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TITLE: Analyzing Ann Quin’s and Kate Millett’s Forgotten Works Through a Mad Reading Practice and Feminist Literary Criticism

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ABSTRACT

In my thesis, I engage with recent scholarship in Mad Studies directed towards introducing a Mad reading practice or Mad theory to the discipline of English and academia more broadly. I utilize Mad theory and feminist literary criticism in order to frame my analysis of two forgotten queer Madwomen—British author Ann Quin (1936-1973) and American author, artist, and activist Kate Millett (1934-Present). I consider how Quin’s novel *Three* (1966) and Millett’s autobiography *Flying* (1974), as experimental texts exploring bisexuality and polyamory que(e)ry heteronormative monogamy and patriarchal literary convention. I also posit that Quin’s “The Unmapped Country” (1973) and Millett’s *The Loony-Bin Trip* (1990) deconstruct a perceived tension in feminist literary criticism surrounding whether the figure of the Madwoman is a subversive or silenced figure. In using a Mad reading practice, my analysis focuses on the intersections of sanism with other forces of oppression, as well as how sanist epistemic violence dissuades critically analyzing Mad individuals’ creative or personal narratives as theoretical and political texts. Moreover, I gesture towards the overlooked social exclusions produced by sanist epistemic violence, such as forced institutionalization, unemployment, criminalisation, and homelessness, which suggests the ethical importance of incorporating Mad theory into everyday practice.
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Introduction:
Framing a Mad Reading Practice

In this project, I analyze why some Madwomen writers are canonized—such as Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Virginia Woolf, or Sylvia Plath—while others are nearly forgotten. My project seeks to problematize considering these quintessential Madwomen authors as being representative of the experiences of Madwomen in general, as they so often are taken to be. I suggest that there are alternative narratives being told by Madwomen that have been, and continue to be, purposefully neglected in order to produce a particular kind of normative Madwoman narrative that is typically white, cis-gendered, middle-class, heterosexual, and monogamous, or otherwise unthreatening to the intersectional hegemonic forces of patriarchy and sanism that often produce Madwoman narratives. I also echo work by feminists, such as Ann du Cille and Gavatri Spivak, who argue that the ongoing process of canon formation and reformation is political, in that my project presumes that when particular kinds of Madwomen authors are neglected it is not a matter of chance. My project focuses on two Mad queer working-class authors—British author Ann Quin (1936-1973) and American author, artist, and activist Kate Millett (1934-Present)—whose literary works experienced brief academic success, followed by a period in which they were criticized and widely neglected, and are more recently seeing a resurgence in literary criticism. Significantly, their texts explore gender, Madness, queerness, and psychiatry in distinct ways from the aforementioned canonized authors. I use these two relatively unknown Madwomen authors as examples to ask broader questions about: whether a literary canon centered around the inclusion of previously forgotten voices—i.e. a feminist literary canon—is able to subvert societal forms of discrimination and marginalization, or if it inevitably reproduces exclusions? Why do previously forgotten authors re-emerge into social and
literary consciousness instead of figuratively remaining buried? What factors influence how feminists and/or Mad scholars tell stories of their past, and, as a result, how these scholars frame feminists/Mad writers of the past? How does marginalization at the level of cultural productions encourage or reproduce social and legal discourses of epistemic violence against those who are queer and Mad? In an effort to respond to these questions throughout my thesis, I also hope to contribute to work introducing a Mad reading practice or Mad theory into the discipline of English, which often embeds Madness as theme, motif, or metaphor, but frequently dispels reader responsibility in being complicit in systems of queerphobia and sanism that can produce Madwomen narratives.

PhebeAnn Wolframe’s dissertation, *Reading Through Madness: Counter-Psychiatric Epistemologies and the Biopolitics of (In)sanity in Post-World War II Anglo-Atlantic Women’s Narratives* (2013), utilizes a Mad reading practice in her analysis of primarily canonical works by Anglo-Atlantic Madwomen, and her blog project allowed Mad-identified individuals to share their interpretations of representations of Madness in cultural productions and the media (iii). Wolframe defines a Mad reading practice as “looking for not only saneist biases in texts, and reading from the perspective of mad experience, but also paying attention to instances and patterns of sexism, racism, classism, heterosexism, cissexism/cisgenderism, ableism and ageism, which are often intertwined with experiences of sanism…” (12). I hope to contribute to her recent efforts to introduce a Mad reading practice or Mad theory into the discipline of English, which often sensationalizes and fetishizes Madwoman narratives, and, in turn, silences both the authors and protagonists. Thus, one of the underlying concerns of my project is to ask how an English academic can do justice to Madwomen authors and protagonists in their analysis of literature without further silencing or stigmatizing their voices or the voices of authors not
included in their immediate analysis.

My project focuses on two twentieth-century British and American women writers because of the revival of feminist and anti-psychiatric movements that occurred post-WWII, which contributed to the flourishing of women writing about Madness (Caminero-Santangelo 5; LeFrançois, Menzies, and Reaume 6). Moreover, stigmatized labels of mental illness are more frequently attributed to women, especially if they also experience discrimination on the basis of sexuality, race, class, or other aspects of their identity, as a means to justify “institutionalized forms of violence,” such as psychotherapy, community intervention, and involuntary hospitalization, to coerce social conformity (Lee 106-107). I have selected Quin’s and Millett’s works for analysis because of their relative lack of academic recognition, despite their initial literary success, as well as their recent revival in literary criticism, in order to suggest that their neglect is indicative of a broader social pattern and not an isolated case in a particular country. There are also striking parallels between the lives and careers of Quin and Millett. They are both psychiatric survivors (including EST), bisexual, polyamorous, working class, and experimental writers (see Buckeye, and Millett 1990). Quin and Millett also experienced physical abuse in their childhoods, became atheists despite being raised in Christian homes, had absent fathers, travelled in Europe and North America, and lived close to poverty as adults because they were unable to find permanent work (see Buckeye and Millett 1990). As a result, their related positionalities enable a discussion of the intersectional forces of sexism, biphobia, sanism, compulsory monogamy, classism, as well as ageism in the case of Millett. Quin and Millett also provide alternative kinds of stories from more popular Madwoman texts that tend to have middle-class, heterosexual, and monogamous protagonists who still “gain health from the treatments [they] receive,” such that at the end of the novel they are ‘cured’ and able to return to
their normative lifestyle (Caminero-Santangelo 50-1). In contrast, Quin’s and Millett’s respective novels remain steadfastly critical of psychiatry, sanism, normative gender roles, compulsory heterosexism, and monogamy. However, I do not mean to suggest that Quin’s and Millett’s stories are the only other kinds of stories that can be shared about Madwomen since every female-identified person’s story will be nuanced by her intersectional positionality. I also chose Quin and Millett because I genuinely enjoy their works and would argue that they are texts worth attention and close analysis, which until very recently they have not been given.

Critic Robert Buckeye suggests that Quin is not well-known because of her anti-bourgeois “refusal of [a] tradition[al]” writing style (28). Similarly, critic Philip Stevick argues that Quin’s unconventional novels “draw on her own troubled mind,” which is both the source of her originality and her lack of notoriety (231). Consequently, both critics put the onus on Quin for not being included in the canon, rather than questioning the hegemonic structures that prevented a non-traditional author who was perceived as queer and Mad from being academically recognized. Similarly, as Victoria Hesford has argued, several of Millett’s critics claim that she lost “public visibility” because of the “general vicissitudes of ‘History’” or because of her “‘ambivalent’ persona,” without explaining why so many of her contemporaries have not also been lost to History (2005: 237). Thus, my project will significantly diverge from previous academic work concerning Quin’s and Millett’s lack of critical attention, and question how the approach to scholarship exemplified by many of Quin’s and Millett’s critics may in fact further contribute to the dismissal of these authors.

Notes on Key Terms

Throughout the thesis, I capitalize Mad to denote my affiliation with Mad Studies, where the previously pejorative label of ‘Mad’ has been reclaimed as a positive alternative for “naming
and responding to emotional, spiritual, and neuro-diversity,” in contrast to the clinical and pathologizing diagnoses of ‘mental illness’ or ‘mental disorder’ (LeFrançois, Menzies, & Reaume 10). Similar to the reclamation of ‘queer’ by LGBTQIA2+ communities or ‘fat’ by the Health at Every Size Movement, Mad is used to “invert the language of oppression, reclai[m] [a] disparaged identit[y] and restor[e] dignity and pride to difference” (10). There is some variation in the use of Mad by scholars and activists (10-11). For instance, Maria Liegghio defines Madness as a “social category among other categories like race, class, gender, sexuality, age, or ability that define our identities and experiences” (122). As a result, a person who is Mad-identified is someone who considers themselves to be Mad or who believes they experience Madness at times in their life, regardless of whether he/she/they¹ have been officially diagnosed or received psychiatric counselling or ‘treatment’² and/or because they ‘pass’ as sane. Shaindl Diamond notes that “Mad is frequently used as an umbrella term to represent a diversity of identities, and it is used in place of naming all of the different identities that described people who have been labelled and treated as crazy (i.e., consumer, survivor, ex-patient)” (66).

Typically, a psychiatric ‘consumer’ is someone who chooses to make use of particular psychiatric ‘treatments’ and is not necessarily anti-psychiatry. In contrast, a psychiatric ‘survivor’ has been forcibly institutionalized and given non-consensual ‘treatments,’ and the term is meant to evoke a “radical critique of the psychiatric system” (68). The term ‘ex-patient’ can apply to both psychiatric consumers and survivors. Terms like consumer, psychiatric survivor, ex-patient, psychiatric inmate, or ‘patient' (in quotations), are all forms of what Bonnie Burstow calls “refusal terms” because they “commen[t] on or displac[e] the terms of the

¹ I use ‘they’ in order to include individuals who are gender queer or those who do not use ‘he’ or ‘she’ pronouns.
² I put ‘treatment’ in quotations in order to gesture towards my skepticism that Madness is something that needs to be ‘treated’ or ‘cured’ (rather than accommodated or experienced) and that these modes of engaging with Madness actually act to ‘treat’ or alleviate distress, rather than inflict more duress in some circumstances.
[psychiatric] regime,” and they can all be used to describe someone who does or does not self-identify as Mad, but is subjected to societal stigma, sanism, clinical diagnosis, and/or chooses or is forced into ‘treatment’ or institutionalization (82-3). Thus, while Mad can be claimed (or imposed) as an identity, different types of engagement with Madness are captured through more specific terminology that falls under the umbrella of Mad. David Reville also coined the terms “Mad positive” to refer to someone who “does not identify as Mad but supports the goals of those who do,” and the term “High-knowledge crazies” for “Mad-identified people who are doing or have done post-graduate work” (170). Diamond also notes that while debate exists surrounding “the question of what term best represents collective and individual experiences of psychiatric survivors, in practice, the meanings of terms are fluid and change in different contexts” (68). As a result, it is significant to highlight that identity markers fluctuate in terms of public acceptance and awareness and that there is no definitive descriptor for everyone who is Mad.

In this paper, I use sanism to refer to prejudice against Mad individuals, but it is relevant to note that Mad activist Judi Chamberlin also coined the term ‘mentalism’ to refer to “discrimination on the basis of intellectual or psychiatric disability,” which is still widely used in Mad Studies (qtd. in Wolframe 7). Sanism refers to a belief system that makes it acceptable to judge, discriminate, reject, silence, discredit, pathologize, kindly undermine, and/or commit violence against someone labelled or perceived to have a ‘mental illness’ on the basis that sanity is the ideal, normative state. Moreover, sanism is produced through sets of social and body regulatory mandates, violent and non-violent practices, and disciplinary regimes that construct prejudice against those perceived to be Mad as acceptable. Although sanism was coined by lawyer Mortin Birnbaum (Wolframe 8), scholar Michael Perlin further elaborates on its
pervasiveness in social discourse in his essay “On Sanism”:

Sanism is as insidious as other ‘isms’…since it is largely invisible and largely socially acceptable. Further, sanism is frequently practiced, consciously or unconsciously, by individuals who regularly take liberal or progressive positions decrying similar biases and prejudices that involve sex, race, ethnicity or sexual orientation. Sanism is a form of bigotry that ‘respectable people can express in public.’ Like other ‘isms,’ sanism is based largely upon stereotype, myth, superstition, and deindividualization. (Perlin 374-5)

Thus, sanism is difficult to address because it has been normalized in Western hegemonic discourse, and, as a result, part of being a ‘rational’ sane agent is to disparage the ‘irrational’ and Mad, which is why ‘crazy,’ ‘lunatic,’ and ‘irrational’ still act as insults that make subjects lose credibility. One of the devastating effects of sanism is epistemic violence, which Liegghio defines as “the ways certain persons or groups within society are disqualified as legitimate knowers at a structural level through various institutional processes” (123). She argues that psychiatrization is a form of epistemic violence because it constructs Mad individuals as necessarily “‘incompetent’ and ‘dangerous,’” in order to disqualify them as legitimate knowers and strip them of authority over their own well-being (125). Thus, epistemic violence targets Mad individuals in order to justify a discourse of sanism that positions Mad individuals as being in the “power-down group” in which everyone “is assumed to be sick, disabled, unreliable, and, possibly, violent” (Poole and Ward 96-7). Moreover, as Wolframe notes, stigma against Mad people “can only be perpetuated because it is supported by sanism as a dominant system of thought embedded in Western institutions and culture” (9). As a result, efforts to dissolve the stigma surrounding ‘mental illness’ fails to address the underlying systemic problem of sanist discourse that produces stigma and epistemic violence (9).
Inspired by other social justice movements in the 1960s and 1970s, individuals objecting to psychiatric practices—including psychiatric consumers, survivors, ex-patients, theorists, and allies—formed human rights groups to protest the mistreatment of the Mad and advocate for reform (LeFrançois, Menzies, and Reaume 3). For instance, in North America, there arose grassroots organizations like the “‘mental patients’ liberation,’ which later became the ‘c/s/x’ (consumer/survivor/ex-patient) movement,” while in the United Kingdom the “psychiatric survivor” and “service user” movements became platforms for anti-psychiatric discourse and resistance (6). The ‘Mad Movement’ is a term introduced in recent years meant to synthesize multiple small grassroots organizations around the globe with similar goals to create continuity with contemporary associations, such as Mad Pride Toronto, Resistance Against Psychiatry, the Coalition Against Psychiatric Assault, and the Mind Freedom Association (Diamond 67). Some of the humanitarian concerns of the Mad Movement include:

…the medicalization of everyday life;…arbitrary, exclusionary, racist, homophobic, gender-biased diagnostic codes and interventions;… involuntary mental confinement and enforced ‘treatments’; …electroshock, Big Pharma, and the profusion of chemical straightjackets branded as therapy; and, increasingly, [the] systemic deinstitutionalization and the wholesale urban ghettoizing of ex-patients under the transparent deceit of ‘downsizing’ and ‘reintegration.’ (LeFrançois, Menzies, and Reaume 5)

While I am positioning these concerns as falling under the umbrella of the Mad Movement, Diamond identifies that in Toronto there exists “the psychiatric survivor constituency, the Mad constituency, and the antipsychiatric constituency,” which have some overlap in their objectives with nuanced differences (65). For instance, she ascertains that the psychiatric survivor constituency in Toronto focuses primarily “on connecting people who have experienced the
psychiatric system and improving the conditions in their lives, alleviating pain and suffering, and finding ways to meet their needs” (65). In juxtaposition, the Mad constituency places “greater emphasis on exploring and celebrating individual experiences of madness and developing Mad culture” and a positive Mad identity, while the antipsychiatric constituency is intent on abolishing institutional psychiatry or restricting psychiatry’s clout and state sanctioned powers (66). While none of these objectives are contradictory, it is important to note that because of the diversity of experiences of Mad individuals, Mad activism has a range of objectives that may be more or less important to particular Mad folks, although the constituencies Diamond identifies still have overlap despite their respective focus on accessibility issues, identity politics discourse, or political ideology. Some of the goals of the Mad Movement also overlap with other human rights activist groups that acknowledge the role of psychiatric oppression in other hegemonic systems, such as patriarchy, racism, or colonialism (69). Diamond suggests it is important for Mad politics to “celebrate a plurality of resistances and subversive acts against sanism,” in order to acknowledge the “processes of racialization, gender, class, disability, sexuality, and other processes [that] shape and define madness” and not alienate individuals whose experiences with sanism are inextricably linked to other forces of oppression they face (69, 71). Today, the Mad Movement continues to flourish locally and globally through various “strands of antipsychiatry, critical psychiatry, mental patients’ liberation, psychiatric survivor activism, and Mad pride,” which advocate for the protection of Mad individuals’ human rights, and develop communities of Mad-identified individuals (LeFrançois, Menzies, and Reaume 8).

Mad Studies is also a burgeoning academic field that has developed out of the activism of the Mad Movement, Foucauldian discourse analysis, disability or crip theory, poststructuralist feminism, critical race theory, and queer studies. Richard Ingram is credited with coining the
term ‘Mad Studies’ in 2008 at a disability studies conference at Syracuse University (Reville 171). While Mad Studies has many aims and functions, broadly speaking it is “a project of inquiry, knowledge production, and political action devoted to the critique and transcendence of psy-centred ways of thinking, behaving, relating, and being” (LeFrançois, Menzies, and Reaume 13). Increasingly, Mad Studies is being taught in institutional settings, with Ryerson University and York University pioneering courses in Mad history in their respective Disability Studies Departments. This trend has spread to other institutions across Canada and the United Kingdom, which is reflected through courses and conferences based on Mad scholarship (see Wolframe 19-20). Moreover, Mad Matters: A Critical Reader in Canadian Mad Studies (2013) is the first textbook that defines Mad Studies as a field, and brings together scholars from various disciplinary backgrounds from across Canada. Mad Studies is significant because it considers first-person narratives from Mad individuals as legitimate sources of knowledge on Madness and psychiatric practices, thus challenging the barriers created when the only ‘experts’ on Madness and psychiatric ‘treatments’ are people who have never experienced either (Reville 177-8). These survivor/consumer/ex-patient narratives and Mad scholarship critique dominant psychiatric discourse and methods of healing as being “biologically reductionist” and as participating in a “capitalist system that prizes bourgeois conformity and medical model ‘fixes’ above all,” and instead focuses on alternative approaches to valuing mental diversity (LeFrançois, Menzies, and Reaume 2). Thus, Mad scholarship is not concerned with how to ‘cure’ or eliminate ‘mental illness,’ but how to engage with Madness as a positive identity that respects individuals’ agency and personhood, as well as ensuring that “people [who are] experiencing mental anguish…are not reduced to symptoms but understood within the social and economic context of the society in which they live” (2). To do so, Mad Studies scholars concern
themselves with “contesting regimes of [psychological] truth,” in order to challenge how psy-
discourse defines truth, normalcy, and Madness (14-15).

My project contributes to efforts to bridge Mad Studies with literary criticism by focusing
on how literary studies has the potential to reproduce psy-discourse through processes of
gatekeeping and marginalization that results in queer Madwoman authors, like Quin and Millett,
being forgotten, as well as how literature can contrastingly be used as a medium for destabilizing
binaries of truth/fiction, self/other, and sanity/Madness. By nuancing Mad reading practice with
feminist literary criticism I suggest how literary critics can incorporate a consideration of sanism
in their analysis of other forms of oppression and treat Mad narratives as legitimate sources of
knowledge and as political texts. I offer short biographies of Quin and Millett to outline the
intersections between their respective marginalized identities and their forgotten works.

Ann Quin and Kate Millett: Biographical Background

Ann Marie Quin was born in Brighton, England in 1936 to parents Nicholas Montague
Quin and Anne Ward (formerly Reid) (Korteling 4). She was raised by her mother after her
father, who was “a failed opera singer, abandoned them” shortly after she was born (Buckeye 9).
Quin’s mother was physically abusive and sent Quin to stay at a Roman Catholic convent for
schooling, although their family was not religious (9). Quin’s family was “petit bourgeoisie” or
lower middle class, which Buckeye argues influenced Quin’s “need to escape” and her “fear of
failure” (47). After finishing school, Quin auditioned at the Royal Academy of Dramatic Art for
theatre, but she “experienced severe stage fright,” and instead turned towards writing (Evenson
vii). Her first two novels, *A Slice of Moon* and *Oscar*, written between 1955 and 1961, were
never published (Korteling 4). During this period, Quin worked numerous secretarial and
waitressing jobs, in addition to writing in her spare time, but she found her work-load to be
extraordinarily taxing and left her with little time or energy for writing (Mackrell 608; Buckeye 11). Evenson describes Quin as having “her first nervous breakdown” at this time and claims she was “[u]nable to get out of bed, [and] she found herself subject to severe hallucinations” (viii). While the veracity of Evenson’s assessment is difficult to assess without more thorough personal records of Quin’s life, it seems that Quin did experience mental duress as a result of her financial constraints and chose to visit a psychiatrist, whereupon she was diagnosed as schizophrenic, although it is unknown if she was prescribed pharmaceuticals (Buckeye 11). In 1964, Quin’s novel *Berg* was published by John Calder. Quin was “best known and best rewarded for her first book, *Berg*…, [which] is the most conventional… of Quin’s four novels and the most readily comparable with other known and established experimental writers” (Morley 128). Mackrell notes that “*Berg* received a great deal of attention for a first novel,” and that reviewers “saw it as a work of considerable depth and originality, important particularly for the way in which it parallels certain qualities of the French new novel in a style and setting that are ‘unmistakeably English’” (610). In that same year, she was the first woman to receive the D.H. Lawrence Scholarship from the University of New Mexico, and a year later she was awarded the Harkness Fellowship, which is given to “the most promising Commonwealth writer under the age of 30” (Buckeye 13). She spent the next two years living and travelling in America using her Harkness Fellowship (Korteling 4). Buckeye claims that while she was in America Quin heavily experimented with drugs and sex (13), including having a simultaneous threesome relationship with a man and woman, which she described in a letter as “very beautiful. [V]ery much like a dance…you don’t know whose hand it is, or whose mouth, and this is extraordinarily exciting” (Quin qtd. in Buckeye 29). Buckeye also suggests that Quin was not private about her bisexuality or polyamory (13).
In 1966, Quin’s second novel *Three* was published by Marion Boyars, as well as two short stories in journals (Korteling 4). She would continue to write short stories, although not all of them were published or were only published posthumously (4). Mackrell claims that “[l]ike *Berg*, *Three* had several appreciative and intelligent reviews—some of which were by other experimental novelists: B.S. Johnson, Robert Nye, and Alan Burns, for example” (611). In 1969, Calder and Boyars published Quin’s novel *Passages* and Quin received an Arts Council government grant (Buckeye 14). In contrast to her earlier work, *Passages* received mixed reviews: “Many reviewers found *Passages* a difficult and irritating book, though Marion Boyars, Quin’s publisher and close associate, feels that the reviews reflected the bad choice of critics rather than the novel’s artistic quality. Quin herself regarded it as her most important work” (Mackrell 612). In contrast to its ambivalent reception, contemporary scholar Buckeye claims that “there are few novels as good as *Passages* that have been as much, as unjustly, neglected” (15). Mackrell critiques Quin’s fourth novel *Tripticks* (1972) stating that “the narrative is too dense a confusion of styles and images to sustain the humor and point of the satire or to provide any coherent insight into the hero’s consciousness” (613). However, between her writing of *Passages* and *Tripticks* Quin was involuntarily hospitalized in Stockholm and London, where she was subjected to “repeated [non-consensual] electroshock therapy,” which prompted Buckeye’s claim that *Tripticks* is “different from her [Quin’s] earlier work and not nearly as powerful” (15-6). Thus, the critical reception of Quin’s novels seems to have declined alongside her repeated forced institutionalizations and ‘treatments.’ In 1972, Quin “traveled to Switzerland and once again suffered a breakdown, unable to speak for some time, and spent a month in a hospital in London,” presumably also receiving EST (Buckeye 16). Buckeye summarizes the last few years of Quin’s life as follows: “Breakdown after breakdown. The loss of two novels. Electroshock
treatment. Naked in a snowdrift in Sweden. Fed intravenously in Stockholm and once again given ECT. Unable to speak. Hospitalized. Unable to speak. Hospitalized” (45-6). In 1972, Quin “entered Hillcroft College to prepare for university entrance examinations,” and she was accepted at the University of East Anglia for the upcoming year (Mackrell 613). She also began to write another novel, “The Unmapped Country,” which was never finished, but a fragment of the manuscript was published in *Beyond the Words*, a 1975 collection of experimental writing (613). In 1973, her father, with whom she had attempted to reconnect, passed away, and her mother had an accident and required Quin’s assistance in Brighton (Buckeye 16). On August 27th of that year, Quin drowned while swimming off the coast of Brighton, in what is speculated to be a suicide, “though the coroner’s verdict on her death was an open one” (Mackrell 613). Mackrell notes that because Quin “always tried to avoid treatment for her mental illness…her friends and associates generally assume that her death by drowning must have been related to it” (613). Thus, because of her history of forced institutionalization, ‘suicide’ becomes the predicted outcome or narrative used to explain Quin’s mysterious death. After her death, Quin’s works were not considered again in academic journals or book collections until the late 1980s (Korteling 6).

Intriguingly, Quin’s texts are experiencing a revival in the twenty-first century. From 2001 to 2003, Dalkey Archive Press re-printed Quin’s four novels, which remained out of print since their initial publication (6). Perhaps spurred by this reprint, Stewart Home’s novel *69 Things to Do With a Dead Princess* (2002) exalts Quin’s prose above more canonical writers such as Hemingway, Gertrude Stein, and Beckett and claims that literary critics’ “attention could be more usefully directed toward Ann Quin” (169). The title of his novel is also based on a story Quin wrote when she was seven about a dead princess (Buckeye 6-7), and elements of the novel
mimic Quin’s life, writing style, and the plot of Berg. Additionally, Nonia Williams Korteling’s doctoral dissertation at the University of East Anglia (2013) was the first “comprehensive, detailed response to the oeuvre” of Quin’s works, and signals a movement towards re-introducing Quin to academic circles (Korteling 6). Korteling notes that “there are several theses-in-progress featuring Quin as one among several others writers, which confirms that reassessment of Quin is timely” (6). Dalkey Archive Press also recently published a biography on Quin written by Robert Buckeye—Re: Quin (2013). Consequently, it seems apparent that Quin’s texts are re-emerging in academic discourse.

Author, artist, and activist Katherine (Kate) Murray Millett shares many similarities with Quin. She was born two years earlier (1934) in the United States to parents Helen and James Millett. Her father was an alcoholic, who physically abused Millett, until Helen, after twenty years of marriage, “kicked [him] out” of their home, although they were never legally divorced (Millett: 1974, 48-9). Unlike Quin, Millett was able to reconcile with her estranged father before his early death and learn about his “new wife and children” (46-47). As a result, Millett was primarily raised by her homophobic mother (27), who sent her, throughout her school years, to Roman Catholic schools that admonished all non-heterosexual sex outside of marriage as a sin (140). As she recounts in Flying, Millett fell in love at the convent with her peer Nancy Kelly, but was unable to act on her desires out of fear of becoming impure and going to hell (139-141). As a senior in college, Millett had her first same sex relationship with JayCee, after which she “decided” she was “queer” (126-129, 242). However, she married her friend Japanese artist Fumio Yoshimura in 1965, in part to assist him to stay in the United States (209, 216). They had an open or “multiple relationships” (194) until their separation and later divorce in 1985 (Millett 1990: 286). With her background in English literature, Millett taught at universities while being a
Millett graduated with her PhD from Columbia University in 1969 and published her dissertation Sexual Politics in 1970 (1974: 213). Sexual Politics highlights the ignored role of patriarchy in sexual relations and sexism in literature, and was taken up as an important piece of feminist literary criticism in the 1970s. Victoria Hesford notes that the “success of Sexual Politics, both in terms of sale figures and reviews, meant Millett’s status as a [women’s liberation] movement ‘star’ by the late summer of 1970 was unsurpassed” (2013: 160). Millett also received overwhelming media and press attention – including being the cover story for Time and Life magazines, focused on her political views and non-normative lifestyle (161-164).

Millett’s prolific literary, academic, and artistic productions post-Sexual Politics have not received the same amount of academic or popular acclaim. Her book publications post-Sexual Politics include: The Prostitution Papers (1971), Flying (1974), Sita (1976), The Basement (1979), Going to Iran (1981), The Loony-Bin Trip (1990), The Politics of Cruelty (1993), AD, A Memoir (1995), and Mother Millett (2001). In addition, she has had art exhibits or installations periodically from 1963 until as recently as 2009, and has directed six films, although I will exclusively consider the critical reception of her literary texts, rather than her theoretical or artistic works. Her autobiography Flying, which deals explicitly with Millett’s attempts to balance her life as a bisexual polyamorous feminist woman facing discrimination, received extremely negative reviews, such as claims that the book was “[‘self indulgent’ and full of ‘ingrown confusion,’]” because its content was deemed too personal for public consumption (qtd. in Hesford 2013: 156). Significantly, the change in reception from Millett’s feminist literary text to her autobiography seems to be linked to her queerness and Madness, which Millett addresses directly in Flying and The Loony-Bin Trip. Prior to the publication of Flying “in July 1973, when
visiting her [Millett’s] family in Minnesota, she [Millett] was forcibly institutionalized with suspected manic depression” by her family (170). She was released after winning a civil rights trial with the support of friends and her lawyer (Millett 1990: 12). After leaving the asylum, Millett “began to crumble in fear and loneliness” and had thoughts of suicide, prompting her to “surrender[ r] [her] mind, the spirit, the self” and become a “lithium patient” (12). In 1980, Millett decided, with the support of her then partner Sophie, to stop taking lithium because of its negative short and long term side effects, including reduced mental clarity, diarrhea, hand tremors, and liver damage, as well as her continued belief that she was not manic depressive (31). However, after learning about the extent of Millett’s history of institutionalization, Millett’s partner and friends believed she should return to taking lithium (56). After refusing medication, Millett’s sister Sally, along with Sophie and Fumio, attempted to have Millett forcibly institutionalized while in New York, but Millett was able to avoid incarceration by having a police officer defend her civil rights (160-168). While on a trip in Ireland during the “Troubles,” Millett was arrested in an airport for ordering an alcoholic beverage despite not having a departing ticket (188-189). Instead of enforcing criminal charges, authorities brought Millett to a mental asylum where she was jailed without communication with her lawyer or family until she was able to be transferred to a different psychiatric institution in Dublin and pass a psychological test (189-191, 212, 249). Again, post-institutionalization Millett faced economic disparity, loneliness, and thoughts of suicide, and she returned to taking lithium (258). In September 1988, she progressively lowered her dosage and finally stopped ingesting lithium in March 1989 “without incident” because she did not inform her family or friends of her decision, which confirmed for Millett that her drug prescription “was based on a fallacy,” namely that she was not manic depressive (310). Thus, Millett quickly rose to public recognition, only to fall out of it
just as suddenly around the same time as she was diagnosed as Mad and ‘outed’ as bisexual and polyamorous in the early 1970s.

Millett was able to explicitly publish her experiences with forced psychiatric treatments in her autobiography *The Loony-Bin Trip* (1990), which received predominantly positive reviews. For instance, Karen Malpede claims that the memoir is “harrowing, hallucinatory, [and] heroic” (7), and Thomas Steinbuch describes it “[as] so tense, so enraging, that one is likely to find oneself having to set the book aside from time to time just to calm down” (197). Reviewers Cricket Keating and Amy Hamilton more ambivalently note that “[e]ven though we were disappointed with the lack of feminist analysis in the book, we believe *The Loony-Bin Trip* is an important work, and that its exposure of madness as a form of systematic silencing is applicable to any oppressed group” (16). Thus, since her gradual disappearance from academic and public attention, interest in Millett’s work resurged around the turn of the twenty-first century, similar to the situation with Quin’s oeuvre (170). This revival was also catalysed by Millett’s self-reflective newspaper article “Out of the Loop and Out of Print: Meditations on Aging and Being Unemployed” (1998), which spurred renewed interest and discussion of Millett, particularly on the issue of why she had become a figure of the past, despite the fact that she was still producing new works (Hesford 2005: 235). Critics L. Crawford and M. Freely responded to Millett’s article and suggested that Millett had lost “public visibility” because of the inevitable “‘temporary oblivion’ suffered by one generation of political activists as the next emerges,” and the “general vicissitudes of ‘History’” without explaining why authors, such as Millett’s contemporaries Betty Friedan (*The Feminine Mystique*, 1963), Gloria Steinem (co-founder of *Ms.* magazine, 1972), and Germaine Greer (*The Female Eunuch*, 1970), have not also been lost to History (qtd. in Hesford 2005: 236-7). Victoria Hesford has since offered a far more comprehensive analysis of

**Quin and Millett as Queer and Mad**

Throughout my thesis, I describe Quin and Millett as queer, rather than bisexual and polyamorous, because I am using queer in its contemporary definition to refer to “a practice of subverting and living against, or across, social identities,” rather than its previous use to refer explicitly and exclusively to gay or lesbian people (Hesford 2005: 239). I posit that queer captures the non-binary perspective towards sexuality and relationships that Quin and Millett practiced and embodied in their writing. For instance, Millett comments on her lesbian friend’s relationship feeling threatened when she advocates for the benefits and freedoms of polyamory: “Sidney’s model monogamy, gay version, is threatened now” (1974: 112). Millett suggests that her friend reproduces systems of normativity, without questioning their basis more broadly.

Moreover, Millett gestures towards the distinction between supporting polyamory or open-relationships and homosexual rights activism or “equity-oriented practices,” which seek to “normalize the queer” by constructing “gays and lesbians as *just* as committed to one another, family oriented, monogamous, etc., as heterosexual folk” (Rosenberg 55). Like Sharon Rosenberg, I make a distinction between “strategies of inclusion [that] may confront heteronormativity…in a very circumscribed way” and “queering” heteronormativity, which implies challenging, troubling, or undermining heteronormative values and practices (55-56). For instance, Jasbir Puar claims that the “gay rights equality agenda” has white, middle-class marriage at its center, and that we should be critical of this “queer family,” because “homonormative reproduction” imitates and reproduces heteronormative reproduction, as well as its problems (31). Moreover, Puar frames her suspicions of the queer family in terms of
homonationalism and the limitations of a politics of inclusion: “Homonationalism is fundamentally a critique of how lesbian and gay liberal rights discourses produce narratives of progress and modernity that continue to accord some populations access to cultural and legal forms of citizenship at the expense of the partial and full expulsion from those rights of other populations” (25). Thus, the gay or lesbian family becomes a site where gay/lesbian subjects can perform normativity by imitating desired white, middle-class citizens, which reproduces the ideology that non-monogamous individuals are deviant and which marginalizes undesired subjects. Similarly, Morgan Bassichis and Dean Spade assert that “both the white gay and lesbian rights framework…participate in white supremacy’s tactics of pitting ‘good gays’ (white, middle class, gender normative, able bodied) against ‘bad queers’ (black, brown, poor, and disabled, which necessarily means gender non-normative)” (193-4). Because lesbian and gay discourse privileges certain subjects, namely those who most closely conform to prescriptions of normativity, who pose no threat to racial, class, gender, able-bodied, or sanist power dynamics, this discourse ultimately increases the marginalization of homosexuals or bisexuals who face multiple forms of discrimination. Similarly, while a feminist literary canon was created in order to recover forgotten women voices, it still privileges particular kinds of subjects as ideal representations of feminist politics. Consequently, I argue that queer offers a productive lens by which we can consider Quin’s and Millett’s lives as well as works that encompass both their non-binary sexuality and polyamorous relationships, which were not necessarily accepted by feminist or homosexual communities of their time.

Similar to my discussion of queer, I want to suggest that while Mad Studies primarily takes up Madness in terms of identity politics in order to improve the lived conditions of Mad individuals, it is also possible to frame Madness as questioning the project of identity politics
itself. Madness highlights the prevalence of binaries of normal/abnormal, sane/insane, or mental health/mental illness in social and political discourse that dictates acceptable behaviours and practices by outlining the limitations and contradictions of standards of ‘normality.’ As a result, Madness gestures towards how these binaries become embedded into systems of power and knowledge and reproduced in order to maintain the status quo of privileged ‘sane’ individuals. Thus, Madness also suggests how binaries of normal/abnormal, sane/insane, or mental health/mental illness might be re-imagined and potentially dismantled by accepting Madness as “part of being human,” rather than a state of disease or illness (Diamond 70). Significantly, as Dwight Fee points out, “[t]he pervasive viewpoint is that the only way that mental illnesses can be recognized as ‘real’ – and hence worthy of funded research, insurance coverage, [and] rigorous study… is when they are anchored in the language of bio-physiology or possibly some other deep-seated individual factor” (1). As a result, Mad individuals come to rely on biomedical labels of ‘illness’ in order to ‘justify’ their accessibility needs, similar to how many trans-entities\(^3\) must accept being labelled as abnormal or deviant in order to receive medical or financial support for their transition. For instance, Diamond notes that some Mad individuals in Toronto were at odds with antipsychiatric political groups because their efforts threatened their “support from social assistance programs for people with disabilities, employment programs available for those who are labelled as mentally ill, and disability accommodations in education and employment settings” (72). While more accessibility measures are still needed, as Diamond points out (75), it is important to recognize that these programs are crucial to the livelihood of many Mad individuals, even if they are based on sanist ideology. I want to acknowledge the

\(^3\) Bobby Noble notes that Wil and Papi coin and utilize “the term [trans-']entities’ instead of [trans-']gender’ or [trans-']sexual,’…[to] signal one response to [the] alienation lived on a day-to-day basis as a result of clinical and binarized language systems that create little possibility for practices that reflect their multiply situated identities” (280).
difficulty of finding a balance between challenging psy-discourse, in order to prevent psychiatric violence and violations of Mad individuals’ human rights, as well as maintaining a positive identity politics in order to ensure support for individuals who would otherwise suffer. In my use of Mad as theoretical lens that disrupts binaries centered around normalcy, sanity, and health, I am in no way criticizing or disparaging the essential work that is done by Mad activists to generate sustainable living environments and humanitarian support for Mad individuals based on a shared common identity.

I hope to push the theoretical and political implications of Madness by using it in a fashion similar to queering as a way to suggest that Quin and Millett more broadly critique constructions of normality, sanity, and health. For instance, in Quin’s Passages, the protagonist “…likes to think people look upon her as essentially quite mad, almost a prerequisite for any lover she has” (39). The phrasing suggests that the protagonist prefers to be perceived as Mad, implying that she does not see being Mad or being perceived as Mad to be derogatory. The narrator also states that the protagonist “has her own lucidity in fantasies,” which undermines binary distinctions between sanity/insanity because it suggests that the protagonist is potentially more lucid or sane when she is fantasizing or hallucinating (29). Moreover, the protagonist’s lover claims that “[i]t’s as if madness is just another trip—like death” (67-8). While his association of Madness with death is morbid, death is also articulated as a universally shared human experience, suggesting that Madness is a normal, and inevitable, part of being human, rather than something monstrous or dangerous. Moreover, the narrator suggests that Madness may be a heightened form of perception, because of the references to “orgies [held] in honour of a mad Dionysus” in order to celebrate his “divine madness” (59). Thus, Quin presents a protagonist and her lover who are quite comfortable with madness as a normal or exalted state of
being and who question what it means to be sane/Mad if they are not constructed in terms of normal/abnormal or health/illness.

Along the same lines, Millett interrogates the way in which sanity is constructed in terms of a dichotomy, rather than a fluid spectrum:

They would never give in, never see a middle ground of being a little crazy (flipped out, upset, frazzled), or see crazy as a mixed state, an ambivalent affair, or that crazy was not a crime but rather a point of view and need not be locked up, that locking up is an invasion of every human right, an invasion essentially insane—no, no, they stood against all that, they had to. Sanity itself demanded that of them, and sanity is a religion to them, an ideology. (1990: 86-87)

Millet inverses the relationship of sane/insanity to suggest that the treatment of the Mad is insane, because it violates human rights, whereas the experiences of Mad folks are sane/normal/healthy because it is their perspective, which is not dangerous and deserving of being treated like a crime. Moreover, Millett claims that sanity is a religion or ideology, which suggests that sanity is a belief system premised on something fabricated or insubstantial. As a result, she suggests that ‘sanity’ is an illusion that is reinforced by punishing those who question the boundaries of sanity by being “flipped out, upset, frazzled” in order to control people’s behaviour, particularly women (86). Like Quin, Millett paradoxically suggests that Madness can be a ‘sane’ (i.e. appropriate) response, particularly to the traumatic experience of being forcibly institutionalized and given mind-altering pharmaceuticals: “[N]ot all I learned in madness before was madness, but the mind reacting to imprisonment: the madness of the sane” (86). Millett also points towards the discrepancies in how outsiders interpret the behaviour of those who are deemed sane and Mad, since before she was seen as Mad her feelings of outrage, frustration, and
loneliness would be considered a ‘sane’ response to being forcibly incarcerated without cause: “If only no one had told them I was mad. Then I wouldn’t be” (143). Consequently, there are double-standards for what actions are considered to be indicators of sanity, with a strong reconfirmation bias for those already seen to be Mad. Moreover, Millett pushes for an alternative approach to queerness, one that also applies to Madness:

Shall we put the queers in concentration camps, jail the dissenters, purge, execute, forever abandoning change itself in the obsessive drive for power? Or shall we find a new way, finally change everything, not just the usual categories of politics or economy, but society itself, the dynamic of roles and identity, all the basic structures, the family, sexual identity, and the self itself? (199)

Thus, Millett gestures towards the limitations of identity politics and instead directs focus towards the need to consider structures of power that create our idea of self and social constructs that define our conceptions of ‘sanity.’ I want to frame Quin and Millett as Mad in the sense that they contributed to the deconstruction of the aforementioned dichotomies and shift away from considering whether or not Quin and Millett would self-identify as Mad, in its positive connotations, since this construction of Madness is relatively recent, although it is clear from the previous short biographies that they are both psychiatric survivors.

Furthermore, I argue that it is relevant to note that Quin and Millett are still framed as Mad, as in ‘mentally ill,’ by literary critics because of their respective histories of psychiatrization, in order to discuss what these critics might obfuscate by labelling these authors Mad. For instance, Giles Gordon, Brian Evenson, and Robert Buckeye all associate Quin’s death directly with Virginia Woolf. Gordon notes that “James Joyce and Virginia Woolf were long since dead, both in 1941 (the latter, like Quin, by drowning)” (viii). Evenson makes an even
more elaborate conflation between the two authors: “Like Virginia Woolf, Quin struggled with mental illness for most of her adult life and many speculate that her death, seemingly a suicide, was motivated by a belief that another breakdown was coming” (Brian Evenson vii-viii).

Buckeye’s description echoes Evenson’s collapsing of the two authors: “In August, she [Quin] walked into the ocean, like Virginia Woolf” (16). These comparisons, based purely on an assumption of shared Madness, seem to attempt to explain away Quin’s drowning as a typical outcome for Madwomen authors that requiring no further elaboration or contextualization. I argue that this conflation encourages a silencing of Quin’s unique positionality in favour of creating a normalizing narrative of Madwomen suicide that discourages considering other social forces that could have influenced Quin’s decision – if it was suicide. Additionally, Philip Stevick claims that Quin’s inventive writing style “…draw[s] on her own troubled mind… and that is why the representation of consciousness in her fiction seems so different from that of anyone else” (232). Stevick unfairly represents Quin by assuming that, unlike her contemporary male experimental writers, her literary creativity was not a product of talent and hard work, but Madness. He also leverages Quin’s creative expression as evidence of Madness, without similarly assuming all male experimental authors are Mad. Along similar lines, Ballard claims that as Quin’s “schizophrenia deepened she embarked on a series of impulsive journeys all over Europe, analogues perhaps of some mysterious movement of her mind” (Ballard qtd. in Buckeye 19). Hence, even Quin’s desire to travel is pathologized. Significantly, in these particular examples Quin’s presumed Madness is used as justification to make otherwise unsubstantiated claims about her life, many of which silence Quin and presume her to be incapable of the same agency afforded to experimental or Mad male authors.

Similarly, I argue that Millett is still labelled as Mad by literary critics in order to justify
their disagreement with her own biography detailing her experiences with being forcibly institutionalized. For instance, although Caminero-Santangelo recognizes that Millett does not self-identify as Mad, she nevertheless claims that “while Millett criticizes others for not attending to her perspective, she herself has difficulty in attending to the implications of her own story” (43). Thus, Caminero-Santangelo suggests that Millett has failed to recognize that she is Mad and that her Madness is silencing. She also critiques Millett’s erasure of binaries of “deserving/ not deserving” and “crazy/ not crazy,” because she claims that if Millett is able to do so that “no one is crazy after all” and that everyone “can resist” and “can speak for themselves” (45-6). Hence, Caminero-Santangelo asserts that Millett should not need to speak for other Madwomen, if indeed Madwomen are subversive figures protesting patriarchy, rather than silenced by their Madness (46). Caminero-Santangelo also insists that Millett experiences a “loss of agency” and, consequently, that her Madness cannot be a sign of “social deviance” (44). However, I posit that this analysis ignores the circumstances under which Millett is repeatedly forcibly institutionalized, whereupon she loses agency, and collapses the forces of internal and social silencing into a single experience. While I do not dispute that Madness can be silencing, as a psychiatric survivor, Millett is socially silenced through epistemic violence and forced institutionalization, which is the primary focus of the memoir. For instance, Millett describes being unable to make phone calls, mail letters, or otherwise communicate with anyone outside of her psychiatric institutions after being arrested (Millett 210). She also describes how her history of ‘breakdowns’ and recently stopping her intake of lithium will be used to justify the narrative that she has “go[ne] off the deep end,” which is why she is “safe in the hospital getting excellent care” until she is “well enough to travel” (230-1). In such a scenario, anything that Millett does is used to justify the narrative being projected onto her life, which effectively eliminates her ability
to shape her own story of events—until she writes her memoir. Consequently, I argue that Caminero-Santangelo further silences Millett by imposing her interpretation of Millett’s experience of Madness onto *The Loony-Bin Trip* and suggests that Millett is not ‘fit’ to comment on her experiences: “She [Millett] herself is ultimately unwilling to listen to the authority of her experience” (44). Because Caminero-Santangelo presents Millett as Mad in order to undermine her own self-reporting, I venture that she reproduces sanist ideology and psychiatric gatekeeping that prevents Mad individuals from being involved in the production of knowledge on Madness. I posit that it is relevant to consider what is gained by literary critics when they choose to present Quin or Millett as Mad in their critical analysis and how this analysis can contribute to the silencing of psychiatric survivors.

In my first chapter, I assert that Quin and Millett can be conceptualized as figurative queer Mad ghosts who haunt a feminist literary canon because of the combined discriminatory forces of sexism, sanism, queerphobia, classism, and ageism⁴ (Hesford 231; Liegghio 123). I suggest that the counter-normative content of their literary works and their non-normative lifestyles contributed to both authors being perceived as Mad, and subsequently, Quin receiving involuntary electroshock ‘treatments’ or electroconvulsive therapy (EST/ECT) and Millett being forcibly institutionalized and medicated, both on multiple occasions (Buckeye 15; Millett 1990: 11-12, 193). My project correlates the societal discrimination faced by Millett and Quin with the lack of academic criticism analyzing their subversive texts (Buckeye 13; Hesford 235).

In my second chapter, I engage with an existing tension in feminist literary criticism concerned with whether a Madwoman in literature is a subversive or silenced figure by utilizing Clare Hemmings’ historiographic methodology focused on commonalities amongst feminist

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⁴ My discussion of ageism only applies to Millett.
theorists across decades, and by using Millett and Quin’s under-considered literary texts to demonstrate that the aforementioned binary is not incommensurable (Gilbert and Gubar 88; Caminero-Santangelo 11). I argue that women’s Madness is potentially subversive and silencing, and, accordingly, it is necessary to develop a Mad reading practice that engages with Mad narratives as theoretical and political texts, as well as to support women if they choose to use psychiatric drugs, EST/ECT, or other methods of psychiatric support. Consequently, my project will offer an alternative ethical approach to encountering ghosts in the literary canon; it will both highlight the limitations of literary criticism, which produces these ghosts, and establish the possibility of an alternative Mad reading practice.
Chapter One:

Queer Mad Ghosts and Feminist Literary Canonization

In this chapter, I consider how Ann Quin and Kate Millett were excluded from a feminist literary canon because of their positionality as queer Madwoman authors who embodied a ‘radical’ feminist politics. I argue that their queer identities and experimental narrative style contributed to their respective psychiatric and social diagnoses of being Mad, because these non-(hetero)normative behaviours were seen as both sign and symptom of a non-normative mental state and that the intersectional forces of sexism, queerphobia, classism, sanism, and ageism influenced their dismissal by feminist literary critics. However, their recent revival in twenty-first century academia gestures towards their “seething presence,” despite their previous marginalization (Gordon 8). Consequently, I argue that Quin and Millett can be conceptualized as queer Mad ghosts, whose texts haunt a feminist literary canon that purports to be more diverse or inclusive of women authors than previous canons, yet continues to exclude prominent ‘second-wave’ feminist authors like Quin and Millett, who are also queer and perceived to be Mad. As a result, I posit that Quin’s and Millett’s queer Mad ghosts act to destabilize conceptualizations of a feminist literary canon as being inclusive of all women and, furthermore, their ghosts question the ability of any canon to be completely representative. Thus, queer Mad ghosts haunt a feminist literary canon because they remind us of the limitations of canonization, the problems with a politics of inclusion or diversity, the false idealization of a homogenous feminist community, and the ongoing repression of queer, Mad, women’s voices.

5 My discussion of queer Mad ghosts is an extension of Hesford’s conceptualization of Kate Millett as a feminist-as-lesbian ghost haunting second-wave feminism, which I later consider at greater length (2005).
6 Although the term ‘feminist literary canon’ suggests a static object, it is important to note that I use this term for the purposes of clarity and that I recognize canons are fluid, multiple, and constantly being re-produced.
The Politics and Praxis of Canonization

In the short biographies included in the introduction, I gestured towards the relative rise and fall of Quin’s and Millett’s literary careers in terms of their academic reception. The premature erasure and recent revival of Quin and Millett, alongside their respective psychiatric diagnoses and ‘treatments,’ raises the question of why their figurative ghosts were buried in academic consciousness in the first place. While I also point towards Millett’s popularity as an activist in the women’s liberation movement, in this chapter, I want to exclusively consider how Quin’s and Millett’s literary works haunt a feminist literary canon, although it would also be productive to consider how they haunt different spaces. It is particularly puzzling why Quin and Millett have only recently metaphorically risen from the dead, despite attempts in the 1980s to reclaim forgotten women writers in a feminist literary canon; perhaps even more puzzling than why they have been neglected by male-dominated canons (Kolodny 2048). Richard Ohmann describes a literary canon as “a shared understanding of what literature is worth preserving—[which] takes shape through a troubled historical process” (1778). He points towards how a literary canon is shaped by “specific institutions and practices,” particularly those with a “well-defined class base,” rather than arising in “some historically invariant way” (1778). Similarly, an underlying presumption of this chapter is that the dismissal of queer Madwoman authors like Quin and Millett is produced by hegemonic systems of power and is not a product of chance. It is important to note that there has been extensive interrogation of the politics and praxis of canonization in feminist theory beginning with 1970s feminists such as Mary Ellmann’s *Thinking About Women* (1968) and Millett’s own *Sexual Politics* (1970), both of which introduced a practice of feminist literary criticism by critiquing patriarchal representations of women. Correspondingly, post-colonial scholars Ngugi Wa Thiong’o, Taban Lo Liyong, and
Henry Owuor-Anyumba argue for the abolishment of the English department because it reinforces the legitimacy of an English-based canon of excellency based on “a few isolated ‘classics,’” instead of encouraging students to “study representative works which mirror their society” (1999). Nevertheless, literary canons remain present in English departments, particularly in grade school and high school where standardized curriculum and budget restraints encourage instructors to continue to teach the same core group of ‘classics’ without troubling the limits of representation. Although literary canons are less ingrained at higher levels of education, instructors and the ideology of the institution determines whether canonization is complicated in classrooms. While Women’s Studies or Critical Race Studies departments or academics may have shifted away from looking at cultural productions in terms of canons, canonization is still a prevalent concern for English academics because of the ongoing utilization of literary canons in some English departments. When I use the term ‘feminist literary canon’ I am referring to the collection of ‘excellent’ works created by women authors that were previously overlooked in male-dominated canons (i.e. Old English, Early Modern Drama, 16th Century British Literature, and so on), but were figuratively resurrected or highlighted by feminist literary scholars (Kolodny 2048). Moreover, the question remains of how an English academic can ethically respond to non-canonized queer Madwomen’s literature, particularly if they are not even made aware that these narratives exist or if they are already pre-disposed to interpret them as less worthy of academic attention.

In this chapter, I am concerned with why particular Madwomen authors are included in a feminist literary canon, while other women authors continue to be neglected, as well as what kinds of broader exclusions are masked by the inclusion of a few particular kinds of women. Rosenberg raises similar questions when troubling metanarratives about women: “Which women
have to be forgotten or obscured for a single theory of women’s lives to be articulated as The Theory? Whose interests does this theory serve and whose lives does it obfuscate or worsen for those interests to be served?” (45). These questions guide my discussion of the politics of canonization with respect to queer Madwoman authors. As previously suggested, the majority of canonized Madwoman authors, such as Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Virginia Woolf, Sylvia Plath, or Anne Sexton, fit within a relatively normative construction of the ideal patriarchal female subject. For instance, with the exception of Woolf, they were all heterosexual and monogamous, which is not a critique of the authors themselves, but rather an indication that only particular kinds of Madwomen authors were highlighted by feminist literary critics in the 1980s. Additionally, they were all upper or middle class, and, as a result, they also received the most exclusive forms of private psychiatric ‘treatment,’ in contrast to the government-run psychiatric institutions that Quin and Millett were repeatedly forced to enter. Consequently, while Gilman, Plath, and Sexton all critique psychiatric ‘treatments’ as being ineffective or traumatic, they do not challenge sanism more broadly as Quin and Millett do. Thus, although there are similarities amongst these Madwomen, there are important differences that suggest that Quin’s and Millett’s exclusion from a feminist literary canon is disciplinary; they connote a more ‘radical’ Madwoman feminist since their texts more often challenge hegemonic systems of patriarchy and sanism. Similarly, Caminero-Santangelo suggests that “‘forgotten’ narratives about women’s madness have received virtually no critical attention because they do not fit easily with the theories of feminist critics who would otherwise recover them” (4). As a result, I suggest that canonized Madwomen authors were highlighted by feminist literary critics in order to construct a particular ‘normative’ image for feminists, as well as create a false sense of inclusivity and neurodiversity.
Significantly, Millett was self-aware of her positionality as a ‘radical’ feminist within the women’s liberation movement, and her attempt to navigate the political climate of the 1970s is one of her main quandaries in *Flying*. Suffragist Victoria Woodhull becomes Millett’s figurative double in her autobiography because she represents a Madwoman existing on the outskirts of ‘acceptable’ feminism of her time:

> [I]n the old movement there was a nutty lady named Victoria Woodhull who was a free lover, believed in astrology and all sorts of stuff, ran for president on the free love ticket, and married John Jacob Astor. That kind of madwoman made it hard for Susan B. and the regulars. Maybe that’s what I am in this movement, an erratic, an eccentric. (37)

Millett sets up a juxtaposition between “eccentric” women, like herself and Woodhull, and the “regulars,” or feminists like Susan B. Anthony, who remain ‘canonized’ in that they are still recognized in history books and national monuments. However, while Millett claims that eccentric woman made it “hard” for Susan B., although perhaps she is being sardonic, their existence made it easier for “regulars” to appear less threatening and their demands more ‘reasonable,’ because they do not question hegemonic structures like marriage (37). Like Millett, Woodhull’s insanity is linked to her queerness, in that her belief in “free love,” which at the time meant the ability for women to marry and divorce freely, is listed as a reason for why she was “nutty” (37). Woodhull reappears in the autobiography in a conversation between Millett and her friend Nell: “‘Who is that lady who ran for president in eighteen something on the platform an orgasm for all?’ ‘Victoria Woodhull, my double. She was a bit too far out for the practical feminists, free love was considered too great a risk’” (321). Again, Millett positions herself as mirroring Woodhull, and in so doing she creates continuity between ‘radical’ or ‘Mad’ feminists perpetually kept on the fringes of the broader ‘sane’ movement, because advocating for their
non-normative lifestyle is too “risky” for “practical feminists” who have the luxury of not having to defend their normative desires (321). Along the same lines, Amy Farrell argues in “Feminism, Citizenship, and Fat Stigma” that twentieth-century suffragists responded to fatphobic anti-suffragist propaganda by constructing “a counterimage of the women’s rights advocate as beautiful, white, youthful, and thin,” and, as a result, they reinforced “the use of fat as a tool to denigrate the opposition,” because thinness was considered to be a “sign of...bodily control and fitness for citizenship” (94-95). Similarly, in response to claims that the feminist and/or homosexual agenda for equal rights threatened the nuclear family, feminists and/or queer feminists constructed themselves “as just as committed to one another, family oriented, monogamous, etc., as heterosexual folk,” which in turn marginalized and demonized feminists who are not monogamous (Rosenberg 55). Thus, the exclusion of queer Madwoman authors like Millett and Quin, who embody a more ‘radical’ feminist politics, implies that only particular kinds of women are considered to be suitable representations for feminism.

Lorraine Morley also takes up “…the longstanding omission of Quin’s work from the list of publishers and the shelves of bookstores devoted to women writers [as being] somewhat less accountable” because of the “…startling neglect of Quin’s work by three generations of feminist literary criticism” (127). Morley argues that Quin’s writing is “promiscuous” in the sense that “it no more concerns itself with consistency either of textual or sexual identity than with supporting a socio-cultural tradition of monogamy” (128). Additionally, Morley compares Quin’s “textual and sexual liberation from the aesthetic and cultural conventions of a patriarchal social order” to the figure of the 1970s ‘free love’ “promiscuous woman” who existed in a state of ambiguity because of debate surrounding whether “sexual promiscuity offered women a path to liberation, or merely served men in their further exploitation” (133, 135). Quin, like the figure of the
promiscuous woman, is never explicitly rejected or accepted by feminists, and, as a result, exists in a liminal space of uncertainty (135). Morley theorizes that Quin was excluded from feminist efforts to recover previously overlooked women’s literature because “Quin’s own project was to elude the feminist eye/I,” in that Quin did not entirely conform to feminist values and goals, during a time when feminists desired “clarity and consolidation” (138-9). For instance, Quin’s *Three* depicts S undergoing the process of obtaining an abortion, including the ridicule and shaming of male psychiatrists and doctors who “sermon on adoption, [and] contraception” and who “seemed to gain almost a perverse satisfaction from enquiring how many men [she] had in fact slept with in the past year” (73). However, contrary to the doctors’ claims that an abortion is necessarily a “traumatic experience” for women, S describes “the utter sense of relief of having [her] body back again” (73). As a result, in this instance S can be read as a pro-choice feminist, who demands control of her own reproductive organs and refuses to be shamed for her (heterosexual) sexuality. Nevertheless, S’s “desperate clinging” to a threesome relationship with Ruth and Leonard was too ‘radical’ for many straight and lesbian feminists of the time who still upheld monogamy or did not believe in bisexuality (125). As Morley suggests, Quin’s “writing is politically ambiguous,” which was perhaps interpreted as “anti- or at least non-feminist” while the “feminist movement strugg[ed] for definition and unity” (138). Consequently, I argue that Quin and Millett were purposefully neglected by 1970s and 1980s feminists developing a new ‘canon’ because as queer Madwomen they did not easily conform to an ‘ideal’ or normative feminist subjectivity. However, the more pressing question is perhaps how should we react when we recognize that such an exclusion is taking place? Feminists responded to the lack of representation of women authors in literary canons by creating a feminist literary canon composed of revived authors, which has, in turn, created its own set of exclusions and Mad queer
ghosts that now haunt that canon, implying the ‘always already’ limitations of a politics of inclusion.

**The Ghosts that Haunt Us**

Avery Gordon describes haunting as a “generalizable social phenomenon,” because ghosts are produced by every dominant social and political order (7). Ghosts are created by hegemonic forces that systemically “marginal[ize], “exclude,” “banish,” or even prevent us from noticing particular “social figure[s],” rather than individuals (24-25). Ghosts are a “sign, or the empirical evidence” that there has been an attempted erasure of something that “meddl[es] with taken-for-granted realities” (8). They also defy, and undermine, binary definitions, because they are simultaneously “the visible and the invisible, the dead and the living, the past and the present” (8, 24). Ghosts both attract and deflect attention since they are “hypervisible,” but this hypervisibility creates a “type of invisibility” because hypervisible subjects are reduced to exaggerated characteristics, which blurs their complex personhood and the power relations that produce them as hypervisible in the first place (17). As a result, ghosts can be described as having a “seething presence” in society and history, and when we encounter ghosts we experience discomfort, similar to when we are faced with something “improperly buried” (25). Because ghosts are “primarily a symptom of what is missing,” they signify a “loss, sometimes of life, sometimes of a path not taken,” as well as “simultaneously represent[ing] a future possibility, a hope” (63-64). Thus, ghosts haunt the spaces from which they have been forced out, and these hauntings give us the opportunity to engage with why particular social figures have been marginalized.

Hesford utilizes Gordon’s theory of haunting in her examination of representations of second-wave feminism and her conceptualization of the “feminist-as-lesbian ghost” in order to
question “underlying assumptions about historical time as progressive or episodic” (2005: 230). She argues that the stereotype that all second-wave feminists were man-hating, aggressive, and unattractive lesbians emerged as the result of “dyke-baiting” in the 1960’s by anti-feminists and/or homophobic feminists, but that the “feminist-as-lesbian” trope remains as both “image and representation” of the late 1960’s to early 1970’s women’s liberation movement (230). In contemporary feminist scholarship, a second-wave “feminist-as-lesbian” is type-cast as a “flannel shirt androgyne, close minded, antisex puritan humorless moralist racist and classist ignoramus essentialist utopian” (228). Hesford identifies Millett’s return to “mainstream press in the late 1990s [as] evidence of the figure’s ‘return’ as a ghost of that history,” because Millett is considered to “represent and advocate” for the now undesirable feminist-as-lesbian trope (235, 238). As a result, the return of Millett’s ghost “signifies that which cannot be remembered but still haunts our conceptions of who and what feminism is” (235). Thus, the concept of the “feminist-as-lesbian ghost” denotes a particular social identity associated with a period of feminism that is widely criticized or ignored by contemporary feminists as being racist, classist, and essentialist, and thus, not worthy of attention (231). Hesford asserts that the feminist-as-lesbian ghost has a “hypervisible presence in both popular and feminist cultural memory,” in that the feminist-as-lesbian is an exaggerated, unrealistic trope: “She’s a monster, she’s ridiculous, she’s laughable, contemptuous, shameful, or she’s joyful and full of a proud anger” (232). This kind of dramatization, in order to prompt a dismissal, are both “acts of burial and silence,” which are “the agencies of repression” for social movements (234). The feminist-as-lesbian ghost was created by attempts to create a “neat linearity” in the history of feminism without any ‘embarrassing’ or controversial past beliefs (234). Consequently, this ghost still haunts contemporary feminism as “the echo of a potentially different social or political experience” that
feminists have attempted to remove or expunge from their historical depictions (229).

Consequently, Hesford argues that to remember the feminist-as-lesbian ghost is to recognize that feminists “have a haunted relationship with the feminist past” and “to be able to bear witness to the possibilities, often unrealized, of that past and to actively resist the policing and defensiveness that have marked much of feminism’s relationship to its diverse history in recent years” (230). Thus, the feminist-as-lesbian ghost, which Hesford argues is embodied in the resurgence of Millett, acts as a nagging reminder of what has been lost in the narrative of feminist history and why the figure of the feminist-as-lesbian has been abandoned or policed.

Building on Hesford’s analysis, I argue that queer Mad ghosts, like Quin and Millett, gesture towards the marginality of queer Madwomen in a feminist literary canon, which reveals the biases of the process of canonization and the limitations of a politics of inclusion. Annette Kolodny claims that “[t]he power relations inscribed in the form of conventions within our literary inheritance…reify the encodings of those same power relations in the culture at large” (2051). Correspondingly, she argues that women have historically been underrepresented in the literary canon because of patriarchal hegemony, which reinforces the purported superiority of men’s writing (2054). In parallel fashion, the neglect of queer Mad women authors, like Quin and Millett, suggests the queerphobia and sanism of society, but more surprisingly, also of a feminist literary canon. Contrary to idealizations of a feminist literary canon as overcoming the shortcomings of the historic exclusion of women and the lack of diversity in other canons, as Hesford posits “[f]eminist theory doesn’t just present or ‘voice’ a body of intellectual work, it also produces silences, repressions, and fears that re-appear as signs or ‘ghosts’ in other feminist texts” (241-2). Thus, Quin’s and Millett’s ghosts haunt a feminist literary canon because they serve as a reminder that not all women’s voices have been or currently are represented in a canon.
intended to be more inclusive of historically forgotten female voices. Consequently, queer Mad ghosts undermine the presumption that a feminist literary canon is necessarily more inclusive than other literary canons by highlighting that the process of canonization is inherently limiting.

Moreover, the inability of a feminist literary canon to fully represent a proposed body of writing or community of authors destabilizes the weight often given to politics of inclusion. Arguing for the inclusion of particular identities—such as bisexual, polyamorous, and/or Mad women—in canonization deflects the key limitations of all canons, namely that they purport to represent a community of writers when these communities are not clearly distinguishable, such as the feminist community. Thus, a politics of inclusion distracts from, but does not solve, the underlying ‘always already’ limitation of canonization, which is premised on exclusion in order to preserve only the most ‘excellent’ works of literature. Sara Ahmed argues that in institutions, particularly universities, which are the chief users of literary canons, diversity or inclusion politics often “function as a containment strategy” because diversity can be evoked in order to “manag[e] [an institution’s] more ‘trouble-some constituents’” (53). Thus, a danger of pursuing diversity as an institutional goal or directive is that “diversity…can be a way of maintaining rather than transforming existing organizational values” (57). As a result, in the context of canonization, we should question how emphasizing the importance of “buzzword[s]” like diversity or inclusion transforms them into “a ritualized or polite speech” that does not correspond to change (61, 58). The exclusion of Quin and Millett from “three generations of feminist literary criticism” is as deeply problematic as proposing to include these two specific authors in order to ‘solve’ or eradicate their queer Mad ghosts (Morley 127). Their ghosts reveal systems of power and exclusion that are not immediately evident, but are inherent to processes of canonization and politics of inclusion, and cannot be dismantled with token admissions to a
literary canon.

It is also important to note that Hesford states that the feminist-as-lesbian ghost is “a monster” in feminist cultural memory (232). To expand on Hesford’s connection between ghosts and monsters, Jeffrey Cohen describes monsters as follows: “…the monster signifies something other than itself…the monster itself turns immaterial and vanishes, to reappear someplace else…it refuses easy categorization…[and] they are disturbing hybrids whose externally incoherent bodies resist attempts to include them in any systematic structuration” (3-6). In all these respects ghosts are monsters, in that they represent an exclusion or marginalization rather than themselves, their presence is haunting or immaterial, and they defy binary definitions, as previously considered.

The issue of monstrosity is exacerbated with respect to queer Mad ghosts. Margrit Shildrick argues that bodies are deemed monstrous not because they belong to “differently embodied others,” but because they produce an ontological uncertainty by suggesting the “permeability of the boundaries that guarantee that normatively embodied self” (1-3). Thus, the monstrous body is not an ‘other’ that can be extracted from the ‘self;’ rather, a monster “demands a fundamental re-evaluation of…the relationship between self and other” and suggests that there is no inherent distinction between monstrous and normative bodies (2). Similarly, Sander Gilman argues that we project our fears of physical and mental ‘dis-ease,’ which encapsulates our fears of collapse and loss of control, onto an external ‘other’ in order to “localize it and, indeed, to domesticate it” (1). Furthermore, Gilman claims that “[d]isease, with its seeming randomness, is one aspect of the indeterminable universe that we wish to distance from ourselves. To do so we must construct boundaries between ourselves and those categories of individuals whom we believe (or hope) to be more at risk than ourselves” (4). Madness, which
Gilman conceptualizes as ‘mental illness,’ is particularly frightening because it represents “extreme states of imbalance” that are “elusive” in their definition, and thus, more difficult to control or predict, making everyone susceptible (19, 1). Thus, the Mad, like the monstrous, are feared not because they are ‘other,’ but because they reflect the inherent vulnerabilities or realities of the self. Along the same lines, Bertha Harris argues that the lesbian epitomizes the figure of the monster because she is “unassimilable, awesome, dangerous, outrageous, [and] different” (qtd. in Caputi 317). Harris identifies the lesbian as monstrous because she is “all that is unfuckable, all that remains chaotic beyond the ordering, taming, controlling power of what she calls the ‘cock’” (Caputi 317). While Harris’s conceptualization is perhaps too limited in its scope, she identifies the lesbian as monstrous precisely because lesbians cannot be controlled by patriarchal hegemony. As a result, I suggest that a queer figure embodies a person who defies the order of patriarchy and who subverts binaries of self and other. As queer Mad ghosts Quin and Millett are monstrous three times over, which makes their haunting particularly fearsome and threatening to the dominant social order. However, Shildrick notes that “[t]he issue [raised by monsters] is not so much that monsters threaten to overrun the boundaries of the proper, as that they promise to dissolve them” (11). Narrow, tokenistic inclusions of Mad queer women, serve to preserve, rather than erase, binaries of self/other and sane/insane by implying a sense of co-habitation that ultimately reinforces the imagined barrier between the ‘sane’ and ‘insane’ that could be dissolved if Madness was seen as normative. Therefore, to meaningfully ‘include’ (monstrous) queer Mad ghosts is to dismantle the binary of self and other, and, subsequently, rethink normative conceptualizations of sanity, health, sexuality, and self.

Que(e)rying in Three and Flying

Quin’s Three (1966) and Millett’s Flying (1974) depict a bisexual protagonist engaging
in non-monogamous relationships, which is also reflective of Quin’s and Millett’s personal lives. As suggested by the title, *Three* is based on a threesome relationship between married couple Ruth and Leonard, and a young woman, only referred to as S, who moves in with them as a tenant (Quin 1-2). While Leonard and Ruth are incompatible as a couple, they find sexual and emotional companionship in a threesome with S, who also “desire[s] to become something in their lives, anything. Everything” (60). It is heavily implied that Leonard and S have a secret sexual relationship, of which Ruth is always suspicious: “Strange how she never says who she was involved with. Did she never tell you Ruth you know how women… Never. I had a feeling though she was involved at one time with someone married but… Oh probably had several. Yet she talks writes as if only the one” (116-7). While Ruth seems to harbour some jealously towards S, it is not clear whether it is because she “regrets not having [female] lovers before marriage” and desires to be S’s sexual partner instead of Leonard (124). Moreover, S’s tape-recorded diary entry suggests a same-sex relationship with a woman: “Never before. Not like this. No one has touched me ever/ never never/ like this. Before. Like waves. The coming/ slowly. Dual roles/ realised. Yes yes/ yes/ Be a boy. If you like. Anything. Be/ Just be” (114). The entry describes a new kind of sexual experience that allows the partner to take on a dual role to “[b]e a boy” or “anything” he/she likes, suggesting that the encounter transcends gender (114). Significantly, after Ruth hears this particular segment, she tells her cat “[i]t doesn’t mean a thing Bobo does it not anything,” as though she is afraid of others understanding S’s implications (119). As a result, it is possible that S and Ruth also engaged in sexual activity, which Ruth is now hoping to cover up. Furthermore, in contrast to the bickering and violence of Leonard and Ruth’s relationship, as a threesome they seem more content. For instance, occasionally the three of them lie “mummified, unaccountable inches apart on the brass four-poster, heads turned away, eyes
closed” to listen to a radio concert together (62). On one such occurrence, S thinks to herself:

“[A]t the convent love was imagining what lay behind Christ’s loin cloth. This is no less imagining. But a situation I long to wade in right up to the very limits of imagination if possible. Gain another level, an added dimension, preferably bringing them both with me. How far can the emotions stretch though?” (62). S’s cryptic musings suggest her desire to challenge emotional and imaginative boundaries in order to maintain her threesome relationship with Leonard and Ruth. Thus, S can be read as a bisexual woman engaged in a simultaneous relationship with a man and woman, much like Quin herself.

_Flying_ is an autobiography, and accordingly, the audience is invited to read the bisexual and polyamorous protagonist Kate7 as an authorial self-inscription. The front cover of the 1975 edition of _Flying_ states: “Loving more than one person is a good thing multiplied. One woman’s startling, courageous journey to the frontiers of sexual freedom” (Millett, no page). Consequently, _Flying_, more explicitly than _Three_, acts as a manifesto for bisexuality and polyamory. Kate marries Fumio, a male friend and lover, in order to extend his immigration visa in the United States (155-6). Nevertheless, she describes herself as having a positive, although unconventional, marriage with Fumio because they “decid[e] [they] will love other people too,” but she also claims that he is the “[c]enter of [her] life” (62, 255). Kate’s extra-marital lovers in _Flying_ are always women, potentially because of “some last fidelity to Fumio” or because she is in “some transitional state” (243). Her primary romantic and sexual relationships are with Vita, Celia, and Claire. Regardless of Kate self-identifying as bisexual and having simultaneous relationships with a man and multiple women, she is primarily considered to be a lesbian by others who are unfamiliar with bisexuality: “‘Kate what is this bisexual stuff, what does that

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7 Although _Flying_ is a memoir, I refer to ‘Kate’ as a protagonist to distinguish between Millett as an author and Millett’s fictionalized self.
Because of this lack of awareness or theorizing about bisexuality, Kate’s lived and theoretical engagement with bisexuality develops a theory of bisexuality in her novel: “Homosexuality was invented by a straight world dealing with its own bisexuality. But finding this difficult, and preferring not to admit it, it invented a pariah state, a leper colony for the incorrigible whose very existence when tolerated openly, was admonition to all” (1974: 121). This claim denotes that homosexuality and queerness are constructed labels given to marginalized people in order to preserve heteronormativity. Kate’s sexuality functions as a public political statement, because she claims that most of 1970’s American society is in the closet. Thus, not only is Kate outing herself as bisexual and looking for acceptance, but she is outing everyone by claiming that “we’re all bisexual anyway” and demanding that the audience see themselves in a radically different manner (162). As a result, Kate’s queerness is not just personal, but fundamentally political and theoretical.

Quin’s/S’s and Millett/Kate’s identification as bisexual, rather than lesbian, is significant because bisexuals in the late twentieth-century were marginalized, and sometimes attacked, by both straight and lesbian communities, which likely contributed to their lack of critical attention. Paula Rust found in her 1995 survey of lesbian communities that “[o]ne of the most controversial issues is the question of whether bisexuality exists at all” and that “nearly one out of four lesbian respondents tends to believe that it [bisexuality] does not exist” (47–48). The study reveals that bisexuality was an ambiguous and not necessarily accepted identity in the late twentieth-century, even by lesbians, because some lesbians believed that bisexuals were “copping out, fence-sitting or trying to maintain heterosexual privilege” (85). Similarly, Stacey Young claims in 1992 that “[l]esbians who talk or write publically about bisexuality often do so from the assumption that bisexuals are a threat to lesbians and are opponents to be fought” (76). Young identifies that
some lesbians felt an antagonistic, rather than empathetic, relationship to bisexuals, who they regarded as delegitimizing their sexual identity and political position (76). She also criticizes the term “hasbian,” (77) which was used by lesbian scholars to refer to outing lesbians who also engaged in heterosexual relationships, as being offensive to bisexual women because it implies “that all one need know about her is her relationship to that exalted state, lesbianism” (77). Thus, Young reveals that women bisexuals of the late twentieth-century faced the challenges of heteronormativity, in addition to potential discrimination from lesbians. Along these same lines, Millett expresses in *Flying* that she publically identified as a lesbian because bisexuality was not considered a legitimate sexuality, and is instead seen as a transitional position for lesbians still partially in the closet: “Finally I am accused. ‘Say it! Say you are a Lesbian.’ Yes I said. Yes. Because I know what she means. The line goes, inflexible as a fascist edict, that bisexuality is a cop-out. Yes I said yes I am a Lesbian” (Millett 17-18). Quin, Millett, and other bisexuals faced discrimination and criticisms from both straight and gay communities, putting them in a different political and social position than lesbians and making their use of bisexual protagonists more ‘radical’ in its contemporary context than it perhaps would be today, although bisexual discrimination is certainly still present.

Quin’s *Three* undermines heteronormative marriage and monogamy by depicting Ruth and Leonard as being an average white, middle-class British married couple with a shallow and disturbing relationship. Ruth and Leonard are constantly talking *at*, rather than *to*, each other, which is reflected in the absence of quoted dialogue in the text, because the lack of distinction between speakers suggests a one-sided conversation. Their marriage also lacks physical intimacy, which is exemplified in Leonard’s failed attempts to seduce Ruth during their bath:

Oh darling don’t bite like that oh no Leon not now noooooooh. He drew back, brush held
against himself. They gazed at the purple flesh protruding from the water. You always have to get sexy in the bath Leon. Sorry. Well you must admit it’s hardly the time or place. … I said I was sorry love. He watched the purple tip disappear, swallowed up by the grey water. (Quin 44)

Leonard attempts to engage Ruth through rough foreplay, which sharply contrasts with an earlier image of Ruth “explor[ing] herself with an oval bar of lilac soap” and her proclaimed desire for “[a] certain tenderness” (43, 124). Similar to their frequent failed communication, Leonard and Ruth appear to speak a different language of seduction and intimacy (16, 50-51, 89). Leonard’s attempts at arousing Ruth develop into a pattern of rape and physical battery (77-9, 89, 127-8), which the text describes at length in order to emphasize the brutality of the rape: “He lifted her back, parted her legs. No Leon don’t not now—not like this. He pressed down, held himself over her face, mouth, between her breasts…She lay motion-less, tears ran into her mouth. Sorry Ruth I. … It’s always the same Leon always” (79). Ruth suggests that all their sexual encounters are non-consensual and violent, which sharply contrasts with Leonard and S’s positive sexual experiences that still revolve around an imagined threesome: “But the sense of touch, fantasies re-explored. Pretend I’m tied to the bed. And his tongue whipped over, across, under. Have you tried it with three? Have you? Be three now… When will you fuck me next? I’ll fuck you any time you want. Out of the window. In a boat. An aeroplane” (142). In juxtaposition to the violent sexual relationship between Leonard and Ruth experienced in multiple physical spaces in their martial home, Leonard and S are able to achieve intimacy and sexual pleasure anywhere. Moreover, Ruth also admits to missing S’s presence: “Much better when—well when she was around at least there was someone who knew how much these things matter” (45). S is able to fill a void in Ruth and Leonard’s relationship by having similar concerns about the upkeep of
their home as Ruth. *Three* undermines the idealization of heteronormative marriage by depicting in detail the violent sexual relationship of a seemingly ideal married couple that is improved by the addition of S, who is able to satisfy Leonard’s sexual desires and Ruth’s emotional needs and, as a result, create a stronger bond between the three of them. Quin’s representation of a strained monogamous couple contrasted with a more positive polyamorous relationship between three people radically suggests the benefits of a stigmatized lifestyle.

Along the same lines, in Millett’s *Flying* Kate speaks explicitly of the challenges of living a polyamorous lifestyle, but she ultimately always argues in favour of non-monogamy. Kate associates monogamy with capitalism and “the old system of possession,” suggesting that monogamy supports “the notion of a person as [a] thing owned” (154). Like her bisexuality, Kate takes her polyamory as something to be theorized and transformed into pedagogy: “…I spread out my theories about loving more than one person, how there is variety and less dependency, how there can be obligation, commitment, and permanence without the exclusiveness of *I own you, so you can’t*” (243). While Kate cites personal reasons, such as desire and love, for her convictions, she also grounds her arguments in a theoretical basis that builds on communist or socialist principals. She portrays herself and her lovers as “conquering jealousy,” and thus moving towards a less possessive communal society (194). However, despite her occasional idealization of polyamory, Kate is explicit about how her multiple relationships with women often fall apart and how her marriage with Fumio can also become strained:

I [Kate] know that every time he [Fumio] attacks this way he’s saying he won’t say he’s jealous. And there is nothing left for him either, and that’s my fault too. Living with me hasn’t made him appear the single woman’s notion of an eligible. So they take him on, and then drop him, just as they do me. Why should the two of us want more than we
have, when it’s more than they have? Mere marks, we get philandered and ripped off, kicked back into the cold comforts of a monogamy we didn’t want…I dare not hurt this man yet I cannot stop wanting women. (69)

Kate positions women trapped in discourse of compulsory monogamy as the source of her and Fumio’s discontents, rather than their unconventional marriage. Kate and Fumio’s relationship remains the most consistent throughout the text, which seems to reinforce Kate’s resolution that “loving Fumio [is not] incompatible…with loving anyone else at all” (84). She continuously aspires to have a “group marriage,” and is partially successful at achieving this goal by the end of the novel with her simultaneous amicable relationships with Claire and Fumio (100). Millett’s *Flying* constructs polyamory as the ethical future of relationships in order to abandon capitalistic jealousy and possessiveness, which despite its challenges from monogamists, is illustrated as possible and fruitful for Kate. As previously mentioned, Quin’s and Millett’s respective support of polyamory sets them apart from both heteronormative patriarchal discourse and contemporary feminist discourse of the time. As a result, the polyamorous characters act to que(e)ry feminist representations of women, particularly Madwomen, by suggesting alternative ways for women to engage in relationships.

**Intersections of Sexism, Queerphobia, and Sanism**

It is important to note that there are alternative explanations for why Quin was neglected by academic criticism that focuses on her experimental writing style. Ellen Friedman and Miriam Fuchs assert that the “steady and strong tradition of women experimentalists” has often been neglected because of its subversion of hegemonic patriarchy (6-7). Their collection *Breaking the Sequence: Women’s Experimental Fiction* includes Quin, among other British women authors. However, their central argument that experimental women writers have been academically
neglected because they threatened patriarchy is also applicable to Millett. In contrast to Friedman and Fuchs, Korteling argues that “it is not helpful to define or limit her [Quin’s] writing or its neglect wholly in terms of gender,” and instead posits that Quin’s exclusion from the British experimentalist canon is a symptom of a “wider attitude to fiction writing in Britain,” namely the lack of appreciation for experimental literature (7). In response, I would suggest that both views are too simplistic in and of themselves, in that they attempt to locate the cause of Quin’s academic neglect to a single source, like gender or a general dislike of experimental fiction, which consequently disavows her of complexity by reducing her to only her gender or writing style. As a result, such explanations neglect the multiple forms of prejudice Quin, and Millett, faced on the basis of their perceived Madness and non-normative sexuality and relationships. In contrast, I argue that the intersectional forces of sexism, queerphobia, and sanism, as well as ageism for Millett, influenced Quin and Millett being perceived as ‘radical’ feminists, and thus, deemed ‘too risky’ to be representative of the burgeoning feminist literary canon.

Quin’s and Millett’s explicit endorsement of bisexuality and polyamory in their literary texts is significant because I suggest that Quin and Millett were perceived as Mad—at least in part—because of their non-heteronormative behaviour, which is taken as both sign and symptom of an insane or unbalanced mind. This claim is premised on the historic pathologization of female resistance or dissent, homosexuality, or other ‘deviant’ social behaviors as being signs of a mental ‘illness’ in order for medicine/psychiatry to be used as a form of social control over ‘deviants’ or the ‘mentally ill’ (Conrad and Schneider 241). Conrad and Schneider define medical social control as “the ways in which medicine functions (wittingly or unwittingly) to secure adherence to social norms—specifically, by using medical means to minimize, eliminate, or normalize deviant behavior” (242). For instance, they describe how homosexuality was
perceived as a sin in religious doctrine until the eighteenth century when new discourses of health and illness emerged, according to which “immorality, as evidenced by social behavior, was believed causal of sickness and disease” (179). Because homosexual sex was deemed deviant and excessive, and thus immoral, the cause of homosexuality was seen to be a type of ‘mental illness’ (179). Hence, there is a longstanding intersection between queerphobia and sanism, which together function to justify medical social control based on ‘moral’ principles. As a result, I argue that there is a complex interrelationship between the queerphobia Quin and Millett experienced, their respective diagnoses of being Mad, and their ‘treatments.’

Quin’s/S’s and Millett’s/Kate’s inability to ‘choose’ between female and male lovers as bisexual women seems to parallel their respective psychiatric diagnostic labels of “schizophrenic” and “manic depressive,” particularly the latter, which implies that the individual is unable to ‘choose’ between dichotomous behaviours of being overly agitated or lethargic (Buckeye 19; Hesford 170). Along the same lines, Hesford claims that “[i]n relation to Millett, and other women active in the various protest movements of the 1960s, mental illness would become a placeholder for, and an explanation of, their political ideas and practices” (170). Their diagnoses also have particularly gendered connotations. Showalter notes that post-WWII diagnoses of the previous “female malady” of hysteria diminished because of male patients “coping with shell shock,” and that a “new female malady of schizophrenia soon arose to take its place” (1985: 19). Women are the prime targets of diagnoses of schizophrenia, which in turn, makes them particularly susceptible to more invasive or violent ‘treatments,’ because “…the main English treatments for schizophrenia were insulin shock, electroshock, and lobotomy,” which have “strong symbolic associations with feminizations and with the female role,” since these ‘treatments’ were meant to make patients docile and languid (205). Moreover, it is
important to note that schizophrenia has a particularly wide range of ‘symptoms,’ and, as a result, “there is a growing consensus that schizophrenia encompasses several different disorders rather than a single phenomenon with a single cause,” which also implies that schizophrenia is a ‘placeholder’ diagnosis for women who do not easily ‘fit’ into other categories (204). Phyllis Chesler also states in her ground-breaking work *Women and Madness* that women who were “openly hostile or violent, or more overtly concerned with sexual and bisexual pleasure” are more likely to be diagnosed as schizophrenic, rather than depressed (87). Consequently, Quin’s and Millett’s respective psychiatric diagnoses seem to be particularly telling, in that they seem to reflect more on their dismissal of gender and sexuality norms, than their actual mental states.

Quin’s and Millett’s experimentalist writing style is also frequently attributed to their queerness and perceived Madness. For instance, critic Margaret Crosland claims that “[i]t is unfortunately true that writers who break open conventional structures sometimes do so because something within themselves is ‘broken’ too, and it can also happen that their research may lead them into the dark waters of the mind until they lose their way…one who did not survive was Ann Quin” (192). Hence, Crosland forges a direct relationship between the nature of Quin’s writing style and her perceived Madness/suicide. Along similar lines, Crawford states that Millett was “far too conflicted and complicated a figure” to remain popular in feminist literature or theory because she was a “manic-depressive, married, bisexual, women’s reformer, gay liberationist, reclusive sculptor, in-your-face activist, retiring Midwesterner, brassy New Yorker” (qtd. in Hesford 2005: 237). Crawford draws on the instability of Millett’s personality, likely to reinforce her diagnoses of being manic depressive, in order to emphasize that her academic dismissal is a causal result of her own ‘failings’ rather than a sign of broader systemic exclusions. These examples illustrate how literary critics more broadly attribute Quin’s and
Millett’s fall from fame to their unstable personalities and minds, rather than acknowledge the sanism apparent in discrediting authors based on psychological diagnoses. Consequently, I posit that their queer Mad ghosts serve to highlight the often unrecognized power relations of compulsory sanism in literary canonization, and the historic connection between non-heteronormativity and psychological pathologization that remains prevalent today.

Quin’s and Millett’s unconventional literary styles and experimental techniques also arguably parallel their ‘radical’ or Mad views on bisexuality and polyamory, which question heteronormativity and compulsory monogamy. For instance, Friedman and Fuchs argue that “the textual practice of breaking patriarchal fictional forms” in favour of using “nonlinear, non-hierarchical, and decentering” modes of writing is “a way of writing the feminine” (3). They correlate elements of “traditional modes of narratives,” such as “[p]lot linearity that implies a story’s purposeful forward movement; a single, authoritative storyteller; well-motivated characters interacting in recognizable social patterns; the crucial conflict deterring the protagonist from the ultimate goal; [and] the movement to closure” with the representation of patriarchal cultural values (3-4). These formal techniques are troubled in both Quin’s and Millett’s writings. For instance, Quin’s *Three* defies the limitations of genre by combining stream-of-consciousness prose, poetic tape-recordings, and journal entries. Characters are almost exclusively referred to by a single letter – L, R, or S. Dialogue in *Three* is never included in quotations, putting the onus on the reader to interpret who has said what and where narration ends and dialogue begins. Moreover, the central plot of the novel—whether S has been murdered or has committed suicide—is never explicitly resolved, and is perhaps unresolvable. In Millett’s *Flying*, the central storyline, which arguably has no plot or resolution, often includes extended flashbacks to Kate’s traumatic childhood or early sexual experiences with women. As a result,
the autobiography does not have a linear progression and it is unclear what is happening in the ‘present’ of the novel or in Kate’s past. The novel is also written in stream-of-consciousness style, providing an almost exhaustive train of Kate’s thoughts while she is writing *Flying*. Significantly, Quin’s and Millett’s refusal to abide by literary conventions parallels their rejection of social conventions of sexuality and relationships. For instance, recall Morley’s theory that Quin is not considered in feminist literary criticism because her writing “might be defined as ‘promiscuous’; in the sense that it no more concerns itself with consistency either of textual or sexual identity than with supporting a socio-cultural tradition of monogamy” (128). Similarly, Hesford claims that critics, such as Wilson, “judge[d] *Flying* a failure by implying a determining connection between established norms of literary style and heteronormative sexuality” (171). Consequently, Quin’s and Millett’s writing style is related to their queerness and Madness, or non-normative content in their novels, and their subsequent neglect by academia.

Millett also experiences ageism, which arguably influences the fact that her more recent critical attention is directed at her earlier works, rather than her most contemporary artistic or literary productions. Millett self-articulates her experiences with ageism in her article “Out of the Loop and Out of Print: Meditations on Aging and Being Unemployed” (1998). Bill Bytheway describes ageism as “a set of beliefs originating in the biological variation between people and relating to the ageing process” (14). He identifies two significant consequences of ageism: one, that it “generates and reinforces a fear and denigration of the ageing process, and stereotyping presumptions regarding competence and the need for protection,” and two, “ageism legitimates the use of chronological age to mark out classes of people who are systematically denied resources and opportunities that others enjoy” (14). Both of these consequences potentially
influenced Millett’s ability to procure employment, and thus sustain herself and protect herself from potential future involuntary incarcerations. Significantly, in 1998, the same year as her article, Millett was included in *The Feminist Memoir Project: Voices from Women’s Liberation*; however, ‘included’ is perhaps too generous a description. Forty women with various ties to the women’s liberation movement wrote or co-wrote chapters for the edition, the majority of which span the length of approximately fifteen to twenty-five pages. However, Millett’s contribution is the final ‘chapter’ titled “How Many Lives Are Here…,” which is only two and half pages long and is largely a summary of the book and the movement as a whole (493-496). Unlike other authors in the collection, Millett does not provide any details about her own contributions to the women’s liberation movement, which are many, other than including herself in broader statements about the movement as a whole. Consequently, it is perhaps not coincidental that Millett plays such a minor role in a collection celebrating the women’s liberation movement the same year she writes an article on the influence of ageism on her career. Moreover, there are also important intersections between sexism, sanism, and ageism, because, as Weitz notes, based on medical records in Ontario from the last fifteen years, “[w]omen and elderly citizens are the prime targets of electroshock,” with elderly women being shocked more frequently than elderly men (160-162). Consequently, elderly women are particularly vulnerable to non-consensual ‘treatments,’ which likely remain a constant fear in Millett’s life as she constantly battled for her right to remain outside of mental institutions and off psychotropic drugs. Thus, as Millett ages, her life becomes increasingly precarious because of the intersectional forces of sexism, sanism, queerphobia, classim, and ageism, all of which are neglected by critics who attempt to dismiss Millett’s erasure as a “pattern of History,” while other second-wave feminists continue to have visibility and influence (Hesford 236-7).
Conclusion

I have argued that the intersectional forces of sexism, queerphobia, classism, sanism, and in Millett’s case ageism, resulted in the exclusion of Quin and Millett from a feminist literary canon, which is a more erroneous form of neglect because of the presentation of a feminist canon as being inclusive of previously marginalized women’s voices, while it reproduces the same heteronormative systems of policing. The concept of the queer Mad ghost is inclusive of all queer Mad women authors who have been neglected or disregarded by academia on the basis that their writing is too unconventional or experimental, while in reality it is the content of their works and/or the shape of their lives that are considered to be too non-normative and/or mentally imbalanced to be an appropriate or ideal representation of feminist politics. I argue that queer Mad ghosts, like Quin and Millett, suggest the limitations of canonization and a politics of inclusion, which will always fail to fully represent the feminist ‘community,’ partially because a homogenous feminist community does not exist (see McCaughey 148). Thus, queer Mad ghosts function to highlight that a feminist literary canon in any capacity cannot ‘speak for’ or represent all women, and that feminist canonization is still subject to the same biased systems of policing and gate-keeping as other canons.

Building on Gordon’s claim that ghosts are indicative of both a loss and a “future possibility, a hope,” I posit that the acknowledgement of queer Mad ghosts offers feminist scholarship an opportunity to move away from a focus on politics of exclusion and inclusion (63-64). To reiterate, Wolframe conceptualization of a Mad reading practice or Mad theory considers experiences of sanism as legitimate sources of knowledge on Madness (12). A Mad reading practice also has intersectionality at its core, which in turn, promotes the kind of discussion found in this chapter around Quin and Millett. While a Mad reading practice is likely not without
limitations, it allows for a plurality of experiences, in terms of Madness or other forms of identity, including racialized identities which have not been at the focal point of this discussion, and does not presume that any particular author can act as representative of the whole. Rather, it encourages a more personal and complex engagement with each author/text/protagonist. It is clear that Quin’s and Millett’s queer Mad ghosts are not simply seeking inclusion, but instead act as a nagging reminder of processes of exclusion and suppression by refusing to remain completely buried. Only by continuing to trouble the hegemonic systems of power that govern and reproduce discourses of oppression and marginalization will these ghostly and monstrous figures potentially be at ‘rest.’ Although it is always possible that new ghosts will arise in their place, and, as a result, we must continuously reassess how dominant narratives will necessarily exclude minoritized subjects.
Chapter Two:  
The Madwoman as Both Subversive and Silenced

In this chapter, I utilize Clare Hemmings’ historiographic methodology focused on finding overlooked similarities in feminist theories across decades. I incorporate her method to deconstruct a perceived tension that exists in feminist literary criticism surrounding whether the Madwoman is a subversive or silenced figure, in terms of women’s lived experiences and the figurative experiences of Madwomen protagonists in literature. In particular, I consider how the representation of Madness in Quin’s “The Unmapped Country” (1973) and Millett’s *The Loony-Bin Trip* (1990) problematizes feminist theorizing that Madness is solely subversive or silencing for women, which suggests that more complex theories of Madness are needed in order to more fully capture Madwomen’s lived experiences. Additionally, these texts demonstrate the intertextuality of literary and theoretical works on women’s Madness across decades. Finally, I offer some suggestions on the ethical implications for feminist critics to acknowledge and engage with Madness as potentially both silencing and subversive, and to consider the tensions surrounding some Mad-identified women’s desire to use psychiatry—particularly pharmaceuticals and EST—as a source of relief or even as a ‘cure.’

In feminist literary criticism, Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar’s *The Madwoman in the Attic* (1979) is seen as pioneering the argument that women’s Madness subverts patriarchy because it is an unconscious sign of female discontent and anger towards androcentrism. However, this thesis was also put forward in other feminist works, such as Phyllis Chesler’s *Women and Madness* (1972), Dorothy Smith’s *Women Look at Psychiatry* (1975), Dianna Hunter’s “Hysteria, Psychoanalysis, and Feminism: The Case of Anna O” (1983), Susan Penfold and Gillian Walker’s *Women and the Psychiatric Paradox* (1983), and Patricia Yaeger’s *Honey-
Mad Women: Emancipatory Strategies in Women’s Writing (1988), to name only a few. In juxtaposition, feminist literary scholar Marta Caminero-Santangelo’s *The Madwoman Can’t Speak: Or Why Insanity Is Not Subversive* (1998) is associated with the thesis that Madness is silencing, and, as a result, Madness prevents women from rebelling against patriarchy in meaningful ways. This position was also posited in work by other feminist critics, including, but not limited to: Shoshana Felman’s “Women and Madness: The Critical Phallacy” (1993), Elizabeth Donaldson’s “The Corpus of the Madwoman: Toward a Feminist Disability Studies Theory of Embodiment and Mental Illness” (2002), and Rita Felski’s *Literature After Feminism* (2003). While I address some of these other texts and their nuanced distinctions, my focus in this chapter is primarily on *The Madwoman in the Attic* and *The Madwoman Can’t Speak*. Although Caminero-Santangelo positions herself as critiquing Gilbert and Gubar, even in the title of her book, and the two bodies of work are usually presented as being in direct opposition to each other, in this chapter, I argue that there exist similarities between them that have been overlooked in lieu of their more obvious disparities. For instance, both iconic works are concerned with changing a social order that “leaves no alternatives but madness” for women and that delegitimizes the voices and concerns of Madwomen (Caminero-Santangelo 180). As a result, although Gilbert and Gubar privilege the experiences of women who are labelled Mad as a form of social control, and Caminero-Santangelo primarily focuses on Mad-identified women authors (with two important exceptions), I posit that their positions are not fundamentally incommensurable because there are connections that can be bridged between them in order to view them as complementary.

While this presumed tension is self-articulated in literary criticism, Quin’s “The Unmapped Country” (1973) and Millett’s *The Loony-Bin Trip* (1990) both engage with
antipsychiatric discourse of their time, as well as make theoretical contributions by suggesting that their respective protagonist’s Madness can be both subversive and silencing. Protagonists Sandra’s and Kate’s non-normative sexuality and political activism illustrates how women are labelled Mad as a means of social control. However, both protagonists also experience Madness as personally and socially silencing, because they experience a loss of agency and their testimony is not considered to be valid. By considering these widely neglected texts, it is apparent that the perceived tension in feminist literary criticism, such as in the iconic work of Gilbert and Gubar and Caminero-Santangelo, presents a false binary of Madness as subversive or silencing, which is challenged by psychiatric survivors, like Quin and Millett. Thus, like Hemmings, in this chapter, I focus on the continuities between decades of feminist work and literature, in order to offer an alternative feminist history of women, Madness, and literature.

Progress and Loss Narratives

In her article “Telling Feminist Stories,” Hemmings argues that there exists a dominant representation of the recent Western feminist past meant to “provide a narrative of relentless progress or loss…where we move from a preoccupation with unity and sameness [in the 1970s], through identity and diversity [in the 1980s], and on to difference and fragmentation [in the 1990s]” (115-6). Progress narratives of the feminist past construct a transition from the “naïve, essentialist seventies, through the black feminist critiques and ‘sex wars’ of the eighties, and into the ‘difference’ nineties and beyond,” whereas loss narratives detail a “shift from the politicized, unified early second wave, through an entry into the academy in the eighties, and thence a fragmentation into multiple feminisms and individual careers” (116). While a loss narrative appears to construe 1970s feminism positively, in contrast to a wholly negative view of the 1970s in a progress narrative, Hemmings argues that both kinds of historical stories “flatten” the
complexity of feminist thought and debate that existed within decades and present poststructuralist feminisms as “the key actor in challenging ‘woman’ as the ground for feminist politics and knowledge production” (116). Similarly, Astrid Henry critiques the wave metaphor frequently used to describe the history of feminism because it “homogenizes the group belonging to that wave,” and, as a result, “reduces complex intragenerational differences in the name of stressing a singular intergenerational identity” (107-8). Both Hemmings and Henry challenge feminists to consider the ways in which we re-tell a history of feminisms, either in terms of a more progressive and diverse present or the loss of feminist activism’s ‘golden age.’ Henry also suggests that both narratives produce a less nuanced representation of the 1970s in favour of simplicity in order to make an immense body of knowledge comprehensible to students (102-103). The way in which feminists produce historical narratives influences how subjects are differently forgotten or recognized during a political moment, as seen in the previous chapter with the exploration of queer Mad ghosts. However, it is important to recognize that Hemmings’ and Henry’s respective historiographic methods are also limited in their capacity to represent vast spans of time without also being reductionist or flattening intragenerational differences in some respect, which raises the question of how to analyze narratives of the feminist past in ways that recognize the biases inherent in that analysis, and avoids producing new binaries, by complicating an either/or perspective. While I use Hemmings’ methodology as a theoretical lens for this chapter, I am not suggesting that the kind of historical narrative produced through Hemmings’ methodology is without limitation or biases.

Significantly, these narratives do not exclusively apply to feminist history, as Mad scholar historians arguably engage with both progress and loss narratives in order to construct a particular kind of ‘present’ for Mad Studies. For instance, LeFrançois, Menzies, and Reaume
describe the 1960s and 1970s as “a golden age of antipsychiatry and Mad liberation” because of the proliferation of Mad activism (6). They also claim that “the following two decades witnessed powerful currents of backlash and retrenchment” because of the rise of “new diagnostic systems,” pharmaceutical miracle ‘cures,’ and the reintroduction of EST as an ‘acceptable’ practice (6-7). Thus, the authors implicitly utilize a wave metaphor not dissimilar to the one often used to describe feminist history, as well as engage in a loss narrative that highlights an ideal activist past that acts as the ‘roots’ or basis for Mad academia today. Consequently, Hemmings’ and Henry’s discussion of progress/loss narratives and the wave metaphor are also applicable to Mad Studies.

Henry points to how progress narratives excessively criticize 1970s or ‘second-wave’ feminism as “dogmati[c] and lack[ing] [in] complexity,” in an effort to demonstrate the “newness and difference” of ‘third-wave’ feminism, which arose “at a time when the second wave was still very much alive” (104). She also illuminates how the homogenization of ‘second-wave’ feminism as lacking in diversity paradoxically neglects “the important role that women of color and queer women of all races played in second wave feminism” (108). In order to appear more diverse in juxtaposition, feminist progress narratives emerging in the 1990s participate in the same erasure of non-white, non-middle class, non-heterosexual or otherwise non-normative theorists for which they criticize ‘second-wave’ feminists. Similarly, Hemmings critiques “unsubstantiated claims about the essentialism of feminist writing in the 1970s” because such arguments “ignore the rich discussions about the relationships among gender, sexuality and race that took place in that decade” (119). For example, in Berg (1964) Quin gestures towards the fluidity of gender-identity by having a male protagonist, who nevertheless resembles Quin in all other respects and who cross-dresses as a woman in order to “act how he pleased” (116-7).
Hence, Quin’s engagement with gender does not fit inside the homogenized ‘box’ of ‘essentialist’ 1960s/70s feminism. Significantly, Hemmings and Henry both gesture towards how academic settings produce pressure for the ‘next generation’ to offset or distinguish its practice from previous generations through progress narratives in order to be recognized as making a meaningful contribution. Historical progress narratives, and their criticism of the 1970s, are, in other words, partially spurred by academic anxieties.

Hemmings does not argue for a coherent new narrative of 1970s feminism, because such a tactic would imply that there is an objective, ‘correct’ version of feminist history that exists outside of our interpretative lenses that we have failed to achieve:

To replace one truth with another suggests that the historical problem is simply one of omission, that once the error has been corrected the story will be ‘straight’…But even if we could fully correct the record, this does not account for the reasons why certain issues become part of an accepted story, and others fall by the wayside…my primary aim is to open up future possibilities rather than dwelling on past omissions. (119)

Hemmings articulates how the issue posed by progress or loss narratives does not revolve around an omission that might be corrected, but around a flawed methodology that is presumed to be reliable through which exclusions are produced, which echoes the first chapter’s concerns with the exclusion of Mad Queer woman authors in canonization. In response, she proposes an alternative historiographic methodology that “stress[es] the links rather than the discontinuities between different theoretical frameworks, as a way of challenging the linear ‘displacement’ of one approach by another” (131). Following Hemmings, I posit that by utilizing a theoretical approach premised on finding similarities and compatibility between decades we are able to discover possibilities for connection not yet explored, thus providing a richer understanding of
both periods and more intragenerational complexity to our histories.

Recognizing Intragenational Difference

As previously mentioned, the literary criticism found in Gilbert and Gubar’s *The Madwoman in the Attic* is often regarded as pioneering the idea that women’s Madness can act as a metaphor for their discontent with or rage towards patriarchy. However, as Henry points out, the wave metaphor invoked in feminist histories, but also in literary criticism’s history, ignores the fact that “multiple waves crash on the shore [of a beach] at the same time” (113). As a result, the wave metaphor “isolates the women’s movements from other movements, other currents in the water,” such as race-based movements or the antipsychiatric movement (113). In order to do justice to the intragenerational differences of the 1970s and to recognize the multiplicity of identity based movements or ‘waves’ occurring simultaneously during this decade, I consider different theoretical approaches to Madness that were in conversation with one another, which influenced Gilbert and Gubar’s significant theoretical text.

Antipsychiatric discourse flourished in the 1960s with important works collectively shifted conversations of Madness away from biological or physical causes towards social or cultural contexts as either producing or labelling social dissent as Madness (Showalter 221, such as American authors Erving Goffman’s *Asylums* (1961) and Thomas Szasz’s *The Myth of Mental Illness* (1961), British authors Aaron Esteron and R. D. Laing’s *Sanity, Madness, and the Family* (1964), and French author Michel Foucault’s *Historie de la folie* (1964). LeFrançois, Menzies, and Reaume also credit author and psychiatric survivor Ken Kesey’s *One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest* (1962) as having a strong influence on antipsychiatric sentiments (5). In *The Myth of Mental Illness* (1961), Szasz argues that “…there is no such thing as ‘mental illness,’” because psychologists deal with “moral problems,” that were “invented,” rather than medical or bodily
illnesses that are “discovered” (1, 9, 12). Similarly, R.D. Laing argued that “madness was not the result of an inherited weakness (as the evolutionists had claimed) or of faulty or incomplete development (as Freud had suggested), but rather a ‘special strategy that a person invents in order to live in an unlivable situation’” (qtd. in Caminero-Santangelo 8). These arguments highlight that Madness as an idea was being fundamentally questioned as a socially fabricated marker of difference in general, before or simultaneous to how these arguments were also developed by feminists or other groups.

Building on these antipsychiatric works from the 1960s, 1970s feminist theorists and activists criticized the hierarchal power relations between paternalistic, and primarily male, psychiatrists with the authority to involuntarily incarcerate anyone labelled Mad, which has consistently been predominantly women since the institutionalization of psychiatry in the seventeenth century (Showalter 1985: 3). These activists also protested the ‘treatments’ used to ‘cure’ Madness, many of which are still used today, including: involuntary psychiatric institutionalization, physical restraints, the ‘rest cure,’ experimental psychotropic drugs, “insulin shock, electroshock, and lobotomy” (205). Joining these criticisms, French feminists Hélène Cixous, Xavière Gauthier, and Catherine Clément respectively argued in the early 1970s that Madness “has been the historical label applied to female protest and revolution” (5). These arguments echo socialist anti-psychiatric literature. For instance, in 1972, the Socialist Patients’ Collective of the University of Heidelberg (Germany) collectively published Turn Illness Into a Weapon, with a forward by Jean Paul-Sartre, in which he claims that “…capitalism produces [mental] illness in every person and [a] ‘psychiatric cure’ only means a reintegration of patients into our society” (ix). This German socialist group argued that mental illness, or Madness, could be used as a weapon to destabilize capitalism because it acted as a sign of refusal to be an ideal
productive capitalist citizen and be complicit in systems of production (Ibid.). Thus, feminist and socialist groups took up Madness in similar ways in order to critique hegemonic structures. Additionally, in Phyllis Chesler’s *Women and Madness* (1972) she asserts that “Madness and asylums generally function as mirror images of the female experience, and as penalties for being ‘female,’ as well as for desiring or daring not to be” (56). Thus, feminists of the 1970’s often deconstructed Madness as an objective psychiatric diagnosis by demonstrating how the label of Madness has been used to stifle or repress women’s rebellion against patriarchal heteronormative hegemony by imprisoning ‘out of control’ women in asylums under the guise of providing ‘treatment.’ However, while French feminists advocated to reclaim “hysteria as a political cause” and as a uniquely female form of expression, Chesler argued for women to be equally included in the creation of psychiatric discourse and for broader societal changes in gender roles (Showalter 1997: 56; Chesler 319-323). While feminists in the 1970s built on antipsychiatric discourse in meaningful ways, there are important and nuanced distinctions between how particular theorists engaged with Madness as a concept.

All of this ground-breaking work prefaces Gilbert and Gubar’s well-known feminist literary text *The Madwoman in the Attic: The Woman Writer and the Nineteenth-Century Literary Imagination* (1979). While their text is often viewed as a foundational or visionary text in feminist literary criticism, it explicitly works in conversation with past and contemporary antipsychiatric work and demonstrates the potential for developing a feminist Mad reading practice. For instance, Gilbert and Gubar cite “Jessie Bernard, Phyllis Chesler, Naomi Wisstein, and Pauline Bart” as critics who have “begun to study the ways in which patriarchal socialization literally makes women sick, both physically and mentally” (53). Moreover, Gilbert and Gubar’s literary theory echoes and adapts feminist antipsychiatric work. For instance, in *Women Look at
Psychiatry (1975), Dorothy Smith claims that women have unconsciously protested patriarchy “by having ‘nervous breakdowns,’ by becoming mentally ill, by suffering from depressions, [and] by committing suicide,” because it is their only means of expressing dissent when the rest of their behaviour is controlled (13). Similarly, Gilbert and Gubar assert that “the madwoman in literature by women is not merely, as she might be in male literature, an antagonist or foil to the heroine. Rather, she is usually in some sense the author’s double, an image of her own anxiety and rage” (77-8). In particular, they consider how Bertha Rochester in Charlotte Brontë’s Jane Eyre “does[…]what Jane wants to do,” namely express anger, which Jane/Charlotte represses because of the constraints of patriarchy (359). Significantly, the female author projects her “rebellious impulses not into [her] heroines but into mad or monstrous women […in order to[…] dramatize [her] own self-division, [her] desire both to accept the strictures of patriarchal society and to reject them” (77-8). Hence, Gilbert and Gubar suggest that authors can metaphorically rebel through Madwomen characters, rather than their ‘sane’ heroines, which is analogous to Smith’s claim that women literally protest through Madness when they are otherwise silenced if they continue to act ‘sane’ by conforming to patriarchy. As a result, it is clear that Gilbert and Gubar’s literary theory built on anti-psychiatric theories of their time, many of which deconstructed the legitimacy of Madness because women continued to be diagnosed as Mad for non-conforming behaviour, such that, semantically, Madness was not always being used to describe only cases of mental distress.

Madness as Both Subversive and Silencing: “The Unmapped Country” and The Loony-Bin Trip

Quin’s unfinished novel “The Unmapped Country” (1973) and Millett’s memoir The Loony-Bin Trip (1990) reflect or engage with contemporary theories of Madness as subversive and foreshadow poststructuralist feminists concerns with Madness as silencing. While it is
impossible to predict how Quin envisioned “The Unmapped Country” to unfold, the short excerpt that was published in 1975 is rich with commentary on the psychiatric system that is echoed by Millett’s work published more than twenty years later, which reinforces Hemmings’ articulation that similarities exist across decades of feminist, and anti-psychiatric, work. The third-person narrative of “The Unmapped Country” focuses on protagonist Sandra, who has been involuntarily admitted into a co-ed psychiatric institution after ambiguously “losing control” and “they in white coats pinned her down” (Quin 1975: 255). Sandra hints at her involvement “in the Cause,” which is presumably political, but reveals that she “had almost forgotten what it [the Cause] was all about” as a result of ECT (266). Thus, it is possible that Sandra is incarcerated for her involvement in a political movement and her ‘treatment’ is meant to prevent her from continuing to assist in ‘the Cause.’ Along the same lines, in Millett’s autobiography, Kate directly relates her ‘diagnosis’ of being “manic depressive” to her rejection of patriarchal heteronormative conventions, which makes her Madness subversive, in the sense that she is being deemed Mad on the basis of feminist protest (1990: 72). For instance, the evening before her family stages a psychiatric ‘intervention’ for Kate, she is criticized by her family for being “unladylike,” for publically ‘coming out’ as lesbian in Flying, and for choosing to sleep with her girlfriend Sita, rather than her husband Fumio (37). She posits that if it were not for her three “sin[s]” that evening, “[t]hen perhaps what followed would never have followed” (37). In her “interrogation” with a male psychiatrist, Kate notes that “each question is posited from the given that I am nuts” (40). When Kate asks why she was not brought to the woman psychiatrist recommended to her sister, the male psychiatrist asks if she is a “women’s libber” and then immediately condemns her to a psychiatric institution when she admits to being a feminist (41).

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8 Again, because of the lack of recognition of bisexuality, Millett describes coming out as lesbian.
Here, Kate associates her ‘diagnosis’ with her non-conformity as a feminist, bisexual, and polyamorous woman, because she sees the distinction between being “sick or well” as premised on whether she is seen as “wrong or right” (62). In contrast to Kate, Sandra is portrayed as heterosexual, and she is sexually active with her boyfriend Clive (Quin 1975: 262). It is suggested that Sandra is still chastised for her sexuality by both her parents and her figurative ‘parental’ figures in the psychiatric institution, which she collapses into a single set: “Sandra it’s time to get up. Sandra your meal is ready. It’s time to go to bed. Sandra take your pills. It’s time for your treatment. Sandra get your potty. You’re late. Sandra do your homework…Don’t go in for petting with men Sandra it leads to other things. Sandra do you hear me …?” Yes I [Sandra] hear you all my mothers and fathers will you never stop? Stop” (257). The progression from receiving orders in the psychiatric institution to childhood and social rules suggests that these restrictions are echoes of each other and that Sandra’s need for psychiatric ‘treatment’ is linked to her sexual ‘deviance.’ Both Sandra’s and Kate’s perceived Madness can be read as subversive in the sense that they are deemed Mad as a result of their political beliefs and their non-normative sexual activity.

Sandra and Kate are also subversive figures in that they are forcibly institutionalized and resistant to psychiatric practices, which they criticize as being unnecessarily violent and used only to subdue patients. Sandra refers to her male psychiatrist as a “clown” and she admits to disliking him (Quin 1975: 252). She also passively refuses drug ‘treatment’ by flushing her administered pills, but she is still subjected to non-consensual ECT (254). While Sandra’s own forced hospitalization is not included in the excerpt, her description of a new patient entering the institution suggests the general practice of how patients are imprisoned against their will:

A new patient entered the ward, screaming between two orderlies. ‘I don’t want to come
here – what are you doing to me – I’m going home right now – leave me – let me go you can’t keep me here you have no right – no right whatsoever – I want to go home.’ The patient’s voice trailed off, rose again as white coated robots surrounded her. The needle produced, raised. The screams into inevitable whimpers, as one more person was subdued into drugged submissiveness; would later wake up, dazed, glaze-eyed, nod into helplessness before the authority of ‘feel better – that’s right – no need to worry you’re in good hands now – we’re here to help you.”’ (254)

The excerpt associates the use of psychotropic drugs with social control in order to produce submissive and docile patients. Additionally, Quin’s use of ‘patient’ to describe the individual entering the institution suggests how psychiatric practices erase a person’s individuality in favour of treating them monolithically and robotically. Consequently, the passage undermines claims of psychiatric practices, especially drugs, ‘helping’ patients admitted against their will. Moreover, Sandra describes a woman patient showing off her new wig because of her upcoming lobotomy: “She looked across at the woman with her wig, she held it up for other women to admire. What would she be like after they had operated on her brain? And all because she was a compulsive house cleaner” (266). Sandra’s commentary draws attention to the disparity between the woman’s non-normative behaviour and the violence and uncertainty of her proposed ‘treatment.’

Immediately after considering the woman’s lobotomy, Sandra reflects on a journal entry she wrote in which she claims “I don’t remember that day as a day,” implying that it is possible that she has also received a lobotomy or other surgical ‘treatment,’ which might account for Sandra’s constant tiredness and why she is described as a “good girl” by a nurse (265, 267, 271). More so than Sandra, Kate believes she is targeted because of her anti-psychiatric beliefs: “Patients with my opinions on psychiatry are treated as hard cases. People with my attitude toward electroshock
could easily get it as punishment” (Millett 1990: 65). In a parody of traditional medical discourse, patients are punished for their distrust of psychiatry through treatments that are meant to ‘cure’ them of an ‘illness’ that they do not believe they have. Like a child, Kate is forced to ingest unknown drugs, in order to be seen as having “good behavior” and avoid receiving EST, which looms as a possible threat in the background of the novel after her first incarceration (67, 282). Non-coincidentally, ‘good behaviour’ in institutions means idealized feminine and heteronormative behaviour, like “enforced childishness… dependence,” obedience, and “never rais[ing] your voice” to authority figures (207, 226). Significantly, Kate also addresses that most of the “female captives” she is incarcerated with are elderly and have “the shut face of poverty,” which suggests how the intersections of sexism, classism, and ageism positions working class elderly women as requiring regulation and as being “unwanted” burdens on family members (197). These long-term women patients also represent the potential futures of Sandra and Kate if they do not cooperate and conform. For instance, when Sandra believes she smells burning flesh she speculates that “[p]erhaps they cremated those who were never discharged?” (Quin 1975: 259-260). Her question suggests the permanence and inescapability of the psychiatric institution, since even in death these women will not be allowed to leave. Similarly, Kate notes that being in a “real madhouse” is worse than jail or prison because “…you will never get out of [a madhouse]…they could starve you or beat you or murder you here and you would merely disappear. Enter here and you are buried alive” (Millett 1990: 193). Thus, women in psychiatric institutions, like Sandra and Kate, must conform to patriarchal heteronormative standards of femininity and infantilization in order to have sane ‘good behaviour,’ or they risk “[d]ecades of these gray places” until death, which highlights how Madness is used to stigmatize and entrap women who protest patriarchy (197).
While Sandra’s and Kate’s diagnoses and involuntary institutionalization can be associated with their political protest and non-normative behaviour, their experiences are still also silencing. For Sandra, her loss of language is complicated by her ECT sessions, which are known to produce memory loss (Showalter 205): “Once she [Sandra] had understood the language of birds, now no longer, it took all her time to understand her own language, and that of those who attempted communication…She knew, had known. No longer knew. Only remembered” (Quin 1975: 257). Sandra’s difficulty with communication can be interpreted as her being silenced by her Madness, a side-effect of ECT, or a combination of the two. She also expresses feeling increased sensitivity to sound which hinders her range of abilities, such as when she claims that “the sound of traffic defeated her” attempts to escape the institution (258). Additionally, Sandra occasionally claims that she feels disembodied: “Sandra looked at her knees, as if they belonged to someone else, they nudged, knocked against each other, in some strange communication of their own” (271). Her feelings of disassociation suggest a loss of control in general, as though she is only able to watch her life happen to her. As a result, the excerpt suggests that Sandra’s mental and physical abilities are inhibited or silenced by her Madness or at least by the side effects of her ‘treatments.’ Similarly, after being released from the second asylum, Kate experiences feelings of depression, since she has once again been betrayed and abandoned by her lover, husband, friends, and family and put into a precarious financial situation after the stigma of her Madness prevents her from attaining interest in her artwork (Millett 1990: 12, 260). Post-institutionalization Kate claims “[m]y illness now is not mania but depression” and admits to being “crazy” in order to receive a prescription for lithium pills to stave off suicide (260, 262). While in this state of distress, Kate also claims “the writing has literally gone [from me],” implying that her depression silences her creative ability as well.
(276). However, Kate questions her self-labeling in the conclusion of her autobiography: “[W]hy call this depression?—why not call it grief? You’ve permitted your grief, even your outrage, to be converted into a disease. You have allowed your overwhelming, seemingly inexplicable grief at what has been done to you—the trauma and shame of imprisonment—to be transformed into a mysterious psychosis” (309). In this passage, Kate illuminates how pathologizing psychiatric discourse under conditions of terror can be internalized such that “convicted but never convinced” women like Kate might claim to be Mad post-institution because of the extreme mental duress caused by being institutionalized (31). As Kate earlier suggests, asylums are “made for you to be mad in,” or they attempt to provoke or create ‘signs’ of Madness in order to “have their evidence,” which justifies the initial incarceration (241). Consequently, mental institutions function like a self-confirming thesis, since women who are not Mad when they enter will often be convinced of their own Madness during or after their incarceration, particularly when they are forcibly given drugs and/or ECT/EST that cause hallucinations, memory loss, and impair their “consciousness, perception, sensation, logic and reasoning” (241). Thus, although Sandra’s and Kate’s respective diagnosis of being Mad are influenced by their resistance of patriarchal heteronormative values, and can therefore be considered subversive, that does not prevent ‘Madness’ from also being a silencing experience that restricts their feelings of agency, in part because of the trauma of being forcibly institutionalized and the side effects of their non-consensual ‘treatments.’

Sandra and Kate can also be interpreted as being socially silenced by sanist epistemic violence. Because of Sandra’s unique neurological perspective she is unable to communicate her experiences honestly with her psychiatrists because they do not interpret these experiences as valid. For instance, in a journal entry Sandra recounts a dialogue with Dr. X. and Dr. Y. in which
Dr. X. asks Sandra if she sees a pen he is holding (Quin 1975: 265). When Sandra claims to not see the pen, Dr. X. has Dr. Y confirm that he also sees the pen to ‘prove’ that she has failed to answer correctly (265). In her journal, Sandra notes the difficulty of expressing what she perceives to the two men who are fixated on their own ‘reality,’ instead of learning about her perspective:

I see an endless road, white-glittering under the sun’s rays, glittering like a needle; above the remorseless sun weighting down the trees and houses under its electric rays. How can I explain, describe that to them? They would never understand. How ridiculous he looked holding that pen, nodding, grinning up at the other doctor. (265)

Sandra can be interpreted as silenced because her way of knowing and understanding the world is not deemed to be legitimate by her psychiatrists, who are only concerned with having Sandra conform to their own world-view. Along the same lines, once labelled Mad, Kate feels silenced because she is no longer treated with respect or agency, which is a product of sanist epistemic violence: “How little weight my own perceptions seem to have. I am the discussed; what do I know, experience, discover?” (Millett 1990: 72). Kate highlights, as many contemporary Mad scholars also address, that once an individual is deemed Mad they are often no longer seen to be the authority on their own bodily and mental experiences, and their perspectives are frequently ignored when developing ‘treatment’ plans, although there have been shifts in patient-doctor collaboration under neoliberalism towards patient self-management and mandated self-surveillance. Furthermore, Kate highlights the unbalanced power dynamic between ‘patient’ and ‘doctor’: “Sitting before him, I feel erased…He calls me Kate, I call him doctor” (260). Kate emphasizes how her own identity and perspective is erased in favour of the doctor’s ‘diagnosis,’ because he is deemed to be an authority while she is not. Mad individuals, such as Sandra and
Kate, are perceived as perpetual subjects or hollow bodies, to be talked about and disciplined, but not to be talked with like human beings. Thus, both protagonists are also silenced by sanist epistemic violence, which prevents Mad individuals from being perceived as legitimate knowers.

Quin’s autobiographically inspired “The Unmapped Country” and Millett’s memoir *The Loony Bin Trip* both illustrate how Mad protagonists can be read as potentially both subversive and silenced, often simultaneously. Significantly, their works were in conversation with contemporary theoretical texts, and foreshadowed poststructuralist concerns with the lived suffering of Madwomen. For instance, Sandra avoids her mother while institutionalized, and suggests, as R. D. Laing does, that her Madness is potentially a result of social strain, particularly that brought on by her mother. Sandra describes her mother as “the Red Queen” who “even when dead…would be watching her” (255). This sequence alludes to the Red Queen in Lewis Carroll’s *Through the Looking-Glass*, who acts as an authoritarian figure that Alice must defeat. Along the same lines, Sandra also claims that the “sound of heavy Red Army boots would be out there, they would be waiting for her” (258). Thus, the excerpt positions Sandra’s mother as an antagonist who prevents Sandra from leaving the institution, presumably because it is her mother’s rigidity and restrictions that cause Sandra to “los[e] control” (255, 257). Moreover, Quin destabilizes the binary of sane/insane by suggesting that everyone in the narrative is Mad, such as when Sandra tells her psychiatrist “I don’t like your madness” (252). Sandra’s claim undermines the psychiatrist’s position as a regulator of sanity by implying that everyone is mad, including him. Furthermore, the narrator describes Thomas, who believes he is “Judas Iscariot reincarnated,” as walking “down the corridors of his Jerusalem,” suggesting that Madness is a matter of perspective, rather than objective reality, similar to Szasz’s argument (253-254).

Millett also directly references antipsychiatric theorists Laing, Szasz, and David Cooper (248),
demonstrating that her text and understanding of Madness is building on previous work by applying these theories to her own lived experience as a psychiatric survivor. Moreover, Millett recognizes collective culpability for the discourse of sanism that justifies involuntary incarcerations and ‘treatments’ in the name of protecting ‘sanity’: “[Y]ou will have to stop equating madness with captivity; that is, stop proving you aren’t crazy, since this assumes that if you were, you might deserve to be locked up: you’re only innocent if you’re sane, and so on” (248). While Millett approaches Madness from the perspective of a psychiatric survivor, she self-reflectively recognizes how using claims of sanity to be released from a psychiatric institution reinforces that those who experience Madness as a lived condition deserve or should be placed in such institutions. Emphasizing the insights generated by this self-reflexivity, I argue that Millett engages in theorizing work on Madness as a lived condition, like later work by Caminero-Santangelo and Donaldson, but in such a way that she still acknowledges Madness to also be subversive. Both texts thus suggest the importance of situating individuals in a socio-political context in order to engage with discourses of Madness, as well as the complexity of Madness as stigma and lived experience, which can be at times both subversive and silencing. Moreover, the comparisons that can be found between Quin’s and Millett’s narratives demonstrate, as Hemmings’ framework suggests, that there exist similarities between decades of feminist work that have been overlooked.

Reading for Similarities Across Decades

Despite the “dominant narrative” of the recent feminist past that proposes a definitive break in theoretical work between decades, by using Hemmings’ historiographical approach there are numerous linkages that can be made between 1960s to 1990s literature and feminist scholarship on the nature of women’s Madness (115). For instance, many anti-psychiatry
activists and feminists of the 1980’s continued to: espouse that Madness was a sign of rebellion or unconscious protest against patriarchy or other forms of oppression, critique the disparity of women labelled Mad in juxtaposition to men, and advocate for the de-pathologization of women’s experiences with distress caused by constricting gender roles. For instance, in Dianna Hunter’s “Hysteria, Psychoanalysis, and Feminism: The Case of Anna O” (1983) she posits that “…Anna’s linguistic hysterical symptoms expressed her cultural silencing” and that her hysteria was “a self-repudiating form of feminist discourse in which the body signifies what social conditions makes it impossible to state linguistically” (Hunter qtd. in Showalter 1997: 58).

Writing in the late 1990s, Hunter continues to advocate, as Smith did in 1975, that Madness is a form of unconscious protest for women when they are otherwise silenced and unable to voice their dissent against patriarchal heteronormative expectations.

In Susan Penfold and Gillian Walker’s Women and the Psychiatric Paradox (1983), they note that “[t]here is no explanation for studies that indicate that women receive psychiatric diagnoses when presenting symptoms identical to those for which men receive physiological diagnoses…or for the high incidence of the prescription of psychotropic drugs to women as compared to men” (iii). They claim that “…psychiatric theories have been used to control women” by labeling signs of “distress, misery, and the disjunction between experience and understanding as individual pathology” (61). In response, they advocate for the inclusion of women in the production of psychiatric discourse, in order to bring to light “knowledge about women’s actual lives” that is ignored by psychiatrists, such as experiences with familial or spousal abuse, rape, incest, and the stresses associated with women “living out [their] expected role in the family” (vi, 185). Thus, Penfold and Walker echo Chesler’s previous work because they also address that psychiatric diagnoses are biased by gender in order to control women’s
behaviour and pathologize dissent or normal human emotion in response to abuse or trauma, and like Chesler, they calling for the involvement of women in the creation of psychiatric discourse.

Patricia Yaeger’s *Honey-Mad Women: Emancipatory Strategies in Women’s Writing* (1988) adapts Gilbert and Gubar’s metaphor of the Madwoman to a woman “mad for the honey of speech” to represent women writers (4). Yaeger suggests that women writers are able to subvert patriarchal language, and its associated cultural values, by making it their own in order to question and “dispel the power of the myth systems represented by the text’s primary language” (37). Yaeger draws upon Gilbert and Gubar’s consideration of stylistic elements of women’s writing as signs of subversion or emancipation from patriarchy, as well as their claim that the women writer needs to reconstruct “those images of women inherited from male literature” (Gilbert and Gubar 76). Consequently, it is clear that 1980s feminist critical literature on Madness draws upon and extends many of the arguments put forth in the 1970s, rather than dramatically breaking from previous theories altogether, as is often suggested when feminists rely upon “progress or loss” narratives of the recent feminist past (Hemmings 115).

It is important to note that Madness was not unilaterally taken up to be a genuine lived condition by 1970s feminists, likely because the 1960s so dramatically challenged Madness having a biological basis—although as Wolframe points out, “understanding madness as embodied—as a real condition, experienced physically—is not dependant upon understanding it as a neurobiological disorder” (39-40). There was an often taken for granted distinction between ‘Madness’ as protest and Madness as a lived condition throughout the 1970s and 80s. However, many feminists were careful to distinguish genuine cases of mental distress from cases of subversive Madness, which had semantically come to signify a pathologizing label without a corresponding physical and mental condition. For instance, Penfold and Walker note that
“[a]lthough ambiguities in the definition and classification of depression may lead to an untoward number of women being assumed to have a psychiatric illness…depression is no myth and there are many women suffering from it” (185). Similarly, in Elaine Showalter’s *The Female Malady* (1985) she posits that:

[a] serious historical study of the female malady should not romanticize madness as one of women’s wrongs any more than it should accept an essentialist equation between femininity and insanity. Rather, it must investigate how, in a particular cultural context, notions of gender influence the definition and, consequently, the treatment of mental disorders (5).

Although some 1980s feminists continued to consider Madness as subversive, in that women were still labelled Mad who did not self-identify as Mad, others recognized how this claim potentially misconstrues women’s Madness as necessarily socially constructed without considering how Madness can also be a limiting experience for many people or that socially constructed Madness still has lived effects that could be just as silencing as patriarchy (5).

In fact, texts such as *Women Look at Psychiatry* (1975), *Women and the Psychiatric Paradox* (1983), *The Female Malady* (1985), and *Women’s Madness: Misogyny or Mental Illness?* (1992) all gesture towards the necessity of developing a feminist therapy, or non-pathologizing form of treatment, for women experiencing distress who cannot be helped by the current psychiatric system. For instance, Barbara Joyce suggests that in feminist therapy “pain [is] acknowledged and… responsibility [becomes] a social and political issue, not just [an] individual problem” (Joyce qtd. in Smith & David 184). The movement towards feminist therapy suggests that while Madness was often seen as a form of subversive female protest, feminists still recognized that feelings of mental pain and distress exist for these women and that they would
benefit from a non-patriarchal, non-pathologizing, and non-blaming form of treatment. Hence, many 1980s feminist works acknowledged that women’s Madness was, in many cases, a patriarchal construction, but also worked to develop new methodologies for approaching women’s Madness, which accepted that to alleviate distress for some women would require helping them leave abusive relationships, while others might benefit more from therapy or medication. Similarly, poststructuralist feminists such as Caminero-Santangelo and Elizabeth Donaldson focus on how contemporary psychiatry is not meeting the needs of individuals experiencing duress, who can be both literally and figuratively silenced and immobilized by Madness, and offer alternative conceptions of Madness as a bodily experience, rather than theory (Caminero-Santangelo 11-12; Donaldson 95). For instance, just as earlier feminists advocated for the necessity of a non-pathologizing feminist therapy, Donaldson points to contemporary problems of individuals’ experiencing duress being “denied treatment” and a general “lack of access to voluntary treatment” for those without health insurance, and, as a result, these individuals have a high probability of becoming criminalized (95). Thus, criminalization has become another means of penalizing ‘out of control’ bodies, similar to pathologization, suggesting the continuity between the works of feminists like Joyce and Donaldson who recognize the need for non-pathologizing or non-criminalizing access to ‘treatment’ for individuals who seek such support.

While backlash against theories of women’s Madness as subversive emerged in the 1990s and continues into the twenty-first century, there are still examples of poststructuralist feminists who acknowledge the importance of 1970s feminist work on women’s Madness. For instance, in Jane Ussher’s *Women’s Madness: Misogyny or Mental Illness?* (1992) she recognizes and probes the complex relationship existing between the label of Madness being used by patriarchal
systems to silence women’s voice, as well as “the day-to-day reality of the misery of those deemed mad” who would benefit from assistance (7). While she claims that “[f]eminist theorists or activists may not have all the answers,” she does not position her work as oppositional to previous feminist theories, but as an extension of an ongoing critical project on deconstructing women’s Madness alongside patriarchy (294). Similarly, in PhebeAnn Wolframe’s PhD dissertation *Reading Through Madness: Counter- Psychiatric Epistemologies and the Biopolitics of (In)sanity in Post-World War II Anglo-Atlantic Women’s Narratives* (2013) she adopts a both/and perspective towards women’s Madness:

I agree with Donaldson (100), Caminero-Santangelo (3), Felman (7), and Showalter (5) that madness is not inherently subversive and in fact often leads to women being further suppressed; however, I maintain, like Showalter, that what is treated as madness may be a (sometimes unconscious) visceral expression of dissent…I contest that rebellion and real suffering are not mutually exclusive. (39-40)

Wolframe rejects the presumption that Madness is either subversive or silencing or that these two positions are inherently contradictory, and acknowledges the relevance of arguments from 1970s and 1990s feminist theorists alike. I would suggest that Ussher and Wolframe offer ways to engage with the recent feminist past that does not engage in binary debates or situate current feminist work as being either a progression or a loss from past feminist work on Madness by acknowledging the value of multiple theoretical perspectives and suggesting ways in which they can be complementary.

In contrast to Ussher and Wolframe, some poststructuralist feminists did position themselves as ‘correcting’ the errors made by essentialist 1970s feminists surrounding women and Madness, particularly Gilbert and Gubar. However, as Hemmings points out, essentialism is
an “…accusation so frequently repeated, that it can actually stand as justification for not reading
texts from the feminist seventies at all any more,” which is why critique of Gilbert and Gubar
often does not delve beyond claims of essentialism (120). For instance, Rita Felski notes that a
popular criticism of Gilbert and Gubar is that they suggest “that the madwoman in the attic [is]
the symbol of everywoman under patriarchy,” which ignores nuances of race and class relevant
to an analysis of Bertha Rochester’s character (69-70). A similar claim, made by Felski and
others, is that the theory of the Madwoman becomes a “feminist monomyth,” which “flatten[s]
out literary ambiguity” in order to “impose a single framework and a false coherence onto a
many-voiced and many-sided history of women’s writing” (70). Caminero-Santangelo also
critiques Gilbert and Gubar’s metaphor of the Madwoman in the attic as “duplicating the
essentialist thinking that identifies women with irrationality in the first place” (2). While these
complications of essentialism in Gilbert and Gubar’s work are important in order to gesture
towards the benefits and necessity of intersectional analysis, these critiques also potentially
obfuscate the meaningful contributions made in that same work. Moreover, these critiques—
perhaps unintentionally—suggest a narrative of “…an overall move from sameness to
difference” in feminist criticism by focusing only on how Gilbert and Gubar’s theory fails to
account for diversity in women’s experiences, which simultaneously suggests a “move forward
from (exclusionary) sameness to (inclusive) difference” (Hemmings 121). However, as discussed
in the previous chapter, it is this false illusion of creating a completely inclusive discipline or
canon that results in the production of ghosts of figures who are nevertheless excluded.
Moreover, while Gilbert and Gubar’s text may make essentialist presumptions about “the
subversive impulses every woman inevitably feels when she contemplates the ‘deep-rooted’ evils
of patriarchy,” this fact alone should not entirely discount the value of their work or the work of
other women on Madness as subversive (Gilbert and Gubar 77). For instance, Chesler’s earlier work *Women and Madness* (1972) considers at length how women are situated differently in relation to patriarchy and Madness on the basis of class, race, and sexuality (see 209-260). She acknowledges that she is unable to speak for non-white women, and denies the possibility of any one theory doing “justice to women of African, Latin-American, Mexican, Chinese, and Native American descent” (237). Consequently, as Hemmings argues, broad “claims about the essentialism of feminist writing in the 1970s[…]ignore the rich discussions about the relationships among gender, sexuality and race that took place in that decade” (119). In using Gilbert and Gubar’s theory to represent a body of work on Madness as subversive, only to reject Gilbert and Gubar on the basis of essentialism alone, critics neglect the complexity of theories of women’s Madness that existed in the 1970s, and in so doing create a progress narrative that creates a false sense of inclusivity for contemporary feminists.

Another frequent point of conflict is Gilbert and Gubar’s apparent dismissal of the silencing influence of Madness for actual Madwomen, rather than Madwomen *characters* who act as symbols of female authorial rage and discontent. For example, in “Women and Madness: The Critical Phallacy,” (1993) Shoshana Felman states that “madness is the impasse confronting those whom cultural conditioning has deprived of the very means of protest or self-affirmation. Far from being a form of contestation, ‘mental illness’ is a request for help, a manifestation both of cultural impotence and of political castration” (2). Felman rejects both the metaphorical and the literal capacity of Madwomen to subvert patriarchy on the basis that genuine Madness creates impotence, or silence, both personally and politically. Similarly, Caminero-Santangelo (1998) focuses on how Madwomen in their autobiographies about Madness “generally share the premise that insanity is the final surrender[…]because it is characterized by the (dis)ability to produce
meaning[…] madness is thus the final removal of the madwoman from any field of agency” (11-12). She focuses on how women are silenced by their Madness, which can prevent them from speaking, writing, or otherwise exercising agency (42-3), and by sanitist epistemic violence, whereby “society completely withholds credibility from the ‘mad,’ thus rendering their protests powerless” (37). Elizabeth Donaldson (2011) claims that the metaphor of “madness-as-feminist-rebellion…indirectly diminished the lived experience of many people who are disabled by mental illness,” because it suggests that Madness does not necessarily correspond to physical symptoms, making those symptoms seemingly a choice rather than an embodiment (94).

Strikingly, over a period of two decades Felman, Caminero-Santangelo, and Donaldson all make remarkably similar criticisms of Gilbert and Gubar focusing on how the theory of Madness as subversive neglects the immediate suffering of actual Madwomen.

Despite the seemingly abundant disparaging opinions of 1970s feminism in contemporary feminist literary criticism, I focus on Gilbert and Gubar and Caminero-Santangelo as examples of feminist literary critics engaging with Madness as subversive or silencing in order to argue that neither genuinely espouses such a limiting binary. That Gilbert and Gubar engage, although to a limited extent, with Madness as a lived and silencing experience beyond literary representation, means that we need to qualify one of the primary criticisms of their work offered by Caminero-Santangelo and others. For example, they explicitly mention the silencing influence of Madness through a discussion of Coleridge:

Thus, although Coleridge’s mirrored madwoman is an emblem of ‘speechless woe’ because she has ‘no voice to speak her dread,’ the poet ultimately speaks for her when she whispers ‘I am she!’ More, she speaks for her in writing the poem that narrates her
emergence from behind the placid mask, ‘the aspects glad and gay,/ That erst were found reflected there.’ (77)

While this excerpt can easily be critiqued for being essentialist, it is significant that Gilbert and Gubar posit that women authors who create fictional Madwomen characters at times are themselves Mad, and silenced by both patriarchy and their Madness. However, they suggest that women can subvert both forms of silencing through the process of writing. While Bertha’s Madness symbolically subverts patriarchy, Gilbert and Gubar acknowledge that she is also a silenced figure who must constantly struggle in order to be seen or heard, although she is finally muted by her death (360). Thus, I argue that Gilbert and Gubar do not present Madness as only subversive, because they must acknowledge that Madness is silencing for women in order to posit that the “very process of writing… liberate[s] a madwoman, a crazy and angry woman, from a silence in which neither she nor her author can continue to acquiesce” (77). Similarly, while Caminero-Santangelo states emphatically throughout her text that Madness is not subversive, she qualifies this claim in her conclusion:

Certainly, madness can be legitimately read as a ‘rejection’ of the social order. But when the social order leaves no alternative but madness, the next logical step is to assert that the social order must be changed. This has always been the goal of feminism. It is true that the possibilities of doing so are historically conditioned; thus, in periods when women’s powers were rigidly circumscribed, the status of madness as ‘resistance’ was proportionally higher. (180-1)

Thus, Caminero-Santangelo acknowledges the central tenet proposed by Gilbert and Gubar and other feminist scholars, who have argued for the subversive power of women’s Madness when society does not provide women with any other means of dissent to challenge patriarchy. While
contemporary psychiatric systems are by no means ideal and a gender imbalance remains in
diagnoses and treatments, Caminero-Santangelo’s shift in focus towards Madness as a lived
experience, rather than a rejection of patriarchy, seems a sign of the limit of previous feminist
work to de-pathologize feminist resistance as Madness. While Caminero-Santangelo often stakes
her argument as being contingent on dispelling theories of Madness as subversive (see 1-4, 18-
19, 55), there is no contradiction in recognizing that women can experience Madness as both
subversive and silencing. By drawing on Hemmings’ methodology of comparing feminists’
works in terms of their similarities rather than their differences, I argue that the perceived tension
in feminist literary criticism surrounding whether Madness is subversive or silencing for women
has never existed as a set of incommensurable opposites. Rather, this tension is largely a product
of attempts to distance contemporary feminism from 1970s feminism, and it is precisely this
effort to reconstruct 1970s feminism as a period of essentialist and wrongheaded thinking that
produces queer Mad ghosts.

Further Questions

Protagonists such as Sandra and Kate, and women like Quin and Millett, who experience
Madness as both subversive and silencing provoke difficult questions for feminist critics that are
perhaps unanswerable, but are still worthy of consideration. For instance, how can feminist
critics engage with Madness as potentially both subversive and silencing for women in a way
that acknowledges the diversity of experiences for Mad women? Is it important to continue to
make these distinctions, or is it impossible to separate instances of subversion and silencing? As
discussed in the previous chapter, any politics of inclusion will necessarily exclude or
marginalize particular identities. Moreover, as identities are multiple, compounded, and
intersectional, it is clear that women will not experience Madness as a lived condition in the
same ways, will not be exposed to the same social or political discourse on Madness, and will not experience sanism uniformly, particularly when sanism intersects with other forms of oppression, such as race, class, sexuality, and/or age. Consequently, rather than attempting to produce a new grand narrative about what it means to be a Madwoman, and thereby potentially create new kinds of exclusions, I hope to shift focus towards an ethical practice of encountering Madwomen, in person or in their writings.

As Caminero-Santangelo states, “it is surely of the utmost importance from a feminist point of view to listen to what women who have experienced madness have to say about it” (18). However, in order to listen to Madwomen and see their narratives as political and theoretical texts or commentary, in a manner that delves beyond fetishizing or sensationalizing, it is also necessary to revisit academic gatekeeping that dictates which kinds of narratives are deemed to be valid, ‘factual,’ or legitimate and that produce sanist epistemic violence by deeming Mad authors to be unreliable, ignorant, or naïve. For instance, in Ann Cvetkovich’s Depression: A Public Feeling she discusses how the use of memoir in academia has been “met with skepticism about its scholarly value” (16). Nevertheless, half of her text is devoted to memoir, while the other half is a set of critical essays. Cvetkovich defends her use of memoir because of its “power as a public feelings genre, one that is both immensely popular and a vehicle for alternative testimonial and scholarship” (23). In asserting the validity of the ‘personal as political,’ Cvetkovich arguably engages in what Hemmings terms a “return” narrative (116), in that Cvetkovich advocates we revisit the “legacies of 1970s feminism such as consciousness-raising, personal narrative, and craft,” and explicitly mentions the work of Gilbert and Gubar, which she had previously criticized in her earlier work as “romanticizing the madwoman” (10). Similar to Cvetkovich’s combination of memoir and essay, in Mad scholars Jennifer Poole and Jennifer
Ward’s chapter “‘Breaking Open the Bone’: Storying, Sanism, and Mad Grief” they combine their personal experiences with Mad grief with their critical theory, insisting upon the relevance and legitimacy of their stories to their academic work (94-95). Mad scholar David Reville, who teaches courses in Mad History at Ryerson University, also discusses the importance of having psychiatric survivor knowledge constitutes as the core curriculum for his classes, having psychiatric survivors as teachers in academic settings, and having psychiatric survivor authors on reading lists (177-8). Thus, in order to develop an ethical reading practice of Mad narratives it is necessary to trouble binaries of fiction/fact and creative/academic work, such that memoirs, autobiographies, and personal disclosures of Madness are deemed legitimate sources of knowledge on Madness. While such work is arguably taking place in Mad Studies, feminist research, and disability studies, it is not clear how to transfer a Mad reading practice to a wider audience, particularly to the sciences or social sciences. For instance, Patrick Bracken and Philip Thomas note that “evidence-based medicine (EBM) now dominates clinical practice,” but that some general practitioners (GPs) and psychiatrists have come to rely on narrative-based medicine (NBM) (195-197). However, they note that while NBM may appear more humanitarian, “it can reduce the polyphony of doctor-patient communication to a monologue […it] reduces the patient to a solely biological object […and in NBM] the patient functions as a character, not as a person” (212). Consequently, they argue that NBM, as it is currently conceived, must be altered such that it allows a back and forth dialogue between human beings and demonstrates “a willingness to engage with the other’s reality, to imagine those realities, to enter into those worlds without judgement or prejudice” (213). Thus, a Mad reading practice must have Mad individuals theorizing at its core if it is to work in conversation with medical and psychiatric discourse, rather than have GPs and psychiatrists adopting NBM and
conceiving of the Mad as characters.

Another more pragmatic concern raised by viewing Madness as potentially both subversive and silencing is what kinds of ‘treatment’ or support should be made available for Mad-identified individuals who may seek assistance? In particular, it remains controversial whether pharmaceuticals/psychotropic drugs and EST/ECT are acceptable forms of treatment for anyone, even if they consent. Because both methods have historically been used to subdue or control non-normative behaviour, particularly women’s, many psychiatric survivors have advocated for the complete abolition of these practices, while some psychiatric consumers or users make a case for their usefulness. For instance, in Judith Gardiner’s “Can Ms. Prozac Talk Back?” she considers how in 1990s discourse “drugs like Prozac are personified as villains and heroes” with seemingly no ground in between (502). For instance, in Peter Kramer’s *Listening to Prozac* he claims that “antidepressants are feminist drugs, liberating and empowering[…]it is the failure to prescribe medication that keeps the wife trapped” (qtd. in Zita 61). As Zita points out, Kramer’s positioning of Prozac as a feminist hero arguably reproduces a patriarchal narrative that women’s “true self” is only reached when she achieves “the values of middle-class work ethic, efficient wifery, hyper-thymic heterosexuality, and perhaps a special kind of whiteness,” which is Kramer’s “Prozac promise” (78-79). In contrast to Kramer, Cvetkovich arguably regards Prozac as a villain because she claims she does not “believe in Prozac,” because she “think[s] it’s a scam” and is more interested in the “environmental, social, and familial factors [that] trigger those biological responses” (15). She also claims that psychiatric drugs “mask the symptoms of a response to a fucked-up world or a fucked-up life,” and, as a result, she implies that drugs are unable to ‘solve’ the ‘root of the problem’ of Madness (15). While she later states that she is “not against pharmaceuticals for those who find they work,” she also claims that
“contemporary medical notions…simultaneously relieve one of responsibility (it’s just genes or chemicals) and provide agency (you can fix it by taking a pill),” which heavily implies that Mad individuals do have a responsibility to use their agency to find the ‘real’ social causes of their Madness (16, 24). Thus, she positions psychiatric drugs as a ‘quick fix’ option for some people who are not driven enough to find the ‘real’ solutions, which Cvetkovich suggests is becoming “unstuck” through activism (26).

While Cvetkovich is skeptical of Madness having a biological source, ironically, she reproduces a medical progress narrative of moving from being ‘stuck’/depressed/sick to becoming ‘unstuck’/hopeful/well (16, 26). Cvetkovich’s criticism of psychiatric drugs also positions their consenting users as being at fault and susceptible to rebuke. Speaking back to criticism like Cvetkovich’s, Caminero-Santangelo shares the story of a feminist working in the antipsychiatric movement who faced criticism from her friends “for continuing to take antidepressant medication; such drugs, they told her, signaled complicity with a patriarchal establishment which functioned purely in the interests of social normalization and control” (18). However, without psychiatric drugs, the woman experienced depression, which made her unable to “work, write, or—often—even get out of bed” (18). As a result, Caminero-Santangelo suggests that we must listen to these narratives as much as we do to those who have been abused with psychiatric drugs (19). Similarly, Donaldson points to cases of “severe and chronic mental illnesses” that result in “physical impairment,” and, as a result, cannot be understood or ‘treated’ as “purely socially produced” as Cvetkovich suggests (106-7). Moreover, Donaldson argues that conceiving of Madness as purely social, with no basis in material or biological reality, disserves individuals who experience mental-physical ‘disability’ by suggesting that they are ‘faking’ their psychical or physical symptoms (105). Consequently, it is clear that debate exists
in feminist criticism surrounding whether psychiatric drugs are ever an acceptable ‘treatment’ for Madness, even if individuals seek or consent to drugs, presumably because for some critics Madness continues to be primarily conceived of as subversive, rather than potentially silencing.

More so than psychiatric drugs, there is heavy debate and activism surrounding the use or abolition of EST/ECT. For instance, Mad scholar Don Weitz’s “Electroshock: Torture as ‘Treatment’” unequivocally denounces the use of EST/ECT and psychiatric drugs as being an “extremely harmful” and unethical “assault on people’s brains, health, and lives, particularly when administered without informed consent, against a person’s will” (158-9). Furthermore, Weitz suggests that even with consent these practices are dubious and inevitably harmful to the person’s body and mind. Significantly, Weitz relies on his own experience as an insulin shock survivor, the testimony of other survivors who describe EST/ECT as “torture,” and the physical effects and side effects of administering EST/ECT (158-9, 165). He also analyzes statistics from Ontario, California, and Texas, which continue to demonstrate that “women and elderly people, especially women 60 years and older, are its [ECT] main targets” (161). As a result, Weitz calls for the banning of EST/ECT entirely, which would also preclude voluntary patients, as well as asking for a Healing House “for psychiatric survivors trying to recover from electroshock” (167-8). However, as Rachel Perkins articulates in “Choosing ECT” she faced pressure not to undergo EST/ECT, particularly because she is “a radical lesbian feminist and a psychologist,” but ultimately decided to have six sessions after experiencing six months of being “unable to work, read, drive [her] car, make even the simplest decisions or look after [her]self,” while also being on medication (623-4). Perkins describes only having minor short term memory loss during the three week course of EST/ECT, with no “long lasting” symptoms or effects, other than feeling like ‘herself’ again and being able to return to work immediately after finishing (624-5).
Importantly, Perkins is critical of the lack of support from her friends, family, or feminist peers who saw “ECT as a single, awful entity” and attempted to dissuade her decision to use EST/ECT (624-5). However, Perkins also notes that “ECT has the potential for abuse and has been abused” and should not be used on anyone against their will (626). Thus, Perkins’ article suggests that ECT has potential, when used carefully and appropriately, by a consenting individual who is under immediate and long-term duress to alleviate distressing symptoms, although it is clear that Weitz would take issue with this claim. While consent is crucial to both discussions, ascertaining consent becomes complicated once Madness is conceived of as potentially silencing and subversive.

These debates illustrate that it is far from obvious how to support the Mad, particularly which kinds of ‘treatments’ should be funded, promoted, or ended for ethical reasons. Perkins’ experiences also highlight the role alliance and community play in women’s decisions about their bodies and care, because women’s decisions may be judged by family, friends, peers, or strangers. Moreover, if Madness is potentially both subversive and silencing, it seems to be necessary to also acknowledge that there will not be a universal method of supporting the Mad, who may at various times benefit from alternative forms of ‘treatment’ or support, including pharmaceutical drugs or EST/ECT. As a result, the debate surrounding the use of EST/ECT highlights how support networks can be effective or ineffective for different individuals, as well as the high stakes for women who experience pressures to behave in particular ways in order to receive conditional support or compassion from family and friends. Again, the discrepancy in lived experiences of Madness makes it impossible to produce any simplistic or general answer. Ussher considers how even widely unpopular ‘treatments’ should not be necessarily eliminated because they may still help a minority, who will not benefit from more popular ‘treatments’.
We cannot make causal assumptions about the etiology of mental health problems on the basis of treatment effectiveness. If we find that a treatment for a particular diagnostic category (such as depression or anxiety) is effective for a significant proportion of women, we cannot assume that this is the cure, as is often implied in the current research literature. Or, conversely, if only a minority of women are helped, we should not reject this as treatment for all women. As mental health problems are fluid and multifaceted phenomena with many possible etiological routes, we should expect to find a myriad means of prevention and intervention. (222)

To expand on Ussher’s discussion, it also seems noteworthy to take into account that individuals respond differently to ‘treatments’ over time as their lived conditions alter, and that ‘treatments’ will become more or less available to different subjects in particular social-political contexts. Thus, while there are no easy solutions or answers, I would suggest that in order to support individuals with all kinds of engagements with Madness the most important response is to give them options for support and care and respect their decision to pursue or not to pursue ‘treatments,’ therapy, support groups, or a change in living situation without judgment or blame, even if individuals complain or disparage about their continuing ‘symptoms’ or lived conditions of Madness. For instance, Zita focuses on women’s ability to challenge Kramer’s vision of “Prozac feminism…with or without Prozac” by celebrating the “…liberating potentials of women’s multiple identities,” rather than necessarily conforming to the “white middle-class values” embedded in Kramer’s arguments (78). Gardiner offers a similar position that professes the importance of not stressing a particular position on psychiatric ‘treatments,’ but rather on disseminating accurate information to allow individuals to make informed decisions: “For ‘no’ to mean ‘no,’ and ‘yes,’ yes,’ women need to understand the consequences of our choices fully,
remaining wary of drug industry and psychotherapeutic hype but also of the automatic dismissal of biochemical reactions as well as medications” (515). It is important to consider that such a task potentially puts a daunting burden on working-class or otherwise preoccupied women who do not have the option to invest their time in researching ‘treatments’ and feminist theories on non-biomedical forms of relief. However, despite Gardiner’s attempt to find a middle-ground between being critical of ‘treatments’ that have historically been abused, yet do seem to provide relief to some psychiatric consumers, it is important in order to also acknowledge the diversity of Mad experience. I argue that this approach is flexible enough to allow for the regulation of psychiatric treatments, such as through demands: to increase research into the long-term effects of psychiatric drugs before they become available to the public, to increase regulations surrounding the advertisement and mark-up of pharmaceuticals, and to outlaw non-consensual EST/ECT, with increased regulation and surveillance to ensure consistency. However, this approach also hopefully allows for individuals to have access to such treatments if they deem them to have a positive impact on their quality of life, although with safety measures put in place to prevent corporations from exploiting Mad individuals or psychiatrists from coercing them. It is also important to continue efforts to depathologize Madness as ‘disease’ or ‘illness,’ and instead see it as an identity that can have a positive influence on one’s life, in order to eliminate pressure on individuals to ‘cure’ themselves in order to be proper neoliberal productive citizens. I recognize that this approach will not seem attractive to many feminists and/or antipsychiatric activists who adamantly oppose particular ‘treatments,’ but I argue that in order to genuinely listen and respect the agency of the Mad—in its broadest sense, not just ‘Mad-people-like-me’—it is necessary to allow them to dictate their own ‘treatment’ or care plan, or lack thereof.

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9 It is important to note that what type of research is understood to be valuable, typically EBM, shapes the research that occurs when funds are allocated to particular institutions.
Conclusion

In this chapter, I offer a short alternative narrative of the recent feminist past with respect to theories concerned with women’s relationship to Madness, as psychiatric diagnosis and as lived condition, based on Hemmings’ historiographic methodology. By comparing iconic literary critical works and largely unknown women’s writing by psychiatric survivors, I argue that there exist important similarities and connections between feminist criticism and literature across the past four decades that have been disregarded. As a result, I posit that the perceived tension in feminist literary criticism between whether Madness is subversive or silencing is a construction invented to support a progress or loss narrative. Moreover, I suggest that key proponents of either ‘side’ of the argument—Gilbert and Gubar and Caminero-Santangelo—do not genuinely propose that Madness exists in dualistic terms, but acknowledge the validity of alternative experiences with Madness, despite focusing on aspects of Madness that they consider to be neglected. Quin’s and Millett’s texts provide examples of protagonists who experience Madness as simultaneously subversive and silencing, suggesting that the two states are not contradictory, and they underscore the need to develop more complex theories of Madness that are able to account for multiple forms of women’s engagement with Madness. I also considered some further questions raised for feminist critics who accept that Madness is potentially both subversive and silencing. I suggest that in order to participate in an ethical Mad reading practice it is necessary to engage with Mad narratives as theoretical and political texts, an approach which in turn requires a re-examination of what kinds of knowledge claims are deemed to be valid in different academic contexts. I have also proposed that in order to account for the wide variety of engagements with Madness, it is important to respect an individual’s decisions regarding their
own support or care, while still monitoring pharmaceuticals companies and holding psychiatrists and other health-care practitioners accountable for not following ethical practices.
Conclusion:
Sanist Epistemic Violence and Social Exclusions

My project focuses on two neglected Madwoman authors and how their queer Mad ghosts figuratively haunt a feminist literary canon, as well as how their works deconstruct a perceived tension in feminist literary criticism surrounding whether the Madwoman is a subversive or silenced figure. In chapter one, I posited that Quin’s and Millett’s queer Mad ghosts suggest the limitations of literary canonization, a politics of inclusion, and formulations of a homogenous feminist community, as well as gesture towards the ongoing repression of queer Mad women voices by feminists and non-feminists alike. In chapter two, I asserted that it is possible to view the figure of the Madwoman as potentially both subversive and silenced, and, as a result, I suggest that Madwomen should be given the opportunity to choose to be psychiatric consumers or to refuse psychiatric ‘treatments’ on an individual basis, as long as psychiatric practices are being held to an ethical standard and include consent. Moreover, in each chapter, I argue that it is ethically imperative to develop and promote a Mad reading practice or Mad theory in the discipline of English that recognizes the intersectionality of Mad experiences, as well as their theoretical and political value, in order to avoid further silencing, stigmatizing, or sensationalizing Mad narratives. However, I want to suggest that the findings of my research also have far-reaching ethical, social, and political implications within and outside of academia.

It is important to recognize that the systemic and intersectional forces of sexism, queerphobia, sanism, classism, and ageism that marginalized Quin’s and Millett’s respective works in a literary canon are the same hegemonic, and largely unrecognized, forces that produce exclusions for Mad queer individuals in society—such as forced institutionalization, criminalisation, incarceration, unemployment, and homelessness. These forms of systematic
discrimination are examples of what Miranda Fricker describes as structural operations of power, which occur in instances when “power has no subject, [but] it always has an object [a social group] whose actions are being controlled…such as to create or preserve a given social order” (13). Fricker also notes that “[t]he conceptions of different social identities that are activated in operations of identity power need not be held at the level of belief in either subject or object, for the primary modus operandi of identity power is at the level of the collective social imagination. Consequently, it can control our actions even despite our beliefs” (15). For instance, sanism is perpetuated by operations of structural power and identity power, which function irrespective of our individual or communal recognition. Fricker posits that identity power has a strong influence on whether agents perceive someone giving a testimonial as a credible source of knowledge because “hearers[…]use social stereotypes as heuristics in their spontaneous assessments of the interlocutor’s credibility” (16-17). As a result, stereotypes and prejudice can cause an individual to have a “credibility deficit,” in that he/she/they are perceived to be less credible than he/she/they otherwise would be, which is a form of “testimonial injustice” because the speaker is wronged specifically in her capacity as a knower (17, 20). Moreover, testimonial injustice can become systematic when the influencing prejudice “‘track[s]’ the subject through different dimensions of social activity—economic, educational, professional, sexual, legal, political, religious, and so on” (27). Fricker claims that the “primary harm of testimonial injustice” is that the person wrongfully mistrusted is dishonoured because it undermines his/her/their rationality, and thus, “their very humanity” (46, 44, emphasis in original). I argue that the connotations of dishonour are not appropriate to the degree of harm that can be inflicted by systematic testimonial injustice, and that Fricker’s collapsing of rationality with humanity is at the core of sanist discourse that causes systematic testimonial injustice against the Mad, because
they are defined as ‘non-rational’ and, thus, inhuman by this standard of humanity. Nevertheless, Fricker’s analysis of power relations and systematic testimonial injustice is astute and assists in discussing how sanism functions in tandem with other forms of prejudice to make particular subjects appear less credible or knowledgeable, even if she reproduces that very same injustice against Mad individuals in her conceptualization of humanity. Fricker also identifies that there are two kinds of secondary harm or “follow-on disadvantages” to experiencing testimonial injustice: practical harm, such as someone being sentenced as guilty instead of innocent, and epistemic harm, where, for instance, the speaker loses confidence in his/her/their general intellectual abilities (47-48).

Furthermore, in Liegghio’s “A Denial of Being: Psychiatrization as Epistemic Violence” she illustrates how epistemic harm or injustice, which she frames in terms of violence, functions specifically in the lives of Mad individuals: “Under dominant psy discourses and practices, psychiatrized people are disadvantaged against constructions of ‘normal mental health’ and experience their identities as pathologized and devalued, and their humanity is denied” (123). Unlike other identities (with the exception of disability, which has close affinities with Madness), Madness is premised on having neurologically diverse experiences, which psychiatry denounces as “flawed or disordered way[s] of seeing, perceiving, judging, and thus, knowing reality” (126). As a result, to be Mad is simultaneously to be “deemed incompetent,” which entails that Mad persons “los[e] their ability to speak on their own behalf and to be heard on their own terms” (126). Thus, Mad individuals are “disqualified as legitimate knowers at a structural level…[which] renders that person out of existence, unable to be heard and to have their interests count” (123-124). Moreover, Liegghio identifies how being labelled as ‘dangerous’ is crucial to the social control of the Mad:
Being constructed as dangerous is a powerful mechanism that sets the stage for epistemic violence. Under psy discourses, a dangerous person is someone who is unpredictable, who cannot be trusted, who threatens the public order, and who, consequently, needs to be controlled. Protecting public order, which represents the well-being of many at the risk of abrogating the rights of the individual, becomes central to the justification for the use of such interventions as forced hospitalization, observation, medication, and restrain.

(127)

Here, Liegghio highlights how Mad individuals are not just deemed to be incompetent, and denied the ability to be seen as knowledgeable because of a credibility deficit, they are also constructed as inherently dangerous and volatile in order to justify the removal of their civil rights in the name of ‘the greater social good’ or for the ‘greater good’ of the individual having their liberties taken away. Consequently, the harm done to Mad individuals is not just epistemic or practical, as Fricker’s discussion would suggest; rather their humanity is being violated and silenced, which is why I suggest that Liegghio’s term of epistemic violence is more appropriate.

Along similar lines, psychiatrist Gordon Warme questions the legitimacy of practices of non-consensual psychiatric ‘treatments,’ particularly in relation to his ability to forcibly institutionalize an individual based on his ‘professional opinion’ when he “cannot predict better than anyone else that a person will do harm to himself or others,” (qtd. in Liegghio 215) yet that is what his profession demands of him: “For years, I told myself that these procedures are tolerable because they keep the community safe and comfortable: the system gets society through awkward predicaments. But I was wrong[...]Were ‘treating our patients as fully human’ deeply realized, committing and treating people against their will would be impossible” (214). Warme recognizes that the practice of forcibly institutionalizing ‘dangerous’ individuals is
premised on the illusion that psychiatrists are able to predict an individual’s future actions, and that such a practice strips those individuals of their humanity out of fear of possible harm. Despite the association of Madness with violence, Warme claims that “Mad people aren’t usually harmful, nowhere near as dangerous as drivers who drink or drive fast” (217), who do not lose their liberties until they have actually committed a crime, rather than when a ‘professional’ anticipates that they might cause harm. In response to the reality of ongoing epistemic violence against the Mad, Liegghio argues for a Mad reading practice, although she does not use that terminology: “Humanity is restored, rather than denied, through the recognition that certain expressions, such as ‘mad talk,’ are legitimate ways for some people to narrate their knowledge, including their experiences of distress, euphoria, and/or confusion” (128). As Leigghio implies, there is a complex relationship between sanist discourse and the policing of Mad narratives, in academia and in public spaces, and in order to refute or undermine epistemic violence against the Mad it is imperative to restore their humanity by listening to Mad voices as legitimate sources of knowledge. Thus, the importance of a Mad reading practice delves beyond developing an ethical approach to literature for academics, because it is also necessary to bring “mad models of thinking and being” into everyday interactions (Wolframe 240).

Furthermore, the feminist debate surrounding Madness as subversive or silencing is embodied in the struggles of real Madwomen who experience discrimination but cannot “separate what is part of being a woman and what is part of being mad,” as well as their other intersectional identities (Wolframe 40-41). Similarly, the burden of whether to use or refuse pharmaceutical drugs or EST/ECT, if these options are even available or accessible, falls on Madwomen, who come to these decisions, if they are not non-consensually administered, with perspectives shaped by their intersectional identities and socio-political contexts. Unfortunately,
the reality for Madwomen faced with multiple forms of oppression is increasingly criminalisation, unemployment, and homelessness. In order to provide specific examples, I will briefly highlight three cases studies conducted in Montreal, Quebec focused on “women referred on multiple occasions to a Montreal mobile crisis intervention team, Urgence psychosociale-justice (UPS-J)” who were considered to be “multi-problem cases” because they fit into multiple categories of “deviance” (Morin et al. 128-131). One case study focuses on Hélène, who “actively seeks help, voluntarily” through UPS-J in order to “see a psychiatrist or go to the hospital” because she is suicidal (134). She is diagnosed as manic depressive at the age of 43, with a history of violence against herself and aggression towards others; she is also homeless, has an alcohol dependency, and has five criminal convictions (134-135). However, her psychiatrist is described by the other case worker as “not very cooperative; he thinks the client isn’t making an effort. He won’t see her more than once a month and no longer sees the point of trying hypnotherapy. He is more in favour of criminalisation and incarceration to make the client take responsibility” (137). Thus, because of Hélène’s positionality she is not treated like a ‘regular’ psychiatric patient, but as someone who needs to be incarcerated to make her behaviour change—despite her history of previous criminalisation. Additionally, it does not seem like pharmaceuticals or EST/ECT are considered as options for her. Hélène is excluded by the psychiatric system, which prefers to transfer the difficulty and cost of her situation onto the criminal justice system. Similarly, Doris—who is 38 years old, has previous convictions, a substance abuse problem, engages in survival sex work, and is HIV-positive, in addition to other chronic illnesses—exists on the fringes of the health care system, psychiatrisation, and criminalisation (137). In her case study, it is found that Doris is repeatedly “rejected by every resource [available to her] except the prisons,” suggesting that she will inevitably be re-
incarcerated, if only for a lack of alternatives (139). These two studies illustrate how women’s positionality dramatically influences their access to psychiatry or other forms of support. The studies also suggest how Madness can produce a chain reaction of other forms of social exclusion, since unemployment or incarceration can lead to extreme poverty causing homelessness, which often results in criminalisation or re-incarceration and a lack of psychiatric support, ensuring that these women remain in a constant state of precarity.

The third case study focuses on France, a 31-year-old homeless woman who is diagnosed as schizophrenic but who refuses psychiatric treatment (140-141). Over a four-month period she is consistently found “settled on the outdoor air grids of a downtown Montreal shopping centre” and is then “forced to move” (140). The study notes that what is odd about France’s case is that while the ‘problem’ situation remains constant, the response she receives “varies from one event to another (criminalisation, psychiatrisation, no follow-up),” suggesting these responses are interchangeable (142). Moreover, the study considers how France only resists through “inertia,” “passive refusal of any form of assistance,” and by asking for a “legal proceeding to have her rights respected by the intervention milieu” (144). As a result, the study questions “[s]hould she [France] be constrained? If so, to what?” (144). Unlike Hélène and Doris, who demonstrate the need for additional services for Mad individuals who want support, France is an example of Madwomen who are criminalised in order to ‘control’ and limit their social presence, despite causing no harm. Ironically, the suggestion of the case studies is that it is only possible for homeless and impoverished women to access psychiatric services if they are unwilling to do so, which highlights how little ‘say’ women have in their own ‘treatment’ plans because they are not deemed to be competent in their own assessments.

Joe Sim considers how once women are criminalised they are deemed to be “less eligible
subjects…[for] medical and psychological care and attention…[because in] a cultural and populist climate dominated by a political consensus built on the demand for an authoritarian response to the problems of law and order, the incarcerated will inevitably fail to generate empathy and sympathy” (212, 216). Women who are criminalised as a means of disciplining their ‘deviance’ as Mad subjects will often receive poor to no psychological ‘treatment,’ because as a ‘criminal’ they are seen as a burden on society for their perceived transgressions, and as a result, their neurological difference will continue to seen as criminal. Sim argues that women are particularly deemed less sympathetic because of “their apparent rejection of the role of subservient, tranquillised homemakers for a life of transgression and deviance” (216). However, Sim also highlights how improving the health care services available for women in prison is complicated because in previous cases where prisons were given an increased budget the prison used the money to “justify detaining women in ever-greater numbers,” rather than to provide the intended added services (214). As a result, it is clear that the problem is not monetary, but ethical. Women prisoners are not seen as persons with rights and health needs, but as bodies that can generate revenue who deserve to be treated poorly.

These examples are limited in their scope and breadth, but they brush the surface of the various extreme forms of social exclusions experienced by Madwomen in contemporary society, to say nothing of how Madness intersects with other identities that are more likely to be: turned down for employment, to come from a lower socio-economic background, to be non-consensually psychiatrized, and to be criminalised, particularly for non-violent behaviour. It is not always possible for Madwomen to use or refuse psychiatric ‘treatments’ or to research the different forms of ‘treatments’ than the ones they may be offered (and are expected to be grateful for), particularly when their financial duress and homelessness puts them in a constant state of
emergency. The question of whether Madness is subversive or silencing, while still relevant to these women, will not be their most pressing concern, even as they experience the consequences of being psychiatrized for being ‘deviant’ and/or they are unable to speak or get out of bed, if they have one. As a result, we may also want to claim that these Madwomen are experiencing what Fricker terms a “hermeneutical injustice”: “the injustice of having some significant area of one’s social experience obscured from collective understanding owing to a structural identity prejudice in the collective hermeneutical resource” (155, emphasis in original). Sanism can produce hermeneutical injustice when Mad individuals, such as Hélène, Doris, and France, and the social workers, doctors, or police officers responding to the needs of these women, are unaware of the concept of sanism and cannot perceive how sanism is affecting their lives. As a result, the issue for Mad feminist literary critics becomes how do we translate a Mad reading practice into an everyday ethical practice? This is a complex question that would take another dissertation to answer, so I will not attempt to undertake that task. However, I will suggest that establishing a Mad reading practice in academia has the potential to alter or undermine public discourse surrounding Madness, just as academia exalting rationality currently reinforces and masks sanist epistemic violence and hermeneutical injustice. For instance, we might consider how syllabus construction and classroom practices can become sites where a Mad reading practice can transform into an everyday ethical practice. As previously considered, the majority of Madwomen authors taught or included in anthologies are white, heterosexual, monogamous, middle or upper class, cis-gendered women. While Quin and Millett diverge from this ideal feminist Madwoman, as white Madwomen their recent resurgence in literary criticism suggests the ongoing marginalization of racialized Madwomen voices and gestures towards the presence of other ghosts lurking beyond the veil of public and academic recognition. Moreover, the debate
surrounding whether Madness is subversive or silencing is further complicated when considering how women’s lived experiences of oppression and privilege prevent them from extracting how forces of sexism, sanism, queerphobia, racism, colonialism, ageism, and ableism intersect. Consequently, while an examination of Quin’s and Millett’s texts offers a consideration of white queer Mad ghosts and suggests that Madness is potentially both subversive and silencing for these women, it is not able to gesture towards how racialized women have been marginalized and how race intersects with sanism, particularly with its social bi-products of unemployment, criminalisation, and homelessness. These issues would be crucial to developing a Mad reading practice that recognizes the importance of intersectional analysis and the diversity of Mad experiences, but as previously suggested with respect to Quin and Millett, Mad theory needs to delve beyond the limitations of a politics of inclusion to instead consider what forces make such consistent exclusions of particular identities predominantly invisible.
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