

COMMUNITY AND SOCIAL MIX

COMMUNITY AND SOCIAL MIX IN PLANNING
- THE NEW TOWNS

by

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ABSTRACT

Briefly, the idea of this paper is to discuss the recent British and American new towns in the light of various theories of the nature of (the formation of) community, and to use that discussion to generate research themes and research categories for new towns and new communities. The main part, then, (Chapter 3) is devoted to what might be termed "middle range" theories of the nature of urban community, and draws heavily on the distinction between "neighbourhood" and "city" approaches, and that between "class-structural" and "status-issue" approaches. Chapter 3 provides antithesis to those ideas I term "geographic" or "psychological", (Chapter 2) which tend to ask how man is determined by the physical or social nature of community rather than vice versa. The interpretation of the new towns (Chapter 4) is very much in terms of the preceding chapter, and here the concept of class mix, or social mix, is here drawn on at some length. In Chapter 5 the examination of research ideas attempts to probe this interpretation, and further to characterize the divergent empirical approaches suggested by more (Chapter 3) or less (Chapter 2) socially theoretic approaches.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Rationale

The key concepts of this paper are *community* and *social mix*. In a sense, the theoretical focus is provided by the former, the empirical focus by the latter. Briefly, my aim is to develop some "middle range" social theories of community, and to relate the British and American new towns to these theories. The idea of "social mix" is to be used as a focus for the discussion of new towns, and will further suggest topics for community research in new towns and similar developments. The new towns are taken to be of particular interest because their relative newness and sheer scale, may offer opportunities for the realization of new or unusual models of community.

The minimum requirements for the discussion of community are conventionally taken much as stated by Bernard (1973, 3), namely *locale common ties* and *social interaction*. However, the very existence of, and precise nature of, community will not be taken for granted. From a geographical point of view, an important divide will be between those theorists who do and do not give strong emphasis to the importance of distance or scale. Some theorists willingly discuss suburb, small town and city in the same theoretical terms (and so seem to give precedence

to "common ties" rather than "interaction"); others give particular emphasis to scale and distance, as by including the concept of *neighbourhood* in their theoretical premises (so seeming to give precedence to "interaction" rather than mere "common ties"). From a sociological point of view an important divide will be between those who approach community from the viewpoint of structural divisions which operate in society at large, and those who pay more heed to local issues and local conceptions of status. The theoretical discussion of chapter 3 will largely revolve about these two important conceptual divisions. It is the introduction and acceptance of these conceptual divisions which is partly responsible for the "middle range" nature of the discussion.

In the empirical discussion of chapter 4, the idea of neighbourhood will turn out to be of considerable value. The development of new town community models for both the "neighbourhood" (interactional) and "town" (political) levels of aggregation will incorporate the notion of *social mix*, or class mix. The idea will be to demonstrate that there has often been, at both neighbourhood and town level, a *conscious* desire to achieve a certain social mix - that is, social mix *is* of importance. "Social mix", like community, is here thought of as a "socio-spatial" concept; it will refer to the mixture of various classes of people in some locale. That mixture will have some relatively persistent reality, but that reality may be merely "statistical" or distinctly "social". That is, for some kinds of analysis, we may be content to say that a certain social mix, or class mix, merely "exists" within some large area, and we may not be interested in the patterns of interaction between

classes, or even in whether the statistical mixture is brought to life by spatial contiguities of classes within smaller (residential) areas. At other, generally lower, levels of spatial aggregation, we may be vitally interested in actual patterns of class interaction, even in the spatial (residential) articulation of a particular social mix. Social mix, or class mix, thought of in the above terms, is considered to be a concept worthy of incorporation into models of community, and with the planning vocabulary in particular.

The use of such a concept may enrich historical, political, social, psychological concepts of community. Consider the following brief examples: a *historical* perspective on community may lead to consideration of the idea of social mix. It may be that declining expression of social distance by rigid social separation of classes goes hand in hand with its increasing expression by rigid spatial separation of classes; this point is strongly suggested by a comparison of the "social geography" of Hamilton, Ontario in 1850 (Davey and Doucet, 1975) with that of today. In this 19th century commercial city, or in earlier rural communities, it is possible that the then relative commonplace of quite considerable class mixture in relatively small (residential) areas meant little in a *social* sense. Nevertheless, there might still be important *political* reasons why we should wish to retrieve this lost community. There seems little doubt that many upper class suburban or quasi-suburban enclaves enjoy what might be called disproportionately good private *and* public facilities. Yet, even in new communities supposedly representing the fabled "cross section of the community", it seems that lower income

groups are often excluded on technicalities. So, Pressman (1975) contends that Bramalea is one of the few privately developed Canadian new communities to have a modicum (7%) of low-income units. In the cases of Don Mills and Meadowvale, CMHC and OHC respectively refused to cooperate on the provision of low income housing. In effect, regardless of the desirability or otherwise of a truly "social" mix, there may be equity principles involved in planning at the town level. The idea of equity may still apply as a neighbourhood level of analysis. Further, a truly "social" mixing (rather more than contiguity of classes) and the ways in which it is achieved, may also be called to account for the success or otherwise of a truly "interactional" (Bell and Newby, 1973, Ch. 6) local community, if that be our goal.

The new communities occasionally seem to demand certain types of class interaction in certain locales (community centres), the success or failure of which will affect the success or failure of local community. In older communities, the idea of class mix and resultant class avoidance or class conflict has been called to account for locally attributed meanings (e.g., *de facto* urban planning which restricts the use of apparently open facilities to one group only - Keller, 1966) or local on-going conflicts (e.g., clashes in class-linked educational values revealed by consensual or democratic local decision mechanisms for education planning, in Gans' (1967) Levittown study). And, in cases where class mix is effectively minimal, the idea may still have explanatory value. So in Keller's (1966) example of a locally observed line of conflict between "rough" and "respectable" in supposedly solid

working class estates, we might take the respectables' acceptance of middle rather than working class values as one way of explaining conflict. That is, a *psychological* gloss has been added to the idea of simple ascriptive class.

1.2 Scope of the Paper

Study of any one of these psychological historical, social, or political themes could in itself generate a lengthy paper. In effect, I will take the first two somewhat for granted in favour of more explicit social and political explorations. (That is, not to say that I will not recommend a historical approach to the empirical study of social mix.) The main empirical concern of the paper will be to relate the British and American new towns to some of the more important theories of community, by using the idea of social mix or class mix. This discussion (Chapter 4) will lead to the generation of social mix recommendations and the more interesting themes of research which attach to these exploratory recommendations. These recommendations may refer to existing social mixes, or to ways in which future mixtures might be created or spatially arranged.

In intervening chapters (2, 3), I will try to give the empirical discussion and research themes some theoretical underpinning. As I have explicitly placed community and social mix in a *locale*, I will first examine (Chapter 2) those theories on the relation between form or space and behaviour which tend to the view that such behaviour can

be understood much in terms of *person* or *place*, and that social considerations such as community or social mix are rather irrelevant. Dissatisfaction with such theories leads to consideration of theories which are rather more about how behaviour creates form, including the idea of "theories of planning" (Chapter 3). Theories of planning will assume greater importance in the discussion of the new towns where we will have to consider the planner's desire to fit the yet-to-be created new town to some theory of community, rather than the social theorist's wish to fit a theory of community to the existing urban world. No firm reconciliation of "theories of planning" and "theories of community" will be attempted, although we may of course simply leave a space for "the planners" in our models of community. The main reference point for chapters to follow will be the shift from an asocial or sub-social view of community (Chapter 2) and the explicit consideration of the ideas of neighbourhood versus town focus, structural versus issue focus, or what has been called the question of elitist versus pluralist models of community.

CHAPTER 2

"NON SOCIAL" THEORIES OF URBAN FORM AND BEHAVIOUR

2.1 Introduction

By introducing concepts such as community and social mix, I am implying that social questions are of importance in the continuing relations between urban form and urban behaviour and of *explicit* interest in planning at the urban level. Yet there is a long and respectable tradition which says this need not be so. The examination of a few "non-social" theories of the relation between urban form and behaviour will provide antithesis for my later discussion of "theories of community" including the idea of social mix.

These are theories which tend to be non-social in Bailey's (1975) sense of using non-social determinations of social phenomena. They are rather more physical or geographic, psychological or structural. They generally concern themselves, implicitly or explicitly, with (natural) areas of sub-city size; occasionally they seem rather more directed at the whole city. They seem to deal in a rather deterministic way with (small-scale) behaviours in relatively established areas. That is, they rarely seem concerned with, or able to cope with, change, especially wholesale change. The possible exception is provided by the rather more structural or "superstructural" theories (2.4), which seem to turn the form-behaviour relationship upside-down so as to ask which

conditions are crucial to the creation and change of cities.

2.2 Physical or Geographic Theories

At the micro-level *architectural determinism* is an important strain of thought on form-behaviour relations. Physical design of individual buildings, or the spatial relations between buildings, is seen as a socially unmediated and somewhat person-independent shaper of behaviour. The literature testing these assumptions is well known and much criticised, as in Michelson (1970, Ch. 9) and Bailey (1975, Ch. 1). Probably, the best known empirical examples of "architectural determinism" are Festinger, *et al.* (1950), who find physical distance (in the case of a more orthodox single-family court development), or "functional distance" (in the case of two-storey eight-family units), to be of prime importance in the formation of friendships amongst a rather homogeneous post-war student sample; and Whyte (1957), who quotes physical distance, as a kind of "functional" distance, as an important determinant of *persistent* informal between house social groupings in a rapid-turnover upwardly mobile Chicago suburb (Park Forest).

In fact, Whyte says that given "a few physical clues", he can come close to telling us the pattern of "social traffic" in a (local) area. Some purely methodological criticisms are apparent. These studies rarely offer us any *replication*, either of settings or cohorts under study. Gutman (1966), in defence of determinism, says that it is difficult to fully test because of insufficient variation in local suburban setting - one could just as well argue that the duplication of

suburban settings offers ample opportunity for replication of architectural determinism studies. Whyte at least offers us some replication of groups under study, that is, he finds that much the same groups of houses interact (not necessarily for the same activities) five years later, despite rapid turnover. What this seems to demonstrate is not architectural determinism but the persistence of social groupings and meanings, and, of course, some such assumption of "persistence" or "on-going reality" would seem to be crucial to urban social, or "social mix", studies. It seems that Whyte or Festinger can, noting the effects of certain kinds of propinquity, tell us something about *sites* of interaction. They cannot necessarily tell us what those interactions will be like; Kuper (1953) suggests that a certain kind of propinquity correlates with intense relations, but those relations may be either intensely *good* or intensely *bad*. Again, this relates to social mix in that we would be ill-advised to ever consider social mix as a social rather than statistical reality if propinquity had no effect whatever in either direction. It seems likely that propinquity has more chance of working in the "good" direction if the cohort in question is rather *homogeneous* in some sense or other. (Thus, Festinger's group was nearly all army veterans with young families, who were further of like ages and undergoing much the same university experience.) Further, Michelson suggests that friendships of propinquity are more likely to *persist* in the face of common deprivation.

As we may "straight-jacket" these studies on methodological grounds, so may we criticize them theoretically. In Bailey's terms, they are

based on a physicalist theory of behaviour which ignores the intentionality of behaviour and the socially determined character of the design which supposedly governs that behaviour. We must presumably imagine some stimulus-response mechanism, or some crude mapping of spatial relations between built forms onto social relations between human forms - the buildings are close (cut off), therefore their inhabitants are close (cut off). For all that, it is possible to get too excited about the evils of architectural determinism thought patterns. In certain limited circumstances, they may provide us with a useful logical principle for first guesses about interaction patterns. What is more, they provide our first "recommendation" for social mix - that local areas be relatively homogeneous in population in order that propinquity may work in the "good" direction (Gans, 1961 - Gans has middle-class suburbia well in mind, and entirely omits to mention that this homogeneity principle lends itself equally well to ghettos). Bailey himself bows to a certain kind of architectural determinism, in that the planner may "build out", or make functionally impossible, certain kinds of behaviour. This is a strong version of Michelson and Garland's (1974) idea of suburbia as competition for scarce spatial resources. However, Bailey sees such "building out" as a manifestation of planning as it really is, a form of social control from without.

Except in the above negative sense, this kind of determinism seems to say little about types of, as opposed to sites of, interaction. Very often, architectural determinism seems equally to be about spatial determinism, and at a rather "micro" level. Spatial determinism writ large is provided by *human ecology* in its various guises as well

summarized by Bailey (1975). The crucial units of analysis here are the "natural areas" within the city, and the "symbiotic" communities which inhabit each natural area. Ecologists seek to record and explain these areal patterns. Communities are seen to struggle for supremacy in these natural areas. This competition for place between communities (species) is governed by extra-human forces such as "dominance", "invasion" and "succession", and many result in a "symbiotic" balance between areas and between their species. These species are seen to be defined with reference to some kind of ethnic or economic communality. Such theory is conservative in that a racial or economic ghetto can be seen to be created and maintained through a *natural* selection. Further, a transitional area can be seen as both site, and cause, of its own problems, an area where no single dominant community exercises control.

Even though its use of data is somewhat unreflective, ecology might often provide a vivid picture of the social integrity of (some) local areas, or suggest sites worthy of further study. However, despite all appearances, ecology is non-social and rather static, theory. It ignores social interaction *within* and *between* community aggregates. It is often completely static, otherwise, it will force change into the somewhat mysterious categories of dominance, invasion and succession. Competition for, and mere physical ownership of, land, says nothing about cultural life or social conflict within areas; that is, how are we to infer social phenomena from the ecologist's spatial structure? However, ecology at least accepts the existence of the ghetto as part of the homogeneity prescription. It is also valuable because it first

alerts us to the idea of "transitional" areas, which may not only be interpreted as areas of heterogeneous social mix, but will also later be given a rather different ideological interpretation.

2.3 Psychological Theories

Not only may we reduce urban theory to the purely geographic or spatial, we may also reduce it to the purely personal or psychological. Now, one of the more obvious ways to do this is to maintain the "spatial behaviourism" flavour of some kinds of architectural determinism, while shifting attention to qualities residing in the *individual* rather than in space or built form. Thus, one might posit an innate, or well internalized, zone of "personal space" (Sommer, 1969) or "body buffer" zone (Kinzel, 1970), the breaching of which will at least cause social discomfort. More generally, it may be thought that individuals will strive to maintain certain innate or learned situation-space associations. For example, if one thinks that so much residential space per person is appropriate, it may be distasteful to live with less,¹ or see others live with less.

While the more "biologicistic" zonal theories seem rather limited, the associative theories do have some appeal. However, all theorizing of the above type seems somewhat static, or at least "equilibrium oriented". The next step in psychological urban theorizing would seem

¹c. f. Choldin, *et al.* (1975) on middle-class students in student family units, especially concluding remarks.

to be the incorporation of *choice* mechanisms, however limited. That is, we begin to drift from personality theory to something more like cognitive theory. At its most general level, this trend expresses itself in non-specific theories of environmental decision making, as Downs' (1970) schema of a perceptual, yet value-dependent, image leading either to "decision" or further "search" for fresh information. Somewhat easier to pin down are object-specific theories - consumer choice, residential choice (mobility), transportation choice. To begin with such theories seem scarcely less deterministic than "personality theory" approaches. For example, the prediction of behaviour may depend simply on the location of the individual in an equivalence class. So, there are numerous consumer and residential choice theories which base predictions of behaviour very much on social class, stage of life cycle or life style. We may elaborate on such simple models by considering a sequential process where the same *one* decision is affected by "information blockages", "evaluative filters", "search processes" and so on - various residential choice models fit here. Alternatively, the conceptual apparatus may be devoted not to a single choice, but to a historical sequence of choices over time. So, Golledge (1967, 1968) works with a transition matrix (P_{ij}) , where P_{ij} is the probability of an individual selecting shopping centre j at the end of an epoch having selected centre i at the start of that epoch. It is then natural to inquire after the existence of a Markovian steady-state matrix. Burnett's (1973) study follows the same thought pattern, in that longer-term residents are assumed to have a different centre use pattern, and to use different "dimensions" in evaluation of

shopping centers, compared to newer residents. In such models, the individual is *eventually* determined, but we may now examine a specific historical process resulting in this environmental steady state. This modified determinism allows the possibility of interplay over time between man and environment, a notion which is given freer expression in "transactional" writings (Unsel, 1975). "Man" and "environment", or any other postulated subsystems of the total environmental system, are to be seen as continually transacting and interdependent subsystems. These transactions are at such a temporal and sensory level as to be "not directly observable". The considerable philosophical distance between transactional and cognitive theory narrows somewhat in empirical research. For example, in the Franck, *et al.* (1974) transactional study of newcomers to Ithaca and New York City, the give and take between newcomer and city seems to tend toward something of a steady state.² Note, however, that *both* newcomer and new city change over time and that theoretical precepts (e.g., the "demandingness" of new cities) are extracted *after* the study.

Especially in its cognitive or transactional manifestations, the strain of thought which I call "psychological" seems to offer some valuable concepts and models for urban theory. Despite its individualistic slant, it offers clues about ways in which we might define class, or rather status, in (small scale) urban settings, and offers empirical evidence of behaviours which *vary* between classes so defined. Some

²This study also recalls Michelson's (1970) perception of man-environment interaction as an individualistic accommodation to, and reduction of, environmental stress.

social theorists would immediately complain that no explicit consideration is given to *conflict* between such classes in the striving for their various goals; or that the choice theories are implicitly consensual in that they generally ignore the fate of those who have little or no choice.³ However, surely the essential question for a social theorist to ask is: "Can we represent a larger scale urban change, change in the sense of alteration of physical form or change in the accepted meaning and usage attached to existing forms, *solely* as the aggregate of individual choices or decisions?"

2.4 Structural Theories

The "physical or geographic" and "psychological" theories both regard the urban environment as a given to which the individual reacts in an accommodatory or stress-reducing, if not entirely deterministic fashion. Larger scale urban change must presumably be accommodated by mysterious processes such as "invasion" or "succession", or from the aggregation of individual decisions. That is, we are, given (occasionally) clear treatment of ways in which the environment creates or determines the individual, not of how people create the environment. Yet, as Berger and Luckmann (1966, 65 *et seq.*) emphasize, there is "no species-specific instinctually organized man-world in the sense that there is a dog-world or horse-world. - Men *together* create an environment, and their

³An exception would be a "filtering" theory of housing markets - continued construction of newer or better houses is good because, in the aggregate, the chain of upward housing moves so generated frees older houses for those at the bottom of the chain.

relationship to that environment is always characterized by world-openness." If we accept such a viewpoint, then we are surely entitled to turn the form-behaviour equation on its head and ask, how it is that human environments come to be created, maintained or changed. (Note that this is rather a different question from that of how they *should* be created, of which more later). Now, one way to answer this question is to look directly at social values and meanings, social conflicts and consensus in local areas. A more structurally oriented theorist might well complain that a social (*interactional*) explanation of urban growth and change is too much tied to local meanings and local institutions and populations, that it does not have sufficient depth of meaning to explain really sweeping physical *or* institutional changes i.e., the presence of a New York. A structural theory of urban growth and change seems to seek the *essential* institutional realities antecedent to, or attendant to, the creation of cities as we know them: To put it another way, perhaps this school of thought would be non-existent (or superfluous?) if there were only one city in the world.

The argument often revolves around whether the essential institutional realities are "economic" or "social". As Harvey puts it (1973, 216), "there is general agreement that an agricultural surplus product was necessary for the emergence of city forms". After acceptance of this apparently incontrovertible historical fact, various emphases emerge. An institutional and/or technological perspective is evident in many European writings. Various European theorists (c.f. Bailey, 1975, 108) emphasize the rise and fall of particular institutional

arrangements (sacred or religious groups, merchant groups, the military) as the key to the evolution and change of various historical city types. Weber's (1958) main institutional prerequisites for city development were fortifications, autonomous law, market, and independent administration. Harvey devotes some space (1973, 216-223) to the question of economic versus social organization. He agrees that the existence of a surplus cannot be seen as a unique causal factor, but notes also that institutional and organizational factors, are, in a Marxian sense, "superstructural" factors in the genesis of "urbanism", which is the social rather than built form of the city. His resolution seems to be that changes in the economic basis of society lead to *social* redesignation of the concept of surplus and new social relations *in production* to match that redesignation. If the socially designated surplus product is extracted and (geographically) concentrated in significant quantities, cities and "urbanism" may be said to occur. Urbanism *may* originate with the transformation from a "reciprocal" to "redistributive" mode of economic integration, but *must* arise "with the emergence of a market exchange mode of economic integration with its concomitants - *social stratification* and *differential access* to the means of production" (Harvey, 1973, 239, my emphasis).

Where this leaves us on the issue of "economic" versus "social" institutions is open to question, a social theorist might make much of the assertion that the surplus product is *socially* designated. Harvey himself doubts the value of comprehensive theories of urbanism, and apparently regards the above ideas as "some fairly simple concepts

through which we can gain some insight into the nature of urbanism itself" (*ibid.*, 196) - Bailey, on the other hand (1975, 110) sees a "very real gap in speculation about the institutional character of cities now" - . One might say, that if Harvey accepts the Marxian idea of modes of economic integration tending to exhaust themselves, then he does have a comprehensive theory of city growth and change.

Regardless of the resolution of the "social" versus "economic" question, there is considerable power in these institutional or structural approaches. Although the Marxian approach may, on superficial inspection, appear to share with the strictly institutional approaches a kind of "linear evolutionism", it may also transcend that limitation. Its evolution is not once-and-for-all, but allows explicitly for successions of systems of stratification and dominant modes of economic integrations. Most importantly, we "flow down" from here directly to the ideas of social stratification and accompanying class conflict, and unequal access to socially valued resources. These two ideas are crucial to the discussion of social mix at both neighbourhood and town level.

2.5 Summary

I have not attempted to give an exhaustive catalogue of what might be called "non social" theories of the relation between urban form and behaviour; I have merely covered in a rudimentary fashion those ideas which will best provide *antithesis* to those of the following chapter. Notably, I have not explicitly covered economic ideas, which are in a sense

covered by some of the characterizations of the psychological and structural theories (2.3 and 2.4), and by those which follow. For example, Alonso-Muth style theories of utility-maximizing choice probably belong with the more deterministic of my "psychological" theories. Note further that the categorization I have employed thus far will not be to everyone's taste. For instance, Bailey (1975, 145 *et seq.*), while retaining something like my "structural" category, merges my geographical and psychological categories into one of *positivist social theory*. Nevertheless, he accepts that such theory is "non social", because it employs non social determinations of social phenomena.

Quite apart from the issues of coverage and interpretation the basic idea of this chapter is the rejection of strict "non social" determinism, and the corresponding search for ways of seeing man as creator of, rather than created by, the human environment. Further, I have sought to characterize the kind of urban theory from which a useful consideration of community and social mix might grow. While spatial and psychological determinism is rejected, some consideration has been given to what might be called a "naively" structural approach, that of seeking the essential institutional realities of urban growth and change. Such an approach is striking for its broad reach, but may lack explanatory power in the more limited context of urban conflict. Bailey (1975, 146) holds that rigidly structural theory denies individual intentionality and choice, or that it can only explain "very broadly" described categories of behaviour. Here, we could cite Rex and Moore's (1967) rejection of a strict Marxian structure in their study of housing class and

housing allocation, or Seley's rejection (Seley, 1974) of Dahrendorf's (1959) "conflict classes" as a guide to urban conflict. Such "conflict classes" based on authority relationships do not, for example, explain the phenomenon of "equal" community groups *competing* for higher rewards despite occupying identical structural positions. Structural theory may be ill-equipped to handle the dynamics of urban conflicts which in Seley's eyes are characterized by shifts in opposition groups, strategies, and arenas of conflict. Seley calls for the development of "biteable chunks" of "middle range" community theory which will inform upwards to general theory, and downwards to hypotheses. It is from this perspective that I wish to develop conceptualizations of the social creation and maintenance of (urban) communities.

CHAPTER 3

"SOCIAL" THEORY - COMMUNITY PARADIGMS

3.1 Theoretical Prerequisites

In 1.1 we have referred to basic requirements for the discussion of community. Now, the first of these, *locale*, seems absolutely essential. However, the ideas of common ties and social interaction are included in the larger problem of "class structural" versus "status issue" approaches. Therefore, I take as a prerequisite the brief explication of ideas on *class conflict* and *class control*. A brief discussion of theory of planning will provide background for those community models which explicitly consider the role of planners or other "urban managers". This discussion, then, is general theoretical background for my "middle range" theories of community.

Locale

With respect to *place*, it would seem that our basic unit of analysis, should be the town or some subdivision thereof. The first part of the stipulation seems more crucial than the second. In some paradigms, we need not accord any special significance to sub-areas or "neighbourhoods", yet we must surely accord the town or city some kind of integrity or unique character. Such character may flow, for example, from the nature of the community power structure (whole-town level), the social integrity

of its neighbourhoods (area level) or the peculiar nature of the expected neighbourhood relation (more individual level).

A social vision of urban community should then have some respect for *locale*. However, I wonder whether a truly "interactive" study of the relation between the social and physical is possible. A social emphasis implies that one in some sense holds the physical milieu constant, or at least considers people rather than built form as the primary agents of change.

Class

Some background idea of *class*, *conflict* and *control* would seem to be essential. In particular the study of an existing or recommended social mix surely demands at least the idea of *inequality*. Now, ideas on class and inequality will themselves generally take some things for granted; few writers are prepared to discuss social reality at the pristine level of Berger and Luckmann (1966, Part 2). Even in the case of two imagined individuals brought together in some abstracted place, lack of a common history would not prevent rapid habitualization of actions. Berger and Luckmann see institutionalization as incipient in any continuing human interaction, as a result of the need for predictability and the need for the release of attention for more demanding activities. There is always the drift toward the "thickening" of the objective institutional world, the shift from "there we go again", to "this is how these things are done" (*ibid*, 77). In the limit, people will tend to perceive each other via "typificatory schemes". (*Social*

structure is the sum of these various typifications and the recurrent patterns of typical action they establish.) Institutionalization, then, "occurs whenever there is a reciprocal typification of habitualized actions by types of actors" (*ibid*, 72). Institutions have a *history*, and they exert *control* by inherently directing behaviour, not through the supporting sanction they may have. The existence of institutions, and more particularly the existence of a complete institutional world, requires various kinds of legitimation. The deepest level of legitimation is the "symbolic universe", the maintenance of which may come to require the existence of full-time legitimating personnel, whose emergence "brings with it occasions for social conflict. Some of this conflict is between *experts* and *practitioners*" (*ibid*, 136, my emphasis). Furthermore, if there are rival sub-universes, there will always be a social structural base for competition between them; the development of this base will affect, if not directly determine, this conflict (*ibid*, 137). In these terms, conflict between classes, or between planners and planned for is really about the policing of reality. This idea is at the back of many other writings on class, though most writers are rather more "grounded" than Berger and Luckmann. Marx asserts that the dominant ideas in any age, not just the age of nineteenth century capitalism from which he draws empirical evidence, are those of the ruling class. Dahrendorf (1968, Ch. 6) says that "because there are norms and because sanctions are necessary to enforce human conduct, there has to be inequality among men". (Note that the emphasis differs from that of Berger and Luckmann, who see sanctions to be somewhat after the event.)

His association of high and low status with conformity and deviance respectively suggests the idea of policing by a dominant class. He identifies (*ibid*, 154) four types of inequality, but for our purposes it is most important to note his distinction between "social differentiation" of positions equal in rank, and "social stratification" based on reputation and wealth and expressed in a social status rank order.

Parkin (1971) rejects Dahrendorf's emphasis on *authority relations* as the key to class conflict. In Parkin's view, the identification of dominant "classes" in organizations is not too helpful in describing cleavages which operate at the *societal* level. This is a common enough point of issue. Essentially, the point is: Are we bound to search for classes which are, sociologically speaking, actual "acting units", or should we stick to the wider structural notion of classes which cannot really be considered as "acting units", merely as their composites? Parkin takes the *family* to be the appropriate basic social unit of the class system, the backbone of which is the *occupational order*. That is, twentieth century society is seen to have an essentially *unitary* system of social reward and social honour. Certain occupational criteria (rather than every single occupation) come to have institutionalized rankings; the most important divide⁴ is still seen to be that between manual and non-manual labour. Parkin finds most textbook examples of status discrepancy in industrial society to be diversionary, but owns that such discrepancy is possible in certain societies where there are

⁴This divide may not operate in the Eastern European states - see Chapter 5, *ibid*.

two or more fundamental, and fundamentally different, ways of achieving social honour. Acceptance of Parkin's ideas would seem to have important implication for the definition of social conflict or social mix in urban areas.

Parkin's "system of social honours" is essentially imposed on society by the dominant class(es), but the success of this particular reality is a tribute more to primary socialization rather than to direct coercion or to a moral consensus arrived at independently by members of various classes. Importantly, the class order is still *problematic*, and in need of stabilizing devices such as between-class social mobility.

In other paradigms, the class order may be taken rather more for granted, as in those of capitalism and structure-functionalism, which Bernard (1973) takes to have formed the "ambience" in which the modern study of (urban) community⁵ has developed. Here she means classical *laissez-faire* capitalism, with the ideas of the rational market mechanism as planner and emphasis on individualistic competition rather than group conflict. Structure-functionalism encompasses Parson's basic questions of the way functions of the system structured, and of what functions are performed by a given structure. Functionalism leads on to the well-known idea of unequal rewards as functional necessity, which surfaces again in Gans' emphasis (1972) of the positive functions of poverty. Functionalism is seen to be community- or collectively-oriented (and implicitly consensus-oriented); capitalism anti-community (but not necessarily conflict-oriented?).

⁵Her "community" would, in my terms, be town or city, i.e., a settlement *mit* for which *locale* is crucial to the definition.

An important part of our vision of the city will then be whether to accept that there is or is not an unproblematic sharing of values and institutions amongst all classes ("consensus" versus "conflict" models). Further, we may hold that consensus (conflict) is appropriate for some areal levels of analysis, but that conflict (consensus) is better for between-area or whole-city analysis. Or, we might strictly apply the idea of conflict, but insist, after Anatol Rapoport (1974), that some (areal?) conflicts are "endogenous", others are "exogenous" - that is, an external referee such as the planner imposes the solution, be that solution area-specific or not.

Perhaps these various choices could be partially summarized in a $2 \times 2 \times 2$ contingency table whose dimensions would be area focus-town focus; control from within-without; conflict-consensus. However, there are two dangers in using this or any other highly stylized device for definition and study of urban community. Firstly, lower order "social" meanings will escape us. For example Keller (1968) gives strong empirical evidence of specifically "neighbourly" (as opposed to friend, relative) relations. It may be that when we mix, say, Parkin's occupationally-derived classes, that the actual locus of some conflict is different neighbouring norms rather than different social rewards as such. Secondly, a stylized model may demand firm class definitions, and lower order "status" meanings may escape us. Recall Keller's quote (1960) of the genesis of rough-respectable division in one-class estates; here, we could refine the class model by adopting Parkin's idea (1971, Ch. 3) and say that "respectables" are in fact cleaving to the *dominant*

value system. In my conceptualizations of community and social mix I will try to keep such problems in mind.

Planners and Planning Theory

The ways in which urban community is being created wholesale, with or without *conscious* ideals of social mix, seem to demand explicit considerations of the planner's role. There are numerous ways of attacking the theory of planning. A distinction may be made between theory "of" planning (how should planning proceed?) and "in" planning (how should the substantive phenomena of urban planning be tackled?). Pahl (1970) draws a distinction between planning for physical mobility and planning for social mobility. Friedmann and Hudson (1974), talking rather more about theory of planning, set up categories of philosophical synthesis, rationalism, and organization development. Bailey (1975, Ch. 9) claims that any social theory implies a theory of planning, and says later that there are three essential visions of the planner - technician, technocrat, and social control agent.

All these conceptualizations seem worthwhile, but all have their difficulties. There are inevitable problems of *overlap* between conceptual categories. So, our ideas of how planning should proceed will overlap with or circumscribe our conceptions of the substantive phenomena of planning. Further, the duties of the planner overlap with those of other agents. Not all important urban decisions are made by planners, even indirectly. At the other end of the scale of legitimacy, we may be able to make a case for "guerilla" urban planning, which may be said to occur whenever a local area makes a *de facto*, but binding, decision

of its own - cf. Keller (1966).

For my purposes, a distinction between "socially unconscious" and "socially conscious" modes of planning, may be useful, though no less problematic than any other conceptualization. "Socially unconscious" planning lines up to some extent with Pahl's physical planning, Friedmann's rationalism or Bailey's planner as technocrat or technician. Or, we could in Bailey's terms say that "unconscious" planning is that which descends from positivist social theory (Chapter 2). Goldberg (1975) talks of "monofunctional" or "isolating" planning styles, and gives a nice example of freeway-building. If we look at the urban congestion problem in a certain way, that is, we concentrate quite literally on Pahl's "physical mobility", or on the fact that so many cars will not divide into so many roads, then the "monofunctional" solution will doubtless be to build more freeway. Such solutions are "isolationist" even in their own terms, in that, they ignore the "feedback" effect of more cars on the freeways, and certainly isolationist in ignoring social costs, disruption of lives, and illegitimate transfers between differentially impacted groups. The whole idea of architectural determinism, which Bailey sees as the main philosophical prop of modern planning, can be seen as an isolationist translation of the form-behaviour question to a form-context question. That is, the quest for "harmony" or "good form" (cf. Alexander, 1965) reduces the problem of matching humans and human environment to one of matching buildings to their physical surroundings, or to some academically conceived aesthetic. Likewise, the various mathematical devices which seek "optimum" land usage of new or existing urban areas can be seen

as isolating or reductionist devices (see for example, Brotchie, 1969, or Brotchie *et al.*, 1972, devices for optimal allocation of approximately defined "activities" to "zones" so as to maximize benefit). Of course, the line between unconscious and conscious planning is exceptionally difficult to draw. Bailey (1975, Ch. 9) alerts us to planning work with "cosmetic" social content applied after the event, and to what he derisively calls social survey "market research". That is, even though we may not use hard science or mathematical techniques, our social science techniques may be equally self-satisfied in their definition of and quantification of social "facts". More sociologically conscious versions of urban planning are occasionally optimistic - for example, Elzioni's (1968) idea of mobilization of group consensus in planning decisions, Friedmann's (1973) idea of urban planning as a transactive process of "social learning" between planner and planned for. Equally, they are often pessimistic, as Bailey's vision of the planner as *discretionary* social agent, or Paris and Blackaby's (1973) vision of the planner as a control agent whose attention may focus on transitional areas or areas of potential conflict. Often, the differences between socially conscious visions of planning or planners will hinge on whether or not the planner is seen to have an impartial and unproblematic role in the resolution of conflict, and whether the planner is seen to be a humanitarian helping people to realize their own goals or an agent of control bent on imposing a single normative scheme on the planned for.

3.2 Models of Community Power and Conflict

It would seem that one of the most obvious ways to characterize community from a power or conflict perspective is to simply divide that community into two opposed camps, as planners and planned for, powerful and powerless, and so on. There seems to be something of this flavor in Lynd and Lynds' very early (1937) study of a town ("Middletown") in post-depression transition. Hunter's classic "Regional City" study (1953) similarly imagines a small oligarchy to rule a southern U.S. city of half a million. Perhaps no single "power pyramid" operates in all types of decision, nevertheless, one overall pyramidal top-structure may be extracted. Rossi (1968) formalizes these ideas with his *pyramid* and *caucus* models of community (city), the second being distinguished from the first mainly by being "flatter" at the top. Note that Rossi's pyramid model is not necessarily as rigid as it sounds; we are told that the appropriate community model may well depend on the *issue* at hand - that is, the pyramid is not an immutable model for any one community. The basic idea of controlling versus controlled seems to find its most forceful expression in the hands of writers such as Goodman (1972) and Bailey (1975, Ch. 9). It must be immediately noted that both these visions are rather more like caucus than pyramid. Planners are seen as agents of a state engaged in controlling the oppressed; they move in sympathy with, or in direct response to, the wishes of other powerful interests such as business groups. On the one hand, planners are not visible agents directly engaged in policing the

line between deviant and conformist, yet their actions are fateful in that they "rearrange the most fundamental resources with which people cope with the natural world" (Bailey, 1975, 142). Now, one might think that an "either-or" powerful-powerless model of community, be it pyramidal or caucus in nature, automatically implies conflict. However, we must first ask whether or not those in power exercise that power in an *even-handed* fashion towards all other groups *not* in power. And it seems that some "pyramid" theorists are in the affirmative on this question, if only because of their failure to clearly take the negative. On the other hand, Bailey would probably think it absurd to imagine planners exercising control over, say, an upper middle class suburban group in the same way that they would over a lower class group. Planners and upper middle class would seem to him too close to the same thing; we are in his writings close to a Mills "power elite" view, although he is aware of the possibility that either of "law makers" or "bureaucrat planners" may have clear *ascendancy* in overall controlling power. His view of social control is emphatically not even-handed. The exercise of social control requires the identification of social problems, and social problems are almost by definition those of *one* group for *another* group. Social problems can hardly ever be consensual. Further, there is a clear element of "moral crusade" in the definition of and attack on social problems. This view forces us to take a structural perspective on social problems. We come back to Berger and Luckmann's point about the development and legitimization of institutional realities, or their policing by "universe-maintenance" personnel. No

longer is it sufficient to blame urban social problems on to individuals or client groups, or even on to localized failures in the planning mechanism.

Less Monolithic Approaches

What we seem to have in these writings is a "whole town" power pyramid, where the town could be specified in either geographical or jurisdictional terms. However, it seems as if the pyramid begins to crumble on closer inspection. The "whole town" integrity of the model begins to disappear. How are we to handle this? We can imagine a "top" power structure, purely monolithic or caucus, imposing its will on *selected groups* in the whole community or town. Such a vision need not be specifically geographic, as Harvey's idea of "influential subcultures" rearranging resources for other groups (1973, Ch. 2). Or, the selected groups may be considered to be more or less socially integrated groups occupying a certain territory within a city or town. Paris and Blackaby imagine planners to concentrate on "twilight" or "transitional" areas, not only for their diversity but because they threaten to conflict with official definitions of good order. In Dennis' (1970) and Davies' (1972) case studies of districts in Sunderland and Newcastle respectively, we have a similar vision of planners labelling heterogeneous or physically decaying districts in order that "revitalization" may be carried out.

If, then, we are dissatisfied with relatively monolithic top-models of community (whole town) power structure, one line of retreat is to effectively "miniaturize" the scale of conflict. We can, as Dennis

and Davies seem to have done, imagine a numerically limited group exercising social control over spatially or numerically limited client groups (deviant groups). Then, one way to go back to the whole-town level of aggregation is to appeal to Rossi's third category of community power structure, the "*polyolith*", wherein may be found "separate power structures definable for major spheres of community activity" (Rossi, 1968, 136). A polyolithic community structure is likely to be associated with partisan community elections, full time community officials, and the coincidence of *party* cleavages and *class* or *status* cleavages. (A middle class dormitory suburb, almost by definition, is unlikely to be a polyolithic community.)

A similar pluralistic vision pervades Dahl's well known work on New Haven, Conn. (Dahl, 1960), although it is important to note that Dahl considers the city to have evolved from an earlier oligarchic or pyramidal power structure. No single cohesive elite, class-based or otherwise, prevails. Rather, many sets of leaders, with different bundles of "resources", prevail. Further, different structural arrangements of leaders and led prevail in different arenas; Bernard (1973, Ch. 5) interprets these structural patterns as "spheres of influence", "executive centred coalitions" and "rival sovereignties". The model of community is beginning to be very fluid, and by the time we arrive at, say, Seley's ideas of changing groups in conflict and changing groups in conflict, and changing arenas of conflict, we have rather more a case study approach than theory as such.

Paris and Blackaby's adaptation of Rex's "housing classes" offers

an approach which, though relatively fluid, may still be called a theory, and which furthermore seems to have a foot in both the monolithic (class or structurally oriented) and polyolithic (local status group, or local issue oriented) camps. The most basic distinction in "housing" class is between "owners" and "renters", a distinction which may be related to Marxian or other dichotomous schemes. However, Paris and Blackaby agree that some social relations may be specifically "*urban*" rather than merely production-related. So, in describing the *various* housing classes of renters, they feel the need to describe the role of "urban managers" who control access to rental housing.

Reconciliation Between Elitism and Pluralism

These are some of the ideas prevalent in models which verge towards the polyolithic rather than monolithic; Paris and Blackaby represent a kind of bridge between the two approaches. Seemingly, the "top" is not so rigidly in control of the "bottom" of the power structure. The vision of class is generally something like that of socio-economic or occupational class, but there begins to be room for divergent power and class structures; or for ideas like "housing class" which mix different ideas into the one class structure. These varying emphases are not such a problem if we accept Rossi's stance that different conceptualizations of the same community may be appropriate for different issues. However, if we believe that class is a universal, attributional device, we are surely not entitled to cut our class model to fit the particular issue at hand. We must consider the respective merits and demerits of both

approaches at some stage or other. A "class-structural" model is tempting because it offers a straightforward way to conceptualize urban conflict (the lines of conflict are those of class, or of class mix or social mix in my terms); the "*status-issue*" models are tempting for their fluidity and "realism". In a simple-minded fashion, we could see the choice as between one model which will cover all issues, or many models each of which appertains to one or few types of conflict. Or, we can ask: can we really expect that all conflicts will be fought according to set class lines, or do we need to consider rather more localized status lines? (Here, I have in mind Bell and Newby's 1971 distinction of class as a categorical or attributional device related directly to the means of production, status as an interactional or group ranking possibly related to *consumption* rather than production patterns.) Whatever our choice there are various ways we can attend to the problems of naive pluralism *and* naive elitism, ways representing a compartmentalization of the problem into "status" (pluralistic) parts and "class"(elitist) parts rather than a marriage between the two approaches:

- In the first instance, we can attempt to distinguish between those issues which do and do not get on the public agenda, as it were. That is, a key weakness of the status-issue approach is that its identification of "key issues" may be suspect, this point is raised by Backrach and Baratz (1962). We may need a "covert power elite", or some similar class-structural notion to deal with the hidden non-decisions, a pluralistic status-oriented or interactionist model for those problems which are actually allowed on to the public agenda. It is the first

class of issues, or rather non-issues, which are implied to be of greater importance in Bachrach and Baratz's treatment.

- In the second instance, we can introduce a "dimensionality" into our class models; Paris and Blackaby's mixture of production-related and "urban" classes may fit here. Similarly, we have Stacey's (1960) introduction of dimensionality with a middle class - working class by traditional-non-traditional (labour-non-labour) typology. That is, we have "economic class" by "historical class", with maximum social distance and tension between middle-class traditional and working-class non-traditional. A relatively sophisticated attempt to resolve the problems of dualistic or excessively monothematic conceptions of class is Parkin's (1974) discussion of "social closure". - So, the ambiguities of class position a "white collar proletariat" can be understood as the adoption of dual closure strategies. "Credentialist", or profession legitimizing *exclusionary* tactics mimic those of a pure upper class, *solidaristic* organized labour tactics mimic those of a pure lower or working class. Yet another alternative is to retreat to (independent) ranking systems which do not necessarily add up to a pervasive class system, particularly relevant is Barber's (1961) "family status" "local community status" and "social class" typology. In both instances, it seems that the most important strategy open to naive class-structural and naive status-issue approaches is for the one to quietly encroach on the territory of the other.

3.3 "Neighbourhood" Models of Community

Rationale

The models of 3.2 do consider power and conflict, even though that conflict may be "false conflict". This is occasionally explicit, as where Gamson (1968, 214) imagines that rancorous conflict will ultimately promote community solidarity. Nevertheless, the question of "who runs this town?" or "who runs this town when under what circumstances?" has at least been asked. Of course, we are quite free to ignore the whole problem of elitism versus pluralism, and to make our community models very much more *consensual*. This is often a feature of community theories which are pitched as the *neighbourhood* level, especially when conflict between neighbourhoods is not considered. The neighbourhood approach can be seen as a counter to the power and conflict models, which occasionally eclipse the spatial (population) element to the extent of happily comparing small suburb and large city in like theoretical terms (Bell and Newby note (1971, 224) that Hunter first used his reputational technique on a community of 7000, further that he identified the *same* number of reputational leaders (40) as in the later study of 500000-strong "Regional City", Atlanta). Of course, we can also deny the existence in the sense of a set of *interrelated* locally based institutions. However, such an approach will also generally demand consideration of the idea of neighbourhood, unless we adopt Pahl's escape route. Pahl (1968) prefers to study "locally oriented" as opposed to "nationally oriented" social groups, instead of focussing on community as a theoretic-

ally valid entity apart from society as a whole.

What follows then, are models of community which entertain the notion of neighbourhood, and which, at least at lower levels of spatial aggregation, tend to focus on consensus rather than conflict as the primary force of urban community. Though the discussion necessarily draws on the "geographic" or "psychological" ideas of the previous chapter, it is more likely that a certain geographical or psychological input will be *necessary* rather than *sufficient* for a model of community.

The Neighbourhood in Isolation

An important "bridge " between this section and the last is Warner and Lunt's "Yankeetown" (1941), a study of a fairly average town of 17,000 people. Warner has a consensual vision of community, but, importantly, this community exists at the *whole town* level, there is little emphasis on *neighbourhood* community as such. (Doubtless, the desire to see community in this way influenced the choice of the study site, a well-knit New England community.) Warner offers a curious straddling of my class-structural status-issue typology of the previous section. He claims to have identified a monodimensional and universally recognized six-fold class system, yet this system is derived using an interactionist or ranked status methodology. That is, he has effectively gone to the people and asked them who ranks above whom and why. His "classes" turn out to be based on income, education, lineage, etc., but the important point is that Warner's "class" can only be derived by *comparative within-town* rankings, it is not a categorical supra-town

reality. Warner was not so interested in how this class structure came to be. Rather, he sought to explain the *cohesiveness* of this ranked-status class system which either existed, or did not exist but was caused to exist by his methodology or choice of the study site (opinions vary). His explanations focus on voluntary associations, the existence of "universal collection representations", (Memorial Day, etc.) and, of course, social mobility, - not just the *existence* of social mobility as a force against class conflict (Parkin's sense), but also the *universal acceptance* of the reality of social mobility. This study has been criticized at length on various grounds. Bernard seems to think the class model may have been valid for Yankeetown, but that Yankeetown was a dying type, perhaps we could say a leftover from the times of Davey and Doucet's 1850's Hamilton. Bell and Newby are more caustic about the class model itself. They note that upper-class conceptions of class divisions have been given more credence. Further, some *general* validity is claimed for the model, despite its strictly local derivation. Bell and Newby doubt the generalizability of an interactional, rather than attributional stratification model, and certainly doubt the validity of deriving a ranking system from quantification of local subjective opinions. Their criticisms lead them to pose an important empirical question about community size, to wit, how large can an interactional community be? "Interactional" here (Bell and Newby, 1971, Ch. 6) seems to imply that all communards know each other or *feel* that they do. It may also mean that all may be slotted into a (not necessarily mono-dimensional) local status system.

Indeed, time seems to have passed Warner's model by. Consensual models, both before and after Warner's time, have very frequently been pitched at something more of an "interactional" level, and importantly, at a geographic level about that of neighbourhood; some *local* area, natural or otherwise, which exists in physical contiguity with, harmony or disharmony with, other such areas which together make some larger whole. Whether the primary binding force of this type of local community is seen as common deprivation and desperation or "gemeinshäftlich" mutual affirmation, the belief in its existence or the desirability of its existence unites writers as diverse as Harvey and Park and Burgess.

Suttles (1972) seems to have been influenced by the writings of Park (1952) and clearly sees common deprivation as the primary binding force of the lower-class Chicago areas he has studied. He shows some of the ecologist's preoccupation with a quasi-natural area marked off by landscape features and the like. Unlike the ecologist he gives some little thought to (a) social process inside that area. - It seems a point whether it is the spatial extent of the *social control* exercised by defending vigilante "peer groups", or if it is the influence of physical landmarks and boundaries, which primarily marks off a neighbourhood. In either case, Suttle's citing of "territorial imperative" workings bespeaks a "psychologicistic" and conservative view of community not unlike that of ecology. Harvey, in some writings at least, offers a rather more optimistic vision of community. He speaks (1973, 91) of "natural forces" such as kinship, shared value systems producing territorial organization. A true local community is seen to have higher motivation toward collective

aims. It may give communards a rare opportunity for genuine democracy or control of their lives, or an opportunity to develop "modes of integration" based on *reciprocity* rather than all-pervasive market exchange.

Such visions of "neighbourhood" type community are important because they have strongly influenced planning, as the next chapter may clarify. In fact, it seems to be *infrequent* that a writer will recognize the integrity of "neighbourhood" or "local community" (some vaguely spatial unit of say 1000-10000 people); yet the integrity of that neighbourhood will be so conceived as to permit the discussion of fierce within neighbourhood conflict. Thus, Smith's study (1974) of St. Leonard seems mildly unusual in that the accepted (spatial) integrity of this Montreal suburb does not preclude the discussion of open conflict between French and (invading) Italian groups. This study seems not to fit neatly either a class-structural or status-issue approach. Even though this conflict eventually found an issue (bilingualism), the issue seems peripheral to the roots of conflict. The Italians' increasing dominance despite an initial numerical disadvantage is seen to be a function of a rather culture-based "demographic energy" rather than *class* superiority or particular victories on particular *issues*.

Relations Between Neighbourhoods

If Smith's within-neighbourhood study offers a slightly unusual perspective, a very common perspective is that which attempts to characterize the relations *between* neighbourhoods, very often in terms of

conflict or competition. This should not surprise us: belief in the existence of spatially distinct neighbourhoods goes fairly naturally with belief in the *visibility* of difference and inequality between neighbourhoods, which in turn leads to accepting the possibility of occasional or endemic conflict. Ways in which such conflict is conceptualized vary greatly. Ley (1974) and others see socially cohesive self-seeking local communities pursuing a policy of "defensible space writ large" in search of neighbourhood-specific gains or "social side payments". Harvey's (1974) view bespeaks a certain "economic determinism" - neighbourhoods are seen to be determined by various idiosyncratic patterns of institutional involvement in the local housing market. Across the boundaries of these "class monopoly" neighbourhood submarkets, consumption classes (reminiscent of Pahl's housing classes) face each other as classes in conflict. Harvey's conceptualization of between-neighbourhood conflict is clearly more "static" or structural than Ley's, but nevertheless, raises an important question. Is this conflict to be seen as strictly *exogenous* in Rapoport's sense, or is it made endogenous by the jurisdiction of some wider authority? The ecologists seem to have in mind a naturally ordained process of between-neighbourhood adjustment unconstrained by higher planning intervention. In Ley's and like models, local communities are clearly seen to *compete* for favours from higher (city-wide) authorities, planners or urban managers. In Harvey's model, the realization of these areal class monopoly rents seems to depend on interplays within a somewhat aspatial managing class of planners and developers. Planners can zone so as to reduce uncertainty for developers,

developers may have political control of certain jurisdictions, and so on. The model seems less static in that class management of "urbanism" requires the consistent generation of new modes of consumption, which may in turn generate new consumption classes and presumably a new pattern of neighbourhoods in conflict. Such management of between-neighbourhood conflict seems rather stochastic; it is interesting to consider the notion that acceptance of the reality of a certain pattern of disparate neighbourhoods within a city might still allow the *purposive* "socially conscious" management of neighbourhood "bundles of public goods" so as to keep between-neighbourhood disparities within some explicit bounds.

However, this last is somewhat of an aside in the present context. More importantly, even though these models seem very much more consensual at the *local* level than those of the previous section (3.4), they seem rather more conflict-oriented (i.e., like those of the previous section) when we go to the between-neighbourhood or city level. However, I think we can maintain the distinction as follows: In the previous section, basic cleavages of people belonging to the basic unit of analysis (town or suburb or some local area) are organized on *class* or *ideational* lines; in this section basic cleavages between the conceptual units of analysis are organized on primarily *geographical* or *jurisdictional* lines; lines which may be related directly or indirectly to "map lines".

Community of No Community

Yet, there is a further sub-school of thought which we might almost

call the "community of no community". Let us suppose for the moment that neighbourhood or locale has separate visual reality, is marked off by an ecologist's physical boundaries, or even exists as a service area for one or several central facilities. Having thus defined town or community in an asocial or subsocial fashion, we then propose that within this unit of analysis community simply does not exist (in Bell and Newby's sense of an interrelated set of local institutions). This view seems well-suited to, say, a rapid-turnover suburb which may have an accepted name or be a recognizable service area, yet not have "community". We might, for example, posit that the only binding force in such a locale is a relatively persistent set of local expectations about *neighbour* relations. Keller (1968) makes a strong case for the existence of a "neighbour" role which is neither that of friend nor relative. Neighbouring relations, though always of limited liability, are shown to vary across cultures in content, priority, frequency, and geographical range.

Perhaps surprisingly, the idea of "community of no community" is *not* merely restricted to streamlined modern suburbs. Despite the folk (and sociological) polar ideals of *gemeinschaftlich* rural community and *gesellschaftlich* urban community, there exist influential studies depicting a fragmented *rural* community. Banfield's (1956) study of a small (3400) Italian rural town, while identifying seven occupational *classes*, focuses on the individualistic ethic of "amoral familism". Families do not work together at either the class or whole-community level, but each pursues instead a policy of maximizing the short-run material

advantage of the nuclear family. Bensman and Vidich (1958) portray a somewhat schizophrenic upstate New York community of 2500, Springdale. Here, despite the local mythology of just plain folks togetherness, Bensman and Vidich find a community where economic success is the main yardstick of personal worth. Even though one or two men effectively run the town, the authors take what Bell and Newby call a Keynesian view of class. These are not conflicting classes based on the means of production, but classes based on *consumption* - hoarders, investors and consumers. To emphasize the denial of community, the authors say that it is not possible to view Springdale as a whole in relation to mass society, but only the relation of various local *groups* to the rest of society (cf. Pahl, 1968). To a certain extent, we can counter these ideas by saying that an accepted local philosophy of "every man for himself" still represents a tacit agreement about the shape of *community*, albeit a community of rather limited liability. Nevertheless, the failure of some of the more optimistic neighbourhood plans in British and American new town planning seems to demand consideration of the "trucial" or limited liability community, perhaps even as an ideal for future planning.

3.4 Summary

We have begun with basic ideas of a split between powerful and powerless, and have generalized this "monolith" model to a "caucus" model which allows the existence of coalitions guided class interest at the top of the power pyramid. If we consider that pyramidal models gloss

over the direction of social control toward *particular* groups or particular occasions, a "polyolithic" model will allow separate power structures for different spheres of community activity. Here emerges the most important divide between class-structural (elitist) and status-issue (pluralist) approaches, and the attempted reconciliation of the two.

The above approaches often pay little heed to the friction of distance, or what the sociologist might call friction of group size- neighbourhood and town may be dealt with in the same theoretical terms. A strong tradition demands that we consider community as "interactional" in Bell and Newby's terms, in which case the neighbourhood will often be used as the basic conceptual unit. "Neighbourhood" generally seems to be a unit of some 1000-10000 people which has some degree of *spatial* separateness. It may also be a *class* island, but we can also imagine the existence of the class-mixed neighbourhood whose striving for local gains will overcome class barriers.

Next, we consider the relations between neighbourhoods, which will often be seen in terms of within-community consensus attended by between-community conflict. Such conflict may be "exogenous", but often it will be made "endogenous", by the explicit consideration of city-wide jurisdiction over between-neighbourhood conflicts. Alternatively, the idea of "community of no community" may encourage us to see local conflicts simply as societal class conflicts in miniature.

Whether we regard them as empirically proven community structures, or statements about the ideal form of community, these community models seem to be essential background for the consideration of social mix, or

any other social variable, in planning problems. For example, the acceptance of a monolithic model of community seems to downgrade the importance of social mix, and to deny the relevance of planning in the sense of local redistribution of income.

Planning, even "socially conscious" planning, at the individual community level, seems not so relevant if conflicts are in fact worked out on exactly the same lines as are class conflicts in society at large. If we adhere to a somewhat more fluid status-issue model of community, then the idea of local planning seems not so irrelevant. We can begin to imagine status groups forming in different ways around different issues, and we can perhaps imagine local intervention in pursuit of outcomes which are no longer structurally determined. If we imagine that the resolution of issues is a somewhat stochastic process attended by shifting groups and arenas of conflict as in Seley's critique, then the role of "social mix" in community still seems problematic. It is in those more geographic models, which recognize the reality of local communities or neighbourhoods as relatively distinct parts of a larger whole, that the role of social mix seems clearest. This is so especially if we hold that local neighbourhoods are not necessarily one-class islands in the city landscape. Let us accept as fact (or idea) that neighbourhoods may contain a mixture of classes yet still function as units which in some sense overcome class lines. Then we might concern ourselves with the question of what kinds of social mix are or are not inimical to the existence of a true neighbourhood community. If we imagine, as perhaps in an American suburban model, that these neighbour-

hoods are semi-independent jurisdictions engaged in "exogenous" conflict, it is now the role of the planner which recedes a little. If we allow the planner or some other authority overriding jurisdiction over all neighbourhoods, then the planning role seems particularly interesting. The concept of "social side payments" comes into play, we can imagine authorities balancing inequalities between neighbourhoods, and paying heed to "neighbourhood interests" which are *not* quite the same as mere class interests.

CHAPTER 4

COMMUNITY AND SOCIAL MIX - NEW COMMUNITIES

4.1 Community and Social Mix in the New Towns

Introduction

In what follows, I shall restrict my attention largely to the new towns of Britain and North America, which are sufficient for some interesting parallels and contrasts. I will first examine the evidence in a matter-of-fact fashion, and then relate that evidence to the models provided by chapter 3.

Certainly, there should be considerable interest in the (implicit) community models of those who, by power of state or finance, have the means to create new town or community wholesale. We should then ask if these influential models contain anything innovatory. I will appeal to the idea of neighbourhood as "interactional" community, while the whole town will be seen more as "political" community. Application of the concept of social mix will suggest what degree of innovation is observable at both neighbourhood and town level.

Britain

First, to examine the British evidence: Heraud (1968a, 1968b) claims that at the *town or whole community* level, there was or is the

distinct goal of mixing classes, where "classes" are now something like a version of Parkin's occupational classes. In effect, the class composition of the new town was to mirror that of England as a whole, or of some other large standard population. Now, this seems like an *equity* rule, rather than a rule about the actual *interaction* of classes. In which case, two very different interpretations immediately spring to mind. If we view the British new towns as relatively "free-standing", or economically self-sufficient, then we could say that the planners are trying to reproduce a "safe" class mixture, or to mirror at town level the class division of society at large. If we see the new towns as somewhat less than free-standing, then we can give a less conservative interpretation - that the planners are redistributing income by giving the lower classes access to *new* developments. Haurd notes that this (whole town) ideal social mix has in fact been approximately achieved. However, he also notes that many of the middle-class transplants were already home owners, and wonders whether the middle classes really needed new towns. Again, this gives new community "equity" meanings; he is implying that the planners could have been more adventurous and swung the class balance more in favour of the lower classes, manual workers and the like.

At the neighbourhood (5000-10000 people) level there was also to be mixing between classes. However, the planners were now more explicit about the nature of *local* community and social mix - mixing would *not* be brought about by the "on the ground" mixing of different quality houses. Rather, groups of 100-300 families would cluster together in

rather similar dwellings, and actual interaction between classes would take place at *neighbourhood* community centres, churches, and schools. Though cautious, such a conception of neighbourhood social mix is interesting in that it involves fairly well defined social interaction, and not the mere contiguity of certain proportions of (possibly conflicting) classes. Nevertheless, Heraud is of the opinion that this second (neighbourhood) ideal has not come to pass. Within the 5000-10000 person neighbourhood, he sees self-segregation by class increasing over time, and the emergence of distinct area (*sub*-neighbourhood) class images. He predicts a more neutral attitude to the neighbourhood ideal in future British new towns,⁶ though the whole town ideal may be preserved.

North America

The American experience is immediately different in that the better-known new towns have been assembled more or less entirely by private enterprise - note, however, Molinaro's (1976) comment that the aggregation of the required capital is increasingly a "social" undertaking. However, both at town and neighbourhood level, there are parallels. The 1968 U.S. Housing Act stated that the "fullest possible range of people and families" should be accommodated in new communities. The ensuing H.U.D. guidelines (quoted by Fava, 1974) required that the percentages of non-whites in an SMSA be reflected in new communities within that

⁶If there are any. The protests over the development of Stonehouse, 18 miles out of Glasgow, have been seen in some quarters as a death-knell for new towns - London Times, May 10, 1976, p. 16.

SMSA. This requirement parallels the British idea of mapping the class composition of a large standard population onto that of the new community. In fact, a recent report⁷ claims that America's most recent new communities are about 20% black overall, in comparison to the usual quotes of 0.5%-1.0% black in conventional U.S. suburbia as a whole. Even though we cannot directly equate "racial mix" to "social mix", or class mix, this is a most interesting claim which implies that the new communities may have been better agents of redistribution or social change than we might think. Still, there *is* considerable variation at the new community level, with respect to racial mix and class mixture. Irvine, Ca. is very much white upper middle class, while Reston, Va. and Columbia, Md. supposedly try for economic *and* racial mix. For comparison, recall Pressman's (1975, 22) claim that Bramalea, Ontario is one of the very few privately developed Canadian new communities to offer a small proportion (2000 of 31000 housing units) of low-moderate income housing units.

In general, we could perhaps say that North American new communities exhibit more variance away from the "matching a large standard population" ideal than do their British counterparts. This variance may be in either a "progressive" or "regressive" direction (e.g., progressive especially if we admit racial mix to transatlantic comparisons).

The history of Columbia, Md. provides an interesting comparison to the British model of *neighbourhood* community and social mix. We have

⁷N. Y. Times, June 13, 1976, Section 1, p. 2.

already mentioned (chapter 2), Gans' 1961 recommendation for relatively homogenous neighbourhoods in order that propinquity may function in a "good" direction. Gans thought that the then current crop of newer suburban developments provides about the right level of homogeneity. Here, "homogeneity" is thought of in terms of families' "values and interests" rather than their "background characteristics" - in the terms of the previous chapter, this is rather more a status-issue approach to social mix than a class structural approach. In his later advice to Rouse, the developer of Columbia, Gans (1968) paralleled the British concept of class mixture and larger scale, but relative homogeneity at smaller scales. Within each block (4-6 houses), homogeneity would be assured by a range of only \$3000 in house prices. A larger range, so it seems, would create pressure, presumably because of lack of consensus on "values and interests". Two exceptions would be made to this general pattern of economic or class homogeneity at those low levels of spatial aggregation. Higher-priced houses would have their own neighbourhoods (a neighbourhood equals some several blocks?) and blacks would be clustered within certain lower priced blocks, rather than scattered between blocks (so as to "prevent isolation" we are told. Note that this rule introduces the idea of *racial* as well as *class* homogeneity at block level). Taking into account these two codicils, Fava calls the desired overall residential pattern one of "heterogeneity within the overall American pattern".

Probably, much the same judgement could be made of Columbia as it has actually turned out. A point made very early in Molinaro's

discussion of Columbia is that the city is directed at *families*. Apparently, the mixture of different types of "basic living unit" (singles, families, larger communal units) is not yet a commercial proposition - recall Parkin's acceptance of the family as the basic social unit of the class system. Molinaro immediately shifts discussion to the *neighbourhood*, a population unit of about 1000 families. It is these neighbourhoods which he refers to as the basic social units of Columbia; they are not much smaller than the British new town neighbourhoods, somewhat beyond Gans' micro-scale concerns. Molinaro says nothing of such a very low level of aggregation, merely that each neighbourhood contains a range of family incomes. We are told that Columbia-wide unit prices range from \$30000 to \$120000 and that there is at least some subsidized housing. Certainly, it is the neighbourhood level of aggregation which draws more attention. A neighbourhood will generally possess a school, park, community centre and the like. That is, quite apart from anything else, the neighbourhood has integrity as a service area, and may then fit my model of community of limited liability. Three to four neighbourhoods equals one "village" at the centre of which will be found a large recreation facility. Seven villages equals one city, at the centre of which will be a "downtown" area for the eventual 100,000 population of Columbia. Now, at this point, one might complain that the neighbourhood (village) scheme seems very much like the not very successful British idea, that is, "let people be as they will at the house-to-house level of interaction, while bringing them together at neighbourhood (village) centres". However, there seems to have been a

more determined (and characteristically American) attempt to ensure that the neighbourhoods and villages will sink or swim together. Molinaro speaks of "interfaith centres" in place of ordinary churches, neighbourhood councils, village councils, and even local (village) architectural review committees(!). Further, the seven-man board of the Columbia Association, the quasi-municipal city administrative body, will eventually, so we are told, be made up of local residents rather than nominees from the developer, American City Corporation.

4.2 New Towns and Community Theory

General Principles

The British and American new towns occasionally seem to have created precedents which would have been difficult to realize in established areas. For example, different mixtures of people may be in contact, the ratio of black: white or manual worker: professional may be unusually high for a new development, free-standing or otherwise. Further, some sophisticated thought is given to what this social or class mix will mean "on the ground". In contrast, proposals for social mix in existing areas may appear rather clumsy. For example, Downs' (1973) proposals for opening up the suburbs to minority groups have been debunked as "mini-ghetto" proposals, and Boeschstein (1971) decries the redevelopment of Boston West End which made the divisions between upper, middle and lower class all too architecturally obvious. Not only do the new developments give some thought as to how the

"statistical" social mix can be architecturally managed they also seem to demand new kinds of (between-class) social action in the hope that the community so created will be more than statistical in its reality.

Indeed, it should not be surprising that new communities are capable of greater innovation. Though it may or may not have true "interactional" community, an established local area has a history, perhaps a set of local meanings, customs or local associations which it shares with no other area. So, a proposal for new social action such as an interfaith centre might in an established area be considered threatening by certain groups of individuals. More importantly, an established area is likely to have property values which bear a relatively constant relationship to those in surrounding areas. Thus, the intrusion of unusual (or just different) developments or buildings may be accompanied by fear or defensive action on the part of individuals or the community as a whole. Similarly, the intrusion of different classes or racial groups will be accompanied by fear about rising (or falling) property values on the part of a numerically dominant lower (upper) class group. So, whether our model of local community is truly interactional or of limited liability, it seems not difficult to develop theories about resistance to the (conscious) creation of different class mixtures and/or different patterns of interaction between existing classes or status groups.

On the other hand, Molinaro asserts that the building of Columbia, or any new community, is very much about the creation of *new* values, and not merely new property values. We are told that newcomers are very much self-selecting, that they devote a great deal of time to the

decision to move. The implication is that because newcomers know exactly what they are buying into, and because they are being offered such an excellent product, they are quite prepared to accept novel patterns of contiguity between classes, and are prepared to accept physical and institutional arrangements which may require social action amongst and between classes. Or, as Eichler and Kaplan have it, Columbia proposes to "sell objective environmental advantages more than (singular) class symbols" (1967, 126, my insertion). In their view, it is the physical environment and the discretion with which classes are mixed, rather than the cement of new local institutions, which remove the market risks of "mixing".

Neighbourhood Theories

It seems plausible, then, that new communities and new towns should have a better chance than older towns to promote new ideas about community, and that they occasionally try to do just that. In general terms, what ideas about community do the British and American new towns seem to promote? Firstly, note that there is very often place for the *neighbourhood*, at the very least in the technical sense of, say, a designated local service area. We could debate the precise nature of the technical identification of neighbourhood. I am inclined to think that that identification is "spatial" or geographic rather than architectural. That is, "technical" neighbourhood is created through its spatial separateness or designation as separate service area rather than through its architectural vitality or architectural integrity. Note that

Molinaro makes a point of claiming architectural ordinariness for Columbia.

Technically speaking, then, the neighbourhood, a roughly geographic area of, say, somewhere between 1000 and 10000 inhabitants is often called into existence in those new towns which have a sufficiently large target population (say 50000+) to support them. What then is the *nature* of this existence? Is it merely, as has been claimed of the British new towns, that planners can do no more than give neighbourhoods *names*, most of which are hardly known to residents? If the neighbourhood has no more than technical existence, then we might return to the idea of community of limited liability, or community of no community. In some of the more modern writings in this vein, what surfaces is not so much Banfield's or Bensman and Vidich's rather deprecatory view of a community of selfish striving on the part of individuals, or families, but rather a community of profound detachment or lack of interest on the part of individuals or families. Rabinovitz and Lamore's (1971) tired suburbanite moving to Californian new communities seem to have little enthusiasm *or* antagonism towards their new community or the city they just came from. Such views of *neighbourhood* community seem more appropriate for more limited or small scale (upper class?) developments. For neighbourhoods which form part of the more grandiose vision of the British and American new towns, we probable need to examine other theories as well. Here the (planner's) vision of neighbourhood is "technical", yet also more than that of limited liability. Quite strongly in the American version, but more weakly in the British version,

there seems to be the desire to create *interactional* community. This desire expresses itself not only in the limitation of the size of the "technical" neighbourhood and in the planned location and restriction of physical facilities so as to create interdependence within and between neighbourhoods and "villages" (Columbia), but also in the conscious creation of local institutions and associations at neighbourhood level. However, there is more to the "interactional" neighbourhood than this, and this is where the concept of "social mix" may come in. Some or all of the above interactional "devices" could exist in the ecologist's (one-class) defended neighbourhood, but now the prospect of mixture of classes is admitted or even encouraged. As has been detailed, this mixture is accomplished in a rather discreet way and still works with the family as basic unit. Nevertheless, it exists and is open to various interpretations. We could say that the class mixture is designed to entirely defeat the class division which were advertised all too openly by the ecological neighbourhood. Perhaps more intelligently, we can see the aim as that of defusing or mollifying class conflict, and we may then interpret that aim as being of either sinister or benevolent intent. In a more sinister interpretation, we can, having assumed a priori some cosmetic or purely economic requirement to admit a fair proportion of the "lower" classes to the new town, assume that the purpose of social mix is social control. That is, by dispersing the lower classes amongst various neighbourhoods the planners ensure that the threatening solidarity of an "ecological" neighbourhood does not develop. Such motives are not always entirely implicit; for example Bailey finds in the British

Stevenage Development Corporation document (1949) the idea of a neighbourhood leavening of "upper" class people so as to give the new town "balance" and "civilization" at the local level. In a more benevolent interpretation, we can say that the between-class informal contact, and contact within neighbourhood associations, give the lower classes far better life chances than would be possible in a more traditional "ecological" neighbourhood. If we can accept that the new town neighbourhood does involve genuine class mixture, yet is sometimes rather more than a community of limited liability, then the above debate is one of the more interesting which emerges.

Relations Between Neighbourhoods

If we examine the planned relations *between* neighbourhoods, then certainly the picture is neither that of Harvey's class conflict nor that of the ecologist's competition. We could almost say that the desired picture is one of endogenously governed consensus between neighbourhoods. The neighbourhood will provide individual *identity* and perhaps community reciprocity, but identity and reciprocity are not such as to lead to neighbourhood nationalism or selfish seeking of neighbourhood-specific gains at the expense of other neighbourhoods. Again, the dispersion of classes between neighbourhoods rather than their concentration within one-class neighbourhood can be seen as a conscious attempt to defuse neighbourhood conflicts. It is hardly surprising that the planner should aim for relatively cordial relations between neighbourhoods. What is interesting is that the neighbourhoods do not seem to be decision-making

jurisdictions in any powerful way; there does not seem to be any mechanism for the "upward" flow of within- or between-neighbourhood decisions. Community life is to be determinedly communal rather than political.

Furthermore, the existence of neighbourhood in this form (i.e., something more than "technical" in scope) seems in itself to be non-trivial. That is, there does not seem to be any convincing a priori reason for the planner, especially be he technocratic or technical in orientation, to insist on the inclusion of such neighbourhoods in new towns. We might inquire as to their *raison d'etre* - whether it is romanticism or the desire to give residents meaningful control over their lives, or whether it is rather more because they ease the task of maintaining a reasonably calm consensus at the town level. Or, very straightforwardly, we can assert that the interactional neighbourhood's purpose is to partially counteract the alienating separation of "home" and "work".

Community Power Structure

The focus at neighbourhood level seems to yield insights about the desired "interactional" nature of community, but not insights about the *political* plan of community. In examining the political nature of the new town, we probably need to direct our attention to the town as a whole, to do some sort of "top-down" analysis. The same problems that arise in all community power analyses arise - Is the town a conceptually distinct unit, or is it merely a convenient microcosm for study purposes?

This issue assumes particular importance in the case of the new town. Some will hold that most new towns are mere satellites of their near large city. If this be the case, then whatever conceptual status we accord the city, the new town is only as a "neighbourhood" in comparison. There seems to be some justification for such a position, it is doubtful if Columbia could exist in its present form (if at all) if it were not for the existence of Washington and Baltimore. Belief in a somewhat rarefied political atmosphere in the new towns could send us in two different directions. We could assert that their special status makes for greater case of political innovation and suggests a status or issue approach to their politics; or that their special status is that of a dependent and we might as well cleave to whatever view we have of community in the city at large.

I wish to suggest a direction on this issue, with the simple concept of social mix as guide, or perhaps, the term class mix is better at this level of spatial aggregation:

Where there is effectively no class mix, it seems likely that the new community will, in design or in reality, have no particular claim to the title of town or city. Such a community (especially an upper-class community) will probably need very large inputs from outside its spatial borders, and from outside its class borders, to keep it going. In such a case, a simple class model is almost a priori insufficient to examine how community does or does not cohere. However, the idea of class may still provide a useful starting point for the examination of conflict. For example, recall my interpretation of the "rough"-"respectable"

division in one-class housing estates in terms of those who adhere to the *dominant* value system ("respectable") and those who adhere to the *subordinate* value system ("rough"). Similarly, we might try to interpret conflict in "an *upper* class area by searching for adherents to Parkins' categories of *dominant* value system and *anarchistic* value system. Note further that the idea of a one-class "town" may, in practice, be virtually confounded with the idea of one-class "neighbourhood". That is, given the information that a "town" is by some criterion effectively one-class, I would suspect that it is in my terms more like a "neighbourhood", and prefer to see the discussion of its politics slotted into a scheme of greater structural (and geographical) breadth.

By implication, the more interesting cases for analysis, in both "new towns" and more traditional settlements, are where some measure of social mix, or class mix, is evident. (However, it may or may not be that this class mix reproduces on a larger scale that which applies in some or all neighbourhoods.) Some further thought should be devoted to the meaning of *class* in discussions of class mixture at this level. Probably, the simplest way to pinpoint the planned reproduction of a certain class order is to detail the deliberate variation in quality, or symbolic status, of housing units within a new town. This variation, though suggestive, need not be a direct "pictorial mapping" of the desired class order. A better representation, would be provided by the range of *income* for which a development caters. Again, I prefer the idea of "occupational order" as the backbone of the class system for the

new town, taking into account Parkin's points that the occupational order is best considered in terms of rights and privileges which vary qualitatively between a (small) number of notional occupational classes as manual, non-manual and elaborations thereon. In these terms, variables such as race and ethnicity are to be seen as variations on a main theme - this is not in anyway to belittle their importance as research topics.

Certainly, it is a representation of the occupational order which is behind Heraud's (1968b) discussion of social mix in British new towns.⁸ If we see class mix in such terms, then a generalization from the American and British new town models is that, *as extreme state*, the class mix will be reproduced in a way which is roughly typical of society as a whole. This reproduction may be seen as a kind of "equity" principle. And, hardly surprisingly, variations away from this limiting state will be in favour of a (numerical) preeminence on the part of the dominant class(es). This (occasionally rather studied) replication of the existing class balance suggests at first a *structural* approach to politics and conflict within the new towns, that some variant of a "pyramidal" or "caucus" model will serve as a first approach. Even though the new towns' lack of history suggests that they are better suited to community innovations, I suggest that these innovations are confined to *neighbourhood* community or "small" issues, and do not flow upwards to radically affect the power structure of the community as a

⁸In fact, all his quantitative tabulations are based on the following categorization: professional, intermediate professional, unskilled non-manual, semi-skilled manual, unskilled manual.

whole. We should probably search in vain for radical innovations at this level, or even for ways of new town urban management which fit with some of the better-known *liberal* perspectives on "radical" planning. Theirs is not the planning of advocacy (Friedmann, 1973; Kasperson and Breitbart, 1974, Ch. 4), neither does their level of citizen participation promise to be flatteringly high up on Arnstein's ladder of participation (Arnstein, 1969). It is true that the Columbia Association occupies a somewhat unusual position in not having the formal status of a county or municipal body yet having the power to exact taxes and perform quasi-municipal functions. As this body is not yet free of developer influence, it is probably too early to assess its role. Should its election procedures prove reasonably predictable, we could probably work it into a class-based model of new town politics. We might, for example, assert that future lower-class board members of the Association have been "co-opted", or are guilty of adopting the dominant value system. In broad terms, I doubt that new towns, at least in their early years, offer fertile ground for a debate between "status-issue" and "class-structural" approaches to the community power structure. That is, we may not see the early evolution of *important* issues whose resolution will demand the formation of conflicting, but not necessarily class-based, groups; there may not be many important inversions of the usual class-based order of rights and privileges.

Now, it could be said that the new towns "client" status precludes the development of important issues in any case. However, we could also relate the quiescent nature of the new towns to the status of two most

important groups, planners and early residents. Some writers depict the (British) new town planner as a rather *unwilling* agent of social control, a "socially conscious" professional who occupies a position somewhat external to the class structure, but is nevertheless subject to class pressure to produce a rather conservative model for the new town community. More simplistically, we can simply indict the planner as the professional whose class interest dictates the reproduction of class balance in the new community. Further, while still accepting the relatively predetermined nature of that class balance, we might consider the psychology of individual newcomers. It may be that, across all glosses, there is a tendency for the new towns to attract (at first) those in search of "the quiet life". These and other psychological glosses might be taken as antecedent to the creation of a structural model of new town power structure, a model which though class-based will be attended by consensus rather than conflict. That is, we might use such psychological classes to explain the relative absence of class conflict.

4.3 Summary

The overall picture which I wish to portray is of class balance at both town and neighbourhood level, where the new town's "absence of history" will permit innovation at the neighbourhood level to perturb an otherwise conservative vision of community. Throughout, an attempt has been made to show the relevance of social concerns in general, and

"social mix" in particular, to theories about the new communities. Now, it could be said that the emphasis on structural ideas such as "class balance" leaves us with a pose scarcely less deterministic than that of my chapter 2 theorising. However, I would defend my emphasis on two counts. Firstly, I would insist that any actual study of community "climb down" from purely attributional ideas of classes as non-acting units, and research, say, ways in which actual acting units such as planners or developers impose and maintain a certain class-interested order of community. Secondly, even my simplistic discussion offers us, or forces on us, certain points of choice. The existence of neighbourhood itself, even in the pristine "technical" sense, is not to be taken for granted in new town planning. The existence of *socially mixed* neighbourhoods is open to both benevolent and sinister interpretations. Further, the socially mixed neighbourhood does not necessarily imply a fully interactional community, we must bear in mind the idea of community of limited liability. We then have the problem of formally integrating these neighbourhoods into a model of the whole community. Here, an important choice is between views of neighbourhood community as an exactor of primarily *social* or primarily *nationalistic* allegiance. In other words, does the neighbourhood have formal or factual power to pursue its own interests at the expense of other neighbourhoods? In my discussion, I have tended to the opinion that this is not the case,⁹ and concentrated rather on the town entire as

⁹My emphasis could easily be defeated by later turns of events. For example, Heraud (1968b) details a trend for British new towners to move between neighbourhoods in such a way as to lessen the amount of class mixture and create the possibility of one-class neighbourhoods.

the guide to community power structure. Here emerges the simple idea that the class balance of the new town will, "at best", reflect that of society at large. Again we may interpret this idea in a benevolent fashion (as an equity principle) or otherwise. In either case, we must interpret "class" and, having done so, interpret "confounding variables" such as race and ethnicity. We must then choose between theories of community power structure which focus on local status and local issues, or general conceptions of class structure, (the latter theoretical category tending to deny the unique conceptual status of any particular town or city). It is the latter "class-structural" path which I have emphasized for the new towns, while allowing that we then need to fashion some explanation of their presumed relative lack of class conflict, as by the use of psychological ideas.

Note the implicit place of psychological and other "sub-social" ideas in the scheme of this chapter. Approximately, one or other of two rationales has applied:

- Firstly, we can see such ideas as an "initial input" into some community model or other. So the architectural idea of neighbourhood, and the psychological idea of individual predispositions toward new town life, serve as initial inputs in my picture of new town.

- Secondly, psychological or architectural determinism ideas may apply to the theory of community interactions which are limited in geographical scope, which can be imagined as exhibiting variation without threatening the essential quality of our "middle range" community model. The question of *neighbouring relations* seems to fit this second rationalization quite well.

CHAPTER 5

RESEARCH DIRECTIONS

5.1 Introduction

In 4.4, we have established a partial resolution between social and social structural theory and "sub social" theory as they might apply to the new towns. This resolution also suggests a fundamental divide for research methods. In my terms, research will be "naive"¹⁰ if it works purely at the psychological or individual level, and, in particular, if it fails to recognize the importance of social stratification and social mix in placing restrictions on individual "degrees of freedom". Nevertheless, there are methodological issues common to both approaches.

As a very general principle, we could take as our task the verification of the theoretical precepts (e.g., "neighbourhood") on which the new town is built. Or, perhaps a better way of expressing this is to say that research should be directed at "breaches" where the new town in practice may differ from the new town in theory. Research predicated on such questions might be distinctly historical, so that we might ignore whether or not a certain initial "input" has led to the desired (short-term) "output" - a certain kind of community. Or, in a relatively ahistorical vein, we could ask whether or not a certain

¹⁰No pejorative sense of the word is implied.

theoretical view of new town community matches the view provided by an empirical "snapshot" of this community. In either case, our research could lead to "recommended" ways in which the community under study, or other new town communities, might be managed. Of course, we can also turn this procedural order on its head. An examination of the theoretical precepts and/or practical results of the new towns may suggest intuitive "recommended" inputs for new town schemes, and observation of the subsequent results of our recommendation will form the basis of research. In what follows, I will try to sketch some of the more immediately apparent research ideas which illustrate the above points.

5.2 "Neighbourhood" and "Town" Research Directions

What follows is more an examination of the *conceptual categories* into which research might fall than an exhaustive listing of research ideas.

Non-Social Structural Ideas - Neighbourhood Level

It could be argued that, while the planners have left many institutions untouched in their rather conservative model of community, the neighbourhood has been their primary vehicle of experimentation and the primary expression of their ideology of community. Thus, a good deal of research could be directed to probing the spatial or social integrity of neighbourhood. In my terms, the most naive or elementary form of neighbourhood research will be that which tends toward the purely *asocial*

and *ahistorical*, and which is mainly psychological in orientation. If not purely asocial in the sense of only considering man-environment interactions, such research will tend to think of man-man interactions in a purely one-to-one (or cognitive) sense without reference to ideas of group interaction or inherent limitations placed on interaction by social stratification. We can create examples in this vein by referring back to the introductory (1.1) requirements for community of locale, common ties, and social interaction, or by referring to Keller's methodological categories for neighbourhood research (Keller, 1968).

Research about *locale* could involve questioning inhabitants about the names, boundaries and physical features of neighbourhoods, about their patterns of usage of local services, or might involve more subjective techniques such as the "cognitive mapping" of neighbourhoods. Generally, our goal might be to test the very existence of neighbourhood as a meaningful locale, or perhaps to test whether the residents' "technical" or spatial idea of neighbourhood matches that of the planner. - In the latter case, we should be careful how we make our accusations, it may not mean much that residents do not know the names or cannot draw cognitive maps if they do not indeed respect, say, the planned integrity of their neighbourhood as a service area.

Research about *common ties* could, in a limited fashion, examine the idea of "neighbouring" (Keller, 1968) without defining it as other than a one-to-one or purely personal behaviour. We might, for example, examine whether or not "neighbourhood" exists in the sense of shared local rules about (limited) neighbouring relations. Alternatively, we

could merely seek common ties in the sense of a shared stock of local knowledge about local rules, events, or phenomena.

Research about *interactions* could still be relatively asocial in that it might merely seek to locate individuals on a social network using a criterion of "knowledge" rather than friendship or bonding. In other words, we might tap the size of "interactional community" by linking representative individuals who merely "know of" or "have seen" each other.

In all cases above, we are probing the nature of community by relatively asocial or ahistorical methods. Of such methods, those under the heading of *locale* appear to be most relevant (because they probe the idea of "technical" neighbourhood on which I have founded more sophisticated or "social" ideas of neighbourhoods), those under the headings of common ties and interaction might be most valuable just when their lack of social-theoretical underpinning makes them easy to conduct as "shorthand" or rough studies.

Still working at the neighbourhood level, we might grant status to a category of research which, though more social, in the sense of giving explicit consideration to types of interaction and group roles therein, is still "naive" in ignoring the reality of social stratification. So, we might "naively" examine local informal groupings (after the fashion of Whyte, 1957) or deliberately created semi-formal groupings (as created in Columbia), so as to determine the "social perimeters" of neighbourhood. Research of this type, while still being ahistorical, could at least be comparative. Here, we might adapt one of Keller's

ideas to serve as an example of comparative "naive" social research. Keller (1966) expresses some scepticism about the likelihood of success of semi-formal groupings around community centres, and suggests instead that the binding force of community be provided by groupings around *avocational* or non-work interests. Her viewpoint suggests a study of the comparative merits of an "avocational", or rather "privatistic", model of community, as opposed to the more usual "vocational", or communal local government ideal.

Social Structural Ideas

Observe that until the last suggestion, the above ideas have not only been relatively asocial and/or ahistorical, but also somewhat isolationist, in the sense that they do not demand explicit comparison between neighbourhoods, or explicit recognition of disparities between (or within) neighbourhoods. If we move to a type of research which, while still social, explicitly considers the idea of *social stratification*, it is perhaps difficult to be quite so isolationist. Just as the notion of neighbourhood community has been one of the main items of new town rhetoric, so one of the main arguments for its completeness would be its transcendence of class barriers through social mix. So we might fairly examine this completeness in our research. More than any research categories thus far discussed, the critical examination of neighbourhood from a social *and* social structural viewpoint lays bare the inadequacies of hard-nosed "scientific" research of community. For the best we can probably do is to indirectly achieve approximate mixtures

over relatively short periods by the use of indirect policies such as mixture of housing types. This very indirectness suggests research ideas based on more sophisticated manipulation of social mix. In the terms of 5.1 it is our "recommendation" which comes first. So, Keller (1966) suggests the idea of *preselection* for socially mixed ("heterogeneous") neighbourhoods, on the grounds that certain groups (renters, young couples, transients) may better tolerate such heterogeneity. Or, she suggests that we opt for relative class homogeneity, but select people whose backgrounds vary within the overall class units. So, we might vary race, religion or "basic living unit" of newcomers, while holding occupational class relatively constant. Presumably, we would observe the results of such selection over time. However, how are we to evaluate the success or otherwise of policies of class mixture? If our goal is merely the *continuing* contiguity of different classes, with no motive other than perhaps the avoidance of "ecological" style neighbourhoods, then we might simply examine class-specific patterns of mobility between neighbourhoods over time, as Heraud (1968a, 1968b). If the goal is more an "equity" prescription of increased life chances for lower occupational classes, then we might with difficulty study intra- and inter-generational patterns of social mobility over time. Or, if we meet the planner fairly much on his own ground, and perhaps take the goal to be the simple lowering of ordinary class tensions, we might rework some of the earlier ideas with a more class-structural perspective.

We might reexamine the idea of neighbouring so as to establish

whether or not class mixed neighbourhoods are inimical to the workings of "ordinary" neighbouring relations, relative to homogeneous neighbourhoods. More pointed would be a reexamination of the variously formulated new-town neighbourhood organizations. Do these formal and semi-formal groups merely attract members, and exert power, according to fairly predictable class lines (denial of neighbourhood), do they genuinely transcend class lines, or are they simply irrelevant showpieces? All these examples with a social structural base demand a historical and/or comparative approach; and are all directed more or less to the proposition: *Is the class mixed community merely a physical entity (truce), or does something more than mere contiguity of classes prevail (consensus, conflict)?* Of course, we should keep in mind that, unless we accept the absolute validity of some "natural" or gemeinschaftlich model of community, our conceptualization of the "something more" which creates "true" community is to a large extent our *own* decision.

By retaining the prejudices (neighbourhood orientation) of the previous paragraph, yet working with a "*top-down*" rather than merely comparative view of neighbourhoods, we can move towards research categories which are directed rather more at the town or city as basic conceptual unit. At once, the most basic question, especially from my viewpoint, is whether or not the city of class mixed neighbourhoods is "better" than the ecological city. Recall that many geographical writings on the management of urban locational conflict tend to assume endogenous conflict between class islands - see, for example, "micro-level" theories of locational conflict as summarized by Evans (1976). In

3.5, we have discussed the general idea of neighbourhood or community conflict made endogenous by the jurisdiction of a relatively aspatial higher authority, but in Mumphrey, Seley and Wolpert (1971), Dear (1974) and the like this section is given stronger empirical content. We can imagine an initial state, which, though doubtless marked by between-neighbourhood disparity, is relatively calm. We then disturb the calm by introducing some new facility or physical network, and ask how the facility will be located so as to minimize community conflict, maximize overall benefit, or minimize neighbourhood compensation costs. And often the implication is that lower class neighbourhoods will lose regardless of the objective function. This school of thought immediately suggests as a "naive" research postulate that the presence of class mixed neighbourhoods forces greater equity in continuing urban management.

We can adopt ~~the~~ above idea of a planned *physical* change on which we may empirically sharpen our ideas of neighbourhood conflict, and the naive postulate would then be that it becomes harder to concentrate desirable (undesirable) facilities in well-defined rich (poor) areas. Or, we may simply assert that it becomes easier in general to institute compensatory principles of balance between new town neighbourhoods. However, if I might considerably paraphrase Townsend's argument (Townsend, 1976), it may be that policies of redistribution which are based on geographical sub-areas are not so productive, because there will always be many more outside the designated "special" areas who will miss out. That is, redistribution should be directed as class-structural

rather than geographic sites. Thus, our attention is directed rather to the city as the nearest micro-cosmic approximation of the nation-state as a whole.

The first issue which might then be discussed is the new town's alleged reproduction of the societal class balance. This seems just as much an issue of interpretation as an issue for practical research. Recall my suggestion that to interpret this reproduction as *progressive* rather than regressive may imply that we interpret the new town's economic status as that of a possibly desirable, but dependent, satellite rather than that of a fully-fledged city.

We might think that any agglomeration worthy of the name of city is bound to exhibit a rather predictable class composition, and further that class structure, and the "social relations" based thereon, tell us all we need to know about power.

In chapter 3, there has been a basic split portrayed between characterizations of city politics. This has been variously written as: "production based" social relations or "urban" social relations? or as: class-structural approaches or status-issue approaches? In each case, the first-named approach tends to deny the new town just that redistributive impact its newness might seem to provide.

Again, this split is just as much a problem of interpreting the world as a problem for "fact-finding" research. Our day-to-day empirical experience of (at least some) towns and cities, and very likely experience of the new towns, will not necessarily provide visible evidence of continual "conflict" between "classes", or between class-

based groups. How then are we to research the alleged class basis of new town community power structure, or to "test" this model against a more pluralistic model? In general terms, we can look for institutional similarities between "new towns" and "old towns", especially if we suspect that the latter have a power structure reflecting class interests. We might examine the municipal or quasi-municipal bodies of the new towns in search of direct evidence of class interest. However, we again come up against the semi-utopian notions on which some of the new towns are founded, and it may be that the search for real power will be frustrating. - Recall the idea that individuals may "trade-off" usual class interests in favour of physical or environmental advantages. In such a dilemma, we could, for example, search for evidence of class interest or "status-quoism" in the planning documents or planning ideology on which the new town is founded. Or, we could assert that it will be the occasional "real" issue disturbing the consensual calm which will demonstrate that class interests are the true guide to power.

Another way to resolve the dilemma is to retreat to the methods suggested at the end of 3.4, where our research is now directed not so much to the "proof" of a class-structural model, but rather to its accommodation with more pluralistic approaches. Recall the ideas of "dimensionality" in class models, and Parkin's idea of "closure". In the latter vein, we might for example theorize about a "new town proletariat", which would mimic upper-class exclusionary policies with respect to those not fortunate enough to live within the town boundaries, but would apply solidaristic principles in the case of within-town class

conflicts. Recall also the idea of "compartmentalizing" the power structure to take into account those issues which do and do not make the public agenda. This idea is tempting in the light of prior discussion about neighbourhood research. We might hypothesize that the overt or public issues are more likely to surface as *neighbourhood* level where they may well be worked out according to pluralist ideals, that the more important issues will become non-issues to be resolved at the *town* level according to the class interests of a covert power elite.

In the above examples, the approach has generally been rather more static or ahistorical than in the case of the neighbourhood-based examples, and there has been little emphasis on the neighbourhood as such. I have not been so much concerned with the "existence" of neighbourhood, but with the "existence" of the town or city as an important or fateful arena of conflict and redistribution. Implicitly, I have tended to grant the new town at least partial status or "existence", I have not taken Pahl's path of "nationally oriented versus locally oriented groups". Despite the structural bias in my presentation, it has generally been implicit that we can nevertheless find local class representatives of "nationally oriented", or society-wide, class interests, and legitimately research the possibly idiosyncratic *ways* in which class interests are protected in a local setting. Regardless of one preference for either a status-issue or class-structural approach, the question motivating many of the new town research themes has been approximately thus: *What is our conception of equity or social justice, and what questions about class mix*

and the community power structure does it lead us to ask? Further, this question is held to be somewhat more general or perhaps more fateful than the question of the shape of community which motivated many of the neighbourhood-level ideas.

5.3 Conclusion

The research ideas suggested above are intended to maintain a tension between those formulations which emphasize town as opposed to neighbourhood, and between formulations which do and do not emphasize the primacy of class relations in models of community (as in 3.3 to 3.5). Nevertheless, my biases should be reasonably clear. The idea of class, and that of relations between classes (the presence of such relations to be signalled by phrases such as "social mix" or "class mix") occupies a prominent place in both "neighbourhood" and "town" research ideas. And, even though the consideration of the ways in which "social mix" is realized at neighbourhood level suggests that the *neighbourhood* is more interesting as an arena of amelioration or innovation, it is my bias that a consideration of the politics of *city-wide* "community" will be a truer guide to the innovativeness of the new towns.

Note also what I might call the "mood" of the research examples. I have tried to avoid rather more hard-nosed scientific statements involving pressured correlations between well-defined variables. Clark's propositions for community research tend to follow this line, one of his examples is as follows: "The more pluralistic the value

system of members of the community, the more pluralistic the decision-making structure" (Clark, 1968b, 119). I have tried to be slightly less self-satisfied, and some of my examples are based on rather intuitive "recommendations", which hold the nature of community somewhat in doubt. Alternatively, examples will seek to compare an empirical new-town "snapshot", (or two "snapshots" taken at different epochs) with some relatively simple theoretical proposition which may allow only two "states of the world". Such an approach seems more appropriate when most of my examples are "structurally" based on difficult-to-quantify concepts such as class, class relations and class mix; and "geographically" based on units such as neighbourhood, town or city - units which are by no means closed systems and by no means easy to rigorous experimentation.

Thus, even though a class-structural perspective may offer insights about the nature of the new town as a "political" community, we may have very few degrees of freedom in manipulating class proportions or class relations at this level. And, though the "neighbourhood" may offer limited opportunities for experimentation in class mix and class relations, such experiments will tend to be fragile. Recall Davey and Doucet's "inverse law" of "social" class distances and "geographical" class distances, and the alleged British trends of limited community centre success and increasing class specialization of mixed neighbourhoods. - Daun (1976) claims that Sweden's historical precedent of mixed neighbourhoods of multiple-family dwelling units is being altered because the sharply increasing stock of quality single-family units is

draining these mixed neighbourhoods of high income families.

Despite these limitations, it is my inclination to see the new towns as having been "planned", and, more importantly, as having been planned in a "socially conscious" fashion (as 3.2). That is, they are planned with class interest and certain ideas of class relations in mind. The buildings, the spatial relations between them, and the rules for their usage, amount to a scenario for class relations which may or may not be attained in reality. This approach to research, which pushes the analysis of behaviour to at least a social if not social structural level, is preferred to a more passive approach which analyses behaviour in terms of qualities residing in form or space, or in the psychology of individuals (as 2.2, 2.3).

In the final analysis, the merit of my approach can be seen to depend on two tests: i) whether or not it suggests limitations to, or extensions of, existing findings. For example, the findings of Whyte, Festinger, *et al.*, which emphasize the importance of neighbourhood as a source of friendship, depend somewhat on what is a neighbourhood "class island". We are then entitled to ask if this important social meaning of physical neighbourhood provided by the architectural determinists will persist when we tamper with the one-class neighbourhood by (physically) introducing other classes. ii) Whether or not it provides different, yet worthwhile, interpretations of innovations such as in the new towns. For example, I have suggested that the new towns, despite their undoubted innovations in sheer scale of development, environmental advantages and even social institutions, may not be so

path-breaking when we examine their administration and politics more closely.

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