THE POLITICS OF EDUCATION GOVERNANCE IN LATIN AMERICA
WHEN GLOBAL IDEAS COLLIDE WITH DOMESTIC INTERESTS:
THE POLITICS OF SECONDARY EDUCATION GOVERNANCE IN ARGENTINA, CHILE AND COLOMBIA

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A Thesis Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science

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Lay Abstract

Latin American countries have shifted from a model of education governance based on hierarchical rules and centralized authority to a results-driven model with shared responsibility among state and non-state actors. Yet, adopted governance models show remarkable cross-national variation. This dissertation aims at explaining this variation amid convergence through the qualitative comparative analysis of education governance in Chile, Argentina, and Colombia during three distinct periods of development, namely centralized education planning from the standpoint of manpower needs (1960s-1970s), market-oriented governance mechanisms (1980s-1990s), and accountability-oriented education for all (2000s-2010s). This analysis demonstrates that while diffusion of widely recognized policy ideas about education governance produces convergence, political contestation of domestic organized actors produces variation that ranges from full adoption to outright rejection of foreign recommendations. My study qualifies insights from institutional and diffusion theories by specifying the conditions in which domestic actors are able to modify both, domestic institutions and powerful foreign ideas.
Abstract
Education reforms in several Latin American countries follow a global trend characterized by at least three changes: 1) from selective student recruitment towards the universalization of secondary education and school choice for families; 2) from a centralized curriculum towards curricular autonomy; and 3) from student evaluation exclusively delegated to teachers towards national standardized tests. Yet, adopted governance models show remarkable cross-national variation. Chile has traditionally emulated global ideas and become a quasi-market of education. Argentina was more reluctant to global norms and made only moderate changes to the state-run governance model. Finally, Colombia left the education of the wealthy to the market, while centralized the authority over the education for the poor. Through a comparative historical analysis of these three countries, this study explains the way in which global ideas are domestically translated through the interaction between diffusion mechanisms, domestic policy legacies, and the ability of domestic actors to negotiate the implementation of foreign recommendations. The evidence provided by this dissertation suggests that the level of organization, the closeness to the decision-making process, and the impact of the power resources of supporters and opponents of global ideas define the extent to what these ideas are adopted. If global ideas favour the interests of powerful actors and opposition is weak the more likely result is the emulation of foreign recommendations. Yet, the more the opposition obtains resources to force powerful actors to bargain, the more the chances for global norms to be resisted or rejected. This analysis explains how the encounter between global norms and domestic institutions shapes processes of domestic institutional entrepreneurship and uncovers paths through which this entrepreneurship is more likely to produce emulation or rejection of global ideas. This dissertation qualifies insights of historical and sociological institutionalisms and contributes to the literature on education policy globalization.
To Sebastián, Violeta and Tomás
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as I wanted. I owe so much to them for all of their sacrifice, support, encouragement, and love.

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACES</td>
<td>Coordination Assembly of Secondary Students (Asamblea Nacional de Estudiantes Secundarios)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACER</td>
<td>Australian Council for Research in Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDP</td>
<td>Christian Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEPAL</td>
<td>United Nations’ Economic Commission for Latin America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHA</td>
<td>Comparative Historical Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDE</td>
<td>Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo de la Educación - Centre for Educational Research and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONACEP</td>
<td>Association of Chilean Private Schools (Colegios Particulares de Chile)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONADE</td>
<td>National Development Council (Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONES</td>
<td>National Committee for Secondary Students (Coordinadora Nacional de Estudiantes Secundarios)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONET</td>
<td>National Council for Technical Education (Consejo Nacional de Educación Técnica)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPEIP</td>
<td>Center for Improvement, Experimentation and Pedagogical Research (Centro de Perfeccionamiento, Experimentación e Investigación Pedagógica)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTERA</td>
<td>Argentine Confederation of Education Workers (Confederación de Trabajadores de la Educación de Argentina)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DINIECE</td>
<td>Department of Education Information and Quality Assessment (Dirección Nacional de Información y Evaluación de la Calidad Educativa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNP</td>
<td>National Planning Department (Departamento Nacional de Planeación)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EBL</td>
<td>Education Budget Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>EFA</td>
<td>Education for All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENU</td>
<td>Unified National School (ENU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FECODE</td>
<td>Colombian Federation of Teachers (Federación Colombiana de Educadores)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEL</td>
<td>Federal Education Law (Ley de Educación Federal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIDE</td>
<td>Federation of Secondary Schools (Federación de Institutos de Educación Secundaria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIEL</td>
<td>Foundation for Latin American Economic Research (Fundación de Investigaciones Económicas Latinoamericanas)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FLACSO</td>
<td>Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEL</td>
<td>General Education Law (Ley General de Educación)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IADB</td>
<td>Inter-American Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICFES</td>
<td>Colombian Institute for the Promotion of Higher Education (Instituto Colombiano de Fomento a la Educación Superior, until 1995) Colombian Institute for Education Assessment (Instituto Colombiano para la Evaluación de la Educación, after 1995)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICOLPE</td>
<td>Colombian Pedagogical Institute (Instituto Colombiano de Pedagogía)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IEP</td>
<td>Institutional Educational Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIIEP</td>
<td>International Institute for Educational Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>International Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>LLECE</td>
<td>Latin American Laboratory for Assessment of Education Quality (Laboratorio Latinoamericano de Evaluación de la Calidad de la Educación)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOCE</td>
<td>Organic Constitutional Education Law (Ley Orgánica Constitucional de Enseñanza)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAPU</td>
<td>Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria - Unitary Popular Action Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MECE-Media</td>
<td>Program of Quality Improvement in Secondary Education (Mejoramiento de la Calidad de la Educación – Educación media)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEP</td>
<td>Manpower Education Planning</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPE</td>
<td>Major Project of Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAP</td>
<td>Priority Learning Cores (Núcleos de Aprendizaje Prioritario)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEL</td>
<td>National Education Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NM</td>
<td>New Majority (Nueva Mayoría)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>National Pedagogical Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPM</td>
<td>New Public Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODEPLAN</td>
<td>Office for Development and National Planning (Oficina de Desarrollo y Planeamiento)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACES</td>
<td>Program for the Expansion of Secondary Education (Plan for Expansion of Secondary Education Enrolment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEP</td>
<td>Institutional Educational Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIIE</td>
<td>Programa Interdisciplinario de Investigación en Educación - Interdisciplinary Program for Educational Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIRLS</td>
<td>Progress in International Reading Literacy Study</td>
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<tr>
<td>PISA</td>
<td>Program for International Student Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Pedagogical Movement (Movimiento Pedagógico)</td>
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<td>PPP</td>
<td>Public-Private Partnerships</td>
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<tr>
<td>PU</td>
<td>Popular Unity (Unidad Popular)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RN</td>
<td>National Renovation (Renovación Nacional)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>SABER</td>
<td>Colombian Standardized Assessment System</td>
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<tr>
<td>SENA</td>
<td>National Learning Service (Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIMCE</td>
<td>System for Measurement of Education Quality (Sistema de Evaluación de la Calidad Educativa)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SINEC</td>
<td>National System for Education Quality Assessment (Sistema Nacional de la Evaluación de la Calidad)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNEDD</td>
<td>National System for Performance Assessment (Sistema Nacional de Evaluación del Desempeño)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNEP</td>
<td>National Service for Private Education (Servicio Nacional de Educación Privada)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUTE</td>
<td>Unified Education Workers Union (Sindicato Unico de Trabajadores de la Educación)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TIMMS</td>
<td>Third International Mathematics and Science Study</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDI</td>
<td>Independent Democratic Union (Unión Democrática Independiente)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>VOCSED</td>
<td>Vocational Secondary Education</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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Declaration of Academic Achievement

This dissertation represents original research that I conducted including the research design, data collection, coding, analysis, interpretation, and write-up of the findings. Dr. Michelle Dion, my primary supervisor, provided invaluable advice on comparative qualitative methodology, the political science components of the theoretical development of this project, and the organization and edition of the dissertation. Dr. Scott Davies, Canada Research Chair in Data, Equity and Policy in Education at the University of Toronto and also a member of my supervisory committee, provided thoughtful guidance on the sociological components of my theoretical framework and editorial advice. As part of my supervisory committee, Dr. Shafiqul Huque from the Department of Political Science at McMaster University, also contributed with insights about theories of public administration. Earlier drafts of parts of this research have been presented at international conferences and academic workshops as part of the manuscript’s development.
Chapter 1. Introduction: Research Puzzle, Theoretical Framework and Research Design

Over the past decades, education governance has been the focus of intense reform efforts. Particularly, before 1970s, secondary education was governed by the state, which relied on a tight-loose arrangement (Astiz & Wiseman, 2005; J. Meyer & Rowan, 1978): tight centralized curriculum definition and selective recruitment of students by national schools to ensure the adequate training of the future ruling elite (Bruter, Savoie, & Frijhoff, 2004), and student evaluation loosely delegated to teachers with the confidence that they would conform to the bureaucratic rules of the system (J. Meyer & Rowan, 1978; Scott, Meyer, Strang, & Creighton, 1994). Yet, since the mid 1970s, different international actors (international organizations, international policy experts, exemplar countries, etc.) have globally diffused ideas calling for significant changes in education governance. This advocacy has coincided with a global ‘governance revolution’ (Astiz & Wiseman, 2005) that shifted away education governance from the above-described tight-loose arrangement towards a loose-tight post-bureaucratic model. On the loose part of the arrangement, centralized control over curriculum definition was at least partially devolved to subnational units, schools and/or communities. In addition, secondary education enrolment was expanded and families were granted choice among public and private schools. On the tight part, however, the control over student assessments was centralized through standardized tests. In other words, education governance did not follow anymore a bureaucratic model based on centralized rules and hierarchical procedures, but a post-bureaucratic logic based on shared responsibility with emphasis on results.
Recent education reforms in Latin American countries follow this global trend. Nevertheless, a detailed look shows a striking cross-national variation in the governance of secondary education even in countries that are similar in many regards. While some countries have substantially devolved responsibilities and decision-making power through school choice, expansion of private provision, or school autonomy, such as Chile, Nicaragua, Guatemala and Colombia (Ganimian, 2016; Gershberg, 2004; Rounds, 1997), some others are more reluctant to redistribute authority and still retain many centralized functions, as in the cases of Argentina and Uruguay (Beech & Barrenechea, 2011; Benveniste, 2002; Narodowski, 2008). What explains this transition to post-bureaucratic models of secondary education governance in Latin America? Do ideas diffused by international actors really play a role in this transition? Why would actors involved in the domestic policymaking accept these ideas? If global ideas do affect domestic decision-making, why and how this ‘governance revolution’ varies across countries that come from comparable educational traditions and have been influenced by similar global ideas? My dissertation answers these questions by relying on insights derived from sociological and historical institutionalism, while highlighting the role of agency of domestic actors in the definition of education governance policy.

Relevance of Topic and Case Selection

By conducting a comparative historical analysis of Argentina, Chile and Colombia, this research explains the arrangements of secondary education governance and contributes to broader theoretical debates regarding convergent and divergent patterns in education policy. Argentina, Chile and Colombia are particularly suitable for comparison for several reasons. On the one hand, Argentina and Chile had very similar secondary education governance models, but after the 1980s Chile shifted towards a
quasi-market of education while Argentina adopted a quasi-state monopoly. This divergence (see Figure 1.1) occurred even though both countries held a state-managed secondary education model committed to train political and economic elites to sustain the nation-state project (Serrano, Ponce de León, & Rengifo, 2012; G Tiramonti, 2003). Both countries were also under the influence of similar global ideas about the expansion of secondary education in the 1960s, and state retrenchment after the 1980s. Likewise, they experienced similar authoritarian regimes prone to neoliberal ideas during the 1970s and 1980s. Both nations experienced economic crises in the 1980s, they had similar levels of development, and the expansion of secondary education followed similar patterns.

Figure 1.1 Changes in secondary education governance.

Despite these noteworthy similarities, Chilean education system is currently based on market mechanisms, including school choice, competition, and standardized evaluation. Meanwhile, in Argentina, secondary education curriculum and provision are still under the control of central and provincial authorities, and student evaluation is very much a domain of teachers. On the other hand, Colombia had originally a different governance system. However, the country now holds similarities with the curricular and provision model of Argentina, and somewhat resembles the Chilean evaluation system.
(see Figure 1.1). This suggests that countries can be pushed to convergence even if they start at different points. Colombia never consolidated a state monopoly of secondary education (Helg, 1987). The country was traditionally more dependent on foreign technical and financial aid for education purposes (Arnove, 1980). In addition, Colombia did not experience the type of military regime that occurred in Chile and Argentina. By contrast, the country had a consociational democracy or a power-sharing agreement between the Liberal and the Conservative Parties. Yet, Colombia was also under the influence of ideas similar to those in Argentina and Chile that promoted secondary education expansion and state retrenchment. Therefore, while Argentina and Chile can be treated as most-similar systems, Colombia provides the opportunity of combining a most-different system design (Przeworski & Teune, 1970). The qualitative comparison of these three cases provides relevant insights to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for transition to post-bureaucratic governance models and to unravel paths that lead to different types of governance arrangements (Mahoney & Goertz, 2006; Ragin, 1989).

Although numerous studies on policy convergence and variation have been conducted in many other policy areas, such as pension (e.g. Hennessy, 2014; Melo, 2004; Queisser, 2000; Weyland, 2005), healthcare (e.g. Cacace & Schmid, 2008; Clavier, 2010; Kaasch, 2013; Montanari, 2013), development policy (e.g. Sugiyama, 2011) or economic policy (e.g. Elkins, Guzman, & Simmons, 2006; Jordana & Levi-Faur, 2005; Simmons, Dobbin, & Garrett, 2008), political science has traditionally neglected the study of education policy2 (Busemeyer & Trampush, 2011; Jakobi, Martens, & Wolf, 2009).

---

1 This agreement, the National Front (1958-1974), stipulated the alternation of presidential power between these parties, and the power-sharing in the Cabinets (Hartlyn, 1988).

2 For exceptions see Busemeyer, 2009a; Castiglioni, 2005; Pribble, 2013; Streeck, 1989; Thelen, 2004.
Nevertheless, education policy deserves a place in political science research for several reasons. First, education is frequently at the core of various human capital, wealth generation, and equity policy strategies. Thus, rhetoric of state retrenchment in education is more ambiguous than in other public services (R. Kaufman & Nelson, 2004). In particular, the roles attributed to education are somewhat at odds with the argument of political science about the regressive effects of secondary and tertiary education expansion (Busemeyer, 2009b; Wilensky, 1974). Second, education spending is often the largest among all government expenditures (Fan & Rao, 2003), which suggests that cutbacks could affect more constituents than retrenchment in other policy areas (e.g. pension, social insurance,) and therefore the definition of role of the state might be more contentious. Hence, education policy studies need to uncover the politics of education policy, not only in the areas of expenditure and provision, but also in other less explored dimensions, such as curriculum and evaluation, which are certainly connected with quality and equity issues.

Consequently, on the one hand, this study demonstrates how the political science literature helps explain education policy puzzles, and on the other hand, it explores how empirical evidence about education policy provide further insights to better understand major questions of political science, such as the changing role of the state in social policy, the increasing participation of other non-state (and non-national) actors in the provision of social services, and the tension between policy convergence and variation.

Given the inattention to education policy by political science, most research about education governance has been produced in the comparative education field. This field has certainly advanced the understanding of ‘travelling education policy’ as a driver of convergence (Dale, 1999; H. Meyer & Rowan, 2006a; Narodowski, 2008; Steiner-
Khamsi, 2004b; Torres & Arnove, 2012; Verger, Altinyelken, & Novelli, 2012), but there are still few studies about how and why education policy ‘travels’, and even less about the re-contextualization of transferred policies at the domestic level (Verger et al., 2012, p. 4).

By the same token, secondary education has received little attention in comparison to research about basic and higher education (Heyneman, 2003). This disregard is surprising considering that secondary education has been characterized as a determinant of social stratification (Kerckhoff, 2001), and its roles are different from those attributed to other levels, including preparing students for future academic and professional choices, promoting job skills, and even fostering vocational training (Gropello, 2006; Pozo, Martín, & Pérez, 2002; The World Bank, 2005; Wolff & De Moura Castro, 2000). These roles involve policy problems, actors and interests that are different from those in basic and tertiary education. For example, the decision about the extent to which secondary education has to prepare students whether for labour market or tertiary education is a constant discussion between employers who want skilled workers, tertiary education institutions that want well-prepared students, and families that may want their kids to be more employable in the short term, or rather prefer them to continue their studies at a higher level. Hence, it is worthwhile to approach this educational level as a particular field of study.

Finally, this research addresses important questions that are also highly relevant and timely since Latin American countries are now experiencing a new wave of reforms to secondary education. For instance, along with the cases included in this study, other countries have initiated processes of reform, such as Mexico, Uruguay, Peru, etc. By the same token, different IOs keep informing these processes through the publication of
different reports about secondary education (e.g. Gropello, 2006; Tenti, 2003a; The World Bank, 2005; UNESCO, 2005; UNESCO/OREALC, 2002; UNICEF, 2010). Such reforms, like the ones undertaken in the past, may have lasting consequences for development and social inclusion.

**Defining Education Governance**

Rosenau (2004, p. 31) defines governance as the combination of formal and informal steering mechanisms to make demands, frame goals, issue directives, pursue policies, and generate compliance. Thus, the notion of governance entails at least four aspects: who has the power to make decisions, over what matters these decision makers have authority, how other actors participate in these decisions, and how an account of these matters is rendered. Considering these aspects, the governance of education determines how and who controls different education matters. *This study is particularly concerned with the changes in the governance of education provision, curriculum and evaluation.* As suggested in the first section of this chapter, these three dimensions have been substantially transformed in the last decades, and the combination of these changes has modified the role of the different stakeholders in the education system.

The governance of *education provision* has two dimensions. On the one hand, it refers to *who is entitled to deliver education*, whether the state through national schools, subnational units through provincial or municipal institutions, non-governmental actors through community schools, or private actors through private establishments (McGinn & Welsh, 1999). On the other hand, *provision is also related with school choice*. The decision of which school the students attend can be centrally regulated by state exams or based on geographic location. Alternatively, it can be the domain of schools that select students, or it may be a parental decision (Herbst, 2006).
Curricular governance also has two dimensions. First, it refers to who is entitled to decide the contents and desired learning outcomes of secondary education, whether the central government, subnational units, or schools and local communities. Second, the governance of the secondary school curriculum also refers to the orientation of its learning goals. Originally, secondary education across the world was often oriented to prepare a small elite through the development of an encyclopaedic knowledge of numerous specific academic areas (e.g. geography, history, chemistry, math, etc.) (White, 2011). With the process of industrialization and the expansion of secondary schooling, the encyclopaedic curriculum was displaced by a scientific curriculum based on studies which should determine learning objectives, and also what and how to teach (Pinar, 1995). Likewise, education systems all around the world typically adopted a distinction between academic and vocational secondary education (Benavot, 1983). As a result, currently, some countries have academic schools oriented to prepare students for higher education, separated from vocational institutions for the poorest or less skilled children (Kerckhoff, 2001). Others have included these two tracks within the same school with the purpose of bridging both types of knowledge, avoiding early specialization and providing wider opportunities to students from low socio-economic backgrounds. Some others try to combine both orientations into comprehensive schools that downplay job training and aim to provide more general and soft labour skills such as communication, planning, problem-solving, etc. (Kamens, 1996).

Finally, evaluation governance refers to who controls the mechanisms by which students are examined, whether teachers, subnational units, or central government. Evaluation governance also refers to the question of who is accountable for assessment results. In secondary education, student evaluation can have consequences exclusively for
students such as granting a degree or university admission (Eckstein & Noah, 1993). Alternatively, evaluation may also be used to assess the implementation of the curriculum (Kamens & McNeely, 2010). This assessment often makes teachers and schools accountable for results through incentives or sanctions, or through informing parental school choices. Lastly, student evaluation can also be employed to determine if programs and policies are rendering the expected benefits. In this case, government authorities are responsible for results and are expected to use them to inform policy decisions.

Considering the shift towards post-bureaucratic models of governance, the distribution of authority over these education dimensions works on a continuum. On one end, we have a strong control of a national agency over schools, and at the other end, authority is dispersed through subnational units or even private parties (Astiz & Wiseman, 2005). This idea of continuum is associated with the concept of decentralization, that is, the distribution of authority between central government and subordinate, semi-autonomous, or non-governmental institutions (Pollitt, 2007; Rondinelli, 1981). Decentralization involves different degrees of transfer of authority and responsibility: 1) deconcentration is the shift of functions and workload to subordinates at the local level without transferring authority; 2) delegation is the transfer of responsibility and some decision-making power to sub-national units but within the boundaries established at the central level; 3) devolution involves the transfer of authority to autonomous local units or non-governmental actors without the direct control of the central level; and 4) privatization implies responsibility and decision-making transfer to private actors, often regulated by a market rationale (Hanson, 1989; Rees, 2010; Rondinelli & Nellis, 1986).
Table 1.1 Policy choices for secondary education governance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model/ “main role of state”</th>
<th>Provision</th>
<th>Curriculum</th>
<th>Student assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State monopoly</td>
<td>Centralized by selectively recruiting students for elite national schools.</td>
<td>Centralized through national curriculum</td>
<td>Delegated to teachers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quasi-state monopoly</td>
<td>Deconcentrated to subnational levels with some school choice for families within the public system</td>
<td>Delegated to local levels within the boundaries of national curricular standards.</td>
<td>Partially delegated to teachers but also centralized through standardized tests to define policy and programs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dualist system</td>
<td>Privatized for a segment of the demand. Delegated to local levels for those that attend public schools</td>
<td>Devolved to the private sector. Delegated to local levels within a curricular framework.</td>
<td>Centralized to inform families in private schools, and to define policy and programs in public schools.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quasi-market of education</td>
<td>Privatized through full school choice</td>
<td>Devolved to schools</td>
<td>Centralized to inform parents and encourage competition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Author’s elaboration based on Maroy (2009) and Narodowski and Nores (2002).

According to the continuum between centralization and decentralization, these dimensions adopt different arrangements that constitute distinctive governance models. In order to categorize these models, I employ Maroy’s classification (2009) which identifies two post-bureaucratic models of education governance, the quasi-monopoly of the state and the quasi-market model. I add a third category based on Narodowski and Nores (2002), the dualist system (see Table 1.1). Based on these categories, I identify four typical combinations of governance arrangements that a country may adopt, but it does
not mean that these combinations cannot be hybridized in different contexts, as my research shows. Therefore, the classification presented here serves heuristic purposes.

At one end of the continuum, we find the classic bureaucratic model of governance. This model is also called ‘state monopoly of education’ by scholars who aim to highlight the limits that the state puts to parents and other actors to make educational choices (e.g. Almond, 1991; Narodowski & Andrada, 2004; Torrendell, 2002), or ‘teaching state’ by scholars who rather emphasize education as a substantial and primary responsibility of the state and its role in the building of national identity (e.g. Braslavsky, 1995; Southwell, 2002; Tedesco, Braslavsky, & Carciofi, 1983; Tiramonti, 2003). Regardless of the denomination, in this arrangement, the state is responsible for curricular decisions and the provision of educational services, although evaluation is mainly delegated to teachers with the main purpose of granting degrees.

In the middle of that continuum, we find a quasi-state monopoly of education in which the central authority deconcentrates the provision of education to subnational units, and also delegates curricular decisions. Yet, student evaluation remains mainly as a domain of teachers although some tests may be used to define education policy and programs (Maroy, 2009; Narodowski & Moschetti, 2015). Thirdly, in a dualist-system model, a portion of the education service, including provision and curricular decisions, is often devolved to private actors, while the state only focuses on the education of a certain segment of the demand, usually the poor (Narodowski & Andrada, 2001). Likewise, student assessment is centralized through standardized tests in order to inform parental school choices in the private sector, and define policy for public schools.3

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3Given the devolution of many responsibilities, this arrangement sometimes is named as ‘endowed state’ (e.g. Southwell, 2002; Tedesco et al., 1983), but also due to the
Finally, we find a quasi-market model. In this model, although the state still defines education goals, it is not anymore directly responsible for provision and curricular decisions. Instead, student evaluation is centralized in order for the state to deliver information about school performance, and for parents and students to decide what school to attend (Maroy, 2009; Narodowski, 2008). Given the varied models that a country can choose to govern education, and even more, considering the hybridization that countries can make from these typical arrangements, the question of why should a country adopt any of these policy choices becomes relevant. This study considers how well the existing literature addresses this question and proposes some theoretical innovations to better explain this puzzle.

Explaining Changes In Education Governance

Though political science has paid little attention to education policy, we can draw insights from three broad approaches to provide answers to the questions of what explains the general trend of the transition to post-bureaucratic models of secondary education governance, and why these models vary across countries that come from comparable educational traditions: economic functionalism, sociological institutionalism, and path-dependence approaches.

Economic functionalism.

Since the 1950s, an important role in human capital training was attributed to secondary education (The World Bank, 1971). As part of the skill regime, secondary education may be shaped by the skills requirements of every country (Busemeyer, 2009a). A more diversified economy and/or a high degree of industrialization would result in the centralization of evaluation, it is also labelled as ‘evaluator state’ (Maroy, 2009; Tiramonti, 2003).
incorporation of more specialized skills in the curriculum. By the same token, the
definition of these skills would be decentralized in order to adapt training goals to
different human capital needs within the country. A highly diversified and industrialized
economy demands skills that are not easily transportable between firms since they are
very specific and only valuable to particular employers (Estevez-Abe, Iversen, & Soskice,
2001). In this context, firms and states have the incentives to invest in education in order
to increase their productivity and competitiveness without the risk of competitors
poaching employees and training investment (Becker, 1993; Estevez-Abe et al., 2001).
Conversely, deindustrialization leads to a less specialized curriculum with more generic
skills, those that are fully transportable and valuable for many employers. As a result,
firms would be reluctant to invest in skills that can be poached by their competitors, and
only state and employees would be motivated to pay for general training (Becker, 1993;
Jensen, 2011). Under these circumstances, a limited capacity of the state to provide
secondary education would pave the way for the privatization of education, since future
workers would be aware of the need of holding a secondary degree to escape from
informal employment and unemployment (Schneider, 2013). Moreover, private provision
would call for accreditation systems to ensure quality training and guarantee the
investment of the trainees. Thus, accreditation systems relying on standardized
assessments would reduce the uncertainty for future employees and employers as well
(Green, 1999).

While domestic levels of industrialization and state capacity are assumed to shape
distinctive forms of education governance, global economic competition, according to the
economic functionalist logic, drives policy convergence. Economic crises, and pressures
for increasing competitiveness and foreign investment lead countries to reduce social
costs by making educational systems more efficient and transferring some costs to private actors. Similarly, changes in the labour market and the rise of a knowledge-based economy promote the incorporation and enhancement of transversal skills such as problem solving, working in teams, effective communication, handling information, etc., in order to make young people flexible and adaptable to changing work environments (Green, 1999). In this way, countries adopt international standards, such as those promoted by the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA), in order to evaluate their educational systems, use benchmarking to improve education quality, and thusly increase competitiveness in the global context (Kamens & McNeely, 2010).

Certainly, (de)industrialization, economic development and global economic competition play a role in the governance of secondary education. Indeed, the boost of vocational secondary schools in the 1950s and 1960s was associated with industrialization projects in different Latin American countries, and their decline was also linked with processes of de-industrialization (Gallart, Miranda, Peirano, & Sevilla, 2003). However, the economic functionalist approach ignores how the establishment of vocational secondary schools also served to track the demand of low income students into second-rate tiers, since vocational skills did not enjoy prestige among middle and upper classes (Gomez, Diaz, & Celis, 2009; Gomez, Turbay, Acuña, & Acosta, 1995; Pineau, 2004). Similarly, this approach neglects that the influence of the manufacturing sector in education decisions is often limited. For example, by the 1950s in Argentina, despite the fact that important industry associations had formally authority over secondary vocational curriculum, their influence was very restricted, and education bureaucrats had actually the upper hand regarding policy decisions (Gallart et al., 2003). Indeed, more often than not, employers were not convinced of the advantages of vocational secondary education,
whether because it raised the expectations of employees in terms of salaries (Gallart et al., 2003) or because employees’ training was not regarded as adequate for firms’ needs (Gomez et al., 1995; Turbay, 2005). Even though vocational education was deemed inadequate, these schools persisted and sometimes had re-flourished. Likewise, vocational secondary education in Colombia proved to be resistant although it is barely related with the skill requirements of the country.

In addition, evidence suggests that countries participating in international standardized assessments, or adopting national testing systems, are not necessarily committed to use them as benchmarking for their educational systems. For instance, Argentina enacted a national assessment system since mid 1990s and has participated consistently in PISA since 2001. However, the national system has been increasingly undermined to such an extent that currently it has become a purposeless tool. Similarly, the Kirchner government in 2012 excused Argentine poor performance in PISA by arguing the unsuitability of this foreign test to national conditions and values. Arguably, some countries are rather ‘persuaded’ to adopt these evaluation systems because it seems more legitimate to follow suit, or even because sometimes these tests are included as conditions for loans, as the Colombian and Argentine case reflect. In general, economic functionalist arguments fall short to explain the political dynamics behind education governance. Clearly, the arrangements that rule secondary education are not just the coincidence of similar global economic pressures, and divergence is not only attributable to different national economic structures. Rather, the interaction between global political pressures and domestic conflicts substantially shapes who steers education and how they do so. Thus, we need to account for this interaction in order to better explain the constitution of education governance.
Sociological institutionalism: the role of external pressures on education governance change.

Sociological institutionalism has become one of the leading approaches for the analysis of education governance, particularly in the field of comparative education. It begins from the observation that education systems across societies present strikingly similar practices and arrangements due to global or external forces that push them to such ‘isomorphism’ (H. Meyer & Rowan, 2006b; J. Meyer & Rowan, 1977). This approach shares similarities with policy convergence literature⁴ and diffusion theories in political science, including coercive diffusion, constructivist diffusion, and learning or cognitive diffusion (Beckert, 2010; Dobbin, Simmons, & Garrett, 2007; Weyland, 2005). Likewise, sociological institutionalism is also close to literature on globalization of education policy in the comparative education field, specifically the world-system perspective or the policy imposition approach (Edwards, 2013; Griffiths & Arnoce, 2015; Samoff, 2007). In addition, the world-culture or world-society perspective is extensively grounded in sociological institutional arguments (J. Meyer, 1997; Ramírez, 2012). Finally, approaches related with transnational agents or global networks of education policy build on sociological institutional insights about cognitive diffusion (Au & Ferrare, 2015; Ball, 2008; Mintrom, 2000).

DiMaggio and Powell suggest that isomorphism may be driven by ‘formal and informal pressures exerted on organizations by other organizations upon which they are dependent’ (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 150). This observation is consistent with the description proposed by coercive diffusion theories of the way in which international

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⁴ Policy convergence indicates the trend of states to solve policy problems in a similar way. This notion emphasizes the dynamic nature of convergence in which states depart from different positions and move towards some common policy (Bennett, 1991).
powerful actors impose certain policies to other countries through incentives and sanctions such as conditional loans or technical assistance (Dobbin et al., 2007; Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000). Similarly, studies based on world system theories in the comparative education field show how developing countries struggling with economic crisis often had little choice but to implement education reforms imposed by financial IOs, such as the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Arnowe, Torres, Franz, & Morse, 1996; Samoff, 2013).

Although coercion is undoubtedly part of the story about education reform in Latin America (Arnowe et al., 1996), this approach often assumes that the presence of coercion mechanisms necessarily causes the imposition. However, governments often fail to implement the conditions required by external actors. For example, this study shows how Colombia ended up transforming and discontinuing a school voucher program prepared and funded by the WB. Similarly, sometimes governments may ask for loans and conditions to further enforce their own agenda and interests, as the Chilean education reform in the 1990s proves. This evidence is consistent with criticisms of the coercive diffusion theory posed by other scholars (Castiglioni, 2005; Dion, 2008; Weyland, 2005).

To be sure, despite similarities with coercive diffusion, explanations of education policy based on sociological institutionalism have de-emphasized coercion (Beckert, 2010; Griffiths & Arnowe, 2015). Instead, these accounts build on the general sociological institutionalist argument that point at globally legitimized, taken-for-granted ideas as institutionalized norms that determine the appropriate behaviour of actors, shape and legitimate identities, and constrain their practices. These norms travel through mimetic processes or normative pressures, which explain isomorphism or policy convergence (Hall & Taylor, 1996; March & Olsen, 1998; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). Constructivist
diffusion theories build on the idea of mimesis by showing how international actors spread global norms and frame them as appropriate solutions to policy problems while countries in uncertain circumstances take these solutions for granted (Beckert, 2010; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Finnemore, 1993, 1996; McNeely, 1995). Building on sociological institutionalism, world-society theory in comparative education argues that countries follow external models, such as mass schooling or national assessment systems. This emulation is driven by ‘globalized myths’ that teach what has to be done and not necessarily by the assessment of technical solutions to train workers or increase quality, but because these models are ‘globalized myths’ that teach what has to be done (Kamens & McNeely, 2010; J. Meyer & Hannan, 1979; Ramírez, 2012).

One of the advantages of the idea of mimesis in particular, and sociological institutionalism in general, is that it contests the arguments of economic functionalism by suggesting that institutional arrangements are adopted because of the perception of its legitimacy and appropriateness, and not because of its actual functionality. Changes in the governance of secondary education in Argentina, Chile and Colombia are certainly associated with the crisis of the welfare state and the rise of the new public management (NPM) idea that private actors may do a better and more efficient job than the public sector (Levy, 2006). Further, IOs such as the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the United Nations’ Economic Commission for Latin America (CEPAL), the WB, the Unite States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Organization of American States (OAS), as well as some US universities were all engaged in diffusing ideas of state retrenchment in education (Galarza, Suasnabar, & Merodo, 2007; Mundy, 1999; Mundy & Menashy, 2014; Verger, 2012). These ideas included decentralization of education decisions, the incorporation of school
choice, result-based accountability, school autonomy, etc., all of them framed as the most appropriate way to solve the inefficiency of public education systems.

However, the diffusion of NPM ideas has not produced the expected policy convergence. School choice has been fully implemented in Chile but is very limited in Colombia and Argentina; standardized exams are widely institutionalized only in Chile and Colombia; and curricular autonomy is only moderately adopted in Colombia, but restrained in Chile and Argentina (see Figure 1.1). The exaggeration of convergence is a consequence of the emphasis on the taken-for-granted nature attributed to global norms that depicts domestic actors as unable to contest it or think outside the template the norm provides (Campbell, 2004).

Unlike the top-down character of coercive and mimetic diffusion mechanisms, normative diffusion emphasizes a domestic-led process (Sugiyama, 2012). Normative pressures refer to processes of socialization through professional training and networks (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Djelic, 2004; Owen-Smith & Powell, 2008). This observation is consistent with cognitive diffusion in political science, which claim that policy diffusion proceeds through policy networks or epistemic communities that tend to favor the adoption of similar policies based on shared professional standards or norms (Haas, 1992; Stone, 2004; Sugiyama, 2011). Scholars in comparative education also highlight the role of policy networks and epistemic communities in the diffusion of global norms, but rather than domestic actors in the network, they emphasize the role of international actors such as IOs, transnational non-governmental organizations and movements, transnational philanthropies, etc. (Ball, 2008; Menashy, 2016a, 2016b; Verger, 2009). Although important, this emphasis obscures again the role of domestic factors in the diffusion of education policy.
Scholars pointing at domestic-led epistemic communities as factors explaining policy diffusion acknowledge that professional norms are not necessarily based on a perfect rationality, but rely on precarious or ambiguous data about the success of the experience and are constrained by initial policy decisions (Weyland, 2005). However, normative diffusion arguments still downplay the fact that policymakers do not only make technical decisions but are also constrained by vested interests tied to existing domestic arrangements (Béland, 2006). Consequently, although my evidence suggests that sociological institutionalism provides a compelling explanation for the transition from a state-run education system to post-bureaucratic forms of governance, policy diffusion whether by coercive, mimetic or normative mechanisms, cannot fully determine domestic decisions, and other domestic factors need to be considered in order to explain diffusion processes and answer what happens once a diffused policy arrives at a domestic context (Campbell, 2004).

**Strategic responses to global ideas.**

In order to compensate for these shortcomings, some organizational scholars building on sociological institutionalism have recently posed the question of whether and how normative-oriented actors can behave strategically to address institutional pressures (DiMaggio, 1988; Oliver, 1991; Pache & Santos, 2010; Sahlin, 2008). To be sure, sociological institutionalism submits that education systems do not just passively emulate global ideas but sometimes contest them by just decoupling the norm from the actual practice (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008; J. Meyer & Rowan, 1991). In other words, education systems abide only superficially by global norms and adopt new structures

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5 The normative mechanism is also present in comparative education studies that identify transnational education policy entrepreneurs and networks (Robertson, Mundy, & Verger, 2012; Verger, 2012; Verger, Altinyelken, & Novelli, 2012).
without necessarily implementing the related practices. This decoupling arises when the adoption of global norms threatens the efficiency of the education system, when the system cannot cope with the global demand, or when the system is subject to multiple conflicting institutional pressures. A good example of decoupling is the way in which Argentina, Chile and Colombia officially committed with the manpower planning perspective diffused in the 1950s and 1960s and its subsequent expansion of public secondary education. Yet, these countries simultaneously fuelled the growth of private provision, sometimes to cope with the increasing enrolment demand, sometimes to accommodate the interests of certain private providers, particularly the Church.

The acknowledgement of decoupling raises questions about the actual change of domestic practices due to global norms or, put differently, the extent to what these norms really matter in terms of domestic policy change (Sahlin, 2008). Furthermore, the mere possibility of decoupling suggests that domestic actors can act pragmatically towards global ideas, identify the possibility of non-conformity, and act somewhat strategically. This notion contradicts, or at least relaxes, the original argument of global ideas as taken-for-granted norms. This theoretical change has two consequences for sociological institutionalism. First, it calls for better specification of the conditions in which domestic policymakers engage in full conformity or in decoupling. Second, it suggests that policy change might not be just a product of external institutional pressures, such as global norms, but also from internal strategic responses, a possibility that was neglected by the original sociological institutionalist core.

In order to deal with these challenges, sociological institutionalists students of organizations acknowledge that global ideas do not diffuse in a vacuum but in the context of other existing institutionalized ideas (Kirkpatrick, Bullinger, Lega, & Dent, 2013;
Sahlin, 2008). Thus, actors reinterpret and transform global norms guided by domestic normative orientations. These scholars still acknowledge the social-fact character of both global norms and domestic institutions, but they also claim that such rule-like character needs to be continuously nurtured. The need of persistent maintenance suggests that global norms and domestic arrangements might also be eroded or deinstitutionalized (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Oliver, 1992). In this way, ‘institutional entrepreneurs’ can maintain or disrupt institutional arrangements if they have the resources and motivation to do it (Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004). Institutional entrepreneurs may be powerful actors that work to maintain the status quo (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006) or who disrupt their own institutions by bringing new ideas that further favour their interests (Hardy & Maguire, 2008). Alternatively, a mounting performance crisis can also transform less powerful actors into institutional entrepreneurs, who forge collective action and accumulate sufficient resources to make dominant actors bargain new institutional configurations (Hardy & Maguire, 2008; Oliver, 1992; Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2008).

With the concept of ‘institutional entrepreneurship’, these scholars suggest that institutions and conflict between actors’ interests and motivations are mutually constitutive (Hardy & Maguire, 2008).

Building on these propositions, these sociological organizational scholars go beyond the notion of decoupling and propose a more nuanced classification of responses to norms that suggests different degrees of (de)institutionalization from full compliance to manipulation of the norm. This classification is correlated with the extent to what global norms negatively affect domestic institutions (Oliver, 1991; Pache & Santos, 2010): 1) acquiescence, conformity or full compliance often happens when the norm is consistent with the domestic arrangement. Therefore, the norm does not affect domestic efficiency
and indeed it may increase the legitimacy of the arrangement; 2) compromise includes the accommodation of global and domestic relatively conflicting pressures; 3) avoidance involves a disguised non-conformity and/or a reduction of scrutiny from outside by ritually adopting the global norm without changing substantially domestic practices. In this way, avoidance draws from the idea of decoupling; 4) defiance is a more active form of resistance which includes dismissal or contestation of the global norm when the incentives to follow it are low (legitimacy or efficiency); and finally 5) manipulation is the most active expression of resistance by attempting to co-opt or control carriers of global ideas in order to change or reframe the global norm.

These different responses are helpful to describe changes in education governance in the countries of this study. For instance, Chile seems to be conforming to education privatization ideas (acquiescence). Colombia showed evidence of compromise in the 1990s by protecting public schools from direct competition, and simultaneously promoting public-private partnerships as education providers. Likewise, Argentina avoided school autonomy, and curricular decisions remained relatively centralized in these countries. Meanwhile, in the 1980s, Chile manipulated ideas of curricular autonomy by reframing them as reduction of the curriculum. In the area of evaluation, Chile conforms global ideas of standardized assessment and accountability, Colombia avoids accountability by decoupling testing results from consequences for low performance, and Argentina defies global norms of accountability by implementing purposeless evaluation instruments.

Although these different responses acknowledge that the adoption of conflicting global norms by domestic institutions is problematic, they focus only on the conflict between the global and the domestic level. Thus, the domestic field is portrayed as a
unified and cohesive context. As a result, these responses do not fully account for conflict within the domestic domain. This point is very relevant for educational systems since they are often subject to heterogeneous and competing pressures from multiple constituents, such as parents, teachers, education providers, education experts, employers, who may eventually advocate or resist global norms.

Comparative education scholars have paid more attention to this point by describing the ‘politics of policy borrowing’ (Steiner-Khamsi, 2004b, 2014). These scholars contend that domestic actors ‘borrow’ foreign policy ideas that serve their policy agendas (Silova, 2009; Spreen, 2004; Steiner-Khamsi, 2004a). Stated differently, students of education policy borrowing shift away from the normative character of global ideas and instead regard them as instrumental tools to further particular interests at the domestic level. Consequently, these scholars describe policy borrowing as a two-stage process. The first stage, reception, refers to the ‘importation’ of global ideas due to their relevance for domestic vested interests. The second stage involves the translation of these ideas according to existing domestic policies and institutions (Steiner-Khamsi, 2014). Studying this two-stage process, scholars contest the notion of policy convergence and identify different types of translation: 1) hybridization, which refers to the combination of domestic practices and global ideas (Anderson-Levitt, 2003; Maroy, 2009); 2) addition or juxtaposition of global ideas and domestic institutions, which may eventually produce a gradual change of both of them but not their displacement (Steiner-Khamsi, 2012); 3) reinforcement of domestic institutions using global ideas to enhance the legitimacy of a existing policy (Silova, 2005; Steiner-Khamsi, Silova, & Johnson, 2006); and 4) inspiration, which refers to the process of drawing lessons from knowledge organizations (IOs, think tanks, etc.) or from other countries (Steiner-Khamsi & Waldow, 2013).
These studies provide detailed descriptions of translation processes that contribute to understand policy variation and the agentic role of the domestic level. Nevertheless, they do not explain why on some occasions this encounter between global ideas and domestic institutions leads to hybridization, but on other occasions it leads just to juxtaposition, or in some others it ends up in the reinforcement of the domestic institution. Although these scholars acknowledge that reception and translation processes are constrained by cultural legacies (Steiner-Khamsi, 2004b), their account sometimes depicts voluntaristic processes, and do not fully define the way in which cultural legacies operate. They just point at them as filters of information and constraints for full instrumental decisions towards global ideas. Therefore, we can still ask why so many ‘strategic’ domestic actors draw from the same global ideas or, put differently, what makes these ideas so attractive if they do not have any normative character. To answer these questions, we still need to determine the character of global ideas and better understand what shapes actors’ decisions at the domestic level.

Path dependence: Domestic institutions as mechanism of translation.

One way to address the shortcomings of sociological institutionalism, diffusion theories, and comparative education literature is to better specify the notion of legacies as constraints of policy change. Historical institutionalism also employs the notion of translation defined as ‘the combination of new externally given elements received through diffusion as well as old locally given ones inherited from the past’ (Campbell, 2004, p. 80). In other words, these scholars study how the processes of translation are constrained by the domestic institutional context, and how translation can fuel revolutionary or evolutionary policy change.
By the same token, historical institutionalism has elaborated more nuanced definition of legacies or path dependence. Traditional understandings of path dependence in political science originate from the idea that once a particular institution has been chosen, it generates increasing returns or benefits for the actors who sustain it. These benefits make the institution highly resistant to change or ‘lock it in’ (Mahoney, 2000; Pierson, 2000). These increasing returns are not limited to material or instrumental resources, but also include increasing legitimization of the institution or positive feedback (Mahoney, 2000). Consequently, on the one hand, institutions only change by external shocks or critical junctures, which contingency and uncertainty provide room for agency and choice. On the other hand, institutional reproduction is a deterministic process defined and secured by the initial choices (Mahoney, 2000; Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). Putting differently, radical institutional change is abrupt while gradual change is not immediately transformative.

Indeed, bureaucratic models of education governance changed in Argentina, Chile, and Colombia in the context of dramatic episodes: dictatorship, democratization and economic crises. Yet, with the likely exception of Chile, these countries did not undertake abrupt transformations of their educational systems. Hence, this specific dynamic of change in these countries raises different questions for the traditional understanding of path dependence. Considering that Argentina went through many arguable critical junctures, such as dictatorship, democratization, and two harsh economic crises (1980s and 2001), why did the secondary education governance not experience a radical change but a gradual transformation? Similarly, why was education governance in Colombia not abruptly transformed in the context of democratization in the 1990s, but it is now very different from it was in the 1970s? Why did dictatorship in Chile radically change
education but democratization did not? In general, how can we identify if a critical juncture really occurred or if small changes are not really transformative in the long run?

Pierson’s arguments can be helpful to address these questions and explain how bureaucratic school systems, survive and adapt but also get gradually modified. Pierson (1995, 1996) argues that cutbacks in welfare are barely radical since politicians would not easily bear the electoral consequences of unpopular decisions. Large constituents of welfare would not accept cuts unless decision makers are able to present them as unavoidable or necessary to face a specific situation, such as economic crises. Yet, more often than not, politicians would avoid the blame of state retrenchment, and therefore, they would make only small policy changes that in the long run can cause substantial transformations. Similarly, the cases analyzed in this study show that education governance presents some continuities as a product of policy feedback and increasing returns, but also shows changes that arise from constant political contestation among teachers, providers, parents, education bureaucrats, students, etc. Changes in these groups of actors and their power distribution affect and modify current institutional arrangements. These changes are often gradual and sometimes unintended.

These findings are consistent with other studies on education policy conducted by historical institutionalist scholars who claim that policy choices depend on the path dependent logic of national institutions and on-going political contestation among the coalitions that support education systems (Busemeyer, 2012; Thelen, 2012, 2014). In this way, institutions and actors’ behaviour co-constitute one another. On the one hand, institutions influence the creation and power relationships of constellations of winners or losers. On the other hand, decisions of these constellations and their interaction can alter the institution in profound ways (Busemeyer, 2009a, 2012; Thelen, 2004, 2014). These
arguments resonate with the concept of institutional entrepreneurship suggested by sociological organization scholars.

Historical institutionalist scholars often refer to the political resources of actors as one of the main factors explaining institutional change, but they also argue that institutions do not necessarily reflect the interests of the dominant constellation (Hacker, 2004; Mahoney & Thelen, 2010; Thelen, 2014). For example, Thelen (2014) argues that low and middle-skilled workers may prevent the privatization of vocational training if they are organized in robust and inclusive labour unions. The evidence provided by my study illustrates these claims. For instance, in the Colombian education reform of 1990s, although the government had enough political support in the Congress to privatize education, the national teacher union banned this proposal through the mobilization of its robust organization. Similarly, the public resonance of the student mobilization in Chile in recent years managed to reform the national education law, despite the undeniable and well-established opposition of the alliance between private providers, the right party coalition, and a sector of the Christian Democratic party.

The observation about the importance of political resources for policy change is helpful to complement sociological institutionalism accounts and amend the somewhat voluntaristic explanation of comparative education studies. Usually, historical institutionalism has been employed to better understand ‘how (domestic) institutions both survive and change through time…(by) outliving their founding coalitions (and) reconfiguring their coaltional base in light of shifting social, political and market conditions’ (Thelen, 2004, p. 33; e.g. Busemeyer, 2012; Dion, 2010; Falleti, 2005; Thelen & Kume, 1999). This study agrees with this argument, and demonstrates how it can be rephrased as an innovation for sociological institutionalism in order to advance our
understanding of the translation of global education norms. My core argument is that

global ideas are reconfigured by groups of domestic actors in order to help winners or

losers of domestic institutions reproduce or change these arrangements. Briefly speaking,

by bridging historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism, we will be better

able to understand how policy constellations and domestic institutions interact to produce
different strategic responses towards global norms, and thusly, different trajectories of
change. The following section unpacks this argument and lays out the hypotheses to test
it.

**When global ideas and domestic interests collide: bridging sociological and
historical institutionalism.**

The main focus of this dissertation is to explain the causes and variations in the

transition to post-bureaucratic education governance models. As noted above, on the one
hand, recent developments in sociological institutionalism posit that NPM global ideas

drive domestic policy-makers to translate them into variant domestic post-bureaucratic
education models. On the other hand, historical institutionalism argues that domestic
institutions shape this translation to make these global ideas fit domestic interests. These
alternative approaches regard institutions in a slightly different -but not incompatible-
way. Sociological institutionalism sees institutions as norms that shape the appropriate
identity, behaviour and practice of actors. Yet, these norms are always subject to
reinterpretation. Thus, struggles over meaning may change norms and therefore the way
in which they are implemented at the domestic level (Hardy & Maguire, 2008; Sahlin,
2008). As Hall (2010, p. 205) puts it, norms are ‘instruments the actors use to negotiate
the complexity of the world’. By contrast, historical institutionalism defines institutions
as formal and informal rules and procedures, although this perspective does not dismiss
ideas and norms as other forms of institutions (Campbell, 2002; Hall, 1989, 1993; Hansen & King, 2001; Katzenstein, 1998). These scholars also see institutions as objects of active reinterpretation but they emphasize the role of power imbalances and political conflict, rather than the contents of the reinterpretation process. Clearly, there are complementarities between both schools of thought that may advance our understanding of the variant transitions to post-bureaucratic education governance described in this study.

To some extent, the combination of sociological and historical institutionalism is not entirely new, and some scholars have bridged these perspectives to analyse other policy areas outside the education field. On the one hand, Djelic et al (Djelic, 2008; Djelic & Quack, 2007) have employed the concept of path dependence to analyse the building of transnational institutions. They contend that the recombination of different national institutional legacies is a significant factor of transnational rule making. Yet, the analysis of how transnational rules affect domestic institutional trajectories is secondary in their research. By the same token, they did not specify the role of power in the institution-building process. Instead, they portray a process of consensus building reliant on a logic of appropriateness.

On the other hand, Campbell (1998, 2001, 2004) introduces the notion of translation to describe the interaction between the diffusion of neoliberal fiscal reform models and domestic political institutions. While the diffused models create certain policy similarities across countries, domestic politics produce divergent national responses. Other scholars have posed similar approaches to analyse the diffusion of global ideas (e.g Soysal, 1995; Soysal & Szakács, 2010). However, they do not address the question of when global ideas are more likely to be fully conformed and when they are likely to be
resisted. The approach presented here directly addresses this question and claims that although diffusion mechanisms are necessary for a global idea to arrive at a country, they are not sufficient to explain its translation. Instead, the degree of conflict or inconsistency between the global idea and the domestic institution, the extent to which the global idea can be discretionary interpreted at the domestic level, and the power resources and subsequent strategies of constituents of both, global ideas and domestic institutions are the factors that combined define the degree of translation of a global norm.

Building on the two-step process of reception and translation proposed by comparative education literature, my analysis of secondary education governance in Latin America points out that the mechanisms of diffusion suggested by sociological institutionalism are adequate to explain the reception of a global idea at a specific country. However, the type of translation is better explained by the way in which the global idea serves or undermines domestic actors’ interests and interacts with the power distribution between its supporters and opponents (see Figure 1.2).
Regarding the reception, we need to address the question of why and how a global idea about education governance arrives at a country, especially if such idea is at odds with the domestic institution. The answer lies on coercive, mimetic, and normative mechanisms as channels that are not mutually exclusive, and which presence or absence is mainly explained by domestic factors.

*Proposition 1. The lack of financial resources and/or technical capacity in a country increases the chances of international actors to exert coercive or mimetic pressures on domestic governments and make it adopt a specific education policy.*

Coercive diffusion theories argue that imposition exerted by international actors shape policy in countries reliant on these entities for funding or expertise (Griffiths & Armove, 2015; Samoff, 2013). Through coercion, such as conditional loans or technical assistance, international actors impose their preferred education policy on recipient countries. Through mimesis, domestic actors follow globally accepted policy ideas, because they are considered the most appropriate and legitimate decisions. Nevertheless, although these coercive and mimetic mechanisms may define the policy agenda in terms
of framing problems and their solutions, actual implementation is still subject to reinterpretation by domestic actors. Thus, coercion and mimesis certainly helps global ideas travel to a country and constrain the choices of domestic policy makers, but they do not entirely determine their decisions. A good example of the relative impact of coercion and mimesis is the financial and technical assistance provided by UNESCO, the WB and other IOs to promote ideas about central planning and manpower supply in the 1960s. With this funding, countries all over Latin America created educational planning offices and embarked in the elaboration of educational plans. Also, regional UNESCO conferences consistently insisted in the adoption of planning as the best way to expand education and promote development (Blat Gimeno, 1983; Martinez, 2004). Yet, secondary education reforms were different across countries. Colombia just ritually adopted the recommendations with only minor changes in its education system, Chile actively engaged in transforming secondary education although accommodating the interests of private providers, and Argentina expanded the enrolment but also fuelled private provision and gradually discouraged technical schools.

Proposition 2. The presence or close connection in the decision-making process of experts trained or highly influenced by international actors increases the chances of reception and conformity with of a global idea.

Different scholars have pointed at foreign trained policy experts or technocrats as crucial actors in the adoption of foreign policy prescriptions (Biglaiser, 2002; Teichman, 2001; Uribe, 2014). Sociological institutionalism also suggests that similar education and training instil similar values which are carried by the trainees to their domestic context favouring the adoption of similar practices and structures (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). Although these scholars acknowledge that these technocrats
are constrained by domestic institutions and interests, these limitations are often considered as secondary, and these technocrats are subsequently portrayed as the drivers of the imported policy reform. Indeed, the well-documented case of the Chicago Boys in Chile supports this argument (e.g. Biglaiser, 2002; Valdes, 1995). Given their training in US universities under the influence of the Chicago School of Economics, this group was certainly able to introduce foreign ideas that were at odds with the Chilean education system and transform it in a radical way.

Nevertheless, like-minded and also well-positioned technocrats in Colombia and Argentina did not achieve the same results. Thus, while it is true that these technocrats may alter substantially the educational system, it is also true that existing domestic institutions are not just the landscape in which these technocrats operate. Existing institutions and global ideas as well create and serve specific interests and correspondent constituents that shape the relationship of these technocrats with the government and direct the influence they have in the policy decisions. In this way, foreign trained technocrats are important for a conflicting global idea to arrive at a country, but translation depends on many other factors beyond the influence of these technocrats.

Once an idea has arrived at a domestic context, it must face the domestic institution for its translation. This encounter may produce affinity, if the global idea and the domestic institution share a similar rationale, or may cause conflict if the global norm challenges existing practices and threatens the interests the domestic institution serves.

**Proposition 3. Conflict between global norms and domestic institutions increases the chances of resistance to the norm. Compatibility between both of them enhances their legitimacy and the likelihood of conformity to the global idea.**
Scholars from sociological institutionalism have shown that global ideas constrain what decision-makers perceive as useful and appropriate to solve problems (Drori, Meyer, & Hwang, 2006; Sahlin, 2008). By the same token, historical institutionalists argue that domestic institutions bind actors’ worldview and their subsequent preferences and strategies (Blyth, 2002, 2010; Hansen & King, 2001). If both, global ideas and domestic institutions, restrain actors’ behaviour, then consistence between them will further crystalize existing institutions enhancing its taken-for-granted character and making it difficult to redesign in the future. A good example of this sort of crystallization is the public school in Argentina, which is still considered indisputably as the most appropriate way to deliver education. Similarly, school choice in Chile has increasingly solidified due partially to global ideas that favoured private provision and competition among schools since the 1980s.

**Proposition 4. When global norms and domestic institutions are in conflict, the greater the degree of discretion to interpret the global norm, the greater the likelihood of conformity.**

Even though global norms may challenge domestic arrangements, domestic policy-makers may be willing to conform it, if it is relatively open to interpretation. When the norm is uncertain, -that means when it does not directly prescribe a specific route or standard for implementation-, domestic actors have room to act strategically and manage conflict by accommodating different interests, as sociological organizational institutionalism suggests (Oliver, 1991). For instance, the ‘Education for All’ framework (EFA) from the UN provides broad conventional goals for education but does not give detailed guidance for implementation. Although the idea of education as a human right brings the role of state back in the discussion of education policy, the framework does not
preclude market-based solutions. Thus, it gives plenty of room to accommodate very different interests at the domestic level, and countries -including those analysed in this study- easily adopt the framework.

Conversely, prescriptions regarding accountability based on standardized assessment systems or school vouchers are clear route maps that exclude many interests, and therefore are more prone to be resisted. In these cases, the conflict between the global norm and the domestic institution undermines the taken-for-granted nature of both of them, and paves the way for winners and losers of existing arrangements to realign and push for or against change. In this way, global ideas and domestic institutions may become instrumental for the preferences of domestic actors, and may also serve to build coalitions around them (Hansen & King, 2001). The conflict between supporters and opponents of the global idea largely define the fate of the translation.

Proposition 5. The level of organization, the closeness to the decision-making process, and the impact of the power resources of supporters and opponents of the global idea define the degree of translation. Greater influence of supporters increases the likelihood of conformity, while greater influence of opponents tips the balance towards resistance.

Studies drawing from historical institutionalism often resort to political parties and salient interest groups, such as unions, as crucial actors to explain chances of policy change (e.g. Dion, 2010; Hacker, 2004; Huber & Stephens, 2012; Mahoney & Thelen, 2010; Thelen, 2004, 2014). However, findings of these studies are sometimes inconsistent. While some scholars have found that party ideology is not able to predict education policy outcomes since the ideological difference between parties have become smaller (Burton, 2011; Klitgaard, 2008), still others argue that left and right parties vary
with regard to their education policy preferences (Castiglioni, 2005; Pribble, 2013). By the same token, unions have often found to be resistant to reforms that aim at improving the quality of education (Grindle, 2004a, 2004b; Lowden, 2004) while still some studies have found that teacher unions sometimes collaborate with progressive reforms (Eberts, 2007; Mausethagen, 2012).

I argue that these apparently inconsistent research findings result from the fact that these collective actors have been often considered unified groups with uniform preferences and interests. Rather, I contend that these collectives are hardly homogeneous and may contain different segments with sometimes conflicting interests. Recognizing the cleavages within collective actors involved in the education policy process is crucial to understand the kind of translation that global norms may experience. For example, the expansion of school choice in Chile convinced large constituents of middle-class parents of the advantages of private education provision. At the same time, low-income parents, with very limited leeway to choose school, and public school teachers, wanted public schools to be favoured by education policy. In this way, left and center left parties, such as the Christian-Democrat party and the Socialist party, struggle to reconcile the different interest of these segments that have been traditionally part of their constituency. Therefore, I argue that these different segments may constitute transversal actor constellations that operate as ‘institutional entrepreneurs’ and crucially determine policy outcomes.

Transversal constellation refers then to actors that join forces in order to push for an arrangement that favours their interests, although such interests are not necessarily the same. On the one hand, my notion of transversal actor constellation resembles to some extent Thelen’s identification of cross-class coalitions based on the cooperation between
particular segments of business and labour (Thelen, 2004, 2014). Yet, in my study, segments and their subsequent cooperation are not necessarily class-based. Rather, segmentation occurs within more specific stakeholders of school systems such as teacher, parents, education providers, political parties, etc. By the same token, this segmentation is not exclusively based on interests. Sometimes, segmentation happens due to different perceptions of what is appropriate for the group. For example, divisions within the teachers’ union may be defined by different perceptions about how teachers should be regarded, whether as public-service workers or as professionals of education (Tenti, 2006).

On the other hand, my definition is also closer to Scharpf’s notion of constellation as composite actors shaped by institutions which determine ‘the membership… and the material and legal action resources they can draw upon, and thus the scope of their legitimate activities and the powers of the individuals who act for them, but also the purposes that they are to serve or the values that they are to consider in arriving at their choices’ (Scharpf, 1997, p. 39). Nevertheless, my idea of ‘transversal’ goes beyond the type of corporate actors typically specified by Scharpf, and instead suggests that association may occur also between different corporate actors when they have the opportunity together to shift institutional rules to their convenience.

Consequently, the different cleavages that define actor constellations are only empirically identifiable. Since the preferences and interests of actors arise from historically constituted institutional arrangements in each country, we need to identify them only on the basis of available data. Notwithstanding, we can divide our population of actors into two hypothetical constellations of supporters and opponents of a global norm. As sociological organization literature and historical institutionalism suggest, the
asymmetries of power between supporters and opponents, and their correspondent strategies are crucial elements defining the type of translation.

I point to the importance of *three* factors in particular that affect the degree to which these actor constellations may influence a translation. The first of these factors concerns the *organizational capability* of actors involved in the supporter and opponent constellation. Membership and cohesion are determinants of organizational capability as in the case of large segments of cohesive teacher unions, or organizations of private providers. Organizations of students and parents are also examples of organizational capability, but sometimes these groups are not very cohesive and are more likely to be coopted by other groups or simply dismissed in the decision-making process. The second of these factors concerns *access or closeness to the decision-making process*. Whether by formal mechanisms, such as participation in law reform commissions or legislative debate, or by informal means, such as personal or business ties with members of the legislative or political parties, some actors may have the ability to join forces together, and undermine or push for a reform. Finally, the third factor concerns the *public impact of the power resources* mobilized by the different constellations. For example, teachers’ strikes are often an effective way to put pressure on government decisions. Also, the diffusion of research that magnify or downplay educational results can also exert influence on policy outcomes. These three factors vary independently of one another producing different degrees of influence of the supporters and opponents of the global norm. If a constellation is composed by highly cohesive groups, have members close to the decision-making process, and mobilize high-impact resources, it will have a high influence in the translation. Conversely, if the constellation only has dispersed members
with scarce ties with the decision sphere, and few significant resources, its influence will be low.

Table 1.2 Constellation influence and type of translation of the global norm.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of influence</th>
<th>Supporters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opponents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High influence</td>
<td>Compromise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate influence</td>
<td>Compromise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low influence</td>
<td>Acquiescence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The asymmetries of influence between the two constellations define the type of translation as suggested in Table 1.2. Following the classification of types of translation of organizational sociological institutionalism, conformity or acquiescence to global norms is only possible when the supporter constellation has moderate to high influence and the opponents are weak. Alternatively, when both constellations have moderate to high influence, compromise is the more likely result. That means both groups will need to bargain the policy outcome and, in this process, the global norm will be transformed to accommodate the interests of the opponent group. Resistance to the global norm will increase when the opponents have high influence. Avoidance or decoupling is more likely to occur when the influence of the supporters is moderate. Defiance is more likely to happen when supporters of global norm are weak. And finally manipulation is more likely to take place when supporters are weak but the influence of the opponents of the global norm is only moderate. In this case, opponents are more likely to try to co-opt the supporters or convert the global norm in a way that increase their influence and favour their interests. Finally, if both groups are weak, it is likely that the domestic institution
does not really change but anyway it could be framed as if it were following the global norm in order to draw from its legitimacy.

**Methodology**

My research relies on comparative historical analysis (CHA), as a suitable mode of inquiry into large-scale processes (Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2003). This mode of research has been traditionally employed to address ‘big questions’ and analyse the evolution of the modern world (Mahoney, 2004). With the purpose of asking and answering questions about long-term processes, CHA focuses on a well-defined set of cases and a substantial time frame in order to ‘test existing theoretical hypotheses and develop new causal generalizations to replace invalidated ones’ (Skocpol, 1980, p. 182). In other words, the systematic comparison of the unfolding of long-term processes and their outcomes assesses, refines and generates concepts and new explanations. The constitution and change of the governance of education systems is a substantial part of the evolution of the modern world. Scholars have shown how mass state-sponsored educational systems became a major component of the nation-state building process (Boli, 1985; J. Meyer, 1997). Similarly, other scholars have also demonstrated how later the ‘crisis of the welfare state’ produced a shift from state to private-managed schooling (Bernasconi, 2006; Levy, 2006). Therefore, the study of education governance demands the acknowledgment of timing and sequences of events as crucial aspects of the analysis, as CHA permits.

Consistent with CHA, my study seeks to identify the causal configurations that produce the above-described shift towards post-bureaucratic models of secondary education governance in Latin America and its cross-national variation. With this purpose, I analyse the historical sequences that constitute the evolution of educational
systems in Argentina, Chile and Colombia, paying careful attention to the timing of events and their unfolding across time. Additionally, systematic comparison of these cases is employed in order to test the different hypotheses proposed here, and make sense of the phenomena of convergence and variation in the secondary education governance.

Following Przeworski and Teune’s comparative historical logic (1970), I select two cases (Argentina and Chile) that have in common the hypothesized causal factors –or most of them- but differ in their outcome (most-similar cases) and one case (Colombia), which lacks some of the hypothesized causes and nevertheless presents a clear transition to a post-bureaucratic governance model (most-different case). This combination of most-similar and most-different cases is powerful for establishing causal mechanisms. In brief, this study is committed to identifying similarities and differences across cases that help to determine, first, why different combination of conditions may lead to convergent governance models, and second, why similar factors may drive to variant directions in different contexts (Locke & Thelen, 1995; Ragin, 1989).

My CHA is complemented with the use of process tracing. Process tracing is a qualitative method that requires very detailed descriptions of trajectories of change in order to find empirical patterns. These descriptions permit testing hypothesized causal mechanisms and build theoretical explanations (Beach & Pedersen, 2013; George & Bennett, 2005). Researchers collect substantial evidence and build sequences of empirically grounded events. This evidence is the basis for several empirical tests of researcher’s hypotheses or causal inferences. Passing these different tests establishes the necessity or sufficiency for affirming causal inferences (Collier, 2011). Consequently, process tracing is employed in this study to systematically examine and carefully describe the causal nexus between (combined) independent and dependent variables in different
points in which secondary education governance reforms were attempted in each selected
country. Furthermore, process tracing is particularly valuable to ascertain the motivations
and channels by which an education-related global norm arrives at a specific country, and
to examine how domestic actors constellations are realigned by the effect of this global
norm.

Consistent with CHA and process tracing, this research combines nominal and
with-in case strategies of comparison. Nominal strategies allow identifying necessary
and/or sufficient conditions -or combination of conditions- for a specific outcome
occurring across cases (Mahoney, 2003). In turn, with-in case strategies permit to
examine multiple features of a single case to assess hypotheses developed through cross-
case analysis strengthening the findings and arguments of the research (Ragin 1989;
Mahoney 2003; George and Bennett 2005).

Therefore, the research has four levels of comparison as Figure 1.3 shows. A first
evident level is constituted by the comparison between countries. At the same time, each
country also represents an opportunity for within comparison between different attempts
to translate a global norm, and failed and successful translation. For the purpose of this
research, the notion of failed or successful translation is not related with the results of a
policy, but with the degree of conformity of a policy with a global norm. Thus, following
organizational sociological institutionalist classification, failed translations refers to
global norms that end up being avoided, defied or manipulated at the domestic context,
while successful translations are those that are either conformed or at least hybridized
with domestic institutions (compromise). In addition, the variation across time in each
country will help to evaluate if patterns derived from cross-case analysis can be matched
with observations from within specific cases in order to refine the potential explanations (Mahoney, 2003).

Finally, the last level of comparison consists of the different areas of governance addressed by this research, namely, curriculum, evaluation, and education provision. The assumption here is that the factors through which a global idea in one area can be successfully translated are not necessarily the same that might be successful in other areas. For example, school autonomy may be achieved because of the support of grassroots education movements. Yet, these same movements may block the implementation of standardized exams inasmuch as they undermine the decision authority on school issues, curricular contents and desired learning outcomes.

**Figure 1.3 Logic of Comparison**

![Image of a diagram showing the logic of comparison between different areas of governance with case studies labeled as Reform 1 and Reform 2 for each country (Argentina, Chile, Colombia).]  

The methods of data collection include archival research in the Congress of each country, analysis of official documents from IOs and key national governmental and non-governmental organizations, and qualitative analysis of news regarding the governance
areas addressed in this study. In addition, the research also relies on eighty-one interviews conducted with international and national education policy experts, elected and appointed officials in government and in education interest groups such as teacher unions, organizations of private providers, parents and students associations, etc. (see Annex 1). These actors were recruited based on the document analysis and by recommendation of scholars following a ‘snowball strategy’.

While document analysis permitted the identification of crucial events or decisions, constellation of actors participating in these events, and policy agendas, the interviews helped understand the motivations and role played by different actors in the reception and translation of global norms (Edwards, 2012). Interview collection was carried out until all suggested actors (through documents or other interviewees) were interviewed, the sample achieved representativeness (including actors of under-represented or less powerful groups), and data did not return new codes (Edwards, 2012; Guest, Bunce, & Johnson, 2006).

Coding and data analysis followed a combination of deductive and inductive approaches. Following Mayring (2000), I started by defining two main categories at two levels (decision making and policy outcome) that corresponded to the spheres I proposed as crucial venues to translate global ideas (international, domestic). I also defined subcategories based on the conceptualization of reception and translation processes elaborated at this chapter (e.g. coercion, mimesis, path-dependence, conformity, avoidance, etc.). All collected information was repeatedly analyzed and codified according to these categories. When data could not be coded accordingly, they were

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6 Information from potential interviewees who were not available was complemented from other academic studies, interviews in the newspaper or other well-established media, and documents authored by the unavailable potential interviewees.
open-coded and grouped in new categories once patterns were identified (Gläser & Laudel, 2013). Finally, I compared the contents of the codes and categories across time in each country, across policy areas, and across countries in order to assess if the proposed hypotheses passed the tests proposed by process-tracing method (Collier, 2011) and propose new causal inferences when needed (Beach & Pedersen, 2013).

**Outline of the Dissertation**

The dissertation is organized in five chapters. In chapters 2 to 4, I analyse the changes in education governance in three distinct historical periods. Each chapter follows the same logic of exposition. I start by introducing the global norms that were dominant in the corresponding historical period with special emphasis in the policy dimensions of analysis in this dissertation, namely, provision, curriculum, and evaluation. Subsequently I track the translation of these norms in each country pointing at the diffusion mechanisms and their interaction with domestic policy legacies and political contestation. Finally I develop a systematic comparison to assess the impact of the (combined) independent variables in each country, and identify different trajectories of change.

Chapter two analyses the translation processes involved in the period dominated by manpower planning ideas during the 1960s and 1970s. It shows that while manpower planning norms reinforced the centralized character of the existing education governance template, it also made evident the problems of centrally managing mass secondary schooling. In addition, the chapter shows how manpower planning ideas were differently translated in each country of the analysis due to the variant influence of the Church, the main private actor involved in education in these Latin American countries during the 1960s. In Chile, the Church supported the reform of the Christian Democratic Party that adapted manpower planning ideas to give the Church participation in curricular decisions
and delivery of education. By contrast, in order to undermine populist forces, the Church and different democratic and non-democratic governments in Argentina opposed the further consolidation of the state in the governance of education suggested by manpower planning ideas and therefore, the country avoided substantial reforms. Finally, Colombia also avoided manpower planning reforms given the opposition of the Church and the lack of interest of political elites. Yet, trying to disguise the non-conformity with the norm, Colombia expanded secondary public schooling for the poorest, which unintentionally fuelled the contestation of public teachers to minimal state intervention in secondary education.

Chapter three examines the reception and re-shaping of two different versions of NPM ideas that were predominant during the 1980s and 1990s: market-based ideas and active-state norms. In the context of economic crises, non-democratic regimes, and transition to democracy, all three countries embraced these norms in different ways. In Chile, the repression of Pinochet’s authoritarian regime and the normative pressure of the Chicago Boys crashed the supporters of the state-run secondary education model and promoted a shift towards a quasi-market of education. Later in democracy, policy reversal was constrained by institutional limitations, normative diffusion of active-state ideas, and the strong opposition to state intervention in education from the right party coalition, the military and other constituents created by market model. In Argentina, NPM ideas arrived during a democratic government, which was not able to undermine the opposition of teachers to state retrenchment. As a result, the country only embraced a minimal version of global norms, and the state remained as one of the main actors of education governance. Likewise, the opposition of teachers in Colombia highly compromised the
adoption of market-oriented norms of education governance, despite the wide support of the government.

Chapter four focuses on the analysis of the modifications of the previous NPM versions, introduced in the 2000s to correct inequalities of previous decades. Although in Chile these norms mainly reinforced the market-oriented character of its education system, ideas of a stronger state and the right of education gave leverage to students’ discontent with the inequalities of the school system. Their demands challenged the taken-for-granted character that market ideas had in Chile and produced small reforms. Similarly, in Argentina, teachers’ discontent with the 1990s education policies tipped the balance for a stronger role of the state that ultimately defied market-oriented prescriptions. Yet, cutbacks of previous decades harmed public secondary school enough to make better-off families opt-out from the public system. By contrast, Colombia remained tied to market-oriented prescriptions and therefore, the government used the negative consequences of the 1990s reform to blame public schools and introduced more market-oriented mechanisms in the governance of the system.

The final chapter synthesizes the main findings of the study and shows how these findings contribute to understand the role of global ideas in the transition to post-bureaucratic education governance models. The conclusions also highlight the contributions of this study in the understanding of state retrenchment in education by showing its inconsistent and highly contested progression. Finally, limitations and further venues for research are presented calling for the need of additional political studies in other education areas and less-developed countries.
Chapter 2. Diffusion and Translation of Manpower Education Planning

In the previous chapter, I presented a framework that combines insights from sociological and historical institutionalism to explain the transition to post-bureaucratic education governance models and the reception and translation of global education policy ideas. In this chapter, I employ this framework to examine the reception and translation of manpower education planning ideas (MEP) in Chile, Argentina, and Colombia in the 1960s and 1970s. I argue that, although MEP norms did not shift away from the state-run template dominant at that time, countries translated them in very different ways. This translation was shaped by the state capacity to govern secondary education, the influence of the Church as the main opponents of the bureaucratic model, and the influence of teachers as advocates of the state. The chapter pays particular attention to the interaction between diffusion mechanisms and domestic factors, including institutional legacies, and the transversal constellations that these legacies created. It also suggests that, although tied to the bureaucratic model, MEP paved the way for the transition to NPM ideas by making evident the difficulties of centralized massive education secondary schooling.

Originally, many Latin American countries emulated the French model of secondary education. As an instrument to educate the future ruling class, secondary education was usually delivered through national schools (especially in unitary states) and based on a national ‘encyclopaedic’ curriculum\(^7\) intended to prepare students for university studies (Bruter et al., 2004). These schools were not necessarily cost free and admission was sometimes regulated through exams (Acosta, 2011; Ruiz Berrio, 2006). Occasionally, the transition between secondary and higher education was formalized by

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\(^7\) ‘Encyclopaedic curricula’ are focused on humanistic content, transmitted by teachers, to be memorized and reproduced by students (White, 2011).
university admission tests, but in general, student learning assessment was in the charge of teachers (Eckstein & Noah, 1993). In turn, instructional inspectors were supposed to monitor the teaching process, but they mainly limited to check compliance with administrative and bureaucratic rules (Gvirtz, 2002). In brief, secondary education was elitist and followed a ‘teaching state’ or ‘state monopoly’ template characterized by a centralized control over education provision and curriculum.

Nevertheless, by the 1950s, many Latin American countries embarked on the massification of secondary education. The rise of human capital theories depicted education as the engine for economic development and modernization (Ramírez & Boli, 1987; Wolf, 2002). Specifically, the MEP suggested that systematically identified workforce needs should be integrated into the educational planning process (Coombs, 1970; ILO & UNESCO, 1963; The World Bank, 1974). This integration had implications for the policy dimensions analyzed in this study. In the policy area of education provision, this approach shifted secondary education from its elitist orientation towards massive schooling to train future workers (Tenti, 2003). The massification of secondary schooling was primarily framed as a responsibility of the state. Private secondary schools were not censured, but they were considered a marginal complement to state provision that should be subjected to state regulation (OEA, 1963, p. 51). In addition, parental choice was not really part of the MEP debate. Although global recommendations acknowledged ‘the right of parents to educate their children in their preferred institutions’ (OEA, 1963, p. 52), the shortage of secondary schools in the 1950s made school choice irrelevant in terms of policy options. Likewise, decisions about secondary school supply were implicitly submitted to manpower requirements. It was expected to divert students from general secondary education and traditional university studies by providing them with
vocational secondary education (VOCSED). This training, arguably, held the greatest promise for students, besides serving the nation’s needs (Coombs, 1968; The World Bank, 1971).

Regarding curricular decisions, the second policy area of this study, global ideas emphasized the need to address the ‘crisis of education’. According to UNESCO, the traditional model of secondary schooling produced an excessive supply of general secondary school graduates with the aspiration to follow classical university studies. This model put enormous fiscal pressure on education systems, left graduates overeducated and unemployed, and did not match the economic needs of different societies (Coombs, 1968; Faure et al., 1972). To address this problem, UNESCO and the WB recommended a lifelong education system in which secondary education model should offer a solid component of general education followed by VOCSED according to country’s needs (Benavot, 1983; Haddad, 1987). To fulfill these needs, encyclopaedic curriculum and rote learning should be replaced by measurable relevant skills identified through scientific procedures. These procedures also defined instructional methods that should be tested, refined and extensively applied in the form of standardized instructional methodologies⁸ (Academy for Educational Development, 1972; R. A. Kaufman, 1972). Putting differently, curriculum was designed and tested by central specialized agencies, and teachers became technicians in charge of applying these scientifically designed

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⁸ This approach echoed Tyler’s four-step model for curricular design and Bloom’s taxonomy. The four steps of Bloom model for the curricular formulation includes the determination of learning purposes, the identification of related experiences, the organization of such experiences, and the evaluation or the purposes. Bloom’s taxonomy established a hierarchy of learning objectives in three domains, cognitive, affective, and psychomotor, that should guided the formulation of curriculum learning goals (Pinar, 1995).
procedures (H. González, 1976). In brief, although the curricular orientation for secondary education changed, decisions remained highly centralized.

Finally, evaluation, the third policy dimension of interest here, was not a policy goal of MEP. The emphasis on evidence-based education planning included standardized assessments as occasional tools that could be used to monitor reforms and measure the fit between curriculum and socio-economic needs. Similarly, these assessments were not associated with accountability purposes. However, MEP contributed to the initiation of a testing culture since the inclusion of these occasional assessments operated later as policy legacies facilitating the adoption of assessment systems. Table 2.1 summarizes changes between the French-inspired model of secondary education and the recommendations of the MEP in the three areas of this study.

Table 2.1 Differences in education governance templates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy dimensions</th>
<th>French-inspired model of secondary education</th>
<th>Manpower educational planning approach (MEP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Provision</strong></td>
<td>State-run, elitist education to train future elite</td>
<td>State-run, massive education to train future workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Curriculum</strong></td>
<td>Encyclopaedic humanistic national curriculum</td>
<td>Scientifically planned national curriculum based on socio-economic needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evaluation</strong></td>
<td>Delegated to teachers</td>
<td>Delegated to teachers. Occasional test used to inform reform.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The MEP was disseminated in Latin America by a combination of three mechanisms. Coercive mechanisms included conditional aid provided by the ‘Alliance for Progress’ and associated IOs such as the WB and the USAID. UNESCO, CEPAL and

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9 The Alliance for Progress was a program for economic cooperation between the US and Latin America established in 1961. The program was inspired on modernization theory and aimed at the expansion of market economy, foreign trade and aid. This expansion was supposed to distribute resources by trickling them down from domestic elites to the whole society (Taffet, 2012). With the promotion of economic development and increased
OAS also exercised *mimetic pressures* through regional conferences of ministers of education, which persuaded them about the benefits of MEP, and the provision of technical assistance to replicate education planning offices across the region (Blat Gimeno, 1983; e.g. ILO & UNESCO, 1963). Finally, these IOs also used *normative mechanisms* by training and promoting networks of education planning specialists that often became statist technocrats, influential in the policy making sphere. Although ideas of MEP travelled by similar means to Argentina, Chile and Colombia, they found different conditions in each of these countries.

In the remaining sections of this chapter, I present a country-by-country comparison showing how the domestic conditions of Chile, Argentina and Colombia received and translated MEP in a variety of ways. Chile *conformed* to global norms because the interests of the Church, the main private education provider, were accommodated although the state kept the primary role in the governance of secondary education. In contrast, an unresolved struggle between the Church and the state in Argentina highly *compromised* and *avoided* the norm translation. Meanwhile, the strong influence of the Church and the absence of advocates for a strong state authority over education matters made Colombia *decouple* from or *avoid* MEP, acting as if recommendations were implemented but without affecting substantially the domestic arrangement.

**Chile: Centralization of Education Decisions and Mixed Provision of Secondary education**

Two reforms were attempted in Chile under the influence of MEP, the successful effort of Frei Montalva (1965-1970) and the failed attempt of Salvador Allende (1970-
1973). Both, success and failure were moulded by the strong influence of statist technocrats allied with the Church and the Christian Democratic Party (CDP), and the relative weakness of teacher unions and left parties. Although constrained by the influence of global forces, this within-country comparison shows the resistant character of domestic arrangements and the way in which they shape the political contestation between competing constellations.

**Frei Montalva’s reform: the rise of a technocratic and mixed-provision policy constellation.**

When MEP ideas arrived in Chile, the country had a particular model of teaching state without a full state monopoly. Traditionally, the presence of private secondary schools was significant but they were highly regulated by the state. The Catholic Church, however, had significant influence in education policy decisions through the intervention of the Federation of Secondary Schools (Federación de Institutos de Educación Secundaria – FIDE), an organization created in 1948 to coordinate the relationship within Catholic private schools and the ministry of education (Brahm, Cariola, & Silva, 1971). Through the lobby of FIDE, Catholic schools received regularly state subsidies and the Church could somewhat guarantee ‘freedom of education’, which was actually a way to provide parents with the chance to choose their children’s school according to their religious beliefs or, put differently, a way to keep Catholic education in the curriculum (Aedo-Richmond, 2000). In short, the Church was a well-organized and powerful actor in the Chilean teaching state model that clearly tolerated private intervention. This teaching state, however, was primarily elite-oriented. Thus, by the late 1950s, while only 25% of students attended private schools, overall enrolment in secondary education was still low (9%).
Due to the elitist character of secondary education, Chilean secondary schools followed a centralized encyclopaedic curriculum, and students presented oral examinations in order to be admitted to university (Serrano et al., 2012). Before the Frei Montalva’s reform, technical schools were not considered part of secondary education and were not conducive to university studies. These schools were often the product of the need of manpower in different areas such as industry, commerce, etc., and they were regarded as second-rate institutions compared to traditional secondary schools. The evolution of these technical schools was uncoordinated as illustrated by the varied duration of their specialties (four to seven years), the proliferation of different curricular plans, and their terminal character (Interview #36). Therefore, technical schools did not have powerful advocates but, due to the influence of MEP, the massification, regulation and integration of technical schools with general secondary education became crucial goals of the Frei Montalva’s reform (Schiefelbein & Davis, 1974). In sum, the influence of the Church in education policies, a centralized encyclopaedic elitist curriculum, and some marginal second-rate technical schools were the policy legacies that MEP global ideas found in the 1960s.

**Pervasiveness of diffusion mechanism.**

As in many Latin American countries, MEP ideas arrived in Chile through the combination of coercive, mimetic, and normative mechanisms (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). The coercion of the Alliance for Progress’ aid10 fuelled mimetic pressures, such as the creation of government planning offices. The Office for Development and National Planning (Oficina de Desarrollo y Planeamiento – ODEPLAN), for instance, was

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10 Chile received 11.8% (US$743 millions) of all of the Alliance’s money and was the third largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid after Brazil and Colombia.
established by Frei Montalva under the auspice of the Alliance but also with the strong influence and support of CEPAL (Hira, 1998, p. 45). Likewise, the Frei Montalva’s administration created the Center for Improvement, Experimentation and Pedagogical Research (Centro de Perfeccionamiento, Experimentación e Investigación Pedagógica - CPEIP), a division in charge of curricular planning within the ministry of education (Leyton, 2010). The ODEPLAN, the CPEIP, CEPAL and UNESCO prompted Chile to mimic educational planning style of policy formulation, including research as the main input to make education decisions, experimentation of formulated education policies, and evidence-based expansion of programs.

Foreign aid and IOs also induced normative pressures, such as the training of planning experts. This training was particularly effective to frame MEP as the proper course of action for the Chilean education system. Several IOs collaborated to train these experts. The first branch of the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales - FLACSO), established in Chile by UNESCO in 1957, actively developed graduate training and educational research in the country (Gill, 1966). In addition, international grants were also provided to train a cohort of educational planners in foreign universities who returned to the country to participate in the Frei Montalva’s reform (Schiefelbein, 1976). Moreover, UNESCO collaborated with Frei Montalva’s government to establish several social science academic programs and research institutes in prominent universities (Picazo, 2013). CEPAL staff also contributed professional training by serving as faculty in the University of Chile and diffusing CEPAL’s structuralist ideas11 (Biglaiser, 2002, p. 273). Indeed, the wide acceptance of

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11 By the 1950s and 1960s, CEPAL was under the influence of the Dependency School. In opposition to development ideas of the Alliance for Progress, this school regarded ‘underdevelopment’ as the result of the exploitation of poor countries through unequal
CEPAL ideas by the Christian Democratic government led Frei Montalva to recruit many of their crucial policy makers from this IO (Fischer, 1979; Picazo, 2013). All these efforts produced a generation of education specialists socialized under similar professional standards, who diffused the MEP in Chile (Farrell, 1986; Nuñez, 1979). Consistent with normative diffusion suggested by sociological institutionalism, these like-minded specialists favoured the adoption of education policies based on MEP, as they became prominent scholars or policymakers (statist technocrats). Yet, although these professional networks were necessary for diffusion, they did not faithfully follow the planning perspective but adapted it to the Chilean conditions.

**Confrontation between public-private technocratic planning and state-led democratic-planning constellation I.**

MEP ideas resonated with the ideology of President Eduardo Frei Montalva (1965-1970) and the Christian Democratic Party (CDP). In the 1960s, the CDP held a ‘social Christian’ ideology focused on the alleviation of poverty and social inequalities, and the promotion of pluralism, social justice, and economic development (Farrell, 1986; Fischer, 1979). The existing structure of secondary education was considered elitist because of its long duration and emphasis on university preparation, while working-class children were conditions of world trade (Baer, 1972). Consequently, CEPAL promoted ‘import-substitution industrialization’ (ISI), a model that aimed to break out of the international division of labour and establish domestic production of goods that were formerly imported. This industrialization should replace the exportation of primary products as the main economic activity (Prebisch, 1959). Although different, both the ISI model and the development perspective emphasized the need of skilled workers for economic growth.

12 For example, Juan Gomez Milla, the education minister who led Frei Montalva educational reform, was previously the dean of the University of Chile where he created the first center for educational research. Likewise, Mario Leyton, the Secretary of Education of Frei Montalva and one of the main actors of the reform, obtained his master and Ph.D. degree in educational planning from the University of Chicago (Leyton, 1970; Ruiz Schneider, 1994).
just trained for specific occupations with limited chances to get equipped with more modern skills (Cox, 1988; Leyton, 2010). Similarly, current instruction was considered inadequate since teachers lacked systematic pedagogical and disciplinary training, and instead relied on ‘pedagogical empiricism’ (Leyton, 2010). Building on MEP ideas, statist technocrats defined four objectives for the Frei Montalva’s education reform: rapid extension of education specially for the poorest sectors, modernization of teaching practices based on systematic research and testing of teaching practices as the basis of the new curriculum, adaptation of education to socio-economic development, and subsequent integration of technical schools to the formal education system (PIIE, 1984; Schiefelbein & Davis, 1974).

Statist technocrats, however, were constrained by domestic legacies. First, they acknowledged private actors, especially Catholic schools, as important contributors to Chilean education system (Aedo-Richmond, 2000; Lyons, 1965). Second, although they believed in the importance of vocational education, they rather favoured a liberal and humanist curriculum (Fischer, 1979). These domestic characteristics drove statist technocrats to reinterpret the global norm and downplay to some extent its emphasis on the role of the state, the importance of manpower training, and the need of diverting students from university studies.

As a result of this re-interpretation, the CDP gave the Church significant influence in the education policy sphere, but its participation was shaped by educational planning ideas. For instance, while the government established the CPEIP, the agency for

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13 Mario Leyton, the director of the CPEIP, criticized the ‘pedagogical empiricism’ as the lack of systematic pedagogical and disciplinary training of teachers, which defined teaching as a vocation, based on empathy and intuition, rather than a profession based on skills and specialized knowledge (Olave, Carrasco, & Salinas, 2014).
curricular planning, it also stimulated the creation of the Catholic Centre for Educational Research and Development (Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo de la Educación - CIDE), in order to improve the planning capacity of FIDE for the formulation and implementation of the reform (Picazo, 2013; Personal interview #46). Both institutions, the CPEIP and the CIDE, elaborated the new curriculum for secondary education for private and public schools (Leyton, 2010). In brief, the ideological affinity between statist technocrats, the CDP and the Church fuelled a constellation of champions of a public-private technocratic planning-based education reform. This constellation enjoyed high influence in policy decisions: it was highly cohesive in their beliefs and interests, it had solid support from the government and the Church, and it counted with important resources including well-reputed research and the potential mobilization of constituents of private education.

Although the goals of the Frei Montalva’s reform appealed to all sectors of society, their means met opposition. Specifically, teacher unions were the strongest and most influential critics. Traditionally, public teachers opposed private education (Aedo-Richmond, 2000). The teacher unions argued that the existence of elite private schools and public subsidies to private institutions reproduced the elitist and anti-democratic character of the education system (Farrell, 1986). In addition, they criticized the top-down character of the education reform that reduced teachers’ participation to (Nuñez, 1989; Ruiz Schneider, 1994). Although teachers broadly agreed with curricular planning, they argued that it should be a task of teachers and communities and not exclusively of education experts (Nuñez, 1980). Moreover, the employment of North-American theories in the curricular planning was deemed as an exaggerated influence of foreign ideas not fully appropriate for the Chilean context (Aedo-Richmond, 2000). In other words,
teachers did not take the government’s interpretation of MEP ideas for granted but opposed it because this template affected their interests and identity.

Teachers, however, constituted a weak *constellation of state-led democratic planning* champions. First, they were not fully cohesive since teachers were divided into three different unions under the influence of three competing parties, the Socialists, the Communists, and the Radicals. While the Socialist Party advocated for education as a tool to make the transition to socialism under the authority of teachers, Communists and Radicals preferred broader and pluralist participation over education decisions, including teachers, parents, students and other education stakeholders (Farrell, 1986). Second, this constellation did not have strong power resources to challenge the popularity gained by the achievements of the Frei Montalva’s reform. Enrolment at all educational levels grew constantly, the evidence-based and technocratic style of the reform granted it with high legitimacy, and teacher salaries were substantially improved (Farrell, 1986). Therefore, this *state-led democratic planning constellation* was undermined and isolated by the influence of their opponents.

*Acquiescence with manpower planning ideas.*

As suggested by my theoretical framework, the combination of the normative diffusion through the training of education planners and the high influence of the *public-private technocratic-planning constellation* led Chile to *conform* to MEP. In terms of education provision, the first policy dimension of this study, Frei Montalva’s government committed to the expansion of public secondary school and the transformation of its elitist character. Public expenditure on education grew from 2.7% to 4.5% of the GDP between 1965 and 1969. Likewise, around 3000 new schools were constructed, including specialized infrastructure for secondary education, such as workshops and laboratories.
(UNESCO, 1971, p. 516). Enrolment in secondary education rose from 17.5% to 29.8% between 1965 and 1969 (PIIE, 1984), and admission exams for secondary education were gradually eliminated (Cox, 1987). Nevertheless, as members of the dominant constellation, private providers were accommodated in the reform. Although the expansion of secondary education came primarily from the state, private enrolment also grew 42% during the same period (PIIE, 1984). State subsidies for private schools increased and these institutions were also provided with access to foreign funds (Aedo-Richmond, 2000). Therefore, the state *conformed* to MEP ideas by becoming the main provider of secondary education, but it still accommodated the interests of the Church by allowing and encouraging private schools.

Regarding the second policy dimension, curricular reforms also *conformed* to MEP ideas although private interests were also accommodated. Due to the influence of the *public-private technocratic-planning constellation*, curriculum became centrally planned on the basis of scientific formulation and conducted by professional education planners. Nevertheless, the decisions over curriculum were agreed to with the Church through the incorporation of their research organization in the curricular elaboration (Cox, 1988). This shows that even in cases of *acquiescence* to norms, domestic interests are often accommodated.

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14 According to Aedo-Richmond (2000), a pre-secondary test was implemented to track students into the vocational or humanistic schools. However, Schiefelbein argued that this test was not really relevant for secondary school admission, and instead it was used to assess the reform (Schiefelbein, 1992).

15 The participation of public schools in the total enrolment of secondary education increased from 66.9% to 76.3% between 1965 and 1969, which made private enrolment share decrease from 33.1% to 23.7%. Yet, in absolute numbers, both sectors grew constantly during the Frei Montalva administration (PIIE, 1984).
The implementation of VOCSED, however, did not follow the same path of conformity. Although one of the official reform purposes aimed at the promotion of ‘the formation of the worker’ (Superintendencia de Educación, 1966) and the share of the enrolment in vocational secondary schools rose from 25.2% to 32.1% between 1965 and 1969 (PIIE, 1984), vocational and humanist schools remained separated. Thus, VOCSED continued to be a second-rate option even though all its specialties were unified and formally acknowledged as part of secondary education. This compromise or mix between global and domestic models shows that domestic templates are not easily displaced by global norms and continue binding policymakers’ worldview and strategies (Blyth, 2010; Hansen & King, 2001). As a result of these endured legacies, the new structure of secondary education did not really divert graduates from university studies since students preferred to attend humanist schools with greater prestige (Nuñez, 2003).

Finally, although student evaluation was not a substantial part of the global norm, and neither was it central for the Frei Montalva’s reform, in 1968, the statist technocrats introduced a standardized assessment for students completing primary education that was yearly applied until 1971 (Ortiz Cáceres, 2012). In line with MEP, this assessment had the purpose of collecting rigorous and relevant data to evaluate the reform. In addition, the government also established a standardized exam for university admission in 1967 (Manzi & Rossetti, 2004). Although irrelevant in the MEP policy debate, these tests initiated an evaluation tradition in the country that would later facilitate the expansion of assessment, thus becoming a future policy legacy.
**Allende reform: the failed response of the public-provision and participatory policy constellation.**

Despite the popularity of the Frei Montalva’s reforms, internal divisions and the erosion of its alliance with the right wing party made the CDP lose the presidential election in 1970.\(^{16}\) Instead, the left coalition, the Popular Unity (Unidad Popular -PU) conducted by Salvador Allende won the presidency (Farrell, 1986). Unlike the Frei Montalva’s reforms, Allende’s education policy was not driven by statist technocrats but mainly by former leaders of teacher unions. As explained before, teachers questioned the technocratic and centralized style of Frei Montalva’s education decisions. Therefore, to contest the widely accepted education reform of Frei Montalva, teacher unions integrated the three different unions into a single organization, the Unified Education Workers Union (Sindicato Unico de Trabajadores de la Educación -SUTE). With SUTE, *the state-led democratic planning constellation* gained some cohesiveness, although the division between socialist, communist and radical partisans persisted (Farrell, 1986; Interview #47).

At the same time, the impressive increase of secondary education enrolment achieved by the Frei Montalva administration elevated the educational expectations of low-income sectors. These expectations, however, became increasingly hard to meet. Demands for expansion of university enrolment put a strong pressure on public funding while still some sectors were excluded from secondary school (Fischer, 1979). By the

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\(^{16}\) For the presidential election of 1964, Frei Montalva was the candidate of a plural coalition of different parties of all across the political spectrum including the Conservatives. This coalition was built up to campaign against Allende and neutralize the advance of the Socialists and Communists. Yet, by 1970, the Conservatives opted for nominating their own candidate, the former president Jorge Alessandri. Indeed, Alessandri achieved 35.29% of the votes, just 1.34 points under Allende (Farrell, 1986).
same token, the growth of public schooling made the centralized management of education very inefficient (Nuñez, 1989). The shortcomings of centralization paved the way for teachers’ demands for participation in the education decisions. In brief, the unintended consequences of former policies along with the government change created more opportunities for influence but also greater challenges for the state-led democratic-planning constellation. In this way, the interaction between policy legacies and political contestation changed the context in which manpower planning ideas were translated. However, the political situation of the country and the persistent strength of the public-private technocratic-planning constellation finally prevented the enactment of the Allende’s reform.

**The combination of coercive and mimetic diffusion mechanisms.**

During Allende’s administration, the diffusion mechanisms for MEP operated in different ways. Regarding coercion, due to the communist influence over Allende’s government, the US halted the Alliance aid\(^\text{17}\) and managed to block access to foreign resources from Western sources (Ray, 2013; Taffet, 2012). The absence of conditional aid undermined mimetic pressures and gave leverage to Allende’s government to reinterpret MEP ideas. However, fiscal constraints also limited the resources of the administration to implement reforms undermining the credibility of the government.

Although mimetic pressures were relaxed, Allende’s education reform ideas still echoed UNESCO recommendations. Due to the fiscal burden produced by the expansion of secondary education during Frei Montalva’s government, Allende’s administration was persuaded by the ‘crisis of education’ proclaimed by UNESCO and reflected by the

\(^{17}\) To be sure, left parties also deemed US aid as a form of economic imperialism (Taffet, 2012).
overproduction of secondary school graduates with the increasing aspiration to follow university studies (Farrell, 1986; Nuñez, 2003). The left ideas of the PU prevented the government from introducing university admissions exams, school fees, terminal vocational secondary education, or any similar instrument that limited the education expectations of their constituents (Nuñez, 2003). Therefore, Allende’s agenda was inspired by UNESCO’s recommendations of lifelong learning introduced in the Faure’s report. Likewise, UNESCO also provided technical assistance for studies regarding the feasibility of a lifelong learning system in Chile (Nuñez, 2003, p. 34). Allende’s government aimed at integrating and diversifying of secondary and higher education as a way to provide people with various educational alternatives beyond traditional university studies (Farrell, 1986; Nuñez, 2003; Interview #43).

Finally, unlike the Frei Montalva administration, normative mechanisms were not pervasive during Allende’s government. Therefore, rather than technocratic, this government re-framed educational planning as an instrument for community participation in education decisions. Thus, curriculum was considered a political issue rather than a scientific one. Although some technocrats remained in their positions after the

18 Faure’s ideas of lifelong learning implied that “The object of post-basic education should be not so much to provide adolescents with access to university as to prepare them for active life, and to keep alive in those who, for the time being, go no further, the hope of undertaking at one time or another some post-secondary education and/or professional or vocational training at a higher level, whether in school or out of school…Higher education should be accessible through many different paths and at any age, in many forms, especially with a view to continual self-improvement and development” (Faure et al., 1972, p. 184). This report also recommended the participation of the community in education decisions including provision and curriculum.
government change,\textsuperscript{19} their influence was undermined by the teacher unions, which took control over policy making (Farrell, 1986; Picazo, 2013). Thus, in addition to greater cohesiveness, the state-led democratic-planning constellation also gained greater closeness to the decision making process while the public-private technocratic-planning constellation lost some predominance. Research centers and education experts committed to the technocratic approach of MEP were displaced from the political arena, weakening their closeness to education decisions (Cox, 1984; Picazo, 2013).

Briefly put, the reduced pervasiveness of diffusion mechanisms provided Allende’s administration with more room to re-interpret MEP ideas. As explained before, the state-led democratic planning constellation disagreed with private schools, tracking between vocational and humanist secondary education, and the technocratic style of decision-making (Aedo-Richmond, 2000; Nuñez, 2003). Consequently, the priorities for secondary education of Allende included three aspects. First, Allende’s education program proposed the nationalization of education by taking ‘charge of private establishments, beginning with those institutions that recruit their students on the grounds of social class, national origin or religious belief’ (Unidad Popular, 1969, p. 30). Second, also following MEP, Allende proposed merging vocational and humanist tracks into a ‘polytechnic’ education that combined practical and academic knowledge and skills, driving students to a variety of post-secondary education alternatives (Farrell, 1986; Fischer, 1979). Third, unlike MEP recommendations, the reform proposed the democratization of educational planning because the ‘transformation (of the school should) not be the work only of experts, but a process analyzed, discussed, decided and executed by organizations of teachers, workers,

\textsuperscript{19} For example, Mario Leyton, the director of the CPEIP, the agency in charge of curricular planning, maintained his position during Allende’s government.
students, and parents’ (Unidad Popular, 1969, p. 30). Although Allende’s proposals were relatively consistent with MEP, they were not compatible with the existing education model and the subsequent interests of the *public-private technocratic-planning constellation*. Consequently, it raised the active opposition of this constellation.

*Confrontation between state-led democratic planning and public-private technocratic-planning constellations II.*

Discontent with the technocratic character of Frei Montalva policies also produced a split within the CDP fuelling the realignment of *transversal constellations*. Specifically, the more radical section of the CDP formed the Unitary Popular Action Movement (Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria - MAPU), which left the CDP to join Socialists and Communists in the PU (Fischer, 1979). Similar divisions happened when, on the one hand, the CDP decided to nominate its presidential candidate without the support of the Conservatives in 1970, and on the other, the Radical Party also abandoned its alliance with the Conservatives and moved to the left, supporting Allende’s candidacy (Corvalán, 2003). As a result, the *public-private technocratic-planning constellation* lost the MAPU and the Radicals to the *state-led democratic-planning alignment*, reinforcing the influence of their opponents. This realignment illustrates how collective actors, such as parties or party coalitions, are not necessarily unified groups. Rather, some factions within these groups can re-organize with different transversal constellations changing the resources available for each other and shaping, therefore, the translation.

This time, the *state-led and democratic-planning constellation* was favoured by its closeness to the decision-making process. Several union leaders were appointed to important positions in the ministry of education.\(^\text{20}\) Nevertheless, the *constellation was not*

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\(^{20}\) Farrell (1986) identified, for example, Mario Astorga, the president of the primary teachers’ union as the first education minister; Waldo Suárez, another union leader, as
fully cohesive. A soft-line faction composed of Radicals, moderate Socialists, and Communists acknowledged some of the achievements of the Frei Montalva’s reforms and regarded technical planning as necessary. This faction believed that the state should provide technical guidance to the wide participation of teachers, parents and community (Farrell, 1986). In contrast, revolutionary Socialists and some MAPU members wanted to give workers, -and particularly teachers-, the upper hand in education decisions to wrest the system from the control of the affluent classes and convert it into a tool for transition to socialism (Cox, 1988; Farrell, 1986; Fischer, 1979).

In addition to its division, the constellation also faced strong opponents. Within the public-private technocratic planning constellation, the Church contested the nationalization of private education by confirming the commitment of Catholic schools to social justice and the avoidance of class-based discrimination (Brahm et al., 1971; Fischer, 1979). The constellation also mobilized its resources through the dissemination of CIDE’s research showing the contribution of private institutions to Chilean education and the limited financial ability of the government to assume the expenditures of all these schools (Brahm et al., 1971). Additionally, the public-private technocratic planning constellation argued that the conception of planning of radical Socialists would convert schools into organizations for ‘communist indoctrination’ (Interviews #33 & 47).

Moreover, given that Allende became elected without a majority of votes, the CDP took advantage of PU’s need for allies in order to push for changes in Allende’s agenda (Aedo-Richmond, 2000; Farrell, 1986; Fischer, 1979). In sum, although the state-

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21 Under Chilean constitution at that time, if no candidate gained the majority of votes in the presidential election, then the Congress should decide between the two leading candidates (Farrell, 1986).
led democratic-planning constellation was close to the decision-making process and had many constituents, it was not fully cohesive. In turn, the public-private technocratic-planning constellation, though relatively undermined, was still organized and remained highly influential in the political arena. Table 2.2 summarizes the changes in the constellations between Frei Montalva and Allende administrations.

**Table 2.2 Changes in constellations between Frei Montalva and Allende administrations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public-private technocratic-planning constellation</th>
<th>State-led democratic-planning constellation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Preferences:</strong></td>
<td>Provision: Public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision: Public-private</td>
<td>Curriculum: Participatory elaboration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curriculum: Technocratic, centralized with private participation</td>
<td>Evaluation: no preferences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation: Emerging interest in standardized assessments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1965-1970:</strong></td>
<td>Actors: Socialists, Communists, some Radicals, teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actors: CDP, Conservatives, some Radicals, the Church, statist technocrats</td>
<td>LOW INFLUENCE: weak organizational capacity, no links with the decision making process, weak power resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGH INFLUENCE: high organizational capacity, part of the decision making process, strong power resources.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1970-1973:</strong></td>
<td>Actors: Socialists, Communists, Radicals, MAPU, teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actors: CDP, Conservatives, the Church, statist technocrats</td>
<td>MODERATE INFLUENCE: moderate organization capacity, part of the decision making process, moderate power resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MODERATE INFLUENCE: moderate organizational capacity, no direct links with the decision making process, strong power resources.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The defiance of the socialist interpretation of MEP.*

The persistent strength of the public-private technocratic-planning constellation weakened the socialist interpretation of MEP. In order to get ratified as president, Allende was urged by the CDP to pass a Statute of Constitutional Guarantees (Aedo-Richmond, 2000; Farrell, 1986; Fischer, 1979). This Statute protected the ‘freedom of education’ by
declaring the relative autonomy of private schools, and the responsibility of the state to provide subsidies to tuition-free and non-profit private institutions (Estatuto de Garantías Constitutionales, 1970, article 10). In other words, the Statute prevented the nationalization of education that had been part of Allende’s campaign agenda. This outcome showed how the combination of strong policy legacies and the high influence of an opponent constellation defied a re-interpretation of a global norm that challenges existing arrangements.

Similarly, in terms of curriculum, the internal division of the constellation of state-led and democratic planning undermined the advocacy for a participatory curricular design. Although both the radical and the moderate factions of the constellation agreed on the importance of participation of teachers and other members of the community, the former considered it as a tool for the transition to socialism, while the latter expected a more pluralist participation to define the objectives of education (Cox, 1988; Farrell, 1986). This division produced confusion within education staff and enabled the media and the public-private technocratic-planning constellation to emphasize the radical version of the reform and increase the backlash of public opinion towards Allende’s agenda (Farrell, 1986; Interviews #33 & 43). To be sure, the public-private technocratic-planning constellation did not openly oppose the participatory character of curricular planning proposed by Allende, but this constellation feared that the participation mechanism would lead to political indoctrination. Therefore, initially, the constellation mobilized its resources to avoid or ritually adopt democratic planning ideas without changing substantially the existing technocratic curriculum. But later, with the radicalization of the state-led democratic-planning constellation, their opponents directly defied or dismiss democratic planning ideas.
Initially, the National Congress of Education convened by teachers in 1971 failed to achieve consensus over education goals and actually sharpened the internal and external contestation about Allende’s proposed reform (Farrell, 1986). While the radical sector of the state-led democratic-planning constellation tried to limit the discussion of education as a means of a transition to socialism (e.g. Segundo aporte al Congreso de Educación, 1972; MEP, 1972), the moderate faction encouraged such a broad participation of teachers and communities that agreement became impossible given the heterogeneity of demands, needs, ideas, and expectations of the participants (Farrell, 1986). Meanwhile, the public-private technocratic-planning constellation, particularly the Church and the CDP, complained that the PU was manipulating the discussion and ignoring their claims for pluralism (Fischer, 1979; Nuñez, 2003).

Despite the failure to achieve consensus, the ministry of education used the conclusions of the 1971 Congress as a platform to propose a decree for the democratization of education. This decree sought to give voice to teachers, students and community in the education decisions including curricular design through the creation of local, provincial, and regional councils (Cox, 1988; Nuñez, 1989, 2003). Nevertheless, the concrete scope of the councils was ill defined, and the opposition deemed their composition as biased in favour of the PU (Cox, 1988; Farrell, 1986). The National Audit Office, which was not under the control of the PU, initially blocked the decree by arguing that it was at odds with the Statute of Constitutional Guarantees. The Audit Office only approved it when the education ministry revised it by ensuring more participation of private providers in the councils and transforming them into advisory bodies with limited authority on curricular decisions (Nuñez, 2003). The failure of the 1971 Congress and the
democratization decree illustrates the *avoidance* or *decoupling* of practices from ideas of democratic curricular planning.

The conclusions of the 1971 Congress were also used to advance the most important education proposal of the PU, the Unified National School (Escuela Nacional Unificada – ENU).\(^{22}\) The ENU was inspired by MEP ideas and reflected concerns to solve the Chilean ‘crisis of education’ (Farrell, 1986; Interview #43). Indeed, before the ENU, the government actively promoted vocational secondary education\(^{23}\) but this type of schooling was expensive and did not reduce the demand for traditional higher education. Therefore, the ENU sought the integration of pre-school, primary and secondary education into a single institution, the merger of vocational and general secondary education into a single track, and the constitution of a lifelong education system with a diversified post-secondary education (Informe ENU-1973, 2014).

Nevertheless, the language employed in ENU’s proposal further raised the fears of socialist indoctrination of the *public-private technocratic-planning constellation*. Several sentences of the ENU’s report pointed out that education would help ‘build a socialist society’ and teach youth ‘the values of a humanist socialism’ (Informe ENU-1973, 2014, pp. 158, 164 & 166). Consequently, the *public-private technocratic-planning constellation* mobilized its resources, such as active media campaigns and massive protests against ENU, portraying it as a ‘system of ideological infiltration into all sectors and ages of the population’ (“Editorial,” 1973).\(^{24}\) These arguments and resources

\(^{22}\) For a thorough analysis of the ENU, see Farrell, 1986; Nuñez, 2003.

\(^{23}\) The enrolment share for vocational secondary education grew from 32 to 36% between 1969 and 1973 (PIIE, 1984).

\(^{24}\) It has been widely documented how the US Central Intelligence Agency supported El Mercurio, one of the most widely read newspapers, to campaign against Allende’s government (Barra & Buono, 2009, p. 231; CIA activities in Chile, 2000; Herrero, 2014).
completely undermined ENU’s legitimacy, and the proposal never reached legislative debate (Interviews #33 & 43). In short, strong opponents effectively resisted and ultimately defied every reform attempt of the constellation of state-led democratic planning. The domestic arrangement of mixed provision and centralized technocratic authority became unchanged and, in a context of a harsh political polarization, the military coup of 1973 delivered the final blow to Allende’s educational reform.

Argentina: The Struggle between Peronists and anti-Peronists From Fronzidi to Onganía (1958-1970)

Compared to Chile, Argentina had initially a stronger state monopoly of secondary schooling. Due to the compatibility between MEP ideas and the domestic template, one could anticipate conformity with MEP. However, education reforms in Argentina during the predominance of MEP showed that compatibility between global ideas and domestic institutions is not enough for acquiescence when there is strong domestic opposition. Specifically, the state monopoly of education in Argentina was partly associated with populist forces that used schools as channels to inculcate their ideology. Therefore, opponent political sectors aimed at eradicating this populist influence from the school system (Rein, 1998). This domestic political contestation compromised the reception and translation of MEP ideas in Argentina.

Secondary education in Argentina was consolidated in 1863 with the foundation of the first national school. This template gradually diffused through several provinces, with the establishment of a number of state schools in charge of training the ruling class (Solari, 1972). Growth of private schools was restricted by their inability to grant certificates to students, their obligation to follow the curriculum of national schools, and the imposition to students of a final examination from state institutions (Narodowski & Andrada, 2001). The strength of the state monopoly was further fuelled by subsequent
Perón administrations from 1944 up to 1955. As a response to their working-class constituents and also to spread Peronist ideology, Juan Domingo Perón, a very beloved populist leader and three times president of Argentina (1944-1952; 1952-1956; 1973-1974), expanded substantially public enrolment in all educational levels, and created a new type of school, the ‘Factory School’. Factory schools, dedicated to working-class children, run parallel to traditional elitist secondary education and also to traditional technical schools that typically served middle-class students (Gallart et al., 2003; Pineau, 2004). Originally, these schools were not included in the regular education system but were managed by the ministry of labour. Likewise, curricular decisions were collectively undertaken by employers, workers, and the state (Gallart et al., 2003; Interview#70). With these schools, the number of students attending technical (and factory) secondary education rose from 23,281 to 83,128 between 1945 and 1955. Briefly put, Perón’s education measures nurtured new constituents of public secondary (technical and factory) schools magnifying the symbolic strength of public education.

By the late 1940s, however, a series of events contributed to the weakening of this state monopoly. As a way to attract the support from teachers, in 1947, Perón authorized a new teacher statute establishing the salaries of public and private school teachers. To pay the salaries of teachers in private institutions, this statute regulated existing state subsidies making the transfer of money for private schools consistent and systematic (Minteguiaga, 2009; Narodowski & Andrada, 2001). These subsidies unintentionally created their own

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25 Perón founded the Peronist party. This party was originally a polyclass alliance of workers, sectors of the army, and industrialists, with various ideological influences and permanent tensions between its working-class base, its anti-capitalist dynamic, and the industrial bourgeoisie (Munck, 1985, p. 51). During his administrations in the 1940s and 1950s, Peron committed to ‘rising the living standards of the masses’ (Munck, 1985, p. 51), and showed persuasion of the need of “the state leadership to intervene on behalf of perceived disadvantaged groups” (Ranis, 1979, p. 326).
constituents among private providers, especially, the Church. In addition, in 1955, Perón was overthrown in a civilian-military coup and subsequent governments engaged in stamping out Peronism from the school system (Rein, 1998). As part of this effort, the government of Arturo Frondizi (1958-1962) granted more participation to the Church, with the creation of the National Service for Private Education (Servicio Nacional de Educación Privada – SNEP), an organization within the ministry of education representing the interest of private schools (Salonia, 1981). Frondizi’s administration also stimulated private provision by authorizing private schools to grant diplomas and abolishing state graduate exams (Narodowski & Andrada, 2001).

Consequently, MEP ideas arrived in Argentina in a context of heated contestation over the control of education. After Perón’s overthrow in the 1955, the subsequent education reforms were typically frustrated by the political instability of the country and the inherited conflict between Peronist and anti-Peronist forces. Three more military coups happened between 1962 and 1976, and teachers and education staff that served during Perón’s administrations were often dismissed and rehired (Rein, 1998). Thus, by the 1960s, while private enrolment in secondary education increased to 26% of the total students, curriculum remained highly centralized and used as a means of indoctrination by both Peronist or anti-Peronist forces (Rein, 1998). With this context of protracted conflict, Argentina is an example of how contestation over domestic institutional arrangements compromised the translation of seemingly compatible global ideas.

A moderate mixture of coercive, mimetic and normative diffusion mechanisms.

The political instability of Argentina during the 1960s did not permit the sort of strong diffusion that Chile experienced. Regarding coercive mechanisms, Argentina also
received financial aid from the Alliance for Progress  

26 By 1962, Sigafoos (1962) reported more than US$270 million in US loans for Argentina within the context of the Alliance (p.51).

27 Southwell (1997) reports that the education office of the CONADE was in charge of developing the Argentine version of the Mediterranean Regional Project, a pioneering manpower planning initiative. CONADE also developed the study titled, ‘Education, Development, and Human Resources’, the first integral analysis of the conditions of the Argentine educational system clearly inspired by MEP ideas (CONADE, 1968).

28 In 1962, Frondizi was overthrown by a military coup. Similarly, in 1966 a new coup deposed the democratically elected president Arturo Illia (1963-1966).
Statist champions versus anti-statist advocates.

Although influenced by MEP, Frondizi’s administration was also pressured by the Catholic Church, the most salient private education provider (Vior & Rodríguez, 2012). As in Chile, the Church in Argentina also advocated for ‘freedom of education’ or the right of parents to choose their children’s school according to their religious beliefs (Llerena, 1998). However, rather than a commitment with social justice or poverty alleviation, this Church was more interested in eradicating Peronism from the school system (Rein, 1998). As a result, both Catholic and liberal education experts with influence in the ministry of education, were less attracted by the statist values of MEP. Although some of the education staff from Frondizi’s administration and subsequent governments participated in UNESCO networks, they were rather concerned with enhancing the influence of private schools (e.g. Van Gelderen, 1963). Therefore, unlike Chile, the Church did not associate with political parties seeking the expansion of public schools. Instead, the Church constituted a cohesive anti-statist constellation with conservative parties, some liberal education experts, and the military. This constellation had direct influence in the decision making process through its participation in the ministry of education, and also had important resources through Catholic private schools and other Catholic organizations. For instance, the Superior Council for Catholic Education and teachers of private schools often supported the demands of the anti-statist constellation (Rodríguez, 2013).

The curricular preferences of the anti-statist constellation were more ambiguous. Since the Church failed to reinstitute mandatory religious education in public schools in 1955, it turned its advocacy to state subsidies for the establishment of private schools.

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29 This Council was a non-governmental organization which coordinated Catholic schools
(Rein, 1998). However, this constellation barely challenged directly the centralized control of the secondary school curriculum (Southwell, 1997). Rather, its contestation focused on keeping religious education in public-subsidized Catholic schools, and abolishing ‘Peronist’ learning content from curriculum (Rein, 1998). By the same token, this constellation agreed on the importance of technical education but, unlike Peronists, they considered this type of schooling to be a terminal level for poor students and not conducive to university studies (Tedesco, 2003).

In contrast, the statist constellation, which included Peronists and statist technocrats, was more clearly connected with MEP. They advocated for the expansion of public schools and the strengthening of the ‘teaching state’ (Minteguiaga, 2009). This constellation does not mean that Peronists and technocrats were political allies. Indeed, they are often portrayed as opponents. Nevertheless, consistent with the idea of transversal constellation, their common interest on public schooling made Peronist and statist technocrats advocate together for a centralized governance model. As expected, however, this constellation was not consistent. While Peronists were barely interested in technocratic planning that was at odds with their employment of education as a political tool, statist technocrats tried to introduce the notions of technical and scientific planning in the governance of education (Palamidessi & Feldman, 1994). Similarly, while Peronists sought to elevate the status of technical education and used it as a means of social mobility (Pineau, 2004; Puiggrós & Gagliano, 2004), statist technocrats instead justified technical secondary schools for the production of the country’s required manpower (CONADE, 1968). Further, since trained statist technocrats were sparse, they did not engage with ideas of standardized assessments as means to collect data to inform education reforms (Interview #81).
In addition to the lack of cohesiveness of the *statist constellation*, their links with the decision-making process were also inconstant. On the one hand, Peronism was banned from electoral competition between 1955 and 1970. On the other, although statist technocrats were not completely excluded from the subsequent democratic and non-democratic governments of Jose Maria Guido (1962-1963), Arturo Illia (1963-1966), and Juan Carlos Onganía (1966-1970), their scarce numbers and high turnover prevented their ideas from being transformed into concrete policies (Interview #81). Nevertheless, the *statist constellation* had considerable power resources. First, despite its proscription, Peronism informally retained its political influence. Frondizi secretly received the support of this party to win the presidency (Rein, 1998). Likewise, public teachers mostly agreed with the preferences of the *statist constellation* (Puiggrós, 2003).

**Table 2.3 Summary of the constellations, degree of influence and actors in Argentina during the predominance of MEP ideas.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provision</th>
<th>Constellation supporting MEP – Statist constellation</th>
<th>Constellation opposing MEP – anti-statist constellation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State secondary schools:</td>
<td>STRONG INFLUENCE (Peronists, statist technocrats, public school teachers)</td>
<td>Public-subsidized private provision: MODERATE INFLUENCE (The Church, the military, some liberal education experts, private school teachers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curriculum</td>
<td>WEAK INFLUENCE (Statist technocrats) Peronists preferred a centralized politically defined curriculum. Technical education: STRONG INFLUENCE (Peronists, statist technocrats)</td>
<td>Centralized politically defined curriculum: STRONG INFLUENCE (The Church, the military, some liberal education experts) Terminal technical education: WEAK INFLUENCE (The Church, the military)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>Not relevant area of debate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Shortly put, the influence of the *anti-statist and statist constellations* was relatively balanced, and as a result, attempts of reforms in favour or against MEP were consistently
blocked, as I will explain in the next section. Table 2.3 summarizes the actors, positions and degree of influence of the constellations.

**Compromise and avoidance of MEP ideas.**

The similar influence of the *anti-statist and statist constellations* led to an unresolved conflict that forced the moderation of both parties. Regarding the first policy dimension of this study, education provision, the expansion of public secondary schooling recommended by MEP was *compromised* by the moderate influence of the *anti-statist constellation*. The deregulation of private schools and the increase of private subsidies during Frondizi’s presidency in 1958 fuelled the growth of private enrolment in secondary education (Narodowski & Andrada, 2001). Later, however, the ministry of education of Ongania’s government (1966-1970), under the influence of the Church, proposed a reform called ‘Escuela Intermedia’ (Middle School). This reform suggested the reduction of primary education by two years and introduced a new non-mandatory lower secondary school with shared funding between state, families, and the community (Ministerio de Educación y Cultura, 1969, p. 13). The reform explicitly attempted to end with the ‘statism’ in education (“La Escuela Media,” 1968).

This project raised a huge backlash from the *statist constellation*, including statist technocrats in CONADE, the planning agency, and public teacher unions. This constellation regarded the Middle School reform as elitist and regressive, since it reduced mandatory education and suggested fees for the new lower secondary school (J. González, 1971). Invoking UNESCO recommendations and CONADE’s call for public secondary education expansion, teachers challenged the proposed reform (ATEP, 1971; Rodríguez, 2013) and convened massive strikes that forced the ministry of education to change the project, making the new lower secondary education mandatory and tuition free
Moreover, by 1971, 13 out of 22 provinces had not implemented the reform due to the opposition of public teachers and provincial education ministries not aligned with the Church (Villaverde, 1971, p. 276). Ultimately, the government had little choice but to limit the reform to the province of Buenos Aires. Later, the education minister was replaced by Gustavo Malek, who was closer to statist ideas and consequently suspended the reform and announced that he would ‘look by all means to prioritize state education’ (Villaverde, 1971, p. 260).

In sum, the balanced influence of both the statist and the anti-statist constellations compromised MEP ideas of public expansion of secondary education. The state-led provision largely accommodated the interests of private providers. Unlike Chile, the authority of the state over education provision in Argentina did not become further consolidated. Although the overall enrolment in secondary reached 44% in 1970, the percentage of students enrolled in private secondary schools grew from 23% to 33% between 1960 and 1970 (Guillermina Tiramonti, 1993), and the conflict between statist and anti-statist forces remained unresolved.

While MEP’s provision ideas were compromised, curricular recommendations were practically avoided or decoupled from the actual practice. In the early 1960s, based on MEP’s rhetoric and with the support of the Inter American Development Bank (IADB), Frondizi integrated Peron’s Factory Schools into the regular education system removing them from the ministry of labour. Yet, these schools remained separated from the traditional academic secondary schools. Likewise, the National Council for Technical Education (Consejo Nacional de Educación Técnica – CONET), a semi-autonomous agency within the ministry of education, was created to regulate technical schools.
With these measures, Frondizi was not just pursuing MEP recommendations, but also continuing Peron’s attempt to elevate the status of technical education. Three situations support this argument. First, although the curriculum of technical secondary education was controlled by a board composed of CONET’s officials, business and union representatives, CONET’s chair had more leverage in these decisions, while business and workers paid little attention to curriculum (Gallart et al., 2003). Second, rather than manufacturing, construction and services were the sectors that absorbed the majority of the labour supply during this period (Torrado, 1992). Putting differently, the promotion of technical schools was not a functional response to the process of industrialization. Third, Frondizi also transformed Peron’s Workers National University into the Technical National University (Salonia, 1981), which is inconsistent with MEP recommendations of discouraging university studies. In brief, Frondizi used MEP ideas to increase the legitimacy of Perón’s technical schools without substantial transformations.

Later, these strong policy legacies blocked the attempt of the Middle School reform to transform the structure and curriculum of technical schools. With the creation of a lower secondary education of four years, the curriculum of the technical secondary education would be reduced from six to four years. Such a model was closer to VOCSED ideas promoted by MEP’s template. To be sure, the Middle School project was not inspired by MEP ideas, but based on an older domestic project of 1916 (Tedesco, 2003). However, the project also used MEP’s rhetoric to increase its legitimacy by invoking the potential contribution of the Middle School reform to manpower and development demands (e.g. Cirigliano, 1971). However, technical secondary teachers in some provinces accused the project of reducing the opportunities for training, and undermining students’ options to access higher education (ATEP, 1971). This time, in contrast to what
happened with education provision, teachers forced the *avoidance* of MEP ideas because it threatened Peron’s legacy and their subsequent interests. Instead of establishing VOCSED, the rhetoric of MEP was associated with the existing six-year technical schools, but these schools were not transformed and its role of discouraging university studies was dismissed.

*Avoidance* or *decoupling* was also present in the adoption of centralized and technocratic elaboration of curriculum. Although both constellations agreed on the centralized control of the curriculum, they rather favoured the encyclopaedic curricular model. On the one hand, as mentioned before, Peronist and anti-Peronist forces used curriculum as a mean of political indoctrination (Rein, 1998). Therefore, a scientific curriculum was inconvenient for these purposes. On the other hand, Frondizi also implemented a new regulation of teachers’ working conditions in which teachers were not appointed to schools but to teach specific subjects (e.g. math, history, etc.) (Salonia, 1981). As a result, teachers became constituents of the encyclopaedic curriculum that defined their job positions. In addition, unlike Chile, Argentina did not have curricular planning experts since normative diffusion was weak in the country (indeed, Argentina did not create a curricular agency such as the Chilean CPEIP or Colombian ICOLPE). Therefore, weak normative diffusion, lack of supporters and strong opposition *avoided* the elaboration of a scientific-based curriculum. Although MEP’s rhetoric was employed to disguise non-conformity, the national secondary school curriculum mainly retained the characteristics of the XIX century (Acosta, 2012; Dussel, 2006). By the same token, the weakness of *normative diffusion* resulted in the absence of standardized tests to inform education reforms. Unlike Chile and Colombia, Argentina did not experience the nurture of testing experts during this period, which foreshadowed difficulties in the future
adoption of assessment systems. Instead, evaluation remained as a domain of teachers loosely supervised by school inspectors (Gvirtz, 2002).

**Colombia: The Lack of Secondary Education Constituents during the National Front**

Compared to Chile and Argentina, Colombia never consolidated a state monopoly or a teaching state for secondary education. By 1950, enrolment was five percent of the school-age population and half of the students attended private, mostly Catholic, schools. Although the Liberal Party tried to reduce the influence of the Church over education, Catholic private schools were always permitted to run parallel to public schools with almost no regulation by the state (Helg, 1987). Moreover, by the early 1950s, the government often delegated the management of the public schools to the Church. For instance, unlike Chile and Argentina where technical schools were managed by the state, Colombian government often contracted with the Church for the operation of technical secondary schools. These schools had usually different duration, sometimes they were not conducive to university studies, and specialties were not unified (MEN & PNUD, 1980). Therefore, even public institutions were somewhat privatized (Castillo, 2008; Helg, 1987). In sum, the Colombian state was not able to force private schools to follow a national template, and instead, the Church was permitted to make substantial decisions over public education.

Similarly, the weakness of the state also produced poor coordination of education in departments (similar to provinces or states) (Helg, 1987). The ministry of education did not have the upper hand in the appointment of teachers, supervisors, education secretaries or any other position in the education system. Departmental education secretaries
designated by governors were in charge of teachers’ appointments. In turn, governors were directly designated by the president, and the ministry of education was just a powerless adviser in this hierarchical chain (Hanson, 1986). Most appointments, from teachers to the minister himself, served clientelist purposes, and departments typically ignored national policy and guidelines (Duarte & Restrepo, 2003; Hanson, 1986; Le Bot, 1971). Consequently, the ministry of education did not have fiscal control over secondary education. By 1948, the ministry stopped the creation of new national secondary schools and delegated this task to departments and private actors (Helg, 1987). By 1951, the departments provided 59% of funding for general secondary schools (Le Bot, 1971). By contrast to Chile and Argentina, where governors feared the transfer of schools with insufficient funding, the Colombian semi-anarchic setting transformed governors and local education secretaries into champions of the decentralized institutional arrangement. This arrangement favoured patronage and political gains. Therefore, it became a resistant legacy difficult to modify.

In this context, the escalation of a violent conflict between Liberals and Conservatives in the 1940s30 perpetuated state neglect of secondary education. The conflict finally led Liberals and Conservatives to agree on a consociational democracy.31 This arrangement, called the National Front, lasted from 1958 to 1974 and involved the alternation of each party in the presidential office every four years as well as the equal distribution of legislative, executive and administrative positions (Lijphart, 1969, p. 213).

30 The particular history of Colombia is usually divided into different periods of violence. Between 1946 and 1958, the period knows as “The Violence” was characterized by the armed conflict between the traditional political parties and an emergent peasant war, derived from the failed implementation of the agrarian reform (Sánchez, 1989).

31 A ‘consociational democracy’ is a pact in which conflicting groups share power, hold mutual veto over each others’ decisions, and provide mutual guarantees in order to settle the conflict and secure stability (Lijphart, 1969).
This mutual veto between parties made it even more difficult to change the education system and its strong legacies in the three areas of this study. Regarding secondary education provision, all national and subnational units, municipalities, departments, and the central government, run their own secondary schools in a very uncoordinated way. By the early 1960s, only 6.5% secondary students were enrolled in national secondary schools (Hanson, 1986). Additionally, neither public nor private secondary schools were tuition free, and the government only distributed a few scholarships for poor students. This provision arrangement was clearly at odds with MEP ideas, anticipating a difficult translation.

In terms of curriculum, during the first half of the twentieth century, 21 reforms of secondary education curriculum were enacted (Henao, 1956). Many of these reforms were promoted by foreign assistance (Helg, 1987) but appropriation and implementation in the country was weak. Often, government change, or even minister replacement, led to new modifications of the secondary school curriculum. Technical secondary schools were marginal and regarded as second-rate education, while humanist and elite-oriented education was predominant (Saldarriaga, 2003). Liberal reforms oriented to promote technical education were often blocked or reversed by the Conservative party (Baquero, 2009). In brief, like provision, the domestic curricular model was in conflict with centralized and technocratic MEP ideas.

Finally, student evaluation was not part of the political debate. Given the lack of coordination, information about the education system was scarce and there was no intention to monitor any reform. In brief, the incompatibility of MEP recommendations and the domestic arrangement anticipated the resistance to global norms, even though the political stability of the country during these years favoured the reception of MEP ideas.
Strong coercion and mimesis, weak normative diffusion.

Like in Chile and Argentina, MEP ideas travelled to Colombia through a combination of coercive, mimetic and normative mechanisms. According to Arnove (1980), the political stability of Colombia during the 1950s and 1970s, and its dependency on foreign aid made the country a laboratory of education innovation for several IOs. Through the Alliance for Progress, Colombia received significant financial and technical aid from UNESCO, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the USAID and the WB.\textsuperscript{32} With this support, several educational innovations were designed and tested in the country (Hanson, 1986; Helg, 1998; Martinez, Ramírez, & Villarraga, 2011).\textsuperscript{33} Like in Chile and Argentina, technical assistance also led to the creation of agencies for educational planning inside the ministry of education, such as the Colombian Pedagogical Institute (Instituto Colombiano de Pedagogía – ICOLPE), similar to CPEIP in Chile, and an education planning office inside the National Planning Department (Departamento Nacional de Planeación – DNP), the government agency analogous to CONADE in Argentina and ODEPLAN in Chile. The characteristics of this diffusion process showed again the interdependency of coercive and mimetic mechanisms.

Normative pressures in Colombia were weaker than in Chile. In the 1950s, a WB’s commission led by the economist Lauchlin Currie advised the Colombian government to adopt a comprehensive public administration reform in order to promote modernization.

\textsuperscript{32} For example, between 1969 and 1972, Colombia received more than 75 million dollars from the WB and the USAID, which represented almost the half of public educational investment in the country (Arnove, 1980). Taffet (2012) also asserts that Colombia was the second largest recipient of the Alliance funding.

\textsuperscript{33} The majority of these innovations focused mainly on elementary and rural education (e.g. Escuela Nueva, school mapping program) with the exception of diversified secondary education (Hanson, 1986).
and national development (Sandilands, 2015). Higher education was included as a part of this reform proposal, and Currie himself led the modernization of the School of Economics of the main public university in the country, the National University of Colombia (Uribe, 2014). Foreign aid also helped the development of sociology in this university and the rise of educational research (Cataño, 1980; Uribe, 2014). By the late 1960s, however, university reform was suspended since financial support from UNESCO and the Rockefeller Foundation was rejected as it was deemed ‘American imperialism’ (Tarazona, 2015; Uribe, 2014). The few scholars trained during the reform went to government agencies in charge of macroeconomic policy in the DNP (Alvarez, 2005), but they barely engaged with educational planning, with the notable exception of the National Learning Service (Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje – SENA). Although a few education officials had strong ties with UNESCO and other IOs, they usually had short tenure, were relatively isolated, and did not develop networks of statist education planning experts like Chile did. Consequently, normative diffusion was limited to some teacher colleges that incorporated solid programs on curricular planning and promoted experimentation and testing of educational innovations (Martinez et al., 2011). In addition, UNESCO and the OAS provided a few short courses and in-place training on

34 To be sure, the DNP was dominated by economists since the 1960s, but not all of them were keen on planning ideas. Some of them were more inclined for classical economics (Alvarez, 2005).
35 The National Learning Service is an autonomous government agency dedicated to workers’ training.
36 For instance, Gabriel Betancourt was a planning expert, two-times ministry of education in Colombia (1955 -1956 and 1966 -1968), and official for UNESCO in different positions including Chair of the Education Planning Commission for Latin America and General Vice-director of the Education Office in Paris.
37 CEPAL was not either influential among Colombian intellectuals and higher education as it was in the cases of Argentina and Chile.
educational planning to middle-level bureaucrats (MEN, 1974). Similarly, some testing expertise was developed through the collaboration with the Ford Foundation and staff from the Scholastic Aptitude Test (Rocha, Hernández, & Hernández, 1998). Yet, these experts were not engaged with secondary education reforms but with student selection for university studies. The weakness of normative diffusion and poor state capacity over secondary education in Colombia explain the particular translation of the MEP in the country.

The predominance of the anti-statist constellation.

During the National Front, the Conservative Party, the Church and governors remained a powerful anti-statist constellation. At the same time, the mutual veto between traditional parties made radical reforms difficult to achieve. Both Conservatives and Liberals had limited leverage for policy change. The appointment of ministers of education typically reflected political motivations rather than technical criteria and tenure was short (Hanson, 1986). Due to the lack of statist technocrats, the occasional appointment of education experts did not neutralize the influence of the anti-statist constellation. For instance, the first five-year educational plan of 1957 conducted by Gabriel Betancourt, a prominent planning expert, reframed the constellation’s preference for private provision by stating that public secondary school should be provided only for those that were not able to pay for private institutions (MEN, 1957). Helg (1987) argued that Betancourt was also tightly connected with the Church and therefore collaborated to the promotion of private schooling (p. 223). As in the cases of Catholic planning experts on Argentina and Chile, this example illustrates how domestic actors influenced by global norms translate them in ways that still reflect the existing domestic arrangements.
In terms of curriculum, MEP ideas were probably more influential due to the embrace of curricular planning ideas in the most prominent teacher colleges during the 1970s. Based on the work of these colleges, the government established in 1968 the ICOLPE, the government agency specialized in curricular research, planning and experimentation of educational innovations (Martinez et al., 2011). All these efforts consolidated a group of curricular planners in academia and government that actively advocated for the centralized and scientific elaboration of the curriculum based on national needs (Interview #7). These planning experts however, focused on the curricular design for public –and mainly primary- schools. This development illustrates the potential of training as a mechanism for normative diffusion, but also the capacity of domestic actors to adapt global norms to domestic arrangements.

In addition to curricular planners, political parties, and the Church, teachers were also important actors in education politics. Traditionally, teacher strikes often pushed the government to transfer funds to subnational units, even when these units failed to comply with education policy (Hanson, 1986). Further, the organization of teachers also reflected the semi-anarchic character of the education system. Typically, each department had its own union, and teachers had very heterogeneous labour conditions (Helg, 1987). Only in 1959, primary public school teachers organized a national federation, the Colombian Federation of Teachers (Federación Colombiana de Educadores – FECODE) in the quest for homogeneous, mandatory and tuition-free public primary school and harmonization of work conditions of elementary teachers across the country (Bocanegra, 2008, p. 118). Given the expansion of elementary education in the 1940s and 1950s, FECODE counted with a robust membership that gave it important political leverage (Bocanegra, 2009, 2010). This leverage was eventually used for the nationalization of fiscal responsibility
over primary education and achieved a unified teacher statute in 1979 (Ocampo, 2002, 2009). The nationalization and the statute paved the way for public secondary education teachers to join FECODE, increasing their power resources and shifting their demands towards the massification of public education at both levels, primary and secondary.

Table 2.4 Summary of the constellations, degree of influence and actors in Colombia during the predominance of MEP ideas.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constellation supporting MEP – No organized constellation</th>
<th>Constellation opposing MEP – anti-statist constellation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provision</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expansion public school: WEAK INFLUENCE</td>
<td>Private and Public-subsidized private provision: STRONG INFLUENCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Public school teachers, some Liberals)</td>
<td>(The Church, some Liberals, the Conservatives)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curriculum</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technocratic (vocational) curriculum: WEAK INFLUENCE</td>
<td>Participatory elaboration of curriculum:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Statist technocrats)</td>
<td>MODERATE INFLUENCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Teachers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>No relevant area of debate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another new demand of FECODE in the 1980s was the professionalization of teaching (Bocanegra 2009). This professionalization included opposition to centralized curricular planning and instructional technology. The union argued that this technocratic style of curricular design treated teachers as education operators only in charge of applying pre-designed and pre-tested programs (Interview #14). Although FECODE agreed with the importance of curricular experimentation, they demanded the participation of teachers in the elaboration of curricula and the introduction of their pedagogical knowledge in the educational planning (Martinez et al., 2011; Interview #14). The support from some prominent national scholars and the concise policy proposals from teachers beyond salaries and work conditions granted significant legitimacy to the union’s demands (Bocanegra, 2010; Interview #14). This legitimacy joined union and scholars into a state-led democratic-planning constellation.
Nevertheless, this constellation only became salient after 1979. In this way, as Table 2.4 shows, the expansion of public (vocational) secondary education and centralized curricular planning prescribed by the MEP ideas during the 1950s through 1970s, lacked strong advocates in the country and instead faced increasingly organized opposition. 

**The avoidance of manpower planning ideas.**

The strength of the *anti-statist constellation* and lack of real supporters of MEP between 1950s and 1970s led the government to *avoid* or *decouple* the prescriptions of expanding public secondary schools from real practice. Although secondary education enrolment grew from 5 to 24%, public enrolment only rose from 42 to 50% during this period. In addition, the different administrations during the National Front undertook only timid efforts for the state to take control over all secondary schooling. The need to centralize authority over education policy was only addressed seriously for primary education. Under the leadership of two educational planning experts, Gabriel Betancourt (1966-1968) and Octavio Arizmendi (1968-1970),38 the ministry of education implemented the Regional Educational Funds (Fondos Educativos Regionales – FER). These funds were contracts with departments in order to make them comply with national education policy in exchange of financial resources from the central government.39 Through the FER, the ministry managed to standardize departments’ education processes, eliminate the practice of diverting education funds to other purposes, and somewhat centralize control over primary education provision and curriculum. Yet, the ministry also needed the nationalization of secondary education in order to complete the process of

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38 Hanson (1986) pointed out that Aurelio Céspedes, the former dean of the School of Education in one of the main universities, was influenced by ideas of educational planning, and directly assisted Arizmendi in the implementation of FER (p.74).

39 For a detailed analysis of FER see Hanson (1986).
authority centralization. Nationalization would imply the central government take full fiscal responsibility over department schools, and control teachers’ appointments’, education provision and curriculum at the department level (Hanson, 1986).

Nevertheless, in the education reform of 1971, the ministry of education refrained from nationalizing secondary education, arguing again that such a measure would provide free education only to the more affluent classes (MEN, 1971, p. 292). Likewise, using the influence over political elites, the Church resisted the attempt to force private schools to grant scholarships for poor children (Helg, 1987). By 1975, the nationalization of secondary education was finally approved but it excluded private schools. The Nationalization Bill required the national government to assume financial responsibility only over public secondary schools and establish the upper limit for public teachers that subnational units could appoint (Ley 43, 1975). This law was sponsored by the Liberal Party as a response to the pressure of FECODE and motivated by a political necessity to show its commitment to public education (Ocampo, 2009). Therefore, the government did not conduct serious research on the fiscal implications of the decision before the enactment of the law (Hanson, 1986). Expecting that the central government would take financial responsibility over public secondary schools and teachers’ salaries, governors and mayors took advantage from the former arrangement and the urgency of the Liberals to please their constituents by quickly appointing new teachers and increasing their salaries and benefits (Hanson, 1986). Ultimately, central government funds became insufficient to cover departments’ secondary education costs. As a result, the national expenditure on education was stalled, teachers’ payroll and appointments were frozen, transfer of fiscal responsibility from departments to the central government was suspended, and nationalization was left to drift (Avellaneda & Rodríguez, 1993).
By 1977, there was still a mix of funding schemes including national schools paid by the national government, department schools subsidized by national and departmental governments, municipal schools funded by all three levels, and private schools also receiving financial resources from all national and subnational jurisdictions. This situation did not change significantly through the following years (Avellaneda & Rodríguez, 1993; Hanson, 1986). In this way, despite the strength of coercive and mimetic mechanisms (financial aid from the Alliance for Progress and UNESCO’s technical assistance), normative pressures were weak and found poor support in a domestic arrangement incompatible with MEP ideas of provision (weak state capacity and political will to control secondary schools). Therefore, the strength of a powerful opponent constellation (the Church, governors, political elites) led the country to ritually adopt a nationalization of secondary education without actually changing the uncoordinated scheme of provision. This case illustrates a path to avoidance of global norms.

In the area of curriculum, the country resisted even more MEP ideas. By contrast to the area of provision, normative diffusion was stronger for MEP curricular ideas, which drove the government to a reform called ‘Curricular Renovation’ in 1975 (Martinez et al., 2011; Personal interview #7). This reform sought to elaborate a scientific curriculum, relevant for the country’s needs, including primary school and secondary education that promoted vocational training (MEN, 1976). Assisted by the OAS and the WB, and conducted by well-trained curricular planners, the Curricular Renovation successfully completed the design and testing of the curriculum for primary education that was enacted by a national decree in 1984 (Decreto 1002, 1984; Interview #7). The lack of interest by subsequent Conservative governments delayed the reform of the secondary
school curriculum, which only started in the mid-1980s. By this time however, the *state-led democratic-planning* had already grown stronger and FECODE contested the technocratic approach of curricular planning (Interviews # 7 & 14). The political strength of FECODE in the late 1980s kept the ministry from imposing the curriculum for secondary education (Interview #7). As a consequence, school curricula were just published but never endorsed by any decree or regulation, and the Curricular Renovation, like the nationalization of secondary school, was also left to drift. Moreover, strong normative diffusion was insufficient to prevent defiance of MEP curricular ideas, since the incentives for the government to impose and enforce a centralized curriculum were never as strong as FECODE’s promotion of curricular autonomy became in the 1990s. Shortly put, this direct influential contestation of global ideas and the lack of advocates for a stronger intervention of the state in secondary education curricular matters produced the *defiance or dismissal* from the global norm of centralized and technocratically elaborated curriculum.

Although in general the curricular reform of secondary education *defied* MEP ideas, vocational secondary schooling followed a different path. Concretely, the WB delivered a loan to Colombia in 1967 to establish VOCSED\(^{40}\) (Helg, 1998; Zuñiga, 1979). Unlike Curricular Renovation, also financially supported by the WB, VOCSED was quickly implemented by the Liberal government of Lleras Restrepo (1966-1970) with the construction of 19 vocational schools in 1968 (Hanson, 1986; Helg, 1998; Martinez et al., 2011). By 1974, another Liberal administration gave a new boost to VOCSED by

\(^{40}\) Following MEP ideas, VOCSED schools had both tracks, vocational and academic, within the same institutions. Specialties were highly diversified and they were initiated only after three years of general secondary education, unlike the six-year existing technical schools.
building 25 more institutions in the capital of the most populated in the country\textsuperscript{41} (MEN, 1974, 1976).

The relative emulation of MEP ideas in VOCSED was possible because the implementation of these schools did not threaten and actually accommodated the interests of powerful domestic actors. First, the implementation of this type of schooling in Colombia started in 1968 before the emergence of the state-led democratic planning constellation in the 1980s, and therefore curricular technocratic planning of VOCSED proceeded without substantial challenges. The Colombian Institute for School Building, one of the planning agencies created in 1968 within the ministry of education, implemented VOCSED quickly and independent from the Curricular Renovation (Interview #7) with the assistance of UNESCO and UNDP (MEN, 1974). Second, VOCSED schools were oriented to poor students in order to discourage them from university studies (Helg, 1998; MEN, 1976). Further, they did not replace the existing technical schools managed by the Church, which were not changed by VOCSED regulation.\textsuperscript{42} Therefore, VOCSED schools did not affect the interests of private providers and nor challenged the elitist character of traditional secondary school. Third, the national government built VOCSED schools with its own funding in different departments. Consequently, VOCSED did not substantially affect the existing provision arrangement. Indeed, by 1982, enrolment in vocational education hardly reached 6\% and from the 80000 students promised by the program, only 56,000 attended VOCSED schools.

\textsuperscript{41} These 25 buildings were not vocational schools but Service Centers for Teachers, institutions that provided workshops and labs for different traditional schools in order for them to implement VOCSED (MEN, 1974).

\textsuperscript{42} As explained before, existing technical secondary schools previous to MEP ideas were often run by the Church with public subsidies. With the implementation of VOCSED, technical schools remained in charge of the Church, with public funding, and with a specialized curriculum of six-years.
(Arnove, 1980; Duque, 1989; Helg, 1998). Shortly put, MEP ideas about VOCSED were emulated and only relatively *compromised* in its expansion by domestic interests.

Finally, as in the other two countries of this study, student evaluation was not part of the policy debate in Colombia. However, in 1968, the government established an instrument called ‘State Exam’ developed by the Colombian Institute for the Promotion of Higher Education (Instituto Colombiano de Fomento a la Educación Superior – ICFES). This exam was based on the same North American curricular ideas that supported MEP (Ortiz, 2012). However, due to the lack of interest in secondary education, rather than informing the reform, testing experts emphasized the use of the exam in Colombia to select students for university studies (Ortiz, 2012; Peña, 2008). Yet, since the elaboration of a national curriculum for secondary education had not been successful, the State Exam became unintentionally the only curricular guideline for secondary schools (Interview #7 & 10). In 1974, the education ministry enacted Decree 080 with the mandatory curriculum for secondary education. This curriculum was hardly the product of scientific planning for secondary education and instead, it seemed to reproduce the contents of the State Exam (Interviews #7 & 10). Although the test was not oriented to evaluate the education reform, it did help to introduce a tradition of standardized testing in the country that would have consequences in the following decades.

**Final Remarks**

MEP ideas did not challenge the traditional state-run governance template, but they introduced moderate modifications, such as the expansion of secondary (vocational) education, the centralization of a scientific curriculum, and the slight emergence of standardized tests to inform reforms. The analysis of the translation of MEP ideas
supports the hypotheses presented in the previous chapter. In all three countries of this study, a combination of coercive, mimetic and normative mechanisms helped the diffusion of MEP. The need for resources forced Chile, Argentina and Colombia to accept the prescriptions of the Alliance for Progress. With this funding, these three countries also followed mimetic pressures of UNESCO and CEPAL by establishing government planning agencies in charge of education policy. Yet, normative diffusion mechanisms showed variation across countries. Although in all three countries there were efforts to train experts in education planning, only in Chile did this effort succeed in producing a critical mass of like-minded experts close to the decision-making process. These statist technocrats were crucial for Frei Montalva reforms in 1964. Likewise, their absence undermined the legitimacy of Allende’s attempt in the 1970. In Argentina, the production and participation of these technocrats was more limited. The small number of statist technocrats weakened the influence of MEP in the country, but the association of the few statist technocrats with influential Peronist forces still helped to curb the influence of the anti-statist champions. By contrast, in Colombia, the shortage of these technical staff played a substantial role in the avoidance and defiance of the global norm.

The diffusion of MEP suggests that coercive, mimetic, and especially normative pressures might have a strong effect on shaping policy outcomes. Nonetheless, the sole presence of diffusion mechanisms did not ensure conformity to the global norm. Regardless of the strength of diffusion mechanisms, global norms are re-interpreted once they arrived at the domestic level. This re-interpretation shows flexibility of global norms and the role of policy legacies and the translation process. Particularly, statist technocrats, although committed to MEP, adapted these norms to their specific context. In Chile, statist technocrats in the 1960s accommodated the interests of private actors in the
education provision and curricular decisions. Later, education officials collaborating with Allende’s reform translated MEP ideas differently, emphasizing public provision and participatory curricular planning. In Argentina, foreign recommendations were associated with the strength of the state monopoly and the restriction of private actors. Conversely, in Colombia, the lack of public interest in secondary education and the tradition of elitist private provision translated MEP into policies only for poor students.

These different domestic interpretations of the same global norm suggest three observations. First, global norms are modified or translated as they circulate, which lead not only to homogenization but also to variation (Sahlin, 2008). Second, domestic actors that support a dimension of the global norm may oppose other dimensions. For instance, while the Church opposed the expansion of state-run schools, it did not contest the centralization of the curriculum. By contrast, teachers supported expansion of public schooling, but sometimes opposed the centralization of curricular decisions. Finally, rather than oriented to global norms, domestic political contestation arose from the different interpretations in each country. Table 2.5 summarizes the different path of translation by showing how global norms interacted with policy legacies, and how this interaction produced either support or contestation in each country.

Regarding education provision, in all three countries, the Church stood as a powerful advocate for private secondary schooling, while teacher unions typically pushed for public education. In Chile, the global norm was conformed to because it was re-interpreted to accommodate private providers. The strength of the public-private constellation produced by this interpretation later defeated a weaker alliance between
Table 2.5 Summary of pathways to MEP ideas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coercion</th>
<th>Mimesis</th>
<th>Normative</th>
<th>Compatibility with legacies</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Opposit.</th>
<th>Translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chile – Frei Montalva (1965-1970)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prov.</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Relatively compatible (Mixed provision under the authority of the state)</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Conformity - State-led public-private provision, national technocratic curriculum, emergence of testing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curric</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Compatible (National curriculum)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eval.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Incompatible (No testing)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chile – Allende (1970-1973)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prov.</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Relatively incompatible (State-led public-private provision)</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Defiance - No changes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curric</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Compatible (National technocratic curriculum)</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Conformity - National technocratic curriculum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eval.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Compatible (some test)</td>
<td>Not contested</td>
<td></td>
<td>Conformity. No change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Argentina (1958-1970)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prov.</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Relatively compatible (Mixed provision under the authority of the state)</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Compromise – Mixed provision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curric</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Compatible (National curriculum)</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Avoidance – National encyclopaedic curriculum with MEP rhetoric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eval.</td>
<td>Not diffused</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Incompatible (no testing)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Colombia (1958-1980)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prov.</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Incompatible (Weak state – uncoordinated system)</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Avoidance – Public secondary schooling for the poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curric</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Incompatible (weak state – uncoordinated curriculum)</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Defiance – No clear curriculum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eval.</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Incompatible (no testing)</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Avoidance – Testing for univ. admission</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
teacher unions and left parties that rather translated MEP as a full state monopoly of education. By contrast, in Argentina, MEP ideas of provision were re-interpreted as the further consolidation of the state monopoly of education. Yet, the rejection of this ‘statism’ by the Church and the power balance between statist and anti-statist constellations blocked reforms proposals of both parties and compromised the translation of the global norm. Finally, in Colombia, the interpretation of MEP as a solution for poor students served to decouple policy from the global norm. Although enrolment in public secondary education increased, state authority over public and private schools remained weak. This avoidance was the result of a powerful constellation composed by the Church, the national government, and subnational authorities with scarce interest in the nationalization of secondary education.

Regarding curriculum, only teacher unions in Chile and Colombia raised questions about the technocratic centralization of authority proposed by MEP. In Chile, the inclusion of the Church in technocratic curricular planning and the consistency of such planning with the former model of national curriculum undermined and defeated teachers’ opposition to MEP and their subsequent demands for participatory curricular decisions. Conversely, in Colombia, technocratic centralized curricular planning was at odds with the semi-anarchic nature of the education system, and therefore, it found few advocates. Consequently, teacher unions were more effective in contesting and defying this global norm. Unlike Chile and Colombia, teacher unions in Argentina did not contest the centralization of the curriculum since it was part of the state monopoly of education. Yet, technocratic curricular planning in this country did not become consolidated due to the few experts trained for this purpose and the political use of the curriculum. Therefore, in Argentina, the avoidance or decoupling of the global norm was driven by the ritual
adoption of the MEP rhetoric about curriculum, but the reproduction of the existing encyclopaedic curricular arrangement.

Regarding student evaluation, it has been explained in this chapter that standardized testing was not very relevant for the global norm, but just a means to collect information for the reform. By the same token, it was barely a part of the policy debates in each country and evaluation remained basically under the authority of teachers. However, MEP ideas managed to establish some testing expertise in Chile and Colombia. For Chile, standardized assessments were a means to evaluate the education reform due to the strong normative diffusion of the whole MEP template. In contrast, Colombia used this kind of tests only for university admission due to the lack of support for MEP ideas. In Argentina, ideas about testing were not diffused since experts were not trained in this field. Although marginal, the development of assessments during the 1960s operated as a policy legacy for future decades.

To conclude, diffusion mechanisms play a substantial role in translation of a global norm. Strong diffusion certainly increases the chances of conformity, as the Chilean case demonstrates. Although necessary, however, external pressures are not enough to fully explain the final outcome of translation. For instance, the strong diffusion of curricular planning in Colombia was not enough to make the country follow this norm. Policy legacies and domestic political contestation are also crucial variables to explain translation. Furthermore, it is the combination between these three factors what explains the outcome. Hence, as the analysis of Chile shows, conformity is more likely when diffusion is strong, the interpretation of the global norm is not in conflict with the domestic arrangement, and contestation is weak. Conversely, regardless of the strength of
diffusion, if the domestic arrangement is in conflict or contestation is strong, the global norm might be decoupled from the actual domestic practice or defied.
Chapter 3. Varieties of State Retrenchment and New Public Management Norms in Education Governance: Market-based and Active-State ideas

In the previous chapter, I explained the translation of MEP ideas in the three countries of my study. MEP ideas put the state at the center of the governance of secondary education. These norms demanded the expansion of secondary schooling and the technocratization of the curriculum. I showed how the combination of diffusion mechanisms, policy legacies, and domestic contestation explained the variation in the translation of MEP governance template: in Chile, the model was fully conformed to; in Argentina, provision ideas were compromised while curriculum prescriptions were avoided or only ritually adopted; and in Colombia, provision norms were also avoided while curriculum ideas were defied. In this chapter, I show that regime changes between 1970 and 1990, the economic crisis during that period, and the policy legacies of MEP that made evident the difficulties of this model to deal with massive secondary education paved the way for New Public Management ideas (NPM). Overall, these norms demanded state retrenchment in secondary education, but the region was dominated by two variations. On the one hand, market-oriented ideas displaced the state from the management of education, and on the other, active-state norms attributed the state a role of coordination instead of a role of provider. This chapter highlights how these two varieties of NPM ideas interacted with the economic and political context, challenging domestic governance arrangements. The economic crisis and the type of regime of each country also shaped the domestic contestation that this challenge raised.

In the 1980s, new global ideas challenged the centrality of the state proposed by the MEP. The new ideas emerged already in the late 1960s, when some economists, particularly from the Chicago School of Economics (Interview #26), raised doubts about
the existence of ‘manpower growth paths’ for developing nations to emulate.43 These scholars also criticized the potential inefficiency of the manpower forecasts44 (Blaug, 1967; Bray, 1990; Psacharopoulos & Hinchliffe, 1973). They also argued that the strong role of state in education without result-based incentives for schools caused inefficiency, low education quality, and underinvestment of the private sector (Psacharopoulos, 1986). In addition, the centralized nature of educational planning proved to be costly, excessively bureaucratized, relatively authoritarian, and unresponsive to diverse needs of an heterogeneous population (Eisner, 1983; Lewy, 1977; Tedesco, 1989). All these criticisms paved the way for new ideas in which the state had a limited role.

Since the late 1970s, these criticisms converged with two major changes in the socio-economic and political context of Latin American countries. On the one hand, a striking economic crisis fuelled massive public debt and paved the way for structural adjustment programs to be portrayed as the most appropriate solution (Mundy & Verger, 2015). These programs restricted financial resources for schools despite the increasing demands for enrolment expansion and quality education (Oliveros, 1978). This situation forced governments to look for alternative solutions beyond the state to education problems. On the other hand, the non-democratic regimes in the region raised questions to the top-down approach of the MEP perspective, and boosted demands for participation in education policy decisions (Astiz & Wiseman, 2005; Mundy & Verger, 2015). All these

43 Given the scarcity of data required to established optimal ratios of manpower (e.g. impact of technical change in the labour market, time series on the productivity of labour, etc.), forecasts usually resorted to adopting standards of advanced economies, which suggested the existence of manpower growth paths.

44 Although these scholars acknowledged the positive correlation between schooling and national income, they argued that different skill combinations might lead to the same growth. If a cheaper skill alternative could produce the same outcome, then the rigid forecast of the manpower perspective would induce efficiency loss.
changes brought two different but not mutually exclusive perspectives into the educational policy debate: the market-based and the active-state approaches.

**The Market-Based Perspective**

Education economists and lending IOs were the most important advocates of the market-based approach (Blaug, 1967; The World Bank, 1980, 1995; Interview #26). These ideas built on human capital theories, but unlike MEP, the market-based perspective focused on individual benefits of educational attainment, namely salaries. It was assumed that different types and levels of education produced dissimilar salary increases. By comparing these salary differentials, governments could identify the education level that might produce higher rates of individual salary return. In a context of restricted public expenditure, higher rates of return would determine the education levels in which public investment would be more efficient and equitable (Psacharopoulos, 1972, 1981a; Psacharopoulos & Hinchliffe, 1973). This rationale challenged the role of the state as main provider of education. Instead, governments might find alternatives to rationalize expenditure, including school fees for affluent populations, scholarships and education loans for the less affluent, and contributions from non-state actors such as employers, local communities, and private schools (Psacharopoulos, 1986; The World Bank, 1980, 1995). In addition, the promotion of private schools, primarily through voucher programs, would solve the lack of incentives for education quality by providing government cash grants for parents to enrol their children in the school of their choice. In turn, school choice would encourage competition between private and public institutions (The World Bank, 1995, 1999). The basis of this rationale was argued by Milton Friedman in 1955 (Friedman, 1955) and was therefore pervasive in the Chicago School of Economics. Economists from the Chicago School joined the education department of the WB in the
1980s, and by the 1990s, market-oriented ideas were already predominant in the WB recommendations (Heyneman, 2012; Interview #26).

School competition and vouchers had strong consequences for the centralized curriculum proposed by MEP. A rigid curriculum was framed as an obstacle for quality improvement. Instead, since the 1980s and more strongly in the 1990s, the WB recommended the government set broad guidelines in core subjects and delegate to teachers and principals the decisions over supplementary contents, teaching methodology, and textbooks (The World Bank, 1980, 1995). Teachers and principals were therefore supposed to have a better knowledge of local conditions and needs. In other words, curricular autonomy was considered necessary for effective schooling. This autonomy and school competition also emphasized evaluation, an area that was included for the first time as a priority in the policy recommendations of IOs. The development of standardized assessments would allow governments to concentrate their action on monitoring outcomes and provide parents with information for them to choose the schools with higher performance (Friedman, 1955; The World Bank, 1995).

As it will be explained later in this chapter, the market-oriented perspective was disseminated in the three countries of this study by mimetic, coercive and normative mechanisms. *Mimetic mechanisms* included policy reports, technical assistance, and cost-analysis studies of education (e.g. Carnoy, 1967; Psacharopoulos, 1972, 1981a; Psacharopoulos & Loxley, 1985; The World Bank, 1995). *Coercive pressures* included reductions in the WB’s investment on secondary education, and its shifted focus toward primary schooling, voucher programs for secondary education (e.g. Bangladesh,

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45 In 1969, the WB dedicated five percent of its total education lending to primary education, while 72% was invested in secondary education. By 2000, the WB expended
Colombia, Dominican Republic, Mexico. See Patrinos & Lakshmanan, 1997) and the establishment of national evaluation systems (Kamens & McNeely, 2010). Since the WB was arguably the largest contributor to international education aid at the time (Chabbott, 1998; Psacharopoulos, 1981b), this re-orientation of its investments had a significant impact on domestic policy agendas. Nonetheless, as in the past period, the most salient dissemination mechanism was normative. Already in the 1950s, even before the boom of market-based ideas, the USAID initiated a program providing grants and financial aid for economists from different Latin American countries to be trained in different US universities, primarily the Chicago School of Economics. These economists were expected to return to their countries and operate as institutional entrepreneurs by helping market-oriented policies permeate domestic policy making (Biglaiser, 2002; Montecinos & Markoff, 2010).

The Active-State Approach

In contrast to the market mechanisms advocated by neoclassical education economists and lending IOs, UN-associated organizations, like UNESCO and CEPAL, promoted decentralization within the context of an ‘active state’. Although CEPAL was not fully persuaded by the structural adjustment programs proposed by lending IOs, it also acknowledged the need to correct macroeconomic imbalance (Sanahuja & Sotillo, 1998). Thus, CEPAL advocated for the integration of Latin America economies in global markets through the development of competitiveness based on technical innovation, high-skilled human resources, and the inclusion of the most vulnerable population in the production system (CEPAL & UNESCO, 1992; Torres, 2006). Unlike the market-based

54% of its total education lending in primary education, while investment in secondary education declined to 13%.
perspective, this approach assigned secondary and higher education with a crucial role in the development of competitiveness and equity, and also regarded the state, not as a burden, but as a key actor in the governance of education (McGinn & Welsh, 1999).

The active-state approach proposed the decentralization of education provision, not only as a way to rationalize public expenditure, but also as a means to devolve decisions to lower levels including subnational units, communities and schools, in order to avoid the authoritarian use of the education system and promote democratization (Picazo, 2013). Similarly, this perspective also suggested curricular autonomy. Yet, the state still should promote a basic curricular agreement between education stakeholders flexible enough to include cultural diversity while emphasizing appropriate skills for science, technology and innovation (Coombs, 1985; Tedesco, 1989). The state also had the important role of coordinating decision-making, ensuring fair distribution of resources and technical capacity, and compensating for inequalities among autonomous units in order for them to deliver good quality education (CEPAL & UNESCO, 1992; McGinn & Welsh, 1999; Tedesco, 1989; UNESCO, 1989). Consequently, decentralization of provision and curriculum should be accompanied by centralized assessment mechanisms, not to inform parental decisions, but to enable the identification of low-performing schools and regions that the state should assist (CEPAL & UNESCO, 1992; McGinn & Welsh, 1999; Tedesco, 1989). With this recommendation, these IOs also engaged for the first time in the evaluation policy debate. Finally, CEPAL and UNESCO agreed with the WB diagnosis of vocational education as costly and inefficient. But rather than eliminating VOCSED, their proposal was to modernize it by integrating general and practical knowledge in order to nurture general labour skills for a knowledge economy (CEPAL & UNESCO, 1992; UNESCO/OREALC, 2002). In brief, although these
propositions seemed quite similar to the ideas of the WB, for UN organizations, the state was not a burden but the most appropriate channel to coordinate education decisions and compensate for inequalities (Tedesco, 1989).

CEPAL and UNESCO however, had less leverage to disseminate their policy ideas. Coercive pressures were not feasible since their financial capacity became compromised once several prominent state donors decided to channel their aid through bilateral programs rather than through UN organizations (Chabbott, 1998; Galarza, Suasnabar, & Merodo, 2007). Therefore, the ‘active state’ perspective was mainly disseminated by mimetic and normative mechanisms. Mimetic mechanisms included the utilization of UNESCO’s Major Project of Education to urge ministers of education to commit to decentralization (UNESCO/OREALC, 1987), policy reports and seminars, and public talks for education decision-makers and teachers (Interview #28). Mimesis also included technical assistance to develop testing mechanisms.46 Normative mechanisms were more effective since CEPAL and UNESCO’s recommendations were elaborated by Argentine and Chilean education experts who later advised or directly participated in the education decisions of their own countries.47 As I demonstrate in next sections, countries that experienced strong normative diffusion of these ideas were more receptive to

46 In the early 1990s, UNESCO created the Latin American Laboratory for Assessment of Education Quality (Laboratorio Latinoamericano de Evaluación de la Calidad de la Educación – LLECE) with the purpose of promoting testing in the region (Kamens & McNeely, 2010).

47 This group includes prominent names such as Fernando Fajnzylber, a Chilean economist who served for Allende’s government and was appointed as the Chair of the Industrial Development Department of CEPAL; José Joaquin Brunner, a Chilean education expert and director of FLACSO in Chile; Juan Carlos Tedesco, an Argentine educator who held different positions inside UNESCO including the Direction of the International Bureau of Education and of the IIEP-UNESCO in Buenos Aires; and Ernesto Ottone, a Chilean sociologists who also worked by the UN and became executive secretary of CEPAL.
incorporating them into policy decisions. Table 3.1 summarizes the similarities and differences between the market-based approach and the active state perspective.

**Table 3.1 Varieties of state retrenchment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provision</th>
<th>Market-based perspective</th>
<th>Active-state perspective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Curricula</td>
<td>Privatized, competition between schools</td>
<td>Delegated to subnational units, financially compensated by state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curricular autonomy for school competition</td>
<td>Guidelines agreed among education stakeholders coordinated by state; school autonomy for adaptation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>Standardized tests to make schools accountable to parents</td>
<td>Standardized tests to define education policy and alleviate inequality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diffusion</td>
<td>Coercive: Re-direction of loans from vocational schools to voucher systems and primary education</td>
<td>Mimetic: Policy reports, seminars, policy dialogues, ministries meetings. Normative: Networks of UN education experts close to domestic decision-making, training of education decision makers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mechanisms</td>
<td>Mimetic: Policy reports, technical assistance, diffusion of best practices</td>
<td>Normative: training of market-oriented technocrats</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the next sections, I explain for each country how economic and political context, policy legacies and political contestation translated market-based and active-state ideas differently in each context. In Chile, market-oriented ideas arrived early and were highly influential due to strong normative diffusion combined with a harsh authoritarian regime that blocked political contestation and locked in education policies that later avoided the adoption of the active-state perspective. In Argentina, by contrast, market-oriented ideas arrived later in the context of a democratic regime and competed with the active-state approach, compromising both prescriptions and ultimately leading to their dilution. In Colombia, market-based ideas also arrived in the context of a democratic regime, and although the active–state approach was relatively absent, the contestation of a powerful teacher union also compromised market-oriented reform efforts.
Chile: Market-Based Ideology and the Conversion of Statist Technocrats.

During the 1980s, under the influence of the market-oriented perspective, the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet (1973-1990) radically reformed the Chilean education system. Later under democracy, the Concertación\(^48\) (1990-2010) pursued another reform under the influence of the active-state ideas, though actual changes were relatively limited. Both reform efforts were shaped by the strong influence of market-oriented technocrats, strong policy legacies, and the limited power resources of their opponents. This within-country comparison shows how the conformity to global idea requires weak opposition of domestic actors and strong domestic support. Indeed, these two elements may lead to acquiescence even if the existing domestic arrangement is incompatible.

**Pinochet’s reform (1973-1990).**

By the 1970s, secondary education in Chile was still based on mixed provision, marginal secondary vocational education, and a centralized technocratic curriculum. Rapid increases in enrolment, however, highlighted the inefficiency and inequality of this centralized governance model (PIIE, 1984). Moreover, the polarization of the country during Allende’s period provoked serious disagreement on the appropriate course for decentralization. In this context, and due to extreme economic hardship and social discontent, Allende’s government was overthrown by military forces in 1973. The dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet was tremendously violent with around 3,195 fatalities from political violence, armed confrontation, and violation of human rights, including torture and forced disappearance (Corporación Nacional de Reparación y Reconciliación, 2021).

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\(^48\) The Concertación was a coalition composed of parties with very different ideologies including the CDP, the Socialists, the Radicals, the Democratic Party, and the MAPU. This alliance was created to campaign against Pinochet during the plebiscite of 1988 and the presidential elections in 1989. Yet, the alliance survived until 2013.
1996). Such violence deeply permeated Chilean society with fear (Lechner, 1988) and gave the government ample margin for policy change. The concentration of power in Pinochet (Biglaiser, 1999; Castiglioni, 2005) and the apparent capacity of his authoritarian regime to confront the economic crisis of the 1970s, led to acceptance of imposed policies (PIIE, 1984). In brief, the dictatorship produced a critical juncture that broke education policy legacies and permitted a radical and far-reaching reform of the Chilean education system.

**The normative diffusion of market-oriented ideas.**

Market-based education policy ideas became popular in Chile during the authoritarian regime of Pinochet. Since the 1956, as a part of the Alliance for Progress, the USAID financially supported Project Chile, an agreement to train Chilean economists in the US under the influence of market-oriented ideas. These generations of market-minded technocrats, also known as the ‘Chicago Boys’, constitute a clear example of normative diffusion. During the authoritarian regime, this like-minded community took charge of the economic policy of the country through their positions in ODEPLAN, the national planning department, and the ministry of economy. By this time, education market-oriented ideas were not yet predominant in the WB or any other IO. Further, during the authoritarian regime, WB’s resources were not used for the education reform.

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49 The Project Chile involved primarily the Chilean Catholic University, one of the most important higher education institutions in Chile, and the Chicago School of Economics. Nonetheless, other US universities also trained these market-oriented technocrats including Columbia and Harvard University (Castiglioni, 2005, p. 130). For studies about the Chicago Boys, see (Biglaiser, 2002; Montecinos & Markoff, 2010; Teichman, 2001; Valdes, 1995).

50 During 1979 and 1985, the time of the education reform implementation, the WB made seven loans to Chile for water supply, agricultural projects, highway reconstruction, and public housing, but not for education (The World Bank, 1985).
In brief, only normative mechanisms were clearly present in the diffusion of market-oriented ideas during Pinochet’s reform. The absence of mimetic and coercive mechanisms in this case of radical policy change suggests that these pressures might not be necessary for the emulation of a global norm.

**The triumph of the market-oriented constellation.**

The Chicago Boys operated as institutional entrepreneurs by radically challenging the existing governance arrangement of the Chilean education system. In terms of provision, these technocrats argued for a voucher system that encouraged competition between schools and devolved school choice to parents (Jofré, 1988; Prieto, 1983). The Chicago Boys also argued for curricular autonomy based on minimal required content and optional subjects that schools could tailor to fit students’ expectations (Prieto, 1983). These market-oriented technocrats also recommended the use of standardized tests to inform parental school choices and thus promote improvement of education quality (Jofré, 1988).

At the beginning of the military regime however, market-oriented ideas were not predominant in Chile. Instead, the MEP perspective remained more accepted by policy makers (PIIE, 1984). Although aware of the need for decentralization, the staff at the ministry of education and a group of nationalist military, which constituted a loose ‘endowed-state planning constellation’, preferred gradual education reforms that diminished the social cost of adjustment (Interview #32) as well as the eradication of Marxist ideology through curriculum control (Cox, 1988; PIIE, 1984) Nevertheless, by the late 1970s, poor macro-economic performance raised questions about the reformist style of the endowed-state constellation and made market-oriented ideas more attractive to solve the critical situation of the country and thusly undermine Pinochet’s opponents.
within the military junta by discrediting their protectionist ideas (Biglaiser, 1999; Castiglioni, 2005; Teichman, 2001). As a result, the endowed-state planning constellation lost momentum, and the alignment of the Chicago Boys and Pinochet built a powerful market-oriented constellation, which became the only powerful policy voice in the regime. The market-oriented constellation was cohesive in their preferences in all areas of this study with the exception of curricular autonomy, which the Chicago Boys advocated. Concerned about national security and engaged with the eradication of any form of Marxist ideology within the educational system, the military was reluctant to give up the control over curriculum (Cox, 1988; PIIE, 1984).

The violence of the authoritarian regime and the market-oriented ideas of the Chicago Boys crushed opposition. Regarding the 1960s public-private technocratic planning constellation, the regime persecuted and isolated statist technocrats from the government, and paid little attention to concerns of the Church about voucher effects on educational inequality (Picazo, 2013; PIIE, 1984). Regarding the state-led democratic planning constellation, Allende’s socialist education experts were also persecuted, the teacher union SUTE was dismantled in 1973, and many teachers were persecuted, tortured, forced to disappear, or executed by the regime (Aedo-Richmond, 2000). In addition, the professional association (Colegio de Profesores a.k.a. Colegio) that Pinochet created in 1973 to replace SUTE was under the control of the military (Castiglioni, 2005; Personal interviews #35 & 47). In brief, opposition to the radical education reforms

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51 Castiglioni (2005) and Biglaiser (1999) argue that Gustavo Leigh, the Air Force chief and member of the military junta of the authoritarian regime disagreed with the appointment of Pinochet as Supreme Chief of the Nation. Yet, given that Leigh held a statist perspective, Pinochet used the arguments of the Chicago Boys to weaken Leigh’s position in the military junta and urge him to resign.
proposed by the *market-oriented constellation* was weak, lacked organizational capacity, was isolated from the decision making-process, and missed power resources.

**The acquiescence of market-oriented ideas.**

The huge influence of the market-oriented constellation and the weakness of all other opposite constellations paved the way for *acquiescence* to market-based ideas. Regarding provision, the main reforms that fuelled the privatization of the Chilean education system were the voucher system and the transfer of schools to municipalities. To be sure, as explained in the previous chapter, subsidies to private schools had a long tradition in Chile. Yet, the application of the same funding formula on a competitive basis for public schools was only initiated in 1980 with the process of municipalisation. Although the weak *endowed-state planning constellation* tried to discontinue the process of municipalisation by showing its poor results (Interview #45), the pressure of the Chicago Boys in ODEPLAN finally forced the resignation of the minister that made such decision (Interview to former education minister Mónica Madariaga in Almonacid et al., 2008, p. 17). By 1983, the municipalisation was resumed and the market-oriented ideas of privatization and competition dominated.

The combination of municipalisation and the voucher system created three types of schools: public voucher municipal schools, private voucher schools, and paid private institutions. Yet, only private voucher and paid private schools were permitted to selectively recruit their students and become for-profit institutions if they so decided.\(^{52}\) (García-Huidobro, 2007). With this new provision structure, enrolment in private secondary schools increased from 20% to 32% between 1981 and 1987 (Cariola, 2003).

\(^{52}\) Few public magnet schools with long reputation of high academic performance were also allow to select their students.
This structure also nurtured new constituents of private voucher schools (non- and for-profit), such as the Association of Chilean Private Schools (Colegios Particulares de Chile – CONACEP), an organization created in 1983 to represent the interests of private schools in the government (Interview #53). This radical change of the education provision in Chile is an example of acquiescence or conformity with global ideas through the combination of the strong influence of their advocates and the weakness of the opponents.

Regarding curriculum, translation of global ideas was more difficult. The military did not fully support the Chicago Boys’ promotion of curricular autonomy and instead agreed with the concerns of the endowed-state constellation about left political indoctrination at schools. The discussion about ‘freedom of education’ of the 1980 Constitution and the 1990 Education Law reflected this tension between curricular autonomy and centralization (see Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 1980, 1990). Similarly, in 1981, the government established a core curriculum with mandatory subjects and granted some autonomy for schools to select optional subjects and school schedules (Aedo-Richmond, 2000; Cox, 1988). However, in 1985, the ministry of education established again the specific types and content of the ‘optional’ subjects of secondary school, restricting again curricular autonomy (see Planes y Programas de Educación Media, 1985). At last, the regime took advantage of the weak support for curricular autonomy and manipulated this global idea by reframing it as a reduction of education requirements, which allowed schools to operate at minimal costs (Cox, 1988). This example of manipulation reflects that actors within a constellation are not always consistent in their support for global norms when these ideas affect their interests. Real

53 For instance, schools were permitted to eliminate subjects from their curricula if they did not have the correspondent teachers or resources to deliver the courses (Interview #50).
curricular autonomy was never adopted during the military regime, and only the day before the transition to democracy did the promulgation of the Organic Constitutional Education Law (Ley Orgánica Constitucional de Enseñanza – LOCE) establish a Superior Education Council\textsuperscript{54} to determine broad fundamental learning objectives and decentralized curricular decisions by delegating to schools the elaboration of specific curricular programs (Ley No 18.962, 1990, art. 18).

Reforms in vocational secondary education reflected some \textit{compromise} of global ideas due to past decisions and the lack of interest of the military in their transformation. Initially, industrial associations were contracted to manage vocational secondary schools before the establishment of the voucher system (Decreto Ley 3166, 1980; PIIE, 1984; Interviews #30 & 45). Once the voucher system and the municipalisation process were initiated in late 1980, the industrial associations did not accept the competitive-based voucher system for their vocational secondary institutions. Three factors helped these institutions keep fixed funding. First, only 71 schools were already delegated to industrial associations. Second, Pinochet offered to transform or close other ‘non-feasible’ vocational schools.\textsuperscript{55} Third, new vocational secondary schools were to be created as voucher institutions (Sevilla, 2012). Therefore, ODEPLAN agreed on a different funding arrangement for these 71 institutions based on a historical costs (Interviews #32 & 37). Despite these controls, the percentage of enrolment in VOCSED out of total enrolment in

\textsuperscript{54} The Superior Council was composed of delegates from the military, in addition to scholars from public and private universities, and delegates from professional institutions. In other words, the promulgated curricular autonomy still reflected the desire of the military to control learning content and to prevent leftist indoctrination (Interview #33).

\textsuperscript{55} In the 1979 Presidential Guidelines, Pinochet demanded the transfer financially feasible and economically relevant secondary vocational schools to private business and the transformation or closure of the remaining vocational institutions (Directiva Presidencial sobre la Educación Nacional, 1979, p. 5).
secondary education increased from 31% to 36% between 1980 and 1990 (Cariola, 2003, p. 25).\[56\]

In the area of evaluation, the *market-oriented constellation* promoted the establishment of an assessment system to inform parental decisions. With this purpose, the government took advantage of the expertise consolidated by the assessments conducted during Frei Montalva’s administration in the 1960s (Interview #48) and commissioned the Catholic University of Chile to develop the Program for Performance Assessment in 1982. For the first time, these tests would be used to make schools accountable for their results (Himmel, 1997; Ortiz Cáceres, 2012). The technical expertise of the team that conducted the program\[57\] permitted the development of very well-designed evaluation instruments and rigorous interpretation of the results (Himmel, 1997). However, the results of these assessments showed poor performance of all type of schools, both public and private, and therefore, the regime discontinued the assessment (Eyzaguirre & Fontaine, 1999; Interview #48) and suspended the work of the Catholic University (Himmel, 1997). Between 1985 and 1988, the test was not applied due to the regime’s concern that unfavourable educational results would affect the result of the coming plebiscite\[58\] (Delanoy, 2000, p. 12). Only in 1988, the regime introduced the System for Measurement of Education Quality (Sistema de Evaluación de la Calidad

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56 Vocational secondary schools had the autonomy to tailor their vocational specializations according to their resources, which made vocational secondary school curriculum very heterogeneous and uncoordinated (Interviews #36 & 45).

57 One of the leaders of this program was Erika Himmel who was also a key actor in the development of standardized assessments during Frei Montalva’s government.

58 In 1988, Pinochet accepted to call for a plebiscite to ratify his mandate and eventually call for elections. This acceptance was motivated by the escalation of protests and the acceptance of the opposition of the new Constitution as the rules of game for the subsequent governments (Garretón, 1995, p. 108).
Educativa - SIMCE) with the support of the same team that collaborated with the Program of Performance Assessment (Interview #48). Nevertheless, the regime refrained from widely publishing results, and only with the LOCE and the transition to democracy in 1990 did publication become mandatory (Interviews #34, 37 & 51). In other words, although the regime actually tried to emulate market-oriented ideas of evaluation, conformity with them was delayed for future governments, in order to avoid political costs.

The reform of the Concertación (1990-2000)

The transition to democracy in Chile was negotiated between the authoritarian regime and the opposition, the Concertación. This ‘agreement’ however, took place under particular circumstances that highly constrained the leeway of the first democratic government to undertake policy changes (Hunter, 1997). First, after the democratic transition, Pinochet was still commander-in-chief of the military. Therefore, the fear of a new coup d’état made the Concertación averse to overt conflict and created an urgency for consensus and consultation in the policy formulation, abandoning any attempts to reverse policy changes (Delanoy, 2000; Interviews #30 & 33). Second, although the country was recovered from the economic crisis of the 1980s, the democratic government was trapped between the need for maintaining economic stability and the demands of the population following 17 years of neoliberal authoritarianism. Thus, establishing priority areas of action was a challenge for the Concertación (Interview with former President Ricardo Lagos in Espínola & De Moura Castro, 1999, p. 42).

Third, according to the 1980 Pinochet’s Constitution, all constitutional laws, including the LOCE required a supermajority threshold of 4:7 in both chambers of the
legislature to be replaced (Heiss & Navia, 2007, p. 182). After the transition in 1990, the military still held a great influence over the Congress, which made significant legislative transformation highly unlikely and locked the LOCE with insurmountable institutional constraints (Burton, 2011; Interviews #30 & 33). Thus, the Concertación’s government had little choice but to undertake measures mandated by the LOCE, including curricular reform and the publication of the results of standardized tests (Gysling, 2005; Interviews #50 & 51). In this context, education was excluded from the priorities of the democratic government and only teacher salaries, which were highly deteriorated during the dictatorship, made it to the top of the agenda of the first democratic government (Delanoy, 2000; Nuñez, 1993). In other words, strong institutional constraints prevented radical policy change and limited the capacity of Concertación’s education experts to operate as institutional entrepreneurs and translate active-state ideas.

A domestic-led Diffusion

The active-state approach was diffused in Chile by normative and mimetic mechanisms. Normative pressures arose from the tough experience of the authoritarian regime that triggered a process of learning for former statist technocrats and socialist education experts. Whether in exile or in domestic think tanks, these actors focused their research agenda on the assessment of previous education reforms, including Pinochet’s education policies (Picazo, 2013). Through these studies, these experts acknowledged the excessive bureaucratization and the concentration of power and authority of the

59 The right wing coalition formed by the Independent Democratic Union (Unión Democrática Independiente - UDI), the National Renovation (Renovación Nacional - RN) and allies of the military held more than a third of the Congress.
governance model in place before Pinochet’s reforms (Burton, 2011; Picazo, 2013; Interview #30). They also positively assess some transformations undertaken by the military regime, including the municipalisation as a necessary step towards decentralization (Latorre, Nuñez, González, & Hevia, 1991; Nuñez, 1993), the standardized assessment system SIMCE as a useful policy instrument to inform policy decisions and promote quality improvement (Cariola, 2003; Cox, 2005), and the voucher system as an efficient way to distribute resources (Burton, 2011). Yet, these experts were also aware of the shortcomings of Pinochet’s reforms, such as the lack of participation in the education decisions (Nuñez, 1993; PIIE, 1989), the inequality produced by the exclusive reliance on market mechanisms to regulate funding (Picazo, 2013; PIIE, 1984), and the poor results produced by the elimination of subjects and learning content from the curriculum (Cox, 1988, 2005).

Through these assessments, these actors concluded that an ‘active state’ would be able to compensate for the inequalities and shortcomings of the existing system and improve education quality (Burton, 2011; Picazo, 2013; Interviews #28, 30 & 50). Based on this learning, they prepared several policy papers with recommendations for education reform (e.g. Cox & Bravo, 1985; PIIE, 1989; Vera & Nuñez, 1983). These recommendations became institutionalized as global norms when some of these domestic experts collaborated in the elaboration of the 1992 CEPAL and UNESCO report “Education and Knowledge: Basic Pillars of Changing Production Patterns With Social Equity”. This document and the domestic experts that contributed to its elaboration became very influential in education policy after the transition to democracy60 (Gysling, 2005).

60 For instance, José Joaquin Brunner chaired a commission in 1994 that set the foundations for the education reforms of the Concertación. Ernesto Ottone was also one of the main advisors of the Minister of Education Ricardo Lagos (1990-1992). Other
2005; Interview #28). The institutionalization of the active-state approach in CEPAL & UNESCO increased the legitimacy of the ideas guiding the Chilean education reform.

Additionally, since the education reforms proposed by the Concertación did not reverse Pinochet’s policies, they gained quickly the support from the WB that was already a strong supporter of market-oriented ideas. The WB provided loans for the Program of Quality Improvement in Secondary Education (Mejoramiento de la Calidad de la Educación – Educación media – MECE-Media) and the consolidation of SIMCE. This apparent coercive diffusion was nevertheless requested by the Chilean government to secure additional resources and lock in reforms in case of government change (Interview #52). Indeed, WB’s funding only accounted for 16.9% of MECE-media, and 33.7% of this funding was cancelled at the borrower’s request without sacrificing any project goals (The World Bank, 2001a, p. 13). This example shows that coercive and mimetic mechanisms are not always the result of pressures imposed from outside, but are sometimes means to increase the legitimacy of changes already in place.

**Active-state and market-oriented constellation: opponents and allies.**

As already suggested, the process of learning and the constraints inherited from the authoritarian regime led to an alliance of actors of former opponent constellations: the public-private technocratic planning and the state-led democratic planning constellations. Together, they aligned in a new ‘active-state constellation’. However, this constellation was not fully cohesive. In terms of provision, the Church resumed its active support for private schools and pushed for the continuation of the voucher system and

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important actors that were also associated with the Chilean reform of the 1990s and were linked with the active-state approach are Cristián Cox, former member of FLACSO and coordinator of the curriculum reform; and Juan Eduardo García-Huidobro, coordinator of several programs included in the education reform.
equal treatment for public and private schools, since that favoured its corporate and financial interests (Interview with Jorge Arrate in Espínola & De Moura Castro, 1999, p. 53). In contrast, under the influence of the Communists, a segment of the Colegio, the professional teachers’ organization established at the beginning of the authoritarian regime, expected to reverse the transfer of schools to municipalities, abolish the voucher system, and restore the former governance model (Cox, 2005; Mizala, 2007; Picazo, 2013; Interview #35 & 47). Finally, another segment of the Colegio, parties in the Concertación, and active-state education experts preferred incremental reforms keeping the existing foundations of the education system (Picazo, 2013; Interview #35). The lack of cohesiveness undermined the influence of the active-state constellation in decisions over education provision.

Conversely, this constellation was more cohesive in their preferences towards curriculum and evaluation. First, these topics were not a priority of the first democratic governments (Interview #50). Second, although active-state ideas formally called for curricular autonomy, both teachers and active-state education experts actually opposed them. On the one hand, teachers associated curricular autonomy with the elimination of subjects and content as it was interpreted during Pinochet’s regime and thus they refused to adopt it (Gysling, 2005). On the other hand, active-state advocates were dubious about the capacity of schools to formulate curricula, and therefore preferred to control curricular elaboration (Almonacid et al., 2008; Interview #50). Finally, active-state experts paid little attention to SIMCE as a mechanism of accountability and rather regarded it as a useful tool to inform policy. This cohesiveness permitted a greater influence of the active-state constellation over curricular and evaluation decisions.
Unlike the active-state constellation, the market-oriented constellation remained cohesive and strong in all policy areas. Supported by market-oriented technocrats, right parties, the military, and CONACEP, this constellation maintained its advocacy for minimal intervention of the state, vouchers, school choice, equal treatment between public and private schools, and the consolidation of standardized tests for parental decisions (Delanoy, 2000). Perhaps, the only area of tension was curriculum since the military was not yet willing to release the control over educational content, and therefore they did not fully support curricular autonomy.

Following LOCE’s mandate for curricular reform, the ministry of education elaborated in 1992 a curriculum proposal, which included topics such as gender equity, human rights, environmental protection, etc. This proposal stoked heated opposition of the right-wing coalition and the Church that resembled the backlash produced by Allende’s ENU. Thus, the 1992 reform proposal was banned by the military, which made part of the Superior Council of education (Cox, 2006). This frustrated reform attempt and the requirement of curricular reform established by LOCE’s urged the government to appoint in 1994 a plural commission to achieve consensus over the future of education policy (Delanoy, 2000; Mizala, 2007). As expected, the National Commission for the Modernization of Education (Brunner Commission) did not suggest any radical reform, but instead refined the existing governance mechanisms, such as the voucher system, the centralization of the curriculum, and the consolidation of SIMCE (Comisión Nacional para la Modernización de la Educación, 1994). This commission ultimately set the foundations for a big market-oriented, active-state constellation that isolated any remnants of advocacy for the previous Chilean state-run model. This emergent constellation undermined the influence of active-state ideas, and further locked in the
Pinochet’s model, which remained largely unchallenged until 2016. Table 3.2 summarizes the preferences, degree of influence and changes in the constellations during the 1990s.

**Table 3.2 Summary of Chilean constellations in the 1990s**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Market-oriented constellation</th>
<th>Active-state constellation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1990-1994</strong></td>
<td>Provision: Voucher schools, equal treatment for public and private institutions - STRONG INFLUENCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Curriculum: Curricular autonomy – MODERATE INFLUENCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Evaluation: Standardized assessment to inform parental decisions – STRONG INFLUENCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provision: State compensation for vulnerable (public) schools - MODERATE INFLUENCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Curriculum: Consensus-based centralized curriculum - STRONG INFLUENCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Evaluation: Standardized assessment to inform and monitor reform - STRONG INFLUENCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1994-2000</strong></td>
<td>No organized opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market-oriented active-state constellation STRONG INFLUENCE</td>
<td>Provision: Voucher system, equal treatment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Curriculum: Consensus-based centralized curriculum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Evaluation: Standardized assessment to inform parental decisions and monitor reform</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The predominance of market-oriented ideas.*

The constraints and demands inherited from past regimes, and the domestic competition between market-oriented and active-state ideas drove the country to different types of translation in terms of provision, curriculum and evaluation. Regarding provision, the governance model of the country continued *conforming* to market-oriented ideas, while the active-state approach was *avoided*. Although active-state decision-makers introduced several programs to improve the conditions of the lowest-performing schools,\(^6\) the effects of these programs over inequality were limited since they were

\(^6\)For secondary education, these programs included MECE-secondary education, which provided funding and technical aid for all secondary schools to develop improvement
addressed to both public and private voucher institutions due to the demands for ‘equal
treatment’ from private providers (Interviews #30 & 55).

In addition, the Concertación introduced two measures that further limited the
capacity of the state to compensate for inequalities. In order to appease teachers’ demands
for changes in the funding system, the Concertación negotiated with the right-wing
coalition a new teachers’ labour regulation that restored teachers as public servants,
granted them life tenure, and banned discreional transfers. Although recruitment
remained in charge of municipalities, teachers’ salaries became centrally negotiated,
forcing the state to financially support municipalities unable to manage this expenditure
(Delanoy, 2000). In exchange, the Concertación accepted a proposal of the right coalition
for a top-up payment that voucher schools could charge families beyond the state’s
subsidy (a.k.a. shared funding). As a result of these two measures, rather than
compensating inequalities between public and private schools, the fiscal burden of the
central government increased, public institutions were left with relatively fewer funding
and higher restrictions to manage personnel (Mizala, 2007), and privatization and school
segregation grew stronger (García-Huidobro, 2007). By mid-2000s, private enrolment

plans (Cox, 2005), and ‘Liceo para Todos’ (‘High School for All’), which aided
secondary schools with the lowest-performing students (Interview #55).

62 The right coalition also agreed with this proposal because the principals appointed by
the military during the dictatorship were also granted tenure (Mizala, 2007).
63 To be sure, this shared funding was already implemented during Pinochet’s regime but
the Concertación reformed it to expand their scope. The Concertación also agreed on this
measure due to the need for additional resources to support education reforms, including
teachers’ salaries. All private voucher institutions were allowed to adopt this system,
while secondary municipal schools should obtain parental authorization for its
implementation (Almonacid, Luzón, & Torres, 2008).
64 Studies suggest that families in Chile ultimately chose schools according to their
capacity to pay for it (Elacqua, 2012). This situation was also magnified by the ability of
private voucher schools to selectively recruit their students (García-Huidobro, 2007).
in secondary education already reached 48% and 71% of private voucher schools had already implemented shared funding, while only 25% municipals undertook this measure (García-Huidobro, 2007). Ultimately, these measures nurtured robust constituencies of private education and school choice.\textsuperscript{65} In brief, strong institutional constraints and unintended consequences of policy decisions avoided active-state ideas of education provision. In addition, while the expansion of privatization became a strong policy legacy in the country, the increasing segmentation would shape the political contestation after 2000.

While active-state ideas about provision were avoided, curriculum recommendations were compromised due to the strong support of the active-state constellation to the centralization of the curriculum (Interview #50) and the limited opposition of the market-oriented constellation. After the frustrated attempt of curricular reform in 1992, and following the recommendations of the Brunner Commission, the Concertación collaborated with the market-oriented constellation on the elaboration of a curriculum proposal for general secondary education (Cox, 2005; Gysling, 2005; Lemaitre María José, Cerri, Cox, & Cristóbal, 2005). Another commission formed by representatives of unions, employers, and education experts also elaborated a reform proposal for VOCSED curriculum (Interview #47). Both proposals were submitted to revision and approval of different education stakeholders, including students, parents, teachers, principals, education experts, the Church, and all political parties (Gysling, 2005; Lemaitre María José et al., 2005). The result of these consultations was a consensus-based centralized curriculum, as active-state ideas suggested (Interview #50).

\textsuperscript{65} By the 2000s, CONACEP already represented around 800 private schools with 550,000 students (Monckeberg, 2011).
However, the active-state recommendation of granting schools with curricular autonomy was not followed. Although the LOCE established that the design of specific programs should be in charge of schools, both market-oriented and active-state constellations agreed that the ministry of education could elaborate ‘optional’ specific programs for general secondary education and VOCSED in order to discourage curricular autonomy (Cariola, 2003; Interview #45). Indeed, by 2011, less than 20% of the secondary schools had elaborated their own programs (Cox, 2011).

Global active-ideas about evaluation were also compromised due to the effects of policy legacies. Initially, and following active-state ideas, the government used test results exclusively as a means to identify low-performing schools, design focalized policies, and evaluate programs (Interview #30). Results were published in newspapers with limited circulation only since 1995 just to fulfill the LOCE’s mandate (Interview #48 & 51). Yet, the rigidities induced by the 1991 teacher statute and the need to enforce the new curriculum motivated the Brunner Commission to recommend the association of SIMCE with clear incentives and accountability purposes (Mizala, 2007; Interview #51).

Therefore, in 1996, the government established the National System for Performance Assessment (Sistema Nacional de Evaluación del Desempeño - SNED). With the SNED, teachers were able to earn salary bonuses based on the performance of their students on SIMCE (Mizala & Romaguera, 2000). Consequently, test results became regularly and widely published to reinforce the legitimacy of the recently created teachers’ incentives. At the same time, these incentives would reinforce the above-described curricular reforms (Interview #34). In this way, the interests of both constellations were ultimately accommodated. Standardized tests became not only instruments to inform policy, as active-state policy-makers initially preferred, but also means to make schools accountable.
for performance and inform parent decisions, as the *market-oriented constellation* desired.

**Argentina: Weak Advocacy for the Market but Reduced Presence of the State**

Like Chile, Argentina also experienced a highly violent authoritarian regime (1976-1982) also keen on ideas of state retrenchment. This regime dismissed around 3,000 teachers, university professors, researchers, and education bureaucrats. Some of them went into exile fearing for their safety as their colleagues disappeared from schools and universities (Hanson, 1996). Violence and fear dismantled any opposition from teacher unions, education experts, or any other kind of social or political force (Tedesco, Braslavsky, & Carciofi, 1983; Interviews #66 & 72). However, unlike Chile, Argentina’s regime did not undertake a radical transformation of the education system. The rules for power sharing between different factions of the military limited the leverage of any of the members of the military junta to appoint market-based technocrats and provide them with stability in their positions (Biglaiser, 1999). Furthermore, market-oriented technocrats were also scarce in the country (Biglaiser, 2002), and the authoritarian regime only lasted six years compared to the 17 years of dictatorship in Chile. Therefore, Argentina’s authoritarian regime just reduced public education expenditures and transferred primary schools to provinces but secondary education remained unchanged in many ways (Tedesco et al., 1983). This example shows how institutional forces shape actors’ possibilities to change domestic arrangements. It also suggests that communities of

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66 Estimates suggest that during this period around 30,000 were tortured and/or forced to disappear (Snow & Manzetti, 1993, p. 180).
67 By 1982, the education expenditure as a percentage of the GDP had dropped to 1.9% (Rivas, 2010).
market-oriented technocrats, which were absent in Argentina, are necessary for normative diffusion to actually happen.

The transition to democracy in 1983 re-activated struggles over the definition of the most appropriate model to govern education. Specifically, the first democratically elected government of Raúl Alfonsín (1983-1989) called for a National Pedagogical Congress (NPC) (1984-1988) in order to build a consensus around education reform (Comisión honoraria de aseguramiento, 1987). The NPC made evident a broad consensus on the need for decentralization of education authority (Aguerrondo, 1989; Interviews #58, 59, 61, 64 & 65), but it also revealed several conflicting interpretations of such decentralization. A segment of the Peronist Party regarded decentralization as administrative deconcentration and fiscal transfer to subnational units, while another Peronist segment regarded decentralization as delegation of education decisions to subnational units. The Radicals preferred devolution of decision-making authority to local communities (Aguerrondo, 1989), and the Church and some private providers argued for the promotion of private provision and curricular autonomy (Minteguiaga, 2009).

Among these actors, only the Church was sufficiently cohesive and organized to dominate the NPC. Other groups were still weak as a consequence of the dictatorship, and therefore, their ideas had little influence in the NPC agreement (Braslavsky, 1989; Hanson, 1996; Interviews #61, 64, 66 & 72). Consequently, the predominant idea of decentralization was privatization and school autonomy, but the unresolved macro-economic crisis inherited from the military regime, hyperinflation, striking increases of foreign debt, and reduction of real wages displaced education from the policy agenda of the first democratic government (Corrales, 2004). Thus, the ideas of the Church did not
find a window of opportunity to be implemented, but they set the foundations for future debates about secondary education governance.

The absence of market-oriented ideas and the domestic-led diffusion of the ‘active state’.

Unlike in Chile where market-oriented ideas arrived in the late 1970s before the emergence of the active-state approach, both market-oriented and the active-state norms arrived simultaneously in Argentina. While the market-oriented norms were disseminated through coercive and normative pressures from the WB and some market-oriented technocrats in the early 1990s, the active-state ideas spread mainly through normative mechanisms. Normative diffusion of market-oriented ideas was attempted in Argentina through an initiative similar to Project Chile, the USAID-funded initiative to train economist in US universities. However, this effort was not equally successful and market-oriented ideas only became influential in private universities and research centers in Argentina in the late 1980s. During this period, specifically, the Foundation for Latin American Economic Research (Fundación de Investigaciones Económicas Latinoamericanas – FIEL), an Argentine think tank with strong ties with US-trained

68 In the 1960s, the Project Cuyo failed to penetrate universities in Argentina since they were under the influence of CEPAL’s structuralist ideas. At the same time, the country was not able to retain the US-trained Argentine economists because labour conditions were not attractive for graduates to return (Beech & Barrenechea, 2011; Biglaiser, 2002; Montecinos & Markoff, 2010). As a result, Argentina did not develop the critical mass of market-oriented technocrats that Chile had in the 1980s (Biglaiser, 2002).

69 These organizations include the Center for Argentine Macroeconomic Studies, the Institute for Economic Studies on the Argentine Reality, the University Torcuato di Tella, and the Foundation for Latin American Economic Research (Montecinos & Markoff, 2010; Teichman, 2001).

The diffusion of market-oriented ideas was also reinforced by the coercive financial intervention of the WB, due to the difficult economic situation of the country. However, WB loans never required the implementation of vouchers or school choice, and they rather focused on the improvement of efficiency and rationalization of the education system (Interview #58). Some scholars argue that coercive proposals of privatization were prevented by the strong symbolic tradition of public education in Argentina (Tedesco & Tenti, 2004; Interviews #58, 64, 76, 81). Some others suggest that Menem might not have been interested in market-oriented education reforms since it would not provide significant savings for the federal government or revenues for private actors (Beech & Barrenechea, 2011; Corrales, 2004; Interview #62). Yet, another explanation suggests that the WB understood that Argentina already had ‘a strong tradition of subsidizing the private sector [with] more than 75% of private sector institutions receiv[ing] financial support from the government to pay teacher salaries’ (The World Bank, 1994a, p. 7).

Through these subsidies, implemented since the 1940s, the state actually helped private schools reduce tuition and recruit students that otherwise would attend public institutions (Morduchowicz, 2002, p. 116). Although there is no evidence that the WB was fully aware of the impact of subsidies to private schools, it might be the case that further coercion for market-oriented measures could have been regarded as needless since they would eventually produce unnecessary backlash. Either way, the lack of promotion of privatization in Argentina shows that domestic forces (strong symbolism of public school, lack of incentives for further privatization) limited the reception of market-oriented ideas and framed the possibilities of translation even in a case of coercion. Hence, the WB’s
funding was employed to enhance provincial capacity for decentralization, promote curricular reform, and establish standardized assessment systems (The World Bank, 1994a).

At the same time, _normative pressures_ spread active-state ideas. Like Chile, Argentine education experts experienced a process of learning. Exiled or hosted in private think tanks and IOs, such as FLACSO, CEPAL and UNESCO, these experts drew lessons from the negative experience of authoritarianism and power concentration of previous periods and collaborated in the critical assessment of preceding education reforms (Braslavsky & Cosse, 2006; Suasnabar, 2014). In collaboration with Chilean active-state advocates, Argentine education experts also argued for a state able to compensate for inequalities, produce information for policy decisions, and promote consensus about curriculum (Braslavsky & Cosse, 2006, p. 2). As mentioned before, some of these experts also contributed to the influential 1992 CEPAL & UNESCO policy report. Like in Chile, with the transition to democracy, these active-state education experts joined democratic governments, whether as policy makers or as advisors of the ministry of education.70 In other words, the _normative diffusion_ of active-state ideas in Argentina was also a domestic-led dissemination in which IOs were employed as platforms to increase the legitimacy of domestic ideas or preferences.

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70 For instance, Juan Carlos Tedesco expended his exile working for UNESCO and he actively participated in the elaboration of 1992 CEPAL & UNESCO report. Tedesco brought a branch of the IIEP-UNESCO in 1997 to Argentina and was its director up to 2005. Similarly, Cecilia Braslavsky expended her exile abroad completing her Ph.D. and then joined FLACSO in 1981. In 1984, she became Education Chair of FLACSO and in 1994 was appointed as the Director for Curricular Reform in the Ministry of Education of Argentina. Later, she joined the IIEP Buenos Aires. Daniel Filmus was appointed ministry of education of the city of Buenos Aires after serving eight years as director of FLACSO.
In brief, both the market-oriented and the active-state global ideas diffused in Argentina at the same time and through influential mechanisms. Both of them nurtured different types of technocrats: market-oriented technocrats located in the ministry of economy and active-state education experts in the ministry of education. The ways in which both types of global ideas were combined and translated to the domestic arena is explained by the political contestation that they produced in the country.

**The instability of transversal constellations.**

In the early 1990s, the *market-oriented constellation*, composed of the President, technocrats in the ministry of economy, and some segments of Peronism, was predominant while their opponents were poorly organized. After 1993, the advocates of the state grew stronger, undermining the influence of market-oriented ideas. However, by the late 1990s, market-oriented and active-state technocrats came together in an inconsistent constellation. In the remaining of this section, I further explain these changes in the constellations and their effect on their influence to translate global norms.

As mention before, in the early 1990s, market-oriented technocrats had direct participation in the decision-making process since they dominated the ministry of economy. They also counted with strong power resources due to the public support gained by their successful control of inflation (Corrales, 2004; Interview #64). However, their ideas about education reform focused exclusively on economic issues, such as reduction of federal responsibility and rationalization of education expenditures (Corrales, 2004). Although staff from FIEL, the think tank that promoted vouchers and school choice in Argentina, gained prominence in the ministry of economy of the Peronist governments of Carlos Menem (1989-1999) (Biglaiser, 2002; Teichman, 2001), they did
not push these ideas forward into the policy agenda. Explanations to the modest presence of market-oriented education ideas in Menem’s policy agenda are somewhat similar to the arguments that explain the absence of WB’s privatization recommendations for Argentina. Some argued that Menem’s government did not have the incentives to implement such reforms (Beech & Barrenechea, 2011; Corrales, 2004; Interview #81). Some interviewees considered that the strong symbolic legacy of public schooling in Argentina prevented the rise of market-oriented policy ideas (Interviews #58, 64 & 76). Either way, these explanations suggest that policy legacies and lack of incentives may prevent the consolidation of incompatible policy networks or communities, affecting normative diffusion. As a result of the absence of market-oriented communities around education policy, market-oriented technocrats in Menem’s government never embraced proposals about school choice and never intervened in curriculum or evaluation matters (Interview #58 & 81). This space instead was filled with active-state ideas in the late 1990s, as I explain below.

In the early 1990s, the loose organization and heterogeneous interests and preferences of the opponents of the reduction of federal responsibility and rationalization of education expenditures prevented the consolidation of a constellation. First, active-state champions were highly dispersed in universities, private think tanks, IOs, and had limited links with the decision-making process. These champions supported decentralization but they disagreed with the reduction of state responsibility over education. Second, the Confederation of Education Workers of Argentina (Confederación de Trabajadores de la Educación de la República Argentina – CTERA), a national alliance of teacher unions, was still undermined by the effects of the authoritarian regime (Interviews #66 & 72). Moreover, since CTERA was created only in 1973, three years
Before the military coup, its membership was reduced to some provincial teacher unions and was not associated with any salient political party (Corrales, 2004). Yet, CTERA opposed the decentralization of secondary education because it could prevent the consolidation of its organization and affect teachers’ labour conditions (Tedesco & Tenti, 2004). Third, provincial governors demanded further decentralization, but they were reluctant to accept additional responsibilities without sufficient funding and technical capacity. Moreover, as explained before, they had different interpretations of decentralization, and they were divided between supporters and opponents of the federal government (Falleti, 2001). Finally, although the Church supported decentralization, it was afraid of losing its subsidies with federal expenditure cuts and the transfer of education responsibilities to provinces (Interview #61).

The weakness and lack of coordination of the potential opponents of the market-oriented constellation fuelled the predominance of ideas of reduction of federal education expenditure and fiscal transfer of schools to provinces. However, when the government tried to further unburden the federal government in 1992, the opponents managed to organize a relatively strong opponent statist constellation composed of CTERA, provincial governors, and active-state experts (Interview #58). Two factors contributed to the consolidation of this constellation. First, opponents developed a unified and cohesive policy position in favour of increasing the responsibility of the state in education (Corrales, 2004, p. 327). Second, opponents also gained significant support from public opinion, which was alarmed by the rapid and striking privatization of other public services71 (Decibe, 2000; Nardacchione, 2011b). This public support increased the power

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71 Teichman (2001) shows the pervasive privatization of other public services in Argentina such as healthcare, pension, transportation, etc.
resources of this constellation. The consolidation of the *statist constellation* illustrates that concentrated costs of state retrenchment increase the chances of those affected by cuts to engage in collective action as Pierson suggests (1995, 1996).

Nevertheless, the *statist constellation* was short lived (1992-1993). On the one hand, despite the unified position around a higher fiscal responsibility of the state with education, CTERA, provincial governors, and active-state technocrats still disagreed over the meaning of decentralization and the role of provincial governments over education. On the other hand, Menem’s administration appointed active-state technocrats in the ministry of education in 1993 (Nardacchione, 2011a) and granted some concessions to provinces (Corrales, 2004). Consequently, several provincial governors and active-state experts abandoned the *statist constellation* and joined the ministry of economy in an inconsistent *market-oriented active-state constellation*. With this new constellation, active-state experts introduced their education policy ideas in the government’s agenda, including a stronger role of the state in the coordination of provision and curriculum and the need to monitor the reform through standardized evaluations. However, these ideas were constrained by the overarching government’s approach of retrenchment in federal education expenditure (Interview #58). Despite its inconsistency, this constellation mobilized strong power resources, such as WB funds and federal resources to encourage provinces to implement the reforms (Interviews #61 & 64). With this re-alignment, CTERA was left alone in their advocacy for a state-run education governance model.

Overall, changes in the Argentine constellations during the 1990s illustrate how actors with heterogeneous interests join transversal constellations in order to push for a favourable arrangement and how these transversal constellations are constantly re-shaped by the preferences of their members and their opportunities to define what is appropriate
to govern education. Table 3.3 summarizes the changes in constellations during the 1990s.

**Table 3.3 Changes in the constellations in Argentina during the 1990s**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constellation supporting state retrenchment</th>
<th>Constellation opposing state retrenchment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1990-1994</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market-oriented constellation (market-oriented technocrats, segments of Peronism)</td>
<td>Statist constellation (active-state education experts, segments of Peronism, teachers, provincial governors)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision: Reduction of federal fiscal responsibility - Delegation to provinces</td>
<td>Provision: Greater responsibility of federal government. Heterogeneous interests in curriculum and evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRONG INFLUENCE</td>
<td>STRONG INFLUENCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No preferences over curriculum/evaluation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1994-1999</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market-oriented active-state constellation (market oriented technocrats, active-state technocrats, segments of Peronism)</td>
<td>Statist constellation (teachers, some provincial governors)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision: Reduction of federal fiscal responsibility</td>
<td>Provision: Greater responsibility of federal government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curriculum: Consensus-based national curricular objects, delegation of curricular decisions to provinces and schools. Reduction of secondary technical school</td>
<td>Curriculum: National encyclopaedic curriculum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation: Standardized exams to inform policies</td>
<td>Evaluation: No standardized exams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MODERATE INFLUENCE</td>
<td>MODERATE INFLUENCE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**The resistance towards active-state ideas.**

The instability of constellations led to inconsistent education reform efforts and limited the influence of both market-oriented and active-state ideas. As suggested before, the *market-oriented constellation* of the early 1990s only focused on education provision, and particularly in the reduction of federal expenditure on education, but its preference was *compromised*. Initially, the predominance of the market-oriented constellation and the weakness of the opponents allowed Menem’s government to easily enact the delegation of secondary schools to provinces in 1991 through the Transference Law
(Corrales, 2004). To enact the Transference Law, the ministry of economy took advantage of the ill-defined demands for decentralization (Falleti, 2001), the lack of coordination of the opposition,\(^{72}\) and separate bargains with each province (Corrales, 2004; Repetto, 2001).\(^{73}\) However, when the government tried to push the reduction of federal education expenditure in 1992 during the discussion of the Federal Education Law (FEL), the 1992-1993 *statist constellation* pushed the Senate to propose an alternative bill that forced the federal government to increase its involvement in education (Corrales, 2004; Nardacchione, 2011a).

The Deputy Jorge Rodríguez, a Peronist leader who wanted to ‘peronize’ Menem’s administration by ‘help(ing) his party to solve their differences and… counterbalance the government’s neoliberal program’ (Corrales, 2004, p. 300), introduced a middle-ground proposal to make political gains and appeal both constellations. Rodríguez and his staff made several meetings to persuade provincial governors and teacher union’s leaders to explain his proposal and appease civil unrest. Rodríguez also gained the support of the Church, since guarantees for private schools were secured in the bill draft (Interview #58). With these meetings, Rodríguez built enough support to ultimately enact his bill draft that became the Federal Education Law in 1993. With the FEL, the federal government was required to increase its commitment to education

\(^{72}\) The transfer of schools to provinces was initially introduced in a budget bill in 1991, which was discovered by legislators practically by accident (Falleti, 2003). This rapid and almost ‘hidden’ inclusion of fiscal decentralization probably helped to prevent a quick organization of the opponents.

\(^{73}\) Argentina has a revenue-sharing system named ‘Coparticipación’. In this system, the federal government holds almost total control of revenues, which are then distributed among provinces. In 1991, the minister of economy argued that since national economy was growing, it was not necessary to increase the percentage of tax revenues for provinces. Increasing fund due to economic growth would be sufficient to finance decentralization (Corrales, 2004).
provision by increasing public education expenditure to 6% of the GDP and subsidizing provinces with deficits in education expenditures (Interview #65).

Nevertheless, despite the constitution of the market-oriented active-state constellation through the appointment of several active-state experts in the ministry of education after the enactment of FEL,\textsuperscript{74} by the late 1990s, the total public education expenditure only reached 4% of GDP (Tedesco & Tenti, 2004). Likewise, the federal government often used funding (‘Coparticipación’ system) to help provinces with political allies rather than provinces in need (Interview #65). In addition, since the FEL continued subsidies to private schools, provinces kept paying them as the federal government did before, and private secondary education maintained its enrolment share. Overall, by 1999 secondary education provision was in charge of poorly funded provincial schools (73%) and several publicly subsidized private institutions (27%). In other words, the inconsistency of preferences of the market-oriented active-state constellation ultimately compromised both market-oriented and active-state ideas.

Following active-state ideas, the FEL proposed significant reforms to secondary school curriculum that deeply affected the constituents of the existing domestic curricular arrangement. As a result, active-state curricular ideas were avoided or simulated but never really emulated, including the decentralization of secondary school curricula and the modernization and inclusion of soft labour skills in the curricula of secondary technical schools. The FEL mandated the elaboration of a federal common basic curricular guidelines that provinces should use to design their specific curricula. In turn, schools

\textsuperscript{74} Corrales (2004) argues that Menem, impressed by Rodriguez’s achievement with FEL negotiations and as a way to settle FEL conflicts, appointed Rodriguez as minister of education (p.331). Rodriguez staff was composed of several active-state experts, including Susana Decibe who was trained in FLACSO. This appointment ultimately paved the way for active-state technocrats to access direct government positions.
were expected to tailor these curricula in institutional educational projects (Gvirtz, 2002). Putting differently, this reform aimed to delegate curricular decisions to provinces and give more autonomy to schools while keeping a national consensual framework. In addition, the FEL unified general and technical secondary schools and divided both of them into two levels: a compulsory lower general secondary education of three years and an upper secondary school of another three years oriented to the development of soft labour skills (Polimodal) (Dussel, 2004).

This reform however, was deeply contested by teachers as they advocated for the continuation of the existing national encyclopaedic curriculum. Since secondary school teachers were not appointed to only one school but as instructors of particular subjects with a specific number of hours, changes in curriculum affected teachers’ labour conditions (Terigi, 2008). Moreover, the reduction of technical schools from 6 to 3 years meant a substantial decrease in the demand of technical teachers (Gallart, Miranda, Peirano, & Sevilla, 2003). Even though teachers were alone in their opposition to the market-oriented active-state constellation, several conditions of the domestic arrangement collaborated to increase their resources to resist active-state curriculum ideas. First, due to the negotiated character of the FEL and the reluctance of the federal and provincial governments to increase their respective responsibilities over education, the law made compliance with the curricular reform mainly voluntary (Hanson, 1996; Interview #77). Second, provincial teachers’ strikes opposing curricular reforms in the late 1990s limited provincial support to the reform. Third, despite some technical assistance of the WB to provinces, due to the reluctance of the ministry of economy to assume further responsibilities over education, the federal government did not provide provinces with the required technical capacity to assume the new task of formulating their
own curricula (Interview #77). As a result of these conditions, provinces did not comply with the enacted curricular reform.\textsuperscript{75} This example of avoidance shows that even relatively weak constituents of existing domestic arrangements may oppose unfavourable global ideas especially when norms’ supporters lack cohesiveness and organization.

Active-state ideas of evaluation to inform education policy and alleviate inequality were also avoided. The 1993 FEL established the implementation of a National System for Education Quality Assessment (Sistema Nacional de la Evaluación de la Calidad – SINEC) in order to promote decentralization, monitor the progress of the reform, identify populations with disadvantaged learning conditions, and determine mechanisms for the government to address inequalities (Ley Federal de Educación, 1993, art. 48–50).

However, unlike Chile and Colombia, Argentina lacked technical expertise in standardized evaluation, which delayed the implementation of the assessment systems and made it highly vulnerable to technical difficulties (Interview #60). In addition, due to the lack of control mechanisms for curricular reforms, Argentina quickly moved to use evaluation as a tool to legitimize and enforce curricular changes. Probably due to the influence of the technical assistance of the WB and the countries of reference for this policy, which included Chile and Colombia (Interview #60), the ministry of education initiated the publication of test results in 1995 in order to create awareness of poor school performance and the need of reform implementation (Gvirtz, Larripa, & Oelsner, 2006).

Assessment was also used to promote parental accountability over schools and provinces

\textsuperscript{75} Only two provinces, Buenos Aires and Córdoba, fully implemented the Polimodal and the curricular reform, three provinces refused to accept changes (Buenos Aires City, Neuquén and Río Negro), and the remaining provinces tried a gradual and slow implementation that minimized the conflict with teachers (Dussel, 2004; Gallart, Miranda, Peirano, & Sevilla, 2003; Rivas, 2004). By 2000, only 985 schools out of 8607 had implemented the reform, 2,497 had just initiated the process without completing it, and 3,055 remained unchanged (Gallart et al., 2003).
(Benveniste, 2002, p. 103). In addition, high-performing institutions were awarded incentives in order to encourage benchmarking (Interview #58).

However, rather than helping to promote the legitimacy of curricular reforms, evaluation measures increased CTERA’s opposition to education reforms and raised provincial backlash for the negative political effects of test results (Nores, 2002). Moreover, technical shortcomings in the application and analysis of the tests further undermined the legitimacy of the national assessment system (Interviews #71 & 80). From annual, test application shifted to triannual (Interview #80). Results were no longer published by school or province, but by region, avoiding any chance of accountability (Beech & Barrenechea, 2011). In addition, the information produced by the assessment was not employed to make policy decisions or inform parents (Interviews #71 & 80). Briefly stated, although the SINEC was created as the global norm recommended, its implementation was merely ritual. This example of *avoidance* illustrates that policy legacies incompatible with the global norm, -in this case, the absence of testing tradition- combined with a weakly supported global norm facilitate domestic resistance and the subsequent decoupling of the reform goals from the actual practice.

**Colombia: Market-based Ideas vs. Teacher’s Union**

As explained in Chapter 2, unlike Chile and Argentina, secondary education in Colombia was not under the control of the state. Although between the 1960s and 1970s, the state gradually expanded its authority, it focused exclusively on secondary schooling for the poor while middle and upper classes paid to attend private institutions. Thus, by the 1980s, Colombia had consolidated a dual education system. Moreover, public provision was still an uncoordinated mix of different types of schools dependent on several government authorities (municipal, departmental and national) and with scarce
controls from the central state. Curricular guidelines were ill defined and constantly changed. Indeed, the State Exam, officially established for university admission, ended up providing unintentionally badly needed curricular guidelines for schools. Shortly put, weakness of the state and neglect of secondary education was still pervasive in the country.

By the 1970s, the National Front, the consociational agreement between political elites to rule the country, was completely delegitimized. This pact restricted the scope of representation in order to protect the interests of the traditional dominant classes, and therefore, inequality and clientelism persisted, fuelling social and political instability. Continuous protest, mobilization and civil unrest demanded democratization of political decisions, while violence escalated due to territorial conflict between drug traffickers, guerrilla and paramilitary groups, which even led to the assassination of three presidential candidates for the election of 199076 (Hartlyn, 1988). In this way, although Colombia did not experience a dictatorship like Argentina and Chile, the erosion of the National Front urged political elites to undertake a process of democratization. This process started in 1986 with the election of mayors, and was consolidated with a new Constitution in 1991, elaborated with broad participation of different social sectors. The new Constitution promised to provide more room for citizen involvement in the decision making, established the election of department governors and declared Colombia as ‘a legal social state organized in the form of a unitary republic, decentralized, with the autonomy of its territorial units, democratic, participatory and pluralistic’ (CPRC, 1991, sec. 1, art.1). As

76 Likewise, after a peace agreement in 1985 with one of the main guerrilla groups FARC, and its pacted participation in political activities (elections) as the political party Patriotic Union, their leaders were illegally persecuted by rightist paramilitary groups. It is estimated that around 5,000 party members were assassinated, and more than 100 were forced to disappeared (Aldana, 2002).
a result, despite the striking problems of coordination in the education system, the new Constitution required the decentralization of both responsibilities and fiscal resources for all social services, including education. Policy legacies of a schooling system prone to market participation and the political and social environment of the country paved the way for the reception of state-retrenchment ideas in the country.

The strong diffusion of market-oriented ideas.

Unlike Chile and Argentina, active-state ideas were barely diffused in Colombia in the 1990s. As explained before, CEPAL and UNESCO had very little leverage for coercive diffusion. Similarly, since Colombian education experts did not participate in the networks of active-state advocates of the Southern Cone, normative mechanisms were absent. Finally, although CEPAL and UNESCO conducted some policy dialogues and seminars in Colombia, these mimetic pressures had little resonance in the country because of the strong legacies of private participation in the school system and the reluctance of the government to increase its responsibility over secondary education (Interview #28).

These legacies and the ideological inclination of the government created instead a favourable environment in Colombia for the market-oriented norms promoted by lending IOs. Market-oriented ideas were diffused in Colombia through coercive mechanisms, including the cancellation of the WB loans for secondary vocational schools in 1984. Instead, consisted with its market-oriented approach, the WB invested mainly on primary education (The World Bank, 1982, 1988), while its funding for secondary schooling only included a voucher program (Program for the Expansion of Secondary Education -

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77 Market-oriented reforms were also popular in Colombia in other public services. In the 1990s, services such as ports, roads, construction of power stations, pipelines and refineries were privatized. Other social services such as pensions and healthcare were also delegated to private actors.
PACES) (The World Bank, 1994b), and the consolidation of the quality evaluation system in the ICFES, the institute for the promotion of higher education, based on the expertise developed through the State Exam (MEN & DNP, 1991).

The WB also exercised mimetic mechanisms by conducting studies in the country showing the inefficient rates of return of VOCSED, which also failed to divert students from traditional university studies (e.g. Psacharopoulos & Loxley, 1985; Vélez & Psacharopoulos, 1987). These types of cost-benefit studies were replicated by domestic experts with similar results (e.g. Ortega, 1999). Likewise, in order to consolidate the evaluation system, the Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMMS) of Boston College and the Regional Comparative and Explanatory Studies of the Quality of Education conducted by UNESCO in Latin America served as references for ICFES to further nurture the testing expertise initiated in the 1960s (Interviews #10 &12).

Finally, normative pressures were strong in the country. Like in Chile, the USAID, and other organizations such as the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations funded graduate programs of domestic economists in the US and also brought visiting professors from US universities to collaborate with the School of Economics in the most prestigious Colombian private university, Los Andes University since the 1960s (Uribe, 2014, p. 48). Thus, normative diffusion was also initiated in Colombia before lending IOs jumped in the wagon of market-oriented ideas. These market-minded technocrats were influential in the government with important positions in the DNP, -the national planning agency similar to ODEPLAN in Chile,- and the ministry of finance since the 1960s given that both the Liberals and the Conservatives, the two party involved in the National Front, favoured minimal intervention of the state (Alvarez, 2005).
However, due to the pervasive patronage in the country, these market-oriented technocrats focused mainly on macroeconomic policy, while social policy was left to the negotiation of regional and partisan interests (Alvarez, 2005; Díaz, 1986). This confirms that global ideas may be re-interpreted according to domestic interests and also explains why education policy was not early oriented by market-oriented ideas as illustrated by the use of ministry of education and education policy as a political job bank rather than a technical agency with technically oriented decisions. Yet, the legitimacy gained by the market-oriented technocrats due to the success of their adjustment measures in the 1980s and the environment of ‘re-invention’ of the country promoted by the 1991 Constitution during the Liberal government of César Gaviria (1990-1994) provided a new opportunity for these market-oriented technocrats to operate as ‘institutional entrepreneurs’ and change the domestic arrangement in education. Nevertheless, despite the strong coercive, mimetic and normative diffusion, these mechanisms were insufficient to confront the political contestation of the teacher union, which compromised the emulation of market-oriented ideas.

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78 Montenegro, one of the most salient Colombian market-oriented technocrats and director of the DNP at the time of the reform, claimed that ‘most of the top education experts migrated to the US and the WB, and other multilateral organizations. The available personnel were incapable of supporting any serious, ambitious process of modernization’ (Montenegro, 1995, p. 12).

79 Cesar Gaviria is an economist trained in Los Andes University very keen on market-oriented ideas. During his presidency, market-oriented technocrats became even more prominent in the DNP and the minister of finance (Alvarez, 2005; Forero, González, & Gómez, 2007; Uribe, 2014) Specifically, Armando Montenegro, an economist trained in the New York University was the chair of the DNP while Rudolf Hommes, trained in the University of Massachusetts, was the finance minister. Both of them were advocates of market-oriented ideas.
Collision of powerful opponent constellations.

While diffusion mechanisms fuelled a strong market-oriented constellation in the country, domestic conditions promoted an also influential statist constellation. The market-oriented constellation was composed of the DNP, the finance ministry and municipal mayors. Although influential, this constellation was not entirely cohesive. Regarding provision, while the DNP and the ministry of finance pushed for vouchers for poor students in order to encourage privatization and school autonomy for hiring, managing, and firing personnel (Montenegro, 1995), mayors were just interested in the transfer of all public primary and secondary schools to municipalities in order to maximize their fiscal and political gains (Falleti, 2010). In terms of curriculum, the DNP and the finance ministry advocated for curricular autonomy to promote school choice and the elimination of secondary vocational schools given their inefficient rates of return (MEN & DNP, 1991). By contrast, municipalities paid little attention to curricular decentralization (Falleti, 2010), and mayors were not keen on cancelling secondary vocational schools since they were highly regarded among low-income communities (Interviews #8 & 10). In the area of evaluation, only the DNP and the finance ministry pushed to use it as a means of accountability (Montenegro, 1995), while municipalities paid little attention to evaluation and probably did not favour mechanisms that could make them accountable for education results. Unlike Chile, private providers were not part of the market-oriented constellation. Since they typically had ample autonomy, private providers perceived little benefits from the reform and preferred the status quo, including existing public subsidies to private schools, autonomy from government intervention, and freedom to establish tuition fees (López, 2001; Montenegro, 1995; Sarmiento, 1998).
The *market-oriented constellation* had direct influence in the decision-making process but the government was divided. Although President Gaviria was keen on market-oriented ideas, a segment of the Liberal party rather favoured a Keynesian approach (Uribe, 2014). The minister of education was part of this Keynesian segment and although he was not trained in MEP ideas, he preferred a more centralized governance model (Interview #13). In addition, given the situation of drug and political violence and civil unrest in the country, the education minister preferred to negotiate reform proposals with the teacher union rather than imposing the technocratic solutions of the DNP and the finance minister (Interview #13). Therefore, he joined FECODE in a *statist constellation*. This *constellation* argued in favour of the nationalization of schools’ funding and the centralization of teachers’ hiring, firing and salary negotiations as established in the 1979 unified teacher statute (Interview #18). The constellation also advocated for the creation of independent municipal councils in charge of school management, including administrative and curricular decisions and with a leading role of teachers (López, 2001; Montenegro, 1995). Finally, although the *statist constellation* did not openly oppose evaluation, they rejected the use of standardized assessments as a means of accountability for schools (Interview #18). The *statist constellation* was highly organized and had strong power resources as showed by the direct participation in the decision-making process gained through the association with the education minister, FECODE’s membership which exceeded 200,000 members, and the participation of two FECODE’s leaders in the elaboration of the 1991 Constitution (Bocanegra, 2010; Interview #14).

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80 FECODE rejected the transfer of schools to municipalities because it would undermine the union’s political strength and leave teachers vulnerable to corruption, clientelism, and lack of technical capacity at the municipal level (Interview #18).
Table 3.4 Summary of constellations and degree of influence during the predominance of NPM ideas in the 1990s in Colombia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provision</th>
<th>Market-oriented constellation</th>
<th>Statist constellation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Municipalisation, school choice, vouchers: STRONG INFLUENCE (Market-oriented technocrats, ministry of economy, municipal governors)</td>
<td>Fiscal nationalization of schools: STRONG INFLUENCE (Teachers, ministry of education)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curriculum</td>
<td>Curricular autonomy with school autonomy: STRONG INFLUENCE (Market-oriented technocrats, ministry of economy)</td>
<td>Curricular autonomy for municipal with municipal councils chaired by teachers: STRONG INFLUENCE (Teachers, ministry of education)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>Testing to inform parental decisions: MODERATE INFLUENCE (Market-oriented technocrats, ministry of finance)</td>
<td>Testing without school choice: STRONG INFLUENCE (Teachers, ministry of education)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nevertheless, the *statist constellation* had some mild internal disagreements regarding curriculum. On the one hand, a segment of FECODE, the Pedagogical Movement (PM), demanded curricular autonomy for schools. On the other hand, other members of FECODE feared that such autonomy could drive to the authorization for schools to hire and fire personnel, which would threaten the stability of teachers’ job security and the political leverage of the union (Interviews #14 & 19). By the same token, although a segment of FECODE considered vocational secondary schools inequitable options for poor students, another segment preferred to avoid changes in VOCSED that might hurt the employment stability of vocational teachers (Interview #18). Despite these differences, FECODE gave priority to its advocacy for teachers’ working conditions and hence, the union downplayed its demands for curricular autonomy and reform of VOCSED. In sum, the organizational capacity, closeness to the decision-making process, and power resources of the *statist constellation* made it a strong opponent of the *market-oriented constellation*. The political clash between the two strong constellations unfolded
as both of them submitted competing bill drafts to the Congress. These bill proposals made their way through the legislative process and forced the two constellations to seek concessions, as I will explain below. Table 3.4 summarizes the constellations and their degree of influence in Colombia during the 1990s.

**Resistance to market-oriented ideas.**

In 1992, the DNP and the finance ministry presented the Decentralization Bill draft to the Congress that proposed the municipalisation of schools, the implementation of vouchers and school choice, the promotion of school autonomy, and the implementation systems for informing parental choices through standardized exams (Montenegro, 1995). This bill proposal raised the strong opposition of FECODE. The union then started a massive 15-days teacher strike against the Decentralization Bill proposal and, along with the ministry of education, presented a bill draft to Congress in 1993, the General Education Law (Ley General de Educación - GEL), challenging the proposal of the market-oriented constellation. The GEL proposal included the fiscal nationalization of schools and the creation of municipal councils chaired by the union to make administrative and curricular decisions (Proyecto de ley 44, 1992).

The division within the government (the DNP and finance ministry versus education ministry) and the strong influence of both the market-oriented and the statist constellation compromised market-oriented ideas by forcing re-negotiations of both the Decentralization Bill and the General Education Law proposals. On the one hand, the market-oriented constellation managed to exclude the councils proposed by FECODE’s by gaining the support of the municipalities and warning about the potential co-optation...
of education by the union. On the other hand, FECODE managed to exclude vouchers and municipalisation from the Decentralization Bill. Instead, schools were delegated to the departments (similar to states or provinces) (Lowden, 2004; Montenegro, 1995), and public-subsidized private schools were limited to places where public supply was insufficient, preventing competition and school choice (Ley 60, 1993, art. 8).

Consequently, the WB was forced to modify its voucher program PACES, into a bursary program for some poor students to attend private institutions rather than an initiative to promote competition between private and public schools. Moreover, the decentralization scheme adopted in 1993 complicated the transfer of resources to participant private schools and the distribution of funds became politicized and used for gaining political clientele (Calderón, 1996; The World Bank, 2008). As a result of these problems, the government of Ernesto Samper (1994-1998), a Liberal of the Keynesian segment, finally decided to suspend PACES (Interview #10). This outcome shows that highly influential domestic pressures and incompatible domestic arrangements can compromise strongly supported global norms.

A similar compromise happened with market-oriented curriculum ideas. The GEL proposal delegated the responsibility of curricular design to departments and granted school autonomy to formulate Institutional Educational Projects (IEPs). Following demands of curricular autonomy from FECODE, the IEPs formally allowed schools to define their specific education goals, the means and resources to achieve them, the

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81 Although the GEL proposal required the fiscal nationalization of schools, the councils proposed by FECODE might eventually determine the number of teachers required by each municipality that the central government should hire.

82 A report of the WB stated that it should ‘adapt the implementation mechanisms and procedures to the new legal educational context, as well as the new institutional and education policies of the country’ (The World Bank, 2001b, p. 3).
teaching methods, the management principles, and the regulation for teachers and students. However, at the same time, FECODE prevented that schools were authorized to recruit and fire personnel (Lowden, 2004; Montenegro, 1995; Sarmiento, 1998), as the market-oriented constellation demanded. In addition, the approved version of the Decentralization Bill that delegated education provision to departments left schools without financial resources and control over their own budgets (Interview #14). Without money and authority to establish their own teacher staff, the curricular autonomy granted by the IEPs was very limited. Meanwhile, several departments, especially the poorest, lacked the required technical capacity for curricular design. Thus, curricular decisions were left to a drift since responsibility was dispersed between the national, subnational, and school level.

Similarly, although the WB discontinued the 1960s funding for VOCSED and persuaded the ministry of education of the inefficient rates of return of these schools, VOCSED was not eliminated. The popularity of these schools among low-income families and municipalities, and the support of FECODE to vocational teachers, drove the education ministry to reduce VOCSED from five to two years (Interview #18) and delegate the responsibility for funding VOCSED programs to SENA, the agency in charge of workers training (Interviews #2 & 4). Therefore, even though VOCSED became ill funded, it did not disappear as the market-oriented constellation preferred. In brief, like in the area of provision, the conflict between two strong constellations compromised market-oriented curricular ideas about school autonomy and elimination of VOCSED, producing inconsistent policy decisions.

While market-oriented ideas about provision and curriculum were compromised, norms about evaluation were avoided. The implementation of an assessment system was
facilitated by the expertise of the ICFES and the development of the existing State Exam. Therefore, both the *market-oriented* and the *statist constellations* easily agreed on including a quality evaluation system in the GEL (Interviews #13 & 18) and ICFES was transformed into the Colombian Institute for Education Assessment (Instituto Colombiano para la Evaluación de la Educación) in 1995 (Peña, 2008; Torrado, 1998). With this transformation, the State Exam had two purposes: selecting students for higher education and monitoring quality in secondary education (Interview #10). \(^{83}\) With the new purpose of monitoring education quality, the WB and the IADB provided funds and technical assistance to consolidate a quality assessment system (SABER). \(^{84}\) However, since vouchers and school choice were defeated in the negotiations of the Decentralization Bill, a standardized assessment for informing parental school choices became meaningless for public schools. In this way, the implementation of SABER was merely ritual since there was very limited chances to make schools accountable for results. This example of *avoidance* shows how incompatible domestic institutional arrangements – in this case, lack of school choice and competition between schools – can limit the adoption of the global norm, such as standardized exams for informing parental decisions.

However, given the absence of clear curricular guidelines from both the national and department levels, the assessment system reinforced the typical role exercised by the State Exam since the 1960s of defining informally the secondary school curriculum. The

[^83]: These two purposes had been already established in 1980 when the ministry of education required ICFES to report the schools with low performance (Peña, 2008, p. 30). Yet, beyond wide publication, the government did not use the information for any other purposes (Interview #10).
[^84]: The assessment systems shifted from just one exam at the end of secondary education to several evaluations applied in different grades of all primary and secondary schools.
stability and technical capacity developed around ICFES provided a strong and highly legitimate reference for teachers to identify learning contents and goals (Interview #11). Hence, the evaluation system further constrained the formal school-level curricular autonomy since these tests ultimately and informally defined what teachers had to teach to their students. Thus, even though parental accountability was avoided, the consolidation of a national assessment system reinforced policy legacies that paved the way for future translations of global norms.

**Final Remarks**

Two sets of global ideas arose in the 1980s and 1990s. Market-oriented ideas regarded the state as a source of inefficiency and proposed privatization, vouchers, school choice, autonomy and tests as means to activate market mechanisms and increase school quality and efficiency. Active-state ideas suggested that the state was still relevant but, rather than a teaching state, it should compensate financial and technical inequalities between subnational units and/or schools to provide education, coordinate the elaboration of national and flexible curricular guidelines, and monitor policy implementation through standardized assessments. These two variants of NPM ideas travelled to the countries of this study by different mechanisms. The influence of the WB disseminated market-oriented ideas through a combination of coercive, mimetic and normative pressures. In contrast, due to their financial weakness, CEPAL and UNESCO only managed to diffuse active-state recommendations through normative networks of education experts and policymakers.

At the same time, both, market-oriented and active-state ideas arrived in each country by different means and found distinct contexts. Normative diffusion of market-oriented ideas was only strong in Chile and Colombia. In Chile, these prescriptions
travelled initially in the 1980s through the Chicago Boys. These normative pressures were sufficient to implement a new education governance model due to the repression of political contestation by the authoritarian regime. Later, with the transition to democracy in the 1990s, *mimetic and coercive pressures* of the WB just helped to increase the legitimacy of the inherited template. Meanwhile, in Colombia, market-oriented ideas arrived in the 1990s through *coercive, mimetic and normative pressures*. Yet, the strength of these mechanisms was not enough to fully transform the country’s education governance model due to the contestation of the teacher union, fuelled by a context of democratization. The comparison between Chile and Colombia shows how both, strong diffusion and absence of political contestation are necessary to fully emulate global ideas. Conversely, the legacy of a strong public education and the lack of advocates prevented the diffusion of market-oriented prescriptions for education in Argentina. This weak diffusion explains why, unlike Chile, the authoritarian regime did not emulate these global norms despite the repression of political contestation. This weakness continued during democracy, and therefore, Argentina never implemented market-oriented reforms. Putting differently, Argentina is an example of how the inconsistency between global ideas and domestic policy legacies may prevent or dilute the dissemination of the global norm to a specific country.

Active-state ideas were strongly diffused only in Chile and Argentina. The experience of authoritarianism and the exposure of their education experts to foreign ideas helped build networks of scholars and future policy-makers that disseminated a renovated role of the state in education in these two countries. Yet, in both countries these active-state technocrats found resistance to change. While in Chile, strong institutional constraints inherited from the dictatorship limited the adoption of active-state ideas, in
Argentina, inconsistent economic policies and political contestation also undermined active-state efforts. In brief, despite strong normative diffusion, strong domestic competing pressures resisted the translation of the global norm and forced the accommodation of domestic interests. Meanwhile, Colombia was not really exposed to active-state ideas. CEPAL & UNESCO barely exercised mimetic pressures through limited policy dialogues and Colombian education experts did not participate in the networks of active-state technocrats. Thus, market-oriented norms were the only powerful template diffused in the country.

In addition to the differences in the diffusion mechanisms and contexts of arrival, Table 3.5 summarizes the way in global norms, policy legacies and political contestation unfolded in each policy area at each country. Regarding provision, the main actors during the boom of MEP, the Church and the teacher unions, remained important but their role changed over time. These changes show how institutional arrangement and conflicting constellations co-constitute providing different opportunities for institutional entrepreneurship. In Chile, the authoritarian regime and powerful market-oriented technocrats ignored the opposition of the Church to vouchers, and crushed any resistance from teachers. Yet, once in democracy, the benefits produced by the market-based provision model for private schools transformed the Church and other private providers’ organizations into one of the strongest advocates of the Chilean quasi-market of education. Similarly, teachers did not challenge the model due to the fragility of democracy, but also because the Concertación improved their labour conditions. This is an example of how changes in the institutional arrangement may weaken opponent constellations and achieve conformity or acquiescence.
## Table 3.5 Summary of diffusion mechanisms of NPM ideas, domestic reception and translation outcomes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coercion</th>
<th>Mimesis</th>
<th>Norm.</th>
<th>Compatibility with legacies</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Opposit.</th>
<th>Translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chile – Pinochet (1973-1990) – Market oriented ideas</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prov.</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Incompatible (State-led public-private provision)</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curri</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Incompatible (National technocratic curriculum)</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eval.</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Relatively compatible (Emergent standardized exams)</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chile – Concertación (1990-2000) – Active state ideas</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Prov.</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Relatively incompatible (Quasi-market provision)</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curri</td>
<td>Strong (domestically led)</td>
<td>Strong (domestically led)</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Relatively compatible (Autonomy reframed as reduction)</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eval.</td>
<td>Strong (market ideas)</td>
<td>Strong (market ideas)</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Compatible (Standardized test to inform parental decisions)</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Weak</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Argentina (1990-1999) Market-oriented ideas &amp; Active-State ideas</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Prov.</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Incompatible (Mixed provision)</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curri</td>
<td>Strong (market ideas)</td>
<td>Strong (market ideas)</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Incompatible (National encyclopaedic curriculum)</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eval.</td>
<td>Strong (active-state ideas)</td>
<td>Strong (active-state ideas)</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Incompatible (No tradition of testing)</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Strong</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Colombia (1990-2000)</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prov.</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Relatively compatible (Public secondary schooling only for the poor)</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curri</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Relatively compatible (No clear curriculum)</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eval.</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Relatively incompatible (Tradition of testing, but no school choice)</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The other two cases, Argentina and Colombia, show that a strong diffusion of state retrenchment can be *compromised* by active domestic contestation. In both countries, the context of democratization helped teacher unions challenge the proposed reduction of the role of the central government in the provision of education. As a result, decentralization was only partial. While in Argentina schools were transferred to provinces, and the federal government did not achieve the expected reduction of its public spending. In Colombia, schools were transferred to departments instead of municipalities, and competition between schools was not authorized. In both countries, the Church was only marginally involved in the reform since subsidies for its schools were not modified. On the one hand, state subsidies to Catholic schools had already such a long tradition that they became taken-for-granted arrangements. On the other, the influence of the Church in both countries prevented any attempt to change its status.

In all three countries, changes in the governance of the curriculum were resisted whether because reforms threatened control over learning content or because they threatened teachers’ working conditions. In Colombia, although teachers demanded curricular autonomy, the union *compromised* its adoption since it could provide schools with the authority to hire and fire teachers. In Argentina, teachers unions *avoided* curricular reforms because re-organization and reduction of (vocational) subjects would affect their labour stability. By contrast, in Chile, it was the military who refused to give up the control over the curriculum fearing leftist indoctrination. Instead, the military *manipulated* the norm and translated autonomy into reduction of subjects. Once in democracy, active-state technocrats also refused to devolve curricular authority given the lack of capacity at schools. The different actors shaping the translation of curricular
global norms in each country reflects that resistance can come from both, powerful and peripheral agents.

Finally, only Chile and Colombia, the countries with a tradition of standardized tests, managed to consolidate a system of quality assessment. These countries show how the consistency between global norms and existing domestic arrangements increases the likelihood of acquiescence. However, although both countries established solid evaluation systems, in Colombia, the contestation of teachers against market-oriented reforms prevented the use of testing as a source of information for parental decisions. This situation illustrates that the influence of an opponent constellation can compromise a global norm even when the norm is somewhat consistent with the existing education system. By contrast, in Argentina, the absence of an evaluation culture and the contestation of teachers led to loosely adopt a system of standardized tests without clear purposes and scarce legitimacy.

Overall, the analysis provided in this chapter shows that global NPM ideas about education governance affect domestic policy decisions in two ways. First, these norms provide alternative ideas to powerful actors, such as the market-oriented technocrats and government actors in all three countries, to change domestic institutions. Second, these norms also raise the contestation of less powerful actors, such as teachers’ unions, who nevertheless manage to resist attempts of change in some contexts. From this contestation and bargaining between groups emerged different and somewhat inconsistent governance models, which would have unintended consequences for both powerful and peripheral actors as I will analyze in the next chapter.
Chapter 4. Education for All in the Era of Accountability

The preceding chapter analyzed the interaction between structural dynamics (e.g. authoritarian regimes, economic crisis) and agentic processes (e.g. influence of market-oriented technocrats, resistance of teacher unions) that led Chile, Argentina and Colombia to translate the two variations of NPM ideas: the market-state approach and the active-state norms. The strong support of the authoritarian regime to market-oriented norms and the lack of political contestation facilitated Chile’s conformity with these ideas. The authoritarian regime also locked in policy changes, avoiding their reversal with the transition to democracy. In Colombia, market-oriented norms were also predominant, but changes were limited by the contestation of the teacher union, which was facilitated by a process of democratization. Conversely, in Argentina, active-state ideas were more influential but they were avoided due to the active contestation of the teacher union and the economic crisis. This chapter examines the recentralization of education governance promoted by global norms after the 2000s and their effects in the countries of this study. Although shaped by these different policy legacies, all three countries adopted in the 2000s some form of authority recentralization. Therefore, the main objective of this chapter is to explain why, despite the divergent paths that Chile, Argentina, and Colombia adopted in the 1990s, all these nations opted for a stronger role of the state in the 2000s. This chapter argues that negative consequences of 1990s policy decisions and the legitimacy of 2000s global norms paved the way for domestic actors to demand a recentralization of authority in the policy dimensions of provision, curriculum, and evaluation.
In the early 2000s, although ideas of state retrenchment were still very popular in education policy, they already faced certain challenges. Regarding provision, cuts to public spending on secondary and higher education, recommended by market-oriented ideas, faced strong criticisms from middle-income countries, which prioritized expanding these educational levels (Heyneman, 2012; Mundy & Verger, 2015). Scholars also argued that these cuts had negative effects in the development of teachers and other staff necessary to achieve high quality primary education. In addition, mechanisms associated with education privatization, competition, and school choice had an ambiguous impact on quality and were often associated with increased inequality (Ball, Bowe, & Gewirtz, 1996; Gordon, 2005; Hsieh & Urquiola, 2006). Likewise, the decentralized provision proposed by the active-state approach fell short of its promises. Throughout Latin America, scholars argued that decentralization did not improve education quality and instead it worsened inequality (Gvirtz, 2008; Prawda, 1993; Tedesco & Aguerrondo, 2005).

Similar criticisms applied to curricular recommendations. Regarding the orientation of the secondary school curriculum, scholars, policymakers, teachers and parents in countries where technical and vocational secondary schooling was already established questioned the prescription of reducing or eliminating vocational content from secondary education. These actors argued that this elimination reduced the opportunities of the poorest students who will not attend higher education and will be left without preparation for labour market (Interviews # 10, 45 & 50).

Regarding curricular authority, McGinn and Welsh (1999) pointed out that some critics perceived curricular autonomy as a threat to cohesion and national identity. Some scholars also indicated that such autonomy negatively affected quality due to poor
coordination and lack of technical capacity at schools and subnational units (Ferrer, 2004; Vegas & Petrow, 2008). Conversely, others still suggested that curricular autonomy was necessary to encourage education diversification and quality, but they also pointed that real improvement was unfeasible if autonomy was not guided by some standards and controlled by accountability instruments. Indeed, according to these scholars, without such controls, curricular autonomy may eventually drive to inequality since schools would not be encouraged to equip students with needed basic skills (Patrinos, 2015; Woessmann, 2007; Woessmann, Luedemann, & Schuetz, 2009). In this way, these scholars strongly recommended the alignment between curriculum and evaluation.

Nevertheless, standardized evaluation also raised criticisms. For instance, scholars suggested that rather than effective mechanisms of control, standardized learning assessment led to curricular homogenization, neglecting the needs and expectations of less powerful groups (Ball, 2003; Hemmer, 2013). Others also challenged the assumption that these assessments would inform parental school decisions, since often low-income families had restricted school choices due to extra-educational factors, such as tuition fees or cost of transportation to better schools (Theobald, 2005; Verger, Bonal, & Zancajo, 2016).

Although all these criticisms of the failures of the earlier reforms did not necessarily suggest a return to a state-centered education system, they demanded the re-consideration of the role of the state in the governance of education. This re-consideration ultimately led to a softer version of the 1990s market-oriented ideas that became closer to the active-state norms. Similarly, both norms, market-oriented and active-state versions, promoted the rise of accountability and the re-positioning of secondary education in the policy agenda. The promotion of these processes was gradual. By 1987, the United
Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) already argued for rethinking the objectives of structural adjustment by strengthening policy actions in favour of the poorest (Cornia, Jolly, & Stewart, 1987). In 1990, in the quest to recover its leadership in the global education space, UNESCO promoted an agreement with UNICEF and the WB to launch the Education for All framework (EFA) (Chabbott, 1998; Mundy, 1999). Building on the Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the EFA demanded that ‘all children must have the opportunity to fulfil their right to quality education’ (UNESCO, 2000, p. 15). It also asked for ‘ensuring that the learning needs of all young people and adults are met through equitable access to appropriate learning and life-skills programmes’ (UNESCO, 2000, p. 6). With quality education as a human right, the EFA reinforced the role played by the state in the education governance. Further, its demands for broader, high quality youth education brought secondary school back to the global policy agenda (Interview #27). Nevertheless, the 1990 EFA framework did not establish specific goals for countries. The slow progress in achieving quality education for all during the 1990s urged the EFA to re-launch the framework in 2000 by including specific targets and refining monitor mechanisms to ensure a real commitment of countries to EFA’s goals (Chabbott, 2003, p. 62). This relaunch, known as the Dakar framework, gave a new push to EFA’s demands.

In terms of provision, Dakar’s goals made modest modifications to both, market-oriented and active-state ideas. As a response to the backlash towards privatization of education, the WB minimized its advocacy for market-oriented measures, such as school fees, and downplayed its promotion of competitive funding and expenditure rationalization (Chabbott, 2003; Mundy & Menashy, 2014; Mundy & Verger, 2015). Instead, the WB broadly suggested public-private partnerships (PPP) as tools to expand
education access for the poor, improve quality, and give greater participation to communities (Patrinos, Osorio, & Guáqueta, 2009; The World Bank, 2004, 2011). These PPPs included not only vouchers but also charter schools, contracting out, and schools managed by parents or communities. Similarly, UNESCO warned about the potential risks of decentralizing education provision when there is not political support for this change and when subnational units or communities did not meet technical conditions to assume the responsibility for managing schools (McGinn & Welsh, 1999). Although UNESCO still recommended establishing decision-making as close as possible to the domain where actions were undertaken, it also advised that in the absence of the mentioned conditions, decentralization could increase inequality among education providers, whether subnational units or communities. Therefore, UNESCO called for a balance between centralization and decentralization in order to provide enough support to education providers (Abu-Duhou, 2005; McGinn & Welsh, 1999).

In 2005, the WB published its very first report dedicated exclusively to secondary education. In addition to signalling the re-positioning of secondary education in the WB’s agenda, the report also highlighted the importance of curricular diversification, a proposal that shifted away from the cost-benefit analysis of the 1990s and showed some consistency with UNESCO and UNICEF recommendations. Although these recommendations somewhat resembled the diversified curriculum of secondary vocational schools in the 1960s, IOs promoting EFA (the WB, UNESCO and UNICEF) emphasized the need for deferring vocational specialization until upper-secondary or

85 Although in the 1960s and 1970s, the WB emphasized the importance of secondary education for the production of the manpower required for economic development, it did not produce a particular report on this educational level, and instead focused on the promotion of the vocational character of secondary, tertiary, and non-formal education.
tertiary education, and rather called for a focus on the development of socio-emotional abilities and soft labour skills, such as communication, problem solving, critical thinking, networking, etc. (Braslavsky, 2001; The World Bank, 2005; UNESCO, 2000; UNESCO/OREALC, 2002).

Likewise, curricular autonomy was relatively displaced by an emphasis on curricular standards. Standards could arguably ensure the alignment of different curricular elements (study plans, textbooks, evaluation) and contribute to compliance with core curriculum goals (OECD, 1998; Rychen & Salganik, 2003). These standards would define a common or national curriculum based on core competencies complemented with optional skills customized to the particular needs of subnational units and communities (De Moura Castro, Carnoy, & Wolff, 2000; UNESCO, 2005b).

Consequently, the emphasis on quality, controlled decentralization, and common learning goals moved the EFA framework to promote the state as an evaluator. Governments were responsible for defining standards or acceptable levels of learning acquisition for all students, and establishing systems of monitoring and assessment (Gropello, 2006; The World Bank, 2011; UNESCO, 2000). These standardized assessments would promote benchmarking between schools and improve accountability of public and private schools and subnational units (The World Bank, 2011; UNESCO, 2005a). Table 4.1 shows the mild modifications between the recommendations of 1980s and 1990s, and the emphasis of the 2000s.

The diffusion of these global ideas in Latin America focused mainly on the establishment of curricular standards and assessment systems. Although education provision was still an important topic for the policy agenda of IOs, Latin American
## Table 4.1 Changes in Global Norms between 1990s and 2000s.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Provision</strong></td>
<td>Market-oriented approach: Privatization-competition</td>
<td>Market-oriented approach: PPP for quality improvement</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Active-state approach: Decentralization.</td>
<td>Active-state approach: Controlled decentralization</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Curriculum</strong></td>
<td>Market-oriented approach: No vocational education &amp; Curricular autonomy</td>
<td>Mild VOCSED</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Active-state approach: Consensual curricular framework, curricular autonomy, mild VOCSED.</td>
<td>Common standardized curriculum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evaluation</strong></td>
<td>Market-oriented approach: Standardized tests for parental or policy decisions.</td>
<td>Standardized tests for centralized accountability and benchmarking</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Active-state approach: Standardized testing for policy decisions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Diffusion</strong></td>
<td>Coercive: No aid for secondary education (except from vouchers and evaluation).</td>
<td>Coercive: Loans for evaluation systems and standardization.</td>
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Middle-income countries had already or were close to achieving the universalization of secondary education. Therefore, emphasis was given to accountability. Conditional loans from the WB and the IADB fuelled *coercive pressures* to implement and use testing with associated incentives and sanctions for schools. *Mimetic* and *normative mechanisms* also operated through the impact of international assessments such as the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), TIMMS, Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS), etc., which were used as benchmarks for educational systems all
over the world (Kamens & McNeely, 2010; Meyer & Benavot, 2013). In turn, institutions promoting these tests, such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), UNESCO, and the Australian Council for Educational Research (ACER), continued with the provision of training and hands-on experience on standardized evaluation (Lockheed, 2013; Interviews #10 & 51).

In turn, ideas about provision were rather diffused by *soft coercion and mimetic mechanisms*. Middle-income countries such as those included in this study, were not substantial recipients of financial aid for schooling expansion because they had already achieved EFA goals regarding enrolment, and therefore, EFA’s aid prioritized less-developed countries. Meanwhile, though EFA argued for education as a fundamental right, the framework was not established as a binding declaration. Signing countries had to elaborate EFA national action plans and monitoring reports, but non-compliant countries were only exposed to the shame of being considered human rights violators without further tangible sanctions (Chabbott, 1998). While the right to quality education was promoted through this soft *coercion*, the WB kept its advocacy for private provision through policy reports, and the constitution of epistemic communities around education PPPs (Mundy & Menashy, 2014; Mundy & Verger, 2015) In sum, all these actions spread the norm of the state as an evaluator alongside the right of quality education. Yet, again, these norms found different reception contexts in each country.

In the next sections of this chapter, I provide evidence to support my argument that the interaction of negative policy legacies of 1990s and the 2000s global norms triggered demands from domestic actors for a stronger role of the state in education provision, curriculum, and evaluation. In Chile, the negative effects of the quasi-market widely perceived by students pushed the country to modify deeply ingrained provision
arrangements. These types of effects were softer in the area of evaluation and practically inexistent for the curricular dimension. As a result, these policy areas were not substantially reformed. By contrast, curriculum was the most affected area in Argentina, where the country initiated a process of standardization. Provision remained in charge of provinces but with more financial support of the federal government, while accountability and standardized tests continued to be ignored due to the lack of domestic supporters. Finally, in Colombia, negative consequences on quality of the 1990s reforms strengthened the position of market-oriented advocates, who finally introduced larger participation of private providers and embraced standardization. Yet, these advocates did not manage to reform vocational education, which already counted with robust constituents.

**Chile: New Voices Against the Market Model**

In the 2000s, questions to the market-oriented model raised by students urged the first Concertación government of Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010) to undertake education reform. Like in the 1990s, however, this attempt did not challenge the legacies of the authoritarian regime, and students’ demands were not met. In the 2010s, the unequal effects of the market-oriented model and the disappointment with the 2000s policy decisions fuelled contestation by students, who framed their demands in the language of global ideas about the right of education, forcing the second government of Bachelet (2014-2018) to initiate another reform. This time students’ demands were not easily dismissed but changes only amended the quasi-market model without replacing it. This within-comparison shows that policy legacies lock in past decisions through increasing returns and powerful actors that reproduce the existing arrangement. In addition, negative consequences may produce collective action that leads to incremental changes. In this
particular case, this collective action successfully used the legitimacy of global norms to challenge the domestic template, which illustrates how the encounter between conflicting global ideas and domestic institutions open room for institutional entrepreneurship.

**Bachelet’s (non) reform (2006-2010).**

By the 2000s, Chile was the country in the region with the greatest progress in enrolment expansion, quality improvement and reduction of educational inequality. Based on the legitimacy of these relative results and the consistency of the Chilean education model with globally accepted market-oriented ideas, the 1990s education reform remained unchallenged. Indeed, the education ministry staff that initiated the reform in the early 1990s also remained in office at the end of the decade, which showed the degree of institutionalization or extent of the political agreement with the reform on the one hand (Delanoy, 2000; Interview with former ministry of education Ricardo Lagos in Espinola & De Moura Castro, 1999; Interviews # 50 & 52), and on the other, the embeddedness of policymakers in mature institutional arrangements that impeded them from envisioning new practices.

Despite the external legitimacy of the Chilean education system, changes in the democratic environment and persistent negative consequences of the market-oriented model paved the way for collective mobilization that eroded the taken-for-granted character of the Chilean education system. Schools’ shared funding system and the ability of private institutions to select students produced education ghettos with uneven quality.

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86 By 2007, the net enrolment ratio in secondary education Chile was 92%, 17 points higher than the average of South America. The country also presented a larger proportion of poor students enrolled in secondary school. The percentage of repeaters in 2000 was less than 3%, 2 points lower than the regional average. Drop-out rate fell from 13 to 9% between 2000 and 2010, and it is 6 points under the regional rate. Moreover, Chile is the Latin American country with higher improvement in PISA (UNESCO/OREALC, 2013).
where each socio-economic strata attended a different type of school according to their capacity to pay for educational services (Garcia-Huidobro, 2007; Mizala & Torche, 2012). Discontent due to inequalities and poor performance fuelled demands for changes in the education system (Interview #38 and #46). Although the Alianza, the right party coalition, which included the Independent Democratic Unit (UDI) and National Renovation (RN), still held 44% of the Congress, the fear of the dictatorship was lower, and people felt free to ask for change.

**Coercion and mimesis as tools to increase domestic legitimacy.**

Global norms suggesting a stronger role of the state in the provision of education arrived in Chile by *mimetic mechanisms*. In 1998, in its annual *Human Development Report*, the UNDP highlighted the inequality and segmentation of the Chilean quasi-market of education (PNUD, 1998). Yet, due to the relative good results of the reform compared to the rest of the region, and the persistent predominance of PPPs in the global discourse, the Chilean government did not question its provision model and rather responded to pressures in the area of curriculum and evaluation. Since Chile applied for the OECD and was expected to follow OECD standards (Sáenz, 2010), the country constantly drew lessons from PISA, the OECD’s international assessment, and also from TIMMS, and ACER (Cox, 2011; Valverde, 2004; Interviews #34 & 48). The standards promoted by these international testing initiatives resonated with the existing curricular orientation and the intentions of domestic policymakers. These *coercive* and *mimetic pressures* further fuelled *normative mechanisms*. Participation in these international tests and foreign technical assistance reinforced testing epistemic communities by providing them with an opportunity to update the discussion about evaluation and have international benchmarks (Interviews #51 & 55). In sum, as my theoretical framework suggests, in the
early 2000s, Chilean policymakers paid attention to the global pressures that were compatible with the existing domestic arrangement.

Challenges to the market-oriented active-state constellation.

After 2000, the student movement challenged the market-oriented active-state constellation and became a crucial stakeholder in education policy (Bellei & Cabalin, 2013). A government initiative to give more participation to young people unintentionally motivated the students to establish the National Committee for Secondary Students (Coordinadora Nacional de Estudiantes Secundarios - CONES) and the Coordination Assembly of Secondary Students (Asamblea Nacional de Estudiantes Secundarios - ACES) (UNICEF, 2014). Although these organizations had minimal demands in 2001, such as free student transportation, they quickly escalated, asking for the abolition of LOCE, -Pinochet’s education law-, centralization of education provision, increased support to public schools, prohibition of for-profit schools, elimination of selective students’ recruitment in public-subsidized private institutions, and abolition of the shared funding system (Propuesta de Trabajo de Estudiantes Secundarios de la R.M., 2005; Interview #38 & 40). These demands quickly attracted the support of the teachers’ union, public schools parent associations, and university students, which all joined a statist constellation (Interviews #42 & 47). This constellation was also supported by the Communist Party (Burton, 2011). With this constellation, the movement increased its organizational capacity and power resources, as it was clearly demonstrated in the massive mobilizations of 2006 (Penguin Revolution).87 This is an example of how institutional entrepreneurship emerges from increasing negative consequences for a

87 Around 80% of secondary students mobilized in 2006 through school occupation and protests.
segment of actors, and the opportunity for these agents to organize and mobilize resources to force powerful actors to bargain.

Beyond demands of changes in the area of education provision, the *statist constellation* did not challenge other education policy areas. The student movement did not disagree with authority distribution for curricular decisions (Cox, 2011), and teachers paid little attention to curricular autonomy (Interview #35). In addition, since vocational secondary schools were underrepresented in the student movement (Interview #41), demands for changes in the orientation of the curriculum were limited to qualified and supervised field experience (Propuesta de Trabajo de Estudiantes Secundarios de la R.M., 2005). Similarly, the *statist constellation* barely contested policies in the area of evaluation. Occasionally, teachers complained that the interpretation of standardized assessments paid little attention to social inequality (Interview #48). However, the *statist constellation* did not seriously challenge the existence or purposes of SIMCE, the national Chilean assessment. The general agreement with curricular centralization and standardized evaluation ultimately helped *conformity* with global ideas of curricular standardization and accountability based on standardized assessments.

Though education provision demands of the student movement resonated with criticisms from IOs and with EFA ideas about the right for education, students did not associate their advocacy with any global norm. In addition, the movement was not fully cohesive. While ACES asked for radical transformations, CONES accepted a gradual change as long as it promised to be transformative in the long run (Interviews #40 & 41). In addition, since the movement was not supported by any major political party, students lacked close links with the decision-making process. By the mid-2000s, the *statist*
The weakness of the *statist constellation* and the lack of opposition in the areas of curriculum and evaluation explain Chile’s general *acquiescence* with global norms in the early 2000s. Regarding provision, the relative strength of the *market-oriented active-state constellation* facilitated isolation and outmanoeuvring of their opponents. To appease demonstrators in 2006, Bachelet invited the student leaders to participate in the Presidential Advisory Council for Education Quality. The role of that Council was to achieve a consensus over a new education law. Yet, internally, students disagreed about their participation in a government-convened space that also included representatives of the *market-oriented active-state constellation*. Indeed, the plural composition of the Council and their radical differences over provision prevented any agreement, and
therefore the *statist constellation* withdrew their support (“Fech se retira del Consejo Asesor para la Educación,” 2007; Interview #38).

Consequently, Bachelet appointed a parallel commission with the exclusive participation of the Concertación and the Alianza (Burton, 2011; Pribble, 2013), reducing participation to the *market-oriented active-state constellation*. This commission drafted the new education bill, the General Education Law (GEL), which lacked substantial reforms of education provision (Larroulet & Montt, 2010). By contrast, the GEL explicitly authorized merit-based selection for all private paid and voucher secondary schools and only for high-performing municipal institutions (Colegios de Excelencia).\(^8^8\) The agreement between the right and left party coalition also facilitated the creation of a Preferential School Voucher, an additional subsidy for the most vulnerable students. Yet, this voucher would be used in both municipal and private voucher schools against the expectation of the *statist constellation* for preferential funding for public institutions. This is an example of how powerful domestic actors can maintain an eroded institutional arrangement by drawing on its global legitimacy, and manipulating or reframing the demands of their opponents. By 2010, the percentage of students enrolled in private secondary schools reached 58%, and the apparent domestic consensus for the enactment of the GEL undermined the legitimacy of the *statist constellation* demands (Interviews #38 & 55).

In comparison, curricular reform was less contentious. In this area, both the Presidential Council and the Commission easily agreed on moderate changes to the curriculum of the 1990s. Thus, the GEL only required to revise learning goals and

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\(^8^8\) ‘Colegios de Excelencia’ are public municipal institutions similar to magnet schools, which have well-established reputations, are highly competitive, and academically demanding.
established more precise curricular standards that better oriented teachers’ performance in the classroom. In other words, like in the 1990s, curriculum remained centralized (Cox 2011) and hence GEL *conformed* to global ideas of curricular standardization. Similarly, curricular reform also showed *acquiescence* with standardization and reduction of vocational content. Based on GEL requirements, the National Education Council, the agency in charge of approving the curriculum reform, asked the ministry of education to standardize VOCSED and reduce the specialization of its content, making it more compatible with general secondary education (Acuerdo No. 93, 2010). Indeed, later in 2013, the ministry of education eliminated nine vocational specialties and replaced them with broader occupation fields (e.g. Sales was transformed into Management) (“Mineduc anuncia eliminación de nueve especialidades en liceos técnicos,” 2013). In other words, this *acquiescence* or full emulation global ideas about curricular orientation and authority distribution was the product of the compatibility between global norms and the domestic arrangement, and the concurrent absence of institutional entrepreneurs for curricular autonomy and vocational education.

Regarding evaluation, the 2009 GEL consolidated SIMCE, the national assessment instrument, as a pillar of the education system. Before the GEL, a government commission in 2003 had increased the frequency and areas of testing to collect information and encourage improvement in additional subjects (Comisión para el Desarrollo y Uso del SIMCE, 2003; Interview #48).89 This commission and the creation of the Agency for Quality Assurance required by the GEL gave SIMCE even more prominence (Interview #51). Based on SIMCE results, the Quality Assurance Agency

89 This commission also included socio-economic status (SES) as one of the main variables to report and compare SIMCE results. These inclusion addressed teachers’ complaints about the little attention that the test paid to SES (Interview #51).
was authorized to close schools that constantly presented low performance (Ley No. 20.529, 2011, art. 31). Although the law that established this regulation was formulated during Bachelet’s government, its implementation was developed during the right party coalition presidency of Sebastian Piñera (2010-2014). Piñera’s administration did not undertake any major education reforms, but its implementation of the Quality Assurance Agency further reflected the preferences of the market-oriented active-state constellation. Piñera increased the areas and frequency of testing and dismissed again SES as a variable to report and compare SIMCE results. In sum, like in the area of curriculum, the conformity to accountability global ideas was also the result of a dominant constellation that continued reinforcing the existing domestic arrangement helped by the legitimacy of compatible global norms.

**A second attempt of reform to the market-oriented system.**

In the 2010s, students mobilized again for a new education reform. The re-emergence of contestation is explained by the concurrence of different factors consistent with my theoretical framework. First, the legitimacy of the existing arrangement continued to be deinstitutionalized or eroded due to the disappointment of the statist constellation, and particularly students, with the manipulation of the government in the discussion of the 2009 GEL. Second, in 2011, the statist constellation had better chances to frame a clear opposition against the right government of Piñera (2010-2014) than they had against the socialist government of Bachelet in 2006, which had sought to forge consensus over the 2009 GEL. Third, the 1990s education policymakers had been gradually replaced since Bachelet’s first government in 2006 (Burton, 2011, p. 64), opening the room for new policy ideas. All these factors paved the way for institutional entrepreneurship giving a new push to the statist constellation and producing different re-
alignments of actors in the areas of provision and evaluation. Yet, the area of curriculum continued to be uncontested.

*Mimesis as a weapon for domestic actors.*

During the 2000s, different IOs consistently pointed at the inequality and segmentation of the Chilean education system. The OECD exercised soft *coercion* through the publication of a report that highlighted inequality as the most important problem of the Chilean education system and the insufficiency of the market to alleviate this problem. Instead, the OECD recommended stronger state incentives and sanctions for school performance (OECD, 2004). In 2007 and 2008, the WB and the EFA global monitoring report confirmed this diagnosis (EFA Global Monitoring Report, 2015; The World Bank, 2007). These reports not only suggest the presence of mimetic pressures, but also the external erosion of the legitimacy of the Chilean education system.

While IOs concerns were supposed to be addressed with the 2009 General Education Law, a renovated student movement also used these global pressures to legitimize their demands for changes, framing them as the ‘right to education’. Using evidence from the 2004 OECD report, the student leaders in 2011 initiated a campaign against market-based education provision and its effects on segregation and inequality (Prologue of Jackson in Atria, 2012, p. 15). This campaign also included international tours to gain support from different IOs, including the OECD, the UN, UNESCO, and UNICEF (AFP/EMOL, 2011; UNICEF, 2014). Indeed, UNESCO and UNICEF took advantage of the momentum of the students’ protests to publicize reports and briefs about the shortcomings of Chilean education in the promotion of the ‘right to education’ (e.g. Muñoz, 2011; UNICEF, 2014). This example shows that less powerful or peripheral
actors can use global norms to increase their resources and work for changes at the domestic level.

Fractures in the market-oriented active-state constellation.

After the 2009 GEL and during Piñera government, the student movement, this time led by university students, became better organized and more cohesive. In 2011, this movement carried out a 36-week strike, which gained extensive public support through the effective message of students against for-profit education and inequality of the school system (Interview #38). They also used innovative means of mobilization, such as massive artistic performances and non-violent demonstrations, which delegitimized the repression of the right-wing government (UNICEF, 2014). The strike consolidated the statist constellation, and particularly the students, as institutional entrepreneurs.

The popularity of the student movement also undermined the cohesiveness of the market-oriented active-state constellation, which had previously contained the left and the right party coalition, the Church, private providers, and several think tanks and education experts. The student mobilization made the diversity of interests and ideologies in the market-oriented active-state constellation evident. A portion of the Concertación actually agreed to some extent with the demands of the student movement, including the elimination of for-profit schools, sharing funding, and selective students’ recruitment (Consejo Asesor Presidencial, 2006; Larroulet & Montt, 2010). Another group in the Concertación was more moderate and suggested that the prohibition of for-profit schools should only applied for private voucher institutions. They also indicated that selective student recruitment, if necessary, should be done by blind selection or on a competitive basis for high-performing municipal schools. However, rather than profit or selection, this
group preferred to focus on policies that could favour public schools as opposed to the equal treatment traditionally advocated by market-oriented ideas (Interviews #28, 33, 35).

Meanwhile, another segment of Concertación, along with the Alianza, the right party coalition, rejected the link between the public or private character of schools and quality, and therefore the modification of provision (Interview #47). They argued that the elimination of for-profit schools would limit the diversification of options. They also suggested that the prohibition to select students might harm education by enrolling students incompatible with particular school projects. Market-oriented advocates also argued that preferential treatment for public schools, and the elimination of shared funding would negatively affect private voucher schools, limiting parental choice (Camhi, Troncoso, & Arzola, 2011). Hence, this portion of the market-oriented active-state constellation demanded further deregulation of education provision, more school autonomy, and more attractive incentives for school performance (Larroulet & Montt, 2010).

The division within the market-oriented active-state constellation became even more complex due to the pressure of vested interests. The Church, a traditional ally of the CDP in the Concertación, fiercely defended the interests of private paid and voucher schools. Similarly, CONACEP, the Chilean association for private schools, also had strong links with the CDP and other parties of the Concertación.\(^90\) Moreover, CONACEP’s influence among principals, teachers, and parents, made it an attractive

\(^{90}\) Several CONACEP’s presidents were important members of the Concertación’s parties. For instance, Rodrigo Bosch, Walter Oliva, and Alejandro Hasbún, former leaders of CONACEP, were also well-known members of the CDP (Carvajal & Partarrieu, 2014). Rodrigo Ketterer, Conacep’s actual secretary, is also member of the Party for Democracy, a Concertación’s party created in 1987 with former members of the Socialist Party, MAPU, and other left parties. Ketterer even held different public positions before becoming CONACEP’s secretary.
electoral ally (Interview #55). In other words, the ideological and interest differences within the market-oriented active-state constellation made this alignment fragile and inconsistent, paving the way for deinstitutionalization of the existing provision arrangement.

For the elections of 2013, the Concertación was dissolved and transformed into the New Majority coalition (Nueva Mayoria - NM), consisting of the parties of the Concertacion (CDP, Socialists, MAPU, PPD) and the addition of the Communist party. The NM aimed at recapturing presidency by moving to the left. With the support of the NM, three student leaders were elected to Congress in 2013. Another one was also elected through a new independent left party, the Autonomous Left. With these positions, students obtained direct participation in the education reform of 2015 (Interview #40).

Moreover, Bachelet won again the presidency in 2014, with a platform extensively based on education reform and students’ demands. In other words, in the early 2010s, the statist constellation increased its resources as an institutional entrepreneur by embracing the banner of the right to education, becoming more cohesive, and gaining influence in the decision-making process, which in turn undermined the cohesiveness and influence of the market-oriented active-state constellation in policy decisions. Table 4.2 summarizes the changes in the constellations between 2000s and 2010s.

The evaluation reforms during Piñera’s administration also caused changes in the constellations. Specifically, the increase of testing areas and frequency, the announced sanctions for low-performing schools, and test reports ignoring SES produced for the first time backlash among some members of the statist constellation, including teachers,
Table 4.2 Constellations and degree of influence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Market-oriented active-state constellation</th>
<th>Statist constellation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2000s</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Provision:</strong> Supported by global norms about PPPs (Concertación, Alianza, the Church, CONACEP, market-oriented and active-state technocrats). MODERATE INFLUENCE</td>
<td><strong>Provision:</strong> Stronger role of the state (Students, teachers, Communists). LOW INFLUENCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Curriculum:</strong> Standardization/Reduction VOCSED (Ministry of education, education experts, Concertación, Alianza). HIGH INFLUENCE</td>
<td><strong>Curriculum:</strong> No opponent position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evaluation:</strong> Accountability (Ministry of education, the Church, CONACEP, education experts, Concertación, Alianza). HIGH INFLUENCE</td>
<td><strong>Evaluation:</strong> No opponent position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2010s</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Provision:</strong> Supported by global norms about PPPs (some segments of New Majority, Alianza, the Church, CONACEP, market-oriented technocrats and some active-state education experts) MODERATE INFLUENCE</td>
<td><strong>Provision:</strong> Stronger role of the state – Right of Education (Some segments of the New Majority, students, teachers, some active-state technocrats). MODERATE INFLUENCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evaluation:</strong> Accountability. (Ministry of education, the Church, CONACEP, education experts, New Majority). HIGH INFLUENCE</td>
<td><strong>Evaluation:</strong> Anti-testing (Colegio de profesores, students, parents, and education experts). LOW INFLUENCE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

parents, students, and some scholars that joined an ‘Stop SIMCE’ Movement (Alto al SIMCE) (Interviews #34, 35, 40, 44 & 46). This movement, however, was relatively weak since it lacked cohesiveness. Some of its members demanded complementary qualitative evaluation mechanisms that expanded the notion of education quality and provided teachers with more authority to assess student learning. In addition, this segment of Stop SIMCE also demanded the re-inclusion of SES to avoid stigmatization and sanctions of low-performing schools (Interview #46). Nevertheless, another segment of the movement was more radical and asked for the total elimination of testing. Similarly, the power resources of Stop SIMCE were not very effective. In addition to some broad
media campaigns about the negative consequences of testing, Stop SIMCE called on schools, parents, and students to refuse completing the examination. However, these boycotts were not supported by teachers due to the monetary incentives that SIMCE results provided to schools and the legitimacy of the test. Consequently, the advocacy for standards and accountability of the market-oriented active-state constellation remained predominant.

**Minor revisions to market-oriented ideas.**

As Table 4.2 shows, changes in the constellations by the 2010s were only significant in the area of provision. Therefore, this is the only dimension in which policy changed in this decade. With the fractures in the market-oriented active–state constellation, the statist constellation successfully embraced the banner of the right to education and used its new links with the decision-making process to compromise the market-oriented model with a new law approved in 2016. This new law required the gradual elimination of for-profit schools and shared funding, and prohibited student selection (Ley N° 20.845, 2016). This law did not fully transform the Chilean quasi-market of education but only compromised market-oriented ideas since vouchers and school choice remained unchallenged. Nevertheless, this relatively small modification in provision arguably shows how domestic institutional entrepreneurs can use global norms to enhance their resources and disrupt the domestic arrangement. This disruption initiates a process of deinstitutionalization that might eventually lead to incremental and transformative change.

Some minor changes also happened in the area of evaluation. First, since the Stop SIMCE movement coincided with the 2011 student mobilization, the Piñera government suspended communication of results that excluded SES, in order to avoid additional
backlash (Interview #54). In addition, with the priority given to education in the policy agenda of the second Bachelet’s administration, the government invited leaders of the Stop SIMCE Movement to join a commission assessing and recommending changes to SIMCE. The Commission’s report reflected some of the preferences of Stop SIMCE, including the expansion of the concept of learning and quality beyond tests, greater leverage and voice to teachers to evaluate student performance, reduction of test frequency and areas, the avoidance of improper comparisons that may stigmatize schools, and the balance of the responsibility for student learning among different education stakeholders (Equipo de Tarea SIMCE, 2015). However, SIMCE continues to be one of the main instruments to evaluate teacher performance and a source for monetary incentives for schools. Likewise, publication of results is still considered necessary to inform parental decisions (Interview #51). Therefore, it is hard to argue that Chile has stopped conforming to global accountability ideas. At best, the country has slightly downplayed the accountability discourse and dismissed the 2000s changes (including sanctions for low-performing schools) in order to appease resistance to the test.

**Argentina: The Revival of a Strong ‘Active State’**

Unlike Chile, market-oriented ideas were never popular in Argentina. Instead, the combination of three factors paved the way for the 2000s global ideas about the ‘right of education’ and a stronger role of the state. First, the 1990s education reforms in Argentina that delegated secondary schools and curricular decisions to provinces, unified vocational and general secondary education, and divided secondary education into two levels of three years each one, were never regarded as positive. Political contestation, insufficient infrastructure, and limited technical capacity in the provinces delayed reform implementation. The unification of vocational and general secondary schools, the division
of secondary education into two levels and provincial curriculum design for secondary education only started in 1997 (Gallart, Miranda, Peirano, & Sevilla, 2003). These delayed reforms were not fully implemented in several provinces, and their results were not satisfactory (Rivas, 2004). For instance, the province of Buenos Aires, one of the provinces that initiated early and went further with the implementation of the reform, showed a striking decline in educational attainment (Rivas, 2010). Overall, unlike Chile, the 1990s education reforms in Argentina never achieved enough legitimacy to get institutionalized.

Second, insufficient resources to respond to salary demands of teachers prompted in 1997 the most significant teacher strike in the recent history of Argentina, the White Tent (Carpa Blanca), which broke the heterogeneous market-oriented active-state constellation of the 1990s. CTERA, the teachers’ union, installed a white tent in front of the National Congress, and carried out a 1,000-days strike with the participation of more than 1,400 teachers from all over the country (April 2, 1997 – December 30, 1999). This strike gained the support of public opinion as one of the major symbols of social discontent with President Menem’s (1989-1999) policies (Interview #81). Although their demands started with salary increases, the magnitude of the strike added other claims, such as the abolition of the 1993 Federal Education Law and the definition of a steady formula for education funding (Interview #72). Despite the strength of teachers’ mobilization, Menem’s ministry of economy refused to increase teacher salaries or federal education expenditure, arguing that it was a provincial responsibility (Morduchowicz, 2002). Nor did the ministry of economy support the solutions proposed by the ministry of education, leaving
it alone to confront the crisis. Ultimately, the minister of education resigned expressing her support for teachers’ demands (Interview #58) and breaking the fragile alliance between active-state and market-oriented technocrats.

Third, in addition to the lack of legitimacy of the 1990s reforms and the breakdown of the constellation that maintained them, by 2001, a harsh economic crisis hit the country. The economic situation drove Argentina to a political crisis that completely eroded the legitimacy of current institutions and policies (Novaro, 2002). An anticipated presidential election took place in 2003. Although Menem won the first round of voting with a small margin, he withdrew from the run-off fearing a potential electoral defeat. His withdrawal diminished the legitimacy of the automatically elected and little-known Peronist president, Nestor Kirchner (Levitsky & Murillo, 2008, p. 16). In the quest of a broader political coalition, Kirchner allied with CTERA due to their political leverage and their symbolic role as opponents of Menem’s policies (Murillo, 2013). This alliance

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91 To resolve the crisis, the minister of education proposed a new vehicle tax to cover a monetary incentive for teachers. Although the tax was approved, the ministry of economy managed to delay its implementation until 1999 and also took advantage of the opposition of the transportation sector to limit collection to private vehicle owners. These changes made financial resources insufficient to pay teachers’ monetary incentive (Morduchowicz, 2000).

92 Only with the government change, the new president Fernando de la Rúa (1999-2001) granted an additional budget of US$660 millions to pay teacher salaries, which ultimately ended with the strike (“Fin de la carpa docente después de 1003 días,” 1999).

93 The failure of the Convertibility Plan, a currency board arrangement that pegged the Argentine peso to the US dollar, and high public and external indebtedness made the economic crisis reach its peak in 2001 with 70% annual inflation, the collapse of the banking system and subsequent restriction of bank deposit withdrawals, a drastic decline of the GDP, a dramatic increase in poverty and inequality, and the suspension of external debt payments.

94 In December of 2001, Argentina had four presidents within twelve days. Massive civil mobilization and unrest demanded all elected and appointed officials to leave office (“Throw them all out” – “Que se vayan todos”).
between the government and teachers delivered the final blow to the 1990s reform, and made the 2000s global ideas promoting PPP and accountability undesirable. Conversely, Argentine public opinion demanded a stronger role of state that would restore public education and reverse the so-called neoliberal education policies of the 1990s (Cao, 2011).

The renovated diffusion of active-state global ideas.

The erosion of the legitimacy of the 1990s education reform blocked the reception of market-oriented ideas. Whereas in the 1990s measures such as privatization or school choice were not promoted, and test-based accountability was just timidly tried, in the 2000s PPPs and increased accountability were openly defied. Conversely, active-state ideas, which emphasized decentralization of the provision with strong state support, consensus-based curricular guidelines, and evaluation to inform policy decisions, were still accepted. This acceptance is the result of two elements. First, active-state advocates from FLACSO and UNESCO remained close to the decision-making process exerting normative pressures (Interview #81). Putting differently, epistemic communities of active-state ideas remained predominant in the country. Second, these active-state advocates successfully shifted away from the ‘efficiency’ discourse promoted by Menem’s market-oriented approach and instead reframed their proposals in the ‘right to education’ rhetoric, which aligned with the 1990 EFA movement and the 2000 Dakar

95 Daniel Filmus, the Education Minister between 2003 and 2007, was the former director of FLACSO between 1992 and 2000. Juan Carlos Tedesco, the former director of IIEP-UNESCO Buenos Aires and one of the authors of the 1992 CEPAL-UNESCO report, was his vice-minister and later his successor. Moreover, during their administrations, similar staff from both institutions, FLACSO and IIEP-UNESCO Buenos Aires, assisted in the development and implementation of the education reforms undertaken after 2005 (Interview #64).
Framework. The shared professional values of the active-state education experts and their former connections with UNESCO drove the ministry of education to elaborate a reform proposal based on the EFA goals, including the universal right to quality education, and the policy recommendations of the 1990s CEPAL & UNESCO report, such as consensual curricular standards and the transformation of vocational education into soft labour skills (Interview #81). This case shows that normative mechanisms might be necessary factors explaining education policy diffusion, but also it shows that under favourable institutional circumstances, domestic epistemic communities can operate as institutional entrepreneurs that change existing arrangements.

Beyond this normative diffusion, Argentina did not receive additional coercive or mimetic pressures to transform its secondary education. Despite the profound economic crisis, the government managed to renegotiate its external debt payment and, helped by the economic growth of the mid-2000s, Argentina was released from coercive pressures of structural adjustment programs. Thus, the 2005 education reforms were actually funded with domestic resources (Interview #81). This shows that lack of resources is not a sufficient factor to facilitate coercive pressures. Few marginal funds provided by the IADB supported programs to improve enrolment and retention of poor students in secondary education and the construction of new schools, but expanded private participation, such as PPPs, or accountability was not encouraged (IADB, 2004). Similarly, WB funding exclusively addressed rural education programs to improve enrolment, provide instructional material and enhance technical capacity at the provincial level (The World Bank, 2014). Since the core of the 2005 education reform was domestically funded, lending IOs had very limited leverage to recommend or impose their preferences.
Furthermore, despite Argentina’s participation in PISA since 2000, TIMMS in 1995 and 2003, and UNESCO’s Regional Comparative and Explanatory Education Studies in 1997, 2006, 2013, these international assessments were not reported as a source of learning or reference for national assessment policies. Moreover, UNICEF’s advocacy for a culture of evaluation and the development of quality standards had little resonance with domestic evaluation policy (Interview #74). Despite the creation of the National Department of Education Information and Quality Assessment (Dirección Nacional de Información y Evaluación de la Calidad Educativa – DINIECE) in 2001, which institutionalized the 1990s quality assessment system SINEC (Nores, 2002), the country did not receive the normative diffusion of testing expertise experienced by Chile and Colombia. Indeed, the design, content, application, and interpretation of results of SINEC had been continuously questioned in Argentina (Nores, 2002). Probably because of the lack of technical expertise, Argentine evaluation policy was barely developed during the 2000s.

In brief, the contestation of the 1990s reforms seemed to isolate Argentina from external market-oriented pressures in education reform, showing that policy legacies may constrain the reception of global ideas that are at odds with the domestic arrangement. At the same time, professional values in the ministry of education helped normative diffusion of active-state ideas. Social and political pressures, along with the rhetoric of the right of education in the 2000s, facilitated the entrepreneurship of active-state technocrats to translate their global ideas into new education governance policies for Argentina.

A new alliance between active-state advocates and teachers.

As suggested before, in Argentina the economic crisis of 2001 discredited market-based policies of the 1990s and broke the market-oriented active-state constellation,
which had been behind the reduction of federal expenditure in education, the
decentralization of the curriculum, the reduction of vocational content in secondary
education, and the establishment of standardized assessments. Moreover, the economic
and political crisis triggered by Menem’s policies in the 1990s deeply undermined the
legitimacy of the few advocates of market-oriented ideas. For instance, in the middle of
the crisis, President de la Rúa (1999-2001) appointed Juan José Llach, Menem’s vice-
minister of economy, as education minister in 1999. Llach had recently published a
widely circulated book analyzing the benefits of school choice, vouchers, standardized
exams, and other market-oriented policies (Llach, Montoya, & Roldán, 2000). Yet,
probably to avoid backlash, Llach quickly clarified that he would not attempt to
implement any of these measures due to the critical conditions of the country (“El primer
punto es poner más plata en educación,” 2007). Despite these clarifications, Llach’s
tenure in the education ministry was very short (December, 1999-October, 2000),
revealing the inconformity of public opinion with his ideas (Minteguiaga, 2009).

The socio-political crisis in Argentina paved the way for the realignment of actors
and the constitution of a renewed statist constellation composed of active-state education
experts in the government, significant segments of the Peronist party, and CTERA
(Filmus & Kaplan, 2012; Murillo, 2013; Personal interview #58, 62 & 68). Although this
constellation did not have salient opponents due to the fall of market-oriented technocrats,
the association between active-state advocates and teachers somewhat compromised the
policy positions of both sides. In terms of provision, both the ministry of education and
teachers wanted to maintain provincial secondary schools but with a larger contribution
and control from the federal government (Filmus & Kaplan, 2012). For teachers, this
stronger role of the federal government would potentially contribute to salary increases.\textsuperscript{96} For the central government, greater dependence of the provinces on federal funding could provide the national education ministry with more tools to enforce provincial compliance with national policies.

Agreement over curriculum policy was less clear. Consistent with the active-state ideas held by ministry officials, the ministry of education wanted the deferral of vocational specialization to the last three years of secondary education and its transformation into the development of soft labour skills. By contrast, teachers demanded the re-establishment of tracking between general and technical schools and reinstatement of traditional six years for both general and technical secondary education (Southwell, 2010). As explained in the preceding chapter, since Argentine teachers were appointed as subject instructors rather than as school teachers, they typically rejected significant changes in the curriculum since that could reduce the demand for specific teachers and/or the workload in particular subjects. In addition, since the provinces that implemented the 1993 curricular reforms had declines in educational attainment, teachers’ demands seemed reasonable (Interviews #64, 71). Due to these demands, active-state policymakers had limited leverage to reform curriculum, implement standards and replace specialized technical education with soft labour skills, as they preferred (Interview #78).

Regarding evaluation, both sides, active-state ministry officials and teachers, paid little attention to standardized exams. Active-state policymakers acknowledged that testing might be an instrument to guide policy decisions, but they were more concerned

\textsuperscript{96} In fact, in his first day in office, Kirchner decided to transfer national resources to pay delayed salaries of teachers at several provinces (Filmus & Kaplan, 2012). Likewise, a series of legislative measures increased the share of federal transfers for teacher salaries from 9,3 to 20,8 between 2003 and 2007 (Filmus & Kaplan, 2012). This achieved 88,6\% increase of teacher salaries.
about promoting pedagogical mechanisms to improve educational attainment of the poorest, such as teaching methods, textbooks, innovative learning strategies, etc. (Interview #81). Teachers, in turn, associated standardized assessments with market-oriented policies and rejected their use as a tool for accountability (Interview #62 & 71). In other words, during the 2000s, there were not influential advocates for stronger accountability based on standardized assessments in Argentina.

Due to the absence of contestation from market-oriented forces and the direct participation of CTERA in policy decisions, three new bills were easily approved between 2005 and 2006 without the heated contestation of the 1993 FEL (Cao, 2011; Filmus & Kaplan, 2012): The Education Budget Law, which increased education expenditure at federal and provincial level (Ley de financiamiento educativo, 2005); the Vocational Education Law, which reinstated vocational secondary schools and increased their funding (Ley de educación técnica profesional, 2005); and the National Education Law, which re-established the duration of secondary education to six years, made it a mandatory level, and re-centralized curricular decisions (Ley de Educación Nacional No. 26206, 2006). Nevertheless, while in the 1990s the market-oriented technocrats impeded a full development of active-state ideas, in the 2000s, their new allies, the teachers, also constrained to some extent their preferences. This example shows that actors may re-align in different transversal constellations when they have the opportunity together to shift institutional rules to their convenience, on the one hand, and on the other, it illustrates that institutional entrepreneurship is constrained by its dependency on other actors and the resources they control as Hardy and Maguire suggest (2008, p. 207). Table 4.3 summarizes the positions of the actors in the dominant strong statist constellation.
Table 4.3 Summary of actors’ preferences within the strong state constellation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy dimension</th>
<th>Statist constellation</th>
<th>No organized opposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Active-state policymakers</td>
<td>Teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision</td>
<td>Decentralization with increased federal contribution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curriculum</td>
<td>Centralization and reduction of vocational secondary education</td>
<td>Decentralization and re-establishment of vocational secondary schools.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>Standardized exams for policy decisions.</td>
<td>No standardized evaluation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Translation: The accommodation of domestic interests.

The need for accommodating the interests of CTERA in the new education reform explains why active-state global norms were *compromised* despite the lack of opponent constellations. In the area of education provision, the 2005 Education Budget Law (EBL) reflected *conformity* with ideas of controlled decentralization because both significant actors of the constellation, the ministry of education and teachers, were interested in increasing the participation of the federal government in education provision. The EBL was one of the first major actions of Kirchner’s government in the area of education and clearly responded to teachers’ demand for an increasing contribution of education expenditure toward teacher salaries. The law increased public expenditure on education (4-6%), and raised the fiscal commitment of the federal government from 25% to 40% of total education expenditure (Ley de financiamiento educativo, 2005). The EBL required provinces to employ this funding to pay teachers’ salaries, which secured education investment at the provincial level (Interview #81), favouring teachers’ interests. To further control provincial investment in education, each province was required to sign a

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97 The EBL also established that the federal government should help the worst-off eleven provinces to cover teachers’ salaries.
contract with the federal government that established provincial education policy commitments in exchange of additional federal resources for infrastructure and quality (Interview #81). The EBL also established that the increase of education resources should prioritize the enrolment and retention of poorest students as a way to endorse the right of education (Filmus & Kaplan, 2012; Interview #81). Briefly explained, since ideas of ‘education for all’ and the ‘right to education’ matched the interests of the strongest actors in the predominant constellation, Argentina easily conformed to the global norm recommending controlled decentralization.

Conversely, PPPs, one of the key new global ideas of the 2000s, did not have resonance in Argentina as it did elsewhere. As explained in previous chapters, public subsidies to private schools were initially the product of Peronist forces trying to improve teacher working conditions in the private sector, and later, they were a response to Church demands for freedom of education. Unlike vouchers and PPPs, these subsidies did not directly encourage competition or benchmarking between public and private schools (Interview #59). Yet, they became ingrained in the Argentine education system and persisted in the 1993 FEL and in the 2006 NEL. Through these subsidies, which reached around 75% of private schools, the percentage of enrolment in secondary education in private institutions remained around 28% since the 1940s (Rivas, 2010). Further, scholars argue that these subsidies and the poor performance of secondary schools motivated middle-class families in better-off provinces to opt out of the public system to pay for private education (Narodowski & Andrada, 2001; Narodowski & Moschetti, 2015; Narodowski & Nores, 2002). This dynamic suggests that past state retrenchment in education expenditure created an environment in which private schools expanded to meet demands of families willing to pay for higher quality education.
Regarding curriculum, disagreements within the *statist constellation compromised* the 2000s global ideas of curriculum re-centralization and replacement of specialized technical education with soft labour skills advocated by active-state education experts. To appease teachers and with the official purpose of supplying human resources required for the re-industrialization of the country in the 2000s, the government enacted the 2005 Vocational Education Law (Interview #81). This law re-established the former technical secondary schools of six years that had been dismantled by the 1993 Federal Education Law. Since the re-enactment of such long secondary technical education was at odds with active-state ideas of soft labour skills, the government included in the 2006 NEL a division of both general and technical schools in two levels: a low secondary education level oriented to general academic training, and an upper secondary education level focused on the development of soft labour skills and career exploration (Resolución CFE No. 84, 2009, Interview #81). Despite this official division, curriculum of technical secondary education was fixed at the provincial level to accommodate existing technical teachers.

At the same time, consistent with the recentralization preference of active-state education experts, the 2006 NEL mandated the establishment of Priority Learning Cores (Núcleos de Aprendizaje Prioritario – NAP), which operated as curricular standards that every province and school had to follow if they wanted to be authorized to grant degrees (Interviews #77 & 78). Nevertheless, this attempt of curricular recentralization was implemented under the premise of not affecting teachers’ employment security (Interviews #75 & 78). Since the appointment of teachers as instructors of specific subjects was not reformed, provincial governments were urged to tailor curricular designs according to teachers’ appointments (Interviews #73 & 75), which affected the
implementation of curricular standards (Interview #81). In short, this curricular reform reflects how policy legacies (the organization of teachers’ work) and the influence of powerful constituents of the existing domestic arrangement (teachers) can compromise a global norm.

While in the 1990s standardized evaluations were avoided, in the 2000s, the Argentine response to global ideas about assessment and accountability showed signals of defiance or dismissal of the foreign recommendations. With the opposition that standardized assessments raised in the 1990s, Argentina was not able to consolidate a tradition of evaluation like either Chile or Colombia. Although the 2006 NEL officially mandated the continuation of the standardized tests applied since the 1990s, it also forbade the publication of results to avoid stigmatization of schools (Interviews #61 & 71). Likewise, the NEL created the National Council for Education Quality to monitor the implementation of curriculum and manage existing assessments. This Council was composed of well-recognized education experts, CTERA leaders, and officials from the education ministry. However, the Council was quickly diluted once its participants failed to achieve agreements over the most appropriate way to monitor curriculum implementation, and the government lost interest in this topic (Interview #62 & 81). Although the application of national tests persisted and Argentina continued participating in international assessments, none of these instruments had any consequences for schools or provinces with low performance, they were not employed to design education policy, they were not coordinated with curricular standards, and they did not have any legitimacy among education scholars in the country (Interviews #59, 71 & 80). Overall, neither active-state policymakers nor teachers actually desired accountability based on standardized exams. The defiance of accountability ideas in Argentina demonstrates that
the strong opposition of influential actors and the lack of institutional legacies might actually dismiss and contest global norms when they harm powerful domestic interests.

**Colombia: A More Favourable Environment for Market-Based Reforms**

Like in Argentina, the 1990s education reform in Colombia did not improve the quality of education as expected. Although enrolment rates in secondary education increased from 52% to 72% between 1990 and 1997, the school drop-out rate also grew from 26% to 41% in the same period, and student performance in standardized tests also declined, despite the growth of public education expenditure (Melo, 2005).\(^98\) In addition, by the end of the 1990s, the number of teachers had increased faster than enrolment,\(^99\) which scholars suggested was the consequence of two situations. First, the 1993 Decentralization Law did not authorize departments to fire or transfer teachers but they were still able to create temporary teacher positions, a practice that was historically used for clientelist purposes\(^100\) (Banco Mundial, 2007). Second, additional costs created by these temporary contracts were often covered by the central government, whenever costs exceeded departments’ budget (Villa & Duarte, 2002). With an increased number of teachers, payroll became unsustainable (Interview #16).

At the same time, despite the constant economic growth of the early 1990s, Colombia experienced a serious economic crisis between 1997 and 1999 characterized by a harsh decline of the GDP (-4.2% in 1999), increase in the unemployment rate (22% in

\(^{98}\) Public education expenditure as a percentage of the GDP grew from 2.4 to 4.4% between 1990 and 1999.

\(^{99}\) Melo (2005) showed that between 1991 and 1998 the number of teachers in primary and secondary school increased by 60.5% while enrolment only grew 37.5%.

\(^{100}\) Traditionally, politicians in the country, such as governors, mayors, and municipal /departmental council members facilitated the appointment teachers as a way to favour their political clienteles and increase their electoral support (Duarte & Restrepo, 2003; Hanson, 1986).
1999), and a striking bank crisis (Torres, 2011). The government pointed at the effects of the Asian crisis, the escalation of the domestic armed conflict, and the ill-defined decentralization model that caused serious fiscal imbalances\textsuperscript{101} as the causes the economic crisis (Presidencia de la República, 1999a). Advised by market-oriented technocrats in the planning agency DNP, the President Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002) looked for the assistance of the IMF through a structural adjustment formula that included reforms to the 1993 decentralization model.

These reforms affected the education sector as I explain below. The government argued that the school system suffered an efficiency problem rather than difficulties associated with insufficient public education funding (Presidencia de la República, 1999b). Multiple concessions and compromises originated by the conflict between FECODE, the teachers’ union, and the government during the discussion of the 1993 Decentralization Bill made the decentralization model weak in terms of efficiency and accountability mechanisms to control public resources (Echavarria, Rentería, & Steiner, 2003; Lowden, 2004; Wiesner, 1995). Fiscal transfers from the central government to departments were distributed according to department education costs rather than on education needs or results. Therefore, departments with more teachers received more resources at expense of departments with greater needs or better performance, which produced greater regional education disparity and inefficiency. In addition, given the high costs of the payroll, investment in quality was very limited (Melo, 2005). In short, the economic crisis, fiscal unsustainability of the education system, and poor results of the early 1990s reforms worked as legacies that paved the way for the translation of market-

\textsuperscript{101} Between 1993 and 2000, total public expenditure grew faster than tax revenues impeding public finance sustainability (Pening, 2003).
oriented ideas of expenditure rationalization and accountability.

The persistent diffusion of market-oriented global ideas.

Unlike Chile and Argentina, global ideas about PPPs to improve education quality, and controlled decentralization were strongly diffused in Colombia during the 2000s and early 2010s by coercive, mimetic, and normative mechanisms. Regarding coercive pressures, in the context of the 1998 structural adjustment program, the IMF and the WB called for increasing the fiscal responsibility over education of subnational units, including departments and municipalities, and incentives for expenditure rationalization (The World Bank, 2008). Mimetic pressures also operated through the WB’s positive assessment and dissemination of different experiences of privatization in Colombia such as PACES, -the short-lived Colombian voucher experiment-, contracting-out with the Church, and charter schools as appropriate solutions to increase students’ performance (e.g. Banco Mundial, 2006, 2008; Patrinos, Osorio, & Guáqueta, 2009). Normative mechanisms also continued exerting pressure as the DNP was still dominated by market-oriented technocrats and the WB served as a platform to nurture a group of Colombian specialists on PPPs who often published policy-relevant studies highlighting the benefits of private education provision.102

Ideas about curriculum standardization and accountability were also diffused by coercive, mimetic, and normative mechanisms. Examples of coercive pressures included an IADB loan in 1999 that provided Colombia with US$11 million to elaborate curricular standards and strengthen the evaluation system (IADB, 1999), and the WB’s technical assistance in the early 2000s aimed at improving evaluation systems and diffusion of

102 These experts included Eduardo Velez (1996), Felipe Barrera-Osorio (2007), and Juliana Guaquetá (Barrera Osorio, Guaquetá, & Patrinos, 2012), among others.
results (Banco Mundial, 2008). *Mimetic pressures* were exercised through the EFA country monitoring report, which recommended curricular standards in order to solve country’s inequality in educational attainment and the heterogeneous interpretation that each school made of the curricular autonomy granted in 1994 (MEN, 2000). Similarly, the WB consistently included in its country recommendations the refinement of curricular standards and quality measures, the improvement of education accountability systems, and participation in international assessments in order to learn from this experience and establish domestic quality goals based on these foreign tests (Banco Mundial, 2007, 2008). Finally, *normative diffusion* mechanisms included the training of the domestic assessment staff by PISA experts (Interview #12). However, unlike Chile, this *normative* pressure emphasized the technical aspect of testing design and interpretation rather than its use as a tool of accountability. This emphasis is probably explained by the little attention that domestic policymakers paid to accountability in the education sector.

*Coercive* and *mimetic pressures* increased with the most recent attempt of secondary education reform in Colombia in 2011, which will be discussed in more detail below. For this reform, the WB provided technical assistance by inviting foreign experts to the country,\(^{103}\) collaborating in the design of studies supporting the reform, and directly participating in the reform discussions (Interviews #1, 3 & 15). The WB also proposed and coordinated the study of foreign experiences that could be emulated by Colombia. Criteria to choose the comparators included their similarity with Colombian economic and social conditions and alignment with WB’s ideas (Interview #15).

\(^{103}\) Proposal elaboration was assisted by Juan Manuel Moreno, one of the authors of the 2005 WB secondary education policy report, Alberto Rodríguez, a Colombian education expert and official of the WB, Cristián Cox, the leader of the 1990s Chilean curricular reform and usual consultant of the WB, and Miguel Székely, a regular consultant of the WB, the IADB, and CEPAL (MEN, 2013; Interview #15).
Although initially the WB did not provide financial resources, it promised the country a loan to fund the reform, and therefore, the education ministry officials addressed their efforts to prepare not only the policy but also the loan project (Interview #1 & 8). Some education ministry staff stated that the WB ultimately defined the goals and characteristics of the reform (Interviews #8, 17, & 25), although they also admitted that the education ministry lacked the technical capacity and knowledge to design the reform by itself (Interviews #1 & 17). This shows that the lack of domestic technical capacity is a factor that facilitates coercive and mimetic diffusion. This is consistent with findings of other scholars studying social policy reforms in Latin America (Dion, 2008; Weyland, 2006). Coercion and mimesis certainly helped global ideas travel to Colombia and constrain the choices of domestic policy makers. Yet, although necessary, these pressures were not sufficient to determine domestic decisions, as I show in the next sections.

**The strengthening of the market-oriented constellation.**

The 1997 economic crisis, poor education outcomes, and the above-mentioned external pressures produced changes in the actors involved in policy decisions and the realignment of constellations. Reforms in education provision coincided with a stronger market-oriented constellation. Unlike the 1990s, the government was not divided this time. Under the Conservative government of Pastrana, the DNP continued to be dominated by market-oriented technocrats. In turn, Pastrana appointed the Liberal Juan Manuel Santos as the ministry of finance. Santos held strong legitimacy within his party, especially in the segment that supported neoclassic economic policies. Since the Liberal

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104 The Director of DNP during Pastrana’s administration was Mauricio Cárdenas, an economist of Los Andes University who also held a Ph.D. in economics from UCLA. The predominance of Los Andes’ and US-trained Colombian economists has been documented by Forero, González, & Gómez (2007).
segment that advocated for Keynesian measures had been undermined by the scandals of the previous Presidency of Ernesto Samper (1994-1998).\textsuperscript{105} Santos easily helped to attract support from the Liberal ranks (Lowden, 2004). Both the finance ministry and the DNP wanted to municipalise schools, make the education system more accountable, and rationalize expenditure (Lowden, 2004; Interview #16). Similarly, the ministry of education was now under the direction of the Conservative party and keen on private provision (Peña interview in Espinosa 2010). The education ministry also wanted to recover control over schools and make them more efficient (Interview #16). Governors and mayors supported the preferences of the government because they wanted to stabilize their revenues, clarify responsibilities, and avoid the political cost of the fiscal crisis (Lowden, 2004).

While the market-oriented constellation was cohesive in its position towards education provision, the preferences of their members over curriculum were inconsistent. In 2002, Cecilia Velez, a former vice-director of the DNP during Gaviria’s administration in 1993, was appointed as education minister.\textsuperscript{106} Velez was persuaded of the effectiveness of curricular standards and also believed that VOCSED was not cost effective (Interview #19). While mayors and governors paid little attention to curricular standardization and probably regarded it as helpful due to their limited capacity for curricular design, they strongly oppose the elimination of VOCSED, which was widely popular among parents and students (Interview #5). Similarly, despite the rhetoric of accountability within the

\textsuperscript{105} Samper mainly supported economic policies closer to a structuralist approach as it was illustrated by the appointment of like-minded economists in the DNP and the ministry of finance (Alvarez, 2005). However, after winning the election, the presidential campaign of Samper was accused of receiving bribes from drug traffickers. These verified accusations deeply undermined the national and international legitimacy of Samper’s government and his collaborators (Crandall, 2001).

\textsuperscript{106} Velez was also Secretary of Education in Bogota during 1998 and 2002.
central government, demands to use the existing standardized assessments as tools to monitor and stimulate performance were scarce, since no government level wanted to assume the responsibility for performance and risk being blamed for poor results.

With the strengthening of the *market-oriented constellation*, FECODE was left alone in the *statist constellation*. Although FECODE remained cohesive in its advocacy against private provision and decentralization, without the support of the education ministry, they lost their links with the decision-making process. In addition, FECODE’s insisting demands for improvement of labour conditions did not attract the support of the public opinion overwhelmed by high unemployment rate (Interview #14). Similarly, the poor results of the limited curricular autonomy granted by the 1993 General Education Law undermined FECODE’s opposition to curricular standards. Lack of departments’ capacity and interest to provide technical assistance to schools, and the absence of clear curricular guidelines from the central government left teachers without a clear understanding of learning goals, curricular content, and appropriate teaching methodologies, and therefore teachers demanded specific and clear curricular orientation from the ministry of education (Interviews #17 & 20). Regarding evaluation, FECODE opposed school performance accountability systems, but the union did not contest the existing standardized assessments since they had long tradition without harming their interests. Overall, as Table 4.4 shows, FECODE, as the only player in the *statist constellation*, was clearly weaker in the three policy areas under study providing the *market-oriented constellation* with strong opportunities to operate as institutional entrepreneurs to change education governance.
Table 4.4 Summary of constellations' positions and influence in Colombia in the 2000s and 2010s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Market-oriented constellation</th>
<th>Statist constellation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Provision</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipalisation and PPP</td>
<td>Limited decentralization, public schools (Teacher union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Ministry of economy, DNP, ministry of education, governors, mayors)</td>
<td>LOW INFLUENCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGH INFLUENCE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Curriculum</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standardization/ Reduction of vocational curriculum</td>
<td>Curricular autonomy (Teacher union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Ministry of education, governors, mayors)</td>
<td>LOW INFLUENCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MODERATE INFLUENCE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evaluation</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td>Anti-accountability (Teacher union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Ministry of education)</td>
<td>LOW INFLUENCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW INFLUENCE</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Conformity to market-oriented reforms.**

Translation in each policy area of the study unfolded at different times. Due to the economic crisis, reforms in education provision started first during the late 1990s. After 2002, reforms regarding curricular standardization and evaluation were initiated. Changes in provision and standardization followed the preferences of the market-oriented constellation. However, unintended consequences of decisions from the education ministry triggered changes in the curriculum of VOCSED that were at odds with market-oriented ideas, showing the effect of policy legacies.

According to the preferences of the market-oriented constellation and the coercive requirements of the structural adjustment program, the government submitted in 2001 a fiscal reform proposal, which included two bills. First, the Legislative Act 001 limited the increase of central government financial contributions for education, transferred schools to municipalities with more than 100,000 habitants, and introduced a demand-driven
formula to fund the education system\(^{107}\) (Acto Legislativo 01, 2001). Second, the Law 715 established the formula for the demand-driven funding based on number of enrolled students, number of school-age children not yet enrolled, and socio-economic conditions of the student population. The Law 715 also created mechanisms to control expenditure at subnational levels, including mandatory ratios of students per teacher (Ley 715, 2001). With these two bill proposals, the government officially expected to encourage enrolment increase and obtain savings at the national level to invest in education quality (Banco Mundial, 2007; Exposición de motivos Ley 715, 2000). Unofficially however, the government also wanted to stimulate subnational units to contract with private education providers since the Law 715 established fixed funding rates per student in public schools but permitted departments and municipalities to bargain lower rates with private institutions (Interview #16).\(^{108}\) The government also wanted informally to avoid the expensive and slow building of new public schools, and skip the ‘rigid’ labour regulation of public teachers (Interview #19).

Helped by the support of governors and mayors, the two bills were discussed and approved in the Congress in 2001 without the direct participation of the teacher union (Interview with the former Vice-ministry of Education in Espinosa, 2010, p. 57). In response, FECODE called for a teacher strike in the same year but, unlike the 1990s, this strategy was not effective. First, the government took advantage of the difficult economic situation in the country to attract the support of public opinion for efficiency and

\(^{107}\) With the demand-driven system, schools turned to be financed according to the number of enrolled students and not based on historical costs.

\(^{108}\) Law 715 established that contracts with private providers would be funded also based on the number of students and prices paid by the governments cannot exceed the rates established for public schools. This regulation implicitly accepted that prices could be nevertheless lower in private institutions.
rationalization of education expenditures (Interview #14). Second, the ministry of education also punished strikers with salary deductions, framed their mobilization as an attempt to politicize education policy, and implicitly attributed poor education performance to teachers (“A despolitizar la educación,” 2002; Miñana, 2010). Third, probably as a strategy to sidestep opposition, the bill proposals did not include explicit privatization of education provision through vouchers and school choice and instead, the Law 715 retained limitation established in the 1993 Decentralization Bill on hiring or subsidizing private schools only in situations in which public supply was insufficient. Thus, FECODE was not able to portray legislative change as privatization. With these strategies, the market-oriented constellation increased its power resources with public opinion and deeply undermined the influence of FECODE, the core of the statist constellation. Hence, the government achieved the approval of the Legislative Act 001 and the Law 715.

As a result of these two laws, existing forms of private provision were expanded. Indeed, before the enactment of the Law 715, during her tenure as secretary of education in Bogota (1998-2001), Cecilia Velez had successfully implemented some strategies that facilitated contracting with private education providers. First, following the limitation of hiring private provision only when public supply was insufficient, she distributed students in public institutions to make schools work at full capacity. Once all public schools were full, she contracted with private schools to enrol the remaining children who

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109 As explained in the second chapter, Colombia traditionally had extensive subsidies for private schools.
110 School-age population in Bogota is unevenly distributed in geographic terms. Thus, instead of building new public schools in the neighbourhoods with more children, Velez offered free transportation to move students to neighbourhood with fewer amount of school-age children (Interview #19).
were not offered a place in public institutions (Interview #19). Moreover, Velez built fifteen new institutions in neighbourhoods without public schools, but granted them in concession to private managers (concession schools) in order to improve quality and make management of personnel more flexible (Interview #19).

The potential savings that the 2001 demand-driven funding system facilitated and the appointment of Velez as national education minister in 2002 paved the way for the replication of these strategies at the national level (Interview #19). According to the OECD (2016, p. 200), by 2014, the country had already 127 concession secondary schools with 9,775 students and students enrolled in private contracted schools increased four times between 2002 and 2006 (Castillo, 2008, p. 38). Although the percentage of enrolment in secondary education in paid private schools decreased from 24 to 21% between 2001 and 2013, the percentage of secondary education students in concession and contracted schools rose from 1 to 3%.\footnote{Authors’ calculations based on data provided by the National Ministry of Education in May of 2015.} In some subnational units, students in this type of public-subsidized private secondary schools accounted for 30% of all secondary students funded with public resources. In short, the way in which secondary education provision in Colombia changed in the 2000s shows conformity with controlled decentralization and the expansion of PPPs produced by to the strong support for global norms and a weak domestic political contestation.

Regarding curriculum, the market-oriented constellation also found favourable conditions for acquiescence with ideas of curricular standardization. In 2002, Velez, already appointed as national education minister, followed the recommendations of the WB and the IADB and the requirement of the Law 715 of undertaking a process of
curricular standardization for primary and secondary education. In order to increase the legitimacy of the process, the education ministry called the Colombian Association of Education Faculties and some private education think tanks to collaborate with curricular standardization (Interviews #17 & 24). This alliance nurtured additional constituents of curricular standards, which further weakened FECODE’s demand for curricular autonomy. In addition, as part of the effort to improve efficiency and quality, the 2001 Law 715 required the education ministry to determine, design, and establish instruments and mechanisms to measure education performance (Ley 715, 2001, art. 5.5). With the support of different IOs, ICFES aligned the State Exam to the recently elaborated curricular standards. Since the State Exam traditionally had oriented what was taught at secondary schools, this alignment reinforced the centralization of the curriculum.

However, the process of curricular standardization and the alignment with the State Exam did not evolve into accountability systems. On the one hand, the mission of ICFES was limited to develop testing and therefore its technical expertise was restricted to this area. ICFES was in charge of designing, applying, and interpreting results of exams, which did not include the design of performance incentives for schools or teachers. On the other hand, the ministry of education had officially the responsibility of developing such incentives, but it lacked the technical capacity to assume it (Interview #10). Thus, the country had extensive tradition of testing and measuring education performance, mainly developed through normative diffusion of international testing agencies, but it did not develop tradition or technical expertise for using this type of measuring to make education stakeholders accountable. Therefore, although the market-oriented constellation wanted to follow global ideas of accountability, policy legacies, -in this case, lack of accountability tradition, avoided the global norm. Test results were only
widely published with the symbolic effect of publicly denouncing low-performing schools or praising high-achievement institutions. At best, test results encouraged parents with means to withdraw from public institutions and pay for private education, which reproduced the dual character of the Colombia education system. Poor families had no other option but to resign themselves to low-performing public schools since there was not school choice within the public school system.

While ideas of curricular standardization were conformed to and accountability was avoided, the preferences of the market-oriented constellation of reducing VOCSED were defied. Due to the persuasion of the education minister Cecilia Velez that secondary school should not be substantially different from basic education (Interview #19), curricular standardization focused mainly on general curricular areas such as math, science, social science, and language (Interview #17). Still influenced by the 1990s cost-benefit analysis that the WB promoted in Colombia, Velez regarded vocational secondary schools as expensive, and therefore, it only published a working paper with some guidelines for the development of soft labour skills (Qualificar, 2012), and ultimately delegated the responsibility over labour skills’ definition to SENA, the national agency for workers’ training (Interview #3). The neglect by the education ministry of VOCSED had several unintended consequences that ended up promoting VOCSED rather than diminishing it as the education ministry preferred. First, due to the absence of curricular guidance and resources for VOCSED, many vocational secondary schools asked SENA for curricular and technical support (Interview #22). Second, by the mid-2000s, President Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) increased the enrolment goals of SENA in order to improve to
higher education enrolment rate in the country.\footnote{SENA is not officially part of the Colombian higher education system. However, Uribe promoted a reform of SENA’s programs to make them similar to degrees offered by technical colleges (Interviews #2 & 4). Therefore, during Uribe’s administration, SENA students were counted as higher education students, increasing substantially the enrollment rate.} Since SENA had some difficulties achieving these new goals, its director decided to transform the assistance provided to public vocational secondary schools into an initiative through which students initiated SENA’s programs while they were still in their secondary education (Interviews 2, 3, 4 & 11). Indeed, secondary school teachers, assisted and trained by SENA, developed SENA programs at secondary schools, while students were counted as enrolled in both secondary and higher education (Gomez, Diaz, & Celis, 2009). SENA’s initiative was also extended to public general secondary schools. By 2009, there were already 300,000 students dual-enrolled in public secondary schools and SENA programs (Interview #3).

Moreover, in 2006, the ministry of education decided to replicate SENA’s initiative with tertiary education institutions in order to promote tertiary non-university education through a program called ‘Articulation between Secondary and Higher Education’ (a.k.a Articulation) (Interview #3).\footnote{One of the education goals of Uribe’s administration was to increase the enrolment of higher education through the promotion of tertiary non-university education.} The programs offered by these tertiary education institutions included specialized vocational content that counted as academic credits for students that later wanted to continue tertiary technical education after finishing secondary education. Thus, the government offered grants for tertiary education institutions, most of them private, in order for them to develop tertiary programs with students in secondary education.\footnote{In some cases, students went to the tertiary education institutions to study their programs. In many others, the tertiary education institutions developed their programs at the schools or trained school teachers to do it as SENA did (Interview #3).} As a result, in 2011, 2,123 secondary schools already
participated in Articulation, which nurtured strong constituents of this program composed of SENA, tertiary education institutions, school principals, teachers, families, the staff within the ministry of education in charge of Articulation, and mayors and governors who perceived the Articulation program as a source of electoral gains (Interviews #3, 5 & 8). In other words, past decisions of the education ministry unintentionally produced new constituents of VOCSED.

In 2011, concerned by the uncontrolled expansion of Articulation, the ministry of education requested the assistance of the WB to propose a reform for secondary education (Interview #5). Hence, the WB supported the elaboration of a loan project oriented to eliminate VOCSED and establish standards for non-academic areas including soft labour and socio-emotional skills (Interview #3 & 24). However, the proposal received significant contestation from VOCSED’s constituents. Education ministry staff responsible for Articulation delayed the bureaucratic process for the formulation of the policy and the WB loan project (Interview #1). Indeed, even though the minister was keen on WB recommendations, she refrained from publicly endorsing the cancellation of VOCSED due to the strength of their constituents (Interview #3). Bureaucratic delay and the ambiguous position of the education ministry towards VOCSED coincided with a new appointment in the ministry of education in 2014. The new minister, who was the chief of SENA, immediately cancelled the reform process and the WB loan request (Interviews #1, 3 & 8). As a result, VOCSED continued to be developed through the program of Articulation. This is an example of how powerful constituents of an existing domestic arrangement can defy an incompatible global norm even when there is strong coercive diffusion.
Overall, secondary education reforms in Colombia during the 2000s and 2010s show that the *market-oriented constellation* only found favourable structural conditions to operate as institutional entrepreneurship and *conform* with global norms in the areas of provision and curricular standardization. In the areas of VOCSED and evaluation, these entrepreneurs did not count with sufficient resources to negotiate and promote support for reforms.

**Final Remarks**

In the 2000s, global education governance ideas did not significantly change compared to the 1990s. Market-oriented norms were moderated with the state playing a stronger role as a market regulator. Active-state ideas continued supporting a state that compensated inequalities and coordinated different education stakeholders. Diffusion mechanisms were also similar to those employed in the 1990s, but their effect varied significantly across countries. Although Argentina and Colombia had significant economic crisis in the late 1990s, *coercive mechanisms* in the form of conditional loans were only employed in Colombia, prompting education reforms. Argentina, by contrast, managed to overcome its difficult economic situation without the imposition of structural adjustment programs. This situation shows that even in critical need of financial resources, governments still have agency to scape from or accept *coercive diffusion* mechanisms. Moreover, governments can ask for conditional loans in order to legitimize domestic decisions as the case of Colombia illustrates. These findings are consistent with other studies about conditionality as a source of policy diffusion (Vreeland, 2003; Weyland, 2005) and also suggest that *coercive pressures* are not sufficient to produce isomorphic arrangements in different societies.
Mimetic mechanisms also produced different effects. Sometimes, mimesis helped to increase the legitimacy of an existing domestic arrangement. For instance, the global acceptance of market-oriented provision facilitated the continuation of the quasi-market model in Chile and the expansion of concession schools in Colombia. Similarly, the global legitimacy of standardized assessments helped the further consolidation of this kind of evaluation in Chile and Colombia. In Argentina, ideas about the right to education resonated with the strong tradition of public school in Argentina, which justified a stronger role of the state in the control of provision. However, sometimes mimetic pressures also facilitate challenges to existing institutions when negative consequences of these arrangements have created enough powerful opponents as the case of Chilean students demonstrated. This variation in the effect of mimetic mechanisms suggests that rather than taken-for-granted norms taught to dependent countries, global ideas may operate as weapons for domestic political struggles (e.g. Blyth, 2002). Thus, global norms increase the resources of domestic institutional entrepreneurs that work for maintaining or changing the domestic arrangement. Whether these entrepreneurs use global norms to support or challenge domestic institutions, both depend on the balance between increasing returns and negative consequences of existing policies and the power unbalances between supporters and opponents of such policies.

As in the previous periods analyzed in this study, normative diffusion is probably more crucial for the acceptance of a global norm. Despite recent opposition, market-oriented ideas remained predominant in Chile and Colombia due to the strong presence of like-minded policymakers. By contrast, active-state ideas were more popular in Argentina where former UNESCO experts were appointed as education ministers. The influence of normative mechanisms is consistent with studies in other policy areas such as pension and
conditional cash transfers (Sugiyama, 2011; Weyland, 2005). Yet, although diffusion mechanisms can explain why and how a global idea arrives at a domestic context, they cannot fully uncover what happens with such norm after its arrival. To understand this process, we need to look at the domestic political contestation raised by global norms. Table 4.5 summarizes the interaction between diffusion mechanisms and domestic factors.

In the policy area of education provision, the 2000s market-oriented ideas still resonated with policymakers and domestic legacies in Chile and Colombia. However, translation varied between these two countries. The inequality and segmentation of the Chilean education system undermined the market-oriented advocates and nurtured a constellation arguing for the right of quality education. The contestation between these groups somewhat compromised market-oriented ideas by dismantling some of the inherited market-oriented mechanisms. By contrast, the market-oriented constellation managed to frame the poor results of the 1990s education reform as a product of a strong and unclear role of the state and therefore, PPPs global ideas were conformed. Unlike Chile and Colombia, negative results of education reforms in Argentina undermined the resources of the few advocates of education market mechanisms. Due to the predominance of active-state ideas and the statist-oriented demands of teachers, Argentina paid close attention to right to education ideas and conformed ideas of controlled decentralization. Briefly put, in all three countries, political and social pressures emerged from past decisions changed the chances of actors to resist or advocate for global ideas and change or maintain existing arrangements.

In the area of curriculum, curricular standardization was conformed or at least compromised in all three countries. In Chile, standardization was akin to their tradition of
### Table 4.5 Summary of diffusion mechanisms, policy legacies, constellations and outcomes in the 2000s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coercion</th>
<th>Mimesis</th>
<th>Norm.</th>
<th>Compatibility with legacies</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Opposit.</th>
<th>Translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chile (2000-2010) – Predominance of market oriented ideas</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prov.</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Compatible (Quasi-market of education)</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Conformity – Quasi-market provision. Manipulation of students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curric (domestically led)</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Strong (domestically led)</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Compatible (Centralized curriculum)</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Conformity – Curricular standardization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eval.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Compatible (Tests for parental decisions, monitor reform, incentives)</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Conformity – Reinforced accountability system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chile (2010-2015) – Emergence of right of education ideas</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prov.</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Strong (against state)</td>
<td>Relatively incompatible (Quasi-market of education)</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Compromise – Elimination of shared funding, for-profit schools and selective recruitment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curric</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eval.</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Compatible (Standardized test to inform parents)</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Conformity – Persistence of accountability system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Argentina (2000-2010) Active-State ideas – The right to education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prov.</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Relatively compatible (Delegation to provinces)</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Conformity – Stronger state regulation and contribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curric</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Relatively compatible (Delegation to provinces)</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Compromise – Standards with accommodation of encyclopaedic curriculum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eval.</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Incompatible (No tradition of testing)</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Defiance – Purposeless testing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Colombia (2000-2015)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prov.</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Relatively compatible (Delegation of schools to departments, some privat.)</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Conformity – Municipalisation, increased PPPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curric</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Relatively compatible (Limited autonomy)</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Conformity – not for VOCSED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eval.</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Relatively incompatible (Tradition of testing, but no school choice)</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Avoidance – Ritual testing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
centralized curriculum, and therefore, both the global norm and the domestic template kept their rule-like character producing *conformity*. Meanwhile, in Colombia, the negative effects of the curricular autonomy of the 1990s and the weakness of its supporters, the teacher union, facilitated the *acquiescence* with standardization ideas. Only in Argentina, ideas of standardization were slightly *compromised* by the accommodation of teachers’ demands for maintaining their working conditions. Conversely, the reduction of VOCSED produced more resistance. Only Chile, which had already deferred vocational specialization to the last two years of secondary school since the 1990s, was able to *conform* global ideas by eliminating some vocational specializations. In Argentina however, these ideas were compromised through the re-establishment of the six-years technical schools. Yet, these institutions aimed at the development soft labour skills. By contrast, in Colombia, where advocates of VOCSED were stronger, global ideas were *defied* and specialized VOCSED actually increased.

Finally, in the area of evaluation, negative consequences of past decisions also played a role in accepting or rejecting accountability norms. For instance, inequality and segmentation produced by the Chilean market-oriented system helped the *acquiescence* with accountability ideas the 2000s. However, the reinforcement of accountability also raised backlash in the 2010s, since sanctions and greater controls produced negative consequences for low-performing schools. In Argentina, consequences of the 1990s reforms and the overall context of crisis created an unfavourable environment for test-based accountability, which was finally *defied* in the country. In Colombia, poor results of the 1990s education reforms also paved the way for accountability ideas; however, unlike Chile, the country *avoid* this sort of mechanisms due to lack of domestic technical capacity.
Overall, through different pathways, all three countries recentralized authority over education. Chile increased central control over curriculum and evaluation systems, although provision remained privatized. Argentina recovered some authority over provision and curriculum, although evaluation continued to be mainly under the control of teachers. Colombia further decentralized schools and also increased public subsidized private provision, but recovered authority over curriculum while evaluation remained centralized. These different trajectories illustrate how countries recombined different education governance models to fit their domestic conditions.
Chapter 5. Conclusions

This chapter provides an overview of the conclusions that can be drawn from the preceding comparative analysis of the education governance reform in Chile, Argentina, and Colombia. The first section presents a brief summary of the arguments and findings of the study. Next, I discuss the theoretical implications of my findings on our understanding of policy diffusion, and particularly, the globalization of education policies. The third section reflects on the contribution of my findings to explain changes in education governance. Fourth, I discuss what my findings mean for education reforms in Latin America. I end this chapter by pointing out limitations of the study and avenues for new research.

Summarizing the Argument and Main Findings

This dissertation set out to answer three main questions related to post-bureaucratic governance of secondary education, which is defined as the steering of secondary schooling based on a logic of result-driven responsibility distributed among state, subnational and non-state actors. These questions were: what explains the transition of secondary education in Latin America to post-bureaucratic governance models, what role do global New Public Management (NPM) ideas play in this transition, and if such ideas play a significant role, why do governance models vary across countries? To answer these questions, three governance areas were selected (provision, curriculum, and evaluation) because of the different role that the state is supposed to play in each of them. Particularly, while bureaucratic governance models propose a tight-loose arrangement (centralized provision and curriculum versus evaluation delegated to teachers) (J. Meyer & Rowan, 1978), NPM ideas argue for a loose-tight template in which different
subnational and non-state actors have autonomy to take decisions over provision and curriculum while the state controls them through standardized evaluation (Astiz & Wiseman, 2005). In addition, three countries were analyzed: Chile, Argentina, and Colombia. Chile and Argentina were chosen due to their similarities in the inherited state-managed secondary education governance model and their significant differences in the reforms of such template. In addition, Colombia provided a contrasting case, where the state had initially a very weak role in the governance of secondary education but nevertheless promoted the transition to a post-bureaucratic governance model.

The preceding case analysis has emphasized the role of global ideas in the transition to post-bureaucratic education governance models. In particular, I have argued that global ideas are domestically translated through the interaction between diffusion mechanisms, policy legacies of each country, and the ability of organized domestic actors, or constellations of actors, to negotiate the implementation of foreign recommendations. Global ideas may operate as reinforcers of domestic arrangements or as triggers of change. Specifically, if diffused ideas are compatible with domestic policies, domestic actors are more likely to emulate them because these norms increase the legitimacy and positive feedback of the existing domestic arrangement. Alternatively, if diffused norms clash with domestic institutions, opponents or ‘losers’ of the existing domestic template may use them to promote change. In this case, the displacement of domestic legacies by global ideas implies requires the consistent support of influential and organized domestic actors and the weakness of the opponents. Yet, even if global ideas are not fully emulated, their influence can produce small and sometimes unintended changes that in the long run can become transformative.
In other words, this dissertation offers a model of conjunctural causation in which different combinations of diffusion mechanisms, policy legacies, and contestation of domestic actors explains when global ideas are more likely to be emulated or resisted. I employ Oliver’s classification of different responses to global norms, which include 1) conformity, acquiescence or full emulation of the global norm, 2) compromise or modest modifications of the global idea to accommodate domestic interests, 3) avoidance or ritual adoption of the global norm without changing domestic practices, 4) defiance or rejection of the global idea, and 3) manipulation or control of advocates of the global idea by co-optation or reframing of the global norm (Oliver, 1991). Yet, in contrast to recent developments in institutional theory, my study does not regard these different responses only as a product of the conflict between the global and the domestic level, but also as a consequence of different conflictive domestic forces that support or oppose global ideas inasmuch as they promote or harm their own interests. Therefore, I employ insights from historical institutionalism to examine the complex interplay between global and domestic scales and highlight the interaction between structural and agentic processes.

In addition, the comparison of three distinct historical periods permits the analysis of the transition between state-centered global ideas of governance to post-bureaucratic forms of education management. Table 5.1 summarizes the recommendations of global ideas for each policy dimension of this study. The first period of global norms was dominated by manpower education planning ideas (MEP) (1960s-1970s), which were jointly promoted by UNESCO, the WB, the USAID, CEPAL and other IOs. This model did not transform significantly the existing bureaucratic template but laid the foundations for the NPM ideas that rose in the 1980s and 1990s. On the one hand, the expansion of secondary education raised questions about the efficiency of centrally managing
numerous secondary schools. It also raised doubts about the appropriateness of concentrating power over curricular decisions for an increasingly heterogeneous student population and in the context of authoritarian regimes. On the other hand, the expansion also put increasing fiscal pressure on governments burdened by a harsh economic crisis. As a result, in the 1980s, the WB shifted away from MEP and instead advocated for market-oriented ideas that substantially reduced the role of the state.

Table 5.1 Summary of global ideas about education governance since the 1960s.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MEP (1960s-1970s)</th>
<th>NPM norms</th>
<th>EFA and accountability (2000s-2010s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Provision</strong></td>
<td>Centralized and massive</td>
<td>Privatized and devolved to subnational units. School choice</td>
<td>Delegated to subnational units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Curriculum</strong></td>
<td>Centralized and scientifically planned with emphasis on vocational education</td>
<td>Curricular autonomy with emphasis on general education</td>
<td>Consensus-based national guidelines with limited curricular autonomy. Emphasis on soft labour skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evaluation</strong></td>
<td>Sporadic tests to monitor reforms</td>
<td>Standardized tests to inform parental decisions</td>
<td>Standardized tests to inform policy decisions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By the 1990s however, former advocates of the state-run governance model collaborated with UNESCO and CEPAL to consolidate an alternative perspective that represents a softer version of WB’s NPM ideas: the active-state approach. After the 2000s, market-oriented and active-state ideas remained predominant but UNESCO’s
advocacy for the right of education changed them moderately, providing a greater role to the state as Table 5.1 indicates.

Translation of MEP ideas (1960s-1970s).

The analysis of the responses of Chile, Argentina and Colombia to global norms in each of the three mentioned periods suggests different patterns of interaction between diffusion mechanisms, policy legacies, and domestic factors that are summarized in Table 5.2. MEP ideas were diffused in all three countries of this study through the coercive mechanisms of the Alliance for Progress, and the mimetic pressures of UNESCO and its Major Project of Education. Yet, all countries presented different responses to these global ideas, which suggest that these mechanisms do not necessarily increase the chances of conformity to global ideas. By contrast, normative diffusion mechanisms showed variation across countries. In the 1960s, Chile developed a critical mass of statist planning technocrats that were crucial for Frei Montalva’s reforms. The relative shortage of such technocrats in Argentina and Colombia played a significant role in the resistance to MEP in these countries. In other words, normative mechanisms arguably have a significant effect on shaping policy outcomes, particularly when global norms are firmly supported by influential actors and opposition is weak.

Nevertheless, the sole presence of normative mechanisms did not ensure conformity with global norms. The compatibility of the existing domestic arrangements with MEP and the domestic contestation over the education governance model also shaped the translation of global ideas. The governance arrangements of Chile and Argentina were both relatively compatible with MEP recommendations since both countries had developed a state-run education system. However, while Chile conformed to all three
Table 5.2 Patterns of education governance variation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Diffusion mechanisms</th>
<th>Compatibility between policy legacies and global ideas</th>
<th>Domestic contestation to global ideas</th>
<th>Policy outcome/translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chi</strong></td>
<td>Strong coercion, mimesis and normative pressures.</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
<td>Strong support, moderate opposition.</td>
<td>Conformity - Expansion of national schools, centralization of curricular planning, initiation of testing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Col</strong></td>
<td>Strong coercion and mimesis, strong normative pressures only for curriculum.</td>
<td>Conflictive</td>
<td>Weak support, strong opposition.</td>
<td>Avoidance – expansion of national and public schools only for the poorest. Defiance – Rejection of centralization of curricular planning. Initiation of testing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chi</strong></td>
<td>Strong normative pressures</td>
<td>Conflictive.</td>
<td>Strong support (not for curricular autonomy), weak opposition.</td>
<td>Conformity – Private and public voucher schools, selective student recruitment and testing to inform parental school choice. Avoidance – Reduction of centrally defined curriculum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Arg</strong></td>
<td>Strong coercion and mimesis, weak normative pressures.</td>
<td>Conflictive</td>
<td>Moderate support for global ideas (only for reduction of federal expenditure), strong opposition</td>
<td>Compromise – Delegation of schools to provinces. Avoidance – Testing to inform public opinion and provide school incentives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Col</strong></td>
<td>Strong coercion, mimesis and normative pressures.</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
<td>Strong support, strong opposition.</td>
<td>Compromise – Delegation of schools to departments, limited private provision and curricular autonomy. Avoidance – Testing to inform public opinion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active-state ideas (1980s-1990s)</td>
<td>Chi</td>
<td>Strong normative pressures, coercion and mimesis domestically manipulated</td>
<td>Relatively incompatible</td>
<td>Strong support (moderate for provision), strong opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arg</td>
<td></td>
<td>Strong normative pressures</td>
<td>Conflicive</td>
<td>Moderate support, strong opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col</td>
<td></td>
<td>No diffusion (very weak mimesis)</td>
<td>Relatively compatible</td>
<td>No support or opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education for all and Accountability (2000s-2010s)</td>
<td>Chi</td>
<td>Weak coercion, strong mimesis and normative pressures</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
<td>Strong support of education as a right, accountability and standardization. Strong opposition to greater state role in provision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arg</td>
<td></td>
<td>No coercion, strong mimesis and normative pressures (not for testing)</td>
<td>Relatively compatible</td>
<td>Strong support of education as a right, moderate support for curricular standardization (not for testing). No opposition for greater role of the state in education, moderate opposition to curricular standardization, strong opposition to testing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col</td>
<td></td>
<td>Strong coercion, mimesis, and normative pressures</td>
<td>Relatively compatible</td>
<td>Strong support for PPPs, standardization and testing. Weak opposition.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
dimensions of MEP norms, Argentina just *compromised* provision recommendations and *avoided* curricular ideas. In Chile, the ideological affinity between the Christian Democratic government and the Church, and the political stability of the country enabled statist technocrats to accommodate the interests of private providers within the state-run model and consolidate a strong support for MEP recommendations. Therefore, the combination of strong *normative diffusion* and the influential support of an influential *constellation* with enough resources permitted the *acquiescence* with the global idea. Indeed, when teacher unions and left parties during Allende government attempted to exclude the Church from provision and curriculum elaboration in 1970, the powerful alliance between the CDP and the Church frustrated this attempt.

By contrast, Argentina experienced political instability in the 1960s through two coups d’état and the political contestation between Peronist/statist forces, the military and the Church. Thus, authoritarian regimes prevented *normative diffusion* of MEP ideas through the intervention of universities in the quest to eradicate Peronist influence. In addition, the Church opposed further consolidation of the state-run model of education proposed by MEP since it might favour the interests of Peronist forces. This combination of weak *normative diffusion* and strong opposition of an influential *constellation* *compromised* provision prescriptions by expanding public schooling and, at the same time, giving more autonomy to private actors. In the area of curriculum, in which *normative diffusion* was even weaker as reflected by the almost complete absence of curricular planning experts, MEP’s curricular reforms were *avoided* and Argentina kept its traditional encyclopaedic curriculum disguised in the rhetoric of MEP norms. Briefly put, while in Chile domestic actors were able to use MEP norms to reinforce the centralized character of the existing governance arrangement, in Argentina preexisting
political contestation prevented global norms from fuelling the maintenance of the state-centered model.

Colombia provides a contrasting case, which shows how incompatible domestic arrangements increase the chances of resistance to global norms. In the 1960s, Colombian secondary education was highly privatized. In addition, the ministry of education was too weak to enforce education decisions and control public schools in departments and municipalities. This type of arrangement produced a powerful constellation composed by the Church, national political elites, and subnational authorities. Despite strong coercive and mimetic pressures, this constellation avoided MEP’s provision recommendations by expanding public schooling only for the poor while the central government remained weak to control schools. Likewise, even though normative diffusion was stronger in the area of curriculum, prescriptions of technocratic centralized curricular planning were at odds with the semi-anarchic nature of the education system. Therefore, teacher unions were able to defy such global ideas with their demands for curricular autonomy. In other words, powerful actors benefiting from the existing domestic arrangement effectively resisted global ideas.

Translation of NPM ideas (1980s-1990s).

In the 1980s and 1990s, the two versions of NPM prescriptions, market-oriented and active-state ideas, travelled to Chile, Argentina and Colombia by different mechanisms. The WB disseminated market-oriented ideas through a combination of coercive pressures, including loans associated with structural adjustment programs; mimetic mechanisms, such as research and policy reports; and normative pressures of epistemic communities pro-privatization. CEPAL and UNESCO only diffused active-state recommendations through mimetic mechanisms (policy reports and dialogues) and
normative networks of education experts and policymakers. Despite the lack of coercive mechanisms, CEPAL and UNESCO ideas were highly influential in Chile and Argentina, which suggests that coercive pressures might not be necessary for global ideas to influence domestic policy outcomes.

Unlike MEP ideas, market-oriented prescriptions were incompatible with the domestic arrangements in Chile and Argentina. Yet, once again Chile conformed to these norms while Argentina compromised market-oriented provision recommendations and did not embrace curricular and evaluation prescriptions. Acquiescence in Chile is explained by the strong normative diffusion of the Chicago Boys and the strong support of a powerful constellation composed by these market-oriented technocrats and the authoritarian regime of Pinochet. Even though market-oriented ideas were at odds with the existing state-run domestic arrangement, Pinochet favoured these foreign recommendations since they benefitted his interests for concentrating power and dealing with the economic crisis of the 1970s. At the same time, the dictatorship crushed any resistance from advocates of the state-run system including teachers, statist technocrats, left parties, and even the Church. In other words, market-oriented ideas provided enough incentives for domestic actors with enough power resources to radically change the domestic arrangement and conform to provision and evaluation global norms. Consequently, Chile consolidated a quasi-market of education based on vouchers and standardized testing to inform parental decisions. These incentives however, did not operate in the area of curriculum since the military refused to give up control fearing leftist indoctrination. Due to weak domestic support, ideas of curricular autonomy were manipulated by reframing it as the authorization for schools to cut down subjects from the centrally defined curriculum if schools could not afford them.
Unlike Chile, diffusion of market-oriented ideas in Argentina only occurred in the area of provision. Moreover, these ideas arrived in the context of a democratic regime, which undermined the opportunities to control opposition. Thus, rather than direct privatization measures, Menem’s government in 1991 re-interpreted and adapted market-oriented prescriptions by proposing only the reduction of central government expenditure and the transfer of secondary schools to provinces. Since this proposition was still at odds with the strong tradition of national secondary schools in Argentina, it was highly contested by a statist constellation composed by the teacher union (CTERA), provincial governments, and active-state education experts, which ultimately compromised Menem’s market-oriented re-interpretations. Therefore, although secondary schools were delegated to provinces, the federal government did not achieve the expected retrenchment of its public spending. Putting differently, institutional entrepreneurs in Argentina did not have enough power resources to fully change domestic institutions. In addition, market-oriented ideas about curriculum and evaluation were not received in Argentina since market-oriented technocrats were only interested in economic dimensions of the education policy, and thus active-state ideas were predominant in all other areas.

Once again, Colombia is a contrasting case where market-oriented ideas were compatible with the existing arrangement since the country was traditionally prone to minimal state participation in secondary education. These ideas travelled to the country in the 1990s through coercive, mimetic and normative pressures and they have the strong support of influential policymakers. Yet, provision and curricular prescriptions were compromised while evaluation recommendations were avoided. Unintentionally, the expansion of public secondary education for the poorest in the previous decades produced strong constituents of public schooling, particularly, the teacher union, which opposed the
implementation of vouchers, school choice, municipalisation and elimination of VOCSED. In addition, FECODE, the teacher union, gained powerful resources to bargain the reform through its massive mobilizations and the support of the minister of education. As a result, provision ideas about vouchers and school choice were *compromised*. Schools were only delegated to departments and private provision was limited. In addition, curricular autonomy was also *compromised* to prevent that schools were authorized to hire and fire teachers. Likewise, VOCSED, rather than cancelled, were only delegated to another government agency, the National Training Service (SENA). Due to the absence of school choice and competition between public and private schools, the recommendation of using standardized tests as a tool for parental decisions was *avoided*. Standardized exams continued to be developed but without clear consequences for schools or teachers. This case shows that sometime less powerful players, such as teachers, may have incentives to preserve the existing model when proposed changes threaten even more their position. Since they had enough resources to force negotiations, the supporters of the global norm had little choice but to accommodate their interests and produce only moderate changes.

Active-state ideas were only diffused in Chile and Argentina, where CEPAL and UNESCO officials had links with the decision-making process. In both countries, active-state recommendations were relatively incompatible with existing domestic arrangements. In Chile, the stronger role of the state promoted by the active-state approach was relatively incompatible with the quasi-market of education inherited from the dictatorship. Meanwhile in Argentina, active-state ideas arrived at the same time with market-oriented prescriptions and thus, pressures for decentralization of authority were
incompatible with the state-run model predominant in the country. As a result of these incompatibilities, active-state recommendations were mainly avoided in both nations.

In Chile, strong institutional constraints established by Pinochet, the fear of a new coup d’état, and the powerful constituents nurtured by the market-oriented model limited the resources of active-state constellation to push for change. By contrast, the market-oriented constellation was favoured by the implementation of the shared funding system, which authorized private voucher schools to charge tuition and obtained more funding than public institutions. Conversely, active-state curricular ideas were only compromised because the military, as part of the market-oriented constellation, supported the centralization of the curriculum since they would have veto power in these decisions. Similarly, the Concertación implemented new labour regulations for teachers in public schools including tenure in order to appease their constituents. Yet, the rigidities introduced by these regulations and the influence of the market-oriented constellation forced the Concertación to use the standardized assessment system not only to inform policy, but also as a means to encourage better performance of schools and teachers and inform parental decisions. In other words, active-state ideas of evaluation were compromised by the accommodation of market-oriented norms.

In Argentina, like the market-oriented approach in the area of provision, active-state ideas about curriculum and evaluation were avoided by the contestation of CTERA. The union opposed curricular reform because it changed and reduced curricular subjects making some teachers’ specializations redundant and threatened teachers’ labour conditions. To undermine this opposition, the ministry of education tried to use standardized tests to provide incentives to schools that implemented curricular reform. These incentives however, also raised strong opposition from CTERA. The economic
difficulties of the country to fund the reform and the lack of mechanisms to make provinces comply with policies ultimately led to a loose adoption of standardized testing without clear purposes and prevented the implementation of curricular reform. In this way, institutional and structural constraints left active-state advocates without enough resources to promote change, and instead gave teachers more chances to limit reforms.

Although NPM ideas were not fully emulated in the countries of this study, the small changes that they promoted had consequences that would shape the political contestation and subsequent reforms in the 2000s.

**Translation of EFA and accountability ideas (2000s-2010s).**

By the 2000s, countries remained linked to the global ideas they followed in the 1990s. Governments just updated their versions according to the recommendations of the EFA movement, which promoted both, a softer version of market-oriented ideas and a stronger active-state approach. Also in the 2000s, all three countries struggled with the consequences of past education policy decisions. In Chile, the inequality and segmentation fuelled by the market-oriented system created angry reactions among students. The 2011 student movement embraced EFA ideas of the right of quality education and demanded a greater role of the state in the education provision. The teacher union, the Communist Party, and some sectors of the Concertación supported students’ demands, creating a constellation of advocates of public school. This constellation undermined the influence of the market-oriented active-state constellation nurtured in the 1990s, especially when the Concertación lost the presidential election of 2010 to the right party. With the support of students and a renovated party coalition, the New Majority (former Concertación) took back office in 2014 and quickly initiated education reforms. As a result, shared funding and selective student recruitment were dismantled. Yet,
vouchers and school choice remained untouched. This is an example of how negative consequences of the domestic template produce agentic responses of an opponent constellation that used global norms of the right of education to compromise the market oriented template.

By contrast, ideas about curricular standardization and testing were not equally contested in Chile. Regarding curriculum, there was not the perception that standardization had negative consequences for any group. In the dimension of evaluation, a reform in 2009 increased testing frequency and areas, and introduced sanctions for low-performing schools. This reform raised some contestation among teachers and students. However, the incentives and reputation provided by test results undermined this opposition. Consequently, the compatibility of global ideas and domestic arrangements and the lack of domestic contestation easily produced acquiescence with global norms of curricular standardization and result-based accountability.

While in Chile students were the main opponents of past reforms, in Argentina, CTERA demanded the reversal of Menem’s education reforms in the late 1990s. In the 2000s, CTERA obtained additional power resources with its alliance with the Peronist Nestor Kirchner, the president elected after the political and economic that delegitimized Menem’s policies. The alliance of the government and CTERA ultimately defied market-oriented ideas of provision and conformed active-state recommendations for a stronger role of the state by increasing the participation of the federal government in the provision of education. Nevertheless, active-state ideas about curricular standardization and deferral of vocational specialization were compromised. Both of these measures demanded curricular reforms that threatened teachers’ working conditions. Therefore, national and provincial governments tailored curricular standards in ways that would not affect
teachers. Likewise, the Kirchner government re-established six-year technical schools, avoiding the deferral of vocational specialization suggested by active-state ideas. Shortly put, even though there was a strong diffusion and support for active-state curriculum ideas, the opposition of teachers forced active-state policy makers to translate their policy ideas to fit domestic interests. Finally, the lack of epistemic communities of testing, which indicates weak normative diffusion, and the unfavourable environment created by the 1990s reforms for standardized assessments produced the defiance of test-based accountability.

Like Argentina, Colombia also faced an economic crisis in the late 1990s. However, the predominance of market-oriented ideas through the influential presence of market-oriented technocrats in the government produced a different pattern of change. Colombia accepted the structural adjustment programs of the IMF and the WB, which prompted education reforms similar to those attempted in the 1990s. In the 1993, the market-oriented constellation was not able to privatize education, reduce the contribution of the central government in education provision, and establish accountability mechanisms due to the contestation of FECODE. Therefore, in the late 1990s, the government framed the fiscal crisis in education as the product of technical problems of the 1993 reform, and the inefficient expenditure these problems caused. FECODE, in turn, continued its demands for improvement of teachers’ working conditions. Since education expenditure increased but quality worsened, public opinion, burdened by unemployment, did not support teachers’ demands. This situation undermined the influence of the union and, consequently, the position of the market-oriented constellation improved. With this new balance of power resources, the government implemented a demand-driven funding system that boosted PPPs in the provision of education. This is an example of how
consequences of past decisions may favour supportive constellations of global norms helping conformity.

Similarly, the government argued that negative effects of the curricular autonomy granted in 1994 worsened education quality. This claim undermined the demands of teachers’ unions for greater leverage in curricular decisions. Consequently, the ministry of education easily conformed to ideas of curricular standards. Such standards also became aligned with national standardized tests. Conversely, the reduction of vocational curricular content was defied because it was opposed not only by teachers, but also by a strong constituency of vocational education. The delegation of vocational education to SENA did not weaken this type of schooling as expected by the ministry of education. Instead, SENA expanded vocational education in order to increase its enrolment rates, and therefore, VOCSED nurtured strong constituents of parents, students and subnational governments. This powerful constellation prevented the cancellation of vocational secondary education, even though the WB recommended it and promised a loan for this reform in 2012.

**Theoretical Contributions for Institutional Theories of Policy Diffusion and Globalization of Education Policy**

Studies on (education) policy diffusion have traditionally focused on showing isomorphism or policy convergence (e.g. Baker & LeTendre, 2005; Benavot, 1983; H.-D. Meyer & Benavot, 2013; H. Meyer & Rowan, 2006; Ramírez & Boli, 1987; Schriewer, 2000). This literature has greatly contributed to the acknowledgement of education policy as a global phenomenon rather than an exclusive domestic policy issue. These studies have also demonstrated that countries adopted the bureaucratic education governance model, not because of domestic needs or functional requirements, but due to external
pressures and subsequent legitimacy/appropriateness of global templates (J. Meyer & Hannan, 1979).

However, these studies have paid little attention to how these global models are translated or re-contextualized at the domestic level, and therefore, they often exaggerate policy convergence and downplay the role of domestic agentic responses. An understanding of these translation processes is necessary if we are to unravel the complexities of convergence and variation in the globalization of education policy. The findings of my study contribute to fill this gap by exploring how the encounter between global norms and domestic institutions facilitates or constrains processes of domestic institutional entrepreneurship. My study also employs conceptual tools to uncover paths through which this entrepreneurship is more likely to produce emulation of global ideas (conformity, compromise) and paths through which it produces resistance to global norms (avoidance, defiance or manipulation).

Qualification of hypotheses.

In the introduction of this dissertation, I articulated five hypotheses about processes of translation of global policy ideas. These hypotheses can be refined and qualified in the light of the findings of the study. First, I hypothesized that the lack of financial resources and/or technical capacity in a country increases the chances of international actors to exert coercive or mimetic pressures on domestic governments and make them adopt a specific education policy. My analysis provides some support to this hypothesis. Indeed, shortage of technical expertise in the 1960s facilitated mimetic pressures of UNESCO, and the 1980s economic crisis also triggered the coercion of WB’s structural adjustment loans. However, the analysis also shows that coercion and mimesis are not necessary or sufficient to produce conformity to global norms. For instance, in the 1960s, strong
coercion and mimesis did not produce conformity to MEP ideas in Colombia and Argentina. Likewise, the 1990s structural adjustment programs did not produce the expected adoption of market-oriented solutions in Argentina. Moreover, rather than top-down pressures, sometimes coercion and mimesis are domestically used as instruments to legitimize domestic decisions as the Chilean 1990s education reforms and the 2000s Argentine education policies show. On other occasions, mimetic pressures are also used by less powerful actors to frame their demands for change and magnify their resources, as the 2010s students’ mobilizations in Chile demonstrate. Put differently, coercion and mimesis can provide domestic actors with resources to do ‘institutional work’ (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006) and maintain or disrupt existing domestic arrangements.

Second, I proposed that presence or close connection in the decision-making process of experts trained or highly influenced by international actors increases the chances of reception and conformity with a global idea. In fact, normative diffusion was involved in all cases of emulation (conformity, compromise) of global ideas as Table 5.2 shows. This finding confirms that policy diffusion is not necessarily the product of structural forces, but the action of domestic agents that embrace and promote similar professional values and norms, as some institutional and diffusion literature suggests (e.g. Owen-Smith & Powell, 2008; Stone, 2004; Sugiyama, 2011; Verger, 2012; Weyland, 2005). However, the defiance of MEP curriculum ideas promoted by curricular planning experts in Colombia and the avoidance of the 1990s active-state ideas promoted by strong epistemic communities in Argentina show that normative mechanisms are not sufficient for global norms to be emulated. Thus, normative diffusion may generate a path towards conformity by channelling global norms into the policy process, but such path can still be altered by domestic factors as the following hypotheses suggest.
Third, I hypothesized that conflict between global norms and domestic institutions increases the chances of resistance to the norm while compatibility between both of them enhances the likelihood of conformity to the global idea. This proposition built on the ‘paradox of embedded agency’ described by institutional theorists, which suggest that dominant actors may have the resources to produce institutional change but they lacked the incentives, while less powerful actors may have the motivation but not the resources (Garud, Hardy, & Maguire, 2007; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). Hence, dominant players would be only motivated to adopt global norms that further institutionalized a favourable domestic template, and subsequently, only peripheral actors would be interested in promoting incompatible global ideas. However, the preceding analysis shows that although conflict between global norms and domestic arrangements is sometimes associated with resistance (e.g. 1960s MEP ideas in Colombia, 1990s market-oriented norms in Argentina), and compatibility with conformity (e.g. 1960s MEP ideas and 2000s accountability norms in Chile), this proposition does not fully describe all possible situations. Sometimes, powerful actors are exposed to new ideas that, although incompatible, provide an opportunity to further realize their interests as the Pinochet’s reforms proved. Alternatively, less dominant players not always support change, particularly when new practices further harm their interests, as teachers in the 1990s reforms illustrate.

My fourth hypothesis proposed that in cases of conflict between global norms and domestic institutions, greater degrees of discretion to interpret the global norm increased the likelihood of conformity. Yet, my findings suggest that, on the one hand, domestic actors always reinterpret global norms to fit better the domestic context, even when there is small room to do it. For instance, by contrast to the more abstract recommendations of
MEP expansion of secondary schooling and EFA’s right to education, 1990s market-oriented ideas prescribed clear policy programs, such as vouchers. However, Menem’s government in Argentina managed to re-interpret these norms by limiting them to the reduction of federal education funding and decentralization of education provision. On the other hand, as this very same example suggests, while this re-interpretation may increase the chances of norm emulation, domestic opposition to reforms can still tip the balance towards resistance. In addition, this re-interpretation also provides evidence of ‘embedded agency’ or the capacity of actors to ‘reflect and act in ways other than those prescribed’ (Garud et al., 2007, p. 961) precisely by combining elements from the global and the local spheres. This re-interpretation also changes the meaning of both, global norms and domestic templates, showing how the globalization of education policy is a multi-level and complex process rather than a top-down binary dynamic.

My final hypothesis proposed that the level of organization, the closeness to the decision-making process, and the impact of the power resources of supporters and opponents of the global idea define the degree of translation. The evidence provided by my study is highly consistent with this hypothesis. Moreover, my analysis suggests that the encounter between global ideas and domestic institutions may alter the power relationship and alignment of supporters and opponents of the domestic arrangement. Since global ideas can be embraced by either powerful or peripheral actors, it is the (im)balance between the influence of these collective agents which defined the fate of the translation. Thus, if diffused global ideas favour the interests of powerful actors and opposition is weak, the more likely result is conformity or acquiescence, as it was typically the case of the Chilean reforms in the 1960s and 1980s. Yet, the more the opposition obtains resources to force powerful actors to bargain, the more the chances for
global norms to get *compromised* or *avoided*. Alternatively, if diffused global ideas favour the interest of less powerful actors, the more likely result is *manipulation* of the global norm or their carriers or its *defiance*. However, if less powerful agents increased their resources through, for instance, links with the decision-making process, mobilizations, etc., they increase the chances for the global norm to be *avoided* or *compromised*. Table 5.3 summarizes the possible combinations of degree of influence and translation outcomes.

**Table 5.3 Degree of influence of domestic actors and translation outcomes.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of influence</th>
<th>Supporters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opponents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High influence</td>
<td>Compromise (e.g. Colombian provision reform in 1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate influence</td>
<td>Compromise (e.g. Argentine provision reform in the 1960s, Chilean provision reform in 2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low influence</td>
<td>Conformity (e.g. Chilean reforms in 1960s and 1980s, Colombian provision reform in 2001)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Taking everything into account, my study qualifies insights of both, historical and sociological institutionalisms by showing that domestic arrangements are not strictly path dependent and global ideas are not fully taken-for-granted norms. While global norms can sometimes reinforce domestic path dependent process, the conflict between global norms and domestic interest can also produce alterations or ‘deinstitutionalization’ (Oliver, 1992) that trigger ‘path generation’ at the domestic level, or the creation of alternative
arrangements through the succession of small steps (Djelic & Quack, 2007). This path generation depends on the resources of the actors with the chances of maintaining/disrupting existing institutions.

My study also contributes to the literature of education policy borrowing and globalization of education policy in three ways. First, my analysis of the interaction between path-dependence and domestic political contestation contributes to better specify the conditions under which global and domestic (institutionalized) ideas can constrain or facilitate policy change (Steiner-Khamsi, 2014; Verger, 2014) by becoming ‘weapons’ of domestic actors. Second, this analysis also provides new insights into the question of how civil society coalitions mobilize their demands towards education policy (Verger & Novelli, 2012). My research shows under what conditions the political context provides opportunities for agency of the civil society in the form of social movements, as Verger and Novelli (2012) do, but also in the form of other actors, such as political parties and interest groups. I also demonstrate that such agency arises in occasions from learning (or reflexivity as named by Verger and Novelli 2012) (e.g. student movement in Chile in 2011) and sometimes from unintended consequences of structural forces (e.g. teacher union in Argentina in 2003). Finally, my research design based on CHA and process tracing also provides new methodological approaches to understand the way in which structure and agency co-evolve over time. With my research design, my study identifies the conditions under which this co-constitution leads to change or reproduction and how these processes unfold over time and across countries (Edwards & Brehm, 2015; Vavrus & Bartlett, 2009). Overall, this study illustrates how traditional methodologies and theoretical approaches in political science can illuminate research puzzles of the comparative education literature.
Implications for Alternative Theoretical Explanations of Education Governance

This study began with a discussion of the potential explanations for the transition of Latin American countries to post-bureaucratic education governance models. Post-bureaucratic models are not anymore based on centralized rules and hierarchical procedures, but instead, state responsibility retrenches and education stakeholders put emphasis on results. While political scientists have developed sophisticated explanations of state retrenchment and the expansion of NPM ideas in other policy areas (pension, healthcare, public services) (e.g. Brooks, 2007; Dion, 2010; Hacker, 2004; Pierson, 1995; Simmons, Dobbin, & Garrett, 2008), these scholars have paid little attention to the role of the state in education governance, especially in areas beyond expenditure and provision, such as curriculum and evaluation. Other social sciences, such as sociology or comparative education, have paid more attention to education governance (e.g. Robertson, Mundy, & Verger, 2012; Steiner-Khamsi, 2004; Verger, 2014; Whitty, 2000), but they have focused mainly on explaining the globalization of NPM ideas or their effects in terms of inequality. The ways in which developing countries reinterpret and modify global education policy recommendations remains understudied.

This research provides limited support for economic functionalist arguments about the adoption of post-bureaucratic governance models. The study did not find support to suggest that the level of industrialization, the need to increase competitiveness, or overall the need to develop skilled human resources shapes the governance of secondary education. Economic crises and lack of state capacity certainly open room for policies that involve cuts in public schooling and transfer of cost to private actors. Nevertheless, these factors do not determine these policy reforms. Rather, rhetoric about the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the state to govern education has been often employed
to justify NPM reforms, but it has not caused them. Therefore, this study represents a qualified acceptance of sociological and historical institutionalist arguments that relate the adoption of post-bureaucratic education governance models to institutional pressures as I explained in the preceding section.

This study also finds that governments do not copy or emulate NPM global ideas, but translate them according to domestic factors. Existing domestic arrangements constrain what policymakers regard as legitimate, convenient, and feasible to do. The extension of the public system and the position of non-government and private actors shape the ability of organized interest groups, such as teacher unions, students or private providers, to push forward demands of increasing or reducing the authority of state in education. The type of political regime also shapes the capacity of these groups to influence decision-making. Hence, the argument presented in this study suggests that the interaction between ideational, political, and economic factors determines the extent to what agents can implement NPM education governance ideas.

In addition to combining theoretical explanations coming from sociological and historical institutionalism, this study also offers three important observations regarding the transition to post-bureaucratic governance models and the role of the state in the management of education. First, the expansion of post-bureaucratic education governance models is not fully correlated with the state retrenchment proposed by NPM norms. More often than not, governments are not willing to upset the constituents that secondary school massification produced in the 1960s, namely teachers and students. As a result, state retrenchment has been inconsistent and incremental rather than revolutionary. The only case of more drastic change was Chile under Pinochet’s regime. The authoritarian government was isolated from electoral concerns and had ample means to repress
opponents of retrenchment. Conversely, democratic governments often conducted gradual and inconsistent reforms. If global ideas are re-shaped by domestic factors, we need to pay attention to domestic political economy in order to better identify variation in the global expansion of post-bureaucratic education governance. Similar evidence of varieties of retrenchment has been found by studies of welfare regimes (Pierson, 1995; Stephens, 2015; Thelen, 2014), which may provide additional lessons for the analysis of education governance.

Second, the study of post-bureaucratic models of education governance may provide additional insight for studies that argue that state retrenchment is feasible when politicians can avoid blame (e.g. Pierson, 1996). Rather than avoid blame, standardized exams suggested by NPM ideas often make actors accountable for education results. Sometimes, politicians can avoid the blame of bad results in standardized tests when education provision is clearly the responsibility of other actors, such as subnational units or private providers (Benveniste, 2002). However, countries often adopt standardized exams even though the responsibility over education is somewhat associated with the central government, as it is shown in the cases of Argentina and Colombia. In these cases, bad results are often employed to push forward government preferences, such as additional cutbacks and privatization (e.g. Colombia in the 2000s) or re-centralization of decision-making (e.g. provision in Argentina in the 2000s, or curricular standards in Chile in the 2000s). Thus, the analysis of the employment of standardized exams and their effects in blame avoidance and policy change should provide further understanding of the motivations for state retrenchment/expansion.

Third, as found in this study, curricular decisions were barely devolved to local actors as NPM ideas recommended. Even in cases in which the domestic environment
was very favourable for NPM norms, curricular autonomy was highly limited often because curricular elaboration was important for ideological control over the population, an advantage that governments, especially in authoritarian regimes, are not very willing to give up. These political motivations beyond fiscal savings or votes are important to understand state retrenchment/expansion, especially in areas that do not clearly represent a fiscal burden.

Implications for Education Politics and Governance in Chile, Argentina and Colombia

Some studies of education politics in Latin America tend to emphasize the influence of external forces on policy outcomes, especially after the 1980s debt crisis and structural adjustment programs (Arnove, Torres, Franz, & Morse, 1996; Edwards, 2015). These studies often highlight convergence in the adoption of NPM governance models and state retrenchment. By contrast, other studies focus on domestic factors and show variance in the role of the state towards education (Castiglioni, 2005; Pribble, 2013). The argument here combines both perspectives and demonstrates that the state has certainly changed its role in the governance of education, but retrenchment is often gradual, inconsistent, and varies significantly across countries.

Even in the most radical example of embrace of NPM ideas represented by Chile, retrenchment has not been necessarily constant. Although the Concertación basically kept Pinochet’s education governance model, it also increased government education expenditure as a percentage of GDP from 2.4 to 3.7% between 1990 and 2000. As Table 5.4 shows, the state also extended its domain in the areas of curriculum and evaluation. Yet, undeniably, education provision is highly privatized and regulated by
market mechanisms. Thus, while Chile is a quasi-market of education, such market is centrally regulated and curriculum has never been liberalized.

**Table 5.4 Changes in education governance 1960 - 2010**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Provision</th>
<th>Curriculum</th>
<th>Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>2010s</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi</td>
<td>Centralized-Mixed</td>
<td>Privatized</td>
<td>Centralized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arg</td>
<td>Centralized-Mixed</td>
<td>Delegated-Mixed</td>
<td>Centralized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Privatized</td>
<td>Delegated-Mixed</td>
<td>Centralized but not enforced</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Likewise, although influenced by market-oriented ideas, Menem’s government in Argentina increased education government expenditure from 1.1 to 4.6% between 1990 and 2000. Later, active-state ideas and domestic pressure of CTERA collaborated to drive Kirchner government to further increase government expenditure to 6% in 2011. However, responsibility for provision and part of the authority over the curriculum was transferred to provinces, and the state never consolidated strong assessment systems. Further, the quasi-monopoly of education held by Argentina continued to be eroded by the lack of quality of public schools. This lack of quality transformed some provincial education systems in dual models, where public schooling and provincial regulations focused exclusively on the poorest.
Although Colombian governments have been consistently keen on market-based ideas, the role of the state has expanded in all three policy dimensions analyzed in this study. This expansion reflects the increasing access of the poorest to secondary education. Nevertheless, department and municipal governments often contract private education providers to save money, reduce fiscal pressure, avoid complex negotiations with the teacher union, and increase education quality. In this way, the dual education system in Colombia has become increasingly privatized.

Inconsistent retrenchment also produced mixed effects. On the one hand, retrenchment created self-reinforcing dynamics, such as the advocacy for school choice by Chilean private schools and parents or the exit of middle-income families from the Argentine public system to enrol better-off public-subsidized private schools. Indeed, very recently in Colombia in 2015, parents and managers of charter schools also came together to resist an attempt of the city government to cancel these schools. This is consistent with arguments about policy legacies feeding the formation of interest groups (Béland, 2010). On the other hand, retrenchment effects, such as education inequality, segregation and worsening working conditions for education personnel, also produced ‘negative policy feedback’ or heated and organized reaction among citizens (Béland, 2010; Stephens, 2015), for example, students in Chile and teachers in Argentina and Colombia.

These mixed effects are likely to sustain the political contestation between supporters and opponents of state retrenchment and NPM education governance ideas. With this contestation, inconsistent retrenchment is likely to continue oscillating between periods and policy areas of stronger and weaker presence of the state. In general, the perspective offered in this dissertation may help policy makers, practitioners, and
researchers to take into account historical forces, domestic factors, and external pressures that shape the chances of education policy change, and define to what extent such changes benefit particular actors of a society.

Limitations and Further Avenues for Research

This study contributes in several ways to our existing understanding of the changes in education governance in Latin American countries, but it also has some shortcomings. Perhaps, its main limitation pertains to generalizability. Further research should include less developed countries in order to confirm if coercion and mimesis are not relevant in the context of greater aid dependence. Arnove (1996, p. 148) has pointed out that dependent states have been ‘further conditioned by external forces and… education policies reflect neoliberal economic policies’. Edwards (2015) has shown that the 1980s Civil War and poor economic development made El Salvador particularly susceptible to the intervention of powerful international actors that imposed school autonomy. Similar countries, such as Honduras, Nicaragua, and Guatemala, also incorporated school autonomy.

Nevertheless, in these countries, the presence of the state in the governance of education was traditionally weak as illustrated, for instance, by the low enrolment rates in secondary education in 1980 (18% in Guatemala, 29% in Honduras, 34% in El Salvador, 38% in Nicaragua) and the low government expenditure in education as a percentage of the GDP in the early 1990s (less than 3%). In addition, Ganimian (2016) has shown that the implementation of school autonomy in Honduras and Guatemala has been gradual in order to avoid the contestation of teachers unions. Therefore, while it is probably true that coercion and mimesis are important factors shaping education governance in less developed countries, one could also hypothesize that the relevance of these mechanisms
is mediated not only by aid dependence, but also by smaller constituents of less expanded public education systems and domestic strategies that avoid political contestation.

Additional research should also be conducted on other education policy areas, such as teachers’ labour regulation or higher education, in order to confirm if inconsistent patterns of retrenchment hold in areas with greater impact on fiscal budgets. Murillo has shown that teachers were substantially affected by state retrenchment after the debt crisis, but negative consequences were not equal in all Latin American countries and varied across time (Levitsky & Murillo, 2008; Murillo, 1999). Likewise, while Levy (2006) suggests convergence in the privatization of higher education in Latin America, Alcántara, Llomovatte, & Romão (2013) find recent resistance and evidences of reversal of privatization. Thus, one can suggest that although these areas may be more vulnerable to retrenchment, such measures are also more prone to raise organized contestation.

Finally, my research opens up new venues to study education inequality. Some studies have shown the effects of privatization and decentralization on education inequality. However, little attention has been paid to the variant effects that various post-bureaucratic governance arrangements have on education segregation and stratification. Do different post-bureaucratic arrangements have the same effect on education inequality? If not, under what conditions do they improve/worsen segregation and stratification? Answering these questions will require comparative approaches that uncover the variety of mechanisms by which each of these arrangements produces or reduces education inequality. This research will contribute to expand our understanding of processes of education stratification in different education systems.
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## APPENDIX 1 Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview #</th>
<th>Participant’s name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Marcela Bautista</td>
<td>Coordinator secondary education modernization project, ministry of education (2012-2014)</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Sep 11, 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Amparo Sandoval</td>
<td>Leader, SINDESENA</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Sep 11/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Bibiam Diaz</td>
<td>Senior director – foreign aid, ministry of education (2010-2014)</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Sep 12/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Martha Laverde</td>
<td>Senior Education Specialist for Colombia, WB</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Sep 15/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Víctor M Gómez</td>
<td>Education Specialist, Universidad Nacional de Colombia</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Sep 15/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Carlos Vasco</td>
<td>Leader Curricular Renovation, ministry of education (1974-1988)</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Sep 16/2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Elvia María Acuña</td>
<td>Independent advisor secondary education, ministry of education (2012-2014)</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Sep 16/2014</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>María Teresa Matijasevic</td>
<td>Researcher, CRECE</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Sep 17/2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Patricia Asmar</td>
<td>Regional director, SENA (2010-2011)</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Sep 19/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Daniel Bogoya</td>
<td>Director, ICFES (2002-2006)</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Sep 20/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>José Fernando Ocampo</td>
<td>Leader FECODE (1975-2000)</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Sep 29/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Cecilia María Velez</td>
<td>Subdirection, DNP (1993),</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Oct. 02/2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position/Role</th>
<th>Country/Institution</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Luisa Pizano</td>
<td>Director concession schools, Alianza educativa</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Oct. 02/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Andrés Casas</td>
<td>Independent advisor, SENA</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Oct 03/2014</td>
</tr>
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