payment of public funds to stratiótai by triérarkhoi (IG I 93, 51-55).} The fourth-century process is outlined by Apollodorus at [Dem.] 50.10:

The clerk shall read you the testimony concerning these matters, those of the persons who at that time collected the military supplies and of the despatching board; also the record of the pay which I gave out every month to the officers (ταῖς ύπηρεσίαις) and the marines (τοῖς ἔπιστάμασις), receiving from the generals subsistence-money alone, except pay for two months only in a period of a year and five months, also a list of the sailors who were hired, and how much money each of them received (τοὺς ναύτας τοὺς μισθωθέντας, καὶ ὀσον ἐκαστὸς ἔλαβεν ἄργύριον).\footnote{1222}{While records were kept, the process was necessarily messy, with ample opportunity for abuse and mismanagement through incompetence or corruption. We should probably not regard the case of Apollodorus as typical. As the son of a very successful banker, he had the skills required to manage large sums of money. He may also, as the son of a naturalized slave, have been especially sensitive to questions about his conduct as a citizen and, therefore, have taken meticulous care for record-keeping where others might not have.}

The combination of the lack of centralized recruiting and the messiness of ancient accounting methods meant that trierarchs had considerable scope for creative staffing and pay distribution.\footnote{1223}{An example of this kind of creative accounting from the 420s is the trial of Labes the dog in Wasps, which is an allusion to the trial (or perhaps only putative trial) of the Athenian stratégos, Lakhes (Kirchner PA, 9019), for his alleged profiting from the first Sicilian campaign (427-425 BC). The play is our only evidence for the trial. Lakhes is alleged to have “stuffed his beehive with money” (241), to have “held back” (ὑφαίρεσα: 958; cf. 556) some of the money meant to pay for his troops (963-966) and to have submitted dishonest accounts (961-962). The verb huphaireô is used synonymously with kleptô at 553-556, but carries elsewhere the specific meaning of “drawing back from” or “skimming off.” At Frogs 148, it is similarly used of holding back pay for services and the speaker of Lys. 14 accuses Alcibiades of having skimmed off (ὑφαίρεσα) 200 talents from the city (38). In the trial scene in Wasps, the household cheese-grater (τυρόκηρης) is chosen to represent Labes’ tamiás because of its metaphorical function as the divider of pay to the troops, and, when cross-examined, the suggestion is that he simply did not dispense the whole amount allocated to the expedition.} While Apollodorus, here, complains of chronic, woeful underfunding (a cry that is often repeated by triérarkhountes in oratory), this system allowed for fraudulent captains to crew less than the full complement of 170 rowers and to keep the difference. Although there were, as we shall see, some safeguards in place designed to keep trierarchs honest and to prevent the most flagrant abuses, intentional under-manning of trireme crews by
unscrupulous trierarchs was a common occurrence. Indeed, the very existence of provisional measures intended to prevent trierarchs from taking advantage of the system attests to the Athenians’ suspicion of the widespread occurrence of under-manning.

The earliest possible evidence for under-manning is a decree, for a year between 440 and 425, which stipulates that no fewer than [140] sailors be present when drawing up a ship onto land (ἀνέλκωμε [σαί]); no fewer than 120 when launching it ([καθελκώμε [σαί]); no fewer than 100 when fitting it with rigging (ὑποζονώνα) and when bringing it to anchor (περι[ομιζέν]).

Gabrielsen explains the quotas outlined by the decree as being necessary to ensure the safe operation of the vessel when performing the difficult tasks of embarking and hauling up—actions that demanded the full attention of the crew and left them vulnerable to enemy ambushes. The argument, of course, has a sound basis in the ancient literary evidence. The process of mast and rigging fitting could also be dangerous if attempted with less than a full complement: the tension on the rigging of a trireme is estimated to have been approximately ten metric tons.

The quotas, however, must also have been useful in providing criteria for the shipyard authorities in inspecting crews, and the liability of fine of a thousand drachmas for trierarchs who did not meet these quotas speaks to suspicions that captains might fail to maintain the same numbers of crew throughout a campaign. A minimum crew complement of 140 rowers at anelkōsis, for example, would oblige trierarchs who had embarked with at

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\[124 IG I² 153, 6-11; Gabrielsen 1994, 109. The sailors (simply referred to as ὀνηρες in the inscription) must include both eretai and hypēresia.\]

\[125 The best example, certainly, of crews being ambushed in the midst of trying to launch their ships is the Athenian defeat at Aigospotamoi (Xen. Hell. 2.1.27-28). See also the Athenian defeat off of Eretria, in which crews were caught away from their ships, seeking provisions because the Eretrian agora was closed to them (Thuc. 8.95.3-7).\]

\[126 Morrison and Coates 1989, 2-3.\]

\[127 On the administration of shipyards and the role of dockyard officials, see Jordan 1975, 30-61.\]
least this number to find replacements for injured or absconded crew and would guard against
the potential for trierarchs to claim funds for the payment of such injured or missing men.

Aristophanes’ *Peace* provides in a passing joke a vital scrap of evidence for the
*triērarkhos ponēros* who would seek to defraud the state of funds meant to maintain his
crew. At 1225-39, Trygaios is presented by the Arms-Dealer with an elaborate breastplate
for which, now that peace has been rediscovered, he cannot find a buyer. Trygaios humorously
considers repurposing the armour as a chamber-pot and, as he squats to test its functionality, he
is pleased to find that going “through the arm holes” (διὰ τῆς θαλαμικῆς) provides convenient
access for cleaning up after himself. Shocked, the Arms-Dealer asks, “do you really wipe with
both hands?” (ἄμφοτερον δῆτ’), to which Trygaios responds unexpectedly: “By god, yes! So
that I might not be caught stealing an oar place in [my] ship” (ἐγὼς νὰ Δία / ἵνα μὴ γ’ ἀλὸ
τρόπημα κλέπτων τῆς νεῶς 1233-1234). The joke is much cleverer than its surface-level
scatological humour. Sommerstein accepts Taillardat’s interpretation whereby he suggests a
reference to the process of crew inspection by dockyard officials in an effort to thwart
understaffing. The simplest way for a dishonest trierarch to avoid detection was to attempt to
conceal the empty seats of *thalamitai/thalamioi* (“those below deck”). At inspection, therefore,
the Athenians required these rowers to put both hands through their oar holes so that they were
easily visible for counting. Difficult though this interpretation has proved to some, the joke

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1228 See Aeschin. 3.146, where Ktesiphon is charged similarly with drawing pay from public monies
for empty spaces (κεναὶς χώραις) in a mercenary force, which he supposedly commanded.
1229 τρόπημα κλέπτων: literally “stealing a bored hole,” hence an oar-place.
1230 Taillardat 1964, 42-44; cf. Olsen 2000, 302 for the difficulties of this interpretation: “Trygaeus is
here putting his arms through two different holes” (original emphasis).
clearly turns on the dishonesty of ships’ captains. The excessive wiping (in the mind of Arms-Dealer), and Trygaios’ sardonic response, might also be read as a humorous commentary on the unscrupulousness of trierarchs who find it difficult to keep their accounts as clean as the protagonist’s behind.

Indeed, it seems that triremes were inspected against understaffing both upon embarkation and return to port. The speaker of the pseudo-Demosthenic On the Trierarchic Crown seems to have been accused of not staffing the usual number of hypēresia (51.6) and for not having on board the “home sailors of the ship” during sea trials (ναύτας . . . οικείους . . . της τριήμους: 51.17). This latter comment suggests that the crew manning the trireme on its return to port was not the same one that had embarked it and that this was somehow problematic. It is difficult to see on what grounds the speaker must defend himself for responsibly finding replacements for crewmembers lost to injury or some other circumstance; the likely interpretation is that he is accused either of replacing them with inferior ones or simply of failing to replace them at all. Either way, the presumed motive that must underlie such actions is that a trierarch could benefit from undermanning or qualitatively altering the composition of his crew in some other way. It should be borne in mind that proper financial outlays and expenditure on crew would boost the performance of a triarch’s vessel and help to avoid costly compensatory claims arising from ship damage or even death or imprisonment due

1231 Alternatively, the interpretation of sealing an oar-hole so as to make due with fewer rowers has been offered; fraud and theft from the state, however, should be the preferred meaning of “ἄλοδος . . . κλέπτον” here; see Olsen 2000, 302; Sommerstein 1985, 192; cf. Pritchard 1999, 179.

1232 As an aside, the sum of 10 minae noted as the price of the thorax by the Arms-Dealer here, is of some interest: this is equivalent to the fine of 1000 drachmae fixed for trierarchs caught with less than the full quotas outlined above by IG I 3 158 and so, for an original audience, may have been part of the joke.

1233 Cf. [Dem.] 51.6, where the speaker makes the exaggerated claim that his opponents, in fact, had hired no rowers, while claiming full crews.
to poor performance in battle. Machinations aimed at personal profit had to be weighed carefully, but they could certainly be lucrative. Just how lucrative, obviously, depended on how many sailors a ship could do without before becoming disastrously or too patently inefficient.

Wallinga has challenged the assumption that trireme crews were always or even usually up to their full complement. Citing the requirements of hippagógoi (old triremes converted into horse-transports), which first made their appearance in the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 2.56.2, 4.42.1, 6.43) and which, evidently, had only sixty oars aboard (IG II² 1628), he argues that this represents the absolute minimum number of oarsmen needed to effectively propel and maneuver a trireme. Although Wallinga’s theory has not met general acceptance, even his critics recognize habitual undermanning and staffing shortages in Athenian fleets.

In order to illustrate the financial impact of undermanning, let us suppose that a trierarch skimped by hiring only half of the required thalamitai (again, the most easily concealed of the rowing positions). Over the course of a short naval campaigning season of three months, he might keep some 7290 obols, well over half a talent’s worth of state-funded wages—and this at the reduced standard wage for the Ionian War of three obols daily per man. Given the

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1234 Gabrielsen 1994, 121.
1237 The full complement of thalamitai was 54 as attested in Athenian naval records (IG I² 1604-1632; see van Wees 2004, 211 n. 43; Gabrielsen 1994, 106). Such undermanning, so long as it did not approach dangerous levels by strongly handicapping the ship’s performance, may well have been a welcome practice among rowers, especially thalamitai; to these men the extra space may have brought some relief from the unpleasant conditions of the ship’s enclosed lower quarters. For the proverbial discomfort of Athenian nautai, especially thalamitai, see Ch. 7, 285 n. 1002.
1238 Seasonal naval campaigning: roughly early June to late August (Rosivach 1985).
average estimated cost for trierachic outlay of approximately half a talent per liturgical term, the potential for financial gain for a trierarch was real, given the right circumstances.\footnote{It is worth considering, in light of the current argument, the practice of misthôsis or ‘hiring-out’ of the trierarchy, presumably for a lump sum at the beginning of appointment. This process is not attested until the fourth century and so cannot directly inform an assessment of the financial advantages and liabilities of the institution in the fifth century. Nevertheless, the mere fact that men were willing to contract the burden of the trierarchy speaks to a certain level of potential profit. Silverman 1994, 124, 131-136 argues that misthôsis was far less common than most scholars believe. He argues that the fact that hired-out trierarchs were not named in the naval records (the ship was still listed under its official trierarch) as reason enough for named trierarchs to avoid it: the official trierarch would have remained ultimately financially liable. The reason that misthôsis is attested frequently in oratory is that allegations of this practice were tantamount to allegations of cowardice (deilia) or shirking one’s military duties (astrateia: 132). Gabrielsen 1994, 95-102 argues that the official anonymity of the hired-out trierarch was an attractive part of the process, since it allowed much greater scope for a ship to be used to serve private interests, and finds sufficient motivation for officially named trierarchs to hire out their obligation: while not granting official exemption, misthôsis nevertheless allowed rich men to remain in Athens, to attend to their personal business and to avoid dangerous campaigning while still receiving credit for undertaking the most important liturgy.}

A final intriguing possibility exists, which has not received attention from scholars: the supplementation, augmentation and substitution of rowing crews with personally-owned slaves.\footnote{The evidence for the presence of slaves in Athenian trireme crews well before Arginousai is unambiguous and irrefutable: see, e.g., Thuc. 7.13.2; IG I\textsuperscript{1} 1032; cf. Thuc. 8.73.5, describing the all free-born, citizen crew of the Paralos, an unintelligible detail if all naval servicemen were free men; Welwei 1974, 91-95; cf. Thuc. 1.55.1, where some 800 slaves are among the 1050 prisoners taken by the Corinthians from the 70 wrecked Kerkyrean ships (1.54.2) at the battle of Sybota. For the contentious dating of IG I\textsuperscript{1} 1032, see Graham 1998, 103-109 and 1992, 264-266, where he convincingly argues for the campaign led by Strombikhides (cf. Thuc. 8.15.1).} There is still no general agreement among scholars concerning the exact composition of Athenian naval crews. At its height during Archidamian War (in 427), the Athenian fleet required a staggering 42,500 rowers, and during the entire Peloponnesian War only rarely
required less than 17,000.\textsuperscript{1241} Certainly citizen rowers represented a very large minority, if not a slight majority, of Athenian trireme crews,\textsuperscript{1242} with free \textit{xenoi} and slaves making up very large portions.\textsuperscript{1243} The ownership of the slaves who rowed on Athenian ships is a question that bears on the present discussion. Scholars had once assumed, naturally enough, that any slave serving aboard a state-owned vessel would himself be the property of the state.\textsuperscript{1244} Welwei called into question this assumption when he identified the slave-rowers mentioned by Thucydides at 7.13.2 and \textit{IG I\textsuperscript{2}} 1951 (now \textit{IG I\textsuperscript{3}} 1032) as belonging to crewmembers.\textsuperscript{1245} For his part, Casson has argued that the slaves aboard triremes were owned by crewmembers, but that ownership was restricted to the officers (\textit{hypêresia}) and marines (\textit{epibatai}) on board, and that these were not rowers in any regular sense, but attendants who might occasionally assist at rowing.\textsuperscript{1246} The recent republication of the now much more complete Triremes Inscription as \textit{IG I\textsuperscript{3}} 1032, however, reveals large groups of slave-rowers (\textit{therapontes}), distinguished from citizen- (\textit{astoi}) and foreign- (\textit{xenoi}) rowers, whose owners can no longer be assumed to belong solely to the officer corps. Graham has shown that citizen- and foreign-\textit{nautai} also had slaves on board and that these slaves took regular places on the rowing benches beside their masters.\textsuperscript{1247}

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\textsuperscript{1241} 427: Thuc. 3.17.1-2. For annual Athenian naval activity from 431-404, see Appendix 2.  
\textsuperscript{1242} For an emphasis on citizen crews, see, e.g.: Hale 2009; Strauss 2000a, 1996; Gabrielsen 1994, 105-110 and 2002; Morrison and Coates 1986, 117-118; Amit 1962; Sargent 1924, 201-212, 264-279 (positing an almost completely citizen rowing force).  
\textsuperscript{1243} For scholarship that accentuates the diversity in juridical status of trireme crews, see, e.g.: Potts 2009; van Wees 2004, 211-30; Jordan 2003, most recently arguing for between 50 and 60 (state-owned) slaves for a typical crew, and 2000, esp. 92-93; E. Cohen 2000, 18; Hunt 1998, 122-143; Graham 1998 and 1992.  
\textsuperscript{1244} Jordan 1975, 262-264 (restited in Jordan 2003).  
\textsuperscript{1245} 1974, 93. See further 67-70 for the argument that the polis did not possess the large numbers of public slaves required by Jordan.  
\textsuperscript{1246} Casson 1995a, 322-324; previous work on the ‘Trireme Inscription’ (\textit{IG I\textsuperscript{2}} 1951) lent support to Casson’s argument: Laing 1965, 126-130 identifies a strong recurrence of slaves with master’s names (in the genitive) among the officers.  
\end{flushright}
It was probably very common for any slave-owning Athenian to hire out his slave’s labour as a rower.\textsuperscript{1248} Indeed, Ps.-Xenophon explicitly attests the widespread practice of slaves rowing in the presence of their masters (1.19). As a result of Athens’ thalassocracy, he writes, the Athenians and their personal slaves (\textit{oiketai}) have gained nautical expertise through repeated experience at the oar (κώπην λαβεῖν). Furthermore, he includes the following enigmatic statement (1.11):

\begin{quote}
For where there is a naval power, it is necessary from financial considerations to be slaves to the slaves in order to take a portion of their earnings, and it is then necessary to let them go free.\textsuperscript{1249}
\end{quote}

The sentence, as well as the chapter of which it is a part, is corrupt, and so the sense is not easily discerned, but it may well imply that Athenian masters found it financially prudent to hire out their slaves for naval activities. This would grant the slaves the amount of ‘freedom’ required to work and serve alongside citizens and away from Athens while collecting their wages, which, on the analogy of Erekhtheion accounts, was likely commensurate not only with free but also with citizen-labour costs.

While Graham has shown that all free members of a warship’s crew could potentially own slaves who rowed alongside them, Laing’s original observation of the preponderance of slaves belonging to the officer class on \textit{IG I\textsuperscript{3}} 1032 is well founded. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the names of the trierarchs feature more than any other among the names listed as masters in the genitive. Of the 21 slaves whose owners’ names survive on the stone for Trireme II, five belong

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\textsuperscript{1248} Just as it seems to have been common for Athenians involved in the building trades to hire out their slaves’ labour to the state and to work alongside them. The building accounts of the Erekhtheion (\textit{IG I\textsuperscript{3}} 474-479) are the best illustration of this. For more, see: Hunt 1998, 98-99; Graham 1992, 262-263, 266-268. \textsuperscript{1249} \textit{[Xen.]} \textit{Ath. Pol.} 1.11: ὅποι γὰρ ναυτικὴ δύναμις ἔστιν, ἀπὸ χρημάτων ἀνάγκη τοῖς ἀνδραπόδοις δουλεύειν, ἵνα λαμβάνωμεν ὅν πρᾶττῃ τὰς ἀποφορὰς, καὶ ἐλευθέρους ἀφιέναι.
to the trierarchs, Pytheas and Kharidemos.\footnote{Pytheas: Davies \textit{APF}, 12350; Kharidemos: Davies \textit{APF}, 15389.} Of those similarly identifiable for Trireme III, only two of 34 belong to the triarch, Pausitratos, although no other crewmember on board this trireme had more than a single slave.\footnote{None are identified with the syntrierarch, Protomakhos (Davies \textit{APF}, 12321).} In fact, of all 37 men catalogued by the inscription, whom Laing and Graham identify with confidence as owners of slaves on board, the only ones with more than one slave are trierarchs, save a certain Antiphates, who served in the role of purser (\textit{pentēkontarkhos}), a position presumably reserved for men of station.\footnote{Laing 1965, 140-141, noting also the possible need for additional slaves to carry out the purser’s considerable management tasks; Graham 1992, 266 n. 40. For the family of Antiphates, see Davies \textit{APF}, 1194.}

One of the criticisms that may be made of Laing’s and Casson’s arguments for the restriction of slave-owning to the officer class is that, while a number of slaves can be matched positively with crewmembers, there are many whose masters’ names are too badly mangled to identify and many more whose own names have been erased by damage to the stone. Graham finds it implausible that many more of these unattributed slaves could have been owned by so small a group of officers.\footnote{Laing’s own arrangement of the fragments of the inscription leaves room for 136 slaves on Trireme I, between 40 and 54 on Trireme II, between 100 and 136 for Trireme III and 94 or more on Trireme IV (1965, 88-93). His arrangement has been accepted reservedly in Graham 1992 and confidently in Graham 1998, 99-102, with minor changes to the number of spaces on the stones for slave names.}\footnote{For this suggestion, see Graham 1998.} Of course, large numbers of slaves could simply have served in the same fleet without being present on the same ship as their masters.\footnote{This would certainly account for the ‘freedom’ alluded to by [Xen.] \textit{Ath. Pol.} 1.11. Moreover, since it was common practice for sailors’ pay, apart from what was needed for daily subsistence (between two and three obols: e.g., Dem. 4.28), to be withheld until disembarkation (\textit{mistolos entelē}), collection by}

\footnote{1250}
Direct evidence for this is, unfortunately, lacking. A number of considerations raised above, however, point to the possibility that trierarchs staffed their crews with as many of their own slaves as possible, and that this sometimes resulted in a very considerable portion of the crew belonging to the ship’s captain. First, of course, is the positive evidence just discussed for trierarchs owning multiple slaves and that these slaves served not only as personal attendants (as they might when the ship was on land) but as regular nautai. Second is that the cost of the crew’s upkeep and pay, although provided by the state, was the single largest cost involved in the trierarchy. Filling a rowing bench with his own slaves would, for a trierarch, have nearly the same financial benefits as leaving the bench empty, while avoiding the charge of understaffing and a decrease in his ship’s efficiency. Third, we have evidence, both literary and epigraphic, that a warship’s crew could include scores of personal slaves. Finally, there is an analogue to the kind of ‘mass’ slave ownership and labour exploitation that I am suggesting here in the workshops of rich, slave-owning entrepreneurs attested for the latter fifth century. Nicias, son of Nikeratos, was famously known for the 1000 slaves whom he let out to the state for its mining operations at Laureion (Xen. Poroi 4.14). Nicias, of course, was preeminently wealthy in his day (e.g., Thuc. 7.83.2; 7.86.4; cf. 6.9.2; Lys. 19.47). Some not the master of his slave’s earnings would be easy. Likely a portion of this would be reserved for the slave to keep as an incentive (if one was required) against desertion. On the unlikelihood of much slave desertion, except given rare opportunities provided by disasters, see Hunt 1998, 6-7, 102-120, and for this issue with respect to agricultural slaves, see above, Ch.3.4.

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1256 Although the sample size is woefully small, note that Pytheas and Kharidemos together are the owners of 24 percent of the slaves whose masters’ name can be discerned on Trireme II.

1257 Discounting, of course, the cost of basic maintenance and food allowance, for which, as has been previously argued, even the three obol wage was more than sufficient: see above, Ch. 4, 4.

1258 The proposition that many of these slaves were publically owned (Jordan 1975, 262-264), was anticipated and convincingly refuted by Welwei 1974, 67-70.

1259 Davies APF, 10808. Nicias’ mining slaves earned him only a single obol per man per day, whereas employing slaves to row might reasonably fetch a sum of three obols per man per day before 413 and thereafter a similar return of one or two obols per day once their daily maintenance is factored.
much less striking examples include Hipponikos of Alopeke, who also leased slaves, some 600, to the state for work in the mines,\textsuperscript{1260} and Philemoniedes, who leased half that number.\textsuperscript{1261} Lysias and his family operated a shield-factory, which employed 120 slaves (Lys. 12. 8, 19). Demosthenes’ father is said to have operated both a sword- and a couch-factory in the early fourth century that employed some 30 and 20 slaves respectively (Dem. 27.9). Finally, there is a handful of further examples collected by Davies of men who owned slightly smaller operations of some 10-25 slaves in the fifth century.\textsuperscript{1262}

Knowing, as we do, that slaves did commonly serve on the crews of Athenian warships, there are few obstacles to the hypothesis that wealthy Athenians might employ groups of slaves as rowers on their ships.\textsuperscript{1263} It is not very surprising that there is a general silence about such use of slaves by wealthy Athenians in military contexts given the general Athenian reservations about profit-making,\textsuperscript{1264} the noted suspicion around trierarchs in this respect\textsuperscript{1265} and the fact that the presence of slaves is typically elided in ancient military narratives of any kind.\textsuperscript{1266}

\textsuperscript{1260} Davies \textit{APF}, 7826.
\textsuperscript{1261} Davies 1981, 42.
\textsuperscript{1262} Davies 1981, 41-43, whose list includes the notable trierarchic families of Kleainetos and Kleon (Davies \textit{APF}, 8674), Hyperbolos (Kirchner \textit{PA}, 13910) and Theodoros and Isocrates (Davies \textit{APF}, 7716), as well as others not attested as trierarchs.
\textsuperscript{1263} Jordan 2003, 41-42; Hunt 1998, 102-120.
\textsuperscript{1264} Particularly about coined money-making. See: Ober 1989, 205-221; Sinclair 1988, 179-186.
\textsuperscript{1265} An orator might well want to raise the issue against a rich opponent before an assembly or in court, but doing so would potentially undermine his own boasts of civic-minded trierarchic expenditure.
\textsuperscript{1266} Hunt 1998, but see esp. 132-135 for the importance for Thucydides of marginalizing slave participation in warfare during the latter stages of the Peloponnesian War where service to the polis, especially military service, became the \textit{sine qua non} of political enfranchisement. Cf. Thuc. 8.65.3; 8.97.1; Lys. 19.58; Xen. \textit{Hell}. 2.3.48; [Xen.] \textit{Ath. Pol.} 1.2; Ar. \textit{Frogs} 686-705; [Arist.] \textit{Ath. Pol.} 29.5, 55.3. Cf. Hunt 1998, 97, where he rightfully dispels the notion that the use of slaves in naval contexts would be viewed as diminishing valuable employment and military service opportunities for citizens.
8.6: Conclusions on the impact of the war on the plousioi

In the preceding sections I have outlined the financial burdens and obligations imposed by the democratic city on its elite citizens in wartime. We have seen how the most onerous duties, especially the performance of trierarchies, were shouldered by a very small proportion of Athenians (hoi plousiôtatoi). I have attempted to redress the assumptions in the scholarly literature that the costs of the trierarchy remained fixed and were uniformly burdensome throughout the last third of the fifth century and have shown, moreover, that there were, in fact, opportunities for trierarchs to profit personally from their service to the state, especially during the years prior to the beginning of the Ionian War when the imperial resources, which ideally covered the base costs associated with the trierarchy, began to wane. For most of the fifth century, Athens was a sufficiently prosperous imperial state, such that the financial demands on its trierarchs were not as keenly felt as in the final decade, when the trierarchs’ share of naval finance became greater.\[1267\]

The increased financial contribution of elite citizens to Athens’ wartime expenses did not, of course, occur in a political vacuum. Rather, there are indications that elite citizens regarded the transformation of their role from guarantors to more direct financers of Athenian naval costs as a quid pro quo, expecting a commensurate increase in the traditional political and social rewards of a philotimos: kharis and lamprotês. Towards the end of the war, triérarkhountes seem to have begun to view their contribution to the polis as deserving of greater social and political prestige than had hitherto been granted. Their role in the oligarchic movement of 411 has already been discussed. According to Thucydides, they thought that their toiling for the city

1267 Pace Gabrielsen 1994, 115-118. Gabrielsen, however, argues that financial strains appeared already in 433 and reached emergency levels (with Kagan 1974) as soon as 428.
should translate into more direct influence over political affairs (8.48.1) and that they should now toil only for themselves (8.63.4).

It is perhaps not coincidental that it is from the last decade of the war, when a greater portion of Athens’ naval expenses were borne directly out of the personal finances of her trierarchs, that we find the most explicit claims to the *kharis* of the *demos* or its representative *dikastai* (e.g., Lys. 7.31; 18.7; 21.11; cf. Thuc. 6.16.1-4). The most notable instance of the latter occurs in a speech written by Lysias for a client defending himself on a charge of subverting the democracy under the Thirty. The speech is remarkable for the way in which it openly discusses the self-interest that motivates public service under the democracy and the expectation of social privilege in reward for this. Naturally, the speakers’ trierarchic service is given prominence:

In my case, gentlemen of the jury, during that period I never suffered any misfortune, either private or public, that would have made me keen to escape from immediate difficulties and eager for a different state of affairs. I have served as trierarch on five occasions, fought in four sea battles, contributed to many war taxes during the war, and performed the other liturgies as well as any of the citizens. But the reason I spent more than was required by the city was to improve my reputation among you and to be able to defend myself better if I were to encounter any misfortune . . .

As Sinclair argues, it is precisely when questions arise among the rich benefactors of the city about the suitability of the honour and recognition that they receive for their services that we

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1269 Lys. 25.12-13: ἔμοι τοῖς, ὁ άνδρες δικασταί, οὔτ’ ἵδια οὔτε δημοσία συμφορὰ ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ χρόνῳ οὖδεμισα πώσιτε ἐγένετο, ἀνθ’ ἡσσίνος ἢν προθυμούμενος τῶν παρόντων κακῶν ἀπαλλαγῆαι ἔτερον ἐπεδήμου πραγμάτων. τετηρημάρχῃ τε γὰρ πεντάκες, καὶ τετράκις νεναιμάχηκα, καὶ εἰςφορᾶς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ πολλὰς εἰςενήναγα, καὶ τῶλλα λελητούργηκα οὐδένος χείρον τῶν πολιτῶν. κατ’ οὖν τούτῳ πλέον τὸν ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως προστατουμένον ἐδαπανώμην, ἵνα καὶ βεβλίων ὑφ’ ὑμῶν νουμίζομην, καὶ εἰ ποῦ μοί τις συμφορὰ γέγονε, ἀμείνον ἀγωνιζόμην . . .
expect to find the notions of *kharis* and reciprocity most strongly emphasized.\textsuperscript{1270} Sinclair has in mind the even more overt claims to *kharis* and *lamprotēs* in the publically sanctioned *philotimia* decrees of the 340s, but his observation is applicable to the late fifth century as well.

In this light the apparent changes in the manner of official public recognition granted to trierarchs and other military officials beginning in the Ionian War is also striking. The Triremes Inscription is one of the earliest public monuments on which Athenian fighters are commemorated hierarchically. The circumstances of this inscription’s commission are unclear, however, and it may well be *sui generis*. More significant are the changes in the late fifth century to the demotic and egalitarian commemorative practice of inscribing Athenian casualty lists. Before 410 these lists provide only the personal names of the dead according to tribal affiliation, or, in rare cases, according to the military theatre in which they died.\textsuperscript{1271} Although one would like a much more complete set of lists on which to base analysis, it would appear that from 411 the Athenians were prepared to acknowledge the special importance of their military leaders.\textsuperscript{1272} The casualty list for that year (*IG* I\textsuperscript{3} 1190) lists two men, Phokion and

\textsuperscript{1270} Sinclair 1988, 190; cf. Christ 2006, 177 n. 67.
\textsuperscript{1271} Low 2003, 99-100; Bradeen 1969.
\textsuperscript{1272} R. Osborne 2010a, 248-249; *phylarkhoi*: *IG* I\textsuperscript{3} 1190; *taxiarkhoi*: *IG* I\textsuperscript{3} 1186, 1191; *toxarkhoi*: *IG* I\textsuperscript{3} 1186; *phrourarkhoi*, *trierarkhoi* and *nauarkhoi*: *IG* I\textsuperscript{3} 1191. The existence of *stratēgoi*, *toxotai*, and a possible *phrourarkhos*, on a list from the 460s suggests the need for caution here (*IG* I\textsuperscript{3} 1147). Nevertheless, the frequency of titles we see in the casualty lists of the late-fifth century suggest a possible connection with a general rise in opulent burials in Athens beginning in the early 430s. The sudden rise of ostentatious funerals and monumental tombs is likely behind the restrictions placed on such practices by Plato in his ideal society (*Laws* 12.958d-959a). By the late fourth century, actions were taken by Demetrius of Phaleron to curb “the magnificence of funerals and graves, which had become frequent” (Cicero, *De legibus* 2.66), apparently invoking laws of Solon that had fallen into disuse (*De legibus* 2.64-65). Morris 1994a, 67-101 discusses the rise in opulent burials for elites both within Athens and in the Greek world generally beginning in the 430s and views this as a sign of the gradual breakdown of the egalitarian ideologies and social structures that had obtained throughout the first two thirds of the fifth century. This breakdown allowed more scope for the *kalokagathoi* to assert their status and importance to their communities. Morris argues that the focus must be brought outside of Athens and explanations of this phenomenon must consider its panhellenic scope (1994a, 82-85; cf. Morris 1994b, 55, 66-69). The phenomenon might be generalized
Lukeas, with the designation τριάρχος on the same line. There appears to be further innovation in the list for 409/8 (IG I 1191), which includes the names of at least 17 men as trierarchs and two men as nauarkhoi under headings on separate lines. The impression that these sources give, from multiple vantage points, is of an ongoing negotiation of burdens and privileges in the late fifth century between the tiny sub-group of wealthy Athenians who financed Athens’ most important wartime public good—its navy—and the citizenry at large, engendered and fuelled by the conditions of protracted external warfare.

and so any connection to the particulars of changes in Athenian society must remain tentative, but there is no reason to assume that the causes of such a panhellenic phenomenon did not vary from city to city.

1273 Line 324 of column 10 begins “Ναυ-” and can possibly be restored as ‘nauarkhos,’ but, given the number of men listed under the heading, ‘nautai’ is more likely, particularly in light of the expression ‘ἄρχον τῷ ναυτικῷ’ employed earlier (lines 106-110).
Conclusions

This study has comprised a close examination of the effects of fighting a generation-long conflict on the city of Athens. It has been my aim throughout to track in as rich and as full a way as our evidence will permit precisely how the Athenians managed to sustain themselves and the war effort from 431-404. In the preceding chapters, I have offered as fine-grained an account as possible of the pressures exerted on the Athenians by a protracted war of attrition and of the adaptations to and consequences of these pressures on the economic and socio-political order of their city.

The experience of the Peloponnesian War represented novel hardships for the Athenians with respect to their agricultural economy and their sense of themselves as a community of autarkic farmers. The abandonment of the khóra in the face of invasion was not a strategy novel to the Greeks or even to the Athenians in the fifth century.\textsuperscript{1274} Nevertheless, the decision to follow Pericles’ advice and cede Attica to the Peloponnesians in the Archidamian War, and the enemy’s fortification of Decelea in the Ionian War, resulted in rural privations that had profound effects on the political economy of the late-fifth century and on the development of the agricultural economy in the post-war period.

Quantitative assessment of the fertility of Attica (Chapter One) reveals that in the late-fifth century, Attic produce was a substantial element in Athens’ food supply. I argue that Attic produce represented some 20% of cereal consumed by the population in Peloponnesian-War Athens. Disruption to the production of local foodstuffs, therefore, was by no means a trivial matter to the city.

\textsuperscript{1274} See Ch. 1, 31.
The Athenians could not suffer lightly the loss of an Attic harvest, and yet the scope of Peloponnesian activity within Attica from 431-421 and from 413-404 was extraordinary. In Chapter Two, I argue that historians have tended to read Thucydides erroneously as claiming that the invasions of the Archidamian War were desultory and of limited range and efficacy. On the contrary, scrutiny of the testimony of Thucydides, and of others, reveals the incursions to have been carefully plotted and timed so as to produce maximal damage to the Athenian countryside, even if the economic effects of this ravaging were less severe than the *epiteikhismos* that was to follow.

Chapter Three looks to determine precisely what these economic effects were. In this chapter, I demonstrate that several factors have been underappreciated or ignored by previous scholars in their attempts to quantify the damage to Athenian agriculture done by the Peloponnesians. The focus of previous studies on non-staple crops, on cultivated vines and olive trees, and on the limited capacity of ancient Greek armies to inflict damage to these has led scholars to understate or overlook the loss of grain crops to Peloponnesian ravaging and foraging. Moreover, the tendency to view the Peloponnesian invasions as short and desultory has contributed to a scholarly oversight with respect to the disruption of the Athenian agricultural calendar and the cumulative effects of these invasions and the permanent installation at Decelea on the resources and morale of Athenian farmers. Finally, I argue, the impact of the catastrophic casualties produced by the plague at Athens on inter-personal networks has been generally neglected in previous studies on Athenian agriculture in the Peloponnesian War. When full measure has been taken of these several neglected aspects of the Peloponnesians’ war within Attica, the conclusion reached is that both the Archidamian and
Decelean phases of the Peloponnesian War were seriously deleterious to the Athenian countryside and Athens’ agricultural economy.

In some respects, these arguments are in line with scholarship of the early twentieth century.\textsuperscript{1275} Scholars before Hanson had traditionally argued for economic collapse as a result of the war. The picture of a wrecked Athenian agricultural economy, however, became the foundation of arguments advanced for a range of purported consequences of the Peloponnesian War for Athens: the pauperization of the peasant farmer;\textsuperscript{1276} the consolidation of landholding in the hands of a wealthy minority in the fourth century;\textsuperscript{1277} a general and permanent economically driven exodus from the \textit{khôra} to the \astyl.\textsuperscript{1278} More recently scholars have been rightly skeptical of these claims.\textsuperscript{1279} The devastation to the countryside, though extensive, need not have been permanent or even long lasting. Soon after the end of the civil war, Athenians got back to the business of farming and began to revitalize the \textit{khôra}.\textsuperscript{1280}

The loss of the Athenian fleet and imperial revenues would have made it more difficult for Athenians to make a living in the city or Piraeus. Opportunities for remunerated naval service and work in the naval yards were drastically reduced in 404/3. The upshot for many of those Athenians, who, as I argue in Chapter Four, had sought to supplement their agricultural losses by drawing on these sources of \textit{misthos}, was that they now had to reinvest and seek opportunity in Attica once more. The ambitious Athenian efforts to improve the defense of their \textit{khôra} in the decades after the war provide evidence, at the public level, of an economic

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{1275} See Ch. 1, 32-34; e.g., Grundy 1948 [1911], 86-91; Glotz 1926, 253.
\textsuperscript{1276} Ephriam 1984; Ehrenberg 1943, 72.
\textsuperscript{1277} Mossé 1962, 39-67; Mitchell 1957, 39, 85-86.
\textsuperscript{1278} Jones 1957, 8-10, 23-37, 80-93; Ehrenberg 1943 68-69.
\textsuperscript{1279} Hanson 1998 [1983], 166-173; Strauss 1986, 42-54.
\textsuperscript{1280} Hanson 1998, 166-170 has collected the evidence for farming in the immediate post-war period.
\end{flushleft}
reorientation toward Attica. The system of border forts, garrisons and patrols established in the fourth century represent a public investment to protect Athenian farmers from enemy incursions in order to allow the revitalized agrarian economy to take root.\textsuperscript{1281}

Such reinvestment in the countryside was no easy task, but recovery was likely swift and robust. Damage to Athenian farming during the war had been extensive, but need not have been permanent—especially if much of the deleterious effects were achieved through occupation and foraging. Moreover, whereas the loss of between one third and one half of the Athenian population as casualties of the plague and of warfare had contributed to economic and psychological trauma during the war, afterwards these losses resulted in economic opportunity.\textsuperscript{1282} The deaths of so many Athenians spelled new opportunities for those who had survived to acquire through sale or inheritance scarce Attic farmland.\textsuperscript{1283} Nor was it freeholders alone who stood to benefit from the available land. Such a decrease in population with attendant, relative availability of land was bound to have a depressive effect on leasing prices and in light of the loss of so many labourers—free and slaves—agricultural labour could command better wages.\textsuperscript{1284}

The return to intensive farming in the countryside, however, is only one part of the coda to the account of the effects of the Peloponnesian War on the Athenian food supply and economy that I have offered. The years 431-404 witnessed a massive infusion of coined money to Athenian society at the same time as more Athenians than ever were reliant upon the purchase of imported foodstuffs at the markets of Athens and Piraeus. Rents paid to Athenian

\begin{enumerate}
\item\textsuperscript{1282} Akrigg 2007.
\item\textsuperscript{1283} Pace, Mossé 1962, 39-67; Mitchell 1957, 39, 85-86.
\item\textsuperscript{1284} Akrigg 2007, 40-41; cf. Xen. \textit{Mem.} 2.8.1-6.
\end{enumerate}
klēroukhoi, wage-earning opportunities for dikastai, stratiōtai, and dockyard labourers, and state subvention in the form of the diōbelia all helped to provide Athenians with the ready cash needed to purchase necessities.

The monetization and commercialization of the Athenian economy can, of course, be pushed back further to the Pentakontaetia. Robust economic diversity was a defining feature of pre-war Athens ([Xen.] Ath. Pol. 2.7-12; Thuc. 2.38.2; cf. 1.141-2). In the last decades of the fifth century, however, there was an expansion of state pay, which helped to mitigate the economic impact of the loss of Attica. The diffusion of hundreds of talents of coined silver into Athenian society year after year hastened the trend to a fully monetized economy. I view it as no coincidence that the earliest known bankers of Athenian history, Arkhestratos and Antisthenes, the masters of Pasion of Akharnai (Dem. 36.43), established their successful trapezai sometime in the 420s. Trapezitai, like Pasion and his predecessors, and their institutions were necessary features of the late-fifth century economic landscape. Cohen, whose work on ancient Athenian banking is the most important to date, regards the development of the impersonal, coin- and credit-based economy characterized by monetary acquisition and facilitated by bankers like Pasion as a fourth-century innovation. This claim, however, is built on the assumption, debunked by more recent economic studies, that the fifth-century economy was characterized by a kind of ‘Rousseauistic’ self-consumption or complete autarky. As I have argued above, already in pre-war Athens agricultural producers were

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1286 Trevett 1992, 1-2; the 420s mark, too, a sudden focused attention on kapéloi and kapéleia. Aristophanes uses kapéleia and its cognates twice as often as any other Greek author (Moreno 2007, 225-232).
eating a majority of the foodstuffs they produced, but were motivated to bring surplus to market, either those in their local deme’s *agorai* or in the city or Piraeus.\textsuperscript{1289} Cohen is correct, however, to point out the rather sudden appearance in our fourth-century sources (namely forensic speeches) of banking operations and the kinds of money-dependent, commercial, profit-focused economic activity associated with banks.\textsuperscript{1290}

I would suggest that the ubiquitous coin—the vast amounts of coined silver paid to Athenians over the course of the Peloponnesian War—is one part of the explanation for the emergence of the commercial economy that we find in the fourth century. But the presence or accumulation of cash in Athenian households does not in itself explain the drive to commercial activity that we find at this time. This, I suggest, can be explained by the need of Athenians, who, in 404, found vast labour opportunities in the fleet and dockyards and imperial rents suddenly disappear, to establish livelihoods based on the countryside or small-time manufacturing (Xen. *Mem.* 2.7). Household industry—especially the manufacture of surplus textiles for sale—is strongly attested in the literary and archaeological record, beginning in the fourth century. Xenophon’s Aristarkhos, who, ruined by the war, is advised by Socrates to turn his home into a textile factory by putting his dependents to work, is a case that could be generalized to judge from recent studies of the distribution of loom weights in private houses.\textsuperscript{1291}

\textsuperscript{1289} Ch. 1, 30-32.\textsuperscript{1290} Of course, here there is a danger in reading too much from the silence of the fifth-century sources when so few forensic speeches survive from before 400. On profit-seeking manufacturing enterprises in classical Athens, see Acton 2014.\textsuperscript{1291} Tsakirgis 2016.
Those Athenians who looked to the countryside and desired to plant new crops in the aftermath of the war\textsuperscript{1292} likely focused maximal attention on agricultural markets and commercial production. This likelihood is not deduced simply from fourth-century evidence for such practices; the most up-to-date scholarship on the economic history of the ancient Greek world demonstrates conclusively that commercial farming was the essential driver of the growth of the agricultural economy in the classical world.\textsuperscript{1293}

Market-oriented activity generated the capital required to invest in the means of expansion for existing farms or for new ventures (i.e., in new farming implements, buildings, livestock, slaves).\textsuperscript{1294} That the Athenians were well aware of market forces is beyond doubt. Aristophanic characters allude matter-of-factly to the price of this or that commodity given variations in supply and demand.\textsuperscript{1295} In Peace, in the scene pitting Trygaios against the arms-dealers derives its humour from the basic observation that a supply of goods outstripping demand will drive down market prices and vice-versa (1191-1269).

In the case of post-war Athens, it was not only the well propertied with large, surplus cash-crops who looked to generate capital via the hungry produce markets in Athens, but also thousands of small-holders who looked to rebuild and expand modest holdings wrecked by years of neglect or Peloponnesian molestation. The demand for agricultural produce—especially grain—would have been extremely high in the years after the war; the loss of imperial control of Aegean shipping lanes meant that Athens had lost the authority to force

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{1292} As evidently they did as early as 404, to judge from the fact that there was grain to ravage in the civil war (Isoc. 16.13); Hanson 1998, 167.
\textsuperscript{1293} Bresson 2016, 118-174, 199-222, 236-239.
\textsuperscript{1294} Bresson 2016, 201-202.
\textsuperscript{1295} Sardines (Knights 644-650); silphium (Knights 894-895); Attic honey (Peace 253-254).
\end{footnotes}
grain merchants to sail to Piraeus\textsuperscript{1296} and Athenians were forced to pay natural market prices for imported grain. To judge from early fourth-century evidence, there was great profit to be made in selling to voracious produce-markets in Athens.\textsuperscript{1297} Athenian farmers large and small could not have been blind to these opportunities. It is surely significant in this respect that we find attested for fourth-century Attica not only the major markets at Athens and Piraeus, but also local markets dispersed throughout the countryside.\textsuperscript{1298} The distribution of attested rural agorai is such that virtually all Athenians lived (and farmed) no more than a three or four hour walk from a market. I would suggest that the emergence of such sites is correlated to the intensification of profit-focused agriculture in the aftermath of 404.

The findings presented above, then, are not just consistent with the developments in the Athenian economy and the trend towards commercialization in the fourth century. My account of the damage to Athenian farming and the adaptive strategies undertaken to offset this harm adds an important explanatory facet to the model of economic development from the fifth to the fourth century. The devastation of Athenian agriculture as a result of the Peloponnesian War was a key factor in the commercialization of the Athenian economy in the period to follow.

Peloponnesian-War economics and finances had other significant consequences besides. Trundle has argued that payment for Athenian stratiótai in the fifth century—first the fleet, then the infantry—resulted in the professionalization of both wings of the Athenian military.\textsuperscript{1299} I would not dispute this general claim; but I argue that, while stratiotic misthos formed an

\textsuperscript{1296} See Ch. 4, 123.  
\textsuperscript{1297} The price of grain was regulated in the fourth century by the sitophylakes (Lys. 22.8, 12), but this was to ensure that sellers did not profit more than one obol per phormos.  
\textsuperscript{1298} Epigraphically and/or archaeologically attested rural markets: Besa, Decelea, Eleusis, Erkhia, Halai Aixonides, Myrrhinous, Thorikos, Sounion, north of Sounion at Pasalimani, and Steiria. See Harris and Lewis 2016, 13 (with references).  
\textsuperscript{1299} Trundle 2010, 251
important source of economic relief for Athenians during the war and the Athenian military
developed some of the hallmarks of professional forces (expertise, wage earning), the
essentially civic nature of military obligation was retained. Athenian servicemen were
undoubtedly well remunerated, and economic motives were involved in Athenian mobilization
(Chapters Four and Seven). Nevertheless, non-monetary motivations appear to have factored
heavily in the elective decision of Athenians to serve (Chapter Seven). In particular, the city’s
hoplite force *ek katalogou* remained resistant to the kind of professionalization that Trundle
posits for light-armed and naval personnel, and service ‘from the lists’, even if such service was
frequent, specialized and remunerated, remained the quintessential expression of the patriotic
and civic duty of the Athenian man. As I have shown in Chapter Six, the hoplite militia of the
early Athenian democracy was probably never as closely coterminous with a class of yeoman
agrarians as has been traditionally held, and the Peloponnesian War, with its attendant
economic pressures, may have resulted in the further disentangling of hoplite status and
ideology from agrarianism.\(^{1300}\) Throughout the fifth century, however, the figure of the hoplite
was normative in Athens and, in the flirtations with oligarchy, political deference was paid to
‘those who provide arms’ not because hoplites had represented an entrenched group of citizens
who traditionally enjoyed full franchise as economic producers and protectors of the city (e.g.,
*zeugitai*), but because hoplite service was a reflection of thoroughly democratic civic values.
Thus the prominent view that the Peloponnesian War saw a ‘revolutionary break’ in the
longstanding correlation between a citizen’s socio-economic status and the nature of his

\(^{1300}\) *Pace*, Hanson 1996.
military service stands to be modified.\footnote{1301}{Hanson 2005, 301; cf. Serrati 2013, 324.} It has recently been forcefully asserted that in the course of the war, armies “became simply military assets that carried no particular civic or political weight.”\footnote{1302}{Hanson 2005, 306; Cf. Dawson 1996, 79.} The culturally sensitive reading of Peloponnesian-War sources I present in Chapter Seven leads, in fact, to the opposite conclusion: military service—especially in the city’s hoplite ranks—was indeed a fundamental expression of democratic citizenship, as can be deduced from the fact that civic military service figured prominently among the issues of contention in the stasis of 411.

Moreover, far from a permanent, professional fighting force, the Athenian hoplite army selected from the list was variably reconstituted as required by elected, temporary officers who selected for service dutiful, patriotic amateurs. Rather than a simple reflection of centralization and the power of the imperial polis to ‘conscript’ or compel service as some have suggested,\footnote{1303}{Van Wees 2004, 88, 96-97, 235-240; Christ 2001.} the katalogos was a typical democratic institution in which civic altruism was balanced with private ambition and self-interest.

Of course, the system did not operate perfectly in reality. Call-up by katalogos, in practice, resulted in an inequitable burden of service, particularly in conditions of protracted warfare such as those of the 470s-445 (\textit{Ath. Pol.} 26.1) and from 431-404 (Arist. \textit{Pol.} 1303a8-10). In the aftermath of the Peloponnesian War, this issue was likely exacerbated by the reduced pool of military manpower in Athens; in the 390s, cases like that of Polyainos, the stratiótês who got himself into trouble with the generals for objecting to repeated call-ups without leave may well have been common (Lys. 9).
In the change, sometime after the Corinthian War, to a more egalitarian system of indiscriminate call-up by age class (*Ath. Pol.* 53.4-7), we may have evidence of an increase in centralization and in the capacity of the state to compel military service. The new system in which men served ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι τῶν ἥλικιοτῶν was instituted sometime between 386 and 366.

In one sense, the fourth-century system represents democratic refinement in that it ensured a fair and equitable burden of service.\(^{1304}\) At the same time, however, the age-class system reflected the increased bureaucratization and centralized administration of the polis. A necessary component of the new system of mobilization, according to Ps.-Aristotle, was the creation of centralized and comprehensive lists of those liable for call-up—in the 330s, every Athenian between the age of 18-59—published on bronze *stelai* outside the Bouleuterion. Moreover, our earliest certain reference to call-up by age-class in Aeschines’ *On the Embassy* (347/6) associates this system of mobilization with ephebic training, making it likely that the new system was introduced along with the state-sponsored, compulsory *ephebeia*.\(^{1305}\) Such training no doubt further increased the professionalism of the infantry—a process that was underway already at the end of the fifth century.

Generally speaking, long, far-off campaigns tended to reduce the amateur character of war-making and to increase the number of military experts and career soldiers in Greek forces. This is borne out by fourth-century sources. For example, military experts—especially generals—abound in Xenophon’s *Anabasis*. Particularly revealing is the travelling general-for-hire, Koiratadas from Thebes (7.1.33). Moreover, the fourth century witnesses the appearance

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\(^{1304}\) Christ 2001, 411.

\(^{1305}\) Christ 2001, 416-417; Aeschines would have completed his ephebic training in 372 (Aeschin. 2.167).
of military trainers and tacticians, the teachers of *hoplomakhia* and the art of generalship (Plato, *Euthy.* 271d, 273e, 290c; *Lach.* 179a-180e; Xen. *Mem* 3.1) and specialized, technical treatises on the military arts.

An increase in the degree of technical expertise and professionalism in Athenian war-making from 431 to the fourth century is beyond doubt. Yet, if the testimony of Xenophon—our most complete authority for the early fourth century generally and our fullest source for the experience of mercenaries—can be accepted, Athenians do not appear to have flocked to armed service abroad in the years after the war. The Athenians may, as a consequence of protracted warfare from 431-404 (to say nothing of the *pentakontaetia*), have become themselves something of the τεχνίτα τῶν πολεμικῶν marveled at by Xenophon (*Lac.* Pol. 13.5), but they do not seem to have focused their livelihoods around military service as other Greeks did. Xenophon, a great admirer of Sparta, tends to focus on the activities of Sparta and Peloponnesians, but his omission in *Hellenika* and *Anabasis* of large numbers of Athenians serving as mercenaries is noteworthy. Despite the well-attested presence of Athenians in the forces under Xenophon’s command in 401, for example, Athens is not among those places listed as the hiring grounds for large contingents of troops. Cyrus evidently had asked his Greek friends to hire specifically Peloponnesian troops (*Anab.* 1.1.6).

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1306 Arist. *Pol.* 1338b suggests that by his day, citizens of many poleis now trained for war as only the Spartans had before.


1308 It is surely significant, however, that in the early fourth century, no less a military authority than Xenophon still expresses astonishment at the singular tactical capabilities of the Spartans.

1309 Nor does the city seem to have been eager to commit itself abroad: in 396, the Athenians excused themselves from Aegisthalus’ expedition to Ionia on the pretext that they were still recovering from plague and war losses (Paus. 3.9.2).

1310 The sizable Greek contingents came from cities of the Khersonesos, Thessaly, Boeotia, Akhaia, and Arkadia; a modest force of 600 soldiers came from Megara (*Anab.* 1.1-2).
On the other hand, the presence of foreign mercenaries (xenoi) serving in Athenian armies in the fourth century is cited by historians as an indication of the city’s need to augment its forces in light of staggering losses of military manpower at the end of the fifth century or else of the patriotic malaise of the post-war generation. Certainly in the fourth century mercenaries served among Athenian forces in large numbers, where they supplemented the citizen militia as well as served in prolonged siege operations and in distant, year-round campaigns (e.g., Dem. 8.9; [Dem.] 50.21-22; Isoc. 15.111-113)—duties which citizens, especially those attempting to rebuild a life in Attica, might find difficult to discharge. The abundance and availability of mercenary manpower is an undeniable phenomenon in the first half of the fourth century, even if the accounts of men like Isocrates exaggerate accounts of enormous mercenary forces roving menacingly throughout the Aegean and Greece (Epist. 9.9-11).  

Athens’ reliance on mercenary and non-citizen troops in the fourth century, however, has been overstated because of influence of several highly rhetorical and extremely pessimistic passages concerning Athenian war-making in middle of the century. In his speeches urging the Athenians to make war on Philip of Macedon, Demosthenes frequently disparages the citizens of his day for their lack of patriotism. He upbraids his fellow citizens as cowards, who, unlike

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1311 That some cities in Greece appear to have become in the fourth century entrepôts of soldiers for hire has become a familiar pillar of the argument for a general rural immiseration throughout Greece as a result of the Peloponnesian War (Isoc. 4.168), of which we should be dubious. We have no evidence outside of Attica about how the rural economies of Greek communities were affected by the war (apart from Aristophanes on the damage done to Megara). Certainly Athenian military activities in the Megarid and the coastal Peloponnesian would have wasted the livelihood of many Greek farmers, who might thereafter have found work as mercenaries—but the vast bulk of the mercenaries we encounter in the sources for the early fourth century are from precisely those areas of Peloponnesian and central Greece least touched by the campaigns attested for the Peloponnesian War (Hermippos Fr. 63 K-A; Xen. Anab. 1.1-2). See further, Trundle 2004, 58.
1312 As has been the putative near total reliance on civic militias by poleis of the fifth and sixth centuries: contra Hanson 1995; see Trundle 2004, 40-46.
the Athenians of old, shrink from *ponoi* and *kindunoi*, instead hiring *xenoi* to perform their military duty.  

Recent work on mercenary use by the Athenians during the Corinthian War reveals that foreign troops, though a prominent feature of Athenian forces, were used in a supporting role and that Athenian citizens well into the fourth century comprised the main element in what were essentially militia armies (e.g., Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.18-22, 4.2.16-23, 4.3.15-20). In early post-war Athens, then, we find that the citizen militia is not only still an important aspect of the city’s defense, but, given the loss of the fleet, has become the decisive military component in Athenian foreign policy. The commitment of 6000 citizen hoplites at Nemea in 394 probably represents fully two-thirds of the available hoplite force in post-war Athens (*Hell.* 4.2.17; cf. Appendix 1). That troops in this decade were levied *ek katalogou*, a relatively messy, casual and decentralized mode of mobilization, is put beyond doubt by the testimony of Lysias’ hoplite-client. The experience of the Peloponnesian War, therefore, does not appear to have drastically altered the nature or composition of Athens’ soldiery. Contrary to widespread scholarly opinion, insofar as the identity, recruitment and deployment of citizen troops is concerned, the war does not seem to have undermined or destroyed “the old Hellenic idea that war served the *polis*, rather than the *polis* war.” Developments in the capacity of the state to compel universal military training and service occur only later. Of course the experience of the Peloponnesian War—economic damage, population loss—may have factored into the reforms of the mid-380s and Athens’ need to improve the efficiency and quality of its infantry, but these

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1313 E.g., Dem. 2.23-24; 3.3, 35; 4.2-4, 7-8, 19, 24, 42, 46; 6.36; 8.21; 9.36, 67.  
1315 Two-thirds is precisely the level of troop commitment for expeditionary campaigns customary for traditional infantry powers (Thuc. 2.10; cf. 2.13, 31). See Ch. 1, 54-55.  
1316 Hanson 2004, 126.
effects were complex, drawn out and tied up in the experience of another costly and painful war against Sparta.

Another area in which Athens changed dramatically from the fifth to the fourth centuries is in the collection and management of state finances. Here it is clearer that the Peloponnesian War was a significant force for change and development. The traditional argument, however, which postulates novelty and experimentation in war-making (e.g., defensive strategies, prolonged sieges, use of mercenaries) as the driver of predatory state behaviour, requires some modification. As I demonstrate in Chapters Six and Eight, the view that the expense of the war led, in 428/7, to the creation of a novel direct tax on Athenian citizens does not seem tenable. The eisphora and the sophisticated mechanisms for its collection predate the Peloponnesian War. While Athens’ arkhē flourished, the burden of direct taxation was not usually great; but when state finances were stretched by very high levels of military commitment and/or by a disruption in the imperial phoros, both of which conditions were present in 428/7, eisphora levies could become very significant.

Likewise, it was not Athenian strategy and the democracy’s dependence on rich trierarchs per se that led to crushing financial burdens on the city’s elite and the disaffection of military leitourgountes during the war, but the foundering of the arkhē in 412/11. The loss of imperial revenues meant a reduction in the capacity of the public treasury to defray trierarchic outlay; the loss of major allies and the struggle for naval supremacy in the Aegean increased the costs associated with hiring and maintaining crews in the face of competition for rowers. To some extent, liturgical institutions in democratic Athens represent redistributive economic
mechanisms ([Xen.] _Ath. Pol._ 2.14),\(^{1317}\) and are precisely the sort of efficient extractive capacities associated with predatory state formation.

Yet there is no evidence that Athens at any time during the war took steps to improve the organization of the trierarchy or to increase the level of financial obligation for individual liturgists. Moreover, the recourse to _antidosis_ available to rich citizens meant that there was a fundamental limit to the polis’ ability to compel its wealthy citizens to undertake liturgical service. The Athenians did create at least one new institution during the war to ensure the efficient and steady contributions from the rich, the syntrierarchy, which aimed at reducing the financial burden on individual trierarchs in the context of the breakdown of the _arkhê_. The creation of the joint trierarchy represents a step—but only a step—in the direction of the impersonalized, permanent associations of trierarchic _symmoriai_, or groups of joint contributors (_synteleis_), established in the mid-fourth century.\(^{1318}\) At the end of the fifth century, the financing and captaining of Athenian warships was still invested in individuals, who could leverage their service for social and political capital to make strong claims to _timê_ and _kharis_. Thus, in the final years of the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians evidently became more willing to grant public honours to the men who had made such important financial contributions to city’s defense,\(^{1319}\) and, well into the fourth century, Athenian orators continued to claim _kharis_ from their audiences in recognition of trierarchic performance.\(^{1320}\)

\(^{1317}\) Ober 1989, 199-201; Rhodes 1982, 7.

\(^{1318}\) On the reforms of 358/7 and 340/39, see Gabrielsen 1994, 182-217. These reforms responded to the need of the city to ensure efficient and predictable finance for its navy while maintaining the cooperation of wealthy citizens.

\(^{1319}\) See Ch. 8, 367-368; cf. Loraux 1986, 155.

The Peloponnesian War brought about great upheaval and transformation in Athens. The effects of the war on the lives of Athenians and on the organization of their city, however, can be obscured by too broad a treatment of Greek history, with the Peloponnesian War standing as a break or watershed between the world of the fifth century and the different world of the fourth. Such a treatment tends toward the historiographical trap of artificial periodization—an accidental consequence of the war’s end falling nearly perfectly at the end of the fifth century.\(^{1321}\) In this study, I have attempted to provide as finely textured and as close an account of some of the ways in which the war brought adaptation and change to life in Athens. I have focused on economic and socio-political developments in Athens from 431-404. There are surely other ways, too, in which the city experienced the \textit{kinēsis} of war. With respect to material and socio-political consequences, however, two main theses can be advanced: as a result of the war, the city appears to have developed a more heavily market-oriented and monetized economy, which hastened and intensified the fifth-century commercialization of Athenian culture; strikingly, Athens did not develop new mechanisms of centralized coercion and extraction for the purposes of national defense and military financing such as we observe in the usual process of predatory state formation. Instead, democratic Athens can be shown, throughout the Peloponnesian War, to have struggled to find the means within the limited state apparatus of its decentralized polity to raise human and material resources for the war effort. While we do observe some degree of centralization, civic ideology and the organizational principles of the polis state act as an impediment to Tilly’s general proposition about the effects of war on state formation. For Athens, resistance towards the usual state-level facilitators of

\(^{1321}\) Cartledge 2001a.
communal defense—professional armies, autonomous military leadership, centralized conscription and regular, direct taxation—came at the cost of *stasis* in 411 as the tensions over the performance of public and military duties fuelled contestation over position and status in the city.

Whereas I have demonstrated throughout this study that the war did represent a considerable upheaval and force for change in Athens, the effects that I have tracked in the preceding chapters need to be understood in the context of a larger historical picture. The changes precipitated by the war must be understood in the context of longer-term developments already underway before the war and continuing after, and while the war did represent a violent disturbance for the Athenians, Athenian society proved resilient and in many respects things recovered and returned to normal remarkably quickly after the war’s end. Thus, in respect of the several areas of Athenian life that I have considered—economy, state finance, and military participation—we see change, but also considerable continuity between the fifth and fourth centuries. While Thucydides’ *megistê kinêsis*, a generation-long total war, may have torn at the fabric of Athenian life and destabilized the polis (Paus. 3.7.11), the material and political conditions that provided for the flourishing of this democratic city proved enduring.
Appendix 1: Athenian hoplite casualties from 431-404 BC

The hoplite casualties and demography from 431-404 presented in the table below is based on the following demographic considerations:

- Hoplite service undertaken by males who could afford the equipment between ages 18-59.
- Males aged 18-59 represent 52.47% of all Athenian males and 91.3% of all Athenian citizens (i.e., adult males aged 18-80+) according to the Demeney-Coale Life Charts adopted by Hansen 1981, 1988.
- 91.3% x 60 000 (the number of citizens in 431 proposed by Hansen) = 54 780 citizens who are old enough to bear arms.
- 14 600 (# of hoplites ready to be mobilized in 431 according to Thuc. 2.13.6 + 1600 already in service at Potidaea [Thuc. 1.64]) / 54 780 = 27% (just over 1/4 of citizens of military age)
- Males aged 18-19 (i.e. newly enrolled citizens) represent 3.3% of all adult males. So 3.3% x 60 000 = 1980 new citizens per year given a standard population growth rate between 0.5 and 1%.
- 1980 new citizens x 0.27 gives the hoplite ratio as about 535 new potential hoplites enrolled in normal years. About 10% of these would statistically be unfit to serve and thus would be classified as *(adynatoi)* (Hansen 1986, 19, on analogy with early modern European demography); so 535 – 10% = 482
Epigraphic evidence (Athenian casualty lists) if correctly restored, suggest that there were engagements fought by the Athenians that were entirely passed over by our literary sources. To account for these casualties, Hansen 1988 adopts a very cautious 200/year. I have simply used roughly 27% of this rate to correspond with the ratio of Athenian hoplites to other citizens in 431.

Hansen 1988 estimates the mortality rate at 2.5% for all Athenian citizens (i.e. those aged 18-80+). Here I have adopted a slightly lower rate to account for a higher standard of living for those of ‘hoplite’ means relative to the Athenian average.

Addition of ephebes: youths aged 18-19 years represent about 3.3% of total adult male population. On analogy with early modern European demography, roughly 10% of individuals would be statistically unfit to serve as hoplites (Hansen 1986, 19) and would thus be classified as adynatoi. With this group removed from the total number of 18-19 year-olds, the total is then multiplied by 0.27, the percentage of total adult males of military age suitable for regular hoplite service to provide a figure for the incoming cohort of hoplites. E.g. for 432/1: 60,000 x 0.033 = 1980 minus 10% = 1782 x 27% = 481. For a similar methodological approach, see van Wees 2011, 99; Hansen 1985. Van Wees, however, despite his insistence in other works on the widespread participation of thetes as hoplites, subtracts the 10% adynatoi from only the ephebic cohort. Such an approach would seem valid only if one assumes that ephebes were the young adult representatives of the very hoplite class whose existence van Wees has questioned.

This column lists instances of major Athenian engagements, which are referred to in the literary sources, but for which no casualty figures have been provided.

For this and the following year, we may well have to reckon with a sizably increased number of ephebes resulting from a likely increase in the amount of children born immediately following Pericles’ citizenship law of 452/1.

The casualty figures from the plague have been averaged out for the three years during which it was most active in Athens.

There is no reason to think that ephebes would be any less vulnerable to the plague than the majority of adult males, so that the reduced numbers for the ephebic cohorts of plague years reflect 3.3% of a reduced citizen population.

Thuc. 2.69.2 records that Melesandros and his six ships were defeated, adding that action the general was killed in action along with “a portion of his force” (τῆς στρατιάς μέρος τί).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Size of Hoplite Force</th>
<th>Major Casualties</th>
<th>Reference(s)</th>
<th>Minor Casualties</th>
<th>Mortality Rate</th>
<th>Ephebe Additions</th>
<th>Other Engagements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>432/431</td>
<td>14600</td>
<td>1322</td>
<td>Thuc. 1.64; 2.13</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>1326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>431/30</td>
<td>14793</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>537</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>430/29</td>
<td>14985</td>
<td>1567</td>
<td>Plague 3.87.3</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>1328 Caria/Lycia 2.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>429/8</td>
<td>13518</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Plague 3.87.3; (+430 deaths)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>410</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>428/427</td>
<td>11611</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>Mytilene (1000): 3.18.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1322 Epigraphic evidence (Athenian casualty lists) if correctly restored, suggest that there were engagements fought by the Athenians that were entirely passed over by our literary sources. To account for these casualties, Hansen 1988 adopts a very cautious 200/year. I have simply used roughly 27% of this rate to correspond with the ratio of Athenian hoplites to other citizens in 431.

1323 Hansen 1988 estimates the mortality rate at 2.5% for all Athenian citizens (i.e. those aged 18-80+). Here I have adopted a slightly lower rate to account for a higher standard of living for those of ‘hoplite’ means relative to the Athenian average.

1324 Addition of ephebes: youths aged 18-19 years represent about 3.3% of total adult male population. On analogy with early modern European demography, roughly 10% of individuals would be statistically unfit to serve as hoplites (Hansen 1986, 19) and would thus be classified as adynatoi. With this group removed from the total number of 18-19 year-olds, the total is then multiplied by 0.27, the percentage of total adult males of military age suitable for regular hoplite service to provide a figure for the incoming cohort of hoplites. E.g. for 432/1: 60,000 x 0.033 = 1980 minus 10% = 1782 x 27% = 481. For a similar methodological approach, see van Wees 2011, 99; Hansen 1985. Van Wees, however, despite his insistence in other works on the widespread participation of thetes as hoplites, subtracts the 10% adynatoi from only the ephebic cohort. Such an approach would seem valid only if one assumes that ephebes were the young adult representatives of the very hoplite class whose existence van Wees has questioned.

1325 This column lists instances of major Athenian engagements, which are referred to in the literary sources, but for which no casualty figures have been provided.

1326 For this and the following year, we may well have to reckon with a sizably increased number of ephebes resulting from a likely increase in the amount of children born immediately following Pericles’ citizenship law of 452/1.

1327 The casualty figures from the plague have been averaged out for the three years during which it was most active in Athens.

1328 There is no reason to think that ephebes would be any less vulnerable to the plague than the majority of adult males, so that the reduced numbers for the ephebic cohorts of plague years reflect 3.3% of a reduced citizen population.

1329 Thuc. 2.69.2 records that Melesandros and his six ships were defeated, adding that action the general was killed in action along with “a portion of his force” (τῆς στρατιάς μέρος τί).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Death</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Death</th>
<th>Causality</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>427/6</td>
<td>11739</td>
<td>1687</td>
<td>Plague: 3.87.3; (+120 deaths) Akarnania: 3.98.4</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>375</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>426/425</td>
<td>10142</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>Aetolia (120): 3.98.4 Solygia (50): 4.44.6</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>378</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>425/424</td>
<td>10218</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>Pylos (60): 4.5-38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>424/423</td>
<td>10344</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>Delium: 4.101.1</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>Megara (600): 4.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>423/422</td>
<td>9470</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>Mende, Scione (1000): 4.129.2 Torone (1200): 5.2, 5.3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>422/421</td>
<td>9615</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>Amphipolis: 5.11.2</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>Scione (800?): 5.2.2, 5.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>421/420</td>
<td>9159</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>183</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>420/419</td>
<td>9314</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>186</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>419/418</td>
<td>9468</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>189</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>418/417</td>
<td>9621</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>Mantineia: 5.74.3</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>394</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>417/416</td>
<td>9573</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>191</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>416/415</td>
<td>9728</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>Melos (1200): 5.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>415/414</td>
<td>9882</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>197</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>414/413</td>
<td>10035</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>413/412</td>
<td>10187</td>
<td>2700</td>
<td>Syracuse: 6.43.1; 7.20.2; 7.87</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>404</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1330 Thuc. 3.19.2 very closely mirrors 2.69.2: Lysikles and his twelve ships are defeated and the commander is killed “along with many of his force” (τῆς ἀλλῆς στρατᾶς πολλοί).

1331 Following plague years, a normal 0.5% total population growth is factored into the calculation for the ephbic cohorts.

1332 Thucydides claims that the 2000 hoplites originally sent to Melos under Nicias joined up with “οἱ δὲ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως πανόημει Ἀθηναῖοι” in Boeotia and fought a victorious engagement against the Tanagrans and “some Thebans”.
These years represent a demographic crisis. The plague probably hit pregnant women, unborn foetuses and young children particularly hard, and also led to problems in fertility (see Ch. 3, 82-84; Gomme 1933, 7). Thucydides comments explicitly that the loss of so much manpower in the Sicilian defeat was doubly crushing because the Athenians in 412 "saw no age class coming to replace" the lost hoplites and cavalrmen (8.1.2: ἢ πόλις ὀσπίτων τε πολλών και ἰππέων καὶ ἡλικίας οίδαν οὐχ ἔτεραν ἐὼρον ὕπαρχοσαν ἐβαρύνοντο).

For this year, Xenophon tells us that the Athenians lost some 400 men at Ephesos, 100 of these are hoplites. For this year, however, we have an Athenian casualty list (Agora XVII 23) that (restored) includes between 900 and 1400 names. There is no literary record, therefore, to account for the deaths of some 500-900 Athenians. Thus 150 represents an absolute minimum and we should probably assume a much greater number of hoplite casualties for this year, especially since it is still a matter of debate whether or not rowers are even included among the names recorded on such lists. The battle is placed variously in either 410/9 (Lys. 32 with D. H. Hypothesis), 409/8 (Diod. 13.54.1; Hell. Oxy. Florence Fragments; Diod. 13.65.1) or 408/7 (Xen. Hell. 1.2.9).

Xenophon describes a battle near Koressos in which 1000 hoplites participated under Thrasyllos, but claims only 100 hoplites for casualties (Hell. 1.2.1-9).

Xenophon reports that Alcibiades commanded a considerable force that included 1500 hoplites which was involved in a battle near Gaurion (Hell. 1.4.21-22).

Hansen 1988 estimates that about 1000 Athenians were lost in the 25 ships destroyed “with all hands” in the storm after the battle. Since Xenophon tells us that the Athenians had embarked no small number even of knights for this sea-battle, I have included hoplites/knights in the casualties at a ratio of ¼.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Hoplites</th>
<th>Tomato</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Miletus (1000): 8.25-27</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>412/411</td>
<td>7638</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>Miletus (1000): 8.25-27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>411/410</td>
<td>7842</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>Koressos (1000): 8.25-27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>410/409</td>
<td>8044</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>(150)</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>Koressos (1000): 8.25-27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>409/408</td>
<td>8144</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>Nisea (1000 + 400 hippeis): 8.25-27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>408/407</td>
<td>8344</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>Andros (1500): 8.25-27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>407/406</td>
<td>8642</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>Andros (1500): 8.25-27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>406/405</td>
<td>8836</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>Andros (1500): 8.25-27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>405/404</td>
<td>8778</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Siege of Athens: Xen. (Hell. 2.2.21)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>? (mass starvation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>10201</td>
<td>1450</td>
<td>4417</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total casualties from war or plague = 11650 (minimum)
Appendix 2: Athenian naval commitments, 433-404 BCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Reference(s)</th>
<th>Number of Ships</th>
<th>Total Naval Resources</th>
<th>Commander</th>
<th>Theatre</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>433/432</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td>Archestratos (PA 2411) and two colleagues</td>
<td>Macedonia/ Chalcidice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kallias (7827) and four colleagues</td>
<td>Chalcidice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>432/431</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td></td>
<td>300 fit for service</td>
<td>Athens</td>
<td>Athens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td></td>
<td>100 in reserve</td>
<td>Athens</td>
<td>Peloponnese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td>Karkinos (8254), Proteas (12298), Sokrates (13099)</td>
<td>Peloponnese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kleopompos (8613)</td>
<td>Euboea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>431/430</td>
<td>2.56, 2.58</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pericles (11811), Hagnon (171), Kleopompos</td>
<td>Peloponnese/ Chalcidice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td>Phormio (14958)</td>
<td>Naupactus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>Melesandros (9803)</td>
<td>Caria/Lycia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>430/429</td>
<td>2.80, 2.83-85, 2.92, 2.103, 2.108</td>
<td>40¹³⁴¹</td>
<td></td>
<td>Phormio [20]</td>
<td>Naupactus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.94</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Athenians assemble ‘pandêmei’ at Piraeus and launch their ships</td>
<td>Athens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>429/428</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kleippides (8521)</td>
<td>Peloponnese</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹³³⁸ These figures represent the minimum of annual Athenian naval commitment as can reasonably be reconstructed from ancient sources. They cannot take account of the various small squadrons of guardships, money-collecting missions, embassies and other small operations, which, to judge from their incidental appearances in the sources, were a more or less constant factor. Given their piecemeal treatment by ancient historians, no accurate yearly totals can be given for these small flotillas, but an additional ten to twenty ships per year seems a likely, if conservative, figure.

¹³³⁹ Unless otherwise stated, all passages come from Thucydides.

¹³⁴⁰ Beside each name, where available, appear the numbers assigned to individuals in Kirchner’s Prosopographia Attica [in brackets] as well as the number of ships within a fleet that a commander has been explicitly referenced as commanding (in parentheses).

¹³⁴¹ The totals for the years 430/29-429/28, look suspiciously low. Unless the plague is attributed with having a very severe impact on Athens’ ability to launch large fleets in these years, it should probably be understood that these moderate sized fleets are in addition to the one hundred or so ships that appear to have been on perennial guard duty around Attica and Euboea (Thuc. 3.17).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Year(s)</th>
<th>Number of Ships</th>
<th>Details</th>
<th>Port(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>428/427</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250 in active service (most of entire war)</td>
<td>Mytilene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.16-17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Peloponnese/Naupactus/Peloponnese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Attica, Euboea, Salamis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ionia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>427/426</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Paches</td>
<td>Mytilene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.51</td>
<td></td>
<td>[?]</td>
<td>Nicias (10808)</td>
<td>Megara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.69, 3.75, 3.77</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Nikostratos (11011)</td>
<td>Naupactus/Corcyra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.80, 3.85</td>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Eurymedon (5793)</td>
<td>Corcyra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.69, 3.75, 3.86, 3.88</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Laches (9019), Charoiades (15529)</td>
<td>Sicily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>426/425</td>
<td>3.90</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Laches</td>
<td>Sicily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.91, 3.94</td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Demosthenes (3585), Prokles (12214)</td>
<td>Peloponnese/Aetolia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Nicias</td>
<td>Melos/Boeotia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.115</td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Pythodoros (12399), Sophokles (12827), Eurymedon</td>
<td>Sicily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>425/424</td>
<td>4.2-6</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Sophokles, Eurymedon</td>
<td>Peloponnese/Sicily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.42-46</td>
<td></td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Nicias</td>
<td>Corinth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.50</td>
<td></td>
<td>[?]</td>
<td>Aristides (1685)</td>
<td>Thrace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.65</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Laches/Pythodorus</td>
<td>Sicily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>424/423</td>
<td>4.53</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Nicias, Nikostratos, Autokles (2724)</td>
<td>Peloponnese/Cythera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.65</td>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Pythodoros, Sophokles, Eurymedon</td>
<td>Sicily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Notes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.66-67, 4.76-77, 4.89</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Demosthenes, Hippokrates (7640)</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>10+</td>
<td>Demodokos (3464), Aristides, Lamachos (8981)</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.104</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Thucydidides (7267)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4.122, 4.129, 4.133</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Nicias, Nikosatros</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5.2, 5.11</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Cleon (8674)</td>
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<td>Cleon (8674)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

423/422

4.122, 4.129, 4.133 | 40 | Nicias, Nikosatros |

422/421

5.2, 5.11 | 30 | Cleon (8674) |

421/420

420/419

419/418

418/417

417/416

5.83 | ?20+? | Athenians ‘blockade’ (κατάκλησιν) |

416/415

5.84 | 20 | Alcibiades (600) |

415/414

6.43 | 100 | Nicias, Lamachos, Alcibiades |

414/413

6.43 | 100 | Nicias, Lamachos |

413/412

6.43 | 100 | Nicias, Lamachus |

412/411

8.8 | no fleet\(^\text{1342}\) | approx. 90\(^\text{1343}\) |

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\(^{1342}\) No fleet at beginning of year, but it is obvious that when Thucydidides talks about “no” fleet he is still assuming the existence of “guard” squadrons, e.g. 8.13, which he has never mentioned and which appear despite Athens having “no fleet.”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Column 1</th>
<th>Column 2</th>
<th>Column 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Aristokrates (1904) [sequestered Chian ships]</td>
<td>Athens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.10</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Unknown Commander</td>
<td>Saronic Gulf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.13</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Hippokles (7620)</td>
<td>Leukas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.13, 8.15</td>
<td>Strombichides (13016) [8 from those at Speiraion], Thrasykles (7317) [12 from those at Speiraion]</td>
<td>Ionia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Unknown commander (‘fresh’ ships to reinforce blockade at Speiraion)</td>
<td>Saronic Gulf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.19</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Diomedon (4065) [10]</td>
<td>Ionia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.25</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Phrynihos (150111), Onamakles (11476), Skironides (12730)</td>
<td>Miletus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>411/410</td>
<td>27? (at least 150)</td>
<td>Unknown commander</td>
<td>Leukas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.95</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Thymochares (7406)</td>
<td>Euboea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.97</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Unknown commander</td>
<td>Athens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.100, Xen. <em>Hell.</em> 1.1.16-22</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>Thrasyillos (7333) [55], Thrasyboulos (7310), Alcibiades</td>
<td>Ionia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.102</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Unknown commander</td>
<td>Hellespont</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>410/409</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Thrasyillos [50], Alcibiades [50]</td>
<td>Ionia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>409/408</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>as many as 180</td>
<td>Thrasyboulos [30], Alcibiades [100]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>408/407</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>as many as 200</td>
<td>Thrasyboulos, Alcibiades [100], Konon [120]; takes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1343 Not many less than 90 ships by the summer of 412 as operations in Ionia reveal (8.19-28).
1344 Probably still serving since according to 8.100, prior to reinforcement, the Ionian fleet is some 55 ships strong (the 80 total from the previous year minus the 27 in western Greece).
Observations:

Average from 431-404:
- 109 ships annually (on low estimate)
- 118 ships annually (on high estimate)

Calculated without The Peace of Nicias:
- 134 ships annually (on low estimate)
- 144 ships annually (on high estimate)

Archidamian War\textsuperscript{1345}:
- 117 ships annually (on low estimate)
- 137 ships annually (on high estimate)

Ionian War:
- 152 ships annually (on low estimate)
- 156 ships annually (on high estimate)

\textsuperscript{1345} Again, some of the totals for the Archidamian War are paradoxically low. Some correction for this may be sought in the addition of vast numbers of guard-ships on more or less permanent duty around the coast of Attica and Euboea until 411/10. However, if one assumes an additional 100 ships on the basis of Thuc. 3.17, it becomes quickly apparent that some years, such as 426-423 and 413, would yield implausible figures, notably exceeding that of 250 given for 428/7, which Thucydides explicitly says was the greatest number active at any one time in the war and which actually includes 100 guard-ships.
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