TOWARD AN AFRICAN ANIMAL STUDIES
TOWARD AN AFRICAN ANIMAL STUDIES:
ON THE LIMITS OF CONCERN IN GLOBAL POLITICS

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Toward an African Animal Studies: On the Limits of Concern in Global Politics

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LAY ABSTRACT

This thesis responds to the question of how we show concern for animals in postcolonial, globalized, and postconflict worlds. Drawing on the example of multiple texts in African literature, film, and other media, it explores how Africa itself has long been construed in the global imagination as a zone associated with animality. This association appears in texts produced within the West and Africa whose accounts of the continent imagine it to be outside the realm of human ethical concern. Demonstrating how exclusive human ethical concern is for African lives, both human and animal, this thesis argues for an ethics of concern that does not revolve around exclusively the human in postcolonial African studies.
ABSTRACT

This project attempts to bridge conversations between the predominantly Western canon of animal studies and the frequently humanist approach to postcolonial African studies. Drawing on these sometimes incompatible fields, this thesis proposes two premises that emerge from close readings of African cultural texts. First, “Africa” as a discursive construct has long been associated with animals, animality, and the category of the nonhuman, evident in, to give some examples, the current touristic promotion across the globe of African wildlife as an essential part of its continental identity, local and global anxieties over zoonotic transmissions of disease, and the history of race science’s preoccupation with animalizing black and indigenous African bodies. My second premise suggests that in postcolonial and especially African contexts ostensibly “human” concerns are inextricably tied to both the categorical limitations imposed by imperial paradigms of animalization and the precarious existence of nonhuman animals themselves, concern for whom is often occluded in anthropocentric postcolonial discourse. In my dissertation, I examine the role that texts play in directing affective relations of concern locally and globally, reading fictional texts as well as news media, conservation literature, and tourist advertisements. Through these works I examine the complex and often cantankerous politics of cultivating interspecies concern in postcolonial contexts, ranging from the globalized commodification of African wildlife and the dubious international policies that ostensibly protect it, the geography of the North American safari park, the animalization of queer bodies by African state leaders, textual representations of interspecies intimacy, and accounts of the Rwandan genocide.
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Introduction

Animals are my concern. Whether in the form of a figure or not. They multiply, lunging more and more wildly in my face in proportion as my texts seem to become autobiographical, or so one would have me believe. (Jacques Derrida, “The Animal That Therefore I Am [More to Follow]” 403)

How does one show concern for other-than-human animals in contexts where human life is precarious? This is the question from which the bulk of this inquiry into African animal life and death derives, though it merits some scrutiny. The question, focusing on shows of concern, is already interested not in concern as such, but in how it enters the field of visibility. This signals perhaps one of the most challenging facets of analyzing concern, in that—as an affect—it is presumably apparent only through the material-semiotic responses it motivates, even as those responses may be the very things that render concern intelligible, circulate it, or produce it. The question of how concern is mediated by various actions and texts will form a substantial part of this project. In interrogating the question of concern, the project will be interested in how the affective dimensions of it manifest in actions directed toward animals, and in the various institutions dedicated to liberating, regulating, killing, exploiting, or defending animal life in African spaces. Asked at the start of a project focused on Africa, the question perhaps presumes too much about the relation between that geographical zone and precarity, and the work that follows will resist as much as possible any simple account of this relation. It is, however, partly because of the persistence of narratives that make Africa the place on the globe most associated with precarity that this project focuses on that location.
But there is another unstable relation at work in that question: the one drawn between human life and shows of concern for animals, as if the world in which human precarity exists did not always already intersect with the worlds in which other-than-human animals live and die. In zones of widespread structural precarity, those in conflict or facing an extreme lack of resources, this intersection is arguably amplified in that the far-reaching and deleterious effects of such phenomena do not simply stop at the edge of the human. I ask this introductory question in response to a widespread cultural presumption that animal suffering occurs outside the realm in which human lives and deaths occur. This presumption, however, may be one that sustains human precarity in its refusal to unmask structures of domination that ostensibly occur in the animal world but that interpellate human lives as well.

As a preliminary guiding inquiry into the nature of concern, the opening question comes from the knowledge that shows of concern for nonhuman life run the risk of being cast as inappropriate or callous in the face of human suffering. If it were the case that such concern was insensitive to humans, and given the extent to which work from within Africa, African studies, or postcolonial studies deals with human oppression, the contexts examined by the postcolonialist might be easily co-opted into an anthropocentric narrative that places human suffering above all other forms, proscribing concern for beings not intelligibly human. It may be, moreover, that the field of animal studies is uniquely qualified to tackle the presumed distinction between humans and animals that such a question entails. Nonetheless, as this thesis explores postcolonialism and animal studies alongside one another, it maintains that looking at animality in zones where
questions of precarity, postcoloniality, and oppression converge is a critical practice in which animal studies must engage, not least because of the predominantly Western-centric archive of the field thus far. As I turn to nonhuman animals in a thesis focused on Africa, one of the reasons for doing so involves the notion that, if animal studies is to make a convincing case for animals in a world where their lives do not matter, it must do so even in contexts where concern for nonhuman life is proscribed under the auspices of attending to human suffering first and foremost.

That said, while there are good reasons for the human to examine the world of the animal, the questionable manner in which concern for animals must be justified in terms of how it will benefit the human is one that this project—as much as it possibly can—rejects. Part of articulating an ethics that considers nonhuman life or even lives that are most distant from what is intelligibly human (and this includes some from the human species) must presumably involve a decentering of the human as the primary actor within and beneficiary of ethical processes. I should note, technologies of animalization also remove many humans from being considered ethical others at all, let alone “first and foremost” above animals. Given that both postcolonialism and animal studies offer ways to rethink “our” relations with various “others,” and that both deal with questions of precarity, suffering, and oppression, these two fields might have much more in common than an anthropocentric narrative would allow us to see. Reading the intersections between these two fields might provide something of a response to the question of how to effectively show concern for animals, whether they be human or otherwise.
In responding to and expanding the above question, this thesis examines Africa specifically for three reasons. The first is that animal studies has shown little concern for Africa so far. Many mammals that currently reside within Africa’s borders have been at the forefront of animal studies—Peter Singer and Paola Cavalieri’s work on the Great Ape Project is one notable and probably the most famous example from within the field—but rarely with a consideration of Africa’s uniqueness as both a physical location and what James Ferguson calls a “discursive imaginative object” in the field of global politics (4). The second reason is that Africa has a unique history in relation to the animal given the (now familiar to postcolonial studies) animalization of so many African bodies under colonialism. Turning to Africa as a site in which ideas about animality have been shaped through colonial history might also shed light on some of the reductive conceptions of animals so often tackled by animal studies. The third reason, following from the second, involves the notion that voicing concern for animals in Africa might encounter impediments given the extent to which animality has been a signifier for a construction of the bestialized human.

Moreover, no widespread animal advocacy like that found in wealthier continents has taken off in Africa. The now-familiar type of advocacy practiced by animal rights movements may actually be incompatible with the work of decolonization continuously underway on the continent. Many such movements might work to sustain rather than critique colonial structures in their impetus to speak for the animal other and in that they
are frequently practiced within Africa by a series of primarily Western NGOs that undermine local sovereignties.¹

In light of the above, this project aims to look at narratives in which animality and ideas about Africanness converge. It does so to tackle the notion that the frequently humanist purview of postcolonial studies and the so-far overwhelmingly Western canon of animal studies might seem incompatible bedfellows. It is certainly the case that Africa does not often appear in the now frequently-published texts within the field of animal studies and, as I will show in the pages to come, postcolonial studies has also been slow to consider nonhuman animals except for their figurative currency in imperialist regimes of racialization and dehumanization. In order to move beyond this singular reading of animal life, I contend that concern and its circulation in global affective networks are deeply rooted in anthropocentric logics, ones that come into formation alongside technologies of colonialism at work in the age of global Empire. Interrogating the notion of concern, then, might reveal ways that animality and the human-centred critiques frequently found in postcolonial studies, rather than being separate issues, actually emerge from similar histories. If there is a tie between the (post)colonial and the animal, as this project argues, we cannot for very long maintain the fiction that postcolonial critique is or continues to be an exclusively humanist project, nor that animal studies is not implicated in the types of power that postcolonialism tackles.²

¹ A more sustained analysis of the limitations of animal rights as a form of advocacy for animal lives appears in Chapter Three.
² The assertion that postcolonialism needs to move beyond its humanist roots is certainly not unique to this project. This assertion has also been the foundation for postcolonial ecocriticism, and the critique of humanism that can be levelled from a postcolonial perspective is well summarized by Dipesh Chakrabarty’s work.
Drawing on these two fields, this thesis proposes two central premises that emerge from close readings of various African literary and cultural texts. First, “Africa” as a discursive construct has a long history of associations with animals, animality, and the category of the nonhuman, evident in, to give some examples, the current touristic promotion across the globe of African wildlife as an essential part of its continental identity, local and global anxieties over zoonotic transmissions (including HIV, Ebola, and trypanosomiasis), and the violent but nonetheless influential history of race science’s preoccupation with animalizing black and indigenous African bodies. The chapters following this introduction engage more deeply with these examples, but suffice it to say that animality and humans’ relations with other animals are often sources of various forms of anxious concern in multiple African contexts. The animal itself is often the marker of the place at which concern can permissibly be denied to a life when concern stakes itself on humanist grounds.

Drawing on the above examples and current understandings of animality, my work relies on two central premises. The first is that Africa often emerges in imperialist global imaginaries as a space replete with and productive of primitivized animality and animalized humanity. If the work of critics I cite in the pages to come is any indication, postcolonial studies has been complicit in these imaginaries in its frequent readings of animality as a marker of subhumanity. My second premise attempts to dispel such readings of animality, and suggests that in postcolonial and especially in African contexts ostensibly “human” concerns are inextricably tied to both the categorical limitations imposed by imperial paradigms of animalization and the precarious existence of
nonhuman animals themselves, concern for whom is often occluded in anthropocentric postcolonial discourse. It is based on this premise that I suggest we might disentangle the African animal from its figurative associations in colonial, imperial, and global capitalist assertions of power that come to render multiple lives (not just nonhuman ones) less than human. I suggest we might articulate an ethics of concern in postcolonial situations for human and extrahuman life-worlds that would emphasize the shared lives of humans and animals rather than one that regards the animal as an abject figure of subhumanity, or a member of a different sphere of life than the human. This project involves thinking through the limits of concern where animality and Africa are concerned, hopefully assembling a discourse whereby concern occurs not within circumscribable categories derived from species boundaries. I suggest that a postcolonial interspecies ethics requires us to extend the ethical imagination beyond such boundaries, toward rather than away from that which is most different from normative visions of the human.

Part of the above work will involve pushing the limits of certain types of thinking within animal and postcolonial African studies precisely because animality represents a limit of sorts in the field of global concern. Dominick LaCapra’s work on the limit, for example, foregrounds the ways that animals are often placed beyond an ethical limit, “in a separate sphere or category of otherness to which ethical and political considerations do not apply, or at best apply in very reduced form” (159). If the animal represents that which exists beyond the human and, often, that body for whom concern can be suspended, I aim to test the limits of current vocabulary in both animal and postcolonial studies in order to extend concern to those for whom it is frequently denied. In the case of
animal studies, what are the limits implied by the term “animal” and how far does the term extend? If animals are to be subjects of concern for humans who have the power to change the conditions in which they live, what counts as an animal? This project suggests that the authenticity of this category also needs rethinking as it turns to not only charismatic megafauna but also microscopic forms of life that move through the bodies of humans and animals, challenging the physical (bodily) boundaries that often make understandings of the individual human or animal intelligible.

The Case for Concern: (Critical) Animal Studies and the Relationality of Concern

To some extent, the question of “how” one shows concern for animals in zones of human precarity has already been given a kind of response evident in various global strategies to protect wildlife. These are strategies evident in the work of the so-called animal rights and animal advocacy movements, not to mention a complex network of environmentalist NGOs that deploy themselves in zones of human precarity under the auspices of preserving “nature.”3 The work of generating concern worldwide and in zones such as Africa is thus already underway in some form, if not exclusively for animals then for nonhuman ecologies in general, circulated through and alongside these institutions.

3 There are numerous examples of such institutions within Africa, some of which are detailed in the first chapter of this project. These include the various efforts of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) to protect wildlife, the now-familiar efforts of figures such as Jane Goodall and Dian Fossey with African apes, the Great Ape Project founded by Peter Singer and Paola Cavalieri in 1993, the Africa Network for Animal Welfare (ANAW), and other examples too numerous to mention. With few exceptions, however, attention to nonhuman lives in sub-Saharan Africa has been motivated by Western bodies that, as critics such as Pekka Virtanen and James Ferguson detail, undermine local sovereignties. This is not to suggest that Africa is a place devoid of concern for animal life, but that those familiar venues that allow speaking for animal life may be incompatible with the local politics of African space.
However, in turning primarily to literary and other cultural texts rather than the familiar institutions that circulate some form of concern for the nonhuman, this thesis is interested in multiplying what it sees as the limited number of venues through which ties of concern between humans and animals can be expressed, and questioning the extent to which international interests sever ties between locals and nonhuman animals in their midst. It is also deeply skeptical of institutionalized rubrics of concern for the way that they reinforce rather than contest the place of Africa and animality in relation to a normatively-construed vision of the human.

In that this project unpacks how one might show concern for animals, concern itself should not be confused with the strategies of its exercise or the events of its appearance. It would be too easy, for example, to dismiss concern for how often it appears in acts of charity or benevolence directed toward a negatively-construed image of Africa, the effects of which are by now well-understood since at least Kwame Nkruma’s work on the neocolonial.\(^4\) If concern is a component of charitable giving, in which Africa becomes the figure of need always dependent upon the benevolent Westerner, this project maintains that this is only one of many iterations of concern’s exercise. To the extent that this approach renders Africa an accessory to Western benevolence, this project critiques such acts of giving (most prominently through the figure of the humanitarian discussed in Chapter Two). It is worth noting that acts of benevolence carried out toward nonhuman animals frequently occur at the expense of—or even depend on—the silence of the animal other that does not speak for her own needs. If charitable giving renders the other

\(^4\) See Kwame Nkrumah’s *Neocolonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism*. 
in need an accessory to the liberal self, there might be ways of envisioning relations of concern that consider rather than occlude the other.

The very language of the relation implies the primacy not of the liberal subject itself, but the zone between beings, and this is the vision of concern I theorize here. While the dominant frameworks of institutionalized concern such as animal rights, animal advocacy, and institutionally-regulated conservationism offer a few modes of turning concern into strategic action for animal lives, this project is interested in unpacking the limits of such shows of concern, the modes of their operation, and their efficacy within zones such as Africa. This project also rejects an approach to animality that merely inverts the anthropocentric hierarchy by considering animals at the expense of those humans living alongside them. While global and institutional instantiations of concern for animals certainly work toward a widespread consciousness of the plight of the nonhuman world, they do not necessarily tell us about the particularities of human/animal relations—or relations between nonhuman animals themselves and their worlds—in the complex politics of African spaces.

Animal studies has already been critical of institutionalized venues that show concern for animals, but understanding concern and its global mechanisms might also be a crucial move for rethinking assumptions within the field of critical animal studies itself. Indeed, the field might be thought of as founded on concern for animal life. More so than its disciplinary counterparts—“animal studies,” “human-animal studies,” “species studies,” all of which render the animal a subject of analysis—critical animal studies
maintains a focus on changing the conditions in which animals live. It builds on these other fields’ focus on the animal, but with a caution against turning it into a mere category for analysis and an explicit aim of working toward animal liberation. To some extent, the current project also emerges from a desire to bring to light and hopefully work toward changing the conditions in which animals live and die, though it retains a skepticism toward the authenticity of the category of animality and any utopic calls for animal liberation. Dipesh Chakrabarty’s work on the Anthropocene cautions against the seductive call of freedom that underlies struggles for liberation. For Chakrabarty, “freedom” is a “blanket category for diverse imaginations of human autonomy and sovereignty” that he reads under the paradigm of humans’ unique “geological agency” (208). If liberationism depends to some extent on this conception of individual freedom, it may be inadequate to extend to animals who cannot claim such autonomy nor sovereignty in current legal instantiations of global justice. The sovereignty of the individual on which freedom stakes its claim might occlude the ways that individuals are made and unmade through relations with other bodies and ecologies. If this project hopes to articulate a concern for animal life, it is a concern that rejects the liberal discourse of individual sovereignty in favor of a view toward the intersections between various lives, even when such lives intersect in violent ways.

If concern finds some expression in the above-mentioned institutionalized venues, this project also reads its traces in cultural texts of various kinds. Although the texts with

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5 This definition of critical animal studies relies on a few influential descriptions from within the field, the most famous of which might be Peter Singer’s *Animal Liberation*. See also Steven Best’s “The Rise of Critical Animal Studies,” Richard Twine’s *Animals as Biotechnology*, Dwayne McCance’s *Critical Animal Studies*, and Nocella et al.’s *Defining Critical Animal Studies* for similar accounts of the field.
which this project deals are primarily literary and visual ones, circulated through various mediating technologies and thus already alienated from the modes of communication embodied by many nonhuman animals, I maintain that such texts nonetheless carry the capacity to cultivate concern in various ways and to facilitate relations of concern between beings. The linguistic text might thus animate affective relations with other animals—even ones that caution the human against intervention into animal worlds—even though they circulate primarily amongst humans themselves.

Concern itself is by definition a relational concept. The multiple meanings of the term “concern” denote its relational components. To be concerned with something is to “have relation” with that thing (def 2a). A concern is itself a “relation of connection or active interest” (4a), or a “subject that affects or touches one” (7a). Curiously, this latter definition brings us into the language of gesture, as if the feeling of concern were something that brought about a form of contact or touching between different bodies. Read in this way, concern might be an intersubjective affect that bridges two entities or, indeed, occurs in its orientation toward the distance or space between two entities.

One of the central aims of this project will be to think of texts as participating in the processes of concern, as cultivating, generating, or directing particular orientations of concern. If we think of texts as being concerned with particular subjects, or as structuring relations of concern by means of a textual encounter with a subject, the “active interest” of concern also gestures toward possibilities for texts to exceed the reductive parameters of representation as it has been understood in postcolonial theory as a form of “proxy and portrait” (Spivak 258). There may be something more at work in texts—be they literary
or otherwise—than representation. If texts can be thought of as facilitating forms of concern, the ‘active interest’ of concern might render the process of reading more than simply a passive encounter with others represented in the textures of various cultural forms; it might be that such texts and their histories leave a residual concern on the being of the reading subject. If texts animate concern for an other, as in the case in which someone or something is or becomes a concern in the encounters that various cultural texts facilitate, this affect encapsulates the event of an affective transmission from the “one” who is the subject of concern to the “one” concerned with the former. Concern might derive from a particular orientation, which Sarah Ahmed describes as involving “directions toward objects that affect what we do, and how we inhabit space” (Queer 28). Beyond the direction toward an object, concern implies a relational transmission of affect, as if concern itself were something that moved between texts and bodies rather than originated from the individual as liberal conceptions of the self would have us believe.

This transmissional quality of concern need not always be a wrought in positivity. Thinking of transmission itself and its relation to transmissible pathogens brings us into bodily zones in which the entrance of another into our bodies or the occupation of our bodies by other, smaller bodies generates another type of concern altogether (to say nothing of spaces occupied by foreign bodies within contexts of colonial domination). Zoonotic illnesses—those that travel across species barriers—involve a relation that cannot be described in wholly productive terms. This concern may be no less intersubjective but indicates that concern can disrupt the smooth unfolding of our lives or
involve relations threatening to the lives of individual bodies. Additionally, concern may be replete with violence, as when we think of the ways that concern for particular subjects gets wielded in the relations between colonizer and colonized, East and West, Global South and Global North, animal and human, and—to cite Agamben’s terminology that will be important to later chapters of this project—sovereign power and bare life. Others emerging in relation to the self as subjects of concern might involve a wholly different kind of transmission, designating a “disturbance” (def. 12), or an interest that precedes an “anxious, uneasy, or troubled state of mind” (def. 5a). However, even as disturbance or anxiety, traces of the other as a subject of concern come to enter the being of the concerned subject, rupturing any easy affective distinction between the two. It may be that the response to this concern is a violent compensatory act that seeks to sever ties with a disturbance, but the anxiety with which such acts are performed emphasizes the affective claim that a concern makes on the actor.

In order to think through how concern has animated the field of animal studies so far, I return now to the epigraph of this introduction from Derrida. I do so also because Derrida is arguably, if not the field’s most influential voice, then certainly one of its most cited. This particular passage comes from Derrida’s brief rumination on the “figure” of the animal so entrenched within anthropocentric systems of thought. Importantly, Derrida follows the declaration of his concern for animals with lively diction, writing other creatures as “lunging” in his face “wildly.” In so doing, he keeps his reader attuned to the notion that the figure of the animal is never simply figurative but—empty as the signifier “animality” may be—derived from the bodies of particular animals. His text tethers its
reader to a language grounded in gesture, in the corporeal capacities of the animal, as if to keep our attention focused on the body of the animal frequently absent in figurations of it. It is also worth noting that his text’s central arguments begin with the body of another particular animal, his cat. In the story Derrida tells, the cat happens upon him standing naked and he falls under the feline’s gaze, feeling shame under it. If this story is one that also animates his concern, it is as if Derrida were responding to an ethical claim on his body made by the animal gaze, as if his concern were generated by the body of a particular animal in his midst. Bodies—especially animal bodies—will be important to this project as well, as a sort of reminder of the fleshly presences that animate global affective networks.

More recently, Bruno Latour encourages an orientation toward what he calls “matters of concern” in critique, to which I add an insistence on the “matter” of concern entering critique. Curiously, though his text interprets the matter of concern under the rubric of the “thing,” it offers no precise account of what concern itself is beyond noting those moments where it matters. Rather, he insists that critique must avoid its consistent attempts at debunking matters of fact and work toward matters of concern. “Critique has not been critical enough in spite of all its sore scratching,” he argues. Commenting on critique’s indebtedness to “a very powerful descriptive tool, that of matters of fact, which were excellent for debunking quite a lot of beliefs, powers, and illusions, it found itself totally disarmed once matters of fact, in turn, were eaten up by the same debunking impetus” (232). He suggests that “the critical spirit has sent us down the wrong path, encouraging us to fight the wrong enemies.” For Latour, the “question was never to get
away from facts but closer to them, not fighting empiricism but, on the contrary, renewing empiricism” (231). I will concede to the notion that many cultural theories (even or especially theories of animality) have involved a good deal of debunking and that there is room to, as Bruno Latour suggests in reference to Donna Haraway’s work, “[deal] this time with matters of concern ... whose import ... will no longer be to debunk but to protect and care” (232). However, particularly where animals are concerned, a revitalization of empiricism does not seem like the answer when animal bodies are frequently the raw materials from which so many empirical truths about the human have derived.6 If Bruno Latour calls for increased attention toward matters of concern, I offer what I hope is more than simple wordplay: that is, attention to the “matter of concern.” Again, particularly where animals are concerned, and much as Derrida encourages, attention to the bodies that become matters of concern and through which concern moves might be part of pushing the critical apparatus toward caring and protection. There is still, however, much debunking to be done where animals are concerned if prevailing anthropocentric attitudes are to come under question. As this thesis intends to show, matters of concern in the critical apparatus are closely tied to the human as the central figure able to generate and circulate concern.

Derrida’s work emphasizes the limitations of critique in a different manner, commenting on philosophy’s tendency to tell an autobiographical story of the human in which animal others only function to buttress the human’s ascendancy. For Derrida,

6 This assertion relies heavily on Nicole Shukin’s work on “rendering” the animal body, discussed in the first chapter of this dissertation. It is also influenced by Dominick LaCapra’s critique of humanist philosophy and accounts of animality that turn the animal body into a kind of “raw material” (LaCapra 159-160).
however, animals disrupt the smooth unfolding of this narrative, as demonstrated in the epigraph to this chapter borrowed from his work. He writes that the animal (in a figurative but nonetheless embodied way) lunges in the face of an autobiographical narrative that Derrida is ostensibly telling through his work. This autobiography is, of course, never simply about Derrida, but about the human as the “autobiographical animal” and about humanism’s narcissistic fascination with the story of itself (Animal 416-418). The animal in this quotation seems to, if not enter, then interrupt the autobiographical process, as if the animal other were to insist on its place in the narrative of the human self. It is a disruptive interruption, borne out of the invasiveness of the animal lunging into the face of Derrida’s narrative. If the face has been an important consideration for thinking through ethical encounters following Levinas, the insistence with which animals lunge into Derrida’s face might also be the start of an ethical encounter, one that gives vitality to his concern and sketches out the urgency of considering animals other than the human.

Donna Haraway would later criticize Derrida, however, for failing his obligation of concern to animal others. In the case of the aforementioned cat gazing upon Derrida’s naked body, Haraway suggests that “he was sidetracked by his textual canon of Western philosophy and literature.” This ostensibly marks his having “failed a simple obligation of companion species; he did not become curious about what the cat [from earlier in his narrative] might actually be doing, feeling, thinking, or perhaps making available to him in looking back at him that morning” (When 20). This criticism derives from Haraway’s own recent work, which has been focused, in both The Companion Species Manifesto and
When Species Meet, on interspecies relationality. Reading interspecies bonds under this rubric, Haraway, similarly to Derrida and in line with much work in animal studies, troubles the categorical limitations imposed by terms such as “human” and “animal” and encourages a look at zones *between* beings. According to Haraway, “it is the patterns of relationality and … intra-actions … that need rethinking, not getting beyond one troubled category for a worse one … The partners do not precede their relating; all that is, is the fruit of becoming with” (*When* 17). Much like Derrida’s foundational work when he insists that “[b]eyond the edge of the *so-called* human … there is already a multiplicity of … organizations of relations between living and dead” (*Animal* 31), Haraway sketches out a mode of understanding humanity’s relations with other species that goes beyond regarding humans as the central autonomous actors in the world. Indeed, the relation between lives rather than the state of individual ones is central concern for both thinkers. Derrida, though, becoming caught up in philosophy rather than his animal companion’s gaze, supposedly fails to return the claim made by the face of his cat, by the material, embodied presence of an animal in his midst. For Haraway’s oeuvre of work, the relationality implied by the joint occupation of the globe by multiple species necessitates a more material response on the part of the human.

Operating under a similar commitment, Matthew Calarco’s work aligns with Haraway’s in its focus on indistinction as a way to conceive of human/animal relations. If concern is that which occurs between bodies, it may be one of those affects that embodies his notion of indistinction. Calarco critiques ethical frameworks that “extend … outward from human beings to include animals, thereby founding continuity on the basis of
animals exhibiting certain human traits” (ch. 3). This framework aligns with what I discuss in the third chapter of this thesis, what I call an “ethics of similarity” that considers other animals only insofar as they bear some similarity to normative human bodies or capacities, an ethics that forecloses concern for those bodies most different from the human. For Calarco, indistinction rejects ethical claims of identity theories that depend on human/animal distinctions and instead “aims to think about human beings and animals in deeply relational terms that permit new groupings and new differences to emerge, such that ‘the human’ is no longer the centre or chief point of reference” (ch. 3). In this way, Calarco’s work resonates with Haraway’s own on relationality.

The language of relationality offers a compelling way to thinking through an affect as complex as concern, but it may be that the celebratory language of Haraway’s perspective does not leave room for the violence inherent to many relational networks.

For Haraway, relationality is a (re)productive and vitalizing process, or so her above-cited botanical metaphor describing “the fruit of becoming with” suggests (17). Later in her text, she expands a similar understanding of relationality to encapsulate a global network of interspecies bonds, insisting that,

We are in the midst of webbed existences, multiple beings in relationship, this animal, this sick child, this village, these herds, these labs, these neighborhoods in a city, these industries and economies, these ecologies linking natures and cultures without end. This is a ramifying tapestry of shared being/becoming among critters (including humans) in which living well, flourishing, and being ‘polite’ (political/ethical/in right relation) mean staying inside shared semiotic materiality, including the suffering inherent in unequal and ontologically multiple instrumental relationships. (When 72)
The tapestry woven out of the above quotation is a compelling one. It celebrates the inclusivity of those of us “staying inside” the relational networks in which we live, even if those networks constitute many forms of suffering (of the animals that exist in the labs, for example). As Judith Butler convincingly argues in *Precarious Life*, however, the celebratory language of relationality does not tell the full story of our relations with others. As she puts it, “we may need other language to approach the issue that concerns us, a way of thinking about how we are not only constituted by our relations but also dispossessed by them as well” (24). If relationality is a consideration in thinking through the mechanisms of concern, there perhaps needs to be a critique of violent, difficult, or cantankerous relationalities that challenge the presumption that humans *can* engage ethically with others or, indeed, that there are not those wholly disenfranchised by or removed from the human realm of ethical relations. Haraway’s work on relationality risks reifying rather than undermining anthropocentrism in reading shared becoming under the rubric of companion species, only imagining relationality as it occurs between other animals and humans and not troubling the overwhelming power humans have in structuring those relations. According to Rosemary Collard, animal studies must recuperate a notion of wildness that views animality other than at the junction of companionship with humans if any meaningful response to the precarious lives of many

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7 Laboratory animals play a significant part in Haraway’s *When Species Meet*, but this text—while cognizant of the differential power position that humans and animals occupy in labs—is hesitant to critique them. For Haraway, “human beings are not uniquely obligated to and gifted with responsibility; animals as workers in labs, animals in all their worlds, are response-able in the same sense as people are; that is, responsibility is a relationship crafted in intra-action through which entities … come into being” (71).
animals is to occur. Relationality, while it informs the bedrock of this project’s work on concern, is thus not always worthy of celebration, but generative of multiple ties that both constitute and violently disassemble subjects in their wake.

Still, in that this project turns primarily to a relational model for reading the transmission of concern between different bodies and locations on the globe, concern itself is something that challenges the concept of the limit mentioned earlier in this introduction. In that concern is something that occurs not within the confines of the individual but precisely in the individual’s relation with an other, it is already an affect that moves beyond the confines of a certain type of limit, that of the body or of the human species. Whether concern emerges as “concern for” in its orientation toward another, or as a type of anxiety that enters the subject as a result of an other in its midst—just as Derrida’s animals lunge into his narrative—concern has a way of spilling over, of moving beyond the boundaries that attempt to contain it.

From Postcolonial Ecocriticism to African Animal Studies

That postcolonialism turns to relations not always easily celebrated—ones enmeshed in no simple way with the history of various locations’ experience of colonial domination—makes it a toolset well-equipped to tackle the questions set out by this project. It also lends a conceptual framework for thinking through structures of domination that mutually affect humans and animals. Much that follows might better fall

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8 According to Collard, it is important to distinguish between the concept of wildness she offers and the notion of “wilderness,” which often has colonial underpinnings. Her focus on wildness involves resisting “the degree to which [animals] are forcibly brought into particular encounters with humans” (161).
under the umbrella of the “global,” globalization studies, and their attendant theorists as part of the project focuses on international networks that facilitate the uses and abuses of African animal lives. Still, given the near-universal domination of animal bodies under human ones across the globe, postcolonial thought will continue to be a primary concern in the pages to come for what Rob Nixon calls its “oppositional incisiveness” that contests the often celebratory language of globalization (18). In his own work on postcolonial environmentalisms, Nixon cautions against the potential for “political retreat” that globalization’s proponents frequently offer. He urges that “neoliberal acts of violence … not [be] hastily euphemized as ‘global flows’” in the language of globalization (18). In that this project is interested in challenging the conditions in which multiple animals live, the critical apparatus of postcolonialism seems uniquely qualified.

Although what might be termed a postcolonial animal studies is still in its infancy, it is worth noting the wealth of ecocriticism and those few texts on postcolonial animals that have laid the groundwork for thinking beyond the humanism of much postcolonial studies. This work is well established in the realm of postcolonial ecocriticism, as indicated by Jennifer Wenzel’s recent comment that “[o]ne can hardly claim any more that postcolonial theory doesn’t say anything about nature” (185). There has already been a wealth of literature questioning the humanism of postcolonial studies, and

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9 Jennifer Wenzel provides an account of multiple “waves” of postcolonial ecocriticism in “Reading Fanon Reading Nature.” Among postcolonial ecocriticism’s central texts she notes the work of scholars such as Rob Nixon, Elizabeth Deloughrey, George Handley, Graham Huggan, Helen Tiffin, Pablo Mukherjee, Bonnie Roos, Alex Hunt, and Susie O’Brien. O’Brien’s “Articulating a World of Difference” describes many of the conversations occurring in this field, while paving the groundwork for connections between thought on the ecological and the postcolonial. I cite Dipesh Chakrabarty here as another figure whose work has questioned the humanism of postcolonialism.
questioning whether postcolonial study is a humanist pursuit. Moreover, texts such as Graham Huggan and Helen Tiffin’s *Postcolonial Ecocriticism* and Elizabeth Deloughrey and George B. Handley’s *Postcolonial Ecologies* theorize the lives of animals under the rubric of a postcolonial ecocriticism.

If ecocritical work has facilitated postcolonialism’s increased focus on the world beyond the human, works from within postcolonial animal studies suggest there are good reasons for focusing more specifically on the animals that occupy those ecologies. Many of these texts appear in my first chapter, at which point I turn to work from African postcolonial studies, but it is worth citing a notable example of postcolonial animal studies here. Written in 2002, Philip Armstrong’s “The Postcolonial Animal” offers an early scholarly mapping of intersections between postcolonial studies and then emergent field of animal studies. Touching on the commonalities between the two seemingly disparate fields, he emphasizes the potential for postcolonial studies to add the animal to its archive given the ways that various imperial practices have affected both human and nonhuman spheres in the postcolony’s contested spaces of power. Of these practices, he reads colonialism’s civilizing mission, its construction of savage natures and cultures, and its processes of racialization as intimately tied to the historical production of the animal as Western humanity’s radical other, its categorical opposite against which the human could stake its superiority. In emphasizing the shared spaces that humans and nonhumans occupy in these worlds, he lays the foundations for bridging what he sees as the predominantly humanist purview of postcolonial thought and the then under-examined conditions of the nonhuman in its intellectual archives.
Roughly midway through the essay, he shifts his focus away from these concerns and toward a reading of the animal as an agent capable of resisting colonial imperatives. For Armstrong, the animal’s agency resonates with the postcolonial project, as he insists that “the question of agency—the capacity to affect the environment and history—is integral to both postcolonial and animal studies” (415). Furthering this theme, he argues that “the animal has tended to disrupt the smooth unfolding of Enlightenment ideology. Defined as that bit of nature endowed with voluntary motion, the animal resists the imperialist desire to represent the natural—and especially the colonial terrain—as a passive object or blank slate ready for mapping by Western experts” (415).

This is an encouraging mode of viewing the animal in a postcolonial context, is it not? In a field (postcolonial studies) dominated by its interrogations of colonialism’s effects on human populations, Armstrong’s intervention posits the animal as a figure that can invigorate notions of postcolonial agency. The subversive potential of animal movements might appear to add vitality to the field, but what are the limits of this ostensible agency? Alternately, perhaps a more prescient question as postcolonial animal studies is becoming increasingly visible: what remains out of sight in Armstrong’s identification of voluntary animal movement as agency? After all, if we are to think of movement more broadly as it relates to both human and nonhuman animals, humans might be thought of as comparably resistant subjects. This account of movement echoes James C. Scott’s characterization of “everyday forms of resistance”—a phrase that he uses to describe practices such as “noncompliance, foot dragging, [and] deception” as not necessarily planned but nonetheless powerful in their cumulative effects (xvi). Rather
than tackling macropolitical and structural problems, Scott’s work suggests that such forms of resistance cumulatively amass formidable communities of dissent. Voluntary movement at a bodily level, then, might carry some potential, but what, if anything, distinguishes the movements of animals from the movements of humans? Are animals engaged in dialectics with power comparable to the everyday forms of resistance Scott cites?

As this project sifts through the positioning of animals in discourses about Africa, including those within the framework of African studies, my initial response to these questions is less optimistic than Armstrong’s analysis would allow. That is to say, in order to answer them, we must consider the different movements or lack thereof of multiple animals in postcolonial contexts and this is no easy task; these animals are many, and no amount of theorizing about the animal in general could hope to account for them. Additionally, there remains the problem that charismatic megafauna (such as “The Big Five Game”) frequently remain the only visible nonhuman African bodies toward whom the globe shows concern, and the precarious conditions of their existence too often remain out of sight. I do not know how comparable human and other animals’ movements are, nor can I decisively say that they are wholly separate from one another, but both postcolonial and animal studies emphasize similar technologies of power that shape and constrain the movement of each. In this regard I would say that something might be gained from furthering the conversation between postcolonial and animal studies, not in a way that assumes any simple relation between the colonial, the
postcolonial, and the animal but precisely one that considers the challenge that animal studies and postcolonial studies pose to one another.

Although Armstrong’s work considers the relation between the macrostructures of colonial power and the micromovements of the animal, it gestures toward the possibility of resistance located at the body of the animal without a thorough consideration of this animal’s own constrained movements through colonial history. His account of agency posits the animal’s voluntary movement as a form of resistance to power. Foucault’s late work on biopower, however, might caution against this reading; his understanding of the administrative operations of power allows for subjects to exercise agency within certain parameters. Furthermore, though animals have frequently been presumed nonmembers of the bios of Agamben-inspired analyses of biopower, Nicole Shukin’s recent work on the zoopolitical convincingly overturns this anthropocentric presumption. Her work demonstrates that extrahuman lives are thickly enmeshed within biopolitical systems even through their exclusion. We might extend these analyses to discussions of colonial administration, emphasizing that animals are not outside the colonial imperative to map, as Armstrong suggests, but subject to it. Even without the critical material, one need only glance at the increasingly precarious spaces that many African nonhuman animals occupy—these include policed game reserves, so-called canned hunting enclosures, and conservation sites with competing international interests—to discover that voluntary movement for many animals is also bordered, policed, contained, and commodified.\textsuperscript{10}

\textsuperscript{10}Canned hunting involves animals being hunted in enclosed spaces for the ease of the hunter.
Armstrong’s work also, though it attempts to exceptionalize the animal as colonial resistance, enacts an interpellative process that risks negating the very agency of the animal on which his argument depends. In Althusser’s account of interpellation, one that has been helpful for thinking through colonialism’s production of the colonized other (Ashcroft 47), the subject emerges in a process of call and response; the response to the potentially punitive call of power is that which brings the colonized subject into relation with power. For Judith Butler, who considers the formation of the subject in *The Psychic Life of Power*, it is also the process by which the subject comes into being, as power is that which forms the very conditions of the subject (1). If we read colonial power through an Althusserian model of interpellation, Armstrong’s animal remains only partially included in this relation in that it does not respond in any simple way to the call. This is not to say that the animal has no capacities for response of its own but that, constrained by language, “we humans” do not have the tools to imagine it. This might be the point for Armstrong, in that the animal is a resistant body precisely because it disregards language and the call of colonialism, has no stake in its discursive sway, and does not recognize it as power. However, in reading the animal as a resistant postcolonial body disruptive to Enlightenment ideology, the being of the animal is rendered intelligible only in terms of its relation to this power. Though the animal gives no response, Armstrong does the work of this interpellative process for us, bringing the animal into a postcolonial framework, insisting on positioning its voluntary movement as resistance. It might be important to note here that colonialism’s relationship to animals has been varied and multifarious, treating some as pests, some (dogs) as policing agents in the colonial endeavor, and
others as game. In the latter case, colonialism has been quite comfortable exploiting the voluntary movements of animals for sport and, thus, this account of agency is not an easy one to swallow.

If I seem unduly harsh toward Armstrong’s work, I encourage the reader to maintain the same skepticism toward the present inquiry. Doing so might keep us awake to the ways that theorizing within postcolonial and animal studies can be complicit in the very power it seeks to critique. It has arguably been one of postcolonialism’s most enduring gestures to emphasize the power of the critical apparatus, no matter how well-intentioned it may be, to silence the voices of those most excluded from its structure, and this idea appears most famously in Gayatri Spivak’s work on the subaltern. Whether we consider the subaltern or the animal other, both are silent figures that do not find entrance into theory without the institutional interests of the one doing the theorizing. Elizabeth Costello in J. M. Coetzee’s *The Lives of Animals*, one of the most influential texts within animal studies, asserts that animals “have only their silence left with which to confront us” (25). What do we do with this silence? Reading it through the lens of humanist concepts is one possibility. It is easy to assimilate the other into the framework of the familiar, but far more difficult is the process of contesting that familiar. If we are dealing with the animal, this is especially the case as language itself—that which animals ostensibly lack—forms the foundations of the familiar and mediates the relation between those in the academy and those figures that occupy its textual archives. Still, to invoke Spivak and the question of the subaltern once again, postcolonialism offers a vocabulary with which to encounter an otherness that cannot or does not speak within hegemonic
systems of communication. Postcolonialism, thus, might buttress those conversations currently underway in animal studies.

If relations of concern form the central archive of this project, they do so not only in the context of any simple relations between the terms human and animal. Indeed, understanding this particular relation in the context of African geosocial politics requires attention to a few other relations as well. If, as this project asserts, Africa is a zone associated with animality following the effects of colonialism, it is also concerned with how this association emerges from another set of colonial mythologies that draw a relation between humanity and the “West.” Keeping in mind that the difference between “Africa” and the “West” is just as unstable as that between “human” and “animal,” I nonetheless suggest that something might be learned about the radical otherness of African animals in thinking through the way that Africa is often pitted as the radical other of the West.\(^{11}\) This assertion should not occlude the fact that Africa has its own history prior to its relation with the West, but in that this project is concerned with contemporary African cultural texts circulated in the postcolonial period, its relation with the West will be of great importance here.

Animal studies has been slow to consider Africa, with the exception of a few isolated works, most of which come from South African scholars. Of those texts that document interspecies relations in Africa, Clapperton Chakanetsa Mavhunga’s recent work on associations between Zimbabwean guerilla warfare and pestiferous existence as

\(^{11}\) This assertion relies on David Graeber’s “There Never Was a West,” which challenges the way that postcolonial studies has too frequently relied on a stable account of the West in understanding its relation to zones such as Africa. Challenges to the authenticity of the category “Africa” appear in the first chapter of this thesis.
well as Wendy Woodward’s work on animals in the Southern African literary imagination have been important beginnings to this field. Both of these scholars, however important to this project, do little to think about the importance of African space itself in articulating a multispecies critique. Particularly for Woodward, animal studies is a way to think through interspecies kinship in localized Southern African contexts but does not consider that Africa and Africanness themselves may be important components of this project. It may be the case that animals in Africa are not simply a category of nonhuman life that animal studies needs to take up, but that ideas about Africa themselves are important considerations to what we think of as the animal, as this project argues.

Kai Horsthemke’s recent work in *Animals and African Ethics* makes some headway in not just considering African animals, but in detailing the role animals play in traditional African philosophies and ethics. Careful to avoid the tendency to generalize on the subject of what constitutes traditional Africanness, the text considers not an authentic or stable narrative of Africanness, but invokes the term as an historical construction steeped in colonial history. Horsthemke claims, “[n]ot only does anthropocentrism characterize traditional African perceptions and worldviews and current South, West, and East African legal systems; it also pervades … postcolonial environmental politics” (12). In response to this anthropocentrism, he argues that “[g]iven the brutal and dehumanizing ravages of colonialism, racism, and apartheid that Africans have historically been subjected to, it does not seem to be wholly off the mark to invite people in sub-Saharan Africa, especially, to reflect on an even longer, more deeply entrenched historical process of discrimination, oppression, and exploitation, namely that of species apartheid” (14).
What is striking about this statement is that—for all the ways his text rejects the stability of Africanness as a category—it casts Africans themselves as entities that have not reflected on the place of animals and that need to be invited into a concern for animal lives. Not only does this statement presume the role of those outside of Africa or Africanness to educate those within on their relationship with animals, it also presumes that Africans have not reflected on the deeply entrenched processes of species apartheid, and this is simply not the case. Cultural texts examined in this thesis indicate that processes of concern for animal life are and have long been underway within Africa, though in ways that do not always resonate with the hegemonic language of popular forms of animal advocacy. Moreover, the anthropocentrism found in many traditional African epistemologies notwithstanding, such knowledges are arguably much less damaging to animals themselves than the more recent practices of animal exploitation facilitated by foreign hunters within Africa, the commodification of African wildernesses by foreign interests, and ongoing and unquestionably brutal processes of factory farming.

In the particular case of African studies, with the exception of these few already-cited figures, a disproportionate amount of animal studies scholarship has focused on J.M. Coetzee’s works, Disgrace and The Lives of Animals. The latter of these two texts has been a major contribution to animal studies. Although I am hesitant to position Coetzee as the central figure in an African animal studies, his text’s handling of the animal offers a start to imagining a multispecies postcolonialism. Allison Carruth argues

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12 Njabulo Ndebele’s “The Year of the Dog” is only one notable example of a South African text that directly compares the discourse of dehumanization at work in South African politics with the figure of the dog, and more appear in the pages to come.
that *The Lives of Animals*’ “hybrid form functions as a critique of anthropocentrism that is best understood as postcolonial” (206), praising its attention to humans’ consumption of other-than-human animals. I cannot rehearse here the numerous arguments made about this text, but turn to Carruth’s literature review to stress the wealth of criticism on this text. Although she takes seriously the text’s attention to animals, she emphasizes that conversations about it have “fallen into more or less two camps: those that classify the text as a work of metafiction and those that classify it as a jeremiad on animal rights” (204). For all of those readings that elide its concern for animals in favor of an interrogation of its literary devices, I confess that I cannot ignore the urgent appeal of the text’s central character, Elizabeth Costello, in forming the bedrock of this project’s central concerns.

In the text, Costello makes a controversial comparison between factory farming and the Holocaust—a now familiar one taken up by many others within animal studies and animal rights activism.\(^\text{13}\) She concedes that this comparison is a “cheap point” but (21), as when Derrida uses it, encourages a view toward the commonalities between the suffering experienced by humans and that by animals.\(^\text{14}\) In this way, the text offers a way to think through how animal concerns and human concerns are not separate but interlinked in terms of those institutions that have controlled, regulated, and killed both

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\(^{13}\) See Jessica Carey’s consideration of this comparison for an in-depth analysis of its problems and possibilities in, for example, PETA’s “Holocaust on Your Plate” campaign as well as one Holocaust survivor offering the very same comparison.

\(^{14}\) Derrida brings up this comparison in *The Animal That Therefore I Am*. Although he is hesitant to state it himself, he emphasizes once again the treatment of animals under late capitalist regimes of production “which some would compare to the worst cases of genocide (there are also animal genocides: the number of species endangered because of man takes one’s breath away). One should neither abuse the figure of genocide nor too quickly consider it explained away” (26).
human and animal lives. Costello tells us, “Let me say it openly: we are surrounded by an enterprise of degradation, cruelty, and killing which rivals anything that the Third Reich was capable of, indeed dwarfs it, in that ours is an enterprise without end, self-regenerating, bringing rabbits, rats, poultry, livestock ceaselessly into the world for the purpose of killing them” (21). It is perhaps precisely the openness that Costello advocates toward which I am drawn; in that she endeavors to “say it openly” against a culture of silence, the text brings to light those institutions and practices that we forget in order to live. Read literally, this comparison applies to animals, but—notwithstanding all the dangers that reading postcolonial literature as allegory entails—read allegorically, this text becomes about so much more. It becomes about rendering visible and open that which we do not want to see as we live, the production history of meat being only one element of what we forget. To it, we might also add the ongoing legacies of colonialism that facilitate certain lives at the expense of so many others as the commodity culture of contemporary globalization often relies on exploiting lives in colonized or formerly colonized locations.

The reason I begin with Costello is to think through the lessons that her “cheap” comparison leaves us with. As the current inquiry is interested in how practices found within African colonialism and animalization collide, I perhaps risk hastily levelling such a comparison as well. This project may be at risk of collapsing the violence experienced by humans under colonialism with that experienced by other species no matter how much it insists on the importance of maintaining an eye to difference in animal studies critique. Thus, the work on the comparison between the violence of the Holocaust and the violence
done to animals might provide some critical groundwork here. Citing Holocaust survivor Isaac Bashevis Singer’s assertions that “[i]n relation to [animals], all people are Nazis” and “for the animals it is an eternal Treblinka” (qtd. in Carey 18), Jessica Carey insists that comparisons such as the one above “call for a collective recognition of the deep links between different sites of atrocity.” This is a call that “asks us to apprehend, to learn to see”—much like Costello’s insistence on saying it “openly”—“the similarities between the un-thought common sense of current institutions and the now-obvious crimes of past ones, so that we might begin to address and work away from the ethical failures that permeate our own actions” (18). The Holocaust and colonialism are two vastly different contexts, certainly, though postcolonial and anticolonial figures note that the Holocaust cannot be thought outside the history of genocide in colonial Africa. As the second and third chapters of this text will argue, the exercises of sovereignty found in particularly the Rwandan genocide rely heavily on not only various figures of animality, but the bodies of animals themselves. Even in the limit-case violences occurring within Africa’s borders in the wake of colonial history, animals may not be incidental figures in crimes committed against the human, but entities on whom justifications for and techniques of genocide stake their claim.

Articulating what we might provisionally call an African animal studies might seem arbitrary; after all, if animals are the concern here, there remains the glaring reality that, though their lives may be subject to the power structures enacted by nations and

15 See Aimé Césaire’s *Discourse on Colonialism*, Mahmood Mamdani’s “Making Sense of Political Violence in Postcolonial Africa,” and Michael Rothberg’s *Multidirectional Memory*. All of these texts foreground the ties between the Holocaust and colonialism.
continental powers, they are not participants in localized politics in the same way that humans are. Geographically tethering the project of animal studies to a particular location, then, might come across as counterproductive if we are to envision more ethical relations with other animals on a global scale, but it is my contention, and this is the subject of the first chapter of this project, that Africa is a unique and, indeed, necessary location for animal studies to consider. This is because, as I have already mentioned, the continent’s colonial history involved multiple techniques of animalization that continue into many accounts of Africa today. Moreover, there may be an uninterrogated connection between animal studies’ commitment to questioning Enlightenment values that solidified a human/animal binary and postcolonialism’s various accounts of the animalization of colonized bodies that also emerges during this period. In short, the definitions of the animal as subhuman that undergird the classic Enlightenment human/animal dichotomy may not be exclusive to the animalization of the colonized; indeed, it may be that ideas about the animal derived from both of these histories call on and recall one another. In this sense, the figure of the animal interrogated by animal studies, along with present-day humans’ presumption of the right to do whatever they wish with animal bodies, might have roots in the process of colonization itself just as colonization often involves animalized figures that render the colonized body intelligibly subhuman in the imperialist imagination.

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16 See, for example, Achille Mbembe’s *On the Postcolony*, which contains lengthy descriptions of imperialist views of African bodies. See also Comaroff and Comaroff’s “Africa Observed,” as well as Lyombe Eko’s work on the animalization of African leaders in the post-Cold War era, “It’s a Political Jungle Out There.”
Chapter Outlines

To respond to what I will suggest are joint histories of animalization and colonization, my first chapter turns to primarily visual representations of Africa and Africanness. It unpacks the various visuals in which Africa finds representation, such as touristic literature that advertises Africa’s animal life, films that circulates images of Africa to Western audiences, accounts of Big Five Game hunting, and conservation literature. It is my contention that these various images, ranging from overtly colonial representations of the continent to ostensibly benevolent environmentalist texts, offer up Africa as a zone closely associated with animality, rendering the continent a space replete with and productive of animality. Particularly for touristic literature, the continent circulates in the global imaginary as a site at which animality is the only thing that appears, rendering animals an essential part of African continental identity and identification. Despite this association, I suggest, even in the most active efforts to protect animal life and in condemnations of those (game hunters and “poachers” included) that deprive other animals of life, ties between human and animal life are severed by these texts’ continual insistence on policing the human/animal divide by framing those spaces in which animals live as unadulterated spaces of nature.

Building on the work in the first chapter, my second and third turn primarily to Western narratives of the Rwandan genocide. I turn to Western narratives because of the large literary industry that has emerged in the West covering violent events such as Rwanda’s genocide, but also to consider how networks of relational concern transmit affect on a global scale and how the techniques of sovereignty involved in genocidal
practice also direct appropriate or permissible forms of concern through text. Although both of these chapters deal with Rwanda’s genocide, they develop two different analyses. Chapter three focuses specifically on the category of the human and how it emerges in large part out of zones of animalized violence within Africa. Interrogating the sacred position of the Western humanitarian, this chapter argues that accounts of violence in the genocide circulate concern around the human. In the texts examined in that chapter, I read the presence of a widely presumed species sovereignty that organizes and administers concern for Africa around a Westernized figure of the human. Some of the texts on which I draw include Philip Gourevitch’s *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families*, Michael Caton-Jones’s film, *Shooting Dogs*, and Roméo Dallaire’s *Shake Hands With the Devil*. This chapter reads the genocide under what are by now familiar rubrics of sovereign power, borrowing from figures like Giorgio Agamben, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Wendy Brown to understand the mechanisms of sovereignty as they affect specifically animalized lives.

Chapter three draws on the work of the previous one, but turns it attention from the human to animal bodies in genocide. In addition to considering the language of animalization exercised over Tutsi bodies and populations in the genocide, I turn to a particular case of animal death: that is, during the genocide the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) and the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF), upon encountering dogs that were feeding on the corpses of those killed in the genocide, began to shoot on site all of the dogs in Rwanda until few, if any, remained in its borders. This canicide, I suggest, far from being a separate issue to the genocide taking place, compels
inquiry into the ways that animal life and human life become subject to the mechanisms of sovereign power in genocidal contexts. Adding to the previous chapter’s archive, this one draws on James Dawes’s *That the World May Know*, Michele Pickover’s *Animal Rights in South Africa*, and Jean-Philippe Stassen’s graphic novel *Deogratias*. This chapter evaluates how we show concern for nonhuman animals in contexts where concern for humans takes precedence, drawing on the example of the dogs. I question how, in contexts as ethically fraught as Rwanda’s genocide, texts emerging from it direct or forestall concern for the dogs. This chapter also evaluates the efficacy of animal rights in attending to postcolonial contexts. Central to this chapter is the concept of the stray. Stray animals such as the Rwandan dogs, I suggest, compel us to analyze those lives so often discarded within the technologies of sovereignty and embody a framework for reading lives that are left out of current anthropocentric understandings of concern.

My final chapter turns to intimate relations between humans and other animals in African narratives. This chapter engages with texts such as Michele Pickover’s *Animal Rights in South Africa*, Zakes Mda’s *The Whale Caller*, and a few shorter texts on HIV/AIDS. Interspecies intimacy, this chapter suggests, is always already occurring in multiple processes affecting humans residing within Africa. This chapter looks at intimacy as it occurs in the act of eating animal bodies, in events of interspecies romance, and in the more difficult relationality between the human body and the entrance of zoonotic illness such as HIV. Reading both macroscopic and microscopic intimacies, this chapter borrows from a range of work on the bestiality taboo, critical virology, and posthumanism to propose that relations of concern between humans and animals are a
part of African everyday lives, even in those spaces where such relations appear not to be a concern. This chapter tests the limits of what interspecies relations mean as well, turning to the body itself and its microscopic occupants to suggest that the human body is a structure that cannot be thought of as an exclusively human zone.

Conclusion

This thesis is broadly interdisciplinary, tying together the threads of multiple fields in order to understand the workings of concern in postcolonial and globalized worlds. Moreover, although it focuses primarily on Africa as an important case for animal studies to consider, my hope is that this work will resonate with other locations as well. Indeed, this thesis maintains that concern occurs not in circumscribable boundaries but precisely in those moments that cross them. Thus, far from being a project devoted to one particular location or a particular set of animal lives, what follows is an emphasis on the important place of categories such as Africa and animality within rather than outside of the global circulatory networks of concern.
Chapter One


Introduction

There is probably no more visible recent example of concern for African animal life than that shown in the death of Cecil, the Southwest African lion shot in Zimbabwe by American dentist Walter Palmer in 2015. On July 1 of that year, Palmer, accompanied by local hunters, lured the lion out of the Hwange National Park in Zimbabwe, shot him with an arrow and a bullet, and finally beheaded and skinned him. A controversial incident across the globe, it resulted in various media outlets in the West flaring up in condemnation of the hunter and questions about the ethics and legality of the hunt continued to circulate late into the year. One remarkable aspect of Cecil’s death was that the outpouring of concern following it was perhaps the most explosive display of affect in the West toward an African life that year, amassing a response likely only surpassed by the death of Nelson Mandela in late 2013. Cecil’s death would later result in the lion being conferred the honour of his own Wikipedia page, numerous protests condemning the killing including one in which activists left stuffed animals at Palmer’s dental practice (Alexander, Thornycroft and Laing), and even a public apology by one celebrity for an ill-intentioned Halloween costume of a lion in October 2015 for “all the hurt” a photograph of the costume caused (Begley). In these responses to Cecil’s death,

17 For details of the killing, see “Cecil the Lion.”
18 Ashley Benson donned the costume in early October, 2015 in an Instagram photograph and apologized for it shortly after.
it is worth noting that animals enter the conversation only as a function of their being mediated by visual cultures of representation: the website, the animal toy, and the animal costume. The global outcry for Cecil might be thought of—just as much as a concern for animal life—as a concern for representation given that the already-dead lion would only ever appear in various visual memorializations of him. It is perhaps because of this orientation toward the individual Cecil over other concerns that another critique of the climate of his death insisted that “[l]aments for Cecil were, sadly, much more heart-rending than the outcries for black lives lost” that year (Craven and Bellware). Regardless of the position various thinkers, critics, and activists took on the issue, the world, it seemed, was concerned about the death of this particular feline and what it meant, and that concern circulated beyond the confines of Africa’s borders. Echoing Craven and Bellware, what was remarkable about it was precisely the extent to which this animal generated concern in a way that so many lives, particularly those within Zimbabwe and the rest of Africa, frequently do not.

In addition to the disproportionate outpouring of concern bound up with this incident, there are a few colonial narratives that converge at this story and its reportage. Not least of these is Cecil’s name, derived from the British mining magnate Cecil Rhodes.\textsuperscript{19} The process by which Cecil received his name might spur us into thinking about how animal as well as human life can be subject to the imperatives of colonial power. The power dynamics behind this particular act of naming echo Derrida’s discussion of naming animals as a form of domestication that recalls the biblical creation

\textsuperscript{19} See Alexander, Thornycroft, and Laing.
story in which Adam names other creatures “to mark his ascendancy, his domination over
them, indeed his power to tame them” (“The Animal” 384). This power becomes all the
more obvious in postcolonial Zimbabwe as indigenous forms of life such as the lion
become subject to being named after colonial figures as well as to the domesticating
gesture of naming itself. The wound to this particular lion, then, was more than the arrow
and bullet could inflict; there still remains what Derrida, echoing Benjamin, calls the
“melancholy” of naming, which is “the wound without a name: that of having been given
a name. Finding oneself deprived of language, one loses the power to name, to name
oneself, indeed to answer [repondre] for one’s name” (The Animal 19). In terms of the
global reaction to Cecil’s death and its relation to this name, it is tempting to attribute the
globe’s outpouring of concern to an identification with not the death of a lion in general
but with a particular lion whose name resonates an anglicized tone.

The colonial dynamics of this story were not lost on one Zimbabwean newspaper,
The Chronicle, which noted the seemingly arbitrary flow of concern from the West
toward a single lion and the hunter that took the animal’s life. In an article published
shortly after the incident, Kennedy Mavhumashava noted the ties between Cecil Rhodes
and the lion, and even the fact that the lion was one subject in a study at Oxford
University, Rhodes’s own alma mater. “Why such an outpouring of grief in the West over
one lion?”, he asked (Mavhumashava), also suggesting that most “Zimbabweans didn’t
know about this until Monday,” after the news had already spread through the West.
There was little word on the reactions of Zimbabweans themselves once the news spread,
but Zimbabwe has been faced with a myriad of other problems in recent years that
probably overshadow Cecil becoming a *cause célèbre*. If concern travels through global virtual networks—as was demonstrated by the outpouring of concern for Cecil that made its way through the social media circuit—it is also worth noting the differential levels of access to such media in the West and Zimbabwe.\(^\text{20}\) What Nicole Shukin calls, borrowing from Akira Mizuta Lippit, the “rapid movement of affect” that occurs in global telemobility might also compel an analysis of the production of the digital subaltern that comes with differential levels of access (Shukin 182). Mavhumashava’s response indicates that, if there was a relation of concern between humans and Cecil, it occurred between those humans that were most physically distant from him and through virtual affective channels rather than bodily proximity.

Another potential effect of the Cecil narrative is its precipitation of a Western-centric mode of animal rights politics condemning the actions of Palmer. It might seem that condemnations of the hunter could amount to a questioning of colonial networks of mobility that give him the capacity to move through Zimbabwe without having to consider the toll of his actions, in this case the slaughter of “a favorite [lion] with visitors in the country’s Hwange National Park” (Thornycroft and Hedgecoe). However, this possibility falls flat for at least two reasons. First, that Cecil was a favorite lion “with tourists” casts the primary relation of concern between the memory of Cecil and those bodies who utilize rather than challenge colonial movements through Africa in the form

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\(^\text{20}\) According to a 2015 report by the Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe, roughly forty percent of Zimbabwe has Internet access. It is also worth noting that, of those Zimbabweans who have Internet access, the average speed and usage is far lower than that in the West.
of the safari.\footnote{See John S. Akama’s work on safari tourism in Africa (specifically Kenya) which, he suggests, “conforms to historical and economic structures of colonialism” (140).} Second, the possibility of a structural critique disappears when we consider the numerous African lives, many of them belonging to critically endangered species, that are taken legally and illegally every year. In Hwange alone, of the 62 lions in the park that had been observed by researchers since 1999, “24 were shot by sport hunters” (Cruise). In spite of these numbers, the only other animal hunts in Africa to spark a comparable level of global outcry even approaching that of Cecil in recent years have been those carried out by 19 year-old American Kendall Jones’s (who posed with the corpses of The Big Five game in 2014), and the sons of Donald Trump (who posed in a similar way for photos in 2012 alongside corpses rendered trophies).\footnote{See Kincaid and Gilbert for information on these two incidents.} Behind protestors that labeled Jones’s, the Trumps’, and especially Palmer’s actions “despicable” (Pratt and McShane), then, there may be not necessarily a concern for Africa or Africans, but a concern for socially policing appropriate modes of whiteness as it moves through the world, centering the conversation about the ethics of African hunting back on the West rather than the ongoing conditions of wildlife within Africa. The critique of the system of colonial mobilities that allows for animals to be killed in the first place arguably receded from view as the conversation orientated around one isolated incident.

Where, then, does the seemingly arbitrary display of concern for one lion come from? Drawing from the explosion of imagery over Cecil’s death, how might we draw conclusions about how concern itself is produced or generated in the current era of global capitalist and neocolonial power? What does it mean to have concern for animal life,
especially if we begin from a postcolonial framework that is cognizant of the ways that what Sara Ahmed calls “affective economies” are negotiated in racialized spaces and places (Cultural 44)? Finally, taking seriously the allegation that many cared more for one animal life than so many racialized lives that face precarity within Africa, how do we begin to talk about an ethics of concern for animal lives given the widely-presumed hierarchy that places human life above animal life? Answering these questions but particularly the last one—one that forms the bedrock of this project—will perhaps require a further interrogation of what these terms (human and animal) mean and, more specifically, what they mean for and in relation to contemporary conceptualizations of Africa. It is my hope that, in so doing, the concept of concern and the networks that produce it might also become clearer.

This chapter is interested in the question of concern for African nonhuman life and how it circulates through the globe; it uses this example of Cecil to think about frequent images of African animals and how these images variously function to generate, mediate, and/or occlude concern for lives. These lives may be, as in the case of Cecil and those Western bodies that demonstrate concern for him, at a physical distance from one another. If, however, the images that come from stories of Cecil are any indication, images themselves have the capacity to construct affective relations between bodies that may reside in radically different zones of the globe. For the protestors that show concern for Cecil and who never came in close proximity to his body, the image that emerges around his death may be a significant source of communal affect and identification. This is not to say that such images might not be harmful or involve objectionable modes of
relating. Indeed, images of Cecil risk being coopted into the fetishistic function that animal signs frequently serve in that they occlude “the material histories of economic and symbolic power that are cunningly reified in them” (Shukin 4). Attending to these material histories, this chapter will show through an exploration of Achebe’s now famous “An Image of Africa” alongside images of African animals that the image is frequently a mechanism that denies Africans their very livelihood even as it generates community in wealthier locations on the globe. That said, although it will be crucial for this chapter to point out the difference between often celebratory images of African animal bodies alongside the violent material conditions in which these bodies live, it does not posit the falseness of these images against some predetermined notion of the real. Instead, it acknowledges the primacy of the image in constructing the very materiality of concern, and argues that the image itself is a medium that sources the conditions out of which relations of concern develop. Moreover, I should note here that the “image” is not exclusively tied to visual cultural texts even while it might facilitate and occur at the nexus of the visual. In tracing the colonial networks that produce concern, this chapter does not seek to undermine the efforts of animal rights protesters, nor to dismiss wholesale the multiple responses to Cecil’s death in global social media. If anything, concern for nonhuman animals is precisely what this project is interested in, even if it challenges certain shows of it. Rather than casting a cynical eye toward such responses, my aim is to consider the dynamics of their emergence and, hopefully, promote forms of concern and care in addition to the totalizing rhetoric of animal rights, totalizing because
of its touting of the generic “animal” as the subject of the right in a way that homogenizes the nonhuman world.\(^{23}\)

I am also interested in the frame as one of many optical structures that mediates how we see animal others and establishes parameters for how we may discuss the animal other in theoretical dialogue, particularly in and around African geospatial politics and the many precarious lives that appear within them. This work, as I see it, has important ties to African postcolonialisms that I will outline below. Broadly speaking, this chapter looks at a range of cultural image-texts about Africa. I suggest that Africa as both place and ideological construct is a location significant to the historiography of the term “animal” with which animal studies has so far been engaged. This chapter aims to discuss animals as they appear in texts about Africa, but also to draw on research that suggests that ideas about animality and Africanness have been constituted contemporaneously from the Enlightenment period onward, and that both emerge from profoundly normative anthropocentric and racialized narratives. This analysis facilitates a view to not only human categories of marginalization (race, gender, sexuality, and class) as often animalized concepts, whereby the animal becomes the figure through which various kinds of subhumanity come into being; it also thinks about how both these categories and the animal itself emerge jointly in relation to one another. As will become clear in the pages to follow, imperialist presumptions about the being of both animality and Africanness echo one another in multiple ways.

\(^{23}\) The third chapter of this thesis explores the limitations of animal rights in detail.
In thinking through the above problems and extending the significance of how we frame otherness, this chapter is grounded in questions surrounding the optics of concern as they relate to the production of African animalities and an animalized Africa. It should also come as no surprise when I argue that images of Africa have long been constructed as images of animality. The present analysis carries my introductory discussion of concern into how the visual mediates what emerges in global affective networks as a matter of concern, but also how various images and their frames occlude the “matter” of concern, that is, the materiality of various animal bodies and lives. The first section of this chapter considers how African postcolonialists have framed African studies as I explore the field’s intersections with animal studies and attempt to add breadth to current discussions of African extrahuman life. I view framing not only as a practice of bordering images, but as a concept that speaks to reductive framings of animality within postcolonial studies. I suggest that such framings within postcolonial studies (which I examine below), in that they rarely contest the subhuman status implied by dehumanizing figurations of the animal, reify rather than resist the anthropocentric elements of colonial power. The second section turns to an analysis of the ways that various images of Africa circulating in the West through animal signs (most notably in touristic literature and the North American safari park) assemble a normative vision of humanness that is constituted in opposition to images of African animality at the same time that these images foreclose concern for African others, whether human or nonhuman. The third section turns to texts that dispel the fantasy circulated by the aforementioned images. This last section draws on research on the Southern African game reserve and accounts of
“The Big Five Game” precisely to consider what is outside the frame in popular images of African animals and to gesture beyond the reductive readings of Africanness offered by them.

This chapter brings together various critical perspectives from visual culture studies, Marxist aesthetics, and postcolonialism in no particular order. I cannot hope to account for all of these theoretical lineages in detail in the scope of this chapter, but I hope that in borrowing elements of their often-interconnected conversations my own work might address some of the complex processes through which competing images facilitate or foreclose concern for others. The broad thesis tying together this chapter’s analyses goes something like this: the unprecedented era of mobility in which the globe finds itself is confirmed by various globally-circulating images of hyperreal natures, of which African ones are a significant part. These images extend the capacity of the observer by bringing into close proximity that which is thought to be “far away,” whether we consider the much-discussed distance between human and animal, the physical distance between the West and Africa, or the ideological distance between a normalized figure of the Western human and the African human. However, this hypermobility rests upon the increasingly constrained movements of African animals. As modernity and mobility’s truths are found in the annals of global image circulation, images of African animals also bespeak the suspension of mobility for various nonhuman animals. Although these images might generate a kind of concern (Cecil the Lion comes to mind), increasingly, their occlusion of the conditions of African animals’ lives also mediates that concern, and channels it into acceptable directions. No matter how celebratory of animal
life these images might be, they are spectral apparitions of the colonization of African animal life by the commodity form.

Framing Africa/Framing Animals

The process of image-examination found in this chapter will resonate with a similar process within African studies. Working within this field usually begins with some rumination on the various persistent images of Africa in an attempt to dispel reductive mythologies about the continent. It also usually involves continual reframings of how we think about the field, as Africa and its meanings continue to change into the early 21st century. This kind of work, difficult though it may be, is probably a necessary endeavor even in the present moment since images of Africa as radically other to the West have not been done away with in the postcolonial period, but heightened through an increased focus on the continent as a site of crisis and negativity. These images in turn produce certain narratives, whether they involve the large number of conflicts that have affected the continent since the latter part of the 20th century, the still-present problems that HIV/AIDS poses to African lives and nation-states, the concept of the “rogue” state attributed to places like Zimbabwe, or, more recently, the deaths of a series of posthumously beloved charismatic megafauna in African wildlife reserves, of whom Cecil the lion may be one of the most recent but will certainly not be the last.

The work of which I speak owes much of its foundation to Chinua Achebe’s “An Image of Africa,” which sought to challenge the hegemonic sway of reductive ideas about the continent as a space of absence. His essay contains a frequently referenced but not so
frequently analyzed linking of the African with animality. Achebe himself recounts a
description of a black man by Joseph Conrad that compares him to an animal and Achebe
later characterizes Conrad’s work as projecting “the image of Africa as ‘the other world,’
the antithesis of Europe and therefore of civilization, where man’s vaunted intelligence
and refinement are finally mocked by triumphant bestiality” (1785). In this regard, the
otherness of Africa conjured up by a whole range of narratives of which Conrad’s is only
one finds some foothold in a figure of animal otherness, the beast. In a similar way,
Achille Mbembe’s polemic On the Postcolony begins with the insistence that “discourse
on Africa is almost always deployed in the framework (or on the fringes) of a meta-text
about the animal—to be exact, about the beast; its experience, its world, and its
spectacle” (1). Mbembe’s account of colonial sovereignty’s treatment of the African is
not only found in the casting of Africanness as radical other (“[a]s an animal, [the
colonized] was … totally alien” [15]) but also in sympathetic attachments to it (“one
could, as with an animal, sympathize with the colonized, even ‘love’ him or her” [17]).
Colonialism’s construction of the animality of the African, according to Mbembe, comes
to justify its domination over the African, an entity the colonizer was free to variously
love, hate, hunt, or kill. The devotion to Cecil the lion I mentioned above might lend
itself to an analysis of colonial power expressed as love, where the Western observer
memorializes an individualized lion with no attention to the history that put the lion in
that position in the first place. These examples represent only a few of many ties between
colonial discourse and anthropocentric logic, but the two are closely tied where Africa is
concerned.
Figures such as Achebe and Mbembe are concerned with the animalization of the African, but what does this mean for nonhuman animals themselves? While both Achebe and Mbembe frame the meanings applied to colonized Africa in terms of different figures of animality, both of their accounts are interested in the animal as a component of colonialism’s symbolic structure, a category whose evocation delimits the subhumanity of various African humans. In Mbembe’s work in particular, the animal is a shifting signifier whose evocation facilitates a diverse range of relations with the colonized in which the colonizer holds the upper hand. The “animal” that appears in the work of these thinkers may have very little in common with nonhuman species in that it is a category that constructs a particular image of the human. Presumably, however, challenging the figure of the animal on which racialization so frequently relies is an integral part of dismantling its processes and the anthropocentric hierarchies underpinning many efforts at colonial administration. This challenge has already been taken up by postcolonial ecocriticism in its decentring of “ideas about the human that usually sustain … the analytic strategies that postcolonial and postimperial historians have deployed” (Chakrabarty 198). If postcolonial work has thus far made significant headway in tackling ecology, for all its challenges to the categories on which colonial modernity stakes its claims (including the image of the primitive African that facilitates modernity’s narrative of progress), it still has some way to go in dismantling colonial anthropocentrisms.

To illustrate this point, I offer another example that works within the categories of postcolonial critique to the detriment of the animal itself. In it, Jean and John Comaroff account for imperialism’s image of the African in a similar way to Achebe and
Mbembe’s. Focusing on late 19th century accounts of Africanness they argue that “the African was assigned a particularly base position: he marked the place at which humanity gave way to animality” (35). This last assertion illustrates this curious blind spot in postcolonial African studies, one that rightfully critiques the animalization of the African, but that reifies the logic of imperialism by offering an unqualified account of the animal’s base position. On the one hand, the claim identifies the mechanisms of imperial power and, in so doing, presumably aims to divest of legitimacy its claim on the African body. On the other, in the quotation’s tacit reliance on the base position of the animal, it contests the violence of categorization for some bodies without ever contesting the imperial underpinnings of that system of categorization itself, the very notion of animality-as-subhumanity that provides the condition of possibility for this type of dehumanization to occur. There are likely good reasons why the above postcolonial critics disregard a critique of this figure of animality; why would they heed the call of the animal in describing imperialist processes when it has come to mean something that registers the less-than-humanness of so many lives? Given the various layers of meaning applied to the animal that render it abject, radically other, and subhuman, it may be no surprise that postcolonial studies—interested in the effects of colonial power on predominantly human populations—would not regard the plight of the nonhuman.

Nonetheless, if the animal has been a component of colonial paradigms of racialization, my argument is that meanings of the term “animal” are also generated in the moment that the African body is animalized. This argument refutes the notion that the animalization of the colonized body occurs as the result of some pre-existing notion of
the animal, instead insisting that ideas about animality and colonial otherness come into being alongside one another. As mutually generative signifiers, the rendering of the colonized and of the animal subhuman are also historically tied. Tracing the ideological histories that each of the above critics tackle—Enlightenment era ideology for Mbembe, the late 19th century for the Comaroffs—we might note that these are also the histories tackled by animal studies during which animality came, over time, to represent a radical other of humanity. These ties notwithstanding, animal studies and postcolonial studies have frequently been contiguous rather than overlapping disciplines. In spite of this contiguity, for a few critics within animal studies—such as Kay Anderson, Cary Wolfe, and Philip Armstrong—the history of the animal and the history of race’s emergence alongside Europe’s colonization of the globe have joint underpinnings in their mutual constitution by imperialist narratives of otherness. As Anderson notes, “[a]nimality has been a crucial reference point for constructing sociospatial difference and hierarchy in Western cultures” and she details that notions of racialized otherness have often operated at “the edifice of animality discourses” (4). This does not mean that animality and race are synonymous, nor does it mean that the permutations of otherness that both terms register are ever homogeneous. As repositories of otherness, animality and race have arguably both been convenient shifting signifiers on which the powerful have been able

24 I do not have the space to give an exhaustive account of these histories here. However, the early work of animal studies spent much time establishing the changing meanings of animality that emerge through the Enlightenment period and, especially, with practices increasingly exploitative of animal life as industrial capitalism begins to develop. For more detail on the definitions of animality that emerge from the 18th century onward in European philosophy, see Kelly Oliver’s Animal Lessons and Jacques Derrida’s The Animal That Therefore I Am. For examinations of the relation between capitalism’s history and the development of the category of animality, see John Berger’s Ways of Seeing and Nicole Shukin’s Animal Capital.
to project different meanings at different historical junctures, facilitated by Europe’s desire to differentiate itself from other locations on the globe. One crucial point of difference is that, where race has been appropriated historically in anticolonial resistances, the anthropocentrism of the world in which we live will likely never facilitate animals being able to engage resistance from the position of their own animality. Regardless, less has been done in the realm of postcolonial studies to unpack the complexity of animal signification than to think through race.

Animal studies also has its limitations on the subject of race and the postcolonial. As Neel Ahuja’s work points out, the animal studies debate about race remains underinformed by critical race scholarship and too readily critical of theorists of colour for not showing the animal necessary justice (Ahuja 556). An ongoing problem within animal studies and animal rights activism involves its consistent and sometimes tokenistic gesture toward non-Western cultures as bastions of alternative or more ethical relations with animals. Marjorie Spiegel’s much-cited *The Dreaded Comparison*, though an incisive look at the commonalities between slavery and the various uses of animal bodies in Western capital, questions, “[w]hy is it an insult for anyone to be compared to an animal?” Spiegel’s response, however, is to insist that “[i]n many cultures, such a comparison was an honour. In Native American cultures, for example, individuals adopted the names of admired animals” (16). She then goes on to cite, “Ancient Egyptians, some African tribes, and many other ancient and aboriginal cultures” for whom the animal was a source of honor rather than degradation (16), but this initial gesture toward “other” epistemologies remains only a gesture to make a point about the
West. “African Tribes” or “Native Americans” remain, in this well-intentioned analysis, too vague, too cohesive, and too totalizing to be convincing alternatives to Western thought. Even the concept of “Western” thought—though this thesis depends to some extent on the category of the West—is a complex, often contradictory, and unstable category according to David Graeber’s “There Never Was a West.” The problem of the comparison goes further and frequently occurs when human atrocity and animal suffering appear similar, as in the case of comparisons between slavery and the Holocaust and factory farming, for example. Donna Haraway, refuting the insistence on making comparisons between human and animal suffering, insists that atrocities “deserve their own languages and ethical responses” (*Companion* 51). It may be that sites of human atrocity offer a point of reference to thinking about the conditions in which animals live, but there is still much work to be done to complicate these comparisons.

Developing the conversations I address here is no doubt necessary if animal studies is to make a convincing case to postcolonial studies, especially given Neel Ahuja’s analysis of current debates about race in species studies as “flattening out historical contexts that determine the differential use of animal (and other) figures in the processes of racialization” (558). As Ahuja’s critique implies, postcolonial scholars’ indebtedness to the history of race might give some critical weight to the debate, but he additionally cautions against the insistence that postcolonialism should tackle the animal in that “such arguments risk perversely suggesting that because race and postcolonial

25 Jessica Carey’s work on this comparison delves into it in more complexity than I can manage here. Her in-depth handling of PETA, Spiegel, and a number of other thinkers in the realm of animal studies emphasizes multiple problems with this comparison, but cautions against outright rejections of them as well.
critics possess special insight into the violence of humanism, they have a unique responsibility to speak for animals” (558). I am skeptical of logic that attempts to carve out a strict and exceptional disciplinary purview for either the postcolonial or animal scholar and, thus, am inclined agree with that statement.

However, this project is motivated by its own concern that if postcolonial and/or animal studies are to envision more just worlds (justice as ongoing process as opposed to a teleological arrival) they cannot afford to draw boundaries that delimit where the responsibility of the critic lies. Moreover, Ahuja’s critique perhaps depends on too hasty a notion of what the animal is in order to determine what the purview of postcolonial scholarship is not. It might be that the postcolonial scholar has no unique responsibility in the debate I erect here, but it might be that determining where responsibility lies in the increasingly commoditized and ephemeral annals of academic literature and their attendant politics is not a clear-cut process. After all, it has often been the work of postcolonialism to contest “individualized versions of care and responsibility by highlighting the inherently relational interdependence that marks the globalizing world” (Raghuram, Madge, and Noxolo 5). Part of the work of this project is to refute the presumption that postcolonial and animal studies are somehow separate entities, as if conversations between the two would not be possible. This presumption, I suggest, comes from disciplinary framings of the fields rather than essential components of their existence. As I will try to demonstrate throughout this project, these conversations are always already occurring, even if their intersections are complex, contradictory, or as yet unmapped. For this reason, bearing in mind Spivak’s now familiar caution over the
postcolonial critic’s institutional backing in forming critique, I consider framings of the fields of animal studies and postcolonial studies that insist on delimiting boundaries as complicit with those cultural industries that frame various visualizations of others, including animals. Indeed, framings of these fields provide normative trajectories toward which our concerns might be orientated. If postcolonial scholars are not responsible for nonhuman animals, they risk overlooking a crucial category (animality) whose examination might bring to light ongoing workings of colonial power within Africa.

Images of Africa Animated: Framing Africa/Framing Animality

If framings of postcolonialism and animality involve exclusion, the frame itself is a valuable device for thinking about the positioning of nonhuman animals, both in terms of the fields in which they may be assigned meaning and the images that commodify their bodies. Especially in that “framing presupposes decisions or practices that leave substantial losses outside the frame” (Butler, Frames 43), turning to those left outside the frame emphasizes that framing is as much an exclusionary as inclusionary practice. The frame is also one of many optical devices that permeate animal studies’ concern with visual processes, whether we consider Derrida’s account of the gaze of his cat that gave the field its more or less official beginnings, or a visual culture that is consistently willing to place animals in any context it wishes without their consent, without even a consideration of what their consent might look like, or whether nonhuman life might want to be observed in the first place. The life and livelihood of nonhumans themselves is
arguably not a consideration in the vast majority of visualizations of them if the image itself is interface at which humans and animals meet.

There have been far too many accounts of the visual in animal studies to mention here. John Berger’s “Why Look at Animals?” (published in 1980) is a notable example from work on visual culture, and Derrida’s own work on the animal gaze in *The Animal That Therefore I Am* solidified the importance of the gaze to animal studies. In the Southern African context, Wendy Woodward’s *The Animal Gaze* examines relations of interspecies kinship through optical processes. Taking into account the discipline’s varied work on the gaze, Randy Malamud also considers the importance of the frame alongside the anthropocentric gaze. For Malamud, “animals are thickly enmeshed in human culture simply because people are so interested in them. We use them in a range of ways—some benevolent, some silly, some violent—in the service of our own cultural drives, desires, fantasies, and obsessions.” He crucially points out that

[t]he place [where animals exist] is always framed, and people are the framers. Framing delineates a boundary that defines the realm in which we allow the framed creature to exist. This framing privileges the space *inside* the frame—here is where we will acknowledge you, it says; here is where we expect you to be when we come to look—and it voids the space *outside* the frame as inaccessible, irrelevant, out of bounds. (5)

Framing is, thus, not an arbitrary practice, but a decisive act of setting a border between what is included and what is excluded. In that it is a mark of border-drawing, framing has much in common with the species sovereignty that I delve into in chapter two of this project, and it is arguably the case that the images I analyze here have much in common with the violences I interrogate there. However, for the purposes of this chapter I am concerned with how the frame and its inherent visual metaphors facilitate or produce
the divide between human and animal, and between with what critics may be concerned and what they may disregard in postcolonial praxis.

This understanding of framing borrows significantly from Judith Butler’s work on the frame as a device steeped in biopolitics, a device that orientates how we encounter other lives and, in the process, even grants the looker a sense of self. The frame, according to Butler, “not only organize[s] visual experience but also generate[s] specific ontologies of the subject” (Frames 3), and Malamud demonstrates the extent to which visual cultures overwhelmingly wield animals to generate human agency at the same time that they banish the possibility of the animal being anything but a symbolic object in the field of the visual. It has been long familiar that images of Africa—one of the points of Achebe’s work and subsequent work on the image—facilitate a kind of subjectivity for the Western observer, as its absence becomes a source of presence for the west, but how are images of African animals implicated in this process?

If theorists in the realm of African studies suggest that the image of animality borne out of Africa is one that continually replicates colonial narratives, the safari and its contemporary permutations are a good place to start an inquiry into how these narratives affect animals themselves. The safari has been one of the most enduring imperial fantasies that both facilitates images of Africa as an animalized discursive object in the contemporary global scene and reifies the human/animal divide on which such imperialist presumptions frequently depend. While the safari within Africa’s continental borders offers one mode of this image-circulation, its draw has expanded to global markets in the construction of multiple safari-themed animal parks across the world. For example, on
the outskirts of Hamilton, Canada, there lies the 300-hectare African Lion Safari. Its geography, removed from the bustle of the Canadian city, offers a place where visitors can “Go Wild!!™” while viewing “over 1000 … exotic birds and animals from around the world!” (African Lion). The plethora of globally-selected species roaming the park are, thus, not indigenous to Africa and have little to do with an essential Africanness except that they collectively replicate the experience of the safari—what Brian Herne’s highly idealized account of the safari calls the “romance, mystique, and danger” presented by the “fiendish beasts” of the “Dark Continent” (3). The Hamiltonian version of the safari is one of many such experiences around the world. In North America alone, there are numerous such parks. The Wild Animal Safari in Pine Mountain, Georgia, offers its visitors the opportunity to get “up close and personal with the types of animals you generally never get to experience” (“About”), presuming the distance between the observer and exoticized animal object in the park. The African Safari Wildlife Park in Port Clinton, Ohio, beckons its visitors to “GET READY FOR A WILD TIME!” (African Safari). Safari West in Santa Rosa guarantees an “African adventure in the heart of California wine country” where guests “may explore the Sonoma Serengeti on an African wildlife safari alongside romping herds of exotic wildlife” (“Home”). All of these experiences offer up a promise to the North American visitor. That is, the ostensible exoticism of the animals in these parks beckons a departure from everyday life and into the domain of an absolutely distant Africa, or at least a particular image of what Africa might be. If the above advertisements are any indication, what Africa promises is the visibility of animals, and lots of them. Also, as the repetition of “wild” suggests, they
bespeak the modern human’s own domestication in the current historical moment, and paradoxically offer up a space of strictly controlled animal movement as an alternative. The paradox occurs precisely in that the freedom for the human to “go wild” emerges from the displacement and arrest of various animal movements.

Hamilton’s Safari, not quite so dangerous or thrilling as its historical predecessor, offers an experience “completely different from the traditional approach; that is, the visitor is caged in the car, and the animals roam in 2 to 20 hectare … reserves.” The park, then, is a primarily visual experience, and promises to be a more humane approach to the safari in that animals appear to have movement and exercise agency in the confines of the park. The park is an experience in which “all Canadians are free to use and enjoy wildlife, subject to laws aimed at securing its sustainable enjoyment and use.” There is little in the various advertisements for the African Lion Safari that signals the anthropocentrism of the experience more than this sentence, in which nonhuman life exists apparently for the purpose of human consumption. Animals are also something to be seen from the window of the car. They are not to be engaged, but exist for the consumer in a kind of phantasmagoric projection of animality onto the window of the car. Originally discussed by Benjamin in relation to the Parisian Arcades and later taken up by film and visual culture studies, the phantasmagoria nonetheless tells us something about the function of the vehicle window as a mediating optical technology. For Benjamin, the phantasmagoria operates within the framework of the spectacle as a series of images that mediate social relations. The concept thus has much in common with Guy Debord’s work on the spectacle as corresponding “to the historical moment at which the
commodity completes its colonization of social life” (42). For Benjamin, the phantasmagoric produces a false consciousness, as a “person enters [the phantasmagoria] in order to be distracted” (7). Benjamin borrows Adorno’s definition of the phantasmagoria as “a consumer item in which there is no longer anything that is supposed to remind us how it came into being” (qtd. in Adorno 669). In the case of the North American safari, the exotic is precisely that mystical experience promised by the animal-as-commodity whose history, in the process of its coming into being-as-spectacle, is obliterated. It is this process that facilitates the human ostensibly leaving behind civilization for a kind of manufactured wilderness.

As counter-sites to the everyday life of the North American visitor, these parks produce a space in which the monotony of everyday life gets inverted. The exoticism of the animals in the safari park, underscored by the otherness of Africa (not as an actual place, but as an idealized construct), also confirms the modernity of the visitor who is able to move through a space that is, much like McClintock’s account of colonial renderings of anachronistic space, “prehistoric … inherently out of place in the historical time of modernity” (McClintock 40). The movement of the visitor’s vehicle into, through, and out of the park contrasts the constrained mobility of animals outside the car or tour bus window; animals are able to move, but only within the confines of strictly policed borders that prevent any transfer between the two worlds, and keeps the animals and their animality tightly sealed off from the human consumer.

In the crafting of the North American safari park the distance between the animal and the human transitions from a spatial metaphor to a geographical certainty, and it is
crucial to point out that the geography of the animal is represented as an (albeit no less manufactured) African one. The window of the visitor’s vehicle is a boundary functioning not only for visualizing the animal, but also to set in place the physical distance between the animal and the human. The obvious and irrefutable justification for this separation is to protect the safety of both animals and humans in the park, but the foreclosure of contact between the two also says something ideologically about the safety of discrete categories into which we may herd the human and nonhuman. As the two come face-to-face, the window provides a look into animality that simultaneously mirrors an image of modern humanity in its very opposite, the animal. But this mirroring occurs in the same moment at which Africanness is also relegated to the other side of the boundary, to the terrain in which the only movements that occur come from contained animal others.

A similar kind of technology appears through the camera lens of Chris Marker’s much-lauded 1989 experimental filmic essay and treatise on visual culture, *Sans Soleil*. Marker also offers a view of Africa through its animality. The film shows footage from a fictional filmmaker, Sandor Krasna, during a foray through urban Japan and rural Guinea Bissau. A woman, Alexandra Stewart (also fictional), to whom the filmmaker is said to have written, narrates the images. Animals are ubiquitous presences in Krasna’s footage of both Japan and Guinea-Bissau, but the images of Guinea Bissau are almost exclusively of animals, with the exception of two scenes depicting humans. The film’s depiction of Africa is also fixated on animal death, featuring images of dehydrated animal corpses littering the African Sahel and an image of a giraffe being shot by a hunter and bleeding
to death. Accompanying the first of these two images is what might be thought of as part of the thesis of the film, which Stewart narrates in a letter from Krasna:

He used to write to me: “The Sahel is not only what is shown of it when it is too late; it’s a land that drought seeps into like water into a leaking boat. … This is a state of survival that the rich countries have forgotten, with one exception … Japan. My constant comings and goings are not a search for contrasts; they are a journey to the two extreme poles of survival.” (Marker)

This quotation from early in the film solidifies the absolute foreignness of the landscapes surveyed by Krasna, and also the Europeanness of Marker and his fictional filmmaker. Guinea-Bissau in particular falls under the grammar of common representations of Africa as that extreme at which life is brought to the brink of survival, its polar extremity to the ostensible absolute modernity of Japan visually constituted by images of dead animals littering a dry Sahel. Even the people of Guinea-Bissau occupy a similar position in contrast to the “rich countries” of the West when Marker’s film later describes Bissau-Guineans as “a people of nothing, a people of emptiness.” What is striking, however, is that the dried-up corpses of animals become the meter stick for measuring the base form of survival that Sans Soleil attributes to this particular African landscape.

Both of the cultural texts I cite here—the touristic draw of the African Lion Safari and Sans Soleil—offer up productions of humanity and animality reminiscent of Giorgio Agamben’s “anthropological machine.” Agamben describes the human as a kind of technology, produced in and against the categorical otherness of the animal. In The Open, he describes the human as “an optical machine constructed of a series of mirrors in which man, looking at himself, sees his own image always already deformed in the features of an ape.” Becoming human, for Agamben, involves a process of seeing through which
“man” must recognize himself “in a non-man in order to be human” (26-27). We might easily connect with the technical language of Agamben’s optical machine each of the processes of riding through a car, observing a safari, and of filming African otherness from the position of the Western same. In the safari, the human views animals from a car, and its window becomes a kind of looking glass that at once constitutes the limit between humanity and animality, and reflects the image of the other back to the human same. In this sense, the car is a protective vehicle that shields the animal and human from one another, but also a productive one whose very movement through a kind of preserved ideal of nature produces the modern human inside the car.

Marker’s film serves a similar function in which images of animal alterity—caught up in the double alterity of animality and death—produce a version of the living human. Where Agamben’s notion of the anthropological machine might fall short, however, is that there is never simply “the human” and “the animal” in general produced within the anthropological machine, but an entire web of varied classifications derived from figures of animality that not only denote degrees of subhumanity, but that also generate certain geographies as bastions of primitive animality or locations where animality is the only thing that appears.

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26 The gendered pronoun, “man,” in the man/animal dichotomy is an important fixture in a philosophical history engaged with animality. “Man” stood for the pinnacle of rationality, on the ostensibly superior side of a reductive Cartesian dualism opposite to animal, woman, and racialized other.
Capturing The Big Five: Imag(in)ing Ecopolitics in African Space

All of the above images present something of an idealized version of African natures, but what is outside of the frame when these images assert themselves? More specifically, if they frame for the consumer what Marxist aesthetics might call a “false consciousness” regarding animal life (and even constitute the humanity of the Western consumer against the apparent animality of African space), an interrogation of the technologies of image-making and framing that shape the experience of Africa for consumption continues to be necessary. If this chapter so far seems preoccupied with such images at the expense of the material, it is to draw attention to the pervasive ways in which multiple colonial narratives generate an animalized contemporary African space before moving on to the bodies of African animals so often left out of the frame in those images of them.

It would be difficult to address the circulation of African animals in visual culture without addressing their most ubiquitous objects: the “Big Five” game, consisting of the elephant, the rhino, the lion, the Cape buffalo, and the leopard. From the images in which they are featured, they beckon to the tourist as an emblem of the safari experience and as an essential (frequently the only) part of Africa’s continental identity offered up to those visiting as tourists. For each of these animals there is a long history of their bodies being hunted for sport and—for the rhino in particular—a global industry that facilitates the decimation of its population to levels of near-extinction.\footnote{The detriments of the industry that facilitates the hunting of rhinos, as well as the rapidity with which the entire species is being eradicated in Southern African reserves, is well-documented by Julian Rademeyer’s \textit{Killing for Profit}. Michelè Pickover’s \textit{Animal Rights in South Africa} also provides a comprehensive detail of Southern African animals’—including the Big Five—exploitation under and since apartheid.} Named for the level of
difficulty in hunting them, the Big Five have a place in both colonial hunting enterprises and contemporary neocolonial attitudes toward Africa, especially in that they are the charismatic megafauna *par excellence* sought out by those attempting to access versions of Southern African “nature.” Their viewing by tourists in recent years also carries with it a growing contemporary concern for animal life, as indicated by the vociferous criticism applied to trophy hunters in Africa mentioned in the introduction to this chapter. They are, thus, also a convenient and visible way to explore competing notions of how one may show concern for animal life, and how the image mediates such concern.

One could examine almost any touristic literature to illustrate the commodified life of the Big Five. One tourist organization, *SA Places*, whimsically advertises, “[a]s during the bygone hunting era the term ‘Big Five’ still conjure[s] up the romance and excitement of Africa’s exotic destinations and experiences” (“The Famous”). Much like the mythologies of the safari, the image of the Big Five is framed to offer up the magic of “anachronistic space” in a deeply commodified wilderness (McClintock 40). The language of the quotation is probably overwhelmingly familiar to those in postcolonial studies (and probably slightly ridiculous), yet perhaps its continual emergence in mass media representations of African tourism merits its continued interrogation. The advertisement, bearing out a problem similar to the one found in McClintock’s critique of colonial travel narratives, speaks to Western visitors, latching onto a particular genealogy of white hunting and beckoning them to move backward through history to an image of a
bygone age.\textsuperscript{28} The site goes on to describe a “visit to … Africa as incomplete without having spotted, and perhaps photographed … the Big Five.” This last quotation in particular and its emphasis on the incomplete produces an appetite for consumption that encourages the tourist to work toward completion. It gestures toward the possibility that one could access Africa in its totality, a totality that emerges out of the “capture” of various animals.

Beyond this advertisement’s reification of multiple colonial narratives of the unpeopled landscape, it also carries implications for how we think about the animal in contemporary conservationist rhetoric. In particular, this advertisement relegates the hunting of such animals to a bygone era, suggesting that hunting is no longer a viable mode of capturing the animal. To some extent, this suggestion is accurate, since hunting the Big Five carries such a hefty price tag that only the wealthiest tourists have access to this mode of accessing African animality.\textsuperscript{29} If we understand the act of taking a photograph of animals rather than hunting them as tied to one mode of ecotouristic citizenship, in which the visitor takes only the image as trophy rather than the animal corpse, it would be difficult to view the ethics of such a politics outside the class matrices that produce it. This is not meant to undermine efforts at preserving animal lives, but to emphasize that they occur within the confines of an historical moment at which capital determines how we are able to relate to animal otherness in even the most ethical

\textsuperscript{28} For McClintock’s work on “anachronistic space,” the colonist’s movement through the globe was figured as a movement “backward in time to an anachronistic moment of prehistory” (40). The advertisement above offers something of a similar imperial nostalgia.

\textsuperscript{29} A \textit{New York Times} article gave an estimated cost of hunting all five of these animals (“Big Five”), placing the total between $186 000 and $287 000 US dollars.
permutations of human-animal relations, as well as how we view the geographies in which various animals reside.

What is now coveted for the presumably less affluent tourist, the advertisement proclaims, is the photograph of the animal, a photograph that has infused Southern Africa’s tourist market, emblazoned on countless kitschy knick-knacks and postcards that offer up pieces of Africa to the tourist. If hunting big game is not accessible to the average traveller, the photograph offers another mode of apprehending the animal, suspending its movement, and capturing it within the boundaries of the image that is, according to the site, also meant to be a mode of capturing Africanness.

This capturing of the animal occurs at a curious historical juncture in which modes of apprehending animal otherness are changing. It might be the case that, in an age of global conservationism in which “game” is an incompatible term with the current state of neoliberal ecotouristic citizenship, when the endangered of “The Big Five” as game cannot be hunted on a wide scale, the photograph offers a new way of preserving animal remains. This process echoes what Nicole Shukin calls “The Double Entendre of Rendering” that signals both “the mimetic act of making a copy” and “the boiling down of animal remains” (20). For Shukin, images of animals carry with them a residual trace of violence that this double entendre signals. Read in such terms, in the act of taking a photograph, the tourist mimetically captures the animal, but this act is also haunted by its historical relation to multiple violences directed at animal bodies. Such violences include the use of celluloid in the production of film, for example, but also—for the purpose of this project—the historical constitution of the Big Five as objects available for human
consumption and sport. There are a few other double entendres at work in the language of photography, those that feminist critiques perhaps first voiced in accounts of film’s masculinist technologies, and they are haunted by the violent treatment of animal bodies that precede photographic technology. Indeed, both Shukin’s critique and the language of various imaginings of the African animal body bring into question the innocuousness of what we are doing when we “shoot” or “capture” and mount the animal on a wall, whether that wall be virtual or physical. For Haraway especially, the camera is a technology “so superior to the gun for the possession, production, preservation, consumption, surveillance, appreciation, and control of nature” (Primate 49). Certainly, the violence embedded in animal photography cannot compare to acute trauma an animal experiences on being shot by a hunter, but for thinkers like Haraway the possession of the animal in photography embodies a process that, similar to hunting, engenders the right of the human to render the animal an object of sight and to control the circulation of its image.

The process of capturing animals in this way might not be so objectionable were it not for the systems that bring about its image-circulation. Examining the politics that produce the tourist’s ability to capture animal otherness refutes the presumption of an ethical encounter taking place. The spaces in which tourists encounter African animals—whether by looking their images on souvenirs or the entering the reserves in which they cannot escape the gaze of humans—are themselves constructed spaces. Moreover, much like in the process of making images, they are bordered, framed, and subject to politics of
both enclosure and exclosure, as Ferguson demonstrates when he calls African wildlife preserves, guarded enclaves, existing in often fiercely combative relations with surrounding residents. Often fenced and militarily patrolled, these patches of internationally valued ‘nature’ may be protected with ‘shoot to kill’ policies against ‘poachers’ who are often simply the local people who lost their land and their ancestral hunting rights when they were forcibly evicted to make way for the game park. (43)

Far from being spaces with an unflinching dedication to the conservation of various wildlives, game preserves are also cultural documents of the human/animal divide. Alongside the creation of the bounded space of the preserve, there comes the very need to preserve, to craft the space in which the nature found inside can be cleanly separated from the politics of human life and death that roam outside. These zones are, thus, sites of both enclosure and exclosure in that they actively police ideologically and physically the boundaries between human and animal, keeping animals in just as they keep humans out. As Brooks et al. point out in their analysis of South African “natural” space, “a key feature of the generic ‘wilderness’ landscape is that it must have in it as little evidence as possible of human beings” (265). Even if such boundaries ostensibly exist to protect animal life, they nonetheless presume appropriate modes of doing so and, in the process, work to sever ties between local humans and animals by relegating all animal life to a zone of ahuman nature, separate from the human lives that surround the preserve. As Nicholas Holm puts it, “[c]onservation discourse … acts to implicitly delimit and police the boundaries of human and nature” (60). If conservationism in Africa is meant to generate concern for animals and the ecosystems in which they live, and if concern occurs in the “space between” as I argued in this project’s introduction—at the relational
tie between ostensibly separate entities—the severing that occurs in Africa’s great “natural” spaces appears to foreclose affective ties between the human in the immediate vicinity of such animals.

This severing cannot be read outside the global networks that produce African natures. In these networks, just as global conservationist imperatives facilitate the removal of ties of concern between animals and humans in close proximity to one another on such game preserves, organizations such as the United Nations bring about proximities between bodies in the West and in Africa. One need only look at the United Nations Environment Programme’s (UNEP) publications on various parks in South, Central and Western Africa and the language they use to see the severing of human-animal ties taking place but also the alignment of concern for other animals with a conception of global citizenship that excludes Africans. One of the program’s documents, for example, offers a description of the Okapi Wildlife Reserve in the DRC, describing it as a “refuge of exceptional species richness” replete with “dramatic scenery including waterfalls on the Ituri and Epulu rivers” (“Okapi”). The document’s edenic description constructs the reserve as an aseptic space of natural biodiversity. This description, perhaps, strikes a chord for the conservationist reader, and also sets the stage for UNEP’s long list of “[t]hreats to the Site.” Highlighting the reserve’s “many threatened species of primates and birds,” UNEP lists “armed conflict” that brings about “the killing of elephants, incursions by thousands of gold and coltan miners, bushmeat hunters and cultivators” as well as “armed militias, miners and hunters” that have “decimated the animal population.” Following this list, the document foregrounds that, in 2001, “the UN and
UNEP responded to pleas from staff and NGOs for international pressure to stop the destruction and help restore funds, morale and order.” Such calls to “morale” and “order” on the part of globalized Western institutions such as UNEP in response to the chaotic construction of political conflict in Africa should resonate with those of us involved in postcolonial criticism. For, within descriptions of wildlife preservation such as the one above, the animal (represented by dead elephants and threatened species) serves a particular function to legitimate the presence of Western organizations purported to be keeping at bay the threat of Africans to African wildlife. Curiously, the only humans that appear within the immediate vicinity of the park for this publication are those that pose an immediate threat. These documents cast those humans who occupy the land as outsiders, noncitizens and threats to the protected commodity of animal life. If conservationism offers a blueprint for global citizenship, it is a citizenship that often facilitates concern for the wildlife of a particular area at the expense of those humans who live in it.

Ideas embedded in frequent approaches to conservation that attempt to preserve nature—especially in the creation of “natural” spaces that ideate the notion of nature itself—also have their roots in colonial thinking. This assertion echoes Rob Nixon’s work, which attends to postcolonial writers (such as Jamaica Kincaid, June Jordan, Njabulo Ndebele, and Nadine Gordimer) who speak against the spectacle presented by “an international nature industry [that is] propelled by a romanticized colonial history and by a neocolonial fantasy.” These writers, he suggests, in “writing against a violent and violating invisibility … engage the contradictions that permeate the marketplace in idealized natural retreats—a marketplace premised on a retreat from” not only the above-
mentioned rigors of everyday life but “from socioenvironmental memory itself” (*Slow* 24-25).

The call to global wildlife preservation, particularly where it aligns with ecotouristic citizenship, might depend on a kind of forgetting that propagates a clean distinction between an idealized notion of “wildlife” as separate from African humans, as if the two are not tied and as if they had not coexisted prior to the moment of global conservationism. In the fantasies of nature that undergird certain conservationisms, the erection of boundaries that contain natural wildlife is another way of creating a frame. It is an effective erasure of the possibility of human and animal worlds being interconnected. Where more recent approaches to nature and ecology—such as Haraway’s insistence on the “naturecultural” as a term that refutes the nature-culture divide—might insist on a joining rather than a severing of the ties between human and animal, the effects of the conservationism put forward by the rhetoric of UNEP is to sever such intersections. Animals are not necessarily considered in their own right within such wildlife conservationisms, but exist as the discursive foundation for the assertion of a suspect anthropocentric narrative of global ecological consciousness which denies African humans the right to occupy land and renders animals apolitical bodies. Moreover, these narratives, even for those such as Ferguson who are critical of them, separate animal movements and rights from human ones, as if the two are not tied by virtue of their cohabitation in shared spaces of nature and culture.
Urban Movements in Lauren Beukes’s *Zoo City*

The movements tackled by this chapter have been predominantly unidirectional, involving the frequently Western body moving from the spaces of modernity toward anachronistic spaces of nature. These movements perhaps signal the nature/culture dichotomy, reified in the above cases through the construction of African geographies that are made to appear removed from the everyday life of global cultural modernity. The automobile, I argued above, is a crucial technology for, literally and figuratively, driving one iteration of the nature/culture divide in its exclusion of African animals. In that it shields its occupant from the space outside the car and drives through various “natural” spaces, the automobile itself facilitates this divide. I turn now to a recent South African novel that confounds the boundaries set in place in the above image-texts. Lauren Beukes’s work of speculative fiction, *Zoo City*, set in the midst of a dystopian Johannesburg, also involves movement in automobiles, but to a different effect.

The early pages of the novel show its narrator, Zinzi December, driving through a traffic-jammed Johannesburg. “Traffic in Joburg is like the democratic process,” she tells the reader, adding that “[e]very time you think it’s going to get moving and take you somewhere, you hit another jam. There used to be shortcuts you could take through the suburbs, but they’ve closed them off, illegally: gated communities fortified like privatized citadels. Not so much about keeping the world out as keeping the festering middle-class paranoia in” (97). Much like the bounded landscapes in which animals live, the city itself contains boundaries that indicate hierarchies between those “inside” and those “outside.” If the wildlife preserve is an enclosure keeping animality in, the novel inverts that
boundary in that the reader is positioned alongside Zinzi in “Zoo City”—the novel’s nickname for Hillbrow—whereas the wealthier (frequently white) populations of the city live in enclosures. The car, in this instance, ceases to be an embodiment of human modernity, as movement within the city is stunted. If modernity’s logics depend on a notion of progress, that Johannesburg roads fail to bring their occupants to where they think they are going subverts notions of the city as a document of human civilization, culture, and ascendancy.

The novel is also deeply aware of the role that the image—especially the commodity spectacle—plays in everyday life. The novel contains multiple chapters that are transcripts of websites, online chat conversations, and various other screen-based media. The image is especially important in the novel’s commodified Johannesburg for the way it subsumes politics of dissent. For example, at one point in the novel, Zinzi attends the “Biko Bar,” an establishment named after the eponymous antiapartheid activist, and states that “[t]he Biko Bar is to Steve Biko as crappy t-shirt design is to Che Guevara” (143). Figuring the bar as a manufactured space through the simile of the infamous Che Guevara t-shirt, Zinzi’s consistently cynical narration of the world around her asks the reader to see through the fetishistic quality that images offer.

Much of the novel takes place in Hillbrow, in which bodies who have been excluded from the novel’s normative world live, and most of these are refugees. Indeed, in writing the novel, Beukes herself suggested that “using elements of the fantastic allow us to talk about the world in a different way” and that, for Zoo City, it was “a way to talk about refugees” (XamXam). The naming of the novel Zoo City is more than an incidental
comparison between urban ghettos and animality, however, in that many of the occupants of Zoo City are “animalled.” In the novel’s universe, those who have committed a crime are susceptible to “AAF or Acquired Aposymbiotic Familiarism” (75)—known informally as being “animalled” or a “Zoo.” The process involves a nonhuman animal—and these animals range from insects to large mammals with no apparent pattern determining who gets what animal—being joined to the human that has committed a crime or violence. The animal also grants its human partner a specific power, and Zinzi’s is the ability to find lost objects. An extralegal and unexplained condition in the novel, AAF is a mystery beyond the certainty that committing a severe crime such as murder will result in the actor being “animalled.” The human then becomes symbiotically attached to the animal to the point that, should the human be separated from the animal, the human experiences pain and eventual death by an unexplained supernatural force known as the “Undertow” (180).

The animals of the novel might be easily read as a metaphor for criminality or other forms of exclusion by the state, echoing Derrida’s notation of the commonalities between beast and criminal in The Beast in the Sovereign, but there is more to it than that. Henriette Roos reads AAF as an “assault on the human body, conventionally regarded as a complete and separate entity, [that] becomes through this coexistence of human and animal perhaps the most vivid example of the blurring and eventual erasure of [species] boundary markers in Zoo City” (59). As a boundary-breaking text, the novel carries the potential to rethink notions of the zoo itself—conventionally enclosed spaces within or in close proximity to the urban that exist for humans’ viewing experience. According to
Patrick H. Wirtz’s history of the urban zoo, it existed “to conceptually categorize the world and, subsequently, maintain categorical boundaries, and thus further entrench the nature-human dichotomy” (61). However, rather than being a zone that contains a zoo, the city of the novel’s title casts the urban itself as a zoological space. Cheryl Stobie reads the occupants of zoo city as “not connected or separated by such markers as race or ethnicity. Instead, their community life is based on the great leveler of their shared outsider status” (374). In Zoo City, multiple lives collide—human and animal ones—and coexist in a space that challenges the normative humanness detailed by this project.

In that the Zoo of the novel is a ghettoized space replete with the workings of power that term implies, it might be valuable to recall that Zoos in our world are also a document of colonial power and marginalization. As Berger suggests, “in the 19th century”—the century during which zoos first emerged—“public zoos were an endorsement of modern colonial power. The capturing of the animals was a symbolic representation of the conquest of all distant and exotic lands” (21). He goes on to suggest that “[a]ll sites of enforced marginalization—ghettos, shanty towns, prisons, madhouses, concentration camps—have something in common with zoos” (26), though he cautions against using the zoo as a symbol for human/animal relations in that this move occludes the primary instance of marginalization taking place—that of the animals themselves.

While this chapter has thus far turned to spaces of imagined nature to examine geographies that contain and attempt to mete out distinctions between human and animal, the novel casts the *urban* as opposed to the rural as an equally imagined space in its reference (cited above) to the enclosures that operate within the city. If Zoo City
confounds boundaries between human and animal, the location of this boundary should not be an afterthought. In that the city—typically thought of as a space outside “nature”—becomes a zoo, the novel emphasizes that ostensibly human spaces also become animal. All forms of life within the city are subject to the boundaries that operate in the city; in this sense, the novel opens up a zone of indistinction between human and animal life. In its use of the term “zoo,” the novel encourages a view of urban biopolitics that registers both animal life and human life as subject to the imperatives of anthropocentric power and dispels images of the city as a space in which human and animal lives are wholly separate.

Conclusion

This chapter is concerned with the significance of not only images but framings of nonhuman life. It does so in order to think more intently about the frame and other technologies that draw lines of separation between what is included and excluded in African natures and cultures. These technologies include the boundary, the border, the animal enclosure, and various others that engender a separation between a human “us” and an animal “them.” These terms will become all the more important in the upcoming two chapters, which tackle how species boundaries operate in the Rwandan genocide. When I turn to figures of the animalized human in the pages to come, who counts as a member of the human “us” is no longer as clear as the simplistic anthropocentric binary insists. It might seem like work on the boundary that refutes the exclusion of those “on the other side” is invested in the logic of inclusion, working toward a world in which that
which is outside the frame, or those left on the other side of a boundary, are brought into the frame. This work might involve an effort to extend concern to those not found in the representational apparatus of the image. However, in closing this chapter, I would contend that it is the logics of inclusion and exclusion, enclosure and exclosure (and the bounded communities such terms imply) that themselves need rethinking. After all, any paradigm of inclusion must be cultivated in relation to a domain of that which is excluded. If the relationality of concern is to do anything, it may not be a furthering of the logic of inclusion, but precisely an enlivening of those forms of concern that call into question the boundary between the self and the other, the human and the animal, the included and excluded. It may be that what is necessary is a reconceiving of the spatial metaphorics that produce animal life as on the other side of a boundary and an imagining of networks of relations that does not involve recourse to the boundary.
Chapter Two

What Puts the “Human” in “Humanitarian”?:

Species Sovereignty and Narratives of the Rwandan Genocide

The possibility of pogroms is decided in the moment when the gaze of a fatally wounded animal falls on a human being. The defiance with which he repels this gaze—“after all it’s only an animal”—reappears irresistibly in cruelties done to human beings, the perpetrators having again and again to reassure themselves that it is ‘only an animal,’ because they could never fully believe this even of animals. (Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia 105)

Introduction

It is rare to read a text about Rwanda’s genocide that does not, at some point, make reference to the human. Whether the conversation centres on human rights, humanitarianism, the failure of humanity that occurred in the genocide, or attempts to reclaim a humanity lost through violence, the persistence of cultural ideas about humanness in events of extreme violence is near impossible to assuage. These ideas are, of course, not unique to Rwanda’s genocide nor even to genocide itself, but following the previous chapter’s work on the association so often drawn between Africa and animality, this chapter views those notions of the human that emerge from African violence as generated out of this association. If this thesis has not already demonstrated that terms such as animal and human are slippery signifiers at best, this chapter goes into detail on the latter term: the human so often evoked in situations of extreme violence. This evocation is paradoxical in that the concept of humanity—usually associated with benevolence and compassion—emerges out of those very contexts in which human
beings themselves commit atrocities deemed inhuman. In keeping with the central concerns of this project, this chapter views the particular ideations of humanness and humanization that occur alongside African violence as similar to the images interrogated in the previous chapter in that both orientate concern toward the anthropocentric. Moreover, while the previous chapter argued that the global circulation of idealized images of African natures is one of the methods through which Africa is imagined and animalized, narratives of African violence arguably serve a similar function, as I demonstrate in the pages to come. But more than simply animalizing the African, the narratives examined in this chapter might be more about the human that emerges from them. Thus, if animality serves a function in the language of African violence or genocide, one of the arguments of this chapter is that it is to rally concern in moments of vulnerability around a normative framework of the human. For this reason, this chapter views extreme cases of violence as not (only) the exercise of a national, supranational, or global imperialist sovereignty as the typical analysis of genocide might suggest, but of an underexamined species sovereignty that is—in terms of its scope—much more far-reaching than current accounts of sovereignty and genocide have hitherto considered.

This chapter is the first of two that discuss the role of humanity and animality in Rwanda’s genocide, though I hope that both will resonate more broadly with work on postcolonial violence. These chapters might be thought of as extensions of one another in that the main thesis binding them together is that, embedded in cultural productions about Africa, particularly when they discuss extreme violence, there exists a kind of sovereignty that stakes its claim on the human/nonhuman divide. This sovereignty finds
expression in the delimitation of boundaries between lives for whom we may show concern and those for whom we may not as well as in what contexts such concern is allowed. It also both engenders and emerges out of a kind of territorialism that draws its borders around the human. As I elaborate below, within a Global-Northern-centric framework, these borders draw certain areas as aligned with figures of subhumanity, of which animality is only one, in the global cultural imaginary. It fashions narratively certain geographies in such a way that the ontology of humanness appears aligned with a Global Northern subject and that other geographies are cast as inherently bestial, inhuman, or subhuman.

For both this and the next chapter, narratives of the 1994 Rwandan genocide will be a central focus for at least two reasons. The first is the already-stated notion that—echoing Roméo Dallaire’s famous subtitle, *The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*—narratives about the human circulate through discourse on the genocide in a troubling way. The second is that the genocide involved a lesser-mentioned canicide, discussed in this and my next chapter. As many texts detail, mostly stray dogs began feeding on the dead as the bodies of Rwandans piled up in the nation’s streets between April and July, 1994. Although the dogs’ actions were presumably a result of hunger, upon witnessing this behaviour, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) forces declared the dogs a “health problem,” especially when many became aggressive. Both UNAMIR and the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) began to shoot them on sight until few,
if any, remained within the nation’s borders. While it might be tempting to view the canicide as a separate ethical issue from the ostensibly more important human toll of the violence, I argue that close attention to the narrative rendering of the deaths of dogs might make clearer the ties between violence in human and animal worlds, as well as their mutual emergence from a cultural veneration of the category of the human.

I argue that, under the hegemony of a widely presumed superiority of the human, the narratives examined in this chapter shore up sovereignty for the Western or Global Northern narrating subject and, in so doing, also lend coherence to the fiction of human exceptionalism. Coalescing out of such narratives is a framework of animality that serves as a marker for distinguishing between those lives that matter and those that do not on the basis of their proximity to the human. The supremacy of the human circulated by these globally deployed scripts is produced against a reduction of animality-figured-as-bestiality to subhumanity. It may be that the paradigm of bestiality I sketch out here is familiar to postcolonial scholarship and cultural theory’s recent interest in sovereignty (especially since Agamben’s alignment of bare life with a figure of bestiality), but I suggest that the modes of sovereignty I engage here work to structure relations of concern; their exercise deals primarily in mediating the relation between various forms of life (in all of its multivalent bio- and socio-political meanings) and concern at the location of the human/nonhuman divide.

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30 Those texts that speak about the dogs appear in this and my next chapter, and include James Dawes’s *That the World May Know*, Roméo Dallaire’s *Shake Hands with the Devil*, and Philip Gourevitch’s *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families*. 
In violent contexts, I argue—of which the Rwandan genocide is only one of many examples—the politics of concern for Africa and questions surrounding which African lives it may be directed toward in liberal accounts of the continent involve a form of decisionism. It should also be noted that decisionism has itself been read as the defining trait of sovereignty since Carl Schmitt. On the one hand, these politics involve deciding when certain shows of concern are tolerated within a neoliberal paradigm of ethical engagement, as is the case when questions regarding the lives and deaths of Rwandan dogs are determined not to be a concern at the risk of devaluing human lives and deaths. On the other hand—what will be more of a focus in my next chapter but is nonetheless worth mentioning here—this kind of species sovereignty is a part of a globalized everyday whose connections to African violence are often difficult to discern because African violence is figured as exceptional, sacred, or outside the everyday.

Given the breadth and scope of this analysis, and the hefty project of revisiting the varied scholarly work on sovereignty, these two chapters are as devoted to laying theoretical groundwork that might buttress current understandings of (post)colonial sovereignty as to considering narratives of the genocide, and these projects mutually inform one another. Whereas the next chapter will turn to the deaths of the Rwandan dogs through a reading of the figure of the stray in global politics, this chapter focuses on the figure of the human and its constitution through various figures of the nonhuman while also considering the dogs’ relation to this project. The present chapter begins by providing some historical context to the genocide. It then moves on to a reading of Philip Gourevitch’s journalistic text on the event, *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We*
Will Be Killed with Our Families, to illustrate the ties between biopolitics and sovereignty. This section is influenced by Agamben’s work on the subject. The two sections following lay out a theoretical framework of sovereignty in order to foreground the human as itself a kind of sovereign over all other forms of life but—in the second—to also think about the limits of sovereignty’s claim to absoluteness. The chapter’s last two sections offer a discussion of the role of the human in a number of texts on Rwanda, including Roméo Dallaire’s Shake Hands With the Devil and Michael Caton-Jones’s film Shooting Dogs, and also posits the dogs as resistant subjects in sovereignty’s violent exercise.

Contested Sovereignties and Rwanda’s Genocide

Understanding the kind of sovereignty I sketch out here requires some attention to the global discourse around UN intervention in Africa at the time of the 1994 genocide. UNAMIR is well known for its refusal to intervene in the genocide of some 800 000 Rwandans (mostly Tutsis), and that refusal arguably occurs amidst the changing landscape of global security discourse during the 1990s, as well as the decline in state sovereignty up to that period. The UN itself is an exemplar of that decline and the rise of global economic liberalization as a common theme in work on neoliberalism, but for those specific to state sovereignty see Wendy Brown’s Walled States, Waning Sovereignties and Jean-Marie Guéhenno’s The End of the Nation State.
of global Empire in Hardt and Negri’s much-cited volume on the subject.\(^{33}\) Be that as it may, the mid-1990s was a time at which the (albeit partly illusory) power of the nation-state made a brief resurgence when the organization’s constituent nations insisted on pulling out of Rwanda after the humiliation of the Somalia Affair only a year prior to the genocide. The images of an American soldier being dragged through Mogadishu streets did not garner sympathy for military intervention in Rwanda, nor did the subsequent revelation of UN soldiers’ roles in abusing and killing Somali citizens. Moreover, for many parts of Africa itself, the 1990s was a decade fraught with violence, and the 2007 Human Security Brief documents that “[t]wenty-three of [sub-Saharan Africa’s] states, some half of the total, were embroiled in state-based conflict at sometime during the 1990s—a decade that saw conflicts erupting across the continent at double the rate of the 1980s” (22). The Second Congo War, for example, involved a death toll that had not been surpassed in a single conflict since World War II. We cannot underestimate the toll of African violence during the 1990s, not only for the millions of Africans whose lives were lost or under threat, but for the intensification of Africa in the global mediascape as a space of negativity around which Afro-pessimistic logics congealed. These narratives, in turn, arguably paved the way for Africa being imagined as a location in need of humanitarian intervention even as they paradoxically halted UNAMIR’s intervention in Rwanda.\(^{34}\)

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\(^{33}\) It is important to note James Ferguson’s criticism of Hardt and Negri’s account of Empire, which asserts that the state of Africa under neoliberal global economies does not fit with their reading of globalization and that this is one of the reasons that Africa is conspicuously absent from their text.

\(^{34}\) Heike Harting draws an association between humanitarianism in Africa and Afro-pessimism, insisting that the two “intersect and share a similar logic of protection and dominance.” This logic derives from
Although the UN had little power in Rwanda, they found a problem over which they could exercise a desperate claim to sovereignty. Indeed, in that the dogs were designated a “health problem” by the UN, their fates illuminate the tactics of biopolitical governmentality. In Agamben’s terms, the UN found a set of biopolitical bodies over whom they could exercise a claim to sovereignty. Also, as bodies over whom supranational institutional forces claim the right to kill, the dogs’ deaths form the foundations of a kind of sovereign power. But this sovereignty, to return to this chapter’s opening arguments, is not merely tied to the nation-state or a supranational body as state-centric critiques of this form of power repeatedly emphasize, but also to the exceptional position to which the animal is relegated in the very fashioning of the human as a category.

With the question of sovereignty in Africa on the table, a crucial component of this discussion is the question of African nations’ own autonomy in the face of Western encroachment. Cultivating African sovereignties is no doubt an important part of redressing the historical relationship between the West and Africa and challenging the ongoing socioeconomic legacies of colonialism. As Ferguson’s work on sovereignty in Lesotho and the Transkei stresses, “we can hardly help but see national independence as almost synonymous with dignity, freedom, and empowerment” after colonialism’s violent history (51). But Ferguson also adds, “with naturalized national mappings of peoples onto places more and more widely [being] challenged and contested … there may be much to

Afro-pessimism’s construction of “an African subject in need not of citizenship and civil rights but of humanitarian protection and aid” (“Global” 164).
be gained from exploring … alternatives to the sovereign nation-state frame of reference” (51). Moreover, as Sidaway’s work on Angolan and Congolese sovereignties suggests, they are part of a global narrative in which African states are problematically “compared with [those] of the West, measured, weighted, and found wanting of strength” (160). Moreover, if movements for autonomy unfold at the level of the state, concern for national sovereignty should not be confused with a concern for all lives within that state. If this chapter critiques sovereignty, it is not necessarily to devalue movements toward African national autonomy, but to critique the very paradigm of sovereignty that structures relations between African nationalisms and Western encroachment. As I suggest in the pages to come, animals are an important part of this relation, and I turn to a reading of one account of the Rwandan dogs’ deaths to illustrate this point.

“What Kind of Country Has No Dogs?”: Western Narrative and the Biopolitics of Sovereignty

Philip Gourevitch’s *We Wish To Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families* contains brief references to dogs killed during the genocide and accounts of the Rwandan nonhuman world more broadly; the confluence of these nonhuman elements alongside the genocidal narrative make clear the ties between extrahuman life, concern, and sovereignty. Gourevitch visited Rwanda nearly a year after the genocide to compile research on what would later become one of the influential journalistic texts on the killings to be circulated in the West. In the opening of his book, he details that his visit occurs at a time when, “most of the dead had been buried” and, as
he puts it, “the work of the killers looked just as they had intended: invisible” (21). On first encountering the nation’s landscape, he marvels as “eucalyptus trees flash silver against brilliant green tea plantations … On the theme of hills, Rwanda produces countless variations: jagged rain forests, round-shouldered buttes, undulating moors.” Taking in these sights, he declares, “Rwanda is spectacular to behold” (20). This is perhaps not the spectacle the reader expects as these early pages of his text describe a landscape seemingly untouched by violence.

Indeed, the collective elements of its nonhuman world are linguistically wrought into a vision of the pastoral. Round-shouldered and undulating, the nonhuman world’s personification and movement in the narrative imbues it with a kind of agency. However, the expression of this agency, tied to the serene and beautiful backdrop it offers to Gourevitch’s text, comes to accentuate the violence immediately preceding his visit precisely because of the invisibility of atrocity on the landscape. After some time, he describes his nights as “eerily quiet in Rwanda. After the birds fell silent, there were hardly even any animal sounds. I couldn’t understand it. Then I noticed the absence of dogs. What kind of country has no dogs? … Village life without dogs? Children without dogs? Poverty without dogs?” (147). More acutely than the general absence of visible violence on the landscape, the particular absence of animal life haunts his early days in Rwanda.

The extent of Gourevitch’s incredulous questioning at this absence is also striking in that his surprise is located at associations between dogs and a framework for a normatively operating country (taken here to indicate both the pastoralized countryside he
constructs and the nation-state). It may be understandable, given the ubiquity of dogs as companion species in many areas of the globe including Africa, to question their absence, but why is this absence drawn alongside a conception of the state? It is as if the haunting arises, rather than simply out of the absence of canine life occupying the landscape, out of Rwanda being a kind of uncanny simulacrum of a normatively operating country because of this absence. Although, on first reading, the absence of dogs or of violence on the landscape might denote an apolitical haunting, his series of questions ties this dual presence/absence to certain conceptions of what the Rwandan country is during the time at which he begins to write and what a normatively operating one should be.

The haunting absence of particularly dogs cultivates anxiety in Gourevitch’s narrative in that a country presumably should contain these animals. Whether he is referring to stray dogs or companion animals here is unclear, though this distinction will become an important one in thinking through the stray as a category of exception in my next chapter. Regardless, it is as if either the subjection of animals to domestication (in the case of the companion canine) or the presence of a certain figure of excluded animals (in the case of the stray) were a prerequisite for the sovereignty of the state to emerge. The association between sovereign power, subjection, and the exception might be a familiar one to cultural theory, but readings of this association that consider the subjection or exception of animal life are rare.\footnote{Foucault’s Discipline and Punish provides a framework for thinking how sovereign power regulates the capacities of the subject, and of how disciplinary power emerges to regulate subjects in more complex and less punitive, but no less controlling, ways. Judith Butler’s work on subjection carries on Foucault’s discussions, especially in The Psychic Life of Power. Her work frequently draws attention to the subject’s formation under oppressive, sometimes sovereign, expressions of power—a kind of subjection that also produces the agency of the subject. Where Foucault has frequently been perceived as unclear on the}
Does the absence of animal life narrated by a Western journalist affect the legitimacy of Rwanda as a sovereign nation-state? If so, normative Western notions of dogs as pets might underlie this presumption of the tie between the state and the dog, and Colleen Glenney Boggs’s work has already demonstrated the important position of petkeeping in Western biopolitical citizenship. Gourevitch’s text, by offering this tie, renders the Rwandan dog—itself an inversion of the typified “man’s best friend” of Western human/canine relationalities as it comes to bite the hand that feeds—a figure on whose back the delicate foundations of a kind of sovereignty rest.

As Gourevitch reveals the unique fate of the dogs at the hands of the UN and RPF, the techniques of sovereignty at work in the narrative become clearer. After investigation he writes, “right through the genocide dogs had been plentiful in Rwanda” but discovers that “as the RPF fighters had advanced through the country … they had shot all the dogs” (148). He also recounts a brief anecdote about the UN peacekeepers’ role in the dog killings:

I was told about an Englishwoman from a medical relief organization who got very upset when she saw RPF men shooting the dogs that were feeding off a hallful of corpses at the great cathedral center and bishopric of Kabgayi, which had served as a death camp in central Rwanda. “You can’t shoot dogs,” the Englishwoman told the soldiers. She was wrong. Even the blue-helmeted soldiers of UNAMIR were shooting dogs on sight in the late summer of 1994. After months, during which Rwandans had been left to wonder whether the UN troops knew how to shoot, because they never used their excellent weapons to stop the extermination of civilians, it turned out that the peacekeepers were very good shots.

Distinctions between sovereign power, disciplinary power, and biopower, Butler insists on sovereign power’s infusion within the mechanisms of disciplinary power and biopower. I offer a more nuanced discussion of these forms of power in Foucault and Butler later in this chapter.

36 For Boggs’s work on how animal representations shape biopolitics, see her book Animalia Americana.
The genocide had been tolerated by the so-called international community, but I was told that the UN regarded the corpse-eating dogs as a health problem. (148-9)

Beyond simply describing the conundrum surrounding the value of dogs’ lives in a situation as ethically fraught as the one above, this quotation is significant for its identification of the national and supranational (though primary Eurocentric) alignments of those voices clashing over the politics of canine life and death in genocidal Rwanda.

Seemingly oblivious to the hallful of corpses in this moment where the lives of animals and the dignified deaths of humans clash, the Englishwoman identified only by her national identity makes herself a futile advocate for the lives of dogs. Conversely, the UN designate the dogs a “health problem” and, in so doing, cast themselves as benevolent protectors of human life by constructing and eliminating a pathogenic threat out of the corpse-eating dogs in their midst. It is significant to note that, in this passage, Rwandans appear as mere spectators “left to wonder” or as corpses amidst Western voices clashing, reinforcing common renderings of the African body as a spectacular “signifier through which the West mounts a revisionary practice of cultural introspection and self-reinvention” (Härtling 61). As an accessory to the reinvention of the West, the spectacle of Rwandans’ bodies being fed on by dogs translates the impotent UN into a perhaps misdirected but nonetheless effective force. The dogs themselves, much like Rwandans, are also not quite present in the narrative, appearing as parasitic entities, only highlighted for their consumption of human remains. Gourevitch’s detailing of the above situation is not so much about ensuring the dignified deaths of Rwandans, nor is it interested in the lives and deaths of dogs. The text’s reticent commentary on either might
be a refusal to hastily presume the position of Rwandans, but—in a moment at which the stakes of the issue are highest for Rwandans themselves—not a single one is identified. European voices appear in the narrative as the only ones apparently capable of intervening in the arduous ethical questions brought about by moments in which human dignity and animal lives clash.

More than simply being about Gourevitch’s own reticence, however, this passage also reveals the biopolitical imperatives at work in shows of concern for animal life such as the one above. These imperatives occur both at the level of the text’s narrative voice and the UN’s handling of canine death. At the level of narrative, the text’s relegation of both Rwandans and dogs to the background of a clash over the politics of life and death aligns it with a biopolitical paradigm that is interested in the proliferation of discourse about life but not necessarily interested in the preservation of all lives. At the level of the UN’s paradigm of security discourse, exemplifying the subordination of life to power, dogs become a “health problem” and cease to be (or perhaps never were, in this case) beings with agency.37 Dogs’ bodies (to say nothing of their lives) are reduced to a biophysical threat to security, mechanisms in the production of the West’s legitimacy as an intervening force.

This figuration of the dogs is inflected with the cultural lexicon of pathogenesis in which the handling of disease by state and extra-state institutions becomes less about concern for the threat to health and more a “reflect[ion of the] structures and

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37 This discussion relies on Foucault’s statement made famous by Hardt and Negri that “[l]ife has now become an object of power” (Foucault qtd. in Hardt and Negri 24).
contestations in human social relationships” (Singer 200). The cultural construction of the pathogen by state and extra-state actors, according to Speake, manifests a kind of “ideational regime” that produces “certainty at the level of the population” in administrative techniques to eradicate perceptible threats to the health of the population (532). Applied to the designation of dogs as a health problem by the UN, these arguments expose that the effect of such a designation reifies the legitimacy of UN forces as entities capable of solving the very problem that UN rhetoric creates.

Georgio Agamben’s work on biopolitics and sovereignty adds some critical weight to the above analysis, particularly through its attention to the animal in *The Open*. Certainly, his refusal to separate biopolitics from sovereignty in his articulation of the concept of “bare life” resonates with the analysis of genocidal sovereignty in this project, and I deal more closely with his work in the following section. More than that, however, for Agamben the creation of bare life as a category indexes a crisis of humanity at the end of the 20th century that parallels the crisis of the UN in Rwanda. For Agamben, the violence of the 20th century and the various animalizations and dehumanizations left in its wake brings the human “to the end of history.” If this is the case, he proposes, “man has now reached his historical telos and, for a humanity that has become animal again, there is nothing left but the depoliticization of human societies by means of the unconditioned unfolding of … the taking on of biological life itself as the supreme political (or rather impolitical) task” (*Open* 76). There is, thus, in the production of bare life a kind of anxiety felt at the level of humanness. The rendering of other lives less than human comes to assuage the fiction of humanity’s ascendancy, just as the UN’s killing of
dogs in Rwanda assuages their inaction. Moreover if “the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power” (*Homo 6*), its traces can be found in the UN’s treatment of the dogs.

Theorizing Human Sovereignty: Animality, Subhumanity, Inhumanity

Even beyond the deaths of Rwanda’s dogs, one need not look very far to see the importance of certain conceptions of animality to the logic of violent events such as genocide, especially in the necropolitical domains of conflict Achille Mbembe has noted within Africa. The mantra that humans are “treated like animals” in such contexts is a common response on the part of the observer, one that many have troubled. This simile draws attention to the disregard for human life in contexts such as Rwanda’s genocide, in which certain human bodies become “deprived of their human qualities … and … excluded from the category of ‘human’ and the protections it entails” (Opotow 72).

It is also a comparative statement that, when leveled as a condemnation of the reduction of human life to the subhuman that occurs in conflict, sets in place a hierarchy between human and animal. The implication of this simile is that a person—itself an ethically fraught and unstable historical category—presumably should be treated like a human. To be treated like an animal is to occupy a place where the privilege of the human right to a livable life is not found or respected. The animal itself embodies a kind

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38 See Mbembe’s “Necropolitics.”
39 Marjorie Spiegel’s *The Dreaded Comparison*, J. M. Coetzee’s *The Lives of Animals*, and Christopher Peterson’s *Bestial Traces* all trouble the uses of animals as objects of comparison in violent contexts.
40 It would be difficult to account for the large body of moral philosophy that discusses personhood. Some examples of texts that discuss whether animals should have legal personhood conferred upon them include those by Bryant, Dennett, and Smith.
of limit or boundary which, when crossed, indicates the suspension of ethical treatment or that being’s claim to protection. That being said, this rendering of the human relies on a set of categories, including the “human” and “subhuman” that have come to have currency in the linguistic economy of conflict, postcoloniality, violence, gender, and race. According to Deckha, the category of the “‘subhuman’ plays [an important role] in current instantiations of global racialized, gendered, and economic violence.” Moreover, she suggests that “the subhuman figure and practices of dehumanization have … [enabled] the violence meted out against human bodies” in various contexts (30). In instances of limit case violence in particular, the condemnation of moments when humans are treated like animals collapses the nominal distinction between the subhuman and the animal as the latter comes to embody that which is subhuman.

This figure of the animal under which multiple species come to mean something less than human is also a kind of exception, which closely ties into Schmitt’s hallmark account of sovereignty as the right to “[decide] on the state of exception” (Schmitt 5). This exception is immediately visible in writing on the Rwandan genocide in which the literary voice understandably shows concern for those lives made precarious, except in the case of the stray dog. For a large part of the theory that discusses sovereignty, although animality and many iterations of subhumanity come to inform the figurative lexicon of sovereignty’s violent exercise, the plight of animals themselves in conflict zones is arguably almost always overshadowed by concern for the human. For example, Agamben’s work has long relied on a figure of the animal, as demonstrated in his above-

41 Refer also to David Livingstone Smith for an account of dehumanization.
cited passage from *The Open*, but in that text the notion of sovereignty figures little except through references to bare life. *Homo Sacer* makes the relation between sovereignty and animality clearer, though animals themselves appear in that text in figure only.

It is important at this juncture, with Agamben in mind, to emphasize the ties between biopolitics and sovereignty, both as we enter an age of Empire in which globally circulated techniques of governmentality are thought to supersede state sovereignty and to foreground animality’s implication in sovereignty. As Judith Butler suggests, “the emergence of governmentality does not always coincide with the devitalization of sovereignty. … Sovereignty … no longer operates to support or vitalize the state, but this does not foreclose the possibility that it might emerge as a reanimated anachronism within the political field unmoored from its traditional anchors” (*Precarious* 53). If life is now the object of power (according to Foucault) the decisionistic power of sovereignty unmoored from the state finds traction in the election to except, now in a global as opposed to state-centric field, “certain lives [as] not considered lives at all, they cannot be humanized, … they fit no dominant frame for the human” (*Butler, Precarious* 34). Butler’s text here relies on a figure of the human that provides the standard for establishing the intelligibility of a life. Is humanness itself a prerequisite for being the subject of a livable life or being exempted from the sovereign’s right to kill? If so, sovereignty might work not only by distinguishing between who gets to live and die on the basis of state power, but by establishing a hierarchy of the living measured by their proximity to humanness.
The discursive regime of sovereignty I sketch out here is linked to humanism and its inherent anthropocentrism. The humanist camp might refute this claim and suggest that humanism is not necessarily synonymous with sovereignty—there are after all ways of showing concern for the animal that derive from the human’s exceptional agency in the world (veganism, conservationism, animal advocacy, and animal rights are just a few). It might be, however, that even a seemingly innocuous humanism is precisely what gives this form of sovereignty vitality by casting the human as the central actor in a field of politics whose constituent bodies are not always human.

Indeed, the human embodies a kind of violent exception when we consider its relation to those deemed nonhuman, and especially those deemed subhuman. What do we mean when we use the terms—often collapsed into reductive binaries with the human on one side and one of any number of terms on the other—animal, nonhuman, subhuman, and inhuman? Perhaps what we might glean from their evocation is that the human—the category that emerges in contrast to the extrahuman other—is a category cultivated in and through violence, even if as a dis-identification with or repudiation of violence. If we consider the meanings circulated by terms such as subhumanity and inhumanity, the human emerges at the pinnacle of a hierarchy of being as the standard for rationality, morality, and compassion. The first of these terms, subhumanity, designates a form of being of a lower order than that of the human, and also implicitly registers a hierarchy of being defined in relation to the human, but atop which the human always presides. There is no room in the parameters set by the prefix of this term for any being higher than the
human. Far from *describing* life that is less-than-human, it *makes intelligible* a domain of the less-than-human in which the human is rendered ideal through disidentification.

The parameters of the second term, inhumanity, more explicitly registering violence, indicate a lack of human compassion or the presence of cruelty and barbarism. For Lyotard, inhumanity is always in tension with humanity, since the “human” is neither an essential nor stable concept, and its artifice is revealed in the various social processes (education being one of these) that must continually make us human.\footnote{This is the primary discussion found within Lyotard’s *The Inhuman*.} Under a similar logic as that of the term subhumanity, ‘inhumanity’ renders the human the standard for compassion; moreover, if we use the term to designate a kind of cruelty that is too debased for the human to commit, as anathema to the very being of the human, the term excises the presence of cruelty (and those who bear the marks of it) to a domain beyond the human.

This process casts the human itself as an ideal of ethical concern, divorced from violence. If the human that emerges from these two terms involves a repudiation of behaviours or beings deemed less than human, cruel, or barbarous, the violence that cultivates the human becomes clearer. It is a double violence. On the one hand, it is borne out of exclusion as the human emergent from these terms is one that casts off a multitude of beings from the domain of ethical concern that is ostensibly proper to the human. On the other, this figure of the human circulated in the very charge of inhumanity or subhumanity purchases a kind of sovereignty in the process of this repudiation—the
process in which the other-than-human is banished to a place below or outside the borders of humanity.

Although this chapter is preoccupied with the human as a category of sovereignty that emerges out of the exclusion of the non-, in-, or sub-human, terms not precisely reducible to “the animal,” various figurations of animality also come to shore up “humanity” in similar ways, alongside terms such as bestiality and brutality. Discourse on brutality is especially significant for its animal underpinnings in the “brute”—a figure of savage violence that can “connote not only animality but a certain bestiality of the animal” (Derrida, Beast 21). Recalling the above mention of Foucault’s use of animality, it would be important to distinguish between the beast and the animal, since the former is that figure that comes to define sovereignty in his work, as well as a number of other concepts, notably madness.43 As Butler puts it, the figure of the beast has “little, if anything, to do with actual animals, since it is a figure of the animal against which the human is defined” (Precarious 78). The beast, thought of in this way, is an empty signifier that defines the human through dis-identification. Itself aligned with inhumanity and subhumanity for its brutality, the beast is that which is produced when the human comes to occupy the pinnacle of hierarchies of compassion and concern. When we think of the ways that the categorical parameters of humanness come to be produced in relation to conceptions of the inhuman, the subhuman, the brute, the animal, or the beast, it

43 This is not to say that Foucault’s treatment of animals is not complex; he discusses animals in varied ways, but rarely refers directly to animals as a subject of critique except as a concept in relation to madness. For a more in-depth reading of Foucault’s use of animals, see Clare Palmer’s “Madness and Animality.”
becomes easier to see the binary structures that render the human a being wrought in and through exclusion, dissociation, and exception.

But as the human is produced in this binary as an ethical ideal over all other categories of life and those rendered subhuman, the animal and other figures of the extrahuman become synonymous with the place at which ethical structures of concern fall apart or do not appear. That is, as the human carves out for itself the domain of pure compassion and concern in contrast to the bestiality of the brute, it obscures the complexity of other forms of life as it displaces them to a domain of nonconcern and of violence conceived only in terms of their not being the human ideal.

This is not to suggest that all members of the human species are allowed entrance into the rigidly policed categorical enclave of humanness, and the exceptionality of certain human lives might be read as the defining trait of an anthropocentric sovereignty. As Matthew Calarco cautions,

anthropocentrism is not actually concerned with all human beings as such, [n]or about stressing the uniqueness of and higher ethical value of human beings as a whole; rather anthropocentrism typically functions to include only a select subset of human beings for inclusion within the sphere of humanity proper while simultaneously excluding (through a kind of inclusive exclusion, as the process of exclusion simultaneously institutes both zones) the vast majority of human beings and the vast majority of animals and the “nonhuman” natural world from humanity proper ... (“Being” 418)

There is also that figure of the beast that, when applied to the human, renders that particular human exceptional, as the qualities of ethical concern thought to reside with the human above all else are ostensibly not found in a person who commits extreme violence. Indeed, Agamben’s own reading of politics figures the animal (closely tied to zoe and ‘bare life’) as a prominent concept in contemporary politics, which he reads in terms of
the anthropological machine that “functions by excluding as not (yet) human an already human being from itself, that is, by animalizing the human, by isolating the nonhuman within the human” (37). He asserts that “the machine actually produces a kind of state of exception” (Open 37). If, following Schmitt, we read sovereignty as in part bound up with the right to decide the state of exception, Agamben’s work here gestures toward a complex of sovereign power that emerges out of the dichotomy between human and animal.

This exceptionality is also closely tied to the lack of concern applied to nonhuman animals’ lives and deaths in global legal-bureaucratic structures. While there exists vocal support of the notion that animals should have rights in some capacity, on a broad structural level, “[t]here is no ‘crime against animality’ nor crime of genocide against nonhuman living beings” (Derrida, Beast 110), though he points out that “there are also animal genocides: the number of species endangered because of man takes one’s breath away)” (Animal 26). Even the call to animal rights, while it vies for the inherent value of some, but not nearly all, nonhuman lives, still founds itself on a fundamental difference between human and animal, on a fundamental cleavage between human rights and animal rights, a concept I explore in depth in my next chapter. Derrida also suggests that an animal is “not the subject of law (not therefore of power) who could protest against a ‘wrong’ done to it and occupy the place of a plaintiff in a trial” (Derrida and Roudinesco, “Violence” 70). Animals are, according to him, in a state of “being outside the law” (Derrida, Beast 17). The law itself, then, is a structure that privileges a limited framework of humanness as it renders other lives exceptions to its purview. Dogs in Rwanda’s
genocide, for example, might be labeled inhuman beasts or performers of an indignity precisely because there exists no widely accepted mode of understanding that renders animals subjects of personhood in current accounts of legal protection. There is no framework under the legal occlusion of the lives of animals for understanding the mitigating circumstances under which animals might come to consume human remains.

The absence of animals in accounts of legal protections puts their lives in a curious dual space of freedom and precarity. In his analysis of the relation between *The Beast and the Sovereign*, Derrida writes, “sovereign and beast seem to have in common their being-outside-the-law. It is as though both of them were situated by definition at a distance from or above the laws, in nonrespect for the absolute law, the absolute law that they make or that they are but that they do not have to respect.” He suggests that “being-outside-the-law” can “on the one hand (and this is the figure of sovereignty), take the form of being-above-the-laws … [and] on the other hand (and this is the figure of what is most often understood by animality or bestiality), [can also mark] the place where the law does not appear, or is not respected, or gets violated” (17). Although the distance of the beast from the law might be read as a kind of extra-legal power, just as the sovereign wields power outside or above the law, the commonality Derrida sketches out is not one that indexes an immutable freedom from the law. Derrida’s work, in both this text and *The Animal That Therefore I Am*, is cognizant of the multiple ways in which animal bodies daily become subject to innumerable kinds of violence.

In the legal framework that designates ontologies recognizable under the law, the beast remains at a distance from those legal provisions that demonize criminality, but also
in a state of nonrecognition by those statutes that guarantee protection. Applied to the human, the figure of the beast delimits a place of nonconcern, or at least a domain with which concern operates by creating a figure of nonconcern in the beast. If the “sovereign sphere is the sphere in which it is permitted to kill without committing homicide” (Agamben, *Homo* 83), the figure of the animal applied to the human offers a convenient mode of removing those humans from the realm of legal protections and into a realm in which terms such as murder and homicide cease to apply; it also produces the human that exercises the right to kill the animal(ized) as a kind of sovereign. This is not to suggest that the law is the origin of all ethics, but a force that structures the circulation of concern through national and supranational systems, toward those whose lives it may be directed, and also determines how such concern is deployed.

**Sovereignty and The Blurred Territoriality of the Human/Animal Divide**

If sovereignty has the capacity to direct concern, the power to do so, like the power of sovereignty itself, is arguably never absolute. While terms such as “beast,” “animal,” and “human” denote the power position of the bodies toward whom they are directed as one mechanism of sovereignty, then what of the power of those bodies to respond? Reading a relation between the terms of animality or bestiality and sovereignty, as Derrida does, is not to create a binary that sets in place a clear, quantifiable differential of power between the subjected body and the sovereign. If categories such as “beast,” “subhuman,” and “sovereign” are valuable for thinking through the mechanics of power in the aftermath of genocide, these terms do not necessarily coincide stably with one
individual body or another. It is crucial to point out that the unmooring of sovereignty from the figure of the state that Butler addresses makes difficult the alignment of sovereign power absolutely with any singular, legible body as it comes to circulate through populations by means of various techniques of governmentality. For the purposes of this study, however, the above terms are helpful for thinking how sovereign power incorporates the extrahuman, and to stress that the circulatory networks of concern and sovereignty do not stop at the limits of the human.

Derrida’s work on sovereignty, especially that in response to Agamben’s *Homo Sacer*, also cautions against viewing the categories produced out of sovereignty as stable ones, refuting the binaries into which analyses of power frequently fall. Derrida performs a reading of Agamben’s Aristotelian distinction between *zoē* (“the simple fact of living common to all living beings” [Agamben, *Homo 1*]) and *bios* (the “way of living proper to an individual or group” understood as political or qualified life which animals ostensibly do not have [Agamben, *Homo 1*]). He asserts that Agamben’s alignment of bare life with the *zoē* of Aristotle’s *Politics*, which constructs bare life as a deprivation of political life proper to humans, “puts all its money on a distinction … between bare life … and qualified life as individual or group life.” He argues instead that “[t]his differentiation has never been secure” (*Beast* 316). In line with Derrida’s skepticism over this distinction is Shukin’s emphasis on the prescience of a global zoopolitics as opposed to *biopolitics* that neatly separates human life from nonhuman life. She argues that a focus on zoopolitics might reveal “an inescapable contiguity or bleed between *bios* and *zoē*, between a politics of human social life and a politics of animality that extends to other species” (9). Indeed,
it has been the work of roughly a decade of animal studies to repeatedly contest the differentiation, limit, border, or boundary placed between human and animal that is repeatedly evoked as a mechanism to generate certain lives as outside the domain of ethical concern.

The association between sovereignty and the practice of establishing borders lends a lens through which to conceptualize spatially the power relations between human and animal, even while these borders might come under contestation and their allocation of power might not always be clear. Notions of the boundary and the border have been important to thinking about the limits to humanness and the limit between human and animal.44 Whether the sovereign “man”-as-political-animal in classical philosophy cultivates himself through separation from the beast as Derrida suggests, or through the production of a bestialized bare life over which it presides as Agamben suggests, the human founds itself doubly in and against an entity ostensibly divided from itself but nonetheless included in its exceptionality. Building on the logics of Agamben’s “anthropological machine,” it might be that this foundation involves a psychic repudiation of the human’s own animality.45

44 The human/animal border has been contested and reinforced by various texts and institutions. Jacques Derrida has questioned what he calls the “fragility and porosity of this limit between nature and culture” (Beast 15). Now much discussed in critical theory is his insistence that the rupture between human and animal “doesn’t describe … a unilinear and indivisible line having two edges, Man and the Animal in general” (Animal 31). Also, Dominick LaCapra addresses the limits of “an exclusively human rights,” questioning whether the “differences [between humans and other animals] that may be adduced are sufficient to serve as a criterion or divider that justifies the human practices and attitudes in the treatment of animals that presumably follow from such a criterion” (150).

45 The glaring masculinist slant to the language of this discourse, that often speaks of “man” as an encompassing term for humanity, also begs the question of where variously gendered bodies stand in proximity to the human
Wendy Brown’s recent work on sovereignty suggests that it operates through a similar kind of repudiation in the act of boundary-setting. According to Brown, “[s]overeignty is a peculiar border concept, not only demarking the boundaries of an entity, but through this demarcation setting terms and organizing the space both inside and outside the entity” (52). This demarcation as a modality of sovereignty’s expression of power, as with any application of sovereignty, is never absolute in that its practice is fraught with the anxious insistence on, but no innate claim to, its own power. The borders instituted as an expression of sovereignty are also “icons of its erosion” (24). In particular, Brown asserts that “nation-state sovereignty has always been something of a fiction in its claim” to qualities of “absoluteness and completeness” (22).

The entity to which Brown refers in the first of the above quotations might easily find expression in the lexicon of critical animal studies as a human one, and the human’s own precarious claim to power complements the image of sovereignty I sketch above. In cases where human identity is cultivated with anxiety or violence, where rigid definitions of the human involve the destruction of the animal or animalized other, we might read the human/animal boundary as being just as anxiously cultivated, as being on the one hand legitimated through recourse to violence and on the other entirely fictional as the violence with which it is cultivated reveals its precarious foundations. When we think of the violent moments in which persons are “treated like animals,” the byproduct of this violence is not simply the reduction of humans to subhuman status, but the production of the human as a category through a dis-identification with such violence—a repudiation of the very violence that doubly extinguishes the animal(ized) other and founds the human.
Indeed, as I suggested above, we might read the human as a category wrought in and through violence, even if as a dis-identification with violence. We might read the conceptual limits set in place in the making of certain iterations of the human as involving a process of psychospatial taxonomic mapping that places certain beings in the territory of humanness and renders others the exception. It would involve a psychic border that founds the limits of the human, one that extinguishes the animal(ized) other’s claim to those qualities deemed human.

This kind of boundary-setting is, in all of its inherent anxiety, precisely what this chapter reads as the logic behind a species sovereignty that must constantly assert the superiority of the human, but whose anxious assertion is also its undoing. The epigraph of this chapter from Adorno’s *Minima Moralia*, itself a text steeped in another history of genocide, illustrates this anxiety where Adorno suggests that the reduction of humans to animal status as a prerequisite for their elimination involves the perpetrators of cruelty constantly having to “reassure themselves that it is ‘only an animal,’ because they could never fully believe this even of animals” (*Minima* 68). In this line of thinking, not only does the justification for the elimination of the animalized human come under question; the limit between human and animal that would alone ostensibly justify violence toward animals fails to cohere. In the following sections of this chapter, I consider sovereignty’s relationship to humanness in three categories that, albeit reductively, have come to structure much thinking about the genocide: victim, perpetrator, and saviour. Although the following section predominantly critiques Western narratives that imagine the sovereignty of the white saviour in contrast to the bestialized victim/perpetrator
dichotomy, I also examine inversions of this dynamic that call into question the stability of these categories by aligning sovereignty with victim or perpetrator through various modes of bestialization. Moreover, I suggest that the entrance of dogs figured as beasts into these relations offers a formidable challenge to those “saviours” that stake their superiority in the instrumentalization of animalized lives. The violent invasion of the animal body into these narratives, which cannot be reduced immutably to a linguistic figuration of bestiality, I suggest, challenges the beast/sovereign dichotomy on which certain assertions of power found themselves.

Applications of Bestiality and the Narrative Rendering of Life in Rwanda’s Genocide

Various extrahuman figures accompany accounts of the genocide and illuminate this chapter’s reading of the sovereignty of the human. Prior to the killings, the Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) had been broadcasting anti-Tutsi propaganda, referring to Tutsis (among others deemed enemies of Hutu nationalism) as Inyenzi [cockroaches], inflecting the genocide with what Clapperton Chakanetsa Mavhunga calls the logic of a “pesticidal” campaign. According to Mavhunga, “the reduction of humans to pests justifies the elimination of pests, sanctions policies of elimination, and blurs the division in weapons required to police people and to police nature” (152). In this sense, the pestiferous is one of many figures of the subhuman wielded to obscure the singularity of those humans to whom this figure is assigned and a term whose usage imbues these humans with the characteristics of abject forms of life.
Frequently, Western efforts to narrate the genocide are no less troubling as they take up familiar derogatory metaphors of the nonhuman, the less than human, or the (Western) human corrupted by the inhuman landscape of Rwanda (the latter is a familiar trope since *Heart of Darkness*). This latter figuration of Africa as corrupting the Westerner has been expounded upon by Sherene Razack, whose work on Western narratives about Africa, particularly of the Somalia Affair, suggests that they construct Western bodies as being “overwhelmed by the inherent evil of the land and its peoples” (17). This evil, in turn, comes to justify atrocities committed against local populations by Western bodies who ostensibly became corrupted victims of Africa’s climate of evil.

There is, however, a different set of politics at work when figures of animals emerge, grounded in the material as opposed to transcendent. The rhetoric of evil applied to the relation between the West and Africa implies a relation of concern, albeit one in which Africa becomes a concern in the sense of an anxiety or formidable obstacle in the smooth unfolding of globalized modernity. Africa becomes a node on the global radar of concern in the sense that it is a “[region] of the world where great evil dwells” (Razack 10). When the common tropes imbuing these texts evoke the relation between human and nonhuman, as in the rhetoric of pestiferousness above, a different set of dynamics is implied. In the case of a pesticidal language, the “formidable obstacle” of “great evil” is replaced by a more diminutive figure of verminous being—the pest that irritates but is never the sublime object of fear to the extent that a transcendent evil might be. Similarly, in the rhetoric of animality or bestiality as opposed to pestiferousness, alignments between Africa or Africanness and animality create an image of the continent derived
from the overwhelming ways in which humans exercise control over other animals. An animalized Africanness is something that can ostensibly be tamed, domesticated, or—if not—contained from the humanized Western subject. The difference between these two rhetorics—on the one hand an appeal to evil and on the other an appeal to animality in various forms—might be simply stated in the following general, but not necessarily universal, way: whereas the discourse of ‘evil’ is grounded in a transcendent, immaterial, uncontrollable object of power, the discourse of (non)humanness grounds itself in a set of immanent corporeal, biological, and biopolitical objects. While both attend to the relation between an “us” and a “them,” the discourse of (non)humanity predicates itself on the nature/culture divide rather than an abstract absolute divide between good and evil.

As the discourse of sovereign power—and Western knowledges about Africa—collapse their object into the biological, this object becomes manageable under the techniques of biopolitical administration. After all, Foucault’s account of biopolitics involves a form of power that centres on the “biological fact that human beings are a species” as a prerequisite for control (Security 1), ushering the material/biological facets of life into the techniques of its governmentality. This perhaps stands in contrast to the intangible malice of something so absolute as “evil.” Moreover, the uses of animality I cite here might also be inflected by those anthropological machinations Agamben theorizes that seek to quell figures of animality in their midst in efforts to legitimate the position of the human as the central figure of global political concern.

Roméo Dallaire’s now famous Shake Hands With the Devil straddles these two discourses, oscillating between both evil and various iterations of other-than-humanity as
its central metaphors for descriptions of Rwanda. The text describes the author as being “in a zombie state” while living in Rwanda, a nation he describes as “a cesspool of guts, severed limbs, [and] flesh-eating dogs” (323), evoking horror conventions to describe the landscape of his narrative.  

We might read this statement as also an expression of the relation between Rwanda and humanness. His description consists of broken figures of the human body that, together, come to reanimate a severed form of the national body politic. Employing the figure of the undead, he pieces together textually the objects of death in his midst, gives them a kind of non-life, and imbues them with the abject powers of horror. Such conventions of horror might more readily align with Razack’s discussion of evil than with the human/nonhuman divide. More than simply a figure of “evil,” however, Dallaire’s account of Rwanda renders it a broken figure of the human. The severed corporeal remnants in his midst render Rwanda somehow incompletely human, as if the presence of body parts but no whole bodies were metonymic of the nation.

This less than human or incompletely human status accompanies Dallaire’s animalization of Rwandans. He describes those hiding from the Interahamwe as “live bait being toyed with by a wild animal, at constant risk of being killed and eaten” (382). Evoking a similar logic to the broadcasts of the RTLM, Dallaire’s reading of the genocide casts victim and perpetrator in a metaphor of predation that places both outside the category of humanness. Perpetrators become depoliticized predators, while Rwandan victims—not precisely aligned with the animalized perpetrator—exist only as objects of

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46 This description of Rwanda echoes Kristeva’s work on horror, whose account emerges from a description of the abject. According to Kristeva, “the corpse is the utmost of the abject” (4).
the predator’s “wild” appetites. The narrator, Dallaire, is the humanitarian there simply to “describe in detail” (5). As a mere reporter of events, Dallaire casts himself as a figure separated from the conflict taking place.

Casting himself in the role of the humanitarian observer, he highlights the distance of various Rwandans from the category of humanness later in his text. Of the perpetrators, he asserts that their “crimes had made them inhuman” (457). Of the victims, he describes the “destruction of their [identity] cards, and of their records” by genocidaires as having “erased [them] from humanity” (281).47 While it avoids the animalization characteristic of his description of perpetrators, Dallaire’s text still insists on the distance of victims from humanity, a category bound up with their recognition by state bureaucracy. It is as if the category of humanness were bequeathed by technologies of state sovereignty on its subjects. Relying on familiar figures of the less-than-human, Dallaire’s language maintains something of the dehumanizing gesture of Interahamwe logic by removing personhood from his description of Rwandans.

When read through Agamben’s terms, the reduction of humans to a kind of animalized life in the above two examples evidences a sovereignty tied to species limits. In that both rely on a production of the animal as a standard for subhumanity they hold up the human as itself a sovereign category. For Hutu Power, the presumption of human sovereignty over the pest coincides with the permissibility with which human actors are able to eliminate the pestiferously-rendered Tutsi. The production of the Tutsi as “pest”

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47 The identity cards to which Dallaire refers were the result of a system of ethnic identity designation set in place by Belgian colonialism, which officially categorized and contributed to congealing “Hutu” and “Tutsi” as essential ethnic identities (Dallaire 281).
might be one mode of inaugurating the sovereignty of the Hutu nation-state against the animality of its exception. In the RTLM example above, the perpetrator of genocide enacts the claim to sovereignty in the process of animalization. In Dallaire’s text, if we accept Agamben’s argument, the sovereignty of the Western (albeit failed) saviour emerges out of the animalization of the Rwandan other. His text’s characterization of the response to 1994 idealizes humanity as a category from which ethical concern should emanate when he documents the “failure of humanity to heed a call for help from an endangered people” (516). In this case, casting Rwanda’s genocide as a failure of humanity produces humanity as the intelligible standard for success.

Moreover, the reference to Rwandans as an “endangered people” resonates with the language of environmentalisms that call attention to endangered species, especially when we consider biopower’s treatment of humans as a species. This is not to suggest that Dallaire explicitly espouses a racism that conflates nonhuman species with Rwandans. Rather, the logic behind and use of the terms of endangerment underlying both Western approaches to conflict and calls to environmentalism might emerge out of a similar paradigm of intervention. Both align the responsibility of global ethical concern with an account of the human that overlaps with Western subjectivity.

If a failure of humanity emerges from the lack of concern with which the international community treated Rwanda (the central actors within the UNAMIR forces were primarily from the Global North), where does Rwanda lie in relation to this vision of the West’s (failed) humanity? Its status within the community of humanity remains unclear as it becomes the object of humanity’s intervention (much like “natural” life
frequently does) and a site at which—based on Dallaire’s predatory figuration of Rwandan conflict—various figures of inhumanity, subhumanity, and animality coincide.

The Ferocious Dog and Animal Resistance: Delegitimizing Sovereign Power

The previous section of this chapter dealt predominantly with processes of dehumanization; this one turns to the dogs themselves. The entrance of Rwanda’s dogs into texts about the genocide brings these particular animals into a complex and sometimes contradictory relationship with the interventionist saviour, a relationship that variably reinforces and contests the privileged position of the human in such narratives. On the one hand, they are wielded, as in the case of the film *Shooting Dogs* that I examine below, as accessories to the brutality of genocide. On the other hand, as “unusually large and fierce” entities (Dawes 20), they represent a formidable challenge to those humans who document coming into contact with them within the contested landscape of power of 1994 Rwanda. Understood as behaving unusually—as acting outside the limits of acceptable canine embodiment—they take on characteristics unfamiliar to what might be common Western understandings of the domesticated dog. Caught between multiple claims on their bodies that would cast them variously as strays, vermin, ferocious beasts, or accessories to bestialized constructions of the *Interahamwe*, the dogs’ entrance into Western narratives of Rwanda’s genocide have a complicated relationship with constructions of the human and humanitarian. It would be presumptuous to idealize their ferocity as an assertion of power on the part of an animality that refuses to be interpellated into conventional human/canine relationalities given the violent deaths
to which they were subject. Moreover, idealizing their deaths as forms of resistance to anthropocentric politics might come under criticism as insensitively erasing the lives of those Rwandans on whom they fed, and starvation is a more likely candidate for their motivation than overt resistance. Rather than making such presumptions about dogs, however, we might read the violent act of putting them to death as itself revelatory of anxieties about conventional human/canine relations, a response on the part of a human whose power position comes under the threat of a ferocious dog.

The film *Shooting Dogs* is deeply invested in the martyrdom of the intervening saviour—complementing a discussion of the association between sovereignty and interventionism—constituted by its relation to various figures of bestialized ferocity in the saviour’s midst. The film covers the early days of the events when UNAMIR troops were positioned at the *Ecole Technique Officielle*, a sanctuary to some 2000 Rwandans, outside the gates of which the *Interahamwe* kept constant watch. Only days later, the UN troops left the school in a convoy evacuating only Westerners, abandoning the remaining Rwandans to the inevitable death they would face upon the entrance of the *Interahamwe*. The film’s central agent is Father Christopher, a Roman Catholic priest presiding over his Kigali parish and teaching at the school. He is a figure of sovereignty, in a sense, legitimated by his divine association, especially if we accept Brown’s contention that “political sovereignty is never without theological structure and overtones, whether it is impersonating, dispelling, killing, rivaling, or serving God” (61). Indeed, the film apotheosizes him as a Christ-like martyr when the UN convoy departs and he “refuses to leave his people and courageously sacrifices his own life in order to save a single truck
load of children from certain death” (Cook 172). The legitimation of the saviour as sovereign here, though, might derive more from his status as a white Westerner since the film focuses primarily on the perspectives of Christopher and other Western bodies, including Joe Connor (a volunteer teacher from Britain) and General Charles Dalon (the Belgian head of the UN forces positioned at the school). Rwandans themselves offer few contributions in the film, and those that do are grounded in a reductive Hutu/perpetrator and Tutsi/victim binary. As a Western interpretation of history, the film is more interested in the power play of various would-be saviours, epitomized by Father Christopher and the UN General Dalon.48

If we accept Brown’s reading of sovereignty as occurring at the boundary, Christopher’s alignment with sovereignty is driven home by the diligence with which he presides over the gated school, aiding General Dalon in keeping the Interahamwe and vicious dogs outside. Indeed, the film was retitled Beyond the Gates for its American release. If the film’s two titles, Shooting Dogs and Beyond the Gates, are meant to encapsulate its thematic concerns, they might spur us into thinking about the associations

48 It is important to note the status of the film as narrative and highlight the problems with its take on history. Although the film insists that it is “Based on Real Events and … Made at the Location Depicted,” Cook suggests that the film, like other films of the genocide, “rel[ies] on an ethnic frame of reference to account for events that were triggered by a complex matrix of historical, political, and economic factors which suggest that ethnicity was one of several factors that determined who was targeted for extermination” (Cook 170). Cook reads the film as a mythologized simulacrum “in which the simulation of genocide on screen becomes the primary frame of reference for viewers simply because it is the means by which many of them will frame their understanding of what happened in Rwanda” (172). We might stipulate that the film emphasizes its own fictionality, however, in statement that it is “based on” real events; as such, it draws attention to itself as an historical simulacrum. Eltringham’s review of the film touches on its historically narrow scope, but assumes greater agency on the part of the viewer to access other accounts of genocide and reads the film as an engagement with a particular facet of Rwanda’s history. For further commentary on the film, see Abrahamsson’s “Acts of Genocide” and Gunnar Olsson’s review of the text.
between animality and the boundary setting involved in the film’s titular gates. Bülent Diken’s assessment of the “Shooting Dogs” title reads it as metonymic of “society gradually being dissolved into a state of nature,” or “the gradual erosion of the line between civilization and barbarism,” exposing the film’s evocation of the nature/culture divide in its use of boundaries. Moreover, for Diken, the dog functions as an indicator of a context in which “man is a dog to men” (747). Under this logic, the film relegates the animal to the space beyond the gate, to the other side of the boundary from that on which the saviour—a representantive of sovereignty—resides.

The film’s dogs are entities, closely aligned with the Interahamwe, on whose bodies the emergence of a sovereign (albeit failed) saviour stakes its claims. These claims emerge in Christopher’s clash with the film’s other figure of sovereignty and (failed) saviour, General Dalon, in which they argue over the fate of corpse-eating dogs roaming outside the gate.

Dalon: The [dogs] outside the gate … are eating the bodies. Can you just please inform everyone that we have a health problem here? We are going to shoot the dogs. If they hear gunshots they should not panic, okay?
Christopher: Did they open fire? Did they open fire, Charles?
Dalon: Did who open fire?
Christopher: The dogs! Were they shooting at you?
Dalon: What are you talking about?
Christopher: It’s just, according to your “mandate,” if you’re going to shoot the dogs then the dogs must have been shooting at you first.
Dalon: Please, Christopher…
Christopher: I’ll tell you what! Why don’t we just say fuck the mandate. And when you’ve finished with this health problem maybe you’ll address the other health problem. The one over there with the fucking machetes!

Far from expressing concern for dog’s lives, Christopher’s comments serve a rhetorical purpose that relegates the Rwandan conflict to a place beyond the border of the human
and into a depoliticized framework. On the one hand, Christopher’s application of the UNAMIR mandate to animals collapses the boundary between human and animal, subjecting the nonhuman dog to the protections of international law. His rhetorical move points to the absurdity of the UN’s actions in that their elimination of a “health problem” overlooks its genocidal cause. On the other hand, this gesture is only complete with its referral to the *Interahamwe* as “the other health problem.” His collapse of the boundary between human and animal only brings the Rwandan human closer to the bestialized dog. Outside that collapse, the film’s perspective—brought forth by the focus on the two figures of Western sovereignty, the film’s primary actors—supersedes any semblance of Rwandan agency. The BBC-made film perhaps delivers to its audience precisely what they want to see: a condemnation of the UN’s actions in the genocide offered up by the convenient scapegoat of the UN General. Indeed, condemnation of the UN and of the killings has perhaps been a dominant humanist perspective of many popular films about the genocide, but these perspectives rely on a humanism in which the only voice able to exercise the autonomy of the political characteristic of liberal accounts of sovereignty is the Westerner’s, as if Rwandans themselves had not taken stands against the killings. In line with Harting’s criticism of such texts, the genocide becomes an opportunity for Western introspection. Christopher’s comparison between the dogs and the *Interahamwe* renders them not subjects with whom we can or should engage politically, but the passive terrain on which the sovereignty of the Western voice can showcase its politics.

Perhaps just as pivotal to this scene is the visual constitution of the order in the bounded space of the school juxtaposed with the chaos occurring outside. Just prior to
this scene, the film’s lens pans over the space outside the gates of the school. It shows menacing, machete-wielding Interahamwe and dogs walking through a field of corpses. Only dogs growling and machetes scraping the ground occupy the scene’s soundscape. No dogs are seen eating corpses, but the message is clear: just as the growling of the dogs establishes their ferocity, the cruel scrape of the machete establishes the ferocity of the Interahamwe. Both are aligned in the aural and visual grammar of bestialization. They are a group of beings rendered, in line with multiple colonial fantasies of the colonized body, “inherently bestial and in need of strict control” (Hoch 94), evidenced by the film’s depiction of the UN unflinchingly minding the gates, “awash with weapons” (Melvern). As Diken asserts, “genocide is depicted in the film as a state of exception” (747), but one which relies on the production of the Hutu as a bestialized killer outside of history, beyond the boundary that separates them from the rationality of the film’s two Western voices. The film attests to the human and humanistic sovereignty of the Westerner, and ossifies the borders between the West and Africa, and human and animal. It is, however, a tenuous sovereignty, one in which the beast’s claim on the Western body must be violently policed.

The challenge that dogs present to conceptions of the human such that they must be violently eliminated emerges also in Dallaire’s text. The dog in this text takes on a presence much more troubling to the saviour’s claim to sovereignty. Dallaire relates an account from August 1994, near the end of his tenure in Rwanda, in which a pack of dogs disrupts a compound he had set off to keep the stress of the genocide at bay, in the following passage:
Toward the end of July I had asked my Ghanaian escort to buy us a few goats … to bring some life into my days. I took immense pleasure in watering them, feeding them, and watching them roam the Amahoro. … One day my Ghanaian batman came running into my office and said for me to come quickly—a pack of wild dogs was attacking my goats. Without stopping to think I grabbed my pistol, raced outside and started shooting at the dogs as I ran across the parking lot. I fired my entire clip at them. I missed them all, but still the dogs fled and I felt satisfied that I had saved my goats. (501)

Dallaire’s account embodies a claim to sovereignty. If we accept notions of the sovereign as having the right to kill, we might extend the scope of that right to animal bodies and read Dallaire’s actions as bearing the marks of sovereign decisionism when he quells the threat to the safety of his pastoral encampment. Indeed, that Dallaire shoots “without stopping to think” indicates that dogs’ lives in this instance do not require thought. They are a form of life that lies beyond the threshold of ethical consideration, whereas he consistently has presence of mind enough to refuse to fire on another human. As an action performed without thought, Dallaire’s shooting the dogs indicates the absolute, unquestioned supremacy of the human over the canine other.

Read another way, an inversion of his status as a representative of UN sovereignty might derive from this lack of thought and his text’s consistent emphasis on the failure of the UN. Even coincident with the notion that Dallaire fails to kill the dogs, his right to kill is an impotently exercised one. Moreover, although he is a kind of saviour, he is, in effect, a failed one. His entire text is framed in terms of failure as its opening presents “the penny-pinching financial management of the mission, the UN red tape, the political manipulations” (6), undermining any claim to absolute power. While dogs might represent one set of lives over whom he can claim absolute power, the dogs escape his exertion of it. They also become the catalyst to his leaving Rwanda as a failed saviour.
“When I turned to go back to my office,” he relates, following the above passage, “I saw at least fifty pairs of surprised and concerned eyes staring at me intently …. They said nothing but the message was clear: ‘The General is losing it.’” Following this event he informs his superiors that he “need[s] to be relieved of his command sooner than planned” (501). The presence of various animals at this moment is striking for the reversal it offers of the conventional figure of the humanitarian saviour pitted against a field of bestialized victims and perpetrators. The general “loses it” alongside the figures of various animals. The relation between his losing his mind and the animals in his midst bears a curious resemblance to Foucault’s analysis of madness as “in its ultimate form … man in immediate relation to his animality” (Madness 69). If the compound itself were read as a psychosocial map of his mental state, the animals found within it render Dallaire’s narrative not only a wrestling with the trauma of genocide, but also with his proximity to animality. The entrance of the ferocious dogs into the ordered, pastoral space of the General’s compound is a catalyst to his losing his mind. The dogs are a presence that undoes his capacity to be the sovereign liberal subject and to exert the control he maintains over his compound. They are figures of animality that tear at the boundaries of his claim to control. If the sovereign subject is meant to cultivate itself through dissociation from the animal, Dallaire’s attack here, in which animals violate his boundaries and he meets the animal other violently, fails to do so. In this way, the dogs’

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49 Foucault’s comment is made in reference to 18th century forms of madness, but the historical currency of this concept and ever-pervasive reductive figurations of animality attest to its continued relevance.
invasion might be read as an event of animality that, at the very least, undermines any clean constitution of the supremacy of the human in relation to other animals.

Conclusion

This chapter has attended to those narratives of humanness that undergird limit-case violence. Its reading hopefully adds to a body of literature that contests the marginal position of Africa and Africans within particularly Western narratives of the continent’s violence. As I have already argued, animal representation and the material treatment of particular animals in genocidal contexts is central to those presumptions that sustain limit-case violence. The chapter’s closing reading of the Rwandan dogs as enacting a sort of resistance also hopes to move the conversation begun here beyond the figure of the human and toward other animals’ experiences of violence. Such as it is, this inquiry into the Rwandan dogs is thus not yet finished. As haunting remainders in various texts about Rwanda, their specters project more than a total victimization under or a confirmation of sovereignty’s absoluteness. As this analysis continues into my next chapter, I focus particularly on the figure of the stray as one that signals but also allows us to think beyond the foreclosures of concern enacted by sovereign power.
Chapter Three

Sovereignty’s Strays: Animal Rights, Canicide, and Concern

There is no “crime against animality” nor crime of genocide against nonhuman living beings. (Jacques Derrida, *The Beast and the Sovereign* 110)

Dogs, in their historical complexity, matter here. Dogs are not an alibi for other themes; dogs are fleshly material semiotic presences in the body of technoscience. Dogs are not surrogates for theory; they are not here just to think with. They are here to live with. Partners in the crime of human evolution, they are in the garden from the get-go, wily as Coyote. (Donna Haraway, *The Companion Species Manifesto* 5)

How did we come to view as debased an animal known for its intelligence, empathy, loyalty, dependability, courage, protectiveness, sensitivity, and caring? Considering that so many of us own dogs, which depend on us, why do we continue to own what we seem to despise so much? How come an animal we own has become such a pervasive symbol of our own violence? How did we turn it into a symbol of abuse? Or could it be a symbol of our own failure to take care of it, and that it is comforting to know that we have something more piteous than ourselves? (Njabulo Ndebele, “The Year of the Dog”)

Introduction

The opening pages of James Dawes’s *That the World May Know* offer one of the scant descriptions of the fate of Rwanda’s dogs in 1994. His text begins by recounting a narrative about the events during which the dogs were killed, related to him by Senegalese author Boubacar Boris Diop. Diop (or Dawes, since we only get his paraphrase) describes the RPF encountering in their movement through Rwanda canines that “were unusually large and fierce, having fed well on the heaps of corpses choking the roadways. RPF soldiers, sickened by this final indignity, began to shoot the dogs. Immediately, animal rights groups in London launched a protest to protect the dogs” (20).
He later condemns the reaction of animal rights groups in this narrative as an exemplar of the way that the Rwandan genocide “becomes primarily an occasion for whites to fantasize about themselves,” a form of “moral self-congratulation” (33). We might note that the genocide of some 800,000 Rwandans (mostly Tutsis) in 1994 was largely overlooked by the West, and Dawes uses this instance of concern for animals to emphasize the globe’s disregard for Rwandan human life.

Still, his is a curious response to this narrative, not least because it maintains a focus on whiteness in its very reading of animal rights groups as gatherings composed of white bodies. Moreover, assuming the whiteness of the London protesters, his response risks occluding those bodies of colour who frequently mobilize both in defense of animals and in locations as racially heterogeneous as London. Narrow as the protestors’ view of justice might appear in the story, by making the animal rights protesters the focus of his critique Dawes avoids a nuanced interrogation of the onerous politics of life and death that converge on the bodies of dogs and the Rwandans on whom they are said to perform an indignity. Beyond these potential pitfalls, his response also raises a host of questions about permissible forms of concern in the context of a post-conflict Africa, and about those intellectual engagements (including his own) that have the capacity to regulate where concern may be directed.

What are the problematics of bodies located in the Global North responding to conflicts in Africa? This question considers Dawes’s own addition to the veritable culture industry that generates appropriate responses to African conflict alongside potential problems with the protesters he cites. It is also perhaps a self-conscious question on my
part, since this project offers what is—if Dawes is accurate—another Western text responding to Rwanda. How are responses such as Dawes’ and the story’s protesters’ tied to this dissertation’s introductory theorization of a discursive regime that directs global relationalities of concern around, away from, or over Africa and African lives? Is an animal rights politics primarily a form of self-congratulation or a white-centric pursuit and, if so, how do we alter the trajectory of such pursuits? Is Dawes’s response meant to emphasize the frivolity of concern for animal life in the face of the genocide’s human toll, or is his text merely critical of a narrowly articulated form of animal rights? The questions and problems laid out here are not uniquely derived from Dawes’s work. What emerges in a reading of his and other works on Rwanda is that the confluence of animal and human death in them is not just the problem of a series of isolated stories in one conflict history, but part of a global narrative that shapes the stories humans tell themselves about animals’ relationship to limit case violence.50

As the reader can probably see, considering animality alongside genocide is no simple matter. Dawes’s text presents us with a difficult situation in which the already complex politics of where concern can or should get directed become evermore arduous when we consider the nonhuman’s implication in genocide. As we enter an age of increasing environmental consciousness, Rwanda’s genocide is an instance in which a hasty repudiation of concern for or a forestalling of inquiry into the nuances of nonhuman life and death is arguably inadequate. But how should we respond to nonhuman lives that

50 Halverson, Goodall, and Cormon’s work on narrative in the wake of American 9/11 Islamophobia is a helpful framework for understanding how stories circulate. They call narrative “a coherent system of stories that share a common rhetorical desire to resolve a conflict” (23).
challenge the authority and sanctity of both particular humans and, perhaps, the category of humanity itself?

It is difficult both to discern the particularities of Dawe’s criticism and to provide a counter-critique from a critical animal studies perspective, perhaps as a result of the notion that accounting for lives beyond the human in conflict histories brings us to the limits of a frequently humanist ethical language about violence. Speaking about the stray dog in a conflict situation might be especially difficult because, as I examine later in this chapter, even in the age of an emerging hegemony of animal rights as the predominantly visible global form of concern for animals, the stray remains a figure difficult to account for next to other, supposedly more important or endangered species. Still, what has come to be read as the limit-case violence of genocide, because it exposes the short-sightedness of certain demonstrations of animal rights, might compel us to think through other and more complex modes of concern that shape global relations and orientations. The genocidal context of Rwanda, rather than being the platform for an obstreperously voiced and uncritical form of animal advocacy, might encourage us to think through concern in terms of our shared ties with other animals, accounting for what James Stanescu calls the “shared embodied finitude” between humans and other forms of life (568).

What is crucial for this chapter is that Dawes evokes a particular tale that juxtaposes an example from everyday London alongside the Rwandan genocide. These two contexts appear absolutely distant from one another, reinforced by Dawes’s dismissal of the protestors’ apparently misplaced political fervour. That distance also has much to do with London’s everyday being considered too far removed from the exceptional
violence of Rwanda’s genocide. However, troubling this apparent distance to some extent, this chapter is skeptical of the way that mass violence is frequently divorced from the everyday. This is not an attempt to deny or devalue the traumatic toll of 1994’s massacre, but to draw attention to those global systems which are a part of everyday life that facilitate relations of concern or nonconcern between locations in the West and Africa, especially in moments of extreme violence. With attention to my previous chapter’s insistence on the primacy of animal representation to narratives of genocide, this one explores how notions of the human/animal dichotomy in Western thought inform global systems that allow for the suspension of concern for animalized lives, particularly African ones. If my previous chapter demonstrated the disservice this dichotomy does to those humans not welcomed into the enclave of humanity, this one is more devoted to the Rwandan dogs themselves and available frames for articulating concern for them. The stories of their deaths, I suggest, offer a start to thinking through the very question with which this project began: how does one show concern for other-than-human animals in contexts where human life is precarious? It is my hope that drawing on the lessons of Rwanda in thinking through this question will also expose the exclusionary nature of what has become a frequently exercised approach to trauma in Western texts about Africa and Rwanda in particular—an approach bound up with the sacred position of the witness-bearing journalist or academic of circulating permissible forms of concern around the human.

A central figure that will be theorized in the late stages of this chapter is that of the stray. Not usually totemic animals for the rights movement, strays are animals that are
“out-of-place” and “frequently controlled as pests” (Srinivasan 2), demonstrated in the Rwandan case by the readiness with which stray dogs’ lives may be taken without consideration. As figures that are “not loved or wanted by human beings” (4), strays are as paradoxical as the sovereign of my previous chapter—both “outside and inside the juridical order” (Agamben, *Homo* 15). On the one hand they are those animals defined by their subjection to and exclusion from the realm of human others, and—echoing Krithika Srinivasan’s work on the subject—I stress the material violence of this exclusion in ongoing processes such as mass sterilization, euthanization, and general biopolitical control of stray populations before moving on to the other side of this paradox. On the other hand, and for the purposes of this chapter, they are also those figures whose traces—in their very movement beyond the human—have the potential to carry us beyond the humanist vocabulary on which accounts of violence frequently stake their claims. In many ways, the stray provides an apt metaphor for this chapter, in that it carries forward some questions left by the previous one, and moves beyond its geographical and critical confines. Drawing on global everydays to frame discussions of Rwandan violence, it follows some of the questions left in the previous chapter’s wake about how or whether concern should be shown for certain animals and the global systems that shape that concern.

In its attempts to account for the Rwandan stray alongside the global everyday, this chapter moves through five sections of analysis. The first section articulates a theoretical frame for considering the everyday alongside the ostensibly exceptional place of Rwandan violence. The next three sections of this chapter interrogate animal rights
discourse in relation to Africa. This chapter maintains that, even as possibly the most visible globally-deployed script for performing concern for animal life, animal rights discourse is inadequate for addressing the concerns of postcolonial and postconflict politics in African studies. I demonstrate this claim through an examination of the notion of the right itself, followed by an examination of Michele Pickover’s *Animal Rights in South Africa*. In its focus on a global community of animal rights activism, I suggest, that text alienates more than ties together the concerns of postcolonial Africas and animal rights. There is more to it than that, however; it is not that animal rights discourse is inadequate for the *particular* situation of postcolonialism but that rights discourse itself falls short of cultivating concern for animal others. It may even produce the hierarchies that render animals unacceptable subjects of concern in zones of violence. It will be one of the arguments of this chapter that there is also a human sovereignty at work in rights discourse, that rights on the one hand and the kind of sovereignty now familiar to cultural theory since Agamben’s *Homo Sacer* on the other complement each other. They do so in that they continually reproduce the division between human and animal and, especially, produce the animal as embodying a separate category of concern—a category that is decidedly apart from the realm of self-reproducing human concerns that dictate where concern lies and toward whom it gets directed.

The final section of this chapter, moving away from animal rights and toward other modes of concern, turns to the aforementioned stray. Reading the stray as a figure that reconfigures current models of human-animal relationality, I suggest that attention to this figure also reveals the workings of sovereignty in narratives of violence. This section
draws on Judith Butler’s *Precarious Life* to consider the role of narrative in producing certain lives as intelligibly human and subhuman. It also argues that the metaphorics of the stray undergird accounts of African “rogue” states, and problematizes the role of animal signifiers in rendering certain locations subhuman. Following a theoretical discussion of the relationship between narrative and sovereignty, this section provides a reading of Jean-Phillipe Stassen’s graphic novel *Deogratias*, a text on Rwanda’s genocide that both encourages a view toward state technologies that act on the stray and narratively directs concern away from the human as the central figure of ethics.

It might seem odd to place a critique of animal rights alongside a reading of the Rwandan genocide, but my argument is that both are productive of taxonomic categories and species hierarchies that dictate how animalized lives are conceptualized in the circulation of Western liberal ideals, in narratives about genocide, and in various ontologies of everydayness in both Africa and the Global North. Moreover, while this chapter focuses predominantly on the 1994 Rwandan genocide and canicide, it deploys these events as a starting point to thinking about their connection to a globalized animal rights discourse. Drawing on the work of my previous chapter, it also considers the association between the liberal politics of the humanitarian intervenor, the scope of the animal rights activist, and—more broadly—the production of a normalized human subjectivity. Amidst these remaining concerns, there figures the uncomfortable position of the Rwandan stray, a category of abjection that reveals the limited scope of humanism’s concern for other beings.
Notes on African Violence and the Global Everyday

One of the aims of this chapter is to contribute to a vocabulary whereby we might be able to account for the nonhuman (or even engage concerns that are controversial or impermissible) in situations of what is frequently understood as limit case violence.\(^{51}\) These are situations often regarded with a kind of sanctification that places limits on what we may discuss post-conflict. This is not to say that we need to approach such violence in a way that throws ethics to the wind, but that we might expand our conceptions of what counts as a matter of concern in what Dominick LaCapra calls the “questionable manner in which violence has been valorized and presented in foundational, sacralized, sublime, or redemptive terms” (90). “A crucial problem,” he argues, “is that such figurations of violence tend to free it from normative limits and associate it with excess” (91). Slavoj Žižek’s *Violence*, likewise, points to a tendency to “oppos[e] all forms of violence … [in the] tolerant liberal attitude that predominates today” (10), particularly *subjective* violence, which he defines as the visible event of violence that ruptures what we view as the “non-violent zero level” of the everyday in global capitalism (2). He instead encourages us to “resist the fascination of subjective violence” and think through “the violence inherent to the ‘normal,’ peaceful state of things” (2)—that is, *objective* violence—under global neoliberal capitalist hegemony, the detrimental effects of which on African lives are well documented.\(^{52}\)

\(^{51}\) Dominick LaCapra reads “[t]he paradigm case of limit event … [as] violence related to traumatization.” His work addresses how “historiography is taken to its limits in attempting to account for extremes” (7).

\(^{52}\) For examinations of the position of Africa in neoliberal capitalism, see Ferguson’s *Global Shadows*, and Harrison’s *Neoliberal Africa*.
One of the consequences of spectacular violence being removed from the normal and relegated to the sublime or exceptional is that it becomes difficult to elaborate its connection to and emergence from the violence of the everyday that precedes and follows the “event” of violence. As recent interrogations of the movement of capital in the global economy suggest, however, the consumptive materiality of multiple everydays have within their invisible histories violences that occur in zones of resource extraction. Even Frantz Fanon’s *The Wretched of the Earth* provides some groundwork for detailing the connection between the materiality of the Western everyday and Africa, insisting that “Europe has been bloated out of all proportions by the … raw materials from such colonial [areas] as … Africa” (58). Understood in terms of this neocolonial history, violence in Africa presumably cannot be regarded outside the global resource flows that unearth the raw materials of Western commodities from Africa. This is especially the case when such violence emerges out of a lack of resources, as was the case when, in 1994, Rwanda was one of the most impoverished nations on earth, and as it continues to be to this day.

Beyond the materiality of natural resources and drawing on my previous chapter’s view of the humanitarian, we could even speculate that Africa’s place in the globe provides the “raw materials” required to assemble the Western humanitarian. The narrative processes that extract them are no less exploitative than in the case of material resources. Indeed, the kinds of animalizations that occur in genocidal contexts might also

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53 I once again cite Ferguson’s *Global Shadows* and Harraison’s *Neoliberal Africa* to buttress my reading of resource-extraction in Africa.
54 According to the IMF, CIA, and World Bank statistics, Rwanda is currently in the bottom 30 countries ranked by GDP.
inform ideas about the animal in certain Western everydays. More specifically, the crafting of the African human as subhuman that accompanies these processes, in effect, might provide the basis for alignments between animality and subhumanity against which normative versions of the human in contexts other than genocide define themselves. In short, I impress upon the reader the tenuousness of providing any isolated reading of African violence that considers it separate from those everydays that facilitate it.

This means that when even or especially those of us in academia outside of Africa contribute to a discourse that reads Rwandan history as a history of genocide, or African history as a history of violence, we might not be telling the whole story. Understanding the politics of human and animal found within narratives of violence might be the start to understanding from where our stories are sourced and how they perpetuate reductive dichotomies between Africa and the rest of the globe. One such text, Jean Hatzfeld’s *The Antelope’s Strategy*—whose title is an animal analogy for survivors’ methods of evading death in the genocide—illustrates well the problematic of non-African intellectual probing into African violence. His opening pages recount an anecdote from his interview with a Rwandan woman, named in the text as Claudine: “‘More questions?’ she says in feigned astonishment. ‘Still about the killings. So you just can’t stop. Why keep on? Why ask me? A person can feel uneasy, answering’” (5). The notion that Claudine feigns astonishment not simply at Hatzfeld’s questions but that they are *still* focused on the killings is telling of how a limited range of questions interpellate African responses to the West within an equally limited range. Hatzfeld offers no response or explanation as to
why he continues to inquire about the killings in what is his third book on the genocide, and Claudine’s interrogation of the author precedes 250 pages of continued questioning.

Claudine’s questions are a sobering indication of the way that the Western literary consumer might come to be concerned with certain locations for their relationship with extreme forms of violence. Considered alongside LaCapra’s discussion of the sanctification of the limit case, the West’s appetite for African violence, even if in a mode of intellectual engagement, might be read as actively rendering violent events exceptional. They might also mark certain geospatial locations as themselves exceptionally violent when few other narratives of them appear, or when the inquiring literary mind has as its only point of orientation the spectacle of the violent event. Any connection to the everyday preceding the event—or even of the violent event’s implication in a myriad of global systems from which the Western everyday cannot be cleanly exonerated—disappears as understandings of these locations in the Global Northern cultural imaginary is limited to the confines of a violent event with a clear beginning and end.

Considering the complexities and challenges of reading African violence, this chapter is an attempt to push the limits of thinking about it in at least two ways. The first involves the above-discussed process of challenging the limitations of reading African postcolonial violence as exceptional to various global everydays. The second involves challenging humanistic narratives of violence, and this will develop in the final section of this chapter that turns to the stray. Narratives of the genocide, I suggest, also sustain the legitimacy of humanness as a sovereign category fashioned through its relation to
exceptional violence. They do so by rendering the violent event a kind of pedagogical moment that ostensibly should direct their audience’s concern toward the human.

Africa and Animal Rights: Who Gets to Care for African Animals?

In my previous chapter, while reading Dallaire’s *Shake Hands with the Devil*, I argued that certain approaches to humanitarian intervention align with prevailing conservationist approaches to nonhuman life. There, I suggested that, just as Africa is constructed as a space in which the humanitarian can presume the right to intervene, the realm of nonhuman life is one in which the conservationist can presume that very same right. Animal rights discourse, although it might be practiced in tandem with such conservationisms, nonetheless depends on the presumption that animals (usually mammals) are unique bodies not necessarily collapsible into the ecologies in which they reside, simply because animals, “endowed with voluntary motion” as Armstrong suggests (415), stand out in the broader, amorphous category of “nature” on which many approaches to environmentalism depend. Animal rights, in that it recognizes animals as beings with agency to some extent, depends on the difference between animals and other forms of life such as plants, bacteria, or viruses, entities considered in my next chapter. However, as this section demonstrates, it is animal rights’ tacit reliance on a category of the animal that might be its undoing, particularly for postcolonial and postconflict zones of Africa that most clearly require intersectional analyses.

Let me say outright that the analysis I offer here is not a simple dismissal of those activists that rally in support of the legitimacy of animal lives. It may appear that fighting
for animals’ rights in a world in which, for example, black lives so often get denied rights is an ignoble pursuit, but fighting for one does not nullify concern for the other. Moreover, given that the right is one of the most available means for a life to be interpellated into a legal subjectivity in a way that grants it agency and protection, it would be a hasty gesture to dismiss its importance outright. Nonetheless, as many interrogations of the notion of rights tell us (and I examine some below) the right does not begin to account for something as complex as a “life” in all the term’s historical, social, political, and biological complexity, and rights themselves, following Foucault, are arguably conferred as part of rather than protection from a system of biopolitical governmentality. For these reasons in particular, rather than rejecting one mode of concern in favour of another, this section evaluates a few approaches to the notion of the right.

Discussions of rights inevitably arise in the global handling of African conflict in response to the supposed precarity of the right to life in African contexts. What often seems occluded in these discussions is the notion that many Africans live outside of or in spite of such precarity even if regarded as being reduced to “bare life.” It might also be valuable to think through how the notion of rights and its association with a liberal framework of the individual tie in with the sovereignties discussed in my previous chapter as rights discourse indexes another interlinked form of sovereignty, that is, the

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55 See Marcelo Svirsky and Simone Bignall’s account of uses of the term “bare life” to apply to postcolonial locations. Svirsky cautions against the readiness with which many have used the term “bare life” to apply to the African postcolony. Where I use the term in this chapter I do so—as Agamben does—to see a certain technology of power rather than an immutable condition of those lives who fall under that power.
sovereignty of the individual in liberal philosophy. That said, when we consider that the
call to grant rights (especially to animals) is so often heard in various locations in the
West, we might question who is able to claim a right, who is able to articulate that claim,
and how the very articulation of the right can both circulate and foreclose concern for
other lives. The latter is especially important when we consider that animals are not those
who could speak for their own rights. The system in which rights are conferred is such
that only certain bodies will ever be able claim them; it depends on a paradigm of
subjectivity that involves the capacity to claim a right under a legal bureaucratic
structure.

While the dogs in the genocide figure as a prominent concern in many Western
accounts, and while the annals of Rwandan studies contain innumerable interviews with
perpetrators and survivors on various aspects of 1994’s massacre, it is curious that those
Western texts which comment on the dogs also offer few African perspectives on their
killing. Dawes, for example, derides the whiteness of at least one group’s animal rights
perspective. Gourevitch, while more hesitant to prescribe an easy response to the death of
dogs, takes no position on the dogs’ deaths other than to refer to an Englishwoman who
shows concern for them. Is this absence in place because Africa is thought to be a
location at which concern for animals does not appear, where more immediate “human”
concerns are thought to be the center of politics? If so, I would question whether this
presumption, rather than being a pre-existing approach to animal life within Africa is also
produced out of Western narratives of this kind that reinforce a species hierarchy. It may
be that these narratives themselves elide African knowledges and write Western ones as
the only visible epistemological frameworks able to think about the fraught ethics of animal death in zones of conflict. My introduction posited that animal rights has not taken hold within Africa’s borders in quite the same way as in the West, but emphasized that animal rights is only one framework for articulating concern and one that reifies colonial logics at that. It might be that animal rights offers us a way to talk about animal lives, but it is worth noting that animal rights comes with its own exclusions. Rights movements frequently ask us to attend to particular animals at the expense of others—generally speaking, mammalian life takes precedence over, say, the lives of insects or spiders.  

Recalling the genocide, the reduction of a Tutsi to a cockroach is what removes that life from familiar modes of ethical engagement and relegating it to a framework outside of concern for the human. If animal rights does depend on the charisma of certain animals, we might evaluate its efficacy with a view toward—rather than those animals it protects—those it renders nonconcerns. If animal rights relies on the charisma of certain animals, it produces the realm of the noncharismatic, the abject, and the pestiferous.  

Moreover, just as Africa is thought to be a place where animal rights do not exist, animal rights is a discursive zone in which Africa also sometimes does not exist, even though many of the animals recently heralded within the movement occupy African geographies. The handling of rights advocacy for great apes in particular in Sub-

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56 The question of whether charismatic megafauna actually help conservation is a source of debate amongst those considering animal rights alongside broader conservation movements. The major critique of the focus on charismatic megafauna involves its focalization of the individual animal or species over the delicate ecologies in which that animal or species resides. Andreas Kontoleon and Timothy Swanson’s work explores this question in detail.

57 Although there has been a long history of environmental and animal advocacy in Africa, much of it has been overlooked in postcolonial scholarship until recently. I do not draw attention to this in order to denigrate postcolonial scholarship; in fact, it is to demonstrate the mutual importance of
Saharan Africa illustrates this erasure of Africans from the discourse of animal rights. The Great Ape Project is one branch of this movement—and it has gained traction in popular and academic circles—that has investments in African animals with little mention of Africa itself. Heralded by philosophers Peter Singer and Paola Cavalieri, the project aims to grant basic human rights to great apes for their genetic and cognitive similarity to humans with some notable recent success. Although two of the three genera of nonhuman great apes are native to Sub-Saharan Africa, the movement’s global call to concern for nonhuman primates focuses relatively little on Africa itself. With this project in mind, it would be productive to delve into the ways that ties of concern between humans and great apes have been culturally represented as occurring between particularly white Westerners and apes in those popular texts that feature them.

There is only space to offer a few examples here, but there are multiple iterations of popular films that posit great apes as embroiled in global crises, and white bodies are typically the primary actors to intervene in these crises. *Gorillas in the Mist* is likely the...
most popular example of a film about the Rwandan mountain gorillas, but the semi-biographical film orientates its viewers around Dian Fossey as the intermediary between Rwandan humans and gorillas. In the film, “only Dian Fossey stands out as a heroine,” depicted as being “unselfishly dedicated to the gorillas” (Nash and Sutherland 114). This is a marked contrast to Rwandans and the nation they occupy, depicted by the film as “dirty, chaotic, corrupt and violent …, hopeless, superstitious, and ignorant” (115). There is also a rash of films that cast African primates as the origins of crisis in the spread of zoonotic disease, arguably haunted by anxieties over HIV/AIDS and its zoonotic transfer from primates to humans within Africa. Congo, 12 Monkeys, and the recent entries into The Planet of the Apes series, among others, involve the spread of pathogens between apes and human populations.

These latter three films involve laboratory animals whose own histories lie outside the frame as the central drama unfolds around the tragic lives of a few North American or European individuals. Whether relations between humans and primates in these texts occur in cooperative or conflictual ways, they nonetheless amass a cultural narrative, much like those of the white humanitarian, in which the white intervener is the only subject visibly capable of facilitating concern for animal lives. These narratives are perhaps invested in softening the historical and ongoing violence committed by whites in Africa by presenting noble white counterparts able to fix the sins of the past, but they operate under a similar colonial paradigm. African space is rendered dangerous space, threatening to the lives of animals and those white saviours that come to their aid. If there is concern for animal life in these texts, and indeed there is, it almost unequivocally
resonates from a sacred relation between the Western interventionist and the nonhuman. The narratives of the Great Ape Project and films that document the lives of apes in African locations, if they emerge from something approximating animal rights, circulate an image of Africa as a zone in which concern for animals does not appear or, indeed, in which the lives of animals must be saved from the danger that Africa presents. The presumptions both that concern for animals does not appear in Africa or (recalling Dawes) that Africa might be too preoccupied with what are presumably more important “human” concerns as a sacralized space of violence in the global cultural imaginary, I argue, are generated by a global regime that is not necessarily interested in Africa, but in the place of the white body in orientating concern.

In the logic of intervention applied to both conflict and environmentalisms that I read above, there is a certain similarity in the treatment of both African and animal lives in the sense that both become objects of concern, but not necessarily subjects of ethical engagement or participation in global politics. It is for this reason that a digressive probing into animal rights as a globally visible politic of concern for animals might be necessary, in order to discern this glaring elision of African perspectives from the field of concern. This digression might also help to discern further associations between “Africa” and reductive figurations of animality in the global cultural imaginary.

The Problem of Rights: Emergent Animal Rights Politics in Africa

If animal rights offers one way of thinking through concern for others, it would be difficult to conceive of a phenomenon that could easily be termed “African Animal
Rights,” just as it would be difficult to localize the aims of any rights politics. This is not to say that animal rights and many other complex advocacies for nonhuman life do not exist in Africa, since various forms of concern for the other-than-human have long emanated from the continent, as noted above. What is perhaps more at odds with an African Animal Rights is that it would be impossible to attend to the lives of African animals without considering the complexity of their embodied, local existence, but if the right is meant to be universal (as we have been led to think by documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights), localizing it perhaps risks undoing that very universality and, thus, complicates from the very start attempts to carve out a set of rights devoted to only those lives that exist within Africa.

There are other problems with rights discourse as well, grounded in their Western liberal humanist tradition. For Wendy Brown, the articulation of a right depends on the “fiction of the autonomous, willing, reasoning, rights-bearing subject convened by modernity[, …] articulated in liberal democratic constitutions and a host of other liberal institutions” (Politics 10). The persistence of this fiction becomes ever more questionable when extrahuman animals, rendered silent and unable to claim their rights through language, do not have a stake in the discourse that insists on their right to life. Moreover, if colonialism leaves us with any lessons in this debate, it might be that this fiction of the autonomous individual is purchased through the destruction of various others. The colonizer, after all, could wield the right as a mechanism for depriving Africans themselves of the right to life and livelihood.
Questions about the particularity of the right’s history are especially important in the era during which a presumed ‘universal human rights’ that transcends territorial boundaries is enmeshed within the fabric of global relations of concern. As a liberal form of responsibility, the articulation of universal rights by some in the Global North might involve speaking on behalf of those in the Global South, responding to the spectacles of underprivilege that emanate from various parts of the globe. This move predicates itself to some extent on the notion that the symbolic granting of rights would begin to redress the precarity of what is cast uncomplicatedly as underprivilege. The term underprivilege itself implies a sort of hierarchy, as that which is “under” privilege falls beneath a normative construction of those who presumably bear it. In this way, rights expressed under the paradigm of underprivilege risk constructing a normative and aspirational mode of privilege that serves as a metre stick for evaluating the precarity of “other” lives that lie outside the norm. Moreover, in that instrumentalizing the spectacle of underprivilege is one mode of regulating the speech of those who have it, this process arguably repositions the terms of debate onto those who are privileged rather than the conditions of those who are not.60

Demystifying the universality of the right and reading it in terms of a globally engendered liberal power dynamic might reveal that there is an observable distinction embedded in its emergence. Evans, for example, notes the “disjuncture between the rhetoric and practice of universal human rights” whereby, while “with few exceptions

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60 This critique echoes Wendy Brown’s work on wounded attachment, which similarly questions the efficacy of certain politicized identities for relying on a normative construction of what it would mean to be granted rights and freedoms, or “equality” in popular American parlance.
[political leaders] are quick to endorse the principles of universal human rights,” there remain “the inconvenient facts of widespread torture, genocide, structural economic deprivation, disappearances, ethnic cleansing, political prisoners, and the suppression of trade unions and democracy movements” (6). What we might glean from Evans’s work is that when the ostensible need for a right emerges—when the need occurs to defend a right in the face of that right being violated for some individual or group occurs—the very need to articulate it signals that there exists a domain (one of either immanent possibility or actuality) in which that right is not available. The emergence of the need for a right to protection or freedom develops alongside the existence of a domain in which that right is or might be violated. And one of the problems we might register with this discourse is that Africa is frequently thought of as that area in which human rights are violated, but not necessarily the area in which the articulation or origin of those rights occurs, especially given human rights’ ties to the European *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* of 1948.61

The articulation of a universal right, moreover, is the undoing of that right’s very universality as it also produces by negative implication the domain in which that right does not exist or gets violated, and we might think of Africa in the global ideoscape as one location at which rights are thought to not exist or be respected. It is not that violations of various kinds do not exist in Africa, but that there is a normative structure

61 It is important to note Ibhawoh’s work on the right here, who is critical of the European system of rights. Although he emphasizes that rights discourse can be found in multiple anticolonial resistance, he maintains that “the ostensible extension of English standards of law, legal rights, and justice to the colony and the official rhetoric that kept them on the agenda was a powerful device for rationalizing and legitimizing empire” (175).
behind assigning certain zones the status of not having access to a right. If we consider that, frequently, the insistence on a universal human rights is “a liberal project whose overriding goal … is the imposition of Western-style liberal democracy” (Mutua 5), the normative structure of rights discourses that mark distinction between the haves and the have-nots of rights becomes clearer. This structure is even more visible when we consider the ideological negative space that Africa often represents in such discourse, as the space par excellence of the have-not in the global cultural imaginary, inside which lives are thought most precarious and in need of protection.

The emergence onto the scene of something as overdetermined as animal rights, or even environmental rights, complicates this universality further, and might spur us into thinking about what those terms, namely “human” and “animal,” mean and what makes them distinct. What, for example, makes a human body the subject of a human right? Is being human the requirement for exercising that right, or is the ontology of humanness to some extent produced out of the very articulation of a human right? If so, what of those humans who become less than human through the lens of the sovereign gaze, as in the case of the Rwandan genocide? I am, to some extent, overlapping discussions of human and animal rights, but I do so precisely because of the taxonomic distinctions that both engender, and it is my argument that both of these phenomena are mutually productive of a framework that makes animality a kind of less-than-human category that sometimes attaches to the bodies or populations of humans themselves.

But when does distinction as I have discussed above become that which is the work of sovereignty in Schmitt’s terms: exception? Moreover, when we consider that
Africa is frequently demarcated as that location at which common human rights are not found, how might the continent be embroiled in a kind of state of exception wearing the veneer of a liberal discourse of humanitarianism that is itself bound up with a normative version of the human? Moreover, the kind of right emergent from accounts of the Western liberal subject and later imposed upon African space through colonialism was often a mechanism of denying what might now be considered rights to Africans themselves in the interest of European colonizers. Suffice it to say that the universalism of certain rights discourses is by no means uncontested, and the spatial particularities of their exercise merit some inquiry.

If we accept that the call to animal rights has been one that has sought to mobilize concern in the wake of anxieties over the relation between humans and their global environment, the presumed universality of this politic’s transcendence of national distinctions also runs the risk of obscuring geospatial particularities. Thinking of the African case, one text that illustrates this problematic is Michele Pickover’s *Animal Rights in South Africa*. It runs into some problems when it “introduces” a liberal ethic into the South African case. On one level, Pickover emphasizes that animal rights is a somewhat foreign concept to South Africa when she declares that it has only been “since

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62 In addition to the Ibhawoh text I cite above, there are numerous studies of precolonial African systems of rights. For a general account of precolonial indigenous justice systems across Africa, see Elechi and Nmehielle.
63 See Conklin.
64 Pickover’s text is focused particularly on South Africa. I do not aim to conflate her critique of South African approaches to animal rights with the rest of the continent, but her text to some extent pays attention to intra-African flows of animal resources that make it difficult to bind her critique to exclusively the South African case. Moreover, her text is, as of yet, the only book-length study of animal rights anywhere in Africa. I use her text predominantly to illustrate the problems of a globalized camaraderie of animal rightism when we consider the particularities of local politics.
1990 [that] the effects of the animal rights movement have begun to be felt in South Africa” (13). She also begins by emphasizing her family’s anti-apartheid stance, and the similarities between that stance and an animal rights perspective. In spite of that commonality, she suggests that since adopting a vegetarian diet

I have become a stranger in a strange land, seeing and seeking what others do not want to see or seek. And this means seeing pervasive evidence of suffering in everyday life: in shopping centres, at restaurants, at the theatre, at social gatherings. When I began to see things this way I couldn’t help thinking my family and friends were in a state of denial that cut them off from themselves and made them unquestioning collaborators and perpetrators. No doubt they were victims of the historically and socially conditioned beliefs that make the things we do seem acceptable, in the same way that the practices of apartheid once seemed acceptable to many. (5)

Pickover’s concern for the violence directed at animals notwithstanding, her text is also about a spatial politics of individualism that sets itself against the particularities of South African history. Her text does not merely point out challenges for animal rights finding ground in South Africa; it is also about the “I” from which the capacity for a right emerges, about crafting an identity cultivated out of its ostensible marginalization as a “foreigner”—a marginalization that obscures the alignments of race, class, and geography from which this animal rights politic emerges. It makes a human speaker the focus of concern, the marginalized bearer of exclusion as a result of animal exploitation, rather than animals themselves. Read in this way, an animal rights politic that becomes about the “I” is paradoxical in that its very articulation is a proscription of agency for animals themselves. If we understand this sort of liberal politic as “presum[ing] sovereign individuals … as sites of agency” (Brown, *Politics* 10), at what point does the kind of sovereignty that denotes individual agency as a prerequisite for rights discourse align
with the violent sovereignty exercised by various state and extra-state powers? Brown contends that “[b]oth state and individual sovereignty require fixed boundaries, clearly identifiable interests and identities, and power conceived as generated and directed from within the entity itself” (Politics 10). Read in these terms, we might consider the assertion of the human liberal subject, a bounded being capable of articulating a call to rights-based concern, as productive of an entity that cultivates exception in its very separateness from animal otherness.

Paradoxes of Animal Rights

Pickover’s rhetoric of marginalization contains within it another curious paradox. Although it purports to account for a uniquely (South) African animal rights politic, its staunch position is staked in a foundation of global citizenship that also enacts a deprivation of national sovereignty. Early on, she voices her call to animal rights in nationalized terms in which she becomes a “stranger in a strange land,” positioning her politics in relation to a conception of national belonging from which she is displaced. Pickover describes the global framework of rights to which she attaches herself in terms that invigorate with sovereignty the individual-as-citizen of a globally connected field of rights advocates. In spite of her text’s ostensible focus on a uniquely South African animal rights, much of it becomes about questioning the legitimacy of the South African state. Drawing a loaded connection between her own politics and those of anti-apartheid movements, her rhetoric has the effect not only of casting her as an alien within South Africa, but of alienating South Africa from its own political history. Indeed, South
Africans, victims of their historically and socially conditioned beliefs, themselves appear
the object of an animal rights politic that seeks to eradicate human apathy. She adopts a
kind of conflictually charged language, calling other South Africans collaborators and
perpetrators, which, given the historical currency of these terms in South Africa’s fairly
recent background, strikes a chord with affective histories of oppositionality entwined
with apartheid-era violence. Her text emphasizes the need of animal rights activists to
help South Africans “learn about atrocities before they can eradicate them” (13). In this
passage, a distinction is set up between the narrating Pickover, a citizen of the world
engaged in a globally-inspired movement, and South Africa and other South Africans, cut
off from the kind of empathy that this movement engenders.

This paradox also extends to Pickover’s critique of the state, which she rejects in
favor of the cosmopolitan individual. According to Pickover, the “[s]tate is a formidable
obstacle to those of us fighting for justice for animals. Its power protects and legitimizes
the forces of exploitation” (7). It is important to note that she refers to the “state” in
general—not exclusively the South African state—aligning her text not solely with a
critique of South African policies, but with a kind of global camaraderie of rights politics
that endeavors to transcend state restrictions. She later argues that animal rights
“movements are guided by the values of democracy, equality, rights, collective action,
and social justice, and they exist because governments are unable to solve major
problems and challenge existing world-views” (12). My critique of Pickover here is not
to suggest that the state and its often violent processes are necessarily benevolent, but to
call into question the logic of exclusion that underlies the ostensible universalism of
global rights discourse. My critique lies with an interrogation of the logic by which terms such as democracy, equality, rights, collective action, and social justice come to be viewed as immutably positive in contrast to the immutably negative figure of state governments and their citizens—particularly South Africa for Pickover—in the era of Empire.

Pickover’s text is about cultivating a kind of (human) individual perhaps as much as it is about concern for nonhuman animals. The individual her text constructs is one that aligns more easily with the language of neoliberalism than with the particularities of South African history, as if an animal rights could find traction with African-identified others by disengaging from the nuanced politics of African geopolitical space. Given Pickover’s loaded comparison between apartheid and the state of animals throughout the globe, its evasion of discussions about race (which is not discussed in Pickover’s text) is suspect if we consider Harper’s insistence that “racialized places and spaces are at the foundation of how we develop our sociospatial epistemologies” in generating concern for other-than-human animals (6). I do not suggest that the distinction that Pickover sets up between her politics and the South African space in which she finds herself a stranger invalidates her work; instead what this critique aims to do is gesture toward the continued work that needs to be done in revising globally-framed ethics of concern whose processes can never be completely universalized.

The paradoxes in Pickover’s work to which I gesture above might extend more broadly to a critique of animal rights. The central paradox within animal rights discourse might be that it emerges out of a discursive formation that only reinforces the sovereignty
of the human. While ostensibly dedicated to promoting animals as subjects whom the law must recognize, this politic is not so much about contesting the juridical bureaucratic complex that, in its current iteration, will *only ever* recognize the human as a fully instantiated subject proper upon whom a complete degree of rights can be conferred. Conservative philosopher Roger Scruton evokes this complex in his insistence, against animal rights, that animals “relate to one another but not as we do. … [T]hey recognize no right of property [and] no sovereignty” (18). Beyond state sovereignty, Scruton also insists that animals “are not the kind of thing that can settle disputes, that can exert sovereignty over its life and respect the sovereignty of others” (55). He insists that humans have or respect a kind of sovereignty that nonhumans do not, derived from the liberal emphasis on the individual as an agent in its own world.

In spite of the vitriolic condemnations of Scruton that might be offered from animal rights camps, as well as his text’s uncritical reliance on sovereignty as a standard for evaluating others, he is, in some sense, accurate. For all of the ways that we might gesture toward the similarities between humans and animals, the very need to suggest that animals are similar us merely redraws the line of the inclusive “us” around a few other beings. It arguably does so without ever contesting the violent exclusions inherent to inclusion’s logics when a vast multitude still remain outside the “us.” We may not be able to itemize, in absolute terms and with precision, the broad range of differences between species and individual members of those species, but to begin to think about the animal is to think about a figure that has been historically saturated in difference and absolute alterity. I suggest that animal rights movements, rather than refuting this problematic,
frequently come to confirm it in their insistence on the likeness between humans and animals. It may be that, strategically speaking, advocating for animals in terms of their likeness to humans is the only way to grant them entrance into a juridical system designed to protect those bodies that are recognizably human, but the insistence on likeness as a metre-stick for evaluating a being’s claim to rights also obliterates the possibility of anything but those that approximate the human or “personhood” being admitted to the enclave of the right. Indeed, as I will show, the anthroponormative underpinnings of the kind of animal rights politic I lay out here reifies a juridical structure in which the only beings capable of engagement are those who are intelligibly human, and acts of genocide with which this paper deals already demonstrate that what is intelligibly human does not include all of those who belong to the human species. An animal rights politic situated in the terms of likeness exists to confirm a structure that circumscribes (that which is perhaps uncircumscribable) the human as the ontological centre of the world, eschewing in its processes other ecologies and ontologies.

The most easily demonstrable (but not the only) aspect of this problematic is the notion that the legal jargon that precedes the granting of a right, or the discourse of liberalism that constructs an autonomous subject onto whom a right can be conferred, is grounded in language. Animals ostensibly do not have the capacity for language, though the complex communication systems of various animals has amassed an academic field unto itself. We might think that, if we cannot distill the plight of animals into a language recognizable to the law we will never achieve justice because the law will never recognize those who fall outside the capacity to occupy such language. We might think
that rights are the most practical mode of granting justice to animals, that is, through recourse to a sovereign body capable of granting freedoms and that, even if animals cannot speak for themselves we should speak for them. However, this reading conflates justice with its legal definition and adopts an ethics whereby justice involves the stifling of alterity rather than its engagement. It may very well be that nonhuman animals will never participate in the language necessary to grant them rights, but the non-use of human language (which is not the same as the lack of language conventionally ascribed to the animal) does not justify the withholding of concern, nor does the use of human language essentially confirm a being as being at the pinnacle of relations of responsibility and ethical concern. Moreover, to expect that justice will be achieved by recourse to sovereign bodies (whether residing in the state or elsewhere) elides the notion that such bodies have significant economic and ideological interests in violences directed towards their subjects, whether human or otherwise. It imagines the state, for example, as a benevolent body rather than a body that is cultivated through exclusion. We might accept that rights are “rooted in the presupposition of sovereign [state or individual] entities” (Brown, Politics 11). But in the granting of animal rights by a state structure that reifies the capacity of the human to be an autonomous subject and renders the animal the object upon whom legally intelligible protections can be conferred but cannot be spoken for, we encounter a paradox in which the nonhuman’s capacity for rights is negated at the very moment that it is brought into being by the law.

We should not forget that sovereignty in the Schmittian tradition emerges in the exercise of a right—that is, the right to kill or to decide on the state of exception. Even
when Foucault traces the transition between sovereign power and biopower, sovereignty emerges in the exercise of the right over technologies pertaining to life and death. In *Society Must Be Defended*, he insists, “I wouldn’t say exactly that sovereignty’s old right—to take life or let live—was replaced, but it came to be complemented by a new right which does not erase the old right but which does penetrate it, permeate it. This is the right, or rather precisely the opposite right. It is the power to ‘make’ live and ‘let’ die” (241). The shifting of sovereign power’s focus from death to its infusion with a politics of life also underlies Agamben’s emphasis on sovereignty’s fashioning in the production of the biopolitical body. To suggest that sovereign power shifts its expression onto life is not to say that it aims to preserve life. As Mbembe’s “Necropolitics” demonstrates, sovereignty retains its techniques for efficiently instrumentalizing and doing away with large populations even as it preserves others. Especially when we consider animals or, in line with Mbembe, technologies of death that operate on African bodies and populations, the biopolitics of governmentality might be read as a politics of life enacted on the occluded precondition of death. Killing may be assigned as a justification for life, in which the life or security of a population is maintained through the annihilation of many others. This is the case in examples such as factory farming that feed a population or external wars that protect it. On a more individual level, where the relation between human and animal is concerned, the liberal subject on which many notions of individual sovereignty depend cultivates “his” superiority over “the beast that he masters, enslaves, dominates, domesticates, or kills, so that sovereignty consists in raising himself above the animal” (Derrida, *Beast* 26). In each case, the biopolitical is haunted by its necropolitical
underside. The sovereign’s exercise of the right to “make” live is also an infusion of the terms by which life is lived with a series of regulatory mechanisms. These mechanisms, in turn, produce life not in the biological sense but in the social sense as well, as in the case of a normatively functioning life, a life with rights and freedoms, or the construction of what Judith Butler might call a “livable life” (Precarious xv). For Foucault, governmentality since the eighteenth century had “to organize a legal system of respect for freedoms” (Security 354), intimately tied to the notion of the right, as part of its regulatory mechanisms. He reads freedom as “indispensable to governmentality itself” (353). Read in this way, the freedom of the right becomes a mechanism of governmentality (rather than an emancipation from it) in the era of biopower which, as Foucault suggests, bears the marks of a sovereign power that merely shifts its mode of expression from death to life. In the emergence of a politics organized around rights—especially the right to life—there is a subjection to sovereignty.

In identifying that animal rights bears within its technological apparatus an appeal to sovereign power, I aim not to show that the impetus for animal rights is inherently destructive to animals. The benefits of many movements for various nonhuman rights can be demonstrated in the case of some (but relatively few) animals. Instead, I suggest that—read alongside Foucault’s body of work—the discourse of animal rights as it operates around (particularly but not exclusively) Africa is productive of a human subject proper capable of circumscribing and objectifying a set of lives. These lives become less than human in the process of a liberal body granting them the capacity for rights. It is this logic of “granting” rights or bestowing the capacity for security onto animals or others,
inflected with the liberal discourse of the individual, that produces a domain of lives not fully recognized as lives, as beings in need of intervention, in need of saving. In the animal rights movement, they are lives that require remedy for an underdeveloped capacity for agency or autonomy, incapable of existing in the same sphere of influence in which the human resicides. Animal rights is a discourse that constructs certain humans as saviours and benefactors and certain others as victimized animals in the scope of global liberal politics.

On Strays, Sovereignties, and States: Recuperating Precarious Life Narratives

I return now to the example of the Rwandan dogs that began this chapter. If, as the above argues, animal rights reifies rather than resists the workings of human sovereignty, what mode of articulating concern might redress that problem? It would be difficult to conceive of a reading of the Rwandan dogs that did not view their lives as steeped in the mechanisms of a biopolitical sovereignty. My previous chapter made some headway in this direction, reading the dogs as a challenge to certain types of sovereignties in their insistence on biting the hand that typically feeds. One significant challenge to this reading, however, involves the notion that it romanticizes the dogs’ violent deaths and the indignity they perform on Rwandan bodies. To say that the entrance of the Rwandan dog onto the conflict scene gestures toward a rupture in the cycle of sovereignty’s production (out) of bare life by revealing the extent of its anxiety should not overlook that this anxiety often assuages itself violently. Stray dogs have little agency in the texts cited in this project. They are spoken of only under the prevailing regime of human sovereignty,
and appear only in terms of their disrespect for the human body or in comparison to other humans narratively rendered animalistic.

Moreover, as I have argued, what produces their lives as apolitical—as the objects of sovereignty’s exercise of power but never in the political sphere capable of being sovereign over themselves—is also what produces them as subjects of nonconcern. I suggest that in the context of genocide the work of sovereignty is not merely one that produces the human or animal as beast or pest. Instead, it is one that produces the sovereignty of the human over the beast under which various animals (human and nonhuman) are made to cross the border into subhumanity, which in turn produces them as subjects with whom the human has no relation of concern or ethical engagement. The readings in this chapter, then, are not only a challenge to human exceptionalism, but to the very standard of humanness that produces certain lives as intelligibly subhuman.

If the Dawes example at the beginning of this chapter—and the texts of the previous one—are any indication, the Rwandan dogs emerge through a concern that is deferred, eschewed, or violently done away with. Where they are a concern they appear as an anxiety or traumatic entrance into the genocide’s narratives of humanness as they become embodiments of ferocity, as if such concern were not allowed in the post-conflict field of narrative. Such narratives describe dogs only in terms of the violence they (threaten to) commit, as with this chapter’s opening paragraph from Dawes that cites the story in which dogs are killed when the RPF are “sickened by [the] final indignity” (20) the dogs commit. As performers of an indignity, dogs unsettle the sanctity with which we presumably should approach the body of the human. As a response to indignity, the
RPF’s shooting of the dogs might be read as one way to reclaim dignity, to garner a kind of sovereignty for the genocide’s victims and the future of the Rwandan state by extinguishing those entities whose ferocity embodies the violence and dehumanization that had preceded that point. It might be an attempt to dispel or dissociate the human from the figure of the beast previously applied to certain Rwandans by literally extinguishing the animal figure that threatens to consume or eradicate the dignity aligned with human death. Dawes’s dismissal of animal rights groups’ responses to the dog killings as being a form of Western “moral self-congratulation,” then, might be important for critiquing a short-sighted version of animal rights, but this project still does not discount the power dynamics that accompany the industry of Western intellectual production behind Dawes’s text—one that is arguably never wholly devoid of self-interest as it generates appropriate responses to genocide. Is there a way to cultivate concern for the nonhuman in such contexts, especially considering the stray dog that feeds on the dead, presumably out of hunger as a result of the very suspension of concern in a genocidal climate? Would it even be appropriate to postulate such a cause of these dogs’ behaviours or to situate their ferocity within the history of Rwanda? If we were to generate such concern, there would

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65 The ethics of narrating trauma is a fraught issue for critical accounts of the genocide, and they are no less so for this chapter. Although the tendency for Western journalists and academics to account for the events in 1994 Rwanda is often accompanied by an insistence on the importance of telling the story of and understanding the events (as if telling and understanding were not accompanied by the privileged power of the narrator to do so), I would also situate this tendency within an industry that generates these efforts as important. It is not that critical accounts of the genocide are not important; it is that we cannot consider them divorced from the culture industry that facilitates the circulation of appropriate responses to trauma for the distant Western observer. Adorno’s work on the unspeakable nature of the Holocaust is valuable here, especially where he asserts that “[w]hen even genocide becomes cultural property in committed literature, it becomes easier to continue complying with the culture that gave rise to the murder” (Can 252-3). We might note that the proliferation of texts on the Rwandan genocide, which still maintain many of the colonial logics that had a hand in producing it, have done little to challenge the power dynamics that facilitate the reduction of the human to bestial status.
certainly be challenges to doing so, not least of which would involve the widely
presumed sovereignty of human lives and deaths over animals’.

It might be complicating matters to introduce that other category of animality into
this project’s already crowded bestiary of disavowed animals, but understanding or
drawing attention to the lives of stray dogs (as well as bestialized humans and other
animals) requires some rumination on the very concept of the stray. It is a figure that is
neither beast nor pest, but no less precarious in its relation to the law in terms of how its
body is instrumentalized by the state. If we accept that there is difficulty showing concern
for animals within many African contexts given the sanctity with which human life is
imbued, concern for common stray animals, especially dogs, is all the more difficult.

The stray is a figure often overlooked by animal studies as well. Much of
Haraway’s work is inspired by dogs as companion species that are “owned, showed,
worked, and loved by human beings” but strays “slip through the cracks” of her argument
(Srinivasan 4). Kelly Oliver’s Animal Lessons contains one chapter on “Kristeva’s
Strays,” but even in Oliver’s analysis the term functions as a form of wordplay standing
in for abjection. Even as a manifestation of abjection, though, the stray is an important
figure. After all, Kristeva herself suggests (reductively of the animal) that the “abject
confronts us … with those fragile states where man strays on the territories of the
animal” (12, italics mine), and the abject shows us “what [we] permanently thrust aside
in order to live” (3). As an idea accompanying Kristeva’s notion of the abject, the concept
of the stray as it applies to animals might be thrust aside precisely because the persistence
of stray animals throughout the globe challenges our very imagining that we can find a
comfortable relationality with other species. As beings thrust aside from us they might be understood being treated as such, following Kristeva, precisely because they remind us of the violent exclusion we commit against animals and rupture any ethical sensibilities we may hold about our ties to other species.

Strays are ubiquitous presences in everyday life worldwide, but their ubiquity makes them no less invisible. The term “stray” has its etymological roots in the verb form “to stray,” which, in one definition, is “to scatter.” Defined as animals “that [have] wandered from confinement or control and [go] free” or that have “become homeless or ownerless,” strays are a kind of subaltern whose very existence is defined by notions of property, as if animals may only find meaningful subjectivity or acknowledgment for their existence in the very denial of ownership over their own bodies (“stray,” def. 2). This denial aligns with many nations’ handling of dogs under the scope of law as, globally, there is almost no recognition of animals outside their role as property, and dogs are nowhere regarded as persons under the law. Many African legal frameworks refer to animals, but not outside of their value as property; in, for example, the case of South African law, the only reference to animals occurs in the Animal Protection Act, which defines “animal” only in terms of a nonhuman “which is in captivity or under control of any person” (Animal). Similarly, Rwanda’s environmental policy refers only to “animal resources” (Twagiramungu 29). In terms of speaking for strays, then, any material legal efforts face the difficulty that most animals, let alone strays, are not even legally acknowledged subjects.
The term “stray” is not limited to the animal. It carries implications for humans as well. In its verb form, “to stray,” meaning “to wander away,” the term also carries moralistic connotations that mean “to deviate,” “to wander from the path of rectitude, [or] to err” (def. 4a), unearthing Judeo-Christian notions of straying into sinful or morally reprehensible territory. The logic of the stray can also apply both to individuals cast aside by the state, and to sovereign states themselves. When we recall that many nations have been called “rogue states,” a term used “in the rhetoric of politicians against sovereign states that do not respect international law or right” (Derrida, *Beast* 18), the figure of the stray (or the verb form “to stray”) becomes all the more palpable. Derrida describes the rogue state much in the same way as the stray when he criticizes the “bestiary lexicon” applied to states. The rogue, according to Derrida, generally associated with carnivorous animals, “is the individual who does not … respect the law of the animal community, of the pack, the horde, of its kind. By its savage or indocile behaviour, it strays or goes away from the society to which it belongs” (19, italics mine). When we consider the moralistic implications of denoting a “rogue” state as having “strayed” from international law, it might remind of a number of African states with a record of human rights violations (including apartheid South Africa, genocidal Rwanda, civil war Mozambique, Somalia, Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and many others). The bestialization of states in this way allows for those within or those who represent the state to be viewed in a state of “being-outside-the-law,” as “at a distance from … the laws, [or] in nonrespect for the absolute law” (17), since the figure of the beast involves a perverse version of animality. The notion of African nations as rogues, or as having strayed from
moral right, also compels us to think through how certain states and human beings residing in them come to be cast off, discarded from a liberal global community because of their ostensible bestiality. The category of the beast might itself be a fetishistic elision of colonial histories that frequently produce the “rogueness” of states.

In the remainder of this chapter I sketch out a politics of concern that breaks with reductive animalized versions of African human and nonhuman entities. This politics considers those cast as strays, vermin, pests, or beasts whose animalization marks them as subjects of nonconcern in the global field of ethical relationality. One of the formidable challenges to cultivating such a concern is that it must contend with the possible charge that human and animal suffering cannot be compared, that human suffering holds a privileged position amidst the plight of the living. Philip Armstrong suggests (and later refutes) that attention to animals in a postcolonial context risks “trivializing the suffering of human beings under colonialism” (413). This presumption, however, overlooks that we are capable of attending to more than one instance of suffering. But attending to animals need not involve a hierarchical comparison between humans and animals, especially not one that reduces the importance of one against the other. Of such comparisons, Calarco contends that they oblige “us to consider … precisely the anthropocentric value hierarchy that places human life always and everywhere in a higher rank over animal life” (Zoo 110). Indeed, it would be those very anthropocentrisms,

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66 Marjorie Speigel’s The Dreaded Comparison is valuable for thinking through such hierarchies, especially for its historical and geographical situation of the phenomenon by which the animal as a point of comparison becomes a standard for subhumanity.
what I have referred to as forms of species sovereignty, whose narratives render the dog a beast whose ferocity is essential rather than historically produced.

Narrative, or lack thereof, is arguably important to the power of such sovereignties and to the casting off of the stray from ethical consideration. When Judith Butler asks, “Whose lives count as lives? And … [w]hat makes for a grievable death?” (20), she suggests that “normative schemes of intelligibility establish what … will be a livable life, what will be a grievable death” and “differentiate among those who are more and less human. … [S]ometimes these normative schemes work precisely through providing no image, no name, no narrative, so that there never was a life, and there never was a death” (146). If the suspension of narrative is one mechanism through which concern is eschewed, then our task might be to provide a narrative that situates animal existence amidst the complex politics of Rwanda and, as it were, give a critical history to narrative productions of dogs as ferocious beasts whose ferocity alone justifies their elimination. It might be that the schemes that suspend narrative also place a border between the suffering of human and animal, rupturing previously joint histories and evicting the dog from the realm of ethical concern proper to the human. Butler herself insists that our task in such contexts should be to “return us to the human” (151) when humanity is denied.  

As the texts I read above show in their elision of Rwandan perspectives and alignment of Rwandans with animals, the human is itself an insular

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67 The value of Butler’s work to discussions of animal life deserves some qualification. In *Precarious Life* her work maintains an insistent humanist focus. However, she revises this perspective somewhat in *Frames of War*. James Stanescu’s recent work on Butler is valuable in assessing her importance to “queer and feminist animal studies—an animal studies that celebrates our shared embodied finitude” (568). However, his text is not necessarily attuned to those moments where Butler’s position on the animal is ambivalent or favours a staunch humanist politics.
category, an enclave into which relatively few have historically been allowed full entrance. Departing from Butler, it may not be a return to the human that is necessary, but instead a calling into question of the logics by which humanity becomes a sovereign category over all other forms of life—a category under which the dehumanization of multiple species (including *homo sapiens*) occurs. In this line of thinking, ethical concern would not stop at the human, but register the human’s relation to and mutual casting amidst other forms of life on which we are dependent and alongside whom many lives become cast off as strays.

Jean-Philippe Stassen’s graphic novel, *Deogratias*, offers a narrative that blurs the barrier between human and animal by giving an account of a life bestialized under sovereign power. It is also perhaps the “graphicness” of his novel, the incorporation of human and animal faces and the visual signifiers of violence against both, that lends a kind of accountability to others in his text. It also challenges the technology of bestializing sovereignty I have sketched out in this thesis. The story follows its eponymous protagonist, a teenage Hutu living on the streets of Kigali after the genocide. Having left the Zone Turquoise, he roams the streets asking for *urwagwa* (banana beer) as the novel flashes back to his life before and during the genocide. Prior to it, he had been in love with two teenage Tutsi sisters, Benina and Appolinaria. As we find out by the end of the genocide, Deogratias had been an onlooker as his friends killed the two sisters’ mother, and he later finds the corpses of the sisters themselves being eaten by dogs.

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68 The Zone Turquoise was a controversial “safe humanitarian zone” set up in Southwest Rwanda by French and Senegalese troops meant to house displaced persons fleeing Rwanda, most of whom were *genocidaires* escaping potential persecution from the encroaching RPF.
Deogratias returns to Kigali to take responsibility for the killings, but that responsibility culminates in him poisoning those friends he deems responsible for the two sisters’ deaths. His poisoning is a striking adoption of sovereign technique, an appeal to a higher moral order, in its assumption of the right to kill. However, he becomes subject to the power of the state when he is finally arrested. Throughout this process, he oscillates in and out of sanity, telling people “I’m only a dog” (76). The frames of the novel show his body transforming into a dog in these moments and, after he poisons his former friends, his transition into a dog is complete.

On one level, Deogratias’s becoming animal might be read as a kind of derogatory indication of his base humanity—as if, because of his morally ambiguous complicity in the genocide, he has behaved outside the ethical norms of human behaviour. This reading does not do justice to the historical, political, and social complexities that produce characters similar to him and the complex figures on whom he is based in postgenocidal Rwanda. His dogness might also embody his feelings of responsibility over his ambiguous complicity in genocide in that he identifies with those dogs, the only others that appear in the novel, that devour Benina and Appolinaria, but his becoming-dog has more in common with the stray than with the beast of other accounts of victims and perpetrators in the genocide. In many ways, he is a social cast-off over whom nobody claims responsibility. Even when he worries that he might be thrown into jail for his reluctant cooperation with Interahamwe militias, one of his former fellow militiamen tells him, “the jails are full, there’s no more room … and certainly no room for dogs” (17). The extent of Deogratias’s dehumanization is such that he not only lives
outside of state protections, he also lives outside its punishments and mechanisms of control. Indeed, as he passes a roadblock, the soldiers attending it ask for his ID, until one says, “He doesn’t have any, officer. He’s this harmless madman. … Let him through” (24). Unrecognized by those state entities that place limits on whose bodies may move freely across such borders, Deogratias is a Derridean being-outside-the-law. But his ability to avoid prison and roadblocks, far from being an expression of freedom, connotes his ultimate removal from social recognition. The physical manifestation of Deogratias’s dog-self expresses not merely that he is treated like a dog by others, but that he becomes a dog under the eyes of certain beneficiaries of sovereign power as a result of this nonrecognition. Much like the figure of Agamben’s bare life, Deogratias’s bestialization is both an effect and constitutive of sovereignty; his treatment exposes that he has become less than human, but also indicates the supreme value that others place on humanness through his very lack of it.

But the novel—by applying Deogratias’s story to narrative, granting him a name, and, indeed, offering a story that revolves around him—might be a mode of producing a textual life that exceeds the reductive bestialization characteristic of other narratives of the genocide, of generating concern for such a life. He is not necessarily an easy character with whom to sympathize given his morally ambiguous complicity with genocidaires. As a stray who has also strayed outside notions of moral right, he is an ethically difficult figure, easily cast aside and discounted from liberal notions of concern that work by evoking sympathy for innocent victims of war. His characterization instead asks us to come to terms with a more difficult mode of ethical engagement in which reductive
victim/perpetrator binaries fall apart. If we accept the recuperative capacity of narrative, the story of Deogratias is a mode of granting concern to a precarious life. His becoming-dog is also a collapse of the boundary between human and animal, a boundary that typically prevents concern being extended to animals in the post-conflict situation. Given the history of Rwandan dogs eating the dead, directing aggression at humans, and finally being shot by the UN and RPF, Stassen’s choice to represent Deogratias as a dog (similar in appearance to those dogs who feed on the corpses of Benina and Appolinaria) is an ethically fraught one. If we are meant to feel sympathy for a character aligned with what, for other narratives, is a beast who ferociously and without regard for human dignity feeds on the dead, we might begin to question the narratives that produce dogs in this way. Indeed, his removal from the story by police at the end of the novel—the images of which show two officers absurdly cuffing and carrying off a dog—might also be read as a comment on those state forces that eliminate problem animals from their midst. Deogratias’s narrative would then extend concern in ways that exceed the human, encouraging us to think through the history of those figures rendered bestial, even when they are regarded as “less than” or are not human. And this should also signal that “nonhuman” or “inhuman” is certainly not the same as subhuman even if all three produce normative visions of the human. It might also signal the need to move beyond a kind of binary thinking between human and animal, precisely because this binary has been wielded to exclude multiple lives from the realm of concern.

Conclusion
If the dogs’ behaviour during the genocide and subsequent elimination attest to the extent of the violence of genocide, rather than an embodiment of some essential ferocity, the Rwandan dogs evidence the extent to which ostensibly human conflict crosses into the world of the nonhuman. It might be that, given this premise, we desire to eliminate those entities that violate the anthropocentric strictures in place for domesticating animal behaviour. Or instead, the evidence that human violence affects the nonhuman just as acutely as the human, that it crosses the boundary between human and animal, might move us toward envisioning an ethics that ceases its figuration of animal others as peripheral accessories to sensationalized stories of political conflict. It might also bring into question the ease with which the category of bestiality applies to various bodies and challenge those sovereignties that suspend the sanctity of so many lives. Moreover, the fraught politics surrounding African conflict and Rwanda in particular offer up challenges to the current scope of animal studies’ visions of ethical relations with nonhuman animals, just as animal studies might challenge us to push the limits of concern in postconflict readings beyond the human. A broader understanding of animality also compels us to think further into the ways that African locations have been and continue to be associated with animality under certain narratives of sovereignty, and to locate our criticisms of what Nicole Shukin calls “technologies of animalization” beyond how they affect the human (24).

But where do we go from here? Straying onto the territory of the animal fundamentally shifts the terrain of ethical concern that has undergirded postcolonial and African Studies thus far. Perhaps the logic of the stray is the very paradigm with which
we might engage. As the figure who moves beyond certain limits and boundaries, who “strays” from certain modes of appropriate behaviour, the stray might end up in some unexpected places. Likewise, if we stray beyond conventional limits of our concern in African studies, we might develop unconventional relationalities which set complex forms of justice and concern in motion.
Chapter Four

Intimacy, Intercorporeal Cohabitation, and African Zones of Interspecies Contact

I. Introduction

Interspecies Relations at the Dinner Table

I return to the Pickover text whose conception of rights I tackled in my previous chapter as a start to thinking about intimacy and zones of interspecies relationality. This is because Pickover’s narrative is not only about an animal rights politics. Just as important to it is the author’s autobiographical narrative reflection on the emergence of this politics. It is curious, moreover, that her account of it begins with the family, an apparatus whose ideological basis we might read as directing normative trajectories for the intimacy of kinship. The first pages of her text detail that, “like most South Africans, my family was immersed in the culture of meat-eating. We indulged as often as three times a day. Delicious it was too. It came neatly wrapped in cultural ritual and habit, and this made it even easier to swallow” (4). In this narrative, as ritual, eating meat is a form of performativity through which the omnivorous or carnivorous subject comes into being in the repetition of certain cultural practices. Described in these terms, the meat eating of Pickover’s text recalls queer theory’s emphasis on gender as a form of ritual, most famously discussed by Judith Butler in Bodies that Matter. The normativity wrapped up in the institution of the family extends beyond gender strictures in this case, where consuming meat itself becomes a norm like gender through which the body cultivates
belonging in the family and the nation, since the family registers its likeness to “most South Africans” through the ingestion of flesh.

It is not simply that meat-eating is “like gender” as a form of ritual production, however. It is also a practice whose history is intimately inflected with gendered underpinnings and productive of gender relations. As Carol J. Adams’ *The Sexual Politics of Meat* suggests, the culture of meat-eating is bound up with a set of gendered, classed, and racial histories whereby “[t]he literal evocation of male power is found in the concept of meat” (57). For Adams, who traces the emergence of meat-eating as a primarily masculine activity expressive of virility in a European history in which women consumed primarily vegetable diets, “gender inequality is built into the species inequality that meat eating proclaims” (58). This practice also came to involve a racial and class dimension in which second-class citizens and racial others who could not afford meat were viewed as effeminate or deprived of virility. For Adams, who employs the language of sovereignty to describe the power structures of meat eating, “Meat is king” (57), associated conceptually both at the family table and in the nation with power. We might say that the institution of meat-eating governs family relations in many contexts, as degrees of belonging emerge based on what we consume, whether we consume in the same way as others in our midst, who is allowed/able to consume what, and whether bodies who refuse the consumption of certain objects are welcome at the dinner table.

The animal emerges on Pickover’s table and confounds family intimacies. Indeed, as Pickover details, eating meat alongside the family comes with its own politics of belonging and nonbelonging in the South African context. Her refusal to eat meat marks
her as different from the rest of her family. This predicament is detailed in the following quotation:

Maybe it was that tongue. As a piece of meat goes, unlike fillet or sirloin, it is not easy to disguise its origin. The tongue would arrive on a silver platter, looking as though it could have licked me. I was shocked to realize that it was not just an object that brought a few moments of gastronomical pleasure, especially when served with English mustard, but had once been attached to a living being. And this began to unsettle me and stirred my heart. Who did it belong to? Was it from a baby cow? What kind of life had the cow led? How did the cow die? How and where was the tongue cut off? I was only a child but mealtimes soon became life-altering encounters. I began to ask questions that made my mother squirm with irritation, and often her frank answers made me rush from the table in tears. (4)

This encounter between Pickover and her food animates the meal before her. It begins to take on a life of its own as that tongue, an organ of speech, begins to account for the body from which it had earlier been removed. Indeed, its absent body is announced through the grotesqueness of its very disembodiedness. Adams calls meat an “absent referent” in that “[a]nimals in name and body are made absent as animals for meat to exist” (66) and “dead bodies are absent from our language about meat” (67). The narrative Pickover builds around the tongue instead imbues the disembodied meat with animacy, assigning to it a life and a death. The interrogative pronoun, “who,” also invests the cow with personhood and, in her imagination of the meat’s origins, in it exists the possibility of an entire life cycle as she wonders whether it came from an infant, whether it had a life, and how it died.

Narrative, recalling my previous chapter’s discussion of Deogratias, is an important component of conceptualizing and cultivating concern for a life. Commenting on narratives of animal death in the particular case of South Africa, Wendy Woodward’s work sheds further light on the difficulties of the dinner table when she states, “[f]or
those of us concerned … about the lack of justice for animals, we all experience guilt in our inability to stop the ongoing killing of animals. Constrained socially from quitting tables laden with the corpses of dead animals, we can, at the very least, tell stories of their deaths” (“Killing” 310). In the case of Pickover’s text, the emergence of the animal as a life complicates the ease with which intimate spaces are constructed by drawing attention to their underlying violence. No longer populated solely by the human, Pickover’s table becomes an archive of both family intimacy and interspecies relations as the specter of the dead cow unexpectedly takes up occupancy at the family gathering space.

Sara Ahmed’s discussion of the habitual space around the family table in *Queer Phenomenology* offers a complement to the politics of belonging in this context. She describes certain proclivities toward, for example, whiteness or heteronormativity as “bad habits” cultivated in part through family and familiar lines, and reads the table as a place at which orientations around the familiar emerge. Eating meat, for all its gendered and racialized historical dimensions, might also find traction with Ahmed’s work on the habitual. She suggests,

> Habits … do not just involve the repetition of “tending toward,” but also involve the incorporation of that which is “tended toward” into the body. These objects extend the body by extending what it can reach. Reachability is hence an effect of the habitual, in the sense that what is reachable depends on what bodies “take in” as objects that extend their bodily motility, becoming like a second skin. (131)

The language of bodily incorporation here readily registers with Pickover’s discussion of eating animals as a ritualized habit. In the case of the animal, the incorporation is literal, as the flesh of the other comes to invigorate the body, but it is also a component of the ideological state apparatus of the family. The taking in of the animal nourishes the body,
extending its motility, much like the habitual does in Ahmed’s account. But this incorporation also invigorates the very space of ritual production (the family table) on which it is offered. This is an extension of the capacities of the state, as the common space of the table registers the family’s national belonging when meat is consumed in the same way as “most South Africans.” The national habit thus circulates in the spaces of familial belonging to orientate its citizens around particular modes of ingestion. As Boggs argues, animality and animal representations as they intersect with family relations “[reveal] a key mechanism of biopolitics … by which forms of power as seemingly disparate as state authority and familial intimacy get conjoined and worked out” (2).

In my previous chapter I critiqued Pickover’s insistence that, because of her animal advocacy, she is a “stranger in a strange land” (5). I argued that she enacts a kind of alienation that carries with it exclusionary premises for South Africa and other South Africans. In this chapter, I want to draw attention to other possibilities raised by the above passage from Pickover. Namely, she also emphasizes the extent to which practices of consumption in private (or intimate) and public contexts circulate notions of citizenship.

While the table is a space whereby the ritual production of belonging occurs, it is also a space where “encounters” threatening to that normativity come about, and the notion of the encounter is where I begin thinking about zones of interspecies contact. Ahmed suggests that the encounter involves “a meeting, but a meeting which involves surprise and conflict” (Strange 6). Coming into contact with a stranger or strange other is an event both constitutive and disruptive of the subject in that “the designation of an ‘I’
or ‘we’ requires an encounter with others” (7), but the encounter also surprises the subject. “The surprising nature of encounters” she suggests, “can be understood in relation to the structural possibility that we may not be able to read the bodies of others” (8). The encounter registers a degree of uncertainty in the subject, an uncertainty that halts the subject’s ability to recognize others. As Ahmed suggests, the subject may “find other ways of achieving recognition, not only by re-reading the body of this other who is faced, but by telling the difference between this other, and other others” (8), but the encounter—as she discusses in Queer Phenomenology—might also be a point of disorientation. Although encounters may “constitute the space of the familial (by allowing the ‘I’ or the ‘we’ to define itself in relation to others who are already faced)” they also “shift the boundaries of what is familiar” (Strange 8). We might consider Pickover’s imagining of the cow as a kind of encounter with a stranger—an encounter whose strangeness reorganizes the space of the familiar as Pickover’s inquisitive probing into the life of the cow disrupts the smooth unfolding of family ritual. The tongue is unlike other forms of meat that are unrecognizable as animal parts—or ‘absent referents,’ to borrow Adams’ terminology—which is precisely what emerges as a result of ‘dressing’ meat. The process of cleaning and preparing it for consumption elides its likeness to a formerly living being through disguise.

In the tongue’s naked visual announcement that it comes from an animal, there is a simultaneous familiarity and strangeness. It is familiar as a frequent presence in the space of family ritual, but strange in that it is clearly out of place, recognizable as a tongue that has been removed from another’s body. It is important to note that the cow on
Pickover’s table emerges in the narrative not as an object or absent referent for family consumption but—at least in the context of Pickover’s imagination—a life with a history behind it. Significantly, however, Pickover’s narrative invites the reader to imagine a narratized other as opposed to a piece of meat.

But the intimacy of Pickover’s narrative occurs not only in her encounter with an imaginary cow as a consideration of animal others, nor in the emphasis on the degree to which meat consolidates ties between others; her text also gestures toward another intimacy bound up with eating the other. It is the intimacy of the other entering the body, of bodily incorporation, even if the other enters as a form of nourishment. If Pickover’s text exposes the animal body that precedes this incorporation, it might lead us into thinking about the meaning behind the close contact of these bodies, even if one of them is a mutilated remnant of a body, even if encounters involve negative affect or violence. The meeting of meat with the body is regardless of its history a moment of closeness—a moment at which a foreign object enters the body. Whether or not this foreign body is acknowledged as an ethical other or a subject of concern, Pickover signals the extent to which other-than-humans form a part of intimate spaces and relations. Indeed, I begin with this example precisely because it foregrounds some aspects of this chapter’s central queries. That is, it signals the extent to which contact with other-than-human lives and deaths is a central, albeit taken-for-granted, part of everyday zones of intimacy.
Intimately Interspecies

This chapter is focused on intimate contact between, within, and across bodies and bodily limits. I am not only interested in incorporative intimacies between bodies that Pickover’s text and work on eating address, but they offer a start to thinking about intimacies in or across unexpected surfaces, whether they be dermal, terrestrial, or on the table. In considering intimacies in this way, in or on what might be unexpected spaces and places, I take seriously the assertion that “[t]o consider the logic of intimacy is not solely to study domesticity, romantic and/or sexual relations, but to question the places and the supposed non-places of intimacy” (Antwi et al. 1). Underlying the multiple analyses this chapter brings together are questions tied to species boundaries, the relation between different species and Africanness, and the limits of the body, the self, or the subject capable of engaging in intimacy. In what ways are those of us occupying humanness always already in the throes of intimacy with extrahuman others? How do these intimacies undo rigid conceptions of humanness or even of the human self? How is the self tied to the limits of the body and, when engaged in some kind of intimate relationality with an other, where do we draw the limits of the self? How does one speak of this intimacy with contexts such as Africa in mind in which relations with animality are particularly fraught, as this dissertation has already shown? What do particular kinds of intimacies with other species such as romance or love do to concepts of humanness? Focusing on a different kind of proximity, how do microbial bodies within the body contest stable associations between the self and the body?
This chapter departs from the readings of my previous chapters to some extent. Both of these dealt closely with Africa’s association with extrahuman otherness in imperial epistemologies. My current preoccupations, rather than centralizing Africa, animality, or the association between the two, participates in concerns about the human raised by animal studies that have manifested globally, but draws on African texts to emphasize the integral place voices from African locations offer to such conversations. The account of intimacy I offer here, though it revolves around the human/animal divide, resonates with a posthumanist commitment that “opposes the fantasies of disembodiment and autonomy … inherited from humanism,” those which try to metaphysically “[transcend] the bonds of materiality and embodiment” (Wolfe xv). My take on the intimate in this chapter questions the limits of the body and their association with a bounded liberal subject, but nonetheless emphasizes ties between human beings and their bodies. Additionally, in engaging with questions of the intimate, this chapter moves away from the broad structural analysis of categories “on the other side” of humanness (animality, subhumanity, and pestiferousness) contained in my previous chapter.

For a long time, animal studies has been preoccupied with terms such as ‘human’ and ‘animal.’ I do not dismiss these analyses since I engage in them, but I suggest that the realm of interspecies intimacy might gesture toward a broader terrain of analysis than adherence to these frequently empty signifiers might allow. Indeed, the language of the intimate brings us into the realm of the particular. It shifts focus to close and sometimes closed spaces and relationalities that—although inflected with broad structural discourses and technologies of power—involves proximities and exchanges between bodies. Rather
than a Foucaultian lexicon of biopolitics that addresses structural power, control, population, and administration, intimacy’s focus on this closeness allows for a reading of how bodies demonstrate agency in spite of, or perhaps in relation to, these structures. If concern occupies the central theoretical premise of this entire project, this chapter is less about structures of concern than about how they are felt at the level of intimate, intercorporeal contact. This concern is not exclusively entwined with love for a romantic other, but anxieties about other species’ claims on us as well.

In tackling intimacy and zones of interspecies relationality, I bring together analyses that demonstrate how interspecies intimacy might inform or—in other cases—always already informs those structures of concern outlined elsewhere in this dissertation. Pickover’s account of the cow’s specter occupying the dinner table is only one example of extrahuman others mediating zones of intimacy and ties of concern. The remainder of this chapter is divided into two sections that deal with different permutations of intimacy. The first is an examination of interspecies love and its capacity for cultivating concern. I draw on Zakes Mda’s *The Whale Caller*, which features a romance between a man and a whale. In tackling romantic or sexual love between species, I also deal briefly with the bestiality taboo because of the term’s hegemonic sway in structuring permissible forms of intimacy and thought about the species divide. I should also point out here that love and intimacy are not terms I equate in this chapter, but love might be thought of as an emotional residue that binds to certain zones of intimate contact. It also acts as the precursor to the discussions of intimacy I raise following this section. I suggest that love in the context of Mda’s novel and interspecies intimacy more broadly bring us into a zone
of thinking about animals not as objects in our midst, nor as bodies of essential difference. As I have shown, notions of similarity and difference underpinning animal rights are a major impediment to cultivating relations of concern with other animals. Love for an (animal) other, I suggest, is one mode of cultivating concern in that it registers the animal as a significant other rather than as an object.

My second section delves into a theoretical discussion on the limits of the body and the relation between the body and microbial beings. I briefly discuss the relation between biomobility, zoonosis, and Africanness before an extended account of the intimate politics of HIV. This section, I hope, although emanating from the concerns raised by HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa, might carry global significance in thinking about responsibility in the context of the HIV positive body. In this section, I argue that there is an intimate relationality drawn culturally between the HIV positive body and the HI virus. This intimacy manifests in the language of neoliberalism and “living with HIV” that isolates the HIV positive body and produces a hyperconsciousness of the body’s relation with the virus. Drawing on work from critical virology, I assert that HIV’s emergence in the space of the intimate contests the dermal limits of embodied selfhood. In effect, the existence of multiple microbial bodies within the human body render it difficult if not impossible to offer a clear articulation of a bounded, embodied, individual humanness. I then extend this premise to resist the neoliberal individualization of the experience of living with HIV/AIDS and to assert—given the multiple lives (microscopic and macroscopic) entangled with our own lives—an ethics of concern derived from the intercorporeal ties that make it difficult to think about our lives in individual terms.
II. Intercorporeal Intimacy

On Interspecies Romance, the Social Function of Bestiality, and Animal Alterity: A Reading of Zakes Mda’s *The Whale Caller*

Set in the coastal town of Hermanus, a popular tourist destination for Whale watching in South Africa’s Western Cape, Zakes Mda’s 2004 *The Whale Caller* follows the story of a protagonist caught up in a love affair with a southern right whale named Sharisha. The eponymous whale caller emerges daily from his home to communicate with her, blowing into a kelp horn across the limit that separates ocean from South Africa’s coast, “penetrat[ing] deep into every aperture of the whale’s body, as if in search of a soul in the midst of all the blubber” (66). As a form of soul-searching, the whale caller’s advances also involve projecting himself across the ostensible boundary between human and animal—a boundary whose anxious institution is perhaps most apparent in prohibitions on interspecies intimacy—finding a sort of personhood in the whale other with whom to identify. It also involves an intercorporeal crossing as the whale caller’s horn probes the limits of the whale’s body. The boundary is metonymized by the coastal edge, foregrounding the limits of interspecies crossings of this kind, but the novel’s central characters negotiate the bodily limitations placed on them. Although the affair involves little physical contact as only sound crosses the species and coastal limit, the above passage is saturated in sexual overtones with its emphasis on penetration. And the sexuality, at least as far as the novel’s protagonist is concerned, involves both romance
and a kind of monastic devotion. His adoration is steeped in ritual, not unlike the ritual production of sexual norms between humans, but he nonetheless cultivates a relationship catalyzed by his song, and Sharisha responds “with her own love calls … [rocking] in the water in a mating dance” (64). This dance continues until the whale caller is “drenched in sweat and other secretions of the body” and the “front and the seat of his tuxedo pants,” a part of his best ensemble which he always wears to greet Sharisha, are “wet and sticky” (66). The years-long romance between the two is abruptly complicated by the arrival on the scene of Saluni, the outspoken “village drunk” (17), who begins a humorous and tumultuous courtship of the protagonist, leaving him torn between his love for Sharisha and the “carnal desires” he feels for Saluni (92), related as if his desire for her were more bestial than that for the whale.

The novel details the whale caller’s difficult and humorous love triangle between himself, Saluni, and Sharisha, but ends in tragedy when, after a fight with Saluni, the protagonist calls to Sharisha in an impassioned frenzy and she is beached, “too mesmerized to realize that she has recklessly crossed the line that separates the blue depths from the green shallows” (216). Saluni herself, in a fight with the Bored Twins—two children in the story that Saluni had frequently visited—is later killed. The scene that follows Sharisha’s death shows tourists, politicians, and marine biologists capitalizing on the event as “a photo opportunity” to make public gestures of environmental concern and self-interestedly quibbling over the fate of Sharisha. All the while they “contribute nothing to save the whale” (221), while the whale caller looks on until finally they kill her with dynamite, the most humane way to do so. It is perhaps the tragic end to the
romance, not to mention the novel’s language of overt sexuality that can be read as a humorous backdrop to ostensibly more important concerns or reductively dismissed as a kind of bestiality, that led some popular reviewers to initially negatively criticize the text. The *New York Times* review of the novel derided the protagonist as “at best merely eccentric, at worst insane” (Bell). Another read Mda’s novel as a cautionary tale that reveals the detriments of situations in which “some people just take their love of animals too far” (Cuda). Such reviews capitulate cultural narratives that pathologize intimate interspecies contact (not to mention modes of being human deemed “bestial”), refusing the complexity and ambiguity Mda’s novel maintains that allows for imagining otherwise in the context of interspecies intimacy.

As an archive of relationality and intimacy, the sexuality of the novel occupies a central place in this chapter. Sexuality and interspecies intimacy, I argue, are also central to the novel’s project of reconfiguring human/animal relationalities. Whereas academic criticism on the novel has viewed sexuality only peripherally, centering the text’s ramifications for ecocritical and South African sociopolitical epistemologies, I suggest that while these are primary concerns in the novel they emerge out of the permutations of intimacy and sexuality the novel offers. I read the novel’s handling of intimacy as a challenge to conventions of romance, as a rethinking of how intimacy has hitherto been conceptualized in primarily anthropocentric frameworks, and especially as foregrounding the potential of intimate interspecies contact for an ethics of extrahuman otherness.

In addition to a reading of Mda’s novel, and using it as a starting point, I offer a rumination on the contested cultural meanings of interspecies intimacy in theory and
popular criticism more broadly. In this way, I consider Mda’s text a pivotal contribution to a conversation that asks us to think intimately about animals. My aim in this section is not necessarily to offer a treatise in favor of what has been reductively read as bestiality, but a thinking through the possibilities of love as a form of concern that crosses species boundaries. Given a recent body of scholarship on queerness and sexuality in animal studies, it is important to gesture toward the politics of this type of intimacy and what it asks of us in texts such as Mda’s. Focusing on the sexuality of the novel and, indeed, love—which is why I employ the rubric of intimacy in an examination of the text—might expose to us different avenues for interspecies ethics that fall outside the hegemonic and infantilizing discourses of animal rights and environmentalism. It might also beckon us to think about how proscriptions on interspecies intimacy structure relations between humans and animals—even those that are ostensibly decidedly nonsexual—in ways that reinforce the animal’s position as absolutely other.69 It might be tempting to gape at the spectacular mess left by Sharisha’s death as a caution against such intimacy, against crossing species boundaries in intimate contexts. Indeed, as the novel perhaps cannot help but register concerns about the bestiality taboo, its central romance crosses the kind of limit that LaCapra calls “an event or experience that transgresses normative limits or suspends constraints and boundaries” (7). This reading, though, does not do justice to the notes of humor and pleasure that precede the spectacular display (such as those I cited in this section’s opening). Reading the novel as bestiality or immorality—as Cuda does

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69 See the introduction to Colleen Glenney Boggs’ Animalia Americana in which she discusses how human sexuality is closely negotiated alongside animal others, even though the companion animal is frequently desexualized.
when he suggests that Mda takes his love of animals “too far”—brings the text into a discourse of normalization that places limits on the cultural scope of permissible intimacies and on how we may discuss our relation to nonhuman beings that occupy our midst. Its emphasis on a perversion of species boundaries also, as I will show, elides other forms of exploitation that humans commit against cetacean ecosystems regularly. A reading of *The Whale Caller* as perverse reinscribes suspect moralisms that equate aberrant forms of sexuality with death and destruction, and confirms hypotheses that render interspecies intimacy an abject form of affection.

For the above reasons, and given the centrality of sexual relations (whether human or otherwise) within the novel, it is curious that academic criticism has only peripherally considered the novel’s zones of intimacy. This is not to say that this criticism does not deal with the novel’s central romance(s), but it is frequently read secondarily to the novel’s other, ostensibly more pressing concerns. These other concerns include its environmentalist stance, its attention to socioeconomic inequality in the wake of apartheid’s history, and, more generally, its challenge to Cartesian human/animal dualisms. Wendy Woodward in particular reads the novel in a “broader context of a sacrificial nature … which depict[s] the effects of instrumentalizing nature as a resource for human consumption at great cost to the Earth and its future sustainability” (*Animal* 145). For Woodward, “nature is sacrificed ultimately in the death of Sharisha” (145), though I would contend that the novel refutes a conflation of Sharisha with nature in its privileging of the whale as an ethical other rather than an immutable stand-in for oceanic “nature” in general. Indeed, even in the Whale being named Sharisha the novel
emphasizes the “calling by name of a particular whale” rather than a generalized whale other (Sewlall 133).

Still, the novel has been extensively read as an ecocritical text, and Jonathan Steinwand provides a nuanced account of the novel’s approach to environmentalist politics and cetacean being. He suggests that the novel is part of a “cetacean turn in postcolonial literature that invites us to attend to the survivance strategies that provide localized challenges to environmentalist universalism, correctives to the sentimentalizing tendencies of environmentalism, and the caution that a sustainable future must avoid imperialist nostalgia” (185). The novel provides “guidance for thinking about nonhuman others in ways that risk but ironically resist domesticating or romanticizing the other by focusing attention on the lives, the knowledge, the arts, the values, and the beliefs of the people who dwell among these species” (185). Other critics have discussed Mda’s attention to the particularities of South African space. As Goodman points out, the novel “has as its implicit pre-text the issue of how to grapple with the daunting inequalities of the South African past, and their persistence into the present” (106). Goodman reads these in the context of the human-animal boundary, but nonetheless insists that the novel is about “the brutal realities of the human condition, as seen through a South African lens” (106). It may be that novelistic representations of animality cannot help but offer an orientation around the human in their very emergence from human authors, but might there be another way to read the novel than in terms of its handling of the human condition given that it at least attempts to account for cetacean otherness through the body of Sharisha?
Other work has suggested so, commenting on the novel’s handling of animality, but sometimes overstating its liberatory effect. Both Steinwand’s and Woodward’s arguments are centered on the relation between humans and other animals. Also tackling the human/animal dichotomy, Harry Sewlall asserts that, “[i]n creating a fabulous tale of a human falling in love with a whale, Mda has attempted to bridge what Derrida refers to as the ‘abyssal’ rupture between humans and non-humans, thus erasing the boundary between the human and the non-human, the self and the ultimate other” (137). Given the tragedy with which the novel ends that underscores the difficulty with which transgressive interspecies bonds are wrought, I maintain some skepticism regarding Sewlall’s reading, even while I take seriously his suggestion that the novel challenges the limits of the human to some extent. I am not suggesting that Mda’s text is a moralistic caution against its central romance, but Sewlall’s assertion risks idealizing the relationship between Sharisha and her caller, insisting that Mda’s attempt to “bridge” the abyssal rupture between human and animal is an erasure of its boundary. How does one bridge an abyssal rupture, especially one that Derrida insists “doesn’t describe two edges, a unilinear and indivisible line having two edges, Man and the Animal in general” (Animal 31)? Indeed, Derrida’s assertion of a heterogeneous abyss of the living counters the very notion of a boundary by entrenching humans within the murky space of an abyss—a space where boundaries are not clearly delineated.

Moreover, bridging does not necessarily erase a boundary; it may involve the possibility of crossing between two sides, but the very presence of the bridge indicates that boundaries or limits (to the shore or to a traversable terrain) are firmly in place. The
bridge is a necessary device precisely because the boundaries it crosses cannot be completely eradicated. Part of the focus of this chapter is, following Derrida, to challenge various boundaries, keeping in mind that they have nonetheless come to determine the way “our” relations with otherness are conceptualized, including boundaries between self and other, lover and loved, man and whale, terrestrial and ocean, human and extra-human, and the human and the numerous other microscopic bodies that compose the human itself.

Taking into account recent conversations about animality and interspecies crossings, I would contend that Mda’s textualization of love between a man and a whale challenges conventions of romantic love that turn sexual intimacy into an event of pure love, instead emphasizing the difficult relationalities emergent even in contexts of romance. I am also interested in the novel’s central romance in that it moves beyond the generality and grand gesturing bound up with categories so overdetermined as “human” and “animal.” Responding to Selwall’s use of Derrida, we might recall Derrida’s foundational insistence that, rather than a strict boundary between human and animal—in spite of the ways the boundary carries cultural weight in discussions about the animal—“there is … a heterogeneous multiplicity of the living, or more precisely (since to say ‘the living’ is already to say too much or not enough), a multiplicity of organizations of relations between living and dead” (31). It may be that, given the plethora of work from animal studies and critical animal studies focused on the hegemonic persistence of the

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70 In addition to the plethora of work on the Black Atlantic as a site of identity constitution, the oceanic has recently emerged in contemporary scholarship on Africa, with numerous scholars exploring littoral identities. See especially Meg Samuelson’s multiple works on littoral cultures, as well as Pat Caplan.
categories “human” and “animal,” we have a responsibility to move beyond them and attend to zones of difference inherent to the heterogeneity of the multispecies abyss in which we live. Moving beyond the generality of the term “animal,” we might consider the relations between particular animal beings and others, ones that are not always human, even though animal studies has been focused on animals and relationality almost exclusively insofar as animals relate to humans. That is, in a reading of The Whale Caller, we might consider not only cetacean being, but also the particularities of a cetacean being. This is the kind of reading Woodward signals when she suggests that the novel “encourage[s] the reader to imagine sharing the being of another, who is condemned to death” (310), emphasizing the precarious place animals occupy in their subaltern positioning next to the sovereign category of the human. In light of Mda’s writing of embodied whaleness, we might consider how the novel ushers the reader into a consideration of being in a context outside of the human body. But it is not only that it imagines an other body. The novel also imagines a relationality of love between a human and a whale through which a whale becomes an embodied other that the reader textually encounters. Keeping this relationality in mind, how might love (and not in its popular romantic sense) and sexuality fashion an interspecies ethics?

Mda’s novel is acutely aware of uses of sexuality that justify ostracism, and his novel early on emphasizes the primacy of debates over sexuality within the South African context. These debates, in turn, haunt the novel’s account of interspecies romance. In a metatextual gesture, the novel describes a play being staged in Hermanus, titled Have You Heard the Seagull Scream?, that “features full frontal nudity and explicit gay sex scenes”
(21). A large group of Christian townsfolk protest this play that is, “they say, … about fuckin’ moffies,” according to one bystander. Following this hearsay claim, the local pastor voices the proclamation that “indeed no moffie will enter the Kingdom of Heaven.” The protest then devolves into a humorous display of misinformation. Although the pastor claims “[p]lays like these are the cause of all of our problems in this town—problems like poaching and drug abuse” (22), he admits, “I have not seen it because these eyes that read the Holy Book … cannot feast on such filth” (23). The novel’s account of the pastor’s refusal to see the play does not necessarily support his assertive dismissal of non-normative sexualities. Indeed, the notion that the pastor has not seen the play, more than emphasizing his position, delegitimates it by exposing its misinformation. After the pastor’s comments, the aims of the protest get muddled into the question of whether the play actually does contain homosexual sex, to the ridicule of onlookers. The novel’s privileging of confusion and ambiguity in this moment evades a rigid assertion of moralism or sexual normativity. In so doing, it might open the reader to an understanding of sexualities that does not immediately cast them off as the stuff of perversion. The novel’s early framing passage cautions the reader against such a dismissive gesture by anticipating controversy over whether the novel contains bestiality.

This early framing passage also signals social scripts that place limits on certain sexualities. Positioned in terms of very current social struggles with displays of queer sexuality in South Africa, the novel satirizes dismissals of non-normative sexual practices. The reference to homophobia in a text that centers on interspecies romance is particularly pertinent to African contexts (even those that have emerged following the
novel) given recent comparisons in Southern African politics between non-heterosexual sexuality and bestiality, the most famous of which in the African context might be Mugabe’s comparison of “gays” to “pigs and dogs.” Of contention in the last decade but particularly in the last two years has been the relation of queer bodies to Africanness, with frequent assertions from African leaders that gays and lesbians are “un-African” and the state-sanctioned violence against queer bodies in locations such as Uganda, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, and South Africa. The love triangle at the novel’s core (between The Whale Caller, Sharisha, and Saluni) which certainly transgresses normative sexual limits also compels us to think about the politicization of sexuality in contemporary South Africa, perhaps best stated by Deborah Posel’s assertion from the same year the novel was released: “post-apartheid South Africa is in the throes of … an historical moment, in which the politicization of sexuality is perhaps the most revealing marker of the complexities and vulnerabilities of the drive to produce a newly democratic, unified nation” (15). The novel’s emphasis on sexuality foregrounds its attention to this complexity.

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72 The list of nations I offer here requires some qualification in that it exists to emphasize the fraught position of sexuality in various African locations. South Africa might seem a strange addition to the list given its inclusive constitution, but the persistence of various forms of violence directed toward queer bodies (including corrective rape) and state figures that speak out against homosexuality implicate that nation in emergent continental conversations about sexuality and citizenship. This list is not meant to position such locations as essentially homophobic, given that anything more than a cursory glance beyond the liberal media spectacle of African homophobia reveals a complex global history of their emergence. Moreover, to align homophobia with a particular national identity risks eliding those queer bodies currently claiming national belonging in visible forums as queer Africans. My concern is precisely that African queerness is frequently read in relation to state and regional citizenships. The designation of queerness as un-African constructs a standard of appropriate sexuality for self-identified Africans. It also sets the terms for queer politics as a struggle for regional and state citizenship.
Additionally, the novel’s featuring of an interspecies romance at its core confounds the limits of what is normatively and anthropocentrically understood as sexuality. It may be tempting to dismiss the romance of the novel on the one hand as perverse or on the other as a merely humorous, apolitical, or allegorical backdrop to the “actual” sexual politics of the nation or the novel, but Mda resists such a gesture when an onlooker to the whale caller’s daily exchanges with Sharisha poignantly shouts, “everything in South Africa is political” (67). The presence in the novel of a voice that insists on the political primacy of everything might make us think about how sexuality is of primary importance to the novel’s other, ostensibly central, projects including environmentalism, the importance of oceanic ecosystems, and other concerns that have occupied the African social up until the present. What does this romance mean in terms of the politicization of sexuality, and not just in contemporary South Africa? Finally, given queer theory’s confounding of the terms by which we encounter sexuality, can we read Mda’s text as a kind of queer intimacy that pushes the generic boundaries of romance, its attendant terms, and the bodies that normativity dictates should or should not be intimate with one another? If so, what might it mean for a politics of interspecies intimacy?

It is difficult to think of such intimacy without addressing prohibitions on bestiality. These prohibitions occupy the legal language of almost every nation globally, and African nations are no exception. Many African nations prohibit sexual contact between humans and other species. The Zambian Penal Code lists any person who “has carnal knowledge of an animal” as guilty of “Unnatural Offences” (Zambia). Employing similar language, Ghana’s criminal code prohibits “unnatural carnal knowledge … of

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73 Many African nations prohibit sexual contact between humans and other species. The Zambian Penal Code lists any person who “has carnal knowledge of an animal” as guilty of “Unnatural Offences” (Zambia). Employing similar language, Ghana’s criminal code prohibits “unnatural carnal knowledge … of
bestiality or zoophilia, precisely because these terms recall for us that controversial intimacies are always already scripted socially as forms of perversion. On the one hand, the terms of bestiality themselves, like those of “the animal,” are an attempt to collapse an unclear range of practices pathologized in various ways at different historical moments, and wielded in criminal codes for ostracizing those who violate sexual limits. Put another way, according to Kathy Rudy, “the widespread social ban on bestiality rests on a solid notion of what sex is, and queer theory persuasively argues we simply don’t have such a thing. The interdict against bestiality can only be maintained if we think we always/already know what sex is. And, according to queer theory, we don’t” (603).

Moreover, the bestiality taboo is in place in spite of the ways that numerous practices on the gamut of eroticism whose boundaries are unclear get crossed every day. These include dogs kissing their companion humans’ faces, the intimate bodily closeness many enjoy with their companion animals, or the mechanisms workers in animal husbandry employ to promote animal breeding. If we have ever noticed, for example, a family dog masturbating closely alongside a human—and the human may laugh off the process or respond to it with disgust—we know that this boundary gets crossed in ways that are not always consensual on the part of the human, even though many conventionally condemn the notion that human/animal sexuality does not consider other animals’ capacity to offer consent. As Rudy convincingly argues, however, a zoophilic perspective is deeply invested in non-coercive relations with other animals and frequently avoids acts not

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any animal” (Ghana). Ethiopia condemns “sexual intercourse with an animal” as “punishable with simple imprisonment” (Ethiopia).
intelligibly pleasurable to them. I would part with this perspective on consent, however, by questioning the zoophilic assertion of a pure relationality with animals. This is not because animals are irrefutably unable to offer consent, necessarily, but bound up with the notion that—even between humans—the recognition of what counts as consent or coercion is a fraught issue, given the plethora of work in South Africa and globally on the persistence of rape-tolerant culture. Indeed, drawing on my previous chapter’s discussion of an ethics of similarity, we cannot assume that, because another body appears to show consent in a way that approximates one’s own mode of showing it, coercion is not part of the apparatus that precedes the event of sexuality. This is not to say that beings cannot engage in consenting sexuality but, as feminist criticism on rape culture has shown, the presumption of consent is deeply entrenched in a culture that purports to resist coercion but nonetheless tolerates sexual coercion in various forms.74 Read across species boundaries, the zoophilic emphasis on consent can perhaps never escape violent histories of domestication that structure the place of any animal in relation to the human.

On the other hand, sexual contact between two nonhuman animals tends to generate little moral concern, though it is frequently observed, and evolutionary biology and genetics have long held interspecies hybrids (products of interspecies copulation) as an influence in our evolutionary history.75 If we accept that the criticism has been directed particularly at the hype around human/nonhuman sexuality, bestiality and zoophilia express a kind of anxiety about the stability of the limit at which the human

74 The politics and problematics of consent are discussed in detail in a number of feminist works on sexual violence. For example, see Mui and Murphy’s collection, Gender Struggles, and Erlich’s Representing Rape: Language and Sexual Consent.
75 See Arnold’s Natural Hybridization and Evolution.
gives way to the extrahuman in particular rather than between species in general. Interspecies sexuality, particularly between humans and animals, I would contend, generates vociferous criticism not because of the sexual act itself, but because it ruptures the taxonomic boundaries that produce the human subject and animal other as separate. In this way, it is seen as a social evil from the perspective of a human subject that assumes it is neatly and cleanly separate from other animals, in spite of the fact that this boundary is and has been frequently crossed. The particular instances in which this crossing occurs are too numerous for this project to mention, but there are well-documented cases of sexuality between even whales and humans.76

In the case of the novel, the allegation of perversion is not a simple criticism in that conventional notions of it that we might graft onto Mda’s text get inverted. Decentralizing hastily leveled notions of sexual perversion, the novel questions and casts as perverse other ways humans often relate to other animals as tourists, (sometimes) omnivores, and egotistical members of global life worlds in which we often fashion ourselves the central actors. The novel figures its protagonist’s exploits and the demonization of non-normative sexualities alongside the ways that others in the town of

76 There is precedent for sexual contact between cetaceans and humans. One woman, Margaret Howe, recently gave an account of her sexual contact with a dolphin from 1965 when she was performing research into his linguistic capacities (Rosenbaum). Journalist Malcolm Brenner’s highly publicized and somewhat idealized 2009 novel Wet Goddess offers a fictional account of his love affair with a bottlenose dolphin in the 1970s. Although widely criticized, Brenner insists that he “wrote [the] book for dolphins because we are mistreating these animals by keeping them in captivity” (qtd. in McCormack). Responding to criticism against those who suggested he had exploited the dolphin by engaging in sexuality with her, he insisted, “[s]ome people find it hard to imagine that I wasn’t abusing the animal. … They didn’t see me interacting with the animal. They weren’t there. These creatures basically have free will” (qtd. in McCormack). While I maintain skepticism over the gender politics of Brenner’s work, I take seriously his reading of interspecies sexual contact’s relation to a conservationist politics. This is a relation I delve into in the ensuing pages of this chapter.
Hermanus sometimes unwittingly abuse its marine residents. In the whale-watching town, although there are “strict regulations governing boat-based whale watching” such as the notion that “touching whales was strictly prohibited,” the “Whale Caller has seen tourists getting off the boat and excitedly boasting of how they actually touched a whale when it came alongside a boat” (131). The Whale Caller himself, viewing this kind of contact as a violation, insists: “He has never touched a whale. He has never even touched Sharisha, except with his spirit—with his horn. There is no doubt in his mind that soon this boat-based whale watching will be abused” (130). The proverbial phallus figured by the horn notwithstanding, the text asks us to consider the ostensibly perverse crossing of the whale caller alongside the nonconsensual probing of South Africa’s marine life brought about by the infusion of an ecologically precarious life world with tourists. And although common condemnations of zoophilia center on the criticism of abuse of an animal other, Mda emphasizes the abuse that eager tourists enact on the ecologies they consume every day. Whereas the Whale Caller figures himself as participating in an intimate adoration grounded in self-conscious limits and whether or not we accept his self-assessment, the tourist’s desire appears as a gluttonous and insatiable urge to test the limits of permissible relations with animals.

This insatiable desire occurs in seemingly every manner except the sexual in the novel. Indeed, the tourists’ bottomless appetites are driven home by their conspicuous consumption as they regularly flock to “stalls and tables displaying … candyfloss machines, ostrich biltong, citrus preserves, and whalebone jewelry.” The crowds themselves are written in pornographic detail as “boerewors-roll-chomping tourists,
mustard and ketchup dripping from their fingers and chins” (19). Pointing to the various modes of exploitation in the whale-watching town, Mda’s text undercuts attempts to locate abuse in the novel’s zones of intimacy and instead encourages us to examine the conventional violence of tourism in marine naturecultures.

It is not simply that we are left to think about the potential of the Whale Caller’s romance, however. The novel also engages an affective ethics of concern through the political force of love that departs from the typical conservationist show of concern for animal life. In this sense, the novel is not only or merely about romance, but about reconfiguring relations to other beings in our midst, particularly our relationality with the figured-as-absolute-alterity of cetacean being in light of the mythology of whaleness that circulates in popular thought and animal rights discourse. Kalland notes that whales are a “kind of totem for the animal liberation movement” (124), albeit based on a series of inaccuracies about what is thought of as their human-like behaviours, or the movement’s construction of what he calls a “super-whale.” He insists that whales in general, with no attention to species or individual difference are wielded as symbols to cast “protectionists … as caring and peaceful by portraying the whalers as greedy and barbarous” (125). Petra Rethmann’s work on the whale views it as an integral part of the emergence of a global environmentalist rhetoric, drawing on Greenpeace’s construction of an image of the whale. Similarly to Kalland, she troubles this construction as “simultaneously autonomous and grand, vanished and in need of saving” (178). Mda’s novel is aware of conflicting notions of whaleness as onlookers to its romance (including marine biologists, politicians, and tourists who collectively form a sort of Greek chorus) provide their own
perspectives on Sharisha’s behaviour right up to the point of her spectacular death, but there is a different kind of politics at work in the novel’s central romance.

When we think of the conventional call to “save the whales,” there is a certain generality attributed to species categories that efface cetacean singularity—one that love perhaps beckons us to complicate. We might recall that Agamben offers love as an example of what he calls the “whatever singularity”—in which he envisions a coming community on the basis of a series of unique singularities rather than a collection of generalities. These generalities, in Agamben’s reading, might be those categories in the realm of an identity politics that collapse individuals into collections of generalities on the basis of race, class, gender, or sexuality, but we might also turn our attention to species. Thinking on love, he suggests,

[1]ove is never directed toward this or that property of the loved one … but neither does it neglect the properties in favor of an insipid generality … The lover wants the loved one with all of its predicates, its being such as it is. The lover desires the as only insofar as it is such—this is the lover’s particular fetishism. Thus, whatever singularity (the Lovable) is never the intelligence of some thing, of this or that quality or essence, but only the intelligence of an intelligibility. (2)

Applying Agamben’s work to the novel, we might read its romance as orientated not around what Agamben calls “insipid generality” in its take on cetacean otherness, but, through the force of love, making intelligible a whale as an example of the "whatever singularity." Sharisha ceases to be a whale and takes on the particular and singular qualities of “the Lovable” for the whale caller.

When we think of love, as Sarah Ahmed does, as a socially rather than individually felt emotion, we might begin to read the Whale Caller’s romance as more than simply an apolitical backdrop to the novel’s critique of environmental exploitation.
Love might instead be integral to this critique. As Ahmed suggests, speaking of love and other emotions, “objects of emotions circulate or are distributed across a social as well as psychic field” (Cultural 45). Judith Butler, also thinking of emotions as social processes, describes love (and grief, which is also at the center of the novel with Sharisha’s death) as bound up with the ecstatic, which involves being “transported beyond oneself by passion” (20). For Butler, these are affects that tie us to others, place us beside ourselves, bring us outside ourselves and, indeed, undo what we think of as our bounded selves when others become integral to our sense of self. As she states, these affects are the start to thinking through a “political community of a complex order” as we come to be beside ourselves, in the throes of, or in the ecstasy of love or grief (Undoing 19). Read in these terms, the whale caller’s and Sharisha’s experience of love ruptures conventional conservationist rhetoric. It encourages us to attend to the singularity of beings rather than whales in their generality. Mda’s protagonist’s fascination with Sharisha envisions her not as a whale, in general, but as a singular member of a complex multi-species life-world. The treatment of her as a character personalizes her in a way that does not allow her to be reduced to a speciesistic rhetoric. It brings us into a realm where the singular being of an other (species-identity notwithstanding) matters alongside the survival of the species itself, testing the limits of our environmental consciousness.

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77 Debates surrounding the sociality of emotion have taken hold in both the humanities and social sciences, especially with the rise of affect theory in cultural studies in recent years. I employ Ahmed and Butler for their particular handling of relational emotional structures, but there is a vast body of work highlighting this sociality. An account of such debates can be found in Rogers, Schröder, and von Scheve’s “Dissecting the Sociality of Emotion.”
This section has been focused significantly on limits, and the whale caller and Sharisha’s romance crosses limits that we can only speculate about, which are themselves figured by the shoreline boundary that separates the oceanic from the conventional realm of human experience. The excess of their romance, which literally ends with an explosion of the boundary when Sharisha’s body is destroyed with dynamite, might easily be read as a caution against such crossings, but we cannot overlook that other motivations (political and touristic) also occur alongside Sharisha’s demise. *The Whale Caller* provides a start to thinking about certain limits between humanity and animality that might inform African and animal studies scholarship. On one level, the novel makes a crossing beyond acceptable limits. On the other, it explodes the very limit on which acceptability depends, at some points spectacularly, as with Sharisha’s explosive death, and sometimes subtly, as with very mundane moments of one man’s captivation by a whale. The seeming incompatibility between the bodies of the whale caller and Sharisha, who nonetheless find a way to meet despite their limitations, presents us with an intimate relationality that reconfigures—rather than strictly bridges—a limit of absolute alterity. What the novel does, in this line of thinking, is ask us to think about particular animals intimately. It asks us to think about ways of relating to animals other than the familiar discourses that define them as pets, as objects in the fight for environmental conservation, or as bodies which we as tourists, buyers, and (sometimes) omnivores, consume.
II. Intracorporeal Intimacies

Because of our close genetic relationship with other primates, we are often especially vulnerable to contracting the pathogens they carry. Cameroon, and indeed all of Central Africa, is home to some of the highest densities of NHPs [non-human primates] and is considered a hot spot for a host of new zoonotic diseases. Already we have witnessed, from Central Africa alone, the emergence of some notable zoonotic pathogens, including Marburg, Ebola, monkeypox, HIV, HTLV, and SFV. (Aysha Akhtar, *Animals and Public Health* 67-68)

The Intimacy of Biomobility: Difficult Relationality Under the Microscope

It might seem odd to shift this conversation from the macroscopic level of cetacean bodies to a discussion of the microscopic relation between bodies and their inhabitants. Still, both of these conversations involve somewhat imaginary limits. As Mda’s text demonstrates, the shoreline and the difference between human and cetacean bodies do not represent untraversable boundaries, though crossing them might be difficult. The discussion I engage here also involves contact between bodies across boundaries seemingly insuperable from the perspective of the macroscopic, but which are permeable and porous on the level of the microscopic. To begin this discussion, and taking into account the above epigraph, how might a text on public health bring us from genetic closeness and into the realm of intimacy studies? Especially, how might its discussion of Central Africa as a zoonotic “hot spot” direct us toward the realm of posthumanism even if the discussion begins from a humanist perspective? The domain of public health might already bring us into intimate spaces and discussions that ask us to declare our vulnerability in many ways, even if the relationalities they signal are overshadowed in the frequently pathologizing language of medicalization, pathogenesis,
and disease. More than that, however, the above quotation, couched in a discussion of zoonosis, might spur us into thinking about the unacknowledged intimacy of microbial contact. To some extent, is not the language of pathogenesis about a vulnerable intimacy in that it signals zones of exchange as miniscule bodies pass from one host to another in moments of closeness? Akhtar’s text highlights our vulnerability to, and perhaps an intimacy with, nonhuman primates and speaks of “our” genetic “closeness” with them.

Moreover, implicit in Akhtar’s account of genetic closeness is the assumption of a human community whose limits are unfixed by the transmission of interspecies pathogen. On the one hand, her text foregrounds a humanist lexicon relying on a species divide between human and animal. In order for zoonosis as an exceptional category to exist, it must rely on the assumption of a fundamental difference between the human and other animals. Though evolutionary history, biology, and philosophy frequently demonstrate the arbitrariness of this boundary, its linguistic currency is nonetheless produced and reproduced in the rhetoric of zoonosis. Moreover, the extent to which her text is concerned for nonhuman animals—much like animal rights or welfare politics I elaborate on elsewhere in this dissertation—is questionable, leveled as a mechanism to confirm the boundedness and sovereignty of the human community. “This book aims to demonstrate that until we improve the welfare of non-human animals,” she writes, “we will never find health” (1). The animal exists in this statement as a body that confirms our humanness, our exceptional capacity to intervene in the nonhuman contexts around us, and—most importantly—our sovereign capacity to zoopolitically manage the health of global life-worlds. But this reliance on the boundedness of the human is also, perhaps, its undoing in
the face of anxieties over the notion that magnifying our scalar theoretical lens to incorporate the microscopic opens up our bodies to porousness, to a vulnerability that calls into question the limits of what we have come to think of as corporeal selves. Smaller scales also contest the agency of the human in that the realm of the microscopic cannot be as easily controlled as can the realm of the macroscopic; the germ, the bacteria, and the virus may be the final frontier of biopolitical control. Indeed, on the other hand, Akhtar’s text also belies the fiction of the species boundary’s essence by signaling the human’s vulnerability to the zoonotic transmission of disease. Zoonosis involves microbes whose imperviousness to taxonomic categories undoes easy claims to essential biological difference between species.

Zoonosis might also lead to a re-evaluation of the presumed sovereignty with which the human exists in the world. If sovereignty relies to some extent on the boundedness of the liberal subject, to recall my previous chapter’s analysis, how does that sovereignty become increasingly incoherent in a scalar level at which boundaries are traversable? Especially, how do we articulate the ties between the self and the body as a container of the self, but also of many other entities in the forms of viral, bacterial, and other particulate matter that straddles the zones of life and nonlife—entities not easily aligned with the self? I argue that the intimate zones of contact found in zoonotic and other forms of intercorporeal transmission might be the start to rethinking the distinction between self and other. In zones of intimate contact at the microscopic level, I suggest, the very materiality of distinctions between self and other, inside and outside, individual and community, and human and animal come undone as the body becomes a complex
assemblage of multiple lives. Exposing the porousness of bodies under the rubric of intimacy might be the start to thinking through an ethics of concern that devitalizes the human as its central figure.

The intimacy of which I speak might occur at microscopic and macroscopic levels, at the levels of both the body and the human community, and involve new ways of envisioning collectives on biological as well as social levels. Lauren Berlant’s handling of the intimate might offer a start to thinking in this way. For Berlant, intimacy “poses a question of scale that links the instability of individual lives to the trajectories of the collective” (3), and scale is important here when thinking about life at both the level of the population and the cell. There is the macroscopic scale that determines human lives’ membership in a community based on a normative understanding of their health in relation to this community, but every individual (human) body might be thought of as a collective of multiple lives. It is perhaps important to suggest that, as this thesis has argued so far, what counts as a “life” is more complicated than we have come to think, and that much cultural theory has maintained a staunchly humanist perspective in its response to this complexity.

The conversation about life in relation to certain microbes such as viruses is even more fraught in that their status as living beings is not always clear. They have been called beings “at the edge of life” (Rybicki 182), and are more commonly thought of as “infectious agents” than lives. It is perhaps also important to reiterate here that to challenge the humanist perspective of work on life is not to undermine the valuable work being done on the precarity of human being in the world, but to come to a more
multivalent understanding of how lives are lived in relation to other forms of life and nonlife than humanism allows. To do so is also to articulate an ethics that asserts the precarity of human life alongside other occupants of the globe. What, then, do we make of the way that lives contain other lives, even if looking into such a claim might encourage us to consider life in miniscule domains at the level of the cellular and microscopic? How do our bodies in such narratives become collectives that allegorically or materially relate to the national collective? And, most importantly for this analysis, how does looking at the life or nonlife of a microscopic agent change the way we think about the existence of and our ethical claims toward other bodies and the bodies they contain?

Moreover, at the level of the individual, what makes the body itself a zone of intimate contact? We can note again that sexually transmitted infections involve a certain level of intimacy—and sometimes this kind of bodily contact occurs in the context of sexual violence. This is not to make a dichotomy between violent or nonviolent sex and say that there are such things in the realms of sexual intimacy as immutably idyllic forms of relati

78 See Bersani’s foundational discussion of HIV/AIDS in “Is the Rectum a Grave?”, the introduction to which demystifies the enthusiasm of sex-positive language by drawing attention to the aversion inherent to multiple forms of sexuality (3-4). Michael Warner’s introduction to The Trouble With Normal carries on discussions begun by Foucault, suggesting that, “culture has thousands of ways for people to govern the sex of others—and not just harmful or coercive sex, like rape, but the most personal dimensions of pleasure, identity, and practice. We do this directly, through prohibition and regulation, and indirectly, by embracing one identity or one set of tastes as though they were universally shared, or should be” (1). Not limited to Bersani and Warner, a trend toward engaging with various negative affects bound up with sex has pervaded queer theory for a number of years. Refer also to Lauren Berlant and Leo Bersani’s Sex, or the Unbearable and Lauren Berlant’s Cruel Optimism. Within and beyond academic discourse, gay shame has also emerged in dialectic with gay pride. Eve Sedgwick’s work on shame provides some foundational ways to thinking.
to suggest that the painful and/or ecstatic politics of sex occur only at the level of those human bodies enthralled in the intercursive power relations of sexual acts. When we take into account scalar rubrics that extend to the microscopic, there are more lives involved in this transmission. The presence of microbial beings entering the body without consent is precisely what might reveal the limits of human power and control in the act of sex.

If we return to Sara Ahmed’s notion of the encounter, her work on incorporation and expulsion opens up thinking about the relation between the body and particulate, sometimes intangible others—intangible at least at the scalar level of human perception. She discusses processes during which the body’s boundaries are permeable. Drawing on Levinas’s work on breathing in *Otherwise than Being*, she suggests that breathing, as one example, is a form of encounter that

> opens the self to the other, a proximity or exposure that is traced in and through the air that is breathed and that, in the cold, can be seen, but only as an indeterminate mist coming from the body. Breathing does not establish territory or fix the relation between self and other, and yet breathing is that which allows one and the other to live in a co-inhabitance that is not premised on the commonality of a bond. (140)

Likewise, acts such as “sneezing … expel … strangers from the philosophical body … Other forms of bodily expulsion might be shitting and vomiting, both of which imply a process of partial incorporation as well as expulsion: the other/stranger must be taken in, and digested, before what is undesirable is both transformed and expelled” (139).

Ahmed’s work here deals with foreign objects whose boundaries are not clearly about resistance to gay pride while maintaining a critical eye toward the potentialities of shame as a critical rallying point, which David M. Halperin and Valerie Traub take up in *Gay Shame*. Suffice it to say that there has, for a number of years, been a conversation about sex that troubles its cultural manifestations in the ecstatic, romantic, and idyllic.
discernable to the eye entering the body, and processes of expulsion that separate these objects from the body. She tackles the distinction between what belongs in or is proper to the body and what is foreign or strange, even if incorporation blurs those distinctions to some extent. What happens when a foreign body enters that cannot be expelled? What of the being that, uninvited, takes up residency in the body and subverts the body’s defense mechanisms (a current of thought I develop further in my next section on HIV/AIDS)? In Ahmed’s line of thinking, these bodies—even without knowledge of one another or commonality—“co-inhabitate.”

The body here should not be taken as an exclusively human body. Ahmed speaks frequently about a philosophical body, for example. As organic theories of the state show us, a territory can also be understood to function as kind of body. But more particularly in the context of pathogenesis and epidemiology, drawing on Ahmed’s claims above, we might think of the history of both more broadly as a history of incorporation and expulsion within and across particular bodies. This incorporation and expulsion might involve the entrance of the virus or microbe into the body. It might also involve technologies of social stigma that work to incorporate and expel certain entities from communal and state bodies. In the case of Africa, this latter iteration of expulsion is particularly prescient given international restrictions on which bodies may move across borders, and this involves both human and animal bodies.

There are major concerns about the mobility of various bodies between African states and outside the continent, frequently because of fears that these bodies carry with them other bodies. And these concerns often focus on the body. According to Ncube,
“Africa is one of the regions in the world with the highest visa requirements,” and there is a broad system in place of visa restrictions on African humans and their ability to move in and out of the continent and between states within the continent. Concerns about bodily contact between Africans and other states are evident even at the level of fleshly contact, in racialized anxieties regarding blood and organ donation. The fear of Africa as a “hotspot” of disease extends to institutional public health policies that police the circulation of the blood of Africans, as well as non-heterosexual men, into Western populations. Although these policies espouse to protect the population from disease, they generalize the presence of disease across specific geographies and sexualities with no attention to complex social differences that produce the occurrence of disease.

Anxieties about state and bodily boundaries extend to animal bodies as well. For example, near the end of May 2011, a series of media outlets within and outside of South Africa documented biological threats in the nation’s agriculture industry. One article described the “worst-yet outbreak of hoof and mouth disease” among South African cattle, the culling of “5000 ostriches … following an outbreak of bird flu, H5N2, on farms … in the Western Cape,” and the “South African racehorse industry” losing “its ‘free status with the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) following an outbreak

79 For example, blood donation programs in North America and Europe still screen potential donors who have visited any part of Africa. Canada Blood Services, for example, stipulates in their blood donation policy that “[p]eople who have lived in certain regions of Africa, who may have been exposed to a new strain of the virus that causes AIDS … are not eligible to donate blood. People who have received a blood transfusion while visiting there or who have had sex with someone who has lived there are also not permitted to donate blood” (“Indefinite Deferrals”). In the United Kingdom, the National Health Service website tells potential donors, “[y]ou should not donate blood for 12 months after having sex with … someone who has been sexually active in parts of the world where AIDS and HIV are common, such as sub-Saharan Africa” (“Blood Donation”).
of African horse sickness … [also] in the Western Cape” (Jordan). Ongoing concerns frequently arise over malaria and, in central Africa and recently Malawi, tsetse flies spreading trypanosomiasis (commonly referred to as sleeping sickness) to humans. The DRC remains one of the worst areas affected by trypanosomiasis, with 70% of cases occurring there.\footnote{See the World Health Organization’s (WHO) statistics on trypanosomiasis.} Even more recently, as of the end of March 2013, efforts have been made to halt the spread of a new strain of Ebola in Guinea and elsewhere in West Africa.\footnote{See the Centre for Disease Control’s (CDC) “Outbreak of Ebola in Guinea and Liberia.”} Of frequent interest to local and global media are those ostensible threats of Africa spreading disease and governmental and institutional restrictions on animal movements, as with the above case of racehorses losing their “free status.” I say ostensible because such threats are frequently overzealous in their sensationalist reportage, but this does not stop the spread of their affective consequences.

These various fears echo Nicole Shukin’s analysis of biomobility in \textit{Animal Capital}. Biomobility, as she describes it, might be read as the inverse of what Baudrillard calls the “Ecstasy of Communication” (the title of his essay) derived from globalized telemobility. Shukin reads telemobility as a global circulatory system that transmits positive affect in the form of telecommunications throughout the world, bringing about a kind of globalized intimacy between bodies. The repudiated anxieties of this system find a foothold in the concept of biomobility, which is telemobility’s “pathological double, the potential of infectious disease to rapidly travel through the social flesh of a globally connected life world (182). “With biomobility,” she suggests, “the ‘rapid movement of
affect’ constituting the spiritualistic currency of telemobility discourse shows its obverse face in the biological threat of zoonosis, or species-leaping disease” (182). What unites the above examples is that they all feature nonhuman bodies occupying the centre of various contested claims about movement and mobility. In them are a desire to stop the porousness of bodies, to maintain rigid boundaries between selves and threatening others. This might be an expression of sovereignty—the creation of bounded bodies whose edges appear fortified—but these anxieties also say something about the nature of the human and the relation between the self and the body.

Keeping Berlant’s work in mind, the instability of lives to which she refers might also infuse a conversation about the instabilities of the limits of the body which themselves come under question when read through the politics of viral containment. If the instability of individual lives, as Berlant suggests, is uncovered in processes of intimacy, how is this instability connected to the body? To what extent is the instability of the individual wrapped up with desire to understand it as a discrete entity, to offer an account of the individual that circumscribes its limits with the dermal limits of the body that may not be circumscribable when we consider the transmission of illness? To some extent the body might be viewed as the container of a discrete individual, but the transmission of illness reveals the porous boundaries with which our embodied identities are contained. Far from being discretely bounded, “bodies as objects of knowledge are material-semiotic generative nodes. Their boundaries materialize in social interaction. Boundaries are drawn by mapping practices” (Haraway, Simians 201). Ed Cohen’s work comments on what such boundaries mean when they emerge in the desire to contain viral
pandemics. He suggests that, “we (i.e., humans) want to contain … diseases … precisely because we (i.e., living organisms) already contain them.” He goes on to suggest that this overt paradox also indexes yet another, perhaps more insidious contradiction, that of the ‘we’ itself. Indeed, the politics of viral containment relentlessly plays upon the contingency of the human ‘we.’ It conceptually and materially confounds our understanding both of how individuals constitute our collectives and of how we exclude other collectivities that might not belong to them—whether these “others” are other individuals, other populations, other humans, other species, or other non-vital entities, such as viruses. In other words, the politics of viral containment foregrounds the tensions that cut across our biopolitical parsings of the world insofar as they inscribe within themselves, and inscribe themselves within, the biological and political phenomena that we construe as epidemic disease. (15-16)

Cohen also examines the difference between epidemics and epizootics as itself expressive of assumptions about the stability of the boundary between human and animal. The discourse around the epidemic as opposed to the epizootic “assumes simultaneously that the kind of life that humans incorporate essentially differs from all other living beings (the zoe in epizootics) and that what makes human life special is the political character which qualifies it as ‘human’ in the first place (the demos in epidemic)” (16).

Cohen’s work is a challenge to human exceptionalism, and his assertion takes as its object of critique the ways that human life is cast as essentially different from other forms of life rather than putting forward a hierarchy of concern between humans and others. Crucially, his discussion is not about establishing hierarchies, as the language of animal rights, for example, might ask us to do under the guise of an ethics of similarity. What gets left out in the rights conversation are forms of life not physically or cognitively proximate to the human, from non-primate animals to the most fundamental forms of life that, while ostensibly insignificant, nonetheless form a part of the life-worlds that humans
occupy. One potential challenge that might be directed at Cohen’s analysis emerges from the breaking down of coherent frameworks through which the human emerges as a bounded being at the centre of the world. If the centrality of the human is what puts it at the pinnacle of global networks of concern, calling that centrality into question would presumably also delegitimize orientations of concern around the human. Part of the work of this dissertation is to expand the global circulation of concern to other-than-human life forms, but what about the microbe? If we aim to show concern for “all lives” as Judith Butler suggests, where does microbial being lie on the spectrum of concern. Are viruses situated at the edge of life, for example, beings for whom we must exercise an ethics of concern, as if that were possible given the affective and material suffering that circulates alongside individuals and populations in which certain viruses are contained. Surely, part of the work of decentralizing the categorical hegemony of the human is about circulating concern to other forms of life or at least envisioning a world in which the interests of politics are not devoted solely to the human, is it not? But where does this concern stop?

These are difficult questions to tackle if we seek to undermine human exceptionalism, but I would contend that the notion of a hierarchy of concern (or deciding where concern should stop) misses the point of Cohen’s work and the broader commitment of contesting humanism entirely. Calling into question the limits of the human in relation to other organisms is not necessarily about creating hierarchies between species or beings, or even about prescriptive notions that we should care for all others. It is a questioning of the axiomatic species categories that themselves provide the preconditions on which species hierarchies stake their claims. If zoonotic transmission
exposes anything, it is that it is difficult if not impossible to decisively and finally provide an account of the physical limits of the human. When we consider chronic viral infection, the virus occupying that body cannot exist without that body. Conversely, the body or population with ineradicable infections such as HIV may not be not precisely aligned with it, but are nonetheless containers of it.

The body in its entire collective complexity as a container of organisms is a life (and a collection of lives) that cannot easily be extricated from those organisms that it contains. Thinking this way, the categories through which we establish species limits such as the human are always already undone in that in order to be, for example, human, the human body must contain and transmit bodies not properly thought of as human. Undoing the categorical boundaries of the human also ruptures the logics on which species hierarchies are premised. To some extent, the species hierarchy relies on categorization. It requires an itemized list of intelligible and circumscribable categories through which we could easily put one above or below the other, occluding the notion that the limits such circumscriptions impose are not final or uncontested. Contesting the human is not about a deprivation of concern for the human, but an undermining of the very notion of the human as a bounded being. It also, perhaps, attempts to undermine the boundaries that determine with which bodies ethical concern lies.

Viral Being and the Limits of the Human: Thinking Through Viral Relationalities and Stories from Nobody Ever Said AIDS
A discussion of the relation between microbial being and the body is especially important in the context of Africa not only for it being referred to as a zoonotic hotspot, but because of the persistence of conversations about HIV/AIDS and the continent. In this section, considering narratives of HIV, I think about the broader ramifications of the discussion on intracorporeal intimacy I raised above, especially for those living with HIV, those marked as transmitters of HIV, and the continent itself as a repository of discourse about HIV. I examine discourses of responsibility for the toll that HIV has taken on the globe. Considering viral being in the context of HIV brings us into a uniquely politicized domain of epidemiology; that is, no other virus circulates with quite the same scale of political contestation or assignation of responsibility. It also carries a certain metaphorical currency as a parasite. As a being that occupies the body, surviving within the host without giving anything back, its parasitism perhaps explains its frequent figuration in militaristic metaphors as an enemy of the body or of certain socials.82 As Cohen points out, however, while “it now seems quite natural to consider infectious diseases in terms of host/parasite relations, in fact this model only emerged as a corollary of the germ theory of disease” (20). Indeed, he demonstrates that “parasitism does not in fact represent a ‘natural’ relationship, since the host/parasite relation derives from political theories dating back to ancient Rome” (22). Cohen’s exposition of the political rather than “natural” roots of parasitism expose that the virus-as-parasite narrative already carries with it value-laden underpinnings.

82 There is a large body of work on the various metaphorical or figurative lexicons used to discuss HIV and AIDS, too large to cite here. Perhaps the most famous contribution to this body of work is Susan Sontag’s AIDS and its Metaphors, in which she discusses the problematics of military metaphors of HIV/AIDS.
What does the discourse of viral parasitism do in terms of HIV positive bodies, and how are discourses of responsibility entangled with it? More specifically, how do these bodies become caught up in the discourse of responsibility as the transmitters of parasitic beings? It is my contention that parasitism is only one way of conceptualizing the relation between the HIV positive body and its viral occupant, and it is one that places the burden of responsibility on the HIV positive body. Parasitism implies a parasite/host relation. As the body aligned with HIV in this dichotomous relation, the individualized “host” becomes singled out as the bearer of the virus in a system that evades the social determinants of HIV infection. The “host” in this dichotomy is not exempt from a Derridean account of the guest/host relation and its implicit violence. Indeed, we might read the body itself as in a guest/host relation. This relation is exercised within the HIV positive body, where the host must accommodate the virus, even if unwillingly. On another scale, under the biopolitical language of pathology, HIV positive bodies and populations also become subject to the state-as-host, their claims to full and absolute citizenship rescinded as they are relegated to the periphery of an otherwise intelligibly “healthy” population. This is the case in that occupying an HIV positive body comes with a set of rules tailored to police that body. These rules deal with questions about how and with whom one may engage in sex, to where one may travel, and what constitutes criminal behavior (as the unique criminalization of seroconversion demonstrates). The violence underscoring the guest/host relation that Derrida signals is nowhere more apparent than in social relations with virulence.
To counter or demystify the mythology of the parasite and the stigma associated with it, we could immediately point to the notion that parasitism extends to broader socioeconomic issues that intimately affect African lives and are not isolated to infectious disease. Parasitisms are embedded within global economic systems that emerge out of the history of colonialism. It might be simple to make a virus the origin of Africa’s problems, but we also might think through the notion that humans and the systems that intersect at the level of their lives often exist in parasitic relationships with one another. This is especially the case for what has come to be called “parasitic capitalism” that draws resources from postcolonial locations on the globe—especially Africa. Global relations that produce poverty might also produce illness in the lives of those living with the virus by removing access to medications and nutrition that allow for a livable life. The discourse of parasitism applied to the HIV positive body, I suggest, elides these processes. My concern here is rupturing the individualizing discourse that renders HIV an isolated problem, and calling into question simplistic figurations of HIV infection. It is also to demystify the layers of mythology associated with HIV infection and, drawing on my above discussion of the intimacy of microbial contact, to question what viral being means in its relation with the human body.

To recall my above discussion of the microbe as a possible subject of concern alongside the human, by calling into question parasitic discourse and drawing attention to the relation between the body and its viral occupant, my concern is not necessarily

83 John Iliffe uses the term “parasitic capitalism” to describe economic systems that took hold in Africa up to the early 1980s as a limited number of government administrators in African nations were able to gain wealth by exploiting the underclass citizenry (34). The term has more recently been taken up in popular, non-academic circles as well to describe resource extraction in Africa.
whether or how we should consider the virus or the organism within the body a subject of concern over, above, or in the same way as the human. Indeed, I have tried to show that a human subject for whom we could establish a bounded mode of concern is materially and ideologically uncircumscribable, and the bodies that occupy the human are not easily separated from the human. Rather, I focus on how HIV mediates and transmits concern through the material and affective domains of cultural life. It might also be the case that the HI virus challenges any clean division between the material and the affective as it transmits affect through the circulatory networks of what Nicole Shukin calls our “social flesh.” It is a particle whose material existence mediates affects, complicates intimacies, and—in the process of attaching to particular bodies—carries with it any number of cultural significations.

It is difficult to speak for the affective currency of something so miniscule as a virus, especially given that even the recent interspecies thinking of biopolitics and cultural studies is frequently preoccupied with macroscopic forms of life. Even in discussions of epidemiology and disease, occupying central focus are their effects on humans and populations or, in some cases, nonhuman animals. As Mel Y. Chen points out, the recent prevalence of biopolitical analyses, staunchly tied to the politics of life (as their title implies), leave us at something of an impasse in thinking of subjects not properly within the sphere of life in its biopolitical, social, and biological meanings. The virus as a form of particulate matter straddles the division between life and nonlife. It may enter discussions of the biopolitical as an object in technologies of control. Still, outside of its mythological currency it carries and in the domain of technoscientific
language it is frequently thought of as nothing more than a passive particle circulating through the bodies of other beings. These beings come to be read as the “real” agents of cultural life. Chen’s work complicates the subject/object distinction as well as biopolitical thinking on the division between life and nonlife, and asks us to consider “how matter that is considered insensate, immobile, deathly, or otherwise ‘wrong’ animates cultural life in important ways.” Using the term “animacy” to account for matter that falls outside the domain of biopolitical analyses, she insists that “the fragile division between animate and inanimate—that is, beyond human and animal—is relentlessly produced and policed and maps important political consequences of that distinction” (2). Thinking about HIV in terms of an animacy hierarchy rather than in terms of the division between life and nonlife characteristic of biopolitical analyses might allow for thinking of the virus less as an object in the technologies of control and epidemiological population management and more as an affective force in its own right. Rather than an insignificant piece of particulate matter, it might emerge on the scene as part of affective relationalities within and between human lives.

Indeed, I suggest that just as HIV attaches to cells in the body, social relations of concern attach to those bodies and relationalities that contain HIV. My contention is that these relations are not independent of the materiality of HIV. In the case of Africa—especially Southern Africa—HIV brings along with it the ascription of a kind of responsibility to African bodies who bear the burden of the origin narrative of HIV. Africa is seen, in short, as a space intimately tied to HIV and its worst effects. Moreover, the crisis in Africa registers with the language of intimacy studies in at least two ways.
First and perhaps most obviously, it signals that intimate relationality carries with it a painful politics when we consider the transmission of illness (not always willingly or wittingly in the case of sexual violence) between bodies in intimate spaces. Second, it exposes the extent to which intimate associations between Africa and illness are frequently drawn.

The latter becomes all the more fraught when we consider what has been called the “origins of HIV.” In the last fifteen years, evolutionary virologists have made significant headway in the search for the “transmission event”—determining when and where HIV was transmitted to humans—and estimates range from the late 1800s to the early 1900s. One thing is certain: the HI virus is a descendent of the Simian Immunodeficiency Virus (SIV), thought to have been transmitted “through the hunting of chimpanzees for food” somewhere in Central Africa, and other strains of HIV have been identified as having come from the sooty mangabey and the gorilla (Hillis 1757). There is no doubt that, as Hillis argues, “[e]stablishing the date of emergence of HIVs is imperative to elucidating how transmission occurred and to finding ways to prevent zoonotic transmissions in the future” (1757), but there is something else at work in the desire to find origins that should make us skeptical of the transmission event as a defining moment.

The location of an originary moment for the “transmission event” constructs an historical crisis at the limit between human and animal and at the imaginary location of

84 For discussions on the origins of HIV, see Hillis, Lecatsas and Alexander, Plantier et al., Reeves and Doms, and Santiago et al.
Africa. The location of the event at this point in history places the origin of HIV squarely on the bodies of certain Africans themselves, both the primates from whom the virus was transmitted and the humans who later transmitted it to others. This moment as a significant event is an arbitrary historical construction, however, when we consider that HIV’s evolution necessarily precedes the transmission event by millions of years, and that HIV continues to mutate, which is precisely the reason it is so difficult to treat. As much as Africa has seen the worst of the epidemic, its ostensible closeness to animality is exacerbated by this origin story in which Africans are the patient zeros of HIV’s zoonotic border-crossing, and Africa’s geography becomes the origin for an epidemic that has wreaked havoc on the globe. Underneath layers of scientific justification, Africans become a focus in a chain of causes that effected a global epidemic. When we consider the common derogatory misconception that HIV was transmitted to African humans engaging in sexual intercourse with other primates, a moralistic ascription of responsibility to a small group of humans in Africa becomes all the more salient. This narrative carries with it the abjectifying politics of the bestiality taboo. Inflected by histories of racialization and notions of appropriate sexual behaviour, it also carries the mythological currency of HIV/AIDS (common especially in North America during the 1980s when gay men were the community most visibly affected by HIV) as a punishment for deviant forms of sexuality and base forms of subhumanity. This signals Neville Hoad’s reading of the African HIV pandemic in which he asserts that “that the real archive in which Africans are working through problems of sexuality and the material and ideological legacies of imperialism consists of the lives of all those affected by the
pandemic” (112). The ascription of an originary narrative to African life and space bears with it histories of imperialism, ones that are also deeply entrenched in anxieties about the species divide.

Beyond its origin narrative, HIV as a zoonotic transmission reveals the more difficult sides of interspecies relationality that cannot be idealized. These mythologies of origins recall Nicole Shukin’s reading of “a fixation on zoonotic diseases [which] suggests that human-animal intimacy is one of the most ideologically and materially contested sites of postmodernity as formerly distinct barriers separating humans and other species begin to imaginatively and physically, disintegrate” (205). Indeed, HIV transmission between humans can act as a painful reminder of our intimate ties to others, where a biological remnant of that intimacy enters and resides in the body, and the difficulty of that tie must only be exacerbated when we consider the staggering number of HIV transmissions in Southern Africa that are likely the result of rape. But the translation of SIV into HIV also underscores the vulnerability of the human body and its limits to those animal others consistently disavowed under anthropocentric logics. It is a biological legacy of difficult relationality that at once shows the fragility of the boundary between species, but also the difficulty with which our biological relations with other species can be wrought. While this relationality might undo the ostensible boundary

85 It is difficult to account for exact numbers of such transmissions, just as it is difficult to account for exact numbers of HIV transmissions in Southern Africa generally. The so-called “virgin cleansing myth” continues to hold sway in various communities of men on the continent and, according to research on the subject, likely contributes to women being the most vulnerable to HIV transmission in Southern Africa. A recent study by the South African Medical Research Council (MRC) estimates that nearly 19.6% of men who participate in rape in South Africa are HIV positive (Jewkes et al. 3). The study also discusses in detail the prevalence of the virgin cleansing myth.
between human and animal by drawing attention to its porousness, it is nonetheless a traumatic undoing.

Still, calling into question the limit or boundary between the HIV positive body and the HI virus—rather than precisely aligning the positive body with its viral occupant—might actually come to undermine the systems of thought that come to stigmatize certain bodies as discrete containers of HIV. They might do so precisely by envisioning a complex social order that refutes the individual bearer of a virus as the being responsible for transmission of the virus and instead conceptualize such an individual in the context of a multispecies world—where species designates both the human carrying HIV and the bodies within and outside of the body that come into contact with the virus. Moreover, exposing the porousness of bodies might also complicate the limit between the individual and the collective by which the individual comes to bear the responsibility of viral transmission. Exposing the ways bodies cannot be cleanly distinct from one another might allow for a conceptualizing of a collective that bears the burden of illness in socially rather than individualizing ways.

The concerns I raise here emerge in a recent South African collection of short stories and poems, *Nobody Ever Said AIDS*. The collection’s title is also the title of its first poem by Eddie Valuni Maluleke, which responds to the culture of silence in South Africa that met the HIV/AIDS pandemic as it permeated the nation and the continent for the last two decades. It tackles AIDS denialism and the stigma attached to HIV that continues to silence discussions around the illness. Part of its handling of this culture of silence involves the speaker chronicling her journey from the ecstasy of collectivity and
community toward a progressive sense of diminishment as those around the speaker begin to die. Beginning with a recollection of better times, the speaker regales the audience with an account of being in the “Friday night shebeen/…/singing loud and rich” (17). Her beginning also places the HIV/AIDS pandemic in the context of apartheid’s history as she recalls, “That was me/Then” at a time when “fear came from/A Boer face/Police,” at a time “Before/Fear was making love” (18). Over the course of the poem, the speaker names friends, and public and popular figures that “coughed and died” until the end of the poem, where she states, “We all died/Coughed and died” (20). The poem’s title is a reference to the twice-repeated line, “Because nobody ever said AIDS” (20), also echoed in the title of the collection. In the second-last stanza of the poem, the speaker states:

I was coughing and dying
The enemy was in our bodies
Making us cough and die
Eating us like worms
But some of us
Still made love
Still kissed
And made each other cough and die
She died of TB
That was me
Whispering it at funerals
Because nobody ever said AIDS (20)

This image of the speaker whispering at the funeral followed by this titular line might at once be an explanation for the crisis (people die because of the silence around the illness) and an ascription of responsibility to a social context that refuses to discuss illness.

Also in this quotation, the poem’s later handling of the HIV/AIDS crisis stands in stark contrast to the poem’s earlier account of antiapartheid struggle. This poem breaks
down easy distinctions between the self and its viral occupant by drawing attention to the problem of enmity, or of locating the enemy as an external force. There is a confusion at work as the enemy ceases to be the white face external to the speaker. Whereas the time of antiapartheid struggle is marked by camaraderie and political gathering, the silence around HIV/AIDS brings with it an increasingly individualized and isolated existence for the speaker. In the above epigraph, which is the second to last stanza of the poem, the first lines begin by registering a broader community of those living with HIV (the “us,” and “some of us”) before moving into the intimate context of kissing and making love and finally resulting in the solitary voice of the speaker whispering at funerals. The image of the whispering speaker brings about an inward turn. It displays to the audience her having receded into the intimate space of the secretive, in effect closing her off from the outside world. Moving away from the joyous celebration of its beginning, the poem results in a set of bodies isolated from one another as a result of the pandemic. “Nobody wanted to touch anymore,” states the speaker as she brings the audience forward in time to when the HIV pandemic had left its mark on South Africa, consolidating the tone of isolation. Even the shape of the stanza, in which (with the exception of the eighth, eleventh, and twelfth lines) the width of each successive line decreases, this isolation as others fade from view can be felt.

There is also in the above stanza a kind of hyper-awareness of the self brought on by notions of guilt and individualized responsibility that accompany or perhaps precede this isolation. The absence of punctuation in the above stanza renders the subject of the line, “That was me,” ambiguous. On the one hand, it may simply be a description of the
speaker whispering at funerals that her friend or lover had died of TB (“That was me/Whispering it at funerals”). On the other, it may express feelings of guilt for transmitting HIV to a lover if read immediately following the previous line (“She died of TB/That was me”), and the rhyme of these latter two lines joins them conceptually. Indeed, in the suggestion that “some of us … made each other cough and die” there is an awareness of the responsibility of transmission. In either case, the intimate image of the speaker whispering and the transition from a second-person voice to a first-person voice contributes to the poem’s isolatory tone. The suggestion of responsibility also adds to the poem a focus on the self, as the speaker becomes aware of the capacities of her body to transmit infection.

But even in the poem’s isolation, and its progressive dissolution of various relations, there is another significant relation registered in the turn toward the self: that of the relation between the body and its viral occupant. The speaker states “The enemy was inside our bodies/…/Eating us like worms.” The simile between the virus and the worm gives the former a kind of animacy. Worms in the domain of literary simile might not carry the agency of other forms of life, but they nonetheless have a kind of movement here. The simile draws on associations between worms and death, and suggests that the HIV positive bodies of the speaker and those around her are already experiencing a kind of decomposition. It is as if these bodies are already marked for death. It closely mimics the decomposition of the social in the poem, as HIV comes not only to consume the body but also to undo social bonds. Still, even a relationship tied to death, the poem casts HIV as some kind of other residing in the speaker’s body. Rather than a diminutive microbial
entity with no agency, it is an animated force, one even cast as an enemy. I should note that enmity is common in the casting of the virus in other texts about HIV/AIDS, even in this collection of stories and poems. How does enmity cast the HIV positive body when it *resides* in the body? The enemy in this poem is “the” enemy; the definitive article preceding “enemy” renders it not simply “a” generalized enemy, but a recognizably central one. While not strictly aligned with this enemy, the bodies of those living with HIV are nonetheless repositories of it, unwitting carrier agents of it. What, then, does this relation mean? What does it mean in the context of the silence around AIDS the speaker notes in South Africa? Especially, what does it mean for the HIV positive body when an object of enmity or opposition resides in the body? I ask this question cognizant of the many contested metaphors of HIV/AIDS discussed especially since Susan Sontag’s influential work on the subject.

The silence of the poem moves the speaker away from the ecstasy of the social and into an interiority, left with the “worms” eating her body. The silence, in effect, brings about this interiority, enacting a kind of subtle coercion that brings the HIV positive body outside the sociopolitical sphere and into a relation of intimate care of the self. This poem’s process, one that documents a transition from sociality to isolation and that signals the awareness of the body, might spur us into thinking about the way that the relation between the body and HIV is culturally conceived in both sub-Saharan Africa and globally. It might also make us think about how this relation contributes to the isolation—or even the expulsion—of bodies from certain socials. I would argue that the

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86 See Susan Sontag’s *AIDS and its Metaphors*. 
poem’s process signals broader discourses about the HIV positive body in a global neoliberal paradigm that, in effect, mark the HIV positive body in relation to viral being and encourage a hyper-awareness of that relation. The recent and persistent liberal language of “living with HIV”—initially a politically strategic refusal of the stigma of “dying of AIDS”—immediately signals this relation, as no other virus or infection has involved quite the same insistence on cohabitation between a human and its viral occupant. Certainly, HIV affects the life of its host, but it has accrued attached ideologies, values, and identities like no other microbe. The qualification of “living with HIV” linguistically tethers certain bodies to HIV as they come to be understood as bodies in cohabitation with the virus. The particulars of this cohabitation are something I develop further in the coming paragraphs but for now I suggest that the discourse around the HIV virus uniquely produces certain bodies as intelligibly in relation to viral being and, subsequently, produces for HIV positive identities a consciousness of this relation between the self and the virus.

Thinking of HIV’s place in a neoliberal system, we might consider the poem’s account of guilt and responsibility as emerging in critique of this paradigm of individualized responsibility. Simply put, it tackles a culture whose silence places responsibility for HIV’s transmission on the individual rather than on collectives and whose silence, in turn, facilitates the isolation of bodies. It also, most importantly for this section, brings into view a difficult intimacy between the body and a viral occupant. It views the body as a repository of other lives, described in the poem as “worms.” I question what it means to consider the body a space at which various lives intersect in...
close proximity. What does it mean to encounter the HI virus, or another microbe, within the body? Does HIV, for example, count as a life in the hermeneutics of infection? How do we think of microbial others given that they cohabit within ostensibly individual bodies? The relation I tackle here occurs not only in metaphors of enmity against the HI virus, as in the case of the poem above, where the virus is understood as an animated, insidious presence. It also occurs in the medicalized language of HIV positive life, in which “living with HIV,” viral load quantities, and T-cell counts bring the relation between the body and the various other lives it incubates into view. If the poem offers a critique of the way that we view HIV positive bodies, it is that they are isolated—both in terms of having been removed and having been drawn attention to—as exceptions to the norm, even though all bodies are containers of microbial lives.

Also in this collection, Puseletso Mompei’s short story, “I Hate to Disappoint You,” offers a response to conventional victimizing rhetoric of HIV discourse, but also an account of “living with” HIV that might shed light on the various degrees of intercorporeal intimacy that accompany being HIV positive. The story is told in second person voice, directed at an unnamed “you” that, given its ambiguity, is as much aligned with the reader as with a personal relation of the narrator’s. In its second person voice it establishes a kind of intimacy with the reader. The title is a sardonic retort to conventions of victimhood that accompany discourse regarding those living with HIV. She begins the story by stating, “I hate to disappoint you, but the truth is, since I’ve found out I carry the virus, I haven’t changed too drastically” (105). Aware of victimizing narratives of those living with HIV, the narrator’s sarcasm inverts the ostensible feelings of disappointment
the positive individual is meant to experience; instead, the narrator’s self-aware charge directs the reader to occupy disappointment in themselves for holding preconceived notions about the HIV positive body. More than disappointment in the narrator or reader, however, this affect manifests as a response to cultural narratives that produce HIV positive bodies in conventionally vulnerable terms. “Sensitive, politically correct journalists have made careers out of soppy stories” she suggests. “They have played a huge role in promoting this permeating myth, that all HIV carriers are angels who have been hit by an undeserved dose of the virus. I refuse to embrace this pervading thought” (105). This quotation also signals global liberal perceptions of Africa as occupying a victimized position in relation to the HIV/AIDS pandemic. It might be presumptuous to assume the Africanness of the narrator, given that she nowhere names herself as such; still, the story’s presence in the collection Nobody Ever Said AIDS that offers Southern African perspectives on HIV/AIDS nonetheless places it within conversations about that location.

This story’s cynicism also offers another perspective that illustrates that the “living with HIV” narrative insists on a kind of intimacy between the HIV positive body and the virus itself. The identification of this problematic emerges when the narrator states, “As I said, I’m fundamentally the same woman. But not exactly” (106). In this statement, the narrator registers a change, as if the entrance of HIV into the body produces an alteration that renders the body “not exactly” the same, even if fundamentally the same. Being fundamentally the same, however, evinces an incorporation or accommodation of the virus into an existing identity-construction. It is
also a change that is explicitly tied to her gender, which compels the question of how HIV ties to embodied and identificatory conventions of womanhood. Her signaling of a change does, however, refuse a precise alignment with HIV positivity as a central mode of identification when she suggests, “[j]ust because I refuse to have it define me doesn’t mean I forget that I’m living with HIV” (107). This change registers more clearly with narratives of heterosexual womanhood when she articulates the difficulties and vulnerabilities she faces in her relationships with men. Speaking of a hypothetical man with whom she might enter into a relationship, she states:

I worry about having to face this reality with another person. What if he decides he can deal with my status and wants to be with me despite everything? See, I’ve been handling this thing single-handedly, quietly taking care of my health, going to gym, eating right, reading up on HIV, vaccines, T-cells, viral loads and all sorts of things. It has been my problem and I have had the freedom to handle it the way I want to. … If I let him know I am HIV positive I’ll have to face his questions, even on days when I don’t want to. I’ll have to hold in my coughs when I have flu so he doesn’t get scared. I’ll have to make sure I never touch his razor blades in case I get my blood onto his blades. I’ll have to tell him when I progress from being HIV positive to having full-blown AIDS. Basically, this is the part I’m struggling with when it comes to this whole HIV thing. (107)

The “I” in this story is immensely important given its overwhelming mention in the above quotation and elsewhere. “I’ve been handling this thing single-handedly,” the speaker states. “It has been my problem”(107). In her claim to independence, the speaker also evinces a slippage into the isolatory tone of Malukele’s poem. What is bound up with this claim over HIV as exclusively the speaker’s problem? Later in the quotation, the speaker’s comments announce that, although she claims an exclusive ownership over the problem, it bleeds into other lives in her midst with whom she exercises intimacy. She realizes that she may have to censor herself in various ways. In order to maintain the
fiction of health when her body may deteriorate, she may have to perform in ways that approximate a conception of the healthy individual, though what appears healthy given that HIV does not always manifest in physically visible symptoms is not clear.

In this quotation are also various degrees of cohabitation that undermine the coherence of the autonomous “I” from which the narrator speaks. On one level, the narrator worries about intimate cohabitation with a man. On another, the story also brings out the anxieties and insecurities entwined with the hyper awareness of self-care that emerges in relation to an HIV positive identity, ones that emphasize cohabitation with a viral other. Indeed, part of this cohabitation involves a certain familiarity with viral otherness through the incorporation into the narrator’s everyday life the language of viral loads and T-cell counts. Even alongside the narrator’s claim to independent, individualized, and autonomous control there is an emphasis of the narrator’s lack of control. The speaker worries about having to face her reality with another person.

Recalling my introductory discussion of anxiety as a relational affect, the speaker’s worry already registers the limits of her control as others rupture her claim to autonomy. It ruptures this autonomy precisely by displaying that control over individual health is always already mediated by a viral other occupying the body. Borrowing from Cohen’s discussion, we might suggest that Mompei’s story emphasizes the extent to which life in the context of HIV is built around difficult relationality with viral being, and that the life of the human ceases to be the central, autonomous actor in the world, existing in relation to other forms of life not always easily tangible or objectified. The neoliberal rhetorics that produce the human as autonomous in the context of illness, then, cease to be valid.
ways of understanding HIV infection. In its juxtaposition of the narrator’s claim to control with her inability to maintain that control, the story calls into question the individualizing, neoliberal rhetorics that produce HIV positivity as a strictly individual phenomenon.

I single out these two texts in this collection because they both stand out as first-person accounts of living with HIV in the body, in contrast to many others in the collection that take on an exclusively externalizing militaristic or demonizing lexica in opposition to the virus. According to Comfort’s discussion of language used on HIV in African contexts, this collection “produces multiple discourses, drawing attention to the many different ways that HIV/AIDS can be conceptualized—some beneficial, and others harmful” (15). Comfort, drawing a dichotomy between the beneficial and the harmful, privileges the language of accommodation or “living with HIV” over military metaphors. I am not so sure that either of these languages could be universally understood as either beneficial or harmful. My contention is that the first-person accounts of Malukele’s poem and Mompei’s story ask us to consider what it means for HIV to be a part of one’s body, or to be an other within the body, but not always (as in Malukele’s case) in accommodative ways. Sontag suggests that the militaristic or oppositional metaphor of HIV “powerfully contributes to the excommunicating and stigmatizing of the ill” (94). Her assertion may be accurate to some extent, but these stories also expose that HIV within the body represents a more difficult relationality than the accommodative language of “living with” the virus might allow. In accounting for multiple permutations of human and viral cohabitation, Nobody Ever Said AIDS, I suggest, at least draws attention to
multivalent understandings of what it means for one to contain viral entities. Malukele’s account of the “enemy” worms working from the inside might reify a militaristic discourse, but it is also a refusal to be aligned—as in the liberal discourse of “living with” HIV—with the virus itself. Mompei’s story, tackling the complications that come along with incorporating viral being into the affectations of everyday life, might align more with the language of accommodation. Both, however, address the complexities of occupying a body alongside another, of being inside a body that is not entirely one’s own, but the receptacle of multiple entities. In so doing, they both express the complex ways that relationalities with viral otherness animate cultural life for the HIV positive body, while simultaneously resisting a wholesale identification with HIV itself.

V. Conclusion

This chapter has focused on intimacies precisely because they reveal the vulnerabilities inherent to our relations with others, and these others are not always human. As I have shown, often these relations are unacknowledged, as in the case of Pickover’s dinnertime encounter or the relation between the body and its microbial occupants. Taking into account this chapter’s discussion of interspecies love, emotional affects that cross the species boundaries also carry the capacity to reconfigure the ways that relations between humans and other animals have hitherto been considered. In tackling multiple zones of interspecies contact, I have tried to demonstrate that, even if such contact goes unacknowledged, it nonetheless influences the unfolding of human lives and the emergence of human selves. In keeping with this dissertation’s discussions
of concern, I embarked on this reading because I read zones of intimacy as locations at which concern circulates, whether as concern for a loved other or an anxiety over a threatening or traumatizing other. My hope is that, in demonstrating the ways that other-than-human lives intimately implicate the lives of humans, structures of concern that centralize the human might be broken down and rebuilt to include the extrahuman other.
Conclusion

As this thesis has demonstrated, we have only just begun to think about animals and African alongside one another. Both in terms of the ways that animal lives occupy African geographies alongside human ones and that Africa has been aligned with animality by imperialist accounts of the continent, my work has sought to think beyond the humanism of much postcolonial work. Part of this project necessarily involved rethinking what animality means in the context of Africa and, especially, nodding toward the supposed nonplaces of animality within Africa. In particular, in favor of articulating a broad structural paradigm in which Africa is cast in the global imagination as a site productive of animality, this thesis has often dealt with texts that appear to have little to do with African nonhuman animals themselves. Such was the analysis of the final chapter, in which the body itself became a zone in which ideas about humanness and animality get worked out. If this project has thus far dealt with zones in which discussions of animality appear on the insignificant, it is to stress the extent to which imperialist paradigms that continually reproduce the normative human as the centre of concern also make animality appear not to be a concern in the field of our ethical relations with others.

Concern itself may be only half of the project, the rest of which occurs in the actions that concern motivates. In gesturing toward some texts that—even in their supposed nonconcern for the animal—are generated out of or generate ethical relations between humans and animals, it has been important in the preceding pages to distinguish between various modes of concern. Indeed, this project moves away from a type of
concern—so familiar in the current framework of relations between the West and Africa—predicated on benevolent giving and toward concerns that unsettle the colonial power dynamics that liberal benevolence toward Africa engenders. Not only in treatment of African animal lives, but also in the range of animal metaphorics that undergird accounts of Africa, this thesis has stressed the importance of modes of relating that acknowledge the shared vulnerability of multiple species rather than the ascendency of one of them. This, I hope, is one step toward a multispecies ethics within African studies.

It seems odd to conclude a dissertation given that these projects so often generate more questions than answers, and this one is no exception. Therefore, in this conclusion, my goal is to articulate where this project is going rather than leaving it with a coherent end. This is partially a commitment to thinking on the stray that I raised in Chapter Three of this thesis. As I argued there, the stray or the act of “straying beyond” is precisely what might lead animal studies into new territory and draw us toward hitherto untheorized modes of ethical relating. As this project develops into a book manuscript, I cannot help but emphasize that there is more to be done.

If I may stray beyond the present of this project and into its future, one question that this thesis leaves unresolved is the question of indigeneity, animality, and African space. The question of the relation between these terms began in my initial research on indigenous narratives of animality that were to be considered alongside those narratives considered in this thesis. However, given this project’s attention to the ways that animal symbolism applies to human bodies in a range of dehumanizing ways—and that indigeneity is so often discussed in terms of an environmental racism that stresses this
category’s ostensible closeness to nature—a more sustained rumination on the relationship between these terms is necessary. My introduction already problematized animal studies’ frequent gesture of tokenizing indigenous knowledges in the service of providing alternatives to the Western paradigm of human exceptionalism. There, I also cited Kai Horsthemke’s recent and valuable work on what have often been termed traditional African ethics, though I criticized that text for reinforcing a dichotomy between traditional Africanness and colonial modernity, terms that are not so easily separable from the vantage point of a postcolonial analysis. Still to add to this conversation is a consideration of the extent to which indigeneity itself is a term with its own complex history within Africa’s borders, given that zone’s history of intra- and inter-continental migrations, mobilities, and violences.

As a brief gesture of conclusion and toward the future of this project, I offer one example that illustrates the direction in which this analysis will go. This example comes from a translation of Khoi literature by Wilhelm Bleek, the 19th century German linguist. It is evidence of colonialism’s ongoing legacies that the major written source of precolonial Khoi literature until recently—as argued by Hermann Wittenberg’s critical history of it—has been Bleek’s translations of fables and poems. Of the texts that Bleek translated, many were animal fables, and one of these, titled, “The Hyena Addressing Her Young Ones,” reads as follows:

The fire threatens,
The stone threatens,
The assegais threaten,
The guns threaten,
Yet you seek food from me.
My children
Do I get anything easily? (Bleek 33)

Where do we locate the perspective of the above poem? Does it lie with the colonial linguist, Wilhelm Bleek, with the genealogy of Khoi orature that produces the spoken text on which Bleek’s is based, or with the Hyena of the poem herself? Amidst these three entities, there are at least two degrees of translation at work in the poem. The most obvious of these involves Bleek’s translation from Khoi, and the other involves the translation of animal experience into the spoken word, the positing of the “I” that speaks the poem and individuates the Hyena. What is striking about the above poem, especially when we consider the multiple ways animal bodies are subject to dehumanizing metaphors, is that it incorporates no explicit figurative language. Pared down to a series of threats perceptible to the hyena watching over her young, the poem is concerned (in its simple present tense) with the immediate and the material. It places the speaker in a position of familiar and familial vulnerability, documenting the precarious existence of a single animal.

Constructed as it is by a history of colonial translation, the poem nonetheless indexes a zone of indistinction between vulnerability to colonial violence and animal vulnerability. Evident in the presence of guns, fire, and other threats, this indistinction emerges from the poem’s focus on the encroachment of the outsider and the vulnerability that comes as a result of it. As the poem documents the familiar in the context of the animal life, it is also about how that which comes from outside threatens to destabilize the zone of the familiar, one of those processes that occurred for many African lives alongside the progression of colonial modernity. The poem also does not position the
animal as an immutable victim, as in need of intervention. Instead, its vulnerability occurs amidst the necessity of caring for other vulnerable lives, in this case the hyena’s offspring. The voice of the poem, responding to the threat of various instruments of violence, might overlap to some extent with histories of violence directed at indigenous bodies within Africa.

In that this poem opens a zone of indistinction, it also speaks to the resonances between a politics of place that so often accompany understandings of indigeneity and the colonial predicament in which animal and indigenous lives frequently exist. Crucial to this analysis is not that this poem represents an authentic human, animal, indigenous, or postcolonial perspective, but that it contains within its apparatus resonances with each. I should note here that trying to derive an authentic Khoi perspective from this poem might serve as an allegory for attempts to identify an authentic indigeneity more broadly. Just as the poem arrives to its reader only following a process of colonial translation, indigeneity itself is a category crafted in the colonial relation between settler and native, and Mary Louise Pratt’s work on the contact zone provides a precedent for thinking through this relation as ongoing and negotiatory rather than delimiting stable identities. As Mahmood Mamdani argues, one of the challenges of locating indigenous identities within Africa involves the “tendency to identify a colonially constructed regime of customary law with Africa’s authentic tradition” (657). Given indistinction’s commitment to thinking beyond the constraints of identity politics, its critical apparatus is helpful to articulating the ties between indigenous concerns and those of animals.
This indistinction is found not in the conflation of indigenous identity with animality or nature characteristic of environmental racisms but with an identification of the human and animal’s mutual vulnerability to violence. If this poem opens up a zone of indistinction, it derives from the fleshly vulnerability of the hyena to those weapons that threaten. In this way, the poem registers a relation between the experience of colonial encroachment and occupation and the vulnerability of the animal. As I carry this work forward, I hope to extend my analysis to how the varied and contested politics of indigeneity in Africa might find conversation with one another alongside animal studies for their relationship to power. Part of this work involves highlighting that both animality and indigeneity are relational categories; just as indigenous identities are defined only in relation to processes of colonial encroachment, animality is so frequently defined in its opposition to humanity.

If this example is to close this thesis, it is not to define or stress the sameness of multiple terms that have come up in it, including race, Africanness, animality, and indigeneity. That work, itself a consequence of colonial taxonomies, may only occlude the important differences between animal and human lives. Instead, I read this example under the paradigm of mutual vulnerability to one’s own world being destabilized by power. Cultivating a multispecies ethics for postcolonial worlds might in part involve attention to mutual precarity, even if the experience of that precarity is not the same for every body. Straying beyond an anthropocentric politics in postcolonial worlds might involve rethinking those categories—human and animal included—that function to deny
the intersections between the precarities and vulnerabilities that exist alongside one another.
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